

# CSD Center for the Study of Democracy

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## Introduction

Economists have long studied the relationship between income inequality and economic growth. While the theoretical literature has developed a variety of arguments that favor either a positive or a negative relationship, by the end of the 1990's it seemed that at the empirical level the question had been resolved: Benabou (1996); Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996) showed that inequality has a negative effect on subsequent growth. By the beginning of the 2000's, however, this conclusion was challenged. Barro (2000) found that the effect of inequality on growth depends on the countries' level of income: higher inequality tends to retard growth in poor countries, but to accelerate it in rich ones. Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) found a positive short-run relationship between income inequality and growth. Moreover, Chen (2003) and Banerjee and Duflo (2003) found evidence that inequality and growth are not linearly related but instead are associated in an inverted-U pattern.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the question about the relationship between income inequality and economic growth remains open both at the empirical and at the theoretical level.

While most of the literature has not made an explicit distinction between the short-run and long-run effects of inequality on growth, the findings in this paper show that they might differ significantly. The basic argument is in line with the recent paper by Halter, Oechslin and Zweimüller (2010), who argue that the positive and negative effects of inequality on growth tend to cluster over different time-frames: the positive effects tend to dominate the shortrun, while the negative ones dominate the long-run. Furthermore, they present evidence that the short-run effects are captured by difference-based estimators (e.g., the Arellano and Bond estimator), while the long-run effects are captured by level-based estimators (e.g., the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)). In contrast to Halter et al. (2010), however, I reach this conclusion using only system-GMM estimators. Furthermore, I also explicitly deal with the possibility that the effect of inequality on growth may be non-linear, as has been convincingly argued by Banerjee and Duflo. I find evidence that the short and medium-run relationship is indeed non-linear, followed by a time-frame in which the effect of inequality on growth depends on the level of income. In the very long-run, the effect of growth on income becomes linear and negative.

## Literature Review

The debate about the relationship between inequality and economic growth has a long story in the economic literature. Starting with the work of Kuznets (1955, 1963), many distinct

arguments have been put forward about the causal direction between these two variables and the effects between them. Here, I focus on the effects of inequality on growth.

From a theoretical perspective, most existing arguments favor either a positive or a negative effect of inequality on growth. Following Barro (2000), these arguments can be classified in four categories: credit-market imperfections, political economy, social unrest, and saving rates.

The impact of inequality on growth through credit-market imperfections is based on the role of credit markets on linking savings and investment decisions across households. Access to credit-markets, however, is dependent on satisfying a given level of assets and/or income. With imperfect credit-markets, poor households may not be able to exploit high-return opportunities such as human capital investment. If this is the case, inequality-reducing transfers may lead to a larger investment in human capital, which in turn would lead to increased economic growth (Perotti, 1996). Through this mechanism we would thus observe a negative relationship between inequality and growth (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Moav, 2006). Barro (2000), however, points out that if the impact of human or physical capital on growth requires a certain minimum threshold (e.g. secondary education has a significant impact on subsequent growth, but not primary education), then lowering inequality could reduce the type of investment required for growth, negatively affecting it. Hence, the argument based on credit-market imperfections can actually support both a negative as well as a positive effect of inequality on growth.

The political economy argument focuses on the distortionary effects of redistributive policies. If a country's mean income is larger than the median income, a system of majority voting would favor redistribution from the rich to the poor. These transfers, however, would tend to distort economic decisions and hence, have a negative impact on investment. Through this channel, an increase in inequality would lead to lower investment, and thus lower economic growth.<sup>2</sup> Barro pushes this argument one step further based on the idea that in a highly unequal society political power also tends to be highly skewed. If this is the case, the rich may divert resources into stopping transfers to occur in the first place. A higher level of economic inequality would imply a higher need for the rich to invest resources in lobbying and influencing political decisions. Because these activities are costly, higher inequality would thus have a negative impact on subsequent growth even if no actual redistribution occurs.

The idea underlying the social unrest argument is that if a society is highly unequal, the poor are more prone to engage in crime, protests, and disruptive activities in general. The resources thus used are diverted from other more productive activities and, at the same time, create more uncertainty (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). The effect is that investments get negatively affected and hence inequality should have a negative impact on growth.

One argument that favors a positive relationship between inequality and economic growth relies on the idea that marginal saving rates tend to rise with the level of income. If so, an increase in inequality would raise the aggregate saving rate, thus increasing investment and growth (Kaldor, 1956).

In addition, there exists a general argument not mentioned by Barro (2000) according to which some level of inequality is required for people to have an incentive to invest in human and physical capital, which are key contributors to long-run growth. While this argument is clearly relevant, it has not been greatly emphasized in the literature, possibly because it is not clear the levels of inequality required for these incentives to be created (or limited).

All these arguments imply a linear relationship between inequality and growth. As was first shown by Banerjee and Duflo (2003), however, it seems that this relationship is indeed non-linear, possibly because these mechanisms do not act in isolation.

At the theoretical level, therefore, we have a mixture of arguments that do not lead to a definite conclusion regarding the effects of inequality on growth.

Let me now turn to a discussion of the empirical work. At this level, the relationship between inequality and growth is also not clear. Estimating the impact of inequality on growth has proven to be a difficult endeavor due to the limited availability of data as well as the problem of reverse causality, which makes it hard to find appropriate estimation techniques given the absence of good instrumental variable for inequality. The only exception is Easterly (2007), discussed below.

Regarding the availability of data on inequality, most studies conducted during the 1990's (Benabou, 1996; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Perotti, 1996) find a negative association between inequality and growth over a 20-30 year period. However, they suffer from various limitations. First, many of the estimates of a significant negative relationship between inequality and growth are not robust to sensitivity analyses. Indeed, Deininger and Squire (1998) question the validity of this association since adding additional regressors or regional dummy variables to the original specification renders the estimates on inequality insignificant. One reason is that these studies rely on limited data sets in terms of regularity, coverage and consistency. Data on inequality used to be sparse, both in time and space, providing observations only at a given point in time and for a small set of countries.

Second, measurement error is generally a concern in cross-country studies. Countries may have different definitions for the variables of interest and the accuracy of the data may also differ. Among the different variables, however, inequality is especially prone to measurement error, which can lead to a significant bias in the estimation results if this measurement error is systematically correlated with other variables in the regression. While the direction of the bias is unknown ex-ante, a spurious negative association between inequality and growth could result if, for instance, more unequal countries tend to underreport their inequality statistics and at the same time tend to grow more slowly than similar countries. Furthermore, many of these data points were derived from estimations based on national accounts, which later on were shown to provide a quite inaccurate picture of the countries' inequality profiles (Deininger and Squire, 1996).

Third, omitted-variable bias can also represent a problem. While the direction of the bias is again not clear ex-ante, the absence of structural parameters, like for instance the level of corruption may bias the coefficient on inequality (omitting the level of corruption would generate a negative bias in the inequality coefficient since it is positively correlated with inequality, but negatively correlated with growth).

Regarding the econometric techniques, the work that concludes that inequality is detrimental to growth was based exclusively on cross-sectional analyses. These studies do not answer the policy relevant question of how changes in a country's level of inequality relates to changes in *that* country's growth; instead, the only conclusion that we can draw from the cross-country regressions is that there is a pattern according to which countries with lower levels of inequality tend to grow faster. To address the policy-relevant question, we need to resort to panel estimation.

The problem of measurement error was first tackled by Deininger and Squire (1996), who constructed a broad-based inequality dataset with a panel structure, which has been used in every study thereafter including Li and Zou (1998); Forbes (2000); Barro (2000); Banerjee and Duflo

(2003), and Chen (2003). To exploit the panel structure of this dataset, most of these papers implement panel-data approaches, which in principle also allow to control for heterogeneity bias. However, these papers use different empirical strategies and also reach quite different conclusions, as I discuss next.

Using fixed effects and random effects estimation Li and Zou (1998) find a positive association between inequality and growth over 5-year periods. In a further attempt to control for the endogeneity between inequality and growth, Forbes (2000) uses the basic Arellano-Bond estimator applied to 5-year periods, and also finds a robust positive association. Li and Zou (1998), however, also replicate previous cross-section results (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994) for growth over the period 1960-1990, confirming the findings of a negative relationship between inequality and growth. This long-run result is further confirmed by Easterly (2007), who instruments for inequality by using the abundance of land suitable for growing wheat relative to that suitable to grow sugarcane.

On the other hand, Barro (2000) argues that running fixed effects regressions tends to exacerbate the biases due to measurement error because of the implicit differencing. Using a three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimator that effectively treats the country-specific error terms as random he finds a negative association between inequality and growth over 10-year periods, but only for poor countries. Among rich countries, he finds that inequality encourages growth over this time frame. Forbes points out, however, that the important policy question is “how a change in a country’s level of inequality will affect growth within that country” (Forbes, 2000, p. 870). Thus, an alternative approach is to try to reduce the measurement error associated with inequality and estimate the effect using fixed-effects-like regressions. As I argue below, much progress has been made in improving the quality of inequality measures and in compiling them across countries and over time, which provide a justification for this alternative approach.

The positive association between inequality and growth found by Li and Zou, and Forbes is not necessarily inconsistent with the negative relationship found in the *long-run* in previous studies. However, as Forbes (2000, p. 885) points out, “it is also possible that the within-country and cross-country relationships between inequality and growth work through different channels and are of opposite signs”. Indeed, Halter et al. (2010) argue that inequality has a mostly positive effect in the short-run because the economic mechanisms dominate over this time frame; but, it has a mostly negative effect in the long-run because the social and political mechanisms operate here. The results shown below are consistent with this argument.

It is also possible that these results emerge because the basic regression is misspecified. In particular, while the two sets of studies discussed so far find opposing results, they share the caveat that they assume that inequality and growth are linearly related. As Banerjee and Duflo (2003) point out, however, there is no reason *ex-ante* to model the relationship between inequality and growth as a linear one. To test for nonlinearities, they first include a quadratic term on the change in inequality and, second, they use a kernel regression. In both cases they find evidence of an inverse-U association between *changes* in inequality and growth in the short-run (5-year periods). While this result gives a completely different flavor to the study of inequality and growth, it is not directly comparable to the other work since it refers to a relationship between growth (i.e., changes in income per capita) and changes in inequality, as opposed to inequality, which is the usual variable used in the literature.

In the long-run, the previous consensus of a negative relationship between inequality and growth has also been challenged. Using a standard cross-section regression, Chen (2003) finds evidence of an inverted-U relationship between inequality and growth. However, using a similar

approach, Bleaney and Nishiyama (2004) find no support for this once they incorporate additional regressors. Depending on the specific set of controls, they find that the sign on inequality changes and in one case it even becomes positive and significant. Furthermore, they also find no support for Barro's finding that increased inequality retards growth in poor countries but encourages it in rich ones. Bleaney and Nishiyama (2004) argue that their results are inconsistent with Barro's. However, because Barro considers 10-year periods, the fact that Bleaney and Nishiyama analyze a 25-year period implies that the two results are not directly comparable. Also, Bleaney and Nishiyama do not include a quadratic term on inequality and thus their analysis is subject to the criticism posed by Banerjee and Duflo.

The literature on the effects of inequality on growth has thus reached a variety of conclusions. So far, no attempt has been made to reconcile them. This paper constitutes an attempt to link the results observed in the literature by analyzing the effect of inequality on growth over different time-frames. In the next section I present the empirical approach used.

## **Empirical Approach**

In this section I discuss the data used and the empirical strategy.

### **Model**

I follow Forbes (2000) and Perotti (1996) in choosing a parsimonious approach within what Perotti calls an "income-distribution-augmented-growth equation" (p. 158). Growth is estimated as a function of initial income pre capita, inequality, inequality squared to control for possible nonlinearities, human capital, market distortions and country and period dummy variables. Except for the dummy variables and the quadratic term, this model is identical to the one used by Perotti (1996) and is a standard starting-point in the growth literature. Country dummies are added to control for time-invariant omitted-variable bias, while period dummies are included to control for global shocks, which are not captured by the regressors, but may affect aggregate growth. From an econometric perspective, country dummies allow for the intercept to vary across countries and period dummies allow for the intercept to vary over time.

I prefer this model first because it allows for comparability with existing literature. In particular, any discrepancy between this study and previous ones cannot be explained by differences in model specification, Also, a need for parsimony. The simple specification helps maximize the degrees of freedom, which is important in this case since sample size is limited by the availability of data on inequality and because of the use of panel data. Finally, the use of stock variables measured at the start of the period (as opposed to flow variables measured throughout the periods) should help reduce the problem of endogeneity. Furthermore, this specification is supported by recent work. In 2004, Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller looked at the robustness of 67 different explanatory variables in cross-country growth regressions. They find that the likelihood of a variable "belonging to the true model" is the highest for the relative price of investment, primary school enrollment and the initial level of income per capita.<sup>3</sup> In particular, using a Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) they find that these variables have the highest posterior inclusion probability among the 67 variables studied.<sup>4</sup>

The model is thus the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta Y_{it} = & \beta_1 I_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 f(I_{i,t-1}) + \beta_3 Y_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_4 Meduc_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 Feduc_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_6 PPPI_{i,t-1} + \alpha_i + \eta_t + \mu_{it} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Where  $i$  represents each country and  $t$  represents each period;  $\Delta Y_{it}$  represents average annual growth for country  $i$  during period  $t$ ;  $I_{i,t-1}$ ,  $f(I_{i,t-1})$ ,  $Y_{i,t-1}$ ,  $Meduc_{i,t-1}$ ,  $Feduc_{i,t-1}$  and  $PPPI_{i,t-1}$  are respectively inequality, a function of inequality which in this paper will take the form of either a quadratic term on inequality or an interaction term between inequality and income, i.e.,  $f(I_{i,t-1}) = I_{i,t-1}^2$ , or  $f(I_{i,t-1}) = I_{i,t-1} * Y_{i,t-1}$ , income per capita, male and female education, and a measure of market distortions for country  $i$  in period  $t - 1$ ;  $\alpha_i$  are country dummies,  $\eta_t$  are period dummies and  $\mu_{it}$  are the errors.

## Data

In this model,  $Y$  is the natural log of real GDP per capita and  $\Delta Y$  is its difference, averaged by the number of years in each period.  $I$  is measured by the Gini coefficient,  $Meduc$  and  $Feduc$  are measured by male and female average years of secondary schooling in the population aged over 25, and  $PPPI$  is the price level of investment.<sup>5</sup> Estimation is based on 5-year, 10-year, 20-year periods and a very long-run cross-section estimation over a 37-year period. In all specifications the dependent variable is average growth of real GDP per capita and the regressors are taken from the last year available in the previous period. Available data covers the period 1950-2007.

Data on human capital is drawn from Barro and Lee (2010), which is the latest update on the original Barro and Lee (1993) database on educational achievement. Income per capita and the measure of market distortions (price level of investment, PPPI) come from the Penn World

Tables 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009). Finally, inequality statistics come from the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database. This extended data set incorporates a systematic improvement on the inequality observations, which now includes more countries and a more precise quality classification. Summary statistics for each time frame are presented in the Appendix. Since an important contribution of the paper is the use of a larger, more consistent dataset on inequality, in the next subsection I discuss it in more detail.

## UNU-Wider Inequality Data Set

One of the main problems in analyzing the relationship between inequality and growth is the quality of the data. Before 1996, this work was limited to cross-sectional analyses mainly because of the limited availability and quality of the inequality data. In 1996, Deininger and Squire put together a consistent and comprehensive inequality data set with a panel structure that has several consecutive measures of income inequality for each country. They also constructed a “high-quality” data subset that included an observation only if it satisfied the following criteria: i) it must be based on household surveys (as opposed to national accounts, which was the previous practice in many countries), ii) it must be based on a comprehensive coverage of the population, and iii) it must be based on a comprehensive coverage of income sources, including income from self-employment, non-wage earnings and non-monetary income. This high-quality

dataset was aimed specifically at reducing the problem of measurement error that had been prevalent in previous research. Furthermore, even this restricted dataset included a larger set of countries and of observations than in any previous data compilation.<sup>6</sup>

The panel data structure of the inequality data set is especially important because it allows for the use of panel data techniques. Panel estimation provides a way to control for unobserved time-invariant country characteristics, thereby removing any source of correlation between these unobservable characteristics and the explanatory variables. One caveat, however, is that this technique does not control for unobservable variables that do change over time. As the period of analysis increases, this limitation becomes more important since it is less likely that the unobserved variables remain constant. This caveat should be taken into consideration in all the panel-based estimations presented below.

After the original work by Deininger and Squire (1996), the World Institute for Development Economics Research at the United Nations University embarked on a systematic effort to expand and improve upon this dataset. Thus, the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database was created. The approach of the UNU-WIDER database is slightly different from that of Deininger and Squire (1996). In particular, this database does not automatically classify an observation as “high-quality” or “low-quality” according to the criteria mentioned above. However, it includes the necessary information to decide whether or not to filter the data. In addition, the UNU-WIDER database also provides a new quality scale ranging from 1 for high-quality to 4 for low-quality, according to the following criteria: i) the concepts underlying the observations are known, i.e., it is specified whether inequality is measured using income (gross or net), consumption, etc., ii) the coverage of the income/consumption concept relies on the most preferred set of underlying definitions, which is analogous to the second requirement of Deininger and Squire (1996), i.e., that the coverage of income sources is comprehensive,<sup>7</sup> and iii) the quality of the survey (mainly coverage issues, questionnaires and data collection methodology) is sound.

The UNU-WIDER database thus allows for a more precise classification of the inequality measures in terms of “high-quality”. This seems particularly important considering that “[a] reexamination of the sources of [Deininger and Squire (1996)] revealed several instances of mistakenly labeled “good quality estimates”, i.e., that did not, in fact, meet the criteria that had been set up” (UNU-WIDER, 2008a, p. 13). Consistent with this statement, I find for instance that for the 180 “high-quality” inequality observations used by Forbes (2000), which come directly from the Deininger and Squire dataset, only 13% have a classification of 1, 21% have a classification of 2, 36% one of 3, and 3% one of 4. The remaining 27% was not found on the UNU-WIDER database implying that they had been replaced by better quality data (due to revisions in the construction of the database or updates in the primary sources used to construct it).<sup>8</sup> Thus, while Deininger and Squire (1996) constructed a much better inequality dataset to what was available previously, the UNU-WIDER inequality database has made further significant improvements to it.

The UNU-WIDER data set includes 5313 observations on the Gini coefficient for 159 countries, most of them from 1960 to 2006.<sup>9</sup> The database includes more than one observation per country per period. Since inequality statistics are not available every year, I take the latest observation available within the previous period. But, even after reducing the dataset in this way, in many cases there is still more than one statistic available for each period. Hence, I applied the following procedure in order to choose a single observation for each country period, which relies

on sequentially eliminating observations according to whether or not they satisfy the following criteria, in the specified order:<sup>10</sup>

1. Data comes from surveys; i.e., data points based on national accounts are not taken into account.<sup>11</sup>
2. The coverage is national, includes all people and all ages.<sup>12</sup>
3. The quality index is the highest available.<sup>13</sup>
4. The measure of inequality is consistent across periods for a given country; i.e., I try to have all inequality observations for a given country based on the same concept (income or consumption/expenditure).<sup>14</sup>
5. The source is consistent across periods for a given country; i.e., following the recommendation of UNU-WIDER (2008a), I try to have as many observations as possible from the same source.

To reduce the problem of measurement error, I use only observations with a quality of 1, 2 and 3, i.e., I drop observations with a quality of 4. Also, since I apply a first-difference-based GMM estimator, I keep a country only if it has inequality observations for at least two consecutive periods. Finally, because consumption-based inequality measures tend to be systematically lower than income-based measures, following Deininger and Squire (1996), I add 6.6 points to the Gini coefficients based on consumption/expenditure in order to make them comparable to the ones based on income.

Applying these criteria to the available data in the UNU-WIDER database, I end up with a sample of 100 countries and 554 observations for the basic 5-year specification.

### **Analysis Over Different Time Spans**

The latest update to the original Barro and Lee (1993) dataset on education makes it possible to construct a dataset for the period 1950-2007 for 100 countries. This allows me to run panel regressions for 5, 10 and 20-year periods, which I denote short-run, medium-run and long-run, respectively. Growth is averaged over at least 5-year periods in order to avoid short-run disturbances and reduce serial correlation from business cycles. In each period, growth is regressed on the lagged values of the explanatory variables measured at the latest (available) year of the previous period. I also run a cross-sectional regression over a 37-year period, which I denote the very long-run. This regression serves as a reference point for the relationship between inequality and growth, but, strictly speaking, it is not directly comparable to the panel-based regressions. Nevertheless, it is the first time that a cross-country regression analyzing the role of inequality looks at such a long period of time.

### **Econometric Identification and Estimation**

In order to determine the optimal econometric approach to estimate equation (1), we need to consider the specifics of the model. For convenience, I rewrite it here with a slight modification. Noting that  $\Delta Y_{it} = Y_{it} - Y_{i,t-1}$ , equation (1) can be written as:



$$\Delta Y_{it} = \beta_1 I_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 f(I_{i,t-1}) + \gamma Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 Meduc_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 Feduc_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 PPPI_{i,t-1} + \alpha_i + \eta_t + \mu_{it} \quad (2)$$

Where  $\gamma = \beta_3 + 1$ .

Standard methods of panel estimation are random effects and fixed effects.<sup>15</sup> Random effects are more efficient since they incorporate information from variation across countries and time; fixed effects, on the other hand, only incorporate variation within countries as they are based on the within transformation. The main caveat of using random effects is that it is consistent only if the individual specific effect is uncorrelated with the other covariates. However, the main reason for including country effects  $\alpha_i$  in model (1) is precisely because we think that there are structural factors specific to each country that may affect the relationship between inequality and growth, i.e., that may be correlated with the other explanatory variables. Therefore, in principle, a fixed effects approach would seem appropriate. However, both fixed effects and random effects are inconsistent in the presence of a lagged dependent variable  $Y_{i,t-1}$  like in model (1), as shown in equation (2).

The estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) provides a better framework to estimate model (1). However, several studies (e.g. Harris et al. (2008)) have shown that this estimator suffers from the “weak instrument problem”. And, furthermore, that it tends to provide biased estimates (Hauk and Wacziarg, 2009). The system-GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) solves these problems and also greatly reduces classical measurement error bias (Hauk and Wacziarg, 2009), at the cost of imposing an additional moment condition. However, the system-GMM estimator presents another problem that becomes increasingly significant as  $T$  increases: instrument proliferation.<sup>16</sup> Because both the difference-GMM and the system-GMM estimators use second and further lagged values of regressors as instruments, the number of instruments increases significantly as the number of periods in the panel increases. This can “overfit” the endogenous variables, leading to biased estimates. The problem is that both the difference-GMM and the system-GMM estimators were originally constructed to be applied in panel data that strictly satisfy the small  $T$ , large  $N$  assumption. Altonji and Segal (1996) and Ziliak (1997) show that, if this assumption is not satisfied, the bias of the GMM estimators increases significantly as the number of moment conditions increases, leading to (downward) over-fitting bias. This renders the usual Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions invalid.

A way to limit this problem is to reduce the instrument count (hence sacrificing efficiency for consistency). There are two approaches to do this: i) Reduce the possible lags that can be used as instruments, and ii) Impose a more restricted application of the moment conditions (each of them corresponding to all available time periods), as in Calderon et al. (2002). According to Ziliak (1997), the second method amounts to stacking the matrix of instruments into a reduced matrix. Below, I use both approaches to reduce the number of instruments of the system-GMM estimator and identify the effect of inequality on growth in the short and medium-run. (Such procedure is not necessary in the long-run since there are only two periods). Below, I discuss the results of applying the system-GMM estimator to the different time-frames.

## Results

In this section I discuss the main results of the paper. In the first subsection I run regressions for 5 and 10-year periods. I show that the results are consistent with Banerjee and Duflo (2003) in that the association between inequality and growth has an inverse-U shape. In the next subsection I present the results for the 20-year regression and show that at this length there is a fundamental change in the relationship between inequality and growth: higher inequality tends to negatively affect growth in poor countries, but to positively affect it in rich ones. Finally, I show that inequality tends to have a negative effect in the very-long run (a period of 37 years).

### Short and Medium-run: An Inverse-U Relationship

Here I present the results of estimating model (1) using the extended inequality data set as well as the system GMM estimator with the small sample correction and instrument reduction. Table (1) (below) summarizes the results of the set of regressions for 5-year periods. I report estimates based on fixed effects (column (1)), random effects (column (2)), Arellano and Bond (column (3)) is the one-step difference-GMM, while column (4) is the two-step robust difference-GMM, which incorporates the Windmeijer (2005) correction). Columns (5)-(9) report the results using different versions of the system GMM estimator that control for instrument proliferation. The system GMM with the full set of instruments is reported in column (5). This specification has 396 instruments. Column (6) allows for only two-lags of each variable in the instrument set for each period (leading to 181 instruments), while in Column (7) I only allow for one-lag (leading to 131 instruments). Column (8) presents the estimates resulting from the application of collapsing the matrix of instruments as in Calderon et al. (2002). It now includes 77 instruments. The last column combines both approaches and thus is the most restrictive (it has only 29 instruments).

Before analyzing the results, I briefly discuss the Hausman test, which influences the choice of estimation technique, as well as some additional tests on the assumptions of the model: i) No serial correlation (Assumption (7)), and ii) Validity of instruments (Hansen and difference-in Sargan tests).

There is significant variation in the results depending on the estimation procedure used. In order to determine whether a random-effects approach is appropriate, I conduct a Hausman test comparing the fixed-effects estimates of column (1) and the random-effects estimates of column (2). The test statistic is  $X^2_{(15)} = 78.51$ , which rejects the null hypothesis of no difference between the two estimates at any standard level of significance, thus favoring fixed effects.

Regarding Assumption (7), the problem is that the presence of serial correlation in  $\mu_{it}$  would invalidate the use of lagged values of the endogenous variable as instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) construct a test statistic  $m_2$  to test for second-order serial correlation based on the residuals from the first-difference equation.<sup>17</sup> As can be seen from the  $p$ -values, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation (although marginally so in columns (5)-(7)). Alternatively, we can use a Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (OIR).<sup>18</sup> Bowsher (2002), however, shows that as the number of moment conditions (and therefore the number of instruments) increases, the Hansen test tends to be very undersized and to possess extremely poor power properties. In the case at hand, indeed, the Hansen test gives  $p$ -values of 1.00 in columns (4)-(6) in Table 1.

Table 1: Regression results: Short-run

| Estimation Method                      | System GMM           |                      |                      |                      |                     |                     |                     |                      |                      |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|  | FE (1)               | RE (2)               | AB (3)               | RAB (4)              | Full (5)            | 2 lags (6)          | 1 lag (7)           | C (8)                | C, 1 lag (9)         |
| Income                                 | -0.0340***<br>(5.34) | -0.0067***<br>(2.65) | -0.0495***<br>(8.32) | -0.0544***<br>(4.21) | 0.0007<br>(0.19)    | 0.0025<br>(0.65)    | 0.0018<br>(0.51)    | 0.0223**<br>(2.52)   | 0.0351***<br>(3.43)  |
| Inequality                             | 0.1103<br>(1.03)     | 0.0539<br>(0.65)     | 0.2488**<br>(2.49)   | 0.2282<br>(1.61)     | 0.1300<br>(1.25)    | 0.1250<br>(0.94)    | 0.1090<br>(0.91)    | 0.5624**<br>(2.36)   | 0.4783**<br>(2.02)   |
| Inequality <sup>2</sup>                | -0.0519<br>(0.45)    | -0.0795<br>(0.86)    | -0.2198*<br>(1.88)   | -0.2000<br>(1.36)    | -0.1897<br>(1.59)   | -0.1828<br>(1.29)   | -0.1594<br>(1.23)   | -0.5740***<br>(2.54) | -0.4723*<br>(1.97)   |
| Female Education                       | 0.0022<br>(0.33)     | -0.0014<br>(0.37)    | 0.0134*<br>(1.85)    | 0.0166<br>(1.43)     | -0.0078<br>(1.08)   | -0.0121<br>(1.49)   | -0.0163**<br>(2.09) | -0.0128<br>(1.37)    | -0.0262**<br>(2.47)  |
| Male Education                         | 0.0033<br>(0.46)     | 0.0067*<br>(1.84)    | -0.0077<br>(1.08)    | -0.0096<br>(0.84)    | 0.0103<br>(1.60)    | 0.0138<br>(1.65)    | 0.0183**<br>(2.17)  | 0.0057<br>(0.55)     | 0.0119<br>(1.02)     |
| PPPI                                   | -0.0001<br>(1.50)    | -0.0001<br>(1.56)    | -0.0001*<br>(2.08)   | -0.0001<br>(1.34)    | -0.0001**<br>(2.18) | -0.0002**<br>(2.45) | -0.0001<br>(1.48)   | -0.0003***<br>(2.63) | -0.0005***<br>(3.34) |
| Countries                              | 100                  | 100                  | 100                  | 100                  | 100                 | 100                 | 100                 | 100                  | 100                  |
| Observations                           | 554                  | 554                  | 399                  | 399                  | 554                 | 554                 | 554                 | 554                  | 554                  |
| Instruments                            |                      |                      | 331                  | 331                  | 396                 | 181                 | 131                 | 77                   | 29                   |
| Arellano-Bond test ( <i>p</i> -value)  |                      |                      | 0.426                | 0.234                | 0.050               | 0.058               | 0.063               | 0.244                | 0.171                |
| Hansen test ( <i>p</i> -value)         |                      |                      |                      | 1.000                | 1.000               | 1.000               | 0.098               | 0.350                | 0.394                |
| Diff-in Sargan test ( <i>p</i> -value) |                      |                      |                      |                      | 1.000               | 1.000               | 1.000               | 0.113                | 0.628                |

*Note:* Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Period dummies are not reported. *t* statistics are shown in parenthesis. Column (1) reports fixed-effect estimation, and column (2) reports random-effects estimation. Column (3) is the one-step Arellano and Bond estimator. Column (4) is the two-step Arellano and Bond estimator with the Windmeijer finite sample correction, columns (5)-(9) are the robust system-GMM estimator. Column (5) includes the full set of instruments. Column (6) allows instruments for up to 2-lags and column (7) allows for only 1 lag. Column (8) collapses the matrix of instruments. Column (9) provides the most restrictive specification: a collapsed matrix of instruments with only a 1-period lag. Significance: \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

Such high  $p$ -values attest the loss of power of the test, and imply that the number of instruments is potentially large. Note that while the problem of instrument proliferation applies to both estimators, the difference-GMM and the system-GMM, it is more serious for the latter because it includes levels and differences as instruments, while the Arellano and Bond estimator only incorporates differences as instruments. Thus, while the system-GMM estimator has good properties in terms of reducing the problem of weak instruments that the difference-GMM has, it can easily lead to a problem of instrument proliferation. That is the main reason why I have included specifications which constrain the number of instruments in columns (6)-(9).

Reducing the lags allowed for the instruments does not seem to help solve the problem of instrument proliferation: the Hansen test remains at 1.00 in column (6) and the difference-in-Sargan test remains at 1.00 in columns (6) and (7).<sup>19</sup> Collapsing the matrix of instruments, as in Calderon et al. (2002), however, does reduce the problem. The regressions in columns (8) and (9) in Table (1) thus provide more plausible values for both the Hansen test and the difference-in-Sargan test. Also, the Arellano and Bond test of no serial correlation is barely satisfied in the specifications with the full set of instruments or with limited lags, but it is satisfied in the 2 specifications that collapse the matrix of instruments.

My preferred specification for the 5-year period analysis is column (8), which collapses the matrix of instruments leading to a total of 77 instruments. I discuss the corresponding results next. Summary statistics for the data used in the regressions in Table (1) as well as a list of all the Gini coefficients is presented in the Appendix, Tables 10 and 14.<sup>20</sup>

First, inequality and growth are related in an inverse-U shape, i.e., either a high or a low level of inequality tends to negatively affect growth. This implies that there exists an optimal inequality level, which according to this specification occurs at a Gini coefficient of 49 (column 8).<sup>21</sup> The coefficient also implies that the effect of inequality is economically significant. For instance, if a country with a Gini coefficient one standard deviation away from the mean changes it by one standard deviation, that country will experience on average a 0.35% change in annual growth. Of course, the effect becomes stronger as we move further toward the extremes of the distribution.

Interestingly, the positive and significant coefficient on initial income shows that there may be *divergence* in the short-run, i.e., richer countries tend to grow faster than poorer ones. Also, comparing the different columns I find evidence confirming the finding of Hauk and Wacziarg (2009), who argue that fixed-effects and the Arellano-Bond estimators overestimate the speed of convergence. Indeed, using either fixed-effects, the Arellano-Bond estimator or the robust Arellano-Bond estimator, the coefficient on initial income is negative and significant, which would imply the existence of convergence in the short-run. However, this result is reversed for all specifications using the system-GMM (i.e., the coefficient on initial income is positive), and it becomes significant in the preferred specification.

The measure of market distortions (PPPI) is consistently negatively correlated with subsequent growth, and significant in the preferred specification. Finally, increasing female education seems to retard growth in the short-run (but the effect is not significant), while increasing male education has a positive effect (but again, not significant). These results might seem counterintuitive. However, a positive coefficient for male education and a negative one for female education, even if not significant in most specifications, are consistent with previous work (e.g. Barro and Lee (1994)). Some intuition for this result can be found recalling the argument put forward by Barro (2000), who argues that it might be that education has a positive

contribution to growth only after minimum threshold has been achieved. While that threshold is not reached, increasing women's level of education can actually have a negative impact on growth because the resources used to educate women could have been used in productive activities. At a more general level, the fact that neither male nor female education are significant in the short-run shows the fundamental investment properties of human capital, i.e., a cost in the short-run that has a return only in the long-run.

I next turn to the results obtained for the medium-run. I run the same regressions as before but for periods of 10 years. The summary statistics and the Gini coefficients used are presented in Tables (11) and (15) in the Appendix. The results are reported in Table (2), which has the same structure as Table (1).

As can be seen, the results are very similar to the ones for the 5-year periods. In particular, there is an inverse-U relationship between (lagged) inequality and growth. Again,  $X^2_{(10)} = 48.48$ , which rejects the specification based on random effects at any level of significance. The Arellano and Bond-test for serial correlation is satisfied in every specification. Also, since I now have fewer periods, the problem of instrument proliferation seems less serious. For the regression with the full set of instrument, the Hansen test provides a value of 0.977 and the difference-in Sargan test provides a value of 1.00. Reducing to two the number of lags allowed to be used as instruments (Column (6)) helps solve this problem, but the difference-in Sargan test still provides a value of 0.909.

Compared to the short-run, reducing the number of lags now does help remove the problem of instrument proliferation. The signs for the coefficients of initial income, female and male education are for the most part consistent with the findings in Table (1). PPPI is not significant anymore. Interestingly, in the most restrictive specification all coefficients (with the exception of the one corresponding to male education) are significant.

In terms of the effect of inequality on growth, the 10-year period provides an inverse-U relationship as before, but the effect is sharper. The coefficients on the Gini coefficient and the Gini coefficient squared have the right signs and are significant (to different levels) in all specifications. Intuitively, this may happen because the 5-year periods do not completely offset the short-run variations related to the business cycle. The inverse-U effect of inequality thus remains over 10-year periods. However, this effect is economically less significant than over 5-year periods. For example, a country with a Gini coefficient one standard deviation of the mean that experiences a change in its Gini coefficient of one standard deviation will have an average change in growth of  $\tilde{0}14\%$  per year. This is less than 50% of the impact found in the short-run. Figure 1 provides a clear picture of how the effect of inequality compares over these two different period lengths.

My preferred specification is now column (7) in Table (2), in which I limit the lags that can be used as instruments to 1.<sup>22</sup> I do not prefer column (8) as in the short-run because the level-instrument set does not satisfy the exogeneity restriction (the difference-in Sargan test provides a test-statistic of 0.044). Furthermore, recall that in principle we would like to use the estimates corresponding to the estimator with the full set of instruments. When there are too many instruments, the aim is to restrict their number without distorting the basic theoretical construction of the estimator.

Table 2: Regression results: Medium-run

| Estimation Method                      |                      |                     |                      |                      |                     |                      | System GMM          |                      |                      |
|--|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|  | FE (1)               | RE (2)              | AB (3)               | RAB (4)              | Full (5)            | 2 lags (6)           | 1 lag (7)           | C (8)                | C, 1 lag (9)         |
| Income                                 | -0.0393***<br>(6.47) | -0.0066**<br>(2.51) | -0.0356***<br>(4.55) | -0.0358***<br>(3.68) | 0.0067<br>(1.25)    | 0.0081<br>(1.64)     | 0.0087<br>(1.33)    | 0.0239***<br>(2.78)  | 0.0355***<br>(2.75)  |
| Inequality                             | 0.3348**<br>(2.31)   | 0.2846*<br>(1.87)   | 0.4684***<br>(3.62)  | 0.4594***<br>(2.72)  | 0.3320*<br>(1.89)   | 0.4096**<br>(2.38)   | 0.4024*<br>(1.87)   | 1.2998***<br>(3.86)  | 1.0924***<br>(3.35)  |
| Inequality <sup>2</sup>                | -0.3205*<br>(1.83)   | -0.3799*<br>(2.09)  | -0.4263***<br>(2.83) | -0.4188**<br>(2.04)  | -0.4640**<br>(2.09) | -0.5472***<br>(2.62) | -0.5541**<br>(2.15) | -1.3400***<br>(3.65) | -1.1460***<br>(3.37) |
| Female Education                       | 0.0060<br>(1.01)     | 0.0042<br>(1.00)    | 0.0026<br>(0.30)     | 0.0016<br>(0.18)     | -0.0011<br>(0.18)   | 0.0002<br>(0.03)     | -0.0002<br>(0.04)   | -0.0131<br>(1.39)    | -0.0224**<br>(2.25)  |
| Male Education                         | 0.0007<br>(0.11)     | -0.0006<br>(0.14)   | 0.0055<br>(0.64)     | 0.0061<br>(0.71)     | -0.0020<br>(0.35)   | -0.0031<br>(0.58)    | -0.0040<br>(0.66)   | 0.0114<br>(1.37)     | 0.0126<br>(1.62)     |
| PPPI                                   | -0.0001<br>(0.81)    | -0.0001<br>(1.00)   | -0.00004<br>(0.71)   | -0.00004<br>(0.58)   | -0.0001<br>(1.46)   | -0.0001<br>(1.35)    | -0.0001<br>(1.55)   | -0.0002*<br>(1.74)   | -0.0003**<br>(2.54)  |
| Countries                              | 90                   | 90                  | 90                   | 90                   | 90                  | 90                   | 90                  | 90                   | 90                   |
| Observations                           | 327                  | 327                 | 241                  | 241                  | 327                 | 327                  | 327                 | 327                  | 327                  |
| Instruments                            |                      |                     | 95                   | 95                   | 126                 | 90                   | 66                  | 42                   | 18                   |
| Arellano-Bond test ( <i>p</i> -value)  |                      |                     | 0.284                | 0.243                | 0.467               | 0.468                | 0.449               | 0.370                | 0.322                |
| Hansen test ( <i>p</i> -value)         |                      |                     |                      | 0.618                | 0.977               | 0.290                | 0.139               | 0.178                | 0.797                |
| Diff-in Sargan test ( <i>p</i> -value) |                      |                     |                      |                      | 1.000               | 0.909                | 0.161               | 0.044                | 0.797                |

Note: Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Period dummies are not reported. *t* statistics are shown in parenthesis. Column (1) reports fixed-effect estimation, and column (2) reports random-effects estimation. Column (3) is the one-step Arellano and Bond estimator. Column (4) is the two-step Arellano and Bond estimator with the Windmeijer finite sample correction, columns (5)-(9) are the robust system-GMM estimator. Column (5) includes the full set of instruments. Column (6) allows instruments for up to 2-lags and column (7) allows for only 1 lag. Column (8) collapses the matrix of instruments. Column (9) provides the most restrictive specification: a collapsed matrix of instruments with only a 1-period lag. Significance: \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

In my preferred specification, the relationship between inequality and growth implies that the optimal Gini coefficient over 10-year periods is 36, which is significantly lower than in the short-run (49).<sup>23</sup> However, we should not read too much into this since the optimal Gini coefficient is higher with the collapsed matrix of instruments than with the reduced lags.<sup>24</sup> Despite this caveat, in all specifications I find that the short and medium-run relationship between inequality and growth follows an inverse-U shape.

As I mentioned above, Barro (2000) finds a different relationship for 10-year periods. To test for this I run an alternative specification in which *instead* of a quadratic term on inequality I include an interaction term between inequality and income level (not reported). While in this specification the signs on the inequality coefficient and on the interaction coefficient are consistent with the findings of Barro (2000), and they are significant in the specifications that use the system GMM estimator including reductions in the allowed lags that can be used as instruments, they are not significant in the specifications that collapse the matrix of instruments (as well as when using the Arellano and Bond estimator). More importantly, in all specifications the coefficients imply levels for the income threshold that are impossible to occur in practice (in the order of  $e^{1000}$ ). Therefore, I do not adopt this specification and focus instead on the results obtained from the specification that includes the quadratic term.

The most important finding of the medium-run analysis is that the inverse-U relationship between inequality and growth found in the short-run is maintained. The next question is whether this relationship holds over 20-year periods, which I analyze next.

### **Long-run: The Turning Point**

So far I have showed that (lagged) inequality and growth are associated in a non-linear way over 5-year and 10-year periods. In particular, the relationship between inequality and growth has an inverse-U shape. Considering the available data, the obvious next question is to verify whether the same relationship holds over a longer period of time. Table (3) summarizes the results for the 20-year period. The summary statistics and the Gini coefficients used are presented in the Appendix, Tables (12) and (16).

As can be seen from the table, the inverse-U relationship found in the short and medium-run does not seem to hold for 20-year periods. Indeed, all coefficients become insignificant when I run the same regression as before. It thus seems that the relationship between the different regressors and growth changes when we move from 10 to 20-year periods. The fact that the data reflects this can shed some light on the apparent contradiction between the short-run and long-run results obtained in the literature over the last two decades. If both results are correct, there must exist some intermediate point at which the relationship changes. The evidence presented here shows that this point occurs between 10 and 20 years.

As a further exploration into these results, I follow Barro (2000) who also finds no relationship between inequality and growth in his basic regression. But, once he includes an interaction term between inequality and income, he does find that inequality retards growth in poor countries but it encourages it in rich ones. Table (4) reports the results for the 20-year periods once I include this interaction term (and eliminate the quadratic term).

Table 3: Regression results: Long-run with non-linear effect

| Estimation Method                      | System GMM           |                      |                      |                      |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|  | FE (1)               | RE (2)               | AB (3)               | RAB (4)              | Full (5)          | 2 lags (6)        | 1 lag (7)         | C (8)             | C, 1 lag (9)      |
| Income                                 | -0.0384***<br>(7.59) | -0.0075**<br>(2.51)  | -0.0334***<br>(3.41) | -0.0347***<br>(7.20) | 0.0018<br>(0.48)  | 0.0018<br>(0.48)  | 0.0028<br>(0.49)  | 0.0058<br>(1.46)  | 0.0075<br>(1.55)  |
| Inequality                             | 0.0575<br>(0.50)     | 0.1091<br>(1.23)     | -0.0932<br>(0.40)    | -0.1010<br>(0.80)    | 0.1837<br>(1.53)  | 0.1837<br>(1.53)  | 0.1819<br>(0.83)  | 0.1469<br>(0.65)  | 0.1642<br>(0.83)  |
| Inequality <sup>2</sup>                | -0.0492<br>(0.32)    | -0.1565<br>(1.46)    | 0.2084<br>(0.92)     | 0.1924<br>(1.50)     | -0.2039<br>(1.37) | -0.2039<br>(1.37) | -0.2109<br>(0.84) | -0.1326<br>(0.47) | -0.1734<br>(0.76) |
| Female Education                       | 0.0039<br>(0.54)     | -0.0081<br>(1.55)    | 0.0096<br>(0.83)     | 0.0104<br>(1.18)     | -0.0071<br>(0.85) | -0.0071<br>(0.85) | -0.0085<br>(1.02) | -0.0059<br>(0.88) | -0.0058<br>(0.78) |
| Male Education                         | -0.0025<br>(0.35)    | 0.0116<br>(2.23)     | -0.0129<br>(0.88)    | -0.0123<br>(1.11)    | 0.0097<br>(1.09)  | 0.0097<br>(1.09)  | 0.0094<br>(1.04)  | 0.0059<br>(0.78)  | 0.0036<br>(0.41)  |
| PPPI                                   | -0.00001<br>(0.21)   | -0.00002**<br>(2.23) | 0.0001<br>(1.13)     | 0.0001<br>(0.87)     | -0.0001<br>(1.43) | -0.0001<br>(1.43) | -0.0001<br>(1.29) | -0.0001<br>(1.52) | -0.0001<br>(1.28) |
| Countries                              | 59                   | 59                   | 59                   | 59                   | 59                | 59                | 59                | 59                | 59                |
| Observations                           | 127                  | 127                  | 68                   | 68                   | 127               | 127               | 127               | 127               | 127               |
| Instruments                            |                      |                      | 20                   | 20                   | 33                | 33                | 27                | 21                | 15                |
| Arellano-Bond test ( <i>p</i> -value)  |                      |                      |                      |                      |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| Hansen test ( <i>p</i> -value)         |                      |                      |                      |                      | 0.425             | 0.425             | 0.179             | 0.343             | 0.132             |
| Diff-in Sargan test ( <i>p</i> -value) |                      |                      |                      |                      | 0.342             | 0.342             | 0.332             | 0.393             | 0.132             |

Note: Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Period dummies are not reported. *t* statistics are shown in parenthesis. Column (1) reports fixed-effects estimation, and column (2) reports random-effects estimation. Column (3) is the one-step Arellano and Bond estimator. Column (4) is the two-step Arellano and Bond estimator with the Windmeijer finite sample correction, columns (5)-(9) are the robust system-GMM estimator. Column (5) includes the full set of instruments. Column (6) allows instruments for up to 2-lags and column (7) allows for only 1 lag. Column (8) collapses the matrix of instruments. Column (9) provides the most restrictive specification: a collapsed matrix of instruments with only a 1-period lag. Significance: \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.



Table 4: Regression results: Long-run with interaction effect

| Estimation Method                      | System GMM           |                      |                    |                      |                      |                     |                     |                   |                    |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
|  | FE (1)               | RE (2)               | AB (3)             | RAB (4)              | Full (5)             | 2 lags (6)          | 1 lag (7)           | C (8)             | C, 1 lag (9)       |
| Income                                 | -0.0420***<br>(5.07) | -0.0254***<br>(3.52) | -0.0298*<br>(1.82) | -0.0307***<br>(2.66) | -0.02611**<br>(2.50) | -0.0261**<br>(2.50) | -0.0270**<br>(2.38) | -0.0200<br>(1.39) | -0.0189<br>(1.29)  |
| Inequality                             | -0.0595<br>(0.33)    | -0.3920***<br>(2.88) | 0.1573<br>(0.42)   | 0.1080<br>(0.38)     | -0.5671**<br>(2.63)  | -0.5671**<br>(2.63) | -0.5864**<br>(2.39) | 0.4937<br>(1.63)  | -0.4640*<br>(1.73) |
| Inequality*Income                      | 0.0083<br>(0.45)     | 0.0423***<br>(2.82)  | -0.0064<br>(0.14)  | -0.0049<br>(0.16)    | 0.0612**<br>(2.63)   | 0.0612**<br>(2.63)  | 0.0643**<br>(2.40)  | 0.0577*<br>(1.72) | 0.0521*<br>(1.70)  |
| Female Education                       | 0.0039<br>(0.54)     | -0.0081<br>(1.64)    | 0.0102<br>(0.94)   | 0.0141<br>(1.41)     | -0.0072<br>(0.94)    | -0.0072<br>(0.94)   | -0.0071<br>(1.21)   | -0.0072<br>(1.18) | -0.0051<br>(0.76)  |
| Male Education                         | -0.0023<br>(0.32)    | 0.0130***<br>(2.62)  | -0.0104<br>(0.72)  | -0.0135<br>(1.53)    | 0.0094<br>(1.14)     | 0.0094<br>(1.14)    | 0.0095<br>(1.53)    | 0.0080<br>(1.33)  | 0.0057<br>(0.81)   |
| PPPI                                   | -0.0000<br>(0.17)    | -0.00002<br>(0.50)   | 0.0001<br>(1.07)   | 0.00004<br>(0.37)    | -0.0001<br>(1.18)    | -0.0001<br>(1.18)   | -0.0001<br>(0.94)   | -0.0001<br>(1.34) | -0.0001<br>(1.17)  |
| Countries                              | 59                   | 59                   | 59                 | 59                   | 59                   | 59                  | 59                  | 59                | 59                 |
| Observations                           | 127                  | 127                  | 68                 | 68                   | 127                  | 127                 | 127                 | 127               | 127                |
| Instruments                            |                      |                      | 20                 | 20                   | 33                   | 33                  | 27                  | 21                | 15                 |
| Arellano-Bond test ( <i>p</i> -value)  |                      |                      |                    |                      |                      |                     |                     |                   |                    |
| Hansen test ( <i>p</i> -value)         |                      |                      |                    | 0.808                | 0.425                | 0.425               | 0.462               | 0.252             | 0.144              |
| Diff-in Sargan test ( <i>p</i> -value) |                      |                      |                    |                      | 0.584                | 0.584               | 0.708               | 0.114             | 0.144              |

Note: Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Period dummies are not reported. *t* statistics are shown in parenthesis. Column (1) reports fixed-effect estimation, and column (2) reports random-effects estimation. Column (3) is the one-step Arellano and Bond estimator. Column (4) is the two-step Arellano and Bond estimator with the Windmeijer finite sample correction, columns (5)-(9) are the robust system-GMM estimator. Column (5) includes the full set of instruments. Column (6) allows instruments for up to 2-lags and column (7) allows for only 1 lag. Column (8) collapses the matrix of instruments. Column (9) provides the most restrictive specification: a collapsed matrix of instruments with only a 1-period lag. Significance: \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

Before discussing the findings, I first check the assumptions required for the specification. The Hausman test provides a test-statistic of 56.27, which rejects the assumption required for random effects estimation. Regarding the validity of instruments, columns (4)-(9) in Table (4) report Hansen and difference-in Sargan tests for the validity of instruments.<sup>25</sup> As can be seen, since the number of periods is small, instrument proliferation does not seem to pose a serious problem. Indeed, in this case the system-GMM estimator with the full set of instruments is identical to the one that restricts the lags to a maximum of 2. Thus, for this regression, my preferred specification is the one with the full set of instruments.

I find evidence consistent with Barro (2000) that inequality is bad for growth in poor countries but good for growth in rich ones. But, while Barro finds this association for 10-year periods, I find it for 20-year periods. The turning point occurs around 10,500 PPP international dollars (2005 as a base year). Also, the coefficient on income now is negative, and significant in the preferred specification, showing evidence of convergence over longer periods of time. The coefficient on female education is negative and insignificant, while the coefficient on male education is mostly positive, but also insignificant. The coefficient on the measure of market distortions, PPPI, while negative in all specifications, is not significant.

The analysis so far shows that as the time-frame under analysis is increased, the relationship between inequality and growth tends to change. In the short-run and medium-run both lower and higher inequality has a negative impact on subsequent growth. But, in the medium-run a different pattern start to emerge: increased inequality tends to affect growth negatively in poor countries, but positively in rich countries.

More work is needed to explain why and how this change occurs. However, it can be concluded that there is a turning point between 10 and 20 years regarding the relationship between inequality and growth. What happens when we increase further the period length? I turn to this analysis in the next section.

### **Very Long-run: A Different Relationship**

I analyze the very long-run effect of inequality on growth by running a cross-country regression, similar to the ones that originated the literature, but over a much longer period. The results are reported in Table (5) below.

The very long-run relationship between inequality and growth seems to be linear and negative. However, the coefficient on inequality is not robust to including either a quadratic term or an interaction term on inequality. This shows the difficulties inherent in trying to find a clear-cut relationship between inequality and growth over such a long period of time. Hence, this result should be taken with care. Furthermore, recall that strictly speaking this result is not comparable with the previous ones since the estimation strategy is different. Despite these caveats, it is important to remember that this result is consistent with that obtained by Easterly (2007) using instrumental variables. His argument is that we should look at the very long-run relationship between inequality and growth and, in this context, he finds that inequality is detrimental to growth.

**Table 5: Regression results: Very Long-run**

| Estimation Method | OLS<br>(1)           |
|-------------------|----------------------|
| Income            | -0.0098***<br>(2.84) |
| Inequality        | -0.0458**<br>(2.32)  |
| Female Education  | -0.0156<br>(1.56)    |
| Male Education    | 0.0199*<br>(1.92)    |
| PPPI              | -0.00004<br>(0.86)   |
| Countries         | 59                   |
| Observations      | 59                   |


Note: Significance: \* significant at 10%;  
\*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

Regarding the other variables, the coefficient on initial income is negative and significant showing evidence of convergence in the very long-run. Female education still has a negative effect on growth, but it is not significant. Male education, on the other hand, still has a positive sign as in the previous sections, but now it becomes significant, confirming the importance of human capital for long-run growth. Finally, as in the 20-year period analysis, market distortions do not seem to have an effect on growth. These conclusions are robust to the inclusion of a quadratic and/or an interaction term on inequality.<sup>26</sup>

## Summary of Results

In the previous sections, I have argued that the relationship between inequality and growth changes as we look at different period lengths. The relationship is non-linear in the short, medium and long-run, but it seems linear in the very long-run. Figure 1 summarizes the main argument: the nature of the relationship between inequality and growth changes over time.<sup>27</sup> When I look at 5-year periods, the relationship has an inverse-U shape. The same relationship holds over 10-year periods, but it is shifted downwards, implying that the effect of inequality on growth turns from positive to negative at a lower level of inequality compared to the short-run.

Figure 1: Inequality and Growth



In the long-run, the relationship between inequality and growth depends on the level of income. In particular, inequality has a positive effect on growth in (very) rich countries, and a negative effect on growth in poor countries. To show this effect, I introduce a lower x-axis, which measures income per capita. In Figure 1, the graph for this period length is constructed assuming there is a negative linear relationship between inequality and the level of income. This relationship *roughly* approximates the observed one in the panel of countries analyzed; I make this assumption to have a smooth graph comparable to the others. As can be seen, the graph for the long-run also depicts a similar relationship as those of the short-run and medium-run, but recall that now it depends on the level of income. Finally, the graph of the very long-run relationship is a straight line with a negative slope.

In the next section I run several sensitivity analyses showing the robustness of the results discussed in the previous sections.

### Sensitivity Analysis

So far I have showed how the impact of inequality on growth differs depending on the period-length analyzed. In this section I first discuss briefly the issue of model uncertainty and selection, and then show that the results highlighted in the previous sections are robust for various sensitivity analyses covering potential problems arising from sample selection.

As discussed above, there are good reasons to choose the shown specification; yet, there are also some potential problems with it. First, as argued by Barro (2000), if measurement error is significant, fixed-effect-like estimations tend to aggravate it. In an attempt to minimize it, for all specifications I use a high quality subset of the UNU-WIDER inequality database that seems to improve significantly upon the ones used in most previous studies, including those that use the Deininger and Squire database. Second, given the length of the period under analysis, it is possible that at least some of the omitted variables supposed to be captured by the country fixed-effects indeed do vary over time, thus biasing the results. This is certainly a matter of concern, but there is no simple way to deal with this problem. An alternative, of course is the one followed by Barro (2000) who includes additional controls in order to address the problem of omitted variable bias. It is not clear, however, which variables do belong to the specification and, again, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) find that many other variables often included in cross-country growth regressions do not seem to belong in the model.

In the end, model uncertainty is likely to remain a problem, even if significant progress has been made. With this caveat, in what follows I conduct some sensitivity analyses. The approach is the following. I select the preferred specification for each period-length (5, 10, 20 and 37 years), and then look at the robustness of the results discussed previously. First, I review the inclusion of a quadratic term on inequality in the short and medium-run, of an interaction term in the long-run and of only a linear term in the very long-run. Then, I evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the presence of outliers and potentially unbalanced regional coverage.

Table (6) below shows the results for the short-run. Columns (1)-(3) present the three alternative specifications discussed along the paper: column (1) includes only a linear term on inequality, column (2) includes a quadratic term and column (3) includes an interaction effect between inequality and income level. The specification with the quadratic term seems to be the relevant one for the analysis over 5-year periods.<sup>28</sup> Hence, columns (4)-(10) are based on this specification. Columns (4)-(8) look at the robustness of this result to the exclusion of outliers. Column (4) removes the 5% of countries with the highest *and* lowest average Gini coefficients; column (5) removes the 5% of countries with the highest and lowest average income level, and column (6) does the same with respect to growth. Since the estimation method emphasizes variation *within* countries, columns (7) and (8) do not include the countries with the highest variation in the Gini coefficients. Column (7) removes 5% of countries and column (8) removes 10%. Finally, columns (9) and (10) look at the robustness of the results to removing East Asian countries and Latin American countries, respectively. As can be seen from the table, the conclusion that there exists an inverse-U relationship between inequality and growth over 5-year periods is robust to these tests. The signs of the coefficients are the expected (positive on the linear term and negative on the quadratic term) and significant in all specifications. The findings for the other variables are also robust. In particular, there is evidence of divergence and market distortions have a significant negative effect on subsequent growth. Finally, human capital does not have a significant effect on subsequent growth.

Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis: Short-run

| Estimation Method       | LIN<br>(1)           | SQ<br>(2)            | INT<br>(3)         | I<br>(4)            | Y<br>(5)            | $\Delta Y$<br>(6)    | $\Delta I$ 5%<br>(7) | $\Delta I$ 10%<br>(8) | EAP<br>(9)           | LAC<br>(10)          |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Income                  | 0.0239**<br>(2.13)   | 0.0223**<br>(2.52)   | -0.0189<br>(0.83)  | 0.0215**<br>(2.37)  | 0.0129<br>(1.29)    | 0.0243**<br>(2.53)   | 0.0205**<br>(2.34)   | 0.0218**<br>(2.38)    | 0.0147<br>(1.70)     | 0.0124<br>(1.64)     |
| Inequality              | 0.0658<br>(0.77)     | 0.5624**<br>(2.36)   | -0.6123<br>(1.31)  | 0.7065**<br>(2.39)  | 0.5008**<br>(2.10)  | 0.4650**<br>(2.05)   | 0.5489**<br>(2.28)   | 0.5188**<br>(2.24)    | 0.4313*<br>(1.96)    | 0.6315***<br>(2.71)  |
| Inequality <sup>2</sup> |                      | -0.5740**<br>(2.54)  |                    | -0.7520**<br>(2.45) | -0.5474**<br>(2.39) | -0.4663**<br>(2.18)  | -0.5686**<br>(2.49)  | -0.5429**<br>(2.53)   | -0.3774*<br>(1.81)   | -0.7485***<br>(2.85) |
| Inequality*Income       |                      |                      | 0.0716<br>(1.34)   |                     |                     |                      |                      |                       |                      |                      |
| Female Education        | -0.0194*<br>(1.72)   | -0.0128<br>(1.37)    | -0.0131<br>(1.34)  | -0.0133<br>(1.22)   | -0.0091<br>(0.88)   | -0.0164*<br>(1.79)   | -0.0107<br>(1.20)    | -0.0089<br>(1.17)     | -0.0067<br>(0.76)    | -0.0029<br>(0.34)    |
| Male Education          | 0.0115<br>(0.98)     | 0.0057<br>(0.55)     | 0.0134<br>(1.37)   | 0.0070<br>(0.54)    | 0.0073<br>(0.69)    | 0.0075<br>(0.73)     | 0.0048<br>(0.47)     | 0.0016<br>(0.19)      | 0.0085<br>(0.93)     | -0.0006<br>(0.06)    |
| PPPI                    | -0.0004***<br>(2.70) | -0.0003***<br>(2.63) | -0.0003*<br>(1.89) | -0.0004**<br>(2.48) | -0.0003**<br>(2.13) | -0.0003***<br>(2.83) | -0.0003***<br>(3.85) | -0.0003***<br>(3.70)  | -0.0002***<br>(2.54) | -0.0002**<br>(2.00)  |
| Observations            | 554                  | 554                  | 554                | 531                 | 526                 | 548                  | 547                  | 527                   | 479                  | 446                  |

Note: Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Period dummies are not reported. *t* statistics are shown in parenthesis. Column (1) reports the base specification with only a linear term on inequality, column (2) adds a quadratic term and column (3) includes an interaction term instead. Column (4) reports estimation results after removing the 5% of countries with most extreme average inequality; column (5) does the same, but with income outliers, and column (6) removes growth outliers. Columns (7) and (8) report results by removing outliers with the highest variation in inequality. Column (7) takes out the outmost 5% countries, and column (8) the outmost 10%. Column (9) removes countries from the East Asia and Pacific, and column (10) removes those from Latin America and the Caribbean. Significance: \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis: Medium-run

| Estimation Method       | LIN (1)             | SQ (2)               | INT (3)              | I (4)               | Y (5)               | $\Delta Y$ (6)      | $\Delta I 5\%$ (7)   | $\Delta I 10\%$ (8) | EAP (9)             | LAC (10)             |
|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Income                  | 0.0093<br>(1.58)    | 0.0082<br>(1.64)     | -0.0246**<br>(2.25)  | 0.0065<br>(1.30)    | 0.0065<br>(1.03)    | 0.0058<br>(1.14)    | 0.0071<br>(1.26)     | 0.0061<br>(1.07)    | 0.0050<br>(0.92)    | 0.0047<br>(1.15)     |
| Inequality              | -0.0482<br>(1.18)   | 0.4096**<br>(2.38)   | -0.6865***<br>(3.07) | 0.3363**<br>(2.11)  | 0.4263**<br>(2.35)  | 0.3084**<br>(2.40)  | 0.3762**<br>(2.50)   | 0.3787**<br>(2.19)  | 0.4363**<br>(2.46)  | 0.4558***<br>(2.72)  |
| Inequality <sup>2</sup> |                     | -0.5473***<br>(2.62) |                      | -0.4341**<br>(2.17) | -0.5682**<br>(2.56) | -0.3781**<br>(2.55) | -0.5069***<br>(2.62) | -0.5113**<br>(2.34) | -0.5688**<br>(2.58) | -0.5984***<br>(2.77) |
| Inequality*Income       |                     |                      | 0.0007***<br>(3.07)  |                     |                     |                     |                      |                     |                     |                      |
| Female Education        | -0.0012<br>(0.16)   | 0.0019<br>(0.03)     | -0.0016<br>(0.34)    | -0.0031<br>(0.57)   | 0.0010<br>(0.18)    | 0.0012<br>(0.21)    | -0.0003<br>(0.04)    | -0.0004<br>(0.06)   | 0.0057<br>(1.04)    | 0.0026<br>(0.56)     |
| Male Education          | -0.0037<br>(0.56)   | -0.0031<br>(0.58)    | 0.00004<br>(0.01)    | 0.0018<br>(0.34)    | -0.0017<br>(0.31)   | -0.0016<br>(0.34)   | -0.0027<br>(0.46)    | -0.0021<br>(0.37)   | -0.0059<br>(1.29)   | -0.0046<br>(0.96)    |
| PPPI                    | -0.0001**<br>(2.03) | -0.0001<br>(1.35)    | -0.0001<br>(1.27)    | -0.0001<br>(1.48)   | -0.0001<br>(1.28)   | -0.0001*<br>(1.78)  | -0.0001<br>(1.52)    | -0.0001<br>(1.35)   | -0.00005<br>(0.94)  | -0.0001*<br>(1.74)   |
| Observations            | 327                 | 327                  | 327                  | 312                 | 308                 | 313                 | 312                  | 303                 | 286                 | 258                  |

Note: Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Period dummies are not reported. *t* statistics are shown in parenthesis. Column (1) reports the base specification with only a linear term on inequality, column (2) adds a quadratic term and column (3) includes an interaction term instead. Column (4) reports estimation results after removing the 5% of countries with most extreme average inequality; column (5) does the same, but with income outliers, and column (6) removes growth outliers. Columns (7) and (8) report results by removing outliers with the highest variation in inequality. Column (7) takes out the outmost 5% countries, and column (8) the outmost 10%. Column (9) removes countries from the East Asia and Pacific, and column (10) removes those from Latin America and the Caribbean. Significance: \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

Table (7) shows the results for the 10-year periods analysis using the specification that includes a quadratic term. The structure is the same as in Table (6). The specification is robust in general. The coefficients on inequality have the correct signs and are significant across the board. The results regarding other variables are also robust to the sensitivity tests. Regarding initial income, while its coefficient is still positive, its significance is greatly reduced compared to the short-run thus confirming the finding that short-run convergence does not seem to follow in the medium-run. Market distortions still have a negative effect, but they are insignificant. The effect of human capital is also still insignificant.

Table (8) summarizes the results for the the long-run. The structure of the Table is the same as in the previous ones. Now only the specification that includes the interaction term seems relevant. Therefore, columns (4)-(10) consider robustness analysis based on this specification. The coefficients have the correct signs throughout, but it seems that outliers now do play a role. More specifically, when the countries with the highest *and* lowest average Gini coefficient are discarded, the coefficients are no longer significant. This is also true when the countries with the highest *and* lowest growth rates are removed, and when the countries from the East Asia and Pacific region are removed. Thus, it seems that the long-run result is not as robust as the short and medium-run ones.

Regarding the other variables, the finding of divergence is robust to the different specifications; again, except for the one that does not include countries with the highest and lowest average Gini coefficients and the one that removes the countries from the East Asia and Pacific region. The coefficients on male education are consistently higher than in the short and medium-run, but are still not significant. Finally, as argued above, the effect of market distortions does not seem to have an effect in the long-run.

Finally, Table (9) reviews the results for the very long-run. This Table has a very similar structure to the previous ones, except that because for this estimation only a single value of the Gini coefficient is used, it is not possible to identify outliers in terms of Gini coefficient variation. Thus, columns (7) and (8) from the previous tables have been erased (I kept the numbering in the rest of columns for comparability). Now the linear specification is the relevant one and it is significant under the different robustness checks. Note that the coefficient on the interaction term is barely significant, raising the question of whether this is the correct specification for the long-run. However, as is the case in the medium-run, the coefficients imply an income threshold that is impossible to occur in practice, and hence I discard it.

Regarding the other variables, note first that the finding of convergence holds, except when East Asian countries are removed from the sample, which tells us that they are the countries driving the convergence result in the very long-run. Male education has a significant positive effect in most specifications, except when East Asian countries or countries from Latin America are removed from the sample. Market distortions are not relevant anymore.

Thus, the results presented before are robust in the short and medium-run, but not fully robust in the long-run.



Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis: Long-run

| Estimation Method       | LIN<br>(1)        | SQ<br>(2)         | INT<br>(3)          | I<br>(4)           | Y<br>(5)            | $\Delta Y$<br>(6)  | $\Delta I$ 5%<br>(7) | $\Delta I$ 10%<br>(8) | EAP<br>(9)        | LAC<br>(10)         |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Income                  | 0.0002<br>(0.04)  | 0.0018<br>(0.48)  | -0.0261**<br>(2.50) | -0.0152<br>(1.00)  | -0.0316**<br>(2.62) | -0.0175*<br>(1.88) | -0.0259**<br>(2.14)  | -0.0358**<br>(2.52)   | -0.0152<br>(1.22) | -0.0231*<br>(1.74)  |
| Inequality              | -0.0167<br>(0.40) | 0.1837<br>(1.53)  | -0.5671**<br>(2.63) | -0.2961<br>(0.78)  | -0.6367**<br>(2.53) | -0.3232<br>(1.52)  | -0.5604**<br>(2.19)  | -0.7054**<br>(2.52)   | -0.3754<br>(1.42) | -0.5696**<br>(2.07) |
| Inequality <sup>2</sup> |                   | -0.2039<br>(1.37) |                     |                    |                     |                    |                      |                       |                   |                     |
| Inequality*Income       |                   |                   | 0.0612**<br>(2.63)  | 0.0335<br>(0.83)   | 0.0695**<br>(2.55)  | 0.0363<br>(1.57)   | 0.0607**<br>(2.19)   | 0.0753**<br>(2.57)    | 0.0404<br>(1.43)  | 0.0601*<br>(2.01)   |
| Female Education        | -0.0088<br>(1.05) | -0.0071<br>(0.85) | -0.007<br>(0.94)    | -0.0087<br>(1.19)  | -0.0054<br>(0.66)   | -0.0091<br>(1.57)  | -0.0074<br>(0.98)    | -0.0044<br>(0.59)     | -0.0057<br>(0.80) | -0.0062<br>(1.03)   |
| Male Education          | 0.0104<br>(1.00)  | 0.0097<br>(1.09)  | 0.0095<br>(1.14)    | 0.0114<br>(1.33)   | 0.0092<br>(1.07)    | 0.0111<br>(1.60)   | 0.0092<br>(1.02)     | 0.0077<br>(0.95)      | 0.0075<br>(1.11)  | 0.0047<br>(0.74)    |
| PPPI                    | -0.0001<br>(1.13) | -0.0001<br>(1.43) | -0.0001<br>(1.18)   | -0.0001*<br>(1.76) | -0.00004<br>(1.07)  | -0.00005<br>(0.02) | -0.0001<br>(1.06)    | -0.0001<br>(0.71)     | -0.0001<br>(1.17) | -0.0001<br>(0.89)   |
| Observations            | 127               | 127               | 127                 | 118                | 122                 | 117                | 121                  | 113                   | 111               | 96                  |

Note: Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Period dummies are not reported. *t* statistics are shown in parenthesis. Column (1) reports the base specification with only a linear term on inequality, column (2) adds a quadratic term and column (3) includes an interaction term instead. Column (4) reports estimation results after removing the 5% of countries with most extreme average inequality; column (5) does the same, but with income outliers, and column (6) removes growth outliers. Columns (7) and (8) report results by removing outliers with the highest variation in inequality. Column (7) takes out the outmost 5% countries, and column (8) the outmost 10%. Column (9) removes countries from the East Asia and Pacific, and column (10) removes those from Latin America and the Caribbean. Significance: \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis: Very Long-run

| Estimation Method       | LIN<br>(1)           | SQ<br>(2)            | INT<br>(3)          | I<br>(4)             | Y<br>(5)             | $\Delta Y$<br>(6)    | EAP<br>(9)          | LAC<br>(10)         |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Income                  | -0.0098***<br>(2.84) | -0.0098***<br>(2.80) | -0.0230**<br>(2.47) | -0.0097***<br>(2.87) | -0.0111***<br>(3.13) | -0.0110***<br>(3.13) | -0.0035<br>(1.12)   | -0.0090**<br>(2.36) |
| Inequality              | -0.0458**<br>(2.32)  | -0.0213<br>(0.21)    | -0.3417*<br>(1.84)  | -0.0498*<br>(1.94)   | -0.0440**<br>(2.25)  | -0.0410*<br>(1.72)   | -0.0367**<br>(2.66) | -0.0467*<br>(1.78)  |
| Inequality <sup>2</sup> |                      | -0.0274<br>(0.25)    |                     |                      |                      |                      |                     |                     |
| Inequality*Income       |                      |                      | 0.0003<br>(1.66)    |                      |                      |                      |                     |                     |
| Female<br>Education     | -0.0156<br>(1.56)    | -0.0156<br>(1.55)    | -0.0159*<br>(1.70)  | -0.0158<br>(1.58)    | -0.0157<br>(1.52)    | -0.0151<br>(1.40)    | -0.0014<br>(0.41)   | -0.0152<br>(1.39)   |
| Male<br>Education       | 0.0200*<br>(1.92)    | 0.0200*<br>(1.92)    | 0.0199**<br>(2.06)  | 0.0196*<br>(1.85)    | 0.0200*<br>(1.95)    | 0.0203*<br>(1.82)    | 0.0043<br>(1.27)    | 0.0188<br>(1.67)    |
| PPPI                    | -0.0001<br>(0.86)    | -0.00004<br>(0.83)   | -0.00004<br>(0.94)  | -0.00004<br>(0.88)   | -0.00001<br>(0.16)   | -0.0001<br>(0.94)    | 0.00001<br>(0.19)   | -0.0001<br>(0.77)   |
| Observations            | 59                   | 59                   | 59                  | 57                   | 57                   | 52                   | 50                  | 43                  |

Note: Dependent variable is average annual per capita growth. Period dummies are not reported. *t* statistics are shown in parenthesis. Column (1) reports the base specification with only a linear term on inequality, column (2) adds a quadratic term and column (3) includes an interaction term instead. Column (4) reports estimation results after removing the 5% of countries with most extreme average inequality; column (5) does the same, but with income outliers, and column (6) removes growth outliers. Column (9) removes countries from the East Asia and Pacific, and column (10) removes those from Latin America and the Caribbean. Significance: \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

## Conclusion

I have analyzed the short, medium, long and very long-run relationship between inequality and growth. I benefit from a large dataset that in the broadest specification covers 100 countries over a period of almost 60 years. It incorporates recent updates to the Penn World Table, the UNU-WIDER inequality dataset and the Barro and Lee education dataset.

Using a system-GMM estimator with a restricted number of instruments I find an inverse-U association between inequality and growth in the short-run (5-year periods). This relationship remains in the medium-run (10-year periods), but it is economically weaker. Finally, it disappears over longer time spans (20-year periods). While the 5 and 10-year findings are consistent with the criticism put forward by Banerjee and Duflo (2003) that inequality and growth are not linearly related, I show that this nonlinearity is found using a system-GMM estimator with restricted instruments that solves the weak instrument problem of the Arellano and Bond estimator as well as the problem of instrument proliferation.

Perhaps the most interesting finding is the fact that this relationship does not remain in the long-run (20-year periods). This implies the existence of some structural change when moving from 10 to 20-year periods. Over 20 years I find that the coefficient on inequality becomes negative in all specifications using the system-GMM estimator, and it is significant in the preferred one. However, this result holds only when I also include an interaction term between inequality and income per capita. Thus, over the 20-year period, inequality seems to have a negative effect on growth in poor countries, but a positive effect on growth in rich ones. This finding is consistent with Barro (2000), who obtains a similar result, but over 10-year periods.

Finally, when I run a very long-run cross-country regression of the effect of inequality on growth I find a linear, negative relationship. This is consistent with the original works on the long-run relationship between inequality and growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994). However, these studies consider the long-run to be around 20 years, while I consider it to be almost 40 years, and hence the results are not quite comparable. My findings for the 20-year periods, on the other hand, clearly contradict previous evidence as I find that the effect of inequality on growth over this time frame depends on the level of income, being negative for poor countries and positive for rich ones.

Much more work remains to be done regarding the specific mechanisms through which the relationship between inequality and growth tends to change over different time periods. The recent argument put forward by Halter et al. (2010) provides a starting point to understand them: the economic benefits of inequality take place mostly in the short-run, while the social and political costs take place mostly in the long-run. However, this leaves aside the apparent non linearity between inequality and growth observed over different time frames. A complementary explanation is based on the salience of inequality. In the short and medium-run, high levels of inequality encourage social conflict and the search for transfers, both of which are costly to economic growth. At the same time, however, too much equality also affects growth as the incentives to invest and progress are distorted. The combination of these effects leads to the observed inverse-U relationship. In the long-run, the dynamics are richer. Even relatively low levels of inequality become salient when it persists for longer periods of time. Thus, lower inequality levels (compared to those necessary in the short and medium-run) can lead to social conflict, which in turn reduces growth. This effect is likely to be seen at an earlier stage in poor countries, since the poor in those countries face much more restrictive life-conditions that make

them act at an earlier point in time than their counterparts in richer countries. In the very long-run, this effect also appears in rich countries.

The effect of other variables on growth is also worth analyzing. First, I find evidence of divergence in the short and medium-run. Over a 20-year period, I find some evidence of convergence. In the long-run, the coefficient remains negative and significant. Thus, it seems that the effect of initial income may also vary depending on the time-frame analyzed. The most puzzling result concerns human capital. The effect of female education does not seem to contribute to growth at any time frame. The coefficient is consistently negative, and significant in some specifications in the short and medium-run. However, it is never significant in the long and very long-run. Male education on the other hand has a positive coefficient attached to it in most specifications, but it only becomes significant in the very long-run. Thus, human capital seems to play a key role only over this time-frame. Finally, the effect of market distortions on growth is consistently negative for all specifications, but it is only significant in the short-run and marginally so in the medium-run, thus showing that over time societies may learn ways around costly blocks to investment.

In the end, the main message of this paper is that the observed relationships between variables depend on the time span considered. This is certainly not a new idea in economics but the existence of new databases allows us to take this point much more seriously and to analyze old questions under a fresh perspective.

## **Appendix**

Here I present tables of the summary statistics of the data used for each regression as well as detailed tables of the Gini coefficients. Tables (10), (11), (12) and (13) show the summary statistics for 5, 10, 20 and 37-year periods, respectively, while Tables (14), (15), (16) and (17) show the corresponding Gini coefficients.<sup>29</sup>

Table 10: Summary Statistics Short-run

| Variable         | Definition   | Year | N    | Mean | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|------------------|--|------|------|------|--------------------|---------|---------|
| Income           | Ln of Real GDP per capita, base year 2005                                  | 1950 | 47   | 8.26 | 0.80               | 6.69    | 9.61    |
|                  |  | 1955 | 63   | 8.18 | 0.86               | 6.35    | 9.63    |
|                  |  | 1960 | 79   | 8.08 | 0.96               | 6.18    | 9.80    |
|                  |  | 1965 | 80   | 8.23 | 0.99               | 6.23    | 9.94    |
|                  |  | 1970 | 89   | 8.35 | 1.00               | 6.41    | 10.11   |
|                  |  | 1975 | 89   | 8.48 | 1.02               | 6.43    | 10.12   |
|                  |  | 1980 | 89   | 8.59 | 1.05               | 6.50    | 10.24   |
|                  |  | 1985 | 89   | 8.63 | 1.05               | 6.43    | 10.34   |
|                  |  | 1990 | 95   | 8.74 | 1.09               | 6.36    | 10.68   |
|                  |  | 1995 | 102  | 8.78 | 1.07               | 6.45    | 10.82   |
|                  |  | 2000 | 102  | 8.90 | 1.10               | 6.52    | 11.06   |
| 2005             | 102  | 9.03 | 1.10 | 6.48 | 11.17              |         |         |
| Inequality       | Inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient                               | 1950 | 10   | 0.43 | 0.11               | 0.30    | 0.70    |
|                  |  | 1955 | 21   | 0.44 | 0.11               | 0.23    | 0.67    |
|                  |  | 1960 | 36   | 0.45 | 0.11               | 0.20    | 0.68    |
|                  |  | 1965 | 45   | 0.43 | 0.10               | 0.21    | 0.68    |
|                  |  | 1970 | 55   | 0.43 | 0.12               | 0.22    | 0.68    |
|                  |  | 1975 | 55   | 0.39 | 0.10               | 0.17    | 0.61    |
|                  |  | 1980 | 57   | 0.39 | 0.11               | 0.20    | 0.65    |
|                  |  | 1985 | 58   | 0.37 | 0.11               | 0.20    | 0.60    |
|                  |  | 1990 | 81   | 0.38 | 0.12               | 0.20    | 0.63    |
|                  |  | 1995 | 97   | 0.42 | 0.12               | 0.20    | 0.75    |
| 2000             | 92   | 0.42 | 0.11 | 0.21 | 0.67               |         |         |
| Female Education | Average years of secondary schooling in the female population aged over 25 | 1950 | 102  | 0.44 | 0.59               | 0.00    | 2.83    |
|                  |  | 1955 | 102  | 0.50 | 0.64               | 0.00    | 3.03    |
|                  |  | 1960 | 102  | 0.58 | 0.71               | 0.00    | 3.19    |
|                  |  | 1965 | 102  | 0.69 | 0.78               | 0.00    | 3.77    |
|                  |  | 1970 | 102  | 0.83 | 0.88               | 0.00    | 4.30    |
|                  |  | 1975 | 102  | 1.03 | 1.02               | 0.00    | 4.76    |
|                  |  | 1980 | 102  | 1.26 | 1.14               | 0.00    | 5.11    |
|                  |  | 1985 | 102  | 1.51 | 1.21               | 0.01    | 5.10    |
|                  |  | 1990 | 102  | 1.77 | 1.28               | 0.02    | 5.12    |
|                  |  | 1995 | 102  | 2.06 | 1.37               | 0.04    | 5.16    |
| 2000             | 102  | 2.29 | 1.45 | 0.09 | 5.43               |         |         |
| Male Education   | Average years of secondary schooling in the male population aged over 25   | 1950 | 102  | 0.66 | 0.67               | 0.00    | 3.19    |
|                  |  | 1955 | 102  | 0.75 | 0.73               | 0.00    | 3.41    |
|                  |  | 1960 | 102  | 0.83 | 0.81               | 0.00    | 3.59    |
|                  |  | 1965 | 102  | 1.01 | 0.89               | 0.00    | 4.02    |
|                  |  | 1970 | 102  | 1.20 | 1.02               | 0.00    | 4.24    |
|                  |  | 1975 | 102  | 1.44 | 1.13               | 0.00    | 4.77    |
|                  |  | 1980 | 102  | 1.70 | 1.24               | 0.00    | 5.09    |
| 1985             | 102  | 1.96 | 1.28 | 0.04 | 5.22               |         |         |

Table 10: (continued)

| Variable | Definition   | Year | N   | Mean   | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|----------|--|------|-----|--------|--------------------|---------|---------|
|          |  | 1990 | 102 | 2.20   | 1.32               | 0.09    | 5.32    |
|          |  | 1995 | 102 | 2.48   | 1.39               | 0.26    | 5.93    |
|          |  | 2000 | 102 | 2.70   | 1.46               | 0.30    | 6.98    |
| PPPI     | Price level of investment, measured as the PPP of investment/exchange rate relative to the United States | 1950 | 48  | 71.57  | 49.99              | 12.38   | 265.04  |
|          |  | 1955 | 64  | 80.48  | 114.97             | 12.85   | 921.86  |
|          |  | 1960 | 80  | 66.12  | 45.30              | 13.30   | 261.47  |
|          |  | 1965 | 81  | 69.86  | 47.24              | 16.15   | 329.88  |
|          |  | 1970 | 89  | 63.67  | 40.23              | 14.60   | 254.58  |
|          |  | 1975 | 89  | 79.15  | 48.45              | 12.89   | 329.44  |
|          |  | 1980 | 89  | 102.05 | 177.04             | 15.75   | 1707.95 |
|          |  | 1985 | 89  | 59.90  | 29.73              | 19.29   | 187.71  |
|          |  | 1990 | 95  | 77.16  | 59.09              | 0.29    | 472.55  |
|          |  | 1995 | 102 | 68.58  | 43.12              | 19.45   | 360.25  |
|          |  | 2000 | 102 | 60.24  | 37.70              | 17.62   | 315.65  |

Sources: Income and PPPI: Heston et al. (2009). Female and Male education: Barro and Lee (2010). Inequality: UNU-WIDER (2008b).

Table 11: Summary Statistics: Medium-run

| Variable   | Definition   | Year | N  | Mean  | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|------------|--|------|----|-------|--------------------|---------|---------|
| Income     | Ln of Real GDP per capita, base year 2005  | 1950 | 46 | 8.30  | 0.77               | 6.69    | 9.61    |
|            |  | 1960 | 80 | 8.11  | 0.92               | 6.18    | 9.80    |
|            |  | 1970 | 86 | 8.44  | 0.95               | 6.41    | 10.11   |
|            |  | 1980 | 86 | 8.72  | 0.96               | 6.50    | 10.24   |
|            |  | 1990 | 92 | 8.88  | 0.98               | 6.36    | 10.68   |
|            |  | 2000 | 92 | 9.05  | 1.04               | 6.52    | 11.06   |
|            |  | 2007 | 92 | 9.24  | 1.05               | 6.83    | 11.26   |
| Inequality | Inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient   | 1950 | 9  | 0.43  | 0.12               | 0.30    | 0.70    |
|            |  | 1960 | 41 | 0.45  | 0.10               | 0.20    | 0.68    |
|            |  | 1970 | 60 | 0.43  | 0.11               | 0.21    | 0.68    |
|            |  | 1980 | 67 | 0.40  | 0.10               | 0.20    | 0.65    |
|            |  | 1990 | 84 | 0.40  | 0.12               | 0.20    | 0.63    |
|            |  | 2000 | 84 | 0.42  | 0.12               | 0.21    | 0.75    |
| Female     | Average years of secondary schooling in the female population aged over 25                               | 1950 | 92 | 0.41  | 0.56               | 0.00    | 2.66    |
|            |  | 1960 | 92 | 0.53  | 0.67               | 0.00    | 3.18    |
|            |  | 1970 | 92 | 0.76  | 0.82               | 0.01    | 4.30    |
|            |  | 1980 | 92 | 1.16  | 1.05               | 0.02    | 5.11    |
|            |  | 1990 | 92 | 1.68  | 1.14               | 0.06    | 5.12    |
|            |  | 2000 | 92 | 2.23  | 1.31               | 0.09    | 5.43    |
| Male       | Average years of secondary schooling in the male population aged over 25                                 | 1950 | 92 | 0.61  | 0.63               | 0.01    | 2.88    |
|            |  | 1960 | 92 | 0.76  | 0.76               | 0.02    | 3.35    |
|            |  | 1970 | 92 | 1.11  | 0.95               | 0.05    | 4.24    |
|            |  | 1980 | 92 | 1.58  | 1.14               | 0.11    | 5.09    |
|            |  | 1990 | 92 | 2.11  | 1.20               | 0.23    | 5.32    |
|            |  | 2000 | 92 | 2.64  | 1.33               | 0.31    | 6.98    |
| PPPI       | Price level of investment, measured as the PPP of investment/exchange rate relative to the United States | 1950 | 46 | 69.39 | 48.30              | 12.38   | 265.04  |
|            |  | 1960 | 80 | 64.45 | 42.43              | 13.30   | 261.47  |
|            |  | 1970 | 86 | 65.36 | 40.78              | 22.65   | 254.58  |
|            |  | 1980 | 86 | 89.43 | 54.73              | 29.86   | 387.79  |
|            |  | 1990 | 92 | 75.54 | 46.67              | 0.29    | 290.17  |
|            |  | 2000 | 92 | 62.30 | 38.32              | 19.08   | 315.65  |

Sources: Income and PPPI: Heston et al. (2009). Female and Male education: Barro and Lee (2010). Inequality: UNU-WIDER (2008b).



Table 12: Summary Statistics: Long-run

| Variable   | Definition   | Year | N  | Mean  | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|------------|--|------|----|-------|--------------------|---------|---------|
| Income     | Ln of Real GDP per capita, base year 2005  | 1950 | 34 | 8.19  | 0.79               | 6.69    | 9.47    |
|            |  | 1970 | 55 | 8.59  | 0.93               | 6.41    | 9.89    |
|            |  | 1990 | 55 | 9.05  | 0.95               | 6.36    | 10.34   |
|            |  | 2007 | 55 | 9.44  | 0.98               | 6.83    | 10.79   |
| Inequality | Inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient   | 1950 | 9  | 0.43  | 0.12               | 0.30    | 0.70    |
|            |  | 1970 | 55 | 0.42  | 0.11               | 0.20    | 0.68    |
|            |  | 1990 | 55 | 0.41  | 0.12               | 0.21    | 0.63    |
| Female     | Average years of secondary schooling in the female population aged over 25                               | 1950 | 55 | 0.44  | 0.59               | 0.00    | 2.66    |
|            |  | 1970 | 55 | 0.82  | 0.85               | 0.01    | 4.30    |
|            |  | 1990 | 55 | 1.82  | 1.21               | 0.12    | 5.12    |
| Male       | Average years of secondary schooling in the male population aged over 25                                 | 1950 | 55 | 0.66  | 0.62               | 0.01    | 2.88    |
|            |  | 1970 | 55 | 1.17  | 0.98               | 0.06    | 4.24    |
|            |  | 1990 | 55 | 2.23  | 1.26               | 0.33    | 5.32    |
| PPPI       | Price level of investment, measured as the PPP of investment/exchange rate relative to the United States | 1950 | 34 | 63.43 | 26.39              | 12.38   | 126.09  |
|            |  | 1970 | 55 | 67.93 | 43.20              | 23.03   | 254.58  |
|            |  | 1990 | 55 | 85.76 | 52.71              | 23.10   | 290.17  |

Sources: Income and PPPI: Heston et al. (2009). Female and Male education: Barro and Lee (2010). Inequality: UNU-WIDER (2008b).

Table 13: Summary Statistics: Very Long-run

| Variable   | Definition   | Year | N  | Mean  | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|------------|--|------|----|-------|--------------------|---------|---------|
| Income     | Ln of Real GDP per capita, base year 2005  | 1970 | 76 | 8.44  | 0.93               | 6.41    | 9.89    |
|            |  | 2007 | 76 | 9.38  | 1.26               | 6.58    | 11.43   |
| Inequality | Inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient   | 1970 | 76 | 0.44  | 0.11               | 0.20    | 0.68    |
| Female     | Average years of secondary schooling in the female population aged over 25                               | 1970 | 76 | 0.73  | 0.84               | 0.01    | 4.30    |
| Male       | Average years of secondary schooling in the male population aged over 25                                 | 1970 | 76 | 1.03  | 0.95               | 0.04    | 4.24    |
| PPPI       | Price level of investment, measured as the PPP of investment/exchange rate relative to the United States | 1970 | 76 | 66.45 | 44.32              | 13.79   | 254.58  |

Sources: Income and PPPI: Heston et al. (2009). Female and Male education: Barro and Lee (2010). Inequality: UNU-WIDER (2008b).

Table 14: Gini Coefficients Short-run

| Country            | 1945-50 | 1951-55 | 1956-60 | 1961-65 | 1966-70 | 1971-75 | 1976-80 | 1981-85 | 1986-90 | 1991-95 | 1996-2000 | Mean |
|--------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|------|
| Algeria            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 39.9    | 35.4    |           | 37.7 |
| Argentina          |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 39.8    | 44.4    |         |           | 41.8 |
| Armenia            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 26.9    | 36.6    | 38.4      | 34.0 |
| Australia          | 30.3    | 27.2    | 30.9    | 30.3    | 31.0    | 26.6    | 27.8    | 32.5    | 33.8    | 34.2    | 31.0      | 30.5 |
| Austria            |         |         |         |         | 29.5    | 26.7    | 24.3    | 28.3    | 22.7    | 27.0    | 23.7      | 26.0 |
| Bangladesh         |         |         | 41.8    | 33.8    | 42.4    | 36.9    | 35.1    | 39.0    | 33.6    | 37.0    | 41.2      | 37.9 |
| Belgium            |         |         |         |         |         |         | 28.2    | 22.5    | 23.4    | 29.8    | 26.8      | 27.1 |
| Bolivia            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 54.5    | 52.7    | 61.7      | 56.3 |
| Botswana           |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 47.7    | 53.7    |           | 50.7 |
| Brazil             |         |         |         |         | 59.0    | 62.5    | 59.6    | 58.9    | 63.1    | 57.0    | 59.0      | 59.5 |
| Bulgaria           |         |         | 24.5    | 21.1    | 21.2    | 17.5    | 23.4    | 27.9    | 21.2    | 36.8    | 30.8      | 24.9 |
| Burundi            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 33.3    | 41.8      | 37.6 |
| Cambodia           |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 46.0    | 44.5      | 45.3 |
| Canada             |         | 32.5    | 32.1    | 31.5    | 36.1    | 33.1    | 28.5    | 28.8    | 28.1    | 28.8    | 30.1      | 31.0 |
| Chile              |         |         |         | 46.2    | 44.0    | 47.1    |         |         | 57.4    | 54.5    | 59.5      | 51.5 |
| China              |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 24.3    | 23.0    | 31.1    |           | 27.8 |
| Colombia           |         |         |         | 48.2    | 49.6    | 47.5    | 44.6    |         | 48.5    | 57.9    | 56.3      | 50.4 |
| Costa Rica         |         |         |         |         |         | 46.4    | 43.0    | 47.6    | 45.3    | 45.8    | 50.1      | 46.9 |
| Cote d'Ivoire      |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 50.6    | 45.9    | 43.9    | 44.0      | 46.1 |
| Cuba               |         |         |         |         |         | 28.3    | 27.0    |         |         |         |           | 36.9 |
| Czech Republic     |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 20.4    | 26.0    | 26.1      | 24.2 |
| Denmark            | 39.0    | 40.0    |         | 37.0    | 24.9    | 22.5    | 31.6    | 20.1    | 23.7    | 20.0    | 21.0      | 28.0 |
| Dominican Republic |         |         |         |         |         |         | 45.0    | 43.4    | 47.0    | 51.6    | 52.0      | 48.0 |
| Ecuador            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 43.7    | 55.6    | 58.8      | 55.3 |
| Egypt              |         |         | 37.0    | 35.0    |         |         |         |         |         | 28.7    | 37.8      | 35.3 |
| El Salvador        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 50.6    | 51.9      | 49.1 |
| Estonia            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 24.0    | 35.3    | 36.4      | 31.9 |
| Finland            |         |         |         |         | 30.8    | 28.3    | 22.7    | 22.4    | 21.5    | 22.9    | 26.8      | 25.1 |
| France             |         |         |         |         | 34.0    | 32.0    | 32.8    | 31.4    | 32.7    | 30.2    | 29.3      | 31.8 |
| Gambia             |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 59.4    | 47.1      | 53.3 |
| Germany            | 39.6    | 38.4    | 38.0    | 38.0    | 39.2    | 37.3    | 36.6    | 30.0    | 29.7    | 29.4    | 24.6      | 34.6 |
| Ghana              |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 36.0    | 33.9    | 40.7      | 36.9 |
| Greece             |         |         | 41.1    | 44.1    | 46.3    | 41.3    |         | 39.8    | 37.0    | 35.1    | 32.3      | 39.6 |
| Guyana             |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 54.0    | 44.2      | 49.1 |
| Honduras           |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 57.6    | 55.9    | 55.9      | 57.9 |
| Hong Kong          |         |         | 47.9    | 50.1    | 49.0    | 43.8    | 43.0    | 44.6    | 42.2    | 43.4    | 51.4      | 46.2 |
| Hungary            |         | 23.3    | 20.4    |         |         | 22.6    | 20.7    | 21.3    | 26.8    | 22.6    | 23.7      | 22.7 |
| India              |         | 33.8    | 32.5    | 34.5    | 30.2    | 28.9    | 30.9    | 30.1    | 27.7    | 28.4    | 36.0      | 31.3 |
| Indonesia          |         |         |         | 38.9    | 34.6    | 43.9    | 38.0    | 33.0    | 34.0    | 34.0    | 30.8      | 35.9 |
| Iran               |         |         |         |         | 41.9    | 46.0    |         |         |         |         |           | 43.7 |
| Ireland            |         |         |         |         |         | 37.4    | 36.6    |         | 36.0    | 34.3    | 30.1      | 34.9 |
| Israel             |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 34.7    | 35.5    | 38.0      | 36.1 |
| Italy              |         |         |         |         | 39.0    | 39.2    | 37.5    | 32.0    | 29.8    | 33.9    | 29.8      | 35.4 |
| Jamaica            |         |         |         |         | 62.8    | 45.7    | 65.5    |         | 41.7    | 39.7    | 38.5      | 50.2 |
| Japan              |         | 31.0    | 36.0    | 34.8    | 41.4    | 36.9    | 33.4    | 29.1    | 31.2    | 31.6    | 31.9      | 33.7 |
| Jordan             |         |         |         |         |         | 42.1    | 36.5    |         | 36.0    | 40.0    | 36.3      | 38.2 |
| Kazakhstan         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 25.7    | 28.9    | 32.7    | 35.4      | 30.7 |
| Kenya              | 70.0    | 63.0    | 68.0    | 63.0    | 68.0    |         |         |         |         | 44.3    | 55.6      | 61.2 |

Table 14: (continued)

| Country           | 1945-50 | 1951-55 | 1956-60 | 1961-65 | 1966-70 | 1971-75 | 1976-80 | 1981-85 | 1986-90 | 1991-95 | 1996-2000 | Mean |      |
|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|------|------|
| Korea             |         |         |         | 28.9    | 31.2    | 40.2    | 36.7    | 37.0    | 32.0    | 32.4    | 37.1      | 34.4 |      |
| Kyrgyzstan        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 24.3    | 30.8    | 39.5    | 47.0      | 35.4 |      |
| Laos              |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 29.9    | 36.5      | 33.2 |      |
| Latvia            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 24.0    | 30.9    | 32.1      | 29.0 |      |
| Lesotho           |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 63.0    | 69.0    | 60.0      | 64.0 |      |
| Lithuania         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 24.8    | 37.2    | 34.7      | 32.2 |      |
| Luxembourg        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 26.4    | 16.6    | 28.9    | 30.2      | 25.5 |      |
| Malawi            |         |         |         |         |         |         | 53.1    | 59.9    |         | 62.0    | 49.3      | 56.1 |      |
| Malaysia          |         |         |         |         |         |         | 50.6    | 51.5    | 49.1    | 50.0    | 44.3      | 48.2 |      |
| Mali              |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 36.5    | 54.0    |           | 45.3 |      |
| Mauritania        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 42.4    | 38.9    | 39.0      | 40.1 |      |
| Mauritius         |         |         |         |         |         | 41.9    | 45.7    |         | 39.8    | 37.9    | 38.7      | 40.8 |      |
| Mexico            | 52.3    |         | 53.0    | 54.2    | 53.6    | 61.2    | 50.0    | 50.6    | 53.1    | 50.2    | 53.2      | 53.1 |      |
| Moldova           |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 26.7    | 41.1    | 39.2      | 35.7 |      |
| Morocco           |         |         |         |         | 56.0    | 59.0    | 54.0    | 38.9    |         | 39.2    | 39.4      | 48.1 |      |
| Netherlands       | 41.0    | 44.4    |         | 43.7    | 36.2    | 29.8    | 28.1    | 28.1    | 32.1    | 25.2    | 32.0      | 34.1 |      |
| New Zealand       |         |         |         |         |         | 30.0    | 34.7    | 35.3    | 29.0    | 33.1    | 33.8      | 32.6 |      |
| Nicaragua         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 56.5    | 54.1      | 55.3 |      |
| Norway            |         |         |         |         | 30.5    | 35.0    | 31.3    | 31.8    | 25.2    | 25.7    | 28.8      | 29.8 |      |
| Pakistan          |         |         |         | 35.6    | 32.9    | 34.0    | 36.7    | 35.0    | 40.7    | 41.0    | 29.6      | 35.7 |      |
| Panama            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 52.0    | 54.7    | 56.8      | 53.9 |      |
| Paraguay          |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 58.4    | 55.5      | 56.9 |      |
| Peru              |         |         |         | 60.2    | 41.3    | 55.0    |         | 57.0    | 42.7    | 44.8    | 49.6      | 50.1 |      |
| Philippines       |         |         | 45.2    | 46.5    |         |         |         | 44.7    | 45.7    | 46.2    | 49.4      | 46.1 |      |
| Poland            |         |         |         |         |         | 24.0    | 23.1    | 23.3    | 28.3    | 32.2    | 34.2      | 27.5 |      |
| Portugal          |         |         |         |         |         | 40.1    | 36.8    |         | 32.9    | 37.4    | 36.8      | 36.8 |      |
| Romania           |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 22.9    | 31.1    | 30.3      | 28.1 |      |
| Russia            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 25.1    | 26.9    | 44.6    | 48.3      | 36.2 |      |
| Singapore         |         |         |         |         | 49.8    | 40.0    | 39.5    | 47.0    | 46.0    | 47.0    | 46.7      | 45.1 |      |
| Slovak Republic   |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 20.0    | 20.0    | 26.0      | 24.2 |      |
| Slovenia          |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 23.2    | 25.1    | 24.8      | 24.4 |      |
| South Africa      |         |         |         | 55.0    | 51.0    | 47.0    | 49.0    | 47.0    | 63.0    | 59.0    | 56.5      | 53.4 |      |
| Spain             |         |         |         |         |         |         | 35.6    | 34.2    | 24.9    | 31.7    | 33.2      | 31.5 | 32.8 |
| Sri Lanka         |         |         |         | 46.7    | 35.3    | 39.8    | 27.6    | 44.9    | 46.0    | 44.7    | 61.0      | 43.7 |      |
| Sweden            |         |         |         |         | 29.5    | 21.4    | 20.4    | 20.5    | 24.6    | 25.6    | 26.7      | 24.1 |      |
| Switzerland       |         |         |         |         |         |         | 34.5    | 32.3    |         | 35.9    | 31.8      | 33.6 |      |
| Taiwan            |         | 56.1    | 43.9    | 32.8    | 29.9    | 29.3    | 27.7    | 29.0    | 30.9    | 31.5    | 31.2      | 34.2 |      |
| Tanzania          |         |         |         |         |         |         | 52.0    | 52.0    |         |         |           | 46.3 |      |
| Thailand          |         |         |         | 43.7    | 43.8    | 41.2    | 45.1    | 48.3    | 47.4    | 43.3    | 44.8      | 44.7 |      |
| Trinidad & Tobago |         |         |         |         |         | 45.4    | 46.1    |         | 42.6    | 49.3    |           | 45.9 |      |
| Tunisia           |         |         |         |         |         | 44.0    | 43.0    | 43.0    | 41.0    |         |           | 42.3 |      |
| Turkey            |         |         |         |         |         | 51.5    | 51.0    | 45.0    | 46.5    | 46.7    | 39.8      | 48.0 |      |
| Uganda            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 35.2    | 46.9      | 41.1 |      |
| Ukraine           |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 22.8    | 36.4    | 42.7      | 31.6 |      |
| United Kingdom    | 34.0    | 34.0    | 35.4    | 24.4    | 25.4    | 23.7    | 25.2    | 27.7    | 33.5    | 32.8    | 34.6      | 30.1 |      |
| United States     | 43.1    | 42.0    | 42.3    | 41.7    | 39.3    | 39.1    | 39.7    | 41.6    | 42.7    | 44.8    | 45.7      | 42.0 |      |
| Uruguay           |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 39.6    | 42.4    | 42.3    | 44.3      | 42.1 |      |
| Venezuela         |         |         |         |         |         | 47.3    | 47.5    | 44.9    | 42.5    | 46.3    | 45.8      | 45.6 |      |
| Vietnam           |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 34.4    | 37.3      | 35.9 |      |

Table 14: (continued)

| Country  | 1945-50 | 1951-55 | 1956-60 | 1961-65 | 1966-70 | 1971-75 | 1976-80 | 1981-85 | 1986-90 | 1991-95 | 1996-2000 | Mean  |
|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|-------|
| Yemen    |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 39.3    | 21.8      | 30.5  |
| Zambia   |         |         |         |         |         | 57.0    | 55.6    |         |         | 64.7    | 66.6      | 61.0  |
| Zimbabwe |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         | 56.6    | 73.1    |           | 64.8  |
| Mean     | 43.51   | 41.88   | 43.27   | 42.98   | 43.11   | 38.98   | 39.02   | 37.29   | 37.68   | 41.71   | 41.99     | 40.61 |

*Note:* Gini coefficient is taken from latest available data within the given period.

Table 15: Gini Coefficients Medium-Run

| Country            | 1941-50 | 1951-60 | 1961-70 | 1971-80 | 1981-90 | 1991-2000 | Mean |
|--------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|------|
| Algeria            |         |         |         |         | 39.9    | 35.4      | 37.7 |
| Australia          | 30.3    | 30.9    | 31.0    | 27.8    | 33.8    | 31.0      | 30.8 |
| Austria            |         |         | 29.5    | 24.3    | 22.7    | 23.7      | 25.1 |
| Bangladesh         |         | 41.8    | 33.8    | 36.9    | 33.6    | 41.2      | 37.5 |
| Belgium            |         |         | 32.1    | 28.2    | 23.4    | 26.8      | 27.6 |
| Bolivia            |         |         |         |         | 54.5    | 61.7      | 58.1 |
| Botswana           |         |         |         |         | 47.7    | 53.7      | 50.7 |
| Brazil             |         | 57.2    | 59.0    | 59.6    | 63.1    | 59.0      | 59.6 |
| Bulgaria           |         | 24.5    | 21.1    | 23.4    | 21.2    | 30.8      | 24.2 |
| Cameroon           |         |         |         |         | 49.0    | 50.8      | 49.9 |
| Canada             |         | 32.1    | 36.1    | 28.5    | 28.1    | 30.1      | 31.0 |
| Chile              |         |         | 44.0    | 47.1    | 57.4    | 59.5      | 52.0 |
| China Version 2    |         |         |         |         | 23.0    | 31.1      | 27.0 |
| Colombia           |         |         | 49.6    | 44.6    | 48.5    | 56.3      | 49.7 |
| Costa Rica         |         |         | 50.0    | 43.0    | 45.3    | 45.8      | 46.0 |
| Cote d'Ivoire      |         |         |         |         | 45.9    | 44.0      | 45.0 |
| Croatia            |         |         |         |         | 22.2    | 30.4      | 26.3 |
| Cuba               |         | 56.7    | 35.4    | 27.0    |         |           | 39.7 |
| Czech Republic     |         |         |         |         | 20.4    | 26.1      | 23.3 |
| Denmark            | 39.0    | 40.0    | 24.9    | 31.6    | 23.7    | 21.0      | 30.0 |
| Dominican Republic |         |         | 49.1    | 45.0    | 47.0    | 52.0      | 48.3 |
| Ecuador            |         |         |         |         | 43.7    | 58.8      | 51.3 |
| Egypt              |         | 37.0    | 35.0    | 38.0    |         |           | 36.7 |
| Estonia            |         |         |         |         | 24.0    | 36.4      | 30.2 |
| Finland            |         | 41.0    | 30.8    | 22.7    | 21.5    | 26.8      | 28.6 |
| France             |         | 47.6    | 34.0    | 32.8    | 32.7    | 29.3      | 35.3 |
| Germany            | 39.6    | 38.0    | 39.2    | 36.6    | 29.7    | 24.6      | 34.6 |
| Ghana              |         |         |         |         | 36.0    | 33.9      | 35.0 |
| Greece             |         | 41.1    | 46.3    | 41.3    | 37.0    | 32.3      | 39.6 |
| Guatemala          |         |         |         | 54.2    | 53.7    | 54.5      | 54.1 |
| Haiti              |         |         |         |         | 51.5    | 50.9      | 51.2 |
| Honduras           |         |         |         |         | 57.6    | 55.9      | 56.8 |
| Hong Kong          |         | 47.9    | 49.0    | 43.0    | 42.2    | 51.4      | 46.7 |
| Hungary            |         |         |         | 20.7    | 26.8    | 23.7      | 22.9 |
| India              |         | 32.5    | 30.2    | 30.9    | 27.7    | 36.0      | 31.5 |
| Indonesia          |         |         | 34.6    | 38.0    | 34.0    | 30.8      | 34.3 |
| Iran               |         |         | 41.9    | 46.0    | 42.9    | 44.0      | 43.7 |
| Ireland            |         |         |         | 36.6    | 36.0    | 30.1      | 34.2 |
| Israel             |         |         |         | 36.3    | 34.7    | 38.0      | 36.3 |
| Italy              |         |         | 39.0    | 37.5    | 29.8    | 29.8      | 35.6 |
| Jamaica            |         | 57.7    | 62.8    | 65.5    | 41.7    | 38.5      | 53.2 |
| Japan              |         | 36.0    | 41.4    | 33.4    | 31.2    | 31.9      | 34.8 |
| Jordan             |         |         |         | 36.5    | 36.0    | 36.3      | 36.3 |
| Kenya              | 70.0    | 68.0    | 68.0    |         | 57.3    | 55.6      | 63.8 |
| Korea              |         | 34.0    | 31.2    | 36.7    | 32.0    | 37.1      | 34.2 |
| Lesotho            |         |         |         |         | 63.0    | 69.0      | 66.0 |
| Luxembourg         |         |         |         |         | 26.4    | 30.2      | 28.3 |
| Malawi             |         |         |         | 53.1    | 59.9    | 49.3      | 54.1 |

Table 15: (continued)

| Country           | 1941-50 | 1951-60 | 1961-70 | 1971-80 | 1981-90 | 1991-2000 | Mean  |
|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|-------|
| Malaysia          |         | 42.0    | 50.0    | 50.6    | 49.1    | 50.0      | 48.3  |
| Mali              |         |         |         |         | 36.5    | 54.0      | 45.3  |
| Mauritania        |         |         |         |         | 42.4    | 38.3      | 40.4  |
| Mauritius         |         |         |         | 45.7    | 39.8    | 38.7      | 41.4  |
| Mexico            | 52.3    | 53.0    | 53.6    | 50.0    | 53.1    | 53.2      | 52.5  |
| Morocco           |         | 50.0    | 56.0    | 54.0    | 38.9    | 39.2      | 47.6  |
| Netherlands       | 41.0    | 44.4    | 36.2    | 28.1    | 32.1    | 32.0      | 35.6  |
| New Zealand       |         |         |         | 34.7    | 29.0    | 33.8      | 32.5  |
| Norway            |         | 38.8    | 30.5    | 31.3    | 25.2    | 28.8      | 30.9  |
| Pakistan          |         |         | 32.9    | 36.7    | 40.7    | 32.5      | 35.7  |
| Panama            |         |         | 58.7    | 47.6    | 52.0    | 56.8      | 53.8  |
| Peru              |         |         | 41.3    | 55.0    | 42.7    | 49.6      | 47.2  |
| Philippines       |         | 45.2    | 46.5    | 45.2    | 45.7    | 49.4      | 46.4  |
| Poland            |         |         |         | 23.1    | 28.3    | 34.2      | 28.5  |
| Portugal          |         |         |         | 36.8    | 33.5    | 36.8      | 35.7  |
| Romania           |         |         |         |         | 22.9    | 30.3      | 26.6  |
| Russia            |         |         |         |         | 26.9    | 48.3      | 37.6  |
| Singapore         |         |         | 49.8    | 39.5    | 47.0    | 46.7      | 45.8  |
| Slovak Republic   |         |         |         |         | 20.0    | 26.0      | 23.0  |
| Slovenia          |         |         |         |         | 23.0    | 24.8      | 23.9  |
| South Africa      |         |         | 51.0    | 49.0    | 63.0    | 59.0      | 55.5  |
| Spain             |         |         | 38.8    | 34.2    | 31.7    | 31.5      | 34.1  |
| Sri Lanka         |         | 47.3    | 35.3    | 27.6    | 46.0    | 61.0      | 43.4  |
| Sweden            |         |         | 29.5    | 20.4    | 24.6    | 26.7      | 25.3  |
| Switzerland       |         |         |         | 34.5    | 32.3    | 31.8      | 32.9  |
| Taiwan            |         | 43.9    | 29.9    | 27.7    | 30.9    | 31.2      | 32.7  |
| Tanzania          |         |         | 43.3    | 52.0    | 52.0    | 38.0      | 46.3  |
| Thailand          |         |         | 43.8    | 41.2    | 47.4    | 44.8      | 44.3  |
| Trinidad & Tobago |         |         |         | 46.1    | 42.6    | 49.3      | 46.0  |
| Tunisia           |         |         | 42.3    | 43.0    | 41.0    | 40.6      | 41.7  |
| Turkey            |         | 53.0    | 50.5    | 51.5    | 46.5    | 46.7      | 49.6  |
| United Kingdom    | 34.0    | 35.4    | 25.4    | 25.2    | 33.5    | 34.6      | 31.4  |
| United States     | 43.1    | 42.3    | 39.3    | 39.7    | 42.7    | 45.7      | 42.1  |
| Uruguay           |         |         |         |         | 42.4    | 44.3      | 43.4  |
| Venezuela         |         |         | 44.8    | 47.5    | 42.5    | 45.8      | 45.2  |
| Zimbabwe          |         |         |         |         | 56.6    | 73.1      | 64.8  |
| Mean              | 43.44   | 44.72   | 42.09   | 39.79   | 38.58   | 40.89     | 40.85 |

*Note:* Gini coefficient is taken from latest available data within the given period.

Table 16: Gini Coefficients Long-run

| Country            | 1931-50 | 1951-70 | 1971-90 | Mean |
|--------------------|---------|---------|---------|------|
| Australia          | 30.3    | 31.0    | 33.8    | 31.7 |
| Austria            |         | 29.5    | 24.3    | 26.9 |
| Bangladesh         |         | 33.8    | 33.6    | 33.7 |
| Belgium            |         | 32.1    | 23.4    | 27.7 |
| Brazil             |         | 59.0    | 63.1    | 61.0 |
| Bulgaria           |         | 21.1    | 21.2    | 21.1 |
| Canada             |         | 36.1    | 28.1    | 32.1 |
| Chile              |         | 44.0    | 57.4    | 50.7 |
| Colombia           |         | 49.6    | 48.5    | 49.0 |
| Costa Rica         |         | 50.0    | 45.3    | 47.6 |
| Cuba               |         | 35.4    | 27.0    | 31.2 |
| Denmark            | 39.0    | 24.9    | 23.7    | 29.2 |
| Dominican Republic |         | 49.1    | 47.0    | 48.0 |
| Egypt              |         | 35.0    | 38.0    | 36.5 |
| Finland            |         | 30.8    | 21.5    | 26.1 |
| France             |         | 34.0    | 32.7    | 33.4 |
| Germany            | 39.6    | 39.2    | 29.7    | 36.2 |
| Greece             |         | 46.3    | 37.0    | 41.6 |
| Honduras           |         | 62.0    | 57.6    | 59.8 |
| Hong Kong          |         | 49.0    | 42.2    | 45.6 |
| Hungary            |         | 20.4    | 26.8    | 23.6 |
| India              |         | 30.2    | 27.7    | 29.0 |
| Indonesia          |         | 34.6    | 34.0    | 34.3 |
| Iran               |         | 41.9    | 42.9    | 42.4 |
| Italy              | 41.7    | 39.0    | 29.8    | 36.8 |
| Jamaica            |         | 62.8    | 41.7    | 52.3 |
| Japan              |         | 41.4    | 31.2    | 36.3 |
| Kenya              | 70.0    | 68.0    | 57.3    | 65.1 |
| Korea              |         | 31.2    | 32.0    | 31.6 |
| Malaysia           |         | 50.0    | 49.1    | 49.5 |
| Mexico             | 52.3    | 53.6    | 53.1    | 53.0 |
| Morocco            |         | 56.0    | 54.0    | 55.0 |
| Netherlands        | 41.0    | 36.2    | 32.1    | 36.4 |
| Norway             |         | 30.5    | 25.2    | 27.9 |
| Pakistan           |         | 32.9    | 40.7    | 36.8 |
| Panama             |         | 58.7    | 52.0    | 55.4 |
| Peru               |         | 41.3    | 42.7    | 42.0 |
| Philippines        |         | 46.5    | 45.7    | 46.1 |
| Sierra Leone       |         | 44.5    | 63.7    | 54.1 |
| Singapore          |         | 49.8    | 47.0    | 48.4 |
| South Africa       |         | 51.0    | 63.0    | 57.0 |
| Spain              |         | 38.8    | 31.7    | 35.3 |
| Sri Lanka          |         | 47.3    | 46.0    | 46.6 |
| Sweden             | 41.0    | 29.5    | 24.6    | 31.7 |
| Taiwan             |         | 29.9    | 30.9    | 30.4 |
| Tanzania           |         | 43.3    | 52.0    | 47.6 |
| Thailand           |         | 43.8    | 47.4    | 45.6 |



Table 16: (continued)

| Country           | 1931-50 | 1951-70 | 1971-90 | Mean  |
|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|-------|
| Trinidad & Tobago |         | 46.0    | 46.1    | 46.1  |
| Tunisia           |         | 42.3    | 41.0    | 41.6  |
| Turkey            |         | 50.5    | 46.5    | 48.5  |
| United Kingdom    | 34.0    | 25.4    | 33.5    | 31.0  |
| United States     | 43.1    | 39.3    | 42.7    | 41.7  |
| Venezuela         |         | 44.8    | 42.5    | 43.7  |
| Mean              | 43.20   | 42.25   | 41.14   | 41.81 |

*Note:* Gini coefficient is taken from latest available data within the given period.

Table 17: Gini Coefficients Very Long-run

| Country            | 1950-70 | Mean |
|--------------------|---------|------|
| Australia          | 31.0    | 31.0 |
| Austria            | 29.5    | 29.5 |
| Bangladesh         | 33.8    | 33.8 |
| Barbados           | 41.8    | 41.8 |
| Belgium            | 32.1    | 32.1 |
| Brazil             | 59.0    | 59.0 |
| Bulgaria           | 21.1    | 21.1 |
| Canada             | 36.1    | 36.1 |
| Chile              | 44.0    | 44.0 |
| China              | 32.8    | 32.8 |
| Colombia           | 49.6    | 49.6 |
| Costa Rica         | 50.0    | 50.0 |
| Cuba               | 35.4    | 35.4 |
| Denmark            | 24.9    | 24.9 |
| Dominican Republic | 49.1    | 49.1 |
| Ecuador            | 63.0    | 63.0 |
| Egypt              | 35.0    | 35.0 |
| El Salvador        | 46.2    | 46.2 |
| Finland            | 30.8    | 30.8 |
| France             | 34.0    | 34.0 |
| Germany            | 39.2    | 39.2 |
| Greece             | 46.3    | 46.3 |
| Honduras           | 62.0    | 62.0 |
| Hong Kong          | 49.0    | 49.0 |
| Hungary            | 20.4    | 20.4 |
| India              | 30.2    | 30.2 |
| Indonesia          | 32.7    | 32.7 |
| Iran               | 41.9    | 41.9 |
| Italy              | 39.0    | 39.0 |
| Jamaica            | 62.8    | 62.8 |
| Japan              | 41.4    | 41.4 |
| Kenya              | 68.0    | 68.0 |
| Korea              | 31.2    | 31.2 |
| Malaysia           | 50.0    | 50.0 |
| Mexico             | 53.6    | 53.6 |
| Morocco            | 56.0    | 56.0 |
| Netherlands        | 36.2    | 36.2 |
| New Zealand        | 68.6    | 68.6 |
| Norway             | 30.5    | 30.5 |
| Pakistan           | 32.9    | 32.9 |
| Panama             | 58.7    | 58.7 |
| Peru               | 41.3    | 41.3 |
| Philippines        | 46.5    | 46.5 |
| Sierra Leone       | 44.5    | 44.5 |
| Singapore          | 49.8    | 49.8 |
| South Africa       | 51.0    | 51.0 |
| Spain              | 38.8    | 38.8 |

Table 17: (continued)

| Country           | 1950-70 | Mean  |
|-------------------|---------|-------|
| Sri Lanka         | 47.3    | 47.3  |
| Sudan             | 45.2    | 45.2  |
| Sweden            | 29.5    | 29.5  |
| Taiwan            | 29.9    | 29.9  |
| Tanzania          | 43.3    | 43.3  |
| Thailand          | 43.8    | 43.8  |
| Trinidad & Tobago | 46.0    | 46.0  |
| Tunisia           | 42.3    | 42.3  |
| Turkey            | 50.5    | 50.5  |
| United Kingdom    | 25.4    | 25.4  |
| United States     | 39.3    | 39.3  |
| Venezuela         | 44.8    | 44.8  |
| Mean              | 43.25   | 43.25 |

*Note:* Gini coefficient is taken from latest available data within the given period.

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## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Note that these findings differ from the Kuznets curve proposed by Kuznets (1955, 1963). While the Kuznets curve refers to the relationship between inequality and the level of income per capita, the more recent studies analyze the relationship between inequality and the growth rate of income per capita.

<sup>2</sup> Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) argue to the contrary that if redistribution leads to increased spending in education, then it can actually have a positive effect on growth.

<sup>3</sup> Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) consider primary school enrollment as a measure of human capital, as opposed to Perotti (1996), Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000) who use years of secondary schooling.

<sup>4</sup> The BACE approach combines diffuse priors with averaging of OLS estimators across models.

<sup>5</sup> This variable measures the cost of investment in a given country relative to the United States and is calculated as the purchasing power parity (PPP) over investment normalized by the exchange rate relative to the United States.

<sup>6</sup> Deininger and Squire (1996) compiled a total of around 2,600 observations, but only 682 satisfied the 3 criteria mentioned above.

<sup>7</sup> The only exception is that “[f]or most developed countries, estimates based on monetary incomes have been accepted since the inclusion of in-kind incomes and home production does not have a major effect on the income distribution” UNU-WIDER (2008a).

<sup>8</sup> A similar account is true for other studies that include the whole Deininger and Squire dataset. Forbes’s dataset is smaller due to the more stringent data requirements needed to run the Arellano-Bond estimator.

<sup>9</sup> The latest update of this database was made in May, 2008. The current version is V2.0c.

<sup>10</sup> Atkinson and Brandolini (2009) point out the dangers of picking data points from the UNU-Wider inequality dataset. While I followed the specified procedure as closely as possible, a few arbitrary decisions were made. I present detailed tables with the used inequality data at the end of the paper.

<sup>11</sup> This is the same as Deininger and Squire’s first requirement.

<sup>12</sup> This is the same as Deininger and Squire’s second requirement.

<sup>13</sup> This incorporates Deininger and Squire’s third requirement plus the specific classification criteria used by UNUWIDER.

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<sup>14</sup> In addition, because the inequality statistics based on income are not adjusted, in general I prefer income-based observations rather than consumption/expenditure-based observations.

<sup>15</sup> Here I follow the terminology used in the econometric literature, but I emphasize that in both cases the individual specific effects are considered to be random (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).

<sup>16</sup> Another issue that applies to both estimators is that as originally constructed, the standard errors of both estimators are systematically downward biased, especially when the instrument count is high. Windmeijer (2005) proposes a small-sample correction that deals with this problem.

<sup>17</sup> The logic of the test is the following. If the  $\mu_{it}$ 's are serially uncorrelated, then the disturbances in the differenced model,  $\Delta\mu_{it} = \mu_{it} - \mu_{it-1}$ , follow an MA(1) process and thus are correlated of order 1, but not correlated of order 2. On the contrary, if the disturbances  $\Delta\mu_{it}$  are correlated of order 2, it means that  $\mu_{it}$  are correlated. The test statistic  $m_2$  is asymptotically distributed as  $N(0,1)$ .

<sup>18</sup> The intuition of this test is that when a model is overidentified (i.e., when we have more instruments than parameters to be estimated), we can run a test on the original moment condition for the GMM estimator, which accounts for a test of the exogeneity of instruments. When the model is just identified, this moment condition is identically equal to zero. But, when the model is overidentified, the moment condition is not necessarily equal to zero and a test can be constructed.

<sup>19</sup> The difference-in Sargan test provides an overidentification test for the validity of the additional instruments used by the system-GMM estimator, i.e., the levels.

<sup>20</sup> The Gini coefficients used in the regressions and for the summary statistics are defined over the range 0-1; however, in the tables that present the Gini coefficients I show actual Gini coefficient over the range 0-100.

<sup>21</sup> Note that the sign of the coefficients on inequality and inequality squared required for an inverse-U relationship are the correct ones in all specifications, but they are significant only in the most restrictive ones. This differs from the results found with the database used by Forbes (2000). When I run the same regression with her data (not reported), the quadratic term on inequality is never significant.

<sup>22</sup> Note, however, that the linear coefficient on inequality is significant only at the 10% level.

<sup>23</sup> A Gini coefficient of 36 corresponds to the inequality level of Portugal, which has the highest inequality among Western European countries. This level is also significantly below the average historical level of inequality in the United States (see Table (14)).



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<sup>24</sup> Ideally, I should compare the same specifications over time. However, due to the different lengths of the panels, the appropriate specification does change when I analyze different period lengths.

<sup>25</sup> Because the panel is shorter, it is not possible to calculate Arellano-Bond tests for AR(2).

<sup>26</sup> See Table (9) below.

<sup>27</sup> To clarify, the lower x-axis is relevant only for depicting the long-run between inequality and growth, when it depends on the level of income. For the short, medium, and very long-run, the relationship can be read recurring only to the upper x-axis. Also, for comparability, in Figure 1 I assume that the constant term in all specifications is equal to 0.

<sup>28</sup> While the coefficient on the interaction effect is significant in the alternative specification, the implied threshold values are of the implausible order of  $e^{1000}$ .

<sup>29</sup> Recall that the Gini coefficients used in all regressions are re-scaled to the interval 0-1.