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### Author

Innes, Judith E.

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# Planning Theory's Emerging Paradigm: Communicative Action and Interactive Practice

Judith E. Innes

University of California at Berkeley  
Institute of Urban and Regional Development



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## Planning Theory's Emerging Paradigm: Communicative Action and Interactive Practice

### ■ CLOSING THE THEORY-PRACTICE GAP

The long-bemoaned gap between theory and practice in planning is closing<sup>1</sup> as a new type of planning theorist is beginning to dominate the field. These theorists make the gap complaint moot because they take practice as the raw material of their inquiry. In this they differ from their predecessors, who did primarily armchair theorizing and systematic thinking about planning. These new theorists pursue the questions and puzzles that arise in their study of practice, rather than those which emerge from thinking about how planning could or should be. These new planning scholars do grounded theorizing based on richly interpretive study of practice. Their purpose is, on the one hand, to document what planners do and, on the other, to reflect critically on that practice. They apply intellectual lenses that are new to planning to illuminate and critique what they see. They see planning as an interactive, communicative activity and depict planners as deeply embedded in the fabric of community, politics, and public decision-making. Their work has gained the attention of both planning academics and practicing planners because it is accessible and interesting. It does not have bottom-line prescriptions or simple models for how to proceed, but it has helped students and academics to see planning, and has helped planners to see themselves.

### ■ AN EMERGING PARADIGM FOR PLANNING THEORY

It is my contention that the new developments in planning theory amount to the construction of a paradigm, rather than simply an incremental adaptation of familiar methods and concepts. A paradigm can be regarded as the assumptions and practices of thought and research that a group of people share among themselves (Kuhn 1970). To be thought of as sharing a paradigm, scholars have to refer to each other, use each other's work, and address each other's puzzles. For a body of work to be viewed as representing a new paradigm rather than an extension of an older one, it would use little of the concepts or methods of the older one. The new one begins to frame the work of most of those in the field.

The communicative action theorists refer to a different set of intellectual mentors and literatures than do the systematic thinkers. They cross-reference each other and build on each other's work (e.g., Forester 1989; Healey 1992), while referring only infrequently to the work of the

systematic thinkers. They address different subjects and questions for different purposes, and they use different methods of inquiry and standards of evidence than do the systematic thinkers. Some of those who began in the systematic thinking approach are now producing work that uses the concepts of these communicative action theorists (Faludi 1992). Like any new paradigm, the communicative action approach is attractive because it answers questions unanswerable in earlier thought. At the same time, however, it raises new questions that it cannot answer and sets the scene for the next generation of inquirers.

If we are witnessing the birth of a planning theory paradigm, then it is right on schedule. There are probably 1,500 people today who hold a planning Ph.D.<sup>2</sup> The proportion of educators with a Ph.D. in planning is steadily increasing. Not surprisingly it is from these educators that the new theorists come. They come armed with the tools of social science research and driven by a need to understand the enterprise they have chosen for their career—to be intellectuals who can educate professionals for practical work in the real world. They have the luxury, far less available to an earlier generation of planning scholars, to speak to their peers at conferences and through the growing number of US and international planning journals. By contrast, the earlier generation of planning theorists had a reference group of people with degrees and academic appointments in other fields, who found the notion of planning practice to be of little intrinsic interest. The task that the earlier generation saw was to map the future terrain of planning. Now the task is to find out what that field has become and to point directions from there.

If a new paradigm is taking shape, coexisting with an earlier one (or with a set of ideas and practices that may never have been sufficiently coherent to be termed a paradigm), it is not surprising that educators cannot find coherence in the planning theory literature as a whole, nor agree on a common bibliography. While John Friedmann (1987) has helped all of us who write and teach planning theory with his remarkable history of planning thought and his categories for classifying planning theory, unless we recognize that a fundamental shift in the world view of planning theorists has occurred, we miss what is important and misclassify some of those theorists' work. If we pay attention, however, to the emergent paradigm, we not only can make more sense of planning theory as a field, but we also discover sources of creativity and renewal.

### ■ SYSTEMATIC THINKING ABOUT PLANNING

Thinking systematically about planning is a good way to describe the work of the predominant contributors to planning thought of the late 1960s and early 1970s. These theorists' purpose was to make persuasive arguments for how planning is or ought to be. Their work may have been tac-

itly informed by their knowledge—or even direct experience—of planning, but it seldom reported first-hand research. These theorists include those in Friedmann's categories of applied rationality and societal guidance, thinkers such as Etzioni (1968), Hirschman (1958, 1967), Lindblom (1959), Faludi (1973), and Rittel and Webber (1973). Throughout most of this work runs the tacit assumption that planners' purposes are to maximize welfare and solve problems. Planners do this through analysis that influences decisions, through the design of regulations and implementation strategies that will produce the desired outcomes, and by enabling or creating institutions like markets or voting rules that allow self-organizing systems to do the job. The planner is ideally and appropriately a rational man operating at arm's length from the messy world of politics. These theorists, for the most part, share a faith in instrumental rationality; they share the ideas that technology and knowledge can make the world work better and that planning can be an important tool for social progress.

The intellectual forebears of this group are embedded in positivist epistemology<sup>3</sup> and their work is on policy analysis, administrative behavior (Simon 1945), public choice theory (e.g., Olson 1965; Buchanan and Tullock 1962), neoclassical market theory (Friedman 1974), systems theory and systems analysis (Churchman 1968); incrementalism (Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963; Hirschman 1967), and others, spanning a wide range of disciplines and fields.

The systematic thinkers came up against the dilemmas inherent in instrumental rationality. Rittel and Webber (1973), for example, pointed out "wicked problems" which could not be solved because the problem definition kept shifting and there was no way to aggregate incommensurable values. The unsolvable puzzles were many, including the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), the prisoner's dilemma (Rapaport and Chammah 1965), the failure of collective action (Olson 1965), the limitations of cost-benefit analysis and other systematic analytic methods (Rivlin 1971), the indeterminacy of the implementation process (Bardach 1977; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973), the inevitability of uncertainty in goals and technology for planning problems (Christensen 1985), the impossibility of aggregating the public interest so that its optimization can be amenable to rational systematic analysis (Altshuler 1965), and the impossibility of relying on the large-scale model for societal guidance (Lee 1973).

## ■ PLANNING AS COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

The communicative action theorists find out what planning is by finding out what planners do, rather than postulating what planning ought to be. They do not talk about an abstract planner, but about specific ones. They pay attention to the messy part of planning that does not fit into a systematic framework. They build on the most fundamen-

tal of findings from their study of practice—that planning is more than anything an interactive, communicative activity. Systematic analysis and logical argumentation are but a tiny part of what this planner does. Communicative action theorists see planners as actors in the world rather than as observers or neutral experts. They not only do not premise their work on the idea that the planner's task is to use knowledge for managing society, many of them are worried about the planner's potential to exercise such power.

For ideas and inspiration, these theorists turn to a different array of social scientists and philosophers than do the systematic thinkers. They rely more on qualitative, interpretive inquiry than on logical deductive analysis, and they seek to understand the unique and the contextual, rather than make general propositions. These theorists tell stories and look for insights, rather than try to impose order and definition (Mandelbaum 1991). This planning theory has a lot of loose ends—so many that other theorists may not recognize it as theory at all.

The communicative action theorists are diverse, delving into many questions of practice and using a variety of intellectual lenses. The groups include many of the theorists Friedmann classifies as "behavioral approaches and communicative practice," and "social learning." The closest approximation to an exemplar thus far for those who do this type of theorizing is John Forester's (1989) *Planning in The Face of Power*. His fine-grained, detailed observational study of planners at work is framed and informed by ideas drawn from Habermas and Wittgenstein. It has been widely read and cited. Many others have brought important perspectives to bear on the study of practice. These include Allen (1994) (Habermas and Foucault); Baum (1983) (psychology); Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) (negotiation and consensus building), Throgmorton (1991) (discourse and rhetoric); Howe (1990, 1992, 1994) (ethics); Liggett (1991) and Peattie (1987) (representation); Bryson (1988) and Bryson and Crosby (1992, 1993) (Giddens and the design of processes); Christensen (1985) (organizational theory and intergovernmental relations); Healey (1992) and Healey et al. (1988) (institutional analysis and discourse); Flyvbjerg (1992) (Aristotle and Foucault); and Innes (1990) and de Neufville (1975, 1987) (social construction of knowledge), among others.

The intellectual mentors within planning whose writing and, most importantly, whose teaching helped most to set this direction for planning thought include John Friedmann, Jack Dyckmann, Richard Bolan, Melvin Webber, Lloyd Rodwin, Donald Michael, and Donald Schön. These scholars did not necessarily study practice themselves, but they raised the questions that challenged the student theorist's faith in the potential of systematic thinking as the answer. They personally taught many of the theorists of today. Some of them introduced social learning theory and the important work of the Frankfurt school of

critical theorists into planning thought, along with its questioning of the assumptions of scientific thinking and its fears of instrumental rationality as a tool of control.

Important social or political theorists outside of planning whose work has influenced the new planning theorists, include European theorists Heidegger, Foucault, Giddens, Wittgenstein and Habermas, and the American pragmatists Dewey and Pierce.<sup>4</sup>

## ■ THE STUDY OF PRACTICE

While communicative action theorists are too varied and too much in an exploratory mode for me to summarize their work here, I will briefly describe my own intellectual odyssey as a way to illuminate some of the important insights and questions that emerge in the study of practice. My odyssey moves from an early faith in the power of instrumental rationality through intensive qualitative studies of practice to a search for a new way to understand and improve planning. It led me to a fundamentally different perspective on planning and to the idea that the planning theorist's goal should be to help planners develop a new type of critical, reflective practice which is both ethical and creative.

The question of how to link knowledge and action led me into planning in 1965. I had been working for a congressman as a legislative assistant. It was my job to advise this man of few strong opinions and a safe seat. I had at my fingertips the information resources of the nation—lobbyists who provided data, professors who advised us on the latest research, and the Library of Congress, whose staff wrote a book for us when they could find nothing already written. I gathered and organized information and gave it to the congressman with my recommendation. He routinely thanked me and retired to his office to call a friend, whose advice he would take. I was frustrated. How could it be that with so much information, much of which was developed for public decision-making, I could not use it to influence the congressman? Was it his fault for being too political or too uninterested in the facts? Was it the fault of the information for not being well enough focused? Was it my fault for not knowing how to present it? Or was it something else?

In my planning studies at MIT my goal was to find out how and under what circumstances information affects decisions. The dissertation was my first venture into the study of practice. I looked historically at examples of success and failure in efforts to make indicators influential in policy making (de Neufville 1975). This research allowed me to see that many factors simultaneously came into play when an indicator became significant in policy making. I began to see that the answers to my question came in the form of stories. A different story was involved in each case, but patterns could be seen.

The most important overall conclusion was that information that influences is information that is socially con-

structed in the community where it is used.<sup>5</sup> To the extent that the users of the indicators had negotiated and agreed on their definitions, they paid attention to what the indicators showed once they were applied. This idea had far-reaching implications. Knowledge was linked directly to action without the intervening step of decision. Action often simply occurred once there was an agreement on the indicator and a shared understanding of the problem it reflected. Learning, deciding, and acting could not be distinguished. The linear, stepwise process, assumed by the model of instrumental rationality, where policymakers set goals and ask questions, and experts and planners answer them, simply did not apply (Innes 1990).

In other research, I found that technical information influenced action, but not by solving problems or providing the bottom line for a decision. Instead, it was the organizational routines and practices required to produce, analyze, present, and discuss such information that were important. Information became embedded in political agendas, and organizational attention focused on the issues it represented. The requirement for development and use of specific kinds of information altered who was empowered and legitimate to speak and which interests were represented. The result was to change the terms of public discourse and the taken-for-granted norms of collective action (Innes 1988).

These conclusions helped me to see how information could become influential, but they raised difficult methodological and ethical questions for a profession which purports to serve through expertise and trained judgment. A profession's legitimacy rests on its knowledge. The study of practice shows that what ordinary people know is at least as relevant as what is found through systematic professional inquiry, but we have no professional standards to evaluate what ordinary people know. Moreover, much of the important knowledge includes stories, myths, and the implicit understandings shared in a community (de Neufville and Barton 1987; Mandelbaum 1991). Indeed, the connection to such narratives is what makes the difference between information that is used and information that is not.

Social processes turn information into meaningful knowledge and knowledge into action. As a profession, however, we know little about developing or carrying out such processes. If professionals actually create such processes instead of following the rules of scientific inquiry, they have far more power and discretion than is legitimate, according to the norms that govern public choice. If knowledge that makes a difference is constructed through a process in which a planner is not only a player, but a guide and manager, initiating and framing questions and directing attention, then ethical principles for this planner become even more essential. We cannot assume that if consensus was reached, it represents truth. Participation in a common education and culture gives us common assumptions and blinds us to what might be obvious to others. No principle allows

planners to discriminate between a fair and informed process leading to some acceptable "truth" and a self-fulfilling process that produces misleading or distorted information and unjustified conclusions.

Most serious of all, knowledge that is generated and validated through social processes involving its users becomes embedded in the taken-for-granted assumptions and practices of these users. It becomes institutionalized and it is no longer examined, evaluated, or criticized. Like the unemployment indicator in the US, which was designed based on understandings and problems emerging from the Great Depression, the knowledge can, over time, come to misrepresent the problem, but it can be virtually impossible to change (de Neufville 1975).

Studies of practice by other planning researchers have left us in quandaries similar to mine. Forester's (1989) planner has substantial discretion—power—to frame problems, inform, and call attention to one point or another and, in the process, to empower or disempower individuals. But how does, or should, this planner decide how to frame issues or what to call attention to? Howe and Kaufman (1979) found that planners divided themselves into those who saw their role as technicians; those who saw themselves as political actors; and, the majority, who could not classify themselves either way, but felt strongly the competing pressures of both roles. The planners who wrote in Thomas and Healey's (1991) *Dilemmas of Planning Practice* are troubled by many of the same things that trouble US planners. They struggle to be ethical, but are beset by competing loyalties and mandates. As a group they are uncertain about what authority or knowledge gives them the legitimacy to act as they do. They are uneasy about the capacity of elected bodies to represent the public or to make morally acceptable, informed decisions. They are uncomfortable with the expert role for themselves, recognizing that they have their own biases and that expertise has its limits. They have strong beliefs about the kind of society that is desirable, but they do not know how to work toward this within their professional roles.<sup>6</sup>

## ■ COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: BUILDING THE INTELLECTUAL FRAMEWORK

My choice of the term *communicative action* to characterize this emerging paradigm reflects my view that Habermas' work, particularly his *Theory of Communicative Action* (Habermas 1984), is likely to provide the principal framework for the new planning theory. This work has already had significant influence on many planning theorists, because it confronts directly many of the concerns that emerge from a study of practice. In particular, it directly confronts their practical and ethical worries about professional knowledge. A few points should suggest why this work, along with the thinking of other Frankfurt School critical theorists, has such appeal.

First, critical theorists contend that the scientific method not only does not produce simple truth, it can conceal as much as it reveals. Science can be a tool for manipulation. Science and other ways of knowing are shaped and distorted by power in a society. While there may be a reality or truth out there, it is hidden under the socially constructed understandings, theories, and assumptions shared in a society. These, in turn, embody an existing set of power relationships. Socially constructed concepts can colonize the lifeworld, blinding us to the deeper reality of our own experience.

While Habermas, unlike some other critical theorists, argues that there is a role for instrumental rationality and scientific method, and thus makes his work acceptable to professionals in many fields, he focuses his attention on the development of critical or emancipatory ways of knowing that are designed to get past the embedded power relations in a society. These ideas are attractive to planners because, rather than forcing them to try for a value-neutral, expert role in which they do not believe, they offer planners the possibility of an ethical stance within the world as they experience it. The principles for emancipatory knowing fit with the basic inclination of many planners. Habermas argues, as do most critical theorists and American pragmatists, that it is not only appropriate to be motivated by practical interest in political and social life, but also that such motivation leads to knowledge. To achieve such emancipatory knowledge, the planner must start by challenging assumptions because hidden within these are power relations. Such challenge comes naturally to planners because of their multidisciplinary education and skeptical view of expertise. Critical theorists go a step further by contending that the knower's responsibility is to oppose the status quo because doing so allows the revelation of what is hidden. While from a practical standpoint this is difficult for a professional, planners are reformers at heart. They find it encouraging to think that the reformer urge need not be at odds with professionalism.

The method of knowing, according to Habermas, involves several elements. One element is self-reflection, designed to identify one's own rationalizations and uncover what is hidden in the self. A second, crucial concept is that emancipatory knowing comes from discourse or dialectic. Such discourse can illuminate the many sides of reality and, if designed properly, can uncover the rationalizations which reinforce power relations. A third way of knowing comes through praxis. That is, those who have long experience and know-how play a part in uncovering reified concepts and assumptions. This practical know-how is itself part of knowledge. Theory and practice intertwine in emancipatory knowing. Theory only makes sense through practice and vice versa. Finally, this method of critique can lead to action through a conversion experience.

These principles for emancipatory knowing are not only compatible with the ways planners actually go about

generating knowledge and influencing action, they provide some broad guidance for their practice. For Forester's planners, critical self-reflection is crucial, as is taking the part of the oppressed to assure they use their power in ethical ways. Planners, in many contexts where knowledge and values are in contention, have created innovative, stakeholder-based, consensus-building processes. Habermas (1984) spells out a process for learning and deciding that bears a close resemblance to such practices and which provides principles for managing these processes, such as assuring representation of all major points of view, equalizing information among group members, and creating conditions within the group so that the force of argument can be the deciding factor rather than an individual's power outside the group. This form of learning is termed communicative rationality by Habermas.

Several other rich literatures also offer the new planning theory important opportunities for insightful reflection on practice. As planning is a communicative activity, language, discourse, and representation have become crucial foci for theorists (e.g., Throgmorton 1991; Peattie 1987). Feminist theory, with its emphasis on empowerment and disempowerment and the ways these occur in the world, and its interest in language and in the uncovering of hidden assumptions also provides a rich set of ideas that address the questions raised in the study of practice (Sandercock and Forsyth 1990). Finally, on the question of how knowledge and power are linked, Foucault (1980 1983) has begun to provide powerful inspiration for planning research (Fischler 1993).

#### ■ FURTHER DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

The combination of the introduction of critical theory into planning thought with the growing corpus of research on practice has opened new problematics for inquiry, which have in turn led theorists into further literatures in search of answers. Several topics will, I believe, become central to the new planning theory. The first is institutional design. The critical practitioner cannot operate within the same institutions nor follow the same norms as those envisioned by an earlier generation. Stakeholder, consensus-building approaches run counter to government by bureaucracy and elected officials. Planners themselves have never fit easily into the latter context, finding themselves equally uncomfortable with the rigidity of bureaucracy and with politician's adaptiveness to public opinion. Some of the new planning theorists have begun to give attention to the design of new institutional forms for the new planning. Bryson and Crosby (1992), Healey (1992), Bolan (1991), Innes (1992a), Innes et al. (1994), and Neuman (1993) are among the theorists who have begun this work. The work of Giddens (1984), Ostrom (1990), and Putnam (1993) are likely to become important inspirations for the institutional design for the new planning in the coming years.

A closely related emerging theme is ethics. Ethics and

institutions are inseparable because norms and values are embedded in the practices of those institutions. If institutions change, so must the ethical principles, and vice versa. Widespread disillusionment with the paradigm of instrumental rationality in a profession opens ethical questions about the legitimacy of professional knowledge. Acceptance of the professional as an interested participant and designer of communicative processes means that planning theory cannot ignore the question of which or whose values must be represented. These are not the limited professional ethics questions that have commonly been addressed in planning curricula, but much broader substantive and procedural ethics. Planning theorists are delving into important philosophical traditions to find those that fit with emerging planning institutions and practices. Harper and Stein (1992) provide an excellent overview of normative ethics for planning theorists, as does Howe (1990, 1992, 1994).

#### ■ TEACHING PLANNING THEORY

Many of my own ideas about communicative rationality and its centrality to learning grew out of a teaching workshop I attended in 1985.<sup>7</sup> The central message of this five-day workshop was that effective teaching requires the teacher to relinquish the authority role while assisting the students to take over their own learning processes. The teachers of this workshop demonstrated this idea by forcing us (often reluctantly) out of the roles of passive listeners into the roles of participants. Our attention flagged after 20 minutes or so of lecture. But when we had a task to do our interest picked up. We became engaged in lively discussion among ourselves, often as the workshop leader simply watched. We could try out our ideas on each other even if we were very uncertain about the subject (German was my biggest problem), and we would gradually reach a way of understanding that gave us some confidence. I will never forget the object lesson when, in a dry abstract lecture, a calculus professor first tried to teach us about derivatives. Most of us had long since forgotten calculus and were not even motivated to pay attention. At best, we could follow the logic but not the implications. When, however, he divided us into groups and gave us a sheet of paper with various curves and lines on it, asking us to tell which were tangent, we immediately engaged in intense discussion and even argument, which we finally resolved by asking him the question he wanted us to ask: what is the definition of a tangent? By then we wanted to know, and we recognized the complex possibilities that the definition would have to address. At this point he could continue his lecture with our attention and understanding.

This experience gave me the object lesson that learning by doing has far more power than simply learning by reading or listening and that social learning—learning as part of a group effort—has important advantages over the solitary investigation of the lonely researcher. It reinforced

and gave deeper meaning to what I had learned in my research on planning practice about the importance of the processes of social construction of information in planning. It meshed well with the literature I had begun to explore on group processes, consensus building, and negotiation. I began to see what communicative rationality could mean.

What more appropriate strategy then but to teach communicative rationality by enacting it in the classroom? My own planning theory course, "Knowledge and Action in Planning," has involved primarily doctoral students over the past few years. Many of the materials were too difficult and inaccessible for any but the most motivated students. We explored texts, with students assigned to teach different portions of the seminar; we did role-playing exercises and tried to make the difficult epistemological writings into ideas meaningful to the students and to planning. Where they were available, we read case material and applications to planning.

In the last two or three years, however, the explosion of thoughtful research and reflections on the communicative aspects of planning practice<sup>8</sup> has made the teaching of planning as communicative action a practical option for professional masters students. Suddenly the abstract philosophical ideas are embodied in real stories of real planners and real problems.

My view is that planning theory should now be divided into two parts. We should be teaching, first, the history of planning thought. This course can deal with all the important perspectives of the last 40 years, perhaps even going back further to incorporate the significant writers on urban form and space such as Howard, Mumford, Stein, Kent, and others so often invisible in planning curricula today. The advantage of this history rubric is that the professor is not required to explain the coherence or logic of relationships among readings in the course. The focus can be on the contexts, events, and understandings over time that framed the work of these varied thinkers. The course can be linked to a history of the profession and of the city. Its purpose can be to help planners not to reinvent the past, but to learn from it and to build on it.

A second course for masters students should focus on theories of planning practice. Much of this would involve recent work, though a few earlier writings such as Altshuler's (1965) *City Planning Process* might be included. This course would be primarily about planning as communicative action, because the research on practice typically demonstrates that this is a good rubric for understanding practice. The objective of teaching planning theory to Masters students is, in my view, to help them become reflective, creative practitioners. The purpose is to give them tools or lenses through which they can see planning and understand how it works. It is to give them ethical guides for practice and frameworks to create the new processes and institutions that will be needed in the future. From this point of view, the new plan-

ning theory serves well as the organizing framework.

Such a planning theory course should be taught as a learn-by-doing-and-experiencing course. It should not only offer the students key readings and lectures on the issues, but also bring in reflective practitioners to speak with the students who are primed with questions about practice, ethics, and politics. It should include miniexercises in communicative practice for the students and assignments which expose them to real-world practice, such as following planners around for a day or interviewing them about their work and critically assessing what they hear.

In the effort to create better planning theory courses for Master students, we must not neglect the Ph.D. students, nor assume that the Masters level of education on planning theory is sufficient for them. They will still need to grapple with the difficult texts in philosophy and social theory and still need the capability and the motivation to search through the various literatures that can provide planning with effective ways of understanding and acting on the difficult challenges that continue to emerge. It is these students who will continue to advance our field and they must be prepared for the task.

Judith E. Innes

Judith E. Innes is Professor of City and Regional Planning and Director of the Institute of Urban and Regional Development at University of California, Berkeley, California 94720-1870 USA.

#### ■ NOTES

1. This gap was discussed in a paper in this journal in 1983 by de Neufville, and the point has been made many times in the literature in the last decade.
2. Eight hundred people graduated with a Ph.D. in planning between 1978 and 1990 and I would estimate another 700 before and since (Innes 1992a).
3. See Bernstein (1971 and 1976) for useful overviews of positivism in social and political theory.
4. Dryzek (1987) provides an excellent review of the earlier modes of thought to show how they are inadequate for environmental planning. Then in *Discursive Democracy* (Dryzek 1990), he outlines a version of communicative action theory for policy making, relying heavily on Habermas and linking it to negotiation and mediation. See Innes (1995).
5. The most important book for me in making sense of what I had found was Berger and Luckmann's (1967) careful exploration of how what we take as reality is formed through social processes which combine subjective and objective knowledge.
6. Much of this is adapted from Innes (1994).
7. Sponsored by Great Lakes College Association, in Albion Michigan.
8. See, for example, the collection by Fischer and Forester (1993) and Mandelbaum et al. (in press).

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