Title
Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Campaign Strategies, Political Parties, and the Puzzle of Asian American Under-participation in Electoral Politics

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Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Campaign Strategies, Political Parties, and the Puzzle of Asian American Under-participation in Electoral Politics

By

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Abstract

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Asian Americans' peculiar combination of high levels of socioeconomic attainment, high rates of citizenship acquisition, and low rates of voting defies conventional sociological theories of assimilation, which tend to view political integration as occurring in step with socioeconomic integration; and traditional political science theories of political engagement, which emphasize socioeconomic determinants of participation. It also complicates the position advanced by some social scientists that Asian Americans are "becoming white." Beyond the theoretical puzzle, low rates of electoral participation from one of the fastest-growing segments of the American population have sobering implications for the practice of democratic self-governance and the representativeness of public policies.

In this dissertation, I approach the puzzle of Asian American under-participation in electoral politics from a contextual perspective by investigating how different political contexts change the extent to which Asian Americans under-participate in the electoral process. I employ a multi-method research design, beginning with statistical analyses that identify the correlates of under-registration and under-voting among Asian American citizens. I find that it is at the registration stage where Asian American "exceptionalism" in the sense of an unusually large and unexplained degree of under-participation in electoral participation occurs. I then perform an in-depth comparison of two California counties that differ substantially in their magnitude of Asian American under-registration relative to whites, and in their values of the correlates.

I find that the incentives for electoral candidates and political parties to target Asian Americans for registration differ substantially between the two counties, and that the mobilization strategies that follow from those uneven incentives are what accounts for the difference between the counties in the degree of Asian American under-registration. I conclude that, when political agents are incentivized to target Asian Americans for mobilization, the gap in voter registration between socioeconomically comparable Asian and white American citizens is significantly reduced. The missing piece in the puzzle of Asian American under-participation in electoral politics is political mobilization.

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Chapter 1
Introduction: Forever Non-Voters? The Puzzle of Asian American Under-participation in Electoral Politics

In scholarly literatures that assess how immigrant and racialized minority populations fare in comparison to native-born whites in the United States, Asian Americans occupy a curious position. On the one hand, Asian Americans have been noted for having relatively high levels of educational and occupational attainment and income, surpassing whites in education and roughly equaling them in income[1] (Zeng and Xie 2004; Alba and Nee 2003; Goyette and Xie 1999; Iceland 1999; Kao 1995); and for having the highest rates of naturalization among immigrant populations (Junn and Matto 2008; Ong et al. 2008; Citrin and Highton 2002; Yang 2002; Lien 2001). On the other hand, Asian Americans have the lowest rates of formal political participation of any racialized group in the United States, being underrepresented both among voters and in national and local political offices (Ong et al. 2008; Lien et al. 2004; Citrin and Highton 2002; Lien 2001).

Asian Americans' peculiar combination of high levels of socioeconomic attainment, high rates of citizenship acquisition[2], and low rates of voting defies conventional sociological theories of assimilation, which tend to view political integration as occurring in step with socioeconomic integration (Bloemraad 2007; Lien et al. 2004); and traditional political science theories of political engagement, which emphasize socioeconomic determinants of participation. It also complicates the position advanced by some social scientists that Asian Americans are "becoming white" (Alba and Nee 2003; Yancey 2003). Beyond being theoretically puzzling, low rates of electoral participation from one of the fastest-growing segments of the American population have sobering implications for the practice of democratic self-governance and the representativeness of public policies.

In this dissertation, I approach the puzzle of Asian American under-participation in electoral politics from a contextual perspective by investigating how different political contexts change the extent to which Asian Americans under-participate in the electoral process. I employ a multi-method research design, beginning with statistical analyses that clarify the nature of under-participation and identify the correlates of under-registration and under-voting among Asian American citizens. I then perform an in-depth, qualitative examination of the mechanisms that underlie the statistical findings. I find that, when political agents—in particular, political candidates and political parties—target Asian Americans for mobilization, the gap in voter registration between

[1] It is important, however, to recognize that there is a great deal of socioeconomic heterogeneity within the Asian American population, particularly across different national origin groups (Lien 2004; Woo 2000; Iceland 1999). Asian Americans tend to cluster at both the high and low ends of socioeconomic measures (a bimodal distribution), resulting in what Zheng and Xie (2004) describe as "a high average and a large dispersion" (p. 1076). Moreover, returns to education and occupational status may be smaller for Asian Americans than for whites (Zeng and Xie 2004; Alba and Nee 2003; Barringer et al. 1990; Nee and Sanders 1985), and Asian Americans may encounter a "glass ceiling" beneath the highest managerial levels in the corporate economy (Alba and Nee 2003; Woo 2000).

[2] High rates of naturalization can be seen as incongruous with low rates of voting because, aside from being a prerequisite for voting among the foreign-born, naturalization is viewed by some to be driven by the same bundle of social and attitudinal forces that drive voting (Bloemraad 2006; Citrin and Highton 2002).

socioeconomically comparable Asian and white American citizens is significantly narrowed. The missing piece in the puzzle of Asian American under-participation in electoral politics is political mobilization.

In the following two sections, I review the extant literatures on individual and contextual determinants of electoral participation and consider how Asian American under-participation is addressed within each theoretical approach.

Traditional and Immigrant Models of Voting Participation

Traditional models of voting participation emphasize socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of individuals, particularly education, income, and age (Brady et al. 1995; Leighley 1995;Uhlaner et al. 1989;Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Education, the strongest predictor of voting, elevates electoral participation by fostering cognitive, civic, and political skills, increasing political knowledge, exposing people to participatory norms, and increasing the likelihood of being mobilized. Income's independent effect on voting is weaker than that of education, but italso enhances the likelihood of voting, in part because it increases exposure to mobilization and in part because it lowers the relative costs of voting. Like education and income, age increases political exposure and experience, and it has a positive effect on voting until very advanced ages. All three variables have demonstrated consistently robust predictive power in studies examining voting behavior.

All racialized minority groups in the United States have lower aggregate rates of electoral participation than whites (Xu 2005; Citrin and Highton 2002; Lien 2001). However, when education, income, and age are held constant, the difference between blacks and whites disappears; in fact, in some elections, blacks are more likely to vote than whites with comparable backgrounds (Xu 2005; Lien 2004; Citrin and Highton 2002; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Lien 1994; Bobo and Gilliam 1990). The gap between Latinos and whites also is reduced substantially, although not entirely eliminated, once socioeconomic and demographic factors are taken into account (Xu 2005; Lien 2004; Citrin and Highton 2002; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Lien 1994; Uhlaner et al. 1989). By contrast, accounting for background variables does not appreciably reduce the gap between Asians and whites (Xu 2005; Lien 2004; Citrin and Highton 2002; Lien 2001; Lien 1994; Uhlaner et al. 1989). While socioeconomic variables do have sizable and statistically significant positive effects on Asian Americans' voting behavior (Wong et al. 2008; Ramakrishnan 2005), even at the highest levels of education and income, they participate at lower levels than others.

Given that the Asian American population consists of a higher percentage of foreign-born individuals than any other racial group[3], it is plausible that Asian Americans' low rates of participation in electoral politics stem in part from non-citizenship[4] or unfamiliarity with the American political system due to recentness of arrival, both of which might be expected to dampen voting rates for any group, not just Asian Americans. A survey of the literature on Asian American voting reveals that while

[3] According to data from the 2000 U.S. Census, 68.5% of Asian Americans are foreign-born.

[4] Although the foreign-born Asian American population has the highest rate of naturalization of all immigrant populations in the United States, with the vast majority acquiring citizenship within 10 years of arrival (Citrin&Highton 2002), the percentage of citizens in the Asian American population at any given time may be moderate due to the continuing influx of new immigrants.

non-citizenship does indeed explain some of the voting gap between Asian Americans and non-Hispanic whites (Wong et al. 2008; Lien et al. 2004; Citrin and Highton 2002), a substantial gap remains *even among citizens* (Citrin and Highton 2002; Lien 2001; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). Foreign-born status contributes modestly to the gap among citizens, with foreign-born Asian American citizens being somewhat less likely to vote than native-born Asian American citizens (Xu 2005; Ong and Nakanishi 2003; Citrin and Highton 2002).[5] Strikingly, a substantial gap persists between Asians and whites *even among the native-born* (Ong et al. 2008; Ramakrishnanand Espenshade 2001). Most interesting of all are the findings by Ramakrishnan (2005) and Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) that improvements in voting do not appear to extend much beyond the second generation among Asian Americans. Thus, the gap in voting between Asian Americans and white Americans cannot be said to be an exclusively immigrant phenomenon; even third and later generations of Asian Americans do not exhibit electoral parity with native-born, non-Hispanic whites.

Contextual Influences on Participation

The persistence of the electoral participation gap between Asian and white American citizens after controlling for individual socioeconomic, demographic, and immigration characteristics has led to interest in uncovering contextual factors that may contribute to diminished participation among Asian Americans. Before turning to the nascent literature on the relationship between context and Asian American political participation, I will first review the general body of work on contextual influences on participation. This body is rapidly growing, although, as Cho and Rudolph (2008) remark, it "can be described as being in much earlier stages of research [compared to the literature on individual-level determinants]" (p. 286). Many studies examining the effects of social and political environments on individual political behavior observe the tendency of communities to produce relative conformity in political behavior (e.g., relatively high or low rates of participation, or a lopsided partisan balance). A key task in these studies is to illuminate the mechanism(s) through which geographic clustering occurs. Several empirically-supported theories of how spatial proximity shapes political behavior have emerged from this literature, including elite mobilization by parties and campaigns (Cho and Rudolph 2008; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Krassa 1988; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), community identification and motivated conformity to perceived norms (Overbye 1995; Krassa 1988; Putnam 1966; Campbell et al. 1960), social interaction with neighbors and through organized social networks (Cho and Rudolph 2008; Krassa 1988; Putnam 1966), and casual observation of low-intensity environmental cues (Cho and Rudolph 2008; Baybeck and McClurg 2005; Krassa 1988).

Another strand of contextual effects research focuses on the *interaction* between individual and contextual characteristics, noting both that context moderates individual effects, and that individual characteristics moderate contextual influences (Huckfeldt 1979). Such studies emphasize the differential effect that the same context may have on people with varying individual attributes. In particular, minorities—understood broadly

[5] In addition to being unfamiliar with the U.S. political system, some first-generation immigrants may be oriented more towards homeland politics than U.S. politics, but as their duration of stay in the U.S. increases, their likelihood of voting rises appreciably (Ramakrishnan 2005; Xu 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001).

as people whose individual characteristics are incongruous with those that predominate in their social and political environments—can withdraw from participation even in communities whose norms favor generally high levels of participation (Dyck et al. 2009; Gimpel et al. 2004; Huckfeldt 1979). Minorities who feel at odds with the majority population may have a reduced sense of facility or efficacy, and majority members and institutions may be less likely to target them for mobilization (Gimpel et al. 2004; Huckfeldt 1979).

Having summarized the broader literature on contextual effects, I now review the subset of the literature that focuses specifically on Asian Americans. Only a handful of studies have empirically examined the effects of social and political contexts on the voting behavior of Asian Americans. Many of these studies investigate, among other contextual influences, the effect of Asian concentration, Asian ethnic concentration, or Asian population size, on Asian Americans' voting participation.

Asian or Asian ethnic concentration can serve as a proxy for many things, among them contact with or exposure to ethnic media, community organizations, interest groups, political parties and candidate organizations. Communities with higher concentrations of Asians are more likely to produce Asian American organizations (Okamoto 2006), and Asian American organizations in turn promote Asian collective action (Okamoto 2003) and may also encourage voting (Diaz 2012). Additionally, interest groups, political parties, and candidate organizations may find it more cost-effective to target geographically concentrated groups and ethnic/immigrant communities that are reachable via ethnic media and community organizations (Ramakrishnan 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). In addition to being a "positive" proxy, as in the examples above, Asian or Asian ethnic concentration can also serve as a measure of residential isolation and political capital/information flow, with the assumption that higher levels of concentration indicate lower levels of political capital/information flow (Cho et al. 2006).

Results for Asian concentration indicate a generally positive relationship: net of other variables, researchers have found a positive effect on voting (without distinguishing between registration and turnout among the registered) at the state level (Ramkrishnan 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001); no effect on voting (without distinguishing between registration and turnout among the registered) at the metropolitan area level (Ramakrishnan 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001); and a positive effect on both registration and turnout among the registered at the county level for Asian Americans who are employed (Diaz 20120)[6].

For Asian ethnic concentration, however, Cho et al. (2006) find a negative relationship between living amongst immigrant co-ethnics and turnout among the registered at the census tract level; the authors attribute the negative effect to reduced interaction with individuals who have participatory political inclinations, such as middle-class whites. They note, however, that the direction and degree of the neighborhood effect is contingent upon the size of the co-ethnic group in the broader location, with Koreans and Chinese in California being less negatively affected by neighborhood co-ethnic concentration than those outside of California, Asian Indians in California not negatively affected at all by increasing proportions of co-ethnics, and Japanese in

[6] However, Diaz (2012) also finds a decreased likelihood of registration among employed Asian Americans who live in counties with a higher concentration of *foreign-born* Asians.

California *positively* affected by higher levels of co-ethnics[7]. They suggest that, in the California context, larger concentrations of each group are more likely to be targeted for mobilization by parties and candidates.

Jang (2009) takes an alternative approach to the studies discussed above by operationalizing political context as the *absolute size* of the Asian American population and proposing a rational choice-based argument: increases in group size enhance perceptions of the group-level benefits of participation by increasing the number of others who would gain an average benefit. He finds that Asian Americans who live in counties with larger Asian American populations are more likely to register to vote, and to turn out once registered, than those who live in counties with smaller numbers of Asian Americans.[8]

While the mechanisms and nuances of the relationship between Asian American population density and size and voting participation have yet to be fully understood, the results of these studies, taken together, suggest that, at least for geographic areas larger than census tracts, Asian Americans who live amongst other Asian Americans are more inclined to participate in the electoral process than those who do not. This impression is further strengthened by related findings, such as a positive relationship between county-level Asian heterogeneity and voting among the registered for highly educated Asian Americans (Diaz 2012); a positive effect on both registration and voting among the registered of living in a county with a national Asian ethnic organization (Diaz 2012); and a positive effect on voting among the registered of living in a traditional Asian gateway city as compared to a small Asian American settlement (Wong et al. 2011). The next step is to empirically investigate the *processes* that account for these relationships

Beyond Asian or Asian ethnic concentration and group size, do other aspects of Asian Americans' social and political environments affect their likelihood of electoral participation? Field experiments reveal that live phone-banking directed at low-propensity registered Asian American voters can produce single-digit percentage-point increases in turnout when a single call is made (Bedolla and Michelson 2008), and double-digit increases when a second call is made to those who had indicated an intention to vote during the first call (Michelson et al. 2009). When a lack of personal connection to the voting process deters individuals from voting, a live invitation to participate can "make the voter feel that the political process is more inclusive, or it can temporarily increase his or her feelings of personal efficacy" (Bedolla and Michelson 2008 p. 18). Further, live calls can cue "the social norm of voting, which makes a difference among those voters for whom conforming to that norm matters" (Michelson et al. 2009, pp. 1559-1560).

In the realm of observational studies, Ramakrishnan (2005) finds limited effects of the closeness of political contests and the number of 501(c)(3) organizations per

[7] In a similar vein, Diaz (2012) finds that employed Asian Americans who live in counties with greater proportions of Japanese are more likely to register to vote, although her finding pertains to counties both within and outside of California.

[8] Jang (2009) elaborates: "though the estimated coefficient of *Group Size* is indistinguishable from zero when modeled by itself or with *Group income*, it is statistically significant and positive when *Heterogeneity* is included in the model. However, in contrast to our expectations, both of the two interaction terms turn out to be insignificant, implying that the economic status of group and racial heterogeneity may not be good indicators of changes in perceptions of group-level participatory benefits among Asian Americans" (p. 525).

capita, but a positive effect of the average rate of voting participation in past presidential elections, on voting among adult citizens at the state level. At the county level, Wong et al. (2011) find no effect on voting among the registered for living where ballot initiatives are offered, the expected negative effect of living where nonpartisan local elections are held, and an unexpected negative effect of living in a battleground county. They comment, "Though residents in battleground regions are usually highly coveted electoral resources, the effect seems absent among Asian Americans. Interestingly, among [survey respondents], those living in county battlegrounds are no more likely to report being mobilized by a party or candidate than those living elsewhere" (pp. 299-300).

That so many political context variables with well-established positive effects on voting participation have no effect, or even a negative effect, on Asian Americans, suggests that Asian Americans have a more complicated relationship with the political forces that influence the broader population. This recalls insights from the strand of contextual effects research, discussed earlier, that focuses on the differential effect that the same context may have on people with varying individual attributes, particularly those who embody minority status. However, studies have yet to explicitly model interactions between contextual variables and the effect of being Asian.

The relationship between Political Context and the Magnitude of Asian-American Under-participation

In this study, I directly address the issue of inequality in electoral participation between Asians and whites by investigating how the effect of being Asian changes alongside changes in political context. Thus, in contrast to the reviewed studies, which examine the effects of social and political contexts on the voting behavior of Asian Americans alone, I focus on how social and political contexts change the disadvantage of being Asian relative to being white. Asians are compared with whites because the "mystery" of Asian American under-participation in electoral politics is really about why Asians, who now equal or surpass whites in terms of the major predictors of voting, continue to lag so far behind in actual voting. I find that the same social and political contexts matter differently for whites and Asians, and that certain contexts are able to reduce, eliminate, or even reverse the negative effect on electoral participation of being Asian.

Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) have demonstrated that people are far more likely to participate in electoral politics when they are mobilized, and that it is the strategic choices of political leaders that determines *who* gets mobilized and *when* they get mobilized. I argue that, at the center of the answer to the puzzle of why Asian Americans overwhelmingly under-participate in electoral politics is the separation of the voting act into two stages—registration and vote-casting—and the heavy concentration of political mobilization at the stage of vote-casting. The American election system increasingly incentivizes political agents to focus mobilization efforts on those who have, on their own initiative, completed the crucial first stage of the voting process. This does not bode well for citizens who are under-socialized in the practice of voting in the American context, most notably immigrants and members of groups who have historically been excluded or discouraged from participating in the electoral process. The Asian American population is especially impacted, being composed of immigrants, the children of immigrants, and third-plus generation Asians whose forbears were denied citizenship in the U.S. until the

second half of the 20th century. Indeed, as I will show in Chapter 2, Asian Americans are strikingly less likely to register to vote than any other racial group, well into the third-plus generation.

Of course, under-socialization can be countered by mobilization, as occurs with registration drives (Cain and McCue 1985; Vedlitz 1985). However, registration drives tend to be targeted to those with low levels of socioeconomic resources (Fawcett et al. 1988; Cain and McCue 1985), and Asian Americans do not fit the bill. As expressed by a political consultant whom I interviewed for this study, "I think the general perception on the part of non-Asians is Asians are well-educated and wealthy, and for that reason, I mean you don't go organize college graduates, you don't go organize Jews…I just think that there's an assumption on the part of non-Asian, meaning white, political players that [the Asian] community is a sophisticated community that will take care of itself." Under some circumstances, however, Asians are in fact politically targeted for registration, as I will show in Chapters 3 and 4. When this occurs, the likelihood of Asian American registration improves dramatically, thus demonstrating that political mobilization is a key determinant of Asian American registration.

In response to the question of why people do not take part in politics, Brady et al. (1995) suggest three broad reasons: (1) lack of resources ("they can't"); (2) lack of psychological engagement with politics ("they're not interested"); and (3) isolation from recruitment networks ("nobody asked"). The literature specifically addressing voter registration tends to emphasize the first two points: people do not register because it is prohibitively costly for them to do so, or because they are uninterested in doing so (Highton 2004). Less often highlighted is the third category of non-participation, lack of mobilization. As I will elaborate in the last chapter, the omission of mobilization as a causal variable within the literature that explains why people do or do not register to vote is unjustified and requires modification.

Implications for Assimilation Theory

The failure of Asian Americans to attain electoral parity with whites in spite of their high levels of educational and occupational attainment and income, and the fact that the inequality persists into the third-plus generation, could imply one of two things for assimilation theory. The first is that, counter to what is predicted by linear assimilation models (Bloemraad 2007; Lien et al. 2004; Park and Burgess 1921), political assimilation does *not* necessarily follow other forms of assimilation, such as cultural, social, and economic. The second possibility is that the linear assimilation models are correct, but Asians are not actually culturally or socially integrated. I will return to this issue in the conclusion.

A Note on Asian American Pan-ethnicity

Given that the Asian American population is composed of multiple ethnic or national origin sub-populations with their corresponding languages, histories, religions and cultures, does it make sense to analyze them as a pan-ethnic whole? After all, even among Latino Americans, for whom a common language and oftentimes a common religion may be considered natural bases for collective identity, scholars have not observed a strong sense of cultural solidarity (Kauffman 2003). Nevertheless, both Latinos and Asians are grouped into pan-ethnic collectivities by official government

entities as well as by the society as a whole (Lee 1993), and these externally-imposed categorizations may have implications for the ways in which they are mobilized by political agents. Moreover, though Asian Americans may prefer to identify in ethnic-specific terms (Wong et al. 2011; Lien et al. 2003), as many as six out of ten "would consider themselves panethnic American ('Asian American') at some point in time" (Lien et al. 2003, p. 466). Thus, without denying the existence and importance of identities based on ethnic or national origin, this study chooses to analyze Asian Americans as a racial collectivity in recognition of the meaningfulness of Asian pan-ethnicity for both Asian Americans themselves and non-Asians who categorize them as such.

Outline of Dissertation Chapters

In Chapter 2, I perform an empirical analysis of national patterns in Asian American under-registration and under-voting, presented within the broader framework of racial inequality in electoral participation. I expand upon the research reviewed in the introduction with the goal of clarifying, at a more detailed level of analysis, the nature, extent and exceptionalism of Asian American under-participation, including an in-depth analysis of differential returns to the standard predictors of registration and voting.

In Chapter 3, I examine the role of context in Asian American under-participation. I begin by evaluating the extent to which the Asian-white gap, net of individual-level variables and their interactions with being Asian, varies across two levels of geography: state and county. After establishing that place-based variance in the effect of being Asian is much wider at the county level than at the state level for both stages of the voting process, I test the effects of specific county-level variables on Asian American under-participation.

In Chapter 4, I expound the mechanisms underlying two of the contextual effects on Asian American under-registration that were found in Chapter 3: the proportion of Asians and the proportion of Republicans among registered Asians. I perform a qualitative comparison of two counties in California that differ in their magnitude of Asian American under-registration relative to whites, employing in-depth interviews with mainstream political consultants, Asian American electoral candidates and elected officials, Republican and Democratic Party officers, journalists, Asian American civic organization representatives, and Registrar of Voters employees.

In the conclusion, I offer a revision to existing understandings of differences between the two stages of the voting process, as well as a discussion of what the findings of this study imply for assimilation theory. I also address the practical implications of the findings of this study for countering Asian American under-participation in electoral politics.

Chapter 2
Racial inequality in electoral participation and Asian American "exceptionalism"

In this chapter, I perform an empirical analysis of national patterns in Asian American under-registration and under-voting, presented within the broader framework of racial inequality in electoral participation. I expand upon the research reviewed in the introduction with the goal of clarifying, at a more detailed level of analysis, the nature, extent and exceptionalism of Asian American under-participation. Since most of the statistical studies addressing racial gaps in participation discussed in the literature review were conducted using data up to 2000, I provide an extension with data from 2000-2010.

Data and Methods

Analyses are performed using pooled data from the Census Bureau's 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Voter Supplements. The CPS Voter Supplements are an appropriate data source for the tasks at hand for several reasons. First, they include questions about registration and voting participation, along with a battery of demographic and socioeconomic indicators. Second, they enable the determination of generational status through questions about nativity and parental nativity. Third, they contain national samples of not only whites and blacks, but also oversamples of Latinos and Asians, thus facilitating racial comparisons. Pooling multiple years of election data minimizes the effects of idiosyncrasies during any single election (Citrin and Highton 2002), and also maximizes the total sample size of Asian American citizens of voting age.

In the first stage of analysis, I estimate registration and voting gaps between whites and each of three racial minority groups—blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans—for the nation as a whole, controlling for a number of individual-level socioeconomic, demographic, and immigrant variables using logit regression, a maximum likelihood method appropriate for modeling a binary dependent variable as a function of covariates. The dependent variables are registering to vote among citizens and voting among the registered. The key independent variable of interest is race, measured by a set of four dummy variables: Asian, black, Latino, and white, with white being treated as the comparison category. Age, education (a dummy variable for having a college or graduate degree), family income (a dummy variable for having a family total income greater than $50,000), residential stability (a dummy variable for having lived at the same address for 3+ years), foreign born status, and dummy variables for the election years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008, are included as control variables.

Next, to probe deeper into the relationship between race and electoral participation, I disaggregate each of the three racial minority groupings into four sub-categories: foreign-born (born outside of the U.S.), second generation (born in the U.S. to two foreign-born parents), mixed generation (born in the U.S. to one foreign-born parent and one U.S.-born parent), and third-plus generation (born in the U.S. to two U.S.-born parents). I then substitute these twelve subcategories, which capture a combination of race and immigrant generation, for the three racial minority groupings in the two logit models, designating whites as the reference category.

In the third section, to gain a more precise understanding of the extent to which individual-level factors influence registration and voting behavior across racial groups, I

explore the possibility of differential returns to the demographic and socioeconomic control variables by fitting interaction terms in the regression models. I also analyze the extent to which interaction effects among Asians and Latinos are conditioned by immigrant generation.

Finally, I conclude with a synthesis of the three sections for each minority racial group and a reflection on Asian American "exceptionalism."

Results

Racial Gaps in Registration and Voting

In the aggregate, Asian and Latino adult citizens severely lag behind white citizens in voter registration, while black citizens are moderately less likely than white citizens to register: the respective registration rates for whites, blacks, Latinos and Asians are 72%, 66%, 55% and 52%. Once age, education, income, residential stability, and foreign born status are accounted for, however, blacks out-register whites and the gap between Latinos and whites is markedly diminished, while the Asian-white gap remains substantial. Table 1 shows that blacks go from 26% lower odds of registration to 10% *higher* odds, Latinos improve from 53% to 28% lower odds, and Asians shift relatively little from 58% to 55% lower odds. These patterns, which echo those found in studies using earlier data, demonstrate that, unlike the registration gap between whites and other racialized minorities, registration differences between Asians and whites persist nearly unchanged after taking into account socioeconomic, demographic, and immigration characteristics.

Many studies have observed that voting rates among the registered are considerably higher than registration rates(Timpone 1998; Highton 1997; Piven and Cloward 1988; Erikson 1981), and also that aggregate gaps are relatively smaller between minority groups and whites at this stage than at the registration stage (Jang 2009; Ong et al. 2008; Wong et al. 2008; Xu 2005; Lien et al. 2004; Ong and Nakanishi 2003; Citrin and Highton 2002; Lien 2001; Lien et al. 2001). I find the same pattern here, with the respective rates of voting for whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians being81%, 79%, 72%, and 77%. When age, education, income, residential stability, and foreign born status are held constant, the gap between blacks and whites reverses and that between Latinos and whites narrows, whereas the gap between Asians and whites actually *increases*. Table 2 shows that blacks advance from 12% lower odds to 20% higher odds than whites, Latinos progress from 43% to 20% lower odds than whites, and Asians decline from 23% to 26% lower odds than whites.

Racial Gap Patterns across Immigrant Generations

Tables 3 and 4 present more nuanced logit analyses of racial gaps in registration by adding the dimension of immigrant generation. The reference category is third-plus generation non-Hispanic whites. For registration, the pattern is roughly similar across racial groups, with gap sizes progressively decreasing or disappearing between the foreign born and mixed generations. By the third-plus generation, blacks are slightly more likely to register than whites, while Latinos and especially Asians remain less likely

to register than whites, and are actually less so than their mixed generation counterparts although still more so than their foreign born and second-generation counterparts[9].

Patterns vary more distinctly across racial groups at the voting stage. Asians display large gains across generations, culminating in the third-plus generation being more likely to vote than whites. Latinos have a reverse pattern: the gap with whites is relatively small among the foreign born, then *increases* across generations (with the exception of the mixed generation, for whom there is no significant difference). Foreign born, second generation, and mixed generation blacks do not statistically differ from whites in their likelihood of voting, but third-plus generation blacks are more likely to vote than whites.

Disaggregating the racial groups by immigrant generation reveals complexities in the relationship between race and electoral participation, particularly among Asians and Latinos. For foreign-born Latinos, the gap with whites is larger at the registration stage than at the voting stage, but whereas it narrows across generations at the registration stage, it increases across generations at the voting stage, such that the gap between third-plus generation Latinos and whites is the same at both stages, deviating from the overall trend of smaller racial gaps at the voting stage relative to the registration stage. For Asians, improvement across generations is evident at both stages of the voting process, but inter-generational progress is much more pronounced at the voting stage. This, combined with the fact that the starting gap size is much greater at the registration stage, means that third-plus generation Asians remain substantially less likely to register than whites, even though they are more likely to vote than whites. For blacks, the disadvantage relative to whites at the stage of registration is characterized by gradual improvement across generations, culminating in greater likelihood of registration than whites by the third-plus generation. At the voting stage, there is no significant difference between whites and foreign born, second generation, and mixed generation blacks, and third-plus generation blacks have an even greater advantage over whites in voting than they do in registration. Taken together, these patterns suggest that, among racial minorities, the factors influencing registration differ –qualitatively, quantitatively, or both—from those affecting voting among the registered.

Interaction Effects

In this section, I return to the observation made in the first section that when age, education, income, residential stability, and foreign born status are held constant, the racial registration and voting gap sizes change—and, in the case of blacks, reverse direction. Changes in the size/direction of racial gaps when control variables are added

[9] Whereas Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) do not find much evidence of improvement between the second and third-plus Asian generations, I find that the Asian-white gap is smaller for Asians in the third-plus generation than for Asians in the second generation. This discrepancy between my findings and theirs is perhaps due to the fact that we define "second generation" differently. Whereas they code as second generation any U.S.-born respondent who has *at least one* parent who was born outside of the U.S., I code as second generation only those whose parents *both* were born outside of the U.S. I code those who have one U.S.-born parent and one foreign-born parent as "mixed generation" (in between 2nd& 3rd-plus). My regression results reveal that there is actually less of a gap between third-plus generation whites and mixed generation Asians and Latinos than between third-plus generation whites and third-plus generation Asians and Latinos. Moreover, mixed generation whites are significantly more likely to register than third-plus generation whites. Thus, mixed generation respondents appear to be especially inclined to register.

to the regression model can have two possible causes, both of which could be simultaneously true: (1) the racial groups differ in their composition of the additional variables, and (2) the effects of the additional variables differ across the racial groups (Xu 2005; Lien 2004; Cho 1999; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). Table 5 presents the mean or frequency of each of the five control variables—age, education, income, residential stability, and foreign born status—for each racial group. Levels vary considerably across groups, with Asians having by far the highest levels of education, Asians and Latinos having the highest levels of foreign born, and whites having the highest mean age and the highest levels of residential stability. Given the extent of variation across groups, it is certainly possible that compositional differences are responsible for changes in the gap sizes. However, the possibility remains that the control variables have unequal impact on registration and/or voting across racial groups. I evaluate this possibility by fitting interaction terms in the regression models, the results of which are displayed in Tables 6-7.

I begin by examining the lower order coefficients (i.e., the conditional effects) for education, income, residential stability, and foreign born status, that is, the effects of these variables for whites. Age, education, income, and residential stability have statistically significant positive effects on registration, while being foreign born has a statistically significant negative effect. These variables also have statistically significant effects in the same direction for voting among the registered, although the effects are substantively larger for age, and smaller for education, income, residential stability, and foreign born status.

Turning to the interactions at the registration stage, every interaction coefficient is significant at the .05 level except for the one between Latino and income. In nearly every case where the interaction is significant, the predictor variable has reduced explanatory power for minorities relative to whites, but the effect remains in the same direction (positive for age, education, income and residential stability, and negative for foreign born); the exception is the interaction between Latino and age, in which case age has a greater positive effect on registration for Latinos than for whites. Returns to education and income are weakest for blacks, while Latinos benefit least from residential stability. Finally, the negative impact on registration of being foreign born is less severe for all minorities compared to whites, but especially less negative for Asians and Latinos.

At the voting stage, interaction effects are more idiosyncratic across minority racial groups. The only group with which education interacts is Asians, and the effect is negative to a larger extent than it is at the registration stage. A similar pattern is seen in the interaction between income and Asian. Meanwhile, blacks, who at the registration stage have the lowest returns to income, actually have higher returns to income than even whites at the voting stage. Unlike the case for any other racial group, being foreign born among Latinos not only has less of a negative impact on voting than it does for whites, but actually increases registered Latinos' likelihood of voting. For Asians, on the other hand, being foreign born has a more negative impact on voting than it does for whites—even though, at the registration stage, Asians are less negatively impacted than whites by being foreign born.

The existence of interaction effects raises the question of *why* the effects exist. For blacks, in light of the fact that their baseline level of registration (i.e., the conditional effect of being black, or the effect of black when the interacted variables are equal to 0,

as indicated by the coefficient for the dummy variable for black) is higher than that of whites, it is possible that lower returns to age, education, income, and residential stability at the registration stage are due to blacks as a group being targeted for mobilization in the form of mass registration drives by institutions such as the black church and the Democratic Party (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Vedlitz 1985). It is reasonable to expect group-targeted mobilization efforts to reduce the relative benefits that typically accrue to those in the group who are older, more highly educated, richer, or more residentially stable, since mobilization provides those with low levels of resources with a greater boost than those with high levels of resources, who were more likely to participate to begin with.

For Asians and Latinos, differential returns to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics may be due to immigration-related factors. Since those variables exert influence on participation through socialization and other exposure processes, it makes sense that their explanatory power might be attenuated if they were acquired in a different setting (Xu 2005; Cho 1999). To test this proposition, I perform separate analyses for each generation of Asians and Latinos. Results are presented in Tables 8-11.

For Asians, the reduced explanatory power of the variables at the registration stage is significant in the foreign born generation but becomes insignificant in the second generation, and by the third-plus generation, education actually has a greater positive effect for Asians than for whites. At the voting stage, the pattern is similar except that lower returns to education remain in the second generation, disappearing only in the third-plus generation. Also by the third-plus generation of Asians, the positive returns to age and residential stability are larger than they are for whites. Thus, for Asians, it appears that immigrant-related factors are indeed the cause of reduced returns to demographic and socioeconomic variables at both the registration and voting stages, and that these barriers to returns disappear and even reverse by the time Asians are several generations removed from their immigrant origins.

For Latinos, the interaction effects also appear to be conditioned by immigrant generation, though not to the same extent as with Asians. At the registration stage, the positive interaction with age and the negative interaction with education are significant for the foreign born and second generations, but not for the third-plus generation. The negative interaction with residential stability, however, remains significant across generations. At the voting stage for Latinos, interactions are significant only among the foreign born, indicating that differential returns to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics at this stage are due to immigration-related factors.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that patterns of inequality in electoral participation vary between whites and each of three racial minority groups—blacks, Latinos, and Asians. Here, I synthesize the findings from the previous three empirical sections for each of these groups and conclude with a remark on Asian American "exceptionalism."

In spite of having lower returns to demographic and socioeconomic attributes at the registration stage, blacks' odds of registration are still 10% higher than whites' when age, education, income, residential stability, and foreign born status are held at their mean levels (Table 1) because blacks' baseline level of participation is 20% higher than whites' (Table 6). At the voting stage, registered blacks' baseline level of voting is 9% higher

than whites', and though blacks have lower returns to age, their returns to income are higher (Table 7), resulting in 20% higher odds of voting than whites when all of the control variables are held at their means (Table 2). Although it is beyond the scope of this study to investigate why blacks have higher baseline levels of registration and voting than whites, previous studies have pointed to heightened levels of group consciousness and the mobilizing capacity of race-based institutions such as the black church and voluntary associations (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999).

Latinos' baseline odds of registration are only 11% lower than whites', but because they, like blacks, have lower returns to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (Table 6), the gap with whites widens to 28% lower odds when all of the control variables are held at their means (Table 1). At the voting stage, registered Latinos have a wider baseline gap: 27% lower odds of voting than whites (Table 7). However, whereas being foreign born has a negative effect on whites' voting, it actually has a positive impact on Latinos' voting (Table 7), such that the voting gap between Latinos and whites is reduced to 20% lower odds for Latinos when the control variables are held constant at their mean levels (Table 2). For Latinos, lower returns to demographic and socioeconomic qualities are entirely explained by immigrant generation at the voting stage, and partially but not fully explained by immigrant generation at the registration stage, with reduced returns to residential stability persisting across generations (Tables 10-11). Registration and voting gaps between Latinos and third-plus generation whites remain statistically significant, though not especially large, in every generation when control variables are held at mean levels (Tables 3-4); at the registration stage, this stems in large part from differential returns to residential stability (Table 6), whereas at the voting stage it arises from a larger baseline gap (Table 7). Interestingly, third-plus generation Latinos have a wider baseline voting gap with whites than do foreign born, second generation, and mixed generation Latinos (Table 11). Because this study is focused on Asian American under-participation, I will not further examine the causes of (1) Latinos' reduced returns to residential stability in every generation at the registration stage or (2) Latinos' generational "decline" in voting. However, future studies should pursue these worthwhile questions.

As is the case for blacks and Latinos, Asians experience lower returns to demographic and socioeconomic traits at the registration stage (Table 6). Asians, however, are the only racial minority group to also have lower returns to these characteristics at the voting stage (Table 7). In fact, the reduced efficacy of these variables in explaining participation is more severe at the voting stage than at the registration stage for Asians, and it turns out that differential returns explain the voting gap between Asians and whites: there is no statistically significant baseline difference between Asians and whites in voting, but a gap favoring whites develops alongside an increase in education and income, and among the foreign born (Table 7). Immigrant generation, in turn, explains differential returns, as the reduced explanatory power of education and income for voting disappears entirely by the third-plus generation (Table 9); third-plus generation Asians are in fact 48% more likely to vote than whites when all of the control variables are held constant at their means (Table 4). However, immigrant generation is insufficient to explain the gap at the registration stage. Though immigrant generation explains differential returns at the registration stage, as it does at the voting stage, the limited role of differential returns in accounting for the Asian-white registration

gap is evident in the finding that, even among third-plus generation Asians, for whom returns to education are 21% greater than for whites (Table 8), the odds of registration are 56% lower than for whites when all of the control variables are held at their means (Table 3). This is due to the fact that the *baseline* registration gap between Asians and whites is especially large, and remains so for every generation of Asians: even among third-plus generation Asians, the odds of registration are 61% lower than for whites when all of the interacted variables are equal to 0 (Table 8).

It is thus at the registration stage where Asian "exceptionalism" in the sense of an unusually large and unexplained degree of under-participation in electoral participation occurs. Among racialized minorities, Asian Americans in every generation—even the third-plus generation, for whom returns to education are greater than for whites—stand alone in their extreme distance from whites in their likelihood of registering to vote.

Chapter Three
Context: The Missing Piece in the Puzzle of Asian American Under-participation in Electoral Politics

The previous chapter examined racial inequality in electoral participation at the national level and identified registration as the stage of the voting process where an unusually large and unexplained degree of Asian American under-participation relative to whites occurs. Asian American under-participation at the turnout stage was discovered not only to be far less severe than at the registration stage, but to have demonstrable causes: it operates through differential returns to age, education and income among immigrants and, to a lesser extent, the second generation; by the third-plus generation, Asians are actually more likely to vote than demographically and socioeconomically comparable whites. However, at the registration stage, even after accounting for differential returns to age, education and income, a substantial portion of the Asian-white registration gap remains well into the third-plus generation.

In this chapter, I move beyond the influence of individual-level characteristics by investigating how different political contexts change the extent to which Asian Americans under-participate relative to socioeconomically comparable whites in the electoral process. I find that the same social and political contexts matter differently for whites and Asians, and that certain contexts are able to reduce, eliminate, or even reverse the negative effect on electoral participation of being Asian.

Data and methods

Step 1: Selecting the Level of Context

Using the same data upon which the analyses in the previous chapter were based, I begin by evaluating the extent to which the Asian-white gap, net of individual-level variables and their interactions with being Asian, varies across two levels of geography: state and county. Far from being merely geographic units, states and counties are also political jurisdictions (Cho and Nicley 2008). State and county boundaries are particularly relevant for the voting process in the United States because voter registration and elections are administered by states and counties. Moreover, mobilization by political campaigns and party organizations often occur at the state and county levels (Diaz 2012; Wong et al. 2011; Ramakrishnan 2005).

In this first step, I do not test the effect of specific jurisdiction-level variables on Asian American under-participation, but rather determine the extent to which each of the two levels of jurisdictional context as a whole influences Asian American under-participation in voter registration and turnout. I employ a random coefficient logit model, a multilevel regression model for a binary response that allows the effect of a variable—in this case, Asian—to vary randomly across groups—in this case, states or counties. For the state variance model, I specify two levels: individual and state. For the county variance model, given that counties are nested in states, I account for the state-level clustering of counties (Cho and Nicley 2008) by specifying three levels: individual, county, and state. Because I am interested in the Asian-white participation gap, I include only whites and Asians in the sample. The dependent variables are registration among adult citizens and voting among the registered. The key independent variable of interest

is Asian; age, education, family income, residential stability, foreign born status, and interactions of each of the last five variables with Asian are included as control variables. In addition to the usual logit regression parameter estimates, the random coefficient logit model produces estimates for variance parameters: one for the intercept coefficient for each level beyond the first level in the model, and one for the coefficient for Asian for the designated level (level two for both the two-level state model and the three-level county model).

After establishing that place-based variance in the effect of being Asian is much wider at the county level than at the state level for both stages of the voting process (refer to the results and related discussion presented in Tables 12-13 in the next section), I conclude that the county level may be the more fruitful level for testing the effects of specific jurisdiction-level variables on Asian American under-participation. I limit my analyses to individuals residing in counties in the state of California because one of the key sets of county-level variables of theoretical interest, discussed in the section below, is only available for counties in California. While this has implications for the generalizability of my findings to the United States as a whole, it is worth keeping in mind that national-level findings, in turn, do not uniformly reflect patterns at subnational levels (see, for example, Cho et al. 2006). As pointed out by Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992), "[only by understanding relationships in particular contexts] can we begin the task of making meaningful statements in more general terms" (p. 72). Ideally, I would model interactions between county-level and state-level characteristics, or at least perform analyses of the effects of county-level variables separately by state for a variety of states, but until data become readily available for such a task, restricting analyses to a state where over 32% of all Asian Americans live is a good start. It should be noted that, because the CPS only identifies by name counties that are more populous, the dataset for California includes individuals in only the largest 32 of California's 58 counties. These 32 counties account for 88% of California's Asian American population.

Step 2: Testing the Effect of County-level Variables

The regression model used to estimate the effects of the county variables is a two-level random intercept logit model that takes into account clustering at the county level and therefore estimates correct standard errors for the regression coefficients rather than the underestimated errors that might occur were a single-level model used instead. The dependent variables are, as before, registration among adult citizens and voting among the registered. The primary independent variable of interest is Asian, and the specific goal is to observe whether and to what extent the coefficient for Asian changes alongside changes in the values of county-level characteristics. Therefore, in addition to Asian, age, education, family income, residential stability, foreign born status, and interactions of each of the last five variables with Asian, four categories of county-level independent variables and their interactions with Asian are included in the models. These variables and the reasons for including them are discussed immediately below, followed by descriptions of the data sources.

(1) Sociodemographic characteristics of the Asian American population

As discussed in the first chapter, on the basis of existing studies, it seems to be the general case that Asian Americans who live amongst other Asian Americans are

more inclined to participate in the electoral process than those who do not. As of yet, however, the extent to which a larger Asian population size, growth rate, proportion foreign born, or share of the population reduces the *gap* between whites and Asians in registration, and in voting among the registered, is unknown.

(2) Institutional features pertaining to the administration of registration and elections

Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act mandates in-language registration and voting materials, as well as in-language assistance at polling places, for language minorities who make up at least 5% of the state or locality's electorate (or who have at least 10,000 voting-age citizens in the jurisdiction), and whose illiteracy rate is higher than the national average. Previous studies have found either no effect (Ramakrishnan 2005) or a negative effect (Jones-Correa 2005) of the availability of Asian-language registration and voting materials/assistance on Asian Americans' likelihood of voting. However, these studies did not distinguish between registration and turnout among the registered, and it also remains unknown how the provisions affect the magnitude of *inequality* between whites and Asians.

(3) Socioeconomic attributes of the Asian American and total populations

Because the highly educated are more likely to increase the flow of political information in a community by discussing politics with their friends and acquaintances (Krassa 2005), greater proportions of individuals holding a bachelor's or graduate degree are expected to elevate the likelihood of registration and turnout. With regard to income, the wealthy may be more frequently targeted for mobilization, so higher median family incomes are expected to increase the likelihood of registration and turnout. However, as discussed in the literature on contextual effects in the first chapter, minorities may have low levels of participation even in communities whose norms favor generally high levels of participation (Dyck et al. 2009; Gimpel et al. 2004; Huckfeldt 1979). Minorities who feel at odds with the majority population may have a reduced sense of facility or efficacy, and majority members and institutions may be less likely to target them for mobilization (Gimpel et al. 2004; Huckfeldt 1979). Thus, Asian Americans may not benefit to the same extent as whites from a higher SES context, and the gap between whites and Asians may actually widen in such contexts. Asian Americans may instead benefit more from living in counties where Asian Americans, specifically, have higher levels of education and income.

(4) Political traits of the Asian American and total populations

Counties with higher proportions of registrants who are partisans (as opposed to independents) may reflect more aggressive registration mobilization efforts by political parties, and may thus be associated with increased likelihood of registration. However, Asian Americans may not be targeted by parties to the same extent as other groups. Wong et al. (2011) find that, among surveyed Asian Americans, party mobilization is rare. Thus, in such counties, the inequality between whites and Asians may even increase. On the other hand, counties with higher proportions of partisans among Asian American registrants, specifically, may reflect strategic targeting of Asian Americans by the parties, and may have a more mitigating effect on the magnitude of Asian-American registration.

County-level sociodemographic and socioeconomic data come from the 2000 and 2010 decennial Censuses and the 2006-2010 American Community Survey 5-year estimates. The list of counties in California which are required by law to provide registration and election materials and services in Asian languages is obtained from Magpantay and Yu (2005, p. 17). Partisanship data are provided by the Statewide Database (SWDB) housed at the UC Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies. The SWDB is the redistricting database for the state of California, created in 1981 for California's State Assembly, and used since then for state and local redistricting as mandated by law. It contains registration data that are broken down by ethnicity for Asians and Hispanics through a process of surname matching, and is available to the public free of charge. Without the existence of the SWDB, this research would not be possible.

Results

Part 1: Selection of the Level of Context

In each of the four random coefficient logit models presented in Tables 12-13, the estimate of the variance parameter, highlighted in blue, indicates the degree to which the effect of being Asian varies across states (Table 12) and counties (Table 13).[10] The coefficient for Asian is the conditional effect of being Asian in an *average* state or county—that is, the effect of being Asian in an average state or county for a native-born 47-year-old[11] person whose residence has changed in the last three years, and who has no college degree and a household income of less than $50,000. This conditional effect is what I referred to throughout Chapter 2 as the "baseline" effect of being Asian. Ninety-five percent coverage intervals for the coefficient for Asian are calculated by multiplying the standard error for the estimate of the variance parameter by 1.96 and subtracting/adding the product from/to the Asian coefficient. Assuming a normal distribution, we would expect the middle 95% of states to have an Asian-white registration gap between -1.007 and -.368; the middle 95% of states to have an Asian-white turnout gap between -.359 and .389; the middle 95% of counties to have an Asian-white registration gap between -.700 and .550; and the middle 95% of counties to have an Asian-white turnout gap between -1.260 and .082.

The fact that the conditional effect of being Asian varies across jurisdictions indicates that influences beyond the individual-level variables and interactions included in the model affect the advantage or disadvantage of being Asian. The greater variance across counties than across states at both the registration and turnout stages suggests, as already stated in the section on data and methods, that the county level may be the more productive level for testing the effects of jurisdiction-level variables on Asian American under-participation. I proceed accordingly in the next section using, as previously explained, data for the state of California only.

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[10] For each model, a likelihood ratio test comparing the log likelihood value of the model with the random coefficient parameters (variance of Asian, and covariance of Asian and the intercept) to the log likelihood value of a random intercept model without the random coefficient parameters results in a test statistic that, when compared to a chi-squared distribution on 2 d.f., achieves the highest level of statistical significance. All this is to say that the variance parameter estimates all are highly significant.

[11] Age, a continuous variable, has been grand mean centered by subtracting the sample mean of age from the raw values, such that when age equals 0, it corresponds to the mean age, which is 47.

Part 2: The Effects of County-level Variables

Table 14 displays six random coefficient logit models for registration. Model 1 includes all of the individual-level predictors and their interactions with Asian, and all of the sociodemographic Asian American population variables, the dummy for Asian language materials/services, both of the socioeconomic Asian American population variables, the proportion of Republicans among registered Asian Americans, and interactions of all of these county-level variables with Asian. Model 2 replaces the proportion of Republicans (and the associated interaction term) with the proportion of undeclared among registered Asian Americans, and Model 3 replaces it with the proportion of Democrats among registered Asian Americans.[12] Models 4, 5 and 6 replace the socioeconomic attributes and the political traits of the Asian American population (and all associated interaction terms) in Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively, with the total population alternatives of those variables. The analogous models for turnout are displayed in Table 15. Because of the large number and complexity of the models, I discuss the results in multiple segments. I begin by providing the following textual descriptions of the statistically significant interaction terms:

(1) Sociodemographic characteristics of the Asian American population

The four sociodemographic characteristics of the Asian American population and their interactions with Asian are included in all twelve of the models (six registration models and six turnout models). In two of the six registration models, there is a significantly positive interaction between Asian and the concentration of the Asian American population. There is also a significantly positive interaction between Asian and the size of the Asian American population in three of the six registration models. Neither of these two variables significantly interacts with Asian at the turnout stage, but there is a significantly positive interaction between Asian and the proportion of Asians who are foreign born in all six turnout models.

(2) Institutional features pertaining to the administration of registration and elections

Like the sociodemographic variables, the dummy for Asian language materials/services is included in all twelve of the models. Contrary to expectations, it shows a significantly *negative* interaction with Asian in two of the six registration models and four of the six turnout models.

(3) Socioeconomic attributes of the Asian American and total populations

Neither of the two socioeconomic attributes of the Asian American population interacts significantly with Asian in any of the registration or turnout models in which they are included. Both socioeconomic indicators of the *total population*, however, interact significantly with Asian at the registration stage. The interaction between Asian and total population education is significantly negative in two of the three registration models in which it is included, while the interaction between Asian and total population income is significantly positive in all three of the registration models in which it is included.

(4) Political traits of the Asian American and total populations

Each of the three Asian American partisanship variables, and each of the three total population partisanship variables, appears in one registration model and one turnout

[12] The partisanship variables are not modeled together because of multicollinearity

model. At the registration stage, the proportion of Republicans among registered Asians interacts positively, and the proportion of undeclared among registered Asians interacts negatively, with Asian. Neither of these two variables interacts significantly with Asian at the turnout stage, and there is no significant interaction between Asian and the proportion of Democrats among registered Asians, or between Asian and any of the total population partisanship variables, at either the registration stage or the turnout stage.

Having textually introduced the interaction findings, I now refer to Table 16 which shows the effect of each interaction with Asian that was found to be statistically significant at least once and the total number of times it was found to be significant out of the number of times it was included in a model. The table also shows the size of the Asian coefficient before and after applying the interaction effect, and the corresponding value of the interacting variable.

A few notes about the values in the table are in order. First, the value of the interacting variable is 100% for all variables that measure proportions because, in a multilevel logit regression, the coefficient of a proportion variable is interpreted as the difference in the expected log-odds of the dependent variable taking on a value of 1 when the proportion variable changes from 0% to 100%. Therefore, when a proportion variable is interacted with a binary variable in a multilevel logit regression, the value of the interaction coefficient represents the change in the size of the coefficient for the binary variable when the value of the interacting proportion variable changes from 0% to 100%.[13] Second, all of the non-categorical variables, including the continuous variables Asian population size and median income in the total population, have been grand mean centered by subtracting their sample means from the raw values, such that when the variables equal 0, it corresponds to their mean values. In the case of Asian population size and median income in the total population, the means are 540,294 and 71,862, respectively. When a continuous variable is interacted with a binary variable, the value of the interaction coefficient is interpreted as the change in the size of the coefficient for the binary variable when the value of the interacting continuous variable increases by one unit.[14] Since a one-unit increase does not represent a particularly intuitive understanding of impact when the interacting variable is continuous, it is helpful to multiply the interaction coefficient by an amount of the continuous variable that allows for a meaningful understanding of impact. I have thus multiplied the coefficient for the interaction between Asian and Asian population size by 100,000, and the coefficient for the interaction between and median income in the total population by $30,000. The corresponding values of the two continuous variables then become 540,294+100,000=640,294 and $71,862+$30,000=$101,862, respectively.

From the summary table, it is clear that the most powerful contextual contributors to Asian American under-registration are the proportion of registered Asians who are undeclared and the proportion of college graduates in the total population. If 100% of

[13] Reciprocally, the value of the interaction coefficient also represents the change in the size of the coefficient for the proportion variable when the value of the interacting binary variable changes from 0 to 1.

[14] Reciprocally, the value of the interaction coefficient also represents the change in the size of the coefficient for the continuous variable when the value of the interacting binary variable changes from 0 to 1.

registered Asians were undeclared, Asians' odds of registration would be over 99% lower than whites', holding all binary predictors at 0 and all other predictors at their means. Similarly, if 100% of the total population were college graduates, Asians would have odds of registration that were 97% lower than those of whites, holding all binary predictors at 0 and all other predictors at their means. It is not surprising that higher proportions of undeclared Asian registrants are associated with lower odds of Asian registration. A situation of low partisanship among Asian registrants likely reflects, and further reinforces, weak attempts at the recruitment of Asians by the major parties.

The negative association between the proportion of college graduates in the total population and registration among Asians is less immediately intuitive. Why should a better-educated county improve whites' odds of registration while reducing Asians' (Table 14, Models 4 & 6)? One tempting explanation is that high overall levels of education exacerbate differential returns to individual education between Asians and whites. However, the individual-level interaction is included in the model as a control and is, moreover, insignificant. A potential contextual-level explanation for this contextual effect is that registration drives and other forms of registration outreach are less likely to occur in high-education counties because of a perception of needlessness. Since low-likelihood registrants are typically characterized by low levels of socioeconomic resources, potential mobilizers may dismiss the need for such in counties with relatively high levels of educational achievement. This would increase the distance between Asians and whites because, for Asian Americans, recruitment may be necessary to overcome a lack of familiarity with the system of registration stemming not only from immigration, but from the legacy of historical political exclusion[15] and the resulting truncated development of participatory socialization.

The table reveals one other county-level contributor to Asian American under-registration: the availability of registration and election materials and assistance in Asian languages. In counties that provide these materials and services, Asians' odds of registration are 51% lower than those of whites (compared to 21% lower in counties that do not), holding all binary predictors at 0 and all other predictors at their means. A negative effect is also evident at the turnout stage, where Asians' odds of registration are 27% lower than whites' (compared to 82% *higher* in counties that do not provide the materials and services), holding all binary predictors at 0 and all other predictors t their means. The negative interaction of this variable with Asian is surprising because the very intention of the law mandating such materials and services is to reduce electoral inequality. One possible explanation of this paradoxical finding is that, in order to qualify for the language materials and services, a language group must demonstrate an illiteracy rate that is higher than the national illiteracy rate. Perhaps the level of provision does not fully match the level of need in those counties for which the need has been formally approved. Future research should address this issue, but it should be noted that cross-sectional, place-comparative approaches like the one taken in this study are inadequate for testing the benefit of language materials and assistance. The appropriate research design would be one that compares outcomes in the same location before and after the availability of the materials and services.

[15] Asians were not permitted to naturalize until the 1943 Magnuson Act, and then only in limited numbers. It was not until the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act that laws preventing the naturalization of Asians were eliminated.

The remaining variables that are summarized in the table interact positively with Asian. Of these, Asian population size confers the smallest positive effect; even very large increases in the size of the Asian population do not eliminate the negative effect of being Asian on registration, though they do decrease it. The median household income in the total population is interesting in that it has no statistically significant effect on whites' likelihood of registration, but does have a positive effect on Asians' likelihood of registration (Table 14, Models 4-6). In terms of its impact on the Asian-white registration gap, it is able to reverse the negative effect of being Asian on registration starting at $23,500 above the mean value in the sample (Table 15 shows the size of the Asian coefficient at $30,000 above the mean value in the sample).

The two variables that have the most substantial positive interactions with Asian at the registration stage are the proportion of Asians in the population and the proportion of Republicans among registered Asians. As the proportion of the population that is Asian approaches 100%, Asians' odds of registration approach the magnitude of being 5 times greater than those of whites, holding all binary predictors at 0 and all other predictors at their means. This is consistent with the majority of studies that have examined the effect of Asian concentration on Asians' likelihood of registration and turnout. Likewise, if 100% of registered Asians were Republicans, an Asian individual's odds of registration would be 4.5 times greater than a white individual's odds, holding all binary predictors at 0 and all other predictors at their means. Interestingly, the proportion of Asians who are Democrats has no statistically significant interaction with Asian (Table 14, Model 3). The reasons as to why higher proportions of Asians in the population, and larger proportions of Republicans among registered Asians, narrow and even reverse the Asian-white registration gap, will be elaborated in the following chapter.

Most of the contextual interactions with Asian occur at the registration stage. At the turnout stage, only two interaction effects are statistically significant. I have already discussed one of them, the availability of registration and voting materials in Asian languages. The other is the proportion of Asians who are foreign born. This variable has a significantly negative effect on turnout among registered whites and a significant and extremely large positive effect on turnout among registered Asians (Table 15). Its impact on the Asian-white gap is enormously positive: if 100% of the Asian American population were foreign born, an Asian registrant would have odds of turnout that were 6505 time greater than those of a white registrant, holding all binary predictors at 0 and all other predictors at their means. This is a curious finding, given that being foreign born at the individual level decreases the odds of voting for whites and Asians alike. In order to investigate more thoroughly the nature of this effect, I modeled using an all-Asian sample an interaction between the proportion of Asians who are foreign born and individual foreign-born status. Though the coefficient for the interaction was substantively large in a positive direction, it was not significant at the .05 level. I therefore conclude that the positive effect on turnout of living in a county with a sizable proportion of foreign born Asians applies to native and foreign born Asians alike.

My focus thus far has been on the interactions between county-level variables and the effect of being Asian. I turn now to those variables that do not interact significantly with Asian but whose lower-order coefficients are significant. These are displayed in Table 17, including the total number of times each one was found to be significant out of the number of times it was included in a model. The coefficients are interpreted as the

effects of the variables for the reference group (i.e., whites), but they also represent the effects for Asians, since the associated interaction terms are insignificant. Though these variables do not contribute to Asian-white *inequality*, they are nevertheless important predictors of Asian American electoral participation more generally.

For whites and Asians alike, the following variables have a negative effect on registration: the proportion of foreign born Asians, the growth rate of the Asian American population between 2000 and 2010, and the median Asian household income. The negative effect of the proportion of foreign born Asians on registration for Asians and whites alike is curious given that the variable has such a positive effect on turnout for Asians. It is also interesting that the Asian version of the median household income variable has a negative impact on registration for whites and Asians, because as mentioned previously, the total population version of the variable has no significant impact on registration for whites but a positive effect on registration for Asians. Moving on to a more consistent predictor, the proportion of college graduates among Asians has a positive effect on registration as well as turnout for both whites and Asians. As for the impact of the Asian partisanship variables, the proportion of Republicans among registered Asians has a negative effect on turnout for whites and Asians, and the proportion of Democrats among registered Asians has a positive effect for whites and Asians. This presents yet another case of predictive inconsistency between the registration and voting stages, as the proportion of Republicans among registered Asians was found to have a positive effect for Asians at the registration stage. Finally, the proportion of college graduates in the total population, which was found to have a positive effect for whites but a negative effect for Asian at the registration stage, has a positive effect on turnout for both whites and Asians at the turnout stage.

The incongruity between the two stages of the voting process, first observed in the single-level models from the second chapter, extends to the effects of the county-level variables. Table 18 summarizes the directions of the effects for Asians and whites between the two stages. Table 19 conveys the same information but also displays the actual coefficients; the coefficients for Asians are computed by adding the statistically significant interaction coefficients to the lower-order coefficients, or are simply the statistically significant lower-order coefficients themselves (i.e., the same as for whites) in the cases where interaction effects are insignificant. From these tables, it is clear that most of the predictors have inconsistent effects across the two stages, and that the inconsistency is more pronounced for Asians than it is for whites. For whites, incongruity exists to the extent that some variables have statistically significant predictive power at one stage but not the other. This is true for Asians, as well, but for Asians, there are also some variables that have *opposite* effects between the two stages. I will return to this issue in the next chapter.

Conclusion

Context is the missing piece in the puzzle of Asian American under-participation in electoral politics. In this chapter, I have demonstrated that county-level contexts can either magnify the severity of Asian American under-participation at the registration stage, or induce Asian American *over*-participation relative to whites at both the registration and turnout stages. Many questions remain to be answered, particularly regarding mechanisms. *How* and *why* do these contextual variables matter? In the next

chapter, I will examine the specific mechanisms that underlie the contextual effects displayed in Model 1 of Table 14. I will also address the issue of the differential effects of contextual variables on the two stages of voting.

Chapter 4
A Tale of Two Counties: Campaign Strategies, Political Parties, and Voter Registration in San Diego and Orange Counties

In this chapter, I expound the mechanisms underlying the two positive interaction effects from Model 1 of Table 14 in Chapter 3: the proportion of the population that is Asian and the proportion of registered Asians who are Republican. As the value of each of these variables increases, the magnitude of the Asian-white registration gap diminishes. In order to elucidate the mechanisms of action behind these statistical effects, which by themselves do not inform us of *how* and *why* the gap narrows, I employ a qualitative comparison of registration outreach to Asian Americans in two California counties that differ in their magnitude of Asian American under-registration relative to whites.

I argue that the incentives for political elites to target Asian Americans for mobilization at the registration stage of the voting process differ substantially between the two counties, and that those incentives are what accounts for the counties' differing magnitudes of Asian American under-registration. The literature on elite mobilization has long recognized that political candidates and political parties strategize mobilization of the electorate around the winning of elections (Anderson 2008a; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992), but I contribute a further refinement by considering the implications of differences in levels of mobilization between the registration stage and the turnout stage.

Selection of Orange and San Diego Counties as Case Comparisons

Orange and San Diego Counties were chosen as case comparisons because they differ markedly in their magnitude of Asian American under-registration relative to whites. In San Diego County, the 2010 registration rate of whites was 72% while that of Asians was 45%, yielding a difference of 27 percentage points in favor of whites. In Orange County, the 2010 registration rate of whites was 75% while that of Asians was 58%, resulting in a difference of 17 percentage points in favor of whites. The 10 percentage-point difference between the two counties in the size of the Asian-white registration gap is substantial[16], and the underlying distributions reveal that it is attributable to differences in the registration rate of Asians rather than differences in the registration rate of whites. The registration rates of both whites and Asians in Orange County are higher than their respective rates in San Diego County, but whereas the rate for whites is only 3 percentage points higher, the rate for Asians is full 13 percentage points higher. In other words, while there is not much difference in the registration rates of whites between the two counties, Asians are much more likely to register to vote in Orange County than in San Diego County.

Importantly for the comparison, San Diego County also has lower values than Orange County on the two variables of interest, and both counties have the same value on the other significant interaction variable from Model 1, the availability of registration and election materials in Asian languages. Both counties are required by law to provide registration and voting materials in Asian languages, but whereas the proportion of the

[16] Of the 32 counties represented in the sample, San Diego County has the 9th widest Asian-white registration gap while Orange County has the 17th widest.

population that is Asian is 18% in Orange County, it is 11% in San Diego County; and while the proportion of Republicans among registered Asians is 36% in Orange County, it is 31% in San Diego County. In terms of where the two counties stand in the distribution of these variables across the 32 counties represented in the sample, Orange County has the 5th largest proportion of Asians while San Diego County has the 12th largest; and Orange County has the 2nd highest proportion of Republicans among registered Asians while San Diego County has the 12th highest.

To illustrate the contribution of Orange County's higher proportion of Asians and higher proportion of Republicans among registered Asians to its relatively smaller Asian-white registration gap, I perform an analytic exercise using the estimates in Model 1 of Table 14. In the first step of the exercise, I generate predicted probabilities of registration for whites and Asians for each of the two counties by plugging each county's mean variable values into the equation for the model. Next, I subtract the predicted probabilities for Asians from the predicted probabilities for whites. For Orange County, the difference between the predicted probabilities of registration for whites and Asians is .16; for San Diego County, it is .24. These differences are somewhat smaller than the observed differences of .17 and .27, respectively, but they are close enough. In the third step of the analytic exercise, I substitute San Diego's mean values on the proportion of Asians and the proportion of Republicans among registered Asians with Orange County's mean values on those same variables, keeping all other variables at San Diego County's mean values. This reduces the difference between the predicted probabilities of registration between whites and Asians in San Diego County by 6 percentage points, from .24 to .18. Conversely, when Orange County's mean values on these two variables are substituted with San Diego County's, keeping all other variables at Orange County's mean values, the difference between the predicted probabilities of registration between whites and Asians in Orange County increases by 6 percentage points, from .16 to .22.

Put differently, if San Diego County shared Orange County's values on the two variables of interest, or if Orange County instead shared San Diego's values on the two variables of interest, the difference between the two counties in the size of the Asian-white registration gap would only be 2 percentage points (.16 in Orange County and .18 in San Diego County in the first case, and .22 in Orange County and .24 in San Diego County in the second case). This exercise demonstrates the importance of the proportion of the population that is Asian, and the proportion of Republicans among registered Asians, in accounting for the difference between the two counties in the magnitude of Asian American under-registration.

Having discussed why Orange and San Diego Counties are appropriate case comparisons, and having demonstrated the quantitative effects of their differences in the two variables of interest, I now briefly introduce the political histories and demographic profiles of the two counties before turning to a qualitative analysis of the mechanisms through which the counties' differing concentrations of Asians in the population and Republicans among registered Asians produce divergent outcomes in Asian American under-registration relative to whites.

Political Overview of Orange and San Diego Counties

Historically, Orange and San Diego Counties were Republican strongholds. While the proportion of Republicans in both counties is still higher than the proportion of

Republicans in California as a whole[17], the decade from 2000 to 2010 witnessed a considerable narrowing of Orange County's Republican advantage, and the virtual disappearance of San Diego's Republican advantage, due primarily to increases in decline-to-state registrants at the expense of Republican registrants. In 2000, Republicans out-registered Democrats in both Orange and San Diego Counties: 41% of registered voters in San Diego County were Republican, 36% were Democratic, and 17% were undeclared; in Orange County, the respective percentages were 49%, 32%, and 14%. At the end of the decade, in 2010, while the percentage of Democratic registrants remained constant at 36% in San Diego County and 32% in Orange County, the percentage of Republican registrants dropped to 36% in San Diego County and 43% in Orange County. Meanwhile, the percentage of undeclared registrant rose to 23% in San Diego County and 21% in Orange County. In sum, while Republicans still have an 11-point lead over Democrats in Orange County (down from 17 points in 2000), the partisan balance is now even in San Diego County, with ebbs and flows in either direction.

Demographic Characteristics of San Diego and Orange Counties

San Diego and Orange Counties are similarly sized in terms of population. In 2010, San Diego County had a population of 3,095,313 and Orange County numbered 3,010,232. Racially, San Diego County is slightly more white than Orange County (48% vs. 44%), moderately more black (5.1% vs. 1.7%), and similarly Hispanic (32% vs. 33.8%). San Diego County is discernibly less Asian than Orange County (11% vs. 18%), and the ethnic composition of the Asian American population is also different in the two counties. San Diego County's Asian American population is 44% Filipino, with Vietnamese and Chinese as the next largest groups at 13% each, and Indians, Koreans, and Japanese occupying far smaller proportions (7%, 6%, and 5.6%, respectively). In Orange County, Vietnamese account for 34% of the Asian American population, followed by Koreans at 16%, Filipinos at 13%, Chinese at 12%, Indians at 7.6%, and Japanese at 6%.

Data and Methods

In each county, I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with 27 mainstream political consultants, Asian American electoral candidates and elected officials and their campaign managers, Republican and Democratic Party officers, journalists, Asian American organizational representatives, and Registrar of Voters employees (total N=54). These categories of individuals together represent the body of actors who, on the basis of the existing literature on voter mobilization, might potentially target Asian American citizens for voter registration. Interviews were conducted on location and in person between March and May of 2012 and ranged in length from one to three hours. Most interviews were recorded and later transcribed, but a few interviewees requested not to be recorded; detailed notes were taken during the interview in such cases.

The first group of interviewees in each county was identified online by virtue of their positions as public/civic/elected officials, political professionals, media professionals, or electoral candidates, and contacted via email prior to arriving on

[17] In 2010, 44% of registered Californians were Democratic, 31% were Republican, and 20% were undeclared.

location; these interviewees suggested other interviewees, who in turn suggested more interviewees, thus producing a partial snowball sample. It should be noted that, in San Diego County, I interviewed only four former or current Asian American electoral candidates/elected officials, whereas in Orange County, I interviewed eleven. This difference reflects the fact that very few Asian Americans run for office in San Diego County, whereas many Asian Americans run for office in Orange County. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, I was invited to several political events where I observed local politics in action and chatted informally with organizers and participants.

Results

The magnitude of Asian American under-registration relative to whites is reduced alongside increases in the Asian share of the population and the Republican share of registered Asian Americans because of the campaign strategies of Asian American electoral candidates and the efforts of the Republican Party to bring in new membership, respectively. I discuss each of these in turn in the sections that follow.

Campaign Strategies

> "[Campaigns] do very well without increasing the pool of voters, and may even benefit from decreasing the voter pool...the first job of the campaign is to take the voter pool as it exists, and make sure that you beat the other person in that existing voter pool."
>
> "[Unregistered co-ethnics] are low-hanging fruits. Well, let's pick them, you know. Let's bring them in, register them."

These two quotes represent two contrasting perspectives on incorporating voter registration into a campaign strategy. The first comes from a mainstream political consultant who has worked on electoral campaigns of various levels throughout California and some other parts of the United States, and the second is from an Asian American in Orange County who has held multiple levels of elected office in California. In both Orange County and San Diego County, the mainstream view enjoys widespread popularity among political consultants. The logic of the mainstream perspective, as explained by one political consultant in San Diego County, is as follows: "Political campaigns are exercises in allocation of inadequate resources, and so every choice you make is to some degree or another related to figuring out the most cost-effective way of using your resources. And, so, a lot of work in campaigns goes into trying to identify which voters are likely to cast out in a particular election."

Another political consultant, based in Orange County, agreed: "I mean it's very hard to register voters, and a lot of people, especially a lot of candidates and their teams, think it's a waste of time. I mean, you can register voters…but not necessarily will that bring them to the polls. Not necessarily will that mean a vote for you. So, why in the world would anyone try to do that?" Bringing new voters into the voting pool is viewed as an inefficient strategy in most cases not only because it is laborious and time-consuming, but also because it heightens the element of uncertainty, given that new voters have no established patterns of voting behavior. If a campaign cannot win on the

basis of existing high-likelihood voters, it will turn to convincing decline to state voters rather than registering new voters: "What you look at is the decline to state numbers in a particular campaign, and you say, ok, well, the Democratic versus Republican registration, Democrats are down by 10 points. But there's 20% of the registered voters in a particular district that are decline to state. Then you're going to focus your messaging rather than go and do voter registration, you're simply going to focus your campaign on how do I convince the decline to states to vote my way. Cuz if I pull 15% of those my way, I'm now in a dead heat with this other person, and may very well win the race, cuz you've now completely closed the gap. You haven't had to expend resources to go find voters, which is a very difficult proposition to do. Rather, you're simply spending the money on trying to convince [those who are already in the system], setting up your messaging to convince the decline to states to vote your way…when it comes down to raw numbers, if you process the numbers, 5% of 300,000 voters, that's like 15,000. So [as opposed to "flipping" already-registered voters] you [would] have to go find 15,000 people to register to move the numbers. That's really hard to do."

Only in exceptional cases are campaigns advised to execute registration efforts, but two conditions have to be met. First, winning must be unlikely with the existing pool of voters; second there must be confidence that the target population of registrants consists of likely supporters. The list of examples of situations in which my mainstream consultant interviewees had utilized voter registration as part of a campaign strategy was short: (1) school bond campaigns "where we have a very well-defined target audience of likely supporters in the person of parents of school age children"[18]; (2) when Senator Birch Bayh was up for re-election in Indiana several decades ago, the campaign team targeted African Americans for registration, figuring 95% of them would be supporters. Other examples given by the mainstream consultants that did not come from their own experience, but from their knowledge of recent political history, include the targeting of Latino Californians for registration by Democrats in the 1990s, and Republican targeting of religious conservatives. To this I would add the targeting of young people for registration by Barack Obama's presidential campaigns in 2008 and 2012.

It is worth noting that the aversion to voter registration under normal campaign circumstances applies most directly to campaigns for local elections. Most of my mainstream political consultant interviewees work primarily on local elections, but some of them have also managed statewide campaigns. In their experience, it is easier to register voters in statewide campaigns than in local campaigns. Explained one, "When you start talking locally, it just gets very complex because of the varied interests that come into play…when you're dealing at a statewide level, where you're dealing almost entirely with partisan distinctions as opposed to local political distinctions, it's easier."

When Asian Americans run for office, it is far more frequently for local offices than for state or national offices (Lai 2011). All four of the former/current Asian American candidates/elected officials I interviewed in San Diego County had run, or were running, in local elections. None of them deviated from the mainstream political consultant perspective of the role of voter registration in electoral campaigns, although apart from their campaigns, most of them were, or at some point had been, involved in

[18] Interestingly, another consultant had, through focus groups, discovered that Chinese parents were adamantly against voting for a school bond in the case of a particular community college district in southern California.

non-profit organizations that had as part of their mission statements the objective of registering Asian Americans[19]. As summed up by one former Asian American candidate who had strategically avoided registration efforts in her electoral campaigns, "If you only have a little amount of money, then you have to concentrate on the people that are already registered…because then you only have how many months to campaign and raise money. If you concentrate on voter registration, then you will lose your momentum of campaigning because whether you register a lot of people to vote, you cannot guarantee that they're actually going to go out to vote. So you really have to concentrate on the people who are already registered, and concentrate on the high propensity voters, the people who never miss election, or maybe miss one. So that's where I concentrate on reaching out."

When asked whether they had ever considered registering Asian Americans *in particular* as part of their campaign(s), they explained that it did not make sense to do so because it was not possible to win on the Asian vote alone. This perception was re-iterated at an Asian Pacific American Leadership Workshop held in San Diego in the spring of 2012, where one of my interviewees advised young Asian Americans attendees who were being encouraged to become public service leaders, "Don't look to be elected by Asian Americans. You can't do it, you must have a broad reach, you must run as an American." The perception of not being able to win solely on the Asian vote does not inhibit Asian American candidates from crafting customized messages for Asian American voters. For example, the same interviewee who provided the previous quote also said, "When I ran, we took the what you call shotgun approach, broad-based, TV and mass mailing. And then we had the target approach, where you—we were able to track down all the people that were born in a different country. And we sent a letter by saying that my father was an immigrant, and there were certain traditions that we brought with us…you know, we [targeted Asian Americans] that way." This approach of Asian American candidates using certain strategies to appeal to the broader population of voters and other strategies to target Asian Americans in particular has been observed by other researchers, including Collet (2008), who coined the term "toggling" for it, and Lai (2011), who conceptualizes it as "the two-tiered campaign strategy." However, it is important to clarify that such customized targeting of Asian Americans by Asian American candidates in San Diego County does not involve bringing in new Asian American voters, but rather reaching out to the ones who are already registered.

In Orange County, by contrast, many former/current Asian American candidates/elected officials and their campaign staff consider voter registration to be a key component of their campaigns, or at least regard it as one strategic component of a well-rounded campaign. Due to the higher concentrations of Asians in Orange County, especially as distributed across electoral districts, candidates perceive being able to win on the co-ethnic or co-racial vote. The incorporation of registration outreach into individual electoral campaigns was first executed successfully by former Garden Grove City Councilmember Van Tran[20] and former Garden Grove School Board Member Lan Quoc Nguyen, and "when candidates started seeing that people would win by 500 votes, and they saw a Vietnamese candidate got 80% of the Vietnamese vote, and that got them in, people started to really target the Asian population…so you saw all these candidates

[19] I will discuss the influence of non-profit organizations in a later section.
[20] Van Tran was later also elected to the California State Assembly

and folks coming in and registering people, going door to door registering, getting in front of grocery stores." One interviewee referred to unregistered co-ethnics as "low-hanging fruit" to be picked, and another as a "gold mine."

Most of the time, candidates focus the core of their efforts on co-ethnics, but there is also the perception of co-racial affinity. Explained one interviewee, "There's a draw based on ethnic background…they see an Asian face, they forget party affiliation, and suddenly they're rallying around…so, whether it's Irvine, where you have the candidate who's Korean American but is able to cross over and pull up Chinese American support, or in the Vietnamese community getting Vietnamese people to register and vote, that type of stuff." Previous research has provided empirical support for Asian American racial bloc voting (RBV). In particular, Tam (1995) found that Chinese, Japanese, and Korean voters in the San Francisco Bay Area all threw their support behind a Chinese American candidate, and Collett (2005), demonstrated that Vietnamese American voters in Little Saigon consistently favored Asian American candidates of various ethnicities to their non-Asian opponents.

My interviews reveal the outreach side of the equation of such voting patterns: nearly every one of the eleven former/current Asian American candidates/elected officials I interviewed in Orange County, including Vietnamese, Korean, Japanese, Chinese and Thai, said that, at least to some extent—whether in the form of registration mobilization, get-out-the-vote efforts, or donation solicitations—their campaigns deliberately reach out to Asian Americans in general, in addition to the core strategy of mobilizing their own ethnic group. One Asian American elected official who had targeted Asian Americans of every ethnicity for financial support, even outside of his electoral district, found them to be extremely receptive: "They said we definitely need more Asian candidates, we definitely need to support more Asian candidates, we need to vote for Asian candidates, and we need to help them get elected. These were the ones that saw that there was underrepresentation from Asian Americans here in California, and they really wanted to change that. So those were a lot of my supporters."

Such co-racial mobilization sometimes even crosses party lines. One Democratic, non-Vietnamese[21] Asian American former candidate had campaigned heavily to largely-Republican Vietnamese voters because he believed strongly that he could "flip" them on the basis of shared racial identity. While focusing his efforts on Vietnamese who were already registered, he did also attempt to register new Vietnamese voters: "We had groups who went out to the [Vietnamese] supermarkets. The student volunteers for the campaign would do that pretty much on Saturdays, and I think it was pretty hard work for them." Although he did not win the election, "In terms of flipping the votes, [in an area with only] 39% Democratic registration, we got 47% of the vote. Someone did some analysis and was telling me, yeah, you were very successful at flipping the Vietnamese in those precincts."

Likewise, Vietnamese American candidates also recruit non-Vietnamese co-racials for support: "Yes, with the Koreans we also did voter registration…we share many values, similar values, as fellow Asians, as well. And I just happen to have friends who are Koreans, and geographically the Koreans were at that time based out of—their business community is based out of Garden Grove, so it's very, very convenient. So, we

[21] I am refraining from revealing his specific ethnicity in order to protect his identity.

did a lot of voter registration and various events, cultural and civic events, together. Same thing with the Chinese, later on with the Chinese community."

The outcomes of these *campaign-initiated* efforts to register Asian Americans in Orange County are impressive, ranging from several hundred to several thousand new registrants per session, as reported to me by the candidates or their campaign staff. This stands in contrast to registration efforts initiated by other agents, such as Asian American non-profit organizations, without the benefit of assistance from or affiliation with an Asian American electoral campaign. As I will elaborate later in the chapter, the registration efforts of Asian American organizations are greatly enhanced when they are aligned with the efforts of Asian American candidates.

Not all candidates who wish to pursue the registration strategy are able to fully do so, however appealing it is to them, due to insufficient resources. One former candidate said, "We had a voter registration effort, but I don't know how effective it was because we didn't have a whole lot of resources to spend on that…we did not have a sophisticated enough organizational effort and infrastructure to really coordinate a serious effort. It was there, but it was not fully resourced." As it turns out, it tends to be the Democratic as opposed to Republican Asian American candidates who find it difficult to resource registration strategies. The reasons for this difference will be made evident when I elaborate, in the next section, the mechanisms underlying the other positive interaction effect from Model 1 of Table 14 in Chapter 3: for Asian Americans, living in a county with higher proportions of Republicans among registered Asians increases the likelihood of registration (and reduces the Asian-white registration gap).

Democrats and Republicans in California

In order to understand why the registration gap between whites and Asians is lower in counties with higher proportions of Republicans among registered Asians, it is necessary to understand the political situation in the state as a whole. From the late 1960s to the late 1980s, California was a Republican-leaning state, with conservatives concentrated in southern California, where the defense industry was located. Then, in the early 1990s, with the end of the cold war, the state's partisan balance started shifting to the left, as Republican-leaning former defense workers migrated out of the state and the liberal-leaning technology and entertainment sectors expanded (Cohen 2012). At the same time, California was in the midst of a rapidly growing influx of immigrants from Latin America and Asia (Buntin 2013). In 1994, the Republican-backed Proposition 187, which sought to block undocumented immigrants from receiving state-funded medical and educational benefits[22], created a rift between the Republican Party and future Latino (Nagourney 2012) and Asian (Buntin 2013) voters. Between 2000 and 2010, while the percentage of Democrats remained fairly steady (45% in 2000 and 44% in 2010), the percentage of registered Republicans dropped from 35% to 31%, and the percentage of independents increased from 14% to 20%. A Public Policy Institute of California report (Baldassare et al. 2013) reveals that independents in California gravitate more towards the Democratic Party than the Republican Party: among independent likely voters, 41% lean Democratic, 29% lean Republican and 32% do not lean in either direction. Thus, the functional Democratic advantage is even greater than the registration ratio alone suggests.

[22] The proposition was passed by voters but later overturned in court, thus it never became law.

Republicans have not won California's electoral college votes since 1988, they are increasingly unable to be elected to state-level offices of the executive branch, and they are overwhelmingly outnumbered by Democrats in the State Assembly and the State Senate (Nagourney 2012). Given that Democrats not only have a far greater share of the state's registered voters, but are also much better positioned to leverage the votes of independent registrants, the California Republican Party must recruit new registrants in order to remain electorally competitive. Accordingly, the party has invested substantial amounts of money into voter registration programs. Between 2003 and 2006, for example, the party spent $3 million dollars registering new Republicans statewide (Lowe 2006), and in 2010 alone it spent $1.3 million (Miller et al. 2010). Funding for voter registration programs is transferred from the state party to the Republican parties of counties with close Congressional and state legislative races, and typically, the county parties use the money to hire signature-gathering firms to conduct voter registration drives (Myers 2012; Miller et al. 2010; Orr 2010; Horwitz 2006; Lowe 2006; Dichiara 2000).

At this point, I want to return to the task at hand, which is to explain why the registration gap between whites and Asians is lower in counties with higher proportions of Republicans among registered Asians, and emphasize that it is the proportion of Republicans among registered *Asians*, and not the proportion of Republicans among registrants in the *total population*, that increases the likelihood of registration for Asian Americans. Recall from the last chapter that there is no significant interaction between the proportion of Republicans among total population registrants and being Asian. In other words, it is not the extent to which *the county as a whole* is Republican, but the extent to which *Asians in the county* are Republican, that matters for the Asian-white registration gap. The implication of this distinction is important: county Republican parties in California are invested in recruiting new registrants into the party, but they only target Asians if the uncertainty that comes with registering new Asian voters appears manageable. One way for them to gauge whether or not it is worthwhile to actively register Asians is to observe the partisan balance among currently registered Asians, particularly as distributed across electoral districts. Each county Republican party has its own set of considerations in making the decision, as I will discuss in the next section.

The Republican Parties in San Diego and Orange Counties

Given the decline of the Republican Party in California over the last two decades, all county Republican parties, even those with the largest registration advantages, are incentivized to register new voters into the party in order to ensure the viability of Republican candidates in state and national level elections. However, as is always the case in politics, resources are limited, and registration efforts must be finely targeted. As mentioned earlier, the California Republican Party has "bounty" programs whereby funding for voter registration is disbursed to counties for use in battleground election areas, but it is up to the counties how to distribute the funds. The most common practice is to hire for-profit petition-circulating firms, whose employees are paid for each new Republican they register, to execute the registration drives, but party activists sometimes participate, as well. Some county Republican parties also have their own bounty programs, and those funds can be used on top of those provided by the state party. The Republican parties in both San Diego and Orange Counties have utilized bounty

registration programs to increase Republican registration in areas where competitive elections occur, but whereas Asians have been strategically recruited for registration in Orange County, they have not been deliberately targeted for registration in San Diego County.

The San Diego County Republican Party is strong, as measured by the indicators of party strength in Gibson et al. (1985),[23] and San Diego County has historically been considered a Republican stronghold. Between 2000 and 2006, Republicans had a registration advantage over Democrats in the range of 4.9 to 5.7 percentage points. In 2008, however, a reversal occurred—as it did across California—with Democratic registrations leading by .16 of a percentage point. In response, the San Diego County Republican Party, with financial assistance from the California Republican Party, mounted an aggressive voter registration campaign using the bounty program (Clock 2010). By the end of 2010, Republican registrations led by .3 of a percentage point. While the drive was successful, it did not involve the targeting of Asian Americans. When asked whether the San Diego County Republican Party actively seeks to register Asian Americans, one member of the Republican Central Committee responded, "Part of our job as being on the Central Committee is to try to get people to register to vote, and to vote on election day. Not necessarily reaching out to the Asian community, but get *anybody* to register to vote, and to vote on election day." Another Republican Central Committee Member also said that the party's registration efforts do not target Asians as a group.

The lack of targeting is manifested in registration trends between 2006 and 2010. In 2006, the 5.5 percentage-point Republican advantage among registered Asian Americans was very similar to the Republican advantage in the total population. Then, in 2008, as happened in the total population, the Republican advantage among Asian Americans reversed, with Democratic registrations leading by .2 of a percentage point. However, whereas the post-2008 San Diego County Republican Party registration push restored the Republican advantage in the total population to a .3 percentage-point lead in 2010, among Asian Americans the Republican disadvantage actually deepened between 2008 and 2010, from a .2 of a percentage-point deficit to a 1 percentage-point deficit.

Why does the San Diego County Republican Party not seek out Asian Americans for registration? None of my Republican interviewees provided a direct answer to this question, but I speculate that it has to do with the partisan proclivities of the various Asian ethnic groups and their distribution across electoral districts. An officer of the San Diego County Democratic Party told me, "The Filipinos are a little more south, and we know that they're more Republican, but have relatively solid relationships with some of our candidates cuz they're in what is a more Democratic area. So their neighbors are Democrats. They are slowly becoming more and more Democratic." Meanwhile, the Korean, Japanese and Chinese populations are concentrated in solidly Republican areas, but as individuals, they lean Democratic. Registering new Asian American voters, then, would seem to be a risky endeavor for the San Diego Republican Party.

[23] These include measures of *organizational complexity*, such as having occupants in the positions of the formal structure, having a budget, having office facilities and staff, and having rules and bylaws; and measures of *programmatic activity*, such as candidate recruitment activity, involvement in patrongage, pre-primary endorsements, and electoral effectiveness of precinct-level organizations.

While the San Diego County Republican Party does not actively recruit Asian Americans for registration, Republican candidates do regularly approach Asian Americans for assistance in running campaigns, practice that began as early as the 1970s. One interviewee who had served as the Filipino campaign manager[24] of a Congressional candidate said, "In the 70s and 80s, we had Filipinos working for U.S. Congressmen…the Congressional candidates and mayoral candidates reached out to the Philippine community and met the president or the officers of [Filipino American organizations]. And that's how…they were hired by the candidates to work for Congress or for the mayor." Similarly, a Vietnamese American interviewee told me, "The mainstream candidates have came to the Vietnamese Americans and say, hey look, we need your help, we need you start making phone calls, phone-banking out for, let's say, Congressman Brian Bilberry or Councilman Carl DeMaio, I need you, can you organize it, can you start making phone calls?" Thus, while registering new Asian voters would lead to too much uncertainty, those who are already registered as Republicans are popular targets of mobilization.

In contrast to the situation in San Diego County, Asian Americans have, for decades, been targeted for registration by the Orange County Republican Party. The party is not only strong as measured by the indicators of party strength in Gibson et al. (1985), it is, by all accounts, an unusually well-organized, active, and generously-funded county party. Orange County is the quintessential Republican stronghold in California, and while the ratio of registered Republicans to registered Democrats took a dramatic dip in 2008, from an 18 percentage-point lead in 2006 to a 5 percentage-point lead, it recovered to an 11 percentage-point lead in 2010. As opposed to the majority of county Republican parties, which rely completely on the state party to fund paid registration programs, the Orange County Republican Party funds its own bounty program to supplement the state bounty, and also maintains volunteer registration efforts (Dichiara 2000).

Since the 1980s, the Orange County Republican Party has recognized the benefit of establishing relationships with the growing Latino and Asian American populations. A 1988 Los Angeles Times article reported that, "while Latinos and Southeast Asians make up only 23% of [Orange County's] population, they have begun to make up as much as 40% or more of the vote and higher in certain precincts in Santa Ana, Westminster, Stanton, west Anaheim and Garden Grove" (Reyes 1988). Then-Chairman Thomas Fuentes was quoted in 1991 as saying, "This is fresh new political ground to plow…and to reap a harvest from," and "The Republican Party realizes that in order to remain the party of leadership, we must have the continued involvement of the growing segments of our population" (Lesher 1991).

The county party's early outreach to Asian Americans primarily targeted the Vietnamese, who were, and continue to be, the largest Asian ethnic population in Orange County, and moreover constitute a substantial proportion of the populations in the 68th Assembly District, the 34th Senate District, and the 47th Congressional District. Efforts to register new Vietnamese voters were facilitated through the establishment of local Republican headquarters in places like Little Saigon, which were staffed with volunteers and local elected officials, and also visited by "big federal folks." However, most of the heavy-lifting of registering Vietnamese Americans was performed by a small group of

[24] As the "Filipino campaign manager," he served as a liaison to the Filipino American community and did it part-time and at no cost, but the candidate had a primary, full-time campaign manager.

Vietnamese American political entrepreneurs, who would later run for office and be elected. These Vietnamese American political entrepreneurs were especially well-positioned to convince Vietnamese Americans to register as Republicans because they knew the community very well. One of them revealed in an interview, "We basically encouraged people to vote Republican because the Republican Party philosophy share, in many ways, share in the same values as the Asian American community in general, and specifically with the Vietnamese American community." When asked what those shared values were, he said, "Education, very conservative, you know, strong on family values, traditional values of family piety. Entrepreneurship, support for business. Strong or firm national defense. Pro-freedom slash anti-communism, if you will. And we also remind the voters that during the years in which the vast majority, the super-majority of Vietnamese refugees who came to the United States were under the years in which President Reagan and President Bush were in the White House. And with their support with their refugee policy…and specifically with Reagan, it was an easier understanding on the part of the Vietnamese community because President Reagan and many of his policy espousements against Communism and pro-democracy around the world, at that time, we were at the height obviously of the Cold War before the Soviet Union collapsed. I think many of the older Vietnamese, first-generation Vietnamese voters, my parents specifically, and others, understand that and really are attracted to that. You know, for second generation or for 1.5 generation Vietnamese Americans like myself, we just happen to grow up under—I consider myself a Reagan kid because I grew into political maturity when President Reagan was in the White House. So we just grew up under that administration, and absorbed or took in a lot of those ideals and those pronouncements."

The early division of labor between the Orange County Republican Party, which provided funding and other material resources, and Vietnamese American political entrepreneurs, who were able to establish meaningful connections with the Vietnamese American community, continues to this day, and has expanded to include *all* Asian ethnic groups—at least the ones whose Republican candidates have been successfully elected. The Orange County Republican Party reaches out to every Republican Asian American, of any ethnicity, who wins an election. One non-Vietnamese Republican Asian American elected official[25], who had not had any formal relationship with the Republican Party prior to holding office, shared his experience of being contacted by the county party shortly after he was elected. He said, "Once you get elected, then they see that you're in a position that could help the party, so they reached out…[they wanted help with] voter registration, get people to the vote, get people to register Republican, and then get Republican candidates to run for office." With regard to voter registration, "they have a lot of resources, yeah, they have a whole system to do something like that…let's say tomorrow, this weekend, I wanted to do a voter registration drive. I would call them up, and then they'll be okay, we'll set up stuff, we'll send some people, help you register, where do you want to set it up, and we'll set it up." Asked whether the party explicitly asks for help in registering Asian Americans, he replied, "They do kind of want us to—sometimes they specifically say it, sometimes they don't, to help target the Asian Americans to register to vote. Because they realize that Asians do swing elections here in Orange County, and they do realize the importance of Asian votes here. And they would rather have you hurry up and get to them first before the Democrats get to them, and then

[25] I am refraining from revealing his specific ethnicity in order to protect his identity

have them register Democrats, so yeah, they do kind of lean towards that, and then they use me as a resource to do that, to help reach out to the Asian American community."

The Democratic Parties in San Diego and Orange Counties

Because Democrats enjoy a generous registration advantage in California, and because likely independent voters in California lean substantially Democratic, the California Democratic Party is not as invested in registering new voters as the California Republican Party. Although the party has a voter registration bounty program, the program does not promote especially aggressive outreach, since only registered Democratic Clubs—not private firms—can participate. Moreover, although clubs are paid per registered head, the money goes to the club, not to individuals. Rather than pursuing intensive registration outreach, the California Democratic Party prefers to develop relationships with independent voters. From 2002 to mid-2012, California used a modified closed primary system, in which political parties could decide whether or not to allow independent voters to vote for their candidates in primary elections. The California Democratic Party consistently allowed it, whereas the California Republican Party—in spite of Arnold Schwarzenegger's strong support of doing so during the years in which he served as governor—did not.

The strategies taken by the California Democratic Party are echoed in the strategies of the San Diego County Democratic Party. The San Diego County Democratic Party is present to register new citizens at the swearing-in ceremonies, but by the party's own admission, its registration operations beyond that are not especially aggressive. It is active at various San Diego festivals and street fairs, but "a lot of that really is not necessarily about registering new voters, but getting registered voters to update their information, in case they've moved or something, so it's kept current. Or, converting them from voting at the polling place to voting by mail. That's a big thing. One of our big pushes for the last few years has been, across the board, to get people to vote by mail." Voting by mail is preferred "because then they become higher propensity voters, statistically. And that makes them—if they're a medium propensity, and you get them to vote by mail, you can convert them to a high propensity voter because of the convenience of getting the ballot in the mail."

When the need arises to cultivate new supporters, the party targets decline to state voters: "Part of [building a relationship with decline to state voters] is getting an understanding of whether they're a decline to state that leans Democratic or not. If they do lean Democratic, then we start treating them as though they were Democratic voters in our database….whether or not they re-register as a Democrat, it connects them with the party that they will have an affinity with." Developing relationships with decline to state voters is preferred over registering new voters because, at the end of the day, when it comes to turning out voters, "typically if they're a person who you had to sort of convince to register to vote, they're not all that motivated to vote naturally."

As a historically weak party organization, the Orange County Democratic Party is even less dedicated to registration operations than the San Diego County Democratic Party. One Orange County Democratic Central Committee Member explained the county party's infrastructure as follows: "You have a situation where the Democratic Party of Orange County is not very organized, is itself an umbrella organization that has activists and leaders that are part of it, but they're also part of their own organizations."

Consequently, the party has difficulty raising money and organizing activities. Another party insider cited "a lot of generational politics" that impedes the adoption of efficient voter registration processes. "One of the examples that's a fairly straightforward example is that the Democratic Party, every summer, staffs a booth at the Orange County Fair. What that generally entails is recruiting people to volunteer to work at the Orange County Fair to register voters. [A young, newly recruited registration chair who had previously worked for Obama for America] had been in charge of that because they said, 'Look, that's something that we do, we register voters at the fair and let people know that we're here. You're gonna be in charge of organizing people to do that.' So he did, or he tried to." Initially, the chair had trouble staffing the event, so the party had to scramble to find 20 volunteers. However, "after they managed to get all that manpower and time and energy expended to get the volunteers to show up to do that, how many voters did they actually register? A handful. I mean, it wasn't worth the time to do that." Moreover, most of the handful of new voters registered as Republicans!

Given the Orange County Democratic Party's difficulty raising money and coordinating basic activities, the specific targeting of Asian Americans for registration does not even enter into the calculus of outreach decisions. Individual Democratic candidates running in electoral districts with substantial proportions of Asian Americans do, however, spend time and resources courting their votes. Democratic Congressmember Loretta Sanchez and Democratic California State Senator Lou Correa, for example, are both well-known for having built solid relationships with the Vietnamese voters in their respective districts. Not surprisingly, however, the mobilization of Asian Americans by non-Asian candidates, however intense, is strictly limited to already-registered Asian Americans. The campaign strategy of registering Asian Americans is used exclusively by Asian American candidates.

Other Mobilizing Agents

Asian American Organizations

The literature on immigrant political incorporation has found that civic organizations serve as important bridges between largely-immigrant minority populations and the broader political context (Anderson 2008a; DeGraauw 2008; Bloemraad 2006; Wong 2006; Hung 2005). However, the forms of political activity that these organizations foster tend to be outside of the formal electoral structure. The evidence suggests that civic organizations play little to no role in registering immigrants to vote (Anderson 2008b; DeGraauw 2008). My interviews with Asian American civic organizations in San Diego and Orange Counties support a modified version of this conclusion, as I will explain below.

The density of Asian American ethnic and pan-ethnic organizations is greater in Orange County than in San Diego County (2% vs. 1% of all non-profit organizations, respectively), but the types of organizations that exist are similar: social service provision organizations, civic engagement/political empowerment organizations, cultural organizations, historical organizations, and religious organizations. Of these, the only

ones that take up the task of registering Asian Americans to vote are the civic engagement/political empowerment organizations.[26]

In San Diego County, following the 2011 decision of the City of San Diego's Redistricting Commission to create a City Council District in which Asians comprise about 33% of the adult population and 26% of the eligible voters, a number of non-profit organizations promoting Asian American registration came into existence. As of the spring of 2012, when I conducted my interviews, the organizations were still developing their leadership structures and considering their inter-organizational affiliations, thus no serious registration efforts had yet been coordinated. It therefore remains to be seen how effective the organizations are in registering Asians to vote.

The experience of similar, but longer-established, civic engagement/political empowerment organizations in Orange County might foreshadow the future of their recently-created San Diego counterparts. In the span of a typical year, such organizations' registration yields might reach the low hundreds—not very high at all. When the organizations coordinate efforts with Asian American candidates, however, they are able to register that many in the span of several hours. Although the organizations' non-profit status prohibits them from participating in campaign activities, they can perform general registration outreach, and Asian American candidates "highly encourage" them to do so. One campaign manager explained the link between Asian American electoral candidates and registration outreach by non-profit organizations as follows: "What we can do is maybe send them a memo about why it's important for voter registration in this area, and they can decide on their own to do it." Importantly, campaigns "put in the manpower" to help with the organizations' registration drives, and can also help the organizations fundraise.

The running of the Asian American candidates also provides a boost in the registration activities of civic engagement/political empowerment organizations that normally do not devote much effort to registering voters. One non-profit head explained, "So, there's various organizations [that occasionally work on registration], but it's not their full-time job, it's not their main thing. But what has spurred the movement is so many candidates, Asian candidates, running…the [abstract political empowerment/civic engagement aspect of outreach] has always been there, but I think the hike [in registration outreach] has been when, like, Sukhee Kang, the mayor of Irvine, ran, and Steven Choi, and now we have Miller Oh, and Steven Hwangbo, and then also, we have a statewide candidate, Michelle Park Steel…[training on the rights and duties of citizenship] is always going on, but I think what drives people out [to do registration outreach] are candidates and issues."

In addition to civic Asian American organizations, both Orange and San Diego Counties also have ethnic-specific and pan-ethnic Asian American organizational affiliates of the Democratic and Republican Parties. The Democratic Asian American organizations in both counties have tended to languish due to problems fundraising and recruiting members. The Republican Asian American organizations have had similar issues, but certain ones have fared better, likely because of deeper connections with the

[26] The major umbrella Asian American social service provision organization in Orange County, the Orange County Asian and Pacific Islander Community Alliance (OCAPICA) did play an important role in a voter participation project funded by the James Irvine Foundation targeting low-income and ethnic communities in five California counties between 2006 and 2009, but the project did not engage in voter registration.

formal party and/or electoral candidates. In the 1980s and 1990s, for example, one Vietnamese Republican organization successfully registered thousands of Vietnamese Americans to the Republican Party because the organization's head was already an insider of the Republican Party, having worked for many years for Republican elected officials and candidates. This organization enjoyed the support of the Orange County Republican Party, "both resource-wise and manpower-wise, man and woman-power wise," and was further hooked into the Orange County Republican Party's generous registration bounty program, which paid as much as $10 per Republican registration.

In San Diego County, there has not been a similar success story, certainly not in terms of voter registration, but as of the spring of 2012, one newly-formed Asian American Republican organization appeared to be gaining momentum in terms of establishing relationships with the county party and mainstream Republican candidates. This organization was formed initially through a request by the Chairman of the County Republican Party to the president of a Filipino American organization after the Republicans took over the House of Representatives in 2010 because "he wanted to keep it going, and he wanted to change the face of the local Republican Party. Instead of being white old men, he wanted to diversify, and he came to me because I'm well-connected in the Asian American community, to start a Republican coalition. So, he asked me to start a Filipino Republican coalition, and so I told him I would, but then when I talked to my Vietnamese friends, and they said, no, no, no, don't say that, why don't you include us? So, I changed it to Asian American…I reached out to all the other Asian conservative groups, and I reached out to the Hispanic group." The organization holds candidate endorsement events on a regular basis, one of which I attended during my fieldwork. The purpose of the events is "to show [the San Diego County Republican Party] that our members are gonna be assigned to each candidate, and this member will stay with that candidate from now until [election day]. So when they win, at least they know that he had an Asian on their staff, on their campaign staff." Previous Asian American Republican organizations in San Diego County had failed to develop inroads into the formal party.

In summary, civic as well as partisan Asian American organizations *on their own* have not demonstrated the capability to successfully register significant numbers of Asian American voters. However, when they work together with Asian American candidates or with the formal political parties, they dramatically bolster their capacity.

Registrar of Voters

In 2004, both San Diego County and Orange County were investigated by the United States Department of Justice for alleged violations of Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act. Both counties agreed to Memoranda of Agreement improving practices and procedures related to the provision of materials and services to language minorities. Since that time, the Registrars of Voters (ROV) in both counties have been extremely active in promoting their covered Asian language services. They do so primarily through official language coordinators for each of the covered Asian languages, who link into their assigned communities with the goal of improving registration and voting in those communities.[27]

[27] Between 2002 and 2012, Orange County was officially covered for Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese; San Diego County was officially covered for Filipino, and unofficially, through the 2004 DOJ

The Asian American organizational heads I interviewed praised the registration outreach efforts of the ROV in both San Diego County and Orange County, and I, myself, witnessed the presence of the language coordinators at all of the Asian American community events that I attended. However, language coordinators by themselves can only do so much to register voters. To begin with, counties can only afford to hire one coordinator for each covered language. These coordinators can get the word out to their communities—and, from what I learned through my interviews, they are very adept at doing so in Orange and San Diego Counties—but they lack the manpower to do the actual work of registering large numbers of individuals. Counties simply cannot afford to fund such teams, so they rely on community organizations to take on the task. As I have argued above, however, community organizations themselves have difficulty mounting successful registration drives. This bundle of factors explains why Asians' odds of registration are actually lower in counties that meet the requirements for Asian-language assistance per the language provisions of the Voting Rights Act. Even when Registrars are dedicated to developing and promoting their language programs, as they are in San Diego and Orange Counties, it remains a challenge to fully match the level of need.

Lessons from Registration Outreachers

Interviewees who had participated in registration outreach to Asian Americans in San Diego and Orange Counties noted a couple of illuminating findings. First, unregistered Asians, even non-immigrants who had gone to college and graduate school—including law school—in the U.S., are very unknowledgeable about registration, voting, and politics and government in general. For example, many Asian Americans, upon learning of Asian American candidates, wished to vote for them, but did not know how to get started; moreover, some of them were not aware that they could not vote for candidates from outside of their electoral districts. One interviewee said, "A lot of people don't know the difference between State Assembly, State Senate, and Congress and Senate. Like, they don't even know the fundamental difference."

Another commonly noted observation about unregistered Asian Americans is that, even among those who have some degree of knowledge about the voting process, deadlines and other rules are unfamiliar and confusing. "What we found out was that a lot of the voter information is really confusing. No matter what language it's in…knowing all the dates of when to vote, when to register, when to do vote by mail was also confusing." Asian American college students often learn about registration for the first time when they are approached by registration drives on or near campus, and they find the multiple rules confusing. They are unsure of which address to use—their dorm address or their parents' address—and many of them are completely unaware that re-registration is required every time they move.

Problems of political knowledge are not unique to Asian Americans; they are well-documented in other racial minority populations, but they are typically associated with lower levels of education. Given Asian Americans' high levels of educational attainment, their level of ignorance is puzzling. I asked one of my interviewees whose job it is to mobilize Asian Americans to register and vote to speculate on why even highly educated, non-immigrant Asian Americans are so unknowledgeable about

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Memorandum, for Vietnamese. In 2012, San Diego County also became officially covered for Vietnamese and Chinese.

registration, voting, and government and politics more generally. He said, "I think politics is something that—and this all my assumptions, but I feel like, you know—my mainstream white friends, they talk about politics at the table. Their parents are friends with the politicians that run for city council and then later seek higher office. So they're in a different, you know, cultural kind of capacity because politics is something they grow up in, so they're familiar with it from a younger age. Whereas, I don't think Asian Americans have that same experience. And there's always things that are changing, they don't know about redistricting or open primary system or things like that, because they don't have to, you know, and they kind of gloss over it."

Conclusion

Asian American registration is higher in Orange County than in San Diego County for two main reasons. First, the relatively high proportion of Asians in Orange County, especially as distributed across electoral districts, allows Asian American candidates to win on the basis of the co-ethnic or co-Asian vote. Asian American voters tend to favor Asian American candidates, even those belonging to an Asian ethnic group that is different from their own, and they are often even willing to cross party lines to support co-racial candidates. In Orange County, it is feasible to win on the basis of Asian racial bloc voting because Asian Americans constitute a substantial proportion of the population in many voting districts. This provides a powerful incentive for Asian American candidates in Orange County to expand the Asian American voter pool, and they do so by incorporating voter registration into their campaign strategies. A further boost to Asian American registration occurs through the work of Asian American civic engagement/political empowerment organizations which normally do not engage in much registration outreach but are motivated to amplify their efforts when Asian American candidates run.

While the same sort of racial bloc voting would likely be true in San Diego County, the concentration of Asian Americans there, as distributed across electoral districts, is insufficient to allow racial bloc voting to carry an Asian American candidate to victory. Thus, while Asian American candidates in San Diego County do mobilize already-registered Asian Americans to vote for them, they do not regard registering Asian Americans as a cost-effective campaign strategy. With the new 26% Asian American City Council District in the city of San Diego, the campaign strategies of Asian American candidates may change, but this remains to be seen. In San Diego County, Asian American registration outreach is regarded as the purview of civic engagement/political empowerment organizations, but such organizations have not been particularly committed to the task in the past. A fresh cohort of Asian American civic organizations emerged following the approval of the new City Council District, but these organizations are still in an early stage of development, so their impact on levels of Asian American registration in San Diego County is as yet an open question.

The second reason why Asian American registration is higher in Orange County than in San Diego County is because the Orange County Republican Party invests funding and other resources into registering Asian Americans, whereas the San Diego County Republican Party does not. While all county Republican parties in California are increasingly keen to register new voters, targeting Asians in particular is a riskier prospect for some county Republican parties than for others, depending on factors such as

the existing partisan balance of Asian Americans across electoral districts. The Orange County Republican Party has spent decades cultivating relationships with Asian American communities, particularly with the Vietnamese, the largest Asian ethnic group in Orange County, thus it has far more confidence in the marginal utility of registering Asians.

Neither the San Diego County Democratic Party nor the Orange County Democratic Party targets Asian Americans for registration, nor, indeed, do they focus much on registering new voters in general. Democratic parties in California typically commit more resources to convincing decline to state voters to support their candidates than to registering new voters, since decline to state voters tend to lean heavily Democratic. In the case of the Orange County Democratic Party, a weak organizational structure and limited fund-raising capacity further constrain the adoption of rigorous voter registration programs.

A general conclusion regarding political parties and registration outreach is that it is the winning of elections, and not the partisan balance of registered voters *per se*, that more decisively impacts their decisions regarding registration outreach. The San Diego County Democratic Party, for example, is an effective and well-funded organization, yet in spite of the fact that the partisan balance of registered voters is roughly 50-50 in San Diego County, the party perceives being able to win elections on the basis of convincing independent voters to support Democrat candidates, thus it does not engage in aggressive registration efforts. The Orange County Republican Party, on the other hand, vigorously and continuously pursues the recruitment of new voters in spite of having a strong lead in registration. In order to understand this behavior, one must look at the political context in California as a whole. In statewide races, the California Republican Party relies on the votes of Republicans in strongholds like Orange County. To illustrate, in 1985, when the Republican advantage in voter registration reached a 15-year high of 52.7% to Democrats' 36.6% in Orange County, Orange County Republican Party Chairman Thomas Fuentes was quoted as saying, "Orange County is depended on by the California Republican Party to deliver this state if we ever have hopes of a statewide Republican candidate being elected," and "We are the anchor to the right. We are the bastion of the Republican votes that counterbalances what is done in West Los Angeles and San Francisco by the Democrats" (Jones 1985).

Discussion

While the purpose of this chapter has been to explicate the mechanisms underlying the (statistically) mitigating effects on Asian American under-registration of the proportion of the population that is Asian, and the proportion of Republicans among registered Asians, the findings of this chapter also help to clarify many of the other statistical relationships that were discovered in Chapter 3. In particular, the opposing effects of certain contextual variables on the two stages of voting among Asian Americans, and the differential impact of some contextual characteristics on Asians and whites, make sense when viewed in light of this chapter's findings that (1) candidate campaigns typically focus on turning out registered voters while reserving the registration of new voters for very special circumstances, and (2) in the current California context, county Republican parties have much stronger registration operations than county Democratic parties.

In the first set of opposing effects, higher proportions of foreign-born Asians have a depressive effect on registration among Asian citizens, but an elevating effect on turnout among registered Asians, and a reductive effect on both registration and turnout among whites. The negative effect on registration for Asians and whites alike probably reflects lower levels of knowledge about the voting process, and fewer interactions with neighbors involving conversations about American politics (Krassa 1988; Verba and Nie 1972), in largely-immigrant communities. At the same time, higher concentrations of foreign-born Asians likely encourage and facilitate the development of ethnic media outlets and ethnic organizations, thus making registered Asians—but not whites—more accessible to outreach by political campaigns focused on mobilizing turnout among the registered.

In the second set of opposite effects, higher proportions of college graduates in the total population have a negative effect on registration among Asian citizens, but a positive effect on registration among white citizens, and a positive effect on turnout among both registered Asians and registered whites. As I suggested in the introduction and in Chapter 3, registration drives are probably less likely to occur in highly-educated areas because of a perception of needlessness on the part of those who conduct registration drives. While this would not impact highly-educated whites, it would have a detrimental effect on comparably-educated Asians, who continue to suffer from low levels of familiarity with registration, even in later generations. At the same time, political campaigns are more likely to target these same highly-educated areas for turnout mobilization because such areas are statistically more likely to contain high-likelihood voters.

In the final set of contrary effects, higher proportions of Republicans among registered Asians have an uplifting effect on registration among Asian citizens (as has been one of the foci of this chapter), but an adverse effect on voting among both registered Asians and registered whites. In interpreting this set of opposing effects, it must be kept in mind that the proportion of Republicans among registrants in the *total population* has no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of turnout among registered Asians or registered whites. Thus, it is not a simply a relationship between party dominance and voter turnout. Instead, a more fitting interpretation is that, in counties where turnout levels are relatively low, there is greater incentive for parties to bring in new voters, such as Asian Americans. While both major parties would be expected to benefit from registering new voters in such a situation, county Republican parties are better equipped to ramp up their registration operations because, as I explained earlier in the chapter, the California Democratic Party offers much weaker support for voter registration programs than the California Republican Party.

Chapter 5
Conclusion: Awakening the Sleeping Giant

The voting process in the United States involves two stages: first, registering to vote, and second, casting a vote.[28] The literature on voting participation has long recognized that different factors are influential at each of the two stages. While studies offer a variety nuanced insights[29], the general consensus is that person-level traits, particularly education, age, residential stability, and income are the hallmark predictors of registration (Jang 2009; Timpone 1998; Jackson 1996). At the stage of vote-casting, these individual-level characteristics remain relevant though with diminished explanatory power (Timpone 1998; Jackson 1996), and contextual variables, particularly campaign influences and other political indicators, also come into play, (Jang 2009; Geys 2006; Jackson 1996). Thus, aside from recognizing that laws pertaining to registration barriers, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, registration closing dates, and motor voter programs, have an important impact on registration (Highton 2004), the extant literature—which is primarily based on samples of non-Hispanic whites—views the stage of registration as being dominated by the influence of personal resources, and the stage of vote-casting as being more responsive to political context.

The findings of this study question this longstanding understanding of differences between the predictors of registration and vote-casting. In particular, it reveals not only that contextual variables significantly predict the likelihood of registration for Asian Americans, but also that the registration gap between whites and Asians, which stubbornly persists even after controlling for a number of time-tested individual-level predictors, and even among third-plus generation Asian Americans, is primarily a function of political context. The literature on voting participation should be amended to recognize that, for some populations, contextual variables are as important to explaining registration as they are to explaining vote-casting. To be sure, the contextual predictors of registration are distinct from the contextual predictors of turnout, but context as a conceptual notion matters significantly at both stages of the voting process. The puzzle of Asian American under-participation in electoral politics is hardly a puzzle when context is included in the equation predicting registration.

The relevance of contextual variables for registration is not unique to Asian Americans. While not captured in the literature just reviewed, studies focusing on registration drives have observed that black registration (Vedlitz 1985) and Latino registration (Cain and McCue 1985) are substantially improved by registration drives. However, while registration drives are recognized as an important element of black and Latino political incorporation, the link between registration outreach and Asian American under-participation in electoral politics has thus far been unappreciated by scholars and mainstream political agents alike, perhaps because registration drives are viewed as being pertinent primarily to those citizens who, unlike Asian Americans as a whole, have low levels of socioeconomic resources.

The consequences of such perceptions—which actually are rational perceptions given existing theories about the determinants of voter registration—are borne out in the comparatively low proportion of Asian Americans who are registered through drives. In

[28] Among immigrants, the voting process also involves the antecedent act of becoming a citizen.
[29] See, for example, Erikson (1981)

the pooled 2000-2010 CPS Voter Supplements sample, only 9% of registered Asians report being registered through registration drives, compared to 14% of blacks, 13% of whites, and 12% of Latinos. Tellingly, in Orange County, where the registration rate of Asian Americans is relatively high, 13% of registered Asian Americans are registered through registration drives. In San Diego County, where Asian Americans have a relatively low rate of registration, 8% of registered Asian Americans are registered through registration drives.

Why should Asian Americans, with their relatively high levels of socioeconomic resources, particularly those in the second and third-plus generations, require registration mobilization? A clue is present in Erikson's (1981) finding that "with measures of political sophistication controlled, income and education appear unimportant [for registration], which suggests that the causal sequence is that SES causes political sophistication" (p. 269). Yet another clue comes from Leighley and Vedlitz's (1999) finding that Asian Americans enjoy lower returns to political interest with regard to voting (without disaggregating between registration and vote-casting). Taken together with my own finding in Chapter 4 that even non-immigrant Asian Americans who have gone to college and graduate school in the U.S., and who are interested in participating in elections, are very unknowledgeable about registration, voting, and politics in general, these clues suggest that Asian Americans as a group are under-socialized in the realm of U.S. electoral politics. A majority of Asian Americans are either immigrants or the children of immigrants, and the ones who are not are the descendants of Asians who were barred from naturalization until the second half of the twentieth century. It is not surprising, then, that the comparatively truncated period of time during which Asian Americans as a group have had to develop participatory socialization limits the extent to which their socioeconomic resources translate into political know-how.

I view knowledge of the voting process as an invisible, taken-for-granted resource enjoyed by non-immigrant, socioeconomically advantaged American citizens whose history does not include the legacy of categorical political exclusion, much like privileged high school students whose habitus (Bourdieu 1985) confers taken-for-granted knowledge, or cultural capital, about the college-application process (Avery et al. 2009). Asian Americans do not share this invisible resource, as it is neither taught in schools nor transmitted at home. In fact, their disadvantage is doubly invisible, since, unlike other racial minorities, they are assumed by virtue of their socioeconomic standing to require no special assistance.

Why, then, if Asian Americans are so lacking in voting-related cultural capital, to such an extent that they are ignorant about the registration process even in later generations, are registered third-plus generation Asians more likely than socioeconomically-comparable whites to vote, as was found in Chapter 2? The answer can be extracted, again, from Chapter 4: mainstream political campaigns focus almost exclusively on turning out registered voters. Once third-plus generation Asians are registered in the system, they are much more likely to be mobilized, and once they are mobilized, the advantages of their socioeconomic resources can be fully, and even surpassingly, realized.

Besides contributing theoretically to various strands of academic literature pertaining to political participation and racial inequality, this study has practical implications for countering Asian American under-participation in electoral politics in

ways that do not depend on the election-specific calculations of candidates and parties. Adequately resourced registration drives are necessary to bring Asian Americans of every generation into the voter pool, and to retain them following changes in residence. Absent such funded, staffed, and continuous mass efforts, participation will remain abysmally low. However, problems intrinsic to the nature of registration work need to be addressed. The interviews I conducted with the heads of Asian American civic engagement/political empowerment organizations reveal that voter registration programs are hard to sustain, primarily because of difficulty maintaining staffing for registration efforts. Working on registration was repeatedly described as "very boring," and "hard, grubby work." Oftentimes, it is the first type of volunteer activity that activists engage in, but they quickly move on to other forms of outreach: "You become part of a campaign, and you move on to other issues…when you work with a candidate, you see the results right away, and you work with the campaign, you work with the strategy, all kind of things." Volunteers are most enthusiastic about registration outreach when an exogenous goal is attached to it, such as the election of an Asian American candidate to office. Thus, efforts tend to be episodic. However, as one interviewee remarked, "Voter registration should never be episodic. It should be ongoing. Ideally, it should be ongoing. You don't wait until the election time comes around, because people move, change their address which you need to re-register…people change parties and need to re-register as well, so there's a number of reasons why it has to be ongoing." The challenge will be to devise viable solutions to the unappealing nature of the work.

Appendix

Because the Asian American population is composed of multiple ethnic or national origin sub-populations with their corresponding languages, histories, and cultures, it is of interest to investigate patterns for each individual sub-population. Unfortunately, the Current Population Survey is not an ideal data source for the examination of differences across Asian ethnic groupings. While the nativity and parental nativity questions do allow for the inference of ethnicity to some extent, a full 52% of Asians in the pooled 2000-2010 CPS Voter Supplement sample cannot be categorized into the six major Asian American ethnicities of Chinese, Filipino, Vietnamese, Indian, Korean or Japanese. Ethnicity cannot be inferred at all for the 17% of Asian respondents who are third-plus generation, and even 41% of the second-generation respondents and 38% of the foreign-born respondents cannot be assigned to one of the six major Asian American ethnicities because responses to the nativity questions include countries from every continent as well as a generic "abroad, unknown" category. Due to these limitations, I choose not to report findings by ethnic grouping, although I did perform ethnic-specific analyses and can provide results upon request.

With respect to county-level ethnicity variables, which can be obtained with confidence from Census data, I did examine whether the proportion of each Asian ethnic grouping interacted with the effect of being Asian, but none of the interaction terms was statistically significant. In other words, the proportion of the Asian American population that is Vietnamese (or Chinese, or Filipino, or Indian, or Korean, or Japanese) has no statistically significant impact on the magnitude of the Asian-white registration gap, net of the other individual-level and county-level variables. Interestingly, the proportion Japanese and the proportion Chinese have a positive effect on registration for whites and Asians alike, and the proportion Japanese and the proportion Vietnamese have a positive impact on turnout for both whites and Asians, net of the other variables. Meanwhile, the proportion Korean has a negative effect on turnout for both whites and Asians, net of the other variables

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Table 1 - Logit models of registration

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	-0.86988	0.015748	-0.79517	0.019329
Latino	-0.75279	0.010983	-0.32459	0.012802
Black	-0.29973	0.009657	0.095603	0.01079
Age			0.01353	0.000198
College			0.905463	0.008548
$50K+			0.542733	0.007178
3+ yrs			1.560167	0.006876
Foreign			-0.46259	0.013851
cps00	0.171388	0.010427	0.313062	0.011591
cps02	0.054556	0.009842	0.144747	0.01095
cps04	0.318544	0.010207	0.458896	0.011331
cps06	0.118017	0.010047	0.196759	0.011169
cps08	0.273748	0.01025	0.369242	0.011373
_cons	0.801579	0.007221	-0.6309	0.009578

Table 2 - Logit models of voting among the registered

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	-0.2637	0.026294	-0.30504	0.029632
Latino	-0.56406	0.016734	-0.22371	0.018173
Black	-0.1247	0.014178	0.180162	0.014857
Age			0.024004	0.000277
College			0.811206	0.010809
$50K+			0.383601	0.009278
3+ yrs			0.439137	0.010066
Foreign			-0.1518	0.020236
cps00	0.89411	0.015137	1.104588	0.015746
cps02	-0.03489	0.012479	0.074137	0.013031
cps04	1.176007	0.015283	1.379155	0.015857
cps06	0.038131	0.012713	0.108785	0.013254
cps08	1.275035	0.01595	1.428169	0.016481
_cons	0.99696	0.009279	0.135698	0.013099

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 3 - Logit model of registration with immigrant generation predictors

	Coef.	Std. Err.
FB Asian	-1.19543	0.022477
2G Asian	-1.02557	0.04092
MixG Asian	-0.50492	0.081668
3P Asian	-0.83304	0.042521
FB Latino	-0.6636	0.02182
2G Latino	-0.48451	0.023888
MixG Latino	-0.27029	0.039048
3P Latino	-0.32514	0.019433
FB Black	-0.47083	0.04022
2G Black	-0.45071	0.066037
MixG Black	-0.02575	0.088202
3P Black	0.119515	0.011346
FB White	-0.57811	0.02042
2G White	-0.04592	0.024258
MixG White	0.184091	0.020412
Age	0.013351	0.0002
College	0.906842	0.008554
$50K+	0.542472	0.007182
3+ yrs	1.561156	0.00688
cps00	0.313059	0.011601
cps02	0.14465	0.010957
cps04	0.459039	0.011335
cps06	0.197999	0.011174
cps08	0.36843	0.011376
_cons	-0.63362	0.009631

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 4 - Logit model of voting among the registered with immigrant generation predictors

	Coef.	Std. Err.
FB Asian	-0.64133	0.03419
2G Asian	-0.39358	0.064726
MixG Asian	0.086371	0.123943
3P Asian	0.388873	0.075877
FB Latino	-0.14723	0.033378
2G Latino	-0.28135	0.034509
MixG Latino	-0.21372	0.053825
3P Latino	-0.35144	0.026745
FB Black	0.005261	0.060305
2G Black	0.173764	0.100645
MixG Black	-0.06096	0.119681
3P Black	0.183457	0.015512
FB White	-0.19853	0.029346
2G White	-0.16324	0.030479
MixG White	0.096025	0.025275
Age	0.024052	0.00028
College	0.81283	0.01082
$50K+	0.38345	0.009286
3+ yrs	0.438636	0.010071
cps00	1.107172	0.015762
cps02	0.075552	0.013043
cps04	1.383167	0.01587
cps06	0.111176	0.013264
cps08	1.430824	0.016492
_cons	0.13557	0.013169

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 5 - Mean values of age, education, income, and foreign-born status, by race

Whites

Variable	*Obs*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
Age	440362	48.06084	17.52225	18	90
College	440362	0.284339	0.451099	0	1
$50K+	440362	0.444873	0.496952	0	1
3+ yrs	440362	0.666484	0.47147	0	1
Foreign	440362	0.03075	0.172639	0	1

Blacks

Variable	*Obs*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
Age	54385	44.66697	17.0193	18	90
College	54385	0.165542	0.371672	0	1
$50K+	54385	0.252092	0.434218	0	1
3+ yrs	54385	0.558224	0.496603	0	1
Foreign	54385	0.058913	0.235465	0	1

Asians

Variable	*Obs*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
Age	17003	45.41975	16.97276	18	90
College	17003	0.41675	0.493035	0	1
$50K+	17003	0.499853	0.500015	0	1
3+ yrs	17003	0.591249	0.491618	0	1
Foreign	17003	0.606128	0.488621	0	1

Latinos

Variable	*Obs*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
Age	37114	41.02115	16.47971	18	90
College	37114	0.137522	0.344403	0	1
$50K+	37114	0.321981	0.467242	0	1
3+ yrs	37114	0.561648	0.496192	0	1
Foreign	37114	0.289594	0.45358	0	1

Table 6 - Logit model of registration with interactions

	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	-0.73902	0.040177
Latino	-0.11436	0.022337
Black	0.182729	0.016581
Age	0.013944	0.000224
College	0.948205	0.009536
$50K+	0.559186	0.008037
3+ yrs	1.608449	0.007861
Foreign	-0.60261	0.02043
AsXage	-0.00472	0.001055
LatXage	0.003237	0.000767
BlXage	-0.00543	0.000651
AsXcollege	-0.07994	0.037158
LatXcollege	-0.10496	0.037613
BlXcollege	-0.36101	0.031194
AsX50K+	-0.1132	0.035772
LatX50K+	0.011009	0.026416
BlX50K+	-0.14123	0.026092
AsX3+yrs	-0.17465	0.036519
LatX3+yrs	-0.4195	0.024514
BlX3+yrs	-0.05629	0.022055
AsXforeign	0.321572	0.040685
LatXforeign	0.310185	0.032759
BlXforeign	0.100074	0.045813
cps00	0.315033	0.0116
cps02	0.145232	0.010959
cps04	0.459182	0.011335
cps06	0.196691	0.011173
cps08	0.369144	0.011372
_cons	-0.66669	0.009909

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 7 -Logit model of voting among the registered with interactions

	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	0.29176	0.072017
Latino	-0.31294	0.036388
Black	0.089693	0.027047
Age	0.025177	0.000307
College	0.835035	0.011737
$50K+	0.389294	0.010174
3+ yrs	0.431432	0.011356
Foreign	-0.2088	0.029222
AsXage	-0.00049	0.001843
LatXage	-0.00432	0.001159
BlXage	-0.00986	0.000935
AsXcollege	-0.47751	0.056761
LatXcollege	-0.08483	0.051022
BlXcollege	0.018738	0.045541
AsX50K+	-0.25739	0.057151
LatX50K+	-0.04754	0.037191
BlX50K+	0.118066	0.035866
AsX3+yrs	0.041379	0.061872
LatX3+yrs	0.009772	0.038252
BlX3+yrs	0.052327	0.032178
AsXforeign	-0.38662	0.0638
LatXforeign	0.393929	0.0486
BlXforeign	0.030065	0.068503
cps00	1.10706	0.015758
cps02	0.075871	0.013042
cps04	1.383133	0.01587
cps06	0.111678	0.013267
cps08	1.429368	0.016487
_cons	0.13378	0.013739

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 8 - Logit model of registration with interactions, by Asian American immigrant generation

	All Asians		Foreign Born		Second Generation	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	-0.74832	0.0401958	-0.89935	0.0449466	-0.99062	0.0829845
Age	0.013957	0.0002237	0.013564	0.000223	0.013566	0.000223
College	0.948474	0.0095432	0.938545	0.0095225	0.938574	0.0095228
50K+	0.560771	0.0080526	0.558226	0.0080455	0.558393	0.0080469
3+ yrs	1.608151	0.0078667	1.607861	0.007858	1.607892	0.0078584
Foreign	-0.59687	0.0205257				
AsXage	-0.00457	0.0010549	-0.00943	0.0014601	0.000505	0.002046
AsXcollege	-0.0785	0.0371861	-0.16806	0.0459918	0.13316	0.0893545
AsX50K+	-0.1119	0.0357991	-0.16296	0.0451296	-0.04023	0.0850016
AsX3+yrs	-0.18058	0.0365448	-0.22467	0.0459343	-0.11907	0.0868038
AsXforeign	0.327241	0.040829				
cps00	0.328158	0.0129275	0.32902	0.0130323	0.329919	0.0131666
cps02	0.167299	0.0121868	0.16937	0.0122874	0.171687	0.0124193
cps04	0.489692	0.012668	0.496507	0.012767	0.500053	0.0129198
cps06	0.228418	0.012501	0.230781	0.0125982	0.232347	0.0127507
cps08	0.357179	0.0127286	0.35631	0.0128324	0.35793	0.0129956
_cons	-0.68124	0.0105974	-0.69961	0.0106353	-0.70135	0.0107177

	Mixed Generation		Third-plus Generation	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	-0.15642	0.1495826	-0.94352	0.0880412
Age	0.013569	0.000223	0.013568	0.000223
College	0.938602	0.009523	0.938584	0.0095229
50K+	0.558569	0.0080475	0.558509	0.0080472
3+ yrs	1.607939	0.0078587	1.607931	0.0078586
Foreign				
AsXage	0.006026	0.0045228	-0.00092	0.0026532
AsXcollege	-0.0506	0.1854985	0.191667	0.0946292
AsX50K+	-0.01398	0.166446	0.033912	0.0880102
AsX3+yrs	-0.53275	0.1686577	0.032334	0.0923687
AsXforeign				
cps00	0.331717	0.0132035	0.331664	0.0131662
cps02	0.172226	0.0124538	0.171278	0.0124166
cps04	0.50362	0.0129671	0.502148	0.0129355
cps06	0.235119	0.0127955	0.235596	0.0127636
cps08	0.357925	0.0130449	0.357794	0.013013
_cons	-0.70286	0.0107419	-0.70247	0.0107235

Table 9 - Logit model of voting among the registered with interactions, by Asian American immigrant generation

	All Asians		Foreign Born		Second Generation	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	0.275852	0.0720215	-0.24814	0.0774501	0.123897	0.1506209
Age	0.02517	0.0003068	0.025069	0.0003063	0.025068	0.0003064
College	0.835113	0.0117431	0.833109	0.0117384	0.833092	0.0117388
50K+	0.390657	0.0101864	0.39022	0.0101872	0.390078	0.0101882
3+ yrs	0.431385	0.0113608	0.4318	0.0113616	0.431776	0.0113618
Foreign	-0.20591	0.0293519				
AsXage	-0.00054	0.0018408	-0.01056	0.0024173	0.003837	0.003561
AsXcollege	-0.47573	0.0567589	-0.50954	0.0701658	-0.52301	0.1337432
AsX50K+	-0.25628	0.0571479	-0.3516	0.0712569	-0.14726	0.1345765
AsX3+yrs	0.045565	0.0618808	0.074312	0.07698	-0.25299	0.1424932
AsXforeign	-0.3756	0.0639666				
cps00	1.127981	0.0173479	1.13209	0.0174582	1.128908	0.0175809
cps02	0.091464	0.0142295	0.09111	0.0143093	0.090892	0.0144199
cps04	1.414381	0.0174862	1.418129	0.0175786	1.41602	0.0177191
cps06	0.139209	0.0145285	0.140126	0.0146056	0.137092	0.014729
cps08	1.392102	0.0180381	1.392369	0.0181442	1.395225	0.0183331
_cons	0.121301	0.0143422	0.115127	0.0143645	0.116247	0.0144268

	Mixed Generation		Third-plus Generation	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	0.334646	0.2731095	0.374201	0.1770285
Age	0.025067	0.0003064	0.025066	0.0003064
College	0.833099	0.011739	0.833084	0.0117389
50K+	0.390005	0.0101886	0.389909	0.0101884
3+ yrs	0.43181	0.0113621	0.431804	0.011362
Foreign				
AsXage	0.01475	0.0078127	0.017328	0.0057416
AsXcollege	-0.03713	0.282615	-0.29395	0.1611582
AsX50K+	0.038943	0.2610684	-0.08828	0.1591503
AsX3+yrs	-0.2428	0.2866452	0.37652	0.1728046
AsXforeign				
cps00	1.127365	0.01761	1.126152	0.0175883
cps02	0.089632	0.0144494	0.087999	0.0144307
cps04	1.416601	0.0177655	1.415396	0.0177509
cps06	0.136724	0.0147632	0.13505	0.0147462
cps08	1.395265	0.0183969	1.394501	0.0183815
_cons	0.116745	0.0144456	0.11791	0.0144379

Table 10 - Logit model of registration with interactions, by Latino immigrant generation

	All Latinos		Foreign Born		Second Generation	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Latino	-0.11974	0.022341	-0.44102	0.0379411	-0.14825	0.0414245
Age	0.013957	0.0002237	0.013562	0.000223	0.013563	0.000223
College	0.948521	0.0095437	0.938572	0.0095229	0.938555	0.0095229
50K+	0.560843	0.0080504	0.55815	0.0080456	0.558319	0.0080461
3+ yrs	1.608385	0.007867	1.608049	0.0078585	1.607988	0.0078585
Foreign	-0.597	0.0205268				
LaXage	0.003208	0.0007674	0.003205	0.0014226	0.005281	0.0014196
LaXcollege	-0.1113	0.0376167	-0.22027	0.0633841	-0.19756	0.0759819
LAX50K+	0.006642	0.026426	-0.04415	0.0480676	0.053512	0.0526367
LaX3+yrs	-0.41972	0.0245256	-0.28532	0.0447242	-0.48693	0.0468081
LaXForeign	0.309376	0.0329239				
cps00	0.330798	0.0125679	0.327552	0.0130119	0.332144	0.013051
cps02	0.164132	0.0118652	0.165192	0.0122694	0.168892	0.0123136
cps04	0.492295	0.0122987	0.499443	0.0127637	0.497176	0.0128022
cps06	0.225618	0.0121236	0.22796	0.0125849	0.231492	0.0126285
cps08	0.362842	0.0123309	0.356282	0.0127942	0.362957	0.0128988
_cons	-0.68203	0.0103996	-0.69867	0.0106178	-0.70136	0.0106609

	Mixed Generation		Third-plus Generation	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Latino	0.081814	0.0690037	-0.09662	0.0329058
Age	0.013568	0.000223	0.013572	0.000223
College	0.938596	0.0095229	0.938626	0.0095231
50K+	0.55851	0.008047	0.558791	0.0080458
3+ yrs	1.607923	0.0078586	1.60788	0.0078584
Foreign				
LaXage	0.00202	0.0024285	0.002181	0.0012566
LaXcollege	0.224411	0.1240032	-0.0017	0.0638147
LAX50K+	0.043005	0.0820926	-0.00477	0.0414416
LaX3+yrs	-0.69619	0.0776502	-0.39028	0.0389836
LaXForeign				
cps00	0.331327	0.0131548	0.334198	0.0129612
cps02	0.171287	0.0124073	0.176015	0.0122371
cps04	0.502428	0.0129123	0.505408	0.0127097
cps06	0.234005	0.0127408	0.237391	0.0125437
cps08	0.356744	0.0129848	0.359235	0.0127732
_cons	-0.70203	0.010712	-0.70488	0.0106093

Table 11 - Logit model of voting among the registered with interactions, by Latino immigrant generation

	All Latinos		Foreign Born		Second Generation	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Latino	-0.30943	0.0363887	0.027864	0.0669255	-0.32581	0.068575
Age	0.025166	0.0003067	0.025072	0.0003064	0.025074	0.0003064
College	0.83505	0.0117422	0.83321	0.0117394	0.833242	0.0117399
50K+	0.390178	0.0101834	0.390003	0.010188	0.390004	0.0101888
3+ yrs	0.431354	0.01136	0.431911	0.0113629	0.431943	0.0113634
Foreign	-0.20602	0.0293523				
LaXage	-0.00439	0.0011584	-0.0099	0.0022926	-0.00388	0.0021615
LaXcollege	-0.09266	0.0510243	-0.36895	0.0911303	0.013262	0.1072301
LAX50K+	-0.04985	0.0371889	-0.19729	0.071557	-0.07796	0.0748252
LaX3+yrs	0.009326	0.0382544	-0.06516	0.0761728	0.069452	0.0732519
LaXForeign	0.389778	0.0488484				
cps00	1.122449	0.0169064	1.128737	0.0174451	1.12953	0.0174487
cps02	0.084846	0.0139402	0.085504	0.0142963	0.086896	0.0143363
cps04	1.405993	0.0170049	1.415695	0.0175781	1.413638	0.0175861
cps06	0.131905	0.0141906	0.133022	0.0145928	0.135461	0.0146331
cps08	1.394558	0.0175255	1.394161	0.0181325	1.401921	0.0182314
_cons	0.126088	0.0141777	0.118494	0.0143538	0.116953	0.0143859

	Mixed Generation		Third-plus Generation	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Latino	-0.28413	0.108014	-0.35374	0.0535278
Age	0.025069	0.0003064	0.025051	0.0003062
College	0.833107	0.0117388	0.832773	0.0117361
50K+	0.39012	0.0101882	0.389668	0.0101842
3+ yrs	0.431779	0.0113619	0.431522	0.0113585
Foreign				
LaXage	-0.00476	0.0035662	-0.00085	0.0018538
LaXcollege	-0.08204	0.1497501	0.041057	0.0826374
LAX50K+	0.079299	0.1138767	0.022554	0.0567919
LaX3+yrs	0.046	0.1153351	0.000152	0.0589357
LaXForeign				
cps00	1.129242	0.0175548	1.122339	0.0173193
cps02	0.09156	0.0144058	0.089918	0.0142601
cps04	1.416405	0.0176944	1.41244	0.0174461
cps06	0.137005	0.0147102	0.136497	0.0145459
cps08	1.395665	0.0183133	1.388104	0.0180254
_cons	0.115953	0.0144185	0.118962	0.0143375

Table 12a - Random coefficient logit models for states, registration stage

	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	-0.68758	0.054423
Age	0.014512	0.000226
College	0.958529	0.009666
50K+	0.578882	0.008167
3+ yrs	1.625134	0.007971
Foreign	-0.55023	0.020763
AsXage	-0.00443	0.001088
AsXcollege	-0.07546	0.037805
AsX50K+	-0.12978	0.036132
AsX3+yrs	-0.17941	0.037047
AsXforeign	0.255092	0.044096
cps00	0.35359	0.01305
cps02	0.176548	0.012263
cps04	0.499025	0.012739
cps06	0.235169	0.012568
cps08	0.364471	0.012798
_cons	-0.68863	0.036565
var(asian)	0.026516	
SE var(asian)	0.012361	
var(_cons)	0.062217	
SE var(_cons) gestfips	0.012531	
cov(asian,_cons)	-0.00914	
SE cov(asian,_cons)	0.010164	

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 12b - Random coefficient logit models for states, voting stage

	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	0.014893	0.087226
Age	0.025435	0.000309
College	0.850789	0.01192
50K+	0.386285	0.010353
3+ yrs	0.463003	0.01151
Foreign	-0.20902	0.029651
AsXage	-0.00443	0.001907
AsXcollege	-0.41023	0.058251
AsX50K+	-0.25561	0.058039
AsX3+yrs	0.011573	0.062773
AsXforeign	-0.17088	0.069487
cps00	1.168691	0.017532
cps02	0.098487	0.014345
cps04	1.433336	0.017589
cps06	0.142156	0.014632
cps08	1.40952	0.01814
_cons	0.105473	0.041979
var(asian)	0.03643	
SE var(asian)	0.017636	
var(_cons)	0.078905	
SE var(_cons) gestfips	0.015965	
cov(asian,_cons)	-0.01503	
SE cov(asian,_cons)	0.014214	

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 13a - Random coefficient logit models for counties, registration stage

	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	-0.58943	0.065857
Age	0.012861	0.000388
College	0.897598	0.015697
50K+	0.577055	0.013825
3+ yrs	1.676235	0.01377
Foreign	-0.59815	0.029356
AsXage	-0.00384	0.001323
AsXcollege	-0.04696	0.047049
AsX50K+	-0.11454	0.044784
AsX3+yrs	-0.20905	0.046647
AsXforeign	0.292508	0.055306
cps00	0.335205	0.022433
cps02	0.162212	0.021551
cps04	0.527543	0.021581
cps06	0.191039	0.020754
cps08	0.392234	0.021259
_cons	-0.67337	0.043557
var(asian)	0.1172	
SE var(asian)	0.041695	
var(_cons) gestfips	0.047473	
SE var(_cons) gestfips	0.015189	
var(_cons)fipscnty	0.065374	
SE var(_cons) fipscnty	0.007822	
cov(asian,_cons)	-0.02791	
SE cov(asian,_cons)	0.014282	

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 13b - Random coefficient logit models for counties, voting stage

	Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	-0.07464	0.104918
Age	0.02691	0.000546
College	0.755308	0.019655
50K+	0.339926	0.018032
3+ yrs	0.453462	0.019823
Foreign	-0.21611	0.043038
AsXage	-0.0042	0.002306
AsXcollege	-0.29882	0.071866
AsX50K+	-0.26495	0.071756
AsX3+yrs	0.015246	0.078287
AsXforeign	-0.11636	0.08693
cps00	1.247326	0.031027
cps02	0.025785	0.02541
cps04	1.552254	0.031038
cps06	0.109068	0.024551
cps08	1.520686	0.031219
_cons	0.173888	0.05385
var(asian)	0.101727	
SE var(asian)	0.043723	
var(_cons) gestfips	0.081911	
SE var(_cons) gestfips	0.021936	
var(_cons)fipscnty	0.0422	
SE var(_cons) fipscnty	0.006843	
cov(asian,_cons)	-0.03653	
SE cov(asian,_cons)	0.016992	

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 14 - Random intercept logit models for registration

Model 1			Model 2		
	Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	-0.23502	0.16568	Asian	-0.36415	0.15819
AsPop	-1.95E-07	1.42E-07	AsPop	-1.98E-07	1.50E-07
AsPopGrowth	-0.24304	0.10041	AsPopGrowth	-0.25772	0.09523
Prop FB Asian	-2.03713	0.77502	Prop FB Asian	-2.05951	0.86196
Prop Asian	-1.07024	0.67624	Prop Asian	-0.85751	0.73274
Asian Lang Svcs	0.218261	0.14008	Asian Lang Svcs	0.193293	0.1412
Prop College Asian	2.759175	0.56683	Prop College Asian	2.819955	0.751
Median Asian HH Inc	-7.90E-06	3.29E-06	Median Asian HH Inc	-8.00E-06	3.65E-06
Prop Rep Asian	-0.26719	0.54512	Prop Undcl Asian	0.056018	1.26258
asXaspop	3.20E-07	1.90E-07	asXaspop	1.59E-07	1.94E-07
asXasgr	-0.36508	0.2871	asXasgr	-0.2693	0.27097
asXprfbasian	-1.22548	2.06867	asXprfbasian	1.167512	2.23694
asXprasian	2.019268	1.03639	asXprasian	2.559763	1.09828
asXaslangsvcs	-0.47867	0.21136	asXaslangsvcs	-0.28404	0.19482
asXprabach	1.523115	1.29672	asXprabach	2.682516	1.41952
asXahhinc	-1.87E-06	6.90E-06	asXahhinc	-7.40E-06	7.33E-06
asXprasrep	1.745828	0.81026	asXprasundcl	-4.64812	1.80956
Age	0.014859	0.00109	Age	0.014877	0.00109
College	0.774189	0.04129	College	0.77445	0.04126
50K+	0.616076	0.03753	50K+	0.616329	0.03754
3+ yrs	1.719226	0.03822	3+ yrs	1.719571	0.03823
Foreign	-0.73998	0.06186	Foreign	-0.73983	0.06187
AsXage	-0.00597	0.00249	AsXage	-0.00604	0.00249
AsXcollege	-0.06383	0.0855	AsXcollege	-0.06444	0.08549
AsX50K+	-0.12367	0.08252	AsX50K+	-0.12945	0.08259
AsX3+yrs	-0.25035	0.08467	AsX3+yrs	-0.24914	0.0847
AsXforeign	0.368077	0.10226	AsXforeign	0.371405	0.10222
cps00	0.273729	0.05638	cps00	0.276384	0.0564
cps02	-0.04129	0.05589	cps02	-0.03839	0.0559
cps04	0.451731	0.05645	cps04	0.453551	0.05644
cps06	0.092228	0.05336	cps06	0.091605	0.05336
cps08	0.302197	0.05411	cps08	0.301341	0.05411
_cons	-0.85439	0.10811	_cons	-0.84102	0.10996

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 14 - Random intercept logit models for registration, continued

Model 3			Model 4		
	Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	-2.17E-01	0.176156	Asian	-0.49982	0.187586
AsPop	-1.97E-07	1.41E-07	AsPop	1.22E-07	1.76E-07
AsPopGrowth	-0.2449	0.102764	AsPopGrowth	-0.22356	0.122782
Prop FB Asian	-2.00158	0.778061	Prop FB Asian	-1.43255	1.044692
Prop Asian	-0.99063	0.600672	Prop Asian	-2.04721	0.770738
Asian Lang Svcs	0.222152	0.148097	Asian Lang Svcs	0.006763	0.19865
Prop College Asian	2.86E+00	0.553667	Prop College TotPop	3.055611	1.028689
Median Asian HH Inc	-8.20E-06	3.31E-06	Median TotPop HH Inc	-5.53E-06	6.69E-06
Prop Dem Asian	2.55E-01	0.634475	Prop Rep TotPop	0.330328	0.64875
asXaspop	3.65E-07	1.96E-07	asXaspop	4.27E-07	1.89E-07
asXasgr	-0.33673	0.293243	asXasgr	-0.17089	0.277498
asXprfbasian	-1.94597	2.137418	asXprfbasian	-2.80092	2.16385
asXprasian	1.351502	0.922981	asXprasian	1.453048	1.168669
asXaslangsvcs	-0.50078	0.2305	asXaslangsvcs	-0.06939	0.252171
asXprabach	8.17E-01	1.29534	asXprtotbach	-3.14497	1.609747
asXahhinc	1.10E-06	6.93E-06	asXtothhinc	2.13E-05	9.35E-06
asXprasdem	-1.87155	1.153046	asXprtotrep	0.148671	0.800264
Age	0.014848	0.001086	Age	0.014933	0.001087
College	0.77507	0.041283	College	0.769847	0.041305
50K+	0.61542	0.037517	50K+	0.61729	0.03756
3+ yrs	1.71887	0.038219	3+ yrs	1.721296	0.038252
Foreign	-0.73932	0.061859	Foreign	-0.73922	0.061924
AsXage	-0.00595	0.002492	AsXage	-0.006	0.00249
AsXcollege	-0.06327	0.085483	AsXcollege	-0.0576	0.085466
AsX50K+	-0.12136	0.082488	AsX50K+	-0.12372	0.082469
AsX3+yrs	-0.25267	0.084611	AsX3+yrs	-0.25212	0.084627
AsXforeign	0.369321	0.10224	AsXforeign	0.36951	0.102241
cps00	0.273722	0.056378	cps00	0.268453	0.056831
cps02	-0.04116	0.055901	cps02	-0.04794	0.056358
cps04	0.451816	0.056451	cps04	0.450825	0.056546
cps06	0.092603	0.053352	cps06	0.087257	0.053351
cps08	0.30265	0.054108	cps08	0.298882	0.054119
_cons	-0.85679	0.111828	_cons	-0.71476	0.144801

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 14 - Random intercept logit models for registration, continued

Model 5			Model 6		
	Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	-0.50362	0.168884	Asian	-0.48817	0.188729
AsPop	5.29E-08	1.80E-07	AsPop	1.27E-07	1.79E-07
AsPopGrowth	-0.19217	0.105905	AsPopGrowth	-0.22267	0.122522
Prop FB Asian	-1.1283	1.060888	Prop FB Asian	-1.47465	1.019811
Prop Asian	-2.10399	0.71435	Prop Asian	-2.04566	0.780808
Asian Lang Svcs	0.09545	0.177718	Asian Lang Svcs	0.003518	0.204809
Prop College TotPop	3.674301	1.189101	Prop College TotPop	2.913277	0.897284
Median TotPop HH Inc	-7.28E-06	6.77E-06	MedianTotPop HH Inc	-5.01E-06	6.45E-06
Prop Undcl TotPop	-2.82741	2.630209	Prop Dem TotPop	-0.3241	0.650732
asXaspop	4.19E-07	1.96E-07	asXaspop	4.41E-07	1.94E-07
asXasgr	-0.15871	0.260636	asXasgr	-0.18405	0.276153
asXprfbasian	-2.7187	2.403027	asXprfbasian	-2.83634	2.118719
asXprasian	1.358159	1.060661	asXprasian	1.537549	1.185225
asXaslangsvcs	-0.06627	0.215894	asXaslangsvcs	-0.08724	0.253804
asXprtotbach	-3.29898	1.988105	asXprtotbach	-3.14652	1.452468
asXtothhinc	2.25E-05	8.98E-06	asXtothhinc	0.000021	8.76E-06
asXprtotundcl	0.08345	3.647799	asXprtotdem	-0.27282	0.817775
Age	0.01493	0.001087	Age	0.014932	0.001087
College	0.768754	0.041308	College	0.769869	0.041309
50K+	0.617139	0.037562	50K+	0.61729	0.03756
3+ yrs	1.720787	0.038254	3+ yrs	1.721366	0.038252
Foreign	-0.73933	0.061903	Foreign	-0.73939	0.061924
AsXage	-0.00601	0.00249	AsXage	-0.00599	0.002491
AsXcollege	-0.05655	0.085479	AsXcollege	-0.05754	0.085473
AsX50K+	-0.12475	0.082557	AsX50K+	-0.12326	0.082483
AsX3+yrs	-0.25209	0.084617	AsX3+yrs	-0.25189	0.084635
AsXforeign	0.3716	0.102187	AsXforeign	0.368793	0.10226
cps00	0.269795	0.056733	cps00	0.268561	0.05681
cps02	-0.04694	0.056254	cps02	-0.0479	0.056332
cps04	0.451925	0.056515	cps04	0.450618	0.056549
cps06	0.087092	0.05335	cps06	0.087243	0.053352
cps08	0.298527	0.054118	cps08	0.298897	0.054121
_cons	-0.7689	0.133363	_cons	-0.71291	0.147934

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 15 - Random intercept logit models for voting among the registered

Model 1			Model 2		
	Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	0.3868	0.272744	Asian	0.4704	0.260593
AsPop	-1.63E-07	1.11E-07	AsPop	-1.71E-07	1.74E-07
AsPopGrowth	-0.11817	0.112833	AsPopGrowth	-0.16819	0.124806
Prop FB Asian	-3.28236	0.902544	Prop FB Asian	-2.91532	1.206667
Prop Asian	0.359793	0.653122	Prop Asian	1.468758	0.963482
Asian Lang Svcs	0.092004	0.124718	Asian Lang Svcs	0.0053	0.155744
Prop College Asian	2.090456	0.680197	Prop College Asian	2.817026	1.174265
Median Asian HH Inc	-2.22E-06	4.17E-06	Median Asian HH Inc	-4.54E-06	5.65E-06
Prop Rep Asian	-1.00532	0.511632	Prop Undcl Asian	-0.91852	1.825626
asXaspop	5.22E-08	2.87E-07	asXaspop	1.17E-07	2.91E-07
asXasgr	0.723661	0.498148	asXasgr	0.569146	0.464378
asXprfbasian	9.183789	2.987784	asXprfbasian	7.907553	3.19211
asXprasian	0.705304	1.618928	asXprasian	0.444235	1.703124
asXaslangsvcs	-0.59949	0.331976	asXaslangsvcs	-0.72599	0.305479
asXprabach	0.115808	1.883909	asXprabach	-0.48211	2.097706
asXahhinc	-9.61E-07	1.02E-05	asXahhinc	1.89E-06	0.000011
asXprasrep	-0.99719	1.226268	asXprasundcl	2.931929	2.745847
Age	0.030116	0.00167	Age	0.030083	0.001672
College	0.727777	0.05794	College	0.733406	0.05802
50K+	0.33182	0.054121	50K+	0.325901	0.054191
3+ yrs	0.501841	0.058665	3+ yrs	0.5023	0.058755
Foreign	-0.43456	0.09485	Foreign	-0.43298	0.094914
AsXage	-0.01128	0.004149	AsXage	-0.01131	0.004151
AsXcollege	-0.32299	0.130102	AsXcollege	-0.33038	0.130213
AsX50K+	-0.51796	0.131566	AsX50K+	-0.51899	0.13156
AsX3+yrs	-0.01864	0.141255	AsX3+yrs	-0.01748	0.141411
AsXforeign	-0.01225	0.159703	AsXforeign	-0.02046	0.159695
cps00	0.909513	0.086107	cps00	0.90699	0.086363
cps02	-0.46826	0.071739	cps02	-0.47001	0.072016
cps04	1.114277	0.088077	cps04	1.111064	0.088145
cps06	-0.13835	0.070499	cps06	-0.13935	0.070563
cps08	1.325865	0.090901	cps08	1.322873	0.09095
_cons	0.553404	0.108818	_cons	0.60756	0.128898

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 15 - Random intercept logit models for voting among the registered, continued

Model 3			Model 4		
	Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	0.381325	0.288608	Asian	0.599749	0.315734
AsPop	-2.16E-07	1.15E-07	AsPop	4.26E-08	1.08E-07
AsPopGrowth	-0.06422	0.117958	AsPopGrowth	-0.07002	0.116042
Prop FB Asian	-2.93472	0.91317	Prop FB Asian	-2.90064	1.052012
Prop Asian	0.376493	0.607575	Prop Asian	-0.60611	0.678173
Asian Lang Svcs	0.195518	0.138904	Asian Lang Svcs	-0.03575	0.164235
Prop College Asian	2.725687	0.710548	Prop College TotPop	1.369244	1.07762
Median Asian HH Inc	-4.59E-06	4.29E-06	Median TotPop HH Inc	7.42E-06	6.81E-06
Prop Dem Asian	1.735395	0.685086	Prop Rep TotPop	-0.70082	0.540712
asXaspop	2.33E-08	2.98E-07	asXaspop	3.77E-07	2.89E-07
asXasgr	0.677443	0.496172	asXasgr	0.914074	0.520022
asXprfbasian	9.831369	3.071936	asXprfbasian	8.180642	3.19004
asXprasian	1.142617	1.457145	asXprasian	-0.86671	1.845231
asXaslangsvcs	-0.60028	0.362378	asXaslangsvcs	-0.91633	0.412136
asXprabach	0.401345	1.888799	asXprtotbach	3.171991	2.568655
asXahhinc	-2.61E-06	1.03E-05	asXtothhinc	3.51E-06	1.52E-05
asXprasdem	1.134588	1.760347	asXprtotrep	-0.51054	1.248164
Age	0.030108	0.001671	Age	0.030121	0.00167
College	0.72695	0.057926	College	0.723466	0.057977
50K+	0.331242	0.054108	50K+	0.330926	0.054095
3+ yrs	0.501072	0.058659	3+ yrs	0.503051	0.058674
Foreign	-0.43484	0.094852	Foreign	-0.43523	0.094882
AsXage	-0.01131	0.00415	AsXage	-0.0113	0.004157
AsXcollege	-0.32265	0.130068	AsXcollege	-0.33054	0.13031
AsX50K+	-0.51849	0.131532	AsX50K+	-0.51528	0.131582
AsX3+yrs	-0.01696	0.141273	AsX3+yrs	-0.02684	0.141491
AsXforeign	-0.01537	0.159645	AsXforeign	-0.00656	0.159959
cps00	0.909112	0.086185	cps00	0.88968	0.086364
cps02	-0.47047	0.071801	cps02	-0.48704	0.072027
cps04	1.115474	0.088112	cps04	1.106801	0.088079
cps06	-0.13998	0.070512	cps06	-0.14357	0.070533
cps08	1.325687	0.090901	cps08	1.325358	0.090939
_cons	0.489655	0.114972	_cons	0.641396	0.127803

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 15 - Random intercept logit models for voting among the registered, continued

Model 5			Model 6		
	Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.
Asian	0.671488	0.285577	Asian	0.624344	0.316773
AsPop	4.75E-08	1.12E-07	AsPop	2.13E-08	1.13E-07
AsPopGrowth	-0.12491	0.106369	AsPopGrowth	-0.06416	0.116759
Prop FB Asian	-1.86193	1.106944	Prop FB Asian	-2.8225	1.022756
Prop Asian	-0.31602	0.628894	Prop Asian	-0.68638	0.695943
Asian Lang Svcs	-0.13498	0.13254	Asian Lang Svcs	-0.01255	0.171426
Prop College TotPop	3.228029	1.305568	Prop College TotPop	1.644773	0.94124
Median TotPop HH Inc	-8.42E-07	6.90E-06	Median TotPop HH Inc	6.44E-06	6.36E-06
Prop Undcl TotPop	-2.46987	2.603518	Prop Dem TotPop	0.767745	0.558661
asXaspop	4.43E-07	2.95E-07	asXaspop	3.81E-07	2.97E-07
asXasgr	0.751648	0.473164	asXasgr	0.878148	0.511381
asXprfbasian	7.865645	3.480018	asXprfbasian	8.46415	3.122469
asXprasian	-0.28017	1.634255	asXprasian	-0.80588	1.886704
asXaslangsvcs	-1.02526	0.352023	asXaslangsvcs	-0.95698	0.413548
asXprtotbach	2.54916	3.165606	asXprtotbach	3.53543	2.307983
asXtothhinc	3.80E-06	1.43E-05	asXtothhinc	2.27E-06	1.42E-05
asXprtotundcl	2.57537	5.660849	asXprtotdem	0.381942	1.271962
Age	0.030161	0.001671	Age	0.030121	0.001671
College	0.725054	0.057965	College	0.723194	0.057982
50K+	0.329452	0.054092	50K+	0.330816	0.054096
3+ yrs	0.503766	0.058662	3+ yrs	0.502925	0.058675
Foreign	-0.43094	0.094886	Foreign	-0.43505	0.094876
AsXage	-0.0113	0.004156	AsXage	-0.0113	0.004157
AsXcollege	-0.33414	0.130231	AsXcollege	-0.33053	0.130295
AsX50K+	-0.51494	0.131531	AsX50K+	-0.51561	0.131569
AsX3+yrs	-0.03026	0.141605	AsX3+yrs	-0.02833	0.14147
AsXforeign	-0.01775	0.1598	AsXforeign	-0.00653	0.159971
cps00	0.885633	0.08637	cps00	0.889952	0.086373
cps02	-0.49231	0.072006	cps02	-0.48726	0.072026
cps04	1.105048	0.088092	cps04	1.10754	0.088096
cps06	-0.14519	0.07053	cps06	-0.14388	0.070536
cps08	1.324233	0.09093	cps08	1.325083	0.090935
_cons	0.703165	0.112985	_cons	0.626967	0.131319

Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better are highlighted in yellow

Table 16 - Interactions with the effect of being Asian, by stage

	Registration				
	Intxn effect	**# of times significant/# of times modeled**	**Baseline Asian coefficient**	**Size of interactedAsian coefficient**	**Value of interacting variable**
Interacting variable					
Prop Undcl among Asians	-4.6481	1/1	-0.3641491	-5.0122721	100%
Prop college in total population	-3.145	2/3	-0.4998165	-3.6447845	100%
Asian language services	-0.4787	2/6	-0.235021	-0.7136918	1
Asian population size	4.27E-07	3/6	-0.4998165	-0.4571165	640,294
Total population median income	2.1E-05	3/3	-0.4998165	0.1391835	101,862
Prop Rep among Asians	1.74583	1/1	-0.235021	1.510807	100%
Prop Asian	2.01927	2/6	-0.235021	1.784247	100%
Prop foreign born among Asians					

	Voting among the registered				
	Intxn effect	**# of times significant/# of times modeled**	**Baseline Asian coefficient**	**Size of interactedAsian coefficient**	**Value of interacting variable**
Interacting variable					
Prop Undcl among Asians					
Prop college in total population					
Asian language services	-0.9163	4/6	0.5997489	-0.3165775	1
Asian population size					
Total population median income					
Prop Rep among Asians					
Prop Asian					
Prop foreign born among Asians	8.18064	6/6	0.5997489	8.7803909	100%

Table 17 - Lower order effects of variables with no significant interaction with Asian, by stage

	Registration		***Voting among the registered***	
	Effect	**# of times significant**	**Effect**	**# of times significant**
Variable				
Prop FB Asian	-2.001575	3/6		
AsPopGrowth	-0.2449	3/6		
Median Asian HH Inc	-8.20E-06	3/3		
Prop College Asian	2.86E+00	3/3	2.725687	3/3
Prop Rep Asian			-1.00532	1/1
Prop Dem Asian			1.735395	1/1
Prop College TotPop			3.228029	1/3

All coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level

Table 18 - Direction of effect on participation, by stage and race

	Registration		*Voting among the registered*	
Variable	**Asians**	**Whites**	**Asians**	**Whites**
Asian language services	-		-	
Asian population size	+			
Asian population growth	-	-		
Prop Asian	+			
Prop foreign born among Asians	-	-	+	-
Median Asian HH Inc	-	-		
Median total population HH inc	+			
Prop college in total population	-	+	+	+
Prop college among Asians	+	+	+	+
Prop Rep among Asians	+		-	-
Prop Undcl among Asians	-			
Prop Dem among Asian			+	+

Table 19 - Effect on participation, by stage and race

	Registration		*Voting among the registered*	
Variable	**Asians**	**Whites**	**Asians**	**Whites**
Asian language services	-4.59E+00		-9.52E-01	
Asian population size	5.49E-07			
Asian population growth	-0.2449	-0.2449		
Prop Asian	0.949031			
Prop foreign born among Asians	-2.00158	-2.00158	5.28	-2.90064
Median Asian HH Inc	-8.20E-06	-8.20E-06		
Median total population HH inc	1.58E-05			
Prop college in total population	-8.94E-02	3.055611	3.228029	3.228029
Prop college among Asians	2.86E+00	2.86E+00	2.725687	2.725687
Prop Rep among Asians	1.48E+00		-1.00532	-1.00532
Prop Undcl among Asians	-4.59E+00			
Prop Dem among Asian			1.735395	1.735395

All coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level