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### Authors

Aizenman, Joshua  
Cheung, Yin-Wong  
Ito, Hiro

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## International reserves before and after the global crisis: Is there no end to hoarding?

Joshua Aizenman<sup>a,1</sup>, Yin-Wong Cheung<sup>b</sup>, Hiro Ito<sup>c,\*</sup>

<sup>a</sup> University of Southern California and NBER, USA

<sup>b</sup> City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Ave, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

<sup>c</sup> Portland State University, USA

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### ABSTRACT

We evaluate the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) and recent structural changes in the patterns of hoarding international reserves (IR). We confirm that the determinants of IR hoarding evolve with developments in the global economy. During the pre-GFC period of 1999–2006, gross saving is associated with higher IR in developing and emerging markets. The negative impact of outward direct investment on IR accumulation is consistent with the recent trend of diverting international assets from the international reserve account into tangible foreign assets; the “Joneses’ effect” lends support to the regional rivalry in hoarding IR as a motivation; and commodity price volatility induces precautionary buffer hoarding. During the 2007–2009 GFC period, previously significant variables become insignificant or display the opposite effect, probably reflecting the frantic market conditions driven by financial instability. Nevertheless, the propensity to import and gross saving continue to display strong and even larger positive effects on IR holding. The results from the 2010–2012 post-GFC period are dominated by factors that had been mostly overlooked in earlier decades. While the negative effect of swap agreements and the positive effect of gross saving on IR holdings are in line with our expectations, we find a change in the link between outward direct investment and IR in the pre- and post-crisis period. The macro-prudential policy tends to complement IR accumulation. Developed countries display different demand behaviors for IRs – higher gross saving is associated with lower IR

\* Corresponding author. Department of Economics, Portland State University, 1721 SW Broadway, Portland, OR 97201. Tel/fax: +1 503 725 3930/3945.

E-mail addresses: [aizenman@usc.edu](mailto:aizenman@usc.edu) (J. Aizenman), [yicheung@cityu.edu.hk](mailto:yicheung@cityu.edu.hk) (Y.-W. Cheung), [ito@pdx.edu](mailto:ito@pdx.edu) (H. Ito).

<sup>1</sup> University of Southern California, University Park, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0043, USA. Tel.: +1 213 740 4066.

holding, possibly reflecting high-income countries' tendency to deploy their savings in the global capital markets. The presence of sovereign wealth funds motivates developed countries to hold a lower level of IR. Our predictive exercise affirms that an emerging market economy with insufficient IR holdings in 2012 tends to experience exchange rate depreciation against the U.S. dollar when many emerging markets were adjusted to the news of tapering quantitative easing in 2013.

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## 1. Introduction and overview

The global financial crisis (GFC) has ended the “great moderation” era, bringing instability to the fore of challenges facing policymakers in the U.S., the Eurozone, and other OECD countries—that is, volatility is back. Yet, for emerging markets, volatility never disappeared, and the GFC is another crisis in the long sequence of turbulent events, this time originating from the U.S. A key lesson of emerging markets' growing financial integration has been a greater exposure to capital flight and sudden-stop crises.<sup>2</sup>


After the financial crises of the late 1990s, many emerging markets increased their international reserves/GDP substantially, recognizing the benefits of self-insurance against the volatility associated with financial globalization. Indeed, the growing financial integration of emerging markets during the 1990s and the ensuing crises were identified as key factors in the structural changes in the motives to hold international reserves (IR), among which the weights of financial factors as well as the past crises history increased (Aizenman and Marion, 2003, Aizenman and Lee, 2007; Cheung and Ito, 2008, 2009). The crises many emerging markets experienced in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the takeoff of reserves hoarding by China and other countries in the 2000s added new factors to the list of determinants of hoarding IR, including mercantilist motives (Aizenman and Lee, 2008), “keeping up with the Joneses,” (Cheung and Qian, 2009), and self-insurance against local residents' flight from domestic assets in the context of the trilemma (Obstfeld et al., 2010; Aizenman et al., 2010).

This paper evaluates whether the GFC and recent structural changes in the global economic environment are associated with new patterns of hoarding IR. This possibility is exemplified in the recent experiences of China and South Korea, both of which have undergone large structural changes that have impacted their IR/GDP in the past decades. China became the largest IR holder in the mid-2000s, and holds \$3.8 trillion dollars, about 33% of the world's total, as of April 2014 (see Fig. 1). After the GFC, however, China has experienced a sizable decline in IR/GDP, resulting in a rebalancing of its export-led growth strategy in the face of declining global demand, a liberalization of its outward foreign direct investment, and the placing of greater emphasis on its sovereign wealth fund (SWF) (Aizenman et al., 2014).


In contrast, during the GFC, South Korea found itself struggling with confidence amid its own banking crisis. Its sizable and once regarded sufficient stock of IR failed to isolate its economy from massive deleveraging. The ensuing financial panic was ultimately abated only with the help of the Fed's offer of special swap lines. Arguably, the experience of Korea illustrated the need to supplement reserves hoarding with prudential regulations dealing with balance-sheet exposure of systemic banking. Indeed, unlike the 1997–1998 Korean crisis, the crisis this time did not lead to a further increase in Korea's reserves/GDP but to prudential regulatory changes (Park, 2010, Bruno and Shin, 2014).

The experiences of China and Korea raise the possibility that the GFC may have induced structural changes in the behavior of IR holding, possibly motivating some countries to supplement their hoarding of reserves with new policies [dynamic prudential regulations including preemptive capital controls] and institutions [financial stability boards and SWFs, among others]. These developments exemplify a growing trend among emerging markets. The GFC and the resultant

<sup>2</sup> See Calvo et al. (2004) on the empirics of sudden stops.



Note: For the country groups, the group’s aggregate IR is divided by the group’s aggregated GDP



Note: For the country groups, the group’s aggregate IR is divided the world’s total IR

**Fig. 1.** International Reserve Holding as a ratio to GDP (a) and to the world total (b).

quantitative easing [QE] policy by the Fed and other central banks also led to large, hot money inflows to emerging markets in search of yields. Emerging markets reacted to these developments by experimenting with dynamic capital controls aimed at mitigating the resultant appreciation pressure and reducing the exposure of future destabilizing outflows. These dynamic policy reactions also included relaxing controls on outward capital flows to defuse greater appreciation pressures from larger inflows, as has been the case in China and other emerging markets (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2013).

The greater reliance on sovereign wealth funds (SWF) as a means to manage the public sector's saving is another example of a possible supplement to IR hoarding, though it pre-dates the GFC. The impetus of instituting an SWF has been based on the recognition that the primary mandate of the central bank is to conduct monetary policy and ensure financial stability, not managing IR. Hence, the opportunity cost of reserves in practice may be of limited relevance for the central bank's operations.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, once the level of IR (as a share of GDP) reaches a level high enough to cover self-insurance needs, countries, usually those with high saving rates, may opt to manage their public saving in their own SWFs. Unlike the central bank authorities, the mandate of SWFs is to secure stable income for future generations; therefore, an SWF generally has a higher risk tolerance than the central bank, and aims for higher-than-expected income and longer-term investments. Given these considerations, a higher savings rate could increase the level of IR/GDP,<sup>4</sup> while the presence of SWFs may lower IR/GDP for a given savings rate.

Against this background, we evaluate the stability of factors accounting for IR hoarding, and the roles of conditional variables that had not been sufficiently studied before the GFC, such as the presence of SWFs, macro-prudential policies, access to bilateral swap lines, saving rates, commodity terms of trade volatility, outward foreign investment, export composition (shares of fuel, commodity, services, or manufacturing exports in total exports), gross financial exposure, and the “keeping-up-with-the-Joneses” motive.

Over time, the introduction of an SWF may reduce the exclusivity of IR as the main, or the only, financial buffer. Effective prudential regulations may reduce external borrowing and the inflows of hot money, thereby reducing the need for IR hoarding for self-insurance purposes. Accessibility to bilateral swap lines may also mitigate the need for IR at times of peril, although this applies only if the use of swap lines does not entail the stigma effect and if the swap-line arrangements are deemed durable. Export composition and terms of trade volatility matters in determining the volatility of trade and the real exchange rate, explaining patterns of pro-active, leaning-against-the-wind type of exchange rate and reserves policies.

Previewing results, we group the explanatory variables into three broad factors. The traditional macroeconomic factors include the propensity to import, the volatility of IR holdings, the opportunity cost of holding IR, and exchange-rate regimes. These variables capture the elements of an international reserve-demand vintage model from the 1970s. The financial factors include domestic financial depth (measured by M2/GDP), external financing, cross-border capital flows, and capital controls on capital flows. The third group includes several factors that have come to the fore in recent discussions: the existence of national-level SWFs, bilateral currency-swap agreements, the implementation of macro-prudential policies, gross saving, outward direct investment, the composition of trade, the implicit-rivalry incentive (also known as the “catching-up-with-the-Joneses’ effect”), and the discounted experience of past financial crises.

We confirm that the appropriate level of IR is not necessarily constant and determining factors continue to evolve with developments in the global economy. In 1999–2006, the pre-GFC period, gross saving is associated with higher international reserves in the developing and emerging markets; the

<sup>3</sup> This also explains the failure in the literature to find a stable and economically significant impact of the opportunity cost of the reserves on the observed international reserves/GDP ratios.

<sup>4</sup> Political economy considerations suggest another channel linking a lower gross savings rate with lower IR/GDP; such a scarcity of saving would make it harder for the central bank to maintain sizable hoarding of IR, as the reserve stock may be an administration's target of opportunity at times of a fiscal crunch, as has been the experience of Argentina and Venezuela (Aizenman and Marion, 2004).

outward direct-investment effect is consistent with the efforts of diverting international assets from the IR account into the purchase of more tangible foreign assets; the Joneses' effect lends support to the implicit rivalry-hoarding motives; and commodity-price volatility induces IR hoarding against uncertainty while fuel exporters store their proceeds partly in the form of foreign reserves. During the 2007–2009 GFC period, many of the variables that are significant contributors to IR hoarding in the previous period become insignificant or display the opposite effect, probably reflecting the frantic market conditions that prevented a normal economic relationship to hold. Nevertheless, the propensity to import and gross saving continue to display strong positive effects (with greater magnitudes). The results for the post-GFC 2010–2012 period are dominated by the “recently discussed factors.” While the negative effect of swap agreements and the positive effect of gross saving on the observed IR/GDP are in line with our expectations, the positive outward direct-investment effect implies a change in the link between outward direct investment and IR holding behavior in the pre- and post-crisis periods. Such a change deserves further analysis in future studies. The SWF seems to exert positive effect on IR accumulation. Some other findings are unexpected or not totally intuitive such as a negative Joneses' effect among developing countries in Europe and the effect of banking-crisis experience. Interestingly, most of these non-intuitive results disappear – they become either insignificant or significant with the expected sign – when we pool the data from all the three subsample periods. In addition, in the entire sample period, the existence of macro-prudential policies is found to complement the IR-accumulation policy.

We repeat the exercise using data from developed countries. In line with previous findings in the literature, the developed and developing countries display fairly different IR demand behaviors. We find that the IR hoarding behavior of developed countries is also affected by the recently discussed factors, including SWFs, gross saving, the Joneses effect, and trade compositions, even in the pre-GFC period, though their results often differ from those of developing countries. For example, gross saving has a negative impact on IR accumulation of developed countries, possibly because these countries have better accessibility to the global capital market where they can invest their savings. The Joneses effect is quite robust among both developed and developing Asian countries.

Overall, the lists of significant variables are quite different between the groups of developed and developing countries. At the minimum, the statistical-demand specification for IR holdings not only evolves over time, but also differ between developed and developing countries. All these suggest that the two groups of countries have different motivations for holding IR because they face different economic realities.

We close with an examination of the adequacy of IR holdings in the 2010–2012 period as was reflected in exchange market pressures. Our empirical analysis confirms that the “fragile five” countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey) held fewer IR than our model predicted in this period. Such a situation reflects the vulnerability of these countries to global economic turbulences in the early 2010s. We test whether and to what degree economies with IR-holding levels below model predictions are susceptible to external shocks, focusing on the induced exchange rate depreciation against the U.S. dollar between 2012 and 2013, a period dominated by the news coming from the Fed that QE may be tapering soon. We confirm a negative and significant correlation between the exchange rate depreciation against the U.S. dollar and our proxy for over-hoarding of IR given by the prediction error of IR holdings. That is, if a country held an insufficient amount of IR, it tended to experience depreciation in its currency value when adjusting to the tapering news.

Sections 2 and 3 outline the empirical specifications and report the estimation results. Section 4 compares the observed levels of IR hoarding with model predictions for several emerging markets, and examines the link between prediction errors in IR hoarding and exchange rate depreciation in 2012–2013. In Section 5, we reexamine the determinants of IR holding using different estimation techniques as robustness checks. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.

## **2. Empirical specifications**

Our analysis examines annual data of 95 countries, 22 developed countries and 73 developing countries, from 1999 to 2012. Given the existing evidence that the IR demand behavior differs across different historical time periods partitioned by global events and between advanced and

developing economies, we implement our empirical exercise for a) advanced and developing economies separately, and for b) three disjointed sample periods; namely 1999–2006, 2007–2009, 2010–2012.<sup>5</sup>

## 2.1. Models

We use the following regression equations to study the IR demand behavior:

$$r_{i,t} = c + X'_{i,t-1}\alpha + Y'_{i,t-1}\beta + D'_i\delta + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \text{ and} \quad (1)$$

$$r_{i,t} = c + X'_{i,t-1}\alpha + Y'_{i,t-1}\beta + D'_i\delta + Z'_{i,t-1}\gamma + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (2)$$

The variable of interest is  $r_{i,t} = R_{i,t}/GDP_{i,t}$ , where  $R_{i,t}$  and  $GDP_{i,t}$  are, respectively, generic notations of economy  $i$ 's holding of IR and gross domestic product (GDP) at time  $t$  with both variables measured in U.S. dollars. Scaling IR as a ratio to GDP facilitates comparison across countries of different sizes. For brevity, we call the ratio  $r_{i,t}$  international reserves (IR), henceforth.

The four types of determinants are: a)  $X_{i,t}(\ = \{x_{i,k,t}; k = 1, \dots, N_x\})$  includes the traditional macro variables, b)  $Y_{i,t}(\ = \{y_{i,k,t}; k = 1, \dots, N_y\})$  includes the financial variables, c)  $D_{i,t}(\ = \{d_{i,k,t}; k = 1, \dots, N_d\})$  includes other characteristics of the economies, and d)  $Z_{i,t}(\ = \{z_{i,k,t}; k = 1, \dots, N_z\})$  includes the possible determinants discussed during the GFC and afterwards. The definitions of these variables and their sources are given in [Appendix 1](#). The coefficient vectors  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$ , and  $\delta$  are conformable to the associated explanatory variables. The intercept and disturbance term are given by  $c$  and  $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ , respectively.

With (1) as a benchmark, the relevance of the determining factors that come to the fore during and after the GFC could be gauged by comparing results from (2) with those from (1).

## 2.2. Explanatory variables

The traditional macroeconomic variables considered under  $X_{it}$  are motivated by existent studies on IR holding behavior, including [Frenkel \(1974a,b\)](#), [Frenkel and Jovanovic \(1981\)](#), [Heller \(1966\)](#), and [Kelly \(1970\)](#). These variables include the propensity to import, the volatility of IR holding, and the opportunity cost of holding IR. Thus, the  $X_{it}$  component of (1) captures the elements of an IR demand equation of the 1970s vintage.

The main economic characteristic ( $D_{it}$ ) discussed in the subsequent literature is the exchange rate regime arrangement. [Frenkel \(1980\)](#) and [Flood and Marion \(2002\)](#), for example, report that exchange rate arrangements have effects on the holding of IR, while [Lane and Burke \(2001\)](#) find no significant effect. Other country-specific characteristics including the past crisis experiences are considered under  $Z_{it}$ .

Financial factors are playing an increasingly important role in the global economy in general, and influencing the behavior of IR holding in particular ([Aizenman and Lee, 2007](#)). The financial variables in  $Y_{it}$  include domestic financial depth (measured by M2/GDP) and external financing capacity measured by net portfolio investment position. The money stock in a developing economy is considered as a proxy for the potential magnitude of capital flight. Holding IR can act as a buffer against such “internal drain” and alleviate the adverse impact of sudden capital flight.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Our sample period starts in 1999 based on the findings in [Cheung and Ito \(2008, 2009\)](#). They find that economies alter their IR holding behaviors before and after major global financial disturbances, and that the last global break point for IR holding is the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. They also find that the developed and developing countries displayed different IR hoarding behaviors; see also [Bahmani-Oskooee \(1988\)](#), [Bussière, et al. \(2014\)](#), [Frenkel \(1974a, 1980\)](#), and [Lizondo et al. \(1987\)](#).

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, [de Beaufort Wijnholds et al. \(2001\)](#), [Guillermo and Calvo \(1998, 2006\)](#), [Aizenman and Lee \(2007\)](#), and [Obstfeld et al. \(2009\)](#).

There are different views on the implications of external financing for IR holdings. One view is that economies with a large external financing exposure in the forms of debts or portfolio flows hold a high level of IR to guard against the possibility of reverse capital flow (Aizenman et al., 2007; Feldstein, 1999).<sup>7</sup> However, if external financing is a substitute for foreign reserves, then the correlation between the two variables will be negative.

The variations in IR holdings observed during and after the GFC have led to further discussions on the determination of the appropriate amount of IR. The variable  $Z_{it}$  includes determining factors that received more attention among researchers in the recent discussions.

Countries may institute sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) to hold and manage their external assets. Typically, the monetary authorities use their IR to fund an SWF, suggesting that the existence of an SWF can be negatively correlated with the level of IR holding. However, the possibility of shifting external assets to an SWF offers a way to divert political pressures on excessive IR holding. If it is the case, then IR holding could even increase in the presence of a SWF. To assess its role, we include the dummy variable that represents the presence of national-level SWFs in our empirical analysis.<sup>8</sup> In passing, we note that the use of the SWF tenure does not change the results reported below.

Bilateral currency swap agreements are another factor. If a country has access to hard currencies via a currency swap arrangement, then it may have a weak incentive to hold IR. We collect from official websites information on bilateral swap agreements (regardless of the currency of the agreement) signed since the breakout of the 2008 global financial crisis.

The desire or the need to hold IR could be affected by the implementation of macro prudential policies, which have attracted considerable discussions in the global community in the aftermath of the GFC (Ostry et al., 2010, 2011; The Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, IMF, 2011). We include a qualitative variable that assumes a value of one if a country implemented any of the macro prudential policies based on the information in Lim et al. (2013).

Countries with a high level of gross saving tend to run a current account surplus, and accumulate IR, unless they are purposefully investing the surplus abroad. Thus, a country's saving could be indicative of the level of IR holding. By the same token, a policy of promoting outward direct investment (ODI) is one means to deploy international assets overseas. Hence, the level of ODI can be negatively correlated with the level of IR holding. In the subsequent empirical analyses, both gross saving and ODI are expressed as a ratio to GDP.

Besides the usual economic considerations, the implicit rivalry incentive could drive countries to accumulate IR in a “competitive” manner. Machlup (1966) first noted the so-called “catching-up-with-the-Joneses effect,” and the Joneses effect was revived by Cheung and Qian (2009) and Cheung and Sengupta (2011). Given the regional characteristics of the Joneses effect, we allow for countries in different regions to display different Joneses effects by interacting the Joneses variables with the corresponding regional dummy variables.<sup>9</sup>

The composition of trade, in addition to trade intensity, can affect the IR hoarding behavior. Hence, we explore the possible effects of the shares of fuel, commodity, or manufacturing exports in total exports, commodity terms of trade volatility, and the relative share of goods to services exports.

We also control for the potential effects of past experiences of currency and/or banking crises. For each type of crisis, we use a dummy variable for the crisis experience in the preceding five-years (that is,  $t-1$  to  $t-5$ ), and calculate  $D_{c(t-1)} + 0.95 * D_{c(t-2)} + 0.90 * D_{c(t-3)} + 0.85 * D_{c(t-4)} + 0.80 * D_{c(t-5)}$ , where  $D_{c(\cdot)} = 1$  if there is a crisis, and  $= 0$ , otherwise. In essence, we assume that the memory of a crisis among policy makers “depreciates” at the annual rate of 5%.

Most of these data are extracted from the *World Development Indicator*, *International Financial Statistics*, and the IMF's *World Economy Outlook*. See Appendix 1 for detail.

<sup>7</sup> Dooley et al. (2005, 2009), based on the Bretton Woods II system argument, note that external financing flows and levels of IR hoarding are positively related.

<sup>8</sup> The information is from the SWF Institute (<http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/>). Canadian or American SWFs are not included in the analysis because they are all managed by provincial or state level authorities, and are thereby not supposed to affect the holding of international reserves at the country level.

<sup>9</sup> The regions are: “North and South America,” “Europe,” which includes Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, “East and South Asia,” “Middle-east and North Africa,” and “Sub-Saharan Africa.”



### 3. Estimation results

Our discussion is focused on the estimation results of developing countries. The results of developed countries are included mainly for comparison purposes.

#### 3.1. Basic results – developing countries

Table 1 summarizes the results of estimating Equation (1); that is, the estimation without the newly focused variables ( $Z_{it}$ ), for the subsample of developing countries. We estimate the model with country-fixed effects because the Hausman test chooses a fixed effects specification over a random effects specification. To avoid the endogeneity issue, all the right-hand-side variables are lagged by one year. We choose the model specification in Table 1 using the following strategy. First, in the pre-test stage, we consider the 1999–2006 period, and examine all the possible traditional macroeconomic, financial, and (institutional) characteristics variables; that is,  $X_{it}$ ,  $Y_{it}$ , and  $D_{it}$ . We sequentially drop insignificant variables, and come up with the specification reported in column 2 of the table. Then, we fit the same model to the sample periods of 2007–09, 2010–12, and 1999–2006.

A few observations are in order. First, in the 1999–2006 subsample, the positive effect of the propensity to import variable suggests that a higher level of IR is expected to cover a higher level of imports (Frenkel, 1974b). The negative reserve volatility effect, however, is different from the prediction of the buffer stock model of IR (Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981). In the current panel setting, the negative effect could be associated with the anecdotal observation that large variations in a developing country's IR are usually caused by large drawn downs.

In addition to the internal drain and capital flight interpretation, the positive money supply stock effect is also in line with the early monetarist model of balance of payments that predicts an excess demand for money leads to an increase in IR (Courchene and Youssef, 1967; Johnson, 1958). The other financial variable, the net value of portfolio liabilities, on the other hand, has a significantly negative effect on IR holdings. One possible interpretation is that, on average, developing countries treat IR and portfolio flows as substitutes.

Second, the performance of these explanatory variables in the tranquil 1999–2006 period is quite different from their performance during the GFC crisis and post-crisis sample periods. The coefficient estimates of these variables change in terms of the magnitude, the sign, and the level of significance. For instance, during the 2007–2009 crisis period, the propensity to import is the only significant variable. During the post-crisis period, the import propensity effect becomes negative –

**Table 1**  
Determinants of holdings of international reserves – developing countries.

	1999–2006	2007–09	2010–12	1999–2012
Propensity to Import (t-1)	0.098 (0.035)***	0.303 (0.160)*	-0.117 (0.060)*	0.107 (0.031)***
Reserve Volatility	-0.013 (0.007)*	0.261 (0.187)	-0.147 (0.212)	-0.019 (0.008)**
M2 (% of GDP, t-1)	0.142 (0.026)***	0.050 (0.145)	0.150 (0.094)	0.233 (0.022)***
Net Port. Liab.(t-1)	-0.101 (0.040)**	0.065 (0.127)	-0.151 (0.127)	0.023 (0.035)
Constant	0.064 (0.018)***	0.029 (0.098)	0.214 (0.072)***	0.024 (0.016)
N	441	182	154	777
# of countries	70	67	58	73
Overall R2	0.56	0.34	0.15	0.58
W/in R2	0.16	0.06	0.07	0.23

Notes: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Estimated with country fixed effects. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity.

a finding that is counter-intuitive.<sup>10</sup> When we pool the three sample periods, the estimation results resemble those of the pre-GFC 1999–2006 period, with the exception that the net portfolio liabilities show no significant effect.

These results reinforce the previous findings that the IR demand function as well as its determinants are evolving over time (Cheung and Ito, 2008, 2009). Apparently, authorities respond to market conditions and adjust their reserve hoarding behavior accordingly. That is, the level of IR that is deemed sufficient is not necessarily constant.

### 3.2. The “new” factors – developing countries

Here, we examine the results pertaining to the variables in  $Z_{it}$ ; that is, determining factors which have received considerable attention during the GFC and in its aftermath.

We augment the first estimation model shown in Table 1 with the elements of  $Z_{it}$  along with the variables from  $X$ ,  $Y$ , and  $D$  that were found significant. As we did previously, we started with all the variables (shown in Appendix 1) and sequentially dropped insignificant variables until we obtained a parsimonious representation which comprised only significant explanatory variables. We repeated the exercise for each of the sample periods, and reported the results in Table 2 for developing countries and Table 3 for developed countries.<sup>11</sup>

One obvious observation is that the “newly discussed” variables ( $Z_{it}$ ) have different effects over different sample periods.<sup>12</sup> Although these variables are labeled as “recently discussed” factors, some of these variables are statistically significant even in the pre-GFC period. For example, gross saving has the expected positive sign in all the sample periods. This result lends support to the view that, for developing countries, a high level of national saving leads to a better current account balance and a higher level of IR holding.<sup>13</sup>

The outward direct investment effect in the pre-GFC years is consistent with the view that investing overseas helps divert international assets from IR accumulation. As anticipated, the Joneses effect varies across different regions and over different time periods. The Joneses effects for Asian countries in the pre-GFC and full sample periods echo the results reported in Cheung and Qian (2009). However, the region’s rivalry-driven IR hoarding motive reverses its sign during the crisis period. Countries in other regions do not display a stable Joneses effect across the sample periods, either.

The two commodity-related variables, the manufactured exports ratio, and the two crisis variables do not perform consistently across the sample periods, though fuel exports seem to be a positive factor especially in the pre-GFC period. The negative banking crisis effect is somewhat difficult to interpret, but it may suggest that a country that experienced a banking crisis in the past tends to experience persistent external drain.

During the 2007–9 crisis period, some of the variables found significant in the pre-crisis period become insignificant, some insignificant variables become significant, while some continue to be significant but display the opposite effect. The change in the performance of these variables may not be surprising because the crisis-driven frantic market conditions could prevent normal economic

<sup>10</sup> The negative effect of the propensity to import is consistent with Heller (1966) argument that the demand for IR should be negatively related to the marginal propensity to import because a higher propensity to import ( $m$ ) implies a smaller marginal cost of balance of payments adjustment (that is,  $1/m$ ).

<sup>11</sup> The sample periods 2007–09 and 2010–12 are small in the time dimension, which can make the use of country fixed effects in the estimation debatable. Some of the results are sensitive to the choice of with or without fixed effects, though the highlights of this paper are not. We only report the estimation results including country fixed effects, as the GFC must have had different impacts on the sampled countries, country fixed effects could alleviate its impacts on the estimation of the average effects of the explanatory variables. Results from the estimations without country fixed effects are available from the authors upon request.

<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the Chow tests confirm that the estimation models from different subsample periods are significantly different from each other; that is, there are structural changes in the set of explanatory variables over time. These results are available upon request.

<sup>13</sup> That implies that financial account is relatively closed compared to current account, which is often the case for many developing countries including China.

**Table 2**  
Determinants of holdings of international reserves – developing countries.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	1999–2006	2007–2009	2010–2012	1999–2012
Propensity to Import	0.079 (0.035)**	0.398 (0.147)***		0.096 (0.031)***
Reserve Volatility		0.353 (0.167)**		–0.021 (0.008)***
Opportunity Cost		0.042 (0.024)*		
Fixed/Peg				–0.026 (0.008)***
M2 (% of GDP)	0.096 (0.025)***			0.152 (0.026)***
Net Portfolio Liability Pos.	–0.137 (0.038)***			
Net Debt Liability Pos.		0.169 (0.073)**		
Net FDI Liability Pos.		0.132 (0.081)		
Financial exposure			–0.048 (0.017)***	0.010 (0.004)***
De jure financial openness		–0.206 (0.083)**		
Sovereign Wealth Funds, dummy			0.082 (0.033)**	–0.024 (0.013)*
Bilateral swap agreements, dummy			–0.026 (0.015)*	
Macro Prudential Policy dummy				0.017 (0.007)**
Gross saving	0.159 (0.046)***	0.526 (0.202)**	0.235 (0.091)**	0.280 (0.043)***
Outward Direct Inv.	–0.170 (0.077)**		0.536 (0.176)***	
Joneses × Asia	1.588 (0.348)***	–2.150 (0.894)**		0.619 (0.170)***
Joneses × Europe	0.973 (0.351)***		–2.506 (0.968)**	–0.672 (0.302)**
Joneses × MENA			0.650 (0.107)***	
% of fuel export	0.113 (0.046)**			0.182 (0.044)***
Commodity Volatility	0.065 (0.031)**			
% of commodity exports		0.269 (0.120)**		
# of Currency crisis (t–5 t–1)		0.056 (0.024)**		
# of Banking crisis (t–5 t–1)			–0.051 (0.010)***	
Constant	–0.051 (0.023)**	–0.027 (0.155)	0.359 (0.052)***	–0.024 (0.021)
N	441	182	154	777
# of countries	70	67	58	73
Between R2	0.21	0.01	0.01	0.48
Within R2	0.27	0.35	0.47	0.35
Overall R2	0.31	0.01	0.01	0.54

Notes: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Estimated with country fixed effects. All the explanatory variables, except for reserve volatility and currency and banking crises, are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity.

**Table 3**  
Determinants of holdings of international reserves – developed countries.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	1999–2006	2007–2009	2010–2012	1999–2012
Propensity to Import		–0.568 (0.245)**		
Reserve Volatility	0.230 (0.054)***		0.864 (0.283)***	
Opportunity cost	0.061 (0.012)***	–0.155 (0.038)***	–0.047 (0.019)**	–0.070 (0.014)***
M2 (% of GDP)		–0.110 (0.031)***		–0.083 (0.017)***
Net Portfolio Liability Pos.			–0.148 (0.047)***	
Net Debt Liability Pos.	0.027 (0.013)**	0.131 (0.035)***	–0.167 (0.031)***	–0.099 (0.013)***
Financial exposure	–0.003 (0.002)*	–0.018 (0.004)***	–0.031 (0.010)***	
De jure financial openness	0.275 (0.090)***	–1.219 (0.241)***		0.548 (0.145)***
Sovereign wealth fund, dummy	–0.036 (0.011)***			
Bilateral swap agreements, dummy		0.051 (0.009)***		0.043 (0.010)***
Macro Prudential Policy, dummy	–0.012 (0.006)*			
Gross saving	–0.311 (0.091)***		–1.451 (0.395)***	
Outward Direct Inv.			–0.428 (0.091)***	–0.159 (0.056)***
Joneses × Asia	0.963 (0.241)***			0.918 (0.238)***
Joneses × Europe	–0.549 (0.179)***			
Commodity Volatility	–0.201 (0.051)***			
% of manufacturing export	0.153 (0.057)***	0.667 (0.389)*		0.331 (0.119)***
% of fuel export	0.152 (0.070)**	1.865 (0.329)***		0.674 (0.189)***
% of commodity exports		–1.809 (0.474)***		–0.468 (0.171)***
Ratio of Goods to Service exports		–0.122 (0.043)***		
# of Currency crisis (t–5 t–1)				–0.031 (0.012)**
# of Banking crisis (t–5 t–1)	–0.015 (0.004)***	0.071 (0.010)***	0.028 (0.007)***	0.015 (0.003)***
Constant	–0.208 (0.107)*	1.760 (0.469)***	0.224 (0.119)*	–0.577 (0.180)***
N	159	64	58	281
# of countries	22	22	20	22
Between R2	0.00	0.09	0.01	0.02
Within R2	0.58	0.83	0.84	0.53
Overall R2	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.00

Notes: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Estimated with country fixed effects. All the explanatory variables, except for reserve volatility and currency and banking crises, are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity.

relationships from holding. Nevertheless, the propensity to import and gross saving continue to display a strong positive effect even with greater magnitudes.

The result from the post-crisis 2010–2012 period may be the most surprising one. The list of significant variables is dominated by the factors included in  $Z_{it}$ . Interestingly, signing on a bilateral currency swap agreement with a major central bank negatively contributes to IR accumulation, suggesting that currency swap agreements can supplement IR accumulation.<sup>14</sup> Given the negative effect of swap agreements is found in the immediate aftermath of the GFC, we conjecture that the negative effect is not driven by stigma (or possibly resultant speculative attacks) from signing on the agreements. Rather, we can stipulate that a swap agreement can relax liquidity constraint and ensure accessibility to a hard currency when there is liquidity shortage. The access to hard currencies is especially helpful when the global economic conditions are still fragile in the immediate aftermath of the GFC. Hence, a swap agreement provision allows countries to hold less of IR than they would otherwise.

We continue to find the positive effect of gross saving in the post-crisis period, signifying the important role of saving. The positive outward direct investment effect, however, implies a change in the link between outward direct investment and IR hoarding in the pre- and post-crisis periods. Such a change deserves further analysis in future studies.

As far as the post-GFC years are concerned, having an SWF seems to have a positive externality on IR accumulation. However, the estimate is found to be significantly *negative* in the full sample period, which is more in line with our priors, making the positive externality only unique to the post-GFC period.

Interestingly, when we pool the data from the three sample periods, most of the non-intuitive results in the crisis- and immediate post-crisis periods disappear (either become insignificant or significant with the expected sign). In addition, the macro prudential policy is found to complement the IR accumulation policy while having an SWF could divert international assets from IR accumulation.<sup>15</sup>

### 3.3. The developed countries

We repeat the same exercise for the sample of developed countries and present the results in [Table 3](#). In accordance with the past literature, developed and developing countries display different IR demand behaviors in each of the sample periods.

For developed countries, some of the “recently discussed” factors, such as SWFs, gross saving, the Joneses effect, and trade compositions affect the reserve hoarding behavior, even in the pre-GFC period. However, the estimated effects reported in [Table 3](#) are different from those of developing countries in [Table 2](#). For example, the presence of an SWF decreases the level of IR holding in the pre-GFC years, and gross saving has a negative impact on IR accumulation. The different saving effect may be caused by the fact that developed countries have better accessibility to the global capital market where they can invest their savings. The Joneses effect is quite robust among the Asian countries, a common characteristic between developed and developing countries.

Overall, the lists of significant variables in [Tables 2 and 3](#) are quite different. Besides gross saving, the contrasting results of the opportunity cost and M2 variables are noteworthy; among developed countries, both variables have negative impacts on IR accumulation. In a country with more developed financial markets, that can be suggested by a higher level of M2 (as a share of GDP), holding a large amount of IR can involve higher levels of foregone investment opportunities. This

<sup>14</sup> We include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a country has a bilateral currency swap agreement with a major central bank (regardless of the currency of the agreement) such as the Fed, the ECB, and the Bank of Japan. This dummy variable does not refer to the currency swap agreements with the People's Bank of China because the Chinese renminbi is not capital account convertible and, thus, does not provide liquidity to the same extent as major hard currencies do.

<sup>15</sup> We also investigated the effect of IMF stabilization measures by including a country-specific dummy variable that takes the value of one if a country receives non-concessional loans from the IMF in year  $t$ . However, this dummy variable is not statistically significant in any of the models considered.

also explains why the estimate on the opportunity cost is significantly negative in all the sample periods except for the pre-GFC period, a result consistent with theoretical predictions and in contrast with the case of developing countries in the 2007–09 crisis period. Other variables with conflicting results compared to developing countries include bilateral swap agreements and banking crisis experience.

#### 4. Prediction exercises

##### 4.1. Are developing countries over- or under-hoarding international reserves?

In the last two decades or so, economists and policymakers alike have been debating on the issue of the adequacy of IR holding. While holding an insufficient level of IR can trigger economic and financial instabilities, excessive hoarding of reserves can lead to over-heating of the domestic economy and contribute to global economy instability. An overarching issue of the debate is how to determine the ‘sufficient’ level of IR, either theoretically or empirically. While the debate on what level of IR constitutes a ‘sufficient’ level cannot be settled, at the very least, we can provide a statistical benchmark based on the past historical patterns of IR holding so as to obtain some inferences about whether the actual level of IR holding is too high or too low.

The estimation results in the previous section clearly show that the empirical IR demand function has evolved over time, including different sets of factors as the determinants in different time periods. Thus, even if we wanted to estimate a benchmark level of IR as a reference point, the estimated degree of over- or under-hoarding would depend upon which empirical model to compute the benchmark. Nonetheless, we use our estimated models to generate the predicted levels of IR and compare them with the actual levels of IR hoarding.


Fig. 2 plots predicted levels of IR holdings for selected individual countries and countries groups based on the estimated models reported in Table 2 for different sample periods and, the corresponding actual levels. The individual countries include Argentina, China, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, and the “Fragile Five” of Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey. The country groups are the developing Asia excluding China, Latin America, and emerging market economies.<sup>16</sup> For each specification, we generate the in-sample and out-of-sample forward, but not backward, predictions. For example, by using the model estimated for the 2007–2009 sample, we generate in-sample predictions for 2007 to 2009, and out-of-sample predictions for 2010 to 2012.

Regarding these graphs, we must note that the predictions are generated without country-fixed effects, though the estimations are conducted with country-fix effects. We conceive that predictions made without country-fixed effects would resemble the way international investors compare cross-country investment destinations for arbitrage opportunities. One could argue that predictions with country-fixed effects are relevant only for assessing whether the path of actual holdings of IR are higher or lower relative to their historical tendencies. However, international investors would also compare the levels of IR holding across countries so that they could react to market signals and reorganize their portfolios when necessary.

Let us consider the period of 2010–2012. In the figure, we can see that, among the predictions of the demand for IR estimated for the four sample periods, the predictions for the 1999–2006 and 1999–2012 periods tend to resemble each other, reflecting the estimation results in Table 2. For some individual countries or country groups, predictions from the 2007–2009 or 2010–2012 specifications differ greatly from those of either 1999–2006 or 1999–2012 specifications.


These plots confirm that whether a country is under- or over-hoarding IR depends on which estimation model to use to compute the benchmark. For example, during the 2010–2012 period, China appears to hold IR far more than those predicted by the model estimated for the 2007–2009 period, but less than what is predicted by the other three specifications, especially the 1999–2006 model. Fig. 2 shows similar results for other Asian economies and the group of ex-China Asian developing

<sup>16</sup> For the country groups, we presented simple cross-country averages of actual and predicted IR holdings.



NOTE: In these figures, the predictions are generated without country-fixed effects, though the estimations are conducted with country-fix effects.

Fig. 2. Predictions with Different Estimation Models.



NOTE: In these figures, the predictions are generated without country-fixed effects, though the estimations are conducted with country-fix effects.

Fig. 2. (continued).



**Table 4**

Over-hoarding estimates: 2010–2012.

	Models (pred. Errors w/out FE)				Models (pred. Errors w/FE)			
	1999–2006	2007–09	2010–2012	1999–2012	1999–2006	2007–09	2010–2012	1999–2012
Emerging Asia	–0.225	0.618	0.087	–0.131	–0.014	0.165	0.002	0.009
Western Europe	0.079	–0.071	0.411	–0.008	0.065	–0.033	0.000	0.008
E. & C. Europe	–0.041	–0.079	0.246	0.085	–0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001
Emerging Latin America	0.036	–0.129	–0.275	–0.042	–0.011	–0.004	–0.001	–0.014
“Fragile Five”	–0.196	0.098	–0.185	–0.124	–0.051	0.031	0.001	–0.008
BRICs	–0.143	0.131	–0.100	–0.095	–0.012	0.017	0.001	0.006
Argentina	0.067	–0.254	–0.232	–0.025	–0.006	–0.032	0.000	–0.010
Brazil	0.046	–0.118	–0.277	–0.014	0.030	–0.016	0.000	0.019
Mexico	0.053	0.011	–0.308	–0.012	0.029	0.040	0.000	0.012
China	–0.265	0.742	–0.097	–0.139	0.018	0.124	0.000	0.019
India	–0.483	0.414	–0.238	–0.304	–0.171		0.006	–0.035
Indonesia	–0.473	0.495	–0.331	–0.260	–0.116	0.073	0.000	–0.021
Korea	–0.412	0.699	–0.161	–0.254	–0.137	0.123	0.000	–0.049
Malaysia	–0.253	0.603	0.014	–0.125	–0.082	0.100	0.000	–0.043
Thailand	–0.173	0.739	0.121	–0.028	0.066	0.156	0.000	0.080
South Africa	0.019	–0.192	–0.209	–0.095	0.028	–0.004	0.000	0.008
Turkey	–0.089	–0.003	0.121	0.052	–0.029	0.070	0.000	–0.012

economies. In short, Fig. 2 suggests that many of the countries displayed in the figure appear to “under-hoard” IR according to the benchmarks based on either 1999–2006 or 1999–2012 specifications. These results suggest that the behavior of IR holding for these countries may have experienced a regime shift after the GFC.

Table 4 allows us to take a closer look at the IR holding behavior in reference to the different benchmarks by reporting the averages of prediction errors in 2010–2012 for the same countries as in Fig. 2 and the country groups of “Emerging Asia,” “Western Europe,” Eastern and Central Europe,” “Emerging Latin America,” “Fragile Five,” and “BRICS.”<sup>17</sup> The first four columns report the 2010–2012 averages of prediction errors while the errors do not incorporate country-fixed effects. The second four columns report the 2010–2012 averages of prediction errors, but the errors do reflect country-fixed effects.<sup>18</sup> As we have discussed previously, the errors without country-fixed effects are more suitable for cross-country comparison, but those with country-fixed effects are suggestive of over- or under-hoarding from historical perspectives for each country.


The country group averages of prediction errors without country-fixed effects suggest that the country groups of Emerging Asia, Fragile Five, and BRICS appear to hold fewer IR than the predictions using either the 1999–2006 or 1999–2012 model, implying that these country groups may have experienced a significant change in the behavior of IR holding after the GFC. The result is somewhat surprising in view of the anecdotal argument that massive IR allowed emerging Asian economies to be resilient to the GFC. However, the result for this group is mainly driven by the results of India, Indonesia, and Korea.<sup>19</sup> Fig. 3, which compares the actual and predicted levels of IR holding for the 1999–2006 and 1999–2012 models, confirms the result graphically.

However, the prediction errors that incorporate country-fixed effects give us a more nuanced picture. The ‘under-hoarding’ countries based on the 1999–2006 or 1999–2012 models are now reduced to India, Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia. Countries like China and Thailand are not ‘under-hoarding’ compared to their historical patterns. Among the country groups, according to the 1999–2006, only the Fragile Five appears to be under-hoarding compared to its pre-GFC patterns.

<sup>17</sup> “BRICS” comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

<sup>18</sup> The in-sample country fixed effects are used in the process of calculating these errors.

<sup>19</sup> Sri Lanka and Pakistan, both included in the Emerging Asia group, also displayed IR under-hoarding based on the 1999–2006 and 1999–2012 specifications.



Note: For clarity purposes, the observations with actual or predicted IR levels greater than 80% (of GDP) are omitted from presentation.

**Fig. 3.** Actual vs. Predicted Levels of IR Holding. (a) Predictions based on the 1999–2006 model. (b) Predictions based on the 1999–2012 model.

Fig. 2 confirms the under-hoarding of IR by “Fragile Five,” that could be viewed by the market as vulnerable to the reverse of the U.S. quantitative easing (QE) policy. These five countries tend to be deficient in IR holding during the period of 2010–2012; they usually appear to be under-hoarding by three of the four specifications. Combined with the results in Table 3 and Fig. 3, among the Fragile Five, India and Indonesia particularly appear vulnerable, justifying the market’s concern over these economies’ deteriorating current account conditions.

4.2. International reserve holdings and currency depreciation

How are the countries vulnerable to external financial shocks doing lately? In recent years, emerging market economies have ambivalent feelings about the spillovers from advanced economies. On the one hand, emerging market economies should benefit from the recovery of advanced economies, which are their important trading partners after all. On the other hand, with recovery underway,




Fig. 4. Over-hoarding and Exchange Rate Depreciation. (a) 1999–2006 model (b) 2007-09 model.(c) 2010-12 model (d) 1999–2012 model.

**Table 5**

The proxy of over-hoarding and exchange rate depreciation in 2012–13.

Model	Dep. Var.: % of depreciation 2012–13							
	Prediction errors 2010–12				Prediction errors as of 2012			
	1999–2006 (1)	2007–2009 (2)	2010–2012 (3)	1999–2012 (4)	1999–2006 (5)	2007–2009 (6)	2010–2012 (7)	1999–2012 (8)
Pred. errors.	–0.065 (0.031)**	–0.055 (0.032)*	–0.018 (0.016)	–0.101 (0.052)*	–0.055 (0.030)*	–0.077 (0.042)*	–0.061 (0.035)*	–0.114 (0.061)*
Constant	0.021 (0.008)**	0.031 (0.011)***	0.016 (0.009)*	0.019 (0.008)**	0.027 (0.010)***	0.038 (0.013)***	0.018 (0.010)*	0.026 (0.009)***
Adjusted R2	0.03	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.11	0.06	0.07
N	75	59	68	78	59	49	52	63

Notes: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors are robust standard errors.

the advanced world will trigger the tapering policy to end the extremely low interest rate policy, which could in turn cause massive capital outflow from emerging market economies. Indeed, on May 22, 2013 the world witnessed the adverse effect of tapering on emerging financial markets when the comment by the Federal Reserve chairman Ben S. Bernanke on the possibility of tapering the QE policy ended up jittering the emerging economies.

As amplified in the media, economies that are financially vulnerable, including the Fragile Five discussed above, have been experiencing economic and financial stresses. One sign of economic and financial stresses is exemplified by the falling value of the domestic currency which is caused by concerns over anticipated capital outflow and possible deteriorating economic performance.

Although our estimation results do not answer definitely the question of whether or to what extent a country is holding too much or too little IR, they can shed light on the relative sufficiency or deficiency of IR hoarding. To investigate the issue, we study the possible links between our estimates of IR holding and the observed exchange rate movements. Specifically, we investigate whether the currency stress is associated with the relative levels of IR holding to our predictions, which we interpret as a barometer of a country's vulnerability to external financial shocks.

Fig. 4 displays scatter diagrams of the magnitude of the U.S. dollar exchange rate depreciation against the degree of over-hoarding of IR, which is measured by the prediction error based on our estimated models. The prediction errors, or the proxies for “over-hoarding,” are defined as the difference between the actual and predicted levels of IR – a positive difference implies over-hoarding and a negative one under-hoarding. If a prediction error is a reasonable measure of vulnerability to external financial shocks, a fall in the prediction error should be associated with a rise in the exchange rate (that is, currency depreciation).

The scatter plots of the annual averages of exchange rate depreciation observed during the year of 2013 and the over-hoarding proxies for the period of 2010–2012 display different patterns depending on the estimation model to use. For instance, the proxies derived from the 2010–2012 model (Panel C) exhibit a wide dispersion relative to those from other model specifications. Nonetheless, a (weak) negative association of the two variables could be visualized in these four scatter plots.

To shed additional insight, we regress the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate against the U.S. dollar on the proxy for IR over-hoarding, and report the results in Table 5. Two types of over-hoarding proxies are considered: one is the average of the 2010 to 2012 values, and the other is the proxy value as of 2012 (Table 6).

The estimation results lend support to the visual inspection that the two variables are negatively related. When we use the proxy average of the 2010 to 2012 period, all coefficient estimates are negative and, with the exception of the 2010–2012 case, statistically significant. The explanatory power, as given by the adjusted R-squared estimates, ranges from 0% to 6% for the significant cases. Apparently, the information conveyed by the 2012 proxy for over-hoarding has a stronger impact for exchange rate depreciation than the one embedded in the annual averages of 2010–2012. Generally, the adjusted R-squared estimates are higher as well.

**Table 6**  
Comparison b/w OLS-FE and PCA Estimation Results – Developing Countries.

1999–2006	OLS- FE	PC	2007–2009	OLS- FE	PC	2010–2012	OLS- FE	PC	1999–2012	OLS- FE	PC
Propensity to Import	+		Propensity to Import	+		Financial Exposure SWF	–		Propensity to Import	+	+
M2 (% of GDP)	+	(+)	Reserve Volatility	+		Bilateral swap	+	+	Reserve Volatility	–	+
Net Portfolio Liab.	–	–	Opportunity Cost	+		Gross saving	–	–	Fixed/Peg	–	–
Gross saving	+	+	Net Debt Liab.	+		Outward Direct Inv.	+	+	M2 (% of GDP)	+	
Outward Direct Inv.	–		Net FDI Liab. Pos.	–	+	Joneses × Europe	+	+	Financial Exposure SWF	+	+
Joneses × Asia	+	+	Chinn-Ito	–	–	Joneses × MENA	–	–	Macro Prudential	–	–
Joneses × Europe	+	+	Gross saving	+	+	# of Banking crisis	+	+	Gross saving	+	+
% of fuel export	+	+	Joneses × Asia	–	–				Joneses × Asia	+	+
Commodity Volatility	+		Commodity exports	+					Joneses × Europe	–	
			# of Currency crisis	+					% of fuel export	+	+
N	441		N	182		N			N	777	
# of countries	70		# of countries	67		# of countries	58		# of countries	73	
B/w R2	0.21	0.05	B/w R2	0.01	0.12	B/w R2	0.01	0.05	B/w R2	0.48	0.25
W/in R2	0.27	0.20	W/in R2	0.35	0.16	W/in R2	0.47	0.39	W/in R2	0.35	0.29
Overall R2	0.31	0.12	Overall R2	0.01	0.12	Overall R2	0.01	0.06	Overall R2	0.54	0.37
Other estimates found associated by PCA:			Other estimates found associated by PCA:			Other estimates found associated by PCA:			Other estimates found associated by PCA:		
Crawling Peg (–); fixed/Peg (–); net FDI Liab.(+); currency crisis (–); banking crisis (+/–); Chinn-Ito (–); manufacturing exp. (–); (Opp. Cost (+))			Swap (+);			Chinn-Ito (–); net FDI Liab.(+); Reserve vol. (–)			net FDI Liab.(+); Opp. Cost (–); banking crisis (+); Chinn-Ito (–); Joneses Westhem. (+); manufacturing exp. (–); Comm. exp. (+); (ODI (–))		

Note: The signs in parentheses in the “PCA” columns indicate they are based on the results of the estimations where the variables that are not highly correlated with any of the PCs are included in the estimation (that is, models shown in column (2) of each table).

We report the full details of this extension in the working paper [Aizenman et al. \(2014\)](#).

Based on the presumption that the market will drive down the currency value of a country experiencing signs of external vulnerability and a resultant fall in IR holding, our findings either lend support to this presumption or are indicative of the relevance of the estimated demand models for international reserves (with the 2010–2012 model as a likely exception). A strong inference is that, if a country holds a deficient amount of international reserves, it tends to experience currency depreciation. Furthermore, the outcome will be reinforced by foreign exchange market interventions conducted by countries' monetary authorities that would further deplete the holding of reserves.

## 5. Additional analyses

### 5.1. A robustness check with the principal component analysis (PCA)

Admittedly, we considered a large number of potential explanatory variables to investigate the reserve holding behavior. The regression analysis may suffer from the issues associated with the curse of dimensionality. Although the correlation between the reported explanatory variables is usually not strong, some members of the original set of potential explanatory variables overlap with others

conceptually or qualitatively (for example, the share of fuel in total exports and that of commodity exports), and thus can display a high level of association with each other. Hence, it is worthwhile assessing the robustness of the estimation results by controlling for potential multicollinearity. To reduce the dimensionality, we consider principal components (PCs) of individual groups of potential explanatory variables instead of the variables themselves in the regression analysis. We report the full details of this extension in Aizenman et al. (2014, section 5). Overall, the models that include PCs perform relatively well. For all the subsample periods, except for the 2007–2009 period, the signs of many significant variables under the OLS-FE specifications are the same as those implied by the OLS-PC exercise.

## 5.2. Bayesian model averaging (BMA)

While the choice of a parsimonious model based on the statistical significance of parameter estimates seems reasonable, one may say the approach does not explicitly allow for model uncertainty. Suppose there are  $p$  possible explanatory variables. These  $p$  variables give rise to  $2^p$  possible model specifications,  $M^i$  that form the model space  $M = \{M^1, M^2, \dots, M^{2^p}\}$ . As long as the process of selecting appropriate explanatory variables involves some degree of uncertainty, there is uncertainty about which one of these  $2^p$  models is the true model.<sup>20</sup> The Bayesian Model Average (BMA) methodology accounts for such model uncertainty in assessing parameter estimates. In essence, the estimate of a parameter is a weighted average of its estimates from all the  $2^p$  possible model specifications, with the weight of each estimate determined by the performance of the model from which it is obtained. We report the full details of the BMA extension of our model in Aizenman et al. (2014, section 5). Despite some differences, the BMA results are in general comparable to those in Table 2. The differences may be attributed to the fact that our BMA procedure does not control for a) the correlation between potential regressors in estimating all possible model specifications, and b) the country-fixed effects. As argued by Montgomery and Nyhan (2010), despite the usefulness of the estimation technique, BMA should not be regarded as a panacea for model selection. It would best work as an estimation technique to test competing theory-based models or as a robustness check to show that the main estimation results are not overly sensitive to model specifications. As such, we could state that most of the determinants we found significant are robust with the BMA estimation, although the estimation also suggests the possibility of other variables entering the models.

## 6. Conclusions

Our analysis puts to the fore the changing nature of the hoarding of international reserves. We empirically confirmed structural changes associated with new patterns of hoarding IR especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Among the determinants that received more attention in the post-GFC period, we found that the saving rate has been playing an important role in determining the level of IR hoarding even before the GFC – emerging markets with higher saving rates tend to use higher buffers of IR, partially accounting for the higher levels of IR in East Asia in comparison of Latin America. Other variables we newly identified include the accessibility to swap lines, implementations of macro-prudential regulations, the existence of a sovereignty wealth fund, and the attitude towards outward foreign investment.

While there is no end in sight for hoarding reserves, some of the newly identified factors may mitigate eventual reserve accumulation. Some of the macro prudential measures are purported to preemptively prevent excessive credit growth through both macroeconomic and microeconomic countercyclical measures while others are particularly targeted to dwarf the influx of overseas capital to an overheating economy by imposing capital controls. Hence, an implementation of macro-prudential policies may lead to fewer IRs if countries feel less need to hold precautionary IR, or it could lead to more IRs if the policies help prevent a drainage of IRs. Interestingly, we found the negative impact of macro-prudential policies for developed countries and the positive one for developing countries.

<sup>20</sup> The decision of which variable to be excluded involves a trade-off between bias and precision of the estimators of the variables included in the model (“focus variables”).

The proliferation of SWFs and possible rebalancing of emerging markets that followed aggressive export-led growth before the GFC may reduce reserve/GDP ratios of developing countries, as confirmed in the predictive exercises using the latest data. The robustness of the “Keeping with the Joneses” effect also suggests potential gains from regional and global steps towards deeper use of swap lines and cooperative pooling arrangements.

These predictions, however, should be taken with a grain of salt. Given the dynamic nature of the forces that shape the hoarding of reserves, there is no reason to expect future stability in the patterns of hoarding IR. Thus, on top of the relevance of the new determining factors, one should be aware of the possible shift in the hoarding behavior in the future.

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## Appendix 1. Data definitions

### Macro/Traditional Variables ( $X$ ):

*Propensity to import* – Imports as a ratio to GDP.

*Reserve volatility* – Standard deviations of the growth of IR holding in five year windows ( $t - 5$  through  $t - 1$ ) are used. The data are extracted from WDI and IFS.

*Gross saving* – Gross saving is used as % of GDP. WDI and WEO.

*Opportunity cost of holding reserves* – It is the difference between the long-term government bond yields and the U.S. 10-year government bond yields (Previously, I used the Treasury bill rates, not any more). For the countries for which the long-term bond yields data are not available, “lending rates” from the IFS are used. The data are from WDI and IFS.

### Financial and Institutional Variables ( $Y$ ):

*M2 as % of GDP* – M2 as a share of GDP (I used liquid liability ratios in the previous round)

*De jure measure of financial openness* – The index is based on Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008) and downloaded from [http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito\\_website.htm](http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm).

*Gross Portfolio Exposure* – The sum of external assets and liabilities divided by GDP. The data are extracted from Lane-Milesi-Ferretti dataset. Previously, we used “net” exposure or change in the net exposure.

*Net liabilities for FDI, debt, and portfolio investment* – For each of the cross-border investment types, the net liabilities are calculated as < external liability minus external asset>, using the updated dataset of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007 and updates).

### Country Characteristic Variables ( $D$ ):

*Dummies for the fixed/pegged and crawling peg regimes* – The Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) index is used to construct the exchange rate regime dummy variables. Their index ranges from 1 “no separate legal tender,” to 14 “Freely falling” (with increasing flexibility of exchange rate movement) and is a “de facto” index (in contrast to IMF’s “de jure” exchange rate regime classification). Here, as in Cheung and Ito, we aggregate these categories into three groups; namely “floating,” “Crawling Peg,” and “Fixed/Pegged.” The Reinhart and Rogoff index is updated to 2010. For 2011, we assume countries have the same exchange rate regime as in 2010.

Other characteristic dummy variables are not tested because the estimations are conducted with country-fixed effects.

### 'New' Variables (Z)

*Dummy for the sovereign wealth funds (SWF)* – Using the data from the SWF Institute (<http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/>), we assign the value of one for the country and years in which the country of concern possesses a national-level SWF.

*Dummy for bilateral swap agreements (SWAP)* – This dummy takes the value of one if a country is in an agreement of bilateral currency swap (regardless of the currency of the agreement) such as the Fed, the ECB, and the Bank of Japan. The data are compiled using website information.

*Dummy for macro prudential policies (MPP)* – This dummy takes a value of one if a country has in place any of the macro prudential policies [Lim et al. \(2013\)](#) compiled.

*Gross saving* – Gross saving is used as % of GDP. WDI and WEO.

*Commodity TOT Volatility* – Using the commodity terms of trade data compiled by [Spatafora and Tytell \(2009\)](#), we use the moving five-year standard deviations (in  $t-5$  through  $t-1$ ) of the change in the commodity TOT index as a proxy for commodity TOT volatility.<sup>21</sup>

*Joneses' Effects* – This variable is supposed to capture regional externality of IR holding and its computation is based on [Cheung and Qian \(2009\)](#). It is essentially the average of IR holding in the region country  $i$  belongs to, but it excludes the level of IR holding of country  $i$  itself. The regions are: "North and South America," "Europe," "East and South Asia," "Middle-east and North Africa," and "Sub-Saharan Africa."<sup>22</sup>

*Outward direct investment (ODI)* – Outward direct investment as a share of GDP. The data are extracted from UNCTAD's database.

*Oil exporters* – The dummy is assigned for oil exporters defined by the World Bank or [Spatafora and Tytell \(2009\)](#).

*% of commodity exports* – The "commodity exports" are the sum of fuel, food, agricultural goods, and minerals, all of which are extracted from WDI. It is shown as the share of total exports.

*% of manufacturing exports* – The data are from WDI. It is shown as the share of total exports.

*Ratio of goods exports to service exports* – Using the BoP data, we calculate the proportion of service exports in goods and service exports. Then, we come up with the ratio as  $(1 \text{ minus service exports as \% of total exports}) / (\text{service exports as \% of total exports})$ .

*Financial Exposure* – We use the ratio of (total external assets + total external liabilities) to GDP. The data are based on [Lane and Milesi-Ferretti \(2007\)](#) and updates).

*Currency and Banking Crises* – We use the dummy for both currency and banking crisis episodes that are identified in [Aizenman and Ito \(2013\)](#). For the identification of currency crisis, [Aizenman and Ito \(2013\)](#) first calculate the exchange rate market pressure (EMP) against the base country ([Aizenman et al., 2008, Eichengreen et al., 1995, 1996](#)). For the countries whose data for the EMP are not available, the crisis dummy is supplemented by the currency crisis identification by [Reinhart and Rogoff \(2004, 2009\)](#). Their banking crisis data are essentially based on [Laeven and Velencia \(2008, 2010a,b, 2012\)](#). We count the number of past crisis years over  $t-1$  through  $t-5$  for each type of crises while assigning weights on the crisis dummies depending on the year. That is, the crisis variables are calculated as:  $D_{c(t-1)} + 0.95 * D_{c(t-1)} + 0.90 * D_{c(t-3)} + 0.85 * D_{c(t-4)} + 0.80 * D_{c(t-5)}$ . We assume that the weight diminishes by 5% every year, that is, that the memory of a crisis among policy makers "depreciates" at the annual rate of 5%.

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<sup>21</sup> The original data are available up to 2009, but we obtained more updated data (up to 2011) from the authors. We thank authors for the generosity to share the data.

<sup>22</sup> "Europe" includes Western, Central, and Eastern Europe.



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