Title
The Civic Culture: Prehistory, Retrospect, and Prospect

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This morning I want to give you a bit of the prehistory of the *Civic Culture* study --the intellectual currents and streams which fed into it. This afternoon in my talk to the Politics and Society Colloquium I will offer a retrospect and prospect of the *Civic Culture* as a theory.

I was both an undergraduate and graduate student at the University of Chicago during the decade 1928--1938. Among the scholarly events during these years were the appearances of the volumes of Charles Merriam's Civic Education series, called "The Making of Citizens". This study was inspired, in part, by the differing performance of the various countries involved in World War I. Merriam served as head of American propaganda efforts in Italy where he dealt with the lagging morale of that country in its conduct of the war. Newly embarked in the war, with new resources and ideas, the United States took on the assignment of trying to prevent Italy from going the way of Russia. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the redrawing of the boundaries of Central Europe and the Balkans after the end of World War I dramatically illustrated the power of nationalism and the ethnic, linguistic, and religious characteristics on which it was based.

The *Making of Citizens* study, begun in the early 1920s included volumes describing these processes in Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland and, to represent the simpler societies, the Duk Dus of Melanesia. Merriam's contribution consisted of a concluding volume on comparative civic training (1931) and a later volume, *Civic Training in the United States* (1934). Today we would call what Merriam was studying, comparative political culture and socialization. Merriam called it "Civic Training" and "Civic Education" reflecting the more rational--voluntarist conceptual terminology of the social sciences at that time.

The exploration of the psychological and sociological aspects of political behavior was just in its beginnings. Merriam had sent Harold Lasswell off to Europe to study Freud and psychoanalysis in the mid-1920s, and his book on *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930) came out a year before Merriam's *The Making of Citizens*. Harold Gosnell was experimenting with the use of statistical and survey methods in the study of political behavior. It seems as though Merriam was working at two different levels: the experimental and innovative level of his young departmental colleagues, and the level of the older generation of colleagues whom he invited to cooperate in his civic training study.

The scholars who wrote the country studies for the civic training series were reputable but conventional American and European historians and political scientists who knew little about the emerging social sciences which Merriam was then fostering in his department of political science at the University of Chicago. However, in the talents and skills of his younger colleagues in the department he had the makings of a modern comparative political socialization study, such area specialists as Merriam was able to draw upon--Samuel Harper (USSR), Herbert Schneider (Italy), Carleton J. H. Hayes (France), Paul Kosok (Germany), Oskar Jaszi (Austria-Hungary), John Gaus (Great Britain), and Robert Brooks (Switzerland)--were good historians and political
scientists, but not up to the challenges of Merriam's imaginative and innovative mind. The Civic Training project was fated to be disappointing, given the discrepancies between the training, capacities, and interests of its participants, and Merriam's ambitions. Highly visible when the study was begun, it faded from memory quite soon. As my graduate cohort moved off into our own careers, we carried away the feeling that the Civic Training project had not come off. But some of us felt that it could be done, and that it ought to be done with sharper theories and better methods.

One of Merriam's lost bets in the Civic Training project was his effort to recruit Robert Michels, the German sociologist and author of the Iron Law Of Oligarchy to do the study of Italian Fascism (Karl, 1974). Michels actually agreed to do the Italian study, but unable to make an academic career in Germany because of his socialist and pacifist record and generally disillusioned both with socialism and democracy, he sought employment in Italian universities. He ultimately ended up with a chair at Perugia. He also joined the Fascist Party around this time, and decided that doing a book on fascism and political socialization was too risky. Instead he wrote a tame book on the history of Italian nationalism. Merriam tried to get Michels to revise his manuscript but without avail, and nothing came of what might have been one of the more interesting monographs of the Civic Training series.

This was not the last time that politics disrupted international scientific collaboration. One that I recall with anguish occurred decades later, long after the Civic Culture had been published. Sidney Verba, then a colleague at Stanford, was embarked on the seven nation study (1977), a follow up of the Civic Culture study emphasizing political participation, and which might be viewed as the grandchild of Merriam's Civic Training project. Verba was having problems with Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, the head of the Mexican team who had compunctions about collaborating with "gringos". We thought that I might be able to reassure him. I spent three days, wandering around Mexico City, engaged in heart to heart talks with my Mexican colleague. I finally seemed to convince him that our purposes were not political, that we could be trusted, and that it would be good for the development of the social sciences in Mexico if he joined the project and led a Mexican team. We solemnized the occasion by a toast and a drink of Tequila, preceded by pouring salt on my hand, licking it, and then downing the Tequila in one gulp. We gave him a substantial grant, including funds for the purchase of a jeep in order to facilitate interviewing in the more remote areas of Mexico, where a four wheel drive was essential. A few months later the Mexican scholar withdrew from the project, on the grounds that we were agents of the CIA and worse. We felt betrayed, particularly when he held on to the jeep.

To come back to the Civic Training series, I carried away from my graduate years at Chicago feelings of frustration and unfinished business. During the next two decades several experiences prepared me for the venture into the study of comparative political culture. During the Second World War I served in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, trying to learn about the effects of bombing on the German war effort in order to apply these lessons to the Japanese phase of the war. The Morale Division of which I was a member did a sample survey of German attitudes immediately after the Nazi capitulation. I learned a bit about sampling and question construction from this exercise.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s in connection with my studies of American opinion and foreign policy (1950) and the Appeals of Communism (1954), I did secondary analysis of public opinion surveys, and actually used British, French, and Italian survey research groups to carry out my foreign interviewing. By the mid and late 1950s (and particularly after Sputnik--the Soviet aerospace triumph of 1957) research funds became plentiful. The Princeton
Center of International Studies and I became the recipients of a substantial research grant from the Carnegie Corporation to carry out a cross national study of political attitudes.

I cite this history going back to graduate student days to make the case that the Civic Culture study, though an innovating one, was not a jump into the blue. The theories and hypotheses which it tested were well discussed in the historical and social science literature. Just as the fact of differences in national behavior and morale had been dramatized in World War I, and led Merriam and his colleagues to the question of how to explain these differences, even more so in the aftermath of World War II scholars and intellectuals were both troubled and challenged by the collapse of Weimar Germany and the French Third Republic in contrast to the stability of British and American politics. The political cultural implications of these differences were unmistakable. Rather than acknowledge any excess of "Chutzpah" in undertaking the Civic Culture study, from my perspective in the late 1950s when the Civic Culture study was launched it was a study whose time had come. Just a little bit ahead of the game, but not too much. Its timeliness was reflected in its early reception. We had an argument with the Princeton University Press. Verba and I wanted a paperback as soon as possible. The Press people did not think it would sell enough to justify a paperback. We asked them if they would allow us to contract for a paperback with Little Brown (1965) of Boston. They agreed, and the paperback version went into more than a dozen printings.

Sidney Verba was a creative, imaginative, and skillful collaborator. In August of 1994, sitting next to his wife, Cynthia, at a dinner at the meeting of the American Political Science Association Meeting at which he was inducted as President-elect, I was moved to recall that for a brief period of years--from 1958 until 1960--I was the only one privy to the full range of Sidney Verba's creativity, originality, and learning capacity. Verba was my dissertation supervisee; he had written an extraordinary dissertation--Small Groups and Political Behavior (1959)--still widely cited in the literature on the social psychology of leadership.

As I sit in Harry Eckstein's seminar I recall how much Harry contributed to the Civic Culture study, and that this influence was mediated by Sid Verba. We were mid-course in the analysis phase of the Civic Culture data in 1960 when I accepted an offer to return to Yale. Sidney remained at Princeton, becoming a Research Associate in the Institute of International Studies, and an Assistant Professor of Political Science. Harry Eckstein, leaving Harvard, replaced me at Princeton. In the later phases of analysis of the Civic Culture data Sidney Verba had the benefit of colleagueship with Harry Eckstein at a time when Harry was deep in writing and lecturing on his theory of democratic stability. It appeared in the Center of International Studies Memoranda series in 1961 and appeared again in his book on Norway (1966). It is cited in the concluding chapter of the Civic Culture as the source of our hypothesis that more stable democracies have a "mixed political culture". We got from Harry Eckstein the idea that a democratic political system requires a blending of apparent contradictions, "balanced disparities" as he called them, if it is to function effectively. On the one hand, a democratic government must govern; it must have power and leadership and make decisions. On the other hand, it must be responsible to its citizens. For if democracy means anything, it means that in some way governmental elites must respond to the desires and demands of citizens. The need to maintain this balance between governmental power and governmental responsiveness, as well as the need to maintain other balances that derive from the power/responsiveness balance--balances between consensus and cleavage, between affectivity and affective neutrality--explains the way in which the more mixed patterns of political attitudes associated with the civic culture are appropriate for a democratic system. Verba and I found confirmation of Eckstein's "balanced disparity" theory in
our analysis of British and American attitudes, contrasted with those of Germany, Italy, and Mexico.

We were also influenced by Harry Eckstein's congruence theory of political authority, the argument that political stability was enhanced if non-political authority patterns—particularly in groups closest to the state—were similar or congruent. Thus we had found in our data that there was a stronger relationship between civic competence and adult participation in workplace decisions, than between civic competence and earlier participation by the child in family decisionmaking.

There was a 30th anniversary "retrospective" on the Civic Culture study at the 1994 meetings of the American Political Science Association. Among the commentators was Robert Putnam of Harvard who concluded his remarks with the observation that the civic culture theory reminded him of "Goldilocks".

In the story of "Goldilocks And The Three Bears," the young heroine, possessed of even more than ordinary feminine curiosity, ventures into the house of the three bears and proceeds to explore its furnishings and contents. In sequence she tries out the three chairs at the dining table, the three plates of porridge, and the three beds. In each case she finds the Papa and the Mama versions not to her liking, and settles on the baby bear's chair, plate of porridge, and bed as more appropriate for her—as being "just right". As you may recall she is ultimately discovered fast asleep in bed by the baby bear. Not to leave the reader in suspense, Goldilocks escapes from the bears by leaping through a window.

At the time I did not fully grasp what Putnam meant by the Goldilocks metaphor. Was it his way of putting a common criticism of the Civic Culture study that it was conservative, smugly Anglo-American, and morally indifferent? That while its "balanced disparity" theory of political stability enabled a democracy to run cool and avoid intense and sustained conflict and breakdown, it also meant the postponement and moderation of political action intended to achieve social justice. Or was Putnam speaking from his current preoccupation with what he calls declining American social capital, the attrition of the American propensity for forming voluntary associations and in general the evidence of decline in the vibrancy of American civil society (1995)? Was it this that made the celebration of political coolness in the Civic Culture study seem particularly smug to Bob Putnam?

As a Goldilocks theory the Civic Culture theory was saying that to run well a democratic polity had to avoid becoming overheated on the one hand or apathetic or indifferent on the other—that it had to combine obedience and respect for authority with initiative and participation, and not too much of the one or of the other; that not all groups, interests and issues would ignite simultaneously, but that different groups, issues, and sectors of the electorate would become mobilized at different times, thus regulating the pressure on the political system. Putnam's Goldilocks metaphor is really an equilibrium theory, comparable to the economic theory of the market, a situation in which sellers and buyers reach a price at which the market is "cleared". We were specifying in civic culture theory a set of conditions under which political markets would clear when the price of responsive public policy was "just right".

The model of effective democratization which has come out of what Samuel Huntington has called the "third wave" of democratization has much in common with Putnam's Goldilocks model and tends to confirm the Civic Culture theory. Students of contemporary democratization have discovered in Nancy Bermeo's (1990, p. 360) words, that effective democratization rests on "the patience of the poor". In the same sense more than half a century ago the German Jewish exile, Adolf Lowe reflecting on British and German political experience, commented that we pay
the price of liberty by foregoing integral political demands and final resolutions, settling for half
or a quarter of a loaf, or simply keeping options open in hope of some future improvement
(1935). I would argue this morning that the theories of democratic transition of the last decade
with their step-by-step, hard-liner, soft-liner, gradualist--maximalist bargaining process was
foreshadowed in the Civic Culture study and in Harry Eckstein's theories more than three
decades ago.

Civic Culture theory is a democratic equilibrium theory, a theory that democratic stability
tends to be sustained when processes and propensities are in balance--when the heat of political
conflict does not exceed or fall below a given temperature range. I am prepared to accept
Putnam's characterization of the Civic Culture theory as a Goldilock's theory. I also share his
concern about the survival of the civic culture. I shall have more to say about this at the
Colloquium this afternoon.

The Civic Culture: Retrospect and Prospect
Department of Politics and Society Colloquium

In our communications about the topic I should address this afternoon, Harry Eckstein at one
point suggested "The Civic Culture in Retrospect." Retrospection comes easy to someone of my
generation. The older you get, the more vivid and precise your older memories become, and the
more blurred and spotty is your vision of the present. Let me give you some retrospect and a bit
of prospect as well.

The five years of our lives that Sid Verba and I spent in doing the Civic Culture study--
1957 to 1962--were the last years of the Eisenhower presidency and the Camelot years of the
Kennedy administration. They were a high point in American pride and glory. Our GIs had come
back from victory, educated themselves, raised families, bought homes, cars, dishwashers,
washing machines, and power mowers that disturbed the quiet of Sunday mornings. Their wives-
mothers of the baby boom--were homemakers mostly, and joined the PTAs and Leagues of
Women Voters. We were still basking in the afterglow of the victory in Europe; the Korean war
was fading from memory. We had an immensely productive economy; Europe and Asia had
recovered from the war's devastation, and our foreign policy and aid had much to do with this
recovery. We had wrestled our worst paranoid and persecutory impulses in the form of
McCarthyism to the ground, and were beginning to express our finer political impulses toward
coming to grips with our ethnic inequalities and injustices. The welfare state--an impulse toward
a broader social justice that came late to the United States--was beginning to be put in place.

It was this America that the Civic Culture captured--just as it captured the re-
Europeanized, low-keyed Germany of late Adenauer; the "I'm allright Jack" Great Britain of
McMillan; the culturally fragmented Italy of Gasperi; and Mexico during the prime of the PRI.
We could not have known at that time that we were capturing the Civic Culture at its peak, when
what we found in England and the United States did indeed look a bit like Goldilocks, with her
search for things that were "just right". But when we took a second sounding two decades later,
in the Civic Culture Revisited (Almond and Verba, 1980), it was already apparent that the bloom
was off America and Britain, that Germany seemed to be moving into Civic Culture territory,
that Italy had not changed much, and the PRI was no longer an inclusive coalition.

What we learned from the Civic Culture Revisited was that political culture is a plastic
many dimensioned variable, and that it responds quickly to structural change. It was not that
Verba and I failed to appreciate structural variables. Somewhere in the Civic Culture (in the
chapter on methodology) there is the observation that our study had to be viewed as a dated "snapshot". But we surely did not appreciate how quickly, and how steep the curves of change were going to be.

The play of structural change and of history on the attitudes making up the Civic Culture since we measured it in the late 1950s has been enormous and complex. For the political culture of the United States, Britain, Germany, and other advanced democracies to have remained unchanged would have been inconceivable. An impressive literature, charting these changes has emerged in the more than three decades that have elapsed since the Civic Culture appeared. Ronald Inglehart quite early (1971) forecast an emerging participatory populism and self involvement--which might undermine the "balanced disparities" of Harry Eckstein--among the generations born after World War II, suggesting how these cultural changes might destabilize and disarticulate political parties and electoral processes. He and his colleagues have charted these changes over time in three publications (1977, 1990, 1994) for what by 1994 had become forty countries, broadly distributed culturally and economically. His explanatory variables are economic development and increasing physical security. As the post-World War II generations experienced economic growth and military security, the values of self--realization and creative participation replaced the primacy of concern for material welfare and physical safety, as though by a process of marginal utilitarian calculation.

Samuel Barnes et al. (1979), and Russell Dalton et al. (1984, 1990, 1994) in an impressive series of studies of the transformation of the democratic infrastructure in the industrial democracies, explored a new world of unconventional political action, the rise of new movements, and of dealigned and realigned voters. This growing political spontaneity and disrespect for political convention, tradition and authority, this complication of "political space", surely was straining the norms of the Civic Culture.

While the work of Inglehart, Barnes, Dalton, and others raised serious questions about the survival of crucial components of the Civic Culture, the appearance of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work (1993), his longitudinal study of regional differences in Italian political culture, was a strong argument in support of the validity of political socialization theory, the importance of voluntary associations as a necessary condition of civic voluntarism, and economic entrepreneurship. However any optimism conveyed by Putnam's work, had to be questioned after the publication of his "Bowling Alone," which demonstrated a decline in social trust and "civic engagement" in America (Putnam, 1995). He comments,

In the established democracies, ironically, growing numbers of citizens are questioning the effectiveness of their public institutions at the very moment when liberal democracy has swept the battlefield, both ideologically and geopolitically. In America, at least, there is reason to suspect that this democratic disarray may be linked to a broad and continuing erosion of civic engagement that began a quarter century ago. High on our scholarly agenda should be the question of whether a comparable erosion of social capital may be under way in other advanced democracies, perhaps in different institutional and behavioral guises. High on America's agenda should be the question of how to reverse these adverse trends in social connectedness, thus restoring civic engagement and civic trust. (Putnam, 1995: --)

As causes of this decline in civic engagement Putnam cites the weakening of the family resulting from the movement of women into the labor force, as well as cultural changes such as the legitimation of birth control, abortion, and divorce. The family has become less effective in political socialization and the transmission of norms. A second major factor which he cites is the transformation of leisure by the electronic media. Television preempts going outside in the
interest of entertainment and edification. "We are now provided with 'virtual reality' helmets in
to be entertained and edified in isolation" (1995: 77)

The "two-step flow" of communication, discovered almost half a century ago by Elihu
Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld (1955) in which the impacts of the mass media are seen to be filtered
and moderated through discriminating and trusted "opinion leaders" (face-to-face contacts with
older, more experienced, "wiser" relatives, friends, local politicians, interest group leaders, and
the like) has given way to the power of electronic journalism, primarily of the populist variety.
Brilliantly celebrated by Tocqueville almost a century and a half ago, and become a cliche of
political science, the America of "voluntary associations" and of social trust seems to be
disappearing under our very eyes.

Surely the equilibrium assumptions of *Civic Culture* theory have been challenged by the
decline of broad aggregating partisanship, by disaffiliation and privatization, issue fragmentation
and polarization, electronic populism, and the attenuation of legitimacy accorded to
governmental agencies. Electoral turnout, partisan affiliation, and interest group membership all
have significantly declined, transforming the participant component of the civic culture.
Confidence in government and in public officials has declined even to a greater extent, reflecting
the spread of an alienated subject mentality. The *Civic Culture* rested on an "allegiant"subject
mentality, and a constrained and filtered "participant mentality".

In the substantial literature describing the ups and downs of political culture in the last
several decades, there has been a tendency to emphasize the explanatory power of domestic
social change--demographic change, economic growth and development, the spread of education
and the media, and changing social structure--as transforming political attitudes and processes. In
our characterization of the Civic Culture as a mixed political culture, we emphasized the
importance of the subject role, the willingness of citizens to be governed, to accord discretion to
political leaders, to accept power and authority as well as to participate in power and decisions.
Effective political decision is a mix of command and obedience. The literature describing
changes in the political culture of the advanced industrial societies in the decades since the 1960s
has emphasized domestic social change and its effects on participant patterns. There has been a
tendency to neglect changes in the international environment and their effects on governmental
authority and subject patterns.

The three decades that have transpired since the publication of the *Civic Culture* have
witnessed significant change in every aspect of social and international structure. To begin with
demography--the age and sex distribution of population, the rate of growth in population, its
regional distribution, urban concentration, and the like. The "baby bulge", the oversize cohorts
born in the 1946--55 decade and reaching adolescence in the early 1960s and 1970s, were one-
third again as large as the cohorts of the preceding decade, and were raised, guided, and role
modelled by the relatively thinner older cohorts. The younger males between the ages of 15 and
25 are by far the more frequent committers of crime, agents of innovation, disorder, dissent. The
rapid increase in the size of these cohorts helps explain the magnitude and violence of the anti-
Vietnam, pro-Civil Rights political protest of the later 1960s and 1970s, and the excesses of the
so-called cultural revolution, which have had a lasting impact on morals and values (Almond,
1977). The cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s set in motion a political polarization--a
mobilization of the "social right" in response to the civil rights, feminist, and sexual mobilization
on the left--a rising level of political antagonism threatening the balances and equilibria of the
civic culture.
A second change in social demography—this time in relation to gender—has produced a weakening of family ties as a consequence of the entry of women into higher education and into the labor force, the increase in the divorce rate, and the number of one parent and broken families. This in turn has had serious consequences for the role of the family in political socialization—the transmission of political affiliations, norms and ideologies, and skills.

Economic changes have also been of great significance in the transformation of political culture. The post industrial society of Daniel Bell (1973)—the rise of the tertiary sector, the decline of smoke-stack, hard hat industry—has transformed the class structure, weakening the power of trade unions and left-wing political parties, moving the center of political gravity to the right. The impact of industry on the environment—air, water, land, forest, animal species—has raised doubts about economic growth as unambiguous progress, and has divided politics by a new set of political issues and movements (Dalton, 1994).

A third set of structural changes results from the communication revolution. Television and radio have largely preempted the print media, and the primary opinion leaders, as we have suggested above. Domestic and international events are brought into the living room with powerful visual and emotional impact—a tele populism which constrains and distorts public policy. The deliberative processes of politics are diluted and heated by this populism, and by "instant" public opinion polls based on telephone samples. The media elites have acquired great and problematic powers as demonstrated by Verba in his studies of elite attitudes. He shows that American and other elites (including the media elites) believe that the media elites have "too much power" (Verba, 1985; 1987).

We can distinguish some four sets of political changes resulting from these structural changes. Two of these—partisan realignment and partisan dealignment—are response to changes in social structure and culture. A third is the rise of new social movements—both of the left and the right—resulting in partisan polarization and consequent difficulties in coalitions and policy making. The fourth is a set of anti-governmental tendencies—movements toward decentralization of authority, debureaucratization, deregulation, privatization, tax rebellion.

**Prospects for the Future**

All of the processes of social change of the last half century which are called upon to explain these political transformations are internal, domestic processes. They are indeed important parts of the explanation. But the international system as such does not enter into this explanation of changing political structure and culture, though the changes which have occurred are very substantial in the sense of cost in blood, treasure and in anguish. In the fifty years since the end of World War II we have moved into the increasingly tense bipolarity of the world of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Blockade, NATO, the Korean War; then into the tense confrontations of the 1960 and 1970s—the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War; then into the diplomacy of arms control and disarmament of the 1970s and early 1980s; and then the Glasnost and Perestroika of Gorbachev, the coup attempt, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s and the turn of the 1990s. We have moved from a WWII US--USSR alliance to a sustained tense bipolarity—to a sustained relatively stable bipolarity—and after the collapse of the Soviet Union to a kind of reluctant unipolarity.
Inglehart includes physical "security" as one of the two changes (the other is material prosperity) bringing about his post-material, post-modern political culture. But he operationalizes physical security as the absence of "total war" during the lifetimes of respondents (1977: 22). His physical security variable is dichotomous—total war or no total war. In actual fact the structure of the international system is a continuous variable. For about thirty five years the bipolar balance of the Cold War, while creating a sense of uneasy safety, also conveyed a justification for a vigilant state, armed to the teeth, militarily deployed and engaged with a powerful and cunning enemy around the world. Bipolarity took shape in the first decades; then stabilized; then in the 1980's a disengagement began. The large tax revenues and budget expenditures of the "Cold War" state, could provide a "piggyback" for the American "welfare state" just as it had done in Britain, France, Germany in earlier decades. In the sustained crisis of the Cold War a welfare net, and civil rights for the poor and for ethnic minorities, could be justified on the grounds of national security as well as justice. The Cold War sustained and legitimized the subject role in the political cultures of the advanced democracies. You needed government in order to be secure, and politics had to be kept under control to avoid division, and in order not to risk the loss of vigilance.

What happens when this bipolarity and delicate balance collapses through the resignation of one of the parties?

Let me spell out the possible implications for political culture of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the disappearance of the Cold War as the organizing principle of international relations. Theories have been around for quite some time as to how international politics affects domestic politics in general terms. At the turn of the 19th century, after a number of decades of accumulating historical information, sophisticated historians began to derive hypotheses from comparative historical analysis. Sir John Seeley (1886) of Cambridge and Otto Hintze (1975) of the University of Berlin, produced what I have referred to as the Seeley-Hintze law (1991: 268 ff.) of the interaction of international conflict and internal authoritarian centralization. Seeley put it elegantly, "It is reasonable therefore to conjecture that the degree of government will be directly proportional, and that means that the degree of liberty will be inversely proportional, to the degree of pressure....intense government is a reaction to intense pressure, or relaxed government is the effect of relaxed pressure." Hintze took this theory and tested it against European history of the 18th and 19th centuries.

With this theory it is possible to get from the powerful, centralized American government (the "imperial presidency") of the Cold War era to the post-Cold War era of the apologetic reinvention of government of the Clinton administration, and the demonization of government of the Gingrich "Contract with America." The relaxation of the Soviet--American confrontation is slowly working its way through transformations of the international political system--a mix of relatively weak multipolarity and reluctant unipolarity. A state no longer defending against a powerful, centralized nuclearized foe begins to lose some of its "necessity". There is an open season on vilifying a welfare state which had piggy backed on the security state. Government becomes a cuss word, bureaucracy an unmitigated evil.

What this suggests is that we can work causally from the international environment to domestic institutions and attitudes, and observe how they combine with, filter, or magnify these international tendencies. Or we can begin with technological change and observe how the rise of the tertiary sector and the information and communication revolutions have interacted with international structural changes to transform political culture. What I am stressing is that in our efforts to explain political cultural change, we need to be monitoring both the international and
the domestic structure and the ways in which these several processes interact. We have tended to take the international structure for granted, and the "subject part" of political culture as a given. It has taken the Gingrich revolution to show that there are tendencies in American political culture, which, in the absence of a clear cut international threat, are prepared to go quite far in disassembling the national state. The collapse of communism and the discrediting of macrosocialism has shifted the center of political gravity to the right, thus weakening support for a welfare net no longer justified by national security.

Thus, the balanced mix of the Civic Culture of loyal subject and consensual participatory elements celebrated in our book of 1963, begins to give way to an alienated subject combined with a form of participation weakened and demoralized by populism, extremism, and apathy. Students of the emerging political cultures of the modern democracies are going to have to ask anew what democratic equilibria are possible given these structural changes, now that the Civic Culture has had its day.

References


