When Mikhail Gorbachev announced his programs of glasnost and perestroika, the western response was one of skepticism. Gorbachev was regarded as a "master manipulator," a "drugstore cowboy" who could not be trusted. As an astounding and rapid succession of events unfolded in Eastern Europe, many at the instigation of Mr. Gorbachev, western analysts concluded that the Soviet Empire was crumbling. As the Soviet Union underwent its own internal transformations, western leaders not only wondered if Gorbachev could survive, many openly hoped that he would.

The speculation concerning this dizzying turn of events has centered on the new rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, of course, their respective allies. That rapprochement is illustrated by the numerous treaties and calls for reductions in nuclear and conventional arms, and even cuts in troop strength on both sides. As the dust settles, however, speculation has broadened as various nations and their more varied constituencies try to understand the benefits of the "great thaw." As important, however, is the mounting competition for a share of those benefits.

On both sides of the Cold War, prospective beneficiaries are sizing up their slices of the "peace dividend." The speculation is that less tension between the super powers means less need for the arms race. A reduction in the arms race implies the need to spend less on the military. In some circles in both the Soviet Union and the United States, the speculation is that reductions in military expenditures automatically mean that there will be more funds for domestic programs; some even believe that there might be additional funds available for foreign aid.

In the glow of such possibilities, there was even conjecture that some rationality might be brought to foreign policy, especially as it related to the Third World, and in particular as it might have an impact on Africa. According to Haskell Ward:

African criticism of American policies toward the continent . . . widespread and deep . . . reflected . . . a particular and profound sense of disappointment with the African policies of the Reagan era. . . . [R]elations between the United States and Africa are at
their lowest levels in Africa's post-independence period. . . . The dramatic reshaping of this country's relationship with the Soviet Union and the consequent easing of East-West tensions provides for the first time in almost four decades a real window of opportunity for a new era in Africa's relationship with the outside world, as well as an easing of externally supported tensions within the continent. . . . [W]e may be looking at a period when assistance to Africa can be seen to be in the interests of the whole world.1

Ward goes on to suggest that the reduction of East-West tensions should allow the U. S. to see the South African situation for what it really is and, therefore, "remove a major source of antagonism between Africa and the U. S."2 These expectations in many ways are not unfounded. Crawford Young, reflecting on twenty-five years of U. S. policy towards Africa in 1984, suggests that that policy was shaped in a "triangular arena": the U. S., Africa, and the Soviet Union.3 So it seems only logical that the reduction of tensions between the Soviet Union and the U. S. would mean change in the way each of the major powers carry out their Africa policy, and in fact, it does.

However, all the indications are that the reshaping of policy is not, and will not be characterized by the expansive largesse that such terms like the peace dividend imply. To understand this, the conditions which have brought about the "thaw" need to be examined. Since the close of World War II, a consistent position among U. S. cold warriors was the proposition that the Soviet Union could be brought to its knees through increased U. S. military growth in all sectors. The idea was that the Soviet economy, unable to keep pace with a more dynamic U. S. economy, would collapse under the burden of attempting to match U. S. military procurement. In fact, a number of analysts, reviewing the events of the last twelve months or so, would argue that such a phenomenon took place in the Eastern bloc and that it signifies the "triumph of capitalism." However, what appears as only side-bar commentary is the effect that the military escalation had on the U. S. economy. From the economic standpoint, it is the malaise of these two economies, the Soviet Union in need of a total economic overhaul and the United States as the mortgagor of its own future, which now fundamentally affects domestic and foreign policy decisions. While it has never been otherwise, now such an analysis should be painfully clear—especially for those who expect to be beneficiaries of the new rapprochement.

With all this in mind, the March 1990 conference on U. S.-Soviet Policy on Southern Africa and the African Response, sponsored by the Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES) and the
American Friends Service Committee at Nyanga, Zimbabwe, provides an appropriate context for the analysis of these events as they relate to Southern Africa. In the past, discussions of U. S.-Soviet policy as it related to Africa have been confined to exclusive meetings of Americans and Soviets determining what they thought might be best for the continent; usually in separate deliberations, but now, increasingly more so, in tandem. That African intellectuals and policy makers should take the initiative to intervene in this process is significant and signals both the urgency and the strength which characterizes African intellectuals and the issues themselves. The analysis which appears here uses this context to discuss the nature of the shift in U. S.-Soviet policy toward Southern Africa, to gauge African reactions to that shift, and to assess the opportunities that this global realignment might present for African initiatives at various levels.

The Policy Shifts

There is a certain irony in describing the Soviet policy of the "New Political Thinking" as the driving force for new political thinking throughout the world. This is true especially in light of internal developments within the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. However, the work of Soviet analysts may be the only way in which we may get a sense of the current dynamics of the new Commonwealth and the potential foreign policy of its members. The "new thinking" was the catalyst for a critical reassessment as well.

The basic elements of the "new thinking" have been categorized by a Soviet willingness to move away from a rigid globalist approach to foreign policy. This move, it has been argued, was intended to promote a relaxation of tensions between the Soviets and the United States. Prompted by the view that "universal human values" would be given "unconditional priority" over those of regions, individual states, or groups of states, the Soviet Union moved to define the content of the "new thinking." The definition began with its admission of the fear that regional conflicts, without regard for their legitimacy, might in fact spill over their boundaries. Such a danger needed to be contextualized within the much larger framework of global nuclear threat.

This prompted some Soviet strategists to reject the concept of a "world struggle against the West" and to opt for cooperation between the superpowers to create conditions for the peaceful settlement of regional crises and, therefore, the establishment of world stability. Explicit in this thinking was the Soviet rejection of armed conflict
because of the potential it possessed for destabilizing what the "new thinking" had defined as the world's precarious nuclear balance.  

There are other rationales concerning the "new thinking" that are not quite as humanitarian. They reflect both the external and internal dynamics of policy formation. In the international arena, one of the arguments made concerning the new formation was predicated on the position of the Soviet Union as a world power. The implication is that given the context for a possible nuclear holocaust, the Soviet Union was simply responding as a world power should. The "new thinking" reflected its obligation as a world power "to do the right thing."

Analysts who were not quite so charitable argued that this shift in policy was indicative of the decline of the Soviet Union as a world power. Glasnost and perestroika were simply illustrative of this fact. Rather than continue as the standard bearer of "world revolution," the U. S. R. opted to seek an ostensibly vaulted position within the "European Home" with the intention of becoming a European power and, therefore, "a respectable world capitalist market." In this light, it was argued that the Soviet Union would become a "normal" state.

Following this argument is the assessment that the Soviet Union has never been a super power in the conventional sense. While the Soviets had been able to further their foreign policy by dint of the state's military prowess, this seemed to be the only tool open to them in the international setting and as such it was not self-sustaining. In fact, the preponderance of the military option was such that the basic assumptions about Soviet aid were based solely on the idea of the shipment of arms rather than any other goods, and certainly, and most exclusively, in lieu of money. In that regard, arms, in effect, were the principal source of capital for the Soviet economy. They represented the one thing that the Soviets did well, and the one thing that Soviet clients desired.

In economic terms the Soviets were of little significance to their Third World clients. The resources necessary to help those clients in realizing their own economic development were virtually nonexistent and the mandates of the "new thinking" illustrated the priorities to which the Soviet Union's limited resources were to be directed. "Domestic realities" could no longer be ignored; the Soviets were experiencing problems at home which demanded economies in the international sphere. The inability to sustain its foreign policy caused a number of its clients to turn to the West; some with the imprimatur of the Soviets themselves. Within this framework, the structural weaknesses of the Soviet state were revealed and historically traced to its birth. The implications of those weaknesses were that it was simply a matter of time before the Soviet economic house of cards fell and with it any semblance of world power.
The conclusion drawn here by erstwhile friends and foes alike was that there was "in practice, only one super power," and the Soviet Union, in many eyes, had acquiesced to the United States. Given the turn of events surrounding this Soviet "compliance" in international affairs, some estimation of the U.S. response to these catalytic events seems necessary. It has been offered that for twenty-five years or more, U.S. policy towards Africa has remained virtually unchanged. In spite of Republican or Democratic, liberal or conservative administration, there was a consistency to the policy that was provided by Cold War analyses.

Even in the opening days of the Bush Administration, there has been a reluctance to view the Soviet "new thinking" as a "window of opportunity" for the restructuring of U.S. foreign policy as a whole, let alone the question of U.S. relations with Africa. Yet, by the same token, Soviet support has been essential in the realization of two of America's most critical policy successes in Southern Africa. Angola and Namibia were regarded as an "important testing ground" for U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Analysts from all three camps (American, Soviet, and African) see them as such. The American policy regarding Angola and Namibia is taken by some as merely sophisticated wrinkles in an old dictum refined by Henry Kissinger in National Security Study Memorandum 39 and given new packaging by Chester Crocker's "Constructive Engagement." While the American position remained basically unchanged, it and the Soviet position concerning Angola and Namibia became virtually synonymous. Both positions placed the onus of cooperation on the Soviet Union. It might be argued that the more the Soviet position changed, the more the U.S. position remained the same.

The African Reaction

The African critique of Soviet and American policies in the post-Cold War era sees these events as the culmination of American Cold War diplomacy. The critique is propelled, in part, by a historical vision of the Soviet Union as an ally, if not the champion, of the oppressed. Soviet support of national struggles for self determination was among the most consistent of its ideological canons. It was within that context that the Soviet Union helped to create space for the initiatives of the Third World through its opposition to Western imperialism. That opposition came to represent the linkage between world socialism and struggles for national liberation.
From the African perspective, the Soviet Union's abdication of its international position has given the United States its way in the "arrogant" and increasingly "violent" enforcement of its foreign policy. In the course of an extremely short period of time they point to the intensification of U. S. aggression in Grenada, Libya, Panama, and Iraq. In this light, the propositions of the "new thinking" are indicative of the Soviets' inability to restrain the excesses of what Africans term "intervention without purpose." 

The Soviets are cognizant of the fact that their "retreat" is being defined within some African circles as "abandonment" and in others as outright "betrayal." The movement "away from revolutionary activism" and the seeming embrace of, or capitulation to, American foreign policy aims, have also brought charges of collusion as well. The United States, with the Soviet Union as junior partner, is presiding over a new U. S./Soviet condominium, where the balance of power is clearly in favor of the U. S.

The issue of collusion is exacerbated by the Soviet rationale of African inadequacy in the quest for world socialism. In many ways the Soviet argument plays like a new version of the "white man's burden" and the impossibility of African development given the rigors and sacrifices of the socialist experiment. Within this context, those African leaders who most cherished the cause of socialism were defined by Soviet theorists as naive; naive for believing that Africa might even approach socialism. From this vantage Soviet theorists suggested that Africans might consider a less strenuous route: accommodation with capitalism. Curiously enough, the new Soviet position, Africans argued, showed little difference from the old American one.

In many ways, African thinkers see the Soviet rationale as a mirror of Soviet inadequacies which lends itself to Western arguments of the failure of socialism in general, and in Africa in particular. The "new thinkers" constructed policy within the framework of the same Euro-American setting that they once opposed as "imperialist."

Resultant Policy re: South Africa

With that realization, U. S. policy towards Africa in the post-Cold War era is more of the same. The Kissinger/Crocker "the-whites-are-here-to-stay/Constructive-Engagement" equation that has characterized almost two decades of U. S. policy formation seems to be bearing fruit with a vengeance. Africans argue that with the Soviet accommodation of the U. S. policy the basic tenets of the struggle for the liberation of South Africa were being compromised. The
prescriptions of the Freedom Charter and the concept of the unitary state became more endangered as the Soviets encouraged the idea of a "peaceful constitutional settlement." From the African side comes the question of "settlement at what price?"

The price of settlement included an attenuated argument of NSSM 39: minority rights. The Soviet interpretation of "the whites are here to stay" motif is the idea that white South Africans are incumbent to the progress of South Africa; that post-apartheid South Africa cannot exist without their presence, and the presence cannot be insured without certain guarantees. For Africans, those guarantees are ominously familiar; they bring remembrances of Lancaster House, Nkomati, Lusaka, and any other agreement that looked to the extension of white domination over the region.

In a much more principled fashion, the notion of "settlement" along these lines brings African aspirations of "non-racial, unitary" states back to their antithesis: a progression from the racially federated state to the ethnically balkanized majority to the grand apartheid scheme of "a homeland for all." At stake here is the right of the majority to rule without regard for the composition of that majority.

The Soviets argued that they came to their support for the rights of the minority after a long introspective and historical analysis of their own situation and the consequences of ethnic strife in the Soviet Union. In what might be regarded in some circles as an apologia for apartheid, Soviet theorists spoke of "apartheid brought to the extreme . . . Stalinism." They cautioned Africans not to take the simplistic view but to try to understand the complexity of their own situation.

What the Soviets seemed to be implying is that in many ways they empathized, and even identified, with reformist South Africa; after all, they were instituting their own reforms as well. What also may be interpreted here is the idea that apartheid is "reformable." The African perception of these arguments and their emotional and historical underpinnings is that the Soviets, like the Americans, were far more interested in accommodating white South Africa in the new post-Cold War political economy than in serving the justice of the South African situation.

Soviet accommodation of white South Africa is spoken of as a key component of the "new thinking" as it relates to Africa, so much so that the Soviets were willing to declare that the "new thinking," glasnost and perestroika, and their chief architect were integral to the process: "the U. S. S. R. under President Mikhail Gorbachev is less threatening to white South Africa." If this is the case, then what might this mean for black South Africa?

It seemed to mean that black South Africans could no longer expect to have their case pressed by the Soviets or anyone else simply
because they have been oppressed. The International Community as represented by the Soviet Union and the United States would also judiciously weigh the interests of the oppressor as well. This position became clear when Soviet theorists argued that the African National Congress was not the only player that the Soviets had to acknowledge. It implied that the ANC's currency with the U. S. S. R. and, therefore, with the other major international parties, had been devalued. It made the ANC, in some instances, an equal among lessers. The bottom line is that it made the ANC, and by this reasoning, all other progressive forces, more pliable to international demand—the demands of the great Euro-American Home of which the Soviets so desperately desired to be members in good standing. It was the way to make those forces deal with the "reality" that there must and will be negotiations.

This would seem to imply that there will be a great deal of hard bargaining in the days to come. And the speculations will continue over the nature of a "negotiated settlement." The expectations of the Americans seem fairly clear; those of the Soviets were less so. Was South Africa worth giving the Soviets stature and access to world markets? Was the appeasement of white South Africa designed to position the Soviets in a favored trading status? Could all of these things be achieved within the framework of the Soviet Union honoring existing commitments? Or had the South African scenario really changed? Are there more "real" players now, and must their needs and aspirations be acknowledged as decisions and hammered out?

The Soviets were quick to say that these are decisions that must be made by South Africans. Yet the framework in which South Africans are to decide has already been delineated by outside parties. Within the context of some "new thinkers," the South African situation is no longer the cut and dry, black and white dichotomy against the backdrop of the internationalist's opposition to imperialism. There are internal dynamics here, they would argue, that can only be settled by internal parties. The best the Soviet Union could hope to do, with the aid of its new (renewed?) international partner, the United States, was to offer its good services in the act of mediation and advise the concerned parties, especially those to whom it is closest, on how they might/must proceed to alleviate what may be construed as one of the potentially dangerous situations in the world.

The Peace Dividend

And what of the "peace dividend"? That might be construed in two ways. The first answer is that there never was a peace dividend. A
hard look at the economies of the Soviet Union and the United States made that fairly clear. The basis of Soviet retrenchment in terms of foreign policy was economic. As its policy makers stated, the U. S. S. R. had to address itself to its internal problems, chief among which was an economy debilitated by a foreign policy which had been driven by military procurement.

For the United States, the issue is the same, but possibly only more complex. Clearly one of the reasons for the flagging U. S. economy is the past decade of profligate military spending predicated on the proposition that the U. S. could outspend the Soviets until the Soviet economy was decimated. At the time, no one among the architects of this policy speculated that this might have the same effect on the American economy. When the trends created by absurd military spending were coupled with the biggest budget deficit in history, the largest negative trade balance ever to occur, the savings and loan debacle, and a crumbling national infrastructure, the bankruptcy of major metropolitan centers and inadequacies in every significant social service sector from health, education, and children through housing, it must be clear that foreign aid must stand at the rear of the line. This must be underlined when key politicians openly speak of reducing aid to Israel.

The other way of viewing the peace dividend is to use the unfolding scenario in South Africa as an example. If the post-Cold War cooperation which characterized the Soviet-American rapprochement was to bring about the proposed negotiated settlement, then the dividends of that peace will accrue to the united States and the new republics of the former Soviet Union, in disparate proportion respectively.

Given that those republics and their commonwealth have no blueprint for an Africa policy the nature of Soviet deliberation and post-Soviet realities become a crucial guide to what a prospective policy might be. Some of the same problems which plagued the Soviet Union now plague the states of the Commonwealth, in many instances to a greater degree. In that regard, it can be speculated that those dynamics will still remain key to the formation of Africa policy, and specifically the issues facing Southern Africa, by the states of the Commonwealth.

NOTES

2 Ibid., p. 7.
goes on to say that the shaping of Africa policy "has never been an autonomous policy field."

The importance of this meeting should not be lost for the reader. The conference marked the first time that policy makers from both the U. S. and the Soviet Union had been obliged, not only to sit with Southern Africans as a unified grouping, but also to entertain their questions and their criticism concerning the fundamental tenants by which both parties formed their policy conclusions as they related to the region. It was an indication, if even in a minor way, of the growing insistence of African actors to be included in the process, and to that degree it is of great significance.


One of the cautions that must be offered here is that the Soviet foreign policy establishment is not monolithic as far as the "new thinking" is concerned. Pallo Jordan has offered a cogent assessment of the camps which make up the Soviet policy apparatus. He divides them into three groups:

1) globalists, who urge joint Soviet/US cooperation in solving the world's problems;

2) regionalists, who argue that Soviet policy on Africa is derived from faulty information and who also believe that the importance and impact of external forces on the region must be de-emphasized. They, however, would join the globalists in supporting joint US/Soviet action;

3) internationalists, who believe that policy should be guided by opposition to world capitalism which undergirds the "intrinsic instability of Third World countries."


Boris Asoyan, "Russia and South Africa," *International Affairs*, December 1989, 42. Asoyan goes on to remind us that the idea of "one person, one vote is not a Soviet provision within the South African context.


MacFarlane writes that the Soviets "have gone well beyond the ANC position in their willingness to address the fears of the white community." See MacFarlane, *Op. Cit.*, 83.

Tikhomirov has gone so far as to write that the ANC is not the "only true representative of the people of South Africa." *Ibid.*, 58-60.