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URBAN GOVERNANCE AT THE NATIONALIST DIVIDE: COPING WITH GROUP-BASED CLAIMS

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ABSTRACT: *This article examines how urbanism and local governance address group differences in cities of nationalistic conflict. I investigate four settings—Basque Country and Barcelona (Spain) and Sarajevo and Mostar (Bosnia-Herzegovina)—that have experienced intergroup conflict, war, and major societal transformations. Findings come primarily from over 100 interviews with urban professionals (both governmental and nongovernmental), community officials, academics, and political leaders in these cities. I find that urban areas can constitute unique and essential peace-building resources that can be used to transcend nationalist divides. Urban interventions aimed at creating inter-group coexistence can play distinct roles in societal peace building and constitute a bottom-up approach that supplements and catalyzes top-down diplomatic peace-making efforts. I discuss why some cities play a progressive role in shaping new societal paths while others do not, how this peace-constitutive city function is actualized, and how this type of urbanism can be misplaced or neglected.*

Intercommunal conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or nationalist fractures are intensifying elements of life in many cities in the world. In this article, I examine the power and limitations of urban governance and planning strategies in helping to address tensions that arise in multinational societies. The research reports on case studies of four urban regions in Spain and Bosnia, each of which has had to address deep group-based fragmentation as part of a societal transformation process. I will discuss the specific characteristics of these cases in Barcelona, Basque Country, Sarajevo, and Mostar and what each illustrates about the nature of the relationship between urbanism and nationalist conflict. I close the essay by advancing generalizable conclusions based on the commonalities and patterns found across the case studies.

The city is important in peace building because it is in the streets and neighborhoods of urban agglomerations that there is the negotiation over, and clarification of, abstract concepts such as democracy, fairness, and tolerance. Debates over proposed projects and discussion of physical place provide opportunities to anchor and negotiate dissonant meanings in societies hosting antagonistic ethnic groups; indeed, there are few opportunities outside debates over urban life where these antagonistic impulses take such concrete forms in need of pragmatic negotiation. As microcosms of broader societal fault-lines and tensions affecting a nation, cities are laboratories within which progressive intergroup strategies may be attempted and evaluated. I do not argue that

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the ultimate causes of intergroup conflict lie in cities; those causes lie in historic, religious, and territorial claims and counter-claims. What I do argue is that the most immediate and existential foundations of intergroup conflict frequently lie in daily life and across local ethnic divides and, importantly, that it is at this microlevel that intergroup tensions are most amenable to meaningful and practical strategies aimed at their amelioration.

MULTINATIONAL CITIES

A worrying number of cities across the world are prone to intense conflict owing to ethnic or nationalist differences. In these cities and societies, ethnic identity¹ and nationalism² combine to create pressures for group rights, autonomy, or even territorial separation. Such politicized multiculturalism constitutes a “challenge to the ethical settlement of the city (Keith, 2005, p. 8). The political control of multinational cities is often contested as nationalists push to create a political system that expresses and protects their distinctive group characteristics. Whereas in most cities there is a belief maintained by all groups that the existing system of governance is capable of producing fair outcomes, governance amidst severe and unresolved multicultural differences is viewed by at least one identifiable group in the city as artificial, imposed, or illegitimate.

Cities such as Jerusalem, Belfast, Johannesburg, Nicosia, Montreal, Algiers, Mumbai (Bombay), Beirut, Brussels, and now Baghdad are urban arenas prone to inter-group tension and even violence associated with ethnic or political differences. In cases such as Jerusalem, Belfast, and Baghdad, the city is a focal point or magnet for unresolved nationalistic ethnic conflict. In other cases (such as certain Indian or British cities), a city is not the primary cause of intergroup conflict, but becomes a platform for the expression of conflicting sovereignty claims involving areas outside the urban region or for tensions related to foreign immigration. In cases such as Johannesburg and Beirut, the management of cities holds the key to sustainable coexistence of antagonistic ethnic groups subsequent to cessation of overt hostilities. In other cities such as Brussels and Montreal, there have been effective efforts to defuse nationalistic conflict through power-sharing governance and accommodation to group cultural and linguistic differences.

As we witness changes in the scale of world conflict from international to intrastate, urban centers of ethnic proximity and diversity assume increased salience to those studying and seeking to resolve contemporary conflict. Increasingly, cities are the arenas within which decision-makers face multiple and unprecedented social challenges connected to group identity-based claims and immigration. Governance at urban, metropolitan, and regional levels appears increasingly to be key pivots in our attempts to address issues of ethnic coexistence, interaction, and democracy within a globalizing world. The challenges of immigration, cultural diversity, and intergroup coexistence hit at the local level first, challenging current ideas and methods of governance, planning, and policy (Sandercock, 1998). What happens in cities—in terms of their political organization, immigration policies, and economic structures—has considerable effects on the nature of the globalization process itself (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Sassen 1991, 2000; Scott, 1998).

There exist national political reform strategies that seek to accommodate the aspirations of different ethnic groups, such as local and regional autonomy, federalism, decentralization, power sharing autonomy and federalism (Ghai, 2000). Whereas such political restructuring seems essential to peacemaking in troubled societies, it usually is the result of top-down, elite agreements at the political level. In contrast, urban and regional policy strategies are more capable than national accords of addressing the complex spatial and social-psychological attributes of intergroup relations. The promise of cities is that they constitute “privileged places for democratic innovation” (Borja & Castells, 1997, p. 246). As such, they are locations where multinational divisions can be addressed in practical and constructive ways.


The challenge of how states and cities in the world that are liberal or based on the value of individual rights can acknowledge the group presence is a problematic one (Weisbrod, 2002). The debate over the effects of group identity politics within democratic societies—and whether group affiliation impedes or facilitates democratic expression—is ongoing (Gutmann, 2003; Young, 1990). Many experts allude to a balance that is needed between group and individual rights. Young (2000, p. 7, 9) views group-based aspirations and expressions as a valuable political resource that appropriately pluralizes discourse. She sees value in a “differentiated solidarity,” where universal and individual-based justice is combined with neighborhood- and community-based participatory institutions differentiated by group identities. Similarly, Rex (1996, p. 2) suggests a “democratic or egalitarian multiculturalism” that couples recognition of cultural diversity with the promotion of equality of individuals. Borja and Castells (1997) assert that city residents’ ability to maintain their distinct cultural identities stimulates a sense of belonging that is needed amidst globalization. In the planning literature specifically, the key to some observers is for urban planners to become more attuned to group identity as a criterion within planning processes and decisions (Neill, 2004; Sandercock, 1998). For others, the critical objective is for planners to transcend and overcome urban and societal divisions (Marcuse & van Kempen, 2002).

STUDYING CITIES IN UNSETTLED CONTEXTS

I investigate four cases, two in Spain (Basque Country and Barcelona) and two in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sarajevo and Mostar). The cases examine the role of urbanism in a society with a 25-year record of regional autonomy (post-Franco Spain) and in a society immersed in reconstruction after war (post-1995 Bosnia). Both countries have experienced major societal transformations and present opportunities to study how urbanism has sought during these periods of political reordering to address the significant and potentially debilitating differences that existed between identifiable nationality groups. In Bosnia’s case, these schisms exist between the three antagonistic nationality groups of Bosniak (Muslim), Croat, and Serb; in Spain’s case, between those that argue for greater regional autonomy in places like Catalonia or Pais Vasco and those that favor a more centralized Spanish state anchored in Madrid.

I locate each of the four case study areas in Figure 1 along a continuum based on the nature and stage of societal conflict. I place the cities along this scale depending upon whether the city is experiencing active conflict, a suspended condition of static nonviolence, movement toward peace, or urban stability/normalcy. Examining cities along such a continuum provides insight into the roles and limitations of possible interventions by city governing regimes amidst differing conditions of inter-group difference. It enables us to think about the differences across types of contested cities and what these differences mean for urban intervention and national peacemaking.³ The continuum is not intended to be a comprehensive measuring tool but rather a useful heuristic model. In placing cities along the continuum, I focus on a sole overriding criterion among multiple urban dimensions—the degree that active inter-group conflict over root political issues has been effectively addressed. Similar to the way that the United Nations tracks countries in terms of their human development, cities may be classifiable in terms of their vulnerability to conflict (UNDP, 2002).⁴ Positioning the case study cities conceptually along this continuum allows me to induce from the specifics of the cases a set of broader implications for the ability of cities to be local contributors to societal peace building. To provide greater depth to this comparative framework to the reader, cities that I investigated in earlier research are situated along the bottom of the figure.⁵

In Spain, the 1978 Spanish Constitution created a quasi-federalism whereby powers are shared between the central government and the governments of 17 autonomous communities (*comunidades autonomas*), two of which govern the Basque Country (*Pais Vasco*) and the region of Catalonia. After Franco’s death in 1975 and the end of his more than 35 years of authoritarian rule,

**FIGURE 1****Case Study Cities on a Conflict—Stability Continuum**

Source: Urban regions from earlier research placed along bottom row.

a broad political consensus during the political transition emerged that resulted in the drafting of the 1978 Constitution. This process created a state balanced between two views: (1) the idea of an indivisible Spanish nation-state, and (2) Spain as an ensemble of diverse people, historic nations, and regions (Moreno, 1997).⁶ Regional governments in Spain have considerable responsibility for health care, education, urban planning, social services, and cultural activities. Each has its own legislature, political institutions, bureaucracies, public services, some financial autonomy, and in the case of the Basque Country, its own police force.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), an independent state formed out of the hell and trauma of the 1992–1995 Bosnian War, is attempting, with strong United Nations oversight, to recreate itself as a loose confederation of two entities—one Muslim and Croat, the other Serb—whose boundaries were created largely by war and ethnic cleansing. The Bosnian War killed 260,000 people and forced half the country's 4 million people to flee their homes to friendlier locales within the state (1 million people “internally displaced”) or to other countries entirely (1 million “refugees”). Ten years after the war, BiH lags behind in undertaking a fuller transition agenda addressing human and economic development (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). Dealing with the aftermath of war remains a primary occupation of the international community. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for BiH remained in 2003 below half its prewar level, GDP per capita in 2002 stood at a paltry \$1,800, and the country has developed a chronic dependence on international assistance. The Dayton Accords (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina) signed in 1995 provided for the continuity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state but created two constituent entities of ethnically separated populations—a Muslim-Croat Federation on 51% of the land, and a Bosnian Serb republic on 49% of the land (Burg & Shoup, 1999).

These two countries have experienced differing trajectories along the path of democratization outlined by Rustow (1970) and Sorensen (1998). In Spain and former Yugoslavia (Bosnia), the first phase of nondemocratic regime breakdown occurred when their authoritarian leaders died (Franco in 1975; Tito in 1980). In a second phase, there is the beginning of the establishment of a democratic order. In Spain, this took place between 1975 and 1979, ending with the popular approval of regional autonomy statutes. In Yugoslavia, the period from 1980 to 1992 was a false start for this second phase as efforts to democratize and restructure the country unraveled into the 1992–1995 wars. Since 1995, under international community supervision, this phase



FIGURE 2

Spain and Its Regions

Source: Preston, P. (1993). *Franco: A biography*. London: HarperCollins.

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of creating democracy has restarted. In the third phase of democratization, a new democracy is further developed and consolidated and democracy becomes ingrained in the political culture. Democratic consolidation and maturation has occurred in Spain since the 1980s, while in Bosnia it is arguable whether it has yet begun 10 years after the end of war.

The compelling similarity between the Bosnian and Spanish cities is that each has been forced to address group-based claims during periods of political uncertainty. Both during and subsequent to a society's reconstitution, it becomes essential that local government address nationalistic tensions that have been a central part of a society's traumatic story. I believe that such extreme circumstances born out of necessity reveal ordinary truths about the capacity and limitations of urbanism and local governance; that these unsettled urban contexts illuminate the basic relationships between urban policy and political power far better than in more mature, settled contexts when these relationships become obfuscated and of greater complexity. I seek to fill gaps in the study of conflict by focusing on the *local* dynamics and outcomes of efforts to reconstitute substate societies and cities. A city focus enables a finer-tuned analysis of the practical, on-the-ground dimensions of building peace. Emphasis on the local arena promises a level of grounded specificity not found in studies of national-level constitutional and political reform (such as found in G-Gagnon & Tully, 2001; Lapidoth, 1996; Lijphart, 1968; Newman, 1996; Nordlinger, 1972; O'Leary & McGarry, 1995).

A project studying this complex and multifaceted topic must use an interdisciplinary approach. I use the insights of political science to examine the political and legal arrangements



FIGURE 3

Bosnia and the Dayton Accord Boundaries

Source: Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S. (1999). *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic conflict and international intervention*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

and mechanisms used to diffuse or moderate conflict. I use knowledge of urban and regional planning to study policies affecting local and metropolitan settlement patterns, the perspective provided by geography to explore the spatial and territorial aspects of conflict and its management, and the social psychology literature to deepen the analysis of group identity and how urban attributes that may facilitate or obstruct aggression.

The main research tool was the face-to-face interview, which I used to obtain objective information and to construct a grounded, ethnographic account of urban management amidst societal reconstruction and political strife. I interviewed, primarily during the period from April 2003 to July 2004, 109 political leaders, planners, architects, community representatives, and academics (see Table 1). I was interested in the complex objective realities and influences in these cities, as well as in how the interviewees make sense of their everyday activities, professional roles, and organizational environment. I sought to understand the organizational, cultural, and historical context within which governmental and nongovernmental professionals operate. I developed core interview lists, based on my primary field contacts, prior to the in-field research portion of the project.⁷ I identified additional interviewees after arrival based upon word-of-mouth referrals

TABLE 1**Interviews Conducted**

City	Interviews	Dates of Visits
Barcelona	55**	April 2003, August 2003–July 2004
Basque Country	15	February 2004
Sarajevo	17	October 1999, April 2003, November 2003
Mostar	22	April 2002, November 2003, and May 2004
Total	109	

**Barcelona was my “home” for about 75% of the 10.5 month sabbatical August 2003 through July 2004. The three other case study visits each ranged from 10 to 15 workdays in duration.

from initial discussions and through local media. Interviews lasted 75 minutes, on average and about 90% of them were audio-taped. In about 10% of the cases, I used a translator to facilitate discussion. Interviews were transcribed and input into a qualitative software program that helped me to document themes and portrayals that connected across multiple interviewees, and also to note multiple, contrary interpretations or ones specific to particular types of interviewees. I used noninterview data sources in order to strengthen research validity and to “reality-check” interviewees’ assertions. I investigated published and unpublished government plans and policy documents, political party platforms and initiatives, implementing regulations, and laws and enabling statutes in terms of how they address intergroup difference. I employed quantitative data concerning growth and housing trends and budgetary spending to supplement interview-based findings.

I used urban planning as the main analytical lens. I did this because the planning function of government, through its direct and tangible effects on ethnic geography, can clearly reveal the intent and role of a governing regime.⁸

I use the terms “urban planner” and “urbanist” in a way that broadly encompasses all individuals (within and outside government) involved in the anticipation of a city’s or urban community’s future and preparation for it.⁹ The category includes, within government, town and regional planners, urban administrators and policymakers, and national and regional-level urban policy officials. Outside government, it includes community leaders, project directors, and staff within nongovernmental, community, or voluntary sector organizations, scholars in urban and ethnic studies, and business leaders.

I focused on urban policies that have direct and tangible impacts on local areas. These include land use planning, real estate development, economic development, reconstruction, housing construction and allocation, refugee relocation, capital facility planning, social service delivery, community planning and participation, and municipal government organization. These policies affect four specific types of conditions—territoriality, economic distribution, policymaking access, and group identity—that exacerbate or moderate intergroup tension (Burton, 1990; Gurr, 1993; Murphy, 1989; Sack, 1986; Stanovcic, 1992):

Territoriality/control over land: Settlement of vacant lands; control of settlement patterns; dispossession from land; return and relocation of displaced and refugee populations; control of land ownership; demarcation of planning and jurisdictional boundaries vis-à-vis ethnic settlement patterns.

Distribution of economic benefits and costs: Magnitude and geographic distribution of urban services and spending; allocation of negative and positive “externalities” of urbanization.

Access to policy making: Inclusion or exclusion from political process; formal and informal participation processes; presence and influence of nongovernmental organizations.

Group identity: Maintenance or threat to collective ethnic rights and identity; education, language, religious expression, cultural institutions.

BARCELONA

Barcelona is the second largest city in Spain. Its region—Catalonia—has a distinct historically rooted regional identity, symbolized by the presence of the regional legislature and executive (the “Generalitat”), and reinforced through the area’s use of the Catalan language. The city contains approximately 1.5 million people (about one-third the population of the metropolitan region). The ambitious city projects and strategies of Barcelona over the past two decades commonly serve as a reference point for other European cities seeking greater opportunities amidst the restructuring of European governance (Le Gales, 2002).

The other side of Barcelona is that it has been a site of enduring conflict between a regionalist Catalan nationalism and a centralist Spanish nationalism. The city and the Catalonia region constituted a focus of Republican strength in the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939 fighting against Franco’s Nationalists, and Catalan nationalism faced strong political, cultural, and linguistic suppression during Franco’s long tenure. From the transition to democracy in the 1970s until today, Catalan nationalism has been a key political force in the region and a constant part of debates between the Spanish state and the Generalitat. The urban area contains in many respects two different identity groups. Almost one-half (44.7%) of survey respondents in the urban region feel “more Catalan than Spanish” or “purely Catalan,” while 18.3% feel more Spanish than Catalan or purely Spanish in identity (Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans, 2002, p. 413). There is also spatial segregation between those who are ethnically Catalan and the population of immigrants from elsewhere in Spain (and their offspring),¹⁰ the latter group residing disproportionately in the first suburban ring outside the city of Barcelona.

Inclusive (vs. Ethnic) Nationalism

Although there exists a robust and historic region-based Catalonian nationalism, Barcelona nonetheless has been a place conducive to transcendence of static group identity, and inclusiveness. Alongside the linguistic, economic, and spatial differences that contrast the ethnic Catalan and immigrant populations, there exists a degree of hybridization. One-third of the surveyed population perceive a dual identity, feeling “as Catalan as they are Spanish.” There also is increasing knowledge of Catalan language among Spanish-immigrant households, strong public consensus across ethnic populations for public sector interventions such as needed for the 1992 Olympic Games, and a high degree of nonmonolithic voting patterns indicative of political interests that cut across simple nationalistic interests. In this more open and inclusive nationalism, the city and region provide a striking and important counter-example to the many cities in the world that host more competitive and exclusionary forms of nationalism. As stated by Oriol Nel-lo (secretary of territorial policy, Generalitat of Catalonia, interview), “there are many elements in Barcelona that predispose it to being polarized—different ethnic groups, histories, and political aspirations—yet this has not happened.” It is important to understand the reasons underlying this hopeful counter-example.

I trace the inclusiveness of nationalism in northeastern Spain to several factors—demographic realities, an accommodative political stance of Catalan leaders vis-à-vis newcomers, the regional structure of autonomy, urban policymaking and planning that has fostered a collective public interest, and a city-based openness to diversity and cosmopolitan linkages that reinforces an outward looking perspective.

Barcelona's urbanization has been a fundamental influence in the development of Catalan nationalism. The city has been a cultural crucible where a place-based and inclusionary (rather than an ethnic-specific and exclusionary) nationalism has developed. Barcelona and Catalonia are simultaneously nationalistic and porous, indicating that regional nationalism can survive, and even thrive, amidst significant and prolonged periods of immigration from elsewhere in Spain.¹¹ In the 1950–1975 period alone, due to Franco's industrialization programs, about 1.4 million immigrants moved into Catalonia (Cabre & Pujades, 1988).¹² This has resulted today in a situation where about 60% of Catalonian residents are first, second, or third generation immigrants from elsewhere in Spain (P. Vilanova, professor of political science, University of Barcelona, interview). This substantial immigration has led to a social hybridization of the Catalan society and a relatively open and inclusive Catalan nationalism.

Catalan nationalist leaders have also made politically astute decisions that facilitated a less rigid nationalism. As far back as the 1960s, nationalists emphasized a place-based nationalism rather than one limited to ethnic identity. Jordi Pujol, the region's future leader,¹³ asserted "anyone who lives and works in Catalonia and who wants to be a Catalan is a Catalan" (Guibernau, 2004, p. 67). Amidst the significant immigration into Catalonia during the 1960s, this statement was significant in its emphasis on social rather than ethnic identity. Facing the demographic realities of mass Spanish immigration, if Catalan nationalist leaders had instead sought a nationalism defined strictly by Catalan ethnic origin, the nationalist political project today would likely be in jeopardy. As stated pragmatically by Catalan nationalist J. Llimona (secretary of external relations, Generalitat of Catalonia, interview), for a region of such substantial immigration, "if we had had a policy only for the 50 percent born here it would have been a disaster." Catalan political interests appear to value and respect the practical need for inter-group inclusiveness and respect. My interviews with individuals inside the political world indicated a keen receptiveness to the need to be sensitive to differences in a nationalistic region of emotive history and passionate views. There is a pragmatic element to this accommodation. "As a government, we must include all the different political wills in order to avoid an endless cycle of conflict between groups," states Doménech Orriols (interview). J. Llimona (interview) further explains, "social cohesion is very important and fundamental to us in maintaining our political coalition; there are challenges constantly that might break this solidarity." Llimona describes how "my heart says one thing as a nationalist, but as a member of the Catalonia government I have to take account of this complex social reality."

Spain's regional autonomous structure is a third factor shaping the fluid nature of Catalan nationalism. Regional autonomy and identity are strong in Spain, and political discussions are an everyday occurrence about how money and resources are distributed from the central state across the country's regions. This constant attention to interregional competition likely facilitates adoption by many Spanish immigrants of a sense of place and regional entitlement about Catalonia. They may not feel culturally Catalan (especially the older generation), but claims for greater Catalonian resources resonate with them. In this way, the allowance for regional autonomy in Spain may be facilitating a Catalan nationalism based on sense of place, in competition with other regions. Within this context, the Catalan nationalist political project has been able to integrate demands for Catalan cultural recognition (such as linguistic rights) with demands that greater financial resources come to the region to benefit the population at-large (both native and immigrant-origin families). Whereas advocacy for Catalan cultural rights would appeal to few Spanish immigrant families, appeals to the Spanish state for money to provide better highways, schools, and public services likely would. Those from Spanish immigrant backgrounds thus align themselves with the Catalan nationalist political project because they perceive benefits from greater regional capacity vis-à-vis the Spanish central state.

Constructing Urban Democracy's Terrain

The openness and inclusiveness of Catalan nationalism is also attributable to changes in the built environment of the city since the end of the Franco regime. Urbanism—both long-range comprehensive planning and smaller-scale project design—has played an instrumental role in pursuing a collective public interest and in constructing the urban terrain upon which a multinational democracy has grown (J. Esteban, director of territorial planning, Catalonia regional government, interview). The tool of large-scale urban planning was used—both during and after the transition from Franco to democracy—to change the prevailing logic of unregulated speculation in the city, institute a collective project that distributed urban benefits to both ethnic Catalan and Spanish immigrant neighborhoods and households, and educate the populous about the potential of democratic action. It showed that there was another way to structure cities, and asserted the “authority of the public interest over the private interest” (Joan Solans, director of planning for Generalitat 1980–2001, interview). Urbanists intervened early in the political transition to democracy (1975–1979) and this increased planning’s effectiveness as a shaping and focusing tool in building a more equitable and livable post-Franco city. The General Metropolitan Plan (GMP) of 1976, in particular, was a key planning intervention, providing the opportunity, during unsettled conditions, for the building of consensus among numerous sectors of society that had different prescriptions about how to reform society (Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona, 1976).

After the formal establishment of democracy, focused architecture and design interventions assumed greater influence than large-scale planning. In the early 1980s, context-sensitive and small-scale interventions of architects and designers were more valuable in imprinting democracy upon the Barcelona landscape than were more abstract and broader scale plans of planners. Small-scale urban projects in the 1980s showed people what democracy was, and were able to build trust for later larger-scale interventions and public planning. They educated the public about the potential of democratic and collective action. As described by Manuel de Solá-Morales (Professor of Urbanism, Universitat Polytechnic de Catalonia, interview), “the recovery of public spaces in the neighborhoods, the creation of new parks, and the renovation of the central city were very pedagogical in their content.” Progressive architects and political leaders who outlasted the regime understood the importance of connecting design, community life, and political expression and were key actors in early democratic urbanist practice in the 1980s. Urban interventions targeted improvement of public spaces because these communal areas were of primary importance to neighborhoods, facilitated mix and contact among a heretofore contained populous, provided avenues for collective expression, and were thus important in developing a civic nationalism in Barcelona. Such a civic spirit spanning Catalan and Spanish immigrant populations in the urban region is evidenced clearly during the 1980–2000 period—and most pronounced in the run-up to the 1992 Olympic Games—by the strong congruence in aspirations between the general public and the activist socialist municipal government.

The City and the Politics of Nationalism

Finally, the city has for two decades been a catalyst toward openness and globalization and this has advanced a pluralist and dynamic “city-state” notion of Catalan nationalism over one more rooted in history, rurality, and purity of nationalist identity. “The city is the place where two models—inward looking nationalism and social inclusion—have met,” says Carles Navales (city councilor, Cornellà de Llobregat, 1979–1991, interview), and “in Barcelona, nationalism has not been able to kill urban diversity so these two influences are co-habiting.” Since the mid-1970s, the city has been a crossroads between two differing Catalan nationalist political projects. The leftist socialists long in charge of Barcelona governance have advanced a metropolitan model of

Catalan nationalism, while the center-right Catalan nationalists¹⁴ in charge of regional government for 24 years argued for more territorial balance through the region and have used the late nineteenth century imagery and rhetoric warning of a “macrocephalic” Barcelona that will encroach and erode the traditional moral and social order of the Catalan rural heartland.

Hemmed in by the antimetropolitan predilections of the Generalitat government for over two decades, on the one hand, and the “centralist” ideology of the Spanish state, on the other, the city of Barcelona has acted creatively to break out of these constraints. Part of the motivation behind the city’s use of grand and prestigious events to catalyze urban activities and investment (such as the 1992 Olympics and the 2004 Forum of Universal Cultures) undoubtedly lies in the city’s desire to create and maintain international linkages and thus burst out of the political quagmire produced by the dual constraints of traditional nationalism and state centralism. Today, in the multi-scalar world of Europeanization and globalization, the political projects of center-right Catalan nationalists and leftist socialists may be converging on a reconceptualized notion of Catalan nationalism that combines both regional identity and international connectivity. Such a “cosmopolitan” nationalism will likely fortify and sustain characteristics of inclusiveness and openness and obstruct the development of more traditional and inward-looking nationalistic identity.

BASQUE COUNTRY

Basque Country (*Pais Vasco*) hosts competing Basque regionalist and Spanish centralist allegiances. Through the years, however, there has been the development of a strong plural Spanish/Basque identity (Francisco Llera, professor, University of Pais Vasco, interview.) Sixty percent of survey respondents identify themselves as some hybrid mix of Basque and Spanish nationalities, whereas 34% of respondents identified themselves as “solely Basque” and 4% identified as “solely Spanish” (Euskobarometro, 2005; Moreno, Arriba, & Serrano, 1998). It is the region in Spain with the greatest amount of financial autonomy, a result of an economic compact between Spain and the region in 1978. The *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) political party supports enhanced regional autonomy and is moderate. The PNV has had since the transition a significantly larger political constituency in the Basque Country than the *Herri Batasuna* (People’s Unity) political party. *Batasuna* had been aligned with the *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA) paramilitary group, a leftist separatist group that uses violence as a political tactic.¹⁵

Overt conflict is not between two communities that live side-by-side, but rather between radical Basque nationalists and a Spanish state that it views with contempt as an unwanted and occupying force. Accordingly, targets of violence and intimidation have been for the most part symbols and extensions of the Spanish state and also those Basque political leaders viewed as too close to the Spanish centralist project. Since 1968, ETA has killed over 800 persons in pursuit of its political goals of independence; almost 500 of these individuals have been police or military personnel while more than 300 of those killed have been civilians (Guardia Civil website, accessed August 4, 2005.) Its killings have had deep psychological and symbolic impact in the country.

In public surveys of Basque residents, about 40% of respondents label themselves as Basque “nationalists” while about 50% “nonnationalists” (Euskobarometro, 2005). While many Basques (about 60%) favor regional autonomy or even independence from Spain, a strong majority rejects terrorism and violence as appropriate means toward those ends. My research visit in February 2004 to Basque Country occurred during a time of substantial political uncertainty. About 18 months prior to my visit, in Fall 2002, the Spanish Parliament outlawed *Batasuna*. In addition, Basque regional politicians were debating in 2003 and 2004 a controversial plan to make the region a “freely associated state” of greater autonomy.

I focus on the three major cities in the Basque Country. Bilbao is the largest city in the region (about 500,000 city population; total regional population is about 2.1 million), Spain's busiest port, historically industrialized and now a focal point for physical and cultural revitalization. Vitoria-Gasteiz, with population over 200,000, is the capital of the Basque Country. San Sebastián (about 180,000 residents) has been the stronghold of Betasuna and ETA supporters.

Urban Pragmatism Amidst Political Gridlock

I find that urbanism has been a significant contributor to the normalization of the Basque Country, opening up new shoots of growth and new institutional relationships in an area that would otherwise be locked in stasis due to political violence. Basque planning and urbanism have provided a space of rationality and pragmatic dialogue in a society where political debate has been constrained by militant nationalism and distorted by violence. The Basque Country combines dynamism at the urban level with stasis and disability at the larger political level. In urban affairs, Bilbao, San Sebastian, and Vitoria have public sectors that are active, partnering, internationally connected, and financially able to affect change on the ground. Urban programs and policies have spawned cooperation between public agencies that have transcended differences on larger nationalistic issues. For example, the creation of an intergovernmental partnership among public entities, Bilbao Ria 2000, to redevelop the city's obsolete waterfront brought together local actors (region, county, and city) and the central Spanish government that otherwise would not have worked together due to the larger political Basque nationalist tensions (Rodriguez, Martinez, & Guenaga, 2001). Without this urban level of workable compromises, there would be no laboratory in Basque Country for the working through of differences and the creation of interorganizational linkages not constrained by larger political divides.

The legacy and threat of violence has been a significant obstacle toward building a constructive peace-building process in the region. Such a socially traumatic environment, together with a crisis of industrial decline, led to responses by the central state and Basque municipalities that have empowered Basque governments and stimulated urbanism and innovation. In response to the Basque problem, the state granted to the region a significant pool of financial resources and municipalities have actively used these resources in efforts to redirect their trajectories away from the negative legacies of industrial decline and political extremism. In Bilbao, policymakers realized in the first decade of democracy that they could turn this sense of crisis and obsolescence into an opportunity to redefine the city. "What might be a handicap in other situations," says Ibon Areso (Vice-Mayor, Bilbao, interview), "became a plus and advantage here because it allowed us to pursue policies that were risky and at times harsh. We didn't have time to waste talking about political issues."

Urbanism has been instrumental in redefining the terms of public debate and this can lead to a transcendence of entrenched political views. For example, significant urban redevelopment is helping to project another image for the Basque Country beyond terrorism and industrial decline. The success of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, and numerous other investments both completed and prospective, presents an alternative view of the Basque Country to the world, one that is cosmopolitan, open, and future-oriented rather than one closed in ideologically and economically. The impetus behind many urban projects in the region has been to create a different appearance for both external audiences (Spain, Europe) and internal ones (the different political sectors in Basque Country). Urbanism, states Victor Urrutia (professor, University of Pais Vasco, Bilbao, interview), "is a very good protocol to use to change public image and, hopefully, political debate."

Narrowing the Ground for Violence

Urban dynamism and betterment also appear as an important counter-argument to those who advocate more extreme forms of Basque nationalism. V. Urrutia (interview) asserts that “urbanism and its openness is the permanent contradiction of such nationalism.” Moderate nationalists thus see increased urbanization as an opportunity to put distance between them and the rural- and small-town based political power of hardcore nationalist groups. Urban policies and investments that strengthen the region’s internal urban connectivity and its external connectivity to growing European opportunities are important counters to Basque extremist nationalism. The *Euskal Hiria* (Basque City) urban strategy of the PNV-led regional government (Gobierno, 2002) seeks to reinforce the three interconnected urban poles of the region. Also, the development of high-speed train transport and the *EuroCity* project connecting Spanish and French Basque coasts (i3 Consultants et al., 2000) help to foster Basque functional independence from Madrid while bypassing and marginalizing militant forms of Basque nationalism. Tactically, the mainstream PNV party is using Europeanization as a key foothold in changing their image from an old, ethnic, and traditional party to one more modern and open. This puts further distance between the PNV and the constituencies of extreme nationalists.

The substantial improvements and redevelopment of Basque cities are the operational and most concrete forms of regional autonomy and self-government and may help increase public condemnation of violence and radical nationalism. Urban policy can ameliorate nationalistic tensions in two respects—(1) it allows for opportunities for consensus building and partnering; and (2) it can increase the public’s allegiance and trust in local government and thus public buy-in to political, rather than violent, means toward resolving conflict.

First, the urban dynamism and partnering in Pais Vasco presents a discussion arena framed by functional and tangible daily issues within which cooperation can take place between parties who otherwise would not concur on the larger nationalistic question. Urbanism can involve agreements and partnering between political sectors and may provide testing grounds for compromises that may move the society forward on other nonurban issues. These agreements and partnerships create joint shareholders of interest and can connote openness to innovation and social learning that is anathema to the rejectionist politics of extremist sectors. Strategic planning and visioning also can play an important role amidst nationalistic antagonisms. The difficulties of engaging in inter-group dialogue (between nationalists and nonnationalists, and between nationalists) amidst the threat and reality of radical violence are real and debilitating. Absent the possibility of inclusive political negotiations, strategic planning provides a forum wherein political violence can be discussed in terms of its impact on the medium-term and long-term development of Basque urban society. In strategic reflections in San Sebastian’s Gipuzkoa province (Diputacion Foral de Gipuzkoa, 2002), explicitly political issues—of violence and political autonomy—were linked to economic and social issues. This connection—between the high political level and the seemingly mundane scale of living—can be highly effective in moving a society forward (Bollens, 1999).

Second, urbanism may attenuate nationalist tension in Pais Vasco through its ability to positively influence the public’s view of local government. Public opinion polls have consistently found that residents in the Basque Country, despite fear and violence, are more satisfied with self-government and quality of life than almost all other regions in Spain. Beyond simply regional pride in the face of Spanish centralism, this public opinion is probably a realistic assessment of the effects of higher public expenditure levels, better public services, and a higher degree of economic development. To the extent that Basque residents have trust in their local and regional governments and perceive positively the outcomes of their actions, residents would have less tolerance for extremist groups and actions that seek to bypass and disrupt these governmental channels. There may exist a time lag between improvements in objective conditions and the diminution of violence and intimidation

in a society, and this time lag may be attributable to the medium- and long-term influences of urbanism to shape public opinion and narrow the ground of acceptance for militant radicalism. I base this assessment on my study of Northern Ireland and the evolution of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) paramilitary (Bollens, 2000.) One interpretation of the IRA's decisions to cease hostilities emphasizes the ability of significant social and economic improvements in the hard-line Catholic neighborhoods of Belfast over a 30-year time period to change the views of the IRA's constituencies. Noteworthy in this interpretation is that a time lag was involved in this relationship between urban betterment and the attenuation of political violence. Many of the rehabilitation projects in Belfast predated the IRA ceasefires by 10 or more years.

Underneath Functional Urbanism

Although urbanism can lead to compromise and dialogue, it also can be useful in supporting and fostering one side's aspirations in a nationalist debate. In the Basque case, I found an intermingling of the functional foundations of urbanism with nationalist cultural goals. The protocol of functional objectivity—and the public face of urbanism as neutral and technical—can provide effective anchors and tools to the nationalist cause. Astute nationalists who understand that urban models and processes can set agendas and psychological frames of reference work to commandeer urbanism and its traditional functional basis for service to their nationalist project. I interviewed several persons aligned with mainstream nonviolent Basque nationalism who divulged how they view urbanism as a way to support and rationalize a cultural bias and explained how they position functional arguments as assets in nationalistic projects.

The EuroCity program stressing joint Spanish-French planning across the international border illustrates the comingling of functional and cultural aspirations. It makes sense on functional grounds, and was the reason behind its funding by the European Commission. Underneath this rationale for Basque nationalists on the Spanish side, however, is a cultural motivation of making increasingly irrelevant the international border that divides two historic Basque communities. Agustín Arostegi (co-director, EuroCity, interview) details the cultural importance of the project to Basques on the Spanish side,

We always talk about institutions and it being an urban project with cross-border benefits. But for us it means we will be in contact with people whom we have been back-to-back with for hundreds of years. This is why I say that Eurocity, although not specifically a nationalist project, certainly helps the nationalist cause. This is a given for us. Although most of my day I speak the language of function, Eurocity for me is more of a cultural than a functional project.

The public face of this project, emphasizing functional goals and interventions, makes it difficult for the central Spanish government to obstruct EuroCity because regional integration and openness constitute commonly held wisdom in the new Europe. In private conversations, I found subservience of urbanism to nationalist aspirations to be explicit and less refined than in public documents and announcements. In this conversation outside public circles, ideological motivations become clearer and planning issues are discussed within their political and tactical contexts. An assertiveness of nationalism arises; an unfiltered link between spatial planning and political tactics is revealed.

SARAJEVO

The siege of the city by Bosnian Serb and Serbian Militias lasted 1,395 days, killed 11,000 residents of the city, 1,600 children, and damaged or destroyed about 60% of the city's buildings.

With a mixed ethnic population in 1991 of 540,000 Bosnian Muslims (40%), Bosnian Serbs (30%), and Bosnian Croats (20%), this city is now an approximately 80% Muslim city of about 3,40,000 population. Although many Bosnian Serbs stayed in the city during the war in defense of the bombarded concept of multi-ethnicity, substantial numbers fled after the Dayton peace accord fearing retaliation. During and after the war, Muslim refugees from ethnically cleansed eastern Bosnia migrated in large numbers to inhabit shelled and burned-out flats in war-torn neighborhoods. Sarajevo today resides at a dividing line between opposing political territories. The boundary between the Dayton-created Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska entities lies just outside the city's southeastern sector and separates the city's functional space. Postwar Sarajevo is not a politically divided city with groups fighting over control; Bosniak Muslims are in the strong majority. However, the larger urban region is home to three peoples who need the buffer of space and time to deal with the trauma of war. The city will not again be mixed in the next 20 years as it was before the war. Although a political boundary created through brutal war is now within its urban sphere, Sarajevo is not now a divided city with partitions and checkpoints. Yet, due to its geographic location, the city is vulnerable and exposed to the strong sectarian pressures of postwar Bosnia. Sarajevo, like Jerusalem since 1948, is now a frontier city—an urban interstice—proximate to opposing political territories. It is a traumatized and dislocated city that must deal with issues of ethnic, nationalist, and religious identity that were not salient until the early 1990s. The political boundary created through war that is within Sarajevo's urban functional space lacks a physical or intimidating presence. It is, nonetheless, a line of separation within an urban system of linkages and it has already influenced—and will continue to do so in the future—where people live and how and where they choose to interact.

Partitioning of Ethnic Space

In contrast to the capacity of Barcelona and the Basque cities to advance those regions' abilities to accommodate nationalistic differences, the power of the city of Sarajevo to do the same in Bosnia has been constrained and quartered—ironically, by the well-intentioned diplomatic agreements that successfully stopped the shooting wars. The ability of urbanism and local policy to reinstate Sarajevo's multicultural environment in the future has been constrained by the 1995 Dayton peace accord, which has provided little space for the city to integrate and assimilate peoples. Instead, in Sarajevo and Bosnia, the drawing of political boundaries has accommodated ethnic differences and reinforced them geographically. As the largest and capital city of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo provides an important potential foundation upon which to rebuild multiculturalism, and from which to develop viable democratic governance and economic interdependences that could normalize the country. Yet, the Dayton redrawing of political space in Bosnia leaves little room for cities like Sarajevo to act as societal transformation agents in the future.

The city of Sarajevo is crippled institutionally and has been submerged and quartered by ethnic goals and imperatives. Diplomatic agreements have neglected international administration of the urban area as an option, drawn Serb entity boundaries just outside its city boundary to the east, created Muslim-majority Cantonal boundaries on the Federation side that now engulf it, and restricted the city's spatial reach. Divided further by four municipalities that make up the city and frequently have greater powers than the city administration itself, Sarajevo city faces strangulation both from outside and within. The effect of such ethnic demarcation and gerrymandering has been to tighten the screws on Sarajevo city's ability to act as an opportunity space for multiculturalism and mixing.

The Dayton structuring of local and regional (cantonal) government authority has obstructed long-range urban planning and development regulation in Sarajevo, resulting in the lack of a cohesive citywide growth policy framework that could guide the city's reconstruction. In this

context, illegal construction and the influence of political connections significantly shape the location and magnitude of development. Extensive international intervention has focused on physical reconstruction rather than social rehabilitation. Substantial money from the EU, and from member states, has led to extensive and visible progress in physically redeveloping the city. Fewer traces of the war are evident with each passing month. However, without social reconciliation, Sarajevo may be increasingly physically rebuilt but the population will be ethnically sorted, and psychologically torn and traumatized (Jakob Finci, head, Civil Service Agency, BiH, interview).

The potential for establishing an open, specially administered, and shared Sarajevo died at the peacemaking table. During the war and before Dayton, there were several unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to preserve the special quality of Sarajevo. When peace finally came to Bosnia, however, peace making set off processes that unraveled efforts to create Sarajevo as a multicultural space amidst a fracturing state. Dayton's ethnic circumscription of space after the war catalyzed a mass migration in early 1996 of some 62,000 Sarajevo Serbs from inside what would be within the Muslim-Croat Federation borders of Sarajevo city and its suburbs, and this exodus created the more monoethnic city of today (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 1996). The Dayton accord structured and empowered the two entities and the Federation's cantonal governments in order to facilitate self-rule by ethnic majorities. On the one hand, this distribution of power in a postwar state in such a way responds to a compelling logic of how to reconstruct a collapsed state. The provision of autonomy to ethnically marked "entities" and the carving up of political geography into ethnic-majority "cantons," while maintaining a national state government, seeks to accommodate ethnic and territorial differences—the combustible fuel that ignited the war in the first place—while holding a country together under a single state apparatus. Yet, there are substantial long-term costs of this ethnic devolution strategy that likely will be greater its short-term stabilization benefits. This is because international community acceptance of ethnic self-rule has established an institutional and geographic framework that will likely entrench ethnic identities territorially and thus obstruct compromises necessary for the success of a multiethnic state. The foundation upon which Dayton is based—the partitioning of political space to accommodate ethnic difference—is more likely to prolong, or at best suspend, ethnic conflict than to solve it. In peace accords that necessarily emphasize conditions that stop shooting wars, peacemakers should be cognizant of the transformative potential of urban areas to help, with time, to reconstitute and rediscover multiethnic tolerance.

Urban Displacement

About 2 million persons were displaced by the Bosnian war, either to safer areas within the country or to foreign countries. Programs aimed at the return of war displaced persons and refugees to their prewar residences are a pivotal part of postwar planning and reconstruction, but such an effort confronts the international community with a difficult moral quandary. Encouraging returns to prewar locations has moral weight behind it because it is critical to bringing back multiethnic integration. However, assertive efforts at returning displacees to their prewar locations may stimulate inter-group tension and conflict and cause hardship on returnees if they are disconnected from social and economic benefits in the prewar location. Sarajevo illuminates the limitations and realities of the returns process in Bosnia. The effort at facilitating returns of displaced persons and refugees to Sarajevo is not restoring the multicultural residential fabric of the city; the city continues to have a considerable part of its original population displaced elsewhere in Bosnia and Serbia. Substantial and impressive legal return of prewar *properties* has occurred, but not the return of prewar *occupants*. The "success" of the property repossession law in Bosnia hides a dispiriting reality—the selling of repossessed units that, in aggregate, is cementing the ethnic sorting of postwar Sarajevo. The ethnic structure of the city remains significantly different

compared to what existed before the war. In addition, for minority returnees (Serbs and Croats) who have come back to the city, their ability to remain in their prewar neighborhoods is tenuous and vulnerable to relapse unless urban planners can provide a supportive environment in terms of social services, education, and job availability. To sustain and increase ethnic reintegration of the city, the international community and municipalities must manage microgeographies and territoriality in ways that respect group identities for the city's nationalist minorities. Yet, such sensitivity to context-specific urban dynamics is not a common expertise of international organizations operating in postconflict situations.

Transcending Ethnic Boundaries

In order to move forward and transcend the ethnic partitioning of Dayton, the international community is increasingly viewing practical on-the-ground strategies as important correlates of larger national political reform. There is an emerging acknowledgement and hope within the international community that functional and economic linkages may increasingly transcend and defacto erase the Dayton boundary lines in BiH and that trust building within the Sarajevo region can be an important building block in the overall State-building project. After years of discussion within the IC, there was the establishment of a development agency for the entire urban economic region—the Sarajevo Economic Region Development Agency (SERDA). The region is defined geographically and functionally and intentionally spans the Dayton boundary between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb republic. A significant accomplishment is that its members include 18 municipalities from the Federation and 13 municipalities from Republika Srpska (European Union and SERDA, 2004). Function-based interventions such as SERDA that emphasize economic reform and revitalization do not seek to explicitly rewrite Dayton's political lines in the short term, but to create new functional partnerships that might supercede the independent importance of Dayton lines in determining household and political party behavior. As these functional and economic links become preeminent, multiethnic functional regions could over time replace Dayton-conceived local boundaries as the main means of policymaking and organizing local programs and activities. Because they have the ability to positively affect people's daily lives, these economic interventions hold promise for complementing and enlivening any advancements that are achieved at the higher, diplomatic level to reform and strengthen Bosnian state governance.

MOSTAR

This city is a case of attempted local power sharing between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, enemies themselves in a "war within a war" in this region of the state. One year before the outbreak of the Bosnian war, the 1991 Census showed Mostar as an ethnically mixed city of 1,26,000. Bosniak Muslims and Croats were each about 34% of the city population, Serbs about 19%, and about 14% identified themselves as Yugoslavs or others. The city constituted a melting pot in that about one-third of marriages were ethnically mixed. Mostar is proximate to the settlement zones of each of the three nationality groups, located near the intersection of Western Herzegovina (majority Bosnian Croat and next door to Croatia 20 miles to its south), Central Bosnia (of a majority Muslim population), and Eastern Herzegovina (majority Bosnian Serb and proximate to Serbia). Because of this spatial location, when nationalistic tensions erupted in the former Yugoslavia, "Mostar was always going to be problematic" (Nigel Moore, formerly OHR Mostar, interview).

When Croat-Muslim hostilities ended February 1994, the demographic and physical composition of Mostar had been severely reconfigured. Physical damage to the city's buildings was

extensive and the city had been ethnically sorted and cleansed. An estimated 15,000 individuals—overwhelmingly Muslim—were expelled from west to east during the war, according to Javier Mier (OHR Mostar 1994–2001, interview). West Mostar became 84% Croat, 11% Bosniak, and 3% Serb; East Mostar 98% Bosniak and less than 1% each Croat and Serb (Repatriation Information Center, 1998). The “Rome Agreement” and an Interim Statute in 1995 specifically addressed how Mostar was to be reconstituted. They created a central zone, consisting of a common strip of land around the former confrontation line within the city, which was to be administered by a city council and administration, where Muslims, Croats, and “other” groups were to have equal representation. Outside this central zone, the postwar city was carved into six municipalities—three Bosnian Croat and three Bosnian Muslim—which were to relinquish powers over time to the joint administration. Beginning March 2004, in response to a dictate by the UN High Representative in BiH, the city of Mostar was unified by merging the six former Mostar municipalities and creating a citywide legislative council and administration.

Urbanism Manipulated

This case shows an urbanism unable to move the city and its larger region beyond a status of simple absence of overt conflict. Instead, the urban capacity to foster tolerance has been stopped dead in its tracks and captured by ethnic and nationalist dynamics metamorphosed from wartime. Urbanism and urban governance in postwar Mostar have been the primary means by which war profiteers have solidified their power and reinforced nationalist divisions in the urban area. War by means other than overt fighting has been carried out in Mostar for 10 years after the open hostilities of 1992–1994. These other means—parallel institutions, demographic manipulation, obstruction of citywide integrative mechanisms, and corruption of public power for private and ethnicized gain—have brutalized the city and its collective sphere. The spoils of war have included the city itself, its inhabitants, and its institutions. The 10 years of institutional and political division of Mostar have hardened antagonisms between the two sides, stimulating and cementing greater inter-group economic, religious, and psychological differences.

The ethnically fragmented local government structure created a divided Mostar possibly beyond reconciliation. Political connections, not sound planning and development policy, have driven development in both the Croat and Bosniak municipalities. The six city-municipalities withheld power and authority from the city administration and ethnically carved up the urban area into a “political space” of contested territoriality (Zoran Bosnjak, Urban Planning Department, City of Mostar, interview). Parallelism and division in Mostar are at an absurd level as the six ethnic municipalities bent many normal functions of local government to achieve group-specific, not citywide, goals. Public services that should be integrated citywide—ranging from electricity and water supply to education and urban planning—have become ethnicized and fragmented.

Both sides, especially Bosnian Croats, are endeavoring to increase their share of the citywide population as a way to increase their political claims. Amidst unsettled views of the past and future, these efforts to change the prewar demographic balance of the city have “become a tool to foster mutual fears and distrust among people” (Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar, 2003, p. 15). Although urbanists are aware of this demographic “numbers game,” they are reluctant to consider ethnic factors due to the planning profession’s disciplinary boundaries and due to the international community’s uneasiness to engage at the urban microscale. Palma Palameta (civil engineer, Urban Planning Department, City of Mostar, interview) rationalizes this professional approach, stating that “no matter which nationality, the urban planning norms stay the same. Real urban planning is not interested in the nationality question.” With this hesitancy to explicitly engage with ethnic issues that impact on the city, urbanists seeking to advance the city’s

cross-ethnic, collective interest—both in local government and in the international community—have found themselves in a hamstrung position vis-à-vis appeals to ethnic self-interest and solidarity.

The international community has sought to counter the development of a “parallel” city but has ultimately been used as a partner in the creation of just such a city. The early establishment of a European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM) to directly administer the city for a 2-year period was a highly unusual strategy of strong local intervention. Yet, Mostar represents a significant missed opportunity to use an urban accommodative strategy as a local remedy and model for inter-group relations at broader political levels. Allowance in international agreements for the creation of the six ethnic municipalities—three on each side of the ethnic divide—created a debilitating framework for the ethnic fragmentation of the citywide interest. The system of integrated and citywide governance intended by Dayton and other agreements has operated for 10 years mostly as a shell and artifice. The disparity between international intent and local reality is more bedeviling because the international community had the vision and tools to effect meaningful normalization of the urban fabric. The development of the “parallel city” was not due to lack of foresight on the part of the international community. Rather, the IC did not commonly use tools available to them to combat behavior by ethnic municipal leaders that distorted urban governance.

The Seed of Neutrality

A central plank of the international community’s urban strategy in postwar Mostar represents both the promise and pitfalls of “neutral” planning and spatial buffering as means of reconstituting a city of extreme division. The international community presented a well-developed conceptualization of how planning and urbanism would contribute to bridging the nationalist divide. Approximately 1 mile long and one-half mile wide, a “central zone” in the traditional commercial and tourist center of the city was to be administered by an ethnically balanced city council and administration. Consisting of a common strip of land along the former confrontation line where joint Federation, Canton and City institutions and administrations would be located, the central zone was to act immediately as a spatial buffer between the two sides and to indicate to both Croats and Bosniaks that land in this area would not be allocated based on wartime positions. It would be a place of neutrality and ethnically balanced control and administration. Over time, through appropriate development, the central zone would grow like a seed and demonstrate that cross-ethnic activities could resume, first within the zone, and then hopefully in larger swatches of urban space within the “ethnic” municipalities. The intent was that with this central zone buffer the city would grow together normally over time, rather than have it develop as a hard interface between two antagonistic ethnic halves of the city.

In reality, both Croats and Bosniaks have acted repeatedly to freeze this seed and obstruct its ability to grow roots that would connect the two sides. The same forces that captured the six municipalities for ethnic gain also were able insidiously to warp and dismantle the integrative goals of the central zone. The district became in the early days a target of ethnic territorial ambitions and remained that way for 10-years. Croats, more than Bosniaks, have strategically built ethnically exclusive institutions in the central zone. Such ethnic penetration—a bastardized type of “policy making through land occupation” (Gerd Wochein, OHR, interview)—has sabotaged the endeavor to construct a foundation for the long-term normalization of Mostar. In the face of ethnically entrenched and war-hardened antagonists, G. Wochein (interview) asserts that “we as urbanists should have helped integrate the city quickly through the design of the central zone with public functions, coffee shops and meeting places, and mixed living areas. We had the chance, but I think we lost that opportunity.”

Paradoxes of Urban “Normalization”

There has been only a moderate level of returns by minority group households and 10 years after the war severe segregation is entrenched. The unwillingness of the international community to push for greater physical and social integration of the urban area is explainable, in part, by their need to avoid rekindling ethnic and nationalist tensions in the urban area. It is understandable that the IC would want to pursue urban stability after a period of interethnic trauma. Yet, its accommodation of local segregating pressures runs counter to international community objectives. Further, the difficulties of normalizing Mostar present disquieting insights into the relationship between war-induced displacement and postwar intergroup stability. It may well be that war-induced ethnic displacement results in a more sustainable and stable situation of postwar inter-group relations than if ethnic antagonistic populations had remained in place. Majority-rule cities (such as Sarajevo) may be more workable than cities of more equal ethnic populations (Mostar). The fact that Croats and Bosniaks have remained in the Mostar urban arena, albeit in displaced locations, means that there is no clear ethnic majority to rule the city and this likely hinders normal urban management. In addition, for a city that hosts relatively equal ethnic populations, spatial segregation rather than integration may be more sustainable and policeable in postwar years. Any countenancing by the IC of ethnic partitioning for the sake of short-term stability, however, creates separate ethnic universes that will in most likelihood beget nasty legacies of inter-group intolerance, lack of understanding, and radicalization over the long haul.

If Mostar is to be a potential model for figuring out larger issues of multinational governance in Bosnia, planning and urbanism will likely play key roles. Negotiated rules and procedures of a postwar society and the structuring of its public authority are absolutely necessary for the moving forward of a city and its society. Yet, in the end, only the urban policy and implementation arm of public authority has the ability, and responsibility, of making genuine positive contributions to peoples' daily lives in their neighborhoods, stores, markets, and public settings. For political unification of Mostar to be successful, electoral rules and administrative policies must be matched by concrete positive outcomes felt by Croats and Bosniaks alike in economic opportunity, social assistance, educational quality, and police reform. Only through improved quality of life and opportunities will there be progress on societal and psychological reconciliation and a more open and expressed support for a shared Mostar. The challenge in Mostar lies in the effective management of the microgeography of a city and its districts and in the promotion of specific development projects. The capacity to engage in such on-the-ground issues likely rests not with top-down international overseers but with more grassroots oriented local groups and international nongovernmental organizations.

CONCLUSIONS

Cities can be critical agents in the development of a multiethnic tolerance. They are crucibles of difference, constituting a necessary and stringent test of whether, and how, group identity conflicts can be effectively managed. The city is a test of whether different nationalistic groups can coexist amidst the proximity, interdependency, and shared geography of the urban sphere. Urban interventions can engage productively and proactively in the creation of inter-group coexistence and societal peace building and can constitute a bottom-up approach able to complement top-down peace-making negotiations.

In the formulation of multinational democracies in Spain and Bosnia, urban interventions have the potential to reinforce and actualize new governing ideologies of democracy, multinational tolerance, and openness. In Barcelona, large-scale planning frameworks, smaller site-specific architectural interventions involving public space, and metropolitan development projects have

been instrumental in moving urban society from the “gray” and static Franco city to, initially, the fragile and emerging democratic city, to, eventually, the stabilized and robust multinational city of today. The ability of planning to articulate and implement the post-Franco democratic city had a pedagogical quality to it, informing the city’s residents about the physical and social–psychological characteristics of an open society. The close alignment of the interests of the new democratic administration and the citizenry facilitated a mutual social learning process about the relationship between political change and urban betterment. In Bilbao, urban development partnerships between local, regional, and central state levels constituted mechanisms of cooperation that have led to significant improvements in urban quality of life and have opened up opportunities for political advances amidst extremist violence. Physical revitalization and urban restructuring in the region is promoting a new and transformed sense of city identity that is competing with negative industrial and political images. Sarajevo and Mostar are more missed opportunities than actualized potential. Whereas Spanish cities have played peace-constitutive roles in Spanish society, the Bosnian cities of Sarajevo and Mostar have not. Despite slow progress, we see in the Bosnian cases how urban policies by the international community that seek returns of minority households are key planks in efforts to reconstitute and actualize multinationalism. Further, in Mostar, the international community endeavored, albeit unsuccessfully, to delineate a central zone spatial buffer that would engender cross ethnic and ethnically neutral activities. In both Bosnian cases, the city is increasingly viewed as a necessary fundamental anchor toward holding the state together socially and politically.

Yet, the promise of the city lies not only in the potential of urbanism to implement and actualize new governing ideologies, but also in its potential to catalyze the reconstitution of multinational societies. Because cities have certain spatial and political dynamics that differentiate it from the state level, they provide opportunities for concrete and innovative interventions that affect peoples’ lives more immediately and meaningfully than state actions. Barcelona was ahead of the Spanish state and the Catalonia region in its ability to actualize multinational democracy in its built and institutional landscapes. Actions by Basque Country cities have catalyzed a dynamic urban track and a reconsideration of political nationalism amidst an otherwise lagging and sclerotic regional politics. The roles of Sarajevo and Mostar in not only anchoring the Bosnia state but as constituting multinational models able to stimulate further state-level intergroup integration reveal the catalytic potential of the city organism in a unstable national setting.

Cities are necessary and strategic foundations on which to build a sustainable and integrated society. By the nature of what it is and what activities it enables, a city is an integrative influence for individuals and activities within its borders. After the trauma of a war, this integrative effect will be minimal or nonexistent as antagonistic groups stay far away from each other in terms of residential and work life. However, if properly configured so that its jurisdictional space includes multiple groups, a city will over time constitute a container within which economic and social interactions start to take place across ethnic divides. The nature of city life is that it brings people together. Drawing on a common tax resource pool, a single city governing regime that represents multiple ethnic groups may at first divide up city resources and allocate to their respective groups based on patronage and favoritism. However, over time and as younger and more accommodating political leaders take over from war-traumatized ones, negotiations about how to most effectively spend public tax money may aspire to collective citywide goals instead of ethnic-specific objectives. Cities do not always lead as a rule to these outcomes of social and economic integration. Indeed, and especially pertinent to the analysis of Mostar, cities must be constituted and geographically configured in certain ways at the start of their corporate life for there to be opportunities for these positive inter-group effects to occur. Recourse to a collective cross-ethnic interest in a multicultural setting is only possible if municipal political geographies reach across and encompass all ethnic group interests within a single urban government system that is set up to fairly represent each of

these group interests. Such a local governance framework sets the necessary condition for war hatreds and antagonisms to be moderated at the local level, likely over considerable periods of time.

In societies of potent ethnic territoriality, cities can be the only places where the necessities of economic need and interdependence bring peoples together in a dynamic and mixed way. In contrast, neighborhoods, cantonal regions, and even states can become demarcated ethnically and susceptible to the protective strategies of ethnic politics. In Barcelona and the cities of Pais Vasco, nationalists and nonnationalists are more mixed at the city scale than they are in small towns or rural places. Languages and cultures mix in an urban setting and open up a space of dialogue. The political empowerment of these cities and their regions in the new Spanish Constitution provided opportunities for public planning to pursue a collective interest submerged under Franco and to illuminate and operationalize the new democracy. The collective, public interest in Barcelona has been robust, vital, and catalytic of inclusive nationalism. In the Basque cities, the collective spirit of city governance has provided an alternative and competing nonviolent path for that society. In contrast, the cities of Sarajevo and Mostar were not empowered but were submerged, marginalized, and even exploited (in the case of Mostar). The collective spheres of these cities have both been damaged. In Sarajevo's case, its collective identity is fragile and susceptible because it is constrained by new postwar ethnic geographies. In Mostar, its collective identity as a city has been destroyed along with much of its physical capital. The dangers of not protecting and supporting the urban sphere as a place of transformation and multiculturalism are revealed in Bosnia. Amidst this vacuum, Bosnian nationality groups who benefit from ethnically delineated state, cantonal, and city boundaries have entrenched themselves in segregated spatial and institutional compartments and become formidable agents actively resisting societal change.

Without an active urban governance system in Bosnia, international community efforts to build a democratic Bosnia lack the local foundational level of democracy from which to build. Instead, Bosnia's political geography reinforces and advances fragmenting impulses in the new country. The retarded peace-building capacity of the Bosnian city cases in the early postwar (1995–2000) years, in comparison to the performance of Spanish city cases early in their posttransition years (1975–1979), is attributable in part to the debilitating effects of active warfare in one transition and not the other, and to the absence of a national Bosnian unity going into the postwar years. Where no such national unity exists, societal adaptation after war has proceeded in ways that are ethnically purified (Sarajevo) or are stagnant (Mostar).¹⁶ In these circumstances, the role of urbanism as stabilizers along a path of postconflict normalization is put to its greatest test. The years ahead in these two Bosnian cities will indicate whether urbanism is capable of moving an urban system out of conditions of ethnic gridlock (Mostar) and ethnic partiality (Sarajevo). The effectiveness of urbanism in Basque Country amidst different, but also challenging, conditions suggests that we should not underestimate urban policy and governance as key agents amidst division. While the choice and capacities of urban interventions is constrained by the lack of societal progress, there is still space even amidst broader political and societal gridlock and a fragile peace for urbanists to contribute important pragmatic urban models and principles of mutual coexistence.

In its structure of political representation, territorial development, delivery of public services, and regulation of ethnically salient land uses, the city is consistently faced with the challenge of balancing the accommodation of group rights and expression with the advancement of cross-group civic allegiance. It is in the city that the abstract goals of equality, tolerance, empathy, and justice are given meaning as people connect, or not, with the city (Merrifield & Swyngedouw, 1997). Challenges regarding identity, citizenship, and belonging need to be addressed and worked through most immediately at the local level. Our degree of progress at this grassroots level will either fortify or confine the ability to address these issues at broader geographies. A balancing between the interests of oneself and one's group with those of other people and other groups

takes place most fundamentally in decision-making forums and lived experiences grounded in the city. Through our shaping of the city, we construct the contours of multinational tolerance. It is important for the international community and scholars in conflict management to understand why some cities play a progressive role in shaping new societal paths while others do not and how this peace-constitutive city function can be either facilitated.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Ethnic groups are composed of people who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on shared experiences or cultural traits (Gurr & Harff, 1994). Such group awareness can be crystallized through shared struggle, territorial identity, “ethnic chosenness,” or religion (A. Smith, 1993).
- 2 Nationalism is a doctrine wherein nationality is the most important line of cleavage for establishing membership in societal groups, and overrides or subsumes alternative criteria such as social class, economic class, or patronage networks (Snyder, 1993).
- 3 The study thus does not use a true “comparative case study” approach where the four cases would all be similar in societal conditions and only the type of urban intervention would vary.
- 4 In the UN report, countries are ranked in terms of their capacity to protect personal security and human and labor rights. Such measures would likely be part of a comprehensive urban index of stability/instability. In another study, Savitch and Ardashev (2001) measure cities in terms of their potential as targets for transnational terrorist violence.
- 5 I studied Jerusalem (Israel/Palestine), Nicosia (Cyprus), Belfast (Northern Ireland), and Johannesburg (South Africa) in 1994, 1995, and 1999 (reported in Bollens, 1999, 2000, 2001). Regarding Johannesburg’s position on the continuum, the city today is challenged by rampant criminality and racial economic disparities. However, its transformation from apartheid addressed root issues of black disempowerment and places it to the right on this continuum of other places where root political issues remain partially or fully unresolved.
- 6 Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution recognizes both the unity of the Spanish nation and the right to autonomy of nationalities and regions (Agranoff & Gallarin, 1997). Such ambiguity has left ample space for negotiation and debate between regions and the state in over 25 years since adoption of the Constitution.
- 7 My host institution from August 2003–July 2004 was the University of Barcelona. Professor Pere Vilanova played a fundamental role in implementing this project by providing background information and contacts for potential interviewees in both countries. Partial funding for the research came from the University of California, Irvine Academic Senate CORCLR.
- 8 Urban planning is only one form of intervention into the cityscape. There are certain important urban activities—such as public education and urban policing—I do not emphasize in order to maintain a coherent analytical focus. I focus on planning-related and often land-based policies that structure opportunities and costs in contested cities, rather than the maintenance of societal order through police and military force.
- 9 It is thus far more inclusive than that defined by the city (town) and regional planning profession, specifically.
- 10 In this article, when I refer to the immigrant population, I include both those who migrated to Catalonia and their offspring who may have been born in Catalonia. This is consistent with local practice.
- 11 Foreign immigration from outside Spain, in contrast, is a more recent phenomenon since the 1990s, one that is currently challenging the social cohesion of Barcelona and Catalonia.
- 12 During this period of substantial immigration, the population of the region was 3.9 million in 1960 and 5.1 million in 1970 (National Institute of Statistics, various years).
- 13 Pujol was president of the regional Generalitat for 24 years.

- 14 *Convergencia i Unio (CiU)* is the major party of Catalan nationalists.
- 15 More than two years after my Basque field research was completed, Basque ETA extremists announced a “permanent ceasefire” effective March 24, 2006. It remains to be seen what will come out this pronouncement, given the breaking of ceasefires in the past (*New York Times*, 3/22/06).
- 16 The question of national unity in Spain is by no means settled, but consensus over national direction in post-Franco Spain was significantly stronger than in post-war Bosnia.

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Queries

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