REBELS WITH A CAUSE:

POWER SHARING, NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS

AND THE LOGIC OF PREEMPTIVE DEFECTION

By

Chelsea Blake Johnson

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Committee in charge:

Associate Professor Leonardo R. Arriola, Chair
Associate Professor Jason Wittenberg
Assistant Professor Aila Matanock
Professor Ann Swidler

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Abstract

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Why are some negotiated settlements successful at resolving intrastate conflict, while others fail? Are settlements involving agreement to share power more effective and, if so, why have conclusions about power sharing been so mixed? I theorize in this project that power-sharing guarantees improve the prospects for a peaceful settlement by reducing the stakes of winning post-conflict elections, thereby increasing the likelihood that rebels will willingly demobilize.

Contrary to the preeminent model of bargaining for peace in the literature, I posit that the costs of complying with a negotiated settlement are asymmetrical. For rebels, compliance means forfeiting military capacity and bargaining power. In contrast, the government never concedes its monopoly on the use of force and, therefore, always retains the option of resorting to military action. Given this, and the risk of competing against an entrenched incumbent with an electoral advantage, it is a rational strategy for rebels to resist demobilization until expectations of future benefits are sufficiently high. Power-sharing reforms can help to increase the perceived value of the payoff to rebel elites, thereby increasing willingness to demobilize, but only when they are designed to outlast elections. Institutions that expire after a transitional period, such as coalitions and governments of national unity, fail to redress the incumbency advantage or to reduce the importance of winning post-conflict elections outright, heightening incentives for rebels to preemptively defect.

The logic of my theory of preemptive defection explains why rebels would be willing to trade military capacity for long-term power sharing, and it also acknowledges the

potential for rebel splintering after a settlement is signed. In the absence of power-sharing guarantees, certain elements of the rebel leadership might still be able to secure a deal that is personally beneficial. As this process of selective cooptation reveals winners and losers during the implementation period, disgruntled rebel elites have an incentive to defect unilaterally, and the likelihood of conflict recurrence is determined by their capacity to access the resources of war. Specifically, my work shows that splintering is enabled by two factors. First, the failure to sign an all-inclusive settlement means that excluded groups are more willing to form an alliance in order to facilitate continued conflict. Second, governments with a reputation for defecting on their peace agreements are easy targets for rebel leaders hoping to mobilize defection from within their own ranks.

Empirically, this project relies on a nested design. It starts with new data collection on 138 negotiated settlements to domestic armed conflict signed between 1975 and 2005. I coded each settlement for its inclusion of power-sharing provisions, with specific attention to different types of power sharing and the distinction between permanent and transitional guarantees. A binomial logistic regression analysis of conflict termination reveals strong support for the central expectations of this study. Settlements that include provisions for permanent power sharing are significantly more likely to result in peace, all else equal, while transitional arrangements have no effect. I then selected a best-fit case exhibiting change over time in order to examine the underlying mechanisms at work. Through extensive field research in Uganda, including interviews with rebel and government representatives and archival and secondary research, I sought to understand why members of the insurgent party eventually rejected four of the five settlements signed, and what conditions allowed them to continue fighting for a more favorable bargain.

My research indicates that settlements are more likely to succeed in resolving conflict where they include provisions for power sharing over the long term. Such guarantees increase the willingness of rebels to surrender their weapons, and they create more diffuse benefits and long-term time horizons throughout the leadership, which reduce the potential for splintering. These findings offer a number of contributions to the literature on conflict resolution and post-conflict power sharing. Most importantly, they show that including permanent and transitional formulas under the same umbrella concept have led to faulty and contradictory conclusions about the effectiveness of power sharing. In addition, by disaggregating the way that the benefits of a settlement are perceived across the rebel elite, this project helps to explain why many are signed that have few prospects of success,

and it provides lessons for identifying such bargains before they can degenerate into renewed conflict. Finally, the theory departs from the common focus on coercive third-party enforcement of peace agreements by emphasizing the rationality of rebel decisions to comply or defect and showing that settlements are most effective where insurgents prefer compliance—namely, where the benefits offered outweigh the costs of both continued fighting and democratization. This suggests a different role for the international community in peace processes, specifically in disseminating new norms and strategies for engineering institutions, rather than investing in costly peacekeeping missions.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

Allied Democratic Forces	ADF
Congolese Rally for Democracy	RCD
Democratic Republic of Congo	DRC
Federal Democratic Movement	FEDEMU
Front for National Salvation	FRONASA
Holy Spirit Movement	HSM
Lord's Resistance Army	LRA
March 23rd Movement	M-23
Movement for the Liberation of Congo	MLC
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda	NALU
National Congress for Defense of the People	CNDP
National Democratic Alliance	NDA
National Federal Army	NFA
National Resistance Army/Movement	NRA/M
Ninth of October Movement	NOM
People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy	PPRD
People's Redemption Army	PRA
Save Uganda Movement	SUM
Uganda Freedom Fighters	UFF
Uganda Freedom Movement	UFM
Uganda National Liberation Army	UNLA
Uganda National Liberation Front	UNLF
Uganda National Rescue Front	UNRF
Uganda National Rescue Front II	UNRFII
Uganda Patriotic Movement	UPM
Uganda People's Army	UPA
Uganda People's Congress	UPC
Uganda People's Defense Force	UPDF
Uganda People's Democratic Army/Movement	UPDA/M
Ugandan Democratic Alliance	UDA
West Nile Bank Front	WNBF

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1

Introduction

The Settlement of Domestic Armed Conflict:

Questions, Theories, and Research Design

More than any other conflict in recent history, the war in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has proved a quagmire for international peacekeepers and an enigma for academics. The Second Congo War began after the overthrow of the notorious dictator Mobutu Seso Seko in 1997, and is considered to have officially ended with the signing of "The Final Act," an agreement culminating the peace process known as the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations in 2003. Most observers hailed the bargain as revolutionary in the degree to which it was inclusive of the multitude of Congolese armed factions that were active at the time, as well as in its much-celebrated "1+4" formula, which allocated four Vice-Presidency positions among the ruling party, the two largest rebel parties, and the unarmed political opposition (Koko 2007).

While the 2003 settlement eventually paved the way for democratic elections, however, it ultimately failed to prevent the recurrence of conflict among its signatories. More than a year after it was signed, an estimated 1,000 people were still dying each day as a result of the conflict according to the International Rescue

Committee.[1] Approximately 20,000 peacekeepers remain active in 2015, with an operating budget of $US 1.4 billion per year. In total, more than $US 10 billion has been spent on peacekeeping efforts in eastern DRC since the United Nations mission was launched in 1999. Investment by the international community—in terms of both monetary and human resources—is second only to the post-war effort in the Balkans, a mission that was considered successful and terminated after only a few years.

The failure of peacekeeping in eastern DRC has been attributed to a number of factors, including the vague and often contradictory mandate of the UN mission, partisan favoritism of the various mediators, opportunities for predation on natural resource wealth, manipulation by regional powers, the country's extreme diversity and rivalries between ethnic groups, a lack of infrastructure and weak state capacity (Rogier 2006; Lemarchand 2007; Koko 2007; Bouvier and Englebert 2005; Ahere 2012). Few have taken a critical look at the terms of the 2003 agreement in order to consider why it was no more effective than its predecessors at resolving the conflict. Since negotiations were launched in January 1999, attempting to realize a peaceful settlement in the DRC has been like fighting the mythical Hydra: cut the head off one rebel group by striking a bargain, and three more crop up in its place from within the hierarchy of the original movement. Two groups were active at the time the first agreement was signed and failed in January 1999, four when negotiations resumed in 2002, and—after two more failed agreements—five groups were included in The Final Act while a sixth was left out.

Much of the proliferation of rebellions resulted from splintering among one group: the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). In fact, three of the five rebel parties included in the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations were factions that had split from the original RCD movement. The year after the final settlement was reached, a senior officer in one of these factions, Laurent Nkunda of RCD-Goma, defected from his position in the transitional government and renewed his insurgency under the banner of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). While there has been a tendency to point to the failure of peacekeepers in the Kivus, at least one account of these events frames the emergence of the CNDP as

[1] Most died due to starvation, malnutrition and preventable diseases, rather than directly due to violent attacks. This helps to explain why the conflict slipped under the radar after 2003, since most quantitative measures focus on battle-related deaths between the state military and armed militias, specifically. While it is difficult to obtain reliable information on conflict deaths in eastern Congo, a number of sources indicate that there was ongoing violence directly related to rebel movements active in the region.

a strategic response in light of the incentive structures created by the 2003 bargain itself:

> The RCD was aware of its lack of popularity among Congolese and had little hope of winning in the 2006 elections. For the RCD leadership, the new rebellion was a means of keeping their influence in the eastern Congo in the case of electoral defeat. Their fears came true: In presidential and parliamentary polls, the RCD wasn't able to garner more than 5 percent of the vote.[2]

In the literature on war-to-democracy transitions, it is often argued that merely agreeing to share power should make rebels more willing to lay down their arms, since the government has shown a commitment to incur costs in order to avoid further bloodshed (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). As this account shows, however, democratization can prove just as risky for the insurgent party as continuing to fight, perhaps even more so, which generates incentives to resist disarmament.

Contrast the RCD-to-CNDP story with that of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), another rebel signatory to The Final Act. The MLC effectively disarmed and transformed into a legitimate political party during the transition period, and it currently represents the most viable opposition to Kabila's party in the Congolese Parliament. A poll conducted in 2002 indicated that the MLC had majority support in its home region of Equateur, making the MLC leadership more willing to disarm and compete under a proportional representation (PR) system than the other rebel movements that had agreed to the same terms in 2003 (Caryannis 2008, 7; Stearns 2011, 229).[3] Such electoral competitiveness is rare for former rebellions, however, particularly when competing against an entrenched incumbent. Traditionally conceived power-sharing arrangements often fall short of transforming the electoral balance of power, mitigating the incumbency advantage, or guaranteeing the safety and representation of threatened minorities.

As a case in point, although the 2003 "Final Act" is often framed as a comprehensive exercise in power sharing, the provisions of the settlement failed to fundamentally alter the political landscape of the DRC (Lemarchand 2007). A closer look at the settlement reveals that, although the various insurgent parties were

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[2] Stearns, Jason (2011), *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*, New York: PublicAffairs, p. 323.

[3] The MLC's presidential candidate, Jean-Pierre Bemba, was runner-up in the 2006 general election, and the party received the second largest share of seats in the National Assembly the same year: 64 seats, compared the PPRD's 111.

given a minority voice in designing the country's new constitution, all of the power-sharing institutions that comprised the transitional government of national unity were designed to expire with the general elections held in 2006. In this light, it is not only the impending expiration date of peacekeeping missions (Downs and Stedman 2002), but also of the institutions that give belligerent parties a stake in the post-conflict transition, which generates incentives for groups to retain their capacity to resort to violence. As the uncertainty that characterizes the immediate post-settlement period gives way to indications about the way the balance of power is ultimately going to pan out, groups that lack guarantees about their future access to power and resources have a heightened incentive to defect while they still have the ability to do so.

The trend of splintering and renewed rebellion has continued unabated, and even seems to have become embedded in the social and political fabric of eastern DRC. Among rebel leaders, experience has led to low expectations about the prospects for legitimate, long-term cooptation into Kabila's power hierarchy, since any promises made during previous negotiations were eventually revoked.[4] In 2009, a unilateral bargain struck with one faction of the CNDP resulted in the launch of the March 23rd (M-23) rebellion. Four years later, negotiations with the M-23's political wing prompted the neglected military wing to unilaterally defect and fire on the multinational peacekeeping force, giving the UN the justification it needed to wipe out the remnants of the group.

Despite the defeat of the M-23, the prospects for lasting peace in the region remain weak. Since 2000, uncoordinated and undisciplined militias under the loose umbrella of the "Mai Mai" movement have emerged under the auspices of defending local communities. In reality, they have fueled the trade of conflict minerals, produced a cadre of career rebels, and generally contributed to an atmosphere of insecurity. Although it is impossible to rewrite history, it is worth considering whether the failures of the 1999-2003 peace process are rooted in the nature of the bargain itself, and whether different terms might have prevented the emergence of patterns of defection and violence that now make the realization of an effective and durable solution unlikely.

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[4] For example, rather than integrate the rebels into the national military, Nkunda was initially given leadership of a semi-autonomous military to handle security in North and South Kivus. After the election, however, Kabila began a process of full integration at all levels of the DRC military. Rebels' demands for a quota system in the state security apparatus had been neglected in the new constitution. Also, despite committing to decentralize power to the provinces in the 2003 settlement, Kabila appointed loyalists as provincial governors rather than the representatives chosen by the rebel parties at the peace talks, as expected (Boshoff and Rupiya 2003; Rogier 2006).

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, following from the DRC story presented above, I elaborate on the puzzle that motivates the dissertation project. Next, in Section III, I describe my theory about when and where insurgents are likely to preemptively defect from a negotiated settlement. I argue that the relatively high cost of unilateral compliance causes the rebel party to resist demobilization until it can develop concrete expectations about the benefits it will receive from the government. If the expected payoffs fail to outweigh the cost of continued war, then defection is a rational response. Moreover, since the process of implementation often generates winners and losers within the rebel party, disgruntled elites have an incentive to defect both from the settlement and from their own group.

Section IV specifies the scope of the study and provides definitions of the central concepts: "negotiated settlement" and "power sharing." Section V describes the original, cross-national dataset of negotiated settlements constructed specifically for this study. In Section VI, I elaborate on my use of a nested design in order to address the central research questions, which combines the cross-national analysis with an in-depth case study of peace processes in Uganda. Section VII concludes with an overview of the plan of study for the dissertation.

1.2 The Puzzle

Since the end of the Cold War, negotiated settlements have become an increasingly common method of resolving domestic armed conflicts (Licklider 1995). This has coincided with a normative shift in the international community, as the world superpowers have started to turn their attention toward the quality and stability of governance in their trading partners and allies.[5] Even as it is becoming increasingly difficult to turn a blind eye to the human suffering caused by war, direct military intervention is also viewed as costly, risky, and potentially counter-productive (Howe 1996; Luttwak 1999; Von Hippel 2000; Weinstein 2005).[6] Without an explicit settlement, especially one that specifies an end date to the

[5] Nisha Fazal (2014) shows that the increase in settlements signed as a mechanism to resolve domestic conflict has corresponded with a decline in the frequency of peace treaties signed at the end of interstate conflicts.

[6] The failed U.S. mission in Somalia in 1991 is often cited as the premier example of this (See Fortna 2008). In the academic literature, it is blamed for ushering in an era of anarchy, warlordism and clan-based warfare. In international policy circles, the embarrassment of the mission's failure was used to justify future resistance to intervene in cases of extreme ethnic violence in Rwanda and Darfur.

transition period, peacekeeping is viewed as a temporary stopgap that threatens to entrench foreign actors in protracted domestic conflicts. The standard approach of international interventions is to encourage belligerents to sit down together and reach a workable solution, wherever possible.

With or without international involvement in the peace process, negotiated settlements have been signed in an attempt to resolve civil conflicts on six continents, and in contexts as diverse as the United Kingdom, the Philippines, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In some countries, the initial bargain was successful; others went through multiple settlements before realizing an effective solution. Some governments choose to pursue all-inclusive peace processes, while others—like Colombia and Chad—prefer to deal with insurgencies separately. Given such variation, generalized conclusions about the prospects of peace via settlement remain elusive. Are negotiated settlements an effective mechanism of conflict resolution? Why are some settlements successful, while most fail to achieve peace? In what ways does the content of a settlement, as well as the context in which it is signed, affect the incentives for signatory parties to stick to their commitments? These are the central questions motivating this dissertation project.

Although the international community continues to promote the settlement of conflicts via bargaining, the academic perspective is less optimistic. Toft (2010) finds that negotiated settlements are less stable outcomes of civil war than outright military victory for either governments or rebels. Others have suggested that it is the involvement of third-party guarantors, and not the settlement itself, that actually reduces the risk of conflict recurrence (Walter 2002; Collier et al. 2008; Norris 2008). Does a negotiated settlement actually have the potential to impact the prospects for peace, or is it better to just let belligerents fight it out until one side wins?

Conclusions about the effect of power sharing as a method of conflict resolution are similarly mixed. International pressure recently led to power-sharing arrangements in order to prevent post-election violence from escalating into full-scale civil war in Zimbabwe and Kenya.[7] Where conflicts have already broken out, power-sharing formulas are part of the standard package promoted by international mediation teams, and a few studies have found that agreeing to share power is an indication that bargaining parties are more willing to stick to their commitments and avoid returning to war (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

[7] See Cheeseman and Tendi (2010).

Yet, it is often suggested that perspectives on the ground are more pragmatic, even pessimistic, about the value of post-conflict power sharing (Sisk 2000; Spears 2000). According to one account, "[l]ook at Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire. If that's power-sharing, I'm not for it."[8] Case studies describe notable examples in which power-sharing settlements failed to prevent the continuation of armed conflict. The most commonly cited is Angola, where first-round results of the post-conflict elections for president sent UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi back to the bush (Ottoway 1998; Spears 1999).[9] Other studies have described power sharing as an inherently unstable, *ad hoc* solution, which has the potential to reproduce perverse incentives, particularly the reliance on violence as the optimal strategy to access power and resources (Sisk 1996; Tull and Mehler 2005; Jarstad 2006; Mukherjee 2006). Is this perspective justified, or can power sharing improve the prospects for post-settlement peace? If so, under what conditions?

In addressing the variation in peace via negotiated settlement, particularly as it relates to power sharing, this project has the potential to influence the international policy circles working on conflict resolution. It provides suggestions about where and in what ways negotiated settlements are likely to prevent conflict recurrence. More specifically, it lays out both theory and evidence about the incentive structures that exist during the process of implementing a settlement, demonstrating that preemptive defection is often a rational response for insurgents, as well as specifying strategies for addressing and overcoming these incentives.

1.3 Theory of Preemptive Defection

The field of conflict resolution has produced is a well-developed literature that explains bargaining during the first phase of a peace process—specifically, why parties choose to negotiate and sign a settlement, rather than continue fighting until one side wins (Licklider 1995; Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999; Walter 2002; Toft 2010). In addition, the comparative literature has addressed the quality and stability of democracy and power-sharing institutions after a post-conflict transition, phase three of a peace process (Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Norris 2008; Lijphart 2008). The theoretical focus of this study is

[8] Burkina Faso resident, quoted in John Darnton's "Africa Tries Democracy, Finding Hope and Peril," (*The New York Times*, 21 June 1994).
[9] Other favorites are Lebanon (Seaver 2000; Zahar 2005; Kerr 2006), Ethiopia (Harbeson 1999; Keller and Smith 2005), and Rwanda (Khadiagala 2002; Lemarchand 2007; Traniello 2009; Stettenheim 2002).

on phase two, the implementation period, when parties to a settlement decide whether or not to comply with their commitments or to defect to the battlefield. It is in this area that the two fields converge—the IR approach to conflict resolution and the comparative approach to regimes—and, perhaps as a result, the findings and conclusions on this topic are more mixed.

There is, however, a degree of theoretical coordination, as arguments about settlement success tend to rely on the logic of commitment credibility and costly signaling. Most famously spelled out by Barbara Walter (2002), commitment theory posits that peace is difficult to achieve via negotiated settlement because both sides retain the capacity to resort to violence, while information asymmetries, mutual suspicions, and the lack of an overarching enforcement mechanism mean that parties' credibility is particularly low. International involvement plays an important—even necessary—role in binding bargaining parties to their commitments (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008; Matanock 2012). In this framework, power sharing has been argued to provide a signal that groups are willing to incur costs rather than return to the battlefield, which helps to overcome the credible commitment dilemma and stabilize a post-conflict transition (Mukherjee 2006; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

Despite the emerging theoretical consensus, however, the classic bargaining model fails to predict much of the empirical variation in settlement success. This problem largely results from a failure to adequately theorize the nature of incentives and decision-making that exist during the implementation period, which ultimately determines whether conflict terminates or continues. Walter (2002) and others assume that belligerents should choose not to sign a settlement unless its implementation is perceived as essentially guaranteed, suggesting that the success of a settlement is predetermined. The empirical record suggests otherwise, as many more settlements are signed than are actually executed (Downs and Stedman 2002), and only about one in three are associated with peace. The IR literature on treaties and contracts lays out a number of reasons that a government would choose to sign an interstate bargain, which are independent of the expectation that rival parties will comply with the terms—examples include battle fatigue, the inclusion of additional "collateral," international pressure, legitimacy-seeking behavior, and concerns about one's reputation vis-à-vis other actors in the international system (Tomz 2001, 2008; Fazal 2014). Therefore, in separate but related literatures, the likelihood that signatories will comply with the provisions of a contract is not assumed to be endogenous to the decision to sign it; a number of factors at work

during the implementation period are likely to have an independent effect on decision-making.

Rather than focus on the reasons that belligerent groups choose to sign a settlement—which are varied and multifaceted—the goal of this project is to develop an understanding about decisions to comply or defect after a settlement has been finalized and signed. The theory I put forth departs from classic commitment theory in two important ways. First, I emphasize the asymmetrical cost associated with compliance for the government and rebels. More specifically, rebel compliance necessarily entails demobilization and disarmament, which results in the loss of both bargaining power and the capacity to coercively bind the government to uphold the terms of the bargain.[10] For its part, the government never truly demobilizes, since it always retains a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and, therefore, the option to return to the battlefield. In this light, the risk of unilateral compliance is substantially higher for rebels. At the same time, however, resisting compliance is not the same as choosing to defect; the optimal strategy for rebels is to wait and see what the government actually intends to offer in exchange for demobilization.

Instead of assuming that parties make their decisions simultaneously—resulting in the worst-case outcome in a classic prisoners' dilemma scenario—an improved bargaining model considers what would happen if group decisions are made sequentially. Unlike rebels, government compliance with a settlement entails implementing the substantive terms. Although the reforms outlined in the agreement likely come at a cost to the incumbent, there are generally a number of relatively low-cost concessions—such as releasing prisoners of war or appointing representatives to an oversight commission—that can serve as initial gestures of good will and put parties on the path toward compliance.[11] The process of implementation involves multiple rounds of decision-making over the medium-term,[12] during which parties constantly update their beliefs and preferences based

[10] To be included in the population, a negotiated settlement must be understood as the final solution to the conflict by its signatory parties. In this way, the cessation of violent activities and the demobilization of insurgencies are requisite terms for all settlements.

[11] As I discuss at length in Chapter 2, the multiple rounds of decisions made by the incumbent party determine the trajectory of the post-conflict regime change. If the formal institutional changes envisioned in the settlement are implemented and used by both parties, the post-conflict regime becomes routinized and stabilized (Young 1982; Krasner 1983; Rothchild 2005). This study is interested in whether conflict terminates or continues, and it is therefore explaining the decision of rebels to either comply or defect that is the central goal.

[12] Post-conflict transitions are usually designed to last between six months and two years, depending on the relative comprehensiveness of the settlement terms.

on information that is revealed by the behavior of their rivals. For Hartzell and Hoddie (2007), this is why delays in compliance and incomplete implementation need not result in conflict recurrence, if the terms that the government *does* implement are sufficient to satisfy insurgents.

As rebels delay demobilization and observe the behavior of the government party, the incentive to preemptively defect—while the capacity to do so still exists—increases if there are indications that the government intends to defect *or* that rebels will not benefit sufficiently from the implementation process. By accounting for variation in the value of actual benefits perceived by rebels during the implementation period, in contrast to "signaling" arguments, my theory helps to explain the way in which power sharing reduces the cost of compliance for rebels and improves the prospects for peace. It also illuminates the reason that rebels often choose to defect from a settlement even when the government largely complies, resulting in democratization without peace. Since the government party's incumbency advantage is likely to reinforce its hegemonic position and restore the status quo, power-sharing guarantees are usually necessary in order to offset the risk to rebels of participating in post-conflict elections (Arriola and Johnson, forthcoming).

This logic also helps to explain the mixed conclusions about power sharing in the literature. By failing to acknowledge the asymmetrical risk of unilateral compliance, previous studies have glossed over the difference between transitional institutions and more the more long-term regime reforms envisioned in permanent power-sharing provisions. Most conflate power sharing with temporary measures that are intended to expire with the holding of post-conflict elections, such as elite "pacting" or governments of national unity (Sisk 1996; Spears 2000; Wantchekon 2000; Jarstad 2006), which fail to effectively alter the status quo in a way that guarantees insurgents—and the sociopolitical communities they represent—access to power and resources in the future. In this light, settlements that include provisions for permanent forms of power sharing should reduce the incentives for preemptive defection during the implementation period and, therefore, the potential for conflict recurrence.

Moreover, permanent forms of power sharing are not only more likely to satisfy the top echelon of a rebellion, but they also create more diffuse and long-term benefits that reduce the potential for infighting and spoiler behavior among the rebel elite. This points to the second important contribution of my theory about preemptive defection: it acknowledges the potential for rebel splintering. Although

it is standard in the literature on ethno-political violence to focus on preferences among group elites—those with the capacity to organize and mobilize their followers for violence or peace (Wilkinson 2000; Brass 1998)—insurgencies often have structures that include distinct hierarchies, factions and levels of elites (Kydd and Walter 2006; Kalyvas 2008; Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2011; Lidow 2011; Cunninham 2006, 2013). In the absence of long-term power-sharing reforms, the process of cooptation during the implementation period is likely to produce more selective benefits, generating winners and losers within the rebel leadership. Although the incumbent might be successful in coopting certain elements of the rebel leadership, particularly those with whom the initial bargain was reached, others might find themselves neglected and have an incentive to defect unilaterally.

Whether or not rebel splintering results in conflict recurrence, however, depends on whether disgruntled elites are able to access the resources of war—recruits, weapons, financing, barracks, and safe haven—particularly since the coopted leadership supports compliance and demobilization (Weinstein 2005, 2007; Kalyvas 2008). I highlight two factors that affect this capacity. On the one hand, defecting leaders might attempt to mobilize defection within their own ranks. A government party with a reputation for defecting on its agreements in the past provides an easy target for suspicious and accusatory rhetoric, allowing neglected elites to play on existing fears in order to convince troops to abandon the process of disarmament.

On the other hand, particularly if the process of demobilization is too far advanced, rebel leaders might resort to forming an alliance with active insurgencies in order to continue fighting and attempt to secure a more favorable bargain in the future. Particularly where there are a large number of armed groups in a given country-conflict, it is not only more difficult to reach a settlement that appeases the multitude of interests and demands, but it is also more likely that groups overlap in terms of ethnic identity, regional base, or ideology, thereby facilitating such an alliance. Resentment caused by being excluded from the peace process and the spoils being divided might make groups even more likely to act as spoilers by forming alliances with defecting elites (Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2006).

In sum, the theory of preemptive defection suggests that the relatively high risk associated with unilateral compliance should make rebels unwilling to disarm until given a sense of the benefits that the government is willing to offer. Without permanent power-sharing guarantees, the risk of democratization and the potential for future exclusion should increase the likelihood that rebels will defect prior to

conceding their military capacity. If, however, the government is able to effectively and selectively coopt certain elements of the rebel leadership, then the potential for continued conflict is determined by whether neglected combatants have the capacity to return to the battlefield. Disgruntled rebel elites might rely on accusatory rhetoric to mobilize defection from within their own ranks if the government has a reputation for behaving badly during peace processes, or they might turn to active rebellions that have been excluded from the peace process in order to share the resources of war.

1.4 Scope and Definitions

The present study encompasses all negotiated settlements to domestic armed conflict signed since 1975. Prior to the 1970s, the concept of power sharing was not widely recognized as part of the toolkit of conflict resolution. It was Arend Lijphart's (1969) seminal work on the consociational democracies of Western Europe that first shed light on the idea that institutions could be engineered to balance and accommodate competing ethnic communities in order to avoid the onset of conflict. Aside from the exceptional case of Cyprus (1947), which was designed and bolstered by external powers in order to prevent violence from escalating into an international crisis, power sharing as method of resolving conflict was first attempted in the late-1970s in the Philippines (1976) and Chad (1978, 1979). Thus, the inclusion of settlements signed before this period would fail to shed light on the comparative impact of power sharing.

I use the phrase "domestic armed conflict" deliberately throughout the dissertation, as the term "civil war" has recognized connotations in the literature. Specifically, a conflict is required to reach the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths in order to meet the definition of civil war; in contrast, a domestic armed conflict implies only that at least 25 deaths occurred in any single year. This greatly expands the universe of cases for comparison and, if a slightly less wieldy term, is rapidly becoming the more standard baseline, thanks in large part to the increased availability of data on smaller-scale conflicts (Pettersson and Walersteen 2015).

The focus of this study is on intrastate conflict, even though much of its theoretical foundation is borrowed from the field of international relations (IR). The framing of negotiated settlements as a form of contract signed under conditions of relatively anarchy, for example, borrows from the IR literature on bargaining and

states' reputations.[13] Although Lijphart and his cohort developed our understanding of power sharing as an exercise in comparative democracy, the contemporary literature on power sharing as a mechanism of conflict resolution is more firmly rooted in the IR subfield. Unlike the resolution of interstate conflicts, however, the goal of power sharing is to design institutions in order to effectively accommodate former belligerents who have to share the same political space after the conflict ends. For this reason, I omit from the sample any settlements that end in secession or independence for the insurgent party, as well as those in which the primary signatories are the international or regional parties involved in the conflict, as in Sri Lanka (1987), Azerbaijan (1991, 1994), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1999).[14]

This project does not attempt to answer the question of where settlements are more likely to be signed, or where power sharing is more likely to arise—Phase One of a peace process.[15] Scholars who have addressed this topic often argue that belligerents submit to a settlement when the costs of the bargain are outweighed by the costs of continuing to fight, signaling that the conflict has reached a "mutually hurting stalemate" (Zartman 1985; Licklider 1995; Mason and Fett 1996; Mason et al. 1999). Walter's (2002) classic bargaining model, on the other hand, assumes that belligerents would only choose to sign a settlement if there are guarantees in place that the terms will be implemented. Thus, in the developing literature that focuses on Phase One, it is suggested that settlements are signed where conflicts are already ripe for resolution and, therefore, that the prospects for peace are revealed by belligerent parties' willingness to sign. However, the empirical evidence reveals

[13] Fazal (2014) suggests that insurgents use negotiated settlements as a mechanism to gain legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of the international community, even as governments are increasingly less interested in signing treaties at the end of their international conflicts. Like Tomz (2001, 2008), she argues that treaties embed states' obligations in a legal framework that is both explicit and public, which most governments want to avoid at the end of a war. On the other hand, this function serves the interests of insurgents, who are generally in a relatively weaker position vis-à-vis the state and, therefore, have an interest in securing a contract that will make violations clearer and easier to punish.

[14] The goal is to determine whether a settlement signed between a government and rebels can prevent the recurrence of conflict between the same parties. If the conflict ends in secession, the potential for the recurrence of domestic conflict between the two groups is removed entirely, even if violence might continue in one or both of the newly created territories—as was the case, for example, in South Sudan and Eritrea. Moreover, while international actors might be involved as mediators, facilitators, or peacekeepers during a peace process, the primary signatories should be the government and rebel contingents. Otherwise, there is no indication that the rebel party has explicitly accepted the bargain and agreed to demobilize. See, for example, Kerr (2006) on "imposed power sharing."

[15] In Chapter 4, I briefly consider the conditions that lead bargaining parties to include power-sharing provisions in a settlement, and whether these conditions independently impact the likelihood of conflict termination, in order to address the potential for bias in the population.

that the majority of settlements fail to resolve the conflict—only about one in three settlements result in peace. Therefore, there is reason to believe that, despite groups' expectations or preferences at the time of signing a settlement, whether a peace agreement "sticks" or breaks down depends on the decisions made during the implementation period (Downs and Stedman 2002).

The trajectory of a regime after the conflict ends—Phase Three—is also beyond the scope of this study. In contrast to the successful Western European cases of consociational democracy, some scholars have suggested that power sharing is ill suited to post-conflict transitions in the developing world (Sisk 1996; Spears 2000). The argument is that such institutions are less adaptable to changing social and economic conditions, that they detract from legitimate competition while entrenching patronage networks, and that they impede the consolidation of democracy (Norris 2008, 2009).[16] I cannot refute these claims based on the current analysis. However, the central focus of this project is about realizing peace, which I contend is a necessary prerequisite to long-term political stability and democratization.

This dissertation project focuses on what happens during Phase Two, the implementation period, or the period between the signing of a settlement and the effective disarmament of insurgents. In light of the variation in the provisional content of negotiated settlements, both in type and in degree, developing a valid, multidimensional index of implementation raises serious comparability problems (Downs and Stedman 2002). The few studies that *have* looked at implementation tend to measure it dichotomously—yes or no—which clearly fails to capture the complex, nuanced nature of decision-making (Walter 2002; Harbom, Hogbladh and Wallensteen 2006; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). Is full compliance with a settlement that has only one substantive provision comparable to full compliance with one that has twenty? Should full compliance with a simple settlement be considered "better" than partial compliance with one that is particularly complex?[17] And how do delays in the implementation timeline impact a case's score? Even more troubling, existing studies too often conflate implementation with peace (Downs and Stedman 2002), which makes it impossible to know whether implementation of the substantive

[16] See especially Roeder and Rothchild's (2005) edited volume for lessons about where power-sharing regimes may (or may not) work.

[17] Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) argue that more comprehensive settlements might make full compliance less necessary, since the different types of power-sharing provisions increase rebels' perceptions that at least some component of the settlement will address their interests.

provisions of the settlement (compliance by the government) is actually impacting the likelihood of conflict termination (compliance by insurgents).

In order to avoid these pitfalls, I acknowledge the centrality of the immediate post-settlement period while avoiding the temptation to measure implementation itself. My goal is to theorize about the incentive structures that exist after a settlement is signed, as both parties attempt to maximize their payoffs while conceding as little as possible to their rivals. This approach is both broader and more nuanced; it assumes that groups—and the factions within them—continue to act strategically after an agreement is reached and, in this way, that the implementation process rarely goes exactly the way it is envisioned or intended in a settlement. Moreover, it distinguishes the strategic process of implementing the substantive terms from rebels' decision to comply with or defect from their commitment to demobilize, which ultimately determines the central outcome of interest: peace.

As the literature on the topic of peace via settlement grows, so too do the terms, definitions, and typologies employed. I provide a more thorough conceptual analysis of negotiated power-sharing settlements in Chapter 3, which justifies and clarifies the definitions I use in this study. To briefly summarize, the key concepts are defined as follows:

Negotiated settlement: a *negotiated settlement* is a written peace agreement that is mutually accepted by the government and at least one rebel party, and that includes one or more substantive solutions intended to maintain the peace. The "substantive" requirement is intended to distinguish negotiated settlements from ceasefires, which are typically understood to be unstable and prone to violations.[18] The types of substantive solutions that qualify are broad; they include amnesty, peacekeeping, and electoral timetables or reforms, as well as provisions on power sharing. In cases where a peace process involved multiple rounds of ongoing negotiation that resulted in distinct agreements on various issue areas, the texts are combined into a single, comprehensive settlement. In contrast, some country-conflicts involve multiple settlements because an initial agreement degenerated into renewed violence, and belligerents later went on to reach a fresh bargain. These settlements are included separately in the dataset.

[18] I contend that this claim about ceasefires provides cursory support for my theory. The compliance option is the same for insurgents in a ceasefire as in a negotiated settlement: disarmament. In contrast, a ceasefire puts no requirements on incumbents to allocate substantive benefits. Given this, the fact that it is common for insurgent parties to preemptively defect from a ceasefire should come as no surprise.

Power-sharing settlement: I define a *power-sharing settlement* as a mutually accepted peace agreement that explicitly allocates decision-making rights and resources among subnational collectivities within a territorial state. In other words, the concept represents a subset of negotiated settlements—specifically, those that include precise provisions for the allocation of power to either the rebel party or the sociopolitical group that it represents. My definition also requires that the envisioned reforms outlast a transitional period, as opposed to temporary "pacting" solutions, which merely shift the nexus of conflict from the battlefield to the post-conflict election. There are two broad subtypes of power-sharing provisions. *Inclusive* power sharing incorporates the elites of relevant segments in entities of joint governance and political or military decision-making, while *diffusive* power sharing devolves power or reallocates resources to the group level.

1.5 The Data

While a handful of cross-national studies have identified some of the conditions under which the prospects for settlement success are higher (Walter 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad 2006; Jarstad and Nillson 2008), a significant amount of variation remains to be explained. This study draws on an extensive process of data collection on negotiated settlements to domestic armed conflict. First, I identified a total of 138 events that met my definition of a negotiated settlement between 1975 and 2005.[19] A complete list of cases included in the dataset is provided in Table 1.1. A variety of sources were used to obtain the full text of each settlement, including existing databases on peace agreements, government websites, non-governmental organizations, and media publications.[20] While reading each settlement, I completed a rubric with qualitative descriptions and citations of relevant provisions in order to justify my quantitative coding decisions. Coding descriptions, justification, and citation information for each case are provided in Appendix C.

[19] Events were identified using a wide range of sources, including the UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement Dataset, Conciliation Resources, Ulster University's International Conflict Research Institute, the United Nations Peacemaker database, and the United States Institute of Peace.

[20] In a handful of cases, the text was not located, so I relied on descriptions of the content of the settlement provided in news articles, the UCDP Peace Agreement database and in Keesing's Record of World Events.

Table 1.1. Negotiated Settlements Signed between 1975 and 2005 (N =138).

Settlement Name	Country	Year	Conflict Ends?
Peshewar Accord	Afghanistan	1992	No
Jalalabad Agreement[21]	Afghanistan	1993	No
Mahipar Agreement	Afghanistan	1996	No
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements	Afghanistan	2001	No
Bicesse Accords	Angola	1991	No
Lusaka Protocol	Angola	1994	No
Agreement with UNITA-Renovada	Angola	1999	No
Memorendum of Understanding	Angola	2002	Yes
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord	Bangladesh	1997	Yes
Washington Agreement	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1994	Yes
Dayton-Paris Agreement	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1995	Yes
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement	Burundi	2000	No
Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government and the CNDD-FDD	Burundi	2002	No
Pretoria Protocol for Power-sharing[22]	Burundi	2003	No
Accord de Partage de Pouvoir	Burundi	2004	Yes
Paris Peace Agreement	Cambodia	1991	No
Khartoum Agreement	Chad	1978	No
Benghazi Accords	Chad	1978	No
Fundamental Charter	Chad	1978	No
Kano Accord	Chad	1979	No
Lagos Accord on National Reconciliation in Chad	Chad	1979	No
El Geneina Agreement	Chad	1992	No
Tripoli I Agreement	Chad	1993	No
Bangui-2 Agreement	Chad	1994	Yes
Abeche Agreement	Chad	1994	No
Dougia Accord	Chad	1995	No
National Reconciliation Agreement	Chad	1997	No
Donya Agreement	Chad	1998	No
Reconciliation Agreement	Chad	1999	No
Tripoli 2 Agreement	Chad	2002	No
Yebibou Agreement	Chad	2005	No
Uribe Accords	Colombia	1984	No
Political Pact, M-19	Colombia	1989	Yes
Final Accord, PRT	Colombia	1991	Yes
Final Accord, EPL	Colombia	1991	No
Final Accord, Quintin Lame	Colombia	1991	Yes
Final Accord, Comandos Ernesto Rojas	Colombia	1992	No
Final Accord, CRS	Colombia	1994	Yes
Coexistence Accord, Medellin militias	Colombia	1994	No
Final Accord, Frente Garnica	Colombia	1994	No
Final Accord, MIR-COAR	Colombia	1998	Yes
San Francisco Agreement[23]	Colombia	2001	No
Sante Fe de Ralito Accord	Colombia	2003	No

[21] Also includes the "Islamabad Accord."
[22] Also includes the "Global Ceasefire Agreement."
[23] Also includes the "Los Pozos" agreement.

Agreement on the transitional arrangements in the Comoros[24]	Comoros	2003	Yes
Linas-Marcoussis Accord	Cote d'Ivoire	2003	No
Accra II Agreement	Cote d'Ivoire	2003	No
Accra III Agreement	Cote d'Ivoire	2004	No
Pretoria Agreement	Cote d'Ivoire	2005	No
Erdut Agreement	Croatia	1995	Yes
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement	Democratic Republic of Congo	1999	No
Sun City Agreement	Democratic Republic of Congo	2002	No
Global and All-Inclusive Agreement	Democratic Republic of Congo	2002	No
Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations-The Final Act	Democratic Republic of Congo	2003	No
Agreement on Peace and National Reconciliation	Djibouti	1994	No
General Agreement on Reform and Civil Concord	Djibouti	2000	Yes
Chapultepec Peace Accords	El Salvador	1992	Yes
Transition Charter of 1991	Ethiopia	1991	No
Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement	Georgia	1994	Yes
Queretaro Agreement	Guatemala	1991	No
Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace	Guatemala	1996	Yes
Abuja Peace Agreement	Guinea-Bissau	1998	No
Governor's Island Agreement	Haiti	1993	Yes
Bodo Accord	India	1993	Yes
Tripura Memorandum of Settlement	India	1993	No
Bodoland Territorial Council Accord	India	2003	Yes
Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement	Indonesia	2002	No
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government and the Free Aceh Movement	Indonesia	2005	Yes
Declaration on Principles of Interim Self-Governance	Israel	1993	Yes
Gaza-Jericho Agreement	Israel	1994	Yes
Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities	Israel	1994	Yes
Interim Agreement on West Bank and Gaza Strip	Israel	1995	Yes
Hebron Agreement	Israel	1997	No
Wye River Memorandum[25]	Israel	1998	No
Sharm el-Sheik Agreement	Israel	1999	No
Tripartite Accord	Lebanon	1985	No
Taif Accord	Lebanon	1989	Yes
Interim Political Authority Act	Lesotho	1998	Yes
Yamoussoukro IV Accord	Liberia	1991	No
Cotonou Agreement	Liberia	1993	No
Akosombo Agreement	Liberia	1994	No
Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement[26]	Liberia	1994	No
Abuja Accord	Liberia	1995	No

[24] Also includes Fomboni I and II Agreements.
[25] Also includes "Wye II Agreement."
[26] Also includes the "Accra Clarification."

Abuja II Agreement	Liberia	1996	No
Comprehensive Peace Agreement	Liberia	2003	Yes
Ohrid Agreement	Macedonia	2001	Yes
Tamranasset Accord	Mali	1991	No
Pacte National/Bamako Peace Pact	Mali	1992	Yes
San Andres Accords	Mexico	1996	Yes
Agreement on Principles of a Peaceful Settlement	Moldova	1992	Yes
The Acordo General de Paz (AGP)	Mozambique	1992	Yes
Bogota Accord	Nicaragua	1984	No
Yatama Peace Initiative	Nicaragua	1988	Yes
Toncontin Agreement	Nicaragua	1990	Yes
Paris Accord	Niger	1993	No
Ouagadougou Accords	Niger	1994	No
Definitive Peace Agreement	Niger	1995	Yes
Agreement Between Government and UFRA and FARS	Niger	1997	Yes
Bougainville Agreement	Papua New Guinea	1976	Yes
Honiara Declaration	Papua New Guinea	1991	No
Bougainville Peace Agreement[27]	Papua New Guinea	1998	Yes
Tripoli Agreement	Philippines	1976	No
Jeddah Accord	Philippines	1987	No
General Agreement for Peace between the Government and the RAM-SFP	Philippines	1995	Yes
Mindanao Final Peace Agreement	Philippines	1996	Yes
Agreement by the Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front	Philippines	1997	No
Tripoli Agreement on Peace	Philippines	2001	No
Accords de cessation des hostilitiés en République du Congo	Republic of Congo	1999	No
Khasavyourt Accord[28]	Russia	1997	No
Arusha Accord	Rwanda	1993	No
Agreement Between Government of Senegal and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance	Senegal	1991	No
Agreement Between Government of Senegal and the MFDC	Senegal	2001	No
Zinguinchor Peace Agreement Between Government of Senegal and MFDC	Senegal	2004	No
Abidjan Agreement	Sierra Leone	1996	No
Lome Peace Agreement	Sierra Leone	1999	No
Abuja Ceasefire	Sierra Leone	2000	No
Honiara Peace Accords	Solomon Islands	1999	No
Townsville Peace Agreement	Solomon Islands	2000	No
Marau Peace Agreement	Solomon Islands	2001	No
Addis Ababa Agreement	Somalia	1993	No
Cairo Declaration on Somalia	Somalia	1997	No
Declaration on Structures and Principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process	Somalia	2002	Yes
National Peace Accord	South Africa	1991	Yes
Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities	Sri Lanka	1995	No

[27] Also includes the "Lincoln Agreement."
[28] Also known as the "Moscow Peace Treaty."

Agreement on a ceasefire between the Government and the Tamil Tigers	Sri Lanka	2002	No
Koka Dam Declaration	Sudan	1986	No
November Accords	Sudan	1988	No
Political Charter between the Sudan Government and the SPLA	Sudan	1995	No
Political Charter	Sudan	1996	No
Khartoum Peace Agreement	Sudan	1997	No
Fashoda Peace Agreement	Sudan	1997	No
Cairo Agreement	Sudan	2005	Yes
General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan	Tajikistan	1997	Yes
Nairobi Peace Agreement	Uganda	1985	No
Pece Agreement	Uganda	1988	No
Addis Accord	Uganda	1990	No
Yumbe Agreement	Uganda	2002	Yes
Good Friday Agreement	United Kingdom	1998	Yes
Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo	Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	1999	Yes

The data also include a number of additional measures of factors that have been argued to affect the potential for peace, independent from the content of a settlement. Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2008) point out that nearly half of all civil wars are not new, but episodes of conflict relapse, and scholars in the field have identified many of the structural factors that are associated with reduced risk of conflict recurrence. Omitting these variables has the potential to introduce bias and endogeneity into the data, since it is possible that they influence the likelihood that a settlement is signed or that power-sharing provisions are included, as well as independently determining the potential for peace.

Third-party enforcement is the most commonly cited factor in the literature (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008; Collier et al. 2008). It is possible that the involvement of international actors in a peace process might result in power sharing as well as in a peacekeeping mission. Other factors associated with conflict recurrence are low levels of economic development, weak states, and conflicts of longer duration and greater intensity (Collier et al. 2008; Walter 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Poor, weak states might be more willing to offer power-sharing concessions to insurgents, rather than face the cost and risk of continuing to fight. On the other hand, insurgents that have fought longer conflicts and suffered more deaths might be more willing to accept a settlement without power-sharing guarantees. If the presence of power sharing is actually picking up on other structural conditions that ultimately determine the prospects for peace, then any effect of power sharing might be spurious. I employed a range of existing datasets in order to control for the potential impact of these conditions (see Chapter 4).

The novel dataset improves on those used in previous studies in a number of ways. Most importantly, it relies on the negotiated settlement as the unit of analysis. It has been more common in the relevant literature to use conflict outcomes as the starting point in order to compare whether the risk of conflict recurrence is higher among cases that end in settlement versus those that end in outright victory for government or rebels (Licklider 1995; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Downs and Stedman 2002; Toft 2010; Fortna 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). In cases as diverse as Nicaragua, Cote d'Ivoire and Papua New Guinea, an initial settlement failed to end the conflict, but a subsequent settlement succeeded under similar conditions. Settlements have also failed to prevent the escalation of conflict, as in Rwanda and Sri Lanka, where war continues either until one side wins or beyond the end of the relevant time period. The population in my data includes all settlements, failed and successful, no matter how the conflict ultimately ended, and thereby avoids censoring valuable data.

Using the negotiated settlement as the starting point also allowed me to employ a lower threshold of violence, as previously discussed in the conceptual distinction between "civil war" and "domestic armed conflict."[29] I was able to expand the sample by first checking the signatories of settlements I identified against inclusion in existing datasets, particularly the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Wallersteen 2015), while also conducting my own follow-up research on conflicts and rebel groups that were left out for various reasons.[30] An independent research project I conducted with Aila Matanock also enabled me to confirm conflict start and end dates using an extensive search of media sources, particularly in order to accurately code for rebellions that are not included in existing datasets.[31]

Ultimately, this strategy allowed me to greatly expand the size of the sample when compared to previous studies of negotiated settlements. It also increases variation on the dependent variable, conflict termination,[32] thereby improving leverage on the statistical analysis.[33] Moreover, the expanded sample warrants an updated reading of the settlement texts, since many of the cases in my sample were not included in previous datasets on peace agreements. I did so with an improved, more rigorous conceptualization of the subtypes of power sharing, described more thoroughly in Chapter 3. Wherever possible, I also checked my coding of the provisional content of settlements against as many existing datasets as possible and consistently found over 90 percent correlation with my coding decisions.[34]

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[29] Traditionally, studies of conflict termination and recurrence rely on the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) to identify conflicts, which requires a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths for inclusion (Walter 2002; Licklider 1995). More recently, others have started to use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Wallersteen 2015), which lowers the minimum to 25 deaths per conflict-year (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jartstad and Nillson 2008).

[30] For example, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset requires that one side of the conflict is the state military, which censors many years of domestic conflict in anarchic conditions, as in Liberia in the mid-1990s or more recently in Somalia, when several settlements were signed among the belligerent parties. It also excludes micro-states, such as the Solomon Islands. Measures of conflict intensity are included in the data to control for the possibility that the potential for post-settlement peace in lower-level conflicts is driven by different mechanisms.

[31] Matanock, Aila, 2014, "Violent Votes" (Paper presented at the Workshop on Non-State Actor Data, Philadelphia, PA, 9 October).

[32] Conflict termination entails the cessation of violent activities among all signatories to a negotiated settlement within six months of its signing, and lasting for at least five years.

[33] Compared to the 138 settlements included in my dataset, Walter (2002) includes only 22, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) 26, and Jarstad and Nillson (2008) 83.

[34] Including Walter (2002), Hartzell and Hoddie (2007), Hogbladh (2011), Harbom et al. (2006), and Matanock (2012). The data used by Jarstad and Nillson (2008) has not been made available.

Taking a cursory look at the data, the frequency of negotiated settlements increases significantly after the end of the Cold War, as expected (Licklider 1995): just 20 settlements were signed in the first half of the time period (1975-1990), compared to 118 settlements in the second half (1991-2005). The success rate also increases after the Cold War ends—25 percent achieve peace before and 38 percent after 1990. It is common to point to the increased involvement of the international community in explaining this trend, yet precisely in what capacity remains unclear. The data reveals that the proportion of settlements including provisions for comprehensive, long-term power-sharing reforms increased from 30 percent to over 40 percent in the second half of the time period. It is perhaps in this way—either by directly affecting the way that institutions are engineered, or by adapting and disseminating norms—that the international community might have the most positive influence on peace processes and not, as commonly argued, in merely enforcing ceasefires. I revisit this discussion in Chapter 8.

1.6 Research Design and Case Selection

In order to test my theory of preemptive defection against alternative explanations for conflict recurrence, this study employs a nested design (Lieberman 2005). First, I conducted a cross-national analysis of negotiated settlements to domestic armed conflict, employing the original dataset described in the previous section. The results of the cross-national analysis are consistent with my central hypotheses about conflict recurrence, even while controlling for preexisting structural conditions, lending support to the theory about when insurgents are likely to preemptively defect.

Despite the advantages of the dataset described in the previous section, however, my ability to draw causal conclusions from these results is limited. Specifically, because the study is based on observational data, it is impossible to randomly manipulate the provisional content of a settlement.[35] In particular, the potential for selection bias continues to pose a threat. If, for example, willingness to sign a settlement is indicative of both parties' battle fatigue, then conflict termination might be a foregone conclusion.[36]

[35] The relatively small number of cases makes it difficult to identify a sufficient number of "most similar" pairs in order to attempt statistical matching techniques, while maintaining balance on the large number of context- and context-related independent variables.
[36] I address the problem of selection bias more directly in Chapter 4.

In order to examine the plausibility of the causal mechanism underpinning my theory, I relied on an in-depth case study. With consideration of the findings from the cross-national analysis, Uganda was selected as the country case of interest for a number of reasons. First, with five peace processes in the relevant time period, the within-case analysis exhibits sufficient variation on the central variables of interest, while controlling for many of the structural factors often argued to affect the likelihood of conflict recurrence. In particular, national-level variables like GDP per capita (Collier et al. 2008; Walter 2004), the strength of the state (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000), and ethnic diversity (Lake and Rothchild 1998; Sambanis 2001) remain relatively constant. Of the 48 countries included in the dataset, Uganda is not an outlier on any of these structural control variables, so there is little reason to believe that the conclusions drawn from this case discussion are not generalizeable to other conflicts. Moreover, it is a "best fit" case in terms of the outcome of the peace processes, each of which is accurately predicted by the results of the regression analysis (See Table 1.2).[37]

Second, Uganda is the origin of the term "consociationalism." David Apter (1961) first developed the concept in his description of the unique political system in post-independence Uganda—specifically its combination of decentralized kingdoms and national-level, multiethnic coalitions. Soon after, the term was made famous by Lijphart (1969, 1977) in his application of the concept to the Western European archetypes of Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands. This suggests that the potential to realize a successful power-sharing solution would have been especially high in Uganda after the Bush War (1981-1985), particularly because others working in the field would later agree that "a history of elite accommodation" is one of the most important favorable factors for building power-sharing institutions (Bogaards 1998; Lemarchand 2007). Considering this, it is puzzling that, as violent conflict has continued on a lower scale, only one settlement signed since the end of the Bush War includes provisions for sharing power (See Table 1.2). Interestingly, the Yumbe Agreement (2002) is also the only settlement associated with conflict termination.

[37] One of the peace processes—that with the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) in 1986—resulted in a verbal agreement but not a signed settlement. Because of this, it is not included in my cross-national dataset of negotiated settlements. The implications of the absence of an explicit contract on sharing power are described in more detail in Chapter 6.

Table 1.2. Variation across five peace processes in Uganda, 1985-2002.

Peace Agreement	Parties	Conflict Termination?	Negotiated Settlement?	Power-sharing settlement?	Inclusive?	Reputation for Defection?
Nairobi Agreement (1985)	(G) Military Council (R) National Resistance Army	No	Yes	**No**	Yes	No
Verbal Agreement (1986)	(G) National Resistance Movement (R) Uganda National Rescue Front	No	**No**	No	Yes	**Yes**
Pece Accord (1988)	(G) National Resistance Movement (R) Uganda People's Defense Army	No	Yes	No	No	**Yes**
Addis Accord (1990)	(G) National Resistance Movement (R) Uganda People's Defense Movement	No	Yes	No	**No**	Yes
Yumbe Agreement (2002)	(G) National Resistance Movement (R) Uganda National Rescue Front II	Yes	Yes	**Yes**	No	Yes

NOTE: Under parties, (G) refers to the government and (R) refers to the rebel group. The first settlement was signed in December 1985 with Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) as insurgent party. Less than two months later, the NRA succeeded in deposing the ruling Military Council and taking over the capital, Kampala. Museveni has been President of Uganda ever since, and his NRM party served as government party in the four subsequent peace processes with various insurgencies. In each case, the primary variable emphasized in explaining the outcome, conflict termination, is highlighted in **bold**.

The case study presented over three empirical chapters is the culmination of nearly two years in the field. My goal was to establish a timeline of events, as well as the beliefs and preferences of key decision-makers, in order to trace the processes through which four out of five settlements failed. Wherever possible, I conducted open-ended interviews with former insurgent leaders and ex-combatants, as well as anyone who directly observed the peace process in question: government representatives, legal counselors, mediators, and third-party facilitators. A complete list of interview subjects is provided in Appendix B.

Unfortunately, however, most of the relevant peace processes took place over 25 years ago, making the identification of and access to ideal interview subjects difficult. Many of those in the high command of the defunct rebellions are now deceased. In this light, I also collected as much information as possible from news reports, radio transcripts, press releases, and NGO assessments, which helped me to

identify the rhetoric and reasoning employed by rebel leadership in their decisions to defect. I was also fortunate to locate a 2008 survey of former members of the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), which helped me to identify the ways in which elite rhetoric was translated into beliefs among the rank-and-file—those whose defection facilitated the continuation of armed conflict (Mwesigye 2010).

Contemporary Uganda is an ideal location for conducting research on topics related to civil war and resolution. Compared to many other post-conflict countries, it has a relatively stable and open political system. The last military coup occurred nearly thirty years ago, and Yoweri Museveni and the NRM are still in control of the state. By now, the government includes a large number of former rebels, who are both accessible and comfortable enough in their positions to speak openly about the war and the process of cooptation. There are also independent media sources available to counteract accounts given in the state-owned newspaper and radio transcripts. For these reasons, there are a number of existing studies on rebellion in Museveni's Uganda.[38] To my knowledge, however, this is the first study that provides a structured comparison of the five peace processes that ended in signed settlements and, in particular, that shows the processes of internal splintering and inter-group alliances among some of the lesser-known insurgencies.

1.7 Plan of Study

The first part of the dissertation, which consists of Chapters 2 and 3, attempts to develop and connect the theoretical and conceptual foundations of this study. In Chapter 2, I explain the logic behind my theory of preemptive defection, which I contrast with the more standard theories about commitment credibility and costly signaling. I also draw on this logic to elaborate three testable hypotheses, which are the central focus of the cross-national test and the case study.

Chapter 3 provides a conceptual analysis of negotiated power-sharing settlements. It first describes the precise difference between negotiated settlements and other types of conflict outcomes, which serves as the basis for identification of the population for study. Next, it elaborates a typology of the power-sharing provisions that might be included in a settlement. Although the categorization of power-sharing provisions is my own, it derives from a thorough examination of the

[38] By far the best overview is Janet Lewis's (2010) analysis of the emergence of insurgencies, especially in explaining the ways in which they become viable threats to the state. More commonly, the focus is on the infamous Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony.

concept across approaches from both international relations and comparative politics. Most importantly, in light of the theory of preemptive defection laid out in Chapter 2, it employs more rigorous criteria for identifying provisions for sharing power, which requires that envisioned reforms outlast the transitional period as part of a long-term restructuring of the regime. This exercise serves as the basis for my operationalization of key variables included in the cross-national dataset.

Part II presents the quantitative, empirical test of the argument. In Chapter 4, I conduct a cross-national analysis of negotiated settlements to domestic armed conflict, based on the process of data collection previously described. It provides strong evidence in support of my expectations. Specifically, when power sharing is defined and measured using the more rigorous criteria outlined in Chapter 3, it significantly improves the likelihood that a negotiated settlement will result in conflict termination.

The next three chapters, Part II, are case illustrations of the underlying mechanisms at work in the theory, which are based on my field research in Uganda. Chapter 5 describes the "Nairobi peace jokes." In the first post-Bush War peace process, a settlement was reached to incorporate Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) into the coalition Military Council that toppled Milton Obote in 1985. The absence of guarantees for long-term power sharing failed to appease Museveni, who was unwilling to submit to the outcomes of post-conflict elections, leading the NRA to defect and continue its military capaign. Soon after, the NRA succeeded in capturing the capital and, as a result, Museveni would represent the government party to negotiations in future peace processes.

Chapters 6 and 7 examine the bargaining process between the NRA/M government and the Uganda People's Democratic Army/Movement (UPDA/M) and the Uganda National Rescue Front I and II (UNRF), respectively, each of which resulted in two distinct settlements. In the case of the UPDA, the absence of power-sharing provisions led to a process of selective cooptation into the NRA/M, resulting in splintering among the insurgent elite. The disgruntled UPDA officers relied on accusations about Museveni's behavior during the Nairobi "peace jokes" in order to mobilize followers to resist disarmament. A second settlement signed with the group's exiled political wing resulted in yet another process of selective cooptation, leaving the rebellion substantially weakened. The remnants of the UDPA joined forces with a new rebellion that had arisen in the North but was excluded from the peace process, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). This alliance would serve as the foundation for the infamous Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

The UNRF followed a similar trajectory after a verbal agreement in 1986 resulted in cooptation of the group's political wing. However, the absence of other active insurgencies in the region meant that excluded elites had to mobilize defection exclusively from within their own ranks. They succeeded in doing so, again, by launching accusations about Museveni's reputation for defection from his peace agreements. When the leaders of the subsequent rebellion, the UNRFII, initiated a second peace process in 2002, they used Museveni's negative reputation to their advantage. By employing similar rhetorical tools, this time in order to justify delaying disarmament until the key terms of the settlement had already been implemented, they were able to secure more favorable terms than any other insurgent party: namely in the form of permanent power-sharing guarantees. This settlement, more than any other in Uganda's history, resulted in a definitive end to the rebellion in question.

Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the findings of this study and a discussion of their implications. In particular, it highlights concrete strategies for policy-makers interested in domestic conflict resolution. Finally, I address remaining problems with the study, as well as questions and avenues for future research.

Part I

On Peace Via Power Sharing:

Connecting Concept and Theory

2

A Theory of Preemptive Defection:

Reconsidering Strategies during the Implementation Period

Despite increasing scholarly attention to the topic of post-conflict transitions, variation in the implementation of negotiated settlements has been poorly theorized and measured in the literature. It is during this period of a peace process that rival groups' obligations have been made known and each party makes its decision to comply with these obligations or not. It is these decisions that, in turn, determine the trajectory of the post-conflict transition and whether the conflict ultimately ends or continues. In this light, developing a valid theory of peace via power sharing requires a reexamination of our current understanding of the strategies and incentives that affect decision-making during the implementation period.

Conceptually, settlement implementation is often conflated with conflict termination (Downs and Stedman 2002). For example, Walter (2002) defines a "successfully implemented settlement" as one in which there has been sufficient "good-faith" effort to fulfill the terms, as well as resulting in peace for at least five years. This makes it impossible to conclude whether the terms of a settlement have any independent affect on the resolution of conflict, or if peace is predetermined by

the same conditions that lead belligerent parties to sign the bargain in the first place.

Perhaps due to the inherent difficulty of constructing a valid comparative measure, cross-national studies of implementation have been exceptionally rare.[39] Those that do attempt to theorize about this period tend to rely on the logic of costly signaling: since the commitments parties make in a settlement lack credibility, conflict resolution is most likely when groups provide sufficiently costly signals of their intentions to comply. Many have argued that power sharing provides an indication of the government's willingness to incur such costs (Rothchild 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008), while for others, power-sharing arrangements are subject to the same credibility problems that undermine the bargaining process more generally (Sisk 1996; Spears 2000; Jarstad 2006). For Walter (2002) and Bekoe (2005), no form of signaling is sufficient without third-party enforcement to coercively bind parties to their commitments. As it stands, therefore, commitment theory falls short of generating consistent conclusions or expectations about the role of power sharing during the implementation period.

At the same time, focused case studies have contributed to this debate by reaching strikingly mixed conclusions about the implementation of power-sharing settlements in specific contexts.[40] While these have produced key insights about the variation that exists empirically, the literature lacks a refined theory about decision-making during the implementation period that is generalizable across cases. What are the decisions that determine whether settlements effectively resolve conflict, or else degenerate into renewed conflict? Is it possible to identify and predict the conditions that influence these decisions across countries and across conflicts? How is the current understanding of the nature of decision-making during the implementation period limited by the predominant model of bargaining for peace?

This chapter aims to address these questions by developing a theory of when and why it is rational for insurgents to preemptively defect from a settlement, which

[39] Examples include the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset; Walter (2002); Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) for military power sharing only; and Jarstad and Nillson (2008) for three dimensions of power sharing. Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) do not attempt to measure variation in the *degree* of settlement implementation, however, but variation in the *type* of power-sharing institutions implemented in post-settlement processes and the effect this has on peace. Thus, their analysis does not speak to the relationship between the content of a settlement and the implementation period.

[40] See especially Stedman, Rothchild and Cousen's (2002) edited volume for case studies on Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Rwanda, Cambodia, Bosnia, Lebanon, Liberia and Sri Lanka.

serves as the foundation of the broader dissertation project. First, I analyze the standard bargaining model that currently serves as the foundation for theories of credible commitments and costly signaling. The model and my primary criticisms are laid out in the next section. In light of these criticisms, section III presents a revised model based on my argument that the costs of compliance are asymmetrical. For rebels, demobilizing means forfeiting bargaining power and competing in elections where the government party has the incumbency advantage. Given this, rebels should delay disarmament as long possible, and as a result, the model considers decision-making as sequential, rather than simultaneous. In this light, the rebel party makes its decision to comply or defect with reasonable knowledge of the payoff that the government intends to offer. Moreover, since the payoff has the potential to benefit certain factions of the rebel party more than others, the updated model allows for three possible equilibrium outcomes: defection, compliance, or splintering. Section IV presents three testable hypotheses that arise from the theory of preemptive defection. They consider factors that affect rebels' perceptions about the value of the payoff offered by the government, as well as the potential for splintering to result in conflict recurrence. Section V concludes.

2.2 The Implementation Period: Current State of the Literature

The current understanding of group behavior during peace processes rests on the logic developed by Barbara F. Walter in her seminal book *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (2002), which serves as the theoretical foundation for the subsequent literature on signaling and commitment credibility. The full model follows the process of decision-making by the government and rebels during the entire peace process: in Phase 1, when groups decide whether to negotiate and sign a bargain, and in Phase 2 when groups decide whether to demobilize.[41] Because this study examines cases where a negotiated settlement has

[41] See also Licklider (1995), Mason and Fett (1996), and Mason et al. (1999) for two-party bargaining models in the period leading up the signing of a negotiated settlement. Unlike Walter (2002), who argues that groups will sign a bargain when they perceive its implementation as guaranteed, previous models argued that a settlement should result where a military stalemate increased the perceived costs of continued warfare for both parties beyond the cost of the concessions made in the bargain.

been signed, I focus instead on the behavior signatory parties during Phase 2, the implementation period.[42]

Figure 2.1 provides a simplified version of Walter's (2002) model of decision-making during the implementation period. It shows an interaction between two unitary actors who have signed a settlement: rebels (R) and the government (G). In the game, the available options to both parties are whether to demobilize or not (~).[43] G and R decide which move to make simultaneously and, thus, without knowledge of the other group's decision. The potential outcomes are: continued war (W) if neither demobilizes, hegemony (H) if one side retains its military while its rival demobilizes, "sucker" (S) if one side demobilizes while its rival does not, and democracy (D) if both demobilize. Both players have a preference function of H > D > W > S.

Figure 2.1. Standard model of bargaining in the implementation period.[44]



NOTE: The government (G) and rebel (R) parties make their decision to demobilize or not simultaneously and without knowledge of the other parties' decision. In the best-case scenario, both parties choose to demobilize. However, this decision path results in democratization and a move by "nature," in which elections determine the victor. Since neither party will risk this outcome, the only possible equilibrium is war (W).

[42] Others have analyzed Phase Three of peace process—specifically, the stability and durability of a power-sharing regime after the terms have been implemented. See especially Norris (2008) and Roeder and Rothchild (2005).
[43] In Walter's model, the ~ symbol denotes the alternative option to demobilization, so it can be understood as "not demobilize" or "defect," which is tantamount to choosing continued fighting.
[44] See Walter, Barbara (2002), *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 35).

Although democratization is a preferred alternative to continued war for both players, the decision path in which both choose to demobilize leads to elections, whereby "nature" determines the winner and loser. Since the winner is unlikely to share power with its rival voluntarily, demobilization is perceived as a risky gamble by both parties. As Walter (2002) puts it, "[t]hese equilibrium outcomes show that civil war combatants will not implement any peace agreement if the last play of the game can deliver a devastating loss" (37). As a result, war becomes the only logical equilibrium, since neither party will risk being the sucker. The literature building on this understanding of bargaining emphasizes the credible commitment dilemma: because the commitments made in a negotiated settlement are not binding, the possibility that the rival party will choose to defect means that neither party should risk unilateral compliance.[45]

Scholars in the field search for the kinds of factors that serve as sufficiently costly signals in order to bind parties to their commitments, guarantee that neither party risks being the sucker, and thereby make demobilization and democratization an optimal strategy. For Walter (2002) and others, third-party enforcement is the only condition that makes this equilibrium possible (Stedman 1997; Bekoe 2005; Norris 2008; Matanock 2012). The role of power sharing, on the other hand, has generated more debate. Some argue that a power-sharing bargain fails to shift the equilibrium outcome from continued war, since nothing prevents parties from defecting from their commitments to share power (Sisk 1996; Walter 2002; Jarstad 2006). Others have suggested that power-sharing bargains might be effective if the settlement provides an indication of the government's willingness to incur costs rather than continue fighting (Fearon 1997; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).

Walter's (2002) model revolutionized the literature, and it contributed to a more developed and coordinated understanding of bargaining for peace. On the other hand, in attempting to simplify reality into a unified model, the assumptions underlying commitment theory have resulted in a number of faulty conclusions. For example, Walter (2002) infers that groups would choose not to sign a settlement at all without third-party guarantees that it will be implemented.[46] Empirically, this is

[45] The logic described here is similar to the classic prisoners' dilemma, whereby the inability to coordinate means that players end up defaulting to the worst-case scenario. The key difference here is that, if both parties choose to "demobilize" in order to get the optimal—democracy—an additional decision node exists whereby nature determines a winner and loser, making it even less likely that either party will take the risk.

[46] This is illustrated in the full model, which includes decision-making in Phase 1 ("negotiations" and "bargaining") prior to the signed bargain (Walter 2002, 35).

far from accurate; only one in four settlements include provisions to invite international peacekeepers to oversee implementation, and less than half of those signed involve external mediation. Moreover, this argument ascribes the same explanation to the signing of a settlement as it does to its success, suggesting that peace is a foregone conclusion, when in fact, settlements fail more often than they succeed (Downs and Stedman 2002). Thus, there are a number of problems with the assumptions in the model that, if addressed, would change the expected outcome in important ways.

2.2.1 Unitary actors.

The design of the game between two unitary players—the government (G) and rebels (R)—is misleading in several ways. Intrastate conflicts are often multidimensional, and more than one insurgent group might be involved in, or excluded from, a peace process. Empirically, the average settlement is signed by more than two distinct rebel parties, and only 30 percent of negotiated settlements are inclusive of all existing armed groups in a country. There is an emerging debate about the ways in which these dynamics have the potential to affect the strategies of bargaining parties. For example, excluded groups might act as "spoilers" in order to destabilize a peace process, but it remains unclear what influence this has on the decisions of groups that are included in a settlement, if any (Stedman 1997; Nilsson 2008).

Moreover, there is an overwhelmingly tendency to view bargaining groups as cohesive, unitary actors (Cunningham 2013). In the standard model, group interactions are structured through the elites representing them, and negotiated settlements—particularly those involving power sharing—represent a bargain struck between leaders, thereby providing those with the capacity to mobilize their followers with a preferred alternative to violence (Rothchild and Hartzell 2014, 258; Schneckener 2002, 203; Jarstad 2006). Thus, the decision to demobilize or not is assumed to be made at the group level. In reality, however, insurgencies vary in their structure and internal cohesiveness, even at the elite level. Despite the fact that a rebel commander signs an agreement, officers at various levels of the group might oppose the terms. Settlements are often reached between the government and the political wing of an insurgency, which lack sufficient guarantees to the

movement's military wing, and vice versa.[47] In other cases, it only becomes clear during the implementation period that certain elements of the rebel leadership will be neglected during the process of cooptation.

Recognizing this dynamic has led to increasing awareness of the potential for spoiler behavior to emerge *within* rebel groups (Kydd and Walter 2006). Recent scholarship has improved our understanding of group infighting and splintering by attempting to conceptualize and measure the extent to which insurgencies are internally factionalized (Bakke et al. 2011). With reference to Walter's (2002) model, Cunningham (2013) argues that divided insurgencies generate greater commitment and information problems than cohesive movements, which therefore increase the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

The potential for effective splintering is ultimately determined by the degree to which disgruntled elites retain the capacity to strategically mobilize followers for violence, a dynamic that has been most effectively illustrated through case study research (Atlas and Licklider 1999; Kalyvas 2008).[48] For example, over the course of multiple, failed bargains with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Toft (2006) attributes the proliferation of armed militias to political opportunists within FARC and their access to neglected ex-combatants. In his analysis of Liberia's civil war, Lidow (2011) highlights the importance of credibility within groups in securing the discipline and loyalty of mid-level elites, which ultimately determines the degree of group cohesion. Therefore, in addition to full demobilization or defection, the current bargaining model would be improved by accounting for a third outcome: rebel splintering.

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[47] As a specific example, a change in the political leadership of the M-23 rebel group in eastern Congo led to a divergence in the ideologies of the political and military wings. Having decided that a negotiated solution was preferable to continued violence, the political wing entered into negotiations with the Congolese government in Kampala, Uganda in November 2013. As terms were being discussed and announced to the public, the military wing—led by Sultani Makenga—remained determined to overthrow President Joseph Kabila and the government in Kinshasa. Makenga violated the ceasefire promised by the M-23's political leadership, giving the Congolese government—with the help of the UN mission's (MONUSCO) intervention brigade—an excuse to launch a major offensive on M-23's remaining strongholds and eliminate them through military force. Ultimately, this eradicated the movement's bargaining power, negotiations were suspended, and the political wing was stranded in exile in Kampala.

[48] Kalyvas (2008) stresses that in-group defection is a function of the resources available to elites, suggesting that disgruntled rebel leaders are constrained by their capacity to mobilize and organize followers for continued violence.

2.2.2 Simultaneous decision-making.

Walter's (2002) model assumes that players in the game decide which move to make once, and simultaneously, since "it is unlikely that either side would accept the security risks involved with moving first" (35). In reality, however, the period of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) is a dynamic and multi-stage process. It involves ongoing decisions on both sides about whether to continue complying or to defect before entirely conceding one's military capacity (Lyons 2002, 231). Rothchild (2002) refers to this as "ongoing bargaining encounters at multiple levels" (118).

It is common that settlements are implemented in a gradual, piecemeal fashion until parties are convinced that rivals' intentions are genuine. In the meantime, rebels are likely to hide information about their remaining capabilities in order to retain the option to defect at any point if they feel deceived. Moreover, parties might choose to comply with relatively cost-free terms during earlier rounds of implementation, in order to avoid the risk of being the first-mover and to get a sense of reciprocation from rivals. As Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) put it:

> Each incremental step taken by one party towards establishing the…institutions outlined in an agreement increases the confidence of those scrutinizing these behaviors that the implementing group's commitment to peace is genuine, as reflected by a willingness to absorb the costs tied to these efforts (95).

For example, prior to full demobilization, rebels might send a small contingent of soldiers to a DDR camp in order to observe whether the state provides the amnesty and reintegration packages it promised. On the other hand, comprehensive settlements tend to have detailed timelines that outline a precise order and deadline for fulfilling the various terms, and missing implementation deadlines is likely to generate negative perceptions about rival parties' intentions to comply in future rounds.

Therefore, in contrast to the simplified model, the implementation of a settlement is a progressive and evolving process in which new information about parties' intentions is revealed. In this way, one of the basic microfoundations of the commitment credibility theory fails to hold up: perfect uncertainty. Rather than making decisions in a vacuum, incentives and decisions in later stages are affected by past interactions and behavior, and the uncertainty that exists when the

settlement is signed slowly gives way to new and evolving information as parties reveal their true intentions. Contrary to the current consensus, therefore, parties can make early moves that are relatively low risk, which have the potential to build on each other and generate a willingness to comply with costlier commitments. This helps to explain why, empirically, international involvement is not always necessary to induce full compliance.[49]

2.2.3 Identical options and strategies.

A second problem with the basic model of civil war resolution is in assigning the same options to both the government and rebel parties during the implementation period: G and R choose to either demobilize or not (~). In the case that both parties choose demobilization, the result is democratization (Walter 2002, 35). In reality, however, it is possible—even common—to get elections without peace. In the Republic of Congo, for example, the reforms entailed in the comprehensive settlement signed in December 1999 were largely implemented and elections were held a few years later, yet several of the insurgent parties to the settlement resisted disarmament and continued to ratchet up violence during the electoral cycle.

By nature, Phase Two of a peace process entails entirely distinct behaviors for government and rebel parties. All negotiated settlements include provisions for disarmament and demobilization, yet, as a means to end the conflict, these terms are targeted at rebels.[50] Since the state always retains its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the government party never truly demobilizes.[51] To date, there has not been a single negotiated settlement that calls for the demobilization of the state, nor

[49] There is a wealth of empirical evidence that third-party involvement increases the likelihood of conflict resolution (Walter 1999, 2002; Fortna 2004, 2008; Collier et al. 2008). On the other hand, many critics have pointed to the potentially counter-productive impact of international involvement (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens 2002). For example, Howe (1996) argues that underfunded peacekeeping forces might prolong conflicts and destabilize the region. Moreover, it remains unclear whether third-party enforcement has any impact on the implementation of the substantive terms of a settlement, or merely in overseeing the ceasefire and enforcing rebel compliance (Matanock 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 90-1).

[50] Settlements do not always require rebel parties to disband entirely, particularly where they are given express permission to compete as a political party. However, every settlement requires rebels to dismantle and eliminate war-making capabilities in one way or another.

[51] This point is echoed by Wantchekon (2000), who concludes that a post-conflict transition requires a complete overhaul of the state security sector. This condition would be the closest thing to requiring demobilization by the incumbent. See also Herbst (2003) on sovereignty and Jackson and Rosberg (1982) on juridical statehood.

even for a reduction in the size of the state military. While it is common to require that the military cease its attacks or withdraw from the lines of battle, this does not weaken the state nor eliminate the incumbent's capacity to return to the battlefield in the future.

During the implementation period, the responsibility of the government is to implement the other substantive provisions included in a settlement. These vary across settlements, but examples include political reforms, holding elections, development and rehabilitation projects, and passing amnesty laws. It is in conflating these two meanings of compliance that the literature has failed most clearly in theorizing the nature of the implementation period in a war-to-democracy transition. If the outcome of interest is peace, then it is rebels' decision to comply or defect—demobilize or not—that matters. If the focus is on regime change and democratization, on the other hand, then the behavior of the government party is central.

For a richer conceptualization of this distinction, I turn to Krasner's (1983) theory of international regimes. A regime change is defined not only by changes in "rules and decision-making procedures," but also in the "principles, norms and expectations" that lead to stable and patterned behavior. Figure 2.2 applies the basic model of regime change to a war-to-democracy transition. In the context of civil war, where existing incentive structures have led groups to pursue violent strategies, a negotiated settlement is an agreement about changes in the formal rules and procedures of the regime that are intended to constrain conflict tendencies.[52] If the government party decides to comply with its obligations after the settlement is signed, the changes are reflected in the formal institutions of the regime.

[52] A power-sharing agreement, specifically, is argued to address grievances and reduce the mutual suspicions that degenerated into conflict by providing for the explicit incorporation and accommodation of segmental interests in decision-making processes (Norris 2002).

Figure 2.2. The role of the implementation period in regime change.



NOTE: Compliance by the government during the implementation period entails reforming the formal institutions of the regime. If the government defects from its commitments to implement the reforms envisioned in a negotiated settlement, the rebel party is likely to respond by defecting, leading to conflict recurrence. Moreover, even if the government implements the reforms promised, either party could still defect if the new institutions fail to adequately alter the status quo. If, however, both parties engage with the new institutions over time, informal norms and expectations should become stabilized, resulting in a complete regime change.

For a complete regime change to occur, however, both parties must engage with these new formal institutions over time. It is through prolonged "usage" of the new rules of the game that behavior and expectations are stabilized—the informal element of a regime change (Young 1982; Krasner 1982). Theories about informal institutions stress the ways in which repeated interactions reveal information about group intentions, which thereby generate expectations about rivals' likely behavior in the future (Helmke and Levitsky 2006; O'Donnell 1996; North 1990). During the implementation period, the degree to which parties' behavior converges towards compliance with the terms of a settlement help to determine whether new norms are developed that support peaceful forms of political competition (Diamond 1996; Jarstad 2006, 11; Norris 2002, 295; Rothchild 2002, 117).[53] According to Rothchild (2002):

[53] In *Three Paradoxes of Democracy* (1996), Larry Diamond makes the following point about a democratic regime change: "Over time, citizens of a democracy become habituated to its norms and

> Where such a framework takes hold and the public comes to embrace new political institutions and rules of competition, the regime can be expected to provide all sides with a stake in maintaining the agreement. Then, as trust in institutions and rules of relations grow, a likelihood increases that agreements will be successfully consolidated (118).

In light of this discussion, where the government makes moves to comply with the terms of a settlement, the rebel party is more likely to expect positive intentions and continued concessions in the future, making belligerent parties more likely to interact positively in the new formal institutions and contribute to rebels' willingness to demobilize. On the other hand, where governments defect from their obligations at an early stage of the implementation period, or where prevailing information reveals that the new rules of the game will not adequately alter the status quo, the likelihood of defection and conflict recurrence increases (See Figure 2.2).[54] Another way to think about this is that it is not uncertainty that leads to defection from a settlement, as in the logic of commitment theory, but instead increasing certainty that rebels will not adequately benefit. Examples of the kind of information that might increase such beliefs include pre-polling or electoral outcomes, the degree to which groups appear to "play by the rules" in nascent institutions, or indications that rivals are behaving deceptively.

The failure to acknowledge the different decisions facing the government and rebels during the implementation period has resulted in another faulty assumption: that both parties have identical preference functions, resulting in the same optimal strategy. However, since the decision to comply or not entails distinct behaviors for each party, the relative cost of compliance is also different. From the government party's perspective, the cost of compliance is defined by the content of the bargain—specifically, the nature of concessions intended to maintain the peace. If the terms of a settlement are of a relatively low cost for the government, then the likelihood of

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values, gradually internalizing them. The trick is for democracies to survive long enough—and function well enough—for this process to occur" (104). This point is consistent with Keohane's (1982) analytic distinction between agreements—or *ad hoc,* often one-shot, arrangements—and regimes, which represent the more stable institutional context which facilitate agreements.

[54] Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) point out that minor defections and delays—e.g. "foot dragging"—on the government side need not guarantee the breakdown of a settlement or the re-emergence of violent conflict, since what matters is rebels' perceptions about whether they sufficiently benefit from the changes that *are* implemented. In post-conflict states characterized by weak capacity and high uncertainty, attempting a comprehensive regime overhaul is likely to prove infeasible and enhance the likelihood that the government will defect from certain commitments. However, full implementation may not be necessary if negotiated settlements are comprehensive, such that the provisions that *are* implemented provide sufficient benefits to insurgents in order to discourage recourse to violence.

unilateral compliance is higher, since the incumbent can risk implementing certain provisions without compromising its relative strength vis-à-vis rebels.[55] For example, releasing prisoners of war or allowing displaced populations to return to the country is unlikely to change the balance of power on the battlefield and risk making the government party the "sucker."

In contrast, the cost of compliance for rebels is the same across all settlements, and it is particularly risky. Demobilization means conceding the capacity to use violence strategically and, therefore, the loss of the bargaining power that allowed rebels to secure an agreeable settlement. One notable way in which this helps to predict a different outcome than Walter's (2002) model is by acknowledging the incumbency advantage: submitting to elections is a much riskier proposition for rebels than for the government, since both parties usually expect the incumbent to emerge victorious from post-conflict elections. As the case of Congo-Brazzaville illustrated, therefore, rebel defection and government compliance *is* a possible equilibrium—one that is not predicted by commitment theory.

On the other hand, the terms of the settlement—and the degree to which the government party complies with them—define the potential *benefits* of compliance for the rebel party, which vary across settlements. In this way, the provisions of a peace agreement, as well as the government party's behavior early in the implementation period, affect the cost-benefit analysis of rebels in deciding whether to risk demobilization or not. It is this difference in the relative cost of compliance that forms the basis of my central theory, which explains the conditions under which preemptive defection is a rational strategy for rebels.

2.3 The Theory of Preemptive Defection

As the preceding discussion has shown, the existing bargaining model glosses over the asymmetrical nature of decision-making and group preferences during the implementation period. Unlike for the government party, the cost of compliance is particularly high for rebels, since demobilization negates rebels' ability to bind the government to its commitments and avoid a return to the pre-conflict status quo, in

[55] The state always retains the option to return to the battlefield if it chooses, as discussed in the previous section. In addition, particularly where the status quo is more authoritarian, the government party usually has the option to reverse any provisions implemented early on in the post-settlement period, such as by dissolving a government of national unity. In contrast, demobilization is an irreversible decision for rebels.

which the incumbent remains the hegemon. For this reason, I argue that insurgents have a heightened incentive to resist disarmament and maintain a critical level of military capacity until they are sufficiently satisfied that the incumbent intends to confer benefits that outweigh the costs of demobilization.

Consider the implementation process from the perspective of each party that signed a settlement. For the government, as long as rebels are respecting the ceasefire and not continuing to launch violent attacks, then it is reasonable to move forward with certain obligations, such as by passing an amnesty bill or by setting up commissions for oversight and arbitration. The fact that the government signed the agreement indicates that it would prefer to incur some costs over continuing to fight, and it is logical to begin with some of the easier and less costly provisions in order to encourage rebels to begin assembling for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). As these initial steps are taken, communication is facilitated and information exchanged between the parties, and—especially if rebels start proceeding with DDR—then the government might begin implementing more costly provisions, depending on the terms of the agreement.

Over time, rebels will begin to get a sense of the terms that the government party actually intends to comply with, and those it intends to ignore. Meanwhile, each step taken to comply with the DDR program weakens rebels' capacity and threatens to give the government the upper hand. Considering this, it would be rational for rebels to defect during the implementation period under three conditions. First, if the government appears reluctant to comply with its promises. Rebels have already demonstrated their willingness to fight a war against the current regime, and this still remains the preferred strategy if the government party rejects the agreed reforms. On the other hand, the government might implement many of the agreed terms, but rebels might realize that they do not benefit sufficiently from the reforms. For example, while insurgent representatives might be appointed to a government of national unity, defection might remain a logical strategy before elections terminate the mandate of the transitional government, especially given unfavorable polling results or a biased electoral commission.[56] Finally, the government might implement terms that benefit certain elements of the rebel elite, but not others. After the political wing has been coopted into the executive cabinet, for example, the military wing of a rebel movement might fear

[56] Recall the story from the previous chapter in which the RCD reemerged as the CNDP in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, but the MLC submitted to elections and demobilized.

that the government plans to go on the offensive and wipe them out and, therefore, has an incentive to defect unilaterally.

I propose a modified model of decision-making during the implementation period, which considers the criticisms raised in the previous section and accounts for all three of these rationalities for insurgent defection. For ease of interpretation, the model still relies on a few basic assumptions. First, it focuses on the interaction of two players, the government (G) and rebels (R). Where there are multiple insurgencies involved in a peace process, it considers the interaction between each government-rebel dyad separately.[57] Second, it assumes that groups, or the leaders who represent them, make their decisions voluntarily and are not compelled either to sign the settlement or to comply with it by any external actor. In this way, each party's decision can be understood as rational and self-interested.[58] Finally, for simplification purposes, the model continues to assign one "move" to each player. In light of points raised earlier, each player's move can be thought of as the accumulation of decisions and behavior over time.

A significant modification, however, is that the updated model assumes that the government moves first. Due to the heightened risk posed by unilateral compliance, the rebel party should delay demobilization and disarmament as long as possible; however, delaying is not the same as deciding to defect. In this light, the rebel party's ultimate decision can best be understood as a response to the prior move(s) made by the government. The key implication of this is that R has a reasonable expectation of its likely payoff given the decision to comply or defect before deciding which move to make.

Additional modifications to the standard model are as follows. First, rather than demobilize or not, the options available to each party are "comply" or "defect." For rebels, compliance means demobilization, while compliance for the government refers to the implementation of the substantive terms of the settlement. Second, and relatedly, the central outcome of interest is war (W) or peace, which is a function of rebels' decision to comply or defect.[59] In contrast, the government's

[57] In developing testable hypotheses, I do consider how the dynamics of the game might be affected by the existence of other, excluded insurgencies.
[58] I speak to the implication of this assumption at length in Chapter 8.
[59] The model is interested only in whether the conflict continues or not, and does not try to capture whether one side is the "hegemon" or the "sucker." As I have explained, this is justified by the fact that the government party never truly demobilizes, and therefore does not run the same risk of being the sucker if it complies while rebels defect. In fact, the government generally retains the capacity to reverse any reforms or minor concessions it has implemented if rebels defect, while unilateral demobilization is irreversible for rebels. One of the central assumptions is that rebels should resist

decision to comply or defect determines regime-related outcomes (see Figure 2.2) and, more importantly, defines the payoff offered to rebels. Government defection maintains the status quo (SQ), in which the incumbent is the hegemon and no concessions are offered. Following Walter (2002), government compliance leads to democratization (D), yet it also often—though not always—involves additional concessions. The nature and scope of the government's commitments are outlined in the provisions of the negotiated settlement signed by both players, a package of concessions I label (C). The preference functions for each party are as follows:

G: SQ > C > W

R: C > W > SQ

Although the government prefers the status quo (SQ), continuing to fight means incurring costs; its willingness to sign a settlement is an indication that it hopes to avoid this outcome. However, it is logical that it will attempt to minimize its costs while still avoiding a return to war. When the government moves, therefore, compliance entails democratization (D) and a package of concessions that is likely to be a reduced version of the payoff offered in the settlement. I label the actual payoff offered to rebels during implementation as (c). The cost to the government of complying is defined as (D + c)—the risk incurred by holding elections, as well as the cost of the concessions it intends to honor. Rebels' decision to comply or defect is dependent on the payoff defined by (D + c)—again, the risk they take by competing in elections, as well as the perceived value of benefits in (c).

The basic structure of the game is illustrated in Figure 2.3a, which confirms the expectations laid out above. Once a negotiated settlement is signed, the government (G) first decides whether to comply or defect. Since I am interested in whether conflict ends or continues, I do not attempt a full explanation of the government's decision-making. To put it very simply, since G knows that R prefers continued war (W) to the status quo (SQ),[60] we can assume that G will choose to comply if it can offer a payoff (D + c) that is less costly than the perceived cost of returning to war (W).[61]

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demobilization as long as possible and, as such, the decision to defect should return combatants to the battlefield with the balance of power relatively unchanged, meaning that victory remains up for grabs.

[60] Rebels have demonstrated their willingness to incur the costs of war and fight against the status quo.

[61] Since G chose to sign a negotiated settlement, it is reasonable to assume that it is willing to accept some cost to avoid returning to war. However, G would prefer to avoid the cost of implementing all

Figure 2.3a. Modified model of bargaining in the implementation period.



NOTE: The standard model is modified by considering the "moves" made by G and R as sequential. Because of this, R knows the payoff it will receive by deciding to comply or defect. If G defects, the payoff is the status quo (SQ), and R will choose to defect: the outcome is war (W). If G complies, R's decision depends on whether the payoff (D + c) outweighs the cost of continued war (W), so both war and peace are possible outcomes given that G complies.

Once the government has made its move, rebels choose whether to comply or defect. Given my argument about the relative cost of unilateral compliance for rebels, if G defects, R should always choose to defect as well in order to avoid the payoff of (SQ). On the other hand, if the government appears to comply with its obligations, then R must choose whether to accept the concessions G actually makes. As I have shown, democratization (D) is risky for rebels, since electoral victory for the incumbent—the likely outcome of elections in most cases—is tantamount to a payoff of (SQ) if they demobilize. Therefore, whether rebels choose to comply or not is determined by two factors: expectations about their own electoral competitiveness and the size of the additional payoff (c). If the total expected payoff outweighs the cost of returning to war (D + c > W), then R should choose to comply, and the outcome is peace. However, if the expected benefits are insufficient (D + c < W), then R should preemptively defect before conceding his military capacity. This

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the concessions it promised in the settlement (C), which is why the final payoff revealed during the implementation period tends to include a reduced package of concessions (c).

equilibrium helps to show why defection remains a logical strategy for the insurgent party even in cases when the government complies—in full or in part—with the terms of a settlement.

Next, I consider the possibility that the rebel party is not internally cohesive or unitary, as in the standard model (Walter 2002). The revised model in Figure 2.3b shows what would happen if rebel factions perceive different values for the payoff (c). For example, if the rebel commander who signs the settlement is promised a particularly powerful position in the government or state military, then he is likely to perceive the package of concessions offered by G much more favorably than other elements of the leadership who might not receive benefits from (c).

Consider a third player in the game, R_2, who represents a second faction within the rebel party (Figure 2.3b). First, the representative(s) of the rebellion who negotiated and signed the settlement (R_1) makes a decision about whether to accept the payoff offered by G.[62] If R_1 benefits from (c) such that $D + c_1 > W$, then the logical choice is compliance and R_1 should be coopted into the government. Next, R_2 considers the package offered by G. If $D + c_2 > W$, then R_2 also perceives the package of concessions offered by G to be sufficiently beneficial in order to override the costs of returning to war. The logical decision is compliance and full demobilization, resulting in an outcome of peace. However, if $D + c_2 < W$, then R_2 should choose to defect both from the settlement and from the faction of his group that accepted the payoff. In this case, the result is selective cooptation and rebel splintering (S).

[62] Again, if G defects, then the package offered is SQ. None of the rebel party should perceive this payoff as outweighing the costs of continued war and, therefore, the result is a complete and cohesive defection by R.

Figure 2.3b. Bargaining model with rebel splintering.



NOTE: There are now two players from the rebel party, who make separate decisions about whether to accept the payoff (D + c) offered by G. As the leader of the rebel hierarchy and signatory to the settlement, R_1 makes its decision first. If it rejects the payoff and defects, the entire rebel party defects and the outcome is war (W). If R_1 accepts the payoff and complies, then R_2 considers whether to accept the payoff (D + c). If R_2 rejects the payoff, the result is splintering, but not necessarily war, since R_2 might not have the capacity to return to the battlefield.

The government is likely to be aware of the potential for splintering that exists in its rival, particularly given the information that is revealed during the negotiation process leading up to the settlement. On the one hand, Cunningham (2006) has shown that internally divided insurgencies receive concessions at a higher rate than cohesive groups, which suggests that the governments generally hope to prevent splintering and avoid conflict recurrence. On the other hand, divide-and-conquer might be the optimal strategy for some governments: confer limited benefits in order to effectively coopt part of the rebel leadership and weaken the remnants of the group in order to wipe them militarily. In this light, it is important to note that splintering (S) is not necessarily tantamount to the outcome of continued war (W). If R_1 chooses to defect—since he is more likely to be in a command position and, therefore, have the loyalty of the majority of troops—war (W) is the outcome. If, however, R_1 chooses to comply and demobilize, this decision is likely to leave any neglected factions of the rebellion in a vulnerable position. Therefore, whether or not splintering results in conflict termination or recurrence

depends on the capacity of R_2 to access the resources of war: recruits, weapons, financing, and territory (Kalyvas 2008; Lidow 2011; Weinstein 2007).

The theory presented here builds on the bargaining model that currently serves as the standard in the literature on conflict resolution, but it incorporates my argument that unilateral compliance is relatively costly for insurgents. In so doing, it considers decision-making during the implementation period as sequential, rather than simultaneous. Since it is imperative that insurgents delay conceding their military capacity, the ultimate decision to demobilize or not is made in response to the payoff offered by the government. Therefore, in contrast to the classic prisoners' dilemma that predicts a worst-case outcome, the present model predicts that peace and democratization—the preferred outcome to war for both parties—is a possible equilibrium. In addition, the model accounts for variation in the payoff offered to rebels, both in terms of the total value of the concessions (c) expected, as well as intra-group perceptions of them (c_1, c_2...c_n). Therefore, in order to develop concrete expectations about insurgents' decision to preemptively defect, it is necessary to consider which factors affect the value of the payoff (c).

2.4 Developing Hypotheses: Power Sharing and Rebel Splintering

Having laid out the logic of the theory of preemptive defection, I turn my attention toward developing concrete expectations about when insurgents are likely to defect. First of all, what kinds of benefits can the government offer that would sufficiently raise the value of the payoff for demobilizing? Second, if the expected payoff benefits some factions of the rebel party and not others, what conditions affect the capacity of disgruntled elites to return to the battlefield? I consider a range of relevant literatures in order to generate three testable hypotheses.

2.4.1 *Permanent versus transitional power sharing.*

The classic understanding of decision-making during the implementation period assumes that the best-case scenario, in which both parties choose to comply with the settlement, leads to democratization (See Figure 2.1). As a result, the ultimate "hegemon" would be determined by nature—elections (Walter 2002 35). As I have previously discussed, knowing that the winner of post-conflict elections is

unlikely to share power voluntarily, "combatants who are likely to lose will never agree to participate in elections" (Ibid, 37) and will, therefore, refuse to demobilize.

There is widespread agreement that it is the government party to a settlement who has the advantage in post-conflict elections. In most cases, the incumbent is able to use the resources of the state to cultivate a constituency and build an effective political party, on the one hand, and to manipulate electoral results on the other. Therefore, it is uncommon that insurgent groups expect to win post-conflict elections, particularly under a winner-takes-all system (Lyons 2002).[63]

In light of this risk, classic commitment theory has concluded that rebels should refuse to demobilize unless third-party enforcers are present,[64] yet the precise mechanism remains unclear. For Walter (2002), third-party enforcement raises the cost of defection from the bargain. However, since compliance in the classic model is defined as demobilization, this suggest that peacekeepers merely reduce the capacity of rebels to defect, not that there is necessarily any impact on the behavior of the government beyond respecting the ceasefire.[65] Others have argued that international involvement provides legitimacy, as well as material and technical resources, in the process of transforming rebel groups into effective political parties, thereby making rebels more willing to participate (Bekoe 2005; Soderberg Kovacs 2007; Matanock 2012). However, international actors often have strategic interests of their own.[66] Since peacekeepers tend to view the election as the expiration date of the mission, belligerent parties are still likely to view electoral victory as imperative (Lyons 2002; Downs and Stedman 2002). Insurgents have an incentive to hide information, retain a military capacity, and wait until the peacekeepers' exit provides a window of opportunity for recourse to violence.[67]

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[63] Soderberg Kovacs (2007) shows that variation in the size of rebel groups' domestic support base affects the likelihood that such groups will transform into effective political parties. The example of the MLC rebellion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, described in Chapter 1, is an example of the rare case in which the rebel party was willing to risk participating in elections without additional guarantees, since polling results indicated that they had majority support their region.

[64] In fact, Walter's (2002) model suggests that even guarantees of permanent power sharing will fail to result in a peaceful equilibrium in the absence of third-party involvement.

[65] Lyons (2002) argues that international involvement contributes to demilitarizing the political arena during a post-conflict transition, suggesting that there is some impact on demobilization on both sides.

[66] Walter's (2002) bargaining model deliberately assumes that third parties are not strategic actors (39).

[67] Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2008) find that post-conflict elections do not significantly increase the risk of civil war recurrence, but they do not control for power sharing in order to determine whether permanent guarantees mitigate the risk.

In contrast to commitment theory, my model demonstrates that additional payoffs to rebels have the potential to offset the risk of democratization. Specifically, power sharing is argued to provide belligerent groups a stake in the new regime "regardless of which set of political elites assumes office" (Rothchild 2002, 118). Power-sharing reforms include measures like administrative decentralization and quotas for representation in government—formal regime changes that reduce the necessity for rebels to win post-conflict national elections outright. Moreover, such changes are relatively intractable and difficult to reverse (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008), reducing the insurgent party's fear of risking future exclusion if the incumbent wins the presidency.

In sum, by their nature, power-sharing concessions reduce the winner-take-all nature of impending elections and, as a result, the risk that democratization will be tantamount to accepting the status quo (SQ).[68] On the other hand, where settlements lack permanent power-sharing provisions, even where the government party complies with its commitments, the risk to rebels of participating in elections is likely to encourage preemptive defection.

H_1: All else equal, the inclusion of power-sharing provisions in a negotiated settlement increases the likelihood of conflict termination.

To date, conclusions about the relationship between power sharing and peace have been mixed. Although Walter (2002) and Bekoe (2005) argue that power-sharing guarantees are ineffective without third-party enforcement to reduce mutual vulnerability, others have shown that certain types of power-sharing settlements can provide sufficiently costly signals to resolve conflict (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). However, most previous studies have neglected to make a distinction between permanent and transitional provisions for sharing power.[69] Certain transitional institutions might be crucial in order to ensure that the more permanent elements of the new regime are ultimately realized (Schneckener 2002; Lyons 2002; Norris 2008).[70] However, many scholars mistakenly conflate power sharing with transitional institutions,

[68] A study by Arriola and Johnson (2015, forthcoming) of 118 post-conflict elections shows that the absence of permanent power-sharing guarantees significantly increases the likelihood of *election-related violence*, though it remains unclear whether such violence is perpetrated by the incumbent or by former insurgents.
[69] A notable exception is Norris (2008), who argues that transitional power-sharing institutions may be vital in the sequence of a post-war transition in order to establish a minimum level of state capacity before a more permanent and stable regime change can be implemented.
[70] Examples inclusive electoral commissions, or committees for oversight, arbitration and constitution-writing.

such as elite "pacting" or governments of national unity, which helps to explain why it is so often understood as unstable and prone to conflict relapse (Jarstad 2006; Sisk 1996; Spears 2000; Wantchekon 2000).[71]

By focusing on the ways in which power-sharing concessions help to compensate for the risk of democratization for rebels, my argument calls for distinguishing between permanent and transitional forms of power sharing. A notable example of this distinction is in Angola, where a 1991 settlement failed to guarantee a place in the future government for UNITA leader Joseph Savimbi. An inclusive military commission was established to oversee the transition, yet when the results of the first-round presidential election in 1992 revealed that Savimbi was likely to lose, UNITA defected from the transitional government and returned to the battlefield. This case is often cited by critics of power sharing, yet it provides an apt illustration of the ways in which institutions that are designed to expire with elections fail to guarantee combatants a stake in the resulting regime and, therefore, do little to diminish the primacy of electoral victory.[72]

In light of the theory of preemptive defection, therefore, settlements that include provisions for long-term power-sharing reforms should be less prone to conflict recurrence for two reasons. First, because the rebel high command has explicit guarantees that it will benefit beyond the transitional period, even if the party fails to win the election outright. And second, because even if some of the rebel elite is selectively coopted, the relative "losers" of the cooptation process have reasonable expectations that they will benefit in the future as well. Power-sharing reforms like guaranteed seats in Parliament or the executive cabinet or territorial decentralization create more diffuse benefits, avenues to powerful positions, and space for internal turnover—for example, upward mobility in the political party as the top leaders age and retire, or potential to be appointed to local or regional governance positions. Therefore, by conceding to share power beyond the transitional period, the government offers a payoff that is not only more likely to

[71] According to Lyons (2002), for example, "interim governments are by their nature not legitimated by democratic processes but derive their authority from the extent to which they prepare the country for meaningful elections and turn power over to the winners" (223). See also Shain, Yossi and Juan J. Linz, 1995, *Between States: Interim Government and Democratic Transitions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 3-21).

[72] Perhaps as the exception that proves the rule, El Salvador's FMLN had a strong domestic constituency and expected to perform well in elections. In fact, the insurgency-turned-political-party won the presidency in 2009. Knowing this, the group was willing to risk democratization without provisions guaranteeing permanent power-sharing reforms. However, the settlement signed in 1992 included a large number of transitional measures intended to legitimize the transition and level the playing field between the incumbent and insurgent parties.

satisfy the rebel high command, but also likely to prevent splintering by appealing to the various factions and mid-level elites within the rebel hierarchy.

On the other hand, in the absence of long-term power-sharing guarantees, a process of selective cooptation might occur, in which some of the high command benefit while others are neglected.[73] In this case, disgruntled rebel elites have an incentive to defect, both from the settlement and from their own group, resulting in splintering. Given that the coopted leaders will encourage their forces to demobilize, the potential for splintering to result in conflict recurrence is determined by the capacity of defecting elites to access the resources of war.

2.4.2 Splintering and inclusive settlements.

There is a clear consensus that peace processes are made more difficult where conflicts are multidimensional, or where multiple "veto players" exist.[74] According to Downs and Stedman (2002), where more than two warring parties exist, "strategies become less predictable, balances of power become more tenuous, and alliances become more fluid" (55). A larger number of bargaining parties increases the number of demands that require solutions, making it more difficult to reach consensus on the terms of peace (Mason et al. 1999; Bekoe 2005; Cunningham 2005). Therefore, a high degree of fractionalization among the armed opposition appears to make peace processes more fragile and volatile during the bargaining period.[75]

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[73] For a discussion of feelings of neglect at lower levels of the rebel party, see Kingma (1996) on the psychology of ex-combatants. He argues that the reintegration process often forces insurgents to reconsider their personal ambitions, expectations and social status, which can be a challenging and traumatic adjustment and lead many to feel neglected

[74] By multidimensional, I refer to the number of active armed groups, and not on measures of social diversity more broadly. The literature suggests that more ethnically diverse societies might be less prone to the onset of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). However, ethnic fractionalization appears to make conflicts more recalcitrant and intense once violence breaks out (Fearon and Laitin 2003). I follow Cunningham (2006) in concluding that, in the pursuit of a solution to conflict, the relevant interests to appease are not those among the multitude of societal cleavages, but those groups with the capacity and demonstrated willingness to mobilize violence against the state: the "veto players."

[75] A similar effect seems to exist in Phase Three, after the conflict is resolved and a power-sharing regime is implemented. According to Lijphart (2008), power-sharing regimes appear to be less durable and effective at resolving conflict in the context of heightened fractionalization. Where the number of groups seeking access to the state is especially high, smaller groups are more likely to feel underrepresented and marginalized at the national level. Wilkinson (2000) has argued that power sharing in such contexts creates incentives for peripheral groups to mobilize and agitate for separate forms of inclusion, rather than form broad-based coalitions. At the same time, diffusive forms of

Whether or not all-inclusive settlements, once signed, are more or less effective at resolving conflict has generated more debate. Since not all armed groups in a given country-conflict possess equal strength in numbers, resources, or organizational capacity, a peace bargain is likely to benefit some groups more than others. In this way, the peace process itself is argued to increase incentives for armed groups to engage in "outbidding" in order to increase their perceived strengths vis-à-vis rival groups (Kydd and Walter 2009; Tull and Mehler 2005; Stedman 1997). Moreover, if rebel leaders perceive themselves as relatively disadvantaged or marginalized during the post-settlement transition, a subsequent decision by one group to defect has the potential to destabilize the transition by setting off a domino effect (Werner 1999; Spears 2000; Cunningham 2005). This suggests that dyadic peace processes might be more likely to result in an effective, workable solution that achieves peace, despite the exclusion of active insurgencies (Nilsson 2008).

On the other hand, the literature on elite bargaining suggests that achieving a "fusion of elites" is associated with a number of positive political outcomes (Bayart 1981; Lonsdale 1981; Boone 1994). As Lindemann (2010) argues, where exclusionary bargains fail to accommodate contending social segments, the elites of excluded groups have an incentive to mobilize their constituents in unconventional forms of political dissent. States that fail to achieve a "fusion of elites" are expected to be more prone to the onset of political protests, riots and civil war. Recent work from Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) shows that the onset of rebellion is most likely where those groups that are excluded from the elite bargain have a high capacity to mobilize violence and have engaged in violent conflict in the past. It follows that exclusionary peace processes increase conflict tendencies by encouraging the emergence of new insurgencies, as well as "spoiler" behavior among existing groups, even if peace is achieved on a dyadic level (Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2006). This approach is supported by international policy-makers and peacekeepers, who tend to argue for all-inclusive peace processes in order to avoid the resentments and shifting power balances that lead to conflict recurrence (Kingma 1996).[76]

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power sharing—such as federalism—are more difficult to realize in more diverse polities due to the geographic intermingling of groups (Bolte 2007; Keller and Smith 2005).

[76] According to Massimo (2003), "In order to establish a safe environment and break the security dilemma, it is necessary that all parties be included in the DDR program and disarm at the same time. Otherwise, it is easy for one party to resume fighting, taking advantage of its opponents' disarmament."

My theory focuses on the potential for spoilers to emerge *within* groups (Atlas and Licklider 1999). Where splintering occurs among the rebel party, though, neglected elements of the rebel elite are limited in their capacity to return to the battlefield. Since it is common that the majority of the rank-and-file remain loyal to their coopted leadership and demobilize, disgruntled officers often have to turn elsewhere to access weapons, recruits, and other resources of war (Weinstein 2005; Kalyvas 2008). Where multiple rebel groups exist, alliances between groups tend to be more fluid, and there is likely to be geographic, ethnic, and ideological overlap among them (Downs and Stedman 2002). In other words, a large number of active armed groups—a condition that makes reaching an all-inclusive settlement more difficult—also facilitates the likelihood of alliances forming across rebellions. Particularly where certain insurgencies are excluded from a peace process that confers benefits to their rivals, resentment might make the leaders of excluded groups even more willing to aid defectors from competing rebellions. In this light, I expect that inclusive settlements reduce the potential that rebel splintering will result in conflict recurrence.

> *H_2: All else equal, inclusive settlements are positively associated with conflict termination among signatories.*

This hypothesis focuses on the capacity of intra-group spoilers to return to the battlefield by sharing the resources of war with excluded insurgencies. In contrast to the tendency to view bargaining parties as unitary and internally cohesive, it suggests that attention to within-group dynamics and the fluidity of boundaries is necessary to understand the prospects for peace. In other cases, however, it is possible that rebel defectors are able to return to the battlefield by mobilizing followers from within their own ranks (Mazarire and Rupiya 2000).

2.4.3 Reputation and patterns of defection.

In considering the kinds of factors that might help leaders to mobilize defection, particularly given that others among the leadership are encouraging demobilization, it important to consider the ways in which beliefs are formed and transmitted in theories of bargaining. The credible commitment dilemma is based on the assumption that mutual suspicions are particularly high in the wake of violent conflict, a heightened security dilemma that makes groups prone to wariness and dishonesty. However, as I have previously discussed, the current model does

not adequately acknowledge the ways in which perceptions may be updated over multiple rounds of decision-making during the implementation period, which can ultimately lead low-cost signals to develop into full compliance (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 95).

Similarly, the standard model views group decision-making in a single, discrete game, neglecting the fact that previous rounds of bargaining might shape expectations and beliefs. The process through which group preferences update over multiple rounds is referred to as Bayesian learning, whereby expectations about the behavior of other groups either improve or worsen in light of those groups' prior decisions and actions (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007; El-Gamal, McKelvey, and Palfrey 1993). Such information can result from direct interactions, or by observing rivals interacting in similar situations with other groups (Powell 2004; Wagner 1989; Levy 1994).

According to inter-disciplinary experimental research, levels of trust are significant predictors of behavior in reciprocal bargaining games (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Buchan, Croson and Johnson 1999). Although non-cooperative game theory models suggest that the existence of a second round of bargaining should have no effect on subjects' behavior in the first round, the actions of subjects in the first round *is* shown to affect decisions made in subsequent rounds (Walker and Ostrom 2009). For example, Dickhaut et al. (1997) show that the reputation established by players determines, to a large extent, the behavior of other players in a game of reciprocity. Although player A typically chooses to reciprocate in the first round in order to maximize future payoffs,[77] player A's preferences change dramatically in the second round if player B has established a negative reputation for reciprocating. The reputation of player B is based on her decision to reciprocate (or not) in the first round (Walker and Ostrom 2009; Dickhaut et al. 1997).

In the context of the international political system, which lacks a clear legal jurisdiction or enforcement mechanism, the reputation of a state is similarly shown to have a significant impact on the behavior of other actors. Crescenzi (2007) shows that states with a reputation for hostility and aggression are more likely to be preemptively attacked by other states, for example. In studies on state bargaining,

[77] This does not apply to bargaining for peace, where players' mutual suspicions are already particularly high as result to having fought a war against each other, such that neither would expect its rival to behave charitably. There is variation in the degree of suspicion presumed, however, such as due to the duration or intensity of violence between the two groups (Kaplan 1994; Young 1994; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). The line of argument introduced here suggests another factor that might affect the level of suspicion: reputation.

Simmons (2000, 2010) and Brewster (2009) argue that states' reputations suffer when they violate their commitments to international treaties and contracts. The literature on international contracts is applicable to a study on domestic conflict resolution for a number of reasons. As in the international arena, there is no overriding mechanism to ensure enforcement or compliance and, as a result, parties' commitments lack credibility. Thus, absent mechanisms to guarantee compliance, an intra-state post-conflict transition is similar to the anarchic environment that characterizes the international system (Stein 1982), hence the security dilemma that degenerated into violent conflict in the first place. Moreover, as Tomz (2008) has argued about treaties, negotiated settlements provide clear stipulations and guidelines for implementation, which publicize states' commitments and raise the reputational costs of reneging.

Lessons from this literature suggest, first, that governments that have a reputation for defecting from their peace agreements will need to offer more favorable terms and concessions—or what Tomz (2001) refers to as "collateral"—in order to convince insurgents to sign a settlement in the future. Thus, the initial payoff offered (C) is likely to be higher than in previous rounds and, given perceptions that the government is willing to comply, is therefore more likely to be accepted by the primary rebel contingent (R_1). At the same time, however, the rebel party should be particularly wary of the risk of unilateral compliance given the government's negative reputation, leading to a heightened incentive to resist demobilization. Given any indication that the incumbent is wavering on its commitments—such as antagonistic rhetoric or delays in implementation—preemptive defection is likely to emerge as a rational response. Therefore, even if R_1 accepts the payoff and is selectively coopted, disgruntled elites can still point to the government's reputation in order to mobilize followers. Prevailing suspicions about the government among rebel troops would be reinforced by accusatory rhetoric by splintering leaders, thereby facilitating defection and continued war.

H_3: All else equal, a history of defection by the government party is negatively associated with conflict termination.

In contrast to rationalist theories, this expectation acknowledges the role of history and learning in bargaining for peace. For the government and insurgent groups involved in a peace process, information and preferences update not only during the implementation period, but also over multiple rounds of interacting. The prevailing reputation of the government party is based on its decisions to comply with or defect from settlements it signed in the past with any rebel party, since this

behavior is public. A negative reputation increases rebels' awareness of the risk of unilateral compliance and heightens the potential for preemptive defection. In particular, a government with a reputation for defection increases the potential for rebel splintering to result in conflict recurrence by providing neglected elites with a rhetorical tactic to mobilize followers. An observable implication of this argument is that patterns of defection have the potential to become entrenched as a result of the government's behavior in the initial round(s) of a peace process. Defection can, therefore, become a self-reinforcing norm that is particularly difficult to overcome in future rounds of negotiation, placing a premium on "getting it right" the first time.

2.5 Conclusions

In contrast to the standard model of bargaining used in commitment theory, my theory of preemptive defection reveals sequential decision-making by the government and rebel parties to a settlement. During the implementation period, the cost of unilateral compliance is much higher for rebels, who risk conceding their military capacity and bargaining power. The cost of moving first is lower for the government, since the state never demobilizes or loses its capacity to return to the battlefield. In this light, governments that intend to comply can make initial moves to implement relatively low-cost terms, and given groups' behavior and information exchanges that occur over time, rebels develop a sense of the actual payoff they are likely to receive beyond the transitional period. Rebels' decision to comply or defect, in this sense, is determined by whether the payoff offered by the government outweighs the costs of returning to war. If demobilizing means risking electoral defeat without additional power-sharing guarantees, then preemptive defection remains the rational strategy even if the government complies with most or all of its commitments.

Moreover, since insurgencies are not unitary—as is often assumed—the potential for infighting and splintering is high during the implementation period. Specifically, the payoff offered by the government might benefit some elements of the rebel elite more than others, which creates incentives for the "losers" to unilaterally defect. Governments that have a negative reputation for implementing past agreements are an easy target for accusations from disgruntled rebel elites, particularly as they compete with coopted leaders attempting to convince their troops to disarm. If demobilization outpaces the process of splintering, however, defecting elites will likely have to look elsewhere in order to access recruits,

weapons, financing and other resources of war that will allow them to return to the battlefield. Such alliances become more likely where active insurgencies have been excluded from the peace process.

In light of the theoretical problems in the literature, a conceptual exercise is the first necessary step before testing the expectations I have developed in this chapter. Specifically, the strategic importance of the distinction between transitional coalitions and more long-term power-sharing reforms calls for an updated conceptualization of power sharing. Moreover, it is vital that the concept of a negotiated settlement be specifically and explicitly distinguished from other types of conflict events and outcomes, such that the assumptions about group preferences and strategies during the implementation period are reasonably constant across cases. This is the goal of the next chapter.

3

Negotiated Settlements and Power Sharing:

A Concept Analysis

In order to test the theory developed in the previous chapter, it is first necessary to define the central concepts more concretely. In recent decades, growing attention to the topics of domestic conflict resolution and war-to-democracy transitions among the academic community has corresponded with a proliferation in the conceptual labels and definitions used. As the end of the Cold War diminished the threat and frequency of cross-border wars, scholars of international relations began to focus on conflicts within borders, an issue area traditionally dominated by comparative approaches to managing ethnic violence and institutional engineering (Licklider 1995). The resulting lack of coordination between the two approaches has resulted in a number of problems (Jarstad 2006), two of which are relevant to the current study.

First, IR approaches to the topic tend to rely on the country-conflict as the starting point for analysis. Conflicts are thus viewed as isolated units and are compared in terms of how long they last, how much death and destruction they cause, and how they are resolved, particularly in order to identify and explain the

risk of conflict recurrence (Licklider 1995; Mason and Fett 1996; Mason et al. 1999; Toft 2006, 2010; Norris 2008). To cite an example, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) code the Ugandan Bush War as ending in a decisive military victory with the insurgent NRA's successfully capture of the capital in January 1986. Yet, as my discussion of the Ugandan case will show, the NRA had signed a settlement with the ruling military government less than two months prior to the coup. Similarly, the Bosnian civil war is coded as ending with a negotiated settlement in December 1995, which censors the settlement signed in March 1994 with Croat rebels. In analyzing why some settlements succeed and others fail to resolve conflict, therefore, the appropriate unit of analysis is the negotiated settlement.[78] In understanding settlement as a *potential* outcome of conflict, which may or may not succeed, this begs the question: how do we know a negotiated settlement when we see one?

Second, the increasingly varied approaches to power sharing as part of a war-to-democracy transition has moved the concept increasingly up the ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1976). Scholars from the classic comparative approach rely on Lijphart's (1969, 1977) model of consociational democracy in identifying the elements of a power-sharing regime in post-conflict cases such as South Africa and India. Yet, the influx of IR scholars of conflict resolution to the field in the 1990s resulted in new applications of the concept of power sharing beyond the political arena—from the security sector to the allocation of natural resources, and even to transitional institutions, such as elite "pacting" and governments of national unity. Losing track of the specific properties to which the concept applies has made it nearly impossible to identify an accurate and consistent universe of cases for comparison (Pappalardo 1981; Bogaards 1998), which has generated opposing theories to explain contradictory findings (Jarstad 2006).

In order to effectively analyze empirical variation across conflict cases, this chapter aims to provide some conceptual clarification. I compiled more than forty of the most cited studies from the three related fields: the IR approach to negotiated settlements, the comparative approach to power-sharing regimes, and those that have more recently attempted to synthesize the two. My goal was to identify the most common attributes cited across scholars' definitions of negotiated settlements and post-conflict power sharing; where definitions diverge, I aim to consider the appropriateness of varied properties through the lens of my own theory.

[78] I discuss the benefits of this strategy in more depth in Chapter 1, and I address and test for potential drawbacks in Chapter 4.

In the next section, I first address the question: what is a negotiated settlement? Within the universe of potential conflict outcomes, how do we identify an appropriate population for comparison? In setting this potential outcome apart from military victories and from ceasefires, I define a negotiated settlement as a peace agreement that is mutually accepted by at least two warring parties, that is understood as an alternative to continued conflict, and that contains one or more substantive concessions intended to maintain the peace.

Next, in section III, I examine the subset of negotiated settlements that include power-sharing provisions. Negotiated settlements can include a wide variety of substantive provisions intended to maintain the peace—such as amnesty for ex-combatants or agreement to hold elections—that fall short of power sharing. In this light, which specific types of provisions qualify a given case as a power-sharing settlement? In this section, I pay specific attention to the contradictions that have been generated by the lack of coordination between the IR and comparative approaches to the topic. While acknowledging that the exigencies of a post-conflict transition require expanding the concept beyond just the realm of political institutions, my conceptualization revisits Weber's understanding of "power," as well as the comparative politics approach to power sharing as mechanism for engineering regimes to avoid future conflict. In this light, I define a power-sharing settlement as a *negotiated settlement that explicitly allocates decision-making rights and resources among signatory parties beyond the transitional period.*

I further expand on this definition by identifying six specific types of provisions that would qualify as power sharing in the text of a negotiated settlement. These include both inclusive and diffusive subtypes of power-sharing provisions—namely, executive coalitions, representation quotas, military power sharing, political decentralization, wealth allocation, and security autonomy. A power-sharing settlement can include any one of the six subtypes; the most comprehensive settlements include all six. The novel categorization presented in section IV results from a thorough examination of the various types of power sharing identified across the various literatures. At the same time, however, and in light of the analysis of the concept of power sharing in section III, it employs a more rigorous standard than in the most broad or minimalist definitions by requiring that any proposed reforms be designed as part of a long-term regime overhaul. Section V concludes.

3.2 Conflict Outcomes and Negotiated Settlements

The most common outcome of all domestic armed conflicts since World War II is a decisive military victory for one side.[79] In general, this outcome does not entail bargaining or agreement on key issues between belligerent groups, as resolution of contentious issues is determined by the victor.[80] In the case of rebel victory, the result may be secession from the state or a successful coup d'etat—or both in the case of Ethiopia (1991). Government victories, on the other hand, are largely tantamount to a continuation of the pre-conflict status quo.[81]

By eliminating the military capabilities of one side and achieving international recognition of sovereignty, decisive victories have been argued to generate a more stable and durable peace as compared to conflicts that end in a relative stalemate (Wagner 1993; Toft 2006, 2010; Mason et al. 1999).[82] According to Mason and Fett (1996) and Mason et al. (1999), it is stalemate that explains why belligerent groups choose to sign a peace agreement. Even though victory is the dominant strategy for both parties to a conflict, a "mutually hurting stalemate" makes winning seem elusive and excessively costly, thereby lowering the relative cost of conceding to a bargain (Zartman 1985).[83]

A simplified typology of conflict outcomes is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The proportion of conflicts ending in outright military victory decreased from 62 percent in the 1980s to just 23 percent in the 1990s, corresponding with a significant increase in the number of conflicts settled via peace agreement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 10). At the same time, a post-Cold War normative shift increased the involvement of international peacekeepers in domestic conflicts, resulting in greater pressure on belligerent parties to negotiate a bargain (Licklider 1995; Fortna 2010, 1).

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[79] According to Hartzell and Hoddie's (2007) analysis of 108 civil wars fought between 1945 and 1999, 51 percent end in a battlefield victory for either the government or insurgents (5-6).
[80] It is possible, however, that an earlier peace process failed to resolve the conflict, and violence continued until one side was able to achieve victory. In such cases, the victor would have no obligation to uphold the commitments made during the peace process, so any prior peace agreements signed during the process would be irrelevant to the nature of the post-conflict regime.
[81] For this reason, conflicts that end in an unwritten (or verbal) truce are included in the category of government victory, since this outcome also maintains the pre-conflict status quo by offering no concessions to insurgents.
[82] In an analysis of 134 civil wars fought between 1940 and 2000, Toft (2006) shows that military victories are twice as likely to remain settled as compared to those ending in negotiated settlements or truces. Moreover, rebel victories appear far more stable than government victories, while also being associated with more improvements in the degree and quality of democracy.
[83] Walter (2002) determines that a military stalemate increases the likelihood that combatants will pursue negotiations by 33 percent.

Figure 3.1. Conceptual diagram of potential conflict outcomes.



NOTE: First, peace agreements are distinguished from military victories. Agreements require mutual acceptance of a bargain by warring parties, who sign on to a contract that is directly negotiated and that outlines the terms for maintaining peace. Second, negotiated settlements are distinguished from ceasefires by requiring substantive provisions beyond a cessation of hostilities, particularly concessions from the government party. Finally, negotiated settlements can be separated into two categories—those that include power-sharing provisions and those that do not.

In comparing conflict outcomes, the literature has identified a number of competing explanations for the decision of armed groups to negotiate for peace, rather than fight out to the end (Warner 1993; Licklider 1995; Mason and Fett 1996; Walter 2002; Toft 2006). However, the focus of the current study is on variation within the subset of settlements, understood here as a potential outcome of conflict where the likelihood of conflict recurrence is relatively higher as compared to outright victory (Toft 2006). Therefore, the multitude of factors that might help to explain when and why peace agreements are signed is less important for my purposes than identifying the core attributes that they have in common and that help to distinguish them from other outcomes.

The first key distinction between a military victory and a peace agreement is mutual acceptance of a bargain by at least two warring parties, neither of which concedes defeat at the time the agreement is reached (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 5-6; Licklider 1995, 684; Walter 2002, 51).[84] In order to meet this criterion, the signing of a peace agreement results from direct, face-to-face negotiations between belligerent parties over the terms of peace and, as a result, the signatures of combatant representatives indicate that the contract represents a mutually agreed alternative to war (Licklider 1995; Walter 2002; Tull and Mehler 2005; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).[85]

Within the subset of peace agreements, in which parties directly negotiate a mutually accepted alternative to continued conflict, a further distinction can be made: namely, that between a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement (see Figure 3.1). Ceasefires generally entail short-term agreements to halt violent activities, while delaying negotiation on more substantive issues (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 7). In

[84] Both Licklider (1995) and Walter (2002) highlight the remaining capabilities of parties involved, such that groups have the option of returning the battlefield if negotiations turn sour.

[85] There have been a number of signed accords grouped under the conceptual heading of "peace agreements" that, in fact, do not qualify as potential civil war outcomes in their own right. Over the course of the most comprehensive peace processes, a number of agreements are often signed, such as those regarding key issues to be discussed in future negotiations, the logistics of the peace process, and timelines and guidelines for implementation of the terms of peace. Harbom et al. (2006) provide an overview of the range of peace agreements included in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. These partial agreements, peace process agreements, and implementation process agreements are undoubtedly valuable components of a peace process, as they signal ongoing commitment and compliance by participants. They also meet the "mutual acceptance" criteria, as indicated by the signatures of group representatives. However, they are not understood as the final stage in negotiations, or the alternative to war, in their own right. Instead, such agreements should be grouped together as separate components of an overarching, comprehensive agreement. This aligns with Walter's (2002) requirement that a "signed bargain" must include a military solution to the conflict, meaning an agreement to cease violent activities, as this is the element of an agreement that indicates that is a potential outcome of—or end to—the conflict.

other words, as Walter (2002) puts it, "signed agreements that included only terms for a cease-fire…were intended as temporary measures to stop the fighting and not serious attempts to resolve the underlying differences that had started the war" (52). As an example, the Zheleznovodsk Declaration was a ceasefire signed in an attempt to end the armed conflict in Azerbaijan's disputed Nagorny-Karabakh region in 1991. However, the signatories failed to reach agreement about the political status of the territory, opting to delay negotiations on this issue to a future peace process that ultimately never took place.

It has been common in the literature to disregard this conceptual distinction (Licklider 1995; Mason et al. 1999).[86] Yet, many scholars have recognized that ceasefires are generally unstable, uncertain, and indeterminate agreements, such that any resulting peace "resembles a type of 'limbo'" (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 7).[87] Since it does not require any concessions from the government, this outcome is largely indistinguishable from a government victory. At the same time, however, the military capacity of insurgents is also temporarily maintained, thereby making conflict recurrence highly likely unless a more definitive solution is negotiated.

Thus, while acknowledging that peace agreements represent a less stable conflict outcome than a decisive military victory, a valid analysis of conflict termination also requires distinguishing ceasefires from more substantive types of peace agreements, which have a more legitimate chance of success: negotiated settlements (Figure 3.1). In order to qualify as a negotiated settlement, an agreement must entail a more substantive solution to one or more contentious issues underlying the conflict, thereby resulting in agreement on the terms through which peace can be sustained.[88] In other words, while negotiated settlements do include terms for a ceasefire, they also require concessions from the incumbent government. Such provisions may include amnesty for rebels, electoral reforms or democratization, recognition of rebel groups as political parties, the establishment of oversight commissions, or—in the most substantive cases—power-sharing reforms such as territorial autonomy for disputed regions.

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[86] Licklider (1995) and Mason et al. (1999) group all signed peace agreements under the conceptual umbrella of "negotiated settlements," distinguishing these from the outcome of military victory for government or rebels. I follow Toft's (2006) classification of civil war outcomes, which distinguishes between government victories, rebel victories, signed truces, and negotiated settlements.

[87] See also Walter (2002) and Toft (2006; 2009).

[88] This is consistent with Walter's (2002) requirement that "signed bargains" entail both a political and a military solution to the conflict. "Signed bargain" is her own conceptual label, although her definition is essentially the same as that of "negotiated settlements" used in the literature.

Table 3.1 compares a few background conditions across the four categories of outcomes for conflicts that ceased for at least six months between 1975 and 2005. Interestingly, conflicts ending in negotiated settlement do not appear strikingly different from the other categories. If anything, conflicts ending in rebel victory appear to stand out in terms of conflict duration, intensity and polity score, although the sample size of five is too small to draw any meaningful conclusions.[89] Surprisingly, negotiated settlements do not seem to arise where conflicts are longer or more intense, and they do not seem any more likely than rebel victory where the state is weak vis-à-vis rebels.[90] Moreover, since Polity score ranges from -10 (most authoritarian) to 10 (most democratic), the mean on all categories falls within the range of "anocracies" and, therefore, there is no real difference in regime type where governments agree to a settlement. These cursory patterns provide little indication that there is something substantively different about conflicts where negotiated settlements are signed as compared to other outcomes, except in the rate of conflict recurrence. This justifies an examination of variation in success *within* the subset of negotiated settlements.

Table 3.1. Summary statistics of economic, political and conflict-related indicators for four categories of outcomes, conflicts ending between 1975 and 2005.[91]

Outcome	N	Mean Conflict Duration (Months)	Mean Conflict Intensity (deaths/year)	Mean GDP per capita (current US$)	Mean Polity Score	Percent Conflict Recurrence
Government Victory	50	89	569	$2,297	-1.6	20%
Rebel Victory	5	228	9499	$959	-4.8	20%
Ceasefire	10	101	293	$1,276	-0.8	50%
Negotiated Settlement	32	90	672	$1,019	1.1	36%

NOTE: Negotiated settlements are largely indistinguishable from the categories of government victory and ceasefires in terms of conflict duration, conflict intensity and polity score, and from rebel victory in terms of income levels. There is little evidence of selection bias within the sample of negotiated settlements, which would drive variation in conflict termination.

[89] Interestingly, the finding on proportion of conflict recurrence contradicts Toft's (2006) finding that rebel victory is the most stable outcome. The data used here relies on a lower threshold of conflict than Toft's study of civil war, and it therefore has an expanded population of conflict cases.
[90] Proxied as GDP per capita (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
[91] Data from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Pettersson and Wallersteen 2015).

The preceding discussion has identified the key attributes of a negotiated settlement by distinguishing the term from other types of potential conflict outcomes: military victories and ceasefires. To summarize, a negotiated settlement is defined as a peace agreement that meets the following criteria: a) it is mutually accepted and signed by at least two warring parties, b) it is understood as an alternative or end to the conflict at the time of its signing, and c) it contains one or more substantive concessions intended to maintain the peace. Using this definition, I identify 138 negotiated settlements signed between 1975 and 2005 in 48 countries.[92]

Having conceptualized the negotiated settlement as a subset of potential civil war outcomes, we have arrived at the conceptual realm of the central research puzzle: why do some settlements succeed while others fail? More specifically, are negotiated settlements that include provisions for power sharing more effective tools of conflict resolution than other settlements, all else equal? In this light, the next section examines the subset of negotiated power-sharing settlements (see Figure 3.1), with the goal of reaching a definition that clarifies the confusion generated from two divergent research schools.

3.3 Negotiated Power-sharing Settlements

Having defined the negotiated settlement as a subset of potential conflict outcomes, the next goal of this chapter is to identify the category of settlements that include provisions for sharing power. Referring back to Figure 3.1, this category exists as a subset within the broader population of negotiated settlements, yet attempting to define it reveals a number of inconsistencies in the relevant literature. It is within this domain that two research schools have converged—that of conflict resolution, on the one hand, and that of power-sharing regimes on the other—with a notable lack of conceptual coordination (Jarstad 2006).

The study of post-conflict power sharing first evolved from the comparative literature on power-sharing democracy, specifically Arend Lijphart's (1969; 1977) seminal study of the "consociational" democracies of Western Europe. At this time, the archetypical model of a power-sharing regime was one that exhibited four institutional characteristics: a "grand" coalition, proportional representation, mutual veto rights, and segmental autonomy. Other scholars soon began to argue

[92] The sample and data are described in more detail in Chapter 4.

that the formula could be applied as a method of conflict resolution in the developing world (Nordlinger 1975).

Yet, the experience of Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands was one of engineering institutions in order to *avoid* the escalation of ethnic conflict in developed and consolidated democracies. While the formula was successful in these cases, critics questioned the applicability of the consociational model to weaker states where subnational violence had already contributed to entrenching cleavages and mutual suspicions between ethnic groups. This debate has generated a broad literature on the sustainability of consociational regimes in the developing world and whether such institutions undermine democratic durability and consolidation (Spears 2000; Schneckener 2002; Binningsbo 2005; Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Linder and Baechtiger 2005; Norris 2008; Lijphart 2008; Jung 2012).

After the end of the Cold War, as cross-border wars became less common and the international community turned its attention toward the resolution of civil war, scholars of international relations began to focus on conflicts within states. In this field, the thing that distinguishes the resolution of domestic conflicts from that of international wars is that belligerents generally have to coexist in the same political and economic space after the conflict ends. This dilemma has generated a research agenda examining the conditions under which negotiated settlements are more or less likely to prevent conflict recurrence. However, due in large part to its foundation in the literature on international war and resolution, scholars in this field have focused overwhelmingly on the structural context in which a negotiated settlement was signed, often failing to address the content of the settlement and the effectiveness of the terms of peace (Licklider 1995; Mason et al. 1999; Toft 2006). Some even explicitly assume that negotiated settlements, by nature, entail the sharing of power (Hartzell 1999). For example, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) claim that "[o]ne of the central characteristics of a negotiated settlement is that adversaries involved in this form of war-ending bargain directly address the question of how power is to be distributed and managed in the postwar state" (5).

While the definition of a negotiated settlement requires some kind of substantive provisions regarding the nature of the post-war regime, as explained in the previous section, it is a mistake to assume that such provisions explicitly entail the sharing or dividing of power.[93] A case in point is the Chapultepec Peace Accord

[93] This is consistent with Barbara Walter's (2002, 52) definition of a "signed bargain," which requires that a peace accord entails both a political and a military (i.e. ceasefire) solution to conflict, but does not assume that the political solution involves power sharing.

(1992) signed between the government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). The document itself is a comprehensive 95 pages covering electoral reform, the creation of an independent electoral commission, integration of the FMLN as a political party, amnesty for FMLN ex-combatants, an inclusive committee to oversee implementation, a Truth Commission to investigate war crimes, and a detailed timeline for implementation.[94] Yet the settlement fell short of explicitly guaranteeing that the FMLN would have access to decision-making powers in the central government, autonomous control over a sub-national region, or incorporation into the security apparatus of the state.[95] Instead, the question of future access to power was left to be determined by the outcome of post-conflict elections.

In reality, it is often difficult to achieve mutual acceptance of a power-sharing formula during a peace process, and belligerent parties often prefer to leave their disputes to be settled at the ballot box. According to Harbom et al. (2006), a more common mechanism for resolving incompatibilities than power sharing has been agreement to hold fresh elections (Harbom et al. 2006, 617). Democratization, electoral reform, and integration of rebel groups as political parties—though substantive political concessions—provide no hard guarantees to former insurgents that their interests will be represented in future administrations. In the case of El Salvador, the FMLN was able to achieve a high degree of electoral success, even winning the Presidency in 2009. More commonly, however, the capacity of former insurgents to challenge an entrenched incumbent in competitive elections is unlikely and, absent guarantees that access to power and resources will not be wholly dependent on election results, the likelihood of electoral defeat and political exclusion might incentivize groups to return to the battlefield.

Therefore, the distinction between negotiated settlements that include power-sharing provisions and those that do not is important for a valid theory of conflict resolution. Although a few scholars have more recently attempted to analyze the impact of a power-sharing bargain on a war-to-democracy transition (Walter 2002; Jarstad 2006, 2008; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007), the lack of communication between the two subfields remains. As a result of this impasse, I

[94] The full text of the settlement can be accessed through the website of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/Chapultepec_Peace_Agreement_16_January_1992.pdf

[95] Chapter VII includes the following vague passage: "End of the military structure of the FMLN and reintegration of its members, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, institutional and political life of the country" (Chapultepec Peace Accord, p. 44).

identify a few remaining problems in defining what qualifies as a power-sharing settlement.

First, scholars who approach the topic from an IR perspective fail to distinguish between transitional and permanent types of power-sharing provisions. Even Jarstad (2006)—who eloquently acknowledges the problems generated by the lack of unity between the two approaches—defines a power-sharing accord as "a political pact after civil war," while Tull and Mehler (2005) equate power sharing with a transitional government of national unity. For many others, power-sharing bargains are, by nature, temporary arrangements (Spears 2000; Wantchekon 2000).

For comparativists, on the other hand, the theoretical difference between a power-sharing regime and transitional elite "pacting" is clear. Although transitional institutions for ongoing arbitration and constitution-building might be important to stabilize a war-to-democracy transition (Schneckener 2002; Rothchild 2005), even necessary in order to establish a minimum level of state capacity prior to elections (Norris 2008), it is the way that institutions are engineered over the long-term in order to accommodate and balance group interests that is argued to prevent a recurrence of violent conflict. Moreover, while transitional power-sharing provisions may succeed in forestalling a return to the battlefield until elections are held, the absence of guarantees that groups will continue to have access to state power heightens the stakes of winning post-conflict elections (Arriola and Johnson 2013, forthcoming). The primacy of winning the election, and the potential for unfavorable electoral outcomes, is likely to generate incentives for recourse to violent strategies.[96]

This failure to distinguish between permanent and transitional provisions when coding the components of a negotiated power-sharing settlement has resulted in faulty conclusions about the relative effectiveness of different types of power sharing. For example, Jarstad and Nillson's (2008) finding that "less costly" power-sharing concessions have little effect on conflict termination is a likely result of their decision to include transitional political pacts as a form of power sharing, in comparison to the more permanent guarantees associated with territorial decentralization or military integration. To apply this argument empirically, many previous studies consider Rwanda's Arusha Accord (1993) as one of the most

[96] The Angolan example is widely cited here (Ottoway 1998). In 1992, early polling results indicated that rebel leader Joseph Savimbi had lost the first round Presidential election. Facing exclusion from the resulting administration, his UNITA militia declared the elections fraudulent and returned to the battlefield.

comprehensive examples of a power-sharing settlement, and its failure is widely cited by critics of post-conflict power sharing. In fact, all of the provisions for sharing power included in the Arusha Accord were transitional in nature. This might help to explain why ethnic tensions remained high going into the subsequent national elections, which ultimately devolved into genocide.

I contend that much of this conceptual fuzziness stems from the failure to consider the meaning of *power* as it is more commonly understood in the discipline.[97] Max Weber (1946) defines *power* as "the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the same action" (180). In this light, power-sharing institutions should be understood as formal mechanisms that provide leverage for groups in the processes of governance and resource allocation at all levels of the state. In order to qualify as a power-sharing settlement, therefore, the agreement should include provisions that are intended as a long-term and irreversible restructuring of the regime, not merely as temporary arrangements that might be revoked or that fail to grant minority groups a legitimate voice in political, economic and military decision-making.

On the one hand, it seems that the IR approach has overlooked the rich literature on power sharing that has developed in the field of comparative politics since the 1960s and, as a result, when it is applied to war-to-democracy transitions, the concept has increasingly come to mean everything and nothing. On the other hand, due to its foundation in the field of international security and conflict studies, this approach has identified new types of power sharing that might have a significant impact on a post-conflict transition. Rather than being limited by the narrow, four-pronged conceptualization of consociational institutions—a formula more applicable to wealthy, consolidated democracies that have avoided the outbreak of violent conflict—IR scholars are more likely to recognize the centrality of security concerns and resource scarcities during peace processes in the developing world. Attempting to stabilize a war-to-democracy transition in a country with a history of coups or military rule, for instance, may require the allocation of military posts in order to guarantee the security of certain groups, as well as that of the new and fragile democratic system itself (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 15; Wantchekon 2000). Therefore, in addition to institutions for sharing political power, scholars have increasingly recognized that successful settlements

[97] In fact, Tull and Mehler's (2005) conceptualization of power-sharing agreements uses the central term ("power") in the definition.

often include provisions for military or economic forms of power sharing (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).

Table 3.2 outlines some of the types of provisions that distinguish, first between negotiated settlements and ceasefires—discussed in the previous section—and, second, between negotiated settlements that include power-sharing provisions and those that do not. Settlements that only include provisions for transitional forms of power sharing qualify as negotiated settlements, since such provisions represent more substantive assurances than a ceasefire, but they fall short of meeting the definition of a power-sharing settlement. Other examples of the types of concessions from the government that might be included in a negotiated settlement, but do not qualify as power sharing, are amnesty or formal pardons, inviting international peacekeepers, agreeing to a timetable for fresh elections, formal recognition of insurgents as political parties, and integration of rank-and-file ex-combatants into the state military.

In light of the preceding discussion, I define a negotiated power-sharing settlement as a *negotiated settlement that explicitly allocates decision-making rights and resources among signatory parties beyond the transitional period.* This conceptualization is more refined than standard definitions in the IR approach to conflict resolution, which tend to conflate power-sharing provisions with transitional, *ad hoc*, and one-off arrangements. According to my definition, only 41 percent of negotiated settlements include power-sharing provisions, compared to 72 percent when relying on the standard definition. At the same time, however, this definition also expands the notion of power sharing beyond the archetypical model used by comparativists by recognizing that military and economic power is often central to the concerns of belligerent parties involved a post-conflict transition. In the next section, I further develop this discussion of the possible categories of power-sharing provisions that might be included in a negotiated settlement.

Table 3.2. Possible provisions included in peace agreement subtypes.

Type of Peace Agreement	Possible Provisions Included
Ceasefire	Cessation of hostilities Disarmament and demobilization Release of war prisoners Agreement to continue future negotiations
Negotiated Settlement	Amnesty for ex-combatants International peacekeeping force Timetable for elections Electoral system reforms Recognition of insurgent groups as political parties Integration of ex-combatants into state military Commissions for oversight and/or arbitration Transitional coalition or government of national unity
Power-Sharing Settlement	Allocation of Cabinet Ministries Representation quotas or reserved seats Incorporation of rebel officers into military high command Recognition of autonomous security zones Territorial decentralization of powers Reforms to the allocation of national wealth

NOTE: Negotiated settlements are more substantive than ceasefires, which only include provisions to stop war-making activities and postpone negotiation on more contentious issues. An agreement qualifies as a negotiated settlement if it includes provisions on amnesty, peacekeepers, post-conflict elections, oversight commissions, or other kinds of concessions from the government, including transitional or permanent forms of power sharing. The most substantive subtype of negotiated settlement—a power-sharing settlement—includes provisions for allocating decision-making powers and/or economic resources among signatory parties beyond the transitional period.

3.4 Power-sharing Provisions: A Typology

There is a growing consensus that analyzing the relative effectiveness of post-conflict power sharing across varied contexts requires disaggregating the subtypes of power sharing (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nillson 2008; Rothchild and Roeder 2005). Empirically, there is significant variation in the type and number of power-sharing provisions that might be included in a negotiated settlement. Broadly speaking, the provisions for sharing power that I identify fall

within two overarching categories: inclusive and diffusive power sharing.[98] While inclusive institutions attempt to incorporate communal groups or former combatants in a body of common decision-making, diffusive institutions distribute vital resources and decision-making powers to the group level. Inclusive institutions include executive coalitions, representation quotas, and military power sharing. Diffusive institutions include security autonomy, political decentralization, and the allocation of national wealth. Next, I provide a conceptual overview of each of these six subtypes of power-sharing provisions.

3.4.1 Inclusive power-sharing provisions.

In light of the credible commitment problem that underlies a post-conflict transition, group leaders are likely to seek out institutional solutions that promote confidence about future access to the central levers of state power. Particularly in societies marred by prolonged conflict—where the formal economy provides few opportunities, resources are especially scarce, and competition is heightened (Hegre, Strand, Gates and Nygard 2011)—the deliberations that take place in central state institutions are often perceived as essential to groups' future security and well-being (Rothchild 2005; Rothchild and Roeder 2005). In this light, negotiated settlements commonly include provisions for inclusive power sharing, which incorporate the elites of relevant segments in entities of joint governance and decision-making (Lijphart 1977, 31; Rothchild and Roeder 2005). As a result of the literature's evolution from Arend Lijphart's model of consociational democracy, political mechanisms of inclusive power sharing—executive coalitions and legislative representation—are the most commonly cited in previous studies. These align with what Rothchild and Roeder (2005, 31) refer to as "mandates," or relatively firm guarantees of group representation in decision-making processes of the central government.

First, an *executive coalition*—or, as Lijphart (1969, 1977, 1996) refers to it, a "grand coalition"—is observable as the allocation of cabinet positions among elites

[98] This distinction roughly aligns with Schneckener's (2002) distinction between shared rule and self rule, Rothchild and Roeder's (2005) between inclusive and partitioned decision-making, and Hartzell and Hoddie's (2007) between power-sharing and power-dividing institutions. I choose new conceptual labels because, first, the terms "rule" and "decision-making" apply only to political forms of power sharing and neglect that reforming the allocation of economic resources is a form of power sharing, and second, Hartzell and Hoddie's choice of terms suggests that "power-dividing institutions" are distinct from power sharing when, in fact, decentralization is one important way to share power.

representing the relevant parties in a way that achieves balance and mutual constraint (Schneckener 2002; Rothchild 2005). As part of a post-conflict transition, such measures are often designed to be temporary in nature, as in the immediate cooptation of insurgent leaders into a governing coalition intended to facilitate arbitration and to expire once elections determine leadership. As previously discussed, such measures do not qualify as power sharing provisions; my theory suggests that relevant reforms should provide for a long-term restructuring of the executive branch in order to ensure adequate representation of former insurgents, minority groups, or disadvantaged political parties, regardless of who wins the election. While 32 percent of settlements include provisions for transitional coalitions, just 9 percent allocate Cabinet posts over the long term (Figure 3.2).

A second sub-type of inclusive power-sharing provision in the political arena focus on the legislative branch: *representation quotas* refer to formalized rules that guarantee a predetermined proportion of seats in processes of legislative decision-making, either to the rebellion-turned-political-party or to the existing sociopolitical group that rebels represent. In existing studies, it has been more common to define legislative power sharing by the use of proportional representation (PR) voting rules, a product of the consociational model (Lijphart 1969, 1977, 1996; Schneckener 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). In Western Europe, where ethnonational communities were already experienced in electoral democracy and organized as functioning political parties, PR seems to have helped to forestall conflict. In war-to-democracy transitions in the developing world, however, minority communities have more experience organizing for violence than for political competition and power is more commonly concentrated in the ruling party and the executive branch (Bratton and Van de Walle 1999). Particularly in highly diverse polities, representation in direct proportion to vote share is unlikely to appease minority groups or to sufficiently moderate the existing incumbency advantage. In light of the theory presented in Chapter 2, therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect threatened minority groups to trade their existing military capacity for a PR system in which they receive an insignificant opposition voice in Parliament.

Instead, parity in groups' shares of reserved seats or the over-representation of marginalized minority groups can provide mechanisms to overcome fears of majority dominance (Schneckener 2002). In post-conflict cases, therefore, mechanisms for sharing power in the legislature should entail reserved seats or quotas for representation. Referring back to the theory laid out in the preceding

chapter, such guarantees reduce the importance of vote share in post-conflict elections and, therefore, the incentives to use violent strategies to affect electoral outcomes. One example of this is in the allocation of an equal number of the 108 seats in Lebanon's Chamber of Deputies to Christians and Muslims, as specified in the Ta'if Accord of 1989, even though Christians likely comprise only 40 percent of the Lebanese population. Approximately 13 percent of negotiated settlements include stipulations for guaranteed representation quotas (Figure 3.2).

Beyond the inclusive political institutions that have been central to the consociational approach to power sharing, scholars of conflict resolution have noted the importance of rebels' inclusion in the security sector of the state (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). To the extent that prolonged conflicts generate entrenched and developed militaries on both sides, and given the relative stalemate that underlies the signing of a negotiated settlement (see Section II), asymmetrically disarming rebel troops threatens to undermine their leverage should the incumbent defect on its promises (Ibid; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 308). In order to overcome this uncertainty, a "restructuring of the coercive institutions of the state" is commonly achieved through guarantees of *military power sharing,* or the equitable and explicit incorporation of former militias into the state security apparatus at all levels (Wantchekon 2000, 339).

My definition diverges from previous studies, which have defined power sharing in the military as the integration of troops only (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Nillson 2008). Incorporating combatants into a single state military may be an important component of a negotiated settlement, particularly given the challenge of reintegrating jobless and untrained ex-combatants into the depleted economy of the post-war state (Rothchild and Roeder 2005). However, as discussed in the previous section, in determining whether reforms qualify as power sharing, I emphasize the capacity of relevant groups to impact state decision-making. There is a general consensus in the relevant literature on comparative democracy that power-sharing institutions stabilize group relations by structuring interactions between the elites that represent such groups (Rothchild and Hartzell 1999; Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Norris 2008, 24-5). Because group leaders are those with the capacity to mobilize their followers for violence, power sharing is intended to give such elites a stake in the decisions and policies of the state. In this light, identifying power sharing in the security sector should require that insurgent leaders be guaranteed high-level officer positions in the military high command or Ministry of Defense. According to Lindemann (2010, 6):

> Access to military power is crucial for competing social groups in that it shapes their feelings of physical security and survival. While balanced recruitment at the level of the rank and file may be considered important, it is especially representation at the upper levels of the army that give groups a real stake in the security sector. Key, therefore, in terms of military power sharing is the composition of the officer corps.

While nearly half of all negotiated settlements provide for the inclusion of rebel troops in the state military, only 11 percent include provisions that meet my definition of *military power sharing* (Figure 3.2). Mozambique's General Peace Agreement of 1992, for example, provided for equal representation of government (FRELIMO) and rebel (RENAMO) troops in the officer corps of the Mozambican Defense Force, as well as the Joint Commission created to oversee the process of security integration. Similarly, Burundi's Pretoria Protocol (2003) called for a 60-40 balance between government and CNDD-FDD troops, respectively, in both military command posts and the rank-and-file.

In the relevant literature, inclusive institutions—executive coalitions, representation quotas, and military power sharing—tend to be those most commonly associated with the term "power sharing" (Spears 2000; Jarstad 2006). The more rigorous conceptualization I put forth here, which requires that be proposed reforms be irreversible and that appointments include positions of power, shows that inclusive power sharing is actually less common than assumed. A second provisional subtype of power sharing, *diffusive institutions,* allocate resources and decision-making rights by shifting the locus of power to the group level, representing a second category of power-sharing provisions that might be included in a negotiated settlement (Schneckner 2002; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). The next section defines the subtypes of diffusive power-sharing provisions.

Figure 3.2. Number of Settlements Containing Each of the Six Subtypes of Power-Sharing Provisions, 1975-2005 (N=138).



NOTE: In the sample of 132 negotiated settlements, the most common type of power-sharing provision is territorial decentralization, followed closely by resource allocation. Thus, in contrast to those who conflate post-conflict power sharing with elite "pacting" (Jarstad 2006), diffusive forms of power sharing are much more like to be part of a settlement. The three inclusive subtypes of power sharing—executive coalitions, representation quotas, and military power sharing—are included in about 20 percent of negotiated settlements.

3.4.2 *Diffusive power-sharing provisions*.

A negotiated settlement includes diffusive power-sharing provisions when the power to affect policy, protect security, or access resource is devolved to the level of the group. The goal of diffusive power sharing is to reduce mutual suspicion by reassuring minority groups about their capacity to affect matters in their direct and vital interest (Rothchild and Hartzell 1999; Schneckener 2002). Most commonly, diffusive forms of power sharing are associated with Lijphart's (1977) concept of "segmental autonomy," defined as "minority rule by the minority itself in the area of the minority's exclusive concern" (113), but it can also be applied to the diffusion of security rights and economic resources. Thus, signatories to the

settlement might be guaranteed to "enjoy some degree of self-government" (Schneckener 2002, 205), or they might be promised an improved stake in the national economic pie.

First, *political decentralization* refers to those provisions of a negotiated settlement that stipulate devolving the locus of political decision-making to the group level. Most commonly, the diffusion of power is achieved by dividing groups on a territorial basis, such as through federalism or regional autonomy (Rothchild and Hartzell 1999). However, examples of "ethnocorporatism" (e.g. Lebanon, Cyprus) point to the potential for jurisdictions based on voluntary or identity-based membership (Rothchild and Roeder 2005, 33), which may provide a preferable solution where groups are territorially intermingled.

Within this category, the extent of decentralization can range from an agreement to hold elections for local governance bodies and devolve administrative functions, to full-scale regional autonomy (Schneckener 2002; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).[99] Similarly, Rothchild and Roeder (2005) distinguish between "soft" (decentralization) and "hard" (full autonomy) guarantees of segmental autonomy in the creation of exclusive jurisdictions. Particularly among those civil conflicts with a territorial motivation, a negotiated power-sharing settlement is likely to contain provisions for some degree of political decentralization, as approximately 54 percent of all negotiated settlements do (Figure 3.2).

Second, although less recognized in the comparative literature on power-sharing democracy evolving from Lijphart, *wealth allocation*—or the economic dimension of power sharing—is increasingly recognized as vital to the prospects for successful civil war resolution (Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). Access to resources is an element of power often perceived as central to groups' interests, even survival, particularly when the motivation underlying conflict is a territorial imbalance in wealth or a scarcity of available resources (Rothchild and Roeder 2005). In terms of the provisions of a negotiated settlement, examples of reforming

[99] Obviously, political decentralization falls short of secession for the purposes of this study. I define a negotiated power-sharing settlement as a "mutually accepted peace agreement that explicitly allocates decision-making rights and resources among subnational collectivities *within a territorial state."* Therefore, any negotiated settlement that granted territorial secession and sovereignty as a method of civil war resolution is excluded from my sample.

wealth allocation include the redistribution of land, natural resource rents, tax revenue, and the establishment of regional development funds.[100]

Because the wealth derived from oil resources has been central to the Sudanese conflict for decades, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 stipulated the allocation of "50% of net oil revenue derived from oil producing wells in Southern Sudan to the Government of South Sudan" (Agreement on Wealth Sharing 2004, Article 5.6). The CPA also provided for the allocation of tax revenue to the Southern region, as well as other non-oil revenues, and the establishment of a development fund for the reconstruction of war-torn areas. On the other hand, in order to convince UNRF II rebels to lay down their arms, the Ugandan government agreed to direct payments of UGX 4.2 million for the resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants in the Yumbe Accord of 2002—a one-off allocation of wealth that does not qualify as economic power sharing since it is temporary in nature. Roughly 22 percent of negotiated settlements include provisions about reforming *wealth allocation*.

Finally, similar to the argument for resource allocation as a form of power sharing particularly relevant to post-conflict transitions, the devolution of power in the security sector—or *security autonomy*—may be necessary in order to assure groups that their physical safety will be guaranteed against future assaults. In other words, by allowing some members of the former insurgent militia to keep their guns and serve in a defensive capacity for the group, weaker parties may be reassured about their continued ability to safeguard their groups' interests and survival. Similar to Native American reservations in the United States, where local and state police lack jurisdiction, such measures can help a community to feel protected from harassment and molestation when it lacks trust in the state security sector.

Most scholars that recognize the military dimension of power sharing focus only on integration (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). In contrast, Wantchekon (2000) has recognized that a post-conflict restructuring of the state's coercive apparatus may also take the form of a "decentralized and federated command structure." Even more common than guarantees of inclusive military power sharing, provisions for *security autonomy* in military or police functions have been included in about 16 percent of negotiated settlements, including those of Bangladesh (1997), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), Niger (1995), India (1993; 2003), and Kosovo (1999) (Figure 3.2). As a specific example, given the continued activity of other rebel groups in

[100] In contrast, resettlement packages for ex-combatants—while potentially important—would not qualify as power sharing since it is essentially a one-off, temporary measure.

Nicaragua, the Bogata Accord (1984) granted the MISURASATA militia the authority to "defend [its] communities and areas…from all aggression in the region" (Article IV.4.3).

In sum, a negotiated power-sharing settlement can include any of the six provisional subtypes: executive coalition, representation quotas, military power sharing, political decentralization, wealth allocation, and security autonomy. Table 3.3 provides an overview of my coding decisions for several of the most well-known settlements signed since 1975.[101] While an agreement need only contain one provisional subtype of power sharing in order to meet my definition of a negotiated power-sharing settlement, some of the most comprehensive settlements include all six subtypes.

Table 3.3. Selected sample of coding decisions on well-known negotiated settlements.

Country	Negotiated Settlement	Power-Sharing Settlement?	Inclusive Institutions			Diffusive Institutions		
			Executive Coalition	Representation Quotas	Military Power Sharing	Political Decentralization	Wealth Allocation	Security Autonomy
Angola	Lusaka Protocol (1994)	X		X	X	X		
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Dayton-Paris Agreement (1995)	X	X	X		X		X
Cambodia	Paris Peace Agreement (1991)	X		X				
El Salvador	Chapultepec Peace Accords (1992)							
Lebanon	Taif Accord (1989)	X		X		X		
Liberia	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2003)	X			X			
Mozambique	General Peace Agreement (1992)	X		X	X	X		
Papua New Guinea	Bougainville Peace Agreement (1998)	X				X	X	
Philippines	Mindanao Final Peace Agreement (1996)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Rwanda	Arusha Accord (1993)	X			X			
Sierra Leone	Lome Peace Agreement (1999)	X	X				X	
Sudan	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)	X	X	X		X	X	X
United Kingdom	Good Friday Agreement (1998)	X		X		X		

NOTE: Negotiated settlements range in comprehensiveness from including no power-sharing provisions, as in El Salvador's Chapultepec Peace Accords (1992) to including all six subtypes of power sharing, as the Mindanao Final Peace Agreement (1996) in the Philippines. Sudan's 2005 was another example of a particularly comprehensive settlement, although it is excluded from the sample used in my analysis since a referendum ultimately brought about secession for South Sudan.

[101] A complete overview of my coding decisions for all 132 negotiated settlements in the sample is provided in Appendix C.

3.5 Conclusion

The inclusion of power-sharing provisions as part of a negotiated settlement is quickly becoming the norm and is often considered the only feasible method for realizing a durable peace in cases of military stalemate (Wantchekon 2000; Lijphart 2004). Yet, the increasing number of empirical examples in which settlements fail to provide a feasible and durable solution to civil war has generated skepticism about the effectiveness of post-conflict power sharing. Much of this criticism likely stems from the inconsistencies in the literature—opposing theories based on contradictory understanding of the population in question—which I have attempted to overcome in the preceding discussion.

In this light, the goal of this chapter has been to develop a more refined definition of the key concepts of this study—a definition that is based on the most common attributes across varied approaches in the literature, and which aligns more accurately with the underlying theory of this study than much of the current literature. First, I define a negotiated settlement as a potential conflict outcome that meets the following criteria: a) it is mutually accepted and signed by at least two warring parties, b) it is understood as an alternative or end to the conflict at the time of its signing, and c) it contains one or more substantive concessions intended to maintain the peace beyond a ceasefire. This conceptualization is used to identify observations for inclusion in the cross-national dataset, discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Second, I define a power-sharing settlement as *a negotiated settlement that explicitly allocates decision-making rights and resources among signatory parties beyond the transitional period.* More specifically, a power-sharing settlement must include provisions for at least one of six subtypes of either inclusive or diffusive power sharing: executive coalitions, representation quotas, military power sharing, political decentralization, wealth allocation, or security autonomy. Although this typology is my own, it is based on a thorough examination and convergence of the multitude of existing studies of post-conflict power sharing. At the same, it considers the various approaches to defining and identifying power sharing through the lens of the theory developed in Chapter 2 and, as a result, each of the subtypes is distinguished from any transitional measures designed to be revoked after elections. This conceptual precision allows me to compare whether settlements that include power-sharing provisions have been more successful at resolving conflict, as well as whether different types of power-sharing solutions might have a different effect. This empirical analysis is the topic of the next chapter.

Part II

Testing the Hypotheses

4

Cross-National Analysis of Negotiated Settlements And Conflict Termination

This chapter investigates cross-national variation in the success of negotiated settlements: why are some settlements associated with conflict termination while others fail? Why is that countries like Guatemala, Liberia, and Indonesia were able to achieve successful settlements only a few years after a previous settlement had failed? Was it the nature of the conflict or the provisional content of the settlement that changed? Why have other countries become caught in a seemingly unending cycle of bargaining, only to watch peace processes continuously devolve into renewed conflict, as in Colombia, Chad, and Israel?

The conventional wisdom in the academic literature on civil war resolution focuses overwhelmingly on the state side of the bargaining equation. Specifically, the factors commonly argued to affect the potential for peace are either structural constraints on the government's capacity to implement the terms (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Collier et al. 2003, 2008; Dubey 2002; Downs and Stedman 2002), on the one hand, or provisions that provide sufficiently costly signals of the state's good intentions on the other (Walter 2002; Jarstad 2006; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008;

Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). For example, the most commonly accepted determinant of post-settlement peace is the presence of third-party enforcement (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008). Due to the failure to properly theorize the distinction between the decisions made by the government and those by the insurgent party, however, it remains unclear whether peacekeepers increase the likelihood of peace by compelling the government to implement the terms of the bargain, or merely by bearing witness to ceasefire violations. If the latter is true, then the terms of a settlement—including power-sharing provisions—might be irrelevant to the prospects for peace.

In contrast to standard approaches, I contend that insurgents' decision-making process is both more important and more complex than currently theorized in the field. Rebels' decision to comply with or defect from a settlement is ultimately what determines whether peace ensues, since it is rebel compliance that inherently entails disarmament and demobilization. Moreover, because compliance fundamentally eliminates insurgents' bargaining power and capacity to hold governments accountable to their commitments, rebels have a heightened incentive to preemptively defect during the implementation period. What kinds of conditions might reduce these incentives for preemptive defection? Where are such incentives more or less likely to translate into a return to the battlefield? Although focused case studies have shed more light on the decisions and behavior of insurgents during the post-settlement period, they provide few insights into the mechanisms that play out across different conflicts and peace processes.[102]

This chapter aims to fill these gaps and contribute to the growing literature on domestic conflict resolution with a cross-national analysis of conflict termination. It uses an original dataset of negotiated settlements to domestic armed conflict between 1975 and 2005. These data include a new coding of the subtypes of power-sharing provisions discussed in the previous chapter, which is based on my own reading of each settlement text.

The findings presented here support my theory about why and how insurgents are likely to preemptively defect from a settlement during the implementation period. Although transitional measures have no discernable effect, settlements that include provisions for permanent forms of power sharing have a

[102] Notable examples include studies of Nicaragua (Hartzell), El Salvador (Call), Guatemala (Stanley and Holiday), Rwanda (Khadiagala), Cambodia (Peou), Bosnia (Cousens), Lebanon (Zahar), Liberia (Adebajo), and Sri Lanka (Bose) in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, Eds. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002.

significant, positive effect on the likelihood peace. Moreover, in line with expectations, all-inclusive settlements are significantly more likely to result in conflict termination, even controlling for the number of non-state armed groups in a conflict. On the other hand, where governments have a reputation for defecting from settlements, the likelihood of peace is significantly lower.

Therefore, the data align with the testable hypotheses derived from my theory of preemptive defection, which are outlined in the next section. In section III, I describe the process of data collection and the measurement of key variables included in the analysis. Because the dependent variable—conflict termination—is coded dichotomously, I conduct a binomial logistic regression analysis of the determinants of peace. The results of the analysis are presented in more detail in Section IV. In section V, I examine potential sources of bias in the data, which might be impacting the analysis. Section VI concludes.

4.2 Testable Hypotheses

The theory I develop in Chapter 2 emphasizes that the costs of compliance with the terms of a negotiated settlement are higher for insurgents than for the government. It is true that the concessions and political reforms required of governments are often costly, giving incumbents an incentive to resist full implementation. However, unilateral compliance by insurgents necessarily entails disarmament and demobilization, moves that fully neutralize rebels' bargaining power without guaranteeing that the state will follow through with its commitments. As a result, insurgent parties have a heightened incentive to maintain their military capacity and, ultimately, to preemptively defect given any indication during the implementation period that they will not adequately benefit. As the multi-stage process of implementing a negotiated settlement reveals winners and losers within insurgent groups, the potential for a settlement to breakdown into renewed conflict depends on the capacity of disgruntled elements within the rebel leadership to mobilize followers to return to the battlefield (Bakke et al. 2012; Cunningham 2013; Weinstein 2005).

There are a number of structural determinants that might affect the capacity of rebels to defect. They include access to lootable resources (Fearon 2004; Kalyvas 2008), support from neighboring countries or an international diaspora (Doyle and Sambanis 2000), the presence of international peacekeepers (Walter 2002; Fortna

2008), and whether the group is ethnically or ideologically cohesive (Sambanis 2001; Walter 2004; Cunningham 2013). In this study, I focus on three hypotheses that have been largely overlooked in the literature on negotiated settlements.

First, power-sharing settlements provide guarantees to insurgent parties that the group's core interests will be addressed beyond the transitional period, thereby assuring rebels that future access to power and resources will be secured in irreversible institutional reforms.[103] In this way, insurgent leaders at all levels are likely to have longer time horizons and more positive expectations about their future mobility in the political party, the autonomous regional government, or the state military. In the absence of permanent power-sharing guarantees, on the other hand, the implementation of a settlement is essentially a one-off process of cooptation, whereby some potentially influential members of the rebel elite are likely to be neglected. Most importantly, leaving the future accommodation of ex-combatants dependent on the outcome of post-conflict elections raises the incentives to preemptively defect.

> *H_1: Negotiated settlements that include permanent power-sharing provisions should be positively associated with conflict termination.*

Although previous studies have reached mixed conclusions about the relationship between power sharing and peace (Spears 2002; Walter 2002; Jarstad 2006; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007), I draw an important distinction between long-term reforms and transitional elite pacts. Based on my argument, as well as the conceptualization described at length in Chapter 3, it is the long-term nature of power-sharing reforms that reduces the incentives for disgruntled rebels to preemptively defect from a settlement and increases willingness to demobilize.[104] In the absence of such guarantees, the nexus of conflict is merely shifted from the battlefield to the electoral arena, thereby increasing the risk of conflict recurrence given unfavorable election results, as well as the use of violence as a strategy to manipulate electoral outcomes.[105]

As Table 4.1 shows, there is a substantial difference in the proportion of settlements associated with peace depending whether provisions for permanent or

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[103] This is in line with Jarstad and Nilsson's (2008) argument that "stickier" types of power-sharing reforms are more often associated with peace.

[104] See Chapter 2 for an in-depth discussion of the differences between my conceptualization and the more common definitions of power sharing employed in the existing literature.

[105] See Arriola and Johnson (2015, forthcoming) on the role of power-sharing reforms in reducing the incentives for competing groups to use violent strategies during post-conflict elections.

transitional power sharing are included. Of the 50 negotiated settlements signed in the relevant time period that effectively resolved the conflict in question, 47 included provisions for some type of permanent power-sharing reform. In contrast, settlements including only transitional power-sharing arrangements result in conflict recurrence at a similar rate to those entailing no type of power sharing at all. In this light, there is reason to believe that this conceptual distinction might generate a more a positive result for the effect of power sharing than in previous studies.

Table 4.1. Comparison of the proportion of settlements ending in peace for different definitions of power sharing (N=138).

Settlement type:	All settlements	No power sharing	Transitional power sharing	Permanent power sharing
Conflict termination	50 (36.2%)	3 (7.7%)	1 (2.3%)	47 (83.9%)
Conflict recurrence	88 (63.8%)	36 (92.3%)	43 (97.7%)	9 (16.1%)
Total	**138**	**39**	**44**	**56**

NOTE: While standards definitions of power sharing combine transitional and permanent types of provisions under the same conceptual umbrella, the two subtypes differ drastically in terms of the proportion of settlements associated with peace. Of the 50 settlements in the relevant time period that ended in peace, 47 included provisions for some type of permanent power-sharing reform.

Second, although there has been much scholarly attention to the unstable nature of bargaining in the context of multiple insurgencies, the literature focuses exclusively on the ways in which excluded groups act as "spoilers" in order to gain access to the goods being allocated during a peace process (Stedman 1997; Tull and Mehler 2005; Rothchild 2005; Jarstad 2006). Previous studies overwhelmingly tend to view armed groups as static actors, highlighting the tendency for rebels to engage in "outbidding" in order to improve bargaining power vis-à-vis other groups (Kydd and Walter 2006).

In contrast, my theory points to the potential for outbidding *within* groups: elements of the rebel elite who perceive themselves as disadvantaged by the bargain have an incentive to preemptively defect during the implementation period, while they still have access to weapons and followers. Where multiple insurgencies exist, alliances between groups are more fluid and there is likely to be geographic, ethnic, and ideological overlap among them (Downs and Stedman 2002). Thus, by providing an outlet for disgruntled insurgent elites to access the resources of war, the exclusion of active insurgencies increases the potential for splintering within the signatory parties to a settlement and, ultimately, the recurrence of conflict.

H_2: All-inclusive settlements should be positively associated with conflict termination.

Although the literature that acknowledges the often multidimensional nature of conflict and bargaining tends to focus on the behavior of armed groups that have been excluded from bargaining, Nilsson (2008) has argued that spoilers have little effect on the behavior of parties *within* a peace process since signatories have already taken the likely behavior of excluded groups into account. Given the difficulty of reaching a bargain that satisfies and balances the interests of multiple parties, governments facing multiple insurgencies often find it expedient to pursue separate bargains with each insurgency. Figure 4.1 provides a preliminary examination of several governments facing multiple rebellions, which chose to engage in dyadic bargaining rather than pursue an all-inclusive settlement.

Figure 4.1. Relationship between the number of negotiated settlements signed and the number of active insurgencies in six countries



NOTE: In the countries included in the figure, the government party chose not to pursue all-inclusive peace processes, but to bargain with one or a few insurgencies at a time. In general, the number of active insurgencies increased over multiple rounds of non-inclusive bargaining, making it even more difficult to reach an inclusive settlement. Although a few of the initial settlements achieved dyadic peace with the insurgent signatory, more commonly the increase in the number of insurgencies resulted from splintering and continued conflict.

The trend lines indicate that this strategy might be counter-productive, since the number of active insurgencies in these countries seems to increase over multiple rounds of non-inclusive bargaining.[106] In each of the countries included in Figure 4.1**,** the increase in the number of insurgencies was the result—at least in part—of new groups splintering off from the rebel party that signed the previous settlement(s). This pattern challenges Nilsson's (2008) "partial peace" theory, and it lends preliminary support to the hypothesis that exclusionary bargains enable rebel splintering and conflict recurrence.

[106] See, for example, Toft's (2006) study of Colombia. Multiple failed bargains with FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) led to a proliferation of armed groups in Colombia due to neglecting security sector reform in the implementation period. The integration of ex-combatants, and their subsequent neglect, led to the emergence of multiple "militias" ready to follow any political opportunist who could provide resources and "sustain their vision of how to win" (35-6).

The third and final hypothesis about the potential for rebel defection highlights the ways in which the reputation of the government party affects group expectations and strategies in later rounds of bargaining. Many governments engage in multiple peace processes during their tenures in office (see Figure 4.1), either with the same group after the breakdown of a prior bargain or with new groups that emerge over time. In the average country included in the dataset, approximately three settlements were signed in the period up to 2005, and in 79 of the 138 settlements in the dataset, the incumbent government had signed at least one prior settlement. Therefore, in most cases, the government party had already established a precedent of either complying with or defecting from its commitments to peace based on its behavior in previous peace processes. This variation provides ample opportunity to test the effect of government reputation on conflict resolution.

Based on my theory, governments with a negative reputation for complying with settlements should increase the likelihood of insurgent defection by providing a rhetorical tool for disgruntled elites to mobilize followers to return to the battlefield. Although many would argue that, given negative expectations about the government's intentions to comply, insurgents should choose not to sign a settlement at all (Walter 2002), there are a number of reasons why rebel leaders could be convinced to sign a bargain with a "bad" government party. Promises of amnesty, power sharing, or third-party enforcement might serve as additional collateral and bring a renewed sense of trust or optimism to the bargaining process (Tomz 2001). In other cases, one or a few officers might reach a bargain that is personally beneficial, but that fails to serve the interests of the rest of the group. Whatever the motivation for signing the settlement, as the process of implementation reveals winners and losers within the rebel party, governments with a reputation for reneging on prior agreements make an easy target for disgruntled elites. Neglected leaders can point to any delays in implementation as evidence that the government party is living up to its reputation—an effective strategy for convincing the rank-and-file to resist disarmament and, ultimately, to continue fighting.

> *H_3: A history of government defection should be negatively associated with conflict termination.*

The data presented in Table 4.2 appear to support this expectation. The success rate of settlements signed where the government party had not yet established a reputation—either the first settlement in the country's history or the first after a significant regime change brought a new government to power—is

roughly equivalent to a coin toss.[107] In contrast, the category of settlements signed with a government party that defected on prior agreements has a much lower rate of success: only 23 percent are associated with peace.

Table 4.2. Frequency and proportion of conflict termination among different categories of government reputation in bargaining (N=138).

Government party reputation:	Reputation for defection	Reputation for compliance	No reputation established
Conflict termination	16 (22.9%)	8 (88.9%)	26 (44.1%)
Conflict recurrence	54 (77.1%)	1 (11.1%)	33 (55.9%)
Total	**70**	**9**	**59**

NOTE: The category of "no reputation established" includes settlements that are the first signed in a country, as well as those that are the first signed with a new government party following a significant regime change. Of the three categories, settlements signed with a government party that has established a reputation for defection have a substantially lower success rate.

Interestingly, in eight of the nine cases in which the government party demonstrated its willingness to comply with prior settlements, peace ensued. Thus, the government party's past behavior appears to affect the stability of subsequent peace processes, both for better and for worse. Although a sample size of nine is too small to draw any definitive conclusions, the countries included in this category—Niger, Indonesia, Guatemala, and Bosnia-Herzegovina—vary dramatically in terms of wealth, regime type, region, the nature of conflict, and the presence of international peacekeepers. While it is important to control for the potential impact of such factors, discussed more fully in the next section, this provides cursory evidence that the government party's decision to comply with—or defect from—the

[107] Even where a country experienced a prior failed settlement, a regime change appears to significantly improve the prospects for peace: seven out of twelve such settlements, or roughly 58.3 percent, resulted in conflict termination. One conclusion that could be drawn from this is that the regime change brings about a perceived change to the ideological or political disputes that the insurgency was fighting against in the first place, or that the regime change itself comes on a wave of democratization that involves the international community as guarantors.

terms of a settlement is largely independent from structural constraints on its capacity to do so.

4.3 Data and Methods

In order to test the validity of my three central hypotheses, I employ a binomial logistic regression analysis of conflict termination, in which the unit of analysis is a negotiated settlement. The analysis is based on my original dataset of negotiated settlements to domestic armed conflicts worldwide from 1975 to 2005.[108] I employed a wide variety of sources to identify cases that meet my definition of a negotiated settlement[109]—and obtained full texts wherever possible—including the UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement Database, UN Peacemaker Library, ACCORD Conciliation Resources, and Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute INCORE.[110] The full sample includes 138 negotiated settlements signed in 48 countries over the thirty-year period.

The dependent variable is a dichotomous measurement of *conflict termination*: 1 if all signatories to a settlement cease violent activities within six months of signing the bargain and for at least five years, and 0 otherwise.[111] In multilateral peace processes, the settlement is coded as 0 for conflict termination if any signatory party returns to violent activities during the five-year period. Although five years might seem like an arbitrary cutoff in order to determine whether conflict has truly ceased, this is the standard benchmark employed in the

[108] The sample starts in 1975 because signed settlements to civil war—particularly those including power sharing provisions—were exceptionally rare in the period before the late-1970s. Since that time, such strategies of conflict resolution have become increasingly common, particularly after the end of the Cold War. The 2005 cutoff was selected because the current research project was launched in 2010, and a minimum of five years is necessary to determine whether conflict has terminated after a settlement is signed. In the future, I plan to extend the dataset through 2010.

[109] See the conceptualization provided in Chapter 3. Specifically, a *negotiated settlement* is defined as a peace agreement that is mutually accepted by the government and at least one insurgent group and that includes one or more substantive solutions intended to maintain the peace beyond a ceasefire. Where peace processes involve multiple rounds of ongoing negotiation that result in distinct agreements on various issue areas, the texts are clustered into a single, comprehensive settlement; in contrast, where a peace process degenerates into renewed violence and belligerents later return to negotiations and reach a fresh bargain, the settlements are included separately in the dataset.

[110] Full citation information for each settlement is available in a Appendix C.

[111] While other studies have analyzed the durability or duration of peace after signing a peace agreement (Werner 1999; Fortna 2008), my research question focuses on the factors that generate defection and a recurrence of conflict, which is likely to be driven by different causal mechanisms.

literature on war and resolution (Walter 2002, 53).[112] Of the 138 settlements in the sample, 50—or 36.2 percent—resulted in conflict termination between the government and all rebel signatories.

In order to assess the determinants of conflict termination, the analysis includes a number of indicators for the various theories put forth in the existing literature, as well as my own hypotheses. The variables and their indicators are summarized in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3. Key variables and their indicators.

Variable	Indicator	Source
Power sharing:		Settlement text (Appendix C)
Transitional power sharing	Provisions for transitional governing coalitions or governments of national unity (0/1)	
Permanent power sharing	Provisions for *permanent* allocation of political, military, territorial or economic power/resources (0/1)	
Inclusive power sharing	Provisions for executive coalition, quotas or guaranteed representation, or military power sharing (0/1)	
Diffusive power sharing	Provisions for territorial decentralization, allocation of economic resources, or security autonomy (0/1)	
Security integration	Provisions for integration of troops	
Military power sharing	Provisions for integration of rebel leaders into military high command or Ministry of Defense (0/1)	
Comprehensiveness	Count of permanent power sharing provisions (0-6)	
Inclusive settlement	All active insurgent groups sign settlement (0/1)	Settlement text (Appendix C) UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Number of armed groups	Count of active insurgencies at time of settlement Number of insurgencies > 4 (0/1)	Conciliation Resources ACCORD Other sources (Appendix C)
History of defection	Government party failed to implement any previous settlements signed (0/1)	Cederman, Min and Wimmer (2009) Walter (2002) UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement Dataset
State capacity	GDP per capita (log)	World Bank Development Indicators
	Mountainous range in country (log)	Fearon and Laitin (2003)
	Size of state military (thousands)	Doyle and Sambanis (2000)
Stakes/cost of conflict	Ethnic fractionalization (0-1)	Fearon (2003)
	Territorial conflict (0/1)	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
	Duration (months)	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
	Battle deaths (log)	UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset
Costly signals	Provisions for international peacekeepers (0/1)	Settlement text (Appendix C)
	Provisions for inclusive commission for arbitration (0/1)	
	Provisions for inclusive commission for oversight (0/1)	
	Provisions for recognition of insurgents as political party (0/1)	
	Provisions for amnesty (0/1)	

[112] In order to address the possibility that conflict tendencies may remain dormant for five years and re-emerge after elections or the exit of peacekeepers, I include a robustness check in Appendix A that employs a 10-year cutoff.

4.3.1 Independent variables.

The data includes a number of measures of the central explanatory variables in the analysis: *power sharing*, *inclusivity*, and *a history of defection*. First, I include a dummy variable for a *permanent power sharing* based on an updated reading of the text; it is coded as 1 if the settlement includes provisions for any of the six dimensions of long-term power-sharing reforms outlined in the previous chapter, and 0 otherwise. As previously discussed, my expectation about the relationship between power sharing and peace hinges on whether a settlement provides guaranteed benefits to insurgents beyond a transitional period. The distinction between permanent and transitional forms of power sharing is, therefore, vital in order to test the proposed mechanism. In this light, my coding criteria require that any relevant reforms be designed to outlast the transitional period. Any inclusive coalitions or governments of national unity meant to expire with post-conflict elections are coded as 1 for *transitional power sharing,* but do not qualify as *permanent power sharing*. While approximately 72 percent of the 138 negotiated settlements in the sample include provisions for some form of power sharing, the proportion falls to 40.5 percent when I restrict the definition to provisions for permanent reforms only.

The data also include three alternative specifications of power sharing in order to address competing theories. First, it has been argued that decentralization is the most effective mechanism of conflict resolution since it is difficult to reverse and it mediates the security dilemma that exists at the national level (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Rothchild and Hartzell 2014). To test this argument, the dataset includes dichotomous measures of the two broad categories of power-sharing provisions: *inclusive power sharing* is coded as 1 if there are provisions for inclusion in the executive cabinet, quotas or guaranteed legislative representation, or power sharing in the national military; *diffusive power sharing* is coded as 1 if there are provisions concerning political decentralization, reforming the allocation of economic resources, or autonomous security rights.[113] The coding is based on my initial coding of *permanent power sharing*, and therefore requires that all proposed reforms be designed to outlast the transitional period. A given settlement could include one or the other types of power sharing, both types, or neither. 22.5 percent of settlements provide for inclusive power sharing, and 34.8 percent include diffusive power-sharing provisions.

[113] See Chapter 3 for a complete discussion of the six subtypes of power sharing, as well as the two overarching categories of inclusive and diffusive power sharing.

Second, Wantchekon (2000) and others have argued that successful settlements require a complete and irreversible overhaul of the state security sector (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). I include an indicator for whether the settlement includes *military power sharing*, which requires that rebel officers be promised posts in the high command or Ministry of Defense. This measure is contrasted with an indicator for whether the settlement mentions *security integration*. While integration of troops has been the standard definition and coding for military power sharing in the literature (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007), it falls short of promising that rebel officers will have access to positions of power and decision-making—a key distinction. In both cases, the variable is coded as 1 if such provisions are present, and 0 otherwise. While nearly half of all settlements provide for security integration—44.9 percent—military power sharing is included in only 10.9 percent of settlements in the sample.

Finally, in order to address Hartzell and Hoddie's (2007) argument that more comprehensive power-sharing formulas are more likely to succeed, I include a count of the number of power sharing subtypes included in a settlement (see Chapter 3). It ranges from 0 for negotiated settlements that lack any permanent power-sharing provisions to 6 for the most comprehensive settlements.[114] The average settlement comprises one provision for permanent power sharing.

My second hypothesis suggests that all-inclusive settlements should reduce the capacity for insurgent parties to defect, since disgruntled elements within the signatory party are not able to share the resources of war with active, excluded armed groups. Thus, the data includes a dichotomous coding for whether a settlement is *inclusive*; 1 if all active armed groups sign the settlement, and 0 if any groups are excluded or reject the peace process.[115] Approximately 44 settlements, or 32 percent, are inclusive.

The potential to reach an inclusive settlement is likely affected by the degree to which the armed opposition is fractionalized. Where the number of active insurgencies is particularly high, it might be more difficult to reach terms for peace that are satisfactory to all groups (Downs and Stedman 2002; Bekoe 2005). At the

[114] See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the six subtypes of power-sharing provisions that can be included in a negotiated settlement.

[115] The UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement Dataset includes a dummy variable for whether an agreement is "inclusive" or not, the samples employed in the two datasets diverge slightly due to differing definitions of the unit of analysis. Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the differences between my definition of a *negotiated settlement* and the varied types of "peace agreements" included in the UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement Dataset.

same time, a large number of armed groups may be indicative of the existence of terrorist organizations or small, peripheral groups that do not pose a viable threat to the government and are unlikely to undermine peace among the signatories to a settlement (Nillson 2008). Thus, as a control variable, I include a measure of the *number of non-state armed groups* active at the time a settlement is signed.

To a large extent, this variable was coded by a simple count of armed groups by conflict-year provided in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). However, for the purposes of addressing the current research question, this data was prone to a number of limitations. For example, according to the coding criteria employed by UCDP, one party in the conflict dyad must be a state military. As a result, in country-years where no clear sovereign existed—such as Liberia in the mid-1990s—years of conflict and relevant armed groups are omitted from the dataset. In addition, UCDP requires that any non-state armed group cause a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths in order to be included for any conflict year.[116] A broad literature has suggested that levels of violence may not be perfectly correlated with military capacity (Kalyvas 2006; Lacina 2006; Weinstein 2007); armed groups may temporarily go dormant due to changes in leadership, territory, discipline, or even bargaining power and, thus, might be censored from the data for the year a settlement is signed. For the purpose of this study, what matters is the existence of armed groups with the capacity to mobilize violence against the state.

In light of these problems, I employed a closer reading of the UCDP/PRIO dataset—looking for brief temporal gaps in the identification of armed groups—as well as case studies and news reports in order to make the most accurate coding of the *number of armed groups* in each case.[117] The average case has roughly five non-state armed groups active at the time the settlement is signed, while the most extreme case—Somalia in 1993—had 17 active insurgencies. As an alternative specification, in order to account for the fact that the relationship between the number of insurgencies and the probability of peace is not likely to be directly linear, I also include a dummy variable for whether the number of active armed groups is higher than average: 1 if five or more armed groups are active and 0 if there are fewer than five.

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[116] Janet Lewis (2012, 20-25) provides an apt discussion of the shortcomings of datasets that rely on strict thresholds for conflict-related events and actors. Among these, the most commonly used data—namely, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset—has been replicated for a myriad of other cross-national analyses of conflict, with little attention to whether coding decisions in the original data might impact the validity of findings when applied to varied research questions.

[117] Most notably, I relied on the Conciliation Resources' Accord publications. These, and any other scholarly studies used for specific country-conflict cases, are cited in Appendix C for reference.

The third and final hypothesis generated from my theory suggests that a history of government defection from peace agreements should increase the likelihood that rebels will preemptively defect during the post-settlement period. Unfortunately, a valid, cross-national measure of the implementation of peace agreements is notably lacking in the existing literature (Downs and Stedman 2002). Yet, by integrating a number of empirical studies that have attempted to get at this issue in various ways, I was able to roughly code whether the government party had reneged on its commitments to any agreements signed in the past (Walter 2002; Harbom, Hogbladh and Wallensteen 2006; Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009).[118] I measure the government's *history of defection* as a 1 if the incumbent failed to implement any settlements signed prior to the one in question; if the settlement is the first in the country's history, if the government party implemented its past agreements, or if there was a regime change prior to the settlement, it is coded as 0. In the sample, 47 percent of settlements were signed by an incumbent party that had defected on one or more previous bargains.

While there are a number of possible options for measuring a history of government defection, I contend that this operationalization most closely aligns with the proposed mechanism of my theory. Since I argue that a bad reputation serves as a mobilizing tool for disgruntled insurgents, what is necessary is a comparison of cases where the government has established a negative reputation to *all other cases*, whether the government party has a good reputation or no reputation at all.[119] Moreover, because the government's behavior in prior peace process is public, it should not matter which insurgent parties were involved in bargaining in the past. A reputation for defecting on agreements is public, and it sets a precedent that *any* rival group will be aware of in the future. Finally, it is possible that government defections have an additive effect—that reputations get increasingly worse with more defections—calling for a count variable. However, there is insufficient variation in the data on the number of past defections, suggesting that multiple defections contribute to an atmosphere of pessimism,

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[118] I largely employ the UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement Dataset for its coding of implementation, since the coding rules do not include conflict termination as a component of the definition of "implementation." Cederman, Min and Wimmer (2009) also code whether the power-sharing provisions of a settlement had been implemented five years after signing. For settlements not included in either of these, I relied on cursory research into case studies, Conciliation Resources description of peace processes, and news media reports to determine whether the terms of past agreements had been implemented or not. Sources and justification are provided in Appendix C.

[119] Government parties with a history of implementing settlements might have developed positive reputations, which not only make the settlement more likely to succeed, but also make other insurgent parties more willing to sign on to a bargain (see Table 4.2). This subset cases is very small, however, and excluding it from the analysis does not impact the results.

whereby insurgent parties are unwilling to sign a bargain at all. A dichotomous coding of whether the government party has a history of defection or not is, therefore, the most reasonable measure at this time.

4.3.2 Control variables.

Collier et al. (2008) have shown that nearly half of all civil wars in the modern era are actually relapses of conflicts that seemed to have been resolved, and a range of studies have identified factors that seem to be significant cross-national predictors of conflict recurrence. The failure of a settlement to resolve conflict might be a reflection of structural conditions that are favorable to insurgency, the underlying nature of the conflict, or whether the terms are sufficient to stabilize the transition or not, beyond power sharing. The data include several additional indicators in order to control for factors that might impact the likelihood of conflict termination, but that are not related to the central hypotheses.

First, weak states are argued to be especially susceptible to insurgency onset and continuation. Fearon and Laitin (2003) have shown that civil war is more likely where resource constraints and difficult terrain reduce the capacity of the state military to extinguish rebellions. Low levels of development, a common proxy for state capacity, are commonly associated with conflict recurrence (Walter 2004; Collier et al. 2008). In order to control for these factors, the data includes measures of *GDP per capita* (World Bank Development Indicators), *mountainous terrain* (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and the *size of the state military* in thousands (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).

The literature also suggests that certain types of conflicts might be more immune to settlement via negotiation. For example, a diversity of social cleavages has been associated with a "vicious cycle" of intense and recalcitrant conflict (Lake and Rothchild 1998). Secessionist conflicts are argued to be resistant to settlement since, by nature, negotiated settlements maintain the existing borders of the state (Walter 2004). Thus, the data includes Fearon's (2003) index of *ethnic fractionalization*, as well as a dummy variable for whether the conflict issue is *territorial* (Harbom, Hogbladh, and Wallensteen 2006). The *duration* of conflict is measured in months from the start date of conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2002), relying mostly on the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Themner and Wallensteen 2013), but

also on news sources for those groups that are not covered by UCDP.[120] Finally, *conflict deaths* (Doyle and Sambanis 2002) is a count from the start date of violent events until the signing of the settlement in question, which comes from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (Sundberg 2008).[121] In the analysis, measures of GDP per capita, mountainous terrain, and conflict deaths are logged in order to improve linearity.

In addition to underlying structural factors, the nature of the settlement itself has the potential to affect both the likelihood that insurgents will agree to the terms, as well as the probability that the settlement will stick. This is the argument about "costly signaling," which stresses the ways in which the terms of a bargain serve as a symbolic indication of belligerents' willingness to abandon fighting. Based on my own reading of the text of each settlement, the dataset includes dummy variables that identify additional provisional measures: if international *peacekeepers* are invited (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008), if commissions for *arbitration* and *oversight* are inclusive of warring parties (Schneckener 2002), if insurgent parties are formally recognized as legitimate *political parties* (Matanock 2012), and if rebels are granted *amnesty*. Such guarantees are understood to provide costly signals of the government's commitment to upholding the bargain, which might encourage insurgents to lay down their arms even prior to full implementation. Summary statistics for all key variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 4.4.

[120] The effect of conflict duration is debated in the literature. Some argue that longer wars are ripe for settlement once the balance of power on the battlefield has reached a "mutually hurting stalemate" (Zartman 1985), while others suggest that protracted conflicts are indicative of the difficulty of realizing a bargain that is acceptable to all warring parties.

[121] Conflict duration and intensity are common control variables in existing analyses of civil war outcomes and negotiated settlements (Toft 2006; Zartman 1985; Fortna 2008).

Table 4.4. Summary statistics of variables used in the regression analysis.

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Conflict termination	138	0.362	0.482	0	1
Power-sharing settlement	138	0.406	0.493	0	1
Inclusive power sharing	138	0.225	0.419	0	1
Diffusive power sharing	138	0.348	0.478	0	1
Security integration	138	0.449	0.499	0	1
Military power sharing	138	0.109	0.312	0	1
Number of power-sharing provisions	138	1.08	1.42	0	6
Inclusive settlement	138	0.319	0.468	0	1
Number of armed groups	138	4.29	2.94	1	17
History of defection	138	0.471	0.501	0	1
GDP per capita (log)	128	6.31	1.38	4.06	10.02
Mountainous range (log)	138	2.18	1.31	0	4.41
Size of state military	138	190.96	305.72	0	1266
Ethnic fractionalization	137	0.64	0.233	0.061	1
Territorial conflict	138	0.435	0.498	0	1
Conflict duration, months	138	297.06	157.56	3	616
Conflict deaths (log)	138	9.29	2.22	2.3	13.35
Peacekeeping provisions	138	0.261	0.441	0	1
Arbitration commission provisions	138	0.268	0.445	0	1
Oversight commission provisions	138	0.464	0.501	0	1
Party integration provisions	138	0.442	0.498	0	1
Amnesty provisions	138	0.442	0.498	0	1

4.4 Empirical Analysis

The results of the logistic regression analyses are provided in Tables 4.5-4.7. For ease of interpretation, these are simplified summaries of the regression results. The complete version of each table can be found in Appendix A, along with a number of alternative tests that serve as robustness checks**.** All results are reported in log odds units with robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.

4.4.1 Power-sharing settlements.

Table 4.5 illustrates the relationship between power sharing and conflict termination. If I measure power sharing based on the standard definition in the literature—including transitional measures as well as more permanent concessions—the effect is positive and significant at the $p<0.1$ level (Model 1). Although this supports arguments that power sharing can serve as an effective tool of conflict resolution (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Wantchekon 2000; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008), the results in Model 1 are far from conclusive. The magnitude of the coefficient on power sharing is low, suggesting that the significance might be sensitive to measurement or control specifications.

This becomes clear when I separate power-sharing provisions into permanent and transitional subtypes: transitional provisions have no discernable effect, while permanent power-sharing provisions are positively and significantly associated with peace at the $p<0.01$ level. This finding is consistent across various model specifications: Models 2 and 3 rely on alternative indicators for state capacity and the nature of the conflict, while Model 4 includes all potentially relevant control variables, including additional measures of the provisional content of the settlement (see Appendix A).

Table 4.5. Logistic regression analysis of power sharing on conflict termination.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Permanent *or* transitional power sharing	0.36*								
	(1.052)								
Transitional power sharing		0.5	-0.39	0.66					
		(1.48)	(1.439)	(1.615)					
Permanent power sharing		5.85***	6.89***	7.73***					
		(1.112)	(1.09)	(1.591)					
Inclusive power sharing					4.33***				
					(0.997)				
Diffusive power sharing						5.12***			
						(1.271)			
Security integration							0.13		
							(0.469)		
Military power sharing								3.63***	
								(1.188)	
Count of power sharing provisions									1.52***
									(0.358)
GDP per capita	0.43**	0.23		0.45*	0.43**	0.3	0.36**	0.46***	0.37*
	(0.202)	(0.249)		(0.271)	(0.216)	(0.2)	(0.171)	(0.161)	(0.189)
Mountainous terrain	0.54***	0.52*		0.53	0.44*	0.26	0.41***	0.5***	0.39*
	(0.207)	(0.263)		(0.4)	(0.227)	(0.212)	(0.148)	(0.165)	(0.201)
Conflict deaths	-0.31*	-0.53**	-0.43**	-0.74**	-0.27*	-0.3*	-0.17	-0.32**	-0.33**
	(0.163)	(0.248)	(0.262)	(0.314)	(0.166)	(0.169)	(0.12)	(0.147)	(0.167)
Other structural control variables (See Appendix A)									
Provisions for peacekeepers	-0.51	-1.03	-1.12	-1.71	-0.17	-0.28	0.16	0.02	-0.08
	(0.573)	(0.926)	(0.94)	(1.297)	(0.864)	(0.73)	(0.52)	(0.71)	(0.726)
Other content-related variables (See Appendix A)									
Constant	-3.63*	-1.43	1.25	-1.03	-2.22	-1.28	-1.94	-1.61	-2.05
	(2.064)	(2.697)	(2.038)	(2.742)	(2.171)	(1.527)	(1.71)	(1.701)	(1.716)
Observations	128	128	138	128	127	128	128	128	128
Log likelihood	-56.79	-32.5	-31.21	-28.25	-49.92	-44.12	-75.04	-63.54	-47.74
Pseudo R^2	0.325	0.614	0.655	0.664	0.404	0.476	0.108	0.245	0.433

Binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported as log odds units.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE: Dependent variable is conflict termination, a dichotomous measure of "1" if conflict ceases among all signatories to a settlement within six months of signing and lasts for at least five years, and "0" otherwise. Restricting the definition of a power-sharing settlement to one that includes permanent guarantees has a much more significant association with the likelihood of peace, as compared to the standard definition, which includes both permanent and transitional provisions. This finding holds for both inclusive and diffusive types of power-sharing provisions, when such provisions are for permanent reforms. The integration of security forces has no discernable association with peace, although guaranteed power sharing in the military does have a positive and significant effect. More comprehensive power-sharing formulas, measured as the number of power-sharing provisions, also seem to have a positive effect on the likelihood of peace.

In order to concretely illustrate the impact of power sharing, I use the Clarify program to generate simulated values from Model 2 (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003). Next, I set each control variable included in the models to its mean value, allowing only the measure of power-sharing provisions to vary.[122] The predicted probability of conflict termination without any form of power sharing is just 3.9 percent (CI: 0.01, 14.4). While a settlement that includes only transitional power-sharing measures has a slightly higher likelihood of peace at 8.3 percent (CI: 0.4, 37.8), the predicted probability of conflict termination increases to 89.7 percent (CI: 47.4, 99.7) where permanent power-sharing provisions are included.

Even where there is agreement on peacekeepers, the predicted probability of peace increases from 4.9 percent to 78.2 percent when the power-sharing formula goes beyond transitional measures. When I modify settings on the contextual variables that appear to have a significant effect—namely, by increasing mountainous terrain and conflict deaths by one standard deviation while lowering GDP per capita by one SD[123]—the predicted probability of conflict termination with permanent power sharing is still 82.2 percent (CI: 57.8, 94.7), compared to 5.2 percent (CI: 0.1, 29.6) with only transitional provisions. This suggests that provisions for long-term power sharing reforms substantially increase the likelihood of peace even where conflicts are particularly difficult to settle.

As an illustration of this difference, Figure 4.2 graphs the predicted probability of conflict termination for settlements with permanent power-sharing provisions, compared to those that only include transitional measures, while allowing the number of battle-related deaths to vary. Again, all other variables in Model 2 (Table 4.5) are set to their mean values. For particularly low-intensity conflicts, the probability of settlement success is high regardless of the content of the power-sharing formula. As conflict intensity increases, however, the likelihood of success declines rapidly with only transitional solutions. In contrast, the predicted probability of conflict termination remains high with permanent power sharing, even as the number of conflict deaths becomes significantly higher than the mean. At the highest level of fatalities for all conflicts included in the sample, peace remains probable with permanent power sharing, while the impact of transitional power sharing is statistically indistinguishable from zero.

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[122] Variables in Model 2 are set as follows: GDP per capita (log) = 6.3, mountainous terrain (log) = 2.2, ethnic fractionalization = 0.64, conflict duration (months) = 197, conflict deaths (log) = 9.3, provisions for peacekeepers = 0, provisions for inclusive arbitration commission = 0.

[123] GDP per capita (log) = 5, mountainous terrain (log) = 3.4, conflict deaths (log) = 11.4, all other variables remain the same as in the previous simulation.

Figure 4.2. Relative effect of permanent power-sharing provisions on the predicted probability of conflict termination.



NOTE: All independent variables in Model 2 are set to their mean values, while allowing the number of battle-related deaths to vary. As conflict intensity increases, the predicted probability of peace remains substantially higher where settlements include permanent power-sharing provisions. The likelihood of success where only transitional measures are included is significantly indistinguishable from settlements that lack any power-sharing provisions. The relative difference between permanent and transitional power sharing is particularly striking in the middle range of conflict intensity, where most conflicts are located.

Models 5 and 6 (Table 4.5) test my operationalization against the argument that territorial forms of power sharing are the most effective at achieving peace (Jarstad and Nillson 2008; Rothchild and Hartzell 2014). Interestingly, although *diffusive power sharing* is significantly and positively associated with conflict termination (Model 6), the effect of *inclusive power sharing* is similar in significance and in magnitude (Model 5). This is further evidence that previous theories arguing against the effectiveness of political power sharing—meaning power sharing in the central government—have been undermined by the failure to distinguish between temporary elite "pacting" and more long-term institutional reforms. This analysis suggests, in fact, that settlements that guarantee national-level representation over the long term could be an effective part of a war-to-democracy transition.

Provisions about the integration of troops have no significant effect on the likelihood of peace (Model 7), a finding that contradicts previous studies (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). On the other hand, my measure of military power sharing has a significant, positive association with conflict termination (Model 8). This result aligns with existing arguments that a successful settlement requires a permanent restructuring of the state security sector (Wantchekon 2000; Jartstad and Nillson 2008), and it suggests that the most valid measure of this variable should capture whether rebel officers are guaranteed access to positions in the highest levels of the military.

Model 9 provides strong support for Hartzell and Hoddie's (2007) theory that more comprehensive settlements are more likely to achieve peace. The *number of power-sharing provisions* is positively associated with conflict termination, and it is statistically significant at the $p<0.01$ level. This is cursory evidence for the logic discussed in Chapter 2, which highlights the value of the package of benefits offered to the rebel party in affecting incentives to demobilize.

The present analysis has attempted to address the range of existing approaches to defining and measuring the impact of power sharing. In the end, the key, consistent result is that power sharing has a positive association conflict termination when its expected role is properly theorized and, in particular, when it is appropriately measured. Provisions for permanent power-sharing reforms appear to significantly improve the prospects for peace, all else equal. These results highlight the dangers of incorporating transitional and long-term power-sharing formulas into the same umbrella category. Many previous studies emphasizing the fragile and *ad hoc* nature of power sharing fell into this trap (Spears 2000; Sisk 2000; Jarstad 2006). At the same time, it seems that permanent guarantees were

doing all of the work in those analyses that *did* reach positive conclusions about power sharing (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). In sum, the findings presented here indicate that all subtypes of power sharing have the potential to positively impact a war-to-democracy transition, as long as they fit the more rigorous conceptual criteria described in the previous chapter.

4.4.2 Inclusive settlements.

Having established that power-sharing settlements are positively associated with conflict termination, as expected, Table 4.6 provides the results of the test of *inclusivity*. In line with my second hypothesis, negotiated settlements appear significantly more likely to result in peace between government and rebel dyads when they are *inclusive*. The positive effect of *inclusivity* on the likelihood of conflict termination attains statistical significance at conventional levels in all models.

In line with the literature, the *number of armed groups* has a significant, negative effect on the likelihood of conflict termination (Model 2), suggesting that conflicts are more difficult to settle where there are more demands to be met. However, when the measure of inclusivity is included (Models 3), the impact of the number of insurgencies is reduced, even negated. This result holds with alternative specifications for the degree to which the armed opposition is fractionalized—specifically, by measuring a greater-than-average number of insurgencies as a dummy variable (Model 4).

Using Clarify again, I set all variables included in Model 3 to their mean values, allowing only the measure of inclusivity to vary.[124] All else equal, the predicted probability of peace increases from 1.1 percent (CI: 0.1, 5.3) to 36.2 percent (CI: 7.3, 86.7) where settlements are inclusive of all active armed groups. If the inclusive settlement also includes power-sharing provisions, the likelihood of conflict termination is almost certain: 99.9 percent (CI: 99.1, 99.9).

[124] Variables in Model 2 are set as follows: power sharing = 0, GDP per capita (log) = 6.3, mountainous terrain (log) = 2.2, territorial conflict = 0, conflict duration (months) = 197, conflict deaths (log) = 9.3, provisions for peacekeepers = 0.

Table 4.6. Logistic regression analysis of inclusivity on conflict termination.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Power sharing	9.7***	7.84***	10.27***	9.61***	23.62***	5.89***
	(1.904)	(1.603)	(2.256)	(2.189)	(3.05)	(1.058)
Inclusive	4.46***		4.32***	4.48***	3.45*	2.66**
	(1.545)		(1.535)	(1.48)	(1.781)	(1.226)
Power sharing X Inclusive					16.24***	1.2*
					(2.49)	(1.812)
Count of armed groups		-0.26**	-0.11		-0.08	-0.01
		(0.109)	(0.155)		(0.162)	(0.176)
Number of armed groups > 4				0.12		
				(0.838)		
GDP per capita	0.33	0.33	0.29	0.34	0.37	
	(0.394)	(0.218)	(0.339)	(0.367)	(0.332)	
Mountainous terrain	0.69*	0.56	0.76*	0.68*	0.67	
	(0.384)	(0.396)	(0.438)	(0.395)	(0.52)	
Conflict deaths	-0.51*	-0.62**	-0.59*	-0.5	-0.46	-0.15
	(0.298)	(0.317)	(0.36)	(0.307)	(0.408)	(0.183)
Other structural control variables (See Appendix A)						
Provisions for peacekeepers	-3.38***	-1.95	-3.56***	-3.35***	-18.4***	-2.89**
	(1.224)	-1.221	(1.242)	(1.296)	(2.163)	(1.454)
Other content-related variables (See Appendix A)						
Constant	-4.8	0.08	-3.8	-4.95	-4.57	-2.71
	(4.207)	(2.083)	(3.908)	(3.841)	(3.483)	(2.431)
Observations	128	128	128	128	128	137
Log likelihood	-22.29	-27.86	-22.15	-22.28	-21.57	-28.28
Pseudo R^2	0.735	0.669	0.737	0.735	0.744	0.683

Binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported as log odds units.
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE: Dependent variable is conflict termination, a dichotomous measure of "1" if conflict ceases among all signatories to a settlement within six months of signing and lasts for at least five years, and "0" otherwise. Model 2 suggests that settlements are more prone to break down where there are more active insurgencies. However, Models 3 and 4 show that the likelihood of peace is significantly higher where settlements are all-inclusive, even controlling for the number of insurgencies. The interaction between power sharing and inclusivity is also positive and significant, suggesting that all-inclusive power-sharing settlements have a much higher likelihood of resulting in peace, all else equal.

Next, I allow the measure of the number of armed groups to vary, while all other variables remain constant at their mean values. The predicted probability of peace is higher for all-inclusive settlements signed with a particularly large number of rebel groups—32.2 percent—than it is where there are only two active armed groups, but a dyadic settlement is reached—13 percent.

This finding is supported by taking a cursory look at the data. The governments of Chad, Indonesia, Liberia, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan all reached non-inclusive settlements while only two or three armed groups were active, and the settlements failed to achieve peace with the rebel signatory. In contrast, even settlements signed with more than five parties have been successful where they were all-inclusive, as in Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This challenges the notion that the existence of excluded armed groups is irrelevant to the behavior of bargaining parties (Nilsson 2008), and it suggests that inclusive settlements are much more likely to prevent the recurrence of conflict among signatories.

Because the number of insurgencies is highly correlated with the degree of ethnic diversity in a polity (see Figure 4.3), I exclude the indicator for ethnic fractionalization from models that include a measure of the number of armed groups in order to avoid issues of multicollinearity. This should not affect the results since, although the number of insurgencies is a significant predictor of settlement failure in Model 2, ethnic fractionalization does not appear to affect the likelihood of conflict termination in any models, including in the preceding test of power sharing (see Appendix A). This supports one of the fundamental assertions of this project: in contrast to the tendency for studies of war and resolution to rely on indicators of ethnic diversity, it is the proliferation of groups with the capacity to mobilize violence that directly affects the prospects for a stable settlement.

Figure 4.3. Ethnic Diversity and Armed Groups in 48 Countries



NOTE: As expected, ethnic diversity is highly correlated with the number of active insurgencies in a polity. The trend holds when excluding the outlier cases in the graph: Somalia, Uganda, and India. This justifies excluding the indicator for ethnic fractionalization from regression models that include a count of the number of armed groups, in order to avoid the problem of multicollinearity.

Models 5 and 6 test the interaction between *power sharing* and *inclusivity* (Table 4.6). The results suggest that inclusive power-sharing settlements are significantly more likely to result in conflict termination, all else equal. This finding is robust to alternative specifications of state capacity and of conflict issue, as well as the inclusion of additional content-related measures that might stabilize the post-settlement period (Model 6). In line with expectations, the findings presented here suggest that inclusivity has been a key omitted variable in the current research paradigm on conflict resolution and negotiated settlements.

4.4.3 History of government defection.

Finally, the third cross-national test of my hypotheses incorporates the effect of reputation into the analysis. The findings presented in Table 4.7 show that a *history of government defection* has a significant, negative effect on the likelihood of conflict termination among signatories, as expected. Again, this finding is robust to various model specifications. Model 1 examines the effect of past defections controlling for the standard structural and provisional factors, while Model 2 relies on alternative measures of state capacity and conflict issue and includes additional content-related controls. A prior government defection from a peace agreement remains a consistent predictor for settlement failure, regardless of the inclusion of other explanatory factors.

When I include the measure of permanent power-sharing provisions, the effects of the two variables do not offset each other (Model 3): all else equal, the prospects for peace are improved with guaranteed power sharing and diminished where the incumbent party has a poor reputation for compliance. Yet, Model 4 shows that there is not a significant interaction effect between a history of defection and power sharing. In this light, although power-sharing concessions might be necessary in order to convince insurgents to sign onto a bargain where the government has a bad reputation (Tomz 2001), it remains unclear whether power-sharing provisions can overcome the potential for rebel splintering in such cases.

Table 4.7. Logistic regression analysis of government reputation on conflict termination.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Power sharing			6.93***	6.88***	9.98***	6.03***
			(1.307)	(1.7)	(2.146)	(1.01)
Inclusive					4.16***	2.89**
					(1.551)	(1.22)
Number of armed groups					-0.07	0.03
					(0.149)	(0.154)
History of defection	-1.99***	-2.22***	-1.17*	-1.26*	-1.58**	-1.35*
	(0.508)	(0.521)	(0.701)	(1.112)	(0.882)	(1.167)
Power sharing X history of defection				0.12		
				(1.501)		
GDP per capita	0.2		0.27	0.27	0.24	
	(0.166)		(0.241)	(0.241)	(0.339)	
Mountainous terrain	0.29		0.33	0.33	0.67*	
	(0.177)		(0.35)	(0.339)	(0.371)	
Conflict deaths	-0.18	-0.2**	-0.51*	-0.51*	-0.57*	-0.15
	(0.132)	(0.096)	(0.276)	(0.266)	(0.344)	(0.181)
Other structural control variables (See Appendix A)						
Provisions for peacekeepers	0.5	-0.34	-1.09	-1.08	-3.29***	-2.19*
	(0.622)	(0.592)	(1.126)	(1.127)	(1.239)	(1.222)
Other content-related variables (See Appendix A)						
Constant	-0.88	0.46	-0.41	-0.34	-3.36	-3.05
	(1.474)	(0.902)	(1.977)	(2.019)	(3.987)	(1.944)
Observations	128	137	128	128	128	137
Log likelihood	-67.38	-68.4	-27.93	-27.93	-21.96	-27.38
Pseudo R^2	0.199	0.234	0.668	0.668	0.739	0.693

Binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported as log odds units.
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE: Dependent variable is conflict termination, a dichotomous measure of "1" if conflict ceases among all signatories to a settlement within six months of signing and lasts for at least five years, and "0" otherwise. A history of government defection has a significant negative effect on the probability of conflict termination, which is consistent across various model specifications. The negative effect of reputation and the positive effect of power sharing both hold when the variables are included in the same model, although Model 4 shows that there is no discernable interaction effect between the two. Models 5 and 6 show that the expected results hold when all three of the central independent variables are included, regardless of the specifications used to control for various structural and content-related factors.

Setting all other indicators in Model 1 (Table 4.7) to their mean values,[125] a history of government defection decreases the predicted probability of conflict termination from 44.1 percent (CI: 26.1, 63.9) to 10.9 percent (CI: 3.5, 24.8). In order to illustrate this effect, Figure 4.4 shows the difference in the predicted probability of peace depending whether the state has a history of defecting on its settlements or not. Holding all other variables constant at their mean values, the capacity of the state to implement the terms of the settlement—proxied as GDP per capita (log)—is allowed to vary.

Figure 4.4. Effect of government reputation on the predicted probability of conflict termination.



NOTE: All independent variables in Model 1 (Table 4.7) are set to their mean values, while allowing wealth to vary as a proxy for state capacity. At all levels of capacity, the predicted probability of peace is substantially lower where the government party has a reputation for defecting from prior peace agreements.

[125] Variables in Model 2 are set as follows: GDP per capita (log) = 6.3, mountainous terrain (log) = 2.2, territorial conflict = 0, conflict duration (months) = 197, conflict deaths (log) = 9.3, provisions for peacekeepers = 0.

The probability of peace is below 20 percent at particularly low levels of income, regardless of reputation, perhaps because rebels doubt the capacity of a weak state to implement promised reforms. At all levels of state capacity, though, the likelihood of peace is substantially lower where the government party has defected on past settlements. Even especially wealthy governments appear unlikely to convince rebels to disarm if they have established a reputation for defection (Figure 4.4).

In the preceding tests, none of the structural or content-related control variables has a significant effect on conflict termination that is robust to various model specifications. One notable exception is the indicator for whether the conflict issue is territorial—secessionist conflicts seem significantly less amenable to peace via settlement than conflicts over the central government, all else equal. When it comes to the other conditions argued to make conflicts difficult to settle, the results are mixed. Contrary to the received wisdom (Fearon and Laitin 2003), many of the structural conditions that tip the scales in favor of insurgency do not seem to undermine settlement success. The measure for mountainous terrain is *positively* associated with peace among signatories, while the strength of the state military has no effect. On the other hand, wealth does seem positively associated with conflict termination, although the results are not consistent.

Deadlier conflicts seem more prone to settlement breakdown, a finding that diverges from previous studies, which do not find a consistent effect for conflict intensity on the likelihood of peace.[126] This might be due to the fact that I employ a lower threshold of violence than standard analyses of civil war, which require a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths for a given country-conflict. Given the addition of lower-intensity conflicts, therefore, it seems that violence that has reached the level of a full-scale civil war might be less amenable to resolution via negotiated settlement.[127] The perceived cost of unilateral compliance should be particularly high in such cases, since rebels and threatened minorities risk a devastating loss of life by demobilizing, thereby increasing incentives to preemptively defect given even minor delays or foot dragging by the government.

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[126] An exception is Doyle and Sambanis (2000), who find a significant, positive relationship between conflict intensity and war recurrence, which is consistent with my results.

[127] Unfortunately, a valid test of this expectation is difficult, since the number of cases of full-blown civil war is a relatively small subset of the population. In fact, using the COW dataset to define the sample would reduce the number of observations below 30—too small to draw conclusions from a regression analysis.

Given that third-party enforcement has been the most consistent predictor of peace in the literature (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008), the lack of significance on the measure for peacekeeping provisions is surprising. Of the multitude of models presented here, the indicator for whether a settlement includes provisions to invite international peacekeepers only appears significant in models that include the measure for inclusivity. It is possible that the two variables are collinear, since international involvement is likely to encourage all-inclusive peace processes, as well as the presence of external monitoring and enforcement. However, the coefficient on peacekeeping provisions is negative, suggesting that settlements are more prone to fail where there is agreement on peacekeepers. One explanation might be that peacekeepers tend to go where conflicts are most difficult to settle (Fortna 2008). If this is true, then the positive effect for inclusivity is particularly striking. I address this issue in the next section of this chapter.

Another explanation for this counterintuitive finding is that the difference lies in the method of measurement: my coding captures whether a settlement includes provisions to invite an international peacekeeping force to monitor implementation, and not whether there are eventually boots on the ground, as in other studies (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008). The fact that peacekeeping *provisions* seem to have a negative effect on peace, even if the effect of *actual* peacekeepers is positive, suggests an important caveat to the literature on signaling. If the role of peacekeepers is to serve as a costly signal of the government's intention to comply, as argued, then signing onto a settlement that includes provisions to invite peacekeepers should be a valid instrument to test this logic. What these findings suggest, however, is that the true role of peacekeeping is in preventing ceasefire violations and coercing demobilization whether the government complies with its commitments or not, and that, for this reason, inviting peacekeepers changes the decision-making calculus of rebels such that defecting prior to their arrival becomes an optimal strategy.

I provide a number of robustness checks in Appendix A, which show that the regression results remain constant across a number of alternative specifications. The expectations hold when I employ different measures of the dependent variable, when I drop settlements for which the full text was not available, when I limit the sample to conflicts that meet the minimum threshold of a full-blown civil war, and when I exclude outlier countries that might be driving the results (See Table A.4). An alternative dataset uses the settlement dyad as the unit of analysis, meaning each pair of government-and-rebel signatories to a negotiated settlement in the relevant time period, while relying on the same measurement for all dependent and

independent variables. This approach expands the sample size to 257 cases, and it provides results that are consistent with the main regression models presented in this chapter (See Table A.5).

In sum, the results of the analysis suggest that the predictive power of any explanation of conflict termination via negotiated settlement is improved substantially by the addition of the explanatory variables emphasized in this chapter. The most basic model that employs the standard measurement of power sharing, Model 1 in Table 4.5, accurately predicts conflict termination 57 percent of the time. In contrast, using my coding of permanent power sharing increases the predictive accuracy of the model to 91 percent (Model 2 in Table 4.5). 94 percent of cases are correctly predicted by the final model, which adds the indicators for inclusivity and government reputation (Model 5 in Table 4.7). Therefore, while some variation remains to be explained, I can conclude that the literature on conflict resolution would be well served by acknowledging the central explanatory variables of this study, particularly the importance of long-term power-sharing guarantees. Based on my findings, these factors play a crucial role in determining whether or not a negotiated settlement has the potential to effectively resolve conflict.

4.5 Addressing the Potential for Bias

Relying on the negotiated settlement as the unit of analysis, as this study does, has a number of advantages, which I discuss at length in Chapter 1. It increases variation on the dependent variable by including a larger number of cases of failure, thereby facilitating a more valid analysis of why some settlements breakdown where others succeed in resolving conflict. On the other hand, focusing only on signed settlements begs the question: is there something fundamentally different about bargaining processes that result in settlements, as compared to those that breakdown before a settlement is signed? More significantly, do the independent variables emphasized in this chapter actually reflect antecedent conditions—the nature or context of bargaining—that determine the likelihood of peace? If so, then it is necessary to question the internal validity of the data and analysis presented in this chapter.

Since each of the three key independent variables of this study are dichotomous, I conduct difference-in-means tests in order to determine whether there is reason to reject the findings presented in the previous section. I now consider each of the three key explanatory variables—power sharing, inclusivity,

and the history of government defection—as the outcome of interest, comparing whether predictors of conflict recurrence are significantly different among the category of cases in which the variable is present and those in which it is not. I largely follow Fortna (2008) in identifying factors that make the probability of peaceful settlement more or less likely.[128] Stronger and wealthier states should be less prone to continued warfare (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier et al. 2008), as well as post-conflict transitions where peacekeepers are present (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008). On the other hand, ethnic and territorial conflicts, as well as longer and more destructive ones, are more often associated with conflict recurrence (Sambanis 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Walter 2004).

First, if power-sharing settlements occur more frequently in contexts where the risk of conflict recurrence is already low, then power sharing might have little independent impact on the likelihood of peace. On the other hand, one might expect that a "mutually hurting stalemate" would be more likely to generate power-sharing concessions from the government party (Zartman 1985, 2001; Walter 2002). Thus, where the state is relatively weak, where conditions favor insurgency, or where conflicts drag on longer and result in more deaths, power sharing may be a more likely outcome than in those cases where the state has a battlefield advantage and is only will to offer rebels a trivial settlement.

Table 4.8 compares the category of settlements including provisions for permanent power sharing to those that include either transitional arrangements or no power sharing at all. In general, it seems that there is little substantive difference between the two subgroups. Although countries where power-sharing settlements are signed appear slightly wealthier, the 95% confidence interval crosses zero, which raises uncertainty about whether a true difference exists. The only clear difference arises on the conflict issue variable: territorial conflicts appear significantly more likely to get power-sharing solutions. This result is not surprising, since provisions on decentralization reforms present a common and logical compromise with secessionist movements. Interestingly, however, it suggests that power-sharing settlements are more often reached where conflicts are the *most difficult* to resolve. In sum, since there is little reason to believe that promises of power sharing occur where conflicts are already ripe for resolution—and, in fact, the opposite might be true—I can conclude that the positive relationship between permanent power sharing and peace is not spurious.

[128] Note that Fortna (2008) and others (Toft 2003; Downs and Stedman 2002) already identify peace settlements as especially prone to conflict recurrence, as compared to cases ending in outright victory for one side.

Table 4.8. Comparison of difference in means on antecedent conditions for power sharing and inclusivity (N=132).

	Power-sharing Settlement				Inclusive Settlement			
Variable	Power Sharing (N=81) Mean (SD)	No Power Sharing (N=51) Mean (SD)	Mean Difference (95% CI)	P-value	Inclusive (N=37) Mean (SD)	Not Inclusive (N=95) Mean (SD)	Mean Difference (95% CI)	P-value
GDP per capita (log)	6.69 (1.41)	6.04 (0.15)	0.65 (-0.17, 1.13)	0.042**	6.19 (1.05)	6.37 (1.52)	-0.19 (-0.7, 0.33)	0.237
Mountainous range (log)	2.32 (1.34)	2.08 (1.29)	0.25 (-0.21, 0.69)	0.138	1.63 (1.38)	2.43 (1.19)	-0.8 (-1.25, -0.35)	0.003***
Size of state military (thous.)	243.99 (345.36)	154.73 (270.84)	89.27 (-14.8, 193.4)	0.46	113.85 (248.82)	227.05 (323.93)	-113.19 (-222.4, -4.03)	0.021**
Ethnic fractionalization	0.586 (0.24)	0.677 (0.23)	-0.09 (-0.16, 0.01)	0.123	0.61 (0.27)	0.66 (0.21)	-0.05 (-0.14, 0.03)	0.116
Territorial conflict	0.64 (0.48)	0.29 (0.46)	0.35 (0.19, 0.51)	0.001***	0.43 (0.501)	0.44 (0.49)	-0.004 (-0.18, 0.18)	0.481
Conflict duration (months)	201.4 (161.8)	194.1 (155.6)	7.3 (-46.9, 61.5)	0.395	101.1 (110.5)	241.9 (156.6)	-140.9 (-192.7, -88.9)	0.001***
Conflict deaths (log)	9.16 (2.47)	9.39 (2.04)	-0.23 (-0.99, 0.53)	0.277	8.25 (2.58)	9.78 (1.85)	-1.54 (-2.3, 0.77)	0.001***
Provisions for peacekeepers	0.27 (0.47)	0.26 (0.44)	0.01 (-0.14, 0.16)	0.439	0.48 (0.51)	0.16 (0.38)	0.32 (-0.16, 0.47)	0.001***

NOTE: The difference in means test reveals some lack of balance in the categories of settlements that include power sharing and those that do not. Power-sharing provisions are more common where conflicts have a territorial basis, suggesting that conflict recurrence should be more likely. Any bias in this case does not work against the positive effect of power sharing. For the category of inclusive settlements, the potential for bias appears more threatening, yet the imbalance seems to work in both directions—where conflict recurrence is more likely in like of structural conditions, but less likely in terms of duration, deaths and peacekeeping.

Unfortunately, there appears to be a more significant difference between the category of settlements that are inclusive and those that are not across a range of predictive variables (Table 4.8). However, indications of bias seem to work in both directions. On the one hand, inclusive settlements seem significantly more likely where the state is weak in terms of military capacity. Moreover, in contrast to power sharing, wealth seems to have no impact on the likelihood of reaching an inclusive settlement. This is a counterintuitive result, since one would expect stronger states to be more capable of inducing broad participation in peace processes through the use of either "carrots" or "sticks," or both. Since poverty and weak states are factors often associated with conflict recurrence (Collier et al. 2008), and since inclusive settlements seem to occur more often under these conditions, the positive effect of inclusivity in the preceding discussion is especially noteworthy.

On the other hand, inclusive settlements seem significantly *less* likely on a few other variables that are considered predictors of settlement failure: duration, deaths, and terrain. In this light, inclusive settlements might only appear to be more successful because they occur where conflicts are easier to resolve. However, the imbalance on conflict deaths is inconclusive, since the 95% confidence interval crosses zero, while duration and mountainous terrain are factors that contribute to a greater number of active insurgencies (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000), thereby making inclusive settlements more elusive but not necessarily less successful when reached (Mason et al. 1999; Bekoe 2005; Cunningham 2006). Since I control for the number of armed groups in the preceding analysis, any potential bias caused by this imbalance might be effectively addressed.

The most threatening impact of bias on inclusivity relates to the existence of provisions for peacekeepers: the two variables are highly and positively correlated. As I suspected, this suggests that international involvement might be a factor in fostering inclusive peace processes and, if this is true, then the positive effect of inclusivity might be picking up on the role of third-party enforcement in preventing conflict relapse. It is interesting to note, however, that the two variables are positively correlated but have inverse relationships with conflict termination—inclusivity has a positive effect, while the effect of peacekeeping provisions is negative. Whether and in what way international involvement may be a source of bias when it comes to inclusivity is a topic that warrants more research. In general, however, the imbalance across categories of inclusive and non-inclusive settlements does not suggest a clear and consistent trend that would undermine the results presented in the preceding section.

A third potential source of selection bias is in interpreting the effect of the government's reputation on conflict termination or recurrence. In this case, it is possible that peace is unlikely in later rounds of bargaining for the same reasons that made conflict continue after the first round—reasons that have nothing to do with reputation. If this is true, then the negative finding on a history of defection might be picking up on the weak capacity of the state to implement the settlement terms (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis 2000), the structural conditions that favor the continuation of rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lake and Rothchild 1998), or the heightened suspicions that are generated in longer or more intense conflicts (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Walter 2004).

In this case, bias exists if there is a substantive difference between places where governments comply with their settlements and places where they defect. Cases in which the government party has not yet had a chance to establish its reputation are, therefore, irrelevant. Table 4.9 compares the difference in mean values on the same structural variables across these two categories: settlements signed with governments that defected versus with those that complied with prior agreements.[129] Unfortunately, the category of states with a reputation for compliance is too small to draw any definitive conclusions, but this is a tentative first cut at the question of whether it is capacity or agency that determines whether signatory parties comply with their commitments or not.

The results show that there is no clear difference between states that implemented previous settlements and those that did not (Table 4.9).[130] This finding lends a great deal of agency to both government and rebels in the decision-making processes that lead to either compliance or defection, since it suggests that compliance is not wholly predicted by capacity or other structural antecedents. The only difference that appears significant across the two categories is in terms of the duration of conflict, although the imbalance barely meets the lowest level of statistical significance. Moreover, this difference is a likely indication of the *effect* of reputation rather than a cause of it, since insurgents would prefer to continue fighting rather than bargain with a government that has a bad reputation, resulting in a more drawn-out conflict before rebels are willing to capitulate and sign a settlement. In any case, these results suggest that the government's reputation has a strong effect on whether settlements succeed or breakdown during the implementation period, which is wholly independent from exogenous determinants on the capacity to implement the terms.

[129] The measure of a history of defection varies by settlement, while most of the other measures only vary by country. Because the same countries would be included in the two subsets of cases where the government has not yet established a reputation for defection and where the state has a negative reputation, then no finding on the mean differences between the two categories would not reveal much of value. For this reason, I compare whether a substantial difference exists between governments that implement their settlements and those that do not, since such differences might also impact the likelihood of peace in later rounds of bargaining, making the effect of reputation irrelevant.

[130] It is important to note that the category of cases in which the state has a positive reputation is extremely small (N=7), which makes the difference in means test susceptible to any "noise" in the data, like outliers, and helps to explain the large confidence intervals on mean differences.

Table 4.9. Comparison of difference in means on antecedent conditions for states with negative versus positive reputations for compliance (N=79).

Variable	Reputation for Defection (N=70) Mean (SD)	Reputation for Compliance (N=9) Mean (SD)	Mean difference (95% CI)	P-Value
GDP per capita (log)	6.19 (1.53)	6.35 (0.83)	-0.16 (-1.2, 0.88)	0.383
Mountainous range (log)	1.98 (1.14)	2.35 (1.17)	-0.65 (-1.82, 0.52)	0.864
Size of state military (thousands)	173.99 (265.61)	295.92 (446.13)	-121.94 (-326.2, 82.3)	0.119
Ethnic fractionalization	0.69 (0.2)	0.68 (0.25)	0.002 (-0.15, 0.15)	0.484
Territorial conflict (0/1)	0.4 (0.49)	0.57 (0.5)	-0.27 (-0.62, 0.09)	0.132
Conflict duration (months)	256.5 (165.1)	119.3 (125.2)	137.2 (23.3, 250.9)	0.09*
Conflict deaths (log)	9.7 (1.82)	8.5 (2.23)	1.48 (-0.09, 2.53)	0.106
Provisions for peacekeepers	0.2 (0.42)	0.26 (0.44)	-0.03 (-0.17, 0.11)	0.331

NOTE: The categories appear relatively balanced, except that conflicts appear somewhat longer where the government has a reputation for defecting from peace agreements. This is likely due to the fact that rebels resist signing a settlement if the government has established a precedent for non-compliance, meaning that the longer duration is an effect and not a cause of reputation. In general, there is no evidence that bias is driving the negative relationship between a history of defection and conflict termination.

A final source of bias relates to the provisional content of a settlement; as Tomz (2001) has argued, states that have established bad reputations for compliance often have to offer additional concessions or collateral in order to secure contracts. In this light, governments with reputations for defection might be more likely to agree to a settlement that includes guaranteed power sharing or third-party enforcement. If this is true, because such provisions are understood as exactly the kinds of "costly signals" that increase the likelihood of peace, then any potential bias works in favor of my findings: the negative effect of a history of defection might, in fact, be even more significant. On the other hand, as Table 4.9 suggests, rebels may be unwilling to negotiate with states that have a bad reputation

until reaching a state of utter battle fatigue. If this is true, then settlements signed with "bad" governments should be lacking in substantive concessions, and the increased likelihood of conflict recurrence in such cases might be reflective of the failure of the settlement to sufficiently address rebel interests.

Figure 4.5 reveals that there is some variation in the provisional content of settlements across the two categories, but a trend is not immediately apparent. Provisions for power sharing, amnesty and political party recognition are somewhat more common where the state defected on prior agreements, yet third-party enforcement is less common. If there is any bias present, it appears to work in a direction supporting my findings. Since more costly provisions appear somewhat more likely to be included in a settlement where the state has a bad reputation, then the negative relationship between a history of defection and peace might be even more significant.

Figure 4.5. Comparison of provisional content of settlements with and without a history of government defection (N=132).



NOTE: While we might expect that additional collateral would be necessary to convince insurgents to sign a settlement with an incumbent that defected in the past, there is no clear difference in the provisional content of settlements depending on the reputation of the government party. Where the government has a negative reputation, settlements more commonly include promises of amnesty and political party recognition, as well as power-sharing guarantees. However, provisions for peacekeepers are actually less common.

The current discussion indicates that some selection bias might be driving the results presented in the previous section, particularly in the case of inclusivity. However, predictions about the likelihood for conflict recurrence often seem to go in contradictory and counter-intuitive directions, and the confidence intervals are generally too large to make any definitive conclusions about imbalance across the categories of settlements. In the future, more sophisticated methods of analysis might be more effective in addressing the ways in which the central independent variables are endogenous to antecedent conditions. In particular, statistical matching techniques would allow for a comparison of cases that are balanced in terms of structural antecedents, but that differ on the independent treatment related to each hypothesis. This is a worthy avenue for future research, since consistent results would provide strong evidence that conflict termination or recurrence is driven by the mechanisms that I propose.

4.6 Conclusions

The data employed in this study is a unique and important contribution to the existing literature on conflict resolution. Even while acknowledging the remaining threat of bias, there are a number of reasons that relying on the negotiated settlement as the unit of analysis improves on the internal validity of cross-national comparisons of settlement success, discussed in Chapter 1. Moreover, the potential impact of selection bias within the population of negotiated settlements is not sufficiently clear and consistent to undermine the conclusions reached.

The results of the cross-national analysis generally align with my expectations. First, the findings suggest that, all else equal, settlements that include permanent power-sharing guarantees are significantly more likely to result in peace than those that do not. The likelihood of peace increases more than tenfold where settlements include guarantees for long-term power sharing. Moreover, this effect holds for all subtypes of power sharing, as long as measurement of the various provisional types meets the more rigorous criteria laid out in Chapter 3.

Settlements that are all-inclusive—meaning the bargain is explicitly accepted by all existing armed groups—also have a significantly higher predicted probability of peace, even when controlling for the number of active insurgencies. However, the category of inclusive settlements is also the most prone to selection bias, meaning

that all-inclusive bargains might arise where conflicts are already ripe for resolution. More research is needed to explore the role of inclusivity, especially as it relates to international mediation and peacekeeping. Finally, the reputation of the government party appears to be an important determinant of peace, which is independent of any structural constraints on implementation or of the concessions used to overcome suspicions. Where governments have a history of defecting from settlements, the likelihood of conflict termination is significantly lower, all else equal.

In conclusion, the present analysis provides tentative support for my theory of preemptive defection by showing that the three central hypotheses of this study are corroborated by the cross-national data. Yet, the statistical analysis fails to measure and test the precise causal process put forth in Chapter 2—specifically, the ways in which

a) the relative costs of unilateral compliance create a heightened incentive for rebels to resist disarmament;
b) the incentives to defect preemptively are affected by the package of benefits offered by the government;

b) these concessions benefit some rebel elites more than others, revealing "winners" and "losers" during the implementation period; and

c) the potential for rebel splintering is affected by the capacity of such "losers" to mobilize followers and access the resources of war.

Exploring these mechanisms further requires an in-depth case analysis. In the next three chapters, I explore the experiences of the three insurgent groups who signed settlements with the government since the end of the Bush War in Uganda (1985).

Part III

Power Sharing and Elusive Peace in Uganda

5

The 1985 Nairobi 'Peace Jokes'

And the National Resistance Army

The results of the statistical analysis presented in the previous chapter show that the general expectations derived from my theory of preemptive defection play out cross-nationally: conflict recurrence seems more likely where negotiated settlements lack permanent power-sharing guarantees. The findings suggest that the patterns hold across a universe of cases—138 settlements in 48 countries—even while controlling for variation in the structural or content-related factors that might impact conflict outcomes. As a complement to the statistical analysis, this section of the dissertation provides an in-depth exploration of the underlying mechanisms that explain conflict recurrence after a negotiated settlement is signed, focusing on peace processes in Uganda since the Bush War (1980-85).

Five negotiated settlements were signed between 1985 and 2002 with three distinct insurgent parties (See Table 1.2). The within-country analysis limits variation on many of the structural constraints argued to affect the prospects for a peaceful settlement, such as income levels, state capacity or ethnic diversity. At the same time, the five settlements vary in their provisional content (see Table 5.1).

International mediators and peacekeepers were only involved during the 1985 peace process, despite the failure of this settlement; on the other hand, the 2002 peace process succeeded at resolving conflict even in the absence of a coercive, third-party enforcement mechanism. The Uganda story, therefore, does not support the argument that international enforcement is necessary (Walter 2002; Bekoe 2005). In terms of comprehensiveness, the settlement signed in 1985 was also the longest and most detailed of the five, suggesting that including more provisions is not always sufficient to enhance the credibility of parties' commitments (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). As illustrated in Table 5.1, the most common rival arguments about settlement success fail to adequately explain variation in Uganda.

Moreover, all five of the agreements reached with Ugandan rebels have included provisions for transitional forms of power sharing and, therefore, would be identified as power-sharing settlements by scholars working in the field. Yet, four of these agreements failed to achieve peace. The Yumbe Agreement (2002) was the only settlement to result in full demobilization and disarmament of the insurgent party—the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFII)—and it was also the only one to include provisions for long-term forms of power sharing (See Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. Variation in provisional content of Ugandan peace agreements.

Observation	NRA (1985)	UNRF (1986)	UPDA (1988)	UPDM (1990)	UNRFII (2002)
Conflict Termination?	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Third-party enforcement?	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Comprehensive?	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES
Transitional power-sharing provisions?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Permanent power-sharing provisions?	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES

NOTE: See the list of acronyms for reference. In contrast to common content-related factors emphasized in the existing literature (Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nillson 2008), only the inclusion of permanent power-sharing provisions accurately predicts conflict termination in Uganda.

I explain the success of the Yumbe Agreement at length in Chapter 7. In this chapter, I describe the failure of the 1985 settlement signed with the National Resistance Army (NRA). According to the logic of my theory of preemptive defection, laid out in Chapter 2, the fact that the Nairobi Peace Agreement lacked any power-sharing guarantees beyond a transitional period should have made the NRA particularly wary to demobilize. The trajectory of defection is then determined by two factors: first, whether the group's high command secured a personally favorable deal and was coopted into the government, and if this occurs, whether the neglected rebel elites had the capacity to unilaterally return to the battlefield. In this case, the terms of the Nairobi Agreement were insufficient to appease the NRA's Commander, Yoweri Museveni, whose past experience with transitional governance after the fall of Idi Amin had demonstrated the gamble of allowing the distribution of power to be determined by post-conflict elections. As a result, the NRA immediately and cohesively defected from the settlement, taking advantage of a shift in the balance of power on the battlefield in order to execute a successful coup.

The next section provides some contextual background to the Nairobi peace process, shedding light on the goals and preferences of the NRA leading up to the negotiations. In Section III, I outline the terms of the Nairobi Peace Agreement, highlighting the ways in which the transitional arrangement kept the NRA in a subordinate position to rival parties, which had a demonstrated capacity to manipulate electoral outcomes in their favor. In this light, Museveni's defection from the settlement can be understood as a rational response to the lack of long-term power-sharing guarantees. The aftermath and legacies of the Nairobi "peace jokes" are discussed in Section IV, with special attention to the precedents set for power sharing and peace processes in contemporary Uganda. Section V concludes.

5.2 The National Resistance Army and the Second Bush War

Yoweri Museveni's first insurgency, the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), was instrumental in the overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979. Throughout the 1970's, the Tanzanian government provided safe haven, technical training and resources to FRONASA and two other prominent Ugandan rebellions: the Save Uganda Movement (SUM) led by Ateker Ejalu, and the *Kikoosi Maalum*[131] led by Milton Obote and Tito Okello (see Figure 5.1). When the leaders of the three groups

[131] Meaning "Special Forces" in Kiswahili.

met to discuss a plan for the coup and its aftermath,[132] Museveni was adamant that there was no need to hold elections, insisting instead that the revolutionary forces should establish a perpetual coalition government.[133] In the end, he was overruled by the northern contingent, yet his resistance to electoral competition was already apparent.

In April 1979, alongside the Tanzanian military, the three groups' coordinated assault was successful in overthrowing Amin under the umbrella banner of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). Throughout the incursion, however, the three insurgencies retained entirely separate command structures within the UNLF. Moreover, each group was comprised of soldiers from distinct ethnic groups and from different regions of Uganda (Epulu-Opio 20089, 8); while Museveni's troops were from western Uganda, the SUM came from the east and the *Kikoosi Maalum* from the north (see Figure 5.1).[134] The resulting national military in the post-Amin period remained loosely integrated at best, with distinct elements that were fiercely loyal to their previous leaders in bonds forged through nearly a decade of out-group rivalry and rebellion-in-exile.

[132] The meeting took place in Moshi, Tanzania in March 1979.
[133] Interview with Olara Ottunu (12 May 2014), representative to the Moshi Conference for the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM).
[134] Idi Amin's military was comprised almost exclusively of soldiers from West Nile in the northwest (see Lindemann 2010).

Figure 5.1. Flow chart of elites and major armed groups in and out of power in post-independence Uganda.



Although Museveni was appointed as Deputy Chairman of the military council after the overthrow of Amin, the leadership of the *Kikoosi Maalum* received the most powerful positions in the transitional government: Paulo Muwanga as Chairman of the council and Tito Okello as Commander of the national military, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) (Epulu-Opio 2009, 10). During his brief tenure on the council, Museveni continued to voice his opposition to elections. In the meantime, he used his position to recruit soldiers from his home region to serve as a "personal army" in case of electoral defeat.[135]

National elections were held December 10-11, 1980. The Uganda People's Congress (UPC)—led by *Kikoosi Maluum* Chairman and former President Milton Obote, who had previously been overthrown by Amin (see Figure 5.1)—won 75 of 126 seats in the National Assembly. The party that Museveni had created in the months leading up to the election, the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), secured only one seat. In fact, Museveni himself lost to a Democratic Party (DP) candidate—his own brother-in-law—in his home constituency.

All three of the competing opposition parties launched accusations that the election was fraught with manipulation and rigging, particularly due to the direct involvement of the military in the electoral process (Brett 1995, 85; Epelu-Opio 2009, 11). For example, each candidate had a separate ballot box at polling stations, making voting public and visible to the Obote-loyal UNLA soldiers who served as "poll security."[136] Moreover, as Chairman of the military council, Muwanga had also installed himself as head of the electoral commission and threatened a five-year prison sentence for anyone who prematurely announced election results.[137] He personally collected the results from the various regions of Uganda and, several days later, officially announced victory for the UPC.[138] Obote was installed as President of Uganda for a second time, with the leader of the *Kikoosi Maalum's* military wing, Tito Okello, as his Army Commander.[139] With the dissolution of the transitional military council, Museveni was released from his position, and he did

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[135] Interview with Olara Ottunu (12 May 2014), who served as Uganda's representative to the United Nations at the time.
[136] "The 1980 election: An accident in waiting," 2012, (*The Daily Monitor*, 25 October, http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/ugandaat50/The-1980-election--An-accident-in-waiting/-/1370466/1594454/-/item/0/-/udwoxvz/-/index.html).
[137] Interview with Moses Ali, Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Uganda National Rescue Front, Kampala, Uganda, 2 May 2014.
[138] Nohlen, Deiter, Michael Krennerich, and Berhard Thibaut, 1999, *Elections in Africa: A data handbook* (London: Oxford University Press, p. 933.)
[139] The Save Uganda Movement (SUM), being from a UPC stronghold, was integrated into the UNLA.

not receive an appointment in the Obote II administration.[140] In early 1981, he and his followers returned to the bush under a new name: the National Resistance Army (NRA) (see **Figure 5.1**).[141]

By the time that an internal military coup that deposed Obote in July 1985, after more than four years of rebellion, the NRA was largely in retreat (Nyeko and Lucima 2002, 20). Museveni had fled to Sweden a few months before, and his remaining troops were scattered across the remote Rwenzori Mountains along the border with Zaire.[142] When the leader of the coup and Army Commander Tito Okello issued a radio announcement providing for a temporary cessation of hostilities and general amnesty for rebel leaders willing to participate in a new coalition Military Council (MC), most groups sent representatives to the capital, marking the end of the Ugandan Bush War.[143] Each group claimed military control of one of Kampala's seven hills, waiting to see what would come of the transitional arrangement (Kiplagat 2002, 24).

The NRA was the only insurgency that refused to join the council until a concrete bargain was hammered out. Despite its apparent weakness, Museveni viewed himself in an advantageous position relative to the other, largely defunct rebellions, all of whom had fled across the border to Sudan, Zaire, or Rwanda prior to the 1985 coup. In this light, the coup presented a window of opportunity for the NRA to take advantage of the apparent rivalries within the UNLA and the exigencies of establishing and stabilizing a new national government in order to launch a negotiation process that might improve the NRA's position in the emerging balance of power (Otunnu 2014; Nyanzi 2004).

Meanwhile, the international community viewed the coup as an opportunity to bring a decisive end to a conflict that had threatened the stability of the region for

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[140] Although ten cabinet ministries had been promised to the Democratic Party (DP) prior to elections, UPC members were appointed to 18 of the 21 ministry positions, with the DP receiving only three. Officially, the DP received an equal vote share to the UPC (47.1 percent), yet the party only received 50 parliamentary seats to the UPC's 75, as the UPC had run unopposed in seventeen constituencies. Under Obote II, an imbalance in powerful positions was restored in favor of ethnic Northerners, particularly in the cabinet and the military (Lindemann 2010).

[141] The group was also reinforced by joining forces with former President Yusuf Lule's rebel army, the Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF).

[142] Interviews with Moses Ali (Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Uganda National Rescue Front, Kampala, Uganda, 2 May 2014) and Olara Ottunu (facilitator of the Nairobi Peace Process and former Minister of Foreign Affairs under Obote II, Kampla, Uganda, 12 May 2014).

[143] The Military Council eventually comprised representatives from the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU), the Ugandan Freedom Movement (UFM), the Ugandan National Democratic Army (UNDA), the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), and the Ugandan National Rescue Front (UNRF).

nearly fifteen years and, therefore, supported the call for a formal peace process. Under the mediation of President Moi of Kenya, negotiations between the NRA and the UNLA-led Military Council began in August 1985 and culminated in the signing of the Nairobi Peace Agreement. As this discussion has illustrated, Museveni's experiences during the post-Amin period had taught him that a subordinate positionb in a transitional coalition would not provide an adequate guarantee of power over the long term. The next section describes the negotiations in Nairobi and the provisions of the resulting settlement, as well as Museveni's major objections.

5.3 Terms of the Nairobi Peace Agreement

According to participants in the Nairobi peace process, the five months leading up to the signing of the settlement were a constant tension between the NRA's demands and the package that had been pre-determined by Okello and the regional mediators.[144] First, although Okello's status as Chairman of the Military Council had been established as a prerequisite for negotiations, it was an issue that Museveni repeatedly reintroduced. He contended that Okello was merely the leader of another factional army, not a legitimate head of state, and that this key position should remain open for deliberation (Kiplagat 2002, 25). Second, as he had done at the Moshi Conference in 1979, Museveni continued to advocate against the need for elections, suggesting instead that the MC was already a legitimate form of governance by revolutionaries.[145]

As a way to justify his claim to the Chairmanship, Museveni publicly accused Okello and the UNLA of representing "the main obstacle to democratization" in Uganda and refused to accept the legitimacy of their authority (Brett 1995, 79). In the words of the NRA contingent, northerners had again:

[144] The tension started even before negotiations had begun, with objections about the location of the proceedings. The talks were originally planned to take place in Tanzania under mediation by Julius Nyerere. However, according to Olara Otunnu, Museveni believed that Nyerere knew his strategies ("tricks") too well, as well as detailed information about the NRA, after having worked together to overthrow Amin for almost a decade. Hoping that Moi would be more sympathetic to the NRA's position, Museveni convinced Okello and the facilitating team to move the talks to Nairobi. (Interview conducted in Kampala, Uganda, 12 May 2014).

[145] Interview with Olara Ottunu, facilitator of the Nairobi Peace Process, Kampla, Uganda, 12 May 2014.

> …inherited the permanent organs of the State including the Police, Prison, security services, the Judiciary and civil services, which in other countries are generally neutral, but have never been neutral in Uganda since independence.[146]

It was, therefore, control of the coercive apparatus of the state that gave the UPC its electoral advantage, an advantage that would be compounded if the NRA agreed to disarm while the UNLA remained effectively armed (Nyanzi 2004). For the NRA, joining the Military Council under Okello's Chairmanship was tantamount to not only accepting the outcome of the 1980 elections, but also submitting to a fresh round of elections with the same cadre of northerners at the helm of the Ugandan military.[147]

In addition to his prior experiences, leading a rebellion in exile for more than fifteen years meant that Museveni had very little domestic political support.[148] His loss in the 1980 election had not even been directly manipulated by Okello and the UPC, as his constituency had been won by the candidate representing another opposition party. According to Olara Otunnu, facilitator of the Nairobi peace process, "Museveni always knew that in any free and fair elections, he stood no chance whatsoever of winning. He had no support. So he always did everything to prevent any open political contest."[149] Without guaranteed power in the executive and the integrated military, in other words, Museveni knew that his aims "could not be achieved through the ballot"[150] and that maintaining the status quo would guarantee another victory for the UPC. For this reason, over the five months of negotiations in Nairobi, Museveni continued to resurrect these key issues even after they seemed to observers to have been settled (Kiplagat 2002).

For their part, the northern contingent was likely aware of the fact that they possessed a political advantage that was greater than their military capacity at the time, given the power vacuum left by Obote, the internal UNLA rivalries that led to the coup, and the presence of a half-dozen armed factions in the capital. The UPC's position was also legitimized in the eyes of observers due to its proven ability to win

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[146] Quoted in Nyanzi (2004).
[147] According to Third Deputy Prime Minister Moses Ali, "Museveni did not see any difference between Obote and Tito [Okello], who he thought were one and the same people, in the same government. Tito had been his Army Commander. And Museveni's view was, therefore, even Tito must go." Interview conducted in Kampala, Uganda, 2 May 2014.
[148] By the time of the Nairobi negotiations, approximately one quarter of the NRA's forces were Rwandan.
[149] Interview conducted in Kampala, Uganda, 12 May 2014.
[150] Written by UPC Bureau Chief in London for the *Daily Monitor* (2006).

elections and experience governing, leading the international mediators to believe that only an Okello-led coalition had the capacity to stabilize the post-war security situation. Therefore, Okello's Chairmanship and the need for post-conflict elections were viewed as non-negotiable terms of any bargain.

In the end, the terms of the agreement retained Okello's position as Head of State and Chairman of the Military Council. Museveni was appointed as Vice Chairman (see Table 5.2), the same position that he had held in the post-Amin period, and from which he had been summarily released after the 1980 elections. Moreover, Okello's seat was in addition to seven others reserved for UNLA representatives, out of a total of 21, while Museveni's was included as one of the seven seats allocated to the NRA (Article 2). Since decision-making on certain issues only required a two-thirds majority of the MC, this formula meant that outcomes related to "interpretation of the agreement, defense policy, political appointments, [and] election-related issues" could be determined *despite* resistance from the NRA (Article 5.1).

While many observers claim that Museveni was also promised an appointment as Minister of Defense, the text of the settlement makes no explicit guarantees for this; Article 11 merely "ensures a balance" of responsibilities in the Defense Ministry among *all* armed groups represented on the MC.[151] The terms also fall short of guaranteeing top positions in the state military to NRA officers, providing merely for the integration of troops.[152] The dominant position of the UNLA contingent was preserved both in numbers—with most positions in the integrated military reserved for former UNLA soldiers (Article 7.2)—and in positions of power. Thus, even if the terms of the bargain had been implemented, Okello would easily have been able to absorb the NRA's rank-and-file while eventually discharging any elites—including Museveni—from their transitional posts after elections reinforced the UPC's claim to power.

[151] If a negotiated settlement is understood as a form of contract, then only explicitly written terms should be viewed as credible and enforceable.

[152] See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the difference between my definition of "military power sharing" and "security integration," the more typical understanding of the concept in the literature. As shown in the previous chapter, my coding of military power sharing reveals a significant, positive association with conflict termination, in contrast to existing codings that rely on integration of security forces only.

Table 5.2. Provisional content of the Nairobi Peace Agreement (1985).

Type of provision	Included?	Relevant provisions
Executive coalition	N	"There shall be a Military Council which shall be the supreme organ of the government in Uganda and which shall upon the signing of this agreement be composed of representatives of the combatant forces and the Head of State as follows: Head of State/Chairman, Uganda National Liberation Army UNLA (7), National Resistance Army NRA (7), Uganda Freedom Movement (1), Federal Democratic Movement FEDEMU (2), Former Uganda National Army FUNA (1), Uganda National Rescue Front UNRF (1), Total (21)." (2) "The Head of State at the date of signing of this agreement shall continue to be the Head of State and Chairman of the Military Council. The Chairman of the High Command of the National Resistance Army at the date of signing of this agreement shall be the Vice-Chairman of the Military Council." (3, 4-7) "The Military Council shall be the supreme authority in whom the executive and legislative power shall vest." (4.1)
Representation quotas	N	N/A
Military power sharing	N	"There shall be established a new national force (UNRF), composed of soldiers from all the combatant forces nominated by the respective combatant forces in the following numbers: UNLA 3700, NRA 3580, FEDEMU UFM FUNA 1200, Total 8480 soldiers." (7.2) "The new national army shall be broad-based and representative of the country as a whole and shall be recruited in the first instance from the combatant forces existing at the date of signing of this agreement…" (8.2) "The Military Council shall ensure a balance between the combatant forces represented on the MC existing immediately prior to the signing of the agreement and the National Resistance Movement in the distribution of responsibilities in the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces." (11)
Political decentralization	N	N/A
Wealth allocation	N	N/A
Security autonomy	N	N/A
Third-party enforcement	Y	"After the signing of this agreement, the Uganda government shall invite into Uganda a force from four Commonwealth countries namely: Kenya, Tanzania, Great Britain and Canada. The force shall be known as the Monitoring/Observer Force and shall…observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire…monitor compliance with agreed arrangements…" (10)
Oversight commission	Y	"The parties to this agreement shall establish, on behalf of the Military Council, a committee to be known as the Ceasefire Committee, consisting of representatives of the forces represented on the Council and the monitoring/observer force for the purpose of implementing the terms of the ceasefire." (1.k)
Arbitration commission	Y	"The normal method of reaching decisions shall be by consensus, except in regard to the following matters where a two-thirds majority shall be required to reach decision by secret ballot: interpretation of the agreement, defense policy, political appointments (including the MC) members, violations of human rights, election-related issues…" (5.1)

Amnesty	N	N/A
Elections	Y	"Free and fair general elections shall be held in Uganda as soon as practicable to return the country to parliamentary democracy." (16)

NOTE: A significant portion of the settlement text focuses on the design of the Military Council (MC). However, this does not meet my definition of inclusive power sharing because the MC was intended to expire after a transitional period culminating in elections. There are also provisions for the integration of the armed groups into a new national army, which does not meet my definition of military power sharing because it fails to guarantee leadership positions to the insurgent parties. See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the ways in which my conceptualization differs from those used in previous studies.

In sum, with UPC loyalists retaining the incumbency advantage, and with elections to be held "as soon as practicable to return the country to parliamentary democracy" (Article 16),[153] there was little reason to believe that the Nairobi Agreement would result in a more favorable outcome for Museveni and his followers than the arrangement in the post-Amin period. Having joined the transitional council in 1979-80, Museveni had a proven willingness to participate in prior coalition governments, and the NRA's near defeat on the battlefield suggests that he entered into negotiations in Nairobi with the intention to accept a bargain, had the terms been more favorable. For example, if the Vice Chairmanship had been offered as a perpetual position, or if the state security apparatus had been restructured in a way that mitigated the UPC's capacity to manipulate elections, then the bargain might have redressed the failures of the previous transitional arrangement. Instead, the bargain reached in 1985 was almost identical to the situation in the post-Amin transition. Because of this, and despite the involvement of international mediators and the commitment of a regional peacekeeping force, preemptive defection was the optimal strategy for Museveni, before any steps toward compliance had the potential to weaken the NRA's military capacity.

[153] Nairobi Peace Agreement (http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/nairobi-peace-agreement.php).

5.4 Legacies of the Nairobi "Peace Jokes"

After five months of foot-dragging, Museveni signed the Nairobi Peace Agreement on 17 December 1985, even as the NRA continued to advance on the capital. As more and more UNLA-held villages in southern and western Uganda fell to his troops, it became clear that the balance of power on the battlefield had shifted to favor the NRA. During the five months of negotiations in Nairobi, an influx of capital and weapons from Libyan leader Muammar Ghadaffi—the NRA's primary financial backer throughout the Bush War—had allowed the NRA to reorganize and rearm from its base in the Rwenzori Mountains (Otunnu 2014; Nyeko and Lucima 2002). In early January 1986, at Museveni's invitation, the Nairobi mediation team traveled to Kabale to meet the NRA high command in order to discuss alleged violations of the ceasefire.[154] The NRA officers shredded the Nairobi Peace Agreement in front of them, demonstrating that they had no intention to join the Military Council and cautioning against sending in the regional peacekeeping force (Kipligat 2002).

As NRA troops neared the outskirts of Kampala, Museveni took advantage of the lack of coordination among the various fighting forces comprising the Military Council. Having fought for years against Obote and the UNLA, often in a tacit alliance with Museveni, many were unwilling to defend Okello's forces against the reinvigorated NRA. Museveni took this opportunity to publicly accuse the leadership of the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) of plotting to topple Okello and return Idi Amin to power.[155] The act of propaganda was successful in sowing the seeds of tribalism and mutual suspicion between the Acholi UNLA and the West Niler UNRF, two groups that had committed grave atrocities against the other during their respective tenures in power (see Figure 5.1). Fearing renewed violence and being

[154] According to Museveni (1997) in *Sowing the Mustard Seed*, the first ceasefire violations were committee by Okello's forces: "The UNLA's massacres of civilians continued even after we had signed the peace accord and we knew that we had no option but to continue with the war against them." In fact, the population in the region preferred the NRA to the undisciplined UNLA soldiers, who have been accused of committing numerous human rights violations in southwestern Uganda during the Obote II administration (Nyanzi 2004).

[155] It was Moses Ali, Chairman of the UNRF, who had first introduced Museveni to Ghaddafi in 1981. At this time, the short-lived "Tripoli Agreement" was signed between the UNRF, the NRA, and the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) in order to create an umbrella rebel organization in order to overthrow Obote II (Mwesigye 2010, 5). The alliance never came to fruition, but Museveni and Ali retained a mutual understanding their respective groups would avoid fighting each other, and that whichever was successful in overthrowing Obote would become President and appoint the other Vice President (Interview with Moses Ali, Kampala, 2 May 2013). When Ali and the UNRF joined the Military Council, Museveni believed that this agreement had been betrayed. (Interview with Caleb Alaka, UNRFII legal counsel, Kampala, Uganda, 30 April 2014).

cut off from their homeland, UNRF troops fled from Katanga, their base in Kampala. NRA forces succeeded in capturing the city later that day, barely one month after signing the Nairobi Peace Agreement,[156] leading the media to dub the negotiations the "Nairobi peace jokes."[157]

Immediately after the coup, Museveni integrated most of the guerilla factions that had previously been represented on the Military Council into the emerging single-party coalition of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), including FEDEMU and the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) (Tripp 2010). However, even as Museveni espoused an ideology of national unity, anti-sectarianism and broad-based governance, many groups were excluded from the governing coalition and the integrated armed forces. More than a dozen new insurgencies emerged in resistance to Museveni and the NRM within just a few years of the coup (see Figure 5.2).[158]

[156] Interview with Moses Ali, Kampala, Uganda, 2 May 2014.
[157] For examples, see Epulu-Opio (2009, 12) and "Peace talks or 'Peace Jokes" (*The Monitor*, 19 July 2006).
[158] Some estimates put this figure much higher. Bond and Vincent (2002), for example, claim that 27 distinct rebel groups were active in the late-1980s. However, an in-depth analysis by Janet Lewis (2010) reveals that many of these groups were short-lived and never posed a viable threat to the government. She settles on a total of 16 distinct rebellions in post-Obote Uganda.

Figure 5.2. Diagram of the emergence, incorporation and fractionalization of major insurgencies in Uganda, 1980-2010. (Refer to list of acronyms on page xv).



(1) = Nairobi Agreement (1985), between the ruling Military Council and the National Resistance Army (NRA).
(2) = A verbal power-sharing agreement between the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) and the NRM government.
(3) = Pece Agreement (1988), between the NRM government and the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA).
(4) = Addis Accord (1990), between the NRM government and the Uganda People's Democratic Movement (UPDM).
(5) = Yumbe Agreement (2002), between the NRM government and the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFII).

During future negotiations with these groups, it is clear that a perceived trend exists among the armed opposition that Museveni uses peace talks as a decoy; first, by offering enough concessions to convince combatants to disarm and strategically coopting the rebel leadership; and second, once the group has been sufficiently weakened, by going on the offensive to wipe out the group's remnants coercively. According to Ottunu:

> One thing has been consistent: that without exception, any agreement Museveni has signed he's broken. You can't cite one example of any agreement he has signed, whether it's [with] an insurgent, whether he was in government as President, whether he initiated discussions, whether he drew up the agreement, it doesn't matter. On every occasion, he's broken it. So he's always used any sitting down, any discussion, any signing of an agreement, simply to have the other side lower their guard, disarm the other side, let them believe 'Well, this conflict is over,' and then pounce. Consistently. Which means, of course, that for those in the know, whenever you speak about sitting down with Museveni, discussing with Museveni, they burst out in laughter. It's a big joke.[159]

Not only did the "peace jokes" lead to a renewal of violent conflict and the proliferation of armed opposition, but it also became a direct source of the "profound mistrust of Museveni and his commitment to his agreements—a persistent theme of his opponents ever since" (Barnes and Lucima 2002, 6).[160]

In addition to the proliferation of rebellions and the establishment of Museveni's reputation for defection from settlements, another legacy of the Nairobi "peace jokes" and the NRA coup was to reify the militarized nature of power in Uganda, which has undermined the potential for comprehensive power sharing in future peace processes. Since independence, power has been increasingly concentrated in the coercive institutions of the state, a trend that began before Museveni's tenure.[161] Idi Amin centralized political decision-making in his military

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[159] Interview conducted in Kampala, Uganda, 12 May 2014.

[160] See also Kiplagat (2002), Permanent Secretary at the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one of the key facilitators of the Nairobi Agreement: "Had it been possible to broaden the support base of the process to ensure wider legitimacy, and to craft an agreement that addressed the principal issues, needs and aspirations in the conflict, Uganda might have avoided the unending war of attrition that followed the collapse of the Nairobi Agreement. Instead, the failure to implement and honor the commitment made in Nairobi became a source of distrust and mutual suspicion between the parties that has lingered ever since" (27).

[161] During Obote's first administration (1962-1972), the power of the Ugandan military had been strengthened and used to undermine democratic institutions (Brett 1995, 78). This process

Defense Council during the 1970's, and control of the state security sector was what delivered the votes that allowed Milton Obote to secure two presidencies (Lindemann 2010; Tripp 2010). According to Brett (1995), "The gun rather than the vote has dominated political change in Uganda since independence" (78). Despite claiming in his presidential oath that "[t]his is not a mere change of guard, it is a fundamental change," Museveni's subordination of political negotiations to military takeover only served to reinforce this trend.

Since 1986, the coercive nature of politics has been reified by the initial "no-party system of governance" and the build-up of the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF), which helped the NRM to maintain its electoral advantage even after transitioning to multiparty democracy (Kiplagat 2002, 26; Tripp 2010). By 1990, the UPDF comprised 100,000 soldiers and nearly 40 percent of the national budget (Brett 1995). As a result, military power has become the central focus of insurgent parties during bargaining—even more than it was for the NRA in 1985—to the exclusion of political or territorial forms of power sharing.[162] In other words, although there may have been potential for a return to a consociational-style political system in 1985, this was effectively destroyed by the Nairobi "peace jokes" (Kiplagat 2002, 27).[163]

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intensified throughout the 1970s, as Idi Amin centralized decision-making power in his Defense Council (Lindemann 2010, 21). The armed opposition groups fighting in the Ugandan Bush War (1980-1985) claimed that it was Obote and Okello's armed monopoly—in the form of the UNLA—that allowed them to rig the 1980 elections in favor of the UPC (Brett 1995, 78-9; Tripp 2010, 48). Five years of fighting a multi-front rebellion allowed Obote to continue subordinating the development of political and bureaucratic institutions, while increasing the size and strength of the UNLA. The militarization of power contributed to perceptions that control of the state army was the most important game in town.

[162] See especially Kayunga (2000) for a discussion of the effective strategy of cooptation and marginalization of groups with claims to territorial decentralization—specifically, the historical kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole. These groups are located in the "NRM belt," which receives the largest allocation of economic resources and delivers the highest support for Museveni. In the 1996 referendum for a (non-federal) constitution, these regions exhibited the highest vote share in support. Where the groups have joined with the political opposition, the issue of decentralization has been sidelined in favor of multipartism. Moreover, due to Uganda's vast diversity, proposals for a federal system have not yet found a solution that achieves homogenous local units. There have been numerous rebel groups from each of Uganda's regions, each fighting for a different cause and representing different ethnic groups (see **Figure 5.2**). Recent proposals amalgamate ethnic groups that have been fighting against each other for land and autonomy in recent history, such as the Bugisu and Sebei (Twaddle 1969) and the Rwenzururu Movement in Toro (Kasfir 1976) and are, therefore unsustainable.

[163] See Apter (1960) for a comprehensive overview of consociational democracy in Uganda in the 1960's.

5.5 Conclusions

The general consensus among participants and observers of the Nairobi peace process is that Museveni had no interest in sharing power.[164] According to Nyanzi (2004), the perception of the MC contingent was that the NRA had a "total disregard for the peace process" and wanted "to disrupt them so that [they] could continue with warlike activities [in order to] gain a military advantage on the battlefield." As the preceding discussion has shown, however, the incentive to resort to violent strategies to secure power was directly tied to the transitional nature of the power-sharing formula offered by Okello and the regional mediators. The UNLA's role in rigging the 1980 elections generated expectations that the UPC would again achieve victory through coercive maneuvering with Okello as Head of State. In addition, Museveni's lack of a political constituency outside his home region of Ankole, where he still had relatively low support, helps to explain his resistance to electoral competition in general. Instead, a more permanent guarantee of powerful positions in the executive coalition and the security sector would likely have been a more appealing arrangement from the NRA's perspective, as future access to power would have been removed from electoral outcomes. Since such terms were not on the table, Nairobi became an all-or-nothing scenario.

The failure of the Nairobi Agreement and the ensuing coup highlight the importance of distinguishing between permanent and transitional forms of power sharing. As discussed in previous chapters, much of the current pessimism about the effectiveness of power-sharing solutions derives from the tendency to conflate the two subtypes (Jarstad 2006; Spears 2000; Sisk 2000; Wantchekon 2000). The story of the "peace jokes" helps to illustrate the logic through which transitional arrangements so often fail to overcome the heightened incentives for rebels to defect during the implementation period: because the incumbency advantage favors the government party, leaving the future balance of power to be determined by the outcome of post-conflict elections increases the likelihood that insurgents will return to the battlefield preemptively, before surrendering their capacity to do so.

The analysis also underlines the importance of a second analytical distinction. In the related literature, Wantcheckon (2000) has argued that sustainable peace requires a complete overhaul of the security apparatus of the state. This claim is supported by the cross-national analysis presented in the preceding chapter, which distinguishes between "military power sharing" and the

[164] Interviews with Olara Otunnu (12 May 2014) and Pascal Piwang (2 May 2014).

integration of troops. The case study presented here reveals the precise reason that this is the case. In short, the rebel high command is unlikely to allow their troops to be demobilized and absorbed into the state military unless they receive guarantees of top-level positions for themselves.

Despite almost one-and-a-half decades of civil war, the Nairobi Peace Agreement was the first negotiated settlement signed in Uganda, and its failure had significant repercussions in future rounds of bargaining. The NRA-led coup, and the subsequent exclusion of previously powerful groups, was a direct cause of the proliferation of armed rebellions, including the infamous Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The deteriorating security situation made it increasingly difficult to reach a solution that would have been inclusive of all groups, while also justifying Museveni's continuing build-up of the UPDF and his concentration of power in the coercive apparatus of the state. The "peace jokes" also solidified his reputation as a defector from settlements, which became a convenient target of accusations from his rivals in future peace processes. The next two chapters discuss the ways in which these dynamics affected the peace process with the Uganda National Rescue Front I and II (UNRF) and the Uganda Democratic People's Army/Movement (UPDA/M), in which Museveni and the NRA/M represented the government party to negotiations.

6

Rebel Splintering, Alliances and Conflict Recurrence:

The Uganda People's Democratic Army/Movement

In the first few months of Museveni's presidency, northerners were systematically excluded from positions of power in the governing coalition and the new national military. Rather than being integrated into the NRA like most other members of the overthrown military council, Tito Okello's UNLA soldiers were driven out of Kampala, and no political appointments were granted to any members of the UPC party (Tripp 2010, 48; Lindemann 2010, 47). In May 1986, four months after the coup, Museveni issued a decree ordering former UNLA troops to report to barracks, causing widespread panic in the North (Otunnu 2002; Van Acker 2004; Day 2011). Fearing retribution for the atrocities committed by the UNLA in the Luwero Triangle—Museveni's home region—during the Bush War, many northerners fled to the bush in Gulu and Kitgum districts or across the border into Sudan. By August, approximately 10,000 former UNLA soldiers had regrouped as the Uganda People's Democratic Army/Movement (UPDA/M) under the political

leadership of Otema Allimadi, former Prime Minister under Milton Obote (Tripp 2010, 152).[165]

Negotiations between Museveni's government and the UPDA/M were launched in early 1988 and eventually resulted in the signing of two separate settlements with the military and political wings of the rebellion—although neither of the settlements reached with either the UPDA (1988) or the UPDM (1990) included any guarantees for long-term power sharing. However, each of the bargains managed to effectively coopt significant segments of the rebel high command, despite strong resistance from the remaining leadership. Through an in-depth analysis of the UPDA/M peace process, this chapter aims to illustrate the precise mechanism that links rebel splintering during the implementation period to the recurrence of armed conflict.

The observable implications of my theory of preemptive defection are outlined in Table 6.1. First, if the settlement fails to include provisions for power sharing beyond a transitional period, rebels are more likely to preemptively defect. On the one hand, if the risks associated with democratization are particularly high, then the terms might be rejected by the rebel high command. A case example of this pathway to conflict recurrence was provided in the previous chapter, with the discussion of the NRA's defection from the Nairobi Agreement (1985). On the other hand, the bargain might insulate certain members of the rebel leadership while neglecting others, resulting in selective cooptation and rebel splintering. In this case, and with reference to argument I develop in Chapter 2, the potential for conflict recurrence depends on the capacity of disgruntled rebel leaders to return to the battlefield.

[165] In July 1987, the UPDA also absorbed the remaining elements of the Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMU), which had initially been incorporated into the NRM in early 1986 but eventually defected due to Museveni's delays in holding national elections ("Ugandan rebels reportedly form 'united front' against government," *Daily Nation*, Nairobi, 7 July 1987).

Table 6.1. Observable implications of the theory of preemptive defection.

Observation	NRA (1985)	UNRF (1986)	UPDA (1988)	UPDM (1990)	UNRFII (2002)
Conflict Termination?	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Permanent power-sharing provisions?	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Splintering?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
Inclusive settlement?	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Excluded groups overlap?	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Excluded groups enable defection?	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
History of state defection?	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Rhetoric of suspicion based on reputation?	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Rhetoric translated into beliefs?[166]	--	YES	YES	--	--

NOTE: The observable implications are derived from the logic described in detail in Chapter 2. Permanent power sharing should result in conflict termination; its absence might lead to full defection (e.g. NRA) or rebel splintering. Where splintering occurs, conflict termination is still possible if the settlement is inclusive or if the government has a good reputation. If the settlement is not *inclusive, especially if excluded groups overlap with the signatory party, then an alliance could form to enable defection and conflict recurrence. If the government has a negative reputation, then splintering rebels could use reputational rhetoric to mobilize defection, which should be reflected in the beliefs among rank-and-file defectors that the government intends to betray the settlement.*

Across conflicts and insurgencies, a number of factors are likely to impact the likelihood that splintering factions will be able to launch a new rebellion, including the charisma of leaders, access to diaspora funding, and the groups' internal cohesiveness (Weinstein 2005, 2007; Kalyvas 2008; Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2011; Cunningham 2013). My field research in Uganda led me to focus on two factors: first, whether active insurgencies have been excluded from the peace process. If so, splintering rebel elites might be able to form an alliance in order to share the resources of war: soldiers, weapons, barracks, and financing. At the micro-level, alliances between insurgencies are facilitated if the included and excluded groups overlap in terms of ethnicity, territory, or ideology, or if they have shared resources in the past. Where alliances form, disgruntled rebel leaders would

[166] I can only answer "yes" or "no" to this question where I have gathered specific and convincing evidence about the beliefs of the rank-and-file who chose to defect and return to the battlefield. For the UNRF, this is based on a survey of ex-combatants (Mwesigye 2010), while the UPDA is based on my own interviews.

be enabled to continue conflict even if the coopted element of the leadership is successful in convincing its followers to demobilize.

A second condition that affects the capacity of neglected rebels to defect is whether the government party has a negative reputation for compliance with its peace agreements. If so, then disgruntled rebel elites should draw on what I refer to as a "reputational rhetoric"—a rhetoric of suspicion that emphasizes the state's reputation for defecting on its commitments—as a strategy to mobilize defection from within their own ranks. As shown in the previous chapter, Museveni's reputation as a defector was established in the aftermath of the Nairobi "peace jokes." The fact that the NRA signed the Nairobi Agreement less than two months before executing a successful coup provided an easy target for rebel officers in justifying resistance to demobilization and, ultimately, in mobilizing defection.

It is important to note that these two strategies are not mutually exclusive: disgruntled leaders might attempt to mobilize followers from within their own group while also forming an alliance with other groups in order to maximize the strength of renewed rebellion and, therefore, bargaining power. On the other hand, their capacity to employ either strategy is also directly related to the context of the conflict, particularly the existence of ongoing insurgencies and the prevailing reputation of the government party. As a case in point, this chapter shows how both conditions facilitated the continuation of rebellion for the disgruntled leadership of the UPDA/M.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes the Pece peace process, which resulted in a settlement with the UPDA military wing in 1988. It illustrates the ways in which Museveni's defection from the Nairobi Agreement less than three years earlier became the primary rhetorical focus of those among the UPDA/M leadership who rejected the terms of the settlement, especially the excluded political wing. Section III provides evidence to make the case that reputational rhetoric was employed at strategic times, which helped the disgruntled leaders to mobilize a return to the battlefield. when the UPDM political wing reached a settlement with the NRM—the Addis Accord (1990), described in section IV— it was difficult to overcome the suspicions generated by these accusations. By this time, more armed groups had emerged in the region, facilitating a merging of forces that allowed the remnants of the UPDA to continue fighting. Section V concludes with a discussion of the limitations of existing quantitative measures of armed conflict, which suggest that the UPDA/M terminated in 1988. In fact, much of the remaining elements of the group were incorporated into the growing forces of

the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which made Kony's rebellion one of the few viable threats to Museveni's government.

6.2 The Pece Peace Process

In early 1988, negotiations began between the NRA and the UPDA's military commander, Odong Latek, a former Brigadier under Milton Obote. The bargaining process—which took place in Pece, northern Uganda—was essentially a military affair, to the exclusion of the UPDM political wing, which operated in exile in London and Nairobi (Lamwaka 2002).[167] Although the final settlement signed in June contained several provisions for transitional power sharing and security integration, it reflected a diluted version of the initial draft demands that had been proposed by the UPDA contingent. The absence of long-term guarantees for power sharing resulted in rejection of the settlement by the exiled political wing, as well as by a number of high-ranking military officers. At the same time, partial cooptation of the acting military leaders generated splintering among the UPDA high command. Throughout the peace process, the neglected elements of the insurgent leadership repeatedly pointed to Museveni's behavior in the Nairobi peace process as a strategy to convince their followers to resist disarmament and integration into the NRA.

After declaring a ceasefire on March 17, 1988, Latek presented a draft of the UPDA's primary demands to the government contingent, led by Museveni's brother, Salim Saleh. First, UPDA soldiers should be integrated into the NRA, while retaining any ranks and promotions conferred under previous administrations. Second, all ex-combatants should be guaranteed jobs and cash ration allowances, including those who did not wish to join the integrated national army.[168] Third, residents of Gulu and Kitgum districts should be waived from taxation, and the government should prioritize development and rehabilitation of northern Uganda, which it argued had been marginalized under Museveni's administration (Lamwaka 2002). This list of grievances failed to address the interests of the group's political wing, prompting UPDM Chairman Otema Allimadi to make an appearance on the BBC's "Focus on Africa" program on March 25, in which he disowned any peace talks with

[167] "Ugandan rebel commander to sign peace agreement," (*Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 5 April 1988).
[168] "Uganda government army, rebel forces hold peace talks," (*Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 23 March 1988).

the government.[169] As it had become clear to the movement's politicians that their interests would be neglected entirely, they began unleashing criticisms about the terms of the bargain and raising doubts about whether it even had Museveni's support (Lamwaka 2002).

Despite resistance from Allimadi and the group's politicians, Latek arrived at the demobilization camp in Lukome on April 5th in preparation to reach a final bargain with the NRA. The revised draft presented by the government met most of his demands. However, while providing for military integration, it required that appointments to officer ranks, as well as political posts, be contingent on approval and confirmation by Museveni himself.[170] Although a final settlement had seemed imminent to observers only days before, Latek also began to distance himself from the peace process at this time. In interviews with the state-owned *New Vision* newspaper, officers loyal to him—referring to themselves as "the pillars" of the UPDA—expressed their belief that the failure of the Nairobi Agreement proved that the NRA could not be trusted.[171] Soon after, Latek denied ever authorizing the negotiations and reaffirmed the UPDA's military campaign (Lamwaka 2002, 31).

On May 8th, the emerging split in the UPDA leadership became clear when it was announced that Odong Latek and Otema Allimadi had been officially released from their positions. The decision resulted from a 6-2 vote of the group's Central Executive Committee at their headquarters in Agung (Lamwaka 2002, 32).[172] Lieutenant Colonel John Angelo Okello assumed the positions of both Commander and Chairman, and it was decided that all military *and* political affairs of the UPDA/M would henceforth be handled by the military high command. In his public statement, J.A. Okello asserted that the majority of the group continued to support the peace process, and that Allimadi and Latek retained only about 150 loyal followers.[173]

In response to this development, the government issued a General Amnesty in order to facilitate the surrender of UPDA forces prior to official integration, and

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[169] "Ugandan rebel commander to sign peace agreement," (*Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 5 April 1988).
[170] Moreover, despite promising jobs and cash allowances for ex-combatants, the draft did not include provisions for the long-term allocation of economic resources to the northern region more broadly. (See "Uganda government army, rebel forces hold peace talks," *Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 23 March 1988).
[171] "Ugandan rebel commander to sign peace agreement," (*Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 5 April 1988).
[172] "UPDA ousts military, political leaders," (*New Vision*, 10 May 1988).
[173] Ibid.

thousands of troops assembled at the demobilization camp by the end of May.[174] At this time, however, Allimadi made a public appearing in which he referred to the bill as a "partial amnesty" and a "trick," causing the number of soldiers arriving at Lukome to slow dramatically (Lamwaka 1998; 2002). Rumors began swirling among the UPDA that the promise of amnesty was a rouse by Museveni to convince soldiers to hand over their weapons, rather than a genuine gesture of goodwill. According to a former UPDA soldier and current officer in the UPDF,

> At the time, there were mixed messages. Some were saying 'it is safe,' others…'look there, what he did before [in Nairobi.] You can not trust this man.' And so many thought it was safer to keep fighting than take the risk.[175]

In a unilateral move, J.A. Okello signed a final settlement on 3 June 1988. The bargain lacked any guarantees of a permanent space for northerners in the Ugandan government and military. It stipulated that UPDA/M members be appointed to the National Resistance Council (NRC)—the national forum intended to draft a new constitution—and the Executive coalition, but the precise proportions and positions were not specified. Most importantly, the NRC and the governing coalition were part of an interim government of national unity, transitional institutions that would expire with the holding of a national referendum and, ultimately, democratic elections.[176] Finally, the terms of the settlement left political appointments to the "prerogative of the President" (Article A.5) and military appointments contingent on retraining (Article B.4). In essence, this wording meant that Museveni had no contractual obligation to share power with the UPDA leadership; it lacked any guarantees that the voices of northerners would be included in political decision-making over the long term, and it implied that any integrated officers would be expected to start fresh at the bottom rungs of the military hierarchy (see Table 6.2).

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[174] Opponents to the peace process emphasized that amnesty was not included among the government's commitments in the draft settlement. In the end, provisions guaranteeing that amnesty would be upheld in the post-settlement period were not included in the final document (see Table 6.2).

[175] Interview conducted in Kampala, Uganda, 26 April 2013.

[176] Under Museveni's regime, the power to appoint a new electoral commission was under the jurisdiction of the NRA Army Council, while a few years of brutal war had decimated northern Uganda's administrative infrastructure, making unlikely the prospect for free and fair elections in the UPC's stronghold. Otema Allimadi and the other members of the UPDM's political leadership were UPC members, many of whom had held high-ranking positions in the previous government of Milton Obote.

Table 6.2. Provisional content of the Pece Agreement (1988).

Type of provision	Included?	Relevant provisions
Executive coalition	N	"UDPM shall be accorded appropriate representation in the Government Executive." (A.1) "In the Interim Period, while the appointment of Cabinet Ministers and their Deputies remains the prerogative of the President, the composition thereof shall reflect the National interest of the People of Uganda." (A.5)
Representation quotas	N	"UDPM shall be accorded appropriate representation in the National Resistance Council in accordance with the provisions of Legal Notice No. 1 aforesaid [before the end of 1988]." (A.1) "The expanded and fully constituted National Resistance Council shall…resolve itself into a Constituent Assembly and draw up a Popular National Constitution…Provided that in the making of the Constitution and the economic situation in the country allowing, a National Referendum shall be conducted to enable the people of Uganda to decide on the issue of Party System and system of Government that shall replace the present Interim Government." (Article 2)
Military power sharing	N	"The UPDA Officers and men who wish to continue with Military service and qualify shall be absorbed and integrated into the NRA and shall participate at all levels of the Army depending on their experiences…The National Army shall be balanced and drawn proportionately from all Districts of Uganda." (B.3 and B.8) "All UPDA officers who desire to join the productive unit of the NRA shall initially be sent to Pabo Military Farm, and later to such other Productive Units appropriate for the attainment of their individual skills, trade or needs." (B.4)
Political decentralization	N	N/A
Wealth allocation	N[177]	"Government shall mobilize all available resources to rehabilitate the socioeconomic infrastructure in Gulu and Kitgum Districts." (C.1) "Government shall declare a policy of free education at all levels, up to the end of the year 1989, for pupils and students from the war ravaged areas." (C.2) "Government shall, up to the end of the year 1988, exempt the peasants of the war ravaged areas from paying graduated tax." (C.3) "The declared Government policy of rehabilitating people and restocking their livestock which were looted, rustled or lost during the hostilities should be strengthened…" (C.4)
Security autonomy	N	N/A
Third-party enforcement	N	N/A
Oversight commission	Y	"A Military Implementation Committee comprised of representatives of UPDA or NRA is hereby established to oversee and supervise the execution and implementation of the Agreement save those that are to be done by NRC…Provided that other groups that will join the peace process shall be coopted into the Implementation Committee." (B.10)

[177] Provisions for economic benefits to the north were envisioned as short-term, one-off payouts. For example, free education was only designed to last one year, and tax exemptions only six months. This falls short of restructuring the way economic resources are allocated in a polity and, thus, fails to meet my definition of economic power sharing (see Chapter 3).

Arbitration commission	N	N/A
Amnesty	N	N/A
Elections	Y	"The Interim Government shall call for and organize free and fair General Elections within the period of its tenure of office." (A.3)

Despite this, the signing of the Pece Agreement was followed by a process of selective cooptation, which reaffirmed the splintering that was already occurring among the former UPDA officer corps. Okello and the five others on the high command who voted to support the peace process were immediately brought in to the NRA. Over the next two months, these officers convinced approximately 2,200 additional UPDA troops to surrender to the government, most of whom were integrated into the national military after passing a screening exercise (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 16).[178] At the same time, even though much of the group had been disarmed,[179] the exiled political wing and a number of high-ranking military officers publicly opposed the terms of the settlement and refused to turn themselves in (Nyeko and Lucima 2002). They remained in hiding along the Sudanese border with thousands of troops and weapons—many more than the original 150 loyalists claimed by Angelo Okello in May.[180]

In defiance of a resolution from the NRA Army Council advising against further negotiations with the remnants of the UPDA/M, Museveni sent four emissaries to Gulu in early August to consult with Latek about integrating his followers.[181] In order to prevent full disarmament and total loss of the group's remaining military capacity, Allimadi held a press conference in London in which he

[178] "Over 2,000 anti-government rebels surrender," (*IPS-Inter Press Service*, 29 August 1988).

[179] A statement from the Minister of State for Defense on behalf of President Museveni claims that 35,000 soldiers had surrendered by the end of 1988, but this figure has not been substantiated ("Ugandan President's Condolences" 1988), and others claim that only 2,000 soldiers surrendered (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999).

[180] See "Over 2,000 anti-government rebels surrender," (*IPS-Inter Press Service*, 29 August 1988). The movement remained dormant during this time, as all violent events that occurred in northern Uganda between March and August 1988 were attributed to the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM).

[181] "Senior Ugandan rebel official surrenders to government," (*Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 2 August 1988).

claimed leadership of the remaining UPDA/M forces.[182] He rejected the legitimacy of any negotiations with the NRA and committed the group to continued rebellion by accusing Museveni of having an "abysmal record" of honoring his peace agreements.[183] This public condemnation of the peace process was sufficient to put an end to further integration of the UPDA/M, and it solidified the rift within the insurgent leadership. In the end, Allimadi and the military officers who opposed the Pece Agreement had succeeded in convincing approximately five thousand soldiers to resist disarmament.[184]

6.3 Reputational Rhetoric as a Defection Strategy

What is important to note about the process of splintering and defection is the timing, and in particular, the way in which accusations about Museveni's reputation were employed strategically in order to prevent the complete neglect of the UPDM's political interests. First, there were a number of events that had the potential to derail the peace process in its early stages. For example, in early March 1988, Information Minister Abubakar Mayanja issued a threat on Radio Uganda and state-owned television: "Amnesty is expiring on March 31. Run, run for your lives." In addition, one of the two UPDA/M officers coordinating the peace talks, Steven Obote, was "accidentally" shot and killed at his first meeting with the NRA contingent. His relatives claimed the shooting was deliberate and that other rebel officers would have been killed if they had been present (Lamwaka 2002, 31). Yet, these incidents were not used by the high command as a justification to halt negotiations; in fact, it was not until after several more meetings had taken place between the rebel and government contingents, which made it clear that the political wing would be excluded from the resulting bargain, that Allimadi and others started accusing the NRA of being untrustworthy.

Moreover, after the settlement had been signed, Allimadi's reference to Museveni's record of defecting from his agreements came at a time when the remaining UPDA military forces were discussing integration without renegotiating the terms of the original bargain to explicitly include the political wing. Museveni's defection from Nairobi was a particularly salient issue for the UPDA/M; it had been

[182] Interviews with former UPDM politicians in London confirm that this was Allimadi's fear at the time (30 July-5 August 2014).
[183] "Peace Process in Jeopardy," (*IPS-Inter Press Service*, 21 August 1990).
[184] "Ugandan rebel leader appeals to followers to stop fighting," (*Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 1 September 1990).

listed as the group's primary grievance when it formed to fight against the NRA in 1987 (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999; Nyeko and Lucima 2002).[185] However, during the process of negotiating for peace, the issue was only raised at specific times when it could be used strategically by neglected elites.

Over the next year, implementation of the Pece Agreement was a mixed bag. Certain elements were complied with immediately, such as the integration of demobilized troops and the release of prisoners of war. A well-known UPDM political leader, Charles Alai, was also appointed to the National Resistance Council (NRC) in April 1989 (Kabwegyere 2000, 166). Despite this, opponents of the settlement repeatedly pointed to delays in implementing certain provisions—such as the lack of UPC members on the executive coalition and the failure to launch rehabilitation and development programs in northern Uganda—as evidence that Museveni was living up to his negative reputation. More than a year after signing the Pece Agreement, two significant events served to confirm these fears. First, in January 1990, Museveni arrested a number of former UPDA officers on accusation of plotting a coup (Nyeko and Lucima 2002). Then, in February 1990, a respected ex-UPDA leader and vocal supporter of the settlement, Mike Kilama, was shot dead by NRA border troops.[186] The remnants of the UPDA officer corps fled across the border to regroup in southern Sudan.[187]

The process of splintering that had taken place in the months surrounding the signing of the Pece Agreement resulted in two camps within the UPDA: on the one hand, those who believed Allimadi's claims that Museveni's reputation made him untrustworthy had resisted disarmament and were ultimately driven to continue rebellion-in-exile; on the other hand, those who followed J.A. Okello in joining the NRA were isolated in the lower ranks of the military, while their leaders were imprisoned and charged with treason. Ultimately, this fragmentation succeeded in undermining the viability of the UPDA's military capacity to challenge the NRA by reducing the groups' numbers to just five thousand from an estimated thirty to forty thousand at its peak. At the same time, the suspicions generated by Alimadi's reputational rhetoric—and confirmed by Museveni's actions—would prove impossible to overcome in future rounds of bargaining.

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[185] Other "grievances" included human rights abuses committed by the NRA in northern Uganda, NRM communist dictatorship, and Rwandan elements with the NRA/M leadership

[186] Kilama is quoted as announcing in March 1988, "We are coming out fully to join government but not as those who have surrendered. We are coming to join hands with the NRA to work and rebuild our nation" (Lamwaka 2002, 31).

[187] Including Odong Latek, Captain Majid Atiku, Major Walter Odoch, Colonel Owiny, and Major Alfred Banya.

6.4 The Addis Accord: Splintering and Alliances

In a surprise move, Otema Allimadi signed an agreement with the NRA in Addis Ababa in July 1990. Both the negotiations and the final terms of the bargain were shrouded in secrecy, but in an official statement released on state-owned media, the central provisions were listed as the surrender and integration of remaining UPDA troops, guaranteed amnesty for all demobilized ex-combatants, and the participation of UPDM politicians both in governance and in the constitution-making process (Lamwaka 2002).[188] The news was met with immediate and vocal condemnation by the remaining UPDA military commanders, as well as the UPDM politicians who remained in London. Since the terms announced were little more than a reiteration of the bargain reached two years earlier[189]—which Allimadi had vehemently rejected—opponents of the Addis Accord charged that Allimadi and his inner circle had, in fact, bargained unilaterally for jobs and personal benefits while neglecting the interests of the broader movement.[190]

The military factional leaders were particularly alarmed by the stipulation that "UPDA soldiers should leave their operational bases under their respective commanders" and report to government reception centers for disarmament (Nyeko and Lucima 2002).[191] They claimed that Allimadi had entered into negotiations without consulting them and that this promise had been made without their consent. They pointed to Allimadi's removal from his position on the Central Executive Committee prior to the talks as evidence that he had no authority to negotiate on their behalf (Nyeko and Lucima 2002).[192] In a press release issued in August, Major Alfred Banya announced that the UPDA was not opposed to negotiating a settlement with the NRA, but that Allimadi was not a "genuine representative" of the rebellion, nor of the northern community.

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[188] According to the announcement issued on Radio Uganda, "[u]nder the accord, the government will, among other things, extend with immediate effect an amnesty to all officers and soldiers of the UPDM who come out of the bush. The NRM government will also absorb and train the UPDM soldiers in the same way that the NRA officers and soldiers are trained. Under the accord, the UPDM has accepted that its soldiers come out of their operational bases under their respective commanders and report to government officials…" (16 July 1990).

[189] Except the guarantee of amnesty, which had been issued in a government decree in May 1988, but not included as a written provision in the Pece Agreement.

[190] "Peace Process in Jeopardy," (*IPS-Inter Press Service*, 21 August 1990).

[191] "Uganda signs accord with rebels," (*Xinhua General News Service*, 14 July 1990).

[192] Despite the fact that Odong Latek had been removed at the same time and through the same process, yet he retained his position as Brigadier in the renewed rebellion.

More significantly, the statement again alluded to Museveni's record of defecting from his commitments in prior peace agreements as justification for rejecting the negotiations in Addis and continuing fighting.[193] As one former soldier put it, "They told us that we had been betrayed. That if we listened to [Allimadi], we would be fed to the lions." In the few weeks following the signing of the Addis Accord, as a demonstration of the military wing's opposition to the bargain, Banya led his troops back into northern Uganda in a wave of violence that resulted in at least 70 deaths and the destruction of Allimadi's personal residence.[194] [195]

For his part, Allimadi vehemently denied that the negotiations in Addis had merely been about jobs for a small cadre of elites,[196] and he made repeated public appeals to the remnants of the UPDA over the radio. His focus in each of these speeches was to convince the remaining rebels that it was safe for them to emerge from the bush by attempting to counteract the same suspicions about the NRA's intentions that he himself had generated in the aftermath of the 1988 Pece Agreement. He claimed that "the government amnesty and the presidential pardon are genuine,"[197] and that fears that surrendering soldiers would be "molested or killed" were based on rumors spread by "disgruntled politicians."[198] In the most clear indication that Allimadi himself had lost credibility among the rank-and-file, he made a plea to the parents of UPDA soldiers to urge their children "to come out from wherever they may be in the bush and report to higher authorities nearest to them."[199]

Despite his best efforts, and while the remnants of the exiled political leadership resigned from their positions in the UPDM,[200] none of the remaining 5,000 UPDA soldiers surrendered to the Ugandan government for disarmament and integration into the NRA after the Addis Accord was signed.[201] Instead, the UPDA

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[193] "Peace Process in Jeopardy," (*IPS-Inter Press Service*, 21 August 1990).
[194] "Uganda government facing growing rebel activities in Soroti District," (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 31 July 1990).
[195] "Peace Process in Jeopardy," (*IPS-Inter Press Service*, 21 August 1990).
[196] See, for example, Radio Uganda, Kampala, 26 November 1990. Allimadi's deputy in Addis Ababa, Akena Adoko, also issued a public denial of the allegations that the UPDM contingent had only agreed to sign the agreement after being assured that they would receive jobs in the NRM ("Uganda former rebel leader optimistic following peace accord," 1990, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 1 September).
[197] Radio Uganda, Kampala, 26 November 1990.
[198] Radio Uganda, Kampala, 10:00 GMT, 15 December 1990. See also "Uganda UPDM leader calls on rebels in Gulu to come out of bush," (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 21 December 1990).
[199] Radio Uganda, Kampala, 10:00 GMT, 15 December 1990.
[200] "Peace Process in Jeopardy," (*IPS-Inter Press Service*, 21 August 1990).
[201] "Ugandan rebel leader appeals to followers to stop fighting," (*Xinhua General News Service*, 1 September 1990).

joined forces with the scattered remnants of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM),[202] and the reinforced, unified insurgency was eventually renamed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) under the leadership of Joseph Kony (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999; Barnes and Lucima 2002; Nyeko and Lucima 2002).[203]

The alliance was facilitated not only by the shared grievances of these groups—namely, the harassment and marginalization of northerners by the NRA and increasing underdevelopment in the North (Lamwaka 2002)—but also by identity and geography. First, the HSM had been founded and recruited primarily in Acholiland; thus, most of its soldiers were co-ethnics with the bulk of the UPDA, particularly the officer corps.[204] Second, throughout late-1980's, the HSM and the UPDA had operational bases in the same regions of northern Uganda—especially the areas surrounding Gulu, Kitgum, Lira and Soroti—as well as in southern Sudan, which facilitated the frequency of communication and information sharing between them (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999; Nyeko and Lucima 2002). According to an interview with a former UPDA soldier and retired local councilor in Gulu:

> When [the UPDA] started, we had been the army, the national military. But [the HSM], they were new, not trained. They had only few weapons, so they threw rocks. But they were sons of the soil. They knew the local areas, they had their families [there], and so on…So we would sometimes, perhaps, share

[202] The Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) of Alice Lakwena had a series of successful attacks against the NRA in late-1986 and early-1987 before suffering a significant defeat in Jinja, just 80 kilometers from the capital. By the time the Pece peace process had started in early 1988, Lakwena had fled into exile in Kenya, and the remaining factions of the HSM—estimated at one point to number in the tens of thousands—scattered across northern Uganda and across the border into Sudan. See Barnes and Lucima (2002) and Lewis (2010).

[203] There are varied accounts on the formation of and relationship between the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Many scholars of the post-Bush War period consider them to be the same group, whereby the name change corresponds to a shift in leadership from Alice Lakwena to Joseph Kony after the HSM's defeat in Jinja in 1987 (Barnes and Lucima 2002; Lamwaka 2002; Jackson 2010; Day 2011; Baregu 2011). Others more commonly describe them as two distinct groups that emerged in the same region of Uganda at around the same time (Lewis 2010; Branch 2005; Behrend 1999). The confusion appears to stem from the fact that Kony had initially been a member of the UPDA, an advisor for its Black Battalion, before leaving to recruit for his own insurgency in 1987 (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999; Van Acker 2004). Kony was able to unite the remnants of the HSM and UPDA by drawing on a similar brand of spiritual Christian mysticism as Lakwena and forming an alliance with former UPDA Commander Odong Latek (Van Acker 2004; Baines 2007; Day 2011). He initially called this group the Uganda Democratic Christian Army (UDCA), but in 1992 the name was changed (back) to the LRA (Baregu 2011).

[204] Some reports indicate that the HSM continued to recruit in Lengo and Teso sub-regions as it marched from northern Uganda toward its last major front in Jinja. However, the defeat in Jinja scattered its forces, which split into ethnic-based factions and returned to their various home regions. It was the Acholi factions of the HSM that would have had continued contact and overlap with the remaining UPDA forces.

some guns if we could, and them, they would tell us [things] that helped us to move around…it was like that.[205]

Some reports indicate that the HSM initially operated like an autonomous unit within the UPDA, from which it recruited and borrowed resources (Baregu 2011, 303).

At the same time, however, the geographic overlap between the groups often facilitated competition for resources. For example, some reports indicate that Lakwena once attempted to coopt a battalion of UPDA troops, and resistance by UPDA officers led to a series of violent encounters in which the HSM succeeded in rearming itself by force (Branch 2005; Behrend 2004; Doom and Vlassenroot 1999; Allen 1991). This inter-group conflict likely helps to explain the timing of the formal alliance between the groups; specifically, why the two groups joined forces in 1990, rather than immediately after the UPDA's defection from the Pece Agreement in 1988. For their part, Museveni and the NRA contingent had strategically ratcheted up this rivalry during the Pece peace process by stipulating that demobilized ex-combatants would be integrated into joint UPDA-NRA task forces, which would fight together against the HSM (Lamwaka 2002; Baregu 2011). As a result, the HSM perceived the 1988 peace talks as a tactical move by the UPDA to avenge their previous defeats from a more advantageous battlefield position (O'Kademeri 2002, 37). In fact, in April 1988, both Kony and the remaining factions of the HSM had initially expressed a willingness to join the peace talks with the UPDA if the negotiations seemed "fruitful" (Van Acker 2004; Lamwaka 2002).[206] However, as in all subsequent peace processes, Museveni pursued a strategy of divide-and-conquer, focusing on the cooptation and pacification of one rebellion at a time while also undermining their capacity to coordinate by encouraging competition between them.

While this strategy succeeded in preventing an alliance between the HSM and UPDA defectors in 1988, two years later the situation on the ground had changed. First, isolation from the UPDM political wing—the cooptation of Allimadi and the

[205] Lewis (2010) and Van Acker (2004) suggest that the UPDA received less support from the northern population than the HSM. She argues that the population believed that the group would be less successful than the HSM, although the reason for this is unclear (p. 160). In contrast, according to Branch (2005) and Doom and Vlassenroot (1999), the Acholi were initially very supportive of the UPDA because they viewed it as the only group capable of defeating the NRA and establishing security in the region. As the conflict and suffering intensified, however, and Lakwena's group emerged with promises to end the violence rather than try to take power, support for the UPDA declined.

[206] "Ugandan President to meet rebel delegation," (*Xinhua Overseas News Service*, 11 April 1988).

resignation of the remaining politicians-in-exile—reduced the prospects for the military wing to access financing from abroad, particularly from its elites in London, and to negotiate for a more favorable bargain with the NRA in the future.[207] Second, both groups had been substantially weakened in number from a peak estimated at tens of thousands to just five thousand troops or less. Thus, the merger represented a final, desperate attempt to regroup and launch a viable rebellion that had the potential to threaten Museveni's military.

In sum, the evidence suggests that elements of the UPDA/M elite who had been neglected from the bargaining process in Addis Ababa continued to justify their rejection of the settlement with accusations about Museveni's reputation, which fed rumors and fears among soldiers in the bush. Moreover, they actively challenged Allimadi's authority and legitimacy, which effectively undermined his attempts to surmount those fears. Because the process of selective cooptation associated with the Addis Accord effectively divorced the rebellion from the political leadership that had given it legitimacy and bargaining power,[208] the marooned and weakened military wing formed a strategic alliance with the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM): an ongoing rebellion with which it shared goals, identity and geography, and which had been excluded from the peace process.

6.5 Conclusions

The events surrounding the signing of the Pece Agreement and the Addis Accord reveal a number of important lessons for scholars of conflict resolution. First, the reputation of bargaining parties, which is based on their behavior in past peace processes, has a significant impact on the likelihood that the negotiations will be successful. During the peace talks between the NRM and the LRA in 1994, it was former UPDA officers in the rebel contingent that chose to end the negotiations before a settlement could be reached, citing their experience being duped by the NRA (Baregu 2011; O'Kadameri 2002). It was after the failure of this peace process that Kony began his campaign of abduction and terror in northern Uganda (Van

[207] Confirmed in interviews with former UPDA officer in Gulu (10 April 2013) and UPDM politicians in London (30 July 2014).

[208] In an interview granted nearly a decade after the signing of the Addis Accord, Otema Allimadi admitted that the bargain had been about little more than his own personal benefit. He claimed that the government had fulfilled all of the provisions for which it was responsible, and said that "[t]he most important thing was that I would come [back to Uganda] and government would look after my security. This was fulfilled." (Lamwaka 2002, 33).

Acker 2004), a tragic history that might have been prevented with greater awareness of the destabilizing impact of Museveni's reputation.

While reputation is clearly in important issue that affects the mutual suspicions of bargaining parties throughout a peace process, the central issue is the way in which reputational rhetoric can be employed as a strategic tool by elites. When the terms of a negotiated settlement fail to serve the interests of certain elements of the insurgent leadership, those neglected elites have an incentive to rely on inflammatory rhetoric in order to convince followers to resist disarmament; incumbents with a "bad" reputation for complying with their agreements provide an easy target. As the discussion of the UPDA/M peace process has shown, even though Museveni's defection from the 1985 Nairobi Peace Agreement was among the rebels' primary grievances,[209] this fact was only emphasized at strategic times—specifically, when certain elites sensed that they would be left out of the bargain.

The exclusion of ongoing insurgencies provides a second strategic outlet for elites who have an incentive to defect from a settlement. In any peace process, it is important to consider the interests of armed groups that have the potential to share resources of war with insurgent defectors, especially those that overlap in terms of ideology, identity, or geography. The merger between the UPDA and the HSM illustrates that, while a divide-and-conquer strategy might be effective in preventing a rebel alliance in the short term, changes in the balance of power that result from implementing a settlement might also lower the opportunity cost of coordinating for insurgents.

Finally, the preceding case study is an especially salient example of remaining problems with the existing data on armed groups and conflict. Both the UPDA and the HSM are only included in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset in the years 1986 and 1987, after which they are replaced by the LRA (Gleditsch et al. 2002).[210] Moreover, the LRA is the only rebel group included in the well-known Correlates of War dataset after 1985 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Even case studies of the conflict in northern Uganda have often overlooked the linkages between the three insurgencies, assuming that the integration of the majority of the

[209] See Lomo and Hovil (2004) and Finnstrom (2008). According to Day (2011), the UPDA viewed the NRA's reneging on the power-sharing agreement it signed with the UNLA as "a betrayal, humiliation, and yet another loss of Acholi political dominance" (448).

[210] Furthermore, the wave violence that occurred in Soroti District in July-August 1990 is specifically attributed to the UPDA in news sources and sufficient to meet the UCDP/PRIO dataset threshold of 25 battle-related in a given conflict-year. This is just one example of a mistake in coding, though my research has revealed many more.

UPDA into the NRA made the group irrelevant after 1988 (Day 2011; Lewis 2010).[211] This chapter has revealed the flaws in this perspective.

In a seminal study of insurgencies in post-Bush War Uganda, Janet Lewis (2010) considers the LRA as one of only four groups that have ever posed a viable threat to Museveni's NRM government. The HSM—the group most commonly considered as the precursor to the LRA—was essentially a defeated and scattered force by 1988, which suggests that it was the influx of UPDA defectors that gave Kony the resources necessary to build a sustainable rebellion. According to the International Crisis Group, the strength of the LRA derives from "a fusion of UPDA conventional military tactics and objectives…with HSM spiritualism." Because it had served as the official state military under Milton Obote, the UPDA had more training, experience and organizational capacity than the HSM. Van Acker (2004) points out that ex-UPDA officers became some of Kony's closest advisors and top commanders; they taught him guerilla warfare tactics and the use of terror as a military strategy, which would become the hallmark of the LRA conflict. Therefore, not only are the trajectories of these groups inexorably linked, but the viability of the LRA can be understood as a direct consequence of the merger between the UPDA and the HSM. The significance of this is lost in current measures of insurgencies that distinguish between groups based on the title or leader, which detracts from the validity of existing analyses of group onset and termination.

In a similar illustration of this problem, the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) was essentially a continuation of the original UNRF insurgency that had fought against Obote's regime during the Bush War, despite being included separately in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). While the leader of the UNRF, Moses Ali, was coopted into the NRA in 1986, a number of his officers returned to the bush. Although it took them almost a decade to sufficiently regroup and begin launching attacks against Museveni's government, resulting in a gap in conflict years, both the officer corps and the rank-and-file of the UNRFII had been part of the original UNRF. The next chapter provides a discussion of the peace processes between Museveni's government and both the UNRF (1986) and the UNRFII (2002). Rather than considering the groups as distinct, it takes the perspective that the power-sharing agreement reached in 1986 failed to end the conflict with the UNRF, which is reflected in the emergence of the UNRFII.

[211] This helps to explain why there is so little information available about the UPDA/M and the peace processes in Gulu and Addis Ababa.

7

Splintering, Reputation and Permanent Power Sharing:

The Uganda National Rescue Front I and II

Similar to the exclusion of Northerners described in the previous chapter, people from the West Nile region—especially Muslims and Idi Amin loyalists—were initially left out of Museveni's integrated military and governing coalition following the NRA coup (Tripp 2010, 48).[212] Unlike the case of the UPDA/M, however, the potential for peacefully incorporating the West Nile-based Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) was relatively high in 1986. Even though they had fought against each other during Amin's administration, Museveni and UNRF Commander Moses Ali developed a close personal relationship during the Bush War.[213] It was Ali who

[212] The armed groups from West Nile and Acholiland were viewed as biggest threats to Museveni, since they had served as the state militaries in the two preceding regimes of Idi Amin and Milton Obote, respectively.

[213] Based out of Uganda's West Nile region, the UNRF originally emerged in the early-1980s after the overthrow of the Idi Amin regime. Under Amin, ethnic groups from West Nile—particularly the Kakwa (Amin's group), Nubians, and Muslims—had been overrepresented in state security institutions, especially at the highest levels (Lindemann 2010, 21). His consolidation of power included a systemic process of centralization, in which local councils were replaced by appointed provincial governors and, later, District Commissioners (DCs), most of whom were military officers and West Nile Muslims (Golooba-Mutebi 1999; Sathyamurthy 1982). The leader of the UNRF—

first introduced Museveni to Muammar Gadhafi, the Libyan dictator who would serve as the primary financial backer to both insurgencies. In an understanding reached in Tripoli in 1981, the two rebel leaders agreed not to use their forces against each other, and that whoever succeeded in overthrowing Obote would become President of Uganda and name the other as his Vice President.[214] When a verbal bargain was reached between Museveni and Moses Ali in July 1986, this relationship lent a sense of stability and security to the process of incorporating the UNRF.[215] Despite the high potential for success, however, the agreement ultimately failed to prevent the group's military wing from returning to the battlefield. It would take a second round of peace talks more than 15 years later to successfully and definitively disarm the UNRFII.

This chapter aims to explain why the second peace process succeeded where the first one failed. In 1986, there was no explicit contract signed between Museveni and Moses Ali, only a verbal agreement on the terms of incorporation and demobilization. Even though the deal initially seemed to be favorable for the UNRF, later indications that the military wing might be neglected from the cooptation process were compounded by the uncertainty caused by the lack of precise terms. Since all other active insurgencies had already been coopted by the NRA at this time, the disgruntled UNRF officers had to mobilize defection exclusively from within their own ranks.

Referring back to the theory of preemptive defection (Chapter 2), where splintering occurs among the rebel party, neglected meso-elites should have a

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Brigadier Moses Ali—had served as Minister of Finance under Amin, as well as on his Defense Council, which was the center of government power and decision-making in the 1970s.[213] Following the 1979 coup and democratic elections that returned Milton Obote to the presidency, Amin loyalists and West Nilers were stripped of their advantageous positions in the military and government (Omara-Otunnu 1987). In their place, the scales of disproportionate ethnic representation were tipped toward Northerners, such as the Acholi and Langi groups, which led much of Amin's former military to take up arms against Obote's regime; this was the origin of the UNRF. With the overthrow of Obote in July 1985, Moses Ali joined Tito Okello's coalition government, and the UNRF established military control of Katanga hill in central Kampala. However, in late January 1986, as it became clear that Okello's UNLA military could not prevent the NRA's continued advance on the capital—even after Museveni had signed the Nairobi Peace Agreement—Ali commanded his forces to withdraw from Katanga. The NRA succeeded in capturing Kampala the same day.

[214] This is often referred to as the "Tripoli Agreement." See Mwesigye (2010, 5), who describes a temporary umbrella insurgency that emerged from these talks, called the Uganda Popular Front, which was ultimately short-lived. In the end, Obote was deposed by his own military commanders, but it was this mutual understanding that led Ali to abandon the UNRF's base at Katanga, rather than stay to defend the capital against the NRA. Confirmed in interview with Moses Ali, 2 May 2014, Kampala, Uganda, as well as several other interviews with UNRF sources.

[215] According to interview with UPDF Commander Elly Tumwine, formerly a high-ranking officer in the NRA, [DATE]. See also Mwesigye (2010, 53).

greater capacity to convince followers to return to the battlefield if the government party has a negative reputation for implementing its agreements. The observable implication of this hypothesis is that there should be evidence that disgruntled leaders employed reputational rhetoric in order to incite fear among the rank-and-file, which is based on accusations about the government party's betrayal of its prior commitments. The previous chapter's discussion of the UPDA/M provided one illustration of this mechanism at work; however, in that case, new rebellions emerged in the region that—having been excluded from the negotiations—were willing to form an alliance and share the resources of war. In the case of the UNRF, on the other hand, all other rebellions in Uganda had been effectively demobilized when the agreement was reached in 1986, either due to being incorporated into the NRA/M coalition or being defeated on the battlefield. Therefore, neglected UNRF officers were forced to rely solely on reputational rhetoric in order to mobilize defection from within their own ranks. They succeeded in doing so by pointing to Museveni's defection from the Nairobi Agreement as a betrayal of the previous tacit alliance between the two groups—evidence that the NRA could not be trusted to uphold its commitments to share power. This was successful in convincing thousands of UNRF ex-combatants to preemptively defect from the agreement and return to the bush.

In 2002, on the other hand, the UNRFII was able to reach a settlement with the NRM that—for the first time in the country's history—included explicit power-sharing guarantees. By this time, Museveni's reputation for defecting from peace processes had become embedded in the mindset of his opposition. However, the UNRFII leadership again managed to employ rhetoric that highlighted this reputation to their advantage—this time in order to secure more favorable, written terms and to delay disarmament until the government began to comply with those terms. As a result, the outcome of the bargaining process prevented splintering among the rebel elite and, ultimately, resulted in conflict termination.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes the verbal agreement reached between the NRA and the UNRF in 1986, and the ways in which the lack of a written settlement led to splintering among the rebel leadership. Section III provides evidence that the neglected military wing of the UNRF used rhetoric strategically in order to mobilize defection, particularly by emphasizing Museveni's previous betrayal of his agreements, giving rise to the UNRFII. Sixteen years later, the UNRFII entered into renewed negotiations with Museveni's government, the Yumbe peace process, which is described in section IV. In section V, I aim to explain the success of the Yumbe Agreement, emphasizing that the

provisions for permanent power sharing in the military reduced the potential for splintering and defection. Since Museveni did not comply with the power-sharing provisions of the Yumbe Agreement in the end, thereby confirming his reputation, Section VI concludes with a discussion about the dangers of conflating conflict termination with a successfully implemented settlement.

7.2 Settlement as Contract: The Uganda National Rescue Front

In July 1986, six months after the NRA-led coup, the new government announced that a verbal agreement had been reached to incorporate the UNRF. While the terms of the agreement were comprehensive, the absence of an explicit, written settlement meant that cooptation took place largely on an *ad hoc* basis without clear guarantees about who would benefit and in what way (Knight 2008). After a few months, as it became increasingly clear that benefits to UNRF elites would be limited to minimal political appointments, neglected military officers defected back to the bush in West Nile to launch the UNRFII.

According to the official press release issued from Entebbe State House on July 27th, the terms of the 1986 bargain included a blanket amnesty for ex-combatants, the integration of UNRF soldiers into the NRA, a resettlement package of UGX 8 billion,[216] the establishment of a joint military oversight commission, representation on the National Resistance Council, and Executive Cabinet positions for UNRF leaders. In particular, Moses Ali was to be appointed as Vice President.[217] Initially, one battalion was selected and sent to Kampala to join the NRA, while the rest—an estimated nine thousand troops—remained in a demobilization camp at Bombo barracks in Aringa County, West Nile.[218]

By the end of the year, much of the agreement had been implemented. An integration oversight committee was established under the Chairmanship of the Minister of State for Defense, Ronald Bata, which included three representatives

[216] Approximately 5.5 million in current US dollars.
[217] Confirmed in interviews with Moses Ali (2 May 2014) and Ali Bamuze (12 May 2014), Kampala, Uganda. Survey data also suggests that soldiers were well-informed of the terms of the settlement, despite the lack of a written document (respondant % reporting): integrate select UNRF fighters into the NRA (18.%), UNRFI combatants were promised UGX 8 billion (30.1%), education scholarship for ex-combatants and their children (11.6%), ministerial posts to be given to select ex-combatants (26.2%), ambassadorial and civil service jobs were to be given to ex-combatants (4.8%), reintegration of ex-combatants to civilian life (20.3%), some ex-combatants to be selected to the National Resistance Council (6.8%) (Mwesigye 2008, 54).
[218] Which would later become Yumbe County.

from the UNRF: Major General Rajab Lembe, Lieutenant Colonel A.M. Tabu, and Captain Twalib.[219] Several others were given civil service jobs, including diplomatic posts and management of state-owned enterprises.[220] Museveni also confirmed four direct Cabinet appointments, while a handful of ex-combatants were assigned to act as "liaisons" between the UNRF and the offices of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense (See **Table 7.1**).

Table 7.1. Political appointments to former Uganda National Rescue Front officers.[221]

Name	UNRF Rank	Positions in NRM
Moses Ali	Brigadier (Commander)	Minister of Tourism and Wildlife (1986-1990) Deputy Prime Minister (1996-2006)
Amin Onzi		Deputy Minister of Works
Agardi Didi		Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Eric Adriko	General Secretary	Minister of Industry Minister of Public Service
Rohan Rembe	Major	Liaison to Prime Minister's Office
Tabu Mulo	Lieutenant Colonel	Liaison to Ministry of Defense
Emilio Mondo	Major General	Ambassador Chairman, Uganda Veterans Assistance Board
John Ona	Lieutenant Colonel	Ambassador to Cairo
Bruhan Abiriga	Major	Resident District Commissioner, Arua Resident District Commissioner, Yumbe
Obiga Kania		General Manager TUMPECO Director, Movement Secretariat

[219] Interview with Elly Tumwine [DATE], Kampala, Uganda.
[220] Obiga Kania was appointed as General Manager of TUMPECO, a state-owned manufacturer of cookware and metal goods. The enterprise was privatized in the 1990s as part of a structural adjustment reform package. Others receiving civil service jobs include Dr. Ajeri Agunda, Hajiti Amina, and Kamya. (Interview with Bruhan Abiriga, former UNRF Major, Resident District Commissioner, [DATE], Arua, Uganda).
[221] Data collected through interviews with Moses Ali (1 May 2014), Pascal Piwang (2 May 2014), (Retired) UPDF Colonel Fred Mwesigye (5 April 2013), and UPDF Commander Elly Tumwine (10 March 2013). See also Mwesigye 2010, p. 57-59.

Despite these positive developments, by the end of the year there were several warning signs that the opportunity to benefit from the power-sharing bargain was coming to an end. First, those among the UNRF elite that had already been coopted were generally appointed to less powerful positions than had been expected, based on the initial bargain. For example, Moses Ali was appointed as Minister of Tourism and Wildlife, while the Vice Presidency position remained vacant (Lindemann 2010). There had also been no direct appointments to the Ministry of Defense, as agreed—only a few officers to act in the temporary position of "liaison." Thus, it appeared that any remaining political appointments, if any, would be to increasingly menial, insignificant posts.[222]

Second, and perhaps more importantly, although Ali claimed that the agreement guaranteed the incorporation of soldiers "at all levels" of the state security sector, including in the NRA high command and intelligence bodies, the initial integration of ex-combatants had been restricted to soldiers with the rank of Captain and below (Mwesigye 2010, 80).[223] Moreover, according to Lomo and Hovil (2004), records from the late-1980s indicate that integrated ex-UNRF combatants were demoted to the lowest ranks of the NRA. The consensus in the literature on Ugandan military history stresses that power remained exclusively in the hands of NRA loyalists—especially the "historicals," or the small cadre of officers who had fought alongside Museveni since the beginning of his rebellion against Obote (Tripp 2010, 52; Lindemann 2010).[224] As a result, the prospects for military power sharing appeared increasingly unlikely to the officer corps who remained encamped at Bombo (Lomo and Hovil 2004; Lindemann 2010).

The absence of an explicit, written contract increased uncertainty about the precise terms of the bargain.[225] Knight (2008) describes the process of implementing the agreement as piecemeal, improvised, and based on a "mutual trust and understanding" between Museveni and Moses Ali. Although the UNRF officer corps had initially had a great deal of confidence in General Ali's ability to reach a workable solution that would benefit them, signaling a high degree of

[222] Confirmed in interviews with Pascal Piwang (2 May 2014, Kampala, Uganda) and Bruhan Abiriga (DATE, Arua, Uganda).
[223] Interview with former UNRF Brigadier Nasur Ezaga [DATE].
[224] Although the NRM serves as the political wing and ruling party of Museveni's regime, the High Command of the NRA (or the UPDF since 1996) is understood to be the real center of power. The dominance of Western Ugandans and co-ethnics at the top levels of this power structure has persisted since the late-1980s.
[225] Survey data reveals that a common explanation for failed or incomplete implementation was the lack of a comprehensive, written agreement—cited by 13.5 percent of respondents in an open-ended response (Mwesigye 2010).

cohesiveness among the rebel high command, the lack of a "tangible agreement" would ultimately lead to a sense of betrayal and abandonment among those who had not received appointments.[226] According to UNRF Army Commander at the time, General Ali Bamuze,

> …part of the issue was Moses Ali. There was no proper document to show. He was in Entebbe with [Museveni] one month or something, when he went back [to West Nile], he said 'okay everything is here.' We said 'we need something that is written, a document, to show that things are true.' But we didn't see a document clearly.[227]

In the few months after the agreement was reached, there was a growing sense that Moses Ali was allowing Museveni to "neutralize the [UNRF] leadership" while turning his back on the rest of the group.[228] These fears were compounded when numerous attempts at correspondence with the increasingly estranged former leadership in Kampala began to go unanswered. Interviews with UNRF officers who remained at the Bombo camp indicate that coopted elites like Moses Ali and Amin Onzi "cut off communication."[229]

After several months, Generals Bamuze, Nasur Ezaga, and Juma Oris fled from the demobilization camp across the border to Sudan, along with more than five thousand soldiers and their weapons (Lindemann 2010, 52; Lomo and Hovil 2004, 11; Mwesigye 2010). Museveni responded by launching a campaign of arrests of ex-UNRF officers who had already been integrated into the NRA military and NRM government, many of whom were charged with treason in the High Court of Uganda (Meredith 2006; Mwesigye 2010, 80).[230] Moses Ali was himself arrested and held in prison for more than two years, before being released and ultimately reinstated in the NRM Cabinet.[231] Over the course of the next decade, the insurgency recruited and regrouped with the aid of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan (Tripp 2010, 155).

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[226] Interview with Pascal Piwang, UNRFII Ex-Combatant Liaison Officer and signatory to the 2002 Yumbe Agreement, Kampala, Uganda, 2 May 2014. Confirmed in interviews with Ali Bamuze (12 May 2014), Caleb Alaka (30 April 2014) and John Bosco Suuza (25 November 2013).
[227] Interview conducted 12 May 2014, Kampala Uganda.
[228] Ibid.
[229] Interview with Pascal Piwang and Ali Bamuze, 12 May 2014, Kampala, Uganda.
[230] Those arrested included Lieutenant Colonel Isa, Lieutenant Colonel Tabu, Major General John Onah, Major Alidriga, Major Nooh, Musa Kyabo, and Major General Rajab Rembe. Onah, Tabu, Alidriga and Rembe had all been promised government appointments, according to the 1986 agreement (See **Table 6.1**). (Interview with Brigadier Nasur Ezaga, cited in Mwesigye (2010, 80). See also "UNRF II Rebels Face Government with Huge Demands," 2002, *New Vision*, 23 October).
[231] "UNRFII Rebels Face Government With Huge Demands," (*New Vision,* 23 October 2002).

In 1996, at its peak of approximately eight thousand troops, the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFII) began launching incursions into Uganda.[232]

7.3 Selective Cooptation and Rebel Splintering

The history that has been written about the launch of the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFII) is that the rebellion was a direct response to the arrests and harassment of former UNRF officers by Museveni's government (Merideth 2006; Mwesigye 2010). For example, the first Commander of the UNRFII, Brigadier Nasur Ezaga, claims that he "had to go back to the bush to fight the NRM government because it started imprisoning some of [his] colleagues for no justifiable reason" (Ibid, 80). Many others point to the shooting of Ali Bamuze near Bombo as the catalyst that forced the remnants of the UNRF to flee to Sudan.[233]

Yet, a closer look at the timing of events and decision-making at the elite level reveals a different story. First of all, according to Bamuze, it was not the NRA who shot him when he arrived at Bombo, but another rebel group.[234] Moreover, after being shot and receiving treatment in Arua, Bamuze returned to Bombo where he oversaw the integration of another four hundred soldiers into the NRA.[235] Instead, his decision to halt integration and mobilize the defection from Bombo followed immediately from the lapse in communication with the coopted ex-UNRF officers in Kampala:[236]

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[232] Recruitment into the UNRFII was aided by several developments in the early-1990s. The lack of military promotions for non-NRA soldiers within the state military led to a number of defections. Moreover, in his autobiography, Museveni (1997) claims that tens of thousands of soldiers were laid off due to budgetary constraints in this period. Finally, marginalization of the northern region from resource allocation and development projects resulted in a particularly high rate of unemployment in West Nile. See Muzaale (1997), Mazarire and Rupiya (2000), and Lomo and Hovil (2004).

[233] Interviews with Pascal Piwang (2 May 2014) and Caleb Alaka (30 April 2014), among others.

[234] The implication was that it was the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which also moved back-and-forth across the border between Sudan and Uganda and had received support from Museveni in its rebellion against President al-Bashir's government in Khartoum.

[235] Interview conducted 12 May 2014, Kampala, Uganda. There is no consensus on the true numbers; while the insurgents claim that only 1,200 UNRF soldiers were integrated, government representatives suggest that as many as five thousand—or half of the entire force—joined the NRA (Mwesigye 2010).

[236] A low ranking ex-combatant also describes this problem: "the UNRF 1 leadership became inefficient when most leaders were given government posts and they forgot to fulfill the commitments in the peace agreement. Besides, they lacked transparency and failed to keep in contact with the rest of the ex-combatants who had been sent to their communities" (Mwesigye 2010, 63-4).

> I wrote a letter to Moses [Ali], I wrote a letter to late Amin Onzi, I wrote a letter to Rajab Rembe. They were in Kampala…In this time, there is not an answer. That's why I jump, I went to Sudan… I called some officers, I [said] "I wrote a letter to our leader, there is no reply"… So we get a gun. That's why we start to fight again.[237]

In this light, it appears to have been a rift within the UNRF leadership—rather than between the UNRF and the NRA—that incentivized the neglected officers to defect. In contrast to the more common focus on Museveni's decision to arrest the integrated officers, a number of interviews confirm that the catalyst for the creation of the UNRFII was a sense of neglect and betrayal among the insurgent leaders who were not coopted (Lomo and Hovil 2004; Lindemann 2010).[238] According to a source in the Ministry of Justice,

> They claim that when Moses Ali was offered a position in government he forgot about them. So there was a nexus between the going into government of Moses Ali and the launch of the second rebellion. It was really a matter of saying, 'what about us?'[239]

This is echoed by the UNRFII's legal counsel, Caleb Alaka, who admited that "they felt Moses Ali had betrayed them," while even Moses Ali himself acknowledged that the future UNRFII leadership believed "that this agreement has not saved them."

Moreover, the wave of arrests and threats against former UNRF officers in the late-1980s occurred *after* the decision by Bamuze and Ezaga to defect. Moses Ali was not arrested until April 1990, while the UNRFII had already started agitating in southern Sudan by the end of 1987. In fact, there were ongoing communications and negotiations between the NRM government and the UNRFII as early as 1988.[240] Of the 1,200 ex-combatants that had initially integrated into the NRA, as many as half defected and fled Kampala in response to the arrests of the integrated officers.[241] However, the bulk of what would become the UNRFII were the five thousand troops who had already defected to Sudan from the Bombo encampment.

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[237] Ibid.
[238] Confirmed in interviews with Pascal Piwang (2 May 2014 and 12 May 2014), Ali Bamuze (12 May 2014), Caleb Alaka (30 April 2014), and John Bosco Suuza (25 November 2013).
[239] Interview with John Bosco Suuza, 25 November 2013, Kampala, Uganda.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Interview with Pascal Piwang, 2 May 2014, Kampala, Uganda. This is disputed by Moses Ali, who claims that none of the integrated soldiers defected and joined up with the UNRFII due to his

According to an open-ended survey of ex-combatants conducted in 2008, the two most common reasons cited for joining the UNRFII were Museveni's "deceitfulness" and a "loss of trust" in the NRA, cited by 16.5 percent and 12.6 percent of respondents respectively (Mwesigye 2010): the rank-and-file defectors were convinced that the NRA was to blame for the failure of the 1986 agreement. Initially, this belief came from allegations by the rebel leadership that Museveni had betrayed the good faith between the two groups by launching a smear campaign against the UNRF during his assault on Kampala. For Museveni, alleging that the UNRF was making moves to bring back Idi Amin had been part of a divide-and-conquer strategy. The goal was to stir up memories of the brutal treatment of Northerners under Amin in order to create divisions between West Nilers and Acholis and destabilize the Military Council (See Chapter 5). It had been so effective in inciting fear and suspicion that the UNRF fled the capital and returned to West Nile on foot—a distance of nearly 300 miles. One year later, it served as evidence that Museveni had no intention of sharing power with the UNRF, despite their previous understandings, and that his presidency was a threat to the security of West Nilers. The wave of arrests that occurred soon after would serve to validate these beliefs.

On the other hand, despite the arrests, six to seven hundred soldiers loyal to Moses Ali and remained in the NRA.[242] In contrast to the majority of former UNRF combatants who point to Museveni's deceitfulness, approximately 10 percent cite the "continuation of fighting by former UNRFI forces against the government" as the reason that the settlement was not fully implemented (Mwesigye 2010). In other words, survey evidence shows that the lower ranks of the insurgent party espouse different beliefs and perspectives about the failure of the peace process depending on which branch of the leadership they chose to follow in the late-1980s. Those who chose to defect and join the UNRFII espouse beliefs that the NRA could not be trusted to implement the bargain, a belief that was initially based on Museveni's behavior after signing the Nairobi Agreement and later confirmed by his purge of former UNRF leaders.

In sum, the verbal bargain struck between Museveni and Moses Ali resulted in a process of selective cooptation, which generated splintering among the UNRF

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influence. However, other sources confirm that the arrests caused some defections, although the there is no agreement on the exact number.

[242] Moses Ali claims that there were no defections, in fact, but this is refuted by a number of alternative sources. In interviews, he says that he urged everyone involved with the group to let him stand trial and that the accusations launched against him by Museveni were merely a "misunderstanding."

leadership. At the time, there were no other insurgent groups active in the West Nile region; after the failure of the 1986 agreement, splintering in the UNRF elite had resulted in two new rebellions. The West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), led by Juma Oris, was a grassroots and guerrilla force comprised of former UNRF troops that had been recruited during the Bush War (1981-85), and it had the more radical goal of overthrowing Museveni and reinstating Amin. Because of this, the WNBF initially received more financial backing from Sudan, but it was easily overwhelmed and eliminated by a coordinated attack by NRA, SPLA, and Congolese forces on their training camp in Borobo in 1997 (Lewis 2010).[243]

The UNRFII, led first by Ezaga and later by Bamuze, was a larger and more disciplined and organized force. It eventually created enough problems for Museveni's government that a second round of negotiations were launched in 2002. At this time, even 16 years after the failure of the 1986 agreement, the division among the former and current rebel elite was still relevant:

> During the [2002] peace talks the UNRFII did not want to meet with Moses Ali. He came there, I remember he came as a leader from West Nile, but they never wanted to talk to him. They never wanted anything to do with him, because they thought he had betrayed them.

By this time, Museveni's reputation for defection had become embedded over multiple failed peace processes. It was initially used as justification for continuing rebellion, and it would later be cited as the UNRFII's primary grievance against the government. Although this had potential to destabilize the peace talks, the next section describes the ways in which reputation would again serve a strategic purpose to the rebel leadership—this time in helping them to realize an effective power-sharing settlement.

7.4 The 2002 Yumbe Peace Process

When negotiations officially began in early 2002, the UNRFII high command refused to cross the border from southern Sudan in order to meet with the NRM delegation directly. They argued that the arrests of ex-UNRF officers and the shooting of Ali Bamuze meant that their security could not be guaranteed; in particular, they accused Museveni of using peace talks as ploy in order to locate and

[243] Confirmed in interviews with former UNRF commanders.

wipe out the rebel leadership. As a result, initial communication took place through written correspondence, and the first face-to-face meetings occurred in Khartoum and Nairobi.[244] Over the course of the negotiations, similar accusations were launched repeatedly by UNRFII leaders, who highlighted Museveni's history of reneging on his promises. However, instead of mobilizing defection during the post-settlement period, as in 1986, reputational rhetoric was employed *prior* to signing as a strategy to secure more beneficial terms and to improve compliance by the government.

In April 2002, at the beginning of the bargaining period, the rebel leadership announced its primary grievance as Museveni's failure to follow through with his commitments in the original bargain with the UNRF I. General Secretary Hamis Akwaku read out a list of demands and defended the group's decision to remain in hiding until certain about their security on this basis.[245] A ceasefire was signed on June 15 in preparation for initiating formal negotiations. In order to avoid risking the integrity of their existing military capacity, the UNRFII leadership began to send troops to the demobilization camp in Yumbe—Bidi Bidi—"in bits and pieces."[246] According to General Bamuze, they used this period to assess whether Museveni intended to go on the offensive and violate the ceasefire.[247] After four months without incident, in mid-October 2002, the rebel delegation presented a 29-page document of demands to the government: positions in the UPDF high command and intelligence sectors, a resettlement package, seven ministerial posts, three diplomatic portfolios, local government appointments, development and reconstruction of West Nile, decentralization reforms, blanket amnesty, return of exiled political leaders, a national dialogue and a peace process inclusive of all active Ugandan insurgencies.[248]

Again, primary among the issues raised was the NRM's history of reneging on its promises. While negotiations over the final terms were ongoing, Bamuze launched a number of public accusations that blamed Museveni for the failure of the 1986 agreement. For example, in two separate statements to the press, he announced that "the government has failed to implement earlier peace agreements,

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[244] Interview with Ali Bamuze and Pascal Piwang, 12 May 2014, Kampala, Uganda.
[245] "UNRFII rebels want two ministerial posts in Museveni's government," 2002, (*New Vision*, 29 April).
[246] Interview with Pascal Piwang, 2 May 2014, Kampala, Uganda.
[247] Interview conducted 12 May 2014, Kampala, Uganda. See also
[248] "UNRF II Rebels Face Government With Huge Demands," 2002, (*New Vision*, 23 October), "UNRF wants Idi Amin, Obote back," 2002 (*New Vision*, 17 October), and "Brig. Kaihura harassed," 2002, (*New Vision*, 26 November).

but we hope that this time it will be more committed to the new peace parley"[249] and "we hope that the Uganda government does not resort to actions it took in 1988 by arresting the UNRF members of the military council."[250] These suspicions were used as justification by the rebel high command for their refusal to disarm fully until their core demands were met. Vice Chairman Antes Oyemi Asedri issued a statement that the UNRFII had not surrendered and that their military force remained in tact with an armory of weapons, which they would not relinquish until the government implemented the agreed terms.[251]

On several occasions during the peace talks, citing indications that Museveni might be up to his old tricks, the UNRFII displayed its willingness and capacity for recourse to military tactics. In one incident, for example, UPDF Brigadier Kale Kaihura arrived unannounced at the Bidi Bidi camp, where he was arrested and "frog marched" at gunpoint. At the time, Bamuze and many of his advisors were in residence at Mvara Inn in Arua for daily discussions with Museveni's brother, Salim Saleh. In response to the incident, however, UPDF Commander James Kazini issued a letter demanding that the UNRFII surrender its weapons "immediately and unconditionally,"[252] leading the rebels to flee the camp. According to UNRFII legal advisor during the Yumbe peace talks:

> So basically the rebels themselves took up arms and said they were ready. General Bamuze decided to pull out all these guns and all these men and said 'well, I'm going to fight.'… They gave the rebels 24 hours either to disband or to face fire. The rebels left the [Bidi Bidi] camp…They said 'I'm going to fight.'[253]

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[249] "Ugandan rebel group sends demands to govt ahead of talks," 2002, (*Agence France Presse—English*, 17 October).
[250] "UNRF II Rebels Face Government With Huge Demands," 2002, (*New Vision*, 23 October).
[251] "Uganda National Rescue Front II rebels await outcome of talks with government," 2002, (*New Vision*, 9 August) and "Brig. Kaihura harassed," 2002, (*New Vision*, 26 November). According to Ali Bamuze, "we were allowed to have guns for security purposes. Only few guns we held for guarding."
[252] Kazini was the same officer who had been responsible for the arrest of Moses Ali, and he had a very bad reputation in West Nile.
[253] Interview with Caleb Alaka, 30 April 2014, Kampala, Uganda. A number of articles in the state-owned newspaper describe the military moves by UNRFII and UPDF in early December 2002 ("West Nile tension building," 2002, *New Vision*, 6 December, and "Government, UNRFII rebels agree on deadline to reach peace deal," 2002, *New Vision*, 8 December). Ali Bamuze (12 May 2014) denies that this ever happened, and claims instead that the articles were attempts to sabotage the peace process by people in the UPDF who stood to lose funding if peace in northwestern Uganda was realized. While this may be true, the group's temporary return to the bush is confirmed by a number of reliable sources.

Thus, given Museveni's history of using peace processes as a decoy to neutralize and eliminate his rivals, suspicions among the UNRFII were high, and they threatened to destabilize the negotiations. Public rhetoric employed by both delegations often spoke to these suspicions; for example, in response to concerns voiced by the rebel contingent, Deputy Prime Minister Eric Kategaya issued a statement at the signing of the ceasefire that there would be "no tricks in the implementation of the peace process."[254] However, for Bamuze and the UNRFII, these kinds of rhetorical signals would not be sufficient to convince them to disarm. Based on their experience in the late-1980s, they demanded a written and signed settlement with the government, and they refused to either sign or to demobilize until compliance with the central terms appeared certain.[255] Over the course of 2002, this approach was justified and substantiated through public accusations about Museveni's reputation for defection and, when necessary, with demonstrations of the group's remaining military capacity.

With the eyes of the international community on the progress of the peace talks,[256] the government began to implement a number of the measures demanded by the UNRFII contingent as proof of its good intentions. For example, amnesty certificates were issued to ex-combatants encamped at Bidi Bidi, and a resettlement fund was set aside that amounted to approximately UGX 240,000 per soldier.[257] Moreover, ten UNRFII representatives were appointed to a joint oversight commission in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, positions that were guaranteed to become permanent once the settlement was signed. By the time the formal settlement was signed on 24 December 2002, the only major provision that remained to be implemented was full disarmament and official integration of troops into the UPDF. Approximately half of the remaining UNRFII forces—one battalion—were present at the signing ceremony at a soccer stadium in Yumbe, where they were immediately recognized as UPDF soldiers.[258]

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[254] "Government in peace deal with UNRFII rebels," 2002, (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 19 June).
[255] Interview with Caleb Alaka, UNRFII legal counsel, 30 April 2014, Kampala, Uganda.
[256] The embassies of Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom served as facilitators of the Yumbe peace process. However, there was no direct international involvement in post-settlement oversight commissions or peacekeeping, so this does not qualify as third-party enforcement (Walter 2002).
[257] Approximately US $100.
[258] Interview with Ali Bamuze, 12 May 2014, Kampala, Uganda.

Table 7.2. Provisional content of the Yumbe Agreement (2002).

Type of provision	Included?	Relevant provisions
Executive coalition	N	N/A
Representation quotas	N	N/A
Military power sharing	Y	**"**Immediately after the signing of this agreement, UNRF II ex-combatants who opt to join the UPDF shall be integrated into the UPDF." (IV.1) "The UNRF II officers who wish and qualify to join UPDF shall be allowed to retain their current ranks." (IV.3)
Political decentralization	N	N/A
Wealth allocation	Y	"Government shall provide a sum of UGX 4,200,000,000 for the resettlement of all UNRF II ex-combatants." (III.3) "The Government recognizes the development programmes identified by the UNRF II as priority areas as reflected in the proceedings of the peace talks and agrees to embark on their implementation as soon as practicable." (V.2)
Security autonomy	N	N/A
Third-party enforcement	N	N/A
Oversight commission	Y	"On dissolution of the UNRF II, the former members of the Front shall form a Committee through which they shall liaise with Government on matters relating to the implementation of this agreement." (VII.2)
Arbitration commission	N	N/A
Amnesty	Y	N/A
Elections	N	N/A

NOTE: The embassies of Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom served as facilitators of the Yumbe peace process. However, there was no direct international involvement in post-settlement oversight commissions or peacekeeping, so this does not qualify as third-party enforcement (Walter 2002). The government posts promised to former UNRFII politicians do not qualify as power sharing in the executive branch since they are considered low level jobs within the Ministry of the Interior.

The central provisions of the Yumbe Agreement are outlined in Table 7.2. While it did not meet all of the insurgents' initial demands, the settlement secured written guarantees on a number of contentious issues, such as amnesty, resettlement packages for ex-combatants, government jobs for liaison officers, and development projects in West Nile.[259] Most significantly, it allowed UNRFII officers to retain their ranks after being integrated into the UPDF. Thus, the bargaining strategy was successful in securing more favorable terms than in any previous agreements reached with Museveni as incumbent—specifically in the form of military and economic power sharing (See Table 7.2).[260]

Focusing on Museveni's reputation as a rhetorical strategy also achieved implementation of most of the central provisions before ink was put to paper and, thus, prior to committing the insurgent party to conceding its military capacity. This increased the UNRFII leaders' confidence that Museveni would not be able to renege on his promises as he had in the past, and ultimately made them more willing to disarm. An Amnesty Commission report claims that 75 percent of rebels in Yumbe district had surrendered their weapons by the summer of 2003 and that nearly 3,000 ex-UNRFII combatants received amnesty and a resettlement package.[261] In the end, more than any other negotiated settlement in Uganda's history, the Yumbe Agreement succeeded in effectively terminating the rebellion in question.

7.4 Explaining the Success of Yumbe

In comparison to other attempted settlements in Uganda, the success of the Yumbe agreement is a puzzle that requires further explanation. The conditions surrounding the settlement, in many ways, point to the likelihood of its failure. For one thing, Museveni's reputation for defecting from his commitments to peace agreements had been reified over the course of four prior peace processes. The previous section described the ways in which reputational rhetoric was employed strategically by the UNRFII leadership in order to induce pre-settlement compliance with their demands—without which it is unlikely that a settlement would have been signed at all. Most importantly, this strategy helped the rebel party to obtain more favorable terms, which lowered the potential for splintering among its leadership.

[259] See "Don't eat with the rebels only; call parties too," 2002, (*The Monitor*, 28 December).
[260] See **Chapter 2** for definitions of these central concepts.
[261] "Yumbe Agrees to Disarm Now," 2003, (*The Monitor*, 26 August).

Given the presence of ongoing, excluded insurgencies, the continuation of the UNRFII rebellion could potentially have been facilitated by an alliance with another group. At the time, there were as many as 22 distinct armed groups and 40,000 rebels fighting against Museveni's government.[262] Although the final settlement was dyadic, the UNRFII was the first group to call for an all-inclusive peace process, and the pursuit of a future settlement with all existing armed groups was one of the central terms of the Yumbe Agreement (Article VI), signaling that it had relationships with other insurgencies.

For one, the UNRFII and the LRA had both been based in southern Sudan, and the groups often worked together to combat southern Sudanese rebellions—specifically, the SPLA, which was backed by Museveni—throughout the 1990s. According to reliable sources, LRA leader Joseph Kony and UNRFII Commander Ali Bamuze met together with Omar al-Bashir on several occasions, as the Sudanese President provided technical and financial resources to both groups. Moreover, Kony had approached Bamuze repeatedly in the hope of trading rank-and-file troops for commanding officers.[263] Due to its practice of abducting children, the LRA had an abundance of untrained soldiers; the UNRFII, on the other hand, was a highly skilled and disciplined force, since it had been the official state military under Idi Amin. Fortunately, the formal alliance never came to fruition,[264] but there is reason to believe that disgruntled UNRFII officers would have found a welcome home in the LRA, had they chosen to defect.

A second insurgency, the People's Redemption Army (PRA), sent representatives to the Bidi Bidi demobilization camp in 2002 requesting 200 recruits from the UNRFII ranks.[265] The PRA had been launched the previous year by several UPDF army colonels who had close ties to some of Museveni's biggest political opponents, including frequent opposition candidate for the presidency, Kizza Besigye (Lewis 2010).[266] Although UPDF spokesmen made several allegations about a connection between the UNRFII and the PRA during the Yumbe peace process,[267] Bamuze and the high command refused to provide soldiers to support

[262] "Uganda has 40,000 rebels, says report," 2003, (*The Monitor*, 23 December).
[263] Interview with Caleb Alaka, UNRFII legal counsel, 30 April 2014, Kampala, Uganda.
[264] The government and UPDF made frequent accusations about an alliance between the LRA and the UNRFII, particularly in the run-up to the signing of the Yumbe Agreement. (See "UPDF denies redeploying in east DRC," 2002, *New Vision,* 16 December). However, there is no evidence that this occurred, and reliable sources involved in the peace process consistently deny it.
[265] Ibid.
[266] "Uganda says opposition leader recruits rebels to unleash violence," 2001, (*Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 21 February).
[267] See, for example, "Border airports renovated," 2002, (*Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 21 December).

the nascent rebellion. Sources indicate that there were no more than a handful of defectors who joined the PRA, if any.[268]

The absence of a larger and more organized defection signals that the UNRFII officer corps was satisfied with the terms of the Yumbe Agreement. With thousands of troops and an atmosphere of heightened suspicion and uncertainty, an alliance with the PRA could have led to a renewed, viable rebellion. Instead, the PRA was defunct by 2005, and it never managed to launch a single attack against the Ugandan government.[269]

On the other hand, some might argue that an alliance with both groups was unlikely because neither the PRA nor the LRA overlapped with the UNRFII in terms of ethnicity, region, or ideology—other than opposing Museveni's administration.[270] The rebel group with the strongest historical ties to the UNRFII was the WNBF, since both groups had been part of the original UNRF and came from West Nile. The WNBF, however, was eliminated several years prior to the Yumbe peace talks, and facilitators of the Yumbe Agreement claim that the WNBF was excluded from the peace process because it was militarily irrelevant by 2002.[271]

Despite this, reports indicate that thousands of former WNBF soldiers surrendered to the government for amnesty and disarmament between 2000 and 2003.[272] These WNBF ex-combatants were also encamped in Arua, where they

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[268] Piwang says that there were a handful of defections, but less than 100, while Ali Bamuze claims that there were no defections. There were several court cases against ex-UNRF members accused of ties to the PRA in the mid-2000s. Caleb Alaka, UNRFII legal counselor, represented the accused and claims that they were not connected to the PRA but were small arms dealers or financial benefactors of the UNRFII, suggesting that the government used accusations about a UNRFII-PRA as propaganda. In a public statement, Bamuze referred to them as "malicious rumors cultivated by people who want to frustrate the ongoing peace negotiations ("No Besigye, UNRF rebel link, says Ali," 2002, *The Monitor*, 17 December).

[269] See Lewis (2010), who points out that it remains unclear whether the PRA actually existed or whether it was a creation by the Ugandan government in order to justify continuing to send troops and resources to the DRC border. In my own interviews, the same accusations were frequently launched against the UPDF—for example, in alleging that the UNRFII was planning to attack Pakwach in late-2002, it was argued that there were sabateurs within the government who stood to lose funding, etc. if the peace process was successful.

[270] In fact, an alliance with the LRA might have been undermined by a history of tribal rivalry: specifically, reprisal killings between Acholi and West Nilers under the administrations of Milton Obote and Idi Amin, as well as Museveni's allegations in 1985 that the UNRF was making moves to topple the Acholi-led Military Council and reinstate Amin.

[271] Interview with John Bosco Suuza, 25 November 2013, Kampala, Uganda.

[272] Likely between two and four thousand, depending on sources. See Lewis (2010), "Thousands of former rebels surrender to Ugandan government," 2003, (*Xinhua General News Service*, 6 May) and "Over 1,000 rebels based in Sudan surrender to Ugandan government," 2002, (*Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 22 April).

remained without jobs or resettlement packages for years and were particularly resentful of the bargain offered to the UNRFII.[273] Thus, in addition to the option of joining up with ongoing insurgencies, there was a wealth of potential recruits available in West Nile at the time, had any disgruntled UNRFII officers chosen to defect from the Yumbe Agreement and mobilize a following. Given that the capacity to access the resources of war existed, the fact that none of the UNRFII returned to the battlefield is a strong indication that splintering did not occur and that, therefore, the terms were sufficient and diffuse enough to satisfy the rebel leadership.

The question remains: why did the terms of the settlement succeed in preventing splintering among the UNRFII leadership in 2002? In the final agreement, there were no promises of high-level government appointments, such as ministerial or diplomatic positions, nor of meaningful political reforms. Thus, although the settlement was the first in Uganda's history to include guaranteed military and economic forms of power sharing, many of the initial demands listed by the rebel contingent were ultimately left out.

Yet, rather than generating rivalries and resentment among the UNRFII, the final terms were effective in addressing the core interests of the group's leaders. According to government facilitator of the peace talks, John Bosco Suuza,

> They were not really interested so much in political positions, because in reality they do not have any political actors. The real issue was about the initial [military] integration [in 1986]. That's what they were interested in really. They were not interested in politics.[274]

Although the original UNRF had had a legitimate political wing, the political "heavy weights" had been effectively coopted into the NRM in 1986. According to one account, "[t]hey culled, they culled, now they had integrated their political wing…into the government," at the expense of the generals.[275]

The UNRFII was, therefore, essentially a military operation, and any politicians involved in the Yumbe talks were considered to be merely "hired guns" or "Johnny-come-lates" who were trying to take advantage of the peace process for

[273] Personal correspondence with Janet Lewis, who visited the camp and conducted numerous interviews.
[274] Interview conducted 25 November 2013, Ministry of Justice, Kampala, Uganda.
[275] Interview with Caleb Alaka, 30 April 2014, Kampala, Uganda.

personal gain.[276] For example, one politician was from eastern Uganda, while the UNRFII came from West Nile, and another—Mahmoud Angoliga—had worked in the NRM government since the late-1980s with no evidence of maintaining a relationship with the second rebellion prior to the peace talks. When the NRM contingent claimed that the new constitution of Uganda stipulates that government jobs be filled via a precise, legitimate process—through the Uganda Public Commission—which made it illegal to include political appointments as part of the bargain, there was little resistance from the rebel party.[277]

In fact, when direct negotiations began in October 2002, it quickly became clear to mediators that the real issues at stake were those elements of the 1986 verbal agreement that still remained to be implemented when the military wing defected back to the bush: namely, high-ranking officer positions in the state military, resettlement packages for ex-combatants, and economic development projects in West Nile. As a result, the text of the Yumbe Agreement represented little more than a written version of the government's prior promises to share military power and redistribute resources to northwestern Uganda. According to the UNRFII's legal counsel,

> "They don't trust Museveni. They believed that if they had a peace agreement, then they will get a deal out of it. That's what they believed. But they could not do anything without a written peace agreement."[278]

Thus, in light of the failure of the verbal agreement with Moses Ali, the goal of the rebel party at Yumbe was to obtain a contractual guarantee of the power sharing commitments that Museveni had reneged on in 1986. In particular, the elimination of the group's political wing via selective cooptation meant that provisions for military power sharing were all that was necessary to satisfy the remaining rebel elite and prevent splintering.

7.5 Conclusions

The case of the UNRF is a perfect illustration of the ways in which the terms of a negotiated settlement effect the potential for splintering among the insurgent

[276] Interviews with Caleb Alaka (30 April 2014) and John Bosco Suuza (25 November 2013). See also "RDC warns of saboteurs in peace deal," 2003, (*New Vision*, 1 February).
[277] Ibid.
[278] Interview conducted 30 April 2014, Kampala, Uganda.

elite and, ultimately, for peace. By including military power-sharing guarantees, the provisions of the Yumbe Agreement (2002) satisfied the long-term interests of the UNRFII leadership, since the group lacked a political wing. In contrast, the 1986 bargain may have been much more comprehensive in its potential for power sharing, but the absence of a written contract heightened uncertainty in the implementation period. Fazal (2014) has shown that this is often the reason that rebels seek a signed settlement in the first place—since the explicit contract not only legitimizes the process, but also makes the government party's violations clear and public. Without a negotiated settlement in 1986, the process of selective cooptation generated a rift between the coopted political wing and the military officers who sensed themselves abandoned. According to a source close to UNRFII Commander Ali Bamuze, "we are even beginning to doubt if there was any agreement with Moses Ali. We are doubting."[279]

For those disgruntled elites, the salient memory of Museveni's post-Nairobi smear campaign helped them to mobilize a mass defection from the demobilization camp in West Nile. Survey evidence shows that the rank-and-file who chose to follow Bamuze and join the UNRFII were convinced that Museveni's deceitfulness was to blame for the failure of the agreement (Mwesigye 2010). The campaign of arrests against ex-UNRF officers who had been integrated into the government and military in the late-1980s served to reify this perception, and suspicions about Museveni's reputation for behaving deceptively in peace processes remained salient during the Yumbe talks.

The existing consensus on bargaining for peace suggests that insurgents should choose not to sign an agreement at all if they do not expect that it will be implemented (Walter 2002); such expectations are more likely arise where the government has a history of defecting from prior agreements. However, the two preceding case studies show that rebel groups often choose to sign settlements with "bad" government, and that there are a variety of reasons for this. In the case of the UNRFII in 2002, group leaders sensed that it was increasingly necessary to strike a bargain with the government due to an aging officer corps and an impending referendum on an independent South Sudan that threatened to terminate financial backing from al-Bashir.[280] Because of its exceedingly low expectations given

[279] Interview with Pascal Piwang, 12 May 2014, Kampala, Uganda.

[280] President al-Bashir had provided funding and safe haven to any Ugandan insurgencies operating along the Sudanese border that would help him fight against the SPLA. The secession of South Sudan would make this battle irrelevant. Confirmed in interviews with Caleb Alaka (30 April 2014), Pascal

Museveni's reputation, the rebel leadership used reputational rhetoric strategically; they vocalized their suspicions about his history of defection in order justify postponing disarmament, to secure more favorable provisions, and to coerce the government into begin complying with their core demands prior to signing.

Implementation began positively, with immediate integration of a battalion of soldiers,[281] allocation of resettlement packages,[282] repatriation of dozens of exiled UNRF officers from Sudan,[283] and the promotion of Ali Bamuze to Major General and of Moses Ali to Lieutentant General.[284] Initially, both parties commended each other for their mutual "patience" and efforts in complying with the terms, and liaison officer Pascal Piwang acknowledged that the government had implemented 70 percent of the terms.[285] Unfortunately for the rebel contingent, however, this strategy was ultimately unsuccessful in ensuring full compliance with the terms of the settlement. Once all 2,800 UNRFII soldiers had surrendered and effectively disarmed, implementation on the remaining provisions halted.

The integrated officers sat UPDF exams in February 2003, but those who passed were not reinstated to their former ranks, as promised, even after undergoing officer training courses in Jinja.[286] In 2006, the aggrieved ex-UNRFII officers issued a joint statement claiming that they had "been at Bombo [army base] for the last three years and regarded as cadet officers without permanent ranks or positions" (Miti and Ssenkabirwa 2006).[287] The distribution of resettlement packages also stalled, as the government failed to allocate any more funding beyond that which had been set aside prior to the signing of Yumbe. By 2007, the government had also stopped providing an allowance for the functioning of the Liaison Committee, which was ejected from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[288] When the Bidi Bidi camp was closed, hundreds of soldiers were left behind without

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Piwang (2 May 2014), and John Bosco Suuza (25 November 2013). See also "1350 UNRF II rebels surrender," (*New Vision,* 22 April 2002).

[281] "UNRF II join UPDF," 2003, (*New Vision,* 3 January).

[282] "Ex-URF rebels sit UPDF exams," 2003, (*New Vision*, 22 February).

[283] "30 former UNRF rebels return home," 2003, (*New Vision*, 15 February).

[284] "Former Ugandan rebel leader promoted to Major General," 2003, (*Xinhua General News Service*, 15 March).

[285] Museveni's brother and leader of the NRM contingent at Yumbe, Salim Saleh, claimed that the government had only managed to implement 5 percent of the settlement by mid-2003, but praised the UNRFII for its tolerance ("Saleh commends Bamuze," *New Vision*, 15 May 2003).

[286] According to Bamuze, some have been promoted only as high as Lieutenant, but none have been reinstated to the positions they held in the UNRFII, which was stipulated in the Yumbe Agreement.

[287] Named officers included Colonel Yusufu Lubega, Lieutenant Colonel Ismail Andi Mawa, Lieutenant Colonel Noah Allahai Avoriga, Major Swaib Sege Abasi, Lieutenant Harun Rajab Ayiga and Mohamad Abiriga Azubu.

[288] Interview with Ali Bamuze and Pascal Piwang, 12 May 2014, Kampala, Uganda.

being integrated into the UPDF, receiving resettlement packages, or opportunities for reeducation.[289] The failures in implementation also led to some indications of looming rivalries and splintering among the ex-UNRFII elite, including accusations of ethnic favoritism in the distribution of scholarships and resettlement funding.[290]

Despite all this, recourse to violence was no longer an option once the armory of weapons had been relinquished and the officer corps integrated into and spread throughout the UPDF, thereby completing demobilization, which occurred the moment the settlement was signed. In this light, the Yumbe Agreement can be thought of as the exception that proves the rule. The rebels' strategy was effective in securing terms that met their interests, which resulted in conflict termination, but in the end it was not enough to overcome Museveni's penchant for reneging on his commitments in peace agreements.[291] In this way, the UNRFII story provides a salient example of the dangers of conflating settlement success with conflict termination, as has been all too common in the literature. Promising costly concessions might be sufficient to convince rebels to demobilize even without the actual implementation of those concessions, and in this light, the institutions themselves might have little affect on the potential for conflict recurrence in the future. On the other hand, the failure to implement the provisions of a settlement might contribute to reproducing conflict tendencies, even if the rebellion in question is eliminated, thereby increasing the likelihood of conflict onset at the systemic level.[292] These are important questions, which can only be addressed in the future with a valid measurement of implementation.

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[289] See "6,000 former rebels stranded," (*New Vision,* 23 December 2003). Confirmed in interviews with Pascal Piwang (2 May 2014) and Ali Bamuze (12 May 2014), Kampala, Uganda.
[290] "Rebels divided over Shs4 billion," (*The Monitor,* 10 December 2003) and "UNRFII ex-rebels protest package deduction," (*The Monitor*, 5 February 2003).
[291] Interestingly, the use of reputational rhetoric during the bargaining process—rather than as a tactic to mobilize and justify post-settlement defection—was a strategy the rebels learned from Museveni himself. Because the UNRFII had close ties to the Sudanese government, they were keenly aware of the way in which Museveni had launched accusations about President al-Bashir's failure to implement their previous treaties regarding security along the shared border during their 1999 negotiations, in order to improve his own bargaining power (Neu 2002; Otto 2002).
[292] Bamuze himself claims that the threat of violent conflict remains latent in West Nile, especially because hundreds of former child soldiers have yet to receive the education and retraining opportunities promised by the NRM in the Yumbe Agreement.

8

Conclusion

Summary of Findings and Policy Implications

Can negotiated settlements provide effective mechanisms for the resolution of domestic armed conflict? In what ways do power-sharing guarantees affect the decisions made by belligerent parties during the implementation period? Which factors affect the potential for spoilers to emerge within the insurgent party and continue fighting?

In addressing these research questions, I have focused on the incentives for rebels to defect from a settlement after having signed it. While the literature on bargaining and conflict resolution widely agrees that peace processes tend to break down due to the heightened security dilemma and the fact that parties' commitments lack credibility, this project takes the unique perspective that the relative cost of compliance is asymmetrical. Since rebels are expected to disarm and demobilize—while the government retains its military capacity and a likely electoral advantage—the risk of complying with a settlement unilaterally means that rebels would concede their coercive threat prior to ensuring that the concessions promised in the bargain are implemented. For this reason, rebels have

a heightened incentive to resist demobilization for as long as possible; the end result is that the decision to demobilize or defect is made once the rebel party forms reasonable expectations about the benefits they are actually likely to receive from the government, which often differ from the precise promises outlined in the terms of a settlement. Moreover, the value of the benefits offered is likely to be perceived differently by different sets of insurgent elites, and neglected "losers" face the same incentives to preemptively defect with the group's remaining military capacity, which results in splintering.

This perspective speaks to a number of empirical puzzles that the extant literature has had a difficult time explaining, such as cases where violent conflict continues despite the presence of third-party enforcement, the cooptation of much of the rebel leadership, and even democratization and full compliance by the government. More importantly, it develops the precise logic through which power sharing increases rebels' willingness to demobilize. By providing diffuse and long-term guarantees that elites will be able to access power and resources, I argue that settlements that include power-sharing provisions reduce the winner-takes-all nature of post-conflict elections. This challenges the pessimism about power-sharing settlements that exists in much of the field, which has often included more "sticky" and comprehensive types of concessions along with transitional commissions and elite pacting under the same conceptual umbrella; it suggests that the problem has not been with the institutions themselves but in a failure to adequately theorize and conceptualize the nature of power sharing in war-to-democracy transitions.

I begin by briefly summarizing the results of this project. Next, I discuss the contributions to the literature on conflict resolution and peace-via-power-sharing. I then develop concrete recommendations for policy-makers based on the implications of my argument. The chapter concludes by considering some of the remaining problems and questions that have emerged in the course of my research.

8.2 Summary of Findings

Provisions for permanent forms of power sharing seem to make it more likely that a negotiated settlement will result in conflict termination. In Chapter 4, I showed that this expectation holds even while controlling for other structural factors that make a settlement prone to break down. As a rough way of testing the

effect of power sharing, however, the cross-national analysis failed to reveal whether the underlying logic of my argument plays out across cases: namely, that rebels prefer to demobilize where power sharing-guarantees reduce the risk of participating in post-conflict elections. I relied on a within-case analysis of variation across Ugandan peace processes in order to test the observable implications of this theory. At the surface level, the general expectations are supported: of the five negotiated settlements signed since the end of the Bush War in 1985, only one included provisions for guaranteed power sharing, and it is the only one associated with complete demobilization of the insurgency in question.

If my theory of preemptive defection is true, however, then there should also be evidence that rebels defected from settlements lacking power-sharing guarantees on the basis that it was too risky or costly to leave power outcomes to be determined via post-conflict elections. This story bears out with the example of the attempt to bring current President Yoweri Museveni's rebellion at the time—the National Resistance Army (NRA)—into the ruling military council in 1985 (See Chapter 5). Having experienced a similar transitional process after the overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979, Museveni knew that he was at an electoral disadvantage and that he would be expelled from the ruling coalition by the likely victor. In other cases, information about relative electoral competitiveness might be revealed during the implementation period, as when the results came in from the first round of Angola's 1992 presidential elections, sending rebel UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi back to the battlefield (Ottoway 1998).

At a micro-level, these examples reveal that the optimal strategy for rebels is to maintain their military capacity for as long as possible and, ultimately, to take the gamble of the battlefield rather than the more certain risk of losing via elections. On the other hand, power sharing helps to offset this risk by providing guarantees to elites that are not dependent on electoral outcomes. In cases like Mozambique, proportional representation voting rules granted space for former rebel groups to exist as a legitimate and viable political opposition to the ruling party. A contrasting observation of the same logic is that the few cases where demobilization occurs without power-sharing guarantees should be those where insurgents have a high expectation about their electoral competitiveness, which was true in El Salvador and South Africa.[293]

[293] See Van Cranenburgh and Kopecký (2004) on how post-conflict South Africa is a "hidden" majoritarian system. Although the transitional constitution-writing commission was broadly representative of the country's relevant political segments, and it wrote some consociational-style

Another implication of the theory is that power sharing reduces the potential for splintering by providing more diffuse and long-term benefits throughout the rebel hierarchy. If the argument holds, then splintering should occur only in cases where settlements lack permanent power-sharing provisions; this is supported by the Ugandan story, which showed that rebel splintering was a direct result of the selective cooptation of elites that often occurs in the implementation period where long-term power sharing is not on offer. Rebel "winners" are coopted and, therefore, support demobilization, while "losers" are neglected and want to defect.

The next level of expectations generated from the theory, then, considers factors that determine the capacity of neglected elites to return to the battlefield. Rebel splintering might not always mean conflict recurrence; coopted leaders might be successful in convincing troops to demobilize. In Nicaragua, for example, an agreement was signed in 1990 with the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) movement, which was essentially a written contract allowing for the integration of the RN into the National Opposition Union, the umbrella political party combining multiple former rebellions. Splintering and alliances among the various Contra movements had been a characteristic feature of the Nicaraguan civil war, but the potential for splintering by this time had been mitigated by the fact that prior settlements had been implemented, all other factions had already been demobilized, and democratic elections had gone ahead—in essence, the train was pulling out of the station without the RN.

In other cases, I have shown that splintering has degenerated into renewed violence where disgruntled rebel leaders are able to either mobilize followers to defect from the demobilization process or form an alliance with active, excluded groups—or both. First, reputation appears to be a critical factor in determining the strategies available to rebel elites who have an incentive to defect. Where the government party has a history of defecting on past settlements, neglected elites should be able to employ this negative reputation as a rhetorical tool in order to convince troops that the peace process is a ruse and that they should fear for their security if they choose to disarm voluntarily. The cross-national analysis provides strong support for the negative effect of reputation on peace, particularly where settlements lack power-sharing guarantees and, therefore, the risk of splintering is higher.

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institutions into the new consitutions in 1994, the peace agreement signed to end the civil war in 1991 contained no explicit power-sharing guarantees. Since the rebels represented the political majority group, however, multiparty elections under conditions of universal suffrage were sufficient terms to achieve demobilization and peace.

Where the reputation of the government party is particularly bad, such that it has been reified over multiple rounds of failed peace processes, insurgents might refuse to sign a bargain at all.[294] This has been the more common claim in the literature, and to a certain extent, the data does suggest that the government's defection makes future settlements less likely.[295] At the same time, however, a bad reputation does not preclude the signing of a settlement, particularly if rebels are able to parlay their suspicions into a more favorable bargain, as I have illustrated with the case with the Ugandan National Rescue Front II. In other cases, when the bargain is insufficient to prevent splintering, an observable implication of my argument is that disgruntled rebels should employ reputational rhetoric at strategic times in order to justify resisting disarmament, to counter encouragement from coopted leaders to demobilize, and ultimately to mobilize a mass defection from DDR encampments. The case studies showed the way that President Museveni's defection from the Nairobi Peace Agreement—dubbed the Nairobi "peace jokes"—played this role in subsequent peace processes in Uganda.

Second, where conflicts are multidimensional, the degree to which a settlement manages to include all relevant insurgencies appears to be crucial in determining the potential for splintering. Unfortunately, where there are a large number of active armed groups, the data indicate that reaching an all-inclusive settlement seems more difficult, as is commonly assumed in the literature. However, the evidence I have presented also suggests that dyadic or selective bargaining might enable the continuation of conflict, since excluded groups are available to share the resources of war with splintering rebel leaders. In Uganda, alliances between insurgencies were facilitated where groups overlapped in terms of ethnicity and territory, and particularly where there was a history of sharing information and resources in the past; on the other hand, even where groups have a history of antagonism or competition, the resentment caused by being excluded from the spoils being divided might make groups willing to form an alliance with defecting rival insurgents.

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[294] In other cases, disgruntled elements of the rebel party might sense themselves neglected during the negotiation process, and they might be successful in acting as "spoilers" in order to prevent a settlement from being signed (See especially Kydd and Walter 2006). A notable example is the M-23 movement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the military wing sensed itself abandoned from the bargain being hashed out by politicians across the border in Kampala. They violated the ceasefire by unilaterally attacking the multilateral United Nations/African Union peacekeeping force, which led to a retaliatory attack that completely eliminated the group's military capacity as the remaining troops scattered across the border into Uganda and Rwanda.

[295] The maximum number of failed settlements signed by any government party in the sample is three—beyond that, rebels seem unwilling to accept a deal.

While the findings of this project are consistent with the theory of preemptive defection, they are not predicted by standard arguments about costly signaling and commitment credibility. Since the state never demobilizes, and since third-party enforcement fails to mitigate against the incumbency advantage, it can never be considered rational for rebels to concede their military capacity before they are relatively certain to receive benefits that outweigh the cost of continued fighting. This helps to explain why international involvement and traditional conceptions of power sharing in the field—which include transitional institutions that expire with elections—fail to explain variation in settlement success in Uganda, as well as in the broader sample of 132 negotiated settlements.

8.3 Contributions to the Field

The key contribution of this dissertation is to the growing literature on peace via power sharing, particularly as part of a war-to-democracy transition. Most notably, by demonstrating the difference in impact when distinguishing between transitional and permanent forms of power sharing, I explain many of the contradictory conclusions in the field (Sisk 2000; Spears 2000; Wantchekon 2000; Tull and Mehler 2005; Jarstad 2006)—for example, Jarstad and Nilsson's (2008) finding that "stickier" forms of power sharing are more effective and Hartzel and Hoddie's (2007) that it is more comprehensive power-sharing formulas that work best. I show that any form of power sharing, when measured as an institutional reform that outlasts the transitional period, has a significantly higher likelihood of preventing conflict recurrence than where such guarantees are absent. Moreover, the results suggest that the effect is context-specific rather than additive; both the cross-national data and case studies indicate that different subtypes of power sharing are likely to be most effective when they address the interests or concerns of the specific parties involved in negotiations.

By considering power sharing as way of mitigating the cost to insurgents of competing against the incumbent in elections, this project taps into a broader literature on designing post-conflict elections (Lijphart 1984, 1989; Sisk and Reynolds 1998). Along with recent work from Matanock (2012), it helps to explain why rebels often *do* choose to participate in elections, precisely because such contests are not always left as random lotteries (Walter 2002; Flores and Nooruddin 2012) or as a mechanism to reaffirm the sovereignty of the incumbent. In this way, it is not necessarily surprising that elections do not seem to increase the risk of

conflict recurrence (Collier et al. 2008)—where they do, rebels are unlikely to submit to them. On the other hand, the theory still helps to explain why democratization sometimes proceeds despite rebel defection and continued conflict as cases in which the distribution of power *would have been* determined by electoral outcomes. In this way, although the current study can not speak directly to the quality of democracy in the cases in question, it does lend support to the common argument about the tradeoff between democratic quality and peace in post-conflict transitions (Lyons 2004; Soderberg Kovacs 2008; Zahar 2008; Norris 2008).

Another contribution is to the growing literature that acknowledges the potential for fluidity and fractionalization among insurgent groups, an important determinant of the stability of any peace process. This study provides evidence that our understanding of bargaining strategies is undermined by assuming that groups are unitary and static when, in fact, "spoilers" often emerge from *within* rebel parties in order to undermine a peace process (Downs and Stedman 2002; Kydd and Walter 2006; Bakke et al. 2012; Oppenheim, Steele, Vargas and Weintraub 2015). Although the data does not directly address the impact of bargaining groups' behavior on the strategies of excluded insurgencies—and, therefore, I can not make definitive conclusions about the impact of my findings on conflict tendencies at the systemic level[296]—it does show that internal spoilers often form alliances with external ones, particularly if doing so is the only hope they have to continue fighting for a better deal (Stedman 1997; Nilsson 2008). Moreover, the project supports a wide range of studies that argue that is the capacity of leaders to access, organize and mobilize followers that determines the onset of rebellion and, in this case, the potential for splintering (Weinstein 2005, 2007; Kalyvas 2008; Lidow 2011).

The findings presented here also have the potential to contribute to the IR literature on contracts and reputation. Although most scholars in this field have focused on bargaining between states in the international arena (Crescenzi 2007; Simmons 2000; Brewster 2009), this study shows that a government's reputation has a similar impact on the agreements it signs with domestic parties. A reputation for violating past agreements, for example, has been shown to require more favorable terms—or "collateral"—in order to convince rivals to sign another bargain (Tomz 2001). The results are also sensitive to the coding on reputation, showing that the effect is specific the government party and not to the state or the regime more broadly, and that reputation can actually improve where there is a significant change in leadership or where the government successfully implements its

[296] See Wilkinson (2000), Stedman (1997), and Tull and Mehler (2005).

settlements. Therefore, in a number of ways, the findings speak to the ways in which states' reputations are developed and evolve over time, and especially how this impacts interactions with rival actors.

Moreover, I have shown that there is a case to be made for thinking about negotiated settlements as a form of contract between parties under anarchic conditions. Governments are likely to resist signing a domestic settlement for the same reason that they are increasingly unlikely to sign international treaties: since the stipulations and requirements for implementation are made explicit and public and, therefore, it is more difficult to renege (Tomz 2001; Fazal 2012, 2014). This is often the rebel party's motivation for seeking a written settlement, as illustrated in the case of the UNRFII (see Chapter 7), especially since the requirements on the government tend to be more varied and complex than rebels' agreement to demobilize. Similar to a contract, the lack of a settlement has been shown to generate uncertainty. Moreover, Fazal (2012, 2014) has argued that rebels pursue settlements as a way to gain international recognition and legitimacy—it is by "codifying" the terms of peace that a settlement becomes a contract upheld by international humanitarian law.

It is in this way that the international community, for better or worse, becomes a third party to a peace process when a settlement is signed—either directly as in mediation and peacekeeping, or indirectly as an observer of violations of the contract. Beyond this project's contributions to scholarship, it is worth considering some lessons and practical strategies for international policy-makers that can be derived from the findings.

8.4 Policy Recommendations

If negotiating and signing a settlement is a signal that rebels are seeking legitimacy, then the results of this study suggest that international actors would be well-advised to grant it. According to the underlying logic of my argument, peace is more likely to hold where rebels choose to demobilize voluntarily; otherwise, the incentive to withhold information and hide military capabilities—in order to protect their capacity to defect, if necessary—is likely to destabilize the transition process. According to Chris McGreal (2015) for *The Guardian,*

> Early successes in Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique and El Salvador generated an overconfidence in the ability of UN soldiers to keep the peace.

> Each of those countries had an accord that former warring parties wanted to maintain. The UN learned the hard way in Angola, Rwanda and Bosnia that where the UN wants peace more than those in conflict, then the illusion of peacekeeping can perpetuate instability and cost lives.

In this light, the most important role for international actors is not to step in and do the job that the state could not by coercively enforcing the peace, as is commonly argued (Walter 2002; Rothchild; Leonard and Straus 2003).[297] Allowing for partition or secession—as Jeffrey Herbst (2003) recommends—has also not played out well in practice; in Eritrea and South Sudan, both violence and a democratic deficit have been reproduced in new states. Instead, the role of the international community should be to incentivize rebels to disarm by ensuring that the concessions offered are sufficient and that the government is effectively bound to comply with them, even if doing so comes at the expense of state sovereignty (Herbst 2003).[298] I highlight a few specific lessons to keep in mind when brokering a peace deal.

First, it is vital to consider what power sharing means to those who are meant to be included in the formula. Again, I highlight the difference between permanent reforms and temporary coalitions. Since they often mark the expiration date of peacekeeping missions (Downs and Stedman 2002; Fortna 2008), post-conflict elections serve as important focal points for belligerent parties (Fearon 2011). Where all mechanisms for sharing power are designed to expire with elections, international mediators should understand that it is not a rational strategy for rebels to demobilize and participate unless they expect to win. This outcome is exceedingly rare, especially since democracy promotion organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) will not have had sufficient time to help build former rebellions into legitimate and viable political parties.

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[297] With reference to the Ugandan case study, the Nairobi Agreement shows that international pressure often gives insurgents an incentive to sign a settlement with which they have no intention of complying if the terms of the bargain seem predetermined, fail to appease rebels, and involve the entrance of peacekeeping troops. In that case, the optimal strategy for rebels is to sign the settlement as a way of distracting negotiators while gaining working to create a military quagmire that discourages peacekeepers from getting involved.

[298] In this way, the project aligns with arguments by Herbst (2003) and others the overwhelming international premium on sovereignty fails to address the conditions that lead to the emergence of rebellion in the first place, particularly gaps in governance and statehood outside the capital. The theory and evidence I have put forth is most relevant where insurgents have a genuine interest in peace and would not apply to armed groups that have no desire or intention to demobilize, such as terrorist organizations or groups that are only interested in criminal activities or rent predation.

It is only when institutions are designed to reduce the winner-takes-all nature of elections and reassure insurgents that they will not be excluded from their fair share of the national pie that demobilization becomes the optimal strategy. Only then will rebels have an incentive to take a stake in the transition process, even if they do not come out as the overall winners (Rothchild 2002). In Mozambique, the rebellion-turned-political party has grown frustrated in its inability to defeat the ruling FRELIMO party outright at the national level after 23 years of peaceful competition; yet the fact that RENAMO was initially satisfied to serve as the largest opposition party under a decentralized, proportional representation voting system means that it now lacks the military capacity it would need to return to the battlefield and, therefore, the risk of conflict recurrence is all but eliminated.

In other cases, proportional representation might not be sufficient if the rebellion lacks an electoral constituency or represents a small minority.[299] Territorial autonomy might also be infeasible if relevant groups are geographically intermingled or exist as minorities even at the local level. Measures like ethnic-based quotas or guaranteed Cabinet posts that are written into the constitution might be necessary to appease certain groups. More cross-national research on such methods is needed; fortunately, they are becoming increasingly common. For now, the key takeaway is that successful settlements must entail fundamental reforms of the political system, which are context-specific in addressing the interest of the rebel party and are not under threat of being revoked in the short- to medium-term.

Second, it is crucial that facilitators bear in mind the potential for splintering within the rebel party. Others have taken on the important task of measuring internal cohesion and the potential for fragmentation of insurgencies based on a number of factors (Bakke et al. 2011; Cunningham 2013). In general, my research has shown that the best way to prevent splintering is, again, to design power-sharing settlements that create more diffuse benefits and increase the time horizons of elites at all levels and in all branches of the rebel hierarchy. Secure routes to powerful positions might need to be created in the state security sector, in the executive branch, at the local or regional level, or within a viable and competitive political party, depending on the structure and interests of the group in question.

Even with a robust power-sharing formula, the implementation process is likely to reveal winners and losers among the ex-combatant leadership; in some

[299] Refer back to the DRC example that I use to introduce the dissertation—proportional representation might be enough for some groups, but not others, even within the same conflict.

cases, even one disgruntled officer can be enough to result in renewed rebellion. It is, therefore, also important to make sure that any disgruntled elites are unable to act as "spoilers" to the peace process. One way of doing this is to avoid excluding any relevant insurgencies, particularly those who either have a history of sharing information or resources with the rebel party or who overlap ethically or territorially. As this project has shown, failing to do so increases the potential for alliances between included and excluded spoilers to facilitate the continuation of conflict.

Observers and stakeholders alike frequently highlight the necessity for peace processes to be all-inclusive. In Uganda, an opposition party spokesman criticized Museveni for failing to include the Lord's Resistance Army in the peace agreement reached with the UNRFII in 2002:

> Piecemeal deals or bribes to some dissidents like [what] happened in the now collapsing peace agreement with UNRF II of West Nile or the use of amnesty will not help either. What is needed is a convention where all stakeholders will freely be invited and consensus reached.[300]

Unfortunately, however, most international policy-makers seem to believe that the verdict is still out on inclusivity and that a non-inclusive settlement is better than none at all. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Addis Ababa is going ahead with a dyadic peace agreement between the new South Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO), an offshoot of the former-rebellion-turned-ruling-party, despite warnings from the International Crisis Group that a solution failing to include the estimated two-dozen active armed groups in South Sudan would be counter-productive.[301] While dyadic bargaining is often the most expedient option, it also benefits the interests of the government party, which often prefers a divide-and-conquer strategy requiring the fewest political concessions. The evidence presented in this dissertation shows that this strategy can be counter-productive—even if the rebel party is effectively weakened by the process of cooptation, it can lead to fragmentation and merging of groups and, ultimately, the proliferation of conflict tendencies at the systemic level.

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[300] "Parties Want Talks," 2003, (*New Vision*, 20 February).

[301] "Looming Military Offensive in South Sudan," 2014, (International Crisis Group Conflict Alerts, 29 October, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/alerts/2014/conflict-alert-looming-military-offensives-in-south-sudan.aspx?utm_source=south-sudan-alert&utm_medium=view-online&utm_campaign=mremail).

In sum, regardless of the structural constraints specific to different conflict contexts, international policy-makers would be well served to exert pressure on governments to engage in open peace processes and to concede costly, long-term political reforms with the ultimate goal of addressing the interests of all active armed groups in a single, inclusive bargain. This is especially true since weak bargains, once failed, set a negative precedent that can have repercussions in future rounds of bargaining. States that fail to implement agreements successfully are easy targets of accusations by would-be defectors and, in this way, negative reputations can generate patterns of defection over time that become very difficult to overcome. This places a premium on getting the inclusive power-sharing formula right the first time.

8.5 Remaining Problems and Questions

This study is an important step towards a better understanding of why rebels defect and what makes settlements stick. Hopefully, it will contribute toward a more coordinated research agenda about what power sharing is and when and where to apply it as a mechanism of resolving civil conflict. There are a number of remaining gaps and questions to address in future research. For one thing, indications that bias might have been introduced into the population due to the method of identifying cases suggests that different strategies of analysis might improve the validity of my conclusions, particularly in terms of generalizing them beyond Uganda. The sample is relatively small, so opportunities for statistical techniques are limited, but randomly selected-paired case comparisons might be one way forward.

Over the course of my research, a number of remaining research questions were revealed. Is power sharing most effective when the institutional subtypes align with the interests of insurgent parties, such as territorial power sharing for secessionist groups or military power sharing with groups lacking a political wing? If so, there is a case for tailored power-sharing formulas that might be more feasible to implement, as opposed to the more common, comprehensive package currently championed by United Nations mediators. The cross-national analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that this might be true, since the individual impact of various power-sharing subtypes had a significant impact while there was no evidence for an additive effect. Also, this analysis has focused on whether peace is realized among the parties included in a settlement, but how does bargaining groups' behavior

relate to conflict tendencies at the systemic level? More research is needed into the fluidity of group borders and the potential for fragmentation and alliances among insurgencies.

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APPENDIX A:

COMPLETE REGRESSION TABLES

AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

This appendix provides full results for the binomial logistic regression analyses of conflict termination discussed in Chapter 4. Tables A.1-A.3 list all control variables, both structural conditions and measures of the content of settlements, while the tables in Chapter 4 provide abridged summaries of the models for ease of interpretation. Since initial tests indicate that the measure for territorial conflicts is a better predictor for settlement failure than the ethnic fractionalization index (Table A.1), this variable is used as the standard for capturing the nature of social cleavages in later models (Tables A.2 and A.3). All variables are measured as described in Chapter 4, with the three tables examining the effect of power sharing, inclusivity, and reputation, respectively. Models 5 and 6 in Table A.3 present holistic tests that include measures for all three of the central independent variables. The prior effect of control variables, if any, appears to be diminished and even negated when these factors are included in the same model.

This final model is used as the baseline for the series of robustness checks provided in Table A.4. First I examine alternative specifications of the dependent variable: conflict termination. Model 1 requires that peace last for ten years, instead of the five-year cutoff used in the preceding tests. Model 2 codes conflict termination at the systemic level, meaning that *all* armed groups active in the country cease violent activities, and not merely the signatory parties to the settlement. The measure of inclusivity is dropped in this model due to perfect prediction of conflict termination.

Next, I test the results against reduced samples. Model 3 includes only settlements for which I was able to obtain full texts, reducing the sample size to 105 cases. Model 4 excludes all low-level conflicts that fail to meet the minimum threshold of a civil war: Comoros, Djibouti, Lesotho, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Senegal, and Solomon Islands. Other models exclude country cases that are outliers on certain factors commonly argued to predict settlement failure, such as the number of active insurgencies and the number of settlements signed during the relevant time period. They are as follows: Chad (Model 5), Colombia (6), India (7), Somalia (8), and Sudan (9).

Finally, Table A.5 tests the final, holistic model using an alternative dataset. It employs settlement dyads as the unit of analysis—specifically, the 257 cases in this population represent each government-and-rebel signatory dyad for the 138 settlements signed in the relevant time period (1975-2005). All dependent and independent variables are measured the same as in the primary dataset, described and cited in Chapter 4. The results are consistent in providing strong support for

the central hypotheses of the study, while other, antecedent conditions seem to have no significant effect on the likelihood of peace.

Table A.1. Full regression results for power sharing.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Permanent *or* transitional power sharing	0.36* (1.052)								
Transitional power sharing		0.5 (1.48)	-0.39 (1.439)	0.66 (1.615)					
Permanent power sharing		5.85*** (1.112)	6.89*** (1.09)	7.73*** (1.591)					
Inclusive power sharing					4.33*** (0.997)				
Diffusive power sharing						5.12*** (1.271)			
Security integration							0.13 (0.469)		
Military power sharing								3.63*** (1.188)	
Count of power sharing provisions									1.52*** (0.358)
GDP per capita	0.43** (0.202)	0.23 (0.249)		0.45* (0.271)	0.43** (0.216)	0.3 (0.2)	0.36** (0.171)	0.46*** (0.161)	0.37* (0.189)
Mountainous terrain	0.54*** (0.207)	0.52* (0.263)		0.53 (0.4)	0.44* (0.227)	0.26 (0.212)	0.41*** (0.148)	0.5*** (0.165)	0.39* (0.201)
Size of state military			0.0001 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)					
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.74 (1.185)	0.5 (1.853)		0.29 (2.473)	-1.04 (1.26)		-0.73 (0.829)	-0.87 (1.091)	-0.23 (1.339)
Conflict issue: territory			-2.45*** (0.9)	-2.65** (1.225)		-2.42** (1.133)			
Conflict duration	0.001 (0.002)	-0.0001 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	-0.0009 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)	-0.0007 (0.002)	-0.0009 (0.001)	-0.0006 (0.002)
Conflict deaths	-0.31* (0.163)	-0.53** (0.248)	-0.43** (0.262)	-0.74** (0.314)	-0.27* (0.166)	-0.3* (0.169)	-0.17 (0.12)	-0.32** (0.147)	-0.33** (0.167)
Peacekeepers	-0.51 (0.573)	-1.03 (0.926)	-1.12 (0.94)	-1.71 (1.297)	-0.17 (0.864)	-0.28 (0.73)	0.16 (0.52)	0.02 (0.71)	-0.08 (0.726)
Arbitration commission	0.35 (0.679)	-0.71 (0.856)	-0.19 (0.945)	-1.11 (1.129)	0.77 (0.64)	0.31 (0.768)	0.84* (0.494)	0.97* (0.542)	-0.56 (0.741)
Oversight commission				1.0 (0.886)					
Party integration				0.16 (0.619)					
Amnesty				-0.1 (0.913)					
Constant	-3.63* (2.064)	-1.43 (2.697)	1.25 (2.038)	-1.03 (2.742)	-2.22 (2.171)	-1.28 (1.527)	-1.94 (1.71)	-1.61 (1.701)	-2.05 (1.716)
Observations	128	128	138	128	127	128	128	128	128
Log likelihood	-56.79	-32.43	-31.17	-28.17	-49.92	-44.12	-75.04	-63.54	-47.74
Pseudo R^2	0.325	0.615	0.655	0.665	0.404	0.476	0.108	0.245	0.433

Binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported as log odds units.
Dependent variable is *conflict termination*, a dichotomous measure of "1" if conflict ceases among all signatories to a settlement within six months of signing and lasts for at least five years, "0" otherwise.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.2. Full regression results for inclusivity.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Permanent power sharing	9.7***	7.84***	10.27***	9.61***	23.62***	5.89***
	(1.904)	(1.603)	(2.256)	(2.189)	(3.05)	(1.058)
Inclusive	4.46***		4.32***	4.48***	3.45*	2.66**
	(1.545)		(1.535)	(1.48)	(1.781)	(1.226)
Power sharing X Inclusive					16.24***	1.2*
					(2.49)	(1.812)
Count of armed groups		-0.26**	-0.11		-0.08	-0.009
		(0.109)	(0.155)		(0.162)	(0.176)
Number of armed groups > 4				0.12		
				(0.838)		
GDP per capita	0.33	0.33	0.29	0.34	0.37	
	(0.394)	(0.218)	(0.339)	(0.367)	(0.332)	
Mountainous terrain	0.69*	0.56	0.76*	0.68*	0.67	
	(0.384)	(0.396)	(0.438)	(0.395)	(0.52)	
Size of state military						-0.001
						(0.001)
Conflict issue: territory	-4.08***	-2.95***	-4.42***	-4.03***	-18.69***	
	(1.339)	(1.098)	(1.609)	(1.48)	(2.078)	
Ethnic fractionalization						-0.57
						(2.527)
Conflict duration	0.01	0.002	0.01*	0.01	0.01	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Conflict deaths	-0.51*	-0.62**	-0.59*	-0.5	-0.46	-0.15
	(0.298)	(0.317)	(0.36)	(0.307)	(0.408)	(0.183)
Provisions for:						
Peacekeepers	-3.38***	-1.95	-3.56***	-3.35***	-18.4***	-2.89**
	(1.224)	-1.221	(1.242)	(1.296)	(2.163)	(1.454)
Inclusive arbitration commission						-0.83
						(0.883)
Inclusive oversight commission						0.06
						(1.035)
Political party integration						0.7
						(0.662)
Amnesty						-0.25
						(0.884)
Constant	-4.8	0.08	-3.8	-4.95	-4.57	-2.71
	(4.207)	(2.083)	(3.908)	(3.841)	(3.483)	(2.431)
Observations	128	128	128	128	128	137
Log likelihood	-22.29	-27.86	-22.15	-22.28	-21.57	-28.28
Pseudo R^2	0.735	0.669	0.737	0.735	0.744	0.683

Binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported as log odds units.
Dependent variable is *conflict termination*, a dichotomous measure of "1" if conflict ceases among all signatories to a settlement within six months of signing and lasts for at least five years, "0" otherwise.
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.3. Full regression results for government reputation.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Permanent power sharing			6.93***	6.88***	9.98***	6.03***
			(1.307)	(1.7)	(2.146)	(1.01)
Inclusive					4.16***	2.89**
					(1.551)	(1.22)
Number of armed groups					-0.07	0.03
					(0.149)	(0.154)
History of defection	-1.99***	-2.22***	-1.17*	-1.26	-1.58*	-1.35*
	(0.508)	(0.521)	(0.701)	(1.112)	(0.882)	(1.167)
Power sharing X history of defection				0.12		
				(1.501)		
GDP per capita	0.2		0.27	0.27	0.24	
	(0.166)		(0.241)	(0.241)	(0.339)	
Mountainous terrain	0.29		0.33	0.33	0.67*	
	(0.177)		(0.35)	(0.339)	(0.371)	
Size of state military		0.001				-0.001
		(0.001)				(0.001)
Conflict issue: territory	0.68		-2.66**	-2.66**	-4.36***	
	(0.451)		(1.226)	(1.232)	(1.678)	
Ethnic fractionalization		0.31				0.04
		(1.113)				(2.03)
Conflict duration	0.002	0.003**	0.002	0.002	0.01*	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Conflict deaths	-0.18	-0.2**	-0.51*	-0.51*	-0.57*	-0.15
	(0.132)	(0.096)	(0.276)	(0.266)	(0.344)	(0.181)
Provisions for:						
Peacekeepers	0.5	-0.34	-1.09	-1.08	-3.29***	-2.19*
	(0.622)	(0.592)	(1.126)	(1.127)	(1.239)	(1.222)
Inclusive arbitration commission		0.99				-0.43
		(0.633)				(0.867)
Inclusive oversight commission		0.82*				-0.19
		(0.422)				(0.88)
Political party integration		0.72*				0.45
		(0.409)				(0.815)
Amnesty		-0.19				0.01
		(0.375)				(0.754)
Constant	-0.88	0.46	-0.41	-0.34	-3.36	-3.05
	(1.474)	(0.902)	(1.977)	(2.019)	(3.987)	(1.944)
Observations	128	137	128	128	128	137
Log likelihood	-67.38	-68.4	-27.93	-27.93	-21.96	-27.38
Pseudo R^2	0.199	0.234	0.668	0.668	0.739	0.693

Binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported as log odds units.
Dependent variable is *conflict termination*, a dichotomous measure of "1" if conflict ceases among all signatories to a settlement within six months of signing and lasts for at least five years, and "0" otherwise.
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0

Table A.4. Robustness checks.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Permanent power sharing	6.85***	6.85***	4.01***	7.36***	6.48***	6.84***	5.19***	5.53***	6.71***
	(1.355)	(1.355)	(1.297)	(1.479)	(1.159)	(1.071)	(0.82)	(0.88)	(1.321)
Inclusive	5.25***	5.25***		5.02**	4.08***	4.7***	3.17***	3.36***	4.32***
	(1.354)	(1.354)		(2.177)	(1.383)	(1.294)	(1.107)	(1.212)	(1.529)
Number of armed groups	0.38*	0.38*	-0.003	-0.14	-0.02	0.16	0.06	0.06	0.24
	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.249)	(0.255)	(0.178)	(0.161)	(0.156)	(0.163)	(0.186)
History of defection	-2.22*	-2.22*	-2.62*	-0.21	0.04	-0.913*	-0.59*	-0.67*	-0.01
	(1.187)	(1.187)	(1.612)	(1.348)	(0.794)	(1.088)	(0.929)	(0.917)	(1.11)
GDP per capita	-0.23	-0.23	-0.01	0.45	0.09	0.42	0.09	0.06	-0.28
	(0.437)	(0.437)	(0.767)	(0.466)	(0.345)	(0.396)	(0.313)	(0.358)	(0.416)
Mountainous terrain	1.01**	1.01**	0.03	1.08	0.66*	0.65*	0.67*	0.64**	0.54*
	(0.397)	(0.397)	(0.524)	(0.77)	(0.375)	(0.394)	(0.376)	(0.303)	(0.292)
Conflict duration	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	0.01	0.004	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.01
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.00351)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Conflict intensity	-0.1	-0.1	-0.16	-0.21	-0.68**	-0.1	-0.33	-0.32	-0.34
	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.208)	(0.295)	(0.315)	(0.253)	(0.24)	(0.247)	(0.256)
Provisions for peacekeepers	-2.43**	-2.43**	0.36	-1.99	-1.43	-2.19*	-1.47	-1.59	-2.54***
	(1.006)	(1.006)	(1.019)	(1.325)	(1.134)	(1.125)	(0.94)	(1.008)	(0.835)
Constant	-6.62**	-6.62**	-1.14	-10.26*	-1.39	-9.63***	-4.0	-4.06	-3.18
	(2.835)	(2.835)	(5.2)	(5.71)	(3.925)	(3.596)	(2.76)	(3.403)	(2.869)
Observations	128	128	42	105	115	113	116	128	121
Log likelihood	-21.45	-21.45	-13.48	-18.47	-22.3	-21.47	-25.9	-26.57	-21.52
Pseudo R^2	0.73	0.73	0.534	0.74	0.702	0.719	0.659	0.684	0.732

Binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported as log odds units.
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.5. Main regression models using settlement dyad as the unit of analysis.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Permanent power sharing	3.85***	3.77***	3.47***	3.61***	3.6***
	(0.672)	(0.708)	(0.824)	(0.623)	(0.673)
Inclusive		1.95*	1.55*		1.82*
		(0.999)	(1.301)		(1.007)
Power sharing X Inclusive			0.93*		
			(1.399)		
Number of armed groups		0.17	0.18		0.18
		(0.123)	(0.114)		(0.119)
History of defection				-1.06**	-0.93**
				(0.53)	(0.532)
GDP per capita	0.19	0.16	0.14	0.14	0.11
	(0.243)	(0.27)	(0.272)	(0.237)	(0.258)
Mountainous terrain	-0.11	0.06	0.03	-0.14	0.02
	(0.163)	(0.193)	(0.209)	(0.161)	(0.187)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.69	-1.94	-2.11*	-0.95	-1.45
	(1.149)	(1.197)	(1.258)	(1.05)	(1.115)
Conflict duration	-0.001	-0.0001	-0.0003	0.0003	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Conflict deaths	-0.12	-0.04	-0.03	-0.08	-0.02
	(0.158)	(0.146)	(0.15)	(0.143)	(0.138)
Provisions for peacekeepers	0.53	-0.09	-0.06	0.59	0.04
	(0.655)	(0.79)	(0.845)	(0.616)	(0.751)
Constant	-1.42	-3.34**	-3.00*	-1.36	-3.01*
	(1.381)	(1.634)	(1.67)	(1.298)	(1.592)
Observations	206	206	206	206	206
Log likelihood	-75.34	-70.24	-69.84	-72.99	-68.55
Pseudo R^2	0.44	0.478	0.481	0.457	0.49

Binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported as log odds units.
Robust standard errors, clustered by settlement, in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX B:

LIST OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS

This appendix lists the interviews I conducted for this project. They occurred during approximately ten months of fieldwork in Uganda between January 2013 and June 2014. The majority of interviews were conducted in the Ugandan capital, Kampala. Most high-ranking government representatives directly involved in the relevant peace processes, former rebel leaders, and third-party observers now reside in Kampala. The peace process with the M-23 rebels from the Democratic Republic of Congo also took place in Kampala while I was there. A handful of interviews were conducted at army bases in Arua and Jinja, where a large number of lower ranking ex-combatants are posted, as well as a few in Gulu and in London.

The interviews were open-ended, loosely structured and conducted in English. In most cases, interviews took place one-on-one, without a third party present, although a few meetings took place in small groups when subjects suggested (or requested) the presence of other individuals knowledgeable about the topic. While a few interviews took place in offices, most occurred in public spaces, although I was careful to situate meetings in a quiet and semi-private location where I could be certain that passersby could not overhear the conversation.

All subjects were offered anonymity, and some chose to exercise it, particularly lower ranking ex-combatants. In such cases, they are referenced according to their title or perspective on the topic. I attempt to include as much information about the rank or title of each individual, but a few were intentionally vague about their precise relationship with former insurgencies so that they could not be identified. On the other hand, I encouraged high-ranking subjects to agree to be listed by name. My feeling was that it improves the validity of the story I tell if it is structured from the perspective of those who made the important decisions at the time. Nearly everyone I asked to be name consented. I only requested to record interviews if I felt that the subject's perspective was particularly important, or if the subject's accent or knowledge of English made it such that my understanding might be limited. In the case of lower ranking ex-combatants, my fear was that a recording device would make the interviewee reticent and less open, particularly when associated with a Western researcher. Only one of the subjects who I requested to record declined. Interviews lasted between 35 minutes and 2-and-a-half hours, with the average interview lasting 55 minutes. Interview transcripts are available on request, if the subject has granted consent.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS[302]

Former rebels

Former UNRFII Captain; Arua, Uganda; 6 April 2013

Former West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) Major; Arua, Uganda; 6 April 2013

Former WNBF Captain; Arua, Uganda; 7 April 2013

Former UNRFII Captain; Arua, Uganda; 7 April 2013

Former UNRFII combatant; Arua, Uganda; 7 April 2013

Former UPDA soldier and retired local counselor; Gulu, Uganda; 9 April 2013

Former UPDA Colonel (equivalent); Gulu, Uganda; 10 April 2013

Former UPDA combatant and current UPDF officer; Kampala, Uganda; 26 April 2013

Former UNRFII Lieutenant Colonel; Jinja, Uganda; 2 May 2013

Rene Abandi, Political Spokesman for M-23; Kampala, Uganda; 3 December 2013

Bertrand Bisimwa, President/Political leader of M-23; Kampala, Uganda; 4 December 2013

Moses Ali, UNRF Chairman and current Deputy Prime Minister; Kampala, Uganda; 2 May 2014

Former UNRFII Colonel; Jinja, Uganda, 6 May 2014

Former UNRFII Lieutenant Colonel; Jinja, Uganda; 6 May 2014

Ali Bamuze, UNRF Field Commander and UNRFII Chairman; Kampala, Uganda; 12 May 2014

[302] Format: Name (if permitted), description or title (both current and former/relevant at the time of the peace process, where applicable); location; date. Categorized by type of interviewee, whether former rebel, government/state military, or third-party observer, mediator, or analyst. Listed in order of meeting date.

Matthew Rukikaire, NRA/M representative to Nairobi Agreement and National Resistance Council member; Kampala, Uganda; 19 May 2014

Kirunda Kivejinja, former NRA/M Secretary for External Operations; Kampala, Uganda; 20 May 2014

Former UPDM leader and Uganda People's Congress (UPC) Member of Parliament; London, UK; 30 July 2014

Former UPDM leader and UPC President; London, UK; 30 July 2014

Government and Military Representatives

Pecos Kutesa, former NRA Colonel and current UPDF General; Kampala, Uganda; 21 March 2013

Gregory Muntu, former UPDF Commander and General; Kampala; Uganda, 22 March 2013

Dr. Kiiza Besigye, former Minister of Intelligence and UPDF Colonel; Kampala, Uganda; 22 March 2013

General Elly Tumwine, former UPDF Commander and current UPDF Representative in Parliament; Kampala, Uganda; 24 April 2013 and 17 May 2014

Fred Mwesigye, Retired UPDF Colonel; Kampala, Uganda; 26 April 2013

Olara Otunnu, Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 1985 Military Council and current UPC President; Kampala, Uganda; 15 May 2014

Sam Kutesa, Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Attorney General for Military Council; Kampala, Uganda; 17 May 2014

Academics, Legal Advisors, and NGO Employees:

Dr. Christopher Twesigye, Political Science Department, Uganda Christian University; Mukono, Uganda; 30 January 2013

Dr. Apuuli Kasaija, Political Science Department, Makerere University; Kampala, Uganda; 11 February 2013

Dr. Chris Dolan, Director of Refugee Law Project, Makarere University; Kampala, Uganda; 27 February 2013

Dr. Simba Kayunga, Chair of Political Science Department, Makerere University; Kampala, Uganda; 14 March 2013

Hussein Kashillingi, former legal advisor to President Yoweri Museveni; Kampala, Uganda; 19 March 2013

John Bosco Suuza, Uganda Ministry of Justice and NRM Legal Advisor for Yumbe Agreement; Kampala, Uganda; 25 November 2013

P.K.K. Onega, Chairman of Uganda Amnesty Commission; Kampala, Uganda; 2 December 2013

Caleb Alaka, legal counsel for UNRFII (2002) and LRA (2008); Kampala, Uganda; 30 April 2014

Pascal Piwang, UNRFII ex-combatant liaison officer; Kampala, Uganda; 2 May 2014 and 12 May 2014

Mahmoud Angoliga, UNRF ex-combatants liaison officer; Kampala, Uganda; 15 May 2014

Former UPDM legal counsel; London, UK; 5 August 2014

APPENDIX C:

CODING DESCRIPTIONS

The starting point for the data is the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Peace Agreement dataset. It includes agreements signed between at least two belligerent parties—one government and one or more rebel groups—that met the minimum threshold of 25 battle deaths per conflict year in order to be listed in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. In light of the limitations of the Armed Conflict Dataset in accurately and consistently identifying armed groups and conflict start and end dates, I used a variety of alternative sources to identify peace settlements that may have been censored from the Peace Agreement dataset: especially UN Peacemaker, ACCORD Conciliation Resources, and Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute INCORE.

Wherever new potential cases were located, I conducted follow-up research to ensure that signatories represent a domestic conflict dyad that did, in fact, result in at least 25 deaths in any single conflict year, that the settlement text substantively addresses an "incompatibility" of the conflict beyond just a ceasefire (Bigombe et al. 2006), and that this solution is an attempt to maintain the territorial borders of the state (see Chapter 3). A number of "new" cases were not included in my population because they failed to meet these criteria.

C.1. Ceasefires and signed truces:

Bishkek Protocol	Azerbaijan (1994)
Nairobi II Agreement	Chad (1981)
Sochi Agreement	Georgia (1993)
Bamako Ceasefire	Liberia (1990)
Geneva Ceasefire	Liberia (1993)

C.2. Agreements ending in independence or secession

Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia	Ethiopia and Eritrea (1991; 2000)
Comprehensive Peace Agreement	Sudan (2005)
Lancaster House Agreement	Zimbabwe (1979)

C.3. International accords on domesticized conflicts

Gbadolite Declaration	Angola and Zaire (1989)
Zheleznovodsk Declaration	Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia Kazakhstan (1991)
Chad-Nigeria Agreement	Chad and Nigeria (1983)
Algiers Agreement	Chad and Libya (1989)
Esquipulas II Agreement	Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica (1987)[303]
Indo-Sri Lankan Accord	Sri Lanka and India (1987)
Brioni Agreement	Former Yugoslav states (1991)

Settlements are clustered into a single case if they occur as part of a multi-stage bargaining process between the same parties—in other words, a continuous peace process. In this case, the coding of content-related variables, e.g. any provisions for power sharing, considers the various texts as part of a single overarching settlement. The date is listed according to the signing of the terminal settlement. On the other hand, if the peace process degenerates into renewed violence and parties return to the bargaining table to reach a new (or reiterated) settlement, or if the process is halted and restarted in order to incorporate new parties, settlements are listed and coded separately.

My coding for "conflict termination" looks at whether *all* signatory parties cease violent attacks within six months and for at least five years from the settlement date. If even one group continues fighting, it is coded as a "no" for conflict termination.[304] If multiple rebel parties are included in a settlement, conflict start and end dates are listed as the earliest and latest for any group. Unless other sources are provided, all conflict dates come from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict

[303] Oliver, Johanna, 1999, "The Esquipulas Process: A Central American Paradigm for Resolving Regional Conflict" (*Ethnic Studies Report* 17(2): 149-179.)

[304] In an alternative dataset, I disaggregate the coding on conflict termination for each rebel party by treating the conflict dyad as the unit of analysis. The robustness checks provided in Appendix A show that the results hold.

dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2012). Temporary dormancy or lapses in violence—i.e. for less than five years—is coded as conflict ongoing. For each rebel party to a settlement, I conducted exploratory research to determine accurate dates for the first and last attack, as well as any alliances among or splintering within groups that resulted in continued conflict under a different name. Any sources used to modify conflict dates are provided below, as well as a brief justification if my coding of "conflict termination" differs from the other datasets.

For each settlement, I provide the name of all included rebel parties. If all active armed groups signed it, then the settlement is coded a being inclusive. If any active insurgencies were left out of the peace process or refused to sign the settlement, they are listed below for each case. Again, this coding is based on my own research into accurate active dates for armed groups, as well as in identifying any relevant groups that might not have been included in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset, for whatever reason. For example, because the UCDP/PRIO data requires that one of the warring parties in any conflict be an official state, a number of substantial Liberian insurgencies are censored because they were active in years when there was no legitimate central government. As much as possible, I provide citation information and descriptive justification wherever my codings contradict or modify the UCDP dataset.

For each settlement, I also identify the government party. For countries with multiple cases falling within the relevant time period, I indicate the name of the leader or the ruling party who was in power at the time of the settlement. Wherever relevant, I describe whether there has been a significant change in government, such a military coup or a transition to multiparty democracy, which would "wipe the slate clean" in terms of the government's reputation for compliance or defection. Omar al-Bashir came to power in Sudan through a coup, which was motivated in large part by the Muslim-dominated military's objection to the previous government's negotiations with southern rebel movements who objected to the implementation of shari'a law. On the other hand, democratically elected President Chamorro in Nicaragua came to power in 1990 on a platform of accommodating the Contras and purging the Sandinistas, who had failed to implement two previous settlements.

In a few cases—specifically in Croatia (1995), Lebanon (1985, 1989) and Liberia (1994, 1995, 1996)—there is no legitimate central authority at the time of the settlement and, therefore, no government party in the traditional sense. The settlement itself represents an attempt by the multitude of active armed groups to restore law and order in order to hold elections. I chose to include these cases, since

the cost of unilateral demobilization and the logic of preemptive defection still holds—to the victor of the election go all the spoils of power.

The coding for "power sharing" reflects the conceptualization provided in Chapter 3. If the settlement includes any type of long-term, permanent reform for including rebels or the social group they represent in the institutions of central governance or the military high command, or for devolving power or economic resource wealth to the regional or group level, it is coded as "yes" for power sharing. A few notes on this subject:

i. Military power sharing must go beyond the integration of troops. The settlement must either specify that officers will keep their ranks after being absorbed into the national army, or else restructure the military high command or Ministry of Defense so that rebels or the ethno-national community they represent are guaranteed a quota of powerful positions.

ii. Economic power sharing needs to entail a long-term restructuring of the way resources are allocated in the country. One-off resettlement payments, provision of services or stipends to ex-combatants, or reparations or compensation in war-torn areas would not qualify. Examples of economic power sharing include permanently redistributing wealth toward the conflict region, granting autonomy over natural resources to locally elected governments, or allowing for tax revenue to remain with the provinces.

iii. Proportional representation voting rules are insufficient, since a simple electoral system reform does not guarantee adequate representation to minority communities. Specified quota systems or reserved seats in either Parliament or the executive Cabinet are necessary to qualify as power sharing in the central government. Cases that have been updated to reflect this include Angola, Burundi and Cambodia.

In light of this description of coding criteria, I describe all 138 settlements included in the dataset below. They are categorized by country and listed in chronological order.

AFGHANISTAN

Peshewar Accord – 24 April 1992

Full text source: INCORE Transitional Justice Institute[305]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

An interim Islamic Council was established with a tenure of two years. Cabinet positions, including Deputy Prime Ministers, were allocated among the various rebel parties, known as the "Peshewar Seven." No guarantees were designed to outlast the transitional period.

Government ID: Jamiat-i-Islami

The communist government had recently collapsed, and Jamiat's forces were the first to enter Kabul. Its leader, Professor Rabbani, was accorded leadership of the transitional government.

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Hizb-i-Islami, Ittehad-i-Islami (IULA), Hizb-i-Islami (Khalis), National Islamic Front (NIFA), Afghani National Liberation Front (ANLF), and Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (RIM)

Inclusive? No.

Hizb-i-Wahdat, Shura-i-Etelaf (Taliban), Junbish-i-Milli-i-Islami (NIMA), and Harakat-i-Islami (IMA) were excluded, although Hizb-i-Wahdat and Shura-i-Etelaf were given positions in the transitional government.

Conflict dates: 15 April 1978 – present

Violence between Jamaat-i-Islami and Hizb-i-Islami continued until at leat 1996. Despite a lull in direct conflict, Hizb-i-Islami began

[305] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/afgan2.pdf

committing violent attacks again in 2008 or 2009.[306] Jamaat-i-Islami also appears to have kept fighting as an unconventional (i.e. non-state) militia through at least 2006.[307]

Conflict termination? No.
Hisb-i-Islami splintered further when a faction led by Hekmatyar defected and fought against the transitional government for years.

Islamabad Accord[308] – 7 March 1993

Full text source: UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement Database[309]

Clustered? Yes, with the Jalalabad Agreement. These agreements are coded separately from the previous Peshewar Accord because violence between the interim government and Hekmatyar's faction of the Hizb-i-Islami continued after Peshewar. The current peace process also incorporated a new group – Hizb-i-Wahdat – which was not included in 1992.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement includes more details about the transitional arrangement than the previous case, by stipulating for a Defence Council to establish a new national army, an integrated electoral commission, etc. All institutions are still intended as part of an interim government with an 18-month mandate, to be terminated with the holding of national elections for President and Parliament.

Government ID: Jamaat-i-Islami

History of defection? Yes.

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[306] Arnoldy, Ben, "Deadly Afghanistan attack: It wasn't only the Taliban," (*The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 October 2006). UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset includes the group through 1995, and then emerging again in 2008.
[307] "Afghan warlords rape 22-year-old married woman," (*Hindustan Times*, 2 December 2006). UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset includes the group through 1996.
[308] Also known as the "Afghan Peace Accord."
[309] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Afg%2019930307.pdf

Rebel ID(s): Hizb-i-Islami; Ittehad-i-Islami (IULA); Mahaz-i-Milli (NIFA); Jabha-i-Nijat-i-Milli (ANLF); Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (RIM); Harkat-i-Islami (IMA); Hizb-i-Wahdat

Inclusive? No.
Shura-i-Etelaf (Taliban), Junbish-i-Milli-i-Islami (NIMA), and Hizb-i-Islami (Khalis) were excluded.

Conflict dates: 15 April 1978 – 5 October 2009

Conflict termination? No. Ongoing violence confirmed by Hizb-i-Wahdat[310] (until 1995), Hizb-i-Islami factions (until 2009), and Jamaat-i-Islami (until 2006). As in the previous case, Hizb-i-Islami leader Gulbadin Hekyamatar remained unsatisfied with the offer of Prime Minister.

Mahipar Agreement – 24 May 1996

Full text source: N/A[311]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The settlement tried to appease Hekyamatar by giving the Hizb-i-Islami the Ministries of Defense and Finance, in addition to Prime Minister. Still, though, all institutions were designed to expire with elections.

Government ID: Jamaat-i-Islami

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Hizb-i-Islami

Inclusive? No. The Taliban (I) was excluded (by choice).[312]

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[310] "Deadly clashes leave dozens dead in Afghanistan's north," (*Agence France Presse.* 9 October 2003).
[311] For summary, see http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=1&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia#

Conflict dates: 15 April 1978 – 5 October 2009

Conflict termination? No. Ongoing violence confirmed by Hizb-i-Islami factions (until 2009) and Jamaat-i-Islami (until 2006). As in the previous cases, Hizb-i-Islami leader Gulbadin Hekyamatar remained unsatisfied with the offer of Prime Minister.

Agreement on Provisional Arrangements[313] – 5 December 2001

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[314]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

See Annex IV for a description of the composition of the proposed Interim Administration. A Transitional Authority (i.e. Parliament) was intended to replace the Interim Administration (i.e. 24-member Cabinet), but both were designed to expire with the holding of elections after two years.

Government ID: Mujahadeen

History of defection? Yes. The Mujahadeen forces are those who fought against the Soviets and Afghan communist government, which fell in 1992, and therefore comprise the armed groups who were signatories to all preceding settlements, including Jamaat-i-Islami.

Rebel ID(s): United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan

Inclusive? No. Much of the Mujahadeen forces united as a peaceful parallel government and stopped fighting each other, but many militias continued fighting against the Taliban. By this point, the

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[312] "Bitter war, harsh peace; The Islamic Taliban militia have plunged millions of Afghans into a new chapter of brutality," (*The Ottawa Citizen,* 17 February 1996).
[313] Full title: "Agreement on the Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions"
[314] http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/pa_afghan_12052001.pdf

Taliban had control of Kabul, so whether or not this really constitutes a negotiated settlement (i.e. government-rebel dyad) is debatable.

Conflict dates: 15 April 1978 – 5 October 2009

Conflict termination? No. Attacks by Jamaat-i-Islami confirmed through 2006, and Hizb-i-Islami through 2009 or possibly later (according to UCDP/PRIO).

ANGOLA

Bicesse Accords – 1 May 1991

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[315]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

> Military power sharing: "Each of the parties shall provide the Army with a total of 20,000 men…" including 2000 officers… "The High Command is composed, during the period prior to the elections, of two general officers having equal rank, designated by each of the parties. Its decisions shall be valid only when signed by those two general officers." (Attachment IV)

Government ID: MPLA

> *History of defection?* No.

Rebel ID(s): National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

> *Inclusive?* No. Cabinda rebellions (FLEC) were not included.

Conflict dates: 11 November 1975 – 4 April 2002

> *Conflict termination?* No. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi defected back to the battlefield after first round Presidential elections indicated he would lose.

Lusaka Protocol – 31 October 1994

Full text source: University of Notre Dame MATRIX[316]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

[315] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/bicesse-accords.php
[316] https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/Lusaka_Peace_Accord.pdf

The agreement stipulated that UNITA representatives elected in 1992 should take their seats in the National Assembly; territorial decentralization of authority and the holding of local-level elections (Annex 6); restated the terms of military power sharing spelled out in the Bicesse Accords and incorporation of UNITA into the controversial "Rapid Reaction Force," which was accused of helping the MPLA to secure the 1992 election (Annex 5).

Government ID: MPLA

History of defection? Yes. The Bicesse Accord was not implemented according to the UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement dataset. There is evidence that the MPLA violated the agreement by using a special unit of the military to manipulate the 1992 election (See Annex 5, I.5).

Rebel ID(s): UNITA

Inclusive? No. Cabinda rebellions (FLEC) were not included.

Conflict dates: 11 November 1975 – 4 April 2002

Conflict termination? No.

Agreement with UNITA-Renovada Updating the Lusaka Protocol – 18 February 1999

Full text source: INCORE Transitional Justice Institute[317]

Clustered? Yes. The settlement included three agreements on "Updating the Lusaka Protocol": "Concerning the Appointment of UNITA Cadres to Government Positions," "Concerning the Reinstatement of Government Administration over the National Territory," and "Concerning a Second Round of Presidential Elections"

Power sharing? No.

[317] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/ang2.pdf; http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/ang3.pdf; http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/ang4.pdf

Annexes restate the terms of the Lusaka Protocol, but the terms of these agreements only state that elected UNITA representatives should take up their seats in the National Assembly and approve the appointment of governors in UNITA strongholds.

Government ID: MPLA

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): UNITA-Renovada

Inclusive? No. The Cabinda (FLEC) rebellions were excluded, as was Jonas Savimbi's faction of UNITA.

Conflict dates: 11 November 1975 – 4 April 2002

Conflict termination? No.

The Luena Agreement, or Memorandum of Understanding – 4 April 2002

Full text source: University of Notre Dame MATRIX[318]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement outlines the terms of military power sharing and incorporation of the UNITA officer corps into the Angolan military.

Government ID: Military of Angola

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): UNITA

Inclusive? No. The Cabinda (FLEC) rebellions were excluded.

Conflict dates: 11 November 1975 – 4 April 2002

Conflict termination? Yes.

[318] https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/The_Luena_Agreement_2002.pdf

BANGLADESH

Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord – 2 December 1997

Full text source: University of Notre Dame MATRIX[319]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

> The agreement provided for a large degree of political and economic autonomy for the Chittagong Hill Tracts region, a Cabinet position to manage the region's interests in the national-level executive, preference to "tribals" in political appointments (e.g. quotas?), resettlement packages for ex-combatants, and the establishment of various commissions for oversight and dispute resolution.

Government ID: Government of Bangladesh (Awami League)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS/SB)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 1 February 1975 – 5 November 1992

Conflict termination? Yes.[320]

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[319] https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/Chittagong_Hill_Tracts_Peace_Accord.pdf

[320] Although there appears to be a five-year lull in violence prior to the settlement, reports indicate that the Shanti Bahini militia did not lay formally down its arms until after the accord was signed ("Bangladesh peace treaty signed," *BBCNews,* 2 December 1997, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/despatches/36256.stm).

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Washington Agreement – 1 March 1994

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[321]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

> The agreement outlines a consociational-style government, with rotating executive between Bosniacs and Croats, a coalition Cabinet, a federal system with proportional representation in the combined legislature, relative political autonomy in the two ethnic-based regions, precise stipulations for majority decision-making and veto rules, and a unified military and high command.

Government ID: Bosnian Government (PM Silajdzic)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Bosnian Croats

Inclusive? No. Bosnian Serbs (Serbian Republic of B-H and Western Bosnia/Bihaca Krajina) were excluded.

Conflict dates: 1993-1994[322]

Conflict termination? Yes.

Dayton-Paris Agreement – 14 December 1995

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[323]

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[321] www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/washagree_03011994.pdf

[322] "…in 1993, after the failure of the so-called Vance-Owen peace plan, the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks began fighting over the 30 percent of Bosnia they held…In March 1994, Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia signed the Washington peace agreement, creating the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This narrowed the field of warring parties down to two." (See http://www.war-memorial.net/Bosnian-Govt-vs-Serbian-and-Croatian-Insurgents--3.206; Some corroboration with UCDP's Battle Deaths dataset and One-sided Violence dataset).

[323] http://www.usip.org/publications/peace-agreements-bosnia-herzegovina

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

> The agreement reiterates that consociational-style system outlined in the previous Washington Agreement, but it adds a third rotating Presidency position for a Serb, allocates one-third of legislative seats for the Republic Srpska, extends veto rights to the Serbian contingent, decentralizes federal powers and security autonomy to the Serbian republic (in equal weight to the Republic of B-H), and stipulates national elections for the various institutions - and levels - within 6-9 months.

Government ID: Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (PM Silajdzic)

> *History of defection?* No. UCDP and others indicate that the Washington Agreement was implemented without incident.

Rebel ID(s): Republic of Croatia,[324] Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on behalf of Bosnian Serbs (Srpska)

> *Inclusive?* Yes.

Conflict dates: 27 April 1992 – 21 November 1995

> *Conflict termination?* Yes.

[324] Since Bosnian Croats had already been incorporated into the government peacefully, the Croatian delegation could be considered as part of the government party. The identification of government and rebel parties does not change the coding decision on "inclusive" or "history of defection."

BURUNDI

Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement – 28 August 2000

Full text source: University of Notre Dame MATRIX[325]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

> The settlement was very comprehensive, but the power sharing reforms were designed as part of a transitional government of national unity, designed to expire with elections to be held within 30 months. It included stipulations for territorial decentralization, but was mostly focused on achieving ethnic balance within the local *collines* and failed to outline the precise devolution of powers to the local level (Protocol II, Articles 8.2 and 20.13). While there were promises about resettlement packages (Protocol III, Article 21.12), there were no provisions about changing the way resources are allocated throughout the polity. Articles defining the makeup of the integrated and inclusive national military and police forces failed to mention officer/high command positions (Protocol III, Articles 11-15). Finally, provisions about the presidency and government of national unity merely stipulated an ethnic balance in responsibilities during the transitional period (Protocol II, Article 15).

Government ID: Government of Burundi (Pierre Buyoya)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie (CNDD), Front pour la Democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU),[326] Front pour la Liberation Nationale (FROLINA), Parti pour la Liberation du People Hutu (PALIPEHUTU)

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[325] https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/Arusha_Peace_Accord___.pdf; http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Bur%2020000828b.pdf

[326] FRODEBU, a Hutu political party, won the 1993 election and took power from previous Tutsi President Pierre Buyoya, triggering ethnic violence. The assassination of the Hutu President led to mass genocide and, ultimately, a coup by the Tutsi-led military that reinstated Buyoya as President. FRODEBU's uncontested associated with armed militias, outside the official state military both during and after the genocide, justifies its coding as a rebel party in this case. When it holds the executive office (i.e. 2004), the group is coded as the government party to the settlement.

- *Inclusive?* No. Factions of CNDD (FDD) and Palipehutu (FNL) were excluded.[327]

Conflict dates: 27 November 1991 – 4 December 2008

- *Conflict termination?* No.

  Continued violence confirmed by Frolina through 2005.[328] Palipehutu-FNL became Pelipehutu-FNL in 1994, then splintered into Kabura and Rwasa factions in 2002, with ongoing attacks recorded through 2008.[329] CNDD also splintered after this settlement, in 2001, into new factions led by Ndayikengurukiye and Nkurunziza. CNDD-FDD violent attacks confirmed through 2005.

Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government and the CNDD-FDD[330] – 2 December 2002

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[331]

Clustered? No.[332]

Power sharing? No.

The agreement stipulated the incorporation of the CNDD-FDD into the transitional power sharing arrangement outlined in the Arusha Accord (Annex I, Article 1.1.12). Promises of resettlement packages to demobilized soldiers and integration into the army fall short of

[327] "Glossary of Burundian political parties and armed opposition groups relevant to the conflict in Burundi," (Amnesty International, International Documentation Network on the African Great Lakes Region, 22 March 2001, http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2150.pdf).
[328] Niyoyita, Aloys. "At Least 49 Killed after the Burundian Army, Former Rebels Attack Insurgents," (*Associated Press Worldstream*, 2 January 2005.)
[329] See UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset; "Three said killed in two ambush incidents in southern, northwestern Burundi," (*ABP News Agency*, 13 November 2007).
[330] Coded as a negotiated settlement because the actual provisions are much more substantive than a ceasefire.
[331] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Bur%2020031102.pdf
[332] "This Ceasefire Agreement is the final stage of the peace process, itself the culmination of the Arusha Agreement signed on 28 August 2002…" (Article I.3). In fact, the settlement was an attempt to recommit and incorporate the CNDD-FDD, a faction that had split off from the CNDD, to the Arusha Accord, which had previously failed to end conflict among the groups.

guaranteed power sharing.*Government ID:* Transitional Government of Burundi (Pierre Buyoya)

History of defection? Yes. According to Cederman, Min and Wimmer (2009), the power sharing institutions of the Arusha Agreement had not been implemented one year later.

Rebel ID(s): CNDD-FDD

Inclusive? No. Frolina and Palipehutu-FNL were excluded, even though both had continued fighting after Arusha.

Conflict dates: 16 November 1994[333] - 4 January 2004

Conflict termination? No. CNDD-FDD violent attacks confirmed through January 2004.[334]

Pretoria Protocol for Power Sharing – 8 October 2003

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[335]

Clustered? Yes, with the Global Ceasefire Agreement and the Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Issues. Unlike previous settlements, violence lulled while these negotiations were ongoing.

Power sharing? Yes.

The CNDD-FDD was given the Ministry of State, without stipulating a transitional period or elections. The agreement also guaranteed 40 percent of officer positions in the integrated military to the FDD and 35 percent in the police, as well as 40 percent of positions in the Chief of Staff/Army high command. Also promised 20 percent of all public

[333] "16 gunmen and 2 children killed in attack on Burundi army post" (*Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 16 November 1994).
[334] "Renewed Fighting Displaces Thousands in Bujumbura Rural" (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 4 January 2004).
[335] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Bur%2020021202.pdf; http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Bur%2020031102.pdf

enterprises to rebel control, and approved three provincial governorships in FDD strongholds.

Government ID: Transitional Government of Burundi

History of defection? No, Pierre Buyoya had abdicated his position in April 2003.

Rebel ID(s): CNDD-FDD

Inclusive? No. Frolina and Palipehutu-FNL were excluded.

Conflict dates: 16 November 1994[336] - 4 January 2004[337]

Conflict termination? Yes.

Accord de Partage de Pouvoir – 6 August 2004

Full text source: UN Peacemaker[338]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement lays out power-sharing reforms intended to be written into the constitution and define the political formula that will govern the country after elections are held. In particular, the National Assembly is designed to meet ethnic quotas: 60 percent Hutus and 40 percent Tutsis (Article 13-15). The executive cabinet should meet the same ethnic proportions, regardless of who is elected President, and two Vice Presidents should be appointed, one from each ethnic group (Articles 9-12). Public enterprises are allocated on the same proportions (Article 20).

Government ID: FRODEBU

[336] "16 gunmen and 2 children killed in attack on Burundi army post" (*Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 16 November 1994).
[337] "Renewed Fighting Displaces Thousands in Bujumbura Rural" (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 4 January 2004)
[338] http://peacemaker.unlb.org/doc_view.php?d=224&p=177

History of defection? No. FRODEBU complied with the Arusha Accord (2000) and is not directly associated with any violence after the mid-1990s.

Rebel ID(s): Frolina, CNDD, CNDD-FDD[339]

Inclusive? No. Palipehutu-FNL was excluded.

Conflict dates: 27 November 1991 – 2 January 2005

Conflict termination? Yes. After January 2005, ongoing violence is associated with Palipehutu-FNL, while signatory parties seem to have ceased fighting. Frolina's last attack was five months after the settlement was signed, and CNDD/CNDD-FDD had already demobilized in 2004.[340]

[339] CNDD and CNDD-FDD had largely ceased violent activities, with the last attack confirmed in January 2004, but this was recent enough that they could be considered capable of returning to violent conflict.
[340] Niyoyita, Aloys. "At Least 49 Killed after the Burundian Army, Former Rebels Attack Insurgents," (*Associated Press Worldstream*, 2 January 2005.)

CAMBODIA

Paris Peace Agreement – 23 October 1991

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[341]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement a proportional representation system of voting for the Constituent Assembly (Annex 3, Articles 1-2), all other power sharing institutions are designed to expire with the election, 9 months after voter registration is completed (Annex I). During the transition period, a Supreme National Council was intended to govern (Article 3), resolve disputes between belligerent parties(Annex I, Article A.2.a), and oversee the integration of combatants into a national army (Annex II, Article V.2).

Government ID: Government of Cambodia

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Khmer Rouge (KR), Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif (FUNPUCINPC)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 1 April 1967 – 25 December 1998

Conflict termination? No.

[341] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/cambodia/paris-agreements.php

CHAD[342]

Khartoum Agreement – 22 January 1978

Full text source: N/A[343]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement guaranteed a ceasefire, a general amnesty for rebels, incorporation into the national army, and the creation of a transitional government of national unity.

Government ID: Government of Chad (President Felix Malloum)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Forces Armées du Nord (FAN)

Inclusive? No. Forces armées populaires (FAP) and Frolinat were excluded.

Conflict dates: 28 February 1976 – 8 June 1982[344]

Conflict termination? No. FAN leader General Hissane Habre eventually succeeded in taking the capital in 1982.

Benghazi Accords – 27 March 1978

Full text source: N/A[345]

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[342] I have found reports from various sources about a number of dyadic peace agreements signed in the relevant time period. While I might have been able to confirm which armed groups were the signatory parties, it was often impossible to locate any reliable information about the content or terms. For this reason, I chose to omit these cases from the dataset. They include, but are not limited to, agreements with: the National Resistance Army (ANR, Gabon, 10 January 2003), Frolinat-FAP (14 August 1997), Armed Forces of the Federal Republic (FARF, 18 April 1997), Action for Unity and Development (AUD, 25 January 196), Lt. Moise Tchiete faction (unnamed group, 24 February 1994), Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD).

[343] Summary provided by UCDP Peace Agreement database, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=32&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

[344] "Rebels in Chad capture capital" (*The Christian Science Monitor*, 8 June 1982).

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The settlement included a ceasefire and formal recognition of Frolinat, presumably allowing the group to function as a political party.

Government ID: Malloum

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Front pour la Liberation Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT)

Inclusive? No. FAN and FAP were excluded.

Conflict dates: 22 June 1966 – 30 July 1979[346]

Conflict termination? No.

Fundamental Charter[347] – 25 August 1978

Full text source: N/A[348]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement named FAN leader General Habre as Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity, while Malloum retained the Presidency.

Government ID: Malloum

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): FAN

Inclusive? No. FAP and Frolinat were excluded.

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[345] http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/
[346] Ibid.
[347] Also known as the "Basic Charter."
[348] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=32&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

Conflict dates: 28 February 1976 – 8 June 1982[349]

Conflict termination? No. Disputes over interpretation of the agreement led to violent clashes in February 1979, leading to renewed negotiations.

Kano Accord – 15 March 1979

Full text source: N/A[350]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement provided for a ceasefire, general amnesty, the release of hostages, demilitarization of the capital, the dissolution of existing institutions and the establishment of a new government of national unity (National Transitional Union Government).

Government ID: Malloum

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): FAN, FAP, Frolinat

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 22 June 1966 - 8 June 1982

Conflict termination? No. Clashes with Frolinat occurred in June-July 1979, and FAN resigned from its position on the transitional government with the intention of continuing fighting, until negotiations were renewed.

[349] "Rebels in Chad capture capital" (*The Christian Science Monitor*, 8 June 1982).
[350] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=32&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

Lagos Accord on National Reconciliation in Chad – 21 August 1979

Full text source: N/A[351]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The new Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) was designed to have FAP leader General Oueddei as President, FAN leader General Habre as Minister of Defense, and former government Lt. Col. Kamougue as Vice President. The GUNT was established in November, but violence continued.

Government ID: Interim unity government (General Shawwa)

History of defection? No. Felix Malloum had resigned in March, and General Mohammed Shawwa formed an interim government, which was dissolved and replaced with the signing of this accord.

Rebel ID(s): FAP, FAN

Inclusive? No, there is no evidence that Frolinat was included.

Conflict dates: 22 June 1966 - 8 June 1982

Conflict termination? No. Hostilities between FAN and FAP occurred in March 1980. FAN leader General Habre fled the country and relaunched attacks on the FAP-led government in eastern Chad starting in November 1981.[352] Habre eventually succeeded in capturing the capital in June 1982.[353]

El Geneina Agreement – 31 October 1992

Full text source: N/A[354]

[351] http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/
[352] Ibid.
[353] "Rebels in Chad capture capital" (*The Christian Science Monitor*, 8 June 1982).
[354] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=32&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement provided for a general amnesty, recognition of the FNT as a political party, and the integration of FNT forces into either the military or government, but no explicit power sharing.

Government ID: Government of Chad (Deby)

History of defection? Yes. President Idriss Deby – who took power in a 1990 coup - had violated his ceasefire agreement with the previous government led by FAN's General Habre.

Rebel ID(s): Chadian National Front (FNT)

Inclusive? No. National Council for Recovery (CNR), Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD), Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD), and the Islamic Legion were excluded.

Conflict dates: 1992 - 1994

Conflict termination? No.

Tripoli I Agreement – 16 October 1993

Full text source: N/A[355]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement stipulated that CNR forces regroup and prepare for integration into the national army within two months, and it recognized the group as a legitimate political party.

Government ID: Government of Chad (Deby)

[355] Ibid.

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): National Council for Recovery (CNR)

Inclusive? No. The Chadian National Front (FNT), Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD), Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD), and the Islamic Legion were excluded.

Conflict dates: 29 June 1992[356] - 18 February 1995[357]

Conflict termination? No.

Bangui-2 Agreement – 11 August 1994

Full text source: N/A[358]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement provided for a general amnesty, the withdrawal of government troops (Republic Guard) from southern Chad, the integration of CSNPD forces into the national army, and recognition of the group as a legitimate political party.

Government ID: Government of Chad (Deby)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD)

[356] "Spokesman for Koti's group says counter-offensive is immiment" (*Radio France Internationale*, 29 June 1992).
[357] "Government, National Council for Recovery sign peace agreement in Sudan" (*Radiodiffusion Nationale Tchadienne*, 18 February 1995.)
[358] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=32&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

Inclusive? No. The National Council for Recovery (CNR), Chadian National Front (FNT), and Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD) were excluded.

Conflict dates: 20 August 1992 – 8 July 1994

Conflict termination? Yes.

Abeche Agreement – 12 October 1994

Full text source: N/A[359]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement included a ceasefire, release of prisoners, integration of FNT troops into the army, and integration of civilian FNT members into the civil service.

Government ID: Government of Chad (Deby)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Chadian National Front (FNT)

Inclusive? No. The National Council for Recovery (CNR), Chadian National Front (FNT), and Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD) were excluded.

Conflict dates: 1992 - ?

Conflict termination? No. UCDP/PRIO codes the FNT as ending in 1994, but it actually splintered into a new group called the Renewed National Front of Chad (FNTR).[360]

[359] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=32&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#
[360] The FNTR signed an agreement with the government in 1994, along with the original FNT.

Dougia Accord – 22 November 1995

Full text source: N/A

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement included a ceasefire, release of prisoners, guaranteed freedom of movement, integration of MDD troops into the army or civilian life, reinstatement of civil servants to their posts, and return of property confiscated during the conflict.

Government ID: Government of Chad (Deby)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD)

Inclusive? No. Armed Forces of the Federal Republic (FARF), Action for Unity and Development (AUD), National Council for Recovery (CNR), and Frolinat-FAP were excluded.

Conflict dates: December 1991[361] - 2002

Conflict termination? No. The MDD splintered in 2000 (MUR) and allied with the MJDT and CDR to continue attacking the government until 2002, before forming the Union Forces of Change in 2003 (inactive?).[362]

National Reconciliation Agreement – 3 October 1997

Full text source: N/A[363]

Clustered? Yes.[364]

[361] http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/
[362] http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4136
[363] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=32&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#
[364] Several dyadic peace agreements and ceasefires have been mentioned in the period between 1995 and 1997, such as with the AUD, but no precise information is available on their content. It can be

Power sharing? No.

The agreement legalized the groups and stipulated their transformation into legitimate political parties, as well as reinstating civil servants and proclaiming a general amnesty.

Government ID: Government of Chad (Deby)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Chadian National Front (FNT), the Renewed National Front of Chad (FNTR), the Movement for Social Justice and Democracy (MJSD) and the Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR)

Inclusive? No. FARF, MDD, and RAFAD (Armed Resistance against Anti-Democratic Forces) were excluded.

Conflict dates: 1991 – 2002[365]

Conflict termination? No, many groups joined forces under the banner of the *Coordination of Armed Movements and Opposition Political Parties (*CMAP) in December 1999. There are reports that the FNTR continued fighting until 2002.[366]

Donya Agreement – 7 May 1998

Full text source: N/A[367]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement contained a ceasefire, withdrawal of government forces from southern Chad (Nomadic and Republican Guards), integration into the national army and civil service, transformation

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assumed that these were either ceasefires or partial agreements meant as part of a longer, more comprehensive and inclusive peace process intended to terminate with this multi-party settlement.

[365] http://www.irinnews.org/report/50301/sudan-chad-chad-threatens-to-quit-as-darfur-mediator-as-border-tension-rises

[366] http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aadd37.html

[367] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=32&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

into a political party, and the establishment of a Truth and Justice Commission.

Government ID: Government of Chad (Deby)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Armed Forces of the Federal Republic (FARF)

Inclusive? No. The MDD, FRNT and RAFAD were excluded.

Conflict dates: 31 July 1995[368] - 8 January 2002[369]

Conflict termination? No.

Reconciliation Agreement – 7 March 1999

Full text source: N/A[370]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The settlement included a general amnesty and integration of rebels into the national army and civil administration, and it paved the way for MDD's leader to return to the country in July.

Government ID: Government of Chad (Deby)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD)

Inclusive? No, the MDJT, FARF, FRNT and RAFAD were excluded.

Conflict dates: December 1991[371] - 2002 (or later)

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[368] "FROLINAT, FARF Join Forces Against Deby." (*Libreville Africa No. 1* (in French), 31 July 1995).
[369] "Four rebels reportedly killed in 5 Jan clash on Chad/CAR border" (*Radio France Internationale*, 8 January 2002.)
[370] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=32&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#
[371] http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/

Conflict termination? No. The MDD splintered in 2000 (MUR) and allied with the MJDT and CDR to continue attacking the government until 2002, before the groups formed the Union Forces of Change in 2003.[372]

Tripoli II Agreement – 7 January 2002

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[373]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement provided for military integration, and a political-legal committee to determine whether and how MDJT could be integrated into state institutions.

Government ID: Government of Chad (Deby)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)

Inclusive? No. CDR, MUR, RAFAD, and remnants of FRNT and FARF were excluded

Conflict dates: January 1999 – 2003 or later

Conflict termination? No. The original leader of the MDJT died in September, but further attacks were recorded in October 2002 and later.[374] According to some reports, the group splintered and hardliners rejected this peace agreement and another offered in 2003, forming an alliance with ongoing CDR and MUR (ex-MDD) rebellions to form an umbrella political-military organization.[375]

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[372] http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4136
[373] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Cha%2020020107.pdf
[374] http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/
[375] "Hardline rebel faction in north rejects peace deal" (*IRINNews,* 16 December 2003, http://www.irinnews.org/report/47704/chad-hardline-rebel-faction-in-north-rejects-peace-deal); see also http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4136.

Yebibou Agreement – 18 August 2005

Full text source: N/A[376]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement allowed for retraining of demobilized soldiers and integration into the army, civil service jobs, and transformation of the group into a legitimate political party.

Government ID: Government of Chad (Deby)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)

Inclusive? No. The Single Front for Democratic Change in Chad (FUCD) was excluded, as well as ongoing – but dormant - factions from the former CDR and MDD.

Conflict dates: January 1999 – ?

Conflict termination? No. The group splintered, and hardliners rejected the agreement, forming an alliance with ongoing CDR and MUR (ex-MDD) rebellions to form an umbrella political-military organization.[377] The group is presumed responsible for ongoing attacks in 2005 and 2005 in the run-up to elections.[378]

[376] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=32&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#
[377] "Hardline rebel faction in north rejects peace deal" (*IRINNews,* 16 December 2003, http://www.irinnews.org/report/47704/chad-hardline-rebel-faction-in-north-rejects-peace-deal); see also http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4136.
[378] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13164690

COLOMBIA

Uribe Accords – 28 March 1984

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[379]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

In addition to a ceasefire, the agreement promised amnesty, political party status for FARC, agrarian reform (Article 8.b),[380] and the holding of local mayoral elections (Article 8.a)

Government ID: Colombian government ("Peace Commission"/Conservatives)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP)

Inclusive? No. The National Liberation Army (ELN), Popular Liberation Army (EPL), April 19 Movement (M-19), Pedro Leon Arboleda Movement (PLA), Death to Kidnappers (MAS), and the Communist Party of Colombia-Marxist Leninist (PCC-ML) were excluded.

Conflict dates: 31 December 1964 - present

Conflict termination? No.

Political Pact, M-19 – 2 November 1989

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[381]

Clustered? Yes, with the "Accord between the National Government, Political Parties, M-19, and the Catholic Church" (1990)

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[379] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/uribe-accords.php
[380] The mention of agrarian reform is vague, and it does not stipulate any goals or mechanisms for achieving this, so I do not code this as an economic power-sharing reform.
[381] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/keytext-accord.php

Power sharing? Yes.

The settlement guaranteed amnesty, justice system reforms, the holding of local/mayoral elections and, most importantly, electoral reforms to guarantee parliamentary representation of minority groups and parties (Article 4).

Government ID: Government of Colombia (Liberal) and Catholic Church

History of defection? No. Barco Vargas had been elected in 1986 on a platform to end violence and accommodate insurgencies, and the Catholic Church was the primary facilitator and guarantor of the agreement.

Rebel ID(s): April 19 Movement (M-19)

Inclusive? No. FARC, EPL, ELN, People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRT), Quintin Lame Armed Movement (MAQL), The Extraditables were excluded.

Conflict dates: 21 February 1978[382] - 14 November 1989[383]

Conflict termination? Yes.

Final Accord, PRT – 25 January 1991

Full text source: UN Peacemaker database[384]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement guarantees amnesty, political party recognition, a permanent position as spokesman in the Constituent Assembly to a representative of the PRT, the creation of an indigenous police force, and a number of economic reforms: government funded development

[382] "No Title" (*The Associated Press*, 21 February 1978).
[383] Coleman, Joseph, "Government offensive kills 23 rebels in Colombia" (*United Press International*, 14 November 1989).
[384] http://peacemaker.unlb.org/doc_view.php?d=907&p=177

projects in the conflict zone, the creation of a scholarship fund and assistance in securing public sector jobs for PRT members, and credit and technical assistance for industrial projects in the PRT region.

Government ID: Government of Colombia (Liberal)

History of defection? No. A new president (Ocampo) was elected in 1990, and reports indicate that the M-19 agreement was largely implemented. Dyadic settlements were signed almost simultaneously in 1991, so Ocampo did not have sufficient time to establish his reputation for compliance or defection.

Rebel ID(s): Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRT)

Inclusive? No. FARC, EPL, ELN, ERP, and MAQL were excluded.

Conflict dates: 17 February 1986[385] - 21 December 1990[386]

Conflict termination? Yes.

Final Accord, EPL – 15 February 1991

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[387]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

Unlike the settlement with the PRT, this agreement promised little more than amnesty, and the funding of retraining, health and pension services for ex-combatants.

Government ID: Government of Colombia (Liberals)

[385] "7 soldiers, 14 rebels killed in Colombian gunfight" (*United Press International*, 17 February 1986.
[386] Iacub, Pablo, "Latin America: Rebel groups survive three decades of struggle" (*IPS-Inter Press Service*, 21 December 1990.)
[387] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/col19910215.pdf

History of defection? No. Dyadic settlements were signed almost simultaneously in 1991-2, so this government did not have sufficient time to establish a reputation for compliance or defection.

Rebel ID(s): Popular Liberation Army (EPL)

Inclusive? No, FARC, ELN, ERP, and MAQL were excluded.

Conflict dates: 4 February 1978[388] - 8 July 2006[389]

Conflict termination? No. The EPL splintered, and while the primary faction demobilized, the EPL-DL continued fighting until 2006.[390]

Final Accord, Quintin Lame – 27 May 1991

Full text source: UN Peacemaker database[391]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement guaranteed amnesty, funding for ex-combatants (including education and retraining, a change of clothes, a monthly allowance for six months, and the creation of a "Sun and Earth" foundation), the establishment of reintegration and oversight commissions, and a seat on the national Security Plan Commission for the movement's leader.

Government ID: Government of Colombia (Liberals)

History of defection? No. Dyadic settlements were signed almost simultaneously in 1991-2, so this government did not have sufficient time to establish a reputation for compliance or defection.

Rebel ID(s): Quintin Lame Armed Movement (MAQL)

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[388] Chardy, Alfonso, "No Title" (*The Associated Press*, 4 February 1978).
[389] "Colombian rebel leader killed in combat" (*Associated Press Worldstream*, 8 July 2006).
[390] "Colombia EPL dissident threatens demobilised fighters with assassination" (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 10 July 1992.)
[391] http://peacemaker.unlb.org/doc_view.php?d=905&p=177

Inclusive? No, FARC, ELN, ERP, and EPL-DL were excluded.

Conflict dates: 8 April 1985[392] - 27 May 1991[393]

Conflict termination? Yes.

Final Accord, Comandos Ernesto Rojas – 1 January 1992

Full text source: UN Peacemaker database[394]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement only provided for amnesty and "reinsertion" of troops into the army.

Government ID: Government of Colombia (Liberals)

History of defection? No. Dyadic settlements were signed almost simultaneously in 1991-2, so this government did not have sufficient time to establish a reputation for compliance or defection..

Rebel ID(s): People's Liberation Army (EPL) and Comandos Ernesto Rojas

Inclusive? No, FARC, ELN and ERP were excluded.

Conflict dates: 4 February 1978[395] - 8 July 2006[396]

Conflict termination? No. The Ernesto Rojas faction of the EPL demobilized after signing this agreement, but the EPL-DL continued fighting until 2006.[397]

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[392] "Reported actiivty by Indian guerillas in Colombia" (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 8 April 1985).
[393] "Colombia Quintin Lame rebels sign peace agreement and surrender weapons" (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,* 3 June 1991).
[394] http://peacemaker.unlb.org/doc_view.php?d=909&p=177
[395] Chardy, Alfonso, "No Title" (*The Associated Press*, 4 February 1978).
[396] "Colombian rebel leader killed in combat" (*Associated Press Worldstream*, 8 July 2006).
[397] "Colombia EPL dissident threatens demobilised fighters with assassination" (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 10 July 1992.)

Final Accord, CRS – 9 April 1994

Full text source: UN Peacemaker database[398]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

> The settlement includes a comprehensive list of economic reforms: development projects in conflict zones, a land grant program, credit and financing for industrial and public works, education and retraining for integration into economic and social life for ex-combatants, extension of benefits (legal, health, education, monthly allowances, etc.) for ex-combatants. It also gave the party several parliamentary appointments and permitted for autonomy in security matters during the transition.

Government ID: Government of Colombia (Liberals)

> *History of defection?* Yes, by this time the government had begun going on the offensive against political-military groups that had demobilized after signing earlier agreements, and this agreement is an explicit attempt to protect and serve the interests of those groups. [399]

Rebel ID(s): Current of Socialist Renewal (CRS)

> *Inclusive?* No, FARC, EPL-DL, ELM and ERP were excluded.

Conflict dates: 1959 – 9 April 1994[400]

> *Conflict termination?* Yes.

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[398] http://peacemaker.unlb.org/doc_view.php?d=908&p=177
[399] "Extrajudicial Killings, 'Disappearances', Death Threats and Other Political Violence in the Department of Sucre" (Amnesty International, AMR 23/30/96, June 1996).
[400] "Extrajudicial Killings, 'Disappearances', Death Threats and Other Political Violence in the Department of Sucre" (Amnesty International, AMR 23/30/96, June 1996).

Coexistence Accord, Medellin Militias – 26 May 1994

Full text source: Acuerdos de Paz (Red de Solidaridad Social/Programa para la Reinsercion, 1995).

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement re-commits the government to hold local/mayoral elections in the region, provide education and retraining to demobilized ex-combatants, pass a general amnesty law and allow the demobilized groups to function as political parties. There is mention of creating a "special electoral district for the political movements that emerged from demobilized rebel groups," but the agreement leaves this decision to the Constitutional Court.

Government ID: Government of Colombia (Liberals)

History of defection? Yes, by this time the government had begun going on the offensive against political-military groups that had demobilized after signing earlier agreements, and this agreement is an explicit attempt to protect and serve the interests of those groups. [401]

Rebel ID(s): "Medellin militias"

Inclusive? No. It is unclear which exact armed groups' interests were represented during these negotiations.

Conflict dates: 31 December 1964 - present

Conflict termination? No.

Final Accord, Frente Garnica – 20 June 1994

Full text source: Acuerdos de Paz (Red de Solidaridad Social/Programa para la Reinsercion, 1995).

[401] "Extrajudicial Killings, 'Disappearances', Death Threats and Other Political Violence in the Department of Sucre" (Amnesty International, AMR 23/30/96, June 1996).

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

Again, the agreement leaves the decision of whether to create a special electoral district for Medellin and the demobilized political movements to the Constitutional Court (Chapter IV). Other provisions on benefits to ex-combatants are one-off service provisions (loans, housing, etc.) that do not qualify as economic power sharing (Articles 1 and 2).

Government ID: Government of Colombia (Liberals)

History of defection? Yes, by this time the government is accused of human rights abuses against political-military groups that had demobilized after signing earlier agreements. [402]

Rebel ID(s): Frente Garnica (EPL-DL)

Inclusive? No, FARC, ELN, ERP, and Jaime Bateman Cayon Group (JBC) were excluded.

Conflict dates: 4 February 1978[403] - 8 July 2006[404]

Conflict termination? No.

Final Accord, MIR-COAR – 29 July 1998

Full text source: UN Peacemaker database[405]

Clustered? No. Violence in Medellin had continued unabated after the 1994 settlement, so these are coded separately.

Power sharing? Yes.

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[402] "Extrajudicial Killings, 'Disappearances', Death Threats and Other Political Violence in the Department of Sucre" (Amnesty International, AMR 23/30/96, June 1996).
[403] Chardy, Alfonso, "No Title" (*The Associated Press*, 4 February 1978).
[404] "Colombian rebel leader killed in combat" (*Associated Press Worldstream*, 8 July 2006).
[405] http://peacemaker.unlb.org/doc_view.php?d=910&p=177

See Chapter 5 for a description of the proposed economic power-sharing reforms. The agreement also stipulated the incorporation of MIR-COAR representatives into local institutions, the provision of legal and technical resources, education and retraining programming, an inclusive monitoring committee, amnesty and political party status.

Government ID: Government of Colombia (Conservatives)

History of defection? No, a new government had been elected and renewed negotiations.

Rebel ID(s): MIR-COAR (Independent Revolutionary Armed Commandos)

Inclusive? No. FARC, EPL-DL, ELN, ERP, JBC, Guevarista Revolutionary Army (ERG), Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU), and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) were excluded.

Conflict dates: ? – 29 July 1998

Conflict termination? Yes.[406]

San Francisco Agreement – 9 February 2001

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[407]

Clustered? Yes, with "Los Pozos Accord"

Power sharing? No.

The agreement was largely a repeat of the Uribe Accords (1984), recommitting parties to holding local/mayoral elections and to respecting the democratic outcome.

Government ID: Government of Colombia

History of defection? Yes. Leadership on all sides of the political spectrum have now proven incapable of implementing reforms

[406] "MIR-COAR CELEBRA 5 AÑOS DE PAZ" (*El Tiempo*, 29 July 2003).
[407] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/col20010209.pdf; http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Col%2020011005sp.pdf

promised in peace agreements, while the state security sector is accused of corruption and human rights violations in conflict zones.

Rebel ID(s): FARC

Inclusive? No. EPL-DL, ERP, ELN, ERG, AUC, ACCU and JBC were excluded

Conflict dates: 31 December 1964 - present

Conflict termination? No.

Sante Fe de Ralito Accord – 15 July 2003

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[408]

Clustered? Yes. Separate documents were signed with each rebel party, the first on 20 January 2002, but the terms are identical.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement commits the rebel parties to end narco-trafficking, lays out a detailed timeline for demobilization and disarmament, and sets up a National Table of Dialogue and Negotiation to resolve disputes.

Government ID: Government of Colombia

History of defection? Yes

Rebel ID(s): FARC and AUC

Inclusive? No. EPL-DL, ERP, ELN, and ACCU were excluded.

Conflict dates: 31 December 1964 - present

Conflict termination? No. FARC is still active (2015), and the AUC has attacks recorded through 2005.[409]

[408] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/santafederalito-accord.php

COMOROS

Agreement on the Transitional Arrangements in Comoros – 20 December 2003

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[410]

Clustered? Yes, with the Famboni (2000) Declaration and the Famoni II (2001) Agreement.[411]

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement established a devolution of autonomous governing powers to the islands of Comoros and a direct transfer of funds from the Central Bank to the islands. It also provides for an inclusive oversight/monitoring committee and electoral commission, a fresh constitution, a transitional government of national unity, and elections for the national-level Parliament.

Government ID: Government of Comoros

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): MPA/Republic of Anjouan

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 3 September 1997 – 20 December 2003

Conflict termination? Yes.

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[409] "Investigators in Colombia seek answers to killings involving militia group" (*AP Worldstream*, 14 December 2005).
[410] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Com%2020031220.pdf
[411] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/com20000826.pdf; http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/com20010217.pdf

COTE D'IVOIRE

Linas-Marcoussis Accord – 23 January 2003

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[412]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement intended to set up an emergency Government of National Reconciliation with representatives from each of the armed and unarmed opposition parties, with a tenure that would expire with the next presidential election (see Article 3). There is also a vague mention of restructuring the security forces, but not enough to qualify as military power sharing. The primary focus was on the electoral timetable, the creation of an independent electoral commission, and to revisit citizenship laws that affect who can run for office.

Government ID: Ivorian government (FPI)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (MPCI), Ivorian Movement for the Greater West (MPIGO), Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 19 September 2002 – 4 March 2007[413]

Conflict termination? No. The three groups formed an alliance under the umbrella organization Forces Nouvelles (FN), which remained militarily active until leader Guillaume Soro took up his position as Prime Minister. However, the same general grouping can also be associated with the violence that broke out again after the 2011 elections.

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412 http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/cote_divoire_01242003en.pdf

413 See "Final Report of the Group of Experts on Cote d'Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008) concerning Cote d'Ivoire" (United Nations S/2009/521, 9 October 2009).

Accra II Agreement – 8 March 2003

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[414]

Clustered? No, rebel parties formed the umbrella FN group after the failure of the first peace process.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement was an attempt to recommit the armed parties to join the coalition government, now called the National Security Council (Article 7), and it ensured that current FPI President Laurent Gbagbo retained the Head of State position (Article 5). It gave the MPCI two (menial) ministries - communication and territorial administration – but the coalition was designed to expire with fresh presidential elections.

Government ID: Ivorian government (FPI)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (MPCI), Ivorian Movement for the Greater West (MPIGO), Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 19 September 2002 – 4 March 2007[415]

Conflict termination? No. The three groups formed an alliance under the umbrella organization Forces Nouvelles (FN), which remained militarily active until leader Guillaume Soro took up his position as Prime Minister. However, the same general grouping can also be associated with the violence that broke out again after the 2011 elections.

[414] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Com%2020031220.pdf
[415] See "Final Report of the Group of Experts on Cote d'Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008) concerning Cote d'Ivoire" (United Nations S/2009/521, 9 October 2009).

Accra III Agreement – 30 July 2004

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[416]

Clustered? No, the multiple agreements are repeated attempts to convince rebels to take up their positions in the coalition government after they have dropped out, blaming President Gbagbo's failure to implement key provisions and continued harassment of northerners.

Power sharing? No.

This is another attempt to convince FN leaders to return to their positions in the transitional coalition government, especially Soro (Article 11). It also vaguely mentions a restructuring of the state security forces (Article 9) and sets a date for presidential elections: October 2005.

Government ID: Ivorian government (FPI)

History of defection? Yes (see above).

Rebel ID(s): Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (MPCI), Ivorian Movement for the Greater West (MPIGO), Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 19 September 2002 – 4 March 2007[417]

Conflict termination? No. The three groups formed an alliance under the umbrella organization Forces Nouvelles (FN), which remained militarily active until leader Guillaume Soro took up his position as Prime Minister. However, the same general grouping can also be associated with the violence that broke out again after the 2011 elections.

[416] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Ivo%2020040730.pdf
[417] See "Final Report of the Group of Experts on Cote d'Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008) concerning Cote d'Ivoire" (United Nations S/2009/521, 9 October 2009).

Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Cote d'Ivoire – 6 April 2005

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[418]

Clustered? Yes, with the Famboni I (2000) Declaration and the Famoni II (2001) Agreement.[419]

Power sharing? No.

Commits the FN to return to the coalition government, and requires President Gbagbo to confirm Soro as Prime Minister, which remain transitional measures prior to fresh elections scheduled for October 2005 (Articles 7-8). Also repeats the need to restructure the national military and police to include rebel forces (Article 5) and to set up an independent electoral commission (9).

Government ID: Ivorian government (FPI)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Forces Nouvelles (FN)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 19 September 2002 – 4 March 2007[420] or later

Conflict termination? No. Forces Nouvelles (FN) remained militarily active until leader Guillaume Soro took up his position as Prime Minister in 2007. However, the same general grouping can also be associated with the violence that broke out again after the 2011 elections.

[418] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Com%2020031220.pdf
[419] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/com20000826.pdf; http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/com20010217.pdf
[420] See "Final Report of the Group of Experts on Cote d'Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008) concerning Cote d'Ivoire" (United Nations S/2009/521, 9 October 2009).

CROATIA

Erdut Agreement – 12 November 1995

Full text source: University of Notre Dame MATRIX[421]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

> The parties agreed to hold elections at all levels, and in particular, the Serbian community was granted the right to appoint its own council to govern the municipalities where it holds a majority.

Government ID: N/A[422]

> *History of defection?* No.

Rebel ID(s): Serbs and Croats

> *Inclusive?* Yes.

Conflict dates: 29 April 1992 – 12 November 1995

> *Conflict termination?* Yes.

[421] https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/S.1995.951_Erdut_agreement_.pdf
[422] The settlement signatories are representatives for the Serb and Croat communities. The Croat delegation could be considered to represent the government side to negotiations.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement – 10 July 1999

Full text source: University of Notre Dame MATRIX[423]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

Beyond a ceasefire, the settlement included amnesty, a UN-OAU peacekeeping force, an open national dialogue, democratic elections (Chapter 5), and the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (Article III.11.b and Chapter 7).

Government ID: DRC Government (Laurent Kabila)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC)

Inclusive? No. The Congolese Democratic Rally (RCD) rejected the agreement before it was signed. Soon after, it splintered into three factions.

Conflict dates: 7 November 1998[424] - 7 March 2003[425]

Conflict termination? No.

Sun City Agreement – 16 April 2002

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[426]

Clustered? No, this was a fresh attempt to include RCD factions in the peace process.

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[423] https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/S.1995.951_Erdut_agreement_.pdf
[424] "DRC rebels claim major victory against Chadians" (*Agence France Presse*, 7 November 1998).
[425] "Calm returns to southern CAR after MLC, army standoff" (*Xinhua General News Service*, 7 March 2003).
[426] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/drc20020416.pdf

Power sharing? No.

The agreement laid out plans for a government of national unity with Kabila retaining the presidency, the MLC given the position of prime minister, and the RCD granted leadership of the National Assembly (Clause 1). In addition to an inclusive National Assembly (Clause 11-12), various ministries were allocated among the different rebel parties, and all belligerent parties are included in the Ministry of Defense, although these institutions are designed as transitional measures (Clauses 9 and 16). Clause 13 stipulates the integration of the armed forces, but it does not guarantee that rebel officers will retain their ranks.

Government ID: DRC government (Joseph Kabila)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): MLC, RCD-N, RCD-ML and Mai-Mai militias

Inclusive? No, the RCD-Congo faction was not included.

Conflict dates: 1 November 1998[427] - 7 March 2003

Conflict termination? No. The MLC continued fighting until 2003[428] and RCD-ML and RCD-N until November 2002.[429] The RCD also splintered further in late 2002 when the RCD-Goma emerged.

Global and All-Inclusive Agreement – 16 December 2002

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[430]

Clustered? No, both the MLC and RCD factions had continued fighting after the prior settlement, so this is considered a distinct peace process, especially since it includes different terms.

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[427] "Kabila under military pressure, hits out at SA" (*Southscan*, 1 November 1998).
[428] "Calm returns to southern CAR after MLC, army standoff" (*Xinhua General News Service*, 7 March 2003).
[429] "Two DR Congo rebel groups agree to end hostilities" (*Agence France Presse*, 16 November 2002).
[430] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/DRC%2020021216.pdf

Power sharing? Yes.

The coalition government of national unity – including the famous 1+4 formula for the Presidency – remain transitional, and fresh elections are meant to be held within two years. Unlike the preceding agreement, however, this settlement includes provision for decentralization of power, proportional representation voting rules for the National Assembly and Senate and the appointment of former rebel officers in a restructured national army and police force. It also provides for an independent electoral commission and inclusive commissions to resolve disputes and monitor implementation.

Government ID: DRC government (Joseph Kabila)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): MLC, RCD-N, RCD-ML and Mai-Mai militias

Inclusive? No, the RCD-Goma and RCD-Congo factions were excluded.

Conflict dates: 1 November 1998 - 7 March 2003

Conflict termination? Yes.[431]

Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations, The Final Act – 2 April 2003

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[432]

Clustered? No, this was an attempt to commit RCD-Goma to the bargain previously reached by other parties.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement was largely a revision of certain parts of the Global Agreement (2002) in order to bring the RCD-Goma into the transitional coalition government – for example, by reallocating

[431] Mai Mai militias are still associated with violence through present day, but these are largely uncoordinated groups and it is difficult to find reliable information and to determine which groups signed on to the settlement, which remained committed and demobilized (if any), and which defected.
[432] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/DRC%2020030402.pdf

ministries and redistributing the number of seats each group would receive in the transitional National Assembly.

Government ID: DRC Government (Kabila)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): MLC, RCD-N, RCD-ML, RCD-Goma and Mai-Mai militias (FAP)

Inclusive? No, the RCD-Congo faction was not included.

Conflict dates: 1 November 1998 – 9 January 2009[433]

Conflict termination? No, RCD-Goma became the CNDP. Mai-Mai attacks are also confirmed through at least 2013.[434]

[433] "DR Congo rebels clash with pro-government militia: UN" (*Agence France Presse*, 9 January 2009).
[434] "Five killed in DRCongo militia attack" (*Agence France Presse*, 1 May 2010).

DJIBOUTI

Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation – 16 December 1994

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[435]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

According to the terms, "[t]he Government engages to guarantee the FRUD combatants jobs and integration within the political, military, administrative, social and economic fields…" (Article IV). However, the provisions are too vague to qualify as power sharing, since they fail to outline specific quotas or to guarantee specific powerful positions to rebel leaders. Other provisions include holding fresh elections (see Section IV), amnesty and political party status for FRUD, and compensating families directly impacted by the conflict (Article III.c).

Government ID: Djibouti government (RPP)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): FRUD (Front pour la restauration de l'unité et de la démocratie)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 12 November 1991 – 30 November 1999[436]

Conflict termination? No. FRUD splintered, and a faction led by Ahmid Dini reached another settlement with the government in 1999.[437]

General Agreement on Reform and Civil Concord – 7 February 2000

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[438]

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[435] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/dji19941226.pdf
[436] "Five soldiers, 15 rebels killed in Djibouti clash" (*Agence France Presse*, 30 November 1999).
[437] "Four die in military helicopter crash in Tadjoura; FRUD claims responsibility" (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 21 March 1995).

Clustered? Yes, there were two agreements signed on 2 February 2000 and 12 May 2001.

Power sharing? Yes.

The settlement outlines decentralization reforms to increase regional autonomy (Clause 2) and guarantees that integrated rebels will retain their ranks (5). Other provisions include holding elections at national and local levels, establishing an independent electoral commission, compensating people impacted by the conflict, and reinstatement of rebels into civil and political positions held before the rebellion.

Government ID: Djibouti government (RPP)

History of defection? No. Reports indicate that the 1994 settlement was implemented.

Rebel ID(s): FRUD – Ahmed Dini faction (FRUD-AD)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 12 November 1991 – 30 November 1999[439]

Conflict termination? Yes.

[438] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/dji20000207.pdf; http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Dji%2020010512fr.pdf
[439] "Five soldiers, 15 rebels killed in Djibouti clash" (*Agence France Presse*, 30 November 1999).

EL SALVADOR

Chapultepec Peace Accords – 16 January 1992

Full text source: University of Notre Dame MATRIX[440]

Clustered? Yes. This accord marks the final stage in a peace process that began with the Geneva Agreement (2000) and resulted in multiple settlements signed about various issues, all of which are combined into a single case.[441]

Power sharing? Yes.

The settlement outlined a detailed plan for land tenure reform, one of the primary grievances underlying the conflict, which focuses on land ownership and issues related to sale/transfer, etc (See Chapter V). Since this reforms the way vital resources are allocated, I code this as economic power sharing, rather than territorial. Other provisions relate to creating an independent electoral commission, holding elections, recognizing the FMLN as a political party and facilitating the transformation, passing an amnesty law, "purifying" the national police force, and setting up a Truth Commission to investigate war crimes.

Government ID: Salvadoran government

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional)

Inclusive? Yes. The FMLN had incorporated other major guerilla groups into a single umbrella organization during the 1980s. It included the BPR/FPL, PCS/FAL, PRS/ERP, RN/FARN, PRTC/ERTC, as well as a number of militant youth and student movements.

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[440]https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/Chapultepec_Peace_Agreement_16_January_1992.pdf

[441] http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/pa_es_04041990_geneva.pdf; http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/ElS%2019900521.pdf; http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/ElS%2019900726.pdf; http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/ElS%2019910427.pdf; http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/ElS%2019910925b.pdf

Conflict dates: 14 September 1979 – 31 December 1991

Conflict termination? Yes.

ETHIOPIA

Transition Charter – 22 July 1991

Full text source: Published in Negarit Gazetta and by Berhanena Selam Printing Press (22 July 1991)[442]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

Inclusive power-sharing institutions – the Council of Representatives and Council of Ministers (Article 6)– were transitional measures designed to expire with elections, to be held by January 1994. On the other hand, the agreement provided for a large degree of federal-style autonomy in regions defined by ethnic divisions/nationality, even permitting independence through referendum (See Articles 2.b and 13).

Government ID: The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) - which had previously merged with the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM) and Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO)- overthrew the previous Derg regime in 1987

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)

Inclusive? No. Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP)*, Afar Liberation Front I (ALF I), Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), and Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) were not included.[443]

Conflict dates: 2 June 1976 – 2010 or later[444]

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[442]; Published in Negarit Gazetta and by Berhanena Selam Printing Press, 22 July 1991 (http://www.ldphs.org.za/resources/local-government-database/by-country/ethiopia/peace-agreements/The%20Transitional%20Period%20Charter%20of%20Ethiopia.PDF); See also Kumar (1998, Table 1.1) for a list of post-conflict elections and relevant peace accords.

[443] For simplicity, and since the contested region was granted full secession as part of the transition, I have excluded Eritrean rebel movements.

GEORGIA

Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement – 12 November 1995

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[445]

Clustered? Yes, with the "Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees" (4 April 1994), the "Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces" (14 May 1994), the "Proposal for the establishment of a Coordinating Commission" (11 May 94), and the "Sochi Agreement" (1993)

Power sharing? Yes.

The settlement granted autonomy to the region of Abkhazia (Article 6). It also established inclusive commissions for monitoring, resolving disputes and ongoing negotiations.

Government ID: Georgian government

History of defection? No, the government respected the previous ceasefire signed in 1993.

Rebel ID(s): Republic of Abkhazia

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 22 December 1991 – 31 December 1993

Conflict termination? Yes.

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[444] "Ethiopia's Ogaden rebels claim seizing oilfield" (*BBC Monitoring Africa*, 30 May 2010); "Ethiopia's Oromo rebels claim victory over government forces" (*BBC Monitoring Africa*, 17 January 2010).
[445] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext1.php; http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/key-texts.php

GUATEMALA

Queretaro Agreement – 25 July 1991

Full text source: UCPD Peace Agreement database[446]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

This agreement has little substance, mostly just vague references to agreeing to respect human rights, rule of law, and natural resources and to enhance participatory democracy.

Government ID: Guatemalan government

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Unidad Revolutionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)

Inclusive? Yes. The URNG is an umbrella organization that includes the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the National Directing Nucleus of PGT (PGT-NDN).

Conflict dates: 1 July 1963 – 31 December 1995

Conflict termination? No.

Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace – 29 December 1996

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace and ACCORD Conciliation Resources[447]

Clustered? Yes, there are a number of supplemental texts to the final agreement, including annexes about legal integration and the electoral regime, etc.

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[446] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Gua%2019910725.pdf
[447] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/firm-lasting-peace.php; http://www.usip.org/resources/peace-agreements-guatemala; http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/key-texts.php

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement includes provisions about decentralizing public services and administrations for indigenous peoples "along linguistic lines and in accordance with customary norms." Other provisions address electoral reform and an independent electoral commission, assistance for reintegration of ex-combatants, an inclusive oversight committee, reorganization of the national police force, a general amnesty, and technical and legal assistance in the transformation of URNG into a political party.

Government ID: Guatemalan government

History of defection? No. Jorge Antonio Serrano Elias, democratically elected President in 1991, fled the country in 1993 after popular protests about the "disappearance" and murder of a popular guerrila leader (Comandante Everardo), the revelation of CIA funding of the Guatemalan military, and illegally dissolving Congress and the Supreme Court. He was replaced in the interim by a non-partisan, Human Rights Ombudsman (Ramiro de Leon Carpio), and new national elections in 1995 resulted in the election of Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen and the conclusion of multiple rounds of peace negotiations with the UNRG.

Rebel ID(s): URNG

Inclusive? Yes. Yes. The URNG is an umbrella organization that includes the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the National Directing Nucleus of PGT (PGT-NDN).

Conflict dates: 1 July 1963 – 31 December 1995

Conflict termination? Yes.

GUINEA-BISSAU

Abuja Peace Agreement – 1 November 1998

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[448]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The settlement provides for a transitional government of national unity inclusive of the military junta until elections could be held, which were scheduled for March 1999 but postponed until December.

Government ID: Government of Guinea-Bissau (President Vieira)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 7 June 1998 – 10 May 1999

Conflict termination? No, the conflict end date just misses the 6-month window required for the cessation of violence.

[448] http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/gb_11011998.pdf

HAITI

Governor's Island Agreement – 3 July 1993

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[449]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement essentially committed Cedras to step aside and allow Aristide to return from exile in order to re-establish a functioning civilian government, and it guaranteed amnesty to Cedras's forces.

Government ID: President Aristide

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Raoul Cedras)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 3 April 1989 – 2 October 1991

Conflict termination? Yes, violence had already ceased for almost two years.

[449] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Hai%2019930703.pdf

INDIA

Bodo Accord – 20 February 1993

Full text source: Phukan, G. 1993. *The Bodoland Autonomous Council Act, 1993: with Bodo Accord*. Guwahati, India: Assam Law House.

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement stipulates autonomy for ethnic Bodos, particularly economic and administrative (Articles 2-4) autonomy, as well as in security/police matters (Article 16).

Government ID: Government of Assam

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Bodo People's Action Committee (BPAC)

Inclusive? Yes, BPAC represents the All Bodo Student's Union (ABSU), the only armed group active at the time.[450]

Conflict dates: 18 February 1989 – 20 February 1993[451]

Conflict termination? Yes, although two other armed groups arose in Assam/Bodoland later in 1993 in opposition to the settlement.

Tripura Memorandum of Settlement – 23 August 1993

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[452]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

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[450] I code this as inclusive since the government-rebel dyad is localized, although a large number of armed groups were active in other parts of the country.
[451] "Bodoland Agreement for Autonomous Council Signed" (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 22 February 1993.)
[452] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/IND%2019930823.pdf

The agreement makes reference to the Autonomous District Council, but this is an institution that already exists. Other provisions promise amnesty and one-off benefits like jobs, stipends, and housing for ex-combatants (Article 2).

Government ID: Government of Tripura

History of defection? Yes, there is evidence that a previous agreement had been signed in 1988, but no information is available on the content.

Rebel ID(s): Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF)

Inclusive? No. Other active groups in the region include the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), Youth Tribal Force of Tripura (YTFT), and Tripura Liberation Organization Front (TLOF).[453]

Conflict dates: 1992[454] - 22 October 2008[455]

Conflict termination? No

Bodoland Territorial Council Accord – 10 February 2003

Full text source: Centre for Peace and Development Studies, India[456]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The settlement grants a large degree of autonomy to Bodos in Assam: "The objectives of the agreement are: to create an Autonomous self governing body to be known as Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) within the State of Assam and to provide constitutional protection under Sixth Schedule to the said Autonomous Body; to fulfil economic, educational and linguistic aspirations and the preservation of land-

[453] A large number of armed groups were active in other parts of the country, but I only include Tripura-based groups here since the government-rebel dyad is localized.
[454] "Tea Executive Kidnapped in Northeastern India" (*Associated Press*, 16 March 1994.)
[455] "Tribal Youth Kidnapped in Tripura" (*UNI (United News of India),* 22 October 2008.)
[456] http://cdpsindia.org/btc_accord.asp

rights, socio-cultural and ethnic identity of the Bodos; and speed up the infrastructure development in BTC area" (Article 2). There are also provisions relating to autonomous security provision and police force (Articles 5-6), allocation of development benefits (5.8), and definition of various tribal rights.

Government ID: Government of Assam

History of defection? No. According to UCDP/PRIO, the 1993 settlement was implemented.

Rebel ID(s): Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)

Inclusive? No, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)

Conflict dates: 29 October 1996[457] - 28 January 2003[458]

Conflict termination? Yes.

[457] "Five Bodo militants killed in Assam" (*BBC Summary*, 29 October 1996.)
[458] "Indian Tribal Militants Shoot Dead Five in Family" (*Agence France Presse*, 28 January 2003).

INDONESIA

Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement – 9 December 2002

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[459]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement focused on holding local-level democratic elections in the Aceh region within two years (Preamble), and it established councils for oversight and dispute resolution (Articles 3 and 8).

Government ID: Government of Indonesia (Megawati)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Free Aceh Movement (GAM)

Inclusive? No, South Maluku Republic (RMS), Organization for a Free Papua (OPM), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Laskar Jihad, and Front for Defenders of Islam (FPI) were not included.

Conflict dates: 31 May 1989 – 15 October 2005[460]

Conflict termination? No.

Memorandum of Understanding – 25 July 1991

Full text source:

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

Unlike the previous agreement, this one makes explicit reference to autonomy and the devolution of economic/financial and

[459] http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/aceh_12092002.pdf
[460] "Aceh separatists shot by Indonesian soldiers as disarming begins" (*BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political*, 15 October 2005).

political/administrative powers to the Aceh region (Article 1), in addition to holding local elections by April 2006 and – significantly – to reallocating farmland (3) and natural resource rents (1).

Government ID: Government of Indonesia (Yudhoyono)

History of defection? No, Yudhoyono defeated incumbent Megawati in what was considered a significant change of guard.

Rebel ID(s): Free Aceh Movement (GAM)

Inclusive? No, Mujahideen KOMPAK, Front for Defenders of Islam (FPI), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), South Maluku Republic (RMS), and Organization for a Free Papua (OPM) were not included.

Conflict dates: 31 May 1989 – 15 October 2005[461]

Conflict termination? Yes.

[461] Ibid.

ISRAEL

Declaration on Principle of Interim Self-Governance – 13 September 1993

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[462]

Clustered? Yes, with the Oslo Accords (August 1993).

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement stipulated a large degree of autonomy for the Palestinian territories in legislation, public services, taxation and financial/economic affairs (Articles IV, VI and IX). It also addressed the need to reallocate water resources equitably (Annex III), to invest in development in the territories (Annex IV), and for a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops and establishment of autonomous security/police forces (Article IV and Annex II).

Government ID: Israeli government

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

Inclusive? No, the process did not include Hamas, Fatah, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Although all of these groups are eventually identified as members of the PLO, the agreement was negotiated without the knowledge or consent of other factions at the time. [More research needed].

Conflict dates: January 1965 - 1988

Conflict termination? Yes, the PLO had been recognized as the legitimate Palestinian Authority and ceased to be coded as an insurgency from 1988, although there is need for further research into direct alliances and overlap among the various armed groups.

[462] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Isr%2019930913.pdf

Gaza-Jericho Agreement – 4 May 1994

Full text source: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs[463]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

Citing the lack of progress on the previous agreement, this settlement reaffirms autonomy for - and transfer of authority to - the Palestinian territories, the withdrawal of Israeli forces and deployment of Palestinian police, jurisdiction over land and water rights, and the creation of a liaison committee.

Government ID: Israeli government

History of defection? Yes, the agreement was signed in light of the failure of Israel to fulfill its obligations and of the PLO to control its member factions.

Rebel ID(s): Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: January 1965 - 1988

Conflict termination? Yes, the PLO is not directly associated with violence until the start of the second intifada in 2000.

Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities – 29 August 1994

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[464]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

[463]http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Agreement%20on%20Gaza%20Strip%20and%20Jericho%20Area
[464] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Isr%2019940829.pdf

Citing the lack of progress on previous agreements, this settlement recommits Israel to withdraw from the territories and to transfer powers of administration, legislation, law enforcement, seized property, and tax revenue to the Palestinian Authority.

Government ID: Israeli government

History of defection? Yes, the agreement was signed in light of the failure of Israel to fulfill its obligations and of the PLO to control its member factions.

Rebel ID(s): Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

Inclusive? No, the peace processes do not have the support of all Palestinian armed movements.

Conflict dates: January 1965 - 1988

Conflict termination? Yes, the PLO is not directly associated with violence until the start of the Second Intifada in 2000.

Interim Agreement on West Bank and Gaza Strip – 28 September 1995

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[465]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

Citing the lack of progress on the previous agreement, this agreement represents a fresh attempt to finalize the transfer of power, and it "supercedes all previous agreements." It reaffirms the transfer of executive and legislative powers to the Palestinian territories, the holding of elections, autonomy in security, law enforcement, and courts.

Government ID: Israeli government

[465] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Isr%2019950928.pdf

History of defection? Yes, the agreement was signed in light of the failure of Israel to fulfill its obligations and of the PLO to control its member factions.

Rebel ID(s): Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

Inclusive? No.

Conflict dates: January 1965 - 1988

Conflict termination? Yes, the PLO is not directly associated with violence until the start of the second intifada in 2000.

Hebron Agreement – 15 January 1997

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[466]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

This agreement attempted to address the security situation in the contested city of Hebron by setting up a joint coordination committee and inviting the Palestinian police force to help establish order.

Government ID: Israeli government

History of defection? Yes, the agreement was signed in light of the failure of Israel to fulfill its obligations and of the PLO to control its member factions.

Rebel ID(s): Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

Inclusive? No.

Conflict dates: January 1965 - 1988

[466] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Isr%2019970115.pdf

Conflict termination? No, the PLO and its member organizations are associated with the launch of the Second Intifada in 2000.

Wye River Memorandum – 23 October 1998

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[467]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement required Palestine to provide lists of its police force members, invited the U.S. to join the monitoring committee, and reaffirmed the establishment of a number of joint commissions. It again postponed negotiations on the issue of permanent status.

Government ID: Israeli government

History of defection? Yes, the agreement was signed in light of the failure of Israel to fulfill its obligations to transfer authority and withdraw troops.

Rebel ID(s): Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

Inclusive? No.

Conflict dates: January 1965 – 1988, 2000 - ?

Conflict termination? No, the PLO and Arafat are associated with the violence that launched the Second Intifada in 2000.

Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum[468] – 4 September 1999

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[469]

Clustered? No.

[467] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Isr%2019981023.pdf
[468] Also known as "Wye II."
[469] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Isr%2019990904.pdf.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement acknowledged the current boundaries of the Palestinian territories, prevented further deployment of Israeli troops, and stated that all joint committees should resume their functions.

Government ID: Israeli government

History of defection? Yes, the agreement was signed in light of the failure of Israel to fulfill its obligations to transfer power and stop further settlement in the Palestinian territories.

Rebel ID(s): Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

Inclusive? No.

Conflict dates: January 1965 – 1988, 2000 - ?

Conflict termination? No, the breakdown of the Sharm el-Sheik peace process is associated with the start of the Second Intifada.

LEBANON

Tripartite Accord – 28 December 1985

Full text source: Organization of Lebanese Forces[470]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement stipulates a transitional power sharing government with a Ministerial Council and Chamber of Deputies, in which seats are to be allocated equally among Christians and Muslims (Article III.III and III.V. The transitional period is designed to end with fresh parliamentary elections as soon as order is restored to the country (Article II). It also makes reference to administrative decentralization of powers, but this is left to be hashed out in a constitution drafted by the transitional government (Article III.V).

Government ID: N/A[471]

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Lebanese Forces/Christian militias, Amal Movement / National Union Front (NUF), and Druze Progressive Socialist Party (LNM/LNRF)

Inclusive? No. The Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF/Jammoul), Abu Nidal Organization (ANO or Fatah Revolutionary Council), Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (FARL), Phalangist Party, Black Brigades of Lebanon (BBL), and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) were excluded.

Conflict dates: 1976[472] - 1990

Conflict termination? No.

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[470] http://www.lebanese-forces.org/lebanon/agreements/may17.htm
[471] Legitimate, functioning government in Lebanon was essentially non-existent in this time period. This settlement represents an attempt by the major warring parties to reestablish it.
[472] Markham, James, "No Title" (*The New York Times*, 20 March 1976).

Taif Accord – 4 November 1989

Full text source: UN Peacemaker database[473]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement explicitly devolved powers of governance, administration and service provision to the provincial level (Article III.A.2-4) and made the governorate the primary electoral district (II.4). It also specified a "national accord cabinet" be established *after* presidential elections (III) and the passage of a parliamentary electoral law that requires equal distribution of seats to Christians and Muslims (II.A.D and III.D). Other provisions specify equal distribution of "top-level jobs and equivalent" (II.G.a).

Government ID: N/A

History of defection? Yes, all three rebel parties had defected from their prior agreement to build a government of national unity.

Rebel ID(s): Lebanese Forces/Christian militias, Amal Movement / National Union Front (NUF), and Druze Progressive Socialist Party (LNM/LNRF)

Inclusive? No. SSNP, Phalangist Party, Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF), Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (IFLP), and Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) were excluded. However, it is possible that there were more signatory parties to this agreement than the previous one. More research is need in order to determine who was included.

Conflict dates: 1976 - 1990

Conflict termination? Yes, although there is evidence that the Lebanese Forces reemerged much later, with attacks recorded in 2008.[474]

[473] http://peacemaker.unlb.org/doc_view.php?d=862&p=177
[474] Abdallah, Hussein, "Two die in clashes between Marada, Lebanese Forces," (*The Daily Star*, 18 September 2008).

LESOTHO

Interim Political Authority Act – 1 October 1998

Full text source: Commonwealth Legal Information Institute[475]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

> The agreement committed the incumbent government to a reform of the electoral system toward proportional representation, with the goal of "leveling the playing field" and guaranteeing adequate representation of opposition parties (Article II). It also addressed the creation of an independent electoral commission, a committee for dispute resolution, and a transitional political authority comprised of equal representatives from all parties.

Government ID: Incumbent government (LCD)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): All opposition parties[476]

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 4 September 1998 – 30 November 1998

Conflict termination? Yes.

[475] http://www.commonlii.org/ls/legis/num_act/ipaa1998336.pdf
[476] The military faction was not a signatory, but it was fighting on behalf of the unarmed opposition parties who were present at the talks.

LIBERIA

Yamoussoukro IV Accord – 30 October 1991

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[477]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The only terms addressed the creation of an electoral commission (Article 4) and a commitment to hold democratic elections by April 1992 (6).

Government ID: Interim Government (President Sawyer)

History of defection? Yes, a previous agreement in Banjul (late 1990) to expand the Interim Government to include the NPFL, INPFL, and AFL was not implemented.

Rebel ID(s): National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)

Inclusive? No, United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), Samuel Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and INPFL were not included.

Conflict dates: December 1989 – 19 July 1997[478]

Conflict termination? No.

Cotonou Agreement – 25 July 1993

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[479]

[477] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/yamoussoukro-accord.php
[478] The end date of conflict by the NPFL is coded as the day that leader Charles Taylor won presidential elections and assumed power, whereby his rebellion had been transformed into the ruling political party. The party was associated with attacks against rival candidates and parties throughout the campaign period.
[479] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/cotonou-accord%20.php

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

Elections were rescheduled for February 1994, and ULIMO was explicitly included in the electoral commission and ceasefire monitoring committee. A three-branch, inclusive government of national unity was described, and – significantly – any rebel representatives to the transitional government were banned from contesting the election (Part II).

Government ID: Interim Government of National Unity (President Sawyer)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)

Inclusive? No, the AFL was not included.

Conflict dates: December 1989 – 18 August 2003

Conflict termination? No. Two new rebellions also emerged in the same month: the Lofa Defense Force supported by the NPFL and the LPC supported by the AFL. ULIMO also splintered into two factions in 1994.

Akosombo Agreement – 12 September 1994

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[480]

Clustered? Yes, unamended elements of the Cotonou Accord are incorporated by explicit reference (Part II.H.20).

Power sharing? No.

[480] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/akosombo-agreement.php

Elections were rescheduled for October 1995, and the provisions reaffirmed and amended the intended design of the transitional coalition government. (Part II).

Government ID: N/A[481]

History of defection? Yes, the NPFL and ULIMO had both defected from previous agreements.

Rebel ID(s): Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Kromah faction (ULIMO-K)

Inclusive? No, the LPC, Lofa Defense Force, and ULIMO-J were excluded.

Conflict dates: December 1989 – 18 August 2003

Conflict termination? No. The NPFL-CRC faction split off after this agreement.

Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement– 21 December 1994

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[482]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

This agreement incorporated the previously excluded factions into the transitional government designed in the Akosombo Agreement.

Government ID: N/A

[481] This was an agreement between the three main rebel groups in order to try to reestablish governance, after the previous interim government had fallen apart. The absence of a legitimate, functioning government means that this conflict and settlement are usually censored from alternative datasets.
[482] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Lib%2019941221.pdf; http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/accra-clarification.php

History of defection? Yes, by the rebel parties in the absence of a true government.

Rebel ID(s): AFL, NPFL, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-Johnson faction, NPFL-CRC, Lofa Defense Force (LDA), and the Liberia Peace Council (LPC)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: December 1989 – 18 August 2003

Conflict termination? No. Elements within the AFL attempted a coup of the transitional government the same month.

Abuja Accord – 19 August 1995

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[483]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement includes precise descriptions of the make-up of the transitional government of national unity, especially the positions allocated to ULIMO-J (Part II.A). It also amends previous agreements by stating that only the Chairman of the Council of State – who is not a rebel leader – would be ineligible to stand for election in October (Part II.D).

Government ID: N/A

History of defection? Yes, by the rebel parties in the absence of a true government.

Rebel ID(s): AFL, NPFL, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-Johnson faction, NPFL-CRC, Lofa Defense Force (LDA), and the Liberia Peace Council (LPC)

Inclusive? Yes.

[483] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/abuja-accord.php

Conflict dates: December 1989 – 18 August 2003

Conflict termination? No. There are reports of numerous ceasefire violations, internal divisions and purges over positions on the transitional coalition, attacks against ECOWAS peacekeepers over disarmament and control of diamond mines, and eventually ULIMO-J leader Johnson was suspended from the transitional government for his involvement in the violence in December.

Abuja II[484] – 17 August 1996

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[485]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

Elections are postponed until May 1997, and a new Chairman of the transitional Council of State is named (Article 1.ii).

Government ID: N/A

History of defection? Yes, by the rebel parties who comprise the transitional government of national unity. The terms make explicit reference to the failure to implement the Abuja Accord.

Rebel ID(s): AFL, NPFL, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J, NPFL-CRC, LDF, and LPC

Inclusive? No, the Congo Defense Force was excluded.

Conflict dates: December 1989 – 18 August 2003

Conflict termination? No. Violence continued right up through the presidential election. After Taylor won, some elements of ULIMO regrouped and reemerged as Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in 1999, while others formed Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL).

[484] Or "Supplement to the Abuja Accord."
[485] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/abuja-accord.php

Comprehensive Peace Agreement – 18 August 2003

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[486]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement required a restructuring of the military command structure in order to incorporate rebel officers, as well as other elements of the state security apparatus (Articles VII and VIII). It also allocated important ministries (State, Defense, Finance, etc.) to the rebel parties, regardless of the outcome of the election scheduled for October 2005 (Annex IV). Other provisions address the design of an interim government of national unity, the establishment of a monitoring committee and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate war crimes, reforms to the electoral system, and mechanisms for dispute resolution.

Government ID: Government of Liberia

History of defection? No,

Rebel ID(s): Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: August 2000[487] - 18 August 2003[488]

Conflict termination? Yes.

[486] http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf
[487] "'All calm in Voinjama,' dissidents say" (*The Perspective (Georgia)*, 4 August 2000).
[488] "Rebels ready to talk - Taylor promises to leave" (*Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 5 August 2003).

MACEDONIA

Ohrid Agreement – 13 August 2001

Full text source: United Sates Institute of Peace[489]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

> Significant reforms include: guarantees of parliamentary representation and veto rights for minority communities (Article 5.1-2), enhanced powers and self-sufficiency for local governments and the revision of municipality boundaries (Article 3.1-2), deployment of co-ethnic police forces and appointment of co-ethnic police chiefs in minority regions, and redistribution of tax revenue (Annex B). Other relevant provisions include a commission for dispute resolution, an external monitoring body, and fresh parliamentary elections to be held by January 2002.

Government ID: Macedonian government

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): UCK

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 1 November 2000 – 13 August 2001

Conflict termination? Yes.

[489] http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/pa_mac_08132001.pdf

MALI

Tamranasset Accord – 6 January 1991

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[490]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

Terms of the agreement include the possibility of integrating ex-combatants into the state military (Clause 8) and the creation of an inclusive oversight commission (Clauses 9-10).

Government ID: Government of Mali (President Traoré)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Azaouad Popular Movement (MPA) and Arabic Islamic Front (FIAA)

Inclusive? No. The Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad (ARLA), Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (FPLA), National Liberation Front of Azawad (FNLA), People's Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) and the Patriotic Movement of Ghanda Koye (MPGK) opposed the settlement.[491]

Conflict dates: 28 June 1990 – 19 January 1995[492]

Conflict termination? No.

Pacte National[493] – 1995

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[494]

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[490] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/mal19910106.pdf
[491] See Togo, Theodore, "The Rebellion In The North Of Mali," in *Peacebuilding: A Caritas Training Manual* (Caritas Internationalis, 2002, pp. 232–235.)
[492] "Mali army takes major rebel stronghold" (*Deutsche Presse-Agentur,* 19 January 1995).
[493] Also called the "Bamako Peace Pact."

Clustered? Yes, the initial Bamako Peace Pact was signed in April 1992, but a number of settlements were signed between 1992 and 1995, combined as the Pacte National.

Power sharing? Yes.

Signficant reforms include: instituting a federal-style system of governance and devolving powers of governance and finance to the local level, allowing MFUA troops to transform into internal security and police forces for the Azawad region, proportional representation voting rules for the National Assembly, immediate guaranteed quotas for national-level representatives from northern Mali, the creation of special funds to redistribute resources toward and institute a development program in the North, and budgetary and taxation autonomy for the region. Other provisions relate to holding elections in 1992, an inclusive implementation oversight commission, and guarantees that northerners will be appointed to top-level administrative positions.

Government ID: Government of Mali (President Konaré)

History of defection? No, a military coup in March 1991 ousted Traoré and ushered in multiparty democracy.

Rebel ID(s): United Movement and Fronts of Azawad (MFUA)

Inclusive? Yes, the various rebellions in the region united into an umbrella organization in 1992.[495]

Conflict dates: 28 June 1990 – 19 January 1995[496]

Conflict termination? Yes.

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[494] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Isr%2019990904.pdf.
[495] See Togo (2002).
[496] "Mali army takes major rebel stronghold" (*Deutsche Presse-Agentur,* 19 January 1995).

MEXICO

San Andres Accords – 16 February 1996

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[497]

Clustered? Yes, with the ceasefire brokered by the Catholic Church on 12 January 1994.

Power sharing? Yes.

The settlement addresses the rights of the indigenous peoples of Mexico by devolving a significant degree of autonomous powers in governance, education and self-determination (See Document I). There are also guarantees of development in the regions in question, as well as compensation for damages caused by natural resource extraction, and preference to indigenous councils in granting extraction concessions and obtaining benefits. There is also mention of instituting quotas, or some other kind of reform, in order to increase representation of Mexican Indians at the federal level and of redrawing electoral boundaries (Doc 2, III).

Government ID: Federal Government of Mexico

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Zapatista Army for National Liberation (EZLN)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 1 January 1994 – 12 January 1994[498]

Conflict termination? Yes.

[497] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Mex%2019960216.pdf
[498] Levi, Issac A., "Hundreds of armed Indians attack towns in Southeastern Mexico" (*Associated Press Worldstream*, 1 January 1994).

MOLDOVA

Agreement on Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniestrian Region – 21 July 1992

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[499]

Clustered? Yes, with the "Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdneistria" (1997)[500]

Power sharing? Yes.

The contested region was delegated increased competencies and veto rights in foreign policy decisions of the Republic. An integration of forces and joint oversight commission were also mentioned.

Government ID: Republic of Moldova

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Transdniestria

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 31 December 1991 – 21 July 1992

Conflict termination? Yes.

[499] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Mol%2019970508.pdf
[500] http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/Russian-Moldovan-Ceasefire-Agreement.pdf

MOZAMBIQUE

General Peace Agreement – 4 October 1992

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[501]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The power-sharing reforms entailed are not as comprehensive as is commonly assumed. They include a new armed forces command including a Renamo representative to oversee integration of forces (Protocol IV), local-level control of legal and administrative affairs in Renamo strongholds (Protocol V), and proportional representation voting rules for parliamentary elections (Protocol III). A range of committees were also designed for monitoring implementation and ceasefire violations, resolving disputes, investigating police abuses and war crimes, as well as a new electoral commission.

Government ID: Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 31 December 1977 – 4 October 1992

Conflict termination? Yes.

[501] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/mozambique/rome-process.php

NICARAGUA

Bogota Accord – 9 December 1984

Full text source: Ulster Transitional Justice Institute[502]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement granted a significant degree of autonomy to specified indigenous territories (Article I, 1.3), it allowed MISURASATA to serve as security/defense forces in the region (Article IV, 4.3), and it granted locals control of natural resource rents (Article I, 1.2).

Government ID: Nicaraguan government (Sandinista)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Mascot, Rama, and Sandinista United (MISURASATA)

Inclusive? No, the Contras were excluded.

Conflict dates: 25 February 1981[503] - 9 October 1987[504]

Conflict termination? No.

Yatama Peace Initiative – 26 January 1988

Full text source: Ulster Transitional Justice Institute [505]

Clustered? No.[506]

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[502] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/nic2.pdf
[503] "Nicaraguan Indians revolt against leftist regime" (*United Press International*, 25 February 1981).
[504] "Other Central America peace news; Nicaragua Indians end war" (*Facts on File World News Digest*, 9 October 1987).
[505] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/nic3.pdf
[506] The Bogota Accord was the first step toward reconciling the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua and the indigenous contras on the Atlantic Coast that would eventually lead to the Yatama Peace

Power sharing? Yes.

> The agreement reaffirms the right of indigenous peoples to autonomous self-determination (Article I) and the use of land and natural resources in their regions (Article II).

Government ID: Nicaraguan government (Sandinista)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Yapti Masrika Nani - Descendants of Mother Earth (YATAMA)

Inclusive? No, Contras were excluded.

Conflict dates: 25 February 1981 - 9 October 1987[507]

Conflict termination? Yes.

Toncontin Agreement – 23 March 1990

Full text source: Ulster Transitional Justice Institute [508]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

> Democratic elections had already taken place, and this settlement was newly elected President Violeta Chamorro's attempt to integrate the Contras into all state institutions for governance and security and allow the group to function as a political party. I do not code this as qualifying as specified power sharing, but more information is needed on the precise terms.

Initiative. The two documents have many of the same concepts behind them including autonomy and ceasefire. However, in the four years in between them, the civil war ragged on and the MISURASATA became the YATAMA—loose indigenous organizations that were very fluid. Because of this, I coded the two agreements separately. Also, the Yatama agreement was more inspired by the message of Esquipulas II, which was signed in 1987, than earlier domestic agreements.

[507] "Other Central America peace news; Nicaragua Indians end war" (*Facts on File World News Digest*, 9 October 1987).

[508] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/nic1.pdf

Government ID: Nicaraguan government (Chamorro)

History of defection? No, the incumbent Sandanistas were defeated in democratic elections in February 1990, and Chamorro made explicit attempts to purge all public institutions of their influence.

Rebel ID(s): Nicaraguan Resistance/Contras

Inclusive? Yes, YATAMA was in a period of dormancy.

Conflict dates: 17 April 1982 - 2 November 1989[509]

Conflict termination? Yes, the Contras had already ceased fighting, largely due to the fact that U.S. support had dried up.

[509] Young, Nicholas, "Nicaragua 'launches attacks on Contras': US angered by Ortega's decision to suspend ceasefire" (*The Guardian*, 2 November 1989).

NIGER

Paris Accord – 10 June 1993

Full text source: N/A[510]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

Negotiations on most FLAA demands were delayed during a three-month ceasefire period, but major provisions include the return of refugees, lifting the state of emergency and establishing an emergency fund for the North.

Government ID: Nigerien government

History of defection? No

Rebel ID(s): FLAA (Front de libération de l'Aïr et l'Azaouad)

Inclusive? No, reports indicate that there were as many as five Tuareg rebellions operating at the time.[511]

Conflict dates: 19 October 1991[512] – 24 September 1997[513]

Conflict termination? No, in June-July the FLAA splintered into three factions over the terms of the accord: the old FLAA and the Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of the North-Niger (ARLNN), which rejected the accord, and the Front for the Liberation of Tamoust (FLT).[514]

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[510] See the UCDP Peace Agreement database for a summary (http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=118&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa# D84:D11).

[511] Jean-Paul, Azam and Morrisson Christian, 1999, *Development Centre Studies Conflict and Growth in Africa: The Sahel Volume 1* (OECD Publishing, 13 September, pp. 92-93).

[512] Ibid (1999, 92-3).

[513] "Niger rebel groups join forces" (*Agence France Internationale*, 24 September 1997).

[514] According to the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset.

Ouagadougou Accords – 9 October 1994

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[515]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

Clauses 1-5 discuss the creation of internal divisions and holding elections at all administrative levels within 16 months (18), but there is no explicit mention of devolving powers to the local level. Decisions about the competencies of various levels of government were left to be decided by an inclusive council.

Government ID: Nigerien government

History of defection? Yes. According to UCDP, the Paris Accord was not implemented

Rebel ID(s): CRA (Coordination de la résistance armée)

Inclusive? No. The CRA comprised the Front for the Liberation of Tamoust (FLT), the Popular Army for the Liberation of the North (APLN), Revolutionary Action Front (FAR), and two Toubou movements. However, the ORA - which included the FLAA, the ARLNN and three other Tuareg movements – rejected the agreement.[516]

Conflict dates: 19 October 1991 –24 September 1997[517]

Conflict termination? No, the CRA would resist disarmament and continue to reject future settlements, eventually regrouping as the UFRA in 1997.

[515] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/nig19941009.pdf
[516] Azam and Christian (1999, 92-3).
[517] "Niger rebel groups join forces" (*Agence France Internationale*, 24 September 1997).

Definitive Peace Agreement – 15 April 1995

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[518]

Clustered? No. This agreement was signed with the ORA, while the previous Ouagadougou Accords were signed with the CRA – two separate umbrella organizations of Tuareg rebel movements.

Power sharing? Yes.

This settlement explicitly guarantees that local councils/assemblies will have autonomy in affairs concerning governance, budget and social/cultural development (Clauses 7-8), thereby establishing a federal system with local elections to be held. It also commits the government to reallocate natural resource rents and accelerate investment in development projects in the pastoral zone (22).

Government ID: Nigerien government

History of defection? No, the terms of the Ouagadougou Accords had been implemented according to the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset.

Rebel ID(s): Organization of the Armed Resistance (ORA)

Inclusive? No, the groups comprising the CRA rejected the agreement.

Conflict dates: 19 October 1991 – 15 April 1995

Conflict termination? Yes, the various elements of the CRA began to demobilize despite continued fighting by the ORA groups and the emergence of a new insurgency – The Front Democratique pour le Renouveau (FDR).[519]

[518] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/nig19950415.pdf
[519] Azam and Christian (1999, 92-3).

Agreement Between Government of Niger and the Union of Armed Resistance Forces and the Saharan Revolutionary Armed Forces – 28 November 1997

Full text source: N/A[520]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The settlement was a reiteration of the terms of the Definitive Peace Agreement (1995) with the goal of incorporating Tuareg movements that had previously rejected the peace process and been left out of the process of integration.

Government ID: Nigerien government

History of defection? No, reports indicate that the government and military had "followed a real policy of openness" and implemented the terms of prior agreements in good faith.[521]

Rebel ID(s): Union of Armed Resistance Forces (UFRA) and the Saharan Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARS)

Inclusive? Yes. UFRA was the new name for the remaining Tuareg rebellions that had not demobilized after the Definitive Peace Agreement (CRA members). FDR had essentially disappeared after the death of its chief in December 1995.

Conflict dates: 19 October 1991 – 24 September 1997[522]

Conflict termination? Yes.

[520] For summaries see Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute (http://www.peaceagreements.ulster.ac.uk/cgi-bin/Agreements/agree.pl?full=528%22) and BBC News Online (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/35548.stm).
[521] Azam and Christian (1999, 92-3).
[522] "Niger rebel groups join forces" (*Agence France Internationale*, 24 September 1997).

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Bougainville Agreement – 7 August 1976

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[523]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement allowed for a provincial statues for Bougainville/North Solomons Province, a form of autonomy, particularly in terms of governance, self-determination (44), legislation, administration, finance (3), and taxation (26-7).

Government ID: National Government (Somare)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Provincial Government of the North Solomons

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 11 September 1975 – 7 August 1976[524]

Conflict termination? Yes, although a full-blown war of secession broke out with the emergence of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in 1988.

Honaira Declaration – 23 January 1991

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[525]

Clustered? No.

[523] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/key-texts2.php
[524] Field, Michael J., 1998, *Chronology of the Bougainville Civil War* (AFP Pacific Islands Report, 23 January 1998).
[525] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/key-texts6.php

Power sharing? No.

The agreement stipulated the creation of a joint Task Force, amnesty, and a commission for resolving disputes, but it was little more than a ceasefire.

Government ID: PNG Government

History of defection? Yes, the provincial status was eventually revoked by the PNG parliament.

Rebel ID(s): Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)/Bougainville Interim Government (BIG)

Inclusive? No, the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) was not included.

Conflict dates: 23 December 1988 – 23 January 1998[526]

Conflict termination? No.

Bougainville Peace Agreement – 10 June 1993

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[527]

Clustered? Yes, with the "Lincoln Agreement" ceasefire (January 1998).

Power sharing? Yes.

The settlement guaranteed a fully autonomous government for Bougainville (Articles 10), self-determination (28-9), financial self-sufficiency (134), and reallocation of fishing revenues to the island (86). It also provided for inclusive oversight and consultation commissions.

Government ID: PNG Government

[526] See Field (1998).
[527] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/key-texts37.php

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): BRA and BRF

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 23 December 1988 – 23 January 1998

Conflict termination? Yes, although more research is needed to determine whether unconfirmed reports of a Mekamui Defense Force emerging in 2002 is connected to either of these groups.

Philippines

Tripoli Agreement – 13 December 1976

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[528]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement stipulated semi-autonomy for Muslim regions in the southern Philippines in terms of administration, governance, legislation, justice and finance (Articles 2-9). Mining and mineral revenues were also meant to be reallocated toward the autonomous regions (10). There is also mention of increased representation for the region in central government, though the precise terms were left to be determined at a later date (7).

Government ID: Government of Philippines (Marcos)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

Inclusive? No, Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) was not included.

Conflict dates: 1972 – present

Conflict termination? No, the settlement led to splintering in the MNLF leadership that eventually resulted in the emergence of the MILF.[529] The original MNLF continued fighting until at least 1993, while MILF has not yet demobilized. Two new MNLF factions also emerged in 2001, though appear to be short-lived.

[528] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/philippines-mindanao/tripoli-agreement.php

[529] See Abuza, Zachary, 2003, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

Jeddah Accord – 4 January 1987

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[530]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

Besides a ceasefire, the agreement only provided for a Joint Commission to complete a new draft on autonomy for Mindanao (Article 1). It also established provincial-level oversight committees (2).

Government ID: Government of Philippines (Aquino – Ramos - Estrada)

History of defection? No, the accord was signed immediately after the civilian uprising that overthrew Marcos in 1986.

Rebel ID(s): Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

Inclusive? No, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) were excluded.

Conflict dates: 1972 – present

Conflict termination? No.

General Agreement for Peace between the Government and the RAM-SFP – 13 October 1995

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[531]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

[530] http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/jeddah_01041987.pdf
[531] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Phi%2019951013.pdf

Military power sharing in the form of guaranteed reinstatement of all rebels, including officers, to the positions held prior to the coup attempts in 1987 and 1989 (Article V). The agreement also established a fund for material and technical support to all ex-combatants (VI) and commissions for oversight and dispute resolution (VII). Finally, the government agreed to implement "structural reforms of the electoral process (Annex A), but the agreement does not provide specifics.

Government ID: Government of Philippines (Aquino – Ramos - Estrada)

History of defection? No, the Jeddah Accord was implemented.

Rebel ID(s): Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa/Soldiers of the Filipino People/Young Officers' Union (RAM-SFP-YOU) [532]

Inclusive? No, MILF and the New People's Army (NPA) were excluded.

Conflict dates: 1987 - 1990[533]

Conflict termination? Yes, the group had been essentially defeated in January 1990, and this agreement paved the way for reintegration into the military.

Mindanao Final Peace Agreement – 2 September 1996

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[534]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement guaranteed a fully Autoonmous Government for Mindanao in budget and finance, legislation and governance,

[532] Gloria, Glenda, 1999, "The RAM Boys: Where are they now?" (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1-2 December, http://pcij.org/stories/1999/ram.html).
[533] "Troops Capture Another Manila Mutineer" (*United Press International*, 28 January 1990).
[534] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/philippines-mindanao/peace-agreement.php

education, taxation and economic development (Article III). It also provide for a permanent position in both the central executive Cabinet and in Congress, veto rights on foreign policy decisions, distinct security units to be deployed in the autonomous regions to be led by and comprised of ex-combatants, autonomous control over mining and resource rents, and a reallocation of public and private investment (Articles II and III).

Government ID: Government of Philippines (Aquino – Ramos - Estrada)

History of defection? No, the Jeddah Accord and the settlement with the RAM-SFP-YOU had both been implemented.

Rebel ID(s): Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

Inclusive? No, MILF was excluded, and these group can be considered entirely distinct by this point. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and New People's Army (NPA) were also excluded, although these are not Mindanao groups.

Conflict dates: 1972 - 1993

Conflict termination? Yes, although two new factions of the MNLF emerged briefly in 2001-2002 and 2005.

Agreement by the Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)– 4 September 1997

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[535]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

[535] http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/agreement_09031997.pdf

The agreement provided for a return of refugees and evacuees, a withdrawal of GRP forces, and a return of law and order under the control of GRP authorities but coordinated with the MILF leadership.

Government ID: Government of Philippines (Aquino – Ramos - Estrada)

History of defection? No, the previous settlement on Mindanao was implemented according to the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset

Rebel ID(s): Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

Inclusive? No, The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and New People's Army (NPA) were also excluded, although these are not Mindanao groups.

Conflict dates: 9 September 1986[536] - present[537]

Conflict termination? No.

Tripoli Agreement on Peace – 22 June 2001

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[538]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The only relevant terms concerned a recommitment to previous ceasefires and the creation of an inclusive monitoring team.

Government ID: Government of Philippines (Aquino – Ramos - Estrada)

History of defection? Yes, the government violated its previous ceasefire with MILF.

Rebel ID(s): Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

[536] "Ten Die in Attack at Phillipine Wedding" (*The Times*, 9 September 1986).
[537] Patrikainen, Maria, 2010, "Muslim Rebels Clash With Philippine Troops on Eve of 'Peace Summit'" (*Global Insight*, 20 September.)
[538] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/philippines-mindanao/tripoli-agreement-peace.php

Inclusive? No, Indigenous People's Federal Army (IPFA), Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan (RHB), the NPA, and the ASG were excluded. Another faction of the previous MNLF also emerged in late 2001.

Conflict dates: 9 September 1986 - present

Conflict termination? No.

REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Accords de cessation des hostilitiés en République du Congo – 29 December 1999

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[539]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The coalition executive cabinet was only a transitional measure (Articles 19 and 25). The agreement also set up a transitional commission for finance and resources, which included rebel representatives (5). Finally, it allowed for the reinstatement of all officers to their previous positions in the police force, but the national military is not mentioned.

Government ID: Congolese government (Sasso Nguesso)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Ninjas, Mouvement National pour la Liberation du Congo (MNLC), Mouvement National pour la Liberation du Congo Renove (MNLCR), Bana Dol, Resistance Sud Sud, Cobras

Inclusive? No, Ntsiloulous and Cocoyes were not included.

Conflict dates: July 1993[540] - 10 February 2003[541]

Conflict termination? No. The subsequent election was extremely violent, and the Ninjas continued attacks until at least 2003.

[539] http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/congobraz_fr_1999.pdf
[540] Massamba, Armand, "Crisis in Congo: another experiment backfires" (*Associated Press*, 18 July 1993); "Congo: De l'armée aux milices" (*La Lettre du Continent*, 18 November 1993).
[541] "Congo-B: At least '10 people' said killed in attack by Ninja militia in Yamba" (*Paris AFP*, February 10 2003).

RUSSIA

Khasavyourt Accord[542] **–** 12 May 1997

Full text source: Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute INCORE[543]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement allowed for local elections in Chechnya, but did not define any transfer of legitimate powers of authority. It also provided for one-off payments of reparations to Chechans affected by the conflict,[544] and for joint commissions and working groups to be established (Principles 2-4).

Government ID: Russian government (Yeltsin)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 25 November 1994 – 16 April 2009[545]

Conflict termination? No.

[542] Also known as the "Moscow Peace Treaty."
[543] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rus2.pdf; http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rus6.pdf
[544] Asatiani, Salome, 2007, "Chechnya: Why did 1997 peace agreement fail?" (*Radio Free Europe*, 17 October, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076426.html).
[545] "Russia 'ends Chechnya operation'"(*BBC News*, 16 April 2009).

RWANDA

Arusha Accord – 4 August 1993

Full text source: Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute INCORE[546]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

> The agreement stipulated 50 percent representation for RPF officers in the high command of the Armed Forces (Article 74). All other power-sharing measures are transitional, such as the establishment of a broad-based transitional government (see the section on Power Sharing), designed to expire with national elections, and followed within six months by local elections.

Government ID: Rwandan government (Habyarimana)

> *History of defection?* No.

Rebel ID(s): Rwandese Patriotic Front (FPR)

> *Inclusive?* No, ex-FAR, Impuzambugambi, Interhamwe, ALiR were not included, although more research is needed into precise start dates of these groups.

Conflict dates: 1 October 1990 – 19 July 1994[547]

> *Conflict termination?* No.

[546] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf
[547] Randal, Jonathan and Keith Richburg, 1994, "Rebels declare victory, cease-Fire in Rwanda; flood of Hutu refugees into Zaire continues" (*The Washington Post*, 19 July.)

SENEGAL

Agreement Between Government of Senegal and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance – 1 May 1991

Full text source: N/A[548]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The accord specifies the replacement of the Casamance military Governor with a civilian and amnesty for ex-combatants.

Government ID: Senegalese government

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 23 December 1988[549] - 2010[550] or later

Conflict termination? No.

Agreement Between Government of Senegal and the MFDC– 1 March 2001

Full text source: N/A[551]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

[548] See the Minorities at Risk project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=43301
[549] "Senegal Casamance separatists kill two soldiers in ambush" (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 23 December 1988).
[550] "Senegal army 'cleans out' rebels from part of Casamance" (*Agence France Presse*, 3 April 2010).
[551] "Senegal: IRIN focus on Casamance peace agreement" (*IRIN,* 26 March 2001).

Substantive provisions include the return of refugees and release of prisoners, environmental clean-up, and the launch of reintegration projects. The status of Casamance was not directly addressed.

Government ID: Senegalese government

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): MFDC

Inclusive? No, reports indicate infighting and violence between factions of the MFDC – Front Sud and Front Nord - over whether to accept or oppose the agreement(s).[552]

Conflict dates: 23 December 1988 - 2010 or later

Conflict termination? No.

Zinguinchor Peace Agreement Between Government of Senegal and MFDC – 30 December 2004

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[553]

Clustered? No

Power sharing? No.

Provisions include integration into the military or resettlement into the economy for ex-combatants, as well as the establishment of a monitoring council and a commission for ongoing negotiations.

Government ID: Senegalese government

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): MFDC

[552] See Minorities at Risk chronology of events and *Africa South of the Sahara* (2004, p. 931).
[553] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/sen20041230.pdf

Inclusive? No, reports indicate infighting between factions of the MFDC in this time period over whether to accept or oppose the agreement(s).[554]

Conflict dates: 23 December 1988 - 2010 or later

Conflict termination? No.

[554] See Minorities at Risk chronology of events and *Africa South of the Sahara* (2004, p. 931).

SIERRA LEONE

Abidjan Agreement – 30 November 1996

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[555]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement stipulated the integration of forces, a reconstituted electoral commission (Article 18), unspecified electoral reforms (18), the holding of a broad-based forum on socioeconomic policy (27), a national commission on human rights violations (20), and an inclusive monitoring committee (3).

Government ID: Sierra Leone government

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 23 March 1991 – 19 May 2001[556]

Conflict termination? No.

Lome Peace Agreement – 7 July 1999

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[557]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

[555] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/abidjan-agreement.php
[556] "UNAMSIL confirms heavy fighting in Kono District" (*Concord Times*, 19 May 2001).
[557] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/lome-agreement.php

Relevant provisions include the integration of ex-combatants into the national army (Part 4) and appointment of RUF leaders to the executive Cabinet (Part 2) – although these appointments are not guaranteed beyond fresh elections, scheduled for early 2001 (Part 3). It also mentioned the creation of a new national electoral commission and a truth and reconciliation commission. Also, Part 2 discusses the creation of a committee on the exploitation of natural resources and grants the Chairmanship position to RUF leader Sankoh, but since it also specifically states that the "Government shall exercise full control over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources…" I do not consider this to qualify as power sharing.

Government ID: Sierra Leone government

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

Inclusive? No, the West Side Boys, the Civil Defense Force (CDF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) were not included.

Conflict dates: 23 March 1991 – 19 May 2001[558]

Conflict termination? No.

Abuja Ceasefire – 10 November 2000

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[559]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement was more than a ceasefire, as it was an attempt to get belligerent parties to recommit to the terms of the Lome Agreement, although this discussion was left to a later date (Article 10). It

[558] "UNAMSIL confirms heavy fighting in Kono District" (*Concord Times*, 19 May 2001).
[559] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/SiL%2020001110.pdf

allowed for a UN peacekeeping force and reaffirmed the government's openness to military integration.

Government ID: Sierra Leone government

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Revolutionary United Front (RUF

Inclusive? No, the West Side Boys (WSB) and CDF were not included, but a separate settlement was signed between the RUF and CDF in 2001.

Conflict dates: 23 March 1991 – 19 May 2001[560]

Conflict termination? No, although this is sensitive to coding specifications. I chose to leave this as a "no" since RUF-sponsored violence continued through national elections.

[560] "UNAMSIL confirms heavy fighting in Kono District" (*Concord Times*, 19 May 2001).

SOLOMON ISLANDS[561]

Honiara Peace Accords – 28 June 1999

Full text source: Solomon government[562]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement mentions equal representation of provinces in the national civil service and police force (Article 8), but no specified quotas or guarantee of high-level command posts. It also commits the government to establish a one-time trust for indigenous communities and to compensate indigenous land owners (Article 4).

Government ID: Solomon Islands government

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Guadalcanal provincial representative, Malaita provincial representative

Inclusive? No, the two active insurgencies - Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM, Guadalcanal) and Malaita Eagle Force (MEF, Malaita) - were not directly included, but were instead represented by the provincial governments of their home island

Conflict dates: 31 April 1998 - 2003

Conflict termination? No.

Townsville Peace Agreement – 15 August 2000

Full text source: Solomon government[563]

[561] Most information on conflict dates comes from BBCNews online and the chronology of events provided in the text of the Townsville Peace Agreement through 2000.
[562] http://www.spc.int/coastfish/Countries/solomons/ACCORD.htm

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

In addition to reaffirming the terms of the Honiara Accord, the agreement provided for a devolution of autonomous powers to Guadalcanal and Malaita provinces (Part 4).

Government ID: Solomon Islands government

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM, Guadalcanal) and Malaita Eagle Force (MEF, Malaita)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 31 April 1998 - 2003

Conflict termination? No.

Marau Peace Agreement – 7 February 2001

Full text source: Solomon government

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

This agreement attempted to address the Marau region by establishing a new electoral ward (Article 14), a separate police unit (13), a resettlement package for ex-combatants (19), a ceasefire monitoring committee (17-8), and respect for customary land rights (2 and 5).

Government ID: Solomon Islands government

[563] http://www.commerce.gov.sb/Gov/Peace_Agreement.htm

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM, Guadalcanal) and Malaita Eagle Force (MEF, Malaita)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 31 April 1998 - 2003

Conflict termination? No, A key leader of the IFM (Harold Keke) refused to sign the agreement and his faction continued to fight, while the rest of the IFM joined with the Malaitan-dominated police to fight against them until 2003, when Australian troops would eventually step in to end the conflict. The MEF is reported to have disarmed after the Townsville agreement in late 2000.[564]

[564] Moore, Clive, 2004, *Happy Isles in Crisis* (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press).

SOMALIA

Addis Ababa Agreement – 27 March 1993

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[565]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement provided for a Transitional National Council including representatives from all signatory parties in order to govern, as well as the establishment of regional and district councils to restore law and order (see Part IV).

Government ID: Transitional government of the Somali National Movement (SNM)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA), United Somali Congress (USC-Mahdi), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF-Muse), Somali Democratic Movement (SDM-Mahdi), Somali Democratic Movement (SDM/SNA), Somali National Front (SNF), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM/SNA), Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM/SNA), United Somali Front (USF), Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), United Somali Party (USP), Somali National Union (SNU), Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU), and Somali Africans Muke Organization (SAMO)

Inclusive? No, SSDF-Yusuf and Al Itihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) were not signatories.

Conflict dates: 1982[566] - 2002 or later

Conflict termination? No, both the SNF and the SPM splintered, with one faction allying with the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) and continuing to fight until at least 2004. The SNDU

[565] http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/somalia_03271993.pdf
[566] "Barre's battles" (*The Economist*, 24 July 1982).

continued violent operations until the late-1990s. A new USF faction had emerged in summer 1991 and continued until the mid-1990s.

Cairo Declaration on Somalia – 22 December 1997

Full text source: Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute INCORE[567]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement outlines the details of the transitional government, the ways in which various councils will be selected and appointed and the establishment of federal-style governance (during the interim period only), and the holding of elections after the three-year transition period.

Government ID: Transitional National Government

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): United Somali Congress (USC/SNA), United Somali Congress (USC-Mahdi), Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), Somali Democratic Movement (SDM/SNA), Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM/SNA), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), Somali National Movement (SNM), Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF-Yusuf), Somali National Union (SNU), Somali National Front (SNF), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF-Muse), Southern Somalia National Movement (SSNM)

Inclusive? No, the SRRC was not included.

Conflict dates: 1982 – 2002 or later

[567] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/som1.pdf

Conflict termination? No. The evidence suggests that most of the signatory parties to the agreement ceased fighting, with the exception of the RRA and the SPM. However, many of these groups splintered at some point in the 1990s, with opposing factions joining the SRRC movement to fight against the transitional government of national unity. Much more research is needed on the dynamics of this case, but for now the country is censored from the analysis due to missingness on several key variables.

Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities, Structures and Principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process – 27 October 2002

Full text source: UN Peacemaker database[568]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

This agreement represents an attempt to bring the SRRC, which has continued to fight in opposition to the transitional government, into the agreements reached by other signatory parties. It stipulated a federal-style system of governance for the country, beyond just the transitional period (Article 1).

Government ID: Transitional National Government

History of defection? No, the transitional government was established after the Cairo Declaration, despite ongoing opposition by excluded parties.

Rebel ID(s): Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), an umbrella organization comprising: USC/SNA, USC, USA/SNA, HPA, USC-Mahdi, USC-Mahdi, SAMO, SNF, SSDF-Yusuf/Puntland, SSNM/SNA, and SPM/Nakuru.

[568] http://peacemaker.unlb.org/doc_view.php?d=241&p=177

Inclusive? Yes. Some factions may have been excluded, but concrete information on groups and conflict dates is lacking.

Conflict dates: 1982 – 2002

Conflict termination? Yes. Although more research is needed into the precise end date of the SRRC, reports indicate that the group ceased violent operations with the creation of Puntland.

SOUTH AFRICA

National Peace Accord – 14 September 1991

Full text source: Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute INCORE[569]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

Provisions include the adoption of proportional representation voting rules under a universal suffrage electoral system, a federal-style system of governance with powers devolved to the provincial level, the establishment of local security forces (Article 3.7.1), and a consensus-based monitoring committee.

Government ID: Government (National Party)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): African National Congress

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 24 August 1976[570] - 20 March 1990[571]

Conflict termination? Yes.

[569] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/sa4.pdf
[570] Burns, John, 1976, "No Title," (*The New York Times*, 24 August.)
[571] Thurow, Roger, 1990, "ANC adopts new role with government in post-apartheid South Africa" (*The Wall Street Journal*, 20 March.)

SRI LANKA

Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities – 8 January 1995

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[572]

Clustered? Yes, with the "Devolution Proposals" of the same year.

Power sharing? No.

In addition to a ceasefire, the agreement provided for the creation of a inclusive commissions for oversight, arbitration and dispute resolution (Article 5).

Government ID: Sri Lankan government

History of defection? Yes, the government had violated earlier ceasefires.

Rebel ID(s): Tamil Tigers (LTTE)

Inclusive? No, Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) were not included.[573]

Conflict dates: 9 September 1984 – 19 May 2009

Conflict termination? No.

Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government and the Tamil Tigers – 23 February 2002

Full text source: United States Institute of Peace[574]

[572] See also http://tamilnation.co/conflictresolution/tamileelam/cbkproposals/95proposals.htm
[573] The UCDP/PRIO dataset identifies only the LTTE as an active insurgency group in relevant settlement years, however many of the groups they list as having phased out in 1984-5 actually continued low-scale operations and re-emerged in the aftermath of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord (1987). Moreover, PRIO fails to identify some key players in the conflict, such as PLOTE and EPDP. I have corroborated this information with ACCORD (c-r.org) and other sources.

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

Again, the settlement was essentially just a ceasefire, but it also included agreement to create local-level monitoring and arbitration committees (Article 3).

Government ID: Sri Lankan government

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Tamil Tigers (LTTE)

Inclusive? No (see above).

Conflict dates: 9 September 1984 – 19 May 2009

Conflict termination? No, the original LTTE kept fighting until at least 2009, while a splinter faction emerged after this settlement was signed led by Colonel Karuna.

574 http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/pa_sri_lanka_02222002.pdf

SUDAN

Koka Dam Declaration – 24 March 1986

Full text source: Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute INCORE[575]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The major agreement concerned the establishment of an inclusive, interim government of national unity and the holding of a national conference to draft a new constitution (Article 3). Provisions about adopting a "regional government" do not address how – or whether – powers will be allocated (2).

Government ID: Government of Sudan

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A)

Inclusive? No. The SPLM was split internally into three factions, only one of which signed on to the agreement. One faction, the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), broke away over the peace process.[576]

Conflict dates: 15 February 1984[577] - 25 September 2002[578]

Conflict termination? No.

November Accords – 16 November 1988

Full text source: N/A[579]

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[575] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/sudan4.pdf
[576] See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/spla-1.htm.
[577] "Sudan People's Liberation Army claims responsibility" (*The Associated Press*, 15 February 1984).
[578] "Sudan rebels accuse Khartoum of launching attacking on three fronts" (*Agence France Presse*, 25 September 2002).
[579] See UCDP Peace Agreement database for summary (http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=145&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#)

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement called on the government to lift the state of emergency in southern Sudan, and to freeze the implementation of sharia law until a national constitutional conference could be held by the end of the year, which had not been done as agreed two years earlier.

Government ID: Government of Sudan

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A)

Inclusive? No, the Equatoria Defense Forces (EDF), and the National Islamic Front (NIF) were not included.

Conflict dates: 15 February 1984[580] - 25 September 2002[581]

Conflict termination? No.

Political Charter between the Sudan Government and the SPLA – 26 April 1995

Full text source: Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute INCORE [582]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement stipulated a federal system of governance with decentralization of powers, particularly the decision to implement sharia law, to the provincial level (Articles 2, 7 and 14). It also guarantees the equitable sharing of national resource wealth (13). The stipulation that "[t]he two parties shall fully and effectively

[580] "Sudan People's Liberation Army claims responsibility" (*The Associated Press*, 15 February 1984).
[581] "Sudan rebels accuse Khartoum of launching attacking on three fronts" (*Agence France Presse*, 25 September 2002).
[582] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/sudan3.pdf

participate in all constitutional, political and executive institutions at all levels" (9) is considered too vague to qualify as power sharing in the central government.

Government ID: Sudanese government (Omar al-Bashir)

History of defection? Yes, Al-Bashir led a military coup in 1989 over the fact that the government was negotiating with the southern rebellions.

Rebel ID(s): SPLA/M-United

Inclusive? No, this is only one faction of the SPLA/M. The SSIM, EDF, SPLA Bahr-al-Ghazal and the Beja Congress were not included.[583]

Conflict dates: 15 February 1984[584] - 25 September 2002[585]

Conflict termination? No.

Political Charter – 10 April 1996

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[586]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The agreement repeated the need for states to accept or reject sharia law only (Article 6), as well as for equitable wealth sharing (10), though it left the details to be worked out at a later date. It called for a referendum to be held in southern Sudan "to determine their political

[583] My coding of the armed groups participating in the violence reflects the fragmented nature of the SPLM/A over time. See Douglas H. Johnson, 2003, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (African Issues: Indiana University Press).
[584] "Sudan People's Liberation Army claims responsibility" (*The Associated Press*, 15 February 1984).
[585] "Sudan rebels accuse Khartoum of launching attacking on three fronts" (*Agence France Presse*, 25 September 2002).
[586] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Sud%2019960410.pdf

aspirations," but does not suggest that the results of the referendum will be associated with any concrete reforms (3).

Government ID: Sudanese government (Omar al-Bashir)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and SPLA/M Bahr-al-Ghazal

Inclusive? No, SPLA-United, EDF, Beja Congress, National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) were not included.

Conflict dates: 15 February 1984 - 9 January 2005

Conflict termination? No.

Khartoum Peace Agreement – 21 April 1997

Full text source: Ulster's Transitional Justice Institute INCORE [587]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement calls for a referendum on unity or secession for South Sudan, a precisely specified devolution of powers to the state level (Article II), an autonomous security unit for the southern region (VI), reallocation of natural resource wealth to the states (II). It also provides for representation of the south in all national-level institutions during the four-year interim period leading up to the referendum – including an executive coordinating council - and for the establishment of several inclusive commissions for monitoring the ceasefire, overseeing implementation, and resolving disputes.

Government ID: Sudanese government (Omar al-Bashir)

[587] http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/sudan2.pdf

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): United Salvation Front (UDSF/SSIM), SPLA/M-BGG, South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG), and Equatoria Defence Force (EDF)

Inclusive? No, SPLA-United, NDA, Beja Congress, and SAF were not included.

Conflict dates: 15 February 1984 - 9 January 2005

Conflict termination? No. While I have not found any direct evidence of attacks by any signatory parties after 1996, the boundaries between groups are so fluid that it is often unclear who is responsible for violence in the region. Most violent events between 1995 and 2005 are attributes to one or other splinter faction of the broader SPLA/M movement, and there are reports that the SSIM faction led by Riek reconciled with the Garang-led SPLA/M in early 2002 and was brought back into the movement. More research is needed, but the evidence points more towards the continuation of the signatory parties, rather than their demobilization.

Fashoda Peace Agreement – 20 September 1997

Full text source: Asser Institute, Centre for International and European Law[588]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement is a restatement of all of the terms outlined in the Khartoum Peace Agreement of earlier the same year, in an attempt to get the perceived biggest and most powerful south Sudanese rebellion to accept the bargain. It allows the SPLA-United to function and exist a legitimate political party during the interim period (Article 1).

[588] http://www.asser.nl/wihl-webroot/finals/Sudan/SD.T-TR.Fashoda%20Peace%20Agreement.1997.pdf

Government ID: Sudanese government (Omar al-Bashir)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): SPLA/M-United

Inclusive? No, the agreement was reached separately from that with the United Salvation Front (UDSF/SSIM), SPLA/M-BGG, South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG), and Equatoria Defence Force (EDF)

Conflict dates: 15 February 1984 - 9 January 2005

Conflict termination? No.

Cairo Agreement – 18 June 2005

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[589]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

Like the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed with the SPLA/M the same year, this settlement stipulates a federal system of government with decentralization of powers and management of resource wealth to the state level (Article 1.6). It also provides for the reinstatement of powerful opposition politicians and military personnel to the posts they held prior to the NIF coup of 1989 (7.1 and 9.3). Elections are scheduled within four years, and after holding a national census (3.3).

Government ID: Sudanese government (Omar al-Bashir)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): National Democratic Alliance (NDA)

[589] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Sud%2020050618.pdf

Inclusive? Yes. All of the active armed groups at the time were signatories to the NDA charter and held positions on the group's leadership council.[590]

Conflict dates: 11 October 1996[591] - 19 October 2002[592]

Conflict termination? Yes.

[590] The Beja Congress and RFL combined to form the Eastern Front (EF), which reached a power-sharing settlement with the government in October 2006. See "Sudan: Preserving Peace in the East," (International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 209, 26 November 2013).
[591] "Sudan opposition stages joint assault" (*United Press International*, 11 October 1996).
[592] "Sudan: Opposition commander says over 300 government troops killed in east" (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 19 October 2002).

TAJIKISTAN

General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan – 27 June 1997

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[593]

Clustered? Yes, with the "Protocol on the Fundamental Principles of Establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan" (1995).

Power sharing? Yes.

Provisions for power sharing include the allocation of thirty percent of executive positions to the UTO (Article II) and appointment of UTO officers to command positions during the third stage of integration. The agreement also stipulates a transitional Commission on National Reconciliation, elections and holding a referendum, a new electoral commission, the integration of forces, and an implementing monitoring commission.

Government ID: Tajik government (President Rakhmonov)

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): United Tajik Opposition

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 5 May 1992 – 12 May 1996[594]

Conflict termination? Yes, although another movement emerged in opposition to the agreement in 1998: the Movement for Peace in Tajikistan

[593] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/tajikistan/key-texts.php
[594] "Urgent - Tajikistan Confirms Fighting in Tavildara" (*TASS,* 12 May 1996).

UGANDA

Nairobi Peace Agreement – 17 December 1985

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[595]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

The power sharing arrangements were only transitional, such as appointing Museveni as Vice Chairman of the Military Council with seven total seats for the NRA, which would expire with the holding of elections "as soon as practicable" (Article 16). Other provisions include the integration of forces into a new national army (7-8).

Government ID: Military Council

- *History of defection?* No.

Rebel ID(s): National Resistance Army (NRA)

- *Inclusive?* Yes.

Conflict dates: 1981 - 26 January 1986[596]

- *Conflict termination?* No, the NRA continued fighting until taking over the government.

Pece Agreement – 3 June 1988

Full text source: ACCORD Conciliation Resources[597]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

[595] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/nairobi-peace-agreement.php
[596] "Ugandan leaders surrender to rebels" (*The Washington Post*, 29 January 1986).
[597] http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/pece-agreement.php

The agreement grants the UPDA/M seats on the National Resistance Council, a temporary legislative assembly charged with drafting a new constitution (Article 2). It also allows for the absorption of the UPDA soldiers into the army, but requires retraining for officers and leaves any political or military appointments to "the prerogative of the President" (B). It also commits the government to holding local-level elections in northern Uganda (A).

Government ID: National Resistance Movement (NRM)

History of defection? Yes, the NRA violated the Nairobi Agreement when it was the rebel signatory party.

Rebel ID(s): Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA)

Inclusive? No, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), Ninth of October Movement (NOM) and Uganda People's Army (UPA) were not included.

Conflict dates: 1986 - present

Conflict termination? No, the UPDA splintered and one faction formed an alliance with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

Addis Accord – 14 July 1990

Full text source: N/A

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? No.

Reports indicate that this agreement was a personal bargain for exiled UPDM leader Otema Allimadi to return to the leader and for the group's political wing to receive seats on the temporary National Resistance Council, in order to have a voice in the drafting of the country's new constitution and transition to multiparty democracy.

Government ID: National Resistance Movement (NRM)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Uganda People's Democratic Movement (UPDM)

Inclusive? No, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), and Uganda People's Army (UPA) were not included.

Conflict dates: 1986 - present

Conflict termination? No, the UPDA splintered and one faction formed an alliance with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

Yumbe Agreement – 24 December 2002

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[598]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The UNRFII was guaranteed that integrated officers would retain their ranks in the national army (Article IV). The agreement also promised resettlement packages, education and retraining for ex-combatants who were not integrated and an implementation oversight committee to be indefinitely positioned in the Ministry of Interior.

Government ID: National Resistance Movement (NRM)

History of defection? Yes.

Rebel ID(s): Uganda National Rescue Front II

[598] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Uga%2020021224.pdf

Inclusive? No, the WNBF, NFA, LRA, NALU, ADF, and PRA were not included.

Conflict dates: 1981 – 24 December 2002

Conflict termination? Yes.

UNITED KINGDOM

Good Friday Agreement – 10 April 1998

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[599]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

The agreement paved the way for a substantial devolution of powers to Northern Ireland, particularly in security and justice, and the implementation of a PR voting system with detailed rules for ministerial appointments.

Government ID: UK government

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Government of Ireland

Inclusive? No, a number of factions of the IRA were opposed to the agreement and have been associated with ongoing attacks (e.g. CIRA, RIRA, IRNA) through 2009 or later.

Conflict dates: 11 August 1970 – 17 June 1997[600]

Conflict termination? Yes.

[599] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/UK%2019980410.pdf
[600] "Police, peace die in IRA attack" (*St. Petersburg Times*, 17 June 1997).

YUGOSLAVIA (KOSOVO)

Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo – 23 February 1999

Full text source: UCDP Peace Agreement database[601]

Clustered? No.

Power sharing? Yes.

> The agreement details institutional rules for the new constitution, which include ethnic balance between the President and PM, ethnic quotas in the legislature and rules amounting to national vetoes, decentralization of powers and finance to the commune level defined by nationality, autonomous security rights for the nationalities, and equalization of revenues across the communes.

Government ID: Governments of FR Yugoslavia and Serbia

History of defection? No.

Rebel ID(s): Kosovo (UCK)

Inclusive? Yes.

Conflict dates: 22 April 1996 – 3 June 1999

Conflict termination? Yes.

[601] http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Yug%2019990223.pdf