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The Military Economy of Seventeenth Century Sri Lanka:  
Rhetoric and Authority in a Time of Conquest

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy  
in History

by

Cenan Pirani

2016

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Military Economy of Seventeenth Century Sri Lanka:  
Rhetoric and Authority in a Time of Conquest

by

Cenan Pirani

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Los Angeles, 2016

Professor Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Chair

From the end of the sixteenth century, the overseas administrative arm of the Portuguese Crown, the *Estado da Índia Oriental*, sought to gain complete territorial control of the island of Sri Lanka and outlined the tenets of the military project dubbed in administrative letters, “the Conquest of the Island of Ceylon”. Such efforts however would be impeded by military rebellions (ie. mutinies and desertions) by native military personnel in Portuguese service, where a rebellion that occurred in 1630 severely weakened the *Estado's* position in the island from which it could not recover. The specific event, the death of a Portuguese general at the hands of his own Christianized native troop, left a deep imprint on Portuguese memory. Decades later, the chronicler Fernão de Queiroz claimed the event, which paved the way for the European's eventual removal from the island by 1658, bore testament to the unbridgeable cultural and religious schism between the Portuguese and the native Sinhala people, an established viewpoint in current historiography.

This study focuses attention on the documentation in Portuguese, English, Spanish, and

Sinhalese written during the more active moments of the conquest period (1580-1640) in order to test such well-established views. Starting with the more general question of how *anyone* captured and maintained territorial authority in the island, since native island kings were said to have encountered similar challenges in keeping the loyalties of their military personnel, the study argues that any person or group vying for territorial authority was required to engage with a military service market consisting of personnel from inside and outside the island. One's posterity depended on how well one could recruit, compensate, and keep such personnel in service.

This case study is influenced by the topics and themes of larger studies on war in early modern South Asia and the Indian Ocean World, from which common challenges regarding territorial expansion are identified. Such pervading themes are enveloped in the concept *military economy*; a political and economic system of war that understands military personnel to be its central agents.

The dissertation of Cenan Pirani is approved.

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2016

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## Abbreviations

<i>AHU-Caixas</i>	<i>Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino; Caixas da Índia.</i>
<i>ANTT-CSV</i>	<i>Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais – Torre do Tombo; Coleção de São Vicente: Book 19.</i>
<i>ANTT-LM</i>	<i>Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais – Torre do Tombo; Livros das Monções.</i>
<i>Assunção</i>	<i>Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais – Torre do Tombo; Manuscritos da Livraria: Codex 1699, ff. 243-320.</i>
<i>Bocarro</i>	<i>O livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e povoações do Estado da Índia Oriental, Vol. 1, Isabel Cid (ed.) (Lisbon, 1992).</i>
<i>DRI-LM</i>	<i>Pato, Raymundo António de Bulhão, Documentos Remittidos da Índia ou Livros das Monções (vol. 1-5) (Lisbon, 1880-1935). Rego, António da Silva, Documentos Remittidos da Índia ou Livros das Monções (vol. 6-10) (Lisbon, 1976-1982).</i>
<i>Estado</i>	<i>Panduronga Pissurlencar, Assentos do Conselho do Estado (Goa, 1956).</i>
<i>Filmoteca</i>	<i>Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, Boletim da Filmoteca Portuguesa, Vol. 11 (Lisbon, 1954).</i>
<i>Glossário</i>	<i>Sebastião Rodolfo Dalgado, Glossário Luso-Asiático, (2 Vols) (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1919).</i>
<i>HAG-Fazenda</i>	<i>Historical Archives of Goa; Conselho da Fazenda.</i>
<i>HAG-RV</i>	<i>Historical Archives of Goa; Reis Vizinhos: Vol. 1.</i>

- Jornada* *Jornada do reino de Huva, por Constantino de Sa de Noronha, oferecida a senhora dona Luisa da Silva e Mendonça. anno de 1635; Biblioteca da Ajuda (Cod. 52-VI-51).*
- Knox Robert Knox, *An Historical Relation of the Island Ceylon*, J. H. O. Paulusz (ed.) 2nd edition (2 vols.) (Dehiwala, 1989).
- Kustantinu Hatana* *Kustantinu Hatana*, Rohini Parnavitana (ed.) (Colombo, 2006)
- Mandarampura Puvata* *Mandarampura Puvata*, D.E. Hettiaracci (ed.) (Colombo, 1958).
- Queiroz Fernão de Queiroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon, translated into English by S.G. Perera* (3 Vols.) (Colombo: A.C. Richards, Acting Government Printer, 1930).
- Rajasiha Hatana* *Rajasiha Hatana*, Ellepola H. M. Somarathna (ed.) (Kandy, 1966).
- Rajavaliya* A.V. Suraweera, *Rajavaliya: A Comprehensive Account of the Kings of Sri Lanka* (Ratmalana: Vishva Lekha, 2000).
- Regimentos* Tikiri Abeyasinghe (ed. & trans.), *A Study of Portuguese Regimentos on Sri Lanka at the Goa Archives* (Colombo: Department of National Archives, 1974).
- Sitavaka Hatana* *Sitavaka Hatana*, Rohini Parnavitana (ed.) (Colombo, 1999).

## **Preface / Acknowledgements**

The year from which the study of this dissertation began, 2009, was a transitional moment in many respects for the two countries I would be regularly visiting from then on to complete my research; Portugal and Sri Lanka. In the case of Portugal, the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis, triggered by the 2008 collapse of the international banking system, impacted every person I met in my time there. The crash of two major national banks led to a series of annual debt crises that needed to be covered by multiple bailout packages over the next few years provided by the IMF and Germany. To repay the loans, and thus regain composure and international investor confidence, the government needed to enact spending cuts and austerity measures, most of which were directed at the relatively large public sector, causing high rates of unemployment. Some immigrant populations, people from the Lusophone world, began repatriating given the closing of opportunities in Portugal coupled with the strengthening of their national economies of origin; Brazil and Angola being the most impressive cases. Native Portuguese would follow this emigration trend to seek out employment in these places as well, with Angola being a prime destination given consistent economic expansion linked to the growth of the petroleum industry. The Portuguese private sector would also follow suit by attempting to appeal to the Angolan market; and even law offices dealing with national corporate law quickly learned Angolan business legal codes in order to serve the considerably more profitable market in Africa. In a statement that sparked public criticism, the Portuguese Prime Minister, Pedro Passos Coelho, in 2011 acknowledged the attractiveness of the Angolan and Brazilian economies and even encouraged the emigration of high-skilled Portuguese citizens to such places in order to obtain employment and thus lessen the burden on the Portuguese government. Though the appeal for emigration was unprecedented, such statements reflected a process already in place that many

Portuguese enacted on their own.

This search for foreign employment among some Portuguese re-evoked some popular viewpoints regarding the flexible cultural disposition of the Portuguese, where the concept of *Luso-Tropicalism* was constantly touched on without naming it outright. The concept originally developed in the 1930s by the Brazilian intellectual, Gilberto Freyre, posited that the Portuguese were a multiracial and thus culturally adaptive people who spanned over many continents since the fifteenth century, and in this contemporary context it began to provide some sort of cultural explanation for the willingness to emigrate. Previously, the concept was taken up by the Portuguese autocrat António de Oliveira Salazar as a means of legitimating his refusal to follow in the footsteps of other European nations and decolonize overseas possessions in the 1950s. Though treated as an uninterrupted cultural trait, the most recent manifestation was fundamentally different; it called to question whether European states like Portugal live in the center of a world system that African countries like Angola are peripheral to.

Perhaps the best indication of this latter point is conveyed through popular entertainment, specifically the recent airing of a Portuguese soap-opera (*telenovela*) in which half of the story is set in Lisbon and the other in Luanda, Angola. The television program follows a 'Romeo and Juliet' plot framing; a young white Portuguese male, who is the son of an elite Lisbon-based family, falls in love with a young black Angolan woman, the daughter of a rich Luanda-based business mogul. From the beginning, the star-crossed lovers predictably had to deal with conflicts between the families; a prejudiced Portuguese family on one side, and an Angolan family tied to the militant anti-colonization movements of the 1960s on the other. As the story goes, the Angolan business mogul father orchestrated a hostile takeover of the Portuguese boy's family company and looked to dissolve it out of spite because his daughter eloped with a *pula*

('whitey'). Though highly sensational, as any *telenovela* would be, the overarching theme that Portuguese citizens and the national economy were moving to the tune of Angolan business was by no means fictional.

In the case of Sri Lanka, the transition felt there had everything to do with the end of the decades long war between the Sri Lankan Government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009. Other designations for the military conflict, such as 'civil war' and 'ethnic conflict', were put forward given the clear cultural and linguistic differences that could be noted between the majority ethnic group, Sinhalese, and next largest minority group, Tamils, that the warring parties were said to be representing. As it would be explained by many academics and scholars, the most recent outbreak of tensions was just another manifestation of a perennial sectarian conflict that went back a few millennia between the two groups. The Pali chronicle of island kings, the *Mahavamsa*, contained evidence of these hostilities, which are said to have begun in the second century BCE with the Sinhala king Duttu Gemunu's taking of the Anuradhapuran kingdom from the Tamil Chola king, Elara. Thus from this point in the history of the island it is explained that the 'indigenous' native Sinhala kings would have to fight back the continual incursions of 'foreign' South Indian powers. The introduction of Buddhism and its patronage by Sinhala island kings was said to have intensified differences, as the formation of the Axial Age religion was explained to have had an epistemological conflict with a competing religion in the South Asian region, Hinduism. Thus the continued South Indian Pandyan incursions against Sinhala kings over the next centuries, which contributed to the movement of the polity from the region of Anuradhapura to Polonnaruva, then to Gampola, and finally Kotte, was in great part mediated by an ideological clash between the 'transcendental worldviews' carried by the two ethnic groups.

With the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009, surprisingly, the popular rhetoric of an epistemological clash between Sinhalese and Tamils ceased almost instantaneously and was replaced by sentiments of equivalence in the vein of a common set of Indic cultural and religious origins. This newfound proximity however came with a newfound schism, where the next minority ethnic group, Muslims, were now beginning to be explained to be in the throes of an epistemological clash with the majority Sinhala group that was nearing boiling point. The specific issue being the newfound national concerns over cow-slaughter, as was pushed with a campaign on the issue by the right wing Buddhist nationalist group, the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS - “Buddhist Power Army”) in 2012. The group led by the intentionally inflammatory monk, Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, received protection from the then Defense Minister, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, allowing the monk to create national differences by intentionally targeting the Muslim community. The act was an attempt at forming an electioneering platform for the upcoming presidential election; to create a specter of an internal terrorist threat from which the ruling party could highlight its commitment to national security, a campaign strategy that granted them decisive victories in the last election given their defeat of the LTTE.

Understanding this background did not stop some scholars and intellectuals from issuing warnings about the real and potential problems that the inherent religious/cultural differences between Sinhalese and Muslims could bring about. In one case, a commentary in the largest English national newspaper claimed that as horrible as it was that the BBS was targeting the Muslim community, the ingrained aversion to cow-slaughter in the spiritual psyche (*cintana*) of the Sinhalese would always in some way pit the communities against each other. In another commentary on global anti-Muslim violence committed by Buddhist monks in an international journalistic publication, a similar position was taken, where the author claimed that such

contradictory measures taken by the clergy of one of the most 'arguably peaceful religions' was because they felt a call to action only because of the global expansion of Islam due to its practitioners' 'conversion drives'. The basis for such doom-saying arguments would crumble as seen in subsequent events; the ruling party would lose the presidential election at the end of 2014 to a splinter group aimed at breaking their coalition. This defeat lifted the protections that Gnanasara and his group once had, leaving him susceptible to criminal allegations, which in turn resulted in the almost instantaneous evacuation of the sectarian sentiments from the public sphere that Gnanasara and his group once pushed.

In the cases of transition that I witnessed in both Portugal and Sri Lanka, as fundamental shifts were taking place, there was an attempt to hold on to well-established and oft-utilized pieces of rhetoric in order to hold on to a notion of continuity. The attempts were fundamentally made in order to keep a singular, timeless, and essential national cultural disposition intact in both cases. Given the unique position I had, as a 'outsider' (no familial connections) who had an intimate engagement with the languages, cultures, and societies in both countries, I perhaps was best situated to see how awkward and desperate such attempts at patching together the splitting fabric of time were. Such a vantage-point also in turn made me wary of the blanket assumptions and seamlessness attributed to the historical period of study in this thesis, since the lessons taken from a distant past served as the building blocks for such essentialist contemporary viewpoints. Such circumstances led me to wipe the proverbial intellectual slate clean when approaching the sources from the period of study, where I aimed to answer the simple question that in my view had been continually skipped over: *what is a broadly understood notion of authority, and how does one achieve it over others?* Thus, the present study is the result of its time, a time when the accumulated weight of intellectual baggage was much more of a burden to carry than to drop it

all completely and start from scratch.

Such a task was not taken on alone, and I owe many thanks and acknowledgments to those from the two said countries that supported me in this process. The names I mention here in no way represent everyone, but these people were most instrumental in helping me to achieve the completion of this Ph.D. work in one way or another. In Portugal; Nuno Camarneiro, Ana Fernandes, Isabel Granés, Filipa Madeira, Sidh Mendiratta, André Murteira, James Nelson Novoa, Edite Queiroz, and Ana Tuna. In Sri Lanka; Anushaya Collure, Devaka Gunawardena, Ahilan Kadirgamar, Niyanthini Kadirgamar, Buddhima Padmasiri, Sunanda Premasiri, Chamila Somirathna, Meera Srinivasan, and Vinita.

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## **Introduction: WAR IN EARLY MODERN SRI LANKA: MOVING FROM THE MODEL OF A CIVILIZATIONAL CLASH TO A MILITARY ECONOMIC MODEL**

For more than three thousand years after civilizations first emerged, the contacts among them were, with some exceptions, either nonexistent or limited or intermittent and intense. The nature of these contacts is well expressed in the word historians use to describe them: “encounters.”

- Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*

In the history of European overseas expansion, the case of the Portuguese in Sri Lanka during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries carries all the familiar tenets of a civilizational West versus Rest encounter. The first Portuguese ships officially landed on the island in 1506 (although there may have been some earlier contacts), but the Europeans would not aim to set up a base in Colombo for trade until the end of the next decade. These new island trade ambitions coincided in time with a set of events that led to the fragmentation of the nearest kingdom, the Western kingdom of Kotte, into three smaller kingdoms: Kotte, Rayigama, and Sitavaka in 1521 due to a succession dispute.<sup>1</sup> The events in question involved a regicide/patricide of the previous Kotte king, Vijayabahu, by his own three sons, who resolved to split the kingdom between themselves.<sup>2</sup> However, tensions soon arose between the king of the now smaller region of Kotte, Bhuvanekabahu VII and his brother the king of Sitavaka, Mayadunne. The Portuguese aimed to take advantage of this situation by offering military support to Bhuvanekabahu in exchange for the privilege of erecting a fort and trading center in Colombo, which the island king readily accepted since he had very little by way of military capability against his brother and enemy,

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1 For details on the first Portuguese activities in the island between 1506 and 1521, see: Geneviève Bouchon, “Les rois de Kotte au debut du XVIe siècle” in *Mare Luso-Indicum* (Vol. 1, 1971), pp. 74-82.

2 Jorge Manuel Flores, *Hum Curto Historia de Ceylan: Quinhentos Anos de Relações entre Portugal e o Sri Lanka* (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 2000), p. 52.

Mayadunne of Sitavaka.<sup>3</sup>

The Portuguese provided Bhuvanekabahu with this military defense against his brother into the century, and the Europeans are said to have used this dependence to gradually take control of the kingdom for themselves. Initial moves were made to convert Bhuvanekabahu to Christianity, which he refused until he was assassinated, but the next king Dharmapala eventually conceded to the ardent request.<sup>4</sup> Dharmapala, baptized as João, is said to have become a practicing Christian, and proved his faith by passing the authority of the kingdom over to the Christian King of Portugal on his death. Thus, by 1597, the Portuguese had taken full and direct control over the Western kingdom's territory.<sup>5</sup>

This new acquisition coincided with a change of power in Europe, as the two Iberian Crowns merged under the control of the Spanish Habsburgs from 1580, what is known as the 'Iberian Union'. Therefore by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the unified Crown controlled territories big and small between the Americas and Asia, including the territory of Kotte in the island of Ceylon (*Ceilão*).<sup>6</sup> Given their global position, the Kings Philip of Portugal and Spain sought to expand their authority over the entire island by military means, and entrusted an official project termed *a conquista da ilha de Ceilão* (the Conquest of the Island of Ceylon) to the *Estado da Índia Oriental* ("The [Portuguese Oversees] State of East India"). Initial gains were made with little force needed, specifically the annexation of Sitavaka, which had a vacuum of power after the deaths of both Mayadunne (1580s) and his son Rajasinha (1593).<sup>7</sup> Further

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3 *Ibid.*, p. 53.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 55, 62.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 69.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 66.

military incursions led by the general Jerónimo de Azevedo resulted in the takeover of key interior military strongholds Malvana, Manikkadavara, Balana, eastern ports; Batticaloa and Trincomalee, and parts of the south, including Matara in the next two decades. In 1619 the general Filipe de Oliveira added to the territories by taking over the northern region of Jaffna, a key zone for the control of the Palk Strait. Thus, by 1620 from the viewpoint of the Portuguese the interior mountainous region of Kandy was the last key territory that the Europeans needed to acquire to complete the conquest.<sup>8</sup>

However, the Portuguese could never achieve this despite the continual attempts they made over a period of some 40 years. Their earliest attempt was in 1594, when they made a military expedition to Kandy to install what they understood to be a native and legitimate heir to the throne, a Kandyan princess baptized as Dona Catarina. On approaching the upcountry kingdom the head of the *lascarim* native troops in the Portuguese party, a Christianized islander baptized as João da Austria, mutinied with his army and from under the cover of the jungled areas fought off the remaining Portuguese force led by the general Pedro Lopes de Sousa.<sup>9</sup> On completing this victory he married Dona Catarina and installed himself as king, shedding his baptismal name to take on the official title of Vimaladharmasuriya (“pure one, who represents the Buddha *dharma*, belonging to the royal solar caste”).

More misadventures were to come for the Portuguese with the Kandyan king who followed, Senarat, a one-time Buddhist monk and brother of Vimaladharmasuriya. The aforementioned king frustrated attempts at a military expedition on Kandy led by the general Constantino de Sá de Noronha by convincing the Portuguese commander's four trusted native

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8 *Ibid.*, pp. 71-6.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 71.

military generals (*disavas*) to rebel and help ensnare Sá and his remaining company in the upcountry forested area of Randeniwela in 1630.<sup>10</sup> The entire affair led the Portuguese commanders in the island to be extremely distrustful of island troops from then on. The final blow against Portuguese military authority was dealt in the time of the third Kandyan king, Rajasinha II, who fought off the last military expedition to Kandy led by the general Diogo de Melo de Castro in 1638, and made an alliance with the Dutch in the 1640s to unseat the Portuguese from their coastal fortifications.<sup>11</sup> By 1658, the Portuguese occupation in the island was no longer viable, and by the end of the decade the Dutch East India Company had taken over their coastal possessions.<sup>12</sup>

Explanations of the rise and fall of the Iberian power in the island, along with their unrealized ambitions at territorial control, are subjects that are touched on directly and indirectly in the extant literature. Generally, this literature works inside the lines of a civilizational cultural dichotomy of 'Western versus Indic', or its religious variant 'Christian versus Buddhist', when attempting to explain eventual outcomes. As would be argued by such interventions, such worldviews were commensurable and incommensurable on certain important matters (legitimacy of kingly rule, and notions/methods of sovereign territorial control in itself), which ultimately resulted in conflicts and shifts in power.<sup>13</sup> In this thesis, though such approaches and their empirical bases are noted, it is my claim that such approaches are insufficient in explaining the nature of how the Portuguese failed to establish and maintain lasting and recognizable territorial authority in the island over others, and much less how any party captured authority. To answer

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10 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 78.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 83.

this question, I first claim that there is a broadly shared and recognized process of establishing territorial authority in the island that was directly linked to the management of military manpower. Additionally, the organization of this manpower involved its own process; recruitment was inextricably linked to fund-raising and effective compensation for the services rendered by military personnel, where such people offered their services in a market-type structure to different and competing would-be power-holders. To sketch out the complex dynamics of the political, economic, cultural and social relationships that this pact between a potential sovereign and their military recruits gave way to, I build out the concept of *military economy*, which will be explained in greater detail in subsequent sections. For now, it is worth examining extant studies on the island during the early modern period that when pieced together offers a set of explanations for how and why the *Estado* could not achieve the said conquest that the Crown mandated.

#### *EARLY MODERN SRI LANKA IN WORLD HISTORY: THE WESTERN IMPERIAL VERSUS INDIC KINGSHIP DICHOTOMY*

A broadly seminal work that identifies the entity of the *West* in World History is the conspicuously titled work by William McNeill originally published in 1963, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community*.<sup>14</sup> In it he details world history spanning from 1700

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13 The subject of commensurability and incommensurability in diplomatic relations and warfare between early modern Eurasian states and empires is the subject of the book by Sanjay Subrahmanyam on 'courtly encounters', see: Subrahmanyam, *Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). Subrahmanyam is keen to note that though the general tendency in early modern studies is to examine the outcomes of encounters between polities along larger civilizational lines, especially in the case of West/non-West encounters, it is more useful to understand how the actors involved represent certain 'subcultures or segments of societies' of the larger political entities in question. *Ibid.*, p. xiv. Besides this, commensurability in such encounters should not be automatically assumed simply because representatives can be tagged to the same religious or cultural grouping (i.e. Ottomans and Mughals).

14 William McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

BCE to 1950 CE and identifies when the West, sometimes loosely associated with Western Europe but which later includes the “outliers” such as North America, tips the balance of power on a global scale away from its competitors such as China and those regions that are broadly understood to be “Moslem”. McNeill identifies the fulcrum period of this *divergence*<sup>15</sup> to be from 1500 CE, a period when Europeans began to expand outside of Western Europe and into lands connected to the sea regions of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

This World historical survey that documents the ascendancy of the ‘West over the Rest’, promoted a taxonomy of “civilizations”, which represented tenuous conjunctions of political entities, geographic regions, regional cultural entities, and religions (i.e. Western, Sinic, Indic, Islamic), that demarcated the main set of players in human history. The concept of civilizational groupings offered by McNeill was in part owed to a related study covering the “Axial Age” of World history. As explained by a proponent of the specialty field, S. N. Eisenstadt, the period ranging from the eight to the third centuries BCE was marked by a concurrent set of “transcendental breakthroughs” that occurred throughout Eurasia and which led to the development of a set of cultural “worldviews” that gave way to the making of world religions.<sup>16</sup> As Eisenstadt explained it, such civilizations propelled by disparate worldviews were in natural

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15 The literature related to the phenomenon in World history known as the *Great Divergence* is wide and varied. Besides McNeill, early divergence literature included the work specifically related to Asia by Eric Jones that highlighted what he called the “European miracle”, see: Jones, *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). By the 1990s this scholarship shifted, noting the “Eurocentric” claims the original proponents of the theory carried. Andre Gunder Frank counter-posed his study on Asia against Jones in particular, claiming that Asia was the center of economic innovation that Europe in some way depended upon, see: Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley: UC Press, 1998). Other works were to follow in a similar vein including that of Kenneth Pomeranz coming out of the China field, who in some way claimed the Industrial Revolution, a mark of Western exceptionalism, was due to luck and not cultural superiority, see: Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

16 See: S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986).

competition with each other and were in some way directed by institutions managed by elite social formations (i.e. intellectual and clerical groups).<sup>17</sup>

Taken as a whole, these general World historical themes, specifically of encroaching Western dominance and the opposition of an entrenched Indic society in the face of it, would set the basis for the historiography on Sri Lanka during the early modern period. In the vein of recounting the history of Western dominance in the island, the scholarship coming out of Sri Lanka between the 1960s and 1970s would mostly concern itself with the efficacy and transition of Portuguese and Dutch “rule” over the island. Scholars such as Tikiri Abeyasinghe, Chandra R. De Silva, Sinnappah Arasaratnam, and K. W. Goonewardena, coming from the intellectual community that formed around Peradeniya University in Kandy, learned to read Portuguese and Dutch sources in order to write the history of the island in this manner.<sup>18</sup> They accordingly periodized Sri Lankan history around the Western powers' “colonial” occupation; thus, the period from around 1506 to the 1650s was termed the “Portuguese Era”, while the period following till the 1750s was termed the “Dutch Era”, and the “British Era” proceeded till 1948 at the dawn of independence. The island scholars would build off the themes put forward from the early part of the twentieth century by Paul E. Pieris, who produced a two volume chronicle text titled *Ceylon: The Portuguese Era*, which he composed almost directly from the history contained in a lengthy and seemingly comprehensive chronicle composed in 1688 on the history of the some 150 years of the Portuguese in Ceylon by the Goa based Jesuit, Fernão de Queiroz, *A Conquista Temporal*

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17 *Ibid.*, p.4.

18 See: Tikiri Abeyasinghe, *Portuguese Rule in Ceylon 1594-1612* (Colombo, 1966). Sinnappah Arasaratnam, *Dutch Power in Ceylon 1658-1687* (Colombo, 1966). Chandra De Silva, *The Portuguese in Ceylon 1617-1638* (Colombo, 1972). K.W. Goonewardena, *The Foundation of Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1638-1658* (Amsterdam, 1958).

*e Espiritual de Ceylão* (“The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon”).<sup>19</sup>

Queiroz's text, which would be transcribed and translated shortly thereafter by the Sri Lankan Jesuit Father S. G. Perera in the 1930s and made widely available, recounted the events of Portuguese ascendancy and decline in the island with a clearly tragic tone.<sup>20</sup> The text, written through the 1670s to the 1680s and thus reflecting a period of absolute finality of Portuguese authority in the island, was a moralistic treatise on why the island was lost to the Dutch, and was a corresponding plea for the Portuguese Crown to revive activities in the island, albeit within the guidelines that Queiroz laid out. Queiroz, being a member of the clergy, predictably claimed that Portuguese administrative officers in the island proceeded to behave in an “un-Christian-like” manner, where they were said to be involved in personal economic activities that corrupted the entire overseas structure and disadvantaged those officers who aimed to work for the king's service. One such case was that of the Portuguese *fidalgo* who held the position of “Captain-General of the Conquest of the Island of Ceylon” for two separate terms, Constantino de Sá de Noronha, who not only was at loggerheads with other officers in the *Estado da Índia*, but died due to a rebellion that his own native Christian military captains organized during an expedition on Kandy in 1630. Accordingly, Queiroz recommended that any plan for reconquest needed to be two-fold; it needed to check the “excesses” that officers who claimed to be working for the Crown committed as well as enact a steady program of Christianizing the local population, since such a rebellion against Sá, a man who Christianized his own native troop only to have them turn coat, represented a kind of religious apostasy that would not have occurred had a proper process

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19 Paul E. Pieris, *Ceylon: The Portuguese Era: History of the Island for the Period 1505-1658* (2 vols.) (Colombo: The Colombo Apothecaries Company Limited, 1914). Fernão de Queiroz, *Conquista temporal e espiritual de Ceilão* (Colombo, 1916).

20 Fernão de Queiroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon, translated into English by S.G. Perera* (3 Vols.) (Colombo: A.C. Richards, Acting Government Printer, 1930).

of religious indoctrination occurred. In this vein, Queiroz throughout his text constantly states that such a tendency for the local Sinhala (*chingala*) populace to revolt against the Portuguese while under military service was in great part rooted in their intrinsic disdain for Christianity and their desire to follow their own “gentile” practices, a theme voiced often in much of the documentation especially from after the summer of 1630 (post Sá rebellion) that Queiroz would have come across himself when doing his own research for his chronicle.

Readily available in English translation from 1930, the Queiroz text's contents and its framing of the history of Portuguese activity in Sri Lanka, as being marked by mismanagement that allowed for detrimental consequences leading to the Dutch takeover of the island, in great measure set the empirical basis for a wide array of divisive political/academic debates in the country from the 1960s; the Cold-War period of the West and the post-colonial period of the East. Accordingly, a binding tie amongst the “Peradeniya school” of scholars from the 1960s and 1970s was the general air of anti-colonialism that the group carried, where Sri Lanka as a country from the beginning of the sixteenth century to 1948 was described as having been under the colonial yoke of one European power or another, and where each successive power took control because they were slightly more socially, technologically, economically, and/or politically sophisticated in their mode of colonial rule than the previous.

This latter point did not conflict with the themes in wider studies on the shift of Indian Ocean maritime power from the Portuguese to the Dutch. Niels Steensgaard's work published in 1973, *Carracks, Caravans and Companies: The Structural Crisis in European-Asian Trade in the Early 17th Century*, offered a specific set of reasons for this occurrence that focused on the

economic rationality of the Northern European Dutch over the Iberian Portuguese.<sup>21</sup> In this view, the Dutch joint-stock company system model for overseas trade, the result being the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC), beat out their Iberian competitors because the latter's "re-distributive" economic model and Crown centralization could not sustain their overseas enterprise. In a work that is in conversation with both the Peradeniya school as well as Steensgaard, George Winius's *Fatal History of Portuguese Ceylon: Transition to Dutch Rule*, points to the 1630 rebellion as a turning-point in Portuguese authority from which the Dutch soon capitalized.<sup>22</sup> Ultimately, Winius claims that the rebellion was the result of the fallout of loyalties that Constantino de Sá's native troops had with him, which in some way had to do with some errors of judgment he made on the expedition, specifically, he had a popular place of worship that many soldiers frequented burnt down. In this case, Sá is charged with not having a more lenient attitude toward "gentile" practices, a typically intolerant behavior pattern of Catholics in this period. The source from where Winius gains such information is the anonymous first-person account, *Jornada do Reino de Huva*, another text edited and translated by S. G. Perera in 1930, a text that is also consulted by Queiroz in his own chronicle.<sup>23</sup>

The idea of islanders being resistant to not only Christianity, but moreover, to Christian over-lordship finds some connection to a parallel set of studies on Sri Lanka in the Buddhist Studies field. Studies on the general prevalence of Buddhism on culture and society in Sri Lanka, and more importantly on the politics of rule, has been taken up by a group of scholars who aimed

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21 Niels Steensgaard, *Carracks, caravans and companies: The structural crisis in the European-Asian trade in the early 17th century* (Stolckholm: Studentlitteratur, 1973).

22 George Davison Winius, *The Fatal History of Portuguese Ceylon: Transition to Dutch Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

23 S. G. Perera (trans. & ed.), *The expedition to Uva made by Constantine de Sa de Noronha, Captain-General of Ceylon, as narrated by a soldier who took part in the Expedition, together with an Account of the Siege laid to Colombo by the King of Kandy written by Affonso Dias de Lomba* (Colombo, 1930).

to identify origins of modern Sinhala Buddhist identity by way of surmising the origins of the island's particular strand of Buddhism: Theravada Buddhism. Coming from what might be called a “post-colonial” position, Richard Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere's, *Buddhism Transformed*, attempts to chart how some areas of Buddhist practice had been shaped more recently through British colonialism and along the model of Protestant Christianity.<sup>24</sup> The authors note the place that figures in the nineteenth century like Anagarika Dharmapala had in establishing the modern religion in this way. Specifically, the authors claimed that he and others helped to bring about an exclusive variant of Buddhism from the messy base of what the authors call “spirit religion”; the philosophies found in the Pali linguistic canon that the two show to be a “syncretic” mix of Hindu and Buddhist practices, beliefs, and deities. In another work that argues against this chronology of the formation of Theravada Buddhism, and specifically takes issue with how both Gombrich and Obeyesekere claim this exclusive consolidation came about in response to British colonialism, John Holt's book titled, *Buddha in the Crown*, claims that such phenomenon occurred much earlier in the “late medieval period”, a time when there was no European presence in the island.<sup>25</sup> Holt argues this by tracking the cult around the Mahayana *bodhisattva* known as Avalokiteśvara, who later was transformed into Nātha in the island, and where this latter avatar is recognized in exclusively island Buddhist practice into the more recent centuries. Holt tracks the veneration practice of Avalokiteśvara as it made its way from South India and the Pallava kingdom from where it entered into the north-eastern part of the country through “cross-cultural contact”, referring to contact with both Mahayana Buddhist and larger

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24 Richard Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere, *Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

25 John Clifford Holt, *Buddha in the Crown: Avalokiteśvara in the Buddhist Traditions of Sri Lanka* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

“Hindu” influences. The point where Avalokiteśvara becomes Nātha is significant, as the evolution occurs in the Kandy region, in which the ascetic visage of Avalokiteśvara becomes the kingly Nātha; an exclusively island deity that is a type of proto-nationalist symbol of defense. From here, Holt explains that the deity further evolved as it was taken up by island rulers representing the Gampola kingdom between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and reached a kind of apex in the sixteenth century once again in Kandy, where Nātha devotionism was a kind of requirement by kings before they could achieve any level of royal legitimacy.

Though Holt's work shows some clear distinctions from Gombrich and Obeyesekere, in that Holt seems keen to locate Theravada Buddhism, and invariably Buddhist nationalism, to a pre-modern period, the two studies seem to agree about the “syncretic” origins of Theravada Buddhism. Making the religion at the heart of Sinhala Buddhist nationalist identity commensurate with other “Indic” civilizational religions (i.e. Hinduism) was a kind of indirect polemical intervention made by both camps of scholars at a time when the explanation for the decades-long war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka, often referred to as a “civil war”, was based on a presumed cultural epistemological clash between ethnic Sinhalese and Tamil sections of society, a viewpoint voiced by their contemporary E. Valentine Daniel in his own work, *Charred Lullabies*.<sup>26</sup> Such studies that were meant to “bridge the ethnic gap”, as it were, ultimately however had to assume the deep fissure between Western (and even Islamic) culture and religion to that in the endemically Indic society of Sri Lanka.

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26 In a strange variant of the civilizational model, Daniel claims that the religious tradition of Buddhism shares more in common with Christian and Islamic traditions as evidenced by the historical/chronicle writings that are found in all three traditions, whereas, in Hinduism no similar type of historical textual production is found. Daniel assumes the conflicting approach to memory is symptomatic of a greater endemic cultural clash between Sinhalese and Tamils, a perennial problem that often leads to violence between the groups. See: Daniel, *Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropology of Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

In recent scholarship, Alan Strathern's *Kingship and Conversion in Sixteenth-Century Sri Lanka: Portuguese Imperialism in a Buddhist Land*, can be understood as a prime example of the amalgamation of the two main currents of research that converge around the events of the sixteenth century period in the island as explained above; the imposition of Portuguese imperial authority over the island, and the maintenance of an entrenched Sinhala Buddhist social and political culture in the face of it.<sup>27</sup> Strathern shows how Sri Lankan history in the sixteenth century was marked by a civilizational clash type encounter that placed an endemically Christian political ideological system against a Buddhist one. Such a conflict becomes apparent in Strathern's survey of the case of the repeated frustrated attempts to convert the King of Kotte, Bhuvanekabahu VII, to Christianity. Bhuvanekabahu, who sought a political and military alliance with the Portuguese to fight his brother, King Mayadunne of Sitavaka, conceded to the Portuguese wish to convert islanders, assuming that it was done on the basis of faith and that it did not affect the measure of kingly authority that the Sinhala king had over such subjects. However, the Portuguese would time and again clash with the king on such details, and even insist that the Sinhala king himself convert to Christianity, using his dependence on Portuguese military support to pressurize him. Resisting the proposal till the day he died, Strathern claims the King's position represents the Sinhala Buddhist Kingship practice of “transcendentalist-intransigence”, and that whereas Bhuvanekabahu could allow for the acceptance of other faiths in his kingdom he ultimately needed to remain Buddhist for the Sinhala populace, lest his legitimacy as an island king would be made null and void. In the vein of Holt, the island was culturally predisposed to require a legitimate sovereign, a *cakravartin*, who would protect and

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27 Alan Strathern, *Kingship and Conversion in Sixteenth-Century Sri Lanka: Portuguese Imperialism in a Buddhist Land* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

maintain the “triple gem”; the memory of the figure of the Buddha, the Buddha's teaching (*dharmā*), and the Buddhist community (*sangha*). According to Strathern, the necessity of this type of legitimacy is evidenced by events that followed when the king who succeeded him, Dharmapala, converted to Christianity by order of the Portuguese, which resulted in a mass exodus of his one-time supporters from his court to the court of the neighboring kingdom, Sitavaka under Mayadunne. The sources Strathern consults for this specific information include a volume of Portuguese administrative documents from the period related to ecclesiastical activities in the island organized and translated by the Jesuit Father Vito Perniola. Outside of these sources Strathern, like many before him, is almost completely reliant on the Queiroz chronicle and finds the theme of political conflict on the basis of a religious conflict to be a suitable characterization for most of the events in question, albeit with some exceptional cases of “realpolitik”, which he characterized as being “temporal” instead of “spiritual”, a dichotomy set down by Queiroz.

Another recent study that takes some difference with Strathern's characterization of the nature of the conflict between the Portuguese and the island powers, albeit gently, is a book by Zoltán Biedermann which is a compilation of previously published articles entitled, *The Portuguese in Sri Lanka and South India*.<sup>28</sup> Biedermann, being trained in Portugal and thus having access to a wider set of untranslated material, explained that the Portuguese were not wholly and uniformly imperial from the moment they arrived in the island. Instead, certain political and diplomatic pressures and contingent circumstances led them to be in the position of authority from which they ruled Kotte through the puppet, Dharmapala. Biedermann differs

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28 Zoltán Biedermann, *The Portuguese in Sri Lanka and South India: Studies in the History of Diplomacy, Empire and Trade, 1500-1650* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014).

slightly from Strathern in the way he finds that such diplomatic pressures that led to the seizure of Kotte resonate a type of commensurability between Catholic and Buddhist notions of sovereignty, as specifically evidenced in the respectively understood vassalage agreements and tributary arrangements. Though Biedermann attempts to differentiate himself from Strathern's approach, as shown above the two scholars' works are both natural products of the course of scholarship produced thus far. Ultimately, the two scholars, and the combination of scholarship that has preceded them, cannot see the historical players working outside of clearly defined sides that fall on one or the other side of a West/Rest civilizational model, with the prevalent rhetoric around Christian and non-Christian belief as the base evidence. In such cases it is assumed belief, or well-disguised crypto-belief, in one religion over the other mediated the side that historical actors found themselves on.

*THE CIVILIZATIONAL MODEL AND THE INTRACTABLE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY  
'CONQUISTA'*

If the civilizational model is so widely used across disciplines, regions and areas of study, why not continue to use it to explain eventual outcomes in the Sri Lankan case? Or use it to map out the sides, and accordingly give meaning to the activities of key figures (i.e. sensibilities and motivations) in Sri Lanka in the early modern period? After all, “contemporary” chroniclers like Queiroz framed things in this way; Europeans as a whole represented a clear and dominant side from the local islanders, and where the greatest challenges that the Portuguese faced could be related in one way or another to a religious ideological conflict, which was a popular explanation for the impetus of native troop rebellions in Portuguese service.

Put quite plainly, the civilizational model may be useful if study is centered on the

explanation of events and themes found in Queiroz's chronicle. However, when centering the study around Portuguese sources not in translation and often not in print from a time in the first half of the seventeenth century that detail the activities related to the project dubbed in administrative materials as *a conquista da ilha de Ceilão*, (the conquest of the island of Ceylon), any attempt to explain outcomes or even demarcate and fit individuals into West/Rest sides of the military conflict falls flat.

Take for example one such document below, the context being the height of the *conquista da ilha de Ceilão*, a military campaign mandated by the Habsburg Kings of Spain and Portugal (the Kings Philip), and under the original direction and advisement of the general Jerónimo de Azevedo, to militarily take over the entire island territory for the Portuguese *Estado da Índia Oriental*. The letter is in response to Philip II (of Portugal), who asked for reconnaissance to be done by officers in the *Estado* related to the progress of the *conquista*, and what specifically was needed to finally complete the conquest, which appeared by then to be in a state of stagnation. The reconnaissance document below, referred in Portuguese as a *devassa*, was written by a friar of the Augustinian order, Sebastião de São Pedro, better known as the Bishop of Cochin, in 1619. The Bishop, a controversial figure in his time, opens the letter by talking about the general challenges the *Estado* faced in the island regarding the conquest. He refers to the challenges the physical environment imposed and how that exacerbated a rebellious tendency amongst the local island population, the Sinhala people (*chingalas*).

The conquest of the island of Ceilão is the most difficult one that Your Majesty is involved in overseas because the land is full of jungles heavily populated by tigers, elephants, and other ferocious animals. The pathways through the jungles are so thin that in many places men can only pass single file, and the entire land is divided by rivers full of flesh-eating alligators as big as horses. There are many rocky mountains, with few flat regions besides those areas approaching Batticalou and Triquilimaly. The people are very

untrustworthy as they are friends of novelties and do not protect a sense of truth or loyalty (*fedillidade*), because of this there are always many rebellions (*alevntamentos*) in this island. And so long as there are *chimgalas* and jungles to shelter them, and the name of the King of Candea in one or another part, there will always be [rebellions in this island].<sup>29</sup>

The impediment of the untrustworthiness of the people, identified as Sinhalese, and their tendency to “rebel” is stressed. This trait, which is meant to be understood generally as a type of cultural defect, comes however out of a very specific context, as it is referring to the islanders’ propensity to rebel while in military service; deserting to rival camps at different times, before, during and after military expeditions. But besides these challenges, the Bishop, being a quite divisive figure at the time given the open criticisms he made of senior-level *Estado* officials, claimed that certain elements within the Portuguese military structure itself were responsible for impeding the successful completion of the conquest. For example, the Bishop voiced strong criticisms against Jerónimo de Azevedo in this regard, highlighting excesses he committed when he held the position of Captain-General of the Conquest of the island of Ceylon (*capitão geral da conquista da ilha de Ceilão*) in the first decade of the seventeenth century. Though he admittedly conquered a significant amount of territory for the *Estado*, he in some way left the war in an active state since he and generals under him benefited politically and economically from it.

Of everything that is said of this war [the most prominent] is that there is a lack of experienced captains and that the generals have always found the means to protract this conquest, which they want to rule over as they are regarded as kings of Ceilão by the natives (*com o nome que os naturaes lhe dão de reis de Ceilão*). [Such is the case] that when there are men of valor that are successful they are removed from the island, and [the generals] keep the people that better accommodate their interests. Given this reason and others the matters of this conquest will never be completed. Many people and much money was wasted in this way mainly when Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo was the Captain-

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29 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 8, p. 54.

General.<sup>30</sup>

The Bishop continues and issues a similar indictment against native captains as well, who are accused of protracting the war as they stand to benefit in similar ways.

Some Captains-General that did not harbor the intentions of staying in control of the island, due to the little experience they had in managing such a difficult war with so few men that can be consistently trusted given they are *chimgala*, [these Captain-Generals] left the government to some *diçavas*, heads of black troops, and *araches*. Given these people become rich off the war and elicit the fear and respect of the natives they protract the war. This is confessed today by the King of Candea, who was deposed three times in the time that Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo [was there], and the many times Simão Correa removed him, who was a *chimgala dissava* and *casado* here, and that they also did it to [Antonio] Barreto the renegade, and other enemies as well. And this was all done by the heads of black troops because they did not want to put an end to the conquest.<sup>31</sup>

The list of individuals that are said to have in some way been affected by the dilatory nature of the native army troop commanders (i.e. *disavas*, heads of black troops (*cabeças da gente preta*), *araccis*) is long and would include not only the “legitimate” rivals of the Portuguese (i.e. Sinhala kings), but also “illegitimate” ones, rebel apostates and *casados* once in the service of the Portuguese themselves. As the Bishop explains, the blame of the perpetuation of a militarized state in the island affects everyone European or native who vies to establish territorial authority and power. In this way, the Bishop claims that such generals and captains, of every origin as well, are taking advantage of their military power and access to interior territories in order to conduct private trade. The Bishop highlights one case in which he claims both European and native military personnel, including *Estado* officers, traded goods with the Kandyan Kingdom.

Much has been done for the enemy by the way of trade, since the general and *dissavas* and *vedor* of the treasury regularly fill the kingdom of Candea with salt, fabrics, opium

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30 *Ibid.*, p. 55. A more literal translation of the emphasized piece of text, “with the names of kings of Ceilão that the natives give them” is also relevant as will be seen, as certain native generals actually took on the names of certain previously well-established island kings. The larger point being, active military personnel had a high level of authority to which the term “king” can be equated.

31 *Ibid.*.

and other things so that Candea has all of these things in abundance for many years to come [...] Such is the case that nothing is considered here more than self-interest, which is treated as the main concern, and the war with little interest. Thus, if this conquest goes on being protracted with our power weakened the enemies will be provided with everything they need with the supplies from our lands that we offer as trade, taking from them betel-nut and brazil wood.<sup>32</sup>

In all, identifying the sides of the conquest from the report is confounded by the fact that in many ways military personnel, both European and “native” in origin, made up a kind of military class that acted in their particular interest. And as it is explained, all kings and other would-be power-holders in the island, once again both European and “native”, depended on these erratic military personnel to make military expeditions in order to compete with each other and establish territorial authority. This picture of the challenges to both European expansion as well as island kingly authority in the first half of the seventeenth century is not one that any of the historians mentioned thus far can explain since military personnel are automatically associated with one side or another based on their civilizational designation (i.e. ideological/cultural/religious/ethnic origin), and where renegade/mercenary actors exist but would be treated as types of aberrations. The historians never assume that military power and thus authority in itself is reliant on a kind of third entity that would-be power-holders needed to first engage with to wage wars against each other; those generals, captains, and “heads” (*cabeças*) that could recruit and compensate military personnel. Finer details of the process by which a king, general, or captain, whether European or native, recruited a military contingent through such heads have not been judged to be of great importance to the historiography thus far, and it has been generally assumed that such studies are not possible.

However, such studies are in fact possible. Not only this, understanding the process by

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32 *Ibid.*, p. 57.

which military personnel were recruited, organized, and compensated during the *conquista* period of the first half of the seventeenth century is extremely important as it concretely identifies the process by which authority is established in the island region. A deeper historical assessment of the information related to recruiting military services provides some concrete evidence that directly contradicts the general picture of how power and authority were established and maintained as portrayed thus far. For one, the Portuguese did not cede territorial control in the island due to the economic and military superiority of the Dutch and the island population's resistance to Christianization as such -- the *Estado* lost their position because they refused to elect those generals like Jerónimo de Azevedo who could effectively gain the support of native island captains who were in charge of recruiting military personnel, where those like Azevedo could effectively compensate them and fund the military expeditions they committed to. The issue was that figures like Azevedo were seen as unruly; using the advantageous position they had in an on-again/off-again war that lasted for decades they built connections to Indian Ocean networks from which they privately traded and amassed personal fortunes selling goods that were accessible to them to a whole host of buyers. The King of Portugal invariably became concerned with the amount of authority such high-level military figures were being attributed by the local population, where they were often being referred to and treated as “kings” themselves, and sought to replace them with generals such as Constantino de Sá, as it was understood the latter would more closely follow the letter of the King in Lisbon. However, the inability of Sá to raise funds due to his avowed non-participation in private trade, and with official avenues for

procuring funds closed to him, meant that he was always placed on unsteady footing.<sup>33</sup> Thus, his expedition failed not only due to a military rebellion he had some previous indication would occur, but also because he lacked the funds for resources and supplies that his party could have used to escape the up-country after the rebellion. After Sá's death, the *Estado* passed measures that outlawed the recruitment of native island military personnel, and from then on any Portuguese military expedition or activity would be severely disadvantaged by the diminished numbers of the contingents that were once quickly filled by this type of readily-available and easy-to-recruit personnel.

#### *LESSONS IN GLOBAL HISTORY: TOWARDS A 'MILITARY ECONOMY'*

At this point, in order to arrive at the above-mentioned arguments that attempt to explain the failure of the Portuguese imposition of territorial control in the island, along with the failure of many island kings to establish a consistent presence of authority, one would need to explore scholarly work that deals with case studies on military conflict outside the island. Specifically, case studies found in the historiographies of 'European Expansion'<sup>34</sup> and the 'Mughal State' offer shared themes which are of great use to the historian of Sri Lanka, as they present the intertwined

33 The statement by Constantino de Sá de Miranda in his descriptions of kingdoms, fortifications, and settlements in the island from 1638 speaks to the Captain-General's (Sá de Noronha) general lack of popularity in the island among many Portuguese officers: "Since I like him am called Constantino de Saa, we are not related, I am told the reasons why everyone in India wrote against this *fidalgo* to Your majesty, [such complaints lead me to believe] that he would have had few friends". Sá de Miranda's description found in: Jorge Manuel Flores, *Os Olhos do Rei: Desenhos e Descrições Portuguesas da Ilha de Ceilão (1624, 1638)* (Lisbon: Comissão Nacional, 2001), p. 119.

34 Sanjay Subrahmanyam's work on Portuguese expansion in Asia is a useful resource that makes mention of the cases in question involving the Portuguese, specifically that of Mozambique, as well as the case of Sri Lanka, see: Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia: 1500-1700, Second Edition* (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). More recent scholarship dealing with Iberian expansion does not consider the case of Mozambique or Sri Lanka, which are cases that would be antithetical to the theme of the edited volume as can be read from the title, see: Pedro Cardim, Tamar Herzog, José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez and Gaetano Sabatini (eds.) *Polycentric Monarchies: How did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony?* (Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).

themes of military conducted trade, military land administrative activities, and military troop recruitment/organization. In all cases, those that can somehow organize troop bases appear to be a focal point of political economic activities in all the regions in question. Such a circumstance requires a term that encapsulates this broad phenomenon; what I call *military economy*.

*Trade, Land Tenure, and Patronage: Military Power in the North American and Mozambican Cases*

The *Military Revolution*, a concept first developed by the European military historian Michael Roberts to explain the change of military organization in Sweden from cavalry to firearm carrying infantry<sup>35</sup>, set off a series of studies that noted pan-European military technological innovations. Works by subsequent scholars, Geoffrey Parker and Jeremy Black, emphasized these developments in the context of European Expansion, noting that innovations such as firearms played an advantage role in outcomes for military conflict in the non-Western world.<sup>36</sup> Though the two authors consider that Europeans had a special advantage in this regard, they are quick to explain that the expansion process was not all that simple, since such technological innovations and tactical skills often moved from Europeans to non-Europeans overtime. In a similar manner, tactical skills flowed from non-Europeans back to Europeans, where two-way transmission is explained to have occurred. Such is the case in an example mentioned by Black from the eighteenth century; when the British took up methods for territorial

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35 Michael Roberts, *The Military Revolution 1560-1600: An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the Queen's University of Belfast* (Queen's University of Belfast, 1956).

36 See: Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800, Second Edition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Jeremy Black (ed.), *War in the Early Modern World* (London: UCL Press, 1999), and Jeremy Black, *European Warfare in a Global Context, 1660-1815* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

expansion in North India that they learned from the Marathas.<sup>37</sup>

Parker in his work notes a case in North America in the seventeenth century, the wars between colonial New Englanders and Native Americans, a case that also highlights this two-way transmission. As he depicts it, the natives would ambush the colonials' pitched battle formations from the cover of swamps, a kind of natural fortification, a tactic that always granted the natives victory.<sup>38</sup> Parker explains the colonists had to learn the same "guerilla tactics" to fight against the natives, therefore a kind of transmission of military tactics is noted. The transmission would go both ways, as Parker also explains that the natives would learn about the effectiveness of firearms and procure them from European traders (i.e. French, English, Dutch). The entire picture Parker paints is one where overtime the group of natives and colonists learn from each other as they are in a constant drive to out-do the other, therefore becoming more militarily savvy as time went on. Thus, the eventual demise of the natives as Parker explains, "is not so much through any technical inferiority as because their numbers dwindled throughout the seventeenth century (largely thanks to the inroads of European diseases), while those of the Westerners (largely thanks to immigration) relentlessly increased".<sup>39</sup>

Parker's detailing of the wars between North American natives and colonists is extremely useful for the Sri Lankan case as it shares some common similarities. For one, effective use of the jungled physical environment was a decisive military tactic for wars in the upcountry regions that the Portuguese had with Kandy. Second, that military skills and wares, specifically the procurement of firearms and skills for their usage, came to the native islanders by way of the

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37 Black, *European Warfare in a Global Context*, p. 29.

38 Parker, *The Military Revolution*, p. 119.

39 *Ibid.*.

Portuguese. The situation is well described in the anonymous treatise on effective overseas military activity from the sixteenth century, *Primor e Honra da Vida Soldadesca no Estado da Índia* (“Excellence and Honor of the Soldier’s Life in the Overseas State of India”).<sup>40</sup>

So that the infidels [non-Portuguese] never prevail against us, those that have governing authority should not allow for such people to be taught about arms, or other fighting skills, or any other such serious matter. [This should not be done] even if they are our great friends, as it could lead to great harm. We see this with what happened in *Ceilão*, where the Portuguese taught the *Cingalás*, specifically *Rajú* [Rajasinha of Sitavaka], how to use arms, shoot with firearms (*espingardas*) and set artillery. Before they were people that were not very warlike, as they did not have skills in the use of arms outside of sword, shield, lance, and arrow, but now they are so experienced in the use of firearms and artillery that they are in no way envious of us. [...] Not only is teaching them harmful, but also practicing [publicly] everything we know, since they can learn from us. [...] For this reason, [arms] should not be sold in public, nor should they be carried when walking around, except by those that are actually using them.<sup>41</sup>

As will be documented in a subsequent chapter, movement of firearms into islanders hands was also a feature of the seventeenth century, albeit through a more scaled-up enterprise. As can be read from the sources, certain Portuguese generals and captains, with the help of regional native land heads (*vidanas*), are shown to have been managing the manufacture of firearms in the island, which they then traded to a whole host of Indian Ocean buyers. The capacity to run such an operation relied upon military personnel’s *de facto* control of regions where such manufacturing occurred. Understanding that in war situations those that had access to military power tended to force themselves into roles of land administration is important, and the Mozambican case of the *prazos da coroa* (“Crown estates”) speaks to this.<sup>42</sup>

The history of the *prazos*, a Crown mandated land tenure system, and its attempted

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40 Laura Monteiro Pereira and Maria Augusta Lima Cruz (eds.), *Primor e Honra da Vida Soldadesca no Estado da Índia* (Ericeira: Mar de Letras, 2003).

41 *Ibid.*, p. 170.

42 This case is well-covered in: Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia*, pp. 206-10.

implementation in the Zambezi valley from the middle of the seventeenth century, is the subject of the work by Allen Isaacman, *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution*.<sup>43</sup> In all, Isaacman's study of the *prazos* is not so much a history of the imposition of a Portuguese land tenure system, it is more about how certain Portuguese and other groups maintained their land holdings and even expanded them through trade and the patronage of local chiefs.

Maintaining a military force, an *achikunda* (“slave army”) was crucial for the *prazeros* in this regard, as seen in the more successful cases from the mid-seventeenth century of Lourenço de Mattos, Sisnando Baião, and António Lobo da Silva, who respectively came to be known by the names: Maponda, Massuampaca, and Nhema.<sup>44</sup> As Isaacman explains it, such people gained power and authoritative control over lands in and around certain chieftancies/kingdoms by offering rare trades (i.e. salt, fabrics)<sup>45</sup> along with military services to chiefs to fight off their rivals.

The *prazeros*' intimate involvement in local African politics seems to have been equally important in the overall process of prazo formation. As a result of unstable political relationships, recurring conflicts, and the general power vacuum, individual *prazeros* acquired a disproportionate amount of influence. By adeptly manipulating their power or by actively allying themselves with one of the combatants, they were able to establish or extend their authority. On several occasions Undi, Macombe, the king of Barue, Chikanga, the king of Quiteve, and the Muenemutapa sought the assistance of powerful *prazeros* or inland traders. In compensation for military aid or for assurances of future protection, they offered the *prazeros* outlying regions of their kingdoms which were generally in revolt or of questionable loyalty.<sup>46</sup>

The military services of *prazeros* were not only utilized horizontally between rivals, but also by upstart and generally disenchanted local chiefs that aimed to remove themselves from the

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43 Allen F. Isaacman, *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution - The Zambesi Prazos, 1750-1902* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972).

44 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

obligations put onto them by regional sovereigns.<sup>47</sup>

Isaacman explains that though the *prazo* institution as a whole was a consistent feature in the East African political system in one way or another, individual *prazos*, and the authority of particular *prazero* families, had a short lifespan. There were certain structural reasons for this, one being that the power and authority of a *prazo* depended on military capability, and specifically, the maintenance of an *achikunda*, “since the loyalty of the *achikunda* was not absolute”.<sup>48</sup> Maintenance is explained to be at its most basic level; offering the military slaves foodstuffs, a consistent and pervading challenge for the *prazero* especially if they commanded a large retinue of this soldiery. Thus, as Isaacman explains, when agricultural yields were bad in one year, this in turn had a great effect on troop maintenance and loyalty, as members of the *achikunda* would turn to rebellion and raiding when their patron could not provide for them.<sup>49</sup>

The deep connection that military power had to trade is apparent in the cases noted above by Parker and Isaacman. And particular to Isaacman, one sees how military capacity, and its ability to deploy it as a service for certain patrons, expands trade and land holding capability. Since military capacity is central to authority in the case of the *prazos*, when the challenges of maintaining such military personnel becomes daunting, the authority of the *prazero* is soon diminished. At this point, it is worth moving to other cases that convey a similar set of challenges when managing *military labor*.

*Recruitment, Loyalty, and Ethnohistory: Military Labor in the Indonesian and North Indian Cases*

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47 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

The essay by Jaap De Moor titled, “The recruitment of Indonesian soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, c. 1700-1950”, notes the changes in VOC army recruitment policy of natives from the Indonesian archipelago.<sup>50</sup> He notes that such changes occurred given changing VOC attitudes toward specific ethnic groups (i.e. Javanese, Ambonese, Timorese, etc.) related to their cultural propensity toward loyalty (and disloyalty) when in military service. Specifically, he charts how the consistently utilized group of ethnic Javanese began to be understood as culturally predisposed to disloyalty, and how the ethnic Ambonese the opposite. As De Moor explains it, this is related to the sheer volume of potential Javanese recruits over Ambonese for a significant period of time, given Javanese recruits tended to be landless peasants that sought out military employment when they could not find any other agricultural based employment. Thus, the pool of Javanese military labor grew and shrunk according to seasonal agricultural patterns and annual yields.

Enlistment usually peaked between January and March, when there were few agricultural employment opportunities for the landless population. Then, from April to August, enlistment normally dropped almost to nil, because the rice and sugar-cane harvests kept the peasant workers occupied. From September or October, recruitment increased again, often stimulated by extra (temporary) measures by the authorities – such as higher enlistment bounties, higher pay and pensions, or a decrease in the minimum height requirement. When the harvests were poor, however, potential recruitment remained high throughout the year, whereupon the authorities could react by manipulating the enlistment conditions again, or even by stopping recruitment altogether for a time.<sup>51</sup>

De Moor explains that the uneasiness between the Javanese and the VOC officers was unavoidable given the dependence that the company had on the abundantly available military labor source of Javanese, an opportunistic and erratic group accustomed to precarious and

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50 Jaap De Moor, “The recruitment of Indonesian soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, c. 1700-1950”, in David Killingray and David Omissi (eds.), *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700-1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).

51 *Ibid.*, p. 61.

inconsistent employment. As it is explained, this circumstance led to the attribution of a cultural trait of disloyalty and non-martial character to the Javanese. This was counterpoised, albeit artificially according to De Moor, to the loyalty and martial cultural traits attributed to the Ambonese.<sup>52</sup> The measured attempt of the VOC to import this latter group through the lure of higher enlistment premiums and paid transport, people that had little military standing beforehand, was an aim to counterbalance the importance and dependence on the Javanese. De Moor claims that besides the VOC conjuring up the martial cultural trait of the Ambonese in this manner, they also helped to set down the Ambonese as an ethnic group to start with, which in reality encompassed a host of people from other islands and linguistic groups.<sup>53</sup> He is also keen to note that the privileges and honor the VOC attributed to the Ambonese and the religious/cultural proximity they claimed the people had with them (i.e. many were Christians) did not account for the many military rebellions they perpetrated in the seventeenth century.<sup>54</sup>

The subject of the connection between military recruitment and cultural identity formation is also dealt with in the literature of the development of the Mughal State in North India in the sixteenth century. Dirk Kolff in his book, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy: The ethnohistory of the military labour market in Hindustan*, speaks to this connection and offers a useful conceptual model, the *military labor market*, which assumes military recruitment exists within a type of supply-heavy market structure.<sup>55</sup> According to Kolff, one's territorial power and authority depended heavily on how one could keep such labor from going back on the market, and he states that the Mughal Empire's power was a consequence of its administrative capacity to

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52 *Ibid.*, p. 62.

53 *Ibid.*, p. 64.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 63.

55 Dirk Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy: The ethnohistory of the military labour market in Hindustan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

keep wide swathes of this soldiery in their service, resulting in an awkward political/administrative structure.

The Mughal army can never be made into a neat category of research outside the context of North Indian society: as such, it defies definition. It can only be described in terms of the dilemma in which the Mughal empire itself seems to have been caught, to wit, the dilemma between, on the one hand, the territorial state where the writ of the emperor was unopposed, and, on the other hand, the state as the largest and most honourable employer of the country whose huge army was the fundamental expression of its achievement.<sup>56</sup>

In identifying how North Indian society, and thus the Mughal army was composed, Kolff starts by identifying two broad groups; the North Indian “peasantry” and “foreigners”. The peasantry are named and identified according to a wide range of taxonomic groupings; sometimes by what could be called regional ethnicity (i.e. Rajput), regional linguistic group (i.e. Maratha), Muslim sub-sect (i.e. Barha Sayyids), tribes/castes (i.e. Girasiyas and Kolis), etc.. But Kolff shows that aside from their taxonomic difference, the names represent identity labels that connote mutual exclusivity, distinctiveness and equivalence in the military labor market as units of soldiery; where each group is constituted by able-bodied men who left their agrarian means of subsistence (much like the Javanese in the case above), to offer their services as military personnel for one patron or another. Groups of foreigners who more easily can be described through a geographical taxonomy (i.e. Afghans, Iranis, and Turanis) are understood to offer services as trained soldiery, and they are said to have migrated into the region to also be patronized by one or another employer (much like the Ambonese).

Kolff shows how in North India such soldiery could expect contracts of fair payment relative to experience; a concept found in the military culture of North India being 'salt' (*namak*),

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<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

the marketable pay of the soldier, and 'service' (*naukari*), the dedicated loyalty to a warband.<sup>57</sup> But where service agreements are made they are often also broken, as there are many cases of groups of soldiers leaving one patron to join another. In another closely related study, André Wink, *Land and Sovereignty in India: Agrarian Society and Politics under the Eighteenth-Century Maratha Svarajya*, it tracks the use of the religiously tinged Islamic concept of *fitna*, translated as “sedition”, in issues of these broken military loyalties in the context of the eighteenth century and specifically Mughal/Maratha military and political engagements.<sup>58</sup>

Between the Indonesian and North Indian cases, one finds that recruitment of military depended on not only tapping into the labor market, the supply of which ebbed and flowed depending on the availability of agrarian based and migrant labor, but keeping the loyalties of such groups and thus keeping them employed and out of the market. For both the VOC and Mughals, there was a tendency to group and identify certain people as units within this market that were distinct and thus had different capacities for service.

#### *The Military Economy of Sri Lanka During the 'Conquista'*

All of the interconnected themes above help us to identify the political economic structure, the *military economy*, found in the island during the *conquista*, roughly during the first half of the seventeenth century. To begin, the link between recruitment, land tenure, and military patronage is noted in the body of Sinhala literary materials known as the *Hatana Kavya* (“war poems”), and the *Sitavaka Hatana* is especially rich in such details.<sup>59</sup> The *Sitavaka Hatana*, a poem written in 1585 by a military general named Attanhari Abaya Alahapperuma who served

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57 *Ibid.*, p. 20.

58 André Wink, *Land and Sovereignty in India: Agrarian Society and Politics under the Eighteenth-Century Maratha Svarajya* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

kings Mayadunne and Rajasinha of Sitavaka, reads like a kind of military expedition travelogue, which could be used to mine empirical information, but is much more useful in the way it lays out a common pattern of how a military expedition is organized.<sup>60</sup> For one, it explains how soldiers are commonly recruited immediately preceding and even during the expedition; as the core group travels to the destination of battle they collect troops along the way and also procure the cash/kind (*padi nadi*) in a similar *ad hoc* manner from which they pay the troops for their services. If the expedition is successful, military heads that bring a base of troops are compensated with administrative control over territories the said king just claimed by way of the battle, from which such generals and captains (*disavas, vidanas, mudaliyars, araccis*)<sup>61</sup> had the liberty to extract revenues based on an agreement that they would send some tribute (cash or trade goods: cinnamon, gems, *areca*) and provide military services to the said king in any future expeditions. Fighting wars in this format, one would imagine with every expedition the group became larger and better funded, where by the end of the poem Alahapperuma's description of the recruitment base of the army as well as the territory they are said to have controlled is wider

59 For a general overview of the genre of literature known as the *Hatana Kavya*, see: Rohini Paranavitana, "Sinhalese War Poems and the Portuguese" in Flores (ed.) *Re-exploring the links: history and constructed histories between Portugal and Sri Lanka* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007), pp. 49-61.

60 I gain this methodological approach toward reading travel accounts from the work of Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, noting; "the delicate interplay between empirical content, the tone and style of the account, and its broader structural characteristics, rather than subsuming the former aspects under the latter". Alam and Subrahmanyam, *Indo-Persian Travels in the Age of Discoveries, 1400-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 19.

61 These four often referred to title groups generally refer to territorial administrative roles as well as military ones, however, depending on the context roles bled into one another. *Disavas* and *vidanas* are land administrative titles and roles; generally, *disavas* controlled larger districts/provinces while *vidanas* controlled smaller *korala* land units inside a district. *Mudaliyars* were types of military generals and *araccis* military captains. However, what is a great source of confusion is that the texts sometimes refer to the military capacity of *disavas* and *vidanas*, as well as the land administrative capacities of *mudaliyars* and *araccis*. And depending on the source, certain *disavas* and *vidanas* had martial title names of *mudali/aracci* as well. What is more, different people were promoted to higher positions and titles overtime, and there were many cases of *lascarins* being promoted to the title of *aracci*. This circumstance is testament to the interwoven nature of military capacity and land administration. In all the cases of the four titles (*disava, vidana, mudaliyar, aracci*), it is assumed they commanded or were linked to those that commanded a retinue of 'black' troops (*cabeças da gente preta*).

than where the Sitavakan group started. Also, one can see from the picture the author paints that the activities of administrating lands and expanding a military service base quickly became linked; compensations for a steady military presence invariably required the said king to give authoritative control over lands “they conquered” to military personnel themselves.

What is striking about the depiction of the entire military service and land administration structure that Alahapperuma paints is that it is equivalent to the picture that the Portuguese administrative materials from the first half of the seventeenth century paint as seen above; the reliance on the services of military personnel invariably put control of territories, and the people and goods in them, in the hands of military personnel themselves. This structure where military generals and captains were the real focal point of territorial authority and power gave way for such military men to quite naturally act in their own interests. From the Portuguese administrative materials we can see how both European and Asian military personnel (and with the aid of each other) organized the extraction and manufacture of goods from the land regions (i.e. cinnamon, *areca*, and firearms) which they then plugged into markets through over-land and coastal trade networks they encountered and also helped develop over time.

On the subject of ethnohistory and military labor, when surveying the materials available, specifically the Sinhala literary historical sources that document the wars of the period, one can find traces of groups of individuals of wide Indian Ocean origins that come into the courts and into the service of the would-be power-holders of the island that are similarly grouped across many different groupable taxonomies (i.e. Black Africans, *vanniyars*, 'cola people' (Kannada and Telugu speakers), Bengalis, Javanese, Chinese, Turks, Persians, Portuguese, etc.). Instead of generally referring to such groups of people as mercenaries, in the vein of Kolff one should

understand these migrants and islanders as a body of *military labor* that had the understanding they could somehow offer their services to one island patron or another. Similarly, it is worth using such a designation for those seen as island “natives”, specifically those people referred to as “Sinhala”, as yet another service group identified among the others in the island military service market.<sup>62</sup> I take this as-yet unconsidered position on the ethno-genesis of the Sinhala identity into the modern period; that it was an identity greatly mediated by the military service market in the island between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indications of this are found today, as besides names of Portuguese origin, many Sinhalese people still possess names reminiscent of martial/military administrative names from this specific period (i.e. *Hewage*, *Arachchi*, *Senanayake*).

The idea that “Sinhala” (*chingala*) in this time specifically referred to a military service group that was characteristically island-based is a sentiment matched in the Portuguese sources. Additionally, as exemplified above in the letter by the Bishop of Cochin, they are often referred to in this source and many others in the context of their disloyal nature, much like the VOC's views on the Javanese. But, much like the Javanese, it is worth considering such a stereotype developed due to the heavy supply of otherwise agrarian sector employed people for such services. This paired with the crucial dependence that the Portuguese had on this base of military personnel quite naturally led to critical assessments of the characters of such Sinhalese people.

62 Such a proposal might be difficult to accept for many invested in studies of the ethno-genesis of the Sinhala ethnicity into the modern period. Tracking the pre-modern origins of the Sinhala ethnicity is the aim of the book by Michael Roberts, the Sri Lankan anthropologist (and not the European military historian), see: Roberts, *Sinhala Consciousness in the Kandyan Period 1590s to 1815* (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa, 2004). Much like Holt, Roberts claims that a “Sinhaleanness” can be traced back to the Kandyan Kingdom's legitimate foundation of Buddhist kingly power in the medieval period. The research once again aims to disrupt claims made by those in the “post-colonial” camp, which claims Sinhala ethnic identity is purely the result of recent British colonialism. However, in the vein of Kolff, it is worth considering how similar ethnic/linguistic groups in North India such as the Rajputs and Marathas had an ethno-genesis of sorts as a consequence of involvement in the military service market; where the identities they forged as military service men in the late-medieval/early modern period were regional/ethnic/linguistic identities they carried into the modern period.

Thus, besides Sinhala troops, both the Portuguese and local kings would also aim to recruit outside of this island labor pool, and would often look to South India as a recruitment base. Such an emphasis on recruitment outside of the island became particularly acute for the Portuguese after 1630, as the *Estado* prohibited the recruitment of Sinhala troops due to the Sá rebellion that summer. After the rebellion, they not only sought after Kannada speaking people, but also people from East Africa, black slaves, to fill these basic roles. As can be understood from Isaacman's work, the East African zone was a clear option for a recruitment base due to shared circuits and respective military activities.

The circulation of South Indian migrants in the island to provide military services was a consistent feature in this period, and in an ethnohistorical mode one may note how such migrants became “Sinhala” through military patronage. This point is exemplified in cases from the period that show how such “ethnic affiliations” were easily granted to migrants by an island king through an agreement of military service through a process of *title naming*. In one specific case documented in the Sinhala chronicle, the *Rajavaliya*, a Telugu speaking ascetic named Aritta Kivendu Perumal came into the island to offer military services to a range of kings on opposing sides and eventually ended up in the Kotte kingdom and the court of Dharmapala, where he was conferred by title the new name, Jayavira Bandara, a name shared by many a past Sinhala island king.<sup>63</sup> The compiled chronicle poem for the Kandyan Kings, the *Mandarampura Puvata*, contains another random example. In the section of the poem that details the activities of Rajasinha II, it narrates his defeat of the Portuguese Captain-General in 1638, Diogo do Melo de Castro, and describes the titles and gifts conferred to people that aided in the victory. In one such

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63 There are many editions and translations of the Sinhala historical chronicle *Rajavaliya* (“Lineage of Kings”), I use the recent edition by A. V. Suraweera done in 2000.

case Rajasinha gives a *title name* to a captain whose origins seem split between the Tamil speaking north and South India.

362.

Vadigaperu Siri Vegandarayana Rama Chandra was famous

He was a very clever archer who liked to walk fast, and “Rajavalli” is the name he was called

He lived in Katarapura in the famous island of Lanka, and to this Vannivansa Minister

The name “Suradivakara” was written on golden paper and given to him with prizes.<sup>64</sup>

The verse is difficult to translate since at times it is unclear if the activities in themselves (i.e. archery, fast-walking) are also names. Additionally, it seems the original name in the first line identifies the figure as a Telugu warlord (*vaguda*)<sup>65</sup>, but where in the third line it alludes that he belongs to a lineage of *vanniyars*, indigenous Tamil speaking warlords found in the north of the island. Regardless of this difficulty, it is clear by the last line he is attributed a name, given his service to Rajasinha, that fits a cultural nomenclature particular to Kandy, and what a modern reader would claim to be Sinhala. In light of such examples, studies on Sinhala ethno-genesis need to consider how “Sinhala affiliation” and naming was a form of compensation for military services attributed to migrants in this period.

From the scholarly work in global history one finds a common set of themes related to war in the early modern world. Would-be power-holders, whether they be Asian or European, in all cases needed to consider how to effectively recruit and maintain the service of military personnel in order to establish and maintain their authority. And in all cases, such ambitious groups and people would have to consider monetary compensation. Effective control of this labor meant the ability to expand territorial authority, and control the goods and services in such

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64 *Mandarampura Puvata*, p. 48.

65 For a background on the *vadugas* and their perennial involvement in the Palk Strait and wider island military activities, see: Lorna Dewaraja, *The Kandyan Kingdom of Ceylon: 1707-1760* (Colombo: Lake House, 1972), p. 23-4 .

regions as well as their trade. This military economy also set the political and economic basis of Sri Lanka during this period and connected the island to the greater oceanic region. For any would-be kings and/or state builders in the island at this time, their success was contingent on how well they understood the contours of this economy and engaged with it; where the more successful of these knew they would face a consistent set of challenges when recruiting military personnel from the open service market. The more innovative of these would-be power-holders would use resources available to them to creatively develop centralized political-administrative structures primarily aimed at effectively controlling the labor of these military personnel, in other words, make a standing army structure.

#### *IDENTIFYING THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY FROM THE DIVERGENT RHETORIC OF LEGITIMACY*

When approaching the sources related to Sri Lanka roughly between 1580 and 1640 from the multitude of linguistic canons the sources come from (i.e. Portuguese, Sinhala, Spanish, English, Dutch) and in the many forms they take (i.e. chronicle, administrative document, literary source, first-person account, etc.) one is confronted with an enormous corpus that can be disorienting when trying to test certain research questions. Take for example the seemingly straight-forward question of *what the nature of authority is* in the island in this time period, or in other words, “what are some clear ways by which states run by sovereigns established and maintained authority over a territory as recognized by a populace and what these specific powers were?” The historian that aims to test such questions is bombarded with many different types of rhetoric regarding 'legitimate' political, economic, and military activities. For example, the Portuguese often considered the caste and noble birth of the native figures they affiliated with,

especially when they attempted to gain authority over a kingdom. There are many examples in which they attempted to arrange marriage affiliations with people that they considered to be of royal lineage with the ultimate aim of establishing indirect rule. When their attempts were frustrated, as often happened, they employed the language of 'illegitimate force' to discredit rival claimants. Such is the case of Vimaladharmasuriya of Kandy, who on serving the Portuguese as a captain of native troops on an expedition to the up-country kingdom in 1594, staged a military “rebellion” (*alevantamento*) and installed himself as king by marrying the heir to the throne, Dona Catarina, under duress. Additionally, the charge of apostasy was made to describe the motivations of such acts of treachery, since Vimaladharmasuriya who once served as a military captain under the Portuguese by his baptismal name and title, Dom João da Austria, was said to have been moved by his inherent native predilection for gentile practices to rebel. The language of illegitimate activities is not solely relegated to descriptions of native figures, Portuguese are also subject to moral rhetoric; cases when they commit 'excesses' against the 'service of the Crown'. This is seen in the specific cases in which Portuguese captains and generals utilized their powers to conduct private economic ventures, which they did with the help of native captains of troops. Such native captains were said to be oppressing the general native population, which was understood to have further engendered a culture of rebelliousness among poor islanders against Portuguese rule.

But in all, the most striking set of rhetoric that can be found in both Portuguese and Sinhala sources is related to the popular subject of military disloyalties. Portuguese administrative sources and chronicles document cases of Portuguese who offered military services to native island kings, the term employed to describe such figures being “renegade”

(*arrenegado*), which carried with it a sense of religious apostasy as the renegade is explained to have left Christianity, and accordingly the Catholic king's service, for pagan/gentile practice. The term *levantado* (“rebel”) is more common however, which represents a native captain of “black” troops who goes back on an agreement of military service, and this group includes those that have been converted to Christianity along with those who have not.

Accordingly, military loyalties are a concern that is well covered in the *Hatana Kavya*, where in both the *Sitavaka Hatana* and *Kustantinu Hatana* the authors go into detail about the destabilizing effects of disloyal activities in a highly moral and ethical tone. Specific terminology regarding disloyal activities is not available in the *Sitavaka Hatana*, where descriptions of disloyal activities are described with generally negative, defacing, and insulting adjectives such as “wicked” (අසත්පුරුෂ - *asathpuruśa*) or “bad” / “evil” (දුෂ්ඨ / නපුරු - *dujana / napuru*). But this specified terminology is found in the work of Alagiyavanna Mukaveti, *Kustantinu Hatana*. Besides being a Sinhala literary figure of his time, Mukaveti served under the Portuguese as a secretary and scribe, *mohitti*, and felt the need to develop an equivalent term as that found in the Portuguese lexicon given its importance in the context of the wars that Constantino de Sá was involved in, since the poem was a panegyric for the Portuguese Captain-General. The term for “rebellion” he developed is *peraliya* (පෙරලිය), a term which is used today for the exact same meaning and can also be translated as “revolt” or “sedition”. In the text it is used also as an adjective in place of the generally negative above mentioned terms, as in the case of “rebellious officers” (පෙරලි මැතිණි - *perali māthiyan*). The fact that a term was created to describe this activity in Sinhala literature is testament to the perceived gravity of the problem at this time.

Quite naturally, many scholars have attempted to group such forms of rhetoric and place

them at the center of studies that build causal explanations related to effective rule in a civilizational mold. As shown above, topics such as apostasy and the legitimacy of kingship make up the empirical evidence that bolsters the central argument behind the theory of Sinhala Buddhist Kingship. Also, subjects of excesses as it equates to corruption, are also subjects found in the broader literature on Iberian expansion, as they indicate how the loose and decentralized structure of the *Estado* permitted such corrupt practices to take place.<sup>66</sup> Such an assessment is meant in some way to help explain how the *Estado* began to lose authority overseas by the mid-seventeenth century to the more militarily and economically efficient Dutch.

Breaking away from this approach, I propose that such sets of rhetoric not be treated as empirical evidence from which causal explanations of larger phenomenon that explain rise/fall of any polity whether European or Asian can be made. Instead, I will show how this language articulates *sentiments* regarding the establishment and maintenance of island authority; hopes, desires, expectations, frustrations, despair, yielding, optimism, confidence, conviction, etc.. When read this way, one can free oneself from the baggage of the civilizational model prevalent in many Social Sciences and Humanities studies on global history and concretely determine the true nature of authority in the specific case of Sri Lanka in the early modern period: that *anybody* (i.e. European, Asian, high-caste, low-caste, island-born, foreign-born) who had enough personal ambition could raise an army through engagement with the *military economy*, and the service market at the heart of it, and establish authority as a “king” in the island. Kingly legitimacy followed behind the use of brute military force which depended on effective recruitment and management of troops. In all, the rhetoric to be found articulates the vicissitudes associated with

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66 For a recent book on the subject of wide-spread corruption throughout the overseas empire, see: Erik Lars Myrup, *Power and Corruption in the Early Modern Portuguese World* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 2015).

the difficult challenges of establishing power out of such a bustling military economy.

*STATE MAKING IN MILITARY ECONOMY: MUGHALS AND KANDYANS*

This then begs a series of questions; if in this arrangement authority depended on active engagement with a military service economy, is the would-be power-holder always at the mercy of the erratic nature of those that make up its military (i.e. troop heads and base soldiery)? That is, can they keep and control a standing army even in times when there is no active war? In a related question, how can a would-be power-holder establish a centralized state that has permanence over many generations and with the capacity to expand given this situation? Once again extant studies on the Mughal State are extremely beneficial in answering such questions.

The combined work of Dirk Kolff and Jos Gommans deals with these questions in the context of North India, where they piece together the story of how the Mughals formed a patchwork state along the contours of the sections of military labor across North Indian society. In *Naukar, Rajput, Sepoy*, Kolff details a period generally known in the historiography as the “Sher Shah Suri interregnum”, a point in the sixteenth century when the Afghan warlord ejected the Mughal ruler Humayun from Delhi, where the latter was forced into exile in Persia and only returned after the death of Sher Shah. By way of tracing and compiling an ethno-history of the Rajput clans, Kolff explains how the key to Sher Shah's success was that he canvassed North India and made alliances with a range of these military based clans located in larger “recruitment areas” such as the Purab (or eastern India).<sup>67</sup> However, such a base of power founded on a network of military connections did not survive past his death in 1545. But the next Mughal, Akbar, is said to have taken up the policy of connecting to Rajput warring clans in a similar

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<sup>67</sup> Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput, Sepoy*, p. 91.

manner as well as many others.

Gommans in his book, *Mughal Warfare*, goes into greater detail about the military administrative structure at the heart of the Mughal State that further developed under Akbar; a structure the Mughal Emperor developed with the intention of offering incentives to military personnel, but where the incentives would not strengthen the hand of such personnel so much that they could rebel against his service.<sup>68</sup> Gommans too is heavily invested in the concept of the *military labor market*, which he claims prompted the Mughals to move away from a military administrative structure reliant on a culture of “military slaves” as is found in those polities in the “Turko-Persian ecumene” (i.e. Ottoman, Safavid), and what is often described as “Islamic”.<sup>69</sup> Gommans shows how the Mughals under Akbar developed a military administrative structure termed the *mansab* system; a numerical ranking system that attributed corresponding political and military power to the *amirs* that made up the Mughal court, or *mansabdars*. The responsibilities of the *mansab* holder ran the gamut of political, economic, and military activities, but where attachment to mounted retainers with connections to other troops that they could deploy when necessary was of central importance. In this structure, cavalry served as a base unit of bureaucratic register in an organizational system of “horse-branding” (*dagh*), where the horse-brand corresponded to a set of information recorded in administrative rolls regarding the details of the horseman (i.e. name, father's name, caste/tribe, place of origin, complexion, features, identification marks, stature, age).<sup>70</sup>

The compensation paid for the services rendered by *mansabdars* was sometimes

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68 Jos Gommans, *Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire 1500-1700* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

69 *Ibid.*, p. 83.

70 *Ibid.*, p. 85.

cash/kind but mostly made by assigning them the revenues from land units called *jagirs*, territorial areas under the authority of the Mughal State through which the *mansabdar* could extract revenues and services from the region. The condition for receiving a *jagir* was the *mansabdar's* agreement to be uprooted from the area he held his troop base, and an additional agreement that his *jagir* term last for a fixed amount of time (usually 3 years) before being assigned another *jagir*. Though explained as a method to avoid “rent-racking” and abuse of the peasant population<sup>71</sup>, the disconnection of the *mansabdar* from a land base had two main interconnected benefits for the State; 1) it prevented the *mansabdar* from setting roots in a region from which a space of autonomous authority could be carved, as someone with the ambition and military connections of a *mansabdar* would predictably aim to do, 2) it served as a reliable system of wide territorial administration that could be managed by a centralized bureaucratic organization.<sup>72</sup> These two clear concurrent aims of the Mughal State were exemplified in the manner in which *zamindars* (local landed hereditary powers) were treated as the greatest internal threat to Mughal authority, and where foreign migrant warlords were more sought after as courtiers. In all, through the combined efforts of Kolff and Gommans, one can get a case-study of how a lineage of men eventually established territorial authority and maintained it through a creative and innovative formulation; a system that interlocked a bureaucratic structure, to a land administration structure, and a military recruitment structure – the result being a state, with

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71 *Ibid.*, p. 92.

72 Both the introduction and reproduced essays in the edited volume on the 'Mughal State' by Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam are useful in explaining the form and function of the state and the *mansab* institution. See: “Introduction” in Alam and Subrahmanyam, *The Mughal State, 1526-1750* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 1-71. Also the essays in the volume by W. H. Moreland, “Rank (mansab) in the Mogul State Service”, pp. 213-233, and, Noman Ahmad Siddiqi, “The *Faujdar* and *Faujdari* Under the Mughals”, pp. 234-51. For foundational works outside the volume, see: William Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration* (Delhi: Eurasia, 1962), Shireen Moosvi, “Evolution of the *Mansab* System under Akbar until 1596-97”, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (No. 2, 1981), pp. 178-85, and, I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire* (Karachi, 1966).

recognizable authority over territory, and a form of standing army. In all, it is important to note that the genesis of this system in the most simplistic terms is built upon the basic shared premise; how to get those men that can fight – who being generally bellicose and therefore characteristically fickle men – to fight for one and continue to do so.

Moving back to Sri Lanka, most groups broadly representing Europeans and Asians did not conduct warfare in a manner much different from each other between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Though the terminology might have linguistically differed, as mentioned above, the order and pattern of recruitment, expedition making, and land granting as described in the *Sitavaka Hatana* was not conducted differently by any party; military were recruited *ad-hoc* immediately before and during the expedition, and any territory gained would be granted as compensation to a military general/captain under the agreement that they pass some tribute and offer military services in the future. Because of this fact, power seesawed not only back-and-forth but between many different would-be power-holders, as authority depended on jockeying for the support of erratic military personnel that moved between different patrons invariably keeping the war in an active state. In light of arguments found in the *Military Revolution* literature, being European in this environment had no special advantage; the use, manufacture, and even cultural adoption of military technologies and wares (i.e. firearms) by islanders was prevalent by the beginning of the seventeenth century.<sup>73</sup> Thus, European military and technological advancements and innovations were not an overwhelming factor in deciding outcomes. Instead, what mattered most was the efficacious control of the labor of military personnel, and the real innovation was *organizational*; it needed to break the fickle pattern by

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73 For a study on how use of firearms appeared in the literary productions of South India, specifically in Telugu poems, see: Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “The Kagemusha Effect: The Portuguese, Firearms, and the State in Early Modern South India”, in *Moyen Orient et Océan Indien* (Vol. 4, 1987), pp. 97-123.

creatively developing a system of military recruitment and compensation that did not invariably put authority back into the hands of the military personnel. Thus, it would have to follow the same basic tenets as the *mansab* system; incentive without handing over authority.

Luckily, one does not need to depend on a counter-factual study in the case of Sri Lanka in this regard, since a system that in some way achieved this was recognizably developed in the upcountry region around Kandy by Rajasinha II. The surviving source that details this is not a courtly administrative document as in the case of Abu'l-Fazl's *Ain-i-Akbari* and its detailing of the *mansab* system; rather, it is the popular account of the Englishman, Robert Knox titled, *An Historical Relation of Ceylon*, which documents his experience being a prisoner for some 19 years in Kandy under Rajasinha II.<sup>74</sup> Knox's account, which speaks frankly and in detail about his experiences in the kingdom between 1660 and 1680, is commonly known and has been widely cited for a whole host of studies but has not been used to document the military administrative structure of Rajasinha II as of yet. This could be for the reason that Knox's acerbic tone when describing most things related to the king, and specifically where military administration is concerned, paints him as a kind of paranoid despot. In some ways, it bears a coincidental similarity to an account by another Englishman and contemporary of his, Thomas Roe, and his despotic characterization of the Mughal Emperor, Jahangir. However, when placed in the context of this larger study on loyalties and the military economy in the seventeenth century, the sardonic picture that Knox paints of Rajasinha's paranoia begins to make functional sense. It is said to

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74 There are many editions of Robert Knox's account, of which I use the version edited by J. H. O. Paulusz in 1989 because of its interleaved notes and easy to read print and language. Besides the Paulusz edition there is a more recent edition that is a facsimile of an older print document, see: Knox, *An Historical Relation of the Island Ceylon in the East Indies, with an introduction and afterword by H. A. I Goonetilleke* (New Delhi: Navrang, 1995). There is also an abridged edition that reproduces sections particular to the Kandyan Kingdom, see: *Robert Knox in the Kandyan Kingdom, selected and edited by E. F. C. Ludowyk* (London: Oxford University Press, 1948). For a general essay on Knox and his account, see: K. W. Goonewardena, "Some Comments on Robert Knox and his writings on Ceylon", in *University of Ceylon Review* (Vol. 16, No. 1-2, 1958), pp. 39-52.

have made for some strange military and administrative formulations: Rajasinha apparently kept troops separate from their captains until battle; he granted captains lands in areas that were disconnected from each other and from their associates; when the troops were not in active service he put them to work on public works such as road making so they were not idle; when on expedition the captains could not communicate with each other and received orders through a messenger later about the intended target, and so on. In all, they bear strong structural similarities, albeit on a smaller scale, to that of the Mughal administrative structure described above. Thus, though meant to discredit Rajasinha II, Knox's account of the king's military administration is key in identifying how Kandy maintained its authority in the upcountry region, as the king creatively used the resources available to build an administrative system that maintained a standing army. He also built a position of a 'bureaucrat king' based in a court from which he and his officers could manage the entire operation, and where he no longer needed to be a 'general king' who was required to be actively engaged in recruiting troops and going on expeditions as his predecessors once were.

Such centralized authority placed a special emphasis on the court, which is reflected in some way by the change in literary and cultural production that occurred in Kandy from the mid-seventeenth century. By this time Kandy had a literary explosion as compared to other kingdoms in the previous century. Amongst the texts is a historical text that extended the *Hatana Kavya* genre produced in the time of Rajasinha II; the *Rajasinha Hatana*. However, the style of this text departs from the previous ones; though many conventions are shared the imagery and descriptions are more fantastical, and in many ways abstracted notions of power and authority

that Rajasinha was said to have possessed compared to Mayadunne in the *Sitavaka Hatana*.<sup>75</sup> More concrete themes related to Buddhism also come into play, thus representing a character of rule and the state in a way that highlights his kingly legitimacy, and where one cannot grasp specific details of the manner of rule as such. The content of such poems written in such a way do not necessarily help one to come to any greater understanding of the nature of Rajasinha's authority, however the abstraction of authority that occurs is a natural product that comes out of the formation of court authority, where the court from the time of Rajasinha II sits on top of a foundation of an administrative system that has developed a working solution for the military service conundrum.

In the case of Kandy under Rajasinha II, a working solution to get around the challenge of managing military personnel was developed, and accordingly, stronger and more solidified claims of legitimacy were evoked using what might be understood to be religious and cultural symbols in the Indic tradition. This in many ways could also be said for the Mughal State, as when Akbar effectively created a working military administration, the nature of the sovereign's authority began to be abstracted and a state culture began to be established using what could be understood as religious and cultural symbols in the Islamic tradition. This is evidenced by Akbar's development of the *sulh-i-kull*, which was a broad cultural/religious court/state culture that conveniently enveloped the wide range of beliefs of the court's members. The administrative formation of the Mughal State at this time had a similar effect on the culture of warfare, as the *dagh* system providing a convenient bureaucratic unit of record to enumerate the swathes of military in the ranks, quite naturally gave way to a military culture that valued cavalry warfare,

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75 On the often “parodic voice” of court poetry in regards to kingship in the context of South Indian Nayaka court poetry, see: Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Shulman, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Symbols of Substance: Court and State in Nayaka Period Tamilnadu* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 22.

which was a form of military power that worked well in the context of North India regardless.<sup>76</sup> Therefore, in the Mughal case, an abstract and singular notion of state culture is not something that gets determined at the advent of Islam, nor from the time of Babur who moved in and out of the characteristically free-form *ghazi* military culture<sup>77</sup>, but instead from when this equation that interlocks military recruitment to land administration to a centralized bureaucratic machine developed in the time of Akbar. From this a state culture was articulated that ejected, combined, re-worked, and kept previous cultural themes, the combined image then presents an opaque picture of the nature of power and authority that over-emphasizes 'legitimacy', and which is taken up by modern-day historians and/or literary studies scholars.<sup>78</sup> However striking the cultural symbols of power might be in the way they link to further reaching civilizational cultural/religious symbols (i.e. Islamic, Buddhist/Indic), they tell us little of the process by which such figures actually captured and maintained real authority. This activity is more localized in time and can be charted from the point that someone creative and innovative enough uses whatever resources available to lure and trap the lightning that is erratic and opportunistic military personnel into the bottle of an administrative bureaucracy, from which they can bring a state to life.

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76 On the efficaciousness of cavalry warfare in this context, see: Gommans, "Warhorse and Gunpowder in India c. 1000-1850" in Jeremy Black, *War in the Early Modern World, 1450-1815* (London: UCL Press, 1999), pp. 105-127.

77 For a study on the notion of the *ghazi* king in the context of the "Islamic world" including Mughal India, see: Ali Anooshahr, *The Ghazi sultans and the frontiers of Islam: A comparative study of the late medieval and early modern periods* (London: Routledge, 2009). For a study from the early Ottoman context that deals with the *ghazi* warrior culture and its malleability in Balkan frontier warfare, see: Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: UC Press, 1996).

78 The idea of this type of "kingship" in the Mughal context is dealt with by a recent monograph by Azfar Moin, who traces, collects, and organizes strands of Sufi and millennial themes claiming they make up a new early modern Islamic royal dynastic political culture. The larger point Moin wants to make is that both the Mughals and the Safavids took up the same themes into both of their royal dynastic cultures, where generally Mughals and Safavids are understood to have a cultural-religious schism along the Sunni/Shi'a line. See: Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).

## CHAPTER DESCRIPTIONS

In this case study, I document the activities of different parties (i.e. Portuguese, “native” island kings, South Indian migrants, “rebels”) as they competed with one another to establish territorial power and authority in the island in the first half of the seventeenth century, and where they all invariably utilized and expanded the *military economy* in the region. Chapter 1 details the attempts of the Portuguese Crown to impose a royal monopoly on cinnamon coming from the island, where king Philip II of Portugal intended for money made on cinnamon in the island go back into the expenses of the island *conquista* project. However, the system ultimately failed to provide a funding base for the conquest since the fiscal administration and its officers (*fazenda real, vedor da fazenda*) did not give enough incentive and did not have the authoritative control to prompt its Portuguese and native military personnel to deliver the item as well as other profitable ones (i.e. *areca*, rice, firearms), which they inevitably traded privately. The cycle of non-compliance, though detrimental for the larger *Estado da Índia*, is extremely useful for the historian as it details the island items/goods and outlines the common circuits of the military economy. Chapter 2 continues from the previous one to explain how it was military personnel had access to the items/goods in question, as they also formed the *de facto* territorial administrative personnel for the regions the *Estado* claimed authority over. It documents attempts by the Crown to impose administrative control over territories, where they passed and continually changed laws regarding land grants as well as canvassed territories and collected information regarding revenues and regional administrative personnel (i.e. *tombos*). Once again however, the Crown did not have the authority to control revenues and people in the territories

outside the region around Kotte, and which was exemplified in the continual activity of military personnel (European and Asian) outright seizing lands from Portuguese non-military grantees.

Chapter 3 moves into detailing the contents of the Sinhala literary sources and panegyrics known as the *Hatana Kavya* (“war poems”), specifically the *Sitavaka Hatana* written in 1585 by a general in service of the court of Sitavaka, Alahapperuma, and the *Kustantinu Hatana*, written in 1619 by the literary figure in the Kotte court Alagiyavanna Mukaveti. In my approach, I find two commonly shared themes/conventions between the poems; the convention of detailing a military expedition in a travelogue type format, and the convention of the problem of disloyalty. From these what is of interest is not specific empirical details regarding battles (i.e. dates, places, figures, outcomes) but instead the order and process by which a military expedition is organized; where the poems show how the recruitment of military occurs immediately preceding and even during the expedition in question, and where compensation is also procured and disbursed in a similar *ad-hoc* manner. Kings who win battles and territory invariably fall back on the same structure that the Portuguese do; they grant the lands to their military to administrate in the hope they pass some tribute to the king and provide military services in the future. The poems also share an interest in cases when such military loyalties were broken, where between the *Sitavaka Hatana* and the *Kustantinu Hatana* a term that encapsulates the concept, *peraliya*, was developed. Finally, the themes regarding making military expeditions as found in the *Hatana Kavya* are put against a detailed account of the takeover of Jaffna in 1619 by the “Captain-Major of the Field”, Filipe de Oliveira, which bears striking similarities regarding the organization of the expedition as well as how the land was subsequently granted under liberal terms to the native military personnel.

Chapter 4 approaches the problem of disloyalty in European accounts, and notes specifically where the rhetoric around Christian religious belief (i.e. anti-Christianity, apostasy) became more useful after the 1630s to explain the problem of military rebellions (i.e. desertions, mutinies). The pivot being the military rebellion that led to the death of the Portuguese Captain-General, Constantino de Sá de Noronha, by his own Christian native troop when on expedition to Kandy in the summer of 1630. Though ultimately used as a form of rhetoric by some writers to justify the Portuguese forfeit of native island military personnel recruitment, the study shows how the notions of Christian belief were commonly used by figures across the political and religious spectrum to articulate challenges, expectations, successes, failures, etc. For example, in an as-yet ignored account by an Augustinian friar regarding the Sá rebellion, Frei Manuel da Assunção, claims that Sá naively ignored signs offered by God that a rebellion would occur among his troops if he went on expedition. Assunção also copied a letter in his account by the King of Kandy at the time, the former Buddhist monk Senarat, where he too claims that a Christian God angry with the manner in which Sá conducted affairs prompted his own native troops to rebel against him. The point of cataloging such rhetoric, and noting where it shifts, is that such language should not be used to determine the 'temporal'/'spiritual' nature of political and military conflicts between the Portuguese and natives, and instead be used to chart out the challenges, expectations, successes, and failures that the rivals articulated in their attempts to establish territorial authority through the military economy.

Chapter 5 moves on to the topic of native kingly legitimacy and the often religious (i.e. Buddhist) character that it can take. The chapter attempts to answer whether or not the theory of *Sinhala Buddhist Kingship*, where a potential king needed to represent the Sinhala ethnicity and

the Buddhist religion as scholars have recently posited, is a factor in who can legitimately become a king. As it is explained, the decision is thus ultimately up to the Buddhist *sangha* and courtly elite, the king-makers as it were, to elect a king who has these specific qualities. However, by documenting the case of an “interregnum” of sorts in the Kingdom of Kandy, the temporary seizure of Kandyan power by a group of “rebels”, one can note a clear order of events regarding legitimacy; kingly legitimacy follows close behind and conveniently molds around those that can mobilize brute military force. Thus, I make a distinction between ‘kingly legitimacy’ and ‘kingly authority’, where people who have access to military force are attributed legitimacy as shown in the honorary title of “king” attributed to them in the two commensurate linguistic terms (i.e. *rei*, *raja*). In effect, the study notes where those kings deemed “legitimate” followed the same trajectories and had similar origins and backgrounds as those deemed “illegitimate” in the historical record, but where the former group had greater posterity due to their greater success in dealing with the military economy. Accordingly, the study details the case of the military administrative structure of Rajasinha II of Kandy and how it offered the most successful example of establishing authority as mentioned above. It also notes the natural process by which his authority is abstracted in courtly literary production, where modern scholars take forward the opaque representation and highlight the centrality and importance of kingly legitimacy colored by what they find to be Sinhala ethnic and Buddhist religious themes.

## Chapter 1: CINNAMON, CROWN TRADE MONOPOLIES, AND PRIVATE TRADE DURING THE *CONQUISTA DA ILHA DE CEILÃO*

One of the earliest accounts of the island cinnamon trade is found in the description of Ibn Battuta from the 1340s, where he describes that there was very little focused trade to speak of in that time. He notes this while he and his retinue came into Puttalam on the Western Coast to meet the Tamil sovereign, Aryacakravarti.

The entire coast of the country is covered with cinnamon sticks washed down by torrents and deposited on the coast looking like hills. The inhabitants of Ma'bar and Malabar take them away without paying for them, but in return for this they only make presents of cloth and similar things to the king.<sup>79</sup>

Instead of cinnamon, Ibn Battuta highlighted the organization of the gem and pearl trade by the Aryacakravartis. But this lack of emphasis on cinnamon would change in the next century, when a Sinhala kingdom would establish itself on the South Western Coast of Kotte. The Sinhala polity would drift toward the South West coast from the interior by this time and focus on trade, primarily in cinnamon, for its survival, moving away from previous agricultural based subsistence in the cases of Anuradhapura (hydraulic irrigation) and Polonnaruva (rain-fed).<sup>80</sup> Thus, within a few decades from the time the Portuguese entered into island and became the sole military protectors of the Kotte kingdom, vassalage agreements were based mostly on *pareas* (tribute) to the Europeans in cinnamon.<sup>81</sup> By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the many changes to Kotte's political fabric, where the Portuguese became the kingdom's owners,

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79 This excerpt is taken from an abridged version of the account that documents Ibn Battuta's travels in South Asia, see: *The Rehla of Ibn Battuta: India, Maldiv Island and Ceylon, Translation and Commentary by Mahdi Husain* (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1953), p. 217.

80 K. M. De Silva, *A History of Sri Lanka* (London: C. Hurst, 1981), pp. 83-6. Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia*, p. 138.

81 Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia*, p. 138.

prompted the Crown and *Estado* to reorganize the trade of cinnamon to make it more effectively profitable. The greatest policy change occurred when the Crown attempted to reserve cinnamon revenues for the expenses associated with island military expansion in the first half of the seventeenth century.

Chandra R. De Silva's short but important work on cinnamon production and trade between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries under the Portuguese Empire is the only article of its kind that addresses the changes that trade in cinnamon went through due to the impact of the Portuguese.<sup>82</sup> The information provided is broad and thus gives a general overview that includes tabulations of economic data, major political events, and how a combination of factors influenced the trade and changed it over time. Specifically, he follows the official policy on its trade, how there was initially a shift between a trade regulated by *cartazes* (or passes) to the *carreira* (or official fleet) structure in the sixteenth century, and then finally how the Crown instituted a monopoly structure (*estanco*) to be administered by the *Estado da Índia* from 1615 until about the 1640s. De Silva explains that the central difference between the monopoly system and the previous two systems was that the Royal Treasury in Goa exclusively made the profit on the sale of all cinnamon coming from the island instead of officials and other traders at the level of the port customs-house (*alfândega*), which collected money on the basis of taxes from the commodity levied at the point of entry and departure much like with other goods. As De Silva shows, the ambitious economic reform was met with clear resistance, which leads him to argue that the monopoly was not totally effective as there were clear cases of “smuggling” that were

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82 Chandra R. De Silva, “The Portuguese Impact on the Production and Trade in Sri Lanka Cinnamon in Asia in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, in M. N. Pearson, ed., *Spices in the Indian Ocean World* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1996), pp. 245-58.

occurring. In other words, private trade in cinnamon continued in the face of the new regulations.<sup>83</sup>

Though an important contribution, De Silva's assessment lacks certain details. For one, there is no indication of the reasons why the Habsburg Crown sought to institute the monopoly structure, and equally the reasons why such an arrangement could not deter private trade. A close examination of the documentation related to the cinnamon monopoly found in the Portuguese administrative archives gives clear answers to these questions. First, Philip II of Portugal argued for the centralization of cinnamon for the reason that it would provide a steady funding base for the military project that the *Estado* had in the island, “the conquest of the island of Ceylon” (*a conquista da ilha de Ceilão*). Similarly, the Habsburg king recommended that such arrangements be made for other goods from the island as well, thus there was an attempt to seize control of the collection and sale of goods such as betel-nut (*areca*) and rice as well. Early monopoly related documents also called for the planting of pepper in the island in order to create an island stock, and thus offset the political and diplomatic pressures that the *Estado* suffered in the Malabar coast. The Kings Philip also attempted to make similar arrangements on manufactured goods coming out of the island, specifically for firearms and other iron and steel based weapons; an extant island-based manufacture and trade that has not yet been recognized by historians as such.

An explanation for why such monopoly reforms could not deter private trade can also be surmised from the documents available in the Portuguese administrative archives. The Crown believed that the intention of providing resources for military activities provided them with a legitimate enough justification to directly apprehend the control of every level of production and trade of cinnamon and other goods. However, such measures were often met with vocal

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83 *Ibid.*, p. 253.

resistance by many including those inhabitants who were alienated from the trade by such regulations; *casados*, local native power-holders, and even the *Estado*'s administrative officers in the island. Complaints abounded, but these did not have any great effect on changes in the monopoly scheme. Instead, it was the non-participation of Portuguese military captains and generals in the scheme that posed the real challenge to the success of the monopoly, since such figures had *de facto* administrative control of regions under the *Estado*, as well as the goods and personnel in them, given that military power was necessary to maintain authority in these regions. In many ways, the Crown monopoly system was left to the mercy of these Portuguese military personnel, who ultimately saw that it was in their interest to continue the private trade in cinnamon and other goods, as well as the trade partnerships they had with native island figures, rather than help to develop the monopoly economic system. Part of this interest is articulated in the sources as personal greed and ambition, and this is not implausible, although it does not negate that there were larger structural problems in the monopoly scheme that also contributed to this situation. Though the monopoly scheme contained concrete and detailed instructions on how cinnamon would be collected and sold, it offered very little in the manner that money made on cinnamon would be disbursed to those military personnel that needed it, and requests for cinnamon money for war expenses often went unfulfilled. This fact kept the option of private trade relevant for those generals and captains invested in the conquest project. Thus, the vicious cycle of non-compliance between the Royal Treasury and the military personnel in the field resulted in one of the intended aims of the cinnamon monopoly, namely price-control, to be not only unrealized but worsened.

Based on the monopoly structures' short-comings it might be easy to fall into a

perspective in the vein of Niels Steensgaard, where one can consider the chaotic result as a systemic failure of an empire that had an essentially “re-distributive” economic model at its core.<sup>84</sup> The argument, carried forward by many scholars dealing with transition to Dutch rule, is connected to a larger tacitly held viewpoint that the Iberian empires ceded to the VOC in the Indian Ocean because of the economic rationality at the center of the company's enterprise as compared to that of the *Estado*. However, as can be seen in the materials, the idea that the Portuguese Crown under the Habsburgs was culturally incapable of comprehending economic problems or envisioning other economic models is completely incorrect. The original proposals put forward by Philip, a king who was highly devoted to matters of religion and the church, bear testament to his administration's ability and interest in detailed economic planning in the island. As explained above, though there were root causes for the destabilization of the cinnamon monopoly along with the other Crown attempts at controlling goods coming from the island, they operated on a completely different order to what Steensgaard and the adherents of his viewpoint might imagine. The real systemic problem that the monopoly faced was that the economy of the island in this period was that of a *military economy*, where not only goods and services were geared toward war activities, but the central agents of economic change were military personnel, irrespective of origin (i.e. European or Asian), the party they supported, or rank. When understood this way, the historian can follow these agents in the historical documentation related to the cinnamon monopoly to trace the trade routes and networks that some of them were connected to, which include intra-island trade, coastal trade (i.e. South India and Bengal), and overseas trade (i.e. to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea).<sup>85</sup>

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84 Steensgaard, *Carracks, Caravans, and Companies*, p. 114.

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONOPOLY STRUCTURE

The first piece of correspondence that contained a request to develop a monopoly for cinnamon along with detailed information as to how it would be structured comes in a lengthy letter by Philip to the Viceroy, Jerónimo de Azevedo, written on the 9<sup>th</sup> of February 1612. In the letter, the king referred back to some correspondence he had had with Azevedo who had been recently promoted to the position of Viceroy from the role of the “General of the Conquest of Ceylon”, from which the king noted certain recommendations. The issue as understood by Philip was that in its current state the price of cinnamon was too low to turn a good enough profit after shipment, and that the reason for its current state was that the market was flooded with cinnamon as it was easily obtained by contractors and other private entrepreneurs. He made the recommendation then to monopolize the commodity, shut out private trade, and control the amount of cinnamon that was going into the market.

Some recommendations have been made to me about the cinnamon in the island of Ceilão, regarding whether it should be contracted out, or whether a monopoly (*estranque*) should be made of it. When I asked you for thoughts and to give information about this matter when you were the General of the conquest of that island, you wrote me saying that the people were always restricted from this drug by a regulation and an old practice, and that it would not be unjust [to keep it restricted]. You thought that it was not helpful to contract for now, as the price was too low, and that much time needed to pass before it gains in value in order to give enough profit to then sustain the island and the conquest.<sup>86</sup>

According to the king, making a monopoly had two positive impacts. At the level of economic planning, by controlling the supply of cinnamon they could regulate what got pushed into the market and therefore could increase its demand and price, and secondly, the money from

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85 Sanjay Subrahmanyam breaks up trade circuits and routes into three groups; overland, coastal, and overseas in his work on South Indian political and economic activities, see: Subrahmanyam, *Political Economy of Commerce: Southern India, 1500-1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). In light of this I also contribute the term 'intra-island' which refers to both overland and coastal circuits restricted to the island.

86 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 2, p. 151.

carefully regulated *Estado* cinnamon sales that went back into the royal treasury would then be used as the main financial basis for expenses related to the conquest of the island. The idea was that once the conquest was finished and the island won, the restrictions would be eased and private traders would be able to once again deal in the commodity, albeit with the treasury still in a dominant position in the supply chain.

Therefore, from now there should be made an injunction that cinnamon and all of [its profit] should go directly into my treasury to be managed by the Captain General, *vedor* of the treasury, and the officers I have in that island. In this way it will be more useful. And after the conquest is complete it would stay reputable and of high value, and could be contracted out for royal revenue [...]. And the money made from the cinnamon that is sent from Ceilão to be sold in India for my treasury, that money should return to the same island for the expenses of the conquest, since it is from this money, along with that which is produced in the island, that would be enough to sustain and conquer it. And if this order is not made then there will be no end to the necessities.<sup>87</sup>

The letter also detailed exactly how such a monopoly would function at every administrative level, from collection to export. At the collection level, new regulations would have to be followed so that leakage of the commodity would not occur and where it eliminated incentives for private trade. In its place, Philip essentially called for a closer connection to the labor force that peeled the cinnamon, the Salagama caste (*chaleás*), along with a new set of expected requirements.

1,000 *bahars* should be collected every year, and included in these are 400 from tribute. And after some time if the taking of much cinnamon by the private traders (*particulares*), which India is full of, was stopped, this cinnamon could sustain and fortify all the island, according to common opinion. When merchants go to Columbo to buy it, they would fill the island with goods and supplies, and there would be more money. For this to happen, I will restrict all wild cinnamon that is made in Cochim, and make sure it only comes from Ceilão, which would make it come to a much higher value. And the Chaleás that strip it, as they would not have to provide it to the traders as they usually do, would voluntarily add at least 200 bahars to those that they are already obligated to pay as tribute, which in all would be 1,800 quintals.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152.

Local traders would not be the only groups of people to be restricted from collecting cinnamon and selling it privately, similar restrictions would be placed on *casados*, Portuguese settlers (*moradores*), and even *Estado* officials. In some cases, their forced break from involvement in the cinnamon market would be recompensed, but in other cases not.

The quotas [over cinnamon] that were granted to the captains of Columbo by an old practice and by the viceroy's provisions, should be recompensed in another way, or should be paid an estimate conforming to the value that it had before the injunction. That no quota should be granted to any person as I declare by law [...] And without any hesitation, in the manner in which I always have acted on this subject, I am making my vassals who are inhabitants in the island cease any trade they have with this drug. As they are poor and there is little in the island for them, because they sustain and help themselves from [cinnamon], if taken away it would deprive them of that which they sustain themselves, and this could result in them abandoning the island (*e tirando-se-lhe, lhe faltará o com que se sustentem, e poderá acontecer largarem a ilha*).<sup>89</sup>

A large segment of the trade would be localized to the Indian Ocean, and trading networks around South India and the Persian Gulf would be utilized in addition to Cape Route shipments. This is asked for by the King in the context of compensating sailors in Cape Route ships, who amongst others would be affected by the change in cinnamon policy.

If and when I send a [*carreira*] ship directly to the island with men of war in it, since this is the only way to conquer and populate [the island], they could take all the profits that they desire, which in this case would be fair for the monopoly. That in the said ship a quantity of cinnamon could be carried to be sold in [Portugal], enough for the ship's costs and expenses. And it would be even better for my treasury, as it would be for the conquest [of the island], if the General [of the conquest] would send another quantity [of cinnamon] directly to Ormuz. To offset the damage the said monopoly does to the sailors of the *carreira* ships, which is of utmost consideration, every year there should be sent enough cinnamon for these people to Goa and Cochim that could be sold to them for fair/low prices. Whatever is made from them should be spent on the conquest of the island.<sup>90</sup>

Besides controlling the movement of particular goods from the island, the monopoly policy that

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88 *Ibid.*, p. 153.

89 *Ibid.*, pp. 152, 154.

90 *Ibid.*, pp. 152, 154-5.

Philip proposed attempted to reform the entire manner of trade that the *Estado* had in South Asia, specifically the official re-localization of trade in the good and others to the Indian Ocean.

This retooling of the cinnamon trade had greater implications for managing the collection and trade of other commodities as well, and such regulations also contained proposals related to the other major commodity the Portuguese traded in the South Asian region, pepper. King Philip detailed some beginning proposals for the reform of this commodity as well in the same letter that he detailed the rules of the cinnamon monopoly.

It was proposed to me that it would be of great profit for my treasury if I were to obligate people that were granted lands in the island of Ceilão to plant a certain quantity of pepper trees every year, according to the substance and capacity of each piece of land, [planting them in places] which would give a lot of pepper and that of good quality. Where it would be obligatory for the renters to pay a certain quantity of rent in pepper, and where the remaining pepper they had would be bought from them for a just price.<sup>91</sup>

This same section of the letter goes on to explain that much like cinnamon, the problem with pepper was that much of it was getting lost in shipment in overland and sea trade routes. There was also the added issue of having a certain amount of dependence on certain power holders in the region, in this case the Nayakas of South India, with whom they were required to have some diplomatic contact to maintain the trade.<sup>92</sup> Having an alternative supply in the island would have elided the awkward political arrangements that put the *Estado* in undesirable diplomatic positions.<sup>93</sup>

Similarly, the control of the other important commodities in the island, betel and rice, would be of high consideration, especially considering rations of rice and betel were the most

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91 *Ibid.*, pp. 155-6.

92 *Ibid.*

93 For Portuguese involvement in the pepper trade in South India in the early seventeenth century and their attempts at making a company structure, see: Anthony Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in Southwest India in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978).

commonly used payment for soldiers. The King in a separate *alvará* attempted to control certain areas in which these important goods were most largely produced, an area known as Bulatagama (Sinhala: 'betel land').

I, the King, am making it known to all who see this *alvará*, that [the profit] which is produced from villages called Bulategama in the island of Ceylão always come to the account of my treasury. It would not be suitable to give those villages to private individuals, since supplies like rice, betel, and other things are taken [by them] which the said island is usually provided with.<sup>94</sup>

The control over Bulatagama would be hard fought in the next few years considering it was a very resource-rich area that many generals and officials in the *Estado* were apt to control for private purposes.

The new official line on trade and the advent of the monopolies as represented in the set of proposals put down by Philip in the beginning of 1612, however unfair or unrealistic his vassals thought them to be (as would soon be shown), marked a clear understanding by him and his officials of the economic challenges his *Estado* suffered. From the letter it can be clearly identified how much of a threat Philip considered private trade conducted by both Portuguese and Asians in the island to the profitability of the *Estado*. The combination of measures, including those measures that touched on pepper, betel, and rice, was extremely unpopular and in many ways untenable. In regard to cinnamon, considering it was mostly circulated by private traders beforehand for the *Estado* on a contract basis, the new regulations were hard to implement in the short-term as can be seen in the documentation from the first few years after the policy was developed.

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*THE MONOPOLY ALVARÁS AND THE INITIAL CHALLENGES OF INSTITUTING THE*

94 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 4, p. 204.

## MONOPOLY

The official *alvarás* by the Viceroy Azevedo that detailed the terms of the cinnamon monopoly that were to take effect within the *Estado* were issued from the 21<sup>st</sup> of April in 1614.<sup>95</sup> Each *alvará* is slightly different but they overlap in that they all state the main set of terms detailed in Philip's original letter from the beginning of 1612. The lengthiest document of these carries the central tenets of the monopoly.

The cinnamon to be made and taken from the island every year for the account of the treasury of His Majesty will not go beyond 1,000 *bahars* and there will be an attempt to have no less. Included in these are the 600 [*bahars*] that are to be paid as tribute conforming to the declaration that I made there about this and the regulation that conforms to it that I left in that island [...] The administration of this will come under the *Veedor* of the treasury of His Majesty of that island (as it pertains to his position) who will order for the collection of the cinnamon. He will collect it in Columbo in godowns or bankshalls in the *matual* making sure that those [*bahars*] that are from tribute are not made at any cost to the treasury of His Majesty up until the time they are brought to the said godowns and bankshalls, as it is an obligation to deliver them [to the stores] without any costs [...] A person of service and confidence will be found to bring this cinnamon as cargo to sell here. This person will be nominated by the captain general, a person in whom I trust, and he will be a person of consideration and good reason. I order this to be done because the said cinnamon will go towards the expenses of the conquest (that are noted in the account), and a person who can be helpful in this regard should be chosen.<sup>96</sup>

The other two copies amend this original document on some key points. There can be found in these documents terms of punishments if trade is conducted outside of the monopoly, in which case, “half would go to the treasury of His Majesty and half to the accuser”.<sup>97</sup> Besides this, all the offenders would suffer a further punishment, “five years as a prisoner in the *armadas* of the south, and the *challias*, or whatever other blacks that took [the cinnamon], spend time as prisoners in the galleys”.<sup>98</sup>

95 Three *alvarás* for the cinnamon monopoly are found in: *AHU-Caixas*, No. 3, Folders 126, 127, 137.

96 *AHU-Caixas*, No. 3, Folder 137, f. 1.

97 *AHU-Caixas*, No. 3, Folder 126, f. 1.

98 *Ibid.*

The monopoly *alvarás* written from 1614 by Azevedo, along with the previous orders by the King from 1612, provided an outline of enough rules and regulations for officers of the *Estado* to comply with. Thus, from April 1614 there would have been no confusion that cinnamon was prohibited from being collected, moved, bought, and sold, without the treasuries in Colombo and Goa having record of it. However, the initial conduct in regards to cinnamon collection and sale did not follow this procedure as is detailed in a letter written on the 20<sup>th</sup> of November 1615 by the *Vedor* of the treasury in the island, Antão Vaz Freire. According to him, the continued private trade of cinnamon in the face of the monopoly was so apparent that it actually hindered instead of helped the cause it was meant to support: “it has to be said, that this monopoly that Your Majesty has ordered for the benefit and support of this conquest has ended up creating an even greater set of needs to maintain [the conquest] compared to before when the said cinnamon was not under monopoly”.<sup>99</sup> Amongst other things, Freire came to know that far more cinnamon was being extracted from the regions under *Estado* control as tribute than was stipulated by Philip. The reason for this over-extraction was unclear in some cases but was assumed to be due to the activities of generals based in certain regions.

Last year in 1614 the Viceroy sent a provision to this island based on Your Majesty's instruction to make a monopoly of cinnamon. In a regulation that the Viceroy ordered in that said year, it stated that no more than 600 *bahars* could be collected as tribute. [However], since then, 1,000 have been collected [as tribute], where it is not clear the manner in which the other 400 *bahars* were added. I along with the Captain-General, M[anu]el Mascarenhas, dealt with this issue by declaring that 200 *bahars* should be reduced from the Royal Treasury, where [those 200 *bahars*] were taken by the Captain-Generals for themselves until now from the *dissava* of Maturé, which is noted in the *tombo* that was made of the lands of that district that belong to the said treasury.<sup>100</sup>

Besides implicating a group of generals for infringing on the terms of the monopoly, Freire also

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99 *AHU-Caixas*, No. 4, Folder: 144, f. 1v.

100 *Ibid.*, f. 1v.

implicates certain individuals, and in this case he takes special concern with the activities of the Viceroy, Azevedo, the author of the original 1614 *alvarás*. The section of the document at the end of the folio that begins to detail the indictment against Azevedo is damaged, and thus its full meaning cannot be ascertained. What can be understood from what is readable is that Freire claimed Azevedo acted outside of the rules of the monopoly by garnering a shipment of cinnamon for use external to the conquest. The next folio, which is undamaged, goes into further detail.

The said cinnamon was sold after the ships departed for this kingdom for a very low price to pay for certain rights from the King of Cochim, which [cinnamon] the Viceroy had taken and spent as can be seen in the authentic copy of a section of a letter written by the Archbishop of Goa, who wrote to me in the time he was in government in the absence of the Viceroy, [as the Viceroy] was in an armada going to the north. It was thought that these needs were far more urgent than those of this conquest. Besides this, when the Viceroy was the general of that island he expropriated [cinnamon] many times from the Viceroy's that preceded him, as those Viceroy's did not send him much support in the way of men and money (where they did however let him freely take all that this island provided).<sup>101</sup>

The indictment carries a few important facts that would reoccur in other cases where cinnamon was found to be traded outside of the monopoly. High-level Portuguese military personnel, like Azevedo, who previously was the Captain-General of the island, had a long-term engagement with the cinnamon trade and thus a clear understanding of the manner in which it was collected and distributed. Secondly, money, resources, and goods like cinnamon were quite often used to deal with more immediate diplomatic and military needs. This could be for funding an expedition within the island, but could also be linked to other political and military activities inside and outside of the island. Therefore, the idea of providing the cinnamon to the treasury, in order to be processed and redistributed through the official channels, was far too slow and lengthy of a

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101 *Ibid.*, f. 2.

process for the immediate needs that certain generals and captains had in the region in which the vicissitudes of war and diplomacy ran at a rapid pace. This also seemed to be the opinion of the Viceroys that preceded Azevedo, who left the likes of Azevedo to their own devices as far as raising revenue for military activities was concerned.

#### *INDIAN OCEAN PRIVATE TRADE AS READ THROUGH THE DEVASSAS*

The initial issues that Freire highlighted immediately after the monopoly on cinnamon was imposed forecast a set of recurring challenges that surfaced in the next few decades. The information would come to the king by way of the *devassa*, a ground report that some officers were asked to make on issues related to urgent overseas activities. The *devassas*, in highlighting problems in a specific area to the king, underlined the private activities of specific officials and thus carried an accusatory tone. In this way, the *devassa* provided a means for officials with competing interests to defame one another, which makes it difficult for the historian to surmise how accurate the observations made in the letters are.<sup>102</sup> In these sets of cases one has to deal with exaggerations in the form of the *defamation*, which is a set of charges that were meant to weaken the position of a prominent official who was often the personal rival of the said author.

In the correspondence the tropes are generally the same, where it is claimed that another official is engaged in private trade of cinnamon, and that they have acted immorally and unethically in other ways as well. Understanding the specific discourses the statements work from is not as important as understanding the specific manner in which private trade functioned,

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102 Approaching this problem one turns to a useful concept developed by Sanjay Subrahmanyam, who termed such emphatic statements as 'exaggerated calculations', where such appeals were meant to inspire an urgency in the king to meet certain requests that the correspondence also contained, see: Subrahmanyam, *The Political Economy of Commerce*, p. 230.

as they tell of a persistent situation of private trade where officials (military and administrative) defame one another based on the same exact sets of charges. Put together, the *devassas* detail the existence of trade routes and connections that would be of general interest to the historian of Indian Ocean trade.

One such defaming *devassa* was written by Lançarote de Seixas, the *vedor* of the treasury in the island in the second decade of the seventeenth century, who used the opportunity to issue a scathing criticism against Azevedo along with his close associate, the general Nuno Álvares Pereira. Though Seixas would himself come under criticism within a short time by many others, in his letter dated the 2<sup>nd</sup> of November 1618 he fashioned himself as the model official by reporting on the Viceroy's private economic activities.

Firstly, Your Majesty will know that the principal reason that the matters of this island do not follow the declaration that is most suitable, which conforms to your service by the orders and regulations that you have passed regarding what belongs to the Royal Treasury, is because dom Hieronimo dezevedo was an absolute lord [of those lands]. He came to the conquest poor, but then became very rich, making large grants and expenses in the time he was here.<sup>103</sup>

The specific issue was that Azevedo gave licenses to the generals of the *Estado* based in the island for trade in cinnamon and other commodities like betel, which was in direct violation of the rules of the monopoly. The result was that revenues were not going back into the treasury of the king, which negatively impacted money available for the conquest. The indictment links Azevedo to the ex-Captain-General, Pereira, who he portrayed to be a major offender.

A license has been conceded to the present general here, Dom Nunalvares Pereira, by a provision which allows him to take 200 *bahars* of cinnamon, and every year he actually takes 1,000, and he has given licenses to many others. And the Viceroy never considered this to be a loss, since it appears he told the same thing to Manoel Mascarenhas, that he could take as much cinnamon as he wanted. Besides the loss incurred by the treasury of Your Majesty, and the great risk it has put this conquest into many times, as it contributes

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103 *AHU-Caixas*, No. 9, Folder 149, fs. 1-1v.

to a lack of money and goods, the *conquistadores* and inhabitants are greatly scandalized, given that this [financial] support is taken from them only to be given to one man and others there that did not work for it.<sup>104</sup>

Seixas not only accused the generals associated with Azevedo of dealing in cinnamon against the regulations, he claimed that trade in *areca*, fabrics, gems, and elephants were all also being done privately by local *vidanas*, who lorded over prominent interior regions against the regulations of the king. He highlighted the specific case of private trade done on goods from Bulatagama, an area for which Philip had issued an *alvará* (as seen above) in which he stated that all the revenue extracted from the region should go directly to the royal treasury.<sup>105</sup> The reason Seixas offered for how and why such figures continued to proceed in such a manner was once again centered on the generals, who ultimately were the people on the ground who gave the final order to extract revenues and were expected to organize its delivery to the treasury.

Regardless of all the [regulations] the generals are subject to, they do not lose anything and are not dispossessed of any profit, and it is not possible to require this of them because they are in possession of what Dom Hieronimo has left them. It is because of these limitations and mishaps that the *Vedor* of the treasury cannot collect anything for Your Majesty, not without the [the generals'] orders and *olas*.<sup>106</sup>

In all, by describing the situation in the way he did, Seixas was not only calling for the official castigation of his rivals in the *Estado* such as Azevedo. The statement was a part of a larger aim of enforcing the monopoly on cinnamon while leaving other trades (i.e. *areca* and fabrics) to private individuals. In fact, he argued that if the cinnamon monopoly functioned as it should, without resulting in money being lost due to private trade, the conquest would be better funded and not require any additional revenue.<sup>107</sup>

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104 *Ibid.*, f. 2

105 *Ibid.*, f. 1v.

106 *Ibid.*.

107 *Ibid.*.

Seixas begins his entire diatribe against military personnel by utilizing a common trope echoed in many documents by other authors, which highlighted the abuse and injustice committed against the poor and destitute settlers, renters, and inhabitants (*casados, foreiros, moradores*) based in the interior areas. In regards to the cinnamon monopoly, such arguments claim that these inhabitants are the only ones in the island that follow the terms of the monopoly to their detriment.

The cinnamon that Your Majesty ordered a monopoly and injunction of four years ago, where it was previously always contracted to the captain of this fortress, up until today is still not being guarded by the generals. Instead, their servants and associates have collected and continue to collect all of it. They get much more than these poor *casados*, who are the only ones that the law is executed against. This leaves the treasury of Your Majesty at a loss every year by 40 to 50,000 cruzados.<sup>108</sup>

Another example of the use of the trope is found in a list of complaints written a year earlier by the entity known as “the City of Colombo”, a collective of elite figures and administrators in charge of the governance of the city. They go far beyond Seixas and make a direct and open criticism of the monopoly imposed on the cinnamon, claiming once again that common people are the only ones taking on the burden of the monopoly regulation.<sup>109</sup> Besides this criticism, the city in the letter questions the actual profitability of the entire operation due to the continued private trade activities of the generals, since the price-control of cinnamon is not being achieved.

Even though there is an injunction today, much more cinnamon is being taken than before, and [because of this] its value is much less. It can be seen in the certificates of the general and the captain of the fortress that after the injunction was set a quintal in Goa was never more than 16 *pardaos*. [But] it is known that in the year of 1611, the year when the fleet of Dom Diogo de Vasconcellos was lost, it was worth 25 *pardaos* in Goa, this being at a time when there was still no injunction and when it was never expected to come. And its worst [value] was that of this last year, in 1617, [a time when] the injunction in the island was set, and when Your Majesty did not even collect one quintal,

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108 *Ibid.*, f. 1v.

109 *AHU-Caixas*, No. 7, Folder 201, f. 1v.

as the general took it for himself and granted it to those of his choosing. [At this time] the price in Goa became so low that it did not go above 16 *pardaos*. In addition to the many things that happened there, the general sent a ship to Ormus [with cinnamon] under his charge, which is something that never happened when the cinnamon was free [to trade]. And even more disheartening for us is that it is taken by the servants of the general and those that he chooses to give a license to. [The injunction] only restricts the inhabitants of this city from it, [thus] they have won and conquered the city only to have someone else cheat them. If Your Majesty wants this injunction on cinnamon to truly be in your service, then we ask Your Majesty to grant us the favor of not letting the general take [any cinnamon], that he be the first to pay respect to the said provision.<sup>110</sup>

The city levied criticisms against the monopoly system in regards to cinnamon as a means of securing trade interests in other goods, such as betel-nut (*areca*). The problem in regards to this good as explained by the city is that renters in interior areas are being required to pay a majority of the rent in *areca* to the treasury.

[Rents] are being paid in *areca* over fabrics and money from the said villages, which is then given to Your Majesty and the general. This is the cause of great harm to the renters, as [you and the general] take all of the product by doing this, and [the renters] are left with nothing or with very little.<sup>111</sup>

Much like Seixas, the city resorts to directly asking that trade in *areca* remains open; given the restrictive burden the cinnamon monopoly already has on the people there, “this city asks that since there is now an injunction on cinnamon [the renters] be left free to [trade ] *areca*”.<sup>112</sup>

The combination of viewpoints on the monopoly of cinnamon between Seixas and the “City of Columbo” outline how most people on the ground perceived the monopoly. First, many officials in the *Estado* in their own ways aptly criticized the system by using similar arguments that touched on similar subjects, for example the concern felt for the poor and destitute inhabitants of the island. Each of these groups clearly felt that the monopoly posed an economic

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110 *Ibid.*.

111 *Ibid.*.

112 *Ibid.*, f. 2.

burden on them, and because of this they additionally asked to keep access to other goods (i.e. areca) free from similar restrictions. Second, both entities held the generals and even the Captain-General culpable of breaking the regulations of the monopoly, specifically the issuing of licenses to their associates who collected and sold cinnamon for money and other goods, which was revenue that would never end up passing through the official channels. The letter by the city in particular highlighted how these private initiatives sustained an unregulated flow of cinnamon into the Asian market, and thus made the control of the price by the Crown impossible.

Philip soon came to know about all of these initial challenges to the cinnamon monopoly. In a letter written in the beginning of March 1619, he specifically recognized that military officials had not stopped collecting and privately trading cinnamon, which had left the price of cinnamon low. He acknowledged the excessive activities of the viceroy, Azevedo, and the Captain-General.

I am informed that the regulation that I ordered to be passed on the monopoly of cinnamon of the island of Ceilão is not being guarded due to the many licenses that the Viceroy Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo conceded to the private traders, as well as from those licenses the Captain-General took for himself and for his servants, who commit many excesses. In the said regulation the amount is limited to 3,000 quintals for my treasury, and the amount of licenses amount to far more than this, they go beyond 9,000 quintals, and the general by himself makes 6,000 [...]. And the powerful take what they want without paying anything to my treasury, which results in great complaints and conflicts, and it is the reason that this drug is in such low demand today.<sup>113</sup>

For Philip's administration at this time, in order to combat the negative impact *Estado* military and administrative personnel were having on his economic plans for the island, it was seen as necessary to procure more information from more trustworthy sources. To this effect, Philip asked that certain officers, who had proven records of service in other locations in Portuguese India, travel to Sri Lanka in order to provide this information by way of *devassas*,

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113 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 5, p. 320.

which were meant to generally give information and suggestions on the manner in which the conquest of the island should be conducted. One of these figures from the late 1610s and early 1620s was a well-known and controversial figure, the Dominican friar Sebastião de São Pedro, the Bishop of Cochin. The letters that the Bishop would write in the years between 1619 and 1623 provided an enormous amount of useful information for Philip, and hence also for the historian of the period. Besides providing information, the role of the Bishop extended in certain cases to being that of an officer in the island, where he would see to it to recommend and implement orders, sometimes without the knowledge of the king. His presence also prompted a heightened sense of vigilance for *Estado* officers to adhere to the regulations set out by the King and to stamp out such illegal activities that they were aware of.

From the end of 1619, this heightened sense of vigilance was felt by the new governor, Fernão de Albuquerque, as he felt pressured to make it publicly clear that infringements against the regulation on cinnamon would not be tolerated. Specifically, he had to deal with new information supplied to him by the Bishop of Cochin in a letter the latter wrote in November, in which the Bishop highlighted the case of a shipment of cinnamon that had been sent to the Red Sea for sale, to an area where there was no official Portuguese presence and thus totally outside the economic ambit of the *Estado*. The situation prompted the governor to take particularly strong measures against the infraction. A few days after the Bishop's report, on the 15<sup>th</sup> of November, Fernão de Albuquerque issued the following statement to the then Captain-Major, António Barreto da Silva.

His Majesty has made a monopoly of cinnamon and has defended it with many orders made 10 years ago, and even older ones, in which he said not to take this good to Meca and other parts. This year it needs to be followed more strictly as I have been informed that this good has been sent [overseas] [...] [As you have not stopped this from

happening] I feel it necessary to forcefully remind the *Vedor* of the treasury and also yourself that there is no greater fault worth considering than when lower officials do not comply to the orders of those senior to them, especially those orders coming from His Majesty and his Viceroy [...] I order and charge you to find and take away all the cinnamon that this fortress [in Goa] has collected, whether it be from Ceilão or Cochym, and then burn it publicly there in front of the custom house.<sup>114</sup>

In the next letter in the *Reis Vizinhos* collection, in the folio immediately after the one above, one finds the same order with no date, but this time given to the *vedor*, Manuel Borges de Sousa.<sup>115</sup> In all, it is not clear whether or not the public burning actually occurred.

Fernão de Albuquerque's sense of vigilance in protecting the trade monopoly can also be attributed to diverting any suspicions of the private trade that he and some of his family members were involved in, which was uncovered within a few years. Soon after he took the position of governor he too was implicated in a private trade scandal involving his son, Jorge de Albuquerque, who Fernão de Albuquerque had made Captain-General of the island by vacating Constantino de Sá de Noronha from the position in 1622. The main party who launched the accusations was none other than Seixas who in a letter to the king claimed that Jorge de Albuquerque used the power of his post in the island in order to take, "more than 200 *bahars* of cinnamon that was collected and sent off against the monopoly that His Majesty has asked to set".<sup>116</sup> As the *vedor*, Seixas accused Jorge de Albuquerque of unlawfully procuring cinnamon and added that he was helping himself to Bulatagama areca as well. In all, he claimed the responsibility for the large margin of losses in the treasury was due to these private enterprises which Jorge de Albuquerque was at the center of. These issues first came under the attention of the king in 1623, and by 1625 the king understood that Fernão de Albuquerque -- the ex-

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114 *HAG-RV*, f. 45v. *Filmoteca*, p. 77.

115 *HAG-RV*, f. 46.

116 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 9, p. 381.

governor by this time, was directly implicated along with other family members and associates. From the description provided by the king one can see the typical process in which cinnamon passed through private trade networks located around South India.

In my letter of 8<sup>th</sup> February 1623, I ordered you to put in place a *devaça* by one of the inquisitors of this state for the sentencing of Jorge d'Albuquerque, the general who was in the island of Ceilão, as it relates to the two cases that he is being tried for. The first being the great amount of cinnamon that he diverted, under the protection of a provision that the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque, his father, made for him so that he could take 50 *bahars* against the monopoly of cinnamon which was set. And the other, where he diverted cinnamon by means of a small ship (*pataxo*), which the said general took to Ceilão after which he had his wife travel by *pataxo* to Goa. For this reason, 200 *bahars* of cinnamon could not be taken to Ormuz to be delivered to Ruy Freire de Andrade, which left the said Ruy Freire without any support and my treasury at a loss of 20,000 x[erafins], the amount that the cinnamon is worth in Ormuz.<sup>117</sup>

In this case and according to the information received by the king, significant amounts of cinnamon (150 of the 200 *bahars*) were passed by small load vessels (*pataxo*) along coastal routes traveling up through South India into Goa, and Jorge de Albuquerque's wife appeared to also be involved in the enterprise.

However, the heightened vigilance in stamping out private trade in the name of protecting the cinnamon monopoly, along with the miscommunication between officers, led to some cases in which people who bought cinnamon in accordance with the monopoly had it stripped away as they were suspected of obtaining the good through private channels. One such case is extensively documented in the collection, *Conselho da Fazenda*, in which one Goan *casado*, Jerónimo da Costa, is said to have bought 40 *bahars* of cinnamon in Sri Lanka in early 1621 only to have it be confiscated in Cochin on its way to Goa by an officer there under the suspicion that it was being sold outside of the monopoly. The case was heard in the council in the summer of 1624, and the original judgment, the petition issued by Costa to retrieve his goods, and the sentence of the

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117 *ANTT-LM*, Book 21, f. 277.

council finally gave, were all copied in the same document.<sup>118</sup> Though it was agreed by all that the cinnamon was unjustly confiscated, the more important judgment the council had to make was whether or not to refund the said cinnamon to Costa. Further, Costa was requiring that the council pay the shipping costs as well, “as this cinnamon has been taken by the said factor, who took it under his charge, the *Estado* should cover this expense as well as what was paid for transport to Cochim, which was 200 *xerafins*, which Your Majesty is also obligated to pay”.<sup>119</sup> Ultimately the judgment was made to pay both costs, albeit very slowly.

It has been declared in the Council of the Treasury that the Veador of the Treasury of Seilão make a payment to the petitioner in the amount of 40 *bahars* of cinnamon. Under this declaration they will be paid in two separate amounts of 20 in this year of 1624 and 1625 in the October monsoon.<sup>120</sup>

But as read from other sources, such vigilance was sporadic and did not curb the loss of much larger amounts of cinnamon stocked in ships traveling through the straits between the island and South India.<sup>121</sup> These problems of loss of cinnamon in coastal transport were so persistent that the *Conselho da Fazenda* passed a law which attempted to restrict most vessels from carrying any amount of cinnamon from the date it was issued, 28<sup>th</sup> September 1629.

No ship that currently goes to Ceilão can carry cinnamon or other goods besides the ship *Madre de Deus* that will have cargo belonging to the account of the royal treasury, it will be carrying everything that is to be brought to this city [Goa], which is cinnamon as well as other goods that there are in the said island.<sup>122</sup>

Solving the problem of cinnamon loss occurring on ships traveling between Colombo and Goa meant directly monitoring the ships that could carry the good between regions.

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118 *HAG-Fazenda*, No. 1160, fs. 238-40.

119 *Ibid.*, f. 239.

120 *Ibid.*, f. 240.

121 For another case from March 1629 when an entire shipment was lost, see: *ANTT-LM*, Book 26, f. 244.

122 *HAG-Fazenda*, No. 1161, f. 81.

Into the 1630s, the rebellion staged against Constantino de Sá, and the detrimental effects it had on Portuguese military authority on the island, led to a noticeable laxity on the question of maintaining the cinnamon monopoly. Therefore, the generals and governors from this decade, such as Jorge de Almeida and Diogo de Melo de Castro, were summarily excused for infractions against the monopoly given the *Estado's* weak military position. For example, by the time of the election of Diogo de Melo at the beginning of 1636 to the post of “Governor of Ceylon”, the *Conselho do Estado* recognized that he had at one point traded 100 *bahars* of cinnamon outside the monopoly to a prominent group of *casados* in Nagapattinam, who then traded with the Dutch. However, very little was done against the infraction, and the only requirement that was made on him on his election to the new post was to provide a report of such activities.<sup>123</sup> In the same year, Philip wrote to the Viceroy on the subject of private trade infractions made by Diogo de Melo, and though he thought it improper that cinnamon was dealt to the *casados* of Nagapattinam, which invariably put cinnamon in the hands of the Dutch, he stated that the contributions of Diogo de Melo outweighed his offense.

Also the monopoly on cinnamon was broken [as Diogo de Melo] sent [cinnamon] to be sold in Negapatão, where it would have gone into the hands of the Dutch. And having examined all of the reasons that this occurred that were given to me, I believe that though the Count of Linhares had reasons to remove Diogo de Mello de Castro from Ceilão, [such reasons] should have been taken lightly. Instead of only considering what the Count specified, it was also necessary to hear from Diogo de Mello about those same reasons. Because though the actions of Diogo de Mello could be subject to punishment, until now he has given satisfaction in the manner in which he has proceeded in peace and war, where he obligated the King of Candea by way of arms to accept and comply with the peace agreements.<sup>124</sup>

Trade between the officials and the *casados* of Nagapattinam would continue into the 1640s, a

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123 *Estado*, Vol. 2, p. 53.

124 *ANTT-LM*, Book 37, fs. 1-1v.

time when the Dutch had almost entirely wrested away control over the cinnamon trade from the Portuguese. By this time, any trade in cinnamon was encouraged with any interested party (i.e. Danes, the Mughal governor of Bengal, or private traders in Nagapattinam<sup>125</sup>) as there were more immediate needs for supplies for the support of the Colombo fort.

[The ships] were provided in Columbo with as much cinnamon as was possible to take at the time. It was brought also for the payments to the Danes and merchants of the Nababo and for one Antonio de Mendonça, a *cazado* from Negapatão, for rice and things that would help that fortress, which satisfies the order of the Veedor of the treasury of Ceilão.<sup>126</sup>

According to De Silva the price of cinnamon in the time of the monopoly, from 1615 to 1640 – in the twenty-five years following the cinnamon monopoly set by the *alvarás* of Azevedo -- was consistently low. Even when it did rise he claims it was merely to keep up with the rate of inflation.<sup>127</sup> In this way, the monopoly did not have the kind of effect it was originally drafted to have. Earlier on, the monopoly laws were far more rigid than later on, where they had to evolve around the activities of those that the monopoly depended on, *Estado* officers/military personnel. Thus, these people were the central agents that destabilized the attempts at controlling the price of the item. Though, it would be incorrect to assume that cinnamon, even with its low price, was not extremely profitable for the *Estado*; a considerable amount of money made on the sale of cinnamon came into the royal treasury over the decades. However, the expenses that such money met were most often not those expenses related to conquest activities in the island as originally promised.

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125 Trade of rice between the island and the Coromandel coast (Nagapattinam and Masulipatnam) has been a consistent feature between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see: Subrahmanyam, *The Political Economy of Commerce*, pp. 53, 62.

126 *HAG-Fazenda*, No. 1163, f. 109v.

127 De Silva, “The Portuguese and the Cinnamon Trade”, pp. 257-8.

*PROBLEMS IN MAKING CINNAMON MONEY AVAILABLE FOR THE CONQUEST AND THE INCENTIVE OF PRIVATE INITIATIVE*

The inability of the cinnamon monopoly to consistently provide money and resources for military activities, and in a timely enough manner, was a noticeable problem that required those generals serious about territorial expansion for the *Estado* to engage in private initiatives. At this point, it will be useful to trace how money from cinnamon and how the crop itself was officially managed around the time of the setting of the monopoly and into the 1630s, in order to establish the level at which generals based in the island were supported by official channels.

Typical expenses met by money from cinnamon from the time of the inception of the monopoly had nothing to do with the conquest or even the island. The month after the original 1612 proposals by Philip were composed (February), the king filled requests for cinnamon as a diplomatic gift. In March he ordered for 100 *bahars* of cinnamon to be sent every year to the ruler of Cochin for his services in providing pepper and allowing certain clergy to be based in the region.<sup>128</sup> Such yearly grants of cinnamon did not cease at the start of the monopoly in 1615, they continued into the 1630s. Guarantees of 50 *bahars* of cinnamon free of duties to be given annually for terms that lasted a number of years were granted to Cochin in 1624 for the purchase of artillery, and the guarantee was restated in 1631 and 1636.<sup>129</sup> By the 1630s, key *Estado* losses in Indian Ocean possessions, such as those in the aftermath of the death of Sá, troubles in Mombasa, Muscat and Melaka, generally spread the money the treasury possessed thin, where no specific contributions could be made to reinvigorate the island.<sup>130</sup>

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128 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 2, pp. 193-4.

129 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 10, p. 356. *ANTT-LM*, Book 28, f. 276. *ANTT-LM*, Book 37, f. 243-243v

130 *HAG-Fazenda*, No. 1162, fs. 71v-73v.

When cinnamon money did come to the aid of island military personnel, it came sluggishly and with the expectation that such generals would also somehow supplement it with money and resources that they procured on their own. In one example, as explained above, by the early 1620s there was a high level of overseas trade in cinnamon to the Persian Gulf, and in some cases there were attempts made to bring back money made on cinnamon in Hormuz to meet the conquest related expenses. In another example, the Bishop of Cochim on the 26<sup>th</sup> of February 1620 notified Fernão de Albuquerque that a ship filled with cinnamon was sent to Hormuz against the monopoly and asked for the money made from the sale of the cinnamon to come back to the treasury in Goa for the expenses of the conquest.<sup>131</sup> Fernão de Albuquerque made note of this and conceded that the money procured from the ship on its retrieval would be granted to Constantino de Sá.<sup>132</sup> Though it was generally understood that cinnamon was meant to go to expenses for the conquest, the specific moment provided a special urgency, as Jaffna had recently been conquered through the independent efforts of Filipe de Oliveira. However, it appears that the ship in question never made it back to Goa, based on the information from subsequent letters: “At the time of writing this, the galliot has not come on the route from Ormus that I am expecting, from which the Vedor of the treasury ordered for me to receive the money made from cinnamon that Your Grace sent to Ormus”.<sup>133</sup>

Different figures including the Viceroy understood that the *Estado* infrastructure was fundamentally incapable of making cinnamon and the money made from it available to those that were actively engaged in military expansion in the island, specifically those model generals of

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131 HAG-RV, fs. 89v-90. *Filmoteca*, pp. 123-4.

132 HAG-RV, f. 96. *Filmoteca*, pp. 129-30.

133 HAG-RV, f. 127v. *Filmoteca*, p. 162.

the 1620s, Sá and Oliveira. The Viceroy at this time, João Countinho, the Count of Redondo, assumed this and requested that Sá find his own funding sources on whatever could be made from land-revenue to cover his expenses, including collecting and selling recently acquired Jaffna elephants.<sup>134</sup> However, as will be dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter on the military and land administration, generals and captains directly extracting revenues to meet their personal expenses was already a quite common practice. The issue was that more obedient and trustworthy generals like Sá and Oliveira would not have engaged in such private initiatives unless it was mandated by senior officials. In light of this, other officers also genuinely concerned with the king's service made attempts to ensure that land-revenues would go directly to those more committed generals like Sá. One of these was the Bishop of Cochin, who attempted to get a regulation passed in which 10 to 12 of the best villages in the region would be set aside for such conquest related expenses.<sup>135</sup> However, as will also be explained in the next chapter, such regulations never took root, leaving the generals that followed the letter of the king, and who refused to engage in private trade, in a perpetual state of financial insecurity. Ultimately, in periods of intense military activity, the senior *Estado* officers would ask time and again that such honest generals organize and arrange their own incomes from whatever sources they found available as the official treasury would never be in a secure enough state to offer them money and resources.

Senior officials and even the Viceroy acknowledged at many points that the process by which generals could expect to obtain money for expenses related to the conquest was remarkably inefficient. In one instance, the governor in 1622, Fernão de Albuquerque, in

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134 *HAG-RV*, f. 16v. *Filmoteca*, p. 56.

135 *HAG-RV*, f. 96v.

recognition of the fact that much of the profit that was being made in the island did not go back into these expenses, recommended the creation of a better line of communication between the *vedor da fazenda* and the *capitão geral*, where the *vedor* would have to ensure that the revenues coming from the island were first devoted to the expenses of the conquest before external *Estado da Índia* expenses. This notwithstanding, it is clear that Fernão de Albuquerque's newfound interest in providing the conquest with a more direct line to the treasury came at a time when he filled the post of Captain-General in the island with his own son, Jorge de Albuquerque, having vacated Sá from it in the same year.

I have understood that all the revenue of the island of Ceilão is spent on expenses and salaries that are unrelated to the conquest, and thus the necessities for it have been lacking on many occasions [...]. Taking this into consideration, even though it is quite fair that the said [external] expenses and salaries are paid for, the maintenance and expenses of the conquest should precede everything else, especially considering that at present the necessities of the Treasury of Your Majesty do not allow for such support and help to be made from here [Goa]. As it is suitable, I felt obligated to pass a provision in which I will not take the [powers away] from the *vedor* of the treasury of that island to make payments according to his regulation, [however] I declare and order in the provision [that] the expenses of the conquest will be granted the money necessary from the revenue of the island firstly, and then all other [external] payments [will be considered]. In order to make this possible, before the *vedor* of the treasury makes the said expenses and salaries, he will be obligated to first contact the Captain General and communicate the amount of total revenue collected from the island as well as the said payments that conform to it, and the Captain General will relate the expenses based on the necessities of the war that he is aware of. Both will declare the expenses and those that are most urgent will be considered first, then all other expenses can be dealt with. This order is very useful and necessary since without it the generals of that island would be stifled and hindered in managing the conquest by the *vedors* of the treasury, who would spend all the revenue of the island on the said [external] expenses and salaries, which they can freely do given the regulation and without the generals knowing about it.<sup>136</sup>

Officials' attitude towards meeting expenses for military activity waxed and waned throughout the conquest period, but interest peaked between the late 1610s and early 1620s, a time when all involved were waiting to see how the economic reforms that were meant to

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136 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 7, p. 399

provide an economic base for the conquest would fare. In many ways, as can be seen in the details above, the monopoly structure did little to nothing to meet this central tenet. The urgent need to cover military expenses along with the sluggish political process it took to get money out of the treasury was a clear message to the military personnel that private initiative was the only way to fund their military activities, that is, if they were inclined to execute them. Also, as with the cases of Sá and Oliveira, the *Estado* officials directly recommended this practice, which they understood to be the only way for generals to efficaciously cover their expenses.

#### *CONTROLLING THE MANUFACTURE AND TRADE OF ARMS*

*Estado* administrative and military officers involved themselves in the manufacture and trade of arms, including firearms (muskets and arquebuses) and other implements such as lances, in the island from a very early stage of the conquest, given the reserves of iron and skilled iron-workers available. When this manufacturing became known to the King, he almost immediately began to pass measures in an attempt to seize the control of its manufacture and sale from those involved, much in the same way as cinnamon. The first statement found in the materials by the king where he recognized that arms-manufacture was occurring in the island was in a royal letter to the Viceroy dated 3<sup>rd</sup> of January 1612, a month before he declared the cinnamon monopoly. The letter, however brief, noted that such manufacture needed to be taken out of the hands of those Portuguese generals involved, as they were in league with local *vidanas* and were manufacturing weapons for the *vidanas* to sell outside the island for their own profit.<sup>137</sup> More information is provided by 1618 from the ground by officials who used the opportunity to accuse their rivals of excesses, much like with cinnamon, where letters related to cinnamon most often

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137 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 2, p. 133.

contained information about arms-making as well. In the letter examined above written by Lançarote de Seixas, in the course of his accusations against Jerónimo de Azevedo's taking of cinnamon against the monopoly, Seixas launched a charge against Azevedo's associate, Nuno Álvares Pereira, on the subject of his liberal acquisition of arms from the Crown storehouses.

Your Majesty has had an iron-works for many years, which does not cost money to maintain and does not need [extra] iron to be worked on, where many arquebuses, muskets, lances, and other arms are made. However, until now, nothing is made for this storehouse, besides the 70 arquebuses and many lances that Manoel Mascarenhas left, and which Dom Nunalvares Pereira took as he pleased along with many other arms that were made and without there being any left for Your Majesty.<sup>138</sup>

Seixas's statement was one of the first that began to explain that Sri Lanka was a location where firearms were being produced, and as importantly, that it was being poorly managed and taken advantage of by certain military personnel.

To control this production and trade, the Crown focused its efforts on controlling the iron-workers themselves, by relocating them to areas where their activities could be better monitored by the king's more trusted officials. Thus, as early as 1612, Philip required that all iron-workers involved in the production of firearms and other weapons be relocated to Colombo or Galle. However, such orders had not been complied with by 1621, as explained in a *devassa* on multiple subjects provided by the Bishop of Cochin, who referenced a list of orders sent by the king and described the ones that had not yet been complied with.

The 4th paragraph [of the 30th chapter] of the instruction that Your Majesty sent to Antão Vaz Freire, and which he sent to the Viceroy Dom Jeronimo d'Azevedo written in Lisbon on the 3rd of January of the year 1612 has not been complied with, by which Your Majesty ordered that all the iron-workers that make arms in this island come to live in Columbo and in the fortress in Galle in order to make the arms for the account of Your Majesty.<sup>139</sup>

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138 *AHU-Caixas*, No. 9, Folder 149, f. 3.

139 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 8, p. 130.

Such information offered by the Bishop of Cochin along with other officers such as the *vedor* who succeeded Friere, Ambrósio de Freitas, made it clear to the king that requiring the iron-workers to relocate had proved to be an unreasonable demand, as noted in a royal letter from 25<sup>th</sup> of March 1625: “given the difficulties there are, the said iron-smiths cannot be collected in the ironworks of Columbo, [and] instead it is suitable to have them work from their normal habitations, from where they can deliver the amounts they have been apportioned to make.”<sup>140</sup> The amounts expected of the iron-works all over the island at this time as stipulated in the same letter were 280 arquebuses.<sup>141</sup> By the end of the previous year, November 1624, the factor in Colombo reported to the Viceroy that some 209 muskets and 2000 lances were produced, of which the factor claimed that a portion of muskets had gone directly to a military battalion for their use, and the Viceroy reported that some 800 lances were received in Goa.<sup>142</sup> Thus by 1625, the production of around 200 firearms and some thousands of lances appears to be a typical yearly amount.

However, the King made it known in the same letter that such a level of production was not sufficient. Given information made available to the King about the amount of iron-workers in the island at this time, he made it clear to the Viceroy that he thought the rate of production to be too low and demanded that the operation be ramped up.

I feel it necessary to tell you that the numbers of arms that are ordered to be made appear to be too few considering the many iron-smiths and the villages which are obligated to make the said arms free of cost to me. [I say this] because I was sent a list by Miguel Pinheiro Ravasco when he served as the *Veador* of the treasury of the said island of Ceilão that contained information that showed there were 48 iron-smiths that have the

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140 *ANTT-LM*, Book 21, f. 179.

141 *Ibid.*.

142 *ANTT-LM*, Book 22, f. 17.

said obligation. From this, I order you to make this amount increase, so that they make more than they are currently obligated to make. A half of this amount can be muskets and the other half arquebuses. And recruit more iron specialists besides the iron-smiths that are currently obligated to do this service so that a greater quantity of arms can be made.<sup>143</sup>

Besides these orders the King also attempted in the same letter to change the manner in which iron was mined, where officers felt the need to get the permission of local heads of iron-rich areas to mine the resource. The king made it clear that the mining process should be controlled more directly.

In the same letter Ambrosio de Freittas told me that the villages in which iron and steel is taken belong to individuals, and they should be left with the right to control them, so that [the Portuguese] can freely take the said metals out of them. I feel it necessary to tell you that there is no basis for this proposition. Given the ordinance of [...] in which it declares that any mine of any quality and condition that has been discovered, or is yet to be discovered, are under royal right.<sup>144</sup>

However, much like the order to have all iron-workers base themselves in Colombo, the request to seize control of all iron-producing areas proved to be just as unreasonable. By March of 1627 the Viceroy reported on the progress of implementing the king's orders, which had adverse effects.

Constantino de Sá de Noronha, the Captain General of the island of Ceylon, sent me a certificate, the copy of which was signed by the secretary of the *Estado* that contains information about the arms that he thought were delivered to the factor, those being made in the time of Ambrosio de Freitas who served as the *Vedor* of the treasury of that island. And it also says that the *Vedor* of the treasury has taken possession of the villages with iron, because Your Majesty made an order to seize them from those who possess them and incorporate them into the Royal Treasury. However, in a total of six months [the treasury] has not made a single weapon from the said villages, nor has the factor actually obtained any iron in the said time. Because of these six months [in which nothing was done] I returned the villages to the original possessors of them, which I have ordered the said *vedor* of the treasury to do, and rightly so [...] The reason why the said villages were given back to their owners was because they give a third of the iron that they mine, and it

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143 *ANTT-LM*, Book 21, f. 179.

144 *Ibid.*.

is understood that this was more profitable to the treasury of Your Majesty.<sup>145</sup>

According to the Viceroy, at this time Francisco da Gama, the letter that he received placed the blame on the incompetence of the Captain-General, Sá, who “did not send the iron to the [villages with iron-works] nor move the iron-works to the villages with iron as was suggested.”<sup>146</sup> On hearing this in April of the next year, the King once again ordered his officials to re-seize the villages in question, though he conceded that the issue was best left to be resolved by the council in Goa.

I feel it necessary to order that you find a means of continuing the making of arms in the iron-works of that island and ask for an account from the Captain General and the *vedor* of my treasury there for the reason why arms are not being made in the manner in which I ordered, where the villages that have iron belong to my treasury. [And specifically] why two villages have been handed over to the iron-workers on the condition that they give a third of the iron that is mined from them. By my order, take these said villages from the people that possess them, and let me know the responses [of the Captain General and *Vedor*] that have been given to you on this matter. Then, examine this in the council of my treasury of the state in which you will be present. In your presence decide whether the iron mines should be under the direct control of my treasury or should be left to the iron-works on the condition that they pay a third of the iron they mine in them.<sup>147</sup>

The issue of allowing local heads and iron-workers themselves to control iron mining and a certain degree of the manufacturing process was never clearly resolved by 1630, a time when the territorial authority of the Portuguese diminished considerably. In the decade of the 1630s the king and the Viceroy still paid some attention to iron-mining and arms manufacturing; however, predictably, the challenges that the Crown faced in running iron-works in a manner it felt suitable appeared to be even more intractable than the previous decade. Still, when comparing some of the information available from 1638, a time when Diogo de Melo had the position of Captain-

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145 *ANTT-LM*, Book 24, fs. 21v-2.

146 *Ibid.*, f. 22.

147 *ANTT-LM*, Book 25, f. 264.

General, it seems that similar challenges continued. Specifically, the general was accused of controlling iron-working people and areas indirectly through key local figures, in this specific case an ancestral land-holding figure who is identified as being a part of the Bandaravaliya caste.

Of the kings of that island, the generals have one Bandigarrala as an officer whom they keep as a servant, who has the greatest jurisdiction and control over the iron-workers, iron-works, and villages with iron, much more so than the *veedores* of the treasury of Your Majesty. Because the regulation that is in effect for the factory in Columbo says that all the minerals and drugs of that island come into the possession of the factors, and where nothing can be taken from the storehouses without the orders of those *veedores* of the treasury, it upsets the generals. And those generals with their servants [...] keep such iron-works separate in order to manufacture *pataxos*, other types of boats, and other works that they are interested in, things Your Majesty has no interest in [...] In all, Diogo de Mello has not complied with such a regulation, nor has he given up his Bandigarrala servant to work on all those things he committed to for his profit, the collection of iron, arms, and other tributes that are called *decuns*<sup>148</sup> that belong to Your Majesty.<sup>149</sup>

In this case of iron-working and arms production one can clearly see how resource extraction and manufacturing was closely linked to land administration, where generals connected to key local figures to control the revenues of areas, the subject of the next chapter of this thesis.

## CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Habsburg Crown through the *Estado da Índia* put forward a set of economic policies that were understood to help raise and keep money for financial support of military activities that made up the “conquest of the island of Ceylon”. The restructuring, which had the cinnamon monopoly at its heart, reflected its desire to reform the economic activities considering the centrality of the military economy in the island, which invariably also put a considerable amount of emphasis on how economic matters were dealt with

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148 “The Dekum or poll-tax which was paid in money by certain classes of the caste”, Pieris, *Ceylon*, Vol. 2, pp. 65. Also see: *Glossário*, Vol 1, p. 353.

149 *ANTT-LM*, Book 44, f. 228-8v.

in the hands of military personnel. However, the imposition of new official policies did not have the effect hoped for, as the Crown could never manage to control the price of cinnamon and use it to fund conquest expenses, as was claimed to be the original aim. The issue was that the monopoly restrictions never curtailed the private initiatives of military officers, who continued their private trade in cinnamon and flooded it into Asian markets. This notwithstanding, the Crown along with the Royal Treasury never developed anything by way of proper infrastructure to manage the disbursement of funds and resources for conquest-related expenses as they did for obtaining cinnamon, the money from which the treasury almost immediately tied up in projects outside the island. Those that would be most negatively affected by this infrastructural problem were usually those generals who doggedly attempted to follow the letter of the King, such as Constantino de Sá, and who ultimately were asked to create their own funding sources to meet the expenses they had from expanding the territory of the *Estado*.

As can be inferred from this survey on the imposition of Crown monopolies during the conquest, given that such economic reform was dependent on *Estado* military personnel in the island, such personnel had the ultimate say in how and to what extent Crown orders were implemented. The activities of such military might have been de-legitimized through the language of “excess” (i.e. smuggling), but the rhetoric appears to be empty since the Crown clearly did not have direct authority to impose a monopoly over any goods coming from the island.

## Chapter 2: THE MILITARY AND LAND ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING OF THE *ESTADO* LAND TENURE STRUCTURE, 1605-1630

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of April 1614, Jerónimo de Azevedo, at this time two years into his tenure as Viceroy, wrote a regulation to Manuel Mascarenhas Homem while the latter was serving in the role of “Captain-General of the Conquest”. The regulation, which was based on a loose order for Mascarenhas Homem to organize an assault on Kandy, mostly covered the experiences had by Azevedo while he was himself in the position of Captain-General in the island, and the specifics regarding the manner in which he had waged war. This document provides many useful bits of information for the historian as well. In the end of the document Azevedo offered some telling advice that accurately forecast a challenge that Homem and others in the same role would face; the complaints that the Captains-General would receive about the poor conduct of native captains (*cabeças*), as they had a tendency of amassing their own political and economic power in the lands the Captain-General granted them. Based on Azevedo's opinion and experience, he recommended that the captains in some way should be given the leeway to conduct such offensive activities as the group played a pivotal role in ensuring the success of the military.

I speak of these captains (*cabeças*) because I believe I should warn you that [people in the island] will end up making 1,000 complaints saying that [the captains] rob the land and make themselves rich. [But] the work needed for that conquest cannot be endured unless they take a great amount of profit, and there is no one else that can be found who can replace them.<sup>150</sup>

The regulation, and the descriptions of war activities and conduct therein, came at a time when the Portuguese *Estado* controlled more territory in the island than ever before, due in large part to the military gains made by Azevedo in the first decade of the seventeenth century. The *Estado* enjoyed this position from roughly 1605 until 1630, when the rebellion that left Constantino de

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<sup>150</sup> *Regimentos*, p. 46.

Sá de Noronha's death occurred in August of 1630, and which in turn left the *Estado* with a diminished military authority in the island from which it was never able to recover. Due to the large amount of territory that became available from the incursions of Azevedo, Philip III (of Portugal) sought out the development of a land tenure system that would handle the administration of these lands. Many things were required to develop such a structure; for one, detailed information was needed about the quality of the lands, including the amounts of goods that could be counted as revenue in them, which could lead to the determination of specific rent amounts by region. This land registry, what was known as the *tombo*, would contain this type of information gathered from first-hand land assessments purportedly conducted by the *vedor* and his scribe. In the case of the 1615 *tombo* of the entire island, Antão Vaz Freire and Balthezar Marinho were these officers.

Though the King ordered the *tombo* in order to clarify land value and thus set up a better administrative structure, when one follows the story of the formation of this land administrative system in the Portuguese archival materials, one finds that it was never fully realized in the form that the Kings Philip at different stages hoped it would be. Over the 25 year period between 1605 to 1630, the archival materials tell of a dwindling ambition on the part of the kings in instituting a streamlined land tenure/administrative structure due to the problems caused by both Portuguese and native military personnel (i.e. generals, captains, *disavas*, *vidanas*) who took over lands without offering rent, seized lands from non-military inhabitants, lorded over the regional populace to extract goods and services, and traded privately -- and this was all done on lands that

were all thought to belong to the *Estado*.<sup>151</sup>

Therefore, much like in the case of private trade and the cinnamon monopoly covered in the previous chapter, the king and his close associates continually introduced and altered policies in the attempt to curb the activities of such military personnel and stabilize the land administrative structure that the *Estado* depended on. In such moves, one can also track what the Crown thought the root causes of the problem were for such infractions, specifically military personnel's seizing of lands, where initially the King thought that such activities occurred due to a law that Azevedo had left in the island as the Captain-General. However, repealing such laws and instituting other ones to prohibit such seizures never seemed to curb the activities as late as 1629 according to the archival materials available. This thus shows how in many ways the activities associated with military personnel's direct management of land, and the activities they would conduct with such land under their control, was endemic to the political geography of the island.

#### *THE FIRST REGULATIONS ON LAND GRANTS*

The issue of land allocation and management became a special concern of Philip II of Portugal (Philip III of Spain) in the first decade of the seventeenth century as the successful

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151 Zoltán Biedermann considers the question of *Estado* land administration in early seventeenth century Sri Lanka in his own work, specifically his article/chapter titled “The Lankan Transition to Colonial Rule”, see: Biedermann, *The Portuguese in Sri Lanka and South India*, pp. 87-102. His general approach to answering the question of the nature of regional rule is theoretical, a tack he takes due to his perceived lack of sources there are on such subjects. “And whilst there is abundant data on military expeditions, on trade and fiscality, on missionary activities and on the conflicts opposing various Portuguese authorities in Colombo to each other, we have virtually no data covering one of the central aspects of life in the colony, justice. Justice – be it royal, seigniorial or municipal, be it Christian or non-Christian – was the most important means of exerting power after military conquest, and yet it is largely off our radar and will probably remain so due to a most unfortunate absence of sources”, see: *Ibid.*, p. 97. Specifically he cites the collection in the National Archive in Lisbon, *Livros das Monções*, a collection that contains approximately 1000 sources on subjects related to Sri Lanka, as having a dearth of such sources. It is from the documents in this collection that this chapter on island land administration and jurisprudence is written.

military campaigns that Jerónimo de Azevedo conducted in the decade previous had expanded the territorial base which the *Estado* controlled in the island as mentioned above. In a letter from the 12<sup>th</sup> of December of 1607 to the then viceroy, Martim Afonso de Castro, who had died by the time Philip wrote the letter, the king relayed practices and laid out the procedures to follow when allocating land to populate the areas under their control.

[The Archbishop and Governor of India, Aleixo de Meneses] told me that he gave villages to all those that were willing to go to Ceilão, under the obligation that they would live in them. Dom Jeronymo de Azevedo also gave them under the same obligation, and under the declaration that they would pay the amount of rent for that village, which is to be determined by the person that makes the *tombo* of the lands and villages of Ceilão, and this person will approximate what each one should pay in rent.<sup>152</sup>

The practice of allocating land under the obligation that owners would physically inhabit the lands in question was not a new condition. However, as follows, the king introduced a key rule that would be referenced in documents in the next few decades which favored granting the lands outright to military personnel based on merit of military service instead of offering them to non-military personnel, a procedure originally put into place by Azevedo. The reason given pertained directly to the problem of military power and the potential of rebellions.

Dom Jeronymo has since suppressed an order that there is related to the allocation of the said villages, saying that it impedes the men of war and many Portuguese from them. Being excluded from [the villages] it is certain that they will rebel against my service. Such an occurrence would be a great scandal to those that served in the war with arms for 10 to 12 years, and in doing so received many injuries to win and defend them. It would be more just to give them to these people than to those that have not put any capital into them.<sup>153</sup>

This new approach was combined with a requirement of completely reallocating lands: “I order that you comply fully with the said provision, and in doing so it will make all the said land titles

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152 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 1, p.161.

153 *Ibid.*, p. 162.

null and void and they should be made over again”.<sup>154</sup> Accordingly the king ranked the potential grantees into a hierarchy.

Starting first with the Portuguese that were in the said conquest, and after them the other Portuguese in the *Estado* based on if each person merits it, and to those that marry orphans. Then to the native Christians of the island who have qualities and have served in their positions with loyalty. And to cultivate the land it should be given to those people from that same island, letting those people already in those same villages and lands stay in them. And if there is a lack of these, put in those Christians from the same island that want to go. And if there are not enough of these, then give these lands to cultivate and pay from them (as is the custom in the villages in the North) to those Christians of São Thomé that want to go there. I will order for a letter to be written to the captain and the bishop of Angamale to persuade the Christians to smoothly make certain promises of favors to get the most people possible to go willingly.<sup>155</sup>

Besides being an important letter by the king that ordered for the reallocation of land based primarily on military service, it demonstrated the great need for manpower in administering lands, and the extent to which the king ranked the trustworthiness of groups of potential candidates, where loyalty tested in war would be most highly valued especially when native grantees were concerned.

By the beginning of the next decade, the king felt the need to clarify procedures for making land grants, as there appeared to be confusion on how to determine the extent to which grantees needed to comply with rules pertaining to rights over the lands in question. On the 4<sup>th</sup> of December of 1611, the King once again wrote to the then viceroy, Rui Lourenço da Távora, and touched on these points by declaring that on receiving the land grant, grantees needed to physically live in the lands within four months of receiving the grant.<sup>156</sup> On the issue of the right of redistribution, the King blankly stated that these grantees, “cannot in anyway be issued a

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154 *Ibid.*

155 *Ibid.*

156 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 2, p.115.

license by which they can sell and exchange such villages”.<sup>157</sup> In this respect, the king asked the Viceroy himself to not provide an opportunity for just such transgressions to occur.

I prohibit you and the Viceroys that succeed you from giving licenses to sell or redistribute the said villages, except in the case that I permit it, as is mentioned previously. Nor can you extend the term of four months, which is the term I have set for the renters to go to the said island. And a license to live outside of the island cannot be conceded as well, as you will find in the same provision.<sup>158</sup>

In this same letter, the King begins to consider the issue of previously granted lands, and those specifically once allocated by Azevedo, who both during and after his tenure as Captain-General had made a considerable number of grants to his associates. The act of seizing the lands that were granted by Azevedo after his tenure in many ways could be understood as a way of limiting the political and economic influence Azevedo still enjoyed in the region, which would be a central issue of concern for the King and his more trusted officers in the next few years.

I have been informed by the *vedor* of my treasury, that after being in the island, with the role of General of the Conquest, [Azevedo] gave out some villages. As this does not serve me well, I ordered the said *vedor* of the treasury to examine this, and if [Azevedo] gave some villages after he was there, then take possession of them from the people that have them, [and] then divide them according to your regulation and provision that is referred to above.<sup>159</sup>

#### *THE TOMBO, DETERMINING RENTS, AND THE DISAVA/VIDANA INVOLVEMENT PROBLEM*

From 1612, Azevedo replaced Rui Lourenço de Távora as the Viceroy of India, and in the years of his tenure the king also commissioned Antão Vaz Freire to compile a new *tombo* of all the lands under their possession, given the acquisitions of the previous decade. Though initially the project was mainly one of determining the revenues of those areas, and thus the rent that

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<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p.116.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*.

should be paid, Freire and others began to comment on how the areas were being administered and by whom, since these situations threatened to be an impediment to receiving rents for the royal treasury. Most notably, there was a concern with how native grantees and their officers; *disavas*, *vidanas*, *mutiares* (*mohitti* – secretary/scribe), *canacapoles* (scribes) continued to be the point-people for land administration.

The case is made in a letter written on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of January 1612 from the king to Azevedo, in which he relayed the first findings of Freire along with the challenges he came across. The King opens the letter in this regard by asking Azevedo to intervene in a situation where the clerks and scribes in Colombo were seen to be withholding *olas* (palm-leaf documents) containing information on lands in the nearby area and that these functionaries should be coaxed using “blandishments, threats, or any other means that are fitting” to divulge the location of those documents.<sup>160</sup> Besides this impediment, it was related to the King that few rents were actually being delivered to the treasury given the lack of clarity on rent amounts. But this problem, it is explained, is also related to the fact that there are lands that are managed by native administrators, who do not seem willing to hand over the rents.

I have been informed that many of the villages of the said island are given to people, under the agreement that rent will be paid on these [places] once [the amount] is arbitrated on them. The other [lands] are possessed by Mutiares, Canacapoles, and other people, without any tax imposed on them and without my treasury receiving any profit from these lands.<sup>161</sup>

These *mutiares* and *canacapoles*, who were native officers generally associated with *disavas* and *vidanas*, performed scribal and administrative duties and were of continued concern to the king and his trustworthy officials in the next few decades. In more cases than the King would like, it

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160 *Ibid.*, p.132.

161 *Ibid.*, p.133.

was these militarily powerful native officials who managed the administration of lands that were understood to be under *Estado* rule. Accordingly, based on the distrust he had of these groups of people who were habitually depended on to administer lands, he ordered them to be replaced by those that would be more likely to comply with the King's service.

[I order] that those ports and villages that are granted are not hereby granted to the *vidanas*, which they usually get. In order for justice to be administered in them, Portuguese people should be chosen that are fit and qualified [and those chosen should] keep shorter terms of service. I am informed that when *vidanas* serve in these offices, as they do now, my treasury receives a loss.<sup>162</sup>

On the matter of “administering justice”, the king gave his understanding of how disputes were presently handled by such *vidanas* and their officers, where these people used such opportunities to extract money from guilty parties as permitted by the title that they held.

I have information that in the said island of Ceilão it is customary that when two people are fighting they are sentenced, and fines of money are taken from them based on the title of royal law. Because of this, the *vidanás* pass sentences according to the case and the wealth (*qualidade*) of the people involved. If one is killed by the other as happens, where such an affront cannot be avenged [by the family of the person killed], they pass a sentence on the person that committed the affront and fine them an amount determined by the *Mutiaries*, who act as deputies.<sup>163</sup>

In addition to this, the King adds that at present the *vidanas* in the island are charging inhabitants in their areas a “parochial tax” of ten *pardaos*, which was done outside of any regulation that had been passed.

As expected, the lack of trust in *vidanas'* military loyalties and their cultural predilection to rebel is also cited in the specific case of Simão Correia, who though proven to be a rebel still controlled certain districts for the *Estado* by this time.

Simão Correia, native of the land, is of little trust and has already rebelled against my

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162 *Ibid.*.

163 *Ibid.*, p. 136.

service and has passed over to the enemies, and one of his brothers has also rebelled, and as such the great amount of trust given to him now should not be given. He is the *vidana* of the Nine Corlas, one of the best, and has no other obligation besides sustaining 600 *lascarins* that he has under his charge, where much less land would be sufficient for this than the two said corlas.<sup>164</sup>

The mention of the current issues surrounding Simão Correia comes with a wider request by the King to look into the backgrounds of other *vidanas* that are in charge of lands under the *Estado*, “regardless of the powers that those *vidanas* have, [I told the vedor] to look at the *forals* and see what obligations those people have for my service, which they would have because they possess lands or for some other reason”.<sup>165</sup> Ultimately, the King wanted them to be relocated to serve in the fortresses and be applied to other works such as manufacturing arms.

Finally, the problem of *vidanas* in this letter goes beyond their own activities, and includes the influence they could have on other *Estado* officers, Portuguese included, who administer lands.

There are many officers in every type of office who are given lands in the island under the obligation that they serve me and do what I order, and where they receive no other pay [besides the lands]. [But] these officials do not do anything more than what the *vidanás* order, and they are always only concerned with the profit [of the *vidanas*].<sup>166</sup>

The specific case that the king highlighted here was the manufacture and private trade in firearms, as was documented in the previous chapter.

The letter as a whole by the King, though about issues regarding starting the *tombo* and land administration, quickly focused on the problem of the power of certain *vidanas* over lands said to belong to the *Estado*. In the King's letter there is an air of surprise regarding the actual amount of control such native military personnel had over *Estado* territories at that point, which

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164 *Ibid.*, p. 134.

165 *Ibid.*.

166 *Ibid.*, p. 133.

he took issue with. Though ultimately the King wanted to replace such administrators with Portuguese that he could trust, there were certain realities of the ground situation that did not permit such an arrangement as would become evident in the following years.

The importance of *disava/vidana* involvement is highlighted by the King's trusted *vedor* in the island, Freire, in a letter the King received on the 17<sup>th</sup> of February 1614, but where the original date is not available. The letter comes in the form of a detailed list of “remarks”, which respond to some of the more pressing issues that the King brought up in the letter above. Specifically, he recommended an interim solution to the problem of not having rent amounts yet determined through the *tombo*, where he recommended the formation of an office board that would include the *vedor* and Captain-General which could quickly determine rent amounts that could be paid until more certain figures could be ascertained from a deeper assessment.<sup>167</sup> Freire also took the opportunity to ask questions about certain protocols of land allocation as they still remained unclear to him, and whether this office involving the *vedor* and the Captain General could be utilized to quickly adjudicate on land decisions. The issue here was the need to quickly and efficiently find resources for the expenses of the conquest, and the manner in which such land taxes could provide the funding base for them. Freire calls for a mixed policy in this regard depending on the type of troops (i.e. Portuguese or native) involved.

Regarding this, I believe that all villages should pay a tax, and that money can be given to those who need it for the requirements of the conquest. Specifically, in order to give the captains of the Portuguese soldiers the things that are necessary to sustain them, the salaries and supplies that they need for the said soldiers should be discounted from the said village tax. And other villages could be given to the heads of black troops, and with them they could sustain those under their charge, and where they also would give a tax; but the amount of the tax should be more in their favor considering that they do not receive supplies [from us] nor salaries as the captains of the Portuguese soldiers do.<sup>168</sup>

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167 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 3, p. 52.

In comparison to the King, there is a much more lenient attitude toward the heads of military personnel (*cabeças* – i.e. *disavas/vidanas*) in the correspondence of Freire, as he understood that such people required monetary subsidies, where he specifically recommended they be granted much more land revenue than Portuguese captains.

Freire touted a generally loose policy on native land ownership in other cases as well. In response to the request by the king as mentioned above, where he was asked to provide information about the obligations of certain *vidanas* given that they possessed *Estado* lands, Freire explained how a group of native “mechanical officers” (those who helped with building works) should be permitted to continue in the manner they have been considering the difficulty and “confusion” it would cause if their terms of ownership were to be altered or rescinded.

On the subject of the officers, I believe nothing new should be implemented, and that everything should go according to the style and order the gentile kings of that island had, because if done otherwise it would cause confusion and [the land allocation] would have to be redone. Anyway, in the said island the officials do not take up the more profitable lands, and even if they do take up some, they are not free from the obligation to feed and clothe themselves. When they come to work on some or another service for His Majesty or any other that governs that island, they are not able to do anything more than sustain their families [from the lands], and even this is difficult considering they are usually away from their households.<sup>169</sup>

Though Freire understands that there are many *disavas* and *vidanas* who skirt their responsibilities of service, he never is as dismissive as the King who calls for stricter measures on these personnel in most cases. Freire's policy compared to the King is more integrative, which comes out of a stronger connection to the reality on the ground in the island. Freire clearly understands that the works of the *Estado*, the administration of land amongst other things, cannot be conducted without the involvement of native military personnel and their officers, and

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168 *Ibid.*, p. 53.

169 *Ibid.*, p. 54.

military personnel in general.

#### *COMPLAINTS OVER MILITARY PERSONNEL'S ABUSES OF LAND ADMINISTRATION*

The necessary involvement of both native and Portuguese military personnel in the *Estado* land administration structure was an issue of concern to certain officials, especially those involved in the governing board of Colombo, the *Câmara Municipal*. In the second decade of the seventeenth century many complaints abounded over the conduct of both Portuguese and native *disavas* and *vidanas* as well as high-level Portuguese military figures, specifically the Captain-General, Francisco de Meneses Roxo. Though rhetorically varied in their indictments, as a whole the complaints pointed to a singular problem; how all military personnel were using their positions as land administrators to amass power and resources in the regions. In all, the documents recognize the endemic problem of the deficiency of trustworthy personnel in the island to fill such administrative positions.

By 1615, the King recommended executing measures to limit the powers of native military captains in the outlying villages. In a letter written to Azevedo on the 21<sup>st</sup> of February, who by then was in the position of Viceroy, the King asked him to move forward on a process earlier put into place to, “take away some part of the jurisdiction that the heads of the *disavas* have”.<sup>170</sup> The problems surrounding the powers of jurisdiction referred to the complaint made earlier by the King, where such military heads were adjudicating on domestic issues in these areas to their benefit. However, the King's pronouncement was not absolute, and by this point he seems to have believed that some powers still needed to be conceded to the group.

Because it is suitable that the problems that are caused when the said heads have too much power should be avoided, [those powers] should be limited in each village and area

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<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 270.

to a level which is believed to be enough for them to manage their offices. I once felt the need to advise you on this, as I am doing now, and thus order you to deal with this matter with the help of the judges and councilors of the treasury, and under their advice you will limit the powers of the said heads to a level at which it is believed to be just and necessary. Therefore, the number of villages and lands that each one has under their jurisdiction should only be an amount that is believed to be enough.<sup>171</sup>

Compared to three years previous, the tone and approach of the King's policy is not as affirmative in regards to the native heads. Though there is a similar concern with how these heads abuse the powers they somehow attain, this time he is not as completely dismissive of them and feels they should be allowed some powers to fulfill their duties. In the same letter, the King in a similar way responds positively to recent land grants made by Azevedo to some *lascarins*, which were understood by the King to have been personally vetted by Azevedo for their loyalty.

It has been proposed to me that the *lascarins* who have served me with loyalty (*fidelidade*) should be allotted lands from the said villages, and they were confirmed this [based on their loyalty]. Order for this to occur if you have come to know them well (*se tenha conta com elles*), where if they are given these grants to sustain they would do so loyally (*com lealdade*) and in keeping with my service.<sup>172</sup>

However not all cases were the same, as the King moves on in the letter to explain the pitfalls of the current liberal policy toward native heads and land administration: “as experience has shown, the freedom (*largueza*) with which they have till now acted in regards to these issues, has resulted in the natives being tyrannized and has impeded a decent collection process for my treasury”.<sup>173</sup> The King wrote yet another letter the next day, the 22<sup>nd</sup> of February, pushing the theme of the natives being “tyrannized” further, this time implicating both Portuguese captains and native heads in such abuses.

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171 *Ibid.*

172 *Ibid.*

173 *Ibid.*

I am informed that for some years in this area many acts of force and tyrannies have been committed against the natives of the island of Ceilão by the [Portuguese] captains and heads of the *disavas* as well as the *vidanas* of the villages. This brings me great displeasure. Without regulating justice on these people, the government we have in the lands cannot be conserved nor will [the lands] be loyally maintained.<sup>174</sup>

In another letter written some days previous (14<sup>th</sup> of February), the King similarly lumps the Portuguese captains and the *vidanas* together to ask the Viceroy to restrict another set of activities they were apparently involved in, their own monetary pursuits, in this case the regulation of jackfruit. Once again the concern for the native population is elicited when making the pronouncement.

In respect of my service, it is for the best that from now on the [Portuguese] captains and *vidanas* of the island of Ceilão do not get involved in works or embark in ships [out of the island] while they are serving their said positions. That they do not harvest jack trees there without the license of my *vedor* of the treasury, who will not give them without sufficient reason, since I am informed that harm comes to the people of the said island [when the captains and *vidanas* control it].<sup>175</sup>

All of the king's concerns as seen in the statements above specifically reference middle-level military personnel, the level of captain in the case of Portuguese personnel, and *vidanas* in the case of native personnel. However, the activities relating to land administration of higher level Portuguese military personnel, even at the level of “Captain General of the Conquest”, were of great concern to the King and *Estado* as well. In this same year, the King and Azevedo traded correspondence regarding the activities of the present Captain General, Francisco de Meneses Roxo, who was selected for the position in the island by Azevedo himself. His activities, which centered on his use of captains based in the interior provinces to orchestrate a circuit of private trade of numerous goods with the kingdom of Kandy, led to his indictment and eventual removal.

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174 *Ibid.*, p. 278.

175 *Ibid.*, p. 199.

The King copied the report on the indictment that was provided to him in the letter he sent to Azevedo, which included eight points, and where the first four deal directly with how Roxo built such a trade network.

1. That the said general is involved in far more commerce and trade than what is required for the conquest as ordered of him by the Viceroy Dom Jeronymo.
2. That first, he ordered to take opium, fabrics, hoes, axes and other things to a certain district of villages neighboring Candea and traded them for betel-nut, pepper, ginger, and other goods that come from Candea. And in the same manner, one of the four captains of the Dissavas, a Portuguese named Luiz Pinto, does this through the routes of the Seven and Four Corlas. [Pinto] has a partnership and shares [the profits] with the said Captain General.
3. That in another district named Sofragão and Corniti Corla there is another Portuguese captain by the name of Luiz Cabral that is sent by the said general to the third Dissava, Mature, an area from which comes the greatest amount of wax. He is sent there to commit many excesses related to trade as well as to apply force and levy fines against the natives, and according to what is affirmed he has made a great amount of profit from this.
4. That the said Dom Francisco has created a great scandal in all of the island given who he ordered to be placed in the said Dissava position of Mature. He was obligated by his own interest when he gave the position to a prisoner of his, a Moor of a low caste who was born in the same island. [He could have chosen someone from Mature] being the best area with the most pure and trustworthy people in all of the said island, which has the most honored captains in all the land today, and he could have even selected a Portuguese. [Instead he selected the Moor] so as to channel through him all the revenues of that area for himself. And he was doing all this secretly which was a great affront to the blacks, which gave them a reason to want to rebel.<sup>176</sup>

The next three points relate to Roxo's conduct in war, where he was accused of simply not having any conduct to speak of, "he has not made any demonstration to show he is a *conquistador*".<sup>177</sup> The points cover specific missed opportunities that if they had been followed were thought to have had the capacity of finally ending the war. The eighth and last point carried forward the rhetorical theme of tyrannies against natives mentioned in this letter and previously,

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<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.

“that the Captains Major of the Field and those captains in the Dissavas commit many acts of tyranny against the natives of the said island adding to the jurisdictions that they have”.<sup>178</sup>

*AZEVEDO'S EXIT, THE UNDOING OF HIS LAND SEIZING POLICY, AND THE CONTINUED SEIZING OF LANDS BY MILITARY PERSONNEL*

In some way, Azevedo was meant to feel responsible for Roxo's actions, as he chose and appointed Roxo into the position of Captain Major when Azevedo himself was promoted to Viceroy. Accordingly, many of Azevedo's opponents in the *Estado* began to question the nature of his title appointments and the people he granted land to. When the slew of accusations began flowing in regard to all matters of excesses, from granting land to his associates, to his expropriation of resources meant for the conquest, there was an attempt made by the King and his trusted officers to undo some of the infrastructural damage that Azevedo had done in the island. Besides rescinding the land grants Azevedo made when he was in office, it was thought that the legal mechanism he left behind by which lands were granted allowed in some way for military personnel to seize lands at will, and where those military personnel associated with the Viceroy or the Captain-General had a special advantage. However as seen in the events that followed, the impetus of these excesses was wrongly attributed to the legal loophole that Azevedo left, as the seizing of lands by these military personnel continued with impunity despite the king's regulation.

As can be read from the administrative archives, the entity known as “the City of Columbo”, a group of officials and other elites in the city, was often at personal and political odds with senior *Estado* officials such as the Viceroy and the Captain-General. In one such example from the 21<sup>st</sup> of November 1617, the final year of Azevedo's tenure as Viceroy, the

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<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*.

group wrote a long letter to the King in the form of a list of “complaints”, where they described in detail the manner in which the likes of the present Captain-General, Nuno Álvares Pereira, took over lands once granted to the *casados* and other Portuguese inhabitants from the city, against the King's regulations.<sup>179</sup> In regards to the manner in which the land tenure system is conducted, the members of the “City of Columbo” describe a chaotic environment in which land is constantly “changing hands” according to how well grantees curry favor with the Captain-General.

On top of the many inconveniences that there are against the peace and common good of this city, there are usually many difficult people who quarrel with each other and create factions with the general against each other in order to take one another's villages, which is the cause of many dissensions and fights in this city, and which always brings disquiet to the city.<sup>180</sup>

The overall environment is said to have made the process of collecting rents impossible: as a result the renters let their land, “turn into jungles”; they refused to meet their obligations of service for the king and were said to be in the process of depopulating the island.<sup>181</sup> In these allegations the City of Colombo also implicated Azevedo, who is said to have set the basis for such a chaotic situation.

The general will want to whitewash this unreasonable act, saying that he took these villages as a means of service to Your Majesty, we do not doubt something like this will gain resonance over there. But what is not known [to you] is that since the time of Dom Jerónimo d'Azevedo there are many villages that have been kept separate, that are exclusively for the service of the generals and all the captains and soldiers of the garrisons and for his servants, and even the *kafirs* [East African slaves] always consume them, as it is known.<sup>182</sup>

Once Azevedo was removed as Viceroy and replaced by the Count of Redondo, João Coutinho,

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179 *AHU-Caixas*, No. 7, Folder: 201, f. 1.

180 *Ibid.*.

181 *Ibid.*.

182 *Ibid.*.

closer attention was paid by the King to the provisions pertaining to land grants in the island that Azevedo had passed while Viceroy, and specifically a provision which was said to have allowed military personnel to seize lands under the auspices of raising money for conquest-related expenses.

Antão Vaz Freire, who was the *vedor* of the treasury in the island of Ceilão, has written to me last year (1618) and gave me information about how Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo, who was the Viceroy of this State, has passed a provision by which it allowed the generals of the said island to give villages to the captains of that conquest and take them from whoever they wanted for this reason. And I am not served by what the said Dom Jeronimo has done regarding this.<sup>183</sup>

In response to this in the following year (1620), the King received information from the then Governor of India, Fernão de Albuquerque, who claimed that those provisions and regulations passed by Azevedo would all be thrown out or revised, including those pertaining to land grants: “the regulations that the Viceroys gave to the captains major and generals relate to the times and occasions in which such orders were determined. Thus, they do not go beyond their time”.<sup>184</sup> Coutinho had passed an order on the 4<sup>th</sup> of February 1618 explicitly barring the practice of land seizure for conquest support, “it was resolved to pass a provision for the generals of Ceilão barring them from seizing possession of lands, and if necessary they would be punished according to the laws and ordinances”.<sup>185</sup>

By 1620, though it was understood that the legal standard by which generals had the ability to seize lands was removed, for a reason unknown to the King and his trusted officials, the generals continued their activities as before. A letter written by the King on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 1620 acknowledges this, as it specifically requests Albuquerque to look into a complaint made

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183 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 6, p. 164.

184 *Ibid.*, p. 100.

185 *Ibid.*, p. 133.

by the *Câmara* of Colombo that the General of Ceilão, along with his “*vidana* servants and captains of the black troops” seized villages from the *casado* renters in order to collect the laborers (*cules*) in the areas “for their own service”.<sup>186</sup> This act of taking all the laborers from this region in this case had a detrimental impact on the production of foodstuff as explained by the King.

[The laborers] were either planting or harvesting the new crop, and when all are taken, as happens sometimes, the seed or harvest is lost. And even after putting in much labor the laborers and renters are left with nothing and are required to buy more seeds, and thus there is always a great lack of foodstuffs. This [planting and harvesting] service should not be given up because a great amount of foodstuffs could be made from this, which would avoid the need for us to look for them in India and Bengalla.<sup>187</sup>

Besides conflicting with the provision that Albuquerque passed, which would have been a year previous to the activities in question, the excesses of the general and his native associates were understood to conflict with another regulation passed previously by the King mentioned above: “I ordered [you] to pass provisions and instructions by which it is prohibited that a person in that island with a position and authority can be involved in their own works or board ships out of the island while the term of the position is active”.<sup>188</sup>

The situation of military personnel dispossessing renters continued into the next few years, as is seen in the caustic yet informative letters offered by the controversial Bishop of Cochin. The Bishop wrote the *devassas* in question between September and November of 1619 and they covered a wide variety of topics but were centrally concerned with the state of the conquest and how at that particular juncture it could be completed. To this end, the Bishop included information related to land administration and revenue extraction as he saw it to be

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186 *Ibid.*, p. 324.

187 *Ibid.*.

188 *Ibid.*.

integral to the project.

In one of the Bishop's *devassas*, he spoke of the continuing problem of the seizing of renters' lands by military personnel. In this regard, he claimed that the Captains-General were nothing short of “absolute lords” in the island, and as such, commanded all the power and authority in matters related to the collection of goods and land tenure, and where they directed subordinate military personnel to conduct such actions. For the Bishop, the greatest offense against the Crown from this arrangement was that besides controlling trade and land administration to their direct monetary benefit, the generals and their associates also collected a salary from the royal treasury. The entire description portrays the military personnel as being involved in a host of different enterprises, land tenure being one of many, from which they amassed large personal fortunes.

Your Majesty has reserved the lands of Bulatigama for himself from which areca is to be collected and sold for your account, but the Captain-General has come against this instruction. Every year he collects 500 *amunas* that Your Majesty buys for 500 *patacõis*, however, the generals also tack on a payment to themselves of 500 *pardaos* because Your Majesty usually purchases it [in Bulatigama]. Along with this extra cost the final sale price is 2,500 *pardaos*. But, because Your Majesty buys it in Columbo there are times when they take it without paying anything to Your Majesty. The Captain and the Captain Major of the conquest collect a salary of 4,000 *pardaos* yearly, along with supplies needed which are paid to them from the treasury of Your Majesty. Besides this they have all the money that they take from the rebels that they kill and the prisoners that they capture as they loot the lands, where until now they have usually obtained 200 *bahars* of cinnamon. They also have four large villages that the Captains-General give them absolute power over which produce more than 500 *pardaos* each year. Each of the fortress captains gets 200 *pardaos* as well as supplies for their daily needs, and the general having absolute power gives them two or three villages that produce 400 and 500 *pardaos*. Many times the generals take them away from the renters in order to give them to these captains, and thus the renters end up paying this rent without benefiting from the villages that they were given on the basis of merit. The *vedor* of the treasury has a salary of 4,000 *pardaos* along with servants, a house, and other assets. He gets more than 2,000 *pardaos* from the royal treasury every year. Besides this, Lançarote de Sexas who serves as *vedor* of the treasury has a village, Madampe, along with all the neighboring lands and villages that total 6 leagues of the best land in that island that was once always under

the patrimony and control of the kings of Ceilão. And with the salary and villages [Seixas] enjoys 10,000 *pardaos* every year in Ceilão.<sup>189</sup>

The information in this *devassa* and others by the Bishop, along with information offered up by the Council of the Treasury in Goa, came to the attention of the King in Portugal in the beginning of 1622. From all the information offered, it was believed that further recourse needed to be taken to limit the powers of military personnel in regards to the seizing of lands since undoing the regulation once set by Azevedo did not seem to have much of an effect. Thus, the King issued an *alvará* specifically barring this practice in March of 1622.

I the King am making it known that this *alvara* is being made because I have been informed that the generals of the island of Ceilão gave villages by their *olas* in that island and took them from their owners who had a valid title over them. As such the regulation and orders that I have given are not being kept, which is a great disservice to me and brings harm to the areas. In order to provide a means to repair the situation it is best that the said generals of the island of Ceilão will not be allowed in any way to take villages from people that were provided them through the regulation. And when it is understood that there are some that possess them illegitimately the generals will notify my Viceroy of India, sending him the descriptions and papers that prove this. Then, the Viceroy will send those documents to be seen in the council of my treasury in Goa.<sup>190</sup>

This *alvará* made in the third decade of the seventeenth century finally directly addressed the issue of the generals seizing of lands, and thus showed how the occurrence was not necessarily one related to some legal mechanism put down in the time of Azevedo, but was a frequently practiced activity independent of any legal recourse. As is expected this particular *alvará* did little to curb the activity and land seizures continued into the next decade.

#### *CHALLENGES IN ORGANIZING LAND TENURE BY 1630*

The Bishop goes further in his 1619 *devassas* by claiming that besides draining the

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189 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 8, p. 335.

190 *Ibid.*, pp. 284-5.

treasury, the same military personnel skewed the official view of the political geography of the island. Namely, he argued that the same generals were responsible for misleading and misinforming the *vedor*, Antão Vaz Freire, of the worth of lands when he made the most recent *tombo* of 1615. This however is not only the fault of the generals, as the likes of Freire are also held responsible by the Bishop for the lack of effort that they put into the information-gathering process.

Your Majesty has not been served well with the *tombo* that was made of the villages and lands of this island by Antão Vas Freire when he was *vedor* of the treasury and his scribe Baltezar Marinho, because the *tombo* was made too quickly and with selective information given by the natives. It would be suitable for the *tombo* to be done again by trustworthy officers and over a greater amount of time, where they spend 10 to 15 days in each *corla*. Doing so would make the treasury grow by much more than what the *tombo* shows now, because the lands that are in the *tombo* that are noted as having a rent of 100 *pardaos* can actually pay 400 and others can pay more. But in all cases the value of rent can at least be doubled. As the *tombo* was made this way for certain reasons and much too quickly, it would be suitable if Your Majesty orders for it to be done again and that the generals of this island do not interfere in its making. Because, if it is made by their order, the *tombo* will look the same as it does today, and it will continue to leave Your Majesty badly served.<sup>191</sup>

The Bishop also claims that the same military elements (*generals*, *disavas*) are responsible for withholding information about whole areas. The problem as the Bishop explains is that the generals have power over information that even senior officers connected to the King cannot get access to.

There are also many villages that are withheld [from the *tombo*] that the *dissavas* left out. Those *disavas* being Simão Correa and others who are known as *lascarins*. Thus, everything ended up being withheld and nothing can be changed or examined given that the generals have more power [in these areas] than Your Majesty. The rents come from the *dissavas* and therefore the treasury of Your Majesty ends up being consumed [by them]. All of this is covered up and there is no one that hears about any of it, and even I being the bishop do not have the freedom to do all that Your Majesty ordered me to. What I tell you here on this matter is all I know.<sup>192</sup>

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191 *Ibid.*, pp. 408-9.

In another lengthy *devassa* from the same period in which the Bishop exhaustively referenced all the regulations and orders made by the King over the last decade and how they were not being followed, the Bishop gave a further explanation into how Freire and Marinho were directly responsible for producing a flawed 1615 *tombo*.

Out of the regulation that was given to the *vedor* of the treasury Antão Vaz Freire when he went from Portugal to Ceilão, he has until this day not done what is noted in the 5<sup>th</sup> section in which Your Majesty ordered that he make a *tombo* of the *corlas* from the chief place of each one. The greater part of the *tombo* was made here in Columbo. And for Malvana and Balane the scribe, Baltezar Marinho, went by himself, without the *vedor* of the treasury, and spent time in the Four Corlas. In Galle, the *tombo* on the two native kingdoms was done in such a way where they [both] did not even see the lands that they surveyed. Thus, the *tombo* is very much made contrary to the treasury of Your Majesty as can be understood by the *devaça* of the treasury and from my letters.<sup>193</sup>

In his comparison of all the regulations put forward by the King, the Bishop explains how all of the activities concerning land tenure had not been affected by such royal regulations and continued in the same manner as before, which was having a detrimental impact on the conquest: “finally, not a single regulation nor order of Your Majesty is adhered to, and nor have your officers executed [a provision according to the regulations].”<sup>194</sup> The list of continued offenses related to land tenure included: grantees were not living in the lands they were granted, lands were being traded and sold between owners, native military personnel had too many jurisdictional powers in the lands, and the land of Bulatigama was not being put under the service of the king and the conquest. Also, all of these offenses in some way were facilitated by *Estado* personnel, especially those people past and present that have filled the roles of Viceroy, *Vedor*, and Captain-General.<sup>195</sup>

192 *Ibid.*, p. 409.

193 *Ibid.*, p. 129.

194 *Ibid.*, p. 133.

195 *Ibid.*, pp. 131-3.

The Bishop was originally ordered to make the 1619 *devassas* to document the state of the war and specifically what needed to be rectified to bring about the successful conquest of the island. In one of the final letters from the set of *devassas*, the Bishop prescribed a specific course of action to help the war effort that directly involved shuffling around land grants. He asked the king to put forward a regulation in which a group of the best producing villages would be repossessed by the Crown in order to produce the necessary revenue, and specifically supplies (i.e. rice), for direct use in the conquest. He took it upon himself to also name these villages, which he identified through his own survey, and offered the list to the King.

Madampe on the coast of Chilao and the neighboring areas, Municerão with its neighboring areas which are *pagoda* lands but give much rice, Apovita, Dulavaca, Dulapane, Mandavaravarita, Visnave, Cadagão, Vrabatacadágão, Vrabatagão, Palabatagão, Gampa, Talampete, Cutapet, Ubanaique, Grimalambo, Barabato, Cadogore, Canange, Anavolundana”.<sup>196</sup>

This reshuffling would assuage the greatest challenge to the conquest where land tenure and administration was concerned, the collection of rice, which had been stunted by the Captain-General and his associates given their land grabbing activities.

The best villages that should be kept separate are currently enjoyed by the Captains-General and others who have taken full control of them. Such is the case that even though Your Majesty has large supply producing villages (*gabara*) that could sustain this conquest with all the rice necessary, the royal dispensary has to buy 10 to 12,000 *pardaos* of rice every year. My Lord, it is the officials that Your Majesty has faith in are those that take everything, then go on to support those involved in war with everything they can get from the treasury. And no one dares to speak or write about this as they are the ones with the power. [They] want to make suffer the vassals of Your Majesty, and [these vassals] who want to honor your service as renters have their villages taken by them.<sup>197</sup>

In an anonymous *devassa* that reached the King on 14<sup>th</sup> March 1623, and which would have been

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196 *Ibid.*, pp. 112-3.

197 *Ibid.*, p. 112.

written as early as the end of 1621, similar recommendations are made with the same importance placed on rice production and the limitations put forward by the generals.

In a letter that His Majesty ordered to be written to Antão Vaz Freire on December 4th 1611, he ordered that the generals not be given villages, that they were only [for His Majesty], and those that were given to generals should be taken away. It would be very suitable to follow this order [...] then there would be no lack of rice for the conquest, and the Royal Treasury would not have to spend so much.<sup>198</sup>

Though most Captains-General tended to be an object of ridicule regarding land and revenue, one particular Captain-General was not, this general being Constantino de Sá de Noronha. However, the honesty with which Sá conducted such matters was said to have made him a target for removal, since the *Estado* political system, often being nepotistic and opportunistic, was described by some as privileging more dishonest characters. This is the description offered in another letter written on the 18<sup>th</sup> of November 1621 by the *Câmara* of Colombo. It added to the ongoing complaints of generals forcibly seizing land, specifically accusing the then Captain-General, Jorge de Albuquerque, of committing such acts with the knowledge of the governor, who happened to be his own father Fernão de Albuquerque. The *Câmara* blamed the *Estado* for habitually recruiting people into the position that went against the orders put forward by the king, and conversely removing those who attempted to follow the king's orders, in this case Constantino de Sá de Noronha.

Instead of support in the way of munitions and soldiers they always send a Captain-General that is not there for any other reason but to destroy [the island] [in order to get] the money and things of profit. And if someone regulates things well for Your Majesty, then the governors send in another one so that things do not go forward. This happened with Constantino de Saa de Noronha who as general in this island for a short period conquered all of it, destroying and killing many enemies that there were which greatly satisfied this city and the natives who would have sold their wives and children to help. But, the governor of India wanted to stifle this progress by replacing him with his son,

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198 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 9, p. 290.

Jorge de Albuquerque, as the general.<sup>199</sup>

When the King took notice of the activities of the father and son, Jorge and Fernão de Albuquerque, from this letter and others, he re-instituted Constantino de Sá in the position of Captain-General. In Sá's own letter from the 1<sup>st</sup> of December 1623 he also highlighted the need of a clearer understanding of how land tenure was structured relating to the progress of the conquest. Sá spoke of this in regards to how to properly manage and regulate gun making, and the iron-working necessary for it.

In this island there are no lack of villages with iron, nor lack of helpful iron-workers that serve Your Majesty, but the confusion caused by the manner in which this island is distributed, and the changes that many generals have made here from the time of the Viceroy Dom Jeronimo d'Azevedo, have greatly delayed the completion of this conquest [...]. Your Majesty cannot be the master of all the island, nor can it ever be governed according to what Your Majesty has ordered by his regulation and instruction, if Your Majesty does not order for the making of a *tombo* for a second time. Because even though Antão Vas Freire served Your Majesty to do this thing with his usual zeal, Ceilão is not so small whereby the first time around such a great work can be completed.<sup>200</sup>

From the time of Sá's second tenure, the island had once again went through a heavy cycle of military activity, which he noted further confused the *Estado's* understanding of land administration. He explained that some areas were paying too much rent, while others were not paying enough, and finally those natives that received lands on the basis of their involvement in military activities were claiming that they would not pay rents because they needed land revenues for military expenses.

With the island resurveyed and redistributed without the confusion that it has now, all of the natives will pay rents that they do not. Because the men of war say that they cannot pay the rent because they are discounting the costs of their payments and supplies from it.<sup>201</sup>

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199 *Ibid.*, p. 377.

200 *ANTT-CSV*, Doc. 276, f. 1.

201 *Ibid.*, 1v.

As can be read from this last statement, the call by Sá to redo the *tombo* in the island in part was also a means to control how native military personnel were compensated, which conflicted with the vision of people like Freire, who earlier recommended the contrary of what Sá proposed: to grant military personnel the liberty to deduct their costs from the rents.

Though the decision to redo the *tombo* and repossess a certain group of villages to cover the expenses of the conquest had been taken by the King, it was clear by 1625 very little had been done regarding these activities. The administrative reshuffling and reassessing had even received noticeable resistance from some *Estado* officials, including the Viceroy, Francisco da Gama, who on responding to an inquiry made by the King about the progress of the efforts gave a discouraging and even sarcastic response. The letter, written on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of January 1625, generally claimed that such a reshuffling contained certain “difficulties”. Though he promised he would follow the orders, he made his criticisms of the reshuffling scheme known to the King.

And a [report] (conforming to the regulation of Antão Vaz Freire) in which all of the notes on [the lands] would go, written in a book for Your Majesty containing the quality of the services and merits which would identify those that have served, has not yet been made. And as it is very well understood that the treasury is being hurt from the rents that they are not paying, this fact [that the report has not been done] could lead to the seizing of lands without just cause from those that possess them [...]. Though many would be discontented by having this done, there are others who would delight in hearing this as they would have done many deserving deeds and have nothing to show for it, and they would enter into this occasion in hopes of gaining something. [But], this would not occur since those villages will be taken only for the conquest.<sup>202</sup>

Gama's pessimism about redistributing the lands can in many ways be read as complicity with activities that went against land regulations by previous Viceroys. In part, the lack of cooperation by Gama and officials like him made it so that by 1629 the redistribution scheme envisioned had still not occurred. This is understood from information offered by the Council of the Treasury in

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202 *AHU-Caixas*, No. 12, Folder 76, f. 1.

Goa, where in one statement they curtly addressed the problem noting that they came to know about the issue from a complaint made by some residents in the island.

The vassals have made a complaint to His Majesty, against both Portuguese [soldiers] as well as *lascarins*, who are all responsible for not organizing the redistribution of villages that His Majesty had required by his orders from before. The reason for this being that there was not enough time and there were many villages given through *olas* that went against the said orders of His Majesty. [Both] the well-deserving vassals and royal treasury are harmed for the same reason; that the *lascarins* in the war are being accommodated [over others]. This goes against what His Majesty has ordered. There was a declaration taken in this council on the 28<sup>th</sup> of January of 626, and in deciding on a means of effectively fixing this situation and stopping the great amount of damage being done to the royal treasury as well as the common good. And for other reasons which were taken into consideration in the said council, it was asserted that in the said offices a redistribution would be done of the lands that the Portuguese and the native *lascarins* had in conformity with the orders of His Majesty.<sup>203</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Between 1605 and 1630 the attempts by the Crown and the officials in the *Estado* more aligned with the policies of the King attempted to impose different visions of a land administration system which they never managed to stabilize. The challenge to their visions came from their own military arm, the European and Asian military personnel on the ground who were seen to be acting in their own interests. At different times, mostly early on, certain *Estado* officers felt the need to allow for such private pursuits to occur, which they would argue for on the basis that it benefited the conquest. However, the arguments employed to support such activities were met by others (i.e. harm against natives) that aimed at curbing the private interests of the military personnel.

In many ways the back and forth outlines the central importance of military power in land tenure and administration. Thus, the suggestions made by Azevedo to Homem detailed above

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203 *HAG-Fazenda*, No. 1161, f. 83.

were not so much his own innovation but formulated around a reality based on his direct interaction with military personnel and warfare, the latter of which he proved to be quite successful at. On the other hand, Sá, who no doubt dealt with the same challenges in warfare, thought to try to stay closer to the administrative vision of the King; by so doing, he eventually collided with the interests of his own generals and captains, whether European or Asian.

At this point, it is worth moving to a corpus of Sinhala literary sources to compare the theme noted above; the connection between military power and land administration. Doing so will require a different set of approaches toward reading the sources compared to the Portuguese administrative materials in the first two chapters.

**Chapter 3: MILITARY LABOR, RECRUITMENT, AND THE THEME OF LOYALTY:  
COMMON CONVENTIONS BETWEEN THE SINHALA *HATANA KAVYA* AND THE  
PORTUGUESE ACCOUNT OF THE JAFFNA CONQUEST**

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When there are too many leaders filled with wickedness (*yutu napuru* - “disloyal”)  
This world is only destroyed and no good will come  
It is like when seven suns are in the sky  
In the end all the lotuses will not bloom but burn

-Alagiyavanna, *Subashitaya* (1611)

In the work on history writing in South India by Rao, Shulman, and Subrahmanyam it is posited that, “the factual is not isomorphic with the true”, and that, “to distinguish the fictive from the factual is, perhaps, the work of history”.<sup>204</sup> In order to make such distinctions the authors provide the methodological approach of reading what they call 'textures' in early modern Asian texts, in their case, Persian, Sanskrit, Tamil, and Telugu. That regardless of the dramatic and colorful character such literary productions embody, a texture that is empirical can be read and understood by consumers of the works in the day, and even by those that attempt to read the texts in our day.<sup>205</sup> Accordingly, one can also read the texture in the *aitihya* mode, what is described as historical in form but, “is always true and rarely factual”.<sup>206</sup> Approaching the body of texts within the so-called *Hatana Kavya* genre with these concepts helps determine where to

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204 Rao, Shulman, and Subrahmanyam, *Textures of Time: Writing History in South India, 1600-1800* (New York: Other, 2003), p. 11.

205 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

206 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

break up this body of panegyric (*prashati*) courtly poems (*kavya*), noting where some works can be read for their empirical texture. Such texts that resonate this texture are the *Sitavaka Hatana* (“War of Sitavaka”) written in 1585 by a senior minister/general in the Sitavakan court named Attanhari Abaya Alahapperuma, and *Kustantinu Hatana* (“Constantino's War”), written in 1619 by the Sinhala literary figure, Alagiyavanna Mukaveti then under the patronage of the Portuguese. Though the author of the former text had a certain amount of proximity to the events that he documents compared to the latter author, it does not discount the empirical texture of the latter work in its documentation of similar events of island wars as will be seen.

The *Sitavaka Hatana*, the earliest sixteenth century Sinhala text available to the historian, tells the story of the rise of the Sitavakan kingdom under Mayadunne and Rajasinha against their European and Asian rivals over a period of about 70 years. The very first military challenge it documents is the event known in popular history as the *Vijayaba Kollaya* (“the robbery of Vijayabahu”) of 1521; the regicide/patricide committed by the three sons of the Kotte king, Vijayabahu. The act split the kingdom into three regions; Kotte, Sitavaka, and Rayigama and what followed was an intense conflict between the rival brothers that lasted through most of the sixteenth century. The initial verses of the *Sitavaka Hatana* document the earliest stages of the *Vijayaba Kollaya*, when the three brothers involved, Bhuvanekabahu, Mayadunne, and Pararajasinha, initially colluded to launch a military attack on Kotte to overthrow their father. To achieve this, the poem shows how the first activity they were involved in was to actually gather a military force. Thus, the poem explains how they left the area of Kotte and ventured into the courts of rival kingdoms in order to obtain this kind of support.<sup>207</sup> Being a panegyric of the rulers of Sitavaka, the poem specifically tracks the movements of Mayadunne and shows exactly how

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207 This episode is also documented in the Sinhala chronicle, *Rajavaliya*. See: *Rajavaliya*, p. 71.

he managed to secure an army and how he commanded it. The narrator explains how his brothers went to the Kingdom of Jaffna to drum up support there, while he went into the court of Jayavira, the king of Senkadagala (Kandy) in the up-country. He told his woes of disinheritance to that king and the plans that he and his brothers made for his father's removal. Jayavira, being pleased with the chaos befalling his rival's kingdom, immediately gave a small group of soldiers to Mayadunne and implored him to "quickly chase the king from the city".<sup>208</sup>

At this point in the poem the style departs from lengthy chronicle verses to shorter verses that resemble a travelogue, which includes basic information about Mayadunne's activities as he passed with his troops through villages in their expedition from Kandy to Kotte. Mayadunne and his troop started from Kandy and came to Gannoruva, moved on to Balana, and found themselves in an area called Valgovuvagoda.<sup>209</sup> In this latter area the narrator explains they built a "proper camp" (*nisi vadiya*), and also built a camp in the next area, Attapitiya.<sup>210</sup> They came across a boundary (*kadavata*) in Saloluva and came to Iddamalpana. At this point in the expedition the text explains how Mayadunne felt the need to pay the soldiers he obtained from Jayavira.

86.  
On one night the king of pure caste (*sudda ubaya kula*)  
Graciously gave pay (*padi nadi*) and increased the courage (*edda vadana*)  
Of the people he received  
They built a camp in Iddemalpana.<sup>211</sup>

The verses continue and on leaving this area and passing a boundary at Kotikakumbara, they came to Mattamgoda where they once again built a camp where Mayadunne once again paid his

208 *Sitavaka Hatana*, v. 74 – p. 11.

209 *Ibid.*, vs. 76-9 – pp. 11-2.

210 *Ibid.*, vs. 80-1 – p. 12.

211 *Ibid.*, v. 86 – p. 13.

troops.<sup>212</sup> They then passed through Nivunhallagama, Puranpotta, and Radavane where once again the troops were paid.<sup>213</sup> They reached Malvana and put up a camp and then came to Kelaniya, and into the court of a king unidentified in the poem. Mayadunne met with this king to give his respects and asked permission to stay.<sup>214</sup> He called for his brothers to come from Jaffna to that location, when by that time the narrator explains they also procured troops from the north. What follows is what is generally known about the *Vijayaba Kollaya*; the Kotte king did not seem to be able placate his rebellious sons nor could he offer up a military force to challenge the one they collected. They killed him and imposed themselves as the collective rulers of the region.

One finds striking similarities when comparing the details in the *Sitavaka Hatana* of how Mayadunne went about the activity of military recruitment in this poem to others within the genre known as the *Hatana Kavya* (“War Poems”). They tell of a situation in which leaders such as Mayadunne who had ambitions of conquest were in a continual process of recruiting military personnel from a variety of sources immediately preceding the expedition in question, as not one island kingdom throughout the sixteenth century ever had sufficient internal military resources on its own to launch a military expedition. In all, the descriptions offered portray how wars in this period were not fought by formal standing armies; rather, the recruitment of troops would be done before and even en route, during the expedition, until the destination was reached. The leaders paid the troops on joining the army if possible, but money and resources were usually collected en route as well. Thus the troops would receive payments when the heads of the expedition came across money collected during the expedition by whatever means possible,

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212 *Ibid.*, v. 88 – p. 13.

213 *Ibid.*, vs. 91-5 – pp. 13-4.

214 *Ibid.*, vs. 97-101 – pp. 14-5.

likely through raiding villages along the way.

Given that the sources mentioned above are literature, the question of whether or not such information had a basis in historical reality could be posed. Specifically, we could ask whether or not the conventions on military recruitment and war-making found in these poems correspond to information from sources outside this particular Sinhala literary corpus. A source that positively confirms that all of the themes found in the first two *Hatana Kavya* are a historical reality and represent the manner in which military activity was conducted, is the Portuguese account of the conquest of Jaffna in 1619 by the general, Filipe de Oliveira.<sup>215</sup> In the first-hand account he offers, he describes how the contingencies he faced when setting out on an expedition to the north of the island forced him to recruit an island-based military force while on route, and where he paid them before the battle in question from money he also obtained by chance during the expedition. Besides this set of themes related to recruitment, there are more themes related to military authority and land granting shared between the two sets of sources from the two linguistic canons. In all, the matching themes help paint a picture of the procedures of warfare and the importance of contractual loyalty that every person throughout the sixteenth and into the seventeenth centuries, be they Asian or European, needed to consider if they expected to conduct successful military expeditions.

#### *THEMES OF AUTHORITY, RECRUITMENT, AND DISLOYALTY ACCORDING TO THE SITAVAKA HATANA AND KUSTANTINU HATANA*

A key theme described in these two poems that is useful for the larger thesis is the theme

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<sup>215</sup> A printed transcription of the document is made available by Pissurlencar, however, it contains notable gaps, which most likely corresponds to damaged areas on the original he worked from. See: *Estado*, Vol. 1, pp. 53-8. My translation works from a copy I found in a different collection, *Conselho da Fazenda*, in the Historical Archives of Goa, which does not suffer from any significant damage and is perfectly readable. It also contains additional documentation regarding the aftermath of the conquest compared to that found in the *Conselho do Estado*. See: *HAG-Fazenda*, No. 1159, ff. 147v-154.

of authority, and specifically methods of obtaining territorial authority. These sources suggest that royal power could be improvised from military authority, and did not require a complex set of prerequisites, as has sometimes been suggested. This is shown in the manner in which different actors from the two poems (i.e. Mayadunne, Rajasinha, Constantino de Sá, Vidiye Bandara, António Barreto) all engage in the same exact activities in order to challenge the authority of each other: recruiting military personnel and collecting tribute and tax from regions they pass through by way of their military. However, the manner in which some figures conduct such activities are valued higher than others, and both poems are deeply concerned with figures who go back on their service agreement and show disloyal characteristics. In other words, the language and concepts of honor and loyalty appear crucial to the mental world of these texts, while the ascriptive requirements for rulership are worn relatively lightly.

*The Concept of Territorial Authority and Challenges to Authority According to the Sitavaka Hatana*

Information about the early activities of Mayadunne in the *Sitavaka Hatana* yields useful details in regards to how administrative authority was practiced, and contested, in this period. Following the story from the defeat of Vijayabahu and the fragmentation of the kingdom, soon after Mayadunne became the king of Sitavaka he began to challenge the authority of his brother, Bhuvanekabahu, the new king of Kotte. The author explains how Mayadunne specifically did this by cutting off tribute/tax flows (*ayabadu*) from nearby territories that the Kotte king thought to be under his authority. It is explained that this was done with the help of the third brother, the new king of Rayigama.

198.

Thus the king Mayadunne told Rayigam Bandara

“Go to Mapitigama and stay there,  
And stop the tribute (*ayabadu*) going to the city [Jayawardenapura, Kotte].”  
Thus the two kings discussed how to cause havoc (*avula*) in the country<sup>216</sup>

The author explains that this activity prompted Bhuvanekabahu to request the military support of the Portuguese, the threat of which led Mayadunne to abandon Sitavaka and relocate further into the interior in Sabaragamuva. The specific term used in the above verse to describe the challenge Mayadunne posed against the authority of his brother, to create 'havoc' or 'chaos' (*avula karanava*), which is often construed as the articulation of a problem in a proto-nationalist vein, is never used outside the specific act of cutting off tribute flows in these poems.<sup>217</sup> This is the case when Mayadunne later in the story is subject to this himself – when tribute flows were being blocked by the rebel Vidiye Bandara from the regions in the interior of the island that Mayadunne claimed authority over.

554.  
The King Mayadunne  
With the desire to get tribute which was not coming  
His ministers were sent  
To see what places were giving and not giving

555.  
The ministers went quickly  
To those areas  
They asked for information  
Of why tribute was not given

556.  
The ministers in those areas  
Said this

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<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>217</sup> In his examination of the *Sitavaka Hatana*, Alan Strathern claims that such language articulates the unique challenges to unify the country (*eksat karanava*) by a Sinhala Buddhist sovereign, a *cakravartin*. But, what is not considered is the fact that the protagonist of the poem, Mayadunne, is charged with creating *avula* as well. In my reading, I attribute the term to the specific act of blocking and relaying tribute flows, since such language is always in accompaniment with those acts no matter who the actor is. See: Strathern, *Kingship and Conversion in Sixteenth-Century Sri Lanka*, pp. 181-2.

“In this country it is King Vidiye  
that is wreaking havoc (*avul karamin*) and blocking tribute.”<sup>218</sup>

On hearing this information from his ministers, the poem goes on to describe how Mayadunne quickly took up arms to defend his ability to extract tribute from these areas. The entire episode points to another important theme for the historian of early modern Sri Lanka as documented thus far in the two previous chapters; the strong link between active military power and territorial/administrative authority in the island. Thus, the privilege of extracting tribute or revenues from an interior region in the island actively required leaders such as Mayadunne to have a consistent military presence in that place to defend such privileges. Otherwise, they could expect someone else to easily claim authority over a region, and along with it, administrative control over it.

This dual problem -- of kings needing a consistent military presence in regions that they claimed authority over, as well as the military personnel to provide this presence -- has an obvious solution as described in the *Sitavaka Hatana*. Kings such as Mayadunne and Rajasinha created connections with regional leaders who accepted the authority of the king and provided him with these military services (recruitment and command) and administrative services (revenue extraction). This was achieved in the way they would contract the military services of these *disavas* and *vidanas*, and in added appreciation for providing a successful result, the likes of Mayadunne additionally gave administrative titles over new lands obtained through battle. All this was done with the hope that such *disavas* would provide such services in the future and pass some tribute from the lands to the king. In one case the author describes the aftermath of a successful expedition against the same rogue figure, Vidiye Bandara.

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218 *Sitavaka Hatana*, pp. 82-3.

892.

To the troops of this great country  
Making them happy by giving them titles (*pata bānda*)  
And putting garlands around their necks  
He gave them permission to return to their own countries

893.

“Stay in Lanka always,  
And stay on the side of our princes,  
If havoc is wreaked against us,  
I will tell you immediately.”<sup>219</sup>

This cyclical approach of contracting military services from regional leaders immediately preceding planned assaults was the only effective way one engaged in military activities on a large scale in the sixteenth century. As described in this poem and others from the period, this form of military recruitment was not without its obvious problems. In particular, what happened when those *disavas* broke loyalties with one king to provide services for another? And since regional leaders were at the center of military command and administration, what was stopping them from staking their own claim of power? How these contingencies are dealt with in the texts will be explained in subsequent sections of this chapter. For now I turn to how the information provided by the *Sitavaka Hatana* is useful for historians and literary scholars of the seventeenth century.

#### *The Sitavaka Hatana as a Historical and Literary Template for the Seventeenth Century*

The details in the *Sitavaka Hatana* on military engagement resonate with the experiences the Portuguese had, as detailed in the two previous chapters of this thesis. Though the *Sitavaka Hatana* represents activities and experiences rooted in the sixteenth century compared to the Portuguese sources we have cited (which mostly date from the early seventeenth century), it

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<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133.

appears the two centuries described in these disparate set of sources are not at all different in the way they reflect a connection between military labor and territorial/administrative authority, especially for interior areas. In this way, the details offered by the *Sitavaka Hatana* provide a general template that does not change into the seventeenth century and is thus useful to the historian of this latter period as well. It is also the first source of its kind, being written by a military general in the Sitavakan court, that explains how the Sitavaka rulers worked around these limits to become the dominant force by the time the text was written in 1585. It points to the connection between the rise of authority of the Sitavakan kings and the development and expansion of a kind of market for military services by the end of the century, which ultimately provided an oversupply of military services that ambitious would-be conquerors would utilize from the early seventeenth century. The environment in which any fit man could offer themselves as military labor in this period set the basis for the cultural stereotype of the Sinhala being disloyal by nature, a trope referenced many times over in the Portuguese sources as noted above.

For scholars of seventeenth-century Sinhala literature, the *Sitavaka Hatana* is of equal importance, as its example spawned a genre of writing that would be later known as the *Hatana Kayva*. For example, seventeenth century court poets such as Alagiyavanna Mukaveti who were personally inexperienced in war, reproduced the simple and utilitarian literary structure developed by Alahapperuma to document the history of Portuguese and Kandyan rule in an empirical mode, making it appear as if the battles described were witnessed first-hand. This is even the case of poems written much later outside of the said genre, where the poets that composed the *Mandarampura Puvata* would compose similar verses of itineraries of battles that

never actually occurred.<sup>220</sup> Opinion is divided on how and under what criteria the poems can be grouped.<sup>221</sup> In my own reading, I find that they can be classified based on two unique sets of conventions that are carried between them; 1) the simplistic and short verses in which the poems document travel activities, specifically the itineraries of military expeditions, and 2) the manner in which the problem of military loyalty is described. I claim the conventions are useful to seventeenth century court poets not purely based on stylistic reasons, but because they best reflected a certain historical reality that was shared between the two centuries; the perennial problem of maintaining authority through military engagement that tested the loyalties of military commanders.

*Mayadunne's Kingly Ascension, 1521-1550*

The *Sitavaka Hatana*, being a panegyric for the Sitavakan kings Mayadunne and Rajasinha I, aims to highlight the positive attributes of the kings, specifically the power and authority they possessed in the face of their rivals. However, it is not so quick to assume that such power and authority was immediately conceded to them merely because of their noble social stature or the level of legitimacy they embodied. The story of the kings of Sitavaka is instead one of ascension through a steady process of intense military engagement. The author, Alahapperuma, had direct experience in such military matters considering his personal involvement in most of the events documented. In the story he tells, Mayadunne went from being a king without any military support or a territory he could effectively defend around the 1520s, to

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220 The *Mandarampura Puvata* is a poem in an *aitihya* historical mode as explained by Rao, Shulman, and Subrahmanyam.

221 In her bibliographical essay on the *Hatana Kavya*, Rohini Paranavitana claims that the poems can be grouped together because they speak to anti-colonial sentiments felt in the island at that time collectively by Sinhala people. See: R. Paranavitana, "Sinhalese War Poems and the Portuguese", p. 61.

a king who wielded an army that successfully challenged the Portuguese a few decades later. The process of this ascension is explained in some degree by Alahapperuma, who shows how steady military engagement over these decades helped the Sitavakan kings establish a reputation in the island, and even South India, which increasingly attracted military personnel, the increasing volume of which is notable in the narrations of every new battle.

In the earliest phases described in the poem, after the *Vijayaba Kollaya* and when conflicts began to foment between the brothers, Alahapperuma makes it clear that Mayadunne does not have much actual authority over the city/region of Sitavaka. Soon after Mayadunne upsets the tribute flows to Kotte, prompting Bhuvengkabahu to request the military aid of the Portuguese, he is forced to abandon Sitavaka and reside further interior in the region of Sabaragamuva for a certain amount of time. The chronicle, *Rajavaliya*, notes this as well and goes on to state that after a three year period he came out of hiding and employed a number of fighters of South Indian origin (*vedakkaru*), also known as the Mappilas, commanded by a “Moor” (*marakkalaya*) named Kundali.<sup>222</sup> The *Sitavaka Hatana* fills in the gap of this three-year period, and departs from the *Rajavaliya* by claiming he was not based in Sabaragamuva for the entire period, but was instead traveling between the central and southern regions of the island. Alahapperuma explains that he spent time visiting sites of worship and other places where he attempted to rally support and build up a military base. He went to the upcountry region of Badulla and sent requests for military support.

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222 *Rajavaliya*, p. 74. The South Indian Muslim seafaring group known as the 'Mappilas' is a subject covered in a few works. For its formation out of the South Indian Muslim communities by the sixteenth century and its responses to Portuguese involvement in the Indian Ocean, see: Bouchon, “Les Musulmans du Kerala à l'époque de la découverte portugaise” in *Mare Luso-Indicum* (Vol. 2, 1973), pp. 3–59. For information regarding conflicts between the the group with the Portuguese around Sri Lanka, and specifically in the Palk Strait region, see the section: “O Mar de Ceilão a ferro e fogo, ou quinze anos de «guerra de esteiro»” in Flores, *Os Portugueses e o Mar de Ceilão: Trato, diplomacia e guerra* (1498-1543) (Lisbon: Cosmos, 1998), pp. 157-83.

223.  
The king at that time in that city [Badulla]  
Sent messages to Tunkinda [Uva]  
Brought and gathered a great army in that city  
And the great armies came

224.  
Spending several days in that city  
Always making the people there happy  
He gave different presents (*dimanna*) to them  
And captured their hearts (*karava sata sita*)<sup>223</sup>

Soon after attaining these troops Alahapperuma claims that Mayadunne began to travel in a southern direction and stop in an area identified as Mada Uyana. In this place Mayadunne demands tribute from the people and he employed his new troop to collect it from the inhabitants.

260.  
Our king staying in that city  
With the great army brought there  
The king sweetly tells (*amayura basa*) his troops  
To quickly receive the tribute in this country

261.  
The order to get the taxes  
Was given to the great army  
Sending a minister with them  
The permission was given<sup>224</sup>

Mayadunne's confidence in collecting tribute in a region he had no prior experience in was owed to the military presence under his command by this time. The up-country region of Badulla, which is quite distant from any rough boundary that could be drawn around Sitavaka, cannot be understood to be a region necessarily under his “legitimate” kingly control as was decided between the brothers after the regicide. It was likely that as he traveled through subsequent areas

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223 *Sitavaka Hatana*, p. 34.

224 *Ibid.*, p. 39.

he would expect to continue to extract resources as tribute by way of the military force he commanded. From here, Alahapperuma explains how he ventured to the Southern coast at Matara where he received another group of soldiers, gifted to him by a king there, and finally in the company of all these soldiers he came back to the western region and Denavaka.<sup>225</sup>

It is at this time the verses allude to Mayadunne beginning to negotiate with the South Indian group of Mappilas.<sup>226</sup> Mayadunne also enlisted the support once again of his brother, Rayigam Bandara, to once again block the paths and interrupt the movement of tribute between Sitavaka and Kotte from Mapitagama. Rayigam Bandara was also told to set up military camps there, which prompted a reaction from Bhuvanekabahu and the Portuguese force.<sup>227</sup> Mayadunne's combined force of island and non-island soldiers could not withstand the Portuguese. His defeat at the hands of the Portuguese is documented in both the *Rajavaliya* and *Sitavaka Hatana*, and both sources claim that the South Indian force was largely to blame for loss.<sup>228</sup> However, the *Sitavaka Hatana* goes further by claiming these soldiers contributed to the defeat through treasonous activities.

310.  
The Vedakkaru quickly  
Gave their word (*basa duna*) to the Portuguese  
From wicked qualities (*ava gatiyena*) they did so  
And king Mayadunne was defeated.<sup>229</sup>

Though ultimately unsuccessful, the description of Mayadunne's initial attempts at grabbing power are telling of how authority is something that can be achieved, albeit on a small

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225 *Ibid.*, v. 271 – p. 41.

226 *Ibid.*, v. 297 – p. 45.

227 *Ibid.*, vs. 298-303 – p. 45.

228 *Rajavaliya*, p. 74.

229 *Sitavaka Hatana*, p. 46.

scale in this case, by anyone with enough personal ambition and time. For such people the first activity was to find military support and, according to the description, there were a number of ways that this could be achieved. First, one could go into recruitment areas and begin to build a support base from the people in the immediate vicinity, as Mayadunne did in Badulla. Second, one could send requests through correspondence to outer recruitment areas, which yielded a group of soldiers from the larger territory of Uva. Third, a local leader could be convinced to donate the force of men they had in their possession, as was the case in Matara. Lastly, one could ally with groups that shared a common rival, in this case the Mappilas who had common cause to fight the Portuguese. In all these cases, communication skills and the charisma that comes with them are of utmost importance for any would-be leader of men, and just as important, the ability to quickly raise funds. In regards to charisma, the constant references to the Mayadunne's words as being like “nectar” (*amayura basa*) makes it evident that Alahapperuma thought the king possessed such abilities. However, Alahapperuma notes in his narrative that Mayadunne is not the only figure at this time to have possessed such talents and ambitions, as seen in the example of Vidiye Bandara.

### *The “King” Vidiye Bandara*

In these subsequent years Alahapperuma reports that the greatest challenge Mayadunne faced was that of the wayward Kotte rebel known as Vidiye Bandara. The biography of Vidiye Bandara shows how entangled the different rivals were with each other in this period. He was a Kotte noble in the court of Vijayabahu and was married to Vijayabahu's daughter, Samudra Devi, thus the sister of the three brothers Mayadunne, Bhuvanekabahu, and Rayigam Bandara. It was Vidiye's son from the marriage, Dharmapala, who was favored by Vijayabahu for succession and

it was possibly on this account that the brothers organized the regicide. After the coup, Vidiye stayed in the court under Bhuvanekabahu, and after the latter's death, Vidiye came under the influence of the Portuguese. But relations were strained from the beginning between him and the Portuguese, as he at first refused to convert to Christianity and additionally did not reveal the location of Bhuvanekabahu's treasure cache, which the Portuguese believed existed even though it was never found. It was his failure to concede on these points which prompted the Portuguese to send him to Goa to be imprisoned. In transit however his wife, Samudra Devi, enlisted the support of some people and successfully hatched and executed a plan for his escape. The *Sitavaka Hatana*, explains that the couple relocated to the interior regions of the island to stake their claim to rule soon after.

It is from here in the story that the *Sitavaka Hatana* follows Vidiye Bandara, as Mayadunne became concerned with him and assigned the task of his capture to his trusted chief minister Vikramasinha. Vikramasinha eventually found Vidiye Bandara and after a small skirmish between the two parties, and with the Portuguese in pursuit as well, Vidiye escaped to Sabaragamuva, the region bordering Sitavaka. In this place he developed a military support base from which he threatened his neighbor.

548.  
King Vidiye  
Without staying in that city  
Came to Sapparapura [Sabaragamuva]  
And built a great camp there (*mahat kandayura*).

549.  
He quickly sent mocking letters  
To Denavaka Pas Rata [Sitavaka]  
He built his camp securely  
And cordoned off the country [Sabaragamuva] at this time (*sitiya rata hasura ema*

*vita*).<sup>230</sup>

From here Alahapperuma explains the disturbances to the tribute flows (*avul*) he caused in and around the area of Sabaragamuva. He destroyed the military camps (*kandayura*) belonging to Mayadunne and built his own, as well as blocked roads to the Sitavaka region from areas such as Kukulapasyotna, Kandukara, Kosgama, Vellava, and Uva Tunkinda.<sup>231</sup> The similarity in Vidiye Bandara's activities of usurping the authority of Mayadunne, and even the locations he goes to in order to develop a military support base, bears an obvious similarity to the Mayadunne's own movements against Bhuvanekabahu. Also, although Alahapperuma casts the activities of Vidiye Bandara in a negative light, he does not shrink from giving him the honorary title of “king” (*rājā*) because of the clear level of military authority he had by this time.

In the next few verses Alahapperuma explains how this situation was rectified, where he himself and Vikramasinha, both chief officers, were sent to recruit a force that could overthrow Vidiye Bandara. They found this fighting force in two contingents from areas outside the regions that Vidiye Bandara inhabited, a troop of *veddah* (tribals) around Ratnapura and *vanniyar* chieftains from the Tamil-speaking Vanni region.<sup>232</sup> This force was led by Rajasinha, who was on his first expedition in the company of Mayadunne's chief generals.

They headed straight to Sabaragamuva and on reaching the area they found and destroyed many of Vidiye Bandara's camps. A few direct battles ensued that he also lost, but they did not manage to capture him and he escaped once again. With Vidiye Bandara's authority diminished in the region, Rajasinha stationed himself in Badulla where he spent time and sent military

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230 *Ibid.*, p. 82..

231 *Ibid.*, vs. 548-53 – p. 82.

232 *Ibid.*, v. 565 – p. 84.

personnel to areas where it was thought that Vidiye was hiding. In this process he also is said to have reestablished tributary connections to these areas.

586.  
The regions of Uva Tunkinda  
Were quickly united (*ekasat kara*)  
And they were guarded properly  
And the tribute was collected

587.  
Vellasa Bintana  
Vellava Gampaha  
The mountain place Kosgama  
He united (*ekasat karapu*) virtuously

588.  
Immediately in all these places  
Tribute was collected  
And with the ministers  
They were sent to the father king.<sup>233</sup>

The activity of “uniting” (*eksat karanavā*) regions, like its counterpart, creating havoc/chaos (*avul karanavā*), can be read in a very proto-nationalist manner as mentioned before. However, the point needs to be stressed that the use of such terms in the poem always refers to the specific act of connecting and disconnecting tribute flows to the people that claim authority over them. In this time as well to prevent future infractions, Rajasinha sought to build checkpoints (*kadavata*) throughout the interior that were manned by recruited personnel from the areas nearby.

620.  
At the checkpoint at Velihida  
The guards were people from Palmadulla  
It was planned  
And arrangements were made

621.  
The checkpoint at Lellopitiya  
Was made powerfully

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<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.

The people guarding it  
Were to be people from Dippitigala

622.

At the checkpoint in Moratota  
Veddah soldiers were recruited  
Responsibility was given  
The guarding duty was done well<sup>234</sup>

Rajasinha's establishment of such checkpoints is a clear statement of the importance of maintaining a military presence in the areas he claimed territorial authority over. As such, the poem shows how the political geography was constantly and rapidly changing in this period given the influence of intense military activity.

*The Rise of Sitavaka and the Expansion of Military Service, 1550-1580*

In the poem, from the time that Mayadunne began his initial attempts at building authority in the island to the time Rajasinha took command of all the military campaigns, the scale of military recruitment had greatly expanded and involved regional leaders in more parts of the country. The demands for local military support came from the Portuguese camp as much as the Sitavakan one, as from the 1550s the Europeans had an increased interest in expansion eastward as well. In the narrative, the Portuguese enlisted their prominent *mudaliyar*, Mananpedi, who went from Colombo to the Southern Coast to claim authority over the area in order to remove the foothold that Rajasinha had made in the region.

961.

The great *mudaliyar* Mananpedi  
Went graciously with his armies  
And got permission to leave  
From king Dharmapala

962.

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<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Receiving the permission  
They passed through each place  
And went to Matara  
And brought forward the Matara minister.

963.  
The minister of Matota [Matara] was brought forward  
He was given the responsibility of all areas  
And with the Portuguese  
He was sent to build a fort (*kotu*).

964.  
Galle Matara  
Tangalle Hakmana  
Panama Girivaya  
Katuvana Uduvaka

965.  
In all these places  
Checkpoints were built for protection  
The tribute meant for Sitavaka  
Was brought and collected at these checkpoints

966.  
The Portuguese who are wicked  
Built checkpoints in this way  
Entered the country and wreaked havoc  
With Mananpedi<sup>235</sup>

A force of ministers and their soldiers were deployed and once again they destroyed the checkpoints, captured and punished the offenders, and re-established communication links and the flow of tribute.<sup>236</sup> Soon after, Rajasinha went on the offensive with the intention of dislodging the Portuguese from Kotte and the result would become the battles at Mulleriyawa.<sup>237</sup> Rajasinha

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235 *Ibid.*, p. 143.

236 *Ibid.*, vs. 970-85 – pp. 144-6.

237 The battles in the Mulleriyawa region on the Kelaniya River between Kotte and Sitavaka occurred subsequent to a siege that Rajasinha orchestrated on Kotte at the end of the 1550s as documented in the *Rajavaliya*, pp. 82-5, and, *Queiroz*, Vol. 1, pp. 333-47. The siege had been repelled after some effort, and with the Portuguese in pursuit of Rajasinha he counterattacked, setting off the said battles in the region. Rajasinha claimed a decisive victory which rocked Portuguese military power and vanquished ambitions to expand eastward well until Rajasinha's death in 1593.

is said to have collected a troop from the immediate area.

1026.

Troops came from the country and were counted  
They were given weapons from the fund (*aramudalan*)  
Like this the group of soldiers (*hēvapanne*) were formed  
They were paid to go to war.

1027.

Gathering the soldiers in this way  
Quickly the God Rajasinha (*Rajasinha Devi*) came  
To Hevagama  
Without delay the enemy armies were ready.<sup>238</sup>

Using this force that assembled at Hevagama, the Minister Vikramasinha confronted the Portuguese, but lost this first battle. After this, Rajasinha made a wider call for troop support and recruited the most troops as shown in the poem thus far. Troops are found to have been taken from places old and new.

1033.

To strengthen his glory  
To destroy their pride without making any mistake  
From the dangerous Atulagiri Korala  
He brought a great and beautiful army

1034.

A powerful army from Gomagandara  
Was brought and control over them  
Was given to the strict *araccis* from Koratota  
They were brought in groups and given luxury goods

1035.

A great army was brought from Denavaka Pas Rata  
They were graciously given riches  
To chase and defeat the enemy  
This great army was ready

1036.

Chasing the shriveling army  
Like a *kumudu* flower in bloom that brings them joy

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238 *Ibid.*, p. 152.

Messages were sent to Kukulū Nawayotna  
And many troops continued coming from that area like a beautiful drama

1037.

Messages were sent to Sapparapura [Sabaragamuva]  
And many ministers and troops came from there  
As soon as they saw the king  
They were happy to go to war

1038.

To Matara  
Messages were sent  
And with great armies the ministers  
Have come.<sup>239</sup>

The list of areas from where troops were recruited included the eastern Tamil speaking regions.

1044.

Kalapuva and Tirikkovila area  
Tirikunamala and Vanigapattuva  
Ministers and a large set of troops  
Came and saw the king<sup>240</sup>

After the war was won, once again verses are dedicated to giving titles and payments. After which, the troop are once again all told to go back to their respective areas.

1110.

To the people who won the war  
According to their status  
To make them content they were given  
Permission to go back to their own countries

1111.

For the ministers  
That did brave deeds  
On that day the King saw to it  
To give them the ownership (*paveni*) to the villages and lands.<sup>241</sup>

The importance of military service and this high point of the defeat of the Portuguese at

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239 *Ibid.*, pp. 153-4.

240 *Ibid.*, p. 155.

241 *Ibid.*, p. 164.

Mulleriyawa was commemorated by renaming the area Hevagam Korallaya (*Hevagam*: “Soldier Land”), which marked the importance of the assembly of such a large and powerful force for that battle. The *Rajavaliya* states.

Rajasinha, having engaged in the sport of warfare, achieved victory, called the Araccis of Koratota and Hevagama and the twelve Radaheva armies of Hokandara, rewarded them with positions and presents for their services in striking the enemy from the rear. Be it known that on account of performing military services that Korale was called Hevagam Korallaya and from then onwards, the name Hevagam Korallaya has persisted.<sup>242</sup>

Wielding this kind of military power, more successes were to come for Rajasinha, including the pushing of the Portuguese and Dharmapala to Colombo from Kotte and the takeover of the up-country regions. However, this peak was soon met by some great setbacks that pointed to some fundamental flaws in the military and authority structure that Rajasinha operated within. When rivals ceased to pose a substantial enough challenge, there was less of a need for military engagement which led the structure to implode, as constant and intensive military activity was the fuel that kept the entire structure alive. Specifically, the lack of means of military engagement led to fragmentation amongst senior military officers, as was the case between the chief ministers, Vikramasinha and Seneviratna, who were said to have wielded their troops against each other over a conflict that had developed between some of their soldiers.<sup>243</sup> In another case, a peripheral up-country minister, Virasundara Bandara in Hevahata, used the moment to plot against Rajasinha, who the latter neutralized before any plan could be hatched.<sup>244</sup>

From the time the poem was finished these faults began to appear, and the entire political structure of Sitavaka would soon dissolve with the death of Rajasinha in the 1590s. Though both

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<sup>242</sup> *Rajavaliya*, p. 88.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid*, p. 87.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 85-6.

Rajasinha and Mayadunne would not secure the posterity of the kingdom, they left an indelible mark on the political and economic climate of the island, since by the seventeenth century their continual military engagement helped to develop a strong form of a military service market by this time. The end of Sitavakan power meant that by the early seventeenth century, the supply of such military services was available to a whole other host of actors who were ambitious and confident enough, as Mayadunne and Rajasinha once were, to stake their own claims of authority. It is not a coincidence that this period is noted in the Portuguese sources as being rife with “rebellions”. Technically, this meant more trained Sinhala captains and generals in the Portuguese ranks were vacating their posts, traveling to the interior, and raising their own forces to challenge both the Portuguese and existing island kingdoms in the hopes of forging their own. This period, and this particular theme is the main subject of the next poem in the group, *Kustantinu Hatana*. Its place in the literary canon and how it articulates the central problem of keeping military loyalties will be discussed below.

*Common Conventions and Common Historical Realities between the Hatana Kavya*

As mentioned many times previously, the *Sitavaka Hatana*, is a unique text compared to the others in the *Hatana Kavya* group because it is the only one written by a senior general/minister, where the others were composed by people skilled in court poetry. In this way, the author, Attanhari Abaya Alahapperuma, does not claim to possess any special literary skills from which he composed such a text, which he in fact states clearly at the end of his work.

1120.  
I do not know Pali  
I provide common Sinhala  
For this war poem of Sitavaka

And I made it into poetry according to my knowledge<sup>245</sup>

The aim is based on a very basic need to document the achievements of Mayadunne, Rajasinha and their supporters at a time when their power peaked. Though admittedly without a predisposed attention to style, Alahapperuma does devise some approaches when organizing his text that were important enough to be reused by subsequent authors. Besides a simple chronicle style, the *Sitavaka Hatana* has a special interest in documenting travel during military expeditions. In the following example of what I call an *expedition narrative*, a basic set of information is presented in a simple and short format to chart the travels of an officer or king with their troops as they approach their destination.

231.

The king stayed and rested in Buttala  
Food was prepared and consumed  
He encouraged and informed his army  
Until the morning came.

232.

Without delay the king set out  
He happily passed through these areas  
He knows exactly where to go in these places and where to go through  
He went to a cave called Patana and put up a camp and rested.

233.

They made huts out of palms for rest  
They quickly made a place to rest  
He had the troops around him  
He stayed and made the troops happy.<sup>246</sup>

In usage, the verses usually contain the location, and linking the different locations together provides a travel itinerary. The verses follow a kind of travelogue-type format, which commonly includes a basic set of supplementary information such as if they ate, where they slept, the people

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245 *Sitavaka Hatana*, p. 166.

246 *Ibid.*, p. 35.

in the group, what kind of camp they built, what was discussed, payments made, etc. In the case of the *Sitavaka Hatana*, there is a special amount of detail included in such verses, and arguably, we may assume that the author, when on these expeditions, wrote down these observations as they happened. Such a convention differs from the *sandesya* form, which though also tracks travel and offers descriptions of the scenery along the way, does not attempt to detail the itinerary of a specific king or minister while on a military expedition. The verses are also composed in a far more simple way compared to *sandesya* poetry.

This is the case in the next poem of the group, *Kustantinu Hatana*, written in 1622 by Alagiyavanna Mukaveti, the renowned Sinhala literary figure recognized as such even in his own time. As a trained literary figure, and author of another well-known *sandesya* poem, *Savul Sandesya*, he clearly had the skill and ability to compose the poem using high literary techniques. However, when reading the poem, which does contain some high *sandesya* style verses, one notes that a considerable amount of verses are constructed with a simple technique that are reminiscent of those found in the *Sitavaka Hatana*. In one example he charts the movements of a Portuguese force when it comes under the command of the general Constantino de Sá de Noronha.

65.  
Arriving in Kalambapura [Colombo]  
He got the prevailing information in Lanka  
From the leaders there  
From which he came to understand what to do.

66.  
By this our beautiful king [Sá]  
Arrived in Malvana  
With the four *disavas*  
The group was taken with him.

67.  
With the great and battle-hardened group  
Which our king [Sá]  
Came to lead  
He arrived in Manikkadavara.<sup>247</sup>

Such simply crafted and informative verses that detail travel during a military expedition are not available at a time before the *Sitavaka Hatana*. In this way, though Alahapperuma's text is not treated as a text worthy of study by most scholars of Sinhala literature today, it has had a clear impact on the poetry composed by those authors that are held in higher esteem. In this way, its influence on authors of that period that compose historical literature should be considered.

Moving on to the content of the *Kustantinu Hatana* compared to that of the *Sitavaka Hatana*, one finds a striking similarity in how it problematizes broken military loyalties and rebellious activity. The *Sitavaka Hatana* being a panegyric, and as such a text meant to laud the likes of Mayadunne and Rajasinha while discrediting and verbally damaging their competitors, is surprisingly uninterested in using much inflammatory language to describe rivals like the Portuguese. For the contemporary literary scholar, there have been attempts to read anti-colonial and ethnic discourses into the poem, but such a feat is difficult considering the lack of such caustic language when describing groups like the Portuguese, Tamils, Muslims, etc. The subjects that the *Sitavaka Hatana* does focus all of its negative attention toward are individuals who are shown to upset the delicate fabric of political and military loyalties between people and polities in the island. Thus, maverick opportunist figures like Vidiye Bandara, who came into the service of many different polities without keeping to any standard of loyalty between them, are subject to more scorn and ridicule in the verses than any Portuguese figure.

The way this is articulated in the verses shows how the author perceives it to be a grave

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<sup>247</sup> *Kustantinu Hatana*, p. 29.

and central problem. Alahapperuma is keen to relate one specific hallmark case, when Vidiye Bandara, having recently lost a battle against Rajasinha, eventually stumbled into the court of the king Edirimanasuriya, sovereign of the formidable Sat Korala, to ask for his support. At this point in the story he ventured into the notoriously dangerous Sat Korala only because he was denied such support from the king of Kandy, Jayavira.

838.  
The king [Vidiye Bandara] got the permission  
To leave that city [Sengkadagala – Kandy]  
And went to Sat Korala  
Where he saw the king Edirimansuriya

839.  
From the Irugal royal line  
This king was descended  
He was named Demeda Uda Kondapala  
And is king of that city by that name

840.  
That king saw him [Vidiye Bandara] immediately  
He spoke to him  
And he was granted the village Bogoda  
From that king<sup>248</sup>

Having gained the trust and support of Edirimanasuriya, Vidiye Bandara almost immediately plotted a scheme to overthrow the king and take over his entire kingdom

842.  
In that city [Bogoda] he stayed and immediately  
Found a strategy  
The king's men were told  
To kill the king Suriya

843.  
King Vidiye  
Told this to the people  
To the people of King Suriya

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248 *Sitavaka Hatana*, p. 125.

“Wreak havoc against the king”.<sup>249</sup>

Vidiye Bandara's time with king Edirimanasuriya's men finally yields results as he is said to have convinced one of the captains in the court to murder the unsuspecting king. The vacuum of leadership was immediately filled by Vidiye Bandara.

844.  
The mighty King Suriya  
Heard a commotion  
He came outside  
To stop the chaos

845.  
Soon after King Suriya came outside  
Velayudda Aracchi was violent and furious  
And by the words of Vidiye he killed him  
By which Vidiye became the king

846.  
In not understanding the wicked nature (*avagunakam*) in the hearts of the people of the world  
The king had to suffer his karma  
On that day he [Vidiye] killed the king without hesitation  
The king that helped him when he did not have a place to go<sup>250</sup>

The author reserves special language to describe the actions and nature of people like Vidiye Bandara as “depraved” or “wicked” (*avagunakam*), whereas such insults are not launched at the fiercest Portuguese rivals. Such damning statements however did not prevent Alahapperuma from acknowledging that Vidiye in some way took the throne in the process no matter how depraved his actions were.

Alahapperuma also relishes in describing the punishments that such people receive when finally the karma of their actions comes back to them. This is the case when Alahapperuma

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<sup>249</sup> *Ibid*, p. 126.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid*..

describes the eventual demise of Vidiye, who on losing subsequent battles is once again traveling into every corner of the country looking for more support for his ventures. This leads him to travel further north into Jaffna and the Tamil country (*demala rata*); however by then the news of his betrayal in Sat Korala had spread, which triggered a violent response from the people there.

932.

To the beautiful Yapapatuna [Jaffna]  
He immediately went to Narakuliyana  
And stayed with the people in that place  
When some tough Tamil men came

933.

“King Vidiye has come from the Sinhala country (*sinhala rata*),  
It is said that he has wreaked much havoc in that country,  
He has done wickedness and evil (*avaguna napura*) in every country,  
Why have you come to this country [Jaffna] now?”<sup>251</sup>

The group of Tamils ultimately decided that Vidiye's intentions in coming into Jaffna were not good, and the group immediately attacked and overpowered the smaller group of Vidiye Bandara and his supporters, and he was finally killed. The entire affair and the discomfort that Alahapperuma generally felt on the subject of disloyal activity compels him to dedicate a few verses in the form of a treatise against such activities. The tone is highly moralistic and claims such disloyal dispositions are detrimental to the moral fabric of the island.

923.

Things were done to protect the country  
To stop people from harming others  
As long as the sun and moon go around Lanka  
Nobody from now on will do any harm to anybody

924.

If the people that have helped you are not considered  
Then a great trouble will befall you  
It was told in all of the country for everybody to know  
As the drum-beating messengers were sent across the island of Lanka

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<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193.

925.

When considering the words of vicious evil people (*asatpuruśa dujana*)  
Such harm is done to every king  
Those people that happily take the luxuries of others  
And who plot such strategies will not exist in this world

926.

King Vidiye faced certain problems  
The king of Irugalsuriya helped him  
Vidiye killed the king  
Thus the same happened to Vidiye.<sup>252</sup>

Moving on to Alagiyavanna's contribution, the problem of disloyalty is not only found in his poem, it is reproduced in the exact same way using the same forms of rhetoric. Such a connection is not considered by other scholars that have examined the poem, nor is the discourse of military disloyalty of any concern as a subject. In a recent monograph on the subject of Alagiyavanna's writings, Stephen Berkwitz has mostly been drawn to the poem because of the ambiguity Alagiyavanna has of his religious affiliation, where at times he honors Christian themes and at other times Buddhist ones.<sup>253</sup> Of equal interest for the scholar is Alagiyavanna's position on the Portuguese occupation, where the poem, in the form of a panegyric, is not dedicated to some Sinhala king or kingdom, but is instead made for the "colonial" Portuguese Captain-General of the period, Constantino de Sá de Noronha. It is an over-emphasis on these themes of colonial domination and its influence on religious disposition that has occluded a central tenet of Alagiyavanna's work: the problem of military disloyalty.<sup>254</sup>

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252 *Ibid.*, pp. 137-8.

253 See chapter 6, "Identity and Hybridity in the War of Constantino" in Stephen Berkwitz, *Buddhist Poetry and Colonialism: Alagiyavanna and the Portuguese in Sri Lanka* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 163-201.

254 Berkwitz has claimed the moralistic rhetoric against rebels such as António Barreto in *Kustantinu Hatana* comes out of a general Buddhist requirement of achieving merit, and the lack thereof in the specific case. In all, the tone shows that the rebel had not done what was necessary to elicit legitimacy, which contributed to his karmic defeat. See: *Ibid.*, pp. 198-9.

*Kustantinu Hatana* was written at a time of major military upheavals caused not by rival kings based in territories, but instead by different captains and generals once under the patronage of the Portuguese. These figures all had similar trajectories once they left the Portuguese military ranks, they ventured into the interior to rally support and compose their own military forces in order to challenge all power-holders of the island. Thus, the poem reflects the centrality of this problem in this period as the Portuguese saw it, the problem of the inciters of “rebellions” (*perali*), a term developed by Alagiyavanna to account for the concern now felt by military officers of the *Estado*. The specific subject was the movements and activities of one such rebel, António Barreto.

Barreto becomes the subject of the poem by the eleventh verse, and is immediately ridiculed by Alagiyavanna, who claims the general had a natural predisposition toward rebellious and disloyal activities. At this point in the story he explains how Barreto went into Kandy, under the guise of seeking support, and disingenuously hid his intentions to eventually subvert Senarat's power.

12.  
The soldier Kangara  
When he made rebellions (*perali*) in the island  
He [Barreto] himself also made rebellions  
He [Barreto] entered the great Senkadagala [Kandy] and did this.

13.  
In the company of the rebels (*peraliyan*) of Lanka  
He saw the up-country king  
And he showed [the king] good qualities (*suguna*)  
He did not show any of his cunning qualities (*kapata gunawaka*).

14.  
From the up-country king  
He received Uva Tunkinda  
While he stayed in Badulla

He produced weapons and collected soldiers.

15.  
[He was also given] two parts of Vellasa  
And Madakalapuva and Panama  
And Kandukara and Kosgama  
And Vallava and Etaravava

16.  
Other countries besides these  
He captured for himself  
His cunning troops  
Went to war for the Saparapura [Sabaragamuva] camp

17.  
Denavaka Pas Rata  
Matota and Balava  
Kukula Pasyotna  
In these areas chaos and rebellions were made (*avul karamin sadā peralit*)

18.  
He had hatred for the up-country king  
Who gave [to Barreto] positions to a great extent  
[Barreto] took different types of weapons  
And entered [Kandy] with a great number of people.<sup>255</sup>

At this point Barreto sacks Kandy and causes its ruler Senarat to vacate temporarily. Afterward, Barreto moves on and attempts to establish his own territory with the resources and military personnel he had collected.

27.  
Antony Barretu  
And the rebellion ministers  
And the leaders of nearby areas  
All came together, each united and with one mind (*ekva ununun vemin ekasit*)<sup>256</sup>

By the end of the poem, such ambitions are shattered by Sá, who hunts down and defeats Barreto with the help of the military support he has received from another set of *disavas*. After this clash

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255 *Kustantinu Hatana*, pp. 22-3.

256 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

is narrated, the entire episode and the treatment that Senarat was subject to, having been betrayed by Barreto, is rehashed and commented on by Alagiyavanna at the end of the poem. Much like Alahapperuma, Alagiyavanna casts Barreto's propensity to betrayal in a morally reprehensible light. He also explains how kings and other leaders should be generally cautious of trusting those people that have similar qualities, as many seemed to have at that time.

160.

As a cunning person filled with mendacious qualities (*asat gunayan*)  
If you listen to Barretu  
The disaster faced by the good king Senarat  
Will soon happen to you as well

161.

The great King Senarat who has come forward and gave great gifts  
Based on the words of the man named Barretu with wicked qualities (*gunamanda dudanā*)  
You have come here to suffer my dear king

162.

“Accepting the words of wicked people  
Destroys great people”, it is said from earlier times  
By listening to minister Barretu’s words you faced disaster  
This is what was experienced

163.

The impure words told by Antony Barretu  
Dear king you listened to those words and you were destroyed  
Kings who are wise, meritorious, and famous  
How could these kings listen to the words of such wicked people?<sup>257</sup>

The *Sitavaka Hatana* is of both literary and historical importance to the *Kustantinu Hatana*. In the area of literature, the latter poem borrows some stylistic elements from the former as shown above. However, one cannot assume that a borrowing of such elements is merely based on a choice that can be narrowed down to literary sensibilities. The conventions, such as the expedition narrative and treatises on disloyalty, had great purchase in the time that the

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<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

*Kustantinu Hatana* was written as it did for the *Sitavaka Hatana*. Similarly, on a historical level, the *Sitavaka Hatana* helps to explain the environment that the *Kustantinu Hatana* was written in, a time soon after the major military power of Sitavaka ceded and helped to expand a kind of military service market, which had many demands placed on it during the sixteenth century. In this environment, the ability to make a play for power became easier because of the availability of manpower, which thus inspired those more ambitious people to leave their positions under their patrons whether they be Asian or European. The entire political and economic structure set the basis for a climate of distrust and “rebelliousness” that is well articulated across sources.

#### *FILIFE DE OLIVEIRA AND THE MAKING OF THE CONQUEST OF JAFFNA*

The *Kustantinu Hatana* captures in the *prashasti* form the powerful position the Portuguese Empire enjoyed in the island in the second decade of the seventeenth century. As mentioned above, the panegyric form is primarily dedicated to the Captain-General, Constantino de Sá de Noronha, but it also makes special mention to the set of campaigns in the interior of the island conducted by other generals, one such being Filipe de Oliveira. Oliveira would become better known for later winning a key battle that resulted in the conquest of the mainly Tamil speaking area of the north, Jaffna (*Jafanapatão*), in the summer of 1619. Since the *Kustantinu Hatana* was written before the event in question, no information is found regarding it. However, it covered other battles that Oliveira was involved in, namely his fight alongside a native general, Luís Teixeira, in the region of Sabaragamuva against the rebel apostate António Barreto, and his South Indian migrant ally, Mayadunne. It is useful as it generally described not only the battle but more importantly how they prepared for it and what they did in its aftermath.

Of the great powerful Frankish military leaders  
Pilippu doluvera was the Captain-Major  
And the shining Luwis Tisera was a high military leader  
And powerful officers and an army were recruited.

168.

They hid in the jungle on the side of the road while the enemy army was coming  
In different places they put up different officers and soldiers with big hearts (*latara*)  
They allowed the people and the king [Barreto] to come that way  
Like two gold mountains they were waiting at Lellopitiya.<sup>258</sup>

At this point, Mayadunne entered the scene accompanied by thirty *mudaliyars* and a powerful army; however, they were no match for the army put together by Oliveira and Teixeira who hid amongst the thickets waiting to ensnare them as depicted.

170.

Like a huge school of fish caught in a huge net  
Like many frogs entering a world of snakes without warning  
Like fireflies jumping into flames to die  
The enemy army came like demons.<sup>259</sup>

Violence ensued and the brutal battle ended in victory and the key generals that supported Barreto and Mayadunne were captured.<sup>260</sup> What then happened fits into a convention used in all *Hatana Kavya* as explained earlier, where the verse goes into post-battle awards, where titles of villages and other gifts were given to the *mudaliyars* relative to their specific activities.

181.

The troop who won the war  
According to their position  
They were given the ownership over villages and lands  
[Oliveira] was assigning titles to certain people.

182.

Like a glorious king  
Pilipu deolivera

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258 *Kustantinu Hatana*, p. 42.

259 *Ibid.*.

260 *Ibid.*, p. 43 - vv. 177-8.

He is content  
And is distributing gifts to each of the soldiers.

183.  
His excellency  
The famous and glorious Luis Teshera  
He gave beautiful titles, positions, and villages  
To his troops without end.<sup>261</sup>

In the poem, though no special details (i.e. dates, places, and numbers, etc.) are offered, one can still get a general outline of the process of organizing a battle, where it was explained that there was a recruitment phase immediately preceding the battle, and then a land-granting phase by the general after the battle was finished. When read on its own, one could easily ignore the set of verses as they seem mundane; appearing as if they were a typical literary convention that is repeatedly used to describe the many battles, real or fictional, that are said to have taken place. Though we do not have much information from other linguistic canons that account for this particular battle which could be compared with that found in this Sinhala source, there is a significant amount of information in the Portuguese administrative archive that details Oliveira's most noteworthy battle, the one that led to the conquest of Jaffna. Assuming that Oliveira did not change his general approach to fighting battles and managing military personnel, I will assess the material available on the conquest of Jaffna to sketch out a case in which the expedition, though conducted in a way where the outcome was never certain at any given time, is extremely useful as it details a case that could be considered to be successful for the Portuguese.<sup>262</sup> This rare

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261 *Ibid.*, p. 43-4.

262 This episode of the conquest of Jaffna is sketched out in Abeyasinghe's short work on the subject of the Portuguese occupation there; see: Abeyasinghe, *Jaffna Under the Portuguese* (Colombo, Lake House, 1986), pp. 3-10. Abeyasinghe's recounting of events, as read from the Oliveira account, is schematic as it smooths over certain important details regarding the awkward manner by which the conquest was achieved. Specifically, he scratches over the difficulty Oliveira had in finding troops as well as the money to pay them leading up to the decisive battle.

example provided from the breadth of material helps us to clearly assess what is actually necessary for a battle to be successful, from which we can identify the extent to which the rhetoric of lament and despair voiced in depictions of failed battles, most notably that of Sá in Randeniwela, can be separated from the key challenges that face all military generals, whether European or Asian, in their pursuits. Besides this, examining the following materials shows the coherence of what is detailed in the *Hatana Kavya* on the subjects of recruitment, issues of loyalty, payment, and land granting.

#### *Background of the Political Differences that Led to the Expedition on Jaffna*

The story of the takeover of Jaffna, amongst other things, called into the question the notion of there being clear cut sides to the conflict between the Portuguese and the Sri Lankans. Specifically, the combined reading of the documentation never leads one to believe that one's so-called origin (i.e. national, ethnic, religious) would coincide with the side actors were expected to be on (i.e. European or Asian). The story as such revolved around a high-caste *vellala* Tamil, Sankili, who over his career had many different relations with the *Estado*, and where early on he was sought out as an ally and vassal who was meant to administrate the region. Sankili came into power in 1617 as a member of a noble family by killing the rival claimants. The *Estado*, which perceived that he was grabbing power in the region, moved to form diplomatic relations with Sankili over the other potentates. The best opportunity came in 1618 when, in October, news came to the State Council in Goa that Sankili had been threatened by some *mudaliyars* and found himself in need of Portuguese military support.<sup>263</sup> At this time the council had received this news and requests for support by way of some letters written by Sankili's trusted advisor, the

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263 *Estado*, Vol. 1, pp. 11-4.

commissioner of the Franciscan mission in Jaffna, Frei Pedro Betancor.

The letters read in the council explained Sankili's predicament and the events that had preceded it. It began with two *mudaliyars*, one being identified only as “Dom Luís” and the other only identified as the “Modeliar branco” (the white *mudaliyar*) who made attacks against Sankili and tried to kill him “three of four times”.<sup>264</sup> The *mudaliyars* had the support of some *casados* and other Portuguese inhabitants in the region. The Captain of Mannar was called to assist but the uprising that resulted was too difficult to contain, where soon a group stormed the royal residences, looted the premises, and set fire to them. Sankili was forced then to seek protection in the Franciscan church, where he also took some of his immediate family members soon after, and the group came under the protection of the head priest. The council ultimately decided that they would capitalize on the situation by installing Sankili in power in the region as their representative, and where military support to defend his place would be offered by the Captain of Mannar, who would become the Captain of Jaffna as a result. With such a person in power, the Portuguese could expect revenues, mostly from elephants, and a strategic location from which a fortress could be built to establish authority that could reach the eastern part of the country and effectively challenge Kandy.<sup>265</sup> The viceroy soon asked for a large armada to be assembled by captains from Cochin and São Tomé to be sent to support Sankili.<sup>266</sup>

Regardless of the support given by the *Estado*, Sankili soon started to renege on his agreements by the following year. In May 1619, information started to come into Goa that he had begun developing political and military alliances with some regional actors, namely a renegade

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264 *Ibid.*, p. 12.

265 *Ibid.*, p. 13. *DRI-LM*, Vol. 5, p. 195-6.

266 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 5, p. 196.

from Malabar named Dom Pedro. Additionally, according to some information the *Estado* received, Sankili was forming an army by recruiting *vadugas* (*badagas*), or Telugu warriors, and having them patrol the Palk Straits in small ships (*parós*) in order to challenge the authority of the Captain of Mannar.<sup>267</sup> The request was made by the viceroy to send an armada to block these *parós* and to capture Sankili, which he asked Constantino de Sá to consider. In addition to what the Captain of Mannar wrote to Sá about Sankili's recruitment of *vadugas*, it was an added concern for Sá that Sankili had not delivered on promises to provide revenues from elephant sales. However, he also noted that the Frei Pedro Betancor was equally to blame, as they had together promised to send 3,000 *patacas* if the Portuguese would overlook their being involved in the elephant trade.<sup>268</sup> Besides this, Sá considered the potential threats from other groups that had animosity toward the Portuguese, including the Dutch and rebels such as Mayadunne, who all observed the weak political state of the region and would have considered conquering it for themselves. Sá ultimately believed that the combined dangers required an immediate and full scale action.

Sá planned an assault that would be by both sea and land; he sent a request to two armada captains to send a fleet by sea and issued an order to Filipe de Oliveira, who was the Captain Major of the Field (*capitão mor do campo*), to organize the land component. Sá's directions also included some information about what Oliveira should expect and the immediate demands that he should make on Sankili.

And so that the business of the *parós* is to be concluded you will ask Changaly for the money made from the elephants, and that he deliver the Badagas that were put in the island, as this breaks the contract of the conditions that make him governor. And in case

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267 *Estado*, Vol. 1, pp. 44-5.

268 *Estado*, Vol. 1, p. 52.

that he is not satisfied with this, then you will use arms until he is captured or dead.<sup>269</sup>

Besides this, Sá gave some details on strategy that merit some attention. Specifically, Sá notes Sankili's apparent weaknesses that needed to be accounted for by Oliveira if he expected to conduct a successful expedition.

He [Sankili] does not have any money to pay soldiers, to get supplies, or buy rice for the winter besides those proceeds from [the sale of] elephants, and this is one of the reasons where it is advisable for you not to come without some money because the Lord Viceroy told me that he cannot help me with anything.<sup>270</sup>

For the expedition to happen it had to be fully funded by Oliveira himself, by credit, or donation. This special challenge added an interesting set of twists to the narrative that Oliveira would provide.

#### *Oliveira's Account of the Conquest of Jafanapatão*

Oliveira begins his account by generally explaining that the conquest was an act willed by God, considering especially how such little of the royal treasury's money, and the resources provided therein, were expended.

God by his mercy put the matters related to this kingdom of Jafanapatão in order at a time when Changali had the most secure possession of it. [Sankili] with the many friends he made hid the truth from Your Lordship, committed many notable acts of tyranny, and punished the natives (which their sins merited [regardless]). The project [of the conquest of Jaffna] has been a suitable one for the service of His Majesty, and has been desired and intended by many Viceroys, but it could not be conquered due to the many difficulties that impeded the process. It appears as though God has [now] willed this, since in the time of Your Lordship, the conquest has been concluded, and moreover, with such a small expense to the royal treasury, without the need of an armada, and with much credit [to you]. It occurred in the following way.<sup>271</sup>

From here, Oliveira begins to describe the source of the conflict, that being the transgressions of

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269 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

270 *Ibid.*

271 *HAG-Fazenda*, No. 1159, f. 147v.

Sankili, and the immediate steps taken by Sá to dislodge Sankili from the region. As Oliveira explains, Sá's initial measures unfortunately fell flat, leaving Oliveira with very little in the way of maritime support.

The *paros* entered into this coast [Palk Strait] as said by the order of Changueli, and by that order they made countless thefts, landing in other islands [in the strait] until they came and landed in the harbor [here]. Such an act of aggression was not witnessed before, which prompted the Captain of Manar to notify the General, who asked him for support by land and sea to cast these enemies out. Since Constãtino de Sá de Noronha is not invested in anything else besides the service of His Majesty [...] he had sent two galliots that were in Columbo that came from the south, one belonging to João da Silva, and the other to João Madeira. With great pleasure both people offered themselves for the expedition at their cost, and [Sá] put many soldiers into the expedition, as well as important people that were based in Malvana. Besides this, [Sá also put in] more than 40 Portuguese that he had sent with Vitorio d'Abreu, a *casado* of Ceilão, who were on their way to Batecalou. All of these people were brought together along with the Captain of Manar to deal with the *paros*. With this [military] support, and with the *tones* that [Sá] organized with his men, he put to sea an armada that had the ability to fend off the greatest amount of enemies there were. But, our sins and lack of organization made it that the *paros* came close to the Captain, and they thwarted and killed almost all the people in the *tones*, which was a great discredit to us. They could not be helped by the galliots as they had a counter-wind, and the galliots did not go back out to sea. What could have been worse is if the *paros* also fought against the Captain, and if they killed him, since the fortress of Manar was left ill-provided.<sup>272</sup>

Next, Oliveira explains the initial challenges he faced that nearly ended the land component of the expedition before it even reached as well.

The Captain-General gave the regulation and the order of Your Lordship, then saw me off before the galliots left. [After which] there occurred a thousand problems, as the main Captains fell sick on me, as well as many Portuguese and natives, from an illness that made for a countless number of deaths. I too let blood six times.<sup>273</sup>

He goes on to explain how regardless of this loss in men he pressed on to Jaffna, where he found the Captain of Mannar in a precarious state with very little in the way of resources. Oliveira explained that he took matters into his own hands to drum up a fighting force to replace the one

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272 *Ibid.*, ff. 147v-8.

273 *Ibid.*, f. 148.

he lost in order to withstand the aggressions of Sankili.

But, once we went on course and left the limits of the Seven Corlas all of us felt better. I arrived to this kingdom [Jaffna] where I was well received by the Captain that was at the harbor with only men from Ceilão [non-Tamils] and a few others. With the two galliots in view of the *paros*, [the latter acting] like great victorious lords of the sea, the Captain had lodged himself in a nearby island so as to be in proximity to the arrival of some ships that he said he was expecting from Negapatão. I embarked in them [when they arrived] and passed to the opposite coastline where the church of [Jaffna] was with only those soldiers [that were available]. Changueli tried to impede the passage with black troops, driving away the sailors from the ships, which he aimed to do considering the tyrant he was. He attempted to recruit all the men of war he could first. Thus, given that the sea-crossing was more than a league long and I had only a few ships, with a great amount of effort I recruited an army in eight days and in which came 3,000 *chingala* men of war, and besides these 1,500 coolies, and other hangers-on, children of the soldiers, and others that came to pilfer. For all these people 15 *candils* of rice was spent every day. I brought seven Captains, much fewer people due to the illnesses that I told Your Lordship about. Regardless, I had then more than 150 [Portuguese] soldiers.<sup>274</sup>

The description of troop recruitment here corresponds with other documents and even information in the *Hatana Kavya*, where native troops were recruited during the expedition in question. This rare description is also useful in that one gets a picture of the fighting force that would go on to claim victory for Oliveira, where a whole slew of people associated with the soldiers (i.e. family members, associates, and other random people) traveled along with the soldiers and subsisted off the rice ration that made up the soldier's payment.

Oliveira then went on to explain the diplomatic interactions he had with Sankili and the manner in which he initially agreed to certain demands, but then how he progressively became less cooperative and even aggressive toward Oliveira's men. Oliveira even explains how Sankili attempted to bribe Oliveira to leave him to his devices.

In these days I communicated the regulation that I brought for Changuely through third party intermediaries, since in no way did he want to see me. According to what he says, those that he supports put him in as their leader. The Captain of Manar wrote [to Sankili] saying that only the Captain could manage the matters of this kingdom, as Your Lordship

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<sup>274</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 148.

gave the order, and in the exchange me and my army were given no recognition. Regardless of this, at the onset he paid better deference to the requests of delivering the Badagas and the King of the Careas (who brought Madune into Ceilão) and that he would not default on payments from the sale of elephants. However, confusions and mistrustful actions were steadily increasing without me knowing it. Then he resolutely responded that he would give me 2,000 *cruzados* as a bribe in order to allow for the Badagas to land in the region, for the King of the Careas not to be delivered, and only give the money made on elephants where possible. He completely went off step by forming a lodging with all the preparations of war. Going even further, he put some guards on me, who captured and beat some of my *lascarins*.

Given Sankili's persistent acts of non-compliance and even aggression, and without the resources or money to launch a battle against him, Oliveira accepted the counsel of a friar, who implored him to take the bribe Sankili had offered, however with the intention of providing a funding basis for an assault.

Seeing the course that this man had taken, it was the belief of the Father Rector Friar Antonio de São Bernardino, a great servant of God and zealous to the service of God and His Majesty, that I accept finally [from Sankili] the 2,000 *cruzados* to cast out the main force, with which I would have money for the soldiers' payments that I brought without any wage, and to help in buying the supplies needed for this army.<sup>275</sup>

With the soldiers paid, and given Sankili's continued lack of cooperation, Oliveira began to prepare his army for an assault. As can be read from the description, Sankili's soldiers launched a first strike against Oliveira's force which was taken offguard, but where the discipline and loyalty of his troops versus those of Sankili was a key factor in Oliveira's victory.

As I had posted the army in marching formation the enemies thought that the army was scared, which surely shows God wanted for this business of great importance to finally conclude. Sankili's troops came to attack the rearguard just as I was returning to my army, and they gave the first charge and where they killed some of my Chingalas without mine making any movement, as they had not been given the order to do so. This could have been an occasion of great misfortune had God not already accounted for the success of the expedition. As I had come to realize what happened, I ordered for them to break out of formation. I came to the army at the right time having found my men surrounded, which was then forced to attack from all sides all parts of the enemies. By which, God gave us a great and important victory, in which they killed more than 100 men, and

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<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*, ff. 148-8v.

injured others, taking many arms, and 15 muskets. Changuely was put to flight, and his own men abandoned him out of fear, and because of the little love they had for him.<sup>276</sup>

Sankili, having been abandoned by his troops, attempted to escape but was eventually tracked down and captured by Oliveira's men.

He was then forced to take to the sea; on being informed of this I went as fast as I could and reached the port that he embarked from. Two hours after he had embarked there with his sister, four nephews, a brother-in-law (who had his eyes gouged out by Sankili), some Badagas, and three people that he trusted, I told the Captain to send my men that were in the harbor with two ships to pursue them. I ordered Luis Cabral to go through the beach, and in all areas they did due diligence. God was served when my soldiers, in a vessel (*besteiro*) belonging to the Priests, managed to reach the gulf on the other coastline. As the works of God are all perfect, he does not want for those that bring disquiet to the kingdom to remain there.<sup>277</sup>

#### *Post-Conquest Military Administrative and Fiscal Issues*

With the conquest of the region realized, Oliveira noted its strategic importance, as it had been a place where native kings moved resources, goods, and people between the island and South India, as was evidenced by Sankili's activities. Conquering the region meant controlling these flows, which put the project of the Portuguese conquest of the island on a better footing.<sup>278</sup> Given that the zone had strategic and geographic importance, Oliveira offered his views on what should occur in the short, medium, and long-term, where a steady inflow of money, resources, and men were needed to provide the basis of its protection.

What I believe most necessary is that the rents not be collected along with the royal villages until the actual revenue is known, in order to determine if it is enough for the people necessary here. I will look to build a fortress in Cardiva (off the coast of Puttalam) and 150 soldiers are necessary to guard it, as well as for going into the field. It will be important for Your Lordship to send these people in August in five ships, given that the *paros* did not come from Negapatão that we were expecting, due to our sins. Also, I

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276 *Ibid.*, ff. 148v-9.

277 *Ibid.*, f. 149.

278 *Ibid.*.

remind Your Lordship that Ceilão, given this event, still remains severely lacking in [the people] it needs, since some have died and others have run away. Where it is necessary for my military company, I can get men here in Ceilão whether they be black or white, which is of greatest benefit. But, Goa could be a source of these men for this support, and it would be good if Your Lordship would help us from there if you can, where you could think about not treating Jaffna any differently from Goa.<sup>279</sup>

Here, it can be noted that Oliveira did not find the recruitment of more islanders to be a special challenge, as long as the local resources and revenues were available.

The importance of retaining such resources for local preservation is highlighted well in the next section of the document, which includes a certification approved by the chief *mudaliyars* involved in the battle, which grant the administration of the region to that group under the Crown. Though the group agreed to give revenue from the region to the Crown, that which is taken as expenses for the *mudaliyars* and *lascarins* is much more than half of the total revenue that is said to come from the area.

We the Mudeliars of this kingdom of Jafanapatão certify that revenue will go from this said land to the Crown. If there is good rains for planting, the flood-plains (*vargeas*) and forests of these villages will produce revenue worth 9,400 *pardaos*, and from this money there will be taken out every year 2,800 *pardaos* for expenses and payments to the Mudeliars, the *pagodas*, and other people. And 1,200 for tribute, and 4,500 for the *lascarins* and people of the land of this said kingdom.<sup>280</sup>

This rare glimpse into a post-conquest land agreement shows the amount of influence the native military personnel had in these situations, where in many ways they could expect to claim almost total authority over the revenues in the region, and could even think about requiring revenues go to the maintenance of non-Christian religious establishments.<sup>281</sup> With this arrangement, the

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279 *Ibid.*, f. 150.

280 *Ibid.*, f. 153.

281 This document is also reproduced in Abeyasinghe's study of Jaffna, however, he seems to have interpreted the data to claim that the economic arrangements represented a kind of "unripe feudalism" instituted by the Portuguese in the region. He also somehow grossly underestimated the payments made to the *mudaliyars*, which he claims was a one-time payment of 100 *pardaos*. This latter figure is noted without giving any corresponding reference. See: Abeyasinghe, *Jaffna Under the Portuguese*, p. 28-9.

*mudaliyars* would have left the Crown with only 1200 *pardaos*, and given such a stark difference in payment (13% in tribute (*pareas*) versus 78% going to native soldier's payments), the group pointed to other funding sources that the Crown officials could consider to supplement the fraction they made from the main fund, but which they would have to organize and collect on their own.

Likewise, there is a village in a bay that is called Madalacota (on the South Indian coast) that produces 1,500 *pardaos* that the Naique of Tanjaor had given to the kings of this said kingdom. There is also what is made in the ports of the sea, junction points, and other privileges which total close to 200 *pardaos*. Similarly there are other plantations in the interior of this kingdom that render close to 500 *pardaos*. There are some elephants that at times are found in these jungles, but not with any certainty since there is no hunt organized for them, and also there are small plots in this kingdom that come close to 100 *pardaos*.<sup>282</sup>

The end of the document bears the signatures of each of the three *mudaliyars*, the scribe, and the translator, which shows that this document was essentially of the *mudaliyars*' making.

And as everything above is the truth, we pass this certification of it to the Lord Captain Major of the Field of the Island of Ceilão Felipe d'Oliveira signed by us and made by Manoel de Ataide, the scribe of the public judiciary of the fortress of Manar. I wrote it for His Majesty on the 7th of June of 1619. Manuel de Ataide, Cavalacon Mudeliar, Manadunga Mudeliar, Puinarga Mudeliar. Estevão da Cunha, the translator.<sup>283</sup>

This rare document and the effect that it had seem to correspond to the convention of title and land granting found in the *Hatana Kavya* that occurs after every major battle. The convention in many ways reflects a historical reality that would have been all too common and expected by native military personnel.

The next section of the document includes two lists; one that is an inventory of the items of worth that were seized from Sankili's personal treasury, and another that is a tabulated list of

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282 *Ibid.*

283 *Ibid.*

each of the specific expenses related to the battle. The list of expenses here is interesting because it is solely based on the budget of 2,000 *cruzados*, the amount which Oliveira admitted he took from Sankili as a bribe, as is noted in the title.

Copy of the list of expense that Felipe d'Oliveira Captain Major of the Field of Ceilão made for the Conquest of the Kingdom of Jafanapatão from the 2,000 *cruzados* that Changuely gave to him as a bribe, which was written about to the Lord Count Viceroy. And about the credit he gave.

- The payment of 155 soldiers 1,550 *pardaos*
- Surgeons and other officers of the army that usually get payment, which total 12 people, 120 *pardaos*
- Supplies for the captains to be given to the soldiers for May and June, along with other people that receive payment being one *pardao* each person every month, which is 334 *pardaos*
- 175 *candils* of rice given until now for the sustenance of the soldiers and the black people which total 875 *pardaos*
- On the ships that the army traveled in 110 *pardaos* were spent
- On the more than 100 heads they cut the day of the battle, and for other people that did good by the people of ours that were injured, and what was given to the spies and the natives up until Changali was taken, there were spent 400 *pardaos*.<sup>284</sup>

On providing this expense report, he makes special mention to a separate list of expenses, those of which he made from his own money account, which he sent to the Viceroy separately and is thus unavailable in this document. On stating this, he emphatically implored the Viceroy to find the means of covering the expenses.

Besides these expenses that total 3,389 *serafins* at 3 *larins* a *pardao*, many expenses were undertaken from [my] salary [...] And this was done without a factor or official [to record these expenses] as there was nobody here. But, it is noted in the registers taken by the Canacapos that I brought from Ceilão, which I sent to the General to be copied, since he always conducts his office with honesty. Your Lordship should make it known which fund or which offices will take account for this money. Your Lordship should without fail and forcibly order for the expenses to be covered here, as they will go toward the continuing expenses.<sup>285</sup>

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284 *Ibid.*, ff. 153-3v.

285 *Ibid.*, f. 153v-4.

In the final part of the document, Oliveira considers the very real possibility of the Viceroy not covering the expenses mentioned, and threatened to use whatever money was available to help with the basic supply needs and military captains' salaries.

I have remarked to Your Lordship about all these things in a hasty manner to show you that grants and honors have not been made to me that I deserved, where at least I should not be paying for rice from my own coffers. Until I receive a message from Your Lordship [regarding these expenses] I will consider spending the money remaining from what Changuely gave me. And without more money I will be obligated to do the same with the elephant enterprise, where there are expectations that [money] will be delivered from their sale. The salaries of the captains have not been considered here, which have not been given to them because there was no money. Today the 8<sup>th</sup> of June 1619.<sup>286</sup>

### *CONCLUSION*

The strong connection between money and the maintenance of military and thus authority is a theme highlighted well in the Oliveira account, as above all else it helps to maintain the loyalties of military personnel who were instrumental in this regard. This is explained to a certain degree in the *Hatana Kavya* as well as detailed above, where at every moment possible revenues would be extracted from regions the kings passed through to pay the soldiers in their company. However basic a concept, such a procedure would be ignored by some generals going into the seventeenth century, most notably by figures such as Constantino de Sá. Sá, who continually had problems raising money through official channels for war expenses, skipped over this basic principle and attempted to gain the loyalty of his troops on a purely personal basis. However, such attempts proved futile and his untimely death would contribute to the passing of certain *Estado* recruitment policies that would ensure the eventual loss of Portuguese military authority in the island.

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286 *Ibid.*.

#### Chapter 4: SWITCHING CAMPS AND CHANGING BELIEFS ALONG THE CONTINGENCIES OF WAR: THE ECONOMY OF LOYALTY IN EUROPEAN ACCOUNTS

*Soldado: E cuida Vossa Senhoria que os reis não castiga Deus de suas culpas, como aos outros homens? Eu creio que, de os reis não pagarem a quem os bem serviu, permite Deus serem mal servidos de outros, que ficam bem pagos do que não mereceram.*

*Vice-rei: Isso é cousa que acontece muitas vezes, e vê o homem cada dia pelo olho. E, se Deus tarda o castigo na mesma hora, é porque em outra há-de castigar mais. Mas, deixando cousas, que só Deus pode remediar, folgarei que me digais muito amiúde o que sabeis [...]*

*Soldier: Your Lordship, do you really believe that God does not punish kings for their sins as he does other men? I believe that if those kings do not pay the person who has served them well then God wills for these kings to be badly served by others who were well-paid, even though they did not deserve it.*

*Viceroy: This is something that happens often, and one can see this for oneself all the time. And if God delays the punishment for a later time it is because the punishment will be even greater. But, moving on from those issues that only God can solve, might I ask you to tell me in great detail what you know [...]<sup>287</sup>*

- Diogo do Couto, *O Soldado Prático*

One can note a few subtle points of difference in the dialog between the soldier and the Viceroy above from Couto's work. Most notably, the usage of the concept of God differs; the soldier claims that God actually judges the merits of the king's officers and is able to determine whether or not their monetary payment coincides with their merits, and where if it does not then God himself acts by dealing the king a symbolic punishment. The soldier's concept of God

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287 Diogo do Couto, *O Primeiro Soldado Prático*, António Coimbra Martins (ed.) (Lisbon: Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 2001) p. 471.

attempts to inspire an action; it articulates an expectation that the problem will be considered and acted upon. On the contrary, the Viceroy's use of the concept of God, which is ultimately employed to change the subject, articulates hopelessness, apathy, and a general declaration of defeat; a way of telling the soldier that no action will be taken on his part or on the part of others to remedy it. This rich piece of dialog highlights perfectly how the rhetoric of belief is employed in Portuguese writing of the period to articulate the general state of matters related to the perennial issue of accounting for merit from service, and the challenges, hopes, and expectations that accompanies it.

The use of many forms of rhetoric concerning belief, which can be seen as crossing the spectrum between secular and religious themes, is quite prevalent when examining documents on the subject of Portuguese expansion in South Asia. One such specific subject where writers employ such rhetoric is the phenomenon of renegades (*arrenegados*), or those military personnel that go between different camps, including that of the enemy of the Portuguese, to offer their military services. The essay by Maria Augusta Lima Cruz on the subject, "Exiles and renegades in early sixteenth century Portuguese India", examines the concept in the context of those Portuguese who migrated further into the interior of the country and came to offer their military and other courtly services to patrons such as the Mughals or the Deccani sultanates.<sup>288</sup> Lima Cruz points out that the rhetoric of belief between the Abrahamic faiths is used when the cases of such Portuguese are documented, where writers will claim that the reason for the crossover has to do with the renegade's predilection for the faith of Islam over Christianity. But, Lima Cruz shows that at the heart of the issue is the problem of maintaining military loyalties in a political

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<sup>288</sup> Maria Augusta Lima Cruz, "Exiles and renegades in early sixteenth century Portuguese India", in *Indian Economic and Social History Review* (Vol. 23, No. 3, 1987), pp. 249-62.

environment that was in constant flux in the period, especially in the frontier areas. Also, that such rhetoric, however damning and absolute, did not preclude the said renegade from crossing back over to the Portuguese side, where in fact such renegades had wide and varied itineraries and careers, sometimes leaving and returning to a single patron multiple times.

The essay is of great use when studying similar issues of loyalty during the *conquista*, as similar rhetoric is employed when crossovers happen in the island. However, there are key differences worth noting, the first and most obvious being that there was not a sizable enough Muslim population that represented any political entity that could be seen as competing with the Portuguese in the island. Instead, gentile and pagan practices were put on the opposing end of the religious spectrum from Christianity by Portuguese writers. In some cases there were more direct references to what could be represented as Buddhism or Hinduism; however, these cases are rare, and most writers do not ever seem to make certain specific distinctions that can be made between Buddhism and Hinduism today. Most writers just used the catch-all term of “pagan practices” or “gentilities” to describe the basis of the opposing faith.

When getting deeper into the subject one finds more key differences from the picture Lima Cruz paints to that of Sri Lanka. The term used, *arrenegado* is found but only refers to those people who are considered Portuguese (Colombo or European born, *casados*, *fidalgos*, etc.) who come into the courts of island kings. These cases in which the loyalties of renegades are discussed pale in comparison to those native Sinhalese who converted to Christianity only to later come back into native kings' courts, and who are identified by the term *alevantado* (rebel). This latter term and the activity they are associated with, *alevantamentos* (rebellions), were of enormous concern to writers in the period, especially after 1630, the year when the *Estado*

suffered its most damaging loss due to the Sá rebellion, which severely damaged its military authority.

Another key departure from the Indian case is related to the 1630 rebellion, where the idea that one's religious belief connoted the loyalty/disloyalty to one or another group was not an officially held idea before the rebellion in question.<sup>289</sup> The 1630 event really sealed the association between faith and loyalty, whereas before explanations for disloyalty could be called more “secular” in their approach. But this does not mean such so-called “secular explanations” cannot be found after the 1630 rebellion; in a striking case such a viewpoint is given by a religious based in Colombo, who clearly had the capacity to employ rhetoric of a connection between religious belief and loyalty, but did not find it necessary given what he observed.

In this chapter I will examine such documents to show how, why, and to what extent belief (or disbelief) in Christianity appeared when writers documented military rebellions and cases of crossovers. I will show how the entrance and proliferation of such language in Portuguese first-person accounts signified the general sense of defeat that the Portuguese had, where the final decision to not use native island troops to conduct conquest activities marked the end of Portuguese military authority in the island. In all, instead of treating the language of religious belief as pieces of evidence from which a causal thesis can be formulated which answers the question of the nature of rebellions, I prefer understanding how these articulations

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<sup>289</sup> A contemporary historical case that shares the similar theme of the connection made between Christian faith and loyalty (or disloyalty in this case) is that of Japan in the early modern period as documented by George Elison in his monograph on the subject of the Jesuit Christian mission there, see: Elison, *Deus Destroyed: The Image of Christianity in Early Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1988). He begins by explaining how the early Jesuit led mission sought to spread the faith by gaining the favor of local lords with military capability. Some inroads were made by Jesuits such as the Italian Alessandro Valignano, however broad interest in the religion waxed and waned over the next few decades. By the 1630s it gained the disdain of the Tokugawa Shogunate given belief in the religion was associated with seditious activities, namely the rebellion formed by Christian *ronin* in the Shimbara region. According to Elison, it is the Shimbara rebellion that sealed the association of disloyalty to Christian belief, where the Tokugawa finally banned the Christian religion, the final policy known as *sakoku* was put into place in 1639.

plot out an *economy of loyalty* that is linked to the larger military economy which the region works from in this period.

*THE SHIFT IN PERCEIVED ORIGINS OF MILITARY REBELLIONS BEFORE AND AFTER THE DEATH OF CONSTANTINO DE SÁ*

Jerónimo de Azevedo's April 1614 regulation for Manuel Mascarenhas Homem, in which he described his experiences on all topics related to his involvement in the conquest of the island in order to provide a template for the takeover of Kandy, included a long section on the problem of rebellions (*alevantamentos*) amongst the native “Sinhala” troop base. The rebellions specifically refer to the mutinies and desertions that this group would commit, which appeared to be quite commonplace during his tenure there, and provided a constant source of difficulty for the organization and the conduct of war activities and expeditions. Azevedo explained that minimizing the negative impact of these rebellions required measures that were both drastic and coercive.

The people of the Chingualla nation are very accustomed and easily pass over to the enemy, and with the same ease they return back [to us]. These people that always ally with the winner for their survival are those that primarily live in lands that neighbor the enemies, and it is over these people you should be most vigilant. Those that go as heads of soldiers or villages are the ones that tend to make these about-turns, who are called *prelicarrios* there. Of these you will kill all of them and spare none. However, do not make these executions in public but at night or order them to be done by the *vidanas* or heads of soldiers, because public justice in similar cases have caused shock for other people, as they fear being blamed for the same thing. When done secretly no one asks questions about it, and they know it was an order of the King. I have ordered the killing of countless numbers of rebels (*levantados*) in the time I was in that island, and it is because I proceeded to clear these weeds from the land that Ceilão is so peaceful today.<sup>290</sup>

Azevedo's depiction of the problem explains that such movements, though generally a consequence of the untrustworthiness inherent in the Sinhala people, were primarily based on the

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<sup>290</sup> *Regimentos*, p. 43.

security issues that certain groups of native army captains had who were specifically located in places in between Portuguese controlled areas and those of Kandy. For him, the only way of dealing with the more fickle of these border *vidanas* was to neutralize them, while sending an indirect message to other would-be rebels. Such a method was not used on its own, as detailed in a previous chapter, the heavy stick was met with a healthy carrot of land granting and an open policy for such *vidanas* to outright seize lands from Portuguese renters and other inhabitants. The combination of approaches, as has been explained previously, proved to be an extremely successful formula for Azevedo, who managed to expand the territory for the *Estado* in the face of such a consistent organizational challenge.

Comments on the nature of rebellions in the island continued from this time, as it appeared to be a regular issue, but the volume of writing on the subject increased dramatically after the death of the general Constantino de Sá de Noronha at the hands of his own native troops in the summer of 1630. Along with this, new explanations abounded over the reasons why such a rebellion occurred and how it was rooted in a cultural disposition of disloyalty that all native people had. Such an explanation is found in the lengthy report on Portuguese overseas possessions in Asia, *Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas*, recorded by António Bocarro between 1634-5, in which the island of *Ceilão* makes up a significant portion of the report. In the section entitled “*a fortaleza e cidade de Columbo*”, Bocarro attempted to explain how this inherent rebellious tendency impeded the Portuguese from properly engaging with the people of the island in different capacities.

The enemy that we have in this island of Ceilão is none other than the King of Candea, with which we have always had to contend since the time he became the vassal of His Majesty, to whom he pays a tribute of two elephants. However, the peace agreement made is not kept while he continues to influence and foment acts of treachery and

rebellions, and he is always plotting and scheming [against us] without guarding a sense of faith, promises, and loyalty to anyone. It is that all Chingalas by nature are traitors and fickle, and would kill their own father for any given interest. It is our misfortune that from the time that we started the conquest in this island there were no lack of rebellions and acts of treachery, and not only by the said King, or the enemy that he helps whether that is in a time of peace or war, but also from our own vassal *chingalas*, Christians and inhabitants of our lands. It is such a commonplace thing these *perlins*, what they call rebellions, that with the same ease that they pass over from us to the enemy, they pass from the enemy back to us.<sup>291</sup>

Generally, the description does not conflict with Azevedo's 1614 assessment, aside from the fact that Azevedo focused on a specific group, those in the frontier territories, and highlighted the context of military insecurity that gave an occasion for such acts of disloyalty to occur. However, moving forward in the text, Bocarro's explanation diverges from that of Azevedo by claiming that such acts of disloyalty were not indiscriminate, and that in fact the Sinhalese were especially prone to acting out such rebelliousness against the Portuguese.

However, there is a great difference, since they are always at the ready to commit every form of treachery against us, no matter how pledged or obligated they are by the benefits they receive from the Portuguese. They are so hard and fast in their hate for us that even those that have showed themselves to always be faithful to us, and even prove it with their own life, confess that until the time they are dead and gone that they had to resist their nature and banish that hate in which they were raised.<sup>292</sup>

Though military rebellions were generally understood to be a problem for every would-be power holder in the island, and thus a challenge that island kings such as Rajasinha and Vimaladharmasuriya also faced, Bocarro was keen to explain how rebellions committed against the Portuguese were somehow distinct, more violent, and therefore more damaging. In what follows, he explains how this distinctness was based on a deep and violent hate for the Christian religion, which is explained in the context of the problem of Sinhalese who convert to

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291 Bocarro, p. 219.

292 *Ibid.*.

Christianity and affiliate with the Portuguese only to later rebel militarily, which raises questions about the nature of their loyalty at the same time as their belief in the Christian faith.

And the problem facing this matter [of the spreading of Christianity], is that it also suffers from the outcome of the said *perlins*, or rebellions, as when they renege the obedience and loyalty to His Majesty, they also renege on the Faith, or at least the obedience to God and his [ecclesiastical] ministers, by passing over to the enemies of the Faith who abhor the name of Christians. This is a great loss to the Faith, which was not enough considering the evil they have in their souls, which did not deter them from profaning the churches and holy images every time there was a rebellion, destroying them and putting them to iron and fire along with the priests in a manner in which sacred things and places appear to receive the greatest fury. Therefore, those rebels that regress from the Faith and pass over to the enemy are greater enemies of God and His Majesty than those that never took the holy water of baptism to begin with.<sup>293</sup>

The connection that Bocarro made between military rebellions and issues of apostasy became especially prominent in texts and writings after 1630 obviously given the specific case of the rebellion against Sá. Sá was said to have been involved in the missionizing of his native troops and gave certain titles and honors to those that practiced the Christian faith, and his four most trusted Christian native military captains were the ones that rebelled against him. However, in returning to Azevedo's 1614 regulation, though admittedly more rough in his dealings with native military personnel, Azevedo did not skirt missionizing duties in the armies under his charge either; he believed that making Christian converts of his own troops was integral to military management. He was even keen to boast in his regulation about the success he had in this regard over ecclesiastical ministers.

The matters of our religion and the growth of the Catholic Faith are of primary concern, and thus I believe it necessary to order you to deal with such matters in the first place. This is because the main reason that moved the King Our Lord to conquer that island was to expand [the faith] and convert the many souls that there are there, which the ecclesiastical ministers could never manage to do without the favor and help of the Captains-General. I can truly affirm that I converted more gentiles than the fathers converted, because in that island Christianity follows arms, and if the arms stay with us

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<sup>293</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 220.

[sic] then the Christians also multiply.<sup>294</sup>

In order to compare the two depictions of the problem of rebellions between Azevedo and Bocarro, depictions that represent two different times and thus two different political-military contexts, it might be useful to ask whether or not both think it was fundamentally possible to wage war with island native troops given they were consistently prone to rebel. Azevedo, though he understood using such personnel to be an extremely difficult challenge, did not believe it to be impossible, and proved it through his military success in the island. However, for Bocarro, the intrinsic cultural and religious differences between the Portuguese and Sinhalese were so profound that it would have been an impossibility. What is of great importance here, is that they both use ideas of faith in Christianity to articulate such contrary sentiments. In the case of Azevedo, he believed that loyalty, and the corresponding faith in Christianity, comes only after demonstrating a certain level of military authority. On the other hand, Bocarro's assumption works backward; fundamental connections on the basis of faith needed to be made before one could expect military gains to be obtained through them, which was generally understood by most to be the approach of Sá in his military affairs. Accordingly, both depictions represent the respective optimism and pessimism that each had given the differing levels of military authority enjoyed by the *Estado* in those two times.

Bocarro's view of the sheer impossibility of controlling island native military personnel was clearly influenced by the fact that there was already a prohibition against recruiting native island military personnel that was issued by the State Council in Goa in August 1631. As read from the meeting's minutes, the Portuguese would look primarily to people from the Karnatak region and East Africa to replace the characteristically disloyal islanders, but a larger debate

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294 *Regimentos*, p. 43.

about the reasons why islanders were prone to rebel is completely absent from the decision to prohibit their recruitment.

His Excellency, [Count of Linhares] concluded saying the issue had been sufficiently voted on, but that it would be best to take not only the Canarins and Cafres referred to in their proposal, but some 10,000 more people than was mentioned. Also, in order to put into place the will and wish of His Majesty, many Canarins should relocate to Ceilão to cultivate the lands and stay, which would avoid the use of the native people for the war given the rebellions they often make against us as experience has shown. Also, it had not been thought that the Cafres should later be freed [from slavery], but if they do well then freedom should be given to them, and those same Cafres should also be given captaincies, which would be very beneficial. For success there, one needs to recruit the most black troops possible, and even the crooks and the rotten ones need to be considered.<sup>295</sup>

Despite the declaration and decision made by the Council, Sinhalese troops were still utilized for military activity through the 1630s because of the obvious difficulty in importing others; however, the numbers recruited of such islanders was now considerably lower than before. This deficiency in the Portuguese army in the mid-1630s, along with the character qualities of those that made up the army, correspond with a description of the troop found in the Sinhala *Hatana Kavya*, *Rajasiha Hatana*. The verse described the army under the charge of Diogo de Melo de Castro on his expedition into the up-country in 1638, and makes special note of the wide foreign origins of the people in the army, and the fewer Sinhala military personnel.

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Like bulls that are drunk on toddy, opium and ganja  
There were different *kanadi* (Kanadas), *javi* (Javanese), *kaberi* (Black African) people  
who showed themselves as brave and brash  
And very tough *benkalo* (Bengalis) from abroad and sailors with bad qualities  
This army was collected with some honorless Sinhala troops.<sup>296</sup>

As seen when comparing these two texts, comments on the moral ineptitude of the new group are shared between the two. In fact, the recruitment necessary to replace the local troop base needed

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295 *Estado*, Vol. 1, p. 360.

296 *Rajasiha Hatana*, p. 38.

to be wide, where the only requirement was that they fulfill the basic criteria of loyalty to the Portuguese in battle activities, as is explained by one council member regarding recruiting Black Africans: “Domingos de Câmara de Noronha was also under the belief that it would be better if even more Cafres would be recruited than was stipulated, because they are people that do not rebel so easily”.<sup>297</sup>

*Account of Reasons for Native Rebellions by the Captain of the Fortress of Negumbo*

The documents on the cusp between the two periods, at the time of the Sá rebellion or soon thereafter, are in many ways a meeting point for the two depictions (Azevedo and Bocarro) of the form and function of rebellions and their effect on the Portuguese capacity for territorial expansion. Such a document written soon after the rebellion against Sá, the 4<sup>th</sup> of December of 1630, that dealt directly with this issue of why the islanders were prone to rebellion, comes from a writer who only refers to himself as “the Captain of the Fortress of Negumbo”, but can be identified by the name Lourenço Teixeira de Macedo in a contemporary source that also documents his successes in defending the fortress.<sup>298</sup> In a rare case, his is a first-hand account of events as seen from the perspective of a man who manages fortresses, as he mentions he had extensive experience captaining them under the direction of different Captains-General including Sá.

As the experience of the 34 years of being in this island has shown me, I believe it necessary that I should give an account to Your Majesty of the reasons I have determined that the Chingalas are so subject to acts of treachery. This is seen in the way that the fortresses of Your Majesty were lost easily and were delivered to the enemies with little or no recourse to war, as has now happened to Manicravare, Malvana, Sofragão, and Caleture. This loss puts great risk and strain on the city of Columbo, Galle, and this

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297 *Estado*, Vol. 1, p. 359-60.

298 Assunção, f. 298v.

fortress (Negumbo), which are those fortresses that have stayed under Your Majesty on the coastline after this rebellion.<sup>299</sup>

There are many rhetorical similarities between the explanations that Macedo offers and the previous examples of Bocarro and Azevedo; he pointed to a general indiscriminate sense of disloyalty, where the Sinhallas were easily swayed by basic economic returns.

To demonstrate to Your Majesty why I believe these people are so prone to rebel and have implemented their acts of treachery so many times, the first reason is that they are so inhumane to each other, where the father kills the son, the son the father, and brother kills brother, all based on the interest of the *larins* and *pardaos* that the general or captain gives them for the amount of heads that they cut off in battle. As I said, this is done without them respecting the alliance of blood or parentage and much less the obligation of friendship, no matter how great or longstanding it is.<sup>300</sup>

He also mentioned the fundamental conflicts based on religious belief, as also voiced by Bocarro.

The other is the great hate that they have for our holy Catholic faith. Regardless of the many crosses that are erected, the raising of temples and churches, and the increase of the amount of religious in the area to expand Christianity, these [natives] still practice their gentilities and superstitions for the adoration of their false non-Christian Gods. For this reason we have many conflicts between your religious ministers and them, and where acts of force are made against them [the natives], from which there is born the most intrinsic hate against our holy faith in which before anything else they burn churches, bring down the crosses, and kill all the religious that are found in the Christian ministry.<sup>301</sup>

But, besides these two interventions based on a combination of tropes available by this time, the rest of the document launches into a lengthy discussion of the political economy of military activity, which connects problems of recruitment, to land administration and revenue extraction, and then its effect on monetary budgeting for war expenses. The detailed depiction of the chain of issues aimed to ultimately explain how it was that Sá's expedition was destined to fail, which

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299 *ANTT-LM*, Book 31, f. 42.

300 *Ibid.*.

301 *Ibid.*, ff. 42-2v.

was not only a consequence of the disloyal Sinhala nature, but how this was exacerbated by the lack of access to money and resources collected before setting out on such a grueling expedition.

In the first piece of the puzzle that he fitted together, he explained how the Captains-General coax native captains of soldiers into service, through land grants, in which they assumed the total control over the goods and people contained therein.

They rise in the offices and ranks in war as Modeliares and Vidanas, which are the positions under which come the control of all the men of war, as well as the lands. Thus, from these positions that they gain through war they become rich and powerful. Based in these lands as such, which they get from the Captains-General as a great favor, they oppress those natives in those lands which they demonstrate their power and authority over.<sup>302</sup>

However, when the time comes for the treasury to begin to extract revenues from the lands in question, a political conflict brews between the *vedor*, the Captain-General, and the native captains.

After they become rich off the favors given to them by the Captains-General, the *Veedor* of the treasury of Your Majesty comes to know about these [*mudaliyars* and *vidanas*] as they need to collect that which belongs to the royal treasury because the [*mudaliyars* and *vidanas*] are in control of these areas, as I explained this was the favor granted to them by the generals. The generals do this in order to make them more loyal, because the war in this island cannot be carried out without blacks as it is very mountainous and has large jungles. What then happens is that the officials of the treasury begin to pressure the people that control the lands and show them that they do not have the power to disobey the said officials, and because the Captain-General cannot meet their complaints they come under the favor of the King of Candea, for whom they act out rebellions and treacheries for all the reasons I have already explained. [Dealing with the complaints] was best achieved by Dom Hieronimo d'Azevedo, who did the most for them and for whom they had the most loyalty.<sup>303</sup>

The success of Azevedo in regards to the appeasing of the *mudaliyars* and *vidanas* through his keeping land grants in their control and possession, is said to be an accomplishment of his that

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302 *Ibid.*, f. 42.

303 *Ibid.*, f. 42v.

effectively kept their loyalties. Macedo claimed that in many ways Sá tried to “imitate” Azevedo in the manner in which he attempted to become close and personal with the native captains; however, Sá's dogged adherence to Crown policy on land grants and his compliance to the prohibition of conducting private trade would have not served him well in the face of the challenge of retaining the natives' land grants, nor would it have helped Sá get access to quick money to buy supplies and resources necessary for the arduous expedition into the up-country, which he clearly lacked according to Macedo.

[The more experienced captains] were disgusted that [the rebels] could commit such a great act of treason that was never before committed by convincing [Sá] to go to Uuva, which was against the opinion of all because of the few men he had, because of the conflicts that Sá had with the *Vedor* of the treasury, Ambrosio de Freitas, and the little money and supplies that he possessed to undertake such a dangerous expedition.<sup>304</sup>

As seen in this comment, besides Sá's lack of personal funds, the pathway to securing official funds had been blocked due to the personal conflicts he had with the *vedor* of the treasury at that time. Macedo further explains that to provide himself with the necessary protection, Sá had to find whatever munitions he could, and in this case had to take supplies from the Captain's fortress stock in Negumbo, which the Captain explained he had bought with his own money.

When [Sá] undertook the expedition under the sole advice of the traitors, the fortresses were left in a miserable state, as I have explained to Your Majesty; the city of Columbo was left without walls, and many *casados* were enlisted to be based in Malvana, Manicravare, and Sofragão. The cost of this fortress [Negumbo], that belongs to Your Majesty, was also left to be completely run off my personal account. I only have 16 men as stipulated in the regulation and 5 officers: a bailiff (*merinho*), a scribe, a gatekeeper (*porteiro*), a constable, and a translator, and some of these do not help with war activities. Moreover, with nothing provided to me, not even money for soldiers' wages or munitions besides that which I bought with my own money, Constantino de Saa took 14 *bahars* of gunpowder and one and a half *bahars* of lead-shot from me with which he distributed to Manicravare, Baticalou, and Triquilimale.<sup>305</sup>

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304 *Ibid.*, ff. 42v-3.

305 *Ibid.*, f. 43.

Macedo continued to explain from his personal experience the inefficient manner in which the disbursement of funds from the treasury for conquest-related military activities was conducted. Once again, he was required to take on the costs of whatever supplies and munitions the fortresses required.

Your Majesty ordered me to give information about the fortresses and the items for them so that they can be charged to Your Majesty's account; about the costs of arms, munitions, and repairs which I had to buy with my own money for the defense of the fortress. Of these the *Vedores* of the treasury did not want to provide me with [the money for them], not even supplies. I sent the charges to the factor in a receipt, and he has not paid me.<sup>306</sup>

The point Macedo wanted to make in his letter was that legal standards and orders passed at higher official levels (i.e. Crown, Viceroy, or Captain-General) regarding the disbursement of funds had little real impact on how the *vedores* conducted financial matters. Such a situation impacted the disbursement of the money that soldiers would receive as wages as well, which would have otherwise been used to buy food rations for the expedition.

[The Count of Linhares], as he considered it to be in the service of Your Majesty, sent an *alvará* for the benefit of the said fortress [of Negumbo] from which Constantino de Saa made a regulation, which was necessary for its defense, and [the council] approved it for the other fortresses of Your Majesty. [Based on the regulation] they were only provided with 21 people as I told Your Majesty, and where each person is given two *pardaos* in money for the supplies of rice and fish every month. The payments of these two wages were meant to be made to the army, but were never paid no matter how much effort was made. And the same happened in regard to my own salaries, where even though the Viceroys gave me legal provisions by which I could be paid, the *Vedores* of the treasury did not want to honor them.<sup>307</sup>

Macedo reiterates that the false sense of trust Sá placed in the judgment of his native captains was problematic, because as a result he went ill-prepared for the expedition. Accordingly the author hints at the naivety of Sá: “thus, Constantino de Saa left for this expedition to the

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306 *Ibid.*

307 *Ibid.*, ff. 43-3v.

Kingdom of Uva with not enough of what was necessary, which given the experience that I had I knew would not be enough for such an arduous battle”.<sup>308</sup>

Macedo's letter to the king, which first aimed at explaining how and why the native military personnel were prone to rebel, contained the common viewpoints about the natives' cultural predisposition towards rebelliousness shared by others in that period. However, this did not apparently conflict with his larger political-economic assessment; it was his belief that the economic challenges imposed by the treasury and its officials, most notably the *vedor*, created an environment in which natives felt compelled to act out their rebellious natures. The Kings of Kandy were said to have taken advantage of this circumstance that they had full knowledge of, and looked to foment rebellions aimed at destabilizing the military authority of the Portuguese at key moments.

*THE FORMATION OF THE SÁ REBELLION AND THE SIEGE OF COLOMBO AS SEEN AND EXPLAINED BY FREI MANUEL DA ASSUNÇÃO*

The particular manner in which the King of Kandy, in this case Senarat, managed to take advantage of this weak military loyalty structure as explained by Macedo in the specific case of the Sá rebellion, is the subject of another contemporary first-person account, *Recôpilação breve das gerras da Ilha de Ceilão, e da religiam dos levãtados, morte do Geral Constantino de Sá de Noronha, e perda de todo o arrayal cõ outras cousas que sucederão* (A brief reevaluation of the wars of the Island of *Ceilão*, the religion of the rebels, death of the general Constantino de Sá de Noronha, loss of the entire army, and the other events that followed), found in the *Manuscritos da Livraria* collection of the Lisbon archive, *Torre do Tombo*.<sup>309</sup> The text, written by an

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308 *Ibid.*.

309 See reference for 'Assunção' in abbreviations page.

Augustinian friar, Father Manuel da Assunção, which he completed on the 25<sup>th</sup> of November 1630, is an organized attempt at explaining the manner in which Senarat fomented this rebellion and also planned a siege and assault against Colombo shortly thereafter. Assunção, being a religious based in the Convent of Colombo, explained that the news of the plot came to the religious personnel well before Sá went on his expedition, which then embroiled the religious of the city in the matter. Ultimately, they failed to convince Sá not to make the expedition in question.

The source is of great use as it contains an amount of detailed information regarding both the Sá rebellion and the events that followed in Colombo, and for reasons that are unclear, it has as not yet been seriously considered in any studies dealing with the Portuguese in Sri Lanka or the Sá rebellion. Another aspect of the text, which might come as a surprise given that the author is a religious of the Augustinian mendicant order, is that it at no point claims that the rebellion against Sá was prompted by motivations that were anti-Christian in nature. As can be surmised by the title of the work, Assunção does write a significant amount on subjects related to violence against religious, the destruction of places of worship, and the defacing of Christian symbols by rebels generally, but it can be seen that he never believed that anti-Christian sentiment was that which motivated the specific group of four *mudaliyars* (Aleixo, Balthazar, Cosme, and Teodosio) to conspire against Sá, which he ultimately boiled down to monetary interest. How and why Assunção as a religious, and as such a man deeply concerned with matters of faith, managed to avoid the use of such anti-Christian rhetoric can be surmised from the information he observed and read, where it is clear to him that it was precisely against the political and military interests of Senarat to be anti-Christian.

*The Framing of the Plot, the Warning Offered by God, and the Naivety of Sá*

Assunção's text is composed of eighteen chapters in which he covers a range of topics related to the rebellion and siege. He begins detailing the plot from the second chapter titled, "The designs and plots which the King of Candia used to destroy the general and all the Portuguese of this island". He opens the section by generally explaining the plot and the actors involved.

It has become my intention to show the ways in which the King of Candea found the means to foment our total ruin by either casting out all the Portuguese from this island, or ending their lives and draining their treasuries. He realized this through the most effective means, forming a friendship with the more important and entrenched black troops that there were among us, counting on the little faith and loyalty that they always had with everyone. He began by sending ambassadors to the general Constantino de Saa to make peace agreements (which always failed), and through these ambassadors he sent *ollas* to Dom Tiadosio Modeliar many times, the more central and important person from the lands of Mature, and Dom Cosmo, head of many men in the Four Corlas, and his son-in-law Dom Balthasar, also the head of some black troops in the same Four Corlas, and Dom Aleixo a valiant and cunning black, also an inhabitant of the Four Corlas. Also, the *banagua* of the general (which is the same as a secretary), Dom Manuel Rodeleim, and one of the judges from Malvana that managed the matters and demands of the natives [all received letters]. He contracted all of these people by giving them great honors and great promises, asking them to deliver the general alive and to kill all the other Portuguese.<sup>310</sup>

Besides implicating those four infamous *mudaliyars*, Assunção noted another group's involvement that is only scantily mentioned in other accounts and letters on the subject, the Moors based in the city of Colombo: "and for the Moor inhabitants of Columbo, an agreement was made by which with all the *casados* in the city dead and gone, [the Moors] would be left as the lords over the money, women, and other things belonging to the Portuguese".<sup>311</sup> The specific role of the Moors as planned by Senarat was to provide a breach through Colombo's fortress by

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310 Assunção, ff. 251v-2.

311 *Ibid.*, f. 252.

which the *mudaliyars* could enter and lay siege on the city. The activity would be directed by an unnamed “Moor *casado*”<sup>312</sup> who held a prominent position in Sá's office.

Supporting this damned council was a Moor *casado* and inhabitant in Columbo who served the general Costantino de Sa as a scribe of his *veniagas*, and he was chosen to be the captain of 500 to 600 Moors who were *cazados* in this city. He had available to him 3,000 *serafins* that the King of Candia gave as a payment to the Moors to persuade them to take arms against us, which they would do after the other conspirators had killed the general. Once the group [defeated Sá] and descended on Columbo those [Moors] together with their captain had the order that night to take all the arms there were first, then set fire to all the thatched houses that were in the city to deal with the *cazados* and other people who were unsafely sleeping in their homes.<sup>313</sup>

The involvement of a group of Colombo-based Muslims in the plot, and even their placement in offices inside *Estado*'s island administration, is a clear indication that there was no real attempt made to vacate the population from the island as the kings Philip had ordered many times over throughout the period.<sup>314</sup>

In another section of the text, Assunção narrates the manner in which the conspirators met and discussed if they should go through with the planned rebellion. Though Assunção would have had many degrees of separation from the meeting in question, it is interesting that he conveys a sense of doubt within the group that nearly put them off executing the plot, where they had to deliberate on more than one meeting to come to the decision.

In January of [1]630, the general Constantino da Sa de Noronha intended to go to Candia

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312 The idea of a “moor” also being a “*casado*” can be seen as antithetical when looking at it from the Indian mainland case; where a *casado* by definition can never be a practicing Muslim. I do not think that Assunção is incorrect here, since the social divisions felt in the island would have everything to do with who the larger players of the military conflict were. I propose that since there is no polity in the island that was challenging the Portuguese that could be labeled “Muslim” the absence of a logic of religious difference would have allowed for closer social proximity between Portuguese and practicing Muslims.

313 *Ibid.*, ff. 253-3v.

314 In February of 1627 the Viceroy, Francisco da Gama, affirmatively stated that all of the Muslims had been removed from the areas of the island controlled by the Portuguese, and that the some 4,000 that remained were in areas controlled by Kandy. See: *ANTT-LM*, Book 24, f. 4v. The statement has led some historians to erroneously state that such an expulsion actually occurred.

for the third time, and scheduled his expedition to enter it in the month of March of the same year. Those in the conspirator group were Dõ Tiadosio, Dõ Cosmo, Dõ Balthazar, and Dom Aleixo, who all met inside the city in the house of Dõ Manuel Rodeleiro to plan the method by which they could most easily put into effect their intentions. Having declared their heavy and traitorous hearts to each other, they said they would comply with the word of the [King] of Candia and that they could do it during the expedition that the general intended to make. But, as happens, amongst many bad apples a good one is found, and Dõ Balthazar said to the others, “How can we do something so terribly bad to a general from whose hand we have received so many honors?” Everyone confessed that these words of Dõ Balthazar were right, and thus they left the matter for another day, which they then completed in the house of Dõ Cosmo outside of the city after a little while.<sup>315</sup>

This narration of the meeting can be compared to others, namely that found in another cleric's account, Queiroz's chronicle, where there is no consideration by the plotters of the gravity of the matter narrated, only a violent monologue that argues for casting off the yoke of Portuguese dominance.

How long illustrious companions, shall we live as slaves to these vile Portuguese, whose harsh servitude you have borne for nearly 125 years without any other liberty than what they permit us? Is it possible that you should be so far removed from reason that though liberty is the thing of greatest value among mortals, you should be so habituated to slavery as altogether to forget it, or to despise it to such an extent, that being able to be free men and lords, you exchange your freedom for slavery, without letting the remembrance of what your ancestors held raise an honourable thought in your hearts.<sup>316</sup>

Moving forward in Assunção's text, he begins to describe the manner in which the religious of the city came to know about the plot well before Sá had made the expedition, because, by the will of God, a low-caste Sinhala, a *pache*<sup>317</sup>, who had a sense of loyalty to the Portuguese found out about the entire plot and confided it to a religious whom he trusted.

In order for the general Constantino de Sa to come to know of this treachery that was

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315 *Ibid.*, f. 253.

316 Queiroz, Vol. 2, p. 762.

317 Dalgado explains *pacha* (Sinhala - '*paduva*') is referred to across the materials as an extremely low caste group that takes on many different menial tasks (i.e. palanquin bearer, cinnamon hauler, cleaner) along with low-level soldiery service under native heads, see: *Glossário*, Vol. 2, p. 126.

planned against him, it was by the order of God our Lord that a Chingala *arache* of the *pache* caste came to discover it. He found a fair and just religious that he knew called Frei Paulino da Madre de Deus who was based in the church of Santa Ursula in Calilia as the vicar, which was 6 leagues from Columbo. He spoke to him in whispers and told him that he had a great secret to tell him. Since the priest wanted to learn of the thing of great importance, he took the *pache* inside his cell, locked the door behind them, and then told him to speak of it. And this secret which the *pache* related to the priest was that he came to know that Dõ Tiadosio, Dõ Cosmo, Dom Aleixo, Dom Balthasar, and Dom Manuel Rodeleiro were exchanging letters with the King of Candea in which it was agreed that in this expedition that the general wanted to make they would rebel against him, and kill all the Portuguese that he took with him. After this was done, the Moors were ordered to take Columbo by killing all the religious and Portuguese in the city, thus delivering the port of Columbo to the Moors for their trade, and they would remain as lords over the money, goods, and women of the Portuguese.<sup>318</sup>

The *pache* did not attempt to relate the story directly to Sá given the potential danger it could put him in, where he understood that he could be implicated in attempting to sow the seeds of distrust between Sá and his captains: “if I were to write him he would put me in irons until he knows for certain about the matter, and if the contrary is discovered he will order for my head to be cut off”.<sup>319</sup> Assunção explains that once the full details of the plot were related Frei Paulino himself began to inquire about the motivations of the *pache* for offering this type of information, which aimed to incriminate his fellow military and country men, in order to gauge its veracity.

The priest Frei Paulino seeing that the black had related a matter of great importance had asked other questions to understand better the reason he was telling him this. He asked him what the reason was that he being a *chingala* like the others, felt the need to relate such a heavy matter. He responded, “Father, I am of the caste *pache*, and thus of a low caste. I have served the Portuguese for more than 30 years as a *lascarin* and some years as an *arache*, and they have given me a village from which I live honorably. As I do not want to be an ingrate to those who have given me so many things, and if now the Portuguese were to be annihilated, I would lose that which I have because these rebels are greedy and would take my village and only leave me with a garden and a plot, at the best. It is because I am doing well and do not want the Portuguese to be defeated and leave the island that I ask you write a letter to the general in which you give an account of what I have discovered, and by which letter I can enter in dialog with him as I want to give him

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318 Assunção, ff. 254-4v.

319 *Ibid.*, f. 254v.

an account of everything I have told you”.<sup>320</sup>

Once Frei Paulino considered the circumstance related by the *pache* and judged it to be honest, Assunção explains that he initially sent a letter to Sá that did not contain the full details of what the *pache* had related, but only said that the *pache* had a matter of great importance that Sá should take heed of.

The bearer of this letter is a *pache* who is a captain and *arache* of some men who I saw in my church and who related to me a secret of great importance which I will not tell you about here as I would like to. Instead the *pache*, who should be trusted and heard by Your Grace, will relate the matter. That which is told should be heard with much care, as the matter he will relate to you alone affects the lives of all that live in this island.<sup>321</sup>

Assunção explains that after Sá received this request, and accordingly heard the story of the *pache*, he gave no weight to the claim that his most trusted captains were plotting a rebellion against him. The *pache* at this point returned to a different religious, who wrote a letter that pleaded further with Sá, this time going into greater detail about the plot, where the names of the conspirators were listed. This second letter pushed Sá to take drastic measures in order to assuage the doubt cast into his mind by the *pache*. At this point in the text, Assunção openly criticizes Sá for his apparent lack of tact when dealing with the matter, and the naivety with which he assumed the trust of the *mudaliyars*.

The general with this second notice apprehended the *pache* and told him that if it were true he would grant him many things, but if it were false he would be considered as a rebel and have his head cut off. But where the general should have inquired about the matter in secret, he instead called the rebels Dom Tiadosio, Dõ Cosmo, Dõ Balthasar, and Dõ Aleixo and told them: “My sons, they tell me that you all along with Dõ Manuel Rodeleiro have plotted a conspiracy against me and the Portuguese, and that you have been exchanging letters with the King of Candia, by which *olas* you have agreed to deliver me alive. But, I cannot believe this of you all, and I have understood well that these are the designs of the King of Candia who wants me to cut off your heads so that I

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320 *Ibid.*, ff. 254v-5.

321 *Ibid.*, f. 255v.

become the enemy of the other natives, by which the *pache* would have made it impossible to make war”. They replied, “King (what the blacks also call the generals of this island), you know His Highness well. We are loyal (*temos bem coração*) to Your Highness, and that what they say to Your Highness is because they are jealous seeing that Your Highness honors us and gives us things. Your Highness will see how at every opportunity we will give service to the King of Portugal”. The general appeared to be flattered by what these blacks said, and thus did not give any weight to what the *pache* said, nor did he rectify the issue of great importance.<sup>322</sup>

In all, the information related by Assunção shows culpability at many different levels, much like the assessment of Macedo, but it is slightly different given that this account is completely silent about the rebellion being hatched out of anything other than the opportunism of the *mudaliyars*. The symbolic significance of Portuguese dominance, or the existence of an anti-Christian sentiment is not recognized as a special motivation. What is also unique in the explanation, as especially noted in this last example from the text, is that Assunção points to the lack of tact and naivety of Sá, a rare perspective for a religious as Sá was said to have a good relationship with the clergy of the island by protecting their interests against military and administrative officers in the *Estado*.

#### *Senarat's Ola and his Use of Christian Moral Language*

Soon after, what the *pache* had described was realized, and news of it came to Colombo through an escaped *lascarín* from Sá's party. The one-time *vedor* of the treasury and newly appointed Captain-General, Lançarote de Seixas, immediately heeded the warnings that Sá had earlier rejected from the religious, and proceeded to impede the Colombo Moors from opening a breach in the city walls. He also seized wives and family members of the rebel *mudaliyars* who were still in the city. Besides knowing of the impending siege on the city from the information provided by way of the religious through the *pache*, Seixas received an open threat from Senarat

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<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*, ff. 256-6v.

to this effect in an *ola* soon after his rout of Sá had been accomplished. Fortunately, Assunção copied the *ola* in question that Senarat wrote into his text as well as Seixas's response, which reveals how Senarat possessed an ability of articulating his attack on Sá through the use of rhetoric popular with the Portuguese, which carried strong Christian moral and ethical arguments. He claimed that Sá had committed injustices against the king that merited the punishment of a Christian God, where God himself is said to have used the rebels as his instrument of justice. Senarat's *ola* is as follows.

Lord Captain General, the vicissitudes of war are many and fortune is not always obliged to favor wrongs and injustices, which were done regularly to me by Costantino de Saa. He entered my lands and disturbed my vassals, thus breaking the peace terms and agreement that Dom Nuno Álvares Pereira, the general of this island, had made in the name of the King of Portugal, to whom I gave tribute in order to live in peace and friendship with the Portuguese. I asked him many times in the name of Jesus Christ, the God whom you serve, adored by the Christians, and in the name of the Virgin Lady of the Conception his mother, to leave me be. He did not do this and instead regularly made war against me. And as God saw the little reason he had, God willed that those who Sá had honored and enriched sold him out, leaving Sá defeated and dead. He is the sole reason on account of which so many Portuguese died and were taken captive, and as such, he will have to give a long set of explanations to God. At present what is suitable for you all is to come into my party and deliver me the city of Columbo where I will leave you and the other inhabitants to be my tributaries, as is done with those that live in Negapatão under the Naique of Tamjaor.<sup>323</sup> And if you do not want to enter into this agreement with me, I will be forced to take to arms and with them punish you in the best manner I see fit. Today, 11 of September of 1630. The King of Candia.<sup>324</sup>

Assunção explains that the *ola* from Senarat came by way of a religious of the Dominican order who had been captured in Sabaragamuva and was given the task of sending and receiving *olas*

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323 Senarat is referring to the relationship that the Nayaka of Tanjavur had with the Portuguese settlers in the Nagapattinam region, where he required them to pay him tribute, an arrangement the *Estado* was aware of, see: Subrahmanyam, *Improvising Empire: Portuguese Trade and Settlement in the Bay of Bengal, 1500-1700* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 89. Subrahmanyam also includes a translated section on the matter from Bocarro's, *Livro das Plantas*, which conveys the forcible manner that the Nayaka collected such tributes when they were not paid outright, "he comes in person to the settlement with the great apparatus of the state, and enters into the houses of the Portuguese, and has even taken images of the saints from them, and he also wishes to do the same with the white women whom he fancies".

324 Assunção, ff. 277v-8.

between the King and the new Captain-General. Assunção described the awkward behavior of the messenger, who seemed to be in a complete state of shock.

This religious who brought the *ollas* was in a state of complete fright and hopelessness, as on seeing us he said: “It will not be possible to escape the city due to the great power that the enemy has”. He spoke to us like a man who was completely stupefied, and thus did not know the answers to the questions we asked him; he only said: “The King of Candia gave me these *ollas* and told me to bring them here, and afterwards that I take him the response from them, and he would then send me back to the city. I want to finish this business and want to come and die with all of you”. It appeared to him that the loss was certain.<sup>325</sup>

Seixas's defiant response, which Assunção also makes available, refers to the case of this religious and makes him the subject of an empty threat given that he had conceded to the request to become the Senarat's messenger at this moment. In many ways, the violent response can be read as a jibe against the Christian-style moral rhetoric that Senarat employed in his *ola* as seen above.

If Your Highness understood and knew who I was, Your Highness would not have the gall to write me *ollas* such as these. And if the bearer of these letters were not a religious, a sacred person for whom all the Christians have much respect, I would have ordered to have his head cut off in condemnation of his being a traitor to his King and his people, but since he is such a person I cannot do this. Costantino de Sa who Your Highness killed and destroyed by way of treacherous designs was much younger than me, when he was a school boy I was a captain and served the King of Portugal in his armadas. Though I served in this island before, I did not have the position I have today [as Captain-General], by which Your Highness will find that every time you come against me with arms, I will be prepared with mine to receive you. Of the injustices that Your Highness said Costantino de Sa did to you, I cannot be bothered with them now as I am occupied in collecting gunshot and gunpowder to use on Your Highness and your company. And of the base terms that Your Highness has offered me, I cannot be bothered with them. I would only say this, Your Majesty should consider well the people with whom you are keeping company, because if Your Highness says that they sold out their general from whom they received honors and grants, they will do all the better to Your Highness from whom they have received none and from whom they can receive little. On the same day, 11 September 1630. From the general Lançarote de Seixas.<sup>326</sup>

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325 *Ibid.*, f. 278.

326 *Ibid.*, ff. 278v-9.

The warning that Seixas issues at the end is telling of what ultimately all those concerned thought the motivations of the rebellion were, and the constant risk that managing military personnel at the level of generals and captains posed for all would-be power holders, whether they be European or Asian.

*CAPTIVITY, PROXIMITY, AND INTIMACY: THE PATH OF THE PORTUGUESE 'RENEGADE'*

Whether the use of Christian symbols and rhetorical arguments that Senarat articulated represented his genuine beliefs is not totally clear, but Assunção in his text hinted at his skepticism of the genuine nature of Senarat's interest in promoting Christianity in his own kingdom, claiming that such openness was yet another design (*traça*) that the King employed. The description Assunção offers in this regard is telling of at least one reason why the King, whether intentionally or not, kept an open policy toward Christianity. The specific case was Assunção's narration of the victory celebration held in Kandy after the rout of Sá was achieved.

[The *mudaliyars*] appeared in front of the King and presented him with everything, making great celebrations for the victory that they achieved against us. As the King greatly desired that they bring the general alive, he was hurt to see that they brought his head, and thus told the rebels that they had not complied well with the promise that they had made him of delivering the general alive. The other Portuguese became subject to the [King] of Candia as prisoners, which were [...] Those who were more important were sent to the king of Candea to be put in irons, but all of these were taken good care of, and it was not said they were badly treated, while the priests were given the ability to make a church and say mass (a design based on the wisdom and prudence of that [king] of Candia).<sup>327</sup>

In reading this description, it is important to note that regardless of Senarat's actual beliefs, his openness to the Christian faith represents a general openness he had toward everyone, especially Portuguese, whom he could potentially recruit as military personnel. In this case his intention of

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<sup>327</sup> *Ibid.*, ff. 269-9v.

keeping Sá alive speaks to this fact, as does his good treatment of the Portuguese prisoners under his command. The phenomenon of Portuguese becoming “renegade” and coming under the patronage of the Kings of Kandy is one that Assunção acknowledges clearly in his account, where he mentions the constant movement of people between Colombo and Kandy during times of peace accords.

During this entire time [of peace] the inhabitants of Columbo had agreements of trade with the King of Candia even as the general spoke out against how he found in [Kandy] Europeans and slaves that ran away from Columbo and followed some or another rebel that went to Candia from our lands. These were the things that happened during peace between us and the King [of Kandy].<sup>328</sup>

In military matters, Assunção mentions the specific case of a Portuguese renegade who fought in the army against Sá for the fortress of Batticaloa the year before Sá died.

Later in August of the following year, [1]629, [the King of Kandy] took an army of five thousand men in whose company there were 14 Dutchmen he had in Candea who were captured from a ship that had landed on the coast of his lands two years ago. This army was equivalent to that in the fortress at Batecalou [...] this army was taken by the two sons of the King of Candea and a renegade (*arenegado*) called Lourenço, who had a child by a Portuguese, who was responsible for everything.<sup>329</sup>

The case of the army, being composed of some Dutch and being led by members of the royal family and a renegade Portuguese, highlights how these kings captured prisoners with the intention of recruiting them for military service.

Queiroz in his own chronicle hints at the attempts that the Kings of Kandy made to recruit Portuguese as renegades during their imprisonment. But, according to him, the Portuguese being Christians before anything else, would never consent to the pagan practices that symbolized a demonstration of loyalty to the Sinhala kings, such as cropping their hair (*xendy*) and piercing

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328 *Ibid.*, f. 248v.

329 *Ibid.*, ff. 249v-50.

their ears (*furando as orelhas*). There are many examples in Queiroz's chronicle, specifically when Portuguese are taken prisoner, in which Portuguese captives were given the choice of committing acts of paganism or death, and where predictably it is narrated that all the Portuguese given this choice chose martyrdom.

On the following day the rebel sent for Phelipe Toscano and Ruy d'Eça, by whose example, as they were Captains, he intended to pervert the rest, and with fair words and generous promises he endeavoured to persuade them to become pagans boring their ears and wearing *xendy* saying that otherwise they would experience the utmost rigour. They answered steadfastly: "That not for the whole world would they abandon the Faith of Christ". He forthwith ordered them to be tied to two trees and the same warnings and threats to be repeated. He ordered his men to shoot Ruy d'Eça with an arrow, who with that fixed in him said: "Why dost thou not remember that thou art a Baptized Christian, and that thou hast sucked the milk of the doctrine of the Catholic Church? Why dost thou show a Rebel to thy Shepherd, whose sheep thou art, though a lost one? Cease to deceive thyself, for thy fury and thy sword will never avail to separate me from that flock". The enraged Tyrant ordered him to be shot on the wounds he received in the battle, and being made another St. Sebastian, with his eyes fixed on Heaven, he gave his happy soul to God.<sup>330</sup>

Queiroz's use of such dramatic imagery in his description does not occlude the fact that there are many cases in the historical record of the existence of Portuguese renegades throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century, some of which he would have been familiar with. Also, when examining such cases it is never clear that any party, the Portuguese Captains-General included, saw it as a wholly unexpected phenomenon. In fact, the more successful Captains-General like Jerónimo de Azevedo saw such figures with an eye of opportunity, since such renegades' experience in the lands and in the presence of the enemy could prove useful in many regards. Such an example is detailed in the travel account written in 1602, and published as the *Journal of Joris van Spilbergen*, a first-hand account that documents the first Dutch embassy to

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330 Queiroz, pp. 490-1.

the Kingdom of Kandy by the Dutch adventurer Spilbergen.<sup>331</sup> Spilbergen is generally keen to note the number of Portuguese and other non-island military personnel in the court of the king at the time, Vimaladharmasuriya, which included his chief *mudaliyar*, a Colombo-born Portuguese named Manuel Dias.

Near the city of Candy the General had to halt close to a river and he was accompanied by many noble Modeliars who were Captains of the King. After about an hour's stay there the King sent his chief Modeliar Emmanuel Dios and many other Portuguese whose ears had been carved attending on the abovementioned King. Our general was received there and accompanied thus to the city of Candy by some thousand armed soldiers of all nationalities, such as Turks, Moors, Sinhalese, Kaffirs and renegade Portuguese.<sup>332</sup>

Spilbergen takes special interest in the case of Dias and proceeds to recount the details of his life story that he collected.<sup>333</sup> Spilbergen explains that Dias was originally taken prisoner by Vimaladharmasuriya in 1594, a time when he came as a young soldier in the army that Pedro Lopes de Sousa commanded. Since this time, Manuel Dias is said to have resided in Kandy until Easter 1602 when he escaped Kandy to return to Colombo. Here, he came into contact with the then Captain-General, Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo, and agreed to serve as a spy for Azevedo in the Kandyan court, where his mission was to ultimately assassinate Vimaladharmasuriya. Azevedo entrusted Dias with this mission precisely because of his exposure and access.

However, though Dias committed to this request, Azevedo would have been presumptuous to assume that Dias did not have the potential to turn-coat once again. Accordingly, Spilbergen explained the hopeful method by which Azevedo attempted to secure some loyalty, by making Dias swear his allegiance on the cross.

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331 Joris van Spilbergen, *Journal of Spilbergen: The First Dutch Envoy to Ceylon*, 1602, K. D. Paranavitana (ed. & trans.) (Dehiwala: Sridevi, 1997).

332 *Ibid.*, p. 29.

333 *Ibid.*, pp. 40-1.

This double dealing of Emmanuel Dios was approved by the General Don Jeronimo, and he brought a silver cross before him and made him swear on it that he would go to Candy with five other Portuguese, namely: Christiaen, Iacombo, Albert, Primero and Ian Pererro, all three captains, and two soldiers, pretending that they had come over to serve the King, and there seek an opportunity to murder the King.<sup>334</sup>

Spilbergen goes on to explain that such attempts were in vain; when Dias finally came into the company of Vimaladharmasuriya, Dias made the king privy to the plot that Azevedo had intended against the king, along with the role Dias and the other renegades were made to play. With this, Dias switched sides yet again and in doing so organized the capture of the Portuguese that accompanied him. Azevedo came to know of the triple-cross through one of the Sinhala troops from the company, who had escaped and informed the Portuguese Captain-General.<sup>335</sup> Spilbergen notes that the maneuver paid off for Dias, and that Vimaladharmasuriya being impressed by his actions gave him the highest position in his military, considering that recent events had positively tested Dias's loyalty toward the king.

Both sides often used such tactics, and it is as a result of this that the Portuguese use the idiom “Esto Preto de Candy Sabo Muito” (“this black from Kandy knows much”) referring to the King of Candy [...]. Considering this faithful service rendered by Emmanuel Dios as a brave soldier with his intelligence and skill, the King appointed him to the high office of Chief Modeliar in place of the Kingship of Candy which had been promised him by Don Jeronimo.<sup>336</sup>

Based on the descriptions offered by Spilbergen, the case of Dias, where he went back and forth between the Portuguese and Kandyan camp before settling on a side, cannot be understood as an uncommon one. Those involved in power grabbing, if they hoped to have any measure of military power and success, had to account for the fickle character of all skilled military personnel in the island, whether they be Asian or European in origin. Such figures who aimed at

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334 *Ibid.*, p. 40.

335 *Ibid.*, p. 41.

336 *Ibid.*.

establishing authority had to understand this central tenet to warfare, and accordingly develop recruitment and reward practices that did not assume that men would be loyal to one patron throughout their careers.

A clear practice of the kings of Kandy, as read from the example of Manuel Dias and others, was to treat prisoners captured in battle as potential recruits. This explains the atypical manner of conduct that such Europeans imprisoned in Kandy related in their first-person accounts, where they consistently comment about how well they were treated as prisoners. Besides this, the accounts tell of the proximity and intimacy that prisoners had with the king, his closest officers, and even his family; where the prisoners become privy to and embroiled in some of the personal problems facing the king. Such is the case in an account written in Spanish by a man who identified himself as Antonio Martins who claimed to be writing from Kandy, where he was being held prisoner.<sup>337</sup> The letter which came to Philip on the 4<sup>th</sup> of March 1614 contained information the author thought useful for the king, which related the state of diplomatic relations that Kandy had with the Dutch.

I feel it necessary first to give a report to Your Majesty from the island of Ceylon, which the enemy Dutch intend to take, and where I have stayed and served for many years for Your Majesty, and where I have been taken captive by the Moor (*sic*) kings, with whom the said Dutch have attempted to form an alliance. It is suitable to cover that which is most important and necessary, as it would shed more light on how to aid against and prevent the maliciousness of the enemy. And it is the following.<sup>338</sup>

The information he provided tells of a recent fallout between Vimaladharmasuriya, who he identified as a “Moor”<sup>339</sup>, and the Dutch, is referring to an embassy made by Sebald de Weert. He explained that they attempted to garner a set of agreements that aimed to challenge the authority

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337 *DRI-LM, Vol. 3*, pp. 109-13.

338 *Ibid.*, p. 109.

of the Portuguese around the eastern and southern coasts in exchange for spices. However, the agreement never came to fruition because of a misunderstanding that he said occurred during the celebration of the agreement, which he narrated as follows.

While celebrating the agreement and alliance with a great banquet, which the king ordered and in my presence was given, the supreme good of our Lord God willed that the Dutch governor brought wine from their ships for the banquet, with which a toast was made to the Moor. He took great offense to this, and thus with great anger ordered to kill him and all his people that there were at the feast. Thus their taste and pretension was taken badly, and as such they sadly wept as they took refuge in the seaport, and the agreement was not put into effect at that time.<sup>340</sup>

More than anything, the information provided by Martins speaks to a certain level of proximity that European prisoners like himself had to the king's court. Martins in fact makes this point directly: “all these things I speak of at present, great and powerful Lord, I have found as an eyewitness, having been a captive in the time of the two kings. I am very intimate with Enerat Bandar, the king that is alive today, and he trusts all his secrets with me”.<sup>341</sup> Such interactions related here between king and prisoner defy the nature of relations one might expect such people to have, as this account seems to relate that prisoners in many respects were treated as guests.

#### *The Intimacy of Captivity According to the 'Jornada do Reino de Huva'*

An extensive first-person account from the period that documents the experiences of a group of Portuguese prisoners that were captured after the rout of Sá that also speaks of the intimate relations that such prisoners had with the Kandyan king and his extended family is

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339 I posit here that Martins, being a Spaniard, is merely using such an identification in order to designate the king's exclusive difference from Europeans like himself, as he had not yet come across the 'gentile' identification. This lack of clarity on the subject also speaks to the king not making any special point of identifying worship practices to establish difference.

340 *Ibid.*, p. 111.

341 *Ibid.*, p. 112.

available in a well-known text, *A Jornada do Reino de Huva*.<sup>342</sup> The text, more known for the description it contains of how the rebellion was fomented and the rout of Sá, is cited in both contemporary studies as well as older ones. For example, in the introduction of the English translation of the text published by S. G. Perera, it is mentioned that the *Jornada* is the prime source used by Queiroz in the section of the chronicle that deals with the events surrounding the failed expedition. Comparing the two texts side-by-side (*Jornada* and Queiroz), one sees that this is definitely the case, though Queiroz does not take into his chronicle the text as a whole and instead selects certain parts. When doing a comparison of what Queiroz selects to what he ignores from the *Jornada* one can identify that he has a selective interest in omitting certain information that implies that Portuguese became close with Kandyan leaders and their families and volunteered their services to them.<sup>343</sup>

When a closer examination of the text as compared to that of Queiroz is done, one finds that the story of their involvement in the political and familial matters of the Kandyans is one of the most richly detailed parts of the text. The text, originally produced in 1635, takes the form of a play involving a dialog between two actors; a soldier named Cardénio, and another named Fabrécio. The former is the experienced soldier who relates the travails and mishaps that befell

342 The original manuscript is in *Biblioteca da Ajuda*. Father S.G. Perera did an English translation with notes and introduction in 1930, see: S. G. Perera (trans. and ed.), *The expedition to Uva made in 1630 by Constantine de Sa de Noronha, Captain-general of Ceylon, as narrated by a soldier who took part in the expedition, together with an Account of the Siege laid to Colombo by the King of Kandy written by Affonso Dias de Lomba* (Colombo, 1930).

343 The sections Queiroz borrows from the *Jornada* concern mostly the story the author relates about how the rebellion was fomented, where a Tanjavur-born sword-smith named Domingos Fernandez is said to have made a false claim of kingship, as being the long-lost son of Rajasinha of Sitavaka, and attempted to garner the support of the *mudaliyars* who would go on to rebel against Sá. It is explained that Senarat substantiated these claims knowing full well that they were untrue, in order to sow the seeds of rebellious discord amongst the group. Domingos is eventually found out, but the group is said not to seem to mind and to have gone through with the rebellion regardless. See: *Queiroz*, Vol. 2, pp. 753-6, and, Perera, *The expedition*, pp. 43-8. The story as it appears in the *Jornada* is a humorous tangent the author makes in the story, and it is only a minor part of the text. This does not deter Queiroz in his own chronicle from treating the story as a key impetus to the formation of the rebellion.

him and his troop on the expedition to the latter, more inexperienced, soldier. The form mirrors Diogo do Couto's *Soldado Prático*, where naive questions that represent a public viewpoint on matters related to the events in question are clarified by the soldier whose personal ground-level experience brings nuance and depth to the often one-dimensional and sometimes clichéd questions.<sup>344</sup>

A subject of interest which the two touch on in this way is the personalities of the members of the Kandyan royal family, and specifically, their predilection toward European manners and the extent to which their religious and cultural state exudes such sensibilities. They carry on this debate as Cardénio relates his experiences first as a prisoner, then as a recruited soldier, where the contingencies and challenges he faced put him in the best position to determine the characters of the people he encountered. What is completely obvious to the reader is that those members of the royal house that Cardénio believed to have the best characteristics, more proximate to those of Europeans like himself, were those figures who paid greatest attention and care to Cardénio and his party of Portuguese prisoners.

Cardénio begins narrating the process by which he and his group eventually became renegades from the point when they became prisoners, on the 46<sup>th</sup> folio of the account. He first explains that the group were assembled in the area of Velavaya soon after they were captured and underwent a difficult journey to Kandy which lasted 15 days. On entering Kandy, Cardénio explains they were not first greeted by Senarat or his son, nor any of his male officers, but instead by the queen, his wife, and the princesses. He relates the initial encounter, painting a very

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344 For a description of the *Jornada* text along with an overview of many seventeenth century Portuguese accounts including that of Assunção, see: Flores and Lima Cruz, "A 'Tale of Two Cities', a 'Veteran Soldier', or the Struggle for Endangered Nobilities: The Two *Jornadas de Huva* (1633, 1635) Revisited", in Flores (ed.), *Re-Exploring the Links*, pp. 95-124.

favorable picture of the queen from the outset.

She spoke to us in a very kind way telling us these were the tribulations in which many honored men had passed. This thought gave us the will to better endure the disgust of our imprisonment, which we would learn to do as experience showed us. She did as she promised in relation to the negotiation of peace terms, she was the best person for the job that we could hope for. She argued our case in other ways, her words carried weight given the discreet and pious woman she was.<sup>345</sup>

From the outset, Cardénio found the queen to be the best ally amongst the royal family members given her favorableness toward the Portuguese as well as her position of authority in the court. He also explains that communication and interaction between the prisoners and the queen, as well as the other female members of the royal house, was consistent given, “they lived five leagues from the camp, and as they were idle people they came to know and understand the names, lives, and habits of all those of us that were there, and in speaking to us they were helpful and consoled us much”.<sup>346</sup>

From this point, Cardénio and Fabrício enter into a rich dialog on the subject of the character of the queen, beginning with her appearance. Cardénio's description of her face is telling of his attempt to paint the queen in a positive light: “she is tolerably beautiful and pleasant, her eyes squint where her left eye is completely closed, which gives her substantial grace”.<sup>347</sup> This labored compliment on her appearance is followed by an explanation of her place in the court. Cardénio explains that she was taken as a wife by Senarat by force, and that he was also married to her mother Dona Catarina. Despite such difficulties, the queen maintained her dignity and modesty, which is another quality in her he is keen to note.

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345 All translations were done from the original manuscript with the help of Perera's translation in some areas. I will note the folio and the corresponding page from both texts respectively. *Jornada*, f. 46v. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 54.

346 *Jornada*, ff. 46v-7. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 54.

347 *Jornada*, f. 47. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 54.

From this point, the dialog moves into the specifics of her cultural sensibilities, the subject of which piqued Fabrício's interest when he was told that she composed poetry in the Portuguese language and not "manicongo" as Fabrício assumed. Cardénio explains that she was instructed by some religious based in Kandy in Latin and Italian, and compares her to other Spanish and Italian historical women figures who had a gift for the arts.<sup>348</sup> The whole explanation left Fabrício somewhat confused as it was beyond his comprehension that a Kandyan native, and moreover a woman, had the intellectual capacity to produce such art that met high European sensibilities.

The issue was such a point of confusion for Fabrício that he again touched on the subject later in the text when Cardénio was generally speaking about native sensibilities, explaining that natives had a natural penchant for idolatry that negatively affected their ability to produce knowledge that could be useful to the arts and sciences. Based on this assessment, Fabrício demanded that Cardénio explain how such a case as the queen was possible given this ingrained defect. Cardénio somehow compensates for the case of the queen by factoring in a climactic variable.

*Fabrício:* I am in [India], and the more you tell me about how little they know in India, the more you contradict yourself.

*Cardenio:* If you are speaking of the verses, I've told you that poetry has the same qualities as music; even though it can be perfected through art, it is not perfect as an art. For poets, it consists of being in more or less degrees of warmth, so that what comes from nature can never be a science. There can well be born in Candea someone with the same temper as Virgil or Homer, who does not function because the climes might be different, unless by chance some sort of miracle happens. And all the more because [the clime] of Ceilão is temperate, and nearly opposes that of Spain [Iberia], where intellects of noble quality can infallibly be formed. That woman had nine years of lesson from an erudite religious, and did not Cicero himself in his first oration argue that there was no intellect so rigid that with art and lesson it could not be improved? What did the Queen of Candea

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348 *Jornada*, f. 48v. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 55.

do to you, that you do not wish her to compose [even] four ballads, which – even if they were in the miller’s style (*de moleiro*) -- bearing in mind who made them, and the place where they were made, must necessarily seem excellent.<sup>349</sup>

In the text of his experience as a prisoner in the upcountry, Cardénio consistently painted the queen in a positive light by weaving together many similar anecdotes, and not by coincidence, he also notes how she had been a consistent source of support for the group of Portuguese. Other members of the Kandyan elite in the story received a similar type of acclaim, with their cultural disposition being judged on the basis of the manner in which they interacted with the Portuguese group.

Moving on in the story, Cardénio details the first encounter the group had with Senarat. The group had been moved outside the center of Kandy on the order of the queen, to some neighboring villages, because the group had contracted an illness and moving them was done with the intention of making them well. When Senarat returned to Kandy, the group was also required to return, and there they spent 13 months in close proximity to the king and his court. The length of the stay is explained because, “the king aimed at keeping us content as he intended to make peace with His Majesty”.<sup>350</sup> Besides this instrumentality, Cardénio genuinely felt the king was “kind” and made friends within the group of Portuguese. Incidentally, in an earlier part of the account he gives a detailed description of the king's general character, which does not suffer from many flaws in spite of the fact he had been a Buddhist monk previously, fought against the Portuguese, killed members of the royal family in order to ascend to the throne, and married Dona Catarina by force. It is the belief of Cardénio that Senarat's overall merits outweigh the combination of his defects, and even his being a monk is made more proximate to a

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349 *Jornada*, f. 52v. I thank Sanjay Subrahmanyam for the translation of this particularly challenging passage.

350 *Jornada*, f. 49. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 57.

Christian sensibility when he is compared to a Catholic religious.

This man is absolutely the best captain, best king, and best person that the Chingalas have known. He had a gentle manner and was inclined to the letters and to books, particularly those of the science of astrology. He was an expert of other languages that are spoken in the orient and he spoke Portuguese very well. He was very generous and a friend of the poor, and above all was courageous and thoughtful, and if he was a Christian he would be held as one of the best there are in Europe. His beginnings were humble as he was a *changata*, which is the same as a religious. Once his brother Dom João ascended in the Kingdom of Candea by way of treason against Pero Lopes de Souza, he left the [monk's] habit and took possession of the principality of Huva. He was the general of the army of Candea and always fought with valor, both against Raiu (who was a king and great captain who was in this island) and Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo. When his brother died, he was in this position over the *lascarins*, and given that the queen Dona Catarina did not want to accept him as a husband [...] he first killed four or five people who aspired to be king and after this married her by force. Of those he committed this sacrilege; he killed a son from the first husband and a nephew of hers. However, he gave her three [sons] and thus paid back this death, these three being very good sons in Mathalê, Huva, and Candea.<sup>351</sup>

Continuing with the narrative of the group's experience in Kandy, Cardénio explains how the group soon fell out of favor with some members of Senarat's court which led to an altercation where the Portuguese had to seek refuge in nearby jungles. However, Cardénio is clear that no fault could be attributed to Senarat, who did his best to quell the situation albeit unsuccessfully.

Cardénio explains that the problem with Senarat's officers began when a prisoner whom Senarat was friendly with began appearing in public in haughty attire, wearing the suit of a general instead of the simple "mourning" attire that the prisoners customarily wore. Two "chief captains" in the court took offense at this gesture and began criticizing the king, claiming that he was overly favoring the group of Portuguese.<sup>352</sup> Further criticism within Senarat's own court abounded, which forced him to depose an *adigar*, or chief administrative officer. Senarat, in a manner of apology to the aggrieved prisoner, assured him that no harm would come to him while

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351 *Jornada*, f. 27v-8. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 33-4.

352 *Jornada*, f. 49v. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 57-8.

in Kandy and encouraged the prisoner to be more friendly with the officers of his court. However, the prisoner met such good graces with unworthy behavior; he plotted to sow the seeds of discord between the king and his son Maha Astana, later Rajasinha II: “they embraced, however underneath this embrace, the aggrieved hid a treachery worthy of a weak man being the half-breed (*meyo mulato*) that he was”.<sup>353</sup> He told Rajasinha that there were some men from Colombo who had “entered the prince's house”, which highlighted the liberal policy of free movement the prisoners had in Kandy. This prompted the prince to attack two some days later, killing one of them. The whole event left the family in tumult, due to the fact that the murdered Portuguese prisoner was a lover of one of the princesses. The princess in question blamed the king for the death, which led to a dramatic physical confrontation between the princess and Senarat.<sup>354</sup> It is also said that the princess eventually arranged for the prisoner who incited the act of violence to be poisoned.<sup>355</sup>

In the next phase, the group comes into contact with the son of the queen, “the Prince of Huva”, who was sent to assist the group while they were exiled in the jungle due to the debacle involving Rajasinha and the Portuguese prisoners. Cardénio explains that the prince had recently fallen out with Senarat over his inheritance, as the king planned to pass over the kingdom to Maha Astana, and under the advice of the queen, the prince sought the military support of the equally desperate group of Portuguese. The group hastily conceded to the arrangement, were accordingly armed and charged with leading the entire army, composed of native soldiers who had only recently been on the opposing line of battle with the Portuguese group. Under these

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353 *Jornada*, f. 50. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 58.

354 *Jornada*, f. 50v. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 57-8.

355 *Jornada*, f. 51. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 60.

circumstances, the group came to intimately know the personal character of the prince, who Cardénio paints as a man with a mix of good and bad qualities that show themselves as they proceed on the course of an expedition out of Kandy.

As I said, 20 of us entered into his army, and it cannot be denied that we were much more at ease that night than the five that we were in the jungle. At dawn they led us to his presence, where he soon showed the little prudence that his mother imparted to him in this world. Without waiting for our business to be dealt with, he gave us a long list of complaints that he had against his father, which was the reason he began to think about passing over to the service of His Majesty [King of Portugal].<sup>356</sup>

The group seeing this opportunity encouraged the prince to move to Colombo, and even attempted to facilitate the process by drafting a paper for the prince that contained terms of allegiance, one of the points being that he would assist the Portuguese in killing his father. This point unsettled the prince, as he claimed he did not want to contribute to his father's death, but only wanted the Portuguese's support in establishing an independent kingdom under his control. The oratory of the prince as Cardénio presents it, and the positive response that the group of Portuguese had to it, show how at this point the prince is seen in a favorable light. Besides this, once again, arguments are employed that put the “law of Buddhism” in closer proximity to the moral and ethical standards the Portuguese had at the time.

He responded to us after reading the paper that he had difficulty with some of the proposals, particularly the killing of his father, which was something that if a Chingalla king did he would be banished for the rest of his life by the law of Budim in Ceilão. It would be better to take the Kingdom of Candea by way of arranging its vassalage to His Majesty, leaving him the city afterward that he would maintain for the Portuguese. That he did not want us to make him responsible for a parricide, which is a sin that God usually did not forgive. To these last few words a soldier in the company named João Roiz Colasso raised his hand and said blessing him: “Blessed is the mother who bore Your Highness”. When the prince asked why the soldier said such a thing he responded: “I said it, my Lord, because of the purity of that person who wants to possess a kingdom not by resorting to dispatching his old father, as it would be taken only to be given to someone to whom it does not belong. Such [good] people do not come often nor are they

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<sup>356</sup> *Jornada*, ff. 52v-3. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 62.

seen”. We all were in agreement with this pious response, and shortly after the praise given by João Roiz Colaço, the following day, His Serenity sent him a portion of pears and oranges besides the ones that he sent to the group. We gathered and he said he was grateful to have taken into his company those he thinks so highly of.<sup>357</sup>

However, Cardénio's depiction of the prince soon shifts given his mismanagement of the expedition, where he is then portrayed as lacking in fortitude and often wavering, which not by coincidence is also a characteristic of his religious sensibilities. Cardénio forecasts the shift at the end of the section that contains the discourse between the prince and João Colaço, where his ability to effectively rule is called into question, “the king knew well who he was denying [the throne]”.<sup>358</sup> He starts to document the failings of the prince from the time in the narrative when the prince sets out on an expedition to Batticaloa soon after the Portuguese group had agreed to be in his military following. The aim was to storm the fortress there, which the entire military group, *lascarins* included, thought was a bad course to take.<sup>359</sup> But, before he goes into more details of the failings of the expedition, Cardénio tangentially shares a story about the prince's flirtation with Christianity. Cardénio relates a story that occurred in the prince's past in which he suddenly had the wish to be baptized even though he had very little exposure to the religion, and tenuous links to indoctrinators who would have had the potential to instruct him on the matters of the faith.<sup>360</sup> After relating this detail, Cardénio returns to the expedition narrative and explains how the prince began to concurrently botch matters in relation to both the organization of the expedition and his receiving the faith.

His Highness began to detail the plans of the expedition where the aim was to besiege Batecalou, which the *lascarins* knew to be madness to undertake as it was proven to them

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357 *Jornada*, ff. 53v-4. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 63.

358 *Jornada*, f. 54v. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 64.

359 *Jornada*, f. 56. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 65.

360 *Jornada*, f. 56v. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 66.

two times already. However, [the king's plan to besiege Batticaloa] was covered up in the contract, and had the adjudicators not been *Chingallas* they would have tore up [the contract] in a thousand pieces (*porem disfarsouce a accção cõ hũa cappa de contrato, que se os adiuntos senão forão Chingallas, a puderão ver rota por mil partes*). Finally, we began traveling [...] and though His Highness went along with the thought of becoming a Christian, the sacred intent did not stop him from visiting the ruins and temple of the God of Catragamma, and in a similar manner but less offensive, he went to the pagode of Constantino de Saa, the mosque of the Moors, and other filth of this type.<sup>361</sup>

Cardénio continues to show how the prince's floundering leads to further trouble that halts the expedition, where he cannot control the *lascarins* in his company from attacking the Portuguese group. The details are not totally clear as read in the text, but Cardénio claims the uprising, which occurred once the group arrived in Batticaloa, was sparked by some offense committed by the prince, though the group of *lascarins* attempted to pass it off as an offense based on the Portuguese's attempt at converting the prince, who was of the kingly "Suriyavamsa" caste.<sup>362</sup> Cardénio explains that most of the group of *lascarins* were once based in the lowlands and had worked for the Portuguese previously but had migrated to the up-country and thus became "rebels".<sup>363</sup> Whatever the reasons given, there was a scuffle, where the Portuguese are said to have come out victorious. The Portuguese group began to negotiate with the *lascarins* who were now in a separate camp from them, and demanded that the prince strip them of their firearms. The prince was placed in an awkward position, to the point that he felt compelled to organize the Portuguese group's escape from the area, albeit not in a manner that exuded confidence.

The poor man having little spirit and being irresolute received our embassy and gave us 30 explanations saying that it was not his intention to kill us, nor did he consent to it. At the end of the replies, questions, and answers he sent someone to tell us that at dawn he would give us 4 *lascarins* from his guard [...] to take us to Vilaçem through a hidden path, while he spoke with his men. With a thousand apologies and an *ola* sworn on the

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361 *Jornada*, ff. 57-7v. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 67.

362 *Jornada*, f. 58-8v. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 68.

363 *Jornada*, f. 58v. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 69.

head of his sister, he claimed there would be no deceit on our exit.<sup>364</sup>

The group made their escape in this manner, but as Cardénio explains, the other *lascarin* group followed in pursuit. On the way to Valaichchenai, the Portuguese came across a group of some 300 *veddahs* tribals who stripped them of their firearms and what little money they had, leaving them stranded and lost. It took the group another 22 days to reach Valaichchenai, and in this period they foraged and lived on wild fruits and other plants.<sup>365</sup> At this time, Cardénio explains the group fell sick due to the cold and the lack of suitable clothing. After three and a half months they came back into contact with the queen, who was desperately inquiring about their state, and who provided them with some support as well as attempted to organize the removal of the group from the area. Her character is once again commented about in a favorable light, where this time Cardénio traces her good qualities to her birth and bloodline.

At the end [of three and a half months] the queen, who was the dove of our deluge and the sun of our storms, sent to know if we were alive, because she was told in Candea that the rebels had killed us. This was the first happy day of all of those that we passed very sadly there. A little later Her Highness provided us with [support] given her Christian piety that she would have inherited from her parents, coming from the highest gentile blood.<sup>366</sup>

Cardénio explains that the group was eventually moved to Badulla, and that during this time a peace agreement was made whereby it was negotiated that the group would be allowed to eventually return to Colombo, thus ending the travel narrative.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter, by detailing the information in European accounts related to the problem

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364 *Jornada*, ff. 59-9v. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 69-70.

365 *Jornada*, ff. 60-0v. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 70.

366 *Jornada*, ff. 60v-1. Perera, *The expedition*, p. 71.

of “rebellions”, and the cultural/religious tone they can oftentimes take, I aimed to prove how such rhetorical language specifically refers to the difficulty of maintaining crucial military loyalties with native island military captains. Though many Portuguese writers before 1630 thought that the Sinhala people (*chingalas*) had a culturally ingrained trait of rebelliousness that made keeping their military loyalties extremely challenging, generals like Azevedo did not assume it was impossible to use such personnel for military activities. In fact, he would mention time and again that fighting wars in the island required such personnel, and which also required a drastic set of actions to keep them in service (i.e. forms of compensation and punishment). This attitude shifted after the 1630 rebellion, and after the State Council in Goa prohibited the recruitment of islanders, requiring that recruits instead be made from other Indian Ocean circuits; East African slaves and Kannada people. After this point, writers would claim that the cultural and religious gulf between the Europeans and islanders was too vast to allow for such alliances to be made as expressed in the account of Bocarro, and which would be the fundamental viewpoint that would set the thematic basis for the Queiroz chronicle. Examining documents on the cusp show us how contrived this cultural/religious argument was, as both the documents of Macedo and Assunção clearly point to themes related to military economic challenges.

The similarities between this circumstance and that of mainland India, as shown in the work of Lima Cruz, are striking given the surface level differences between the cases. The well established rhetorical cultural/religious disjuncture between Christianity and Islam is an obvious difference, where the people in question could refer to more familiar and longer-held ideological differences. Though the rhetoric differed, the military economic activities between the cases (i.e. mainland India and Sri Lanka) were very much the same; personnel moved between different

factions, and the patrons readily accepted them despite any reluctance they voiced previously about the cultural/religious nature of differences. Accordingly, from the *Jornada* account, we get a rare glimpse of the beliefs of a Portuguese 'renegade', as defined by their having served in a military function for an island king. From it we can see how beliefs changed to create cultural and religious proximity and equivalence in a time of great desperation, thus creating new cultural and religious concepts and ideas along the way.

## Chapter 5: OF *REIS* AND *RAJAS*: THE RHETORIC OF KINGSHIP AND MILITARY METHODS OF ATTAINING AND MAINTAINING KINGLY AUTHORITY

The manner in which a king became a king and maintained his authority in Sri Lanka during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is a subject on which many writers and scholars past and present have presented theories, whereby it has been the attempt to come to the essence of *kingship* in the Sri Lankan case. Queiroz offered his own thoughts on the subject in his chronicle, by which his theory of Lankan kingship was meant to explain how the Portuguese's methods at controlling the island did not consider the nature of the legitimacy that the king needed to embody. It was the view based on his understanding of the events specifically surrounding the rebellion of João da Austria (a.k.a. Vimaladharmasuriya), that the island people would never be able to accept a king who was of pure European stock. This error in judgment underlay the unification of the otherwise divided native Sinhalese against the Portuguese at this particular juncture.

But when they [the Sinhalese] saw a new form of government and new intentions of the Portuguese disclosed by the introduction of a new General as conquistador, and when they suspected that the attempt was not only to subdue the whole of Ceylon, but even to marry the Princess of Candea, D. Catherina to a Portuguese gentleman, who would be King of Candea in such a way as to acknowledge vassalage to the King of Portugal, that great change succeeded altogether in alienating the minds of a nation that ill-endured its own native government and was unyielding to a foreign one, and in making those very people who once obeyed us declare themselves against us, uniting the whole Island against the Portuguese nation without hesitating to accept a subject as King, provided he was an Apuhami or Chingala gentleman.<sup>367</sup>

Predictably, Queiroz goes on to explain that it is Vimala's predilection to “gentility” that also gained him the support to rout the Portuguese. Thus, Queiroz also believed that being a non-Christian, and even further, an anti-Christian, was a kind of requirement that placed the potential

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<sup>367</sup> Queiroz, Vol. 2, p. 478.

kingly candidate in a better position over other would-be claimants.

A seemingly different text on the face of it, the *Mandarampura Puvata*, written in the form of poetic verses by multiple authors in Sinhala, carries forward strikingly similar viewpoints on kingship to that of Queiroz. The text is composed of multiple parts that chronicle the works of each king of Kandy from Vimaladharmasuriya, where the emphasis is placed on each king being Sinhalese and/or Buddhist. Thus, a king's assertion of this combined identity corresponded to the kingly authority he received. In the specific section on the king Rajasinha II, the author, a self-identified ascetic (*yati*) by the name Unambowee, claimed that Rajasinha in part received the mandate of the kingship of Kandy by its people to protect them from the foreign influence of the Portuguese, and the forced imposition they were making of the Christian faith to the detriment of the Buddhist one.

316.

[The Portuguese] destroyed libraries, monasteries, and Bo trees  
They took control of areas offered to temples  
Instilling a wrong view (*misaditu deva*: “conversion”) and punishing them  
They created chaos in the country and people were affected

317.

People in the low-country who did not take the [Christian] faith (*devsamayam*)  
Were burnt and killed with their wives and children  
Inappropriate punishments were given according to the orders and acts (*anapana*)  
They disenfranchised people from their property

318.

The god Raja[sinha II] got to know about this  
And with his two virtuous brothers and officers  
Discussed how to destroy these Portuguese people  
He collected troops in all the different areas.<sup>368</sup>

The meeting of the two perspectives, which assume that interactions between the Portuguese and Sinhalese were defined by ethnic and religious conflicts, is a very commonly held perspective by

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368 *Mandarampura Puvata*, pp. 40-1.

amateur historians of the nationalist bent that study the subject. Historians such as Susantha Goonatilake approaches the subject in this way in such works as, *A 16<sup>th</sup> Century Clash of Civilizations: The Portuguese in Sri Lanka*.<sup>369</sup> Basing his narrative primarily on that of Queiroz, but employing the *Mandarampura Puvata* for effect as well, he rehashes the history of the period along these clichéd and often politically dubious lines. In some ways the arguments speak to contemporary debates in a Sinhala chauvinistic manner; where the author touts that the island is the homeland of Sinhala Buddhism that has continually been under threat by foreign influences, Europeans being one of them and Tamils being the other.

However, these more Sinhala chauvinistic scholars are not unique in assuming the period in question was defined primarily in terms of an intractable racial and religious conflict between the Portuguese and Sinhalese. In a far more politically correct, theoretically dense, and academically situated intervention made within the last decade, Alan Strathern's *Kingship and Conversion in Sixteenth-Century Sri Lanka*, approaches the topic with a similar set of assumptions. In the work, Strathern attempts to answer the question of why it was that the king of Kotte, Bhuvanekabahu VII, who received military support from the Portuguese in the mid-sixteenth century, did not convert to Christianity in his lifetime despite the immense amount of pressure put on him by the Portuguese. To answer this question he touches on some theoretical models made available to him from the fields of religious and Buddhist studies, namely the concept of *Sinhala Buddhist Kingship*, whereby kingship is said to have been granted to a king on the condition that he maintained the ethnic Sinhala identity, as well as the Buddhist religious identity of a region and a people. Similar approaches to studying the nature of Kandyan kingship,

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369 Susantha Goonatilake, *A 16<sup>th</sup> Century Clash of Civilizations: The Portuguese in Sri Lanka* (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa, 2010).

Buddhist kingly patronage, and the history of the Sinhala ethnic identity by John Holt and Michael Roberts have been a key influence on Strathern's approach in his own work.<sup>370</sup> Taken as a whole, though seemingly distant from the work of Goonetilleke in style and approach, the group of professional academic scholars' works employ the same core assumptions about the centrality of Sinhala ethnic and Buddhist religious identity and its representation as a kind of xenophobic *indigeneity*. Such concepts are meant to have longer term, more modern, implications as well.

Returning to the viewpoints expressed regarding kingship and kingly authority found in Queiroz's and Unambowee's writings on Rajasinha II, there are some obvious reasons for similarities between the two perspectives. Both writers might have been interested in the matters of their respective faiths, given that they were both religious figures of a kind. However, as seen in the previous chapter in the case of Assunção, the mere connection to a clerical group did not imply the writer would take such a violent approach when approaching their subject. A more telling aspect of the similarity between the two (Queiroz and Unambowee) is that they both wrote, or began to write, their respective texts soon after the Portuguese permanently lost their military position in the island. Though the occurrence was recent and thus a part of people's lived experience, it was an event still very much relegated to the past by this point.<sup>371</sup> Thus, the two perspectives represent the laments of the loser and the arrogant boasts of the winner, where such perspectives could only be born out of a sense of finality that might gloss over the more complicated details on the subject of kingly authority.

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370 See: John Clifford Holt, *The Religious World of Kirti Sri: Buddhism, Art, and Politics of Late Medieval Sri Lanka* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Michael Roberts, *Sinhala Consciousness in the Kandyan Period, 1590s to 1815* (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa, 2003)

371 The date of completion of the Queiroz chronicle is the late 1680s. There is no clear date associated with Unambowee's section, it could be dated anywhere from the end of the 1640s and most likely no later than the end of the 1670s. The point being there would have been overlap between the two give or take a decade.

Such a similarity based on location in time is a most obvious contributing factor to the convergence of the two viewpoints (Queiroz and Unambowee), which is made apparent when compared to perspectives on the nature of kingly authority written within the period of Portuguese military presence. These earlier documents, which run the gamut between Portuguese administrative sources to Sinhala literary sources, articulate a notion of kingship in the following manner: there is a general expectation that elements like caste, royal familial relations, etc. determine kingly authority, but where such forms of “legitimacy” are never understood to be effective in themselves to establish kingly authority. Instead, the sources in sum speak of an environment in which many potential kingly candidates, some of whom did not often fit the prescribed caste or familial backgrounds, engaged actively in the recruitment and deployment of military personnel to realize their kingly ambitions.

Thus, the historical record from the period shows that legitimate kingly ascension was not something that was received by order of any *sangha*, group of urban elites, or by mandate of a populace, but was instead assumed through the show of military force, with elites and other figures later following suit with their patronage and support. The rhetoric of “legitimacy” was conveniently molded around military authority, which was achieved through effective engagement with the *military economy*. The maintenance of kingly authority was a slightly different exercise; kings would have to maintain the loyalties of their military personnel in an environment that encouraged their non-compliance, since it fed the ambitions of higher level military personnel to become kings themselves. This ephemeral state of authority in the island persisted until the 1640s when Rajasinha II, understanding the necessity of maintaining military loyalties to keep his authority, began to develop a land and labor system with the direct aim of

controlling the movements of military personnel and limiting the opportunities available to them to rebel against his service. The development of this standing army through a reform of the land administrative system also invariably changed the role of the king from that of a “general king” to that of a “bureaucrat king”, who now could be based in a court and was no longer required to make military expeditions as such. The court being the focal point of power thus allowed for its expansion, which led to more literary productions such as the *Mandarampura Puvata* and an addition to the *Hatana Kavya* genre, the *Rajasiha Hatana*. The texts from then on would outline a more abstract notion of kingly authority; writers would gloss over finer details and reference more symbolic notions of the king's authority as it equates to the forms of legitimacy he acts out or exudes.

*CASES OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN ESTABLISHING KINGLY AUTHORITY ACCORDING TO THE MANDARAMPURA PUVATA*

Kingly ascension and the maintenance of kingly authority as explained by the authors of the *Mandarampura Puvata*, a chronicle poem that highlights the activities of the kings of Kandy, are processes highly dependent on legitimacy gained through the protection of Buddhism above all else. This can be read in the description of the ascendancy of Vimaladharmasuriya over his rivals, specifically Rajasinha of Sitavaka and his South Indian Shaivite priest courtier, Giri Tawasa. The depiction is exaggeratedly sectarian; the text claims Rajasinha ultimately lost his authority due to his taking up of the Shaivite worship practices that came with those courtiers who migrated from South India. Such a shift is said to have prompted him to reflexively defile all things and people connected to Buddhist practice -- a popular story known well even today that had great thematic purchase during the more recent war. Though the events depicted in the

poem could be considered to be historically inaccurate, it is worth reading the text to get more thematic details. For one, the poem cannot avoid the military service theme; the Indian Shaivite known in the poem as Giri Tawasa, whose movements and activities can be likened to another figure in the historical record known as Mannamperuma, is not only said to be a “priest” (*tawasa*) but is also explained to be a general with a group of his own soldiers (“followers”) who provided military and administrative services for Rajasinha. Secondly, the poem shows how even legitimate figures such as Vimaladharmasuriya move between different camps/courts to offer services and take up different names in every move to a new place, in order to fit the cultural nomenclature of that particular court. Taking this theme forward, it is worth showing how all figures found in the historical record tend to partake in this activity as they endeavor to gain power and privileges. Ultimately, the assessment of the paths and actions that figures such as Vimaladharmasuriya and Giri Tawasa/Mannamperuma take can lead us to question whether or not the two are all that different. That is, we may wonder if the likes of Mannamperuma, despite being a South Indian migrant, could have become an island king himself much like Vimaladharmasuriya.

The second verse of the section on Vimaladharmasuriya in the *Mandarampura Puvata* contains information about the author and the date of the poem, and in this case the author identifies himself as Vikum Aduru, the second part of his name signifying his status as a learned figure (*aduru* - “teacher”). He also states that he wrote the text in 2190 of the Buddhist calendar, in about 1647.<sup>372</sup> The general approach of his text, which sets the theme for the rest of the sections for the later authors, is to tell the story of the history of the up-country kings as seen from the perspective of the region of the up-country known as Mandarampura. In the earliest

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<sup>372</sup> *Mandarampura Puvata*, v. 2 - p. 1.

verses of the poem, he shows how this particular region was affected when Rajasinha of Sitavaka took control of the entire up-country, where Rajasinha is said to have granted the area of Mandarampura to the Shaivite priest (*tawasa*) Giri.

36.  
Hevahata and  
Denuwara, Udunuwara, Yatinuwara, Kotmale, Uva, Valapane, and Mandarampura  
King Rajasinha gave the responsibility over the tribute of them to Giri Tawasa<sup>373</sup>

Vikum Aduru begins to explain how it was that a Shaivite such as Giri Tawasa managed to gain access to the court of Rajasinha; in reality, he claims the king actively brought not only Giri Tawasa but many other Shaivite priests from South India. The motive begins to become clear for this migration, as the group of Shaivites, besides being priests, were military heads who offered military and administrative services to Rajasinha.

59.  
[Rajasinha] brought great priests (*kapuva*)  
From different countries such as the Chola country  
The king gave power to these people  
In different places in this island

60.  
The Shaivite army was quickly recruited  
And seven powerful priests  
Destroyed Lanka with great pride

61.  
Of these of fame and glory  
Was a priest named Giri  
He came by order of Rajasinha  
To the Manadaram Disava

62.  
With thousands of powerful Shaiva people  
He had full control  
Giri Tawasa received soldiers

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373 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

And he took over the luxurious Manadaram pura<sup>374</sup>

From this description, one sees that Rajasinha's association with Shaivites and Shaivism was based on military recruitment, though it is articulated much later in the poem as a connection primarily based on common religious sensibilities.

Moving on in the narrative, Vikum Aduru shows how the presence of Shaivites in the court of Rajasinha began to change the king, as the philosophies and laws of their faith flew in the face of those of Buddhism, which led the king down a path of karmic ruin. At this point, Vikum Aduru begins to explain that Rajasinha's lust for power had finally pushed the king over the edge, as he soon killed his own father the Sitavakan king Mayadunne, in order to take over the kingdom. Stricken with guilt and fear over his karmic future, he searched for counsel among the Buddhist clergy; however, the response he got put him in a further state of despair.

46.  
Remembering that he once killed his father  
He was afraid of the sufferings of hell  
He called people knowledgeable in dharma

47.  
Having brought the Maha Sanga  
And having made the offerings (*sivupasen puda karavā*)  
He touched his crown to the floor  
He cried out and in this manner said in fear:

48.  
“To remove the sin of my father's death  
Tell me the appropriate merits that need to be done  
To remedy this and have a comfortable future”.

49.  
The Sanga who knows the dharma of Buddha  
Listened to his words  
There was no counsel to get rid  
Of the sin of the father's death

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374 *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

50.  
“But King,  
Constantly doing meritorious acts  
In the next life  
It will carry over.”<sup>375</sup>

In search of other counsel, he is said to have come across some Shaivites who presented matters more simply to him, where he was only required to do a few *pujas* to Shiva to absolve his sins. The relief that he felt from the counsel was met with a seething anger he had against the monks who had previously told him he was damned to suffer for this sin in an uncountable number of lifetimes. His response against the clergy and the faith more generally was said to be violent, which prompted the reaction of the inhabitants in the region.

51.  
The king was not happy from hearing this  
He was afraid of the sufferings of hell  
And he searched for some other faith (*parasamaya bālāvī*)  
Then a greedy person said to him

52.  
“Meritorious King!  
Do not worry  
Pray to the God Shiva  
And remedy your situation by doing a ritual sacrifice”

[...]

54.  
The King Rajasiha was happy  
On hearing the words of this greedy person,  
And he was angry that  
The [useless] Maha Sanga did not know this

55.  
[And thus] he killed Bhikkus  
Destroyed Buddhist books and monasteries  
He worshiped Shiva

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<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*.

And took the false faith (*misaditu gena*) and put ash on his forehead

56.

At that time the people in Lanka  
Came to the king with love  
And pleaded with the king  
To give up the false faith

57.

He did not take heed of the words from these good people  
Understanding the king to be wrong (*rajahu dāna notaram vana*)  
They secretly found another prince  
To control the Lankan state

The elites of the region are said to have elected a popular leader to replace the king, an up-country *disava* named Sundara Bandara. However, ambitions of instating his authority were dashed when the plot was discovered and the would-be leader killed.

67.

Sivu Korala, Sat Korala, the Vanni, and Anaradhapura  
From these areas people assembled in Gampala  
And planned to take the kingdom from the demon Rajasiha  
And gave the mandate to Sundara Bandara

68.

The dastardly Rajasiha got to know of this plan  
And killed Sundara Bandara  
And because of this they hid the young prince his son  
In Sanguran Keta

From this point in the narrative, it follows the son of Sundara Bandara, Konappu Bandara, who was eventually sent to the Portuguese for protection and was baptized as João da Austria. In this phase of the text it covers his time under the Portuguese, who are said to have brought him up well; however, did not keep to their promise of delivering him the Kandyan Kingdom when he came of age. This latter issue prompted the king to rebel against the service of the Portuguese and take the kingdom for himself as a rightful heir.

72.  
King Rajasiha was tricked  
Konap Bandara was sent with gifts  
To the Portuguese King who was in Kolompura  
And had the privilege over Lanka

73.  
The meritorious prince who inherited the kingship (*rajakama*) of Lanka  
Grew up in luxury with the Portuguese King  
“Let us make Konuppu Bandara the king of the upcountry,  
The coastal area of Lanka can be ruled by the Portuguese king”

74.  
Without giving way to conflicts between the two sides  
The Portuguese king will always protect Lanka  
All these things were discussed with the Sinhala troops  
Thus these two countries had an agreement

75.  
Then the Portuguese king being a hypocrite made a different plan  
He showed his cheating nature by wanting to take over everything  
They took up strategies to make conflicts between the people that lived in Lanka  
They invited another prince for the kingship

[...]

77.  
Pilip was made king of Sengkada[gala]  
Konupu was [only] given the head of the army  
He was not happy because of this  
He discussed this with the Sinhala army

78.  
“We have to kill prince Pilip as soon as possible,  
And we have to remove these Portuguese,  
Sengakadagala should be like heaven.”  
And he became the king by the name of Vimaladham suriya<sup>376</sup>

The statements made against the Portuguese here, though accusatory, are innocuous compared to those found in the later section on Rajasinha II by Unambowee as explained above, where the latter conveyed that there was a type of persecution under the Portuguese on the basis of religion,

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<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

whereas Vikum Aduru is completely silent about such persecution. The selective basis that both writers take (Vikum Aduru: anti-Shaivite, Unambowee: anti-Christian) when painting the opposing faction is striking considering the style employed is exactly the same; Vikum Aduru developed the style that Unambowee used later, and Unambowee states that he was influenced by Vikum Aduru's previous contribution.<sup>377</sup>

Later in the narrative, after the king assumes the new name Vimaladharmasuriya, Vikum Aduru describes how he challenged first Rajasinha, who died from a karmic incident in which he fell off his horse, and then the priest/general Giri. Soon after defeating both, he predictably righted the wrongs that Buddhism had suffered due to the imposition of Shaivism in the region. Besides this, in a convention shared between all the sections of the *Mandarampura Puvata* that will be covered in more detail in a later part of this chapter, Vikum Aduru also details the types of activities into which the king invested organizational resources (i.e. taxes, resource management, land grants, occupational development, etc.).

Moving from the picture of Vimala offered by Vikum Aduru to a first-hand account offered by the first Dutch envoy to Kandy, Joris van Spilbergen, though there is a clear difference in the description of the king's personal beliefs, the explanation of how he took control of Kandy away from the Portuguese is similar. Spilbergen acted as an early Dutch envoy in order to gather information about Kandy to help the Dutch to decide whether or not they would offer military support to the king. Spilbergen generally had a favorable attitude toward the king, and he notes with delight and surprise the European and "Christian" manner and sensibilities the king possessed and how this affected the manner in which he maintained his court.

The next day the King once again sent his horses for the General and his people to come

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<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

to his Court as guests in a Great Hall, which was decorated with beautiful tapestry. There were many Spanish chairs and a table on which all was arranged in the Christian manner and enlivened with much music and other ceremonial shows.<sup>378</sup>

Besides the decor of his living quarters, his family appeared to share the same set of characteristics, “the General was brought into the chamber of the Queen where she sat with her children, the Prince and Princess, who were all dressed in the Christian manner”.<sup>379</sup> Spilbergen links this to the king's personal religious beliefs, “yea, they often confess that their gods are of no value. Dona Catharina visits no pagodas. Don Ioan the King does it mostly to please the Singales”.<sup>380</sup> Ironically enough, Spilbergen takes interest in the personal beliefs of the king in order to assess the possibility of converting the king and his subjects to Protestant Christianity, and away from the mix of Catholic and gentile superstitions that the natives of the island believed in: “it may be said that the Portuguese have tried their best and accomplished nothing as the Portuguese looked merely for the wealth of Celon rather than true conversion or the knowledge of God through Jesus Christ”.<sup>381</sup>

The many avenues of proximity Spilbergen felt toward Vimaladharmasuriya in many ways spoke to his positive consideration of making him a political ally by this time. The tone is similar when Spilbergen deals with the story behind Vimala's kingly ascension, which at first carries familiar tenets of legitimacy found in other accounts.

At this time the King of Candy died. The Chief Modeliar at the time was Wimala Dharma Suri Ada. He was a son of a great Prince in Candy who also held the office of Chief Modeliar, and he was brought during his youth from Candy to Colombo where he was baptised and given the name of the brother of King Philip of Spain and Portugal, Don Ioan Daustria. Subsequently, he was sent from Colombo to Goa at the time when the

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<sup>378</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>379</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>381</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

Governor of Goa was Emanuel Sosa Cottin and when Mattheo Albercke came from Portugal as Viceroy. Since Wimala Dharma Suri Ada was baptised as a Christian he grew up as a great strong man, physically sound and a man of great power and very intelligent. He was appointed Chief Modeliar of the Captain of Candy by the Portuguese, as mentioned above. This Chief Modeliar was the next person to the King. He had much authority and had conducted the military affairs of war. At the time of the death of the King of Candy, Don Ioan, who had the soldiers in his control and was also liked very much by the Singales as he too was a Sinhalese and belonged to the great dynasty of the House of Candy, made himself the King of Candy and all the Portuguese who dwelt there freely in Candy were driven away or put to death, and he openly declared war against the Portuguese.<sup>382</sup>

In the next part of the narrative he shows how Vimala's use of military force, and specifically guerrilla warfare that utilized the nearby jungles, was instrumental in establishing his authority over the region, which was independent of his status as a Sinhala or of noble blood, and more related to the fact that he was a military general with a sizable force under his charge. He details the fight between Vimala and Pero Lopes da Sousa, the Portuguese general who intended to take control of the region and marry the legitimate heiress, Dona Catarina.

When Lopes and his army went to Candy, Don Ioan, who was then in Candy, withdrew into the matto and the jungles and there he cut off General Lopes from his supplies, and all the Portuguese who ventured on the roads or outside of Candy were slaughtered. Thus General Lopes was compelled to withdraw his troops to a place called Ballene, a mile away from Candy, with a view to fight, a battle with Don Ioan Daustria, which was the baptismal name of the Sinhalese Wimala Dharma Suria.<sup>383</sup>

From Kandy, Vimala and his troops were in a better position to fight Lopes da Sousa, and the victory was eventually achieved; with Catarina now “prisoner”, “Don Ioan established himself as the definite King of Candy and married Dona Catherina, by whom he has a Prince and a Princess”.<sup>384</sup>

The two depictions offered by Vikum Aduru and Spilbergen on the rise of Vimala, though

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382 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

383 *Ibid.*, p. 38.

384 *Ibid.*.

different in the way they explain the sensibilities and motivations of the king, both acknowledge the complex itinerary the king took, noting his many shifts in political identity, where even his name changed, in order to achieve the result of ruling over a kingdom. When comparing such activities to others in the period, Vimala does not appear to be any different from any other military captain/general, who were all involved in the same set of activities and took the same itineraries. An example that could be compared to that of Vimala is the figure of Giri Tawasa, but more specifically his equivalent personage found in earlier sources, the South Indian migrant known as Mannamperuma.

In the *Rajavaliya*, there is a description of a man named Mannamperuma, who is said to be an ascetic (*fakir*) that came into the region from the “Chola country” and gained the favor of Rajasinha of Sitavaka.<sup>385</sup> There are enough basic similarities between the figure of Giri Tawasa and the man found in the *Rajavaliya* to make a connection; however, comparing the career and trajectory of Mannamperuma as documented in the *Rajavaliya* to that of Giri Tawasa makes the latter appear to be an extremely one-dimensional character. The *Mandarampura Puvata* version is a type of caricature that appears to be wholly unconcerned with anything but spreading Shaivism and destroying Buddhism as shown above, while the man in the *Rajavaliya* seems to follow a completely different trajectory; he moves between different polities and offers military services to different patrons in order to gain favors, wealth, and prestige. Along the way he adopts new names and even identities. The *Rajavaliya* explains that his first avatar was that of Aritta Kivendu Perumal, a Telugu-speaking South Indian migrant who on coming into Rajasinha's court received the new name, Mannamperuma, along with the title *mohitti* (secretary/official). Some time later he is found in the Kotte court, with the name Jayavira

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<sup>385</sup> *Rajavaliya*, pp. 88-9.

Bandara, where the name is associated with an island identity, and from it, his South Indian origin cannot be identified.

According to the *Rajavaliya*, fighting battles against the Portuguese were among Mannamperuma's earliest activities once he came under the patronage of Rajasinha of Sitavaka. The chronicle states that the Portuguese organized an assault and put a *mudaliyar* named “Jida Silva”<sup>386</sup> in command of the army against Sitavaka and Mannamperuma.<sup>387</sup> Mannamperuma successfully repelled this assault; however, he soon had to deal with the challenge of remaining in Sitavaka once his patron Rajasinha died.<sup>388</sup> In the picture of the transitional period found in the next example, a power vacuum emerged in the region, and Mannamperuma began to receive an indication that his position in the region was untenable.

Let it be known first that this Manamperuma Mohitti, had come from the Soli country in the company of Fakirs and that he had been conferred the title of Manamperuma Mohotti. For the reason that he was keeping company with Fakirs, Atapattu Aracci, in charge of the twelve companies of the main royal guard composed four-lined verses, each of them ending with the word *Kokkanama* and he got these verses to be recited in every street of Sitavaka. Manamperuma Mohotti being ashamed went to Moravatta and lived there. Not many days passed before the noble queen invited him down, and he took up residence at Sitavaka. Even while he was residing there, lads began to sing those verses, whenever he was seen.<sup>389</sup>

*Kokkanama* refers to a traveling bag carried by wandering ascetics, and this reference thus was meant to shame Mannamperuma for once being one. However, we may note that Mannamperuma's main challenger was the *aracci* named Atapattu, who now controlled a section of the main army in the region. This was a clear threat against Mannamperuma who did not seem

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386 The text suggests that this figure is a Muslim. The fact that he also carries the name “Silva” could be more proof of the existence of a kind of “Moor *casado*” identity group in the island as explained by Assunção in his account.

387 *Ibid.*, p. 91.

388 *Ibid.*, p. 92.

389 *Ibid.*, pp. 91-2.

to have the ability to defend himself at this time. Such a state of insecurity explains what prompted him to find a patron in his one-time enemies, Dharmapala and the Portuguese.

The *Rajavaliya* does not indicate that Mannamperuma's move to the Portuguese camp was difficult. Under the Portuguese, he was given yet another name and title, Jayavira Bandara, and it is under this title that he appears in Queiroz's account, where Jayavira's movements are tracked from the time he made this shift.<sup>390</sup> The *Rajavaliya* explains that under the patronage of the Portuguese, Jayavira Bandara's first set of responsibilities was to take over Sitavaka, which he achieved. The group of Portuguese along with Jayavira Bandara are said to have then set their sights on Kandy. However, the *Rajavaliya* explains that any Portuguese hopes of taking over the kingdom were wrecked by Jayavira, who attempted to betray the Portuguese to Vimaladharmasuriya, in exchange for control over the lowlands.<sup>391</sup> Queiroz's account of the man coincides with what the *Rajavaliya* details, where the haughty Jayavira Bandara, who aimed at becoming the king of the low-country, was found to be exchanging letters with Vimaladharmasuriya and plotting different schemes to destabilize the Portuguese expedition, which resulted in his execution.<sup>392</sup>

In his own assessment of the life and works of Mannamperuma, Alan Strathern is reluctant to assert whether or not the historical figure's lack of *indigeneity*, a theoretical tenet central to his work, was an impediment for the South Indian migrant or not. At certain times Strathern suggests that it is, as explained by the case of Mannamperuma's need to abscond from Sitavaka and the anti-South Indian rhetoric espoused by some, as can be read in the *Rajavaliya*.

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390 Queiroz, Vol. 2, p. 482.

391 *Rajavaliya*, p. 93.

392 Queiroz, Vol. 2, p. 483-4.

However at other times it is not, as he explains the Portuguese utilized the “native” in his capacity to effectively keep troops under his command.<sup>393</sup> One thing Strathern seems to be entirely certain about is that the likes of Mannamperuma were fundamentally different from those of Vimaladharmasuriya, the former being a kind of foreign “warlord” and the latter an island “noble”, where the warlord type always depended on the royalty for titles and grants.<sup>394</sup> Therefore, there is no possibility as Strathern can see it that a personage such as Mannamperuma could ever become a king in his own right and claim authority over territory. Yet, for two people who are deemed to be so fundamentally different, they both followed very similar itineraries and even shared the same position in the Portuguese army as military commanders. Therefore, as I see it, the record suggests that Mannamperuma had an equal capacity to fulfill such ambitions if he had had more luck on his side. More concrete proof of this can be seen in another case of a South Indian migrant and his “rebel” partner, who combined forces to oust Senarat, the one-time Buddhist monk, from his seat as the legitimate king of Kandy.

*THE KANDYAN “INTERREGNUM”: THE MILITARY PROCESS OF KINGLY  
LEGITIMIZATION OF THE “REBEL” ANTÓNIO BARRETO AND SOUTH INDIAN MIGRANT  
MAYADUNNE*

What is generally known in the Mughal historiography as the “Sher Shah Suri Interregnum” highlights the case when the second Mughal emperor, Humayun, was exiled to Iran from Delhi by the Afghan “warlord”, Sher Shah, who afterwards installed himself as emperor from the capital. Sher Shah achieved this by making connections with Rajput warring clans from which he was able to contract a large fighting force to oust Humayun, and the Mughal sovereign

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393 Strathern, *Kingship and Conversion in Sixteenth-Century Sri Lanka*, pp. 208, 215.

394 *Ibid.*, p. 246.

was not able to return to reclaim his authority over Delhi until after both Sher Shah and his son Islam Shah died. There are many coincidental similarities between this case and the turnover of Kandyan power in the first few decades of the seventeenth century; a South Indian migrant who called himself “Mayadunne” after the sixteenth century king of Sitavaka, came into the island and with the help of the “rebel” António Barreto raised a fighting force to remove Senarat from power and from the region. Senarat, also being the second king in the newly developed kingdom, could only return to claim the throne once his foes were defeated by their other rival, the Portuguese.

The Portuguese watched the events of this “interregnum” with close interest, describing the turnover of power at different stages in administrative letters written between the second and third decades of the seventeenth century. From these documents, one gets their views on how the two managed to ascend to power in the region, through military force, and how by the end of it the pair were cautiously dealt with due to the kingly “legitimacy” they were said to still have. For one, the case shows how kingly legitimacy follows arms, so that even in the region of Kandy, often described as a kind of cultural heartland of the island, two figures deemed as “rebels” could become kings whose legitimacy claims were valued over those of Senarat as the Portuguese saw it.<sup>395</sup> Secondly, it shows how this ebb and flow of power in Kandy was in great part orchestrated and directed by a third-party military class, generally referred to as “rebels” in this period, who are said to have intentions/ambitions (*pretenções*) of their own, and wanted to keep the war in an

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395 In a latter section of his monograph, Strathern explains that “rebels” such as Nikipitiya Bandara overturned the rules of legitimacy in the Kandyan Kingdom, see: “Christianity and Buddhism resurgent”, in Strathern, *Kingship and Conversion in Sixteenth-Century Sri Lanka*, p. 194-234. However, he claims that this is only a feature of this brief moment in the seventeenth century, since Portuguese “direct rule”, and the era of indigenous rebellions they are charged with bringing on, destabilized the culturally established norms of kingly legitimacy throughout the island. I would argue that kingly authority, and thus kingship, is apprehended through the imposition of military force throughout the some 150 years that the Portuguese were on the island, and that it is not a special feature of just these few decades.

active state.

On the 10<sup>th</sup> of March 1611, King Philip received what he thought to be an important letter from Sri Lanka that he passed on to the viceroy at the time, Rui Lourenço da Távora. The letter was by an anonymous author who was most likely a Portuguese captain serving in the island. It contained information pertaining to the progress of the conquest, or the lack thereof. The letter is in the form of eleven different remarks (*apontamentos*) which aimed to explain how it was that the conquest had not been achieved in the span of twenty years under three different Captains-General.

The conquest of the said island has lasted for sixteen years under Dom Jeronymo de Azevedo, besides this there resided Pedro Homem Pereira for four or five years, and after him Pero Lopes de Sousa, which is altogether twenty years of the conquest. In this time, without a doubt, there have been used more than 12,000 soldiers and 400 or 500,000 cruzados without there being an end to the conquest, the reason for which is the following.<sup>396</sup>

The list that follows includes many points mentioned by others in the period, which usually refer to the excesses that the generals and captains committed while in the king's service. These charges include the harsh treatment of natives by Portuguese, the absolute power that Portuguese generals often gave to *disavas*, and the large tributes the generals extracted.<sup>397</sup> As voiced in previous chapters, the author identifies that the reason for the lack of fortitude of the local heads under the generals to complete the conquest of the island for the Portuguese was because they stood much more to gain in profit and power with the war in an active state.

The heads that have power over the men of war do not want this conquest to end, because if it does then it ends their power, authority, seniority, government and profit, which they consume at the expense of the king and the poor.<sup>398</sup>

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396 *DRI-LM, Vol. 2, p. 83.*

397 *Ibid.*

398 *Ibid.*

In the ninth remark the whole concept of kingly authority is turned on its head, as native military captains are said to be continually making their own claims of authority by assuming the names of previous kings and other notable military figures, which created an environment of political and military instability.

They [Portuguese] do not allow in any way that the natives take the names of kings, princes, [royal] infants, or *mudaliyars*, but only [allow] those that have the right to do so. Because it is with those titles and the power they get by fighting wars that the people come to them out of fear. And this is the way the people rebel against us, by following the faction of some or another renegade (*arrenegado*), putting their lives and efforts into the hands of one of these.<sup>399</sup>

It is clear from this statement that prominent Lankan figures, those who had military capabilities, were taking on the names and titles of notable figures to rally troops. The remarks were written at a time when there began a wave of “anti-Portuguese rebellions” according to chroniclers like Queiroz. However, such activities also had grave destabilizing effects for other island powers, such as the Kandyan Kingdom, as was well understood by Portuguese officials.

The chaotic state of Kandy in the 1610s came to the attention of Portuguese officials, who realized that Senarat had no real way of defending himself from the military activities of groups led by such itinerants like António Barreto and his ally, the South Indian migrant who had taken on the name of the sixteenth century Sitavakan king, “Mayadunne”. This can be read in the Portuguese administrative documents and even the Sinhala “war poem” that documents this period, *Kustantinu Hatana*. As explained in a previous chapter, the main antagonists in this latter text are not Senarat but those who were rebelling against both the Kandyan king and the Portuguese. In the narrative, Barreto comes into the court of Senarat and is granted lands in the up-country. However, the rebel is said to have used his authority in these areas to recruit people

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<sup>399</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

to eventually lay siege on Kandy.<sup>400</sup> The narrative afterward follows Barreto with his force, as he attempted to set up a base for his own kingdom.

26.  
The Etarava Korala  
Comprises of many hills and mountains  
In a certain village [in Etarava Korala]  
He built up a city with his troops as he wished

27.  
Antony Barretu  
With all the rebellious officers (*perali mätīyan*)  
And along with the *vanniyars* in that country  
Came together with one another and united

[...]

30.  
Taking the kingship (*rajasiri bāra kara*)  
Along with the queens and followers  
He went from place to place making rebellions (*tāna tāna perali kara*)  
This enemy army did not stop<sup>401</sup>

Though the rhetoric and language is meant to discredit Barreto in some way, the description of Barreto's activities suggests an element of organization and planning that does not look that different from how other kings in the previous century, and in the previous poem, consolidated power; he went into the interior and collected a wide range of military personnel. In the last verse, it even alludes to them having kingly authority as such (*rajasiri* - 'kingship'), which is not different from when Alahapperuma in the *Sitavaka Hatana* notes that Vidiye gained kingship in the Sat Korala after organizing the assassination of his own patron there.

A document written by the members of the *Câmara* of Colombo in 1618 to the king conveyed a similar idea; that the rebels had a certain level of political authority in the island at

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400 *Kustantinu Hatana*, pp. 23-4.

401 *Ibid.*, pp. 24-5.

the time due to their effective consolidation of power at the expense of Senarat. The letter to the king was drafted in order to inspire the officials to send proper support, including better military personnel, as the likes of the Captains-General Nuno Álvares Pereira were not doing what was necessary to fight back certain rebel incursions on Colombo. It also explains what the members of the *Câmara* of Colombo thought to be the reason for the rise of the phenomenon of António Barreto and his associates, particularly another notable rebel named Nikapitiya Bandara.

The *Câmara* officials detail the series of events that all started with the incursion against Colombo led by the “rebel” Nikapitiya, which came about not only because of the intrinsic cultural trait of rebelliousness that all Sinhalese were said to have, but the mismanagement of the conquest by the present Captain-General, Nuno Álvares Pereira.

The captain general Dom Nuno Aluares Pereira took control of the conquest of the island of Ceilão on 28 of February of [1]616 with all the lands of the two kingdoms of Cota and Ceitouaqua under the obedience of His Majesty with the two fortresses of Balane and Sofragão that provided security for the lands [...] and everything was wasted and destroyed by the present rebellion. It occurred on the 7th of December at the same time that the island generally rebelled, and the natives of it said that they did it because they could no longer suffer the impositions and extraordinary services that the said Captain-General and his officers pressured them with.<sup>402</sup>

Though the group referred to as “the natives” (*naturaes*) can be read as general island inhabitants (i.e. every man, woman, and child), and where the *Câmara* in some way would like to portray it as such, the letter is very specifically referring to men who have some or another military capacity (i.e. *disavas*, *vidanas*, *cabeças*), which becomes clearer as it proceeds.

The natives are said to have brought in the rebel Nikapitiya in order to revenge themselves against the impositions of the Captain-General: “For this reason they raised the rebel

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402 *DRI-LM*, Vol. 5, p. 296.

Nicampeti as king, who under a banner of freedom consolidated great power”.<sup>403</sup> With the power in question they assaulted the Portuguese army, which would only be saved by the industriousness of the *casados* of Colombo as explained in the letter: “it is well noted that the lack of this support would have led to the loss of the army and thus the entire conquest”.<sup>404</sup> When the plight of the city was finally recognized by outside *Estado* officials, the letter explains how military support came pouring into the island. However, it is explained that such support was squandered once again thanks to military mismanagement.

[At this time] there came to Colombo a fleet that came from the south in that year with 400 soldiers and many *fidalgos* captains, given the state of that conquest. They offered to go and help in the fortresses of Balane and Sofraguão and there were even many of them reaching [M]aluana. But, due to the lack of order in this matter instead of helping they lost the said fortresses with 180 soldiers that was the cause of great discredit to us. This has prolonged the war till now as it has put us at odds with the lands of Sofraguão and a great part of those in Maturem that have rebelled, which are the most profitable and best lands of that island.<sup>405</sup>

Such discredit gained through military mismanagement is said to have had a negative effect on the popularity of the Portuguese, which in turn created a greater military support base for their rivals, and which also in turn negatively affected Senarat in Kandy.

Though many people died in the two great victories that this rebel had, others have not lost the pride and desire of freedom. Seeing in Nikampeti much talent and bravery [the natives] intended to install him in the kingdom of Candia, from where with even more power he could wage war against us. And seeing this Heneraz, who is currently the king of that kingdom, sought to submit to peace terms with the Captain-General handing over the port of Baticalor and many other lands belonging to the two kingdoms of Cota and Ceitauaqua that belong to His Majesty.<sup>406</sup>

As the *Câmara* has led us to believe, the reason why the group would even install Nikapitiya into

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403 *Ibid.*.

404 *Ibid.*, pp. 296-7.

405 *Ibid.*, p. 297.

406 *Ibid.*.

Kandy was not for the symbolic nature of Kandyan kingship *per se*, but to continue military activities, with Colombo being the target and victim. The entire debacle is said to have ruined the credibility of both the Portuguese and Senarat, the latter having to leave the kingdom and suffer the imposition of the boorish lot of “rebels” who did not appear concerned or conscious of preconceived rules of legitimate kingship.

Entering into this agreement was a great discredit to His [Majesty's] service, as it was done on the judgment of the said officers and some important persons from the City of Colombo, [and] it was understood that certain opportunities were lost. And wrong actions were taken due to the lack of government that they had, because if it was something examined and made certain, such an agreement would not have been confirmed in this way by the Viceroys of this state [...] The war has not ended with this peace treaty, it is instead thought to be greater and more dangerous. This is because the natives see the little order with which this rebellion was handled, and the great resourcefulness and valor of the rebel [Nikampeti] and the great reputation of Antonio Barreto, apostate of our holy faith and rebel against 15 years of service to His Majesty. To achieve [the natives'] ambitions (*para effeito de suas pertençaõs*) they make great promises and oaths [of allegiance] to both of them, which have created in Barreto the spirit to rebel against his own King of Candea. And with 3 to 4,000 men Barreto attacked him and killed many people and took his treasure and women, who are two legitimate sisters and queens, from that kingdom. He then married one of the queens to a man of royal blood of that island that they call Cosuatabandar, and people in his group call him, "the King of Candea". The other queen is said to be promised to the rebel Nicapeti. Thus, these are the three in confederation against the King of Candea, [and] that was the reason why he made peace with us. Those that intend our destruction are the rebels that went to the kingdom of Candea to be [in the party of] the group of three, which are a combination of the worst people in the kingdom of Candea and the worst people from our lands in the low-country.<sup>407</sup>

Once again, it is worth highlighting the “ambitions” of the rebellious natives, who seem to flock to those leaders who can be persuaded to actively engage in war.

By the first years of the next decade of 1620, Senarat still did not seem to carry much authority in the region, even though the two rebels had been beaten back by the Portuguese through the native *disava* Constantino Barreto, and regardless of the above-mentioned peace

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407 *Ibid.*, p. 297-8.

treaty still in place. In the *devassa* written in 1621 by the Bishop of Cochin, he explains the present situation, which was referred to above in the introductory chapter of this thesis. To highlight the points of the letter once again, the Bishop explains that the central impediment to the conquest is the Portuguese and the native military personnel, which he in some ways depicts as an autonomous party, who keep the war in an active state because they stand to benefit from it. As he also explains, this circumstance is the prime reason why power in Kandy cannot be stabilized or established by any given king or military head, since such military personnel shift from one camp to the other with the immediate intention of dragging out military activities. In light of this, the Bishop explains to King Philip that though the “rebels” Barreto and Mayadunne had been defeated, their retreat into the jungles could spell trouble, something that Constantino de Sá has naively overlooked.

This was the state of things when Constantino de Saa de Noronha came into the management of this conquest as the Count of Redondo ordered for him to succeed Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira in the place of Captain-General of this conquest, where the enemies were in retreat and the King of Candea was at peace [with us]. He assumed thus that the conquest was almost over and there was no war to speak of. It is true Dom Constantino [Barreto] fought Madune and [António] Barreto and pressured them to the point that they retreated into the jungles. However, Lord, as long as there are Changalas there are enemies, and these two have the names of kings which is enough for us to be concerned and realize that more prevention and vigilance is necessary. Because tomorrow they can easily come back with arms against us, as the Chingalas have not lost their tendency of being friends to novelties and a native king.<sup>408</sup>

As explained by the Bishop, though Mayadunne and Barreto had apparently been cast out of the kingdom, he understands that they had the ability to easily garner military support from which they could eventually win it back and challenge the Portuguese once again. The language used to describe Mayadunne's position of authority here is interesting, as the migrant itinerant from South India by this time was being described as a “legitimate heir” to the kingship of the up-

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408 *DRI-LM, Vol. 8, p. 55-6.*

country, which impelled Senarat to seek the help of the Portuguese at least until the “rebel” threat was neutralized.

The King of Candea is a powerful enemy who is still under a peace agreement with us as a reconciled friend. He committed to the terms with Dom Nuno Alvares given that Madune is a legitimate and native heir (*erdeiro natural e legitimo*) of these kingdoms. Since the Chingalas were following him [Mayadunne], [Senarat] made peace with us to help cast out Madune from the island, because he fears that he will take the kingdom from him. Accordingly, once Madune escapes or dies in the next moment the King of Candea will rebel. There would be great difficulties [if this happened] because mishaps of this conquest are and were very great. The Portuguese soldiers are few, very poorly armed, and people of little worth, which the King of Candea knows very well.<sup>409</sup>

In all, the combined statements provided above show that Senarat did not have much kingly authority and stature in the region of Kandy by the early 1620s, and this is regardless of whether he thought he was carrying a legitimate title or not, since the rhetoric of legitimacy passed to different figures depending on the level of their military power. This situation placed a considerable amount of power into the hands of the military heads, who in many ways were the real king-makers of the island, but who would characteristically shift their support and weight toward the more belligerent factions in order to keep the war in an active state.

#### *SOCIAL AND POLITICAL INNOVATION'S OF RULE: RAJASINHA'S MILITARY LAND AND LABOR STRUCTURE*

Rajasinha II, originally known as Maha Astana, the youngest of the three sons of Senarat, came to power in part by the mandate of the king, which was given to him at the expense of his other brothers. The fact that Rajasinha II could protect his mandate militarily contributed in great measure, as he had been on enough military campaigns and dealt with enough military personnel to understand how to maintain this type of support. Soon after the death of Senarat, one of his main rivals was to be his brother Vijayapala, the Prince of Matale, who in fits of desperation

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409 *Ibid.*.

sought the military support of both the Portuguese and Dutch to unseat his brother. This would be the first of many challenges to his power and other contingencies that he had dealt with in his long career. However, as time went on, Rajasinha II began to approach such perpetual problems differently from his predecessors; he identified key structural faults in the military recruitment model used thus far given it promoted seditious activities, and began to develop structures and institutions that attempted to re-route authority in the military structure. Specifically, he had attempted to form what seems to be the first ever standard formal army structure in the island's early modern history, thus eliding contracting military heads at times when support was needed, usually immediately before expeditions. He made the standing army structure possible through an administrative and economic restructuring that kept military involved in non-military activities when there were no wars to be fought, and which also socially disconnected such military from each other during non-activity. The innovative structure, which took the social connections formed between military personnel into account, and where a land administration scheme was developed around de-socializing them, was one of a kind in the period.

The information pertaining to administrative development in the up-country region found in the *Mandarampura Puvata* is of great use to the historian in this regard. The convention of detailing such information that Vikum Aduru created, makes it possible to track these administrative activities and how they change from king to king. When noting the differences in administrative policy one sees a clear shift between that of the first two kings, Senarat and Vimaladharmasuriya, and the third, Rajasinha II. Most notably, the class of military generals and land administrators, the *disavas* and *vidanas*, begin to receive non-military and non-land administrative roles that were created by Rajasinha, which concerned resource development.

This is different from the two previous kings, who tended to grant land outright to military heads.

In Vikum Aduru's description of the form and function of administration in the time of Vimaladharmasuriya he generally explains how the roles of different occupational and caste groups change; however, the administrative roles of the chief military personnel seem to stay the same. In similarity with the conventions found in the *Hatana Kavya*, the descriptions of land title grants and other administrative changes occur in the narrative soon after major battles, since it is generally understood that land was captured with the expulsion of the opposing force. In the descriptions, we find details of the contours of what a simple land-granting administration system could have looked like, where military personnel were given titles over areas and granted the ability to extract tribute freely, as seen in other *Hatana Kavya*.

121.

Mandaram Pura was given by law (*karunā panat*)  
To fifteen ministers and their soldiers  
An inscribed statement (*sanhas*) was given  
To be seen with this information

122.

Salsapuna, Panaramba, Puwakturu  
And Mal Uyana was given to Giri Tawasa  
Three ministers and their people were appointed  
And Gattanpanduru was given to them by law

123.

Paraviyagala and Ratninda Belihul  
Inside the borders of the valley there is Sapuvinna  
These were given to the minister Divaratna  
Giving these made his heart content<sup>410</sup>

Besides this, Vikum Aduru begins to provide some information about the place of other groups (low-castes and other occupational groups) who are said to be given new roles to help meet the development of taxes on goods and messaging services.

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410 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

145.  
To the arrow makers named Gunama and Valambuva  
The village title was given to each  
To collect the toddy tax and the betel tax  
And the job of messaging service was given<sup>411</sup>

The same thing would occur for the development of iron and gem-mining, rice farming, betel-nut collection, etc. in the region, where the workforce would be made up from a collection of different service castes, under the charge of the a courtier and military head (*maeti* - “minister”) assigned to the area. Vikum Aduru marks points when success within these areas was driven by the personal initiative of certain heads.

158.  
The respectable Govigama caste members  
Named Kariyawasam, Rajapasa, Ambagaspitiya and Suriyavasam  
And sixteen ministers who knew various different occupations and sciences (*sipkam*)  
For development (*diyunuva*) of each area were sent

159.  
Of those skilled ministers  
Two named Ratnayaka and Ambagaspitiya  
Were sent for the responsibility  
Of beautiful Mandarapura in Upper Uva and Hevahata

160.  
These ministers who received the order to develop this area  
Had relations with Hevahata from a previous time  
They came and with the people  
Made the farm lands fertile and improved other things as well

161.  
The great minister Ratnayaka who was knowledgeable about gems  
Went into the forested areas of Diyabubula and the top of Agalpav  
He brought forward gems from forty different mines  
From different locations in Wilkada, Uva after four months<sup>412</sup>

The section on Senarat, also by Vikum Aduru, speaks of a general continuation of policy but

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411 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

412 *Ibid.*, pp. 20-1.

does not have the same level of details in how labor was managed for the different industries as the previous section. However, it does generally refer to the land-titles, money, and other presents given to those military personnel that gave a notable service, including low-castes and *veddahs*.<sup>413</sup>

Moving to the section on Rajasinha II by Unambowee, there are similarities in that there seems to be a continued policy for the development of lands and resources. However, the roles of the ministers seem to shift. While there are cases of ministers being given land titles, there also appear to be instances of ministers being assigned specific tasks and roles that took them away from direct land and resource administration.

367.

Riches and positions were given  
To soldiers and ministers who won the war which made them happy  
The king gave Ihala Hevahata and Maturata  
To those who were cleverer.

368.

Nilawature and Labutala were given doctors' positions (*vedaduru*)  
Kottwa and Holiyabandara were given the income positions (*ādāyam duraya*)  
The ministers of Pussalamankada Ilangatilaka and Udagama  
Were each given a shield, arrow, and sword

[...]

376.

Minister Ambagahapitiya who defeated enemies in the great battle of Kelani  
Was given the village Galabada  
The minister Uduwala was given the village Madapala  
Hotana Arrachila was given the road duty position (*kankānam*)

[...]

380.

The road duty post of Hevavasam was given to minister Deniye  
The work management (*pangāratu*) position of Kariyawasam was given to Aesapamalpe

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413 *Ibid.*, pp. 32-3 – vs. 245-54.

Ministers Vadavala and Dehipe were in charge of store houses (*gabadā bāraya*)  
In the area of Gannawa the post of store keeper was given to Minister Vagama<sup>414</sup>

New roles suddenly feature in this section (i.e. *vedaduru*, *ādāyam duraya*, *kankānam*, *pangāratu*, and *gabadā bāraya*) where previously there was no record of these in the *Mandarampura Puvata*. Taken this way, the roles represent the fragmentation of the larger responsibility of land administration that members of the military class (*disavas*, *vidanas*, *mudaliyars*, *araccis*, *lascarins*) were now made to fill. The structure departed from previous land-revenue extraction roles and fragmented them into specialized roles that did not offer full and direct control over an entire village or territory in some cases.

A similar description of land and resource administration in Kandy under Rajasinha is found in another source, the captivity account of Robert Knox, *An Historical Relation of Ceylon*. Among the many statements Knox has on the subject, one stands out that helps to connect regional development to military roles, and how they both fit into an overall administrative program.

He [Rajasinha II] approves not that his People should be idle; but always finds one thing or other to be done, tho the work be to little or no purpose. According to the quantity of the work, so he will appoint the People of one County or of two to come in: and the Governor of the said County or Counties to be Overseer of the Work. At such times the Soldiers must lay by their Swords, and work among the People.<sup>415</sup>

From this passage, it can be surmised that changes in policies in the time of Rajasinha II made for new non-military roles for the soldiery and potential soldiery. Going further into the source one can find out why and to what extent this occurred.

Knox's account gives much important information internal to the kingdom, and takes

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414 *Ibid.*, pp. 34-6.

415 Knox, p. 142.

specific interest in how the military service structure became a standing army structure under Rajasinha, which the ruler tied to land and resource administration and development. Knox notes that the general land-based administrative structure had moved away from a previous revenue extraction structure to one that was based on providing services.

The countrey being wholly his, the King farms out his land not for money but service. And the people enjoy portions of land from the King, and instead of rent, they have their several appointments, some are to serve the King in wars, some in their trades, some serve him for labourers, and others are as farmers to furnish his house with the fruits of the ground.<sup>416</sup>

Knox saw the formation of this service-based administrative structure to be the product of the great fear the King had of his subjects: “he often employs his People in vast works, and that will require years to finish, that he may insure them to Slavery, and prevent them from Plotting against him, as haply they might do if they were at better leisure”.<sup>417</sup> Knox generally characterizes Rajasinha as a highly paranoid individual who structured his activities around this eventuality. Accordingly, Knox notes that the king had a tendency to constantly move personnel into and out of his court.

Displacing some of his courtiers, and promoting others, and giving sentence to execute those whom he would have to live no longer: and many times commands to lay hold on and carry away great and noble men, who until that instant knew not that they were out of his favour.<sup>418</sup>

Rajasinha is said to have taken the same approach in managing military personnel (*disavas*, *vidanas*, and *araccis*), or those that “are Generals or Chief Commanders who have a certain number of soldiers under them”.<sup>419</sup> Knox gives some details on how the king elects such people

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416 *Ibid.*, pp. 139-40.

417 *Ibid.*, p. 142.

418 *Ibid.*.

419 *Ibid.*, p. 156.

for these positions and what the role entails. Once again, the propensity to loyalty is valued above all else, even above resourcefulness and intelligence.

The King when he advances any to be Dissauvas, or to any great Office regards not their ability or sufficiency to perform the same, only they must be persons of good rank, and gentile extraction: and they are all naturally discreet and very solid, and so the fitter for the King's employment.<sup>420</sup>

Knox continues by giving a profile of a typical candidate for the post, claiming that above all else, Rajasinha preferred his governors to be Christians as he had in them “greater confidence than his own people, concluding that they will make more conscience of their ways, and be more faithful in their office”.<sup>421</sup> This position entailed the control and maintenance over a territory, which included the control over the people enlisted to services within it, and where the governor received the profits from the revenues made.<sup>422</sup>

Knox explains that there were some notable drawbacks to holding such a high-level post. For one, the governors themselves could not actually inhabit the areas they were assigned, as they are required from then on to “stand guard in certain stations, where the King appoints them”.<sup>423</sup> In their place administrative matters were managed by a set of *vidanas* for the region, who amongst other things are said to have managed disputes between the people in their areas. Knox claims that such disputes would be dealt with in such a way that the *vidanas* would favor the side that could offer the *disava* the most money, which in turn made him unpopular amongst the people. This was a design that Knox explains Rajasinha intended, “and these carriages cannot reconcile them much love among the people; but the more they are hated by the people for their

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420 *Ibid.*, p. 158.

421 *Ibid.*.

422 *Ibid.*, pp. 158-9.

423 *Ibid.*, p. 160.

rigorous government, the better they please the King”.<sup>424</sup> Knox claims that Rajasinha removed such *disavas* from his court as frequently as he admitted them, using the complaints put forward against the *disavas* by the populace in the regions, complaints that Rajasinha in some ways elicited, as a justification for his policies.<sup>425</sup> When such figures were finally deposed Knox claims that rival *disavas* carried out the process of unseating predecessors in a violent and competitive manner, “and the great Men are as ready when the King commands to lay hold on one another, as he to command them: and glad to have the honour to be the King's executioners, hoping to have the place and office of the executed”.<sup>426</sup> To complete the process of sacking a *disava*, Rajasinha is said to have ordered the killing or imprisonment of all the male familial relatives of the removed *disava*, “fearing they should plot revenge, and seizes on all the estate”.<sup>427</sup> In all, Rajasinha did not feel it to be in his interest to harbor commanders who were audacious and could win battles as such people were understood to have a natural sense of personal ambition, which was treated as a potential danger: “he cares not that his great men should be free-spirited or valiant: if there be any better than the rest, them to be sure suddenly he cuts off, lest they might do him any mischief”.<sup>428</sup>

Knox shows that this entire administrative structure, and the discord and competition that was systemically manufactured between the *disavas*, provides the basis for the maintenance of a standing army, which was designed to offer military services at times of war while minimizing the risk of military rebellions. Much like the military heads, the soldiery in Rajasinha's service

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424 *Ibid.*.

425 *Ibid.*.

426 *Ibid.*, p 167.

427 *Ibid.*.

428 *Ibid.*, p. 176.

were given areas to administer, albeit smaller sections, and as such were required to stay close to the court. However, unlike the heads, though they stayed in court for allotted periods of time, they were allowed to return to their land at other times. The locations that these soldiers lorded over were strategically placed as Knox explains, “the soldiers of the high-lands called Cande Uda, are dispersed all over the land: so that one scarcely knows the other, the King not suffering many neighbours and townsmen to be in one company: which hath always heretofore been so ordered for fear of conspiracies”.<sup>429</sup> According to Knox, Rajasinha had a similar attitude toward relationships between the commanders of the soldiers as well, “neither doth he like or approve that the great commanders of his soldiers should be very intimate or good friends, lest they conspire against him”.<sup>430</sup> When on expedition, safeguards against rebelliousness were also put into place, which required the commanders and soldiers to be wholly ignorant of the expedition or assault that the group was commissioned to.

Whensoever the King sends his armies abroad upon any expedition, the watches beyond them are all secured immediately, to prevent any from passing to carry intelligence to the enemy. The soldiers themselves do not know the design they are sent upon, until they come there. None can know his intentions or meaning by his actions. For sometimes he sends commanders with their soldiers to ly in certain places in the woods until farther order, or until he send ammunition to them.<sup>431</sup>

Though designed to offer protections from rebellions, the fragmentation and social constrictions of the military and administrative structure did not offer Rajasinha a form of military power that did anything more than defend the up-country region and more specifically the immediate vicinity of the Kandy region. Knox claims that the lack of social cohesion between the commanders made the execution of military plans very difficult, and in particular

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429 *Ibid.*, p. 174.

430 *Ibid.*.

431 *Ibid.*, p. 176

that there was competition amongst the commanders, who hence could not decide on an overarching commanding general to manage the entire army.

And when several of them are sent together upon any design, there is not any one appointed to be Chief Commander or General over the whole army, but each one as being Chief over his own men, disposeth and ordereth them according to his pleasure, the other do the like. Which sometimes begets disagreement among themselves, and by that means their designs are frustrated.<sup>432</sup>

Along with these leadership impediments, the fact that the soldiers were individually responsible for carrying their own supplies (i.e. food, wood, tents, and weapons), was yet another way of disconnecting troops from each other, and resulted in shorter expeditions that could not venture far from up-country centers; “and having spent what provisions they carried out with them, they go home to fetch more, so that after a month or two a great part of the army is always absent”.<sup>433</sup> Though the military might under Rajasinha was structured to not have the capacity to expand his territory, and specifically take over fortifications located on the coasts, it was highly effective in frustrating the attempts made by enemies to gain territory in the regions in proximity to the up-country, especially around the jungles from which they waged guerrilla warfare. The following seems to be an accurate description, barring the sarcasm, that Knox offers regarding the form and function of Rajasinha's military power, which explains such strengths and weaknesses.

In their war there is but little valour used, altho they do accomplish many notable exploits. For all they do is by crafty stratagems. They will never meet their enemies in the field, to give them a repulse by battel, and force of arms: neither is the enemy like to meet with any opposition at their first goings out to invade the King's coasts, the King's soldiers knowing the adverse forces are at first wary and vigilant, as also well provided with all necessaries. But their usual practice is to way-lay them, and stop up the wayes before them: there being convenient places in all the roads, which they have contrived for such purposes. And at these places the woods are not suffered to be felled, but kept to shelter them from the sight of their enemies. Here they lye lurking, and plant their guns

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432 *Ibid.*.

433 *Ibid.*, p. 175.

between the rocks and trees with which they do great damage to their enemies before they are aware.<sup>434</sup>

Though the military land and labor structure could not absolutely prevent internal rebellions against the king in Kandy, it greatly reduced their occurrence, which is shown in the extended length of Rajasinha's rule in the region, which endured over a half century until his death in 1687. Furthermore, such a structure gave no occasion for rebellions to form in the field of battle, which in the past had completely destabilized the military power and thus the authority of many a king and general, European and Asian, in the early modern history of the island. Though the administrative structure is treated with contempt by Knox, who has a generally acerbic view toward anything related to the King, it fits in with a larger picture of military labor and the military economy detailed thus far. It also speaks to Rajasinha's ingenuity compared to all previous rulers in the island; he understood that military rebellions formed from social connections between ambitious generals and captains, whereas he implemented a land and resource administrative structure primarily aimed at de-socializing them from each other and kept them active in other works during periods of no military activity. This allowed for a move from the method of open recruitment before and during an expedition, to a standing army that was readily available. As shown, the structure was highly effective in defending the immediate area of the up-country, but the structure in particular did not allow for larger territorial expansion.

*THE ABSTRACTION OF KINGLY AUTHORITY AT A TIME OF FINALITY: RAJASINHA HATANA*

By 1640, the relatively stable establishment of Kandyan power by Rajasinha II correspondingly created a basis for courtly cultural production, which bore the responsibility of

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434 *Ibid.*, p. 177.

highlighting the achievements of the Kandyan kings for posterity. As explained above, such writings were produced at a time of finality; Portuguese military authority had ceded, which allowed for the brushing over of the complexities behind relations between the Kandyan kings and the Portuguese that occurred over the last few decades. In other words, clearer dividing lines could be drawn between the Kandyan kings and the Portuguese without too many messy details getting in the way. In this way, the compilation of courtly panegyric, the *Mandarampura Puvata*, shares a deep similarity with Queiroz's *Conquista*; both are texts that present themselves as historical, but both tend to paint clear and distinct sides entrenched in defined clashing ideological motivations. The texts can take the tack they do precisely because they are both composed at the time of the recent end of Portuguese military authority in the island.<sup>435</sup>

But, as also shown above, this cannot be said for Sinhala literary cultural productions from an earlier time, specifically the first two *Hatana Kavya*; *Sitavaka Hatana* and *Kustantinu Hatana*. In these texts, the lines are not so clearly drawn, and greater problems as they explain it relate to the loyalties of military personnel. The *Rajasiha Hatana* (“War of Rajasinha”)<sup>436</sup>, though sharing many similarities with the predecessors of the genre in that it takes on certain conventions (i.e. expedition narrative, recruitment descriptions, and title granting) bears more striking resemblances in tone and approach with those texts produced after 1640 (the time of its composition) such as *Mandarampura Puvata*. Composed by an anonymous poet, the *Rajasiha Hatana* highlights the events surrounding the achievements of Rajasinha II in his war against the

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435 The concept of *aitihya* is useful here, as both the texts of Queiroz (an European chronicle) and the *Mandarampura Puvata* are 'true' but in many cases not 'factual', see: Rao, Shulman, Subrahmanyam, *Textures of Time*, p. 14.

436 This section references Paul E. Pieris' translation of the *Rajasiha Hatana* he did in a 1909 volume of sources that he misleadingly titled as 'Parangi Hatane'. Adding to the confusion, the verse numbers are not equivalent to those in the Sinhala version edited by Somaratna, where Pieris ends up with 16 more verses than Somaratna. Pieris, *Ribeiro's History of Ceilão* (Colombo, 1909), pp. 244-70. This text will be referred to as *Pieris-RH*.

Portuguese, referred to as “Franks” (*parangi*), and where the author is unequivocal about how such “foreign” foes are as treacherous as they are morally reprehensible. The author also clearly identifies the motivations of Rajasinha, who does not seem interested in anything else besides protecting the religious and cultural symbols of Buddhism and in a corresponding manner casting out the foreign “beef-eating” Franks. Dedication to such merits is said to have naturally resulted in his victory, where holding to kingly precepts as a *cakravartin* wins him the support of men and even “the Gods”, which the Portuguese are obviously no match for. The *Rajasiha Hatana* in many ways is the textual production that provides the evidence for the theoretical concept of Sinhala Buddhist Kingship used by some scholars. Such a theory, that certain kingship practices connote authority, has already been dealt with in this thesis. But it must be said that even when examining the poem on its own, the theoretical concept and the forms of rhetoric it references, specifically the rhetoric of foreignness and indigeneity, can be easily critiqued, given that such rhetoric does not seem to apply to those groups that should be on the wrong end of such designations (i.e. the Dutch, and Tamil speakers serving as soldiers), as one would expect. What is also important to note, since it accounts for certain blind-spots in the kingship theory, is that the *Rajasiha Hatana* depicts the process of military recruitment for Rajasinha to be an effortless task, where troop leaders, even from the other side, are said to flock to the king based purely on his kingly charisma. Such is not the case for the Portuguese however, who are said to put much more effort in the process, and are even required to pay their own Portuguese troops for services rendered.

Unlike the *Kustantinu Hatana*, which opens with a mix of what could be identified as a combination of Buddhist and Christian themes, the first three verses of *Rajasiha Hatana* opens

with a singular and unequivocal reference to the Buddhist triple gem (i.e. Buddha, *dharma*, *sangha*).<sup>437</sup> It begins by providing visual imagery of the pristine and serene surroundings of Kandy under Senarat; buildings, *bo* trees, wares, landscapes, and of course the Sacred Tooth of Buddha. However, such serenity is soon troubled by the Portuguese, who purposely intend to defile certain cultural symbols, as they are charged with setting fire to the Tooth Relic and slaying and consuming cattle.<sup>438</sup> This prompts the author to make certain historical connections between the Franks and another group of invaders from a previous age.

31.

As when long ago the cruel Tamils did land and sack our city Anurapura.<sup>439</sup>

The incursion prompts Senarat to leave the city, where he finds exile in the forested areas in the up-country that the *veddah* tribals inhabit. The forfeit represents nothing less than the complete “destruction of our [Buddhist] faith”.<sup>440</sup> The desperate situation that Senarat finds himself in prompts him to seek the council of astrologers, who claim that the king and his kingdom would soon be reinstated to glory through his newly born son, Maha Astana (Rajasinha II). The reading of the omen as it is explained had an immediate positive effect in this regard.

47.

“He will follow the law set for Kings”, his glory shall be as the full moon, in his might he will be as Vishnu

48.

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437 *Pieris-RH*, vs. 1-3 -- p. 246. There are references to Buddhist symbols in the *Sitavaka Hatana* as well, but the number of references to such symbols is much greater in *Rajasiha Hatana*, which is a third of the size of the former. The thematic difference is that such symbolic references are not meant to identify the nature of a comprehensive schism between sides as it is in the *Rajasiha Hatana*.

438 *Ibid.*, vs. 28-30 – p. 247. There are derogatory references to beef-eating in the *Sitavaka Hatana* as well. However, the tone is markedly different from the references in the *Rajasiha Hatana*, which explains it to be a fundamental point of conflict in itself. Once again, there is also a difference in the number of references, with the *Rajasiha Hatana* far outweighing the earlier work.

439 *Ibid.*, p. 247.

440 *Ibid.*, v. 36 – p. 247.

Lo, a Chakravarti is born for our land, he will make the three Sinhala lands into one, he will protect the Doctrine, and the foe shall quail before him

49.

The happy King rewarded him to his full content for his words

50.

And such was the merit of the Prince that the enemy deserted their fort of Balane and retired

51.

While the country remained once more at peace, the fields were tilled, and the religion awoke again

[...]

54.

And our king Senarat reigned in peace and power observing the law of Kings, and in the hope of Buddhahood.<sup>441</sup>

The events in question document the period when Senarat sought Portuguese military support to oust the likes of Barreto and Mayadunne, who were a serious challenge to his kingly authority as shown above. Messy details such as those related to the making of the peace treaty would have to be glossed over given the theme of primary differences between the islanders and the Franks.

From the 72<sup>nd</sup> verse, the poem begins to chronicle the incursions made by Constantino de Sá, and in his initial forays for conquering the up-country, Sá is said to have not been able to challenge the king, who was shielded by his overwhelming “merits”.<sup>442</sup> Sá makes a more concerted effort in the second attempt, where this time the verses follow a convention of recruitment as found in other *Hatana Kavya*.

87.

So Kustantinu de Sa collected the forces of the four Dissavas with speed and summoned a Council of many Captains.

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441 *Ibid.*, p. 248.

442 *Ibid.*, v. 84 – p. 250.

88.

And they advanced from the city of Columbo – stout captains, *casados*, and *soldados*, like the demon host from Kuvera, with the lust of war in their hearts, and reached Malvana

89.

The triumphant flags and martial banners fluttered in the breeze, lances and bows and guns were handed round the men, villages and lands, titles and chains of gold, were there bestowed, and the order of the march, front and rear, allotted.

90.

While the hearts of *soldados* and Captains were delighted with their pay.<sup>443</sup>

However, the poem breaks with the convention when explaining the manner in which Rajasinha organized his corresponding troops.

107.

Determined to crush the treacherous foe, that day they encamp by the Belahul Oya.

108.

Thence they move to Sahalgarana Oya where the troops are reviewed according to the Lekam lists.

The differences in the descriptions, besides their lengths, speak to a difference in the amount of effort each party needed to put into the process of recruitment. For Sá, he had to recruit widely and compensate his captains and troops with payments. Rajasinha is said not to have been required to do the same laborious activities, as he seems to be in possession of a force that is both voluntary and standing, as alluded to by the administrative rolls that already contained troop information. But, as it is explained, Rajasinha's eventual success against Sá is not brought about by his standing and voluntary troop base. Instead his kingly attractiveness lures the susceptible island *disavas* serving under Sá away from the Frank and toward the island king.

121.

Thus stood our King, like Vishnu, drying up the ocean that was the foe

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443 *Ibid.*, pp. 87-90.

122.  
The crown of the race of the sun, delighting the heart of man

123.  
Vanquishing the foe and protecting the Faith, leading his triumphant men.

124.  
“Why do we walk in boots in circles with the Parangis?”, and they pondered how to leave them. And with this thought

[...]

127. [The disavas] presented themselves before the King with due obedience.<sup>444</sup>

The rebellion leaves Sá stranded in Randeniwela, and an Indic-themed piece of rhetoric drives home the point of xenophobic difference.

138.  
Were Rama and Ravana contending again?  
Was the war of the gods and Asuras renewed?  
Was a new Gemunu hurling back the Tamil foe?  
Between whom was this awful fight?<sup>445</sup>

The verses then tell of the violent mayhem that ensues, where Sá and some of his company, including priests, are hacked into pieces, their severed heads sent back to Senarat with prisoners in celebratory adulation. From this point the group makes their way westward, toward Colombo, taking all the key interior fortifications along the way. However, the plan to lay siege on Colombo is halted since a group of “great *mantris*” abandoned the advancing army on route.<sup>446</sup> Rajasinha therefore decides to leave the Franks with the control of the low-country. His fortitude in all of these moments marks his right to take up the sovereign role and the well-deserved title of “Rajasinha” (King of Lions).

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444 *Ibid.*, p. 251-2.

445 *Ibid.*, p. 253.

446 *Ibid.*, v. 221 – p. 257.

234.

And the King in his grace replied, “Have I not crushed the foreign foe who for so long has dealt in his forts? Have I not brought this Lanka beneath the shadow of one canopy? Who then is there of the race of the Sun so fit to wear the name?”<sup>447</sup>

From the 238<sup>th</sup> verse, the author narrates the entry of Diogo de Melo de Castro, who now has under his command a whole new set of military recruits of unfamiliar origins and base habits.

240.

Thereon the worthless crowds of Kaberis, Kannadis, and Javas, steeped in ganja and opium and witless with drink, the shameless Sinhala who accompanied them, with the graceless Bengalis and Parawara sailors.<sup>448</sup>

This prompts Rajasinha to make a wide call for military support, including in Tamil-speaking areas, and once again the generals and captains in the *disavas* are not said to be lured by any sort of compensation.

253.

And many a loyal servant of the King went forth to Uva Tunkinde and the remote ends of Matale that the hosts should assemble in their numbers.

[...]

257.

From Ratdala, Itulana, Yalepana (Jaffna) and Magampura, from Wellawaya, Palugamam, and Tirukkovila, from the Vedi Pattu, and the great harbour of Kottiarama, and from many a land of the famed Wanniyas.<sup>449</sup>

The battle ensues and predictably Rajasinha and his supporters overrun Diogo de Melo's force. Diogo de Melo's troops from the Karnatak and East Africa are scattered, leaving a small group of Sinhala soldiers who were one-time supporters of the Franks. These are said to have effortlessly departed from the party of the Franks given their cultural proximity to Rajasinha.

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447 *Ibid.*, p. 259.

448 *Ibid.*.

449 *Ibid.*, p. 260-1.

388.

“And why do the gallant men of Lanka, who are of us, cleave to this beef-eating group?  
Should they not join us today, verily on the morrow we shall slaughter every one”

389.

Such was the message the royal drummers conveyed, and the Sinhala releasing fear from  
the heart rolled away from the Parangis, like the dew drop on a leaf.<sup>450</sup>

However others that stayed in the Portuguese party were not so lucky.

405.

Those country-born Thupassis who feed on beef and ape the *senhores* in their trousers –  
Kavisi, Kannadi, Parangis and men from many a land – all are struck down as when  
fishermen kill their prey by night.<sup>451</sup>

The poem goes on to explain that some *thupassis* and Catholic priests were spared “for mercy’s  
sake”, since the death of Diogo de Melo signified the complete defeat of the Portuguese in the  
island.<sup>452</sup> At this point, titles, land grants, and other rewards are given to the notables who have  
served the king zealously.<sup>453</sup>

Rajasinha's final achievement as noted in the poem is the takeover of coastal “low-land”  
fortifications. However it is clear from the description, that the king and his army cannot do this  
on their own, which prompts him to “permit” the Dutch to enter, in order to complete the  
Portuguese removal. The rhetoric employed in the verses is striking considering the author  
somehow fits the Dutch into Rajasinha's party under an Indic-type theme.

436.

And he laid plans to capture the strong fort of Madakalapuwa which the enemy raised.

437.

And like the host which rallied around King Gemunu when he marched to the siege of  
Anurapura

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450 *Ibid.*, pp. 265-6.

451 *Ibid.*, p. 267.

452 *Ibid.*, vs. 415-7 – p. 268.

453 *Ibid.*, p. 268.

438.  
With a might force of Hollanders from Dambadiva

439.  
An Amaral arrived with his host of brave men sailing in 12 ships to Madakalapuwa

440.  
News of which was submitted to the King who graciously permitted them to land

441.  
And by the merit of our king and the efforts of this host the fort was won.<sup>454</sup>

In some way the Dutch here are being likened to Dutugemunu's army on expedition to retake the ancient city of Anuradhapura from the Cholan Tamil “invaders” in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE. Once the final blows are delivered on the Portuguese and peace is restored, the poem ends establishing the right and legitimate kingly rule of Rajasinha over the entire island.

450.  
Protecting our religion, and observing the law set for kings, and dazzling the neighboring kingdoms with his glory. For he reduced the whole of Lanka under the White Canopy of his dominion and ruled as its prosperous lord.

[...]

453.  
May you flourish as the wish-conferring [*bo*] tree, gladdening the hearts of men! May you win more victories over your foes, and reign as a Chakravarti, Lord of the Earth!<sup>455</sup>

As striking as the xenophobic rhetoric in the entire poem is, it is clearly directed at the Portuguese and those in their military camp. This is seen in the way Rajasinha is said to use people from the Tamil speaking regions in his own army, as well as the Dutch, who are even fitted into an Indic style imagery as they are depicted as a troop led by the famed Sinhala king,

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454 *Ibid.*, p. 269.

455 *Ibid.*, p. 270.

Duttu Gemunu. The poem also sets the cultural basis of kingship, as a panegyric would, but in a way that is generally more absolute as compared to previous poems in the genre. This is related to the more permanent character of his military authority over the Portuguese as I posited above.

### *CONCLUSION*

The extant studies on Sinhala Buddhist Kingship and their theoretical formulations when set against the source documentation available from the period are found to be shortsighted in two areas; 1) they make no connection between the rhetoric of kingly legitimacy and actual kingly authority, 2) they do not recognize that legitimacy conveniently changed along the lines of shifting military authority throughout the roughly 150 year period that the Portuguese inhabited the island. Put quite simply, the studies available have not considered the imposition and control of force when examining the process of kingly ascension and the maintenance of the position. Adherents of the set of theories tend to have more populist assumptions when describing power and authority in the island, where the people of the island, often elites, whom they assume are unequivocally ethnic Sinhala and Buddhist, are the agents of authority and bestow it on the king of their choosing depending on his qualifications, specifically the level of ethnic and religious legitimacy he embodies. The Sinhala Buddhist kingship theories, far from being based on a detailed examination of the wide set of documentation available from the period in question, seem to be little more than a rehashing of contemporary social and political assumptions about the primacy of certain ethnic and religious groups, (i.e. Sinhala Buddhist) over others (i.e. Tamils and Muslims). Though such identities can be found in name in sources from the said period, they differ greatly from what social scientists today might term “ethnicity”. Far from being as rigid

and timeless as assumed, the historical documentation from the period of this study finds that such identities are malleable, but not freely so, as I have argued that they change according to the ebb and flow of a social, cultural, political, and economic system of war in the island during the period.

Moving away from the approaches offered by such studies to ones that consider the central military economic dimension is also of use when looking at the century following the one of the present study. The theme of kingly authority and its connection to vacillating terms of legitimacy is also seen in the eighteenth century as explained in the work by Lorna Dewaraja, *The Kandyan Kingdom of Ceylon: 1707-1760*. In the work, she charts how the habit Kandyan kings had of marrying South Indian princesses eventually gave way to the formation of a royalty that was clearly linked to South India by this time; what is known as the 'Nayakkar dynasty' of Kandy. As she explains it, the noble character of the South Indian princesses and their families was fabricated in a sense.

Contemporary Sinhalese literary works and land grants of the period abound in grandiose titles regarding the illustrious *ksatriya* ancestry of the Nayakkar kings of Kandy. The Nayaks who in their south Indian home were contended with their *sudra* origin had a sudden rise in the caste scale when they crossed the Palk Strait to occupy the throne of Kandy and the haughty Kandyan nobles prostrated themselves at their feet, regarding them as the *ksatriyas* of the solar race. The term *ksatriya* was loosely applied in Ceylon as there was no powerful Brahmin element to regulate the claims of caste. Anyone who happened to occupy the throne was necessarily a *ksatriya* of either the solar or lunar dynasty.<sup>456</sup>

Specifically, the case of the marriage of the late seventeenth century Kandyan king and grandson of Rajasinha II, Narendrasinha, to a low-caste Madurai princess speaks to this, and would become a regular custom in subsequent generations. In carrying forward the theme of this larger early seventeenth century study on military economic systems it is important to mention here that

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<sup>456</sup> Dewaraja, *The Kandyan Kingdom*, p. 43.

this was not done by accident; that the princess married to Narendrasinha was the daughter of one Pitti Nayakkar, a *vaduga* (Telugu speaking warlord).<sup>457</sup> Subsequent princesses were also linked to South Indian *palaiyakarans* (courtier military commanders) that migrated into the island due to the pressures put on Madurai by Sultanate and Maratha expansion.<sup>458</sup> In this sense, one can see a connection in practice with Akbar and his marriage to Rajput princesses in order to achieve the same military connections (a similar practice that even Dewaraja is keen to note).<sup>459</sup> Such a continuation of affiliation practices that overlook the low social stature of such personnel given the crucial military services they provide speak to the perennial and default nature of military economic systems.

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457 *Ibid.*, p. 32.

458 *Ibid.*, p. 40.

459 *Ibid.*, p. 43.

## **Conclusion: THE MILITARY ECONOMY: A COMMON DISCONNECTED AND CONNECTED EARLY MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM**

In the introduction of this thesis, I built out the concept of the *military economy* from a comparative set of early modern global historical cases I found to be topically proximate to the Sri Lankan case. It is worth noting that such similarities come out of seemingly different cases that one might want to group individually inside the taxonomy of one or another civilization (i.e. African, Islamic, Buddhist/Indic) noting where in some cases local forces had to deal with the “colonial” presence and dominance of Western powers. Each of the studies done above however conveys the complex nature, what seems chaotic at times, of relations between groups during periods of war. By linking the cases together and putting them up against my own in-depth study I have aimed to prove there to be a common underlying pattern of activity related to the establishment of territorial authority. Specifically, the establishment of territorial authority by any party required recruitment of military personnel, and thus an engagement with a service market whose pool consisted of groups of people from both inside and outside the said region. When keeping the loyalties of the more immediate group became burdensome, as in every case it was, then outsiders would be preferred to replace the local force or at least counterbalance the predominance of it (here the example of the Javanese and the Ambonese is of particular use). Also, compensation had to be considered, which quickly tied the entire recruitment process to revenue extraction from acquired territories. In the case of commander level people (i.e. generals and captains), systems of compensation became closely tied to land administration, where the contractors granted lands to its own higher level military personnel to elide the difficulty of revenue extraction and administration, and given that a military presence was still needed to

defend the territory from rivals. In all, given that military personnel were the focal point of authority, it gave way to 'rebellious' activities (i.e. mutinies, desertions, land grabbing, revenue extraction, private trade) in these cases. Thus the pattern of the military economic system is by definition a cyclical one that depended on active, or at least on-again/off-again, war.

The recognition of this entire military based political economic system, as well as its cyclical nature, was a pattern well recognized by conquerors such as Akbar and Rajasinha II. By understanding that this system was hinged on a set of social and economic relationships, namely the connections between a commander and his troop base and connections between commanders themselves, both power-holders attempted to create land administration compensation schemes that interrupted existent relations as well as impeded future ones from developing. In both cases a central bureaucracy to manage the personnel and land arrangements was made necessary giving way to the development of a state and an authoritative court run by a sovereign who no longer needed to be directly involved in recruitment and/or military expeditions. Also in both cases, a state/court culture also solidified when the scheme was realized that abstracted the nature of kingly rule – representations of which are later taken up by contemporary historians and literary scholars and organized into theories of kingly 'legitimacy' in a civilizational mold. Additionally, given the deep link between military recruitment and state-building, the state and its formation of institutions, and the social culture such institutions would give way to, needed to be complementary to the pools of labor that were most effectively utilized. This invariably also had an impact on the demographics of people in the region the state controlled, as overtime such groups would develop and sediment martial cultural characters into the future.

By understanding the military economic pattern as a default and common, even universal,

pattern that occurs when certain people attempt to establish and maintain territorial control helps to explain the reason for equivalence of certain typologies found across linguistically and culturally distinct case studies. Subrahmanyam warns about making certain equivalences based on the similarity of terminology as in the case of the '*prazo*', where he notes that though the land administrative unit can be generally understood as a land grant (*aforamento*), it did not mean that the *prazo* of the Zambezi valley functioned in exactly the same manner as that of the *Província do Norte* (i.e. Daman, Bassein). By not falling back on a purely legalistic analysis and considering the local political and economic circumstance one might make more equivalent comparisons, "But in Daman and Bassein, the *prazo* was superimposed on a complex system of land rights which obtained in an already quite commercialized economy, and corresponded fairly closely in practice to the Indo-Islamic idea of the *iqta*""<sup>460</sup> In this thesis I aimed to show how the military economy is a kind of shared political economic system in which certain typologies from different linguistic canons (which come out of different cultural realities) are equivalent. The formation of the Sinhala term '*peraliya*' in relation to the Portuguese term '*alevntamento*', to mean 'rebellion' or 'sedition', occurred due to a shared political and economic reality in a common space. However, I would go further to claim that both terms are equivalent to that of the Indo-Islamic concept of '*fitna*', a disconnected term that shares no linguistic, cultural, religious, or spatial connection, but describes a common activity given the common military economic system that the Mughals and Marathas worked within in eighteenth century North India, which appeared to be similar to that found in Sri Lanka in the seventeenth century.

But, as can also be seen in this Sri Lankan case study, military economic circuits were

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<sup>460</sup> Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia*, p. 207.

also connected across wide distances.<sup>461</sup> Such is the case with the involvement of four pools of migrant military labor that were referenced in sources between the centuries; black East African slaves, Javanese, Bengalis, and South Indians (Kannadas and Telugus) as found between Portuguese and Sinhala sources. As evidenced in the Portuguese ones, after the summer of 1630, when recruitment of islanders was ordered against by the *Estado*, the Europeans attempted to pool and import all of the troops they could from the regions of East Africa and the Karnatak for obvious reasons; linked circuits and respective political-military activities. However, the continued presence of other non-island groups that the Portuguese did not manage the importation of directly, the Javanese and Bengalis, conveys that groups also migrated in military economic circuits not conducted directly by European interests. Such a point notes the existence of a wider seventeenth century military economy that is connected by wide Indian Ocean circuits that a whole host of conquerors in their respective areas could utilize to challenge their rivals.

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461 For studies in 'connected history', see: Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *From Tagus to the Ganges: Explorations in Connected History* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012).

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