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One of Us: A Theory of Identity-Based Appeals

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

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in

Political Science

by

Rudy Alamillo

September 2019

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

One of Us: A Theory of Identity-Based Appeals

by

Rudy Alamillo

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science
University of California, Riverside, September 2019
Dr. S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Chairperson

This dissertation examines whether non-co-ethnic candidates can benefit from shared ethnicity. Using the test case of non-Hispanic White candidate appeals to Latino voters, I argue that non-Latino candidates who use a package of appeals I call identity-based appeals can reduce the social space between themselves and Latinos and increase support. The first chapter consists of four candidate case studies based on news accounts, campaign materials, and archival records. These case studies illustrate the varied uses of identity-based appeals across states, political parties, and time. The second chapter uses observational vote data to conduct ecological inferences analyses for candidates from the first chapter. Evidence suggests that relative to comparison cases who do not use identity-based appeals, candidates who use identity-based appeals perform better among Latino voters. The final chapter uses a novel conjoint experiment to examine the relative impact of each identity-based appeal as well as compare the effectiveness of identity-based appeals to policy and partisan cues. While evidence suggests identity-based appeals are effective at increasing candidate support among Latinos, policy appeals on immigration have
significantly larger effects. Evidence suggest political knowledge moderates the effects of identity-based appeals.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most consistent findings in the study of mass behavior is that shared ethnicity can increase support for ethnic candidates among co-ethnic voters. Studies of minority candidates in the United States suggest that the presence of a minority candidate on the ballot functions as a cue or informational shortcut that helps co-ethnic voters judge how well a candidate will represent the interests of their ethnic group (Barreto 2007; DeFrancesco Soto 2007; Stokes-Brown 2006; McConnaughy et al. 2010). Borrowing from the literature on advertising and social identity theory, I argue that non-co-ethnic candidates can use a package of appeals I call identity-based appeals to trigger and exploit a voter’s ethnic identity the same way a co-ethnic candidate would.

My theory of identity-based appeals allows candidates to reduce distrust and play to in-group biases by attempting to appear as much a member of the targeted group as possible. When non-co-ethnic candidates show care and respect for the targeted community, and demonstrate that they share the group’s values, they reduce distrust between themselves and members of the racial or ethnic outgroup. Members of the targeted group come to see the candidate as a member of their group, which allows the candidate to reap the electoral benefits of shared ethnicity. While any candidate can benefit from using identity-based appeals when targeting ethnic voters, this strategy should be most effective for candidates whose policy preferences do not align with those of the targeted ethnic group. For example, we could imagine that when it comes to appeals to Latino Americans, Democratic candidates have less to gain from using identity-based appeals than Republican candidates as Democratic candidates start from a
more advantaged position among most Latinos and have the advantage of being able to make policy appeals on a wider variety of issues as well (Lopez et al. 2016). I thus use the test case of Republican candidate appeals to Latino voters in the United States.

This project will challenge the dominant narrative in Latino politics that policy is the only way to increase electoral support among Latinos. I do not seek to downplay the importance of policy-based appeals, but I want to bring identity back into the discussion. Political scientists have long recognized the importance of social groups in shaping individual political thinking and behavior, and while I acknowledge that appeals to Latinos on policy could be construed as appeals to a Latino’s ethnic identity, not all appeals will be (Berelson et al. 1954; Dahl 1961; Carlson 1984). I focus my analysis on White Republicans who appeal mainly to Latino ethnic identity as they exemplify how Republicans can best increase their support among Latinos outside of adopting more favorable positions on immigration. As the Republican Party is becoming increasingly exclusionary on immigration, while at the same time the Latino vote grows in importance in many congressional and gubernatorial races, I believe we will increasingly see Republicans rely on identity-based appeals.

Like others, I treat Latino identity as being largely constructed in the United States, rather than being brought to the United States by immigrants from Latin America (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996). The racial hierarchy in the United States required Latinos to be differentiated from Blacks and Whites, and umbrella terms like Latino and Hispanic conveniently allow individuals from over 20 countries of varying phenotypes and backgrounds to be lumped into one group (Ferdman and Gallegos 2001). I do not conflate
Latino identity and linked fate, as the literature has shown Latino identity is not a feeling of solidarity with the political interests of other Latin American-origin groups, but more of a general approach to politics, in which this shared identity lies dormant, ready to surface when activated (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). This shared identity is not entirely constructed from the outside though, as the literature has shown Latino identity has also emerged from common features and experiences such as an immigrant background, Spanish language use, a value on cultural maintenance, a cultural focus on family, and religious and moral traditions rooted in Catholicism (Ferdman and Gallegos 2001).

To be clear, I do not believe all voters will respond to identity-based appeals equally. Second and third generation Latinos may not see Spanish, Catholicism, or the preservation of culture as crucial to their Latino identity, if they even choose to identify as Latino at all. Research suggests importance of the family could be mediated by gender (Amaro 1998; Raffaelli and Ontai 2004). The degree to which one has internalized these common values as part of their Latino identity will almost certainly affect their receptivity to identity-based appeals. While I don’t conflate linked fate with Latino identity, I believe those with a higher sense of pan-ethnic linked fate will be more responsive to identity-based appeals. Given that linked fate and Latino identity tend to be strongest in foreign-born Latinos and decrease in future generations (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010), I argue that identity-based appeals should be most effective on foreign-born Latinos.
This leads me to the following questions: Can no-co-ethnic candidates benefit from shared ethnicity? Do low information voters respond better to identity-based appeals than high information voters? Do Democratic and Republican candidates benefit equally from identity-based appeals?

**White Republican Appeals to Latinos as a Case**

The United States is undergoing a massive demographic shift from a White dominated numerical majority to a multi-ethnic majority (Barreto and Segura 2014). This demographic shift is having consequences on how politicians position themselves vis-à-vis different racial constituencies and subconstituencies (Bishin 2009). 54 million Latinos live in the United States, making up 17% of the population; however, just 1% of elected officials across all levels of government are Latino (Latino Victory Project); moreover, 10 congressional districts, 17 state senate districts, and 53 lower state house districts have majority-Latino populations but are not represented by Latinos (Latino Victory Project). Cross-racial mobilization is certainly not a new phenomenon, but given the aforementioned demographic shift, and the movement of Latinos from the Southwest to more White-dominated states in the South, it may become the norm as demonstrated by the following examples.

On October 30, 2014, two non-Hispanic White US House candidates engaged in Colorado’s, and possibly the nation’s, first-ever congressional debate held entirely in Spanish. Televised on a local affiliate of Univision, Republican Representative Mike Coffman and Democratic challenger Andrew Romanoff took questions in Spanish for 30
minutes in an effort to woo the district’s sizable Latino population. Romanoff speaks fluent Spanish thanks to his time teaching in Central America, and Coffman began taking intensive Spanish classes after the 2010 Colorado Redistricting added Latino parts of Aurora to his district. Just five years after anti-immigrant hardliner Tom Tancredo stepped down as the representative of Colorado’s 6th district to pursue an unsuccessful run for governor, his Republican successor Coffman had to appeal to his district’s new sizable Latino population to keep his seat. Although Romanoff attacked Coffman for his stance against the DREAM Act and support for English-only ballots, Coffman won 20% of the Latino vote (CBS Denver 2015). Coffman attributed his narrow 47-45% victory to his Latino outreach, and gave part of his victory speech in Spanish. Coffman has continued his Latino outreach, recently taking an intensive Spanish course in Mexico (Llorente 2015). His success in using identity-based appeals to target Latinos has led Coffman to appeal to his district’s second largest minority group, Ethiopians, using many of the same strategies he used to appeal to Latinos.

My theory of identity-based appeals is applicable to any White candidate appealing to any racial or ethnic minority in the United States. In New York City’s recent mayoral election, White candidate Bill de Blasio heavily featured his African American wife and biracial children in his campaign. Two of de Blasio’s television advertisements featured his children stressing that their father would be a mayor for all New Yorkers, regardless of what they look like. Bill de Blasio won the election with 42% of the African American vote, tying African American candidate Bill Thompson among Black voters. I am using White Republican appeals to Latinos as my case study.
because compared to White appeals to African Americans, targeting Latinos is more challenging for White candidates and potentially more rewarding. The language barrier is a prominent hurdle that exists for mobilizing Latinos, but not African Americans, and usage and mastery of Spanish sends clear identity-based signals (Giles et al. 1973; Alamillo and Collingwood 2017). Because Latinos are more heterogeneous in political orientation and identity, one identity-based approach might not work for all Latinos where it might work for a large majority of African Americans (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). Finally, given the toxic brand of the Republican Party to many Latinos, especially in the wake of Donald Trump’s presidency, seeing if Republicans can make gains among Latinos without supporting comprehensive immigration should be a strong test of identity-based appeals.

Identity-based Appeals

My theory of identity-based appeals is largely based on accommodation theory and social identity theory. Accommodation theory posits that as person A becomes more similar to person B, the likelihood that B will like A increases. The desire of person A to become more similar to B is perceived by B as acknowledgment of the inherent worth of B’s self and cultural identity, which results in positive feelings toward A (Giles et al. 1973; Koslow et al. 1994). Imitating a person or group’s characteristics is not enough to gain their support though, as accommodation theory argues there must be some genuine effort perceived by members of the targeted group. If accommodation speech is attributed to a desire to break down cultural barriers between the listener and the speaker, the
listener receives the message favorably, but if the message is attributed to some external pressures, such as the perceived desire to mislead the listener, negative feelings may be invoked instead. We can see examples of this in the negative reaction to Gerald Ford attempting to eat a tamale without removing the corn husk, or Al Gore telling a largely Latino audience that because his first grandson was born on the Fourth of July, he hopes his second will be born on Cinco de Mayo.

Social identity theory argues that one’s self-esteem is in part dependent upon how one’s in-group compares to an outgroup. Social categorizations divide, group and rank the social environment, making self-reference easier by allowing individuals to define their place in society vis-à-vis their group’s place in society (Tajfel and Turner 1979). The evaluation of one’s group is thus determined in large part with reference to other groups, with positive comparisons increasing in-group prestige and self-esteem, and negative comparisons reducing in-group prestige and self-worth. Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that the need to maintain a positive social identity will lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other, but they fail to consider the possibility that members from one group might attempt to reduce the social space between themselves and another group by highlighting how similar they are. Padilla and Perez (2003) follow this logic, writing that to be culturally competent, one must learn to function in a culture in a manner appropriate with the values, beliefs, customs, mannerisms, and language of most members of that culture.

Previously, I argued that in the American cross-racial context, voters’ views of political candidates begin with a social space, or social separation, created by the legacy
of racism in the United States (Alamillo and Collingwood 2017). Just as we see in society writ large, some members of different groups may initially view one another with distrust and/or hold strong in-group biases (Brewer 1999; Chambers and Melnyk 2006; Dovidio et al. 2002). For most non-Hispanic Whites, it is not something they usually think about when deciding between candidates because most of the candidates that appear on their ballot are White. However, for non-Whites – who are more likely to have to vote for non-co-ethnic candidates – the legacy of racism and repression is something they may have to consider when assessing new candidates (Alamillo and Collingwood 2017).

Identity-based appeals allow candidates to reduce distrust, and to play to in-group biases, by attempting to appear as much a member of the targeted group as possible. By showing care and respect for the targeted community, and making an effort to adapt their mannerisms to the targeted group’s norms, candidates can demonstrate they share the group’s values. I argue members of the targeted group come to see the candidate as a member of their group, which allows the candidate to reap the electoral benefits of shared ethnicity. Thus, positive reinforcement of the targeted in-group’s (in this case Latinos) values and characteristics by an elite member of the dominant outgroup (non-Hispanic White Republicans) will be well-received by members of the in-group (Latinos) and lead them to increase support for that member of the outgroup (the candidate).

Employing social identity as a part of identity-based appeals may seem similar to microtargeting social groups like firearm owners and NASCAR fans, but I argue the two concepts are theoretically distinct. Given the history of repression faced by non-Whites, race plays such a central role in American life that race and ethnicity are likely a greater
component of one’s identity than being a fan of NASCAR. Eating a tamale with its husk on or mistaking Cinco de Mayo for a holiday Mexican-Americans care about may prove more damaging to a candidate than incorrect or weak appeals to groups based on less salient identities. Additionally, engaging in any aspect of identity-based appeals involves significant investments in terms of a candidate’s time or money relative to purchasing a firearm or attending a NASCAR event.

Each person has multiple identities, and one’s socializing experiences will inform which groups they identify with and how candidates can exploit these identities (Bishin 2009). But even though individuals have multiple identities, not every identity is treated equally. When facing competing primes, individual preferences depend on how identities are primed (Klar 2013). Simply mentioning an identity is enough to prime it and bring it to the forefront, but primes that threaten a group one identifies with usually take precedence (Zaller 1992). This may be why Republican candidates who use identity-based appeals often do not mention immigration policy or their party in any of their Spanish advertisements, instead focusing on how they respect and share Latino values. In order for their identity-based messages to work, these candidates need to activate a Latino’s ethnic identity without also priming their distrust of the Republican Party. As far as co-ethnic candidates are concerned, their race and ethnicity can provide cues to groups and voters that may be related only indirectly to issue positioning, with their race and ethnicity sometimes even serving to inoculate a candidate or give them greater freedom in the range of issues they can support (Lublin 1997). White candidates who engage in identity-based appeals may also be inoculated on the policy or party front to some degree,
allowing White Republicans to gain support from Latinos even if voters know the candidate is against passing comprehensive immigration reform.

There are five main ways candidates can bridge group differences when they use identity-based appeals. The first is speaking the language of the targeted racial or ethnic group (assuming one exists). Speaking the language of a targeted group conveys a certain familiarity with that culture that distinguishes a candidate from other candidates who do not speak the language. When Latino voters see a non-Latino candidate who is fluent in Spanish, this signals to the voter that the candidate respects their group enough to communicate to them in their ancestral language. 82% of Latino adults say they speak Spanish, and 95% say it is important for future generations to do so, even if most agree speaking Spanish is not a necessary condition for being considered Latino (Taylor et al. 2012).

An even more intimate way for candidates to bridge cultures is to demonstrate family connections, often through marrying into the targeted group. Candidates with family members in the targeted group may have an easier time making a connection with the targeted group as their family members can speak to the candidate’s commitment to the targeted group and how the candidate shares the targeted group’s values. In what he calls messenger politics, Nuño (2007) argues that the effectiveness of a political message rests in large part on the messenger. Nuño (2007) finds that Latinos who were contacted by Latino Republicans were much more likely to vote for Bush in the 2000 presidential election than those who were contacted by non-Latino Republicans, but finds no similar effect for Democratic outreach. This may be because for the party with the steeper hill to
climb, the messenger is the most crucial component of the message. Family connections may be especially important for appeals made to Latinos, as familism is a key part of Latino identity (Sabogal et al. 1987; Suro 2007). The literature has shown that the mutual help and interdependence seen among Latino families could be expanded to include members of the dominant out-group (non-Hispanic Whites), which could be crucial for White candidates who can successfully demonstrate family ties (Sabogal et al. 1987; Suro 2007).

A candidate can also employ signals of respect and accommodation by appealing to the group in more traditional ways. Candidates who air television or newspapers ads in the targeted group’s language or media, collect endorsements from public officials from the targeted group, and appoint members of the targeted group to their staff demonstrate they care about and respect the targeted group in the vein of accommodation theory. A candidate who is endorsed by Latino public officials is basically vouched for, which should expedite the accommodation process as Latinos speak to the candidate’s dedication to the community (Alamillo and Collingwood 2017). Appointments to a candidate’s staff work in the same way, showing that the candidate values input from members of the targeted group. Television and radio advertisements aimed at Latinos have generally focused more on character appeals than policy, and the degree to which Latinos are incorporated into American life determines which Spanish political ads affect their vote choice and political participation (Abrajano 2010). Abrajano (2010) finds that while ethnic ads are received positively by English dominant Latinos, they only affect the
vote choice of recent immigrants; on the other hand, the vote choice of English dominant Latinos is only affected by policy specific ads.

In my previous work, we examined what drives support for presidential candidate Jeb Bush (Alamillo and Collingwood 2017). We built a measure of receptivity to identity-based appeals by asking respondents their likelihood (very unlikely, somewhat unlikely, neither likely nor unlikely, somewhat likely, or very unlikely) of supporting a White candidate in a variety of scenarios based on the following prompt: “Imagine a scenario where two White or Anglo candidates are running against one another for Congress. They are the only two candidates in the race. When considering who to vote for, how likely or unlikely are you to vote for the candidate based on the following statements.” The items included “the candidate speaks fluent Spanish,” “the candidate has family members, such as a son or daughter, who are of Latino descent,” “the candidate is endorsed by several well-known Latino public figures,” “the candidate promises to appoint several Latinos to key staff positions,” and “the candidate airs advertisements on Spanish-language television or places ads in Spanish-language newspapers.” We performed a factor analysis and alpha reliability test which provided strong support for our use of these items as a measure of receptivity to identity-based appeals. We argued those who score high on the measure should be most receptive to identity-based appeals. We also asked respondents general political information questions and asked about support for a candidate who supports comprehensive immigration and lowering taxes.
We looked at support for Jeb Bush because he fit the profile of a candidate who could employ identity-based appeals. Bush has a Latina wife and children, speaks fluent Spanish, aired Spanish television ads, appointed Latinos to positions on his staff as governor of Florida, and collected numerous endorsements from Latino public officials. At the time our questions were fielded on a nationally representative survey of 1,500 Latino conducted by Latino Decisions (February of 2015), Bush was considering a run for president and was an early frontrunner to win the nomination. Given that Bush’s identity bridging potential was largely unknown to most Latinos, we figured our dependent variable would provide some context of Bush as pertains to Latinos. Our dependent variable primed respondents with a script informing them of Bush’s characteristics and asked how likely they would be to vote for him on a scale from 0-100, where 0 was completely unlikely and 100 was completely likely.
As Figure 1 shows, our identity-based appeals measure was the strongest predictor of vote likelihood for Bush. As one moved from minimum to maximum levels of receptivity to identity-based appeals, their vote preference for Bush increased by about 40 points. Our measure of receptivity to identity-based appeals even trumped both party
attachment and ideology. An external validity analysis based on the identity-based appeals efforts of 60 White candidates across 33 elections in eight states from 2010 to 2014 supported our findings (see Chapter 2). Outside of being a Democrat, engaging in identity-based appeals was the strongest predictor of Latino vote share, with White candidates who engaged in identity-based appeals performing 20% better among Latino voters on average than candidates who did not.

Identity-based appeals as I define them are like commitment acts from the literature on religious movements. Per Hine (1970), commitment has two components: a subjective experience in which one’s self-image is altered and some degree of cognitive restructuring occurs, and an overt act which sets the performer apart from the larger society in some way. While the literature on commitment acts focuses on membership in religious movements or social groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous, my research focuses on White candidates attaining membership into racial and ethnic groups. While there is not a perfect overlap between identity-based appeals and commitment acts, there is some synergy. Hine (1970) notes that there are certain characteristics common of committed individuals. One is a capacity for risk, or a willingness to sacrifice social status and kinship ties to attain membership in the group. White candidates who engage in identity-based appeals face the risk of losing support among White voters if they are seen pandering to a racial or ethnic minority group (Hersh and Schaffner 2013). Another characteristic is attitudinal and behavioral change. Hine (1970) notes that committed individuals often can provide a before and after story which can be corroborated by close associates. Almost every candidate in my case studies demonstrates some degree of
attitudinal and behavioral change and has a before and after story to share. Mike Coffman, for example, openly speaks about how he didn’t learn Spanish until his district became 20% Latino. Coffman’s position on the DREAM Act has softened since the 2010 redistricting, but he remains opposed to any kind of amnesty for undocumented immigrants. Greg Abbott’s mother-in-law spoke to Abbott sharing Latino values because he converted to Catholicism and married into a Latino family.

Identity-based Appeals as a Theoretically Distinct Concept

Campaigns have evolved with technology and changed from broad appeals delivered via mass media to targeted appeals aimed at specific subgroups over targeted media (Hillygus and Shields 2008). Targeted appeals are generally overt because they want to make an impression, but they feature vague, generic pandering messages such as “Candidate X will create more opportunities for New Jersey’s Latino families” or “Candidate Y is fighting for Illinois fire fighters” (Hersh and Schaffner 2013). There may be a value in ambiguity as candidates with imprecise positions have been found to benefit in a partisan setting as voters favorably perceive the policy positions of candidates in their own parties while not pessimistically perceiving the policy positions of candidates from opposing parties (Tomz and Houweling 2009). But there are limits to targeted appeals, especially if someone outside of the targeted group receives a message meant for another group. Hersh and Schaffner (2013) find that most groups do not reward candidates for pandering to their group, and that individuals who received messages not meant for their group punish candidates for mistargeting. A key exception was Latinos,
who enjoyed being pandered to by Republicans, perhaps because they updated their views on the candidate when provided with information beyond a simple Republican label.

There are many parallels between identity-based appeals and targeted appeals. There is some value in ambiguity as my case studies demonstrate that identity-based appeals are generally devoid of policy. Republican candidates go one step further and often make no mention of their party. Identity-based appeals are also overt, with candidates making claims about sharing values and having respect for the targeted community. There is also the risk of a voter from a non-targeted group viewing the identity-based appeals and punishing the candidate, but I believe the nature of identity-based appeals limits the chance this will occur. Finally, particularly adept candidates can use identity-based appeals to promise benefits to narrow audiences which may sometimes be in conflict. Senator John Tower and Governor Greg Abbott of Texas both ran two different campaigns in English and in Spanish. In English, they both promised to limit immigration and crackdown on immigrants, while in Spanish they claimed to be a part of the Latino community and share Latino values. While being Latino and sharing Latino values does not necessarily mean being pro-immigrant, a clear majority of Latinos are pro-immigrant and some of these voters may have expected Tower and Abbott to be pro-immigrant. As Hersh and Schaffner (2013) note, coalitions of voters built on narrow promises to narrow audiences may create a different kind of democracy than a coalition of voters built on broad appeals and collective benefits.
So how are identity-based appeals different from targeted appeals or simple pandering? First, identity-based appeals should be less risky that traditional targeted appeals methods such as mailers or flyers because they are generally made on ethnic media. John Tower’s “El Corrido de John Tower” aired exclusively on Spanish radio and television, and Greg Abbott’s “Contamos” advertisement featuring his mother-in-law and sister-in-law aired on Spanish television during Mexico’s first game in the World Cup on Univision and continued to air on during the World Cup on other Spanish networks. Given that ethnic media is most likely viewed by members of the targeted group, it is unlikely identity-based appeals will be mistargeted. Another way that identity-based appeals are different from targeted appeals and simple pandering is that identity-based appeals cannot easily be dismissed as cheap talk. Targeted appeals and simple pandering have been found to be received as cheap talk (costless, unverifiable claims) by most targeted groups (Hersh and Schaffner 2013; Farrell and Gibbons 1989). This makes sense given the vagueness and openly pandering nature of statements like “Candidate X will create more opportunities for New Jersey’s Latino families”. Although identity-based appeals can also be vague and openly pandering, there is generally more commitment behind an identity-based appeal which reduces its likelihood of being dismissed as cheap talk. For instance, when Mike Coffman talks about wanting to serve the Latino community in an advertisement, because he speaks Spanish and makes it known that he learned Spanish to better communicate with his constituents, the appeal has weight behind it. Greg Abbott never addresses Latinos directly in his Spanish advertisements,
but his Latino family members speak to his Latino values and to his conversion to Catholicism.

Finally, identity-based appeals are different from targeted appeals and simple pandering in that identity-based appeals don’t necessarily commit the candidate to one group. In a targeted appeal, a candidate might say that they will create more opportunities for Latinos. Understandably, this appeal could lead to backlash against the candidate if a non-Latino receives the message. I don’t believe most identity-based appeals will create the same kind of backlash given that they don’t overtly pander to one group. Outside of airing a Spanish radio or television advertisement, identity-based appeals should not be construed as overt pandering to the targeted group by outsiders. Identity-based appeals may then be the best of both worlds as they are not seen as cheap talk by the targeted group and are less likely to be seen as overt pandering by individuals from non-targeted groups.

Receptivity to Identity-based Appeals

One of the main weaknesses of my previous work is that it includes no discussion of what influences one’s receptivity to identity-based appeals. Much of the literature which indicated a declining relevance of race and ethnicity for electoral behavior was conducted at a time when party attachment was strong among most Americans (Dahl 1961; Wolfinger 1965; Parenti 1967; Carlson 1984). As party attachment has declined over time, ethnicity may again emerge as an important factor in predicating political behavior (Carlson 1984). With more than half of all Latinos identifying as something
other than Republican or Democrat, unaffiliated Latinos could be prime targets for identity-based appeals (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Local elections with low party salience may make it easier to make identity-based appeals. For Latinos, co-ethnic voting is greatest among those who are foreign-born and Spanish dominant, so foreign-born and Spanish dominant Latinos should be most receptive to identity-based appeals, although this could be a function of low political knowledge among Latinos (Manzano and Sanchez 2010). The likelihood of a Latino turning out to vote when a co-ethnic candidate is on the ballot increases as the district becomes more Latino, which suggests receptivity to identity-based appeals could be affected by environmental factors (Barreto 2007). Members of groups with low representation at the local or state level may be more accepting of an outsider who engages in identity-based appeals because they could potentially represent their interests as well as a co-ethnic would. On the other hand, identity-based appeals may be less effective among Latinos with higher amounts of co-ethnic representation at the local level, and even less effective when a non-co-ethnic candidate runs against an actual co-ethnic candidate.

**How do identity-based appeals increase support?**

Research has shown that some members of different groups may initially view one another with distrust and/or hold strong in-group biases (Brewer 1999; Chambers and Melnyk 2006; Dovidio et al. 2002). For non-White voters – who are more likely to have to vote for non-co-ethnic candidates – the legacy of racism and repression in the United States is something they may have to consider when assessing new candidates. I argue
that identity-based appeals allow non-co-ethnic candidates to reduce distrust by activating and exploiting an ethnic voter’s sense of shared ethnicity as a co-ethnic candidate would. Based on the literature, I believe identity-based appeals increase support via three paths which operate simultaneously. First, candidates demonstrate to members of the targeted group that they have respect for the group’s traditions and customs. As accommodation theory suggests, speaking a targeted group’s language communicates to an ethnic voter that a non-co-ethnic candidate has respect for the ethnic’s group customs. Similarly, airing advertisements in the targeted group’s language signals that the candidate is forgoing reaching out to a larger English audience because the candidate values reaching out to the ethnic group in their own tongue (Hagan 2009). Appointing members of the targeted group to one’s staff also demonstrates respect for the group as the candidate acknowledges the value and expertise of members within the group.

Second, candidates show members of the targeted group that they share the group’s values. Candidates will most often communicate these shared values in advertisements, but can also do so by having members of the targeted group vouch for them via public endorsements. Endorsements from the targeted group will most often come from public officials or celebrities, but endorsements from the candidate’s family members of the targeted group will be most effective as they best attest to the candidate sharing the targeted group’s values given their personal connections. Lastly, identity-based appeals can increase support among members of the targeted group by creating the expectation of substantive representation as voters come to see the candidate as a co-ethnic. As the literature has shown, a candidate’s ethnicity serves as a cue to co-ethnic
voters that the candidate will likely advocate for issues important to the ethnic group, even if the candidate has made explicit policy appeals (McConnaughy et al. 2010; Barreto 2007).

My key contributions to the literature are expanding my theory of identity-based appeals, and challenging the dominant narrative in the literature on Latino politics by showing that ethnic cues still matter for Latino voters, even if they come from non-co-ethnic candidates. I expand my theory of identity-based by employing a mixed-methods approach, and examining whether respondent-level characteristics, such as political knowledge and ethnic linked fate, moderate the effects of identity-based appeals.

Based on my case studies, I believe that identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more among foreign-born Latinos than native-born Latinos as foreign-born Latinos are shown to have higher levels of ethnic attachment, which is strong predictor of shared ethnicity (Lopez et al. 2017; Manzano and Sanchez 2010). I also contend that identity-based appeals will be more effective among non-partisan than partisan Latinos, as non-partisans tend be more detached from politics (Hajnal and Lee 2011), which could increase their receptiveness to apolitical identity-based appeals. Similarly, low information and foreign-born Latinos should be more receptive to identity-based appeals than high information and native-born Latinos as high information Latinos, who are often native-born, have been shown to prefer policy-based appeals (Abrajano 2010), while low information Latinos, who are often foreign-born, tend to prefer ethnic appeals (Barreto 2007; Manzano and Sanchez 2010). Finally, all identity-based appeals are not created equally, as some may be perceived as requiring more effort of the
candidate’s part than others (Giles et al. 1973; Koslow et al. 1994). Based on the literature and case studies in Chapter 2, I argue that Latino family connections will have the greatest effect on candidate support among Latinos, followed by Spanish speaking ability.

**Hypotheses**

I will test the following hypotheses in the coming chapters.

H$_1$: Identity-based appeals will increase candidate support among Latinos.

H$_2$: Identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more among foreign-born Latinos than native-born Latinos.

H$_3$: Identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more among Latinos with high linked fate than Latinos with low linked fate.

H$_4$: Identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more among non-partisan Latinos than partisan Latinos.

H$_5$: Identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more among low information Latinos than high information Latinos.

H$_6$: Of the five identity-based appeals, Latino family connections will have the greatest effect on candidate support.

H$_7$: Of the four identity-based appeals outside of Latino family connections, Spanish speaking ability will have the greatest effect on candidate support.
Cross-racial Appeals in Action

While the rate of cross-racial appeals is sure to increase in accordance with demographic change, it is important to note the phenomenon is not a new one. White candidates started mobilizing Blacks in the South shortly after the all-White primary was ruled unconstitutional (Collingwood and O’Brien 2016). Gosnell (1969) documented cross-racial mobilization in Chicago prior to World War II. Between 1970 and 1990, White moderates dominated Southern politics by cobbling together coalitions of Blacks and moderate and conservative Whites (Black and Black 2009). However, these cross-racial appeals were driven more by policy stances, valence appeals, and patronage, as opposed to candidate attempts to be more like the Black communities in their areas given racial tensions between Blacks and Whites at the time.

On the Latino front, Viva Kennedy clubs sprung up in Texas during John’s Kennedy’s 1960 presidential campaign. Prior to this, Eisenhower targeted the Latino vote by advertising on Spanish-language radio in Latino-heavy counties across Texas and printing Viva Eisenhower and Me Gusta Ike buttons (Collingwood 2012). Presidents Carter, Ford, Reagan, and George W. Bush all appealed to Latino voters in one way or another to varying degrees of success. On the Republican side, Reagan and Bush were the most successful at courting Latinos in large part due to their use of identity-based appeals. It is no coincidence that Latino outreach for these campaigns was headed by Lionel Sosa, founder of Sosa and Associates, the largest Hispanic advertising agency in the United States.
Reagan told Sosa, “Lionel, your job’s going to be easy. Hispanics are Republicans. They just don’t know it yet. Hispanic values are conservative values. Republican values. What you need to do is communicate the truth to them. At our core, we think alike. The same thing that matter to Latinos matter to me. Family. A strong work ethic. Personal responsibility. Good moral values. Patriotism” (Sosa in Cisneros and Rosales 2009). Reagan told Sosa that to win a voter, you must use advertising to form a deep, personal bond, which you did by stressing shared, core values. Reagan’s advertisements featured Latinos saying that while they previously voted for Democratic candidates based on tradition, they were going to vote Reagan because he better represented their traditional Latino values. At a time when Republicans were winning 8% of the Latino vote, Reagan won 35% in 1980 and 37% in 1984 (DeSipio 1998).

When Sosa was hired by George W. Bush in 2000, he applied what he called the Reagan strategy. Bush told Sosa, “We are going to do this right. I want more Hispanic votes than any Republican running for president has ever gotten. I want ads that portray Latinos as Americans, equally deserving of the American Dream. And I want to leave a model for other Republicans to follow” (Sosa in Cisneros and Rosales 2009). Bush had some experience appealing to Latinos on identity with his earlier gubernatorial campaign where he won 49% of the Latino vote. His ads featured Latinos saying that there was finally a candidate who understood Latino values and was close to the Latino community, so who cares if he is not a Democrat? In another ad, Bush noted that while a lot of politicians like to about cultural diversity, cultural diversity is something he sees everyday as it is part of his family. One advertisement featured Bush’s half-Latino
nephew George P. Bush, who said that along with sharing his name, his uncle shares his Latino values. Bush went on to win 35% of the Latino vote in 2000, a record high 40% in 2004.

The Reagan and Bush cases are great examples of identity-based appeals, but I cannot attribute their popularity among Latino voters to just identity-based appeals as Reagan and Bush were largely pro-immigration, especially when compared to today’s Republicans. In the next chapter, I will examine three cases in depth as they highlight how Republicans can use identity-based appeals to win large shares of the Latino vote without supporting comprehensive immigration reform, which is more likely to be the norm today and in the foreseeable future. I will also examine the case of Robert “Beto” O’Rourke, a White Democrat who used identity-based appeals to defeat a Latino incumbent in one of the nation’s most Latino districts before challenging Ted Cruz for Senate in 2018.
CHAPTER 1: The Ballad of John Tower and Other Tales of Identity-based Appeals

Given what the literature thus far has told us about the value of cross-racial appeals (Alamillo and Collingwood 2017; Collingwood 2012), it stands to reason that any candidate could improve their standing among a targeted minority group by using identity-based appeals. I focus my case studies mainly on White Republican candidate appeals to Latino voters because unlike Democratic candidates, most Republicans cannot appeal to Latinos on immigration for fear of losing their base Republican supporters (Hawley 2013). Thus, while Republican candidates like George W. Bush and Ronald Reagan performed well among Latinos with a combination of identity-based appeals and progressive immigration policies, most Republicans will not be able to replicate these results. It is also difficult to disentangle how much of George W. Bush’s record support among Latinos came from identity-based appeals when he was among the most progressive Republican candidates on immigration in recent memory.

Thus, to better examine the impact of identity-based appeals on Latino support for Republicans, I examine the campaigns of three Republican candidates who make no appeals to Latinos on immigration due to their support for restrictive immigration policies: Senator John Tower of Texas, Governor Greg Abbott of Texas, and Congressman Mike Coffman of Colorado. I also examine Congressman Robert “Beto” O’Rourke of Texas, a Democrat who used identity-based appeals to defeat a 16-year Latino incumbent in the second most Latino district in the country. I acknowledge that O’Rourke breaks the mold of my other case studies, but it is important to demonstrate that Democratic candidates can use identity-based appeals in concert with policy-based
appeals on immigration to outperform Democrats who rely on policy or partisan identification. In this chapter, I use case studies of Tower, Abbott, Coffman, and O’Rourke to illustrate the effectiveness of identity-based appeals when it comes to garnering Latino support.

The Ballad of John Tower

In 1961, John Tower won a special election to fill Lyndon Johnson’s Senate seat and became the first Republican elected to a statewide office in Texas since Reconstruction (Sosa in Cisneros and Rosales 2009). Tower won by only 10,343 votes in 1961, and subsequent close elections led him to search for new voters in Texas’ growing Latino population, despite no Republican at that point ever winning more than 8% of the Latino vote (Thomas 2005). In 1978, Tower approached Lionel Sosa, a leader in Latino advertising, and said, “Lionel, the Latino vote is getting bigger every year. One of these days it will be the deciding vote, and I’m going to get started early. I don’t see why we have to accept 8%” (Sosa in Cisneros and Rosales 2009, 118). Tower told Sosa he wanted 35% of the Latino vote in his upcoming election, and Sosa got to work on a series of advertisements. According to Sosa, Tower was already well-liked by Latinos, and the campaign would focus on making Tower’s credentials known to Latinos:

“We didn’t have to make John Tower likeable to Latinos. He already was. We only had to show the man to the voters. He visited South Texas Mexican beer joints often, and when he stepped inside, the men knew him and greeted him with big abrazos. He asked about their families and their worries. They wanted the latest Washington gossip and the Senator’s tall Texas tales. This guy was the real thing. He ‘spoke cantina’” (Sosa in Cisneros and Rosales 2009, 118).
Sosa made advertisements that stressed Tower’s service to the Latino community and featured Tower drinking with Latinos in bars and eating tamales (with their husks off) at fiestas. One commercial Sosa fondly recalls is “El Corrido de John Tower” (the Ballad of John Tower), a minute-long Spanish ballad demonstrating Tower’s connection with the Latino community (Tower 2008). For this television and radio spot, Sosa and his team wrote a Mexican ballad and hired a local band to give the ballad an authentic sound. The half million-dollar ad budget for “El Corrido de John Tower” was the highest in Texas history up to that point, and it was the first advertisement to target Latinos so far ahead of the general election. Tower would go on to win re-election with 37% of the Latino vote and an overall margin of victory of 0.05%. According to Sosa, the Latino vote had made the difference (Sosa in Cisneros and Rosales 2009). But while Tower was drinking Lone Star Beers and eating tamales, he was actively anti-immigration and worked to limit the ability of undocumented immigrants to find work (López 1995). One English language pamphlet, for example, asks “How does alien labor affect your job?” and notes “Tower is for job protection.”

Being anti-immigration does necessarily mean being anti-Latino, as Tower worked to advance the interests of Latinos who were already in the country. Records from Tower’s library show that in 1966, Tower led an effort in the Senate to pressure the Nixon administration to appoint the first Latino to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In a press release, Tower wrote:

“I am gratified to learn the Administration has at last recognized the need which exists for a citizen of Latin background to be serving on the important government body...As you know, I brought this matter to the attention of the administration and of the Senate with my bill and recommendations to achieve such Latin-American representation.”
Noting that another position on the EEOC may soon open, Tower also wrote that he would recommend the next appointee also be a Latino. In 1977, Tower lobbied the Carter administration on behalf of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), urging the overturn of a decision to discontinue funding for Hispanic American scholarships. Tower, who sat on the advisory board of the LULAC National Scholarship Fund for Americans of Spanish Origin, was successful in his efforts, and future advertisements would note key his role in this endeavor.

Tower had many Latinos in high ranking positions on his staff, such as long-time campaign chairman Humberto Silas. In one race, Tower attacked his Democratic opponent by advertising that he did not have one Hispanic American above clerical level on his staff. Other documents show that as early as 1966, Tower was building a database mapping the Latino population in every congressional district in Texas, as well as information on how many of these Latinos were eligible to vote, and how many Latinos in each district had voted Republican in previous elections. Tower met with Mexican-American Democratic machine leaders to secure their endorsements, and advertised his endorsements from prominent Latino officials in Spanish newspaper advertisements. Come election season, local *Tejanos por Tower* clubs were instructed to undertake massive letter writing campaigns, with each club encouraged to tailor their letters to the local Latino community with endorsements from local Latino officials. One club sent out more than 30,000 letters in one election cycle. Tower threw numerous lunches and “*tamaladas*” (tamale making parties) for his Latino supporters, and rallies with as many
as 4,500 Latinos were held throughout Texas, where Tower would often appear flanked by local Latino leaders.

Given Texas’s long history of minority disenfranchisement, a key focus of the Tower campaign was training poll watchers to ensure Latinos could cast ballots for Tower (Perales et al. 2006). Tower worked with Anthony Perez Farris, the first Latino US Attorney for South Texas, to place federal officers throughout South Texas. This is ironic given that Tower was strongly against civil rights and was one of the Senate’s most outspoken critics of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), standing with Strom Thurmond as the only Republicans to vote against the VRA. This juxtaposition of support for Latino voting rights but not those of Blacks also comes through in Tower’s records, where we can see the Tower campaign accuse Democrats of improving the status of Blacks at the expense of Latinos.

At a meeting of Tejanos for Tower, Floyd Hyde, undersecretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under President Nixon, said, “The Johnson Administration was too preoccupied with the problems of the Black community, and neglected the Mexican-American community. After talking with Senator Tower about this, I feel much better because I know he understands.” An campaign outline highlighting Tower’s achievements for Latinos includes the following quote Tower made during a Senate hearing, which seemingly praises Latinos in comparison to Blacks:

“Because I am a Texan I have had the opportunity to observe directly the problems facing the Spanish-speaking in our country. It is a great tribute to Hispanic-American citizens that they have not faced their problems irresponsibly. They have not taken to the streets in violence and destruction to call attention to their plight. Instead, they have sought to
work within the system, believing the American way works. No group is more sought after in Texas at election time than the Mexican-American Texans. And, no group is more ignored after.”

Coverage of Nixon’s appointment of Hillary Sandoval, a Latino ally of Tower’s, to the head of the Small Business Administration (SBA), suggests that Sandoval will help steer the SBA back towards helping all minorities, instead of just Blacks, which some Latinos claimed was the case under the previous Democratic administration. News coverage also highlighted remarks at a Tejanos por Tower meeting where a Tower surrogate claimed that under Nixon, 32 Latinos were appointed to top-level, national positions, compared to six under Johnson and three under Kennedy. In comparing Tower’s credentials to that of Ted Kennedy’s, the surrogate said:

“Tower has been less radical and more effective. He recently sponsored a bill funding $15 million to the bilingual education program and one financing a GI Forum housing project in Fort Worth. At a recent GI Forum Convention in Washington, D.C., all Kennedy had to offer was the usual slogans, Viva La Raza, Viva Cesar Chavez.”

Tower did not speak Spanish, and had no Latino family connections to speak of, but he did advertise in Spanish, appoint Latinos to his staff, aid in the appointment of Latinos to other influential positions, and collected endorsements from Latinos public officials. Perhaps most importantly, Tower authentically understood and respected Latinos and their culture. Unlike Gerald Ford or Al Gore, Tower was able to present himself as culturally competent, which likely made his appeals that much more believable (Padilla and Perez 2003; Koslow et al. 1994). Tower is perhaps the earliest example one can find of a Republican appealing to Latino voters using identity-based appeals, and he would come to be an expert on Republican appeals to Latino voters.
Tower went on to advise Ronald Reagan on Latino appeals and introduced Lionel Sosa to Republican presidential politics.

**Chameleon Politics – Greg Abbott**

As Greg Abbott made evident in Texas’ 2014 gubernatorial election, White candidates who can demonstrate Latino family connections have an advantage when it comes to garnering Latino support. Abbott’s wife, Cecilia, a third-generation Latina, and her family were prominently featured throughout his campaign. Abbott’s first ad, “Contamos” (We count on), was the first television advertisement of the campaign, and it aired during the Mexico-Brazil match during the 2014 World Cup (Abbott 2014a). It features Abbott’s sister-in-law and mother-in-law saying that while it is never easy meeting your in-laws, when Abbott joined their family, they knew he was special. They tell us that Abbott’s values are the same as “ours”: family, faith, and honesty. As a family man, they have always been able to count on Abbott, and Texans will be able to count on him as a governor as well. Another advertisement, “Madrina” (Godmother) opens with Abbott’s mother-in-law explaining that she is also Abbott’s godmother, because he converted to “our” Catholic church to marry her daughter (Abbott 2014b). She goes on to mention that Abbott is a man of character, who is always true to his family and his faith and stresses that Abbott shares “our” Latino values (Abbott 2014b). The ad closes with Abbott’s mother-in-law telling viewers that she loves him as a son-in-law, and that Texans will love him as a governor.
Abbott can speak Spanish, but never does so in his advertisements, instead leaving that to his Latino family members. Abbott’s Latino family connections were the focus of his Spanish advertisements, but he never shied away from mentioning his family on the campaign trail with English speakers. When he announced his run for governor, Abbott said:

“The story of my family is as old as the story of Texas itself, the uniting of cultures to form one unique people. Our marriage wasn’t just a joining of two families, but a uniting of cultures. We may have come from different cultures, but we realized that we share the same foundation: Dos casas. Pero una fundacion (Two houses, but one foundation).”

While Abbott’s Latino appeals largely focused on demonstrating his family connections, Abbott also appointed Latinos to high-ranking positions on his staff and collected endorsements from Latino public officials.

What is most interesting about Abbott is that he essentially ran two different campaigns, one in English based on anti-immigrant policies and one in Spanish based on identity-based appeals. While Abbott’s Spanish advertisements are light on policy and big on identity, stressing that he is essentially a Latino, Abbott’s English ads focus on increasing security at the border and stopping an influx of criminals and drugs from Mexico (Abbott 2014c). During the campaign, Abbott called for doubling the budget for border security and adding 500 additional state troopers to defend the border. Abbott also said he would not veto a repeal of the Texas DREAM Act, signed into law by former Republican governor Rick Perry, who defended it as “compassionate” (McKinley 2011). Abbott’s Democratic opponent, Wendy Davis, ran ads in Spanish criticizing Abbott’s past policy positions, reminding Latinos that she, as a Democrat, was like family.
As a Republican running for governor in Texas, there was little doubt Abbott would win, but what surprised observers was how much of the Latino vote he won. Although he aimed for 45% of the Latino vote, Abbott won between 32% to 44% of the Latino vote (Latinos Decisions 2014; Krogstad and Lopez 2014). Even if we accept the more conservative estimate, Abbott still won nearly one-third of the Latino vote based largely on Spanish advertisements that focused entirely on his family speaking to his status as an honorary Latino. This victory cannot solely be attributed to something in Texas’ water making Latinos more Republican as Abbott won more than twice the share of the Latino vote Rick Perry did in 2010 after signing the Texas DREAM Act into law (Latino Decisions 2010). While Abbott still trails George W. Bush’s 1998 numbers, Bush was openly pro-immigrant, and the Republican Party brand of 1998 was much different than in 2014. After becoming governor, Abbott led the efforts of 26 states to sue the federal government over President Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) and Deferred Action for Child Arrivals (DACA) programs. In 2017, Abbott signed S.B. 4, which prohibited cities in Texas from declaring themselves sanctuary cities and directed local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration laws. While one may argue that Abbott’s targeted appeals to Latinos worked so well because Latinos were unfamiliar with him and his policy positions, Latinos should have had a much clearer picture of who Abbott was during his re-election bid in 2018.

As early as 2017, Abbott made it clear that identity-based appeals centered on Latino family connections would be again be the focal point of his Latino outreach. In October 2017, Abbott’s campaign hosted a Hispanic Leadership Conference in San
Antonio, headlined by a speech from Abbott. According to Abbott’s campaign, the Hispanic Leadership Conference served to train young Latino conservatives on how they can best stump for Abbott among fellow Latinos (Garcia 2017). During his speech, Abbott held a relay baton, which he said he would pass to the next governor of Texas, who would be a Hispanic Republican: “The first Hispanic governor must be a Republican. We are running to win the next generation. You are that next generation…It is essential that your voice be heard” (Caruba 2017). This speech, like many others, began with Abbott reminding the audience that his wife is the first Hispanic first lady of Texas, and touting his shared values: “We’ll continue to educate them about my historic connection with the Hispanic community and about how my values and principles connect with the values and principles of the Hispanic community” (Svitek 2017).

In Texas’ 2018 gubernatorial election, Abbott was challenged by a Latina Democrat, Lupe Valdez. Few expected Valdez to pose a serious challenge to Abbott in a deeply Republican state like Texas, but some observers believed Valdez could chip away at Abbott’s support among Latinos due to her shared ethnicity and Abbott’s support for anti-immigrant policies (Barragán 2018; Sanchez 2018). Abbott again turned to his mother-in-law, Maria de la Luz Segura de Phalen, to be the focal point of his first Spanish ad of 2018, “Madrina Dos” (Godmother Two). Like in her first ad, Abbott’s mother-in-law explained that she was also his godmother, and that Abbott was a man of faith who Texans who could be proud to call their governor (Abbott 2018a). Another Spanish advertisement, “Futuro” (Future), featured clips of Abbott interacting with Latino children and touted Abbott’s efforts to improve Texas’s education system (Abbott
As in 2014, Abbott’s 2018 Spanish advertisements made no mention of Abbott’s stance on border issues, which were a focal point of his English advertisements. One ad, “Keeping Texans Safe”, features Abbott touting his efforts to protect Texans by banning sanctuary cities, cracking down on human trafficking, and increasing border security (Abbott 2018c).

As most predicted, Abbott won re-election, claiming 56% of the total vote (Garrett 2018). Surprising many, however, was that Abbott won an estimated 42% of the Latino vote, roughly equal to Abbott’s performance four year earlier against a non-Latino candidate (Krogstad et al. 2018). This suggests that even when competing against an actual Latino candidate, Abbott’s identity-based appeals seem to resonate with Latino Texans. To be clear though, Abbott’s Latino outreach was never entirely necessary. Abbott could have received as little Latino support as Ted Cruz did and still handily defeated Vasquez. As demonstrated by his investments in the Latino community and his words about passing the baton off to a Latino Republican governor, presumably Texas Land Commissioner George P. Bush, Abbott is building a model that will ensure Republican dominance in Texas for decades, even as Latinos will outnumber Whites in Texas by 2022 (Ura and Ahmed 2018).

“Uno de nosotros” - Mike Coffman

While Abbott let his Latino family members do most of the heavy lifting on his identity-based appeals, most candidates will not have the benefit of family ties. But as my theory suggests, speaking Spanish can help bridge ties and reduce distrust. One candidate
who put in the effort to reach out to Latinos in Spanish is Representative Mike Coffman of Colorado, a White Republican who began taking Spanish classes after his district gained Latino-heavy areas of Aurora in the 2010 Colorado Redistricting and became 20% Latino. Coffman’s district has been a battleground district ever since, as the district leans Republican but went to Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 and Hillary Clinton in 2016. Coffman began using identity-based appeals in earnest in 2014, when he was challenged by Democrat Andrew Romanoff. Romanoff, who speaks Spanish thanks to his time teaching in Costa Rica, attacked Coffman for his anti-immigrant voting record in Congress, and for his seemingly disingenuous efforts to use Spanish to appeal to Latinos, as he toured a Latino movie theater with then Latino Congressman Xavier Becerra: “No matter how you say it – in English or Spanish – no matter what you say in Colorado, what matters is what you’re doing in Washington, DC, and what [Coffman’s] doing is part of the problem” (Stokols 2014a).

Undeterred, Coffman took to spending weekends at Latino markets and restaurants, speaking to Latinos in Spanish about their problems and concerns, albeit with a Spanish coach nearby (Stokols 2014a). What was on pace to be one of the most expensive and competitive races in Colorado history then took a turn for the bizarre as both non-Hispanic White candidates agreed to debate entirely in Spanish for 30 minutes on a Univision affiliate (CBS4 2014). In a bit of irony, the same candidate who had once co-sponsored a bill to make English the official language of the United States, and suggested that Latino voters who could not understand their ballots should “pull out a dictionary”, took part in what could have been the nation’s first congressional debate held
entirely in Spanish (Huetteman 2016). Coffman, who had received the questions ahead of time, seemingly read all his responses from his notes, which was pointed out by Romanoff, who told the audience his spoke from the heart, not a script (Stokols 2014b). Coffman narrowly won a 47-45% victory, which he attributed to his Latino outreach that had earned him an estimated 20% of the Latino vote, and even gave part of his victory speech in Spanish (CBS Denver 2015).

In an interview about his Spanish skills, during which Coffman answered many questions asked in Spanish, Coffman noted “Es muy importante para la comunidad (It’s very important for the community) …It’s a sign of respect for the community” (Llorente 2015). After his close 2014 victory, Coffman continued to improve his Spanish with daily tutoring sessions and by watching Spanish-language news shows and telenovelas (Llorente 2015). In addition to practicing his Spanish with Hispanic members of Congress during breaks from the floor, Coffman traveled to Mexico in the summer of 2016 with a bipartisan group of lawmakers for an intensive Spanish immersion program (Peterson and Stanley-Becker 2016). Eager to demonstrate his improved Spanish, Coffman welcomed another Spanish-language debate against his 2016 opponent, Democrat Morgan Carroll. While Coffman more naturally answered questions in Spanish, his opponent responded through a Spanish interpreter (Bunch 2016).

Throughout the campaign, Carroll attempted to associate Coffman with then candidate Trump, perhaps in hope that the presence of Trump would be enough to finally push Colorado’s 6th district, which had recently gone for Democratic presidents, into the hands of a Democrat (The Sentinel 2016). In response, Coffman attempted to distance
himself from Trump and other Republicans. Coffman’s first ad of 2016, “One of Us”, featured a diverse group of constituents explaining how Coffman was not like other Republicans because Coffman had worked to represent the interests of their groups, with all his constituents saying that Coffman was “one of us” (Coffman for Congress 2016a). Another ad, “Jackie”, featured a Latina constituent saying that it meant a lot to Latinos that Coffman learned Spanish, and included a clip of Coffman speaking Spanish during a debate (Coffman for Congress 2016b). In another ad, “Country First”, Coffman declares that he doesn’t like Trump and doesn’t trust Hillary Clinton, but that as a former Marine his duty is to country first, so he will stand up to Trump if he wins and hold Clinton accountable is she wins (Coffman for Congress 2016c). The “Country First” ad aired in English and Spanish and was the first time a House Republican used explicitly anti-Trump rhetoric according to Politico (Isenstadt 2016).

Coffman also extended his identity-based appeals to Aurora, Colorado’s sizeable Ethiopian community, which is the second largest immigrant community in Colorado. At the annual Taste of Ethiopia festival in 2016, Coffman was something of celebrity. Local leaders presented him with flowers and a traditional Ethiopian shirt, and he made a few remarks in Amharic. Per news accounts, the Ethiopian community remembers that Coffman attended their churches to grieve with them after several Ethiopians died in a terror attack in Libya in 2015 (Huetteman 2016). One of Coffman’s advertisements, “Mamay”, features an Ethiopian-American constituent crediting Coffman for his outreach efforts and praising his honesty and trustworthiness (Coffman for Congress 2016d).
In 2018, Coffman faced his toughest test yet in Democrat Jason Crow. From the outset, Crow drew parallels between Coffman and Trump, noting that for all his rhetoric, Coffman almost always voted with Trump (Bianchi 2018). Coffman continued to distance himself from Trump in his ads, and painted himself as a bipartisan leader who stands up to Republicans in Congress (Coffman for Congress 2018a). Coffman continued his outreach to his district’s Latino and Ethiopian communities, and again participated in a Spanish language debate where his opponent answered solely in English and Coffman made remarks in Spanish (Staver 2018, Hernandez 2018). Despite his efforts, Coffman trailed behind Crow throughout the campaign, and in the weeks leading to election day, the Congressional Leadership Fund and National Republican Congressional Committee cancelled millions of dollars’ worth of ad buys in Coffman’s district (Wilson 2018).

Coffman was not able to gain on Crow’s lead and ultimately lost his seat, which some, like Republican strategist Dick Wadhams, attributed to Trump more than Crow: “Donald Trump did what Democrats could not accomplish, which is the defeat of Mike Coffman. Coffman lost because there was such an anti-Trump sentiment running through the district that no Republican could survive it” (Staver et al. 2018). Coffman seemingly agreed in an interview after his loss, saying:

“I was told at the beginning by the (National Republican Congressional Committee), that you have to try and localize this race. You have to make this race a referendum on you. If it’s nationalized and it’s a referendum on the president, you’re not going to win. And, it was nationalized. I couldn’t help that” (Murray 2018).

President Trump had a different view, as he believed Republicans like Coffman lost because they failed to embrace him: “I’m not sure if I should be happy or sad, but I feel just fine about it. Carlos Curbelo, Mike Coffman. Too bad, Mike” (Washington Examiner
2018). Coffman has since expressed interest in running for Aurora mayor in late 2019, although he rules out seeking another partisan office (Murray 2018).

Coffman’s identity-based appeals focused on his Spanish speaking ability and Spanish television ads. Unlike Abbott and Tower, Coffman’s Republican affiliation was ultimately his undoing in one of the nation’s most competitive congressional districts. Coffman’s appeals likely lacked the authenticity of those of Tower and Abbott, who could claim they embraced the Latino community long before they needed to do so for electoral gain. To be clear, news accounts suggest that some Latinos respected Coffman for his efforts to engage them in their own language, but unlike Tower and Abbott, Coffman did not do so until he needed to. Should Coffman seek Aurora’s mayorship in 2019, he will likely perform well given his name recognition, the lack of partisanship, and the connections he’s built with Aurora’s Latino and Ethiopian communities. As for Colorado’s 6th district, it is unlikely any Republican will be able to easily reassemble the Coffman coalition, which makes it unlikely the district will remain competitive in the future.

**Brown at heart – Beto O’Rourke**

Robert “Beto” O’Rourke authored one of 2012’s biggest upsets when he defeated 16-year incumbent Silvestre Reyes in the Democratic primary of Texas’s 16th congressional district (Bland et al. 2012). O’Rourke’s victory shocked many as Texas’s 16th is the second most Hispanic district in the nation with 81.5% of residents identifying as Hispanic or Latino. O’Rourke, a fourth-generation Texan of Irish descent, ran a
A grassroots campaign that painted the Hispanic incumbent as a corrupt Washington politician who had forgotten about his constituents (Benson 2018). O’Rourke, a native of the district, adopted the nickname “Beto” and used his fluent Spanish speaking skills to reach out to the district’s Latinos. Lacking funding, O’Rourke amassed an army of volunteers and knocked on as many as 16,000 doors. Reyes attacked O’Rourke’s previous theft and drunk driving convictions, as well as O’Rourke’s position on legalizing marijuana. O’Rourke aired Spanish advertisements where he called for ending corruption and protecting social programs (O’Rourke 2012). Despite nearly two decades of incumbency and endorsements from Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, O’Rourke narrowly won with 50.5% of the vote in an election where two-thirds of the voters were Latino (Bland et al. 2012). O’Rourke won among non-Hispanic White voters and only lost the Hispanic vote by 9 points. Without his identity-based appeals, O’Rourke may not have pulled enough Hispanic voters from Reyes to win the election.

O’Rourke went on to easily defeat Republican Barbara Carrasco and Libertarian Junart Sodoy in the general election, and he spent his first term advocating for border issues such as reducing red tape at border crossings and rethinking the war on the drugs (Neff 2014). Mindful of his criticism of Reyes, O’Rourke held at least one town hall meeting every month (Benson 2018). Due to being non-Hispanic, O’Rourke was ineligible to join the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, despite representing the second most Latino district in the United States (Aguilar 2013). Although O’Rourke’s campaign never asked to join the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, there were those who favored changing rules to allow O’Rourke to join, pointing to the Congressional Asian Pacific
Caucus which does not have racial requirements, and the Mexican American Legislative Caucus of the Texas House of Representatives, which only requires members represent districts that at least 50 percent Mexican American (Ferris 2013; Aguilar 2013). In 2014, O’Rourke ran unopposed in the Democratic primary and easily defeated Republican Corey Roen and Libertarian Jaime Perez in the general election with 67.5% of the vote (New York Times 2014). In 2016, O’Rourke easily defeated Ben Mendoza in the Democratic primary, and went on to defeat Libertarian Jaime Perez and Green candidate Mary Gourdoux with 85.7% of the vote in a general election where Republicans did not even run a candidate (New York Times 2017).

In 2018, O’Rourke announced he would not seek re-election for his Congressional seat as he would run for Texas’s Senate seat held by Ted Cruz. O’Rourke won the Democratic Primary against Sema Hernandez and Edward Kimbrough with 61.8% of the vote, which was lower than many observers expected given his name recognition and significant financial advantage (Ura and Platoff 2018). Some attributed O’Rourke’s worse than expected performance to his competing against a Latino candidate, which portended poorly for O’Rourke’s chances against Ted Cruz (Ura and Platoff 2018). In his 2012 Senate victory, Ted Cruz won 35% of the Latino vote in Texas, which is not all that bad considering his position on immigration and party attachment in a state where only 23% of Latinos identify as Republican (Latino Decisions 2012). Analysis of 2012 election results suggest that Cruz’s Hispanic heritage helped Cruz outperform Romney among Latinos in heavily Latino counties (Hopkins 2016). Relative to Cruz’s last
Democratic opponent who had no identity-based appeals to speak of, O’Rourke was in a better position to limit Cruz’s appeal to Latinos in Texas.

From the outset, Cruz’s campaign painted O’Rourke as something of a cultural appropriator who would do anything for a vote. Cruz’s first radio ad took the form of a country song, attacking O’Rourke for his liberal values and adopting the name Beto:

“If you’re gonna to run in Texas, you can’t be a liberal man. I remember reading stories, liberal Robert wanted to fit in. So he changed his name to Beto and hid it with a grin. Beto wants those open borders and wants to take our guns. Not a chance on Earth he’ll get a vote from millions of Texans” (Cruz 2018a).

Cruz defended his ad, and his choice to go by Ted instead his first name, Rafael, by playing the ad off as a jest and focusing on his immigrant father’s pursuit of the American Dream (Vasquez 2018). Cruz’s surrogates continued this line of attack, tweeting photos of O’Rourke signing numerous documents as Robert (@JeffRoe 2018) and painting O’Rourke as “an Irish guy pretending to be Hispanic” (@DonaldJTrumpJr 2018), while reporting showed that Cruz went by Rafael while attending Harvard (@mviser 2018; Golshan 2018). During a town hall, when O’Rourke was asked about his name and connection to the Hispanic community, O’Rourke stated:

“You know this in McAllen – if you are born Robert or Albert or Gilbert or Humberto, your folks, your friends, your community calls you Beto...Born and raised and fourth generation in El Paso in a community that is more than 80 percent Mexican-American...this is part of who I am and where I’m from and the pride that I feel...I’m fiercely proud of that.” (CNN 2018a).

In response to Cruz’s attacks, O’Rourke tweeted a photo of himself as a toddler wearing a sweater with Beto written on the front (@BetoORourke 2018).

O’Rourke’s first Spanish ad showcased his efforts to visit every county in Texas as he called for Texans of all backgrounds to come together and overcome the fear,
divisions, and corporations that control American politics (El Paso Times 2018). Another Spanish ad, from People For the American Way, featured images and audio of families separated by the Trump administration’s policies, and urged Latinos to register and vote for O’Rourke, who, unlike Cruz, would fight for children and families (People For the American Way 2018). Not to be outdone, Cruz launched what was likely his first Spanish ad in a Senate race. The ad featured his father Rafael Cruz, who spoke of his imprisonment and torture in Cuba before coming to the United States to pursue the American Dream (Cruz 2018b). Unlike Cruz’s English ads, which focused on highlighting policy differences between Cruz and O’Rourke, Cruz’s Spanish advertisement focused entirely on Cruz’s Latino family connections.

While highlighting differences between himself and Cruz on immigration was important for O’Rourke, he also acknowledged that Latinos wanted to hear about other issues as well. In an online feature, O’Rourke talked about taking the Latino vote seriously:

“[We’re] talking about, in Spanish, not immigration, talking about the debt, talking about national security, talking about veterans, talking about this tax bill, talking about healthcare, talking about jobs. Again, not taking Mexican-Americans and Hispanic voters for granted by, you know, maybe some token Spanish about immigration…They’re every bit as concerned about everything you and I are concerned about, and we acknowledge that” (Greater Houston for Beto 2018).

O’Rourke would conduct numerous interviews with Spanish media outlets of various sizes, ranging from local Telemundo affiliates in Texas to nation-wide talks shows on Univision hosted by Jorge Ramos, demonstrating his fluent Spanish speaking ability. During an interview with Ramos, Beto O’Rourke was asked if Cruz, who refused O’Rourke’s invitation to debate twice in Spanish, was betraying Latinos (O’Rourke
O’Rourke stated that it was important to him to listen to all Texans in their language, whether that be English and Spanish, and that offering to debate Cruz in Spanish was a sign of respect toward Latinos (O’Rourke 2018). O’Rourke added that Cruz not only failed to represent Latinos, but all Texans as well (O’Rourke 2018).

Despite his efforts, O’Rourke narrowly lost the election to Cruz. O’Rourke outperformed expectations, earning 48.3% of the total vote to Cruz’s 50.9% and trailing Cruz by less than 250,000 votes (New York Times 2018); in comparison, Cruz won his 2012 Senate race by more than 1 million votes (New York Times 2012). Among Latinos, O’Rourke won an estimated 74% of the vote, up from the 2012 Democratic candidate’s share of 65% (Latino Decisions 2018). Perhaps most impressively, O’Rourke outperformed Latina Democrat Lupe Valdez, who was on the same ballot and won only 53% of the Latino vote against Greg Abbott (Krogstad et al. 2018). O’Rourke came as close to winning a Senate seat in Texas as any Democrat since the 1980s, and he can certainly attribute part of success to his identity-based appeals to Latinos. O’Rourke’s identity-based appeals to Latinos should serve him well should he challenge John Cornyn for his Senate seat in 2020, given that Cornyn won less of the Latino vote than Cruz did even when Cruz wasn’t running against O’Rourke in 2012 (Latino Decisions 2014). Outside of statewide contests in Texas, O’Rourke’s identity-based appeals may serve him best in the 2020 Democratic primaries.
The Future of Identity-based Appeals

The O’Rourke-Reyes election is likely a preview of what future Democratic primaries and intra-party contests will look like. To compete in the nation’s second most Latino district, O’Rourke had to rely in part on identity-based appeals. Outside of a few policy differences on issues like the legalization of marijuana and border security, O’Rourke and Reyes had similar platforms. When policy and party cues are neutralized, elections, especially Democratic primaries, may come down to who can better mobilize ethnic voters. Per exit polls, O’Rourke handily won among the district’s non-Hispanic Whites, while Reyes only beat O’Rourke by 9 points among Latinos (Bland et al. 2012). Had O’Rourke not engaged in identity-based appeals, he might not have done as well among Latinos in a close election decided by less than 3,000 votes.

In addition to Democratic primaries in minority-heavy districts nationwide, one can see the future of identity-based appeals in congressional elections in California, which are now essentially Democrat-only contests thanks to California’s top-two primary. The 2017 special election for California’s 34th district, where Asian American Robert Lee Ahn faced Latino Jimmy Gomez, saw both candidates mobilize co-ethnics, but also use identity-based appeals to reach out to their opponent’s co-ethnic bases. Gomez touted endorsements from local leaders in the Asian Pacific Islander American community such as Congresswoman Judy Chu and Congressman Ted Lieu, and shared stories of his history of service to Chinese and Filipino Americans during his tenure as a state legislator (Keith 2017). Ahn’s campaign released statements from local Latino leaders who praised Ahn’s ability to represent Latinos and Koreans, and appealed to
African Americans by highlighting endorsements from Rev. J Edgar Boyd, pastor of the oldest African American church in Los Angeles, and other faith-based leaders (Meraz 2017). With California moving its primary to Super Tuesday, it is likely that identity-based appeals will play a large role in the Democratic primary as presidential hopefuls like Kamala Harris, Julián Castro, and Beto O’Rourke vie for minority votes in the country’s largest minority-majority state.

Similarly, Coffman’s odds-defying tenure in Colorado’s 6th district will likely serve as a blueprint for Republicans in increasingly diverse districts and states. Thanks in part to his identity-based appeals to Latinos, Coffman was able to hold a district that went for Obama in 2012 and Clinton in 2016. Coffman’s case is also interesting because prior to his redistricting, Coffman was anti-immigrant and had no identity-based appeals to speak of. Coffman is unique among my case studies in that unlike Abbott, who married a Latina before he went into politics, O’Rourke, who speaks Spanish because of his upbringing in southern Texas, and Tower, who was apparently a regular around the cantinas of Texas, Coffman only adopted identity-based appeals for political reasons. As Giles et al. (1973) and Koslow et al. (1994) wrote, listeners from ethnic backgrounds will respond more favorably to speakers from a different background when the speaker’s message is perceived as containing more effort; moreover, if accommodation is perceived as coming from an inauthentic place, such as a desire to mislead listeners, it could backfire and invoke negative feelings toward the speaker (Simard et al. 1976). In the case of identity-based appeals, it is likely that messages from Tower, Abbott, and O’Rourke were seen by Latinos as authentic due in part to the connections these candidates had.
with Latinos prior to running for office. On the other hand, while Coffman made a
genuine effort to learn Spanish and appeal to Latinos, these efforts may have been
perceived by some Latinos as inauthentic.

While evidence suggests identity-based appeals can be a boon for candidates in
minority-heavy districts, they are only a portion of a candidate’s strategy. Coffman’s
2018 loss suggests that in spite of his identity-based appeals and the distance he
attempted to create between himself and Trump, Coffman was defeated, as least in part,
by a wave of anti-Trump and anti-Republican sentiment. O’Rourke was able to combine
identity-based appeals with policy-based appeals to great success, but this strategy may
be limited to Democrats for the foreseeable future given the Republican party’s anti-
immigrant shift. Despite Coffman’s shortcomings, Tower and Abbott’s campaigns
suggest that Republicans can rely largely on identity-based appeals to build substantial
bases of Latino support. Abbott, who spoke of building a Latino base of support that will
keep Texas red long beyond his term as governor, has already been emulated by
Republicans in competitive elections with large Latino electorates.

The most prominent example is Rick Scott, who was narrowly elected governor
of Florida in 2010. Scott ran no Spanish ads until he was called out by Republican
primary challenger Bill McCollum, who made Spanish ads a focus of his campaign
(Caputo 2014). In 2014, Scott began running Spanish ads as early as March and started
learning Spanish with the help of a campaign aide (Smiley 2018). Scott spoke Spanish in
his ads and on the campaign trail, and even had former governor Jeb Bush record a
Spanish advertisement for him (Florida GOP 2014). During his Senate run in 2018, Scott
seemingly adopted Abbott’s playbook and aired Spanish ads during the World Cup to court Florida’s diverse Latino population. One World Cup themed ad, “Venimos” (We came), highlights that although Latinos come from many different countries, they now call Florida home, and ends with Scott saying “May the best team win” in Spanish (Scott for Florida 2018). Scott went on to run a slate of Spanish ads, including ones distancing himself from Trump, and gave weekly Spanish interviews to news outlets, while his Democratic opponent, three-term incumbent, Bill Nelson, had little Latino outreach to speak of (Caputo et al. 2018). Likely thanks in part to his identity-based appeals, Scott outperformed Nelson’s previous Republican challenger by 8 points and defeated Nelson by a margin of only 10,000 votes (CNN 2012; CNN 2018b).

Analyses of identity-based appeals suggests that, at least for Republicans, ambiguity is key. While Beto O’Rourke touted his Democratic party affiliation in his ads and on the campaign trail, Republican candidates do not, likely owing to the Republican Party’s poor standing among Latinos, even before the emergence of Trump (Pantoja 2015). Case studies of Tower, Coffman, Abbott, and Scott all suggest that Republican candidates engaging in identity-based appeals make no mention of their party affiliation. In addition, while O’Rourke could make policy-based appeals on immigration alongside his identity-based appeals, Republican candidates appealing to Latinos rarely mention policy in their advertisements. However, while Republican candidates are ambiguous on policy, they are not ambiguous when it comes to identity, as identity-based appeals stress the candidate’s connections with the Latino community. The literature suggests that Republicans candidates who hide their party affiliation may be doing so at their own
detriment, as Hersh and Schaffner (2013) found that targeted, ambiguous appeals from Republicans, but not Democrats, increased support among Latinos. Similarly, Nuño (2007) finds that Latino voters contacted by Latino Republicans were much more likely to vote Republican than those who were contacted by non-Latino Republicans, but finds no similar effect for Democratic outreach. It may then be the case that since Republicans start at a lower position of support among Latinos, an appeal from a Republican may be met more positively than the same appeal coming from a Democrat.

I distinguish identity-based appeals as being unique from simple targeted ads or pandering appeals as there is a generally a greater commitment on the part of the candidate when making identity-based appeals. While Marco Rubio could target a mailer to evangelical Christians, or pander to gun owners by saying that he bought his family a gun for Christmas (Bolton 2016), identity-based appeals are more difficult to pull off effectively, but potentially much more rewarding because they go beyond simple pandering (Koslow et al. 1994; Simard et al. 1976). Unlike simple targeted appeals or pandering, identity-based appeals signal a strong commitment from the candidate to the group, which increases the effectiveness of these appeals (Koslow et al. 1994; Giles et al. 1973). Hine (1970) wrote of the kinds of commitment acts required for membership in religious movements or social groups, and while there is not a perfect overlap with identity-based appeals, we can see similarities. According to Hine (1970), committed individuals have a before and after story regarding membership in the group and how it has changed them, which can be usually corroborated by close associates or group members. We can see examples in Coffman touting his efforts to learn Spanish and
embedding himself in the Latino community after his redistricting, or in Abbott’s advertisements where his Latino family members speak to Abbott’s Latino values because he converted to Catholicism and married into their family.

While I contend that identity-based appeals are theoretically distinct from simple targeted appeals, I cannot argue that identity-based appeals do not pose the kind of threat to democracy that Hillygus and Shields (2008) argued micro-targeted ads do. According to Hillygus and Shields (2008), micro-targeted ads allow candidates to discretely make different claims and promises to different groups, which can complicate electoral mandates. With identity-based appeals to Latinos, candidates have even more leeway to make different promises to different electorates as many candidates advertise in Spanish. As I have suggested in this chapter, identity-based appeals seemingly allow Republicans to run anti-immigrant, policy-focused campaigns in English, and pro-Latino, value focused campaigns in Spanish. Similarly, identity-based appeals may also be contributing to the information asymmetry that exists between English and Spanish dominant Latinos, which is largely a native and foreign-born divide.

Unlike the targeted ads on wedge issues Hillygus and Shields (2008) wrote of, identity-based appeals, and most advertisements in Spanish, contain little policy information, opting instead to focus on cultural and symbolic appeals (Abrajano 2010). Research suggests that as Latinos become acculturated, they come to prefer policy appeals, but foreign-born Latinos, who still make up sizable shares of the Latino electorate and turn out at higher rates than native-born Latinos, prefer cultural appeals like those seen in identity-based appeals (Abrajano 2010). These differences could be due
to Spanish dominant Latinos having lower levels of political knowledge than English dominant Latinos (Abrajano 2010). As of result of these information asymmetries, we some something of a self-fulfilling prophecy where campaigns don’t make policy appeals to Spanish dominant Latinos because they have low political knowledge, and the political knowledge of these Latinos doesn’t increase because they only see cultural appeals. On the other hand, Abrajano’s (2010) research suggest that when English dominant Latinos see policy-based appeals, their political knowledge increases. Identity-based appeals from Republicans are likely not providing this benefit for English dominant Latinos, as a survey of appeals from Coffman and Abbott suggests their English identity-based appeals differ little from their Spanish identity-based appeals.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have analyzed the campaigns of four candidates who have used identity-based appeals to varying degrees of success. On the Democratic side, Beto O’Rourke used identity-based appeals to unseat a 16-year Latino incumbent in the second most Latino district in the entire country. O’Rourke went on to nearly defeat Ted Cruz for his senate seat and looks to be a strong contender in the 2020 Democratic primaries, were his Latino appeals should serve him well. On the Republican side, we see a pattern emerging where candidates who employ identity-based appeals can run what amounts to two separate campaigns: a policy-focused, anti-immigrant campaign in English, and a culturally focused, largely policy-free campaign in Spanish built on identity-based appeals.
John Tower used identity-based appeals, rooted in his connection with everyday Latinos and built in cantinas across Texas, to become the first Republican elected to a statewide office in Texas since Reconstruction. Tower recognized how important the Latino vote would become and spent decades building a playbook on how Republicans could best appeal to Latino voters. Tower toured cantinas, threw tamale making parties, and relied on local Latino leaders throughout Texas to mobilize Latinos in his favor. Tower also employed Spanish advertisements, spending half a million dollars on a Spanish ballad that, at the time, was the largest ad buy in Texas history (Sosa in Cisneros and Rosales 2009). Although Tower was against illegal immigration and was one of only two Republicans to vote against the VRA, Tower worked to ensure Latinos could vote across Texas, and pressured the Nixon administration to appoint Latinos to high posts in the federal government. Tower’s identity-based appeals playbook went on to be used by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush to great success, and in modern day Texas, Governor Greg Abbott has mastered Tower’s chameleon tactics by focusing entirely on identity-based appeals to Latinos.

Abbott is perhaps the best example of a candidate using identity-based appeals to run separate campaigns in English and Spanish. In English advertisements, Abbott was an immigration hardliner who ran on promises of securing the border with Mexico. In Spanish advertisements, Abbott’s Latino relatives speak to his Latino values, and tell Latinos that they can trust Abbott. While observers predicted Abbott would fare poorly given his anti-immigrant platform, Abbott won more than twice the share of the Latino vote his predecessor Rick Perry did. And despite signing a controversial anti-sanctuary
cities bill into law in his first term as governor, Abbott went on to earn substantial shares of the Latino vote in his bid for re-election, even against a Latina Democrat. Abbott hasn’t touted Latino endorsements and has not made promises to appoint Latinos to his staff. Abbott also hasn’t spoken much Spanish on the campaign trail or in his advertisements. Abbott’s campaigns instead rely heavily on his Latino family connections and Spanish advertisements, which aired heavily during Mexico’s World Cup games in 2014 and 2018. These findings suggest that if a candidate has Latino family connections, they may make up for a lack of other identity-based appeals. As Nuño (2007) argued, because the effectiveness of a political message rests in large part on the messenger, Latino family connections may be the most important part of identity-based appeals.

It is important to note that Abbott is an outlier, as most candidates will not have Latino family connections to base their campaigns around. On the Republican side, Mike Coffman represents what is likely the most common case where we will see candidates employ identity-based appeals. Coffman was notoriously anti-immigrant until his district became 20% Latino and he realized he needed Latino voters to win re-election. Coffman learned Spanish, aired Spanish advertisements, and became a common fixture around Latino neighborhoods in his district. He participated in an all-Spanish debate and won a close election where he gave part of his victory speech in Spanish (CBS Denver 2015). Although Coffman continued to improve his Spanish throughout his time in congress, his position on immigration did not improve much, which likely hurt him in one of the nation’s most competitive districts. Despite his efforts to distance himself from Trump,
Coffman lost his seat in 2018, which he had previously held even when it went for Obama in 2012 and Clinton in 2016.

As the United States becomes a majority-minority country and we see large scale demographic shifts, candidate use of identity-based appeals will surely increase. Candidates from both parties, but especially Republicans, will have to adapt their appeals to compete for minority votes. Candidates like Beto O’Rourke, John Tower, and Mike Coffman have laid out blueprints for effective cross-racial mobilization strategies based on appeals to Latino identity. Greg Abbott represents a unique case with his Latino family attachments, but this may become more common as Latino and non-Hispanic White marriages make up a plurality of intermarried couples (Livingston and Brown 2017); moreover, among U.S. born Latinos with a bachelor’s degree, 56% intermarry, with a majority marrying non-Hispanic Whites. Thus, we may see the rise of more candidates like Abbott, especially when we look at intermarriage outside of just Latinos.
CHAPTER 2: Analyzing Identity-based Appeals in Congressional and Gubernatorial Elections

To better understand the benefits of identity-based appeals, this chapter uses ecological inference to estimate how well Mike Coffman, Greg Abbott, and Beto O’Rourke performed among Latino voters in selected elections. John Tower is excluded from these analyses because of the lack of necessary data detailed below. Ecological inference techniques allow researchers to use aggregate-level data to draw conclusions about individual-level behavior. This is especially useful when estimating minority support for candidates since we can’t access voting records and count exactly how many Latinos voted for any given candidate in an election. I also use ecological inference techniques to predict Latino vote share for candidates who ran in similar electoral contexts to Coffman, Abbott, and O’Rourke, but who did not use identity-based appeals. These comparison cases highlight the benefits of identity-based appeals when it comes to appealing to Latino voters.

To perform an ecological inference for a given election, I first collected data on race and ethnicity at the precinct level for the area of analysis, which is either a congressional district or state. Next, I collected precinct level results for the election of interest and merged with the data on race and ethnicity. For Texas, this data is available from the Texas Legislative Council at ftp://ftpgis1.tlc.state.tx.us/. For Colorado, this data is available from the Colorado Secretary of State at https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/Archives.html. With the data merged and cleaned, I performed ecological inference analyses using the eiCompare package (Collingwood 2017) in the R statistical computing environment. While Robinson (2009) cautions against ecological
inference methods for social science research, as the conditions under which individual behavior can be inferred from group behavior are rarely present in data, ecological inference techniques have been widely used in research on voting (Herron and Sekhon 2005; Altman 2002) and are even accepted for use in cases on voting rights (Collingwood et al. 2016; Greiner 2006).

There are numerous ecological techniques available, and the eiCompare package (Collingwood 2017) allows for the results of three of the most common techniques to compared side-by-side. The first, and one of the oldest techniques, is Goodman’s (1953) method, which fell out of favor among social scientists as it assumes that group patterns are consistent between ecological units. This is clearly not always the case, as one can imagine scenarios where an ecological unit consisting of native-born Latinos behaves entirely differently than an ecological unit consisting entirely of foreign-born Latinos. King’s (1997) method improves upon Goodman’s (1953) method by removing the need for the aforementioned assumption, and has become the standard in voting rights courts cases (Collingwood et al. 2016). A key weakness of King’s (1997) method, however, is that it is designed to predict models with only two groups, such as Whites and Blacks, or Whites and Hispanics. This makes King’s (1997) method unsuitable for many cases involving Hispanics, which is why I rely on Rosen et al.’s (2001) method.

Rosen et al.’s rows by columns (RxC) approach allows for analyses involving multiple candidates and multiple groups, which makes it the preferred method for the elections I am studying. For all the analyses in this chapter, I conducted RxC ecological inferences predicting candidate support among non-Hispanic Whites, Latinos, and Others
(all other racial and ethnic groups). I predict support for the Republican and Democratic candidate in each election, and as well as Other, which is all other candidates in the election combined. For the sake of clarity, I only present findings for Latinos and non-Hispanic Whites. Finally, although all the results presented in this chapter come from RxC ecological inferences, the appendix contains plots comparing the findings of King’s (1997) method and Rosen et al.’s (2001) RxC method for each election.

**Mike Coffman**

I begin by looking at Coffman’s performance in 2012, immediately before he began using identity-based appeals to target Latinos. Table 2.1 presents results from a RxC ecological inference model predicting support for candidates among non-Hispanic Whites and Latinos in the 2012 general election for Colorado’s 6th congressional district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>RxC: Percent Latino</th>
<th>RxC: Percent White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Miklosi</td>
<td>71.4 (3.87)</td>
<td>35.06 (0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffman</td>
<td>8.04 (4.24)</td>
<td>59.55 (0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20.65 (1.18)</td>
<td>5.4 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.09</td>
<td>100.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

As expected, Coffman, who suggested that Latino voters who could not understand their English ballots should “pull out a dictionary” (Huetteman 2016), performed poorly among Latinos in 2012 with only 8.04% of the Latino vote. Coffman’s Democratic
challenger won 71.4% of the Latino vote, and two independent candidates won a
combined 20.65% of the Latino vote. Coffman comfortably won 59.55% of the non-
Hispanic White vote, compared to 35.06% for Miklosi, and 5.4% for the independent
candidates. Figure 2.1, a scatterplot comparing how Latino electoral precincts are versus
how much of the total vote Coffman won in that district, suggests that as precincts
become more Latino, Coffman is much less likely to win a higher share of that precincts
total vote.
Turning to 2014, we can estimate how well Coffman performed among Latinos once he began using identity-based appeals. Table 2.2 presents results from a RxC ecological inference model predicting support for candidates among non-Hispanic Whites and Latinos in the 2014 general election for Colorado’s 6th congressional district.
Table 2.2. Ecological inference mean estimates for Latino and non-Hispanic White vote preferences in CO-6, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>RxC: Percent Latino</th>
<th>RxC: Percent White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanoff</td>
<td>55.76 (4.06)</td>
<td>35.07 (0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffman</td>
<td>22.99 (4.35)</td>
<td>61.21 (0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21.28 (1.18)</td>
<td>3.70 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.03</td>
<td>99.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

Per Table 2.2, we can see that in 2014, Coffman performed significantly better among Latinos than in 2012. Coffman earned 22.99% of the Latino vote, while his Democratic opponent Romanoff earned 55.76%, and two independent candidates won earned a combined 21.28% of the Latino vote. Figure 2.2 also suggests that Coffman performed significantly better among Latinos in 2014 than 2012, as we see Coffman drawing more support in Latino-heavy districts.
Figure 2.2. Scatterplot comparing precinct percent Latino and Coffman vote between 2012 and 2014.

I attribute Coffman’s improved performance among Latinos to his identity-based appeals. From 2012 to 2014, Coffman learned Spanish, embedded himself in his district’s Latino community, and even participated in a Spanish-language debate with Romanoff. Considering that Romanoff also spoke Spanish and engaged in identity-based appeals of
his own, it is possible Coffman could have performed even better against a Democrat who wasn’t Romanoff.

In 2016, Coffman faced Democrat Morgan Carroll, who had little in the way of identity-based appeals. Carroll did not speak Spanish, and her Spanish advertisements were just English advertisements subtitled in Spanish. Coffman, on the other hand, doubled down on identity-based appeals by taking an intensive Spanish course in Mexico during the summer of 2016 and airing more Spanish advertisements (Llorente 2015). The results of an RxC ecological inference model for 2016, presented in Table 2.3, suggest that Coffman was rewarded for his efforts, as he drew an estimated 29.05% of the Latino vote.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>RxC: Percent Latino</th>
<th>RxC: Percent White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carroll</td>
<td>51.95 (3.73)</td>
<td>34.17 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffman</td>
<td>29.05 (3.91)</td>
<td>60.87 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19.02 (1.19)</td>
<td>4.96 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.02</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

By 2016, Coffman had more than tripled his share of the Latino vote from 2012, and although he saw a smaller increase from 2014 to 2016 than from 2012 to 2014, Coffman was still improving his share of the Latino vote every election. Figure 2.3 corroborates
the findings in Table 2.3, as we see Coffman slightly improve his performance in Latino-heavy districts from 2014 to 2016.

**Figure 2.3.** Scatterplot comparing precinct percent Latino and Coffman vote between 2012 and 2016.

Data from the 2018 elections in Colorado are not yet available, but I suspect Coffman performed at least as well in 2018 as he did in 2014. Coffman’s identity-based appeals were not enough to secure his re-election in a race seen as a referendum on
Trump, but Coffman’s improved standing among Latinos from 2012 to 2016 suggests that investments in identity-based appeals can pay off for Republicans in closely contested elections.

To better illustrate the benefits of identity-based appeals, we can compare Coffman’s performance among Latinos to that of Scott Tipton, a similar candidate who I use as a comparison case. Tipton is a Republican who represented a congressional district in Colorado at the same time Coffman did. While Coffman’s district is 73.8% White and 20.2% Hispanic (My Congressional District 2018a), Tipton’s district is 88.5% White and 24.4% Hispanic (My Congressional District 2018b). Coffman was elected to Colorado’s 6th district in 2008, and Tipton was elected to Colorado’s 3rd district in 2010. The key difference between Coffman and Tipton’s districts is that while Coffman’s district leans Democratic with a Cook Partisan Voting Index (CPVI) of D+2 in 2018, Tipton’s district is strongly Republican with a CPVI of R+6 for 2018 (Cook Political Report 2018). While Coffman had to use identity-based appeals to increase his share of the Latino vote, Tipton could essentially ignore the Latino vote and maintain his status as an immigration hardliner.

Data from Colorado’s 3rd district is incomplete, but there is enough data available to allow for a rough comparison. As Table 2.4 shows, while Coffman saw a substantial increase in Latino support from 2012 to 2014, Tipton did not. As previously discussed, it was in the 2014 campaign that Coffman began using identity-based appeals for his Latino outreach. I attribute Coffman’s improvement among Latinos to his identity-based
appeals, and Tipton’s continued poor performance among Latinos to his lack of identity-based of appeals.

**Table 2.4.** Comparison of ecological inference mean estimates for Latino vote preferences from 2012-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>RxC Percent Latino – Coffman</th>
<th>RxC Percent Latino – Tipton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>8.04 (4.24)</td>
<td>0.783 (0.746)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>22.99 (4.35)</td>
<td>-4.25 (6.71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

**Greg Abbott**

Before analyzing Greg Abbott’s performance, we can first look at Rick Perry, who was elected to a third term as Governor of Texas in 2010. Although Perry did not engage in identity-based appeals, he did sign the Texas Dream Act into law. Perry thus serves as an interesting comparison case for Abbott, who engages in identity-based appeals but is notably anti-immigrant. The results of an RxC ecological inference, presented in Table 2.4, suggest that Perry earned 23.26% of the Latino vote, although the standard errors are quite high.
Table 2.5. Ecological inference mean estimates for Latino and non-Hispanic White vote preferences in Texas’ gubernatorial election, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>RxC: Percent Latino</th>
<th>RxC: Percent White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perry</td>
<td>23.26 (11.55)</td>
<td>77.60 (7.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>74.76 (12.02)</td>
<td>18.90 (7.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.31 (0.51)</td>
<td>3.48 (1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99.33</td>
<td>99.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

According to Table 2.4, Perry performed significantly better among Latinos than exit polls gave him credit (Latino Decisions 2010), perhaps in part to his support for Latino-friendly policies like the Texas Dream Act.

Turning to Abbott, the results of RxC ecological inference suggest that Abbott performed better than Perry among Latinos, but not by much. Per Table 2.5, Abbott earned 29.87% of the Latino vote, while his Democratic opponent Wendy Davis earned 67.61%. Likely owing to his more anti-immigrant positions, Abbott performed significantly better among non-Hispanic Whites than Perry did.

Table 2.6. Ecological inference mean estimates for Latino and non-Hispanic White vote preferences in Texas’ gubernatorial election, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>RxC: Percent Latino</th>
<th>RxC: Percent White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbott</td>
<td>29.87 (0.41)</td>
<td>89.9 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis</td>
<td>67.61 (0.41)</td>
<td>8.25 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.52 (0.06)</td>
<td>1.85 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.
While 29% of the Latino vote is a far cry from the 44% claimed by some exit polls (Krogstad and Lopez 2014), Abbott still outperformed Perry by at least 20% despite running a much more anti-immigrant campaign in English. Abbott can likely attribute his gains over Perry to his identity-based appeals focused around his Latino family connections.

Abbott’s re-election bid in 2018 serves as another test of identity-based appeals as Abbott’s Democratic opponent, Lupe Valdez, is a Latina. Despite Abbott’s success in 2014 among Latinos, many observers wondered how well Abbott’s Latino appeals would be in the presence of an actual Latino candidate; moreover, while Abbott may have benefitted from being a relative unknown among Latinos in 2014, by 2018 his policies as governor had run afoul of many Latinos. One such policy Abbott signed into law was SB 4, which banned sanctuary cities in Texas and was seen by many as explicitly anti-Latino (Garcia 2017). Undeterred, Abbott again relied on his Latino family members in his Spanish appeals while his English appeals focused on his efforts to secure the border and keep Texans safe. As Table 2.6 shows, Abbott’s identity-based appeals were largely successful.
Table 2.7. Ecological inference mean estimates for Latino and non-Hispanic White vote preferences in Texas’ gubernatorial election, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>RxC: Percent Latino</th>
<th>RxC: Percent White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbott</td>
<td>28.07 (0.38)</td>
<td>89.63 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valdez</td>
<td>70.52 (0.26)</td>
<td>8.86 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.41 (0.03)</td>
<td>1.51 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

An RxC ecological inference suggest that in 2018, Abbot won 28.07% of the vote to Valdez’s 70.52%. While Abbott did perform slightly worse in 2018 than 2014, it is key to note that Abbott nearly maintained his support among Latinos despite running against a Latina candidate and championing an anti-sanctuary cities law during his first term as governor. Given what we know about the benefits shared of ethnicity between Latino voters and candidates (Barreto 2007; Barreto 2010), as well as support for sanctuary cities among Latinos (Ramsey 2017), it is impressive that Abbott performed as well as he did. Comparing Abbott’s 2014 and 2018 results to each other as well to Perry’s 2010 performance suggests that Abbott had an advantage among Latinos. Despite his support for anti-immigrant policies, Abbott performed basically as well in 2018 as he did in 2014, and outperformed Perry among Latinos in 2010. I attribute Abbott’s success among Latinos to his identity-based appeals, which seemingly inoculated him against his partisan attachment and support for anti-immigrant policies. While I cannot say that Abbott’s identity-based appeals can be easily replicated by other candidates, Abbott stands out as a strong example of the benefits of identity-based appeals.
Beto O’Rourke

Before analyzing O’Rourke’s performance in Texas’ 2018 Senate Election, we can first look at how Democrat Paul Sadler performed against Ted Cruz in Texas’ 2012 Senate Election. Seen as a long shot in Republican Texas, Sadler raised little money and used no identity-based appeals to increase his support among Latinos (Benning 2012; Batheja 2012; Kuffner 2012). Cruz did not use identity-based appeals either, instead relying on shared ethnicity via his surname to gain Latino support on his path to becoming Texas’ first Hispanic Senator (Hernandez 2012). The results of an RxC ecological inference, presented below in Table 2.8, suggest that Cruz overwhelmingly won the White won and performed better than one might expect among Latinos.

Table 2.8. Ecological inference mean estimates for Latino and non-Hispanic White vote preferences in Texas’ Senate election, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>RxC: Percent Latino</th>
<th>RxC: Percent White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cruz</td>
<td>27.47 (0.34)</td>
<td>86.91 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadler</td>
<td>69.39 (0.23)</td>
<td>9.97 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.14 (0.06)</td>
<td>3.13 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

While 27.47% of the Latino vote may not seem particularly high, Cruz performed better among Latinos that Rick Perry did in 2010 after a series of immigration policy appeals; moreover, Cruz performed only slightly worse than Abbott did in 2014 and 2018 despite Abbott making identity-based appeals a focal point of his campaign. But while Cruz
relied on his surname during his 2012 campaign for Latino outreach, he would appeal to Latinos more directly when he went against O’Rourke in 2018.

Challenged by O’Rourke, an underdog who had previously unseated Hispanic incumbents with his identity-based appeals, Cruz launched his first ever Spanish advertisement in a statewide contest. Cruz also relied on shared ethnicity, telling Latino audiences in the Rio Grande Valley “I am the son of a Cuban immigrant who came here with nothing. I’m the first Hispanic senator ever to represent Texas” (Wallace 2018). Cruz recounted being asked whether O’Rourke would be good for diversity in the Senate and replied asking if there was a shortage of Irishmen in the Senate, a playful reminder to the audience that O’Rourke was not Hispanic. Latinos were not likely going to decide Texas’ next Senator, but in a race this close, Cruz could not could no longer rely on his surname and ignore making appeals to Latinos.

An RxC ecological inference suggests that O’Rourke’s identity-based appeals helped cut away at Cruz’s Latino support. Table 2.9 shows that compared to Sadler’s 69.39% of the Latino vote, O’Rourke earned 76.76%. While Cruz had earned 27.47% of the Latino vote in 2012 relying essentially on his surname, in 2018 Cruz only won 22.46% despite airing Spanish advertisements and making efforts to engage Latinos for the first time.
Table 2.9 Ecological inference mean estimates for Latino and non-Hispanic White vote preferences in Texas’ Senate election, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>RxC: Percent Latino</th>
<th>RxC: Percent White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cruz</td>
<td>22.46 (0.42)</td>
<td>86.29 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Rourke</td>
<td>76.76 (0.41)</td>
<td>12.91 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.76 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.80 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99.98</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

O’Rourke’s success with identity-based appeals portends well for his success in 2020’s Democratic primaries; furthermore, O’Rourke’s usage of identity-based appeals will likely influence future Democratic contenders who seek to make statewide contests in Texas competitive as only O’Rourke has done in recent memory. To better illustrate how successful identity-based appeals can be, we can compare O’Rourke’s performance among Latinos to that of Lupe Valdez, an actual Latina.

Table 2.10. Comparison of ecological inference mean estimates for Latino vote preferences for 2018 Democratic candidates in Texas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RxC Percent Latino – O’Rourke</th>
<th>RxC Percent Latino – Valdez</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76.76 (0.41)</td>
<td>70.52 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2.10 shows that in 2018, O’Rourke outperformed an actual Latina candidate on the same ballot among Latino voters in a statewide contest in Texas. Figure 2.4 shows that while O’Rourke outperformed Valdez overall, his lead over Valdez widened in precincts with higher Latino populations. This suggests that at least to some degree,
identity-based appeals helped O’Rourke overcome Valdez’s shared ethnicity among Latinos.

**Figure 2.4.** Scatterplot comparing precinct percent Latino and candidate vote between O’Rourke and Valdez in 2018.

But we cannot attribute this discrepancy solely to O’Rourke’s identity-based appeals, as Valdez faced Greg Abbott, who also used identity-based appeals to great effect. As Table 2.11 demonstrates, Abbott outperformed Cruz among Latinos in Texas.
by about 25%, despite not benefitting from shared ethnicity and signing a highly controversial sanctuary cities ban into law in 2017.

**Table 2.11.** Comparison of ecological inference mean estimates for Latino vote preferences for 2018 Republican candidates in Texas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RxC Percent Latino – Cruz</th>
<th>RxC Percent Latino – Abbott</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22.46</td>
<td>28.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 2.5 suggests that as precincts become more Latino, Abbott’s lead in Latino vote share over Cruz widened.
Figure 2.5. Scatterplot comparing precinct percent Latino and candidate vote between Cruz and Abbott in 2018.

Just as O’Rourke’s identity-based appeals signal a path for Democrats competing in Texas, Abbott’s campaigns suggest that Republicans can win significant shares of the Latino vote in spite of their policy positions by engaging in identity-based appeals. Given that demographic shifts will eventually see Texas become a minority-majority state with
a Latino plurality, the importance of identity-based appeals for Democrats and Republicans will only increase.

External Validity

While the preceding results in this chapter certainly provide evidence that candidates who engage in identity-based appeals perform better among Latinos than those who do not, I do acknowledge that the relative lack of geographic diversity among my case studies may lead some to question whether these findings have external validity. I thus present the results of an external validity analysis adapted from my previous work (Alamillo and Collingwood 2017). For this analysis, we pooled information on 60 White candidates and seven Latino candidates in 33 elections. Included were data on every Senate and gubernatorial election from 2010 to 2014 in states where Latinos make up at least 10% of the state’s total population. Because polling data on Latinos is often questionable, we used Latino Decisions election eve polls to gather Latino vote percent for each candidate. Latino Decisions has not yet conducted election eve polls for New York and New Jersey, but they did provide poll data for California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Florida, Texas, and Illinois.

Based on information from candidate websites, news accounts, and campaign advertisements, we compiled a data set on the mobilization efforts of candidates in the aforementioned races. For the five identity-based appeals, candidates were assigned a score of 1 or 0 based on whether they engaged in the identity-based appeal or not. We then created a composite score variable for each candidate based on how many identity-
based appeals they engaged in. We also collected information on the candidates’ party, whether they supported comprehensive immigration reform, and other policy preferences. If a candidate did not publicize their Latino outreach or we could not determine a score for an issue stance or candidate characteristic, we left that score blank. We acknowledge that this missing data is a weakness in our study, but we remain confident in the results since they fit so well with the other analyses in our paper, and have been further substantiated by the results of this dissertation.

We used an ordinal logistic regression model to predict Latino vote share for each candidate. In addition to our composite identity-based appeals measure (listed as Cross-Racial Mobilization), we also included controls for whether the candidate supported comprehensive immigration reform, and whether the candidate pledged to lower taxes. We controlled for party, using Republican candidates as the reference category, and included a measure of each state’s Latino citizen voting age population. We also included a dummy variable for whether the candidate was Latino, as well dummy variables for each state in the analysis, with Arizona as the reference category, and dummy variables for each year we collected data for, with 2010 as the reference category. Figure 2.6 presents the results of this analysis. For a full regression table, see the appendix.
As Figure 2.6 shows, a candidate’s party is easily the strongest predictor of candidate support among Latinos as Democratic candidates tend to outperform Republicans by as much as 60%. A candidate’s cross-racial mobilization efforts (what I refer to as identity-based appeals) are also strongly associated with Latino support, as
Figure 2.6 suggests candidates who engage in cross-racial mobilization can, on average, increase their Latino support by as much as 20%. Using real-world data collected from statewide elections across eight different states over 3 election cycles, this external validity analysis suggests White candidates who engage in identity-based appeals perform significantly better among Latinos than those who do not. Thus, while my case studies focus on prominent examples of identity-based in Colorado and Texas, these results suggest that identity-based appeals can be used by candidates anywhere who seek to increase their support among Latinos.
CHAPTER 3: Estimating the Effects of Identity-based Appeals

As I have discussed throughout the previous chapters, there are five identity-based appeals I have observed which I believe allow non-co-ethnic candidates to benefit from Latino shared ethnicity. In no particular order, the five identity-based appeals are: demonstrating Latino family connections, speaking Spanish, collecting endorsements from Latino public officials, airing Spanish language advertisements, and appointing Latinos to one’s staff. My previous work (Alamillo and Collingwood 2017) shows measures of these five appeals scale well together, which informed my decision to create a scale that measured a respondent’s favorability to a collective set of identity-based appeals. While my collective measure of identity-based appeals was a strong predictor of candidate support among Latinos, the structure of the data did not allow me to infer how much each identity-based appeal was contributing to the likelihood of supporting a candidate. This chapter employs a conjoint analysis which allows me to determine the individual treatment effect of each identity-based appeal in an experimental setting. The nature of the conjoint design also allows me to compare the relative treatment effects of identity-based appeals to those of immigration-based policy appeals.

Methods and Data

As other studies have demonstrated (Hainmueller et al. 2014; Kirkland and Coppock 2018), a conjoint design is uniquely suited to determine the relative influence of various candidate characteristics on vote choice. Because I am interested in the effects of identity-based appeals and policy cues on Latino vote choice, my conjoint design
includes measures of both. In the conjoint design, respondents were tasked with completing five candidate comparisons. For each candidate comparison, respondents saw a table where the following attributes for two Anglo male candidates were displayed: political party, Spanish speaking ability, Latino family connections, Spanish advertisements, Latino endorsements, Latinos on staff, position on immigration, and religious affiliation. Each attribute had at least two possible levels, and each level of each attribute had an equal chance of appearing. After reviewing the two candidate profiles, respondents were asked which candidate they would vote for if they had to choose one. Respondents were then asked to rate how likely they were to vote for each candidate on a five-point scale. For an illustration of how the conjoint appeared to respondents, see the appendix. To ensure no attribute order effects, the order in which each attribute was displayed was randomized for each respondent and held constant for the five candidate comparisons. Table 3.1 displays the candidate attributes and their possible levels.
Table 3.1. Conjoint Candidate Attributes and Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish speaking ability</td>
<td>Fluent Spanish speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does not speak Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino family connections</td>
<td>Latino spouse and children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Latino family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish advertisements</td>
<td>Spanish radio and television advertisements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Spanish radio and television advertisements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino endorsements</td>
<td>Endorsed by Latino public officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not endorsed by Latino public officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos on staff</td>
<td>Once elected, promises to appoint Latinos to key staff positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has not made any promises to appoint Latinos to key staff positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position on immigration</td>
<td>Supports the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supports a guest worker program leading to legalization eventually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supports a guest worker program that permits immigrants to be in the country, but only temporarily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supports the immediate deportation of all undocumented immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-denominational Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No religion stated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I base the attributes and their levels on the literature on Latino vote choice and cross-racial mobilization (Alamillo and Collingwood 2017; Barreto 2007; Barreto 2010; Barreto and Collingwood 2014; Panagopoulos and Green 2010). Consistent with the literature, I contend that candidate attributes and levels are independent of each other, and no prohibitions on the possible combinations of attribute levels were implemented (Orme 2002). While there is no consensus on the number of attributes a conjoint may employ
before respondents become fatigued, eight attributes are common (Hainmueller et al. 2014; Huertas-Garcia et al. 2012; Pullman et al. 1999).

I used the aforementioned conjoint design on a convenience sample of 299 Latinos on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) recruited through TurkPrime, which yielded 1,495 candidate comparisons consisting of 2,990 rated candidate profiles. Relative to the 2016 CCES Latino sample, the MTurk sample skewed more Democratic, more liberal, and more native-born. An instructional manipulation check, also known as an attention check or trap question (Oppenheimer et al. 2009), included on the MTurk sample yielded a 100% success rate. While the literature has presented some concerns regarding the generalizability of findings from MTurk samples (Berinsky et al. 2012; Huff and Tingley 2015), research suggests that in most cases, the representativeness of MTurk does not affect experimental inferences drawn from these samples in any meaningful way (Levay et al. 2016; Mullinix et al. 2015; Goodman et al. 2013).

The dependent variable for all analyses is forced-candidate choice. For each candidate comparison, respondents were asked “If you have to choose between them, which of these two candidates would you vote for?” This most closely resembles real-world elections, where a voter is forced to choose between two candidates, and mirrors other conjoint analyses in the literature (Hainmueller et al. 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Kirkland and Coppock 2018). Analyses were performed using the cjoint package (Barari et al. 2018) in the R statistical computing environment, which allows for the estimation of average marginal component effects (AMCE) from a dataset employing a conjoint design. Put simply, the AMCE for any attribute level represents the average
change in the probability a profile will be chosen when a given attribute level is present, relative to a baseline attribute level. Thus, if being a fluent Spanish speaker has an AMCE of 0.157, this tells us that relative to the baseline of a candidate who speaks no Spanish, a candidate with fluent Spanish speaking skills has a 15.7% increased chance of being selected.

For the identity-based appeal attributes, the baseline levels are the absence of any identity-based appeals on the part of the candidate. The baseline level for Latino endorsements is the lack of any Latino endorsements. For Latino family connections the baseline level is no Latino family connections. The baseline level for Latino on staff is no commitment to appoint Latinos to staff once elected, while the baseline level for Spanish advertisements is no Spanish radio and television advertisements. For the final identity-based appeal, Spanish speaking ability, the baseline level is no Spanish speaking ability. For political party, the baseline level is Democrat, while the baseline level for position on immigration is support for a guest worker program leading to legalization eventually. The baseline level for religious affiliation is Catholic. On all figures throughout this chapter, baseline levels for each attribute are easily identifiable as they have no AMCE estimate. All confidence intervals are set at .95.

**Expectations**

My previous work (Alamillo and Collingwood 2017) and the dissertation thus far suggest that candidates who use identity-based appeals will see increased support among Latinos relative to candidates who do not engage in identity-based appeals. I attribute this
increased support to identity-based appeals allowing non-co-ethnic candidates to tap into shared ethnicity, which the literature argues operates as a cue to ethnic voters that co-ethnic candidates will represent their interests if elected (Barreto 2007; Barreto 2010; Manzano and Sanchez 2010; McConnaughy et al. 2010). Barreto (2007; 2010) and Manzano and Sanchez (2010) suggest that shared ethnicity is strongest among those Latinos with strong ethnic attachment. As Lopez et al. (2017) show, Latino identity, a key measure of ethnic attachment (Manzano and Sanchez 2010), tends to decrease as immigrant connections fade and Latinos become more acculturated. I thus use a Latino’s nativity as a proxy for ethnic attachment, and argue that identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more among foreign-born Latinos than native-born Latinos. While I acknowledge nativity is not a perfect proxy for ethnic attachment, the data lack a direct measure of ethnic attachment and foreign-born status is the closest substitute.

In contrast, McConnaughy et al. (2010) argue that shared ethnicity is not driven by a Latino voter’s sense of ethnic attachment or group identity, but by linked fate, as it is a sense of connectedness that translates ethnicity into political behavior (1209). If shared ethnicity is in fact driven by linked fate, I posit that identity-based appeals will work in a similar fashion, and that identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more among Latinos with high linked fate than Latinos with low linked fate.

There is reason to believe that the effectiveness of identity-based appeals may be moderated by partisanship, as Barreto (2007) finds that partisan Latinos are less susceptible to ethnic appeals based on shared ethnicity. Similarly, Barreto (2007) finds that low information voters may rely more on shared ethnicity than high information
voters, who rely more on partisan cues and policy positions. I thus argue that identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more for non-partisan Latinos than partisan Latinos, and that identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more for low information Latinos than high information Latinos.

The conjoint design also allows me to determine which of the identity-based appeals are increasing candidate support among Latinos the most, fixing a key weakness of my previous work. Based on the literature and my case studies, I argue that Latino family connections will have the greatest effect on candidate support. I draw mainly on the case of Greg Abbott, who performed far better among Latinos than anyone in Texas expected given his support for anti-immigrant policies. As I have documented in Chapter 2, Abbott based his Spanish campaign almost entirely on publicizing his Latino family connections and performed well among Latinos in 2014 and 2018. I do acknowledge that Abbott is something of an outsider, at least for the time being, as most non-Hispanic White candidates do not have Latino family members they can base campaigns around. Thus, I also posit that outside of Latino family connections, Spanish speaking ability will have the greatest effect on candidate support. I base this hypothesis on the success Mike Coffman and Beto O’Rourke demonstrated throughout their campaigns. For Coffman specifically, I provided evidence in the previous chapter showing a significant increase in Coffman’s Latino support after he began speaking Spanish.

This is not to say that I expect Latino endorsements, Spanish speaking advertisements, and commitments to appoint Latinos to one’s staff to be weak predictors of Latino support. Rather, I argue that Latino family connections and Spanish speaking
ability show Latinos that the candidate is one of them, in a way the other identity-based appeals cannot. My theory of identity-based appeals is based in large part on accommodation theory, which argues that as person A becomes more similar to person B, the likelihood that B will like A increases. The desire of person A to become more similar to B is perceived by B as acknowledgment of the inherent worth of B’s self and cultural identity, which results in positive feelings toward A (Giles et al. 1973; Koslow et al. 1994). Imitating a person or group’s characteristics is not enough to gain their support though, as accommodation theory argues there must be some genuine effort perceived by members of the targeted group. While all identity-based appeals involve some effort from the candidate, I posit that having Latino family connections and speaking Spanish as a non-Latino show a greater degree of care and respect for the Latino community because they communicate a genuine effort from the candidate.

I believe that Latino family connections will be the most effective identity-based appeal because the family unit is especially important for Latinos (Suro 2007). Familism, described as a strong attachment of individuals with their families, is considered by the literature to be a central value of Latino culture (Moore 1970; Triandis et al. 1982; Sabogal et al. 1987). Sabogal et al. (1987) note that even while familism tends to decrease with acculturation, familism continues to play a role in the lives of Latinos. Among the numerous benefits familism provides Latinos, Triandis et al. (1982) point to the sense of loyalty and trust Latinos feel among family members. It is this trust and loyalty Greg Abbott’s Latino family members speak of in his Spanish advertisements, where they note Abbott values family just as Latinos do, and that just as his Latino family
members have been able to trust in Abbott, Latino Texans will be to trust in Abbott as governor (Abbott 2014).

In this chapter, I test the follow hypotheses:

$H_1$: Identity-based appeals will increase candidate support among Latinos.

$H_2$: Identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more among foreign-born Latinos than native-born Latinos.

$H_3$: Identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more among Latinos with high linked fate than Latinos with low linked fate.

$H_4$: Identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more among non-partisan Latinos than partisan Latinos.

$H_5$: Identity-based appeals will increase candidate support more among low information Latinos than high information Latinos.

$H_6$: Of the five identity-based appeals, Latino family connections will have the greatest effect on candidate support.

$H_7$: Of the four identity-based appeals outside of Latino family connections, Spanish speaking ability will have the greatest effect on candidate support.

In addition to identity-based appeals, the conjoint design included attributes for candidate party, position on immigration, and religious affiliation. While I do not test any hypotheses regarding these candidate attributes, I expect party and position on immigration to have strong effects on candidate support. As Barreto (2007) and Manzano and Sanchez (2010) found, high information Latinos and those with strong partisan attachments are more likely to support candidates based on partisan and policy cues. I
also expect Democratic candidates will perform significantly better among Latinos than
Republican candidates given the limited support Republicans generally attract among
Latinos (Lopez et al. 2016; Lopez et al. 2018). Chief among significant policy cues is
likely to be immigration policy, as Barreto and Collingwood (2014) and Collingwood et
al. (2014) among others have shown effective appeals on immigration can increase
candidate support among Latinos.

I expect that relative to the baseline category where a candidate expresses support
for a guest worker program with a pathway to legalization, candidates who express
support for the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants will lose the most
support among Latinos. In terms of a candidate’s religious affiliation, I do not expect any
significant differences in support for candidates of different affiliations. Although a
majority of Latino American adults identify as Catholic, there has been a recent decline
in Catholic affiliation among Latinos, and the literature does not suggest Latinos favor
candidates of one religious affiliation more than others (Pew Research Center 2014a).
Just as in Latin America, most Latino Americans may prefer keeping religion and politics
separate (Pew Research Center 2014b; Kelly and Morgan 2008).

**Results**
Figure 3.1. Effects of candidate attributes on Latino support for congressional candidates.
I begin by looking at the results of the full sample in Figure 3.1. As I predicted, the five identity-based appeals increase candidate support; however, contrary to my expectations, the effects of the identity-based appeals are essentially indistinguishable from each other as the confidence intervals are too wide. Relative to a candidate who has no Latino family connections, a candidate with a Latino spouse and children is 0.069 percentage points more likely (SE = 0.018) to win a Latino voter’s support. A candidate’s Spanish speaking abilities are essentially just as important, as relative to a candidate who speaks no Spanish, a candidate who speaks fluent Spanish is 0.069 (SE = 0.018) more likely to win a Latino’s voter support. Efforts to make one’s staff more representative of the Latino community prove effective, as candidates who promise to appoint Latinos to their staff are 0.066 (SE = 0.017) more likely to be win support than a candidate who has made no such commitment. Collecting endorsements from Latino public officials also improves a candidate’s performance among Latinos, as candidates who are endorsed by Latinos are 0.053 (SE = 0.018) more likely to win support than candidates who are not endorsed by Latino officials. Finally, Spanish advertisements seem to provide the least benefit, as candidates who air Spanish radio and television advertisements are 0.036 (SE = 0.018) more likely to be selected than candidates who air no Spanish advertisements.

As predicted, relative to a Catholic candidate, candidates with no religious affiliation and Nondenominational Christian candidates are not any more or less likely to be selected. Relative to a Democratic candidate, only Republican candidates are punished, as Republicans are 0.126 (SE = 0.024) less likely to win support than Democrats. Consistent with Barreto and Collingwood (2014) and Collingwood et al.
(2014), candidates who makes appeals on immigration see the biggest changes in Latino support. Relative to a candidate who supports a guest worker program leading to legalization, candidates who express support for a guest worker program without the possibility of permanent status are 0.096 (SE = 0.026) less likely to win support. Somewhat surprisingly, candidates who favor the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants also lose support relative to more moderate proposal with eventual legalization, as they are 0.079 (SE = 0.027) less likely to win support. This suggests that Latinos prefer an earned path to permanent status for immigrants, which certainly warrants future research. Unsurprisingly however, candidates who support the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants are the most penalized, as relative to the earned path to permanent status, they are 0.276 (SE = 0.029) less likely to be win support among Latinos.

I have found evidence in support of H1, as Latinos respond favorably to candidates who engage in identity-based appeals; however, I must reject H6 and H7 as the data do not suggest Latino family connections and Spanish speaking ability are more effective than other identity-based appeals at increasing candidate support among Latinos. The possibility remains that respondent-level characteristics may moderate the effect of identity-based appeals; as a result, for the remaining models in this chapter, I split my sample into various relevant subgroups so that I can investigate my hypotheses. I first examine the differences between native and foreign-born Latinos. We can first look at native-born Latinos, who make up a clear majority of the total sample.
Figure 3.2. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among native-born Latinos.
As Figure 3.2 shows, the results are largely similar to the complete model, with some minor differences. Latino family connections lose some of their benefit, as relative to a candidate with no Latino connections, a candidate with a Latino spouse and children is 0.056 (SE = 0.018) more likely to win support. Relative to the complete sample, native-born Latinos are more rewarding of a candidate who speaks fluent Spanish. A candidate who is fluent in Spanish is 0.072 (SE = 0.019) more likely to win support than a candidate who speaks no Spanish. Like the complete sample, native-born Latinos are more likely to support candidates with Latino endorsements and those who pledge to appoint Latinos to their staff. Among native-born Latinos, candidates with Latino endorsements are 0.056 (SE = 0.019) more likely to win support than a candidate with no Latino endorsements, and candidates who pledge to appoint Latinos to their staff are 0.067 (SE = 0.018) more likely to win support than candidates who make no such pledge. A key difference between native-born Latinos and the complete sample is that for native-born Latinos, candidates who air Spanish language advertisements are not any more likely to win support than candidates who do not. To better interpret these results, we should first look how foreign-born Latinos evaluate candidates who employ identity-based appeals in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among foreign-born Latinos.
Interestingly, the only identity-based appeal that increases support among foreign-born Latinos is displaying Latino family connections. Relative to the native-born (0.056, SE = 0.018) and complete samples (0.069, SE = 0.018), foreign-born Latinos are 0.157 (SE = 0.058) more likely to support a candidate with a Latino spouse and children than a candidate with no Latino family connections. The difference in the effect of Latino family connections for foreign-born and native-born Latinos on candidate support itself is not surprising, as the literature on familism tells us how important family is for Latinos, as well as how familism tends to decrease with generation (Sabogal et al. 1987; Triandis et al. 1982). What is surprising is that identity-based appeals seem to be more effective for targeting native-born Latinos than foreign-born Latinos, both in terms of combined AMCEs and in terms of the number of appeals that provide electoral benefits. I thus reject H2. It is possible that this finding is due to the complete sample being drawn from MTurk, which is low in Latinos and especially low in foreign-born Latinos. With a greater sample of foreign-born Latinos, it is likely that the confidence intervals around the positively signed but not statistically significant identity-based appeals would shrink, which would provide findings consistent with my expectations.

Another unexpected finding is that if we change the confidence intervals to .9, a candidate’s religious affiliation becomes a strong predictor of Latino candidate support. Relative to a Catholic candidate, a nondenominational Christian candidate is 0.091 (SE = 0.05) less likely to win a foreign-born Latino’s support. The data prevent a further examination of this result, but it should be investigated further as the literature on religion and political behavior among Latinos thus far has neglected candidate characteristics. In
terms of expected findings, a Republican candidate is 0.182 (SE = 0.073) less likely to win a foreign-born Latino’s support than a Democrat, which is roughly twice the effect we see among native-born Latinos (0.120, SE = 0.026). In the same vein, while candidates who support the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants are 0.082 (SE = 0.029) less likely to win a native-born Latino’s support relative to a candidate who supports a guest worker program with eventual legalization, I observe no such punishment among foreign-born voters. This suggests that when candidates make appeals specifically aimed foreign-born Latinos, they need not worry about supporting more liberal immigration policies.

I now turn to examining how a Latino’s pan ethnic linked fate influences the effectiveness of identity-based appeals. I split the sample into four groups based on their response to the question “Do you think what happens generally to Latino people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” Respondents who answered “No” were categorized as having no linked fate. Respondents who answered “Yes” were then asked, “Will it affect you a lot, some, a little, or not very much?” Those who responded “A lot” were categorized as having high linked fate, those who answered “Some” or “a little” were categorized as having moderate linked fate, and those who answered “Not very much” were categorized as having low linked fate. 14% of respondents reported having high linked fate, 42% reported having moderate linked fate, 21% reported having low linked fate, and 23% reported having no linked fate. Figure 3.4 examines how high linked fate moderates the effect of identity-based appeals.
Figure 3.4. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among high linked fate Latinos.
As Figure 3.4 shows, none of the identity-based appeals have any effect on the likelihood of a candidate winning the support of a Latino with high linked fate. As with the model predicting support among foreign-born Latinos, these results could due to a relatively small number of Latinos in the data identifying as having high linked fate. It could also be the case that Latinos with high levels of linked fate simply don’t respond to appeals from a non-co-ethnic candidate pretending to be Latino. Of the candidate attributes presented in the conjoint, only a candidate’s position on immigration seems to influence Latinos with high linked fate. Relative to a candidate who supports a guest worker program leading to legalization, a candidate who supports only a temporary guest worker program is 0.13 (SE = 0.059) less likely to win support. Compared to the baseline category, a candidate who supports the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants is 0.34 (SE = 0.064) less likely to win support among Latinos with high linked fate. Barreto and Collingwood (2014) and Collingwood et al.’s (2014) findings seem to be especially prescient for Latinos with high linked fate, as these findings suggest that only appeals on immigration seem to have any effect on their likelihood of supporting a non-co-ethnic candidate, as not even candidate party cues have any effect.

Looking at Latinos with moderate linked fate provides findings that are more in line with my predictions. Figure 3.5 presents these results.
**Figure 3.5.** Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among moderate linked fate Latinos
Of the identity-based appeals, Latino endorsements has the largest effect on support for congressional candidates among Latinos with moderate linked fate. Relative to a candidate with no Latino endorsements, a candidate who is endorsed by Latinos is 0.10 (SE = 0.028) more likely to win support. Pledging to appoint Latinos to one’s staff is also important for Latinos with moderate linked fate, as a candidate who makes such a pledge is 0.094 (SE = 0.025) more likely to win their support than a candidate who has not. Airing Spanish language advertisements increases the likelihood a candidate will win support by 0.061 (SE = 0.027), relative to a candidate lacking such advertisements. Unlike Latinos with high linked fate, Latinos with moderate linked fate punish Republican candidates, as relative to a Democratic candidate, Republicans are 0.184 (SE = 0.036) less likely to win support. However, like Latinos with high linked fate, moderate linked fate Latinos punish candidates who support any immigration policy other than a guest worker program leading to legalization. Relative to this moderate position, a candidate who supports the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants is 0.374 (SE = 0.039) less likely to win support, while a candidate who supports only a temporary guest worker program is 0.162 (SE = 0.039) less likely to win support. Like many other Latino subgroups, those with moderate linked fate punish a candidate with a fairly permissive immigration policy, as candidates who support the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants are 0.106 (SE = 0.036) less likely to win support than the baseline candidate.

As Figure 3.6 shows, different identity-based appeals effect candidate support among Latinos with low linked fate than those with moderate linked fate.
Figure 3.6. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among low linked fate Latinos.
Demonstrating Latino family connections has a positive effect on candidate support among Latinos with low linked fate, as they are 0.095 (SE = 0.039) more likely to favor a candidate who has a Latino spouse and children than a candidate who has no Latino family members. Relative to a candidate who does not speak Spanish, a candidate who speaks fluent Spanish is 0.098 (SE = 0.036) more likely to win support. Like Latinos with moderate linked fate, low linked fate Latinos also punish Republican candidates, who are 0.17 (SE = 0.051) less likely to win support than a Democrat. Latinos with low linked fate also punish candidates who support the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants, although less so than moderate and high linked fate Latinos. While a Latino with moderate linked fate is 0.374 (SE = 0.039) less likely to favor than a candidate who supports a more moderate immigration policy, a Latino with low linked fate is only 0.181 (SE = 0.077) less likely to favor such a candidate. These results suggest that as linked fate decreases among Latinos, the penalty candidates face for embracing hardline immigration positions decreases.
Figure 3.7. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among Latinos with no linked fate.
Figure 3.7 presents the results for the model predicting candidate support among Latinos who report no linked fate. In terms of the effectiveness of identity-based appeals, Latinos with no linked fate are similar to those who report low linked fate. Relative to a candidate who has no Latino family members, a candidate with a Latino spouse and children is 0.117 (SE = 0.036) more likely to win support. Compared to a candidate who speaks no Spanish, a candidate who speaks fluent Spanish is 0.097 (SE = 0.037) more likely to win support. Turning to immigration, Latinos with no linked fate punish candidates who support restrictive immigration policies. Relative to the baseline, a candidate who supports the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants is 0.174 (SE = 0.064) less likely to win support. Latinos with no linked fate are unique in that the penalty candidates face for supporting the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants (0.186, SE = 0.056) is essentially the same candidates face for supporting the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants.

Ultimately, I was not able to find support for H₃, as identity-based appeals do not increase candidate support more among Latinos as linked fate increases. As I alluded to earlier, this finding could be attributable to the data lacking enough Latinos with high linked fate to allow for reasonable confidence intervals. If, for example, we only compare the AMCEs for Latinos with moderate linked fate to those with low or no linked fate, Latinos with higher levels of linked fate support candidates who employ identity-based appeals more than those with lower levels of linked fate. It is also possible that Latinos with high levels of linked fate don’t want to extend the benefits of shared ethnicity to a candidate who is not actually Latino. I don’t believe this to be the case given how well
candidates like Beto O’Rourke and Greg Abbott have performed among Latinos, but I cannot be sure with the data available. If we briefly step away from identity-based appeals and examine the relationship between linked fate and candidate position on immigration, evidence suggests that while most Latinos punish candidates who support restrictive immigration policies, this penalty is greater among Latinos with higher levels of linked fate. This is in accordance with the literature, which has found that Latinos with the highest levels of linked fate are those who are Spanish dominant and foreign-born (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010).

I now turn to examining how partisanship moderates the effects of identity-based appeals. I first examine the differences between partisans and nonpartisans, as the literature suggests Latino partisans are more likely to rely on partisan and candidate cues rather than shared ethnicity (Barreto 2007). Respondents were sorted into partisan categories based on several questions. First, respondents were asked “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else?” Respondents who answered “Republican” or “Democrat” were classified as such, and those who answered “Independent”, “Other party”, or “Do not think in these terms” were asked “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?” Respondents who identified themselves as closer to the Republican or Democratic parties were classified as Republicans and Democrats, respectively, and those who responded “Neither/No preference” were classified as independents. Democrats and Republicans and Democrats were then classified as partisans, while independents were classified as nonpartisans.
Figure 3.8. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among nonpartisan Latinos.
Figure 3.8 displays the results for the model predicting candidate support among nonpartisan Latinos. Like the model predicting support for high linked fate Latinos, this model suffers from wide confidence intervals as few Latinos self-identified as non-partisans. Also like the model predicting support for high linked fate Latinos, none of identity-based appeals have any effect on the likelihood a candidate will win support. Of the available candidate attributes, only a candidate’s position on immigration seems to impact candidate support. Interestingly, nonpartisan Latinos are more likely to favor candidates who support restrictive immigration policies. Relative to a candidate who supports a guest worker program leading to legalization, a candidate who supports only a temporary guest worker program is 0.226 (SE = 0.085) more likely win support. Relative to the same baseline, a candidate who supports the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants is 0.169 (SE = 0.076) more likely to win support. Also, although these attribute levels just miss out on statistical significance, nonpartisan Latinos are also unique in that relative to a Democratic candidate, Republican and independent candidates are more likely to win support. We can now examine the model predicting support for partisan Latinos in Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among partisan Latinos.
Most identity-based appeals have positive, significant effects on candidate support for partisan Latinos. Relative to a candidate with no Latino endorsements, a candidate endorsed by Latinos is 0.069 (SE = 0.019) more likely to win support. Compared to a candidate with no Latino family connections, a candidate with a Latino spouse and children is 0.075 (SE = 0.018) more likely to win support. Candidates who pledge to appoint Latinos to their staff are 0.078 (SE = 0.017) more likely to win support than candidates who make no such pledge, and candidates who speak fluent Spanish are 0.069 (SE = 0.019) more likely to win support than those who do not speak Spanish. The only identity-based appeal to not reach statistical significance is airing Spanish advertisements. Based on the evidence, I must reject H₄ as it appears the inverse is correct: identity-based appeals increase support more among partisan Latinos than nonpartisan Latinos. But why is this the case?

It may be that Latino nonpartisans are independents in the mold of The American Voter: individuals who are less involved in politics with lower knowledge, interest, and stakes in the outcome (Campbell et al. 1960). Hajnal and Lee (2011) take a similar point, contending that for Latinos, nonpartisanship is viable reaction to an unfamiliar, and sometimes hostile, political system. For these Latinos, then, while it may matter if a candidate is a co-ethnic, it seemingly does not matter if a non-co-ethnic candidate attempts to bridge the social distance by using identity-based appeals. Figure 3.9 suggests that most identity-based appeals increase candidate support among partisans, but do these appeals work for both Democrats and Republicans? Figure 3.10 presents the results of the model predicting candidate support for Latino Democrats.
Figure 3.10. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among Latino Democrats.
For Latino Democrats, every identity-based appeal except for Spanish advertisements has a positive effect on candidate support. A candidate who is endorsed by Latinos is 0.079 (SE = 0.022) more likely to win support than a candidate with no Latino endorsements, and a candidate with a Latino spouse and children is 0.061 (SE = 0.023) more likely to win than a candidate with no Latino family connections. Relative to a candidate who does not pledge to appoint Latinos to their staff, a candidate who does commit to appoint Latinos to their staff is 0.089 (SE = 0.021) more likely to win support. A candidate who speaks Spanish is also advantaged over a candidate who does not, as they are 0.067 (SE = 0.024) more likely to win support among Latino Democrats. Latino Democrats also punish non-Democratic candidates, as relative to a Democratic candidate, an independent candidate is 0.081 (SE = 0.028) less likely to win support, and a Republican candidate is 0.25 (SE = 0.03) less likely to win support.

The biggest effect on candidate support among Latino Democrats is not the candidate’s party, but the candidate’s position on immigration. Relative to a candidate who supports a guest worker program leading to legalization, a candidate who supports a temporary guest worker program is 0.16 (SE = 0.033) less likely to win support. Predictably, the biggest penalty is for a candidate who supports the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants. Such as a candidate is 0.387 (SE = 0.036) less likely to win support than the baseline candidate who takes a more moderate position. Latino Democrats do not punish a candidate who supports the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants, which gives Democratic candidates a greater degree of freedom when appealing to this group on immigration.
Figure 3.11. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among Latino Republicans.
As Figure 3.11 shows, most identity-based appeals also increase candidate support among Latino Republicans. Relative to candidate with no Latino family members, a candidate who has a Latino spouse and children is 0.094 (SE = 0.029) more likely to win support. A candidate who pledges to appoint Latinos to their staff is 0.068 (SE = 0.031) more likely to win support than a candidate who makes no such promise, while a candidate who speaks fluent Spanish is 0.067 (SE = 0.029) more likely to win support than a candidate who speaks no Spanish. While Latino endorsements increase candidate support among Latino Democrats, they do not increase support among Latino Republicans. This may possibly be a function of many Republican candidates not being able to get endorsements from Latino public officials, as most are probably Democrats. In Chapter 2, I found that John Tower met with Mexican-American Democratic machine leaders to secure their endorsements, and that Tower advertised his endorsements from these and other Latino public officials in newspapers.

As one might expect, Latino Republicans do not punish Republican candidates relative to Democratic candidates, but it is interesting to note that Republican Latinos also do not favor Republican candidates any more than they do Democrats. This is a troubling finding for Republican candidates, as it signals that even among Republican Latino voters, being a Republican candidate does not confer any benefits. This may be why my case studies consistently show that Republican candidates tend to avoid referring to their partisan affiliation in their identity-based appeals. This is similar to what I find in my case studies regarding immigration policy, as Republican candidates generally do not make any mention of their support for restrictive policies in their identity-based appeals.
Republican candidates are likely making the smart choice in this regard, as even Republican Latinos punish candidates who support restrictive immigration policies. Relative to a candidate who supports the moderate baseline of a guest worker program leading to legalization, a candidate who supports the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants is 0.261 (SE = 0.047) less likely to win support. Candidates who support the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants and a temporary guest worker face smaller penalties of 0.185 (SE = 0.045) and 0.102 (SE = 0.045), respectively, but statistically, the effects of these policies are indistinguishable from one another. All of this suggests that unless a candidate supports a moderate immigration policy, they should not appeal to Latinos on immigration and instead rely on identity-based appeals, as they are otherwise likely to alienate some Latino subgroup.

I now examine whether political knowledge moderates the effects of identity-based appeals among Latinos. Per H5, I expect that identity-based appeals will be more effective among Latinos with low political knowledge than those with high political knowledge, as Latinos with high political knowledge should rely more on other cues when deciding which candidate to support. Each respondent was assigned a political knowledge score based on their responses to two questions. First, respondents were asked “Which party currently holds a majority of the seats in the U.S. House of Representatives?” Respondents who answered “Democrats” received a score of 1, while respondents who answered “Republicans” received a score of 0. Next, respondents were asked “Which party currently holds a majority of the seats in the U.S. Senate?” Respondents who answered “Republicans” received a score of 1, while respondents who
answered “Democrats” received a score of 0. A respondent’s scores on these items were added to create a political knowledge score which ranges from 0-2. Respondents who scored 0 were classified as having low political knowledge, respondents who scored 1 were classified as having moderate political knowledge, and respondents who scored 2 were classified as having high political knowledge. 10.4% of respondents were classified as having low political knowledge, 24.7% were classified as having moderate political knowledge, and 64.9% were classified as having high political knowledge. Figure 3.12 presents the results for the model predicting candidate support among Latinos with low political knowledge.
Figure 3.12. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among low political knowledge Latinos.
Most identity-based appeals do not have an effect on candidate support among Latinos with low political knowledge. Candidates who speak fluent Spanish, air Spanish language advertisements, and are endorsed by Latinos do not fare any better among Latinos with low political knowledge than the baseline candidates. Low political knowledge Latinos are also uninfluenced by candidate party cues, as relative to a Democrat, Republican and independent candidates are not any more or less likely to win support. For the two identity-based appeals that influence candidate support, we see strong effects, as candidates with Latino spouses and children are 0.115 (SE = 0.052) more likely to win support than candidates with no Latino family connections, and candidates who promise to appoint Latinos to their staff are 0.134 (SE = 0.051) more likely to win support than candidates who do not make such a pledge. A candidate’s immigration policy has the strongest effect on candidate support, as relative to the baseline candidate who takes a moderate stance, a candidate who supports the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants is 0.375 (SE = 0.105) less likely to win support. While Latinos with low political knowledge punish candidates who support the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants (0.167, SE = 0.082), they do not punish a candidate who supports a temporary guest worker program.
Figure 3.13. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among moderate political knowledge Latinos.
As Figure 3.13 shows, identity-based appeals influence candidate support differently for Latinos with moderate political knowledge. Latino family connections no longer provide any benefits to candidates who have them, but candidates who can speak fluent Spanish are now 0.083 (SE = 0.038) more likely to win support than a candidate who speaks no Spanish. As with Latinos who have low political knowledge, those with moderate political knowledge are not influenced by Latino endorsements and Spanish advertisements. Latinos with moderate political knowledge do reward candidates who pledge to appoint Latinos to their staff, as these candidates are 0.111 (SE = 0.037) more likely to win support than candidates who make no such promises. Relative to the baseline candidate, Latinos with moderate political knowledge also punish candidates who support the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants (0.222, SE = 0.54), but the penalty is lower than that imposed by Latinos with low political knowledge (0.375, SE = 0.105). Unlike Latinos with low political knowledge, Latinos with moderate political knowledge punish Republican candidates, as they are 0.111 (SE = 0.044) less likely to win support than Democratic candidates. These results suggest that as Latinos become more politically knowledgeable, identity-based appeals matter less, while partisan cues matter more. We can examine the model predicting candidate support among Latinos with high political knowledge to see if these results hold.
Figure 3.14. Effects of candidate attributes on support for congressional candidates among high political knowledge Latinos.
Latinos with high political knowledge are unique in that they reward candidates who are endorsed by Latinos, as these candidates are 0.08 (SE = 0.022) more likely to win support than a candidate who is not endorsed by Latinos. High political knowledge Latinos also reward candidates who speak Spanish, as they are 0.074 (SE = 0.021) more likely to win support than candidates who don’t speak Spanish. Being endorsed by Latino public officials is also beneficial, as these candidates are 0.08 (SE = 0.022) more likely to win support than candidates who have no Latino endorsements. The AMCEs for Latino staff and Spanish language advertisements are positive, but not statistically significant. Summing the AMCEs for the statistically significant identity-based appeals for low and high knowledge Latinos suggests that identity-based appeals have a greater effect on candidate support for low information Latinos. I have thus found support for H5.

As with other Latinos, I find that candidate support among high political knowledge Latinos is largely immigration cues. Relative to the baseline candidate who supports a guest worker program leading to legalization, a candidate who supports the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants is 0.29 (SE = 0.037) less likely to win support. Candidates who support a temporary guest worker program with no pathway to legalization are also penalized, as they are 0.106 (SE = 0.031) less likely to win support than the baseline candidate.

Conclusion

This chapter provides the first experimental evidence in support of my theory of identity-based appeals. Using a novel conjoint design, I have demonstrated that non-co-
ethnic candidates can use identity-based appeals to increase support among Latinos. I found support for H1, as all five of my identity-based appeals measures increased candidate. Relative to a candidate who uses no identity-based appeals, each identity-based appeal increased candidate support from between 3.6% to 6.9%. While these might seem small, it is important to note than in the full model, the penalty Republican candidates faced relative to Democrats was 12.6%. I was not able to find support for H2, as identity-based appeals were moderated by nativity, but not in the direction I expected. My results suggest that identity-based appeals are more effective among native-born than foreign-born Latinos, which goes my expectations based on my case studies and the literature. The only identity-based which had any effect on candidate support among foreign-born Latinos was Latino family connections, which was expected given the prevalence of familism among Latinos. As for the lack of effects for the remaining identity-based appeals, while it is possible foreign-born Latinos don’t wish to support a candidate who they possibly see as pretending to be Latino, it is also likely that with a large enough sample the confidence intervals would decrease enough that I would find results matching my expectations.

While this research makes an important contribution to our understanding of Latino vote choice, it also highlights the weaknesses of research conducted using online Latino samples. While MTurk is a great equalizer for social scientists, the samples one can draw on MTurk are not always the most representative. The lack of foreign-born Latinos possibly inhibited my ability to accurately test not only H2, but H3 and H4 as well, as I lacked significant numbers of Latinos with high linked fate and nonpartisans. I found
evidence supporting H5, as identity-based appeals appear to have greater effects for low political knowledge Latinos than high political knowledge Latinos. This finding is in accordance with the literature, which suggests low information Latinos rely less on candidate and policy cues than other Latinos, instead relying on ethnic cues like identity-based appeals. I was ultimately not able to find support in favor of H6 and H7 as the results in Figure 3.1 suggest that effects of the five identity-based appeals are statistically indistinguishable, at least among the full sample.

In addition to showing the benefits of identity-based appeals, this chapter demonstrates that when it comes to candidate support among Latinos, a candidate’s immigration policies will often have the largest effect. Relative to a candidate who supports a guest worker program with eventual legalization, a candidate who supports the most restrictive policy of immediately deporting undocumented immigrants is 27.6% less likely to win support. Even among Latino Republicans, candidates who support the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants face stiff penalties. While the primacy of policy-based appeals centered on immigration is not surprising, it interesting that many Latinos will punish candidates who support the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants. While in the full sample, candidates who favored such a policy were 7.9% less likely to win support relative to a candidate who supported a more moderate plan, among Latino Republicans, candidates who supported immediate legalization were 18.5% less likely to win support.

It’s also important to note how poorly Republican candidates performed in most models. Among Latinos in the full sample, Republican candidates were 12.6% less likely
to win support than Democrats. Even among Republican Latinos, the effect of being a Republican candidate was indistinguishable from that of being a Democrat. Given the difficulty Republicans candidates have with Latino voters in my models, it is understandable why so many real-world Republicans are ambiguous regarding their partisanship when they make appeals to Latinos. This is why identity-based appeals are especially important for Republicans. While the effectiveness of identity-based appeals depends in part on the appeal and the audience, my models suggest these appeals never have a negative effect, and often benefit candidates. As I have argued throughout my dissertation, identity-based appeals can form the core of a Republican candidate’s Latino appeals, as they cannot likely appeal on immigration or partisanship.
CONCLUSION

One of the most consistent findings in the study of mass behavior is that shared ethnicity can increase support for ethnic candidates among co-ethnic voters. For minority voters, the presence of a co-ethnic candidate on the ballot serves as a cue which helps co-ethnic voters judge how well a candidate will represent the interests of their ethnic group (Barreto 2007; DeFrancesco Soto 2007; Stokes-Brown 2006; McConnaughy et al. 2010). Based on social identity theory and accommodation theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Giles et al. 1973; Koslow et al. 1994), I argue that non-co-ethnic candidates can exploit a minority voter’s ethnic identity by using identity-based appeals. Previously, I posited a theory of identity-based appeals, which argues that identity-based appeals allow non-co-ethnic candidates to reduce distrust and play to in-group biases by using the same kinds of appeals co-ethnic candidates do (Alamillo and Collingwood 2017). This dissertation expands on that work and provides additional support for my theory of identity-based appeals by employing qualitative case studies, ecological inferences using real-world election data, and a novel conjoint experiment.

This literature on Latino politics has largely focused on the value of policy appeals when it comes to candidate support among Latinos (Barreto and Collingwood 2015; Collingwood et al. 2014; Nicholson et al. 2006; de la Garza 2006). The limited literature on candidate appeals to ethnic identity has focused on the benefits of co-ethnic appeals (Barreto 2007; Barreto 2010), although some of the literature has downplayed the role of ethnic cues and shared ethnicity in Latino vote choice (Manzano and Sanchez 2010; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Michelson 2005). This dissertation is among the first
pieces of research in the discipline to argue that non-co-ethnic candidates can benefit from shared ethnicity. I contend that there are five ways non-co-ethnic candidates can tap into a Latino voter’s sense of shared ethnicity: collecting endorsements from Latino public officials, displaying Latino family connections, appointing Latinos to one’s staff, speaking Spanish on the campaign trail, and airing Spanish advertisements. In the preceding chapters, I provided a large and methodologically diverse amount of evidence suggesting that identity-based appeals increase candidate support among Latinos.

Chapter 1 included four in-depth case studies of candidates who used varying identity-based appeals to different levels of success. As my dissertation uses the test case of White Republican candidate appeals to Latino voters, most of my case studies were White Republicans: John Tower of Texas, Greg Abbott of Texas, and Mike Coffman of Colorado. I also included a case study of Democrat Beto O’Rourke of Texas, to demonstrate the potential benefits of identity-based appeals for Democrats. My case study of John Tower showed that identity-based appeals have been used as the focal point of Republican outreach to Latinos as far back as 1978. Tower, the first Republican elected to a statewide office in Texas since Reconstruction, saw the rapid growth of the Latino population and wanted to be among the first Republican politicians to capitalize on it. Using archival documents from the John G. Tower Papers archive at Southwestern University, I found that Tower invested heavily in Spanish advertisements and worked diligently to collect endorsements from local Latino public officials, many of whom were Democrats. Tower also appointed Latinos to his staff and pushed for Latinos to fill high-ranking positions in the bureaucracy. Tower was largely anti-immigrant, but he managed
to keep his policy appeals and identity-based appeals separate, which essentially allowed him to run separate campaigns for Whites and Latinos.

Greg Abbott of Texas would perfect Tower’s strategy in his efforts to become governor. Abbott relied entirely on his Latino family connections in his Spanish appeals, presenting himself as a candidate who shared the values of the Latino community. Numerous Spanish advertisements featuring his Latino family members aired during the 2014 World Cup, most of which were devoid of any policy appeals. For his English advertisements, Abbott presented himself as a candidate who would secure the border and limit illegal immigration. Identity-based appeals allowed Abbott, like Tower, to operate as a political chameleon, presenting only the best side of himself to different electorates. In his 2018 re-election bid, Abbott again relied on his family for his identity-based appeals. In spite of supporting Texas’ ban on sanctuary cities and competing against a Latina candidate, Abbott went on to win substantial shares of the Latino vote.

Mike Coffman of Colorado represents what I believe is the most likely case where a Republican candidate will use identity-based appeals. Coffman, once an immigration hardliner who suggested that Latino voters who could not understand their English ballots should “pull out a dictionary” (Huetteman 2016), began taking intensive Spanish classes when his district became 20% Latino after the 2010 redistricting. Coffman became a local fixture at Latino markets and restaurants, and even agreed to participate in an all-Spanish debate on a Univision affiliate in 2014. Coffman narrowly won re-election, and doubled down on his identity-based appeals, as he took an intensive Spanish course in Mexico and began using identity-based appeals aimed at his district’s sizable Ethiopian population.
Coffman held on to his district in 2016 even as it went for Clinton by a nine-point margin. Although he distanced himself from Trump, critics noted that he consistently voted with Trump and remained anti-immigrant. Ultimately, Coffman was defeated in 2018 amid a wave of anti-Trump sentiment, but his use of identity-based appeals to secure a sizable share of the Latino vote serves as an example to other Republicans who need Latino votes but cannot support moderate immigration policies.

My final case study examined Beto O’Rourke, who used identity-based appeals to challenge Latino incumbents in Texas. O’Rourke first gained national attention for defeating Silvestre Reyes, a 16-year Latino incumbent in the Democratic primary of Texas’s 16th congressional district, which is the second most Latino district in the United States. O’Rourke attacked Reyes as an out-of-touch Washington insider, and used his fluent Spanish speaking skills to engage the district’s Latinos. Combined with the retail politics he would come to be known for and a series of Spanish advertisements, O’Rourke contested the Latino vote, losing it by only nine points on the way to a narrow victory. O’Rourke next drew national attention as he challenged Ted Cruz for his Senate seat. This race proved especially interesting as it was essentially a contest between a White candidate who embraced Latino culture, and a Latino candidate who embraced Whiteness. O’Rourke was attacked by Cruz and his surrogates as a cultural appropriator, while O’Rourke sold himself as a candidate who would better represent the interests of Latinos. O’Rourke narrowly lost, but he made the best showing of any Democrat in a statewide election in Texas since Ann Richards. O’Rourke’s identity-based appeals even
forced Cruz to air his own Spanish advertisement featuring his father, a first for Cruz in a Senate contest.

Chapter 2 used real-world election results and demographic data to better understand the benefits of identity-based appeals. By employing ecological inference models, I was able to use aggregate-level data to draw conclusions about individual-level behavior. The results of these models suggest that identity-based appeals helped the candidates in my case studies outperform similar candidates who did not use identity-based appeals. I compared Greg Abbott to the previous Governor of Texas, Rick Perry. Perry was a Republican, but he did not use identity-based appeals aimed at Latinos. Instead, Perry relied on policy appeals, the most important of which was his support for the Texas Dream Act. I found that Abbott outperformed Perry in 2014 and 2018 among Latinos by as much as 25%, which is significant considering that Abbott supported restrictive immigration policies such as Texas’ ban on sanctuary cities. I attribute Abbott’s success among Latinos to his identity-based appeals outlined in Chapter 1.

O’Rourke’s comparison case was Paul Sadler, who challenged Cruz in 2012. Results suggest that O’Rourke outperformed Sadler among Latinos by nearly 10%. Comparing O’Rourke to Abbott’s opponent, Valdez, and Abbott to O’Rourke’s opponent, Cruz, shows that O’Rourke and Abbott, the candidates who most used identity-based appeals, outperformed their comparison cases as electoral precincts became more Latino. Coffman’s comparison case was Scott Tipton, who represented another district in Colorado. Although the data are incomplete, results suggest that Coffman significantly outperformed Tipton among Latinos. The more interesting comparison case for Coffman
is himself, before and after his use of identity-based appeals. That comparison suggests that after he began using identity-based appeals in 2014, Coffman’s Latino support at least doubled from 2012. By his 2016 election bid, Coffman’s Latino support had more than tripled from 2012. When taking my case study of Coffman into account with the results of the ecological inference, I attribute Coffman’s improved performance among Latinos to identity-based appeals.

Chapter 2 also included an external validity analysis, as I acknowledge that three of my four case studies are in Texas. For the external validity analysis, adapted from my previous work (Alamillo and Collingwood 2017), we gathered information on 60 White candidates and seven Latino candidates in 33 elections from 2010 to 2014. Included was data on every candidate in every Senate and gubernatorial election in states where Latinos make up at least 10% of that state’s population. Because we used Latino Decisions election eve polls to determine the amount of Latino support each candidate won, we excluded elections in New York and New Jersey, but included every election from California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Florida, Texas and Illinois. For each candidate in our data set, we collected information on their usage of identity-based appeals, their policy preferences, and other characteristics. Using an ordinal logistic regression with controls for state, year, and Latino citizen voting age population, we predicted Latino vote share and found that while the strongest predictor of Latino vote share was the candidate’s party; however, our measure of identity-based appeals was the second strongest predictor. Our results suggest that relative to a candidate who engages in no identity-based appeals, a candidate who engages in every identity-based appeal is
going to earn roughly 20% more of the Latino vote. While these results suggest identity-based appeals are a boon for any candidate appealing to Latino voters, they do not allow me to determine the relative value of each identity-based appeal.

Chapter 3 employed a novel conjoint experiment to better understand the treatment effect of each identity-based appeal, and to allow for the comparison of identity-based appeals to policy and partisan cues in an experimental setting. In the conjoint design, 299 Latino adults recruited from MTurk were tasked with completing five candidate comparison. Each candidate comparison presented respondents with information on two hypothetical White male candidates running against each for Congress. For each comparison, respondents saw a table where the following attributes for two candidates were displayed in a randomized order: political party, Spanish speaking ability, Latino family connections, use of Spanish advertisements, endorsements from Latino public officials, commitment to appoint Latinos to staff, position on immigration, and religious affiliation. Each attribute had at least two possible levels, and each level had an equal chance of appearing. After viewing the candidate profiles, respondents were asked which candidate they would vote for if they had to choose one.

Once the data were collected, I estimated the average marginal component effect (AMCE) for each level of each attribute. The AMCE for any level of an attribute represents the average change in the likelihood a profile will be chosen when a given attribute level is present, relative to a baseline attribute level. With enough respondents completing enough candidate comparisons, a conjoint design allows for the comparison of AMCEs across attributes and levels to determine which candidate characteristic has
the biggest effect on a Latino’s likelihood of supporting a candidate. As expected, identity-based appeals have strong, positive effects on candidate support among Latinos. Relative to a candidate with no Latino family connections, a candidate with a Latino spouse and children is 6.9% more likely to win support. A candidate’s Spanish speaking ability is equally important, as candidates who speak fluent Spanish are 6.9% more likely to win support than those who do not speak Spanish. A commitment to appoint Latinos to one’s staff is also important, as candidates who pledge to do are 6.6% more likely to win support than those who do not. Latino endorsements are also effective, as candidates with Latino endorsements are 5.3% more likely to win support than those who are not endorsed by Latinos. Finally, candidates who air Spanish advertisements are 3.6% more likely to win support than those who air no Spanish advertisements.

While these effects might seem small, it is important to consider them in the context of partisan and policy cues. Relative to a Democratic candidate, a Republican candidate is 12.6% less likely to win support, which is only about twice the effect of most identity-based appeals on their own. Immigration policy is the primary driver of candidate support among Latinos, as relative to a candidate who supports a guest worker program leading to legalization, a candidate who supports the immediate deportation of undocumented immigrants is 27.6% less likely to win support. Relative to the same baseline immigration policy, candidates who support a temporary guest worker program with no path to legalization are 9.6% less likely to win support, while candidates who support the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants are 7.9% less likely to win support.
I was also able to find evidence suggesting that political knowledge moderates the effectiveness of identity-based appeals, as these appeals were slightly more effective on Latinos with low political knowledge than Latinos with high political knowledge. I was unable to find support for nativity, partisanship, and linked fate moderating identity-based appeals, possibly because of weaknesses in the data I discuss in sections below. For similar reasons, I was unable to determine the relative strength of each identity-based appeal, as the confidence intervals are wide enough that their effects are statistically indistinguishable.

**Research Contributions**

My dissertation makes two main contributions to literature on race and ethnic politics. First, this work greatly expands on my existing theory of identity-based appeals. Using a mixed methods approach employing qualitative case studies, real-world election and demographic data, and conjoint experiments, I was able to show that identity-based appeals can significantly increase candidate support among Latinos. This work examines past cases of identity-based appeals going back to John Tower and demonstrates why we are likely to see more candidates turn to identity-based appeals increase in the future. I document the spread of identity-based appeals from John Tower to Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush, and I posit that other Republicans have taken note of Greg Abbott’s success among Latinos. The chameleon politics strategy, where candidates are anti-immigrant in English and use identity-based appeals in Spanish, was established by Tower but perfected by Abbott in Texas. We have seen this model spread to Colorado,
where Coffman used identity-based appeals to hold on to one of most competitive districts in the country for several election cycles.

While my previous research focused on the benefits identity-based appeals provide for Republicans, this work shows that identity-based appeals are also beneficial for Democrats. Whereas Republicans rely on identity-based appeals to increase support in interparty contests, identity-based appeals may be most effective for Democrats in intraparty contests like primaries and top two general elections. O’Rourke first drew national attention for using identity-based appeals to defeat an eight term Latino incumbent in an intraparty contest. As I briefly covered in Chapter 1, when the general election for California’s 34th district pitted a Latino Democrat against an Asian Democrat, both candidates turned to identity-based appeals to reach out to each other’s co-ethnic bases. Based on these cases, I predict that identity-based appeals will only continue to grow in importance in Democratic intraparty contests.

This work’s second main contribution is challenging the dominant narrative in Latino politics by showing that Latino voters value ethnic appeals, even if they come from non-co-ethnic candidates. I hope to bring identity back into the discussion on Latino vote choice, which has been dominated by studies on partisan and policy cues. While I do not contest the importance of partisan and policy cues, as both had significant effects in my conjoint experiment, my research clearly demonstrates that identity-based appeals are an effective strategy for any candidate who wants to increase their support among Latinos. As many Latino voters remain nonpartisan or plagued by low political
knowledge, we should expect that some of these voters will be swayed by ethnic appeals, regardless of whether they come from a co-ethnic candidate or not.

Accounting for ethnic cues and identity-based appeals also helps improve our understanding of why Latinos sometimes seemingly vote against their own interests. Many political observers were left scratching their heads as to why Latinos would support a White candidate over a 16-year Latino incumbent, or why Latinos continue to support Greg Abbott despite his support for restrictionist immigration policies. I contend that these curious cases can be explained in large part by candidate use of identity-based appeals. Some Latinos, and perhaps other minorities, may not be knowledgeable enough or have the time to pursue additional information about a candidate, and thus may fall prey to the identity-based appeals of a candidate who won’t act in their best interests.

Based on Chapter 1, identity-based appeals will likely not help solve the information asymmetries that exist between foreign and native-born Latinos. To be sure, when it comes to certain Republicans, one could argue that these candidates are using identity-based appeals to exploit these information asymmetries.

Identity-based appeals thus provide a way forward for candidates who cannot appeal to Latinos or other ethnic groups with policy or partisan cues. Normatively, it may be better for the health of our democracy if Latinos can avoid capture by the Democratic Party similar to what Frymer (2010) documents among African Americans. That Abbott, Coffman, and other Republicans still contest the Latino vote is a positive sign in this regard, even if the means by which they appeal to Latinos are not the most transparent.
Research Limitations

I have identified two main limitations that need to be addressed as this research project expands beyond this dissertation. First, more diversity is needed in my case studies, as three of my four case studies involve candidates who ran for office in Texas. My case study of Mike Coffman showed that identity-based appeals can work outside of Texas, but additional case studies in other states would be provide additional depth and information. I already include a brief discussion of Rick Scott of Florida in Chapter 1, which could be expanded upon with additional information and ecological inference analyses. Beyond diversity in candidate location, how racial and ethnic diversity among candidates and voters impact identity-based appeals will also eventually need to be addressed.

While I use White (Republican) candidate appeals to Latinos as my test case, I believe that non-White candidates could use identity-based appeals to increase support among Latinos, as Robert Ahn attempted to do in the election for California’s 34th district. Similarly, my theory of identity-based appeals could apply to any non-co-ethnic candidate reaching out to any racial or ethnic minority group. Chapter 1 briefly mentions Coffman using identity-based appeals to reach out to his district’s sizeable Ethiopian population, as well as Jimmy Gomez using identity-based appeals to increase support among his district’s Asian American population. As it stands, I believe this work is strong even with a limited focus on White candidate appeals to Latino voters, but it must eventually expand to be a more generalizable theory that explains identity-based appeals beyond just these two groups.
The second, and more pressing, limitation of this research concerns the lack of
data needed to properly test some hypotheses. Although I was able to find evidence that
each identity-based appeal increases candidate support among Latinos, I was not able to
determine which identity-based appeal has the largest effect as the confidence intervals
for each appeal overlapped, making their effect indistinguishable. Thus, while the sample
size is adequate for detecting the effects of identity-based appeals, it lacks enough
Latinos to allow for the detection of distinct effects. In its current form, the conjoint also
prevents me from testing the proposed causal mechanism at work behind identity-based
appeals.

In addition to sample size issues, there were also issues with the demographics of
the sample. While I was able to find evidence suggesting that political knowledge
moderates the effects of identity-based appeals, I was not able to find support for
hypotheses concerning the moderating effects of nativity, linked fate, and partisanship. In
these cases where I could not find support for my hypotheses, the effects were in the
direction I expected, but the confidence intervals were very wide due to having small
populations of specific subgroups of interest. I believe these problems could be remedied
in part with a more representative sample, as my sample from MTurk was only 10%
foreign-born, while foreign-born Latinos make up 47.9% of the adult Latino population
(Flores 2017). If my hypotheses are correct, and foreign-born and non-partisan Latinos
are more susceptible to identity-based appeals, the results of my full model, which is
largely native-born and partisan, could be underestimating the strength of identity-based
appeals. While MTurk can provide up to 1,000 Latinos for another conjoint, this will not
ameliorate the demographic issues, which necessitates using a costlier sample provider such as Dynata, the former Survey Sampling International.

Another data-related issue is that the data required for ecological inferences are not always easily available. While states like Texas make their demographic data available online, other states, like Colorado, do not. Running ecological inference models for states like Colorado is thus difficult, as it often requires turning to a third-party vendor like Catalist. Demographic data woes are often compounded by limited or low turnout in Latino precincts that result in large standard errors. These issues are less concerning as I do not use ecological inference analyses to make causal claims, but they can present problems when it comes to providing evidence for the real-world benefits of identity-based appeals.

Next Steps

Based on the aforementioned research limitations, I see this project expanding in two main ways. First, I need to address the lack of diversity in my case studies. This includes adding additional case studies of White candidates in states outside of Texas, like Rick Scott of Florida, but also adding additional case studies of Democratic candidates and non-White candidates to determine whether Latinos reward candidates of different racial and ethnic backgrounds differently when they use identity-based appeals. One such candidate is Sri Preston Kulkarni, a Democrat of Indian descent who relied on his fluent Spanish speaking skills and a bevy of Spanish advertisements when he challenged a Republican incumbent in 2018. Another interesting case is Will Hurd, an
African American Republican who represents a border district that is majority Hispanic. Hurd spoke Spanish on the campaign trail in 2018 when he narrowly defeated a Latina Democratic challenger.

The second main expansion I see for this project is improving the sample and design of the conjoint experiment. With a greater sample size, I could determine the relative worth of each identity-based appeal, as well as provide stronger evidence regarding the moderating effects of respondent partisanship, linked fate, and nativity on identity-based appeals. I also want to test the causal mechanism at work in identity-based appeals to demonstrate that non-co-ethnic candidates can activate a Latino’s ethnic identity similar to how a Latino could would. If identity-based appeals allow non-co-ethnic candidates to benefit from shared ethnicity, the conjoint should also an include an attribute for the candidate’s ethnicity, with levels for non-Hispanic White and Latino. In addition to this attribute, questions would need to be asked after each candidate comparison to determine whether respondents saw candidates who use identity-based appeals similarly to co-ethnic candidates.
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### Table A.1. External validity predicting Latino vote.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
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<td>Cross-racial mobilization</td>
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<td>(2.062)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lower taxes priority</td>
<td>7.296</td>
<td>(6.786)</td>
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<td>Supports comprehensive immigration reform</td>
<td>-5.824</td>
<td>(6.140)</td>
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<td>Percent Latino CVAP</td>
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<td>Democrat candidate</td>
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<td>(7.874)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL dummy</td>
<td>-4.921</td>
<td>(6.281)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 dummy</td>
<td>4.372</td>
<td>(5.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 dummy</td>
<td>3.297</td>
<td>(4.276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>15.094</td>
<td>(12.888)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 61

$R^2$ 0.802

Adjusted $R^2$ 0.742

Residual std. error 14.109 (df = 46)

$F$ statistic 13.334*** (df = 14; 46)

*p < .1.

**p < .05.

***p < .01.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRM variable (0-6 composite):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate has Latino Family members</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate speaks fluent Spanish</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate supports Dream Act</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate promises to appoint Latinos to key staff positions</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate airs Spanish advertisements</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate is endorsed by Latino mayors</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate has a good plan to lower taxes</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate supports comprehensive immigration reform</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s party</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Democrat = 1; Not Democrat = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s ethnicity</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Latino = 1; Not Latino = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s state is California</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s state is Nevada</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s state is Arizona</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s state is New Mexico</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s state is Colorado</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s state is Texas</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s state is Florida</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s state is Illinois</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate had an election in 2010</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate had an election in 2012</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate had an election in 2014</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Yes = 1; No = 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Figure A.1. Estimate difference between King’s and Rosen et al.’s ecological inference methods for Colorado’s 2012 6th Congressional District Election.
Figure A.2. Estimate difference between King’s and Rosen et al.’s ecological inference methods for Colorado’s 2014 6th Congressional District Election.
Figure A.3. Estimate difference between King’s and Rosen et al.’s ecological inference methods for Colorado’s 2016 6th Congressional District Election.
Figure A.4. Estimate difference between King’s and Rosen et al.’s ecological inference methods for Texas’ 2010 Gubernatorial Election.
Figure A.5. Estimate difference between King’s and Rosen et al.’s ecological inference methods for Texas’ 2014 Gubernatorial Election.
Figure A.6. Estimate difference between King’s and Rosen et al.’s ecological inference methods for Texas’ 2018 Gubernatorial Election.
Figure A.7. Estimate difference between King’s and Rosen et al.’s ecological inference methods for Texas’ 2012 Senate Election.
Figure A.8. Estimate difference between King’s and Rosen et al.’s ecological inference methods for Texas’ 2018 Senate Election.
Appendix B: Chapter 3

We’re going to ask you some questions about how you feel towards some political candidates and political parties.

For the following questions, imagine a scenario where two hypothetical white male candidates are running against one another for Congress. Below are attributes for each candidate.

Question 1

Please carefully review the options detailed below, then please answer the questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Candidate 1</th>
<th>Candidate 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Non-denominational Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino endorsements</td>
<td>Not endorsed by Latino public officials</td>
<td>Endorsed by Latino public officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish advertisements</td>
<td>No Spanish radio and television advertisements</td>
<td>No Spanish radio and television advertisements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos on staff</td>
<td>Has not made any promises to appoint Latinos to key staff positions</td>
<td>Has not made any promises to appoint Latinos to key staff positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino family connections</td>
<td>No Latino family</td>
<td>No Latino family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position on immigration</td>
<td>Supports the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants</td>
<td>Supports a guest worker program that permits immigrants to be in the country, but only temporarily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish speaking ability</td>
<td>Does not speak Spanish</td>
<td>Does not speak Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you have to choose between them, which of these two candidates would you vote for?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate 1</th>
<th>Candidate 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates you would absolutely not vote for this candidate and 5 indicates you would absolutely vote for this candidate, how would you rate the following candidates?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure B.1.** Sample experimental design. This figure illustrates how a respondent would see and rate the candidate profiles when participating in the conjoint experiment.