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Newark: Community or Chaos

A Case Study of the Medical School Controversy

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Assisted by

NANCY JO STEETLE

This paper is an attempt to record the events and decisions surrounding the creation of the Medical College in Newark out of the seeds of the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry. This issue, although often cited as an underlying cause of the Newark riots in July 1967, is also illustrative of what may happen constructively when the poor and the alienated confront the system with a series of demands. The Newark case indicates that the Model Cities Program, in conjunction with urban renewal and other federal programs, can be one of the mechanisms for increasing the competence of both City Hall and the ghetto to deal with the complex and interlocking problems of the neighborhood and the city. It offers insights into new levels of federal, local, and interagency coordination that can make agreement possible.

The confrontation between the poor citizens threatened with displacement and City Hall clearly showed that the "urban problem" is not only the sense of alienation felt in the ghetto community but also the capacity of a local government to solve its problems. If poverty is defined as the inability to command the events that affect one's life, both City Hall and the ghetto can be described as "poor."

This case study of the proposed relocation of a medical school begins with background sketches of Newark's politics, racial composition, health, education, and housing problems. There follows a

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survey of the chronology of events over a two-year period surrounding the site choice and acreage demands of the school in the face of ghetto area opposition. Interagency cooperation at federal, state, and local levels during the school's planning phases and application for funds is also depicted. The lessons of Newark are many. It is the intent of this paper to focus on a few acts from the urban drama.

CAST OF CHARACTERS¹

HUGH J. ADDONIZIO	mayor of Newark, New Jersey
ROBERT R. CADMUS, M.D.	president, New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry, Jersey City
MANUEL CARBALLO	assistant to commissioner, New Jersey Department of Community Affairs
WILBUR COHEN	under secretary, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
LOUIS DANZIG	director, Newark Housing and Renewal Authority
LEONARD J. DUHL, M.D.	U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
RALPH DUNGAN	chancellor, New Jersey Board of Higher Education

1. First appearance of each character will be indicated by capitalization of his name in the text.

LEONARD FENNINGER, M.D. director, U.S. Bureau of Health
Manpower

RICHARD J. HUGHES governor of the State of New
Jersey

DONALD MALAFRONTÉ director, City Demonstration
Agency; administrative assistant
to the mayor; Model Cities
director

WARREN PHELAN regional administrator, Housing
and Urban Development (HUD),
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

ROBERT C. WEAVER secretary, U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Develop-
ment

HARRY WHEELER chairman, Committee Against
Negro and Puerto Rican
Removal

JUNIUS WILLIAMS director, Newark Area Planning
Association (NAPA)

ROBERT WOOD under secretary, U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment

PAUL YLVISAKER commissioner, New Jersey Depart-
ment of Community Affairs

BACKGROUND
SKETCHES
Political Problems

"Today, poverty and the problems of racial transition are common to most older cities, especially in the Northeast. However, there are few cities anywhere in the nation where these and other problems extend so widely and cut so deeply as in Newark, New Jersey." This description of Newark, written in 1967, before the summer riot, is extracted from Newark's Model Cities Program application. To become familiar with Newark's problems is to see the nation's urban problems magnified and focused. The lessons to be learned from the decision surrounding the location and construction of the Newark Medical College and its relation to the Model Cities Program will be lessons applicable to the problems of many of the nation's beleaguered cities.

Newark's problems begin with the harsh reality that Newark is land-poor. The Newark Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, consisting of Essex, Union, and Morris Counties, has a population of 1.8 million persons, making it the thirteenth largest SMSA in the nation. The city itself, however, consists of only 24 square miles, the smallest land area among major American cities; 25 per cent of that area is covered by Newark Airport, Port Newark, or uninhabitable marshlands. Furthermore, much potentially taxable city property lies fallow awaiting urban renewal development.

In fact, urban renewal programs have been limited in results because the city's redevelopment program has lacked overall planning leadership. About the time of HUGH J. ADDONIZIO's election as mayor, the local housing authority received \$300 thousand (with \$150 thousand later added) to draw up a Community Renewal Program (CRP), an assessment of needs in terms of long-range social, economic, and physical planning. As of January 1968 the community was still awaiting the CRP. (There are now hopes that Model Cities planning will fill some gaps in the overall redevelopment plan.)

The new mayor's statement shortly after he took office in 1963 indicated his desire to fill these gaps quickly and yet ensure that the city would not overextend itself:

The city has bitten off more than it can chew now, with enough projects to keep the city busy for the next 20 years. I don't want

to do what the previous administration did. I don't want to be placed in the position of announcing that "this is going to be done" and then find these projects are 10 years off or even longer. We can't get to what we have now. How much can the federal government allocate to Newark?

Yet in the six years that Addonizio has been in office, Newark applied for five new urban renewal projects totaling \$63 million in federal funds, more than three-fourths of what had been earmarked prior to his administration.

The logjam has been partially broken by the State Housing Finance Agency which, through cooperation with the Prudential Insurance Company of America, has already begun construction of 270 units of cooperative housing with 500 more units on the way. Yet one of the crucial functions for which the agency was created—the floating of bonds to raise money—has yet to be accomplished. The tax base in Newark is constricted not only because there is a dearth of property but also because the finer residential neighborhoods that mark the outer reaches of most major cities fall beyond the city limits. City land taxes are double the suburban rate, in many cases enticing people into the suburbs. Those who remain in the city are those who can least afford to pay, the Negro poor.

Financial difficulties are further heightened by the fact that Newark has reached its bonding limit. Although state law allows a city to ask the Local Finance Board in the Department of Community Affairs for permission to exceed that limit, Newark has yet to make such a request.

Simultaneous with this fiscal squeeze, expenses continue to rise. Typical of our large cities, Newark spends more on municipal services but receives proportionately less state aid than the wealthier surrounding suburbs. The redistributive impact of federal programs similarly favors the suburbs.

The man responsible for keeping rein on spiraling expenses while keeping pace with the city's growing demand for services must be the mayor. Hugh J. Addonizio, armed with a comparatively liberal voting record from 14 years in Congress, beat the Democratic machine when he defeated incumbent Leo Carlin in the 1962 mayoralty race. The characterization of Carlin's attempt at urban renewal as "Negro

Removal" brought Addonizio the overwhelming support of black voters. Following the election, Negroes were installed in the mayor's Democratic machine and were generally welcomed to Newark politics.

Of the three Negroes who helped Addonizio's 1962 campaign and who were to be given jobs in the city administration the appointment of HARRY WHEELER hit a snag. Just before his appointment as Assistant Business Administration Commissioner, a shortage was discovered in the school milk fund of which he had custody. When this news hit front pages, Wheeler's appointment never came through. Some Negroes charged that an Italian plot maneuvered the story to the front page.

More Negroes have been appointed to high positions in the Addonizio administration than ever before. He has named the first Negroes to the following positions: Budget Officer, Director of Human Rights, Executive Secretary of the Planning Board, Director of Health and Welfare, Director of the NC-NCR, School Principal, Commissioner to the Board of Adjustment, Fire Dispatcher, Police Captain, and Chairman of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. However, the President's Commission on Civil Disorders notes that in "the city administration Negroes are either out of touch with the ghetto community or they are dependent on the Mayor for their political lives."

In fact, election laws and procedures seem to work against political participation of the poor blacks in Newark. A six-month residency requirement eliminates a large portion of the newly arrived Negro population. It is also necessary to re-register with each change of name or address. Approximately 60 per cent of the potential black voters have failed to register; recent Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) amendments prohibiting expenditure of OEO funds for voter registration drives have not helped.

Another institutional factor which has succeeded in reducing nonwhite representation in Newark city government is the fact that the city is broken up into five wards, each with one councilman and four councilmen-at-large. This system tends to dilute the one man, one vote theory; in this

case, it works against minority groups, although it was not designed for this purpose. The predominantly black Central Ward elects one representative; each of the other four wards, predominantly white, elects one representative. This gives the black community one-fifth of the voting and bargaining power through its ward councilman. However, overriding this is the councilman-at-large system, which operates with a predominately white voting population. Thus, the Central Ward, which appears to have one-fifth of the political power, actually has only one-ninth of the power.

In the 1966 race, Addonizio's opponent was a Negro engineer, Kenneth Gibson. According to those "in the know," the Addonizio victory was again won with black support, but this time it was coerced support. Welfare clients learned that a Gibson vote would strike them from the rolls. People on waiting lists for public housing or government jobs learned that their positions were related to their vote. It was also contended that Addonizio enlisted the help of "old-line machine" Negroes to see to it that new black voters were allowed to register only as Democrats. Even if Gibson had had total black voting support, the financial support crucial to a campaign would still have been a problem. Newark blacks can rarely afford this kind of contribution. Gibson believes that white votes plus white money are essential and that in the next election he might be able to count on both from the white business community.

Since the 1967 summer riot, the Italian/American/Negro coalition that Addonizio had counted on for his political life has been deeply shaken, if not irreparably ruptured. Although Addonizio feels that he has done the best possible job, he is in the difficult position of trying to be responsive to the voting majority (white), as well as to the actual majority (black) of the city's population, with each having very different needs and aspirations.

Racial Problems

To understand Newark's racial upheaval, one must see it in the context of a rapidly shifting racial composition. The black population jumped from 17 per cent in 1950 to 34 per cent in 1960. In 1968 the percentage of blacks was approximately 63 per cent. Yet Negroes do not represent that much

of the voting population, due to being underage or newly arrived or so mobile that they fail to re-register—or just plain apathetic. Given this emerging community, with traditional avenues to power made difficult, what will the transition to power be like? On a television program shortly after the riots, one of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee representatives summed up the militants' view of transition by saying: "Nobody gives up power; it has to be taken. The Italians took this city from the Irish, and the Negroes are going to have to take it from the Italians." The form of this "taking" has become the crucial question for Newark and the nation.

A study sponsored by the Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorders shows clearly the polarization of whites and Negroes. It states: "Attitudinally whites and Negroes are in two separate worlds. On many issues related to future relations between the two groups, Negroes and whites hold almost diametrically opposed views." The survey continues:

The majority of Negroes believe they are denied equal job opportunities, with whites overwhelmingly taking a directly opposite point of view. Similarly, most Negroes attribute their lack of progress to white discrimination, while the vast majority of whites say the cause is lack of effort by Negroes themselves. Another unpleasant fact of Negro life as they see it is lack of adequate police protection and police brutality, which whites, for the most part, deny exists.

There is sharp disagreement among Negroes and whites on the causes of riots. Again the study points out: "Young Negroes in particular say that the riots were justified, while whites, again by a wide margin, see inadequate justification for the riots."

Professor Alfred Blumrosen, Rutgers University School of Law, stated cogently to the President's Commission on Civil Disorders: "Some of the tensions which were created in the 1960's between the Negro and white communities could be analyzed as stemming from the failure of the administrators of the legal systems to press for and achieve compliance with the Constitution and statutory mandate to eliminate discrimination."

Dominick L. Spina, director of the Newark Police Department, believed that the riot tensions were due to the large numbers of Southern Negroes who had brought with them their traditional hatred of the police and to the presence of a core of unemployed high school dropouts. The President's Commission on Civil Disorders, on the other hand, found that the "typical" rioter is not a recent immigrant but rather someone who has been in the city for *over 10 years*.

Health Problems

While the city has a series of health grants to improve prenatal and hospital services, the need continues to be staggering. Newark has the highest maternal mortality and infant mortality rates in the country. The VD rate is unmatched nationally. It has the highest rate of new TB cases. Newark ranks seventh among the 10 leading cities in total number of drug addicts. The 1966 HEW Poverty Area figures paint a picture of mass suffering shown by the following disease rates per 100,000 population: tuberculosis, 86.6; syphilis, 239.3; gonorrhea, 598.5.

The Newark City Hospital, alternately referred to as the "Slaughterhouse" or "Butcherhouse," is administered by the city; but while state law requires one nurse per six to eight patients, there are only two nurses per ward of 39 patients. To add insult to injury, an OEO study has revealed that medical services and facilities in the suburban areas surrounding Newark are some of the best in the nation.

Educational Problems

Any diagnosis of Newark's educational ills must be in the context of a massively transient population and severe financial difficulties. One-third of the annual school population is composed of new arrivals from outside Newark, predominantly from the South, Puerto Rico, or New York City. Twenty-eight per cent of the school population annually transfer out of Newark. Seventy-four per cent of all Newark's school children are nonwhite. The buildings are overutilized (108 classes on part time) and old (over half were built in the 1800's). Although the budget is regularly increased and there is now a \$51 million program for new schools, the school system lacks the resources to correct these tremendous deficiencies. Newark's financial difficulties are heightened by the fact that

in this land-poor city, the State School Aid Program is based on taxable property.

It should be noted that the school system itself was the focus of tremendous community hostility in 1967, when a Negro was passed over for a Board of Education position, and this has often been pointed to as one of the precipitating factors in the Newark riot.

Fortunately, the crisis in the educational system has produced a candor that may be an important step in solving the complex educational problems. Howard J. Ashby, president of the Newark Board of Education, typified this candor when he stated before the New Jersey Commission on Civil Disorders:

Until such time as these reading levels and arithmetic levels come up, there isn't anyone in the City of Newark, professional or otherwise, who can say we are doing a good job, because these children just can't read and do arithmetic. What I want to do is put the facts on the table without any cover-up because I think this is the time to do it. I think we are going to have to call a sharp halt to all of the camouflage that has gone on for the past 10, 15, and 20 years.

Hopefully this openness and candor have not come too late. As a result of growing community concern, new programs have been initiated in vocational counseling, counseling and training for dropouts, work study programs, teacher training, and adult education.

*Employment
Problems*

The educational crisis of the city contributes to the employment problems in Newark. Forty-five per cent of the population in the Model City neighborhood who are over 25 years old have less than an eighth-grade education. Ironically, while the major reason for dropping out of school is the need for employment, the more educated are hired first. One result of this vicious cycle is that unemployment in the ghetto area has soared past the unemployment level for the total city, which is in itself twice as high as the national average. Job opportunities for the unskilled have become increasingly scarce as new industries (related to transportation, distribution, and personal services) which require less manpower and

more mechanical aptitude and literacy move in. Simultaneously, the light manufacturing industries which employ the unskilled are leaving Newark for the suburbs where they can take advantage of lower taxes and land for expansion. The poor cannot follow because transportation is inadequate.

It was expected that the Concentrated Employment Program, jointly sponsored by City Hall and the Community Action Agency, would find jobs for 2,000 unskilled persons from the Model Neighborhood. Unfortunately this program has become bogged down in disputes concerning program coordination and responsibility. The local people feel that they have not had an opportunity for meaningful participation in program planning.

The racial dimensions of the problem can be appreciated by recognizing that blacks, who represent 10.5 per cent of the work force, hold only 3.7 per cent of the white collar jobs and 20.9 per cent of the blue collar jobs. Some progress has been made in Negro employment. The mayor has called for training programs and a change in the trades unions' procedures in hiring Negroes, requiring that all construction work on city projects have integrated work forces.

There are a total of 13 federally and locally sponsored employment programs in Newark. Although they have helped significantly, the Newark Model Cities Program application notes that some major blocks remain: personal indifference to work after dropping out of the job market, a second-generation public welfare attitude toward jobs, disbelief in the job programs, and general timidity.

The Business and Industrial Coordinating Council (BICC) is an example of a private effort directed to improve the Newark employment situation. It is a voluntary organization of 200 business, labor, civil rights, and community groups aimed at all aspects of employment. Although its vital interest was first that of employment, it has become involved in police-community relations and school board affairs. According to the project director of BICC, the business community is more mature in its racial attitudes than either the police or City Hall.

These programs to improve the employment situation in Newark illustrate the city's successful "grantsmanship" and a growing sensitivity to community problems. The next step, however, is for Newark to mesh its total effort to achieve city-wide objectives.

Housing Problems

No background picture of Newark would be complete without focusing on housing, among the most often stated causes for the 1967 riot. The city's Model Cities Program application describes one-third of the city's houses as substandard, giving Newark the highest percentage of substandard housing for any city of comparable size. Public housing in the Central Ward is high-rise, resulting in high density. Parents complain that in such crowding it is hard for them to supervise their children and for police to do their jobs. In these crowded conditions, any minor incident can lead to major crisis. In fact, the July riots of 1967 were triggered by a minor incident between a Negro cab driver and the police across the street from a public housing project, the Hayes Homes.

Newark has an adequate housing code but it is inadequately enforced. It has been charged that one reason for the lack of enforcement is that the real estate interests are represented by two city councilmen who are themselves real estate brokers. Furthermore, the fine for a violation is a very lenient \$50 to \$60.

LOUIS DANZIG, director of the Newark Housing and Renewal Authority, is proud of the housing programs. He told the New Jersey Commission on Civil Disorders: "Housing conditions in Newark have now been made better in recent years by means of urban renewal and the public housing program."

Newark has the largest per capita public housing program in the country, having received \$325 million in federal housing aid and urban renewal. It ranks fifth nationally in the amount of urban renewal funds it has received. The New Jersey Commission on Civil Disorders, in its findings, states:

It seems paradoxical that so many housing successes could be tallied on paper and in bank ledgers, with so little impact on those the program was meant to serve. The paradox stems from a wide-

spread overemphasis on dollars sought, money appropriated, and allocated units built. Quantitative assessments have been the measure of success. In the scramble for money, the poor, who were to be the chief beneficiaries of the programs, tended to be overlooked. For many years, the major share of the benefits of housing programs has gone to middle and moderate income people. This is still the pattern in Congress, where at the end of the last session the housing interests of poor people, in the form of rent supplements and leased housing, again got short shrift.

THE MEDICAL SCHOOL

It was against this frustrating background that the decisions concerning the relocation of a medical school to Newark's ghetto area were formulated.

As early as 1962 Addonizio offered the city's municipal hospital to any medical school interested in taking it over.

In January 1965, Seton Hall College's Medical School in South Orange became a state institution. The Board of Trustees of the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry in Jersey City had determined that the costs of maintaining quality medical education were prohibitive and had also asked the state to take over. Shortly thereafter, the conclusion was reached that the cost of rehabilitating the Jersey City Medical Center would be almost as great as constructing a new medical complex. Thus, in April 1966 the trustees notified the Public Health Service that the school would seek matching funds for the building of a new medical complex. The Public Health Service helped with the development of these plans.

Site Selection and Acreage Debate

The City of Newark, interested in having a medical school located in Newark, brought to the attention of the college administration an AMA study acclaiming Newark the city with "the most advantages and the fewest disadvantages for the development of an outstanding medical college." The mayor saw the college as part of the answer to the city's massive unemployment problems, as well as a chance for more and better services for a city which, according to its own Model Cities Program application, had the highest rate of venereal disease, tuberculosis, and maternal mortality among major American cities. The college would also give the city the chance to eradicate a blighted area that was costing the city thousands of tax dollars for police and fire protection. The charge was later leveled by Harry Wheeler, chairman of the Committee

Against Negro and Puerto Rican Removal, that the real reason for courting the medical school was that Addonizio wanted to disperse the Negro's political power, which was at that time turning against him, by changing the makeup of the Central Ward.

Nonetheless, in June 1966 the site selection committee of the College agreed to accept the offer of the 138-acre estate of Mrs. M. Hartley Dodge in suburban, semirural Madison, New Jersey. The decision to move to the suburbs was based on a desire to have assured control and unquestioned access to acreage for future development, as well as on uneasiness about locating in the ghetto. (It should be noted, however, that the school would have been guaranteed access to land wherever it located; as a state institution it enjoyed the right of "eminent domain" and would be granted additional land as the need were shown.) The committee further held that the Madison location eliminated the need to relocate hundreds of families, which would also be the case if building occurred only on 50 acres in Newark's Central Ward (plus the City Hospital). All that was needed to "clinch" the case for Madison, after the site committee's recommendations, was the approval of the College's six-member Board of Trustees, four of whom lived in small suburban communities. Architects were engaged to design the complex of buildings for this very large parcel of land.

According to DONALD MALAFRONTÉ, administrative assistant to the mayor, in his testimony to the Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorders, City Hall received an advance copy of the site selection committee report which recommended the Madison site. The report emphasized that Newark would be an excellent location, except for the land shortage, and that 150 acres were required.

Malafronté stated:

We got a copy of the report and said, "We have been undone here." We all sat down with a map and looked around at the area we wanted them to go into, which was Fairmount Urban Renewal Project. It worked out to 20 acres, or if we pushed it, to 30 acres, which we felt was more than sufficient for a medical school; and we still do. It was clear that we were "hung" on their 150 acres

stipulation, but we did have this rather glowing account of all the advantages of Newark.

So we thought we would surprise them in this and we drew a 185-acre area which we considered to be the worst slum area. It included Fairmount and surrounding areas, which were clearly in need of renewal—and we were going to proceed with the renewal in any case for that area.

We felt that in the end they would come down in their demands to 20 or 30 acres in Fairmount, or that in a battle we might have to give up some more acreage. We never felt they would ask for 185. We felt that it was a ploy on their part.

With the benefits of hindsight—the testimony before the President's Commission on Civil Disorders and the transcript of the later hearings—one can see that the city intended to use the large acreage offer as bait to get the College to come to Newark, with little intention of actually delivering it. Sensing this deception, the College was reluctant to accept the Newark site.

In November of 1966, the State Senate requested the College's Board of Trustees to conduct public hearings. At these hearings Louis Danzig, director of the Newark Housing and Renewal Authority for 18 years, testified that the land could be quickly provided for the College by condemnation. He also testified that "buffer zones . . . can be readily established to take away the fear of the surrounding areas." The Housing Authority handles public housing, urban renewal, and redevelopment. This dual role of Danzig made it possible, if not precisely proper, for him to promise the protective "buffer zones."

Part of the city's offer included sections of the Fairmount Urban Renewal Project area which had been slated for low and middle income housing. As the NAACP brief later stated, "At the time of making these commitments, the Newark Housing and Renewal Authority had not applied to change the Fairmount Urban Renewal Plan, although the plan had called for residential development of a large portion of this land and federal funds for the acquisition of land had been provided pursuant to that plan."

The pressure for a Newark site location was intense. This pressure was generated from Essex County's 13-member Democratic legislative delegation as well as from the governor's

office. Support for the Newark site had come from a wide spectrum of organizations: medical, civic, educational, religious, business organizations, and municipalities. The local papers pushed the city's case. Dr. Leroy E. Burney, former Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service, stated that medical schools in general belong in the urban areas rather than in suburbia. The Regional Plan Association's New Jersey Committee urged the Board of Trustees "to choose a central city location to serve the best interests of the school and of regional development" and later urged a reduction in the acreage requested. PAUL YLVISAKER, Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, also called for smaller acreage in the Newark site.

In June 1967, as a result of the tremendous pressures exerted on the Board, the Medical College had agreed to come to Newark provided that the city would produce 50 acres by March 1968 and an additional 100 acres on 18 months' notice. When the city had asked the College to pinpoint the area for its first 50 acres, the request was not for cleared land but for 50 acres in the predominantly Negro Central Ward across from cleared land. In reviewing this controversy later, Malafronte stated before the New Jersey Commission on Civil Disorders:

To us, this was a slap in the face It was our opinion that they were attempting to get out of the situation in which they found themselves, which was an aroused public demand that they come to Newark What they said they wanted was across the street from cleared land. This to us was insanity and enraging because they knew this was not an urban renewal area. They knew that the urban renewal process takes three years and perhaps five.

Despite the frustrating demands of the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry, the city moved quickly toward actualizing the project. Title searches and appraisals of the 500 properties in the initial 50-acre site were begun. Within three months the legislature had passed bills which would enable the city to—

1. Float a \$15 million bond issue for the purpose of acquiring property, an expenditure that would not be charged against the city's bonded debt ceiling;

2. Take land quickly by condemnation while not jeopardizing the rights of property owners to appeal;
3. Bind future city councils to any agreements made concerning the medical school by the present city council;
4. Pay part of the moving expenses of shops and other small businesses;
5. Give property owners more time to relocate.

By May 25, 1967, the city council had voted to accept the contract, and on May 26 it was signed by the Trustees. It was agreed to pay \$17,424 an acre, the lowest cost yet offered to a redeveloper in the city. Construction was to begin on April 15, 1968.

The "Medical School" decision incensed the Negroes, according to the President's Commission on Civil Disorders. A sense of outrage and anger about the decision spawned the creation of two important organizations prior to the riot: the Newark Area Planning Association (NAPA) and the Committee Against Negro and Puerto Rican Removal (The Committee). Both wanted the size of the Medical School site drastically reduced. NAPA, headed by third-year Yale law student JUNIUS WILLIAMS, pushed for legal solutions. NAACP financed the legal brief, written with the help of NAPA. The Committee, led by Harry Wheeler, a teacher in the public school system of Newark, pushed for administrative solutions, by pressuring HUD and HEW officialdom. Neither group was broadly based. Their protest made little headway until the July riots demonstrated the explosiveness of the problem. Although the Medical School issue was by no means the only volatile problem in Newark, it helped create the atmosphere in which only a spark was needed to kindle the riot fire in July.

The existence of the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs gave the state some creative points of leverage. This cabinet-level department had been created on the premise that modern community problems can no longer be met by local and county governments acting alone. The Department's major role has been active support of local communities in human and physical renewal programs. The state agency designated by the governor to coordinate Model Cities efforts, it has been closely involved with the OEO program of the

state. In the Newark Medical School issue, the Department used its funds, expertise, and "good offices" to bring about confrontation, dialogue, and finally negotiations between the warring parties.

Paul Ylvisaker, Commissioner of Community Affairs of New Jersey, played a crucial role in reestablishing communication between the city administration and the Negroes following the uprising. On the second day of the riot he was sounding out Negro leaders to learn their grievances. He convinced Governor RICHARD J. HUGHES that resolution of the Medical School question could forge a new and healthier middle ground between the Negroes and the power structure. His belief was: "We have to develop a process of collective bargaining between the present power structure and the Negroes . . . , a process not dissimilar to labor bargaining with management." After months of talking, Ylvisaker was able to convince some of the more militant Negro leaders of his sincerity and of their potential leverage. Junius Williams of NAPA contacted Mike Davidson of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and they conducted careful research on possible avenues for a legal challenge to the Medical School proposal.

At this point the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) became deeply involved in the Medical School issue because of its commitment to both the new urban renewal national goals and Model Cities requirements. Both were being sidestepped in Newark. HUD's newly stated national goals for urban renewal indicated that priority would be given to projects that would (a) provide housing for low and moderate income families or (b) provide employment for residents or (c) meet critical, urgent needs. Clearly, the Medical College's project in its original form decreased the housing supply and provided no safeguards to ensure employment for residents.

The Newark Model Cities application, drafted in the spring of 1967, committing the city to comprehensive integrated planning in that area, had mentioned the Medical School and its program in the following terms:

The primary goal in improving health services in the Model Neighborhood area is to evolve a relationship with the new Med-

ical School whereby the School will become the major stimulus in bringing about quality service, a new quantity of services, and new kinds of service previously not available.

The application continues in these glowing terms:

It will be a primary goal of the physical development of the Model Neighborhood to provide a site so that the School may build the modern teaching and community service facilities to which it has committed itself.

The difference between these statements and the Medical College's application to HEW for funds was glaring. The HEW application did not indicate a similar thrust toward the school's involvement with the neighborhood. HUD officialdom, with the prodding of an NAACP brief on the issue, decided to take the city at its word as stated in the Model Cities application.

Second, the Model Cities Program requires citizen participation by neighborhood residents. The HUD Model Cities evaluation team found the input of the residents in planning extremely limited and the chances for future meaningful involvement marginal. There was little doubt that Donald Malafrente, in his double role of director of the City Demonstration Agency and administrative assistant to the mayor, could write a work program that looked good on the surface. But the needed dialogue between City Hall and the Model Neighborhood residents was tragically missing. This became clear as the interdepartmental review teams made judgments about Newark's capability to deliver. The review teams worried about City Hall's seeming reluctance to approach and deal with the real leaders of the grassroots. The citizen participation mechanism was repeatedly indicted for its failure to give target residents a role in the decision-making structure. The capacity of the Model Cities Program to increase the competence of citizens to solve their problems by dealing with City Hall rather than bypassing it was being tested here.

On November 30, 1967, the NAACP wired a complaint to HUD Secretary ROBERT C. WEAVER regarding an alleged HUD decision that no hearing was needed on the amendment of the Fairmount Urban Renewal Project (redesignating 11.5

acres to permit the construction of the Medical School). HUD responded on December 8 that the review of the Fairmount project was still in process, that no decision had been made about a public hearing, and that no plans would be approved until "all outstanding questions . . . on the entire medical school complex" had been satisfactorily resolved. Counter pressure was exerted by the College's Board of Trustees who, on December 7, had issued an ultimatum to the city and the Newark Housing Authority to deliver 11.5 acres to the school by December 31. Pressure mounted further as the NAACP filed a formal complaint on December 19 asking HUD to reject the Medical College renewal plan on the grounds that (1) the College site was unreasonably large, (2) Newark lacked adequate relocation housing, and (3) the College had not indicated an interest in meeting the health needs of the community, thus failing to satisfy the requirement of the Demonstration Cities Act.

As New Jersey Commissioner of Community Affairs, Paul Ylvisaker's previous relationship with HUD officialdom, particularly with Under Secretary ROBERT WOOD, played an important role here. He asked both Wood and Secretary Weaver (whom he had worked with while a vice president for The Ford Foundation) to give the complaint serious attention and began sounding out HEW on the matter as well. They discovered that although the Housing Authority promised the Fairmount Urban Renewal acreage to the College in June 1967, its amendatory application of September 1967 still indicated that sections of that land were to be used for residential and commercial development. The Newark Housing Authority contended that the amendment was minor and would not, therefore, require a public hearing.

A quick survey by a now alerted HEW revealed that no urban medical school on record used that large an acreage and that there was no correlation between acreage and size of student body or quality of medical education. In the face of such opposition, the College's acreage demands began to waver—then decrease to 98 acres—with a succession of deadlines stated, then withdrawn, as each deadline passed. The College, which had been reluctant to take the Newark site,

felt itself the helpless victim of bureaucratic red tape and local power plays. On the other hand, the deadlines that the College delivered as ultimatums were seen by government officials as a bluff. It appeared that ROBERT R. CADMUS, M.D., President of the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry, was not really a free man, for his career was at stake here. It became evident that decision making must not be left to peers, but required escalation to a higher level, in the face of the urgency of the problems and the magnitude of the opportunities.

It was here that the author was able to play a critical role in the escalating process because, as a commissioned Officer in the Public Health Service (PHS) and as a member of the Secretary's staff at HUD, he had a clear relationship with the two major federal camps. In this role LEONARD J. DUHL, M.D., helped the departments see their relationship to each other. He met with Dr. Philip R. Lee, Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, and various members of the Public Health Service, as well as with HUD Under Secretary Robert Wood, to brief these men on developments and to start discussions concerning the two departments' relationships to the Medical College project. The new Center for Community Planning, charged with coordinating all of HEW's Model Cities involvement, also played a crucial role in the discussions that followed. As a result of this dialogue, Under Secretary Wood decided not to act on a sign-off on the Newark Medical School project until consulting Under Secretary WILBUR COHEN at the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

From January 3 to 5, 1968, the Public Health Service held a site visit prior to HEW's funding decision, shattering all precedent by including, for the first time, observers from HUD. The traditional purpose of PHS site visits is to allow a new college's research library, medical, and dental plans to be viewed by medical experts in these particular fields. The question before the site visitor has always been, "Will these plans produce quality medical manpower?" Each of the 50 members of the Newark site visit team was reviewing a particular part of the College's proposed operation. The Division

*Interagency
Cooperation in
Evaluating the Project*

of Physician Manpower (from PHS) assessed the educational program, the capability of the faculty and student body, and the educational facilities for the medical and dental schools. The Division of Health Research Facilities and Resources of the National Institutes of Health assessed the research component. The National Library of Medicine appraised the plans for the library. There were also four observers from HUD, one observer from the Surgeon General's office, and one observer from the Office of the Secretary, HEW (Individual and Family Services). These observers were not allowed to speak, but their presence indicated a new dimension in interagency cooperation. The Departments wanted to avoid the problem of one agency's deciding to fund and the other's refusing, thus presenting the College with the problem of having money for building granted by HEW, but no land relinquished from HUD, or vice versa. It was hoped that joint criteria for funding could be formulated—or at least criteria that would not be mutually exclusive. This was some of the thinking behind the decision to allow HUD observers to take part in the site visit.

The Surgeon General also recognized the unusual nature of the case by granting permission to neighborhood representatives to attend the site visit: Mr. Davidson, NAACP attorney; Junius Williams, NAPA; Mr. Marshall, Committee Against the Removal of Negroes and Puerto Ricans; and Mr. Rabin, a planner-architect.

The site tour visit included a bus tour of Newark City Hospital and the Veterans Hospital in East Orange (which is also run by the Medical School). Although no one left the bus at any time, there was some anxiety that the presence of the site visitors might be inflammatory to the community. After the tour there were presentations by the mayor, State Treasurer John A. Kervick, and Chancellor of Higher Education for New Jersey, RALPH DUNGAN. All spoke in favor of the Newark site. Representatives of the New Jersey College's medical and dental schools, the library, and the architectural firm also made presentations. Each community representative was also given five minutes to speak. Some spoke in favor of a smaller site for the school and wanted guarantees that the

neighborhood residents would gain employment during the school's construction. Others questioned whether the city would relocate the families displaced by the school. Attorney Davidson of the NAACP stated that nothing he had heard at the meeting justified the need for 98.2 acres, but a figure in the neighborhood of 46 acres he did see justified. He wanted to know where he should go to get a definite answer to this question. After an embarrassing pause he was informed that these concerns would be communicated to HEW and HUD. The remainder of the site visit took place in Jersey City, including conferences with appropriate College officials, the Division of Physician Manpower, the Division of Health Research Facilities and Resources, the National Institute of Dental Health, and the National Library of Medicine.

To HUD observer Frank Haas, it appeared that the site visitors and consultants from distant universities and hospitals were treating the Medical College as a routine request for HEW assistance; any community problems were considered "HUD's concern," with little bearing on the grant decision. The College appeared to view the criticism from the community as a threat to its primary responsibility of providing general medical education for New Jersey.

The whole question of what *is* medical education came into play here. The College perceived the function of medical education in classical terms—providing an arena for the development of doctors. Given this perspective, the ills of the ghetto are viewed in nonmedical terms: In terms of classical medical research, housing, relocation, and land use problems are unrelated to producing good medical men. This framework also implies that the medical profession tends to feel that it is the only group competent to make decisions about medical education; all others, be they outsiders from HUD or the community, pose a threat to good education. The distant perspective of the community is expressed by Robert Curvin of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE): "Nonprofessional people certainly have the ability to organize themselves; and if they don't know the technical matters, they have the ability and the insight to get adequate and competent consultants to explain these technical matters to them."

*The Wood-Cohen
Criteria*

Following the site visit, a HEW-HUD letter setting forth joint criteria for funding in this case was sent to Governor Richard J. Hughes. LEONARD FENNINGER, M.D., director of the U.S. Bureau of Health Manpower, drafted background material for discussions between HUD Under Secretary Wood and HEW Under Secretary Cohen and for the letter to Governor Hughes. The contents of that letter were cleared by the site visitors, HEW, and HUD. The draft was read to a group of HUD and HEW officials along with John A. Kervick, State Treasurer; Ralph Dungan, Chancellor of Higher Education; Paul Ylvisaker; and other representatives of the governor. The letter was modified to clarify responses to questions raised by the governor's representatives, and the College officials were also briefed on pertinent details.

The letter required that in order for the Medical College plans to be approved, certain criteria must be met.

1. The size of the site must be resolved in terms of the Model Cities Act and of the social impact of the amount of land removed from residential use.
2. Construction and operation of the Medical School must bring about increased medical services to the neighborhood.
3. Medical School and City Demonstration Agency representatives must meet with neighborhood representatives to resolve any differences.
4. Relocation plans must be developed to meet the needs of the neighborhood residents.
5. The construction period must yield jobs for residents.
6. There must be training of neighborhood residents in health fields.
7. Further long-range planning for additional facilities must necessarily be linked to the Model Cities Program.

These requirements radically enlarged the original Medical College proposals, which had included no plans for training neighborhood residents and little or no outpatient facilities. Not only the plans but the College's vision of itself in the community was being altered. The College's very existence now hinged on what had previously been peripheral to the

interests of medical education: housing, employment, and citizen participation.

Prior to the sending of the letter, Special Assistant to the President Joseph Califano discussed the Wood-Cohen letter with the latter at HEW. Califano precipitately telephoned Governor Hughes telling him that the Medical School proposal had been approved without mentioning the conditions of the Wood-Cohen letter. Actually, approval of the Medical School project hinged on City Hall, local residents, and federal and state representatives who must reach substantial agreement on the terms of the letter. Unaware of these express terms, Governor Hughes set the machinery in motion for the execution of the project. The *New York Times* carried the story. The community was angered at what was apparently a disregard of their concerns. HUD, HEW, and state officials held an emergency huddle to straighten out the signals.

The letter was finally sent to the governor on January 10, 1968, who immediately released it to the press, clarifying the previous misunderstanding. The letter has since been heralded as a major turning point by the governor, the city, HUD, and HEW officials. In Dr. Fenninger's words: "It doesn't duck the issues but it doesn't promise anything that can't be promised. It simply outlines what has to be done in order to have some kind of action taken."

On January 26, HUD Secretary Weaver met with Governor Hughes. Also in attendance at this meeting were WARREN PHELAN, HUD regional administrator in Philadelphia; Paul Ylvisaker; Steve Farber, administrative assistant to the governor; and Joseph Freitas, HUD White House Fellow. The central issue was a letter that the HUD regional office intended to send to Louis Danzig, director, Newark Housing and Renewal Authority. The letter provided that HUD would approve conveyance of an 11.5-acre plot to the College following redesignation of the plot from residential to public use zoning classification at a January 31 public hearing, and provided agreement could be reached among community groups, the City of Newark, and the Medical College on the conditions of the Wood-Cohen letter. The letter outlined that the

Community and
College Officials
Negotiate

second plot (46 acres) would proceed through normal renewal processes. HUD Secretary Weaver agreed to the letter.

Phelan, looking back on the Medical College controversy, sees this as a crucial move. It forced the parties involved to start the process of working toward agreement on the seven points of the Wood-Cohen letter. It also closed the issue of whether or not there would be a medical school in Newark and set the stage for the 46-acre hearing. But it still gave HUD room to maneuver, because New Jersey State Treasurer John Kervick made it clear that no state funds would be authorized until there were HUD approval on both the 11.5-acre site *and* the 46-acre site.

Nevertheless, the Board of Trustees of the College and the community groups soon reached an impasse. The Board of Trustees and President Robert R. Cadmus, M.D., questioned the legitimacy of the community "spokesmen." Three persons previously introduced claimed to be the "spokesmen" and negotiating team for the community: Mike Davidson of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Junius Williams of the Newark Area Planning Association, and Harry Wheeler of the Committee Against Negro and Puerto Rican Removal.

Dr. Cadmus felt that this negotiating team saw itself as bearing the "imprimatur of HUD" as the accepted representatives of the community and that their every demand had to be satisfied before the land would become available from HUD. In a conversation with Dr. Leonard Fenninger, Cadmus quoted one member of the negotiating team as saying, "We've got HUD in our hip pocket."

But Cadmus was most incensed that people who knew nothing about medical education apparently wished to dictate what the educational programs were going to be. President Cadmus and the Board of Trustees chairman walked out of an early meeting with this "community" team, alleging that they now wanted the College to limit itself to 17 acres (when the Board had agreed to the 57-acre limitation) and were demanding a position on the Board of Trustees and a say in hiring of faculty and structure of the curriculum. Adding to these tensions was the fact that Cadmus perceived that New Jersey Commissioner of Community Affairs Ylvisaker had

sided with the community vis-à-vis the Medical School. In the midst of this, Cadmus was getting more and more pressure from students who had decided that the wisest course was to transfer to other schools. In Dr. Fenninger's words, "... all the things that precipitated the crisis in December [1967, prior to the Wood-Cohen letter] were now back."

Fenninger felt that medical schools of the future would not want to locate in urban areas if it meant this kind of interference from the community. Fenninger argued that the community representatives did not have "any interest in the school as a school" but saw it as "a device to gain power and they have the backing of HUD to do so." At this point Fenninger felt that the Medical School plan for Newark could fold in the midst of this "power struggle." He was irritated that no one from the Medical College (no one "negotiating for the College's survival") was sent a copy of the HUD regional office letter to Louis Danzig clarifying the implications of the Wood-Cohen letter. This added fuel to his feeling that the Medical School was being used as a pawn. Fenninger felt that at this point "the governor and the government of Newark had to decide who was the community that was represented by whom and transmit that judgment to HUD." Fenninger argued: "The governor is going to have to make the judgment as to whether or not the school is more important in that location or other factors in that area are more important."

Fenninger believes that the crisis could have been avoided by requiring some additional information when the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry originally applied for building money to relocate in Newark: e.g., what planning groups had been used, what kinds of information had been exchanged, what were the expectations of the community relative to the Medical School, what understanding had the community been given about the role of the Medical School. Such changes in the application are *now* under consideration. A second step toward avoiding the slipshod, Newark-type plan first proposed is the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act which will provide project money to plan medical schools with a view toward total community needs.

Ylvisaker, concerned about the impasse between the Medical School and the community's negotiating team, suggested to the governor that there be a series of public meetings to hear from other elements in the community. Many local groups, feeling that nothing could be done until agreement were reached on the Wood-Cohen letter, had not participated in the public hearing on the 11.5-acre site. It was advisable to get the pulse of this larger community regarding the seven points of the Wood-Cohen letter. Representatives of the responsible federal agencies would be asked to assess this pulse and to make judgments on the issues of agreement, approval of the 11.5-acre and 46-acre sites, as well as the PHS application. The state had to trigger a mechanism for agreement soon or the College's Board of Trustees would be likely to recommend that the College abandon the Newark site.

However, at the first community meeting held in the second week of February 1968, the community reaffirmed Williams and Wheeler as its representatives in the negotiating process. Also delegated by the community were two men from NAPA; two more from the Committee Against Negro and Puerto Rican Removal; Reverend Sharper of the United Freedom Party and the Abyssinian Baptist Church; Duke Moore, UCC Director of Technical Assistance; Oliver Lough-ten, the Newark Legal Services Project (OEO-funded). The question of who was to represent the community had finally been answered. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Ylvisaker's assistant in the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs MANUEL CARBALLO, the question remained as to *which segment* of the community this group represented.

It rankled the state that HUD representatives were not present, for at this first meeting the community had questions about HUD policies and plans for Newark. In Carballo's words, it was "rather ridiculous for HUD to insist on community participation and yet not be a part of it." HUD's Region II director Warren Phelan had refused to send a representative from the Philadelphia office because he did not want the Department put into the position of having to make decisions on the spot. Phelan later remarked, "I like to be where I can fend and think. I like to put staff out on the front

line so that they have room to maneuver by saying, 'Let me check with Phelan.' It should be noted, however, that a HUD official was present at all subsequent meetings.

The parties involved in the subsequent negotiations were (1) the "negotiating team" of nine Negroes determined that the black community have leverage in the planning; (2) the College, represented by *Dr. Cadmus*, who had reluctantly chosen the Newark site and now faced the prospect of losing his faculty and accreditation because of delays in the negotiating process; (3) *Louis Danzig* of the Newark Housing and Renewal Authority; (4) *Ralph Dungan*, acting as mediator in his capacity as Chancellor of New Jersey's Board of Higher Education. The mayor did not attend the sessions but was represented by his assistant and Model Cities Director, *Donald Malafronte*. Last, always in the wings were the HUD and HEW officials who provided technical and procedural advice and counsel.

In negotiating agreement over the Wood-Cohen letter, community meetings followed informal technical meetings. Here the community, state, and local people met with experts in housing, medicine, Model Cities, and labor and hammered out issues and positions to be presented at the open community meetings. Using this procedure, the group approached understanding and agreement to a degree that Carballo felt there was sufficient agreement on acreage, health services, and employment to schedule public hearings. When advance notice requirements would put off the public hearing for 17 days, Carballo suggested that the interim period could be used to further resolve issues. The state was anxious to have the hearing as soon as possible because of the Medical College construction schedule.

According to Carballo, the main obstruction at this point was HUD's apparent unwillingness to commit itself to anything, specifically to relocation. Carballo said that the state knew through informal channels that HUD had, in fact, finished its relocation study and that they were "sitting" on it until Secretary Weaver could review it. Carballo realized that Danzig was ready to agree to a reasonable relocation program with staging and rent supplement provisions, but HUD

was not there with the relocation study. Thus the momentum toward final agreement was slowed.

The perceptions of these events by NAPA's Junius Williams, a member of the community's negotiating team, differ drastically from those of Carballo. Williams saw Danzig as the person tying up the relocation report by not making all the necessary information available to Charles Beckett of the HUD regional office relocation staff. Williams also felt that the state was attempting to rush them into public hearings prematurely. He insisted that he and the community needed more time to digest the information on community health programs submitted by Paul O'Rourke of East Palo Alto and Alvin Conway of Knickerbocker Hospital in New York City. Williams felt that he had finally convinced the community that the proximity of a medical school did not necessarily mean good health and that it was imperative to have guarantees from the College concerning its relationship to the community. For example, he demanded assurances from Cadmus that there would not be a situation like that at the VA Hospital in East Orange where the hospital is run by the Medical School with very few Negroes on the staff. Cadmus denied the possibility.

There were more tumultuous meetings, with the fate of the Medical College, the community, and the Model Cities structure hanging in the balance. Sometimes the tumult grew out of the frustration of trying to make governmental structures responsive and responsible to the Central Ward residents. Junius Williams sums up the lack of communication and clarity neatly:

It seems that throughout this process . . . that there is never anybody to blame. We come from the community and we ask a specific question. You, who are supposedly representing the powers that be, always say, "Let's be reasonable." We make a specific request; then the people who are supposed to be representing the power structure say, "It is not our fault that such and such exists."

Sometimes the crisis was the result of one black community member's anger at the militance or lack of it in another:

We have been fighting for houses and schools, all of us, a long time and not one of you came out and said one word for it. Why come tonight and say something?

Sometimes Dr. Cadmus' view of the medical school vis-à-vis the community was the focus of angry outbursts. On one occasion Cadmus exploded:

There is no argument whatsoever that vertical construction [of the Medical College] is recommended, including Mr. Danzig—if he knew what he was talking about. He is not the expert, so don't get your authority from that source. The experts have said that the planning we have presented to the federal government is one of the best plans that they have seen, and I don't think that they would like to see it packaged so that quality education and quality performance . . . can be ignored.

Danzig responded in kind:

So long as you got personal, I have to respond in a somewhat personal nature. This whole issue would never have arisen if these people had stayed out of my business, which is land and its use in the urban scene—about which Dr. Cadmus knows nothing.

Pat Girders, architect and city planner from Yale, commented further:

. . . it would be a mistake in this kind of session to treat experts . . . as if this were some kind of magical or holy thing. . . . I know enough about the medical profession to know that there is a jargon; it takes a while to learn a great number of things about it, but there is nothing holy about it. The policies for these kinds of decisions . . . can be made here. Policy decisions don't need to be made by experts. . . . The medical center can be done on less acreage than we are talking about.

Sometimes Malafronte, in his role as director of Newark's Model Cities Program, inspired the wrath of the community with his proposals for a community task force on Model Cities. One community member bluntly stated:

I'm not too sure I'm satisfied with Mr. Malafronte as the head of the Model Cities Program. I go a step further than that. I am not sure the community is going to accept you.

Reverend Sharper carried the criticism to all of City Hall:

In spite of the fact that the governor of this state would appoint a reasonable committee of individuals . . . they [Malafronte and the mayor] come up with the recommendation that undermines [our confidence] . . . , if there was any confidence on the part of . . . this

community in the administration of this city. In fact, we have no respect for City Hall at all. It is just there. It is not even a shell of anything that has any integrity in it where we are concerned.

When tempers flared around the housing relocation issue, the anger of ghetto residents was directed at Mr. Danzig by spokesman Junius Williams:

For those of you new in the session, you are getting indoctrinated in the whole process. Number one, you can't talk because Mr. Danzig talks; number two, he has been successful in making something that is very simple into a confused mirage. [We say] 54 acres of land is necessary to house the people that are going to be dislocated and somebody is going to have to find that land. It is just like that. Until that happens, there shall be no medical school.

Sometimes a confused community resident living on the proposed medical school site, bewildered by it all, did not know which person to believe:

We have been told all last year from June up until October from City Hall that they would be prepared to pay us for the property so we could move out. Now, we don't know whom we are to believe.

Yet out of this chaos came agreement. On March 1, 1968, that which had seemed impossible two months earlier was, in fact, accomplished. All parties involved in the negotiating process agreed that "substantial progress" had been made toward settling the issues of the Wood-Cohen letter and that this "progress" was sufficient to permit the scheduling of public hearings. The hearing would be canceled if progress did not develop into "substantial agreement" prior to the hearing date. By March 15, "substantial agreement" had been hammered out, the hearing proceeded, and the resulting agreements were heralded by HUD Secretary Weaver as a "beginning solution to a highly complex and controversial situation." The areas of agreement emerging from these hearings were as follows:

I. Acreage

The Negroes had wanted only 17 acres for the medical school, hiring architects to back up their point. They eventually agreed to 57.9 acres.

II. *Health Service, Employment, and Training*

The medical school agreed to upgrade the services and facilities of City Hospital and to implement a comprehensive community health services program subject to review and recommendation by the community health council.

III. *Relocation*

The State of New Jersey pledged that demolition and construction on the 46-acre site would be staged in a manner so as not to displace any individual or family until satisfactory relocation accommodations could be found. Those families who could not be otherwise relocated would receive rent supplements through the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs.

IV. *Medical School Construction*

A major objective of all parties was the assurance of employment opportunity for minority group members on the construction site. It was agreed that there would be significant representation of minority groups in each trade, with at least $\frac{1}{3}$ of all journeymen and $\frac{1}{2}$ of all apprentices in each trade being drawn from minority groups.

V. *Model Cities*

The federal regulations relating to the Model Cities Program would be rigidly adhered to by the Newark City Demonstration Agency. An ad hoc committee of community representatives was formed to serve as the catalyst in developing a broad-based community group to serve as the vehicle for community participation under the Model Cities guidelines. The composition of this group was to be decided through community elections. They would have a joint veto over the programs developed and administered by the City Demonstration Agency and would have the power to call for public hearings.

VI. *Housing Construction*

A Citizens Housing Council, representing the community, was named to work with a task force in planning for Newark's housing needs. The Newark Housing Authority agreed to convey 52 acres of land to nonprofit community-based housing corporations for housing.

The agreements were cheered by all parties involved. These are some of the reactions:

Paul Ylvisaker: If this becomes the procedure to be followed by the rest of the nation, we're going to be able to lick the problem of the cities.

Donald Malafronte: If we can continue this we will be able to hold this city together.

Harry Wheeler: It is the Magna Charta of Newark. . . . For the first time the people had a voice in making policy that affected them . . . ; it gave the black community a feeling of being somebody.

Dr. Cadmus considered the Negroes' demands reasonable and is reported to have said:

We got clobbered. The summer of 1967 changed the rules. Before we simply looked at our goal as building a medical school. We said the problems of housing, jobs, and relocation were real problems but we can't do anything about them. Then we learned we could involve those people who could do something.

BEHIND THE SCENES

Why, given the complexities, the tensions, and the distrust, was agreement possible?

It appears that a contributing factor was an informal network set up among key decision-makers in HUD, HEW, Community Relations Service (CRS), the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, leaders in the Central Ward, and City Hall. The Wood-Cohen letter set the stage for this network of players. The fact that some of the players had worked together previously facilitated the game. No figure emerged as the protagonist; the network remained more important than any of its members. Each player had his own sphere—housing, relocation, medical care, citizen participation—with the boundaries set at his city, his agency, his department, or his office. At crucial points, these spheres intersected and linkages occurred. HUD worked in tandem with HEW, coordinated closely with its own regional office (which served as a primary funnel for information concerning state, city, and community efforts), and kept tabs on the needs of City Hall. The community groups established links with CRS, Ylvisaker's Department of Community Affairs, Yale University students and faculty, and HUD's Model Cities team; from each of these came technical assistance. The City of Newark found its fate intricately bound up with that of the Medical School, the residents of the Negro Central Ward, and the Departments of HEW and HUD. In sum, as a result of the negotiations, people and institutions became aware that the welfare of the

"turf" of each was dependent upon the welfare of the "turf" of all.

SCENES TO COME

The story does not end here, however. The real tests will come with implementation and follow-through. Several problems still remain:

- A frightened white community is organizing vigilante groups to "protect our families and homes."
- The Advisory Council of the U.S. Public Health Service elected to defer a decision on funding the Medical School until June 1968.
- The Department of Transportation has yet to work out highway plans in the neighborhood that are consistent with the HUD-HEW conditions for funding.
- The Negro community itself continues to bicker about who represents whom.
- City elections to choose the permanent citizens' participation structure were held amid charges of fraud. The elections were not accepted by the city and proved embarrassing to HUD. Since HUD plans to make Newark a second-round city of approvals in the Model Cities Program, the questionable elections can be thrown out; yet the city must still evolve a workable relationship with the Negro residents of the Central Ward.

Although the stir of crisis no longer charges the federal bureaucracies and there is a tendency to view the whole crisis in retrospect as a clash of conflicting personalities rather than of unresponsive structures, the Newark Medical School story illuminates several important areas:

1. The interrelatedness of federal programs operating in a specific case.
2. The importance of cooperative relationships between the federal agencies (HUD-HEW) and the state officials.
3. The importance of meeting social needs in a community as a prerequisite for land utilization under an urban renewal program.
4. The usefulness of the Model Cities Program as a coordinating force to pull together diverse activities in a given area.

The events in Newark outlined in this case study have relevance within a much broader context—that of major social change within the United States. Though the focal point of concern was a medical school, the issues of the Negro, the poor, and all others who have not participated in what Hylan Lewis² calls “the democratization of the spoils” serve to point up the inadequacies of many of the social institutions in our society. Confrontation with the poor has become an essential part of program making in the fields of health, education, welfare, and housing. These programs must be made more responsive to human needs, justice, and equality.

2. From a personal statement by Dr. Lewis, currently professor at Brooklyn College and a Fellow of the Metropolitan Advisory Research Council, New York City.

Note: This paper was written in the Spring of 1968 and reflects concern with the early period of the development of the Medical School in Newark. Many events have taken place since this writing.