Reluctant Reception: Understanding Migration and Refugee Policy in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey

DISSERTATION

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Political Science

by

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Dedication

“Rationally I know what is right: my attempt at living in this village with these happy people. But mysterious things in my soul and in my blood impel me towards faraway parts that loom up before me and cannot be ignored. How sad it would be if either or both of my sons grew up with the germ of infection in them, the wanderlust.”

—Tayeb Salih, Season of Migration to the North

“When our citizenship laws effectively become intertwined with distributing shares in human survival on a global scale—designating some to a life of relative comfort while condemning others to a constant struggle to overcome the basic threats of insecurity, hunger, and destitution—we can no longer silently accept this situation.”

—Aleyet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery
Table of Contents

List of Figures ................................................................................................................. v
List of Tables .................................................................................................................. vi
List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................. vii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ viii
Curriculum Vitae .............................................................................................................. xii
Abstract of the Dissertation ............................................................................................ xiii

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
1.1 The Myth of the Transit Country .............................................................................. 1
1.2 Migrants and Refugees in the Global South ............................................................... 4
1.3 Changing Global Security Regimes ........................................................................... 8
1.4 Mixed Migration ........................................................................................................ 10
1.5 The Argument ........................................................................................................... 13
1.6 The Plan ................................................................................................................... 17

2.1 Defining and Classifying the Outcome Variable: Engagement ................................ 19
  2.1.1 Engagement in Illiberal Regimes ...................................................................... 22
  2.1.2 Engagement with Non-Citizens ......................................................................... 25
  2.1.3 Engagement with Non-Citizens in Illiberal States ............................................. 29
2.2 An Engagement Typology ......................................................................................... 30
2.3 Factors Influencing Engagement Policy Choice ......................................................... 39
2.4 Hypotheses ................................................................................................................ 45
2.5 Alternate Explanations ............................................................................................. 53
2.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 55

Chapter 3: Methods, Data and Analysis ................................................................... 57
3.1 Case Selection ........................................................................................................... 57
3.2 Data Collection ......................................................................................................... 59
3.3 Qualitative Data Analysis ......................................................................................... 66
3.4 Quantitative Data Analysis ....................................................................................... 71
3.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 73

Chapter 4: Demographic Shifts and Political Developments in Egypt, Morocco and
Turkey ........................................................................................................................... 74
4.1 Egypt ......................................................................................................................... 74
4.2 Morocco .................................................................................................................... 78
4.3 Turkey ........................................................................................................................ 82
4.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 85

Chapter 5: Engagement Strategy Choice in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey ............... 87
5.1 Measuring Engagement ............................................................................................ 87
5.2 Case History: Egypt ................................................................................................ 93
5.3 Case History: Morocco ............................................................................................ 98
5.4 Case History: Turkey ............................................................................................... 102
5.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 107

Chapter 6: Change in Engagement Strategy Over Time ......................................... 109
6.1 Factors Driving Engagement Policy Change ........................................................... 109
6.2 Continued Ambivalence and Movement Toward a Repressive Strategy in Egypt .......... 112
6.3 Morocco’s New Migration Policy .............................................................. 119
6.4 Turkey’s New Law on Foreigners ............................................................... 129
6.5: Lessons in Policy Change from Global South Host States ............................ 136

Chapter 7: Differential Treatment by Nationality ............................................ 139
7.1 Culture and Host State Integration ............................................................ 139
7.2: De Jure Preferential Policies ................................................................. 141
   7.2.1 Egypt ................................................................................................. 142
   7.2.2 Morocco ............................................................................................ 143
   7.2.3 Turkey ............................................................................................... 146
7.3 Outcomes in the Host State ................................................................. 150
7.4 The Cultural Embeddedness Factor in Comparison .................................... 156
   7.4.1 Egypt ................................................................................................. 156
   7.4.2 Morocco ............................................................................................ 159
   7.4.3 Turkey ............................................................................................... 161
7.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 164

Chapter 8: Conclusion .................................................................................. 166
8.1 Revisiting Hypotheses ............................................................................... 166
8.2 Addressing Alternative Explanations ....................................................... 171
8.3 Scope Conditions and Avenues for Future Research ................................. 172

References ....................................................................................................... 176
List of Figures

Figure 1: Engagement .................................................................29
Figure 2: Three-Dimensional Engagement Typology ..................................35
Figure 3: Illiberal States and Engagement Options ........................................35
Figure 4: Engagement Strategies by Measurement Type ..................................36
Figure 5: Dependent Variables ............................................................45
Figure 6: Mediterranean Irregular Migration Routes ...................................59
List of Tables

Table 1: Asylum-Seekers, Refugees and Migrants by Nationality and Host State ..........63
Table 2: Codebook ..............................................................................................................68
Table 3: Traditional Measurements of Engagement, Grouped by Strategy & Country ...90
Table 4: Non-Traditional Measurements of Engagement, Grouped by Strategy & Country
...............................................................................................................................................92
Table 5: Overall Totals, Grouped by Strategy & Country .................................................93
Table 6: Factors Influencing Engagement Strategy, Grouped by Factor and Country..111
Table 7: Access to a Hospital by Migrant and Refugee Characteristics ......................151
Table 8: Access to Education by Migrant and Refugee Characteristics .......................152
Table 9: Attitudinal Measure of Host State Privileging of Certain Nationalities ...........153
Table 10: Attitudinal Measure of Host State Targeting of Certain Nationalities ..........153
Table 11: Trouble With Host State Authorities by Migrant and Refugee Characteristics .................................................................................................................................154
Table 12: Participation in a Community Organization by Migrant and Refugee
Characteristics ..........................................................................................................................155
Table 13: Participation in Political Advocacy by Migrant and Refugee Characteristics
...............................................................................................................................................155
### List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAPEC</td>
<td>National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Competencies (Morocco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republication People’s Party (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDH</td>
<td>National Council for Human Rights (Morocco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGMM</td>
<td>Directorate General for Migration Management (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECtHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party (Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSD</td>
<td>Refugee status determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAF</td>
<td>Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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Acknowledgements

I began this project in 2012, just following the Arab Spring and as Syrians were only beginning to seek refuge in neighboring countries. I did not anticipate, as I was finishing fieldwork in the summer of 2015, that the migration and refugee ‘crises’ I had been researching would suddenly become front-page news in Europe, the United States and across the world. What had been a niche topic as I was writing proposals, seeking out contacts and conducting interviews, suddenly became mainstream. Initially this seemed promising: increased attention would mean increased support in terms of international funding and perhaps even refugee resettlement. But the momentary global sympathy after the body of three-year old Aylan Kurdi washed up on a Turkish beach quickly dissipated, and was replaced by xenophobic nationalism, anti-immigration platforms, and calls for reinforced borders.

Against this backdrop, the process of writing this dissertation between 2015 and 2017 was difficult. Often I felt that my efforts would have been better directed toward activism or public engagement that attempted to counter some of the racist and exclusionary rhetoric that has become so prominent. But I persisted in my efforts because I believe that the topic addressed in this dissertation is a critical yet neglected component of the broader contemporary migration picture: the reception of migrants and refugees in the states that are arguably doing the most ‘work.’ As I have written elsewhere, countries in the Middle East and North Africa need to be taken seriously by the international community and donor countries. These states are not mere migrant or refugee hosting vessels, and their incentives should be better understood.
While my focus in this study is primarily on the host state, the interviews I conducted with individual migrants and refugees living in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey formed the backbone of my thinking for this project. I am extremely grateful to everyone who was willing to share his or her story and time so generously, as this research would not have been possible without the insight of lived experiences. I am not overly optimistic that the circumstances—poverty, war, insecurity—driving individuals from their homes will suddenly resolve themselves in the near future, nor am I optimistic that the countries and regions—Europe, North America, Australia—currently barring these people from access will suddenly change their policies and permit them to enter legally and safely. But as a collective result of the conversations I had with men, women, and families in make-shift homes, tents and coffeeshops, I am optimistic that migrants and refugees will persevere, even in the face of closed and fortified borders and absent meaningful international protection. These individuals are more tenacious and brave than they are ever given credit for in the media, and while many are victims, all are resilient, resourceful and imaginative, willing to see a future in a new home despite the many obstacles en route.

This research required extensive, multi-country and multi-visit fieldwork, and I am eternally grateful to the many friends, family members, colleagues, and strangers who assisted me along the way. Thank you to the various foundations and centers that provided financial support for this project, including the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Project on Middle East Political Science, the Kugelman Center for Citizen Peacebuilding, the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, and the Center for Research on
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I am extremely grateful for the tireless mentorship of my advisor, Louis DeSipio, and my committee members, Sara Wallace Goodman and Kamal Sadiq. They were encouraging of this project since its inception, and very understanding of my need to be away from California frequently, always willing to offer advice by phone, email or Skype. They also read seemingly endless drafts of this dissertation, particularly Chapter 2, and pushed me to think more critically and coherently about what it means for a state to enact a ‘non-policy.’

In addition, many colleagues graciously read or listened to parts of this dissertation in various forms and provided invaluable feedback. In particular, I would like to thank Fiona Adamson, Hannah Alarian, Rawan Arar, Ibrahim Awad, Ilka Eickhof, Lisel Hintz, James Hollifield, Karen Jacobsen, Michael Kagan, Audie Klotz, Lev Marder, Erin McGrath, Dana Moss, Lama Mouriad, Carrie Reiling, Craig Damien Smith, Leila Tayeb, Phil Triadafilopoulos, and Gerasimos Tsourapas for their advice and encouragement. I am also grateful to the organizers and participants of the ‘Forced Displacement in the Middle East’ workshop at the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics, the ‘Regional Security Complexes in the European Union and its Neighbourhood: a Critical Reflection’ workshop at the University of Dundee, the ‘Comparative Responses to Asylum Seeking in Europe, Australia, the U.S., and Middle East’ workshop at the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of
California, San Diego, and ‘The Stakes of the Middle East and North Africa Migration Studies’ workshop at the Moise A. Khayrallah Center for Lebanese Diaspora Studies at North Carolina State University, for the opportunity to present early stages of this work.

I am deeply indebted to the family and friends who hosted me between 2012 and 2017, whether for a night, a week, or several months at a time. I could not have done the traveling that I needed to do for this project without your kindness and hospitality. Lastly, my thanks go to my father, Jon Norman, for being a proponent of the PhD endeavor from the get-go (for better or worse), and to my mother, Deborah Norman, for her unwavering confidence in my abilities. And of course endless thanks go to my husband, Mohammed Ali, both for his willingness to draw many iterations of the diagrams in this dissertation, and, more importantly, for his love, patience, and ability to always see the bright side.
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Reluctant Reception: Understanding Migration and Refugee Policy in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey

By

Kelsey P. Norman

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Irvine, 2017

Professor Louis DeSipio, Chair

This dissertation explores the phenomenon of migrant and refugee settlement in three Middle Eastern and North African countries—Egypt, Morocco and Turkey—from the perspective of migrant and refugee groups as well as each host state. It asks: What policy options to Global South host countries, specifically those with semi-authoritarian governments, have for engaging with migrants and refugees, and what factors make a state choose one policy option over another? While existing citizenship and migration scholarship asserts that host countries essentially have two policy options regarding the treatment of migrants and refugees on their territory—integration or exclusion—my research introduces the concept of ambivalence; aware of the presence of migrant and refugee groups, a host state chooses not to directly engage such groups. Instead, if relies on international organizations and NGOs to carry out engagement on its behalf, which often has tangential benefits for the host state. Through extensive fieldwork and 131 interview conducted over two years in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, I find that in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey were able to use ambivalence to manage the implications of their new inward migration due to three
primary factors: migrants and refugees found ways to integrate into large informal economies, international organizations and domestic organizations intervened to provide essential services, and the issue of migration was not so highly politicized that it gained prolonged traction in media or amongst the national population. By allowing migrants and refugees to integrate in a de facto sense through minimal government intervention and by relying on international organizations to provide primary services, host states derive international credibility while only exerting minimal state resources.
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The Myth of the Transit Country

Abdou\(^1\) is a thirty-year-old migrant from Cameroon. He has lived in Morocco for seven years and in Tangier, his current home, for two. Before that he was in Rabat and Casablanca, but he prefers Tangier because he still hopes to travel to Spain, his initial impetus for coming to Morocco. But going to Spain is expensive and dangerous, and he knows that the likelihood of crossing the Straight of Gibraltar or scaling the fences into the Spanish enclaves of Melilla or Ceuta successfully is slim. Abdou lives in a Tangier neighborhood called Boukhalef that has a large migrant population, many of whom are like Abdou: hoping to eventually reach Europe. For Abdou the problems in his neighborhood are as bad as ever. Primarily, migrants are subject to racism from their Moroccan neighbors, and in some cases young Moroccan men, *shabaab*, will break into and rob migrant houses or assail migrants in the street. Abdou and his neighbors cannot go to the police to report these attacks because many do not have legal status in Morocco, so they are left vulnerable.

Ibrahim, a 26-year-old Congolese migrant, came to Turkey because he understood Istanbul to be a large, cosmopolitan city with ample work opportunities, and because Turkish visas are relatively easy to obtain for nationals of his country. But after one year in Istanbul, work opportunities have proved to be sparse, and Ibrahim is considering moving onto Europe. Ibrahim prefers this prospect to returning home, as he wants to make some return on his migratory investment. His family and friends helped him to come to Turkey by providing him with funds and assisting in the visa process, so he feels

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\(^1\) The names of migrants or refugees used in this section have been changed to protect the identity of interview subjects.
he cannot return to Congo empty-handed. Ibrahim calls this the ‘African’ way: your family members help you to leave, but then they expect something when you return. Ibrahim thinks that he would probably qualify for refugee status given continued unrest in parts of his country, but he has heard from friends in Istanbul that some refugees have to wait up to five years to be resettled to a third country like those in Europe or North America. He does not want to wait that long, and prefers instead to work in Istanbul’s informal economy while waiting for his chance to move onto Europe.

Sama is a forty-five year old woman from Syria who came to Egypt two years ago with her husband, her elderly mother-in-law, and her six children. They live together in a two bedroom flat on the outskirts of Alexandria in a beach community populated by Egyptians during the summer, but relatively empty throughout the rest of the year. Sama’s husband has a stomach ailment that makes it impossible for him to work, and the family subsists on a small stipend paid to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Many of Sama’s neighbors—other Syrians who had been living in Egypt—have paid smugglers to be taken by boat to Europe. Sama says she would gladly buy space for all her family members on a smuggler’s boat, if only she had the money to afford it.

What Abdou, Ibrahim and Sama have in common is that they are ‘stuck’ in countries thought to only be spaces of transit. Many migrants and refugees come to countries like Morocco, Turkey and Egypt intending to pass through on their way to Europe or other Western states. In reality though, it is only a small fraction that successfully do. The majority of migrants and refugees find themselves lingering, perhaps indefinitely, in transit states that are rapidly becoming countries of migrant and
refuge settlement (Hoeffler 2013). Some, like Ibrahim, come with the intention of staying put. As Fargues (2009) acknowledges in his study of migration in Middle Eastern and North African countries, the number of migrants aiming to end up in countries like Egypt, Morocco or Turkey is on the rise. This is perhaps because individuals are increasingly aware of the near impossibility of reaching heavily fortified states within the European Union (EU).

This study is concerned not with migrant and refugee intentions but with the outcome: semi-permanent settlement in states that were previously assumed to be only countries of transit. In this dissertation I explore the phenomenon of migrant and refugee settlement in countries not usually thought of as host states—both from the perspective of migrants and refugees themselves, and from the perspective of the receiving country. Through this exploration I seek to understand how and when a new receiving country comes to conceive of itself as a host state, and the process by which this mentality becomes reflected in formal policy and law.

As this dissertation will explain, the Egyptian, Moroccan and Turkish governments have been fully aware of the migrant and refugee groups residing within their territories. These countries have therefore unofficially permitted migrants’ and refugees’ continued presence through both their inability to successfully prevent migrants and refugees from entering the country and the fact that the vast majority of these groups have not been deported. Why do these countries permit migrants and refugees to remain indefinitely, and what determines whether host states treat them inclusively, exclusively or with what I call ‘ambivalence’?
1.2 Migrants and Refugees in the Global South

The vast majority of academic literature on migration and citizenship examines the phenomenon of movement from the Global South to the Global North (e.g. Adida 2014; Sadiq 2009), and the reception policies of Global North host states (Brand 2008). Indeed, prior to the year 2000, countries of the Global North hosted a larger percentage of international migrants than those of the Global South (UN Population Division 2013; OECD 2010). But since 2000, the migrant stock in the South has been growing more rapidly than in the North. Between 2000 and 2010, the average annual growth rate for migrants in the South was 2.5 per cent per year compared to 2.3 per cent in the Global North (UN Population Division 2013). Since 2010, the annual growth rate has slowed in both regions, but remains .3 per cent higher in the Global South. Furthermore, in 2013, nearly nine of every ten refugees in the world lived in a Global South country, and some 13.7 million refugees, or 87.2 per cent of the 15.7 million refugees worldwide, resided in countries in the Global South (ibid).

Despite these figures, there is comparatively little information and theorization about how host states in the Global South choose to treat migrants and refugees: whether to offer access to residency, employment and services on par with citizens, or whether to treat them with exclusion. Why is there a less developed analysis of Global South countries as host states? I argue there are three assumptions embedded within the extant literature on migration to countries in the Global South that prevent us from adequately understanding this phenomenon.

First, the extant literature assumes an impermanence of migrants and refugees residing in host states in the Global South. Migrants and refugees in transit are thought to
only be aiming for Western democracies—Europe, North America, or Australia—and any country crossed while en route to these Western states is assumed to be a place of temporary residence. While this viewpoint is not incorrect, it is an incomplete picture that misses many of the nuances underpinning the realities of contemporary migration to and through countries in the Global South.

For example, in Southeastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries specifically, it is a minority of labor migrants, refugees, and transit migrants who reside there that are bound for Europe. According to a study conducted by Fargues in 2009, of the at least 3.6 million irregular migrants in the region at this time, between two and three million of them are workers attracted by local labor markets, and only some 100,000 are transit migrants intending to continue to Europe (Fargues 2009). Migrants and refugees are strategic actors who will adapt their travel routes based on the most recent information available (de Haas 2007), and perhaps realizing the near impossibility of crossing into “Fortress Europe,” migrants and refugees have amended their plans. If the possibility of reaching Europe or elsewhere is too dangerous or costly, these individuals will consider other possibilities.

Another assumption in the literature that further underpins the sense of impermanence is the idea that forced migratory flows will eventually reverse themselves once refugees are able to return home. Karen Jacobsen (1996) looks at the question of why refugee-receiving states sometimes respond generously to short-term refugee flows, finding that political calculations about the local community’s absorption capacity and the costs or benefits of international funding are important considerations (Jacobsen 1996). This work assumes that refugee flows will be temporary, however, even though it
is not always the case that refugees are able to repatriate. Increasingly, the conflicts that produce refugees in Africa and the Middle East are protracted. Refugees from Ethiopia, Sudan and Afghanistan in second half of the twentieth century found themselves in circumstances where the conflict that forced them to flee did not end with a secure situation in the refugees’ home state.

The assumption that refugees will return home once a conflict has ended is the result of an active decision made on the part of the international community in conjunction with the UNHCR. It used to be the case that forced migration situations were viewed as having three durable solutions: repatriation, integration into the host state, and resettlement (Jacobsen 2001). Yet since the 1980s, host states in the Global South have begun to view repatriation as the only viable solution for refugee situations, even when the situation in a refugee’s home country remains less-than-ideal. Barnett (2001) examines how the UNHCR managed to reconcile states’ preference for repatriation with the UNHCR’s longstanding protection and assistance mission that is meant to protect against refoulement (Barnett, 2001). Previously, voluntary repatriation

...demanded that the refugee consent to return to a country that in his or her view no longer represented a threat to his or her safety. But UNHCR officials began introducing new concepts like “voluntariness” that meant that refugee consent was no longer necessary and that the home situation need only have appreciably improved or held out the promise of improving (261).

In line with this new mentality that privileges the UNHCR’s knowledge claims over those offered by refugees, the UNHCR is no longer required to obtain informed consent before authorizing an individual’s repatriation, even when the uncertain security situation in a home country may be well known to a refugee (ibid). The UNHCR justified this new
practice by claiming that the less-than-ideal situation in a refugee’s home country might still be better than camp life (ibid).

However, the majority of refugees no longer live in camps, the second assumption underpinning the literature on migration in the Global South context. In actuality, more than half of the world’s refugees, and all migrants for that matter, live in urban areas (Ward 2014). In the Middle East specifically, the vast majority of refugees reside outside of camps in either urban or rural areas (ibid). In Jordan, a country with some of the largest refugee camps in the world, approximately eighty per cent of refugees live in urban areas (Achilli 2015). In Turkey, which currently hosts 2.2 million refugees, only twenty-five per cent live in camps (Kirişci 2014). While the literature assumes that refugees are warehoused against their will in camps run by the UNHCR, thus allowing for little interaction with a host population or government, refugee and migrant populations living in urban areas have a great deal of interaction with host country nationals, and may also have interactions with host state authorities.

The final misconception embedded in the literature on migration to the Global South is that because of lower state capacities, countries in the Global South are not capable of engaging with or providing services to migrants or refugees. As stated by Betts (2010), “With relatively porous borders, limited capacity to deport, and a clearly defined legal obligation not to forcibly return refugees to their countries of origin if they face persecution, these neighboring states have little choice but to host refugees” (Betts 2010; 13). In other words, emerging host states in the Global South do not have the capacity to prevent migration, and thus must accept their role as temporary host countries. In a similar vein, Hollifield (2004) argues, “In Africa and the Middle East,
which have high numbers of migrants and refugees, there is a great deal of instability, and states are fluid with little institutional or legal capacity for dealing with international migration” (905). In addressing these unsubstantiated claims, I argue in this dissertation that state capacity does not, in and of itself, determine host state responses to migrants and refugees; rather, states make calculations based on the incentives involved about when and how to engage migrant and refugee populations. Kagan (2012) comes to a similar conclusion when looking at host states in the Middle East and North Africa. He writes,

> With the possible exceptions of Lebanon, Yemen and post-Baathist Iraq, where central governments are weak, one risks making an incorrect generalization to think that Arab governments are unable to administer refugee policy on their own. It would be more accurate to say that they are unwilling, and there are specific reasons why (Kagan 2012; 320).

Furthering Kagan’s argument, this dissertation proposes a reconceptualization of state engagement choices in Global South countries, as will be explained further in this chapter.

### 1.3 Changing Global Security Regimes

Part of what necessitates this study of Global South host states are the changing security regimes put in place by Western countries over the last three decades. These new means of fortifying territories manifest themselves both physically—such as the United States’ amplification of the wall along its Southern border with Mexico—and through technological means (biometric scanning systems, enhanced passports, etc.). New methods of immigration control have even extended beyond the state itself, in both concrete forms such as zones established for policing illegal migrants within the territory
of another state, as well as through more subtle ‘soft power’ mechanisms like coercing or threatening other states to more effectively counter unauthorized migration.

Goldschmidt (2006) argues that when the EU created the Schengen space, an internal zone of free movement, in 1985 it also proceeded to bar legal entry to migrants from Global South countries. Since this time it has granted continually fewer visas for migrants coming from Global South countries in all immigration categories, despite an increase in the number of aspiring immigrants (ibid). Part of the reasoning behind this was a backlash against the guestworker system that had fueled much of Europe’s migration prior to the 1990s. With the realization that many migrants would not return home following the end of their contracts, Europe began to phase out the guestworker system (Castles 2006). When it became clear that European states would be unable to ‘import labor but not people,’ the governments instead sought to limit the number of migrants able to immigrate through formal venues (ibid).

In the 2000s, European governments also began pressuring neighboring Balkan and North African countries to bolster border security in order to curb irregular migration. As Geddes (2005) states, “The language of EU policy development…has been couched in terms of ‘co-operation’ and ‘migration dialogue,’ but policies have tended to reflect EU security concerns without dialogue that takes into account the interest of sending, receiving or transit countries” (278). In the context of North Africa, EU states used the incentive of increased trade and the normalization of relations to compel the Gaddafi regime beginning in 2003 to adapt its migration policies to fit EU objectives, resulting in the establishment of Italian-Libyan joint patrols in Libyan and international waters (Boubakri 2013). Tunisia and Morocco also conformed their immigration policies
during the same time period. On its eastern border, the EU has incentivized Turkey to prevent irregular transit migration through the improvement of border controls and the construction of detention centers with the promise of eventual EU accession.

Furthermore, the EU has been pressuring migrant source countries and neighboring states into signing readmission agreements. Burden-sharing is very difficult to enforce in the EU, and third countries can generally not be forced to accept migrants. As such,

In this legal environment, the external dimension of protection becomes one of the pillars of the mechanism, which is designed to shift the responsibility of protection seekers to third countries. Readmission agreements have appeared as a solution to make such rules operable by creating a mechanism capable of forcing transit countries concerned to readmit asylum seekers as well as migrants (Tokuzlu 2010; 6).

Non-EU countries agree to sign readmission agreements if the benefits provided by the EU are deemed more profitable than the cost of hosting migrants and refugees. While the EU has not yet reached an agreement with Morocco, Turkey has agreed to various readmission agreements with individual EU countries and with the EU as a whole.

The sum effect of these multifaceted forms of European security externalization has been the increasing difficulty, cost,\(^2\) and danger for irregular migrants as well as would-be refugees to successfully cross into Europe, contributing to the buildup of migrant and refugee stocks in surrounding Mediterranean countries.

1.4 Mixed Migration

A brief discussion of the terms ‘migrant,’ ‘refugee,’ and ‘asylum-seeker’ is warranted. In most host states in the Global South, the term refugee refers to an individual who has

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\(^2\) According to de Hass (2007) it cost between US$ 800 and US$ 1,200 for sub-Saharan Africans to cross between Morocco and Spain in 2003. A sub-Saharan migrant I recently interviewed in Rabat in 2013 quoted the price for the same voyage at 2,000 Euros, or approximately US$2,660.
been officially recognized by the UNHCR or the host state government as having fled from his or her home country for officially approved reasons, and who now deserves protection under the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of the Refugee or under subsequent protocols. The term asylum-seeker refers to an individual who has applied to receive the designation of ‘refugee’ from the UNHCR or host state government, but who has not yet gone through the refugee status determination (RSD) process. The asylum-seeker is thus entitled to some protection in the host country under international law, but he or she may not be eligible for UNHCR-funded services or assistance.

The term ‘migrant’ in countries in the Global South is generally left to serve as a blanket term for those who do not fit into the other categories. The label of migrant therefore contains individuals who have left their home countries to seek economic opportunities elsewhere (‘economic migrants,’ ‘illegal migrants,’ or ‘undocumented migrants’), as well as individuals who consider themselves to be refugees but do not meet the criteria for an official designation (‘rejected refugee applicants’). The term ‘transit’ migrant is also used to refer to people initially heading for regions further away—Europe, North America, or the Gulf States—but who never complete their journey because they do not meet visa conditions (Fargues 2009).

Importantly though, since the 1990s some migration scholars and international migration bodies have begun advocating for the term ‘mixed migration.’ This is because, a) the root causes of migration, such as conflict and poverty, are interrelated, and b) it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between forced and economic migrants in certain movements (Betts 2011; Castles and Van Hear 2011). Some individuals will also jump categories in order to obtain work or as they acquire new information concerning
legal categories (Castles and Van Hear 2011). In addition, both refugees and other migrants may use similar networks and smugglers to facilitate transit (ibid). However, refugee classifications do not reflect the issues raised by the mixed migration debate. Because the UNHCR’s classification of refugee is based on political, as opposed to economic, reasons for fleeing one’s home state, migrants fleeing poverty or state economic failure do not qualify as refugees (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Sergio 1989; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011; Hathaway and Foster 2014).

Recognizing the debate over mixed migration, the term migrant will be used in this study when speaking generally about those who migrate: refugees, economic or transit migrants, and asylum-seekers residing in a host state. If referring only to those who are recognized by the UNHCR as either asylum-seekers or refugees, and excluding migrants that are not recognized, the term asylum-seeker or refugee will be used respectively.

I also recognize that migrants to the host countries in question—Egypt, Morocco and Turkey—may originate from Western countries. In the migration lexicon these individuals are sometimes referred to as ‘ex-pats,’ connoting their privileged status above other migrant groups. Because of the ease with which these individuals can often enter and remain in Global South countries, they are not the focus of my study. Instead, this dissertation focuses on migrants who are generally deemed ‘undesired’ by host states, defined by Joppke (1998) as individuals seeking asylum or irregular migrants who overstay their visas. My study includes individuals with official refugee designation, asylum-seekers who have requested status and are awaiting an interview, and migrants
who are rejected refugee applicants (i.e. ‘closed files’) or who never applied for refugee status but consider themselves unable to return to their home country.

1.5 The Argument

The extant academic literature on migration and its impact on citizenship is largely preoccupied with comparison and typology building. It addresses why states have certain types of nationhood, formal rules for belonging, and approaches to inclusion versus exclusion, such as multiculturalism or assimilation. But in all of these debates, the topic under discussion is access to formal rights by migrants and refugees, namely: cultural rights, recognition in law, and access to services, including legal services, healthcare, primary education, or employment training. While host states in the Global South that have less experience receiving migrants and refugees may have some of these policies in place, ranking them according to the same criteria as experienced migrant and refugee-receiving states is limiting. Looking specifically at the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), many states lack comprehensive national legislation governing engagement with migrants and refugees, and it therefore appears that engagement between the host state and migrant or refugee groups does not exist or exists to a very limited extent.

Furthermore, the literature on state policy toward minority groups assumes that countries effectively have three broad policy options regarding the treatment of minority groups—in this case, migrants or refugees—on their territory: assimilation, accommodation and exclusion (Mylonas 2012). Assimilationist policies aim for the minority group to adopt the majority group’s culture and way of life. Accommodation policies are those that respect the differences of a minority group and put in place
institutions to monitor these differences. Finally, exclusionary policies aim to remove a minority group from the state, sometimes by force.

Yet this conceptualization leaves out the possibility of ambivalence-as-policy. Not bound by the same migration paradigm as their European and North American counterparts, host states in the Global South may choose to simply tolerate migrants or refugees, particularly those who did not enter their territory through formal channels. I argue that ambivalence is a viable policy option for states in the Global South experiencing inward migration flows if certain conditions are met: (1) migrants and refugees are able to integrate into the informal economies, (2) international organizations and domestic organizations intervene to provide essential services, and (3) the issue of migration is not so highly politicized that it gains prolonged traction in media or amongst the national population (i.e. low salience of the issue). Considering this option, I propose a tripartite typology for understanding host state engagement choices that encompasses three possible strategies: liberalizing, repressive, and ambivalent.

A policy of ambivalence means that the host state refrains from directly engaging with or providing services to migrants and refugees, and instead relies on international organizations and NGOs to carry out engagement on its behalf, which often has tangential benefits for the host state. As such, in a state exhibiting ambivalence, I expect that there will be minimal to no direct interaction between the state and migrants or refugees. If interaction with the state does occur, it will likely happen in an indirect capacity and will be mediated by international migration organizations, unions, or NGOs.

I argue that the relationship between civil society and international migration actors differentiates ambivalence from mere neglect or ‘doing nothing’ in that an
Ambivalent policy necessitates that other actors step in to carry out engagement on the state’s behalf. This indirect form of engagement is unique from pure neglect in that the state is aware of the presence of migrants and refugees, but is refraining from a hands-on approach with them. Conversely, the absence of engagement, or ‘doing nothing,’ would mean that a state not only has no direct relationship with the migrants or refugees on its territory, but also has no relationship with international organizations or civil society actors that provide services to these groups.

Ambivalence, which at face value looks like inaction or the absence of policy, is by nature a difficult concept to study (McConnell and ‘t Hart 2014). To theorize ambivalence in Chapter 2, I draw on the work of scholars that examine state responses to protests in semi-authoritarian contexts. While it seems self-evident that a state would be aware of the presence and actions of protestors in countries such as China, Jordan or Egypt, these scholars document instances where the state ‘chooses’ not to respond to them, or to withhold attention (Stern and O’Brien 2012; Moss 2014; Bishara 2015). While these scholars cannot claim to know a state’s intention with any kind of certainty, they instead focus on the actions set in motion by a state that is utilizing disattention or ignoring as form of repression. Similarly, while I cannot say with certainty that ambivalence is a deliberate state strategy relative to ‘doing nothing,’ I can analyze the effects of an ambivalent policy and compare those to what complete inaction or neglect would look like. In other words, what are the consequences of host state ambivalence, and what actions does this type of policy necessitate?

This dissertation is devoted to an examination of liberal, repressive, and ambivalent host state engagement strategies and their consequences. I show how states
derive important benefits from their chosen policy, depending on the domestic and foreign policy considerations involved. Specifically, I examine why states employ ambivalence when confronted with a growing migrant and refugee population, as well as when ambivalence becomes untenable, forcing states to move away from ambivalence toward liberalizing or repressive engagement practices. I also address the consequences of a state’s engagement policy choice for migrant and refugee populations, and examine whether treatment from the host state varies according to a migrant or refugee’s nationality.

In addition to its contribution to the immigration and citizenship literature, this study also addresses the growing literature on semi-authoritarianism, as all three countries under examination in this study can be classified as fitting this regime type (Collier and Adcock 1999; Coppedge and Gerring 2011). Semi-authoritarian states, characterized by power consolidated in a small, political elite and often lacking an even application of law, are often considered to be weak or low-capacity states. In some regards this is true; weak is synonymous with developing, in that these states have lower GDPs and may have difficulty providing basic services—education, health, employment—for their own citizens. However, I argue in this dissertation that state capacity does not, in and of itself, determine host state responses to migrants and refugees; rather, states make strategic calculations based on the incentives involved about when and how to expend resources for the purpose of engaging with these populations.

While Western donor states and international migration bodies continue to push for host state responsibility concerning migrants and refugees, countries in the Global South may have differing views of the appropriate division of labor between themselves,
international NGOs, and civil society organizations. Whether and how states choose to take responsibility for migrants or refugees, as opposed to leaving responsibility up to international migration bodies and civil society actors, can also depend on the origin of the migrants or refugees themselves, in as much as they provide geostrategic advantages. Through a close examination of engagement strategies over time, I demonstrate that the host states in consideration are not merely weak or low-capacity, but instead strategic about when and how they choose to allot resources for the purpose of engaging with migrants and refugees.

Together, these contributions will provide a clearer picture of migrant and refugee settlement in the Global South, looking particularly at host states in the MENA region. On the face of things, it may appear that little is going on in the way of migrant and refugee engagement. However, this research proposes that our definition of engagement needs to be expanded and clarified in order to capture the processes that take place and in order to understand what these processes tell us about the incentives of semi-authoritarian states regarding migration.

1.6 The Plan

This dissertation comprises eight chapters. In Chapter 2 I present the basic logic of my theory for why host states in the Global South make a specific engagement choice, which comprises three possible strategies: liberalizing, repressive, and ambivalent. I also situate my theory in existing scholarship, drawing on three primary bodies of literature: citizenship and migration, semi-authoritarianism, and international security. In Chapter 3 I describe my methods for case selection, data collection and data analysis. In Chapter 4 I examine the migration histories of each state through demographics, law, and policy, and
explore each state’s changing role from transit country to host state.

In Chapter 5 I clarify what an ambivalent engagement strategy has meant over the last three decades in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, prior to any policy reforms in the case of the later two countries. In Chapter 6 I explain why ambivalence remains the predominant strategy of choice for Egypt, and what factors have led Morocco and Turkey to move toward a more liberalizing policy. In Chapter 7 I switch views to approach the question of migration and host state engagement from the perspective of individual migrants and refugees. I explore whether various nationalities of migrants and refugees experience differential treatment from the authorities of their respective host states, and what this says about the influence of culture on host state engagement choice.

Lastly, I conclude in Chapter 8 with a review of my analysis and a final examination of the contributions of this dissertation. I also examine the scope conditions of my argument and its potential applicability to other spheres—Asia or South America—undergoing similar migratory transformations.
Chapter 2: Host State Engagement Strategies: A Tripartite Characterization

This chapter defines the concept of state engagement. First, it differentiates between state engagement with citizens of liberal democracies and state engagement with citizens of illiberal regimes that we might see in Global South countries, focusing specifically on semi-authoritarian states. Second, it examines state engagement with non-citizens, asking: If citizenship regulates engagement, and if citizenship is a membership institution, how can we understand state engagement with non-members, both in Western liberal democracies and illiberal regimes?

Next, this chapter introduces a typology that encompasses the engagement strategies available to illiberal migrant host states in the Global South and compares them to the options available in Western host states. It reviews the extant literature for theories that explain why a host state chooses one engagement strategy over another, and assesses the extent to which these explanations travel to illiberal states in the Global South. Last, it presents hypotheses for why illiberal host states employ each type of engagement strategy, and also considers several alternative explanations.

2.1 Defining and Classifying the Outcome Variable: Engagement

In a democratic system, governments are elected to power in order to carry out the people’s collective will. If governments are directly accountable to the citizenry there is little opportunity for independent decision-making and autonomy, and the state is a passive actor. In this type of formulation, we can therefore understand and explain political and governmental activities from a society-centric point of view, or by looking at competing interest groups and social movements. For many years this assumption led political scientists and sociologists to use pluralist and structuralist-functionalist
perspectives to understand public policy decisions, and it was not until the 1970s that political scientists began to focus on the state itself as an actor, specifically a “society-shaping institutional structure” (Skocpol 1985: 6). In this conception the modern state is more than just a government; it is an autonomous institution that creates and enforces the rule of law, citizenship rights, and broad economic and social responsibilities. If a state has the capacity, it can create or strengthen state organizations, employ personnel, co-opt political support, subsidize economic enterprises, or fund social programs (Skocpol 1985: 17).

With the state as an autonomous actor, the concept of state engagement becomes meaningful. Drawing on Dahl (1998), Tilly (2007) asserts that the set of relations between states and citizens can be called a regime, and that a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation. In a democratic regime, the institution of citizenship regulates the relationship between the individual and the state. This means that as a citizen, an individual is granted the right to equal access of state resources: the civil resources of the state (e.g. the courts of law), the power-political resources (e.g. vote and election), the social services resources (e.g. welfare, education), and the material resources (e.g. land, water) (Davis 2000).

Citizenship scholars point to the French Revolution as the origin of the modern Western concept of citizenship. Heater (1999) explains how the French revolutionaries’ idea of citizenship rested upon two traditions—the liberal and the republican—instead of one. The legal language of the Declaration of Rights is concerned with the right and entitlements of the citizen as an individual, whereas the patriotic language to love and
defend *la nation* is derived from the civic republican tradition, which views the citizen as a member and part of a community. By calling on both traditions, modern citizenship became a package that contains rights, duties, and a sense of tradition, community and identity, as well as a tool that is employed by states to bring citizens into the national fold.

According to T.H. Marshall (1950), citizenship engages a state’s populace through the bestowment of certain rights. Marshall is credited with devising a tri-partite construction of citizenship based upon three temporal phases: civil (eighteenth century), political (nineteenth century) and social (twentieth century). Each phase builds upon its predecessor; for example, freedom of speech (political citizenship) is only worthwhile if it accompanied by freedom of education (social citizenship), in order to teach citizens how to exercise their political rights. Marshall’s cumulative concept results in the twentieth-century model of citizenship that accompanies all three components.

But because it is derived from the experiences of countries in one specific region, “…the Marshallian model [is] based on the assumption that civil, political and social rights are historically secured beyond doubt, at least in principle, and can be taken for granted as stepping stones for further advancements” (Butenschon 2000: 8). In many regions outside of Western Europe, where the state is qualitatively very different from the liberal-democratic entity envisioned by Marshall, this assumption is not applicable without important qualifications (ibid). What does state engagement look like in regimes that are classified as illiberal, where citizenship may not necessarily entail equal access to the social, material, and political resources promised by the Marshallian model?
2.1.1 Engagement in Illiberal Regimes

Levitsky and Way (2002) argue that certain factors including the post–Cold War Western liberal hegemony, developments in media and communications technologies, and the growth of international networks that promote democracy and human rights have prevented regimes from becoming (or reverting back to being) fully authoritarian. As a result, many states have evolved into hybrid regimes that are neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian, described instead as ‘illiberal.’ The recognition of this type of regime in the academic literature was in part a response to democratization theories from the 1980s and 1990s that assumed a linear development of regimes from authoritarianism to democracy. When it became clear that not all countries were on a trajectory toward democracy, scholars began to develop classifications that more accurately captured empirical reality.

Under the broad heading of illiberal regimes, scholars have identified various permutations. Examples include ‘competitive authoritarian’ states that use bribery, co-option, persecution, and other more discrete methods of violating democratic rules, as well as ‘façade electoral regimes’ in which electoral institutions exist but fail to provide any meaningful contestation for power (Brown 2011). Such regimes cannot be considered purely authoritarian due to the fact that they tolerate at least partial electoral and institutional challenges and allow a degree of freedom for competing organizations. Ottaway (2003) argues that the term ‘semi-authoritarian’ best captures the nature of these hybrid-regimes rather than ‘failed democracies’ or ‘semi-democracies’ as it is their authoritarian characteristics that make them unique. These states are, “…successful semi-authoritarian regimes rather than failed democracies” (ibid, 9).
In a semi-authoritarian regime, membership in the core power group, and thus allocation over decision-making processes, is generally not determined by election but by family, economic and personal ties between core power group members (Olcot and Ottaway 1999). As Brown (2011) states, “Regimes in a semi-authoritarian setting have the capability, virtually by definition, to impose rules” (54). Further, the rule of law can be arbitrary and not evenly applied to all groups or individuals (Olcott and Ottaway 1999). Judiciaries may also be inhibited from ruling against the party or leader in power through bribery, extortion, and other mechanisms of co-optation (Levitsky and Way 2002).

Yet pressures exist that prevent semi-authoritarian regimes from sliding completely into authoritarianism, including global human rights norms, international networks and funders that promote democracy, media, and technological advancements. While fully authoritarian governments are unlikely to respond to external pressure from international actors, semi-authoritarian governments are still concerned with upholding their image and playing by the ‘rules’ of the international system. In practice, this means that other states or international actors may have the ability to influence or incentivize semi-authoritarian governments to adopt certain strategies or policies. In response to these pressures, leaders may allow some areas of openness, but often limit the potential impact of this openness through the state’s monopoly over, and periodic use of, instruments of repression (Olcott and Ottaway 1999).

Consequently, state engagement is likely to look qualitatively different in semi-authoritarian regimes rather than liberal democracies. Some semi-authoritarian governments with strong economies can win genuine public support by providing
services and stimulating economic growth, but for most countries this method of generating support is infeasible (Ottaway 2003). Instead, leaders of these states rely on their personal appeal, the strength of patronage networks, or playing on the population’s fears of change and instability (ibid). While in democratic systems, elected members of the government must prove to voters that the country has prospered in order to remain in power, semi-authoritarian governments are less concerned with spreading benefits widely than with maintaining the loyalty of a core group of supporters through patronage (ibid). Looking at the ‘Arab state’ specifically, Ayubi (1996) explains that

> It is a ‘fierce’ state that has frequently to resort to raw coercion in order to preserve itself, but it is not a ‘strong’ state because (a) it lacks—to varying degrees of course—the ‘infrastructural power’ [Mann 1986] that enables states to penetrate society effectively through mechanisms such as taxation for example; and (b) it lacks ideological hegemony (in the Gramascian sense) that would enable it to forge a ‘historic’ social bloc that accepts the legitimacy of the ruling stratum (3).

Additionally, semi-authoritarian governments may make an effort to engage with the broader populace through civil society actors, but often these actors are funded and promoted to serve and propagate the regime’s interests. In many Arab regimes in particular, a proportion of civil society actors are quasi-governmental organizations established by the ruling party, or they are organizations that have been co-opted by the state in a corporatist civil society–state arrangement, thereby limiting their ability to defy the regime (Deane 2013). As such, the provision of basic services and opportunities—education, health care, access to employment—that is a major part of state engagement with citizens in democratic states, is often not provided to the same extent to citizens in semi-authoritarian countries.
2.1.2 Engagement with Non-Citizens

The previous two sections outlined the extent to which we can expect state engagement to differ between Western democracies and illiberal states in the Global South, but in both situations the topic under discussion is engagement with citizens. If citizenship regulates engagement, and if citizenship is primarily a membership institution, how can we understand state engagement with nonmembers in a community? While some scholars make normative arguments that non-members should be treated equally as citizens if they reside in a host state for an extended period of time (Walzer 1983; Carens 1987), the reality is that most states treat non-members distinctly from citizens. States develop rules regulating the period of time for which non-members are able to remain on a state’s territory, the legal status of individuals while they remain, and what sort of economic, social or political activities individuals are permitted to take part in.

There is an abundant literature addressing the issue of migration and its impact on citizenship, which primarily uses comparison and typologies to examine why states have certain types of nationhood, formal rules for belonging, and approaches to inclusion versus exclusion. The construction of typologies regarding nationhood and rules for belonging began with an examination of two states—France and Germany—which were thought to exemplify two archetypes. The French adopted a juridico-political and territorial approach—*jus soli*, or ‘right of the soil’—whereas the German citizenship was ethno-cultural—*jus sanguinis*, or ‘right of blood’. According to the French model citizens could be made, whereas by German logic, citizens had to be born.
But with the influx of immigration following WWII, both of these citizenship regimes had to create policies to address the admission and integration of new members. With the adoption of naturalization policies, scholars began to debate whether or not nation-states were becoming more alike in how they addressed immigration. In his seminal study of the French and German citizenship regimes, Brubaker (1992) argues that despite presumed convergence among European states, national systems remain divergent. Brubaker asserts that the cultural foundations of nation-states act to restrain and bind a community through nationhood, resulting in divergence (ibid). Extending Brubaker’s analysis, Koopmans and Stratham (Koopmans and Statham 1999) arrive at three ideal-type citizenship regimes based on their observations of patterns within the European context: the ethno-cultural exclusionist, civic assimilationist, and the multicultural pluralist.

While Germany was once considered the archetype of the ethno-cultural exclusionist model, and France the archetype of the civic assimilationist, these divisions have softened, and other states now fit within these typologies. The third type, multicultural pluralist states, adopt the belief that liberal, democratic states must go beyond merely upholding the set of common civic and political rights of citizenship that are protected in all liberal democracies, and also adopt various group-specific rights and policies that recognize and accommodate the distinctive identities and needs of minority groups (Taylor 1992). In theory, this allows ethnic groups to express and promote their culture and identity, but rejects any policies that impose a duty on individuals to do so (Kymlicka and Norman 2000).

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3 In reality, Germany and France are now hybrid citizenship regimes that combine elements of both *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*. 
The type of citizenship regime a state has in place is related to, but unique from, a migration receiving state’s policies regarding integration measures. Integration is a complex process, and host state policies are only one factor in determining social and economic integration outcomes for migrants. Dancygier and Laitin (2014) review existing literature to assess the extent to which state institutions can affect migrants’ integration outcomes and economic participation in the receiving state. They find that most studies have focused on a dichotomous comparison between multicultural policies that recognize and value group identities, and assimilationist policies that do not accord minority groups with special privileges.

Nonetheless, the authors discuss several indexes that have been developed to document the range of rights granted to migrants (the liberal aspect of integration) as well as the integration requirements put in place by various Western states (the republican aspect of integration): the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP) (Banting and Kymlicka 2013), the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) dataset (Koopmans and Michalowski 2016), the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Huddleston et al. 2015), and the Civic Integration Index (CIVIX) Wallace Goodman (2010; 2012). A review of these four indices demonstrates that there is variation in terms of what it means for a host state to engage with migrants, through there are also overlaps in terms of broad policy areas (Wallace Goodman 2015). These can be broadly divided into two categories: engagement that focuses on individual rights—access to legal status (residence or citizenship), access to employment, access to health care and education, political participation, family reunification measures, and protection against deportation—, and engagement that focuses on group rights—ensuring cultural and religious rights, anti-
discrimination measures, and allowing exemptions from dress codes or institutional requirements for ethnic minorities. Engagement can also mean that the state makes requirements of migrants, such as asking them to participate in a language or civic course or necessitating that they pass a language or civic test in order to obtain membership.

These indices primarily focus on Western states, where it is easy to observe and measure overt host state engagement, though the recent iterations of two indices have branched out to include less ‘traditional’ migration countries in a variety of regions. The latest iteration of the ICRI includes several countries from the Middle Eastern, East Asia, Africa and South America, and the latest iteration of MIPEX includes South Korea, New Zealand and Turkey, among others. Yet, for example, when Turkey is included in the MIPEX index, it (perhaps unsurprisingly) ranks 38 out of 38, thus coming in ‘last’ in terms of integration measures for migrants. This sort of ranking leads us to believe that in comparison to other receiving states Turkey lacks any policies toward migrants, and has effectively failed in terms of integration.

It is true that Turkey, as well as other host states in the Global South, may not have the same sort of engagement policies in place as states in Europe or North America, but ranking them according to the same criteria as experienced immigrant-receiving states is limiting. As is demonstrated by the case of Turkey and MIPEX, Global South host states are likely to score ‘0’ on many measurements of engagement, and it would therefore appear that engagement does not exist or exists to a very limited extent. Furthermore, this type of ranking fails to account for the historical and current relations between minority and majority groups in non-European contexts. For example, Kymlicka and Pföstl (2014) argue that the idea of ‘protection of minorities,’ particularly where it
involves potential appeal to international actors, is not seen as a legitimate or normal form of domestic political contestation in Arab countries, but as a geopolitical threat to state security as a result of the region’s experience with colonization.

Consequently, I propose that a different measurement that incorporates both ‘traditional’ and non-traditional engagement is needed in order to fully understand what types of engagement do occur in host states in the Global South.

2.1.3 Engagement with Non-Citizens in Illiberal States

Figure 1 captures engagement across two parameters: the type of population that a state is engaging with, and the type of regime in which engagement occurs. This study focuses on the bottom-right box: engagement with non-citizens in illiberal states.\(^4\)

*Figure 1: Engagement*

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<th>Type of Population</th>
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<td>Citizens in illiberal states</td>
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<td>Non-citizens in illiberal states</td>
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In this study I define engagement as any interaction, direct or indirect, that the state has with the migrant and refugee population residing on its territory. I take into account the policies outlined by the four integration indices in Section 2.1.2, focusing on traditional measures derived from the existing literature that are considered most important for legal,\(^4\)

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\(^{4}\) It is important to note that in study I focus specifically on one sub-type of an illiberal regime: semi-authoritarianism.
economic and social inclusion in the host state: (1) residency and membership rights, (2) access to healthcare, education, and housing, and (3) access to employment. But I also account for forms of engagement that may not be represented in formal policy or legislation. For example, a host state may not permit migrants or refugees to work in the formal economy, but may ‘turn a blind eye’ to them doing so in the informal economy. Conversely, a host state may allow the participation of migrants and refugees in the formal economy in a de jure sense, but obtaining the needed documentation or sponsorship is effectively impossible, thereby barring work in a de facto sense.

Furthermore, a host state may not provide healthcare, education or housing to migrants and refugees itself, but it may allow other organizations—international or domestic—to provide these services. The very decision to allow an international migration body or an NGO to operate on the host country’s territory and provide services to migrants or refugees is a form of engagement with these populations, even though it occurs indirectly via intermediary organizations. Conversely, the inability for civil society actors or international migration bodies to carry out migration-related work due to host state government interference is a type of engagement, as it constitutes an exertion on the part of the host state.

As such, this study will account for ‘traditional’ aspects of engagement—residency and membership rights; access to healthcare, education, and housing; access to employment—but I will also account for non-traditional measures that capture the indirect relationship between a host state and migrants or refugees that is mediated by international organizations and NGOs.

2.2 An Engagement Typology
Now that I have identified the anticipated differences between engagement in Western democracies versus illiberal countries in the Global South, how can we classify the types of engagement strategies that can be used by host states? As indicated in the above section, classifications in the existing literature tend to describe engagement in a dichotomous manner: inclusionary versus exclusionary or accommodationist versus assimilationist. Host states in the Global South also have these options available to them, though I choose to refer to these strategies as ‘liberalizing’ and ‘repressive,’ using an on-going verb tense that connotes a direction rather than an endpoint. In a liberalizing regime, a host employs mechanisms such as education, employment or legal structures in an effort to bring migrants into the national system. A repressive strategy constitutes exclusionary policies that aim to remove migrants from the state, and is characterized by high levels of policing, arrests, incarceration, and possibly deportation.

However, in addition to liberalizing and repressive strategies, I argue that we need to also consider a third option: the idea of ambivalence-as-policy. A policy of ambivalence means that a host state refrains from directly engaging with or providing services to migrants and refugees, and instead relies on international organizations and NGOs to carry out engagement on its behalf, which often has tangential benefits for the host state. As such, in a state in the Global South exhibiting ambivalence, I expect that there will be minimal to no direct interaction between the state and migrants. If interaction with the state does occur, it will likely happen in an indirect capacity and will be mediated by international migration organizations, unions, or NGOs. This indirect engagement makes it clear that the state is aware of the presence of migrants and refugees, but is remaining ambivalent. I argue that this differentiates ambivalence from
mere neglect in that an ambivalent policy necessitates the action of other actors—international migration bodies or NGOS—to step in and carry out engagement on the state’s behalf.

The difficulty of measuring the intention behind a state’s policy is acknowledged by a number of other scholars also examining state ‘non-responses’ (Bishara 2015; McConnell and ‘t Hart 2014). While ambivalence can appear to be ‘inaction’ or ‘doing nothing’ at face value, I argue that this seeming non-response actually constitutes a policy on the part of the host state and a strategy for engaging with migrants and refugees. To build the concept of ambivalence and to differentiate it from ‘doing nothing,’ I look to other policy areas—most prominently, the study of government responses to protest movements—in which states are understood as ‘tolerating,’ ‘ignoring,’ or ‘turning a blind eye’ as a policy response.

In recent work on government responses to protests in semi-authoritarian contexts, Su and He (2010) argue that when protests appear seemingly spontaneous, the Chinese state is likely to take an ‘accommodating’ approach to diffuse the conflict, rather than respond with overtly repressive measures (ibid, 177). In the Middle Eastern context, Moss (2014) describes how the Jordanian government has used ‘disattention,’ defined as an instance when state institutions selectively withhold recognition of activists who are attempting to elicit a response from a governmental department or high-level state representative, to repress protests and deter future activism. Similarly, Bishara (2015) proposes the concept of ‘ignoring’ to understand instances in which Egyptian government officials have appeared dismissive, either through in-action or contempt, of popular mobilization.
In all of these instances it is highly likely that the state in question is aware of the presence and actions of protestors, but chooses not to respond or to withhold attention. Nonetheless, these scholars cannot say with absolute certainty that the state is \textit{choosing} not to respond. They also acknowledge that focusing solely on state intentionality can be problematic, as sometimes elite state actors may be very conscientious of a policy or strategy and at other times not (Stern and O’Brien 2012). Instead, these scholars choose to focus on the actions \textit{set in motion} by the state utilizing tolerance, disattention or ignoring as form of state repression. They examine how activists to whom these state strategies are directed consider the state policies intentional, and how they subsequently act based on that assumption (Moss 2014; Bishara 2015). As Moss (2014) states,

\begin{quote}
Ironically, the frequent high-level attention given to activist leaders and organizations distinguishes disattention from their otherwise routine access to political elites and the security apparatus. As such, respondents logically did not believe that disattention stems simply from a lack of state capacity to recognize their requests (269).
\end{quote}

Similarly, while I cannot say with absolute certainty that ambivalence is a deliberate state strategy relative to ‘doing nothing,’ I can analyze the effects of an ambivalent policy and compare those to what complete inaction or neglect would look like.\footnote{Using this type of approach to examining state inaction, Mourad (2017) argues that a ‘non-policy’ on behalf of the Lebanese government in response to the Syrian crisis necessitated that other actors—both at the local and international level—adopt certain actions. While Mourad is unable to say with certainty that this ‘inaction’ was a strategy rather than a lack of capacity, she demonstrates that this non-policy subsequently, “structur[ed] the responses that did emerge, both “below” and “above” the state, that is namely by local authorities and international agencies” (49).} In other words, what are the consequences of host state ambivalence, and what actions does this type of response set in motion?

While it is not the focus of this dissertation, I argue that ambivalence is also a policy option for Western migration-receiving countries, though it is generally regarded
as a policy failure. Looking to European countries that only recently underwent transitions from countries of conduit to countries of destination for many irregular migrants, such as Spain and Italy, is helpful in illustrating this classification. For example, Cornelius (2004) argues that in Spain a multiracial, multicultural society is not seen as a desirable goal, and any immigration policy that would lead Spain down this path is consciously avoided.

Domestically, the goal of the Spanish government for thirteen years under Gonzalez and his center-left Spanish Socialist party (PSOE) was to have a low-profile immigration policy—one that avoided arousing public passions and inflated expectations...The reticence of the political class during the 1990s reflected the country’s ambivalent attitudes toward the “new” immigration (391).

South Korea, a more recently industrialized democracy, can also be classified as ambivalent toward its new status as a country of immigration. For example, although South Korea has sanctions in place for undocumented workers and their employers,

...in practice the [South] Korean government mostly ignores the illegal hiring of foreign workers and usually does nothing to find or deport them. The law imposes a hefty fine (up to 10 million won) on employers of undocumented workers, but few employers pay any fine at all (Seol and Skrentny 2004: 502).

A characterization of engagement strategies that incorporates ambivalence can be better understood along three axes, as depicted in Figure 2. The ‘y’ axis of the diagram measures the level of ambivalence exhibited by the state ranging from ‘high’ to ‘low.’ This can also be thought of as the state’s willingness to expend resources for the purpose of engaging with migrants and refugees. The ‘x’ axis of the table measures the state’s goal, with exclusion on one end and incorporation on the other. States that want to keep migrants separate from membership in the state will pursue a more repressive strategy, while states that want to incorporate migrants will pursue a liberalizing strategy. Lastly,
the ‘z’ access of the diagram measures the level of democratic governance in the host state, ranging from ‘liberal’ on one end to ‘illiberal’ on the other.

*Figure 2: Three-Dimensional Engagement Typology*

What is not visible in this diagram is the backside of the three-dimensional typology, which depicts engagement options in illiberal host states. Figure 3 shows the backside of the typology in a two-dimensional format.

*Figure 3: Illiberal States and Engagement Options*
The upper left-hand quadrant contains countries that exhibit a low level of ambivalence and whose migration policies are aimed at excluding migrants from the host state society. Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Singapore are examples of this type of host state, where the rights, employment, and residency of migrants are highly controlled and policed. The upper right-hand quadrant depicts host states that exhibit a low level of ambivalence, but which enact policies that are aimed at including migrants and refugees in the host state. Conversely, the two lower quadrants depict states that are exhibiting high levels of ambivalence. The lower left-hand quadrant contains states that exhibit a high degree of ambivalence and have engagement strategies subtly aimed at excluding migrants and refugees from the host state (‘ambivalent exclusion’), while, the lower right-hand quadrant depicts countries that also display a high-degree of ambivalence but enact engagement strategies subtly aimed at including rather than excluding (‘ambivalent inclusion’).

By examining engagement according to these defined parameters, I will be able to classify each state as exhibiting a predominant strategy. Figure 4 describes the parameters of each strategy as an ideal type.

*Figure 4: Engagement Strategies by Measurement Type*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Residency &amp; Membership</th>
<th>Access to Services</th>
<th>Access to Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalizing</td>
<td>General access</td>
<td>Provided directly</td>
<td>Permitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressive</td>
<td>Highly regulated/Exclusionary</td>
<td>Not provided</td>
<td>No access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Short-term/Not regulated</td>
<td>Provided indirectly</td>
<td>Informal access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A liberalizing state will permit residency and membership (though perhaps not citizenship) for regular migrants and refugees because it aims to include these groups in the national system and permit their legal presence. The state may also provide
regularization processes for irregular migrants. Regarding services, the state will take primary responsibility for basic service provision (health, education for children, and possibly housing) and will provide these services directly, as opposed to leaving the responsibility up to international organizations or NGOs. Employment in the formal economy will be generally permitted and encouraged, as the state’s goal is to encourage migrants’ economic participation in the national system.

A repressive strategy will make it very difficult for migrants to obtain residency or membership, as its goal is to exclude them from participation in the national system, even if it meanwhile seeks gains from their labor. Similarly, the state will refrain from providing services to migrants or refugees, and will also make it difficult for international organizations or NGOs to provide them. Lastly, employment will not be permitted, and informal employment will be disallowed and strictly monitored.

An ambivalent strategy may make it difficult for migrants to obtain residency, but either (a) this only has mild implications because residency permits are not frequently checked by authorities, or (b) residency is permitted but only for a short period of time that requires permits to be frequently renewed. In regard to the residency of refugees, an ambivalent state will also leave the provision of documentation and status determination up to the UNHCR instead of handling it directly. An ambivalent host state will not provide services directly to migrants, but will allow the operation of international bodies and NGOs that provide services on its behalf. This alleviates the responsibility of the host state, while still ensuring that migrants and refugees are not excluded from basic services. Lastly, employment in the formal economy will not be permitted under most
circumstances, but employment in the informal economy will be widely pervasive and not highly policed.

A central difficulty in ascertaining the presence or absence of a certain strategy in each host state is measuring state intentions as opposed to actual policy or actions. If a state claims to be enacting a liberalizing strategy, but in reality very few services are offered, is this because the state is actually implementing an ambivalent or repressive strategy, or is this due to an implementation failure? Because my study is a contemporaneous analysis, I had the advantage of interviewing both state officials involved in policy processes as well as non-state actors. I thus used the data collected from interviews to differentiate between state actions and intentions. For example, if a state official claims that a specific intention guided a particular policy or action, I was able to triangulate this information with other data gained from non-state actors. By interviewing migrants and refugees I was able to learn whether a policy is actually in place and functioning as intended, and by interviewing intermediaries—international organizations, NGOs, and human rights groups—I was able to learn whether state officials had been forthcoming with their intentions behind the policy.

Another challenge is the difficulty of mixed policies: when one migrant or refugee group is targeted with a liberalizing policy while another is excluded from a service or treated with ambivalence. To account for differential treatment I examined policies toward migrants at the group-level (i.e. Syrians residing in Egypt, or Nigerians in Morocco). If I noted inconsistencies in state policies toward any group, I then conducted my analysis at the sub-group level for that specific group. In his historical analysis of state engagement with minorities in the Ottoman Empire, Mylonas (2012) acknowledges
that it may prove difficult to determine whether mixed policies are the result of, “...principle-agent and local implementation problems” (73), or the result of a state intentionally pursuing a mixed policy. Because I primarily used interviews as my data collection procedure as opposed to historical analysis, I was able to triangulate my data to tease out state intentions and to determine whether resulting policies or actions reflected these intentions.

2.3 Factors Influencing Engagement Policy Choice

What determines the type of engagement strategy that will be adopted by a specific state? There are several theories advanced in the literature on migration and citizenship for why: (1) a state chooses a relatively liberal or open strategy versus a relatively restrictive or closed one for admitting migrants or refugees onto its territory; and, (2) a state chooses inclusionary policies for bringing migrants or refugees into the national system versus excluding them. In this section I draw on both strands of literature to extract theories for policy choice regarding engagement, and to determine which explanations travel to the Global South context.

The first thesis, which is purported by Brubaker (1992) and previously mentioned in section 2.1, is the idea that the cultural foundations of nation-states act to restrain and bind a community through nationhood. While other scholars have since criticized Brubaker’s cultural embeddedness thesis as too rigid (Joppke 1999b), the general assertion that states possess institutional and cultural legacies that affect how they conceive of and treat migrants and non-citizens remains intact.

Second, the neoclassical political economy theory developed by Freeman (1995) asserts that migration and integration policy is determined by organized interests in a
given state. The more strongly a group’s interests are affected by immigration, the greater incentive it has to organize and lobby for the policies that it believes will be most beneficial. Consequently, employers and immigrant groups have incentives to lobby more intensively to promote a liberal immigration policy, whereas those negatively affected by the policy will have fewer incentives to lobby against it (Boswell 2007). However, a critique advanced by opponents of the political economy approach is that the state itself is merely a passive reactor to different interests (ibid).

Additionally, there are competing interests in the state, only some of which will favor open migration policies. Conversely, nationalist and ethnocentric groups may mobilize against the presence of immigrants or asylum-seekers, sometimes assisted by the mass media (Howard 2009). Yet Castles (2004) argues that while politicians may pay these groups lip service in the form of anti-immigration rhetoric, they will nonetheless pursue policies that lead to more immigration, as labor market and economic needs trump sensationalist concerns.

A third hypothesis, the neo-institutionalist approach purported by Hollifield (1992) and Joppke (1998) asserts that states adopt liberal migration policies when migrants are able to mobilize and capitalize on political opportunities. In this approach, state institutions like the judiciary, welfare bureaucracies or trade unions are instrumental in assisting and advancing the rights claims of migrants. In an examination of France, Switzerland and Germany, Miller (1981) asserts that migrant political advocacy in five spheres—homeland influence, extraparliamentary opposition, consultative institutions, industrial democracy, and civil society—led to a liberalization of migration-related policies.
A fourth theory, the postnationalist approach, asserts that the influence of international norms explains why states have converged in the ways they address migration. Postnationalists argue that because many non-citizen residents of Western states currently enjoy the same rights and privileges as citizens, human rights have become globally sanctioned norms that supersede the rights granted by nation-states (Soysal 1994). Sassen (2002) argues that it is becoming evident today that the institution of citizenship has multiple dimensions, only some of which are linked to the nation-state. Postnationalist norms take on a domestic presence through international organizations and international treaties and conventions that pressure states and domestic actors to adopt these norms. This process is also helped along by the actions of civil society or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that campaign against discrimination toward migrants.

However, the postnationalist argument has many critiques. Joppke (1999a) argues against Soysal (1994) and the postnationalists that human rights norms and obligations do not meet nation-states from the outside, but through internal governmental structures. According to Joppke, a more appropriate image is one of nation-states undergoing internal conflict between their human rights and popular sovereignty dimensions (1999a). In a similar vein, Hansen (2008) argues that it is possible to make the case that the content of citizenship is changing or offering more rights without making a postnational argument, as citizenship can change while still remaining anchored in the nation-state and serving as the single most important generator of rights. Lastly, through an examination of civic integration policies across Europe, Goodman (2012) acknowledges that while
convergence in citizenship regimes exists, citizenship requirements are variegated and contingent upon a country’s history with migration and past policies.

Fifth, security interests impact migration policy considerations and a state’s willingness to be open or closed, or accommodationist versus exclusionary. Rudolph (2003) argues that in the period following WWII Western states have become increasingly open to cross-border trade, yet cross-border migration imposes security risks on states that sometimes lead to, “…highly symbolic policies that present a strong image of control” (618). Even before 9-11, Western states were moving toward further restriction with policies that rolled back the rights of asylum-seekers or that made it more difficult for migrants to naturalize (Hollifield 2004). But Hollifield (2004) argues that for Western liberal democracies, the security-influenced desire to remain closed to migration or to enact restrictive policies toward migrants already within a country’s border is generally mitigated by the liberal tendencies embedded within constitutions.

In the end, however, it is the nature of the liberal state itself and the degree to which openness is institutionalized and (constitutionally) protected from the ‘majority of the moment’ that will determine whether states will continue to risk trade and migration (904).

States are limited in their ability to enact restrictive policies either by their economic need for further immigration (what Hollifield terms the ‘liberal paradox’) or by norms that are sanctified in constitutions and legislation that can be used by migrants and active judiciaries to counter exclusionary policies.

Lastly, international relations influence immigration policy at the diplomatic/economic level (Cornelius and Marc R. Rosenblum 2005). Meyers (2004) finds that receiving states tend to accept immigrants from specific countries in order to advance foreign policy goals, and that the impact of foreign policy considerations on
immigration policies is particularly strong in countries seeking leadership status. Rosenblum (2004) asserts that contrary to previously held assumptions that countries of the Global South have little say in the migration policy-making of Western receiving states, migration policies in the post-Cold War era are increasingly intermestic. As such, sending states may be able to employ migration as a foreign policy tool by linking cooperation on visa and residency access to other dimensions of bilateral relations, such as trade, investment, and security relations.

For Western democracies then, the primary factors influencing host state responses to migration are: (1) a host state’s cultural foundations and institutional unwillingness to adopt new policies (2) economic interests of domestic groups, (3) rights enshrined in domestic legislation that migrants can take advantage of with the assistance of judiciaries, (4) postnational human rights logic that is adopted domestically to the benefit of migrants, (5) a state’s security concerns, and (6) international relations that influence immigration policy at the diplomatic/economic level.

Yet with all these explanations, the backdrop of a liberal democratic state is assumed. If the classification of a state as a liberal-democratic regime is one of the central factors in explaining why and how states engage with migrants, then by definition we know very little about why states that are classified as illiberal (to varying degrees) choose to do so or not. Which of these explanations travel to the Global South context and are useful for understanding migration engagement strategy choices outside of Europe, North America and Australia?

As discussed in Section 2.1.1, there has been a rise of semi-authoritarian regimes globally. Many states have evolved into hybrid regimes that are neither fully democratic
nor fully authoritarian (Levitsky and Way 2002), where membership in the core power group is generally not determined by election but by family, economic and personal ties between core power group members (Olcott and Ottaway 1999). The backdrop of a semi-authoritarian state has important implications in terms of the explanations described earlier in this section, in particular the neo-institutionalist hypothesis. According to this theory, in Western states the principle of universalism, protected by constitutional norms and aggressive judiciaries willing to uphold those norms, helped migrants to gain rights, even as non-citizens (Joppke 1999b). Without accountability to citizens, constitutional norms and active judiciaries, and without an even application of law, the same mechanism that forced liberal regimes to provide rights to migrants is absent. The postnationalist hypothesis may also not apply to semi-authoritarian states if leaders fail to adopt or implement international treaties and conventions that pressure states and domestic actors to adopt liberal norms. Lastly, the neoclassical political economy theory may not apply if employers or organized interests hold little sway with semi-authoritarian leaders and are not able to push for more pro-immigrant policies.

However, it is conceivable that the same pressures—global human rights norms, international networks and funders that promote democracy, media and technological advancements—that prevent semi-authoritarian regimes from sliding completely into authoritarianism, could also compel states to engage with migrants in ways that they might not if they were fully authoritarian. Levitsky and Way (2002) identify four institutions in which contestation can occur in semi-authoritarian regimes—the electoral arena, the legislative arena, the judicial arena and the media—and the degree to which these institutions are contested varies across semi-authoritarian states. It is conceivable
that these institutions could also serve as access points for migrants, migrants-rights groups, or economic groups that are pro-migration to influence a state’s decisions regarding migrant and refugee engagement. Thus, it is possible that explanations derived from the experiences of Western states can travel to the Global South context, but it is unclear which explanations do so and to what extent.

2.4 Hypotheses

In this section I outline my hypotheses for why a Global South host country will employ each type of engagement strategy: ambivalence (DV1), liberalizing (DV2) or repressive (DV3). I also compare ambivalence to the policy option of ‘doing nothing’ (DV0), and address several alternative explanations that could conceivably account for host state policy choice.

*Figure 5: Dependent Variables*

\[ \text{DV}_0 \leftarrow \text{DV}_1 \rightarrow \text{DV}_2 \rightarrow \text{DV}_3 \]

\( \text{DV}_0 \): No Response
\( \text{DV}_1 \): Ambivalence
\( \text{DV}_2 \): Liberalizing
\( \text{DV}_3 \): Regressive

*DV1: Ambivalence*

**Hypothesis 1:** Global South host states will employ ambivalence when confronted with a growing migrant and refugee population because it constitutes the policy option requiring the least amount of institutional output.

An ambivalent strategy requires little effort on the part of the government. This is because when host states in the Global South appear incapable or are unwilling to manage migration and refugee matters themselves, international migration organizations
like the UNHCR and IOM, in addition to smaller migration-focused international NGOs, step in to provide services, conduct status determination procedures for refugees, or assist the host government in building its capacity (Barnett 2001; Jacobsen 2001). Liberalizing or repressive policies both require the use of state resources (financial allocations, manpower, and institutional knowledge) to either integrate a migrant or refugee population or to exclude these groups via policing. As such, ambivalence is comparatively cost-effective.

Ambivalence must also be differentiated from ‘doing nothing’ (DV₀), which would require even less effort than ambivalence. As mentioned in Section 2.1, an ambivalent policy requires that the government liaise with other actors—international migration bodies or NGOS—which step in to carry out engagement on the state’s behalf. Yet by virtue of operating in the host state, these international organizations also bring in international funding that translates into development assistance for the broader host state population. As such, a strategy of ambivalence is to the host state’s advantage.

Host states thus derive important benefits from a policy of ambivalence, including aid via international organizations as well as economic gains through migrant participation in the informal economy, remittances that are spent locally, and international credibility for (generally) refraining from the deportation of migrants and refugees. This explanation follows the same logic as the neoclassical political economy thesis, whereby domestic pressures—primarily economic—result in policies that are tolerant toward the presence of migrants and refugees. Ultimately, the benefits of hosting these groups outweigh any potential costs to local labor markets, public opinion or security concerns (as long as these remain relatively minimal).
**DV$_2$: Liberalizing**

The next two hypotheses deal with the factors that incentivize a host state to adopt a liberalizing policy. I argue that these factors are independently necessary and jointly sufficient.

**Hypothesis 2A: Global South host states will employ a liberalizing policy when doing so allows them to avoid international shaming or co-opt domestic civil society critics.**

This explanation requires a brief look at the function of civil society in illiberal host states in the Global South. While an active civil society is often linked with democratization and is assumed to provide checks against an authoritarian government (Durac 2015), Foley and Edwards (1996) argue that the role that organized groups in civil society play depends critically on the larger political setting. Where the state is unresponsive and its institutions illiberal, the parameters in which civil society actors can operate will be decidedly different than under a strong and democratic system (ibid).

Looking at MENA states in particular, Hawthorne (2004) cites several reasons for the ineffectiveness of civil society organizations: repression, precarious funding and weak management, and the fragmentation of civil society across the Arab world, which hinders the ability of these actors to unite groups of citizens around common goals in a way that might generate pressure on regimes. Hawthorne claims that while Arab leaders will often support service-oriented civil society groups, they see activist groups as adversaries: “Indeed, when Arab leaders boast of their countries’ burgeoning civil societies, as they often do, they are referring to service NGOs and similar organizations that are carrying out their own national development agenda” (12).

In fact, the increase in civil society activism in Arab states since the end of the Cold War may be seen as reflecting state-led processes of controlled political liberalization rather than the expression of autonomous associational activity on the part
of citizens (Durac 2015). In many regimes, civil society actors are co-opted by the state
in a corporatist civil society–state arrangement, thereby limiting their ability to defy the
regime (Deane 2013). By inviting civil society actors ‘to the table’ regarding the
implementation of reform processes and by undertaking periodic consultations with them,
the government reduces the risk of criticism that could hurt a state’s reputation
internationally. Vairel (2013) describes this process as the state “modifying its form of
domination” (47).

In the case of migration reform, a state facing pressure from activist civil society
groups (international NGOs, local NGOs or migrant community groups) may choose to
bring these actors ‘on board’ rather than allowing them to openly defy the state. They
may implement a liberalizing engagement strategy and invite civil society groups to
participate in the implementation of the policy in order to alleviate domestic pressure and
strengthen a regime’s stronghold over the issue of migration. In other words, by elevating
the importance of migration issues and bringing civil society actors on board, the regime
also co-opts civil society actors and limits their ability to defy the state.

This hypothesis is related to the neo-institutionalist and the post-nationalist
hypotheses, but with a realist twist that accounts for the differing political and
institutional context of the type of state in question. The state is responding to domestic
civil society actors that enact pressure (neo-institutionalism) and is incentivized to do so
because of potential international shaming regarding human rights norms (post-
nationalism), but is doing so as part of a strategic plan that allows the state to retain
control over an issue (in this case, migration).
However, the need to co-opt domestic critics on its own is not a sufficient condition for the enactment of a liberalizing strategy. I argue that a host state must also perceive tangible economic or diplomatic benefits in order to do so. In other words, hypothesis 2A is a necessary but not sufficient condition for liberalization.

*Hypothesis 2B: A Global South host state will enact a liberalizing strategy if doing so will reap economic or diplomatic benefits from either a powerful neighboring state or a geostrategically important sending state.*

This hypothesis is directly tied to the international relations hypothesis which asserts that host states can use migration policy as a bargaining chip to bolster their economic or diplomatic standing and project international influence (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). Rosenblum (2004) finds that states may be able to employ migration as a foreign policy tool by linking cooperation on visa and residency access to other dimensions of bilateral relations, such as trade, investment, and security relations. Using the same premise, I argue that Global South host states can use migration liberalization as a tool in bilateral negotiations.

In the case of MENA host states in particular, this tool can be directed toward the European Union and its member states. One mechanism for this is through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) framework, which governs the way that the EU approaches and hopes to influence the countries of its periphery. Established in 2003, the ENP aims to influence the political association and economic integration of neighboring countries through the fostering of ‘shared values,’ including rule of law, democracy, human rights and social cohesion. It consists of a series of bilateral agreements and regional frameworks through which the EU offers financial aid, market access and visa facilitations to neighboring countries in exchange for the conduct of domestic reforms in
the political, economic, and administrative spheres (Lavenex 2008). As mentioned in the previous chapter, external borders and migration controls have been a clear priority for the EU over the last several decades, and this priority is reflected in the bilateral agreements negotiated as part of the ENP (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).

Thus, if a Global South host state is willing to conform its policies to meet EU migration and asylum standards (i.e. employ a liberalizing strategy), this may mean potential accession or enhanced association for the host state. Importantly though, neighboring EU states are often framed as the reluctant objects of European migration strategies (Geddes 2005). I argue that MENA host states should rather be understood as strategic actors who make calculations about when and whether to comply with European demands regarding migration engagement and policy reform.

The use of migration policy as an instrument of influence can also be directed toward sending states. This is certainly true in the case of European receiving states and migrant source countries (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009), and I hypothesize that it is also the case for a Global South host state and its desire to influence the behavior of a country of origin. For example, a Global South host state may employ a liberalizing policy toward migrants or refugees residing on its territory in order to bolster economic or political relations with the source country of those migrant groups. In other words, if a Global South host state wishes to project influence toward a source country or region, then it must put on a welcoming face toward migrants who originate from there.

The mechanism at work in this hypothesis is derived from recent scholarship on sending state governance of diasporas abroad, which suggests that sending states are becoming less concerned with the circulation and return of migrants, and increasingly
focused on dispersion as a resource (Ragazzi 2009; Gamlen 2014). While for a Global South host state like those in MENA the goal of a liberalizing policy is related to geopolitical or economic influence, the goal for sending states is the ease with which their migrants can work, travel back and forth, and “…act as ‘lobbyists’ and extensions of the state’s foreign policy” (Ragazzi 2009; 390). As such, source countries may also benefit from a liberalizing policy in a Global South host state and may be willing to negotiate economic or political deals.

I argue that like hypothesis 2A, hypothesis 2B is a necessary condition for a Global South host state to enact a liberalizing policy, and that together these two factors are sufficient.

**DV$_3$: Repressive**

A third set of hypotheses deal with the factors that incentivize a host state to adopt a repressive policy. I argue that these factors are independently sufficient.

**Hypothesis 3A: Global South host states will employ a repressive strategy when security concerns trump the economic benefits of employing an ambivalent strategy.**

This hypothesis directly relates to the security interest explanation derived from existing literature, in which a host state enacts restrictive policies toward migrants or refugees due to security concerns. Security concerns might include terrorism, sectarian tensions, or domestic unrest (Weiner 1992). In such situations, minority groups, including migrants and refugees, may be seen as possible collaborators with neighboring enemies or terrorists, particularly in cases where the minority is related to a neighboring state by ethnicity or religion, or where a minority is found on both sides of an international border (Mamdani 2002). Under these conditions, the relationship between a host state and
migrants or refugees is likely to become securitized, and a state may choose to enact a repressive policy that aims to exclude or force out migrants from the host state.

Yet enacting this type of strategy requires a high level of institutional investment in order to transition from ambivalence. A host state also risks losing the economic and diplomatic gains derived from ambivalence: primarily, aid via international organizations and international credibility for refraining from deportations. As such, a Global South host state will only employ this type of strategy if the security risk poses a grave enough threat to domestic stability. This factor is sufficient for a state to enact a repressive policy.

**Hypothesis 3B:** Global South host states will employ a repressive strategy when the investment in doing so is offset by economic or diplomatic benefits derived from agreements with a powerful neighboring state.

This hypothesis is related to hypothesis 2B. In both situations, a Global South host state is willing to invest the necessary resources in implementing a high-output policy because of perceived international relations gains, yet in this case the policy is repressive instead of liberalizing (e.g. it has the opposite effect). While in hypothesis 2B the pressure emanating from European countries leads a host state to enact a liberalizing policy, pressure from the EU can also lead to a repressive strategy if the negotiations are solely concerned with migration control and deterrence.

As part of its effort to prevent irregular migration, European governments have been pressuring neighboring Eastern European, Balkan and North African countries to bolster border security in order to curb illegal migration over the last two decades. In many instances, neighboring countries have been compelled to adopt enhanced migration control measures, usually in exchange for increased trade or the loosening of visa
requirements for nationals of neighboring countries. While there has been much variation in the types of partnerships and agreements concluded with neighboring host states, Tokuzlu (2010) groups the ‘carrots’ that Europe uses into four categories: development cooperation (i.e. development aid), economic cooperation, neighborhood association with the EU, or acceptance into the framework of EU enlargement (i.e. accession). The domestic effects of this pressure also vary, but in many cases European policies have led to increased policing, raids on neighborhoods known to host migrants or refugees, and in some cases, deportations from the host state (Geddes 2005).

However, the internal policing and border control measures required by a repressive policy involve a high level of exertion on the part of the Global South host state, and it risks international reputational costs if it carries out deportations at high rates. As such, a state will only pursue this type of repressive policy if the benefits it derives (i.e. aid, economic cooperation, or political association) offset the potential costs. Like hypothesis 3A, this factor is sufficient for a Global South host state to enact a repressive strategy.

2.5 Alternate Explanations

Before evaluating these hypotheses, I need to account for several alternative explanations that could conceivably explain why a host state enacts a certain strategy toward migrants and refugees on its territory. In turn, these alternative hypotheses consider demographic, institutional and cultural aspects of the host states in question.

One possible argument has to do with the size of the migrant population. Perhaps host states in the Global South only decide to enact a liberalizing or repressive strategy once the size of the migrant population has reached a critical capacity. Otherwise, these
groups ‘fly under the government’s radar,’ and the state does not react to them (DV$_0$ or ‘doing nothing’). The absence of a reaction could be interpreted as indifference or unawareness instead of strategic ambivalence. To account for this possible explanation, I trace the population dynamics of the migrant and refugee population over time in each of the host countries examined in this study. If this explanation is correct, there should be a strong correlation between the size of the migrant or refugee population and the host state enacting a high-output strategy (liberalizing or repressive). The host state government should also be unaware of the migrant and refugee population until it reaches a certain demographic size.

A second argument deals with the institutional capacity of the host state. As discussed in Chapter 1, this line of reasoning asserts that states with low or minimal capacity are unable to enact a liberalizing or repressive strategy, and instead resort to ambivalence (Betts 2010a; Hollifield 2004). Only when states gain more capacity are they able to enact a policy that requires greater institutional output. While acknowledging this line of reasoning, I argue in this dissertation that state capacity is not simply an empirical reality related to the GDP or administrative functionality of the host state. Instead, states make decisions about whether to allot resources for the purpose of engaging migrant and refugee populations based on calculations about the incentives involved.

A final alternative explanation is derived from the cultural embeddedness hypothesis purported by Brubaker (1992), which claims that a host state’s cultural foundations influence its migrant engagement strategy choice. In the case of MENA states, the most influential cultural legacies are likely to be: Islam, former rule under the
Ottoman Empire, and notions of pan-Arabism (Abu-Sahlieh 1996). This could mean that co-ethnic migrants from other Arab states or co-religious migrants who are also Muslim would be given preferential treatment by host states in the region. For example, some Arab countries give preference in terms of naturalization to those who adhere to Islam, and some, such as Egypt, provide special rules for co-ethnics, or other Arabs (Parolin 2009). According to this explanation, a Global South host state will enact a liberal strategy if the demographic composition of the migrant or refugee groups on its territory is primarily composed of co-ethnic or co-religious individuals, and an ambivalent or repressive strategy if not. As noted earlier in this chapter, I will account for this explanation by examining policies toward migrants in each country at the group-level (i.e. Syrians residing in Egypt, or Nigerians in Morocco) to take note of whether host state strategies vary by the religious or ethnic background of migrants and refugees.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter defined what it means for a state to engage with citizens, as well as what it means for a host state to engage with migrant and refugee populations residing on its territory. It differentiated between the state engagement that we are likely to see in liberal democracies, versus engagement in illiberal regimes in the Global South. It also proposed the idea of ambivalence as an engagement strategy, and developed a typology encompassing the engagement strategies available to both democracies and non-democracies, composed of a liberalizing, repressive and ambivalent strategy. It then reviewed the extant literature for factors that explain why a host state chooses one engagement strategy over another, and assessed the extent to which these explanations

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6 For an overview of the lasting influence of the Ottoman millet system on the conception of minorities and minority rights in the Middle East, see Kymlicka and Pföstl (2014).
travel to the Global South context. Last, it offered three hypotheses for why Global South host states employ a liberalizing, repressive or ambivalent strategy as opposed to ‘doing nothing,’ and also considered several alternative explanations.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine the engagement strategy choices of Egypt, Morocco and Turkey over time, and use empirical evidence to assess each hypothesis and alternative explanation. Chapter 7 will focus on the cultural embeddedness alternative explanation in particular. But first, Chapter 3 further explains the case selection of Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, and the process of collecting and analyzing the data that will be used throughout the rest of this dissertation.
Chapter 3: Methods, Data and Analysis

This chapter describes the mixed-methods approach that I use in order to address the questions: Why do host states in the Global South permit migrants and refugees to remain indefinitely, and what determines whether host states treat them inclusively, exclusively or with ambivalence? In the following sections I address three methodological components of this study: case selection, data collection, and data analysis, both qualitative and quantitative.

3.1 Case Selection

To examine when and why Global South host states select certain engagement strategies, I employ a qualitative case study analysis (George and Bennett 2005). I selected three cases, all of which are from the Middle East and North Africa, which is sometimes also referred to as the South and Eastern Mediterranean region in the academic and policy literature on migration. Geographically, this region is of special interest because it is immediately affected by Europe’s increased border securitization over the last two and a half decades as well as conflict-generated migration, leading to increased patterns of migrant and refugee settlement (Fargues 2009).

In considering possible cases for the study, I made decisions based on both exclusion criteria and inclusion criteria. Beginning with exclusionary factors, I removed Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and Yemen due to their inaccessibility and/or dangerous domestic situations at present. I also chose to exclude all countries that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) since these oil-rich states operate a specific migrant recruitment scheme—the
*kafala* program—that makes them highly dissimilar from other states regarding migration (Ruhs 2013).

Additionally, I chose to exclude countries that host large numbers of Palestinian refugees (Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel/the Palestinian Territories) since topics of migration, refugee-status and citizenship in these states are dominated by controversy surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Tetreault 2000). While undeniably a prominent issue for politics in the region, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the focus of this study. I also wanted to focus on a specific type of country: transit-turned-host states. Because Jordan and Lebanon have been hosting refugees of various nationalities since the 1950s, they do not fit this category.

After these exclusions, I was left with five possible cases: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. At this point I considered two primary factors for inclusion. I wanted to include countries that maximize variation on the outcome variable, and that also maximize geographic variation within the selected MENA region. Ultimately I selected three of these countries—Egypt, Morocco and Turkey.

Egypt, Morocco and Turkey are all major receivers of migrants and refugees and have each signed treaties and conventions relating to the protection of refugees and migrants (both legal and illegal) on their territories, including the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. All three countries also have a moderate to strong presence of international organizations and NGOs working on human rights and migration issues, but they vary in terms of their official engagement outcomes with migrants and refugees, thus constituting a diverse set.

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7 Though Turkey holds geographical limitations to the Convention.
of cases (Gerring 2006). Additionally, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey are all transit-turned-host countries along three different but popular migration routes leading to Europe, as illustrated in Figure 6.

*Figure 6: Mediterranean Irregular Migration Routes*

**Mediterranean Sea Route**

*Source: National Geographic (2015)*

### 3.2 Data Collection

Data collection for this dissertation began in July 2012 with preliminary fieldwork in Cairo, Egypt. This is when I first established interview contacts and began formulating
my research question. Preliminary research continued according to the following schedule:

*July 2012-March 2013*: Cairo, Egypt  
*August-September 2013*: Rabat and Casablanca, Morocco  
*July-August 2014*: Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey

The purpose of preliminary research was to gather initial contacts and determine whether each country constituted a strong case for the purpose of my research question.

In Egypt my introduction to the migrant and refugee protection sector began with my affiliation at the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS) at the American University in Cairo. The center has operated in Cairo for over twenty years and is connected to a network of migrant and refugee NGOs and CBOs. In Morocco my initial point of contact was the Moroccan Association for Human Rights, known primarily by the French acronym AMDH, and a second point of entry was an individual migrant affiliated with the *Counsel des Immigrants*. In Turkey my point of entry was an affiliation at the Center for Migration Research at Istanbul Bilgi University. The center is connected to a network of migration-focused NGOs that operate in Istanbul, and that are in turn connected to migrants and refugees of various nationalities.

Once I finished preliminary research, decided definitively on my case selection, and received IRB approval for my study, my official dissertation research began in September 2014 and proceeded according to the following schedule:

*September-December 2014*: Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt  
*January-April 2015*: Rabat, Tangier, Casablanca and Oujda, Morocco  
*May-June 2015*: Istanbul, Ankara and Gaziantep, Turkey

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8 IRB approval was obtained for this study on September 12, 2014 (HS# 2014-1407, e-APP# 8295).
In total I conducted 131 semi-structured interviews during this period using a two-tiered system. First, interviews were conducted with elite interview subjects, including relevant government ministries, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), local NGOs, and international migration bodies like the UNHCR and the IOM. Elite interview subjects were asked a predetermined list of questions about their role in engagement with migrants and refugees in the host state and, if applicable, how their organization interacts with the host state government. But because interviews were semi-structured, I also allowed interview subjects to elaborate on questions or to go off on tangents, and asked follow-up questions when appropriate. Often non-scripted questions revealed important factors I had not considered when designing my interview questionnaire, thus leading to potential new variables or themes. In total, I conducted 53 elite interviews, and a full list of elite interview subjects is available in the Interview Methods Table in Appendix A.

In addition to elites, I also conducted interviews with individual migrants and refugees in order to understand if and how interaction occurs between these individuals and state institutions or authorities. My initial point of contact for migrant and refugee interview subjects was often a leader of a community-based migrant organization (CBO). CBOs are run by migrants and refugees themselves and often have a democratically-elected, rotating president. Using these initial points of contact, I asked to be referred to other migrant and refugee interview subjects. In order to avoid a biased sample of migrants or refugees who are organizationally affiliated with CBOs or NGOs, and are thus more politically and socially active, I used snowball sampling to gain multiple entry points to migrants and refugees who are not affiliated with community organizations. Often this would entail asking to meet a friend or family member of someone I had
already spoken with. Other times I frequented coffee shops or restaurants in neighborhoods with large populations of migrants and established a rapport with a particular migrant or refugee employee, eventually asking them if they would agree to be interviewed.

I attempted to make my sample of migrant/refugee interview subjects as diverse as possible in terms of nationality, gender, age, and years spent in the host state. While I cannot say that my sample is a statically accurate representation of the migrant/refugee population in each country, I did my best to approximate representativeness. Table 1 contains the most recently available number of asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants in each host country and compares it to the number of interview subjects of each nationality included in my study.
### Table 1: Asylum-Seekers, Refugees and Migrants by Nationality and Host State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Asylum-Seekers(^a)</th>
<th>Refugees(^a)</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Estimated Total</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
<th>My Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>38.03%</td>
<td>18.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan/South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>32.59%</td>
<td>54.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,664</td>
<td>7,664</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.08%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>1,625</td>
<td>3,157</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.86%</td>
<td>18.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.79%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>79,600</td>
<td>86,300</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.44%</td>
<td>6.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,927</td>
<td>4,217(^c)</td>
<td>7144</td>
<td>29.22%</td>
<td>5.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,188</td>
<td>6188</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.30%</td>
<td>23.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote D'Ivoire</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>1,467(^c)</td>
<td>2056</td>
<td>8.41%</td>
<td>10.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,833(^c)</td>
<td>1,833</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.50%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1,329(^c)</td>
<td>1,797</td>
<td>7.35%</td>
<td>7.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>215</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,352(^c)</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>6.41%</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>410</td>
<td></td>
<td>894(^c)</td>
<td>1,304</td>
<td>5.33%</td>
<td>15.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,100(^c)</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>5.01%</td>
<td>7.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td>779(^c)</td>
<td>779</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.19%</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2,287,360</td>
<td>2,287,360</td>
<td>90.65%</td>
<td></td>
<td>66.67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>95,631</td>
<td>23,098</td>
<td></td>
<td>118,729</td>
<td>4.71%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>85,640</td>
<td>4,127</td>
<td>89,767</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.56%</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>18,362</td>
<td>5,097</td>
<td>23,459</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.93%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,735</td>
<td>2,370</td>
<td>4,105</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) Factsheets.  
\(^b\) Grabska 2006.  
\(^c\) GADEM 2014.

The number of asylum-seekers and refugees is taken from publically available UNHCR figures, while the number of migrants in each state is compiled from various sources. For
a number of reasons,\(^9\) it is difficult to know the exact number of migrants in each host state and these figures are understood to be best estimates. In total I conducted 80 migrant/refugee interviews: 33 interviews in Egypt, 38 interviews in Morocco, and 9 interviews in Turkey.\(^{10}\) Further information on migrant/refugee interview subjects’ nationalities and backgrounds will be presented in Chapter 7.

Migrant and refugee interview subjects were asked about how they navigate life in the host state on a day-to-day basis: whether they are able to access certain services or employment, whether they are subject to discrimination, and how they interact with organizations and state authorities. I used a set list of questions to guide my interviews, but also let migrants and refugees tell me about additional topics that are not directly related to my research question, such as the journey from their home country to the host state. While elite interviews generally lasted between 45 minutes and one hour, migrant/refugee interviews were as short as 20 minutes and as long as four hours.

In order to protect interview subject confidentiality, I took several precautions. Elite interview subjects in this project were given the option to remain deidentified. For those elite interview subjects who chose to have their identities made available, all names and affiliations are made explicit in the Interview Methods Table in Appendix A. However, for elite level-interview subjects who chose to remain deidentified, I have removed some information in order to protect the individual’s privacy. For referencing

\(^9\) It is difficult to estimate the number of irregular migrants residing in a host state because these individuals are unlikely to be registered with the government or an international migration body. Furthermore, it is difficult to approximate a migrant stock when this number may is likely in flux due to new arrivals and frequent departures from the host state.

\(^{10}\) The amount of migrant/refugee interviews I was able to collect in Turkey was fewer due to time restraints. I had less than half the time to conduct research in Turkey as compared to Egypt and Morocco.
ease, each elite interview subject is assigned a codename (i.e. Elite Interviewee A) that will be used throughout this dissertation.

Migrant/refugee-level interviews were automatically deidentified. Because migrants and refugees are considered to be vulnerable interview subjects according to IRB protocol, all migrant and refugee interview subjects have been assigned a code name (i.e. Syrian Migrant A, Ethiopian Migrant C). This is especially important in the case of those individuals who do not have official refugee or other legal status in the host state. For a summary of migrant and refugee background characteristics, see Appendix B.

If interview subjects allowed it, I created an audio recording of the interview. If an interview subject preferred not to be recorded, I took notes during the interview and transcribed the interview subjects’ responses immediately upon conclusion of the meeting. Interviews occurred in a variety of locations. I generally met elite interview subjects at their office and the setting tended to be fairly formal. In contrast, migrant and refugee interviews were generally informal. While I did meet some individuals at their place of employment, especially if they worked at a migration-related NGO, I more often met individuals at coffee or juice shops. Other times I was invited into someone’s home and the interview took place while members of their family were also present.

In addition to recording the interviews themselves, I also took meticulous fieldnotes during the data collection process, totaling approximately 200 pages. This is where I noted factors such as the interview subject’s mood or composure during the interview, any comments before or after the interview that were relevant for my research, as well as how I initially got in touch with the interview subject.
Most elite interviews were conducted in English, though some were conducted in Arabic, or a combination of Arabic, French and English. In the case of two elite interviews in Morocco that were conducted in a combination of French and Moroccan Arabic, I employed the assistance of a Moroccan interpreter. In Egypt, most migrant and refugee interviews were conducted in Arabic, though some were conducted in English or a combination of English and Arabic with intermittent switching throughout the interview. In Morocco, most interviews were conducted in either French or English, or a combination of the two. In the case of six migrant/refugee interviews, specifically those conducted with well-known migrant community leaders, I used the assistance of a Moroccan interpreter who helped me translate questions from English to French if needed, and also helped interpret the respondent’s answers. In Turkey I conducted elite and migrant/refugee interviews in Arabic, French or English, and did not require the assistance of an interpreter.

3.3 Qualitative Data Analysis

Upon concluding my fieldwork and returning to my home university in July 2015, I transcribed and translated (when necessary) all audio-recorded interviews. I also deidentified any confidential data and prepared the transcripts for uploading into a CAQDAS program (Atlas.ti). Once all interviews were transcribed and interview subjects deidentified if appropriate, I selected nine elite interview transcripts to use as a basis for developing a codebook (three from each country).\(^{11}\) I chose to use an inductive approach in order to allow the interview subjects to ‘speak’ when identifying themes. For a list of questionnaires used and to better understand the process for constructing themes, see

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\(^{11}\) According to a calculation of average quotations per interview, the selected nine transcripts constituted approximately twenty per cent of total elite interview quotations.
Appendix C. Using one interview transcript from each case (Egypt, Morocco and Turkey) and the assistance of Atlas.ti, I began a process of open-coding by selecting all relevant quotations from each interview subject’s responses. The only quotations not included were those that did not relate in any way to the research topic.

After I developed an initial list of codes, I sorted them into overarching themes using Atlas.ti’s code manager and grouping function. I then tested the codes on another set of transcripts—two more from each case country—and fixed any problems that arose with regard to the codes, primarily to ensure that the codes did not overlap and that all concepts were represented in the codebook. Once I had a fully developed codebook with a list of thirty-nine codes, I created a list of inclusion and exclusion criteria for each code.

The next step in developing the codebook involved two checks for intercoder reliability. First, I sent the codebook to an established academic in the field of refugee and migration policy. This individual examined the codebook and provided feedback on the validity of the concepts. After some changes to the definitions of the codes based on these recommendations, I enlisted the assistance of two undergraduate research assistants at the University of California, Irvine. Using Atlas.ti, these two assistants were given the refined codebook and asked to code the same nine transcripts using the codebook’s definitions and list of inclusion and exclusion criteria. The students used transcripts that had all quotations highlighted, but for which the linked codes had been removed. After the students re-coded the texts using the codebook, their coding was compared to mine and assessed for intercoder reliability. According to Bernard and Ryan (2010), an agreement of eighty per cent or higher is accepted as strong agreement or high intercoder
reliability. We did not reach the agreement threshold on the first try, but after redefining certain problematic codes we were able to bring our score up to eighty-nine per cent, which is within the acceptable range for establishing inter-coder reliability. As lead researcher, I resolved any remaining coding discrepancies myself.

In total the training and coding process took four months, and resulted in 1,379 segments of coded text. Upon conclusion of the coding, I used Atlas.ti’s ‘network’ function to fit the codes, or sub-themes, into one of three categories: a traditional measurement of engagement, a non-traditional measurement of engagement, or a causal factor influencing engagement strategy choice. The codebook as divided into these three categories is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Codebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalizing</td>
<td>Access to government provided education</td>
<td>Migrant or refugee children able to access the host country's public primary education system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to government provided health care</td>
<td>Migrants and refugees are able to access the host country's public health care system without paying or paying a minimal fee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General access to residency</td>
<td>Migrants and refugees have access to legal residency. The state may also provide regularization processes for irregular migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to formal employment</td>
<td>Migrants with legal status and refugees able to participate in the formal economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Measurements of Engagement</td>
<td>No access to education</td>
<td>Migrant and refugee children are not able to access education in the host state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No access to health care</td>
<td>Migrants and refugees are not able to access health care or are only able to access expensive private health care.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residency highly-regulated &amp; exclusionary</td>
<td>It is very difficult migrants and refugees to obtain residency and legal status is highly policed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No access to employment</td>
<td>Migrants and refugees are not able to access any employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressive</td>
<td>Access to civil society provided education</td>
<td>Migrant or refugee children able to access schooling that is provided by or paid for by international or local NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Access to civil</td>
<td>Migrants and refugees are able to access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>Measurement</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalizing</td>
<td>Change in government mentality</td>
<td>Mention of the mentality or ‘thinking’ of government in regards to migrants and refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalizing</td>
<td>Government and civil society cooperation</td>
<td>Whether the host government is willing to meet with and listen to the demands of civil society. The process of putting migration-related laws in place, as opposed to relying on informal practice or policy in regards to migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressive</td>
<td>Absence of support</td>
<td>The absence of support, from either the host state government or civil society organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressive</td>
<td>Inability for civil society actors to carry out work</td>
<td>Mention of the host state government making it difficult for civil society actors to carry out their work in either an official or unofficial capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressive</td>
<td>Migrant/refugee fear of host state government</td>
<td>Migrants and refugees refraining from organizing or conducting political activity due to fear of repercussions in the host state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Civil society acting without any government support</td>
<td>Organizations from civil society starting initiatives without any government assistance or support, or with the government turning a blind eye to these activities. Civil society includes both international and national actors. If the host government or any government ministry has directly funded a civil society organization or community group to provide services or assistance for migrants or refugees on its behalf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Government outsourcing to organizations</td>
<td>If there are no laws in place regarding an aspect of migration governance, and government or civil society actors must act informally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Informality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for Strategy Choice</td>
<td>Differential treatment by nationality</td>
<td>Whether migrants/refugees receive treatment or access to services according to their nationality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Embeddedness</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political Economy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host state culture and ethnic relations</td>
<td>De facto Integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of religion</td>
<td>Economic benefits of migration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host state “culture” or the country’s history of ethnic relations is said to be related to the current treatment of migrants and refugees. This could include the presence of multiple cultures, multiple groups, multiple nations, or mention of historical ethnic tensions in the host state.</td>
<td>Whether migrants or refugees are considered integrated in a de facto economic sense.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If religion (Islam, Christianity, etc.) is said to influence responses to migrants and refugees in the host state.</td>
<td>Whether migration is said to benefit the host society economically.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Economy</th>
<th><strong>Neoinstitutionalist</strong></th>
<th><strong>Postnationalist</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International funding for migration/refugee programs</td>
<td>Migrant/refugee advocacy directed at the government</td>
<td>Civil society being critical of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whether international funding is used to support the hosting of refugees or migrants, and whether this funding is transferred directly to the host country or via international agencies like the UNHCR or IOM.</td>
<td>If migrants and refugees have focused political activity — advocacy or protests — on the host state government or police.</td>
<td>Criticism from civil society actors in regards to the treatment of migrants and refugees. This is more forceful than merely providing recommendations. Civil society includes both international and national actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrant/refugee advocacy directed at the UNHCR</td>
<td>If efforts from civil society have led to changes in official or unofficial migration policy. Civil society includes both international and national actors. References to international human rights values and their influence on policies or practices in the host state in regards to migration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security/ Politicization</th>
<th><strong>Postnationalist</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Securitization of migration</td>
<td>Civil-society led reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considering the issue of migration in relation to security; both security at the host state's border or domestic security.</td>
<td>International human rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Politicization of migration

Whether the topic of migration or refugees has become politicized and taken up at the government-level by bureaucrats, politicians, or the media. Policitized means that the issue of migration has become a political issue, as a result of deliberate action or otherwise, whereby people become politically active over that issue. Mention of xenophobia (fear of foreigners) as an explanation for the treatment of migrants or refugees, or tensions between the host population and migrants/refugees.

Xenophobia and tensions with the host population

Mention of xenophobia (fear of foreigners) as an explanation for the treatment of migrants or refugees, or tensions between the host population and migrants/refugees.

Influence of Europe

Influence of the EU or any particular European country on the policies or practices of the host state in regards to migration.

Knowledge diffusion of migration practices

Policy learning between migrant host countries, or the transfer of knowledge between governments and/or international migration actors.

Using migration to project influence

Mention of the host state using migration to project influence, either toward Africa/the Middle East (i.e. sending countries) or toward Europe.

3.4 Quantitative Data Analysis

I also employed the assistance of undergraduate research assistants in creating a quantitative dataset from the information contained in the 80 migrant/refugee interviews. The primary purpose in creating a quantitative dataset was to look for patterns between characteristics of migrants/refugees and experiences or treatment in the host state. The characteristics included in the dataset are: nationality, number of years residing in the host state, whether the individual is employed and in what type of sector, whether the individual has a legal status in the host state, and whether the individual is a refugee versus a migrant (according to the UNHCR or host state government). The host state experiences or treatment include the following topics:

- Whether the individual has been able to access a hospital, and whether they had assistance in paying for this service;
• Whether the individual has children in the host state, whether their children are able to attend school, and whether they receive assistance;
• Whether the individual thinks that migrants/refugees are targeted by host state authorities;
• Whether the individual has ever had trouble with host state authorities;
• Whether certain migrant/refugee nationalities are privileged over others in the host state and if so, which groups;
• Whether the individual has ever participated in political advocacy in the host state and if so, what kind of advocacy;

In certain interview transcripts, the answers to these questions were incomplete. For example, an individual may have told me that they had gone to a hospital, but they did not inform me whether or not they received assistance for their visit or from what source (the government, an NGO, or family members). In this case I instructed my research assistants to code this lack of information as missing data.

Another difficulty arose in the case of migrants/refugees who were politically active and involved with migrant-community organizations. Often these individuals would answer my interview questions on behalf of their community, speaking about collective experiences instead of their own individual experience. The benefit to extracting both qualitative and quantitative data from the interviews is that collective experiences were captured via coding, while the quantitative data is concerned primarily with individual experiences. As such, if an individual failed to answer questions based on his or her own individual experiences, this information was coded as missing for the purpose of the quantitative dataset.

Once complete, I used SPSS to explore and analyze my quantitative data, primarily through frequency tables and cross-tabulations. The results of this analysis are presented in Chapter 6.

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12 One exception is a question that asks about host state police targeting of migrants/refugees in a general sense.
3.5 Conclusion

This chapter covered three methodological topics: case selection, data collection, and qualitative and quantitative data analysis. The results of the qualitative data analysis will be used in Chapters 5 and 6 to identify the type of engagement strategy present in each host state and the reasons for change in strategy over time. The quantitative data will be used specifically in Chapter 7 to explore migrant and refugee experiences in each host state and how this varies according to characteristics such as nationality, number of years in the host state, or legal status.

In the next chapter I examine the migration histories of each state through demographics, law, and policy, and explore each state’s changing role from transit country to host state.
Chapter 4: Demographic Shifts and Political Developments in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey

While Egypt, Morocco and Turkey have long histories as countries of immigration and settlement, they have been ignored as migrant-receivers in both academic scholarship and global migration policy discourse. Instead, they are most often treated as countries of *emigration*, since large proportions of their nationals have been emigrating to Europe, North America and elsewhere for several decades. This chapter examines the demographics of migration patterns to Egypt, Morocco and Turkey in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, as well as pertinent political developments during this time period.\(^\text{13}\)

4.1 Egypt

Egypt has long been a melting pot of immigrants, though since the 1980s it has primarily been considered a country of emigration in the academic and policy literature. For example, Egypt has an ancient and intertwined history with the geographic area now covered by Sudan and South Sudan, and up until 1994 Sudanese nationals enjoyed relative ease of travel to and residence in Egypt. Additionally, Greeks resided in Egypt from the Hellenistic period until many were forced to leave after the 1952 revolution that overthrew the monarchy and established a republic. Immigrants that would now be referred to as refugees also fled to Egypt after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, the Armenian massacres in Turkey in the 1920s, as well as during both World Wars (Zohry 2003). Numerous African nationalist politicians or their families—notably those

\(^{13}\) I demarcate this time period as significant because Western states have enacted a series of progressively restrictive migration controls since the end of the Cold War (Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014) leading to the build-up of stocks of migrants and refugees in ‘buffer’ states, such as those considered in this study.
of Kwame Nkrumah and Patrice Lumumba—also found sanctuary in Egypt during the 1960s (ibid).

Yet since the end of the Cold War, Egypt has seen specific and new forms of immigration. Migrant groups from the Horn of Africa—Sudanese refugees and migrants in particular—have been predominant in Egypt since the 1990s (Kagan 2002). Continuing conflict in the region and the Arab Spring has also caused a sudden, intermittent rise in the number of migrants and refugees from Iraq, then Libya, and most recently Syria arriving in Egypt. The actual number of both migrants and refugees residing in Egypt is uncertain, and the number of refugees who officially register with the UNHCR is acknowledged to be only a fraction of the actual total. For example, though only 12,000 Sudanese asylum-seekers are officially registered with the UNHCR as of December 2015, the actual number of Sudanese migrants residing in the country is estimated to be in the several tens of thousands (Grabska 2006). Additionally, while the UNHCR had registered 250,000 Syrians in late 2014 at the time of interviewing for this project, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated that 100,000 Syrians remained unregistered yet residing in the country (Elite Interviewee AV).

The vast majority of refugees and migrants reside in Cairo, though other coastal cities such as Alexandria have become popular locations for migrants and refugees hoping to be smuggled to Europe by boat, and for Syrian refugees due to historical connections between Syrian and Egyptian merchants in the area. An important element that makes Cairo an attractive destination for refugees is the existence of a large resettlement program, both through the UNHCR presence as well as private sponsorship programs to Canada, Australia, and the United States (Grabska 2006). International
organizations have expressed concern that the existence of generous resettlement opportunities might be acting as a pull factor that draws asylum-seekers to Egypt in increasing numbers (Sperl 2001). While the system may constitute a pull factor for those hoping to be resettled, the number of resettled refugees is quite small: an average of only 3,000 per year (Kagan 2011). Due to this pattern of high inflow and low outflow, Cairo, and increasingly other cities in Egypt, hosts a sizeable urban migrant and refugee population.

Cairo’s economy is also an attraction for migrants from the Horn of Africa. As the director of one of the fifty-seven refugee schools located in Cairo explained, “They come to Egypt because it’s a big city, a big economy. Maybe eventually they’d like to go elsewhere, but in comparison to African countries, Egypt looks pretty good” (Elite Interviewee R). As acknowledged in Chapter 1, the distinction between refugees and migrants is not always very clear. In the Egyptian case in particular, those arriving and applying for refugee status from the UNHCR are given a ‘yellow card’ which connotes that they are asylum-seekers and under temporary protection until they undergo refugee-status determination (RSD). At the time of interviewing for this research in 2014, RSD interviews dates were being given to asylum-seekers for 2019, meaning that would-be refugees have to wait five years before receiving official status. As such, it is to any migrant’s benefit, even if they suspect they will not qualify as a refugee, to apply for refugee status and to receive temporary protection benefits for up to five years (Elite Interviewee Q).

Patterns of migration and resulting implications for host state engagement should be considered against changing political dynamics in Egypt, particularly in the 1990s and
2000s. Former President Hosni Mubarak came to power in Egypt in 1980 after the assassination of former President Anwar Sadat. After being elected Mubarak renewed the state of emergency under which Egypt had been ruled on and off since the 1950s, suspending many safeguards for civil liberties and human rights that had been provided in the 1971 constitution (Dunne and Hamzawy 2008). The 1990s saw the rise of increasingly violent Islamist opposition groups that were opposed to the regime, and Mubarak took steps via the 1993 Syndicate Law, the 1995 Press law and the 1999 Nongovernmental Associations Law to curtail freedom of expression and association in order to prevent these groups, and other non-Islamist opposition groups, from gaining influence or power (ibid).

However, Mubarak’s party, the National Democratic Party (NDP or al hizb al watanny), underwent reforms in 2000 after a poor performance in the parliamentary elections. Yet it still failed in 2005 to convince the electorate that it was more than, “a tool for recruiting support for the regime” (Dunne and Hamzawy 2008; 95), and continued to rely on cronyism in securing its representation in the Egyptian parliament (ibid). Opposition groups used the changing political environment between 2000 and 2005 to become more organized and outspoken, including both the leading Islamist opposition—the Muslim Brotherhood—and other liberal political groups and movements. The most dynamic protest movement to emerge during this period was the Egyptian Movement for Change that became associated with the slogan ‘kefaya’ or ‘enough.’ Though kefaya’s momentum did not last, another important group emerged in 2008, known as the April 6th Youth Movement (harakat shaab 6 abril). This group used social media and word-of-mouth organizing to plan the 2008 Egyptian general strike, led by
laborers and activists in response to low wages and rising food costs. While the strike itself was thwarted by authorities and *baltigeya* (hired thugs), the demands for social and economic equality and chants for “down, down, Hosni Mubarak” (Slackman 2008) that drove workers and their allies to strike can now be seen as a precursor for what was to come in 2011.

The Egyptian revolution of 2011 began on January 25, which is also a national holiday celebrating the Egyptian police force. Calls for protest spread via social media asked protestors to gather in objection to the wide-ranging policy brutality of civilians, though demands of protestors grew to include bread, freedom, social justice, and an end to the emergency law and Mubarak’s rule. Millions of protestors from a range of socioeconomic and religious backgrounds gathered in public squares in Cairo and across other cities in Egypt for eighteen days, facing armed riot police, plain-clothed police officers, and tanks. On 11 February 2011, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that Hosni Mubarak would resign as president, turning power over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), who maintained power until presidential elections were held in June 2012. Mohammed Morsi, representing the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected to power on 30 June, though he was ousted from office exactly one year later in 2013, leading to military rule and the rise of current military-backed President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

4.2 Morocco

Like Egypt there is a well-documented literature on Morocco as a sender of migrants abroad (Iskander 2010), but Morocco also has a long history of inward migration that has significantly shaped its demographic composition, culture, religion and language. In the
1000s Arab invasions led to the Islamization of Saharan Berbers and of the southern Sahel region, not only through militant activities but also through contact, trade, teaching and intermarriage (El Hamel 2012). In the 1200s the Marinid dynasty that ruled Morocco increased the use of sub-Saharan slaves from West Africa, leading to inward (forced) migration. The institution of slavery was not abolished in Morocco until the end of the nineteenth century, and the lasting effects of this are made visible through the presence of certain groups, particularly the Gnawa who were originally slaves from West Africa freed over a period of time (ibid). Another important timeframe for demographic change is the French colonial period. As a result of the establishment of a French protectorate between 1912 and 1955, a large French community immigrated to Morocco, and tens of thousands of French nationals continue to reside in the country.

Yet beginning in the late 1980s Morocco began serving as a host country for migrants from surrounding regions, particularly West Africa.14 Since the creation of the EU in 1985, Morocco has been a popular last stop on the migration route from Africa to Europe. Before the year 2000, there were many migrants who would travel by sea via the route through Tangier or via the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the northern coast of Morocco. But beginning in the 2000s, the EU and individual European states began pressuring North African countries to bolster border security in order to curb irregular migration (Boubakri 2013). In exchange for increased trade and the loosening of visa entry requirements for nationals of neighboring countries, the EU successfully

14 Unlike other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Morocco has received relatively few refugees from other MENA states over the last ten years, and the majority of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa do not qualify for official refugee status. According to a 2010 study, seventy-six per cent of the total number of Sub-Saharan migrants residing in Morocco at the time—approximately 30,000 individuals—were irregular (Khachani 2010).
pressed many of these states to adopt enhanced policing policies toward irregular migrants.

In the case of Morocco, this meant particularly violent policing measures toward migrants near the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta. Between 2000 and 2006, the Spanish authorities erected border fortifications between Spain and Morocco, and the Moroccan, Spanish and EU governments collaborated to make it more difficult to cross from Morocco to Europe (Goldschmidt 2006). Due to increased fear of arrest or detention from Moroccan authorities, migrants began living clandestinely in a forest near Tangier on the Northern coast called Belounis before preparing to go to Spain. In 2005 authorities in Morocco started raiding this location and arresting migrants they found living there (MSF 2013). Authorities would also periodically raid urban locations known to be housing migrants in Morocco’s major cities—primarily Casablanca, Rabat and Tangier (ibid). Once arrested, migrants were often taken to Oujda, a Moroccan town on the eastern border of the county, and forcibly deported into the no-mans land separating Morocco and Algeria (ibid).

Despite the deterrents that characterized Moroccan migration policy in the 2000s, migrants and refugees continued to depart from their home states, though few were able to reach Europe or their desired destination country due to prohibitive financial cost, potential danger, or limited resettlement spots in the case of refugees (de Haas 2007). Additionally, the price of a return journey via the same migratory route was often too high, or the opportunities available in a migrant’s home country were too limited. Consequently, many migrants chose, or were forced to choose, the best available solution: remaining in Morocco for an indefinite period of time.
Like Egypt, it is important to set this changing migration context against the backdrop of a Moroccan state in flux. In Morocco, the monarchy, along with the political elite that it has co-opted, is in control of the modern state apparatus. As such, all public policies in Morocco should be assessed through the lens of derived benefits for the monarchy (Sater 2010). The previous King, Hassan II, infamously announced that the government was to be a critical force in the policy-making process, nonetheless assuring the populace that, “We [the monarchy] do not want in any way to impose Our opinion nor manage State affairs according to Our own personal point of view” (ibid: 43). The years of Hassan II’s reign from 1961 to 1999 are referred to as ‘years of lead,’ during which thousands of Moroccan dissidents were jailed, killed, exiled, or forcibly disappeared. Anyone who was perceived as a threat to the regime, including leftists, Islamists, advocates of Western Sahara’s independence, and military personnel implicated in several unsuccessful coup attempts, were all considered opponents and subject to these repressive measures (Ottaway and Riley 2008).

During the final years of his rule the King embarked on a path of top-down reform, allowing opposition parties into government after the 1997 parliamentary elections and permitting civil society to speak openly about issues such as corruption. Steps toward liberalization were continued by his son Mohammed VI after succession in 1999, and the new King gave special attention to human rights issues and acknowledged some of the heavy-handed measures used by his father. Yet the policies introduced in the 1990s and early 2000s targeted very specific policy areas rather than introducing sweeping democratic transformations, and Mohammed VI has shown much continuity
with his father’s policies, at least as far as governance is concerned (Ottaway and Riley 2008).

Inspired by protest spreading across the Arab world in 2011, between 150-200,000 Moroccans rallied in cities across the country on 20 February and demanded that the King relinquish some of his power and enact a new constitution.15 This sparked a series of protests over the proceeding months, ultimately leading King Mohammed VI to respond by ordering the drafting of a new constitution. The constitution was validated by the royal cabinet through a country-wide referendum, and most political parties supported the text despite their lack of substantive input (Madani, Maghraoui, and Zerhouni 2012). The new constitutional text was enacted on 29 July 2011 and makes important changes to the previous text including the promotion of human rights, recognition of the Amazigh language as an official language, capacity building for the parliament and government, and the constitutionalization of regulatory bodies. However, the King remains at the center of politics, and the new constitution did not establish a true parliamentary monarchy (ibid).

4.3 Turkey

Turkey is most often characterized in academic and policy literature as a country of emigration. Turkey has indeed sent large portions of its population to Europe, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s through guestworker programs and family reunification processes. However, Turkey also has a long history as a receiver of migrants, though this fact has been overshadowed in recent years by its emigration narrative. Historically, Muslims from lands surrounding Anatolia that had been conquered or re-conquered

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15 A popular chant in Moroccan protests was ‘al shaab yoreed dustur al jadeed,’ or ‘the people want a new constitution.’ This is markedly different from the popular chant heard in other Arab states like Egypt and Tunisia in 2011: ‘al shaab yoreed isqat al nizam,’ or ‘the people want the fall of the regime.’
immigrated to the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries (Kale 2014). Following the abolition of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s founding fathers also sought to encourage the migration of Muslim Turks from surrounding countries in the 1920s as part of the state’s nationalization project (İçduygu and Kirisci 2009). Migration continued throughout the twentieth century, though since the 1980s and increasingly after the end of the Cold War, Turkey has witnessed new forms of migration involving refugees from neighboring states, EU nationals, and irregular and transit migrants.

Turkey hosts as many as one million irregular and transit migrants (İçduygu 2009), including ‘suitcase traders,’ circular migrants and clandestine workers from Iraq, Iran, Eastern European countries and the former USSR, in addition to transit migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa, and mainly regular migrants from Europe (İçduygu and Kirişçi 2009). In addition, since 2011, Turkey has hosted a mass influx of refugees from Syria, with estimates of over 3 million Syrians at the time of writing in 2016. While some migrants come to Turkey intending to pass onto Europe, others come with Turkey as their intended destination. Turkey also allows nationals of Iran, the former Soviet Union, and the Balkans to enter the country either without visas or with visas that can easily be obtained at airports and other entry points, making Turkey fairly accessible for certain groups of foreigners. Many migrants come as tourists or students and then overstay their visas, finding work in the informal economy to support their continued stay in Turkey.

Unlike Egypt and Morocco, the refugee system in Turkey is unique. Individuals that would be recognized as refugees in other countries are not granted full status in
Turkey because of the geographical limitation that Turkey maintains in regard to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Only European refugees are considered full refugees in Turkey that will one day be able to obtain residency permits and apply for Turkish citizenship. Practically speaking, this means only those refugees coming from Russia or the Caucus states. All other refugees from anywhere outside Europe that arrive in Turkey and successfully undergo RSD procedures are granted either conditional status or temporary protection by the Turkish government.\footnote{In Turkish popular media and political speeches the word misafir is used to describe refugees, which translates to 'guest' or 'visitor.'}

A brief snapshot of modern Turkish political history is also important for understanding the impact of changes in Turkey’s migration trajectory. The modern Turkish state began following the end of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the republic on October 29, 1923, with Mustafa Kemal (known as Atatürk, meaning ‘Father of the Turks’) as its first president. As part of his state-building project Atatürk utilized secular Westernization processes that attempted to refashion a ‘Turkish’ Islam (Azak 2010). This included closing Islamic courts, holding Friday sermons in Turkish, and replacing the Ottoman Turkish alphabet’s Perso-Arabic script with a Latin-based alphabet (ibid). His policies also emphasized the alleged homogeneity of the Turkish population, and he engaged in forced population transfers, with 1.3 million Anatolian Greeks exchanged for 500,000 Muslims in Greece. Atatürk was leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP), which maintained power after his death until a multi-party period began in 1946. Since that time the Turkish military has also been an important political player, intervening in Turkish politics via a coup d’état three times: in 1960, 1971 and 1980. The military views itself as the ‘guardian of Turkish democracy’ and the defender
of the staunchly secular state created by Atatürk, and Feroz (1993) explains that there has been no real attempt to amend the undemocratic laws inherited from the post-independence military government.

This has not changed under current President (and former Prime Minister) Erdoğan’s rule as leader of the Justice and Development (AKP) party. A political crisis in 1997 and an economic crisis in 2001 led to elections in 2002 that brought the AKP into power (Tepe 2006). The AKP has since carved out a ‘new and safe place in Turkey’s polarized ideological space’ by bringing Islamic values into the political sphere in novel ways (ibid), and its success has been buoyed by steady economic growth since it came to power in 2002. Erdoğan has been criticized by segments of Turkey’s population for the increasingly authoritarian direction he has pursued since coming to power, which was highlighted internationally after his hard-handed response to the Gezi Park protests in 2013. The protests started in response to the government’s urban development plan for Gezi Park in Istanbul, but grew into protests and strikes across Turkey that voiced a wide range of concerns including freedom of the press, assembly, and the government's encroachment on Turkish secularism (Bostan-Ünsal 2013). Since moving from the office of prime minister to the office of the president in 2014, Erdoğan has sought to increase his political standing by pushing for a constitutional amendment that would enhance the power of his presidency (Tisdall 2016).

4.4 Conclusion

Now that a brief background on migration and governance in each host state has been provided, Chapter 5 turns to the results of the collected and coded interview data to examine engagement strategy choice in each host state. I also use the qualitative data to

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17 As of 2016 Erdoğan has served 13 years in office (11 years as prime minister and two years as president).
provide a case history and to clarify what an ambivalent engagement strategy has meant over the last three decades in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, prior to any policy reforms in the case of the later two countries.
Chapter 5: Engagement Strategy Choice in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey

Chapter 4 provided a historical snapshot of migration to each host state, and also briefly discussed important political developments in each host state over the last several decades. This chapter uses the coded qualitative data discussed in Chapter 3 to identify the engagement strategy present in each country, using both ‘traditional’ and non-traditional measures of engagement. This is supplemented by a second section that provides a case narrative of Egypt, Morocco and Turkey and offers further insight into the type of strategy present in each country.

5.1 Measuring Engagement

To begin, I look at ‘traditional’ measures of engagement for each host state, including access to services (education and health care), access to employment (in the formal or informal economy), and access to legal status. These measures constitute the most important components of protection and access to a livelihood for migrants and refugees in a host state. As described in Chapter 2, a liberalizing state will permit residency and membership (though perhaps not citizenship) for regular migrants and refugees because it aims to include these groups in the national system and permit their legal presence. Regarding services, the state will also take primary responsibility for basic service provision (health, education for children, and possibly housing) and will provide these services directly, as opposed to leaving the responsibility up to international organizations or NGOs. Employment in the formal economy will be generally permitted and encouraged, as the state’s goal is to encourage migrants’ economic participation in the national system.
A repressive strategy will make it very difficult for migrants and refugees to obtain residency or membership, as its goal is to exclude them from participation in the national system, even if it meanwhile seeks gains from their labor. Similarly, the state will refrain from providing services to migrants or refugees, and will also make it difficult for international organizations or NGOs to provide them. Lastly, employment will not be permitted, and informal employment will be disallowed and strictly monitored.

An ambivalent strategy may make it difficult for migrants to obtain residency, but either (a) this only has mild implications because residency permits are not frequently checked by authorities, or (b) residency is permitted but only for a short period of time that requires permits to be frequently renewed. In regard to the residency of refugees, an ambivalent state will also leave the provision of documentation and status determination up to the UNHCR instead of handling it directly. An ambivalent host state will not provide services directly to migrants or refugees, but will allow the operation of international bodies and NGOs that provide services on its behalf. This alleviates the responsibility of the host state, while still ensuring that migrants and refugees are not excluded from basic services. Lastly, employment in the formal economy will not be permitted under most circumstances, but employment in the informal economy will be widely pervasive and not highly policed.

These categories represent ideal types, and no state will fit perfectly within any category. But by measuring access to each service across the three countries using the coded data, I can determine the extent to which each state is exhibiting a liberalizing, repressive or ambivalent strategy. In Table 3 I present the number of times a particular
code—which is associated with either a liberalizing, repressive or ambivalent strategy, and which denotes access to a type of service in the host state—is mentioned during an elite or migrant interview. This raw count is then adjusted for the overall number of coded segments of text for each country in order to appropriately weight the data.\textsuperscript{18} This allows me to compare strategies within each country and also across cases.

\textsuperscript{18} For example, there are 532 coded segments of text associated with transcripts from Egypt out of 1,379 total segments of text for the whole project. The raw counts from Egypt were thus multiplied by (1-.38) (532/1379) to adjust for the fact that there were more segments of text associated with Egypt than with Morocco or Turkey.
Table 3: Traditional Measurements of Engagement, Grouped by Strategy & Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement Type</th>
<th>Egypt Raw</th>
<th>Egypt Adjusted</th>
<th>Morocco Raw</th>
<th>Morocco Adjusted</th>
<th>Turkey Raw</th>
<th>Turkey Adjusted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberalizing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to government provided education</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to government provided health care</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to formal employment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General access to residency</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Regressive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No access to education</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No access to health care</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No access to employment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency highly-regulated &amp; exclusionary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ambivalent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to civil society provided education</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to civil society provided health care</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to informal employment</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency short-term permitted or residency not highly regulated</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>82</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regards to traditional measures of engagement, Egypt and Turkey exhibit predominantly ambivalent approaches, while Morocco has a predominantly liberalizing approach. But as I argued in Chapter 2, we can gain further insight into the engagement practices of each country by also looking at non-traditional measures of engagement. This includes the relationship between the host state government and civil society, and the relationship between host state authorities and migrants or refugees. Global South host states may have differing views of the appropriate division of labor between themselves, international migration bodies, and NGOs. The very decision to allow an
international migration body or an NGO to operate on the host country’s territory and provide services to migrants or refugees is a form of engagement with these populations, even though it occurs indirectly via intermediary organizations, and this relationship is worthy of examination.

Table 4 takes into account non-traditional measures of host state engagement including: the shifting legal framework of the host state in regard to migration, the relationship between the host government and civil society, and interactions (or lack thereof) that individual migrants and refugees may have with the host government.
Using only non-traditional measures, Egypt has a predominantly repressive approach, while Morocco and Turkey have predominantly liberalizing approaches. For Egypt, non-traditional measures are able to capture the increasingly securitized approaches being used by the government toward civil society actors as well as individual migrants and refugees. For Turkey and Morocco, non-traditional measures capture the increasingly open relationship between the Moroccan and Turkish governments and civil society actors (including migrant-run organizations) between 2008-2015. Both of these developments will be further elaborated on in Chapter 6.

Lastly, Table 5 groups together the totals of both traditional and non-traditional measures, resulting in overall totals for each strategy.
Table 5: Overall Totals, Grouped by Strategy & Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement Type</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalizing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regressive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When all the weighted data is assessed cumulatively, Egypt has a predominantly ambivalent strategy, while Morocco and Turkey have predominantly liberalizing strategies. To provide further insight into the ambivalent aspect of each country’s engagement strategy, I provide a narrative analysis of each case, focusing on the last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century, when each country began to experience greater migrant and refugee flows.

5.2 Case History: Egypt

Given the many political and social challenges facing Egypt, the most populous state in the MENA region, migrants and refugees are often treated as ‘one more problem’ that the government would rather not have to deal with. As Ambassador Naela Gabr, chairperson of the National Coordinating Committee On Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration—a recently formed governmental body—stated bluntly during an interview,

[We are] not so much concerned [with] the people coming, the infiltrators or illegal migrants; it’s not my primary concern. I can tackle it with cooperation with the African Union. And we are working with the African
Union in that regard. We don’t love having extra people in detention. We
don’t like this, it’s costly, it’s a headache, a responsibility with human
rights and anything can happen to the detainees so we’ll be having
additional problems (Elite Interviewee AT).

Or as an individual at the Ministry of the Interior explained, “Of course we know about
them [migrants and refugees]. We let them stay. Even those without papers or who come illegally” (Elite Interviewee AS). Why does the Egyptian state permit the long-term
presence of migrants and refugees and enact an ambivalent strategy? I argue that there are
various gains for the Egyptian state from this type of approach.

In regard to the formal employment of refugees, Egypt entered into the 1951
Refugee Convention with careful restrictions (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003). While
technically refugees have the same right to employment as other foreigners in this
country, they must prove that an Egyptian is not more qualified for the same job, a
difficult requirement for most refugees. However, in a country such as Egypt, which has
a large informal economy (ILO 2012), some migrants and refugees have been able to
secure employment without authorization. As a UNHCR representative stated,

I’m not calling them refugees, because they are not registered with the
UNHCR, but for many reasons they are in the country. They are migrants.
So, Egypt is welcoming for this migrant population. They are integrated somehow. They are not integrated to the extent of taking the nationality,
but they can find their livelihoods, they can reside in the country (Elite
Interviewee A).

According to the UNHCR and IOM, refugees and migrants have found jobs in the
garment, food, artisanal and industrial sectors, in addition to others who do domestic
work in wealthy Egyptian households as cleaners, nannies and drivers.

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19 Specifically, Egypt claimed reservations to Article 12.1, thereby waiving the responsibility of
determining the personal status of refugees as well as Articles 20, 23 and 24, which claim that refugees
should be afforded equal status to nationals in regards to rationing, public relief and assistance and labor
laws/social security, respectively (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003).
Egyptian landlords also take advantage of the presence of migrants and refugees by charging them inflated rental prices. As the director of a refugee school noted, “For landowners it’s a great opportunity to make more money because a lot of the Egyptians are under the old Nasser system where they’re paying fifteen pounds a month [in rent]” (Elite Interviewee R). A Sudanese migrant explained that Egyptian *simsars* (housing brokers) will size up migrants or refugees based on nationality and show them neighborhoods accordingly. Alluding to this informal system, one Sudanese migrant stated, “They know each type of customer, they know how much they have in their pocket” (Sudanese Migrant I). A representative from the IOM confirmed this, saying, “I remember it starting with the Sudanese when I was living here in 2003 or 2004. There’s lots of demand anyway, and there’s a shortage of housing. So with increasing numbers of Sudanese refugees the rent kept increasing” (Elite Interviewee E).

Another benefit for the Egyptian state is the very presence of international migration organizations like the UNHCR and IOM, in addition to smaller migrant-focused international NGOs. These organizations bring in international funding that also translates into development funding for the broader Egyptian populace. As an individual at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained,

…We prefer that the IOs help us in enhancing the infrastructure of the local communities that receive refugees and immigrants. That way, in the sense of building new schools, building new hospitals, you’re benefitting the local society so you’re killing or you’re undermining the xenophobic tendencies that exist naturally in any society toward the arrival of refugees or illegal immigrants. And you’re benefitting both the refugees and the local communities at the same time. And you’re assisting the government in alleviating part of the challenges that it is facing in dealing with the issues (Elite Interviewee AV).
In other words, the Egyptian government views the presence of international migration bodies as a convenient vessel for foreign funding. This coincides with what Kagan (2012) identifies as the ‘perverse incentive’ facing Middle Eastern host states for making refugees on their territory as vulnerable as possible. Kagan notes, “If refugees are able to support themselves, it will appear that they are on the road to integration, a policy opposed by host governments which seek to share costs with the international community in hosting refugees” (Kagan 2012; 335). Additionally, these organizations provide essential services for migrants and refugees that the Egyptian government might otherwise have to provide itself.20 As the interim director of another refugee school noted, “All the international money goes to the UNHCR. But in a sense, it’s like this is going to Egypt, because it’s money that Egypt doesn’t have to spend on refugees and migrants” (Elite Interviewee Q).

The perverse incentive to keep migrants and refugees reliant upon international aid is illustrated through the residency permit system. Both migrants and refugees are required to obtain a residency permit from the mugamma, a government building in central Cairo. When conducting interviews in 2014, migrants and refugees of all nationalities described the increasing difficulty of obtaining a residency permit for longer than three to six months. One Eritrean refugee complained, “Before the revolution [the permit] was for one year or even more, but after the revolution it’s always for six months” (Eritrean Migrant A). In response to a question about whether the state would consider lengthening this time period, a government official explained, “Extending it toward one year or more means that the government may be responsible for normalizing

20 Primarily these services are available to refugees who have officially registered with the UNHCR in Egypt, though the UNHCR and IOM also fund some services for migrants who do not have proof of status.
the situation of refugees, without being equipped by international help in this regard” (Elite Interviewee AV).

However, the UNHCR and its partner organizations do not view this type of funding and service-provision model as sustainable, and they continue to push for further host government responsibility. For example, at the time of interviewing in 2014, the UNHCR had recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Egyptian Ministry of Health and was piloting a primary health care plan for refugees that would be operationalized through government health care services. Previously refugees were required to go directly to Caritas, an international NGO with centers in Cairo and Alexandria, to receive health services. Beginning in 2014 Syrian refugees in Alexandria were instead told to go directly to government hospitals for primary health care services, which would then make a referral for secondary or tertiary care. After implementing this system for Syrian refugees in Alexandria, Caritas’ caseload went down by seventy percent (Elite Interviewee E). Based on this success, the plan between the UNHCR and the Egyptian government was to eventually apply this model to all refugee nationalities in both Alexandria and Cairo. A representative of the UNHCR in Alexandria explained that health care is

…a responsibility we would like to share with the [Egyptian] government, because the government has all these facilities in the country…And we’re also trying to build their capacity by having some trainings. We have started organizing that. And we are also trying to help them with some medicines, some infrastructures through UNICEF. So our aim is to capacitate those services that exist, rather than creating a parallel system. Because there is no sustainable parallel system (Elite Interviewee F).

Yet even in pushing for greater host government responsibility, the UNHCR continues to include the host community of Egyptian citizens in its service-provision, by providing,
for example, “…all the vaccinations, some infrastructure, some medicines through UNICEF and UNHCR” (ibid). In other words, there is an ongoing negotiation between international organizations and the Egyptian government regarding financial responsibility for refugees and migrants.

In general, those providing services to migrants and refugees reported not having any direct problems from the government in regards to their work. Just as the government is aware of the migrants and refugees themselves, the government knows about the presence and activities of migrant and refugee-focused organizations. Yet for those organizations providing not just assistance but also doing advocacy work, the current political climate has become debilitating. The increasing securitization in Egypt in the post-2013 environment and its impact on state engagement will be further explored in the next chapter on reasons for change in engagement strategy.

5.3 Case History: Morocco

In terms of international agreements governing the country’s responsibility toward migrants and refugees, Morocco is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1969 Protocol, as well as treaties pertaining to migrants more broadly, such as the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Migrants and refugees live throughout the country, either in cities (primarily Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, Oujda, Fez and Marrakesh) or in remote areas such as the forests near the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta. In cities, migrants tend to reside in traditionally low-income areas otherwise populated by poorer Moroccans. One particularly well-known migrant neighborhood is Taqadum in Rabat. As one migrant from Cameroon explained, “Taqadum is the area where you’ll see all the
African nationalities. We live there because it’s cheap and it gives the migrants the opportunity to sleep 5, 6, 10 to one room” (Cameroonian Migrant B). On the central street running through Taqadum migrants will line up early in the morning in the hope of being selected by a Moroccan employer for a day’s labor in construction. The head of migration-focused advocacy at the Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH) elaborated on this practice,

[Migrants] can do some work, for example in food markets, in construction, domestic work. But it’s very difficult, sometimes they don’t pay them...Every morning, they take twenty or ten people, they work for them for two or three or four days of the week, and then the next week, they take other people. So that they don’t have to do work papers for them (Elite Interviewee X).

In a country with such high unemployment (20 per cent in 2014 according to the World Bank), migrants would seem to compete with Moroccan unskilled workers, particularly youth. However, the Secretary General of the Organization Démocratique du Travail (ODT), which now has a sub-section devoted to migrants’ rights, explained that many Moroccan youth no longer want to work in these demanding, low-paying positions.

Morocco has economic difficulties: poverty and unemployment. But Moroccan youth have changed. The ones who were living in the countryside moved to cities and refused to do some types of work. They don't want to work in agriculture anymore. They don't want to work in construction anymore...Work that is hard like building or agriculture, in the sun and heat, this is the kind of work that Africans search for (Elite Interviewee Y).

The Head of the Department of Immigrants at the Ministère Chargé des Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger et des Affaires de la Migration,\(^{21}\) indicated that the government is aware of the pervasiveness of migrant participation in the informal economy, stating, “The young people who come now from Africa and other areas, many of them are

\(^{21}\) In English, the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs (which will be referred to in this dissertation as the Ministry of Migration Affairs for purposes of brevity).
overqualified and all of them work…They work with hard conditions, in the non-formal sector” (Elite Interviewee AX). Yet as in all countries, working without authorization and without a residency permit, or carte de sejour, can lead to exploitation.

However, this is not the case for all African migrants. Morocco operates student exchange programs with West African countries, and some migrants arrive as students and are able to find formal work once their academic programs are complete, particularly in Moroccan call centers. Also, certain nationalities are able to search for formal work without first obtaining a residency permit as a result of a convention Morocco holds with Algeria, Tunisia and Senegal. Nationals of these countries do not need to apply for work through the process run by the L'Agence Nationale de Promotion de l'Emploi et des Compétences (ANAPEC), meaning that a company does not have to put out a search to see if any Moroccan is more qualified for a specific position.

Yet if most African migrants are only able to access informal jobs and do not receive assistance from the government, why do they remain in Morocco? For many, the opportunity to pass on to another country like Spain has been severely curtailed since the mid-200s. Migration trajectories to Morocco began to change between 2003 and 2005 when it became more difficult to transit through Morocco to Spain. In 2002 the EU provided €70 million for the development of Northern Morocco to encourage European Readmission Agreement negotiations along with several other financial incentives (Wolff 2014). Shortly thereafter in 2003, Morocco produced its first law on irregular migration, Law 02-03, which criminalized irregular migration, established strict sanctions for the support and organization of irregular migration, and increased human and technological control capacities at Morocco’s borders with Algeria and Spain (Natter 2015). Due to
increased fear of arrest or detention from Moroccan authorities, migrants began living clandestinely in a forest near Tangier on the Northern coast called Belounis before preparing to Spain (MSF 2013). In 2005 authorities in Morocco started raiding this location and arresting migrants they found living there. Authorities would also periodically raid urban locations known to be housing migrants in Morocco’s major cities—primarily Casablanca, Rabat and Tangier. Once arrested, migrants were often taken to Oujda, a Moroccan town on the eastern border of the county, and forcibly deported into the no-mans land separating Morocco and Algeria (ibid).

The director and founder of an NGO that offers legal and other services to migrants explained the impact of these decisions on migrants in Oujda, the city closest to Morocco’s border with Algeria.

Before 2005 Melilla was easier to access and migrants coming from Algeria would just pass through here. They would just rest in Oujda for a week or so, but then they would move on. But afterward it became difficult to cross and migrants had to stay in Oujda longer, so we started to see problems of homelessness, health. And there weren’t any organizations for migrants in Oujda then. We were the first (Elite Interviewee AB).

The buildup of stocks of migrants in Morocco since the 1990s has given rise to a network of international and local NGOs that provide essential services for migrants and refugees, including Caritas, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), and the Groupe Antiraciste de Défense et d’Accompagnement des Étrangers et Migrants (GADEM). Some of these organizations receive support from the UHNCR and IOM, but others are funded by private foundations or foreign governments such as the European Union. Migrants themselves have also established community organizations like the Conseil des Migrants.

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22 MSF closed its operation in Morocco in 2013 in objection to violence used by Moroccan and Spanish border authorities against migrants.
Sub-Sahariens au Maroc or the Collectif des Communautés Subsahariens au Maroc that provide a community space for members and that advocate for migrant rights. Many migrants in Morocco still hope to continue their journey to Europe, and view their time in Morocco as temporary, even when it consists of years rather than months. Other have changed their mentality. One individual from Senegal who has been residing in Morocco for fourteen years explained,

I think that now most people…when you talk to people, you don’t think that they just want to go to Europe. You think that they just want to have a better life, here or in Europe. Or just to stay here. Because everyone knows what is happening in Europe now, Europe is in crisis. You can go there to find a better life, but you have to be strong. You have to innovate. And here in Morocco, we still have many things to build up, the economy, and social, things like that. Morocco is a country of opportunity. It’s a Global South country and people, they like it. They know it. You still have people who want to go to Europe, but if I can’t go, I can stay here to make a better life (Senegalese Migrant B).

Another migrant who tried to go to Spain in 2010 but was arrested and released in Morocco stated, “…for the moment, I’m here. I want to stay here” (DRC Migrant A).

5.4 Case History: Turkey

The primary legislation governing engagement with migrants and refugees in Turkey since 1950 has been the Passport Law and the Law on the Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey, which provides regulations for the entry, stay and deportation of foreigners (Açıkgöz and Ariner 2014). While Turkey did sign the 1951 Convention in 1960, Turkey did not enact domestic legislation on international protection until 1994, and implementation in this area was regulated through secondary legislation and administrative regulations (ibid). After Turkey signed the 1951 Convention the UNHCR requested to open an office in the early 1960s, taking over the protection role that the International Catholic Corps (which later became ICMC) had been playing up until that
time (Elite Interviewee AI). Prior to 1979 and the Iranian Revolution, Turkey primarily received refugees from Europe, most of whom were Cold War defectors, and the UNHCR managed to resettle refugees within a short period of time (Elite Interviewee AJ). Turkey’s first major influx of non-European refugees occurred as a result of the Iranian-Iraqi war between 1980 and 1988, though even with a larger influx the UNHCR was able to resettle refugees within one or two years (ibid).

This pattern changed in 1988, when Turkey had experienced an influx of approximately 60,000 Iraqi Kurds following the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi government (Ogata 2005). This influx was followed by a second from Turkey’s West, with approximately 300,000 refugees fleeing an attempt by the communist government in Bulgaria to assimilate ethnic Turks and Pomaks into a Bulgarian Slav identity (Kirisci 2003). Not long after in 1991 there was a second major influx of about 450,000 refugees from northern Iraq after Sadam Hussein used force to suppress the country’s Kurdish uprising (Ogata 2005). As a result of these three influxes, Turkey enacted an Asylum Regulation in November 1994, which was subsequently amended in 1999 and 2006. The regulation effectively restated the refugee definition set forth in the 1951 Refugee Convention in establishing who can benefit from temporary asylum protection in Turkey, but it also left significant room for administrative discretion in the processing of applications for temporary asylum (Levitan, Kaytaz, and Durukan 2009).

Turkey experienced two more influxes in the late 1990s—from Bosnia in 1996 and Kosovo in 1997/1998, though neither was prolonged. Then in 1999, Turkish-EU

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23 Ultimately refugees fleeing Iraq were housed in camps along the Iraqi/Turkish border until they were returned to the Kurdish autonomous zone (Sassoon 2009). In both 1988 and 1991 Turkey was reluctant to accept Kurdish refugees, fearing this could affect Turkey’s demographic balance or incite tensions with Turkey’s Kurdish minority (Sassoon 2009; Ogata 2005).
relations started to gain a new pace. In order to be considered for candidacy, the EU insisted that Turkey needed to remove the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention and transfer all asylum matters to a civilian authority, among other matters. In 2005, the EU decided to open negotiation accession talks with Turkey, which had a significant impact on Turkey’s attention to the matter of migration, which will be further discussed in the next chapter.

After increased refugee influxes in 1988, the UNHCR began taking on more responsibility for determining refugee status, a task originally left to individual embassies, even though the UNHCR had no official country agreement with the Turkish government. A former deputy minister at the UNHCR in Turkey explained, “Instead of going directly to the US embassy or the UK embassy, people were recommended to go to the UNHCR. Then the UNHCR became the filter for whether they have good claims” (Elite Interviewee AJ). This informal practice effectively created a dual system for refugee recognition that continues today: one run by Turkish authorities and another run by the UNHCR.

Alongside the UNHCR procedure, refugee claimants were required to file a separate ‘temporary asylum’ application with the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (MOI). The purpose of the government procedure was to determine whether the applicant has a legitimate need for temporary asylum in Turkey as specified by Turkey’s national legislation (Levitan, Kaytaz, and Durukan 2009). Upon application, refugees were granted a six months’ residence permit, which was automatically renewable for another six months. At the end of this second period, extension of the residence permit fell under
the discretion of the MOI prior to 2013 (Tokuzlu 2010), and now falls under the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM).

Under the current procedure, once refugees have registered with Turkish authorities, they are then assigned to one of the approximately sixty ‘satellite cities’ that have been appointed by the Turkish government as temporary residences for refugees. Refugees are given access to health care and schools while they reside in a satellite city, and depending upon the province, they may be eligible for a modest stipend. Yet because this stipend is not usually enough to cover the cost of living in the satellite cities and because there are few work opportunities, many refugees decide to leave their assigned satellite city in search of work in Istanbul or one of Turkey’s other metropolises, thereby forfeiting their legal status.

From the point of view of NGOs operating in Turkey, the national government was effectively absent from migration matters during the 1990s and first half of the 2000s. Responsibility for refugees was primarily handled by the UNHCR, and access to basic services for irregular migrants, or refugees residing outside their satellite city, was left to international and local civil society organizations. The founder and director of a prominent legal and advocacy NGO based in Istanbul recalls the period from 2000 until 2007, saying,

Basically our assessment was that refugees were arriving in Turkey, they had zero access to any kind of legal information, counseling and assistance. And a lot of them actually didn’t know where to go, how to apply, [and] a lot of times they were having problems with the UNHCR procedure at the time (Elite Interviewee AG).

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24 Most satellite cities are located in Turkey’s internal provinces. Unlike other refugee nationalities, Syrian refugees are not subject to the satellite city system.
25 For an analysis of the ways in which the local government in Istanbul responded to migration, see Biehl (2013).
International and domestic NGOs stepped in to fill this information and service-provision gap, and between 2009 and 2010 the organizations operating in Istanbul formed a network and began to cooperate via an online platform and monthly in-person meetings (Elite Interviewee AE). This included secular and religious NGOs like Caritas, IMP, Union Church, and the UNHCR, and then expanded to include the Turkish Humanitarian Assistance Foundation (IHH), in addition to others.

Refugees technically have access to the Turkish labor market, but in a *de facto* sense refugees face legal, administrative and language barriers associated with receiving work permits (Levitan, Kaytaz, and Durukan 2009). Nonetheless, refugees as well as irregular migrants have found work in informal sectors, including construction, domestic work, agriculture, sex work, and employment in restaurants and shops (Elite Interviewee AH; Elite Interviewee O; İçduygu and Aksel 2012), though the ability to access informal work varies by geographic location, gender and nationality. For example, in a survey of African migrants and refugees living in Istanbul, Brewer and Deniz (2006) find a difference between West African irregular migrants and East African asylum-seekers in terms of their economic survival strategies in Istanbul. West African migrants were more likely to be engaged in some kind of trade activity such as selling clothing, trinkets, electronics, or food, while asylum-seekers were more likely to resort to marginal survival activities like begging, peddling, or sharing crowded apartments (ibid). While access to employment has been somewhat unique for the Syrian refugees that began arriving in 2011, most Syrians also survive via informal methods. As a spokesperson for the UNHCR operation in Gaziantep in Turkey’s South explained,

*Lots of people are working informally. You know, during my day here, I may go get my car washed and it’s a Syrian working there, or I go to get*
my shirts cleaned and there’s a Syrian working there. Or I go to eat and there’s Syrians working in the restaurant. They’re working everywhere, but they’re all working without benefits and without insurance (Elite Interviewee O).

While migrants and refugees are somewhat confined in their movement and ability to access informal employment due to a system of policing and check-points, a spokesperson for the UNHCR in Istanbul notes that this is the same system that Turkish citizens are subject to. In his opinion,

[Turkey] is not a country that is really working on, it’s not really hard on irregular migrants, it’s not really hard on their access to services, or access to labor market. If they really want they could develop a better supervision system, but it’s not what’s happening in Turkey (Elite Interviewee 1).

The informality of policing and deportation was confirmed by Brewer and Deniz’s 2006 study of African migrant and refugee populations living in Istanbul. Brewer and Deniz (2006) explain that once an individual’s application for asylum is rejected twice, the Foreigners’ Police notify this person that his or her residence permit has expired and that he or she needs to leave the country within fifteen days. However, police officials interviewed for the study admitted that they only provide a notification of the intention to deport, and that deportation of rejected asylum-seekers is not pursued because, “it is difficult to determine the whereabouts of such persons, and such a pursuit would be costly in terms of labor and time” (ibid: 26). As a result, these individuals become ‘tolerated foreigners’ in Turkey (ibid).

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter further defined the concept of ambivalence by looking at the government’s response to migration across three cases during the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. Egypt, Morocco and Turkey have been able to use
ambivalence to manage the social and political implications of their new inward migration due to certain factors: migrants and refugees migrants have found ways to integrate into large informal economies; international organizations and domestic organizations have intervened to provide essential services, and the issue of migration was not so highly politicized that it gained prolonged traction in media or amongst the national population. The next chapter will answer the question: when does ambivalence become untenable? It will explore the reasons why Morocco and Turkey liberalized their engagement approach between 2008 and 2013, and why Egypt remains predominantly ambivalent with movement toward a more securitized and repressive policy.
Chapter 6: Change in Engagement Strategy Over Time

While Chapter 5 proposed measures for identifying the type of engagement strategy present in a Global South host state and explained how Egypt, Morocco and Turkey utilized a policy of ambivalence to manage their migration situations in the 1990s and early 2000s, this chapter addresses the question of change in engagement strategy over time. Using the six factors identified in Chapter 2, I examine why Egypt remains predominantly ambivalent while Morocco and Turkey changed their engagement approaches between 2008 and 2013.

6.1 Factors Driving Engagement Policy Change

As discussed in Chapter 2, the primary factors influencing host state engagement strategies in Western democracies are: (1) a host state’s cultural foundations and institutional unwillingness to adopt new policies, or cultural embeddedness; (2) economic interests of domestic groups, or political economy factors; (3) rights enshrined in domestic legislation that migrants can take advantage of with the assistance of judiciaries, or neoinstitutionalist factors; (4) postnational human rights logic that is adopted domestically to the benefit of migrants, or postnationalist factors; (5) a state’s security or political concerns, or security/politicization factors; and (6) international relations that influence immigration policy at the diplomatic/economic level, or international relations factors. This section asks: which of these explanations travel to the Global South context and are useful for understanding migration engagement strategy choices in illiberal Global South host states, specifically Egypt, Morocco and Turkey?

Using the coding process detailed in Chapter 3, Table 6 displays the raw and adjusted counts for the codes that correspond to each of the six explanatory factors. As in
Chapter 5, I present the number of times a particular code—associated with one of the six explanatory factors—is mentioned during an elite or migrant interview. This raw count is then adjusted for the overall number of coded segments of text for each country in order to appropriately weight the data. Each explanatory factor is associated with three codes, and the total count for each explanatory factor is also included.
Table 6: Factors Influencing Engagement Strategy, Grouped by Factor and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors Influencing Strategy Type</th>
<th>Egypt Raw</th>
<th>Egypt Adjusted</th>
<th>Morocco Raw</th>
<th>Morocco Adjusted</th>
<th>Turkey Raw</th>
<th>Turkey Adjusted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Embeddedness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differential treatment by nationality</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host state culture and ethnic relations</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of religion</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Economy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>De facto integration</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic benefits of migration</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International funding for migration</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Neoinstitutionalist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Advocacy involving migrant/refugees</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant/refugee advocacy directed at gov</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant/refugee advocacy directed at UNHCR</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Postnationalist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society being critical of gov</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-society led reform</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Security/Politicization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicization of migration</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securitization of migration</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia and tension with host state</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>82</strong></td>
<td><strong>67</strong></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Relations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of Europe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge diffusion of migration practices</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using migration to project influence</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When all the weighted data is totaled for each strategy, it becomes evident that certain factors are more important than others in driving host state engagement policy, and that this varies by country. The three most influential factors in the case of Egypt are:
security/politicization (82), cultural embeddedness (69), and political economy (36). For Morocco, the three most influential factors are: security/politicization (67), cultural embeddedness (36), and postnationalist factors (32). Lastly, for Turkey the three most influential factors are security/politicization (109), cultural embeddedness (80), and international relations (64).

Because cultural embeddedness is a prominent factor in all three cases and is driven primarily by the differential treatment of migrants and refugees according to their nationality or ‘culture,’ this factor will be discussed in depth in Chapter 7. The following three sections provide a narrative of strategy change in each country, supplemented by qualitative information extracted from interviews. Each section also explains how certain explanatory factors are influential in each case, as well as why other factors are not.

6.2 Continued Ambivalence and Movement Toward a Repressive Strategy in Egypt

The prominence of the security/politicization factor is driven primarily by the securitization of migration in Egypt in the post-2011 environment, particularly following the mid-2013 military coup. The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 led to a temporary security vacuum during which various factions—leftists and revolutionaries, Muslim Brotherhood supporters, and those who supported the former Mubarak regime—vied for the ability to shape Egypt’s political and social future. However, following the military coup of June 30, 2013 and the rise to power of current President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, power has once again been consolidated under a military-backed regime. The increasingly securitized approach to migration that coincides with these domestic developments began with the case of Syrian refugees.
When Syrians began arriving en mass in Egypt in 2012, former President Mohamed Morsi announced that all Syrian children residing in Egypt would be granted enrolment in public schools regardless of official UNHCR status and that Syrian families could access Egyptian public hospitals free of charge (Elite Interviewee AK). However, following the Egyptian military coup in July 2013 that ousted former President Mohamed Morsi, Syrians in Egypt became the subject of a government-organized media campaign that referred to them as ‘terrorists’ allied with the Muslim Brotherhood and former President Mohamed Morsi’s supporters (Elite Interviewee A).

While the special treatment—healthcare and access to primary education—extended to Syrian refugees under former President Mohamed Morsi was technically upheld by the subsequent military government, the *de facto* treatment of Syrians changed dramatically. As a result of the increasingly hostile treatment of Syrians in Egypt, Amnesty International documented a sharp increase in the number of Syrian refugees attempting to escape Egypt to Europe (Amnesty International 2013a). From January to August 2013, an estimated six thousand Syrian refugees managed to reach Italy by boat from Egypt, a figure that spiked after the coup between September and mid-October to over three thousand. Further, Human Rights Watch documented over 1,500 cases of prolonged detainment of Syrian refugees between July and December 2013, as well as hundreds of cases of coerced refoulement to Syria (Human Rights Watch 2013).

At the time of interviewing one year later in 2014, concerns over ‘terrorism’ and its alleged links with migrants in Egypt had spread to all migrant and refugee nationalities. A representative at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that while current measures were not indicative of long-term policy, the alleged association between
migration and possible terrorist activities was the government’s priority at present, stating, “And let me say that for us now, from a governmental perspective, there is a link between terrorism, illegal migration and human trafficking. The networks are connecting together” (Elite Interviewee AV). NGOs had already noticed this securitization shift. An employee who focuses on migration issues at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), a prominent human rights group, explained,

Nowadays it’s the first time that the Egyptian intelligence [is] involved with the migrant situation. There are one hundred and thirteen migrants arrested in Abou Kheir, west of Alexandria. They’re always detained in some police station or some detention place, and after that national security searches their papers. [Last week is] the first time that the intelligence [mukhabarat] searched on their papers, not the national security [al amn al kawmy] (Elite Interviewee V).

The handling of migrant affairs by state intelligence signals that the issue of migration has become more of a priority for the current regime, specifically as it relates to security.

Aside from security/politicization and cultural embeddedness, the other most influential factor determining engagement strategy choice in Egypt is the political economy of migration. I will not elaborate on this explanatory factor as it was already detailed in Chapter 4. Primarily, the Egyptian government benefits from international funding that is channeled through the UNHCR and other international organizations, the participation of migrants and refugees in the informal economy, and remittances sent to migrants and refugees in Egypt that are spent locally.

But in addition to the factors that are most useful in explaining engagement strategy choice in Egypt, it is also worth examining why specific factors do not have much impact in the Egyptian context. First, why are migrants and refugees or civil society partners unable to mobilize and affect a change in strategy, via the neo-
institutionalist hypothesis? Many migrants and refugees in Cairo have formed community-based organizations (CBOs) that often provide a physical location for gatherings as well as services like language-training, aid for those experiencing difficulties in obtaining service provision or seeking informal work, and community activities. Yet despite the presence of numerous CBOs, these organizations are fragmented and focused primarily on supporting the individual members of their national communities (i.e. Sudanese, Eritrean, etc.). Even for highly organized migrant communities like the Sudanese, attempts at organized advocacy have largely been unsuccessful and even violent.

In the most extreme case, twenty-six Sudanese refugees were killed by the Egyptian security forces after refusing to disband their protest outside the UNHCR offices in the upper-class Cairo neighborhood of Mohandiseen in 2005 (Salih 2006). The protest was organized in objection to the UNHCR’s decision to suspend refugee status determination procedures for Sudanese in Egypt (Judell and Brücker 2015). Following this incident, the Egyptian government requested that the UNHCR move its offices to a remote satellite city located on the outskirts of Cairo in order to avoid future incidents of confrontation and violence. The director of an Egyptian-based NGO that works on migrant and refugee issues, recalled,

I was there [at the protest]. Lots of people died, and lots of people went missing as well…And since then we haven’t seen any protests like this, because that was the setting up of refugees. It was naïve as well, because demonstrations can’t get them anything, but they take a lot (Elite Interviewee P).
The superintendent of a school for refugees confirmed this sentiment, saying, “I think most of the refugees have taken the attitude of ‘we want to stay low. We don’t want to raise attention to ourselves’” (Elite Interviewee R).

An individual from the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), a human rights organization that also focuses on migrant rights issues in Alexandria, explained that he advises his refugee and migrant clients against protesting.

We don’t advise them to. Some Syrians think about some kind of protests, but we advise them not to [protest]...Some of them were thinking to protest against UNHCR, but we advised them not to do, because then they may get arrested. (Elite Interviewee U).

When refugees and migrants were asked about protesting or engaging in political activities for this project, only three of the thirty-three individuals interviewed said that they participate in political activities directed at the host state. For these three individuals, political activities never involved protests or demonstrations, but instead included activities like writing articles or speaking with journalists. While many migrants mentioned being involved in political activities in their home countries, they were unable or reluctant to participate while in Egypt. For some there are simply no opportunities to engage in political activities, while others are fearful of the Egyptian police and mukhabarat (state intelligence). Some responses to the question of political participation included:

It’s hard. Within 24 hours, they’ll take you. Here, sometimes the UNHCR will not take people from the prison, because the UNHCR has no right to enter the prison. So if you enter the prison, forget it (Eritrean Migrant A).

No, because you can’t. I used to do a lot of advocacy back in Sudan, but I can’t here. The Egyptian government won’t let us. (Sudanese Migrant C).
In Sudan I was a member of the Sudan People Liberation Movement. But now that I’m here, I’m an artist. No more politics, only in Sudan (Sudanese Migrant A).

Both because of the securitized atmosphere of post-revolutionary Egypt where even Egyptians are barred from organized protest,26 and due to many migrant and refugee’s precarious legal status, opportunities for overt protest in the Egyptian host state are limited, though more subtle forms of advocacy—community gatherings, cultural activities, writing articles or speaking to journalists—are deemed innocuous enough to be permissible. As such, neo-institutionalist factors are ineffective in the Egyptian context.

Similarly, it is pertinent to ask why the post-nationalist hypothesis is absent or ineffective in Egypt? In order for this mechanism to work, international norms and practices must be transmitted via international bodies, such as the UN, causing domestic actors to enact more liberal policies. Indeed, representatives from both the UNHCR and IOM spoke of examples in which they had been able to successfully advocate for more inclusive policies toward migrants and refugees in Egypt regarding education. According to a Livelihoods Officer at the UNHCR Cairo office,

Practically, when they [refugees] were approaching schools and trying to get registered, we were facing a lot of difficulties. We were getting reports that they were informally informed that there were no places, and that they are not welcome. But the ministry, and the focal points from the ministry, was very helpful…We have a good role in advising the minister to issue the [educational] decree (Elite Interviewee A).

In general, those providing services to migrants and refugees reported not having any direct problems from the government in regard to their work, as the government is aware of the presence and activities of these migrant and refugee-focused organizations. In a somewhat chilling story, the director of one of the fifty-seven refugee schools in Cairo

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26 A law against protesting came into effect in November 2013 that requires three days notification before protesting. The Egyptian Ministry of the Interior also has the right to cancel, postpone or move any protest.
explained that in August 2013, the morning that Egyptian security forces attacked protestors *rabaa al-adawiya* square, he received a phone call from the Ministry of the Interior warning him not to open the school that day because of impending unrest. The school is unregistered with the government, and Egyptian authorities had never previously contacted the director. “I laughed,” the director said, “because I had actually been overseas and I had just changed my phone number only three days earlier, but they managed to get straight to me, on my mobile” (Elite Interviewee R).

However, the government only employs this hands-off approach toward organizations so long as they do not cross the line from service provision to outright advocacy. As a government official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “We differentiate between political organizations that deal with human rights, solely human rights, and organizations that deal with social welfare and economic prosperity for migrants and refugees” (Elite Interviewee AV). This division is partly reinforced by the UNHCR, which is willing to advocate on behalf of its service-providing partner organizations. A UNHCR representative stated,

> Actually in our discussions with the Ministry of Social Solidarity, we always advocate for NGOs working with the UNHCR, and we always tell them that these organizations, they do emergency assistance, they do the type of activities that are sometimes life-saving, and we cannot afford blocking activities because of bureaucracy (Elite Interviewee A).

Yet for those organizations providing not just assistance but also doing advocacy work, the current climate is debilitating. The securitization that the Egyptian state has undergone since 2013 has also spilled over into its approach to both civil society affairs and migration.
Many NGOs are unregistered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity, which did not pose a problem under the laissez-faire approach prior to the 2011 revolution (Elite Interviewee P). However, in fall 2014 all unregistered organizations were issued a mandate requiring them to register with the Ministry of Solidarity, which would then have the right to approve all organizational activities in advance. Individuals from the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) explained they had received threats from the Ministry of Interior regarding their advocacy work and were dealing with negative public perceptions of their work due to state-owned media.

It’s ridiculous. Sometimes you can’t tell them that you’re a human rights defender, you have to tell them something else. It’s not safe on the streets. And the other part of our work, making campaigns, it’s very hard because of the media. Not one voice in the media is talking about [detention]. So we can’t deal with the media. Sometimes journalists come and make reports about some [detention] case, and when they go back they can’t publish it because of the police and the newspapers (Elite Interviewee V).

The president of the Egyptian Foundation for Refugee Rights said that he has been careful in his work not to cross the line from providing legal aid for detained migrants and refugees to conducting advocacy work. He agreed that, “With this campaign against the NGOs in Egypt, I think they will not be focused so much on the people working in development or service organizations. They care about the people who work on election observing, democracy, human rights” (Elite Interviewee S). Consequently, in the post-revolution and post-coup political climate, postnationalist factors have little effect on host state engagement strategy choice, and security/politicization factors take precedence.

6.3 Morocco’s New Migration Policy

On 10 September 2013, the King of Morocco, His Majesty Mohammed VI, made an announcement that startled the country’s civil society: Morocco would be reforming its
national migration policy, including the introduction of a regularization process for irregular migrants. Following the King’s announcement, ministries were mobilized alongside the National Commission for Human Rights (known by the French acronym CNDH) to develop an implementation plan for the unfolding of the regularization process. It was decided that the process would begin in January 2014 and run for one year. Migrants would have to meet certain criteria, such as being married to a Moroccan national, or providing proof of residency in Morocco for five years, in order to be regularized. The policy changes would also involve the government taking on responsibility for refugees whose claims had previously been handled solely by the UNHCR. Lastly, informal policies of policing and mass arrests were minimized (though not eradicated) after the King’s announcement in 2013, thought by many to signal that the Moroccan government was sincere in its commitment to cultivating a new relationship with migrants.

A narrative now common to those involved with migration in Morocco is that the reform was the result of pressure emanating from civil society actors and migrant political activity; in other words, neoinstitutionalist factors. A representative from the Ministry of Migration Affairs, a ministry whose mandate was enlarged by the new law, reaffirmed this mentality, stating, “…there has never been a public policy like this [in Morocco] executed with such a high level of coordination with civil society. We do nothing without coordination with civil society” (Elite Interviewee AX). According to the official narrative, migrants and migrant-focused civil society organizations successfully demanded their rights from the government. Yet the civil society-led, neoinstitutionalist explanation fails to explain why new legislation was announced in 2013, specifically.

27 In total the Moroccan government created six criteria.
Civil society groups and migrant community organizations had been writing scathing reports and lobbying the government for years preceding the new law (Elite Interviewee X). Why did the reform suddenly occur in 2013?

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the buildup of stocks of migrants in Morocco since the 1990s gave rise to a network of international and local NGOs that provide services for migrants and refugees. Migrants themselves have also established community organizations like the Conseil des Migrants Sub-Sahariens au Maroc or the Collectif des Communautés Subsahariens au Maroc that advocate for migrant rights: the right to fair pay, access to health care, and the right to remain in the country. A turning point for many of these groups occurred in 2005 following the death of at least fifteen migrants at the hands of Spanish and Moroccan authorities while trying to scale the fences separating Morocco from Melilla and Ceuta (Goldschmidt 2006). After a series of particularly violent incidents that year, a forum was held in 2006 between European civil society groups, migrant community leaders in Morocco, and Moroccan civil society organizations, many of which had only worked tangentially on the issue of migration up until that point.

That same year, a NGO called GADEM was formed to advocate for the recognition of the rights of foreigners and migrants. A ‘Platform for Protection,’ led by GADEM, Caritas, La Fondation Orient-Occident, and other NGOs, was officially launched in 2009 and continued to solidify over the next several years, even in the face of continued violence toward migrants and the excessive use of force by Moroccan authorities (Elite Interviewee Z).

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28 GADEM is a French acronym for Groupe Antiraciste de Défense et d’Accompagnement des Étrangers et Migrants.
Concurrently, in 2006, a labor union called the Organization Démocratique du Travail (ODT) was founded. Unlike older, more established unions, this organization’s membership was young, with seventy-five per cent of members under the age of thirty. In 2012, following several incidents in which migrants were injured or killed while working informally for Moroccan companies, migrant community leaders approached the ODT and asked its leadership to consider allowing migrants to join the union. While ODT leaders initially rejected the migrants’ request, the organization’s Secretary General had recently returned from meetings with labor unions in France and the United States. There, he learned that labor groups had been largely responsible for helping migrants to gain working rights (Elite Interviewee Y). Later that year ODT leaders reconsidered the migrants’ requests and created a separate section of the organization to work solely on the issue of migration, headed by a migrant community leader. In conjunction with the broader migrant protection platform, the ODT was highly involved in pushing for migrant employment rights and working condition standards.

In August 2013, GADEM compiled a highly critical, one hundred and thirty-five page report on the status of migration in Morocco (GADEM 2013). This report provided the basis for a more condensed publication written by the quasi-governmental National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) and presented during a closed session between the Commission and the Moroccan parliament in September 2013. Shortly thereafter, on 9 September 2013, representatives from GADEM presented their report in Geneva at the 19th session of the Implementation Monitoring Committee of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members, a
convention that Morocco ratified in 1993. The next day, 10 September, King Mohammed VI announced his plans for migration policy reform.

Thus, while the official government narrative is that the reform emanated from civil society, this timeline of events has led GADEM and other civil society organizations to conclude that the primary motivation behind the King’s announcement of reform was international shaming: Morocco despises humiliation on the international stage (Elite Interviewee Z). This explanation thus encompasses a combination of postnationalist and neoinstitutionalist factors; international shaming is effective within the context of a top-down international normative environment (postnationalist), yet it was local civil society (primarily, GADEM) that brought the topic to international attention (neoinstitutionalist).

Following the King’s announcement for reform, the government has indeed reached out to civil society. Unlike the pre-2013 period, both the CNDH and the Ministry for Migration Affairs actively consulted migrant-focused NGOs on a range of issues related to the regularization process and plans for integration measures. The Secretary General of the ODT emphasized, “We are present now at all the conferences and meetings with CNDH, and we work with the Ministry of Migration Affairs” (Elite Interviewee Y). Migrant community groups noticed this change as well. A migrant from Chad who heads the Voix Des Femmes, the only female-run migrant community group in Morocco, affirmed,

Yes [we work] with them, the Ministry des Etranges Marocains, and with the International Delegation of Human Rights. And with CNDH… they’re very receptive. They’re very agreeable. They work with us after the announcement for the new law; in 2013, when the king made the announcement (Chadian Migrant A).
Following the King’s announcement and the unfolding of the migrant regularization process, individual migrants and refugees noticed a change in state policing behavior as well. A migrant residing in Oujda – a city previously known for brutal policing practices toward migrants – explained,

> Before 2013 it was bad. I live over near the university, and they would come in and demand papers and sometimes they would deport you to the border and you’d have to walk back. But then after 2013, it’s calm. The police don’t come and do that anymore (Burkina Faso Migrant A).

Similarly, a migrant from Ghana living in Tangier noted,

> I’ve never had a problem with the police. Back in 2000, 2010, 2013, it was very bad. But after 2013 everything changed for migrants. Before police would come everywhere – houses, restaurants. But now they don’t bother you. Unless you’re near the border (Ghanaian Migrant C).

However, Morocco has a long history of co-opting civil society elements in order to minimize dissent and criticism. After Mohammed VI seceded the throne in 1999, many anticipated the ushering in of a reformist era. Mohammed VI did carry out certain tasks to distance himself from the harsh rule of his father Hassan II, such as releasing political prisoners and establishing a truth and reconciliation commission to address human rights abuses (El Amrani 2012). Even then, Vairel (2013) argues that instead of opening opportunities for opposition, the succession gave way to a reinvented ‘discipline’ on the activist scene.

> One of the elements of this new discipline has been the establishment of quasi-governmental institutions, such as the CCDH, the CNDH’s precursor.29 By giving civil society actors more visibility through integration into government, the monarchy’s stronghold over these issues was simultaneously strengthened (Sater 2010). In other

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29 The CNDH was established in 2011 by Royal Decree with a broader mandate than the CCDH in order to, “…protect and promote human rights, but also to enrich thoughts and debate on human rights and democracy issues” (CNDH 2014).
words, by elevating the importance of human rights issues and bringing civil society actors on board, the monarchy also co-opted civil society actors, thereby limiting their ability to defy the state. Moroccan civil society organizations thus paid a heavy price by choosing to transform, “…their practices and policies from mobilization and street activities to participation in public policies and cooperation with the authorities” (Vairel 2013: 43).

Given this history, civil society has been weary of government-led outreach related to migration reform. At the time of interviewing, all migrants, civil society organizations, and governmental bodies were still waiting for the three new laws attached to the policy reform to be finalized and implemented: one that would regulate immigration, another the asylum system, and the third would deal with human trafficking (Elite Interviewee AW). These delays caused a representative from GADEM to question the motives of the government in enacting reform: “The question is now, was it really, did it really have the intention to change the situation or was it just a big communication event to show the international community that Morocco is doing something new?” (Elite Interviewee Z).

Other organizations argued that if Morocco had been serious about its role as a migrant host society, it would have taken integration measures to accompany the regularization campaign from the start. Mohammed Talbi, founder of ABCDS, a migrant advocacy organization located in Oujda, argues that the Moroccan government should have been proactive about sensitizing Moroccans to the presence of migrants from the outset.

The Ministry likes to talk a lot, but it doesn’t take integration seriously. If it did it would have started offering integration right away, not a year after
it issued residency permits. By now most peoples’ residency cards have expired; they were only good for one year. So now migrants have to go to the offices and renew them, and do you know what they want? They want proof of a life – a work contract or a housing contract. But migrants can’t get these things because the Moroccan people aren’t sensitized to migrants yet. So the regularization needed to also be accompanied by a sensitization process (Elite Interviewee AB).

While many civil society actors were skeptical of the reform implementation process, some individuals were more cynical about the government’s motives. Said Tbel, a representative from the Moroccan Association for Human Rights—the CNDH’s more radical, non-governmental counterpart—asserted that the regularization process is nothing more than political posturing. In his view, “…the reform is a way of appeasing European countries, which can then claim that migrants have no need to travel to Europe when integration possibilities exist in Morocco” (Elite Interviewee X). Organizations also pointed to Morocco’s mobility partnership with the EU, signed in June 2013, as a reason for their skepticism (European Commission 2013), doubting that reform can be meaningful when Morocco solidified its commitment to preventing irregular migration to Europe just three months prior to the announcement of September 2013. The partnership effectively committed Morocco to eventually sign a readmission agreement with the EU (EURA) in exchange for visa liberalization for Moroccan nationals, though no agreement has yet been agreed upon (Wolff 2014). This continued commitment to border security and combatting irregular migration to Europe suggests that the securitization/politicization factor is still highly influential in determining Morocco’s engagement strategy choice.

In line with the distrust expressed by civil society actors, a worrying incident occurred in February 2015 when Moroccan authorities conducted the first large-scale,
post-2013 police raid on a migrant settlement on Morocco’s northern coast (Associated Press 2015). According to an individual at GADEM who was monitoring the situation, this raid was more centrally organized and systematically orchestrated than any previous attack, perhaps ushering in yet another era marked by violence and exclusionary treatment toward migrants (Elite Interviewee Z). The director of Caritas, the main provider of health services to migrants and refugees in Rabat, shared this concern, stating, “The migrants who were caught [after the raids], now they are coming to the center. So they [the government] promised them that they would receive the regularization, but it’s just that – a promise” (Elite Interviewee AQ).

When asked about this return to securitized policies, a representative from CNDH, the quasi-governmental human rights body, hypothesized,

I would think that it [has] to do with the fact that we’ve regularized people, and now the people that have not been regularized…Okay, we haven’t seen deportations as such, but they try to get them as far away from the Spanish border as possible. Because that’s where they were arrested, in Nador, that’s right next to Melilla. And the Gurugu forest, they kind of…cleared the whole forest, burnt down tents (Elite Interviewee AW).

Migrants and the organizations advocating on their behalf wanted to know if the new law and the regularization process was a momentary shift, followed by a return to securitization, or a real change in government mentality? One Cameroonian migrant explained,

Because if there’s integration, the people who died trying to go to Spain, to Europe, they will not try and go. They go there to find integration, to find work, to become independent economically. So if there is integration here, there will be no problem (Cameroonian Migrant A).

With the announcement of its new policy, the Moroccan government appears to be attempting two different approaches simultaneously. The first is the co-optation of civil
society: domestic human rights actors, international migrant-focused organizations, and migrant community organizations. By inviting these actors ‘to the table’ regarding the implementation of the reform process and by undertaking periodic consultations with them, the government—in particular the newly expanded Ministry for Migration Affairs—reduces the risk of criticism that could, and has, hurt Morocco’s reputation internationally. Vairel (2013) describes this process as the state ‘modifying its form of domination.’ At the same time, Morocco wants to uphold its commitments to the EU, particularly Spain, by returning to its raid-and-arrest police tactics in the north of the country, demonstrating that the security/politicization factor remains influential.

A third explanation for the timing of the policy reform suggested by some civil society groups and migrants is the country’s desire to play a leading role in Africa, both economically and geo-politically. There is evidence that just prior to the King’s announcement in 2013, Morocco began to look toward West Africa for new trading partners and as a possible sphere in which to project its influence. As an illustrative example, several months prior to the migration reform announcement, King Mohammed VI visited Senegal where he and president Macky Sall signed two bilateral agreements; one increasing cooperation on international land transport of goods and persons, and one related to mining, hydrocarbons, electricity, and renewable energies (Tamba 2013). Additionally, just following the announcement of the migration policy reform, on 19 September 2013, Moroccan King Mohammed VI made a trip to Mali to attend the inauguration of Mali’s new president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita; a trip, “So stark and brash… that many [saw] in it a major attempt to realign power relations in North Africa and the Sahel” (Morgan 2013). In May of the following year Morocco and Mali signed an
MOU related to mining and the processing of hydrocarbons (ONHYM 2014). International relations likely have at least some effect on Morocco’s engagement strategy choice, tied primarily to Morocco’s interests in Africa and its most pressing foreign policy concern: Western Sahara. This will be discussed further in Chapter 7 as it interacts with the cultural embeddedness factor.

6.4 Turkey’s New Law on Foreigners

Turkey’s engagement strategy choice, and specifically its 2013 policy reform, is driven primarily by security/politicization factors and international relations. On 4 April 2013 Turkey adopted Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection, and a common narrative is that the new law is tied to the EU accession process (Kilberg 2014). While initial efforts toward accession, which began in 2005, did spur discussion of reshaping existing legislation related to migration, policy reform in this area continued even after EU accession negotiations were stalled and shelved indefinitely in 2006. Kirişçi (2012) notes that it is difficult to judge the extent of the EU’s impact on Turkish migration reform, since the EU came on to the scene at a time when a ‘paradigmatic shift’ was already occurring among Turkish officials (73).

Metin Corabatir, former UNHCR Turkey deputy director and current director of an Ankara-based research group called IGAM, attributes Turkey’s continued efforts to high-level meetings held between Turkish government members and EU officials in 2007, just after negotiations came to a halt (Elite Interviewee AJ). During these meetings, Turkish officials were quietly told they needed to deal with the country’s immigration issues. The government officials responded to this request by tasking two inspectors from

30 IGAM is short for İtica ve Göç Araştırmaları Merkezi, meaning Migration and Asylum Research Center in English.
the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) with conducting a needs assessment in 2008.

Considering that migration to Turkey was such a low priority issue at the time, it is difficult to understand what incentivized MOI officials to follow through on EU requests. Oktay Durukan, director of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, an advocacy organization based in Istanbul, argues that even though migration was not high on the overall political agenda, a certain clique—a team of bureaucrats from the Migration Asylum Bureau (part of the Turkish police force at the time) and a small group within the Turkish Ministry in charge of EU Negotiations—had come to understand the significance of migration and asylum in a regional sense; namely

The way in which it was such an important political issue in many EU member states, and the way in which migration, asylum and borders was gradually turning into a very comprehensive, broad agenda of cooperation between Turkey and the EU that, you know, actually went beyond the confines of the accession (Elite Interviewee AG).

Yet post-nationalist influences also contributed to the timing of Turkey’s reform. Kirişçi (2012) argues that the response by the MOI was primarily driven by several cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), particularly the 2009 case of Abdolkhani and Karimnia in which Turkey deported two Iranian refugees to Iran and denied them access to contest deportation decisions. Specifically, Kirişçi notes

During the period from 1991 to 2008 there had been 13 cases that were taken to the Court and only one had led to a conviction against Turkey. However, the case of Abdolkhani and Karimnia was followed by twelve additional cases culminating in rulings of convictions and most accompanied with demands for compensation to be paid to the complainants (77, emphasis in original).

Thus, while the EU accession and international relations provided the initial trigger for reform, the continued impetus was driven by an understanding and acceptance of
Turkey’s new migratory role among a certain, critical faction of the government, coupled with international shaming at the European level.

While conducting the needs assessment the two MOI inspectors learned of the many flaws with existing migration legislation and practice. Civil society actors were already aware of the protection gap surrounding migrants and refugees. Oktay Durukan recalls

Very early on we identified that although Turkey was actually receiving refugees, there was no domestic law framework for Turkey to manage asylum, and actually migration asylum, you could say. It was a field left to the national police, foreigners department of the police, to manage from a very narrow, security perspective, with insufficient expertise and resources (Elite Interviewee AG).

Once the MOI inspectors began collecting testimonials and information from civil society groups, they realized that piecemeal reform would not be sufficient to address all the existing gaps surrounding international protection and migration management and that instead, a systemic overhaul was needed.31

The drafting of the law continued over the next five years and in 2013 Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection was passed. The new law covers policy toward all foreigners residing in Turkey, including refugees and irregular migrants as well as European nationals who come to work or buy property in Turkey. Importantly, the law transferred responsibility over migration matters from the Turkish police to a newly-created civil body, the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM), with the plan to eventually have an office in each governorate of the country staffed with specialists trained in handling migrant affairs.

31 Despite the reform process, Turkey maintains its geographical limitation in regards to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention. According to a key informant who was involved with the drafting process, lifting the geographical limitation was never up for debate (Elite Interviewee K). The drafting committee was fearful that addressing this controversial issue would jeopardize the success of the entire law.
Meral Ackgoz, an IOM employee seconded by the MOI to participate in drafting the new law, attributes the law’s success to the leadership and diplomacy of the two investigators, particularly that of Atilla Toros, who has since been named head of the DGMM (Elite Interviewee K). Turkish police units that had been responsible for managing migration affairs up until that point proved reluctant to relinquish their control over duties like issuing residency permits because of the import it allotted their institution. Consequently, Atilla Toros and his team were careful not to remove any police officers from their posts and were vigilant about constantly updating and informing them of his activities—what Meral Ackgoz describes as his ‘diplomatic’ nature (ibid). Atilla Toros also went to great lengths to keep the issue of migration from becoming politicized while attempting to ‘sell’ the legislation to various ministries and members of parliament prior to voting. Ackgoz explains, “He [Atilla Toros] knew the state of play, and so, accordingly, he had been convincing people. But at a substantive level, not only at a discourse level” (ibid). Toros’ strategy was successful and the new law was adopted in 2013, passed unanimously by Turkish parliament.

Though the new law moved Turkey closer toward a liberalizing engagement strategy, civil society organizations have become weary of movement to securitized policies, partially due to the mass influx of Syrian refugees over the last several years. When the new law was passed in 2013, Syrian refugees had already been arriving in Turkey for two years, but the approximately 400,0000 Syrians in the country at that time (Elite Interviewee I) pales in comparison to the estimated 3 million Syrians in Turkey at the time of writing in early 2017. While the initial government response was welcoming and financially generous, Turkey’s hospitality toward Syrians started to wear thin in
2014. Echoing the objections usually heard from right-wing parties in Europe and the United States, Turkish nationals began to vocalize their resentment toward the presence of Syrian refugees, accusing them of taking Turkish jobs, increasing local rents, and being able to access universities without having to sit for the same examinations as Turkish students (Cetingulec 2014). Syrian refugees were also a major point of contention in the lead up to the June 2015 parliamentary election, with the main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), going so far as to propose sending refugees back to Syria if the party managed to come to power (Daily Sabah 2015).

As a result of this type of criticism, the AKP government took measures to limit the gathering of data related to Syrian refugees, both by UN bodies and humanitarian NGOs, and also by academics affiliated with universities and research centers. As a deidentified UN official attested, providing services and assistance is particularly challenging when little is known about the demographic in need (Elite Interviewee L). Additionally, Turkey capitalized on European fear during the 2015 refugee crisis by negotiating an up-to 6 billion Euro aid package coupled by the reinvigoration of EU accession negotiations and visa liberalization for Turkish nationals. The aid package will be partially used to fund services for Syrian refugees, but will also be used to help fortify borders and further prevent irregular migration from Turkey to Europe (Albayrak 2015). The failed military coup of July 2016 and Prime Minister Erodğen’s increasingly authoritarian response to those he believes were involved threatens to dismantle any progress toward accession talks and enhanced EU relations, though cooperation may continue so long as Europe fears increased irregular migration arrivals.
Lastly, when the official transfer of responsibility from the police and the Ministry of the Interior to the newly created DGMM took place on 18 May 2015, the DGMM was not yet fully prepared in terms of capacity and staffing. The Deputy General Coordinator of the Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) explained that in the provincial DGMM offices, “They just switched all the positions from Turkish national police positions into DGMM positions. I mean, one police officer just took off the uniform and now he’s wearing this DGMM uniform” (Elite Interviewee AI). Coupled together, and considering that Turkey still maintains a geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention, these events have led to doubts as to whether the emergence of the new law reflected a sincere change in government mentality and an acceptance of Turkey’s role as receiver of migrants and refugees, or whether the reform was driven purely by political power motives with little change on the ground.

As with Egypt, it is pertinent to ask why neoinstitutionalist factors have been ineffective in Turkey? Like both Egypt and Morocco, there is a divide in Turkey between NGOs providing health, shelter, and legal services for migrants and refugees, and other groups, such as Helsinki Citizens Society (founded in 2005) and the Migrant Solidarity Network (founded in 2009) that focus primarily on advocacy. Remaining ‘neutral’ allows service-provision organizations more access to government contacts and a less conflicted working relationship. As the Director of a material-support focused organization called Human Resource Development Foundation explains,

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32 The mysterious death of Festus Okey, a migrant from Nigeria, on the 20th of August 2007 from gunshot while in detention at the Beyoglu Police Station, was perhaps one of the most important turning points in raising public awareness of police treatment of undocumented migrants in Istanbul that instigated the creation of the Migrant Solidarity Network (Biehl 2013).
We have contacts with [advocacy groups] but we did not get into those networks, because we are working or providing services to refugees…For NGOs that are providing services, we have too much contact with Turkish authorities. So we do not want to be in those networks because Turkish authorities or the individuals at the units, we experienced that they became, they behaved badly to refugees when we accompanied them (Elite Interviewee AE).

While in Istanbul there are numerous migrant organizations founded mainly by migrants from the Balkans, Caucuses, Central Asia and Iraq, most of the activities of these organizations are limited to cultural events or to raising awareness about the political situation in their countries of origin (Biehl 2013). While some of these organizations lobby for migrants’ rights in Turkey and have developed social service programs, such as the Iraqi Turks Association of Culture and Solidarity and the Afghan Turkmen Social Assistance and Solidarity Association, migrants without legal status generally refrain from engaging in protests or other forms of overt advocacy (ibid).

A notable protest did occur in 2008, when migrants being held at the Kumkapi ‘Foreigners Guest House’ in Istanbul started an uprising in protest to the poor conditions in which they were being held. Treatment in detention centers had previously been widely criticized by various human rights organizations, with migrants complaining of being unable to apply for asylum, not understanding why they were detained or when they would be released, and of unhealthy detention conditions and physical abuse. The two-hour long protest at Kumkapi, which received national and international attention, was brought before the Human Rights Council of the Governor’s Office, resulting in the establishment of The Commission on Migrants, Refugees and Human Trafficking and some improvements to the conditions of the Kumkapi facility. Nonetheless, Biehl (2013)

33 ‘Foreigners Guest Houses’ are effectively migrant detention centers where apprehended foreigners are held until deportation arrangements can be made (Beihl 2013).
notes that the Commission was also handicapped in their ability to enact any major reforms in the absence of national legislation pertaining to migrants and refugees.

The inability for migrants and refugees to engage in overt political advocacy in Turkey is unsurprising considering the increasingly authoritarian environment in Turkey where even protest by citizens has been hampered. In 2010 the AKP government passed a constitutional referendum on judicial reform, leading to curtailed freedom of expression, assembly, and of the press. In 2013 the Gezi Park protests were suppressed with tear gas and water cannons, leading to 11 deaths, over 8,000 injuries, and more than 3,000 arrests (Amnesty International 2013b). More recently, assaults on freedoms of expression and of the press have picked up pace following the foiled July 2016 coup attempt. Since declaring a state of emergency after the failed coup attempt, President Erdoğan has dismissed tens of thousands of academics, teachers and civil servants, purged the armed forces, detained journalists and shut more than a dozen media outlets as of December 2016 (Yeginsu and Timur 2016).

6.5: Lessons in Policy Change from Global South Host States

Returning to the question of which factors derived from the experiences of Western migration-receiving countries travel to the Global South context, this chapter illustrates that only some factors are effective due to the legal and political nature of the semi-authoritarian states under study.

First, neo-institutionalist and postnationalist factors can influence outcomes in some cases, but they operate differently than in Western states. Outright protest by migrants and refugees and their civil society partners is often not permissible, though in Morocco some protests have been allowed. Further, civil society advocacy organizations
are more likely to succeed in lobbying for improved treatment of migrants and refugees at the international level, via the United Nations or, in the case of Turkey, at the ECtHR, as semi-authoritarian host states are more likely to respond to international shaming than to pressure from domestic judiciaries. Similarly, a host state’s enactment of a liberalizing policy may be an act of co-optation in order to reduce international criticism, rather than the influence of human rights norms adopted at the domestic level.

Second, international relations factors should take into account both sending states and powerful neighboring states or bodies, such as the EU. Morocco illustrates how diplomatic relations with both West African sending countries and the EU can influence engagement strategy outcomes, and can lead to either repressive, securitized policies or liberalizing policies depending on the desired goal of the sending or neighboring state.

Third, security/politicization and political economy factors operate similarly in both Western and Global South states, though security/politicization concerns takes precedence. While labor market and economic needs generally trump sensationalist concerns in liberal democratic states (Castles 2004), security/politicization factors win out in the semi-authoritarian context. Egypt illustrates how political economy factors have incentivized a continued ambivalence, though the unstable post-2011—and even more so, post-2013—political climate has led to a more securitized approach whereby the state is willing to expend additional resources for the purposes of policing, detention and deportation of refugees and migrants, moving Egypt further away from ambivalence and closer toward a repressive strategy.
The next chapter will directly address the cultural embeddedness factor; namely, are some nationalities of migrants and refugees treated differently than others in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, and is this related to the cultural foundations of each state?
Chapter 7: Differential Treatment by Nationality

This chapter explores whether migrants and refugees residing in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey experience differential treatment according to their cultural, national or religious background. It pays particular attention to whether a migrant or refugee’s experience in the host state, and specifically the treatment incurred by host state authorities, varies according to cultural embeddedness factors, rather than how long an individual spends in the host state and his or her legal status.

7.1 Culture and Host State Integration

The cultural embeddedness thesis, purported by Brubaker (1992) and previously mentioned in Chapter 2, is the idea that the cultural foundations of nation-states act to restrain and bind a community through nationhood. Brubaker argues that the historical path a country takes toward nationhood, embodied in distinctive ways of thinking about belonging, informs the ways that a country develops citizenship and immigration policies (ibid). While other scholars have since criticized Brubaker’s cultural embeddedness thesis as too rigid (Joppke 1999), the general assertion that states possess institutional and cultural legacies that affect how they conceive of and treat non-citizens remains intact.

The perception of shared culture, from the perspective of host states as well as individual immigrants, is cited in the migration literature as a strong indicator of successful socioeconomic integration outcomes in Western countries (Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Adida et al 2010; Danzinger and Laitin 2014).

Importantly though, integration is a two-way street, meaning that both host state policies and individual migrants’ decisions can affect whether or not an individual
becomes economically or socially integrated into a host state society. In the context of states like those of Europe, North America and Australia, much attention has been paid to the factors that determine an immigrant’s willingness and ability to participate politically in his or her new society. The literature tells us that many of the demographic traits associated with political activity among native-born individuals are also associated with immigrant’s political activity, including race, gender, education, occupation, language ability, marital status, and age (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009). But there are also characteristics that are distinctive of immigrants—such as nationality, duration of stay, date of entry, and perception of nativist threat—that are relevant for immigrant integration outcomes (ibid). Modood (2009) also demonstrates that an immigrant’s religious background may facilitate or hinder his or her involvement with host state political activities, such as participating in a protest movement, a ‘moral crusade,’ or supporting a candidate for office.

While it has not been studied to the same extent, cultural traits may affect integration outcomes, and host state treatment, for migrants and refugees in Global South states as well. For the countries included in this study, religion and the state overlap in various capacities (Brown 2002; Hirschl 2010). With the exception of Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Israel, MENA countries declare Islam as the state religion, and Islamic law serves as either a principle or supplementary source of the national legal framework (Brown et al 2006). However, even in states where Islam is specifically mentioned in the constitution, the Islamic character of the state exists in tension with other schools of

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34 Non-state actors, such as employers, can also affect an immigrant’s socioeconomic integration outcomes, and have been shown to display preferences for certain types of immigrants. For example, employers in Western Europe have been shown to favor immigrants who are coethnics or from the same religion over those who are more culturally distant (Firth 1981, Adida et al. 2010).
thinking in regards to membership and belonging; namely, pan-Arabism and the modern, secular conception of the nation-state.\textsuperscript{35} Abu-Sahlieh (1996) argues that while the concept of the modern nation-state appears to have triumphed in regards to citizenship and residence, elements of the other two schools of thought are also present and persistently in tension with each other.

In this chapter I ask: is differential treatment according to nationality experienced by migrants and refugees in Global South host states? If so, is this differential treatment related to the concept of cultural embeddedness, or the cultural legacy of the host state? And further, how does cultural embeddedness interact with the other factors influencing engagement, including international relations and security, discussed in Chapter 6?

7.2: De Jure Preferential Policies

The question of whether certain groups of migrants and refugees receive preferable treatment in Global South host states needs to be separated into its \textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} aspects. Examples of \textit{de jure} privileging include instances in which certain nationalities are given access to host state services or are not required to obtain a work permit in order to participate in the host state economy. This section focuses on the \textit{de jure} instances of privileging in each host state, with some references to \textit{de facto} practices, as well as the reactions from individual migrants and refugees to any preferential treatment.

\textsuperscript{35} Pan-Arabism refers to the idea that each individual Arab country belongs to a larger 'Arab nation,' and was a prominent ideology at various points and in various forms throughout the twentieth century (Dawisha 2003). Conversely, the idea of 'regionalism' rejects the idea of pan-Arabism and asserts that the modern division of the Arab world into nation-states, and the subsequent rise of individual country-level nationalism (for example 'Egyptian-ness'), is the defining feature of modern Arab countries (Abu-Sahlieh 1996). These different conceptions have implications for groups of migrants residing in MENA countries. As Abu-Sahlieh (1996) asserts, if a purely Islamic conception of the state is adopted then each Muslim is part of the Islamic ummah ('nation') and can travel wherever he or she wants in dar al-islam (the land of Islam), benefiting from the same rights as other Muslims. If the concept of pan-Arabismism is adopted, then Arab citizens benefit from rights that non-Arabs cannot have since they are considered to be foreigners. Lastly, if the concept of the nation-state is adopted, only the citizens of the state can benefit from all the rights while the others are considered as foreigners whatever their religion (Abu-Sahlieh 1996).
Of the refugee and migrant groups present in Egypt, Sudanese and Syrians receive *de jure* access to certain services that are not allotted to other nationalities. Specifically, Sudanese and Syrian refugee children are permitted to attend primary school for free. In the case of the Sudanese, this is due to the Four Freedoms Agreement signed in 2004, and in the case of Syrians, an exceptional decree was issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Education in 2012 (Elite Interviewee A). This *de jure* privileging of Syrians and Sudanese by the Egyptian government in comparison to other national groups is most often attributed to cultural familiarity. One Eritrean migrant noted, “Eritrea has a different language, different culture, so they have a harder time integrating. It’s like, Sudanese, they’re Arab. Like Egypt, like Syria. But Eritrea has its own culture. So life here is hard for Eritreans” (Eritrean Migrant B).

Yet the idea of shared culture between migrants or refugees and the Egyptian population is not easily demarcated. Some South Sudanese and Sudanese migrants and refugees interviewed for this study expressed a sense of ‘African solidarity’ in that they believe the Egyptian government privileges Syrians or other ‘Arab’ nationalities over those from Africa. As one Sudanese stated, “Yes, there’s more services for Syrians, Libyas, Iraqis, *keda*. All the Arab groups” (Sudanese Migrant J). And yet three of six Eritreans interviewed in Egypt explained that Sudanese are considered by the Egyptian

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36 Prior to 1995, the 1976 Wadi El Nil agreement between Sudan and Egypt gave Sudanese access to education, health services, property ownership, and employment, but this ended in 1995 after an assassination attempt on former President Mubarak, allegedly committed by individuals linked to the Sudanese government (Karasapan 2016). The Four Freedoms agreement, signed in 2004, reenacted some of these rights for Sudanese citizens residing in Egypt, but is not necessarily enforced in practice (CARIM 2004).
government to be ‘Arabs,’ as opposed to Africans. One argued, “Yes, there’s some discrimination. For example, if you’re Eritrean and you don’t have your residency visa they’ll throw you in jail. But it’s not like that for Sudanese or Syrians” (Eritrean Migrant C). From the perspective of the Eritreans, this ‘Arab-ness’ comes with certain privileges. Sudanese migrants and refugees can therefore be simultaneously African and Arab, depending on the point of view in question.

The responses from Syrians in regard to preferential treatment were mixed. Some Syrians believed their national group to be the worst off in terms of treatment. One Syrian refugee living in Alexandria explained, “The treatment here [makes] us want to leave. Maybe from the sea, to another country. The treatment is very, very bad. Unlike the Sudanese, or the Libyans, and Somalis. No, the treatment is very bad for the Syrians” (Syrian Migrant C). Others indicated that Syrians are treated more favorably, even in light of the events following the removal of former President Mohammed Morsi from political office that targeted Syrians specifically.

I think Africans have it worse than Syrians. Maybe it’s because they always come here illegally. And right after Morsi was forced out, things were bad for Syrians, mostly from the Egyptian people. They didn’t trust us, they thought we were all affiliated with the ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood]. But in general, Egyptians trust the Syrians more. We’re they’re Syrian brothers, you know? For Africans it’s more difficult (Syrian Migrant A).

While de jure privileging of Sudanese and Syrians does occur in Egypt regarding access to education, and in some cases healthcare, the perception that this is based on culture requires further examination, especially as each national group is likely to perceive their own group as being the worst off regarding treatment from host state authorities.

7.2.2 Morocco
One widely-recognized *de jure* preferential policy in Morocco is that certain nationalities are not required to go through the normally burdensome process for obtaining a work permit. A convention dating from the 1950s exempts nationals of Tunisia, Algeria and Senegal from having to go through the process run by the *Agence Nationale de Promotion de l’Emploi et des Compétences* (ANAPEC) which requires individuals to demonstrate that they are more qualified than Moroccans for a position (Escoffier et al. 2008). Normally, an employer seeking to hire a foreign national would have to post an advertisement in both French and Arabic to see if there are any Moroccans who are qualified for a position, and give preference to any Moroccan who is qualified for the job. Consequently, among West African migrants in Morocco, Senegalese are seen as a privileged group that does not have to comply with this requirement. Regarding this perceived favoritism one migrant from Cameroon remarked, “Yes, Senegalese, they get some benefits because of the relationship between Senegal and Morocco. [It’s] better than Cameroon, for example” (Cameroonian Migrant D). One migrant from Mali attributed this privilieging to political, cultural, and religious factors,

> The Senegalese community, they are a priority in everything...Because Senegal and Morocco have a good relationship. You know, diplomatic relations, race relations, religious relations. And the relation[ship] is very, very good (Malian Migrant A).

Some Senegalese agreed with this depiction, stating that culture and diplomatic ties are the factors behind the privileging of Senegalese.

> Well with Moroccan people, they like people from Senegal. They’re gonna think, oh Senegal, good. Muslim. You have two things, you’re Muslim and you speak French. But if you’re from, like, Nigeria, you’re not Muslim and you don’t speak French. You know, it’s not the same. You have more difficulties to speak with people, to make them understand who you are, what you want (Senegalese Migrant B).
But even for Senegalese who are *de jure* privileged in Morocco regarding the ability to access employment, many still face other barriers. For example, Senegalese must still obtain a residence permit, or *carte de sejour*, in order to remain legally in the country. As a representative of the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) notes,

> If in practice that makes it easier for Senegalese to get a job, and then through that job, being able to apply for a *carte de sejour*, is different….it’s a lot more hassle to hire someone who has to go through an ANAPEC process, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that those who are exempt have it much easier (Elite Interviewee AW).

Like other West African migrants and refugees, Senegalese individuals also reported that they face discrimination and racism in Morocco regarding access to employment and other necessities like housing.

> They think that people from France or from America…when you have the same diploma, and you are applying for the same job, they’re going to prefer these people to you. Yea. For me, it’s racism. Or if me and you are going to rent a flat, they’re going to rent to you, but for me, they think, oh he’s Black, he’s going to make noise. You have clichés, and stereotypes (Senegalese Migrant B).

In addition to Senegalese, Syrians are also seen as a favored group by the Moroccan government, according to other migrant and refugee nationalities. Syrians themselves also described preferential treatment, and attributed this to cultural factors.

> Maybe for the Moroccans, maybe they love the Syrians more than the Africans. Because there is a relationship, with language, with religion, with history (Syrian Migrant G).

It is important to note though, that most Syrians currently residing in Morocco have been in the country for several decades and arrived long before the 2011 crisis erupted in Syria (Elite Interviewee AW). As a result, these individuals have had many years to establish business relations with Moroccan nationals and form their own community networks in the host state. This longevity may have also affected their *de facto* treatment in the host state, as will be explored in Section 7.3.
7.2.3 Turkey

At the time of interviewing for this research in 2015, Syrian refugees were viewed as a favored refugee group in Turkey, even while many Syrians face economic hardship and discrimination. While neither Syrian nor non-Syrian refugees qualify for full refugee status in Turkey as a result of the geographical limitation Turkey holds to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Syrian refugees fall under a different legal category than non-Syrians. Unlike other refugees, Syrians residing in Turkey have what is called ‘temporary protection,’ which allots them certain rights in addition to those granted under conditional refugee status. Temporary protection is a category that can be applied by the government to any group entering Turkey in mass numbers, and was applied to Syrians in 2011. Unlike other refugee groups, Syrians in Turkey are not subject to the satellite city system described in Chapter 5 and are allowed greater freedom of movement in Turkey. Their cases are handled solely by the Directorate General for Migration Management and its provincial offices, and refugee status determination for Syrians is conducted by the government rather than the UNHCR. Syrians are legally tied to their city of registration and are required to seek a travel permit before traveling or moving to another province, but, practically speaking, the only factor tying Syrians to a specific location is that they can only receive access to full health care services and education for children in their initial city of registration.

Syrians also have easier *de jure* access to the labor market. For a company to hire a non-Syrian refugee, it must have at least five Turkish nationals already employed: a five-to-one ratio for every foreigner. Additionally, the company must be able to prove that no Turkish national is equally eligible for the job, and the refugee must possess
certain skills or training that makes him or her more qualified than any Turk for that position. These bureaucratic barriers to entering the formal labor market were eased for Syrians in 2016 in the midst of the ongoing negotiations between Turkey and the EU, though the new policy only saw a 5,500 increase in the number of Syrians able to obtain a work permit (Kaymaz and Kadkoy 2016). This is likely due to several factors, at least one of which is the burden that obtaining a work permit places on employers: they must agree to pay Syrian employees the minimum wage and provide them with health benefits. In a saturated market with Syrians who are otherwise willing to work informally for much cheaper, most employers will not agree to take on these additional requirements.

The differing status between Syrians and non-Syrians has in some cases provoked resentment on behalf of other refugee groups who have been residing for longer in Turkey, but even within the Syrian population there is de facto differential treatment. Some Syrians are ethnically Turkmen, who speak a language that is much closer than Arabic to Turkish and thus have an easier time integrating within the Turkish community. As a UN employee working on education for Syrians in Turkey notes, “…there’s Turkmen Syrians [who] speak the language more or less…And depending if they live in a community that’s heavily Syrian or more mixed with Turkish, they may already speak some Turkish” (Elite Interviewee L). Conversely, Syrian Kurds face a difficult situation in Turkey due to the on-going tensions between the Kurdish minority areas and the central Turkish government. When the city of Kobani was under siege in northern Syria in 2014, the Turkish government initially refused to allow Kurdish Syrians to cross the border, though it eventually reneged and established temporary camps for them inside
Turkey (Elite Interviewee AJ). As the Vice Chairman of the Asylum and Migration Research Center (IGAM) in Ankara notes,

[At] first the government resisted. But the refugees are ethnically Kurds, and for them it is a kind of Kurdish solidarity. The government opened big camps, but the people did not want to go. And the municipalities, the fact that they are running out of money, they do not want them. So a lot of difficulties, lots of nationalism, nationalistic (Elite Interviewee AJ).

Some Syrian interviewees acknowledged the de jure privileging of their nationality in Turkey. One Syrian man in Gaziantep stated, “For example, the Iraqis and Iranians, the difference for them in Turkey, the Syrians are fortunate to receive a lot of help from the Turkish government” (Syrian Migrant M). But others disagreed, believing that the sheer number of Syrians in Turkey was leading to exclusionary treatment and pushback. One Syrian man in Istanbul commented, “Yes, Syrians have a more difficult time because of the number. There’s so many Syrians now” (Syrian Migrant J). Another individual in Gaziantep, speaking metaphorically, explained,

In the beginning you could maybe get some food or some blankets, but now there’s nothing. In the beginning you and me are friends. But now you say, ‘I’m tired of being friends. I don’t want this friendship anymore. You should go now.’ But where can we go? Or, for example, let’s say you have a baby in your house, and the baby is crying. You come to the house with the police and you say that if the baby doesn’t shut up, it’s going to be out on the streets. It’s either be quiet, or you have to go out on the street (Syrian Migrant L).

While I was unable to speak with Iraqis or Iranians in Turkey to understand whether they feel disadvantaged in Turkey, an Afghan migrant explained that in his view Afghans also receive favorable treatment and attributed it to cultural links.

One [factor] is religion. [Afghans] share the same religion, most are Muslim Sunnis. And the other thing is history. Turkey and Afghanistan have a history. In WWI when they were fighting the Ottoman Empire, Afghans and Pakistan people, like Muslims from South Asia, they came here to help the Ottoman Empire. They’re always talking about this. Turkish companies are doing lots of investments in Afghanistan. And they always say, yea, you are our Muslim brothers, you helped us many years
ago and now we’re helping you. That’s how they are doing business, it’s a capitalist thing that they do.

While this individual arrived in Turkey from Afghanistan in the 2000s, there were earlier groups of Turkmen Afghans who arrived in Turkey as refugees during the Cold War in the 1980s. These groups formed organizations that eventually were able to lobby the Turkish government for citizenship in exchange for political support (İçduygu and Kirisci 2009). An African migrant from Congo who has lived in Turkey for two years also observed a perceived favoritism toward Afghans and Iraqis, attributing it to religious and racial preferences.

But in general the relations with Turks are not very good. They’re not very open as a people. I have two Turkish friends. I think it’s different for other groups like Iraqis or Afghans, maybe because of religion, or because African migrants stand out so much because of their skin (Congolese Migrant C).

To conclude then, some groups—Turkmen Afghans historically and Syrians more recently—have experienced both de jure preferential policies and de facto preferential treatment in Turkey, which some interviewees attribute to cultural ties.

This section focused on certain policies and practices in each host state that privilege specific migrant and refugee nationalities over others, and also provided anecdotal evidence linking this privileging to cultural factors. The next section examines quantitative data that compares the cultural background of migrants and refugees with other factors that might affect outcomes; namely, how long a migrant or refugee spends in the host state and whether an individual has legal status.

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37 Specifically, a small group of 5,200 Turkish speaking Afghans from UNHCR camps in Northern Pakistan were accepted by Turkey as ‘national refugees’ (Kirişçi 1991).
7.3 Outcomes in the Host State

To further examine host state outcomes and to assess whether these vary according to cultural factors, I divided migrant and refugee interviewees into two groups: those classified as ‘African’ nationals, and those classified as ‘Arab.’ As explained in Section 7.2, I acknowledge that the distinction between an ‘African’ and ‘Arab’ ethnicity can be malleable. For example, Sudanese migrants and refugees can be simultaneously African and Arab, depending on the point of view in question. Nonetheless, this demarcation is employed in order to further examine the thesis that host state outcomes depend on whether a migrant or refugee is considered a co-cultural. I compare the results to two other factors that are likely to affect outcomes based on the existing literature: the length of time that a migrant or refugee spends in the host state, and whether an individual has legal status in the host state. Using the quantitative dataset described in Chapter 3, I look at the following outcomes: access to hospitals and whether assistance was provided, access to education for those with children and whether assistance was provided, treatment and policing by host state authorities, and two types of participation: political participation and participation in migrant/refugee community groups.

To begin, I asked interviewees about accessing two specific types of services: health care and education for their children, if applicable. 59.2 per cent of individuals

---

38 Syrian was the only nationality included under “Arab” (n=14). All other nationalities were grouped under “African” (n=64). Two nationalities (Afghanistan and Filipino) were excluded for the purpose of the quantitative analysis.

39 I demarcate between individuals who have spent less than two years in a host state and those who have spent two or more years residing in a host state. Based on my conversations with the 80 interviewees, two years is the best approximation of the time it takes to become situated in the host state: to learn about neighborhoods, to establish relationships with other nationals from one’s home country residing in the host state, to potentially find a job, and to learn both the formal and informal rules of the host state.

40 This can include either refugee or asylum-seeker status or a valid residency permit (carte de sejour) in the case of regularized migrants in Morocco.
said they had been to a hospital or clinic in the host country. Of those individuals, only 32.3 per cent had some form of financial assistance when doing so. For those who received assistance, 54.5 per cent received assistance from the host state government in the form of free treatment at a hospital, and 45.5 per cent received assistance from an NGO. Arabs were more likely than Africans to visit a hospital, but were not more likely to have assistance to do so.

Table 7: Access to a Hospital by Migrant and Refugee Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Visited hospital</th>
<th>Assistance for visiting hospital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59.2% (42)</td>
<td>40.8% (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>63.2% (36)</td>
<td>36.8% (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>38.5% (5)</td>
<td>61.5% (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 years</td>
<td>73.3% (11)</td>
<td>26.7% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 years</td>
<td>55.4% (31)</td>
<td>44.6% (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Legal Status</td>
<td>50% (23)</td>
<td>50% (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Legal Status</td>
<td>76.0% (19)</td>
<td>24.0% (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 27.7 per cent of interviewees had children with them in the host state. 76.2 per cent of those interviewees with children enrolled them in school (whether government-run, community organized, or private), and 66.7 per cent of those with children in school received some form of assistance. 41 44.4 per cent received assistance from the host state government, in that enrollment in public school was free, and 55.5 per cent received assistance from an NGO. As can be seen in the figure below, Arabs were more likely than Africans to have their children enrolled in school, and were also slightly more likely to receive assistance for doing so.

41 One individual reported having children but did not answer the question about whether the children were in school and was counted as missing for the remaining questions about assistance.
**Table 8: Access to Education by Migrant and Refugee Characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Children attend school</th>
<th>Assistance for school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (children)</td>
<td>Yes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23.8% (5)</td>
<td>76.2% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>31.3% (5)</td>
<td>68.8% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>100.0% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 years</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>100.0% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 years</td>
<td>31.3% (5)</td>
<td>68.8% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Legal Status</td>
<td>25.0% (4)</td>
<td>75.0% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Legal Status</td>
<td>20.0% (1)</td>
<td>80.0% (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, I asked interviewees about two perception questions relating to the privileging of certain nationalities by host state authorities. First, I asked whether treatment from host state authorities varied by nationality; are certain groups privileged over others? 34.4 per cent stated that privileging does occur, while 65.6 per cent claimed that all migrant/refugee groups are treated the same. Of those who felt that privileging of certain groups does occur, the most common nationality mentioned in Egypt was Syrians, Senegalese in Morocco, and Syrians in Turkey. It is important to contrast this to statements made in Section 6.2, which anecdotally indicate that privileging does occur. However, my data indicates that it is the minority, not the majority, of migrants and refugees who perceive that certain nationalities are privileged, and that this does not vary significantly by whether an individual is Arab or African.

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42 Eighteen individuals did not respond and are counted as missing for this question.
Table 9: Attitudinal Measure of Host State Privileging of Certain Nationalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Believes some nationalities are privileged in host state</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65.6% (40)</td>
<td>34.4% (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>68.0% (34)</td>
<td>32.0% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>66.7% (6)</td>
<td>33.3% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 years</td>
<td>88.9% (8)</td>
<td>11.1% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 years</td>
<td>61.5% (32)</td>
<td>38.5% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Legal Status</td>
<td>66.7% (28)</td>
<td>33.3% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Legal Status</td>
<td>63.2% (12)</td>
<td>36.8% (7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, I asked migrants and refugees whether certain nationalities are targeted by police or other authorities in the host state. 66.7 per cent stated that they did not think migrants or refugees are targeted by host state authorities, while 33.3 per cent felt that these groups are targeted.\(^{43}\) Africans and Arabs were equally unlikely, on average, to say that privileging of certain groups occurs.

Table 10: Attitudinal Measure of Host State Targeting of Certain Nationalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Believes certain nationalities are targeted by host state authorities</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66.7% (48)</td>
<td>33.3% (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>67.9% (38)</td>
<td>32.1% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>64.3% (9)</td>
<td>35.7% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 years</td>
<td>80.0% (12)</td>
<td>20.0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 years</td>
<td>63.2% (36)</td>
<td>36.8% (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Legal Status</td>
<td>63.3% (31)</td>
<td>36.7% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Legal Status</td>
<td>73.9% (17)</td>
<td>26.1% (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to asking about the perception of policing of certain groups, I also asked interviewees whether they had ever personally had trouble with host state authorities. This could include neighborhood raids, getting stopped at a checkpoint, or having trouble

\(^{43}\) Eight individuals did not respond and are counted as missing for this question.
while trying to renew a residency permit. 75.7 per cent of interviewees responded that they had not had trouble with a host state authority, while 24.3 per cent reported that they had had trouble with an authority during their residency in the host state. Arab interviewees were slightly more likely than Africans to have had trouble with a host state authority, though the larger discrepancy was between those who had legal status and those who did not.

Table 11: Trouble With Host State Authorities by Migrant and Refugee Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has had trouble with host state authorities</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75.7% (56)</td>
<td>24.3% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>75.9% (44)</td>
<td>24.1% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>71.4% (10)</td>
<td>28.6% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 years</td>
<td>80.0% (12)</td>
<td>20.0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 years</td>
<td>74.6% (44)</td>
<td>25.4% (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Legal Status</td>
<td>78.0% (39)</td>
<td>22.0% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Legal Status</td>
<td>70.8% (17)</td>
<td>29.2% (7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lastly, I asked interviewees questions about their community and political participation in the host state in order to gauge their connectedness to other migrants and refugees. 60.8 per cent of interviewees participated in community organizations run by migrants and refugees themselves, whether with only members of their same nationality or in a community group open to various nationalities. 39.2 per cent stated that they did not belong to any community group. African interviewees were much more likely than Arabs to participate in a community organization, though the larger discrepancy is between those who spent less than two years in the host state (13.3 per cent) versus those who spent two years or more (71.9 per cent).

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44 Six individuals did not respond and are counted as missing for this question.
45 One individual did not respond and is counted as missing for this question.
Table 12: Participation in a Community Organization by Migrant and Refugee Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Participates in a community organization</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39.2% (31)</td>
<td>60.8% (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>31.3% (20)</td>
<td>68.8% (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>76.9% (10)</td>
<td>23.1% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 years</td>
<td>86.7% (13)</td>
<td>13.3% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 years</td>
<td>28.1% (18)</td>
<td>71.9% (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Legal Status</td>
<td>34.0% (18)</td>
<td>66.0% (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Legal Status</td>
<td>50.0% (13)</td>
<td>50.0% (13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 14.1 per cent of interviewees participated in some kind of political activity in the host state, while 85.9 per cent had not. Of those who participated, 36.3 participated in a demonstration against the host state government (4 individuals), 27.3 participated in a demonstration against the UNHCR (3 individuals), and 36.3 per cent (4 individuals) participated in some other kind of activity that they considered political, such as writing a newspaper article or speaking to a journalist, speaking at a conference or forum, or participating in a labor organization. African interviewees were only slightly more likely than Arab interviewees to participate in a political activity, though for the most part refugees and migrants of all backgrounds refrained from political participation.

Table 13: Participation in Political Advocacy by Migrant and Refugee Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Participates in political advocacy</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85.9% (67)</td>
<td>14.1% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>84.1% (53)</td>
<td>15.9% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>92.3% (12)</td>
<td>7.7% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 years</td>
<td>93.3% (14)</td>
<td>6.7% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 years</td>
<td>84.1% (53)</td>
<td>15.9% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Legal Status</td>
<td>85.9% (67)</td>
<td>14.1% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Legal Status</td>
<td>96.2% (25)</td>
<td>3.8% (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two individuals did not respond and are counted as missing for this question.
To summarize then, the outcomes in which Arab migrants and refugees—who are considered to be ‘culturally similar’ in the host states examined for this study—fare better than African migrants and refugees are access to hospitals and education. For other outcomes—policing and treatment by host state authorities, community and political participation—cultural factors did not appear to matter as strongly as whether an individual has legal status or the amount of time that an individual has spent in the host state.

7.4 The Cultural Embeddedness Factor in Comparison

This section examines the privileging of co-cultural migrants and refugees, whether *de facto* or *de jure*, from the perspective of the host state’s security and diplomatic interests. In doing so, it compares the cultural embeddedness factor to two other factors—security and international relations—discussed in Chapter 6. In each host state, I find that the privileging of co-cultural migrants or refugees emanates primarily from the state’s domestic and political interests rather than as a result of cultural factors. I also find that this privileging can be overridden should a culturally-similar group be perceived as a security threat in the host state.

7.4.1 Egypt

The case of Syrians in Egypt demonstrates that perceived cultural affinity with the host population does not always benefit migrants and refugees, particularly during times of domestic instability or during periods of tension between the migrant sending state and the host state. As discussed briefly in Chapter 6, a preference for culturally similar migrants or refugees appeared to underlie decisions made by the government of former President Mohamed Morsi in regard to Syrian refugees. When Syrians began arriving en
mass in 2012, former President Mohamed Morsi announced that all Syrian migrant children residing in Egypt would be granted enrolment in public schools regardless of official UNHCR status and that Syrian families could access Egyptian public hospitals free of charge (Elite Interviewee AK). If Egypt’s modus operandi toward other migrant and refuge groups is one of ambivalence, then this recognition and willingness to offer services to Syrians represented an anomalous break. Further, if a supposed lack of capacity had been preventing Egypt from extending state services to other groups previously, then one would expect this to be an even more difficult challenge with the country’s comparatively large Syrian population.

It became clear in hindsight that this decision was not motivated by cultural affinity for Egypt’s ‘Syrian brothers’ but was instead politically motivated by Morsi’s desire to show solidarity with Syrian opposition forces. Yet as a result of this affiliation, following the Egyptian military coup in July 2013 that ousted former President Mohamed Morsi, Syrians in Egypt became the subject of a government-organized media campaign that referred to the group as ‘terrorists,’ allied with the Muslim Brotherhood and former President Mohamed Morsi’s supporters (Elite Interviewee A). While the special treatment—healthcare and access to primary education—extended to Syrian refugees under former President Mohamed Morsi was technically upheld by the subsequent military government, the de facto treatment of Syrians changed dramatically, causing many Syrians to flee to other countries if they had the financial means to do so.

By 2014 the situation was less dire for Syrians, though other national groups also had trouble. In June 2013 disagreements arose between Ethiopia and Egypt over the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia (Witte 2013). Egypt and Ethiopia
both consider the Nile River to be a vital water and electricity resource (ibid). As a result of Egyptian news reports condemning Ethiopians and predicting nation-wide water shortages in Egypt, Ethiopian migrants and refugees were evicted by Egyptian landlords and harassed by Egyptians in the street (Elite Interviewee C). While the construction of the Renaissance Dam is a foreign policy issue and arguably fairly removed from everyday interactions between Egyptians and migrants, Egyptian media helped to make the issue highly personal.

In the second half of 2015 there were also a number of incidents directed toward the Sudanese migrant and refugee community in Cairo (The Center for Refugee Solidarity 2016). In the period preceding parliamentary elections in Egypt at the end of 2015 there was a documented increase in the arrests of Sudanese nationals and stories of abuse in police custody (ibid). According to The Center for Refugee Solidarity that was monitoring the situation at the time, rising tensions between Egypt and Sudan were primarily due to accusations that Egypt was holding parliamentary elections in the Halayeb triangle, a disputed territory on the borders of Sudan and Egypt (ibid). While Sudanese migrants and refugees in Egypt have previously benefited from historic ties between the two countries, as well as from the 1976 Wadi al-Nil Agreement and increased cooperation between the Sudanese and Egyptian governments in recent years, this recent rupture indicates that Sudanese are as susceptible as other nationalities when it comes to strained diplomatic relationships.

Contrasting the case of Syrians with Ethiopian and Sudanese nationals illustrates that negative host state relations with a sending country can impact culturally similar and culturally dissimilar migrants and refugees alike. While culturally similar migrants and
refugees (Syrians, and by some considerations Sudanese) may receive *de jure* preferable consideration, all migrants and refugees are at risk of exclusionary treatment should they be perceived as a security risk or should the relations between their home state and Egypt become antagonistic.

**7.4.2 Morocco**

Viewed through the lens of geopolitical concerns, the privileging of certain West African migrants over others can be understood as emanating from Morocco’s foreign policy and economic interests, with particular regard to issue of Western Sahara, rather than originating primarily from cultural ties. Connected to the foreign-policy goal of projecting influence in Africa discussed in Chapter 6, it is also speculated that Morocco’s 2013 migration reform was at least partially a bid for the support of African countries in Morocco’s control of Western Sahara, an ongoing conflict that remains a taboo subject in Morocco. Ownership over Western Sahara has been a key concern for the monarchy since independence in 1956. From a Moroccan perspective, all territories that were unlawfully occupied by colonialists prior to independence should have become part of Morocco, including Western Sahara. The importance of the claim to Western Sahara is not purely political; it is also a matter of religion. Even under Spanish colonial rule, residents of Western Sahara looked to the Moroccan monarch as the religious sovereign. The possibility of Saharawi independence therefore threatens the religious legitimacy of the Moroccan crown (Sater 2010).

Since Hassan II’s rule, gaining support for Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara has been a major driver of foreign policy. Morocco has been willing to compromise on many issues with the EU, partly for trade purposes but also because the EU secures
Morocco’s financial, military and energy needs, allowing it to continue its Western Saharan strategy (Sater 2010). This has also impacted Morocco’s relationship with the United States; in exchange for U.S. support regarding the Western Sahara, Morocco has been willing to take a soft stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict (ibid). In an interesting juxtaposition, Theofilopoulou (2010) notes that while the U.S., France and several members of the EU have recognized Kosovo’s independence, they have refused to accept the same option for Western Sahara, demonstrating that for these key actors bilateral interests have priority over efforts to seek a fair and long-term solution to the conflict (ibid).

While Morocco has been able to gain support from Western countries on the issue, the diplomatic struggle has been more difficult on the African continent. Sarter (2010) argues that this is because of broad support among African nations of the Sahrawi’s right to self-determination, as well as general acceptance of the principle of inherited colonial borders. However, West African support for Western Sahara has recently been on the rise. When King Mohammed VI visited Senegal in May 2013 to sign trade agreements, Senegalese President Macky Sall announced that, “Morocco’s initiative for a broader autonomy of the Western Sahara region constitutes the ideal solution to the conflict” (MACP 2013). The Cote D’Ivoirian leadership has also been persuaded by Morocco. On 13 March 2015, the ambassador of Côte d’Ivoire to the United Nations, Youssouf Bamba, was removed from office after stating that the Western Sahara was the only territory not yet autonomous in Africa (News Abidjan 2015). This statement clearly ran contrary to Moroccan, and thus Côte d’Ivoirian, interests.
Government-affiliated officials interviewed for this research were unwilling to discuss the topic of Western Sahara directly, but several migrants claimed that the topic of Western Sahara factored into the everyday treatment of certain nationalities residing in Morocco. As discussed in Section 7.2, Senegalese and other select Francophone sub-Saharan migrants are sometimes acknowledged to receive better treatment than other groups. While some individuals suggested that cultural proximity and language are the primary factors influencing host state treatment, others attributed this disparity to whether or not one’s home country supports Morocco’s Western Sahara policy. One Ghanaian migrant explained,

There’s a very big difference. Migrants are being treated here according to their nationality. They won’t say this but the reality on the ground is they’ve being treated differently…If you’re from West African countries, you’re a friend of Morocco. But if you’re from a country that’s supporting the Polisario, it’s trouble. And the police know. But this, they won’t tell you. No migrant would dare to say this, but everyone knows (Ghanaian Migrant A).

An individual from the IOM in Rabat confirmed this suspicion.

Yes, that’s definitely the case. I mean, there would be no indication from the government. But if they [the government] tell authorities that they should treat [migrant] nationalities differently, then obviously the Western Sahara topic comes up (Elite Interviewee H).

This suggests that geopolitical factors play at least some role in the differential treatment sometimes experienced by West African migrants and refugees in Morocco, and that the enactment of migration reform in Morocco was at least partly related to its claim of ownership over Western Sahara.

7.4.3 Turkey

Interviewees from civil society and international organizations in Turkey noted that the government has responded with an uncharacteristically strong hand to the Syrian refugee
influx. As a NGO director in Istanbul who has been working on refugee issue for more than twenty years stated,

Turkey has by and large responded positively, uncharacteristically positively, to the refugee influx from Syria. This looks nothing like what Turkey did in response to the Kurds from Syria in the aftermath of the first and second wars in Iraq. This looks nothing like how Turkey has been treating the mass influx of people from the Balkans throughout the 90s, this looks nothing like the way Turkey has been treating Iraqis, Iranians and Afghanis who have been arriving (Elite Interviewee AG).

Interviewees also remarked that since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has attempted to manage the situation on its own terms, reflected in the government’s initial reluctance to accept international aid. An individual at a UN agency in Ankara explained, “The government, at the beginning, was clear that they would provide all the services. So there wasn’t much space for international agencies at the beginning of the crisis” (Elite Interviewee L). The Deputy General Coordinator of an NGO that assists with RSD and service provision in Ankara explained that Turkey wanted to project the image that the country, “…is strong enough to tackle this problem, and the Syrians are our brothers, [so] please don’t try to interfere [with] our relation, Turkey has this capacity to manage this” (Elite Interviewee AI).

However, the Turkish government had no way of anticipating that the number of Syrian refugees would rise to approximately three million in the course of five years. Turkey’s willingness to allow international organizations to assist with the crisis changed beginning in 2014 as more international organizations were been permitted to operate inside Turkey, but a representative of IOM explained that, nonetheless, “Turkey is providing all the assistance and they are in the driver’s seat, so our role as IOM and UN is much more to support the work of the government” (Elite Interviewee I). Turkey’s leading role is also reflected through financial allocations; the Turkish state spent
between $9 and $10 billion as of May 2016, primarily directed toward the government-run refugee camps established in the country’s Southeast.

Yet Turkey’s desire to appear capable of managing the Syrian situation through the DGMM and the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) is not necessarily in line with the government’s institutional abilities. While the government has biometrically registered 2.7 million refugees, UN officials and NGOs indicated that the Turkish government had not been collecting enough information during registration, focusing only on basic biometrics. This is potentially detrimental in terms of conducting vulnerability assessments—done by the government instead of the UNHCR—for the purpose of targeted aid or selecting individuals for resettlement. In order to manage such a large population, the government has attempted to minimize the internal movement of Syrians by only providing full access to services for those who remain in their initial city of registration or in camps, even though Syrians are spread throughout the country and in major cities including Istanbul, Ankara or Izmir.

Despite any known limitations, projecting the image of Turkey as a high-capacity state is critical to the AKP’s relations with Europe. The government underlined its capability at every opportunity during the 2016 EU/Turkey negotiations in order to demonstrate the extent to which Turkey has invested in hosting Syrians, and to emphasize that the EU needs to offer further aid in the name of burden-sharing. The AKP government has also been under pressure domestically to continue showing support for Syrian refugees. An NGO director in Istanbul sees the AKP’s Syrian refugee policy as,

…an extension of their Syrian policy at large, so if you’re going to engage with the conflict in Syria, of course you’re going to welcome the refugees escaping that conflict in Syria, for which you can see that the Assad
regime is responsible, and you’re actually arming the opposition to take Assad down, so all of those things (Elite Interviewee AG).

The outwardly warm reception of Syrian refugees by the AKP has been criticized by political opponents as a ploy to gain future voters. Erdoğan’s announcement in July 2016 that “our [Syrian] brothers” would be granted citizenship, and the voting rights that this would entail, “…provides a mechanism for transforming refugees’ gratitude into political support” (Hintz and Feehan 2017). A MP with the Republican People’s Party (CHP), one of Turkey’s opposition parties, told the news outlet Hürriyet that if Erdoğan’s citizenship plan goes through there will be over one million new voters that could, “…change the outcome of the [2019] election” (Pitel 2016).

While Turkey’s reception toward Syrians can be viewed through the lens of cultural preference for culturally similar refugees, the AKP’s use of this group for domestic and international political gains reveals that its intentions are more likely a result of political maneuvering than cultural embeddedness. As acknowledged in Section 7.2, Turkmen Afghans and Syrians have received preferential treatment from the Turkish government historically and in the present that may attributable, at least in part, to cultural preferences and easier language acquisition. Yet the AKP’s actions make it clear that the seemingly preferential treatment allotted to Syrians in general is more a reflection of the host government’s political and diplomatic incentives than perceived cultural affinity.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter explored why migrants and refugees residing in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey may experience differential treatment according to their cultural, national or religious background. Using quantitative data derived from interviews with individual migrants
and refugees in each host state, it found that cultural factors can have a bearing on integration outcomes in some cases—namely, regarding access to health care and education. Yet for other outcomes—policing and treatment by host state authorities, community and political participation—cultural factors do not appear to matter as strongly as whether an individual has legal status or the amount of time that an individual has spent in the host state.

Second, this chapter explored the impact of the cultural embeddedness factor and differential treatment according to one’s nationality in comparison to other factors discussed in Chapter 6: specifically, international relations and security. Based on an analysis of the political incentives underlying the *de jure* and *de facto* treatment of certain groups in each host state, qualitative interview data shows that the privileging of co-cultural migrants or refugees may actually emanate primarily from the state’s diplomatic and political interests rather than as a result of cultural factors. The analysis also shows that any privileging can be overridden should a culturally-similar group be perceived as a security threat in the host state.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

This dissertation explored the phenomenon of migrant and refugee settlement in three Global South countries—Egypt, Morocco and Turkey—from the perspective of migrant and refugee groups as well as each host state. It argued that while existing citizenship and migration scholarship asserts that host countries essentially have two policy options regarding the treatment of migrants and refugees on their territory—integration or exclusion—we should also consider the concept of ambivalence; aware of the presence of migrant and refugee groups, a host state chooses not to directly engage such groups. Instead, it relies on international organizations and NGOs to carry out engagement on its behalf, which has tangential benefits for the host state. In this chapter I revisit the hypotheses surrounding ambivalence outlined in Chapter 2, and also address the scope conditions of my argument.

8.1 Revisiting Hypotheses

$DV_1$: Ambivalent

_Hypothesis 1: Global South host states will employ ambivalence when confronted with a growing migrant and refugee population because it constitutes the policy option requiring the least amount of institutional output._

In Chapter 4 I explained that ambivalence refers to official inaction on the part of the host state government, even as the state allows other actors to carry out engagement on its behalf. I demonstrated that in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey were able to use ambivalence to manage the social and political implications of their new inward migration due to three primary factors: migrants and refugees found ways to integrate into large informal economies, international organizations and domestic organizations intervened to provide essential services, and the
issue of migration was not so highly politicized that it gained prolonged traction in media or amongst the national population. By allowing migrants and refugees to integrate in a *de facto* sense through minimal government intervention and by relying on international organizations to provide primary services, these host states derived international credibility while only exerting minimal state resources.

I also demonstrate that ambivalence is different from a host state ‘doing nothing’ (DV₀) in that ambivalence requires a relationship with international organizations and NGOs that step in to engage directly with migrants and refugees on the state’s behalf. This indirect form of engagement is unique from neglect or ‘doing nothing’ in that the state is aware of the presence of migrants and refugees, but is refraining from a hands-on approach with them. Conversely, the absence of engagement, or ‘doing nothing,’ would mean that a state not only has no direct relationship with the migrants or refugees on its territory, but also has no relationship with international organizations or civil society actors that provide services. I demonstrate that an ambivalent strategy is tenable until the diplomatic, economic or security incentives surrounding migration change, as explained in Hypotheses 2 and 3.

*DV₂: Liberalizing*

*Hypothesis 2A: Global South host states will employ a liberalizing policy to avoid international shaming or when doing so allows them to co-opt domestic civil society critics.*

In Chapter 5 I examined the reasons behind the Moroccan and Turkish governments’ choices to employ liberalizing policies in 2013. I explained that while the official government narrative of policy change in Morocco is that the reform emanated from civil society, a closer examination reveals that the primary motivation behind the King’s
announcement of reform was international shaming. This explanation thus encompasses a combination and perversion of the postnationalist and neoinstitutionalist factors; international shaming is effective within the context of a top-down international normative environment (postnationalist), yet it was local civil society actors that brought the topic to international attention (neoinstitutionalist). In order to prevent future shaming, the Moroccan government instigated reform and co-opted civil society critics, including international and domestic NGOs and migrant community groups. By inviting these actors ‘to the table’ regarding the implementation of the reform process and by undertaking periodic consultations with them, the government—in particular the newly expanded Ministry for Migration Affairs—reduced the risk of criticism that could, and has, hurt Morocco’s reputation internationally.

In Turkey the decision to reform the country’s migration policy was driven in party by several cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)—particularly the 2009 case of *Abdolkhani and Karimnia* in which Turkey deported two Iranian refugees to Iran and denied them access to contest deportation decisions (Kirişçi 2012)—and perceived diplomatic benefits from its European neighbors (Hypothesis 2B).

*Hypothesis 2B: A Global South host state will enact a liberalizing strategy if doing so will reap economic or diplomatic benefits from either a powerful neighboring state or a geostrategically important sending state.*

The case of Morocco demonstrates that the use of migration policy as an instrument of influence can be directed toward sending states. One explanation for the timing of the Moroccan policy reform discussed in Chapter 6 is the country’s desire to play a leading role in Africa, both economically and geo-politically. If Morocco wants to take on a leadership position, then it must put on a welcoming face toward migrants from African
countries. Tied to the foreign-policy goal of projecting influence in Africa, the migration reform was also at least partially a bid for the support of African countries in Morocco’s control of Western Sahara, as discussed in Chapter 7.

In Turkey, the EU accession process of the mid-2000s provided the initial trigger for its policy reform. Beginning in 2004, through the mechanism of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the European Union incentivized Turkey to begin examining and conforming its domestic legislation in several policy areas, including migration, to meet EU standards. Yet even after negotiations with Europe fell apart, migration reform in Turkey continued as a result of the factors detailed in Hypothesis 2A.

As such, in both the Moroccan and Turkish cases, migration policy reform was used to, a) avoid international shaming, and b) reap diplomatic benefits from neighboring states. The cases of Morocco and Turkey thus suggest that these two factors are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a Global South host state to enact a liberalizing policy.

**DV3: Repressive**

_Hypothesis 3A: Global South host states will employ a repressive strategy when security concerns trump the economic benefits of employing an ambivalent strategy._

Egypt illustrates how political economy factors have incentivized a continued ambivalence, though the unstable post-2011 political climate has led to a more securitized approach whereby the state is willing to expend additional resources for the purposes of policing, detention and deportation of migrants and refugees, potentially moving Egypt closer to a repressive strategy. While African migrants and refugees were sometimes detained and deported prior to 2013 (Elite Interviewee AM), this increasing securitization began in earnest with the case of Syrian refugees. Following the Egyptian
military coup in July 2013 that ousted former President Mohamed Morsi, Syrians became the subject of a government-organized media campaign that referred to them as ‘terrorists’ allied with the Muslim Brotherhood and former President Mohamed Morsi’s supporters. At the time of interviewing one year later in 2014, concerns over ‘terrorism’ and its alleged links with migrants in Egypt had spread to all migrant and refugee nationalities. While Egypt remains primarily ambivalent, this hypothesis explains its recent move toward a more repressive and securitized engagement approach.

**Hypothesis 3B:** Global South host states will employ a repressive strategy when the investment in doing so is offset by economic or diplomatic benefits derived from agreements with a powerful neighboring state.

In Morocco, European funding incentivized a less-ambivalent, more repressive policy in the pre-2013 era. Beginning in 2002 when the EU provided €70 million for the development of Northern Morocco to encourage European Readmission Agreement negotiations along with several other financial incentives (Wolff 2014), Morocco criminalized irregular migration, established strict sanctions for the support and organization of irregular migration, and increased human and technological control capacities at Morocco’s borders with Algeria and Spain (Natter 2015). The Moroccan government also conducted raids on migrants living in cities, and forcibly deported migrants across the border into Algeria. While these policies required greater institutional output on behalf of the Moroccan state, the diplomatic and economic benefits derived from Europe were deemed worth the investment. However, the incentives changed for Morocco in 2013, due to the factors outlined in Hypothesis 2. Morocco moved toward a more liberalizing policy post-2013, but because of its reaffirmed commitment to
preventing irregular migration via a European Union Mobility Partnership signed the same year, the state retains a partly repressive strategy toward migrants and refugees.

8.2 Addressing Alternative Explanations

In Chapter 2, I presented three alternative explanations for the factors driving host state engagement decisions: (lack of) host state capacity, the size of a host state’s migrant or refugee population, and the cultural background of migrants or refugees. My dissertation addressed all three factors, showing that strategic, geopolitical and security factors are more determinative in driving engagement decisions than any of the alternative explanations.

Elsewhere it has been argued that states with low or minimal capacity are unable to enact a liberalizing or repressive strategy (Betts 2010a; Hollifield 2004), and instead resort to ambivalence. Only when states gain more capacity are they able to enact a policy that requires greater institutional output. I demonstrated in this dissertation that when Morocco and Turkey implemented their policy changes in 2013, their capacity did not suddenly change. Rather, these states decided to move away from ambivalence and actively redeploy state funding and resources to the institutions that deal with migrants and refugees due to perceived political gains.

Similarly, as Egypt moved toward a more repressive strategy post-2013 that requires active policing, it also choose to redeploy resources for the purpose of (negatively) engaging with migrants and refugees. In the case of all three host states—Egypt, Morocco and Turkey—I demonstrate that geostrategic imperatives and international perceptions drive engagement decisions more than the capacity of each host state. Capacity is therefore not only an empirical reality but also a perception that can
serve strategic purposes, and this influences the choices that host states make regarding migrant and refugee engagement.

Rather than the sheer number of migrants or refugees present in a host state influencing policy choice, I demonstrate that whether and how states choose to take responsibility for migrants and refugees—as opposed to leaving the task to international actors—may depend on the origin of the refugees themselves, in as much as these groups can provide geostrategic advantages to the host country. Even though Syrians outnumber other groups, supporting Syrian refugees has been useful to both Turkey and Egypt because of perceived international gains, whereas these host states do not derive the same benefit from other refugee populations. The same is true for Morocco and sub-Saharan migrants, even though the number of migrants in Morocco is not particularly large. However, if Morocco wants to position itself as a leader in West Africa in order to encourage trade and gain regional political clout, then supporting these populations is beneficial.

Lastly, my dissertation addressed the cultural embeddedness thesis through an examination of the political incentives underlying the de jure and de facto treatment of certain groups in each host state. Qualitative interview data shows that the privileging of co-cultural migrants or refugees emanates primarily from the state’s domestic and political interests rather than as a result of cultural factors, and also that any privileging can be overridden should a culturally-similar group be perceived as a security threat in the host state.

8.3 Scope Conditions and Avenues for Future Research
An examination of the cases of Egypt, Morocco and Turkey shows that we can better understand the migrant and refugee engagement strategies of Global South host states if we take into account ambivalence as a measurement component, in addition to the state’s goal of inclusion versus exclusion. Highlighting the idea of ambivalence offers a dynamic explanation of engagement in Global South host states, elucidating approaches that might otherwise be considered neglect or an absence of engagement. By including non-traditional measures of engagement, we can understand what types of policies do occur in MENA host states where migration is an increasingly important phenomenon with implications for governance, stability, and human rights protection.

This research also has implications for our understanding of state capacity in semi-authoritarian countries. In theory illiberal states should be highly capable and competent to take on state-building projects and to make unilateral decisions, as they are less constrained in their actions than liberal democratic countries. In practice though, the inverse is true: authoritarian regimes are most often associated with weak state capacity and low economic development. As Hall and Ikenberry (1989) explain,

> The notion of state capacity is not straightforward: above all it is an error to equate the strength or autonomy of the state with the ability of state elites to ignore other social actors or to impose their will in any simple manner on society. If this were the case, totalitarian states, which seek to suppress the independence of other social actors, would be most capable of realizing state goals and of promoting larger social purposes (95).

For Mann (1988), an important element of capacity is predicated on the state’s infrastructural power to, “…penetrate and centrally coordinate civil society through its own infrastructure” (7). In this sense, states in the Middle East have generally been considered weak (Dorman 2007). Yet crucially, this infrastructural weakness does not imply a lack of strategic decision-making, or an unwillingness to expend state resources...
when the incentives are in place. Through my historical and contemporary analysis of the willingness of the Egyptian, Moroccan and Turkish states to engage—either directly or indirectly—with migrants and refugees on their territory, I problematize simplistic understandings of state capacity and demonstrate the strategic use of migration policy choices.

Importantly, the countries examined for this study—Egypt, Morocco and Turkey—are all transit-turned-host countries along three different but popular migration routes leading to Europe. To further develop the concept of ambivalence, future work might assess the scope conditions of this argument. For example, can ambivalence be utilized as a long-term strategy, as in the cases of Jordan or Lebanon that have hosted refugees for more than six decades in addition to various migrant populations? Furthermore, does this theory travel outside of the Middle East and North Africa to state in other regions such as South America or Asia undergoing a similar transformation from countries of conduit to countries of settlement?

Lastly, the findings of this dissertation contribute to the growing literature that examines whether or not theoretical understandings of the treatment of migrants and refugees, derived predominantly from the experiences of Western Europe and North America, are applicable in the context of illiberal countries in the Global South. By modeling host state engagement policies in three semi-authoritarian Middle Eastern and North African host states—Egypt, Morocco and Turkey—I turn this question on its head, demonstrating that engagement decisions in Global South host states can have important similarities to those utilized by countries in Western Europe and North America. I argue that both illiberal and liberal democratic host states utilize ambivalence to varying
extents, and further research is needed in order to assess additional similarities and differences between host state engagement policies in the Global North and Global South.
References


## Appendix A: Elite Interview Methods Table

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<th>Length</th>
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<td>Founder and Director, Egyptian Foundation for Refugee Rights (EFRR)</td>
<td>Conducted in person 10/27/2014</td>
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<td>Elite Interviewee T</td>
<td>Head of Syrian Project, Egyptian Foundation for Refugee Rights (EFRR)</td>
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<td>Coordinator, Groupe Antiraciste D'Accompagnement et De Defense Des Etrangers et Migrants (GADEM)</td>
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<td>AC</td>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>Professor of Law, Istanbul Bilgi University</td>
<td>Istanbul, Turkey</td>
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<td>AE</td>
<td>Director, Human Resources Development Foundation (HRDF)</td>
<td>Istanbul, Turkey</td>
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<td>AF</td>
<td>Trafficking Officer, Human Resources Development Foundation (HRDF)</td>
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<td>AG</td>
<td>Founder and Director, Helsinki Citizens Assembly</td>
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<td>AI</td>
<td>Deputy General Coordinator, Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants (ASAM)</td>
<td>Ankara, Turkey</td>
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<td>AJ</td>
<td>Vice Chairman, Asylum and Migration Research Center (IGAM)</td>
<td>Ankara, Turkey</td>
<td>Conducted in person 5/27/2015</td>
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Coordinator, Resala Cairo, Egypt    Contacted by email; no response

Organizer, Refugees Solidarity Movement Alexandria, Egypt    Contacted by phone; unable to meet

Director, Psycho-Social Services and Training Institute in Cairo (PISTIC) Cairo, Egypt    Contacted by email; unable to meet

Director, Groupe Antiraciste D'Accompagnement Et De Defense Des Etrangers Et Migrants (GADEM) Rabat, Morocco    Contacted by email; no response

Director, Fondation Rabat, Morocco    Contacted
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<th>Medium</th>
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<td>Communications Manager, Save the Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinator, Terre des Hommes</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
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<td>Program manager, World Food Program</td>
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<td>Program Officer, Terre</td>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>Ambassador &amp; Chairperson of the National Coordinating Committee On Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration</td>
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<td>Alexandria, Egypt</td>
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<td>Head of Program for Migrants and Refugees, Conseil National des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH)</td>
<td>Rabat, Morocco</td>
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<td>AX</td>
<td>Head of the Department of Immigrants, Ministry of Foreign Moroccans and Migrant Affairs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deputy Director of the Consular Department for Egyptian Expatriates, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ambassador, Spokesman for the President</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
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<td>Judge, Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>Political Counselor, United States Embassy</td>
<td>Rabat, Morocco</td>
<td>Met in person; declined</td>
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<td>Communications Manager, Le Conseil de la communauté marocaine à l'étranger (CCME)</td>
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<td>Board Member, Conseil National des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH)</td>
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<td>Assistant Migration Expert, Directorate General for Migration Management (DDIM)</td>
<td>Ankara, Turkey</td>
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Appendix B: Descriptive Characteristics of Migrants and Refugees

In total 80 refugees and migrants were interviewed for this study. 66 per cent of interview subjects were male and 34 per cent were female. On average interviewees were 33.4 years old. I grouped interview subjects’ reasons for leaving their home country into four broad groups: political, economic, war, and other. 21.3 per cent of interviewees left their home country for political reasons, 27.5 per cent due to economic reasons, 35 per cent because of war, and 16.3 per cent fell into the “other” category. Responses grouped into this category included family reunification, corruption, studies, and two individuals who were born in the host state but are still considered migrants due to the inability to obtain host state citizenship.

On average, migrant and refugee interview subjects had been living for 6.6 years in their respective host state, with a range from 1 year to 35 years. I decided to create a dichotomous variable out of the number of years each individual spent in the host state, with two years as the cut-off point. Based on my conversations with the 80 interviewees, two years is the best approximation of the time it takes to become situated in the host state: to learn about neighborhoods, to establish relationships with other nationals from one’s home country residing in the host state, to potentially find a job, and to learn both the formal and informal rules of the host state. Upon dividing interview subjects into two groups, twenty per cent had lived in the host state for less than two years, and eighty per cent lived in the host state for two years or more. If broken down by country, 18.2 per cent of migrants had lived in Egypt for less than two years, while 81.8 per cent lived in Egypt for two years or more. 15.8 per cent of migrants lived in Morocco for less than two years, while 84.2 per cent lived in Morocco for two years or more.
And 44.4 per cent of interview subjects in Turkey lived in that host state for less than two years, while 55.6 per cent of interview subjects in Turkey lived there for two years or more.¹

80 per cent of interview subjects were employed, though the vast majority of employment was in the informal economy of the host state. 33.8 per cent of interview subjects were employed in the NGO sector, often working as translators or community liaisons for either international NGOs or local NGOs that are often internationally funded. 15 per cent of migrants and refugees interviewed worked in restaurants or coffee shops, sometimes run by other migrants/refugees or other times run by host country nationals. 3.8 per cent of interviewees were employed as domestic workers, including cleaning ladies, nannies or drivers for the households of host country nationals. 5 per cent of interviewees worked in construction or factory jobs, though interview subjects noted that often this work was only available on a day-to-day basis without promises of future employment. 18 per cent of interviewees had employment categorized as “other,” including professional sports, trade between the individuals’ home country and the host country, selling items as a street vendor, gardening, teaching, working in a call center, and working as a shop assistant. Lastly, 3.8 per cent were students. While not technically employment, enrollment at a host state university allowed individuals to obtain legal status and gave them an affiliation.

65 per cent of interviewees had some form of legal status in the host state, while 32.5 per cent were irregular migrants. Legal status means that an individual was able to obtain a residency permit as a result of his or her refugee or asylum-seeker status,² employment, student enrollment,

¹ The larger percentage of interview subjects in Turkey who had been living in that host state for less than two years, in comparison to the percentages in Morocco and Egypt, is a result of interviewing primarily Syrians in Turkey, many of whom only recently (within the past two years) left Syria.
² This also includes temporary protection or conditional refugee status in the case of Turkey.
or as a result of having being successfully regularized in the case of Morocco. Specifically, 36.3 per cent of interviewees were recognized asylum-seekers or refugees, while 60 per cent were not.
Appendix C: Interview Guides

Interview Guide for Elites

*This guide was also translated into Arabic and French.

Section 1: Background Information

1. Which organization do you work for? What is your role there?

2. Please tell me about the work of your organization. What was its original mandate and what is its current focus? How long has it existed in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey]?

3. Does your organization have any direct interaction with the [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] government? If so, please describe this relationship.

4. Have you worked for any other migrant or refugee-focused organizations?

Section 2: Engagement with Migrants

5. How would you characterize the [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] state’s interaction with migrants and refugees? What events or incidences is this characterization based on?

6. Does the [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] state have formal policies toward migrants or refugees? If so, what are these?

7. What are the international treaties and/or conventions relating to refugee rights, human rights or migrant rights that the [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] state has ratified? Are these conventions held up in court? Can they be used to protect migrants?

8. Has there been any legislation in the last several years specifically addressing migrants or refugees? What was the nature of this legislation?

9. Are some groups of migrants privileged over others by the [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] state through legislation or policy? [Examples might be access to citizenship or permanent residency].

10. Have there been any [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] politicians in the last few years that have been willing to meet with a migrant community association or non-government organization? What was the nature of these meetings?

11. Have there been any public servants or ministries that have been willing to meet with a migrant community association or non-government organization? What was the nature of these meetings?
12. Have you heard any political speeches in the last several years in which politicians have mentioned migrants or refugees? If yes, any particular migrant or refugee group, or migrants generally?

13. Does the [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] state have informal policies toward migrants or refugees? If so, what are some examples?

14. Does regular policing of migrants on the part of the [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] state occur? Does it occur heavily in any particular areas?

15. Do some migrant groups seem to be targeted more often than others? By the state? By the police? If yes, why do you suspect this is?

Section 3: Other Actors

16. Are there any groups in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey] that benefit from the presence of migrants or refugees? If yes, do they benefit from the presence of any particular type or group of migrants? If there are such groups, do they lobby or speak with the government about keeping migrants or refugees in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey]?

17. Are there any groups that lobby or speak out against the presence of migrants or refugees? How do they go about doing so?

18. How many international organizations operate in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey] that work on issues related to migrants or refugees?

19. Does the government interfere with the work of these international organizations? Does the government hold meetings with these organizations and listen to their recommendations? In what ways?

21. Does the [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] state partner with or facilitate the work of any international migration bodies in providing services for migrants? In what ways?

Section 4: Host State Politics

22. Would you consider [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey] to be in a period of domestic unrest at present? Has [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey] experienced unrest over the last twenty years?

23. During a period of unrest, has treatment of migrants changed from what it was previously? How so?

24. Are there any existing bilateral relations between [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey] and neighboring states that affect how migrants are treated in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey]? [Examples might be migrant source countries, or countries of the EU] What is the nature of these agreements? In what ways do they affect migrants? Do they affect specific
groups of migrants? Has the nature of the agreements changed over the last twenty years? How so?

27. Does the [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] government receiving any funds from other countries to host refugees or to contain migrants or to implement laws dealing with migrants? If so, which countries, and what is the nature of the funding?

Section 5: Migrant Political Activity

28. Have there been wide-scale advocacy attempts (public protests, sit-ins) by migrants over the last twenty years? If yes, what were the migrants lobbying for?

29. Did the advocacy attempts involve the judiciary or other state institutions?

30. Did the migrants have help from any non-government organizations or community groups?

31. Have any of these advocacy attempts been successful in your view?
Interview Guide for Migrants and Refugees
*This guide was also translated into Arabic and French.

Section 1: Background Information

1. What is your name?

2. What is your age?

3. What is your nationality?

4. And which ethnicity are you? [may not be relevant for all interviewee subjects depending on the answer to the ‘nationality’ question above]

5. Can you tell me about why you left your home country?

6. How long have you been in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey]? Have you been in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey] since then, or have you been to another country and come back?

7. Which neighborhood do you live in?

8. What was your job in your home country? Are you able to do that job here in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey]? If not, what is your current job?

9. Have you applied for refugee status here in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey]? Have you received refugee status?

Part 2: Experience in the Host State

10. Does the [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] state have any special programs for migrants that you are aware of? For example, legal aid or access to schools. Are you taking advantage of any of these programs? If yes, which ones? If not, why not?

11. Have you ever had to use a [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] hospital? Y, N Can you describe this experience?

12. Do you have school-aged children? Y, N
   If yes, are you sending them to a [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] public school? Y, N
   If yes, please describe this experience.
   If no, why are you not sending them to one? Are they attending any type of school?

13. Does regular policing of migrants on the part of the [Egyptian, Moroccan, Turkish] state occur? Does it occur heavily in any particular areas?
   Have you yourself ever been arrested or detained? Y, N
   If yes, please describe this experience.
14. Do some migrant groups seem to be targeted by the state more often than others? Or by the police? If yes, why do you suspect this is?

15. Do you belong to a migrant community organization? Y, N
   If yes, which one? If not, why not?
   If yes, is the organization political?
   What are ties between this organization and your home country?
   What sorts of activities are you involved with?
   How does this organization help you live in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey]?

16. Have you participated in any kind of advocacy events while you’ve lived in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey]? Y/N
   If yes, what was your role? Please describe your experience.
   If not, why not?

17. Have you ever had an interaction with an organization that works with migrants or refugees? Y/N
   Which organization(s)? Please tell me about your experience.
   Have any religious organizations provided help to you during your stay in [Egypt, Morocco, Turkey]?
   If so, how have they helped?

18. Have you registered with the UNHCR? Y/N
   If yes, please describe this experience.
   If not, why not?