Negotiating with Agency: Towards an Intersectional Understanding of Violence and Resilience in Young Southeast Asian Men

by

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the young men who generously shared their time and stories with us.
# Table of Contents

**Dedication**  

**Acknowledgments**  

**Chapter 1 – Literature Review**  

Part I: Research Context  

Part II: Southeast Asian Youth, Immigrant Adjustment, and Violence  

Part III: Towards an Intersectional Approach to Violence  

Conclusion  

**Chapter 2 – Research Findings**  

Methods  

Research Findings  

Discussion  

Implications  

Limitations  

Next Steps and Conclusions  

**References**
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Chapter 1 – Literature Review

I want people to love me for me, not because of what people tell them. But to give me the opportunity...to sit down with me, and just to get to know me and talk to me. If so, maybe you’ll find out that I’m really not a bad guy after all, you know? I’m not a lost cause.

– Duc Ta, Juvies

Southeast Asian\(^1\) youth in the United States are popularly perceived as either the model minority or the juvenile delinquent. Such characterizations found ideological scaffolding in 1980s and 1990s mainstream media. For example, in a widely cited article from *Time Magazine*, Brand (1987) discusses the educational successes of 2\(^{nd}\)-generation Asian Americans, including many Southeast Asians, labeling them “the new whiz kids.” On the other hand, scholars have pointed to the ways in which the mainstream media have played on public fear of violence and crime to warn of rising waves of nomadic Southeast Asian youth gangs preying on the livelihood of innocent citizens (Smith & Tarallo, 1995). This alarm has also been sounded from within the academy and criminal justice organizations, decrying the emergence of Southeast Asian youth gangs as a “rising epidemic” (Akiyama & Kawasaki, 2001).

In direct contrast to these popular characterizations, the voices of Southeast Asian youth point to a much different conclusion and a more complex life course than expressed by such a false dichotomy. A good example of this disconnect between

\(^1\) For this thesis, I utilize the term “Southeast Asian” to refer to individuals who are, or have family, from three particular countries in Southeast Asia: Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Though Southeast Asia as a region contains many more countries, and though these three particular countries have distinct histories and cultures, they also share a common history and relationship to the United States. This history has played a paramount role in the current situation for Southeast Asian refugee communities in the United States.
scholarly and popular characterizations of Southeast Asian youth and their actual, lived realities is the case of Duc Ta, a 2\textsuperscript{nd}-generation Vietnamese American young man whose words serve as the epigraph for this chapter. Duc is one of twelve youth who play a prominent role in the documentary film \textit{Juvies}, in which filmmaker Leslie Neale explores the punitive nature of the juvenile justice system by profiling these twelve juvenile offenders as they serve out long adult sentences in California’s prisons. Duc was sixteen years old when he was arrested and tried as an adult for first-degree attempted murder. In an article in \textit{Amerasia Journal}, Duc (Ta, 2005) recalls the incident that changed his life:

One day, just like any other day, I drove my friends home before we went to our night class. Although I was not in a gang, the friends I drove home were. While we were driving, we saw two guys from another gang that we had previously had words with. We decided to pull up to fight them. I thought we were going to just fist fight it out. But, when I pulled up and pulled in, I heard four or five shots coming from my car. It all happened so fast. It was like a blur. I couldn’t see them coming and I couldn’t see myself going. All I heard was shots being fired and my ears ringing. Then, in a blink of an eye, we were all in handcuffs sitting on the sidewalk. No one was injured but we were there in handcuffs (pg. 116).

Despite having no prior arrests, no evidence that he had fired the gun in question, and having spent most of his young life avoiding the trappings of a life in a street gang, Duc was charged, along with his two friends, with first-degree attempted murder and personal use of a firearm with a gang enhancement. In the end, Duc was convicted and sentenced to 35-years to life\textsuperscript{2}.

At one point in the film, Duc responds to the question of what he would like people to know about him with the following quote: “I want people to love me for me,

\textsuperscript{2} In 2004, after public screenings of \textit{Juvies} and the work of his legal defense team, the gang and gun charges were dropped and Duc’s sentence was reduced to 11-years to life.
not because of what people tell them. But to give me the opportunity...to sit down with me, and just to get to know me and talk to me. If so, maybe you'll find out that I'm really not a bad guy after all, you know? I'm not a lost cause.” Looking past the camera, Duc’s eyes well with tears and his lower lip quivers before he offers an apology for his emotional expression. In this poignant moment, Duc manages to capture in a few words the tension that is at the very heart of this thesis: namely, the disconnect between how we as a society portray and perceive young Southeast Asian men and the ways in which they see themselves and define their own identities. For Duc, he was neither the model minority nor the Southeast Asian gangster, and as such, he found himself outside of the false dichotomy that society casts. However, the rigidity of such a dichotomy aided in his mischaracterization in the court of law—because Duc was clearly not the model minority, he thus had to have been the juvenile delinquent. His case thus illustrates the very real material consequences of casting young Southeast Asian men into such rigid categories. It is this misrepresentation of young Southeast Asian men that this research addresses in the hopes of coming to a more complex and critical understanding of the ways in which young Southeast Asian men come to see themselves and understand their social positions.

To do so, this project engages the emerging public health literature on resilience, youth development, and violence and delinquency prevention in a dialogue regarding theory, framing, and agency. In particular, I build on emerging research from the Bay Area of California that seeks to elucidate an ecology of Southeast Asian youth violence and delinquency through the lens of immigrant adjustment theories.

Public health research on Southeast Asian youth violence and delinquency approaches
this social issue with an ecological framework that seeks to expose different factors that work in tandem to mediate risk. This approach borrows from the immigrant adjustment literature to understand how acculturation and social environments are related to different rates of delinquency and violence. However, I argue that this theoretical framing misses the ways in which young Southeast Asian men are agents in navigating their social worlds, and thus obscures the complexity of the lived realities of the young people they purport to encompass. Rather, because this social navigation is often intertwined with their formation of racial and gender identities, I utilize intersectional theory first developed by black feminists and critical race theorists as an additional lens to understand the role of violence in race and gender identity formation. As such, this study attempts to centralize the lived experiences of young Southeast Asian men in trying to illuminate the role violence plays in their everyday lives. The findings of this study come from individual interviews and focus groups with Southeast Asian young men in Alameda and Contra Costa County in 2007.

In part I, I ground this study in its social and historical context. The environment in which the young Southeast Asian men who participated in this study find themselves is one of increased criminalization and carceralization. By briefly highlighting Southeast Asian refugee resettlement in the United States against the backdrop of the changing economic and political climate of the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century, this section serves to illustrate the social and historical forces that have shaped these young men’s current situations. In particular, this context illustrates the ways in which the legacy of the Vietnam War, global economic restructuring, and national deindustrialization combined to create the
conditions of concentrated poverty and criminalization within which the young men in
this study live.

In part II, I offer a brief review of the explanatory model that public health and
medicine use to address the issue of youth violence, and in particular, the violence and
delinquency of Southeast Asian youth. The dominant model is the ecological model
that borrows from the immigrant adjustment literature to explain the role of culture
and acculturation in predicting Southeast Asian youth violence. Recent research on
Southeast Asian youth violence utilizes segmented assimilation theory to explain
statistical associations between acculturation and violence in the second generation.
The segmented assimilation argument can be broken down into two interlinked
strands. First, it is postulated that a legacy of war in Southeast Asia created the
conditions for refugee flight and the subsequent breakdown of family and community
networks. As a result, a lack of economic and social capital prevented these refugee
families and communities in the United States to take part in the successful integration
into the economy that most Asian immigrant communities are able to take part in.
Second, relocation into urban areas of concentrated and persistent poverty is
postulated to have had toxic effects on the refugee second generation. Specifically,
the adoption of characteristics of the “urban underclass” is theorized to be the cause of
high rates of violence and delinquency in Southeast Asian communities. In this
section, I argue that segmented assimilation theory is insufficient in capturing the full
complexity of Southeast Asian youth’s experiences. As such, this social issue needs to
be reframed and approached with an additional lens.
In part III, I describe the ways in which violence has been theorized to hold meaning. Drawing from the work of gender theorists such as Judith Butler and West and Zimmerman, feminist criminologists argue that violent acts are a resource for claiming masculinity (Messerschmidt, 2004). Insofar as gender is understood to be a performative construct, one that is “done” and “accomplished,” acts of violence, then, are theorized to be accomplishments of gender, and in particular, masculinity. I argue that violence should not, therefore, be understood merely as a negative outcome of insufficient socialization or as a problem for correction. Rather, it also functions as a system of meaning, for perpetrators, victims, community members and professionals who interact with violent youth, and ultimately for the larger community. Within different masculinities, however, there are also unequal distributions of power based on race, class, and sexuality. The performance of masculinity, therefore, is often racialized, as well as associated with class status (Harris, 2000). Insofar as racism’s effects on men of color is to subordinate them based on their racial and gender identities vis-à-vis white men, I argue that violence is also a way in which men of color attempt to reclaim, or “do,” race. To understand this, I utilize the theory of “hegemonic masculinity” (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005).

Part I: Research Context

In considering a modified lens for understanding Southeast Asian youth violence, it may be helpful to consider the social and historical context within which Southeast Asian youth find themselves. This contextual grounding includes the history of Southeast Asian refugee migration to the United States as well as the
shifting economic and political environments in the United States in the latter half of
the twentieth century.

In 1975, the United States military pulled out of the Vietnam War. Soon
thereafter, a large influx of Southeast Asian refugees was admitted to the United
States. Scholars estimate this first wave to have included about 130,000 refugees
(Strand & Jones, 1985). Many of these first wave refugees were soldiers who fought
alongside the U.S. military against the communist regimes in Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos who fled their homelands for fear of persecution after the U.S. military
withdrawal. However, many scholars also point to the responsibility of the United
States and their direct role in creating the harsh conditions that forced many Southeast
Asians from their homelands (Hing, 2005; J. H. Lee, 2006). As Chan (1991) states,
the large number of refugees from Southeast Asia post-1975 were heavily influenced
by “the legacy of 30 years of warfare, which...demolished cities, destroyed farmland,
denuded forests, poisoned water sources, and left countless unexploded mines” (pg.
157). This combination of an infrastructure destroyed by years of war and the fear of
persecution at the hands of Southeast Asian regimes created the lasting conditions that
uprooted many Southeast Asians from their homelands, including the later waves of
refugees that came to the United States. The profile of the second wave refugees
differed from the first, as there were considerably larger numbers of Cambodians and
Laotians, and they were generally more rural, less educated, and poorer than their first
wave counterparts (S. Chan, 1991).

Under the supervision of the Interagency Task Force (IATF), Southeast Asian
refugee resettlement in the United States was initially fragmented and disorganized.
The IATF regulated several volunteer agencies that were in place to help find sponsors for the refugees. State governments also were supposed to receive federal reimbursement to provide medical and social services for refugees that were resettled in their states. However, time constraints placed on the volunteer agencies by the IATF as well as lapses in funding from the federal government proved to be barriers to this process (S. Chan, 1991). As a response to the influx of second wave Southeast Asian refugees, Congress passed the 1980 Refugee Act, which sought to improve the resettlement process. The act also put a cap on the number of refugees allowed into the United States per year (S. Chan, 1991).

In an attempt to mitigate the economic and social burden of relocating such a large group of refugees, both the IATF and the Refugee Act of 1980 adopted a policy of dispersal, resettling refugees in different communities all across the nation. Such a policy, however, was unsuccessful, as many Southeast Asian refugees underwent a secondary migration to states such as California and Texas in order to reunite extended family and social networks, as well as to seek out better public assistance programs and warm weather (S. Chan, 1991). As a result of this secondary migration, though only about 25% of refugees were first placed in California, the state is estimated to provide a home to more than 40% of all Southeast Asian refugees in the United States (S. Chan, 1991).

The history of Southeast Asian refugee resettlement in the United States also coincides with a changing national economic and political climate. During the post-1975 period in which large numbers of Southeast Asian refugees were resettling in the United States, working-class communities around the country were bearing the brunt
of disinvestment and deindustrialization in the nation’s major cities. In California, as blue-collar jobs were being relocated in droves, cities such as Oakland, were left with high rates of unemployment, growing poverty, and struggling public schools. To make matters worse, in 1978, Proposition 13 was passed by California voters, decreasing the state property tax by 30% and subsequently reducing local tax revenues by 53% (Pintado-Vertner, 2004). As a result, California’s national ranking in educational measures such as per-pupil spending and performance dropped from first in both categories to thirty-seventh and forty-third, respectively (Pintado-Vertner, 2004).

California in the 1990s also saw a conservative political agenda pushed through the ballot system, again mirroring national trends in the Wars on Crime and Drugs. Drawing on public fear of a supposed population of vicious youth “superpredators,” this period in the late twentieth century saw the passage of policies such as “three strikes” and Proposition 21 in California, aimed, respectively, at lengthening prison sentences and increasing the ease with which prosecutors could try youth in adult court. At the time, Proposition 21 “amended juvenile law to move the State towards becoming the harshest juvenile sentencing system in the nation” (Krisberg, 2004). Communities and schools joined in with “zero-tolerance” policies and “tough love” attitudes, criminalizing young people for otherwise “normal” behavior (Ishihara, 2007; Krisberg, 2004). The War on Crime has also served as justification for the creation of gang databases, or “mug books,” in local police departments, as well as the rise of “gang expert” testimony in court cases against
youth offenders, both of which have combined to “heavily track and confine young people’s movements and identities” (Ishihara, 2007, pg. 5).

In the same period, anti-immigrant sentiment and the reactionary backlash against growing diversity resulted in the passages of Propositions 187, 209, and 227 in California. Proposition 187, ultimately rendered unconstitutional in the courts, sought to deny undocumented immigrants from access to government services. Proposition 209 banned affirmative action in University of California admission policies and Proposition 227 banned bilingual education in California public schools. Furthermore, national legislation in the forms of the Illegal Immigrant and Refugee Individual Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) had additional detrimental effects on poor Southeast Asian communities, pushing welfare recipients into low-wage work and creating the legal means for the deportation of Cambodian refugees (Hing, 2005; Tang, 2000).

The cumulative effect of the aforementioned policies and changing social and political climate has had a disproportionate effect on young people of color in urban cities. As Krisberg (2004, pg. 2) states, “To the extent that obscene levels of spending on the War on Crime have led to reduced funding for education, health care, after school programs, and job training, low income youngsters have paid an indirect and egregious tax to finance the attack on them by cynical politicians.” Furthermore, the extension, or spillover, of punitive and disciplinary technologies into the community and educational institutions has been identified by scholars as “governing through crime” or “the youth control complex” (Rios, 2006; Simon, 2007). As such, the social
and political climate in which the young Southeast Asian men interviewed in this project live is one of increased criminalization and carceralization.

**Part II: Southeast Asian Youth, Immigrant Adjustment, and Violence**

Youth violence is a public health problem (Department of Health and Human Services, 2001). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Health Organization define violence as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against another person or against a group or community that results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation” (Dahlberg & Krug, 2002). Using this definition, violence is a multifaceted, broad category that includes the use of physical force and/or power, and thus describes a wide variety of different actions.

In the Bay Area of California, Southeast Asian youth violence and delinquency have gained recent attention from violence prevention activists, community groups, and researchers in the Asian and Pacific Islander (API) community. Such attention emerges out of research from disaggregated data on the API community that shows an increased visibility of certain API subgroups within criminal justice statistics (Le & Arifuku, 2005). Part of the picture lies in arrest and incarceration data. Local data illustrates the fact that Laotian, Vietnamese, and Cambodian youth account for over 68% of felony arrests in Oakland, California between 1991 and 2000 (National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 2003). State data points to the disproportionate and rising representation of Southeast Asians and Pacific Islanders in the California
Division of Juvenile Justice\(^3\) during the 1990s (Glesmann, 2005). On a national level, FBI data from 1980 and 2000 show the rising arrest rates for APIs in general (Arifuku, 2005).

Arrest statistics, however, cannot offer more than a hazy picture of violence in the community, as violent crime is often underreported and the aforementioned statistics do not clarify whether young people were arrested for violent or nonviolent crimes. Thus, victimization and self-report data are important in providing another angle in understanding the prevalence of violence in the lives of API youth. In a community survey from San Francisco, 27% of surveyed API youth report having been on the receiving end of violence from another API youth at some point in their life (The Services and Advocacy For Asian Youth Consortium, 2004). Furthermore, when compared to Chinese youth, Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Mien youth all self-report higher levels of engagement with violent activities (Le, Monfared, & Stockdale, 2005). Though each subset of data only provides a glimpse into the bigger picture, taken together, victimization, self-report, and official arrest statistics help us understand more fully the extent with which Southeast Asian youth are disproportionately involved in violence and delinquency, as well as the criminal justice system.

The dominant public health approach to understanding and preventing youth violence is best characterized through an ecological model of risk and protective factors. Such an approach uses "standard methods and strategies including

\(^3\) Formerly known as the California Youth Authority, the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) is a state-run agency in which youth are incarcerated, usually due, but not limited, to violent offenses.
epidemiology, community outreach, screening, community based programs, health education, behavioral modification, public awareness, and education campaigns” to curtail the involvement of youth in violence (Prothrow-Stith, 2004). Public health departments, for example that of Alameda County, California, remind us that violence prevention is a local effort, focusing on comprehensive and multifaceted local coordination to reduce risk factors and increase protective, or resilience, factors in the lives of youth (Prevention Institute, 2005). Defined simply, risk factors are characteristics or circumstances “that increase the likelihood of an individual, family, or community being affected by or perpetrating violence” (Prevention Institute, 2005). In contrast, resilience factors are those characteristics or circumstances that promote “healthy” or “positive” growth in the midst of a wide array of risk factors, or those factors that mitigate the potential harmful effects of a risk factor (Huang, Lee, & Arganza, 2004). There is considerable overlap between what is considered to put youth at risk for violence and what puts youth at risk for delinquency.

Public health research on Southeast Asian youth violence has focused on the role of culture as a mediating factor, testing to see whether culture plays a risk or protective role. In general, culture has been seen as an important factor in explaining disparate rates of violent victimization and perpetration seen in communities of color when compared to whites (Soriano, Rivera, Williams, Daley, & Reznik, 2004). In particular, different components of culture have been studied as possible links to the perpetration of violence, such as assimilation and acculturation. Classic assimilation theory was first expressed in the works of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, defined as a “straight line” integration of ethnic minorities into mainstream society (Martinez &
Valenzuela, 2006). On the other hand, Moyerman and Forman (as cited in Soriano et al., 2004) define acculturation as the process through which a person from one culture, such as an immigrant to the United States, modifies his or her values and behaviors due to contact with another, usually dominant, culture. In this view, acculturation is not linear. Research on culture and youth violence has generally found that a deeper penetration into the host society, or "American" culture, is associated with higher levels of violence, gang membership, and substance abuse (Soriano et al., 2004).

Research regarding the Southeast Asian refugee experience in the United States is also influenced by the way culture is theorized and used to explain deviance or problem behaviors. Early on, under an assimilationist framework, cultural and lifestyle differences were seen as a barrier and used to explain a wide array of medical problems and problem behaviors, such as mental health problems, infectious diseases, low utilization of health care services, medical non-compliance, child abuse and neglect, gang violence, and delinquency (Cowart & Cowart, 1994; D'Avanzo, 1992; Davis, 2000; Mattson, 1995; Mattson & Lew, 1992; Muecke, 1983; Nuttall & Flores, 1997). However, because assimilationist views of immigrant adaptation posit that these markers of maladaptation would disappear with time through a natural process, such a theory was not able to explain the persistence of problems such as poverty, poor school performance, and violence in the second generation (Zhou, 1997). Furthermore, assimilation theory cannot explain research findings that acculturation is positively associated with violence and delinquency (Le & Stockdale, 2005; Ngo & Le, 2007).
More recently, segmented assimilation theory has emerged to offer an explanation of these seemingly contradictory findings. Segmented assimilation theory is a framework used to encapsulate the different processes and pathways second-generation immigrants go through as they incorporate into the host society (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). This framework describes three possible pathways, depending on the social context, or which different “segment” of society, the immigrant community is most likely to acculturate into. The first pathway borrows from classical assimilationist theory and is described as the “time-honored portrayal of growing acculturation and parallel-integration into the white middle-class” (Zhou, 1997, pg. 975). The second pathway is an opposite, “downward” assimilation into an American “underclass” characterized by persistent urban poverty in the context of deindustrialization, globalization, and a growing national class dichotomy. Finally, the third pathway is a preservation of original ethnic networks and cultural values, in which the immigrant community bands together for the sake of increasing their economic capital and protecting against the harmful assimilation into the underclass.

Segmented assimilation theory uses the historical context discussed in Part I to argue that Southeast Asian youth violence and delinquency occur as a result of problematic environmental factors. Specifically, the breakdown of the family and social networks due to the historical circumstances of the Vietnam War combined with the insertion of these vulnerable families into criminogenic environments in the United States is believed to have led to downward assimilation into the American underclass that is characterized by high levels of violence, substance use, adolescent pregnancy, and high school dropout rates. Good examples of segmented assimilation theory,
particularly the idea that the refugee experience is a unique factor that leads to
deviance, can be found in scholarly writing on Southeast Asian street gangs. In one
example, Rumbaut and Ima (1987) argue that the formation of Southeast Asian street
gangs in San Diego, California is a result of the breakdown of family networks that:
otherwise would be intact if not for the plight of the refugee. In a more recent
example, Vigil et al (2004), in discussing the rise of Vietnamese youth gangs in
Orange County, California, starts out by stating, “because of their refugee status, many
Vietnamese American youth suffer from unique adjustment problems and experience
conflict and alienation both at home and in school” (pg. 207, emphasis added).
Drawing from previous work, they show how family disorganization and changes in
gender roles in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and subsequent resettlement in the
United States leads the children of Southeast Asian refugees towards the camaraderie
found in street gangs. In conclusion, they describe street gangs as “a surrogate family
and a bastion of dependability and self-esteem” (pg. 219).

Empirical research has also been used to support the second aspect of
segmented assimilation theory that says that Southeast Asian youth are vulnerable to
violence and delinquency due to their proximity to the American underclass. Perhaps
the most well-known application of this theory to adaptation research in a Southeast
Asian community comes from Bankston and Zhou's (1997) article on Vietnamese
youth in New Orleans. Using findings from a survey administered to Vietnamese
youth in two local high schools, the authors state that “following the traditional path of
assimilation by increasing contact with native-born groups and losing original cultural
traits may turn out to be assimilation into an underprivileged segment of American
society and could trap immigrant youth into permanent poverty” (pg. 521). In their estimation, peer group influences are the most important in dictating whether assimilation into the underclass occurs, whether it be contact with native-born minority groups or co-ethnic peers that have been Americanized. Thus, their research posits that, within a context of urban poverty, association with Americanized co-ethnics and members of other racial groups predicts maladjustment for Southeast Asian immigrant youth. Similar conclusions were drawn from other research pointing to the importance of peer groups and peer delinquency in predicting delinquency within Southeast Asian youth. In a report for the U.S. Department of Justice, Kent and Felkenes (1998) studied a sample of 270 Vietnamese youth-parent dyads in Westminster, California to demonstrate that positive attitudes among youth towards gangs and the fact that gangs occupied territories in the youth’s neighborhoods predicted youth gang involvement. Similarly, Le, Monfared, and Stockdale (2005) find that peer delinquency is strongly correlated with self-reported delinquency for Southeast Asian youth. Further, Ngo and Le (2007) find that acculturation is associated with risk for serious violence. They hypothesize that this is due to acculturation leading youth to a more individualistic outlook on life and to intergenerational conflict with parents who are acculturating more slowly, or differently, than their children.

Despite empirical backing, segmented assimilation theory has limitations and it has been critiqued for many different reasons. First, just as classical assimilation theory was unable to explain certain anomalies in research findings, so too is segmented assimilation challenged by research that cannot corroborate the theory’s
assertion that acculturation into urban poverty is associated with higher rates of violence and delinquency. For example, in a sample of 29 Cambodian parent-adolescent dyads, Lim, Levinson, and Go (1999) found that less acculturation was associated with higher levels of delinquency for the adolescents. Furthermore, Go and Le (2005) demonstrate that higher levels of delinquent behavior in Cambodian youth is positively associated with ethnic identity, a finding that is contradictory to the notion in segmented assimilation theory that holding on to identities and values of the original culture is protective against violence and delinquency.

Second, scholars have taken umbrage with the notion that the Southeast Asian refugee experience, when compared to that of other Asian immigrant groups, is a unique contributor to the vulnerability of the refugee second generation. Scholar and activist Eric Tang (2000) calls this apolitical treatment of Southeast Asians within the segmented assimilation framework “Southeast Asian exceptionalism.” In other words, Tang argues that in the minds of segmented assimilationists, Southeast Asians have come to represent an exception to the Asian immigrant success story due to their “unique experience” of war, trauma, and refugee flight. Southeast Asian exceptionalism posits that if only these strong, traditional cultural networks in the Southeast Asian community were not destroyed, then they would be available to help the refugee second generation withstand the downward pull of the American underclass, protecting against the problems prevalent in this sector of society. The lack of an ethnic and cultural network is seen as the reason for this exceptional “Asian inner-city poverty that is strikingly similar to Black urban poverty” (Tang, 2002, pg. 241). Insofar as segmented assimilation theory views Southeast Asian poverty, crime,
and deviance as "exceptional" to an Asian immigrant model of success, such research
drawing from this framework ignores the state's involvement in maintaining these
conditions of vulnerability. As such, state violence enacted against Southeast Asian
communities in the form of welfare reform, increased criminalization and police
brutality, and deportation is obscured (Tang, 2002).

Third, segmented assimilation theory has also been criticized for embracing liberal
notions of the underclass. By insisting that Southeast Asians acculturate
"downwardly" into the urban underclass, such theoretical frames naturalize poverty
and deviance as pathologies of the inhabitants of the communities in which Southeast
Asians have resettled, mostly black and Puerto Rican individuals (Tang, 2002).

Rather than using the similarities between Southeast Asian communities and the
communities that predated their resettlement as evidence of the adoption of underclass
pathologies by Southeast Asians, critics of segmented assimilation note that these
similarities point to the ways in which structural environments for all youth of color in
poor, urban environments are similarly constraining. As Jaynes (2004) states:

Both the preexisting and the continuing pockets of social distress
suggest that poverty and the oppositional identities adopted by the
alienated children of poor immigrants have little to do with cultural
contamination from the black poor. The second generation’s
socioeconomic attainments frequently mirror similarly situated native-
born attainments because both groups face the same opportunity-
limiting schools, employment chances, and the discriminatory patterns
of intergroup relations and have similar access to criminal careers (pg.
113, emphasis added).

Furthermore, Kasinitz (2004) argues that the toxic characteristics of the “culture of the
underclass” that Southeast Asian youth supposedly adopt, such as individualism,
materialism, nihilism, and hedonism, “are hardly unique to any real or imagined
"culture of poverty" (pg. 287). In other words, all segments of the American population exhibit these characteristics to varying degrees.

Fourth, criticism of segmented assimilation also centers on the rigidity of its pathways, noting that there are limitations to how the theory conceptualizes the lives of immigrant youth who are caught in harsh environments. For example, Kasinitz (2004) charges that segmented assimilation theory "underestimate[s] the fluidity in the ways people acquire and use" their racial identities. As a result of this rigidity, segmented assimilation theory fails to fully characterize the different pathways many second-generation immigrants take in life. Going back to the characterization of Southeast Asian youth gangs, Lay (2004) describes the life trajectories of Southeast Asian youth in Providence, Rhode Island:

It would be a mistake to conclude that gang membership is inevitable for Cambodian American youth, even taking into account their particular background and migration experience. Although the poor neighborhoods in which many Cambodians reside provide an environment where the temptation to choose gang membership is all too readily available, joining a gang is still ultimately a conscious decision. Gang members fully recognize and accept this fact. That they should even attempt to hide their gang affiliations from their parents shows that they understand the undesirability of their choice. There are alternative means of acquiring companionship, protection, excitement, romance, money, identity, and acceptance – means that do not involve harm to others or invite the possibility of harm, imprisonment, and death to oneself (pg. 231, emphasis added).

In other words, segmented assimilation theory does not account for the ways in which Southeast Asian youth living in poverty find alternative means of expressing themselves that is not tied to violence and crime, on the one hand, nor tied to educational achievement and the maintenance of traditional cultural values, on the other hand. Alsaybar (1999) similarly complicates the notion that Americanization
leads to violence and delinquency, and that maintenance of traditional cultures leads to high achievement. Following fieldwork with Filipino street gangs and party crews in Los Angeles, Alsaybar describes the fluidity with which young people from the same environments are able to construct themselves as both gang members and budding entrepreneurs in the L.A. club scene at the same time. What these studies illustrate is that, insofar as segmented assimilation rigidly equates acculturation into urban poverty with “underclass” pathologies, it obscures the alternative and overlapping ways that immigrant youth express themselves.

To be sure, some scholars have moved away from the false dichotomy promoted by segmented assimilationists to show how, for example, Hmong youth navigate their school environments in unpredictable ways (S. J. Lee, 2001). Lee (2001) uses ethnographic data from her time in a Wisconsin high school to argue that the simplistic characterizations found in the segmented assimilation theory that Southeast Asian youth are either model minorities or juvenile delinquents is unfounded. In her words, “descriptions of Hmong students as either traditional or Americanized fail to fully appreciate the extent to which those who are described as traditional have acculturated and those who are described as Americanized have maintained a distinct identity as Hmong Americans” (pg. 16). Furthermore, the youth in her study were neither solely “good kids” nor “bad kids;” there were those in both “traditional” and “Americanized” groups that excelled in school and those that were chronic truants. With regard to Southeast Asians, Jeung (2002) describes the multiple layers they move through in constructing their identities within different social settings, all the while “creating new spaces for identity formation” (pg. 73). For
example, their adoption of a strong ethnic identity in their neighborhoods to compete for resources and power as well as a panethnic Asian American identity in the face of anti-Asian racism illustrates the situational nature of identity. Such a fluidity of identity formation also speaks against the idea that identities are bound by culture or class, as theories of acculturation and segmented assimilation would argue.

As these studies show, a critique of the dominant approach to research on Southeast Asian youth violence and delinquency does not require that scholars abandon the notion of culture altogether. Quite the contrary, these studies are examples of a fuller engagement with culture using a youth cultures perspective. Indeed, API researchers have begun to employ a youth culture framework to understand practices that do not fit neatly into the boxes of the model minority and juvenile delinquent. Zhou and Lee (2004) define youth culture as “the distinct ways and patterns of life in which socially identifiable youth groups come to process the raw material of their life experiences and give expressive forms, or ‘maps of meaning,’ to their social and material existence” (pg. 5-6). This framework has endowed researchers with the theoretical tools to explain the ways in which young people respond to racial and class subordination in ways that create new, hybrid identities, values, networks, and spaces. In this way, a youth culture perspective is also a constructionist perspective, looking at how identities are constructed as a result of interactions among individual agency, local contexts, and micro and macro social forces.

Using a youth culture framework, then, these studies collectively illuminate the ways in which the lives of youth are much more complex than predicted by segmented
assimilation. As such, research on violence and delinquency needs an alternative lens to complicate the simplistic notions that are currently predominant in the literature, and to fully capture the experiences, identities, and expressions of Southeast Asian youth.

**Part III: Towards an Intersectional Approach to Violence**

Extending from the previous critique of segmented assimilation and adoption of a youth culture perspective, I argue that to talk about violence and delinquency is also to talk about gender. Gender has been shown to be a central organizing component in the lives of API youth. For example, recent attention has been paid to the emergence of API male youth in import car culture as another way of creating a pan-ethnic identity, as well as a locus for the reclamation of masculinity (Namkung, 2004). Gender has also been shown to have a powerful impact in school settings for Vietnamese American young women and men. Using qualitative interview data with Vietnamese immigrant high school students in Washington, Stritikus and Nguyen (2007) suggest that these youth employ a *strategic transformation*, a “process in which students intentionally define gender or cultural identities as ways to leverage social status and power within specific situations” (pg. 889). The young women in this study, confronted with notions of gender that encouraged “freedom” and “individual opportunity,” were able to utilize these characteristics within their own lives to reposition themselves in regards to their male peers, as well as within a racializing school structure that marginalized them via linguistic and geographic isolation.
This section argues that, in direct contrast to the prevailing approaches found in the public health and medical literature, we must also understand the interpretive nature of violence in order to completely understand its role in the lives of young Southeast Asian men, and to thus prevent its occurrence. Criminologists and gender theorists have been at the forefront of this work, asserting the importance of masculinities to the contribution of violence. In these theories of violence causation, violent acts are understood to be a tool for the construction of a masculinity, symbolized as the power over others (Messerschmidt, 2004).

This field of inquiry borrows its foundation from feminist gender theorists and their conception of gender as a social construct. In these formulations, gender is a “routine, methodical, and recurring accomplishment” that is a product of interpersonal interactions (West & Zimmerman, 1987). In this social constructionist view, as opposed to the previously accepted sex-role theory, gender is a process that one does, as opposed to a set of roles or traits that one possesses. Gender thus is a construct that is never static and always being contested on many different levels. This contestation of gender, in which individuals are either socially positioned as men or women, is ideologically and historically designed so that the claiming of manhood includes a claiming of authority and power in our social hierarchy (Bederman, 1995). The importance of viewing the accomplishment or production of gender in this way is the notion that human practices and behaviors are gendered in specific contexts and within certain structural environments. Indeed, this cyclical relationship between practice and institutionalization is what Messerschmidt (2005) refers to when labeling gender as "structured action:"

24
Social structures are neither external to social actors nor simply and solely constraining; on the contrary, structure is realized only through social action, and social action requires structure as its condition. Thus, as people do gender, they reproduce and sometimes change social structures. Not only, then, are there many ways of doing gender – we must speak of masculinities and femininities – gender must be viewed as structured action, or what people do under specific social-structural constraints (pg. 197).

Such a social constructionist theory of gender, then, highlights an essential aspect of understanding human behavior – agency – while also taking into account the importance of structure and discourse. Extending this understanding of masculinities and applying it to the study of criminal or violent behavior, Messerschmidt’s (2004) claim is that violence is one way in which men are able to construct their masculinity; simply put, to do violence is to do masculinity. Similar applications have been made in health-related behaviors research, illuminating the relationship between masculinity and practices such as accessing health services, sexual decision-making, pain and symptom denial, substance use, lifestyle habits such as exercise and diet, and treatment decisions, particularly regarding prostate or testicular cancer (Courtenay, 2000; Marcell, Plowden, & Bowman, 2005; Sabo, 2005).

Edwards (2006), however, argues that such work has been overly focused on explaining differences in crime and violence between men and women on a whole, and further has been whitewashed, ignoring the different ways gender plays out for men of color. Messerschmidt (2006) has noted similarly that masculinity theory has yet to completely theorize the ways in which men’s and women’s crime are similar, and further the ways in which crime, violence, and gender constructions differ among groups of men. In other words, men should not be seen as a homogenous group, and
masculinities, rather than masculinity, should be understood as a fluid, situational construct that can be enacted or performed in different ways in different contexts.

The social structures and circumstances that surround men are shaped by differences in relations of power among men, differences that unfold along lines of race, class, and sexuality. To speak on how differential power relations among men influence their identities and actions, I turn to the contributions of critical race theorists and feminist legal scholars to our understanding of the multidimensionality of race, gender, class, and sexuality. Whereas masculinity theorists have importantly argued that men, as well as women, are gendered beings, feminists of color and critical race scholars have shown us that all men, despite the strongest efforts of proponents of multiculturalism and racial pluralism, are not created equal. Multidimensionality theory posits that, as human beings, we all are composed of many different dimensions, though only some of these have material significance "in that society structures systems of privilege and disadvantage on the basis of them" (Mutua, 2006, pg. 23). Furthermore, these different systems of domination are inseparable and mutually reinforcing. Using such a multidimensional approach, then, we can begin to understand how the lives of men of color, for example, are both racialized and gendered. The effects of a mode of oppression based on race and gender situates men of color in a position of advantage vis-à-vis women of color, but in a position of subordination in comparison with white men (Mutua, 2006). Such is the basis of the recent truism in scholarship on racism that, in the words of Daniel Y. Kim (2005), "the language of race is also a language of sex, that meditations on the effects of racism
and the possibilities of its transcendence are often framed by a rhetoric of “gender and sexuality” (pg. xv).

Scholars of Asian American masculinities have long focused on the ways in which racism and patriarchy combine as an emasculatory force in the lives of Asian American men. The target of inquiry is often the depiction of Asian American men in the popular discourse. In these depictions, Asian American men are either portrayed as the asexual, effeminate model minority type or the conniving, disloyal kung fu master indicative of the yellow peril (J. Chan, 2001). Regardless, the argument goes, the real lived experiences of Asian American men are obscured, and their identities emasculated at the hands of white racism. This representation of Asian American men has a historical legacy in an “ideology of White aesthetics” (Kang, 1997), which is “the belief that the physical racial features of White Americans are seen as objectively appealing and universally true whereas the physical racial features of people of color are seen as subjective and deviant” (pg. 286). The particular mechanisms through which the aesthetics of Asian American masculinities are devalued are not the focus of this discussion, but it would do us well to acknowledge the fact that racism operates by using this logic to deny Asian American men, and all men of color, the power to define their identities as both Asian American and men.

Masculinities scholars have dealt with these unequal power relations among men in two ways. One mode of thought asserts that race and class relations, through economic exclusion, disrupts traditional mechanisms through which men of color can construct their manhood, such as providing for their family and educational advancement. In this sense, race and class relations influence social structure in a way
that constrains a man of color’s opportunities and resources to construct masculinity. Without other means to construct masculinity, such as educational and economic advancement, men of color are left with very few choices, including violence, crime, and sports (DeKeseredy & Schwartz, 2005). The second mode of thought borrows from Dubois’ concept of double consciousness, arguing that men of color, bound between a dominant and subordinate culture, have “conversations” between the two in order to “project an image of self to the world” that is at once a result of the external and internal gaze (Lazar & Majors, 1995). The resulting strain of having to exist both inside and outside of these two worlds produces the ingredients – frustration, anger, visceral emotions – for violence.

The theories of hegemonic masculinity (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) and multidimensionality (Mutua, 2006) provide us insight into how a man of color’s actions may reflect both his gender and racial identity, as well as their position within structural constraints. The argument is that all men, through their practices, work together in constructing various types of masculinities, out of which emerges a hegemonic masculinity that is, in turn, maintained by the practices of men and women. Hegemonic masculinity is thus constructed through differential power relations not only between men and women, but also among men. That straight, middle class, white men embody such a hegemonic masculinity in American society, however, has less to do with the characteristics they encompass, and more to do with the power they hold in society to define. Thus, “it is more precise to think of hegemonic masculinities as a position in the social order – one that is seen as worthy, complete, and superior – rather than a fixed set of essential characteristics” (Chen, 2004, pg. 50). Insofar as I
have argued that racism entraps men of color in a position of racial subordination as well as gender subordination in relation to white men, I also argue that violence, then, can be conceptualized as a way men of color can attempt to lay claim to a hegemonic masculinity that is denied them. In this way, to do violence is to do gender and race.

**Conclusion**

The dominant public health approach to understanding Southeast Asian youth violence is an ecological approach that utilizes segmented assimilation theory to posit that acculturation into the American underclass is associated with violence and delinquency. Through this literature review, I have attempted to show how the rigidity of the segmented assimilation results in a failure to capture the full complexity and fluidity of identity formation that young people go through as they negotiate the world that surrounds them. Though this environment and social structures have an important contribution to the actions of young Southeast Asian men, segmented assimilation theory underprivileges the role of individual agency. As such, rather than being solely a result of insufficient socialization or maladaptation, I argue that we must also understand that violence holds meaning for those who experience it. Thus, in researching the interpretive nature of violence and delinquency in young Southeast Asian men, the complexities of identity formation require that we stand at the intersection of culture, race, and gender, and further that we interrogate the ways in which agency interacts with structure within this particular historical moment and social context.
Chapter 2 – Research Findings

The saving of our world from pending doom will come, not through the complacent adjustment of the conforming majority, but through the creative maladjustment of a nonconforming minority.

- Martin Luther King Jr., *Strength to Love*

Two lives to live but just one man
Stuck between good and bad
Slowly and surely going mad.

- Duc Ta, *We All Make Mistakes: One Day I’ll Be Free, Thirty-Five Years to Life*

Chapter 1 introduced the frameworks and theories used to understand Southeast Asian young men’s violence, highlighting the ways in which such models fail to fully characterize the experiences, motivations, and trajectories of young Southeast Asian men. Missing from most of this research is the voices of the very people we are interested in learning from and about. As such, Chapter 2 turns to these voices and experiences of young Southeast Asian men in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties to elucidate the ways in which violence occurs in their daily lives, and to explore what meaning is ascribed to the multitude of violence(s) that these young men experience.

An improved understanding of how Southeast Asian young men see themselves has tremendous potential benefits for both theory and practice. First, including the voices of these young men may lead to a more apt and sound theoretical understanding of young Southeast Asian men’s lives, actions, and identities. Second, a more precise theoretical perspective will thus inform more appropriate, relevant, and comprehensive program or service development that targets young Southeast Asian men. As such, our research questions were:
1. How do young Southeast Asian males experience or make meaning out of violence, both as victims and perpetrators?

2. How is the experience of violence for young Southeast Asian males connected to their construction of race and gender identities?

Methods

This study utilized a qualitative approach to exploring young Southeast Asian men and their understandings of the violence that they experience, as well as their construction of gender and racial identities. There are often multiple perspectives that need to be explored when dealing with issues such as identity, culture, and behavior. Qualitative methods are well suited to discover these multiple perspectives through a give-and-take between researcher and participant (Ulin, Robinson, & Tolley, 2005). Furthermore, a combination of focus group and individual interviews, the protocol for which is described below, aids in developing a deeper exploration of multiply layered topics such as race, gender, and violence.

Research Team

The research team consisted of the lead investigator, a second-generation Chinese American man, and two co-investigators, a second-generation Korean American woman and a second-generation Cambodian American man. All members of the research team are either current or former employees of the health clinic where recruitment was centered.
Recruitment and Sampling

Eligible participants included young Southeast Asian men ages 13-19 that were also residents of Alameda or Contra Costa County. Because of the many different ethnic groups subsumed under the category "Southeast Asian," a diverse sample was sought using purposive sampling methods. Furthermore, in order to get a broad view of the community, purposive sampling was used to recruit from two different groups of young men, commonly referred to as the "good" kids and the "bad" kids. As we came to find out, however, such a dichotomous representation was unfounded.

Fliers with information about the study along with the lead investigator’s contact information were posted in a local community health clinic that serves the Asian youth community in Alameda County. Participants were also recruited through other youth-serving community organizations. A member of the research team contacted leaders at these organizations to see if any of their youth would be interested in taking part in the study, and fliers were distributed accordingly. These organization leaders were asked to follow up with scheduling an interview if their youth were interested in participating. Once initial interviews were conducted, a snowball sampling technique was utilized to recruit further participants. Participants were asked if they knew any other eligible young men that may be interested in the project. Participants were given information about the project as well as the research team’s contact information to give to these other young men. Any interested young men could then call the lead investigator or clinic staff that were also a part of the research team if they wanted to be interviewed.
Data Collection

This project utilized an open-ended, semi-structured approach to guide both individual and focus group interviews. The combination of both group and individual interview techniques allows researchers to obtain a broad understanding of a social phenomenon such as violence and identity formation. Focus group interviews are a "rich and productive way of gaining access to well rehearsed 'public knowledge'," whereas individual interviews allow a more in-depth exploration of the ways in which social hierarchies and cultural institutions affect identity formation and behavior (Michell, 1999, pg. 36). Furthermore, focus groups enable researchers to observe the interactions of participants in discussing sensitive issues, such as masculinity and violence. Such interactions are invaluable in illuminating the ways in which group solidarity is built, and they also show the steps through which groups progress in framing issues in collectively-approved ways (Blee & Taylor, 2002). Lastly, a mixed focus group and individual interview pattern enabled us to validate participants' statements and also encouraged the exploration of new ideas that would otherwise be unacceptable or unsafe. For example, focus groups can be used to validate claims made in individual interviews, while individual interviews give space for those youth who are uncomfortable or bucking tradition in focus group settings to speak to their experiences.

Nineteen young men participated in a total of four focus groups that lasted for an average of 45-60 minutes. The focus groups were scheduled ahead of time with the young men and the community agency at which the focus group would be held. The focus groups were facilitated by the lead investigator with the help of either one of two
co-investigators. Facilitators followed a semi-structured interview guide that was created and re-evaluated by the research team through an iterative process. Focus groups were digitally recorded and transcribed.

Four young men participated in a total of 4 individual interviews that lasted for an average of 45-60 minutes. Interviews were conducted either at a local café or at the community organization that housed this project. The individual interviews were conducted by the author using a semi-structured interview guide. Individual interviews were also digitally recorded and transcribed.

All focus groups and individual interviews began with an explanation of the project, its goals, and the potential benefits and risks of participating. Written informed consent was obtained, which included the assurance of confidentiality, explaining that participation was voluntary, and that the focus groups and individual interviews could be stopped at any time. All the youth participants signed an informed consent form prior to participating in any focus group or individual interviews.

The semi-structured interview guides used in this project contained mostly open-ended questions that covered subject areas listed in the prompt, though the focus groups and individual interviews were largely driven by the youth participants’ interests and ideas. Subject areas in the interview guide were created from previous research literature on violence and included: 1) experiences with violence, 2) gender identity/masculinity, 3) racial/ethnic identity, and 4) experiences with racism. These categories were designed to gain a full sense of the youth participants’ experiences with violence, as well as the ways in which these youth understood themselves as racialized and gendered beings.
After the focus groups and individual interviews, the youth participants were asked to fill out an anonymous demographic survey that collected self-reported information about their age, gender identity, racial/ethnic identity, generation in the United States (e.g. first- vs. second-generation immigrant), and educational level. At the end of the focus group or individual interviews, all youth participants were given $20 cash as compensation for their participation. All youth participants were also provided with light food and drink during their focus group or interview.

*Institutional Review Board Approval*

Approval for this research project protocol was obtained by the lead investigator from the University of California, Berkeley’s Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects. The protocol number is #2007-2-58 and approval was granted on April 19, 2007.

*Analysis*

Qualitative analysis was done using the theory-driven approach of the extended case method. The extended case method is a reflexive theory of social science research that seeks to “extract the general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro,’ and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on preexisting theory” (Burawoy, 1998, pg. 5). In other words, this approach views everyday life as an extension of larger sociocultural processes, and furthermore situates the everyday within a particular historical context. Taking macro theories as a starting point, the extended case method seeks to improve upon these theories by embedding them within dialogues – between researcher and participant, local and global forces – and searching for “anomalies” that such theories
fail to explain. In this sense, the extended case method seeks to “extend” a particular case “by theorizing it as a very specific instance of social and cultural structures or institutional forces at work,” and then to refine theory through the explanation of anomalous cases (Lichterman, 2002, pg. 122). Furthermore, as culture is the lens through which people understand or recognize their position within a structure, or group of structures, the extended case method is an appropriate approach to studying how people's actions are shaped by sociocultural forces, and further how people use culture to make meaning out of their everyday actions as related to their position within a particular social context and historical moment (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 1999).

The extended case method is often contrasted to another methodological undertaking: grounded theory. However, despite their methodological differences, researchers using the extended case method can also employ similar techniques of data analysis that are most clearly delineated by grounded theory researchers. In this view, data analysis progresses through a systematic and iterative course, using “memos” and codes from field notes or interview transcripts to develop hypotheses about the importance of these codes and the stories they tell. Such a back and forth between analyzing and collecting data informs subsequent field visits and interviews, allowing the researcher to hone in on meaningful findings. The difference between an extended case method and grounded theory is that, for the extended case method, researchers “write theory into our field notes,” as our previously targeted theories are used as the basis for our analytical codes and memos (Lichterman, 2002, pg. 123). The process of
analysis, then, is used to find anomalies within the data that are inconsistent with the corresponding theoretical lens.

Though the extended case method has generally been offered as an ethnographic lens for doing focused participant observation, Burawoy (1998) also details the ways in which extended case method can be accomplished via qualitative interviewing techniques. As such, this methodological approach was the one best-suited for our research inquiries.

All participants were assigned an unidentifiable pseudonym during the process of interviewing and analysis. Interview transcripts were initially coded by the lead investigator and co-investigator, developing an initial codebook congruent with theories and stories from the study participants. With these initial codes, the interview transcripts were again analyzed for consistency and overlapping themes. Furthermore, the codes and themes were used to inform the creation of new questions or modification of old questions to add to the interview guides. As such, this process was iterative. After data collection was complete, the analytic codes were applied to the interview transcripts and indexed according to thematic content. Detailed memos related to each main code were utilized in developing hypotheses and highlighting important connections between codes to explain the “anomalies” that arose out of the interview transcripts. All qualitative analysis was done using Microsoft Word and Excel.

*Participant Demographics*

Fourteen of the 21 youth interviewed in this study resided in Oakland, whereas the other seven young men were from different cities in Contra Costa County
(Richmond, El Sobrante, and Pinole). The age range of participants was 13-17 years old. All but two were currently in high school. On both ends of the spectrum, one participant was still in middle school (8th grade), while the other had just recently graduated from high school.

The ethnic composition of the cohort was: six Cambodian or Khmer young men, nine Laotian young men, of which seven were Khmu and one was Mien, five Vietnamese young men, and one Biracial young man of Vietnamese and White descent. Sixteen members of the cohort are second-generation in the United States, and 5 are of the 1.5-generation, as they were born in Southeast Asia but entered the United States as refugees when they were infants.

**Research Findings**

The findings from this article describe the ways in which the actions of young Southeast Asian men are guided by race and gender. First, I will relay the participants' experiences with "the hood," illustrating how violence is normalized as an everyday part of their lives. Second, I will describe how, depending on their respective settings, young men's actions are related to different codes of masculinity, and further how violence is a tool with which young Southeast Asian men construct their masculinity. Third, I will discuss the reactions the young Southeast Asian male participants have to their racialization by peers and other institutions, such as the school and agents of law enforcement. Fourth, I will briefly highlight Southeast Asian youth organizing as an emergent cultural pathway that is not reflected in segmented
assimilation theory, but that is heavily linked with these young people’s constructions of their racial and gender identities.

_Violence: An Everyday Thing_

The young men in this study differentiate the world that they inhabit – “the hood” – from the rest of the East Bay – “the hills” and “the suburbs.” For them, the hood comes to represent everything that the hills are not: impoverished, dilapidated, overrun with drugs and violence. The metaphoric boundary between the two takes on significance as a marker of class. As one participant puts it:

_Rusky: _The people in low class – it’s really different from the higher class people, because – ‘cause if you see the low class people, it’s really poor. It’s like – a lot of broken houses. There’s people with no jobs. The high-class people, they got jobs. Low-class people, they be broke, they be in the streets.

In a way, the hood also comes to be embodied by these young men in their characterizations by society at-large. As John explains: “Just the environment we live in, that’s the way we grew up so people gonna label us as ghetto – not successful and all that stuff.” Furthermore, the young men all describe their sense of isolation in this social context, describing how “growin’ up, you don’t know no one [to] help you” or “deep inside…I know ain’t nobody always gonna be there for me.”

Perhaps the most striking aspect of this social context that arose out of the interview transcripts was the normalization of violence, an idea that was universally accepted by the study participants. When asked to simply describe their experiences growing up in Oakland, all of the young men described violence as a ubiquitous concern. As Rusky stated: “My experiences growin’ up in Oakland? I see a lot of
violence. I see a lot of drug use and alcohol use. This is basically an everyday thing. I see it there all the time, everywhere I go. It’s kinda normal for me to see that now.”

*Gendered Pathways*

In talking about pathways of achieving masculinity, the young men differentiate between a code of the streets and a code of the family (Anderson, 1999). The code of the streets is heavily influenced by notions of power, respect, and masculinity. In effect, such a code differentiates those who are men from those who aren’t, determining who commands respect and power, while branding others as weak, soft, and targets for harassment. As KP, a 17-year-old Khmu youth, explains in a focus group:

> On the streets, you gotta be like...you can’t be no sucka or nothin’. You gotta be like...you can’t be soft. You gotta be like tough. Can’t let nobody push you down. In the streets, like everybody tryin’ to be a man, like ‘man I ain’t no kid, I’m a man!’ They tryin’ to prove it.

The conversation continues:

*Interviewer:* OK, so what are ways you can, you know, prove that you’re not a sucker?
*KP:* Somebody got a problem with you, yeah you gotta prove it.
*Billy:* You gotta prove it. Like you gotta rob somebody or somethin’...do somethin’.

Within a code of the streets, manhood is understood as a zero-sum construct. As such, a person’s ability to prove their manhood comes at the expense of another person’s manhood. In other words, proving your manhood involves an extension of power, whether physical or not, over another.

Jason, a 17-year-old Cambodian youth, uses a similar logic in explaining his previous experiences with violence. Jason, loyal to a fault, describes himself as a
person who was always looking out for his friends and family: "I was always tryin' to be a nice person, you know what I'm sayin', helped all people, always looked out, gave people money when they needed it, always a nice person – that's how my dad raised me." However, after lending several hundred dollars to an acquaintance and never being paid back despite "asking politely" many times, Jason describes feeling taken advantage of and needing to send a message. Eventually, Jason assaulted the other young man in question – once to try and get his money back and a second time for good measure. When asked why he went about it in this manner, he replied:

To show people that I don't like to play around, [that] I got a short temper. That's if he push my button. You know what I'm sayin'? 'Cause in the hood, you have to have a short temper because can't nobody just come and sweet-talk you and stuff, you know what I'm sayin'? 

Through these testimonies, then, we can begin to see how violence is 1) guided by codes of masculinity and 2) a means of exerting, or performing, a particular masculinity in a particular setting. Out of the very act of violence – whether it is robbery or assault in these cases – emerges a picture of the young man as tough, powerful, and commanding respect.

The other side of the game is also clearly articulated, perhaps pointing to the importance of adhering to such a code in the first place. Within this code, those young men who are not able to successfully fight are labeled as "soft," "weak," or "punks" and subsequently targeted for harassment:

*Interviewer:* What happens to someone that's weak or soft, and he's like walkin' out on the street? Like, how do people react?

*Jordan:* They know.

*Interviewer:* They know?
Jordan: They know [and] mess with them. It’s like a target for them...It’s like on TV. You got a bully pickin’ on a kid and the kid don’t do nothin’ about it. The bully gonna continue pickin’ on him until the kid do something about it.

In this context then, self-defense also emerges as an essential component of masculinity, even for those young men who consider themselves to be anti-violent. Take for example Bubba a 16-year-old Vietnamese youth. Stemming from previous personal and family experiences with violence, Bubba has come to adopt a very negative perception of violence and is a self-professed pacifist. He is mild-mannered and spends the majority of his time either with schoolwork or at the local community center, hanging out with friends and playing basketball. Bubba is tall for his age and somewhat heavyset, still retaining much of the baby fat from his earlier years. Because of this, and due to his overall shy demeanor, Bubba is often teased and bullied at school: “People pick on me...they want to start fights but I say no...I say ‘Oh no, I don’t wanna fight,’ and then they think I’m a sissy.” Over the years, Bubba notes that he has been in a couple of scuffles at school. By his own standards, they have been fairly minor. However, they have resulted in suspension, and ultimately, his father pulled him out of school and placed him in home-schooling. In describing these events to me, Bubba is adamant about his dislike of fighting. However, he adds one caveat: “I don’t like fighting, but I want to try to be able to...if someone stands up to me...try to fight back.” With regard to his experiences with the school fights, Bubba explains: “My dad told me, ‘If he hits you, you have the right to defend yourself,’ and I did.”
Bubba's experiences and ensuing discussion highlights two key points. First, his situation calls to attention the ways in which a code of the streets can extend into the school setting, albeit in a less severe form. Because Bubba, due to his body habitus, personality, and anti-violent values, found himself in a social position of weakness, namely that of the "sissy," he was a target for harassment. The second point, then, is found in Bubba's response. Reinforced by messages from his father, Bubba expressed the need to physically defend himself against the verbal and physical onslaughts of his peers.

In contrast to a masculinity governed by a code of the streets, the young men in this project also point to alternative means of being a man. For example, they point to the "breadwinner" role, which is much more aligned with a middle-class conception of masculinity and responsibility, guided by a code of the family. In a focus group, Jordan states, "Bein' a man's, like, bein' there for your family, comin' home with a paycheck, [and] feedin' your family and stuff. Just like...bein' a man in general...mostly takin' care of your family." Such a characterization was echoed by several other youth in this study. However, most of the young men interviewed identify this role as one that young people grow into, as they accrue more responsibilities as adults, as well as more economic means. For example, they describe a progression into this type of manhood that is associated with finishing school, obtaining full-time employment, and moving out of their parents' house. For the young men, such a definition of manhood was highly tied to their age, and as such, they did not come to see themselves as men in this way. Rather, in this arena, they still label themselves as teenagers, young people, or youths. When asked what marked
the transition from youth to an adult manhood, Rusky puts it simply: “They’re older, and we’re younger. They got more power.”

Here, like in the previous discussion about a street-governed masculinity, we see that a masculinity guided by a code of the family is also linked to power, although in a different way. In the former, power and respect are exhibited and gained through intimidation, harassment, and physical force. In the latter, respect is gained through other channels, such as doing well in school and finding successful employment. KP lays out these two pathways in the following quote:

[There are] two ways to get respect...Like, you do bad things and, and you be like...you get locked up or something and you come out. Your homeboy’s gon’ show you respect, be like, ‘oh you did time...you get that respect.’ But then, to a good way it’s like...to elders, ‘cause like you tryin’ to show them, like, you ain’t goin’ to grow up to be like a messed up youth. It’s like you do good, you gon’ be a role model to the other little kids, and then you be like oh...the mom’ll be like ‘oh why don’t you be like him,’ and this and that. ‘Cause he got...he be like successful...Yeah.

Furthermore, the young men note that these pathways aren’t mutually exclusive. For example, Jason explains:

_Jason_: There’s always the devil and the little heaven thing – angel. They’re like, ‘there go the drugs and gun stuff,’ and then you go to school and have success with that. Which one do you wanna be? You can choose to do both. But if you lose – if you slip and fall, it’ll all get back up and try again. That’s what I always say.

_Interviewer_: Do you think – who has more weight, the devil or the angel?

_Jason_: I say both. The devil pulls you down so quick. The heaven thing, right back up.

Because these pathways aren’t mutually exclusive, however, they overlap in ways that are seemingly contradictory. For example, in these young men’s discussions regarding the two codes governing their gender identities and actions, robbery
surfaced as a tool that occupied positions within both codes. Understanding that their economic and social opportunities were limited, and at the same time recognizing that they were still held to the standards of masculinity put forth in the different environments that they moved in and out of, these young men came to recognize robbery as a means of survival, both in the sense of “proving manhood” and “taking care of a family.” As Jordan explained: “People, they rob to feed their family. Yeah, it’s like if you got nothin’…you broke…you got a family you gotta raise…you gotta do what you gotta do.”

Racialized Youth

In addition to seeing their social positions and identities influenced by class and gender, the young men in this study also discussed at length the ways in which their racial and ethnic identities are shaped by both external and internal racializing forces. Using Omi and Winant’s (1994) theory of racial formation, the ways in which these young men negotiate these racializing forces can be understood as micro-level, everyday racial projects. Omi and Winant define a racial project as a simultaneous “interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines” (pg. 56). Before discussing these negotiations, however, it is important to understand how these young men conceptualize their racial worlds and how they understand the ways in which they are perceived by “racial outsiders.”

The young men describe anti-Asian racism in their schools and neighborhoods as a common problem. When on the topic of racism, the first example that inevitably comes up is their mischaracterization as Chinese or simply Asian, as well as the racial
taunts that ensue. In contrast to the matter-of-fact manner which most of the young men used in discussing the other aspects of their worlds, such as the codes of masculinity elaborated above, the topic of interpersonal racism was consistently met with a remarkably visceral response. For example, Rusky, an even-keeled and notably calm young man, became animated and immediately arose from his comfortable, slouched seating position to declare:

Ooh, let me just say this one thing! I hate it when people come up to me and ask me, ‘Are you Chinese or Asian?’ I hate that. It’s because there is more other races than Chinese. So I’m like…man! [I’m] Mien. They don’t even know what Mien is. I have to explain it. I have to give them the history…so I don’t want to say I’m Mien. But I would still say it.

This theme was repeated throughout the different interviews we conducted with the young men as they pointed to their peers’ ignorance, sometimes seemingly deliberate, of the ethnic diversity of the API umbrella category. In another example, KP jokes about the way he tells people what his ethnic background is: “I’m Khmu. They be like, ‘What is that?’ And I’ll be like, ‘Don’t trip, you better find out.’”

Associated with this ignorance, the young men also describe other forms of interpersonal racism that they experience. For example, it is common for the youth to be subject to racial taunts of name-calling and language-mocking, such as “Chinky Eyes” or some incoherent derivative of “Ching-Chong” phrasing. Name-calling is often accompanied by violence, as illustrated by the following focus group exchange:

_Jackson_: People at school, they’d be like, ‘Oh, he’s Asian. He’s smart, he’s rich – let’s go Jack him.
_Mark_: He wears glasses. He’s a nerd. [Let’s] punk him. You got a messy hairstyle, they’re gonna take you as a FOB (Fresh Off the Boat) and then they’re gonna want to jump you, because they assume you can’t fight.
As they explain, being stereotyped as the rich, nerdy, or weak Asian male archetype often leads to these youth being targeted for harassment, assault, and robbery in both their school and neighborhood environments.

The young men’s reactions to such anti-Asian racism are equally as visceral and consistent as their experiences. Rusky states simply, “It just makes me mad, like I wanna fight that person who makes fun of me.” Similarly, Van explains how fighting or other aggressive alternatives are his initial response:

When people make racist comments about you and you’re just made like that, you know you’re gonna fight…you know something’s gonna happen. I just…either, I try not to let it out, but if you would mess with me I’d probably accidentally let it out. I’ll just play basketball all day or something, or just practice something really, really aggressive, like probably jump rope a lot, like all day. Just make myself sweat so much that I get really tired and just fall asleep.

To be clear, these young men are not helpless victims of racial discrimination. Rather, it is important to note the way in which an externally imposed racial identity that marks these young men as weak intersects with a gendered understanding of power as a trait of masculinity. Insofar as these young men are defining anti-Asian racism as the mismatch between their internal understandings of their racial identity with an externally-produced definition, it is at the intersection of race and gender that we can come to understand their visceral, sometimes violent, responses to racism.

A story that John, a 17-year-old Cambodian youth living in East Oakland, relays about the changing demographics of his neighborhood and subsequent encounters with racism illustrate more clearly this point. Settling into his current home as a child, John recalls that the majority of his neighborhood at that time was
comprised of other Southeast Asian families. Over the years, however, most of these families moved to other cities in the Bay Area for a variety of reasons, and subsequently the racial demographics of the neighborhood changed to being predominantly black. Now that his family is the only Asian family in the building, John describes the way in which their neighbors denigrate and threaten them. In this recounting, the "code of the streets" emerges again in the form of a turf battle. The young black men who, according to John, have moved into the neighborhood and are "tryin' to run the block, claiming the block," enact the same performance of masculinity described earlier. However, the additional piece of the story is that John and his family, being Asian and also numerically isolated, have come to embody the weakness that these other young men in the neighborhood target.

The intersection of race and gender is important in understanding these young Southeast Asian men's emotional responses to anti-Asian racism. However, though these young men speak plainly about the possibility of violence and aggression in the face of such treatment by their peers in the school and neighborhood settings, a third pathway that these young men were engaged in emerged from the interview transcripts and analysis that was not linked with violence, educational advancement, or gainful employment, but that was also associated with these young men's identities and social positions.

*Southeast Asian Youth Organizing*

Unbeknownst to the research team at the beginning of the study, and regardless of their level of involvement with violence and delinquency, as well as their successes in school, most of the young men who were interviewed in this study were in one form
or another also involved in youth organizing towards social justice. Due to the sizeable population of API youth in the Bay Area, there are a large number of community-based organizations that provide services for and are engaged in advocacy and organizing work with young API communities. As such, young Southeast Asian men have also found ways to engage with these organizations in an attempt to change the institutions in which they are being racialized and targeted. They do so in the form of organizing against Cambodian deportation, police misconduct, and racial profiling, as well as organizing regional violence prevention summits and getting together with other Southeast Asian youth to learn about their collective histories. For example, Jason describes the work he’s done with a youth organizing group in Oakland:

Jason: We was doin’ this show at Chinatown...about deportation. Yeah, it was fun. We wouldn’t get paid that much but, it’s not always about getting paid. It’s about learnin’ something, getting’ something out of it and gainin’ something. That’s how I look at it.
Interviewer: So what did you gain from [this youth organization], would you say? Jason: I gained from [them] how to stand up for your rights.

In engaging in this organizing work, the young men are able to construct a racial identity that is associated with pride and the buildup of community power. They take a great deal of pride in their work with, and for, the community as they strive to become role models for younger generations, as well as make substantive, material changes in their communities that can also impact the lives of their families and community.

Another example of youth organizing came from a focus group with young men who were all members of a violence prevention organization. The young men all worked together to outreach to their peers and other organizations, putting on a yearly
anti-violence summit that included educational workshops and entertainment. Part of
the programming, however, also included lessons about Southeast Asian history that
the young men describe as invaluable in helping them connect to their families,
communities, and roots. As KP explains:

Programs like this, they help you out with the history and stuff, like get
you thinking. ‘Cuz before this when I used to be outside, like out in the
streets and stuff, I be complainin’ all the time, be like damn we livin’
like this. It’s hella hard and shit, be like where we live somebody got
shot and stuff like that, but I ain’t really realize that my parents were
goin’ through harder stuff than what I was goin’ through.

Though not all of the history is new to the young men, they explain that some of it is,
as they are not taught Southeast Asian history in schools and many times their parents
would rather not speak about the past. They also link these lessons to their
commitment to the community, sharing how learning about their roots instills in them
a sense responsibility to changing the conditions in which they currently live. As
such, it was clear from the interviews that youth organizing and youth programs had
emerged as an important locus for racial and gender identity formation for these young
men.

Discussion

The goal of a social science approach to violence, Abbink (2000pg. xvi) posits,
is to inform an academic and public discussion:

It can do this by sensitively describing and demonstrating [violence’s]
historical forms and its discursive forms, revealing its cultural aspects
and its social reproduction among humans, and in doing so contextually
explain its variability and contingency. Any essentialized views of
violence as inevitable and immutable in human nature – or, allegedly,
in some societies or so-called ‘cultures of violence’ – can thus be rejected as explanatory non-starters.

In this spirit, this thesis calls into question research that portrays Southeast Asian youth violence as primarily a result of conditions of vulnerability that were created by the Vietnam War and refugee resettlement in concentrated areas of urban poverty. In contrast, in light of the different contexts and social settings that young Southeast Asian men navigate on a daily basis, the main findings of this research suggest that their actions are also influenced by their construction of racial and gender identities. These identities are forged through interactions with peers and social structures, such as schools and social service agencies, as well as guided by codes of gender that are defined by social setting. As the findings demonstrate, then, violence is one tool that young Southeast Asian men strategically and situationally employ in the expression of their multiple identities.

The findings of this research corroborate one aspect of segmented assimilation theory, namely the notion that proximity to urban poverty is associated with violence. The young men in this study describe the ways in which violence and poverty are ubiquitous in their lives, and many of them also describe instances in which they have perpetrated violence against another. However, rather than seeing violence as a marker of vulnerability and maladaptation via adoption of a culture of the underclass, this research complicates segmented assimilation theory by arguing that violence is an adaptive response to structural constraints and limited opportunities. Such an adaptive response, as explained by the young men in this study, is governed by different codes of masculinity.
Both qualitative (Anderson, 1999) and quantitative (Brezina, Agnew, Cullen, & Wright, 2004) studies have shown that poor, urban, young men enact a code of the street in the face of status insecurity and the threat of being “disrespected.” The code emerges out of a social context in which a young man’s opportunities to attain respect and achieve success are limited by economic and social barriers. Citing Anderson, Brezina et al (2004, pg. 311) explain:

The code is partly a function of the restricted opportunities available to disadvantaged youths for obtaining respect in mainstream culture – especially poor Black males. This fact helps explain why communities racked with poverty, unemployment, and racism tend to possess a relatively large share of young men who are invested in the code. Among such men, the aggressive campaign for status and respect on the streets is perceived to be “the only game in town” (Anderson, 1994, pg. 94). At its core, then, the code is described as a cultural adaptation to the hopelessness and alienation generated by blocked opportunities.

Such a code is also enacted by the young Southeast Asian men in this study as they navigate and survive the urban ghetto. Similar to the young people in Anderson’s study, social structure also plays an important role in constraining the opportunities of young Southeast Asian men in the United States. Although the majority of young men in this study see education as a possible pathway for them in attaining status and respect, they also are aware of the reality that very few of them will make it to higher education and beyond. Indeed, research has identified the formidable barriers that young Southeast Asian men face in their educational settings, such as racism, stereotyping of low achievement, and a lack of access to support and educational resources (Um, 2003). Furthermore, Stritikus and Nguyen (2007) found in their study that Vietnamese young men face alienation and exclusion in academic settings. With this traditional immigrant pathway blocked, the young men discuss violence as an
alternative means to achieving power and success that is in line with the code of the streets.

In highlighting Southeast Asian young mens' adoption of a code of the streets, this research links Southeast Asian youth violence to studies on African-American subcultures of violence, such as work by Majors and Billson (1993) and Anderson (1999). In doing so, this research is able address conceptual gaps that are present in previous studies that overprivilege the influence of structure on Southeast Asian youth violence. First, this research illustrates the agency with which young men in urban poverty negotiate their worlds and social constraints. In this way, we can see how the actions of the young Southeast Asian men in this study are guided by agency but also constrained by social structure in a way that is described by Messerschmidt's (2005) concept of structured action. Second, this study also problematizes the idea that Southeast Asian poverty is exceptional and the implication that Southeast Asian poverty is unlike native minority poverty, such as that of African-American communities. In linking this research to that of Majors and Anderson, this study pushes us to think of how similarities between the structural and contextual forces within African American and Southeast Asian communities similarly affects these communities (Jaynes, 2004).

With regard to agency, violence is but one adaptive response of Southeast Asian youth in urban poverty, and the code of the street is but one governing code that these young Southeast Asian men abide by. They also describe a code of the family in which men are responsible for financial and social support of their families. In certain circumstances, this code of the family overlaps with a code of the streets. This is
clearly illustrated in the young men’s discussions of robbery as a way to simultaneously fulfill both codes, serving as a means to gain respect as well as secure money for family obligations. However, this study also highlights the ways in which these young men seek out and build their own support networks, as illustrated by their involvement with other youth in organizing and leadership programs housed in community-based non-profit agencies. These youth leadership and organizing programs emerged as key loci for racial and gender identity formation that served as alternatives to those involving violence and delinquency. These programs served an important social function for the young men, connecting them to their history, their peers, and older youth who had previously gone through these same programs. Community-based organizations thus may play an important role in helping youth avoid violence, and this should be a focus of future research and programming.

These findings, that the young Southeast Asian men in this study follow different codes and engender different adaptive responses to conditions of deprivation, suggest that the young men, in a sense, are able to “code-switch” as they navigate different social settings (Anderson, 1999). Moreover, it is important to note that the same young men in these programs were also, at times, violent. As such, this points to the fluidity of their lives that is not captured by segmented assimilation theory. Thus, the pathways of adaptation described earlier should not be understood as mutually exclusive nor totally inclusive. This study thus complicates segmented assimilation theory by illustrating the fluidity and contradictions inherent in young people’s actions and identities.
Finally, this study highlights the value of intersectionality as an additional lens for understanding Southeast Asian youth violence and identities, illustrating the ways in which race and gender coincide to influence behavior. The visceral reactions that the young men in this study display in response to their racialization as weak can be better understood within a code of the street, in which strength is perceived by others as a trait of masculinity and weakness is taken advantage of in this zero-sum game. In this way, this visceral, sometimes violent, response to racism can be understood as a way to defy their racialization as weak and to reassert or reclaim both their racial and gender identity.

Implications

The findings from this thesis have both theoretical and practical implications. First, this research builds on other studies within a youth culture framework that complicates the simple notions of the model minority and the juvenile delinquent that are put forth by the current immigration adaptation literature. Just as previous research has shown the inaccuracy of labeling a young person as either a "good kid" or a "bad kid," the findings from this project illustrate that young men who are engaged in crime or violence in the street or school are also the same young men who are committed to social change through their work with different youth programs. By noting that their actions are bound by their perceptions of gender and race, this study suggests that future research on immigrant adaptation and violence should include an intersectional analysis to more fully capture the complexity of the life course of immigrant youth.
The second implication involves how we have come to define resilience. Rather than defining resilience with the perceptions and experiences of youth, an ecological framework defines from an outsider’s point of view. In other words, what is considered resilient versus what is considered delinquent is predetermined without input from the young people themselves. Those youth who do well in school and ascend through middle-class pathways and take on middle-class values in the face of adversity are considered resilient. All other youth, regardless of their actual criminality or delinquent behavior, are pushed into the box of “at-risk” or delinquent. However, our findings suggest that such a definition of resilience is too narrow and obscures the ways in which young Southeast Asian men are finding success in their own ways. Our findings thus suggest an alternative reading of resilience such as that offered by Canadian social worker and scholar Michael Ungar (2004). Rather than defining resilience as “health despite adversity,” as is the traditional definition under an ecological model, Ungar argues that a “constructionist interpretation” is more apt. He defines resilience as “the outcome from negotiations between individuals and their environments for the resources to define themselves as healthy amidst conditions collectively viewed as adverse” (pg. 342). Applying this definition to the young men in this study, then, we can begin to see how their negotiations with their respective environments and peers, as means of survival and identity formation, are forms of resilience. In this way, violence can thus be seen as a situational tool with deep personal and social meaning, not simply a sign of vulnerability.

Finally, this work has implications for the way we approach violence prevention and youth development. Given the limitations of an ecological approach
that utilizes segmented assimilation theory, the solutions that it will engender – such as cultural and language competence within the juvenile justice system, mentoring, and behavioral modification – though important and well-intentioned, will ultimately be insufficient in changing the conditions that need also be implicated in the production of Southeast Asian delinquency and violence. For example, these approaches do not address the structural constraints, such as barriers to education and increased criminalization, nor do they tackle the codes of masculinity that are bound up with patriarchy that together shape a young person’s experience with violence. As Tang (2002) notes: “Most inner-city youth programs are aimed at keeping youths off the streets, out of jails, and in school. While these programs of prevention are certainly important, they often begin with a rather low expectation of what young people living in poverty can actually accomplish.” Our findings suggest that programs developed to promote leadership and prevent violence should take into account Southeast Asian young mens’ conceptions of race and gender, as well as the unique ways in which they define their own resilience and health, and also their roles in their community.

Limitations

As a qualitative study with a small sample size, the results of the interviews in this project are limited in their generalizability. Moreover, because this study was interested in the particular interplay between individual agency and local contexts and structure, the actions and beliefs of the young men in this study may be completely
different than those of other young men in different geographical locations and social contexts.

Another limitation to this study is connected with our recruitment strategy. All of the young men in this study were in some way connected to a community organization or social service agency. Though purposive sampling was successful in garnering an ethnically diverse participant population, because they were all a part of the social service network of the East Bay, their collective experiences may not corroborate the experiences of those young men who share their neighborhoods and schools, but who do not have any contact with these agencies. This may be because these other young men are not identified as “at-risk,” or also because they are further disconnected from the social safety net. Either way, the views of the young men who participated in this study may not totally reflect the views of the general population.

Finally, the race, gender, and class identities of the interviewers may have had an impact on the credibility, or accuracy, of the study’s findings. In urban ethnographic research, the multiple identities that are held by the researcher can influence the content of a participant’s interview, the relationship between researcher and participant, as well as the way in which the data is interpreted and analyzed (Twine, 2000). However, it is impossible to predict how a participant will respond and to which part of an interviewer’s identity that participant will respond to. For example, the ethnicity of the lead investigator, different than that of the participants, may have been to be a barrier in establishing an open and trusting atmosphere during the interviews. On the other hand, the gender match between lead investigator and participant may have facilitated a more honest discussion about masculinity.
In an attempt to increase the credibility of the qualitative data and analysis, we employed a mixed individual and focus group interview approach in order to validate ideas from interview to interview. We also held one session with two of the youth participants in which we “reported back” our findings and asked them whether or not they held true to their thoughts. Such a report back session was aimed at assessing the accuracy of our data. Though the two participants did not find fault with our findings, the small number cannot guarantee that the findings of this study are completely accurate.

Next Steps and Conclusions

Despite the contributions that this research can make to understanding Southeast Asian youth violence, the scope of our research limits the inroads we can make in understanding all aspects that contribute to Southeast Asian youth violence. As such, future research should address these gaps. First, empirical studies are needed to establish whether there is an association between code-of-the-street-related beliefs and violence in young Southeast Asian men in urban areas. Such beliefs include the idea that violence is justified in response to real or perceived insults against a person’s status (Brezina et al., 2004). Such studies have been done with other youth groups, such as African Americans, but there have been no quantitative research looking at these code-related beliefs in Southeast Asian youth.

Second, future research should also address the influence of a history of violence and trauma, namely the Vietnam War and its aftermath, on the second generation of Southeast Asians in the United States. Segmented assimilation theory
explains the role of the Vietnam War as that of a disruption of family and community networks. However, it is unclear whether there are other mechanisms via which this legacy of trauma is transmitted, and how, if at all, it is transmitted between generations. As most of the Southeast Asian youth in the United States are now of the 1.5 or second generation, this is an important link to flesh out in order to completely understand Southeast Asian youth violence. An important emerging theoretical framework that might be useful to engage is the model of historical trauma outlined in Sotero (2006).

In conclusion, I am reminded of a quote from Kasinez (2004) on the excitement of charting the boundaries of emerging, second-generation youth cultures:

As we think about race and the new second generation, it behooves us to pay close attention to the popular culture these young people are creating. In the end that culture may prove far more fluid and dynamic than the advocates of renewed assimilation recognize, and less corrosive than the predictors of segmentation and second-generation decline now fear.

It is the hopes of this author that, with this study, we have begun to explore this fluidity and dynamism seen in Southeast Asian young men’s negotiations of their social worlds. By engaging with Southeast Asian youth on their own terms, we will be able to chart a new approach to youth leadership development and violence prevention that captures the complex interplay between individual agency and social structure.
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