Title
Regime Hybridity: Boundaries, Definitions, and Economic Outcomes

Author
Shuker, Zeinab F

Publication Date
2021

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
RIVERSIDE

Regime Hybridity: Boundaries, Definitions, and Economic Outcomes

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Sociology

by

Zeinab F. Shuker

June 2021

Dissertation Committee:
Dr. Matthew C. Mahutga, Chairperson
Dr. Steven G. Brint
Dr. Rengin Firat
Dr. Victoria Reyes

The Dissertation of Zeinab F. Shuker is approved:

Committee Chairperson

University of California, Riverside

Acknowledgements:

I would like to thank my committee members, especially Dr. Matthew Mahutga, for their support, advice, and encouragement throughout this project and throughout the Ph.D. process.

I would also like to thank the faculty and staff at the University of California, Riverside, and all the friends at the Sociology department and at the university who I got the privilege to meet along the way. I will treasure your support and friendship for all the years to come.

And finally, to my parents, to my family, to my people, to Iraq, this is all because of you; this is all for you.

To My Grandmothers

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Regime Hybridity: Boundaries, Definitions, and Economic Outcomes

by

Zeinab F. Shuker

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Sociology
University of California, Riverside, June 2021
Dr. Matthew C. Mahutga, Chairperson

After the Soviet Union's breakdown and the end of the third wave of democracy, a relatively new form of regime type started to emerge (Hale 2010). This new regime type, which was neither democratic nor autocratic, contained democratic institutions, such as

free or semi-free elections, combined with autocratic features, such as the limitation of civil liberties. These hybrid regimes, and their economic implications, are the focus of this project. Despite these regimes' prevalence, we have very little, and often contradictory, understanding of their nature. On the one hand, the democratic-autocratic combination took many different forms that coming up with a clear defining boundary only became more allusive. The institutional diversity that emerged in hybrid regimes left us with a host of typologies and intermediate types around what constitutes hybridity. As a result, there is little consensus on what hybrid regimes are and how to measure them. And on the other hand, these regimes' seemingly paradoxical nature indicates that they are not more than a short-lived transitional moment before either "backsliding" towards autocracy or "advancing" towards democracy. In chapter one, I re-define hybrid regimes, create a new dataset based on this new definition, and examine these regimes' durability. Furthermore, the disagreement around what makes a regime hybrid left us with contradicting conclusions on the nature of these regimes' economic, social, and political outcomes. Previous scholarship documented the direct and indirect impact of regime types (democracies and autocracies) on economic outcomes (economic growth and income inequality). What remains missing is whether or not the patterns observed in other regime types are still applicable to countries that are neither democratic nor autocratic. Using the new dataset, chapter two measures the levels of economic growth in hybrid regimes, and chapter three examines the impact of hybrid regimes on income inequality. Developing a better understanding of hybrid regimes, especially with an ever-increasing global democratization crisis, is crucial to our policy recommendations and overall knowledge of a new political and economic global order.

Table of Contents:

List of Tables:

Introduction: Democracy in Retreat - The Move Towards Hybridity and the Theoretical and Methodological Limitations of our Understanding

This dissertation aims to examine the tension and the blurred boundaries around regime type classifications -- namely, the category of hybrid regimes. This dissertation also aims to develop theoretical and methodological tools that can aid in exploring the relationship between hybrid regimes and economic outcomes. This topic is particularly important as global governance is facing a democratization crisis and as more and more countries are moving towards the hybrid form.

In 2018, *Freedom House* recorded the 13th consecutive year of decline in democratization globally; a shift is happening across multiple countries and in every region of the world. Furthermore, this decline of democratization and the limitations of civil and political freedoms is happening in countries that achieved a modicum of electoral or even liberal democracy, as well as in countries that have long been considered stable democracies, such as the United States and Canada (Freedom House 2019). A combination of economic stressors, increase in inequalities, loss of trust in institutions, and a changing global and domestic order have created the political opportunities for the rise of antiliberal populist movements across the globe, as well as the rise of less democratic candidates to political positions. We can see examples of this antiliberal and exclusionary national politics across Europe -- Sweden, the UK, and France -- as well as the United States and Brazil, to name a few examples. These anti-democratic political leaders targeted -- sometimes very effectively, like in the case of Manymar -- civil and political liberties and sought to undermine freedom of the press and elections' integrity. Additionally, these antiliberal leaders engaged in increased human rights abuse, facilitated the rise of digital authoritarianism, as well as created an environment that increased the threat to the safety and security of activists and journalists (Freedom House 2021).

In fact, between 1988 and 2005, countries ranked *Not Free* according to the *Freedom House data* dropped from 37% to 23%, yet from 2005 to 2018, that share of *Not Free* countries rose to 26% compared to a decline to 44% of countries considered *Free*. Furthermore, 22 countries out of the 41 countries that consistently ranked as *Free* between 1985-2005 have registered a net score decline since 2014. *Freedom in the World* data shows that for the past 13 years, freedom of expression has declined each year, with a sharper decline with each passing year. And in 2019, the freedom of the press declined in four out of six regions in the world (Freedom House 2019).

Yet, the promise of democracy still holds. Massive nonviolent protests erupted worldwide -- such as the Black Lives Matter Movements in the United States, the Arab Spring in the Middle East, and other demonstrations in Hong Kong, Armenia, Turkey, Iran, and Malaysia -- against these patterns of repression. The phenomenon of the rise of autocratic leaders and the undermining of democratic institutions, coupled with citizen's push towards democratization and more political and civil rights, produced a form of hybrid governing where both democratic and autocratic institutions co-exist. In other words, while democratic institutions retreated globally, countries moved towards a more hybrid form rather than an authoritarian one. While the hybrid regime phenomenon is not new -- scholarly conversations around the concept started two decades ago -- our current economic and political conditions are different.

These hybridity patterns seem to hold, and it might be the future of governing, as the prolonged democratic recession continues to deepen. In 2020, nearly 75% of the world's population lived in a country with a declining democracy. The number of *Not Free* countries is the highest in 15 years, and the number of countries with an improved democracy net score is the lowest since 2005. India, for example, the world's most populous democracy, became a hybrid country in 2020. In 2021, less than 20% of the world's population now live in what's considered to be a *Free* country, the smallest since 1995 (Repucci and Slipowitz 2021).

I. The Hybrid Form of Governance: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations

However, as we shift towards hybridity in global governance, we are faced with a multitude of methodological and theoretical issues on how we define and measure hybrid regimes. Despite these regimes' prevalence, we have very little, and often contradictory, understanding of their nature. On the one hand, the democratic-autocratic combination took many different forms that coming up with a clear defining boundary only became more allusive. The institutional diversity that emerged in hybrid regimes left us with a host of typologies and intermediate types around what constitutes hybridity, or as Bunce and Wolchik (2008) described them as the "sprawling middle of a political continuum between democracy and nondemocracy." As a result, there is little consensus on what hybrid regimes are and how to measure them (Mufti 2018). And on the other hand, these regimes' seemingly paradoxical nature indicates that they are not more than a short-lived transitional moment before either "backsliding" towards autocracy or "advancing" towards democracy (Armony & Schamis 2005; Linz 1973). In Chapter one, titled *Defining the Boundaries of Political Hybridity,* I re-define hybrid regimes, create a new dataset based on this new definition, and examine these regimes' durability.

To re-define hybridity, I expand on Gilbert and Mohseni's (2011) research by measuring hybridity along the three dimensions of civil liberties, elections competitiveness, and tutelary interference. Civil liberties broadly include freedom of speech, freedom to access alternative sources of information, and freedom of association, all well documented in the Freedom House *Civil liberties* variable. Executive survival or governmental turnover is often used as an indicator of competitive election (Huntington 1991; Geddes 1999; Gandhi 2008), and it is what Gilbert and Mohseni used in their own analysis. However, I argue that incumbent elites have used a change in executive power to maintain their rule and control when that power is under threat. Thus, to account for this, and to utilize an accessible and widely used dataset and variable, I instead use Polity IV's *Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment*. The variable, which is one of the measures of democratization, is intended to measure the competitiveness of the electoral process. I argue that the greater the competitiveness, the greater the electoral returns.

Finally, tutelary interference refers to the "unelected bodies, such as the military, religious authorities, or a monarch, [that] unduly constrain the agency of elected leaders or veto national legislation." (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011:281). I expand on the conceptualization of tutelary interference to include *Tutelary Groups* -- or ethnic, tribal, and sectarian groups. Tutelary Groups have not been considered in previous research on hybridity. Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian identities are essential in the political processes in many countries in the global south, where most hybrid regimes are located, and not considering them in the past has contributed to our theoretical and methodological errors. It is also a reflection of western-centered theories of politics that peripheralized non-western political and economic structures.

Disagreement around boundaries has contributed to the misclassification of regimes. As a result, I create a dataset that re-classifies regimes between 1990-2017, allowing us to further examine the social, political, and economic conditions associated with different regime types in general, and hybrid regimes in particular. Furthermore, using the new dataset, I as well examine the durability and stability of hybrid regimes.

II. Beyond the Boundaries: The Regime Type-Economic Outcomes Debate

The debate around boundaries and definitions meant that our overall understanding of other economic, social, and political outcomes in these regimes is at best limited, and often non-existent. If we specifically look at the relationship between economic growth and regime types, the lack of attention to, and the misclassification of, the hybrid category contributed to decades-long contradicting literature on the impact of democratic institutions on economic outcomes. For example, there are three theoretical and empirical positions on the relationship between democratic institutions and economic growth. The “conflict” school claims that democratization is harmful to economic growth, and non-democratic regimes that suppress civil and political rights are more likely to develop growth-friendly institutions (De Schweinitz 1964; Andreski 1968; Chirot 1977; Rao 1985.) The "Compatibility" perspective concedes that authority is necessary to enforce laws and policies that encourage growth. Yet, scholars within that school argue that regime stability that is associated with democracies and the protection of economic and political rights is what generates growth (Nelson 1987). And the final line of research is skeptical that regime types have an impact on growth levels. Research within this school of thought shows that growth is associated with factors that could exist in any regime type, such as class relations (Huntington 1987).

Like growth, research on the relationship between income inequality and regime type is equally divided. And again, the hybrid category is either not included or misclassified. Researchers disagree on whether or not democratization reduces inequality, exacerbates inequality, or does not affect inequality. On the one hand, the "Democracy" model shows that with the spread of democracy, the median voter is more likely to be of lower income, and thus, he or she is more likely to demand redistribution policies. The political leader is held accountable to the voter, and thus, he or she is more likely to introduce redistribution policies, which lowers inequalities in democratic countries (Lenski 1966; Lipset 1959). On the other hand, the "authoritarian" model finds that non-democratic leaders are more likely to push towards more egalitarian redistribution to avoid the possibility of regime breakdown and instability (Beitz 1982). And like growth, empirical and theoretical research within the skeptical model show that regime types do not affect the stratification system of a country, but rather a combination of social, political, and economic factors, which can exist in any regime type, shape the levels of inequalities (Abad 2013; Albertus 2015; Marsh 1979; Nelson 1987; Williamson 2015).

A core reason at the heart of these contradictions is related to our earlier concern on regime type measurements and classification. In the most commonly used datasets of regime type, such as the Freedom House Dataset, certain countries -- such as Iraq -- are included within the democratic countries in certain studies. In other cases, these countries are included within the autocratic regimes category. Disagreements around definitions led to confusion in conclusions. Furthermore, while there is a wealth of research examining the impact of democratization and authoritarianism on economic outcomes, hybrid regimes are often left unstudied. Using the new dataset, I develop in chapter one, chapter two, and chapter three tackle this gap in measurements.

Chapter two looks at the impact of hybridity on economic growth. I examine the degree to which hybrid regimes experience growth trajectories compared to other regime types, as well as the variation in economic growth across types of hybrid regimes. Data for the dependent and control variables come from World Development Indicators. The dependent variable is economic growth, measured as the annual percentage change of per capita GDP growth, produced by logging and then differencing annual GDP per-capita observations. To identify the link between regime type and economic development, I control for the following variables that represent the neoclassical model of growth: labor, capital, technology, and a lagged dependent variable to capture the phenomena of beta convergence. Other control variables include population size, industrialization, and the lagged level of GDP per capita (Curwin and Mahutga 2014; Clark 2010).

Chapter three looks at the impact of regime type, and the hybrid varieties, on income inequality. To measure the second dependent variable, income inequality, I use the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), since it combines the strength of The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the UNU-WIDER databases (Solt 2008, 2009). I utilize the Alderson and Nielsen (1999) internal-developmental model of inequality to control for the following variables: labor force shifts, sector dualism, and demographic transition (Alderson and Nielsen 1999; Williamson 1991).

To conclude, this project sets out to examine the question of regime types' definitions and boundaries, namely the hybrid regime category, as well as the impact of hybrid regimes on economic outcomes. I argue that our earlier definitions and measurements are limited and incomplete, which contributed to some of the confusion and the contradicting theoretical and empirical research, which I will examine in the upcoming chapters. In addition to the immediate scholarly value of such work, developing a better understanding of hybrid regimes in particular, and regime types in general, especially with an ever-increasing global democratic crisis, is crucial to our policy recommendations and overall knowledge of a new political and economic global order.

Chapter I: Re-conceptualizing and Re-measuring Hybridity

In the two decades of scholarship on regimes' hybridity, many advancements have been made, yet disagreements remain, which calls for a more thorough and multi-dimensional re-examination. More recent scholarship argues that hybrid regimes are multi-dimensional regimes based on flawed electoral competition. The most significant advancement on this front is Gilbert and Mohseni's (2011) three-fold typology of regime hybridity based on combinations of three dimensions: civil liberties, election competitiveness, and tutelary interference. I add to their method measuring free elections via the quality of elections; by expanding their conceptualization of tutelary interference to include ethnic, tribal, and sectarian groups as "Tutelary Groups"; and by extending both their measurement strategy and my modified one to the entire period years 1990-2017. I also consider the contentions topic of the durability of hybrid regimes. Using our new data, I find evidence to suggest that hybrid regimes are no less transitory than autocratic regimes, both of which are more transitory than democracies. These new data will allow for systematic empirical examinations of the economic, social, and political consequences of the hybrid form.

I. Introduction

After the Soviet Union's breakdown and the end of the Third Wave of Democracy, a relatively new form of regime type started to emerge in many of these newly formed countries (Hall 2011). This new regime type, which was neither democratic nor autocratic, contained democratic institutions, such as free or semi-free elections, combined with autocratic features, such as the limitation of civil liberties. The unique nature of these regimes made understanding them challenging. On the one hand, their seemingly paradoxical nature seems to indicate that they are not more than a short-lived transitional moment, before either "backsliding" towards autocracy or "advancing" towards democracy. And on the other hand, the democratic-autocratic combination took many different forms in what later came to be known as "hybrid regimes" that coming up with a clear defining boundary only became more allusive. Indeed, the institutional diversity that emerged in hybrid regimes left us with a host of, sometimes contradicting, typologies and intermediate types around what constitutes hybridity. These conceptual disagreements are at the core of the hybrid regime literature. This paper attempts to address both of these questions.

Developing a better understanding of the boundaries and durability of hybrid regimes is crucial, especially with a growing global democratization crisis and the rise of hybrid forms of governing. In the past 15 years, we have witnessed an erosion in global levels of civil liberties and political rights. According to data from the Freedom House, one in six democracies has failed over the past decade (Repucci 2020). Furthermore, earlier research seems to suggest that hybrid regimes behave differently compared to full democracies and autocracies. For example, Zakaria (2003) indicates that these regimes could be as oppressive of human rights as an autocratic regime, while Mansfield and Snyder (1995) find that they are more likely to engage in armed conflict with other countries. Goldstone et al. (2000) find that these regimes are more prone to instability and ethnic war compared to other regime types, and Bacher (1998) finds that such regimes are most likely to enact anti-environmental policies. In their re-examination of modernization theory, Epstein et al. (2006) find that democratization largely depends on the level, rate, and properties of regime features in hybrid regimes, and hybrid regimes should be the focus of our understanding of that process.

This chapter, then, increases our understanding of hybrid regimes by addressing the two main questions in the literature. In the first section of the paper, I look at the question of boundaries by expanding on the work (and data) of Gilbert and Mohseni (2011). The authors enhance our understanding of hybrid regimes by developing a three-fold typology of regime hybridity based on combinations of three dimensions: civil liberties, elections, and Tutelary interference. I add to their method by first, measuring free elections via the quality of elections; second, by expanding their conceptualization of tutelary interference to include "Tutelary Groups," -- or ethnic, tribal, and sectarian identities; and third, by extending their data to include the years 1990-2017.

The second section of this paper examines the second question in the literature: the durability of hybrid regimes. Previous research has argued that hybrid regimes are in-between transitional regimes. However, using the new classification discussed in part one, I will show that these regimes are stable regime types and might be the future of governing. This paper adds to the more recent research that seems to reach a similar conclusion. Epstein et al. (2006: 556) argue that hybrid regimes account for an increasing portion of regimes and the lion's share of regime transition. Adding that what shapes the behavior of such regimes still eludes our understanding. Morlino (2009:293) indicates that "although literature to date has failed to be precise on this and there are only a few case studies, some comparative analyses, and good insights, on the grounds of our analysis we can conclude that hybrid regimes are a substantial reality and can be considered an autonomous model of regime vis-a`-vis democracy, authoritarianism, and the traditional regime." The misidentification of regimes, and the divergent understanding of their durability, can have significant economic and political policy implications.

II. The Boundaries of Hybridity

Despite the extensive efforts to examine the blurred lines of hybridity, there is little consensus on what hybrid regimes are; or as Bunce and Wolchik (2008) described them as the "sprawling middle of a political continuum between democracy and nondemocracy." The lack of consistency in definitions indicates that scholars are not in conversation with each other, nor are they building on each other's theoretical and empirical work. Hybrid regimes are understood to be a subtype of democracy in certain research (Merkel 2004; Zakaria 1997) or a subtype of authoritarianism in other cases (Schedler 2006). They are seen as transitional regimes (Linz 1973) or as residual categories (Bogaards 2009). These disagreements left us with fragmented understanding, and little methodological tools that can allow us to advance our research beyond basic definitions.

i. Diminished Subtypes

In the early 1990s, earlier efforts to classify these regimes often placed them as a diminishing subtype of democracy. These efforts came as a response to the end of the Third Wave of Democratization, and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of new countries under the premise of democracy. However, the birth of these new countries was accompanied by the rise of complex formation of democratization and governing, that scholars often saw hybridity as an element or a stage of the democratization process itself towards an ideal type of regime. Under this view, democracy is an ideal type with specific essential qualities, and hybrid regimes are democratic regimes that lost -- or yet to gain -- some of these essential qualities, moving away from that ideal type in a continuum towards the other end of that spectrum. Linz (2000) and others represent new efforts to understand why these incomplete democracies failed to transition towards full democracies. Under this lens, hybridity is seen as a defective or corrupted form of regimes that will amend themselves over time.

With the start of the new millennium, the conversation shifted from classifying these countries as a subtype of democracy, to examining the inherited authoritarian features embedded within these regimes. Rather than hybridity being seen as a subtype of democracy, it is being understood as a subtype of authoritarianism. And rather than focusing on what these regimes lack, Cassani (2014) and Ottaway (2003), among others, argue that research should address what these regimes have; countries that hold elections while violating democratic norms. Schedler (2002) argues that these regimes are far removed from democracies that it makes no sense to compare the two types together in any meaningful way.

Classifying hybrid regimes as a diminished subtype of either democracy or authoritarianism led to the production of both narrow and broad concepts that included terms such as, delegative democracy (O'Donnell 1994), semi-democracy (Diamond, Hartlyn, Linz, and Lipset 1995), illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997), pseudo-democracy (Diamond, 2002), semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway 2003), electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2002), hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes (Magaloni 2006), and competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002). Mufti (2018) adds that hybrid regimes were defined differently based on how scholars understood and defined the root concept, adding another vagueness level to the scholarly debate. For example, Zakaria's (1997) concept of 'illiberal democracy' is limited to multiparty elections and the failure to protect civil liberties. However, under this definition, illiberal democracies can include minor offenders and near tyrannies (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011). Diamond et al.' concept (1988), on the other hand, includes election competitiveness and the effective power of the elected elites. Similarly, Schedler (2006) draws the line between authoritarianism and hybridity by arguing that elections in authoritarian regimes are un-free and unfair, while Levitsky and Way (2002) argue that the boundary is around the presence of competitive elections in an uneven field. In this sense, some countries can be classified as hybrid in certain studies, while they are either classified as democracies or authoritarian in different studies.

This is largely due to the disagreement on how democracy and authoritarianism are defined in the literature. There is neither empirical nor theoretical consent on what democracy and autocracy are, ranging from a minimal definition based on elections alone (Przeworski 1999) to a maximal definition that includes the protection of rights and justice (O'Donnell 2004). Hybrid regimes defined based on the root term of either democracy or autocracy are bound to face a similar fate. In other words, under this conceptualization, hybrid regimes are so categorically different -- other than they simply are not democratic or autocratic -- that comparing them systematically is almost impossible.

ii. Components of Hybridity

As a result, Bogaard (2009), among others, argues for the conceptualization of a hybrid regime as a "residual category" or a regime type unto itself. This produced new efforts to re-classify hybrid regimes into intermediate types. For example, Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Linan (2001) organize regimes into democracy, semi-democracy, and authoritarianism. Others have different typologies, such as mixed regimes (Bunce & Wolchik, 2008) and hybrid regimes (Ekman, 2009; Karl,1995). Yet, despite these efforts, Mufti (2018) shows that the resulting categories are still combining qualitatively different regimes, and producing new challenges that hinder scholars from systematically comparing hybridity in any meaningful way. This promoted a further shift towards focusing on the dimensions or components of hybridity in these regimes (Lindberg 2009; Schedler 2006). The most common dimension of classifying hybrid regimes is electoral competition (Howard & Roessler 2006; Levitsky & Way 2012; Lindberg 2009; Schedler

2006). Morgenbesser (2014) argues that using electoral competition as the only measure of regime type is insufficient. This is due to the different goals attached to elections in democratic and autocratic regimes.

In democratic regimes, elections serve to legitimize the political process and allow other competing actors access to decision-making positions within the political apparatus. However, over the past decades, elections have been used by antiliberal political leaders to consolidate their power base. In non-democratic regimes, elections serve the purpose of elite and loyalties management and redistribution of resources among the leader's inner circle. Elections in non-democratic regimes also legitimize the regime within and outside the country and manage internal threats that could be increased due to the limited freedoms. This emphasis on electoral competitiveness, rather than the meaning attached to them, also ignores the fundamental understanding that regime types can't be reduced to their elections' quality as the sole measure of their type. Regimes can share a common feature, such as elections, while also being fundamentally different from each other based on the institutional structures present. Whether competitive or not, elections themselves are the product of the societal relationships and expectations, which can alter meanings and the legitimation process, as well as the roles and expectations between the population and political elites. Furthermore, the presence of democratic institutions does not alter the fundamental nature of the authoritarian features present in a regime, nor its impact on power distribution and exchange. The focus on elections alone leaves off the interactions between political elites and their population outside of the election process, or what Munck and Snyder (2004) refer to as "actor capacity."

iii. Multi-Dimensionality

Further efforts to address the previously discussed limitations come in the form of conceptualizing these regimes through a multi-dimensional lens. For example, Dahl (1971) argues that regimes ought to be classified based on the interaction of two dimensions, the right to alter policies (contestation) and the right to participate in the political process (participation). Merkel (2004) introduces three alternative dimensions, vertical legitimacy, horizontal accountability, and effective government, which he later breaks into smaller subtypes. However, despite these efforts, these studies continued to view hybrid regimes in terms of an ideal form of democratic and non-democratic regimes.

Gilbert and Mohseni's paper (2011) represents the most thorough response to the lack of an operational definition of hybridity. The authors created a configurative approach of three categories -- illiberal hybrid regimes, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes, and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes -- based on three dimensions: election competitiveness, civil liberties, and tutelary interference, that emphasizes the differences in the *kind* of hybridity rather than the *degree* of hybridity, as we can see in the table below. This approach captures the complexity of hybrid regimes in two fundamental ways. First, this approach highlights the complexity of regime type beyond election competitiveness, since multiparty elections or even competitive multiparty elections do not in and of themselves challenge the control over or distribution of power. Second, the configurative approach allows us to compare hybrid regimes to each other to examine the institutional differences and similarities for middle-range countries that continuum scores, such as polity2 and the Freedom House classification, tend to mask.

Table 1.1: Institutional Dimensions and Hybridity

	Democracies	Autocracies	Illiberal Hybrid Regimes	Illiberal Tutelary Hybrid Regimes	Liberal Tutelary Hybrid Regimes
Elections	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Civil Liberties	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Tutelary Institutions	No	No/Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Example	The United Kingdom	Egypt	Brazil (1993-1999)	Iraq (2003)	Lebanon (2009-2010 Sectarian) Then the country became illberal tutelary

III. Rethinking Multi-Dimensionality

i. Election Competitiveness

As the primary boundary of classification between hybridity and other regime types in previous research, there is a conceptual disagreement on the role of elections in determining governing quality. Previous research often used the presence of multi-party elections as an indicator of a hybrid regime. Gilbert and Mohseni argue that multi-party elections alone do not challenge the existing power distribution in an authoritarian system. Furthermore, after the end of the Third Wave of Democratization, many "emerging democracies" as well as authoritarian regimes held some form of multi-party elections. Thus, a distinction between electoral and non-electoral regimes does not produce any meaningful distinction between the different regime categories. However, the presence of competitive multi-party elections can impact the process of who controls and distributes power.

The authors give the example of Egypt to illustrate the limitations of multi-party elections as a tool of classification. In the 1970s, Egypt witnessed the rise of regular multi-party elections, leading some scholars to classify Egypt as a hybrid regime (Schedler 2006). Yet, while different political parties participated in the electoral process, Mubarak's political party, *The National Democratic Party* (NDP), remained the hegemonic ruling party and monopolized power distribution in the different branches of the government. And thus, classifying pre-2011 Egypt as a hybrid regime won't fully reflect the nature of power exchange in the country. At the core of this argument is that for an authoritarian regime to transition to a different regime type, there must be a true threat to the monopoly of power within the political sphere. "Proformative democracy," as I indicated earlier, can serve to stabilize and legitimize the positionality of elites in authoritarian regimes rather than present a legitimate threat to their power, thus serving the opposite goal of the further democratization of a non-democratic country.

Competitive multi-party elections, then, are those in which different groups' diverse, and sometimes competing, socio-economic interests can compete and present a threat to incumbent elites (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011; Levitsky and Way 2002). To bring more consistency to the measurement of hybrid regimes, the authors argue that turnover rates can measure competitive multi-party elections, since turnover indicates a defeat of the incumbent and the exchange of power. Executive survival or governmental turnover is often used as an indicator of competitive election (Huntington 1991; Geddes 1999; Gandhi 2008). However, I argue that incumbents have used an exchange of executive power to maintain power, when that power is under threat. For example, looking at recent leader turnover in many of the Gulf states is a good indicator that leaders transfer power to others without necessarily losing their monopoly or the monopoly of their party or family over power in a country. Furthermore, lack of turnover does not necessarily indicate that the election itself was not competitive. To account for this, and to utilize an accessible and widely used dataset and variable, I instead use Polity IV's *Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment*. Regardless of turnover, this variable measures whether or not chief executives are chosen in or through competitive elections where two or more major parties or candidates can compete. In other words, competitive elections are the dimensions that allow us to separate authoritarian regimes from non-authoritarian regimes (hybrid regimes and democratic regimes)

ii. Civil Liberties

The second dimension in Gilbert and Mohseni's classification is the quality of competition, or civil liberties. While competitive elections can occur in a country, the playing field of competition can still be unequal. Civil liberties provide the minimum condition to ensure fair competition between the different centers of power. Democracies with strong civil liberties -- broadly include freedom of speech, freedom to access alternative sources of information, and freedom of association -- allow citizens and political parties to participate freely, ensuring the ability of those not within the ruling party to change the political structure and ensure a more competitive electoral process.

The authors describe this process by arguing that democracies have competitive elections with an equal competition, while hybrid regimes have competitive elections with unequal competition. Civil liberties are well documented in the Freedom House *Civil liberties* variable, which Gilbert and Mohseni use as well.

iii. Tutelary Interference

Our third dimension, initially identified by Samuel Fitch (1998) as part of his discussion on the typology of civil-military relation, is tutelary interference. In addition to the military institution recognized by Fitch, Gilbert and Mohseni include monarchy and the clergy, and define the concept as the "unelected bodies, such as the military, religious authorities, or a monarch, [that] unduly constrain the agency of elected leaders or veto national legislation." (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011:281). The main argument here, also presented in previous work by Diamond (1999 and 2002) and Schedler (2002 and 2006), is that non-elected bodies, that citizens have no ability to vote out, must not constrain the ability of those elected political leaders to govern. As I argued earlier, an essential distinction between authoritarian and non-authoritarian regimes is the ability of different centers of power to compete in the political process. The ability of these centers of power to govern once they win elections is another important boundary that separates regime types from each other. Gilbert and Mohseni identify three institutions -- military, monarchy, and the clergy -- that represent the tutelary dimension of hybrid governing.

However, I argue that limiting our conceptualization of tutelary interference to only these institutions leaves us with a limited and narrow boundary that fails to capture the diversity of these bodies in hybrid regimes, especially in non-western countries, where the majority of these regimes are located. For example, S. -E. Skaaning (2006:15) suggests political regimes are an:

> Institutionalized set of fundamental formal and informal rules identifying the power holders (character of the possessor(s) of ultimate decisional sovereignty), [that] regulates the appointments to main political posts (extension and character of political rights) as well as the vertical limitations (extension and character of civil liberties) and horizontal limitations on the exercise of political power (extension and character of division of powers—control and autonomy).

In other words, political recruitment and power distribution can be done either formally (military, monarchy, and religion) or informally (ethnic, tribal, and sectarian groupings). Furthermore, when examining centers of power and the forces that shape the decision-making process, we must consider society's make and the horizontal negotiation between different groups in society and their impact on the political process. Not taking these groups into account leaves us with a narrow boundary of tutelary interference -- resulting in misclassification of hybrid countries because the non-elected bodies shaping the political process do not fit the formal and institutional conceptualization. Furthermore, correctly identifying the source of tutelary interference has a significant impact on our empirical qualitative and quantitative research and conclusions on the nature of the governing process in a country. For example, Geddes (1999) shows that military influence produces different regime life span compared to other non-elected bodies. Unintentionally misclassifying a country outside of the tutelary boundary because it lacks the institutional and formal structure of non-elected influence will produce wrong theoretical and empirical conclusions. Valenzuela (1992) identified a similar concept which he referred to as "reserved domains," citing high civil servants as an example of tutelary influence.

Another danger of limiting our understanding of the tutelary boundary to only institutional and formal structures is sliding back into a Western-centered understanding of governing. Outside of the west -- where many hybrid regimes exist -- in addition to the institutions already discussed by Gilbert and Mohseni, there is a complexity of governing that, when deconstructed, is both unique and necessary for our understanding of polity structures. I extend the concept of tutelary influence to include non-elected bodies, that are both formal and informal. When I speak of informal influence, I am explicitly referring to the broad category of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian groups. I argue that reserved domains, even when not formal, can impact the political process and undermine democratization as much as the formal reserved domains can.

Let's think of two examples that represent the formal reserved domains. In Turkey, while the military positioned itself outside and above the civilian government, its impact on the political process is undeniable. The military, for example, intervened to change the government on four occasions (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997), that the late Turkish political leader Süleyman Demirel described the relationship between the Turkish military and the state by saying, "In Turkey, God first created the military. Then he realized his mistake, and created the Turkish people as an afterthought" (in Haugom 2019). The case of Iran represents an example of another formal reserved domain. In Iran, Khomeini's teachings, part Islamic theology, and part political theory, have evolved into a system of government that continues to shape political decisions in Iran, outside and despite election outcomes.

While informal tutelary groups produce different dynamics, they still represent a powerful entity that shapes the political process where they exist. In places like Iraq, Lebanon, or Pakistan, sectarian groups, namely the Shia-Sunni divide, have shaped the political process for years and are often credited for the lack of democratization in these countries. A common mistake in the literature when thinking of sectarian groups is classifying them as an extension of the religious institution. I argue that a distinction is necessary. Faleh Abdel Jabbar argues that speaking of the Shia-Sunni identities in religious terms masks the complexity of these groups' political, social, and economic interests. In other words, Sunni and Shia are polylithic groups that have distinct class and ideological interests, rather than religious ones --albeit influenced by these religious identities in terms of symbols and mythology -- that motivates state-sponsored sectarian discrimination or sect-centric political influence. Sectarian leaders in Iraq, such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr, have played a significant role in influencing election times and political decisions. For example, every Prime Minister in Iraq since 2003 sought the approval of al-Sistani, the most important Shia authority in the country. He is, for instance, the reason Adel Abdul Mahdi, a technocrat lacking a political constituency of his own, became the prime minister. Sectarianism exists in the country alongside semi-free competitive elections, where different centers of power competitively participate in the political process with varying degrees of success, while at the same time political decisions can be vetoed by these Shia powerhouses. Not taking the impact of the sectarian tutelary influence into account will be a gross misunderstanding of the hybridity of Iraq, and classifying that influence under the religious institution is another fundamental misunderstanding of religiosity and sectarianism.

A similar logic applies to tribal groups (see the case of Libya) and ethnic groups (see Kurds vs. Arabs in the Middle East). To use Iraq as an example again, tribal groups have been one of the most important sources of solving disputes, including political ones, outside of the state apparatus or the legal system. Tribal Justice, a defining characteristic of the modern Iraqi society -- with its role diminishing after 1958 and the end of the feudalism system and under Saddam Hussien's authoritarian state, only to regain some relevance after 1991 as the central Iraqi state weakened -- came to fill the "justice gap" left by a weak state judicial system since 2003. While tribes' role at the national level remains marginal, on the local level, client-centric forms of tribal authority shape political, economic, and social outcomes outside of the state apparatus. It is also worth noting that different forms of tutelary spheres can exist and interact simultaneously. For example, the Kurds, an ethnic category, in Northern Iraq, are also part of the Sunni sect, where many powerful tribal groups interact.

Take Lebanon as another example. While facing many challenges regarding the freedom of its electoral process, until recently, Lebanon was still considered one of the few countries in the Middle East with semi-democratic institutions and free elections. As in many Middle Eastern countries, religious and sectarian identities are the basis for the country's political structure. The state, and the military, use a quota system to include a certain number of Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims, Druze, and Armenians, roughly correlating to the countries' demographic makeup. And while representatives in political and governmental positions of power are elected, not all decision-makers are. For example, Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of the Lebanese political and paramilitary party Hezbollah, came to power after the assassination of the previous leader, Musawi, in 1992. Nasrallah not only plays an important role in determining which members of Hezbollah enter the election process, but he also wields considerable political power in the country, and the current economic crisis is primarily attributed to his action.

It is important to emphasize that Lebanon's sectarian leaders -- as is the case for many countries with a tutelary influence -- do not incite sectarian conflict. Instead, they are invested in maintaining a hybrid political structure that promotes their sectarian identity while marginalizing nonconformists and those who question their authority, and allow them to build a network of clientelism and patronage around their interests. Furthermore, the political process is fueled not by sectarian hatred but by the profits and corruption it facilitates. While there is a religious element to the Lebanese case, in reality, at its core, these are collections of sectarian identities weaponized by non-elected organizations and parties, and the political institution is used to add a sense of legitimacy and access to lucrative contracts. The legitimacy and the economic payoff, as well as the power gained, make these non-elected bodies an essential player in the Lebanese political structure. As a result, one can see how not including these informal or non-institutional groups within the category of tutelary interference have produced a considerable theoretical and empirical error in our previous scholarly work on hybridity.

IV. Remeasuring Hybridity.

To summarize, one of the main areas of interest in the hybrid regime literature is the question of what constitutes hybridity? While most of the research on the topic has defined hybrid regimes as a "diminished" type of democracy or autocracy, more recent work by Gilbert and Mohseni and others came to challenge that definition by classifying hybridity as a regime type unto itself. Hybrid regimes can be classified based on their quality of elections, degree of civil liberties, and the impact of tutelary inference on the decision-making process in a country. The resulting definition gave us three hybrid categories: illiberal hybrid regimes, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes, and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes. Expanding on this, I argued that while the logic of Gilbert and Mohseni's classification is fundamental in moving the research on hybridity forward, we can add two main improvements to their original classification.

First, to measure the quality of elections using the Polity IV's Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP) as a more appropriate variable compared to presidential and parliamentary turnover. The variable, which is one of the measures of democratization, is intended to measure the competitiveness of the electoral process. I argue that the greater the competitiveness, the greater the electoral returns. However, since non-democratic institutions impact hybrid regimes, election competitiveness is not expected to be perfect. For that reason, I consider both semi-competitive elections (score 2) and fully-competitive elections (score 3) as possible hybrid regimes. Countries that score one on the XRCOMP variable (or uncompetitive elections) are classified as authoritarian regimes. A country like Iraq with a score of 2 on XRCOMP between

2010-2017 (semi-competitive elections) is considered a hybrid regime, even though the country has scored low on the civil liberty variable (Freedom House) and has significant tutelary interference. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan in 1993 had scored a one on the XRCOMP variable (non-competitive), even when the country scored a three on the civil liberty variable (low restricted CL) and there was no tutelary interference, the country is not hybrid due to the lack of free or semi-free elections. This new classification produces completely different data points. For example, Russia is a well-known example of a hybrid regime (Goode 2010). Yet, since G&M uses governmental turnover, Russia is only included within the hybrid category between 1998-2002. Similarly, Indonesia between 2013-2017 is not included, neither Kyrgyzstan between 2011-2017, nor Lebanon between 2010-2017, nor Iraq between 1990-2017, to name a few of many examples. These countries all have free or semi-free elections, and some other form of non-democratic institutions. Not including them in the analysis leaves us with a very restricted and inaccurate dataset, which significantly undermines our overall understanding of hybrid regimes.

Second, civil liberties broadly include freedom of speech, freedom to access alternative sources of information, and freedom of association, all well documented in the Freedom House Civil liberties variable. The original variable in the Freedom House database ranges from a score of 1, or countries and territories that enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, to 7, or countries and territories that have few or no civil liberties. I follow Gilbert and Mohseni's measurement, and I re-code the variable to 1 (unrestricted civil liberties) for score (1-3), and 0 (restricted civil liberties) for score (4-7).

Third, I expand our use of tutelary inference by the category of "Tutelary Groups" -- ethnic, sect, and tribal -- as another dimension of influential non-state bodies. To collect data for this variable, I conducted a historical analysis covering all countries between 1990-2017. All countries that have tutelary groups that influenced the political process, by determining elections outcomes, rejecting the election results, and/or determining political candidates or government appointees during any given year were coded as tutelary. Most data came from the Polity IV country reports. These categories were coded as 0 for no presence of tutelary inference, 1 in the presence of monarchy, 2 for clergy, 3 for the military institution, and 4 for the presence of sectarian, tribal, and ethnic non-elected bodies. This variable was re-coded to 0 when there is no tutelary inference, and 1 in the case of a tutelary inference. Under this new classification, a country like Macedonia will be classified as hybrid (1993-2017) due to the impact of ethnic groups on the political process. A country like Iraq will be classified as a Tutelary Illiberal Hybrid Regime, rather than an Illiberal Hybrid Regime under the old classification, because of the ethnic, tribal, and sectarian interference in the political process. This new classification re-shifts some of our regimes between the different hybrid categories.[1] For example, Lebanon is an important example of tutelary influence, yet G&M classify the country as an illiberal hybrid regime.

The resulting categories of regime type are: Democracies (elections-1, civil liberties-1, tutelary inference-0), Illiberal Hybrid Regime (elections- 1, civil liberties-0,

[1] We have few cases to compare this shift in the hybrid category between my data and G&M data, since the G&M data contains a very limited number of cases due to the earlier restriction of election measurements.

tutelary inference-0), Tutelary Illiberal Hybrid Regime (elections-1, civil liberties-0, tutelary inference-1), Tutelary Liberal Hybrid Regime (elections-1, civil liberties-1, tutelary inference-1), Authoritarian/Autocracy (elections-0, civil liberties-0, tutelary inference-0) (elections-0, civil liberties-0, tutelary inference-1) (elections-0, civil liberties-1,tutelary inference-0). The time period covered is between 1990-2017.[2]

V. The Durability Of Hybrid Regimes.

With this new measure of hybridity in hand, and with an insight into the impact of the different democratic and non-democratic institutions, we can examine the *durability* of these regimes. For example, when considering their role in democracies, free elections help promote peaceful and regular political transition of power that leads to more regime stability. It also signals to the different competing centers of power in the political arena that access to power is possible via the election process, without the need to engage in violent political action. Meanwhile, unfree elections in autocratic regimes can also be an essential source of stability, since opposition needs to weigh the cost of rebellion and the violent overthrow of political leadership. And while the limited pathways to governmental change will limit the level of stability in autocratic regimes compared to democracies, it can still add more stability to autocracies than hybrid regimes -- since Hybrid regimes share the free elections dimension with democracies but not necessarily the other features of democracy that stabilizes them. For example, Schedler (2002) notes that introducing elections, even unfree ones, undermines the stability of "semi-democracies" since elections provide signals for opposition to organize collective

[2] All codes and variables are included in appendix 1. Additionally, all newly coded countries are included in appendix 2.

action, and repeated elections over time will spread democratic norms. Elections can also create further destabilization if the election results start to produce unacceptable consequences for the incumbent. Under this assumption, hybrid regimes should experience less level of stability when compared to other regime types.

Meanwhile, Gandhi (2008) argues that introducing free elections to non-democratic regimes allows the incumbent to co-opt any critical opposition groups, increase the incumbent's legitimacy, and undermine the opposition. Furthermore, multiparty elections and institutionalized constraints on the ruler signal to the opposition and the population that the ruler is willing to share power and thereby reduce the incentive to overthrow the regime. Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) found that, in fact, multiparty elections in non-democratic countries stabilize the regime. Elections then add a source of legitimacy to the ruler and the political process, while also allowing the opposition to participate in the decision-making process without engaging in violent action against the state. As a result, we can expect that while democracies remain to be the most stable regime type, hybridity can provide a pathway to autocrats to add more stability to their political leadership when that leadership is threatened.

Another critical element that differentiates hybrid regimes from either democratic or autocratic regimes in the presence and absence of civil liberties. Civil liberties in democratic regimes allow for the development of civil society, and with that, peaceful political and civil involvement of the population in the political process, which is more likely to stabilize these regimes. Limitation of civil liberties can also be a source of stabilization in non-democratic regimes. More specifically, the stability of autocratic regimes depends on two factors: the leader's ability to mobilize violence and the leader's ability to mobilize legitimacy. While the use of force was effective in some notable cases -- Stalin, who ruled for 31 years, and Mao, who ruled for 33 years -- there are compelling examples of other autocratic leaders who used force. Yet, their regimes did not survive for an extended period. The reason is that the use of force is costly, and the results might not always end in favor of the autocratic ruler -- and without some form of legitimacy, reliance on force is short-lived. The ability of autocratic leaders to monopolize legitimacy and force, which can be achieved by limiting all alternative legitimacy projects via limiting civil liberties, plays an important role in stabilizing these regimes.

Limited civil liberties can allow the leader to produce a hegemonic project that serves to stabilize the autocratic regime, while undermining the presence of civil society and political opposition. Hegemony, according to Gramsci (Cox 1993), is the control over the cultural, moral, and ideological spaces in a given country, meant not only to rule the population, but also to obtain their consent. An effective hegemonic project is more likely to develop in autocracies when the opposition is co-opted, and civil society is limited. Autocratic Iraq in the 1950s represented an important example of political leadership using oil resources to destroy civil society and limit civil freedoms, which not only allowed Saddam to create his own hegemonic project, but it also stabilized his regime for more than 30 years. As a result, while civil liberties can contribute to the democratic stability equation, a successful hegemonic project in autocratic regimes, built based on civil liberties limitations, can stabilize these regimes.

Hybrid regimes lack this clear-cut relationship between elites and the population via civil society, and as a result, are more likely to experience less stability because of that ambiguity. Research by Gurr (1974) and others (Epstein et al. 2006: Gates et al. 2006; Goldstone et al. 2010) provides evidence that "semi-democratic" are more volatile than full democracies and full autocracies because they lack the concentration of power and authority found in autocracies. And they lack the check and balances in the form of citizen participation and voluntary transfer of power common in democratic regimes. As a result, not only are hybrid regimes more likely to experience less stability compared to other regime types, but liberal hybrid regimes are also more likely to experience less stability compared to illiberal hybrid regimes.

Beyond civil liberties and free elections, some hybrid regimes have non-elected bodies that can impact their stability. Tutelary bodies are economic and political centers of power interested in maintaining the overall stability of the regime, as we saw in the case of Lebanon, while also seeking to protect their own interest. That divided interest between elected leaders and non-elected bodies is more likely to undermine the overall stability of hybrid regimes when compared to other regime types, since these non-elected bodies have the tools and the resources to mobilize against elected leaders when their interests are under threat. Meanwhile, hybrid regimes without tutelary bodies will experience a more concentration of power, and as a result, more stability.

However, since these non-elected bodies are combined with other hybrid institutional structures, their impact on the political process will differ. The configurative approach discussed earlier in this chapter allows us to examine hybrid regimes further by considering the different institutional formations in these regimes, enhancing or undermining their stability. As a result, one can expect that when tutelary bodies are combined with illiberal hybrid regimes, this will add a level of stability compared to when tutelary bodies are combined with liberal hybrid regimes, since the fractured interests and the different intersections between free civil liberties, non-elected bodies combined with free elections will position these countries away from the transparent and regular transfer of power in democracies, and away from the control over the hegemonic project and different forms of opposition in autocratic regimes. As a result, liberal tutelary hybrid regimes are more likely to experience less stability to other hybrid categories.

Using the new dataset developed in the first part of this paper, I examine the durability of hybrid regimes relative to other regime types and how the three sub-categories of hybrid regimes compare to each other. The dependent variable is regime type, which includes the three following categories: democratic regimes, hybrid regimes (all three categories of hybridity are included), and autocratic/authoritarian regimes. Using the new dataset of all countries between 1990-2017, I calculate the proportion of country-years that remain within the regime type after a country enters the regime type. I then test the null hypothesis that these proportions are the same between democracies/hybrids, autocracies/hybrids, and democracies/autocracies.

The proportion of countries that remain within the regime type after entering that category are listed in Table 1.2. I find that, as expected, proportions are all significantly larger than zero, which indicates that different regime types are substantially different from each other, and they all experience different levels of stability. When comparing these regimes to each other in the bottom cell of table 2, I find that democracies remain the most stable regime type compared to both autocratic regimes and hybrid regimes. As a result, despite the current democratization crisis, and the overall shift towards hybridity, the overall combination of democratic institutions, namely protected civil liberties and free elections, serve to stabilize these regimes over time. Meanwhile, while hybrid regimes are less stable than autocratic regimes, the results are not significant. The introduction of semi-free elections and some civil rights to authoritarian regimes does not seem to impact their durability.

What it might do, however, is shift the source of instability. For example, when faced with an immediate threat to their power due to the oppression of civil rights, authoritarian leaders might introduce more freedoms that won't impact the country's stability. Still, they can shift the focus of the population towards a different source of grievances for the time being. On the other hand, while democracies are more stable compared to other regime types, their stability depends on whether or not these countries will remain democratic. This means that once a democratic country shifts to the hybrid category, due to an economic crisis, a global democratization recession, or other factors on the national or global level, this country will become less stable. With the current democratization crisis, and the larger shift towards hybridity, we could be facing an upcoming period of political instability. This overall threat requires further research, which is beyond the scope of this study.

When comparing the different categories of hybrid regimes, I find that illiberal hybrid regimes are significantly more stable at 0.54 than illiberal-tutelary and liberal-tutelary regimes, which do not yield significantly different stability counts vis-a-vis each other. In other words, the presence of non-elected bodies seems to destabilize hybrid regimes, regardless of the level of civil liberties available. In illiberal hybrid regimes, with no interference of non-elected bodies, limited civil liberties allow the leader and his or her inner circle to control internal threats from the opposition, via elections, while limiting external threats from the population by controlling the civil sphere. Weak civil liberties will most likely produce more indifferent citizens to the political process, determine the interplay between the opposition and the population, and undermine the opposition's threat. While not wholly oppressive, these regimes allow for limited space for the opposition in the political process via elections -- thus, they will be less likely to organize to threaten the current political structure -- and the citizens will have a limited space of expression via the limited civil liberties -- thus, they are less likely to demand radical changes. In other words, semi-free elections and restricted civil liberties appease the opposition and the population. At the same time, power remains mainly in the hand of the political elites, which stabilizes these subtypes of hybrid regimes.

Meanwhile, in hybrid regimes with tutelary influence, non-elected bodies with the ability to impact the political decision-making process increase the possibility of conflict between the different competing power centers, which destabilizes these regimes. For example, in hybrid regimes with a military tutelary influence, the political process will be impacted by the economic and political interests of the military, which can organize a coup when its interests are threatened. Recent events in Myanmar are a case in point. Tutelary influence based on ethnic and tribal cleavages can also intensify political polarization rather than provide political accountability and citizen participation. Furthermore, as the public sphere is a primary tool of legitimacy creation, when such a sphere exists in a political space dominated by competing groups over ethnic, religious, and tribal identities, rather than political views -- which can be revisited and changed compared to well-established identities -- the civil sphere can serve to legitimize these tutelary identities while undermining alternative national or oppositional identities. This can explain why liberal tutelary hybrid regimes are less stable compared to illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes, even when the results are not significant. These findings confirm that further examination of the institutional diversity of hybrid regimes should be the focus of future research.

Table 1.2: Shuker (1990-2017)-Regime Durability

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Democracy	Hybrid	Autocracy	Liberal T	Illiberal T	Illiberal
Proportion Stable	0.878***	0.554***	0.678***	0.248***	0.400***	0.541***
	(130.238)	(44.522)	(55.432)	(10.100)	(19.599)	(35.449)
N	2355	1598	1493	578	578	1066
	Hybrid	Autocracy			Illiberal	Liberal T
Democracy	30.88***	16.68***		Illiberal T	2.94	2.11
Autocracy	3.03			Liberal T	10.73**	

Proportion stable is the proportion of country-years that remain within regime type after country enter that regime type
Bottom cells are a chi-square test

For the sake of comparison, comparing my results to those from Gilbert and Mohseni, we can easily see that misclassifying regime types can lead us to reach contradicting conclusions. For example, in table 1.3, G&M data might lead us to conclude that hybrid regimes are more stable than both autocratic and democratic regimes, which neither matches the empirical nor the theoretical existing research.[3]

[3] Furthermore, the amount of missing data within the hybrid category produces nonsensical results, and for that reason they are not included.

Table 1.3: Gilbert and Mohseni (1990-2007)-Regime Durability

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Democracy	Hybrid	Autocracy
Proportion Stable	0.208***	0.898***	0.540***
	(15.034)	(41.339)	(15.147)
N	91	454	61
	Hybrid	Autocracy	
Democracy	153.07***	155.48***	
Autocracy	5.65*		

Proportion stable is the proportion of country-years that remain within regime type after country enter that regime type

VI. Conclusion

As we shift towards hybridity in global governance, we are faced with a multitude of methodological and theoretical issues on how we define and measure hybrid regimes. Despite these regimes' prevalence, we have very little, and often contradictory, understanding of their nature. In this chapter, I aimed to revisit the question of hybrid regimes, their boundaries, and our definitions and methodological limitations. Building on the work of Gilbert and Mohsani (2011), I expand on their multi-dimensional approach in three ways. First, I add to their method by measuring free elections via the quality of elections; second, by expanding their conceptualization of tutelary interference to include ethnic, tribal, and sectarian groups as "Tutelary Groups"; and third, by extending both their measurement strategy and my modified one to the years 1990-2017. I also consider the contentions topic of the durability of hybrid regimes. Using our new data, I find evidence to suggest that hybrid regimes are no less transitory than autocratic regimes, both of which are less stable than democracies.

This research moves the conversation on regime types in multiple ways. First, our new dataset, which, as far as I know, is the only effort that exists towards developing a complete dataset of hybridity covering these ranges of years, will provide us the tools to build a better understanding of these mid-range regimes. In chapter 2 and chapter 3, for example, I use this data to examine the questions of income inequality and economic growth. With this data, future research can explore the different layers and institutional complexities, and manifestations of these regimes that are slowly dominating our current political climate. Second, while previous research suggests that hybrid regimes are a transitional stage between democratic and autocratic regimes, this chapter comes to challenge that assumption. I find that hybrid regimes are as stable as autocracies, and less durable than democracies. With a general global democratization crisis, we are seeing more countries shifting towards the less stable hybrid form. This has significant economic, political, and humanitarian implications. As a result, and like I mentioned in the previous point, future research must focus on hybrid regimes and their institutions to understand this new era in global governance, and what it might mean for economic and political stability and global security.

Chapter II: Regime Types and Economic Outcomes: The Relationship Between Hybrid Regimes and Economic Growth

What is the effect of regime hybridity on economic growth? With the increase in the number of hybrid regimes globally, and with the persistence of the democratization crisis, developing empirical and theoretical research on the impact of hybridity on economic growth is crucial. I begin by drawing from literature linking particular democratic institutions to economic growth to theorize how hybridity may or may not be conducive to economic development. Using improved and expanded measures of regime hybridity, this chapter explores the relationship between regime hybridity and levels of economic growth between 1990-2017. I find that democratic institutions, namely civil liberties, are beneficial to growth. I also find that the different kinds of hybrid regimes experience different levels of growth based on the different democratic and non-democratic institutional combinations in these regimes.

I. Introduction.

Hybrid regimes are those regimes where democratic and autocratic institutions co-exist to produce unique polity structures. How might these unique political manifestations impact levels of economic growth, and how would they compare to democratic and autocratic regimes? While our understanding of hybrid regimes is limited, we have a wealth of research examining how democratic and non-democratic institutions might impact levels of growth. This previous work might give us an insight into the relationship between hybridity and economic development. However, scholars examining the relationship between regime types and economic development have long debated the impact of democratic institutions on economic prosperity. Democracies and non-democracies are seen to both inhibit and promote economic growth (de Haan and Sturm 2000; Pitlik 2002; Weede and Kampf 2002; Berggren 2003; de Haan, Lundstrom, and Sturm 2006; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2006; Olson 1993; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Londregan and Poole 1996) -- yet others argue that regime types and growth are unrelated (Baum and Lake 2003). The lack of consensus on whether or not democratic institutions can lead to higher economic growth over time have significant economic, political, and policy implications.

These contradicting conclusions are the product of disagreements on theoretical and methodological bases on defining and measuring regime types. On the one hand, glaring inconsistencies arise when it comes to defining democracies and autocracies, adding further confusion to how we define hybrid regimes, as we saw in the previous chapter. Furthermore, hybrid regimes have long been considered an extension of either democratic or authoritarian regimes, rather than an independent regime type. And as a result, when hybrid regimes were included in previous research, they were often classified either under the democratic or autocratic category -- based on how that author defines the root term -- which meant that we were measuring growth in misclassified categories and producing inaccurate conclusions. On the other hand, even when scholarship on hybridity developed in the previous years, the question of hybrid boundaries remained an obstacle towards creating a complete dataset that classified hybrid regimes into their correct categories, thus, not allowing us to measure their institutional structures and outcomes.

As a result, in addition to the disagreements in the literature on how democratic and non-democratic institutions might impact levels of economic development, as far as I know, hybrid regimes remained outside of these scholarly conversations. And when scholarship on hybrid regimes progressed over time, our literature did not move beyond the questions of boundaries.[4] This chapter attempts to address this gap in the literature in two ways. First, unlike previous research on the relationship between regime types and economic development, this chapter investigates the impact of hybrid regimes on economic growth. Second, to explore this relationship, I use a new and improved dataset

[4] While Gilbert and Mohseni's classification (2011) produces a dataset of hybrid categories, as we saw in chapter 1, that dataset is not particularly helpful in this case; as I argued in the previous chapter, I improve their data on measuring election competitiveness, and I expand the concept of tutelary regimes. In addition to misclassification due to measuring errors, the authors' data ended in 2007. I broaden the years measured to 2017, which provides us with a complete dataset to expand our understanding of these regimes beyond the question of boundaries.

that remeasures regime types along additional and more nuanced boundaries—using appropriate econometric techniques on panel data between 1990-2017.

Testing a theoretical model against the new data allows us to reach three important conclusions; I find that first, democratic institutions are better for economic growth compared to non-democratic institutions; second, liberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience a faster level of growth, even when compared to democracies, although they are not significantly different from each other; third, protection of political and economic freedoms seems to be the most critical indicator of the levels of growth in a country.

This chapter is organized as follows: Section two highlights the main arguments in the literature on the political economy of growth, and explores a theoretical framework on the relationship between hybridity and development. Section three specifies the data, methods, and variables used in this chapter. Section four presents the results of the analysis. And section five provides a summary, conclusions, and future directions.

II. The Ambiguous Relationship Between Regime Types And Economic Growth: A Theoretical Framework.

To reiterate, hybrid regimes are neither democratic nor autocratic. They represent the grey area between democratic and autocratic regimes where democratic institutions, such as free or semi-free elections, are combined with autocratic features, such as the limitation of civil liberties and the presence of non-elected bodies (tutelary groups) in the decision-making process. As a result, based on recent scholarship, I classify hybrid regimes into three categories: illiberal hybrid regimes, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes, and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes -- based on three dimensions: election competitiveness, civil liberties, and tutelary interference. All three categories of hybridity share the free or semi-free election dimension with democratic regimes, and share the limitation of civil rights[5] and/or the presence of non-elected bodies[6] with authoritarian regimes. Exploring the different mechanisms by which democratic and autocratic regimes harm or benefit economic growth can provide us with an insight into how hybrid regimes might impact economic development.

i. The Case for Democratic Institutions and Economic Growth

Do regime types impact the level of economic prosperity and growth? The question of which form of government brings about economic development has been debated for more than two millennia, with no clear consensus (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Huntington 1968; Tocqueville 1835; Persson and Tabellini 1994).

Arguments for a positive relationship between democracy and economic growth suggests that the transparency and the high-quality public institutions of democratic regimes, which are the product of political and economic freedoms — such as the protection of property rights and market competition — allows for equitable economic development, which leads to higher growth (Friedman 1961; Lipset 1959; Riker and Weimer 1993; Scully 1988). Previous scholarship shows that the transparency and the high-quality public institutions of democratic regimes are more likely to eliminate trade barriers, fight public sector corruption, enforce property rights, stabilize high inflation and create market-friendly reforms and policies, all of which lead to higher levels of

[5] Illiberal hybrid regimes and illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes.

[6] Illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes.

economic development (de Haan and Sturm 2000, Pitlik 2002, Weede and Kampf 2002, Berggren 2003, de Haan, Lundstrom, and Sturm 2006, Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2006; Robinson 2006).

More specifically, scholars who argue that democratic regimes produce higher levels of economic growth mainly emphasize the role of two institutions: elections and civil liberties. In the case of elections, regular and irregular governmental changes have a different impact on economic growth. Evidence suggests that inconsistent governmental change — such as *coup d'etat*, which is more likely to occur in autocratic governments — is more likely to slow down economic growth by introducing a high level of uncertainty to the marketplace (Li and Thompson 1975; Londregan and Poole 1990). Meanwhile, regular governmental change removes politicians that oversee economic stagnation (Feng 1997). Additionally, regular political change due to economic circumstances signals to investors that the country contains the capacity to respond to evolving market conditions. It also reflects governmental accountability and system adjustability, as well as the continuity of governmental policy and political stability, all of which favors economic growth (Alesina and Perotti 1996; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared, 2005). In other words, irregularity in governmental turnover can lead to market uncertainty, while regular elections lower the risk of entering the market, which improves economic growth. Following this logic, and to the extent that hybrid regimes also have free or semi-free elections, they should experience higher economic growth than autocratic regimes, since leaders in hybrid regimes are held accountable by the population through the process of elections.

When it comes to civil liberties, evidence suggests that the protection of civil, political, and economic freedoms will increase economic growth in direct and indirect ways. For example, protected civil liberties are a sign of high-quality public institutions, which leads to more transparent public decision-making, and more certainty for investors. Protection of property rights and the enforcement of the rule of law, among other things, translates to a better environment for business decision-makers, which means less risk for market entry. Additionally, the protection of economic and political rights leads to higher innovation potentials. When investors make decisions on market entry, the innovation-friendly characteristics of the economic environment in a country play an important role. Furthermore, countries with protected civil liberties tend to be attractive for highly educated people who can contribute to high-skilled economic activities, which are associated with higher levels of growth, compared to low-skill economic activities. Benyishay and Betancourt (2014) find that the "Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights" component of the *Freedom House Civil Liberties* variable[7] is the most significant positive form of liberties that impact economic growth. Thus, one can expect that liberal hybrid regimes should experience higher levels of economic growth than illiberal hybrid

---

[7] *The Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights* component of the *Freedom House Civil Liberties* variable measures economic freedoms -- such as the right to ownership form and employment -- as well as social liberties. In my measurements, I use the civil liberties variable as a whole (which includes economic and political freedoms) to determine whether a hybrid regime is illiberal (score lower than 4-7 on the scale) or liberal (score between 1-3 on the scale). As a result, economic freedoms are included in the overall analysis. It will be useful in future research to break down the civil liberties variable in the illiberal hybrid regimes and liberal hybrid regimes to examine which components of civil liberties or limitations impact economic growth in these regimes.

regimes, since liberal hybrid governments experience higher levels of protection for civil, political, and economic rights.

Beyond elections and civil liberties, hybrid regimes contain non-elected bodies that will impact economic and political outcomes. Different non-elected bodies are not held accountable by the population, even when there is a free or semi-free election. At the same time, they represent important centers of economic and political power (Wantchekon 2004). These different tutelary bodies will most likely control a significant share of the market income of the society. Thus, they have an encompassing interest in the overall productivity of that society. In tutelary regimes, one can expect strong personalized power-sharing and control over leadership between political leaders and the non-elected bodies. When combined with civil liberties -- liberal tutelary hybrid regimes -- the protection of economic rights and the pressure from non-elected bodies, will produce higher levels of economic growth. However, when civil liberties are unprotected --illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes -- the economic uncertainty and the limited economic freedoms will impact growth negatively. Meanwhile, illiberal hybrid regimes lack economic liberties and the pressure from non-elected elites with a vast interest in maximizing growth outcomes, and thus are more likely to experience the least amount of economic growth.[8]

[8]It remains to be seen whether this growth in tutelary hybrid regimes is the product of a high degree of capital accumulation or an increase in economic activity and improvement in the overall quality of life. It is, however, essential to point out that not all non-elected bodies are likely to behave in similar ways, and further historical examination is necessary.

ii. The Case Against Democratic Institutions

However, this positive relationship between democratic institutions and economic growth came under scrutiny when various theoretical and empirical work reached different conclusions. For example, autocratic leaders, such as Pinochet and the Fujimori administration, have expanded economic freedom leading to higher levels of growth while suppressing political rights at the same time. The Chinese economy grew by 3.9 percent in 1990, and by greater than 7 percent every year between 1990 and 2014 while being ruled by a one-party regime (Kaul 2021). Other than China, countries like South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan experienced high levels of growth in the absence of democracy (Mauzy 2006; Mutalib 2000; Rodan and Jayasuriya 2007).[9]

Those who argue for the positive relationship between non-democratic institutions and growth agree that the presence of free competitive elections and protected civil liberties harm growth. Extensive political science research suggests that the "median voter" in democracies is likely to prefer policies that increase wages and redistribution, and will vote for political leaders who will introduce such policies.[10] In democratic

[9] However, we know from more recent work that economic freedoms, more so than political freedoms, are the most significant positive form of liberties that impact economic growth. Meanwhile, China's high development -- based on resource-intensive manufacturing, exports, and low-paid labor -- has progressed beyond the country's institutional capacity. More recently, growth has moderated and is expected to slow down further if the Chinese government can not address its autocratic conditions (The World Bank 2021).

[10] An economic policy that promotes higher wages and egalitarian resource distribution is often seen as antithetical to profit and growth (Olson 1993). Research indicates that in the past two decades, in many countries where GDP per capita increases, income disparities have increased as well. An increase in income disparities is associated with lower well-being and decreased quality of life (Causa, de Serres, and Rus 2014).

regimes, politicians will converge to the viewpoint of the median voter, since they fear being voted out of office, and are more likely to campaign around the premise that they improved or will improve the overall well-being of the population.

Contrarily, political leaders in authoritarian regimes are insulated from the preferences of the median voter and thereby more capable of resisting these demands. This is especially true for autocrats who have been in their positions for a long time.[11] And since autocratic leaders often seek to legitimize and stabilize their regime, as well as to monopolize economic resources and increase their net worth, they are more likely to introduce growth-friendly policies (Morrison 2009). Autocratic leaders can accumulate large amounts of wealth -- an expected outcome of economic growth -- while also escaping accountability, primarily because of the limited existing system of checks and balances in these regimes. In other words, free elections -- which are often credited for good economic outcomes -- would hinder the ability of democratic leaders to introduce growth-friendly policies, which will limit economic growth in these countries (Houle 2009). However, since hybrid regimes share the freedom of elections with democracies, they too are more likely to experience slower levels of economic growth compared to autocratic regimes, according to this theoretical model.

When it comes to the role of limited economic and political freedoms, supporters of the autocratic model argue that the ability of autocratic leaders to monopolize force

[11] Autocratic leaders in stable autocracies are more likely to have highly institutionalized tools to monopolize force, allowing them to oppress opposition easier than those in unstable or new autocratic regimes. While political leaders in unstable or in new autocracies can suppress non-violent political resistance, they have fewer resources to suppress violent action. And thus, they have more to fear and lose when economic policies create high levels of income inequalities.

and oppress opposition, will also enable them to suppress any widespread rejection of growth policies. While growth-friendly policies tend to increase levels of inequality in the short run, they also tend to increase life expectancy, improve infrastructure, and increase access to healthcare and education in the long run (Miller 2011). As a result, autocratic leaders who can successfully suppress freedoms can withstand the initial increase in the levels of inequality until the more positive outcomes of economic growth start to materialize (Way and Levitsky 2006). O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) find that if autocratic leaders can withstand the initial stage of growth, the positive outcomes of economic growth that emerge over time add legitimacy and stability to the autocratic regime. As a result, it is in the interest of the autocratic leader to introduce growth-friendly policies. Johnson (1964), Moore (1966), and Gerschenkron (1962) find that rapid growth can not be achieved without strong central and autocratic governments that can suppress opposition and monopolize the decision-making process. If this theoretical reasoning is accurate, we should expect illiberal hybrid regimes to experience faster economic growth than liberal hybrid regimes. And since tutelary groups are often interested in economic growth and wealth accumulation, they are more likely to continue to push towards these policies even in the absence of civil liberties. Thus, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes should experience higher growth levels than liberal tutelary hybrid regimes and illiberal hybrid regimes.

In short, in the democratic model, the presence of civil liberties -- especially economic freedoms -- and free elections lead to better economic growth outcomes. Since hybrid regimes also have free or semi-free elections, and since tutelary bodies are more likely to advocate for growth-friendly policies, liberal tutelary hybrid regimes are more likely to experience higher levels of economic growth. Meanwhile, the economic uncertainty and the limited economic freedoms are more likely to lead to lower levels of economic growth in illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes and illiberal hybrid regimes.

In the autocratic model, limited civil liberties and unfree and uncompetitive elections are seen to produce higher levels of economic growth. Since hybrid regimes have free or semi-free elections, they will experience lower levels of growth compared to autocratic regimes in general. Meanwhile, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes should experience the fastest growth, followed by illiberal hybrid regimes, and then liberal tutelary hybrid regimes. In the next section I test our data against these theoretical models.

III. Data and Methods

i. Sample

The sample includes all countries between 1990-2017, classified into three categories: democracies, autocracies, and hybrid regimes. The hybrid category is divided into three categories: illiberal hybrid regimes, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes, and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes. The sample includes a total of 3,958 year-country cases divided between 2,068 (%52.25) democracies, 1,005 (%25.39) autocratic regimes, 577 (%14.58) illiberal hybrid regimes, 231 (%5.84) illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes, and 77 (%1.95) liberal tutelary hybrid regimes, not including missing cases. The data covers 177 countries over a period of 28 years. Data for the dependent and control variables come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2019). The choice to use WDI in this paper is motivated by two reasons. First, WDI has considerably larger country coverage than other data sets, such as PWT. Second, WDI contains the best-measured growth performance (Nuxoll 1994).

ii. Dependent Variables

Economic growth is measured as the annual percentage change of per capita GDP, produced by logging and then differencing annual GDP per-capita observations (Curwin and Mahutga 2014). The variable is *GDP per capita* from the World Development Indicators.

iii. The Baseline Model of Economic Growth

Most studies in the growth literature utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) models, with regime type as an independent variable and economic growth as a dependent variable. I produce dummy variables for our three regime categories, as well as for our three hybrid categories. To identify the link between regime type and economic growth, I control for the following variables that represent the neoclassical model of growth; labor, capital, and technology, as well as a one-year lag of GDP per capita. (Curwin and Mahutga 2014; Clark 2010).

Labor force participation refers to the percentage of the working-age population that is currently economically active. In addition to being part of the neoclassical model of economic growth, research indicates that many countries that undergo political transition --such as movement between regime types -- experience a shift in the percentage of labor force participation, which in turn impacts levels of economic growth (Meurs and Ranasinghe 2003). Furthermore, research indicates that different regime types impact labor policies -- such as public sector overemployment, job security guarantees, and minimum wage protection -- which are all associated with labor force participation, and levels of economic performance (Banerji and Ghanem 1997). To account for this interaction, I control for *total labor force (log base 10)*.

The second control variable is human capital, which is defined as the level of skill and ability of the countries' workforce, and often measured through education enrollment rates (Barro 2001). Research indicates that human capital, especially in relation to technology, is a strong indicator of economic growth (Lucas 1988). Additionally, regime types have an impact on basic and advanced human capital. For example, Klomp and de Haan (2013) find that democracy increases basic human capital, while regime instability -- often associated with non-democratic regimes -- is negatively related to basic human capital. Stable governance also has a positive relationship with advanced human capital, while governmental instability negatively impacts advanced human capital. Using Curwin and Mahutga's measurement (2014) and Barro (1991), I measure human capital as *secondary-school enrollment (gross %) (log base 10)*.

The third control variable is industrialization. Previous scholarship finds that industrialization and economic growth are highly correlated (Acemoglu et al., 2019). Furthermore, Gerring, Gjerlow, and Knutsen (2020) find that autocratic leaders are more likely to center their growth policies on heavy industrialization policies compared to other regime types, such as democracies. These economic policies tend to be motivated by the nature of population-leaders interaction, which tends to be shaped by limited freedoms and higher regime durability threats. As a result, autocratic leaders have higher incentives and better capabilities to push for a rapid and comprehensive level of industrialization. I measure industrialization as the v*alue of industry of total GDP, including construction (log base 10).*

Finally, I control for population size, as higher population growth is more likely to situate larger segments of the population below the working age, which lowers per-capita economic growth (Sheehey 1996). I account for demographic effects by controlling the variable *Total Population (log base 10).*

iv. Panel Regression Model

The contradicting empirical conclusions on the relationship between regime type and economic growth require an analytical strategy that can verify that the data meets the OLS regression's assumptions. To do so, I estimate a model that addresses heteroskedasticity with a Huber/White estimator or sandwich estimates of variance, which relaxes the assumption that our errors are both independent and identically distributed. To eliminate unobserved country effects and minimize the influence of outliers, I estimate my models with the first difference of logs variant, which produces an unbiased and consistent coefficient on the differenced variables . An increase in multicollinearity indicates that our regression model estimates of the coefficients become unstable, and the standard errors for the coefficients are inflated. I test for multicollinearity using the *variance inflation factor*. The VIF values for the variables in my model are smaller than 0.1, and thus, the coefficients in the model are fairly stable with un-inflated standard errors. All analyses were performed with STATASe 16.

IV. Results

Table 2.1 represents the neoclassical baseline model before and after, including the three regime type categories. The neoclassical model --model 1-- confirms conclusions in previous research that finds an increase in the labor force, levels of industrialization, and human capital lead to an increase in economic growth (Piketty 2014). Meanwhile, an increase in population size lowers growth, matching previous conclusions in the literature (Ehrlich 1968; Malthus 1993). Models 2, 3, and 4 examined the impact of the three main categories of regime type on economic growth. Democratic governments experience the highest level of economic growth compared to both hybrid regimes (-0.014) and autocracies (-0.020*). However, while democratic governments experience faster growth compared to hybrid regimes, the results are not significant. In other words, non-democratic institutions, like the limitation of civil liberties and tutelary bodies, do not significantly impact growth levels in hybrid regimes compared to democracies. However, the loss of free elections significantly lowers levels of growth in autocratic regimes. When we compare hybrid regimes to autocratic regimes, as we do in models 3 and 4, we see that while hybrid regimes experience faster growth than autocratic regimes, the results are also not significant. As a result, while democratic and autocratic regimes experience different levels of economic growth, the overall hybrid category does not seem to impact growth levels.

Table 2.1: Shuker (1990-2017)-The Three Main Categories of Regime Type and Economic Growth

	(1) Base Model	(2) Democracy	(3) Hybrid	(4) Autocracy
	GDP PC	GDP PC	GDP PC	GDP PC
Democracy			0.014	0.020*
			(1.54)	(2.34)
Hybrid		-0.014		0.006
		(-1.54)		(0.70)
Autocracy		-0.020*	-0.006	
		(-2.34)	(-0.70)	
L. GDP PC	-0.009***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***
	(-4.79)	(-5.24)	(-5.24)	(-5.24)
Labor Force (log)	0.127	0.102	0.102	0.102
	(0.59)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Sec School En (Log)	0.109	0.075	0.075	0.075
	(1.74)	(1.06)	(1.06)	(1.06)
Population Total (log)	-1.089**	-0.869*	-0.869*	-0.869*
	(-3.14)	(-2.37)	(-2.37)	(-2.37)
Industry GDP (log)	0.172*	0.225**	0.225**	0.225**
	(2.24)	(3.28)	(3.28)	(3.28)
Constant	0.135***	0.168***	0.154***	0.148***
	(7.19)	(7.13)	(7.63)	(6.92)
Observations	2475	2262	2262	2262
R^2	0.029	0.039	0.039	0.039
BIC	-3095.299	-2866.692	-2866.692	-2866.692

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

However, when breaking the hybrid regime category further in table 2.2, we find that in model 1, democracies are significantly different and experience faster growth compared to illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes (-0.043**) and autocracies (-0.022*), with illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes experiencing the slowest growth. Model 2 indicates that illiberal hybrid regimes are statistically different from illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes (-0.033*), showing that when tutelary groups are combined with limited civil liberties, economic growth slows down. Model 3 shows that illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience slower growth compared to democracies (0.043**), illiberal hybrid regimes (0.033**), and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes (0.068**). As a result, when compared to other hybrid categories, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience the slowest level of growth. Meanwhile, liberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience the fastest growth compared to all other regime types, even democracies, although the results are not significant in the case of democracies. In model 5, we also see that liberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience faster growth (0.046*) than autocratic regimes, even more so than democracies (0.022*), and the results are significant. It indicates that the combination of civil liberties and non-elected groups produce the best condition for growth. Simultaneously, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience slower growth out of all regime types, although they are not statistically different from autocracies. As a result, when non-elected bodies are combined with limited civil liberties, they produce the opposite effects. This suggests that civil liberties are the determining factor of growth levels in different regime types.

Table 2.2: Shuker (1990-2017)-All Regime Types and Economic Growth

	(1) Democracy	(2) Illiberal	(3) Illiberal Tutelary	(4) Liberal Tutelary	(5) Autocracy
	GDP PC	GDP PC	GDP PC	GDP PC	GDP PC
Democracy		0.010	0.043**	-0.024	0.022*
		(0.32)	(0.00)	(0.24)	(0.01)
Illiberal	-0.010		0.033*	-0.034	0.012
	(0.32)		(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.26)
Illiberal Tutelary	-0.043**	-0.033*		-0.068**	-0.021
	(0.00)	(0.03)		(0.00)	(0.13)
Liberal Tutelary	0.024	0.034	0.068**		0.046*
	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.00)		(0.03)
Autocracy	-0.022*	-0.012	0.021	-0.046*	
	(0.01)	(0.26)	(0.13)	(0.03)	
L. GDP PC	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Labor Force (log)	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077
	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.73)
Sec School En (Log)	0.080	0.080	0.080	0.080	0.080
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Population Total (log)	-0.756*	-0.756*	-0.756*	-0.756*	-0.756*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Industry GDP (log)	0.225**	0.225**	0.225**	0.225**	0.225**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.171***	0.161***	0.128***	0.196***	0.149***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	2262	2262	2262	2262	2262
R^2	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043
BIC	-2861.014	-2861.014	-2861.014	-2861.014	-2861.014

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

For the sake of comparison, I use the G&M data to see if our results will be different. In table 2.3, we can see that autocratic regimes seem to produce better growth levels than democracies, although the results are not significant. In fact, autocracies are better for growth than all other regime types, with significant results for illiberal hybrid regimes (-0.110*), which contradicts my results, and the theoretical and empirical research discussed in the previous section. These results also illustrate that misclassification of regimes can produce different results, which, as I argued earlier, can significantly impact our understanding of the political economy of economic development and policy creation, and which have contributed to previous contradicting conclusions in the literature on the impact of democratic and non-democratic institutions on growth.

Table 2.3: Gilbert and Mohseni (1990-2007)-Economic Growth and All Regime Types

	(1) Democracy	(2) Illiberal	(3) Illiberal Tutelary	(4) Liberal Tutelary	(5) Autocracy
	GDP PC	GDP PC	GDP PC	GDP PC	GDP PC
Democracy		0.052	0.018	0.056	-0.058
		(0.21)	(0.68)	(0.30)	(0.34)
Illiberal	-0.052		-0.034	0.004	-0.110*
	(0.21)		(0.13)	(0.92)	(0.03)
Illiberal Tutelary	-0.018	0.034		0.038	-0.076
	(0.68)	(0.13)		(0.37)	(0.14)
Liberal Tutelary	-0.056	-0.004	-0.038		-0.114
	(0.30)	(0.92)	(0.37)		(0.06)
Autocracy	0.058	0.110*	0.076	0.114	
	(0.34)	(0.03)	(0.14)	(0.06)	
L. GDP PC	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Labor Force (log)	-1.111	-1.111	-1.111	-1.111	-1.111
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Sec School En (Log)	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039
	(0.83)	(0.83)	(0.83)	(0.83)	(0.83)
Population Total (log)	1.238	1.238	1.238	1.238	1.238
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Industry GDP (log)	0.084	0.084	0.084	0.084	0.084
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)
Constant	0.221*	0.169*	0.204*	0.165	0.279**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.00)
Observations	221	221	221	221	221
R^2	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060
BIC	-189.935	-189.935	-189.935	-189.935	-189.935

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

V. Discussion and Conclusion

The results indicate that regime types impact economic growth, with democracy being overall better for growth and autocracy leading to slower growth levels. This conclusion aligns with the democracy model in the literature that suggests democratic institutions, such as civil liberties and free elections, provide the ideal conditions for economic growth and development. When compared to democracies and autocracies, hybrid regimes as a collective do not significantly differ from both. Thus, it seems that hybridity does not have an impact on economic growth. Previous research would have ended with that conclusion. Yet, when considering the *kinds* of hybrid regimes, we see that the relationship between democratic institutions and economic growth is more complicated.

I argued in the previous chapter that the configurative approach to classifying hybrid regimes along the three dimensions of election competitiveness, civil liberties, and tutelary groups allow us to capture the complexity of hybrid regimes in two fundamental ways. First, this approach highlights the complexity of regime type beyond election competitiveness, since multiparty elections or even competitive multiparty elections do not in and of themselves challenge the control over or distribution of power. Second, the configurative approach allows us to compare hybrid regimes to each other to examine the institutional differences and similarities for middle-range countries that continuum scores, such as polity2 and the Freedom House classification, tend to mask. Previous classifications of hybrid regimes would lead us to conclude that hybrid regimes have no impact on economic growth. This new classification, however, allows us to reach a few important conclusions. Liberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience the fastest growth compared to all other regime types, including democracies[12], while illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes contain the worst conditions for growth, including autocracies.[13]

It seems then that tutelary bodies can improve growth levels, but only in the presence of protected civil liberties. Meanwhile, when economic and political freedoms are limited, tutelary bodies' presence impacts growth levels negatively in a similar fashion to autocracies, even when there are free or semi-free elections in these hybrid regimes. The underlying determinant of growth then is the presence of civil liberties as the essential condition to positive economic growth.

These findings indicate a few things. First, the different kinds of hybrid regimes have different, and opposite, impact on growth. In other words, some hybrid regimes will experience faster growth, while others will experience slower growth. Second, the presence or absence of democratic institutions is not an indicator of growth levels in a country. Instead, the interaction between different democratic and non-democratic institutions is what determines levels of growth. For example, lack of civil liberties will impact growth levels in different ways based on other regime features, and the same can be said for the presence of non-elected bodies. These findings highlight the complexity of hybrid governing. Future research ought to further examine the direct and indirect mechanisms by which these different dimensions of hybridity interact with each other to produce different economic, social, and political outcomes.

---

[12] Although it is important to point out that while liberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience faster growth than democracies, the result is not significant.

[13] Again, the results are not significant when comparing the two.

To conclude, previous research has long ignored the relationship between hybrid regimes and economic outcomes as a result of definition disagreements and methodological errors. However, with the increase in the number of hybrid regimes globally, and with the persistence of the democratization crisis, an ever-increasing need to develop empirical and theoretical research on understanding the complexity of hybrid regimes and their political, economic, and social conditions. As a result, this chapter examined the relationship between hybrid regimes and economic growth. Using a new dataset that remeasures hybridity between 1990-2017, I find that first, democratic institutions are better for economic growth compared to non-democratic institutions; second, liberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience a faster level of growth, even when compared to democracies, although they are not significantly different; third, protection of political and economic freedoms seems to be the most important indicators of the levels of growth.

Chapter III: Regime Type and Economic Outcome-Income Inequality Dilemma

Research on the political-economic consequences of hybrid regimes has reached a number of conflicting conclusions on the consequences of hybridity on income inequality. Drawing from older literatures on the link between particular types of institutions that represent the boundaries of regime hybridity and income inequality, I find that theoretical and empirical research is divided on whether these institutions --such as civil liberties and tutelary bodies -- increase inequality, lowers inequality, or does not impact inequality. These contradictory conclusions reflect the diverse definitions of hybrid regimes, and the limited methodological tools available to us. Given the important real-life consequences of income inequality on things such as political instability (Duarte and Schnabl 2018) and the overall quality of life of the population (Tan 2018), the limited understanding of the relationship between hybrid regimes and income inequality is surprising. In this chapter, I examine the relationship between hybrid regimes, using my new classification of hybridity and the resulting dataset, and income inequality between 1990-2017. My data shows that hybrid regimes experience less inequality than democracies, but are not significantly different from autocracies. Among hybrid regimes, I find no significant difference between the three categories of hybridity. I interpret this to mean that limited civil liberties motivate political leaders to introduce egalitarian policies that tend to stabilize the regime. Additionally, tutelary bodies play an essential role in equalizing hybrid regimes, since they have an invested interest in stabilizing the regime and building their legitimacy.

I. Introduction

Is there a relationship between hybrid regimes[14] and income inequalities? Like the research on the relationship between economic growth and the hybrid type, the literature here is divided. Some theoretical and empirical analysis finds that democratic institutions --such as civil liberties and free elections -- in hybrid regimes reduce income inequality (Lenski 1966; Lipset 1959). In theory, free elections allow the median voter to punish elected political leaders that maintain consistently high levels of inequality because it is in the voter's interest to support regimes that promote redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981). Additionally, protected civil, political, and economic freedoms allow various interest groups and labor unions to organize and compete in the political arena towards more favorable economic policies.

Other research finds that autocratic institutions in hybrid regimes lead to lower levels of inequality (Beitz 1982). Even with free elections in these regimes, limited civil liberties undermine the ability of the population to use non-violent tools to organize towards specific political and economic needs and goals. These citizens are more likely to engage in violent action, due to the limitation of democratic spaces, if levels of inequality rise. And thus, political leaders in these regimes aim to pacify the population by focusing on more egalitarian redistribution policies to limit the odds of rising violent conflict. For example, political leaders in rentier states engage in a wide range of redistribution

[14]Hybrid regimes are divided into three categories: illiberal hybrid regimes, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes, and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes. All three categories of hybridity share the free or semi-free election dimension with democratic regimes. Illiberal hybrid regimes will have limited civil liberties; illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes will have limited civil liberties and non-elected bodies; liberal hybrid regimes will contain more protected civil liberties but non-elected bodies.

policies, public sector employment, and universal free healthcare and education while also suppressing civil rights in these countries. These policies are often cited as the source of stability of these regimes and the persistence of their undemocratic nature (Ross 2001; Shuker 2017; Shuker and Abrutyn 2019). In contrast, a third line of research cautions against simplifying the relationship between inequalities and regime type (Abad 2013; Albertus 2015; Marsh 1979; Nelson 1987; Williamson 2015).

Given that the politics of income inequality have been the central issue in many academic and policy circles, the lack of attention to the relationship between hybrid regimes and income inequality is surprising. Indeed, understanding the impact of hybridity on income inequality could provide a lens through which to evaluate the long-term viability of this emergent form of governance. One common reason for the differences in research outcomes is the diversity of designs, measurements, and models used. Income inequality data, in particular, vary in coverage over time and across countries (Solt 2008). Existing inequality research also sheds little light on its association with hybridity because the different classifications of regime types have played a significant role in producing contradicting research. Hybrid regimes have been included within the democratic countries category in certain studies and with non-democratic countries in other cases. For example, The Freedom House dataset classifies Iraq as Not Free --despite the presence of semi-free elections in the country -- and it is one of the most commonly used datasets in measuring regime type and civil liberties in cross-national research.

Using the new regime types data, and the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2008 and 2009) -- which combines the strength of The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the UNU-WIDER databases -- this chapter examines the relationship between hybrid regimes and income inequality between 1990-2017. I find that democratic regimes experience higher levels of income inequality when compared to other regime types. Meanwhile, hybrid regimes experience less income inequalities than democracies, but they are not significantly different from autocracies. And the three categories of hybrid regimes are not significantly different from each other. As global governance is experiencing a democratization crisis and a shift towards hybridity, these results indicate that democratic countries shifting towards hybridity are more likely to experience less income inequality. In contrast, autocratic regimes that make the transition towards hybridity will experience more democratization without an increase in income inequality.

This chapter is organized as follows: Section two provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of democratic and non-democratic institutions on levels of income inequality. Section three examines the data, methods, and variables used in this chapter. Section four presents the results of the analysis. And section five provides a summary, conclusions, and future directions.

II. The Hybrid Type-Income Inequality Dilemma

A wealth of research addresses the relationship between regime type and income inequalities. Like economic growth, positions are divided on whether democratic institutions decrease inequality, exacerbate inequality, or have no systematic influence on inequality.

i. *The Democratic Boundaries of Hybrid Regimes and the Reduction of Income Inequality*

Interestingly enough, many scholars who argue either for or against the positive relationship between democratic boundaries and growth agree that democratic institutions lower income inequalities. On the one hand, those who suggest that democratic institutions decrease growth also argue that economic development aggravates inequalities and indirectly lowers inequality (Kuznets 1953 and 1955). On the other hand, those who theorize that democratic institutions have a positive effect on growth also suggest that these institutions are inherently good for equal resource distribution, since neither regimes with these institutions willingly deprive the different groups in the population of resources, nor they can ignore the needs of the mobilized voting masses (Lipset 1959). As a result, free elections and protected civil liberties produce more egalitarian societies, which leads to the decrease of distributional inequalities over time, as more members of the masses organize into unions, interest groups, and political parties.

Work within the democracy model builds on the analytical contribution of Meltzer and Richard (1981), who examine the effect of electoral competition on inequalities. Meltzer and Richard's theory — the median voter model — assumes that levels of inequality depend on the relationship between the mean income and the income of the voter, which in turn determines the size of the government and its policies. Before the spread of democratization, the median voter was a member of the wealthy and upper classes. Thus, they were more likely to push towards policies that protect their political and economic interests as members of the upper class, which will harm the overall resource distribution in society. However, after the spread of democratization, the likely median voter is a lower-income citizen in an unequal society, most likely to favor higher taxation and more redistribution. To accommodate this shift in needs and demands -- the impact of the demographic change of the voter classes on governmental stability -- unlike autocracies, governments, where free elections exist, are more likely to provide more public goods, which will lower inequalities.

Building on that model, Boix (2003 and 2015) argues that free political participation reduces inequality because power distribution is structured around the range of interests of different groups, while the lack of elections leads to higher inequalities because the state caters only to the interests of the elites. Others, like Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), reach a similar conclusion. Lindert (1994) finds that expansion of voting rights between 1880-1930 led to more redistribution, mostly among OECD countries after World War I. Husted and Kenny (1997) also find that increased voting led to the introduction of higher redistribution programs in local and state governments in the United States between 1950-1988. On a cross-national level, Adsera and Boix (2002) find that in 65 developing and developed countries, democracy led to more redistribution compared to non-democracies. Mahler (2004), Rudra and Haggard (2005), and Norruddin and Simmons (2009) find a similar effect in both developed and developing countries.

Others like Olson (1965) and Becker (1983) look at the role of civil and political rights, namely the ability of lobbying and interest groups to contribute resources to politicians and political parties to exact compromises and impact policy decisions. Mueller and Murrell (1986) find that as the number of interest groups increases, government spending increases. These different groups overcome the collective action problem to impact policy decisions more meaningfully compared to unorganized groups. These interactions between the public and political spheres are often missing or limited in non-democratic countries. As a result, there is little pressure for elites to alter their redistribution policies. An implication of this relationship between interest groups and the state is that lobbying groups can withdraw resources and attention from unorganized individuals. However, Person and Tabellini (2000) find that lobbyists often have an interest in the public good, and are more likely to overcome the free-rider problem of unorganized individuals towards a general, more equal distribution.

Milanovic (1999) found that while there is redistribution in democratic societies, they are not necessarily a product of the median voter model. Instead, he argues that the poor are not constantly pushing towards more distribution, but other segments of the population such as the middle class, even though they are not benefiting from these redistribution policies now, are more likely to expect long-term benefits from these policies, and they will vote for them. Ringen (2007) and Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) also emphasize the role of the middle class by arguing that the middle class, even though they do not always share the same interests as the poor, they fear the impact of poverty on their established order of life and are more likely to demands redistribution policies if it leads to protecting their own interests. Segura-Ubiero (2007) finds that the poor will only demand redistribution policies if these policies benefit them directly. Anderson et al. (2003) argue that the poor's ability to push towards redistribution depends on their capacity to organize themselves into social and political parties. Solt (2008) and Goodin and Dryzek (1980) invert that relationship and argue that the higher the inequality, the less likely for the poor to become politically engaged, thus widening the gap between the different classes in society --- as explained in the relative power theory. In his examination of 136 countries between 1981 and 2011, Cole (2018) finds that as income inequality increases, civil liberties become concentrated in the hands of the rich.

A core argument in the democracy model is the freedom of elections and the protection of civil liberties -- particularly the right of different groups to assemble and organize towards specific political and economic outcomes -- play an essential role in determining the levels of inequality within a particular type of regime. Elections are the tool by which the median voters express their demands to acquire a more egalitarian redistribution policy, and the tool to pressure political leaders to achieve that demand. Roll and Talbot (2001) find that elections are an "information mechanism" that provides the rulers with feedback on which direction to pursue during their incumbency. However, even with free or semi-free elections, the ability of the population to organize in political parties, unions, and civil groups is necessary for the general population to impact redistribution policies. Thus, one can expect that while free or semi-free elections in hybrid regimes will reduce inequality in these countries, illiberal hybrid regimes are more likely to experience higher levels of inequality compared to liberal hybrid governments.

In other words, the impact of elections on levels of redistribution is limited if the citizens do not have the capacity to mobilize and organize towards egalitarian policies.

ii. The Non-Democratic Boundaries of Hybrid Regimes and the Reduction of Income Inequality

The second line of research — the "authoritarian model" — contradicts these findings and theoretical reasonings. The primary premise in this model is that regimes where civil liberties are limited face a higher possibility of destabilization and violent resistance, since the population lacks democratic spaces where the population can express political and economic grievances. Political elites are invested in introducing more egalitarian redistribution policies -- especially if these political leaders are subjected to election results, as is the case in hybrid regimes -- to pacify the population, avoid violent reactionary moments due to higher inequality levels, and stabilize the country.[15]

At the core of rentier theories and the resource dependency literature is that leaders in these regimes use resources wealth to build the public sector and provide universal health care and social services, and these practices are cities as the main contributing reason for the overall stability of these regimes and their lack of democratization (Ross 2001). The Arab Spring, for example, in Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and so on, to a large degree was motivated by rising levels of inequalities in these countries

[15] In chapter one, I discuss the durability and stability of hybrid regimes. Hybrid regimes are less stable than democracies, and thus, political leaders in these hybrid regimes face a higher risk of power loss and governmental turnover when compared to democracies. These political leaders in hybrid regimes neither have the freedom of autocratic leaders to utilize force in similar ways, nor do they have the stability of developed democratic regimes. And as a result, they are more likely to seek to minimize instability via economic policy, such as income redistribution.

and the failure of political leaders to control that economic crisis effectively. Iraq, a tutelary illiberal hybrid regime, has been facing an inequality crisis due to institutional weakness and oil price collapse. The ever-rising levels of income inequality and poverty have played an important role in delegitimizing the non-elected bodies and pushing the country into waves of protests against the existing government. Meanwhile, leaders in Saudi Arabia and other autocratic and hybrid states, managed to avoid that same fate since these leaders were more successful in resource redistribution.

In other words, with the limitation of civil liberties in hybrid regimes, the risk of violent reactionary political action rises when economic inequalities rise, even with free or semi-free elections. And whether political leaders in these regimes are motivated by an ideological goal or the need to maintain their control over power, these leaders stand to benefit from more income redistribution. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000 and 2002) and Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) find that in their U-shaped Kuznets curve, gross inequality led to disenfranchisement and led to conflict. As a result, with the exception of a few ruling elites with massive amounts of wealth and resources, the majority of the population will more likely experience similar levels of income (Beitz 1982).

Not only does the limitation of civil liberties produce better conditions for income redistribution, but the presence of civil liberties generates an environment that can produce more equality. On the one hand, freedom of civil and political rights provide the space for citizens to be unified by different social cleavages, such as religion and ethnicity. Even if the institutional capacity exists in these regimes to introduce redistribution policies, the impact of the median voter could be inhibited. Scheve and

Stasavage (2017) illustrate how social cleavages around religious identity delayed adopting a universal primary education system in many democratic European countries, producing higher levels of income and wealth inequalities. In this case, the limitation of civil liberties in hybrid regimes can reduce the impact of that interaction between citizens and the political elites.

On the one hand, economic and political rights are credited for creating an "investor-friendly" environment leading to a greater economic and income variation, as we saw during the discussion in chapter two (Li and Thompson 1975; Londregan and Poole 1990). Meanwhile, the lack of heterogeneity of economic action in hybrid regimes with limited civil liberties is more likely to equalize income. Democratic institutions only matter if they can lead to the adoption of economic policies that control the earning process in the society. Suppose these institutions are not likely to equalize outcomes. In that case, liberal hybrid regimes are left with the consequences of their economic success and openness to the free market and economic growth, without a stabilizing policy to control for the harmful effects of these economic conditions. The limited economic freedoms in illiberal hybrid states mean that many of these regimes are not as integrated into the free market and global economy, which produces its own set of income inequalities. In this theoretical framing, the presence of free elections and civil liberties would not protect liberal hybrid regimes from inequalities that can emerge in these societies. Still, the lack of these democratic institutions can create an equalizing effect (Gradstein and Milanovic 2004).

Another non-democratic dimension of hybrid regimes is the presence of tutelary bodies. Tutelary bodies are similar to lobbyists and different interest groups in democracies in terms of having economic needs and goals that need to be supported via policy decisions. Yet, rather than engaging in policy work or sharing resources, tutelary groups can bypass institutional limitations and pressure politicians in their favor or simply push to place political leaders sympathetic to these groups' demands in a position of power. These tutelary groups, while not elected, still represent the interest of specific groups within the population. For example, leaders of tribal, sect, religious, or ethnic groups maintain their legitimacy via traditional authority and their ability to promote and protect the economic interests of their followers. Protection of the economic interests of these groups can be done via a system of patronage relations; it is also maintained through a complex system of social and community support, and state and community redistribution of resources. Under this assumption, tutelary hybrid regimes should experience less inequality than hybrid regimes that lack tutelary groups. Yet, the nuanced interaction between different non-elected groups and their level of power and relation with the political institution will likely determine the degree of success of non-elected bodies to achieve their economic goals.

Hybrid regimes share the free elections dimension with democracies; thus, one can expect them to have higher levels of inequalities than autocratic regimes. Meanwhile, the presence of tutelary groups is more likely to have an equalizing effect, as I argued in the previous discussion. The degree of that effect will reflect which other features of hybridity exist in that regime. Limited civil freedoms can produce conflict between the different non-elected groups and civil groups, producing contradictory policy outcomes. As a result, an illiberal tutelary hybrid regime should experience the least amount of inequality among hybrid regimes.

iii. Hybrid Regime Have no Effect on Inequality

The third line of research rejects the argument that different regime types, hybrid or not, impact income inequality. Marsh (1979) suggests that changes in redistribution policies and outcomes reflect the changes in the occupational structure that are independent of political institutions. And any relationship between democracy and inequality is based on the level of economic development. Nelson (1987) argues that any universal generalization of the relationship between regime type and income inequality is misleading, since citizens' participation patterns and class structure are country and region-specific, rather than a constant feature of regime type.

Scholars researching developing countries, especially Latin American countries, have also questioned the existence of a relationship between regime types and redistribution. Ferreira et al. (2004) find that welfare programs in Latin America did not lead to lower inequalities because they were designed as social insurance and security that targets only formal sector employees. Huber (1996) adds that these programs only increase the allocation of resources to bureaucrats, creating a vast patronage network. Williamson (2015) presents data showing trends of decreasing and increasing inequality in Latin American countries over the past 500 years, unrelated to regime type. Abad (2013) finds that rather than regime type, inequalities reflect factors such as endowments and international trade. Albertus (2015) finds that democratic governments have engaged in less land redistribution compared to autocratic elites. And rather than being a reflection of a regime type, it was the product of the relationship between the landholding elite and the ruling elite.

Similarly, authoritarian regimes do not all hold uniformly pro-elite anti-egalitarian stances. Some authoritarian regimes, such as the Velasco government in Peru (1968–75), actively supported downward redistribution, while others, like Chile under Pinochet (1973–90), pursued policies that concentrated resources in the hands of elites. Thus, it is essential to distinguish between left and right authoritarianism, with the expectation that right-wing authoritarian regimes are most likely to reduce (downward) redistribution (Huber et al. 2006; Schamis 1991). (Morgan and Kelly 2013: 676). Under the skeptical model, we can expect that hybrid regimes will not have significantly different levels of income inequality.

To summarize, the democracy model argues that free elections and the ability of citizens to organize in different interest groups will lead to the creation of more redistribution policies that can equalize society. Under this theoretical view, democratic regimes should experience the least amount of inequality, followed by hybrid regimes since they share the free election dimension with democracies, then autocracies. When considering civil liberties and the impact of tutelary groups, liberal tutelary hybrid regimes should be more equal than other hybrid regime categories. When considering the authoritarian model, the limited civil liberties and free elections produce a centralized state that can, and need, to introduce more egalitarian economic policies. Furthermore, the presence of democratic institutions in itself does not ensure more equal income distribution, but that lack of these institutions might have an equalizing impact. In this case, autocratic regimes should experience the highest levels of income equality, followed by hybrid regimes, then democracies. When considering civil freedoms and tutelary bodies, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes will experience the least amount of inequalities, followed by other hybrid categories. Meanwhile, we can expect insignificant results if the skeptical model is accurate.

III. Data and Methods

i. Sample

The sample includes all countries between 1990-2017, classified into democracies, autocracies, and hybrid regimes. The hybrid category is divided into three categories: illiberal hybrid regimes, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes, and tutelary hybrid regimes. The sample includes a total of 3,958 year-country cases divided between 2,068 (%52.25) democracies, 1,005 (%25.39) autocratic regimes, 577 (%14.58) illiberal hybrid regimes, 231 (%5.84) tutelary illiberal hybrid regimes, and 77 (%1.95) tutelary hybrid regimes, not including missing cases. The data covers 177 countries, over a period of 28 years. Data for the dependent variable and control variables come from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). It combines the strength of The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the UNU-WIDER databases, which are by far the most commonly used sources of inequality data in cross-national studies. This data is also best designed to maximize intertemporal and cross-national comparability (Solt 2008, 2009).

ii. Dependent Variable

Income Inequality is measured as the Gini coefficient, which captures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. One major issue in cross-national research on income inequality is that complete comparability is not possible in terms of units. The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) allows us to account for that uncertainty and minimize bias by estimating multiple imputation (MI) models (Curran and Mahutga 2018; Rubin 1996). I average the Gini coefficient across multiple imputations.

Panel data violates the strict exogeneity assumption in the OLS model -- since in nearly every case there are time or group invariant unobservables that should otherwise be in the model -- it's appropriate to use either "random effects" or "fixed effects" models. Both the "fixed effects" and "first difference" models are unbiased and inefficient, while the "random effects" estimator is biased and efficient. To test for which appropriate model to use, I use the *Hausman test* to test if the null hypothesis is consistent with the fixed effect and first difference models and is not different from that in the random-effects model, and I reject the null hypothesis. Panel data also violated the *Homoscedasticity* assumption since we have different groups in our data, and it's possible that each group (or some groups) has a different error variance. I test for heteroskedasticity by using "xttest3" Serially correlated errors are also a common feature of panel data (Wooldridge 2002). In the models that follow, I report fixed-effects estimates. The variance/covariance matrix has been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial (AR1) correlation with a Prais-Winsten transformation.

iii. The Baseline Model of Income Inequality

Since many factors shape income inequality, I utilize the Alderson and Nielsen (1999) internal-developmental model of inequality to control for the following variables. First, I control for real GDP per capita (log base 10) since economic growth and income inequality are impacted by each other, as previous literature indicates (Accumoglu and Robinson 2015). Furthermore, as we saw in the previous chapter, levels of economic growth are different between the three main regime types. The variable is *GDPPCapCUS* from the WDI.

Second, I control for sector dualism (log base 10). The variable is calculated from taking the absolute value -- to guarantee a positive value -- of the percentage of the labor force in agriculture (P) and the share of agriculture of the gross domestic product (L), as we can see in the following equation:

$$SD = |P - L|$$

Kuzents (1955) argues that with an increase in development, workers would shift from the low-wage agricultural sector towards the higher-wage industrial sector. At first, this shift will lead to higher income inequality, a peak period, and then a decrease in income inequality. This generates the inverted U-shaped model discussed in Nielsen (1994). Sector dualism is the amount of inequality generated from this moment between sectors, which can be measured by looking at the average of income between sectors, rather than within sectors. To measure this variable, I use *EmpInAgr* and *IndGDP* from the WDI.

Third, demographic transition is another variable that impacts levels of inequality. Kuznets (1955) argued that population growth produces generations of young, and often lower-income workers. This leads to the creation of an excess labor supply, which increases inequality. To capture the demographic transition, I will control for the effect of the variable of the natural rate of population increase, or birth rates minus death rates. The variables are *BirthRate* and *DeathRate* from the WDI. Fourth, the spread of education should allow a broader population range to obtain and accumulate human capital, which reduces inequality (Williamson 1991). To account for this, I control for the secondary school enrollment ratio (log base 10) or *secdual* from the WDI.

IV. Results

There are two groups of regression testing the hypothesis in this analysis. The first regressions capture the impact of the three main regime types on levels of inequality. In Table 1, the baseline model indicates that with an increase in GDP per capita, we also see a decrease in income inequality. However, the relationship is not significant. These findings fit some of the current existing research. Barro (2000) argues that there is little overall relation between income inequality and growth rates, and growth only impacts income inequality after income per capita crosses a certain threshold in highly developed countries. Hermansen et al. (2016) and others (Dollar and Kraay 2015) argue that the relationship between the two is likely to differ based on the location of the income distribution, the source of growth, and whether or not income inequality measurements came before or after governmental redistribution. Table 3.1 also gives us an insight into the relationship between regime types and income inequality. We see that democratic regimes experience higher levels of inequality (0.3515***), compared to autocratic (-0.0068***) and hybrid regimes (-0.0055***). Meanwhile, hybrid regimes and autocratic regimes are not significantly different from each other, as shown in model 2 and model 3. In other words, democracies experience the highest level of income inequality, followed by hybrid regimes and autocracies.

These results fit the existing literature that illustrates that in autocratic regimes, the presence of the centralized state and the exclusion of a large fraction of the population from different productive occupations, and the heterogeneity of economic activities lead to lower levels of inequality overall. In contrast, the freedom to participate in economic activities in democratic regimes can increase disparities when combined with civil liberties and free elections. Although, Acemoglu et al. (2013) caution us that this increase in inequality in democratic regimes might be the product of an increased inequality among certain groups that are excluded from economic actions, which can impact levels of inequality in the overall society. Additionally, the extent of inequality in democracies is most likely shaped by the higher institutional capacity -- namely economic and political freedoms -- of these democratic countries to enter the global economy, which previous empirical research finds support for (Barro 2000).

Meanwhile, while limited civil liberties and other non-democratic features in hybrid regimes decrease income inequality when compared to democracies, these mixed institutions do not produce different levels of inequalities between hybrid regimes and autocracies. It seems then that the introduction and impact of redistribution policies in autocratic regimes produce similar outcomes, even when some democratic features, such as free elections, are introduced in the case of hybridity.

Table 3.1: Shuker (1990-2017)-Regimes Linear Regression With Panel-Corrected Standard Errors

	(1) BaseModel	(2) Democracy	(3) Hybrid	(4) Autocracy
	Mean Gini SWIDD	Mean Gini SWIDD	Mean Gini SWIDD	Mean Gini SWIDD
Democracy			0.0055^{***}	0.0068^{**}
			(3.85)	(2.83)
Hybrid		-0.0055^{***}		0.0014
		(-3.85)		(0.65)
Autocracy		-0.0068^{**}	-0.0014	
		(-2.83)	(-0.65)	
GDP Per Capita (log)	-0.0002	-0.0006	-0.0006	-0.0006
	(-0.27)	(-0.75)	(-0.75)	(-0.75)
Sector Dualism (log)	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0003
	(-1.27)	(-1.09)	(-1.09)	(-1.09)
Population Rate	-0.0004	-0.0005^{*}	-0.0005^{*}	-0.0005^{*}
	(-1.92)	(-2.28)	(-2.28)	(-2.28)
Sec School En (Log)	-0.0022	-0.0008	-0.0008	-0.0008
	(-0.96)	(-0.29)	(-0.29)	(-0.29)
	(30.49)	(21.34)	(21.34)	(21.34)
Constant	0.3438^{***}	0.3515^{***}	0.3461^{***}	0.3447^{***}
	(28.52)	(24.64)	(24.05)	(23.70)
Observations	2409	2226	2226	2226
R^2	0.986	0.986	0.986	0.986
BIC	.	.	.	.

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3.2 gives us an interesting overview of the hybrid categories breakdown. All three hybrid categories experience less inequality compared to democratic regimes, and these results are significant. Meanwhile, both illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience the least level of income inequality when compared to democracies, followed by illiberal hybrid regimes. Indicating that when compared to democracies, the presence of tutelary bodies produces more equal income distribution, regardless of the level of civil liberties in the country. However, none of the hybrid regimes are significantly different from each other. These results indicate that while democratic regimes impact inequality, different forms of hybridity do not affect income inequality. Instead, the direction and degree of inequalities in hybrid regimes are the product of other institutional manifestations and policy decisions, which fits the overall argument presented in the skeptical model.

Table 3.2: Shuker (1990-2017)-Hybrid Linear Regression With Panel-Corrected Standard Errors

	(1) Democracy	(2) Illiberal	(3) Illiberal T	(4) Liberal T	(5) Autocracy
	Mean Gini SWIDD	Mean Gini SWIDD	Mean Gini SWIDD	Mean Gini SWIDD	Mean Gini SWIDD
Democracy		0.0052^{***}	0.0072^{***}	0.0072^{***}	0.0071^{**}
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Illiberal	-0.0052^{***}		0.0020	0.0021	0.0019
	(0.00)		(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.43)
Illiberal T	-0.0072^{***}	-0.0020		0.0000	-0.0001
	(0.00)	(0.26)		(0.97)	(0.95)
Liberal T	-0.0072^{***}	-0.0021	-0.0000		-0.0002
	(0.00)	(0.32)	(0.97)		(0.95)
Autocracy	-0.0071^{**}	-0.0019	0.0001	0.0002	
	(0.01)	(0.43)	(0.95)	(0.95)	
GDP Per Capita (log)	-0.0007	-0.0007	-0.0007	-0.0007	-0.0007
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Sector Dualism (log)	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0003
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Population Rate	-0.0005^{*}	-0.0005^{*}	-0.0005^{*}	-0.0005^{*}	-0.0005^{*}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Sec School En (Log)	-0.0009	-0.0009	-0.0009	-0.0009	-0.0009
	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)
Constant	0.3520^{***}	0.3469^{***}	0.3448^{***}	0.3448^{***}	0.3449^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	2226	2226	2226	2226	2226
R^2	0.986	0.986	0.986	0.986	0.986
BIC	.	.	.	.	.

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Looking at table 3.3 and the G&M data, we see that democracies are not significantly different from either hybrid regimes or autocratic regimes. Meanwhile, illiberal hybrid regimes are significantly different and experience less inequality compared to illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes. As a result, G&M data masks an essential distinction between democratic regimes and other regime types. And at the core of that difference is the misclassification of the tutelary category, where some countries that should be part of the illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes, are likely included in the illiberal hybrid regimes. Similarly, the free elections boundaries between my data and G&M data are a likely reason for the lack of significant results between the three main regime categories.

Table 3.3: Gilbert and Mohseni (1990-2007)-Hybrid Linear Regression With Panel-Corrected Standard Errors

	(1) Democracy	(2) Illiberal	(3) Illiberal T	(4) Liberal T	(5) Autocracy
	Mean Gini SWIDD	Mean Gini SWIDD	Mean Gini SWIDD	Mean Gini SWIDD	Mean Gini SWIDD
Democracy		0.002	-0.005	-0.003	-0.006
		(0.28)	(0.11)	(0.37)	(0.11)
Illiberal	-0.014		-0.007^{*}	-0.005	-0.008^{*}
	(0.62)		(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.02)
Illiberal T	-0.035	0.007^{*}		0.002	-0.001
	(0.21)	(0.02)		(0.17)	(0.70)
Liberal T	-0.009	0.005	-0.002		-0.003
	(0.74)	(0.12)	(0.17)		(0.22)
Autocracy	-0.054	0.008^{*}	0.001	0.003	
	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.70)	(0.22)	
GDP Per Capita (log)	0.027^{***}	-0.010^{***}	-0.010^{***}	-0.010^{***}	-0.010^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Sector Dualism (log)	-0.015	-0.008^{***}	-0.008^{***}	-0.008^{***}	-0.008^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Population Rate	0.004^{***}	-0.002^{***}	-0.002^{***}	-0.002^{***}	-0.002^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Sec School En (Log)	-0.009	-0.027^{***}	-0.027^{***}	-0.027^{***}	-0.027^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.254^{***}	0.792^{***}	0.799^{***}	0.797^{***}	0.800^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	259	259	259	259	259
R^2	0.482	0.996	0.996	0.996	0.996
BIC	.	.	.	.	.

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

V. Discussion

In this chapter, I set out to examine how hybrid regimes might impact levels of income inequality. The first finding of this analysis is that democratic regimes experience higher levels of income inequality, followed by hybrid regimes and then by autocracies, which experience the least amount of inequality. These results suggest that limited civil liberties in hybrid regimes motivate leaders to introduce more egalitarian economic policies, and restricted civil rights and the heterogeneity of economic action ensure that these policies' impact will be felt equally by the majority of the population. While democratic regimes have higher levels of institutional quality that can produce ideal growth conditions, the side effect of that development is that these regimes are more integrated into the global economy and are more likely to experience higher levels of inequality.

Furthermore, the median voter model -- indicating that people's ability to demand more redistribution policies will lead to the creation of such policies, and as a result, less inequality -- does not have a support using this data. Similarly, while civil liberties allow for interest groups and social classes to lobby in democratic regimes, these efforts are more likely to benefit specific groups only, rather than the entire population, which increases inequality. As a result, while regular elections and free civil liberties produce ideal conditions for growth in democratic regimes, they also lead to higher levels of inequality. Additionally, both illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience less income inequality compared to democracy. This suggests that tutelary groups are more likely to push towards more equalizing policies in hybrid regimes, even when civil liberties are present.

The second important conclusion is that autocratic regimes and hybrid regimes are not significantly different from each other, while hybrid regimes are significantly different from democratic regimes. Democratic institutions, such as free elections and protected civil liberties, produce a social, economic, and political environment that produces higher levels of inequality in democratic regimes. Yet, these same institutions impact income inequality outside of democracies differently. Hybrid regimes share the free election boundary with democracies, and differ along the civil liberties and tutelary bodies dimension. If the free election dimension is constant, then both the differences in civil liberties and tutelary bodies are what produce the different outcomes between democratic and hybrid regimes. However, since both illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience less income inequality compared to democracy, it seems that tutelary bodies are the central equalizing dimension of hybridity. Although, whether free elections impact redistribution policies through similar mechanisms in democracies and hybrid regimes remain to be seen. Similarly, when compared to autocracies, although the results are not significant, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes experienced less inequalities. Again, it seems that tutelary bodies are the main contributing factor in lowering inequality levels, even in relation to autocratic regimes.

First, these findings confirm that different institutions will behave differently depending on the regime type. Free elections and civil liberties in democratic regimes produced different outcomes compared to free elections and civil rights in hybrid regimes. Although the exact mechanisms are not clear, future research should expand on how these democratic institutions might behave differently based on the regime type. As a result, the relationship between, say, citizens and their elected leaders, will have different, even contradicting, effects on economic outcomes when it exists in a democratic political environment vis when it exists in a non-democratic space. These findings also emphasize that hybrid regimes are unique regime types and not the sum of democratic and non-democratic regimes. Second, while it seems that higher growth and more inequalities exist in democracies, and slower growth and lower inequalities exist in autocracies, there is no clear relationship between growth and income inequality levels in hybrid regimes. Finally, while regime types in the case of democracies impact levels of income inequality, it seems that outside of democratic regimes, regime types have little impact on levels of income inequality.

VI. Conclusion

Given that the politics of income inequality have been the central issue in many academic and policy work, the lack of consensus on how different regime types might impact income disparities and the lack of attention to the relationship between hybrid regimes and income inequality is concerning. Research indicates that free elections and protection of civil liberties can either increase income inequality, reduce income inequality, or have no impact on income inequality. The democracy school argues that free elections allow citizens to pressure elected political leaders to introduce redistribution policies, and free civil liberties enable the population to organize in interest groups to demand beneficial economic policies, all of which lowers income inequality. The autocracy school argues that unfree elections motivate political leaders to introduce egalitarian policies to avoid destabilization, and limited civil liberties limit the formation of social cleavages and special interest groups. Thus redistribution policies will have an equalizing effect in these regimes. The skeptical model shows that levels of income inequality are the product of other institutional formations, such as free trade and class relations, which are not exclusive to one regime type.

Using a newly developed dataset, I find autocratic regimes and hybrid regimes experience less income inequality compared to democracies. This indicates that the limited civil liberties and unfree elections lead to more egalitarian societies. In contrast, citizens' ability to participate freely in the electoral process and organize into interest groups did not lead to less inequality in democracies. Furthermore, there is no significant difference between the level of income inequality in the three hybrid categories. This indicates that the different combinations of elections, civil liberties, and non-elected bodies do not make these regimes different from each other or from autocratic regimes. And while free elections and free civil rights increase inequalities in democratic regimes, these institutions behave differently when combined with other non-democratic institutions in hybrid regimes. These results call for further examination of inequality in hybrid regimes, what they are shaped by, and why democratic institutions in hybrid regimes produce different economic outcomes?

Conclusion: The Age of Hybrid Governing - The Economic and Political Challenges of a New Era

The puzzle of the hybrid regime has been debated and unpacked for several decades by sociologists and political economists, yet we remain far from fully understanding the unique complexity of countries that are both half-democratic and half-autocratic yet cannot be reduced to either; where democratic rules are combined with authoritarian governance, producing new forms of societal structures that often escape the conventional wisdom of scholars of democratization, transitology, and (new) authoritarianism. Yet, there is an urgency now to develop better tools and concepts as the nature of global governing is changing. A historical erosion of long-standing democratic institutions has been re-shaping our current polity structures for the past 15 years or so, of which India, the most populous democracy in the world, transitioned to hybridity, and the election of Trump -- who actively campaigned around the undermining of free elections and civil liberties -- to one of the world's oldest democracies are but a few examples. This democratic crisis was met with a global social movement of citizens in every region of the world against long-standing authoritarianism in places like the Middle East and Latin America. With this reordering of global power, many of these previous democratic and autocratic regimes shifted towards hybridity. And while hybrid regimes have been present throughout history, the scale and speed by which regimes are transitioning to hybridity are unique.

With this rising wave of hybrid political systems comes new challenges and questions for scholars of regime types. Are these regimes stable? Are they going to produce more or less inequalities? Are they going to experience more or less growth? How will any of this impact migration, conflict, the global economy? Here is where our urgency comes in. As this shift is happening, and as the nature of global, regional, and national political economy changes, many of the questions of what this might mean and how it might impact the human condition, remain unanswered. Mainly, scholars addressing the questions around hybridity rarely spoke to each other in the past, leading to countless, often conflicting, definitions of hybridity, and the lack of creation of tools to measure economic, social, and political conditions in these regimes. This project aimed to move the conversation forward by synthesizing our previous knowledge to develop theoretical and methodological tools. Tools that can aid in defining hybrid regimes and exploring the relationship between these regimes and economic outcomes.

This dissertation is divided into three chapters that aimed to answer four questions. In chapter one, I sought to answer the questions of how we define and measure hybrid regimes and what can our newfound knowledge tell us about the stability of these regimes. While most previous efforts have been concerned with the question of definitions, I advanced that existing knowledge by arguing for more complex boundary understanding. I arrived at my re-conceptualization of hybridity by first, instead of thinking of hybrid regimes as a subtype of other ideal regime forms, I joined the call of previous scholars to think of hybridity as an independent regime type (Bogaard, 2009; Bunce & Wolchik, 2008; Ekman, 2009; Karl,1995). Second, instead of thinking of these regime types as one-dimensional around the boundary of free elections, I, too, conceived them as multidimensional, like some of the arguments in recent scholarship (Gilbert and

Mohseni, 2011; Merkel, 2004). And third, by re-examining and expanding on the work of Gilbert and Mohseni (2011), who I consider to have developed the most thorough and complete examination of hybrid regimes up until now.

The authors created a configurative approach of three categories -- illiberal hybrid regimes, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes, and liberal tutelary hybrid regimes -- based on three dimensions: election competitiveness, civil liberties, and tutelary interference, that emphasizes the differences in the *kind* of hybridity rather than the *degree* of hybridity. This approach captures the complexity of regime type beyond election competitiveness, since multiparty elections or even competitive multiparty elections do not in and of themselves challenge the control over or distribution of power. The configurative approach also allows us to compare hybrid regimes to each other to examine the institutional differences and similarities for middle-range countries that continuum scores tend to mask. I added to this vital work by utilizing Polity IV's *Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment* variable to measure freedom of election, instead of governmental turnover used by the authors, which I argued does not always capture power transfer. I also expanded their use of the concept of tutelary interference to include ethnic, tribal, and sectarian groupings. Using these new measurements, I developed a dataset that re-measures regimes between 1990-2017, instead of G&M data that stopped in 2007.

Now that the first question is answered, I asked whether or not these hybrid regimes are durable? I found that democracies remain the most stable regime type compared to both autocratic regimes and hybrid regimes. When comparing the different categories of hybrid regimes, I found that illiberal hybrid regimes are significantly more stable than illiberal tutelary and liberal tutelary regimes, which are not significantly different from each other. In other words, the presence of non-elected bodies seems to destabilize hybrid regimes, regardless of the level of civil liberties available. There are few important implications of these conclusions. First, it is not surprising that democratic regimes overall are more stable. They, after all, contain the mechanisms of peaceful power exchange, and citizens have the freedoms to express grievances to their elected representatives. If a political leader is no longer serving the needs and desires of the population, they can be voted out of office.

Meanwhile, the lack of pathways in autocratic regimes to ensure accountability means that leaders can only be replaced via violent means -- *coup d'etat,* uprising, or other such forms -- which creates a political vacuum and further struggle over power capture. Meanwhile, hybrid regimes experience less stability than democracy, yet are not significantly different from autocracies. If nothing, this confirms that the one-dimensional approach of previous scholarship -- focusing only on whether or not free elections exist as the line in the sand that differentiates regime types -- is highly simplified. After all, hybrid regimes share the free elections dimension with democratic regimes, yet they are less stable. This tells us then that citizens' ability to vote elected leaders out of office can only stabilize a regime when combined with other democratic institutions, such as the protection of political, social, and economic rights.

Second, hybrid regimes that lack divided centers of power -- illiberal hybrid regimes-- are more stable than those regimes with tutelary groups, regardless of the degree of civil liberties available to the population. While the citizen-political leader relationship in illiberal hybrid regimes faces similar challenges to those in autocratic regimes, in terms of the narrow pathways to express grievances, the lack of powerful groups above and beyond the state means that even when the population engages in the violent overthrow of the political establishment, the system will restabilize faster. Meanwhile, when there are multiple power centers in a state, a power vacuum is a golden opportunity for these non-elected bodies to seek control over the state apparatus, destabilizing the country overall. Iraq is a prime example of that process where the collapse of Saddam Husiens's regime opened the door for non-elected bodies to attempt to capture the state via different violent tactics and legitimacy projects since 2003. The presence of civil liberties does not match the might of these groups' financial, political, and paramilitary resources. The interactions of citizens and non-elected bodies, the formation of these groups' legitimacy projects, these groups' impact on identity, civil society, and political activism, all of which are mechanisms that can explain how these hybrid formations destabilize regimes, and ought to be the focus of future research.

Third, knowing that there is a global shift away from democratic regimes and towards hybridity signals the start of a possible destabilization period in global governance. Our future research needs to focus on what are the implications of a global destabilization crisis. The solution to the democracy crisis is more democracy. Our policy work needs to target this crisis in two ways. First, at the core of the democracy crisis is a lack of trust in democratic institutions by citizens who for the past two decades have experienced the failure of their states to effectively target rising levels of inequalities, a climate crisis, an immigration crisis, the rising power of interest groups, among other things. These crises undermine social cohesion and create space for anti-democratic leaders and movements to rise.

Democratic leaders must invest in protecting civil liberties and journalistic integrity, re-build trust in the government decision-making process, and safeguard pathways through which citizens can express grievances and demand justice and more egalitarian redistribution of resources. Leaders must create economic and political policies that can restore faith in democratic institutions, by showing that the government is for all people, not just the powerful. Second, international efforts must continue to support the struggle of citizens in non-democratic countries towards more equal and free societies. These efforts must target tutelary groups to ensure their integration within the state apparatus, and to invest in civil society and community collectives that can counter the destabilizing influence of tutelary groups.

After answering the first two questions, I moved to question three and ask what is the relationship between hybrid regimes and economic growth? Previous literature on the relationship between democratic institutions and economic development is divided. On the one hand, the democracy school shows evidence that regular elections and the protection of economic, political, and civil rights create transparency and market stability that generate the ideal conditions for economic growth (de Haan and Sturm 2000; Pitlik 2002; Weede and Kampf 2002; Berggren 2003; de Haan; Lundstrom and Sturm 2006; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2006; Robinson 2006). On the other hand, the autocracy model suggests that in democratic regimes, the median voter is more likely to demand more redistribution policies than growth policies. Meanwhile, the lack of free elections and civil freedoms allow autocratic leaders to introduce their desired economic policies without population pressure (Way and Levitsky 2006; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

Utilizing the new dataset of regime types, I found support for the democratic model. Democratic institutions, such as civil liberties and free elections, provide ideal economic growth and development conditions. Interestingly enough, when compared to democracies and autocracies, hybrid regimes as a collective do not significantly differ from both. However, when looking at the different categories of hybrid regimes, I found that liberal tutelary hybrid regimes experience the fastest growth compared to all other regime types. In contrast, illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes contain the worst conditions for growth. It seems then that tutelary bodies can improve growth levels, but only in the presence of protected civil liberties. Meanwhile, when economic and political freedoms are limited, tutelary bodies' presence impacts growth levels negatively in a similar fashion to autocracies, even when there are free or semi-free elections in these hybrid regimes. The underlying determinant of growth in hybrid regimes is civil liberties as the essential condition to positive economic growth.

An important thing to note is that while free elections and civil liberties impact growth in democracies in a particular direction, they do not necessarily impact growth in hybrid regimes through the same pathways. For example, if free elections can produce transparency and accountability in democracies, can this mechanism also be observed in hybrid regimes? Understanding these pathways would be an essential departure point for future research.

Another important observation is that as democracies are the most stable --from the previous discussion in chapter 1-- they also experience the highest level of growth, and autocracies experience the least stability and the least growth levels. However, when looking at hybrid regimes, illiberal hybrid regimes are significantly more stable than illiberal tutelary and liberal tutelary regimes, which are not significantly different from each other. Yet, with growth, illiberal hybrid regimes experience slower growth than liberal tutelary hybrid regimes. While stability is thought of as an important condition for faster levels of growth in democracies, stability and development do not seem to correlate in hybridity. Another departure point for future research is to understand how and why that might be the case. Finally, civil liberties still play an important role, whether in stabilizing regimes or creating faster growth. Policy work must target the improvement of these institutions. This includes supporting and prioritizing inclusion and sustainability, civil society building, protecting laws and transparency, and engaging a broad range and diverse civil society actors and organizations.

The final question is whether hybrid regimes impact levels of income inequality and in which direction? Like growth, the research is divided into two main camps. On the one hand, the democracy model finds that free elections provide citizens with the tools to increase social pressures to demand more redistribution. Additionally, protected civil, political, and economic freedoms allow various interest groups and labor unions to organize and compete in the political arena towards more favorable economic policies (Lenski 1966; Lipset 1959). On the other hand, the autocratic model shows that the lack of civil liberties allows political elites in autocratic regimes to enact more egalitarian redistribution policies to appease the population and avoid the possibility of political instability. The limitation of various interest groups ensures that most of the population will benefit equally from redistribution policies. A separate camp argues that regime types and income inequality are not correlated. I found support for the autocratic model, or autocracies seem to experience the least amount of inequality compared to other regime types. These results suggest that the concentration of power and the heterogeneity of economic action, as well as the limitation of economic and political freedoms, might actually be beneficial for lowering levels of inequalities in autocracies. I also find that neither hybrid regimes are significantly different from autocratic regimes, nor do the three forms of hybridity differ significantly from each other.

Few important conclusions can be drawn: first, the median voter model -- indicating that people's ability to demand more redistribution policies will lead to the creation of such policies, and as a result, less inequality -- does not have a support using this data. This suggests that while citizens can vote, their voting pattern does not always reflect the rationale of maximizing returns from political engagement. Second, free elections and civil liberties in democratic regimes produced different outcomes compared to free elections and civil rights in hybrid regimes. As a result, similar institutions can produce different outcomes based on the regime type they manifest in. The impact of free elections in hybrid regimes does not mimic the behavior of free elections in democracies, and the same can be said for civil liberties. Third, these findings also emphasize that hybrid regimes are unique regime types and not the sum of democratic and non-democratic regimes. Future research, especially detailed case studies, can provide us with important insight on how and why these different institutions produce different outcomes in different regime types. Finally, while regime types in the case of democracies impact levels of income inequality, it seems that outside of democratic regimes, regime types have little impact on levels of income inequality. All in all, a new wave of challenges is rising as hybrid regimes slowly come to dominate global governing. Our future academic research, policy work, and national and international focus need to shift towards examining this rising phenomenon, and this dissertation represents an effort towards that end.

Bibliography:

Abad, Leticia A. 2013. "Persistent Inequality? Trade, Factor Endowments, and Inequality in Republican Latin America." *The Journal of Economic History* 73 (1):38–78.

Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. 2019. "Democracy Does Cause Growth." *Journal of Political Economy* 127(1) :47-100.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2015. "The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 29 (1): 3-28

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

-----------. 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115(4): 1167-1199.

---------------. 2002. "The Political Economy of the Kuznets Curve." *Review of Development Economics* 6(2): 183-203.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared. 2005. "From Education to Democracy?" *The American Economic Review* 95(2): 44-49.

Adsera, Alicia and Carles Boix. 2002. "Trade, democracy, and the size of the public sector: The political underpinnings of openness." *International Organization* 56(2): 229–262.

Albertus Michael. 2015. *Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Alderson, Arthur S., and François Nielsen. 1999. "Income Inequality, Development, and Dependence: A Reconsideration." *American Sociological Review* 64(4):606–31.

Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. 1996. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment." *European Economic Review* 40:1203-1228.

Ames, Barry. 1990. *Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Andreski, Stanislav. 1968. *Military Organization and Society.* Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Anderson, Edward, Tim Conway, Andy McKay, Joy Moncrieffe, Tammie O'Neil and Laure-Hélène Piron. 2003. "Inequality in Middle Income Countries: Key Conceptual Issues." *Overseas Development Institute occasional paper.*

Armony, Ariel C., and Hector E. Schamis. 2005. "Babel in Democratization Studies." *Journal of Democracy* 16 (4):113–28.

Bacher, John. 1998. "Oil and Dictatorship." *Peace Magazine* 14:8.

Banerji, Arup, and Hafez Ghanem. 1997. "Does the Type of Political Regime Matter for Trade and Labor Market Policies?" *The World Bank Economic Review* 11(1): 171–194.

Barro, Robert, J. 2001. "Human Capital and Growth." *American Economic Review* 91 (2): 12-17.

------------. 2000, "Inequality in a panel of countries", *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5: 5-32.

----------. 1996. "Democracy and growth." *Journal of Economic Growth* 1:1–27.

Baum, Matthew A., David A. Lake. 2003. "The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 333–347.

Becker, Gary. 1983. 'A theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 98(3): 371–400.

Beitz, Charles R. 1982. "Democracy in Developing Societies." Pp. 145-166 In *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, edited by Raymond Gastil. New York: Freedom House.

Bellin, Eva. 2004. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics* 36(2): 139-157.

Benyishay, Ariel, and Roger Betancourt. 2014. "Unbundling Democracy: Political Rights and Civil Liberties." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 42 (3): 552-568.

Berggren, Niclas. 2003. "The Benefits of Economic Freedom: A survey." *Independent Review* 8: 193–211.

Bogaards, Matthijs. 2009. "How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism." *Democratization* 16 (2): 399–423.

Brown, David S., and Wendy Hunter. 2004. ''Democracy and Human Capital Formation: Education Spending in Latin America, 1980 to 1997.'' *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (7): 842–64.

Brown, David S., and Wendy Hunter. 1999. ''Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–92.'' *American Political Science Review* 93 (4): 779–90.

Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press

-----------. 2015. *Political Order and Inequality*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press

Bourguignon, François and Thierry Verdier. 2000. “Oligarchy, Democracy, Inequality and Growth.” *Journal of Development Economics* 62(2):285-313.

Buchanan, James and Gordon Tullock. 1962. *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy.* Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2008. “Mixed Regimes in Postcommunist Eurasia: Tipping Democratic and Tipping Authoritarian.” Paper presented at the Workshop on Democratization in European Former Soviet Republics: Limits Obstacles and Perspectives, Florence, Italy.

------------ 2006. “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39: 283-304.

Causa, Orsetta, Alain de Serres and Nicolas Ruiz. 2014. “Can growth-enhancing policies lift all boats? An analysis based on household disposable incomes”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Cassani, Andrea. 2013. “Does It Make a Difference? Hybrid Regimes and Their Consequences on Citizens’ Wellbeing.” Paper prepared for delivery at the panel “The economic, political, social consequences of democratization”, XXVII Annual Conference of the Italian Political Science Society (SISP).

Center for Systemic Peace. 2017 “Polity IV Country Reports.” Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna, VA. Retrieved March 28, 2021. (https://www.systemicpeace.org/p4creports.html)

Chirot, Daniel. 1977. *Social Change in the Twentieth Century*. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Cole, Wade M. 2018. “Poor and Powerless: Economic and Political Inequality in Cross-National Perspective, 1981–2011.” *International Sociology* 33(3):357-385.

Clark, Rob. 2010. “World-System Mobility and Economic Growth, 1980–2000.” *Social Forces* 88(3):1123–51.

Curran, Michaela and Matthew C Mahutga MC. 2018. “Income Inequality and Population Health: A Global Gradient?” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 59(4):536-553.

Curwin, KD and Matthew C. Mahutga, 2014. “Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: New Evidence From Post-Socialist Transition Countries.” *Social Forces* 92(3):1159-1187.

Cox, R. W. (1993). Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: An essay in method. Journal of International Studies, 12 (2), 162–175.

Dahl R. Polyarchy. 1971. *Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

de Haan, Jakob, Susanna Lundstromand and Jan Egbert Sturm. 2006. “Market-oriented Institutions and Policies and Economic Growth: A Critical Survey.” *Journal of Economic Surveys* 20: 157–191.

de Haan, Jakob and Jan Egbert Sturm. 2000. “On the Relationship between Economic Freedom and Economic Growth.” *European Journal of Political Economy* 16: 215–241.

de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1835. Democracy in America. London, UK: Saunders and Otley.

De Schweinitz, Karl Jr. 1964. *Industrialization and Democracy: Economic Necessities and Political Possibilities.* New York, NY: Free Press.

Diamond, Larry. 2002. “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 21–35.

Diamond Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore, BA: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, Larry, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1995. *Democracy in Developing Countries Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

Diamond Larry, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1988. *Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Dollar, D. T. Kleineberg and A. Kraay. 2015. "Growth, Inequality and Social Welfare: Cross-Country Evidence", *Economic Policy*, 30:335-377.

Doucouliagos, Chris and Mehmet A.Ulubasoglu. 2006. "Economic Freedom and Economic Growth: Does Specification Make a Difference." *European Journal of Political Economy* 22: 60–81.

Duarte, Pablo and Gunther Schnabl. 2018. "Monetary policy, inequality and political instability." *The World Economy* 42 (2): 614-634.

Ehrlich, Paul. 1968. *The Population Bomb*. New York, NY: Ballantine Books.

Ekman, Joakim. 2009. "Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes." *International Political Science Review* 30 (1): 7–31.

Engerman, Stanley L., Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 1997. "Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View From Economic Historians of the United States." In How Latin America Fell Behind, edited Haber, Stephen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006. "Democratic Transitions." *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 551-569.

Feng, Yi. 1997. "Democracy, Political Stability and Economic Growth." *British Journal of Political Science* 27: 39

Ferreira, Francisco, David de Ferranti, Guillermo Perry and Michael Walton. 2004. “Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History?” Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Freedom House. 2021. “New Report: The Global Decline in Democracy has Accelerated.” Freedom House, Washington, DC. Retrieved March 28, 2021 (https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated)

Freedom House. 2019. “Freedom in the World 2019: Democracy in Retreat.” Freedom House, Washington, DC. Retrieved March 28, 2021. (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/democracy-retreat)

Friedman, Milton. 1962. *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago, IL:University of Chicago Press.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2007. “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (11): 1279–1301.

Gates, Scott, Harvard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Havard Strand. 2006. “Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800–2000.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 893-908.

Gilbert, Leah, and Payam Mohseni. 2011. “Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46 (3): 270–97.

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. “What do we Know About Democratization After 20 Years?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2(1): 115–144.

Gerring, John, Haakon Gjerlow, and Carl Henrik Knutsen. 2020. “Regimes and Industrialization.” *V-Dem Institute Working Paper Series 2020:99.*

Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.” Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Goldstone, Jack A, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. 2009. “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability.” *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 190-208.

Goldstone, Jack, et al. 2000. State Failure Task Force: Phase III Findings. McLean, VA: SAIC.

Goodin, Robert, and John Dryzek. 1980. “Rational Participation: The Politics of Relative Power.” *British Journal of Political Science* 10 (3):273-292.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1974. “Persistence and Change in Political Systems.” *American Political Science Review* 68(4):1482-1504.

Hall, Henry E. 2011. “Eurasian Polities as Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Putin’s Russia.” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 1 (1): 33–41.

Haugom, Lars. 2019. “The Turkish Armed Forces and Civil-military Relations in Turkey after the 15 July 2016 Coup Attempt.” *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies*, *2*(1): 1–8.

Hermansen, M., N. Ruiz and O. Causa. 2016. “The Distribution of the Growth Dividends”, *OECD Economics Department Working Papers*, No. 1343, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Houle, Christian. 2009. "Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization." *World Politics* 61(4): 589-622.

Howard, Marc Morje and Philip G. Roessler. 2006. “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2):365-381.

Huber, Evelyne, Francxois Nielsen, Jenny Pribble, and John D. Stephens. 2006. ‘‘Politics and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean.’’ *American Sociological Review* 71 (6): 943–63.

Huber, Evelyne. 1996. “Options for Social Policy in Latin America: Neoliberal versus Social Democratic Models.” Pp. 141-191. In *Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies*, edited by Gosta Esping-Andersen. London, UK: Sage.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. “Democracy's Third Wave.” *Journal of Democracy* 2 (2): 12-34.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1987. *Understanding Political Development: An analytic Study*. Boston, MA: Little Brown.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. London, UK: Yale University Press.

Husted, Thomas and Lawrence Kenny. 1997. “The effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government.” *Journal of Political Economy* 105(1): 54–82.

Kaufman, Robert R., and Alex Segura-Ubiergo. 2001. ‘‘Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America.’’ *World Politics* 53 (4): 553–87.

Kaul, Vivek. 2021. “Autocracy and Economic Growth: Does an Autocratic Government Lead to Faster Economic Growth than a Democratic Government?” Value Research. Retrieved April 11, 2021. (https://www.valueresearchonline.com/stories/34294/autocracy-and-economic-growth/)

Karl, Terry Lynn. 1995. “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America.” *Journal of Democracy* 6 (3): 72–86.

Klomp, Jeroen and Jakob de Haan. 2013. “Political Regime and Human Capital: A Cross-Country Analysis.” *Social Indicators Research* 111: 45–73.

Kuznets, Simon. 1953. *Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings*. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.

———. 1955. “Economic Growth and Income Inequality.” *American Economic Review* 45:1–28.

Lee, Cheol-Sung. 2005. ‘‘Income Inequality, Democracy, and Public Sector Size.’’ *American Sociological Review* 70 (1): 158–81.

Lenski, Gerhard. 1966. *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification*. New York, NY: McCn'aw-Hill.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2002. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 51–65.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2012. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambrideg, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Li, Richard P.Y., and William R. Thompson. 1975. “The ‘Coup Contagion’ Hypothesis.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19(1): 63–84.

Lindberg, Staffan I. 2009. *Democratization by elections: A new mode of transition*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lindert, Peter. 1994. “The Rise of Social Spending, 1880-1930.” *Explorations in Economic History* 31(1):1-37.

Linz Juan J. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Linz, Juan J. 1973. “The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime : The Case of Brazil.” Pp. 233-254. In *Authoritarian Brazil : Origins, Policies, and Future*, edited by Alfred Stepan. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lipset, Smymour M. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Development.” *American Political Science Review* 53:69-105.

Londregan, John B., and Keith T. Poole. 1996. “Does High Income Promote Democracy?” *World Politics* 49:1–30.

Londregan, John B., and Keith T. Poole. 1990. “Poverty, The Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power.” *World Politics* 42 (2): 151-183.

Lucas, Robert E. Jr., 1988. “On The Mechanics Of Economic Development.” *Journal of Monetary Economics* 22: 3-42.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. New York, N.Y: Cambridge University Press.

Mahler, Vincent. 2004. “Economic globalization, domestic politics, and income inequality in the developed countries.” *Comparative Political Studies* 37(9): 1025–1053.

Mainwaring, Scott, Daniel M. Brinks and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán.2001. “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999.” *Studies in Comparative International Development*. 36 (1): 37-65.

Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 1995. “Democratization and the Danger of War.” *International Security* 20 (1): 5-38

Marchenko, Yulia. 2010. “Multiple-Imputation Analysis Using Stata’s mi Command.” Paper presented at the Stata Conference, Boston, MA.

Marsh, Robert M. 1979. “Does Democracy Hinder Economic Development in Latecomer Developing Nations?” *Comparative Social Research* 2:215-48.

Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2017. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2017.” Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna, VA.

Mauzy, Diane K. 2006. "The Challenge to Democracy: Singapore and Malaysia's Resilient Hybrid Regimes." *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 2(2): 47-68.

Malthus, Thomas R. 1993 (1798). *An Essay on the Principle of Population*. Edited by Gilbert, G. New York, NY: Oxford Press.

Meurs, Mieke, and Rasika Ranasinghe. 2003. "De-Development in Post-Socialism: Conceptual and Measurement Issues." *Politics & Society* 31(1): 31–53.

Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. "Embedded and Defective Democracies." *Democratization* 11 (5): 33–58.

Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89(5):914-927.

Milanovic, Branko, Mark Gradstein, and Yvonne Ying. 2001. "Democracy and Income Inequality: An Empirical Analysis." Working Paper Series no. 411; World Bank Research Working Paper no. 2561.

Milanovic, Branko. 1999. "Do more unequal countries redistribute more? Does the median voter hypothesis hold?" *The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2264.*

Miller, Michael K. 2011. "Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Hybrid Regimes since 1815." Working paper, Australian National University.

Morgan, Jana and Nathan J. Kelly. 2013. "Market Inequality and Redistribution in Latin America and the Caribbean." *The Journal of Politics* 75(3): 672–685.

Morgenbesser, Lee. 2014. "Elections in Hybrid Regimes: Conceptual Stretching Revived." *Political Studies* 62(1):21-36.

Morlino, Leonardo. 2009. "Are There Hybrid Regimes? Or Are They Just an Optical Illusion?" *European Political Science Review* 1 (02): 273.

Muller, Edward N. 1988. ‘‘Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality.’’ *American Sociological Review* 53 (1): 50–68.

Mueller, Dennis and Peter Murrell. 1986. “Interest Groups and the Size of Government.” *Public Choice* 48: 125–145.

Mufti, Mariam. 2018. “What Do We Know about Hybrid Regimes after Two Decades of Scholarship?” *Politics and Governance.* 6 (2): 112.

Mulligan, Casey, B., Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies? ." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18 (1): 51-74

Mutalib, Hussin. 2000. "Illiberal Democracy and the Future of Opposition in Singapore." *Third World Quarterly* 21(2): 313-42.

Moore, Barrington Jr. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Nelson, Joan. 1987. “Political Participation.” Pp. 103-159. In *Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study*, edited by Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington. Boston, MA: Little Brown.

Nielsen, Francois. 1994. “Income Inequality and Industrial Development: Dualism Revisited.” *American Sociological Review* 59:654–77.

Nuxoll, Daniel A. 1994. “Differences in Relative Prices and International Differences in Growth Rates,” *American Economic Review* 84.

Nooruddin, Irfan and Joel W Simmons. 2009. “Openness, Uncertainty, and Social Spending: Implications for the Globalization–Welfare State Debate.” *International Studies Quarterly* 53(3): 841–866.

O’Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. “The Quality of Democracy: Why the Rule of Law Matters.” *Journal of Democracy* 15(4): 32-46.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 1994. "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1): 55–69.

O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *The American Political Science Review* 87(3): 567-576.

--------------. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ottaway, Marina. 2003. *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*. Carnegie Endowment.

Parvin, Phil. 2018. "Democracy Without Participation: A New Politics for a Disengaged Era." *Res Publica* 24:31–52.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2000. *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Pitlik, Hans. 2002. "The Path of Liberalization and Economic Growth." *Kyklos* 55: 57–80.

Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1994. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?" *The American Economic Review* 84(3): 600-621.

Piketty, Tomas. 2014. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century.* Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press

Przeworski, Adam. 1999. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense." Pp. 12-16. In *Democracy's Value*, edited by I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Pozuelo, Julia Ruiz, Amy Slipowitz, and Guillermo Vuletin. 2016. "Democracy Does Not Cause Growth: The Importance of Endogeneity Arguments." *IDB Working Paper Series 694.*

Rao, Vaman.1985. "Democracy and Economic Development." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 19 (4): 67-81.

Repucci, Sarah. 2020. "Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy." Freedom House, Washington, DC. Retrieved March 28, 2021 (https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/FIW_2020_REPORT_BOOKLET_Final.pdf)

Repucci, Sarah and Amy Slipowitz. 2021. "Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy Under Siege." Freedom House, Washington, DC. Retrieved March 28, 2021 (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege)

Riker, William H., and David L. Weimer. 1993. "The Economic and Political Liberalization of Socialism: The Fundamental Problem of Property Rights." *Social Philosophy and Policy* 10(2): 79-102

Ringen, Stein. 2007. *What Democracy is for: On Freedom and Moral Government.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Robinson, James A. 2010. "The Political Economy of Redistributive Policies." Pp. 39-71. In *Declining Inequality in Latin America*, edited by Luis F. L´ opez-Calva and Nora Lustig. Washington, DC: UNDP and Brookings Institution Press.

------------. 2006. "Economic Development and Democracy. " *Annual review of Political Science* 9:503-527.

Rodrik, Dani. 1999. ''Democracies Pay Higher Wages.'' *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114 (3): 707–38.

Rodan, Garry, and Kanishka Jayasuriya. 2007. "The Technocratic Politics of Administrative Participation: Case Studies of Singapore and Vietnam." *Democratization* 14(5): 795-815.

Roll, Richard and John Talbott. 2001. "Why Many Developing Countries Just aren't." *University of California at Los Angeles: The Anderson School at UCLA, Finance Working Paper No. 19-01*.

Ross, Michael L. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53(3): 325–61.

Donald B. Rubin. 1996. "Multiple Imputation after 18+ Years." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 91(434) :473-489

Rudra, Nita and Stephan Haggard. 2005. "Globalization, democracy, and effective welfare spending in the developing world." *Comparative Political Studies* 38(9): 1015–1049.

Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992. *Capitalism Development and Democracy*. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.

Schamis, Hector E. 1991. ''Reconceptualizing Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s.'' *Comparative Politics* 23 (2): 201–20.

Schedler, Andreas. 2002. "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation." *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 36–50.

———. 2006. "The logic of electoral authoritarianism." Pp. 1-26. In *Electoral authoritarianism: the dynamics of unfree competition*, edited by Schedler A. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. 2010. "The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation." *International Organization, 64*(4): 529-561.

--------------. 2009. "Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality in the Long Run." *World Politics* 61(2): 215-253

Segura-Ubiergo, A. 2007. The Political Economy of the Welfare State in Latin America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Scully, Gerald. 1988. “The Institutional Framework and Economic Development.” *Journal of Political Economy* 96 (3): 652-62.

Sharma, Ruchir. 2016. *The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World*. New York, NY:W. W. Norton & Company.

Sheehey, Edmund J. 1996. “The Growing Gap Between Rich and Poor Countries: A Proposed Explanation.” *World Development* 24(8): 1379-1384.

Shuker, Zeinab F. Seth Abrutyn. 2019. “Oil, Polity, And Civil Society: The Construction Of A Hegemonic System In Iraq (1945-1958).” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1-16

Shuker, Zeinab F. 2017. “Hybrid Regimes and the Resource Curse After Authoritarianism: Parastatal Organizations, Violence and Legitimacy Making in Post-Invasion Iraq.” Thesis: University of California, Riverside.

Skaaning, Svend-Erik. 2006. “Political Regimes and Their Changes: A Conceptual Framework.” (Working Paper no. 55). Stanford, CA: CDDRL Working Papers.

Sirowy, Larry., and Alex Inkeles. 1990. “The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A review.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25:126–157.

Sokoloff, Kenneth, L., and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14 (3): 217-232.

Solt, Frederick. 2008. “Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement.” *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (1): 48–60.

———. 2009. “Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database*.” *Social Science Quarterly* 90 (2): 231–42.

Tan, Zhijun., Shi, Fuyan., Zhang, Haiyue. *et al.* 2018. “Household income, income inequality, and health-related quality of life measured by the

EQ-5D in Shaanxi, China: a cross-sectional study". *International Journal for Equity in Health* 17 (32).

Tusalem, Rollin F. 2015. "Democracies, Autocracies, and Political StabilityAuthor." *Pi Gamma Mu, International Honor Society in Social Sciences* 90 (1):1-40.

Valenzuela, J. Samuel. 1992. "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions." Pp. 57-104. In *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela. Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute series with the University of Notre Dame Press.

Wantchekon, Leonard. 2004. "The Paradox of 'Warlord' Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 17

Way, Lucan A., and Steven Levitsky. 2006. "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39(3): 387-41

Weede, Erich and Sebastian Kampf. 2002. "The Impact of Intelligence and Institutional Improvements on Economic Growth." *Kyklos* 55(3): 361–380.

Williamson Jeffrey G.. 2015. "Latin American Inequality: Colonial Origins, Commodity Booms, or a Missed 20th Century Leveling." *Journal of Human Development Capabilities* 16:324–41.

Williamson, Jeffrey G. 1991. *Inequality, Poverty, and History*. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.

Zakaria, Fareed. 2003. *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*. New York, NY:W. W. Norton & Company.

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 76: 22.

Appendix 1: Variables Measurements

Independent Variable:
cyear, ccode, scode, country, year

Election Competitiveness → Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP) → Polity IV

- Original Code:
  - 1 - non-competitive election
  - 2 - executives are chosen by hereditary succession and competitive election or for transitional competitive elections
  - 3 - competitive elections
  - 0- If power transfers are coded Unregulated ("1") in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 3.1), or involve a transition to/from unregulated
  - -88 Transition
  - -77 Interregnum or Anarchy
  - -66 "Interruption or Missing"
- re-code:[16]
  - 1 re-coded as 0 non-competitive
  - 2 and 3 re-coded as 1 competitive
  - 0, -88, -77, -66 re-coded as "." missing

[16] Gilbert and Mohseni's (2011) re-coding system.

Civil Liberty: Civil Liberty variable from Freedom House

- Original Code:
    - 1 – Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They have an established and generally fair system of the rule of law (including an independent judiciary), allow free economic activity, and tend to strive for equality of opportunity for everyone, including women and minority groups
    - Rating of 2 – Countries and territories with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker civil liberties than those with a rating of 1 because of such factors as some limits on media independence, restrictions on trade union activities, and discrimination against minority groups and women
    - Ratings of 3, 4, 5 – Countries and territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 include those that moderately protect almost all civil liberties to those that more strongly protect some civil liberties while less strongly protecting others. The same factors that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken civil liberties in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5, but to an increasingly greater extent at each successive rating
    - Rating of 6 – Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted civil liberties. They strongly limit the rights of expression and association and frequently hold political prisoners. They may allow a few civil liberties, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly

restricted private business activity, and some open and free private discussion

  - Rating of 7 – Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no civil liberties. They allow virtually no freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of detainees and prisoners, and often control or dominate most economic activity
  - -66 -missing

- re-code (civillib): [17]
  - A score (1-3) re-coded as 1 (unrestricted civil liberties)
  - A score (4-7) re-coded as 0 (restricted civil liberties)
  - - 66 -missing

Tutelary Institutions (tutinst): "Tutelary bodies, or reserved domains of power, refer to non-elected institutions such as militaries, monarchies, or religious authorities that engage in politics. Based on Samuel Fitch's (1998) typology of civil-military relations, a country is classified as having either low or no degree of tutelary interference if non-elected institutions such as militaries, monarchies, or religious authorities do not participate actively in the policy-making process." (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011)

- Original Code:
  - 0 none or inactive

[17] Gilbert and Mohseni's (2011) re-coding system.

- 1 monarchy[18]
- 2 religion
- 3 military[19]
- 4 sectarian, tribal, and ethnic[20]

* re-code (TI):
    - 0 no tutelary institutions
    - 1 all countries with tutelary institutions

Regime Type (regtype):

- 1 Democracy[21] (1,1,0)
- 2 Illiberal Hybrid Regime[22] (1, 0, 0)

---

[18] Countries where a royal figure/family has a significant impact on the political process (such as Saudi Arabia and Morocco). Countries with constitutional monarchy and a democarctic system (such as the United Kingdom) are not included. Countries with constitutional monarchy, yet the royal figure/family has little to no impact on the political process, and there is an impact of other tutelary institutions, are coded based on the tutelary institution with the most impact on the political process.

[19] Coded as tutelary interference (3) if the military has political control over civilians (Military Control) or the military has direct and indirect control over civilians and civilians have low policy control over the military (Military Tutelage)

Coded as no tutelary interference (0) if the military has limited scope and limited influence over civilians and civilians have limited policy control over the military (Conditional Subordination) or if civilians exert policy control over the military (Democratic Control).

[20] The presence of clergy, tribal figures, and ethnic figures are coded as one category, since these institutions seem to have somehow similar impact on the political process, and often go hand in hand in many countries. An example of this will be Iraq.

[21] All countries with a code of 1 (2&3 original code) on xrcomp (Election Competitiveness), a code of 1 (1-3 original code) for civil society, and a code of 0 for the tutelary institution variable.

[22] All countries with a code of 1 (2&3 original code) on xrcomp (Election Competitiveness), a code of 0 (4-7 original code) for civil society, and a code of 0 for the tutelary institution variable.

- 3 Tutelary Illiberal Hybrid Regime[23] (1, 0, 1)
- 4 Tutelary Liberal Hybrid Regime[24] (1, 1, 1)
- 5 Authoritarian/Autocracy[25] (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1) (0,1,0)
- -55 Missing Data/transational cases

Not included countries

- The state does not have a monopoly of violence in the country, if they do not control their own police or military force, and if international or other troops/forces are essential in providing basic security and order in the country

[23] All countries with a code of 1 (2&3 original code) on xrcomp (Election Competitiveness), a code of 0 (4-7 original code) for civil society, and a code of 1 for the tutelary institution variable.

[24] All countries with a code of 1 (2&3 original code) on xrcomp (Election Competitiveness), a code of 1 (1-3 original code) for civil society, and a code of 1 for the tutelary institution variable.

[25] All countries with a code of 0 (1 original code) on xrcomp (Election Competitiveness), a code of 0 (4-7 original code) for civil society, and either a code of 0 or 1 for the tutelary institution variable.

Appendix 2: New Regime Classification

	Democracies	Illiberal Hybrid Regime	Tutelary Illiberal Hybrid Regime	Tutelary Liberal Hybrid Regime	Authoritarian/Autocracy
North/Central America	United States (1989-2017)	Haiti (1996-1998), (2000-2003), (2007-2009)	Haiti (1990 Military), (1994-1996 Military)	Dominican Republic (1989-1995)	Cuba (2005-2017)
	Canada (1989-2017)	Guatemala (1997-2017)	Guatemala (1990-1996)	Guatemala (1989 Military)	Nicaragua (1989)
	Dominician Republic (1996-2017)	Nicaragua (1993-1995), (2009-2012), (2016-2017)	El Salvador (1989-1991)	Suriname (1989), (1992-1995)	Venezuela (2009-2012), (2017)
	Jamaica	Colombia		Paraguay	Guyana

	(1989-2017)	(1995-2004), (2008-2015)		(1989-1992)	(1989-1991)
	Trinidad and Tobago (1989-2017)	Venezuela (1999-2008), (2013-2016)	Colombia (1989-1994)	Honduras (	
	Mexico (1989-2017)	Ecuador (1996)	Suriname (1991)		
	El Salvador (1992-2017)	Peru (1989-1995), (1997-1999)			
	Nicaragua (1990-1992), (1996-2008), (2013-2015)	Brazil (1993-1999)			
	Costa Rica (1989-2017)	Bolivia (1995)			
	Panama (1990-2017)	Honduras (2009-2017)			
	Colombia (2005-2007),				

	(2016-2017)				
	Venezuela (1989-1998)				
	Guyana (1992-2017)				
	Suriname (2001-2017)				
	Ecuador (1989-1995), (1997-2017)				
	Peru (1996), (2001-2017)				
	Brazil (1989-1992), (2000-2017)				
	Bolivia (1989-1994), (1996-2017)				
	Paraguay (1993-2017)				

	Chile (1989-2017)				
	Argentina (1989-2017)				
	Uruguay (1989-2017)				
	Honduras (1989-2008)				
Europe	United Kingdom (1989-2017)	Slovak Republic (1993), (1996-1997)	Kosovo (2009-2012)	Yugoslavia (2001-2002)	Albania (1989), (1996)
	Ireland (1989-2017)	Albania (1990-1991), (1993-1995), (1997-2001)	Yugoslavia (2000 Military)	Ukraine (2004-2007)	Croatia (1996-1998)
	Netherlands (1989-2019)	Kosovo (2013-2017)	Belarus (1991-1995)	Macedonia (1993-2000), (2002-2017 Ethnic)	Yugoslavia (1991-1999)

	Belgium (1989-2017)	Bulgaria (1990)	Georgia (1991-2003 Military)		Bulgaria (1989)
	Luxembourg (1989-2017)	Moldova (1991-2009)	Azerbaijan (1992 Military)		Belarus (1996-2017)
	France (1989-2017)	Romania (1990-1993)	Macedonia (1992 Ethnic Conflict) (2001)		Armenia (1996-1997)
	Switzerland (1989-2017)	Russia (1998-2017)			Azerbaijan (1991), (1993-2017)
	Spain (1989-2017)	Ukraine (1993-2003)			
	Portugal (1989-2017)	Armenia (1991-1992), (1995), (1998-2017)			
	Germany	Georgia			

	(1989-2017)	(2004), (2007-2009)			
	Poland (1989-2017)				
	Austria (1989-2017)				
	Hungary (1989-2017)				
	Czech Republic (1989-2017)				
	Slovak Republic (1994-1995), (1998-2017)				
	Italy (1989-2017)				
	Albania (2002-2017)				
	Serbia				

	(2006-2017)				
	Croatia (2000-2017)				
	Montenegro (2006-2017)				
	Slovenia (1991-				
	Greece (1989-2017)				
	Cyprus (1989-2017)				
	Bulgaria (1991-2017)				
	Moldova (2010-2017)				
	Romania (1994-2017)				
	Russia (1992-1997)				

	Estonia (1991-2017)				
	Latvia (1991-2017)				
	Lithuania (1991-2017)				
	Ukraine (1991-1992), (2008-2017)				
	Armenia (1993-1994)				
	Georgia (2005-2006), (2010-2017)				
	Finland (1989-2017)				
	Sweden (1989-2017)				
	Norway (1989-2017)				

	Denmark (1989-2017)				
Africa	Cape Verde (1991-2017)	Guinea-Bissau (1994)	Guinea-Bissau (1995-1997 Military), (2000-2002 Military), (2005-2011 Military), (2014-2017 Military)	Niger (2004-2006 Military)	Cape Verde (1989-1990)
	Gambia (1989-1993)	Gambia (2017)	Mali (2013-2017 Military)	Comoros (1991-1994 Military)	Guinea-Bissau (1989-1993)
	Mali (1992-1993), (1995-2011)	Mali (1994)	Niger (1992-2003 Military), (2007-2008 Military), (2011-2017 Military)	Mauritius (1989-1991)	Senegal (1989-1999)

	Senegal (2001-2017)	Senegal (2000)	Ivory Coast (2000-2001 Military), (2011 Military)		Mauritania (1989-2005)
	Benin (1991-2017)	Ivory Coast (2012-2017)	Liberia (1997-2002)		Niger (1989-1990)
	Burkina Faso (2015-2017)	Guinea (2010-2017)	Sierra Leone (1996 Military)		Ivory Coast (1989-1998)
	Sierra Leone (2003-2017)	Liberia (2006-2017)	Congo Kinshasa (2006-2015)		Sierra Leone(1989-1991)
	Ghana (2001-2017)	Nigeria (2000-2017)	Burundi (2005-2014 Ethnic)		Togo (2005-2017)
	Nigeria (1999)	Gabon (2009-2017)	Somalia (2012-2017 Ethnic/Clan)		Cameroon (1989-2017)
	Congo Brazzaville	Central African	South Africa (1989-1991)		Congo Brazzaville

	(1992-1993)	Republic (1993-2002), (2016-2017)			(1989-1990)
	Kenya (2003-2008), (2010-2011)	Congo Brazzaville (1994-1996)	Lesotho (1993-1997 Military/Monarchy)		Congo Kinshasa (1989-1991), (2016-2017)
	Tanzania (2002-2014)	Kenya (2002), (2009), (2012-2017)	Comoros (1990 Military), (1996-1998)		Kenya (1989-2001)
	Mozambique (2007-2014)	Tanzania (1995-2001), (2015-2017)			Tanzania (1989-1994)
	Zambia (1991-1992), (2008)	Djibouti (1999-2017)			Burundi (2015-2017)
	Malawi (1994-2001), (2006), (2015-2017)	Ethiopia (1994-2004)			Djibouti (1989-1998)

	South Africa (1994-2017)	Mozambique (1994-2006), (2015-2017)			South Sudan (2011-2012)
	Namibia (1989-2017)	Zambia (1993-1995), (2001-2007), (2009-2017)			Ethiopia (1989-1990), (2005-2017)
	Lesotho (2002-2017)	Zimbabwe (2009-2017)			Eritrea (1989-2017)
	Botswana (1989-2017)	Malawi (2002-2005)			Angola (1989-1990), (1997-2017)
	Madagascar (2003-2008)	Madagascar (1992-2002), (2014-2017)			Mozambique (1989-1993)
	Mauritius (1992-2017)	Comoros (2006-2017)			Zambia (1989-1990), (1996-2000)
	Tunisia (2014-2017)				Zimbabwe (1989-2008)

					Malawi (1989-1993)
					Swaziland (1989-2017)
					Madagascar (1989-1990), (2009-2010)
					Morocco (1989-2017)
					Algeria (1989-1991), (1995-2003)
					Tunisia (1989-2010)
Asia	Israel (1989-2017)	Kyrgyzstan (2005-2017)	Iran (1997-2003 Clergy)	Turkey (1989 Military), (2004-2011 Military)	Iran (1989-1996), (2004-2017)
	Mongolia (1991-2017)	Mongolia (1989-1990)	Turkey (1990-2003	Lebanon (2009-2011	Iraq (1989-2002)

			Military), (2012-2015 Military)	Ethnic)	
	South Korea (1989-2017)	India (1991-1997)	Iraq (2010-2017 Ethnic/Tribal/ Clergy)	Pakistan (1989 Military)	Egypt (1989-2010)
	Japan (1989-2017)	Bangladesh (1993-2006), (2009-2017)	Lebanon (2005-2008 Ethnic), (2012-2017 Ethnic)	Nepal (1991-1992 Monarchy)	Syria (1989-2017)
	India (1989-1990), (1998-2017)	Sri Lanka (1989-2002), (2006-2017)	Yemen or NY (1990 Military)	Fiji (1992-1996)	Jordan (1989-2017)
	Bangladesh (1991-1992)	Nepal (2008-2017)	Bhutan (2007-2017 Monarchy)		Saudi Arabia (1989-2017)
	Sri Lanka (2003-2005)	Thailand (1991-1995), (2008-2013)	Pakistan (1990-1998 Military),		Kuwait (1989), (1991-2017)

			(2009-2017 Military)		
	Thailand (1989-1990), (1996-2005)	Cambodia (1993-1996)	Myanmar (2016-2017 Military)		Bahrain (1989-2017)
	Philippines (1989-1992), (1996-2017)	Malaysia (1989-2017)	Nepal (1989-1990 Monarchy), (1993-2017 Monarchy)		Qatar (1989-2017)
	Indonesia (2005-2012)	Singapore (1989-2017)			UAE (1989-2017)
	East Timor (2002-2017)	Philippines (1993-1995)			Oman (1989-2017)
	Australia (1989-2017)	Indonesia (1999-2004), (2013-2017)			Afghanistan (1989-1991), (2014-2017)
	Papua New Guinea (1989-1992), (1998-2017)	Papua New Guinea (1993-1997)			Turkmenistan (1989-2017)

	New Zealand (1989-2017)	Fiji (1990-1991), (2001-2005)			Tajikistan (1989-2017)
	Solomon Island (1989-1999), (2004-2017)				Uzbekistan (1989-2017)
	Fiji (1997-1999)				Kazakhstan (1989-2017)
					China (1989-2017)
					North Korea (1989-2017)
					Bhutan (1989-2006)
					Bangladesh (2007-2208)
					Myanmar (1989-2007)
					Thailand

					(2006-2007)
					Laos (1989-2017)
					Vietnam (1989-2017)
					Indonesia (1989-1998)
					Fiji (1989), (2006-2017)

Appendix 3: Tutelary Reclassification of only the Regimes Include in the Original G&M Data[26]

Country's Name	Year	T Type	New Code	Original Code
Macedonia	1991	Ethnic	3	2
Macedonia	1993-2000	Ethnic	4	1
Macedonia	2001	Ethnic	3	2
Macedonia	2002-2017	Ethnic	4	1
Yugoslavia	2001-2001	Ethnic	4	1
Azerbaijan	1992	Ethnic	3	2
Liberia	1997-2002	Ethnic	3	2
Burundi	2005-2014	Ethnic	3	2
Somalia	2012-2017	Ethnic	3	2
South Africa	1990-1991	Ethnic	3	2
Lebanon	2005-2008	Ethnic	3	2
Lebanon	2009-2010	Ethnic	4	1
Lebanon	2011-2017	Ethnic	3	2

[26] Since the authors measure elections differently, many hybrid regimes in my data are not included in their data. For example, Iraq is a hybrid regime along tribal/sec lines. However, since the authors did not include Iraq in their original data as a hybrid regime, I did not include the country in the table above as an example of a tutelary shift.