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University Influence on Students' Political Ideologies

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# UNIVERSITY INFLUENCE ON STUDENTS' POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

Ву

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A capstone project submitted for Graduation with University Honors

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#### Abstract

As influencers of the next generation of educated political leaders, professors play a large role in shaping society's future policy and administrative leaders. With such influence on their students' attitudes and opinions, concerns are raised regarding the type of information they provide and how it is taught. Prior research suggests that people shift attitudes in response to information from opinion leaders and seek out contexts that conform with their ideological predispositions. In this study, I seek to establish whether those findings apply to professors and to the university context. Specifically, (1) Do professors serve as credible opinion leaders who can shape students' political opinions? And furthermore, (2) Do students seek out, and/or avoid, professors with certain political predispositions? To test these questions, I conducted two experiments embedded within a survey of the UCR undergraduate student body during the fall of 2019. In the first experiment, I found that Democratic students, the largest partisan group in my sample, become more opposed to a policy (in line with their party's stance) when the professor advocates against it. The results from the second experiment show that students are more likely to select into an undesirable class taught by a professor with similar political interests. Overall, my findings imply that students' susceptibility to professors' frames and their self-selection into university courses provide undesirable circumstances for the goal of improving cooperation within the future of American government.

#### Framing and Self-Selection in an Academic Environment

As influencers of the next generation of political leaders, professors play a significant role in shaping society's future political elites. This possible influence on their students' attitudes and opinions raises concerns regarding the type of information professors provide and how it is framed. Prior research suggests that people shift their attitudes in response to information from opinion leaders and seek out contexts that comport with their ideological predispositions. In this study, I seek to establish whether those findings apply to professors and to the university context. Specifically, (1) Do professors serve as credible opinion leaders who can shape students' political opinions? And furthermore, (2) Do students seek out, and/or avoid, professors with certain political predispositions?

I situate my answer to the first research question in the scholarly literature on framing effects, cues, and source credibility (Chaiken 1980; Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman 2001; Kinder and Herzog 1993; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; McGuire 1969; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Taber and Lodge 2006; Zaller 1992). Frames adjust an individual's understanding of what they believe to be an essential consideration of an issue. Some scholars fear that the use of frames allows elites to manipulate the political opinions of individuals, though Druckman (2001) shows that the source of the frames has to be credible in order to affect attitudes. That source credibility cue serves as an information shortcut for one to form their political opinions on specific issues, events, or individuals without retaining the extensive information necessary to make well-informed opinions. Source credibility, in turn, is determined not only by pre-existing political views or confirmation biases, but also by the legitimacy, qualifications, accuracy, and trustworthiness of the informed actors (e.g., Lupia and

McCubbins 1998). Given these findings, it is possible that, just as citizens look towards political leaders to guide their political opinions, students may look to professors to shape their opinions on academic, and possibly political, matters. If this is the case, then how professors frame political issues may have a profound impact on students' political attitudes and opinions.

In order to formulate a response to the second question, I rely on the literature on political self-selection and political choice homophily (Alford et al. 2011; Benedictis-Kessner, Baum, and Berinsky 2019; Bennett and Iyengar 2008; Carlson 1979; Davis and Dunaway 2016; Gage, Zick, Tully, & Simon 2010; Huber and Malhotra 2017; Iyengar et al. 2008; Kim 2009; Martin et al. 1986; Niemi, Hedges, and Jennings 1977; Prior 2007, 2013; Putnam 1993; Quintelier and Hooghe 2013). While the notion that individuals self-select into political context that reinforce existing beliefs may be unsurprising, scholars are increasingly focusing on how individuals bring political considerations into something often considered unpolitical. Similarly, political choice homophily is the tendency for individuals to seek out relationships or join groups with others who share similar political ideologies or values. In light of this demonstrated role of political predispositions on decision-making in seemingly nonpolitical environments, this same dynamic may occur when students make course selections (at least when students have information at their disposal to do so).

To test these expectations, I conducted a survey of the University of California, Riverside undergraduate population. Within the survey, I ask subjects to report their level of support or opposition toward a specific policy after I randomly assign a purported UCR professor to take one side of the issue. This permits me to test whether subjects become more supportive of (opposed to) the policy when someone with the title "professor" advocates for (against) it. In a

second experiment, I ask subjects to report the likelihood that they would enroll in a potential course for which I vary a number of factors, including the professor's frequently stated admiration for a political candidate. This permits me to test whether subjects will select specific courses (a seemingly nonpolitical decision) based on the professor's political ideology even in the presence of other undesired aspects of the course.

The findings largely align with my expectations. Democratic students, the largest partisan group in my sample, become more opposed to policy (in line with their party's stance) when the professor advocates against it. There is also suggestive evidence that a professor advocating for the issue can reduce their opposition, and that Independents/unaffiliated students can be swayed either way depending on the stance taken by the professor (though these effects are not statistically significant). The results from the second experiment show that students are more likely to select into an undesirable class taught by a professor with similar political interests.

This study speaks to the formation of student political thought when such attitudes are still malleable. The findings help further our understanding of professors' influences on the political attitudes and perceptions of college students. As professors appear to be able to influence opinions, these findings reinforce the care with which professors must select the content and context provided in their class, over which they have considerable discretion. The results also strongly suggest that students do self-select into courses based on how the professor presents the material (when such information is available to them), which raises concerns about the type of classes (and thus information and viewpoints) to which students may not be exposed. This also raises concerns about the consequences of possible framing effects that would, in these

instances, reinforce existing political beliefs and potentially lead to further polarization or sorting.

### **Framing Effects and Political Issues**

A fundamental theory for understanding political communication, the notion of framing is well-established both inside and outside of the political science discipline. According to Chong and Druckman, "Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue" (Chong and Druckman 2007, 104). In other words, frames adjust an individual's understanding of what they believe to be an essential consideration of the issue (Druckman 2001). Framing effects often occur when a different aspect of an issue is emphasized, which can in turn affect an individual's opinion on that issue. Moreover, individuals may be exposed to new information through a specific frame that can alter their understanding of the issue. Even if an individual does not learn something new, however, that particular frame may still impact their current perceptions of the issue. Given their effectiveness in shaping attitudes, some scholars have expressed concerns regarding the potential for elite manipulation of citizens' political opinions through the use of frames (e.g., Kinder and Herzog 1993). While such concerns are not unwarranted, Druckman's (2001) findings on the limits of framing indicate that the source of the frames must be credible in order for there to be significant framing effects. Moreover, Druckman (2001) points out that framing effects are presumably the by-product of citizens seeking out information or cues from elites in order to obtain guidance on an issue, rather than elite manipulation. This establishment of the limits to framing effects should arguably ease the concerns of scholars (such as Kinder and Herzog 1993).

As noted above, the credibility of a source is often understood as a critical determinant of whether an individual is likely to accept the information given to them. However, the influence of source credibility on opinion change is debated in the literature. Zaller (1992), for example, highlights the influence of psychologist William McGuire's (1969) work in our understanding of the effects of source credibility on obtaining information. McGuire saw a "pattern" of individuals only accepting the opinion or stance of a credible source, rather than gaining greater knowledge on the subject matter. He argues that "the receiver can be regarded as a lazy organism who tries to master the message contents only when it is absolutely necessary to make a decision. When the purported source is clearly positively or negatively valanced, he uses this information as a cue to accept or reject the message's conclusions without really absorbing the arguments used" (McGuire 1969, 198). This cue then serves as a sort of hint to help the general public form their opinions on an issue or individual with minimal context. This information shortcut (and others) decreases the demands of making political decisions and allows individuals to do so based on limited information without retaining the information that would allow them to become wellinformed citizens (Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).

Lupia and McCubbins (1998) discuss the tradeoffs of depending on the cues or advice from informed actors ("speakers"). Depending on "speakers" to provide the additional information necessary to form attitudes offers citizens ("principals") a tool to lower the cost of acquiring information while, simultaneously, increasing their vulnerability to the risk of manipulation. If a decision is made based on the cues from a "speaker," "principals" must decide which source or "speaker" to listen to and which to disregard. Lupia and McCubbins note the "systemic and predictable ways" in which individuals select their sources. Specifically, they identify persuasion, interest and knowledge as the primary criteria that determine source

credibility. First, persuasion refers to the ability to successfully change the principal's belief or opinion, which Lupia and McCubbins claim to be necessary in order to use the speaker's information in decision making. Second, the importance of interest in determining source credibility suggests that the speaker's interests must be in line with the principal's interests. Lastly, for the principal to perceive the source as credible, the speaker must have the knowledge that the principal needs. If these three key elements are met, the speaker will be perceived as a credible source so long as external factors do not diminish their credibility.

While McGuire (1969) argues that the credibility of a source influences an individual's willingness to accept or reject the information, Zaller (1992) provides an alternative to McGuire's understanding of source credibility via the studies done by Chaiken (1980) and Petty and Cacioppo (1986). Petty and Cacioppo's (1986) study on undergraduate college students, for example, measured the influence of source credibility (a Princeton professor as the "highly credible" source vs. a high school class report as "low credibility") and the strength of the argument as determining factors of opinion changes. Zaller (1992) summarizes the findings of these two studies as having "...provided clear support for the view that individuals will, under certain circumstances, entirely ignore such factors as 'source credibility' and instead base their attitudes on the quality of the persuasive information they have been given" (Zaller 1992, 46). As such, it is possible that in some circumstances even credible sources may not be able to affect attitudes.

Additionally, some scholars argue that source credibility may depend on an individual's preconceived political beliefs and the party identification of the source. Taber and Lodge (2006), for example, claim that information that supports an individual's preconceived political perspectives is more likely to be accepted, regardless of flaws in the argument or counter

arguments. Furthermore, when given information that does not align with their preconceived views, individuals often search for ways to invalidate the source or context. This is similarly illustrated in Lupia and McCubbins' (1998) depiction of interest as one of three necessary elements for a speaker to achieve source credibility. The importance of interest in determining source credibility suggests that the "speaker's" interests must be in line with the "principal's" interests. In this case, source credibility is not simply determined by the legitimacy, qualifications, accuracy, or trustworthiness of the speaker him/herself. Rather, source credibility is determined by preexisting political views or confirmation biases.

The extent to which the literature mentioned above is suited to explain the distinctive characteristics of the student-professor relationship is unclear. The cited work considers political elites, but whether professors (can) fulfill that same role is unknown. To the extent that students seek guidance from credible and knowledgeable sources, that role may inevitably filled by professors in a university setting. That said, one primary contrast with prior work is the dissimilarities in the ideal roles of political elites, as elected representatives of the people, and professors, as unbiased educators and specialized academics. In other words, the job of a professor is to educate students, not frame students' opinions on policy issues. Therefore, the credibility of professors and their ability to frame students' political opinions should be considered within the classroom.

#### **Self-Selection into Non-Political Environments**

Potentially further enhancing the impact of framing on political opinions is the role that self-selection or political choice homophily plays in the exposure to these frames. As defined by Gage et al., self-selection is the notion that people select into environments that reinforce their preexisting politically beliefs (Gage, Zick, Tully, & Simon 2010). For example, Benedictis-

Kessner, Baum, and Berinsky (2019) discuss this notion of political self-selection as it pertains to the media. With the explosion of modern media outlets, individuals have the opportunity to select into a variety of different partisan news sources. As demonstrated in previous studies (Arceneaux et al. 2012; Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Stroud 2011), individuals often choose partisan news sources that confirm their pre-existing political beliefs and disregard ideologically opposed sources (Benedictis-Kessner et al. 2019). The conditions in which partisan media sorting most often occurs, according to scholars (Bennett and Iyengar 2008; Davis and Dunaway 2016; Iyengar et al. 2008; Kim 2009; Prior 2007, 2013), are among the most engaged and informed partisans. (Benedictis-Kessner et al. 2019).

While the fact that individuals self-select into political news based on partisan predispositions is unsurprising, increasingly scholars have found evidence that people bring political considerations into decisions often thought to be nonpolitical. This includes self-selection into politically homogenous groups and political choice homophily, defined by Huber and Malhotra as "a preference for those who are politically similar" (Huber & Malhotra 2017, 269). In other words, political choice homophily is the tendency for individuals to seek out relationships or join groups with others who share similar political ideologies or values. Political choice homophily, as described in this paper, portrays the notion that individuals may self-select into seemingly nonpolitical domains based on partisan considerations.

Recent studies convey the prevalence of political homogeneity in social networks and environments often regarded as nonpolitical (e.g., Alford et al. 2011; Carlson 1979; Martin et al. 1986). However, whether political homophily is explained by self-selection (Huber and Malhotra 2017; Uslaner 2002) or socialization (Quintelier and Hooghe 2013; Putnam 1993) is disputed. Initial work by Niemi, Hedges, and Jennings (1977) found no correlation between a couple's

background or frequency of political discussion and their shared political views, suggesting that selection and socialization were insufficient to explain the existence of politically homogeneous marital couples. Due to Niemi et al. 's inability to establish the conditions linking political attitude similarity and interpersonal attraction, Carlson (1979) attempted to reassess socialization and selection as explanations for the political homogeneity of couples. Carlson's (1979) results revealed that a potential dating partner's political opinion influences their attraction to another politically interested dating partner. However, as one might expect, political views did not influence interpersonal attraction for those with little political interest. In opposition to Niemi et al.'s (1977) findings, Carlson's (1979) results partially confirmed selection as an explanation for politically homogeneous couples.

More recent work seeks to further clarify this relationship, though disagreement remains as to the explanatory factors for the politically homogeneous environments and social networks. On one side of the debate, Huber and Malhotra's (2017) online dating study analyzes the influence of political predispositions on social relationship selection, illustrating that relationships are more likely to start when individuals share similar political ideologies. Huber and Malhotra (2017) found group identity as an explanation for political choice homophily in politically homogeneous relationships. Moreover, Huber and Malhotra's (2017) study provides direct evidence of political choice homophily within social relationships.

In addition to intimate relationships, political homophily applies to a wide array of social, educational, and residential interactions. The motivation behind an individual's tendency to live within politically homogeneous areas remains partially ambiguous and could be the result of self-selection, contextual factors, or a combination of both. Gallego et al. (2014) conducted a study to analyze the cause and effect relationship between political homogeneity and location

selection: does an individual select an area based on political ideology, or does the area shape their political ideology? Ultimately, their study shows that an individual's tendency to live within a politically homogeneous area is due to self-selection. Gallego, et al.'s (2014) study reaffirms the notion that individuals tend to self-select into seemingly nonpolitical environments and social networks based on political predispositions.

Quintelier and Hooghe (2013) provide an alternative to Huber and Malhotra's (2017) understanding of political homogeneity within a political environment. Quintelier and Hooghe analyzed the relationship between participation and attitudes during a two-year span to study the probability that civic engagement socializes respondents rather than respondents self-selecting into civic experiences. They found that the attitudes of those engaged in a political group in 2006 morphed into attitudes more consistent with their civic experiences by 2008. Quintelier and Hooghe's findings support the socialization argument over the self-selection argument. "The relationship might be reciprocal, but the arrow is significantly stronger in one direction than in the other" (Quintelier & Hooghe 2013, 75).

Quintelier and Hooghe's (2013) and Carlson's (1979) findings on the prevalence of self-selection indicate that the propensity for political choice homophily tends to be among those who are politically knowledgeable. Those who engage in political choice homophily tend to hold stable political opinions and high levels of political engagement; therefore, they seek out those with similar opinions. However, this only applies to politically knowledgeable individuals (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013). In Carlson's (1979) study, he found that subjects with little political interest had minimal differences between those who received the political attitude similarity and dissimilarity conditions. Carlson's finding supports the argument that those who are uninterested in politics are unlikely to participate in political choice homophily or partisan

self-selection. Given that the American public generally possesses low levels of political knowledge, information, and interest (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), partisan self-selection may be limited to the minority of individuals with established political views and sorted social networks (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013).

Although this literature primarily concerns nonacademic environments, it raises crucial questions regarding student's self-selection into courses (a seemingly nonpolitical domain). Specifically, do students select a course based on their political ideology and the professors perceived political preferences (political choice homophily)? According to this literature, despite classroom environments being seemingly nonpolitical, individual selection into courses may nonetheless be determined by students' political predispositions (at least if they are politically knowledgeable).

### **Hypotheses**

My research questions are as follows, (1) Do professors serve as credible opinion leaders who can shape students' political opinions? Or, put another way, do students take cues from individuals with the title of "professor" without partisan cues? (2) Do students seek out and/or avoid professors with some political predispositions? Drawing on the prior work discussed above, I have the following expectations:

Hypothesis 1: Students presented a policy framed by a professor in a positive (negative) manner will become more supportive of (opposed to) that policy.

Hypothesis 2. A professor's expressed political candidate preferences exert a greater influence on a student's willingness to take a course than the effort the course requires or the presence/absence of additional classroom time (in the form of discussion sections).

#### **Research Design**

To test my hypotheses, I conducted two experiments embedded within a survey of the UCR undergraduate student body during the fall of 2019. In order to recruit subjects, I advertised the online survey through the R'Campus weekly newsletter, which is an online newsletter sent out to all UCR undergraduate students. The survey was advertised in the emailed newsletter the three Tuesdays between October 8 and 22, and provided a survey link in order for subjects to participate. All subjects were at least 18 years of age and an undergraduate student at UCR. I provided an incentive for UCR students to complete the survey by offering an opportunity to be entered in a prize drawing to receive one of eight \$40 VISA gift cards. Out of the 22,055 undergraduate students at UCR, I recruited 553 students over the age of 18, of whom 461 were deemed eligible subjects for my sample. Eligible respondents were those who completed the survey, only submitted one response, signed the informed consent, and met the additional requirements. Overall, the sample was reasonably representative of the UCR population. A few subpopulations were over or under-sampled; for example, the UCR population<sup>2</sup> consists of 47.2% males and 52.8% females; however, the sample consists of 27.4% males and 70% females. The racial and ethnic divide in the sample is reasonably representative of the population in most categories, except for the white racial category, which was oversampled by 7%. (See Table 1 for descriptive statistics for the sample).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The survey and recruitment materials are provided in the appendix.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Undergraduate population statistics from <a href="https://ir.ucr.edu/stats">https://ir.ucr.edu/stats</a>.

**Table 1. Demographics of UCR Sample and Population** 

	% Sample Respondents (n)	% UCR Undergraduate Population as of 2019
Academic Year		1
Freshman	21.1% (95)	
Sophomore	18.9% (85)	
Junior	28.7% (129)	
Senior	31.3% (141)	
Gender		
Female	70% (322)	54% (binary scale)
Male	27.3% (126)	46% (binary scale)
Other	2.7% (12)	
Race/Ethnicity		
Asian or Asian American	31.9% (144)	33.6%
Black or African American	2.7% (12)	3.2%
Hispanic or Latino	34.2% (154)	41.7%
Middle Eastern	2% (9)	Not reported
Mixed Race	7.8% (35)	5.5%
Native American	0.22% (1)	0.1%
White	18% (81)	11.1%
Other Races	3.3% (15)	Not reported
Party ID		
Democrat	61.8% (283)	
Republican	11.1% (51)	
Pure Independent or	21% (96)	
Unaffiliated		
Other	6.1% (28)	
Note: n=461 N=22 055 Under	graduata population statistics fro	m https://ir.uar.adu/stats

Note: n=461 N=22,055. Undergraduate population statistics from <a href="https://ir.ucr.edu/stats">https://ir.ucr.edu/stats</a>.

Once subjects verified their eligibility to participate in the study, they answered three policy questions framed in a non-partisan manner with both the supporting and opposing arguments presented. Respondents were then randomly assigned one of three versions of a policy question on photo ID laws, in which a supposed UCR professor takes a policy stance in an op-ed. This issue is an increasingly salient one with clear partisan positions, yet one on which California students may be less informed given that the state does not require such identification to vote. In

order to test for framing effects, I evaluate students' support for photo ID laws when they are supported or opposed by a professor. The treatment condition that frames the professor's op-ed as supportive of photo ID laws claims that they "are crucial to protect the integrity of elections and have not been demonstrated to reduce eligible voter turnout." In contrast, the condition that frames the professor's op-ed as opposing photo ID laws claim that they are "not crucial to protect the integrity of elections and have been demonstrated to reduce eligible voter turnout." The control condition frames the professor's op-ed as unbiased, with both supporting and opposing arguments presented. Specifically:

As you may know, a number of states have recently adopted photo ID policies that require a photo identification to vote. In case you are unfamiliar with this issue, here is how an incoming UCR professor recently characterized the debate in an op-ed: "Supporters believe that photo ID laws are important to reduce voter fraud and protect the integrity of elections, while opponents fear that some eligible citizens without photo ID will not be able to vote and claim that concerns about voter fraud are exaggerated." [Pro-photo ID treatment] Despite the arguments of opponents, photo ID laws are in fact crucial to protect the integrity of elections and have not actually been demonstrated to reduce eligible voter turnout." [Anti-photo ID treatment] Despite the arguments of supporters, photo ID laws are not, in fact, crucial to protect the integrity of elections and have actually been demonstrated to reduce eligible voter turnout."

All policy questions, including the photo ID question, measure the subjects' level of support or opposition for the policies based on a seven-point Likert scale (strongly support, somewhat support, slightly support, neither support or oppose, slightly oppose, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose). This set up permits me to test whether subjects become more (less) supportive of the policy when a professor advocated for (against) it. No direct partisan cues were used within the policy questions; however, subjects with moderate to high levels of political knowledge may have known their party's stances.

After completing the policy questions, respondents were provided a potential course offering with various characteristics. Subjects were asked to report their interest in taking this course based on a seven-point Likert scale (extremely interested, somewhat interested, slightly interested, neither interested or disinterested, slightly disinterested, somewhat disinterested, extremely disinterested). Subjects were randomly assigned one of eight variations of the course listing, in which the amount of effort, presence of a discussion section, and the professor's frequent admiration for a political candidate were varied. In order to understand the impact of a professor's political preference on course selection, the course listing mentioned that the supposed professor "would regularly discuss his admiration for Donald Trump's (Hillary Clinton's) proposed policies during his (her) 2016 presidential election campaign." Specifically:

In the Spring of 2020, UCR will be offering an upper-division Presidential Politics course (POSC101) [S with a discussion section / no discussion section]. The course analyzes modern presidential leadership and power. Topics include the institutional presidency, presidential selection, and the presidency's relationships with the bureaucracy, Congress, interest groups, the press, and the public. Also covered is what makes presidents popular and what determines the effectiveness of presidential leadership. The professor offering this course last taught it two years ago and, based on his iEval comments, a large number of students expressed an expectation of getting a high grade in the class and noted that they put in [maximum effort/ minimum effort]. In the comments, several students also flagged that the professor would regularly discuss his admiration for [Donald Trump's / Hillary Clinton's] proposed policies during their 2016 presidential election campaign. How interested would you be in taking this course?

This experiment examines whether students will select specific courses based on the professor's political preferences over other unfavorable conditions. This, therefore, assesses the extent to which students' political preferences affect decisions made outside the political domain, namely the selection of courses. A series of demographic questions then followed to record the

gender, race, and ethnicities of subjects, as well as measure their party identification and level of political engagement.

#### **Results - Experiment #1**

I begin by examining Democrats' stances toward the photo identification policy. OLS regression results, presented in Table 2, provide substantial support for the expectation that professors are viewed as credible sources who can influence students' attitudes. Compared to the control (objective presentation of voter ID laws), Democrats who received the anti-photo ID law treatment were about half a point more opposed to this policy on a 7-point scale (p<.05, one-tailed test). In contrast, the first row shows that the pro-photo ID treatment pushes Democrats to be more supportive (by 0.38 of a point) of photo ID policies. Unfortunately, my sample size is relatively modest, meaning this test may be somewhat underpowered. As such, the evidence is at least suggestive of significant framing effects that work both ways.

Due to the smaller sample size, the results for Republicans are underpowered. Compared to the control, Republicans who received the pro-photo ID law treatment were roughly 0.2 points more supportive of this policy on a 7-point scale. Interestingly, Republicans who received the anti-photo ID law treatment were about half a point more supportive of this policy. I also looked at Independents and unaffiliated respondents, with the expectation that Independents and unaffiliated respondents will likely shift both ways. The results are consistent with this expectation, as Independent and unaffiliated respondents that received the pro-photo ID treatment became 0.26 points more supportive, while the anti-photo ID treatment pushed Independent/unaffiliated respondents to be half a point more opposed of photo ID policies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> A one-sided test is justifiable as the directionality of the expected relationship is clear. Specifically, I have clear expectations that the anti/pro photo ID message should drive respondents to oppose/support the policy.

(though this effect is not statistically significant). Thus, within party identification, at least for Democrats and Independents/the unaffiliated, the analysis largely supports the hypothesis that professors serve as credible opinion leaders who can shape students' political opinions.

Table 2: Support for Photo ID Policy, by Party ID

	Democrats	Republicans	Independents & Unaffiliated	
Conditions				
Pro-ID Treatment	-0.380	0.0179	-0.255	
	(0.283)	(0.592)	(0.424)	
Anti-ID Treatment	0.499	-0.482	0.533	
	(0.288)	(0.537)	(0.421)	
Constant	3.928	2.625	3.667	
	(0.211)	(0.404)	(0.317)	
	N=283	N=51	N=96	

Note: OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses.

Thinking about heterogeneous effects, we might anticipate that Hispanics and African Americans will respond to the ID policies differently since members of their communities are less likely to have identification (Hajnal, Lajevardi & Nielson 2017). As reported in Table 3, for these individuals the effect of the pro-photo ID treatment on their level of support is essentially 0 (0.02 points). Hispanic and Black respondents who received the anti-photo ID treatment became 0.78 points more opposed to photo ID policies on the 7-point scale (p<.05). This suggests that group membership may play a reasonably significant role in students' susceptibility to the professor's framing effects. Respondents within these minority groups that are primarily affected by photo ID laws show a larger movement in opposition to the policies when receiving the anti-photo ID treatment and minimal effects when receiving the pro-photo ID treatment, compared to Democrats in general who received the treatments. Although according to nine PPIC studies

between 2018 and 2019 a majority of African American and Latino voters in California are Democrats, I ran an additional regression taking both race and political party into consideration. Democrats who are Hispanic or African American that received the anti-photo ID treatment moved one whole point towards further opposing photo ID policies (p<.05). In contrast, the prophoto ID treatment had no meaningful effect. Although the magnitude of the effects varies by race/ethnicity, the results largely support the hypothesis that professors serve as credible opinion leaders and can shape their students' political opinions.

Table 3: Support for Photo ID Policy, by Partisanship & Race

	African A	Americans &	Whites		Entire Sample	
	Latinos					
Conditions	Dems	All	Dems	All	Dems	All
Pro-PID	0.019	0.016	-0.386	0.192	-0.380	-0.100
Treatment	(0.427)	(0.370)	(0.663)	(0.568)	(0.283)	(0.224)
Anti-PID	0.994	0.779	0.064	0.468	0.499	0.378
Treatment	(0.453)	(0.387)	(0.622)	(0.568)	(0.288)	(0.225)
Constant	3.590	3.574	4.786	3.739	3.928	3.628
	(0.314)	(0.270)	(0.477)	(0.424)	(0.211)	(0.165)
	N=121	N=166	N=49	N=81	N=283	N=461

Note: OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses.

The more politically interested and engaged individuals are, the more politically knowledgeable they tend to be. The more politically engaged the respondents are, the more likely they are to be aware of their party's policy stance on photo ID laws. Therefore, I anticipate that the more politically engaged Democratic respondents are, the less responsive they will be to the pro-photo ID treatment. Table 4 reports the treatment effects on Democratic respondents based on their levels of political engagement. It is important to note that the lowest level of political engagement ("hardly at all") will not be included in the analysis due to insufficient cases.

As Table 4 illustrates, when given the pro-photo ID treatment, the most politically engaged Democrats are minimally affected and become 0.11 points more supportive of photo ID laws. In contrast, Democrats with low political engagement ("only now and then") who receive the pro-photo ID treatment become nearly half a point more supportive of photo ID laws on a 7-point scale. Surprisingly, the pro-photo ID treatment slightly moves highly and moderately engaged Democrats towards greater support of photo ID laws (though the effects are not significant). These findings continue to support the narrative that professors are credible sources who can influence their students' political opinions. The direction of the relationship aligns with what we would expect with the less and more informed respondents. The larger effect sizes for respondents in the Democratic Party who are less informed are likely due to their lack of exposure to party cues. The smaller effect sizes for Democrats who pay attention to politics are likely due to their stable attitudes and recognition of the policy stance of the Democratic Party.

Table 4: Support for Photo ID Policy by Political Engagement, Democrats Only

Conditions	Most of the time	Some of the time	Only now &	Hardly at all
			then	
Pro-ID	-0.105	-0.369	-0.400	0.792
Treatment	(0.613)	(0.435)	(0.468)	(1.212)
Anti-ID	0.317	0.326	0.565	2.333
Treatment	(0.575)	(0.423)	(0.558)	(1.266)
Constant	4.583	3.919	3.368	2.333
	(0.429)	(0.314)	(0.371)	(1.034)
	N=77	N=122	N=66	N=17

Note: OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses.

### **Results – Experiment 2**

Table 5 presents OLS regression results for the second experiment and provides substantial evidence for partisan self-selection for class selection. One may expect that Democrats should be

most interested in taking the political science course that requires minimum effort, has no discussion section, and has the professor that often discusses his admiration for Hillary Clinton (treatment 5). Therefore, when we hold the class elements constant (minimum effort, no discussion section), switching from a course whose professor discusses admiration for Clinton to a course whose professor admires Trump reduces Democrats' interest in taking that course by one whole point on a 7-point scale (p<.05). This illustrates the role of political preferences in students' course selections. When comparing the most desirable course treatment (minimum effort, no discussion section, pro-Clinton) to the other Clinton treatments, we see small and insignificant movements in course desirability. For example, when we make the course treatment minimum effort and pro-Clinton but add a discussion section, there is no meaningful effect (the course becomes 0.01 points less desirable). There is a somewhat larger effect when the pro-Clinton course treatment requires maximum effort with no discussion section. This course treatment (pro-Clinton, maximum effort, no discussion section) decreases Democrats' willingness to take the course by roughly one-third of a point (though the effect is not significant). Lastly, holding the pro-Clinton element constant, going from no discussion and minimal effort to a discussion section and maximum effort decreases Democrats' willingness to take the course by half a point. However, that effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero (possibly due to the small sample size and resulting relatively large standard errors).

Table 5: Effect of Treatments on Democrats' Willingness to Take Course, Outgroup Treatment 5 Democrats Only

Conditions	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t
Dis, Max, Trump	1.103175	.4749562	2.32	0.021
No Dis, Max, Trump	1.297619	.4749562	2.73	0.007
No Dis, Min, Trump	1.040373	.4518058	2.30	0.022
Dis, Max, Clinton	.547619	.4952999	1.11	0.270
No Dis, Max, Clinton	.3721805	.4694561	0.79	0.429
Dis, Min, Clinton	.0142857	.4644504	0.03	0.975
Dis, Min, Trump	1.455665	.4994055	2.91	0.004
Constant	3.785714	.3562172	10.63	0.000

Note: OLS regression results. Outgroup is Treatment 5 (No Dis, Min, Clinton). N= 461

Additionally, if we run a regression model with treatment 1 (discussion section, maximum effort, and pro-Trump) as the outgroup, switching the course components while keeping the pro-Trump component constant has no significant or substantively meaningful effect. Moreover, when making the class more desirable by requiring minimum effort and no discussion section, it only becomes more desirable by 0.06 of a point (see Table 6). When making the class much less desirable on dimensions aside from candidate preferences, students care less about the partisan bias, although it does not make those effects go away. Given the information about candidate preference, across Tables 5 and 6 we see that regardless of who the candidate is, students are not more or less likely to take the course given its level of difficulty

(minimum or maximum effort required) or the required additional class time (discussion sections).

Table 6: Effect of Treatments on Democrats' Willingness to Take Course, Outgroup Treatment 1 Democrats Only

Conditions	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t
No Dis, Max, Trump	.1944444	.4442809	0.44	0.662
No Dis, Min, Trump	0628019	.4194408	-0.15	0.881
Dis, Max, Clinton	555556	.4659657	-1.19	0.234
No Dis, Min, Clinton	-1.103175	.4749562	-2.32	0.021
No Dis, Max, Clinton	7309942	.4383961	-1.67	0.097
Dis, Min, Clinton	-1.088889	.4330314	-2.51	0.012
Dis, Min, Trump	.3524904	.4703274	0.75	0.454
Constant	4.888889	.314154	15.56	0.000

Note: OLS regression results. Outgroup is Treatment 1 (Dis, Max, Trump). N= 461

These findings are fascinating, as they seem to suggest that information on a professor's candidate preferences trumps other course considerations (effort and discussion sections). The most significant determinant for whether students are likely to take the course is the professor's candidate preferences (1 point), then the amount of effort and, lastly, discussion or no discussion section. Ultimately, absent the least desirable combination of other factors, the knowledge of the professor's candidate preferences influences a student's likelihood of enrolling in the course. One could argue that students do not care about the parameters I selected. It is possible that I overestimated the importance of avoiding additional class hours and a larger workload to undergraduate students. However, it should seem sensible that the amount of time and degree of difficulty are factors that undergraduate students would consider. Moreover, the findings suggest

that students are more willing to take the harder course with longer hours if they know that the professor is pro-Clinton than the easier course with shorter hours if the professor is pro-Trump.

#### Conclusion

The findings from my first experiment suggest that both Democratic and Independent students are susceptible to how professors frame political issues (there are too few cases to draw any conclusions about Republicans). That susceptibility appears for Democrats to be conditioned by information levels, as the less politically knowledgeable respondents are, the more likely they are to be influenced by the professor's frames. In contrast, the more politically engaged Democratic respondents are, the less responsive they are to the treatments. This latter relationship is likely due to the more politically engaged respondents more likely being aware of their party's policy stance on photo ID laws (and thus having firmer pre-existing attitudes). Despite this caveat, the results generally show that, even in the absence of partisan cues, students are vulnerable to the professor's frames of photo ID laws regardless of their party ID.

That susceptibility is potentially further enhanced by the possibility of students self-selecting into politically homogeneous environments, such as a classroom in which the professor holds similar political opinions. Based on my findings, information on a professor's candidate preferences trumps other course considerations (effort and discussion sections). The second experiment's findings illustrate the potential for further sorting or polarization as students prefer politically homogeneous groups even within their courses. Admittedly, students often do not have information about the professor's political preferences before enrolling in their course. As such, while when such information is present we will see students self-select into courses, the resulting negative consequences of students' selection into courses may be tempered by the infrequency of students obtaining information necessary to do so. These findings do imply

though that, when possible, students will self-select into a learning environment that reinforces their preexisting political beliefs. If those students are then influenced by the professor's political frames, this could potentially lead to further polarization or sorting

These findings help us further understand the extent to which professors' political frames can influence students. That influence, which exists largely regardless of the student's party ID, implies that the information environment and how issues are presented do matter for students' political opinions. If political biases are present within a college course, students may be pushed further towards a polarized position, diminishing the opportunity to instill a comprehensive education that facilitates compromise between opposing opinions. Since professors can affect students' political opinions, it signals the importance of ensuring that political issues are discussed in a neutral manner within a class setting.

Within their study, Benedictis-Kessner, Baum, and Berinsky (2019) note the potential consequence of partisan self-selection into media sources, as acquiring partial information on a political debate may deny individuals the well-rounded information necessary to form well developed political opinions. My findings apply to Benedictis-Kessner et al.'s concerns, as obtaining partial information within an academic environment diminishes the value of education and withholds the impartial information necessary for students to establish well developed political opinions. Overall, my findings imply that students' susceptibility to professors' frames and their self-selection into university courses provide undesirable circumstances for the goal of improving cooperation within the future of American government.

## **Appendix. Survey Instrument**

You are invited to participate in a research study about political ideology and higher education being conducted by an undergraduate student and supervised by a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the UCR. Your participation in this study will help us understand what students think about politics within a university setting.

If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to complete one survey. The survey will take between 6-8 minutes of your time and will consist of answering survey questions. Upon successful completion of the survey, you will be able to enter a prize drawing to receive 1 of 8 \$40 Visa gift cards. All UCR students who are 18 years of age or older can be entered in the drawing regardless of participation. If you do not wish to participate but would like to be included in the drawing, please email me at <a href="mailto:Dshar007@ucr.edu">Dshar007@ucr.edu</a>.

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You must be 18 years of age or older to participate. You may decline to answer particular survey questions or choose to end your participation at any time without penalty. Confidentiality will be maintained at all times. At the end of the survey, you will be given the opportunity to provide your UCR email for the purpose of being entered into the prize drawing to receive 1 of 8 \$40 Visa gift cards. That information will be used solely for the purpose of awarding the gift cards, and the record of your UCR email will be deleted before any of your responses to the survey are examined, two weeks following submission of your responses. Therefore, your responses cannot be linked back to you in any way, which is why we would be unable to identify and delete your responses should you want to withdraw your data after the two-week period mentioned above. The data collected from this study will be stored on secure, password-protected computers.

This study should not include any risks or discomforts for you that you would not encounter in everyday life. There will be no direct benefit to you for participating in this study; however, we hope to learn more about your opinions on political ideology and University influence. For those interested, we will be posting reports and papers from the project to the following website: <a href="https://escholarship.org/uc/ucrhonors">https://escholarship.org/uc/ucrhonors</a>.

If you have any questions for the researcher, please contact Danielle Sharf, an undergraduate in the Department of Political Science, <a href="Dshar007@ucr.edu">Dshar007@ucr.edu</a>, or Dr. Daniel Biggers in the Department of Political Science, <a href="daniel.biggers@ucr.edu">daniel.biggers@ucr.edu</a>. If you have questions about your rights or complaints as a research subject, please contact the IRB Chairperson at (951) 827 - 4802 during business hours, or to contact them by email at <a href="irb@ucr.edu">irb@ucr.edu</a>.

#### **CONSENT**

[online] By clicking yes below, I agree to participate in the study.

YES

- 1) Are you 18 years of age or older?
  - a) Yes
  - b) No
- 2) What is your current class standing?
  - a) Freshman
  - b) Sophomore
  - c) Junior
  - d) Senior

Now we would like to ask you about several issues that have recently been in the news.

- 3) As you may know, President Donald Trump has proposed a policy to build a wall across the U.S. southern border. Supporters argue that the wall will lower the number of illegal immigrants and the amount of drugs entering into the U.S., while opponents argue that the wall is too expensive to build and will have minimal to no effect on the flow of illegal immigration and drugs into the U.S. What do you think? What is your opinion on this proposal?
  - a) [strongly support, somewhat support, slightly support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose]
- 4) As you may know, a number of states have recently legalized the use and possession of marijuana. Supporters see legalization as a sensible effort to reform failed drug policies, while opponents view it as misguided and fear that it will lead to the increased use among young people of other, more dangerous drugs. What do you think? What is your opinion on this decision?
  - a) [strongly support, somewhat support, slightly support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose]
- 5) As you may know, there has been a lot of talk recently about whether police officers should be required to wear body cameras that record all of their activities while on duty. Supporters claim this requirement will help hold police accountable for their conduct, while opponents assert it is too costly and unnecessary. What do you think? What is your opinion on this requirement?
  - a) [strongly support, somewhat support, slightly support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose]

[Note: Randomly assign subjects to either 6a, 6b, or 6c.]

6a. As you may know, a number of states have recently adopted photo ID policies that require a photo identification to vote. In case you are unfamiliar with this issue, here is how an incoming UCR professor recently characterized the debate in an op-ed:

"Supporters believe that photo ID laws are important to reduce voter fraud and protect the integrity of elections, while opponents fear that some eligible citizens without photo ID will not be able to vote and claim that concerns about voter fraud are exaggerated.

Despite the arguments of opponents, photo ID laws are in fact crucial to protect the

integrity of elections and have not actually been demonstrated to reduce eligible voter turnout."

What do you think? What is your opinion on this policy?

(a) [strongly support, somewhat support, slightly support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose]

6b. As you may know, a number of states have recently adopted photo ID policies that require a photo identification to vote. In case you are unfamiliar with this issue, here is how an incoming UCR professor recently characterized the debate in an op-ed:

"Supporters believe that photo ID laws are important to reduce voter fraud and protect the integrity of elections, while opponents fear that some eligible citizens without photo ID will not be able to vote and claim that concerns about voter fraud are exaggerated.

Despite the arguments of supporters, photo ID laws are not, in fact, crucial to protect the integrity of elections and have actually been demonstrated to reduce eligible voter turnout."

What do you think? What is your opinion on this policy?

(a) [strongly support, somewhat support, slightly support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose]
6c. As you may know, a number of states have recently adopted photo ID policies that require a photo identification to vote. In case you are unfamiliar with this issue, here is how an incoming UCR professor recently characterized the debate in an op-ed:

"Supporters believe that photo ID laws are important to reduce voter fraud and protect the integrity of elections, while opponents fear that some eligible citizens without photo ID will not be able to vote and claim that concerns about voter fraud are exaggerated."

What do you think? What is your opinion on this policy?

(a) [strongly support, somewhat support, slightly support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose]

Now we would like to ask you about your interest in political science classes being offered at UCR...

[Note: Randomly assign 1 version of text in brackets for discussion/no discussion and maximum/minimum effort. Also, randomly assign the second to last sentence (In the comments,..." to (1) reference Trump, (2) reference Clinton, or (3) not appear at all.]

7. In the Spring of 2020, UCR will be offering an upper-division Presidential Politics course (POSC101) [S with a discussion section / no discussion section]. The course analyzes modern presidential leadership and power. Topics include the institutional presidency, presidential selection, and the presidency's relationships with the bureaucracy, Congress,

interest groups, the press, and the public. Also covered is what makes presidents popular and what determines the effectiveness of presidential leadership. The professor offering this course last taught it two years ago and, based on his iEval comments, a large number of students expressed an expectation of getting a high grade in the class and noted that they put in [maximum effort/ minimum effort]. In the comments, several students also flagged that the professor would regularly discuss his admiration for [Trump's / Clinton's] proposed policies during their 2016 presidential election campaign. How interested would you be in taking this course?

a. [extremely interested, somewhat interested, slightly interested, neither interested or disinterested, slightly disinterested, somewhat disinterested, extremely disinterested]

# We're almost done. We just have a few more questions to ask.

- 8. Are you...?
  - a. Male
  - b. Female
  - c. Transgender male
  - d. Transgender female
  - e. Genderqueer
  - f. Gender non-conforming
  - g. Different identity
- 9. What racial or ethnic group best describes you?
  - a. White
  - b. Black or African-American
  - c. Hispanic or Latino
  - d. Asian or Asian-American
  - e. Native American
  - f. Middle Eastern
  - g. Mixed Race
  - h. Other (open) \_\_\_\_\_
- 10. Some people seem to follow what is going on in government and public affairs, whether there is an election going on or not. Others are not that interested. Would you say you follow what is going on in government and public affairs ...
  - a. Most of the time
  - b. Some of the time
  - c. Only now and then
  - d. Hardly at all
  - e. Don't know
- 11. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, something else, or are you not sure?
  - a. Democrat
  - b. Republican
  - c. Independent
  - d. Other
  - e. Not sure

- i. [If Democrat] Would you call yourself a Strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? Strong Democrat / Not very strong Democrat
- ii. [If Republican] Would you call yourself a Strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? Strong Republican/ Not very strong Republican
- iii. [If Independent] Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or neither? Democratic Party / Republican Party / Neither

#### Thank you for your time and participation

In the survey you just took, we asked about your support for photo ID laws after giving you a selection of an op-ed written by an incoming UCR professor. That selection was not in fact taken from an op-ed and was, instead, written by the researcher. The use of this deception was necessary in order for us to assess how people's attitudes towards political issues are affected by the views of their professors.

In addition, we asked you about your interest in taking a Political Science class offered in Spring quarter 2020, based in part on how previous students have evaluated the Professor and the course. That information was created by the researcher and did not, in fact, come from previous course evaluations. The use of this deception was necessary in order to study what factors influence the decision to take a course.

If you would like to have your responses withdrawn from the study, please contact the researcher, Danielle Sharf, at Dshar007@ucr.edu within two weeks following the submission of your responses. Failure to email the researcher by the two-week mark following submission of your responses will result in the researcher's inability to have your responses withdrawn. Your request to delete your responses to the survey will not affect your opportunity to win the gift card drawing should you choose to participate in it. However, you do need to enter your email address on the next screen in order for us to be able to identify your responses and thus delete them.

On the next page, you will be given the opportunity to provide your UCR email for the purpose of being entered into the prize drawing to receive 1 of 10 \$40 Visa gift cards. That information will be used solely for the purpose of awarding the gift cards, and the record of your UCR email will be deleted before any of your responses to the survey are examined. Therefore, your responses cannot be linked back to you in any way, which is why we would be unable to identify and delete your responses should you want to withdraw your data after the two-week period mentioned above. As mentioned at the beginning of the survey, the data collected from this study will be stored on secure, password-protected computers.

If you have any questions for the researchers, please contact Danielle Sharf, <a href="Dshar007@ucr.edu">Dshar007@ucr.edu</a>, or Dr. Daniel Biggers in the Department of Political Science, daniel.biggers@ucr.edu. If you have questions about your rights or complaints as a research subject, please contact the IRB Chairperson at (951) 827 - 4802 during business hours, or to contact them by email at irb@ucr.edu.

If you would like to be entered into the prize drawings please provide your complete UCR email address in the box below. As mentioned at the beginning of the survey, your email address will be used solely for the prize drawings of the gift card and will be deleted from your responses before they are examined.

[*Text box*]

#### **Appendix. Recruitment Script**

Chance to win 1 of 8 \$40 Visa Gift Cards – Higher Education and Students Political Ideologies Dear Students.

Please take a few minutes to complete this important survey.

By filling out this survey, you will be entered into a prize drawing to receive 1 of 8 \$40 VISA gift cards. A fellow UCR undergraduate student is conducting an academic survey about political policy preferences and current events. The survey takes between 6-8 minutes and consists of answering survey questions.

The data collected from this survey could help bring insight and support to the UCR undergraduate student population, and may help expand our understanding of what a UCR undergraduate education means.

Participation in the study is strictly anonymous. All responses are treated as confidential, and in no case will responses from individual participants be identified. You must be 18 years of age or older to participate. You will be entered into a prize drawing and given the opportunity to receive 1 of 8 \$40 VISA gift cards. All UCR students who are 18 years of age or older can be entered in the drawing regardless of participation. If you do not wish to participate but would like to be included in the drawing, please email me at <a href="mailto:Dshar007@ucr.edu">Dshar007@ucr.edu</a>.

Select the link below to complete the survey. At the end of the survey, you will have the opportunity to enter your email for the prize drawing.

LINK WILL BE INSERTED

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