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IRVINE

Who's in My Bed: Strange Bedfellows in the American pro-Israel Movement

DISSERTATION

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for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Sociology

by

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DEDICATION

I know this is for Dylan, but that's as far as I got.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Who's in My Bed: Strange Bedfellows in the American pro-Israel Movement

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Coalitions and collaborations can improve organizations' chances of affecting political change. However, competition for resources, incongruent collective identities, ideological disputes, incompatible organizational structures, and interpersonal conflict often prevent social movement organizations from working together. This dissertation explores how social movement organizations overcome these traditional barriers and come together to form coalitions and maintain alliances. I used both qualitative and quantitative methods to understand how the American pro-Israel movement has formed and maintained coalitions among diverse groups with contrasting religious and political values. Advanced statistical analyses of an original dataset of 968 national American Jewish organizations coupled with comparative historical analysis of American Evangelical and Jewish support for Israel highlighted how social movement organizations can overcome traditional barriers that frequently limit inter-organizational alliances. I found that that despite numerous barriers, coalitions and alliances can be formed and maintained when situated in an amenable context, they have appropriate access to resources, and organizational leaders act as brokers and organizational entrepreneurs. Changes to the broader political and national context enabled coalition formation and growth by both increasing the

incentives for individual organizations and changing the structure of the organizational field to create new opportunities for alliances. Sufficient access to monetary and organizational resources encouraged groups to overcome traditional barriers, like competition and ideological disputes. The deliberate choices of various organizations leaders to capitalize on opportunities and skillfully deploy resources facilitated the growth and maintenance of a vast network of inter-organizational collaborations among Jewish organizations. Furthermore, organizational entrepreneurs and brokers helped facilitate collaborations between adversarial organizations. I integrated specialized knowledge from Jewish Studies, Political Science, and Sociology to advance our understanding of organizational processes and political advocacy. This dissertation expands our current sociological understanding of social movement coalitions and collaborations, especially underdeveloped theories of adversarial collaborative movements.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Social movement coalitions are an important means to advocate for political change. Coalitions and alliances can improve individual organizations' range and access to resources, legitimate grievances, and increase the political influence of member groups (Obach 2010; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010; Gamson 1961; McCammon and Campbell 2002). However, coalitions and inter-organizational alliances are often difficult to form because organizations risk their autonomy and reputation when they partner with others (Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Clemens 1993; Meyer and Imig 1993) and organizations may have to sacrifice precious resources for the sake of an alliance (Meyer and Imig 1993). Furthermore, coalitions frequently fragment as a result of conflicting ideologies, disputes over strategies, incompatible organizational structures, and interpersonal arguments amongst organizational leaders (Cornfield and McCammon 2010:80; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003; Maney 2000; Lichterman 1995; Roth 2008). *How do organizations come together to form coalitions and maintain unity?*

The American pro-Israel movement provides an excellent opportunity for understanding how coalitions are formed and maintained among both ideologically similar and disparate organizations. The American pro-Israel movement has developed and maintained diverse alliances within and beyond the American Jewish community. I use the term "American pro-Israel movement" (APIM) to refer to the diverse set of organizations in the U.S. who actively support Israel through political advocacy, educational campaigns, and material support. The American pro-Israel movement is a highly organized movement with a vast network of alliances within and across interest sectors. In his in-depth analysis of organized Jewry, Daniel Elazar (1997) argued that one of the American Jewish community's strength is its organizational

capacity. Others have suggested that the Jewish community's united front has enabled them to successfully advocate for various national policies (Goldberg 1990; Chanes 2001; Ambrosio 2003; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Grossman 2012). In his study of U.S. interest group politics, Grossman (2012:68) attributes Jewish interest groups' success in advocating on behalf of Israel to their, "...group-level social capital, especially Jewish social networks and organizations." The APIM extends beyond the American Jewish community and includes strange bedfellow alliances with Evangelical Christians. American Jews and Evangelical Christians openly collaborate in support of Israel despite incompatible ideologies and incongruent collective identities.

This dissertation empirically examines how the APIM has created and maintained formal, enduring coalitions and persistent alliances within the American Jewish community and between Jewish and Evangelical Christians organizations. Though political science and Jewish studies scholars have examined American support for Israel, research on this topic lacks a sociological perspective. In their examination on the extent of news media coverage of various social movement families, Amenta, Caren, and Olasky (2009:641) note the lack of sociological research on this topic, "Jewish civil rights and civil liberties families place in the top 10, none have received extensive scholarly attention." Using both a quantitative and qualitative analysis, I examine how coalitions are formed and maintained among American pro-Israel groups.

I begin my analysis by examining the formation and growth of formal, enduring coalitions created and maintained by Jewish pro-Israel groups over the course of 60 years. Then I explore the emergence of informal alliances between Jewish and Evangelical organizations. I argue that organized American Jewry has worked hard to create and maintain the perception of a united front. The American Jewish community is credited with presenting a unified front on a range of political issues. But few acknowledge that American Jewish organizations work

furiously behind the scenes to maintain the perception of unity. Since the 1920s, the American Jewish community has developed and maintained alliances despite an increasingly fragmented community that possess a range of conflicting ideas about domestic policies, foreign policy, and Israel. My quantitative analysis of formal coalitions among Jewish organizations revealed a diverse community of organizations which compete for resources. My comparative-historical analysis of Jewish-Evangelical alliances explains how fracturing support within the American Jewish community provided an opportunity for the emergence of an adversarial collaboration between Jews and Evangelicals. This strange bedfellow alliance was further facilitated by new political opportunities in both Israel and the U.S., organizational entrepreneurs, brokers, and the creation of codes of conducts.

This dissertation is both substantively relevant and also advances our understanding of sociological theory. American support for Israel has been studied by a range of scholars from a variety of fields. Despite an expansive literature covering both American Jewish and non-Jewish support for Israel, few have studied this topic from a sociological perspective (for exception see Elazar 1997; Lainer-Vos 2012; Grossman 2012; Goldberg 1990; Halperin 1985; Mearshimer and Walt 2007; Sasson 2014). Much of the literature on American support for Israel is composed of detailed case histories or articles that rely on anecdotal evidence. This project empirically explores the development and maintenance of pro-Israel coalitions using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The extensive network of formal pro-Israel coalitions offers a unique advantage to understanding how groups form and maintain alliances.

In the next section, I provide a historical overview of American support for Israel. After briefly situating my case, the American pro-Israel movement (APIM), within the broader sociological literature, I discuss current theoretical perspectives used to understand social

movement organizations and coalitions. Finally, I outline the remaining chapters of the dissertation.

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PRO-ISRAEL MOVEMENT

American support for Israel arose from Zionism, a nationalist movement predominantly focused on the mass migration of Jews to Palestine and the establishment of political sovereignty. Zionism is defined as, "...a movement seeking to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law" (Engel 2009:1).

Early Zionism

The modern political Zionist movement was formally established in August 1897 when over two hundred Jews met in Basel to form the World Zionist Congress and the Zionist Organization (ZO). This burgeoning political movement was dominated by secular, socialist Jews in Europe who sought to create an entirely self-sufficient nation based on the Utopian writings of Theodor Hershel.

Much of the American Jewish community's support for Zionism and, subsequently, Israel did not emerge until after the First World War. Despite early attempts to mobilize political and monetary support, American Zionists represented only a small minority of American Jews until much later (Cohen 1975). One of the first American Zionist organizations, Federation of American Zionist (FAZ), had less than 15,000 members in 1914 (Cohen 1975:8-9). FAZ membership represented less than 1% of the nearly three million Jews living in the U.S. at that time. During these earlier years, American Jewish support was limited "...to a relatively small handful of zealots..." (Halperin 1985:11).

Several factors hampered American Jewish support for the Zionist movement. First, American Jews were content to remain U.S. citizens and did not have any interest in emigration

(Lainer-Vos 2012). The Zionist movement encouraged all Jews to immigrate to Israel. American Jews were happy in the U.S. and had no interest in leaving their new homeland. Second, American Jews were worried that their support for the Zionist movement would call into question their loyalty to the U.S. At the time, American Jews represented an immigrant community attempting to assimilate. Supporting a movement that sought to create a new Jewish nation-state called into question their commitment and loyalty to the U.S. Jews worried that supporting Zionism would be construed as un-American and would alienate them from American society. Though some American Jews supported the Zionist movement, the broader American Jewish community mobilized later than European Jews.

The emergence of prominent American Jewish leaders who supported Zionism, along with worsening conditions for Jews in Europe and Russia, helped mobilize U.S. support for the Zionist movement. The Jewish leader Louis Dembitz Brandeis, who served as a Supreme Court Justice and a trusted adviser to Woodrow Wilson, is credited with mobilizing greater support for Zionism during World War I (Halperin 1985). He helped build an infrastructure for American Zionists, provided access to valuable political opportunities, and proved that Zionism did not threaten Jews' standing in American society. Brandeis planted the seeds of Zionism, even among acculturated American Jews, by promoting a predominantly philanthropic movement (Cohen 1975). Instead of focusing on the ingathering of Jews in Palestine, Brandeis framed the movement's aims as rescuing and resettling persecuted European Jews. This new frame meant that American Jews could support the Zionist cause without feeling pressure to emigrate or undermine their loyalty to the U.S. The American Jewish community eventually became one of the most important benefactors of the Zionist movement (Elazar 1997; Lainer-Vos 2012; Sasson 2014).

Between World War I and the establishment of the state of Israel, the American Zionist movement grew in spite of factionalism within the Jewish community and economic hardships associated with the Great Depression. Growing anti-Semitism and worsening conditions in Europe mobilized an unprecedented number of American Jews. The Zionist Organization of American (ZOA) grew from 18,031 members in 1929 to 250,000 members in 1948 (Halperin 1985). Leading up to Israel's independence in 1948, the American Jewish community was one of Israel's biggest financial supporters. The ZOA was only able to raise \$2 million for Palestine in 1929 but gave Israel nearly \$100 million in 1948 (Halperin 1985).

American Zionists' political efforts were crucial to Israel's formation and independence. The American Jewish Conference of 1943 successfully unified major American Jewish organizations, whose progress has been stymied by in-fighting and factionalism (Halperin 1961). In a vote of 480 to 4 on the Palestine Resolution of the American Jewish Conference, organized American Jewry agreed on shared purpose and a set of short-term goals. The Palestine Resolution called for "...the fulfillment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration and ... to found there a Jewish Commonwealth. The Conference affirms its unalterable rejection of the White Paper of May 1939...The Conference urges that ... Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world." (Jewish Virtual Library 2013). The Palestine Resolution was not universally adopted by every American Jewish organization, nor did it represent the views and opinions of the entire American Jewish community. However, it was an unprecedented display of organizational unity. The American Jewish Conference of 1943 revealed the strength of these organizations and their ability to overcome fragmentation in order to form united front.

Coalitions were an essential part of American Zionists' fund-raising efforts. The money raised in the U.S. was used to resettle Jewish refugees, secure more immigrant visas, buy land in Palestine, purchase weapons, and build an initial infrastructure in the region. At the start of World War II, two organizations were primarily responsible for collecting donations in the United States (Elazar 1997; Lainer-Vos 2012). The American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) aided Jewish refugees around the world, especially in Europe. The United Palestine Appeal (UPA) focused exclusively on supporting Zionists in Palestine. As the conditions in Europe deteriorated, significantly more money was needed to help alleviate suffering and to free Jews from persecution.

In 1939, these two organizations formed a coalition to reduce the cost of campaigning and to secure more resources for Jews in need. With the help of the National Refugee Service (NRS), which served the needs of Jewish refugees within U.S. borders, these organizations formed a coalition. United Jewish Appeal for Refugees and Overseas Needs (UJA) represented a formal alliance among these three organizations (Elazar 1997; Lainer-Vos 2012). In order to solicit donations from Jews across the U.S., the newly formed coalition worked with two preexisting confederations that served local communities' needs through social services and educational programs. In its first year, the coalition nearly doubled its donations. In 1938, the three independent organizations collected a combined total of nearly \$7 million. By 1939, the UJA coalition was able to raise over \$13 million (Lainer-Vos 2012).

Inter-organizational alliances are an import characteristic of organized American Jewry (Elazar 1997). While coalitions and alliances are still a key feature, organized Jewry has changed in the past 60 years (Elazar 1997:296). Political and cultural shifts both at home, in the U.S., and in Israel have substantially changed the way American Jews relate to Israel (Sasson 2014).

Setting the Tone and Solidifying Support for Israel

Israel's independence and a major war in 1967 set the tone for early American Jewish support for Israel. In 1948, the American and Israeli Jewish communities had to negotiate the role diasporic Jews would play in Israeli nation-building efforts. Then, the Six Day War in 1967 encouraged American Jewish organizations to reevaluate their organizational structure to better respond to sudden threats. These events set the tone for how organized American Jewry would support Israel and led to the emergence of a new subset of organizations designed to advocate on behalf of Israel.

In 1948, Israel was established as an independent nation-state. This was considered a major victory for the Zionist movement. Having realized its primary goal, the Zionist movement had to re-evaluate its role, which created some tensions between American Jews and those settled in Israel. Israelis were trying to fully realize their goal of building a self-sustaining nation based on the socialist ideals first discussed in the 1800s. Those living in Israel saw themselves as pioneers. Though these new pioneers aspired to build a completely independent Israel, as a new nation they were still reliant on American Jews' financial support.

Victories of World War II and the establishment of the State of Israel emboldened American Jews. Unlike the period leading up to World War I, American Jews were not nearly as worried about seeming un-American because of their support for Zionism and Israel (Lainer-Vos 2012). Some American Jews immigrated to Israel, but most still had no interest in leaving the U.S. (Lainer-Vos 2012). Though many American Zionists wanted to remain U.S. citizens, they still saw themselves as fellow pioneers working to develop the newly established state of Israel. As partners in this new endeavor, American Jewish donors wanted a say in how their donations to Israel were spent. Those living in Israel disagreed.

The American Jewish community and Israel had to negotiate this complex position. American Jews felt like they were equals and wanted to connect with the Zionist project, but did not want to immigrate to Israel. Israel heavily relied on the American Jewish community's financial support, but did not view them as equal partners in building a new nation. By in large, Israelis felt that they were the true pioneers making the sacrifice to work on building this new country. Though Israel continued to rely on monetary and political support from the American Jewish community, Israeli pioneers viewed themselves as self-reliant and independent. The creation of State of Israel Bonds allowed these two communities to negotiate this ideological tension.

American Jews felt connected to Israel and were valued as an important part of its early nation-building efforts. Meanwhile, the Israeli community had sovereign control over how American contributions were spent and the policies they created as an independent democratic State. This compromise resulted in what I refer to as the "deferential position." Israel is viewed as an independent State that has the sovereignty to determine its own policies. The American Jewish community's duty is to support Israel in whatever decisions the democratically elected government may make. Deferential American pro-Israel groups do not believe that they are in a position to criticize, provoke dissent, or offend Israel.

The founding of Israel (1948) and the Six Day War (1967) were watershed events that not only solidified the American Jewish community's deferential support for Israel, but they also changed organized Jewry. First, a new sphere of American Jewish organizations emerged to support Israel (Elazar 1997). The rise of the American Zionist movement in the early 1900s altered the organizational landscape. In his extensive review of organized American Jewry, Daniel Elazar (1997) described five central categories, or "organizational spheres." The

community relations sphere represented the political arm of organized American Jewry and was initially developed to protect Jewish rights and combat anti-Semitism. The communal welfare sphere was primarily concerned with providing social services and welfare to Jews in the U.S. and around the world. In response to the growing Zionist movement and the Jewish refugee crisis, many organizations in these two spheres shifted their attention. Community relations organizations became increasingly focused on advocating for the creation of a Jewish state. Communal welfare organizations became key fundraisers for the Zionist movement and provided services for the relief and resettlement of Jewish refugees immigrating to both the U.S. and Israel. Once Israel was established and the primary goal of the Zionist movement had been realized, American Jews' interest in Israel and the Zionist movement began to wane. Many of the community relations and communal welfare organizations began shifting their attention to back to domestic issues and other causes that had been deprioritized. As a result, smaller organizations that were solely dedicated to Israel began to emerge.

The Six-Day-War (1967) was a watershed event that made Israel a salient issue among national Jewish organizations. Between Israel's independence and the Six Day War, ideological disputes amongst Jews over domestic issues such as affirmative action began to fragment community relations organizations. As a result, membership declined in traditional community relations agencies that broadly represented the political interests of American Jews. Instead, individuals began seeking out more specialized, single-interest groups that focused on their specific concerns. The smaller, pro-Israel political advocacy organizations began to attract more supporters as community relations organizations became increasingly fragmented. The Six Day War represented a major threat that mobilized massive support from the American Jewish community. The amount of funds raised by the Jewish Federation, which was one of the primary

fundraising bodies for the APIM, more than doubled in 1967 (Elazar 1997). In response to this massive outpouring of support, the nascent pro-Israel sphere of organizations grew rapidly.

The American pro-Israel sphere is considered, "...the best organized and best integrated of all the spheres" (Elazar 1997:303). This sphere is composed of both fundraising and advocacy groups that often coordinate and cooperate to provide support for Israel. American pro-Israel groups are engaged in a range of activities beyond fundraising and political advocacy. These groups also seek to foster a bond between American Jews and Israelis through a range of programs such as group trips to Israel and pro-Israel rallies. They have developed teaching material and courses to encourage American Jews' interest in Israel. American pro-Israel groups work closely with communal welfare, educational, and religious organizations to engage community members in pro-Israel activities. These groups regularly provide Jewish leaders, politicians, and community members with the latest news on Israel.

The pro-Israel groups that had emerged in the 1950s, were further developed in the 1960s and 70s. The prevailing norm was for these organizations in the pro-Israel sphere to provide deferential, unquestioning support for Israel. As with any organizational field, individuals and groups often disagreed and bickered about specific Israeli policies and actions. However, the status quo was to present a unified front when speaking with political elite, the press, and other outsiders. By advocating deferential and unquestioning support for Israel, the American Jewish community appeared to speak with one voice when discussing foreign policy and advocating on behalf of Israel.

Rise of Evangelical Support for Israel

While American Jewish support for Israel is rooted in the early Zionist movement, Evangelical Christians' political support for Israel began gaining momentum in the U.S. in the

1970s and 1980s. Evangelical Christian support for Israel is largely based on a religious movement known as premillennial dispensationalism. Dispensationalists are not confined to a specific church or denomination. Rather, these beliefs are shared by a larger community of Evangelical Christians.

Widespread political support for Israel among Evangelical Christians began to gain momentum in the 1980s with the politicization of the New Christian Right. Organizations, such as Christian Voice, the Roundtable, and the Moral Majority emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Guth 1983). Founded by Evangelical clergyman and televangelists, these early political organizations sought to mobilize conservative Christians. Of all the New Christian Right organizations in the early 1980s, the Moral Majority was one of the most successful at mobilizing Evangelical Christians in the U.S. (Liebman 1982).

One difficulty often associated with studying conservative Christians' political mobilization is identifying the appropriate terms and operationalizations to characterize this population (Carenen 2012). For simplicity, I use Hunter's (1981) definitions and operationalizations, which are based on theological tenets rather than self-reporting or denominational affiliation. There are three core theological beliefs that unite all Evangelicals: the Bible is infallible, Jesus Christ is divine, and salvation can only be achieved through faith in Jesus Christ (Hunter 1981:368-369). Some scholars studying Evangelical support for Israel believe that proselytization is another defining characteristic of Evangelicalism (Lipset and Raab 1981; Spector 2009). For the purpose of this project, I use Evangelicals and Fundamentalists interchangeably to refer to conservative Christians who adhere to these four theological tenets.

This overview of the APIM raises questions about social movement coalitions and collaborations. How has organized American Jewry perpetuated the perception of a united front

despite internal disagreements? How does the increasingly fragmented American Jewish community continue to create and maintain formal coalitions? How did Jewish and Evangelicals come together to provide political, material, and moral support for Israel? These questions are not only substantively interesting, but also speak to broader social movement processes.

BEYOND THE AMERICAN PRO-ISRAEL MOVEMENT

Despite ideological differences, both American Jews and Evangelical Christians work together to secure political and material support for Israel. The APIM is not the only strange bedfellow alliance advocating for political change. A growing body of social movements literature on coalitions and inter-organizational collaborations has begun exploring such alliances. This dissertation builds on the existing social movement literature by expanding our understanding of how coalitions are formed and maintained among ideologically diverse organizations. The APIM is an excellent case for exploring social movement theories about collaborations and coalitions.

First, the American Jewish organizations that make up one part of the APIM, are highly organized and actively participate in formal, enduring coalitions. The historical overview above echoes findings from previous research which has noted that the American Jewish community is highly organized (Elazar 1997; Grossman 2012). While other social movement organizations struggle to develop and sustain coalitions, American pro-Israel groups have developed an extensive, “...system of negotiated sharing...a network of agreements dividing the funds or campaign arenas or both” (Elazar 1997:303). This dissertation expands on social movement theories about formal coalition growth by exploring the development of formal coalitions among Jewish pro-Israel organizations.

Second, the APIM has not only developed an extensive set of formal coalitions within the Jewish community, but they have also expanded to develop unexpected alliances with disparate partners, such as Evangelical Christian organizations. Evangelical Christian organizations began allying with Jewish pro-Israel groups in the 1980 and 1990s, providing insight into the emergence and maintenance of strange bedfellow alliances. The Six Day War ignited a new wave of Evangelical and fundamentalist interest in Israel (Carenen 2012). The sight of Jews praying at the Western Wall and Israel's impressive military victory was recognized by some Evangelical Christians as a sign of the End of Days. While many Evangelical organizations were reaching out to Israel, some church groups tried connecting with the American Jewish community. Shortly after the Six Day War, Jews were invited to attend "Adventures in Understanding," a dinner sponsored by Evangelical congregations aimed at offering their friendship and support to their Jewish friends (Carenen 2012:144). American Jewish organizations cautiously reached out to Evangelical Christian organizations as well. In 1975, the director of the American Jewish Archives reached out to Bible Light Ministries, a prominent Evangelical organization, asking if they would like to add their publications to the Jewish archival collection. While there is evidence over the years of Jewish and Evangelical groups working together, it is unclear when and how these two seemingly disparate partners began forming formal partnerships in order to provide political and monetary support for Israel. This dissertation explores the development of this adversarial collaboration between Jewish and Evangelical Christian pro-Israel groups.

My analysis of the American pro-Israel movement is rooted in the social movements literature. Previous research on social movement coalitions provides a strong foundation for understanding how organizations set aside their ideological differences and come together to

form alliances and coalitions. Only recently have scholars begun exploring how ideologically opposed social movement organizations with incongruent collective identities collaborate (Whittier 2014). In the next section, I briefly review the current literature on social movement coalitions.

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

Zald and Ash (1966) provide an excellent definition that distinguishes coalitions from simple, inter-group interactions or complete organizational mergers. Coalitions (1) pool resources, (2) coordinate plans, and (3) maintain distinct organizational identities (Zald and Ash 1966:335). This distinguishes coalitions from simple, inter-group interactions because it requires member groups to contribute some amount of resources to a common purpose. Coalitions are different from mergers because member groups continue to maintain distinct organizational identities. Following from this definition, Levi and Murphy (2006) propose that coalitions exist on a spectrum: these organizational ties can range from event to enduring coalitions. Event coalitions are short-term agreements between groups that involve coordinating the time, place, and tactical repertoire for a particular action. Enduring coalitions are formally structured alliances that require long-term commitments from member groups. These types of coalitions usually possess founding documents, establish rules for electing leaders and introducing new members, and pool a substantial amount of resources.

According to Whittier (2014), interactions between various organizations also vary according to the degree that two or more organizations have congruent collective identity or similar ideologies. Strange bedfellow alliances, like those in the anti-Hate Crime and anti-pornography campaigns, are termed “collaborative adversarial movements”. Collaborative adversarial movements are composed of organizations that (1) interact toward a shared goal, yet

(2) possess either opposed ideologies or incongruent collective identities (Whittier 2014). Such adversarial organizations with opposed ideologies and incongruent collective identities are different from groups that merely have dissimilar goals but are located in the same or similar interest sectors.

Political groups face risks and advantages when they consider joining coalitions. On one hand, coalitions are linked with a greater chance of movement success (Gamson 1990; Hathaway and Meyer 1993-1994). They can improve the range of and access to resources, increase the visibility of a movement, legitimate grievances, and increase the political influence of member groups (Staggenborg 1986; Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005). Joining together and pooling resources, through a formal alliance, can improve a movement's visibility and increase the chances of affecting political change.

On the other hand, joining a coalition can be risky for individual organizations. Cooperation requires groups to sacrifice some elements or a degree of their autonomy. Disputes between member groups over strategy, ideology, and tactics can fragment a successful coalition. The resources required to maintain coalitions, such as money to pay staff and office space, can strain participating social movement organizations (SMOs) (Meyer and Imig 1993). While focusing on maintaining a coalition, individual groups aren't as salient, which can demobilize grassroots members and lead to loss of resources (Rohlinger 2002). Forming associations with some groups can damage or even destroy existing ties that SMOs have worked hard to cultivate within their community, among other organizations, or with political elites (Clemens 1993; Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005). Coalitions consume resources, can compromise a particular group's identity, and could damage pre-existing relationships with other groups or individuals.

The current literature divides those factors affecting coalition formation and maintenance into exogenous and endogenous variables (Staggenborg 1986; Hathaway and Meyer 1993-1994; McCammon and Campbell 2002). Threats, opportunities, and political structures are commonly considered external to the movement, or exogenous factors, that can affect the chances of forming and maintaining a formal coalition. Endogenous or internal factors refers to the relationships between individuals or groups within a coalition or organizational field. Despite this dichotomy, there is a clear interplay between these factors. I build on these theories throughout the dissertation.

SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION CHAPTERS

How do coalitions and alliances come together and maintain unity? To answer this question, I explore formal coalitions and informal alliances formed among American pro-Israel groups between 1945 and 2005. I examine both the exogenous, environmental factors as well as the endogenous, organizational factors that influence how and when organizations will collaborate as well as how they maintain collaborations and a sense of unity despite ideological differences. I investigate how formal coalitions are formed and maintained among Jewish organizations as well as the emergence of informal alliances between Jewish and Evangelical groups. I employ both a quantitative and qualitative analysis to gain a better understanding of when and how social movement organizations overcome traditional barriers to collaboration and join together in order to advocate on behalf of a shared grievance. I begin by surveying coalitions formed between Jewish organizations, located within the same interest sector. Then, I explore the emergence of alliances between Jewish and Evangelical organizations that possess oppositional ideologies and incongruent collective identities.

Chapter two deconstructs exogenous factors to understand how they drive the growth of formal coalitions. I present an advanced regression analysis of membership rates in a formal Jewish pro-Israel coalition between 1965 and 1990. Building on previous research, which has found a strong link between threats and coalition growth, I argue that this relationship is primarily driven by two underlying mechanisms. I show that threats increase coalition growth because these salient events increase access to available resources and create a common enemy that unites individual organizations. I further argue that social movements experience various types of threats which can produce a range of results.

In chapter 3, I shift my attention to endogenous factors that influence which organizations will become members of formal, enduring coalitions. Using an event-history analysis of membership in a formal Jewish pro-Israel coalition, I identify organizational characteristics that increase the likelihood of joining a coalition. My results suggest that an organization's influence, structure, and strategy are important characteristics which explain why some groups are more likely to participate in formal coalitions.

I employ a comparative historical analysis in chapter 4 to understand how organizations located in different sectors overcame ideological barriers and worked together to advocate on behalf of Israel. My analysis of archival documents and previous research demonstrates that American Jewish and Evangelical organizations constitute two parts of a broader movement which seek to secure political, financial, and moral support for Israel. These two communities constitute adversarial collaborations because they openly interact in support of Israel. Yet, they possess incongruent collective identities and oppositional ideologies. I argue that changes in the political opportunity structure and shifts in the organizational field allowed for the emergence of such collaborations. Furthermore, the work of organizational entrepreneurs, mediation efforts of

brokers, and the establishment of codes of conduct helped manage inter-organizational collaborations and minimize disputes between these ideologically disparate communities. I highlight how changes to a political structure coupled with the concerted effort of social movement actors can create new, unexpected alliances in order to advocate for political change.

In my concluding chapter, I provide a short summary of my main findings and discuss the implications of my dissertation. I highlight how my dissertation speaks to research carried out not only in sociology but also political science and Jewish studies. I also suggest possible directions for future research that can advance our collective understanding of organizational processes and political advocacy.

CHAPTER 2: THREATS, RESOURCES, AND COALITION GROWTH IN THE PRO-ISRAEL MOVEMENT

The relationship between coalition growth and threats is well documented by social movement scholars; increased threats generally lead to coalition growth (Staggenborg 1986; Hathaway and Meyer 1993-1994; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). However, the underlying mechanisms that drive this relationship remain unclear. Previous research offers two possible explanations. Threats can make an issue more salient, increasing organizations' access to members and resources. As membership levels and available resources increase in response to exogenous factors, so too will organizational membership in coalitions (Staggenborg 1986; Hathaway and Meyer 1993-1994). Additionally, imminent threats and new opportunities can encourage social movement organizations to overcome ideological differences, facilitating coalition work (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Thus, a more diverse set of organizations become involved in coalitions when there is a perceived threat.

Despite evidence of these mechanisms' potential importance presented in case studies, it is still unclear how much they explain the effect of threats on coalition growth. Part of this confusion might stem from differing definitions of "threats" in the coalitions literature. To address this gap in the literature, I analyze various types of threats and their effect on coalition growth among American pro-Israel groups between 1965 and 1990. I employed an advanced regression analysis to determine the extent to which various mechanisms explain the robust relationship between threats and coalition growth. I found that both increased access to resources and uniting around common enemy contribute to coalition growth during a threat. Furthermore, I

found that different types of threats have varying effects on coalition growth, emphasizing the need for better definitions of threats.

In the next section, I identify theoretical approaches to understanding coalition growth, discussing how my study builds on previous research. Following a brief background on American Jewish support for Israel, I discuss my methods and results. In the conclusion, I discuss the relevance of these results for understanding coalition growth, considering the role of exogenous factors and the relevance of organizational theories in social movement research.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In chapter 1, I provided a definition of coalitions and discussed how they vary based on the duration and degree of commitment required from members. In this chapter, I focus on formal, enduring coalitions. These types of coalitions are long-term and tend to have professional staff, founding papers, and routines for accepting new members.

Political groups face risks and advantages when they consider joining coalitions. On the one hand, coalitions are linked to a greater chance of movement success (Staggenborg 1986; Gamson 1990; Hathaway and Meyer 1993-1994; Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005). Joining together and sharing resources through a formal alliance can improve a movement's visibility and increase the chances of affecting political change. On the other hand, joining a coalition can be risky for individual organizations (Clemens 1993; Meyer and Imig 1993; Rohlinger 2002; Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005). Coalitions consume resources, can compromise a particular group's identity, and could damage pre-existing relationships between member organizations and other groups or individuals. At times, the risks and barriers associated with joining a coalition are minimized, making coalitions an attractive option for individual organizations.

Coalition Growth in Response to Threats

An extensive social movements literature suggests that resourceful, organized groups can mobilize greater support when they experience a threat or crisis. Expanding upon this literature, social movement scholars have found that coalitions tend to grow in response to threats (Staggenborg 1986; Hathaway and Meyer 1993-1994; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Previous research on social movement coalitions provides two possible explanations for the robust relationship between threats and coalition growth.

First, increased resources that come during times of threat negate the negative effects of coalition membership. Social movement organizations have limited access to resources (Gamson 1961; McCarthy and Zald 1977). Competition for resources is considered a major barrier to coalition formation because social movement organizations will often try to distinguish themselves from others working to solve similar social problems (Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Major threats can make relevant social movement issues or organizations more salient because, “when there are threats to movement gains, resources are likely to become more available as constituents are alerted by such widely-publicized events” (Staggenborg 1986:380). Renewed public interest in their cause can potentially attract more members and resources. Extra resources reduce the need to compete against similar groups, allowing these groups to more easily form coalitions. Thus, threats may lead to coalition growth because they provide greater access to resources, which decreases the inter-organizational competition that would normally deter groups from building formal alliances (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Staggenborg 1986). *If threats increase access to resources, then I would expect that this increased access facilitates coalition growth during times of threat.*

Second, ideological barriers may be dismantled during times of threat. In order to form a coalition, organizations must possess "...compatible ideology or collective identity..." (Whittier 2014:176). Even minor ideological differences can prevent social movement organizations who have shared goals from forming a coalition (Obach 2004; Reese 2005; McCammon and Van Dyke 2010). Threats are thought to spur inter-organizational cooperation because, "...in such situations, movement actors will see the benefits of coalition work" (McCammon and Campbell 2002:235). In other words, threats incentivize coalition membership because, in desperate times, groups are more willing to overcome ideological divides which would ordinarily bar formal cooperation (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). The presence of a common enemy has the ability to bring together a diverse set of organizations. *If threats increase coalition size because they allow groups to overcome ideological divides, then I would expect that during times of threats, coalitions will be composed of a more diverse set of organizations.*

Operationalizing Threats

Threats are often thought of as sudden, salient moments around which resourceful, organized social movements can mobilize. However, threats are movement specific. A review of organizational coalitions in the social movements literature reveals a wide range of events that may or may not be labeled as threat. Different approaches and operationalizations of threats could explain some of the confusion about the possible underlying mechanisms that driving potential coalition growth during times of threat. Employing a movement specific definition of threats can help elucidate the underlying mechanisms that drive this social movement process.

In their meta-analysis of social movement research on coalition growth, McCammon and Van Dyke (2010) identified 16 studies that used political threats to explain coalition growth. In

15 of these studies, political threats helped explain that formation and growth of coalitions. However, definitions and operationalizations of political threats vary. Staggenborg (1986) found that abortion rights groups formed coalitions in response to proposed legislation that cut Medicaid funding for abortions. Reese (2005) defined threats as legislation that would have reduced federal funding for welfare programs. In their work, McCammon and Campbell (2002:234) define threats in two ways: first, when movements experience political defeats or, secondly, when activists believe they have a diminished capacity to achieve their goals. When confronted with a harsh political climate or a difficult legislative defeat, groups are likely to join coalitions because these threats or political defeats, "...suggest to movement members that they are not progressing toward their goal should encourage movement organizations to seek new strategies" (McCammon and Campbell 2002:235). Van Dyke (2003) used the following three indicators to approximate threats: university administrators' negative response to protests, the presence of a counter-movement, and the presences of elite political antagonists (e.g. Republican president in office).

The diverse range of events that have been labeled as threats in the existing research discussed above highlights the need for clear operationalizations of threats. I employed a movement specific definition of threats for my case, the American pro-Israel movement (APIM). To obtain a movement specific definition of threats for the American pro-Israel movement, I reviewed Jewish Studies literature and archival material to identify instances that activists perceived as threats and created a typology categorizing similar types of threats. In the next section, I provide a brief overview of the American pro-Israel movement, discuss relevant events that could be considered threats, and consider how those events are expected to influence coalition membership.

THE AMERICAN PRO-ISRAEL MOVEMENT

The American Jewish community is highly organized (Elazar 1997; Lainer-Vos 2012). Though less than 2% of Americans identify as Jewish, the American Jewish Yearbook's directory of organizations lists 968 distinct national Jewish organizations between 1945 and 2005. Of these organizations, support for Israel is one of the most highly organized spheres (Elazar 1997). This organizational field is relatively large and has been well documented over the years. Highly organized and resourced movements are most likely to mobilize in response to threats, making this an excellent case for disentangling different understandings of threats.

Though this loose collection of organizations is not traditionally characterized as a social movement, I define this as a social movement because the APIM meets the criteria for a social movement outlined by Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2009:6): (1) it needs to challenge or defend existing social structures; (2) it needs to be collective; (3) it needs to act with some degree of organization; (4) it needs to act partially outside of institutional or organizational channels; and (5) it needs to show some sense of continuity. First, the APIM seeks to defend existing social structures that support Israel by influencing U.S. foreign policy, generating public support for Israel, recruiting volunteers to help organizations in Israel, and offering financial contributions. Second, the APIM includes a large number of individual members and organizations which engage in coordinated, collective action directed toward supporting Israel. Third, as previously discussed, this movement is also highly organized (Elazar 1997). Fourth, the APIM has been involved in extra institutional tactics such as rallies, boycotts, and public demonstrations. Finally, this movement includes organizations like AJC which have supported Israel since 1948, demonstrating continuity.

Defining Threats for American pro-Israel Organizations

I employ a case centered approach to identify threats for American pro-Israel movement in an effort to address ambiguity often associated with this concept. Using Jewish studies literature, previous research on pro-Israel organizations, and archival documents from major American pro-Israel groups, I compiled a list of major events that could have affected Israel's salience and mobilization of pro-Israel groups. I divided these events into three categories: existential threats, identity threats, and moral legitimacy threats. Many of the social movements discussed in the literature above experienced immediate, direct threats. However, threats for the APIM are more distant. These events include military actions that threaten Israel's sovereignty or anti-Semitic events that threaten Jews in the United States and around the world.

Existential Threats

The APIM is primarily concerned with the safety and security of Israel. Cooperating groups ensure Israel's safety and security by giving money directly to Israel, lobbying the U.S. government for more favorable foreign policy toward Israel, educating Americans on topics affecting Israel, and encouraging greater public support for Israel. I would expect members of the APIM to feel threatened when American supporters think that Israel's safety and sovereignty is under attack. Since its War of Independence in 1948, Israel has engaged in a series of military conflicts that may have been perceived as threats that could facilitate coalition membership. The Six Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973) have been identified as watershed events and are most likely to be perceived as major threats. Other military conflicts that could be perceived as major threats to Israel's sovereignty include the War of Attrition (1969), when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a large scale shelling along the Suez Canal. Though this list of Israel's military conflicts is not exhaustive, these events most likely affected

the salience of Israel in the minds of Americans because they involved direct attacks on Israeli soil.

It is important to note that the agents and organizations under investigation here are acting on their perception of ambiguous signals from the broader political and social context. Organizations will respond to events that they *perceive* as threats. For instance, Israel launched the first attack in the Six Day War. Taking place June 5-10, 1967, this short military conflict resulted in a decisive victory for Israel. However, I coded this military action as a threat because American Jewish communities perceived this as a threat and mobilized in response. Prior to the official start of conflict, as tensions in the Middle East were on the rise, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (COP) held a solidarity rally in New York on May 27, 1967. At the "Solidarity with Israel Rally," COP President, Dr. Joachin Prinz was quoted as saying the following to 125,000 attendees (emphasis added):

The tremendous outpouring of Jewish solidarity with Israel is a heartening demonstration that **in this hour of crisis** the American Jewish community speaks as one, united in its commitment to the security of Israel (American Jewish Archives September 30, 1967:4).

In the middle of this short military conflict, the President of B'nai B'rith, Dr. WM. A. Wexler, sent the following cable to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Schkol on June 8, 1967 after a mass demonstration in Washington, D.C. (emphasis added):

I extend the greetings of 40,000 representatives of American Jewry assembled in Lafayette Park, in front of the White House, to **demonstrate their support of Israel in this critical hour**. Our hearts are overflowing with gratitude that the army and government and people of Israel in resolute defense of their homeland and survival were blessed with victory. We shall continue our sense of oneness with the people of Israel and to labor with all of our strength for a permanent peace in the entire Middle East. Be assured **we will continue with ever increasing devotion to assist you in the rebuilding of Israel**. (American Jewish Archives September 30, 1967:19).

American pro-Israel groups perceived these events as threats to Israel's existence. Though this cable mentions Israel's victory, the President of B'nai B'rith emphasizes that Israel, now more than ever, requires American Jews' "devotion and support" in rebuilding during this "critical hour." While some may not identify this as a threat to Israel's sovereignty, the American Jewish community did see this as a threat and mobilized in response.

Existential threats, such as the Yom Kippur War and the Six Day War, likely mobilized greater resources and support from the American Jewish Community. As discussed in the literature above, I would expect well organized social movements to benefit from such threats. These existential threats received a great deal of attention from the American news media and were discussed at length in Jewish publications. Increased salience of Israel likely attracted more resources and mobilized greater support. These existential threats also could have created a sense of urgency or a common enemy for groups to rally around. *Thus, I would expect that existential threats increase the likelihood of organizations joining a formal coalition in response to greater access to resources and the presence of a common enemy or sense of urgency.*

Identity Threats

I identified a second category of threats that includes international incidences involving Israel, which I coded as "identity threats." These differ from the existential threats above because they do not involve military attacks that directly threaten Israel's safety and sovereignty. These events are high profile incidents involving Israel that may have elicited a strong reaction from American supporters. The 1972 Munich Olympics, in which Israeli athletes were captured then killed, might have spurred mobilization in the United States. Similarly, in 1975, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 3379 which declared that Zionism is a form of racism. This could have been perceived as a threat to American pro-Israel groups. Finally, the

1976 hijacking of an Air France flight from Tel Aviv to Paris received a great deal of public attention and could have mobilized greater American support for Israel. These three events were coded as identity threats, and may have a slightly different effect on coalition membership rates.

Unlike existential threats, identity threats did not directly affect Israel's safety and sovereignty. For the American Jewish community, these events highlighted the constant threat of anti-Semitism and potential for another genocide. For American Jewish pro-Israel organizations, these events emphasized the need for a Jewish State amidst an unfriendly, anti-Semitic world. For instance, in response to drafts of UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, the COP organized a rally against racism and anti-Semitism held on November 11, 1975. While addressing the nearly 100,000 protesters, Mrs. Lea Rabin said the following: "Our history will not go backwards; there will be Jewish extermination no more; there is an independent State of Israel. We are the master of our own fate. We are the only ones to decide our future" (American Jewish Archives March 31, 1976:16). These same themes were present in many of the speeches given at this rally. This UN General Assembly resolution was seen as anti-Semitic, was perceived to be a direct attack on Jews around the world, and highlighted the community's need for an independent Jewish State.

Well-organized coalitions, like the Conference of Presidents (COP), responded to this threat with a media campaign, and were able to mobilize greater resources and public support. For example, the COP took out full-page ads in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Star*, and other newspapers around the country in preparation for the rally against discrimination and anti-Semitism (American Jewish Archives March 31, 1976:16). In addition to attracting attendees for the upcoming rally, these ads also brought in thousands of dollars from supporters around the country (American Jewish Archives March 31, 1976:16). Similar to existential threats, *I would*

expect that identity threats would increase the likelihood of joining a formal coalition because it attracts resources and creates a sense of urgency or common enemy that groups can rally around.

I would, however, expect that identity threats would have a lower magnitude when compared to existential threats because these events do not directly threaten Israel's existence. Such events, which highlight global discrimination and anti-Semitism, could mobilize support for Jewish groups working on anti-Semitism and discrimination at home in the United States. Alternatively, it might mobilize support for American Jewish organizations that aid needy Jews around the world, including those groups that help Jews living outside of Israel. In other words, mobilization might not be funneled toward pro-Israel groups. Instead, identity threats might spur broader mobilization, where support is spread more widely among American Jewish organizations. *Therefore, identity threats will increase likelihood of joining a coalition, however this mobilization may not be directly linked to Israel, resulting in a smaller magnitude when compared to existential threats.*

Moral Legitimacy Threats

Although Israel is often a salient issue, not all of Israel's military actions have been viewed favorably by the American public nor the international community. For instance, the Sabra and Shatila Massacres (1981-1982), which involved violent killings of refugees, the First Intifada (1987) and the Second Intifada (2000), which were Palestinian uprisings in opposition to Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories. During these conflicts, Israel came under heavy international scrutiny. Though these events were salient and attracted a great deal of American media attention, they did not solicit the same broad-based support for Israel as the other two threats discussed above. This third category of threats calls into question Israel as a moral,

legitimate ally for the American government. Thus, I term this third category of events, moral legitimacy threats.

The contentious nature of these moral legitimacy threats elicited a wide range of responses from American pro-Israel groups, potentially fracturing existing coalitions. The American Jewish community's response ranged from criticisms of Israel to ardent support of Israeli policies. Though American pro-Israel groups were often active and politically engaged during these threats, opinion among American Jewish organizations was extremely divided. Some American Jews felt that Israel was making a mistake and impeding opportunities for peace, while others felt that the community should stand with Israel in the face of critics.

For example, amidst increasing violence during the First Intifada, the American pro-Israel coalition, the COP, issued a formal statement on December 15, 1988. Before this statement was issued all 46 member groups had an opportunity to meet and vote on their response. One member group, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, sent a letter to all of its members regarding the COP meeting and resulting statement. In this letter, Joe Glaser wrote, "Finally, the reaction of the Israelis. We didn't agree in characterizing it. Some thought is excessive, some mild, some in between" (American Jewish Archives, Nearprint December 19, 1988). Despite the united front presented by the COP in its formal statement issued on December 15, 1988, coalition members were divided. During this moral legitimacy threat, conflicts and disagreements arose among American pro-Israel groups, suggesting that moral legitimacy threats have the potential to fracture alliances and fragment existing coalitions. *Thus, I would expect that during moral legitimacy threats, groups are less likely to join coalitions.*

DATA AND METHODS

To what extent do these proposed underlying mechanisms explain the relationship between threats and coalition growth? The American pro-Israel movement (APIM) provides an excellent case for exploring this questions. This chapter focuses on the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (COP), a long-standing, formal coalition that has maintained a prominent position within the APIM. At its founding in 1955, the COP was composed of fifteen member groups and wished to act as a spokesman for the Jewish people. It was created to prevent overlapping responses to issues concerning Israel and to reduce the effects of inter-organizational competition (Elazar 1997). However, this coalition was fairly weak and inactive until the Six Day War (1967). The COP eventually came to serve as a key bridge between Israeli officials and American Jewry. Currently in 2016, the COP consists of 54 member groups.

Data

I built an original dataset of coded purpose statements from over 968 national Jewish organizations from 1945 to 2005. The American Jewish Committee (AJC) has published the *American Jewish Yearbook* nearly every year since 1901. Similar to the *Encyclopedia of Associations*, these volumes contain a directory of national American Jewish organizations. Each entry in the directory lists an organizations' name, founding year, purpose statement, and publications. I coded the purpose statements of these organizations from 1945-2005. After surveying the literature and reviewing 10% of the sample, I developed a code book that categorized purpose statements into nine overlapping classifications: supports Israel, promotes immigration, indicates political/legal focus, serves as fraternities/social groups, promotes Jewish culture, educational organizations, promotes religion, collects funds/provides charitable services,

and supports professionals/vocational workers. This coding scheme integrates categories used by the American Jewish Committee and Elazar (1997) (see appendix A for further details).

Researchers often use directories of formal organizations, such as the *Encyclopedia of Associations* to identify elements of formal organizations' ideologies (Minkoff 1999; Martin, Baumgartner, and McCarthy 2006). Purpose statements submitted by organizations to such directories indicate what these groups stand for. While these purpose statements tend to be more centrist and moderate statements of their ideas and goals, they still represent the public face of an organization. Thus, I used purpose statements listed in the *American Jewish Yearbook* to assess organizations' ideological approaches.

The purpose statements exhibited a great deal of variation. American pro-Israel groups were evaluated based on whether they described a neutral, hawkish, or dovish approach to Israel. Dovish groups tend to be more oriented toward peace and often oppose the Israeli settlements in Palestine, while Hawkish groups focus on the safety and security of Israel. Table 1 gives examples of purpose statements of pro-Israel groups listed in the *American Jewish Yearbook* directory of national Jewish organization. All five groups advocate on behalf of Israel and were coded as pro-Israel groups. However, the more dovish, peace-oriented groups advocate equality between Jews and Palestinians; these groups generally oppose the occupation of Palestine because they believe that peace can only be achieved through equality and an independent Palestinian state. More Hawkish groups tend to focus on the safety and security of Israel through close monitoring and strict control over Israel's borders and the occupied territories. As table 2.1 below indicates, the COP's purpose statement offers a more centrist and moderate stance. The COP focuses on the U.S.-Israel alliance as well as the security and dignity of Jews without explicitly discussing Palestine or the occupied territories. More dovish groups like Jewish

Alliance for Justice and Peace explicitly discuss Palestine and the need for an independent Palestinian state that is economically viable. Similarly, American Friends of Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salam created a community of Jews and Palestinians built on shared cultural understandings. By contrast, Hawkish groups like Tsomet-Techiya USA believes Israel should control the entire territory, including those areas inhabited by Palestinians. Americans for a Safe Israel also opposes a two-state solution, believing that peace can only be achieved when Israel has complete control over the entire territory, including the West-bank and Gaza.

Table 2.1: Purpose Statements Listed in the American Jewish Yearbook	
CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS: Seeks to strengthen the U.S.-Israel alliance and to protect and enhance the security and dignity of Jews abroad. Toward this end, the Conference of Presidents speaks and acts on the basis of consensus of its 54 member agencies on issues of national and international Jewish concern.	
Dovish pro-Israel Groups	Hawkish pro-Israel Groups
BRIT TZEDEK V'SHALOM—JEWISH ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE: Works for the achievement of a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict guided by the traditional Jewish obligation to pursue peace and justice, in the conviction that security for Israel can only be attained through the establishment of an economically and politically viable Palestinian state, necessitating an end to Israel's occupation of land acquired in the 1967 war and an end to Palestinian violence; its national office and 30 chapters around the country engage in grassroots political advocacy and public education.	AMERICANS FOR A SAFE ISRAEL (AFSI) Seeks to educate Americans in Congress, the media, and the public about Israel's role as a strategic asset for the West; through meetings with legislators and the media, in press releases and publications AFSI promotes Jewish rights to Judea and Samaria, the Golan, Gaza, an indivisible Jerusalem, and to all of Israel. AFSI believes in the concept of "peace for peace" and rejects the concept of "territory for peace."
AMERICAN FRIENDS OF NEVE SHALOM/ WAHAT AL-SALAM: Supports and publicizes the projects of the community of Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salam, the "Oasis of Peace." For more than twenty years, Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel have lived and worked together as equals. The community teaches tolerance, understanding and mutual respect well beyond its own borders by being a model for peace and reaching out through its educational institutions. A bilingual, bicultural Primary School serves the village and the surrounding communities.	TSOMET-TECHIYA USA: Supports the activities of the Israeli Tsomet party, which advocates Israeli control over the entire Land of Israel.

The majority of the sample expressed a neutral stance toward Israel in their purpose statements. Groups rarely changed their stance toward Israel; of 313 groups, only 13 groups changed their stance on Israel over time. However, there was a great deal of variability between groups' stance on Israel. Figure 2.1, below, shows how the percentage of dovish or hawkish pro-Israel groups changed over time. In order to control for changes in the number of groups that existed during each year, Figure 2.1 presents the percentage of those groups in existence who were coded as either hawkish or dovish. These two stances increase over time. By 1997, nearly 6% of member groups were coded as dovish, seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflicts between Israelis and Palestinian people. Similarly, the percentage of the sample coded as hawks also peaked in 1997.




Figure 2.1: Percentage of Sample Coded as Hawks vs Doves

These ideological differences can often lead to disagreements among groups and can threaten enduring coalitions. For example, in 2014, the COP member groups voted on whether to

admit Jstreet into their coalition. Jstreet is controversial because it is a dovish groups that insists many of the traditional and well-established pro-Israel groups fail to represent American Jews' opinions concerning Israel. When deciding on new members, each of the 51 member groups was allotted one vote on prospective members. Groups must receive a two-thirds majority in order to be admitted. Of the 42 member groups that participated in this decision, 22 voted to admit Jstreet while 17 voted to reject Jstreet (Paulson 2014). Some members were happy about the decision to deny Jstreet membership. However, other organizations were outraged and threatened to leave the coalition. This conflict has significantly affected the nature of the coalition, the COP has pledged to review its voting process and consider an alternative voting system that accounts for the different types of member-groups present in the coalition.

Dependent Variable

To determine the effect of threats on coalition size, I tracked which organizations were members of the COP each year between 1965 and 1990. The dependent variable in this analysis is a count variable which represents the total number of COP members in a given year.

Independent Variables

Using publicly available data, I compiled nine independent variables to explore the effect of threats on coalition formation. Data for the independent variables, which I discuss in further detail below, was collected from publicly available sources including the U.S. Census Bureau, American Jewish Archives, Library of Congress, and Roper.

Threats were broken down into the three different variables that reflect the categories discussed in the literature review: Existential Threat, Identity Threat, and Moral Legitimacy Threat. Each type of threat is a binary variable where “1” represents the presence of that type of

threat during a given year. For instance, Existential Threat was coded as “1” during 1967 (The Six Day War), 1969 (the War of Attrition), and 1973 (the Yom Kippur War).

The Jewish Federation’s annual budget and Israel Bonds Sales was used to approximate available monetary resources. The Jewish Federation is often considered the primary fund raising organization within the American Jewish community (Elazar 1997; Lainer-Vos 2012). Because access to historical budget data is limited, I used the annual amount of funds raised by the Federation to approximate annual financial contributions from the American Jewish community (Elazar 1997). I used the total amount of donations collected by the Jewish Federation each year (in millions of USD) to approximate available resources for national Jewish organizations associated with the pro-Israel movement. The funds raised by the Jewish Federation are not all dedicated to Israel, only a portion of these funds are given to Israel each year. I used this measure to approximate the availability of monetary resources for national Jewish organizations. I also used annual Israel Bonds Sales (Rehavi and Weingarten 2004). In order to control for inflation, both of these measures of resources are presented in 2015 U.S. dollars. Though social movement organizations rely on a wide range of resources, I used the availability monetary resources. This type of resource is highly fungible and, when compared to other types of resources, provides organizations with greater flexibility in the range of strategies and tactics available to them (Edwards and McCarthy 2009).

I aggregated *COP members’ stances on Israel* to test whether threats encouraged coalition growth by creating a sense of urgency or a common enemy. The Israel stance variable represents the percentage of the coalition member groups that were coded as neutral (as opposed to hawkish or dovish). During threats, we would expect a more diverse coalition that would

result in fewer neutral organizations, because the urgency of threats results in a more diverse coalition.

In order to gauge *moral support for Israel*, I used public opinion poll data collected as early as 1955. Roper provides access to a diverse set of surveys. I used Gallup's nationally representative surveys of American adults 18 and older were to construct a measure of public sympathy towards Israel. These surveys asked a national sample of U.S. adults about whether their sympathies lied with the Israelis or the Palestinians/Arabs. I used the percentage of the population that sympathizes with Israel to approximate public opinion toward Israel. Although there have been minor changes to this question over time, the most common survey question asked respondents, "In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with the Israelis or the Palestinian Arabs?" Availability of public opinion poll data varied over this time period. When multiple public opinion polls were available within a single year, the results of the surveys were averaged together. For missing years, data was interpolated based on available data.

Total foreign aid and *United Nations voting records* were used to approximate the political context. A report produced by the Library of Congress Research Office provided a yearly break down of U.S. foreign aid to Israel (Sharp 2012). I used the total aid (in millions USD), which includes all grants and loans. Aid is presented in 2015 U.S. dollars to control for inflation. In addition, I coded U.S. votes on UN General Assembly Resolutions regarding Israel from 1955 to 2005. The list of General Assembly Resolutions was taken from the Jewish Virtual Library and includes over 900 UN GA Resolutions (American Jewish Virtual Library 2014). For each year, I calculated the percentage of U.S. votes that matched Israel's. A score of "1" indicates that the U.S. and Israel had the same voting record that year.

Coalition growth is directly tied to number of potential members. I used *Total Organizations at risk of joining* the COP to control for the number of potential coalition members in a given year. This variable was calculated by identifying how many of the 313 pro-Israel groups in the directory were present each year.

Analytic Strategy

The analysis explores the extent to which resources or the presence of a common enemy, explains the relationship between threats and coalition growth. I employ a regression analysis using Poisson distribution with robust standard errors because the dependent variable is a count. Coefficients are presented in terms of incidence rate ratio for easier interpretation.

RESULTS

Table 2.2 summarizes the results of the analysis. The first model explores the relationship between threats and the risk of joining a coalition. The coefficients indicate that identity threats tend to increase the size of the coalition. When there was an identity threat, COP membership increases by 12%.

	Model 1 (S.E.)	Model 2 (S.E.)	Model 3 (S.E.)	Model 4 (S.E.)	Full Model (S.E.)
Existential Threat	1.0170 (0.06272)	0.9656 (0.0717)	1.0357 (0.0559)	0.9923 (0.0689)	0.9665 (0.0592)
Identity Threat	1.1203** (0.0447)	1.0755* (0.0375)	1.1039** (0.0387)	1.0646* (0.0331)	1.0712*** (0.0210)
Moral Legitimacy Threat	0.9757 (0.0425)	0.9935 (0.0422)	0.9595 (0.0291)	0.9803 (0.0292)	0.9702 (0.0225)
Federation Budget (in millions USD)		1.0001** (0.0000)		1.0001** (0.0000)	1.0001** (0.0000)
Israel Bonds Sales (in millions USD)		1.0000 (0.0001)		1.0000 (0.0000)	1.0000 (0.0001)
Israel Stance			1.0305* (0.0150)	1.0280** (0.0098)	1.0371** (0.0139)
Sympathy Toward Israel					1.1897 (0.3029)
U.S. Foreign Aid (in millions USD)					0.9999* (0.0000)
UN Agreement					0.8999 (0.0672)
Total pro-Israel Organizations	1.0143*** (0.0015)	1.0139*** (0.0009)	1.0152*** (0.0015)	1.0148*** (0.0009)	1.0149*** (0.0011)
R ²	0.2151	0.2256	0.2177	0.2277	0.2023

†*p*<.10 **p*<.05, ***p*<.01, ****p*<.001

Model 2 includes the Federation’s annual budget and Israel Bonds Sales, an approximation for available resources. Resources reduce the effect that identity threats have on the risk of joining the COP. When controlling for resources, identity threats only increase coalition size by approximately 7.5%. Furthermore, for each additional 100 million U.S. dollars in the Federation’s annual budget, the COP membership increases by approximately 1%. The R² suggests that model 2 is a better fit than model 1.

Likewise, member groups’ stances on Israel explained some of the relationship between identity threats and risk of coalition membership. In model 3, which approximates the effect of a

common enemy, identity threats increase coalition size by 10.3%. When a greater proportion of the coalition members expressed a neutral stance toward Israel, the total coalition membership increased by 3%. The R^2 suggests that model 3 is a better fit than model 1 but not as good of a fit as model 2.

Model 4, which includes both of the proposed mechanisms, reduces the explanatory power of identity threats. In model 4, identity threats increase coalition size by approximately 6.5%. Budget data suggests that for each additional 100 million U.S. dollars in the Federation's annual budget, the COP membership increases by approximately 1%. When a greater proportion of coalition members expressed a neutral stance toward Israel than coalition membership increased by 2.8%. The R^2 in model 4 suggests that this model is the best fit for the sample data. The full model includes additional variables which control for contextual factors.

In the final model, international events increased coalition size by 7%, federation budget increased coalition size by 1%, and Israel stance increased coalition membership by 3.7%. Foreign aid had a marginal effect on coalition size. For each addition million dollars Israel received in U.S. foreign aid, coalition size decreased by approximately 1%. The R^2 suggests that the variables used to approximate broader, contextual factors (Foreign Aid, Public Opinion data, and UN General Assembly Votes), do not produce a better model.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Threats are often dramatic events that influence many aspects of the social movement sphere. Threats can bring greater public attention to a pressing issue, thus mobilizing more resources for social movement organizations. Threats can create a sense of urgency, encouraging groups to ignore minor differences and present a united front. The case of APIM coalitions highlights the complicated influence that threats have on coalition growth. The analysis suggests

that both of the mechanisms proposed by previous scholarship help explain the relationship between threats and coalition growth. Threats can influence coalition growth by increasing the salience of a social movement grievance, mobilizing resources, and reducing competition. Threats can also lead to coalition growth by creating a sense of urgency or a common enemy which allows groups to overcome ideological barriers that normally prevent some groups from joining coalitions.

While both resources and the COP's overall stance toward Israel did explain part of the relationship between threats and coalition growth, this analysis produced an unexpected result. Identity threats were the only type of threat that was significantly associated with coalition size. This could be explained the nature of identity threats. Alternatively, these results could be attributed to the clustering of different types of threats. Existential threats clustered in earlier decades, when the coalition was smaller, and moral legitimacy threats clustered in later decades, when coalition growth was larger. Adding a variable for the total number of possible members mitigated this bias by controlling for periods of rapid growth and decline in the interest groups organizations. The robust standard errors used in the analysis relaxed some of the model assumptions and lessened the bias of a small sample size. Though existential threats and moral legitimacy threats did not produce significant results, they may have affected the size of the coalition. Further research with a larger dataset would be needed to better understand this relationship.

Despite the limitations of a small sample size and clustering of threats, the current analysis represents a strong first step toward understanding these mechanisms and refining social movement theories. Little quantitative work has been done to understand the mechanisms driving the relationship between coalitions and threats (for exception see Van Dyke 2003; McCammon

and Van Dyke 2010). It is difficult to assess the generalizability of this analysis of a formal pro-Israel coalition, which experiences distant threats. Future research should explore the effects resources and a common enemy have on the growth of informal coalitions or coalitions which experiences more proximate or immediate threats.

These findings advance our understanding of social movement coalitions by identifying the role that exogenous factors, such as threats, access to resources, and the presence a common enemy, play in coalition growth. This chapter cannot speak to the effect endogenous factors, articulated in previous research, have on coalition growth. Future research should explore whether more prominent groups, hybrid versus single issue organizations, advocacy versus service, and older groups are more likely to join a formal coalition.

These results also indicate a need to better specify what should be considered a threat. Threats are an increasingly important feature of the social movement literature. Despite the central role threats play, it is difficult to create a unified definition and operationalization of this concept. This chapter demonstrates that all threats are not equal. When the threats experiences by the COP were disaggregated into categories, it revealed that only identity threats were linked to an increase in the size of the COP. This suggests that it is important to specify the type of threat and critically think about the effect that a given threat might have on social movement organizations. This chapter highlights the need to better understand which events qualify as a threat, how they should be operationalized in future research, and the underlying mechanisms driving these patterns of coalition growth.

CHAPTER 3: ENDOGENOUS FACTORS AND COALITION GROWTH IN THE AMERICAN PRO-ISRAEL MOVEMENT

In the last chapter, I examined a variety of threats to Israel in order to explore their effect on American pro-Israel groups. My analysis revealed that threats to Israel increase the rate of joining a formal pro-Israel coalition. I concluded that increased access to resources and overlapping ideology only drive some of the coalition growth in the APIM coalition. In this chapter, I shift the focus from exogenous factors to endogenous factors that influence coalition growth. More specifically, this chapter explores how various organizational characteristics explain coalition growth.

Social movement scholars have identified various organizational characteristics that can potentially influence coalition formation, growth, or decay. Organizations are more likely to join together and form a coalition if they have related ideologies (Hirsch 1986; Taylor and Whittier 1999; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Rucht 2010), overlapping networks (Hathaway and Meyer 1993-1994; Obach 2003; Obach 2004), and similar organizational structure (Morris 1984; Staggenborg 1986; Lichterman 1995). However, little work has investigated how important organizational features like visibility in the news media and hybrid organizations, which focus on multiple issues, influence the formation of coalitions. *To what extent does an organization's ideological stance, visibility in the news media, primary strategy, and structure influence membership in formal, enduring coalitions?* This chapter uses an event history analysis of American pro-Israel groups to explore how features of social movement organizations affect the likelihood of joining the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (COP).

To address this question, I begin by reviewing the literature on coalition formation and growth. After a brief discussion of the American pro-Israel movement, I detail my methods for data collection and analytic strategy. In my analysis, I found that organizations with similar ideology and a high degree of visibility are more likely to join a formal coalition. Furthermore, hybrid organizations were more likely to join the coalition than single-issue organizations. Similarly, groups whose stated strategy focused on advocacy were more likely to become coalition members than service-oriented organizations. This research supplements the existing literature on social movement coalitions by shifting the attention from exogenous, contextual factors that influence membership rates to the endogenous, organizational characteristics that influence which groups are most likely to join a formal coalition.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In chapter 1, I provided a definition of coalitions and discussed how they vary based on the duration and degree of commitment required from members. In chapter 2, I built on to this literature by examining the exogenous factors that drives coalition growth in formal, enduring coalitions. This chapter examines the same coalition but focuses on organizational factors that explain coalition growth. In this chapter, I focus on formal, enduring coalitions. These types of coalitions are long-term and tend to have professional staff, founding papers, and routines for accepting new members.

As previously discussed, political groups face risks and advantages when they consider joining coalitions. On the one hand, coalitions are linked to a greater chance of movement success (Staggenborg 1986; Gamson 1990; Hathaway and Meyer 1993-1994; Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005). Joining together and sharing resources through a formal alliance can improve a movement's visibility and increase the chances of affecting political change. On the

other hand, joining a coalition can be risky for individual organizations (Clemens 1993; Meyer and Imig 1993; Rohlinger 2002; Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005). Coalitions consume resources, can compromise a particular group's identity, and could damage pre-existing relationships between member organizations and other groups or individuals. Membership in a formal coalition represents a process; becoming a member is an interaction between organizations and coalitions.

Joining a formal coalition is a two-way street. Organizations must decide on whether or not they would like to join a coalition. Furthermore, coalitions must decide on which new members they will accept. Some organizations are rejected from membership and some organizations choose not to apply. Generally, organizations with no chance of becoming a coalition member will not apply for membership. Similarly, a coalition may ask particularly attractive organizations to apply for membership. Officially becoming a member of a formal coalition is the outcome of the interaction between the organization and the coalition.

At times, the risks and barriers associated with joining a coalition are minimized, making coalitions an attractive option for individual organizations. Exogenous and endogenous factors may influence an organization's decision to join a coalition, a coalition's decision to accept an organization as a member, or both an organization's and a coalition's decision making process. Chapter 2 focused on how various exogenous factors influence the likelihood that an organization would become a member of a formal coalition. I found that major threats, increased resources, and the changes to political context increased the chances of becoming a coalition member. In this chapter, I focus on how various organizational characteristics, or "endogenous factors," influence the likelihood of becoming a coalition member. Ideology, visibility, strategy, and organizational structure could alter an individual organization's decision to join a formal

coalition or the coalition's decision to accept an organization as a new member. It is important to understand those factors that influence the likelihood of becoming a member because it represents the full interaction between organizations and coalitions. In the next section, I review the literature on coalitions and social movement organizations and formulate hypotheses about how ideology, visibility, strategy, and organizational structure influence membership in a formal coalition. Following the literature review, I discuss the process of becoming a member of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (COP) including the likelihood of being rejected, the motivations to join this coalition, and the advantages of accepting particular organizations into the COP.

Ideology

In order to build and sustain a coalition, social movement organizations (SMOs) must share a common purpose and create a shared identity that can unite member groups (Hirsch 1986; Taylor and Whittier 1999; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Rucht 2010). Groups with conflicting ideologies or world views find it harder to identify shared interests and create a shared, collective identity. In other words, member organizations must share sufficient common ground upon which to build a coalition. Divergent interests and conflicting world views can create divisions and fracture the coalition. Therefore, I would expect that organizations with similar ideologies are more likely to join formal, enduring coalitions.

American pro-Israel groups are frequently characterized as a single, unified lobby or interest group sector despite a great deal of variation among pro-Israel groups' ideological stances toward Israel. Though all of the Jewish pro-Israel groups in my sample expressed support for Israel, individual organizations frequently disagreed about Israel's relationship to Palestinians. On one side of this spectrum are peace-oriented advocacy groups that often oppose

the Israeli settlements in Palestine, which I refer to as “dovish” organizations. On the other side of the spectrum are organizations who primarily focus on the safety and security of Israel and frequently support the settlements in Palestine, which I refer to as “hawkish” organizations. The majority of American pro-Israel groups fall somewhere between these two extremes.

Among American Jewish organizations, extremely hawkish and extremely dovish groups can polarize the debate about Israel and Palestine. Many American Jewish pro-Israel groups express deferential support for Israel. In the introduction, I used the term “deferential” to describe American pro-Israel groups who provide Israel with unconditional support and stand by whatever decisions the democratically elected Israeli government makes. These groups do not feel that they are in a position to criticize, provoke dissent, or offend Israel. The COP expresses a deferential stance toward Israel in its purpose statement. Given the COP’s stance toward Israel and the possibility for fragmentation over this ideological division within the community, I would expect that groups with deferential stances toward Israel are more likely to become members of the COP because they are viewed as less controversial. *Hypothesis 1: Organizations that express similarly deferential ideological stance toward Israel are more likely to join the COP coalition.*

Visibility

A rich body of social movements literature has explored when, how, and why different social movement organizations receive extensive news media coverage, the nature of their media coverage, and the consequences of news media coverage. Previous research has revealed a variety of political, organizational, and contextual factors that affect how visible an individual organization will be in the media (for review see Amenta et al. 2009). Visibility is often considered a measure of an SMO’s influence (Lipsky 1968; Gitlin 1978, 1980; Gamson et al.

1992; Berry 1999; Ferree et al. 2002; Gamson 2004; Koopmans 2004; Vliegenthart, Oegma, and Klandermans 2005; Amenta et al. 2009). Despite this extensive research, little work has been done to explore the effect of visibility, and consequently influence, on inter-organizational ties.

In their study of which social movement families get the most media coverage and why, Amenta et al. (2009) ranked Jewish civil rights and Jewish civil liberties organizations, which includes pro-Israel groups, in the top 10 most covered social movement families just below Environmental groups and above anti-war groups. Three of the Jewish pro-Israel groups I identified in my sample are among the top 30 SMOs that Amenta et al. (2009:640) found had the most coverage. One reason the Jewish community, and consequently Jewish pro-Israel groups, may have received extensive media coverage is because of their organizational capacity which has the ability, "...to exert influence of many different sorts, including media related" (Amenta et al. 2009:638). In other words, this movement family received disproportionate media coverage because they represent a large number of organizations that have the capacity to get media attention.

Newspaper coverage is not equally distributed within an interest sector or movement family. Organizations that engage in radical tactics, have professional staff, or are prominent within an organizational field are more likely to get newspaper coverage (Amementa et al. 2009). Though Jewish pro-Israel groups engage in extra-institutional tactics (such as boycotts and rallies), they rarely employ radical tactics that lead directly to newspaper coverage. The majority of the Jewish pro-Israel groups that are highly visible in newspapers and receive regular newspaper coverage are prominent or formal organizations, such as the Anti-Defamation League or the American Jewish Congress, which employ a professional staff. Organizations which

receive the bulk of newspaper coverage are considered more influential than Jewish pro-Israel groups that are rarely mentioned in the news.

Highly visible organizations that wield a great deal of influence within the organizational field may be more likely to become coalition members. These influential organizations tend to be more formalized and often employ professional staff that can help manage day-to-day operations. Coalitions are more likely to form and are easier to maintain among formalized organizations with professional staff (Staggenborg 1986). Thus, highly visible organizations may be more likely to choose to join and participate in formal, enduring coalitions when compared to less visible organizations. Furthermore, enduring coalitions may be attracted to highly visible organizations. Noteworthy member groups that are frequently mentioned in newspapers make an attractive coalition member because they can boost the prestige, legitimacy, and newspaper coverage of the formal coalition. Therefore, increasing amounts of media coverage which an organization gets may increase the probability of becoming a coalition member. *Hypothesis 2a: More visible organizations are more likely to join the COP coalitions because their professional staffs facilitate coalition work and because influential organizations are an attractive member for enduring coalitions.*

By contrast, highly visible organizations may be less likely to join a coalition because they have less to gain and more to lose. As previously discussed, coalition membership comes with risks and advantages. Highly visible organizations may not benefit as much from joining a coalition because they already wield a great deal of legitimacy and influence. However, they are still exposed to the risks associated with coalition members. Joining a prominent coalition could alienate existing organizational and political ties elites (Clemens 1993; Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005). Furthermore, coalition membership requires groups to contribute resources and

often forces them to sacrifice some of their autonomy and individuality (Meyer and Imig 1993). In other words, a prominent organization may lose some of its influence and media visibility if it joins a prominent coalition because it must sacrifice some of its autonomy and individuality. Thus, highly visible organizations that are frequently mentioned in newspaper articles may be less inclined to join a coalition because they have already gained some legitimacy and may be less inclined to sacrifice their resources, autonomy, and individuality in order to join a formal, enduring coalition. *Hypothesis 2b: More visible organizations are less likely to join coalitions because they receive fewer benefits from coalition work while risking their own organizational resources, legitimacy, and influence.*

Organizational Strategy

Organizations within a single movement often disagree about the appropriate tactics and strategies to pursue when pressing for social change. For example, animal rights activists that target the use of animals in laboratories frequently debate the merits of advocating for either incremental change that improves the welfare of animals or the complete abolition of animal use in scientific research (Evans 2015). Such debates can make fragment existing coalitions and prevent organizations from uniting around a common purpose to form a formal coalition. An SMO's primary strategy is an important part of their organizational identity and structure. I use Minkoff's (1999) operationalization of strategy which is defined, "...in terms of the organization's primary activities: social protest, institutional advocacy, and service provision or cultural activities" (Minkoff 1999:1668). SMOs' primary strategies are fluid and exist on a continuum ranging from protests, which directly challenge institutions, to service or cultural organizations, which are focused on individual change and providing services (Minkoff 1999).

Previous research investigating this dimension of organizational identity has highlighted how SMOs shift their strategies in response to changes in the organizational field and political context (Minkoff 1995). Changes to an organization's primary strategy can disrupt, "...established routines, inter-organizational relationships, and organizational legitimacy" (Minkoff 1999:1668-1669). Despite a growing body of literature exploring the various factors that cause organizations to change their strategy, little work has been done to determine how an organization's strategy influences coalition membership.

Research on organizations' identity and coalition formation suggests that organizations with similar goals, interests, and structure are more likely to cooperate (Lichterhan 1995; Maney 2000; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003; Roth 2008; Cornfield and McCammon 2010:80). Because the COP, the enduring coalition under investigation in this chapter, is primarily focused on institutional advocacy, I would expect that organizations primarily focused on institutional advocacy would be more likely to join the coalition. *Hypothesis 3a:*
Organizations primarily focused on institutional advocacy (challenging the institution) are more likely to join the COP coalition.

On the other hand, competition for resources is considered a major barrier to coalition formation. Social movement organizations will often try to distinguish themselves from others working to solve similar social problems (Hathaway and Meyer 1993-1994; Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Therefore, organizations primarily focused on institutional advocacy may be deterred from joining the COP because it would be harder to distinguish themselves from other, similar pro-Israel groups.

The competition that may deter advocacy groups from joining a coalition could encourage service or culture-oriented groups to join an advocacy-focused coalition.

Organizations primarily focused on service or culture, as opposed to advocacy, may not be deterred because their strategy differentiates them enough to gain sufficient access to resources. Service groups may be more inclined to join the COP because membership could increase an individual organization's perceived legitimacy within the community. Furthermore, existing coalition members may feel less threatened by service or culture-oriented organizations, increasing these organizations' likelihood of joining the pro-Israel coalition. *Hypothesis 3b: Organizations primarily focused on service or culture (focused on providing services or individual change) are more likely to join the COP coalition.*

Organizational Structure

Conflicting organizational structures can make cooperation difficult for any groups seeking to form a coalition. Differences in leadership styles, organizational routines, and decision making practices create tension within a coalition and can make it more difficult for groups to cooperate (Morris 1984; Staggenborg 1986; Lichterman 1995). Decentralized, grass roots organizations often come into conflict with more formal, bureaucratic structures (Lichterman 1995). Differences in leadership styles can also create tension within alliances (Morris 1984).

Organizations that traverse traditional movement boundaries are sometimes referred to as "hybrid organizations" (Heaney and Rojas 2014). The Jewish LGBTQ organization, A Wider Bridge, is an example of a hybrid organization within the American pro-Israel movement. A Wider Bridge describes itself as, "...the pro-Israel organization that builds bridges between Israelis and LGBTQ North Americans and allies" (A Wider Bridge 2016). With ties to both Israel and LGBTQ movement, A Wider Bridge experiences unique advantages and barriers.

On the one hand, hybrid organizations, like A Wider Bridge, may be more likely to join a coalition when compared to single-issue organizations. Hybrid organizations have access to a more diverse membership base, expanding the range of coalitions that they can potentially join. Hybrid groups that have ties to multiple interest sectors can draw members from multiple movements. Research on coalition formation suggests that membership networks influence which groups are most likely to form a coalition (Hathaway and Meyer 1993-1994; Obach 2003; Obach 2004). A Wider Bridge can choose to join both pro-Israel and LGBT coalitions to advance their goals, increasing the group's likelihood of becoming a coalition member because they have access to a greater number of potential coalitions. Thus, being a hybrid organization could increase the likelihood of becoming a coalition member because these groups have access to a greater number of coalitions that they can potentially join.

As previously discussed, becoming a coalition member is a two-way street. Hybrid organization may seem like an attractive candidate for membership in a formal coalition. First, hybrid groups may represent and reach a more diverse audience, making them attractive candidates for coalition membership. Coalitions that purport to represent a diverse membership and range of voices from within a community are more likely to affect policy (Gamson 1961; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Obach 2010; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). The COP may benefit from extending membership to a hybrid organization like A Wider Bridge because it could improve the perceived diversity of the coalition and could boost the chances of affecting policy. Second, hybrid organizations can increase the range and reach of social movement's messages and frames. As a hybrid organization, A Wider Bridge believes that, "...through this unique LGBT path to Israel, more LGBT people in North America, both Jews and non-Jews will find meaningful connections with Israel and Israelis" (A Wider Bridge 2016). If a formal

coalition like the COP included a hybrid organization like A Wider Bridge, then the COP's message could stretch beyond the traditional American Jewish community and reach individuals who previously hadn't thought to support Israel. Third, hybrid organizations can act as brokers that can bring together a more diverse set of organizational allies (Lichterhan 1995; Heaney and Rojas 2014). Inclusion of a hybrid organization like A Wider Bridge in a formal coalition can increase the American pro-Israel movement's chances of working with other LGBT groups. A Wider Bridge could act as an organizational bridge or broker and connect the COP to a more diverse set of organizational allies that can help advance the COP's goals. *Hypothesis 4a: Hybrid organizations are more likely to join the COP coalition because they have access to a broader or more diverse network.*

When compared to single-issue organizations, hybrid organizations that cross interest sectors or advocate for several issues might be less likely to join a coalition. First, hybrid organizations may conceptualize a problem very differently than more narrowly focused, single-issue groups. Varied conceptualizations of the same social problem can lead to divergent movement goals (Maney 2000:159). These varied conceptualizations may prevent hybrid organizations from joining a coalition. Second, trying to cover too many issues can make it difficult for an advocacy group to connect to their audiences (Zuckerman 1999; Zuckerman et al. 2003; Hsu 2006). Hybrid organizations may have difficulty conveying their messages to a broader audience that may include potential coalition members (Minkoff 2002). Third, hybrid organizations can be perceived as illegitimate because they don't fit squarely into categories constructed by the broader population (Zuckerman 1999). Established groups are less likely to form alliances with groups they perceive to be illegitimate or insincere. Finally, groups in a coalition may not agree upon other topics beyond the shared goal. Hybrid organizations often

link multiple topics from a variety of interests sectors together. Disagreements about peripheral issues can lead to disputes among member groups and prevent hybrid organizations from joining a coalition (Rucht 2010).

For example, A Wider Bridge often finds itself at odds with other American LGBTQ organizations because of its support of Israel. One such instance happened at the National LGBTQ Task Force’s annual Creating Change Conference in Chicago on January 26, 2016. At the last moment after organizing a special reception, A Wider Bridge was uninvited from one of the largest LGBTQ conference in the United States. After deciding to move their reception off site, the organization’s event was disrupted by more than 200 protesters who opposed the presence of two Israeli speakers (Beyer 2016; JTA 2016). *Hypothesis 4b: Hybrid organizations are less likely to join the COP coalition because of varied conceptualizations of an issue or possible conflicts with other organizations.*

DATA AND METHODS

In this chapter, I explore how endogenous factors influence coalition membership among American Jewish pro-Israel groups between 1965-2005. Table 3.1 summarizes the various hypotheses outlined in the literature review. In the next section I provide a brief overview of the Conference of Presidents (COP), my methods, and the analytic strategy I used to test the hypotheses outlined above.

Table 3.1: Hypothesis Table		
Hypothesis	Organizational Characteristic	Expected Likelihood of Joining the COP
1	Similar Ideology	Increase
2a	High Degree of Visibility	Increase
2b		Decrease
3a	Primary Strategy: Advocacy/Service/Culture	Advocacy oriented
3b		Service/Culture oriented
4a	Hybrid Organizations	Increase
4b		Decrease

American Jewish Pro-Israel Coalition

This paper assesses which organizational characteristics influence the likelihood that a group will join a formal coalition. I focus on the largest, formal coalition within the American Jewish community's pro-Israel movement: The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (COP). Often referred to as "The Conference," this formal coalition was founded in 1955 and was originally composed of 15 member groups. COP was created to prevent overlapping responses to the same issues concerning Israel and to reduce the effects of inter-organizational competition (Elazar 1997). However, this coalition was fairly weak and inactive until the Six Day War (1967). The COP eventually came to serve as a key bridge between Israeli and American political elite and organized American Jewry. By the year 2016, the COP expanded from the original 15 members in 1955 and consisted of 55 member groups.

The COP regularly organizes rallies, meets with political elite, and issues press releases on behalf of all of its member groups. The COP is a prestigious coalition that can provide member groups with access to political elite and a degree of legitimacy. As the purported spokesmen for the American Jewish community, the COP may prefer organizations that can boost its legitimacy. This includes smaller groups whose voices are not currently represented by the COP or larger organizations that whose actions have attracted the attention of other organizations within the field, political elite, and American pro-Israel supporters.

To become a member of the COP, perspective organizations must apply for membership. Each COP member group votes on new, perspective members. Organizations with a two-thirds majority are accepted into the coalition. The COP does not disclose which groups apply and the rate of acceptance. Occasional news stories by Jewish media outlets has revealed several

instances when notable Jewish organizations' membership applications were denied by the COP. Rejection of perspective applicants was often a result of variations in American Jewish organization's stance toward Israel (i.e. hawkish, dovish, deferential stance). Most recently, the American Jewish pro-Israel group Jstreet was recently rejected from membership, sparking a debate amongst American Jews. In 2014, the COP member groups voted on whether to admit the Jstreet organization into their coalition. Jstreet was viewed as a controversial choice; this dovish group insists that many of the traditional and well-established pro-Israel groups fail to represent American Jews' opinions concerning Israel. When deciding on new members, each of the 51 member groups was allotted one vote on the prospective member. Though 22 COP members voted to admit this applicant, Jstreet did not secure the two-thirds majority needed and was rejected from the coalition (Pauslon 2014). Some members were happy to deny Jstreet membership. However, other organizations were outraged and threatened to leave the coalition. This conflict has significantly affected the nature of the coalition and the COP has since pledged to review its voting process and consider an alternative voting system that accounts for the different types of member-groups present in the coalition.

The conflict over Jstreet and similar American pro-Israel organizations that can be traced back to ideological tensions that arose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. When Jews left Eastern Europe en masse in pursuit of a better life, the majority immigrates to the U.S. Some Jews, inspired by socialist ideologies and nationalist aspirations, made their way to Palestine. Those Jews living in Palestine believed it was every Jew's duty to immigrate and help create a self-sustaining nation-state. American Jews disagreed and saw the U.S. as their homeland (Lainer-Vos 2012). American Jews supported Zionist ideals and were happy to contribute political and financial support, but believed Jews from other countries should

immigrate to Palestine. Despite these early ideological differences, American Jews became one of the largest financial supporters of Zionist movement in the early twentieth century (Lainer-Vos 2012). When Israel became an independent nation-state, this ideological tension came to a head. American Jewish donors wanted a say in how their donations to Israel were spent.

However, those living in Israel disagreed:

The [Jewish-Israeli Pioneers], who now occupied dominant positions in the Israeli polity, believed that American Jews, who proved their moral weakness by failing to migrate to Israel, had absolutely no right to determine policies in Israel... On the other side of the ocean, many Jewish Americans admired the [Jewish-Israeli Pioneers] but, by and large, also rejected much of their world-view. American Jews, as a whole, saw the United States as their home and aspired to a bourgeois lifestyle (Lainer-Vos 2012:69)

The American Jewish community and Israel had to negotiate this complex position. American Jews wanted to feel connected to the Zionist project and equals in the Israeli struggles, but did not want to immigrate. Israel heavily relied on the American Jewish community's financial support, but did not view them as equal partners in building a new nation. The creation of State of Israel Bonds allowed these two communities to negotiate this ideological tension.

While the Jewish-American contribution was different in kind from that of the Jews in Israel – Israeli Jews (some of them) served at the military front, while the bond subscribers served on the economic front – the sale and purchase of Israeli bonds allowed Jewish Americans to think of themselves as counterparts in the defense of Israel (Lianer-Vos 2012:125)

American Jews felt connected to Israel and were valued as an important part of its early nation-building efforts. Meanwhile, the Israeli community had sovereign control over how American contribution were spent and the policies they created as an independent democratic State. This compromise resulted in what I refer to as the deferential position: Israel is viewed as an independent State that has the sovereignty to determine its own policies. American Jewish community's duty is to support Israel in whatever decisions their democratically elected

government may make. Deferential American pro-Israel group do not believe that they are in a position to criticize, provoke dissent, or offend Israel.

While many mainstream American Jewish organizations approach Israel with deferential support, some groups have begun commenting on Israel's policies and treatment of Palestinians. Some American pro-Israel organizations take a "hawkish" approach while others have a more "dovish" approach. As discussed above, dovish groups are peace-oriented advocacy groups that often oppose the Israeli settlements in Palestine. By contrast, I refer to organizations who primarily focus on the safety and security of Israel and frequently support the settlements in Palestine as "hawkish" organizations. These groups differ from the traditional deferential approach to Israeli policy because they do not implicitly support all Israeli policies. Both hawkish and dovish groups feel entitled to criticize Israeli policy based on their ideological approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Data

As I discussed in chapter 2, I built an original dataset of coded purpose statements from 968 national Jewish organizations from 1945 to 2005. I coded the purpose statements of these organizations from 1945-2005. This coding scheme integrates categories used by the American Jewish Committee and Elazar (1997) (see appendix A for further details on my methods for data collection).

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is measured as the rate of membership in the COP each year between 1965 and 2005. Because the COP is primarily concerned with Israel, I limited the population of national Jewish organizations to only those that were coded as "pro-Israel" at some point between 1965 and 2005. This reduced the sample of organizations from 989 organizations

listed in the American Jewish Yearbook to 300 national Jewish organizations. Each organization was coded “1” if they were members of the COP for a given year and “0” if they were not. Of the 300 groups that were coded pro-Israel between 1965 and 2005, 62 distinct organizations were, at some point, members of the COP. While the total number of groups that were members of the COP steadily grew, not all groups remained members during the entire observation period. Groups that left the coalition generally merged with other organizations or were no longer present in the directory. When organizations merged with an existing group, they were recorded as “censored” data. In other words, when organizations merged with an existing group or were no longer present in the directory then they were dropped from the analysis in subsequent years.

Independent Variables

To test several hypotheses about the effect organizational characteristics have on coalition membership, I included several independent variables in my analysis. Using data from the *American Jewish Yearbook*, the *Encyclopedia of Associations*, and PROQUEST, I tested the effect of ideology, visibility in news media, strategy, and organizational structure. Below, I discuss how I collected and coded these independent variables.

Ideology

Researchers often use directories of formal organizations, such as the *Encyclopedia of Associations* to identify some elements of formal organizations’ ideologies (Minkoff 1999; Martin et al. 2006). Purpose statements submitted by organizations to such directories indicate what these groups stand for. While these purpose statements tend to be more centrist and moderate statements of their ideas and goals, they still represent the public face of an organization. Thus, I used purpose statements listed in the *American Jewish Yearbook* to assess organizations' ideological approaches.

The purpose statements exhibited a great deal of variation. I coded each purpose statement based on whether they described a deferential, hawkish, or dovish approach to Israel. Dovish groups tend to be more oriented toward peace and often oppose the Israeli settlements in Palestine, while Hawkish groups focus on the safety and security of Israel. Table 3.2 gives example purpose statements of pro-Israel groups and how they were coded.

Table 3.2: Purpose Statements Listed in the American Jewish Yearbook	
CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS: Seeks to strengthen the U.S.-Israel alliance and to protect and enhance the security and dignity of Jews abroad. Toward this end, the Conference of Presidents speaks and acts on the basis of consensus of its 54 member agencies on issues of national and international Jewish concern.	
Dovish pro-Israel Groups	Hawkish pro-Israel Groups
BRIT TZEDEK V'SHALOM—JEWISH ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE: Works for the achievement of a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict guided by the traditional Jewish obligation to pursue peace and justice, in the conviction that security for Israel can only be attained through the establishment of an economically and politically viable Palestinian state, necessitating an end to Israel's occupation of land acquired in the 1967 war and an end to Palestinian violence; its national office and 30 chapters around the country engage in grassroots political advocacy and public education.	AMERICANS FOR A SAFE ISRAEL (AFSI) Seeks to educate Americans in Congress, the media, and the public about Israel's role as a strategic asset for the West; through meetings with legislators and the media, in press releases and publications AFSI promotes Jewish rights to Judea and Samaria, the Golan, Gaza, an indivisible Jerusalem, and to all of Israel. AFSI believes in the concept of "peace for peace" and rejects the concept of "territory for peace."
AMERICAN FRIENDS OF NEVE SHALOM/ WAHAT AL-SALAM: Supports and publicizes the projects of the community of Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salam, the "Oasis of Peace." For more than twenty years, Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel have lived and worked together as equals. The community teaches tolerance, understanding and mutual respect well beyond its own borders by being a model for peace and reaching out through its educational institutions. A bilingual, bicultural Primary School serves the village and the surrounding communities.	TSOMET-TECHIYA USA: Supports the activities of the Israeli Tsomet party, which advocates Israeli control over the entire Land of Israel.

The majority of the sample expressed a deferential stance toward Israel in their purpose statements. Groups rarely changed their stance toward Israel; of 300 groups, only 13 groups did

so. However, there was a great deal of variability over time. Figure 3.1, below, shows how the percentage of dovish or hawkish pro-Israel groups changed over time. In order to control for changes in the number of groups that existed during each year, Figure 3.1 presents the percentage of those groups in existence who were coded as either hawkish or dovish. These two stances increase over time. By 1997, nearly 6% of member groups were coded as dovish, seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflicts between Israelis and Palestinian people. Similarly, the percent of the sample coded as hawks also peaked in 1997.




Figure 3.1: Percentage of Sample Coded as Hawks vs Doves

Organizations were coded as advocating a deferential or non-deferential stance toward Israel.

Because the Conference of Presidents advocates a deferential stance toward Israel, I would expect organizations with a deferential stance to be more likely to join the coalition.

Visibility

To approximate an organizations' visibility in news media, I recorded how often organizations in my sample were mentioned in historical newspapers. Using PROQUEST, I

searched historical newspapers and recorded the number of articles that mentioned organizations in my sample each year. The search was limited to articles in newspapers and magazines. I excluded academic articles, trade magazines, obituaries, and advertisements from my searches using PROQUEST's advanced search feature. This measure approximates visibility of organizations in print news media. It does not account for what type of coverage organizations received or how focused a given article was on a particular organization.

Advocacy and Service

I used Minkoff's (1995) research on advocacy and service organizations to approximate the effect of organizational strategy on coalition membership. Organizational strategy exists on a continuum ranging from those strategies that directly challenge the institution to those that focus exclusively on promoting culture or providing individuals with services. Using Minkoff's (1995) codebook, I coded organizations' purpose statements to determine whether they were focused on advocacy, service, culture, or some combination of these categories. The scale used by Minkoff (1995) was adapted to fit this dataset¹. The purpose statements were coded on an ordinal scale where "1" indicates primary focus on institutional advocacy and "7" represents primary focus on culture. For a detailed description of this code book and scale, see Appendix B.

Hybrid Organization

Hybrid organizations were any organization whose purpose statements indicated that a group fell into more than one of the nine overlapping classifications discussed in chapter 2: supports Israel, promotes immigration, indicates political/legal focus, serves as fraternities/social groups, promotes Jewish culture, furthers education, promotes religion, collects funds/provides charitable services, and supports professionals/vocational workers. The variable "hybrid

organizations" was operationalized as the number of coded categories for each group in a given year.

Age

Previous research suggests that organizations may hybridize as they age in order to cope with the political and organizational context (Minkoff 1995; Minkoff 1997). Thus, I would expect older organizations to hybridize. To control for this effect, I include the self-reported founding year listed in the directory for each organization.

Location

The coalition is located in Washington, D.C. I would expect that organizations that have their headquarters located in Washington D.C. would be more likely to join the coalition. New York City was also a common location for pro-Israel groups and could enable groups to more easily access this network of organizations, so I included it in the analysis. I include two dummy variables to represent locations. Organizations were coded as 1 if at any point between 1965 and 2005 the organizations indicated in their purpose statements that they were located in either New York City or Washington D.C.

Analytic Strategy

To test my hypotheses, I employed an event-history analysis, also known as survival analysis. These advanced statistical models estimate the probability that an event, such as joining a coalition, will occur given that it has not occurred already. In other words, this model estimates the conditional probability of joining a coalition. Event history models are advantageous because they can control for when organizations enter and exit the dataset. Only those organizations "at risk" of joining the COP coalition are included in the analysis. In other words, organizations are only included in the model when they have valid data points in the sample. As soon as an

organization joins the coalition or ceases to exist, it is no longer “at risk” of joining the coalition and dropped from the analysis.

The coefficients produced by an event history analysis reflect the impact of independent variables on the rate of coalition membership. A positive coefficient indicates that an independent variable increases the risk of joining a coalition over time. Similar to an OLS regression, this analysis provides standard errors, which allow us to determine if the observed effects are statistically significant or simply a product of random variation.

RESULTS

Table 3.3 summarizes the results of the event-history analysis. Model 1, which explored the relationship between ideology and coalition membership, shows that a deferential stance toward Israel increases the risk or likelihood of joining the coalition in a given year ($p < 0.05$). In other words, groups that expressed a deferential (as opposed to hawkish or dovish) stance toward Israel in their purpose statements were more likely to join the COP. This lends support to Hypothesis 1, which predicted that a deferential stance toward Israel increased the risk of joining the COP.

Table 3.3: Event History Analysis
(Robust, Exponential Coefficients)²

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Israel Stance	0.371* (0.180)	-	-	-0.134 (0.244)
Visibility	-	0.008* (0.003)	-	0.006 [†] (0.003)
Organizational Strategy Scale	-	-	-0.233*** (0.006)	-0.209** (0.074)
Hybrid	-	-	0.721*** (0.125)	0.740*** (0.147)
Founding Year	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)
New York	0.556 (0.601)	0.629 (0.580)	0.504 (0.633)	0.538 (0.618)
Washington D.C.	1.466* (0.646)	1.343* (0.590)	1.037 (0.672)	0.940 (0.630)
χ^2	12.1*	18.13**	41.07***	53.94***

[†] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Model 2 tested the effect of visibility on membership rates. The number of times an organization was mentioned in the newspaper each year is positively associated with the likelihood of joining the COP. Visibility increases the risk of joining the COP ($p < 0.05$). This result lends support to hypothesis 2a, which predicted an increased risk of coalition membership for highly visible groups.

Model 3 evaluated the relationship between organizational strategy, organizational structure, and coalition membership. The analysis shows an inverse relationship between coalition membership and the organizational strategy scale (where “1” represents institutional advocacy and “7” represents cultures) ($p < 0.001$). More simply, organizations focused on institutional advocacy (coded as “1”) were more likely to join than organizations focused on service or culture (coded as “6” or “7”). This lends support to hypothesis 3a, which predicted that when organizations’ strategies focused on advocacy, they were more likely to join the COP.

Model 3 also supports hypothesis 4a, which predicted that hybrid organizations were more likely to join the COP than single-issued groups. The number of categories expressed by an organization was positively associated with the risk of joining the COP in a given year ($p < 0.001$).

Model 4 shows how ideology, visibility, strategy, and organizational structure combine to explain coalition membership. In model 4, an organization's stance on Israel is no longer a significant predictor of COP membership. Visibility is marginally significant in this model, lending some additional support to hypothesis 2a. Organizational strategy and structure remain robust predictors of coalition membership in the full model, lending further support to hypotheses 3a and 4a. Organizations that focus primarily on institutional advocacy, as opposed to service or culture, are more likely to join the COP. Likewise, the more issues of foci an organization mentioned in their purpose statement, the more likely they were to join the COP in a given year.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Whereas chapter 2 focused on how exogenous, contextual factors influence the growth of a formal, enduring coalition, this chapter explored the endogenous factors related to coalition membership. Table 3.4 outlines the results and which hypotheses were supported or rejected. Previous research has suggested that organizations with similar ideologies are more likely to come together and form a coalition. I found that organizations with a similarly deferential stance toward Israel were more likely to join the COP coalition than groups that expressed either a hawkish or dovish stance in their purpose statements. Deferential organizations were more likely to join the coalitions because they were more similar to the existing members and seemed less threatening. Alternatively, hawkish and dovish groups could have opted out of the coalition;

groups with more extreme stances concerning Israel and Palestine may have chosen not to associate with the coalition.

Table 3.4: Results Summary			
Hypothesis	Organizational Characteristic	Expected Likelihood of Joining	Results
1	Similar Ideology	Increase	Increase
2a	Highly Visibility Organizations	Increase	Increase
2b		Decrease	
3a	Primary Strategy: Advocacy/Service/Culture	Advocacy oriented	Advocacy oriented
3b		Service/Culture oriented	
4a	Hybrid Organizations	Increase	Increase
4b		Decrease	

The event-history analysis revealed that the more often an organization was mentioned in newspaper articles, the more likely it was to join the COP. More visible organizations are more influential and often employ professional staff to manage day-to-day operations. Highly visible organizations are better situated to manage coalition membership. Formalized organizations with professional staff have individuals on hand who are available to act as representatives at coalition meetings, can maintain contact with other coalition members, and manage tasks associated with coalition work. Furthermore, the COP may be more inclined to seek out and accept highly visible organizations as coalition members. Having high-profile members that are prominent actors within the organizational field elevates the status of a coalition and can bring it greater legitimacy, influence, and attention. It is important for coalitions like the COP to include prominent organizations in their coalition in order to maintain their status and legitimate their claim of representing the entire American Jewish community.

Organizations whose strategies were primarily focused on institutional advocacy were more likely to join the COP coalition. Despite the pressure organizations feel to differentiate in order to compete for resources, advocacy organizations were more likely to join the coalition

than service or cultural organizations. This result could indicate that formal, enduring coalitions like the COP choose to accept organizations that share their strategy in order to prevent conflict and fragmentation. Alternatively, organizations that focus on providing services or promoting culture may decide that the costs associated with membership in a formal, enduring coalition are not worth the benefits. Further research should investigate if service-oriented coalitions behave differently from advocacy-oriented coalitions.

Hybrid organizations have recently received a great deal of scholarly attention. Table 3.3 shows that hybrid organizations were more likely to become COP members than single-issue organizations. Having a range of foci, as opposed to focusing on a single issue or strategy, appears to improve the chances of joining a formal enduring coalition.

A great deal of the existing literature on coalition formation focuses on how coalitions form in response to exogenous stimuli, such as threats and political opportunities. By combining insights from organizational theory and social movements, scholars have improved our general understanding of how groups press for change and what make some groups more successful than others. In this chapter, I've tried to shift the focus from how exogenous, contextual factors facilitate coalition growth to the endogenous factors that influence which organizations are more likely to join formal coalitions. Differences in an organization's visibility, strategy, and structure influence whether or not they'll join a formal coalition. While previous research has investigated how organizational factors (such as membership networks, organizational structure, and ideology) influence coalition membership, it has neglected other endogenous factors that I have explored in this chapter. This research adds to the existing literature by advancing our understanding of the variety of organizational characteristics and how they influence inter-organizational ties. Coalitions are an important social movement feature that can influence the

range and access to resources and potential to affect change. Future research should continue to identify the variety of endogenous factors that influence which organizations are most likely to join a coalition and advance our understanding of social movements.

CHAPTER 4: JEWISH AND EVANGELICAL ALLIES: ADVERSARIAL COLLABORATIONS IN THE AMERICAN PRO-ISRAEL MOVEMENT

‘Politics makes strange bedfellows’ we say to express our bewilderment at some new coalition which belies our expectations from past knowledge of the participants (Gamson 1961:373).

Premillennial Dispensationalism is a biblical interpretation which predicts that during the Rapture, when Jesus Christ returns, the majority of Jews will perish while the rest immediately convert to Christianity. Israel heavily factors into these end-times prophecies. The restoration of Jews to the Holy Land is a precondition for Christ's return. Additionally, foreign nations' treatment of Israel and the Jews, God's chosen people, affects Evangelical Christian's place in Heaven. This is the basis of American Evangelical Christian support for Israel. American organized Jewry willingly accepts support from Evangelical Christians despite Premillennial Dispensationalist prophecies that predict the demise of Jews around the world. When Nathan Perlmutter, director of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL), was asked about uneasy alliances between American Jews and Christian fundamentalists he said, “Praise God and pass the ammunition” (Carenen 2012:201).

These end time prophecies are not the only ideological distinction that makes these two groups unlikely allies. American Jewish political organizations like the ADL and Evangelical Christian organizations like the Moral Majority often disagree about domestic policy (Kosmin 2007; Carenen 2012). Social policies such as prayer in school, same-sex marriage, and access to abortion often divides these two political groups. Despite these differences, both American Jews and Evangelical Christians work together to secure political and material support for Israel. *How did these ostensibly unlikely alliances form? How do these organizations maintain alliances despite conflicting world views?*

Recently, social movement scholars have begun developing a theoretical framework for understanding how adversarial groups work together toward a common goal. These collaborations, often referred to as “strange bedfellow alliances,” differ from traditional coalitions because they bring together relatively diverse organizations that possess disparate ideologies and incongruent collective identities (Whittier 2014). The American pro-Israel movement is an excellent case for advancing our understanding of these strange bedfellow alliances. In this chapter, I use content analysis of archival documents to understand when and how Evangelical Christians and Jews in the United States began working together to support Israel. I build on Whittier’s (2014) concept of collaborative adversarial movements by exploring how these groups overcome their ideological differences and work together.

To address this question of how collaborative adversarial movements form and develop, I begin by reviewing the social movements literature on coalitions and collaborations. Then, I provide historical context for this case. I discuss relevant events in the U.S and Israel that provided new political opportunities. I review early American Jewish support for Israel and highlight how it has shifted since the early 1900s from a unified body to more fractured, partisan support. I then discuss how Evangelical Christians came to support Israel and the Biblical prophecies that motivate their advocacy efforts. Finally, I discuss how American Jews and Evangelical Christians negotiate their differences to provide political and financial support for Israel. I find that this strange bedfellow alliance was facilitated by the confluence of three interacting processes. First, changes to the U.S. and Israeli political context created new opportunities. Second, shifts in the Jewish and Evangelical organizational fields allowed for new alliances to emerge. Third, organizational entrepreneurs, brokers, and codes of conduct mediated conflicts among ideologically disparate communities.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In chapter 3, I confirmed that social movement organizations (SMOs) must share a common purpose and create an identity that can unite member groups to build and sustain a coalition (Hirsch 1986; Taylor and Whittier 1999; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Rucht 2010). Conflicts over organizations' grievances, goals, tactics, and structure can lead to fragmentation (Lichterman 1995; Maney 2000; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003; Roth 2008; Cornfield and McCammon 2010). Groups with conflicting ideologies or world views are likely to find it harder to identify shared interests and create a common identity. Even if groups share similar interests or are located in the same interest sector, varied conceptualizations of the same social problem can lead to divergent movement goals (Maney 2000). Furthermore, groups often link multiple topics together. Groups in a coalition may not agree upon other topics beyond the shared goal. Disagreements about peripheral issues, as opposed to overlapping issues or grievances which coordinating groups agree on, can lead to disputes among member groups (Rucht 2010). In other words, member organizations must share sufficient common ground upon which to build a coalition. Divergent interests and conflicting world views can create divisions and fracture the coalition.

Political Opportunities, Organizational Entrepreneurs, Brokers and Codes of Conduct

Previous research has found that several processes can enable groups to overcome traditional barriers and form alliances and collaborations amongst organizations within the same interest sector. In chapter 2, I found that exogenous factors, like threats, can reduce the barriers to forming a coalition. Similarly, political opportunities can encourage coalitions between organizations. Shifts in the organizational field can reduce the barriers to forming a coalition.

Organizational entrepreneurs and brokers can bring groups together and mediate conflicts.

Establishing codes of conduct can ease tensions and enable collaborations.

Social movement scholars often use political opportunity structure as a theoretical framework for understanding social movement processes (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; Amenta et al. 2002; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Ho and Rolfe 2011; De Fazio 2012). The political opportunity approach links elements of the existing political structure to social movements' abilities to influence national policy. Changes to the political context can create opportunities for social movement organizations to affect political change. Structural or contextual changes can create new political opportunities that make successful policy change seem close at hand, which can encourage coalition formation and growth (Staggenborg 1986; Hathaway and Meyer 1993-1994; Van Dyke 2003; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005). In such instances, organizations may be more willing to set aside their differences and work together to achieve a shared political objective. Thus, changes to the political context could create opportunities that enable collaborations between adversarial communities.

Organizational dynamics also influence when and how different SMOs come together and form an informal alliances or formal coalition. Changes to the structure of an organizational field can create new opportunities for collaboration (Staggenborg 1986). The way in which an organizational field is structured and, "...the types of connections and structures that exist within and across social movement communities as well as internal dynamics with SMOs" can influence whether different groups will come together and form an alliance or coalition (Staggenborg 2010:322).

Some types of organizational leaders, or entrepreneurs, can help SMOs overcome barriers to coalition formation by reaching out to engage new, potential allies. Whereas social movement

professionals make a career out of organizing social movements, entrepreneurs initiate movement activity based on their commitment to the movement.

...personal experiences and ideological commitments which make them interested in the particular issue(s) of the movement. They are also tied into the social networks and preexisting organizational structures that allow the movement to mobilize and are influenced by environmental developments... (Staggenborg 1986:594-594).

Staggenborg (1986) argues that professionalized social movement organizations with paid staff can more easily maintain coalitions. However, entrepreneurs are more likely to initiate certain types of movement activity and take advantage of new opportunities because entrepreneurs are motivated by personal experiences, ideological commitments, and social networks. Thus, entrepreneurs may be more likely to take advantage of new opportunities and overcome existing barriers while professionals in more formalized organizations with paid staff are better suited to maintain existing coalitions and alliances.

Organizational bridge builders or brokers are another way that organizations can overcome barriers to collaborative work. Obach defines these coalition facilitators as, "...individuals who possess intimate knowledge of the different movements or organizations that are coming together or who hold a dual identity such that they have a rich understanding of the perspectives and cultures of two or more distinct groups" (Obach 2010:202). These individuals help facilitate coalitions by smoothing over cultural or organizational differences, creating a shared understanding of a grievance, and fostering trust between various communities (Hula 1999; Rose 2000; Obach 2004; Mische 2008; Reese, Petit and Meyer 2010). For example, a lack of mutual trust and shared understanding makes it difficult for labor unions and environmental groups to collaborate on long-term policy goals. Obach (2004) notes that whenever these two communities are able to overcome these barriers and engage in long-term collaborative work,

there is always an individual who has strong ties to both communities that facilitates the interaction. Those individuals who facilitate collaborations between social movement organizations are often referred to as either bridge builders or brokers. I refer to these individuals as brokers.

Finally, routines and codes of conduct can facilitate collaborative work between social movement organizations. Unlike mergers, inter-organizational alliances indicate that SMOs are open to working together yet they would like to maintain some of their autonomy and distinctiveness. Rucht (2010:203) argues that the very definition of an alliance, "...implies an insistence on differences between the allied partners." An organizational structure or routine can provide a systematic way of dealing with these differences, including interpersonal and ideological conflict (Staggenborg 1986). Williams found that when member groups "...acknowledge such threats to cooperation and successfully abate conflict through innovative procedures or power-sharing arrangements, cooperation is more likely to endure over time" (Williams 1999:142). In other words, establishing routines or codes of conduct can facilitate collaborations between groups who may have difficulty working together. Such codes of conducts can limit disputes about by focusing attention on what groups share rather than those features or periphery issues that distinguish groups from one another. In this context, a "periphery issue" is grievance or ideology that distinguishes organizations from a potential ally that could share some other common ground.

Collaborative Adversarial Movements

Recently, scholars have turned their attention to strange bedfellow alliances (Whittier 2014). These collaborations differ from traditional coalitions because they bring together

relatively diverse organizations that have incongruent collective identities and disparate ideologies. How do such ostensibly unlikely alliances develop and maintain open collaborations?

Nancy Whittier (2014) offers a theoretical framework to help us understand these strange bedfellow alliances, which differ from typical coalitions. While strange bedfellow alliances may interact and work together on similar goals, they generally do not form explicit coalitions.

Whittier's (2014) work expands our understanding of social movement organizations by suggesting that coalitions are one part of a broader spectrum of inter-organizational interactions. According to this theoretical perspective, interactions between various organizations also vary according to the degree that two or more organizations share a collective identity or a congruent ideology. Strange bedfellow alliances are termed "collaborative adversarial movements."

Collaborative adversarial movements are composed of organizations that (1) interact toward a shared goal, yet (2) possess either opposed ideologies or incongruent collective identities (Whittier 2014). Such adversarial organizations with opposed ideologies and incongruent collective identities are different from groups that merely have dissimilar goals but are located in the same or similar interest sectors:

Congruence consists of broad compatibility, with shared values and beliefs, but not necessarily complete overlap. Radical and liberal feminists, or labor and environmental activists, would thus be congruent because of their shared membership in a progressive social movement sector. Organizations are neutral when their stances toward each other's ideologies, values, beliefs, or collective identities are neither congruent nor opposed (Whittier 2014:177).

In other words, organizations within the same interest sector that disagree on minor points are relatively congruent. For organizations to be considered incongruent, they must be located in opposed interest sectors. The Anti-Hate crime campaign is a collaborative adversarial movement because it is composed of liberal and conservative groups that take an oppositional

stance toward each other's ideologies. Similarly, the anti-pornography campaign is a collaborative adversarial movement because it includes liberal feminist and conservatives who work together behind the scenes. Today's American pro-Israel movement represents a collaborative adversarial movement because it includes both liberal Jews and conservative Evangelical Christians that are located in oppositional interest sectors. These communities disagree on a range of ideological issues and possess incompatible collective identities.

Whittier (2014) provides an important first step to understanding these understudied inter-organizational interactions. The adversarial collaborations described by Whittier (2014) were often behind the scenes. Incongruent and opposed ideologies or collective identities generally prevent such groups from openly collaborating. To advance this theoretical framework, I examine how collaborative adversarial alliances emerged and created open collaborations in spite of groups' opposed ideologies or incongruent collective identities. I employed a comparative historical analysis of the American pro-Israel movement to understand how liberal Jewish organizations and conservative Evangelical organizations were able to forge and maintain loose collaborations. Drawing on previous research, I argue that collaborative adversarial movements can openly collaborate when political and contextual shifts create an opportunity, brokers and entrepreneurs help negotiate conflicts, and codes of conduct are created to manage interactions. These processes are similar to those discussed by coalitions scholars.

This project expands our understanding of strange bedfellows by exploring how ideologically opposed organizations with incongruent collective identities openly worked together toward a shared goal. More specifically, this chapter explores how Evangelical Christian and Jewish organizations in the United States negotiated their differences and openly work together to mobilize American support for Israel. I use the term American pro-Israel movement

(APIM) to refer to those American organizations that seek to secure political, financial, or moral support for Israel. APIM is rooted in American Zionism, which dates back to 1914 and advocated for the establishment of a Jewish state (Cohen 1975). In the previous chapters, I have described how the APIM has developed an extensive set of formal coalitions within the Jewish community. In this chapter, I show how this movement has expanded to develop unexpected alliances with Evangelical Christian organizations. I argue that, despite oppositional ideologies and incongruent collective identities, American Jews and Evangelical Christians have been able to form and maintain open collaborations. Using archival research, I demonstrate that these adversarial groups were able to form open collaborations as a result of three key factors: (1) new political opportunities in the U.S. and Israel, (2) shifts in the Jewish and Evangelical organizational fields, and (3) the mediating effect of brokers, entrepreneurs, and codes of conduct to manage interactions. In the next section, I briefly review the history of American Jewish support for Israel. Then I detail the rise of conservative Christian support for Israel. Finally, I discuss what makes these two groups incongruent and how these communities overcame these barriers to eventually collaborate.

TIMELINE: MAPPING FOUR DIMENSIONS

By employing a comparative historical analysis, I trace the emergence of Jewish Evangelical collaborations. Using archival research, I show that these adversarial collaborations were able to emerge as a result of shifts in the American and Israeli political opportunity structure as well as changes to Jewish and Evangelical organizational fields. While these political and organizational shifts provided an opportunity, they were not sufficient to build and maintain alliances. Organizational entrepreneurs, brokers, and codes of conduct help ease tensions and facilitate inter-organizational interactions. The timeline, below, provides a brief overview of key

events that occurred between the 1960s and the 1990s that allowed for the emergence of Jewish-Evangelical collaborations.

The timeline is broken down into four parts: Israeli political opportunity structure, US political opportunity structure, organized American Jewry, and the American Evangelical community. For clarity, I tackle these four dimensions separately before discussing how they came together and allowed for the emergence of Jewish-Evangelical adversarial collaborations. First, I consider major events in Israel and the U.S. that created political opportunities. Second, I discuss the American Jewish community and key changes to its organizational field. I highlight how, in response to changes to the political context, organized Jewry shifted away from unquestioning, deferential support that arose in the 1950s and 1960s. This organizational shift created an opportunity for collaborations with Evangelical groups. Third, I explore American Evangelical support for Israel and their politicization in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of political opportunities in the U.S. Organizational entrepreneurs took advantage of new political opportunities in the U.S. The newly mobilized Christian Right became a major force in American politics. Finally, I consider how these dimensions resulted in the emergence of loose collaborations between American Jewish and Evangelical organizations.




Figure 4.1: Timeline of Political Structures, American Jews, and Evangelicals

AMERICAN AND ISRAEL POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

Like other transnational social movements, the American pro-Israel movement is effected by more than one national political context. Both events in the U.S. and Israel influence Americans’ pro-Israel advocacy efforts. Several key events in both countries created new opportunities between the 1960s and 1990s. Major ideological shifts in the Israeli legislature,

new Israeli policies that alienated American Jewry, and shocking events changed American Jews' relationship to Israel and the nature of their support. In the U.S., new campaign finance laws, the Supreme Court's ruling on *Roe v. Wade*, and Ronald Reagan's political victory mobilized the New Christian Right and revealed their strength and a political bloc.

Israeli Political Context

As discussed in the previous chapters, Israel has undergone several major threats that have shaped organized American Jewry. The Six Day War in 1967 mobilized mass support among American Jews and helped establish a well-organized network of Jewish pro-Israel groups. During this war, Israel occupied new territory. Israelis argued about how to handle the newly occupied territory. Though the Yom Kippur War in 1973 mobilized mass support from American Jews, it served to deepen political divides in Israel. The government's failure to anticipate the 1973 attack, a growing nationalist movement among Palestinians, debates about religious Jewish settlers' movement, and demographic changes in Israel led to a major political shift. From 1948 to 1977 the Israeli legislature, the Knesset, had been dominated by the left-leaning labor party. In 1977, the right-wing Likud party along with the Agudat party, which represented extremely religious Jews, won control of the Knesset. This was a major political shift that reflected deepening political divides within Israel. Control over the Knesset has shifted between the Labor (left-wing) and Likud (right-wing) since 1977. These shifts reflected increasingly heated debates among Israeli citizens over the contentious issues that emerged in 1973. Israeli policies toward Palestinians, Jewish settlers' movement, and the peace process fluctuated in response to changes in leadership. American Jewish advocacy groups that hoped to influence U.S. foreign policy found it increasingly difficult to lobby American politicians because Israel's policies shifted with each new Knesset.

In the 1970s and 1980s, these deepening political divisions in Israeli society spilled over into American Jewry. As previously discussed, American Jews developed a norm of deferential support in the 1940s and 1950s. They refused to comment on Israeli policy and maintained that as an independent nation-state, Israel had the right to self-govern without interference from American Jews. However, the 1970s ushered in a new era in which American Jews began debating Israeli policies. Rapid shifts in the Israeli politics, especially the government's policy toward Palestinians and the peace process, made it increasingly difficult for mainstream American Jewish pro-Israel advocacy groups to maintain deferential support. Furthermore, individual Israeli political parties, such as the Likud and Labor party, began establishing their own ties to individual American Jewish organizations. American Jews' opinions toward Israel began to fracture as they took part in similar debates that were happening in Israel. Though events in the 1970s sparked debates among American Jews, they continued to maintain unified deferential support when advocating for and speaking publicly about Israel.

The 1982 Lebanon War and the Sabra and Shatila massacres sparked outrage and contention among Israeli citizens. News of mass demonstrations in Israel made headlines in American Jewish newspapers and publications. Outraged protestors demanded a full public inquiry into the massacres. Prominent American Jewish leaders from mainstream organizations condemned the massacres and publically demanded to know how such atrocities could take place under Israeli rule. For the first time, American Jewish leaders from large, mainstream organizations publically questioned the Israeli government's policies.

Subsequent events in the 1980s further fractured organized American Jewry. First, the Likud government, which allied itself with religious Jews, enacted policies that increasingly privileged Orthodox Judaism over other denominations. American Jews are primarily affiliated

with three denominations, or “movements.” National surveys of American Jews in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2001 reveal that only a small portion of American Jews identify as Orthodox (Berman Jewish Databank 1995). In 1970s, 40.5% of respondents identified as Conservative, 30% identified as Reform, 12% didn’t identify with any movement, and 11% identified as Orthodox (Berman Jewish Databank 1995). Since 1970s, fewer American Jews surveyed identify as Orthodox (Berman Jewish Databank 1995). Thus, pro-Orthodox policies in Israel alienated the vast majority of American Jews who didn’t identify as Orthodox. Second, Jonathan Pollard, an American Jew, was charged with espionage for passing on classified U.S. naval documents to the Israeli government. The case of Jonathan Pollard led to deepening divides within American Jewry and increasing disappointment with Israeli leadership (Elazar 1986). Though the majority of American Jews maintained that Israel needed their support, the nature of that support became increasingly fractured in the 1980s in response to these events. Some American Jews became more hawkish while others took a dovish approach.

U.S. Political Context

Changes to the American political context in the 1970s and 1980s created opportunities that encouraged collaborations between American Jewish and Evangelical organizations. The Federal Elections and Campaign Act (FECA), *Roe v. Wade*, and Reagan’s victory over Carter created key opportunities in the American political context. Enacted in 1972, FECA was designed to limit the influence of money in U.S. political campaigns. The initial law and subsequent amendments throughout the 1970s were designed to create greater transparency in campaign spending and limit the influence of money in politics. Though FECA and subsequent amendments established limits on campaign contributions. Limits on campaign spending were struck down by the Supreme Court in 1973. In addition, loopholes have developed that allow

individuals and groups to contribute unlimited sums of money to special, *ad hoc* groups that indirectly advocate for specific candidates (Quinn 1997). More specifically, the use of soft money, independent expenditures, issue advocacy spending, and the formation of political action committees (PACs) provided individuals and groups opportunities to contribute unlimited sums of money to support specific candidates (Berry and Wilcox 2007). The changes in the American political system created an opportunity for organizational entrepreneurs that could influence politicians by mobilizing the appropriate resources and taking advantage of new campaign finance laws.

The Supreme Court's decision on *Roe v Wade* (1973) gave rise to an increasingly polarized political landscape which parties strategically used to mobilize supporters. This landmark Supreme Court decision stimulated not only legislative debates, but also mobilized social movement organizations (Ferree et al. 2002). Following the decision, televangelist Billy Graham founded the first formal conservative Christian anti-abortion organization, "Christian Action Council" (Ferree et al. 2002:31). Major Christian Right organizations, including the Moral Majority, Christian Voice, and the Religious Roundtable, rapidly mobilized throughout the 1970s and 1980s in response to the Supreme Court decision (Ferree et al. 2002:163). Ronald Reagan capitalized on the growing abortion debate that emerged following *Roe v. Wade*. To win the support of the newly politicized Christian Right, Reagan's platform included a promise to pass a constitutional amendment banning abortion (Ferree et al. 2002:36). Before *Roe v Wade*, few Evangelicals actively participated in politics and were fairly divided in their partisan support (Ferree et al. 2002). Reagan's anti-abortion platform helped him oust the incumbent, Jimmy Carter, for U.S. president in 1980, highlighting the potential political strength of the New Christian Right.

AMERICAN JEWISH SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

Extensive research by Jewish studies scholars provides a detailed analysis of the Zionist movement and trends in American Jewish support for Israel. This rich literature, coupled with archival research, provides an excellent background for understanding how the American Jewish community and conservative Christian community have worked together to advocate on behalf of Israel. I have outlined much of this history in the introductory chapter. Rather than provide a comprehensive background, I focus on American Jewish support from the 1970s to the early 2000s. The goal is to provide an overview of how the relationship between the American Jewish community and Israel has developed and changed in more recent years. In the next section, I will highlight how organized American Jewry responded to these changes in the political opportunity structure and consequent shifts in the organizational field.

Changing Support for Israel

In general, the Six Day War mobilized and solidified American Jewish support for Israel. However, the land Israel captured and occupied in the Six Day War became a point of contention. The same debates Israeli citizens were having about the occupied territories, how to secure peace, and civil rights for Palestinians were also taking place among American Jews. However, American Jews confined their debates and criticisms to other members of the community. Unlike the Israelis, American Jewish organizations and individuals continued to maintain a norm of deferential support when speaking with outsiders, such as the political elite and the press. When discussing Israeli policy, especially Israel's treatment of Palestinians, some took a "hawkish" approach while others had a more "dovish" approach. Hawks primarily focused on the safety and security of Israel, viewed Palestinians as a security risk or threat, and frequently supported Jewish settlements in Palestine. I include organizations and individuals

affiliated with the neoconservative movement among Hawkish groups because of their focus on strong military defense. By contrast, the dovish approach was more peace-oriented, tended to support a two-state solution, and often opposed the Israeli settlements in Palestine.

In the 1970s, American Jewish organizations began challenging this norm of deferential, unquestioning support for Israel. Dismayed by the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, a group of Rabbis, scholars, and prominent Jews formed a new organization in 1973, “Breira”, to promote dialogue between Jews and Palestinians. Breira, which is Hebrew for alternative, challenged the prevailing norms about deferential support. In its founding statement, Breira declared, “This is the reason we join together now -- we deplore those pressures in American Jewish life which make open discussion of these and other vital issues virtually synonymous with heresy” (Staub 2002:281). Breira was widely criticized and accused of anti-Semitism by the American Jewish community. In 1977, forty demonstrators from the Jewish Defense League protested Breira’s first national conference (Washington Post 1977:A39). Many community members felt that American Jews had no right to criticize Israeli policies. Rabbi Stanley Rabinowitz, President of the Rabbinical Assembly told reporters from the Washington Post (1977:A39), “It is arrogant of them to sit in their ivory towers and pass judgement, with nothing to lose by making the wrong choice.” Other Jews viewed Breira’s actions as a threat to Israel. Rabbi Israel Klavan, executive vice president of the Rabbinical Council told reporters, “What they are doing is weakening Israel’s bargaining position” (Washington Post 1977:A39). Organized American Jewry, which relied heavily on cooperation and coordination, ostracized Breira. In 1978, the Jewish Community Council, an umbrella organization composed of over 200 local Jewish groups, rejected Breira’s membership application because of the groups, “...form and style of dissent on issues affecting the survival of Israel” (Vin 1978:C10).

Breira was the first of several organizations to breach the American Jewish community's norms of deferential support for Israel. It prompted more traditional, mainstream Jewish groups, like the American Jewish Committee and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, to launch internal investigations on limits of public dissent of Israel (Sasson 2014:24). The COP stated in its 1977 annual report, "Dissent ought not and should not be made public" (Sasson 2014:26). Breira, which disbanded by 1980, and similar dissenters represented only a small fraction of the American Jewish community. During this time, the vast majority of American Jews maintained unquestioning support for Israel. Daniel Elazar, a prominent political scientist, described the American Jews' tendency to idealize the Jewish state as "Israelolotry" (Sasson 2014:28).

Events in the 1980s began to strain this norm of deferential support for Israel. Fewer and fewer American Jews believed that they should only provide deferential support for Israel. Surveys of American Jewish public opinion, commissioned by the American Jewish Committee, revealed that by the mid-1990s, only a minority of American Jews felt they should not criticize the Israeli government. When asked, "American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel," only 26% of Jews agreed with this statement in 1995 and 33% of Jews agreed with this statement in 1998 (American Jewish Committee 1995; American Jewish Committee 1998). Though opinions changed modestly, only one-third of American Jews in the mid- to late-1990s continued to maintain the norm of deferential support for Israel.

Just as the Six Day War encouraged the emergence of a new organizational field within the American Jewish community, the events in the 1980s and 90s led to the emergence of more hawkish and dovish Israel advocacy organizations that appealed to the diverse perspectives within the American Jewish community. Some had direct ties to specific political parties in Israel

while others reflected the increasingly diverse range of public opinion concerning Israel. Many of the larger, traditional Israel advocacy organizations that had emerged in the aftermath of the Six Day War maintained a centrist approach. This centrist approach reflects the deferential, unquestioning support for Israel that emerged after 1948. These groups often take their lead from the Israeli government. These centrist organizations continue to dominate the organizational field. Alongside these centrist groups, left-leaning (dovish) and right-leaning (hawkish) groups began to emerge. They have become increasingly more popular, competing for membership and resources with mainstream, centrist organizations.

More recent data shows that centrist groups still dominate the field, but hawkish and dovish groups continue to compete for support and attention. Sasson's (2014) study compares total membership, number of newspaper mentions, and total budget of a left-leaning group (Jstreet), a centrist group (American Israel Public Affairs Committee or AIPAC), and a right-leaning group (Zionist Organization of America or ZOA). AIPAC's \$67 million budget operating budget in 2010 vastly exceeded Jstreet's (\$7 million) and ZOA's (\$4 million) budgets (Sasson 2014:45). Between 2009 and 2011, AIPAC received the most attention from both the U.S. general media and American Jewish media (Sasson 2014:54). However, hawkish and dovish groups continue to attract attention from the media and supporters. Jstreet ranked second behind AIPAC in media mentions, receiving roughly two-thirds of the amount of mentions as AIPAC (Sasson 2014:53). Though Jstreet operated on a significantly smaller budget, it attracted a disproportional amount of media attention when compared to AIPAC.

Increasing support for left- and right-leaning pro-Israel groups has been an alarming shift for mainstream, centrist groups that had previously dominated the field. A shrinking membership base and difficulty raising resources has led these mainstream groups to lament declining support

for Israel among American Jews. They thus claim that the American Jewish population is shrinking and support for Israel amongst American Jews is declining. More recent research by Sasson (2014) suggests that support for Israel amongst American Jews is not declining, but rather changing form. Instead of deferential support and membership in centrist organizations, American Jews are more engaged in partisan support and tend to join more niche organizations. Whether American Jewish support for Israel is shrinking or simply changing form, mainstream organizations feel a diminishing capacity to influence U.S. foreign policy for Israel.

EVANGELICAL CHRISTIAN SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

Conservative Christian support for Israel and the Zionist movement has waxed and waned in the U.S. since the 1920s. One difficulty often associated with studying conservative Christians' political mobilization is identifying the appropriate terms and operationalizations to characterize this population (Carenen 2012). For simplicity, I use Hunter's (1981) definitions and operationalizations. While some scholars distinguish between Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism, others often conflate these terms. In his review, Hunter (1981) considers them to be synonymous.

...the concept, Evangelicalism will be considered synonyms with the concepts conservative Protestantism, ascetic Protestantism, orthodox Protestantism, and Fundamentalism. With few exceptions, these terms are used synonymously by members of this broad subculture as well as by social scientists who study this phenomenon (Hunter 1981:363).

Scholars engaged in survey research have difficulty operationalizing Evangelicalism because of the ambiguity associated with this concept. Hunter (1981) provides an operationalization that is based on theological tenets rather than self-reporting or denominational affiliation. There are three core theological beliefs that unite all Evangelicals: the Bible is infallible, Jesus Christ is divine, and salvation can only be achieved through faith in Jesus Christ (Hunter 1981:368-369).

Some scholars studying Evangelical support for Israel believe that proselytization is another defining characteristic of Evangelicalism (Lipset and Raab 1981; Spector 2009). For the purpose of this project, I use Evangelicals and Fundamentalists interchangeably to refer to conservative Christians who adhere to these four theological tenets.

This religious movement is extremely popular in the U.S. A nationally representative survey in 2014 about American's religious attitudes and beliefs showed that the more Christians identify as Evangelical than any other Christian denomination. In the U.S., 70.6% of all Americans identify as Christian. Nearly one-fourth of Americans (25.4%) identified as Evangelical Protestant (PewForum 2014). Catholics make up the next largest subgroup (20.8%) followed by mainline Protestants (14.7%) (PewForum 2014). Today, Evangelical protestants are the largest single religious denomination in the U.S. Between the late 1920s and early 1970s, this religious community did not generally engage in patrician politics (Himmelstein 1983; Ariel 2007; Dorrien 2007). However, the emergence of the New Christian Right movement in the 1970s and 1980s meant that this community began actively engaging in American politics. In the next section I briefly review the history of American Evangelical/Fundamentalist Christian support for Israel and its roots in the theological movement known as “premillennial dispensationalism.”

The Rise of Premillennial Dispensationalism

Evangelical Christian support for Israel is largely based on a religious movement known as premillennial dispensationalism. Dispensationalists, who interpret the Bible as the literal word of God, believe history is divided into distinct periods, known as dispensations. The present dispensation is said to have begun with the death of Jesus and will end with the Second Advent of Jesus. Christ's return will mark the next dispensation, known as the millennium. In other

words, dispensationalists believe that we are currently living in the period that will end with the rapture and Christ's return. Dispensationalists are not confined to a specific church or denomination. Rather, these beliefs are shared by a larger community of Evangelical Christians. Dispensationalists are defined by a set of theological beliefs including, but not limited to, the rapture, the return of Christ in physical form, a literal interpretation of the bible, and that these End-times prophecies will likely take place within their lifetimes.

The founder of this theological movement, John Nelson Darby, began disseminating his views in the U.S. in the 1870s. Darby drew adherents from various denominations. Though dispensationalists never organized a specific institution or denomination, at the turn of the century they pioneered the U.S. Fundamentalists movement. For Darby, Israel factored heavily into his End-of-Days prophecies, also known as eschatology. According to dispensationalist prophecies, the Jews' gathering in Israel and the rebuilding of the temple in Jerusalem are important precursors to the rapture and return of Christ.

William E. Blackstone became a prominent leader within the dispensationalist movement. He reached out to both Jewish and Christian leaders in his efforts to advocate for political Zionism in the late 1800s and early 1900s. After visiting Palestine, Blackstone organized a joint meeting between Reform Jewish rabbis and Christian leaders in 1890 to mobilize support for a petition that advocated for the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine. The vast majority of Reform rabbis opposed this petition. At the time, Jews were hesitant to accept Blackstone as an ally. Some were wary of Blackstone's missionary activities and feared that if they allied with him, then Jews would be expected to accept all of the New Testament and Christian beliefs (Spector 2009). Others, such as the United States Council on Jerusalem, were

afraid that Blackstone's efforts would complicate American foreign policy, especially American-Turkish relations (Spector 2009).

Eventually, Blackstone gained numerous allies within the American Jewish community. Several of the 413 signatures on Blackstone's 1891 political proposal advocating for the Zionist movement were from American Jewish rabbis and community leaders (Malachy 1978; Spector 2009). The same year that Blackstone submitted his proposal to the President, he also published a pamphlet to combat anti-Zionism among U.S. Reform Jews. Orthodox Jews appreciated Blackstone's work, had his pamphlet translated it into Yiddish, and circulated 75,000 copies (Malachy 1978).

Though Blackstone was a lifelong supporter of Zionism until his death in 1935, he became increasingly frustrated with the political Zionist movement. In 1916, he submitted a second petition to Woodrow Wilson. However, Blackstone's second petition only had 82 signatures. Blackstone was frustrated by the secular nature of the Zionist movement, the Jews' refusal to convert to Christianity, and American Jews' hesitation to fully commit to the Zionist movement. In a 1918 speech, he proclaimed that American Jews who chose to assimilate would suffer, "...the same fate as was experienced by those who came out of Egypt by never reaching Palestine" (Malachy 1978:140). In spite of his criticism of American Jews and his missionizing efforts (or proselytizing efforts), Blackstone was honored by American Jewish historians and Zionists for his political activity (Malachy 1978; Spector 2009).

Evangelicals and Fundamentalists began shifting their focus toward proselytizing and no longer advocated for political Zionism. Dispensationalists were hesitant to view the formation of Israel in 1948 as a sign of the rapture and End of Days. In 1955, Professor Charles Feinberg

published a comprehensive article on Israel and its role in dispensationalist eschatology in one of the movement's leading publications, *Bibliotheca Scara*:

First of all, the present return to the land is not the fulfillment of the Abrahamic Covenant. The present boundaries of the State of Israel are a far cry from those given in Genesis 15:12-21...As a matter of sober fact, their present non-religious trend and uneasy peace that prevails in the land can easily set the stage for their relations with the Roman beast and false prophet (the Anti-Christ) of the great tribulation, after the Church is raptured to glory...Let us not misjudge the existence of the State of Israel in the world today, and let us realize as never before that earth's time is running out rapidly. (Malacy 1978:149)

Israel's creation as a more secular, democratic nation-state was viewed as a clear sign that it was not the Israel described in biblical prophecies. Dispensationalists saw the founding of Israel as "setting the stage" for End of Days eschatology rather than fulfilling prophecies about Christ's return. Similarly, dispensationalist leaders cautioned their followers against viewing Israel's victory in the Six Day War (1967) as fulfilling prophecies. The editor of another leading dispensationalist publication, *Moody Monthly*, declared his warnings in July-August 1967:

We should like to reiterate here, that we believe it wrong to consider any current happening a direct fulfillment of biblical prophecy, although many aspects of the political situation are strikingly similar to what the Bible says about conditions in the last days (Malachy 1978:155).

Premillennial dispensationalist eschatology, or end-times prophecies, spurred American Christian Support in the early 1900s. By the 1920s, Evangelical Christians shifted their attention away from Zionism and towards proselytization. Between the 1920s and the 1970s, some Evangelical Christian organizations and leaders expressed support for the creation of Israel, but most Evangelicals and Fundamentalists were not actively advocating on behalf of Israel and the Zionist movement after the First World War. Evangelical Christian support for Israel didn't resurface until the 1970s.

Politicization of the Christian Right and Support for Israel

Widespread political support for Israel among Evangelical Christians began to gain momentum in the 1980s with the politicization of the New Christian Right. This increasingly influential political movement merged in response to changes in the U.S. political structure discussed earlier. Organizations, such as Christian Voice, the Roundtable, and the Moral Majority emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Guth 1983). Founded by Evangelical clergyman and televangelists, these early political organizations sought to mobilize conservative Christians. Of all the New Christian Right organizations in the early 1980s, the Moral Majority was one of the most successful at mobilizing Evangelical Christians in the U.S. (Liebman 1982).

The Moral Majority, led by Jerry Falwell, successfully politicized Evangelical Christians, giving rise to the Christian Right as an influential political bloc in American politics (Guth 1983; Himmelstein 1983; Dorrien 2007; Grossman 2007; Mamo 2007). The Moral Majority was founded in 1979 and had four major principles: oppose abortion, uphold traditional marriage, strengthen U.S. defense, and support Israel (Carenen 2012:198). The Moral Majority and other New Christian Right organizations contrasted from their predecessors in their leadership, organizational structure, and strategy.

First, they were led by charismatic figures that already had large public followings. Jerry Falwell, who founded the Moral Majority in 1979, used his widely viewed television broadcasts to mobilize support. In 1979, Falwell's weekly broadcast, "Old Time Gospel Hour," aired on 373 television stations and raised \$35 million dollars from a mailing list of two and a half million people (Liebman 1983:58). By 1980, Falwell raised \$1 million each week. In 1976, Falwell also began a series of rallies on the steps of state capitals around the country. These "I Love America" rallies resembled religious revivals and attracted both clergymen and local politicians. Tim

LaHaye, another leader in the New Christian Right movement, attracted supporters through his publications. LaHaye penned over sixteen books, selling more than 300,000 copies per year, which advanced his pro-family philosophies (Liebman 1983:59). The Christian Voice, a major rival of the Moral Majority, relied on Pat Robertson's support to mobilize the "700 Club" viewers. These and other charismatic leaders in the New Christian Right movement used existing platforms that already had a large following to mobilize support for their burgeoning political movement.

Second, the Moral Majority created a network of churches in each state that were loosely tied to the national organization. Unlike mainline Protestants and Catholics, Evangelical churches weren't governed by a central body of religious organizations (Guth 1983; Grossman 2007; Mamo 2007; Spector 2009). Individual churches enjoyed a great deal of freedom and autonomy. Without the support of a central coordinating body, many Evangelical and Fundamentalist churches had difficulty raising funds and supporting themselves in the first few years (Guth 1983; Grossman 2007). While Jerry Falwell was touring the country to hold "I Love America" rallies, he also worked to set up local chapters of his growing national organization (Guth 1983:32-33). The Moral Majority set up a network of state chairmen to mobilize local support in each state. Various "church planting" efforts by the Moral Majority that helped fund new churches successfully mobilized local grass-roots support (Liebman 1982). Local churches and state chapters of the Moral Majority benefited from the financial support of the national organization but were also allowed to maintain their autonomy and freedom in setting their own agendas (Liebman 1983).

Third, the Moral Majority used its network of local churches and state chapters to mobilize local communities. It encouraged local church leaders to get their congregations to

engage in politics. This was difficult because, traditionally, church leaders refrained from any political discussion for fear of alienating their members. This was further complicated by laws regarding churches' tax-exempt status.

Currently, the law prohibits political campaign activity by charities and churches by defining a 501(c)(3) organization as one 'which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.' (Internal Revenue Service 2015)

Churches could lose their tax-exempt status if they engaged in political campaigning. Moral majority instructed local clergymen on how to negotiate this complex position. In 1980, Jerry Falwell told fellow church leaders at a conference, "What can you do from the pulpit? You can register people to vote. You can explain the issues to them. And you can endorse candidates, right there in church on Sunday morning" (Vecsey 1980). Church leaders were given specific instructions on how to mobilize their congregants without losing their tax-exempt status.

Here's what you do...You tell everybody in your congregations to bring two stamped envelopes to church on Sunday. You show them a couple sample letters. And don't assume they know who their state representative is. Show them a map of their district. Make them write those letters in church. It's all perfectly legal as long as you don't use the buildings for special meetings. Do it right during services. (Vecsey 1980:A21)

Churches were encouraged to engage in a range of political activities such as registering to vote, writing their representative, and voting in elections. Church leaders could endorse candidates as long as they clarified that it was their personal position and not the position of the church.³ Falwell told a reporter in 1980, "I'm not afraid to endorse candidates...I told people in my church how I was going to vote." (Vecsey 1980:A21)

Within the first few years of its founding, this organization became a household name. A series of nationally representative opinion polls shows that in 1980, 40% of Americans were familiar with the Moral Majority (Liebman 1982:54). By 1981, that number rose to 49%

(Liebman 1982:54). Surveys of potential voters in 1981 in Alabama and Dallas-Fort Worth revealed that nearly 75% of respondents were familiar with the Moral Majority (Liebman 1982:54). The Moral Majority and many political observers in the 1980s claimed that the New Christian Right played a decisive role in the 1980s (Lipset and Raab 1981; Leibman 1982). However, political scientists have questioned the actual effect of the Moral Majority in the presidential election (Lipset and Raab 1981).

Though the Moral Majority and similar groups that emerged in the 1980s were short-lived, they successfully politicized Evangelical Christians. In their study of social movement media coverage, Amenta et al. (2009:642) ranked the New Christian Right movement as the 20th most visible and influential movement in newspapers. According to their analysis of newspaper articles in the New York Times and Washington Post, the most frequently mentioned Christian Right organization was the Moral Majority. The Christian Right was mentioned every other day in newspapers throughout the 1990s (Amenta et al. 2009:648). Since the Moral Majority disbanded, numerous organizations, like Christians United for Israel (CUFI), have continued to mobilize Evangelical support. Since the emergence of the New Christian Right, Evangelical political support for Israel has substantially increased. Pew Center and Pew Form polls from 2003 to 2013 suggests that a greater proportion of Evangelicals support Israel when compared to the broader population. Furthermore, their support for Israel appears to be increasing. In 2003, 55% of Evangelicals surveyed sympathized with Israel over Palestine, compared to 41% of the general U.S. population (Green 2007:35). In 2013, 72% of Evangelical Christians sympathized with Israel compared to only 49% of all U.S. adults that were surveyed (Pew Research Center 2013). In their study of the U.S House of Representatives from 1997-2005, Oldmixon, Rosenson, and Wald (2005) found that fundamentalist legislators' support for Israel increased

over this period. Mayer (2004) found that American Fundamentalists not only support Israel more than other Christian denominations, they are also significantly more likely to oppose putting pressure on Israel. In sum, Evangelical support for Israel gained momentum in the 1980s and has continued to rise since the emergence of the New Christian Right in the late 1970s. Today, American Evangelical support for Israel is at an all-time high.

Framing Evangelical Support for Israel

Evangelical Christian support for Israel is directly linked to religious beliefs. A 2003 survey by Pew Research asked Christians why they sympathize with Israel. Among Evangelicals, 75% agreed that their support stems from biblical prophecy (Pew Research Center 2003). While premillennial dispensationalist beliefs are an important basis for Evangelical Christian support of Israel, it is not the only biblical interpretation cited by Christian supporters. When asked why they support Israel, Evangelical Christians will often cite two biblical prophecies: premillennial dispensationalist eschatology and God's promise to Abraham in Genesis 12:3 (Green 2007; Spector 2009; Carenen 2012).

Literature on Evangelical support for Israel often addresses eschatological beliefs about Israel, but Genesis 12:3 is also frequently cited by Israel's American Christian supporters. Genesis 12:3, "I will bless them that bless thee" is often interpreted to mean that Christians will be judged in accordance with how they treat the Jews, God's chosen people. Among his many arguments for supporting political Zionism, Blackwell cited Genesis in his petition to the U.S. Presidents in 1891 and 1916:

May it be the high privilege of your Excellency, and the Honorable Secretary, to take a personal interest in this great matter, and secure through the Conference, a home for these wandering millions of Israel, and thereby receive to yourselves the promise of Him, who said to Abraham, "I will bless them that bless thee," Gen. 12:3 (Blackstone 1891).

These sentiments were also expressed by New Christian Right groups. In his 1980 book, *Listen, America!*, Falwell invoked this same sentiment expressed in Genesis:

God has blessed America because America has blessed the Jew. If this nation wants her fields to remain white with grain, her scientific achievements to remain notable, and her freedom to remain intact, America must continue to stand with Israel (Falwell 1980:98).

Evangelical Christian support for Israel stems from both dispensationalist eschatology and the belief that American Christians must support the Jewish State of Israel because it will determine their place in Heaven. Evangelical Christian supporters also express a wide range of other reasons that they support Israel, including spreading democracy to the Middle-East and remorse about Jews' treatment during the Holocaust. Like any social movement, multiple frames are used by Evangelicals to explain their support for Israel. However, the majority of Evangelical Christian supporters, when surveyed, will cite religious beliefs and end times prophecies.

COLLABORATIVE ADVERSARIAL ALLIANCES

By the mid-1980s, both the American Jewish and Evangelical Christian communities worked to support Israel. Together, these two communities constituted two parts of a larger American social movement that aimed to provide Israel with political, financial, and moral support. Political advocacy groups in both of these communities raised funds, held rallies, and lobbied politicians for favorable foreign policy toward Israel. Though both of these communities agreed that Israel needed American support, they disagreed on other policies. Eventually, they were able to form loose collaborations and alliances. In the next section, I discuss the barriers to collaborative work and how these communities overcame those barriers to form tenuous alliances. I argue that American Jews and Evangelical Christians were able to overcome ideological differences and form collaborations because of three important and connected factors: the political and contextual opportunity created by both the fracturing of the Jewish

community's pro-Israel groups and rising politicization of the Christian Right; Israeli and American leaders' roles as entrepreneurs and brokers; and the creation of codes of conduct to govern interaction and relieve tension.

Ideological Disputes and Barriers to Collaborations

Despite their shared concern over Israel and its future, American Jews and Evangelical Christians found it difficult to collaborate. Three points of contention present major barriers that hampered Jewish-Evangelical alliances. First, these two groups tend to hold very different political views about domestic issues. Second, Jews and Evangelicals in the U.S. often fail to agree on proselytization, anti-Semitism, and eschatology. Third, they often hold different opinions regarding Israeli policies toward Palestinians and the land acquired in 1967 war.

When it comes to politics, aside from supporting Israel, American Jews and Evangelical Christians share very little common ground. Public opinion polls show that when American Jews are asked about their political affiliation and ideology, the majority tend to be liberal and identify as Democrats. Evangelical Christians, on the other hand, tend to be more conservative and often identify as Republicans. Figure 4.2 and 4.3 below compares American Jews' and Evangelical Christians' party affiliations between 1994-2015. Based on the table 4.1, party affiliations tend to be stable, yet very different. American Jews, by in large, tend to identify with or lean Democrat while Evangelicals, generally, identify with or lean Republican. These ideological divides extend beyond party affiliation. These two groups also disagree on a range of political issues. For example, table 4.1 compares American Jews' and Evangelical Christians' opinions on access to abortion and homosexuality. The vast majority of Jews in both 2007 and 2014 believed that abortion should be legal in all or most cases. By contrast, the majority of Evangelical Christians believed in both 2007 and 2014 that abortion should be illegal in most or all cases. Similarly,

nearly 80% of Jews in both 2007 and 2014 believed that homosexuality should be accepted. Over half of Evangelical Christians in both 2007 and 2014 believed that homosexuality should be discouraged. Party affiliation, abortion, and homosexuality are not the only areas of disagreement amongst these two groups. They also tend to hold conflicting views regarding other policies related to separation of church and state, such as prayer in school, sex education, and evolution.

Table 4.1: Jewish and Evangelical Political Leanings and Opinions

	2007		2014	
	% of Jews	% of Evangelicals	% of Jews	% of Evangelicals
Identify as Conservative	21	52	21	55
Identify as Moderate	39	30	33	27
Identify as Liberal	38	11	43	13
Abortion should be legal in most/all cases	84	33	83	33
Abortion should be illegal in all/most cases	14	61	15	63
Homosexuality should be accepted	79	26	81	36
Homosexuality should be discouraged	15	64	16	55

Source: Pew Research Center 2014




Figure 4.2: Percentage of Jews and Evangelicals Identify or Lean **Democrat** 1994-2014




Figure 4.3: Percentage of Jews and Evangelicals Identify or Lean **Republican** 1994-2014

A second major point of contention that hampers collaborations between American Jews and Evangelicals are faith-based differences (e.g. proselytization, eschatology, and anti-Semitism). As mentioned above, a central tenet of Evangelical theology is to “spread the good word.” In addition to this, many Evangelicals believe that not proselytizing the Jews would be anti-Semitic because they are depriving Jews of the gospel and salvation. In April 1989, a group of Evangelical theologians issued a public statement denouncing a public statement issued by national

Evangelical groups which implored the community to refrain from proselytizing Jews: "...failure to preach the gospel to the Jewish people would be a form of anti-Semitism, depriving this particular community of its right to hear the gospel" (Grossman 2007:57). Other Evangelicals believe that there is nothing wrong with being both Jewish and believing in Jesus. At the October 2004 Feast of the Tabernacles in Jerusalem, Pat Robertson told attendees, "I've met wonderful Jews in Siberia, Brazil, the United States, here in Jerusalem who are all saying, 'Yes, Jesus you are our Messiah'" (Spector 2009:118). Finally, Evangelical End-Times eschatology prophesizes that when Christ returns to Israel during the Second Advent, the vast majority of Jews will either be converted to Christianity or killed.

By contrast, modern Jewish theology largely opposes any efforts to actively seek out new converts outside of the Jewish faith. Jews often view Evangelicals' missionizing efforts as anti-Semitic. Many feel that these missionizing efforts call into question the legitimacy of Judaism as a religion (Spector 2009). By trying to convert Jews to Christianity, Evangelicals are implying that Judaism is not a valid belief system. American and Israeli Jews were especially frustrated by the rise of Messianic Jews' proselytization efforts in the 1970s and 1980s. Messianic Jews, or Jews for Jesus, are unique among Evangelicals because they co-opt Jewish traditions and symbols and ascribe Christian meanings. At one point, the Jewish Defense League sued Jews for Jesus ascribing new Christian meanings to Jewish symbols and for coopting their acronym (JDL), symbol, and motto ("Never Again") (Ariel 1999:250). In his book, *End of Days*, the prominent Israeli reporter Gershom Gorenberg summarizes American and Israeli Jews sentiments concerning Evangelicals' proselytization efforts:

"As far as Jews are concerned, Christian proselytizing historically has meant an assertion that the Jewish people has no right to exist any more. Virtually all Jews, including the most secular, reject the evangelical view that you can remain a Jew in the ethnic sense while accepting Christianity-indeed, the Israeli Supreme Court

based a 1960s ruling on that consensus. To ‘support Israel’ while actively seeking to convert the Jews is, in Jewish eyes, to couple a caress with a stab in the back” (Gorenberg 2002:163)

Though many national Evangelical associations have agreed to limit or refrain from sending missions to Israel or proselytizing American Jews, individual adherents continue to proselytize. Because of this, American Jews and Israeli Orthodox Jews are wary of Evangelicals’ support for Israel. American Jews also find Evangelical prophecies that predict the demise of Jews off putting.

A third major point of contention is Israel’s borders and the treatment of Palestinians. Despite fracturing within the American Jewish community, the vast majority of American Jews continue to provide Israel with deferential, unquestioning support. Though Evangelical groups continue to support Israel, their views on Israel’s borders and Israel’s treatment of Palestinians is colored by premillennial eschatology. Similar to hawkish American Jewish groups, Evangelicals tend to oppose two-state solutions, support Jewish settlements in occupied territories, and believe that Israel should maintain complete control over land acquired during the 1967 war (Judea and Samaria). At a press conference during a visit to Jerusalem in 2004, Pat Robertson warned Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, about the dire consequences of any peace plans that involve conceding territory to the Palestinians:

I see the rise of Islam to destroy Israel and take the land from the Jews and give east Jerusalem to (Palestinian leader) Yasser Arafat. I see that as Satan's plan to prevent the return of Jesus Christ the Lord... God says, 'I'm going to judge those who carve up the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It's my land and keep your hands off it.' (Associated Press 2004).

Hawkish and Evangelical views of Israel’s borders contrasts with those of more centrists and dovish American Jewish organizations. Centrist Jewish groups tend to provide deferential support, but generally advocate for a two-state solution and are less supportive of Israeli

settlements in occupied territories. Dovish pro-Israel groups also support a two-state solution, but they oppose Jewish settlements and are concerned with the fair treatment of the Palestinians. Right-wing political leaders, who are more aligned with hawkish American Jewish pro-Israel groups, often cultivate close relationships with American Evangelicals (Spector 2009:141). In 1980, Right-wing Israel Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, awarded Jerry Falwell the Zionist Jabotinsky Medal on the 100th anniversary of birth of the militant Zionist leader's, Valdimir Jabotinsky. The Israeli government awards this medal for outstanding achievements and defense of the Jewish people. Begin and Falwell's friendship was unnerving for some American Jewish leaders. In response to the award dinner in 1981, Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, former chairman of the Conference of Presidents, told Jerusalem Post reporters, that he felt that this was "madness and suicide if Jews honor for their support for Israel right-wing evangelists who constitute a danger to the Jews of the United States" (Shipler 1981:A2).

Jews and Evangelicals Working Together

Despite these differences, American Jewish and Evangelical Christian organizations openly work together and collaborate on campaigns to support Israel. Collaborations between Evangelicals and Jews have occurred prior to the 1980s. However, widespread support for Israel amongst Evangelicals and support for pro-Israel advocacy organizations is a more recent phenomenon. The movement to free Jews from the Soviet Union created a shared grievance that encouraged collaborations between Jewish and Evangelical leaders throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.

During much of the Cold War, Jews in the Soviet Union experienced massive anti-Semitism yet many were trapped behind the Iron Curtain (Gary 1984; Altshuler 1988; Kliger 2011). Jews were often barred from participating in many aspects of civic life including joining

the military and working for the political party (Gary 1984; Altshuler 1988; Kliger 2011). Jewish leaders were often wrongly imprisoned on trumped up charges (Gary 1984; Altshuler 1988; Kliger 2011). Jews that decided to emigrate from the Soviet Union because they saw no future for themselves or their children, were often denied exit visas. These Jews trapped in the Soviet Union were often referred to as “refusenik” (Gary 1984; Altshuler 1988). Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ) was established in 1964 in response to anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and aimed to free Soviet Jews (Elazar 1997; Staub 2002). It eventually sparked widespread support among American Jewish organizations. The relief and resettlement of Soviet Jewry created an opportunity to unite an increasingly fractured Jewish community around a common cause. Prominent Jewish organizations, like the American Jewish Committee, together with Christian leaders created the National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry to advocate for religious freedom in the Soviet Union. The Task Force’s founding documents demonstrate the intent to openly collaborate with leaders from all major Christian faiths:

The National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry was founded in Chicago in 1972, and includes among its leaders major personalities of the Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Evangelical and Jewish communities. The Task Force, a major expression of human rights concerns shared by Christians and Jews, works in many ways to achieve freedom for the Soviet Jews, and other oppressed peoples. It carries on an intensive programs of education, interpretation, and action (American Jewish Committee Archives 1978).

The collaborations helped bring Jewish and Evangelical leaders together. Evangelical Christian leaders sympathized with the movement to free Soviet Jews and allow them to immigrate to the U.S. or Israel.

The National Association of Evangelicals firmly support the National Summit Rally for Soviet Jews. We are convinced that religious liberty -- the freedom of conscience -- is the foremost of all human rights. Soviet Jews are consistently denied this basic human right, and often are deprived of the right to go where they can practice their faith freely and openly. Evangelical Christians stand in solidarity

with the Soviet Jews, and with all who seek to remove Soviet barriers to Jewish emigration (American Jewish Committee Archives 1987).

While these interreligious conferences helped bring these two communities together. They continued to disagree on a range of issue like proselytization and the role of religion in public life. Few Evangelical organizations and leaders had openly collaborated with American Jewish pro-Israel organizations between the 1920s and 1980s.

Today these two communities openly collaborate in support of Israel. Evangelical leaders are frequently invited to speak at Jewish community events. In 2007, the leader of Christians United for Israel (CUFI), John Hagee, was invited to speak to AIPAC's policy conference (Spector 2009). Similarly, the Christian Coalition and CUFI frequently invites prominent Jewish leaders, such as chairmen of the Conference of Presidents (COP), to speak at their annual conference. Organizations like the International Fellowship of Christian and Jews (IFCJ) receives money from both Evangelical and Jewish supporters (Mamo 2007).

American Jewish-Evangelical collaborations can benefit organizations in both communities. Mainstream American Jewish organizations benefit from collaborations with Evangelicals by gaining greater political efficacy. Only 2% of the American population identifies as Jewish (Pergola 2001). That population has been steadily declining due to intermarriage and other trends (Sasson 2014). Though Jews are still an influential political bloc in the U.S. (Grossman 2012), their changing support for Israel has caused mainstream centrists groups to feel less politically efficacious (Sasson 2014). By working with Evangelical organizations, Jewish pro-Israel groups can tap into a wider constituency and access more resources. By openly collaborating, American Jews and Evangelicals constitute a powerful political bloc that appeals to political elite from both parties. Both religious communities benefit from forming a diverse alliance that represents Republican-leaning Evangelicals and Democrat-leaning Jews because

such collaborations are more likely to influence policy makers (Gamson 1966). Biblical mandates from Genesis 12:3 make open collaborations with Jews especially appealing to Evangelicals. As mentioned above, God's promise to Abraham in Genesis 12:3 is frequently interpreted to mean that Evangelicals will be judged based on their treatment of the Jews, God's chosen people. Furthermore, allying with American Jews gives them a sense of legitimacy and authority to speak on behalf of Israel.

Negotiating Differences

How do these two seemingly disparate communities that frequently disagree on domestic issues, proselytization, and Israeli policies set aside their differences and work together? First, new political opportunities and shifts in both the American Jewish and Evangelical Christian community created an opportunity for inter-organizational collaboration. Second, Israeli officials and American Jewish leaders have worked to actively broker a strong relationship between Evangelicals and Jews (both in Israel and the in U.S). Third, these two communities have established norms and codes of conduct to govern interactions and relieve tension.

Opportunities for Collaborations and Organizational Entrepreneurs

During the 1970s and 1980s, major changes affected both the American Jewish and Evangelical Christian organizational fields. At the same time that centrist Jewish pro-Israel groups felt a diminishing membership base, Evangelical political groups, led by charismatic organizational entrepreneurs, were gaining momentum and mobilizing political support. This created an opportunity for these two communities to collaborate despite their ideological differences and previous conflicts.

The American Jewish pro-Israel organizational field began to fracture in the 1970s and 1980s. The emergence and increasing popularity of hawkish and dovish organizations drew

membership away from centrist deferential groups. Though centrist mainstream organizations continued to dominate the organizational field, they felt diminishing support from the Jewish community. Mainstream organizations, such as the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League, commissioned studies to understand this waning support (Sasson 2014). The emergence of new, niche pro-Israel groups meant that individuals who identified with either dovish or hawkish perspectives could leave centrist groups and work with organizations that were more closely aligned with their personal ideologies (Sasson 2014). As more Jews opted to support either hawkish or dovish organizations, centrist groups represented a narrower range of perspectives. The weakening support from the Jewish community, coupled with the narrower range of supporters, facilitated collaborations between centrist groups and Evangelicals. Liberal, left-leaning Jews decried new alliances between centrist Jewish organizations and Evangelical groups. For instance, Rabbi Eric Yoffie, president of Union of Reform Judaism, decried centrist's groups' growing alliances with Evangelical Christian organizations like CUFI because it alienated younger, liberal Jews from the broader movement:

And so whom do we offer to these young people as a spokesman for Israel? John Hagee, who is contemptuous of Muslims, dismissive of gays, possesses a triumphalist theology and opposes a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If our intention was to distance our young adults from the Jewish state, we could not have made a better choice. Even worse, a primary motive here seems to be that we see Hagee and his Christians United for Israel as a source of dollars for federation coffers. (Yoffie 2007)

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL), a more centrist organization, has openly criticize Evangelicals on domestic policies but accepts them as an ally in support of Israel. For example, in 1994 the ADL issued an extensive critique of the Christian Rights' attempt to dismantle separation of church and state in *The Religious Right the Assault on Tolerance and Pluralism in America*. Yet, the ADL is willing to set aside these differences concerning domestic policies and

openly collaborate with Evangelical organizations. ADL's president, Abraham Foxman, told Stephen Spector in an interview that he was more than willing to ally with Evangelicals in support of Israel:

We need as many friends as we can get...but you don't make common cause because somebody happens to share a view with you. We can differ on other issues with respect, appreciate what we can do together, and establish the conditions for dialogue (Spector 2009:160)

At the same time, new political organizations that mobilized Evangelicals began to emerge. Organizations like the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, and Christians United for Israel unveiled the widespread availability of allies outside of the Jewish community who were willing to offer political, financial, and moral support. Evangelical sympathy for Israel has rapidly grown since the 1970s. The combination of these two processes in the 1980s and 1990s created an opportunity for open collaborations between centrist Jewish organizations and Evangelical Christian political advocacy groups.

The fracturing of the Jewish community's opinion toward Israel and the emergence of hawkish and dovish groups caused mainstream, deferential organizations to feel diminishing support and less politically efficacious. In the 1970s and 1980s, norms about public discourse concerning Israel lessened. It became increasingly acceptable to criticize aspects of Israeli policy while still maintaining support for Israel. Eventually, organizations that catered to these dissenting voices emerged. These new organizations drew away support from the larger, mainstream organizations that continued to maintain deferential, unquestioning support for Israel.

At the same time, changes to the U.S. political context encouraged organizational entrepreneurs to mobilize Evangelical Christian support. Ronald Reagan's 1980 Presidential victory demonstrated the potential political influence of new political advocacy organizations

that mobilized Evangelicals. Groups like the Moral Majority and the Christian Voice, aimed to mobilize a community that had been previously underrepresented in electoral politics. Though many of the initial groups that emerged in the late 1970s were relatively short-lived, they successfully mobilized Evangelical political support for a range of issues, including Israel. Though the Moral Majority disbanded in the 1980s, the charismatic organizational entrepreneurs that founded these groups continued to mobilize supporters. New organizations, like the Christians Coalition and Christians United for Israel, continued the work of their predecessors and Evangelical support for Israel rapidly grew in the 1980s and 1990s.

Taken together, these political changes and organizational shifts created an opportunity to collaborate. Mainstream, centrist Jewish organizations were more willing to collaborate with Evangelicals in the 1980s and 1990s because they felt diminishing support from the Jewish community and because they represented a narrower range of supporters. Meanwhile, Evangelicals were becoming increasingly involved in politics, especially supporting Israel. They were eager to work with Jewish organizations because it aligned with their theological beliefs associated with Genesis and it also gave Evangelical groups a sense of legitimacy and authority concerning Israel.

If these political and organizational changes had not occurred, it is unlikely that these groups would have been able to openly collaborate. If the American Jewish community had maintained its strict norms of deferential support, then the mainstream organizations would have continued to dominate the organizational field and would not have felt weakening supporter. Furthermore, those Jews who were, and continue to be, staunchly opposed to allying with Evangelicals would have prevented open collaborations. However, the shifts in organized Jewry created an opening. It is unlikely that Jewish organizations would have openly worked with

Evangelical organizations if the Evangelical community had continued their separatist approach to politics and had refrained from actively engaging in the political sphere. As the New Christian Right became an increasingly influential part of the American political landscape, they became more attractive ally for weakening Jewish organizations.

Brokers

Though changes to the organizational field presented opportunities for collaborations, Jewish and Evangelical leaders still frequently clashed. The presence of brokers helped negotiate some of these differences. Both the Israeli government and key American leaders attempted to strengthen the relationship between these communities.

The Israeli government has a history of encouraging American Christian support for Israel. The Israeli Government's Ministry of Religious Affairs opened a Department of Christian Affairs in the 1960s. This department's primary goal was to work with Christian leaders and manage Christian visitors. The Israeli government has worked to develop a relationship with the Evangelical community in particular. Many mistakenly trace Israeli-Evangelical relations to Menachem Begin reaching out to Evangelicals, like Jerry Falwell, in 1977. However, the Ministry of Religious Affairs sent Yona Malachy to the U.S. in 1967 to study Evangelical support for Israel (Spector 2009). Malachy's work compares and contrasts how four sects of Christianity (Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentecostals, and Dispensationalists) view the Jewish State (Malachy 1978). While collecting data for this project, in the U.S., Malachy encouraged Evangelicals to publically declare their support for Israel (Spector 2009:145).

To foster American Christian support for Israel, and Evangelical support in particular, the Israeli government engaged in a range of activities. The Department of Christian Affairs

published a journal, *Christian News from Israel*, to communicate directly with Christian leaders (Spector 2009). The Israeli government helped organize Christian conferences in Israel, especially Jerusalem. In 1971, the Israeli government offered the Jerusalem conference center, free of charge, for the Bible Prophecy Conference. Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion spoke to the 1,400 Evangelical Christians who attended this event (Spector 2009). To promote tourism in Israel, the Ministry of Tourism offered free trips to Israel to hundreds of Evangelical pastors. Top officials, like Prime Minister Menachem Begin, encouraged Evangelical leaders to open travel agencies that exclusively organized trips to the Holy Land (Spector 2009:146). The Ministry of tourism would buy airtime on Evangelical broadcasts, like the 700 club, and advertise tourism in Israel (Spector 2009). Top officials in the 1970s and 1980s, like Defense Minister Moshe Arens and Prime Minister Begin, would personally meet with tour groups and Evangelical leaders (Spector 2009).

Not only did Israeli leadership foster a relationship with Evangelicals, they also encouraged American Jewish organizations to coordinate with Evangelical groups. Israeli government officials touring the U.S. would occasionally meet with both groups together. Israeli officials would bestow honors, such as the Jabotinsky medal, to both Jewish and Evangelical leaders. For example, Ester Untermeyer, a prominent leader in the American Jewish community, was awarded the Jabotinsky Medal in 1980, alongside Jerry Falwell (New York Times 1983).

Rabbi Yechiel Eckstein is an example of an American organizational leader who worked as a broker that helped facilitate collaborations between American Jews and Evangelicals (Spector 2009). This Orthodox Rabbi began collaborating with Christian organizations in 1977 to mobilize opposition to a proposed Nazi rally in Skokie, Illinois (Chafets 2005). He identified Evangelicals as an important ally and has continued to work as an organizational broker. In

1983, founded an organization to realize his "...vision of building bridges of understanding and cooperation between Christians and Jews" (International Fellowship of Christians and Jews 2016).

As discussed in the literature review, brokers help facilitate coalitions by smoothing over relations, building trust, and negotiating a shared understanding between communities (Obach 2010). Eckstein has a history of negotiating disagreements between American Jewish and Evangelical organizations. He has mediated several public disputes between organizational leaders from both communities. Eckstein frequently works with Evangelical leaders to ensure that they have a deeper understanding of Judaism and teaches them the appropriate terminology. For instance, Rev Billy E. Smith sparked outrage from American and Israeli Jews with anti-Semitic statements like, "God Almighty does not hear the prayer of the Jew" (Shipler 1981:A2). To mend fences, Eckstein offered to accompany Smith on a trip to Israel in order to learn more about the Jewish faith (Chafets 2005).

Eckstein has also organized meetings between community leaders to build trust and create a shared understanding. In 1994, Evangelicals were outraged by the ADL's report, which harshly criticized Evangelical Christians for dismantling laws concerning separation of Church and State. Eckstein helped organize a joint, closed-door meeting between leaders of both communities to create a dialogue and negotiate their relationship. Meetings like this help organizational leaders build trust and develop a shared understanding of their grievances so they can work together to support Israel.

Codes of Conduct

These adversarial communities have established a codes of conduct to manage their interactions. Several key brokers have initiated and mediated dialogue between these two

communities that helped establish and ever-evolving code of conduct to facilitate their interactions. Several interreligious conferences, organized by both Jewish and Evangelical groups, have helped establish a set of norms that mitigate these groups' ideological differences. Leaders have negotiated both official and informal limits on proselytization in Israel and amongst American Jews. Groups often refrain from discussing Evangelical eschatology and political issues unrelated to their support of Israel. These codes of conducts allow Jewish and Evangelical leaders to work together while remaining loyal to their constituents.

Proselytization is one of the most divisive issues that limits open collaborations between these two communities. The American Jewish Committee department of Interreligious Affairs reached out to the Institute of Holy Land Studies in 1974 to organize summit and create a dialogue between American Jews and Evangelicals for the relief and resettlement of Soviet Jews. Leaders from both communities agreed that Israel needed American support from both communities. This conferences resulted in a joint resolution where leaders from both communities publicly condemned UN resolutions likening Zionism to racism (American Jewish Committee Archives 1974-1976:32). However, these two communities continued to disagree on Evangelical missionizing efforts (Grossman 2007:53).

Israeli officials are extremely troubled by Evangelical efforts to convert Israeli Jews. Among Evangelical missionizing efforts, Israeli officials are most frustrated by Messianic Jews, or Jews for Jesus, and often seek to limit their influence on Israeli society. Israeli officials acknowledge that Evangelical are an important political ally that bring in a significant amount of tourism. However, they disapprove of ongoing missionizing efforts to convert Israeli Jews (Spector 2009). Encouraging Evangelical support while opposing Evangelical missionaries often divides secular and religious Israeli officials (Spector 2009). Israeli Orthodox Jews are more

resistant to collaborations with Evangelicals because of their commitment to convert Jews. Secular Israeli officials, however, acknowledge the importance of Evangelical support despite the strings attached to such support. To negotiate these internal disputes, Israel has enacted several laws and regulations to limit Evangelical proselytization in Israel

The laws and regulations established by Israel represent a compromise between religious Jews who oppose missionizing efforts in Israel and secular Jews who don't want to alienate Christian supporters. In Israel, it is illegal to offer material incentives for conversion and all groups are strictly prohibited from proselytizing to minors. Before organizing conferences in Israel, Evangelical leaders are often asked to sign a pledge, vowing not to proselytize Israeli Jews (Spector 2009). Also, Israel's Law of Return, which grants every Jew the right to become an Israeli citizen, was amended in 1970 to exclude Jews who have converted to another religion. The second amendment to this law states, "...except for a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his religion" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). Under this law, a Jew is explicitly defined as, "a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). These rules and regulations set the tone for appropriate behavior in Israel.

American Jews also oppose Evangelical missionizing efforts. Though American Evangelical organizations refuse to stop sharing their faith, some of these organizations have agreed that they won't explicitly target Jews (Spector 2009). Some national Evangelical organizations have encouraged their members to refrain from proselytizing Jews. Messianic Jews, which ascribes Christian theology to Jewish symbols, traditions, and celebrations, are especially worrisome for American Jews. Though Evangelical groups support Messianic Jews

and their missionizing efforts, many national Evangelical organizations will tend to refrain from co-opting Jewish practices (Spector 2009).

To enable open collaborations in support of Israel, American pro-Israel organizations will refrain from discussing Evangelical eschatology and periphery political issues. Initially, Evangelical eschatology, which predicts the eventual demise of the vast majority of Jews, was off putting for American Jews and inhibited collaborations. To overcome this barrier, American and Israeli Jews have come to the conclusion that, until the Second Advent, this eschatology is not innately problematic. In fact, when Jewish leaders are asked about these Evangelical End-Times prophecies, they will frequently respond with different versions of a similar joke that can be traced back to 1940s (Spector 2009):

When we're standing in Jerusalem and the messiah is coming down the street, one of us is going to have a very major theological adjustment to make. But until that time, let's walk together in support of Israel and in Defense of the Jewish people, because Israel needs our help (Spector 2009:177).

I say to evangelicals, when the Messiah comes, we'll ask him if it's the first time or the second time...If he says it's the first time, you'll apologize to me. If it's the second, I'll apologize to you (Spector 2009:159).

Leaders from both communities agree that support for Israel is a bipartisan issue that cuts across political party lines. American Jews can continue to support Democrats while Evangelicals support Republicans as long as candidates agree on U.S. foreign policy concerning Israel. When collaborating on campaigns to support Israel, both Jewish and Evangelical organizations will refrain from discussing periphery issues that normally divide these two groups. During a convocation at Liberty University, an Evangelical college, Rabbi Yoffie talked about how Jews and Evangelicals can negotiate their differences and still support Israel. Rabbi Yoffie, President of the Union for Reform Judaism said he could, "believe what I believe without

calling you a homophobic bigot, and you can do the same without calling me an uncaring baby-killer” (Siegel 2006).

These codes of conduct help establish expectations to govern interactions between these adversarial communities. These compromises allow leaders to openly collaborate with the oppositional groups while remaining loyal to their core constituency. Evangelicals publically limit missionizing efforts, but continue to maintain that salvation can only be achieved through Jesus Christ, and continue to support a range of missionizing efforts around the world. By refraining from discussions of periphery issues while collaborating on campaigns to support Israel, neither group has to compromise their ideological stances. Both groups can agree to support Israel but disagree on abortion, same-sex marriage, and prayer in school.

Another way these codes of conduct enable collaboration is by providing a release valve. Both Jewish and Evangelical leaders will frequently violate these norms and codes of conduct. Publically violating codes of conduct provides a release valve that endears community leaders to their base of supporters. Because codes of conduct have previously been established, brokers can negotiate apologies between community leaders that acknowledges the violation of a norm without admitting fault or compromising on oppositional ideologies.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I argue that American Jewish and Evangelical organizations constitute two parts of a broader movement that seek to secure political, financial, and moral support for Israel. These two communities constitute adversarial collaborations because they openly interact in support of Israel. Yet, they possess incongruent collective identities and oppositional ideologies.

First, these two communities are located in different interest sectors. American Jews are more liberal and tend to identify as Democrat or lean Democrat, while Evangelical Christians are more conservative and tend to identify as Republican or lean Republican. Second, they possess incongruent collective identities. American Jews believe that those who accept the New Testament as the literal word of God and Jesus Christ as their savior are no longer Jewish. While Jews oppose actively seeking out converts outside of the Jewish faith. Furthermore, Evangelicals are united by the belief that the Bible (including the New Testament) is ineffable, salvation can only be achieved through Jesus Christ, and that End Times prophecies will come to pass within their lifetimes. Evangelicals believe that proselytization is an important part of their faith and are commanded to “share the good word.” Third, these groups disagree on how and why they should support Israel. American Jews generally view Israel as the Jews’ homeland and safe haven to protect against anti-Semitism. Their basis of support is based on historical oppression and solidarity with global Jewry (Spector 2009). By contrast, Evangelicals’ support for Israel is strongly tied to biblical beliefs (both dispensationalist eschatology and God’s promise to Abraham in Genesis).

Building on recent theories about collaborative adversarial movements, I used comparative historical analysis to understand how such groups are able to set aside their differences and openly work together in support of Israel. By reviewing historical documents and archival material, I identified when and how American Jews and Evangelicals worked together. Between the 1920s and 1970s, short-lived collaborations emerged between some community leaders. However, consistent collaboration only emerged more recently, in the 1980s. I argue that these recent collaborations emerged as a result of new political opportunities and shifts in two

organizational fields, the presence of brokers and organizational entrepreneurs, and the creation of norms or codes of conduct to manage interactions.

Opportunities

First, changes to the organizational and political landscapes in the 1970s and 1980s created an opportunity that encouraged these adversarial communities to partially overcome barriers for collaborative work. In Israel, shifts in the Knesset, deepening political divides among Israelis, and disturbing events changed how American Jewry supported Israel. In the U.S., campaign finance reform, the Supreme Court's ruling on *Roe v Wade*, and Ronald Reagan's Presidential campaign created an opportunity for the New Christian Right to mobilize Evangelical support and demonstrate their potential political influence. Led by organizational entrepreneurs, American Jewish and Evangelical organizational fields responded to these political shifts in both Israel and the U.S. The confluence of these events created an opportunity for the strange bedfellow alliances between American Jews and Evangelicals.

Brokers

Second, the work of organizational brokers, like the Israeli government and American organizational leaders (e.g. Rabbi Eckstein), facilitated open collaborations between these two communities. Though shifts in the organizational field created new opportunities, they may not have been sufficient conditions to create open collaborations. I argue that the presence of brokers enabled open collaborations between these two adversarial communities. Despite a shared concern for Israel's future, Jewish and Evangelical leaders regularly, and publicly disagree. Jewish community leaders would often accuse Evangelicals of bigotry and anti-Semitism. They would publically dismiss Evangelical perspectives as aggressive, unintelligent, and hateful. Likewise, Evangelical leaders expressed frustration over Jews' inability to accept Christ as their

savior. They publicly accused Jews of contributing the moral decay of American society. Such public disagreements regularly arise and inhibit open collaborations. However, brokers are able to intervene to mediate these public disagreements. The Israeli government regularly reached out to Evangelicals to increase tourism in Israel and mobilize political support. Key figures in the U.S., like Rabbi Eckstein and the International Fellowship of Christians and Jews, helped ease tension. Brokers helped negotiate these ideological disputes and often solicited public apologies to ease tension. Without these brokers, it would have been difficult for community leaders to publicly collaborate with their adversaries while maintaining loyalty of their supporters.

Norms, Routines, and Codes of Conducts

Third, community leaders have established codes of conduct to manage organizational interactions. Evangelicals have agreed to limit missionizing efforts in certain settings. American Jews and Evangelicals have both agreed to refrain from discussing domestic policies, such as abortion, same-sex marriage, and prayer in school. These norms allow both communities to maintain their core beliefs and ideologies. American Jews aren't expected to convert to Christianity in exchange for Evangelical support. Evangelicals aren't required to completely stop their proselytization efforts. When supporting political elites in the U.S, American Jews and continue to support the Democratic party while Evangelicals support the Republican party. These two communities, with the help of brokers, have created a way to maintain their oppositional ideologies yet collaborate in specified settings.

Conclusion

Whittier's (2014) theory of collaborative adversarial movements advances our understanding of interactions amongst social movement organizations in different interest sectors. This chapter builds on her work by exploring how collaborative adversarial movements

can eventually form open collaborations without alienating their constituents or compromising their oppositional ideologies and incongruent collective identities. Unlike the anti-pornography movement, the American pro-Israel movement has been able to openly collaborate in support for Israel. These adversarial groups were able to openly collaborate because of shifts in the organizational field, the presence of brokers, and the establishment of codes of conduct and norms to manage interactions and ease tensions. The conflicts between these two communities make it difficult to form a coalition. However, these three interacting factors have allowed them to overcome some of the barriers faced by collaborative adversarial alliances and create open collaborations without alienating their constituents.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

How do coalitions come together to and maintain unity? Throughout this dissertation I have noted that coalitions and alliances are an important way for social movements to reach their goals and affect change. Coalitions and alliances can improve individual organizations' range and access to resources, legitimate grievances, and increase the political influence of member groups (Gamson 1961; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Obach 2010; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). However, coalitions and inter-organizational alliances are often difficult to form because individual organizations risk their autonomy and reputation when they partner with other organizations (Clemens 1993; Meyer and Imig 1993; Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005) and organizations must sacrifice precious resources for the sake of an alliance (Meyer and Imig 1993). Furthermore, coalitions frequently fragment as a result of conflicting ideological, disputes over strategies, incompatible organizational structures, and interpersonal arguments amongst organizational leaders (Lichterman 1995; Maney 2000; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003; Roth 2008; Cornfield and McCammon 2010:80). Some social movement organizations are more likely to overcome these barriers and form coalitions than others.

I started writing this dissertation to understand how two seemingly disparate communities, American Jews and Evangelicals, set aside or managed ideological disagreements and oppositional collective identities in order to advocate together on behalf of Israel. I began by looking at a supposedly unified American Jewish community who spoke with one voice through formal, enduring coalitions like the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. Political Scientists and Jewish studies scholars have noted in previous research that the American Jewish community is highly organized. In his in-depth analysis of organized

Jewry, Elazar (1997) argued that one of the American Jewish community's strengths is its, "...system of negotiated sharing...a network of agreements dividing the funds or campaign arenas or both" (Elazar 1997:303). Others have suggested that the Jewish community's united front has enabled them to successfully advocate for various policies (Goldberg 1990; Chanes 2001; Ambrosio 2003; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Grossman 2012). In his book, Grossman attributes Jewish interest groups' success in advocating on behalf of Israel to their, "...group-level social capital, especially Jewish social networks and organizations" (Grossman 2012:68).

However, I discovered that organized American Jewry has worked hard to create and maintain the perception of a united front. American Jewry is credited with presenting a unified front on a range of political issues, but just below surface I found that these organizations work furiously behind the scenes to maintain the perception of unity. Since the 1920s, the American Jewish community has developed and maintained alliances despite an increasingly fragmented community that possess a range of conflicting ideas about domestic policies, foreign policy, and Israel. My analysis of formal coalitions among Jewish organizations revealed a diverse community of organizations that competes for resources. The increasing diversity of Jewish perspectives on Israel and conflicts among the diverse set of organizations within the American Jewish community, in part, created an opportunity for some mainstream Jewish organizations to collaborate with newly politicized Evangelical Christian organizations.

MAJOR FINDINGS AND ARGUMENT

My dissertation builds on the existing social movements literature by providing a deeper understanding of how a range of organizations manage to work together and advocate for political change. I began by exploring how Jewish pro-Israel coalitions responded to major threats. Then I looked at how characteristics of Jewish pro-Israel groups influenced their chances

of becoming a member of a prestigious, enduring pro-Israel coalition. Finally, I studied the emergence of alliances between Jewish and Evangelical pro-Israel groups in the United States.

In chapter 2, I analyzed how a formal Jewish pro-Israel coalition responded to exogenous factors over a 60-year period. Building on the previous literature that has found a strong link between threats and coalition growth, I found that two underlying mechanisms drive this relationship. Identity threats, like terrorists hijacking an airplane, can influence coalition growth by increasing the salience of a social movement grievance, which mobilized resources and reduced competition among organizations within an interest sector. Threats can also lead to coalition growth by creating a sense of urgency or a common enemy which allows groups to overcome ideological barriers that normally prevent some groups from joining a coalition. Both of these mechanisms helped explain the relationship between threats and coalition growth in the APIM. This analysis also highlighted the importance of understanding how a “threat” is operationalized in social movements research. I broke down threats into different categories, which provided greater insight into the various underlying mechanisms which drive coalition membership and growth.

In chapter 3, I shifted the focus from how exogenous, contextual factors facilitate coalition growth to the endogenous factors that influence which organizations were more likely to join formal Jewish pro-Israel coalitions. More specifically, I found that three different organizational characteristics independently and collectively influenced coalition membership. Influential organizations, as measured by visibility in news media, were more likely to become members of the coalition. Hybrid organizations, as opposed to single-issue organizations, were also more likely to join the formal coalition between 1955 and 2005. Organizations whose strategy was geared toward political advocacy, as opposed to providing services, were more

likely to become members of a formal, enduring coalition. The combined effect of these characteristics revealed that more prominent, advocacy-oriented organizations are in a better position to engage in coalition work than lesser known, single-issue, service-oriented groups.

After exploring how exogenous and endogenous factors influence coalition growth and maintenance among Jewish pro-Israel groups, I used a comparative historical analysis to understand how two disparate communities work together on behalf of Israel. I found that American Jews and Evangelicals constitute adversarial collaborations because they openly interact in support of Israel. Yet, they possess incongruent collective identities and oppositional ideologies. These two communities tend to identify with opposite ends of the American political spectrum, disagree on the role of religion in public institutions, and possess opposing views on proselytization. Despite these differences, both Jewish and Evangelical organizations will openly work together in support of Israel. Building on recent theories about collaborative adversarial movements, I found that American Jewish-Evangelical alliances were able to emerge as a result of new political opportunities in the both the U.S. and Israel. Alliances across religious divides was made possible by major shifts in both the American Jewish and Evangelical organizational fields. Furthermore, organizational entrepreneurs and brokers/bridge builders negotiated ideological differences. Though conflicts continue to arise, community leaders have established informal codes of conduct to manage inter-organizational collaborations and minimize disputes.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY

More broadly, this dissertation teaches us that despite the numerous barriers, coalitions and alliances can be formed and maintained provided an amenable context appropriate access to resources, and purposeful action of organizational leaders. I argue that much of the APIM's ability to successfully form and maintain coalitions and alliances can be attributed to three

interacting factors: changes to the broader context (political structure and organizational field), access to a variety of resources, and deliberate choices by organizational leaders.

Changes to the broader political and national context enabled coalition formation and growth for the APIM by both increasing the incentives for individual organizations and changing the structure of the organizational field. First, major events can directly influence organization's decision to join a coalition. Threats to Israel and world-events that highlighted global anti-Semitism enabled coalition formation among groups in the same interest sector. These events served as a focal point that united groups with a shared grievance. I found that multi-issue organizations hesitant to participate in coalitions could overcome this barrier when they were faced with a major threat. Second, changes to the broader context directly influenced the shape and structure of an organizational field. Field-level changes provided a new context that incentivized certain collaborations. In Israel, changes the political context changed the structure of the American Jewish organizational field. It resulted in the emergence of new types of organization (hawks and doves) that directly competed with existing groups within the same interest sector. As the American Jewish organizational field began changing shape in response to the new political context, the incentives for allying with Jewish groups versus outsiders changed. Similarly, changes to the U.S. political context lead to massive expansion of New Christian Right organizations. The structure of the American Jewish and Evangelical fields shifted in such a way that it incentivized collaborations between adversarial groups. Thus, events in both the U.S. and Israel resulted in a new set of incentives that encouraged certain types of collaborations for APIM groups.

Access to resources encouraged organizations in the APIM to work together in formal coalitions and informal alliances. The APIM is a well-resourced movement. I found that a

significant portion of the individual APIM organizations have access to both material resources (i.e. money) and cultural resources (i.e. media visibility, influence). Organizations with access to these resources were more likely to participate in coalitions and collaborations. Furthermore, the broader social movement benefits from access to a rich set of socio-organizational resources. The availability of these resources increased in response to dramatic events, like a major threat or a dramatic political shift. Access to resources reduces the barriers associated with joining for multiple reasons. First, sufficient access to material resources leads to coalition growth because it lessens the pressure on individual organizations to compete and differentiate themselves from other groups within the same interest sector. Sufficient material resources allow individual organizations to see past their individual differences and join together in order to increase their chances of influencing foreign policy. Second, organizations with more cultural resources were more likely to participate in coalitions because these more influential organizations are better suited to manage the tasks associated with coalition work. Highly influential organizations also are attractive allies for existing coalitions seeking out new members, increasing the probability of being accepted into a formal, enduring coalition. Despite extensive social movement research on organizational processes and a growing body of literature exploring social movement media coverage, previous research hasn't looked at how media coverage influences inter-organizational alliances and collaborations. This dissertation represents a first step in understanding how Third, access to socio-organizational resources encouraged coalition growth by increasing the number of available organizations individual groups can coordinate with. In general, coalitions and collaborations are risky and force organizations to sacrifice precious resources. Though resources fluctuated in response to the broader political and national context, I found that overall, the APIM is a well-resourced movement. Access to material, cultural, and socio-organizational

resources reduced the risks associated with coalitions and incentivized inter-organizational collaborations.

The deliberate choices of various organizations leaders to capitalize on opportunities and skillfully deploy resources facilitated the growth and maintenance of a vast network of inter-organizational collaborations for the APIM. I found that the agentic work of individual organizational leaders helped facilitate collaborations between adversarial organizations. First, organizational entrepreneurs, like Jerry Falwell, responded to shifts in the political context to mobilize the New Christian Right. This resulted in increased socio-organizational resources for the movement as a whole, increasing the chances of forming a coalition or collaboration. Second, individual brokers managed interactions between organizations. Organizational leaders, like Rabbi Eckstein, carefully deployed resources at opportune moments to bring together ideologically opposed groups. Organizational brokers managed interactions between adversarial groups in order to maintain alliances and smooth over ideological differences. Without the work of these individuals, ideological disputes would have continued to hamper possible collaborations between Jews and Evangelicals. Third, leaders enacted and respected codes of conduct to further mediate disputes and create an environment amenable to collaborations. Though individuals did not always adhere to codes of conduct, they helped guide some interactions and created a system for holding offensive parties responsible for their actions. These purposive choices by movement actors enabled coalition formation and growth by creating an atmosphere amenable to collaborations and mediating interactions that would otherwise fracture existing alliances.

I argue that the APIM has successfully created its vast network of coalitions and collaborations among Jewish groups and between Jewish and Evangelical organizations because

of opportunities created by shifts in the broader context, access to a range of resources, and the purposive actions of organizational leaders. These three features interacted together to reduce the barriers for engaging in coalition work and create new incentives for collaborations within and across interest sectors. The political context directly increased availability and range of resources for APIM organizations. Individual leaders capitalized on new opportunities and carefully deployed resources to manage organizational interactions. Individual leaders' and members' responses to shifts in the political context and availability of new resources resulted in dramatic changes to organizational field. Together, these three processes interacted to enable APIM groups to form a vast network of enduring, formal coalitions and loose adversarial collaborations.

BROADER IMPLICATIONS

My dissertation builds on research in three separate fields of study and highlights the importance of inter-disciplinary research. I integrated specialized knowledge from Jewish Studies, Political Science, and Sociology to advance our understanding of organizational processes and political advocacy. First, I provided a broader theoretical understanding of processes and patterns that have been observed by Jewish studies scholars. Jewish studies literature is largely reliant on case-studies to provide in-depth, nuanced explanations of specific historical patterns. Using a sociological perspective, I explained observable patterns using sociological theories. Similar to other social movements, the APIM's access to resources coupled with a receptive political context helped create an extensive organizational network to advocate for change. I showed how patterns associated with these pro-Israel organizations compare to other, similar organizational fields. I argued that shifts to the American Jewish organizational field, which have been observed by Jewish studies scholars, results from changes to the national

political context in the U.S. and Israel. Furthermore, changes to the organizational field have influenced the American Jewish-Evangelical relations.

Second, I expanded on political science literature that explains interest group politics in the U.S. I argued that American Jewish interest groups are much less unified than the previous research suggests (see Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Grossman 2012). I found that divisions within the American Jewish community helped explain the emergence of unexpected alliances with the New Christian Right. I used social movements theories about collaborative adversarial movements to determine how competing interest groups (Jewish and New Christian Right) can come together and jointly advocate for favorable foreign policy.

Third, my dissertation demonstrates the utility of researching understudied social movements like the APIM. While the APIM has received attention from political science and Jewish studies, this literature lacks a sociological perspective. Amenta et al. noted that despite empirical evidence of this movement's influence, social movement scholars have yet to study this case: "Jewish civil rights and civil liberties families place in the top 10, none have received extensive scholarly attention" (Amenta et al. 2009:641). My dissertation fills in this gap in the literature and provides a building block for future research on this topic. I found that the APIM is a well-resourced and highly organized movement composed of diverse actors seeking to affect political change. Individuals and organizations associated with the APIM work both within and outside of institutionalized politics to achieve their goals. I argue that the APIM's access to resources and ability to take advantage of new opportunities has enabled them to create a strong network of coalitions within and beyond the American Jewish community. While such movements are often discounted because of their reliance on institutional tactics, I've shown that they can offer theoretical insights.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

My dissertation sheds light on important gaps in the literature and provides a direction for future sociological research. The findings from chapter 2 suggest that there are different types of threats that can lead to different types of responses from organizations and individuals.

Existential threats in chapter 2 motivated coalition growth among similar organizations. Chapter 4 suggests that when prominent, mainstream Jewish organizations were threatened with a loss of resources, it created an opportunity to reach out to new allies outside of their interest sector.

Future research should more critically think about the notion of “threats” and how we should treat this concept. Characterizations and operationalizations of “threats” vary across the social movements literature. One difficulty in trying to define threats is that each movement experiences very different types of threats. A cross-sectional study of various social movements that represent different parts of the political and ideological spectrum might reveal different categories of threats and their assorted consequences for social movement organizations.

Scholars interested in coalitions and alliances should also consider deconstructing the process of becoming a member in a formal coalition. My analysis in chapters 2 and 3 considered how exogenous and endogenous factors influence membership rates in formal coalitions. However, becoming a member includes two separate processes: coalitions’ decision to accept (or reject) potential member groups and individual organizations’ decision to join (or not join) a formal coalition. Deconstructing coalition members and considering how threats, resources, and organizational characteristics effect each part of this process is an important next step. For instance, organizational characteristics may have a greater impact on an organization’s decision to join a coalition than on the coalition’s decision to accept of new members. Similarly,

exogenous factors like threats may have a greater impact on a coalition's acceptance of new members than on an organization's decision to join.

Finally, future research should look more closely at APIM and similarly understudied movements. Though APIM and other similar movements engage on both institutional and extra-institutional tactics, they are not generally viewed as a social movement. This dissertation demonstrates that these types of understudied movements can be explained through a social movements lens. The sociological perspective, and more specifically social movements theories, can provide a deeper understanding of how well-resourced movements coordinate action and successfully affect political change employing a combination of both institutional and extra-institutional tactics.

ENDNOTES

1. Minkoff's (1995) code was adapted for this dataset. Several categories included in Minkoff's original 10-point scale measuring organizational strategy were dropped because they were not applicable to the 300 pro-Israel groups coded in this project. Specifically, none of the pro-Israel groups coded for this project mentioned legislative or protest strategy, therefore these categories were not included in this analysis. Additionally, the original code did not account for organizations whose purpose statements mentioned advocacy, service, and culture. For this analysis, I coded variables on a 7-point scale ranging from institutional advocacy to cultural. For a full description of this scale, see Appendix B.
2. Researchers must specify an expected distribution when running a parametric event-history analysis. Using AIC to compare the fit of exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz distributions, I determined that an exponential was ideal. However, I found similar results using alternative distributions.
3. Jerry Falwell's methods for maintaining tax-exempt status while discussing political issues was widely accepted among Evangelicals. However, the Christian Right and churches that engaged in such practices came under heavy scrutiny for engaging in campaign-related conduct (Carrol 1992).

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APPENDIX A: CODING INSTRUMENT FOR AMERICAN JEWISH YEARBOOK

I built an original dataset of coded purpose statements from over 968 national Jewish organizations from 1945 to 2005. The American Jewish Committee (AJC) has published the *American Jewish Yearbook* nearly every year since 1901. Similar to the *Encyclopedia of Associations*, these volumes contain a directory of national American Jewish organizations. Each entry in the directory lists an organizations' name, founding year, purpose statement, and publications. I coded the purpose statements of these organizations from 1945-2005. After surveying the literature and reviewing 10% of the sample, I developed a code book that categorized purpose statements into nine overlapping classifications: supports Israel, promotes immigration, indicates political/legal focus, serves as fraternities/social groups, promotes Jewish culture, educational organizations, promotes religion, collects funds/provides charitable services, and supports professionals/vocational workers. This coding scheme integrates categories used by the American Jewish Committee and Elazar (1997).

I further distinguished between organizations within each overlapping categories. For any organization that was coded as “support Israel” I determined if that support was hawkish, dovish, or neutral (deferential). For an example of determine hawkish versus dovish organizations see table A.1 below. For “promotes immigration” I determined if the organization supports immigration to US (through resettlement and assimilation services), immigration to Israel, immigration to another country, or provides unspecified support for immigrants. For organizations that promoted religion, I tried to determine which Jewish movement or denomination they were affiliated with. Religiously-oriented organizations were categorized as Reform, Conservative, Reconstructionist, Orthodox, Lubvitch, other, or unspecified. Educational organizations were coded based on if they primarily offered educational services (i.e. elementary

schools, Sunday schools, etc.), were a yeshiva, focused on building or funding schools, were a university, or were unspecified.

Table A.1 gives examples of purpose statements of pro-Israel groups listed in the *American Jewish Yearbook* directory of national Jewish organization. All five groups advocate on behalf of Israel and were coded as pro-Israel groups. However, the more dovish, peace-oriented groups advocate equality between Jews and Palestinians; these groups generally oppose the occupation of Palestine because they believe that peace can only be achieved through equality and an independent Palestinian state. More Hawkish groups tend to focus on the safety and security of Israel through close monitoring and strict control over Israel's borders and the occupied territories. As table A.1 below indicates, the COP's purpose statement offers a more centrist and moderate stance. The COP focuses on the U.S.-Israel alliance as well as the security and dignity of Jews without explicitly discussing Palestine or the occupied territories. More dovish groups like Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace explicitly discuss Palestine and the need for an independent Palestinian state that is economically viable. Similarly, American Friends of Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salam created a community of Jews and Palestinians built on shared cultural understandings. By contrast, Hawkish groups like Tsomet-Techiya USA believes Israel should control the entire territory, including those areas inhabited by Palestinians. Americans for a Safe Israel also opposes a two-state solution, believing that peace can only be achieved when Israel has complete control over the entire territory, including the West-bank and Gaza.

Table A.1 Purpose Statements Listed in the American Jewish Yearbook	
<p>CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS: Seeks to strengthen the U.S.-Israel alliance and to protect and enhance the security and dignity of Jews abroad. Toward this end, the Conference of Presidents speaks and acts on the basis of consensus of its 54 member agencies on issues of national and international Jewish concern.</p>	
Dovish pro-Israel Groups	Hawkish pro-Israel Groups
<p>BRIT TZEDEK V'SHALOM—JEWISH ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE: Works for the achievement of a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict guided by the traditional Jewish obligation to pursue peace and justice, in the conviction that security for Israel can only be attained through the establishment of an economically and politically viable Palestinian state, necessitating an end to Israel's occupation of land acquired in the 1967 war and an end to Palestinian violence; its national office and 30 chapters around the country engage in grassroots political advocacy and public education.</p>	<p>AMERICANS FOR A SAFE ISRAEL (AFSI) Seeks to educate Americans in Congress, the media, and the public about Israel's role as a strategic asset for the West; through meetings with legislators and the media, in press releases and publications AFSI promotes Jewish rights to Judea and Samaria, the Golan, Gaza, an indivisible Jerusalem, and to all of Israel. AFSI believes in the concept of "peace for peace" and rejects the concept of "territory for peace."</p>
<p>AMERICAN FRIENDS OF NEVE SHALOM/ WAHAT AL-SALAM: Supports and publicizes the projects of the community of Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salam, the "Oasis of Peace." For more than twenty years, Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel have lived and worked together as equals. The community teaches tolerance, understanding and mutual respect well beyond its own borders by being a model for peace and reaching out through its educational institutions. A bilingual, bicultural Primary School serves the village and the surrounding communities.</p>	<p>TSOMET-TECHIYA USA: Supports the activities of the Israeli Tsomet party, which advocates Israeli control over the entire Land of Israel.</p>

APPENDIX B: CODING INSTRUMENT FOR ORGANIATIONAL STRATEGY

My coding of organizational strategy is based on Minkoff’s (1995) codebook. The original codebook results in an ordinal scale ranging from directly challenging the institution through legislative actions or protest to, cultural organizations that don’t directly challenge existing institutions. This codebook was developed for analyzing purpose statements by Women’s and Racial-Ethnic organizations published in the *Encyclopedia of Associations*. Table B.1 below contains the scale I drew on for this project.

	Legislative	Advocacy	Service	Culture
Legislative	01			
Advocacy	02	03		
Service	04	05	06	
Culture	07	08	09	10

While this original scale was useful in quantifying organizations’ strategies I had to modify it for my purposes. My project analyzes purpose statements of American Jewish organizations, which were excluded from Minkoff’s (1995) sample of Racial-Ethnic organizations. When applying the original coding scheme to my data, I found that legislative action failed to accurately describe many of the advocacy groups in my sample. Given the purpose statements in my sample, I determined that Legislative action was not useful in describing my data. Therefore, I removed the legislative category from my scale. Furthermore, I found that the original scale failed to account for organizations that discussed more than two types of strategies in their purpose statements. Table B.2 below shows the modified scale I used my analysis and how it compares to the original scale.

Original Scale	New Scale	Description

3	1	Advocacy
5	2	Advocacy + Service
8	3	Advocacy + Culture
-	4	Advocacy + Service + Culture
6	5	Service
9	6	Service + Culture
10	7	Culture
1, 2, 4, and 7 were legislative categories that I excluded in my analysis		