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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

In the shadow of September 11: The roots and ramifications of anti-Muslim attitudes in the United States

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Abstract

What are the underpinnings and ramifications of anti-Muslim attitudes in the United States? While scholars have emphasized the centrality of race and racial attitudes to American politics, examinations of hostility towards Muslim Americans with context-specific measures are still lacking despite the increasing relevance of this population in the public imagination. Particularly after the tragic 9/11 attacks, Islamophobia emerged as a pervasive force in American social and political life, entangling race, religion, and nationality to further stigmatize and marginalize Muslims. By more systematically examining the relationship between anti-Muslim attitudes and public support for a range of initiatives that aim to, or already have, further marginalize(d) American Muslims, the research presented herein aims to underscore the limitations of attitudinal measures that lack context specificity. Through two studies that utilize a nationally representative survey and a longitudinal study of public opinion towards Muslims, we make the case for the development and use of more nuanced measures that capture the distinct nature of hostility towards Muslims as encompassing both perceived realistic and symbolic threats. Additionally, we consider the range of social, psychological, and physical consequences that Islamophobia may exert on Muslim individuals themselves, as well as their interactions with the majority population. These have important implications for scholars studying the sociopolitical behavior of Muslims and policymakers seeking to counteract the adverse effects of Islamophobia in the United States or elsewhere.

Nazita Lajevardi, Kassra Oskooii and Muniba Saleem indicates shared first authorship.

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INTRODUCTION

Scholarship has documented over the last 75 years the centrality of race and racial attitudes in American politics (Hutchings & Valentino, 2004). The influence of outgroup animus on White political attitudes in the United States has long been recognized, although the salience of different group attitudes has varied over time. Early work focused on anti-Black attitudes (Du Bois, 1899; Myrdal, 1944) and racial resentment (e.g., Smith et al., 2020; Stephens-Dougan, 2016; Tesler & Sears, 2010; Valentino et al., 2002), although increasingly research has also pointed to the unique importance of anti-Latino and anti-immigrant attitudes (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2017; Buyuker et al., 2021; Enns & Jardina, 2021; Hajnal & Rivera, 2014; Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018; Ramirez & Peterson, 2020).

There is good reason, however, to also account for hostility towards Muslims when examining contemporary American political attitudes. Although Muslims received little attention in the years before the turn of the century, Islam and its adherents forcefully entered the national discourse in the immediate aftermath of the tragic terrorist attacks on 9/11, and remained cemented there in the following decades as the United States was engaged in armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and as attacks unfolded in the United States and in other western democracies. Negative and frequent depictions of Muslims and Islam were routinely communicated in the mass media to the general public (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017; Bleich & van der Veen, 2021; Lajevardi, 2021; Saleem et al., 2016; Yazdih, 2020), arguably worsening attitudes towards Muslims (Lajevardi, 2021; Shaver et al., 2017). This media environment cultivated a political climate that directly targeted Muslims with antidemocratic policies (Saleem et al., 2017; Schmuck et al., 2020).

During this period, Islamophobia emerged as a pervasive force in American social and political life. Islamophobia is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, encompasses race, religion, and nationality, making its definition and conceptualization rather challenging (Awan & Zempi, 2020; Naber & Rana, 2019). Recent scholarship has sought to unearth its historical manifestations (Naber & Rana, 2019; Oskooii, Dana, & Barreto, 2021). Presently, Islamophobia is understood to be fueled by various forms of animosity, including institutional, ideological, political, and religious, and that it embodies both structural and cultural facets of racism specifically targeting Muslim identity, symbols, and markers (Awan & Zempi, 2020). This perspective underscores the institutional and political biases against Muslims (e.g., the “Muslim Travel Ban”), viewing Islamophobia as a distinct type of racism that portrays Islamic practices and culture as threats to Western society. Instead of utilizing biological superiority as its basis, Islamophobia employs concepts of cultural and religious supremacy, and as such, it marginalizes Muslims and their distinct beliefs and practices (Awan & Zempi, 2020).¹

In line with the recent and sustained rise of Islamophobia, scholarship has highlighted the unique impact of anti-Muslim attitudes on presidential vote choice (Jardina & Stephens-Dougan, 2021; Mason et al., 2021; Tesler, 2018; Tucker et al., 2019) and policy preferences (Lajevardi, 2020; Oskooii, Dana, & Barreto, 2021). Much of this work, however, accounts for anti-Muslim animus within a broad ethnocentric measure, employing favorability ratings, feeling thermometers, or group stereotypes that are often developed with other marginalized groups in mind. While these measures have at times shown that anti-Muslim animus operates in ways distinct from other outgroup attitudes, they are devoid of the contextual specificity necessary for encapsulating the unique perceived threats associated with Muslims in the United States and the range of negative attitudes that exist in the population (Lajevardi & Abrajano, 2019; Oskooii, Dana, & Barreto, 2021). This issue becomes particularly challenging when considering

¹Other work has also defined Islamophobia. For example, Bleich (2011) defines Islamophobia as indiscriminate and unnuanced negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims, while Beydoun (2023) conceptualizes Islamophobia as being a stereotypical term that directly couches Muslims worldwide under the cover of terror suspicion.

that varying outgroups are linked to unique threats (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). These divergent threat perceptions carry significant ramifications for the affective responses evoked towards these groups and the ensuing behavioral tendencies during intergroup interactions (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Notably, anti-Muslim animus stands apart from other outgroup attitudes primarily due to the way Muslims are closely associated with tropes of terrorism, existential threats, violence, and perceived cultural incompatibility with the American way of life within the American imaginary (Lajevardi, 2020; Naber & Rana, 2019).

In this *Advances* article, we advocate for the incorporation of more comprehensive and nuanced attitudinal measures when evaluating the factors that influence public political preferences, and specifically when focusing on anti-Muslim attitudes. We strongly urge researchers to employ attitudinal assessments that are specifically tailored to the content under investigation. Hostility towards Muslims, for instance, can stem from objective or perceived threats related to one's welfare/safety (i.e., realistic threats) or values (i.e., symbolic threats). This underscores the critical need to embrace an approach that fully encapsulates the multidimensional essence of these attitudes. Employing such measures will enhance our ability to pinpoint the core motivations underpinning support for public policies aimed at Muslims, both within national borders and on the global stage. Despite considerable interest in Muslims from politicians, academics, and the public, our understanding remains relatively limited. While numerous studies have been conducted, the intricacy of the subject matter and the constraints of our empirical and theoretical foundations have hindered a comprehensive exploration of the origins of anti-Muslim sentiments. However, the most significant barrier in this research area is the paucity of public opinion surveys incorporating Muslim-specific measurements. As Lajevardi (2020) notes:

Several impediments limit scholarly research. Scholarly interest in attitudes towards Muslims (as a foreign group), Islam (the religion), and Muslim Americans (the domestic group) only peaked after 2001. As available Roper polls demonstrate, only three public surveys are available to scholars measuring attitudes towards the group prior to 2001, complicating attempts at identifying how Muslim Americans were viewed prior to 9/11.

While a nascent political science scholarship exploring mass attitudes towards American Muslims has begun to emerge, this literature is based on formulating an all-encompassing theory evaluating how the group fares in the face of all facets of American democracy. Moreover, the questions posed about U.S. Muslims in surveys are often either uninformative—e.g. favorability scores—or based on stereotypes typically attributed to other groups. (pp. 13–14)

Therefore, much of our understanding of the psychology behind anti-Muslim attitudes is hindered by limited data availability, which restricts the ability of most studies to comprehensively consider a range of highly relevant and context-sensitive measures. To address this gap, we begin by providing an in-depth review of existing studies that have, to our knowledge, developed and utilized attitudinal items specific to Muslims. We then conduct two sets of original analyses that combine a nationally representative survey with a longitudinal study of public opinion towards Muslims.

The first set of analyses empirically demonstrate that attitudes towards Muslims are unique and cannot be fully captured by attitudinal measures that were originally designed for other groups. Specifically, we investigate whether ethnocentric measures (generalized hostility) override or encompass the effects of context-specific measures when assessing support for various policies targeting Muslims. Our second set of analyses differentiate between perceived realistic and symbolic threat and examine how these two components of anti-Muslim animus may differently shape related policy attitudes.

The findings reveal that Muslim-specific constructs offer a more comprehensive understanding of Americans' endorsement of anti-Muslim policies. We find that policy preferences can be explained by perceived safety concerns, and that Muslims living in America are perceived not only as a realistic threat to physical safety, but also as symbolic threats to American values.² Consequently, studies on anti-Muslim animus should take into account different forms of perceived threat, especially if the goal is to gain a better understanding of support for policies aimed at restricting the rights and freedoms of American Muslims.

While it is important to understand the underpinnings of negative attitudes towards Muslims, it is also vital to underscore the adverse effects of stigmatization and hostility on Muslims themselves. Therefore, the final part of this article presents a review of the research on the social, psychological, physical, and political consequences of stigma on Muslims.

Together the article makes four main contributions. First, it provides a comprehensive literature review of studies examining anti-Muslim attitudes with context-specific measures. Second, results from Study 1 demonstrate the ways in which Muslim-specific constructs provide a nuanced understanding of Americans' endorsement of anti-Muslim policies. Third, findings from Study 2 illustrate that measures encompassing both realistic and symbolic threats provide a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics underlying anti-Muslim attitudes and specific policy preferences. Lastly, we discuss the social, psychological, and political ramifications of prejudice on Muslims themselves.

Moreover, this article has important policy and normative implications. Our study underscores that attitudes towards Muslims can be a function of theoretically distinct concerns, and these distinctions are integral in explaining anti-Muslim policy preferences. Therefore, it is crucial for policymakers and stakeholders to consider these dynamics when devising strategies to combat Islamophobia. Moreover, our findings signal a need for policies that challenge these types of perceived threats, ultimately informing proactive policy development aimed at mitigating anti-Muslim prejudices. By addressing the multifaceted dimensions of anti-Muslim attitudes and their consequences, we aim to contribute to efforts promoting inclusivity and combating discrimination against Muslim communities.

THE CASE FOR STUDYING ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDES

Islam is the second largest religious group behind Christianity, with an estimated 1.6–2.1 billion adherents around the globe. Islam is also the fastest growing religion in the world, with the Muslim population predicted to increase by 35% over the next 20 years. The Pew Research Center estimates that the Muslim population will likely surpass the number of Christians to become the world's largest religious group during the second half of *this* century.³

Yet, despite the large number of Muslim adherents worldwide, anti-Muslim hostility is pervasive and global. In 2021, a Special Rapporteur to the United Nations warned that anti-Muslim hatred worldwide has reached “epidemic proportions” and urged member states to take immediate action.⁴ The report to the UN Human Rights Council cited surveys finding that nearly 40% of Europeans held unfavorable attitudes towards Muslims in

²The terms “realistic” and “symbolic” are employed in accordance with integrated threat theory (ITT) to distinguish between threats arising from safety and economic competition concerns and those stemming from ideological differences. It is important to note that these terms do not imply whether these concerns are objectively substantiated or perceived, as both aspects are considered within the framework of ITT.

³<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/06/why-muslims-are-the-worlds-fastest-growing-religious-group/>.

⁴<https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086452>.

2018 and 2017, and around 30% of Americans viewed Muslims negatively. In turn, Muslims in Western democracies have arguably been subject to widespread discrimination in various social and institutional settings. While our research focuses specifically on the U.S. context, it is the case that the hostile lived experiences of Muslims extend to other Western democracies at large.⁵

Although anti-Muslim hostility can be found worldwide, there are a number of reasons why it is particularly pervasive in the United States. Notably, negative attitudes towards those who practice religions other than Protestant Christianity have a long history in the United States (Higham, 2002; Schrag, 2010). Although many of the U.S. colonists fleeing from Europe cited religious freedom as a reason for seeking the colonies, this religious freedom was not extended to Catholics, Mormons, Jews, atheists, or people of other faiths (Beale, 1951). Rather, it allowed the freedom to practice different forms of Trinitarian Protestant Christianity, while those of other faiths were routinely prosecuted. As such, American religious minorities have long experienced bias and violence, motivated by rampant nativism and religious intolerance (Schwartz, 2016). Against this backdrop of discrimination and persecution of those who belong to non-Christian faiths, it is perhaps not surprising that in the contemporary era, American Muslims are facing similar oppression (Merkel, 2019). As a “whiteshift” took place after World War II, where immigrant Catholics and Jews were subsumed into the “Judeo-Christian” category as a proxy for whiteness, the country has seen an emergence of “a visible and culturally alien” minority of Muslims (Kaufmann, 2018), who are racialized religious minorities (Garner & Selod, 2015; O'Brien & Abdelhadi, 2020), and against whom hostility is currently high. However, these anti-Muslim attitudes are distinct in many ways from those of other religious groups, as described in more detail below.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, concerns about the status of Muslims in the United States have intensified. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 saw Muslims in America become central to the national discourse and almost uniformly associated with tropes of terror, violence, and oppression. Constructed as antithetical to the American way of life, Muslims very quickly were situated in a low and salient position in the American racial hierarchy. This situation has arguably remained unchanged. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the imaginary of the “Racial Muslim” was constructed, whereby individuals with particular names (like Mohammad), darker skin, particular forms of religious dress, and with roots in parts of the world (like the Middle East or Pakistan) became part of an imagined (and conflated) Arab/Muslim/Middle Eastern enemy (Aziz, 2021; Bayoumi, 2006; Kumar, 2021; Naber, 2008).

What came next was a dramatic deterioration in how U.S. Muslims were treated by federal law enforcement agencies, when compared to other subsets of Americans (Lajevardi, 2020), with one study examining a 2014 survey of law enforcement agencies finding that political attitudes among this population were positively associated with perceiving Muslims as more of a threat (Kurzman et al., 2017). Over the past two decades, U.S. foreign and domestic policies have been heavily influenced by the perceived threat of terrorism, leading to the enactment of security measures that largely target Muslims, both foreign and domestic, under the guise of ensuring safety (Kumar, 2021). The worsening in the status of U.S. Muslims was almost immediate: Six weeks after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush signed the USA Patriot Act into law. With dual goals of strengthening and broadening the reach of federal law enforcement agencies, as well as denying entry into the United States any aliens suspected of supporting or being engaged in any terrorist activity, this landmark piece of legislation had immediate impacts on the U.S. Muslim community. As Abdo (2005) notes:

⁵For more information on European Islamophobia, see the European Islamophobia Report: <https://islamophobiareport.com/islamophobiareport-2021.pdf>.

The act, written in response to the September 11 attacks, in theory applies to all citizens, but it was written with Muslims in mind and in practice denies them their civil liberties by empowering law enforcement authorities to raid their homes, offices, and mosques in the name of the war on terrorism. (p. 12)

In this era, both foreign and domestic Muslims found themselves under unprecedented surveillance, being singled out under the pretext of terror suspicion. This marked a distinct approach from how the U.S. state apparatus interacted with Muslims or those perceived to be Muslim, with a dramatic expansion of surveillance and law enforcement powers subjecting individuals to intensive scrutiny. For instance, in the aftermath of the attacks, approximately 1200 Muslim U.S. citizens were detained and interrogated by various law enforcement agencies (Kumar, 2021). The implementation of the Patriot Act led to sweeping surveillance, prolonged detentions, and countless gag orders within the U.S. Muslim community. Other initiatives further targeted Muslim communities, such as the National Security Agency's warrantless surveillance program,⁶ the New York Police Department's counterterrorism lessons painting mainstream Muslims as violent,⁷ and the Obama administration's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program (Tekelioglu, 2019). This hostile political climate, exacerbated by the antagonistic 2016 presidential election campaign, cumulatively deteriorated the status of Muslims in the United States.

The ramifications of these initiatives have been considerable, significantly impacting both the U.S. Muslim community and the wider public. In the Muslim community, such policies have essentially normalized discriminatory treatment, including unlawful detentions, invasive security checks, and in some instances, home and mosque raids under the pretext of the War on Terror (Abdo, 2005). As a result, many Muslims face constant animosity and discrimination, making life increasingly challenging. As of 2021, the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) reported the highest ever number of civil rights complaints (see also Hobbs et al., 2023), indicating a persistent suspicion towards Muslims in the United States.⁸ These complaints highlighted a 28% increase in hate and bias incidents and a 13% rise in workplace and public accommodation discrimination since 2020.

These policies have also contributed to shaping broader public attitudes towards Muslims. Propagated by a political and media climate that often portrays Muslims as threatening, violent, and primitive, public opinion has grown increasingly negative. Numerous polls since 2001 consistently show American public perception of Muslims as worse than most other racial, ethnic, or religious groups (Edgell et al., 2006; Khan & Ecklund, 2013; Lajevardi, 2017; Panagopoulos, 2006; Selod, 2015; Tesler, 2022). The 2020 American National Election Study (ANES) survey reinforces that these negative attitudes persist today, with Americans rating Muslims least favorably compared to other groups.⁹

In this context, understanding the roots and consequences of anti-Muslim attitudes is important for at least two reasons. First, Muslims have been consistently rated more negatively than nearly any other group over time (Edgell et al., 2006; Pew Research Center, 2017b; Putnam & Campbell, 2012). The fact that Americans consistently and openly express hostility towards Muslims in surveys at levels distinct from most other outgroups that face tremendous prejudice in day-to-day American life indicates that the roots and consequences of said opposition towards Muslims may differ from those other groups. Indeed, there have been scholarly

⁶<https://theintercept.com/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/>.

⁷<https://www.wired.com/2011/09/fbi-muslims-radical/>.

⁸<https://www.cair.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Still-Suspect-Report-2022.pdf>.

⁹In the 2020 ANES survey, 6460 respondents answered the feeling thermometer questions about each of the aforementioned groups. Note that half of respondents were instructed to rate their attitudes towards "Asians," and half were instructed to rate their attitudes towards "Asian Americans."

observations indicating that the heightened animosity towards Muslims could stem from variations in the perceived acceptability of expressing prejudice against Muslims compared to other racial, ethnic, and religious groups in the United States (Ruisch & Ferguson, 2022). Second, a number of anti-Muslim policies that directly target only this group have been proposed and even enacted over the last two decades. Some of these policies include anti-Sharia laws, proposals to restrict mosques from being built (such as the Park 51 mosque in New York City), proposals to ban Muslims from purchasing weapons, proposals to create a Muslim registry, and banning individuals from Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States. At their core, these policies introduce a significant amount of religious discrimination that are antithetical to the core tenets of religious freedom in American democracy.

THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDES

Having examined the significant impact of policies and initiatives on the U.S. Muslim community and the broader public, we now turn our attention to understanding the distinctiveness of anti-Muslim attitudes. It is essential to explore whether attitudes towards Muslims differ from those towards other marginalized groups and how they are uniquely shaped. Scholars in the field of American politics have sought to unravel this question, considering the interplay between ethnocentrism, generalized measures, and specific threat perceptions posed by various social outgroups. In the following sections, we delve into the existing scholarship, which encompasses both ethnocentric measures and the development of Muslim-specific or content-specific attitudinal items, shedding light on the complexity of anti-Muslim attitudes.

Ethnocentric measures and attitudes towards Muslims

Research has shown that measures of prejudice and ethnocentrism predict important intergroup outcomes. Ethnocentrism is the explicit preference for one's racial or ethnic group over other groups (Kam & Kinder, 2012). This extends to feeling positive affect for one group and animus toward other groups. Research finds that ethnocentric beliefs are strong predictors of opposition to policies that are perceived to benefit members of the outgroup (Kam & Kinder, 2012). To develop measures of ethnocentrism, researchers often turn to surveys that include batteries of questions that ask respondents to rate how well different stereotypes (e.g., lazy, violent, etc.) describe members of different racialized groups (e.g., Kam & Kinder, 2012). Alternatively, favorability ratings, such as feeling thermometers, can be used to construct ethnocentrism measures by averaging ratings of multiple social outgroups (e.g., Pérez, 2015; Valentino et al., 2013). When measuring White racial attitudes, for example, researchers have created specific group difference ratings between the ingroup (e.g., feeling thermometer for Whites) and each outgroup queried.

Some of the earliest work on attitudes towards Muslims in the United States was conducted by Kalkan and colleagues and suggests that anti-Muslim prejudice exhibits an ethnocentric pattern (Kalkan, 2010; Kalkan et al., 2009; Kalkan et al., 2018). They postulate that Muslims in the United States belong to a “band of others,” which relies on the theory of ethnocentrism. These attitudes are deeply ingrained and less likely to change due to singular events like a terrorist attack (Kalkan, 2010, p. 42). Building on this, Kalkan et al. (2018) examined attitudes towards Muslim candidates, formulating a “cultural outgroup antipathy” measure by combining thermometer ratings of cultural minority groups (e.g., gays and lesbians, welfare recipients, and “illegal” immigrants). They conclude that anti-Muslim hostility is rooted in generalized hostility towards cultural outgroups.

Similar approaches have been taken by other scholars, such as Tesler and Sears (2010), who proposed that attitudes towards Muslims and undocumented immigrants can be indicative of ethnocentric sentiments towards other outgroups, such as Blacks, who may not elicit as explicit expressions of prejudice in the present political climate. More recently, Tesler (2022) postulated that there is a large and persistent link between anti-Muslim sentiments and opposition to President Obama, which saw the emergence of anti-Muslim attitudes becoming an independent predictor of American political partisan preferences. In this study, Tesler utilized a number of datasets to gauge anti-Muslim hostility with the use of favorability ratings and questions probing respondents to indicate which religion aside from their own they least and most respected.

More recent research has expanded the measurement of generalized hostility by incorporating feeling thermometer ratings of Muslims. Mason et al. (2021), for example, constructed group animus measures of party-aligned groups. Their study's measure of Democratic linked groups is an average of feeling thermometers towards Black Americans, Latinos, Muslims, and Gays and Lesbians. Baranaukas and Stowell (2022) similarly constructed an ethnocentrism measure by taking the average feeling ratings (0 being least favorable and 100 being most favorable) towards several social outgroups (e.g., Hispanics, Muslims, African-Americans, Asian-Americans) and subtracting this average from feeling thermometer ratings towards Whites.

Muslim Americans and portfolios of threat

Despite the usefulness of ethnocentric measures in understanding intergroup outcomes and exclusion of social outgroups, focusing solely on ethnocentrism overlooks the specific threats perceived by groups like Muslims (Lajevardi & Oskooii, 2018). Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) suggest that generalized measures may obscure the distinct profiles of threat associated with different outgroups. Across several studies they found that (1) individuals perceive social outgroups to vary on specific kinds of threat, (2) different threat types may elicit different emotions, and (3) such emotions have important behavioral consequences for intergroup relations, including action tendencies or preferences regarding policy outcomes (Cottrell et al., 2010). The specificity of assessing distinct threats allows researchers to make more fine-grained predictions about intergroup behavior (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Dovidio et al. (2010) have also underscored the limitations of applying measures developed for groups such as Black Americans in understanding bias towards other groups, such as Latinos.

While ethnocentric accounts have provided rather parsimonious explanations of intergroup behavior, policy outcomes related to Muslims are usually attributed to specific types of threat that do not uniformly apply to different types of “outgroups.” Previous research suggests that citizens have adopted fairly nuanced, group-specific beliefs about Muslim Americans, much of which is rooted in the long-standing orientalist depictions of Islam in the West (Said, 1978), as summarized by Oskooii, Dana, and Barreto (2021):

Orientalism, in particular, refers to the “distorted lens” through which the West has looked at and explained the Muslim world. This distorted lens has led to inaccurate depictions of how Muslims, Arabs or Middle Easterners think, behave, and interact, creating serious misconceptions regarding the belief structure of Muslims world-wide. According to Said, misrepresentations, assumptions, and negative stereotypes are overwhelming, culminated overtime in “subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arabo-Islamic peoples and their cultures” in the arts, literature, news media, political discourse, and scholarly research (Said, 1978). In turn, the prevalence of negative images of Islam has created a mindset among ordinary citizens and elites that Muslims

are culturally inferior, uncivilized, and out of touch with modern social and democratic norms. (p. 540)

Drawing on classic work from the likes of Said (2008) and Shaheen (2003) and examining political discourse surrounding the 2010 Park51 Islamic Center controversy in lower Manhattan, New York, Oskooii, Dana, and Barreto (2021) advocated for going beyond ethnocentric measures or heavily relying on stereotype measures developed with other groups in mind. They argued that Muslim Americans are vilified in contemporary political discourse in ways that are fairly distinct from anti-Black resentment or general anxieties over immigration. To this end, the authors designed content-specific items that they argued are rooted in orientalist accounts or notions of the supposed beliefs and intentions of Muslims that are highly salient in contemporary American society. More specifically, their measures probed respondents to indicate their support for two questions (“Mosques in the United States discourage Muslims from adopting the American way of life”; “Muslim Americans would rather follow their religious code, or Sharia law, than the Constitution and laws of America.”) that tapped into symbolic anxieties over Muslim Americans, which refers to perceived group differences in values, norms, morals, and customs (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

The contention that Muslims are perceived as symbolically threatening to Westerners (Abrams et al., 2017; Croucher et al., 2013; Pal & Wellman, 2022; Wirtz et al., 2016) is rooted in the tendency to perceive one's own groups' values as objectively and universally true, which can take on characteristics of moral convictions (Skitka, 2010).

Violations of these convictions are often experienced as threatening and lead to prejudice against the outgroup (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Symbolic threats are especially important in societies with egalitarian social norms because they help to justify behaviors—such as civil liberty restrictions—that would be otherwise considered unfair (Pereira et al., 2009). This is consistent with research emphasizing the importance of symbolic threat in understanding attitudes towards immigrants or newcomers (Citrin et al., 1997; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004).

While Oskooii, Dana, and Barreto (2021) primarily focused on measures of symbolic threat to highlight the limitations of applying general models of intergroup relations in understanding the dynamics of prejudice towards Muslims, their study was limited in so far as not paying enough attention to perceptions of realistic/safety threat. Research in social psychology, however, has paid much attention to realistic threat, finding that Americans' anxieties towards Muslims and their implications for related policy outcomes are usually attributed to realistic *safety* concerns surrounding terrorism (Cottrell et al., 2010; Huddy et al., 2005; Nisbet et al., 2008; Saleem et al., 2016). Such concerns have certainly gained salience in the public discourse after the tragic terrorist attacks on 9/11, which were perpetuated by individuals claiming to be Muslim (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). The 9/11 attacks not only led to long-standing changes in Americans' attitudes towards war and violence (e.g., Carnagey & Anderson, 2007) but also led to Americans explicitly and implicitly associating (and conflating) Muslims, Arabs, and people from the Middle East with terrorism (Park et al., 2007; Saleem & Anderson, 2013).¹⁰

The associations formed between Muslims, Arabs, and people from the Middle East with terrorism not only influence perceptions of threat but also evoke anger and fear towards members of these groups (Cottrell et al., 2010; Saleem et al., 2016). Beyond emotions, perceptions of Muslims as a realistic safety threat influences Americans' support for hawkish policy stances such as military action in predominantly Muslim countries or civil restrictions

¹⁰Edward Said would suggest that these links existed well before 9/11. If so, 9/11 may have further activated such associations.

for Muslim Americans (Nisbet et al., 2009; Saleem et al., 2016). Research also finds that Americans' lack of support for Palestinians in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is partly due to perceptions of Palestinians as inherently aggressive (Bruneau et al., 2017), which scholars have challenged (Dana, 2018). While realistic threat can be triggered by competition for scarce resources, political or economic power, and/or concerns about the physical safety (e.g., terrorism), studies suggest that safety threat outweighs material or economic interests in shaping Western society's attitudes towards Muslims (Abrams et al., 2017; d'Haenens & Bink, 2007; Nisbet et al., 2009; Shadid, 2005). This is consistent with American media's representation of Muslims mostly in the context of violence and terrorism (Alsultany, 2016; Dixon & Williams, 2015).

Previous work suggests that to better predict and understand the precise behavioral reactions towards an outgroup it is imperative to consider the specific threats elicited by that group (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). This suggests that if the outcome of interest is action towards a specific group, such as examining support for public policies harming Muslims, then it is prudent to consider content-specific measures in favor of generalized constructs.

Going beyond generalized hostility

In the wake of critiques about ethnocentric measures and the recognition that citizens can adopt fairly nuanced and distinct beliefs about different groups, scholars have attempted to consider content-specific measures with different degrees of specificity and success. In this section we provide examples of such efforts before highlighting the general limitations and strengths of each approach.

One way in which scholars initially attempted to use more fine-grained measures was to rely on stereotype items available in publicly available national surveys, such as the American National Election Studies (ANES) or the Cooperative Election Study (CES). Using such measures, Sides and Gross (2013) were able to convincingly demonstrate that not all stereotypes are equally applicable to Muslims. Stereotypes related to violence and trustworthiness were predictive of unfavorable attitudes towards Muslims and linked to attitudes towards the War on Terror, while those related to laziness and intelligence, which are often associated with attitudes towards groups, such as Black Americans, were not. Similarly, Jardina and Stephens-Dougan (2021) conducted a study of anti-Muslim attitudes and presidential vote choice from 2004 to 2020. In addition to using a feeling thermometer to gauge group affect towards Muslims, the authors relied on the 2012 and 2016 ANES, which included measures of stereotypical attitudes about Muslims.¹¹ Specifically, they constructed a "Negative Muslim Stereotypes" measure with respondents' assessment of how "violent" or "patriotic" Muslims are.

Other scholars have developed more robust scales, but they have either focused too heavily on symbolic or realistic threat (rather than both), focused on outcomes measures only, or included items that conflate foreign Muslims with American Muslims. For example, Hackett et al. (2020) considered the extent to which identification with the American South correlates with stronger anti-Muslim attitudes. However, respondents were presented with four statements that conflate elements of symbolic ("Muslims do not share the values of Americans") and realistic ("All Muslims are a threat to America") threats with policy items related to Muslims domestic and foreign ("All Muslims should have to register in a national database"; "Muslims should not be allowed to immigrate into the United States"). In evaluating which subsets of Americans were most likely to cast a ballot for Donald Trump, Whitehead et al. (2018) drew from the 2017 Values and Beliefs of the American

¹¹Note that these questions were posed slightly differently between the two surveys.

Public Survey and used items that tap into both symbolic and realistic threats of Muslims, but they did not distinguish between American Muslims and foreign Muslims. Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate their support for the following statements: (1) “Refugees from the Middle East pose a terrorist threat to the United States”; (2) “Muslims hold values that are morally inferior to the values of people like me”; (3) “Muslims want to limit the personal freedoms of people like me”; and (4) “Muslims endanger the physical safety of people like me.”

In another example, Sherkat and Lehman (2018) relied on content-specific measures that explain outcomes rather than the roots of (in)tolerance towards Muslims. Specifically, respondents were directed to answer the following questions: “Now consider a Muslim clergyman who preaches hatred of the United States. (1) If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community preaching hatred of the United States, should he be allowed to speak, or not? (2) Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not? (3) If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote which preaches hatred of the United States should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?” Together these items considered the extent to which respondents would be supportive of protecting the civil liberties of Muslims rather than explaining the reasons for wanting to limit or eliminate such liberties.

Surveys from the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) have remedied the aforementioned shortcomings by fielding much more refined questions specific to American Muslims. For example, their surveys have asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following five statements: (1) “Most Muslims living in the United States are more prone to violence than other people”; (2) “Most Muslims living in the United States discriminate against women”; (3) “Most Muslims living in the United States are hostile to the United States”; (4) “Most Muslims living in the United States are less civilized than other people”; and (5) “Most Muslims living in the United States are partially responsible for acts of violence carried out by other Muslims.” However, ISPU surveys have not been as relied upon in academic studies in part because ISPU does not regularly include outcome measures and covariates that are commonly included in other surveys.

One scale that has similar strengths as the ISPU measures and has been used in numerous academic studies (e.g., Beydoun & Sedique, 2023; Bonilla et al., 2022; Calfano et al., 2021; Engelhardt, 2021; Erentzen et al., 2022; Karlsson, 2020; Lajevardi, 2020, 2021; Lajevardi & Abrajano, 2019; Lajevardi & Oskooii, 2018) is the “Muslim American Resentment” (MAR) scale, first developed by Lajevardi (2017). The index consists of nine items, which together capture both elements of symbolic and realistic threat towards Muslims in the United States: (1) “Most Muslim Americans integrate successfully into American culture”; (2) “Muslim Americans sometimes do not have the best interests of Americans at heart”; (3) “Muslims living in the US should be subject to more surveillance than others”; (4) “Muslim Americans, in general, tend to be more violent than other people”; (5) “Most Muslim Americans reject jihad and violence”; (6) “Most Muslim Americans lack basic English language skills”; (7) “Most Muslim Americans are not terrorists”; (8) “Wearing headscarves should be banned in all public places”; and (9) “Muslim Americans do a good job of speaking out against Islamic terrorism.”

Lajevardi constructed the nine items using insights from the European literature in social psychology and education (e.g. Agirdag et al., 2012; Bevelander & Otterbeck, 2010; Heitmeyer & Zick, 2004), which more extensively examined symbolic and realistic threats of Muslims in the West.¹² Regarding the benefits of the MAR scale, Lajevardi (2020) writes:

¹²Research on European attitudes towards Muslims was much more developed and robust at that time relative to research in the United States (e.g., see Savelkoul et al., 2010; Sniderman et al., 2003; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008).

[B]ecause they are closely related to scales that have already proven successful in measuring attitudes toward Muslims in the Western world, are reflective of contemporary stereotypes of Muslim Americans, and are specifically tailored toward Muslims in *America*, rather than conflating Islam or overseas Muslims. Furthermore, the MAR scale takes into account the myriad ways in which the public perceives and has critiqued U.S. Muslims. (p. 42)

The MAR scale was certainly designed with American Muslims in mind, instead of foreign Muslims, and encompassed elements of symbolic and realistic threat. However, one shortcoming of the MAR scale is that two of the items considered policy attitudes. As such, researchers have considered using a shortened version of the MAR scale that excludes Items 3 and 8 (e.g., Lajevardi & Oskooii, 2018).

Overall, each of these strategies on their own is arguably imperfect and can ultimately contribute to the inconsistent findings observed in the literature. For example, the use of general assessments of stereotypes to predict specific outgroup behaviors can obscure the specific profiles of threat posed by different social outgroups. Thus, a composite stereotype measure (or feeling thermometer measure) which includes items such as “Muslims are violent” and “Muslims are unfriendly” confounds different threat types, ultimately yielding low predictive power for specific behaviors relevant to Muslim Americans.

Furthermore, even though Muslims in America are perceived as symbolically threatening (e.g., PRRI, 2015), much of the existing work in this area attributes Americans' attitudes towards and support for policies targeting Muslims solely to perceptions of Muslims as realistic threats. Because perceptions of symbolic threat serve to justify unequal treatment of minority groups in egalitarian societies (Pereira et al., 2009), perceptions of Muslims as symbolic threats are also pertinent to policy decisions involving Muslims living in America.

Finally, previous work on support for policies relevant to American Muslims often confounds policies that target Muslims internationally (e.g., military action in Muslim countries or banning Muslim immigrants) with those that focus on U.S. Muslim citizens (e.g., civil restrictions on Muslim Americans). This is problematic as there are likely different reasons behind Americans' support for harming Muslims internationally versus support for harming Muslim Americans, who are legally entitled to the same constitutional rights as all Americans. For example, in one longitudinal study, Saleem et al. (2016) found that perceptions of Muslims as aggressive—a proxy for realistic/safety threat—predicted support for military action in Muslim countries but not necessarily support for civil restrictions for Muslim Americans. This suggests that support for policies directed at Muslim Americans may primarily result from another threat type, such as symbolic threat.

Building on previous work, in the sections that follow, we will evaluate the extent to which ethnocentric measures and content-specific items (using a shortened MAR scale) predict anti-Muslim policies evaluations. We then parse through specific types of threat underlying anti-Muslim evaluations and turn to a longitudinal study to test whether different threat types—realistic/safety and symbolic—render distinctive policy evaluations. Finally, before concluding, we consider how the proliferation of Islamophobia in Western societies, more broadly, has resulted in the stigmatization of Muslim individuals or those perceived to be Muslim, leading to detrimental social, psychological, physical, and political outcomes.

STUDY 1

Data and measures

We have argued that distinctive, group-specific measures focused on the perceived beliefs and behaviors of Muslims will explain citizens' endorsement of anti-Muslim policies above and

beyond ethnocentric measures that lack nuance or were developed with other groups in mind. To evaluate this claim, we rely on statistical models using the nationally representative 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)—the University of Delaware's (UD) preelection wave team module—which includes a shortened MAR scale, various outgroup measures, and policy questions specifically related to Muslims.¹³ The module includes 804 adult respondents who provided answers to all the study questions.

Our key explanatory variable is a shortened and refined version of the MAR scale and consists of four questions that capture elements of symbolic and realistic threat towards Muslim Americans. Respondents were asked to report how strongly they agree or disagree (5-point response options) with the following statements presented to them in random order and some reverse coded to mitigate the possibility of acquiescence bias: (1) Most Muslim Americans integrate successfully into American culture (reverse coded); (2) Muslim Americans sometimes do not have the best interests of America at heart; (3) Muslim Americans tend to support jihad and violence; (4) Muslim Americans would rather follow their religious code, or Sharia law, than the Constitution and laws of the United States.¹⁴ Consistent with previous work, we used these items to construct an additive scale and normalized (min–max) this variable and all the other measures used in this study to range from values 0 to 1. The MAR scale employed here is internally consistent with a Cronbach's scale reliability α coefficient of .882.

To account for generalized outgroup measures related to racial minorities, particularly towards Black Americans, we constructed a standard racial-resentment scale using the following battery available in the CCES Common Content sample: (1) Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors; (2) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class (reverse coded); (3) Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve (reverse coded); (4) It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites. For each item respondents expressed agreement or disagreement (5-point response options). This scale is internally consistent ($\alpha = .918$), with higher values indicating greater resentment.

The survey also includes questions related to cultural outgroups, namely resentment towards members of the LGB community. In specific, respondents were asked how strongly they agree or disagree (4-point response options) with the following two statements: (1) Gay and lesbian people should stop demanding special rights; (2) Gay and lesbian people are trying to get more than they deserve. We relied on these items to create an additive LGB resentment scale ($\alpha = .896$). Our study also accounts for hostile sexism with a scale ($\alpha = .647$) comprised of respondents' agreement or disagreement (5-point response options) with the following items used in prior studies (Cassese & Barnes, 2019; Schaffner, 2022): (1) When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against; (2) Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men (reverse coded).

The preelection module also includes questions about four policy proposals that inquire about the respondent's willingness to curb Muslim Americans' civil liberties and religious institutions and practices, as well as restricting Muslim immigrants from entering the United States, which gained traction with President Trump's Muslim Travel Ban Executive Order (Oskooii, Lajevardi, & Collingwood, 2021). More specifically, respondents were asked to report the extent to which they oppose or support (4-point response options) the following proposals

¹³AAPOR Response Rates and other CCES sample metrics can be found at: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/ZSBZ7K/WZWCZ1&version=6.0>.

¹⁴Note that Items 3 and 4 here differ somewhat from the original MAR scale. Item 3 reverses the valence of Statement 5 in the MAR scale, and Item 4 is a new item building on an item used in Oskooii, Dana, and Barreto (2021)'s work.

presented to them in random order: (1) We should pass laws to restrict the number of mosques or Islamic centers being built in the United States; (2) Muslims in America should be allowed to wear their religious clothing, the hijab (headscarf), in all public places (reverse coded); (3) Muslims in America should not be allowed to buy weapons even if they are U.S. citizens; and (4) We should severely restrict immigration from all Muslim-majority countries. The outcome measures were also normalized to range from 0 to 1, with the highest value indicating support for the restrictive policy in question.

In addition to the prior measures, the statistical models account for standard demographic controls (education, income, sex, age, and race), partisanship and political ideology, political interest, and a dummy variable for born-again Christians. Given that authoritarianism may underlie negative views of out groups such as Muslims (Kalkan et al., 2009), we also included an authoritarian personality scale of child-rearing preferences (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014). The items in the scale ask respondents to express their preferences for children who have good manners, are obedient and well-behaved, and respect elders. Finally, we also included a measure of familiarity with Muslims, which asked respondents to report how many Muslims they know personally (*none*, *only a few*, *more than a few*, or *a lot*). Variable coding and summary statistics are reported in Table S1.1 in the online supporting information.

Analysis and results

To evaluate the interplay between the generalized measures and Muslim-specific constructs, we employ a similar analytical strategy used by Oskooii, Dana, and Barreto (2021). That is, we estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) models by first regressing each outcome measure on racial resentment, LGB resentment, hostile sexism, and all the other explanatory and control variables excluding the MAR scale. We refer to this first model as the “ethnocentric model.” We then add the MAR scale to the ethnocentric model to evaluate the extent to which group-specific measures focused on the perceived beliefs and behaviors of Muslims may explain citizens' endorsement of anti-Muslim policies above and beyond the ethnocentric measures. For ease of interpretation, we provide coefficient plots (with 95% confidence intervals), which signify how much the mean of each policy measure changes given a discrete change in each explanatory variable (0–1), while holding all the other variables constant. Full regression tables are also reported in Appendix S1 in the online supporting information.

Figure 1 reports the results of the ethnocentric and MAR regression models as it pertains to respondents' willingness to pass laws to restrict the number of mosques or Islamic centers being built in the United States¹⁵ As the left panel of the figure helps illustrate, all of the generalized measures provide statistically significant (at $p < .05$) explanatory power in predicting opposition towards mosques. All else equal, respondents scoring high on racial resentment, relative to their counterparts, were 31.5 percentage points more likely to support the proposition of passing laws to restrict the number of mosques or Islamic centers being built in the United States. We also find that resentment towards cultural outgroups, such as members of the gay and lesbian community, also predict antimosque policy preferences. That is, a discrete change in LGB resentment corresponds to an average increase of 15 percentage points in support of restricting mosques. Furthermore, a single unit increase in hostile sexism corresponds to an increase of 10 percentage points in support for restricting mosques. Authoritarian personality orientation and partisanship are also both

¹⁵To check for multicollinearity, we relied on the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) measure. The diagnostic measure suggests that multicollinearity is not of concern, with VIF values falling between 1.2 to 2.9.




FIGURE 1 Predictors of supporting the passage laws to restrict the number of Mosques or Islamic centers being built in the United States. Change in predicate values with 95% CIs are derived from OLS regression results reported in [Table SI.2](#) in the online supporting information.

predictive of anti-Muslim policy support, and the other coefficients of demographic controls such as education, income, and born-again status are in the expected direction and statistically significant. Overall, the results of the ethnocentric model are consistent with previous studies, in particular the Kalkan et al. (2009) study, which suggests that attitudes towards Muslims are shaped by a general sense of negative affect for racial and cultural groups that fall outside of the mainstream.

However, once we account for Muslim-specific constructs (MAR scale), the ethnocentric measures lose explanatory power, as illustrated on the right-hand panel of [Figure 1](#). With the inclusion of the MAR scale into the model, authoritarian-personality orientation and value orientation such as partisanship still predict anti-Mosque policy endorsement. In contrast, both the LGB resentment and the hostile sexism measures exert little to no influence with coefficients near zero. While racial resentment is still a statistically significant predictor of anti-Mosque support, its explanatory power is cut in half (12 percentage point change). The results show that the single biggest predictor of supporting the restrictions of Mosques or Islamic centers is the Muslim-specific construct of MAR. A discrete change in the MAR scale is associated with an average increase of 65 percentage points in favor of mosque restrictions. Linear hypothesis testing indicates that the MAR coefficient is not equal to the racial resentment coefficient ($F 52.895; p < .001$). That is, the effect size of MAR is statistically larger than that of racial resentment. In sum, the results provide support for the argument that group-specific measures focused on the perceived beliefs and behaviors of Muslims will explain citizens' endorsement of anti-Muslim policies above and beyond ethnocentric measures.

We find similar patterns when examining the next two policy initiatives that implicate Muslims. [Figure 2](#) shows that under the generalized, ethnocentric model, racial resentment, LGB resentment, and hostile sexism predict the endorsement of not allowing Muslim American women to wear the hijab in public places. But, once we account for MAR, only hostile sexism




FIGURE 2 Predictors of opposing allowing Muslim Americans to wear their religious clothing, the Hijab (Headscarf), in all Public Places. Change in predicate values with 95% CIs are derived from OLS regression results reported in [Table S1.3](#) in the online supporting information.

marginally predicts the willingness to restrict hijabs in public spaces (at $p < .1$). Instead, a discrete change in MAR is associated with an average increase of 48 percentage points in favor of restricting the hijab. [Figure 3](#) shows that under the ethnocentric model racial resentment and LGB resentment are strongly associated with the willingness to not allow Muslim citizens to purchase weapons. With MAR added to the model, only racial resentment is marginally associated with the outcome measure. Our group-specific construct that captures elements of symbolic and realistic threats towards Muslim Americans, however, is highly predictive of one's willingness to restrict Muslim citizens from purchasing weapons—a discrete change in MAR increases support of the policy by 54 percentage points.

Only as it pertains to restricting immigration from Muslim-majority countries do we detect a more meaningful influence ethnocentrism. But, as [Figure 4](#) illustrates, even for a policy that targets Muslim immigrants rather than American Muslims, the explanatory power of each of the ethnocentric measures declines with the inclusion of MAR. Furthermore, linear hypothesis testing indicates that the MAR coefficient is not equal to any of the ethnocentric coefficients (at $p < .05$).

In [Appendix S2](#) in the online supporting information, we supplement the main analyses with additional models that further examine the interplay between group-specific and generalized outgroup measures. For these additional analyses, we also capture ethnocentrism with both absolute and relative group feeling thermometer (FT) ratings. In [Tables S2.1–S2.4](#) we first report models with only (absolute) group FT ratings (scaled 0–1) as opposed to the various group-specific scales we relied on for the main analyses. What we find is that even when negative affect towards Black Americans, “illegal” immigrants, gays and lesbians, and atheists is predictive of anti-Muslim policy preferences, the explanatory power of each FT diminishes once we account for FT ratings for Muslim Americans (a group-specific construct). In some cases, FT ratings of racial, cultural, and religious outgroups do not predict anti-Muslim policy




FIGURE 3 Predictors of not allowing Muslim-Americans to buy weapons even if they are U.S. citizens. Change in predicate values with 95% CIs are derived from OLS regression results reported in Table S1.4 in the online supporting information.

preferences even without the inclusion of the Muslim American FT rating. For instance, the gay and lesbian FT rating is not associated with the desire to restrict mosques, disallow hijab in public, and restrict the purchase of weapons by Muslim American citizens. Likewise, negative affect towards Atheists is not linked to the desire to disallow hijab in public places nor is it associated with the desire to restrict immigrants from Muslim-majority countries. In all cases in which the other outgroup FT ratings are predictive of policy preferences, the substantive impact of the Muslim American FT ratings is substantively larger (at $p < .05$). This means that even when utilizing FT ratings as indicators of group-specific and generalized hostility, ratings of Muslim Americans are substantively and consistently much more predictive than FT ratings for other racial, religious, or cultural outgroups.

Next, we consider whether a group-specific measure that does not specifically capture perceived symbolic and realistic threats (i.e., FT of Muslim Americans) provides the same predictive power as the MAR scale while still controlling for all the other outgroup FT ratings. Tables S2.5–S2.8 in the online supporting information show that while both measures predict each policy initiative, the coefficients of the MAR scale in each model are substantively larger and statistically distinct (at $p < .05$) from the Muslim American FT rating. For instance, a discrete change in the MAR scale is associated with an average increase of 61 percentage points in favor of mosque restrictions, while a unit change in the Muslim American FT rating, which is also scaled from 0 to 1, is associated with an average increase of 13.2 percentage points. This difference of 47.8 percentage points is statistically significant ($F_{210.2}$; $p < .001$).

Finally, we put the MAR scale to test against generalized measured by constructing a relative FT score in which the FT rating for Whites (“dominant group”) is subtracted from the average FT ratings for all other racial, cultural, and religious outgroups—that is, Blacks, “illegal” immigrants, gays and lesbians, and atheists. Given that individuals may have different baseline scores even if their feelings towards one group versus another




FIGURE 4 Predictors of supporting severely restricting immigration from all Muslim-majority countries. Change in predicate values with 95% CIs are derived from OLS regression results reported in Table S1.5 in the online supporting information.

group is consistent, a relative score is often preferred over single group ratings (Valentino et al., 2013; Wilcox et al., 1989). Tables S2.9–S2.12 in the online supporting information report the results among all the participants and also only among White respondents since the relative measure relies on differentiation between the “dominant” and “subordinate” groups. Across all the models we find that MAR provides greater predictive power over ethnocentrism, with the latter not predicting opposition to Hijab in public places. In models in which the ethnocentric variable is statistically associated with the outcome measure, the coefficient for MAR is substantively much larger. For example, the difference between the coefficients for MAR and White preference over all other outgroups among White respondents in the mosque restriction model is a statistically significant 37.7 percentage points ($F 11.16$; $p < .001$). For all the respondents, this difference is a statistically significant 46.3 percentage points ($F 21.87$; $p < .001$).

Overall, the accumulated evidence suggest that negative evaluations of racial and cultural outgroups may provide some explanatory power in understanding attitudes towards Muslim Americans. After all, there is some overlap in outgroup evaluations in that individuals who have a negative outlook towards racial, cultural, or religious minorities may also evaluate Muslim Americans negatively and show a proclivity to endorsing policies that restrict their rights. However, as the accumulated findings have shown, a more nuanced approach using group-specific constructs that focus on symbolic and realistic threats that Muslim Americans are perceived to pose provide a greater understanding of why some Americans are willing to endorse anti-Muslim policies that even violate American values of equality, fairness, and religious freedom.

In the next study, we take a step further and consider whether distinct threat perceptions (symbolic vs. realistic) have differential effects on domain-specific (e.g., security checks vs. limiting sites of worship) policy initiatives implicating American Muslims.

STUDY 2

Data and measures

To examine the relationship between each threat type and distinct policy outcomes we rely on data as part of a longitudinal study of 795 American adults conducted before and after the 2016 U.S. Presidential election through Research Now, which is currently called Dynata. The first wave was fielded in August 2016, and the second wave was fielded from November to December 2016. We will refer to these surveys as W1 and W2, respectively. For our analysis, we subset the data to only participants who did not self-identify as Muslim ($N=791$). Of these participants 403 identified as female and 368 as male. In terms of the racial and ethnic composition of the sample, the majority of participants identified as White ($N=621$, 78.51%) followed by Hispanic ($N=43$, 5.44%). The average age of the participants was 45 years old with a standard deviation of 16.73.

To measure content-specific constructs directly related to American Muslims, we use four survey items that tap distinctly into the perceived symbolic and realistic/safety threat of Muslim Americans. More specifically, two items assessed symbolic threat ("To what extent do Muslims in America... (1) Violate your core values and beliefs; (2) want to change our way of life."), and two items assessed realistic/safety threats ("To what extent do Muslims in America... (1) make our society less safe and more dangerous; (2) Endanger the safety of people like you."). Participants responded on a scale from 1 (*Not at all*) to 5 (*A great deal*). On average, participants reported that Muslims represented "a little" threat at both waves, both on the symbolic threat (μ W1 = 2.08, $SD = 1.21$; μ W2 = 2.21, $SD = 1.28$) and safety threat (μ W1 = 2.02, $SD = 1.11$; μ W2 = 2.13, $SD = 1.13$) scales. Cronbach's alpha indicates high interitem reliability for symbolic threat at both waves (α W1 = .87; α W2 = .90) and for safety threat at both waves (α W1 = .93; α W2 = .94).

In addition to perceived threats, participants expressed their support for three specific public policies by responding to the following items with response options ranging from 1 (*oppose a great deal*) to 7 (*support a great deal*): (1) "We should restrict the number of Islamic mosques in America"; (2) "Muslims in America should have to do annual security clearance checks with government agencies"; and (3) "Immigrants from Muslim countries should NOT be allowed to enter the U.S." These specific policies were examined as they mirror real-world policies proposed by American politicians in recent times (Naber & Rana, 2019) and are also closely related to the policy questions we examined in Study 1. Average responses for the sample generally indicated moderate support for these policies at all waves, for limiting the number of mosques (μ W1 = 2.98, $SD = 1.90$; μ W2 = 3.11, $SD = 1.97$), requiring annual security checks (μ W1 = 2.66, $SD = 1.86$; μ W2 = 2.88, $SD = 1.91$), and barring immigrants from entering (μ W1 = 3.01, $SD = 1.98$; μ W2 = 3.10, $SD = 1.95$).

The analysis also accounts for standard demographic controls, such as age, sex, race, and political ideology.

Analysis and results

To begin, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with the four perceived threat items at wave 1. Fit indices from the CFA generally indicated that a two-factor model, with two of the items indexing symbolic threat and two of the items indexing safety threat, provided an excellent fit to the data, although it should be noted the model only had one degree of freedom: $\chi^2(1) = .11$, $p = .736$, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .00. A similar model for the same items and factor structure at wave 2 also had excellent fit but only one degree of freedom: $\chi^2(1) = .01$, $p = .906$, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .00. Thus, we averaged two items to create a score for perceived symbolic threat

from Muslims and averaged two items to create a score for perceived safety threat from Muslims at both waves 1 and 2.

Next, we conducted an autoregressive cross-lagged model with the two perceived threat scales and three items assessing support for U.S. policies related to Muslims: limiting the number of mosques being built, requiring annual security clearance checks for Muslims, and not allowing immigrants from Muslim countries to enter the United States. In this model, each of the five variables at wave 2 is regressed on itself at wave 1, to allow for autocorrelation over time, each of the policy support items at wave 2 is regressed on symbolic and safety threat at wave 1, and symbolic and safety threat at wave 2 are regressed on the three policy support items at wave 1. In addition, race (White = 1), sex, age, and political orientation, each assessed at wave 1, are included as controls in the model, such that they are included in regression equations for wave 2 variables and are allowed to covary with wave 1 variables. Thus, the model assesses how perceived symbolic and safety threat towards Muslims predicts subsequent support for policies affecting Muslims in the United States after accounting for earlier support for these policies and relevant control variables.

Bivariate correlations among key variables in the model are displayed in Appendix S3, Table S3.1 in the online supporting information. In general, there were strong positive correlations among political orientation, symbolic and safety threat at waves 1 and 2, and support for the three policies at waves 1 and 2. Only minor occasional differences emerged due to sex, race, or age; for example, White participants were more likely to support policies limiting mosques or banning immigrants from Muslim countries at wave 1.

Model fit indices provided mixed support for a close fit of the model to the data; the chi-squared test was significant, RMSEA was above .08, and TLI was below .90, but CFI was above .95 and SRMR was below .06: $\chi^2(8) = 68.85, p < .001$, CFI = .97, TLI = .76, RMSEA = .10, SRMR = .04. Results for the model parameters of interest are displayed in Table 1 and graphically in Figure 5. The model indicates that perceived symbolic threat of Muslims at wave 1 significantly predicted support for policies limiting the number of mosques being built (standardized $\beta = .25, p < .001$) and banning immigrants from Muslim countries ($\beta = .18, p = .007$) at wave 2. Additionally, perceived safety threat of Muslims at wave 1 predicted support for a policy requiring Muslims to undergo annual security clearance checks at wave 2 ($\beta = .35, p = .008$).

In terms of reverse associations (i.e., support for policies at wave 1 predicting perceived threat at wave 2), we only found evidence for one: Support for limiting mosques at wave 1 predicted symbolic threat at wave 2 ($\beta = .07, p = .039$). However, this association was significantly weaker in magnitude compared to the hypothesized association of perceived symbolic threat from wave 1 predicting support for limiting mosques at wave 2 ($p = .005$).

In sum, the results of this second study provide valuable insights into the relationship between perceived threat and support for policies affecting Muslims in the United States. By utilizing an autoregressive cross-lagged model, we were able to examine how perceived symbolic and safety threat towards Muslims at one point in time predicts subsequent support for policies targeting Muslims, while accounting for earlier policy support and relevant control variables.

Findings from Study 2 revealed that perceived safety threat of Muslims at wave 1 predicted support for a policy requiring Muslims to undergo annual security clearance checks at wave 2. In contrast, perceived symbolic threat of Muslims at wave 1 significantly predicted support for policies limiting the number of mosques being built and banning immigrants from Muslim countries at wave 2.

These findings suggest that support for restrictive security measures targeting Muslim individuals may be driven by safety concerns. While these concerns can be influenced by terrorist activities associated with individuals claiming to be Muslim, it is important to acknowledge the role of media portrayals that often perpetuate the association of Muslims with terrorism

TABLE 1 Results from cross-lagged model predicting perceived threat and support for policies affecting Muslims.

	Unstandardized β	SE	Standardized β	p
Predicting support for policies				
Symbolic Threat W1 $\rightarrow$ Limiting Mosques W2	.39	.11	.25	<.001
Safety Threat W1 $\rightarrow$ Limiting Mosques W2	.04	.12	.03	.708
Symbolic Threat W1 $\rightarrow$ Annual Security Checks W2	.01	.12	.01	.928
Safety Threat W1 $\rightarrow$ Annual Security Checks W2	.35	.13	.21	.008
Symbolic Threat W1 $\rightarrow$ Immigration Ban W2	.28	.10	.18	.007
Safety Threat W1 $\rightarrow$ Immigration Ban W2	.13	.12	.08	.257
Predicting perceived threat				
Limiting Mosques W1 $\rightarrow$ Symbolic Threat W2	.07	.03	.11	.039
Limiting Mosques W1 $\rightarrow$ Safety Threat W2	.04	.03	.07	.184
Annual Security Checks W1 $\rightarrow$ Symbolic Threat W2	.02	.03	.03	.612
Annual Security Checks W1 $\rightarrow$ Safety Threat W2	.05	.03	.09	.098
Immigration Ban W1 $\rightarrow$ Symbolic Threat W2	-.02	.03	-.03	.617
Immigration Ban W1 $\rightarrow$ Safety Threat W2	.04	.03	.07	.218

Note: $N=778$. Model fit statistics are as follows: Chi-square (8)=68.85, $p<.001$, CFI=.97, TLI=.76, RMSEA=.10, SRMR=.04. Sex (0=male, 1=female), race (0=non-White, 1=White), age, and political ideology at W1 were included as controls in all regression equations with wave 2 variables and were allowed to covary with wave 1 predictors.




FIGURE 5 Standardized coefficients from path analysis of W1 perceived threat predicting W2 support for policies affecting Muslims. For clearer interpretation, this figure excludes the autoregressive effects as well as the effects pertaining to the control variables (sex, race, age, and political orientation). Model results are displayed in Table 1. ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$.

(Alsultany, 2016; Dixon & Williams, 2015). This association, despite its misrepresentative nature, influences perceptions of safety threats and subsequently shapes the endorsement of security policies against Muslims in the United States (Saleem et al., 2016, 2017).

Furthermore, it is noteworthy to address the underlying motivations behind public policies that restrict immigrants and refugees from predominantly Muslim countries. While proponents argue that these policies stem from concerns about national security (Addicott, 2018),

our study suggests that they are primarily influenced by apprehensions regarding the religious values held, expressed, and practiced by incoming individuals, which are perceived to be in conflict with American values (Yalcinkaya et al., 2018).

Our research findings shed light on the lack of support for activities related to religious expansion and expression, revealing that these attitudes are primarily driven by perceptions of Muslims as symbolically threatening. Despite the United States exhibiting a higher level of tolerance towards religiosity and religious groups compared to European countries (Pew Research Center, 2017a), there exists a prevailing perception among Americans that Muslims hold values that are incompatible with their own (Pew Research Center, 2021). It is within the context of these perceived incompatibilities and threatening values that tolerance for various religious expansion and expression activities, such as the construction of mosques, the wearing of Islamic clothing, the provision of Halal food options, and the incorporation of Muslim holidays as national holidays, becomes limited (Carol et al., 2015; Oskooii, Dana, & Barreto, 2021; Verkuyten, 2021).

Despite the widespread perception that the religious identity of Muslims is an obstacle to their successful integration within American society, the majority of Muslim Americans perceive no such conflict (Pew Research Center, 2017b). In fact, research studies find a positive association between the importance placed on the religious (Muslim) and national (American) social identities of Muslim Americans (Fine & Sirin, 2008; Saleem et al., 2019). Perceptions of conflict or incompatibility between these identities arise when social contexts are hostile towards Muslim Americans (Fine & Sirin, 2008; Saleem et al., 2019).

Outside of the United States, research in European contexts finds a notable decrease in national identification among Muslim immigrants residing in countries characterized by heightened levels of animosity towards Muslims (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2018). These hostile social contexts have detrimental effects on the well-being of Muslim individuals residing within those societies (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2022). Given the rising levels of Islamophobia across Western nations, it is vital to recognize the implications of stigmatization for Muslim individuals residing within these countries.

In the next section, we examine the broader impact of stigmatization, encompassing not only the United States but also other Western societies facing similar challenges, in order to understand the multifaceted obstacles encountered by Muslim communities and to develop strategies for promoting social inclusion, tolerance, and well-being.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ISLAMOPHOBIA AND STIGMA

Islamophobia, as a distinct form of racism, perceives Islamic religion, culture, and traditions as threats to Western societies, based on notions of cultural and religious superiority rather than biological superiority (Awan & Zempi, 2020). This marginalizes Muslim individuals and their beliefs when they deviate from mainstream norms (Naber & Rana, 2019). Islamophobia is expressed through individual acts of discrimination and hate, as well as policies that disproportionately affect people from predominantly Muslim countries (Awan & Zempi, 2020). Significant events like the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the Syrian civil war in 2017 have witnessed a surge in hate crimes and the implementation of anti-Muslim policies. Factors contributing to this escalation include ongoing refugee crises, driven by Western foreign policy decisions, and the spread of anti-Muslim narratives by political leaders and the media (Alsultany, 2016; Lajevardi, 2021). The pervasive presence of Islamophobia in Western societies stigmatizes not only Muslim individuals but also those perceived to be Muslims (Awad et al., 2019). This stigmatization imposes various detrimental consequences on affected populations, including social, psychological, physical, and political impacts (Sedique, 2020).

Self- and group esteem

Experiences of being devalued and marginalized can erode self-worth and contribute to feelings of inferiority and self-consciousness (Crocker & Major, 1989). These experiences threaten individuals' motivation to see themselves and the groups they belong to in a positive regard (Major & Schmader, 2018). Research has shown that anti-Muslim hostility, whether encountered personally or perceived within the broader sociocultural context, has a detrimental impact on the self-esteem and group esteem of Muslim individuals (Every & Perry, 2014; Thijs et al., 2018). Muslim individuals can further internalize the negative tropes associated with their religious group and accept common stereotypes associating Muslims with violence (Mogahed & Mahmood, 2019). These findings are especially concerning for children who are in the process of developing their sense of self within the context of their group affiliation (Fine & Sirin, 2008; Tahseen et al., 2019). Consequently, Muslim youth who have been the target of stigmatization report school anxiety, decreased academic engagement and performance, and increased engagement in risky behaviors (Tahseen et al., 2019; Thijs et al., 2018).

Identity and intergroup relations

Stigmatization acts as a threat to individuals' social identities and can influence the ways in which they identify with, negotiate, and integrate their multiple social identities (Sellers et al., 2003). The religious identity of Muslim immigrants is often speculated to be a barrier or obstacle in the successful integration of these communities within Western host societies (DelReal, 2016; Fang, 2011; Oskooii, Dana, & Barreto, 2021). These speculations are often unfounded as there is a positive and moderate correlation observed between the strength of identification between the religious and national identities of Muslim immigrants living in many Western societies (Balkaya et al., 2019; Fine & Sirin, 2008; Saleem et al., 2019; Spiegler et al., 2022).

Despite this, Muslims frequently report being subjected to questioning regarding their patriotism and loyalty to their host societies and identities (Fine & Sirin, 2008). When confronted with terrorist acts attributed to individuals claiming to be Muslim, both Muslim individuals and organizations are anticipated to issue responses or statements regarding these incidents, although their responses are frequently deemed unsatisfactory (Lane et al., 2020). Such hostile social contexts can induce conflict and a sense of incompatibility between social identities. Indeed, research has found interpersonal experiences of discrimination, perceptions of group discrimination, and exposure to negative media depictions of Muslims to be inversely associated with the strength of national identities of Muslims residing in Western nations (Giuliani et al., 2018; Saleem et al., 2019; Thijs et al., 2018). These hostile experiences also contribute to a perceived incompatibility between religious and national identities among Muslims, often leading them to distance and disengage themselves from mainstream culture (Hutchison et al., 2015; Saleem et al., 2019; Saleem & Ramasubramanian, 2019). Experiences with societal discrimination can also dampen Muslim individuals' willingness to partake in mainstream political activities (Oskooii, 2016; Saleem et al., 2019), and hostile political rhetoric can reduce online visibility and increase individuals' willingness to avoid public spaces (Hobbs & Lajevardi, 2019; Salehi et al., 2023). At the same time, perceptions of injustice can motivate racial, ethnic, and religious minorities to engage in collective action strategies to improve their disadvantageous status. In a longitudinal study, for example, Muslim Americans' exposure to negative media images of their religious ingroup increased willingness to engage in collective action efforts 9 months later to improve the position and status of Muslims in American society (Saleem et al., 2021).

Mental health

Continuous threats to social identities can trigger a series of negative thoughts and emotions that ultimately undermine the mental and physical well-being of stigmatized individuals (Major & Schmader, 2018). Studies examining the impact of discrimination on Muslims indicate that experiencing discrimination is associated with higher rates of depression (Hodge et al., 2015), anxiety (Lowe et al., 2019), stress (Abu-Ras et al., 2018), paranoia (Rippy & Newman, 2006), and post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms (Abu-Ras et al., 2018; Lowe et al., 2019). Moreover, research has indicated that discrimination is associated with lower life satisfaction among Muslim individuals, reflecting the broader negative impact on overall well-being (Bassioni & Langrehr, 2021). Discrimination also has detrimental effects on the mental health outcomes of Muslim youth and young adults (Maes et al., 2014; Tineo et al., 2021), which is particularly worrisome given the reluctance of Muslim individuals to seek support for their mental health needs (Ciftci et al., 2013).

Physical health

Pervasive and ongoing stigmatization is known to adversely influence physical health outcomes for the targeted individuals (Grasser & Jovanovic, 2022; Major & Schmader, 2018). For Muslim populations in Western nations, the challenges they face extend beyond stigmatization, encompassing additional trauma associated with their immigration journeys, refugee status, and sociopolitical conflicts in their countries of origin, contributing to cumulative trauma experiences (Awad et al., 2019; Kira et al., 2014). Despite the extensive evidence supporting the detrimental impact of discrimination on physical health (Pascoe & Richman, 2009), research specifically focused on Muslim individuals remains limited (Samari, 2016). In the United Kingdom, researchers found that anti-Muslim hostility was associated with poorer objective and subjective health outcomes among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, with measures including blood pressure and cholesterol levels (Johnston & Lordan, 2012). Moreover, stigma acts as a barrier that impedes minorities' equal access to and quality of health care (Major & Schmader, 2018). Muslim individuals have reported experiencing discrimination within health-care settings, feeling neglected, ignored, and even facing criticism for wearing Islamic clothing (Martin, 2015). Muslim women who wear a hijab, in particular, report experiencing discrimination in health-care settings, including unwarranted speculations and questions regarding abuse in their marriages (Shah et al., 2008). These perceptions significantly influence health-seeking behaviors. For instance, a study examining Muslim American women found that experiences of discrimination in health-care settings were inversely associated with mammogram screenings, highlighting the tangible impact of discrimination on preventive health-care practices (Padela et al., 2015).

Academic outcomes

Hostile social contexts have a detrimental impact on the sense of belonging and satisfaction of racial ethnic minority students within their academic institutions (Benner et al., 2018). These contexts not only directly affect the academic performance of minority youth but also invoke stereotype threat, indirectly influencing their academic performance and engagement with specific academic domains (Appel & Weber, 2021; Steele, 1997). Muslim students report experiencing discrimination and bullying through institutional practices as well as interpersonal experiences (Abu Khalaf et al., 2023; CAIR, 2019; Eslea & Mukhtar, 2000; Tabbah et al., 2016). The perception of discrimination and the experience of stereotype threat have been found

to be inversely associated with the academic success of Muslim students (Baysu et al., 2016). Moreover, discriminatory experiences among Muslim college students have shown an inverse relationship with academic self-efficacy, which reflects students' belief in their ability to successfully complete their academic tasks (Totonchi et al., 2022). Beyond academics, discriminatory experiences can influence externalizing behaviors among adolescents including aggression, substance abuse, and disobedience (Benner et al., 2018). For instance, Dutch Muslim youth who reported incidents of discrimination by their teachers were more likely to exhibit externalizing behaviors like lying, stealing, and aggression (van Bergen et al., 2021). These findings highlight the broad impact of discriminatory experiences on various aspects of Muslim students' academic and behavioral outcomes.

In summary, Islamophobia presents a complex challenge with far-reaching consequences. It encompasses both individual acts of discrimination and systemic policies that marginalize and stigmatize Muslim individuals and communities. The psychological consequences of Islamophobia include negative impacts on self-esteem, identity, and mental health. Physical health outcomes are also affected, with discrimination impeding access to health care and influencing health-seeking behaviors. Moreover, Islamophobia has adverse effects on academic outcomes, hindering the sense of belonging, academic performance, and engagement of Muslim students. Addressing Islamophobia requires a comprehensive approach that challenges stereotypes, promotes inclusion, and advocates for the well-being and rights of Muslim individuals in society.

CONCLUSION

This *Advances* article offers a comprehensive examination of anti-Muslim sentiment, shedding light on the dynamics of outgroup animus in the American political landscape. Relying on two studies, we have demonstrated that Muslim-specific constructs provide a richer understanding of anti-Muslim policy endorsement. Our study further emphasizes the importance of accounting for both perceived symbolic and realistic threats. Historically, anti-Muslim attitudes among (non-Muslim) Americans, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, were largely interpreted through the lens of realistic threat perceptions, encompassing fears related to terrorism and physical safety (Cottrell et al., 2010; Huddy et al., 2005; Nisbet et al., 2008), and had real-world consequences, insofar as they shaped interpersonal perceptions but also influenced support for policies impacting Muslims both within the United States and internationally (Nisbet et al., 2008; Saleem et al., 2016, 2017). By accounting for and distinguishing between these two forms of threats, we illustrated the ways in which diverse threat perceptions may uniquely shape policy preferences.

Overall, we conclude that opposition to Muslims and support for restrictive policies are not solely driven by perceived concerns for physical safety. Rather, the role of anti-Muslim attitudes in shaping political attitudes and behavior is complex and multifaceted, requiring a nuanced approach that appreciates the specificity and context of the historical and present-day U.S. Muslim experience. We suggest distinguishing between these two types of threats in order to provide a more holistic perspective as to the multifaceted motivations underlying attitudes towards Muslims.

Our study further underscores the need for more research into the psychological and sociopolitical impact that anti-Muslim sentiment has on Muslim individuals *themselves*. For instances, we highlighted how instances of devaluation and marginalization can undermine self-worth and group esteem of Muslim individuals, which can have profound consequences for intergroup relations. We also discussed the adverse physical and mental health consequences of stigmatization for targeted individuals, including individuals' sense of belonging and satisfaction in academic institutions.

Moving forward, it is crucial for researchers to consider examining and addressing the ongoing effects of Islamophobia as a form of racism on Muslim individuals in the United States and elsewhere. While we aimed to provide a more nuanced understanding of anti-Muslim attitudes, more research is needed. Future research can further explore the complexities of Islamophobia by examining its various manifestations in different social, political, and geographical contexts. Implementing longitudinal panel studies that trace the evolution of anti-Muslim sentiment over time and investigating the influence of specific events or policy decisions is also fertile ground for future research. It is equally important to include Muslim American samples in such panel studies to gain prospective insights into the coping strategies utilized by Muslim individuals in hostile contexts. By continuing to delve into these areas, we can further advance our knowledge and guide policymakers and advocacy groups in developing effective strategies to counter Islamophobia and its impact on Muslim communities.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

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