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Plato’s *Ion* ends when the hapless rhapsodist Ion, a forerunner of the modern literary critic, accepts the verdict of Socrates, who finds Ion's "interpretation of Homer to come not from skill but inspiration." This sardonic conclusion derives from Socrates' earlier "proof" that poets "compose all those lovely poems of theirs not by their own skill but in a state of inspiration and possession.... So long as a man retains dominion over his mind, he is powerless to make poetry or prophesy." As recently as Shelley's *Defence of Poetry* we find the same sentiments: "Poetry is indeed something divine.... Poetry is not like reasoning, a power to be exerted according to the determination of the will." Inevitably, "a poet therefore would do ill to embody his own conceptions of right and wrong, which are usually those of his place and time, in his poetical creations, which participate in neither." Socratic echoes may even be detected in W. K. Wimsatt's attack on literary criticism directed toward authors and their circumstances: "Critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle." By contrast, Mary Shelley qualifies her husband's sense of the ineffable nature of literary composition when she writes: "Everything must have a beginning.... The materials must, in the first place, be afforded.... Invention consists in the capacity of seizing on the capabilities of a subject, and in the power of moulding and fashioning ideas suggested to it." While one's mind may boggle a little to find this assertion appearing in the Preface to *Frankenstein*, even her husband's elusive poetry can illustrate the intelligible interaction between the poet's mind and its intellectual environment. If modern literary critics and scholars are to avoid the fate of the rhapsodist Ion, they will have to accept some practical application of Mary Shelley's assertion.

The present essay seeks to strengthen the rational exposition of literature by illustrating the inevitable interaction between art and society at one of its periods of peak
interest; this, to show how illuminating such a procedure can be for both components, with
the larger view of proving that there may be a whole valid discipline parallel to literary
criticism and reinforcing it, which studies the evolution of human sensibility and mental
processes in ways also analogous to and largely including such more selective disciplines
as the History of Science, or even the History of Ideas. This comprehensive humanistic
study has been named Historical Psychology, following the precedent of Zevedei Barbu’s
*Problems of Historical Psychology* (1960). To illustrate its procedures I would like to
suggest that partly as a result of nonliterary pressures in the Reformation the human mind
acquired certain possibilities for self-definition and heightened performance which were
not as fully recognized in the literature of previous periods, so that the study of the use of
these resources in Renaissance literature is still essential to the full development of
modern personal identity, as our continued admiration suggests.

Some conventional assumptions about such a psychological evolution were
codified long ago when Jacob Burckhardt asserted that, in Europe during the Middle Ages,
"Man was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or
corporation-only through some general category. . . . But at the close of the thirteenth
century Italy began to swarm with individuality; the ban laid upon human personality was
dissolved." He claimed that "this result was due above all to the political circumstances of
Italy."7 Anyone who knows the distinctive charm of the lives and works of such early
clerics as Alcuin or Walafrid Strabo will find these assertions too categorical.8 If we
recognize a truly significant shift in human psychology from around 1300 it is probably
less toward the political egotism that Machiavelli’s *Prince* detects in many earlier
societies, and rather toward its opposite: the legitimizing of a truly private individuality
free equally of the burdens of power and glory.

It is my contention that this definitive vindication of the self did not arise from the
"new" despotisms under which "enjoyment of life was enhanced and concentrated by the
desire to obtain the greatest satisfaction from a possibly very brief period of power and
influence" (Burckhardt 82). Much rather, private personality was fostered by a growing
revulsion from orthodox public roles and services, above all in the ecclesiastical hierarchy
to which politics remained nominally subordinated through-out the Renaissance. Instead
of admiration for the megalomania of Renaissance over-reachers our modern concern is
more profoundly directed to the vindication of the modest right to private judgment that was asserted by the Reformation and enhanced by the obtuseness of various established authorities throughout the period. It was in the often-forced flight from public duties that our modern awareness came to fruition. Earlier European personalities were surely distinctive, but more usually within professional hierarchies or official roles. By contrast, Petrarch's importance lies in the systematic accumulation of precedents intended both to justify the thesis that private uniqueness is the only proper goal for the individual mind and to seek to act consistently on this basis. In his *Life of Solitude*, Petrarch declares the right and obligation of each of his readers "to live according to your pleasure, to go where you will, to stay where you will.... To belong to yourself in all seasons and wherever you are to be ever with yourself,... not to be driven along, not to be dashed aside, not to be tormented, not to be pressed." The modern translator of this treatise observes that "The *De Vita Solitaria* may not contain such deliberate self-analysis or direct confession as is to be found in other writings of Petrarch, but a distinctive interest attaches to it for asserting as a principle the right of human personality to express and realize itself according to its individual qualities. The book thus acquires something of a philosophical import as marking a stage in the development of the European mind. If there is an important idea in the book, it is neither more nor less than the establishment of self-cultivation as an adequate guiding motive in life" (Zeitlin 87).

The paradox in this assumption is that it favors a personality exactly antithetical to the virtuoso public figures of Renaissance princes, or their courtiers, whom we have been encouraged to admire as the ideal products of Renaissance culture. It is not accidental that such aspiring figures are the butt of much Shakespearean comedy from *Love's Labor's Lost* onward. By contrast, the flight from public distinction is shared by many of those whom we now recognize as the most influential minds of the period. Typically, Montaigne retires from successful public service, professing that the public level of French civilization is worse even than that of cannibals:

I am sorry that, seeing so clearly into their faults, we should be so blind to our own. I conceive there is more barbarity in eating a man alive than in eating him dead, in tearing by tortures and the rack a body that is still full of feeling, in roasting him by degrees, causing him to be bitten and torn by dogs
and swine (as we have not only read, but lately seen, not among inveterate enemies, but among neighbors and fellow-citizens, and what is worse, under color of piety and religion), than in roasting and eating him after he is dead.\textsuperscript{10}

It is in this spirit that the mature Montaigne turns away from glory and public service: "I have set for myself no other goal than a domestic and private one. I have given no consideration in it either to your service or my glory.... If I had intended to seek the favor of the world I should have adorned myself better and should present myself in a studied bearing. I wish to be seen in my simple, natural, and ordinary fashion without effort or artifice, for it is myself that I portray. My defects will be here read to the life, and my natural form."\textsuperscript{11}

Such a flight into subjectivity reaches extravagance in Sir Thomas Browne's complacent preference for contemplation of "the Cosmography of myself. We carry with us wonders we seek without us.... The world that I regard is myself... for the other I use it but like my Globe, and turn it round sometimes for my recreation."\textsuperscript{12} Before we dismiss the sense of private awareness that can lead to such narcissism for being as culturally reactionary as Browne's contemporaries felt, it is necessary to recognize that it can also lead to the contrastingly severe yet creative scrutiny of the self illustrated in Rembrandt's magnificent cycle of self-studies, which may well claim to be his most sustained achievement. Rembrandt's exploration of his own identity through endless disguises and role-playing in his self-portraits may remind us somewhat of John Donne's virtuosity in striking distinctive subjective poses. Donne's poems often also reject public office and rewards, while attempting to vindicate the worth of the private sexual satisfactions. In fact these had cost him a public career, sacrificed to his hasty and inexpedient marriage, so it is natural enough that a poem like \textit{The Canonization} should parallel and justify such a preference as that favored by Petrarch and Montaigne:

\begin{quote}
For Godsake hold your tongue, and let me love,
Or chide my palsie, or my gout,
My five gray haires, or ruin'd fortune flout,
With wealth your state, your minde with Arts improve,
Take you a course, get you a place,
\end{quote}
Observe his honour, or his grace,
Or the King's reall, or his stamped face
Contemplate; what you will, approve,
So you will let me love.¹³

Such rejection of fame, honor, and public roles was necessarily intensified by the various religious and social discriminations to which Donne, while a Catholic, had been subjected by the Elizabethan and Jacobean Establishments. However, even in the drama that was broadly favored by the English courts there is a recurring emphasis on the revulsion from the value of public service and reputation. Hamlet may seem typical of the conventional Renaissance ideal when he notes the infinite excellence of man (II.ii.300-03), but he does so only to dismiss "this quintessence of dust." Hamlet's flight from his public obligations is proverbial. And the intensification of his subjective identity under authoritarian persecution is the norm for Shakespearean heroes, whose distinctive personalities characteristically intensify rather than fail as a result of public humiliation and exclusion. When his kingdom collapses around him and his own mind threatens breakdown, Shakespeare's Richard III even bravely reasserts his identity in an echo of the Jewish Jehovah (Exodus iii.13-14): "I am I" (V.iii.184), just as later Shakespeare will make an Antony hounded by Caesar seek to become "a private man in Athens" (IV.xii.15) but still assert: "I am Antony yet" (IV.xiii.92). In turn, John Webster's Duchess of Malfi affirms the continuity of her personality, toughened by her appalling persecution: "I am Duchess of Malfi still" (IV.ii.142). Such subjective affirmations need not rise from purely theatrical situations. Not only do Shakespeare's stage heroes assert the superiority of their private identities to their public roles, but that more truly contemporary version of the poet's self which governs Shakespeare's Sonnets repudiates public "reproach" with the same sense of the uniqueness of that self: "I am that I am" (121). The exact parallel here to the biblical antecedents tempts one to assert that in such passages the private self has consciously usurped the prerogatives of the godhead, often as the result of a turning away from participation in religious orthodoxy, which was often fostered by that orthodoxy itself.

For while we have seen that as early as Petrarch's Treatise on Solitude the full realization of an essentially private identity was proposed as a worthy goal more absolutely than in any classical precedents, what made this process a matter of more
general application was surely the wide-spread feeling precipitated in the sixteenth century by the Reformation: that the regulation of private states of mind must be a crucial factor in public policy. We may deplore the unprovoked persecution of Sir Thomas More for his private opinions, but the case does dramatize how much the age had come to respect the seriousness of purely mental attitudes even when they seemed devoid of dangerous physical acts against society. The intensification of such persecution correlates strongly with the heightening of private subjective awareness throughout the Renaissance, and without the resulting religious tensions the Renaissance might well have missed many of its most valued achievements.

Of course, the portents of this ominous catalyst begin to appear very much earlier. As Burckhardt noted, even Dante's literary career evolved in large measure out of the painful consequences of the interaction of religious and political strife in Florence, which led to his exile and the resulting leisure to devote himself to completion of *The Divine Comedy*, not to mention intense personal feelings that lend such vividness to the *Inferno* in particular.\(^\text{16}\) It is surely not accidental that as a resentful victim of persecution Dante developed his opportunities for self-vindication in displaying himself as the hero of his epic. As for Petrarch, much of his private writing laments the fact that the general pattern of his career is defined by effects of the Great Schism, which rent the fabric of Christendom and thereby forced a new autonomy on Christian awareness in the fourteenth century. The resulting exile from Italy in general, and Rome in particular, was a profound catalyst of Petrarch's self-awareness, nationalism, and classicism. Furthermore, his hatred of the papal court in Avignon, which boils over into many of his sonnets,\(^\text{17}\) led to his flight to Vaucluse and the pursuit of a new life-style, as Ernest H. Wilkins describes: "His friends in the city were amazed; but he had two compelling reasons for his move: Vaucluse was not Avignon, and Vaucluse was Vaucluse. Avignon, to Petrarch, meant crowds, clamor, confusion, elegance, demands upon his time, knowledge of unworthy doings in the papal court.... By his move to Vaucluse he had taken charge of his own life."\(^\text{18}\) The early fruits of this move away from papal politics were *The Life of Solitude*, and a new, creative sense of his distinct private identity, as he writes in *his Letter to Posterity*:

> Since I experienced a deep-seated and innate repugnance to town life, especially in that disgusting city of Avignon which I heartily abhorred, I
sought some means of escape. I fortunately discovered, about fifteen miles from Avignon, a delightful valley, narrow and secluded, called Vaucluse, where the Sorgue, the prince of streams, takes its rise. Captivated by the charms of the place, I transferred thither myself and my books. Were I to describe what I did there during many years it would prove a long story. Indeed, almost every bit of writing which I have put forth was either accomplished or begun, or at least conceived there.¹⁹

Such frequently repeated assertions suggest that the literary career of Petrarch was largely determined by alienation from the religious establishment of his time that was centered in Avignon.²⁰

As the Renaissance advanced so did the subtlety and savagery of the religious persecution fostered by the evolving Reformation confrontations, and this inevitably led to further advances in self-awareness among intellectuals. Thus, the prototype for French Renaissance poets, Clément Marot, seems to have suffered marked reinforcement of his sense of personal identity as a result of his persecution by the Church for supposed Huguenot beliefs. His imprisonment at Chartres is commemorated in *L'Enfer*, which proposes a detailed autobiography vindicating his right to his private identity. Paradoxically, the supreme model for self-realization in the High Renaissance was probably Marot's successor, the Catholic Pierre de Ronsard, at least if we consider his decisive influence on the personae of poets like Donne and Shakespeare, Milton and Marvel, not to mention Spenser and Drayton.²¹ In Ronsard's "Reply to the insults and calumnies of various unrecognizable preachers and ministers of Geneva" of 1563, we can see how the cut and thrust of religious polemic sharpened the opponents' sense of their individual identity and strengthened their power to project it as a public image.²² Ronsard censures his attackers "for having dared to slander such a person as myself, well-knowing that you lie and that I am not in the least guilty of the vices with which your fury paints me" (including not only a lawless life but atheism, which in turn supposedly earned Ronsard God's punishment in deafness, the pox, and old age). He writes:

You complain moreover, that my life is licentious, over-burdened with luxury, sport, and vice. You lie maliciously: if you had followed me for two months
you would know well the state of my life and now I intend to spell it out for you so that everyone will know you are a liar. When I wake each morning before I do anything I say a prayer to the Eternal Father of all Good. . . . When I get out of bed and am clothed I devote myself to study and learn virtue, writing and reading as my vocation requires since I have been inclined to the Muses since my childhood. I stay closeted for four or five hours; then when too much reading wearies my spirit I drop my book and go to the church. Returning I devote an hour to recreation; then dine soberly, saying grace; for the rest of the day I relax, for if the afternoon is fine and calm I go for a long walk now through the fields, then in a village, or in a wood, or sometimes in truly lonely and obscure spots: I greatly love gardens that verge on wilderness, I love the rippling streams that brush their banks gently. There, discussing on the grass with a friend, I often allow the flowers to lull me to sleep in the shade of a willow, or browsing in a book I strive to find means to restore my life, free of ambition and piercing anxieties.

Since this often-magnificent poem is twenty-six pages long in the Pléiade edition, I can hardly quote the full range of Ronsard's account of his personality, career, and art. Suffice it to say that a religious controversy evokes the conscious creation of a formal personality in a way that provides a clear Renaissance prototype for the pattern of John Milton's formulation of a persona for himself in his prose pamphlets. Some of the most resonant autobiographical passages in Milton's writings are evoked by a need parallel to Ronsard's for the systematic vindication of one's private identity against bigoted calumniators, as in his contribution to the Smectymnuus controversy, where Milton writes, "since I dare not wish to pass this life unpersecuted of slanderous tongues, for God hath told us that to be generally praised is woeful, I shall rely on his promise to free the innocent from causeless aspersions: whereof nothing sooner can assure me than if I shall feel him now assisting me in the just vindication of myself." Milton then presents a full account of his life, not omitting an exact parallel to Ronsard's summary of his daily routine: "up and stirring, in winter often ere the sound of any bell awake men to labor, or to devotion; in summer as oft with the bird that first rouses, or not much tardier, to read good authors, or cause them to be read, till attention be weary or memory have its full
fraught: then, with useful and generous labors preserving the body's health and hardiness" (691). From this parallelism to Ronsard, Milton rises to a full statement of the synchronization of art and life:

And long it was not after, when I was confirmed in this opinion that he who would not be frustrate of his hope to write well hereafter in laudable things, ought himself to be a true poem, that is, a composition and pattern of the best and honorabllest things - not presuming to sing high praises of heroic men or famous cities, unless he have in himself the experience and the practice of all that which is praiseworthy. These reasonings, together with a certain niceness of nature, an honest haughtiness and self-esteem either of what I was, or what I might be (which let envy call pride) and lastly that modesty whereof, though not in the title-page, yet here I may be excused to make some beseeching profession; all these uniting the supply of their natural aid together, kept me still above those low descents of mind beneath which he must deject and plunge himself that can agree to saleable and unlawful prostitutions.” (694)

Later Milton is to defend himself from the charge that his evil ways have caused him to be struck blind, just as earlier, in his Reply, Ronsard had to refute the charge that his deafness was God's punishment for sin. At this point it is hardly necessary to stress how the pamphlets' creation of a formal Miltonic persona contributed decisively to the assured autobiographical phases which serve to gear the cosmic sweep of *Paradise Lost* to contemporary experience, in a way quite alien to its impersonal classical precedents in the epics of Homer and Virgil, but facilitated unquestionably by the more modern precedent of Dante, himself significantly a victim of persecution in part because of his opposition to the Papacy.²⁴

On the other hand, it is perhaps less obvious that this pious defensive pattern precipitated by religious controversy contributes to the creation of more fictional personae of the greatest magnitude. Religious controversy is a crucial factor in the characterization of Shakespearean plays as different as *Henry IV, Part I, Love's Labor's Lost, King John, Measure for Measure*, and *Henry VIII*. Even more significantly, we find that one of
Shakespeare's most memorable characters, Falstaff, affords many illustrations, however ironic, of the same psychologically formative consequences of religious controversy. It is curious to note that the ultimate derivation of the theatrical Falstaff was not the career of the dourly orthodox general Sir John Fastolf, but that of the brilliant if erratic heretic Sir John Oldcastle, whose name he bore in early performances of the play. The emphatic remarks about hanging, in which Falstaff-Oldcastle indulges from his very first appearance in *Henry IV, Part I* (I.ii), would give his earliest theoretical manifestations a sinister over-tone, for Shakespeare's Protestant audience would have known from Foxe's Book of Martyrs that the grotesque figure first called Oldcastle on the stage purported to be the historical personality who was hung (and then burned) on 14 December 1417 as a convicted enemy of religious orthodoxy and the political establishment, after almost endless escapes from justice and even from the Tower of London itself. Offended awareness of this relationship was what forced the company to change the character's name to Falstaff.

If Falstaff is one of Shakespeare's most memorable creations, the fact that his complex psychology may find one of its roots in the career of an early religious martyr could encourage us to look for further illustrations of the impact of Reformation experience on so distinctive a theatrical creation. In one recognized scholarly precedent for discussion of this matter, Alfred Ainger notes how:

> running through the whole creation is this thread of the perverted Puritan, of the man whose memory, and perhaps uneasy conscience, is always recalling to him the religious phraseology and topics of his youth. . . . What put it into Shakespeare's head to put this distinctively religious, not to say Scriptural phraseology into the mouth of Falstaff, but that the rough draft of the creation, as it came into his hands [in *The Famous Victories of Henry the Fifth*], was the decayed Puritan? For the Lollard of the fourteenth century was in this respect the Puritan of the sixteenth, that the one certain mark of his calling was the use of the language of Scripture and that conventicle style which had been developed out of it.
Moreover, one is struck by the addition of further clues by A. R. Humphreys. While Humphreys follows Ainger in deriving the mingled cant and sensuality in the tradition from the polarized attitudes in Catholic and Protestant accounts of the martyred Oldcastle, he also quotes evidence to show that even the more "sinful" traits of Falstaff may have a bizarre precedent in that during his trial the historical Oldcastle's commitment to a strenuous puritanical self-scrutiny forced him to anticipate Montaigne's self-abasement by confessing "that in my frayle youthe I offended thee (Lorde) moste greeuously, in Pride, Wrathe, and Glottony, in Couetousness and in Lechery." 27 Many of Falstaff's other attitudes also parallel those reflected in the legends that accumulated around the Lollard's hostility to the political and religious authorities of his time. For it was the historical Oldcastle's outspoken contempt for his ecclesiastical judges and the whole hierarchy that ultimately turned the will of a reluctant Henry V against his old comrade-in-arms. Kenneth B. McFarlane asserts that Oldcastle won lower-class support by "the intention of wiping out the royal family, the nobility and the higher clergy, of stripping the Church of its great possessions and of dividing the kingdom up amongst themselves under the regency of Oldcastle." 28 Some of these attitudes prefigure the Commonwealth, and it is not surprising that they precipitated a mythos suitable for theatrical exploitation, in which Shakespeare developed to an extravagant degree the analogous sentiments and affections of his own Puritan contemporaries. Humphreys also observes of the Oldcastle precedents that "Falstaff's Biblical quotations might just possibly reflect such antecedents" (p. xxxix), but whether or not the actual Wycliffism of Oldcastle provided any specific inspiration, Falstaff does consistently exploit a whole range of Reformation responses to religious controversy. His sardonic rejoinders to his various critics in the plays parody the vein of Marot, Ronsard, and Milton in repudiating pompous and bigoted attacks on their moral characters; Falstaff conforms to their pious autobiographical approach: "My lord, I was born about three of the clock in the afternoon, with a white head and something a round belly. For my voice, I have lost it with hallowing and singing of anthems" (2H4 i.ii.177-80). As Ainger notes, Falstaff's view of mankind also reflects both the Reformers' sense of Original Sin and the total in-adequacy for the earning of Grace which they saw in virtue, merit, and good works generally. His contempt for honor parallels that of Calvin and Puritanism as a whole, as do
his attacks on the landed gentry and upper-class "grand-jurors" (IH4 II.ii.84). Falstaff's language equally exploits the characteristic Puritan slant toward morbid preoccupation with the Devil and damnation: "The field hath pricked down Bardolph irrecoverable, and his face is Lucifer's privy-kitchen, where he doth nothing but roast malt-worms. For the boy, there is a good angel about him, but the devil blinds him too" (2H4 II.iv.310-13). Frequently, Falstaff affects Reformation concern with Original Sin: "There is nothing but roguery to be found in villainous man" (1H4 II.iv.16-17). And of course he implicitly rejects good works when he says of Poins "0, if men were to be saved by merit, what hole in hell were hot enough for him" (IH4 I.ii.110-12). On the other hand, unlike Hal (who completely fails to understand Original Sin, as we see in his baffled reflections on the English conspiracy against him (in H5 I.ii), Falstaff concedes wittily that by his own doctrine he too must be held guilty: "Thou knowest in the state of innocency Adam fell, and what should poor Jack Falstaff do in the days of villainy? Thou seest I have more flesh than another man, and therefore more frailty" (IH4 III.iii.158-62). Since all men are guilty, his confessions can be the more shamelessly open: "now am I, if a man should speak truly, little better than one of the wicked" (1H4 I.ii.88-89). As Poins points out, an anti-establishment figure like Oldcastle-Falstaff would risk adding to his deeper sins the results of dogmatic rejection of ceremonies and outward observances, and thus expose himself to such jeers from religious conformists as Poins's query: "Jack, how agrees the devil and thee about thy soul, that thou soldest him on Good Friday last for a cup of Madeira and a cold capon's leg?" (1H4 I.ii.106-09). Yet like Marot, Ronsard, and Milton, Falstaff justifies even his unofficial "vocations" energetically (IH4 I.ii.99), and with the same conviction as in his famous self-defense: "That he is old (the more the pity), his white hairs do witness it; but that he is (saving your reverence) a whore-master, that I utterly deny. If sack and sugar be a fault, God help the wicked! If to be old and merry be a sin, then many an old host that I know is dammed.... Banish plump Jack, and banish all the world" (1H4 II.iv.444-56). Yet Falstaff affects to compensate for what he implies here in jest: "I must give over this life, and I will give it over!" (1H4 I.ii.89-90). He wryly observes to Bardolph, "I never see thy face but I think upon hellfire" (1H4 III.iii.29). This is reiterated when his page recalls the time when he "saw a flea stick on Bardolph's nose, and 'a said it was a black soul burning in hell" (H5 II.iii.35-37). Inevitably, he continually
affects to seek the grace that will avert such a fate: "God help the while! A bad world, I say, I would I were a weaver: I could sing psalms" (1H4 I.iv.123-25). Shakespeare's final ironic refinement on Puritan theology may lie in Falstaff's deathbed salvation in Henry V II.iii, where he ultimately invokes God triply after singing the Twenty-Third Psalm, and dies (in the opinion of all witnesses) in a state of grace. The possibility of the ultimate "salvation" of Falstaff is not merely true to our often-unconscious involvement with his venality, it may reflect post-Reformation suspicion of orthodox virtue and conformity (as Baudelaire has casually noted: "in reality Satanism has won. Satan has made himself naive. Evil knowing itself was less appalling and nearer cure than evil unaware of itself. G. Sand inferior to de Sade")

Falstaff impresses us most because Shakespeare has invested him with a self-awareness that extends to the understanding of evil in both others and himself. The psychological insights and mental agility of Falstaff derive from the profound skepticism about established institutions and values that was characteristic of the historical men of the era, such as Petrarch, Oldcastle, Montaigne, and many others. His own distinctive behavior is founded on the dual knowledge that all men are ultimately as corrupt and evil as himself and that they are merely less aware of their hypocritical affectations. By comparison with them, his own jocularly feigned professions of virtue put him far closer to grace since he obviously never believes such claims or consistently seeks to impose them on others. Falstaff could not have been created without the discoveries about the spuriousness of affected orthodoxy and virtuous personality increasingly precipitated by the doctrines, controversies, and persecutions characteristic of such disputes as those prevalent in European society from the time of Petrarch onward. In order fully to understand the nature of Falstaff's character as Shakespeare originally intended it, we must recognize the implication latent in his original name, Oldcastle. It was not accidental that the original name persisted, after the nominal change to Falstaff in the texts, in numerous performances of Henry IV by his company both during Shakespeare's life and after, at least until 1651.

My specific assertion is not that the wry self-discovery of this period is in any absolute sense novel; after all, behind the Reformation and Lollardry lies Wycliffe, and behind his wry challenge to the Establishment we can look back to the self-awareness that antique religious controversy generated in the St. Augustine of the
Confessions. And even that brilliant piece of self-exegesis is modeled on the calculated self-betrayals of St. Paul defending himself from the censure of his theological opponents in the law courts and in Letters like those to Corinth. Despite these historical precedents, it is only in the history plays of Shakespeare that we discover the crucial transition from the factual self-definitions precipitated by church history to the dynamic re-creations of deliberate art. Shakespeare turns the remote figures of religious controversy into wonderfully vivid and active personalities whose minds are as convincing as those of Paul and Augustine and far more immediately accessible, not to say con-temporary.

Nevertheless, without the serious analogues to the wit of Falstaff and Berowne (who also has a bizarrely historical model), which were generated by political and religious controversy, Shakespeare could no more have created such memorable characters than could the analogous lyric self-awareness have been generated in poets like Marot and Ronsard, Milton and Marvell, not to mention Donne. Moreover, it is possible that the combative force of Protestantism may indeed provide the key to other Shakespearean techniques of characterization if we take into account the weird falsifications resulting from mistranslations of Machiavelli at the hands of Protestants like Gentillet. These pious moralists transposed Machiavelli's willful and provocative caricature in The Prince of the kind of tyranny that had lately subjected him to acute physical torture: they turned it into a full psychology for an improbably self-conscious personality, which was diabolic in every way yet fully able to recognize its own evil. Ironically, the Machiavel who appears in the discourses of Gabriel Harvey and Simon Patrick, and who dominates the stage in Marlowe's Jew of Malta, is fully compatible with the total human depravity conceived of in Calvin's theology and the theatrical convention of the Vice figure. This improbable conjunction of Reformation theology, sardonic Renaissance political science, and literary formula generated the concept of a virtuoso human personality of a kind hitherto unknown to Western literature, with the possible significant exception of Chaucer's rather Wycliffite portrait of the Pardoner, Kittredge's "one lost soul among the pilgrims" of whom, like Parolles, it is "possible that he should know what he is, and be what he is" (All's Well iv.i.43-44). T. S. Eliot corroborates this theory of the evolution of a "new" kind of personality when he writes, "What influence the work of... Machiavelli... seems to me to exert in common on that time and most
conspicuously through Shakespeare, is an influence towards a kind of self-consciousness and self-dramatization of the Shakespearean hero, of whom Hamlet is only one. It seems to mark a stage, even if not a very agreeable one, in human history, or progress.\textsuperscript{31}

Here, in brief, we have an authoritative statement of my theme: the creation of new psychological possibilities in the Renaissance resulting from its intersection with the Reformation. And it is readily possible to document the evolution of skeptical self-awareness in Shakespeare's major characters, starting with the fully self-conscious villainy of Shakespeare's supreme version of the Elizabethan Machiavel, Richard III. As with the use of the Oldcastle mythos this extraordinary and fascinating persona is in part generated by the author's cooperation with the inherited political patterns, in this case, of the Tudor Myth, which justified the Tudor usurpation and killing of Richard III by asserting his diabolic nature. On the other hand, it is curious to discover that one of the most recent biographers of Richard III describes him as "a rudimentary Puritan.... It was the vices particularly repugnant to sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Puritans from which he wished to turn men's habits,"\textsuperscript{32} and another views Richard as "a man ahead of his time... an early puritan," and one like Oldcastle who was "obsessed with social justice," and who, "as Edward IV's successor, displays rare qualities of social conscience."\textsuperscript{33}

Perhaps only an artistic genius such as Shakespeare could have perceived that what passed for history was indeed stranger and more fascinating than consistent fiction, and distilled from the accidents of historiography personae which have proved the archetypes of modern personality, if we are to believe the models reflected in the works of such recent sociologists as Erving Goffman and such psychologists as Erich Berne. It is striking to find R. A. Foakes ascribing the whole of Henry VIII to Shakespeare in part because he is certain that Shakespeare is far more faithful to history than such of his contemporaries as Greene, Marlowe, or even Fletcher. Foakes asserts that in Henry VIII the "sources are often followed very closely, and what is known of Fletcher's habits suggests a different method of working."\textsuperscript{34} But we must recognize that the creative transposition of controversial and ambiguous historical figures into universal literary archetypes is a supremely Shakespearean phenomenon, and most of his lesser contemporaries seem to be content merely to invest literature with the accidental psychological innovations generated by their own tortuous and tortured careers. If it is true that many of Donne's lyrics are deft
plagiarisms from the early Shakespearean comedies whose performances we know he attended in the early 1590's, it is scarcely unexpected that scholars like J. B. Leishman have felt that Donne's persona seems more like a creation of Shakespeare than an autonomous identity.\(^{35}\)

The fact would seem to be that Donne chose systematically to create for himself, both in and out of his lyrics, a persona as complex, subjective, and volatile as any of Shakespeare's more gifted heroes: whether we think of Petruchio or Berowne, Benedick or Faulconbridge, Hamlet or Antony. If Shakespeare turned life into art, Donne and many of his con-temporaries applied art to life. In my book *The School of Love* I have already tried to map out the successful transcendence of specific social disadvantages which Donne and Shakespeare taught the lyric poets who succeeded them.\(^{36}\) It is quite clear that what distinguishes the virtuosity of Richard III or Falstaff is this power to transcend hostile circumstances and social alienation in ways largely unknown to classical and medieval poets. It is also this overriding motivation to defeat alien or hostile public circumstances that sustains the supposed logical or forensic structure of many of Donne's poems. They are not syllogistic because he liked reason but because ratiocination was being exploited, often seriously, to serve the expediencies of his own erratic career or moods.

The leisurely review of the implication of Donne's defensively solipsistic persona and its Shakespearean prototypes was accomplished by his seventeenth-century successors, and in the process their psychology has evolved even from that of Donne's immediate predecessors, like Sidney and Spenser (despite a sonnet like *Amoretti*, 54). The earlier sonneteers visualize their relationship as almost a classical stasis (however picturesquely agonizing the lovers' moods may be), in which an ideal female figure dominates an abject male. But when we consider Andrew Marvell's "Gallery," to choose a typical example, we find a totally relativistic vision of human relationships that anticipates Erving Goffman's *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, in which is fully recognized the pure artifice of personae, and the mental agility needed to sustain each virtuoso performance:

Clora come view my Soul, and tell  
Whether I have contriv'd it well.  
Now all its several lodgings lye
Compos'ed into one Gallery;
And the great Arras-hangings, made
Of various Faces, by are laid;
That, for all furniture you'll find
Only your Picture in my Mind.
Here Thou art painted in the Dress
Of an Inhumane Murtheress; . . .
But, on the other side, th'art drawn
Like to Aurora in the Dawn . . .
But, against that, thou sit's a float
Like Venus in her pearly Boat....
These Pictures and a thousand more,
Of Thee, my Gallery do store;
In all the Forms thou can'st invent
Either to please me, or torment:
For thou alone to people me,
Art grown a num'rous Colony,
And a Collection choicer far
Then or White-hall's, or Mantua's were.\(^{37}\)

Here, as in the Donne lyrics mentioned earlier, Marvell is borrowing from Shakespeare: from the last memorable soliloquy of Richard II (in a play to which Marvell will strikingly return again when he recalls John of Gaunt's speech in *Upon Appleton House*):

My brain I'll prove the female to my soul,
My soul the father; and these two beget
A generation of still-breeding thoughts;
And these same thoughts people this little world,
In humors like the people of this world....
Thus play I in one person many people. (R2 V.v.6-10, 31)

Under the tremendous impact of Shakespeare's theatrical genius, personality has ceased to be the almost hieratic thing it was even in Chaucer (witness the portraits in the
General Prologue). In the work of later post-Shakespearean writers, we have moved from the medieval behaviorist view of personality, as defined by cosmology, social pressures, and psychosomatic factors, to a purely volitional approach in which men and women are essentially only what they choose to be.

This theatrical sense of personality saturates all of Marvell's writing whether we consider *The Rehearsal Transpros'd* or the Horatian ode with its Royal Actor, or the endless scene-changing of *Upon Appleton House*, where masking and the painterly analogues are the most emphasized:

This Scene again with drawing brings  
A new and empty Face of things;  
A level'd space, as smooth and plain,  
As Clothes for Lilly stretcht to stain. . .  
Or rather such is the Toril  
Ere the bulls enter at Madril.

(Margoliouth, I, 72, 1. 441-44, 447-48)

The result is that Marvell's own persona as the speaker of his verse proves positively Protean, whether he plays the role of the libertine cynic in "To His Coy Mistress," of the platonizing sophisticate in "The Definition of Love," or of the misogynistic recluse in "The Garden," or of the pious Puritan in "The Bermudas." Marvell is correctly seen as the master of Swift in his virtuoso manipulation of masks and personae, which often result in a calculated impact on his reader's sensibilities, values, and intention.

The supreme manipulative use of authorial persona in Marvell probably lies in *Upon Appleton House*, where Marvell's critique of permanent seclusion reaches its climax in his own exemplary experience, but only after reviewing medieval monasticism and the retirement of his own patron, General Fairfax, from public affairs. Marvell finds it tactful to censure pastoral escapism chiefly in his own persona, and skillfully manipulates the presentation of his rural moods to display their narcissism, intellectual hubris, and paganism. He alternates between the roles of biologist, meta-physician, and Druid, only to relapse into the modest recognition of his own social obligations when he encounters his pupil Mary Fairfax with her exemplary acceptance of her political and social duties as a
future wife and mother of English leaders.

The skill with which Marvell integrates the plausible staging of his own shifting moods into an ideological exposition shows a new authority in the systematic structuring, not to say manipulation, of the self. It does owe some debt to the analogous formal patterning that is latent in earlier English verse like Marlowe's "Passionate Shepherd," Raleigh's "Nymph's Reply," and Donne's further development of their effects in "The Baite"—and, of course, in the supreme point in this explicit literary sequence, that of Milton's fully self-conscious and yet more elaborate subjective psychology in L'Allegro and II Penseroso, where pastoral debate acquires a baroque sophistication of structure and temperament without ever sinking back into trivial pastoral affectation such as Marlowe's. Milton is the supreme Renaissance master of self-manipulation to esthetic and ideological ends in literature, in both his prose and verse. The idealized self with which he defends himself from censure in the prose pamphlets reaches its ultimate esthetic expression in the mediating role of the historical identity of the author of Paradise Lost, whose contemporary point of view assimilates the modern reader's perspective into the structure of the poem, a technique also visible in the paintings of the time by Michelangelo, Velásquez, and Rembrandt.

However, the ultimate understanding of how the individual may review potential personae in the spirit of Marvell's "Gallery" no doubt lies in Paradise Regained, where Christ in practice may be considered as reviewing the gamut of social roles available to the gifted person and rejecting them all because, being conventional, they fail to do justice to his own unique talents. In Christ's confrontation with this sequence of schemata for a life-style, we have reached, in art at least, the full recognition of the flexibility of the human persona. This only the most sophisticated modern psychologists have recognized, and then often without that awareness of deliberative choice that had become axiomatic for Marvell and Milton. It is surely accurate to say that under the inspiration of Shakespeare authors like Donne and the two Puritans mapped out our modern sense of the dimensions of personality.

In corroboration of this view one may briefly note the numerous and significant literary consequences of such poets' exploitation of the personae they developed under the pressures of religious and political controversy. Swift's indebtedness to what he called
Marvell's "great Genius" is generally recognized. What might be stressed here is that the first major illustration of Swift's virtuosity in role-playing should be the work in whose prefatory Apology this phrase appears: *A Tale of a Tub*, itself a religious polemic involving masterly examples of masking and affected personae on the part of the author, and a work that owes explicit local debts to prototypes such as Marvell and Donne. The parodic persona of Swift's notorious *Modest Proposal* also finds a more gently ironic precedent in "His Majesty's Most Gracious Speech to Both Houses of Parliament," now universally judged to be within the scope of Marvell's wit alone among its potential authors (Legouis, p. 211). Of the more morbid extremes of Swift's defensive self-awareness it is unnecessary to speak here, but a suaver example may lie in his "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift." However, the literary bearings of the development of Renaissance self-protective characterization are not limited to the immediately following cultural phase.

The development of the authorial persona as a crucial factor in narrative (not to say epic) verse can be seen to progress consciously from Milton's limited practice in *Paradise Lost* to Wordsworth's full sense in *The Prelude* that "the growth of a poet's mind" was a fit and self-sufficient subject for poetry, as well as a necessary vindication of his own role in the controversies of the Revolutionary Era. The defensive roles of Byron's literary personae are too complex for analysis here, but by contrast the direct historical debt to the seventeenth century that can be seen in Browning is self-evident from the very titles of many of his works. Not only does Browning perfect the art of assuming personae in his dramatic monologues, he characteristically chooses subjects inviting defensive roles, particularly religious and political ones generated by historical events or pressures. It is scarcely necessary to explore the bearing of my thesis on *Bishop Blougram's Apology*, but many of Browning's other poems also explore the creation of self-protecting personae, and many of these are modeled on seventeenth-century precedents. One of the most startling is the creation of the psychological tension in "The Bishop Orders His Tomb at Saint Praxed's Church" by a clever superimposition of the theatrical deathbed episodes from Izaak Walton's *Life of Donne*, on analogous but purely pagan and frivolous material dexterously excerpted from the role-playing of Trimalchio in the *Satyricon* of Petronius. While Tennyson's experiments with dramatic monologues are fully comparable to
Browning’s, it is significant that modern taste favors the intensely autobiographical self-scrutiny generated by Tennyson’s religious preoccupations in *In Memoriam*. Though the dependence of Yeats on the vindication of his own position on the Irish Rebellion is a factor in much of his best verse, perhaps I may be forgiven for concluding my survey of the implications of Renaissance literary psychology merely by reverting to the writings T. S. Eliot, on whom I drew earlier for authority to strengthen my case. His intense preoccupation with the material I have discussed needs no further corroboration, though perhaps his exact debts to specific models do need still fuller documentation than my present scope permits. His mastery of the art of assuming a persona is best epitomized by *Prufrock*, but the consistent, often defensive religious undertone of his verse is more openly recognizable in *The Journey of the Magi*, and the creative psychological impact of historical religious controversy reaches its fullest expression in *Murder in the Cathedral*, which achieves a similar sophistication of character to that in *Henry IV* and for very much the same reason: that full-blown politico-religious controversy forces richly defensive self-characterizations. In choosing his play’s subject, Eliot paradoxically showed his sense of this truth, whose first full literary fruits we associate with the later period of the Reformation. As we have seen what Eliot himself recognized, that the self-conscious power of subjective projection into alternative identities is a talent that we probably owe to the impact of the Reformation on Renaissance poetry, and the new resource has an enormous importance not only for literary esthetics, but equally for that intellectual discipline which I have chosen to call Historical Psychology.43

REFERENCES


NOTES

1 Plato, *Five Dialogues* 6. Compare these ideas with those of Paul Kimmich at the start of the previous essay in this volume.


3 *The Verbal Icon*18. These views are clearly related to those of T. S, Eliot cited in the previous essay.

4 *Frankenstein* 8.


6 This issue is discussed and documented in detail in H. M. Richmond, "The Dead Albatross: The New Criticism as a Humanist Fallacy" 515-31.

7 *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* 81.

8 See Helen Waddell, *The Wandering Scholars*. 


9 Trans. Jacob Zeitlin 149. The original reads "Vivere ut velis, ire quo velis, stare ubi velis. ... In utraque tuum esse et ubicunque fueris esse tecum, ... non impelli, non collidi, non affici, non urgeri." Francesco Petrarcha, *Prose*, ed. G. Martellotti 354.

10 *Selected Essays*, ed. Blanchard Bates 82-83. The original reads: "Je ne suis pas marry que nous remarquons l'horreur barbaresque qu'il y a en une telle action, mais ouy bien dequoy, jugeans bien de leurs fautes, nous soyons si aveuglez aux nostres. Je pense qu'il y a plus de barbarie a manger un homme vivant qu'a le manger mort, a deschirer par tourments et par geenes un corps encore plein de sentiment, le faire rostir par le menu, le faire mordre et meurtrir aux chiens et au pourceaux (comme nous l'avons non seulement leu, mais veu de fresche memoire, non entre des ennemis anciens, mais entre les voisins et concitoyens, et qui pis est, sous pretexte de piete et de religion), que de le rostir et manger apres qu'il est trespasse." Montaigne, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Albert Thibaudet 207-08.

11 Bates 1; "je ne m'y suis propose aucune fin, que domestique et privee. Je n'y ay eu nulle consideration de ton service, ny de ma gloire. ... Si c'eust este pour rechercher la faveur du monde, je me fusse mieux pare et me presenterois en une marche estudiee. Je veus qu'on m'y voie en ma façon simple, naturelle et ordinaire, sans con-tantion et artifice: car c'est moy que je peins. Mes defauts s'y liront au vif, et ma forme naifve." *Oeuvres complètes* 9.

12 *The Religio Medici* 82-83.

13 John Donne, *The Elegies and the Songs and Sonnets*, ed. Helen Gardner 73. 14 "When I ... say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say unto me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them? And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM" (Authorized Version Bible).


15 *The Duchess of Malfi*, ed. Fred B. Millet, 73.
16 *Civilization of the Renaissance* 49, 81-82. A fuller account of such influences appears in Paget Toynbee, *Dante Alighieri His Life and Works*, and another recent authority is Michele Barbi, *Life of Dante*,


18 *Life of Petrarch* 17.

19 Bergin, p. 6; "cum omnium sed in primis illius tediosissime urbis fastidium atque odium, naturaliter animo meo insitum, fere non possem, diverticulum aliquod quasi potum querens, repperi vallem perexiguam sed solitariam atque amenam, que Clausa dicitur, quindecim passuum milibus ab Avinione distantem, ubi fontium rex omnium Sorgia oritur. Captus loci dulcedine, libellos meos et meipsum illuc transtuli, cum iam quartum et trigesimum etatis annum post terga relinguerem. Longa erit historia si pergam exequi quid ibi multos ac multos egerim per annos. Hec est summa: quod quicquid fere opusculorum michi excidit, ibi vel actum vel ceptum vel conceptum est." F. Petrarca, *Prose* 12.

20 The most relevant material for this aspect of Petrarch appears in Ernest H. Wilkins, *Petrarch at Vaucluse: Letters in Verse and Prose* . Discussion bearing on Petrarch's retreat also appears in H. M. Richmond, *Renaissance Landscapes* 38-55.

21 For these aspects of Marot and Ronsard see my *Renaissance Landscapes* 55-76. For Ronsard's impact in England, see H. M. Richmond, "Ronsard and the English Renaissance."


24 A fuller account of material bearing on the later evolution and use of the Miltonic persona will be found in H. M. Richmond, *The Christian Revolutionary: John Milton*.
25 The Falstaff material is vividly described in Henry S. Bennett, *Six Medieval Men and Women* 30-68.

26 *Lectures and Essays* 141-42. Ainger's judicious balance of historical and mythical factors seems to have influenced J. Dover Wilson, *The Fortunes of Falstaff* 16, 32-35. The complex assimilation by Shakespeare's Falstaff of various elements in earlier plays such as *The Famous Victories of Henry the Fifth* and *Woodstock* is succinctly described by A. R. Humphreys' Arden edition. *The First Part of Henry IV* xxxii-vii. Humphreys also discusses the bearing of the Oldcastle tradition on the play (pp. xxxix-xlv) and I too cover the issues: Shakespeare, *The First Part of the History of King Henry IV*, ed. H. M. Richmond xxi-ii. Most recent scholars tend to emphasize the derivation of Falstaff's theology from the Vice figures in Morality Plays, or from earlier analogies discussed in C. L. Barber, *Shakespeare's Festive Comedy* but many see some inspiration from the original, historical Oldcastle figure. My first challenge to a merely negative view of Falstaffian ethics appears in H. M. Richmond, *Shakespeare's Political Plays* 153-57, 174, 197.

27 Humphreys, xxxix. It is worth noting that Shakespeare shows a predilection for historical figures about whom traditional opinions become thoroughly polarized, as argued by John R. Elliott, "Polydore Vergil and the Reputation of King John in the Sixteenth Century" 90-92.


29 Cited in Michael Holroyd, *Beginnings* 363: "en réalité le satanisme a gagné. Satan s'est fait ingenu. Le mal se connaissant était moins affreux et plus près de la guerison que le mal s'ignorant. G. Sand inférieure à de Sade."


31 "Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca," in *Selected Essays* 119.


36 *The School of Love: The Evolution of the Stuart Love Lyric*.


38 Much of my argument about the implication of *Upon Appleton House* coincides with that of George de F. Lord, "From Contemplation to Action: Marvell's Poetical Career." The broader applications of contextual studies to Marvell's writing have been well displayed in John M. Wallace, *Destiny His Choice: The Loyalism of Andrew Marvell*.

39 For some account of this literary influence of Marvell's religious pamphlets in particular see Pierre Legouis, *Andrew Marvell, Poet, Puritan, Patriot* 193-223 (note particularly the Bibliography 208-09).

40 See *The School of Love* 268-69, 273-75, n. 44.


43. This essay was originally delivered as an address to the Pacific Northwest Regional Conference at the University of Oregon in Eugene, on 10 March 1973. However, despite somewhat similar nominal terms of reference, its comparative methodology was not directly derived from an earlier study, Zevedei Barbu’s *Problems of Historical Psychology* (1960), nor obviously from that of the subsequent review of Tudor literature by my colleague Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-fashioning* (1980). The Preface to that *PMLA* issue rated as “seminal” the essay’s demonstration of how the development of
subjective awareness in Renaissance literature was provoked by Reformation confrontations.