

The Armenian Diaspora: Migration and its Influence on Identity and Politics

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Abstract

The diasporan occupies a liminal space as a person that comes from one place, yet lives in another. This split identity can often pose challenges for diaspora communities, not only in questions of assimilation but also in coming to an understanding of what “identity” means at all. Understanding the diasporan’s lack of belonging and its influence on the way in which different diaspora communities function in their host nations is crucial in the present day, at a time in which identities are more fluid than ever. In this study, I explore the concept of diaspora through the particular lens of Armenian diaspora communities in the United States. This article will not only focus on the causes and effects of Armenian migration historically, but will also explore the characteristics and goals of the Armenian diaspora in the United States today – particularly in terms of its current understanding of identity, its uniting factors, and political influence. In studying the Armenian diaspora, I hope to emphasize the powerful impact of mobilizing diaspora communities through their uniting causes and characteristics, in not only creating a diasporan sense of identity but also in better understanding how diasporas influence globalization.

Keywords

Diaspora; Armenia; Migration; Assimilation; Lobbying; Armenian Genocide.

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1. Introduction

Diaspora communities exist across cultures, continents, and peoples, and are notably present in the United States. Diasporas are traditionally viewed as communities that have migrated in large numbers to at least one country outside of their home nation. Armenia, however, is a unique case among different diaspora communities in that there are more Armenians currently living outside of Armenia than within its borders – the current Armenian population is about three million, whereas the global Armenian population outside of Armenia is about ten million (Thandi, 2017; see Fig. 1). The Armenian diaspora is often defined in terms of the Armenian Genocide, and the forced migration it resulted. Armenian migration, however, occurred long before and after the genocide took place. The Armenian diaspora has existed for centuries, often because of displacement due to violence and conflict, but also for labor and financial reasons.

Today, there are as many as 1.5 million Armenians living in the United States, with most diasporans concentrated in California. My research explores the Armenian diaspora in the United States, first in terms of its migration history, then its socio-economic characteristics, assimilation to the United States, and finally its cultural and identity challenges. As a whole, this study concludes that the Armenian diaspora's identity is inseparable from the Armenian peoples' political interests and complex history, and influences the way they create social and political space for themselves in the United States.

2. Migration History

Armenian migration to the United States began centuries ago, shortly after the first British colonists arrived in North America. Armenian migrants at the start of the 17th century arrived in small numbers, which did not increase much throughout most of the 18th and 19th centuries (Zarifian, 2014: 505). Most Armenian immigration began at the end of the 19th century and continued into the 20th century, and took place in three waves. The first wave was a direct result of Armenian persecution by Ottoman Turks, first in the Hamidian massacres in the 1890s, and then in the Armenian Genocide, which lasted from 1915 through about 1922. A total of about 1.5 million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire were massacred, and as a result about 100,000 Armenians fled to the United States until U.S. immigration restrictions were implemented in the 1920s (Pezeshkian, 2011: 10).

The Armenians who arrived in the United States – and that immigrated elsewhere – during this time were mostly Western Armenians, from the region that is now a part of Eastern Turkey, as opposed to Eastern Armenians from what used to be both Persian and Russian Armenia (Kasbarian, 2015: 359). This established the foundation of the first wave of the Armenian diaspora as predominantly Western Armenian, whose dialect differs from that of Eastern Armenians. Seeing as Eastern Armenian is the dialect spoken in Armenia today, this difference – along with other cultural differences that have developed over time – have proven to be a significant factor in the relationship between diasporan Armenians and those born in today's Armenia.

Following the end of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Armenia

briefly became an independent country, with a fraction of its original territory and completely excluding Western Armenia. Its independence lasted from 1918 through 1920, until the Soviet Union annexed Armenia as the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The second wave of Armenian migration to the United States took place in the context of Soviet Armenia, post-World War II. Most Armenian migrants to the United States were not Armenians from Soviet Armenia, but instead were those whose ancestors had been a part of the first wave of the diaspora.

A majority of those fleeing from the Armenian Genocide during the first wave had migrated to surrounding Middle Eastern countries, and during the decades following WWII, Middle Eastern conflicts began to intensify. After the U.S. Immigration Act of 1965, it became easier to immigrate to the United States because of its elimination of the quota system (Pezeshkian, 2011: 11). Many of these migrants came to the United States as “neither survivors of the Genocide nor from the ancestral homeland,” but rather as diasporans who could better adjust to life in the U.S. than those who came directly to the U.S. from Armenia (Pezeshkian, 2011: 11).

They previously learned how to assimilate into a community that was new and foreign to them, and so they were better prepared to do so in the United States. On the opposite end of the spectrum, there were diasporans that attempted to return to Armenia – at this point, Soviet Armenia – during this time, motivated by the integral

element of diaspora that is the return to the ancestral homeland.

Number of Armenians living outside Armenia




Figure 1²

However, upon arrival “the returnees had a hard time adapting to the hardships of a post-World War II Soviet Armenia still ruled by Stalin, such that, starting in the mid-1950s, many sought to emigrate” (Kasbarian, 2015: 363). Starting in 1974, roughly 60,000 Soviet Armenians left for the United States (Kasbarian, 2015: 363).

The last wave of migration to the United States began during the 1980s in part due to the Nagorno-Karabakh, or Artsakh, conflict with Azerbaijan. Artsakh is a disputed territory that has been a major point of controversy for the Caucasus region. Artsakh is populated by a majority of Armenians and is historically Armenian, but was given to Azerbaijan by Soviet leadership post- WWI. Since then, tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan about the status of the Republic of Artsakh has only increased – Azerbaijan believes it is rightfully a part of Azerbaijan, whereas Artsakh has voted to be free and independent of Azerbaijan. The Sumgait Pogrom of February 1988, in which

² Figure 1. “The Armenian genocide – the Guardian briefing.” Ministry of Diaspora of the Republic of Armenia, FCO, Statistics Canada, Australian Bureau of Statistics. *The Guardian*.
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/16/the->

“atrocities against and the forced deportation of the Armenian population was carried out by Azerbaijani authorities,” marked the beginning of an outbreak of violence between the two countries due to the Artsakh conflict (“Artsakh Parliament Issues Statement,” 2018). The brutality of the Sumgait massacres was so severe that the global Armenian diaspora community called them the continuation of the Armenian Genocide.

This Armenian persecution within Azerbaijan catalyzed Armenian immigration to the United States. A massive earthquake struck Soviet Armenia during this time as well, causing even more Armenians to emigrate. Unlike previous waves of migration to the United States, these more recent immigrants were predominantly Eastern Armenian, as they mostly arrived from Armenia and the Eastern Caucasus Region itself. What can arguably be referred to as an extension of the third wave, or a new fourth wave, of Armenian immigration to the United States is the immigration that has resulted from Middle Eastern conflicts in the 21st century. While most Armenian refugees escaping the War in Iraq and the Syrian Civil War did not come to the United States, it is still important to note that movement within the Armenian diaspora is constant – and historically, the pattern illustrates that this movement is often not voluntary.

3. Contemporary Socio-economic Characteristics

The Armenian diaspora in the United States is well assimilated to life in the U.S. as a whole. Diasporans are often well-educated, “with a graduate, and often post-graduate, degree, and many have special skills or expertise” (Kasbarian, 2015: 368). The Armenian diaspora also travels back to its homeland often, seeing as “most...are economically comfortable” (Kasbarian,

2015: 361). Seeing as a large portion of the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. is middle class, “ease of travel, voluntary overseas work, gap years, adventure vacations, and internships abroad” to Armenia “are the norm;” they do this in order to “maintain Armenianness” (Kasbarian, 2015: 370). This “reflects the privileged mobility” that a significant portion of Armenian diasporans currently have (Kasbarian, 2015: 370). In the past, however, this was not necessarily the case.

Armenians migrating to the United States during the first wave of migration did not arrive with considerable resources. This is obvious, considering that they were displaced as a result of forced ethnic cleansing executed by the Ottoman Empire. The second wave of migration was not a result of circumstances that were quite as dire, but oftentimes the second-wave immigrants were not immigrating out of choice either. Those immigrating from Middle Eastern countries were escaping conflicts of their own. One example is that of the Israel-Palestine conflict that broke out in the 1950s, where as a result, roughly 8,500 Armenians were displaced and immigrated to the United States (Pezeshkian, 2011: 11). Other groups may have wanted to leave their host nations for financial reasons; Armenian families in Syria in the 1970s, for example, came to the United States looking for economic opportunity and to escape Hafez al-Assad’s oppressive dictatorship.

Much of the third wave of Armenian immigrants to the United States arrived here on refugee status, because of the Soviet Armenian earthquake and the conflict in Artsakh. A substantial number of Armenians living in post-Soviet Armenia left Armenia for the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union, again for economic opportunity. These immigrants were generally well-off in Armenia, but had to give up their upper-middle class standing

upon arrival to the United States (Pezeshkian, 2011: 12). More common, however, is migration within former Soviet States: roughly 60,000 labor migrants leave Armenia for Russia each year, who bring back over \$1.5 billion in remittances (Kasbarian, 2015: 363). This makes up 18% of Armenia's Gross Domestic Product as of 2007 (Kasbarian, 2015: 363). While migration from Armenia to the United States is less focused on remittances, labor migration as a whole is more prevalent among the third wave of the Armenian diaspora.

Recent Armenian immigrants largely come from Middle Eastern countries that have seen conflict in the past two decades. The War in Iraq and the Syrian Civil War – with Iraq and Syria having large Armenian populations – have catalyzed mass movements of Armenians to surrounding Middle Eastern nations, and to the United States. In examining Armenian migration on a larger scale, it is evident that Armenians have been moving from nation to nation for centuries.

4. Cultural Adaptation to the United States

The Armenian population in the United States is a mixture of Armenian diaspora communities – many Armenians currently living in the U.S. immigrated to the United States from another nation outside of Armenia, such as Russia, Syria, or Lebanon. “Subcultures” can form, in which groups may specifically identify as British-Armenian, or Lebanese-Armenian, or Russian-Armenian – all while living under the umbrella of being an Armenian-American. First generation Armenian-Americans born in the United States could have adopted hybrid identities from their parents, who could feel attached to the hostlands they were born in as well. Yet, because these immigrants – or their families

– have previously adapted to cultures outside that of their homeland identity, it is often easier for them to adapt to life in the United States than for Armenians that immigrate to the United States directly from Armenia. Armenians have had relative success in assimilating to life in the United States, especially because areas such as California are already home to many other diaspora communities. Multiculturalism is an integral part of life in California, and as such it becomes easier for Armenians – especially because they are primarily a Christian minority, the dominant religion in the United States – to assimilate and find monetary success there. Armenians have also significantly contributed to American cultural life; celebrities such as Kim Kardashian, Andre Agassi, Kirk Kerkorian, and Cher are key public figures of Armenian descent that have found immense success in the United States, and have used their success to further Armenian causes to varying degrees, such as humanitarian relief and genocide recognition. Having celebrities with a large following publicly discuss Armenian issues contributes, at the very least, to large-scale awareness of Armenian causes, and at best can help to achieve them.

In examining the global Armenian diaspora, it is evident that Armenians are able to maintain a distinct identity separate from other communities in their hostlands, in order to preserve a sense of cultural identity and attachment to their homeland. The concept of cultural identity, however, is tricky when Armenians that immigrated to the United States have arrived from a variety of previous host nations, and could feel isolated from other Armenian communities in the area. It is important to note, as Khachig Tölölyan states:

“In a diaspora such as the Armenian, as within nation-states, the (re)production of culture and of contesting

visions of collective identity is a quotidian, persistent, and costly activity, conducted not just by a few individual aesthetic producers but also by larger groups of journalists, intellectuals, teachers, scholars, activists, artists, performers, and entertainers, some of whom are associated with – or, in the case of most teachers, dependent upon – organizations and institutions that offer material support and make ideological claims. These institutions constitute a diasporic civil society that nurtures and sustains the public sphere of debate and cultural production” (Tololyan, 2000: 109).

As such, each individual in the Armenian diaspora can play an important role in creating a sense of belonging or identity for Armenians, despite the fact that in a cosmopolitan world of hyphenated identities, it can be difficult to find unifying factors to bring people together. However, important unifying factors for the Armenian diaspora have been found in its political interests.

5. The Armenian Cause” Nature of Culture and Identity Challenges

As previously discussed, the United States is home to both Eastern and Western Armenians, often all living in the same area. The merging of these different dialects, cultural attitudes, and previous homelands can create difficulty in uniting Armenian-Americans as part of the same diaspora. This also creates a complicated relationship between today’s Armenia and Western Armenians; seeing as what was Western Armenia is now Eastern Turkey, Western Armenians have lost their ancestral homeland. As a result, they accept today’s Armenia as a “step-homeland,” one that is not actually where they are from, but that is

representative of their roots (Kasbarian, 2015: 359). Ironically, however, other cultural and identity challenges that Armenians face in the U.S. also serve as uniting factors for different communities within the Armenian diaspora.

Most identity challenges for Armenians in the United States go beyond uniting hyphenated Armenian communities that live in the same area. The Armenian cause is transnational, and focuses on what diasporans can do to help not only Armenian-Americans, but the Republic of Armenia itself. In this way, Armenian identity challenges in the U.S. are very much political; with a history so full of conflict and forced migration, it is difficult to separate the personal from the political. Armenians grow up hearing stories about their grandparents or great-grandparents that escaped the Armenian Genocide, about those who were massacred during or survived the Sumgait Pogrom, and about Armenian soldiers fighting for the freedom of Artsakh. As adults, they are thus motivated to unite with other diasporans to campaign for genocide recognition and fight for Artsakh’s freedom. In this way, Armenians of different “subcultures” are united. Through political and identity struggles, they come together and create an identity centered around political activism and the defending of the homeland.

Because of the political nature of Armenian cultural and identity challenges in the U.S., these challenges are mostly met by the efforts of the Armenian lobby. Two of the most powerful Armenian lobbying groups in the United States are the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA). The ANCA is a Tashnag party organization, originally the political party that was in power during the first Republic of Armenia in 1918. This party was vehemently anti-Soviet, and today favors a “free, united, and

independent Armenia” (Zarifian, 2014: 507). During the Cold War, the ANCA and other Tashnag diaspora organizations developed stronger relationships with the U.S. due to their anti-Soviet stance. The AAA, on the other hand, is non-Tashnag and thus was more sympathetic towards Soviet Armenia before Armenia’s independence; its rhetoric is softer and more flexible, aimed at dialogue and reconciliation. Non-Tashnag diaspora organizations prioritized maintaining a relationship with Armenia, regardless of its government or ruler. Armenians in the homeland, however, have their own political goals to focus on. Armenians in the diaspora focus on advancing the “Armenian Cause” and preserving their ideal homeland, and Armenians in Armenia are more concerned with everyday issues in the country itself (Panossian, 1998).

The differences and similarities between the ANCA and the AAA provide basic examples of how Tashnag and non-Tashnag party politics interact. The AAA’s goals today emphasize U.S. interests, prioritizing the needs of the United States when discussing topics of interest to Armenian-American communities. This is interesting because it diverges from its previous position during the years of the USSR, in which it supported Soviet Armenia despite the Cold War (Zarifian, 2014: 507).

The ANCA’s goals, however, prioritize Armenians and Armenian-Americans, not the United States. The ANCA also supports uniting historic Armenian territories, “which are today either not inhabited by Armenians because of the Genocide of 1915 (Western Armenia today in Eastern Turkey), or inhabited by Armenians but controlled by other countries (Javakhetia in Georgia) [which] is nothing less than an appeal to dismantle major allies of the United States, and it cannot please Washington” (Zarifian, 2014: 507). These goals become less feasible to reach in the United States

because they disrupt U.S. foreign policy goals, whereas the AAA’s goals appear to be less aggressive because they prioritize U.S. interests.

It is of significance to compare the two organizations in their success in accessing different branches of the U.S. government. The ANCA is incredibly successful in terms of lobbying Congress, but they have “trouble [accessing] the executive branch” due to its use of more overt political language (Zarifian, 2014: 507). The AAA has more success with the executive branch as a result, which proves to be a “quite positive” situation, “especially when the two organizations struggle for the same goal (such as recognition of the Armenian Genocide); they are complementary” (Zarifian, 2014: 507). This is a prominent way in which party divisions can, at times, be beneficial for the global Armenian diaspora community in advancing common goals: when one organization fails in a specific area, another has a chance at succeeding.

While there are different political parties – within the Armenian diaspora, as well as among Armenian-American lobbying organizations – and while the specifics of the parties’ goals may differ, there are a few cultural challenges that stand universal across Armenian diaspora communities and that serve as unifying forces: Armenian Genocide recognition, the freedom of Artsakh, and securing aid for Armenia.

Armenian Genocide Recognition One of the most pronounced and visible cultural challenges that Armenians face in the United States is that of Armenian Genocide denial. The occurrence of the Armenian Genocide in 1915 is a fact vehemently denied by the Turkish government, and unacknowledged by the U.S. The Turkish government reduces the 1.5 million deaths to thousands, and claims that if the deaths occurred at all, they took place in combat during World War I. Turkey has had and continues a policy of

denying any and all accusations of ethnic cleansing, even going so far as to prosecute Turkish citizens that discuss the Armenian Genocide as a factual occurrence under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code – thus classifying discussion of the Armenian Genocide as speech insulting the Turkish government (“Turkey,” 2016). The Turkish government has enforced a gag rule on United States policy. The United States considers Turkey to be an essential ally in the Middle East, especially considering that the U.S. has an air base in Turkey. In order for the two nations to continue a positive relationship, Turkey requires that the United States not recognize the Armenian Genocide. Armenian diasporans organize yearly protest marches across the globe to take place on April 24th, Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day, in an attempt to draw attention to the issues with genocide recognition that Armenians face. The Armenian diaspora calls for the United States government to recognize the events of 1915 as genocide, and they emphasize that “genocide denied is genocide repeated;” to not recognize the Armenian Genocide is to violate human rights, and will perpetuate cycles of discrimination, genocide, and ethnic cleansing in the future.

Artsakh

Many Armenians consider the land dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Artsakh – commonly referred to as Nagorno-Karabakh – and the violent activity that resulted to be a continuation of the Armenian Genocide. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Union designated the region of Artsakh as a part of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, despite its ethnic Armenian majority (BBC.com, 2016: “Nagorno-Karabakh Profile”). As a result, tensions between the two groups grew, peaking “when the region’s parliament voted

to join Armenia” (BBC.com, 2016: “Nagorno-Karabakh Profile”). In 1991, a war broke out that left Armenians in control of the region. After the collapse of the USSR, Artsakh declared its independence, which led to further tension and violence. A ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994, which left Artsakh and surrounding areas in ethnic Armenian control. Since then, however, tensions have continued to rise. The most recent example of violence breaking out over the region was in April 2016, when soldiers on both sides were killed. This speaks to the present relevance of the problems in the area and the effect they have on the Armenian diaspora.

Tashnags and non-Tashnags alike have united in support of Artsakh. Azerbaijan continues to resist Armenian claims to Artsakh, believing that the land given to them by Soviet rulers is rightfully theirs. Azerbaijan has also chosen to ignore the opinions of the population of Artsakh, which has overwhelmingly voted to remain independent of Azerbaijan. Ilham Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan, has made discriminatory remarks against Armenians and the diaspora that are fueled by the conflict in Artsakh: “Our main enemy is the Armenian lobby...Armenia as a country is of no value. It is actually a colony, an outpost run from abroad, a territory artificially created on ancient Azerbaijani lands” (Antidze, Grove, ed. Liffy, 2012: “Azeri President Says Armenia is a Country ‘Of No Value’”). It is sentiments such as these that unite Armenian diasporans, regardless of their political affiliations or host nations. Artsakh has become a symbol of the enduring Armenian spirit, of a culture built on survival. Armenians claim that attacks against them committed by Azerbaijan are ethnically and racially targeted attacks, continuing the genocide that the Ottoman Turks began. Azerbaijan’s close relationship with Turkey only adds to this belief. Armenians thus rally

around Artsakh as a direct way they can support their people and their homeland.

United States Aid to Armenia

Supplying U.S. aid to Armenia is another major issue that unites Armenian diasporans. Seeing as the Republic of Armenia has close relationships with both Russia and Iran, and the United States has ties with Turkey, maintaining a positive U.S.-Armenia relationship can be difficult. Armenian-Americans believe that with U.S. recognition of the Armenian Genocide will come better trade relations with Armenia, which will catalyze Armenia's economic growth as a whole. The belief is that "the continued growth of U.S.-Armenia economic relations advances key U.S. regional interests and creates jobs in both countries, while reinforcing the enduring friendship between the American and Armenian peoples" and that "strategically, bilateral trade and investment is vital to anchoring Armenia to the West and providing Armenia with expanded options and independence in dealing with regional powers" ("Growing the U.S.-Armenia Economic Relationship," 2018). A closer economic relationship with Armenia would put an end to Armenia's reliance on Russia for security; in order to bring Armenia closer to the U.S., the U.S. must first provide assistance. U.S. aid to Armenia also extends to aiding the Armenians affected by the Artsakh conflict – supporting de-mining efforts, "developmental aid," and restricting military trade and aid with Azerbaijan ("Armenian Americans," 2018).

6. Success in Accommodating Cultural and Identity Challenges

³ Figure 2. "Armenian Genocide Recognition in the United States." *Armenian National Committee of America*, [anca.org/armenian-](http://anca.org/armenian-genocide/recognition/united-states/)

In comparison with other diaspora communities in the United States, the Armenian diaspora is quite small. Because of this, the Armenian lobby and diaspora's effectiveness in achieving its goals in the U.S. is often questioned – but "being a 'small' community is not as negative as it could appear at first glance. On the contrary, it can be an asset when collecting resources rapidly or mobilizing and organizing the group is needed. Furthermore, small groups tend to focus on a more limited and polarized scope of issues, which avoids scattering energy and resources" (Zarifian, 2014: 506). In this way, the Armenian lobby is incredibly effective in, at the least, drawing the public's attention to Armenian-American issues.

The Armenian lobby has skillfully linked the two main challenges of Armenian Genocide recognition and U.S. aid to Armenia in their discussions with elected officials – "They make a direct connection between Turkish recognition of the Armenian Genocide, and the security and prosperity of Armenia" in the way that Turkish and U.S. recognition of the genocide would better U.S.- Armenia relations (Zarifian, 2014: 509).




Figure 2³

[genocide/recognition/united-states/](http://anca.org/armenian-genocide/recognition/united-states/).

In connecting the two, the Armenian lobby is usually able to get at least parts of their needs met every time they meet with elected officials – over time, this can lead to great benefits. In fact, Armenian lobbying efforts have made Armenia “one of the most important recipient countries of U.S. per capita foreign direct financial aid, and has prevented Azerbaijan from getting financial assistance” (Zarifian, 2014: 509). In respect to humanitarian aid, the Armenian lobby has been quite successful in accommodating its identity challenges.

In terms of the Armenian Genocide recognition, the diaspora has been less successful. As shown in Figure 2, while 48 states in the U.S. have formally recognized the Armenian genocide as of 2017, the U.S. federal government has yet to formally recognize the Armenian Genocide. Genocide recognition in Turkey has become increasingly more impossible because of Turkish President Erdogan’s authoritarian policies. The Armenian diaspora’s effort to distance the U.S. government from the Turkish government has made some progress however, after President Erdogan ordered his personal security forces to brutally attack unarmed, peaceful Kurdish protesters in Washington D.C mid-May 2017. Footage of this attack went viral, and in response, the Armenian National Committee of America organized a demonstration in July of 2017; several Congresspeople across party lines attended and spoke at this event condemning President Erdogan and the violation of U.S. Constitutional rights by a foreign government. In this way, the issue of genocide recognition has gained a massive amount of attention in the United States, and

has gotten close to passing as a resolution in Congress, but has consistently fallen short of being written into law because of Turkey’s gag rule.

7. Conclusion

The Armenian diaspora in the United States is incredibly diverse; it is comprised of families that have often migrated twice, once from their Armenian homeland and then again from their host nations to the United States. As a result, Armenian-Americans come from a diverse set of cultural backgrounds and possess hybrid identities, but are unified in their shared connections to Armenia – whether as a literal homeland or a “step-homeland” – as well as in their desire for Armenian Genocide recognition. As a whole, the Armenian diaspora occupies a unique space in United States and especially, in the American political arena in matters of the Armenian Genocide recognition and the Artsakh conflict. Armenian-Americans may have previously been scattered all over the world, but they find their strength in coming together.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The author declares no conflict of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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