Objects of Pity: Art and Emotion in Archaic and Classical Greece

by

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation investigates the relationship between art and emotion in Archaic and Classical Greece, particularly the relationship between changes in the cultural values attached to *oiktos* or "pity" and simultaneous changes in the formal appearance of Greek art. Whereas traditional histories assume that emotional engagement was only made possible with stylistic developments in the fifth century, I argue that a cultural mode of viewing works of art through an emotional lens was cultivated already in the sixth century. By promoting encounters with art objects as emotionally similar to real life experiences, this mode of viewing made art *look* more real by compelling viewers to treat works of art as having intellectual and psychological agency.

I understand emotion as a form of subjective experience cultivated through cultural practices, one of which was art making and viewing. In order to recover pity in ancient Greece as a cultural practice deployed through works of art, I examine a broad range of sources. These include not only surviving works of art but inscriptions—especially those that accompanied sculptures—and ancient literature, including both poetry (especially epic and tragic) and prose (especially philosophical texts). Pity, in my account, provides a structural framework through which not only different works of art but different forms of cultural expression can be linked together at the level of their affective content.

The Introduction serves to outline traditional approaches to the relationship between art and emotion in ancient Greece and to highlight the contribution of this dissertation. In many accounts, the possibility of emotional engagement on the part of a viewer is measured according to the apparent realism of the art object as a stylistic feature, the assumption being that only when a work of art offers a convincingly mimetic copy of its depictive subject matter can a viewer approach it with real emotional interest. In contrast, I understand emotion not as a byproduct of style but as something experienced through the very formal structure of the work of art, and I use ancient understandings of emotion as a physiological experience to highlight its role in the viewing of art.

Chapter 1 reveals the structural nature of the relationship between emotion and the work of art through a case study of a single funerary stele. I use the interplay between carved relief and inscribed epigram on this stele to outline how the two elements work together to compel the viewer to engage on an emotionally subjective level. Chapter 2

associates the effects of this interplay with ancient understandings of the emotion of pity, and uses inscriptions and literature to explore how a viewer's pity configures their experience of Archaic funerary sculpture. An Interlude between the main narrative of the dissertation considers how an understanding of the emotional work of the funerary monument might help us account for the break in the production of funerary monuments in Athens for several decades following the end of the Archaic period.

The third and fourth chapters examine Classical funerary monuments. In Chapter 3, I investigate the ways in which ancient viewers interacted physically and emotionally with these monuments, paying close attention to different modes of optic and haptic engagement. Chapter 4 directly confronts the formulaic nature of the Classical funerary monument. Working through a variety of theoretical approaches that explore how emotion is related artistic form, I argue that, rather than reduce an individual monument to a mere instantiation of a type, the use of repetitive formulas enabled ancient individuals to inscribe their personal grief within broader forms of cultural practice. This interpretive move allows me to treat configurative details of different funerary reliefs as embedding emotional meaning in their very form—form that was itself conditioned by standardized artistic practice. The result is a model for understanding how the perceived emotional subjectivity of an individual viewer might be developed and expressed within a broader cultural system. The Epilogue pursues the historical and political implications of this model by examining works of art that demanded pity from beyond the funerary realm in Classical Athens.

While the focus of this dissertation is an historical account of how emotions affected the production and viewing of funerary monuments in Archaic and Classical Greece, the structural model it develops for studying the relationship between art and emotion has broader applications. At the heart of this project lies the question of how an individual's sense of emotional subjectivity is inscribed within artistic and cultural practice, and how works of art themselves constitute a form of emotional practice that can shape that sense of subjectivity. Confronting Greek art through questions of emotional engagement allows me to reframe standard narratives and open up new ways of thinking about the cultural work of sculpture, and art more generally, in Archaic and Classical Greece.

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INTRODUCTION

Art and Emotion in Ancient Greece

Sometime around 520 BCE, in the countryside outside of Athens, a wealthy local family set up a grave monument for their deceased son Kroisos. The most conspicuous element of the monument was a full-scale marble statue of a naked young man, with strapping physique, wide eyes, and a big smile (fig. 1). The statue stood on a base with an inscription that commanded the viewer to stand before the monument, look at it, and feel pity:

> στέθι : καὶ οἴκτιρον : Κροίσο | παρὰ σε͂μα θανόντος :
> hόν ποτ᾽ ἐνὶ προμάχοις : ὄλεσε | θοῦρος : Ἄρες.
> *CEG* (Hansen 1983) 27

> Stand and pity by the *sema* of Kroisos, dead,
> whom fierce Ares once destroyed among the front ranks.[1]

Most scholarly accounts of Kroisos' monument disassociate the pity asked for in the epigram from the statue, whose meaning is generally understood as a symbolic embodiment of aristocratic values, not a presentation of a human form before which we can emote as if it were alive.[2] Where the inscription seeks emotional response, the statue, most scholars agree, offers an allegorical substitute for the beauty and good breeding of the deceased. But what if a viewer, encountering such a monument and reading its inscription, *did* feel pity before the statue? How might their pity transform it into a visible presence of Kroisos himself?[3] What, in other words, happens to static objects when we animate them with deeply felt emotions?

This dissertation investigates the relationship between art and emotion in ancient Greece, particularly the relationship between the emotion of pity (*oiktos*) and the sweeping stylistic, formal, and technical changes in Greek art over the course of the Archaic and Classical periods. Kroisos' funerary monument is hardly unique as a work of Greek art that demands to be seen in a particular emotional light. Yet emotions have rarely been an explicit focus in the study of Greek art, and the lack of methodological frameworks for exploring them means that they are often assumed to be stable features of works of art that are encoded within them. Many histories of Greek art treat emotions as symbolically embedded in iconography, for viewers to decipher and interpret rather than feel or experience. Emotion, in this sense, is frequently treated as a byproduct of narrative, and art is understood as capable of eliciting emotions only when it tells stories

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[1] Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

[2] So, for instance, Elsner (2006: 8): "The inscription, so potent in generating emotion around this image (much more so than modern titles and captions), is fundamentally ambivalent about whether the *kouros* is or is not Kroisos." For the possibility that statue and base do not belong see Neer 2010: 24-7. See Chapter 2 for further discussion of Kroisos' monument.

[3] In my arguments gender has no bearing on vision, and throughout this dissertation I refer to the viewer using "they" as a singular pronoun rather than the more cumbersome "he/she."

that have emotional content, transmitted to the viewer through symbolic displays such as gestures or facial expressions.[4] In this rubric, Kroisos' stiff, naked, and smiling kouros hardly looks like an object of pity.

In contrast to such approaches, I define emotion as a form of subjective engagement conditioned by cultural practices—ones that, in the case of viewing ancient art, are not our own. If we do not feel pity before Kroisos' kouros, that is not because it has failed to look pitiable. Rather, *we* have failed to understand what it means to feel pity before a statue. The ways in which ancient viewers might have engaged emotionally are not self-evident simply by looking through our own eyes and with our own emotions, but need to be discursively reconstructed through external evidence.

To this end, I prioritize monuments that, like Kroisos' kouros, contain explicit emotional content in accompanying inscriptions.[5] The majority of the dissertation focuses on monuments that functioned as funerary markers, since they were experienced in a context whose emotional charge can be readily accessed through the kinds of evidence available to the modern scholar. For the same reasons, many of the monuments I discuss are from Attica, where sculpted and inscribed funerary monuments survive in significantly higher numbers than elsewhere in the Greek world.

To contextualize the statues and inscriptions, I often turn to contemporary literature that reveals ancient understandings about the relationship between art and emotion. Greek literature is rich in moments where individuals engage emotionally with works of art or are compared to works of art while they are in emotional states.[6] While these episodes cannot be divorced from their literary contexts and taken as straightforward evidence for ancient viewing practices, they help us gain a more nuanced understanding of the cultural context in which works of art acquired the capacity to engage viewers emotionally. In contrast to many approaches that relate art and text through narrative content or iconography, I focus on structural similarities, exploring how emotions affect the viewer of ancient art in ways that were analogous to the effects of emotions in other contexts.

Among the genres of ancient literature that explore the relationship between art and emotion, none offers a richer body of evidence than fifth-century Athenian tragedy—not simply for the content of the plays themselves, but because surviving ancient

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[4] Some recent studies in this vein include Oakley 2005; Franzoni 2006; Prioux 2011; Masséglia 2012 and 2013; Bobou 2013.

[5] The study of inscriptions and emotion has not received much attention, but see Chaniotis 2012b as well as Chaniotis 2012a and Chantiotis and Ducrey 2013 more generally. Joseph Day (2010) has recently put forward the notion of "emotional heightening" as one element (among several others) that contributed to a viewer's experience of an inscribed monument in archaic and classical Greece. Such emotional heightening, for Day, makes ritual experience more convincing: "an audience might accept the social distinctions put forward in a rite as natural, desirable, and sanctioned by a deity, because they were embodied in charming performances that produced pleasing aesthetic responses and moving religious experiences" (2010: 185-86).

[6] Discussions of various passages occur throughout this dissertation. Others not directly touched on include Hes. *Op*. 66 (Pandora afflicts men with longing); Eur. *Helen* 31-36 (the *eidolon* of Helen); Aesch. *Aga.* 239-43 (the pitiful Iphigenia described as looking like a painting); Soph. *Trach.* 765-8 (the pitiful sight of Herakles's garment clinging to him as if carved from wood). For broader discussions of such moments in Greek literature see Zeitlin 1994; Bettini 1999; Steiner 2001; O'Sullivan 2008; Stieber 2011.

philosophical discources explicitly analyze the emotional effects of viewing a tragic performance. Pity—the emotion that forms the focus of this dissertation—is one of the emotions (together with fear) most closely associated with the effects of tragic performance and art more generally in works by Gorgias, Plato, and Aristotle.[7] Indeed, in their accounts, a primary function of the tragic performance is its ability to cause its audience to *experience* pity, rather than merely become aware that a pitiable scenario is taking place. In this sense, tragedy as performed in the theater operates according to structures of emotional engagement similar to those that govern the work of art, as I will argue in this dissertation.

Emotion and Classical Realism

While my own methodology will be presented in greater detail in Chapter 1, I use this Introduction to briefly review ways in which art and emotion have been linked in the study of Greek art of the Archaic and Classical periods in order to foreground the contribution of this dissertation to the field more broadly.

Much of the reason that Kroisos' kouros is often seen as emotionally unavailable, so to speak, has little to do with the statue itself and more to do with its place in a stylistic history of Greek art. In many classic studies, such as those of J. J. Pollitt or B. S. Ridgway, emotion is one of the defining features of the radically new Classical style that emerged in Athens after 480—several decades after Kroisos' kouros was made.[8] In such accounts, new forms of sculpture—new styles, new techniques, new iconography—that strove towards artistic realism made emotional engagement possible for the first time. A classic comparison sets Kroisos' kouros against the Kritios youth (fig. 2)—one of the first examples of the new style, which it manifests through its relaxed posture and its body that is softer, smoother, and more naturally configured than its Archaic counterpart.[9] Although, as the Kritios youth demonstrates, depictions of emotion remained relatively restrained at first, a spark had been lit, and interest in conveying emotion through art would only increase into the Hellenistic period.[10]

In recent years, this approach has been productively nuanced by locating emotion in the viewer as much as in the hands of the artist. Classical sculptors did not simply *make* their works emotional, but rather stylistic developments enabled or even encouraged viewers to *see* their creations as containing emotional content.[11] Emotion thus becomes possible when realism as an artistic style has configured a statue in such a way that a viewer can perceive it as animate, and endow it with psychological agency. Among

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[7] Munteanu 2012 offers a fulsome analysis of the relevant texts. See also Rouveret 1989; Konstan 2001; Stewart 2006: 132-35 (with a list of relevant passages on 133).

[8] Pollitt 1972: 43-54, 143-55 on *ethos* and *pathos*. Ridgway 1970: 8-11 includes an "interest in emotion" in her catalogue of new features of the Severe Style. Such approaches continue to define how emotion is usually studied in relation to Greek art; see, for instance, Bobou 2013.

[9] For the Kritios youth see Stewart 2008a: 409 cat. 10 with earlier bibliography.

[10] For the emotional blankness of Classical faces see Hallett 1986: 80. For emotion in Hellenistic sculpture see Stewart 1993 and 2006.

[11] On the often vexed relationship between what is made and what is seen in a work of art, see Davis 2012.

recent publications, one of fullest and most eloquent expositions of this understanding of emotion as a byproduct of the Classical style is that of Jaś Elsner:

> In Classical art […] the viewer observes figures in a visual world *like* that which he or she inhabits, and relates to that world by means of identification. Most of the specific terminologies used for the description of the Severe style (for instance, 'characterisation', 'ethos', 'narrative' and 'emotion') are in fact not present in the object as such but are entailments of viewer identification and the fictions or fantasies generated by such identification. It is the singular achievement of Classical art — an achievement impossible to overstate for its effects on the traditions of Western image-making and reception — that it created this kind of viewing. In place of the participant observer, whose viewing fulfilled the work of art by creating a temporary bridge across worlds in archaic art, the Classical generated its viewer as voyeur. What we look at in naturalistic art — from the very first moment that the *kouros* sheds its formal resistance to full realism in the Kritios Youth, eliciting a particular relationship between viewer and image which I have called 'voyeuristic' —is a world in which we might participate but cannot, to which we relate by fantasy, wish-fulfillment and imaginative contextualization.[12]

Emotion plays a small role in such an account, but its ability to structure a dialectic between visual experience and artistic form is an important move away from approaches that simply link it to narrative. At the same time, however, by presenting emotion as a form of viewing rather than making, the equivalency between emotion and the particular effects of the Classical style is put into question. In its earlier formulations by Pollitt or Ridgway, emotion was simply absent from the carving of Archaic sculpture, but then suddenly present in the Classical period as a stylistic feature. Yet once emotion is (correctly, in my opinion) reformulated as something experienced through form rather than carved into it, there is no compelling reason to associate it with a particular artistic style—no reason why viewers cannot also act as voyeurs, to use Elsner's term, of what they see in Archaic works of art.

In order to sustain the relationship between emotion and the realism of the Classical style, arguments like Elsner's end up effacing the materiality of the work of art as itself possessing emotional interest. For if, as the argument goes, works of art inspire emotion only when we attend to their figurative content *as if it were real,* our emotional reactions are not geared towards them as works of art but as instances of reality. "Realism" as an artistic style acts as a means to divorce iconographic content from artistic form, and animate the former *as reality* while essentially erasing the latter. It is not the art object, in this approach, that makes the viewer emotional, but simply real life.

In contrast, this dissertation investigates emotions generated by works of art in themselves, locating emotion not only in the images they make present, but first and foremost in the material form they take. Works of art do not need to adopt a realistic style, or even be figurative in nature, to stir emotions. We can find just the opposite development to that from Archaic to Classical, for instance, in the history of twentieth century American art, where the deep emotionalism of the works of Abstract

[12] Elsner 2006: 85-6.

Expressionist artists such as Mark Rothko or Barnett Newman was subsequently rejected by others who turned instead to defiantly realist but emotionally distant genres like Photorealism or Hyperrealism.[13] Emotional engagement is not contingent on any particular artistic style or an ability to replicate observed reality. Instead, it emerges through the experience of a viewer, whose emotions have in turn been shaped by artistic practice and cultural expectations.

In this sense, there is nothing inherently lacking from an Archaic kouros that inhibits us from engaging it emotionally in the ways Elsner considers particular to Classical art. Despite the fact that its anatomy and posture are less natural than those of the Kritios youth, Kroisos' kouros offers a full-scale three-dimensional physical presence of a human form, one that is highly refined in its design and execution. There is no threshold of realism that needs to be passed before art becomes emotional—no formal flourishes whose absence from the kouros prevent it from provoking an emotional response. When we read in modern scholarship that though the Classical statue "cannot truly speak any more than a kouros, it seems to have sufficient animation to make the possibility apparent to the viewer's imagination in a way that a kouros would not," we are left with no empirical method for defining "sufficient" except in relative terms established by a modern art historian.[14]

On the contrary, an abundance of evidence explored in the first two chapters of this dissertation shows that not only *could* the funerary kouros—and Archaic funerary sculpture more generally—engage the viewer's emotions, but that this is what it was designed to do. The possibilities of imaginative identification and animation that in traditional accounts are only made possible through the realism of the Classical style will emerge, instead, as already available to the viewer of Archaic sculpture. This exploration of emotions in the Archaic period will, in turn, allow us to nuance our understanding of the relationship between emotional engagement and Classical art, as I explore in later chapters.

Emotions and Aesthetics

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[13] On the emotional appeal of abstract art, see Freedberg and Gallese 2007 and Freedberg 2009, who argue for a kinesthetic form of emotional engagement with artist's actions (indexed in the material form of the work of art) rather than with iconography. Rothko and Newman both wrote and spoke extensively about the emotional nature of their paintings in writings and interviews. So, for instance, Newman explicitly describes the advantage of abstract art in engaging emotions when we writes that "abstract art can become personal, charged with emotion and capable of giving shape to the highest human insights, instead of creating plastic objects, objective shapes which can be contemplated only for themselves because they exist between narrow limits of extension" (Newman 1992: 141).

[14] The quote is from Stansbury-O'Donnell 1999: 113. For a recent re-evaluation of the Classical style's ability to represent reality see also Platt 2014, who acknowledges (briefly) the role of the viewer's subjectivity by engaging the concepts of "likelihood" or "plausibility" rather than "realism" or "naturalism." As she writes, "crucially, the concept of likelihood or plausibility does not entail an *absolute* correspondence between image and reality. Rather, it suggests that an image should conform to its viewers' subjective experience and expectation of what is usual or plausible: representations, like rhetorical proofs, are only ever convincing 'to someone'" (2014: 189). On the difficulties of seeing Archaic art through eyes not conditioned by modern reception of Greek art, see Hallett 2012.

Emotion as a way of engaging artistic form rather than narrative content is at the center of another approach to Greek art, one that also closely links emotion to the Classical style. This emotional engagement with form is often called aesthetic emotion—a term most famously associated in the history of art with the critic Clive Bell, for whom aesthetic emotion, as a description of the viewer's experience, was the counterpart of the art object's "significant form."[15]

In the study of Greek art, aesthetic emotion has been most explicitly taken up by Rhys Carpenter in his book, *The Esthetic Basis of Greek Art of the Fifth and Fourth centuries B.C* (1959). For Carpenter, "esthetic emotion" or "sculptural emotion" (as he variously terms the experience) constitutes the very meaning of the work of art. In contrast, its depictive subject matter and formal arrangement are the mere mechanisms for achieving this emotion.[16] Where formal patterns in isolation can "affect" him, Carpenter asserts that "only when this abstract play of lines and angles and surface-shapes appears incarnate in recognizable objects derived from the real world of my experience, that it seems to get sufficient emotional focus and bearing for me to appreciate clearly (or even describe) its character and range."[17] This emergence of recognizable forms through abstract material is, for Carpenter, the supreme achievement of Classical Greek art, and his appreciation of it takes the form of an emotional response.

While Carpenter's approach is appealing in its ability to describe formal details of specific sculptures as having emotional value, it is elaborated into an encomium of Classical art that reflects Carpenter's personal artistic preferences more than historical reality. If aesthetic emotion is related not to iconographic content but artistic form, then there is no reason why art of the Classical period should be more emotionally compelling than that of the Archaic period. Indeed, there are viewers today—and, as I will argue, there were viewers in antiquity—who find "emotional focus" in the very features of the kouros that make it, in Carpenter's eyes, emotionally deficient compared with works of the Classical style.[18]

Yet even beyond the spurious link between aesthetic emotion and any particular artistic style, there is a deeper problem with Carpenter's "esthetic" or "sculptural emotion": it is not really emotion. Like other authors interested in aesthetic emotion,

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[15] Bell 1914. Also relevant is Vernon Lee's work on empathy (Lee 1913 and Davis 2010: 175-85 for a useful discussion of her work).

[16] Carpenter 1959: 28-41 and passim.

[17] Carpenter 1959: 32.

[18] Carpenter was well aware of his own bias in this regard, as he makes clear in his review of Gisela Richter's book on kouroi (Richter 1942): "It is a matter of considerable note (and not for any reviewer to criticize or oppose) that Miss Richter is convinced that 'the end of the seventh century . . . produced some of the masterpieces of European sculpture,' that the recently discovered kouroi on Santorin are 'stupendous,' and that the very first of the kouroi (the group which includes the ugly limestone head from the Ptoan Sanctuary, the uncouth Dermys and Kittylos, and the bold but primitively proportioned faces of the Dipylon head, the Sunium boy, and the Metropolitan kouros) share the 'radiant clarity' of Sappho's verses on moonlight. Confronted with such wholehearted admiration the present reviewer feels himself a spiritual outcast in admitting that for him the famous Metropolitan kouros is one of the ugliest of statues and can only hope that somehow in his innocence he resembles the little children in Hans Andersen's story of the emperor's clothes" (1943: 358).

Carpenter does not address emotion in a psychological sense, but as an aesthetic byproduct of a particular artistic style. While it might trigger minor physiological symptoms, the aesthetic emotion we experience before a work of art is categorically different from emotions we feel towards fellow human beings. Indeed, it cannot be experienced *except* before the work of art. In contrast, my understanding of emotion in this dissertation follows the more common usage of the term, as a form of subjective experience that could emerge in any scenario, not just before an object of aesthetic interest.

Yet even if aesthetic emotion is not really emotion, thinking through it brings us to a problem that will be addressed throughout this dissertation: how to relate formal, material features of works of art to felt experience. Richard Neer's recent monograph on Greek sculpture, which is a touchstone for my own approach to Greek sculpture, can in some ways be seen as a radically updated and historicized version of Carpenter's approach through his marshaling of the concept of *thauma* or "wonder."[19] *Thauma*, in Neer's account, is not an emotion, but it provides a way of talking about the form of sculpture—details of its carving, for instance—as the corollary of a viewer's aesthetic experience. Through close attention to ancient understandings of this concept, Neer sidesteps Carpenter's problematic projection of his own "aesthetic emotion" onto historically situated objects. Moreover, the misleading psychological connotations of aesthetic emotion are avoided by embedding *thauma* firmly within the realm of aesthetics. Importantly for Neer, *thauma* is not generated by a viewer's subjectivity.[20] Instead, it originates in the very material configuration of the object that inspires it, waiting for a viewer to activate it. Although informed by these and other approaches to Greek art, this dissertation focuses on emotion as something that emerges in a viewer through felt subjective experience.

Theorizing Emotions

In recent years, art historians, working from both phenomenological and neuroaesthetic approaches, have shown how empathetic engagement with visual representation allows us to attribute psychological agency to works of art.[21] But while many such accounts portray these empathetic responses as universal, cultural historians of emotion have shown that emotions, through cultural nurturing or repression, can have a history.[22] Emotional investment in social practices (such as viewing works of art) can be a crucial factor in creating a community: emotions can obscure agency, structuring a scenario so that individuals feel responsible for their own actions and decisions when they have been largely inspired or even predetermined by external cultural forces.[23] In contrast to the actual subjective experience of emotion, the study of a history of emotion allows us to access *perceived* subjectivity as a historical phenomenon. Taking advantage

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[19] Neer 2010.
[20] Neer explicitly distances his approach from subjective judgment (2010: 12-13, 48-9).
[21] On the intersections between empathy, phenomenology, aesthetics, and neuroaesthetics, see recently Harris 2013.
[22] Publications on the history of emotions that I have found useful include Rosenwein 2006 and Frevert 2011.
[23] Cf. Geertz 1973.

of our anachronistic vantage point, we can discursively analyze the structures that transformed subjective experience of a work of art into social practice.

In order to generate a framework for exploring how emotion relates to social and artistic practice in ancient Greece, I attend closely to ancient understandings of the concept of emotion (*pathos* in Greek).[24] In most instances, pathos is not experienced by an individual in isolation, but in concert with the actions of something or someone else, outside of the subjective self. Indeed, in Greek literature, pity—the emotion that will form the focus of this dissertation—is often described as entering into the mind: one does not feel pity so much as one is struck with pity by the sight of something pitiful.[25] Emotion, in other words, is singularly poised to negotiate the relationship between subjective experience and objective reality.

Insofar as it constructs or configures our relationships with the world around us, emotion is intimately connected with our senses—that is, our ability to place ourselves and define our subjectivity in terms of our visual and material experience. In ancient philosophical texts, for instance, the act of seeing is described as a state of pathos precisely because it is conceptualized as arising through the objects of our gaze and the medium of light that translates them into images.[26] The close connection between vision and emotional experience has a direct impact on how images become representational or animate—that is, how they succeed to forms of visual experience that we can relate to realities that exist outside of the pictorial world of the work of art. Attending to emotion in this way allows us to discuss the same issues of realism that, as we have seen, are often presented as a hallmark achievement of Classical sculpture without mapping them onto a history of style. Works of art that from one emotional standpoint appear inanimate or unrealistic might appear otherwise to a viewer who engages in a different emotional fashion, and so studying Greek art through the lens of emotion has the capacity to revise and amplify traditional accounts.

The full effects of how emotions contribute to the experience of the work of art will only become apparent through close engagements with particular objects over the course of the dissertation. But it is useful here to outline the potential effects of emotion on art-viewing in historically-informed terms, using Aristotle—an idiosyncratic thinker, and one who is by no means representative of all ancient viewers, but whose writings nonetheless can help bring us as close to an emic perspective as possible.[27]

In his *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, Aristotle offers explicit accounts of how not only tragic performance but rhetorical speech can elicit mental actualization of tragic scenarios to which viewers can respond emotionally as if they were real by visualizing the events

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[24] For the remainder of the dissertation I use the word pathos without italics as the ancient term for emotion. For a recent introduction to pathos in relation to ancient art see Elsner 2014: "*Pathos* is the addressee's frame of mind, by extension assimilated to the questions the addressee can raise, linked certainly with passions and emotions; but more essentially, it is the locus of problematization, which may be based on anguish, curiosity, anger or joy, whether emotional or intellectual" (7). For the use of the concept of *pathos* in ancient art criticism see Prioux 2011.

[25] Sternberg 2005b: 39

[26] An excellent account of these issues can be found in Munteanu 2012. See also Nightingale 2009 and 2016; Elsner 2014.

[27] Among various studies relating Aristotle to the visual arts, particularly useful are Rouveret 1989 and Munteanu 2012: 70-138.

before their own eyes.[28] While focused on the emotional effects of speech rather than works of art, Aristotle consistently asserts that language must be translated into visual experience in the mind of an audience member before it can elicit emotional engagement. His frequent comparisons of the mimetic effects of language with those of others forms of art (such as painting) highlight the degree to which the emotional capacity of any work of art can only be activated through the mental effort and subjective experience of an individual viewer.[29] While Aristotle does not discuss the kinds of works of art that form the focus of this dissertation, both treatises provide invaluable evidence for how the relationship between art and emotional subjectivity was conceptualized in ancient Greece.

Less well known among Aristotle's surviving writings, but more directly relevant to the concerns of this dissertation, are a series of short works on dreams and memories, in which he offers an account of how emotions affect cognition and so affect the mechanisms of vision. Emotional states, he argues, are like dreaming and remembering in that they focus our visual attention on images constructed in our minds rather than the veridical realities that exist outside of our bodies.[30] As he states:

> πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἀπατώμεθα περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ἐν ἄλλοις, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς ἐν φόβῳ, ὁ δ´ ἐρωτικὸς ἐν ἔρωτι, ὥστε δοκεῖν ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ὁμοιότητος τὸν μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους ὁρᾶν, τὸν δὲ τὸν ἐρώμενον· καὶ ταῦτα ὅσῳ ἂν ἐμπαθέστερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ ἀπ´ ἐλάσσονος ὁμοιότητος φαίνεται.
>
> Arist. *De Ins.* 460b3-9

> It may be added that we are easily deceived with respect to our perceptions while we are in emotional states. And different people according to different states, e.g. the coward in a state of fright, the amorous man in one of amorous passion. Thus, from a slight resemblance the former judges that he sees his enemies, but the latter that he sees his loved one. The more emotional his state, the slighter the resemblance that can give rise to these appearances.
>
> trans. Gallop

Pathos is grouped together with illness and dreaming as a bodily affliction capable of transforming our sensory experience of the world.[31] The same external stimulus, in other words, might be visualized as two completely different things by two different people depending on their emotional state. Whether this stimulus is another individual or an inanimate object (such as a work of art) is not made clear, but Aristotle allows for the possibility of mistaking inanimate objects as human beings when the subject is emotional, sick, or dreaming. A line that occurs in one manuscript glosses Aristotle's example of the man who is afraid by arguing that, "if he sees these sticks standing

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[28] See Munteanu 2012: 76-103.

[29] On the comparison to painting, see Munteanu 2012: 105.

[30] See Gallop 1996 for commentary.

[31] On this passage see Everson 1997: 215-8. Aristotle likewise states that those suffering from a fever – a bodily transformation comparable, for Aristotle, to emotion – will see living creatures in cracks in the walls based on nothing more than "a slight resemblance in the combination of lines" (460b13-4).

nearby, he thinks he is seeing armed men."[32] This example suggests that the man's fear causes objects that only offer a schematic outline of human bodies (upright sticks) to be visualized as real men. Aristotle likewise states that those suffering from a fever—a somatic affliction comparable, for Aristotle, to emotion—will see living creatures in cracks in the walls based on nothing more than "a slight resemblance in the combination of lines" (460b13-4).

Ancient theories of vision do not distinguish as readily as modern ones between images generated by external stimuli and those generated through mental effort, and most hold that what we see when we look at something is not the thing itself, but a mixture of material particles that emerge from the stimulus and particles that emerge from our own eyes.[33] Perception under emotional duress, in other words, is a recalibration of normal perception so that we contribute more particles from our own mind than those coming off the external stimulus. According to such theories, thinking we recognize a lover in the stranger on the street (to use Aristotle's example) means that our subjective emotional experience has contributed more to the image we see than the stranger. Emotion, in a sense, offers an alternative or compliment to mimetic approaches to art in that it is able to affect the viewer's capacity to see a work of art as real.

This account of the relationship between emotions and vision can help us explain a passage from a treatise on memory where Aristotle explores how we come to recognize a particular individual in a work of art. Aristotle uses the example of a painted image of a man named Koriskos, which we can see either as a generic figure of a man, or, by using our memories and personal knowledge of Koriskos, as a likeness of Koriskos himself:

> ἂν δ΄ ᾖ ἄλλου καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ καί, μὴ ἑωρακὼς τὸν Κορίσκον, ὡς Κορίσκου, ἐνταῦθά τε ἄλλο τὸ πάθος τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης καὶ ὅταν ὡς ζῷον γεγραμμένον θεωρῇ.
>
> Arist. *De Mem.* 450b30-451a1

> When one contemplates the [mental] image in relation to something else, it is as in a painting, as representation (*eikon*), as [an image] of Koriskos, without [actually] having seen Koriskos. And so the emotional state (*pathos*) of this contemplation is something different than when one contemplates a painting as a [generic] figure.
>
> trans. Munteanu, adapted

The difference between the two modes of viewing is a difference in our emotional attitude towards what we see.[34] To look at a work of art and reify its depictive content as a specific individual (*eikon* can mean "portrait" as well as "image" or "representation") requires us to do something similar to seeing a loved one in the stranger on the street, by tapping into our subjective experiences, our memories and mental images, our capacity to imagine and transform the sense particles that are our visual focus when we look at the world around us. The relationship between the two modes of viewing the work of art—as

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[32] See Gallop 1996: 94 n. 15.

[33] See Nightingale 2016 and further discussion in Chapter 3.

[34] On *theorein* in Aristotle, see Peponi 2004. See also Everson 1996: 194-6; Halliwell 2002: 182-3.

a generic figure or as a representation of a specific person—is not merely metaphorical, but physiological, embedded deep within the mechanisms of our minds and bodies.

Working through Aristotle allows us to consider how works of art might succeed to representation and recognition through the viewer's emotional engagement rather than simply through artistic realism. Understanding representational art as emerging through a certain pathos of viewing means that the onus to represent, when it is not attributed to an artist, is on the viewer as much as the sculpture.

Theorizing the Viewer

Aristotle's account of the relationship between art and emotions speaks to an inextricable relationship between the emotional and the visual: we cannot talk about one without talking about the other. Emotions depend on intersubjective relationships constructed at least partially (and in the case of pity, as we will see, almost entirely) through visual engagement. Vision likewise is an embodied experience, one made possible, in Greek thought, through the movements of corporeal and cognitive-affective elements of the individual human psyche. While different emotional states, as Aristotle suggests, will color visual experience in different ways, emotion cannot be switched off entirely. Ancient Greece is no place, in other words, for a disinterested viewer, and every engagement with a work of art will be subject to its viewer's pathos.[35]

Focusing on emotions compels us to confront the role of the viewer's subjectivity in a way that is rarely done in the study of ancient art. Certainly, many scholars of Greek art, especially in recent years, have become interested in exploring their objects of study from the vantage point of the ancient viewer. Yet more often than not this "viewer" is a hypothetical construct, not a historical reality—an idealized, statistically average avatar with no individual life experiences or emotional sensibilities. This "viewer," in short, has no subjectivity. When this "viewer" is placed in a position where subjectivity is required—when they are asked to experience emotion, for instance—they usually emerge as nothing more than an imaginary space into which modern authors, often with little critical awareness, project their own selves.[36]

In contrast, by framing the act of viewing as an act of emotional engagement I imagine the viewer as a fully fleshed out human being. I approach this dissertation as an exercise in discursively analyzing a set of lived experiences that would have been, for an ancient viewer, recursive and habitual. In the process of researching and writing I have tried to bring to the surface my own emotional, perceptual, and cognitive biases and to align them with those expected or taken for granted in antiquity. Yet I have done so by starting from the forms of evidence that bring us as close to ancient viewers as possible: the objects themselves. These might have come down to us broken and incomplete, but

[35] Compare Irene Winter's discussion (2002) of aesthetics in ancient Mesopotamia as different from modern Western notions of disinterestedness.

[36] An example of this practice is Oakley 2005, the only publication of which I am aware that, like this dissertation, looks at the relationship between pity and art in ancient Athens. Oakley explicitly ignores the ancient definition of pity and instead interprets it based on his own experiences and intuition, which he then projects back onto what he imagines an ancient viewer would have experienced.

just as ancient viewers saw, touched, and read them (in the case of inscriptions), we can do the same today.

Treating these objects as both shaping and shaped by emotional experience allows me to engage their very material forms as instances of cultural practice. My goal, then, is to provide an account not so much of what I think an ancient viewer would have felt or experienced but of what I feel or experience when, before the same work of art, I go through the motions and emotions of an ancient viewer—when I submit my own subjectivity, in the face of the same sculptures, to the culturally-determined structures that likewise shaped the subjectivities of ancient viewers.

This approach might seem less scientific or objective than those traditionally applied to Greek art that seek to uncover a singular historical truth about how art functioned in antiquity. But the effects of subjectivity and personal experience, I hope to show, were anticipated through how ancient artists configured their works and how viewers approached them. Engaging the role of such subjectivity ourselves, even analytically, constitutes in this sense a more historically informed approach than ignoring or suppressing it. By explicitly theorizing how viewers—ancient or modern—experience works of art through their sense of emotional subjectivity, I hope to give methodological structure to biases and dispositions that still exist in most scholarship but simply go unacknowledged. Nonetheless, I am not a substitute for an ancient viewer, and do not claim to speak for any particular ancient viewer, much less the hypothetical collective "viewer." There are as many experiences of a single work of art as there are viewers, but in the end I can only write about my own.

CHAPTER 1

The Function of the Archaic Funerary Monument

Introduction

The most elaborate funerary monuments of Archaic Greece consisted of a sculpture—carved either in the round or in relief—and an inscribed epigram, usually carved on the base below. Numerous examples of both elements survive, but only a handful preserve both elements together and intact.[1] One of them is a remarkable stele discovered in 1992 in a cemetery of the Boeotian city of Akraiphia (fig. 3).[2] Its relief, the work of the sculptor Philourgos whose signature appears below in the predella, shows a young boy in profile smelling a flower and holding a cock—iconographic motifs that commonly serve, especially in Attic vase-painting, as love-gifts given by an older *erastes* to a younger *eromenos*.[3] The relief is accompanied by a verse epigram, consisting of a single elegiac couplet. Inscribed to the left of the boy's lower body, it identifies the deceased as Mnasitheos and the man who erected the monument as Pyrrichos:

> Μνασιθείω̄ : μνε̃μ' εἰ|μὶ ἐπ' ὀδω̃ι: καλόν· | ἀ(λ)λά μ' ἔθε̄κεν:
> Πύ(ρ)ρι|χος: ἀρχαίε̄ς: ἀντὶ | φιλε̄μοσύνε̄ς.
>
> Of Mnasitheos I am the *mnema* on the road, beautiful. But he set me up,
> Pyrrichos, in place of long-ago affection.

Most attempts to correlate epigram and sculpture in Archaic funerary monuments focus on semantic content, treating the iconography as an illustration of some aspect of the deceased as described in the epigram, or the beauty and quality of the sculpture itself as an allegorical substitute for the character and values mentioned in the poem.[4] Because

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[1] See Clairmont 1970: 3-37. Other monuments that qualify include Kroisos' kouros (see Introduction and Chapter 2) and Phrasikleia's monument, discussed later in this chapter.

[2] Archaeological Museum of Thebes 28200. Extensive excavations at the cemetery, which lies at the foot of the ancient acropolis, have revealed thousands of tombs dating back as far as the Middle Geometric period (Andreiomenou 1994). Unfortunately little is known about the context of the stele, which was discovered by chance during unauthorized planting of vines about twenty-five meters outside of the area of excavations (Andreiomenou 1999: 81). The stele has been beautifully published in a series of articles by Angeliki Andreiomenou (most recently 2012; specifically on the inscription, 1999; on the sculpture, 2000, 2006). Identifying Philourgos as the Athenian sculptor Philergos known from other inscriptions, she associates the stele in terms of its carving and style with contemporary Attic sculpture, especially from the workshop of Endoios, and in terms of its iconography with Ionian models, and dates it accordingly to ca. 520-15 BCE. Its find spot and the use of the Boeotian alphabet in the inscription suggest, however, that Pyrrichos and Mnasitheos were local figures (Andreiomenou 1999: 97, 116; Cassio 2007: 6).

[3] Andreiomenou 1999: 114-21.

[4] The first approach is illustrated by Clairmont 1970. For the second, see Day 1989; Vernant 1990: 76-78 and 1991: 162; Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 141-297; Steiner 2001: 252-59. A viewer/reader-centered approach to negotiating between sculpture and inscription in Archaic

both the sculptures and epigrams are often formulaic or even impersonal, the monuments are usually understood as representing the deceased in a symbolic rather than literal way. On Mnasitheos' monument, the flower and cock, for example, are generally interpreted as symbols that record biographical information alluded to in the epigram: Pyrrichos and Mnasitheos were lovers in a pederastic relationship, and the function of the epigram and relief is to communicate this fact.[5] Yet the nature of their relationship is not stated in the epigram, which only tells us that the two men once shared "affection" (φιλε͞μοσύνε͞ς)—an emotional bond, we know from other funerary inscriptions, that could define a relationship between father and son as easily as the one between lover and beloved.[6] Focusing primarily on the effects of loss rather than biographical details, Archaic funerary monuments often give us little more than raw materials of names and images, compelling us to experience the monument on our own terms rather than decipher a singular fixed meaning encoded within it.

Instead of locating the meaning of the Archaic funerary monument in the semantic content of its iconography or epigram, this chapter uses Mnasitheos' monument as a case study to develop an approach that isolates a common structure underlying both image and text. This structure, once linked to pity in the following chapter, will serve as the basis for the overall approach to funerary sculpture developed in this dissertation. Attending to the underlying structure of a monument such as Mnasitheos' allows us to see it as more than a record of someone who has passed. Instead, funerary monuments will emerge as elements, often the only ones that survive, of a much broader cultural system that helped individuals process the death of a loved one—a system that gave meaning to the effects of death on the emotions, perception, and memory of the bereaved.

It is only as viewers who operate within this system that we can understand such a monument. Using various forms of evidence from antiquity for the effects of grief on image-viewing, I build an interpretive framework for understanding how viewers might have engaged with Mnasitheos' monument in antiquity, and how we can continue to engage with it today. I focus in particular on the monument's stated function as a *mnema* or memory-object, arguing that remembering the deceased is an inherently disjunctive act that pits visual presence against cognitive-affective absence. The monument's function as a *mnema*, in other words, aligns the ontology of the representational work of art, which offers a visceral image embedded in a static medium, with the memory of the deceased, who exists in Archaic thought only as an evanescent image that emerges through a viewer's memory or imagination. In this context, the very act of looking at the sculpture and reading the inscription becomes an emotional experience analogous to the pain of remembering a deceased love one. [7]

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funerary kouroi is explored in Lorenz 2010 as well as other articles in Baumbach, Petrovic and Petrovic 2010. Dedicatory epigrams, in some cases together with their accompanying sculpture, are explored as devices for framing particular kinds of experience in Day 2010.

[5] Andreiomenou 1999, 2006, 2012; Cassio 2007: 5-6; Knoepfler 2009.

[6] E.g. *CEG* 32. Compare *CEG* 47, where a pederastic relationship is made explicit. For a discussion of the term *philemosune* see Cassio 2007; Knoepfler 2009; *SEG* 48.1170.

[7] My understanding of the terms "image," "body," and "medium" in this context derives heavily from that of Belting (2005; 2011). In thinking about the significance a work of art as residing it the viewer's experience of it rather than its encoded meaning, I have benefited greatly from Didi-Huberman 2005.

Approaching the sculpture in these terms, we come to appreciate how Pyrrichos, and so the monument he set up, remembers Mnasitheos as the kind of boy who is beautiful enough to serve as an *eromenos*—regardless of whether this was their relationship in real life. Looking at the relief, we see the deceased as focalized through the eyes of an *erastes*, and we as viewers are asked to remember Mnasitheos as a beautiful, sexually desirable young boy. The relief, I will argue, provides a visual stimulus that serves as the counterpoint to the inscription: it presents a seductive image of a boy whose affection we actively desire—a desire that is undercut when we read that the possibility of such affection has been destroyed by his death.

Approaching the Monument

Approaching Mnasitheos' monument, I begin where an ancient viewer would have begun, taking the cues from the monument itself as we experience it—first, from a distance, in terms of its relief sculpture, and then as we move closer, the inscription. Confronting the relief, we see a young boy engaging with a flower and a cock. Our vision is drawn the areas of the boy's body most closely associated with them, that is, the head and the thighs and buttocks—a focus the sculptor has accomplished by shrinking the torso and twisting it into the background, away from the strict profile of the head and legs. The significance of these objects lies not only in their ability to suggest the presence of an *erastes* who has given them, but in the way they shape the boy's appearance, instantiating the affection cited in the epigram on a material level. Relief sculpture is here used to make us see how an intimate relationship between lover and beloved can be forged, and ultimately broken, through engagement with material objects—an affective form of engagement that, as the inscription will suggest, is parallel to the one we ourselves are meant to forge with the monument before us.[8]

The flower the boy draws to his nose is configured so as to highlight the intimacy of an intersubjective encounter constructed through sight, touch, and smell. The boy's right hand is enlarged in proportion to the rest of his body, with his thumb and extended forefinger unnaturally elongated into sinuous curves around the flower they pinch. The flower seems to reciprocate, exerting a physical pull over the features of the boy's face. The nose, made prominent by pushing the lower mouth and jaw back and up, juts out and at a downwards angle from the rest of the head to touch the flower directly. The tip of the nose has been pulled towards the flower, and the head as a whole is likewise stretched horizontally, positioned on the front part of the neck as if the scent of the flower has attracted it forwards. The result is a wide distance between the face and the back of the head that is only partially masked by placing the ear in the center. Taken together, these anatomical anomalies serve to highlight the sensuality of the flower and the boy's engagement with it, making use of the very planar surface of the relief and its flattening of profile forms to suggest a physical continuum between hand, flower, and face.

The cock held by the boy in his other hand is even more overtly sensual.[9] The body of the bird is carved as a continous appendage jutting up and out of the boy's upper

[8] For a striking account of gesture, touch, and intimacy as structuring the experience of works of art in the Italian Renaissance, see Randolph 2014.

[9] On the erotic nature of the cock in Greek art and literature, see Csapo 2006: 21-27. On the use of cock-imagery in the funerary realm, see Vermeule 1979: 173-77.

thighs, marking out where the genitals are obscure. There is a subtle but palpable tumescence at the back of the bird, below the boy's left wrist, suggesting something hidden beneath. The boy's hand is submerged between the bird's wing and body, pressing it so close to his flesh that the upper edge of the plumage is caught between the boy's hips and his left forearm. While the front part of the cock is carved in the same full relief as the boy's body, the back part and plumage, which overlays the boy's hips and buttocks, is carved in extremely shallow relief—so shallow, in fact, that at the bottom of the rear of the bird's body there is no differentiation whatsoever. The effect is that of a paper cut-out glued to the surface of the boy's body: where there is a slight indentation between the boy's gluteal muscles, for example, the flat outline of plumage follows suit, seemingly pressed into the recess of flesh. There is an unmistakable eroticism in the broad curve formed by the plumage that seemlessly completes that formed by the buttocks, while the end of the plumage overlays the boy's flesh with finger-like feathers. Traces of polychromy have been detected on the plumage, and paint would have articulated a distinction between the human skin and the bird's feathers.[10] But even when painted, the undifferentiated smoothness of the surface here would have contrasted with the rest of the relief, where natural light creates distinctive shadows around the figure's more deeply carved silhouette. The addition of polychromy on the flat plumage would only serve to highlight the intimacy between the bird's feathers and the boy's body.

Several of the artistic effects of the relief—the twisted profile, the wide head, the long fingers—are hardly unique in the corpus of Archaic sculpture, in which structural clarity and internal coherence are prioritized over mimetic verisimilitude.[11] Yet when visualized in the context of cemetery—especially a cemetery such as that of Akraiphia, where no other sculpted funerary monument of the period has been found—such effects must have been seen as more than purely aesthetic. For our experience of them emerges not only through Philourgos' carving, but through our knowledge that Mnasitheios is now dead—that the affection materialized before us can no longer exist. It is this knowledge that is set forth by the epigram, which suggests a parallel between the boy's engagement with the gifts and our own experience of the self-professed beautiful monument:

> Μνασιθείō : μνε͂μ' εἰ|μὶ ἐπ' ὁδõι: καλόν·
>
> Of Mnasitheos I am the *mnema* on the road, beautiful.

In this first clause, inscribed over the first two lines, the monument presents itself as a fully operative social agent that inhabits our own spatial and temporal world, speaking in the first person and in the present tense (I will return to the significance of the term *mnema*).[12] The monument's perceptual nearness is underscored by the adjective it attaches to itself—καλόν ("beautiful")—while its physical and spatial immediacy is suggested by the fact that it is "on the road," precisely where we are. The first two lines, in other words, establish that the monument exists in the here and now, in our space and our time, and it is something that we can see and that can speak to us.

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[10] Polychromy: Andreiomenou 2000.

[11] Andreiomenou (2000, 2006, 2012) offers contemporary sculptural comparanda for the relief.

[12] For funerary monuments speaking in the first person, see Svenbro 1993; Steiner 2001: 255-57; Christian 2015: 28-45.

The second clause, which makes up the last three lines, is linked to the first by the concessive conjunction ἀλλά ("but") and its semantic content stands in opposition to that of the first, focusing on what is absent and out of reach:

ἀ(λ)λά μ' ἔθεκεν: Πύ(ρ)ρι|χος: ἀρχαίες: ἀντὶ | φιλεμοσύνες.

But Pyrrichos set me up in place of long-ago affection.

The subject is no longer the monument, but an absent man, Pyrrichos. Instead of asserting itself as an active agent, the monument is now acted upon—it is something set up. The verb tense is now in the aorist, suggesting a single event in the past that is over and done with.[13] Above all, the phrase ἀρχαίες ἀντὶ φιλεμοσύνες ("in place of long-ago affection") speaks to a defining element of the monument's *raison d'être*: a personal, emotional relationship that is not accessible to the viewer. The preposition ἀντί ("in place of") suggests irrevocable absence, so that the monument marks out where the affection will never again exist.[14] The temporal disconnect of the aorist verb is underscored by the adjective ἀρχαίες ("long-ago"), emphasizing that the elusive affection is not merely spatially distant but also temporally—it existed at some point in some other place, but not here, not now.[15] Taken together, the two clauses of the epigram set up a disjunction between perceptual presence, in the first, and cognitive-affective absence, in the second—a disjunction that offers a framework for understanding the relief sculpture's open distortion of its subject matter and ambivalence towards its own realism. Some visible quality of the deceased, the inscription suggests, is here, at hand, now, made present by the monument that talks to us and the image we see, but the emotional and intellectual bond, the capacity to reciprocate feeling and affection, is gone.

Memory and Longing

The disjunction framed by the epigram on Mnasitheos' monument is inherently connected to the function claimed by this and many other Archaic funerary monuments through the term *mnema.* Derived from the verb μνάομαι ("I remember"), *mnema* is usually translated as "memorial." As memorials, *mnemata* are generally understood as stand-ins or substitutes, in that they are able to construct and preserve a social persona for the deceased that can remain in the world of the living.[16] The memory they nurture and preserve, it is commonly argued, is an abstract collective memory, one processed through

[13] On shifting verb tenses in Archaic epigram as denoting presence and absence, see Kurke 1998: 147-48. For a different perspective, see Bakker 2007.

[14] The use of *anti* to mean "in place of" rather than "in return for" is a distinctive feature of Attic funerary epigram, used especially in the case of premature deaths like that of Mnasitheos (Tsagalis 2008: 278-80). See also on Phrasikleia below.

[15] A similar sentiment expressing the emotional absence felt by bereaved loved ones occurs in an epigram (*CEG* 52) on a large Archaic funerary monument from Athens signed by the artist Philergos, who is likely the same as Philourgos. For the identity of the artist, see Andreiomeou 2000; for the base see Viviers 1992: 103-13.

[16] Vernant 1991: 161-62; Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 140-41, 144-45; Keesling 2003: 23; Bruss 2005: 30; Day 2010: 7.

the social expectations of a community as a whole, and the function of the *mnema* is commonly understood to be that of a record that preserves the name and an abstracted remembrance of the deceased's character for posterity.

Yet Mnasitheos' *mnema*, like many other Archaic funerary monuments, speaks in the first person singular, as an individual agent afflicted with memory of its own. Even when it is developed in relation to other members of a broader community, memory works differently on the individual body. As Nathan Arrington has recently argued, the kind of "collective memory" employed in studies of ancient funerary monuments is usually a mere metaphor for some other form of cultural knowledge. Memory itself, on the other hand, is a neurological process embedded within the mechanisms of an individual body and deeply connected to our own subjectivity, our own personal history, and our own sense of self.[17] As I have suggested, Mnasitheos' *mnema* does much more than archive biographical facts for a general public, and closer attention to the understanding of memory found in Archaic Greek literature can illuminate the potential for an emotional viewer of a *mnema* to generate a memory as an embodied response and feel its effects on a subjective level.[18]

Recent studies on Homeric memory have clarified its ability not to recall something or someone, but to make the remembered thing or person present in the mind of the one remembering.[19] As Egbert Bakker has argued, "Remembering the god is to ensure, through assertive song-speech, his (ritual) presence; remembering the song is to perform the song, that is, to bring the world of heroes to the present; and remembering food, or sleep, or physical strength, in Homer means to eat, sleep, or be strong."[20] Remembering, in other words, does not give us access to something or someone who is elsewhere. Instead, it is a performative act that makes that thing or person present in the here and now. Memory in Archaic literature is above all an exercise in visual perception, and remembering in a performative sense means a form of seeing.[21] In Homer, "remembering an event from the past is bringing it to the mind's eye, seeing it, and describing it as if it were happening before one's eyes."[22]

Memory, in short, is a form of psychic image production. This is especially true of memories of the dead, where no external visual stimulus remains from which a new image can be derived or against which our mental images can be checked. A bereaved individual must instead use memories to ensure the deceased's continued visual presence, as Sappho suggests in the following fragment:

κατθάνοισα δὲ κείσῃ, οὐδέ ποτα μναμοσύνα σέθεν

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[17] Arrington 2014: 13-18, 273, 276-85.

[18] In this respect, the *mnema* functions analogously to conception of the *agalma* put forth by Day 2010, which frames the communicative experience of dedicatory objects through the emotional effects of their language and visual brilliance.

[19] Minchin 2001; Bakker 2005; Clay 2011.

[20] Bakker 2005: 67.

[21] Simonides, who himself wrote many funerary epigrams, was the most famous exponent of this type of memory in antiquity. See Small 1997: 82-86. Among his output might be an epigram similar in structure and content to that of Mnasitheos, attributed to Simonides in the Palatine Anthology (*AP* 7.509 = *GV* 76); for the comparison see Cassio 2007: 6.

[22] Bakker 2005: 146.

ἔσσετ᾽ οὐδὲ πόθα εἰς ὕστερον. οὐ γὰρ πεδέχῃς βρόδων
τῶν ἐκ Πιερίας· ἀλλ᾽ ἀφάνης κἀν᾽ Ἀΐδα δόμῳ
φοιτάσῃς πεδ᾽ ἀμαύρων νεκύων ἐκπεποταμένα.
Sapph. 55[23]

Dead you will lie and never any remembrance of you
will there be nor desire into the aftertime—for you do not share in the roses
of Pieria, but unseen even in Hades' house
you will go your way among dim shapes having flown away.
trans. Carson, adapted

Sappho asserts that because no one will have remembrance (μναμοσύνα—a word often used synonymously with *mnema* in Archaic and classical literature) or longing (πόθα, if the emendation is correct) for the woman she addresses, she will remain "unseen even in the house of Hades."[24] Sappho's insult relies on the notion that the dead can only be seen when they are remembered or longed for by the living. Memory and longing, in other words, *create* the visible presence of the deceased. Where an understanding of the *mnema* as memorial assumes that we move from the visual experience of the monument to thinking about the deceased in a generic or abstract way, Sappho suggests that remembering the dead will not only help us see them but give them a seemingly independent visual existence.

A close link between the *mnema* and longing for the dead is suggested in a mid sixth-century epigram from Thera, found carved into a large marble block decorated with moldings and standing on a pedestal:[25]

Παρθενίκας : τόδε μνᾶμα Φρασισθένος hεῖρι θανοίσας
Δαμόκλεια᾽ ἔστα|σε κασιγ⟨ν⟩έταν ποθέσαισα.
SEG 48.1067

This *mnema* of Parthenika, daughter of Phrasisthenês, who died early,
Damokleia set up, longing for her sister.

If in Sappho's poem memory and longing can serve to create and maintain a visible image of the deceased, here Damokleia's memory and longing serve as the mechanism for erecting a monument visible in the here and now. Like Mnasitheios' epigram, the inscription at first focuses on its presence. But as we read we are jolted with personal tragedy: the grammatical subject is revealed to be not the *mnema* itself (which, as a neuter noun identical in the nominative and accusative, appears at first to occupy this position) but Damokleia, a woman grief-stricken over the early death of her sister. As in Sappho's fragment, the presence of the deceased in the world of the living is linked to

[23] I follow the emendation οὐδὲ πόθα εἰς ὕστερον proposed by Bucherer and printed in Campbell 1982.
[24] The phrase finds a parallel in a late sixth-century inscribed epigram from Kos (*SEG* 57.799), where the monument provides a mechanism for allowing the deceased to speak and connect emotionally with her parents "even in the house of Hades" (κ[ἠ]ν Ἀΐδαο δό[ματι).
[25] See Sigalas and Matthaiou 1992-1998: 393-97 no. 14 and pl. 66.

pothos—an intensely felt form of longing for what is absent or unattainable, suffused with a sense of remoteness and isolation.[26] Once again, there is an alignment between the disjunction within the epigram's semantic content—the movement from the present monument to absence and its emotional effect—and the paradoxical status of the *mnema* as something that, though here and now, can only show us what is gone.

The visual effects of the *mnema* are suggested in a rare Homeric use of the word, during the funeral games of Patroklos in Book 23 of the *Iliad*. Achilles gives Nestor a two-handled cup, not as a prize, as it was originally intended, but as a *mnema* of Patroklos:

> τῆ νῦν, καὶ σοὶ τοῦτο γέρον κειμήλιον ἔστω
> Πατρόκλοιο τάφου μνῆμ᾽ ἔμμεναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτ᾽ αὐτὸν
> ὄψῃ ἐν Ἀργείοισι
>
> *Il.* 23.618-20
>
> There now! Also for you let this be a treasure, old man, to be a *mnema* of the burial of Patroklos, for no longer will you see him among the Argives.

As with Parthenika's death, the absence of Patroklos has created a hole in the lives of those who knew and loved him, a hole that can only be filled through memory. Although Nestor will no longer *see* him among the Argives (that is, no longer see him alive), Achilles' use of the deictics τῆ ("there!") and τοῦτο ("this") and the temporal adverb νῦν ("now") imply that the immediacy of the *mnema*, its visible existence here and now, will act as a means of making Patroklos visually present by inducing a mental image of him in Nestor's mind. In declaring the cup a memory-object specifically related to Patroklos' burial, Achilles' emphasizes its relationship to the present and its ability to recall a focalized, subjective form of memory. There is no question of representation: the cup does not depict Patroklos or even embody him symbolically. Instead, as a *mnema*, it is capable of generating a mental image of him, of helping Nestor see Patroklos even though, as Achilles states, he is not actually there to be seen.

We can find strikingly similar conceits in preserved funerary epigrams, such as the following lines inscribed onto a late Archaic monument for a young girl from Thasos:[27]

> ἦ καλὸν τὸ μνῆμα [πα]|τὴρ ἔστησε θανόσ[ηι] |
> Λεαρέτηι· οὐ γὰρ [ἔτ]|ι ζῶσαν ἐσοφσόμ[εθα].
>
> *CEG* 161
>
> How beautiful is the *mnema* her father set up for dead
> Learete, for we will see her no longer still living.

[26] For the connection between *pothos* and funerary monuments, see Neer 2010: 50-57.

[27] Although the shape and size of the inscription suggests it was carved into a base for a (painted or sculpted?) stele, it is impossible to be certain since the block has not been located since the nineteenth century (Patrice Hamon, personal communication).

The structure of the epigram is almost identical to Achilles' pronouncement, with a visually imminent *mnema* directly set up against the perceptual absence of the deceased herself. The opening exclamation—"How beautiful is the *mnema*…"—points, like Mnasitheos' epigram, to the visual appeal of the memory-object in contrast to the perceptual absence of Learete herself in the second clause.[28] That Learete's father has set it up suggests that he himself retains a memory of her. But the shift to the first person plural in the second clause implies that the impossibility of seeing Learete *still alive* pertains not only to her father but to the viewer of the monument as well.[29] While an image of Learete can no longer be derived from her living body, the monument suggests that in setting up a *mnema* her father has externalized his memory. Although we will never see Learete alive, when confronting the *mnema* we come face to face with an object that remembers her, just as her father does. We in turn, by focusing on the visible beauty of this memory-object, will be able to place a memory of Learete in our own minds. The *mnema*, in other words, is not a functional substitute for Learete's beauty, but a mechanism for generating a psychic image of her.

All of these examples suggest that the *mnema* offers a remembered image that persists beyond death, allowing us to see the deceased even in the absence of their living body. The *mnema* is something that itself contains memory; that, when it speaks in the first person, brings the deceased to mind; and that invites us, as we stand before it, to do the same. At the same time, visualizing such memories only makes us all the more painfully aware that the deceased remains forever out of reach. Understood in this way, the memory of the deceased helps give meaning to the disjunction we saw in the configuration of Mnasitheos' monument and his epigram: memory is able to make us see something that we know is not really there. Memory, and thus the *mnema*, opens up a "rend"—to borrow Georges Didi-Huberman's term—between vision and cognition, between what I will call psychic reality and veridical reality.[30] By psychic reality, I refer

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[28] In contrast to my argument, the epigram is usually understood as saying that no image of Learete, herself once beautiful, is available, and therefore the beautiful monument supplies a replacement or substitute to console the bereaved (Ecker 1990: 220-23; Vernant 1991: 162; Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 143; Bruss 2005: 32 and 2010: 395).

[29] Svenbro 1993: 35.

[30] The distinction between psychic and veridical reality as traced here is inspired by Sigmund Freud's distinction between "psychic" and "material" reality in chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams,* as well as similar disjunctions in the case of mourning discussed in his essay "Mourning and Melancholia," Joan Didion's memoir *The Year of Magical Thinking*, Rebecca Solnit's *The Faraway Nearby*, and various modern-day medical studies of the effects of grief. I borrow the notion of the artistic "rend" between cognition and perception from Didi-Huberman 2005 (his term is *déchirure* in the original French edition), who relies in turn on Freud's concept of the dream-work. Didi-Huberman 2005: 140 sees the "alienating choice" posed by the rend at the heart of all image viewing: "*to know without seeing* or *to see without knowing*. There is loss in either case. He who chooses only *to know* will have gained, of course, the unity of the synthesis and the self-evidence of simple reason; but he will lose the real of the object, in the symbolic closure of the discourse that reinvents the object in its own image, or rather in its own representation. By contrast, he who desires *to see*, or rather to look, will lose the unity of an enclosed world to find himself in the uncomfortable openness of a universe henceforth suspended, subject to all the wind of meaning; it is here that synthesis will become fragile to the

to what we see in our minds, in our memories, dreams, visions, mental images. Veridical reality, on the other hand, refers to what we know to be true, what actually exists in a material sense.

For most of us, under normal circumstances, these two forms of reality are aligned—we see something in our minds because it is really there. But funerary monuments are set up by those who grieve, and their grief confuses perception and cognition. Characters who have lost loved ones in ancient literature, such as Penelope in the *Odyssey*, are afflicted by memories, dreams, and visions that confound their sense of reality, and images of the dead commonly haunt bereaved individuals, to devastating effects, when they sleep or visit the grave.[31] The disjunctive structure of Mnasitheos' epigram, where the dead is visually apprehensible but his cognitive-affective self remains out of reach, is typical of such encounters between the living and the dead.[32] In one of the most touching scenes of the *Iliad*, Achilles encounters the recently deceased Patroklos in his dreams. Removed from veridical reality to a realm of psychic experience, Achilles thinks Patroklos is really there, even though we (the audience) know the image is generated by memory: Patroklos appears fully clothed, after all, as Achilles knew him, not naked like his corpse that lies on the shore.[33] Achilles realizes that his mind has deceived him only when he reaches out to embrace Patroklos. Only then, when he grasps at empty air, does he understand it was merely an image, what he calls an *eidolon*, as he explains upon waking to his fellow Achaeans:

> "ὢ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τίς ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι
> ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν·
> παννυχίη γάρ μοι Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο
> ψυχὴ ἐφεστήκει γοόωσά τε μυρομένη τε,
> καί μοι ἕκαστ' ἐπέτελλεν, ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ."
> ὣς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο.
>
> *Il.* 23.103-108

> "Oh, wonder! Even in the house of Hades there is left something,
> a spirit and an image, but there is no real heart of life in it.
> For all night long the spirit of unhappy Patroklos
> stood over me in lamentation and mourning, and the likeness
> to him was wonderful, and it told me each thing I should do."
> So he spoke, and stirred in all of them the desire for mourning.
>
> trans. Lattimore, adapted

Even as Achilles realizes what he saw was an illusion, there is, as he says, something there, an image of the deceased that exists in and of itself. But Achilles realizes that this presence was nothing more than an image, an *eidolon*: even though it

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point of collapse; and that the object of sight, eventually touched by a bit of the real, will dismantle the subject of knowledge, dooming simple reason to something like a rend."

[31] Johnston 1999: 3-35. For this phenomenon in Attic white-ground lekythoi, see Arrington 2014: 239-74. For Penelope's dreams, see Mueller 2007.

[32] Clarke 1999: 61-126; Holmes 2010: 58-83.

[33] See Bardel 2000: 146-47.

looked just like (ἔϊκτο) Patroklos, it had no heart of life, no φρένες, in it. The gap between vision and cognition corresponds to an emotional gap: the sight of a loved one brings joy, while the knowledge that he is dead causes pain.[34] The paradoxical simultaneity of these emotional experiences in the face of a mental image of the deceased is summarized in the Achaeans' reaction to Achilles' speech, which stirs in them "the desire for mourning" (ἵμερον γόοιο). In the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle cites this line to exemplify how memory, because it is inherently disjunctive, can produce an aesthetic form of pleasure even in the face of a tragic circumstance:[35]

> καὶ ἐν πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ὡσαύτως ἐπιγίγνεταί τις ἡδονή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡδονὴ δ' ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν πως ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἃ ἔπραττεν καὶ οἷος ἦν· διὸ καὶ τοῦτ' εἰκότως εἴρηται: "ὣς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο."
>
> Arist. *Rh.* 1370b25-28

> And similarly, a certain pleasure is felt in lamentations and mourning; for pain applies to what is not there, but pleasure to remembering and, somehow, seeing him [the deceased], and what he used to do and what he was like. For this reason the poet rightly said: "So he spoke, and stirred in all of them the desire for mourning."
>
> trans. Munteanu, adapted

As Aristotle suggests, the Achaeans, by listening to Achilles' words and using their own mental energy, are able to actually see Patroklos by remembering him. Yet just as they see him, they weep at the knowledge that he is dead. Mourning, in other words, inherently involves a visual component of seeing the deceased that is directly opposed to a cognitive component of knowing the fate of the deceased. Here, the sorrow of the Achaeans combined with their longing for Patroklos is able to render in their minds a disjunctive visual experience that is similar to that encountered by Achilles in his dreams—an experience that fragments the self by pitting opposing emotional states against one another.[36] Standing before Mnasitheos' *mnema*, simultaneously desiring the beauty of what we see and confronting the tragedy of what we know, we are meant to experience, in a sense, the emotionally debilitating effects of death in our own minds.

The *Mnema* and the *Sema*

Before returning to Mnasitheios' monument, I pause to consider how this understanding of the work of the *mnema* can, in turn, help us reconsider the other name commonly used in Archaic inscribed epigrams to identify the funerary monument: *sema*,

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[34] See also *Od.* 15.399-400.

[35] The line he cites also occurs at *Od.* 4.183. In addition, the phrase "ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο" occurs at *Il.* 23.108, 23.153, 24.507, *Od*. 4.113, 19.249, 23.231. See Munteanu 2012: 108-31.

[36] Munteanu 2012: 126. The disjunction is made all the more painful for the Achaeans because they stand around Patroklos' corpse (23.113).

a term we first saw used in Kroisos' epigram in the Introduction.[37] The word *sema* is generally translated as "sign," and most accounts of funerary *semata* rest on an assumption that a sign offers a stable meaning that a viewer must decode in terms of an external referent.[38] In much of Archaic literature, however, a *sema* is a sign not because it replaces something absent, but because it enjoins a viewer to do something or act in a certain way. Many *semata* in Homer, for example, have no prior external referents. Their meaning is not communicated directly but grasped inferentially by a viewer, without recourse to encoded messages or semiotics.[39] *Semata* are instructions, commands, signals and portents, fabricated in order to force an individual to do or create something, or simply become aware of what is about to happen.[40] Realizing that something seemingly ordinary is in fact a *sema* compels us to look at it differently.

Like the *mnema,* the *sema* only exists as a function of a viewer. In an influential account, Svenbro argued that an inscription is not complete until this viewer reads it aloud: "the sound of the voice is indispensable if the inscription is to recover its meaning. The voice of the reader is the eternally renewable referent thanks to which the inscription finds full realization."[41] Where Svenbro focuses on the reader's ability to make the inscription audible, Nagy has underlined the importance of the viewer's *noos* or intellect in interpreting a *sema*.[42] In his account, the *sema* is a critical element of narratives of recognition that requires an act of interpretation. This act of recognizing a *sema* has less to do with prior familiarity with a prototype than it does with "recognizing the internally coherent system of signals."[43] Thus, as with the cup that Achilles gives Nestor as a *mnema, semata* in Homer do not rely in any way on resemblance, but on recognition.

A funerary monument that self-identifies as a *sema* sets itself up as a locus for the viewer to recognize, rather than decode, the presence of the deceased. To label something a *sema*, in this sense, is to tell its audience to look at it in a different way, to see it as something more than its appearance, and to build a new meaning for it through this process. Instead of understanding the *sema* as an encoded sign, in many instances a more useful analogy is a telltale indicator, or even a symptom, in the sense that it gives visual

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[37] *Sema* appears earlier and more frequently on Archaic funerary monuments than *mnema.* But despite their semantic differences, in practice *sema* and *mnema* can be used interchangeably, and often appear on different monuments with the same formulaic inscription. The shift from *sema* to *mnema* should be seen as part of an ongoing readjustment of the communicative possibilities of the funerary monument—of accessing the deceased both through recognition and memory—rather than a wholesale change in function. See Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 149.

[38] See especially Sourvinou-Inwood 1995.

[39] Steiner 1994: 10-60. Steiner argues that the "whole ensemble - stele, writing, and picture - contributes inferentially as a marker of the person's death. The purpose of the writing is not just to inform but to make the audience recognize the intention to inform on the part of the person who commissioned the monument; it tells us plainly that the stone is a gravestone" (Steiner 1994: 34). See also Foley 1997: 72-3.

[40] Although she favors a symbolic approach, Sourvinou-Inwood (1995: 136-9) offers an overview of the Homeric approaches to the *sema*. It is her sixth definition that interests me most: "The *sema* is a certain type of behavior/set of events which, it is prearranged, will function as a signal to trigger off a certain action" (137).

[41] Svenbro 1993: 62.

[42] Nagy 1990. See also Svenbro 1993: 26-43

[43] Nagy 1990: 206.

form to a story or event. Identifying something as a *sema* points to a deeper, less tangible reality that we have to construct through its visible and material presence. Like recognizing a visible phenomenon as a telltale, recognizing a *sema* as such makes us shift our vision: there is more to the story, it tells us, that we have to figure out.[44]

An episode from Book 2 of the *Iliad* demonstrates how a block of stone that takes the form of a living creature might function effectively as a *sema*. In an event described as a "great *sema*" (μέγα σῆμα, 2.308), a large serpent appears and devours a group of small sparrows, and is then turned to stone. Odysseus, who narrates the story, describes the state of shock and wonder (*thauma*, 2.230) he and the other Achaeans experienced in witnessing this transformation. Yet it is only the seer Kalchas who recognizes that, more than a self-contained aesthetic experience, the serpent's transformation requires its viewers to see it as a telltale of another event—in this case, the future destruction of Troy (2.323-29).[45] It is the switch in visualization from *thauma* to *sema*, made possible through a cognitive act of interpretation, that makes the serpent not only something of mere aesthetic interest but one that tells a story of future events.

Standing before a carved funerary monument that presented the human form in stone, viewers of funerary monuments were asked to make similar shifts from an aesthetic appreciation of the sculpture to a recognition of it as a telltale for the deceased:

> ἄνθροπε hὸστείχε[ι]ς : καθ᾽οδὸν : φρασὶν : ἄλα μενοινῶν:
> στῆθι | καὶ οἴκτιρον : σῆμα Θράσονος : ἰδόν.
>
> *CEG* 28

> Mortal, you who are approaching along the road, intent with other things on your mind,
> take a stand and feel pity while looking at the *sema* of Thrason.

Thrason's epigram, carved on a late sixth-century base that once supported a stele, actively requires a viewer capable of visual, physical and emotional engagement—one who can interpret it through the lens of their own subjective experiences. The viewer here is addressed directly in the second person as an anonymous *anthropos*—an ungendered mortal person, not a god. The inscription describes a current scenario—one where an *anthropos* is walking down a road directing their mental activity towards "other things"—and asks them to transform it according to the conceit of the *sema*: walking becomes standing, mental thoughts become pity. By invoking the physical and mental activities in which the passerby is already engaged, outside of the encounter, the monument is specifically addressing a viewer who *can* stand (because they can walk) and *can* pity the monument (because they have mental thoughts). The deceased, no longer a mortal, is capable of neither.[46] The inscription frames the viewer's interaction with the

[44] See, for instance, Archilochus 105 W, where the speaker urges his interlocutor to look at the movements of the waves and the formations of the clouds in order to infer that a storm is coming by recognizing them as a *sema* of that storm.
[45] Nagy 1992: 204-5.
[46] Cf. *Il.* 23.104 and see below on *eidola.*

stele above as something that will necessarily look different to one who stands, pities, and visualizes the monument as a *sema.*[47]

Framing the *sema* as an object of recognition compels us to confront funerary sculpture according to the same disjunctive structure we have seen in *mnemata* such as Mnasitheos' monument. The epigram on the base of Xsenophantos' late Archaic monument, once topped with a kouros, is a case in point:

> σε͂μα πατὲρ Κλέ[β]||βολος ἀποφθιμέ|νοι Χσενοφάντοι |
> θε͂κε τόδ' ἀντ' ἀρετε͂ς | ἐδὲ σαοφροσύνες.
>
> *CEG* 41

> For dead Xsenophantos his father Klebbolos placed this *sema*
> in place of good character and wisdom.

Most interpretations of Xsenophantos' epigram understand it as framing his monument as a substitute that is now able to embody the "good character and wisdom" he once possessed through formal, abstract qualities of the kouros itself as an idealized male body.[48] The kouros that once stood above the epigram, in this interpretation, compensates for the loss of these qualities by embodying them symbolically rather than mimetically: the apparent quadrifacial carving of the body and rigidity of the posture becomes a metaphor for moral uprightness, the perfection of the body one for unblemished character, and so forth.[49]

In contrast, in my understanding of the function of the *sema,* the inscription insists it is up to us as viewers to recognize something of Xsenophantos in its very formal structure and visual presence. Using the same structure as Mnasitheos' epigram, it sets up "this *sema*" in the first line against the intangible characteristics of the deceased—*arete* and *sophrosune*—that are now lost. While the kouros above might provide some visible presence of the deceased, it cannot as a stone monument embody cognitive-affective qualities such as good character and wisdom, which is why they are marked out in the epigram. The visible monument stands in their stead (*anti,* as in Mnasitheos' epigram), but cannot replace what death has destroyed.

Indeed, while kouroi might look quadrifacial and rigid to some modern viewers, such visualization of them is anachronistically affected by later developments in Classical

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[47] The particular effects of standing and feeling pity will be examined in Chapter 2.

[48] Steiner 2001: 12: "As discussions of *kouroi* regularly point out, the marble youths' physical forms supply unmistakable declarations of the very properties the description privileges, visibly displaying through their flawless physiques, upright bearing, and general air of disengagement the typically aristocratic values of *aretē* and *sophrosunē."* See also d'Onofrio 1982: 163-8; Vernant 1990: 79-82.

[49] Such an explanation is often used to explain the supposed "foursquareness" of kouroi (see Hurwit 1985: 344; Rouveret 1989: 144-9; Franzoni 2006: 181; Neer 2010: 36 and 220 n.67 for further bibliography). In this approach, the quadrifaciality of the statue, a result of it being carved from a rectangular block, is equated with the "foursquare" (*tetragonos*) quality associated with being good or noble (*agathos*) in a fragment of the Archaic poet Simonides. Against such an interpretation, Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* specifically cites Simonides' "foursquare" metaphor as the sort of dead metaphor that is impossible to visualize because it lacks any capacity for mental actualization (*energeia*); see Munteanu 2012: 87-88.

sculpture, as discussed in the Introduction, and ancient viewers might have seen them as active, fully three-dimensional bodies. In a wide-ranging studies more grounded in empirical measurements than most accounts of Archaic sculpture, Ilse Kleeman has revealed that many Archaic kouroi were carved with carefully planned deviations from the basic rectilinear forms.[50] Such deviations, for Kleeman at least, suggest subtle effects of torsion and twisting that allow a viewer to visualize them as restless with incipient movement rather than frozen in a static position.

One such deviation is visible in the kouros base of an Archaic funerary monument for a man named Xenokles from the Athenian Kerameikos (figs. 4-5). The statue is unfortunately lost, but the outline of the feet still set into the plinth indicate that the kouros was oriented at a very slight oblique angle from the front of the base.[51] Instead of insisting on the statue's supposed quadrifaciality, this small rotation of the kouros sets it off-kilter from the viewer. The result is a one-way form of engagement structured according to the disjunction between a visual presence and a cognitive-affective absence. As we look at the *sema*, we recognize Xenokles in the three-dimensional, life-size form a man before us—but he twists every so slightly away from, oriented elsewhere.[52]

Engaging the statue in this sense allows us to visualize the disjunction set out in the epigram inscribed on the base:

> [----]ς αἰχμετῶ, Χσενόκλεες, ἀνδρὸς | [ἐπισ]τὰς ⋮
> σῆμα τὸ σὸν προσιδὸν γνό|[σετ]αι ἐν[ορέαν?].
>
> *CEG* 19

> (Each man?), standing and looking at your *sema*, Xenokles,
> will recognize the courage (?) of a spear-bearer.

While Xenokles' kouros took the form of a man, the epigram suggests that it is the viewer, not the statue itself, who generates the possibility of recognizing a cognitive-affective quality like courage by looking at the monument as a *sema*.[53] Like Xsenophantos' epigram, that of Xenokles is often understood as stating that the kouros itself functions as a visual allegory for the deceased's courage.[54] But the verb *gignosko* means to recognize through visual engagement—not to know in a familiar or emotional sense—and so suggests the now familiar disjunction between the veridical reality we stand before and the visual one we see.[55]

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[50] Kleeman 1984 and 2008.

[51] Noted by Kissas (2000: 291 n. 213), and confirmed by personal observation. On the base see Kissas 2000: 39-40 cat. A4.

[52] See Neer's comments (2010: 42) on the kouroi from Sounion, which are similarly twisted away from a frontal orientation.

[53] In Archaic poetry, the courage (*enorea* or *andreia*) visible to viewers of Xenokles' *sema* was a quality linked to physical beauty, visible on a man's exterior. See Robertson 2003, who explores the epitaph in the context of Homeric and Pindaric conceptions of *andreia* and beauty.

[54] E.g. Hurwit 1985: 202.

[55] The related verb *anagignosko* is commonly used in conjunction with recognizing *semata* in Homer; see Nagy 1990. The same formula of looking and knowing (*gnothi ... prosidon*) is found in a pseudo-Simonidean epigram for a victor statue of the wrestler Theognetus, though the epigram is "probably not genuine" (Robertson 2003: 62).

We can see this sense of the verb at work in Book 5 of the *Iliad*, where Pandaros has difficulty explaining how a warrior he sees fighting like a god could be Diomedes, the mortal man he appears to be:

> Τυδεΐδῃ μιν ἔγωγε δαΐφρονι πάντα ἐΐσκω,
> ἀσπίδι γιγνώσκων αὐλώπιδί τε τρυφαλείῃ,
> ἵππους τ᾽ εἰσορόων: σάφα δ᾽ οὐκ οἶδ᾽ εἰ θεός ἐστιν.
> *Il*. 5.181-3
>
> Indeed I liken him to the battle-minded son of Tydeos,
> recognizing him by his shield and his plumed helmet
> and discerning his horses; but I do not know with any clarity if he is a god.

Pandaros recognizes (*gignoskon*) the warrior through visual cues such as his shield, helmet and horses that he uses to liken the man he sees to the Diomedes he knows. Yet despite the persuasiveness of the likeness, Pandaros does not know (*oida*) if it is actually him. Like those who encounter *eidola,* he is compelled to dissect perception from cognition. In the same way, before Xenokles' kouros, the burden of likeness is on us. Because his image is recognized by us rather than inherent in the statue, we see him without knowing he is actually there. Pushing our vision and cognition beyond the limits allowed for by veridical reality—trying to recognize a man's courage or goodness or wisdom in nothing more than a mere image, one that turns away from us as we try to look at it—we gain access not to Xenokles himself, but to the emotionally and aesthetically disjunctive effects of his death.

Works of Art and Mental Images

In this framework, the Archaic funerary monument—whether labeled *mnema* or *sema*—operates as a mechanism for opening up mental images and for creating psychic experiences that could not veridically exist. Archaic funerary sculptures do not serve to record the deceased's appearance or character, but to mold and shape a visual image of the deceased in our minds, one generated through memory (the function of the *mnema*) or recognition (the *sema*).

The visual effects of such sculptures only come into focus as a function of a cultural attitude in ancient Greece that imagined works of art as operating like dreams, visions, and other mental images, in that they are able to shape psychic reality by making visually present something that we know is not really there.[56] In a well-known passage from Euripides' *Alkestis*, Admetos explains how he will cope with the grief caused by the death of his wife:

> σοφῇ δὲ χειρὶ τεκτόνων δέμας τὸ σὸν
> εἰκασθὲν ἐν λέκτροισιν ἐκταθήσεται,
> ᾧ προσπεσοῦμαι καὶ περιπτύσσων χέρας

[56] Vernant 1990: 34-41; Bettini 1999; Steiner 2001: 193-94. On the relationship between epiphanic visions and works of art see Platt 2011. More generally on the relationship between mental images and works of art, see Didi-Hubermann 2005; Belting 2005 and 2011.

ὄνομα καλῶν σὸν τὴν φίλην ἐν ἀγκάλαις
δόξω γυναῖκα καίπερ οὐκ ἔχων ἔχειν·
ψυχρὰν μέν, οἶμαι, τέρψιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως βάρος
ψυχῆς ἀπαντλοίην ἄν. ἐν δ᾽ ὀνείρασιν
φοιτῶσά μ᾽ εὐφραίνοις ἄν· ἡδὺ γὰρ φίλους
κἀν νυκτὶ λεύσσειν, ὅντιν᾽ ἂν παρῇ χρόνον.

Eur. *Alc.* 348-56

Your outer form, imaged by the skilled hand of craftsmen,
will be laid out in my bed.
I will fall upon it, and as I wrap my arms around it
and call your name, I will imagine that it is my dear wife
I hold in my arms, though I do not hold her.
A cold pleasure, I think, but nonetheless I might lessen
the heaviness of my soul. And perhaps in dreams
you might give cheer by visiting me. For it is sweet to look at loved ones,
even if at night, for however long it is possible.

We see here the familiar disjunctive approach to dreams of the dead, but now applied in equal measure to a work of art. Admetos suggests a direct link between placing a statue of his wife in his bed and the vivid dreams he hopes for. He does not desire the statue itself, but the image of his wife it is able to summon forth in his mind.[57] Sculptors, he remarks, can produce the actual outer form (δέμας) of his wife, not merely a representation of that form.[58] The image produced by sculpture, in other words, is the *same* as the memory-image of the deceased: when Athena sends an *eidolon* of Iphthime to sleeping Penelope in the *Odyssey*, for instance, she also likens its outer form (δέμας once again) to that of the woman herself.[59] Where Penelope encounters Iphthime's *eidolon* through the agency of the gods, Admetos looks instead towards sculpture as mechanism for transporting him to the dream-world where Alkestis still appears to exist. Bracketing both the statue and his dreams, Admetos focuses, like Homer and Aristotle, on the pleasure offered by the imagined sight of the deceased that is able to overcome the pain caused by the waking knowledge that she remains dead. Yet for all its visual persuasiveness, the statue, like an *eidolon*, has no heart of life in it: Admetos himself must animate the object by placing it in his bed, physically engaging with it, attributing Alkestis' name to it, and using his imagination. Just as Achilles' vision dissipates when he attempts to embrace Patroklos, so here too Admetos is disappointed by the cold touch of the statue, which removes him from his perceptual fantasies back to cognitive

[57] Arrington 2014: 265-67. The passage is often misinterpreted as suggesting that Admetos' desire is directed towards the statue as a material object (e.g. Stieber 1998; Neer 2010: 50, 53, 61).

[58] The term *demas* indicates only the outer appearance of an individual, in contrast to their inner self (e.g. *Od.* 10.239-40, where Kirke gives Odysseus' men the outer form [*demas*] of animals even though they maintain their human minds [*nous*]).

[59] *Od.* 4.796: εἴδωλον ποίησε, δέμας δ᾽ ἴκτο γυναικί ("she made an *eidolon* and likened its outer form to the woman"). Steiner 2001: 23 cites this episode as an example of image-making that goes beyond "seeing-in"; see n. 66 below.

experience (οἶμαι).[60] Nonetheless, for the emotionally distraught widower, the visual illusion remains more compelling than its tactile reality.

This relationship between the disjunctive effects of works of art and those of dreams and memories is a theme in many ancient literary texts. In Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (414-26), for instance, the chorus describes how Menelaus, mourning the loss of his wife, is haunted in waking life both by a phantom and by statues that remind him of her, and in sleep by dreams in which he tries, in vain, to grasp her.[61] By the time of the Platonic dialogues if not earlier, the term *eidolon*, the psychic image of the deceased in Homer, comes to be commonly used to refer to an image in a work of art.[62] And Aristotle, in his *De Memoria* and *De Anima*, equates the process of mental imaging (*phantasia*) inherent in memory with the process of creating and looking at a work of art.[63]

These examples, like the *Alkestis* passage, date later than Mnasitheos' stele and other Archaic monuments. But already in Homeric ekphrasis, we can see how works of art are understood as operating according to the same structural principle of disjunction, as in the following description of a field on the Shield of Achilles:

> ἡ δὲ μελαίνετ᾽ ὄπισθεν, ἀρηρομένῃ δὲ ἐῴκει,
> χρυσείη περ ἐοῦσα: τὸ δὴ περὶ θαῦμα τέτυκτο.
>
> *Il.* 18.548-49

> And [the field] grew black behind them, and looked just like one that had been ploughed
> though it was made of gold. Here truly a wonder had been made.

The scene is described not as a representation, but as an actual field visible to us and growing black before our eyes. At the same time, we are aware it is made of gold. As in Mnasitheos' epigram, a concessive particle (περ) marks the disjunction between psychic and veridical reality—what it looked like (ἐῴκει) as opposed to what it was in an ontological sense (ἐοῦσα). And the aesthetic effect is the same as that of the *eidolon* of Patroklos: it is a "wonder" (θαῦμα), just as Achilles, realizing the gap between his own vision and cognition, states that the similarity between the *eidolon* and Patroklos himself was "wondrous" (θέσκελον).[64] In both cases, wonder is directed towards the phenomenon of seeing something that we know cannot really be there.

A complex instance of such an analogy, where the work of art's disjunctive structure is tied to its status as a *sema,* occurs in Book 19 of the *Odyssey*, a passage whose relationship to the aesthetics of Archaic art has been discussed by Neer.[65]

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[60] Bettini 1999: 19-21; Steiner 2001: 192.

[61] Bettini 1999: 14-17. Similarily see his discussion (9-14) of Euripides's lost *Protesilaos*, where Laodamia sleeps with a bronze statue of her dead husband. For Greek tragedies in which individuals are substituted for statues, see more generally Steiner 2001 and Stieber 2011.

[62] On the *eidolon*, see Saïd 1987; Pfeifer 1989; Bettini 1999.

[63] *De Memoria* 450a-451a; *De Anima* 427b.

[64] On wonder as an aesthetic effect of Archaic art, see Neer 2010: 57-69.

[65] Neer 1995: 124; 2010: 59. See also Steiner 2001: 20-1 and my discussion of "seeing as" in the following note.

Odysseus, still in disguise as a beggar, bonds with Penelope through their shared memories of her husband. When Penelope asks him for his memories of her husband, Odysseus describes his magnificent cloak, tunic, and above all a golden brooch decorated with images of a hound preying on a fawn:

> αὐτάρ οἱ περόνη χρυσοῖο τέτυκτο
> αὐλοῖσιν διδύμοισι· πάροιθε δὲ δαίδαλον ἦεν·
> ἐν προτέροισι πόδεσσι κύων ἔχε ποικίλον ἐλλόν,
> ἀσπαίροντα λάων· τὸ δὲ θαυμάζεσκον ἅπαντες,
> ὡς οἱ χρύσεοι ἐόντες ὁ μὲν λάε νεβρὸν ἀπάγχων,
> αὐτὰρ ὁ ἐκφυγέειν μεμαὼς ἤσπαιρε πόδεσσι.
>
> *Od.* 19.226-231

> … but the brooch was golden and fashioned
> with double sheaths, and the front part of it was artfully
> done: a hound held in his forepaws a dappled
> fawn, preying on it as it struggled; and all wondered at it,
> how, though they were golden, it preyed on the fawn and strangled it
> and the fawn struggled with his feet as he tried to escape him.
>
> trans. Lattimore, adapted

Odysseus uses the same structure of the rend to describe how the brooch simultaneously offers the visual experience of living creatures and the veridical materiality of the gold brooch—a disjunction that, once again, elicits a sense of wonder from its beholders.

Yet the brooch's effects are not merely aesthetic. Set in its proper context, this description functions as a paradigm of sorts for the process of remembering the deceased. In prefacing his description, Odysseus states that he will describe the scene "as my heart images it to me" (ὥς μοι ἰνδάλλεται ἦτορ, 19.224). The entire description, in other words, is configured by memory, so that just as image is detached from material in the brooch, so too can Penelope, as she listens, generate an image of Odysseus that exists only in her mind. Isolating the image from its embedded context enables Penelope to transfer it to her own mind and match it with mental images she herself retains of her husband. In doing so, she looks at the brooch not simply as an object of wonder (*agalma*) as it once was, but as a *sema*:

> …τῇ δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο,
> σήματ' ἀναγνούσῃ τά οἱ ἔμπεδα πέφραδ' Ὀδυσσεύς.
> ἡ δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν τάρφθη πολυδακρύτοιο γόοιο.
> καὶ τότε μιν μύθοισιν ἀμειβομένη προσέειπε·
> "νῦν μὲν δή μοι, ξεῖνε, πάρος περ ἐὼν ἐλεεινός,
> ἐν μεγάροισιν ἐμοῖσι φίλος τ' ἔσῃ αἰδοῖός τε·
> αὐτὴ γὰρ τάδε εἵματ' ἐγὼ πόρον, οἶ' ἀγορεύεις,
> πτύξασ' ἐκ θαλάμου, περόνην τ' ἐπέθηκα φαεινὴν
> κείνῳ ἄγαλμ' ἔμεναι."
>
> *Od.* 19.249-57

> He still more aroused in her the desire for weeping,
> as she recognized the certain proofs (*semata*) Odysseus had given.
> But when she had taken her pleasure of tearful lamentation,
> then once again she spoke to him and gave him an answer:
> "Stranger, while before this you had my pity, you now shall
> be my friend and be respected here in my palace.
> For I myself gave him this clothing, as you describe it.
> I folded it in my chamber, and I too attached the shining
> brooch, to be an adornment (*agalma*)."
>
> trans. Lattimore, adapted

Penelope's reaction and response to Odysseus' description depends on an understanding of the *sema* as a telltale, as discussed above. In happier days, Penelope gifted the brooch to Odysseus as a "shining *agalma*," the sort of object that would readily produce the wonder experienced by the onlookers within the scene. Now, however, she sees it as a *sema* and weeps. Odysseus' description, couched in ekphrastic detail and framed according to the reaction of onlookers, has provoked a mixed emotional reaction from Penelope—that of arousing a desire for lamentation (ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο)—that is identical to the one, as we have seen, that Achilles provokes from the Achaeans in describing his encounter with the *eidolon* of Patroklos. Insofar as it functions as a *sema*, the brooch, like a funerary monument, is able to open up the disjunctive experience of the deceased through its very material structure—its very ontology as a work of art.

In this sense, the description of her husband's brooch enables Penelope to bring to mind something like an encounter with his *eidolon*—a visual experience of him divorced from his corporeal reality. The brooch's inherent disjunction as a work of art works within the episode to crystallize the analytic structure of such a mental image. The encounter with a work of art, then, is framed in Homer in precisely the same way as encounters with images of the dead: there *is* something there, something visible and real, whether it be a ploughed field or a hound with its prey, a dead friend or husband or lover, not merely a representation or symbol of them. Yet the image can never transcend psychic fantasy, because, we know, it is made of stone or metal instead of flesh and blood.

The Sculpted Image

Such understandings of the relationship between the image of the deceased and the image contained in the work of art shape how we encounter a monument like that of Mnasitheos. As we have seen, all encounters with the dead, including those experienced in memories and dreams, are conceived of as inherently disjunctive. But just as significantly, because such encounters are visualized within our bodies, their disjunctive nature fragments our own sense of self and destabilizes the alignment of cognition and vision we take for granted in straightforward perception. Mnasitheos' epigram frames the relief in such a way that it can only be visualized by us when we are capable of feeling such effects ourselves—when we are willing to acknowledge its first-person voice, its capacity to remember, and so its ability to image the deceased not only in the stone, but in our own minds. The image that the relief brings to mind can only effectively operate,

in other words, within an aesthetic system that applies not only to viewing representational art, but to viewing images of the dead more generally.[66] It follows that what we see when we look at the monument is not merely the result of Philourgos' skill or Pyrrichos' brief. Instead, the monument's formal configuration emerges through a recursive exchange between the monument as a material object and our own emotional and cognitive preparedness for engaging with it—a form of preparedness that is conditioned, in part, by the monument itself through the epigram and sculpture and the disjunction they set out.[67]

While our initial encounter with the relief might focus on its presentation of the boy as an object of desire, reading the epigram and understanding the disjunction it sets forth draws our eyes to features that undermine the fulfillment of this desire, as already suggested in the initial description of the love-gifts. In a relief sculpture such as that of Mnasitheos, the disjunction manifests itself in a tension between surface and depth, between the flatness of the relief's planarity and the three-dimensionality of the virtual forms we see. Looking at the monument, we confront an ongoing spatial negotiation between the visual and the veridical—between the boy, a tantalizing visual presence, and the stele itself, an angular slab of marble made up of abstract forms.

The tension is clearest in the framing devices surrounding the boy. At the bottom, his feet stand on a ledge that sticks out from the otherwise flat stone and is decorated with a painted meander pattern.[68] At the top, the stele morphs into an anthemion finial with a

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[66] Although Neer 2010: 20-69 has offered a compelling account of the aesthetic effects of Archaic sculpture that informs my own approach, I do not think that the type of seeing appropriate to *mnemata* is the "seeing-in" conceptualized by Richard Wollheim and deployed in the study of Archaic art in Neer 1995 and 2010, as well as Stewart 1997: 43-44 and Steiner 2001: 19-22 among others. For Wollheim, seeing-in is the sort of seeing appropriate for representation (i.e. we see person X in a painting) and is categorically different from the type of seeing appropriate for non-representational or straightforward perception. The mental images we attend to in dreams and memories "anticipate seeing-in, or are continuous with it" but "they themselves are most certainly not themselves cases of seeing-in" because in looking at representations rather than dreams "the relevant visual experiences cease to arise simply in the mind's eye: visions of things not present now come about through looking at things present" (Wollheim 1980: 217-18; on the psychic qualities of Wollheim's approach, see Davis 2010: 271-95). If, on the other hand, we "come to believe that something which is before the mind is really there, in front of us, we do not simply make an error in observation, we evince derangement or disturbance" (1973: 39; see also Neer 1995: 124). Yet, as we have seen, grief opens up precisely this kind of perceptual "derangement or disturbance." While they might appear to us pathological or irrational, the perceptual effects of grief were not dissimilar from other forms of alternative visual experience in ancient Greece (such as epiphany in religious practices, for which see Platt 2011). So, for instance, interactions with *eidola*, as Steiner (2001: 22-27) has noted, seem to go beyond the aesthetic possibilities of seeing-in, and suggest that the Archaic Greeks conceived of a greater continuity between mental images and images derived from works of art than allowed for by Wollheim's model (for this continuity more generally, see Belting 2011). *Mnemata* in particular, I would argue, set themselves up as things that, even though they are "things present" in a veridical sense, seek to create images in the mind's eye rather than embedded in stone. Rather than set itself off in an aesthetic category that is immune to real-life perceptual disturbances, the funerary *mnema* trades on the possibility of perceptual error opened up by emotion and memory.

[67] On the recursive quality of formalism, see Davis 2011: 45-74 and 2012.

[68] For the paint traces see Andreiomenou 2000: 86-90.

painted double helix below a palmette. Unlike the boy, these motifs are only sculpted in their outline, with their details rendered in paint. There is a stark visual discrepancy between these flat, painted, stylized framing motifs, embedded in the structure of the vertical slab of marble, and the supple, carefully modulated carving of the boy's body, pushed beyond the confine of that slab into our space. The result is the visual sensation that the boy is not fully embedded in the stone—not simply a feature that exists in its surface like the meander or palmette, but something that is in the process of detaching itself, in a sense, that exists somehow in a space between the flat background and us.

The immediacy of the raised relief stands, of course, in direct contrast to the incised inscription. Unlike many Archaic funerary epigrams, the one on Mnasitheos' monument is embedded within the pictorial space, nestled between the boy's legs and the outer edge of the stone, and acting almost like a pillar base on which the cock rests its talons. The inscription, positioned perpendicular to the image, literally reorients it, taking hold of a self-proclaimed beautiful image and framing it within the experience of loss. As it fills in the negative space surrounding the relief, the inscription asserts the flatness and verticality of the stele, denying the existence of a virtual pictorial space in which the boy can exist as a three-dimensional form. Rendered through incision rather than relief, through abstract letterforms rather than figurative imagery, the formal configuration of the inscription follows the disjunctive structure of its content. While it is more or less written in stoichedon, the words μνῆμ' εἰμὶ ("I am a memory object") in the first line break off from the linear pattern, rendered in slightly more compressed letters that align with the boy's lower leg. As the inscription's semantic content moves away from psychic perception towards veridical reality, so do our eyes, as we read, move away from the image towards the straight edge of the stone—away from the memory-world and towards the real world, outside of the monument, where Mnasitheos is dead and gone.

The framing devices and inscription—stubbornly material, abstract, and flat features—do not negate the image of the deceased we see, but instead expose it as a psychic fantasy, a memory-image. As we have seen in reference to other inscribed epigrams, most understandings of Archaic funerary sculptures treat them as representations that try to capture some essence or quality of the deceased as they were when they were alive. As a substitute for the deceased, the monument's function is understood as trying to overcome the facts of death by providing a continued presence, even if that presence is only symbolic or idealized.[69]

Yet in its verbal address to the viewer, Mnasitheos' *mnema* does not attempt to preserve something that has disappeared. It openly acknowledges the irreversible loss of the cognitive-affective qualities of the deceased and instead makes claims to what still remains and only comes into focus after death: the remembered image of the deceased which still exists in the mind of Pyrrichos and which is here, now, beautiful and on the road in the monument that speaks to us.[70] Insofar as Mnasitheos' monument is a *mnema*, the image it produces is psychic, in our minds, and not dependent on the veridical absence of the deceased. As such, we see the relief not as a representation of a real

[69] Day 1989; Vernant 1990: 75 and 1991: 161-62; Steiner 2001: 151-56, 252-59.

[70] Sourvinou-Inwood correctly argues that "the deceased did not evaporate from the world of the living: a new form, successor to his living persona, remained behind, his memory" (1995: 120). But she sees the memory as something symbolically articulated in the monument, which serves as an index of the deceased, and does not acknowledge the visual nature of that memory.

human being (who happens to now be dead), nor even as an illustration of a memory. Rather, the carved image serves to create and shape a mental image of the boy for those of us who never knew him—we who, to paraphrase Learete's monument, will never see him alive. Just as this engagement leads us to see someone who isn't there, so too do the visual effects of the relief suggest that by smelling and touching the gifts the boy is able to use them as memory objects of his own—memory objects that will help, if only fleetingly, overcome the absence of the affection he shares with the man who gave them.[71] When we stand before the monument and see it as our own memory, we feel as if that man is us.[72]

The same tension between desire and absence is engaged in *semata* to create an empathetic reaction from its viewer. The well-known monument of Phrasikleia, for example—a self-proclaimed *sema*—uses a flower to similar effect (fig. 6).[73] Phrasikleia's appearance is shaped by her richly decorated gown and the pomegranates and flowers—variously open, half-open, and closed—that ornament her neck, ears and hair. Phrasikleia's own body, like that of Mnasitheos, is molded by her accessories: the braiding of her hair into a carefully patterned surface mirrors the arrangement of flowers and fruits on her head and around her neck, while the delicate strands perfectly positioned over her shoulders and breasts outline the very form of her body. The epigram on the front of her base reads:

> σε͂μα Φρασικλείας.| κόρε κεκλέσομαι | αἰεί,
> ἀντὶ γάμο | παρὰ θεο͂ν το͂το | λαχο͂σ′ ὄνομα.
> *CEG* 24

> The monument of Phrasikleia. Maiden shall I be called forever,
> in place of marriage, having received this name from the gods.

While the first line invites us to call the statue maiden (*kore*)—that is, to recognize through the *sema* an actual human being, a girl dressed to be married—the second calls attention to the fact that she stands in place of marriage (ἀντὶ γάμο). Just as Mnasitheos' monument stands "in place of affection" (ἀντὶ φιλε͂μοσύνε͂ς), Phrasikleia's monument marks out where another intimate relationship, that between husband and wife, has been preemptively destroyed. Once again, the disjunction is clear: we see a girl before us, ripe for marriage, but we know, as the second line of the inscription makes explicit, this marriage can never happen. The budding flower she holds towards us is surely meant to

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[71] Gifts of flowers between lovers and the lingering perfume of such flowers seem to be used as memory objects in this way in Sappho fr. 94. Flowers are also associated with seeing and touching someone far away, perhaps deceased, in Simonides fr. eleg. 22 W^2; for the reconstruction of this poem as elegiac threnody see Yatromanolakis 1998. More generally, see Bodiou and Mehl 2008.

[72] For viewer of the funerary kouros as an *erastes*, see Stewart 1997: 63-67; Steiner 2001: 212-18; Day 2007: 41; Neer 2010: 50.

[73] Athens, National Archaeological Museum (=NM) 4889. A number of other Archaic funerary reliefs show a boy smelling a flower, such as Louvre MND 1863 (Richter 1961: 41 cat. 57) and Argos Archaeological Museum 11164 (Piteros 2012). A parallel for Phrasikleia's own gesture is now known from another Attic kore from Anavyssos, for which see Tzaxou-Alexandre 2012.

tempt us into desiring the girl as our own wedded wife.[74] It is an invitation, in other words, to enter the world in which she continues to exist. But the inscription serves to remind us that because that world can only be achieved through sculpture, it is bound, like Admetos' statue of Alkestis, to leave us cold: the girl will never be more than a maiden, and so, for all her visual allure, will never be available to us.

Even closer to Mnasitheos' stele is an early fifth-century funerary stele from Rhodes, in which the cock literally links the young man to an older, though still beardless, lover (fig. 7).[75] The asymmetry of this pederastic relationship is emphasized not only in the jarring difference in the height and proportions of the two figures, but in posture and dress. The older man stands in a relaxed profile pose, holding a staff that seems to orient the boy's body, from his head to his left foot. In contrast, the boy twists his own body, pressing his heel against the frame of the relief while propelling his upper body forward into an almost frontal pose so that it meets the inner curve of the man's profile. Where the older man's head is barely lowered, the younger boy strains his neck upward to meet his lover's gaze, aligning his eyes with the staff he holds. The cock, once again carved in extremely shallow relief compared to the figures' outer edges and pressed closely against the boy's body, bridges two men rent apart by death. It acts as a mechanism, like the monument itself, through which they can almost touch each other, their elongated fingers stretching towards one another across the bird's body, but never meeting. While the relief carving enables us to visualize their bodies as partially overlapping, only their shared gaze enables continued contact, emphasizing yet again the psychic presence of the deceased even as he remains out of reach.

A pattern emerges: visual engagement suggests the possibility of a "real," affective, perhaps even sexual connection between the deceased and living viewer, but this connection is simultaneously denied through the materiality of the statue, the fact that the image we see with our eyes has nothing to do with the stone that is there. In this context, the erotic qualities of Mnasitheos' relief that we saw earlier emerge as a rhetorical strategy employed by Philourgos to exacerbate the rend between psychic and veridical realites simultaneously structured in the epigram, and so articulate in empathetic terms the tragedy of death. By making us remember and desire Mnasitheos without actually making him present, the monument ruptures the alignment of perception and cognition we take for granted and pulls us closer to the disorienting experience of loss. The material stuff of pictorial imagery, the fact that we can look but can only look, makes the sculpture not a mere representation of a tragedy, but a tragedy in itself.

Yet at the same time, our pain will never be equivalent to that felt by Pyrrichos, and we are never meant to mistake what we see for the boy himself. Philourgos' signature in the predella—outside of the pictorial frame that contains both statue and epigram—reminds us that the entire encounter is a self-consciously staged experience of what it is like to experience loss rather than an opportunity to truly do so. Just as when listening to a Homeric epic and visualizing its descriptive narrative we empathize with Penelope or Achilles without becoming them, we are not Pyrrichos, and no matter how deeply felt our

[74] Neer 2010: 53-54.

[75] Rhodes, Grand Master's Palace Γ 1640. See Kaninia 1997, who gives iconographical comparanda.

reaction to Mnasitheos' death, we will not be afflicted by dreams of him at night.[76] The monument, with its unspecific imagery and language, relies on our own experiences to complete it. Its effects do not come into focus from a single encounter, but from a lifetime of crossing paths with funerary monuments and momentarily slipping into someone else's memory world—a memory world that resembles our own when, inevitably, we ourselves experience the loss of someone we love.[77]

Conclusion

Using Mnasitheos' monument as a case study, this chapter has attempted to outline a new way of thinking about the social function of Archaic funerary monuments. In recently published studies, scholars have explained the elaborate nature of Mnasitheos' monument, including the presence of a high-quality relief sculpture, as an attempt by Pyrrichos to flaunt his wealth and advertise both himself and Mnasitheos as members of a privileged social class.[78] Such an interpretation overlooks both the personal tragedy at the heart of the monument as well as the powerful visual effect of Philourgos' work. Mnasitheos' epigram is only one among many that hint at the emotionally isolating effects the death has had on the individual who set up the monument. Rather than merely flaunting their wealth, such monuments come off as vulnerable attempts to make us, strangers walking along a road, understand the profoundly destabilizing effects of loss. Looking at Mnasitheos' monument, we are asked not only to place him in our memories, but to feel affection, even desire for the boy we see. The result is a form of emotional investment in the tragedy that transforms *our own* cognition and perception, that makes us *see*, even if only analytically, through the eyes of the bereaved and feel the effects of grief in our own bodies.

A funerary monument like that of Mnasitheos, in other words, is an ideological tool that a bereaved individual can use to mold and harness the sympathy of a community.[79] Working through the subtle language of emotion, the monument is able to obscure its own agency by making us feel that our emotional engagement with it is a product of our own subjectivity, not something that it has carefully constructed on its own terms. As a visual spectacle, it insinuates a tragedy that is someone else's into our perceptual space, on our road, in our present tense. Like the love-gifts that the boy holds, the monument is able to seduce us without commanding us. It convinces us to care about individuals wealthy enough to commission such a monument not through a display of economic power, but by asking for our emotional understanding in the face of the common tragedy of mortality. When its various components are taken together, the monument emerges as a powerful mechanism for generating empathy among a

[76] For the relationship between mourning and aesthetic responses to poetic performance, see Peponi 2012: 33-69.
[77] This sort of generalization is made explicit in some epigrams, such as *CEG* 34.
[78] Duploy 2006: 143; Cassio 2007. Such an interpretation is typical of contemporary understandings of the function of Archaic funerary sculpture, which focus on their socio-economic communicative potential and their desire to substitute the social virtues of the deceased with the monument.
[79] For the notion of "emotional communities" as an object of historical investigation, see Rosenwein 2006.

community of individuals, for constructing a shared sense of emotional identity, by compelling those of us who never knew Mnasitheos to experience Pyrrichos' tragedy as if it were our own.

CHAPTER 2

Archaic Funerary Monuments as Objects of Pity

Introduction

The exploration of Archaic funerary monuments as *semata* and *mnemata* in the first chapter has highlighted how these functions designate not merely a type of object, but a type of engagement appropriate to the object. With Mnasitheos' stele, we saw how a funerary monument can draw a viewer into the sphere of the mourner's grief, even as it affirms the viewer's outsider perspective as not equivalent to that of the mourner. But we can go much further than simply stating that the viewer feels something like grief, or an analytic form of grief, when looking at a *sema* or *mnema*. For we know from monuments such as that of Kroisos the name given to the emotion the viewer is meant to feel:

> στεῦθι : καὶ οἴκτιρον : Κροίσο | παρὰ σεῖμα θανόντος :
> hόν ποτ' ἐνὶ προμάχοις : ὄλεσε | θοῦρος : Ἄρες.
> *CEG* 27

> Stand and pity by the *sema* of Kroisos, dead,
> whom fierce Ares once destroyed among the front ranks.

The formula on Kroisos' monument to stand and feel pity is one of the most common in Archaic funerary epigram, and pity is expected or commanded from viewers in a number of additional inscriptions.[1] Although pity is reserved for the passerby and distinguished from stronger emotions of grief associated with family members, most scholars treat pity in this context as the same as grief or lament, with many translations not differentiating between the two.[2] Even when pity has been recognized as distinct from other emotions in Archaic funerary monuments, the injunction to feel pity is often understood to be a ritualized response and not an emotion that is actually felt.[3] Yet funerary epigrams so often call on the viewer to feel pity, to the exclusion of other named emotions, that we should expect it to be felt even when it is not explicitly named, and for pity to be the name given to whatever emotions such funerary monuments evoke in a passerby. As Kroisos' monument suggests, feeling pity was as basic to the viewer's experience of the monument as standing before it and scrutinizing it.

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[1] See Tueller 2010. The expression occurs on *CEG* 27, 28, 174B—the last of which, from the Black Sea region, breaks the dominance of Attica as the origin for such epigrams, suggesting that the few epigrams that survive do not offer a representative sample of how widespread the use of this expression was in the Archaic period. Pity is also demanded of the passerby on *CEG* 13, 51, 117, 148, while on *CEG* 43 the speaker offers pity. For the related command to stand, see also *SEG* 58:556.

[2] E.g. Day 1989; Tueller 2010. Sourvinou-Inwood is practically alone among modern commentators in pointing out that the translation of verbs for pity as weep or lament "obscures an important distinction… We should assign to *oiktiro* its proper meaning, 'feel pity for', and preserve the distinctions made by the epigrams' writers" (1995: 176).

[3] E.g. Himmelmann 1999: 17.

Despite the frequency with which pity is linked in epigrams with viewing funerary monuments, the relationship between it and sculpture has not received any serious scholarly attention.[4] Emotions in antiquity have been the focus of much recent scholarship, including several studies that investigate how pity was developed as an emotion that depended on grief and suffering but with its own patterns and rules.[5] These publications, unfortunately, have largely ignored the epigraphic material, focusing instead on literary testimony, most of which, in the Archaic period, consists of poetry.[6] Where these poetic accounts present imaginary or mythical scenarios in which pity operated, archaeologically retrieved inscriptions and monuments provide us with access to real-life tragedies, and so allow us to investigate how pity functioned within lived social practice. By bringing such evidence in dialogue with the literary testimony we can gain a much fuller understanding of how pity affected viewers of funerary monuments.

Defining Pity

Pity is not the same as grief. Pity is what enables us, when we encounter a stranger afflicted by grief, to negotiate the relationship between that grief—someone else's tragedy—and our own subjectivity. When combined with visual engagement, pity activates a particular way of looking at funerary sculpture, as two inscriptions from Attic stele bases suggest:

οἴκτιρο προσορῶ[ν] | παιδὸς τόδε σῆμα | θανόντος⋮
Σμικύθ[ο] | hός τε φίλον ὄλεσε|ν ἔλπ' (*sic*) ἀγαθέν.
CEG 51/ii.470 (fig. 8)
I feel pity as I look at this *sema* of a dead son,
of Smikuthos, who destroyed the good hope of those who loved him.

παιδὸς ἀποφθιμένοιο Κλεοίτο τῶ Μεν|εσαίχμο⋮
μνῆμ' ἐσορῶν οἴκτιρ'ὸς καλὸς | ὸν ἔθανε.
CEG 68 (fig. 9)

Of a son who died, Kleoitos the son of Menexaichmos,
looking on the *mnema* have pity that he died being so beautiful.

Although different in language and stated function (the one a *sema,* the other a *mnema*), both epigrams share a basic structural pattern that compels the viewer to confront grief with pity. In both cases, pity allows us to come to terms with the grief of bereaved parents—the only biographical information in either epigram is that the deceased was someone's child—through the structure outlined in the previous chapter:

[4] O'Sullivan 2008 briefly considers the link between Archaic funerary sculpture and pity in fifth-century tragedy.
[5] Kim 2000; Konstan 2001; Sternberg 2005a, 2006; Munteanu 2011 and 2012; Chaniotis 2012a; Chaniotis and Ducrey 2013.
[6] But several recent epigraphic studies do address emotional effects. See Tsagalis 2008; Day 2010; Chaniotis 2012b.

the disjunction of visual imminence and cognitive-affective absence. In Smikuthos' inscription, pity provides the hinge between the visually present *sema* and the now-destroyed hope and love that existed when he was alive. Providing a voice for the viewer to adopt as their own as they read aloud, the epigram emphasizes that the monument is meant to be experienced subjectively, from the perspective of an individual viewer affected by their personal sense of pity. Kleoitos' inscription, in turn, commands the viewer to use pity to focus on the paradox of the disjunction by stating that he died "being so beautiful"—as beautiful, that is, as we see him in the stele that once stood above.

Both epigrams, moreover, take advantage of their material configuration to underscore the dramatic effect of the disjunction they map. Smikuthos' carefully carved epigram is arranged on a tall base in a series of five lines, each one supplementing or altering our understanding of the previous one. The presence of a form of the verb ὄλλυμι ("to destroy") in the fourth line, for instance, might make a reader think of formulaic expressions common in both inscribed epigram and epic poetry that refer to the destruction of a man's youth at the moment of death.[7] But the final line reveals that it is the "good hopes" of those who love him that he has destroyed with his death, suddenly making present the effects of loss suffered by those who set up the monument. As we read each line downwards, away from the stele above and towards the ground where Smikuthos is buried, we likewise move from our own emotional reaction to what we see in the first line ("I feel pity as I look at…") towards the loss that haunts the bereaved family. Kleiotos' epigram, on the other hand, is spread out in longer lines on a low base for an unusually thick stele, causing us to move to our left with each line break.[8] As the second line sets up our reaction of pity, the line divides up its double-focus ("so beautiful /being, he died"), suspending the final two words on the final line as the ultimate contrast between the monument we see and the man who is dead.

As it makes us feel the disjunctive effects of grief, pity does more than simply change how we look or what we see. Instead, it implicates us in a system of social practice. In the funerary context, where pity is directed towards *semata* and *mnemata*—monuments that overtly rely on our experiences, memories and cognitive skills to interpret them—pity takes effect by involving the viewer directly. Demands for pity in epigrams are often combined with the injunction to engage physically (as in Kroisos' inscription) or visually (as in Kleoitos' and Smikuthos') with the monument.[9] Pity is usually commanded in an imperative form, as in Kroisos' and Kleoitos' epigrams, but in some cases, like Smikuthos', the inscription provides a first-person script for the viewer to read aloud and ventriloquize.

Rather than undermine the authenticity of the emotion as subjectively experienced, the direct command for pity in such inscriptions calls out to the viewer as a distinct player in the work of the funerary monument, and assigns them a proper role in the staging of mourning. In a wide-ranging study of Greek pity, focusing on its role as a tragic emotion in particular, Stephen Halliwell argues that:

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[7] E.g. *CEG* 13, for which see below.
[8] Athens, Epigraphical Museum 10641. Kissas 2000: 249 cat. C4, 300 n. 482.
[9] On standing before the monument, see Steiner 2001: 153; Lorenz 2010; Schmitz 2010: 35.

> When we feel pity, we do not share the sufferer's subjectivity: however much we may draw emotionally near to it, or move vicariously with its psychological expression, we remain, *qua* feelers of pity, outside the immediate, "first-person" reality of the pain, whether physical or mental. And that degree of psychological space, so to speak, allows pity to take on a particularly free but also intense form in theatrical settings, where, however engaged or absorbed an audience may become, it can never lose at least a subliminal awareness of its spectatorial role.[10]

It is precisely this ability to open "psychological space" that makes pity such a compelling topic of historical investigation. We cannot uncover truly subjective, anecdotal thoughts and experiences of individuals in antiquity that have not been colored by their form of cultural expression. But understanding an emotion like pity provides access to the social structures and mechanisms through which such subjective thoughts and experiences emerged, and so gives us a means to retrieve forms of experience that, although perceived as subjectively determined by ancient individuals, we can discursively reconstruct as shaped by broader cultural forces.[11]

To understand how the language of Archaic funerary epigram might unconsciously lead viewers to understand their culturally-determined experiences as emotional subjectivity, we might compare the ideological framework of the funerary monument to that outlined by Louis Althusser in his work on subject formation and state ideology. For Althusser, an individual who acknowledges something as simple as the address of a stranger on the street is implicated or "interpellated" into the ideological system espoused by the stranger—a fact that the first individual might misrecognize: "The 'obviousness' that you and I are subjects—and that that does not cause any problems—is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect."[12] The possibility of misrecognition—of the inability to see ideology at work or recognize the mechanics of subject formation—is carried out through the monument's ability to tap directly into the viewer's perceived emotional subjectivity. Misrecognition, in other words, allows us to understand our emotions as the outcome of personal psychology and individual decision-making, rather than cultural conditioning. Yet because it does, in the end, rely precisely on such cultural conditioning, the role of pity in shaping the viewer as subject allows us to speak about subjective feeling without concerning ourselves with particular historical viewers—to see the kind of subjectivity at work here as something constructed through cultural activities, such as the viewing of funerary monuments, rather than something innate in a specific human psyche.[13]

The Mechanics of Pity

Even when it is overtly commanded, pity only functions as an emotion when it is felt as a genuine response rather than a ritualized action. Reconstructing the mechanics of such a subtle, self-effacing system requires us to see the full impact of the encounter with

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[10] Halliwell 2002: 216.
[11] Compare with de Sousa's philosophical account (1987) of emotions as emerging through "paradigm scenarios."
[12] Althusser 1971: 46
[13] See Wohl 1997: xxx-xxxiii.

the monument as something greater than the sum of the fragmentary parts of it that survive today.[14] We have no records of how ancient viewers actually interacted with such monuments, and we cannot know, historically speaking, if the carefully constructed rhetorical strategies of the monuments were successful (though their widespread use for almost a century suggests they were). While our literary sources do not contain direct accounts of these interactions, they can provide poetic re-imaginings that confirm what the surviving inscriptions tell us.

In Book 17 of the *Iliad,* Achilles' horses—the only animals in the *Iliad* endowed with human qualities such as speech—see Patroklos' corpse. Realizing he is dead, they stop in their tracks and begin to weep. Frozen in grief, with wet tears marring their manes, they are compared to a funerary stele (17.434)—a metaphor that underscores not simply their frozen immobility, but the consequent channeling of all their emotional and affective engagement towards Patroklos. As they stand and weep, they attract the attention of Zeus:

> μυρομένω δ' ἄρα τώ γε ἰδὼν ἐλέησε Κρονίων,
> κινήσας δὲ κάρη προτὶ ὃν μυθήσατο θυμόν·
> ἆ δειλώ, τί σφῶϊ δόμεν Πηλῆϊ ἄνακτι
> θνητῷ, ὑμεῖς δ' ἐστὸν ἀγήρω τ' ἀθανάτω τε;
> ἦ ἵνα δυστήνοισι μετ' ἀνδράσιν ἄλγε' ἔχητον;
>
> *Il.* 17.441-5

> As he watched the mourning horses the son of Kronos pitied them
> and stirred his head and spoke to his own spirit: "Poor wretches,
> why then did we ever give you to the lord Peleus,
> a mortal man, and you yourselves are immortal and ageless?
> Only so that among unhappy men you also might be grieved?"
>
> trans. Lattimore

Just as Kleoitos' monument asks for pity that is specifically motivated by the tension between his beauty, bodied forth in the monument, and the fact that he is dead, so Zeus explains that his pity is generated by the tension between the horses' immortality and their experience of grief caused by the death of a loved one, an emotional experience normally reserved for mortals.[15] The stele metaphor suggests that it is precisely this tragic tension between the experience of the stone monument as a permanent, immortal, and unfeeling object, outside of the realm of the human experience, and its status as a social agent endowed with mortal qualities (including emotional intelligence and the visual presence of human form), that engenders pity in the viewer.

While grief can be directed towards any tragic occurrence, pity requires us to see the commonalities between two situations that, at face value, are unrelated.[16] Pity is

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[14] On this encounter, see Lorenz 2010.

[15] Schein 2002: 202. Schein suggests that Zeus implicitly links the horses' suffering to that of Thetis over the eventual death of her son Achilles. His pity, in other words, is specifically oriented towards someone who suffers by unnaturally outliving a loved one, much as pity in funerary monuments is oriented towards families who have lost children.

[16] For this aspect of pity see especially Konstan 2001.

construed empathetically either by remembering a similar previous experience or anticipating one in the future. Feeling pity, in other words, requires us to perform the same sort of metaphoric viewing that is enjoined by the *sema* and *mnema*—to take the visible scenario at hand and transform it through cognitive engagement, often through psychic imaging. A paradigmatic episode of pity in Archaic literature is the climactic encounter between Priam and Achilles at the end of the *Iliad*, when Priam comes to Achilles' tent to retrieve the corpse of his son Hektor.[17] Priam both begins and ends his first address to Achilles by entreating him to look at him and remember his own father, combining this request the second time with an appeal for pity:

> μνῆσαι πατρὸς σοῖο θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ,
> τηλίκου ὥς περ ἐγών, ὀλοῷ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ
> …
> ἀλλ' αἰδεῖο θεοὺς Ἀχιλεῦ, αὐτόν τ' ἐλέησον
> μνησάμενος σοῦ πατρός· ἐγὼ δ' ἐλεεινότερός περ
>
> *Il.* 24. 486-7, 503-4

> Achilles like the gods, remember your father, one who
> is of years like mine, and on the sorrowful door-sill of old age.
> …
> Honour then the gods, Achilles, and take pity upon me
> remembering your father, yet I am still more pitiful.
>
> trans. Lattimore, adapted

Priam, in combining his request for pity with a demand that Achilles remembers his own father who is like him in age, inserts himself into a generic category of elderly fathers who outlive their sons. The pity that Priam demands relies on his interlocutor's ability to combine two different and potentially exclusive relationships he has with elderly men—his love for his father and his hatred for Priam—by focusing on the generic qualities they share. In asking Achilles to remember his own father, Priam asks him to make an image of him present in his mind that he can compare with his visual experience of Priam.[18] When Achilles acknowledges Priam's request, the coincidence of their remembering and grieving leads to a symbiotic relationship between the two, who are now described, like Achilles' immortal horses, in the dual:

> τὼ δὲ μνησαμένω ὃ μὲν Ἕκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο
> κλαῖ' ἀδινὰ προπάροιθε ποδῶν Ἀχιλῆος ἑλυσθείς,
> αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς κλαῖεν ἑὸν πατέρ', ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε
> Πάτροκλον· τῶν δὲ στοναχὴ κατὰ δώματ' ὀρώρει.
>
> *Il.* 24.509-12

> The two remembered, as Priam sat huddled
> at the feet of Achilles and wept close for manslaughtering Hektor

[17] On this episode and its relationship to Aristotelian conceptions of pity, see Munteanu 2012: 122-3.
[18] Munteanu 2012: 123.

> and Achilleus wept now for his own father, now again
> for Patroklos. The sound of their mourning moved in the house.
> trans. Lattimore

Achilles' pity for Priam is here framed as discursively derived from his mourning not only for the anticipated death of his father Peleus, as Priam requested, but for an actual death that has left him traumatized, his recent loss of Patroklos.

Achilles' pity can readily be described in terms outlined by Aristotle in his account of pity in the second book of the *Rhetoric*.[19] As Munteanu notes, just as Aristotle argues that we feel pity when we remember having suffered or expect we will suffer the same kind of misfortune as someone else (*Rh.* 2.1386a1-3), Achilles reaches both into his memories of suffering (Patroklos' death) and his anticipation of future suffering (his bereaved father) to engender pity for Priam.[20] Moreover, just as Aristotle argues that pity develops when tragedy is placed before the eyes through mental imaging, Achilles' pity is not simply an emotional but a visual experience: a mental image conjured up through memory is able to make him look at veridical reality—Priam—in a new light.[21] Priam does not simply resemble Achilles' father, much less Patroklos. Instead, by focusing on the generic characteristics they share, Achilles is able to use visual imaging to translate Priam's loss into a form that Achilles can himself experience—an experience which generates empathy.

This ability of pity to take a generic scenario and give it personal meaning by structuring it according to the same form allows us, in the funerary context, to generate specific identities for statues that appear at first glance formulaic.[22] Kouroi, for instance, are famously difficult to age, sometimes combining the hairless face or prepubescent genitalia of a youth with the proportions and muscle development of an adult. Moreover, their appearance does not always correspond with the facts about the deceased stated in the epigram. Kroisos, for instance, died in battle, and must have looked older—and had a

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[19] On Aristotle's account of pity see Konstan 2001 (esp. 128-36); Munteanu 2012: 70-138.
[20] Munteanu 2012: 122-4.
[21] On the Aristotelian expression "before the eyes" in relation to pity see Munteanu 2012: 85-103. This transformation of Priam in Achilles' eyes is illustrated by the comparison of Priam to a murderer at *Il.* 24.480-4. Two lines are devoted to the wonder Priam's supernatural appearance inspires in his onlookers, including Achilles. The comparison of Priam's wondrous appearance to that of a fugitive homicide sets up the visual transformation brought on by Achilles' pity by suggesting that the difference between Priam and Achilles is one of perspective. The simile might at first seem out of place: the murderous suppliant appearing before the wealthy foreign man in the simile seems to invert the appearance of the innocent king Priam before the man who killed his son. Yet the comparison underscores the similarity between the two men, opening up a framework for empathetic interaction. Just as in a simile Priam can be compared with a murderer and Achilles with an innocent man, pity is predicated on Achilles' realization that their roles could have been reversed: Hektor's father is just as deserving of pity as his own, if neither will see his son alive again. Wondrous appearance, once again, provides the hinge by which alternative visual experiences of the same stimulus are made possible. Visual wonder closes the episode as well, as Achilles and Priam stare at one another (24.629-33).
[22] On the generic quality of the kouros, see Stewart 1986; Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 241; Elsner 2006: 75; Neer 2010: 39-40.

less delicate appearance—than the young man we see in the statue that stood above.[23] Instead, it is the generic quality of the visual presence that allows us to experience empathetically what it would be like to be affected directly by the tragedy at hand. Just as Achilles sees both his father and Patroklos in Priam's grief, generic presence allows us to generate a specific identity on our own terms. The result is that a viewer can use the loss of potentially any male relative or friend that they have suffered to come to terms with what they see in the kouros.

Funerary sculptures are configured so as to dramatize the transformative effects pity has on viewers standing before seemingly inert, unchanging objects. Kroisos' kouros offers an image of the deceased as a beautiful young man, with a perfect naked body and a beaming smile—the enigmatic "Archaic smile" that marks so many sculptures of the period (fig. 10; see also fig. 1). In other contexts, this smile might symbolize some form of divine radiance.[24] But on a dead man, it can only inspire pity, as a story from Book Five of Herodotus' *Histories* illustrates. In response to an oracle that the baby Kypselos will grow up to dominate Corinth, the ruling Bacchiadai plot to kill the infant (5.92). Herodotus recounts how ten Bacchiadai arrived at the house of Kypselos' mother Labda intending to smash the newborn to the ground. But when the man charged with the murder takes the child in his arms, it suddenly smiles at him. This sight causes pity (*oiktos*) to overtake him, which in turn compels him to spare the child. He passes the baby, and the responsibility for the murder, on to the next man. But the pitiable effect of the baby's smile transfixes each man in turn, saving the child's life and making the men failures at their task.[25]

A smiling baby in itself is not pitiable, but it becomes an object of pity when threatened with death. Just as the incongruity of the smiling baby with its fate causes pity in the eyes of each man, the sight of a young man with a broad smile, when viewed in conjunction with an epigram stating that it stands above the grave of a dead man, becomes an object of pity.[26] As Kypselos' story illustrates, pity asks us to look differently, but also makes us act differently. Pity politicizes our vision, making us not just bystanders but witnesses, responsible for acting on what we see.

Standing before Kroisos' monument and feeling pity, it is difficult to see the kouros' smile as a mere symbol.[27] Formed by thick lips ending in deeply pinched corners that create prominent nasolabial folds, the smile is animated by the exaggerated features of the face. His eyes are bulging and wide-open, barely encased by the lower and upper lids. The ears blend into the patterning of the hair, the swirl of the helix matching the

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[23] Stewart 1997: 66.

[24] On the smile, see Stewart 1986: 63-4; Ridgway 1993: 19-20 (with n. 1.21 for bibliography); Stieber 2004: 49-55; Neer 2010: 157; Hallett 2012: 96-100.

[25] See Sternberg 2006: 25-6, who stresses the role of sight in engendering pity in this passage.

[26] A similar story occurs in Book 1.112, where Astyages orders that his grandson Cyrus be killed by a herdsman. When the herdsman's wife sees how "great and beautiful in form" (*mega kai eueides*) the child is, she implores him to spare the baby. Although pity is not explicitly mentioned, the woman's tears and supplication, derived from her reaction to the baby's physical attractiveness, seem to imply it. Interestingly, the woman substitutes her own dead baby with this one, exchanging one body for the other while preserving the visual appearance of continuity, like a funerary monument. See Sternberg 2006: 33.

[27] Cf. Pollitt's claim that the smile is "not so much an emotion as a symbol, for [kouroi] are beyond emotion in the ordinary sense of the word" (1972: 9).

increasing size of the snail curls that radiate out from the center of the forehead with a ripple-like effect.[28] These features exude a beautiful, artfully composed image of a living human. The violent death reported in the inscription cuts through them, exposing them as a contradiction of veridical reality, and causing us, against our will, to kill the image we see. As we obey the inscription and stand before it, as we remind ourselves that we cannot see someone who has been slaughtered by Ares on a distant battlefield, the statue stiffens: the eyes become fixed, gazing past ours, its smile turning into yet another geometrical pattern on the symmetrical surface of the stone. Unlike Kypselos' smile, Kroisos' cannot save him. But just as pity is the mechanism through which the Bacchiadai's henchmen see the baby differently, pity offers a way for us to extend ourselves into this tragedy by turning the statue into someone whom, at the very least, we wish we could save.

Pity and Others

Far from a mere ritualized response, pity is a form of embodied engagement, one that transforms the pitier as much as the object of pity. When Achilles comes to terms with the similarities between Priam's situation and his own, he does so by describing the uncertain lot of all mankind and the random distribution of fates that affects all mortals (*Il.* 24.527-42). As Crotty argues, "Achilles' ultimate ability to appreciate the similarity of another's experience to his own […] reflects a more complex self. In appreciating his resemblance to another, Achilles no longer confines his reactions to the immediate stimulus but can see in another's distress the kind of danger to which he is *in general*, or *as a kind of being*, exposed."[29] Pity emerges as a mechanism for recursively generating empathy between two unrelated or even opposed persons by finding common ground in the tragedy of mortality, capable of drawing even outsiders into its circle, as Zeus' pity suggests. Disjunctive visualization—seeing something in our minds that is not really there—provides a way to articulate the paradoxical state of mortal existence that affects us all, even when we are not grieving.

The flash of self-recognition that accompanies pity makes the concerns of others our own. In Bacchylides' fifth ode, the poet uses an encounter between Herakles and Meleager to illustrate that no man, no matter how prosperous or victorious, is fortunate in all things. Meleager's shining armor catches Herakles' eye as he descends into the underworld. Thinking he is in the presence of a worthy opponent—a living man with all his strength intact—Herakles reacts with fear, reaching for his arrows. Yet the Meleager he sees is mere *eidolon* (68) that entreats him not to shoot at the souls of the dead. Meleager explains how he died, describing his death as the disintegration of his corporeal self—the diminution of his soul, the lessening of his strength, the loss of shining youth—an account which causes Herakles to cry tears of pity for the only time in his life:

μινύνθη δέ μοι ψυχὰ γλυκεῖα,
γνῶν δ' ὀλιγοσθενέων·
αἰαῖ: πύματον δὲ πνέων δάκρυσα τλ[άμων
ἀγλαὰν ἥβαν προλείπων.

[28] For Kroisos' face, see Neer 2010: 42-3.
[29] Crotty 1994: 79 (italics original). On Achilles' pity as a theme in the *Iliad* see Kim 2000.

φασὶν ἀδεισιβόαν
Ἀμφιτρύωνος παῖδα μοῦνον δὴ τότε
τέγξαι βλέφαρον, ταλαπενθέος
πότμον οἰκτίροντα φωτός·
Bacch. 5.151-58

"My sweet life was diminished within me
and I realized that I had little strength left,
alas! And as I breathed my last I wept in misery
at leaving behind my glorious youth."
They say that Amphitryon's son, fearless of the battle cry,
shed tears then and only then,
pitying the fate of the grief-suffering man.
trans. Campbell

The disjunctive nature of the encounter with the deceased is familiar from Achilles and Patroklos or Admetos and Alkestis.[30] But where those encounters depended on activation of memories by the person suffering from grief, pity, relying nonetheless on the same structure, enables even strangers to form emotional bonds. Herakles' recognition of Meleager first as a living man, a warrior like him, and then as a mere image, one who inspires pity, is tantamount to a recognition of his own death, foreshadowed in the mention of Deianeira—the sister of Meleager and the future wife of Herakles, who will eventually kill him—at the end of the episode. Herakles comes to pity Meleager's fate because in it he sees his own.[31]

The structure and language of Meleager's encounter with Herakles echoes our encounter with a monument such as Kroisos' kouros—first as a fully-formed presence of a man, and then, upon reading the inscription, as a mere image of that man, one that deserves our pity. This sort of encounter is staged explicitly by some funerary epigrams, such as one of the earliest preserved, from c. 575-550 BCE, for a man named Tetichos:

[εἴτε ἀστό]ς τις ἀνὲρ εἴτε χσένος |ἄλοθεν ἐλθὸν ⋮
Τέτιχον οἰκτίρα|ς ἄνδρ᾽ ἀγαθὸν παρίτο, ⋮
ἐν πολέμοι | φθίμενον, νεαρὰν hέβεν ὀλέσαν|τα. ⋮
ταῦτ᾽ἀποδυράμενοi νῆσθε ἐπ|ὶ πρᾶγμ᾽ ἀγαθόν.
CEG 13

Whether it is a man from town or a stranger from elsewhere approaching,
let him pass by once he has pitied Tetichos, a good man.
He died in battle and destroyed his youthful prime.
Having lamented these things, go on to a good deed.

Tetichos' monument uses pity to draw a viewer—openly addressed as a stranger—into the personal tragedy of a death in battle. Like Herakles facing Meleager,

[30] See also *Od.* 11.55: when he encounters Elpenor's *eidolon* in the underworld, Odysseus is struck by the appearance of a man who remains unburied and feels pity.
[31] Burnett 1985: 145-46.

we encounter the deceased as a mere image through the stele that was likely carved or painted. The inscription, like Meleager's account of how he left behind his "glorious youth," emphasizes the destruction of Tetichos' "youthful prime," his sudden extradition from the normal timeline of a man's development and the disintegration of his self into its material and affective components. The viewer who happens upon Tetichos' monument, reads the inscription, looks and feels pity, and finally goes "on to a good deed" is a changed individual, one whose initial pity transforms into something closer to lamentation, and whose actions are now motivated by an empathetic inclination towards fellow mortals. The monument, in other words, not only promotes Tetichos as a "good man" but, through emotional engagement, impels us to use him as a moral paradigm for our own behavior.

Pity and the Work of Art

This self-reflexive power of pity, already visible in Archaic material, is made explicit in several episodes in fifth-century tragedies, such as Cassandra's final onstage words in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon.* At the apex of her powerful account of psychic visions that, as the chorus frequently remarks, have no veridical existence outside of Cassandra's own mind, Cassandra predicts her own murder. The chorus pities her fate (1321), but Cassandra generalizes her situation, explaining that the fragility of human existence, which she likens to that of a painting, is far more pitiable than her individual death:

> ἰὼ βρότεια πράγματ᾽: εὐτυχοῦντα μὲν
> σκιᾷ τις ἂν πρέψειεν[32]: εἰ δὲ δυστυχῇ,
> βολαῖς ὑγρώσσων σπόγγος ὥλεσεν γραφήν.
> καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐκείνων μᾶλλον οἰκτίρω πολύ.
>
> Aesch. *Aga.* 1326-30

> Alas for the affairs of men. For when they are fortunate
> one could liken them to a shadow. But if they are unfortunate,
> a moistened sponge destroys the painting by striking it.
> And I feel much greater pity for this than for that.

The appearance of good fortune, Cassandra explains, is like that of a shadow or *skia*—a word commonly used, like *eidolon*, to describe an individual's visible appearance that lacks any cognitive-affective properties.[33] Just as the *eidolon* dissipates when a hand reaches towards it, the appearance of human affairs is destroyed by striking it with a wet sponge—an act that simultaneously erases the image and exposes its true nature a painted illusion (*graphe*). Not only has fortune changed, but the sponge also reveals that even the

[32] As emended from the manuscript, which reads: σκιά τις ἂν τρέψειεν.
[33] For *skian* see *Od.* 10.495, where those who exist in the underworld as merely *skiai* are contrasted with Teiresias, who, in addition to his visible existence, has *noos* and *phrenes*. See also Eur. *And.* 745.

appearance of good fortune was a false one, a mere shadow.[34] Pity emerges through the realization that what appeared to be reality was nothing more than a painting, just as a living human is revealed to be nothing more than a fleeting image at the moment of death. As she enters the house where she will soon be murdered, Cassandra suggests that the chorus, and by extension we as the audience, should pity her death not because of her individual tragedy, but because of what her situation reveals to us about our own material ephemerality.

A similar correlation between pity, the image, and the illusionary nature of human existence occurs near the beginning of Sophocles' *Ajax,* when Odysseus pities the sight of his enemy, the once mighty Ajax, driven mad and blind by Athena. In observing and pitying him, Odysseus reveals how his emotional state not only affects how he perceives Ajax, but how he looks at himself:

> Athena: ὁρᾷς, Ὀδυσσεῦ, τὴν θεῶν ἰσχὺν ὅση;
> τούτου τίς ἄν σοι τἀνδρὸς ἢ προνούστερος
> ἢ δρᾶν ἀμείνων ηὑρέθη τὰ καίρια;
> Odysseus: ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδέν' οἶδ'· ἐποικτίρω δέ νιν
> δύστηνον ἔμπας, καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ,
> ὀθούνεκ' ἄτῃ συγκατέζευκται κακῇ,
> οὐδὲν τὸ τούτου μᾶλλον ἢ τοὐμὸν σκοπῶν·
> ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν
> εἴδωλ' ὅσοιπερ ζῶμεν ἢ κούφην σκιάν.
>
> Soph. *Aj.* 118-126

> Athena: Do you see, Odysseus, how great is the power of the gods?
> Whom could you have found more mindful than this man
> or more capable at doing what was called for?
> Odysseus: I know of no one. But nonetheless I pity him,
> touched by disaster as he is, even though he is my enemy,
> because he is yoked to an evil derangement.
> I look at his situation as no different than my own.
> For I see that all of us, as many as are alive,
> are nothing but images or empty shadow.

Athena draws Odysseus' attention to the gap between the intelligent Ajax he knows and the madman he sees. Odysseus responds with pity, which allows him to negotiate the disjunction by recognizing that what he sees of Ajax is nothing more than an empty image (*eidolon*) of his former self. But pity simultaneously transforms Odysseus' own sense of self. Like Herakles or Cassandra, he sees both his own tragedy and the tragedy of human existence more generally in the image before him.[35]

Odysseus remarks that Ajax does not merely expose himself as an *eidolon* or *skia* with no psychological depth, but reveals that all human beings—a group that includes not

[34] The violent language of throwing the sponge (βολαῖς and ὤλεσεν in particular) reminds us of an earlier passage in the play of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, who is likewise compared to a painting and seen as pitiful. See O'Sullivan 2008.
[35] Munteanu 2012: 191.

only the characters on stage but us as spectators of the play—are mere images, things as materially fragile as paintings or sculptures. The pity we feel for others, he suggests, forces us to come to terms with our own evanescent existence. In doing so, we stitch the staged tragedy at hand into the reality of our lives, and gain an understanding of how someone else's tragedy—the tragedy of a shadow, an image, a sculpture—might be our own. Just as pity reveals the fragility of our mortality, so too does the work of art, with its unstable relationship between medium and image. The stone, divorced from its animate image, makes us aware of the pitiable gap between our own bodies and our affective identities—aware, in other words, that we ourselves are subject to our own material limitations.

If Tetichos' epigram, seen above, attempts to use the tragedy at hand to influence the viewer's future actions, other epigrams seem to structure the monument as directly connected to the viewer's current intentions and goals:

> ἄνθροπε hὸστείχε[ι]ς : καθ᾽οδὸν : φρασὶν : ἄλα μενοινῶν, :
> στῆθι | καὶ οἴκτιρον : σῆμα Θράσονος : ἰδόν.
> *CEG* 28
>
> Mortal, you who are approaching along the road, intent with other things on your mind,
> take a stand and feel pity while looking at the *sema* of Thrason.

Thrason's epigram, already discussed in Chapter 1, explicitly invokes the monument's ability to disrupt our routine—our path along the road, the "other things" on our mind—by making us stand in front of it. Our pity acknowledges the monument's material place within this routine, but also its distinction from us. Like us, the monument occupies physical space—is here and real—but unlike us it lacks the ability to move or have thoughts. As we feel pity, we realize that the deceased cannot participate in activities we take for granted, and so acknowledge how our own actions—the very fact that we walk along this road, the impulse we have followed to stop in front of this monument, our capacity to emote—inscribes us within a social system in which funerary monuments also participate, but in which the deceased cannot.

The Sculpted Self

Like the majority of the epigrams explored in this and the previous chapter, Thrason's was inscribed on the base for a stele that does not survive. But we know from stelai that have survived that the deceased was always figured in generic elite social roles, such as those of warriors, athletes, and even symposiasts. These extant stelai allow us to see how such monuments were specifically configured in ways that enable our pity by encouraging us to see ourselves in their imagery. A typical (if battered) example, dating, like Thrason's epigram, from the mid sixth-century, is the so-called Gorgon stele, which shows a naked youth with elegantly coiffed hair holding a spear—a generic figure who simultaneously embodies male beauty, athleticism, and military training (fig. 11).[36] His

[36] Athens, NM 2687. Richter 1961: cat. 27; Kaltsas 2002: cat. 50.

form is closely cropped within the confines of the narrow vertical stone, his proportions exaggerated as if stretched towards the top of the monument. Standing in strict profile facing right, the youth's erect posture and splayed feet align him with the left and lower edge of his frame, while the tip of the spear merges into the right-hand border.

Such relief figures, penned in by the constraints of the rectangular block of marble, are usually seen as operating in a fundamentally different manner than free-standing kouroi, who fully occupy three-dimensional space.[37] Yet relief stelai often surpassed kouroi in size and often in the complexity of their design, and were set up at family tumuli side-by-side with kouroi. Moreover, as we have seen, their epigrams are interchangeable in terms of structure and content, suggesting that they served the same function for the same population.[38] I argue that stelai, rather than offer a political or social alternative to more traditional kouroi, expand the range of possibilities for visualizing the deceased as an object of pity—helping to explain the increasing popularity of funerary relief sculpture in the late Archaic period and its dominance after the Persian Wars.

Relief stelai and three-dimensional funerary sculptures share a close relationship not simply because of the scale of the figures but because of technique: both aspire to present figures that are not just virtually depicted, but take up physical space. Archaic relief is often seen as flat, planar, and constricted by borders. But the youth on the Gorgon stele is not, in fact, fully inscribed within the raised border surrounding him. The background is concave, suggesting a virtual space beneath the surface in which the figure is inscribed, yet the depth of the relief is so great that the figure's surface, now badly damaged, would have projected beyond the flat surface of the stele as preserved in the raised border. The figure, in other words, would have been closer to us than the planar surface of the stele outside of the pictorial space.[39] In relationship both to the sides of the stele and the depth of its virtual space, the youth is experienced outside of it rather than within in.

The sculptor establishes this effect not only through the layering of the relief, but through details such as the big toe of the left foot, which, rather than aligning itself with the right edge of the frame, punctures it (fig. 12). The toe does not simply merge into the border or overlay it as does, for example, the youth's left calf. Instead, it fully penetrates it, making the toe visible when the stele is viewed from the side. The border stops for a few centimeters, its edges carefully finished above and below the toe so as not to encroach upon it. The result is a subtle inversion of the pictorial logic of the image: borders that appear fixed are exposed as permeable, and so a figure that appears to exist beyond us, within a virtual space set off by the straight edges of the block of stone, suddenly moves closer, edging towards our own physical space.

The figure of the youth contrasts in scale, posture, and technique with the Gorgon depicted in the predella below which gives the stele its modern name (fig. 13). If the

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[37] Neer 2010: 186-7 (who argues for a political differentiation). See also D'Onofrio 1982: 167 and 1985; Stewart 1990: 50 (who argues for a more referential distinction, with the stelai, unlike the kouroi, constructing the deceased as a social being); Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 264-70 (who assimilates free-standing and relief monuments on the basis of iconography rather than technique).

[38] Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 267.

[39] Summers 2003: 448-9 for the idea of original planes. See also Neer 2010: 185-6.

youth seems to pop forward, almost out of the frame, the Gorgon's gaze reminds us of the innate capacity of human flesh to suddenly turn into stone.[40] Carved in shallower relief, the Gorgon's *Knielauf* posture, frontal face, and balanced, swastika-like arrangement of limbs lend her figure a flat appearance, flush with the background. Unlike the youth, the Gorgon is inscribed precisely within the framed panel, her body reaching to the edge of the space on all four sides and her left foot pushed up against the side band. The meander patterning of the gorgon's chiton and the extremely low, almost engraved relief used to render it replicate the meander pattern which frames the upper and lower bands surrounding the panel, assimilating her further with the geometrical structure of the block itself. Both technically and iconographically, the Gorgon serves to provoke a pitiful response, undercutting the vividness of the image above and, with her gaze, making us aware of the disjunctive nature of our own mortality.

The Gorgon stele offers only one possible configuration of a stele monument, and different combinations of images, techniques, and epigrams will allow for different interpretations and experiences. Yet in its willingness to push its principal figure beyond the seemingly constrictive frame towards the viewer's space, it is hardly unique. On the well-known stele of Aristion, the big toe of the left foot, the buttocks, and the right calf go over the banded edge of the monument (fig. 14).[41] On a stele fragment showing a youth holding an aryballos, the extended thumb of the left hand pushes into the raised band (fig. 15).[42] On the shaft of a stele showing a hoplite (fig 16), the toe of the left foot cuts through the band that borders the stele (fig 17), as do the knuckles of the left hand, curled around a spear shaft (fig. 18).[43] The spear held by a youth on another stele projects upwards beyond the frame of the relief onto the flat, smooth surface of the blank stele, where it is lightly indicated in a technique that assimilates it with the decorative motifs of engraved lines that frame the relief (fig. 19).[44]

Projection beyond the frame is only one technique used to push the image of the deceased forward. Some reliefs use props held by the central figure. Two different stelai show young men holding a discus over the shoulder, its circumference framing the profile head like a massive halo (figs. 20 and 21).[45] The discus provides a third relief layer between the background and the head, pushing the profile forward, while in each case the figure's left hand holds the discus with the thumb visible on the front but the other fingers hidden behind, creating an even greater sense of depth and layering. Another relief fragment, belonging to the largest-known funerary monument of the Archaic period, shows a helmeted man holding a shield, which is placed behind him and so presumably held in his left hand (fig. 22).[46] The visible interior of the shield sinks its concave form into the background of the relief, but at the same time its circumference is inscribed within the outer limits of the stele, so that its edges overlap the raised borders of the

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[40] Stewart 1997: 182-6. For another Archaic funerary stele with a gorgon see New York MMA 55.11.4.
[41] Athens, NM 29. Richter 1961: cat. 67; Kaltsas 2002: cat. 100.
[42] Athens, NM 5826. Kaltsas 2002: cat. 54.
[43] Athens, NM 3071 Richter 1961: cat. 46; Kaltsas 2002: cat. 86.
[44] Athens, NM 2825. Richter 1961: cat. 29.
[45] Athens, NM 4474. Richter 1961: cat. 26; Kaltsas 2002: cat. 52. Athens, NM 38. Richter 1961: cat. 25; Kaltsas 2002: cat. 55.
[46] Athens, NM 4801. Richter 1961: cat. 47; Kallipolitis 1969; Ridgway 1993: 233.

relief. The figure appears, in other words, within a niche-like space that is, at the same time, placed in front of the surface of the stele itself.

Finally, we should remember that figures that appear almost flush with their background today would have stood out in antiquity through the addition of brightly-colored paint, creating not only a distinction through color but also possibly through texture and finish. Although carved in relief, the ability of such figures to overcome their pictorial confinement, combined with their large scale, allows them to compete with free-standing kouroi as visceral, haptically-present images which work in tandem with the function of the monument as a *sema* or *mnema* to suggest new visual realities.[47]

Just as such visual realities are undercut in epigrams by pity's appeal to veridical reality, these figures, made prominent by both technique and scale, are contrasted on many stelai with subsidiary figures like the Gorgon. The Gorgon is a rare example of a mythological subject on such panels, which usually illustrate idealized versions of elite activities, especially horse-riding. Like the Gorgon, however, they are often carefully inscribed within the small confines of the predella, carved in much flatter relief or in some cases merely painted, in contrast to the robust carving of the principal figure above.[48] Such scenes are usually considered to have only minimal meaning, derived entirely from their symbolic content and defining the social persona of the deceased in generic terms. Depictions of elite activities, for instance, are seen as communicating that the deceased (or, at any rate, the family who set up the monument) aspired to be seen as elite.[49] From a compositional perspective, however, the multiplication of images and techniques undermines the individuality of the principal image as a portrait of the deceased. The proliferation of scenes of horsemen might remind us, for instance, that we are ourselves travellers on a road.[50] Almost all such images, such as a stele fragment now in Rome (fig. 23), show the riders coming to a halt, as we do when we stop to look at the monument. [51] Just as the command of Kroisos' monument to stop forces us to align our

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[47] Figures in Attic vase painting (both black-figure and red-figure) often overlap the boundaries of pictorial frames as a form of mimetic projection; see Hurwit 1977.

[48] On a fragmentary stele in Athens (National Archaeolological Museum 31; Richter 1961: cat. 71; Kaltsas 2002: cat. 99), for instance, the principal figure is sculpted in relief, while a horseman depicted in small scale below is only painted. The relief serves as a salutary reminder that many other reliefs could have been decorated with subsidiary painted decoration that is now lost. See also a stele in New York (Metropolitan Museum of Art 38.11.13; Richter 1961: cat. 45) in which the principal figure of a hoplite is carved in a robust, deep relief, overlaying the guilloche decoration on the sides, and the figure of a warrior mounting a chariot below is rendered in a delicate engraved technique, mirroring that of the guilloche.

[49] See eg. Kosmopoulou 2002: 62 n. 125. Kosmopoulou, synthesizing the earlier literature, argues that relief bases gave viewers additional information about the deceased, providing generic scenes that contributed to their social persona (2002: 52-55). D'Onofrio 1986 argues that the bases show scenes of *paideia*, the education of a young man that leads to the status of *aner aristos* that she sees as symbolized in the kouroi that stood above. Sourvinou-Inwood (1995: 220-1, 275): warrior mounting chariot is "heroic" image referring to deceased's connection with war or chariot racing, indicating the social persona of the deceased.

[50] The imperative "*stethi*" (stop!) found on Kroisos' epigram could ask a rider to bring his horse to a halt just as easily as it could ask someone on foot to stop walking. For the use of the verb *histemi* to refer to bringing horses to a halt, see *Il.* 5.755, Herodotus 5.111.

[51] Stele fragment in Barracco Museum, Rome: Richter 1961: cat. 64.

bodies with the kouros, these horsemen stand in the same pose as the figures above, aligned with their profile orientation and creating a sense of physical empathy.

While these scenes usually show a single horseman, others portray more complex scenes. A cavetto capital from Lamptrai (fig. 24) seems to link the presence of a rider explicitly with the absence of the deceased, who was probably shown on the shaft of the missing stele.[52] The capital, carved in delicate engraved relief, shows a single rider taking charge of two horses, holding the shield of an absent second man as well as his own. The horseman sits between two panels of mourning figures on the lateral faces of the capital, further emphasizing the scene's role in figuring the emotional effects of the death. The single rider is normally interpreted as a squire, but why a squire would gain such a prominent position on the monument is difficult to explain.[53] Perhaps, instead, the rider is simply the fellow citizen—potentially us—one whose very ability to ride a horse underscores the gap between us and the deceased, signaled by the second, abandoned horse.

An equally elaborate scene occurs on a large base for a now-lost stele from the Kerameikos (fig. 25).[54] On the lateral face, where other bases were inscribed with epigrams, we find a series of four horsemen in relief, the first two riders pulling at the reins and slowing their horses, and the last two more or less at a standstill. Even though each figure is marked by distinctive clothing or hairstyle, their overall similar appearance and alignment one after the other suggests a collective group of individuals once again empathetically aligned with one another—in contrast to the deceased, presumably shown as a single, isolated figure above. In its original context, sunk into the earth, the ground line for the scene would have been the same ground we stand on, so that even with their small scale the virtual space occupied by the riders would be assimilated with our own. Such secondary figures open up a broader visual field in which we can find not just the deceased but ourselves, allowing us to visualize how our own actions and identities are already inscribed within the same structural paradigms as those that now govern the deceased in his disjunctive state.

The versatility of the horse and rider as funerary imagery meant that it could even be used to illustrate the monument's principal figure in the form of large-scale freestanding statues. The base for one such monument, with its epigram and the artist's signature, survives from the Kerameikos.[55] The epigram is placed on one of the short ends of the long base, indicating that when we read it we face the horse and rider head-on, confronting them directly. Our initial inclination might be to take the horseman we face as a representation of the deceased himself, but the epigram, like all Archaic epigrams, suggests that "this *sema*" and the deceased, whom we directly address, are not one and the same:

> [σ]ῆμα τόδε, Χσενόφαντε, | πατέρ σο<ι> θῆκε θανόντι |
> Σόφιλος hôι πένθος | θῆκας ἀποφθίμενος. |
> Ἀριστοκλῆς ἐποίεσεν.

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[52] Athens, NM 41. Richter 1961: cat. 20; Kaltsas 2002: cat. 65.
[53] Sourvinou-Inwood (1995: 226) and Richter (1961: 18-19) see the Lamptrai figure as a squire.
[54] Athens, Kerameikos Museum 1001. Kosmopoulou 2002: 164-66 cat. 7.
[55] Perhaps associated with fragments of an equestrian statue found built into the Themistoclean wall. For the monument, see Eaverly 1995: 87-93.

CEG 50

This *sema*, Xenophantos, your father Sophilos set up for you, dead,
for whom you set up grief when you died.
Aristokles made it.

The repetition of the same verb (θῆκε, θῆκας) for the actions of both the father and the deceased son creates a reciprocal effect: the father has erected this monument for his son just as his son erected grief (πένθος) for him, alluding to the correlation between the structure of grief and that of sculpture we have already seen.[56] The statue, in other words, has been set up not to show the deceased so much as instantiate the emotional effects of his death—to make the loss materially real. Addressing the deceased directly on behalf of his mourning father, we are suddenly charged with mediating between father and son. As we read and look, we might in turn see a reciprocal effect between our own presence and that of the statue we face. Just as it provides the material instantiation of a father's grief above his son's corpse, the statue serves not as a representation so much as a hinge between us and the deceased: we might see Xenophantos in the horse and rider before us, but we might equally see ourselves.

Other imagery found on funerary monuments is even more far-reaching than the equestrian scenes. An unusual series of bases for kouroi is decorated in relief with scenes of elite sporting and leisure activities—ball games, wrestling, and staged dog and cat fights (fig 26).[57] The scenes, balanced in composition, symmetrical in their arrangement of figures, show elite social practice as coordinated activities that rely on multiple individuals acting in concert. The carving of these bases is often noted as among the most adventurous in late Archaic art, showing young men twisting and turning their bodies in vivid poses rendered in daring perspective, yet carved in shallow relief. These figures, needless to say, would have formed a distinct contrast with the kouros above. Like the equestrian figures, they are normally seen as further attempts to define an elite social persona for the deceased. Yet, like epigrams carved in the same location on a statue base, their meaning resides less in their specific iconography than their ability to pull us back from an unmediated interaction with the statue above.

Like epigrams such as those of Tetichos or Thrason, these scenes of elite athletic activities and competitive sports suggest social spheres in which *we* might continue to participate, or aspire to participate, but in which the deceased cannot. Where the kouros above is singular and asocial, the reliefs below depict contests and games involving multiple figures. The contrast that emerges between the reliefs and the kouros is, I would suggest, the same one Thrason's epigram structures—our vibrant movement and social engagement within a defined virtual space, set up against a singular, unmoving, purely visual existence. The base uses small-scale relief to visualize scenes of action discursively, its flat surfaces opening up through foreshortening and other optical

[56] On the two meanings of *tithemi* with reference to *CEG* 113, which has a similar construction, see Meyer 2005: 60-61. Cf. *Iliad* 17.37 where Euphorbus tells Menelaus that by killing his brother he "erected grief" (πένθος ἔθηκας) for his parents.
[57] Stewart 1990: 112-3.

techniques as vistas into elite social activities.[58] The kouros, on the other hand, takes up actual physical space, providing an image that is full-scale and visible from multiple angles, yet lacks a sense of place, time, or narrative. The more we look at the reliefs, the more we are able to animate them by drawing the figures out of their flat surfaces and placing them in a virtual space. The longer we look at the kouros, the more we realize how out of place his physical presence is in our space, how dead he really is.

If this interpretation is accepted, we might be able to see a statue base from Lamptrai that has traditionally been excluded from the corpus of funerary monuments in a new light (fig. 27).[59] Because of its iconography, the base is usually assumed to have supported a cult statue of Herakles, yet it cannot be associated with any known cult site. Moreover, no non-funerary relief bases are known from any Attic site except the Acropolis. The rural findspot suggests it might instead have belonged to a funerary monument: other funerary monuments are known from Lamptrai, such as the cavetto capital discussed above, and the base is of a type familiar from other Attic funerary monuments.[60] The cutting in its surface indicates that the statue placed above stood with the left foot forward. This could easily have been a kouros.[61]

The base shows scenes from the life of Herakles carved in relief on three sides. The two lateral faces show struggles between Herakles and Kerberos (on the left side) and the Nemean Lion (on the right, fig. 27). Although ostensibly mythological, the figures are isolated and enlarged, filling the entire space available, highlighting the nature of the struggle over the narrative they illustrate. Like a funerary base for a kouros that sets up a visual comparison between athletic ball games on one side and a struggle between a lion and a boar on another, the base presents Herakles as a heroic paradigm for the types of contests and games in which any citizen might participate.[62] The front of the base is even less mythological in content, showing a reclining symposiast holding a kylix, only identifiable as Herakles by the club placed at his side (fig. 28).[63] With his tightly crossed legs and twisted torso, Herakles assumes the posture not just of a symposiast but of a fallen warrior of the kind commonly shown in contemporary Attic vase painting, suggesting his death and apotheosis as much as rest from his labors. By presenting him as a symposiast as well as a hero who risks his life, the base inscribed Herakles, even at the moment of his death, within the elite social practices of contemporary Attic society.[64]

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[58] On at least one of the bases, the background was covered in thin sheets of silver or tin, isolating the figures from the background and giving them an even greater virtual presence. See Neer 2010: 75.

[59] Athens, NM 42/3579 (Kosmopoulou 2002: 37-8, 162-3 cat. 6).

[60] The Nelonides base (Athens, Epigraphic Museum 12870, Kosmopoulou 2002: 165-66 cat. 8), for instance, which included painted decoration on one of its surfaces, is of the same type. For the type see Kissas 2000: 16-7.

[61] The cutting for the statue is too small for a full-size kouros, but the statue could be under life-size.

[62] Athens, Kerameikos Museum 1002 (Kosmopoulou 2002: 171-73 cat. 11).

[63] Kosmopoulou 2002: 38.

[64] At least one Archaic stele shows the deceased, named as Lyseas in the inscription below, as a symposiast (Athens, NM 30. Richter 1961: cat. 70; Kaltsas 2002: cat. 105). Lyseas is shown as a bearded man holding a kylix in one hand and twigs in the other. While the figure is usually identified as a depiction of a priest of Dionysus, there is no reason to see him as anything but a regular symposiast, his cup indicating his readiness to drink and the twigs he holds his readiness

Regardless of how they are configured, all funerary monuments of the Archaic period highlight men and women in ideal social roles. Kouroi provide beautiful youths and korai young women on the cusp of marriage, while funerary reliefs show athletes, warriors, symposiasts. Subsidiary decoration only expands the visible range of social practices affected by the death, using a variety of techniques to render a densely variegated visual experience that will inevitably come together in different ways for each viewer. Just as Herakles, in Bacchylides' poem, feels pity and weeps for Meleager when he recognizes how similar they are as warriors, the generic imagery of Archaic funerary monuments explicitly sets up social paradigms broad enough to incorporate any number of personal identities, ones that we can readily pity because we believe—we *see*—that they are like us. Precisely because meaning results only from the interpretive process linked with the *sema* or *mnema*, funerary sculptures do not simply provide a social persona for the deceased, but one that we are equally meant to ascribe to ourselves. As we navigate the monument for meaning, we incorporate our own identities into the structures revealed by death, drawing ourselves into the same process of subject formation that shapes how the deceased is recognized and remembered. The pity we feel is the emotional glue that holds the entire experience together, bonding our own identities and aspirations with those we ascribe to the deceased.

Conclusion

Some images matter to us more than others. Roland Barthes, in his book *Camera Lucida*, refuses to illustrate the photograph of his mother that forms the focus of much of his text: sharing it with strangers—people who have no emotional attachment to her—would compromise the integrity of his entire project.[65] For his part, W. J. T. Mitchell, in *What Do Pictures Want?*, suggests that we might come to acknowledge how much some images matter to us—how much agency we ascribe to them—by taking a photograph of our mother and cutting out her eyes.[66]

As images of parents, siblings, spouses or, most often, children, Archaic funerary sculptures meant more to those who set them up than they can ever mean to us. We experience them today in fragmentary condition, divorced from their epigrams and removed from the corpses they marked. In their neutral museum settings, it is easy to see them primarily as markers of socio-economic status and artistic achievement. Even in their original contexts, the bereaved family who set them up knew that an anonymous passerby would not instinctively understand their grief. The goal of such monuments is not to showcase the deceased, but to gain empathy from a broader group of people, to present a tragedy that any of us could see as our own. The result is a series of monuments with images we can associate not only with the deceased, but also with ourselves.

By investigating these monuments through the lens of pity, we can explain why bereaved individuals invested so heavily in elaborate sculpted ones that have no parallel as private dedications outside the context of a sanctuary. Pity, as we have seen, provides a framework for approaching sculpture, turning its inherent disjunction between image and

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to sing (for the use of twigs in the symposion to designate turns for singing, see Wecowski 2014: 90).

[65] Barthes 1981. See also Chapter 4.

[66] Mitchell 2005: 9.

medium into a discursive paradigm for the mortal condition. Our pity gives meaning to a funerary monument by allowing us to enter other hearts and minds, and simultaneously transform our own. This experience is not itself merely personal or subjective. It is an act of cultural conditioning, of acknowledging that the social structures behind the monument are ones in which we are ourselves are invested. If the formulas and imagery of Archaic funerary monuments appear repetitive and impersonal today, that is because we have no stake in the social practices they structure. A landscape dotted with such monuments, however, shaped the most routine activities of ancient viewers making their way from one place to another, transforming an extra-urban environment into one charged with the authority of fellow citizens, made present through the cultural practice of erecting marble sculpture.

INTERLUDE

The Persian Invasion and the End of the Archaic Funerary Monument

Introduction

Sculpted funerary monuments were produced in most of the Greek world throughout the fifth century BCE. But in Attica, the situation was different. While Athenians of the Archaic period erected sculpted funerary monuments in far higher numbers than their counterparts elsewhere in the Greek world, the production of these monuments stopped sometime in the early fifth century, and sculpted funerary monuments were not produced again for at least fifty years. This sudden change registers as more than a mere shift in sculptural practice. Instead, as I argue here, it should be connected to the widespread cultural changes in Athens during the Persian Wars, especially to the material destruction of the city and its traumatic aftermath. The destruction of Archaic monuments deprived the concept of the funerary monument developed in the previous chapters of its efficacy—its ability to function as a *sema* or *mnema* and so its ability to produce pity.

The End of the Archaic Funerary Monument

In 480/79 BCE, the Persian army invaded Athens and took the Acropolis, defacing and destroying a large number of funerary monuments in its path.[1] Not only were many funerary monuments damaged, but they were also quickly effaced from the visual landscape of Athens by being built into a new defensive wall built by Themosticles. In the archaeological record, this event marks a clear terminus for the Archaic cemetery in Attica. Yet in most scholarship, a halt in the production of funerary monuments is dated well before the Persian invasion and so is seen as having a different motivation. Two kinds of evidence are usually cited: a sumptuary law limiting extravagant monuments, and a sharp decline in the number of preserved monuments dating to after ca. 500.

The evidence generally presented for a sumptuary law is a passage in Cicero (*Leg.* 2.64-5), who describes legislation limiting elaborate funerary monuments put in place sometime after Solon's archonship (594/3) and before the rule of Demetrius of Phaleron (317/6-307/6). The only corresponding gap in the material record during this period is the end of Archaic funerary monuments.[2] Yet little in Cicero's text corresponds with what we know about Archaic funerary monuments, and his description of monuments adorned with stucco (*opera tectorio*) and herms (*hermas*) should make us skeptical of its historical accuracy. Moreover, the date of this elusive act of legislation is impossible to determine

[1] On the material destruction wrought by the Persians see Keesling 1997; Lindenlauf 1997; Holloway 1999; Bäbler 2001; Stewart 2008a and 2008b; Kousser 2009; Miles 2014; Rosenberg-Dimitracopoulou 2015.

[2] There has been a large bibliography generated by this issue. Among others see Morris 1992: 128-55; Stears 2000; Hildebrandt 2006: 77-84; Stewart 2008b: 585-6, 604-5; Arrington 2014: 51-52.

from Cicero's text. In fact, recent studies have placed it around 480—the same date as the Persian destruction, making the very existence of the law something of a red herring.[3]

If it is impossible to date this law, let alone substantiate its existence, it is likewise almost impossible to date Archaic funerary monuments with enough precision to pinpoint a decline in production before 480. Traditional style-based chronologies of Greek sculpture obscure how funerary monuments could combine conservative and innovative sculptural forms and techniques in a single monument, as in the case of the relief bases that supported kouroi cited in the previous chapter. Moreover, recent studies, especially those of Stewart, have lowered the dating of late Archaic sculpture so that the supposed decline occurs only a few years at most before the Persian invasion.[4] In a period of Greek sculpture with few fixed chronological points, the down-dating of the ripe Archaic sculptural decoration of the Athenian Treasury at Delphi to after 490 rather than the end of the sixth century, as was traditionally thought, should cause us to seriously reevaluate the dating of Archaic funerary sculpture from Attica more generally.[5]

Beyond the difficulties of ascribing precise dates to surviving monuments, the argument for a pre-480 decline relies on statistical evidence—never representative in this period—instead of actually looking at preserved sculpture. For while numbers might decline, production of traditional, high-quality monuments does not.[6] The kouros of Aristodikos, for instance, which should be dated around or after 490 and was vandalized probably during the invasion, shows a softening of the musculature and the forms of the face that foreshadows the Severe Style perhaps more than any other funerary monument, yet preserves the traditional form of the kouros.[7] Moreover, new forms of monuments emerge after 500, indicating continued artistic investment in the form. Especially notable are reliefs with two or more figures—a format that reflects changes in funerary sculpture elsewhere in the Greek world that continue past 480 and simultaneously anticipates the format of Classical monuments once they reappear in Athens later in the century.[8]

We simply do not have enough evidence at our disposal, in other words, to substantiate the hypothesis that a halt in production of funerary monuments—or, more importantly, a decline in their efficacy—occurred before 480. Instead, we know without question that the cemeteries of Athens were full of intact, functional funerary monuments right up to the Persian invasion, when many were damaged beyond repair in one fell swoop.

Picking up the Pieces

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[3] Stears 2000; Keesling 2005: 420; Stewart 2008b: 585-6.

[4] Stewart 2008b: 585-6. Stewart ascribes the last Archaic funerary monuments to the "early 480s" (2008b: 601).

[5] On the dating of the treasury see Stewart 2008b: 582 n. 6 with earlier bibliography.

[6] Stears 2000: 29.

[7] On the damage to the Aristodikos kouros see Holloway 1999: 80-81. A head found in the Kerameikos near the wall that appears to only slightly pre-date the Tyrannicides (so, before 477/6) might have belonged to a funerary monument destroyed by the Persians. See Stewart 2008b: 583-6.

[8] See, for instance, Berlin, Antikensammlung 734 (Hölscher 1988) and Athens, NM 36 (Kaltsas 2002: 77 n. 122). See also Viviers 1992: 213-17.

As much as the Persian invasion damaged the ability of the Archaic funerary monument to function, it was ultimately the actions of the Athenians themselves that put a halt to their production by building the damaged monuments into the Themistoclean wall. After the invasion, Athenians hardly shied away from embedding its physical scars into the material structure of the city. Dozens of damaged dedications from the Acropolis were buried in pits, while the looted statues of the Tyrannicides were replaced with a new monument, so distinctively modern in style that, despite the historical importance of the original, it must have registered as new.[9] Most visible, perhaps, was the incorporation of architectural elements of ruined temples from the Acropolis into the outside of its defensive wall on the north side. Column drums and elements of the entablature were arranged in patterns that replicated their placement on the temples. The result, easy to see from the city below, was what a number of modern scholars have characterized as something like a memorial to the war.[10]

In contrast to such ideologically charged projects, the Themistoclean wall is generally seen as a purely pragmatic endeavor, one whose incorporation of ruined monuments was incidental and not intended to signal anything beyond the haste with which it was built.[11] In this interpretation, the scars wrought by the Athenians on their own monuments in building the wall were necessary to transform readily available stones from ruined funerary monuments into suitable building material. As a destructive act, such reworking is understood to be entirely different from the intentional iconoclasm carried out by the Persians. Rachel Kousser, for example, has recently argued for a stark distinction between the "*pragmatic* despoliation and reuse of images" in the case of the funerary monuments and the "*programmatic* mutilation of works of art" in the case of the Acropolis monuments.[12]

Yet if we take seriously, as Kousser suggests we do, that the mutilation of the Acropolis statues was intended to remove their efficacy as images rather than simply destroy them materially, then it is difficult to maintain her distinction between pragmatic and programmatic destruction. The attack on sculpted dedications is simply the pragmatic enactment of the ideological destruction of the city—both its political and religious institutions.[13] As I have argued, the ideological structures of Archaic sculpture depended upon social engagement aimed at creating empathetic links between members of a community. For Athenians to take sculptures set up to be activated as *semata* and *mnemata* of their fellow citizens and transform them into building material is just as ideologically destructive as Persians smashing the faces of gods who were not their own.

Indeed, the deeply emotional nature of the engagement demanded by funerary monuments works against the notion that the Greeks would have taken a cold, pragmatic stance towards the reuse of these monument, defacing them only as a matter of necessity.

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[9] On the korai pits see Lindenlauf 2007, Stewart 2008a and b. On the modern appearanc of the Tyrannicide monument, see Stewart 2008b: 602; Neer 2010: 78-85.

[10] Ferrari 2002; Kousser 2009; Miles 2011; Martin-Mcauliffe and Papadopoulos 2012; Arrington 2014: 147.

[11] The strongest statement of this argument is Bäbler 2001, with earlier bibliography. See also Kousser 2009: 266-67.

[12] Kousser 2009: 267 (emphasis original).

[13] See Miles 2014: 121-23 for similar remarks on the burning of temples in the war.

In the context of the Persian Wars, such an approach only furthers a long-standing and, in its origins, racially-charged scholarly bias that whereas Persians saw objects as magical and animated—ones whose powers could be deactivated by gouging out their eyes or cutting off their lips—the Greeks maintained a rational, disinterested, and aesthetically oriented approach to sculpture.[14]

On the contrary, a decidedly animistic attitude towards broken funerary monuments is visible in the private burial of funerary statues damaged in the invasion on the outskirts of Athens, in Merenda. There, two exceptionally fine funerary monuments of the late Archaic period—the kore of Phrasikleia (see Chapter 1) and her "brother," a kouros that marked the grave of an unknown man—were found together in a pit with a funerary pyre nearby, suggesting a burial of the kind normally reserved for humans.[15] The kouros' feet and arms had been broken off before the burial, though the arms were deposited with him and fragments of the inscribed base that supported him were found nearby. Phrasikleia's kore was found intact (except for a broken hand) but detached from her inscribed base which must have been deposited elsewhere, since it was later built into a nearby church.

The circumstances of the burial were for many years unknown and the archaeological context unpublished. But a recent study of the ceramic material from the pyre by Angele Rosenberg-Dimitracopoulou confirms what many scholars had previously suspected: the burial took place not long after 480, and so was likely a response to damage wrought on the statues during the invasion.[16] The state of preservation of the statues, including still-colorful painted details, indicates they stood intact as *semata* (the name given in Phrasikleia's epigram to her monument) up to their vandalism in the invasion, when they were buried presumably by the same family that had erected and previously maintained them. This burial, carried out by Athenians, can be seen as an attempt to ascribe to the statues the same degree of agency in the moment of their own "death" that they were able to exert while they stood and engaged viewers in ideologies of desire, empathy, and pity, as outlined in previous chapters. Yet at the same time, the burial acknowledges the failure of the statues, in a critical moment, to serve their function, and a recognition that the first-person voice of Phrasikleia's monument—the one who stated she would always be called a maiden—could no longer speak.

The treatment of the Merenda statues reminds us that material objects do not simply preserve a record of historical events such as the Persian invasion, but once played a role in shaping how Athenians dealt with its consequences. In the face of such an unprecedented and resolute destruction of their material landscape, the intentional burial of damaged statues was only one possible response. The Merenda statues, after all, were in good enough condition that they could have been restored. Indeed, on the Acropolis, while many damaged votive statues were buried in pits, at least one was restored and presumably re-erected.[17] Moreover, Pausanias (1.27.6) tells us that others that were blackened by fire but not broken were put back on display as witnesses to the destruction. Likewise, while some architectural elements from damaged temples were built into the north wall of the Acropolis, a section of the temple of Athena Polias was

[14] See Bahrani 2003: 26-33, 165.
[15] See Rosenberg-Dimitracopoulou 2015 for a description of the burial.
[16] Rosenberg-Dimitracopoulou 2015.
[17] Athens, Acropolis Museum 694. Brouskari 1974: 66 pl. 119.

left as a ruin perhaps as late as the Roman period.[18] Each response to an ideological destruction was inevitably politically charged in its own way.

In this context, using funerary monuments as building material was undeniably an expeditious way to build the wall, but it was also a deliberate choice. Stones that had been carefully carved into elaborate sculpted monuments were not the only ones available in 478. In his account of this period, Thucydides explains how the wall came into being, stating that Themistocles ordered that:

> τειχίζειν δὲ πάντας πανδημεὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας, φειδομένους μήτε ἰδίου μήτε δημοσίου οἰκοδομήματος ὅθεν τις ὠφελία ἔσται ἐς τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καθαιροῦντας πάντα
>
> Thuc. 1.90.3

> the whole population of the city, men, women, and children, should take part in the wall-building, sparing neither private nor public edifice that would in any way help to further the work, but demolishing them all.
>
> trans. Smith

Thucydides goes on to cite explicitly numerous stelai from private tombs and worked sculpture as among the building material (πολλαί τε στῆλαι ἀπὸ σημάτων καὶ λίθοι εἰργασμένοι, 1.93.3), highlighting the unusual nature both of the construction and the source for its material. The wall, in other words, was a civic building project in the broadest sense, unprecedented in terms of its involvement of both the entire population and the entire material structure of the city.

At the same time, the vivid language in this passage frames the Athenians' building of their wall as an act of destruction or even murder. The Athenians, Thucydides states, did not "spare" (φειδομένους) buildings—a verb commonly used in the context of war to describe the treatment of one's mortal enemies, suggesting something of a moral quandary or sense of self-sacrifice in the decision to demolish the city for building material. Likewise, the Athenians did not simply reuse these structures, but literally took them down: the verb used here—καθαιροῦντας—means not only to raze a city (e.g. Thuc. 1.58) in order to render it impotent, but also to depose or kill someone. Perhaps most evocatively in this context, it can refer to the act of closing the eyes of a deceased family member before burial (*Il.* 11.453; *Od.* 24.296). Rather than record an act of building that fulfilled a simple pragmatic need for a wall, Thucydides' anthropomorphizing language here testifies to the very sourcing of the wall's material and act of putting it together as deeply political.[19] The Athenians inexorably killed the material past of the city—one associated in particular with the elite—in order to secure its future.

Thucydides' assertion that the haste with which the wall was built could be verified in his day through autopsy (1.93.2) is corroborated by the archaeological evidence. For while the sculpted and inscribed faces of many monuments were hidden within it, enough were visibly built into its face to remind future viewers from where the

[18] Ferrari 2002; Martin-Mcauliffe and Papadopoulos 2012: 346-7; Rosenberg-Dimitracopoulou 2015: 96 n. 72.

[19] Miles (2014: 122-23) notes similar points of comparison between the treatment of material culture and of human victims in Herodotus' account of the Persian Wars.

stones had come. A seated funerary statue, for instance, was squared off on its front and sides, but built into the wall in one of the lower courses with its carved back, rounded in shape and covered in drapery folds, facing out (fig. 29).[20] Two of the relief bases for kouroi cited in the previous chapter—the so-called Ball Player and Hockey Player bases—were built into the wall with one of their carved surfaces facing out (both were carved on three of four faces), right side up in the case of the Ball Player base, and upside down in the case of the Hockey Player.[21]

Evidence that ancient viewers were attuned to the figurative imagery of these monuments even after their incorporation into the wall comes from a third relief base from the Kerameikos whose relief was intentionally damaged after its erection. Although three sides were carved, deliberate damage is visible only on the side facing out of the wall, on the faces and upper bodies of men and horses, indicating it was carried out after the wall was built (fig. 30).[22] This kind of damage is similar to that on the cavetto capital from Lamptrai discussed in the previous chapter (fig. 24), as well as the complete obliteration of the painted figure on the kouros base of Neilonides, that has led Keesling to speculate that the intent was "to destroy the human and animal figures symbolically by defacing them—literally."[23] The imagery of these monuments, in other words, was subject to the same kind of vandalism found also on monuments attacked by Persians, such as the Acropolis korai and perhaps the Aristodikos kouros. Such monuments suggest that there is a closer link between the recarving of monuments to turn them into building material and the mutilation of sculptures to deprive them of their representational efficacy than has been allowed for in recent scholarship.

Turning to the monuments that were hidden within the wall, we can see how their disfigured appearance indexes the communal experience of the political moment that precipitated their destruction. Even where elements of individual monuments were incorporated more or less intact, the construction of the wall challenges the Archaic funerary monument's integral combination of epigram and sculpture. No monument could simply be inserted into the wall complete. Instead, it was broken up into its constituent parts of statue or stele and base. Bases, usually already quadrifacial blocks, were most readily adapted as building material, and they are preserved in the greatest number—though even these were frequently recut.[24] Stelai, once separated from the base and smoothed flat on their carved surface, were also easy to reuse. Three-dimensional sculpture was adapted with more difficulty, usually only once the least quadrifacial elements—especially heads and limbs—were lopped off and smoothed down, their sides often shorn clean off. A good example is the horse and rider sometimes associated with the inscribed base for Xenophantos (discussed in the previous chapter) whose entire right flank has been cut off (figs. 31 and 32).[25] Sculptures that have been found within the wall are never as complete as those found in the pits on the Acropolis and in private burials

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[20] Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 1052. See Knigge 1988: 32 pl. 28 for a photograph of the statue *in situ* before its removal from the wall.
[21] Keesling 1999: 515.
[22] Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 1002. Keesling 1999: 516.
[23] Keesling 1999: 516. See also her discussion of the relief plaques on 516-17.
[24] See the individual entries in Kissas 2000 for details.
[25] Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 6999. Eaverly 1995: 87-93.

such as the one at Merenda: there is no question that the bulk of the damage done to them was carried about by the Athenians themselves.

A number of transformations required the deliberate, time-consuming destruction of the sculpted human form—a process that mirrors the iconoclasm of the Persians. The present appearance of the Gorgon stele analyzed in the previous chapter, for instance, is the result of someone having hacked away at its relief until its highest points were no longer raised above the outer border, in order to render the carved surface flat for building material (figs. 11-13).[26] The relief surface, originally carefully detailed and polished so that it could be visualized as human flesh, was chipped away, leaving a silhouette whose roughly textured surface lays bare the crystalline structure of the marble. In the process, the nuanced interplay of relief surface and virtual space that was integral to an encounter with the monument, as I have argued, was neutralized. The treatment of the stele is hardly unique: reliefs discussed in the previous chapter, such as the excessively disfigured fragment of the head of a helmeted warrior (fig. 22), endured similar damage.[27]

Most striking perhaps are the ghostly outlines of the feet of kouroi left in the bases of some monuments such as those of Xenokles (fig. 5) or Aischros of Samos (fig. 33).[28] Like all kouroi, the statues were carved from a single block of marble with a small plinth below the feet that was set and soldered into a cutting in the separately carved base. The outlines of the feet show that, unusually, these statues were never removed from their bases, the lead soldering never retrieved when the statue was damaged—perhaps already broken during the invasion at the weak spot of the ankles (where the Merenda kouros, for instance, was also broken).[29] Instead of removing the lower legs of the kouroi to reuse the lead, someone hacked at the feet until the stump that was left was flush with the base to make it a quadrifacial block. Part of the sculpted human form, in other words, was not simply removed but intentionally destroyed by an Athenian in order to make the monument suitable building material.

However we explain the motivation for such damage, its enactment cannot have been apolitical, even in the case of seemingly benign acts such as separating statue from base. Such separation is often taken for granted as almost inevitable, since statues and bases are almost never carved from the same block and many were separated at some point to retrieve the valuable metal used to solder them together. Yet, as we have seen, bases of funerary monuments with their inscribed epigrams constitute the very mechanism through which the statues they support gain meaning. Without its base, an Archaic statue is anonymous, a generic type with no name or identity attached to it, its capacity for representation deactivated. In this sense, the separation of statue from base is an inherently destructive act, as the ghost of Darius in Aeschylus' *Persians* states in his account of the invasion:[30]

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[26] See Keesling 1999: 516 n. 28.

[27] On this stele see Kallipolitis 1969.

[28] Athens, Kerameikos Museum. Keesling 1999: 515 n. 27. For Xenokles's base see Kissas 2000: 39-40 no. A4. For Aischros's base see Kissas 2000: 61 no. A27.

[29] Stele bases, such as the one for Smikuthos and Ker. P. 1001 (which shows four horsemen) cited in the previous chapter, show similar treatment, retaining jagged stumps of stele still soldered into the cutting in the base.

[30] For this passage see Ferrari 2002: 30 and Miles 2014: 112-13.

βωμοὶ δ᾽ ἄιστοι, δαιμόνων θ᾽ ἱδρύματα
πρόρριζα φύρδην ἐξανέστραπται βάθρων.

Aesch. *Pers.* 811-12

Altars have been made to vanish, the dwellings of the gods
have been ripped out from their bases and turned upside down in utter confusion.

Whether carried out by an invading Persian or an Athenian citizen, the act of cleaving a statue from its base inherently acknowledges the failure of the monument to function properly—the failure of the image it embodies to actualize itself. In the case of funerary monuments, this meant that the possibility of engaging with the monument as a *sema* or *mnema* was nullified, and the potential of a figured monument to open up new forms of visual experience erased in favor the marble's material value.

Even though they are made of different blocks of stone, statue and base form a close material relationship, with a plinth usually carved as part of the statue, so that the area of the base directly below the statue's feet is carved from the same block as the statue itself. The join between statue block and base block occurs, in other words, outside of the pictorial space of the statue, on its flat surface rather than where feet meet stone block. The importance of this seamless appearance between statue and base is emphasized in the inscription on the base of the colossal statue of Apollo dedicated by the Naxians on Delos in the early 6th century:

[τ]ô αϝὐτô λίθο ἐμι ἀνδριὰς καὶ τὸ σφέλας.

CEG 401

I am of the same stone, statue and base.

It is not clear whether the inscription is meant to suggest that the statue and base were carved from a single block (a claim that is visibly false) or from the same kind of stone. Yet in either case, it encourages the viewer to link material and image, to take the first-person voice of the inscription as capable of unifying a quadrifacial block of marble—the base—with one carved to take an anthropomorphic form. Such sentiments confirm the co-dependent relationship between statue and epigram that I have argued is fundamental to the efficacy of the Archaic funerary monument.

Whether accomplished with the gleeful intent of taking down symbols of aristocracy or with a bitter sense of self-sacrifice, the very act of picking away at such monuments, of flattening their pictorial capacity and exposing their materiality, must have affected their efficacy in the eyes of the many Athenians who participated in the building of the wall.[31] The ideological premise of the funerary monument, as we have seen, was always fragile, dependent not only on the integrity of the monument, but also on the willingness of the viewer to engage physically, visually and emotionally. Once the systems that enabled these forms of engagement were threatened, a social disinvestment in sculpted monuments is hardly surprising: they simply did not work.

Conclusion

[31] Cf. Bäbler 2001: 6-8.

Of all the motivations for a halt in the production of funerary monuments in early fifth-century Athens, the material destruction of earlier monuments during and after the Persian invasion stands out as the decisive factor. The damage was not simply physical, but ideological—damage wrought not on specific monuments so much as the entire social system that gave them meaning. For if sculpted funerary monuments, as I have argued, were set up to assert an elite's ability to provide a sense of social cohesion and empathy, even those that survived undamaged showed themselves to be failures at these tasks at a critical moment in Athenian history.

Many accounts of why and when funerary monuments are erected reduce sculptures to "symbolic capital"—symptoms of social behavior whose appearance or disappearance we use to diagnose changes in social practice (such as sumptuary legislation).[32] Yet as I have argued, the disappearance of funerary monuments should be understood as a matter first and foremost of sculpture—how Athenians used and abused it, how they carved it and looked at it, set it up and knocked it down, engaged with it and experienced it, and incorporated it into the narratives of their own lives. Changes in artistic practice, after all, cannot be taken as evidence for changes in a sociopolitical or legal system until we can account for how artistic practice shapes those systems. In this sense, a sudden abandonment of a sculptural type is just as telling of its social value as its widespread use before the invasion. Only by understanding the social function of these sculpted monuments can we consider why they appear in certain moments and in certain configurations in Athenian history.

[32] Funerary monuments as "symbolic capital": Morris 1992.

CHAPTER 3

Engaging the Classical Funerary Monument

Introduction

Well over two thousand—and perhaps closer to three thousand—examples of sculpted marble funerary monuments from Attica survive from a period not much longer than a century, ca. 430-317 BCE.[1] This is the largest surviving corpus of any genre of Greek sculpture, and it represents a remarkable investment by a wide swath of the Athenian population in sculptural practice on an individual level. The number of fragments suggests that a funerary monument was in many cases the only public sculpture an individual would have paid for and set up in their lifetime, and certainly the only sculpted monument set up outside of a sanctuary.

Such a corpus has the potential to provide insight into the social value of marble sculpture in this period at the level of the individual. Yet the sheer number of monuments has only encouraged an attitude, in the dominant scholarly traditions, that takes their existence and social value for granted.[2] In their sculpted imagery, funerary monuments are almost unrelentingly generic, filled with the same faces, the same dress and hair, the same accessories, the same postures and gestures. These figures are arranged according to set formulas that endlessly repeat one another. Very few monuments, it seems, were specific commissions, and most were probably bought off the rack, so to speak, with the carving already completed.[3] Regardless of their configuration, such monuments almost always show quiet, even static encounters between the deceased and their family and household—scenes with almost no narrative content and little outward display of emotion. Other genres of sculpture from the Classical period show that the same artists who created funerary monuments were capable of depicting dramatic scenes of violence and death populated with figures with expressive bodies and faces.[4] That they rarely did so in funerary monuments was a deliberate choice.

Because of both this generic quality and the repetitive emphasis on family and household scenes, the images on funerary monuments are not understood as portraits in the modern sense of images whose physiognomy records the appearance of the sitter.[5] Instead, decades of scholarship have focused on showing how monuments were set up to record information about the deceased and preserve a memory of them by generating a standardized visual image of the type of person they were. The images we see, it is argued, are social stereotypes—the virtuous wife, the dutiful son—reduced to templates through which anyone could be remembered after their death as a function of their age

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[1] For estimates and discussion of different tabulations, see Grossman 2013: 1-2.

[2] The historiography of the study of Attic funerary sculpture, especially Classical, and an overview of recent and current approaches, has been summarized in Grossman 2013: 1-64. For a discussion of the generic nature of Classical monuments see Himmelmann 1999: 40-7.

[3] Ridgway 1997: 164-5.

[4] A portrait statue of Dieitrephes on the Acropolis from late fifth century, for instance, showed a man dying and pierced with arrows. See Arrington 2014: 189-90.

[5] For arguments for a correspondence between "portraits" in funerary reliefs and those in other contexts, see Dillon 2006: 6, 65; Bergemann 2007.

and gender, their position within the family unit or within Athenian society more broadly.[6] In such interpretations, the grave monument was used to establish and illustrate the deceased's moral character according to culturally determined values that were established elsewhere and then mapped onto funerary sculpture. Visiting and looking at the tomb, decorating and adorning it, were ritual activities that acknowledged allegiance to civic and family ideologies. This dispassionate, mechanistic understanding of the function of the funerary monument assumes a stable meaning inherent in its formal configuration. Though this meaning can be nuanced from grave to grave according to biographical details of the deceased, it is ultimately established through external social expectations that are used at any given gravesite to generate an identity for the deceased configured for broader public consumption.

In contrast to such traditional approaches, this chapter builds on the previous ones by exploring how Classical funerary monuments functioned within the context of bereavement—how they opened up private grief and compelled viewers to engage with this grief on an emotional level.[7] Where most approaches assume that monuments were set up to produce stable accounts of the deceased, many funerary monuments, I will argue, openly confront the traumatic effects of grief. They call on us to experience sculptures not as existing in a closed system of symbolic meaning, but as objects that complicate and destabilize our visual engagement with the world around us. The dependence of such monuments on images—that is, the degree to which bereaved families in Classical Athens set up monuments with sculpted figurative imagery—can only be explained, I argue, by understanding a critical engagement with very concept of the representational image as a symptom of grief.[8]

Defining the Classical funerary monument

Because of the chronological gap between the production of Archaic and Classical sculpted funerary monuments, and because of the important changes in sculptural practices during that time, Classical funerary monuments are generally seen as disconnected from their Archaic counterparts. The features that make Classical monuments distinctive, however, can only be understood when framed as deliberate choices set against the background of traditional practices. While many of these features will emerge over the course of the chapter, focusing here on one example—the grave stele of a girl named Pausimache—can highlight the most significant characteristics (fig.

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[6] Among a vast bibliography, see: Morris 1992; Osborne 1996; Stears 1995 and 1998; Bergemann 1998 (esp. 56-62, 126-7); Closterman 2007; Oakley 2008 and 2009; Walter-Karydi 2015: 233-330.

[7] Contra Oakley: "The grave is his new home and will remain as the place of contact with him in the future, and so is a reassuring image for a grieving family member" (2004: 230). Similarly, see Turner 2016.

[8] A similar correlation between personal grief and figurative art in Classical Athens has been suggested by Arrington in his investigation of white-ground lekythoi (2014: 239-274, esp. 272-4). Subjective experiences of grief, he argues, depended on personal memories and images that were readily explored through works of figurative art, in contrast to collective grief at the level of the *polis* that was commemorated in state gravesites decorated with minimal or no figurative imagery or expressed through mythological imagery in public architectural sculpture.

34).[9] The relief shows a standing young woman holding a mirror, and the carved epigram above her reads:

> πᾶσι θανεῖν ⟨ε⟩ἴμαρτα⟨ι⟩ ὅσοι ζῶσιν, σὺ δὲ πένθος
> οἰ|κτρὸν ⟨ἔ⟩χ⟨ειν⟩ ἔλιπες, Παυσιμάχη, προγόνοις
> μητρ ⟨ί ⟩ | τ⟨ε Φ⟩αινί⟨π⟩πηι καὶ πατρὶ Παυσανίαι,
> σῆ⟨ς⟩ δ' ἀρετῆ⟨ς μ⟩νη|μ⟨ε⟩ῖον ὁρᾶν τό⟨δ⟩ε τοῖς παριοῦσιν σωφροσύνη⟨ς⟩ τ⟨ε⟩.
> *CEG* 518
>
> For all to die is the fate of all who live; and you, Pausimache, left behind pitiable mourning to your parents, your mother Phainippe and your father Pausanias, and (you left) this remembrance of your virtue and moderation for passers-by to see.

The epigram stresses two elements that we saw as crucial to how viewers generated their experience of Archaic monuments: the name the monument gives itself—here, *mnemeion* (similar to *mnema*)—and the type of emotional engagement it demands—pity as a response to parents' mourning. Both elements are present in Pausimache's epigram, but are not foregrounded in the same way as in Archaic epigrams. The monument is presented as a *mnemeion* with a deictic, but is framed as the object of Pausimache's own agency. Pity is not explicitly demanded, though the inscription's opening line directly implicates the viewer on an empathetic level in the same terms as those of pity.[10] Instead, Pausimache herself is responsible for both elements: she has generated both pitiable mourning and the monument we see through her death.

This presentation of pitiful mourning and the monument itself as a direct outcome of the deceased's agency is suggested through the use of the verb *leipein* ("to leave"), which governs both elements. The verb is extremely common in Classical funerary epigrams, and can take on a wide variety of meanings depending on what accusative object the deceased leaves behind.[11] Some of the things deceased individuals are recorded as leaving behind are tangible: specific family members, the deceased's fatherland, their own corpses. Others are emotions that emerge in the wake of death, such as mourning and longing (γόον, πένθος, λύπην, πόθον). Yet others are immaterial things—forms of light (φάος, φῶς, αὐγάς) or their breath or soul (πνεῦμα, θυμόν)—that construct metaphors for death. Finally, the deceased can, like Pausimache, leave behind remembrances or memory-objects (μνήμην, μνημεῖον)—things that, as we shall see, are both tangible and immaterial, the name given to the inscribed object or the decorations left on the tomb and the mental images and memories that linger after death.[12]

While the zeugmatic expression on Pausimache's monument of leaving both mourning and a memory-object has been seen as awkward syntax symptomatic of the generally poor quality of funerary epigrams, similar effects are found in other epigrams

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[9] Athens, NM 3964. Clairmont 1970: 77-79 cat. 13.
[10] Contra Bruss, who states that the epigram "fails to instruct passers-by on the emotional stance from which they ought to view the monument" (2010: 400).
[11] See Tsagalis 2008: 111-113.
[12] *CEG* 474, 493, 495, 518, 577. For μνήμην: *CEG* 577. Cf. *CEG* 511.

showing the intentionality of this stylistic feature.[13] One epigram, for instance, combines the twin effects of longing and memory that we saw tied together in Archaic monuments by commenting on how the deceased died "leaving longing for youth and a *mnema* of moderation" (*CEG* 577, 3-4: ἡλικίας δὲ πόθον νεαρᾶς μνήμην τε λιποῦσα | σωφροσύνης ἔθανον Λογχὶς ἐπωνυμίαν). On Pausimache's monument, the zeugma effectively ties the empathetic effects of pity to the visibility of the memory-object, structuring at the level of syntax the same close relationship between emotional response and visual presence that governs, as we will see, how viewers engaged with such a monument.[14] The material object we attend to is inseparable from the grief that occasioned it, and both are the direct result of Pausimache's own agency.

This emphasis on the deceased is one of the most distinctive features of the Classical funerary monument—one that contrasts strikingly with Archaic monuments, which, as we have seen, locate agency either in themselves (speaking in the first person *qua* monument), in the family member who set up the monument, or in the sculptor whose signature appears on the monument. Classical funerary monuments usually only name the monument and the family members who set it up incidentally, as in Pausimache's epigram. And where Archaic funerary monuments are more frequently signed than even contemporary votive dedications, not one of the thousands of surviving Classical funerary monuments records the name of its sculptor.[15] A similar shift occurs in the naming of the deceased. Where the name is in the genitive on Archaic monuments, those of the Classical period present it, as a rule, in the nominative. In both cases, this is true even when the name appears in isolation: the monument is no longer *of* someone, but the deceased is presented directly, often with the same kind of deictic marker that points to the monument as *sema* or *mnema* in Archaic epigrams. The monument's independent status as mediator between the deceased, the family, and the viewer is downplayed. Instead, the deceased is presented as almost directly responsible for the monument's presence and the image below that literally embodies their presence.[16]

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[13] Tsagalis says of Pausimache's epigram: "The opposition is striking: the deceased has left different things to different groups of people, private mourning to the intimate relatives and an example of virtue to the unrelated passers-by, to the former through her death, to the latter through the monument-memorial erected for her sake. As one moves from death itself to the commemoration of the one who died, sadness gives its place to a 'memorial of *arete*' and the beloved ones are replaced by the anonymous passers-by" (2008: 156).

[14] For the stylistic effects of the zeugma with *leipein* see Tsagalis 2008: 99. See also *CEG* 495 (Athens, Epigraphical Museum 9476; Clairmont 1970: 141-42 cat. 63):

> [σ]ῆς σ᾽ἀρετῆς καὶ σωφροσύν[η]ς μνημεῖον ἅπασιν |
> [λείπ]εις οἰκ‹τ›ρὰ παθὼν Μοίρας ὕπο, δαίμονος ἐχθροῦ.
> You leave behind for all a memorial of your virtue and goodness after suffering a pitiful lot from a hateful destiny. (trans. Clairmont)

[15] Ridgway 1997: 166.

[16] Some of the generalizations I present here contradict the statistical evidence as presented recently by Hochscheid (2015: 241)—for instance, there are many more funerary monuments of the Classical period with the names of patrons on them than there are from the Archaic period. But statistics do not pay attention to where the names occur within the epigrams and how they are framed, and the massive increase in the number of preserved monuments from the Classical period skews the statistical evidence to a degree that renders it misleading.

The presentation of the deceased in the sculpted relief undergoes a similar shift. The most common forms of Archaic monuments, as we have seen, present the deceased to us with maximal clarity and visibility, showcasing beautiful bodies disengaged from the world around them. The figures on Classical funerary monuments, on the other hand, are more introverted, often sequestered within small temple-like structures called *naiskoi*, their bodies usually turned away, their eyes focused on other people or held objects—like the mirror into which Pausimache gazes.[17] This distinction is highly gendered: where almost all Archaic monuments commemorate men, many of the sculpted stelai of the Classical period focus on women, shown in the privacy of their homes, and in a number of cases only accompanied by other females. This change has generally been seen as indicative of new attitudes towards women over the course of the fifth century, or changes in the symbolism of the female in Greek art.[18] Yet the shift in gender is only part of the equation: where Archaic monuments show scenes that are designed for and oriented towards our gaze, these Classical monuments give us special access to intimate moments, drawing us into much more direct, less artificially staged encounters with the deceased and the bereaved.

We can see such effects at work in Pausimache's relief, which shows her simultaneously at her toilette and in the act of leaving behind a remembrance of her virtue and moderation for us to see, precisely as the epigram states. Pausimache gazes into a mirror, creating an image of herself—one that, following ancient accounts of vision that will be explored below, is generated through the material trace of her own appearance in the surface of the mirror. Yet as Neer notes, Pausimache's mirror is partially turned towards us, so that it "is available simultaneously to our gaze and to that of the depicted woman. It invites us to look into the reflecting surface ourselves, there to lock eyes with the deceased." Because the mirror is rendered in marble, it offers not a literal reflection, but "an invitation to entertain an appealing fantasy: the idea that we as beholders can actually meet the gaze of the departed through the medium of stone."[19] Pausimache's figure is carved in low relief, her body tightly framed and her right foot even pushing beyond the border and projecting into the viewer's space.[20] The background surface deepens slightly only around her head, giving it greater plasticity than the rest of the body, while the left arm and the mirror it holds is pushed almost to the outer band of the stele, as if Pausimache's gaze from within the pictorial space looks towards the same planar surface that we attend to. The mirror, in other words, acts like a visual hinge between Pausimache's image and our own, an allegory for the act of viewing we are ourselves engaged in. Pausimache's fate is our own, as the epigram's opening line reminds us, and to fully engage with the pitiful mourning and memory-object Pausimache has left behind, we have to take our own place within the world in which she exists—the one we see before us, constructed through images.

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[17] See Himmelmann 1999 : 64-74.

[18] See Stears 1995 and 1998; Osborne 1996; Younger 2002; Oakley 2008. This shift actually predates the reappearance of sculpted monuments: white-ground lekythoi, as soon as they are produced not long after the Persian Wars, focus on household and especially female scenes. See Oakley 2004: 219.

[19] Neer 2010: 198.

[20] Noted also by Platt (2014: 197). Such techniques of projection beyond the frame are typical of Attic vase painting; see Hurwit 1977.

Without the intermediary of the monument as an independent agent, the Classical funerary monument asks us to see the image before us as a representation of the deceased in a much more vivid and physical sense than its Archaic counterpart. Yet the central conceit of Pausimache's monument—that the monument itself, as a trace of the deceased and her agency, provides the mechanism through which we can retrieve her image—is, as the inscription and delicate carving suggest, a precarious one. Rather than offer an unproblematic image of the deceased, such a monument thematizes the very difficulty of representing them. This critical engagement with the possibility of representation is at the heart of how the Classical funerary monument functions. Even when funerary monuments do not have epigrams like Pausimache's, they are always attached to one or more particular individuals, and often the name is placed so as to be clearly associated with a particular sculpted figure. Because individuality is not expressed through outward appearance, it is up to us as we look at the sculpture to transform the generic figure into a representation of the named deceased. Precisely because the sculpture is so generic, this process depends not on iconographic decoding, but instead on our emotional engagement.

Motivations for the return to sculpted monuments in the second half of the fifth century are often assumed to have been pragmatic—frustration with democratic practices of public burial, changes in attitudes towards the dead during the plague, an over-abundance of sculptors living in Athens after the completion of the Parthenon.[21] Yet Pausimache's monument makes clear that endowing the funerary monument with figurative imagery served a function in the context of bereavement, just as it had in the Archaic period. In order to explore how emotional engagement arises through form rather than symbolic content, I focus in this chapter on how funerary reliefs of the Classical period work to thematize not the biography of the deceased, but the actions of the viewer. Like Pausimache's epigram and relief, such monuments work to implicate our own actions—our capacities for visual, physical and emotional engagement—into the narratives they offer of the deceased in order to generate a connection formed through empathy.

Tragic Pity and the Classical Funerary Monument

As in the Archaic period, the pathos of the viewer of the Classical monument was that of pity. Although explicit commands for pity disappear from the repertoire of Classical epigrams, mentions of pity on monuments like that of Pausimache make clear the continued importance of the emotion. A double epigram inscribed on a stele for a woman named Xenokleia from circa 360 BCE shows how clearly pity remains articulated as distinct from the grief of the family:

Ξενόκλεια χρηστή.

ἠιθέους προλιποῦσα κόρας δισσὰς Ξενόκλεια
Νικάρχου θυγάτηρ κεῖται ἀποφθιμένη,
οἰκτρὰν Φοίνικος παιδὸς πενθοῦσα τελευτήν,

[21] For an overview of these explanations, see Grossman 2013: 11-13. The last suggestion is especially problematic since many major sculpture projects were initiated in the same period as the Parthenon.

ὃς θάνεν ὀκταέτης ποντίωι ἐν πελάγε.

τίς θρήνων ἀδαής, ὃς σὴν μοῖραν, Ξενόκλεια,
οὐκ ἐλεεῖ, δισσὰς ἣ προλιποῦσα κόρας,
ἠιθέους παιδὸς θνείσκεις πόθωι, ὃς τὸν ἄνοικτον
τύμβον ἔχει δνοφέρωι κείμενος ἐμ πελάγει;
CEG 526

Good Xenokleia.

Having left behind her two unmarried young daughters, Xenokleia,
the daughter of Nicarchos, lies dead,
after having mourned the pitiful end of her son, Phoinix,
who died at open sea at the age of eight.

Who is so ignorant of lamentation, Xenokleia, that he does not pity
your fate? Having left behind your two unmarried young daughters,
you are dead because of longing for your son,
who, lying in the dark sea, has his grave without pity.
trans. Tsagalis, adapted

The first epigram prompts our pity for Xenokleia's death by narrating a tragedy she herself had endured: the premature, "pitiful" death of her son Phoinix. The second epigram makes the comparison between the death of Phoinix and that of his mother explicit by asking how viewers who have themselves experienced grief could not pity the fate of a dead stranger.[22] Although the second epigram adds little new information and repeats much of the first, it reconfigures Xenokleia's death in a number of ways that intensify its emotional pull for the viewer so that it emerges more pitiful. First, the person shifts from third to second, so that we address Xenokleia directly as if she is present. Second, we learn the cause of her death: she died out of longing for her dead son.[23] In this sense, Xenokleia's grief provides a paradigm for the physiological effects of emotion on the human body—including our own as we feel pity. Finally, where Phoinix's death is described as "pitiful" in the first epigram, in the second his grave is "without pity" because it lies faraway at sea. Phoinix's death, in other words, is all the more tragic because he has no grave—and so no monument—which can engender pity for him, explaining why he features so prominently on that of his mother. Where pity for Xenokleia herself would be expected from any viewer of her monument, pity for her unburied son must be more consciously activated. Pity, in other words, occurs precisely at the juncture of viewers who have themselves experienced grief and a monument that marks the grief of someone else. Only when colored by pity can our experience of the monument acknowledge and understand the grief that occasioned it.

In a number of instances in Greek tragedies of the fifth century, individuals deserving of pity compare themselves or are compared in their visual appearance to

[22] For the shift between the two different epigrams in *CEG* 526, see Tsagalis 2008: 228-30; Fantuzzi 2010: 302-303.
[23] On the relationship between longing and grief see Chapter 1.

works of art in ways that parallel the deployment of pity in a monuments like that of Pausimache or Xenokleia.[24] Such passages offer more elaborated instances where someone's grief (imaginary, but nonetheless emotionally compelling) is rendered for a viewer as a piteous spectacle, and can help flesh out the effects of poetic and visual imagery on funerary monuments. In Euripides' *Hecuba*, for instance, the title character finds herself in a situation not dissimilar to that of Xenokleia: her son Polydorus has been murdered in a far-off land, and his corpse has washed up on the shore without proper burial. Just as Xenokleia uses her own monument as a source of pity for herself and her dead son, Hecuba makes herself into something like a funerary monument as she mourns her son and seeks pity for his death.[25]

Just as Xenokleia dies out of longing for her dead son, Hecuba's own life disintegrates as she mourns, and her grief transforms her according to the same disjunctive structure analyzed in earlier chapters. As she announces Polydorus' death to Hecuba, the maidservant tells her paradoxically "you are destroyed and you are nothing, although you behold the light" (ὄλωλας κοὐκέτ᾽ εἶ, βλέπουσα φῶς, 668)—a statement that uses the same language, as we will see, used to describe the dead as depicted in funerary monuments. When she sees the corpse and recognizes her son, Hecuba expresses this paradox in her own words, announcing that she no longer exists (684) and that what she sees is unbelievable and fearful (689). Similarly, before uncovering the corpse the maidservant warns Hecuba that it is a "wonder" (θαῦμα, 680)—an inherently disjunctive visual experience that, as we saw in Chapter 1, was used in Homer to characterize the image of the dead as well as the work of art. Hecuba, in turn, laments the murder of her son as "beyond wonder" (θαυμάτων πέρα, 714) in its horror, a crime committed "with no pity" (οὐδ᾽ ᾤκτισας, 720). Perhaps the most striking evidence of the disjunctive effects of Hecuba's grief is a dream she recounts in which she saw the murder take place. Although she was asleep, Hecuba she saw the vision with her eyes (ἔνυπνον ὀμμάτων / ἐμῶν ὄψιν, 703-704), emphasizing how new visual realities that originate in internal mental activity have come to overtake veridical reality.

The comparison of Hecuba herself, in her state of grief, to a work of art is made explicit in the scene following the unveiling of Polydorus' corpse, when Hecuba seeks Agamemnon's pity in order to avenge her son's murder:

> οἴκτιρον ἡμᾶς, ὡς †γραφεύς† τ᾽ ἀποσταθεὶς
> ἰδοῦ με κἀνάθρησον οἷ᾽ ἔχω κακά.
> τύραννος ἦ ποτ᾽, ἀλλὰ νῦν δούλη σέθεν,
> εὔπαις ποτ᾽ οὖσα, νῦν δὲ γραῦς ἄπαις θ᾽ ἅμα,
> ἄπολις ἔρημος, ἀθλιωτάτη βροτῶν
>
> Eur. *Hec.* 807-11

> Have pity on us: standing back like a painter
> look at me and compare[26] what evils I have.

[24] See O'Sullivan 2008, and, more generally, Steiner 2001 and Stieber 2011, as well as discussions in Chapter 1 and the Epilogue.

[25] For other relavant passages from the same play, see discussion in the Epilogue.

[26] The verb is often translated here as "consider." For ἀναθρέω as meaning "to compare" one thing to another, see Thuc. 4.87.

I was once a royal, but am now your slave,
once was blessed with children, but am now a childless old woman,
with no city, alone, the most wretched of mortals.

Discussions of this passage often emphasize how Hecuba's request uses physical detachment and objectification to engender an empathetic reaction.[27] But the full force of the comparison only comes into view through the shared disjunctive structure between pity and the work of art that has already been set up in the preceding scene. What the person who feels pity and the painter share, Hecuba suggests, is the ability to analyze the disjunction between visual and veridical reality—to negotiate the gap between what they see and what they know. Earlier, Hecuba had wavered in her decision to confront Agamemnon and beg him for pity because of her concern that he might not understand her plight and instead treat her as a slave (740-1). When she does ask for pity, then, she does so by compelling Agamemnon to visualize (ἰδοῦ) the contrast between her present state as a childless, homeless slave, and her former state as a queen with many children. Presenting herself to Agamemnon according to the disjunctive structure of a funerary monument allows Hecuba to elicit from Agamemnon the pity demanded by such a monument.[28]

Hecuba reinforces her similarity to a work of art later in the same speech:

εἴ μοι γένοιτο φθόγγος ἐν βραχίοσι
καὶ χερσὶ καὶ κόμαισι καὶ ποδῶν βάσει
ἢ Δαιδάλου τέχναισιν ἢ θεῶν τινος,
ὡς πάνθ' ὁμαρτῇ σῶν ἔχοιντο γουνάτων
κλαίοντ', ἐπισκήπτοντα παντοίους λόγους.
ὦ δέσποτ', ὦ μέγιστον Ἕλλησιν φάος,
πιθοῦ, παράσχες χεῖρα τῇ πρεσβύτιδι
τιμωρόν, εἰ καὶ μηδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅμως.

Eur. *Hec.* 836-43

If only I had a voice in my arms
and hands and hairs and in the step of my feet
through the arts of either Daidalos or one of the gods,
so that they might all together grasp your knees
lamenting, pressing upon you words of all kinds.
Oh lord, oh greatest light of the Hellenes,
trust me, stretching forth a hand to an old woman, a hand that will avenge,
even if she is nothing—but nevertheless.

If Hecuba has already suggested her similarity to a figure in a work of art because of her tragic plight, the extraordinary wish that each part of her body might be given voice registers as a wish that she might become an *animate* work of art. The reference to Daidalos—a mythical figure famous for his ability to endow objects and sculptures with

[27] Zeitlin 1994: 142; Steiner 2001: 51-2; O'Sullivan 2008: 188-95; Stieber 2011: 223-32 (who summarizes various other interpretations of the passage).
[28] See O'Sullivan 2008: 184-85.

human qualities like speech and movement—underscores how, even as her grief has reduced her to an almost non-human "nothing," she wishes to regain the power of speech and supplication. Such ability to speak, however, is not achieved by restoring the cognitive-affective functions of a human being. Instead, in her state of "nothingness," Hecuba tries to regain the powers of speech and supplication through the magical animation of the physical components of her outer form, her very material existence as something object-like. Taking the entirety of speech together, Hecuba presents herself as a mere image, embedded in a non-living form, whose internal suffering can only be fleshed out through the empathetic visualization of a fellow mortal who understands her plight. Only in establishing herself as a work of art can she make herself, in the eyes of Agamemnon, an object of pity.

Light, Vision, and Emotion

In calling herself a "nothing," in contrast to Agamemnon who appears as the "greatest light," Hecuba engages with language and imagery of light/life and darkness/death that had colored her experience of grief in the preceding scene, where Polydorus appeared to her in a dream as "no longer being in Zeus' light" (706). As we have already seen in the epigram of Xenokleia, whose son lay dead in the "dark sea," this language of light is ubiquitous among Classical funerary epigrams. Such epigrams constantly insist on the invisibility or blindness of the deceased as a condition of death, and the dead are frequently described as leaving the light of the sun or departing the earth for the dark chambers of Hades below.[29] Yet, as Hecuba suggests in linking light with her ability to visually access her son, these metaphors are not mere poetic imagery. Rather, they structure death and bereavement in terms of perceptual problems that come to affect, in turn, our own engagement with the monument before us as we feel pity. As we saw in the Introduction, pathos in Greek thought was understood to be physiologically embedded in the functions of the body. If, for the bereaved, grief strengthens visual encounters through dreams and memories that are detached from veridical reality, the framing of such encounters as problems of light and vision encourages us, standing before the monument, to critically assess how the same disjunction structures our own visual and emotional engagement.

An early example of a monument inscribed with this kind of poetic language was one set up for Ampharete and her grandchild, who apparently died around the same time in the late fifth century (fig. 35).[30] The name of the deceased adult— Ἀμφαρέτη—is carved in large letters on the horizontal geison of the pediment, offset so that it is associated with the woman in the relief below. The grandchild is left unnamed. The epigram carved into the architrave below reads:

τέκνον ἐμῆς θυγατρὸς τόδ' ἔχω φίλον, ὅμπερ ὅτε αὐγάς :
ὄμμασιν ἠ|ελίο ζῶντες ἐδερκόμεθα,
ἔχον ἐμοῖς γόνασιν καὶ νῦν φθίμενον φθιμένη 'χω.
CEG 89

[29] Tsagalis 2008: 63-86.
[30] Athens, Kerameikos Museum P695/I221. Clairmont 1970: 91-92 cat. 23.

> This child, my daughter's, I hold, the dear one whom, when we were alive
> and saw the rays of the sun with our eyes,
> I held on my knees, and whom, dead, I myself dead hold even now.

The epigram, and in turn the relief, dramatizes the absence of the deceased in the world of the living as a problem of light and vision. Ampharete's voice suggests that death does not break the bonds of love between grandmother and grandchild or the physical connection between them—she continues to hold her grandchild even in death—but only disconnects their gaze from the light of the sun. Death has not changed the actions or appearance of Ampharete and her grandchild, but only their ability to see the sun with their eyes.

Though it alludes to Homeric language, Ampharete's statement that she "saw the rays of the sun with [her] eyes" is no mere metaphor for death, as it is often understood, when placed above a carved relief sculpture.[31] Instead, it directly confronts the viewer's simple act of beholding and reframes it in relation to the tragedy at hand. For the viewer, the sun would have enabled the very act of reading the epigram and beholding the relief, whose semi-translucent marble surface would have glowed with embedded sunlight.

Andrea Nightingale's recent survey of different understandings of optics in ancient Greece makes clear the critical role played by sunlight in each one.[32] In Democritus' intromission theory of vision, the sun and its rays act as the agent of condensation enabling effluences from objects to compress into air-borne *eidola*.[33] It is the sun, in other words, that creates the impressed image or reflection (*emphasis*) of the visualized object within the viewer's eye. Likewise, Plato's extromissive theory of vision espoused in the *Timaeus* understands light flowing out from our eyes into the world as requiring an enveloping medium of sunlight with which it coalesces in order to grasp an external stimulus and create its image.[34]

Aristotle, in his treatise on the soul, *De Anima*, goes even further in attributing our ability to see to sunlight itself, arguing that we cannot see objects as such, but only the medium of light that provides their image. When we look at an object, he argues, our eyes actually take on the imaged form of the object we see—an image that has become dissociated from its material medium and enters our bodies through the medium of light.[35] Regardless of the specifics of any individual theory, our evidence suggests that all conceptions of vision in the Classical period required sunlight as the medium in which images occur and in which various rays and effluences, whether coming from our own eyes or from the objects before us, give material form to what we see.

By highlighting sunlight and its absence as the critical difference between life and death, Ampharete's inscription insists on a close relationship between vision and human life. Indeed, the verb used here meaning "to see" (*derkomai*) refers to a specific form of vision where the eyes flash with life and animation, and is frequently used in Greek

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[31] For the poetic language of light as metaphor for death in Classical funerary epigram, see Tsagalis 2008: 63-86.
[32] Nightingale 2016. See also Bielfeldt 2016; Squire 2016b: 10 n. 34 (citing *Od.* 4.539-40.); Turner 2016.
[33] Rudolph 2011: 75-6; Nightingale 2016.
[34] Nightingale 2016.
[35] Nightingale 2004: 11-12.

literature metaphorically to mean simply "to be alive."[36] In this inscription, the embodied, living eye of the viewer seems to be granted at least some degree of agency in creating a visualized image, in contrast to a true intromissive theory of vision. Indeed, in extromissive accounts as well as in poetic imagery dating as far back as Homer, the eyes are themselves capable of emitting rays of fire just like those of the sun.[37] By describing herself and her grandchild together as looking on the rays of the sun with their eyes when alive, Ampharete suggests that the relationship she formed with her grandchild was generated through mutual forms of visual, physical, and affective engagement both comparable to and generated by the very much material relationship between vision and sunlight. In death, on the other hand, Ampharete and her grandchild have transformed into something like the immaterial, insentient *eidola* that occupy the sunless realm of Hades: their eyes, embedded in bodies that nonetheless continue to hold one another, cannot see.

These sightless eyes embedded in visually intact bodies are what we confront in the relief below, which is delicately carved to create a vivid, tender image of a woman—who, incidentally, shows no signs of the age of a grandmother, confirming that this is no portrait in the modern sense—and a baby. As we begin to read the inscription, we are compelled to imagine the first-person voice—the one that describes herself and her grandchild as seated "here"—as emanating from the figure we see. We look at the relief as a representation of grandmother and her grandchild playing with a bird, and we see in their exchanged glances and gestures an affective bond between them. When the speaking voice of Ampharete affirms itself as dead in the third line, the bonds break: the playful gesture of the baby's outstretched hand reaches out in vain to the bird—itself a flighty *eidolon*-like creature—that Ampharete forever holds back, outside the frame.

Just as the inscription describes how the possibility of a visual connection disappears in the absence of daylight caused by death, so too is the optic relationship between grandmother and grandchild never fully achieved. Although the two figures turn towards the general direction of one another, Ampharete's eyes are directed not quite at the child but just above his head. The baby, for his part, does seem to look at his grandmother, and his haptic contact with her is shortcircuited, as his arm that reaches towards her is rendered so short (despite the large size of his hand) that the gesture seems futile.

The imagery of the epigram, with its insistence on the impossibility of a visual connection for the dead, encourages us to visualize the collapse of the connection between Amphraete and her grandchild through the subtle effects of how the figures are configured within the architectural space. Ampharete's chair is placed in front of the naiskos both spatially and logically, its upper back pushed into the left anta, which in turn expands in the wake of the concave curve of the chair's lower back and legs. Seated in this chair, Ampharete herself exists between the naiskos and us, her right elbow pushed against the left anta, and her left leg against the right one. In contrast, the child exists only within the naiskos, his body and hand carved in profile against the background surface. Where the veil surrounding her head is seen in profile, its outer edge flattened against the planar surface of the background, Ampharete twists her head out and away from this

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[36] See the entry in Liddell and Scott's *Greek-English Lexicon*, which cites *ll.* 1.88. *Od*. 16.439; Pi *P*.2.20; Soph. *El.* 66. See also Tsagalis 2008: 81-6; Bielfeldt 2016: 124-45.
[37] Bielfeldt 2016.

surface so that her full face, including both eyes, are visible, detached from the background, endowing her with a presence within our own space (fig. 36). In contrast, the baby's head is carved in true profile against the surface of the background plane, with only one eye visible. If we create a shared gaze between grandmother and grandchild, we must imagine it as existing not behind the flat surface of the background, but within our own space. The invisible line drawn between the two pairs of eyes must be traced from our perspective through the same admixture of air and sunlight through which we see, and through which Ampharete and her grandchild saw when they were alive, rather than a virtual world constructed behind the imaginary pictorial space of the naiskos, in the dead world of stone.

If the inscription presents the difference between life and death as the ultimate denial of full engagement between two figures who remain close to one another, so too when we look at the relief do we attend to an image of a grandmother and grandchild who, no matter how far their bodies and glances reach out into our own space, are constantly pulled back into a flattened surface where they can no longer see. Sculpture does not simply represent the deceased. Instead, sculpted bodies—even when they speak through epigrams and are carved from marble that glows in the sun—themselves lack life, insofar as they cannot look on the rays of the sun with their eyes. In the end, the only ones who can see are the viewers standing before the monument. By compelling us to contrast our power of vision with that of the images we see, the monument directly implicates our beholding in the tragedy we witness.

From Optic to Haptic

Only by reading the inscription on Ampharete's stele do we learn that both figures we see are dead. In contrast, on many Classical funerary monuments the deceased is accompanied by one or more family members who were still alive when the monument was set up. The physical and visual interaction between the dead and the living takes on new meaning as our experience of the representational potential of the image shifts, so that relationships appear simultaneously forged and broken through images of the living and dead side by side. A modest stele for a man named Andron is carved in low relief with perhaps the most ubiquitous form of interaction between the living and the dead in Classical funerary art, the *dexiosis* or "hand-shake" motif (fig. 37).[38] For modern scholars, the motif's precise meaning has been impossible to pin down, though it is generally acknowledged that it is meant to suggest a connection between the deceased and the living.[39] Yet the inscription on Andron's monument makes clear that, rather than encode a specific concept or event, the meaning of the gesture can shift depending on how we visualize it and engage with it. The inscription reads:

> Ἄνδρων ἐνθάδε κεῖται, ὃς αὐτο | τὸν μὲν ἐπεῖδεν
> υ[ἱ]ὸν ἀποφθίμε|νον, τὸν δὲ ὑπέδεκτο θανών.
> *CEG* 478

[38] Piraeus, Archaeological Museum 1161. Clairmont 1970: 113-114 cat. 36.

[39] On *dexiosis* see Grossman 2001 and 2013: 38. As Turner notes, discussions of *dexiosis* "have not tended to acknowledge the tactility of the gesture, focusing instead on the connotations of unity" (2016: 154 n. 53).

Andron is buried here, who lived to look upon his own
son perish, but received him, having died himself.[40]

As Kaldellis and López-Ruiz note, both inscription and image present two distinct events simultaneously: the moment when Andron lost his son, and the moment when he welcomed him again in Hades.[41] Yet the different language used in each phrase indicates that these moments are not structured as simple opposites of one another. When Andron sees his son dying, the verb is *epeiden* ("to look upon"), suggesting the active gaze of a living human that falls upon an inanimate corpse. When Andron himself is dead, however, the verb that describes his reconnection with his son is *hupodechomai* ("to welcome" or "receive")—not a verb of seeing, but of physical contact, one that suggests a more mutually dependent and less one-sided action than *epeiden*.

The inscription makes clear that the image is not simply ambiguous, as if we do not have enough information at our disposal to decide whether we see a scene of departure or greeting. Instead, the image we see depends on how we look—on the pathos of our vision, on how we turn the generic figure into a representation of Andron and his son. If we vivify the elder man on the left as Andron, we see him clasping the hand of a dead or dying man. The young man's head is just slightly downcast, emphasizing that although Andron sees his son, his gaze is not reciprocated. If we prioritize the internal logic of the image and see both figures as engaging with one another as if alive but in Hades, like Ampharete and her grandchild, we lose the veridical presence of both of them. The figures retreat to mere images within the shallow surface they are set against, and their disconnected gaze signals their inability to see. The relief, in other words, transforms before our eyes as we extend ourselves emotionally into the narrative of vision and loss that frames the sculpture.

Like Ampharete's monument, that of Andron prompts a critical evaluation of the image we see by suggesting through the inscription that affective bonds between family members exist after death, but not through visual engagement. The viewer of such a monument is invited, in other words, to feel a crisis of perception before it—to question how a visual image of the deceased could succeed (or fail to succeed) to a representation or embodied manifestation of the deceased. Such a crisis at the gravesite is acted out in precisely these terms in Sophocles' *Electra*, as the title character, at the tomb of her father Agamemnon, clasps a bronze urn that she believes contains the ashes of her brother Orestes:

ὦ φιλτάτου μνημεῖον ἀνθρώπων ἐμοὶ
ψυχῆς Ὀρέστου λοιπόν, ὥς σ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἐλπίδων
οὐχ ὧνπερ ἐξέπεμπον εἰσεδεξάμην.
νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὄντα βαστάζω χεροῖν,
δόμων δέ σ᾽, ὦ παῖ, λαμπρὸν ἐξέπεμψ᾽ ἐγώ.

Soph. *El.* 1126-30

[40] My understanding of this epigram is indebted to the recent analysis in Kaldellis and López-Ruiz 2011.
[41] Kaldellis and López-Ruiz 2011: 11.

> Oh *mnemeion* of the dearest of mortals to me,
> the remaining *mnemeion* of the life of Orestes, how far from the hopes
> with which I sent you away have I received you back.
> For now, I hold you—you being nothing—in my hands,
> but from home, oh child, radiant with light I sent you.

Although the word *mnemeion* only appears once in the passage, in the first line, the qualification of it with the adjective "last" or "remaining" (*loipon*) in the second line narrows its meaning. At first, *mnemeion* is the word Electra uses to address and so to name the bronze vessel as something like a funerary monument. *Loipon*, however, suggests that, like Pausimache's *mnemeion* that she left behind, the vessel is a trace or index of Orestes's life (*psuche*) that can connect Electra to him directly, through memory. Indeed, the act of clasping the vessel in her hands immediately transports Electra to an alternative word of psychic visualization, in which Orestes appears to her and in which she can talk to him as if he is her child.[42]

The visualization that arises from touching the vessel and the contact that it constructs with Orestes emerges through the language of shadowy images and empathetic feelings of pity that we explored in previous chapters as commonly structuring such interactions between the living and the dead. Electra complains that she grasps merely "ash and a useless shadow instead of [his] beloved form" (ἀντὶ φιλτάτης μορφῆς σποδόν τε καὶ σκιὰν ἀνωφελῆ, 1158-9) and addresses Orestes as nothing but a "pitiable appearance" (ὦ δέμας οἰκτρόν, 1161)—the same kind of pitiable appearance, I have argued, that we are meant to experience in the sculpted imagery of a funerary monument.

Electra juxtaposes her current state of clasping at Orestes "being nothing" with having sent him away bright with life—a contrast of the visual splendor of his living appearance with the mere material index that remains and provides only a psychic image of him after his death. The similarity to Andron's epigram is striking: both experienced their loved one for the last time visually—Andron "looked upon" (*epeiden*) his son while Electra sent off Orestes "radiant with light" (*lampron*)—but reconnected with them in death only physically, both with a form of the verb *dechomai* ("to receive" or "welcome"). For Andron, this reception only took place once he himself had also died. Likewise, Electra, as she grasps the *mnemeion* and enters the memory-world it opens up, wishes to die herself and asks Orestes to receive (δέξαι, 1165) her into his world. For Electra, the vessel's capacity to image Orestes as not simply her brother but her dead child is activated through her love for him and memories of him, and the fact that she is the only character on stage to look at the vessel in this way suggests the degree to which her individual emotional experience has colored her vision.[43] Monuments such as those of Ampharete and Andron function as *mnemeia* with similar effects, presenting pictorial and poetic imagery that compel viewers to engage with the same struggles of visual and physical interaction that Electra confronts as she tries to connect with her brother through the aniconic *mnemeion* she holds in her hands.

Touching Monuments

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[42] Mueller 2016: 119-125.
[43] Mueller 2016: 125.

As we read the epigrams of Ampharete and Andron, the individuals we see in the reliefs below flicker before our eyes between psychic and veridical realities, between pure fantasy and embodied image. The same process happens simultaneously *within* the reliefs, as Ampharete and her grandchild, Andron and his son try to maintain connections with one another as they move from life to death. In both cases, touch and gesture play an important role in constructing a relationship with what we see, as they do in Electra's interaction with Orestes through the bronze vessel. At the same time, the inherently haptic nature of our own vision—of the material sense impressions formed within our mind or the air around us and their material connection with visual stimuli—implicates our beholding as physically engaging us while simultaneously underscoring the connection between the shared gazes of each pair of figures in the reliefs and their physical contact.[44]

Indeed, one of the most distinctive features of the iconography of Classical funerary monuments is an often intense focus on physical engagement. In many cases, family members touch or gesture towards one another. But even figures shown in isolation, such as Pausimache, often clutch objects, and so engage with the world around them through touch. Gestures in ancient art are almost always interpreted as symbolic, and those on funerary monuments are generally seen as articulating different kinds of relationships between figures or indicating their status or identity.[45] Yet the degree to which these figures engage through their hands with the world around them—a world itself usually constructed on an extremely intimate scale—goes far beyond the standard forms of Classical art.

Attending to how physical contact establishes intersubjectivity means exploring not only the content of sculpted reliefs but also our own mode of experiencing funerary art. Unlike modern museumgoers, ancient viewers physically interacted with funerary monuments, frequently pouring libations before them and placing material objects of adornment on them.[46] While such acts of adornment are usually understood as ritual activities performed out of obligation or habit, they were not devoid of emotional sentiment. Electra in Euripides' eponymous play, for instance, suggests that an offering left on her father's tomb was the result of the pity felt by a stranger before it (…τάφον ἐποικτίρας ξένος, 545), and we should imagine such emotion as conditioning any activity before the funerary monument.

The best evidence for practices of adorning the tomb comes from images on white-ground lekythoi.[47] First produced soon after the end of the Persian Wars, they often show viewers of funerary stelai engaging physically with the monuments as they behold them, affirming the importance of this mode of engagement long before the return of

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[44] For relationship of sight and touch see Stewart 1997 (esp. 19-23) and various essays in Squire 2016a (especially Squire 2016b: 16-17).

[45] Gestures on grave monuments: Grossman 2001 and 2013: 38; Younger 2002. For a different approach see Turner 2016. For "body language" more generally in Greek art, see recently Masséglia 2015.

[46] For an overview of such rites see Kurtz and Boardman 1971: 200-218.

[47] Shapiro 1991; Oakley 2004, esp. 145-214; Arrington 2014: 239-74; Walter-Karydi 2015: 139-59. Visits to tomb and gift-giving generally: Closterman 2007 and 2014; Turner 2016.

sculpted figurative monuments later in the century.[48] Sometimes this engagement takes the form of direct contact: a female mourner on a late fifth-century lekythos, for instance, sits beside a stele decorated with a ribbon, her head bowed towards an alabastron she holds in her left hand in front of the stele, while with her right she grasps the top of the stele itself (fig. 38).[49]

In rare cases, viewers even reach out towards sculpted or painted images on tombs. A lekythos by the Sabouroff Painter, for instance, shows a large block on a stepped base, on top of which a seated woman holds out an object to a naked child sitting on the ground before her, who stretches his hand out towards her (figs. 39 and 40).[50] The placement and scale of the mother and child, as well as the mirror that hangs above them, indicate that they are images decorating the tomb, presumably rendered in paint or relief sculpture, but no border surrounds them setting them off from the outside world. Occupying this world is a male mourner who approaches the tomb from the left, stretching out his right hand into the pictorial space of the monument in a gesture closely imitating that of the child, as if he himself is about the grab the object held by the seated woman.

More commonly, interaction with monuments and the images they contain is mediated through the placement of adornments on or around the tomb. So, on the same lekythos, we see another mourner, a woman approaching from the right, placing a wreath on the tomb, not far from where a ribbon has already been fixed to it. Here and on many other such vases, there is a close association between how viewers physically interact with monuments—whether through direct touching or through the placement of gifts—and what they see in the monument at the moment of interaction.[51] Perhaps, indeed, the young man on the left is not a visitor to the tomb after all, but an apparition of the deceased who reaches out to the woman on the right (perhaps his mother) as she holds forth her wreath in a gesture that itself imitates that of the seated mother. In this interpretation, the visit to the tomb—the act of decorating it and the visualization of the deceased that ensues—would be a version of the image on the monument itself come to life: the woman gains visual contact with her deceased son through the wreath just as the mother in the tomb's decoration reaches out to her child with an object. In the white-ground technique used to render the scene, there is no way of differentiating between the flesh of the man and woman and the stone bodies of the mother and child, and the image as a whole suggests that such continuity likewise affects the experience of the mourner who adorns the sculpted tomb as she visits it.

In illustrating such scenes, lekythoi point to their own use, since they themselves were frequently left on or in the grave. To explore the relationship between decorating and viewing the tomb, however, I focus here on perhaps the most common form of adornment: the pieces of fabric or ribbons depicted on vases in a variety of bright colors, which could be fixed to the monument, draped over it, or wound around its shaft and tied

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[48] As Oakley observes (2004: 218-9), scenes of visiting the grave become especially popular beginning around the middle of the fifth century, replacing domestic scenes.
[49] Athens, NM 19354.
[50] Athens, NM 1815.
[51] See also Vermeule 1979: 31-32.

together in a broad knot or bow.[52] Visitors to the grave on white-ground lekythoi are commonly shown either carrying ribbons, sometimes in a basket, towards the tomb, or in the act of tying them on, and stelai and other monuments are commonly depicted with one or more ribbons already placed on them. Often these are identified as *tainiai*—commonly used as fillets or headbands—while in other instances the object appears to be a *sakkos*—a headscarf. For my purpose, the precise identification is less important than acknowledging that such ribbons and sashes function as objects of adornment that could be used equally on a living person as on a tomb.

Like many other aspects of funerary practices, decorating the tomb in this way is generally seen as a ritual activity and the ribbon's meaning is usually understood as symbolic. As Garland writes, "[v]arious explanations have been proposed to explain their meaning – that they possessed the power to ward off evil, elevated the object they adorned to a higher plane, or were a mark of homage – and it is probable that their durability and popularity owed something to each."[53] While no single explanation will satisfy, my interest is not in what such objects signify but instead how the act of tying them compels the viewer to engage with the monument in ways that animate it. For the painters of white-ground lekythoi went to great lengths to indicate that the placing of such ribbons was not a mere ritual activity, but one that prompted a visual, physical, and emotional engagement with the monument.

One of the rare depictions of crying in Greek art, for instance, occurs on such a pot that shows two women approaching a stele already adorned with a ribbon (fig. 41).[54] The painter—named the Inscription Painter for this very reason—has shown the stele inscribed with a five-line stoichidon inscription, using small strokes to indicate the letterforms. While the woman on the right approaches with a basket full of loose ribbons, the one on the left carries a single piece of fabric in her right hand. As she lowers her head to read the inscription on the face of the stele before her, she pulls her mantle to her eyes with her left hand, dabbing at her tears. The inscription, of course, remains illegible to us. What matters is not so much its specific content as the form of engagement that it prompts from the woman who reads it: adornment and tears of pity.[55]

Ribbons are used in other stages in the burial. Corpses laid out for burial were also decorated with garlands or ribbons, as well as with oil from lekythoi, and so the act of leaving such gifts by the tomb would not simply call the deceased to mind but physically re-enact an encounter with the body of the deceased.[56] Indeed, in funerary art, the act of adorning the tomb often goes hand in hand with the opportunity to encounter

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[52] For depictions of visits to the grave on white-ground lekythoi, see Shapiro 1991; Oakley 2004: 145-214 and 2005.

[53] Garland 1985: 116.

[54] Athens, NM 1958. Oakley 2004: 146-48.

[55] For the relationship between tears and pity see Sternberg 2005b: 31-36.

[56] Aristophanes in the *Ecclesiazusae* refers to a corpse as crowned with decorations and (the contents of?) a lekythos: "leaving me like a corpse that is laid out, except without the crowning and the leaving of a lekythos" (καταλιποῦσ' ὡσπερεὶ προκείμενον, μόνον οὐ στεφανώσασ' οὐδ' ἐπιθεῖσα λήκυθον, 537-8). See also Arrington (2014: 239-74, esp. 239-40) for relationship between anointing corpse and vases for oil used for anointment.

the ghost-like presence of the deceased, as the possible reading of the Sabouroff Painter's lekythos already suggests.[57]

A lekythos-shaped marble monument from Aegina, for instance, preserves traces of a painted scene showing two visitors to a tomb, decorating it with ribbons (figs. 42 and 43).[58] The depicted tomb consists of a two-step base, shown in perspective, on which stands a naiskos stele decorated with a standing figure, presumably either painted or sculpted, and crowned with a pediment. The other side is of the lekythos is painted with a dense landscape of reeds around which flit five winged *eidola*.[59] The act of adorning the sculpted monument, the imagery suggests, leads to the visual presence of the deceased in the form of these shadowy ghosts.

Other works of art showing visits to the tomb include images of the deceased that ambiguously materialize as if from the decoration of the tomb itself. Another marble lekythos, now in the Piraeus Museum, shows a seated woman, the deceased, gesturing towards a visitor to the tomb who stands to the right, reciprocating her gaze (figs. 44 and 45).[60] Once again, the relationship between this visualization of the monument and the act of decorating the tomb is suggested by the presence of a second visitor approaching from the left, carrying a box in her right hand, and an unidentifiable object in her left, positioned as if she is about to place the object on the tomb. The carved relief surface refuses to distinguish between whether the seated woman is a fully embodied person, like the standing visitor she gestures towards, or herself a relief sculpture or painting decorating the tomb she sits on. While her raised hand extends only to the edge of the stele behind her, as if carved into it, her feet spread beyond it to the edge of the base, juxtaposed with the standing mourner but not noticed by her, suggesting both the intimacy and the impossibility of their engagement.

The same ambiguity applies to our own relationship with the image. A small cutting on the shoulder of the vessel just above where the stump of the stele is depicted was intended to hold an attachment to complete the stele vertically. This plastic extension of the relief scene into our physical space could have provided a way for the viewer to adorn (that is, place a ribbon or wreath around) the stele depicted within the relief, opening up a point of entry into the image-world we see. That both this monument and the one from Aegina take the form of colossal lekythoi, moreover, is not incidental. The entire scene, including the visit to the tomb, can only be made present as a function of a vessel—through the craft of image-making, through our adorning of the tomb with such objects—and the dead only become visible when our own engagement and our own bodies are structured in the same terms of visualization that control the image of the deceased.

A close relationship between the decoration of the tomb and the visual presence of the deceased is also suggested by the epigraphic evidence, such as the epigram on a now-lost stele for Anthemis and Herophilos, whose names are placed so as to correspond with now-lost painted figures:[61]

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[57] Closterman 2014: 165-6

[58] Athens, NM 3585. Posamentir 2006: cat. 37; Clairmont 1993: cat. 2.052.

[59] For *eidola* on white-ground lekythoi, see Oakley 2004: 212-3.

[60] Piraeus, Archaeological Museum 1700. This scene showing the deceased seated at the tomb receiving a visitor is commonly found on earlier white-ground lekythoi.

[61] Clairmont 1970: 146 cat. 69.

Ἀνθεμίδος τόδε σῆμα· κύκλωι στεφα|νοῦσ<ι>ν <ἑ>ταῖροι
μνημείων ἀρετῆς | οὕνεκα καὶ φιλίας.
CEG 92

This is the *sema* of Anthemis. Her companions crown it with a ring of remembrances (*mnemeia*) for her virtue and friendship.

Although the monument adopts the old-fashioned formula of naming itself as a *sema*, the name given to what Anthemis' companions leave—*mnemeia*—could indicate any number of things: a remembrance or memory stored in the mind; gifts such as libations and locks of hair, as Orestes describes the *mnemeia* that crown a tomb in Sophocles' *Electra* (52-3); or the stone monument itself, which could be referred to as a *mneimeion* as we saw with Pausimache's epigram. The imagery is both literal and metaphorical. Material objects tied to the tomb are physical instantiations or traces of memories and affection, so that there is an unbroken continuum between the memories of Anthemis that her companions still have of her and the material objects they ring around her *sema*—which itself becomes a *mnemeion* of its own. Adorning the tomb is a mode of engagement that constructs a form of intersubjectivity through a combination of material objects, emotions, and memories.

While objects left on the tomb do not themselves survive, a large number of stelai were painted with ribbons depicted as if wound around them and knotted on the front with a large bow (e.g. fig. 46), sometimes with a personal item painted as if tied hanging from it.[62] These ribbons have an almost *trompe-l'oeil* effect, but their intention was not to trick the viewer—they are almost always painted only on the front face, for instance—but to provide a more permanent visual instantiation of a decoration as an index of the presence of a visitor who has reached out and remembered the deceased. Their material status as part of the monument, embedded flat into its surface, transfers this indexical quality to the monument itself, which appears as not a mere post on which to hang remembrances of the deceased, but a presence that is capable of generating them itself. In their rhetorical effect, such painted ribbons act like epigrams: they provide a permanent voice of a viewer as part of the monument, a sort of template we can easily use for our own engagement, and which, as soon as we do, casts us into an intimate relationship with the deceased.

A particularly evocative example of this kind of painted monument is a fragment of the lower part of a late-fifth century marble stele from the Kerameikos in Athens (figs. 47 and 48).[63] At the bottom, a small dog, which appears to be a spitz, is shown in profile, its head turned three-quarters towards the viewer, and its front paws resting on the upper body of a broken lekythos that lies on the ground. Above the dog, a ribbon was painted as

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[62] Posamentir's study (2006) of a number of painted monuments using techniques such as examination under UV-fluorescent light has shown just how commonly unsculpted stelai, beginning in the late fifth century, were painted with ribbons tied around them or rolled up and tied to them. See his catalogue for a list, to which we can add Paris, Louvre MA 4159 (Hamiaux 1992: 195 no. 198).

[63] Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 863. Posementir 2006: cat. 15.

if strung around the stele. Only a lower loop is preserved, from which hangs, to the left, a strigil and an aryballos, and to the right a pair of sandals, all seen in perspective. All of these items are personal effects commonly worn or held by young men in sculpted relief stelai, but here rendered as if left at the tomb.[64] On either side are painted threads of what must have been a second ribbon.

As Posamentir notes, the painting is of particularly high quality, and the artist has deployed a remarkable series of illusionistic effects: the ribbon is shaded to show it twisting, its inner and outer faces rendered in different hues; the sandals are depicted as if seen from behind, one overlapping the other as they hang against the surface of the stele; the threads of the second ribbon stretch around to the short sides of the stele, as if fallen away from the front. Likewise, the broken lekythos is placed at ground level, as are the back paws of the dog, as if the pot had been put there by a visitor and the dog had just run up and broken it. This decorative scheme allows us to see in the surface of the monument not only remembrances of the deceased, but of ourselves and our own actions. Our engagement with the tomb and the gifts we leave have become part of its surface structure; our memories have materialized not just into gifts, but, as in Anthemis' epigram, into the monument itself.

Put this way, the act of decorating the monument is something like the act of image making. The coalescence of the remembrances (*mnemeia*) in our mind, the remembrances we leave on the monument, and the remembrance that is the monument itself is made possible only through the medium of the work of art. Simply engaging with the monument, crowning it with *mnemeia* of any kind—whether made of fabric or perfumed oil, spoken words, tears or the touch of our fingers—creates a symbiosis between ourselves and the monument that inextricably links our engagement and its appearance.

When they are held by the deceased in the sculpture we see, placed in the tomb by the bereaved family, or left at the gravesite by visitors, material objects function as mechanisms for creating empathetic bonds between unrelated actors through forms of physical and visual engagement. The assimilation between our own modes of engagement as visitors and those figured in the images opens up associations between our experience of the monument and that of the bereaved family who set it up. If, as we have seen, the possibility of recognizing the deceased in the monument is configured by our emotional engagement, the act of adornment and the grief that has occasioned the monument are inextricably linked.

An epigram inscribed on the architrave of a mid-fourth century relief stele (fig. 49) offers vivid testimony of how the act of adorning the tomb crystalizes the grief of a widowed husband:

> οὐχὶ πέπλους, οὐ χρυσὸν ἐθαύμασεν ἐμ βίωι ἥδε,
> ἀλλὰ πόσιν τε αὐτῆς σωφροσύ[νην τ(ε) (⏑) ⏑ –].
> ἀντὶ δὲ σῆς ἥβης, Διονυσία, ἡ<λ>ικίας τε
> τόνδε τάφον κοσμεῖ σὸς πόσις Ἀντίφ[ιλος].

[64] The tomb of Eupheros from the Kerameikos was marked with a stele (Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 1169/I 417) showing the deceased holding a strigil, while his corpse below was buried with a real bronze strigil. See Schlörb-Vierneisel 1964.

CEG 573

No, not garments, not gold did this woman admire when she was alive.
Rather her husband and modesty [...]
But instead of your girlhood and your youthfulness, Dionysia,
your husband Antiphilos adorns this tomb.

Dionysia's epigram is complex in its logic and priamel structure, but like all funerary epigrams of the Archaic and Classical periods, it uses poetry and narrative to give meaning to the effects of death rather than provide an accurate biography of the deceased.[65] The first couplet invites us to imagine Dionysia as belonging to an age and class of women who normally desire adornments like garments and gold from their husbands—forms of engagement with unmistakable erotic connotations.[66] In contrast, Dionysia was a modest woman, whose attentions were focused only on her husband and her marriage. The second couplet turns to the present, where that relationship has been dismantled by her death, and Antiphilos seeks a connection through adornment—but only of her tomb.[67]

A structural relationship between Antiphilos' inability to adorn his wife and our own engagement with her tomb is suggested through the aesthetic framing of his crisis. The verb translated as "admire" is *thaumadzo,* an aesthetically-loaded term that links the visual appeal of a material object to a form of engagement with imagined realities, especially the divine.[68] *Thauma*, as we have seen, suggests the opening up of new visual possibilities, the opportunity to visualize material objects as animated through their brilliant appearance. For Dionysia, the poem suggests, the use of visually brilliant material objects as modes of affirming marriage distracts from achieving an intersubjective bond with no object as mediator. Antiphilos' adornment of his wife's tomb, then, is not only an inadequate substitute for adorning his wife, but a sad return to the paradigm that Dionysia rejected, where material objects with their visual beauty take the place of real-life affective relationships between two humans. The role of the monument, in this sense, is analogous to the statue of Alkestis that Admetos imagines commissioning after her death or the brooch of Odysseus that causes Penelope to weep, as we saw in Chapter 1—a replacement love-object that provides a compelling visual experience but remains a cold substitute for the real thing. Where adornment of the wife leads to intimate engagement with the woman herself, adorning the tomb takes us only to her image.

Little survives of Dionysia's monument, but we can tell it followed a common type known from more complete examples, such as a stele for a woman named Damasistrate, where the deceased is shown as the seated woman holding the hand of her husband, accompanied by a slave girl (fig. 50).[69] A barely visible lip along the lower

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[65] On this epigram as priamel see Tsagalis 2008: 284-85.
[66] For such erotic connotations compare *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite* 6.11.
[67] For the continuation of affective engagement towards the deceased after their death, see *CEG* 571 discussed by Tsagalis 2008: 105. For a parallel use of κοσμέω to describe the adornment of a tomb, see Soph. *El.* 1400-01.
[68] On *thauma* see Neer 2010 and discussions in Chapter 1.
[69] Clairmont 1993: cat. 4.430.

break of Dionysia's stele registers the presence of a head that corresponds with that of the seated woman in Damasistrate's relief. The background figure—the one whose head is preserved in Dionysia's relief—could function as a mother, a sister, or any other female member of the household.[70] In this sense, she acts as a paradigm for our own viewing and engagement, and in at least one example of a stele of the same formula, she holds a box, suggesting adornment paralleling our own.[71] The crisis that Antiphilos feels before his wife's tomb was, in other words, not depicted in the subject matter of the relief, which likely showed a straightforward *dexiosis* between husband and wife. With Andron's relief, we saw how this physical contact can be destabilized when we are compelled to visualize one or both of the figures as deceased. Yet Dionysia's epigram goes even further. Just as Antiphilos moves from adorning his wife to adorning her tomb, so does the man in the relief before us seem to grasp not the hand of his living wife, but the sculpted image of her that adorns her tomb—the very one that we are looking at. As in Ampharete or Andron's relief, only in death could the scene we see possibly unfold.

As we ourselves visit the tomb, as we stand before it, look at the relief showing a husband and wife together, read the epigram through which we address Dionysia, and perhaps even leave an adornment of our own, our visual experience of the sculpted monument—the object with which Antiphilos has adorned his wife's tomb—is shaped by his crisis of grief. Looking at the relief sculpture for an image of Dionysia, we search for a subject who might seem to appear, but who cannot actually be made present: the woman whose head is preserved—the unidentifiable family member with generic features—is, in a sense, a viewer like us, looking at an image of a non-reality from within the naiskos as we look from without. As much as the inscription suggests Dionysia is there in the relief, pointing to "this woman" in its opening line, it ultimately insists on representational failure, on our inability to reify its content into a depiction of the dead woman. At the end of the inscription we are left, like Antiphilos, pointing only to "this tomb." The crisis of grief experienced by the widower who adorns his wife's tomb becomes, for us, a crisis of representation: the impossible task of trying to find a real person in a marble sculpture.

Many funerary monuments appear to thematize the act of adornment described in Dionysia's epigram through the iconographic content of their reliefs, inviting us to associate our adornment of the tomb with the adornment of the deceased they depict. As already mentioned, women are often shown in personal settings, handling mirrors, jewelry, dolls, and other objects of adornment of the kind we might leave on the tomb, including ribbons.[72] The relationship between the adornment of the deceased and that of the tomb is sometimes made visually explicit, as in a stele for a young woman named Eukoline, daughter of Demokles (fig. 51).[73] The relief shows the deceased holding a small object between her fingers that she has presumably drawn from the box held by the slave standing before her. The object is difficult to identify—it looks like a small roundel

[70] On the ability for the same formulas to be used to depict different family members and different relationships, see Grossman 2001.
[71] Paris, Louvre MA 3113. See Hamiuax 1992: 162 no. 156. For the role of onlookers as guiding or engaging the viewer, see Stansbury-O'Donnell 2006; Grethlein 2016.
[72] For women handling ribbons in particular: Athens, NM 1858 (Clairmont 1993: cat. 2.152) and Athens, NM 1822/4522 (Clairmont 1993: cat. 2.151).
[73] Athens, NM 4006. Clairmont 1993: cat. 1.797.

with a raised boss in the center (fig. 52).[74] But what it most clearly resembles are the stylized rosettes that decorate the crowning element of the stele, below the figure of a mourning siren.[75] The woman and her tomb, in other words, are adorned with the same kind of object, shown in profile and oriented towards the deceased within the relief, and rendered frontally, oriented towards us, when placed outside of this pictorial space, within the space of mourning.

Eukoline's handling of the object is transformed into a paradigm for our own engagement through the presence of the slave before her, who seems to less engage with her than respond like a mourner. Even as she brings the object towards her, Eukoline seems to hold it back, framing it against the field of the relief so as to show it—even offer it—to us. The result is that Eukoline herself, together with the object she holds, appears like a funerary sculpture even within the scene depicted—something like the Archaic funerary kore of Phrasikleia seen in Chapter 1. The slave's reaction only heightens this sensation. Although she holds the box from which Eukoline has presumably drawn the object, suggesting that they are both alive and in the same space, her right hand is raised to her cheek, suggesting a gesture of mourning like that of the siren above. Her gaze, moreover, is not oriented towards the object or Eukoline's face, but, like our own gaze, towards her body more generally, as if she has just realized her mistress as she sees her is nothing more than an image.

Such features of Eukoline's monument exemplify the ways in which Classical funerary monuments can thematize the viewer's optic and haptic engagement through their very form. In a recent study of intimate engagement with art objects in Renaissance Italy, Adrian Randolph has offered a fresh approach to the Renaissance portrait in precisely these terms of gesture and touch, turning away from physiognomy as a site of representation and instead towards the sitter's hands.[76] For Randolph, the notion of gesture "points to an intimate cultural space of sitter, object, and viewer, within which a form of intersubjectivity arises, akin to, but distinct from, the notion of the literary voice. And, if gesture does offer something like voice, it also presents viewers with a challenge to the future anteriority of portraiture's normal 'tense.' […] [H]ands suggest a pronominal present and presence — an enduringly gestural 'I,' underwritten by a suggested haptic relation between the being in representation and the viewer."[77]

Exploring the role of hands, touch, and gesture in Classical funerary monuments allows us to see how they situate the deceased in ongoing relationships with the world outside of them in ways that are similar to the use of tense, voice, address, and deictic markers in the accompanying epigrams. If epigrams use a series of poetic techniques to point simultaneously towards the deceased as present and towards the monument as a marker of their absence, so too do sculptural techniques allow the deceased

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[74] Clairmont (1993: 448-9) identifies it as a ring and Walter-Karydi (2015: 258) simply as a "Schmuckstück." As Andrew Stewart suggests to me, the most obvious identification would be a pyxis lid, but the pyxis held by the slave girl is square and much larger than the object. Moreover, the position of the fingers holding the object suggests Eukoline grasps it by a stem or handle on which her index finger rests.

[75] For the decoration of Classical stelai with such carved rosettes, including their form and meaning, see Hildebrandt 2006: 60-67.

[76] Randolph 2014.

[77] Randolph 2014: 11.

simultaneously to touch their living relatives and be forever out of reach—to hold tangible objects that seem to disappear between their fingers.

The innovative and often arresting techniques used to emphasize the haptic nature of our engagement can be readily appreciated in a monument such as the stele of Ameinokleia, where a woman—indicated as the deceased through the inscription above her head—stands on the right with two slaves before her, on the left (figs. 53 and 54).[78] One slave stands in the background, holding a box. The other, in the foreground, kneels to adjust Ameinokleia's sandal, while Ameinokleia rests her right hand on the kneeling slave's head. Though they do not look at one another, Ameinokleia and the kneeling slave are bound together through reciprocated gestures—the one touching the other's head as she touches her sandal—that allow them to negotiate the placement of their bodies simultaneously inside and outside the frame of the naiskos.

Towards the edges of the stele, in front of the antae, the right side of the slave's body and the left side of Ameinokleia's take on a robust physical presence through the deep carving, while towards the center of the relief these same bodies flatten into the relief plane taking on a concave effect. The disjunction between the carving techniques is most noticeable where the slave cups the left foot of Ameinokleia. While the slave's right hand was almost fully carved in the round, as her now-broken thumb indicates, her entire left arm was only roughly sketched out, schematically engraved into the background plane, where the adjacent drapery of the standing slave receives similar treatment. As she holds up Ameinokleia's sandal, the kneeling slave appears to twist the foot forward and almost pull it out of this flat surface. Where Ameinokleia's right foot is not even visible beneath the heavy, confining drapery of her garment, the slave's gesture gives her left foot three-dimensional form as she conveys it beyond the confines of the naiskos and into the world of air and light. In reciprocating the gesture, Ameinokleia twists her right arm out of the flat depths into which her shoulder has submerged in order to place her right hand, also carved in very deep relief, on the slave's head. Ameinokleia's dependence on the slave for balance as she stands with a foot off the ground becomes a means of acknowledging the slave's role in affirming her presence.

The resulting exchange of touch between the two figures unites them in a concentric configuration that cuts across the flat void of the background plane between them. Nonetheless, the gestures are not equal and the circle remains incomplete: where Ameinokleia rests her hand on the slave's head, the slave grasps not her actual flesh, but only the sandal she wears, which mediates between them. Moreover, the straps of the sandal—which the slave is presumably tying—are not visible. They were once, presumably, painted directly onto Ameinokleia's foot, and so had no physical presence that the slave's three-dimensional hand could grasp.

The second slave, in contrast, stands outside of this exchange, her body given less depth as it assimilates into the background, her hands drawn close to her chest. Like us—and like the woman at the center of Dionysia's relief or the slave in Eukoline's—she watches the scene before her from the margins, standing close to the space of the other figures, but denied the embodied presence affirmed by touch. Only the box she holds suggests the potential for her too to engage, by removing something from it to offer as an

[78] Athens, NM 718. Clairmont 1993: cat. 3.370. For a detailed analysis of the relief see Adam 1966: 115-7. Parallels for the composition include a fragment from the Agora; see Grossman (2013: 101-3, cat. 69) who provides additional examples.

adornment for the deceased. Indeed, the statue of Ameinokleia did wear an actual object of adornment: an earring, almost certainly made of bronze or another metal, which once hung from the hole drilled through her left ear. As a real object—no different, perhaps, from an adornment we ourselves wear—the earring serves as a point of entry for our own engagement with Ameinokleia, yet at the same time a mark of her own disengagement. Nothing could more effectively enact the crisis of the bereaved husband who adorns his wife's tomb—the one we saw outlined in Antiphilos' epigram—than a real earring placed on her marble statue.

Conclusion

A small gesture similar to the one in the center of Ameinokleia's relief emerges in the middle of Plato's *Phaedo* when, in a break from the philosophical debate, Socrates places his hand on Phaedo's head:[79]

> καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Αὔριον δή, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς κόμας ἀποκερεῖ.
>
> Plat. *Phaedo* 89b2-5

> He stroked my head and gathered the hair on the back of my neck into his hand—he had a habit of playing with my hair on occasion—and said, "Tomorrow, perhaps, Phaedo, you will cut off this beautiful hair."
>
> trans. Fowler

Socrates refers to the custom of cutting one's hair in mourning—an act that enables the body to symbolically articulate itself as in mourning through established social practice. Yet Socrates' actions—stroking and gathering Phaedo's hair, calling it "beautiful"—locate in the potential cutting of Phaedo's hair a breaking of intersubjective bonds and corporeal human relationships. The moment occurs at a low point in a heated argument, on the eve of Socrates' execution, over the immortality of the soul (*psuche*), where Socrates appears close to defeat. In this moment of hesitation before he resumes his arguments, Socrates' engagement with Phaedo's hair takes on a delicate poignancy, silently articulating the inevitable real-life effects death will have on the mourner's body.[80]

Despite Plato's idiosyncratic understanding of the *psuche,* the term could be applied, for most Greeks as we have seen, not just to an abstract understanding of the soul but to an image of the deceased that persisted after death. In broader terms, it articulates some element of the deceased's character or affective self that might not die with their body, but nonetheless remains difficult if not impossible for the bereaved to access. We have seen, for instance, how Electra in Sophocles' play tries to use the bronze urn that is Orestes' *mnemeion* to access his *psuche,* of which the urn is but a trace. The Platonic debate over the relative importance of the body or soul at the moment of death, in other

[79] I thank Leslie Kurke for suggesting this passage as a parallel to the relief.
[80] Indeed, Phaedo cites this episode specifically to illustrate Socrates' sensitivity and gentleness in his final hours (89a1-6).

words, frames essentially the same problem grappled with by the visitor to the tomb: how to access someone whose image has been rent from their body.

It is in this sense that Socrates' tender caress of Phaedo's hair functions rhetorically like Ameinokleia's hand that balances on the head of her slave. Like Socrates' immortal soul, the sculpted funerary monument offers, at face value, a confident exposition of the permanence of the deceased in a non-corporeal form—an assurance that despite their death, a trace of them remains that we can readily access. Yet as these monuments thematize the difficulties inherent in social contact when mediated through material objects, they complicate our access to the deceased. Possibilities of visual and haptic engagement are broken as soon as they are promised both within the image—between the figures depicted in it—and within our own space, as we ourselves engage. It is this symbiosis of the crisis of the bereaved with the crisis of the representational image—a symbiosis of subjective experience and artistic form—that generates, in my argument, the full impact of the funerary monument for its viewer. To theorize this relationship in more explicit terms will be the goal of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

Forms of Grief in Classical Funerary Sculpture

Introduction

The imagery of Classical funerary monuments, I argued in the previous chapter, does not depict the deceased so much as it thematizes the very actions we are engaged in as we try to reach some form of intersubjective encounter with the deceased. Only in the contextual experience of the monument at the gravesite does the impact of our visual, tactile, and emotional engagement emerge, and only through the subjective nature of this encounter does the monument attain visuality. Yet artistic form exists in the world of veridical reality, and aspects of the form of a given monument—its style and technique, its handling of surface and texture, of line and volume, of light and shadow—are usually treated as inherent in the object, outside of subjective experience. Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, Classical funerary monuments are often seen as formally repetitive. Their meaning, it is understood in many accounts, lies not in the particular form of a given monument so much as the symbolic significance of the overall type of which it constitutes merely one example.

Put this way, subjective experience and artistic form appear difficult to reconcile. Yet it is in the act of negotiating between the two, I argue in this chapter, that a viewer gives social value to the funerary monument. Emotion's capacity to mediate between subjectivity and external form has been explored throughout the previous chapters. We have seen in particular how pity blossoms before the generic image, which it transforms into representation through a viewer's capacity for mental imaging and empathy. In the following pages, I move away from the mechanics of an individual encounter to explore how feeling pity before funerary monuments, when it is understood not only as an act of subjectivity but as a standardized cultural practice, informs our appreciation of artistic form—itself a standardized cultural practice when consistently deployed across a corpus of similar objects. What, I ask in this chapter, does the repetitive formal structure of the affective work of art tell us about how subjectivity not only responds to but is itself shaped by artistic practice? Put more simply: How can emotional experience take form in a work of art?

The Wound of the Image

One of the most provocative attempts to answer this question is Roland Barthes's book *Camera Lucida,* in which he developed a vocabulary for describing the emotional impact of confronting photographs of people who have since died.[1] In looking at the formal structure of such a photograph, Barthes' distinguishes what he terms the *studium* and *punctum*. The *studium* is the photograph's ostensible subject matter—who or what it shows, its narrative—while the *punctum* is a moment in the photograph that pricks or wounds us, and in doing so transforms our entire experience of the image. The *punctum* is initially explained as a detail—a necklace, for instance, in one photograph—but is

[1] Barthes 1981.

developed over the course of the book into something more metaphysical—a feeling, an affect, a memory. Ultimately, as Barthes focuses on a photograph of his deceased mother, the *punctum* becomes death—the death of the subject in the photograph, and the viewer's knowledge of their own eventual death. The *punctum* thus unites the undialectical nature of grief with that of the photograph: neither can bring back the deceased, no matter how committed they are to doing so or no matter how vivid the image they provide.[2] So, for instance, in reference to Alexander Gardner's photograph of Lewis Payne (fig. 55), who appears awaiting his execution for conspiring to assassinate Abraham Lincoln, Barthes states: "The photograph is handsome, as is the boy: that is the *studium*. But the *punctum* is: *he is going to die*."[3] Put this way, the *punctum* is the same wound we feel when we confront images on monuments like those seen in the last chapter—the image of Dionysia that her husband can adorn but only as a marble monument, or that of Eukoline, who adorns her body with the same object that adorns her tomb. It is the same emotional disturbance, I would argue, we are meant to feel before every Classical funerary monument that offers an image—but only an image—of the deceased.

One of the most dramatic stagings of a *punctum*-like moment in the process of viewing a funerary monument can be seen in the stele of a girl named Eukoline— (fig. 56—not to be confused with the Eukoline whose stele was described in the previous chapter).[4] Eukoline's monument is striking for the depth and vigor of its carving, both of the figure and the floral decoration above. On the architrave below this decoration, her name is inscribed in large letters Εὐκολίνη : Ἀντιφάνος (Eukoline, daughter of Antiphanes). The rectangular space in which she stands is framed by a flat band, which is inscribed with an epigram that runs vertically along both sides, the letters turned ninety degrees to the side. It reads:

> εὐκολίας ὄνομ' εἶχεν ἐπώνυμον ἥδε βίο δὲ |
> κεῖται ἔχοσ' ὑπο γῆς μοῖραν ἐφ' ἧιπερ ἔφυ.
> *CEG* 517

> This woman had a name given in commemoration of her good nature;
> she lies dead having under the earth the share of life for which she was born.
> trans. Tsagalis

The epigram follows a structure we have already seen in Dionysia's epigram, pointing first to "this woman" as a visual presence before undermining that presence with a reminder that she is dead and gone. The repetition of a form of the same verb—*echein*, to have or hold—helps make the dialectic explicit: where in life Eukoline held a name that matched her affective disposition, in death she is merely a corpse under the earth that holds not her name or her character, but merely her predestined fate.

The dialectic structured by this verb of holding takes on an even more forceful meaning when we turn to the sculpture, where the image of Eukoline was, in fact, holding something, as indicated by the position of her hands and two dowel holes drilled into

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[2] On this point see Brinkema 2014: 76-112.
[3] Barthes 1981: 96 (emphasis original).
[4] Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 1136. Clairmont 1970: 79-80 cat. 14. See also Schlörb-Vierneisel 1968: 103-109; Vierneisel 1968; Knigge 1988: 143-44; Tsagalis 2008: 245-6.

them.[5] Whatever this object was, it would have been something real—most likely a piece of jewelry, such as a necklace, made of bronze or another metal. Perhaps the object was not even fixed until the monument was erected, so that the family could place an object of their choosing. Whatever it was, when placed in the hands of a vigorously carved statue, itself once painted with bright colors, this real object would have added to a sensation that the woman we see has overcome her marble material and become the one named in the inscription.

This invitation to see the girl as Eukoline herself—to change the *pathos* of our vision from generic image to representation, following Aristotle's account as described in the Introduction—is bolstered by the placement of the hands (fig. 57). The figure is inscribed within the niche, yet the left hand oversteps the border, reaching outside the confines of the niche and towards us.[6] But at the very moment it reaches into our real space, holding an object that is itself real, it penetrates the inscribed band, partially obscuring it and sinking into the words *hupo ges*—"under the earth." Just when Eukoline almost becomes real—when, as in the epigram, she seems to hold something that corresponds to who she was in life—we are hit by the fact that she remains dead and buried beneath the earth, where she holds nothing but her predestined fate.

Subjectivity and Antitheatricality

Barthes' distinction between *studium* and *punctum* is able to specify the particular pain felt when recognizing someone in a work of art as dead and so is able to account for the emotionally and visually transformative impact of a moment like Eukoline's hand. Precisely because every person named in a funerary monument is already dead, the generic figure's succession to representation is an inherently emotional act, one that compels us to navigate between our subjectivity—our experience of the *punctum*—and a picture's overt content—the *studium*. Yet while both Barthes and the Classical funerary monument link a crisis of representation to the emotional consequences of death, there is a crucial difference. As Michael Fried has emphasized in his recent book on photography *Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before*, Barthes insists that the *punctum* is unintentional, only visible to a particular viewing subject but not to the depicted subject or even the photographer.[7] Similar moments on funerary monuments, on the other hand, are overtly rhetorical devices, as is made clear by Dionysia's epigram or Eukoline's outstretched hand, not to mention the sheer repetition of visual and epigrammatic forms from monument to monument. How can we define the emotional wound of an image as a matter not only of subjective visualization but also of intentional form and composition?

Eugenie Brinkema has recently addressed this question by treating Barthes' account of grief as a problem of form—a question of illumination, of the physical capture of light, divorced from both the subject of the photograph and the viewer.[8] Brinkema shows how, for Barthes, both grief and the photograph are fundamentally undialectical, in that they inevitably fail to bring back the deceased. When grief is seen as embedded in the very form of the photograph—the very medium of photography—affect (she argues)

[5] I thank Leslie Kurke for suggesting the link between the verb and the outstretched hand.
[6] For another monument with similar configuration, see Athens, NM 3283 (stele of Ameinodora).
[7] Fried 2008: 95-114.
[8] Brinkema 2014: 76-112.

takes on a life of its own and becomes independent from the viewing subject. As she writes: "The externalization of affect into the ontology of the photograph forms the ground for a post-subjective, impersonal affect. Thus, it is not the knee-weakened subject who grieves but an undialectical image through which the dimension of grief moves as something that is painful *for form*."[9]

As we have seen, ancient conceptions of light and vision in both philosophical texts and funerary epigrams suggest that the image we attend to in a funerary monument functions as a physical trace of the deceased, rather than a representation mediated through the independent monument or the mind of the sculptor. Understood this way, the ontology of the image is analogous to (though by no means the same as) how a photograph captures form through light. If the experience of the *punctum* is caused by the ability of the mechanical process of photography to formalize grief without mediation (as opposed to its ability to capture physiognomic likeness), the sheer formal impact of photography on the modern viewer might parallel the impact of the marble funerary monument on the ancient viewer.

Where Brinkema's account can help us understand how we might locate grief in artistic form itself, sculpture is not photography, and once again the formulaic nature of the corpus of Classical funerary monuments compels us to consider how the predetermined configurative strategies of monuments structure subjectivity itself. In his reading of Barthes, Fried offers a way forward by aligning the work of the *punctum* with what he has called antitheatrical pictorial practice—a practice, spanning several hundred years of modern Western art, which aspires to make something seen by the viewer without it having been shown by the artist or work of art itself.[10] Antitheatrical pictures treat viewers as if they are not present, and present the image as if it were not intended to be seen. The *punctum*, Fried argues, is antitheatrical because it could not have been anticipated at the moment the photograph was taken, when the subject was alive, but can only emerge after the fact, to a viewer who recognizes that the subject will die or has already died. When the *punctum* is reframed in terms of its antitheatricality rather than its mere subjectivity, it offers a way of transporting the link between pathos and representation, as discussed in the Introduction with reference to Aristotle, to the context of grief. The pathos of our vision is changed not only by recognizing a specific individual in a generic image, but, as in Eukoline's monument, by recognizing that individual and then realizing they are now dead—by bringing a generic image to life and killing it in almost the same moment.

An almost explicit statement of such antitheatrical sentiments occurs on a late fifth-century monument for two children, Mnesagora and Nikochares (fig. 58):[11]

> μνῆμα Μνησαγόρας καὶ Νικοχάρος τόδε κεῖται.
> αὐτὼ δ(ὲ) οὐ πάρα δεῖξαι· ἀφέλετο δαίμονος αἶσα,
> πατρὶ φίλωι καὶ μητρὶ λιπόντε ἀμφοῖμ μέγα πένθος,
> ὄνεκ(α) ἀποφθιμένω βήτην δόμον Ἄιδος ἔσω.
>
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[9] Brinkema 2014: 92 (emphasis original).
[10] Fried 2008: 100-114, 338-47.
[11] Athens, NM 3845. See Brown 2005.

> This lies here, a *mnema* of Mnesagora and Nikochares.
> The two are not here to show themselves; the fate of destiny has carried them
> away, leaving behind great grief for their dear mother and father,
> since they have died and gone to the halls of Hades.

When we look at the relief, we might think we see Mnesagora and Nikochares. But what is actually present—what has been left behind in the wake of their deaths—is something different: memory and the grief of bereaved parents. The children, as the epigram explicitly states, are not here to show themselves. The image of Mnesagora and Nikochares, in other words, is merely seen *by us*, configured by the grief felt by their parents and by our own emotional engagement, not shown by the monument.

The relief thematizes the instability of the image by depicting the children playing with a bird—a common motif on children's graves, as we saw on that of Ampharete and her grandchild. Although the two look towards each other, the placement of the bird between them breaks their shared gaze, so that their interaction is mediated only through the bird—no stable object, but one whose flightiness is associated in art and literature with the mercurial nature of souls in Hades, and who is depicted here about to take flight. Like the presence of the image before us, the bird that binds Mnesagora and Nikochares visually and physically evaporates before their very eyes.

This antitheatrical nature of the image we see is underscored in the configuration of the children's bodies. The baby gazes at the bird—visualizes it—but his attempt to catch it seems almost intentionally unsuccessful. Although the arms should be seen in profile, the hands have been rendered flat against the relief surface, as if he is grasping at something that exists only on the surface of the relief, not within the virtual space of representation. Indeed, the form of hands and the bird are flat, their edges sharply raised off the planar surface of the relief in a technique that contrasts with the modulated carving of the girl's dress. Like Antiphilos who adorns his wife's tomb instead of the woman herself, the baby here seems to reach not for a bird, but for the carved marble image of a bird. Seen this way, the gesture surely references our own inability to grasp any real connection with the dead children. What wounds both the baby and us is precisely the notion that what we see has not been shown to us. Instead, it has been constructed in our minds through the traces left behind—memory and grief.

Such antitheatricality colors many Classical funerary monuments, which, as we have seen, frequently present intimate, inward-looking moments of domesticity that in real life were not meant to be seen by strangers—images of other people's wives, children, slaves, and personal spaces whose very visibility contradicts standard Athenian notions of propriety, especially concerning women.[12] Seeing these women in these intimate settings is, in essence, a cultural impossibility—good wives are almost by definition antitheatrical, not meant to be visually apprehensible to a stranger in the flesh.[13] While seeing an artistic rendition of a woman at her toilette is within the bounds

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[12] The most famous ancient account of this topic is Pericles' admonition to women in his funerary oration (Thuc. 2.45.2).

[13] I argue this in contrast to the *opinio communis,* which treats the significant proportion of funerary reliefs showing women as indicative of changing social attitudes to women in the later fifth century, especially with regards to their role in determining citizenship. See Osborne 1996, 1997; Stears 2000; Younger 2002; Oakley 2004: 223-5; Closterman 2007: 648-9.

of decency (such scenes are common on pottery), the transformation of that image into a representation of someone's wife or daughter—a woman named in the inscription—can, paradoxically, only take place when we see her as dead. In this context, the very prospect of reifying their image in any meaningful way is foreclosed from the first. Only when viewed through the prism of memory and grief—memory and grief that are embedded in the very conceit of the art object—can such subjects attain visuality. Their ubiquity among carved reliefs would seem only to exacerbate the crisis of representation that defines the experience of the funerary monument.

In this sense, Classical funerary monuments contrast not only with the theatrical displays of (predominantly male) bodies in their Archaic predecessors, but also with other contemporary sculpture. In the context of the gravesite, aspects of Classical relief sculpture that were used in multiple genres would have taken on new meaning. So, for instance, the appearance of the *dexiosis* motif on both funerary monuments and documentary reliefs of the period has been taken to suggest a symbolic meaning common to both settings. Instead, we might see the changeable appearance of the motif in the funerary context, as in Andron's relief, as a subversion of the stability of the image in its official context.[14]

Most significant is the contrast with the other major category of marble sculptures erected by private individuals in this period: votive reliefs. Unlike funerary reliefs, these aimed at unproblematically representing myth and manifesting the presence of the god, and were created so as to allow viewers themselves to engage in such practices of visualization. The contrast is not merely at the level of subject matter—access to an epiphanically present god rather than an ever-absent deceased—but is also configurative. So, in Classical votive reliefs, family members usually dutifully line up in paratactic, horizontally oriented formations to approach a deity.[15] The clarity of such images suggests a parallel between the exchanges of gazes and offerings within the scene and the ability of the monument to offer the viewer a similarly epiphanic experience. In contrast, the tall, compressed setting of funerary reliefs, the vivid, strained gestures and averted gazes of their figures, and the dense layering of relief surfaces of varying depths all work towards much less stable images whose capacity for representation is not guaranteed by a deity, but is only activated through the will of an emotionally committed viewer.

The *Punctum*'s Form

In their subject matter and configurative structures, Classical funerary monuments correspond to the category of absorptive pictures that Fried has long characterized as essential to the antitheatrical project.[16] The classic absorptive picture, such as Chardin's *La mère laborieuse* (fig. 59), shows individuals deeply engaged in what they are doing,

[14] Grossman 2013: 38.
[15] See Depew 1997; Platt 2011: 77-123. As Platt argues, representation or manifestation of the divine was not taken for granted in these forms of sculpture but still required negotiation and engagement on the part of the sculptor and the viewer.
[16] Fried 1980, 2008, and 2010. Grethlein (2016) has recently used Fried's concept of absorption to frame a discussion of sight and reflexivity in Athenian vase painting.

seemingly unaware that they can be seen by us.[17] Such figures are often physiognomically unexpressive, their faces hidden or their bodies twisted away from the surface plane. Instead, intersubjective recognition is structured through small, intimate gestures between absorptive figures and other humans or the environment around them.[18] Yet such paintings are often simultaneously absorptive in their structure, so that the pictorial configuration appears motivated and ultimately unified by the same deep focus of its subjects. Absorption at both levels is often offset by moments of its antithesis: elements of address that call out to the viewer, often in subtle ways, reaffirming the presence of the viewer as outside of the absorptive space of the composition.

It is the link between the thematic and formal elements of the anitheatrical picture that allows the emotional force of the *punctum*, once characterized as antitheatrical, to be reconceptualized as something embedded in a particular configurative structure. A comparison between Chardin's painting and a late fifth-century monument for a woman named Hegeso (fig. 60) highlights this structure in the Classical funerary monument.[19] There are obvious similarities: both depict a seated older woman interacting with a standing younger one—a mother and child in the Chardin, Hegeso and her female slave in the funerary monument. But what is more striking is how both artists have positioned their figures turned towards one another, seemingly collapsing them into an intimate domestic space. In Chardin's painting, this space is defined by the screen behind the figures blocking the door—a door that points to an outside without making it present.[20] In Hegeso's stele, the figures are enclosed by the architectural frame. Although the chair she sits on overlays the outer pillar, affirming an outside world that corresponds to our own space, Hegeso leans her back against the inside of the frame, confined within it.

In both cases, this folding-in of the figures into a self-contained space allows them to establish a connection with one another through their visual focus on a single material object—an object whose configuration, while crucial to their intersubjective engagement, is made obscure to us. The painting and the relief, in other words, do not invite us to identify the object held between the figures, but to make the very act of engaging through a material object the thematic focus. In Chardin's painting, this object is the piece of needlework held between mother and daughter: what exactly the needlework shows, and why the mother points to it, is blurred through painterly technique.[21] In Hegeso's relief, both figures likewise focus on a box placed between them and a jewel, probably a necklace, that Hegeso has drawn from it and holds in her right hand.

Today we cannot see this necklace. Unlike the rest of the scene, which was carved in relief and finished with paint, the necklace was rendered in paint alone, and we can now infer its existence only from the positioning of Hegeso's fingers. The necklace, in other words, exists merely as a function of the background plane. Unlike every other

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[17] For Fried on Chardin, see 1980: 49-55. On *La mère laborieuse* and its techniques of absorption and inwardness, see Söntgen 2014.

[18] See, for example, Fried's analysis (2010: 86-107, esp. 94-95) of the man in armor in Caravaggio's *Crowning with Thorns*—a figure whose absorptive contemplation and gestural relationship with Christ leads him to the theological argument: "Recognizing another to be Christ for oneself is, in my account, the very content of the *Crowning*" (106).

[19] Athens, NM 3624. On Hegeso, see Stewart 1997: 124-29.

[20] Söntgen 2014: 105

[21] Söntgen 2014: 108-9.

element of the sculpture, including its architectural frame (whose carved details extend even around to the side of the monument), the background surface in these reliefs is pictorially invisible: it does not *represent* something—it does not even exist for the figures we see, within their virtual space. It is for this reason that these background surfaces are so often left more roughly finished than the figures and were painted a neutral blue in antiquity.[22] While objects or details of objects are sometimes merely painted onto the background surface in Classical relief to indicate their projection into the deepest realm of virtual space, this is not the case with Hegeso's necklace.

If we examine how the various planes of the relief are layered, Hegeso's right hand should be in the center, between the open arms of the slave. The hand covers the open lid of the box, which folds backwards, pushing open more space and obscuring the slave's left arm and hand. It is this arm that should be the most deeply projected element of the scene, yet even it is rendered in relief. The necklace, in other words, should be just as tangible as the carved hand holding it. But rendered only in paint, the necklace acts as a crucible for the crisis of representation that we saw articulated in Dionysia's epigram in the previous chapter, again in terms of material objects of adornment. As we search for the object that forms the visual focus *within* Hegeso's world, we lose track of the image, our eyes settling instead on a surface that is only visible within our own world, where Hegeso and her slave are not present.

Even as the necklace is submerged into the virtual space of the relief, the internal focus on it and the box from which it came is configured as the focus of our own gaze. For while we would expect the slave to present the box to Hegeso directly, she holds it sideways, with the lid opening backwards so that the box is oriented towards the viewer outside of the composition. Likewise, while the rest of her body is shown in profile, Hegeso's upper body turns forward and her right arm and hand turn around full circle. Instead of simply holding the necklace in front of her, she opens the palm of her hand towards us while simultaneously setting off the necklace against the background surface.[23]

The resulting hand is a contortion of tubular forms that open up space in ways far more complex than the simple profile rendering of Hegeso' inexpressive face. In his painting Chardin complicates our outside vantage point by placing a small dog which stares directly at us from the lower left corner of the painting, disrupting our otherwise unnoticed external gaze.[24] Hegeso's monument, however, disturbs the absorption of the image at its very center, tilting the box towards us and laying the necklace that is Hegeso's visual focus across the flat surface plane of the relief, so that it becomes something closer to an adornment of the monument we see—something we might leave on the monument—rather than of Hegeso herself.

Formulaic Pathos and *Pathosformeln*

[22] Blue paint was visible on the background of the Eupheros stele when it was discovered: Schlörb-Vierneisel 1964: 85; Posementir 2002 and 2006: 30.
[23] Compare the handling of the object in the monument of Eukoline daughter of Demokles in the previous chapter.
[24] Söntgen 2014: 115.

Comparing these works does not reveal any historical link or influence—Hegeso's relief, after all, was only discovered in 1870, over a century after Chardin's canvas was completed.[25] Instead, the comparison highlights how both works use similar formal structures and techniques to thematize the very act of using objects and images to forge affective connections, and can help expose how compositional and configurative features of Hegeso's stele determine its emotional impact. Repetitions of formal structures that themselves contain affect can help us understand how emotional engagement with features such as a *punctum* can succeed to the realm of culturally-determined artistic practice.

In the history of art, no theory of how emotion is embedded in formal patterns has generated more debate than Aby Warburg's concept of *Pathosformel* or "pathos-formula."[26] For Warburg, formal gestures or patterns embedded in subsidiary elements like drapery and hair can be seen as projections of emotional states that extend from the human subjects who occupy the scene. Pathos-formulas emerge through the repetition and reconfiguration of such formal moments in different works of art with different subject matter across different centuries, and carry with them a heightened sense of affect and energy as they move from one picture to another. In the process, they become more animate than that of the figures who populate the scene, who are only animated insofar as their dress, hair, and other accessory features provide the formal moments in which pathos-formulas reside. As Spyros Papapetros has recently argued, such accessories, for Warburg, "move less because of the wind, but rather, they flutter because of their oscillation between two different epistemological systems, represented by empathetic psychology and animistic mentality."[27] The animation of formal elements, in other words, always entails a hidden subjective presence—the empathetic inclinations of a depicted subject and ultimately of a viewer—but bodies and subjects are implied through the animation of such accessories rather than the other way around.[28]

Comparing Hegeso's monument to the Chardin in this light allows us see how works with fundamentally different subject matter, from different times and places, thematize the affective relationship between two figures using strikingly similar formal devices. Intersubjective narratives—seeing two figures as mother and child or mistress and slave—emerge through the rendering of accessory objects, such as the needlework and the necklace. Rather than animating the figures through iconographical identification or psychological projection, focusing on shared configurative structures allows us to experience form itself as giving life to the images before us.

Yet if the comparison highlights how form can generate affect, it tells us little about what kind of affect—and indeed, what kind of form. Pathos-formulas, for Warburg,

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[25] Stewart 1997: 124.

[26] Waburg's ideas on *Pathosformeln* were never fully published, and are most readily encountered through his incomplete Mnemosyne Atlas (Warburg 2000). In thinking through the concept of *Pathosformel,* I have benefited less from Warburg's own writings than from recent secondary literature, and I have found particularly useful discussions in Didi-Huberman 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2016; Bredekamp 2010; Bennett 2012: 160-66 and passim; Johnson 2012; Papapetros 2012; Wood 2014. For uses of *Pathosformel* in the study of ancient art see Settis 1984; Franzoni 2006 (esp. 153-61); Prioux 2011.

[27] Papapetros 2012: 47.

[28] See especially Papapetros 2012: 48, 60, and passim.

are universal, embedded deep in the human unconscious, and pay little attention to how both emotional engagement and artistic form are developed as a function of human beings who occupy a specific historical moment. Instead of requiring our emotional engagement, pathos-formulas, as Christopher Wood has recently put it, "do the suffering for you."[29] In this sense, they are incompatible with particular, subjective instances of grief that are the catalysts for each and every Classical funerary monument. For all his use of similar formal devices, Chardin never asks us to consider that the seated woman in his painting is now dead.

But if we can decouple the idea of the pathos-formula from Warburg's larger project and reconcile it with the presence of a visualizing, emotional subject, it emerges as a compelling way of accounting for the formulaic nature of the Classical funerary monument. In a series of recent essays and books, Georges Didi-Huberman has highlighted the potential of the pathos-formula to produce radical new forms of art history precisely because it is able to give voice to the emotional or traumatic experience of the image.[30] In contrast to more traditional positivist approaches that seek closure in the image's ability to represent some external reality, Didi-Huberman emphasizes, like Barthes, the undialectical nature of the image, foregrounding our experience of it over its encoded meaning. An art history traced through a pathos-formula is capable of forging new ways of explaining formally similar images—not through their shared symbolic content, but through their shared pathos. The result would be what Didi-Huberman has described as "a *knowledge-movement* of images, a knowledge in extensions, in associative relationships, in ever renewed montages, and no longer knowledge in straight lines, in a confined corpus, in stabilized typologies."[31] Didi-Huberman's formulation allows us to replace Warburg's panhuman unconscious with a form of cultural memory that might develop in a specific time and place—cultural memory that cannot be traced through typologies of iconography and symbolism, but forms of grief.

This approach to the pathos-formula allows us to consider series of funerary monuments that resemble one another not as the expression of a universal emotion, but as a self-conscious effort, within a community, to give voice to similar emotional experiences by giving them similar visual form. Indeed, if, as Papapetros argues, animation of inorganic forms is for Warburg the corollary of empathy towards material objects, a pathos-formula shared between two different pictures acts as the visual complement to something like the Greek conception of pity. By structuring two disparate events as visually similar, it compels us to engage empathetically in order to find commonalities between not only the images we see in the different pictures before us but those in our mind, derived from our own experiences and memories. The very experience of the Classical funerary monument—not only seeing it but touching it, adorning it, weeping and remembering before it—is predicated on formalizations of subjectivity that structure our own bodies and emotions into patterns no different from those that govern the figures we see carved in marble.

Tracing Hegeso's Formula

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[29] Wood 2014: 23.
[30] Didi-Huberman 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2016.
[31] Didi-Huberman 2004: 10.

Treating the corpus of Classical funerary monuments as the kind of "knowledge-movement of images" described by Didi-Huberman offers a way to address their generic nature while simultaneously attending to the emotionally subjective experience at their core. Far from transmitting stable messages or providing closure in meaning at the gravesite, pathos-formulas institutionalize grief in the form of a culturally determined art object. If, as I have argued, moments of touch or proximity—eyes and hands, objects held or looked at—can construct intersubjectivity in ways similar to but perhaps even more subtle than poetic effects of epigrams such as voice and deixis, attending to such moments in a series of reliefs can help us see a given instantiation of the pathos-formula as a personal grief mediated through a culturally-developed form. While many more examples of the mistress and slave formula survive, I focus on just six further ones here, dating from the end of the fifth through the middle of the fourth centuries. Even when details of subject matter change between them, the repetition and reconfiguration of form structures each monument as yet another eruption of grief, another collapse of the representational image, right at the center of the relief where the two figures attempt to engage one another.

i) A Monument for Phan[…]

Two battered fragments of a funerary stele now in Cleveland are all that is left of a monument with the same formula as Hegeso's stele, that of a seated woman, her head downcast, approached by a standing female slave holding a box (fig. 61).[32] The inscription partially preserved on the Cleveland fragments helps illustrate how a generic-looking monument could activate an emotionally subjective encounter:

> ὦ μεγάλην λύπην σὺ λιπôσα, Φαν[– ⏑ ⏑ – –]
> [– ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – (⏑ ⏑) – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – (–)] |
> [ὸ]δέ σ'ἐπώικτισε Μο⟨ῖ⟩ρα ποθει[ν ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – –]
> [– ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – (⏑ ⏑) – ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ – (–)].
>
> *CEG* 515

> Phan[…], you left a great grief […]
> […]
> And Fate did not pity you, longing […]
> […].

Although less than half of the inscription survives, what is left indicates it generated an intimate and direct engagement between the viewer and the deceased in ways that parallel the relationship structured between the slave and the deceased in the relief below. The reader addresses the deceased Phan[…] directly in the second person, telling her that she left behind great grief at her death—a formula we have seen in Pausimache's epigram that suggests an indexical relationship between the deceased and the monument.[33] If, as in Pausimache's epigram, grief refers to the burden the deceased has left for her family, the second fragment of the epigram alludes to pity—pity which, as we tell the deceased,

[32] Cleveland Museum of Art 1924.1018. Clairmont 1970: 106-107 cat. 31.
[33] For the exceptional use of ὦ to address the deceased in the vocative see Tsagalis 2008: 249.

Fate did not offer her, but which by implication we are meant to feel before the monument. In only a few words, the inscription manages to compel us to reify the deceased by addressing her, confront the monument we see as an instantiation of her family's grief, and contemplate how we might compensate with our own pity. The language and structure of both epigram and relief are formulaic, but the direct confrontation between an individual and the deceased in both elements transforms familiar form into a subjectively felt experience of this particular death and its effects.

Where the Cleveland stele provides evidence for how an inscription could generate such an individualized encounter, its relief is too fragmentary, especially at the center, to consider how its sculptural effects might have been configured in similar terms. Yet when we turn to better preserved monuments we see that many had no such inscription, and this work was accomplished instead by the relief alone.

ii) Adornments: A Ribbon

Many examples of the formula, like Hegeso's, focus on moments and objects of adornment. Only a small fragment remains of what is one of the earliest surviving examples (fig. 62).[34] Of the seated woman, only her right hand resting on her knee survives. The slave girl, standing on the left, is preserved from the waist up, and she holds forth an open box towards the seated woman from which she pulls a ribbon just like the one we might use to adorn the monument itself. As in the other examples, the slave girl's body is shown in a three-quarter view, and her head in profile. Yet the box she holds in the center of the composition seems simultaneously oriented towards the deceased and us. The box itself is shown frontally with its long side outwards, as in Hegeso's relief, but the lid opens at an oblique angle pointing towards the deceased, as if viewed in perspective. The spatial ambiguity of the box is underscored by the placement of the slave's hands. The fingers of the left hand emerge from beneath the box, so that her arm has been turned ninety degrees towards us, outside of the scene, yet the right hand pulling the ribbon is shown in profile like her head.

Even this right hand, however, seems to gesture as much towards us as the deceased as it falls between the lid and box. The interior of the box is not depicted as hollowed out, but has been left as a flat surface from which the ribbon suddenly emerges. Even as she pulls it out of the box, the slave simultaneously drapes the ribbon over the lid—much as a viewer might drape a ribbon over the tomb—so that it falls behind the open lid into the background plane of the relief. The ribbon, in other words, emerges from nothingness and disappears into nothingness, its entire existence configured by and dependent on planar marble surfaces that have no reality within the virtual reality of the pictorial world. Like the ribbons painted into the surfaces of stelai, objects of adornment only take on life within imaginary spaces conjured up through sculptural craft.[35]

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[34] Athens, NM 1858. Clairmont 1993: cat. 2.152. For a potentially similar stele see Grossman 2013: cat. 80.

[35] Worth noting in this context are three Classical Attic funerary monuments showing a slave and mistress in which a real object might have been fixed to the relief:
i) A fragment of a stele now in Istanbul (Archaeolgical Museum E 265; Clairmont 1993: cat. 1.839) shows a woman reaching towards the open box held by a slave. The proximity of their

iii) Adornments Again: A Basket

The composition is reversed on a stele now in the Piraeus Museum (fig. 63), with the slave, approaching from the right rather than the left, bringing not a box to the seated woman but a flared basket, called a kalathos.[36] Kalathoi were multipurpose baskets, commonly shown in Classical art in female domestic settings and often used to store wool. On this stele, however, there is no indication of the use of the vessel. Instead, its status as a mediating object between the slave and the deceased is emphasized by its huge size. While the slave approaches as if bringing the basket to the woman, the woman takes no notice, her head lowered from the slave's forward gaze and her hands clasped together over her upper legs. The act of holding the basket allows the slave to mimic the woman's gesture with her own hands, which are placed so close to the seated woman's that they almost touch. The exaggerated size of the basket itself serves to fill in this empty space, its flare following the outline of the heads of the two figures.

Despite her physical proximity to her mistress, the slave's gaze is unreciprocated. The result is that the composition appears less like an image of a mistress and slave together in a domestic setting and more like a visitor approaching a sculpted monument of the deceased, bearing a basket containing objects of adornment, as on the ceramic and marble lekythoi discussed earlier. This impression is underscored by differences in how the two figures are carved. Although her lowered head fits snugly beneath the architrave, the deceased woman's body is placed in front of the naiskos, her back overlaying the left anta and her right foot in front of the slave, as in many similar reliefs. The carving of her garments, especially the swirled fabric of her himation, is remarkably animated, with crisp, deeply-drilled folds that appear almost wind-swept behind her neck and around her hands, despite her static posture. The slave's garment, in contrast, appears heavy and unmoving, its straight, vertical folds carved in a shallower relief that assimilates her body with the anta against which she stands.

The material distinction between the two figures is only enhanced by the basket, whose rim presses against the architrave above, almost supporting it like a column, and whose tubular form, rendered in shallow relief as if a swelling of the background plane, obscures the slave's right forearm and palm. Where the clasped hands of the deceased are given fully physical presence, their interlocking fingers asserting the living touch of flesh on flesh, the slave's right hand is pushed deep into the virtual space behind the

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hands suggests the object was once painted and held between them; Clairmont suggests perhaps it was a sash.

ii) A stele now in Copenhagen (Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek 201a; Clairmont 1993: cat. 1.876) shows a woman holding an object she has drawn from a box held by a slave. Though the woman's hands are damaged, their positioning indicates it might hand been a long object held between them like a (real?) sash.

iii) A stele in Paris (Louvre, MA 806; Hamiaux 1992: 149 no. 142) for a woman named Myrtia shows the slave her with her left hand held out directly in front of the face of her mistress, who looks directly ahead. The configuration of the slave's profile hand—her palm and proximal phalanges flat, the tips of her fingers turned up at a perpendicular angle—suggest that she once held something, though the object might have been merely painted.

[36] Piraeus, Archaeological Museum 5290. Clairmont 1993: cat. 2.335. For the kalathos in funerary monuments see Hoffman 2001; Grossman: 2013: 216.

background plane by the object she holds. The deceased, in other words, is given a statuesque presence that seems to place her more in our own space than that of the naiskos. The slave, in contrast, emerges from this virtual space within the naiskos, her body mediated through the architecture of its frame, and her gesture through the materiality of the object she holds. This subtle assimilation of the slave with the frame suggests a parallel between the slave's attempt to engage the deceased—physically close but worlds apart—through the object she holds, and our own attempt to do so through the relief sculpture itself.

iv) Phrasikleia and her Child

In two further examples of the formula, a third figure is added—a baby or small child, presumably one that the deceased has left behind. Without disrupting the formal arrangement of the mistress and slave, the appearance of the child reconfigures the formula, displacing the material object as the locus of intersubjective construction with one of the figures most pitiably affected by the death at hand.

A relief for a woman named Phrasikleia has the same inverted configuration as the previous stele, showing the seated woman at left, with a child standing before her resting her (or perhaps his—the gender is difficult to determine) left hand on her mother's lap (fig. 64).[37] Although the stele is badly damaged, mother and daughter are closely engaged with one another, and their hands seem to have been joined, perhaps around an object or bird, over the mother's lap.

With the addition of the child, the slave, although placed in the standard position and holding a box, is excluded from the interaction. Although she stands within the deep space framed by the naiskos, the left side of her body, and especially her left leg, is oriented outward towards the viewer, turning to extend in front of the anta. Rather than offer the box forward towards the deceased, she holds it away from the figures off to the side, flush with the outer edge of the anta and outside of the space of the mother and daughter, opening its lid towards us (fig. 65). Where in Hegeso's relief the box opened towards the viewer nonetheless functions as a bridge between the two central figures, here the box, materially the closest element of the relief surface to the viewer, is placed in a space that the other figures do not appear to occupy or even to be aware of. The slave's twisted body, with one foot in the scene and the other oriented ninety degrees outside of it, acts as a hinge between the enclosed scene before us of a mother and daughter, and our outside orientation. The box becomes for us something like the object or gesture that originally linked the mother and child: a *punctum*-like invitation to engage with an image that appears only in stone.

The possibility of either optic or haptic engagement is complicated by the broken exchange of gazes. Where physical contact exists between mother and child, visual contact does not. The child's head is mostly missing, but appears to have been turned towards her mother. The same is true of the slave, who turns away from the box to look inwards towards Phrasikleia. Yet the three-quarter turn of Phariskleia's head does not allow her gaze to meet that of her child or the slave. Instead, she appears to turn towards the box, the object closest to our own space. The child and the slave function, in this sense, as model viewers, each engaging with the deceased in her own way. To her

[37] Athens, National Museum 831. Clairmont 1993: cat. 2.750.

child—deeply embedded in the scene, suffering the grief of an orphan—Phrasikleia offers physical contact. As for the slave—within the household, materially part of the same block of marble, but hovering on its pictorial edges—Phrasikleia can only engage with her through the objects of adornment she holds. We occupy another level of distance from Phrasikleia, that of a stranger, present in the flesh rather than marble, who nonetheless looks on like the child or the slave, and emotionally and perhaps physically tries to engage the deceased. To us, Phrasikleia can only offer her image in stone.

v) Phylonoe and her Baby

In a monument for a woman named Phylonoe (fig. 66), the slave once again holds something towards the deceased—not an object of adornment but a baby.[38] The result is one of the most dramatic Attic funerary monuments, yet its drama occurs only by maintaining the basics of the formula. Here, the seated woman's downward gaze and hand held towards her body do not merely register introversion. Instead, they structure the image of a mother who can no longer reach out to her child. By replacing the object or box held by the slave with a baby, the monument entirely reconfigures the possibilities of intersubjective visual engagement without changing the formula. For in the presence of her child rather than an object, Phylonoe, uniquely among the women on the other monuments considered here, reciprocates someone else's gaze. Yet where a strong visual bond exists, a haptic one is not possible: the child's outstretched hand cannot quite reach that of his mother. Looking at but not touching her orphaned son, Phylonoe takes on the role of someone pitying the effects of her death on her family as much as she herself is an object of pity for us.

The haptic failure at the center is not located so much in the narrative of the relief—Phylonoe could easily move her hand forward, after all—as it is structured at the level of surface. The result is an opening of Phylonoe's crisis before her child—seeing him without touching him—to us, standing outside the relief. More than any other monument so far considered, the figures are robustly carved in relief so deep that, in certain areas, the figures are almost detached from the background. A host of technical flourishes—the shadows formed by the undercutting of the faces, the darkness of the void within the curled fingers of Phylonoe's right hand, the deep, variegated folds of her garment, animated by drill channels slashed all over the surface—conspire to generate a play of light and dark across her body. Phylonoe's presence is not generated through illusion but through a sense of measurable realism: the folds of her garment and the forms of her body occupy real space, and create real shadows. This realism culminates in the hole in her ear, indicating that she originally wore an earring probably made of bronze—an earring that, like the earring worn by Ameinokleia or the necklace held out by Eukoline, offers us something of the real, while emphasizing the unreality of its wearer.

This presentation of Phylonoe as someone who might actually be there is challenged by the configuration of the baby (fig. 67). Like Phylonoe and the slave, the baby is carved in deep relief. In fact, his right forearm, now broken off, would have originally been the only sculptural element fully disengaged from the background,

[38] Similar iconography is found on a number of reliefs, including: Leiden I. 1903/2.1 (Clairmont 1993: cat. 2.652); Laval D 41 (Clairmont 1993: cat. 2.778); British Museum 18946-16.1 (Clairmont 1993: cat. 2.786); Piraeus, Archaeological Museum 3582.

rendered in three dimensions. Yet his left arm is drastically elongated to bring it as close as possible to Phylonoe without touching her. Although it is fully formed at the shoulder, as it reaches forward it sinks into the background, turning into by far the shallowest element of the entire relief. The effect culminates in the baby's hand—the focal point of the slave's own gaze—which forms a stark contrast with the adjacent hand of his mother. While the hand should be in profile like the rest of the arm, it has been twisted and flattened into the surface, the edges around its fingers lightly chiseled as if the background has given way.

The baby's hand does not simply fail to reach that of his mother. Instead, it fully inverts the pictorial logic of the sculpture. As it reaches into the background, the hand is transformed by it and flattened into it. Phylonoe pulls her hand back not because her child is out of reach, but because at the very moment he tries to touch her, he reveals himself to be nothing but fantasy.[39] The tragedy of an orphaned child is formally configured as the tragedy of a sculpted image. It is, in other words, the tragedy we encounter as we too try to find something of the dead Phylonoe in the monument that stands before us.

vi) Mnesarete

A final example of the formula is the stele of Mnesarete, daughter of Socrates (fig. 68).[40] Mnesarete's relief follows the formula insofar as the gazes of Mnesarete and her slave converge at a central point, anticipating the presence of something between them. But unlike the other monuments, there is nothing there. The formula, in other words, has been stripped down to its bare minimum, the box, necklace, or baby replaced with a void that is highlighted through the common focus of their gazes.

What is at stake is the very possibility of any kind of relationship between the two figures, whether optic or haptic. At first glance, Mnesarete and her slave appear to be intimately connected, pushed closer together and in a taller, narrower space than the figures on the other examples. With no object between them to link them, the two do not even seem to be aware of each other's presence. The physical proximity and even overlap of the figures only exacerbates the disquiet caused by their inability to look at or touch one another. The fingers of the slave's right hand, for instance, just barely brush the top of Mnesarete's right leg, yet the slave covers this hand with the other, enacting a common gesture of reserve and isolation. Touch, in other words, occurs only in marble, not in flesh.

Equally striking is the rendering of Mnesarete's right leg (fig. 69). Though in theory it recedes into the background as she sits in profile facing left, Mnasarete swings the lower part of her right leg forward so far that it overlaps the right side of the slave and juts in front of the architectural frame. The foot inclines back to her right, into the relief and so into the slave's garment. Here, in front of the anta, where the depth of the relief is particularly shallow, we would expect the two elements—Mnesarete's foot and the slave's lower body—to register the presence of one another. Instead, at the moment the foot meets the garment, it simply disappears. The slave's body below the waist is barely

[39] Compare Odysseus trying to embrace the *eidolon* of his mother in Book 11 of the *Odyssey*. See also Chapter 1.

[40] Munich, Glyptothek 491. Clairmont 1993: cat. 2.286. Ridgway (1997: 167-8) compares Mnesarete's stele to that of Hegeso and I draw on some of her observations.

visible beneath her garment, which assimilates her with the architectural frame she leans against. The thick, tubular folds that fall behind her cut directly into the horizontally-oriented foot, as if Mnasarete were not flesh but a ghost.

While her right foot spreads forward, Mnasarete's upper body twists inwards, folding itself not into the architecture of the frame as the slave does, but into the invisible space of the flat background. This folding is above all accomplished through drapery. Mnesarete has pulled the garment she wears tightly across her body, resulting in shallow creases that structure the mass of her legs and torso as a series of lines and triangles. Her left arm and hand are fully covered by such folds, yet from the end of the hand an excess of the same fabric sputters forth towards us, over her left thigh and the edge of the chair. The deep drill-work here indicates that Mnesarete's garment is in fact light and billowy when freed from her body. When pulled across her skin, however, the mantle seems to confine and flatten her.

This impression culminates in her right hand, which tugs at her mantle and spreads it across the background (fig. 70). Carved in extremely shallow relief, the folds of the mantle are here rendered as a series of simple straight lines radiating from her pinched middle finger and thumb, a stretch of fabric pulled across the surface of the background as if configured by its very flatness. The gesture is one commonly found on Classical funerary monuments and known as *anakalypsis*. Just as most gestures are usually understood as symbolic in meaning, *anakalypsis* is usually seen as indicating the woman's status as a bride.[41] Yet the double epigram inscribed into the architrave, which states that Mnesarete had a husband and a child, makes clear that she was well past her bridal days:

> ἥδε πόσιν τ' ἔλιπεν καὶ ἀδελφὸς μητρί τε πένθος
> καὶ τέκνον μεγάλης τε ἀρετῆς εὔκλεαν ἀγήρω.
>
> ἐνθάδε τὴμ πάσης ἀρετῆς ἐπὶ τέρ[μα μολοῦ]σαν
> Μνησαρέτηγ κατέχε Φερσεφόνης θάλ<α>μος.
> *CEG* 513
>
> This woman left behind her husband and her brothers and grief for her mother and (she also left behind) her child and undecaying good reputation of her great virtue.
>
> In this place, Persephone's chamber holds Mnesarete,
> who arrived at the end of all virtue.
> trans. Tsagalis

The epigrams enact the same folding of Mnesarete's presence into nothingness that is configured in the relief. As we read them the monument before us quickly turns from "this woman," a reified image to which we can seemingly point, to "this place," the spot that marks where she is held back, where she is absent, where what we experience is what she has left behind—memories of her and a family filled with grief.[42] Mnesarete's

[41] For this interpretation, see Grossman 2013: 31 n. 156, 38.

[42] On the epigram see Tsalagis 2008: 98-99; Fantuzzi 2010: 300-301. Fantuzzi emphasizes how the different distichs focus on different aspects of the deceased from different perspectives, one

name means something like "she who remembers virtue," a fact emphasized in each epigram's insistence on the deceased's virtue. As we stand before the monument and try to engage it, the name could not be more apt: what we encounter is not Mnesarete's actual virtue—her true self—but a mere memory of it.

Pathos in Formulas, Subjectivity in Form

By looking at this series of monuments, we see that their shared formula does much more than ascribe to the deceased a sense of moral character or social stature, as such scenes are normally interpreted. Instead, each one relies on the same basic formal structure to present an impossible scenario—a living slave with her dead mistress—compelling us to attend simultaneously to the monument's ability to image this scene and its failure to actually materialize it. Techniques of relief carving that are hallmarks of Classical sculptural practice work to present an intimate encounter through vision and materiality, but these same techniques, at each turn, simultaneously short-circuit the very possibility of representation, exposing their material limits at the central, most critical and most vulnerable point in the image. Small moments and gestures—painted adornments, open boxes, carried vessels, outstretched hands—reference our own engagement, subtly breaking the antithreatrical presentation of the deceased by addressing us and inviting us into the image-world we see. Rather than reference a particular member of the household or the wealth of the deceased, the anonymous slave—her actions, her carving, her very presence within the same frame as the deceased—acts in each instance as an avatar through which we can confront our own visual and physical relationship with the deceased, our own strategies for negotiating between her remembered presence and affective absence. The more reliefs we come to know—the more deaths we experience—the more we know how to look and how to empathize. The shared formula of these reliefs, in other words, is tantamount to a shared crisis of perception that occurs at the gravesite, a recognition that though the deaths are distinct, the form of grief in each case is the same.

Attending to the shared emotional content of such formulas, rather than their shared iconographical content, allows us to see how monuments work together at a formal level through the repetition of even individual figures or motifs rather than entire configurative schemes. So, for instance, a relief now in the Piraeus Museum (fig. 71) appears at first different in its formal configuration than Hegeso's, but shows the same subject matter: a woman and her slave with a necklace.[43] The woman wears bracelets on her forearms that are carved in relief, but the necklace she once held, like Hegeso's, was only painted, forming a triangle as it fell across her open palm towards the slave who touches it with her right hand.

Seeing the monument, we immediately relive the crisis at the center of Hegeso's relief, even if the positions have changed, and the woman's posture here is in fact more like that of Hegeso's slave. But the same woman—with the same twist of her body, the same carefully rendered garments, even the same dainty handling of the necklace—

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familial, one public: "the hexametrical couplet focuses on 'virtue' as a guarantee for public survival, while the second couplet focuses on mortal life as fulfillment of complete 'virtue' qua an individual feature concerning the prior existence of the deceased" (301).

[43] Piraeus, Archaeological Museum 2555. Clairmont 1993: cat. 1.761. See Kalogeropoulou 1986.

recalls also Eukoline, the daughter of Antiphanes, the woman who offered us a real necklace from beneath the earth. By the same token, beneath the folds of the dress we might find Mnesagora, one of the siblings who could not show themselves. In turn, the slave, exaggeratedly small in size, as she reaches for the necklace herself reminds us of Nikochares's struggle with the bird. Seeing the Piraeus relief, in other words, might bring before our eyes not just grief for a woman of the same age and status, like Hegeso, but a different tragedy entirely—that of deceased children. Like deictic markers and open first-person voices in epigrams, such formal associations are configured so as to activate empathetic responses and feelings of pity that engage the viewer on multiple levels. In the cemeteries and along the roads where these monuments were displayed, shared formal elements, in themselves occasioned by grief, would allow viewers to generate their own narratives, to experience someone else's tragedy through formulas they remembered from loved ones they themselves had buried.

Conclusion

The vast corpus of Classical funerary monuments has traditionally been arranged according to concepts of style and iconography, so that individual monuments become repetitions of a prototype that has already generated the monument's basic meaning and function even before it is set up over a particular grave. Paying close attention to the form that grief takes helps unravel this monolithic corpus and re-inject the subjectivity of death by treating each monument, each manifestation of the formula, as initiating a new experience of its related pathos. Each monument has at its core a distinct death: each sculpture is inscribed with a different name, each was erected at a different time and place, over a different body, by a different family suffering from their own distinct grief. Rather than elide differences and slot individuals into predetermined social categories, each appearance and reappearance of the formula renews and builds on the grief of earlier instantiations. As a distinctly visual phenomenon, the pathos-formula allows the crisis of representation we have seen articulated in epigrams to be silently expressed through the visual and material presence of the monument itself, without need for verbal explanation.

If emotion can itself configure what we see when we look at a work of art, forms of grief distributed across multiple graves and multiple monuments are tantamount to a kind of social empathy, constructing a community bound together simultaneously by emotional experience and artistic practice. Through repetition and reconfiguration, *punctum*-like moments that prick and wound are made conscious and deliberate, transferable from one grief to another. The result is not a unified function for the funerary monument, apportioned out to each individual when they die, but a dense pile-up of personal traumas, strung together through forms that embed grief in their very material configuration. Bereavement, after all, begins as a personal crisis that has no automatic mode of expression and transmission. It requires a formal structure to become visible to other people. For the families who set up the monuments discussed in this chapter, along with countless others in Classical Athens, marble relief sculpture provided the medium through which their grief could be given form.

EPILOGUE

Failures of Sculpture and the Work of Pity

Introduction

The foregoing chapters have examined the effects of pity as an embodied form of art-viewing in the funerary context, exploring how sculpture can articulate issues that are particular to the emotional effects of death—issues of presence and absence, empathy and longing, vision and touch. The viewer's pity has a close thematic relationship with the narrative content of the funerary monument, responding directly to the grief that occasioned it. But the work of pity felt before the art object—its ability to crystallize what is at stake when an image is embedded in an alien medium—has much broader applications. Focusing on the disjunctive structure of pity has enabled us to explore how subjective experience is socially constructed through artistic practice. By turning to instances of pity felt before the art object in non-funerary contexts, this Epilogue investigates how paradigms of emotional experience developed as a function of funerary monuments could be harnassed towards more political ends in Classical Athens.

When pity was introduced in Chapter 2 as a mechanism for engaging the funerary monument, I highlighted its capacity to incorporate the viewer's experience of subjectivity into a social system and mold it according to the demands of that system. The funerary monument, located at the nexus of personal grief and artistic practice, has been presented as the mechanism through which a bereaved individual's emotional subjectivity could be translated into culturally-determined material form—a form in which a viewer, in turn, could find the material expression of their pity. Throughout my account, I have emphasized the importance of the subjectively felt nature of the viewer's experience *despite* its culturally conditioning. Here, I turn towards the second part of this equation, moving from private funerary monuments that configured emotional subjectivity on a personal level towards public monuments that put on display civic concerns and shared mythology.

Where a focus on funerary monuments has helped us understand the mechanisms through which emotional engagement can configure visual experience, a turn towards other contexts will highlight the cultural significance in Classical Athens of aligning emotional and artistic practice. I have suggested, in earlier chapters, that pity before the work of art might develop a viewer's sense of empathy or heighten their awareness of how they relate to other members of their community. Here in this Epilogue, I ask not what an individual but what a society stands to gain from its members feeling pity before works of art. What, in other words, does pity before the work of art accomplish? In this sense, this Epilogue aims to contextualize funerary art in its broader artistic and cultural setting while at the same time offering a preliminary investigation into a more comprehensive account of art and emotion in Classical Athens.

The Work of Pity in Classical Athens

Despite its connectedness with grief and tragedy, pity was not an emotion reserved for the funerary context. From literary accounts we know that pity could

potentially affect almost any event in day-to-day life in Classical Athens, whether in the theater or the courtroom, in political arguments or philosophical debates, in times of war or times of peace.[1] In many of those contexts, pity felt for a fellow human being was meant to accomplish something—to shift attitudes, promote change, avenge a crime, save a life. When oriented towards a work of art, however, pity cannot generate such practical outcomes.[2] Indeed, we have seen how in the funerary context pity operates on the premise that it is unable to accomplish a tangible resolution, either for the bereaved family or the viewer. As far as the family is concerned, a viewer's pity cannot change the facts of the matter: the deceased is dead and under the earth, the grief permanently inscribed in stone, the body figured in sculpture forever deprived of cognitive-affective reality. Whatever sense of consolation a viewer might wish to provide to the bereaved cannot be accomplished here, before a stone monument. And while a viewer's pity might contribute to some form of personal transformation—develop a sense of empathy or connectedness, reinforce social aspirations or personal fortunes—the results of this change can only be enacted elsewhere. Here and now, the sculpture must do something very different to generate pity: it must insist on its inability to transform into what it represents by making a visual promise it cannot keep. It must, in a sense, fail.

Turning to works of art that functioned as objects of pity from outside the funerary realm allows us to explore in more political terms what it means for a work of art to fail. In its ability to distill the relationship between medium and image, the work of art that inspires pity does more than make us respond emotionally: it confronts the question of what a work of art can accomplish beyond the aesthetic, within lived experience. Exploring works of art through the lens of pity compels a viewer—ancient or modern—to address critically what is perhaps the most distinctive feature of Classical Attic art: its promise of a relationship to real life, through what is known as realism.

In traditional accounts, as we saw in the Introduction, this realism is the singular achievement of Classical Greek art. The ability of a work of art to bring to fruition the visual reality it appears to make present is determined, in such an approach, by its artistic quality or style. Yet pity, and emotional forms of engagement more generally, reveal the limits of this model, compelling viewers to attend not only to the imaged realities that works of art appear to make present but the material realities that they hold back or mark as absent. As we have seen, pity reveals how sculpted images are mechanisms for producing a connection with their depictive subject matter, but are not guarantees of its presence. For all their representational potential, even the most realistic-looking images might not succeed to cognitive-affective reality.

While it is an inherent feature of the funerary monument, this representational failure—and the accompanying crisis of representation experienced by the viewer—could occur in other contexts, as a function of images showing not contemporary mortal citizens but gods, heroes, and other mythological figures. As the Interlude explored, the Persian invasion brutally exposed statues—including those of deities—as objects whose material composition was ultimately more durable than the realities they appeared to image. The Classical style that developed in the years following the invasion can be seen as a robust response to the challenge to the image put forward by this destruction, but it is

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[1] Generally on pity in Classical Athens, see Konstan 2001; Sternberg 2005a and 2006.

[2] But see the fascinating hypothesis put forward by Tonio Hölscher concerning the mid fifth century statue of Penelope and its role in Athenian diplomacy (Hölscher 2011).

a response necessarily informed by apprehension that it might not work. Classical realism does not mitigate the risk that the image might fail. Instead, it raises the stakes.

As we have seen already in the transition from Archaic to Classical funerary monuments, changes in artistic style were not simply geared to make art look more like reality, but to provide new ways for viewers to engage with it emotionally. When examined through this lens, new techniques for engaging viewers emotionally in fifth century art are not simply byproducts of realism, but constitute a means of politicizing emotional behavior and controlling subjective experience through artistic form. Realistic works of art, as we have seen in the case of Classical funerary monuments, are not always intended to be visualized as reality. On the contrary, realism might serve to expose the limits of the figurative work of art, encouraging viewers to engage and question its efficacy rather than take for granted its ability to reify its depictive content. Works of Classical art from beyond the funerary realm, as I will argue in this Epilogue, could work to such ends, distending and complicating reality rather than substituting or supplementing it.

Instead of treating Classical realism as an intrinsic feature of a given work of art, bestowed upon it by the artist and visible to any potential viewer, focusing on an emotion such as pity allows us to understand the role of the viewer's felt subjectivity in negotiating between the art object's ability to make present what it depicts and its failure to do so. For while pity might open the rend (to return to the term as used in Chapter 1) between image and material, in the very act of exposing this rend it empowers the viewer to find a way to repair it. The acknowledgement that the agency or animacy of a work of art is never inherent is what gives the human viewer a proper role in knowingly distilling it, activating it, engaging with it, and fixing it.[3] Pity, in this sense, does not deconstruct the promise of realism so much as it articulates its stakes, placing the art object's ability to succeed in the hands (or eyes) of a viewer.

Pity beyond *katharsis*

In many accounts, the question of what pity felt before a work of art is meant to accomplish is solved by considering it as an aesthetic emotion that operates only in the realm of aesthetics. While I explored the concept of aesthetic emotion in general terms in the Introduction, the function of pity in particular as an aesthetic emotion has been most thoroughly treated in the context of tragic performance, whose emotional effects were famously linked by Aristotle to *katharsis*—a term difficult to define, but usually associated with a sense of ethical clearing up.[4] *Katharsis,* in many modern accounts, is seen as in itself the goal of aesthetic pity by providing a form of pleasure derived not from the narrative content of the play—which is usually emotionally devastating—but from the analytic coherence of its structure, the beauty of its poetic form, and the closure of its ending. When understood this way, pity and the *katharsis* that results can only be experienced as a function of a fiction. Whereas witnessing a violent episode in reality, for

[3] I emphasize the role of the individual, subjective viewer in contrast to other accounts of art and agency which focus (variously) on wider social structures or inherent powers of objects. For some important accounts of these kinds see Freedberg 1989; Gell 1998; Belting 2011; Bredekamp 2013. On objects and agency in ancient Greece in particular see Collins 2003.

[4] On *kartharsis* see Munteanu 2012: 238-50 with earlier bibliography.

instance, might inspire "real" pity that would compel the viewer to intervene, witnessing the same episode in the form of a play enables the viewer to put these emotions aside in favor of pity as a purely aesthetic emotion.

Although Aristotle's notion of *katharsis* is developed specifically in relation to tragedy, it has proved for scholars of Greek art an attractive model for the emotional effect of art more generally in its ability to explain pity felt by a viewer as an experience predicated on the formal configuration of the work of art.[5] Yet this move essentially forecloses an exploration of the relationship between the experience of the work of art and real-life action by considering aesthetic pity as cut off from other forms of lived experience. When pity is understood as merely aesthetic, the viewer's emotion and the art object's form are isolated in a self-contained feedback loop. Such an experience might correspond with the modern viewer's appreciation of the decontextualized art object in the museum setting. But as the discussion of funerary monuments in the previous chapters has amply shown, pity even as an aesthetic emotion could ignite emotional experiences deeply embedded in real-life events that directly affected real people. Pity generated from a work of art might not lead directly to real-world action, but it is felt as a function of objects configured by the same social system in which viewers lived—objects that participate in, rather than merely reflect, that system.

In this sense, *katharsis* goes too far in isolating the aesthetic effects of emotions such as pity from other forms of lived experience. Indeed, scholars of Greek tragedy, including Dana Munteanu and Victoria Wohl in their recent monographs, have tried to move beyond the restrictive notion of *katharsis* towards a more practical understanding of tragic emotions, one that takes into account the fact that pity in Greek tragedy does not often lead to action.[6] As we have seen in Chapter 2, for instance, Odysseus' pity for the title character at the beginning of Sophocles' *Ajax* does not provoke him to intervene and save Ajax, but rather leads to an acknowledgement of Odysseus' own status as a mere image (*eidolon*). As Munteanu argues, pity in this play "goes beyond Aristotle, who refrained from specifically developing the topic of the morality of the tragic emotions, to suggest a clear ethical benefit, 'wisdom' (*sophrosyne*) derived from pity: contemplating another's misfortune helps us to estimate our correct place in the universe, our limited powers, and to avoid arrogance."[7] Aesthetic emotion developed in the theater, in this sense, is not an end in itself, but a means to cultivate an emotional attitude that can only find true applications outside the theater. When we take into account how the aesthetic structure of Odysseus' pity is similar to that experienced in sculpture, as I argued in Chapter 2, we can appreciate how engaging with works of art—including non-funerary works of art—that inspire pity is a mechanism for cultivating similar emotional attitudes.

As it happens, on a number of occasions characters in Greek tragedy make explicit the similarity between pity experienced in the theater and pity experienced before the work of art. Such moments offer us insight into how the aesthetic effects of pity translate (or fail to translate) into real life action. A dramatic passage in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (239-42), where the chorus describes Iphigenia looking as pitiable as a painting at the moment of her sacrifice, perhaps inspired a similar moment in Euripides' *Hecuba*—the same play in which, as we have already seen, the title character presents

[5] See the discussion of aesthetic emotion in the Introduction.
[6] Munteanu 2012; Wohl 2015.
[7] Munteanu 2012: 202.

herself as a pitiable monument for her dead son Polydorus.[8] In the first part of the play, before Polydorus' body washes up on shore, Hecuba is confronted with the murder of another of her children, Polyxena, who is to be sacrificed to the ghost of Achilles at his tomb. Hecuba pleads with Odysseus to spare her daughter, begging him for pity (287), but Odysseus retorts that she is no more deserving of pity than those of the Greeks who have suffered similar fates (321-31).

Polyxena's sacrifice takes place offstage; it is not witnessed by Hecuba or the audience. Yet soon after, it is reported in vivid detail to Hecuba and the chorus by the Greek herald Talthybius. At the climax of his narrative, when Polyxena appears most pitiable, he compares her to a work of art:[9]

> λαβοῦσα πέπλους ἐξ ἄκρας ἐπωμίδος
> ἔρρηξε λαγόνας ἐς μέσας παρ᾽ ὀμφαλόν,
> μαστούς τ᾽ ἔδειξε στέρνα θ᾽ ὡς ἀγάλματος
> κάλλιστα, καὶ καθεῖσα πρὸς γαῖαν γόνυ
> ἔλεξε πάντων τλημονέστατον λόγον·
> Ἰδού, τόδ᾽, εἰ μὲν στέρνον, ὦ νεανία,
> παίειν προθυμῇ, παῖσον, εἰ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αὐχένα
> χρῄζεις, πάρεστι λαιμὸς εὐτρεπὴς ὅδε.
> ὃ δ᾽ οὐ θέλων τε καὶ θέλων οἴκτῳ κόρης,
> τέμνει σιδήρῳ πνεύματος διαρροάς·
> κρουνοὶ δ᾽ ἐχώρουν. ἣ δὲ καὶ θνῄσκουσ᾽ ὅμως
> πολλὴν πρόνοιαν εἶχεν εὐσχήμων πεσεῖν,
> κρύπτουσ᾽ ἃ κρύπτειν ὄμματ᾽ ἀρσένων χρεών.
>
> Eur. *Hec.* 559-70

> Taking hold of her robes she tore them from the top of her shoulder
> along the middle of her flanks to the navel,
> and she displayed her breasts and a chest
> as beautiful as that of a sculpture, and falling on her knee to the ground
> she spoke a word more defiant than all:
> "Look! This—if this breast, young man,
> you desire to strike, strike! Or if you long to strike
> into my neck, here it is, a ready throat, this one!"
> And both unwilling and willing with pity for the girl,
> with iron he cuts the channels of her breath,
> and streams poured forth. But she, even as she was dying,
> held strong her design to fall with beautiful form,
> hiding what must be hidden from the eyes of men.

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[8] On these passages see O'Sullivan 2008.

[9] On this passage see Stieber (2011: 147-9, 215-18), who rehearses various interpretations of the comparison. She connects this passage with a painting of the sacrifice of Polyxena described by Pausanias in the Propylaia of the Athenian Acropolis, though there is no evidence for this connection.

If at the moment of her murder Polyxena resembles a statue or painting, it is one that she herself has created. It is Polyxena herself who rips off her garment, positions herself on her knee, and displays her breast that looks like that of a statue. Even as she collapses in death, she strives to maintain a beautiful outward appearance. And using strategies now familiar from funerary epigram, Polyxena's final words make full use of deictics and imperatives to draw direct attention to the statue-like body she displays. As she commands Neoptolemus to look at her, she offers "this" breast or "this" neck for him to strike. Presenting and pointing to her naked body, calling on his desire and longing to cut her throat or neck, she emphasizes the intimacy—the physical contact, the eroticism—of the interaction required to commit the murder.

In one sense, Polyxena's design works: Neoptolemus feels pity, becoming "both unwilling and willing" to carry out the murder. Yet instead of compelling him to check his blade, Neoptolemus' pity only makes Polyxena's death more disturbing, exacerbating the contrast between her statuesque outer appearance and corporeal reality. The vivid, close-range description of the moment of her death seems focalized through Neoptolemus' eyes, narrowing in on her trachea, the slicing of which Talthybius suddenly describes in the present tense. As she strains to petrify her appearance in an act of aesthetic formalization, Neoptolemus cuts through this sculpted image, revealing the still-vibrant internal organs through a sudden eruption of blood. His pity for a statue does not stop him from killing the human subject it represents.

The entire description of the sacrifice is narrated through the bleary-eyed lens of Talthybius—no neutral observer, but one who, as he states, weeps copious tears of pity as he recounts and relives the scene he witnessed (518-20). Through his description, Talthybius presents Polyxena as an object of pity not only for Neoptolemus but also for both his internal and external audiences. Just as the disguised Odysseus can use a description of a brooch to render images of himself in Penelope's mind, as we saw in Chapter 1, so too here does the comparison of Polyxena to a statue help make Talthybius' audience's imaging of her more vivid. Hecuba, in fact, models precisely how the scene might emerge in our imaginations as a pitiable spectacle as she responds to Talthybius' report, speaking directly to her dead daughter as if visually (but not corporeally) present:

> καὶ νῦν τὸ μὲν σὸν ὥστε μὴ στένειν πάθος
> οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἐξαλείψασθαι φρενός:
>
> Eur. *Hec.* 589-90

> And now I could not plaster over in my mind
> that which you have suffered so that I would stop crying.

Following on Talthybius' comparison of Polyxena to a work of art, Hecuba picks up its structure to visualize the scene in her mind. The result is a vivid picture that she images mentally like a fresco painting—one she wishes she could erase by plastering it over or washing it away as a painter might do to create a fresh picture.[10] Although Hecuba is touched by a personal grief that the audience does not share, her act of picking

[10] That this is a reference to painting is made clear from a similar passage in Euripides' *Helen* where Helen wishes her beauty could be "plastered over like a work of art" (εἴθ' ἐξαλειφθεῖσ' ὡς ἄγαλμ' αὖθις πάλιν / αἴσχιον εἶδος ἔλαβον ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, 262-63). See Zeitlin 1994: 142.

up Talthybius' image and transferring it to her own mind provides a framework for how we too might respond emotionally through our own individual visualization. In a sense, then, the image we as the audience construct of Polyxena's sacrifice is analogous to the sculpted image on a funerary monument—one that has been processed and configured through grief and pity, detached from its veridical reality, and so made ready for us to transfer into the visualizing medium of our own minds.

Precisely because Polyxena's statue-like, pity-inducing appearance exists in a world where image and medium have become rent—the world of both the work of art and of mental imaging—our pity cannot prevent her murder any more than that felt by Neoptolemus. As Wohl argues, the gap between Neoptolemus' pity and his violence is configured for us as a gap between pity and justice, as we negotiate between a poetic description that is "hyper-aestheticized, encrusted with layer upon layer of beauty" and a voyeuristic experience of murder:

> Neoptolemus' conflicted desire encapsulates the perverse specular dynamic of the episode, which demands that its audience invest simultaneously in the pity aroused by beautiful suffering and in the suffering that arouses that pity. Hecuba's appeals [to Neoptolemus for pity] propose that pity can fuel the drive for justice by making us feel the iniquity of this girl's undeserved and lamentable death. But if we are aroused by the scene of Polyxena's sacrifice (and it seems clear that we are meant to be), then we become complicit in the injustice. We, like the Greek army, derive pleasure from the girl's murder, and that pleasure is only increased by the beautiful pathos of the event.[11]

The result, for Wohl, is an unsettling conclusion: "pity in this play entails an injustice, a sadistic enjoyment of beautiful suffering."[12] On the contrary, "justice, if it is to come, will come not in the theater but beyond it; and it is the responsibility of the viewers in their role as citizens to bring it about."[13] If pity offers no promise of justice—of social change, of real political action—the description of Polyxena's sacrifice suggests that neither does the pitiful work of art.[14]

The full effects of the comparison of Polyxena to a statue come into focus when we turn to a sculpture from the same period that place us in the same position as Talthybius' audience, compelling us to feel pity for a young murder victim who takes the form of a statue. Of surviving Classical Attic sculptures from outside the funerary realm, none presents its subject in a more pitiable light than Alkamenes' Prokne and Itys, set up on the Acropolis around 415 BCE (fig. 72)—a statue group that, as it happens, shares its subject matter with a roughly contemporary play by Sophocles.[15] The statue shows the final moments of Itys' life, just before his mother Prokne kills him with a knife she originally held in her now-broken hand. Configured as a sculpture, the naked child, struggling to break free from his mother's deadly grasp, enters our vision through the

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[11] Wohl 2015: 55.
[12] Wohl 2015: 49.
[13] Wohl 2015: 137.
[14] For the sometimes uncomfortable relationship between pity and power or politics in Classical Athens more generally, see Konstan 2001: 78-83; Konstan 2005; Lateiner 2005.
[15] On the relationship between Alkamenes' statue and pity, see also Ajootian 2005: 229-37

same disjunctive structure that determines how we visualize Polyxena's sacrifice through Talthybius' description, and in both cases this structure configures our emotional engagement. Whatever pity we feel for Itys comes through the beauty of his suffering, the visibility and proximity of his naked body, held in place by Prokne right before our eyes.

As in Euripides' poetry, the emotional pull of the statue group emerges through its very form—especially, as Neer has argued, through the interaction between Itys' body and Prokne's drapery.[16] Prokne is massive and solid with broad proportions, heavy garments, and an unmoving posture. Itys is just the opposite: a small, naked, lithe figure whose body twists in three dimensions. Where Prokne presses his upper body tightly against her legs, Itys jerks his hips at an almost perpendicular angle so that his lower legs, now lost, break free. Viewed in the context of other sculpture on the Acropolis, the contrast between the two figures would have easily stood out, especially when polychromed. Where Prokne has the appearance and bearing of an Erechtheion caryatid, Itys is contorted like a fallen warrior on a Parthenon metope, his body both burrowing into and breaking free from a surface constituted by the straight, parallel folds of his mother's garment.

The contrast in carving serves to dramatize the narrative—to implicate us emotionally, as Neer argues, in the tragedy at hand. As he hovers between life and death, Itys is suspended somewhere between high relief and three-dimensional sculpture—between an existence conditioned by his mother's almost architectural form and an independent, fully-rounded body that stands in front of it, on its own, and pushed into our own space.[17] In contrast, the vertical and frontal posture of Prokne standing behind him resembles that of a votive or cult statue of a smiting deity. An ancient viewer would have instinctually known how to address such a statue—how to supplicate it for help or ask it for pity. But standing before this statue group, we mirror not a goddess but someone more like us: a mortal mother with her son, but also a murderer with her victim.

What does our pity before this statue accomplish? For Neer, it "effectively reaffirms the very social bonds that Prokne is cutting. Bearing witness to a loss of humanity, a severance of human ties, repairs those ties. […] As with tragedy, the Prokne group tends toward *katharsis*, that is, 'clarification' or 'clearing up': a perspicuous representation of mutual implication. That is the ethical work of such drama. We see as Prokne does not; we find humanity where she does not."[18] Yet in another sense, we see precisely as Prokne does, with Itys' wriggling body as formally distinct from his mother as he is materially distinct from us. Murdering Itys only as a means to avenge her sister, Prokne might, after all, share our pity: even Neoptolemus felt pity as he slid his blade into Polyxena's statuesque throat. Yet pity—even that felt, perhaps, by Prokne herself—cannot prevent Itys' death.

Rather than *katharsis*, our pity might lead us to the same uncomfortable experience Wohl attributes to the audience of the *Hecuba*: pleasure in the sculpture, and so complicity in the crime. Pity might make us wish for a tidy resolution, but its disjunctive structure means we cannot act on what we see. We can visualize the statue group as animate, but we cannot transform Itys into flesh and pull him away. Precisely

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[16] Neer 2010: 169-81. See also Ajootian 2005: 232-33.

[17] The same contrast is explored in similar terms at Neer 2010: 172-73.

[18] Neer 2010: 178. Ajootian 2005: 234-37 offers a more political interpretation of the group's ability to provoke pity.

because the figures remain formed from a single stone block, we cannot intervene and separate them. By showing the climactic moment before Itys' death, Alkamenes almost guarantees our complicity.[19] We come to the monument knowing the outcome already: Itys is killed. On its own, however, the sculpture makes no such narrative claims, showing Itys in danger, but still alive. To play the story out, we must turn the boy we see into a representation of a specific mythological individual, and with our knowledge and imagination help Prokne deliver the fatal blow. Whatever sense of humanity we derive from feeling pity before the sculpture, we cannot use it to change the story and help this marble Itys. The pity we nurture before Alkamenes' work can only benefit someone else—a human, not a statue, whom we encounter elsewhere, in our own lives.

It is not difficult to attribute such an experience of Alkamenes' group to a viewer who was familiar with the conceit of the sculpted funerary monument of the same period—a monument that compels us to reify its figurative imagery as a representation of a real person and simultaneously acknowledge that they are dead. Pity makes visible but cannot in itself repair the divide between image and medium that is inherent in the material structure of the work of art. Whatever pity motivates us towards—justice, consolation, *katharsis*—we must pursue in our own lives, not in the disjunctive world of sculpture, where the rend between image and medium is impossible to overcome.

Cassandra and the Statue that Fails

Whereas funerary sculpture succeeds (or fails to succeed) to representation through its association with a particular individual buried below, most other forms of art in Classical Athens depicted mythological narratives with figures who could appear and reappear across a variety of contexts and objects. In some of these myths, the failure of the work of art was part of the very narrative depicted, and so was thematized as a crisis not only for the viewer but also for a character within the myth. Perhaps the most significant example of such thematization of the failure of sculpture occurs in depictions of the fall of Troy. With its clustering together of a variety of individual tragedies—each a well-known story in its own right—the Iliupersis provided a narrative framework not simply for exposing violent acts to the viewer's eyes, but for politicizing the relationship between pity and art.[20]

One of the most commonly illustrated episodes from the Iliupersis was the one that most directly confronts the failure of sculpture: the rape of Cassandra by Ajax, at the foot of the cult statue of Athena.[21] The earliest renderings of the episode in Attic vase painting from the sixth century show Athena as a fully embodied goddess present at the rape, threatening Ajax directly. Over time the figure of Athena is reconfigured so as to indicate more clearly that Athena is present only through her statue. Modifications are introduced gradually beginning in the late Archaic period: Athena is placed on a base; her

[19] Different reconstructions place the knife closer to Itys' throat, and so make his death more imminent. For an interpretation of Prokne as more contemplative and less threatening, see Ajootian 2005: 233-34.

[20] For accounts of the Iliupersis in Greek art, see Anderson 1997; Hedreen 2001.

[21] On this episode in vase painting see most recently Hölscher 2010 and Marconi 2011 with earlier bibliography. For the ability of Greek painted vases to engage viewers into self-reflexive accounts of sight and vision through their imagery, see Grethlein 2016.

posture becomes more rigid; her garments become flat, without wrinkles or volume; she turns away from the scene before her, often frontally to face the viewer. In contrast, other figures, especially Cassandra, are transformed according to broader changes in artistic practice over the same period, their bodies rendered with increasingly mimetic flair that emphasizes the violence of the struggle.

For a number of scholars, such transformations of the figure of Athena into a statue can be explained by changing attitudes both towards artistic practice—especially a trend towards realism in the fifth century—and towards the relationship between sculpture and its divine referent. Platt, for instance, has recently argued that, in the later scenes, the rendering of a statue that "fatally fails to fulfill its function as a talisman suggests a certain self-conscious anxiety about the [statue's] relationship to divine presence, which is unsurprising, one might argue, in the years following Athens' sack by the Persians. The goddess is conceived of as operating independently of her image, and its identity as 'Athena herself' is by no means guaranteed. […] [I]t acts as a symbolic *marker* rather than a mimetic *depiction* of divinity."[22]

Arguing against such an interpretation, other scholars stress that the transformation does not indicate a weakened authority of the cult statue.[23] Indeed, over the course of the fifth century cult statues only became bigger and grander, while maintaining in many instances relatively stiff, conservative bodies. This appearance hardly made them less effective, but instead emphasized the continued authority of antique forms by rendering them in new techniques. Moreover, some vase paintings of Cassandra's rape from the later fifth century show a second Athena—the goddess herself, fully embodied—next to her disengaged, Archaic-looking statue. Instead of undermining the power of the statue, such depictions, for Marconi, suggest a stronger conceptual division between representation and represented: "Statues of gods are no longer the living gods, but rather inanimate images that nonetheless retain the power to materialize the divine presence, and making [sic] present the living gods."[24]

Yet, rather than simply register new attitudes towards either artistic realism or the ontology of cult statues as a matter of belief, changes in the depiction of Cassandra's rape might work to accomplish something entirely different: they make Cassandra more pitiable. The earliest vases show active and robustly present Athenas intervening on Cassandra's behalf. As the gap between the realism of the figures expands, Cassandra's attempts to supplicate a mere statue seem more desperate and futile, emphasizing how even if Athena will avenge Cassandra in the future, she cannot help her now. When Athena stands beside her own statue, the separation between visual and veridical reality is as clear as when the *eidolon* of the deceased stands beside their own funerary monument on contemporary white-ground lekythoi: though both elements are present, they are irreparably rent.[25] Regardless of what power viewers attributed to cult statues, such scenes would have made them witness a statue failing to become active even as it is fervently supplicated. As Athena's succor becomes increasingly unlikely in this moment and Cassandra's fate increasingly certain, we as viewers are called on to intervene ourselves in the only way we can: with pity. We are compelled, in other words, to frame

[22] Platt 2011: 96.
[23] Hölscher 2010; Marconi 2011.
[24] Marconi 2011: 161.
[25] See previous chapter and Oakley 2004: 201-202, 212-13 and passim; Arrington 2014: 253-67.

Cassandra's plight according to the same questions of vision and emotion that structure our own experience of the painted vase on which she is depicted.

On many Classical vases, the viewer's pity is activated not simply through the configuration of the scene of Cassandra's rape, but through the incorporation of this episode into broader presentations of the fall of Troy.[26] Such depictions become increasingly complex and synoptic over the course of the fifth century, collapsing multiple episodes into a single pictorial space. Encompassing some of the most violent scenes in Greek art, these images frequently highlight as victims categories of individuals considered especially worthy of pity in Classical oratory and historical accounts: people captured in war; babies, children and women; and the sick or elderly.[27] Not only are the victims increasingly from vulnerable demographics, but the physical balance between victor and vanquished that is often more or less equal in Archaic images is distorted over time, so that a tragic outcome for the pitiable victim appears inevitable. These changes register once again, I argue, as an attempt to heighten the viewer's pity.[28]

On several vases, this sense of pity is encouraged by interspersing anonymous victims among the figures from well-known episodes, allowing for the kind of comparative empathy that, as we have seen, underlies the Greek conception of pity. When we examine the elaborate frieze on the so-called Vivenzio hydria in Naples, attributed to the Kleophrades Painter, we see that none of the figures are given names, so that it is up to use our knowledge of the myths to recognize figures such as Cassandra, identifiable through her shocking nudity (figs. 73-6).[29] Yet as Giuliani notes:

> [T]he role of those figures that cannot be named is far more significant here. Cassandra is not the only figure who is shown seeking refuge before the cult image of Athena. A second woman sits at the foot of the statue, partially concealed behind it, and a third woman sits directly opposite her [fig. 74]. Both of them have lowered their heads and appear completely immersed in their own sorrow. These two women are also without their own story and without names; they stand for all the women of Troy while at the same forming a backdrop against which Cassandra's individual fate is all the more sharply delineated.[30]

For Giuliani, the presence of these two women within the same frame as Cassandra's rape heightens the pathos of the scene by allowing it to transcend its specific mythological narrative and take on a more generic descriptive character.[31] Just as it is up to us as viewers to identify and flesh out the mythological episodes, it is up to us to recognize the shared pathos of figures with separate identities and sorrows. This strategy of viewing closely resembles that of engaging with funerary monuments as discussed in earlier chapters, and similar techniques are employed to draw different figures together at a formal level. Even though the two seated women are so introverted that they do not

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[26] For an excellent discussion of these combination scenes see Giuliani 2013: 176-194.
[27] For discussions of who was deserving of pity in Classical Athens, see Konstan 2001 and Sternberg 2005a.
[28] Contra Muth (2008: 592) who argues they are meant to praise the victor.
[29] Naples, National Archaeological Museum 81669.
[30] Giuliani 2013: 187.
[31] See especially Giuliani 2013: 176 (for the link to Aristotelian pity) and 193-4.

seem aware of their surroundings, subtle details in their configuration encourage the viewer to weave their stories into the more familiar narratives around them through shared pathos.[32] The seated figure to the right, for instance, tears at her hair with one hand and reaches out with the other, seemingly unaware that her long, slender fingers touch the curled tips of Athena's plume. The serendipitous meeting of these two elements over the surface of the vase transforms the seated woman before our eyes into the mirror image of Cassandra. Like Cassandra, she will not be saved by the statue, and so (the vase suggests) she is just as worthy of pity despite her anonymity.

As in funerary monuments, such gestures enable figures to transgress spatial and temporal boundaries when combined with emotional engagement. An even clearer instance of the phenomenon is Cassandra's outstretched right hand, which ostensibly reaches towards Ajax, who stands over her grabbing at her head. Yet just as Cassandra's gaze is focused not on Ajax but somewhere beyond him, so too does her hand seem to reach past him, over the flat surface of the vase and towards Anchises, who turns back to look at her from his own story in the adjacent scene as he is carried to safety by Aeneas.

Formal repetition accomplishes similar effects. So, the gesture of the anonymous seated woman (the same gesture that links her to Athena's statue) is replicated at the other end of the frieze, where another seated woman raises her hand in a similar fashion (fig. 75). Yet this woman encounters not a statue but a helping hand from the warrior who stands above her. The scene is usually interpreted as the rescue of Aithra by her sons—the woman is shown with unusually pronounced signs of age—but for the viewer to identify her as such, they must first recognize her plight and distinguish it from that of the seated woman who remains both anonymous and forlorn. In such instances, the formal links with other characters who find salvation serve only to underscore their underserved fate, and so enhance the viewer's pity towards them.

While the desperate gestures of these women are oriented towards figures within the scenes depicted (even if they occupy other times and place), other details directly confront us as viewers outside the pictorial space. Our own emotional involvement in the scene showing Cassandra's imminent rape, for instance, is increased through the eroticization of her body, twisted forward so that her breasts and genitalia are exposed not only to Ajax but also to us. A similarly voyeuristic vantage point is provided for Astyanax, whose naked body seems splayed not so much across Priam's lap as over the curved shoulder of the vase—our space rather than virtual space—with streams of blood draped across his body and the altar below like ribbons on a funerary monument (fig. 76). As in Talthybius' description of Polyxena's death, we see no differently than the attacker, joining in a crime we not only cannot stop, but also from whose sight we might even derive pleasure.

That we are ultimately meant to respond to the beauty of the painting, rather than the horror of the scene depicted, is suggested by the only inscriptions on the hydria: the word *kalos* ("the beautiful one"), which appears twice, including once in the void between the two women behind Athena's statue. The placement of the adjective (with no referent) in the midst of these scenes refocuses our attention on the beauty of the image itself. Just as we have seen in the funerary context how pity gives structure to the disjunction between the pleasure derived from seeing the deceased and the increased pain caused by the deceased's affective absence, here too our enjoyment of the vase comes at

[32] Compare the introversion of figures on funerary monuments as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

the cost of the figures depicted within it.

These techniques of generating pity on the Naples hydria are only amplified over the course of the fifth century. Vases increasingly show characters as victims meriting our pity who are themselves witnesses who seem to pity the fate of figures in other times and places. Such collapsing of time and space is a common feature of Greek narrative technique, in art as much as in poetry. Yet rather than simply coalesce different narratives or even merely intensify the emotional impact of the story, such techniques are exploited in scenes of the fall of Troy to restructure emotional experience, above and beyond narrative possibilities, through artistic form. Sometimes, these interaction are subtle, contained in a single gesture. On the outside of a red-figure cup by the Brygos Painter, for instance, Cassandra, as she is led away by Ajax, turns her head back to watch the scene where Neoptolemus kills Priam with the baby Astyanax (fig. 77). She alone, the turn of her head seems to suggest, can understand the full tragedy of Priam's death.[33]

But most intense are those vases that continue to focus on Cassandra's supplication of Athena's inert statue as a paradigm for our own engagement. On a calyx krater in Boston attributed to the Altamura Painter (figs. 78 and 79), Cassandra, even as she grasps at the statue of Athena with one arm, reaches out her other arm to her father Priam.[34] He reciprocates the gesture, reaching out of the adjacent scene where he is about to be struck by Neoptolemus with Astyanax. The violent acts are dramatically staged, the critical moments just seconds away, yet Cassandra and Priam are fixated on one another, seemingly unaware of the warriors Ajax and Neoptolemus who threaten them. Whereas in the story of the Iliupersis Cassandra and Priam meet different fates in different times and places, the figures seem, in this moment and on the surface of this vase, to overcome temporal and spatial distance—not in order to save each other, but simply to recognize their shared fate. Cassandra and Priam, after all, do not touch, and the images they see of each other are as removed from corporeal reality as the ones we as viewers of the vase see of them. To see each other, they must extract themselves from the narrative they inhabit and become like us: viewers looking into the world constructed by the painter from the outside, but failing to reach into it, and feeling pity for what they see.

Our own visual engagement with the figures we see on the Boston krater is thematized through two of them that are rendered so as to face us directly: the statue of Athena, the one that has failed to protect Cassandra, and the desperate Astyanax, flying through the air as he transforms into the weapon used to bludgeon his own grandfather. The two figures offer oppositional approaches to the frontal image, Athena meeting our eyes with a blank, disengaged stare, while Astyanax seems to turn to face us directly—to notice us looking at him, and beg for our help. Set against the inability of Cassandra and Priam to reach one another despite their shared gaze, these frontal figures ask us to critically confront what our own gaze and our own emotions can accomplish. Cassandra's fate, after all, is doomed by the statue's inability to succeed to an embodied presence of its represented subject, reminding us that no matter how intently we animate Astyanax's gaze, we cannot save him.

An even greater range of artistic devices that enhance the viewer's emotional engagement are deployed on a magnificent early fourth-century volute-krater in Ferrara

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[33] Paris, Louvre G 152.

[34] Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 59.178.

(figs. 80-82).[35] On one side of a frieze that extends around the body of the vessel, below its neck, three episodes are conflated into a single scene. To the left, Ajax pulls back the head of Cassandra, who flings her naked body around the statue of Athena. Sitting on the statue's base, on the other side from Cassandra, is Andromache holding Astyanax. Directly in front of them, Neoptolemus attacks Priam on the altar. Two women—one holding a baby—run away from these central scenes on either side, encountering further violence as they blend into the Centauromachy that is depicted on the other side of the krater.

In this dense configuration of different narratives, parallels between figures emerge within a single visual frame through formal analogies. Cassandra's posture and gesture as she supplicates the statue of Athena, for instance, parallels those of the baby Astyanax, who reaches forward as if supplicating Neoptolemus and almost touching Priam. Where Cassandra is physically before the statue, Andromache and her child are not present at the murder of Priam—Andromache, in fact, lowers her head, seemingly unaware of the violence unfolding before her. Just as the configuration of the one scene emphasizes the futility of Cassandra's attempt to gain salvation from a statue, Astyanax seems to reach into a scene that is only present before him as an image—something with a visual presence but no corporeal reality, a fantasy, in a sense, that even his mother cannot see. Between two scenes where no narrative continuities exist, the formal comparison allows a viewer to see similarities in the emotional plights of Cassandra and Astyanax, structured according to the disjunction inherent in the image itself.

The struggles of both Cassandra and Astyanax to activate the images they see are similar to attempts by the living to reach out and touch images of the dead, whether in Homeric accounts of *eidola* or in Phylonoe's grave relief explored in the previous chapter, which figures a baby, like Astyanax, who attempts to connect with a figure who exists in another pictorial world. As in that relief, the struggle of Astyanax parallels our own. Just as our pity overcomes us as we look at Phylonoe's relief, the figure of Astyanax himself transforms into the same kind of object of pity he sees in the scene before him: a tragic scene we see but in which we cannot intervene.

Athena and Priam are configured so as to enhance this disjunction, both functioning simultaneously as a frozen image and a participant in the scene. Athena stands on a base, her feet closely together, in a stance familiar from cult statues, within a cult space as indicated by the ribbon hanging above her. Yet her garments are depicted with diluted, swirling lines—the same used to render Cassandra's soft flesh—that make them appear diaphanous and loose, as if made of fabric. Although she turns away from Cassandra, she is rendered in profile—not frontally as in the Boston krater—as if participating in the scene around her, her spear directed at the adjacent scene with the menacing intent of a living warrior. Where Athena is a statue as animate as any other figure, Priam is a living human given an almost statue-like appearance, with a huge,

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[35] Ferrara, National Archaeological Museum 1637 (T136 VP). The vase, which comes from a burial at Valle Pega, remains unattributed, and its Attic origin has been given followed by a question mark since its original publication (Arias 1955, who identifies three different hands). A fragment discovered in the Athenian Agora, however, bears "certain similarities" to the depiction of the death of Priam in the Ferrara vase (Moore 1997: 199 cat. 389; see also Miller 1995: 459, who notes similarities in the vestments of Priam).

broad face, exaggerated with mask-like features and twisted to an almost frontal position.[36]

As Cassandra's struggle to animate the image before her becomes our own, we become emotionally invested in the scene before us—we feel pity. Yet this pity cannot accomplish anything: we are as distant from her as Athena, and cannot save her. Once again, there is a clear analogy with the type of pity felt during a tragic performance. In the prologue to Euripides' *Trojan Women,* the rape of Cassandra is used by Athena as a paradigm for the uncomfortable sense of pity the audience experiences while viewing the play. Athena asks Poseidon to cause storms that will prevent the Greeks' homecoming, citing Cassandra's rape as the cause of her anger (69-86). But Ajax's violation of her sanctuary is only one part of the crime: the other, she states, is that the Greeks did nothing to him in response (71). The rest of the play makes a painful spectacle of the victims of war crimes like that of Ajax, presenting one destroyed woman after another. As they sat and watched, pitying but unable to intervene, the Athenian audience must have taken Athena's accusation to heart: to do nothing when the gods have been dishonored is a crime in itself—a crime whose effects pity only magnifies.[37] Our emotional engagement before an image of Cassandra's rape, in other words, might only serve to upset the clarity of its narrative exposition, muddling her emotional plight before an image with our own.

If not salvation, what does pity felt before such vases accomplish? An approach that understands pity as an aesthetic emotion might focus on the artificiality of the scenes, and so see them as offering nothing more than an intellectual exercise in what it would be like to witness such tragedies. Yet discourses of pity in ancient Athens suggest that the emotion functioned in "real life" scenarios in equivalent terms and worked towards the same ends. Aeschines in the fourth-century courtroom, for instance, relied on precisely the same structures to move a jury to pity by asking them to picture in their minds the destruction of Thebes in 338 BCE—eight years before his speech:

> ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ τοῖς σώμασιν οὐ παρεγένεσθε, ἀλλὰ ταῖς γε διανοίαις ἀποβλέψατ᾽ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς συμφοράς, καὶ νομίσαθ᾽ ὁρᾶν ἁλισκομένην τὴν πόλιν, τειχῶν κατασκαφάς, ἐμπρήσεις οἰκιῶν, ἀγομένας γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας εἰς δουλείαν, πρεσβύτας ἀνθρώπους, πρεσβύτιδας γυναῖκας ὀψὲ μεταμανθάνοντας τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κλαίοντας, ἱκετεύοντας ὑμᾶς, ὀργιζομένους οὐ τοῖς τιμωρουμένοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τούτων αἰτίοις, ἐπισκήπτοντας μηδενὶ τρόπῳ τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλειτήριον στεφανοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν δαίμονα καὶ τὴν τύχην τὴν συμπαρακολουθοῦσαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ φυλάξασθαι.
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> Aeschin. 3.157

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[36] Indeed, Priam's face resembles that of the sculpted head of Priam from the east pediment of the roughly contemporary Temple of Asklepios at Epidauros. As Stewart (1990: 170) notes, this Priam, "screaming in agony, with cheeks, eyes, and brow heaving, pushes pathos so far that for many years it was mistaken for a Centaur's head: heroic it certainly is not."

[37] Wohl (2015: 47) argues: "Not only is there an automatic affinity between Athenian audience and Greek heroes in a play structured by a polarity between Greek and barbarian, but this play goes out of its way to emphasize the analogy between imperial Athens and the conquering Greeks."

> But since with your bodies you were not present, yet with your intellects behold their disaster; imagine that you see their city taken, the razing of their walls, the burning of their homes; their women and children led into captivity; their old men, their aged matrons, late in life learning to forget what freedom means; weeping, supplicating you, angry not so much at those who are taking vengeance upon them, as at the men who are responsible for it all and calling on you by no means to crown the curse of Hellas, but rather to guard yourselves against the evil genius and the fate that ever pursue the man.
>
> trans. Adams, adapted

The work of the mental imaging Aeschines demands of his audience is essentially the same as that of a painted vase: it allows us to see something that we did not actually experience. As Sternberg argues of this passage, Aeschines "piles one pathetic image upon another so that each juror will feel pity and indignation as he sees conquered Thebes in his mind's eye."[38] But pity is not motivated simply by witnessing the city's destruction. Instead, it emerges, once again, through the disjunctive act of seeing an imagined tragedy, one made visible as a mere image rather than a directly observed reality. Drawing on the same structure of pity as the work of art, Aeschines asks those who have no memories of the destruction to use their mental energies to create images of it. At the same time, the various scenarios that Aeschines describes are so generic that any audience members who had not themselves witnessed such a destruction could easily substitute the images they already knew from paintings, sculptures, and dramatic performances of the fall of Troy.

The result of this process of visualization is that we place ourselves directly in the midst of the destruction. Old women, Aeschines says, supplicate *us,* his audience, as we visualize Thebes, just as figures in vase paintings sometimes turn away from the narratives in which they are engaged and open themselves up directly to our pity. And yet, because the scene is imagined, we are unable to save these women—we are not even asked, in fact, to intervene on their behalf. Supplication is not directed at stopping the destruction and changing the course of their lives. Instead, it compels us to consider how we might, in different circumstances and in this courtroom in particular, prevent the fate of people *like them*—a group of people that includes ourselves. In this case, pity is clearly intended to not simply provide the jurors with an aesthetic experience, but to change their minds and actions on a fundamental level. Yet it does so not by presenting a tragedy into which they are meant directly to intervene. Rather, action happens through the same imaginative empathy that motivates pity before the work of art. The social significance of the pitiable work of art lies, in other words, in the structures of emotion and vision that it engenders in the viewer, rather the stories it tells through iconographic content.

The structural work of pity emerges on the Ferrara krater in another, perhaps more unexpected synthesis of form and emotion—that between Cassandra and the maenad depicted in the scene above her, on the neck (figs. 81-82). Like Cassandra, the maenad flings her head back, her hair flying, and lifts her feet almost off the ground. Both,

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[38] Sternberg 2005b: 27. As she notes, although pity is not explicitly mentioned in this passage, the categories of people suffering—children, the elderly, those captured in war—correspond with those who were considered worthy of pity in both philosophical and forensic literature.

moreover, are pushed to this point of corporeal and visual contortion by the man behind them: just as Cassandra is threatened by Ajax, the maenad is controlled by the music of the satyr behind her, his pose imitating that of Ajax, his double flute held forward somewhat like Ajax's sword.

In one of his most widely cited examples of *Pathosformeln,* Warburg explored how this form of ecstatic maenad emerged in all kinds of contexts in later Western art, animating the pathos of everyone from the dancing Salome to the weeping Madonna at the cross.[39] Here, similar forms encourage associations at the level of pathos within a single vase, compelling us to use the unified surface as a means to construct intersubjective links not only between different victims of the Iliupersis, but between two entirely unrelated figures. Cassandra flings herself forward in an attempt to reify the image of Athena before her. The maenad's ecstatic dance can be seen as similarly bringing her closer to an epiphanic encounter with the divine. Stripped of their narrative specificity, the figures' emotional plights—their desire to activate the deity and make the images they see come to life, their sheer emotional commitment to visual over veridical reality—emerge through the configuration of their bodies according to the same pattern of form. This, perhaps, is the real work of pity.

Statues on and in the Parthenon

Over the course of the Classical period, the Iliupersis became one of the most popular subjects in Greek art, occurring in all categories of private and public art. When carved into the architectural sculpture of temples or painted the walls of public buildings like the Stoa Poikile, the violent narratives were often juxtaposed with other mythological or even historical battles in ways that served to highlight the shared pitiable nature of the scenes depicted. The most spectacular example of the use of this imagery in Classical Athens occurs on the Parthenon, whose ninety-two metopes were sculpted with scenes of struggles between Greeks and Trojans, Amazons, Centaurs, and Giants.[40]

The pitiable nature of these scenes has historically been underplayed in favor of a more triumphalist reading of the monument, with the depictions of mythological battles understood as a symbolic celebration of the victory over the Persians earlier in the century. In contrast, Arrington has recently offered a fresh evaluation of the Parthenon metopes, focusing on how frequently and explicitly they feature twisted, mangled bodies and corpses of Greeks in ways that, he argues, are meant to evoke pity rather than victory. For Arrington, such scenes "do the work of tragedy":

> The dead and dying were portrayed with such dramatic iconography on the Parthenon to draw the attention of the viewers and to create an emotional connection between the viewer and the defeated provided in the first instance by the mythical bridge that likened the Greeks of the distant past to recent Greeks. Pity drew the viewers to heroic Athenian dead, securing the cultural and emotional link that awakened their own memories of the dead. The pathos of the representations made them noteworthy and elicited the viewer's empathy. Whereas pity does not seem to have been encouraged in the public cemetery, the

[39] Warburg 2000: 3. See Johnson 2012: 138-9.
[40] For an overview of the metopes see Schwab 2005.

> distance afforded by myth and the sacred setting that ordered, organized, and justified death provided a secure place to experience it.[41]

Despite the vivid carving of bodies in relief so deep they almost emerge as three-dimension sculptures, the placement of the metopes high up on the temple and the inevitable interruption of the narratives they construct by the triglyphs between them precludes any intimate identification with the figures as anything more than sculptures. Indeed, we can go further than Arrington in stating that these scenes do not simply engender pity for the people depicted but for the sculptures themselves. We do not need to reify the figures we see as flesh and blood to make them pitiable. Instead, as in funerary monuments, the very form of the relief, placed high up and embedded in the architectural fabric of the temple, enacts the structure of a pitiable scenario we can see but into which we cannot intervene.

The metopes on the long north side of the Parthenon were devoted to scenes from the Iliupersis.[42] Though few are preserved to a degree where we can even identify the iconography today, for an ancient viewer standing on the Acropolis they would have been among the most visible and open to the rest of the sanctuary. From what survives, we know that these scenes included at least two—and perhaps as many as four—depictions of a statue of Athena.[43] Showing episodes such as the rape of Cassandra and the theft of the Palladion, each of these scenes seems to have presented the statue at a moment where its efficacy was put into question or failed altogether.[44] Interspersed among depictions of Greek struggling against a range of mythological foes, the appearance of figures that confront statues reminds us that victims of war are threatened not simply by their mortal enemies but by a failure of their broader cultural structures, including their images. Experienced in a sanctuary that had only a few decades before been destroyed in the course of the Persian invasion, such images would have served as a vivid reminder of a destruction that, as we have seen, had emotional as well as material consequences on the Athenian's approach to sculpture. If, as Arrington argues, such scenes were configured so as to engender pity from their viewers, the very materiality of sculpture seems to have played a self-conscious role in cultivating this experience.

Of the instances of figures interacting with statues on the northern metopes of the Parthenon, only one survives to a degree that we can identify the figures clearly. The episode is spread over two metopes: two warriors approach from left (N. 24, fig. 83) in pursuit of a woman, who runs towards a statue (N. 25, figs. 84 and 85).[45] Although the scene is badly damaged, it is well known from contemporary vase painting and so can readily be reconstructed as showing Menelaus with another warrior in pursuit of Helen,

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[41] Arrington 2014: 153.
[42] Schwab 2005: 183-90.
[43] See Schwab 2002. Another depiction of the statue of Athena occurs on the south suite of metopes, S. 21.
[44] N.27 has been reconstructed as showing the theft of the Palladion (Brommer 1967: 111-17 cat. 52-53; Schwab 2002: 294-95). For fragments that might belong to a scene of Ajax and Cassandra, see Mantis 1987; Trianti 1992; Schwab 2002: 295.
[45] Schwab 2002 and 2005: 184-86.

who runs to the statue of Athena.[46] To Helen's left, preventing Menelaus' approach, stands Aphrodite accompanied by Eros, small and winged, hovering over her shoulder.

Details of the scene vary in its many ancient accounts, but the inclusion of a statue (such as the statue of Athena here) into the episode is distinctive of visual depictions, likely developed sometime in the fifth century to mirror Cassandra's plight. In the narrative of the Trojan War, Helen's story is different from that of the innocent Cassandra, a virgin priestess, and Menelaus' pursuit of his errant wife is in many accounts justified. Yet the configuration of the scene here and elsewhere in Attic art, with the interpolation of the statue, largely overlooks such narrative distinctions in favor of emphasizing the common threat of the failing statue. Where in many depictions on vases Helen is shown looking at Menelaus in terror, here on the Parthenon she appears like Cassandra, twisting her body towards the statue, ignoring the scene behind her and reaching with her left hand to embrace it. Whereas the other figures are carved in the vivid, variegated style typical of the Parthenon metopes, whose figures twist and turn as if fully detached from the background, the statue is placed perpendicular to the background of the metope, right at its edge. The tall base appears like an architectural extension of the temple itself, its rectilinear form mimicking that of the cornice below and the carving of the triglyph beside it.

The statue itself was depicted as an Archaic *xoanon*—an under life-size figure with close-set feet, a thin, flat frame, and a smooth, shapeless garment that covered the entire body. Where Helen's body is shown as flexible and kinetic, the statue is rigid and solid. The same differentiation applies to how the two figures are configured in relation to the background surface of the relief: where the statue stands perpendicular to it, as if configured by it, Helen's left arm—the one that embraces the statue—sinks into the background surface in order to reach behind it, attempting to reify the image of the goddess by opening up deeper pictorial space and detaching it from the architectural background. Her attempt to animate the statue, in other words, is equivalent to an attempt to break free from the confined structure of the relief metope. In this sense, Athena's statue stands in stark contrast not only with Helen but also with the fully-formed Aphrodite next to her, the goddess who is able to intervene on her behalf. At a narrative level, Helen has appealed not simply to the wrong goddess, but to the wrong material form.

Because the entire scene is carved from the same marble block, its figures bound by the same architectural space, the crisis that Helen confronts emerges as a paradigm for our own attempts to make sense of the metopes that ring the building: how to give animate substance to a block of marble. As with contemporary images of the rape of Cassandra (including the one on a nearby metope, if its fragments have been correctly identified), our emotional engagement emerges not simply through the narrative content of what is depicted, but by framing that narrative in terms of the intellectual strategies and emotions we engage with in order to transform figurative sculpture into representation.[47]

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[46] For the scene in vase painting, see Ghali-Kahil 1955; *LIMC* IV (1988): 498-563; Cohen 2014: 24-25; Stansbury-O'Donnell 2014.

[47] For the evidence for a metope showing Cassandra, see Mantis 1987; Trianti 1992; Schwab 2002: 295.

Our pity for Helen's plight, like that of Cassandra, would seem to highlight the failure of the statue as a mere material object—a surprisingly negative paradigm for a temple to Athena that housed one of the most spectacular temple statues in the ancient world, Pheidias' massive Athena Parthenos. Indeed, for the ancient viewer, it would not require much imagination to compare the statue of Athena on the metope of Helen not only with the ancient xoanon housed first in the Old Temple and later in the Erechtheion, but also with the statue within the Parthenon. In its conservative, restful pose, Pheidias' statue was closer in appearance to the statue approached by Helen than the "living" figures carved into the sculptures adorning the outside of the temple.[48]

Moreover, the actual cult statue of Athena and the one depicted in the metope were oriented parallel to one another, both facing east. A viewer standing outside the Parthenon, in other words, looking at its north colonnade, could hypothetically see both simultaneously from the same angle if the cella wall were removed. For the viewer who would go on to get a glimpse of Pheidias' statue within, even fleeting pity felt before a metope like that of Helen might be formative. Yet what, in this context, can this depiction of a failed statue accomplish?

The answer lies, once again, in the structure that pity reveals—the disjunction between the image and material of Athena's statue—as much as the narrative content of the image itself. For by appealing to an inert statue assimilated with the structure of the triglyph adjacent to it, Helen seems to supplicate not so much Athena's image as her temple—the one that stands before us, sculpted top to bottom in marble, through whose materiality Helen herself emerges. And although within the narrative it is Aphrodite and Eros who prevent Menelaus from killing her, materially it is the triglyph on the other side of the scene, in front of Aphrodite, which blocks Menelaus from approaching Helen. It is the temple itself, in other words, in all its material glory that intervenes on behalf of Helen. Far from undermining its authority, reducing Athena's statue to a mere material object within the narrative compels us to confront her agency as something evidenced not by the content of a myth, but by the material structures that enable the story to be figured in the first place.

Even beyond this individual metope, focusing on the structures revealed by pity rather than its purely thematic or narrative content allows us to see how pity, experienced in beholding the metopes, works to articulate the structure of the work of art more generally. Just as contemporary vases linked various episodes from the Iliupersis through pathos formulas, so the Parthenon metopes frame individual struggles from different contexts as a series of paratactic narratives, assimilated through stylistic, technical and formal devices. If the repeated formulas of contemporary funerary monuments enabled viewers to compare and empathize with multiple discrete tragedies, the metopes function in a similar manner, presenting a series of separate, close-range encounters between (almost always) two figures that are unified only through a viewer who walks around the temple.

Pity felt before sculpture does not simply teach us how to emote. It teaches us how to make sense of sculpture, how to give it structure, how to animate it and activate its pictorial content. Our pity, in other words, gives sculpture social value.[49] For the ancient viewer, such strategies of experiencing sculpture succeeded to a form of civic

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[48] Neer 2010: 102.

[49] Compare Kurke's account (2012) of the social value of *choreia* in ancient Greece.

engagement in the Parthenon's most original feature: the Ionic frieze tucked inside the colonnade, above the outer wall of the cella, depicting processions of Athenians participating in the Panathenaia—the festival that culminated in the presentation of a new peplos to Athena's cult statue in her northern shrine. The apex of the two strands of the procession occurs on the east side of the temple, above the central doorway through which a viewer approached Pheidias' cult statue. In the center, on the longest block of the frieze, between the pantheon of gods who turn their backs away on either side, we find a depiction not of Athena or her statue, but of a series of five mortals holding accouterments for the ritual dressing of that statue (fig. 86).[50] Each is engaged in an exchange of the objects: two pairs of figures on the right face one another, passing objects between them—most noticeably the large piece of fabric that will form the peplos—while the solitary figure on the left, her hands occupied with paraphernalia, looks out frontally, as if intending to form a similar bond with the viewer (though the high placement of the frieze diminishes the effect).

At this climactic moment, we find depictions of human encounters through material objects which are no less intimate and interpersonal than those found in contemporary funerary reliefs, carved in similar scale and style, with similarly generic figures, who seek to give life to one another in the same way. As the figures pass the objects and garments between them, they perform their roles in the Panathenaia. Yet because they are themselves figured in marble, they simultaneously enact, in a sense, the very adornment of the statue that is about to take place. Both for the figures within the relief and the viewer looking at it, stone becomes flesh through vision and touch, mediated through objects of adornment themselves configured through the same marble surface.

Once again, it is the pathos of our vision that animates the figures we see and gives them meaning, just as it is our engagement that brings to life the cult statue visible through the opening below. A social investment in sculpture on the scale of the Parthenon depended not on a naïve belief in the assimilation between material and image, but on an intentional effort—an emotional commitment—to engage with sculpture and work it into the subjectivity of lived experience.

[50] *Pace* Connelly 2014, who interprets this scene as showing the daughter of Erechtheus being prepared for her sacrifice.

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

Figure 1: Kouros of Kroisos, from Anavysos, Attica. Ca. 520 BCE. Athens, NM 3851.

Figure 2: Statue of a young man, known as the Kritios youth. 480-70 BCE. Athens, Acropolis Museum 698.



Figure 3. Stele of Mnasitheos. From Akraiphia, Boeotia. Ca. 520-515 BCE. Thebes, Archaeological Museum 28200.



Figure 4. Base of Xenokles, front side with inscription (*CEG 19*). Third quarter of sixth century BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum I 425.

Figure 5. Base of Xenokles, upper surface with kouros plinth. Third quarter of sixth century BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum I 425.

Figure 6. Kore of Phrasikleia. From Merenda, Attica. Ca. 540 BCE. Athens, NM 4889.

Figure 7. From near Cape Vodi, Rhodes. Early fifth century BCE.
Rhodes, Grand Master's Palace Γ 1640.



Figure 8. Base for stele of Smikuthos, front side with inscription (*CEG* 51). Late sixth century BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum I 327.

Figure 9. Base for stele of Kleoitos (*CEG* 68). Second half of sixth century BCE. Athens, Epigraphical Museum 10641.



Figure 10. Detail of kouros of Kroisos, from Anavysos, Attica. Ca. 520 BCE. Athens, NM 3851.



Figure 11. Funerary stele of a youth (the Gorgon stele). Mid sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 2687.

Figure 12. Detail of foot of youth on the Gorgon stele. Mid sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 2687.

Figure 13. Detail of predella of the Gorgon stele. Mid sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 2687.

Figure 14. Stele of Aristion, signed by Aristokles. Late sixth century BCE. Athens. NM 29.

Figure 15. Stele fragment of a man with an aryballos. Mid sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 5826.

Figure 16. Stele of an armed warrior. Second half of sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 3071.

Figure 17. Detail of foot from stele of an armed warrior. Second half of sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 3071.



Figure 18. Detail of hand from stele of an armed warrior. Second half of sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 3071.

Figure 19. Fragment of upper part of a stele of a man with a spear. Second quarter of sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 2825. Photo: Richter 1961.



Figure 20. Stele of a man with a discus. Mid sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 4474.

Figure 21. Stele fragment of a man with a discus. Mid sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 38.

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

Figure 22. Fragment of a stele of a helmeted man holding a shield. Second half of sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 47.

Figure 23. Fragment of a stele of a man, with horseman in the predella. Late sixth century BCE. Rome, Barracco Museum.

Figure 24. Cavetto capital from a funerary monument with horseman. From Lamptrai. Mid sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 41.

Figure 25. Base for a stele with horsemen. Mid sixth century BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 1001.



Figure 26. Lateral face of base for a kouros. Late sixth century BCE. Athens, NM 3476.



Figure 27. Lateral face of statue base showing Herakles and the Nemean Lion. Late sixth or early fifth century BCE. Athens, NM 42/3579.



Figure 28. Front face of statue base showing Herakles reclining. Late sixth or early fifth century BCE. Athens, NM 42/3579.

Figure 29. Seated figure, found built into the Themistoclean wall. Third quarter of sixth century BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 1052.

Figure 30. Base for a kouros. Late sixth or early fifth century BCE Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 1002.

Figures 31. Equestrian funerary statue. Late sixth century BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 6999.

Figure 32. Alternate view of equestrian funerary statue, showing damage to left side. Late sixth century BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 6999.

Figure 33. Base for a kouros monument for Aischros of Samos. Late sixth century BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum I 189.

Figure 34. Stele of Pausimache.
Ca. 390 BCE. Athens, NM 3964.

Figure 35. Stele of Ampharete and her grandchild. Ca. 410–400 BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum P695/I221.

Figure 36. Detail of stele of Ampharete and her grandchild. Ca. 410–400 BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum P695/I221.

Figure. 37. Stele of Andron. Early fourth century BCE. Piraeus, Archaeological Museum 1161.

Figure 38. White-ground lekythos. Painter of Munich 2335. Ca. 420 BCE. Athens, NM 19354.

Figure 39. White-ground lekythos. Sabouroff Painter. Mid fifth century BCE. Athens, NM 1815.

Figure 40. Detail of same white-ground lekythos. Sabouroff Painter. Mid fifth century BCE. Athens, NM 1815.

Fig. 41. Detail of white-ground lekythos. Inscription Painter. Ca. 460-50 BCE. Athens, NM 1958. Photo: Oakley 2004.



Figure 42. Detail of marble lekythos. Ca. 400-390 BCE. Athens, NM 3585. Photo: Posamentir 2006.



Figure 43. Drawing (from Posamentir 2006) of same marble lekythos. Ca. 400-390 BCE. Athens, NM 3585.

Figures 44 and 45. Marble lekythos monument. Early fourth century BCE. Piraeus, Archaeological Museum 1700.

Figure 46. Stele of Hediste. Ca. 400 BCE. Athens, NM 1929.

Figure 47. Painted stele showing a spitz. Ca. 420-400 BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 863. Photo: Posamentir 2006.



Figure 48. Drawing (from Posamentir 2006) of same stele showing a spitz. Ca. 420-400 BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 863.

Figure 49. Fragment of stele of Dionysia. Mid fourth century BCE. Athens, NM 2062.

Figure 50. Stele of Damasistrate. Ca. 350-320 BCE. Athens, NM 743.

Figure 51. Stele of Eukoline. Early fourth century BCE. Athens, NM 4006.

Figure 52. Detail of left hand of Eukoline. Early fourth century BCE. Athens, NM 4006.

Figure 53. Stele of Ameinokleia. Second quarter of fourth century BCE. Athens, NM 718.



Figure 54. Detail of stele of Ameinokleia. Second quarter of fourth century BCE. Athens, NM 718.



Figure 55. Alexander Gardner. *Portrait of Lewis Payne*. 1865. After Barthes 1981.

Figure 56. Stele of Eukoline. Late fifth century BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 694/I 210.

Figure 57. Detail of stele of Eukoline. Late fifth century BCE. Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 694/I 210.



Figure 58. Stele of Mnesagora and Nikochares. Ca. 420-410 BCE. Athens, NM 3845.

Figure 59. Jean-Siméon Chardin. *La mère laborieuse*. 1739-40. Paris, Louvre.

Figure 60. Stele of Hegeso. Late fifth century BCE. Athens, NM 3624.

Figure 61. Stele of Phan[…]. First half of fourth century BCE. Cleveland Museum of Art 1924.1018.

Figure 62. Fragment of funerary stele showing a slave drawing a ribbon from a box. Ca. 420-400 BCE. Athens, NM 1858.



Figure 63. Stele of woman and slave with basket. Early fourth century BCE. Piraeus, Archaeological Museum 5290.



Figure 64. Stele of Phrasikleia. Early fourth century BCE. Athens, NM 831.

Figure 65. Detail of stele of Phrasikleia. Early fourth century BCE. Athens, NM 831.

Figure 66. Stele of Phylonoe. Ca. 380-70 BCE. Athens, NM 3790.



Figure 67. Detail of stele of Phylonoe. Ca. 380-70 BCE. Athens, NM 3790.

Figure 68. Stele of Mnesarete. First quarter of fourth century BCE. Munich, Glyptothek 491.



Figure 69. Detail of right foot of Mnesarete. First quarter of fourth century BCE. Munich, Glyptothek 491.

Figure 69. Detail of right foot of Mnesarete. First quarter of fourth century BCE. Munich, Glyptothek 491.

Figure 71. Funerary stele of a woman. First quarter of fourth century BCE. Piraeus, Archaeological Museum 2555.

Figure 72. Prokne and Itys by Alkamenes. Ca. 415 BCE. Athens, Acropolis Museum 1358.

Figure 73. Red-figure hydria attributed to the Kleophrades Painter (so-called Vivenzio Hydria). Ca. 490-80 BCE. Naples, National Archaeological Museum 81669.

Figures 74. Detail of Vivenzio hydria, showing rape of Cassandra. Ca. 490-80 BCE. Naples, National Archaeological Museum 81669.

Figures 76. Detail of Vivenzio hydria, showing murder of Priam. Ca. 490-80 BCE. Naples, National Archaeological Museum 81669.



Figure 77. Detail of red-figure kylix attributed to the Brygos Painter. Ca. 480-70 BCE. Paris, Louvre G 152.

Figure 78. Red-figure calyx krater attributed to the Altamura Painter. Ca. 470-60 BCE. Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 59.178.

Figure 79. Photographic rollout of same krater. Ca. 470-60 BCE. Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 59.178.

Figure 80. Red-figure volute krater. Ca. 400-390 BCE. Ferrara, National Archaeological Museum 1637 (T136 VP).

Figure 81. Detail of same krater, showing scenes from the Iliupersis. Ca. 400-390 BCE.
Ferrara, National Archaeological Museum 1637 (T136 VP).



Figure 82. Detail of same krater, showing Cassandra below and maenad on neck. Ca. 400-390 BCE. Ferrara, National Archaeological Museum 1637 (T136 VP).

Figure 83. Metope N. 24 from the Parthenon, showing Menelaus and Odysseus. Ca. 447-32 BCE. Athens, Acropolis Museum.

Figure 84. Metope N. 25 from the Parthenon, showing Eros, Aphrodite, and Helen before the statue of Athena. Ca. 447-32 BCE. Photographed *in situ*; now Athens, Acropolis Museum.



Figure 85. Drawing of metope N. 25 by Katherine Schwab. 2009. Bellarmine Museum of Art, Fairfield University.

Figure 86. Detail of central portion of block East V of Parthenon frieze. Ca. 447-32 BCE. London, British Museum.