

UC Berkeley

Working Papers

Title

The cultural conquest of the presidency : incorporation and the transformation of American political life, 1890-1916

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/56z237zz>

Author

Schwartz, Peter

Publication Date

1990

A1458
no. 90-30
[1990]

✓ 11/13/90

**THE CULTURAL CONQUEST OF THE PRESIDENCY:
INCORPORATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL LIFE, 1890-1916**

Executive power & United States History

by Peter Schwartz
Murphy Institute of Political Economy
Tulane University

Institute of Governmental Studies
University of California, Berkeley

Working Paper 90-30

INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL
STUDIES LIBRARY

NOV - 6 1990

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

**The Cultural Conquest of the Presidency:
Incorporation and the Transformation of American Political Life,
1890-1916**

by Peter Schwartz

Murphy Institute of Political Economy
Tulane University

Institute of Governmental Studies
University of California, Berkeley

For their assistance, I wish to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Murphy Institute of Political Economy at Tulane University, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, Tom Haskell, Tom Langston, Matthew Mancini, Elizabeth Norville, David Steiner, and Richard Teichgraeber, III.

Working Paper 90-30

Working Papers published by the Institute of Governmental Studies provide quick dissemination of draft reports and papers, preliminary analyses, and papers with a limited audience. The objective is to assist authors in refining their ideas by circulating research results and to stimulate discussion about public policy. Working Papers are reproduced unedited directly from the author's pages.

nation, a partisan figure and a unifying and healing presence. Royalism, as I use the term, however, refers to a cultural disposition that ascribes magical qualities to the office of the presidency. Like a monarch, the modern president—far more than his nineteenth-century predecessor—mystically embodies and represents the nation. His speech is oracular, his body sacred, his power personal. Qualities generally ascribed to him include benevolence, omnipotence, omniscience, and moral purity. Americans look to him to provide them with security and to affirm their fundamental virtue as a people.⁵

What I wish to suggest in this essay is that the "royalist" character of the modern presidency is the result of its active participation in the dialectic of (ir)rationality characteristic of capitalism in its advanced, incorporated stage of development. Liberal theoretical approaches—so often attuned to politics simply at the level of interest and expedience—have foundered in attempts to comprehend the twentieth-century presidency because they cling to the assumption that politics in the "modern" world is essentially, and (following Weber) increasingly, a "rational", instrumental, and goal-oriented enterprise.⁶ By focusing, in particular, on the importance of the transition to a consumption-based economy, I aim to relocate irrationality so that it is proximate, not marginal, to what one might term the hyperrationality of the science-based corporate order.⁷

How does royalism manifest itself within the framework of this corporate order? As a result of the magnification of his institutional and personal authority, the president has come to inhabit the popular imagination as the high priest of democracy.⁸ According to Theodore Lowi, in his own, quite critical, assessment of this development, the modern presidency must be appreciated as "an office of tremendous personal power drawn from the people

At the same time, other developments within the political economy--particularly those related to the rise of a mass market and an ethic of consumption--dramatically transformed the structural features of the relationship between the president and the American people. In this century, the presidency has itself been drawn into the national culture, and it has come to express many of the cultural paradoxes of our age.¹⁰ Presidential effectiveness has increasingly depended upon the ability to establish a rapport directly with the American people. As Walter Dean Burnham describes this development, "very shortly after 1900--clearly Theodore Roosevelt's presidency and his unprecedented landslide victory of 1904 represent the turning point--the presidency assumed the independently visible, 'charismatic', and 'focusing' role in the national political system with which we are familiar today."¹¹

A number of the factors that help to account for this second trend--including the disintegration of previously significant distinctions between public and private realms, the near-total collapse of the party system and of meaningful and stable party loyalties, and the new importance of rhetoric and images for creating and sustaining political support--are themselves linked to the institutional transformation of the presidency. However, the protean qualities of the institution, and of the men who have inhabited it, suggests the degree to which the presidency now also exists as a simulacrum of the restless, endless multiplication of desires upon which the modern economy and culture of consumption itself depends. In the age of the mass market, the presidency itself has become a commodity, packaged by experts and consumed by the public.¹² The incorporation of America therefore provides us with a rich symbolic referent, one that is adequate not merely as a description of the

and the Hayes-Tilden compromise of 1877 (brokered by Thomas Scott, the president of the Pennsylvania Railroad) signalled the emergence of an integrated national, urban, and industrial economy.¹⁴ During the last third of the nineteenth century, a regional division of labor developed, organized to meet the demands of the most technologically advanced industrial sectors, located almost exclusively in the Northeast.¹⁵ As numerous authors have stressed, "modernization" linked regions and subcultures within relationships that reinforced inequality. The economic development of the urban, industrial Northeast depended upon the colonization and the structural underdevelopment of much of rural America and of the South as an entire region.¹⁶ As Trachtenberg describes this process, "The countryside found a place fashioned for it within the urban system: it became an impoverished zone, a market colony, a cheap source of food, labor, and certain raw materials. Its function was precisely to remain a backwater, to remain dependent."¹⁷

Industrialization during the Gilded Age also produced an angry and alienated labor force. Dramatic changes in relationships within the workplace, as capitalists incorporated new technologies into the work process and received a seemingly endless flow of immigrants from preindustrial and alien cultures, rapidly reduced the skilled crafts to routinized forms of wage labor. The survival of non-industrial subcultures under this intense strain nourished a collective will among workers to resist subjugation to the impersonal and degrading demands of industrial society.¹⁸ The equally determined will of industrial capitalists to repress worker militancy reflected the arrogance of an ascendant class, ethnocentrism, and the fiercely competitive business environment of the Gilded Age. The intensity of class conflict between the Civil War and World War I has not been approached

as a political vehicle for incorporation by insulating industrial and financial elites from the turbulence engendered by cultural criticism and organized political conflict. Realignment and demobilization both depended upon "broad popular acceptance ... of the industrial-corporate path to economic development." During the early years of the twentieth century, the consensus in America about the inevitability and the desirability of incorporation was "overwhelming". Of course, this really only indicated the degree to which fundamental issues about the character of industrial capitalism no longer provided the focus for organized debate and struggle. They had receded, Burnham suggests, "below the level of explicit consciousness."²³

The Populist Critique of Incorporation

It is at this subterranean level of consciousness that I would like to explore the relationship between incorporation, presidential power, and democratic culture. According to Burnham, national political integration facilitated "the transition to a mass consumption economy and the liquidation of older 'island communities'" that had resisted incorporation and challenged both its inevitability and desirability.²⁴ Populism represents the most organized, sustained and widespread movement of protest originating from within these island communities, one that also retains significance as the expression of an authentic and indigenous tradition of American radicalism. To a great extent, the system of 1896 existed not merely to make America safe for consumption, but precisely to prevent the resurgence of a mass movement of protest such as that which swept across the southern and western states in the early 1890s.²⁵

essentially were mounting a rearguard defense of very traditional values, appropriate to the freehold farmer, but virtually irrelevant to the new industrial capitalist order—should not obscure the power of their insights into the nature and destiny of this new order. As the Populists well knew, the legal fiction of the corporation represented an adaptation to the demands of an increasingly integrated national market. In medieval and early modern Europe, artificial corporations that possessed legal status and rights had often expressed transcendent ideals, embodied and rendered immanent within a communal context. Even the economic monopolies chartered by monarchs attached clearly defined duties to legal privilege. In contrast, the nineteenth-century American corporation, which served purely private ends, expressed secular and liberal ideals embedded within the Constitution itself: of formal equality, of representation, of limited participation as an accommodation to scale, and of instrumental rationality and efficiency.³¹

Populists assailed these ideals as a screen that concealed both the underlying dynamics and the inner meaning of incorporation. Generally, they understood the corporation to be an unnatural, artificial, mechanical—and hence also political—instrument of class rule. And there is no doubt that incorporation involved the attempt to reconstitute the meaning of terms such as order and authority, so that they more closely conformed to emerging organizational imperatives such as efficiency and scale. However, the desire to consolidate, integrate, and control production that so obsessed industrial titans such as Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford also suggests the need to reconsider our understanding of corporate property as a "possession", as a tool or instrument of the "plutocracy". For it remained entirely unclear, in

department stores as the external source of identity and status, and even of freedom, may well have been fleeting.³⁷ Still, there is little doubt that its promise more securely bound those with disposable income (along with those who merely aspired to have disposable income) to the existing order.

As another, far more political, alternative to the vision of perpetual struggle and conflict advanced by apologists for the spiritual and material immiseration of the age, Populists offered the enduring vision of the cooperative Christian commonwealth.³⁸ In so doing, they challenged not simply the tenets of Social Darwinism, but the ethics of consumer culture itself. Populists closely linked consumption to the degradation of national politics and to the illegitimacy of the dominant political culture. For Tom Watson, speaking in terms that were perhaps more premonitory than descriptive, parallels between presidential and royal authority revealed the extent to which politics had degenerated from the republican ideals of the founders into a modern form of feudalism. "Having become an empire in territory, and in wealth, and in power, we seek to become an empire in outward appearance, in the display of armies and navies, in the geegaws of royal ceremonial and observances, and in the maintenance of splendid embassies at foreign capitals." A new corporate aristocracy had arisen, "a more brutal and godless and rapacious nobility than ever rode ... over the peasantry of feudal Europe." And the president, while only a man "whom our masters, the corporations, have set up over us," now commanded "the servile attentions, the abject flatteries, and the degrading prostrations of the court circle."³⁹

However bombastic his language may seem to us a century later, Watson was not simply a "calamity howler".⁴⁰ His description of the relationship between power and consumption came tantalizingly close to a characterization

the concept of self-government. One even encounters this set of beliefs among Progressives during the early phases of the movement. Richard Ely, for instance, a professor at the University of Wisconsin and a founder of the American Economic Association in 1885, did not believe the claims of science contravened those of religion, and he proclaimed the need for "a great religious awakening which shall shake things, going down into the depths of men's lives and modifying their character. This religious reform must infuse a religious spirit into every department of political life."⁴³

By way of contrast, the corporate order consolidated within the framework of the System of 1896 expressed the imperialism of a "secular, technical, urban society," within which such ideas about the relationship between moral selfhood and politics were largely irrelevant.⁴⁴ As Cushing Strout has noted, the election of 1896 marked a watershed in American politics. In the aftermath, "a new note would enter in the reformers' campaigns, reflecting the professionalization of middle-class life and the new secular fascination with scientific method and administrative techniques. Men who called themselves progressives after the turn of the century would not need to rely on religious traditions and vocabularies but could seek sustenance in the development of social science."⁴⁵ In their belief that the important questions facing government were essentially empirical, Progressives would locate the source of conflict and crisis not in corruption, but in deficient insight and intelligence, and they would seek to shift the basis of reform from issues of ethics, conscience, and principle to those of technique, reason, and expertise.⁴⁶

Contrast the lineaments of the old, "traditional" culture to those of the new, and the depth of the gulf between them becomes clear. Those committed

derived from their belief that no moral or inner solution existed to the crisis that might revive democracy.⁴⁸ In many respects they had even distanced themselves from history, which they read less as a mystically dense collocation of events than as an abstract series of effects subject to manipulation by the efficient application of appropriate causes.⁴⁹

While superficially inclusive, the new order actually excluded those, still quite substantial, portions of the population that resisted accommodation to its modernizing impulses. It split capitalism between large and small business enterprises, labor between the organized and the unorganized, and Protestantism between modernists and fundamentalists. It exploited sectional divisions, divided farmers from workers, whites from blacks, and immigrants from the native-born. It gathered the educated professional classes--particularly social scientists, engineers, and lawyers--loosely within its folds, and left those it excluded noticeably more inarticulate, and hence isolated and divided amongst themselves.⁵⁰

The administrative state and the institutional presidency developed in response to crises of authority, stability, and legitimacy generated by these patterns of integration, subordination, and exclusion. There is no doubt that Progressive reformers meant the administrative state to act as an autonomous zone of government, free from private interference or influence, and responsible for regulation and oversight of workplace and market issues on behalf of a "national" or "public" interest that transcended class, ethnic, and racial cleavages. In Progressive justifications for the concentration of power at the national level--for the creation of a professional civil service, independent commissions of neutral, fact-gathering "experts", and a presidency unencumbered by ties to party or Congress--it is not at all

reform nationalism of Theodore Roosevelt. In the end, however, the significance of Roosevelt's commitment to endowing popular government "with larger powers, more positive responsibilities, and a better faith in human existence" depended far more upon its "fit" with the new political and economic realities of the twentieth century. Evidence for the democratic faith of Roosevelt ultimately rested with his willingness to entrust men "of special ability, training, and eminence" with power.⁵³ For others, such as Walter Weyl, the "new democracy" depended upon coordination and efficiency of government "on a far higher plane" than had previously obtained in national political life.⁵⁴ The Progressive commitment to democracy was, in fact, something of a charade, linked much more closely to an ideal of efficient, concentrated, and responsible state power than to a vision of popular self-government and participation that promised inclusion to groups potentially threatening to the existing order.⁵⁵ In this sense, the forms of political life largely conformed to the substantive interests of its dominant elements.⁵⁶

And so, on the one hand, Progressive advocates for enhanced executive authority acted upon the belief that only administration and regulation of the economy by experts could protect the public interest from the destructive effects of concentrated economic power. At the same time, Progressives accepted, and even celebrated, the fundamental outlines of the new industrial capitalist order. Their belief that the "successful conduct of both public and private business is becoming more and more a matter of expert administration, which demands similar methods and is confronted by the solution of similar problems" indicates the extent to which the reconstitution of public power simply mirrored the underlying transformation of the social and

business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness."⁶⁰

2. Consuming the Presidency: Desire and Power

In the previous section of this essay, I focused on Progressive efforts to concentrate executive power within bureaucratic forms unsullied by popular control or influence. These forms, I suggested, both mimicked and sought to advance the rational organization and administration of production within integrated business enterprises. To this extent, the culture of incorporation generally reinforced the rather traditional values of discipline and productivity closely linked to capitalism in its proprietary-competitive stage of development. However, the consolidation of corporate power within the framework of the System of 1896 bound the realms of production and consumption more closely together. As the history of the automobile suggests, production within the new corporate order actively depended upon mass consumption. Discipline and repression served desire and impulse. From this bind, attempts to rationalize and systematize the political order could not escape. Politics itself rapidly adjusted to the culture of consumption. The presidency conveniently served as the vehicle for this transition.

Cultural Modernism and the Presidency

The process of incorporation drew the presidency into the American culture. It transformed the presidency into an object of consumption and desire, and it did so in a manner that dissolved highly articulated En-

Trachtenberg and Jackson Lears, have discussed, in somewhat darker terms, the deconstruction of the autonomous self. This revelation of the "deeply underlying" emptiness of the soul they link to the spiritual poverty and anonymity of the urban-industrial age, as well as to transformations in the organization and meaning of labor, a diminished sense of personal efficacy and autonomy, and the compensations offered by the emergence of a culture of consumption around the turn of the century.⁶⁵

From one perspective, modernism actually derives from the culture of consumption, in that this culture repudiates the older ethic of production, as well as the sense of history and of place upon which the idea of a stable individual identity depended.⁶⁶ As I suggested in the previous section of this essay, nineteenth century protest movements had typically based their opposition upon firmly Protestant commitments to the moral autonomy and inalienability of the self and to the link between conscience and character. "In the interdependent urban marketplace," by way of contrast, "the fragmented self became a commodity like any other, to be assembled and manipulated for private gain."⁶⁷ One no longer presented one's "objective" and "real" self to the world. For this, strictly speaking, did not exist. Instead, the self was re-presented by the external configuration of poses and styles that one might adopt. In this century, politicians have exploited the capacity of a "commodified" presidency to represent the self within a newly structured "modernist" politics.⁶⁸

The relationship between cultural modernism and the presidency is obviously laced with ambiguity. The cult of presidential authority has presupposed the disappearance of conventional boundaries which, in a prior age, had effectively hemmed in the self, while simultaneously confirming its

The President and the People -- The Re-Presentation of the Self

The integration of presidential politics within a market framework occurred at two levels. Systematic attempts to "package" and to "sell" presidential candidates in terms of culturally meaningful images illustrate the influence of marketing strategies in electoral politics. At a deeper and more fundamental level, the market also transformed the psychological relationship between the president and "his" people.

If monarchs and presidents have always, in some sense, been "consumed" by publics, it is only in this century that advanced marketing and public relations techniques—instruments of the rationalized, incorporated political economy—have enabled presidents to acquire celebrity status as idols of consumption. In the twentieth century, the rising influence of political consultants and handlers, most of whom possess backgrounds in journalism, public relations, and advertising, has correlated closely to the decline of the party system. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, political parties had provided an organized basis for mobilizing "armies" of voters. In this century, campaign officials, particularly the consultants and advisors whose influence has replaced that of party regulars, have increasingly imagined politics to be an arena of desire. Candidates themselves have served both as the means to satisfy popular wants, and, through the expectations and dreams they embody, as the focus of desire themselves. William Allen White's reaction to the formation of the Bull Moose Party in 1912—"Roosevelt bit me and I went mad"—suggests the high level of excitement, even passion, presidential candidates could inspire.⁷² Recognizing this, consultants have understood the voter to be less a soldier than a consumer, and less a

revenue. The modern advertising industry developed as an adjunct to the mass-circulation daily, and it, too, tended to view politics as something that one "sells". Finally, most of the early consultants to political campaigns were journalists acting as press agents for politicians.

According to Robert Westbrook, the Populist defeat in 1896 and the consolidation of the new corporate order within the framework of the System of 1896 "set the stage for the redefinition of politics as consumption."⁷⁴ While primarily remembered as the election in which William McKinley ran for the presidency from his front porch in Canton, Ohio, the 1896 campaign was also the first one in which a charismatic candidate—William Jennings Bryan—actively and directly wooed the support of voters. During this campaign, Theodore Roosevelt opposed what he perceived to be the demagoguery of Bryan. But in 1900, Roosevelt himself set endurance records in his efforts to reach and to court all available voters.⁷⁵

The 1896 election also highlighted the new importance of campaign contributions from large corporations, particularly for the Republican Party. Sensing the organized influence that might accompany their munificence, businessmen argued for an appropriately business-like approach to political campaigns. In particular, they advocated the "massive and systematic" use of the new techniques of mass advertising. In 1896, substantial contributions from John D. Rockefeller and J.P. Morgan, among others, funded Mark Hanna's extraordinary organizational and publicizing efforts on behalf of McKinley, which involved the distribution of 200 million pieces of campaign literature. Hanna, Theodore Roosevelt declared, "has advertised McKinley as if he were a patent medicine."⁷⁶ In the 1904 campaign, John Morton Blum tells us, Roosevelt "advertised himself."⁷⁷

ation without reference to the turbulent and unreliable "will" of the public.⁸³

Direct appeals to the people were partly an outcome of presidential struggles with Congress. Both Roosevelt and Wilson declined to observe what Roosevelt scornfully termed the "Buchanan-Taft" understanding of presidential power, the "narrowly legalistic view that the President is the servant of Congress rather than of the people, and can do nothing ... unless the Constitution explicitly commands the action."⁸⁴ Wilson believed that the president could only move the Congress according to his will by appealing to an "aroused" public to apply the necessary pressure upon their representatives.⁸⁵

As advocates of a stronger presidency, Roosevelt and Wilson expressed the anti-formalist sentiments that more generally characterized Progressive thought.⁸⁶ Unlike their Whig forebears, they believed that politics concerned the proper means, not to disperse power, but to concentrate and channel it. The "power and glory" of the presidency promised to lift politics beyond "mere" administration and interest-based bargaining to a yet higher plane from which acts of government could be understood with reference to charismatic leadership, social transformation, and the realization of the general will.

In this context, the Constitution itself--almost certainly the most important expression of Enlightenment thought in American history--appeared to many Progressives to be either defective or irrelevant. Wilson certainly believed that an unduly scrupulous attention to Constitutional forms had characterized the study of politics in America. These forms, he argued, had not really corresponded to the substance of politics since the election of

According to Wilson, the visionary president alone could transfigure the nation and thereby make perfect an inchoate national community. Through his demonstrated ability to interpret, and thereby to articulate the yearnings of an entire people, he could bring these yearnings to flesh. Leadership here emerges as essentially a hermeneutic endeavor, with the body of the nation as text. Lincoln provided Wilson with the model of a president precisely because he "understood and represented the thought of the whole people." In so doing, he bound all together within a higher and more perfect union, founded on sympathy and love, instead of expedience and interest. This fervently Christian understanding of national leadership dominated Wilson's thought, at times to an extraordinary degree. While it superficially resembles the Populist notion of the cooperative Christian commonwealth, Wilson focused more directly upon the enabling role of the leader, without whom the people would remain formless and inarticulate.⁸⁹

Far more than Wilson, Roosevelt simply addressed the need, within a democracy or any type of political system, to concentrate power within "responsible and accountable hands".⁹⁰ In his Autobiography, he declared that he "did not care a rap for the mere form and show of power; I cared immensely for the use that could be made of the substance."⁹¹ To this extent, Roosevelt elaborated upon and rendered explicit an enduring, if generally covert, assumption within American political thought: that republican ideals basically express a vision, not of power dispersed, but of power relinquished.⁹² The New Nationalism of Croly and Roosevelt largely constituted a Progressive gloss on this vision. As Roosevelt himself put it in a letter to Henry Cabot Lodge, "I think the President should be a very strong man who uses without hesitation every power that the position yields; but because of this very

"spoke to his generation of righteousness and judgment to come. [He] withstood men because of their sins, and [he] dominated because of eloquence and purity and personal force." Wilson here uses a powerful and suggestive vocabulary. However, the paternal judgments of the leader cannot by themselves provide adequate grounds for obedience. His jeremiadic thunder ultimately must pass into the peaceful and gentle caritas of the shepherd, of one able to act "under the impulse of a profound sympathy with those whom he leads."⁹⁶

Roosevelt, by way of contrast, glorified only the martial, heroic, and "hard" virtues—those of courage, energy, daring, and endurance—associated with soldiers, wilderness hunters, and Indian fighters. It was these virtues which he regarded as prerequisite for active leadership in the world of policy and affairs. Richard Slotkin has noted the ambivalence that informs Roosevelt's nostalgic identification with the hunter-hero. "Like the knight, the hunter had pure ... motives. He lived outside the cash nexus, in a pre-capitalist Eden: yet he made the woods safe for bourgeois society by killing or removing the Indians.... His myth was one of redemptive sacrifice: he gave his life ... for a society whose rewards he did not value, and whose manner of earning break he despised."⁹⁷ Roosevelt, of course, also expressed distaste for the urban middle classes, whom he regarded as materialistic, decadent, and effeminate, a "miracle of timid and short-sighted selfishness."⁹⁸ He certainly doubted their ability to participate fully and effectively in the great tasks of empire and expansion that defined the progress of the nation. These tasks required the active and aggressive leadership of a class and racially conscious elite, capable of mobilizing and hardening for service the common herd of men.⁹⁹

sive intellectuals, and advertising executives. "The therapeutic ethos," Lears writes, "promised to heal the wounds inflicted by rationalization, to release the cramped energies of a fretful bourgeoisie."¹⁰²

It was as if a system of dikes and levees had ruptured. Where religion had previously provided the middle term in the relationship between democracy and authority, the therapeutic ethos now did so. However, the "self-realization" toward which this ethos aimed required the assimilation of external commitments and obligations to private needs. Politics, no less than religion or art, could not resist being drawn into this vortex. Those specific qualities, such as rationality and affect, which had previously distinguished the exercise of legitimate power within public and private realms, overflowed the boundaries of their respective domains and converged. Presidential politics conflated public and private concerns. The president himself now loomed large as the single person responsible for all aspects of existence. Wilson observed that "the people stand ready to overwhelm him by running to him with every question, great and small. They are as eager to have him settle a literary question as a political; hear him as acquiescently with regard to matters of special expert knowledge as with regard to public affairs, and call upon him to quiet all troubles by personal intervention."¹⁰³

By 1900, Americans quite literally consumed the president. They desired his touch, and obtained it, at staged events such as the annual visit to the White House on New Years Day, where any citizen who was "sober, washed, and free of bodily advertising" could shake his hand.¹⁰⁴ But all seemed to realize that they had assumed and enacted roles. It was certainly the case that judgments upon Roosevelt himself often seemed to touch on the dramatic and aesthetic quality of the impression he made, and of the fantasies he

presidents as well as that of the demos, that presidents might equally consume a nation. To England's King George V, he spoke of himself as an embodiment of the spirit of the United States, and he believed his to be "a sample American heart." However, Wilson also spoke frequently of his own loneliness and sense of isolation, of his own sense of being unmoored from time and place. He possessed a great need to be loved by those whom he represented and led. "My salvation," he wrote his first wife, "is in being loved." Upon his return from Europe, he told the crowd that welcomed him home of his loneliness. "[I]t warms my heart," he said, "to see a great body of my fellow citizens again." At another time, he spoke of his need "to come and stand in the presence of a great body of my fellow-citizens ... and drink ... out of the common fountains with them." It is not an exaggeration to suggest that, as president, he hoped through the love of his people, to achieve some sort of peace or happiness that had otherwise eluded him.¹¹⁰

3. Conclusion: Of Presidents and Happiness

In 1983, shortly after their wedding, England's Prince Charles and Princess Diana visited the United States. Observing the adulatory crowds who greeted the royal couple, historian and then-Librarian of Congress Daniel Boorstin mused, "What might the consequences have been if George Washington hadn't refused the throne? We might have this kind of thing every day in America, a prince and princess roaming around making people happy?"¹¹¹ According to George Will, Ronald Reagan actually did make the American people happy during his years in office, and in so doing he successfully fulfilled

national politics has "come to share with other spheres of experience the peculiar features of the culture of consumption: passivity, atomization, and spectatorship."¹¹³ In this essay, I have looked back to the early years of the twentieth century in order to to explain this development. The transformation of American political life, I have argued, has been largely driven by the need, within an corporate economy, to forge new links between discipline and desire. In this context, the magnification of presidential authority has advanced efforts to secure the allegiance of the population through the promise of abundance and happiness offered by a culture of consumption.

Press, 1986), pp. 286-302; "Presidential Leadership in Political Time," in The President and the Political System, Michael Nelson, ed. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), pp. 87-132; Thomas S. Langston, "Alternative Perceptions of the Presidency: Delegates, Trustees and Non-Linear Models of American Political Development," prepared for delivery at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association; "A Rumour of Sovereignty: The Head of State as an Agent of American Political Development," prepared for delivery at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

5. See Thomas Cronin, The State of the Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980, Second Edition), pp. 79-80.

6. Reason and rationality are slippery terms. In its purest form, liberal thought has tended to both to assume and to valorize the "rationality" of political behavior. Normal politics typically involve bargaining games, in which groups seek to advance or protect discrete interests. The rationality ascribed to their behavior is, of course, largely instrumental and non-substantive. Rationality also implies "reasonableness", however. The parties to any dispute should, and usually do, recognize that they must bargain in good faith, they must compromise, they must learn to accept half a loaf. Thus the reasonable man or woman eschews ideological and moral considerations that, by their nature, are not amenable to negotiation and compromise. "Irrationality", as liberals define it, typically characterizes groups at the margins of American politics and society (abolitionists, Populists, and religious fundamentalists, for instance), who position issues with reference to moral imperatives, who are not tolerant, who do not bargain, and who are eminently not reasonable.

In a somewhat different manner, Weber linked rationalization to the disenchantment of the modern world, and he proclaimed rationality to be the ordering principle within modernity's epistemological, methodological, and political domains. First of all, rationality provides the underlying logic by which the phenomenal world is objectified, quantified, and arranged in relation to impersonal, formal, and abstract categories. It also denotes an instrumental orientation toward the use of reason itself, which Weber described as "the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means." Finally, the Weberian understanding of rationality refers to forms of legal domination characterized by submission to impersonal structures of authority, which are generally bureaucratic, and which are themselves constituted, maintained, and legitimated with reference to specific, although formal, rules and procedures. See William Riker, Liberalism Against Populism; Max Weber, Economy and Society, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

7. The literature on the irrational foundations of "rationality" is extensive. See Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Continuum, 1986); Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum, 1989 [1944]); Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud (New York: Vintage, 1955); One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society

- 1979), pp. 240-65.
17. Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America, p. 115.
 18. Herbert Gutman, Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America (New York: Vintage, 1977).
 19. See Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967).
 20. Walter Dean Burnham stresses that Democratic triumphs during the 1910-1916 "deviation" must be understood as an "artifact of divisions within the majority party." "The System of 1896," p. 188.
 21. See Thomas Ferguson, "Party Realignment and American Industrial Structure: The Investment Theory of Political Parties in Historical Perspective," in Research in Political Economy, Vol. 6 (New York: JAI Press, 1983), pp. 1-82.
 22. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 165.
 23. Burnham, "The System of 1896," pp. 164, 166. Also see p. 181.
 24. Burnham, "The System of 1896," p. 165.
 25. Incorporation does not merely draw new groups into the political life of nation. It also constitutes processes of exclusion and redefinition. See Martin Shefter, "Political Incorporation and the Extrusion of the Left: Party Politics and Social Forces in New York," in Studies in American Political Development, Vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 50-90.
 26. Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
 27. Norman Pollack, ed., The Populist Mind (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. 4.
 28. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, pp. 541, 543.
 29. The Omaha Platform provides the most powerful written expression of the democratic faith of the Populists. See Pollack, ed., The Populist Mind, pp. 59-66.
 30. Pollack, ed., The Populist Mind, pp. 231-39.
 31. Jeff Lustig writes, "In protesting 'monopoly' the populists were not retreating from the real world. They were actually identifying a common pattern lying beneath superficially disparate phenomena. The pattern was of corporations gone wrong, of private companies possessing significant power over the commons (which for traditional liberals meant the market), yet spurning responsibilities to it. In finance, private banks promoted federal

44. Samuel Hays, "The New Organizational Society," in Jerry Israel, ed., Building the Organizational Society (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 10.
45. Strout, The New Heavens and the New Earth, p. 235. Also see Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 80, 97.
46. See Skowronek, Building the American State, p. 180; Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, pp. 93-94, 110.
47. See Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), pp. 11-75.
48. Walter Lippmann felt that the people "will do almost anything but govern themselves. They don't want the responsibility. In the main they are looking for some benevolent guardian." Similarly, Herbert Croly wrote in The Promise of American Life that "the average American individual is morally and intellectually inadequate to a serious conception of his responsibilities as a democrat." He had no doubt about the need for a governing class to "leaven the inert mass." See Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, p. 108; Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965 [1909]), p. 276. Also see Lustig, Corporate Liberalism, p. 213.
49. Walter Lippmann seemed to be especially sensitive to the transformed quality of historical awareness engendered by the scientific and engineering revolutions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Drift and Mastery, pp. 146-77.
50. The literature on corporate liberalism is extensive, ranging from the early work of William Appleman Williams, James Weinstein, and Gabriel Kolko to the more recent studies of David F. Noble, Jeff Lustig, and Martin Sklar.
51. For my understanding of the links between electoral politics and industrial development, I am deeply indebted to the brilliant research and insights of Thomas Ferguson. In his work on party realignment and industrial structure, Ferguson has argued that business elites, not farmers and workers, have played the leading role in the determination of electoral outcomes and the formation of electoral "systems". According to Ferguson, mass party structures and voting behavior are simply dependent variables, which can be explained by understanding rules for access to the system, change within the structure of important institutions, and the salience of specific issues. Unlike the business community, voters simply do not possess sufficient resources, information, and interest to control politics at the national level. Instead, party realignments and important shifts in public policy occur in the context of national economic crises, as in the period between 1893 and 1896. When electoral competition heats up, as different industrial and financial sectors use the parties to contend for influence at the level of national politics, the voters "also begin to shake, rattle, and roll." But unless the grass-roots organization of the electorate is enormously sophisticated and effective, it will not "receive more than crumbs." See "Party Realignment and American Industrial Structure"; "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the

59. Richard Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Coward, McCann and Goeghegan, 1979), p. 17. Woodrow Wilson employed a different metaphor. "Self-government," he wrote, "does not consist in having a hand in everything, any more than housekeeping consists necessarily in cooking dinner with one's own hands. The cook must be trusted with a large discretion as to the management of the fires and the ovens." "The Study of Administration," p. 374. Also see "Democracy and Efficiency," (1900) Papers, Vol. 12 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 6-20.
60. Wilson, "The Study of Administration," p. 363. Also see Colonel Dru, Administrator, the quite extraordinary novel published anonymously by Colonel House in 1912.
61. See Thomas S. Langston, "Alternative Perceptions of the Presidency: Delegates, Trustees and Non-Linear Models of American Political Development," Paper presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, March 1990, pp. 7-8.
62. Quoted in Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, p. 440.
63. See Alan Wolfe, "Presidential Power and the Crisis of Modernization," democracy 1 (April 1981), pp. 19-32. On the distinction between modernization and modernism, see Daniel Joseph Singal, "Towards a Definition of American Modernism," American Quarterly 39 (Spring 1987), pp. 7-26. In this essay, my use of the term "modernism" also encompasses developments identified with "post-modernism". With Singal, I believe that it has not yet been clearly established that post-modernism represents a clear and distinct cultural break with modernism.
64. Daniel Bell, "Modernism Mummified," American Quarterly 39 (Spring 1987), p. 123. For an elaboration of Bell's perspective on cultural modernism, also see The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976); "Beyond Modernism, Beyond Self," in The Winding Passage: Essays and Sociological Journeys Cambridge, Mass.: ABT Books, 1980), pp. 275-302.
65. Lears writes, "In the United States ..., the bourgeois ethos had enjoined perpetual work, compulsive saving, civic responsibility, and a rigid morality of self-denial. By the early twentieth century that outlook had begun to give way to a new set of values sanctioning periodic leisure, compulsive spending, apolitical passivity, and an apparently permissive ... morality of individual fulfillment. The older culture was suited to a production-oriented society of small entrepreneurs; the newer culture epitomized a consumption-oriented society dominated by bureaucratic corporations." "From Salvation to Self-Realization," p. 3. Also see pp. 7, 9.
66. See David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry Into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
67. Lears, No Place of Grace, p. 37.

80. Jules Abels, The Degeneration of Our Presidential Election: A History and Analysis of an American Institution in Trouble (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 109.
81. See Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, pp. 95-161.
82. Roosevelt's attempt to gain passage of the Hepburn Act and Wilson's effort to obtain congressional support for the League of Nations provide probably the two most notable examples of this practice.
83. The Constitutional Convention itself provided a model for this type of deliberation.
84. Roosevelt, Autobiography, p. 362.
85. Wilson, Constitutional Government, p. 116. Also see Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1964), p. 148.
86. See Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).
87. Wilson, Congressional Government; Speaker of the House, Joe Cannon, said of Roosevelt that "he's got no more use for the Constitution than a tomcat has for a marriage license." See Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 11.
88. See Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 173-81.
89. See Constitutional Government, pp. 104-23, along with Wilson's often-delivered speech, Leaders of Men, T.H. Vail Motter, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952). See also Niels Aage Thorsen, The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson, 1875-1910 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 27-29; Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, pp. 117-37.
90. Theodore Roosevelt, "Eighth Annual Message to Congress," in Works, Vol. XV, pp.
91. Roosevelt, Autobiography, p. 357.
92. See Garry Wills, Cincinnatus: George Washington and the Myth of Enlightenment (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984). For the classic account of Washington as a Cincinnatus-like figure, see Mason Weems, The Life of Washington (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962).
93. Albert Bushnell Hart and Herbert Ronald Ferleger, eds., Theodore Roosevelt Cyclopedia (New York: Roosevelt Memorial Association, 1941), pp. 303, 466.
94. Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 144-45.
95. Wilson, Leaders of Men, pp. 52.

IGS Working Papers

(\$2.50 each plus tax and handling)

1990

- 90-34 Recent Development in Disease Prevention/Health Promotion in the Federal Republic of Germany, Rolf Rosenbrock**
- 90-33 Recent Development and Reform Proposals in the Politics of Pharmaceutical Supply in the Federal Republic of Germany, Rolf Rosenbrock**
- 90-32 Speech Before the Meeting of Texas Public Interest Organizations, David Cohen**
- 90-31 A Curious Life—The Pursuit of an Understanding of Public Administration, James W. Fesler**
- 90-30 The Cultural Conquest of the Presidency: Incorporation and the Transposition of American Political Life, 1890-1916, Peter Schwartz**
- 90-29 The Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung: Is the Tax Revolt Over?, Randy H. Hamilton**
- 90-28 A Tightrope Walk Between Two Spheres of Logic, Observations—and Self-Observations—of a Social Scientist in Parliamentary Politics, Rolf Rosenbrock**
- 90-27 Iran Air Flight 655 and the USS *Vincennes*, Complex, Large-Scale Military Systems and the Failure of Control, Gene I. Rochlin**
- 90-26 Political Leadership and Value Change: Reagan, Thatcher and the Conservative Revolution?, Pippa Norris**
- 90-25 Party Rules and Women's Representation: Reforming the British Labour Party, Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris**
- 90-24 Political Cultures, Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky**
- 90-23 Ecological Regression and Voting Rights, D. A. Freedman, S. Klein, J. Jacks, C. Smyth, and C. Everett**
- 90-22 The San Jose Metropolitan Area: A Region in Transition, Donald N. Rothblatt**
- 90-21 The Demand for Referendums in West Germany "Bringing The People Back In?", Wolfgang Luthardt**
- 90-20 Sunset As Oversight: Establishing Realistic Objectives, Cynthia Opheim, Landon Curry, and Pat Shields**
- 90-19 Government Expenditure Levels: Alternative Procedures for Computing Measures, Brian Stipak**
- 90-18 Transformation of American Liberalism, 1940s - 1980s: An Analysis of Liberal Policy Change and the ADA, Ichiro Sunada**
- 90-17 The Politics of Policy "Political Think Tanks" and Their Makers in the US-Institutional Environment, Winand Gellner**
- 90-16 CAUTION: Excessive Use of Government Statistics May be Injurious to the Health of the Body Politic, Randy H. Hamilton**
- 90-15 Thermidor In Land Use Control? Paul van Seters**
- 90-14 Taxation For a Strong and Virtuous Republic: A Bicentennial Retrospective, W. Elliott Brownlee**
- 90-13 How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics, Barbara Geddes**
- 90-12 Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science, James D. Fearon**
- 90-11 Pat Crashes The Party: Reform, Republicans, and Robertson, Duane M. Oldfield**
- 90-10 The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian-Americans: Immigrants and Native-Born Citizens, Bruce E. Cain, D. Roderick Kiewiet, Carole J. Uhlaner**
- 90-9 New Perspective on the Comparative Method, David Collier**
- 90-8 California Agency Reconnaissance Project: Teaching Public Administration Through Field Research, Todd R. La Porte and David Hadwiger**
- 90-7 Earthquake Safety For New Structures: A Comprehensive Approach, Stanley Scott**
- 90-6 Government Policies And Higher Education: a Comparison of Britain and the United States 1630 to 1860, Sheldon Rothblatt and Martin Trow**
- 90-5 Dominance and Attention: Images of Leaders in German, French, and American TV News,**

- Roger D. Masters, Siegfried Frey, and Gary Bente
- 90-4 **Nonverbal Behavior and Leadership: Emotion and Cognition in Political Information Processing**, Roger D. Masters and Denis G. Sullivan
- 90-3 **The Dredging Dilemma: How Not to Balance Economic Development and Environmental Protection**, Robert A. Kagan
- 90-2 **Turning Conflict Into Cooperation: Organizational Designs for Community Response in Disaster**, Louise K. Comfort
- 90-1 **The Effect of Campaign Spending, Turnout, and Dropoff on Local Ballot Measure Outcomes and The Initiative and California's Slow Growth Movement**, David Hadwiger
- 1989
- 89-27 **On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted**, Daniel Hays Lowenstein
- 89-26 **Toward A Dispersed Electrical System: Challenges to the Grid**, Jane Summerton and Ted K. Bradshaw
- 89-25 **Top Bureaucrats and the Distribution of Influence in Reagan's Executive Branch**, Steven D. Stehr
- 89-24 **Designing an Emergency Information System: The Pittsburgh Experience**, Louise K. Comfort
- 89-23 **Learning From Risk: Organizational Interaction Following the Armenian Earthquakes**, Louise K. Comfort
- 89-22 **The Elusiveness of Rural Development Theory and Practice: Domestic and Third World Perspectives Joined**, Ted K. Bradshaw
- 89-21 **Saints and Cardinals in Appropriations Subcommittees: Academic Pork Barreling and Distributive Politics in an Era of Redistributive Budgeting**, James D. Savage
- 89-20 **The Case for Experiential Knowledge**, Gene I. Rochlin
- 89-19 **Choice vs. Control: Increasing Organizational Effectiveness in Interdependent Environments**, Louise K. Comfort and Keun Namkoong
- 89-18 **Bingo! An Untapped Revenue for California Cities**, William B. Rumford, Jr. and Randy H. Hamilton
- 89-17 **The Research on Higher Education Program: An Appreciation of Eskil Bjorklund**, Martin Trow
- 89-16 **Santa Cruz County Planning Issues: Papers on Planning, Housing And Forestry**, Edward J. Blakely and Ted K. Bradshaw
- 89-15 **Why Pretend One Size Fits All: An Examination of Management Issues That Concern Small Federal Agencies**, Randy H. Hamilton
- 89-14 **Music of the Squares, a Lifetime of Study of Public Administration**, Herbert Kaufman
- 89-13 **Technology and the Future: Issues Before the Bush Administration**, Edward Wenk, Jr.
- 89-12 **How Much Does Law Matter? Labor Relations in Rotterdam and U.S. Ports**, Robert A. Kagan
- 89-11 **Party, State, and Ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1967-76**, K. G. Armstrong .
- 89-10 **Ernst Fraenkel Lecture, Free University of Berlin the American Election of 1988: Outcome, Process and Aftermath**, Nelson W. Polsby
- 89-9 **The Ambiguous Status of Science and Technology in Australia**, Anthony Pecotich and Kelvin Willoughby
- 89-8 **1992, European Integration and *The Times***, David Morgan
- 89-7 **American Higher Education: "Exceptional" or Just Different?** Martin Trow
- 89-6 **American Higher Education: Past, Present and Future**, Martin Trow
- 89-5 **The Distribution of Academic Earmarks in the Federal Government's Appropriations Bills, FY 1980-1989**, James Savage
- 89-4 **London 2001**, Peter Hall
- 89-3 **The University of London: An American Perspective**, Eugene C. Lee, Frank M. Bowen
- 89-2 **Ukiah, 1904: A Modest Footnote to the History of the Council-Manager Form of Municipal Government in the United States**, Randy H. Hamilton

- 89-1 **American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change**, Jack Citrin, Beth Reingold, Donald P. Green
- 1988
- 88-27 **Locality and Custom: Non-Aboriginal Claims to Customary Usufructuary Rights as a Source of Rural Protest**, Louise Fortmann
- 88-26 **Bruce Keith's Almanac: Patterns of Voting in California**, Bruce Keith
- 88-25 **Cold Turkeys and Task Force: Pursuing High Reliability in California's Central Valley**, Todd R. La Porte and Ted Lasher
- 88-24 **Environmental Ethics in California**, Carolyn Merchant
- 88-23 **Crisis as Opportunity: Designing Networks of Organizational Action in Disaster Environments**, Louise K. Comfort
- 88-22 **The Logic of Uncertainty: Interorganizational Coordination in International Disaster Assistance**, Louise K. Comfort
- 88-21 **Information Networks in International Disaster Assistance**, Louise K. Comfort
- 88-20 **The Decay of Federal Theory**, S. Rufus Davis
- 88-19 **Inside Japan's Leviathan Decision-Making in the Government Bureaucracy**, Brian Woodall and Nobuhiro Hiwatari
- 88-18 **Technology and Adaptive Hierarchy: Formal and Informal Organization for Flight Operations in the U.S. Navy**, Gene I. Rochlin and Energy Resources Group
- 88-17 **From Crisis to Community: The 1988 Oil Spill in the Pittsburgh Metropolitan Region**, Louise Comfort, Joel Abrams, John Camillus, and Edmund Ricci et al.
- 88-16 **The Arrogance of Optimism**, Martin Landau, Donald Chisholm
- 88-15 **American Democracy in World Perspective and What to Do About It**, Nelson W. Polsby
- 88-14 **Modernization of the U.S. Senate**, Nelson W. Polsby
- 88-13 **The Iowa Caucuses in a Front-Loaded System: A Few Historical Lessons**, Nelson W. Polsby
- 88-12 **The Reagan Presidency After Seven Years**, Eugene C. Lee (moderator)
- 88-11 **The United States Air Traffic System: Increasing Reliability in the Midst of Rapid Growth**, Todd La Porte
- 88-10 **Issues in Rural and Small Development, Case Study: Watsonville, Santa Cruz County California**, Trish Ramos, Lakshmi Srinivas, Miriam Chion, Ana Lopez, Harry Hecht, Chris Broughton, Robert Murray
- 88-9 **White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter?** Jack Citrin, Donald Philip Green, David O. Sears
- 88-8 **Are Chicanos Assimilating?** Jorge Chapa
- 88-7 **California Agency Reconnaissance Project Reports**, Todd R. La Porte, David Hadwiger, Steven Stehr
- 88-6 **Do You Have To Be Crazy To Do This Job? Causes and Consequences of Job Satisfaction Among Local Legislators**, Edward L. Lascher, Jr.
- 88-5 **American All-Mail Balloting: A Summation of a Decade's Experience**, Randy H. Hamilton
- 88-4 **Corporate Campaign Spending and Initiative Outcomes in California**, Tom E. Thomas
- 88-3 **Research Applications: Perspectives on the California Seismic Safety Commission**, Stanley Scott
- 88-2 **Earthquake Engineering and Public Policy: Key Strategies for Seismic Policy**, Stanley Scott
- 88-1 **What Do Decision Models Tell Us About Information Use?** Evert A. Lindquist
- 1987
- 87-7 **The Politics of the AIDS Vaccine or How the California Legislature Searched for the Magic Bullet—And Wound Up Squabbling With the Trial Lawyers, the Budget-Cutters, and the Alzheimer's Establishment**, David L. Kirp and Hugh Maher
- 87-6 **The Reagan Presidency After Six Years**, Eugene C. Lee (moderator)
- 87-5 **A Critical Theory of Community**, Dennis J. Coyle
- 87-4 **The Reluctant Revival of Landowner Rights**, Dennis J. Coyle
- 87-3 **Informal Pluralism and LDP Guidance—Examination of Japan's Protectionism of Raw Silk Importation**, John Q. Zhao

**87-2 Towards a Typology of New Subnational
Governmental Actors in International
Relations, Ivo D. Duchacek**

87-1 The Rocky Road to Privatization, Lyle C. Fitch

SEND ORDER TO:
Institute of Governmental Studies
102 Moses Hall
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720
(415) 642-5537

**PLEASE PRE-PAY ALL ORDERS
UNDER \$30:** checks payable to The
Regents of the University of
California.
SALES TAX: California residents add
sales tax.
HANDLING AND SHIPPING: add
20% of sales price. Allow 4 weeks for
delivery.

Please add my name to the *PAR* mailing list (free). _____
TITLE _____ QUANTITY/COST _____

SUBTOTAL _____
SALES TAX _____
HANDLING (20%) _____
TOTAL _____

NAME _____
ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES



C098096060