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A Semantics for Causing, Enabling, and Preventing Verbs Using Structural Causal Models

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Abstract

When choosing how to describe what happened, we have a number of causal verbs at our disposal. In this paper, we develop a model-theoretic formal semantics for nine causal verbs that span the categories of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT. We use structural causal models (SCMs) to represent participants' mental construction of a scene when assessing the correctness of causal expressions relative to a presented context. Furthermore, SCMs enable us to model events relating both the physical world as well as agents' mental states. In experimental evaluations, we find that the proposed semantics exhibits a closer alignment with human evaluations in comparison to prior accounts of the verb families.

Keywords: causality; language; structural causal models; semantics; psycholinguistics.

Introduction

Causal cognition is ubiquitous and foundational for reasoning about both the physical and the social world (Gerstenberg & Tenenbaum, 2017; Waldmann, 2017). How can we best capture people's causal knowledge about the world? Structural causal models (SCMs) (Pearl, 2009; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 2000) are a generic formalism where a set of variables can represent both the mental states and actions of agents, as well as the state of the physical world at various levels of detail. In this paper, we use SCMs to define a semantics for three verb families and experimentally evaluate the novel predictions that our framework makes about how people use these verbs against those of alternative models.

Our objects of study are English verbs of causing (*cause*, *get*, *make*), enabling (*enable*, *let*, *allow*), and preventing (*prevent*, *stop*, *block*). We investigate the meaning of these nine verbs when used in linguistic constructions of the form

$$X \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{caused} \\ \text{got} \end{array} \right\} \alpha \text{ to } Z \quad X \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{made} \\ \text{let} \end{array} \right\} \alpha \text{ } Z$$

$$X \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{prevented} \\ \text{stopped} \\ \text{blocked} \end{array} \right\} \alpha \text{ from } Z \text{ing}$$

where the subject X is an event, the object α is an agent, and Z is an event. Our choice to use these nine verbs was motivated by previous work on these verb families (Cao, Williamson, & Choi, 2022; Klettke & Wolff, 2003; Wolff, Klettke, Ventura, & Song, 2005). While each of these verbs undoubtedly has

its own subtle meaning, our proposal is that each verb family will at least entail a “core” meaning of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT, respectively (see also Wolff, 2007). We propose that **causing verbs** entail that the event X causes the event Z with actions of α mediating, **enabling verbs** entail that X makes α able to bring about Z , and **preventing verbs** entail that X makes α unable to bring about Z .

The proposal that these verb families each entail a respective “core” meaning makes good on insights from the psychological study of causal language where periphrastic causatives (verbs that denote indirect causal relationships) have been organized into CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT families (Beller, Bennett, & Gerstenberg, 2020; Cheng & Novick, 1991; Sloman, Barbey, & Hotaling, 2009; Wolff, 2007; Wolff et al., 2005; Wolff & Song, 2003; Wolff & Zettergren, 2002). As depicted in Figure 1, Wolff (2007) defines these three categories in terms of affector and patient forces, and how they combine to align with the endstate. The representational use of “forces” emphasizes the physical aspect of causal relationships, and thus anticipates agents' internal desires to manifest as a force. From another point of view, Cheng and Novick (1991) differentiate causing, enabling, and preventing by measuring the covariation between candidate causal factors and the effect over a set of contextually relevant events. Yet another view uses the framework of mental model theory in which different causal verbs are analyzed in terms of the logical possibilities that they imply (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). More recent efforts capture the differences between CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT using SCMs (Sloman et al., 2009).

Previous experimental work on causal language such as Beller et al. (2020), Bender and Beller (2017), Klettke and Wolff (2003), and Wolff (2003) has focused on physical set-




Figure 1: Representation of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT from Wolff (2007), where forces associated with the affector (A) and the patient (P) combine to form the resultant force (R) that may or may result in the patient reaching the endstate (E).

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tings, and have primarily used causal patients that are not goal-oriented. Prior work has demonstrated that people reason about goal-directed individuals distinctly from those that are not goal-directed (Bender & Beller, 2017; Muentener & Lakusta, 2011). Here, we explore similarities and differences between the semantics of causal expressions as they apply to physical events in the world versus to rationally acting agents who choose actions subject to their beliefs and desires (Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005). Specifically, we look at situations that feature agents and patients with inferable desires and goals that influence their actions.

Causal language has also been studied extensively in linguistics (Dowty, 1979; Levin & Hovav, 1994; Siegal & Boneh, 2020). Recently, there has been a growing interest in using SCMs to define natural language semantics (Baglini & Siegal, 2020, 2021; Lassiter, 2018; Lauer & Nadathur, 2020; Schulz, 2011). For example, Lauer and Nadathur (2018, 2020) argue that causal necessity and sufficiency differentiate lexical uses of *make* and *force*, while Baglini and Siegal (2020) use SCMs to explain the asymmetric entailment relation between *cause* and lexical causatives (e.g., *kill*).

In this paper, we build on the psychological and linguistic work by developing a semantics for causal language based on SCMs. We first define time-indexed causal models with agents for jointly representing social and physical dynamics. Then, we use this formalism to define “core meaning” concepts CAUSE, ENABLE, PREVENT, and propose that verbs in the cause, enable, and prevent families entail their respective concept. We experimentally support three predictions made by our model that conflict with existing accounts. In the experiment, we asked participants to watch videos of a simple grid world and evaluate whether English sentences are an accurate description. We model participants as constructing some time-indexed causal model with agents of the grid world that is used to evaluate the truth of the English sentences, and give two examples of such models. We close by discussing our results, which support the proposed semantics, and highlighting directions for future work.

Time-Indexed SCMs with Agents

In this section, we first define causal models in the sense of Pearl (2009). Using the logic of structural causal models (SCMs), we define a model-theoretic semantics for the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT.

For our purposes, SCMs can simulate the mechanics and entities of a particular world. Causal models carve up a phenomenon into a set of variables with a causal structure that connects them and causal mechanisms that determine their value. We additionally privilege certain subsets of variables that represent the mental states and actions of agents.

Definition 1. Models. We define a **time-indexed causal model with agents** $\mathcal{M}$ to consist of:

- **Variables** where each variable X_t , indexed by a timestep $t \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$, has an associated set of **values** it can take on $\text{Val}(X_t)$.

- **Causal Structure** represented by arrows running from “parent” variables to “child” variables. We require that all parents immediately precede their children. Equivalently, if P_t is a parent of $C_{t'}$, then $t' = t + 1$.
- **Causal Mechanisms** that determine a node’s value based on the value of its parents.
- **Agents** where each agent α has associated sets of variables encoding mental states $\mathbf{M}^\alpha$ and actions $\mathbf{A}^\alpha$. We require that the children of mental state variables be mental state variables or action variables of the same agent.

Definition 2. Partial and Total Settings. A **setting** assigns some number of variables values. **Total settings** assign every variable a value, while **partial settings** assign values to some subset of variables.

The variables at timestep zero have causal mechanisms that output constant values, which, in turn, determine the values for variables at timestep one, which determine the values for timestep two, and so on. Think of this total setting as capturing what actually happens.

Definition 3. Events. We define an event $\mathbf{E} = \mathbf{e}$ to be a partial setting $\mathbf{e}$ of a set of variables $\mathbf{E}$. An event *happens* in a model $\mathcal{M}$, written $\mathbf{E} = \mathbf{e}$, when the total setting that satisfies the mechanisms of $\mathcal{M}$ projected onto the variables $\mathbf{E}$ results in the partial setting $\mathbf{e}$.

The fundamental operation on a causal model is an intervention that fixes the values of some variables, which in turn may have downstream changes on other variables. Interventions can be understood as a function that takes in a causal model and outputs a new causal model where the intervened-on variables have their causal mechanisms fixed to be functions mapping to constant values.

Definition 4. Interventions. An intervention $\mathbf{I} \leftarrow \mathbf{i}$ is a partial setting $\mathbf{i}$ of variables $\mathbf{I}$. A proposition ϕ is true under an intervention, written $\langle \mathbf{I} \leftarrow \mathbf{i} \rangle \phi$, if ϕ is true in the model identical to $\mathcal{M}$ except where the causal mechanisms of $\mathbf{I}$ are set to be constant functions mapping to the values in $\mathbf{i}$.

We include a list of agents that are associated with mental state variables and action variables, which allows us to define the *dynamic modality* of agents, that is, what an agent is and isn’t able to do.

Definition 5. Action Sequences. We define an action sequence $\mathbf{a}_{t:t'}^\alpha$ to be a partial setting that fixes only the action variables of an agent α from time t to time t' , inclusive.

Definition 6. Dynamic Modality. We define an agent α to be able to bring about an event $\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{z}$ at time t , written $\text{CAN}(\alpha, \mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{z}, t)$, if there is a time $t' > t$ and action sequences $\mathbf{a}_{t:t'}^\alpha$ and $\mathbf{b}_{t:t'}^\alpha$ such that

$$\langle \mathbf{A}_{t:t'}^\alpha \leftarrow \mathbf{a}_{t:t'}^\alpha \rangle \mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{z} \wedge \langle \mathbf{A}_{t:t'}^\alpha \leftarrow \mathbf{b}_{t:t'}^\alpha \rangle \mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{z}'.$$

Semantics for Causing, Enabling, and Preventing Verbs

We take the definitions given by Pearl (2009) and use them to build a semantics for verbs of causing, enabling, and preventing. We take the standard philosophical view that causation is a binary relation between *events* (Davidson, 1967; Lewis, 1973, 1986; cf. Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado, & Tenenbaum, 2021). This means that in a sentence depicting a causal relationship of the structure $[X \text{ CAUSE/ENABLE/PREVENT } \alpha \text{ } Z]$, X and $\alpha \text{ } Z$ are events and X implicitly or explicitly embeds both an agent and event led by the agent when the syntactic subject is agentive (Hitchcock, 2020). Others have argued that *facts* are the relata of causal relationships, since facts are better able to account for negative events or absences (Bennett, 1988; Mellor, 2004). For our purposes, we allow the term *event* to have a fairly wide domain and include previously debated phenomena such as states and events of omission (Beebe, 2004; Gerstenberg & Stephan, 2021; Henne, Pinillos, & De Brigard, 2017; McGrath, 2005).

Causing Verbs

We hypothesize that a verb from the cause family entails that X was a cause of α taking actions to bring about Z . Formally, we define $\text{CAUSE}(X = x, \alpha, Z = z, t)$ to be true when the following hold

1. The event $X = x$ happens.
2. The event $Z = z$ happens.
3. There exist a sequence of actions $\mathbf{a}_{\geq t}^\alpha$ such that
 - (a) The event of agent α taking the actions $\mathbf{a}_{\geq t}^\alpha$ happens
 - (b) The event $\mathbf{A}_{\geq t}^\alpha = \mathbf{a}_{\geq t}^\alpha$ causes the event $Z = z$ and this causal relationship is fully mediated² by the event $X = x$, meaning there exists x' , a' , and z' such that $\langle X \leftarrow x' \rangle (\mathbf{A}_{\geq t}^\alpha = a' \wedge Z = z') \wedge \langle X \leftarrow x', \mathbf{A}_{\geq t}^\alpha \leftarrow a' \rangle Z = z$.

Consider the following sentence as an example: “The deer running across the street caused Josie to slam on the breaks.” Condition 1 tells us that the event of *the deer running across the street* actually occurring logically follows. Condition 2 tells us that the event of *Josie slamming on the breaks* actually happens as well. Finally, Condition 3 tells us that Josie took a (sequence of) actions that fully mediates the *the deer running across the street* causing *Josie slamming on the breaks*, such as taking her foot off the gas and pushing on the break.

Enabling Verbs

We hypothesize a verb from the enable family entails that X was a cause of α having available actions that bring about the event Z . Formally, we define $\text{ENABLE}(X = x, \alpha, Z = z, t)$ to be true when the following hold

1. The event $X = x$ happens.

²Mediation in the sense that the indirect effect is transmitted to the outcome via the mediator (Pearl, 2014).




Figure 2: A mockup one of the short videos shown to participants where the bolded cell starts empty and the farmer moves towards the apple. Then, the wizard places a rock which blocks the farmer’s way to his (apparently) preferred fruit. In the end, the farmer reaches the banana instead. The green arrows indicate in which direction the farmer moves during the video and are added only for demonstration.

2. The agent α is able to bring about the event $Z = z$

$$\text{CAN}(\alpha, Z = z, t).$$

3. The event $X = x$ causes the agent to be able to bring about the event, meaning there exists an x' such that

$$\langle X \leftarrow x' \rangle \neg \text{CAN}(\alpha, Z = z, t).$$

Again, consider the following example sentence: “The ice freezing enabled Jin to skate on the lake.” Condition 1 holds because the ice actually froze, Condition 2 holds because Jin actually has the ability to skate on a frozen lake, and finally, Condition 3 holds because if the ice hadn’t frozen, then Jin wouldn’t have been able to skate on the lake.

Preventing Verbs

We hypothesize a verb from the enable family entails that X was a cause of α having no available actions that can bring about the event Z . Formally, we define $\text{PREVENT}(X = x, \alpha, Z = z, t)$ to be true when the following hold

1. The event $X = x$ happens.
2. The agent α is unable to bring about the event $Z = z$

$$\neg \text{CAN}(\alpha, Z = z, t).$$

3. The event $X = x$ causes the agent to be unable to bring about the event, meaning there exists an x' such that

$$\langle X \leftarrow x' \rangle \text{CAN}(\alpha, Z = z, t).$$

Consider the following example of a preventing verb: “The storm warning being issued prevented Juan from visiting his family over the holidays.” This statement tells us that the storm warning was actually issued (Condition 1), Juan is actually unable to travel to his family (Condition 2), and if the storm warning hadn’t been issued, then Juan would have been able to visit his family (Condition 3).

Novel Predictions

Our proposal is that the verb families of cause, enable, and prevent verbs have meanings that logically entail the concepts CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT. We experimentally test three novel predictions that our account makes which are in conflict with previous accounts.

H1. *X* may be an event of omission for cause, enable, or prevent verbs.

Hypothesis **H1** follows from our model because an act of omission (e.g., “the fire did not happen”) is defined in the same way as a normal action (e.g., “the fire happened”) in that both are represented as a partial setting of variables. This hypothesis is in conflict with the accounts of Dowe (2004) and Salmon (1998) which predict that *X* may not be an omission.

H2. Enabling verbs do not entail that *Z* happened.

H2 is in conflict with the account of Beller et al. (2020) and Wolff et al. (2005) which argue that enabling verbs *do* entail that *Z* actually happened.

H3. Preventing verbs do not entail that *Z* would have happened if not for *X*.

Hypothesis **H3** is in conflict with the account of Beller et al. (2020) and Wolff et al. (2005) which predict that preventing verbs *do* entail that *Z* would have happened if not for *X*. Hypotheses **H2** and **H3** follow from our model because our semantics only specifies the *ability* of an agent to bring about event *Z*, rather than the fact that event *Z* would have come about in the relevant counterfactual situation. Evidently, this characteristic emphasizes the applicability of our semantics only to events with agents, and excludes purely physical events, especially since our primitives require agents to be associated with mental states.

Experiment

We tested our semantics by presenting participants with short animated videos including scenes like the one shown in Figure 2, and asking them to select which of several expressions accurately describe the scene, and which ones do not.

Methods

Data, scripts, and experiment materials are available online: <https://github.com/cic1-stanford/Causative-Verbs>.

Materials We created 7 different videos, each less than 10 seconds long. Figure 2 shows the general structure of each video. In each video, there is a **wizard** and hallway with a **farmer** in the middle, an **apple** on the far right, a **banana** on the far left, and a **bolded cell** between the farmer and the apple which could be empty or contain a rock. Across the videos, we varied (1) whether a rock is present in the bolded cell at the beginning of the video, (2) whether the wizard casts

a spell that either removes or places the rock, and (3) whether the farmer prefers the apple or banana.³ In Figure 2, we show three frames for the video where the bolded cell starts empty, the farmer walks toward the apple, but then the wizard places a rock stopping the farmer who ends up going to the banana.

Language Stimuli For each video, we constructed a set of nine sentences of the form “*The NP of the rock verbed the farmer (to/from) reach(ing) the apple.*” where *NP* is either *appearance*, *disappearance*, *presence*, or *absence* depending on which event happened.

Participants. 80 native English-speaking participants (*age*: Mean = 40, SD = 12; *gender*: 36 female, 43 male, *nationality*: US) were recruited over Prolific. Each participant was provided with an introduction to the study and had to pass a simple comprehension question to continue. Failing the comprehension check brought the participants back to the introductory instructions, after which they could re-attempt the comprehension question. Participants took on average 7.32 minutes (SD = 4.68) to complete the task and were compensated at a rate of 12.57 USD per hour.

Procedure. Each participant completed 7 trials. The first trial was always the one shown in Figure 3a to ensure that participants were aware of the full abilities of both the wizard and the farmer, in addition to these being specified in the participant instructions (since not all stimuli include the wizard taking an action, or the farmer changing directions). Each trial contained one of the short videos paired with four randomly sampled sentences of interest and a trivial attention check question about the video. The four verbs every participant saw was held constant throughout all trials. Participants were asked to select whether each sentence was “accurate” or “inaccurate”⁴. 8 participants were excluded for failing any of the attention checks.

Results

Figure 3 depicts the proportion of participants selecting “accurate” for each verb in each video. We predicted that the causing, enabling, and preventing verbs would have meanings that entail the logical formulas CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT, respectively. The results broadly support this hypothesis. Whenever a logical formula is not true, the verbs in the corresponding family are near zero. However, for situations in which our logical formulas are true, participants’ don’t always endorse the corresponding verbs as accurate.

H1. Our hypothesis that *X* may be an event of omission is supported in Figures 3e, 3f, and 3g where participants found sentences accurate even when the wizard took no action. After aggregating the data by-participant and evaluating such against their hypotheses, we get $t(71) = 17.61$, $p < .001$ and

³This results in seven videos, because when the rock is present and the wizard casts no spell, the video is the same regardless of the farmer’s preference.

⁴We also conducted an experiment where we allowed for responses on a continuous slider scale instead of a binary choice setup. This led to similar results which are omitted here.




Figure 3: Proportion of participants who judged the different expressions to be accurate (blue bars with 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals) together with the theoretical predictions (striped pink bars), separated for each of the seven videos.

$t(71) = 49.85$, $p < .001$ for the CAUSE and ENABLE verbs in Figure 3e, respectively; $t(71) = 7.50$, $p < .001$ for the ENABLE verbs in Figure 3f; $t(70) = 16.75$, $p < .001$ for the PREVENT verbs in Figure 3g. It has been long observed that people ordinarily judge omissions to be causes (see, e.g., Gerstenberg & Stephan, 2021; Henne, Pinillos, & Brigard, 2017; Walsh & Sloman, 2011). Our experiment extends this result to enabling and preventing verbs.

H2. Our hypothesis that the effect Z is not entailed by enabling verbs is supported in Figures 3d and 3f where a significant portion of participants ($t(71) = 9.31$, $p < .001$; $t(71) = 7.50$, $p < .001$, respectively) found sentences with enabling verbs accurate even when the farmer never reached the apple.

H3. Our hypothesis that preventing verbs do not entail that Z would have happened if not for X is supported in Figures 3b and 3g where a significant proportion of participants ($t(70) =$

13.05, $p < .001$; $t(70) = 16.75$, $p < .001$, respectively) found sentences with preventing verbs accurate when it is clear that the farmer wouldn't reach the apple even if he had been able to (because he prefers the banana anyways).

Discussion

We found that participants only judged causing, enabling, or preventing verbs to be accurate when the core meanings of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT are true. However, we saw the contrapositive did not hold. While this is consistent with our hypothesis, we will still consider what could explain the gap between core logical meanings and the empirical results on English verbs.

Potential explanations include different thresholds for when the term *accurate* is appropriate, sub-populations having different underlying semantics, and variations in pragmatic reasoning about implications.

If a portion of participants have semantics that *do* require that $\mathbf{X} = \mathbf{x}$ is not an event of omission or that the event $\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{z}$ happens in instances of enabling or preventing. In this case, their lexical meanings are logically stronger (but do not contradict) our core logical meanings.

Another possibility is that all participants have semantics consistent with our core meanings, but make pragmatic inferences that either $\mathbf{X} = \mathbf{x}$ is not an event of omission or (for enable and prevent verbs) the event $\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{z}$ happens. The empirical data results from variations in both the strength of the inference and the threshold of inference strength necessary to license the use of the word “accurate”.

The proposed semantics has the potential to model participant disagreement with an appropriate pragmatic account that weights preferences according to complex contextual constraints. We hope that our semantics can form the basis for the exploration of holistic models of pragmatic causal language production and comprehension.

A crucial benefit of semantics grounded in SCMs is that we can remain agnostic about the details of the participants’ mental model of the video stimuli. Any two participants may have different causal models in their minds with variables corresponding with events at varying levels of granularity. Our conjecture is that these mental models which ground the truth of natural language sentences have the structure of time-indexed causal model.

Detailed Model. A participant might have a detailed, low-level causal model of the grid world’s mechanistic updates at each time-step with variables representing the values of each cell, or a high-level causal model with variables representing the occurrence of major events and aggregated timesteps.

There are two agents, **Wizard** and **Farmer**. The variables are defined to be $\mathcal{V} = \text{Grid} \cup \mathbf{A}_{\text{Farmer}} \cup \mathbf{A}_{\text{Wizard}}$ where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Grid} &= \{G_t^j : 0 \leq j \leq 24 \wedge t \in \mathbb{N}\} \\ \mathbf{A}_{\text{Farmer}} &= \{A_t^F : t \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{3\}\} \quad \mathbf{A}_{\text{Wizard}} = \{A_3^W\} \end{aligned}$$

The values of these variables are defined to be

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Val}(G_t^j) &= \{\text{Blank}, \text{Farmer}, \text{Wizard}, \text{Rock}, \text{Banana}, \text{Apple}\} \\ \text{Val}(A_t^F) &= \{\rightarrow, \leftarrow\} \quad \text{Val}(A_3^W) = \{\text{Cast}, \text{Don’t Cast}\} \end{aligned}$$

for $0 \leq j \leq 24$ and $t \neq 3$.

The causal mechanisms of the grid variable on the first timestep are constant functions that set the scene, with the rock only appearing in certain experimental conditions.

$$\mathcal{F}_{G_0^j} = \begin{cases} \text{Farmer} & j = 12 \\ \text{Banana} & j = 2 \\ \text{Rock or Blank} & j = 18 \\ \text{Apple} & j = 22 \\ \text{Blank} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \mathcal{F}_{G_4^j}(g_3^j, a_3^W) = \begin{cases} \text{Rock} & a_3^W = \text{Cast} \\ & \text{and } g_{t-1}^j = \text{Blank} \\ \text{Blank} & a_3^W = \text{Cast} \\ & \text{and } g_{t-1}^j = \text{Rock} \\ \text{Rock} & a_3^W = \text{Don’t Cast} \\ & \text{and } g_{t-1}^j = \text{Rock} \\ \text{Blank} & a_3^W = \text{Don’t Cast} \\ & \text{and } g_{t-1}^j = \text{Blank} \\ g_2^j & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

For the timestep $t = 4$, the causal mechanisms of the grid variables determine the values of each cell based on the value of the cell on the previous timestep and any action taken by the wizard on the previous timestep.

$$\mathcal{F}_{G_t^j}(g_{t-1}^{j-1}, g_{t-1}^j, g_{t-1}^{j+1}, a_{t-1}^F) = \begin{cases} \text{Farmer} & a_{t-1}^F = \rightarrow \text{ and } g_{t-1}^{j-1} = \text{Farmer} \\ \text{Farmer} & a_{t-1}^F = \leftarrow \text{ and } g_{t-1}^{j+1} = \text{Farmer} \\ g_{t-1}^j & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

For all other timesteps $t \notin \{0, 4\}$, the causal mechanisms of the grid variables determine the values of each cell based on the value of the cell on the previous timestep and any action taken by the farmer on the previous timestep. In both cases, the model will be compatible with the proposed semantics.

Using this low-level mental model of the gridworld, participants would be able to record events such as the *Farmer’s initial direction* (i.e., $\leftarrow$ or $\rightarrow$) and *actions taken by the Wizard* (i.e. **Place Rock** and/or **Lift Rock**).

Abstract Model. Alternatively, participants may represent their causal models at a higher level of abstraction. The videos can be understood as a sequence of four event variables: (1) *R*, the rock is **present** or **absent**, (2) *I*, the farmer initially moves **left** or **right**, (3) *W*, the wizard **casts** or **doesn’t cast**, and (4) *F*, the farmer moves **left** or **right** after the wizard acts. Like in the lower-level model, there are two agents, **Wizard** and **Farmer**. These variables have binary domains and their causal mechanisms directly encode the contrasting conditions in our experiments. The constant mechanism $\mathcal{F}_{R_0} = \text{present}$ or **absent** encodes one of two starting positions, the mechanisms for farmer movement $\mathcal{F}_{F_1}(r_0)$ and $\mathcal{F}_{F_3}(w_2)$ encodes one of two fruit preferences (apple or banana), the mechanism for wizard action $\mathcal{F}_{W_2}(f_1)$ encodes one of two wizard mindsets (helpful and unhelpful).

Future Directions. While our proposal is compatible with participants’ judgments in the presented experiment, our semantics is limited in that it cannot make graded predictions. For example, consider that our notion of *bringing about* is binary – either an agent is able to bring about the effect, or it isn’t. Introducing probability would be an option for creating a gradient.

We are also interested in the level of granularity at which participants mentally model causal scenarios. As discussed in the Experiment section, participants may internally reason using the low-level model or the high-level model. What are the implications of using one or the other for natural language judgments? Theories of causal abstraction and event representation provide a rich avenue for future work (Gantt, Glass, & White, 2022; Geiger, Potts, & Icard, 2023).

Conclusion

This paper proposes a model-theoretic semantics for nine verbs of causing, enabling, and preventing using the logic of SCMs. SCMs enable us to not only model affector and patients’ mental states, but also allow us to represent participants’ construal of a presented video at different abstractions. In an experiment that asked participants to rate descriptions of a context, we found that the results aligned better with the proposed semantics than with previous accounts of the verb families. This suggests that an SCM account of causal language provides a valuable new perspective to understanding causal event language and judgments.

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