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The Value of Recognition

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements

for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Philosophy

by

Melissa Ann Retkwa

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Value of Recognition

by

Melissa Ann Retkwa

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

University of California, Los Angeles, 2022

Professor Alexander Jacob Julius, Chair

The topic of my dissertation is *merit recognition*, recognition for good action or thought. To start, I introduce the question that motivates the dissertation: what is the value of recognition for us? Recognition is, in various ways, instrumentally valuable for us. But we care about recognition not just as a means. This is not, I suggest, a mistake. Merit recognition is good in itself for us as part of good in itself action. The second and third sections of my first chapter begin to make a case for thinking that merit recognition is part of good in itself helping. And my second chapter aims to be a first step towards arguing that merit recognition is part of a kind of good thinking.

In the second section of my first chapter, I make a case for thinking that small acts of helping between friends aim at merit recognition and include it when they succeed. Friends do small acts of beneficence together by doing them for each other. The beneficiary's seeing the benefactor's helping as good for the reason that it is her part of shared friendly helping.

In the third section of the first chapter, I suggest that we can find, in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN) discussion of friendship, the idea that helping generally (not just within friendship) aims at merit recognition and includes it when it succeeds. In order to find this idea in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship, I do a couple of things. First, I make a case for thinking that perfect

friendship, friendship between two people who each have complete virtue, is the only relationship of equality in which parties love each other as good that Aristotle is interested in in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. It is this relationship that Aristotle means to consider the value of in EN Book IX section 9.

Second, I offer some critiques of proposals that have been made about how the first part of the concluding section of EN Book IX section 9, 1169b29-1170a12, can be understood as argument that a virtuous person needs a friend to be happy. Third, I make my own suggestion about how we can understand the entire concluding section of EN Book IX section 9, 1169b29-1170b19, as argument that a virtuous person needs a friend to be happy. We can do this, I suggest, if we suppose that Aristotle thinks that the small-scale activity of practical virtue aims to be seen as good for the reason that it is by a character friend and is completed by such recognition. At the end of the second chapter, I raise the possibility that the most blessed person, for Aristotle, will not spend all of the time for serious activity she has contemplating. If this is true, then we might interpret Aristotle in EN Book IX section 9 as suggesting that beneficence from a friend makes available a valuable and unique kind of self-awareness.

In the second chapter of my dissertation, I turn to testimony and to beginning to think about how merit recognition might be part of a kind of good thinking. My second chapter is primarily an in-depth discussion of an account of testimony coming from Richard Moran. Testimony, as Moran (2018) understands it, aims at merit recognition and includes merit recognition when it succeeds. To show this, after presenting the basics of Moran's account of testimony, I discuss Burge's (1993/2013) account of the warrant we have to believe what comes to us from interlocution. Like Burge, Moran thinks that telling gives reason for belief because telling is subject to certain norms. A person should tell *p*, for Moran, only if she believes and is in a position to know *p*. Telling, as Moran understands it, is an act that aims at a hearer's believing on the basis of trust, not as a product, but as its proper finishing, I say. A hearer who believes what a teller tells on the basis of trust, believes on the basis of a reason, the goodness of which depends directly on the teller's reason for believing what she tells. In my second chapter, I consider how this is true and connect my discussion of this to Burge's (1993/2013) idea that when a hearer knows something on the basis of interlocution, we need to look at the hearer's "extended

body of justification” to evaluate her warrant (p. 251). At the end of my second chapter, I make a small suggestion about the point of telling. When we tell, we act for a reason that we have in a way that others can see and believe directly on the basis of such seeing what our reason supports believing. Because, with respect to many of our reasons, telling is the only thing we might do to act for them in this way, the point of telling, we might say, is allowing us to act for our reasons in this way. There is, we might think, a good realized through acting for our reasons in ways that others can see and believe directly on the basis of such seeing what our reasons support believing that telling makes available.

The dissertation of Melissa Ann Retkwa is approved.

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2022

For my mom, Tammy, my dad, Jim, my sister, Michelle

You have all been on this journey with me,

and I am lucky to have you as my family.

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CHAPTER ONE

I. Introduction: The Value of Recognition

It is an undeniable fact that we care what other people think about us. We want others to see us in ways that reflect the basic worth we have as persons. We want what I will call *status recognition*. And we want others to see and value the good things that we do and think. We want what I will call *merit recognition*.¹²

Later in this chapter, I will make a case for thinking that merit recognition is a part of good helping. And, in the next chapter, I will discuss in detail an account of testimony, coming from Richard Moran, according to which merit recognition is a part of testimony. The discussion of testimony in the next chapter is, I take it, a first step towards understanding the interest we have in receiving merit recognition for our good thinking.

I think that we need to understand merit recognition's relation to good acting and thinking in order to fully understand what merit recognition is. As such, I cannot begin by giving

¹ *Merit recognition* can sound like something that a person deserves only for great accomplishments, for winning gold or solving a long unsolved problem, for example. However, as I am thinking of it, merit recognition is something that a person might receive, not only for remarkable actions, but also for small, ordinary good actions. Later in this chapter, I will consider the value of receiving merit recognition for small acts of helping. In the next chapter, I will consider the value of receiving merit recognition for telling. These actions are ones that many people do on a daily basis. In virtue of this, they seem not to be remarkable. However, we regularly receive merit recognition for these kinds of actions. And there is, I think, further, an important good that depends on our receiving merit recognition for these actions.

² It is possible to want a kind of recognition that is mixed. It is possible, that is, to want, roughly, more than the baseline status recognition because of merit. It is possible for a person to want, for example, others to be particularly concerned not to interfere with what she is doing, to be very ready to help or to give her a greater share of shared means because of her great accomplishments. I am setting this kind of recognition aside here because I think it is a mistake to want it and because my aim is to understand proper concern for recognition and identify the genuine interest that grounds it.

a complete account of what merit recognition is. I will for now just be relying on a simple and, I hope, intuitive idea of it. When one person gives another merit recognition for some action or thought, she sees that other person's action or thought as meeting the standards that there are for action of that kind or for thought non-accidentally. When one person gives another merit recognition for some action or thought, she sees that other person as acting or thinking as she has reason to, in response to the reason she has, we might say, alternatively.

I also will not at the start here attempt to give a full account of what it is to recognize someone as a person. Rather, to start, I will be relying on a basic idea of what this involves that is Kantian. Persons are beings with the capacity for rational activity. I follow Kant in thinking that persons make special demands on other persons. The ends of persons are to be valued by other persons. Further, persons rightfully set limits on the setting and pursuing of ends by other persons. One person gives another person status recognition when she sees that other person as a being with a capacity for rational activity, with valuable ends, with the ability to rightfully set limits on her own and others' (other persons') setting and pursuing of ends.³

The fact that we want status and merit recognition is evident from everyday experience. We care that other people, for example, make room for us to pass on the sidewalk when they see us coming. And we care that other people do this as a result of seeing and responding to our value as persons. Alternatively, when we have a good idea or do something good, we almost always want other people to see and appreciate this. Very rarely will a person not be moved to

³ Given what I say here, if A and B are persons, then A has reason to give B status recognition. This would be A taking the correct view of B. It might seem, then, that we do not need to ask what the value of status recognition is. It is the correct attitude for a person to take towards other persons. However, the question that I am considering is: what is the value to B of A's giving her status recognition? That is a question that I think does warrant investigation. We might think that B has an interest in A's having the correct attitudes towards and ideas about things in general and that this explains why she cares that A see her as a person (given that she is a person). Further, we might think that this also explains why B cares that A sees that she has done well when she has. People may have reason to care that others have the correct view of things in general. However, this cannot, on its own, I think, do a good job of accounting for the ways in which and the intensity with which we care about recognition.

share what she takes to be her accomplishment. And very rarely will she not care that others appreciate what she has done when she shares.

People do want both status and merit recognition from others. But do they have a genuine interest in recognition? Can we understand how the value of recognition makes it reasonable for people to be concerned with recognition in the ways that they are concerned with it?⁴ To start to answer these questions we can notice that both status and merit recognition normally come with obvious instrumental benefits. When others recognize me as a person, I will be less likely to have my pursuits interfered with. I am also more likely to receive help. Alternatively, when others recognize my accomplishments, I am more likely to have access to important resources like jobs, money, partnerships and power.

Although recognition is instrumentally valuable, it is immediately clear that people do not want recognition merely for its obvious instrumental benefits. In many cases, people care about recognition more than they care about those benefits. Further, people often want recognition even though it comes with no obvious instrumental benefits. And, even when recognition comes with such benefits, in many cases, people would still be concerned with it if those benefits were stripped away.

Examples make this clear. Consider a person who goes out for a walk in order to exercise. It would not be strange for such a person to be bothered by someone who sees her coming but fails to make room for her to pass on the sidewalk. This is true even though her end of exercising is not at all thwarted by taking a few extra steps to avoid the person who blocks her. Consider also a slightly altered case. Imagine a person who is walking, not for exercise, but rather to get somewhere. This walker is plausibly harmed a little by having to avoid the person on the

⁴ I am not proposing here that we try to see if all instances of desire for recognition can be vindicated. Some concern for recognition is clearly problematic and obviously incorrect. What I am proposing here is that we try to see if we can understand the cases of concern for recognition that seem to be non-problematic and correct as being cases in which concern for recognition is response to a genuine value.

sidewalk. However, we still expect the walker in this case to be bothered in a way that does not make sense if the only harm she is responding to is losing a few seconds and going a little bit out of her way.

Further, we can notice that it is very common for people to want merit recognition from friends even though no obvious instrumental benefits might come from such recognition. Friends commonly share with each other their take on things, for example, the news, art, other friends. And when they share, friends hope for merit recognition, though no instrumental benefits promise to come from it. We can see that the obvious instrumental benefits of recognition cannot fully make sense of the ways in which people do pursue and care about both status and merit recognition.

It could be the case that people start by correctly valuing recognition only for its obvious instrumental benefits but, over time, mistakenly come to think of recognition as something with further, non-instrumental value. This might be thought to happen in different ways. It might be thought to happen because recognition is very instrumentally important for people. As such, people are often, in accordance with the demands of prudence, occupied by thoughts about how to get it. It is certainly true that merit recognition in the workplace can be very instrumentally valuable for people. Gaining it can be a means to keeping employment and thereby also to having food, healthcare and housing. Merit recognition in the workplace is clearly something that many people do have a strong prudential reason to be concerned with. Suppose we thought that people tend to mistakenly value merely instrumental goods for their own sake when people are frequently made to pursue and be concerned with such goods. Then, we would have available to us a way of explaining why people value merit recognition for its own sake even though merit recognition has no such value.

There could, alternatively, be a different kind of psychological tendency that explains why people develop a non-instrumental desire for recognition.

Rousseau, in *Emile* (E) and the *Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality Among Men* (*Second Discourse* or SD), is very interested in the question of how it comes to be the case that people value recognition for its own sake.⁵ And he seems, in both places, to suggest that there is a kind of psychological necessity by which people who experience recognition come to value it in this way.

In *Emile*, one of the main pieces of parenting advice that Rousseau gives is the recommendation that parents try to stop their children from experiencing recognition for as long as possible. Children, more so the younger they are, lack the capacity to meet many of their needs on their own. As such, they depend on others to meet their needs. When a caretaker meets the need of child, she can be understood as giving the child recognition. The caretaker chooses to meet the child's need. And the child's need is something that the child, in accordance with what Rousseau calls her *Amour de Soi*, desires the meeting of. In choosing to meet the child's need, then, the caretaker can at least seem to the child as if she recognizing child's desire as something that makes a demand on her (the caretaker), that she should help to fulfill. (Caretakers will, of course, in meeting the child's needs, be concerned not only with doing what the child wants but also with taking care of the child, making sure the child is safe and healthy.)

To prevent children from experiencing recognition, Rousseau says that caretakers should pretend as much as possible that what is happening to and around the children in their care is a result of natural necessity rather than the choice of the caretaker. He says, for example:

“Keep the child in dependence only on things. You will have followed the order of nature in the progress of his education. Never present to his indiscriminating will anything but

⁵ All of the quotes from *Emile* that I include come from text translated by Allan Bloom. All of the quotes from the *Second Discourse* that I include come from text translated by Victor Gourevitch. See the bibliography for full citations.

physical obstacles or punishments which stem from the actions themselves and which he will recall on the proper occasion.” (E 85)

Children have their needs met by caretakers without (at least when they are young) reciprocating and helping their caretakers in return. As such, Rousseau seems to think that children who see their needs being met by caretakers who choose to do so will experience a kind of heightened status recognition and will, further, come to see themselves as deserving of it. They will come to see their desires as holding more weight for others than the desires of others hold for them. In addition to this, Rousseau seems to think that children who have the experience of being recognized (of having their needs met by a caretaker who chooses to do so) will, by a psychological necessity, come to value recognition for its own sake. If a child is taken care of by a caretaker who meets the child’s needs without hiding the fact that she (the caretaker) is choosing to do so, a child will come to value, in particular, a kind of heightened status recognition for its own sake. Warning caretakers about what will happen if they do not take his advice, Rousseau says: “The first tears of children are prayers. If one is not careful, they soon become orders. Children begin by getting themselves assisted; they end by getting themselves served” (E 66).

In his *Second Discourse*, Rousseau again seems to be thinking that humans who experience recognition, come, by a kind of psychological necessity, to value recognition for its own sake. In Rousseau’s *Second Discourse* hypothetical history, people who, in the beginning, live solitary, nomadic lives eventually start living in settled family units next to other family units. When this happens, Rousseau says, people start looking at each other and making comparisons.

Describing this period Rousseau writes:

“Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a price. The one who sang or danced best; the handsomest, the strongest, the most skillful, or the most eloquent came to be the most highly regarded...” (SD 166).

And he also says:

“As soon as men had begun to appreciate one another and the idea of consideration had taken shape in their mind, everyone claimed a right to it, and one could no longer deprive anyone of it with impunity. From here arose the first duties of civility even among Savages, and from it any intentional wrong became an affront because, together with the harm resulting from the injury, the offended party saw in it contempt for his person, often more unbearable than the harm itself.” (SD 166)

The first kind of recognition that people experience in Rousseau’s story that Rousseau remarks upon is a kind of comparative merit recognition.⁶ Some people are recognized as doing free-time activities well. And the judgment that some people are doing free-time activities well is

⁶ Rousseau does say that people living in family units, before they start regularly associating with people living nearby in other family units, experience: “the sweetest sentiments known to man, conjugal love, and Paternal love” (SD 164). However, Rousseau does not remark on recognition within family units or say that a desire for recognition emerges from the interactions that people have with those in their family units. People living in family units choose to meet each other needs according to Rousseau, and so we might think that they should, in line with the psychological tendencies Rousseau recognizes, be thought to experience and made to value for its own sake recognition.

Further, Rousseau says that even before people start living in family units, mothers care for their children and form a bond with them. He says: “The mother at first nursed her Children because of her own need; then, habit having made them dear to her, she went on to feed them because of theirs...” (SD 145). Again, Rousseau does not remark on recognition in the context of mother-child relationships or say that a desire for recognition emerges from interactions within such relationships. But, again, we might wonder why.

made on the basis of comparing people. Doing free-time activities well is doing free-time activities better than others. The people who are not recognized as doing free-time activities well in comparison to others do not desire for its own sake what we might call a kind of demerit recognition. They do not want for its own sake for others to see what they are doing as bad. Rather, I take it, Rousseau suggests that people who are not recognized as doing free-time activities well in comparison to others will begin desiring for its own sake and seeing themselves as deserving of a kind of status recognition owed to all. Again, Rousseau seems to be thinking that a kind of psychological mechanism explains this development. When people experience demerit recognition, they come, by a kind of psychological necessity, to want for its own sake and to take themselves to be deserving of a kind of status recognition owed to all.⁷

In Rousseau's *Second Discourse* hypothetical history, the desire for status recognition for its own sake that is formed shortly after people start living permanently among other people transforms for some people into a desire for its own sake for a kind of heightened status recognition. People take land as private property. And, eventually, all the land that there is is owned. Some people then are left without a place to live or means for sustaining themselves. These people are forced to work for those who have land. Those who have land, experience a kind of heightened status recognition when those without land work for them and meet their desires without much reciprocity. (Those with land presumably give those without land the means to sustain themselves and a place to be, but this is not much in comparison with what those without land do to meet the desires of those with land.) Again, by a kind of psychological necessity, Rousseau seems to think, people with land are made to transition from desiring for its own sake a kind of status recognition owed to all to desiring for its own sake a kind of heightened status recognition.

⁷ It is less clear what Rousseau thinks happens to the people who are recognized as doing free-time activities well in comparison to others.

Describing the advent of such a desire for recognition in the people with land who are served by people without land, Rousseau says:

“The rich, for their part, had scarcely become acquainted with the pleasure of dominating than they disdained all other pleasures, and using their old Slaves to subject new ones, they thought only of subjugating and enslaving their neighbors; like those ravenous wolves which once they have tasted human flesh scorn all other food, and from then on want to devour only men.” (SD 171)

It is clear that Rousseau thinks that the desire for status recognition for its own sake that people in his *Second Discourse* hypothetical history form makes people unfree. This is true both of the desire for a kind of status recognition owed to all that forms shortly after people start living permanently among other people as well as the desire for heightened status recognition that people with land form when others are forced, because of poverty, to serve them. These desires have as their effect people being materially unfree. The desire for its own sake for a kind of status recognition owed to all plays a role in bringing about the institution of private property. And it is what develops into a desire for its own sake for a kind of heightened status recognition in those with land after all the land is owned. Further, since people with land aim to get the recognition that they want by having people without land do as much as possible for them, people with land, become materially dependent on others for meeting their needs. People with land lose the ability to meet their own needs themselves. People without land are also clearly materially dependent on those with land for having a place to be and means for sustaining themselves. Additionally, the desire for its own sake for status recognition that people in Rousseau's story have, he seems to think, makes the people in his story directly we might say unfree. Such a desire makes people immediately, as soon as they have it, dependent on others in a way that makes them unfree.

Clearly, most people would reject the parenting advice that Rousseau gives in *Emile*. And there is also reason to doubt at least some of Rousseau's psychological claims. For example, parents meet their children's needs not just because they see these needs or their children's desires as a making a demand on them. Parents meet their children's needs because they love their children and themselves value the meeting of their children's needs and desires. If children can see that their parents are choosing to meet their desires, then it seems they should also be able to see the fact that their parents love them and themselves value meeting their (the children's) needs and desires. On the basis of this, we might doubt that children who see their parents choosing to meet their needs will experience a kind of heightened status recognition in the way Rousseau imagines.

We might though still try to take from Rousseau some psychological principle that can be used as part of an error theory to explain how it is the case that people come to value recognition for its own sake even though it is not something that really has such value. Having certain experiences of recognition causes people to desire for its own sake certain kinds of status recognition, we might follow Rousseau in thinking. Before using such a principle as part of an error theory, though, we might ask: Does Rousseau himself think that it is just a mistake (for people who live among other people, a psychologically necessary one) to desire recognition for its own sake? The answer to this actually seems to be no.

Emile and the *Second Discourse* make it clear that Rousseau thinks that it is very easy for people to develop, in accordance with the workings of human psychology, an improper desire for its own sake for recognition. He thinks that a child that sees her parents choosing to meet her needs will have an improper desire for its own sake for recognition. And he thinks so too do the people in his *Second Discourse* hypothetical history. However, Rousseau's *Of the Social*

Contract (SC) may suggest that Rousseau also thinks a certain kind of recognition is actually good in itself for people.⁸

In *Of the Social Contract*, Rousseau says that legitimate political power must be seen as arising from a social contract between a group of people who all surrender all of their rights to all the other members in the group.

Rousseau says:

“These clauses [of the social contract that gives rise legitimate political power], rightly understood, all come down to just one, namely the total alienation of each associate with all of his rights to the whole community...” (SC 52)

This social contract creates a body politic with its own will that Rousseau calls the General Will. Political power can be used legitimately to force people who are members of the body politic to obey the General Will, Rousseau says. When this happens, people are “forced to be free” (SC 53).

When a person enters a social contract and becomes part of a body politic, she gives up natural freedom, “an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and he can reach,” in exchange for civil freedom, a state-backed right to what she has a right to within the state (SC 53-54). Further, a person gains, through entering a body politic, in addition, a moral freedom.

About this Rousseau says:

“To the preceding [freedom that comes with membership in a body politic, namely civil freedom] one might add to the credit of the civil state moral freedom, which alone makes

⁸ All of the quotes from *Of the Social Contract* that I include come from text translated by Victor Gourevitch. See the bibliography for full citation.

man truly the master of himself; for the impulsion of mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to the law one has prescribed to oneself is freedom.” (SC 54)

It is only as a citizen (a member of a body politic) that a person can have moral freedom, as Rousseau sees it.

Rousseau might be read as suggesting that being a citizen is something that a person realizes through a single act of contracting away her rights (to others who similarly contract away theirs). However, it is, I think, more plausible to think that this is not really his view. Plausibly, a person can only be a citizen, for Rousseau, if she is recognized as a citizen, that is, if she is recognized as a member of a body politic, as someone who has a part in revealing the General Will and as someone who is legitimately subject by force to the General Will. Plausibly, recognition as a citizen, is required for moral freedom for Rousseau.

Is recognition as a citizen, then, good in itself for people for Rousseau? Previewing the account of the value of recognition that I will go on to give, I can say now that it would be for Rousseau if recognition as a citizen did not just instrumentally enable free action, as Rousseau saw it, but rather was a part of (good in itself) free action. This may, I take it, be Rousseau’s view. I will briefly sketch a proposal about how we might understand Rousseau as having this view.

Rousseau, I take it, thinks that the problem of understanding legitimate political power is the problem of finding out what the General Will wills. It is clear that legitimate political power is exercised to fulfill the mandates of the General Will. But how can we tell when an exercise of political power is fulfilling the mandates of the General Will? How can we tell what the General Will wills?

The General Will, according to Rousseau, wills only with respect to general matters.⁹ Further Rousseau says that the General Will aims at “the common interest” (SC 60). The General Will cannot deviate from this aim.¹⁰ But what is in the common interest is not something that itself is apparent.

What the General Will wills, according to Rousseau, will be revealed when citizens get together and each of them expresses, in response to specific questions, an independent opinion about what the General Will wills. If enough citizens express independent opinions, the majority opinion will reveal the correct answer about what the General Will wills.¹¹ However, Rousseau does not think that the General Will is only revealed through the results that emerge when citizens gather and express, in response to specific questions, independent opinions about what they take to be the General Will. The General Will is what rightfully determines when such gatherings are called for. And so such gatherings themselves can be understood to reveal the General Will, to show that General Will wills for there to be such gatherings.¹² Further, the

⁹ “Why is the general will always upright, and why do all consistently will each one’s happiness, if not because there is no one who does not appropriate the word *each* to himself, and think of himself as he votes for all? Which proves that the equality of right and the notion of justice which it produces follows from each one’s preference for himself and hence from the nature of man; that the general will, to be truly such, must be so in its object as well as in its essence, that it must issue from all in order to apply to all, and that it loses its natural rectitude when it tends toward some individual and determinate object; for then judging what is foreign to us, we have no true principle of equity to guide us.” (SC 61-62)

¹⁰ Rousseau says that: “There is often a considerable difference between the will of all and the general will: the latter looks only to the common interest...” (SC 60). And he says that: “By itself the people always wills the good, but by itself it does not always see it. The general will is always upright, but the judgment that guides it is not always enlightened” (SC 68).

¹¹ “If, when an adequately informed people deliberates, the Citizens had no communication among themselves, the general will would always result from the large number of small differences, and the deliberation would always be good.” (SC 60)

¹² People can vote on how often and when they should gather to vote. But they can gather together to figure out what the General Will is by voting at times other than those that are required by law. And the first time they get together to vote cannot be understood to be a gathering that is rightful because it was revealed through voting to be rightful.

General Will wills, Rousseau says, what it has willed and does not object to. Citizens not getting together to answer specific questions about what the General Will wills can be understood to reveal that the General Will continues to will what it has been willing.¹³

It is, I take it, plausible to think that, as Rousseau sees it, people in a body politic, citizens, whenever they will, will in way that aims to be revealing of the General Will. Further, it is also, I take it, plausible to think that willing can be revealing of the General Will, only if it is taken by other citizens to be aimed at revealing the General Will. The General Will is always revealed through a collection of wills that are aimed at revealing the General Will (at answering the question of what the General Will wills). But, outside of gatherings aimed at answering specific questions about what the General Will wills (outside of official voting situations), there is no third party who gathers together all of the wills that are aimed at revealing the General Will and looks to see what the collection of wills shows about what the General Will wills. Citizens themselves are the ones who, day-to-day, work out together what the General Will wills. As such a person's will will be revealing of the General Will on a day-to-day basis (outside of official situations) only if she is taken by other citizens to be willing in a way that aims to be revealing of the General Will.¹⁴

¹³ "Yesterday's law does not obligate today, but tacit consent is presumed from silence, and the Sovereign is assumed to be constantly confirming the laws which it does not abrogate when it can do so. Everything which it has once declared it wills it continues to will, unless it revokes it." (SC 109)

¹⁴ Rousseau says:

"The Citizen consents to all the laws, even to those passed in spite of him, and even to those that punish him when he dares to violate any one of them. The steady will of all members of the State is the general will; it is through it that they are citizens and free. When a law is proposed in the People's assembly, what they are being asked is not exactly whether they approve the proposal or reject it, but whether it does or does not conform to the general will, which is theirs; everyone states his opinion about this by casting his ballot, and the tally of the votes yields the declaration of the general will. Therefore when the opinion contrary to my own prevails, it proves nothing more than that I made a mistake and that what I took to be the general will was not. If my particular opinion had prevailed, I would have done something other than what I had willed, and it is then that I would not have been free." (SC 124)

If, first, free action, for Rousseau, is action that results from willing in a way that aims to be revealing of the General Will, and, second, this means that being recognized by others as willing in a way that aims to reveal the General Will is a part of successful free action for Rousseau, then recognition (being recognized as willing in a way that aims to reveal the General Will, as a citizen), for Rousseau, would be good in itself for people as part of good in itself successful free action.

There is obviously much more to say about Rousseau's ideas about legitimate political power and freedom. But, I hope for this limited discussion to show that Rousseau, even though he recognized psychological mechanisms capable of explaining how it could come to be the case that people value recognition for its own sake even though recognition has no such value, might be interpreted also as thinking that a certain kind of recognition is something that can be good in itself for people.

Although it may be possible to give one, I do not think that we should settle for giving an error theory that explains how people come to value recognition for its own sake even though it has no value beyond its value as a means to obvious instrumental advantages. Sometimes we feel a person can be mistaken in not caring about recognition or in caring too little about recognition even though she stands to gain no obvious instrumental advantages from it. A person who never cares that others see her as a person or that others appreciate the good things she does and thinks, except when she stands to gain obvious instrumental advantages from recognition, is a person that would strike many as seriously flawed. It is worth considering how we might make sense of this.

Status and merit recognition might have less obvious instrumental benefits. And these might be useful for explaining why it can be correct to be concerned with recognition even when

In the above passage Rousseau is talking primarily about voting. But I think that, for him, free willing in general, not just in the voting booth, aims to reveal the General Will.

it has no obvious instrumental value. To start to consider this possibility, we can look at ideas from Kant and Rawls.

Kant thinks that a person must have self-respect, that is, respect for the moral law within herself, to be capable of rational action. Self-respect is one of the things that Kant says, in the *Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue* (in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, MM), is “presupposed on the part of feeling by the mind’s receptivity to concepts of duty as such” (MM 6:399).¹⁵

According to Kant, a person cannot have a duty to feel self-respect. But, self-respect is “the basis of certain duties” (MM 6:403). Kant says that not only does a person have what can be called duties of respect to herself to, for example, avoid servility and “pursue his end...not abjectly, not in a servile spirit as if he were seeking a favor, not disavowing his dignity, but always with consciousness of his sublime moral predisposition” (MM 6:345). A person also has a duty of respect to others, “to acknowledge in a practical way, the dignity of humanity in every other human being” (MM 6:462).

According to one reading of Kant, Kant’s idea about the importance of self-respect to rational activity and his idea about the existence of a duty of respect to others are related in the following way: There is a duty of respect owed to others because self-respect is required for rational activity and because a person’s ability to feel self-respect can be damaged when others fail to treat her in ways that express respect or when others treat her in ways that express disrespect.

In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls (1971/2005) is clear about the fact that he thinks people must regularly receive recognition (both status and merit recognition) in order to maintain their self-respect. Rawls describes self-respect as a person’s sense that her ends are valuable and that

¹⁵ All of the quotes I include from *The Metaphysics of Morals* come from text translated by Mary J. Gregor. See the bibliography for full citation.

her capacities are sufficient for realizing her ends. A person must have self-respect, understood as such, to be capable of rational activity, according to Rawls.¹⁶

Rawls says that self-respect is “the most important primary good” and that, “the parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect” (1971/2005, p. 440). As such, consideration of the conditions that support and detract from self-respect is something that Rawls sees as playing an important role in the choice of his two principles of justice in the original position¹⁷.

Rawls says that a society’s institution’s being governed by his two principles of justice helps to ensure that people receive, in their public life, status recognition. He says that a society’s institutions being governed by his two principles of justice helps to ensure specifically that, “in public life citizens respect one another’s ends and adjudicate their political claims in ways that also support their self-esteem” (Rawls, 1971/2005, p. 442).

In addition to a public life that provides status recognition, people require “at least one community of shared interests” in which they are recognized for accomplishments to maintain their self-respect, according to Rawls (Rawls, 1971/2005, p. 441-442). Society’s institutions being governed by his two principles of justice, further, helps to makes it possible for people to receive merit recognition in communities of shared interest, according to Rawls. Rawls says:

“...the more someone experiences his own way of life as worth fulfilling, the more likely he is to

¹⁶“ We may define self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two aspects. First of all, as we noted earlier, it includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions. When we feel that our plans are of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in their execution. Nor plagued by failure and self-doubt can we continue in our endeavors. It is clear then why self-respect is a primary good. Without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism” (Rawls, 1971/2005, p. 440).

¹⁷ “The fact that justice as fairness gives more support to self-esteem than other principles is a strong reason for them [people in the original position] to adopt it.” (Rawls, 1971/2005, p. 440)

welcome our attainments. One who is confident in himself is not grudging in the appreciation of others” (1971/2005, p. 441). Since public life in a society whose institutions are governed by Rawls’ two principles of justice provides people with status recognition, public life in a society whose institutions are governed by Rawls’ two principles of justice helps to make it the case that people are able to appreciate the accomplishments of others and to themselves receive such appreciation in communities of shared interest, according to Rawls.

Following Rawls and, perhaps, if we accept the above interpretation of him, Kant, we can consider the possibility that recognition is instrumentally valuable as a means to preserving a person’s self-respect. In considering this proposal, we need to ask: how does recognition promote and a lack of it detract from a person’s self-respect?

It could be the case that it is just a brute psychological fact about people that their self-respect is preserved by recognition and diminished by disrespect or a lack of recognition. However, before we settle for this explanation of the connection between self-respect and recognition and try to use it to make sense of the ways in which we are concerned with recognition for more than its obvious instrumental benefits, we should, I think, consider alternative explanations for how it is that recognition interacts with self-respect.

I take it that there are a few reasons for looking for an alternative way of explaining how recognition interacts with self-respect. First, if an alternative explanation is available, it might be more informative and revealing. Second, it does not seem to a person, as she is desiring recognition, that she is wanting a means to psychological conditions she requires to act. A person might notice the fact that a lack of recognition is having harmful psychological effects on her, that a lack of recognition is, for example, diminishing her sense that her ends are worthwhile and her capacities sufficient for realizing them. But when a person wants recognition, when she aims, for example, for something that she takes to be an accomplishment to be recognized, it will not feel to her as if she doing this for the psychological benefits of recognition. We might think that the psychological benefits do explain the value that recognition

has beyond its value as a means to obvious instrumental advantages, but that this is just not clear and transparent to people who pursue it. However, before settling for this, we should consider alternatives.

Here is one possible alternative way of explaining how it is that a lack of recognition damages self-respect: It might be thought that when others fail to give us status and merit recognition, they act in ways that give us evidence that we are not rational beings, that our ends are not valuable, that our capacities are not sufficient for realizing our ends. If I see my neighbor leaving her apartment with an umbrella this can serve as evidence that it is raining. Similarly, it might be thought that if someone carelessly and unapologetically interferes with what I am doing, this can serve as evidence that I am not a rational being with valuable ends and capacities sufficient for realizing them. Or, if others fail to give me merit recognition, this might serve as evidence that what I am doing is not worthwhile or that my capacities are not sufficient for doing well what I am doing.

The self-respect that Kant thinks is required for rational activity is a feeling that the law within us inspires and not a judgement about ourselves.¹⁸ Rawls describes self-respect similarly as a *sense* that our ends are valuable and that our capacities are sufficient for realizing our ends. So, self-respect for these authors, it seems, cannot be something that we have or fail to have just by making judgments (possibly on the basis of evidence provided by others and their conduct) about ourselves, our ends and our capacities.

Still, we might think that our self-respect, as Kant or as Rawls understands it, is something that is sensitive to judgments we make about ourselves, specifically to judgments we make about our status as rational beings, about the worthwhileness of our ends, about the sufficiency of our capacities for realizing our ends.

¹⁸ "Respect is...something merely subjective, a feeling of a special kind, not a judgment about an object..." (MM 6:402)

Kant makes it clear in the *Ground of the Metaphysics of Morals* that we cannot determine whether or not we are rational beings on the basis of empirical evidence. And, in fact, it seems true that we just do not decide the question of whether or not we are rational beings and make a judgment about this on the basis of empirical evidence.

Further, we can see that we do not take the fact that others fail to give us status recognition as evidence that our ends are not worthwhile or that our capacities are not sufficient for realizing our ends. For example, when someone sees me coming but fails to make room for me to pass on the sidewalk, I do not respond to this by questioning whether or not my ends are valuable or whether or not my capacities are sufficient for realizing my ends. Rather, I see the person's failure to make room as a mistake because my ends are valuable, because I do have reason to get where I am going, and because I will be able to do what I am doing when I get there. Someone who experiences a pervasive denial of status recognition may experience damage to her self-respect. But this cannot be explained by the fact that each time the person experiences a lack of status recognition, she is confronted with what she takes to be evidence that her ends are not worthwhile and/or that her capacities are not sufficient for realizing her ends.

At this point in my discussion, I will set aside questions about the value of status recognition and focus my attention on merit recognition. Again, it will be merit recognition that I will make a case for thinking is a part of good helping and testimony.

Ultimately, I think that understanding the value of merit recognition will help us to understand the value of status recognition. These two kinds of recognition are not unrelated, as we can see from even the initial characterization of them provided at the beginning of this chapter. Our interest in merit recognition, we said above, can be characterized as an interest in being seen as doing what we have reason to do in response to the reason we have to do it. And persons, we said, are beings with a capacity for rational activity. Persons are beings that are capable of responding to reason, we might say, alternatively. Whenever a person receives merit

recognition, it seems, she can also be understood as receiving status recognition.¹⁹ In this dissertation I will not be able to discuss further the connection between our interest in merit recognition and our interest in status recognition. But such a discussion, would, I think follow naturally from some of what I will be able to say.

I will now continue on with a consideration of the question of whether or not a lack of merit recognition might be understood to damage our self-respect by serving as evidence on the basis of which we make judgments about ourselves, about the worthwhileness of our ends and the sufficiency of our capacities for realizing our ends.

We do sometimes make judgments about the worthwhileness of our ends, about whether or not we have acted well, and about whether or not we are capable of doing what we are trying to do in response to the way in which we see others responding to what we do. A lack of merit recognition is sometimes something that we take to be evidence that bears on judgments about the worthwhileness of our ends and about the sufficiency of our capacities for realizing our ends.

The fact that what we are doing is not taken by others to be worthwhile can sometimes be understood to directly serve as evidence that what we are doing is not worthwhile. There are some things it would be worthwhile for a person to do even though no other people agree that they are worthwhile. For example, it would be worthwhile for a person to pursue certain kinds of medical knowledge even if she finds herself in a world in which no one else agrees that what she is doing is worthwhile and, further, even if she does not expect what she does to be remembered and her findings to be preserved. Alternatively, though, there are other pursuits that seem to be such that their being worthwhile things for us to do depends on others taking them to be

¹⁹ This might sound a little too quick. We might be worried that one person might receive merit but not status recognition from another person when, for example, the other person sees what the first has done as very skilled but also as morally corrupt or vicious. I think this worry can be addressed, but I will not be able to do it here.

worthwhile, on others also doing them, and on others continuing on with them after we are gone.

It can happen that an artist who is not appreciated in her lifetime comes to be appreciated and influential after she has died. When this happens, clearly, we can say that what this artist was doing was worthwhile even though none of her contemporaries thought it to be so. However, consider an artist who is not appreciated by her contemporaries and is sure that she is doing art as well as she can. Suppose that this artist knows that what she is doing will also not be appreciated in the future. It can, then, seem doubtful that what this artist is doing is worthwhile. Suppose, for example, that this artist makes sculptures out of fresh fruit and has been doing this for many years. None of her contemporaries like her sculptures and she knows there will be no record of them. Further, they clearly will not last since the fruit will rot. There seems to be a very close connection between the fact that others do not see what this artist is doing as worthwhile and the fact that it seems not to be.²⁰

Some pursuits may be such that it is obvious that they are worthwhile things for a person to do regardless of whether or not others agree that they are worthwhile. Other pursuits that in fact are worthwhile things for a person to do even when no one else agrees, we might think, are such that the fact that they are worthwhile in this way is not obvious. With respect to these latter pursuits, then, the opinions of others might indirectly serve as an important kind of evidence that the pursuits are worthwhile.

A person's failing to receive merit recognition when she shares what she takes to be her accomplishment in pursuit of what she knows to be a worthwhile end can give the person evidence that she did not act well, and this may make her doubt that she has capacities sufficient for doing what she is trying to do. However, it is not always the case that a person's failure to

²⁰ A person can make art for different reasons. She might do it, in learning to be an artist, as a hobby with friends, to relax. I do not mean to say that it will not make sense for a person to make art except when she is or might in the future be renowned.

receive merit recognition for what she does in pursuit of an end that she knows to be worthwhile serves as evidence that she failed to act well (or that her capacities are not sufficient for doing what she is doing). There are a number of reasons why it can be true that a person's failing to receive recognition for something she does for a worthwhile end does not serve as evidence that she failed to act well. Sometimes a person is just very sure that she acted well and so is not prepared to take someone else's failing to agree as evidence that she did not. Alternatively, sometimes a person will have reason to believe that another person failed to give her merit recognition, not because she failed to act well, but rather for another reason. Maybe the person who failed to give her merit recognition does not like her, is in competition with, harbors bias against her, for example.

When a person is confident that she is pursuing a worthwhile end and also that she acted well and/or that a denial of merit recognition is likely attributable to something other than the fact that she did not act well, can a person still lose something when she is denied merit recognition? It seems that even in cases in which a person does not (as it is reasonable for her to) attribute a lack of merit recognition to the fact that she did not act well for a worthwhile end and, further, she loses no obvious instrumental advantages from being denied merit recognition, a person can experience a failure to receive merit recognition as a loss. It is worth considering how we might make sense of that.

Here is one proposal: Merit recognition provides a person with evidence that she needs to be absolutely certain, to know, that she acted well. A person can feel confident on her own that she acted well. But her belief in this, it might be thought, can be knowledge only if it is confirmed by another person, only if she receives merit recognition. We might, additionally, go further and explain the fact that a person cannot, on her own, know that she acted well. Drawing from Cooper (1977b), who uses similar ideas in explaining Aristotle's claim that we can contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves, we might say the following: People are fallible and, further, have a strong wish to be good and do good that makes them tend to form a

distorted picture of themselves. People tend to overestimate their virtue and skill and to underestimate their vice and weaknesses. This is why people need others to confirm that they have acted well in order to have evidence sufficient for knowing that they have acted well.²¹

About this proposal, we can say two things. First, we can notice that it seems like people who are moved by the epistemic interest described above should want, not merit recognition, but rather feedback, good or bad. Consider a person who is very unsure about the goodness of something she has done. Someone else's opinion can be epistemically valuable to her. It can help her form accurate assessment of what she has done. However, if this person is concerned with forming an accurate assessment of what she has done and knowing what she has done (if she has acted well or not), it is not merit recognition that she should be seeking. She should want honest opinions, favorable or unfavorable.

Of course, a person who is very unsure about the goodness of something she has done might both *want* to form an accurate assessment of what she has done and also *hope* that she acted well. However, insofar as the latter of these makes her want merit recognition over honest feedback, her attitude is not something that fully makes sense given the epistemic interest she has in knowing how she acted. Things do not change, I think, for a person who is pretty confident that she acted well. If such a person has the epistemic goal of knowing how she acted, then she should want feedback, not recognition.

It might be thought that our epistemic interest in getting feedback from others vindicates some of our concern for merit recognition that goes beyond a concern for obvious instrumental advantages *in a way*. Our desire for recognition has the effect of making us seek out others'

²¹ I discuss Cooper (1977b) more below in discussing Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* argument that a virtuous person needs virtuous friends. Cooper does not suggest that because people are biased in their own favor, they need confirmation in the form of merit recognition from others to know that they acted well. Cooper suggests instead that, because people are biased in their own favor, they need to look at someone whom they know to have the same character as them to know that are good and acting well. Cooper attributes that thought to Aristotle and suggests that he finds it persuasive.

opinions. So, although our desire for recognition is not made fully rational by our epistemic interest in getting feedback from others (it would make more sense for us to desire feedback and not recognition), it is nonetheless good, from the perspective of that interest, because of its effects. Before settling for this minimal vindication of some of our concern for merit recognition that goes beyond a concern for obvious instrumental advantages, we should, I think, consider alternatives.

The second thing we can say with respect to the above proposal about the epistemic interest we have in merit recognition is the following: people often seek merit recognition from friends for certain kinds of thoughts (for example, about the news, art, other friends). When they do, often, people care about getting this merit recognition even though no obvious instrumental advantages promise to come from it. And sometimes people will do this (seek such merit recognition from friends) while being pretty confident that their thoughts are good. When this is true of a person who seeks merit recognition from a friend, can we make sense of the person's concern for merit recognition by pointing to the epistemic interest that the person as a fallible being, biased towards herself, has in getting confirmation that she has thought well? This seems doubtful.

First, we can notice that, if it is true that people are likely to form a distorted picture of themselves because of their strong wish to be and do good, it is probably also true that people's friends are likely to form a distorted picture of them because their friends similarly wish for them to be and do good.²² And, second, a person's friends, often, will not be the people who are best able to evaluate her thinking. A person might, for example, share her thoughts about some new music with a friend, hoping that the friend recognizes these thoughts as good. She might do this even though her friend is not a musician or an expert. There are people who are better able to evaluate this person's thoughts about the music, we can suppose. But still, we do not expect

²² Cooper (1977b) mentions this as a challenge to the argument he attributes to Aristotle. I discuss what Cooper has to say about this below.

this person to prefer to receive merit recognition for her thoughts from a stranger who is a musician or an expert. And we do not expect this person to take herself to be just settling for merit recognition from her friend. We should take this seriously and consider the possibility that the person in our example might want merit recognition for a reason that we have not yet found.

Aristotle seems to think that a person's interest in merit recognition goes beyond any interest she may have in its obvious instrumental benefits and epistemic value as evidence that she needs to know her character or that she acted well. Aristotle says in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN) that the virtuous person will want honor.²³ But she will not, Aristotle thinks, want this as evidence of her goodness or only for the money or other instrumentally valuable advantages that may come from it. This comes out in Aristotle's EN Book IV section 3 and section 4 discussions of magnanimity and the virtue concerned with lesser honors.

I take magnanimity to be the virtue concerned with honor that a politician must have. The virtue concerned with lesser honor is the virtue concerned with honor that a person who is not a politician must have to be virtuous as private citizen. A politician must have the right relation not only to great but also to lesser honors. So, either a politician must have magnanimity and the virtue concerned with lesser honor or magnanimity must be understood as a virtue in virtue of which a person has the right relation to both great and lesser honors.

Aristotle characterizes the magnanimous person as someone who wants the greatest honors because she deserves the greatest honors. Those with the virtue concerned with lesser honors will, like the magnanimous person, be interested in honor as and insofar as it is something that they deserve. Aristotle makes it clear that a person's goodness and the goodness of what she does is what makes her deserving of honor.²⁴ So, if virtuous people want honor

²³ All of the quotes I include in this chapter from the *Nicomachean Ethics* come from text translated by W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson. See the bibliography for full citation.

²⁴ Aristotle says that, "honour is the prize of excellence and it is to the good that it is rendered" (EN 1123b30-1124a1). And further he says: "Now the proud man, since he deserves most, must

because they deserve honor and if they deserve honor because they are good and they do good things, virtuous people cannot want honor as evidence of their goodness.²⁵

The magnanimous person and those with the virtue concerned with lesser honors are also plausibly not concerned with honor merely as a means to money or other instrumentally valuable advantages that may come from it. This is indicated by the fact that they want honor from good people who know their character for good actions and not just from anyone they would receive material advantages from for any reason.²⁶

It might be the case that Aristotle's suggestion that the good life will be one that includes a concern for honor, not as evidence of goodness or a means to other external goods, shows a sensitivity to the psychological fact that people need to have their good actions recognized by others in order to maintain a capacity for rational activity. (Above we considered the possibility that this is what Rawls is thinking when he says that recognition is required to maintain self-respect.) Aristotle does think that the virtuous person will value money as means to good activity. We need money and the resources we can acquire through it in order to do good things

be good in the highest degree; for the better man always deserves more, and the best man most" (EN 1123b28-29).

²⁵ Aristotle says that people with vices opposed to magnanimity do not know themselves (EN 1125a16-34). In this they differ from the magnanimous person.

²⁶ Aristotle says of the magnanimous person that:

"It is chiefly with honours and dishonours, then, that the proud man is concerned; and at honours that are great and conferred by good men he will be moderately pleased, thinking that he is coming by his own or even less than his own; for there can be no honour that is worthy of perfect excellence, yet he will at any rate accept it since they have nothing greater to bestow on him; but honour from casual people and on trifling grounds he will utterly despise, since it is not this that he deserves..." (EN 1124a5-11)

The person with the virtue concerned with lesser honors also, presumably wants honor from good people.

Further, in his EN Book I section 5 discussion of the conception of happiness implicit in the political life, Aristotle says that those leading the political life, do not just want honor. Rather, "it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the grounds of their excellence" (EN 1095a27-29).

in the world and also to sustain ourselves so we can contemplate. And Aristotle thinks that the virtuous person will be sensitive to this. Aristotle might be understood to indicate that the virtuous person will similarly be concerned with honor as something that is itself instrumentally required for good activity because a person requires it to maintain her capacity for rational activity.

Some of Aristotle's remarks, however, suggest instead that he takes honor to be something that is good in itself for people. In Aristotle's EN Book I section 7 argument that happiness is the most complete good, Aristotle says that, "honor, pleasure, reason, and every excellence we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them)" (EN 1097b1-3).

Of all of things that Aristotle suggests are good in themselves, honor is likely to cause the most confusion. For Aristotle, excellence and pleasure are very closely related to good activity which, over the course of a complete life is happiness, what we choose always for itself and never for anything else. Excellence is good activity in potentiality, while pleasure, for Aristotle, either is good activity or something that necessarily accompanies good activity. How we might start to explain the non-instrumental value of honor, on an Aristotelian picture, is, in contrast, initially unclear.

One possibility is that Aristotle simply takes it to be a brute fact that honor is good in itself for people. And the idea that honor or rather merit recognition might simply be good in itself for us is a possibility worth considering, not only for the sake of understanding Aristotle's remarks about the virtuous person's relation to honor, but also for the more general purpose of trying to make sense of concern for merit recognition that goes beyond its obvious instrumental value. I will call the idea that merit recognition just is an independent, intrinsic good, the brute account.

The brute account initially seems promising. If merit recognition is something that just is good in itself for us, we can make sense of many of the initially puzzling ways in which we care about and pursue merit recognition. We can explain in a straightforward way why it makes sense for us to want merit recognition for more than just its obvious instrumental benefits. And we can explain why a person can lose something in failing to receive merit recognition even when she is sure she is acting well for a worthwhile end and no obvious instrumental benefits are at stake.

There is, however, a problem with the brute account. We do not think that every instance in which a person is concerned with or pursues merit recognition is proper. And the brute account does not have the resources to say what goes wrong in some problematic cases. The brute account vindicates too much of our concern for merit recognition.

The brute account does have resources for explaining what goes wrong in some cases in which concern for merit recognition strikes us as problematic. To start, a proponent of the account might point out that it can seem like a person receives merit recognition when in fact she does not. It is plausible to think that, in order for a person to receive genuine merit recognition from someone, the person who gives recognition must see the action or thought recognized as good for (some of) the reason it is. Recognition for good action or thought because it is good, given by someone who sees this, is genuine recognition and what the brute account would want to say is good in itself for us.

This fact about genuine merit recognition can be used to explain what goes wrong when someone tries to use her authority or power to get merit recognition for something that she does or thinks, wanting such recognition for its own sake. Such a person would not be pursuing something that is genuinely an intrinsic good. For example, students who are confused but impressed by what a lecturer says would not be giving the lecturer genuine merit recognition by praising her. So wanting such praise for its own sake would be a mistake. Further, the fact that genuine merit recognition is recognition of an act or thought as good for the reason that it is

good can explain what goes wrong when someone seeks recognition for something that they do or think that is not genuinely good. Genuine merit recognition, understood as suggested, is necessarily recognition of genuinely good action or thought.

A proponent of the brute account could also point out that merit recognition cannot be pursued in just anyway. Not every way of pursuing our ends and what we have an interest in is permissible. As such, people can go wrong in going after merit recognition, like other things they want, through impermissible means. A politician who genuinely does something good for her city can go wrong in seeking merit recognition for this if, for example, she uses the city's limited resources to publicize her accomplishment rather than to meet important needs of residents.

Even further, a proponent of the brute account could suggest that a person can go wrong when her primary or only motive in doing something is merit recognition. People who pursue merit recognition in this way will make the mistake of failing to adequately appreciate and respond appropriately to all of the goods at stake in what they do. For example, someone whose primary motive in developing a vaccine was her desire for acclaim would be concerned with recognition in a problematic way. And we can explain the problem by saying that this person fails to adequately appreciate the value that her work has, not only as something that will win acclaim, but also as something will save and improve the lives of others.

Even with the resources described above, I think that there are ways that a person can go wrong in caring about recognition that the brute account will have problems dealing with. Sometimes concern for merit recognition can be problematic because of who a person is concerned to be recognized by. We can see this when we consider cases in which a person is concerned to be recognized for helping.

When one person helps another, the person who helps demonstrates problematic concern for recognition if she wants to be recognized for helping, not by the person she helps, but rather by others. Examples make this clear. Imagine someone who holds a door for a stranger. This person makes a mistake if she only cares that a friend she is with sees the door

holding as good and not the person for whom she holds the door. Alternatively, consider a person who returns car keys that a stranger walking by accidentally drops. This person would likewise make a mistake if she were to only care that the friend she is with appreciates what she does and not the person whose keys she returns.

The brute account does not have adequate resources to explain what goes wrong in the cases described above. We can assume that the actors in those cases are not only or primarily motivated by recognition but do adequately care about other values the proponent of the brute account will think are at stake. The actors care about people getting where they are going and into their cars. Further, we can assume that the actors do not pursue recognition via any impermissible means. Finally, I take it that the proponent of the brute account will want to say that the helping actions in both of the above cases are in fact good. And she (the proponent of the brute account) will allow that the people from whom recognition is desired are in a position to see the goodness of what is done. No special explanation or expertise is needed to understand how holding a door or returning keys is a good thing to do.

The proponent of the brute account might say that the people in the above cases make the mistake of not wanting as much recognition as possible. Recognition from strangers we help and not just recognition from friends is intrinsically valuable.

It seems mistaken to think that people always have prima facie reason to want as much recognition as possible. But, setting this aside, we can notice that the proponent of the brute account needs to reckon with the fact that there seems to be something special about the wrongness of only caring about recognition for helping from those other than the people that we help. Intuitively, it would be better for the people in the above cases to only care about recognition for helping from those they help than it would be for them to only care about recognition from bystander friends. This is true even when the same amount of recognition is sought in both scenarios.

A proponent of the brute account might try to explain the special wrongness of only wanting recognition from a bystander and not from the person helped in the following way: They might say that there is something problematic about wanting recognition for our helping actions from people other than those we help because receiving help can be embarrassing. Even if we do not pursue recognition in any impermissible way, it is still wrong for us to hope for recognition from those outside our helping actions because this amounts to hoping that the people we help will be subject to embarrassing exposure. However plausible this might seem as an explanation of the wrongness of wanting recognition from bystanders for some kinds of helping, it clearly cannot explain the wrongness of the concern for recognition shown in the above cases. There is no reason to think that a person who has a door held for her or dropped keys returned would or should feel embarrassed by it becoming more widely known that she received such a small form of assistance.

If we accept the idea that it is simply a brute fact that merit recognition is something good in itself for us, we will not be able to fully explain our intuitions about the ways in which a person can go wrong in pursuing merit recognition. If there were an alternative account of the value of merit recognition that could both more fully vindicate our intuitions about bad cases and also make sense of what seem to be the proper ways in which we value merit recognition for more than its instrumental benefits, that account would be preferable. In fact, I think that we can find such an alternative account.

Merit recognition could be something that is good in itself for us, not because it is independently and on its own a good of this kind, but rather instead because it is *part* of something with intrinsic value. If merit recognition were a part but not the whole of something with intrinsic value, we may be able to fully vindicate some non-instrumental concern for merit recognition while also being more discriminating than the brute account can be about the kinds of non-instrumental concern for recognition we call proper.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will begin to develop and defend an account of the value of merit recognition that understands merit recognition to be something that is part of an intrinsically good whole. When a benefactor helps a beneficiary, she does an act that is aimed at her beneficiary's recognizing that act as good in a way that makes it true that her beneficiary's recognizing the act as good (when her beneficiary does this) will be a part of the act. Further, a benefactor's act being aimed at her beneficiary's recognition and the beneficiary's recognizing the benefactor's act as good, makes the benefactor's act good in itself. A beneficiary's recognizing a benefactor's act of helping as good can be understood as something that is good in itself for the benefactor, as a part of her good in itself helping action.

In the next section, I will begin to defend the idea that merit recognition can be understood as a part of good in itself helping. Specifically, I will argue that small acts of helping between friends, acts that we do take to be good in themselves, are aimed merit recognition and include merit recognition as a part. These acts are ones that are shared between friends. The beneficiary's part of the shared act is her seeing the act as good. This is a part of what the benefactor does because, in doing a small act of beneficence for a friend, a person acts for a reason that is both a reason to help and a reason to help in way that is seen as good by the beneficiary for that reason.

The argument in the next section is only a first step towards defending the ideas about the relation between merit recognition and good in itself helping that I presented above. The argument will leave to be defended the following two ideas: First, it will leave to be defended the idea that helping generally and not just within the established relationships we call friendship aims at merit recognition in a way that makes merit recognition a part of the act. Second, it will leave to be defended the idea that a benefactor's act being aimed at merit recognition and the beneficiary giving merit recognition make an act of helping good in itself. I will not be able to provide a complete defense of these further ideas in this dissertation. However, in the final section of this chapter, I will take a step towards doing this.

In the final section of this chapter, I will discuss Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* Book IX section 9 argument that a virtuous person needs a virtuous friend. I think that we can see Aristotle, in EN Book IX section 9, thinking that the small-scale, non-political activity of practical virtue aims at being done for and recognized by a character friend in a way that makes a character friend's recognition (when it comes) a part of the act. A person who is practically virtuous needs a character friend, I think Aristotle can be understood as arguing, because she, in being practically virtuous, is disposed to activity that aims at being recognized by a character friend and that is completed by a character friend's recognition. Aristotle thinks that beneficent activity in general and not just beneficent activity within an established relationship that we would call friendship aims at recognition from a character friend. A person needs to get a character friend to do the best kind of beneficent activity, according to Aristotle.

Further, although I will not be able to say too much about this in this dissertation, I think we may be able to find in Aristotle's thinking about the activity of practical virtue and the differences between this activity and productive activity, ideas that may be use to understand how it could be the case that a benefactor's act being aimed at recognition and a beneficiary's giving recognition make an act of beneficence good in itself.

Of course, saying that Aristotle thinks that merit recognition is good itself for us because he thinks it is part of good in itself beneficent activity is not directly defending the idea that merit recognition is good in itself for us as part of good in itself beneficent activity. Defending the idea directly is a project that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, finding the idea in Aristotle can, I think, provide motivation for the project of developing such a defense and can also give us some help with the project.

I do not think that merit recognition is something that is good in itself for us only when it is part of good in itself helping. I think that merit recognition can also be part of a certain kind of good in itself theoretical accomplishment, a certain kind of good in itself believing. In the next chapter of my dissertation, I will discuss in detail an account of testimony, coming from Richard

Moran, according to which testimony aims at merit recognition in a way that makes merit recognition a part of testimony. This is, I think, a first step towards understanding merit recognition as a part of a kind of good in itself thinking.

II. Merit Recognition as a Part of Good in Itself Helping in Friendship

What it is for two people to stand in a relationship of friendship with each other is, in part, for them to be disposed to and to actually do small acts of beneficence for each other. And, when a person helps her friend, normally she does this in part for recognition from her friend. To see this, we can consider an example. Consider a case in which one friend, Tara, cooks dinner for another friend, Jason. About the helping in this case, we can ask: Why does Tara do this? What kind of reason is it natural to think Tara acts for?

We might try saying that Tara cooks for Jason because, as his friend, she is concerned to promote Jason's interests and expects the food she prepares to do this. Although we do expect Tara to be so motivated and having food prepared for him to promote Jason's interests, this kind of answer strikes us immediately as insufficient. The purpose we expect Tara to have in cooking for Jason is not one that we think would be served just as well by her anonymously sending him some gourmet food. Beyond providing Jason with an easy and pleasant way of satisfying his hunger, in cooking, we expect Tara, further, to aim at manifesting her care for Jason.

With this in mind, we might try to offer the following revised answer: We might say that Tara cooks for Jason because, as his friend, she is concerned to promote Jason's interests and because she expects both the food she prepares and the care manifested in it to do this. But, although we do expect Tara to be so motivated and the food and manifest care themselves to promote Jason's interests, this answer also seems incomplete. We can see this again by considering the fact that there are ways Tara might provide Jason with these benefits that

nonetheless we would not expect to fully serve her purposes. For example, she might discreetly phone Jason's dad and suggest that he send Jason some food and a note. Although this would have the same result of providing Jason with beneficial food and manifest care, this is not something we expect Tara, given her aims, to choose to do.

The insufficiency of the above answers suggests that there is something other than providing our friends benefits that we normally aim at when we do things for them in friendship. To start to see what this is, we should consider more the strangeness of the suggestion that Tara might do just as well to provide Jason benefits secretly via a third party. What is most obviously missing in the scenario where Tara does this is Jason's seeing her helping him. And given this, I think we ought to understand the strangeness as revealing the following: we expect Tara to and we ourselves normally do, when benefiting our friends, care not only about providing benefits to our friends but also about our doing so being seen by our friends.

We might try to explain the fact that we care about being seen in many ways. We might say it is simply a fact about us that we want friends to see us doing the good deeds we do for them. Or, we might say that our concern to have our helping activities seen by friends has other self-interested grounds. Perhaps, we want our friends to see the favors we do for them so they will be in a position to reciprocate. Although that kind of consideration may sometimes lie behind a person's desire to be seen helping, given that the concern in question is a concern that our helping a *friend* be seen by the *friend*, I think we can find a different and more charitable explanation.

Friendship is characterized by shared activity. Normally, we think of friends as people who do things like go to the movies, go for a walk, or have a conversation together. But, I think that we might also see them as people who do small acts of beneficence together by doing them

for each other. For example, in the above case, we might see Tara's cooking for Jason as something that Tara and Jason, as friends, both take part in.

In what follows, I explore the possibility of shared helping. That is, I explore the possibility that helping might be shared between benefactor and beneficiary. I will consider what, in general, must be the case in order for us to think of an activity as shared. Then, I will make a suggestion about what must be involved in the particular case of a benefactor and beneficiary sharing an act of helping. I think that for an act of helping to be shared, the benefactor who performs the act must act for a reason that is a reason to help in a way that the beneficiary sees as good for that reason. When an act of helping is done for such a reason in helping, a beneficiary's seeing the act as good will be a part of the act. Small acts of helping between friends are done for reasons that are reasons to help in ways that beneficiaries see as good for those reasons. As such, we can understand, in a charitable way, our concern to be seen in doing them. We care about being seen when helping our friends because normally we aim, in helping friends, not to do something to them (that could be accomplished anonymously), but rather with them.

There might be a special concern about the possibility of benefactor and beneficiary sharing acts of beneficence. We might be worried that there is nothing for the beneficiary to do and so no way for her to participate the activity. That is, when we try think about benefactor and beneficiary sharing a helping action, we might initially feel like we are in the position of trying to think about two people playing a game of solitaire together. We can imagine ways in which it might, in an extended sense, be said that two people play solitaire together. We might say two people play together because they play in the same room. Likewise, we might say that benefactor and beneficiary do an act of helping together because one is acted upon by the other. However, in both cases, more would be required to say in a robust sense that what is done is done together.

For an activity to be shared between two people, it must be true that the success of the activity depends on both of the people doing well. Just as we do not think a person's success or failure at solitaire hangs on how someone else playing that game in the same room performs at the game, so too we might think that what a beneficiary does is not determinative of the success of the benefactor's helping.²⁷ In the process of considering what would be required for an act of helping to be shared by benefactor and beneficiary, we will see both a role for the beneficiary to play in helping and a way in which the success of the helping depends on the beneficiary doing well too. As such, I hold off on addressing these worries for now.

I want to make the following two general claims about what is required for two people to count as doing something together: First, in order for two people to do some activity together, they both must see the activity as good. It is not my aim here to present and argue for a theory of action and collective action that would ground this claim. Rather, I only give a basic, intuitive argument in its favor (my intention being to rely on this as an assumption). If two people are doing some activity together, then it must be true of each of them that she is doing that activity. And, if a person is doing some activity, then she must see that activity as good. This is the familiar but controversial guise of the good thesis. I will assume it here.

Second, if two people share some activity, not only must they both see the activity as good, further, the fact that they both see the activity as good must be non-accidentally true. Again, I do not aim to argue via theories of action and collective action for this point (my intention being to rely on this as an assumption). However, I do again think there is intuitive evidence in its favor. When we look at cases in which we are and are not inclined to say that two

²⁷ Of course, it is possible for one person's success at solitaire to indirectly impact another person's success at solitaire. Suppose A and B are playing solitaire in the same room. Suppose B plays badly and throws her cards across the room. This distracts A and makes her play badly. Alternatively, suppose A plays solitaire best when she is in the company of another person who is calmly playing solitaire. Suppose B is in the room with A. B's doing well at solitaire makes her calm and helps A to play well. When two people act together, the success of each depends on the success of the other, not in ways like these but directly we might say.

people are doing something together, I think we find the following: When we answer in the affirmative (when we say that two people are doing something together), the fact that both people take the activity to be good will be non-accidentally true. And when we answer in the negative, the fact that both people take 'the' activity to be good will be accidentally true.²⁸

If we accept the above two claims and apply them to the case of helping, we get the following: in order for a benefactor and beneficiary to share a helping action, first, both must see the helping as good and, second, the fact that both see the helping as a good must not be accidentally true. How can these conditions be met? When two people do something together, it can be tempting to try explain how it is non-accidentally true that each sees what they are doing as good by appealing to prior, joint deliberation and decision. However, that kind of thing could not explain why it is non-accidentally true that both benefactor and beneficiary see an act of helping as good. It is the benefactor's deliberation and decision that starts such an action.

Given this, we might look for something in the benefactor's deliberation and decision or, rather, in what the benefactor responds to in deliberating and deciding that might allow for it to be true that it is not accident that benefactor and beneficiary see the helping that the benefactor does as good. Here is a proposal: it would not be an accident that both beneficiary and benefactor saw the benefactor's helping as good if the benefactor's reason for helping grounded both her and the beneficiary's seeing the action as good. A reason could do this, if it were a reason not only for the benefactor to help but also for her to help in a way that the beneficiary

²⁸ To see the idea we can consider and contrast the following two cases: In the first case, A calls B and asks if B wants to go for a walk. B says yes and A and B walk down a path together. In this case, A and B walk together, and it is not an accident that A and B both see their walking as good. In the second case, C and D are strangers walking down a path in close proximity. They do not make eye contact, and neither is aware that the other is thinking that it is good they are both walking. Suppose C values C and D's walking because C is afraid of bears and thinks she is safer walking next to D. D values C and D's walking because keeping pace with C is motivating her to walk at a faster pace. We might say that C and D are not walking together even though they both value 'their' walking and that a mark of this is the fact that it is an accident that they both see 'their' walking as good.

sees as good for that reason. I take it that shared helping is helping done for such a reason. Helping done for this kind of reason is helping that is such that it can be non-accidentally true that both benefactor and beneficiary see it as good.

A benefactor who acts for the above-described reason, in full awareness of it, to help a friend will be a benefactor for whom the following is true: the benefactor intends for the beneficiary to see her helping as good for the reason she (the benefactor) sees her helping as good, and she (the benefactor) sees this (the beneficiary's seeing her helping as good for the reason she (the benefactor) sees her helping as good) as good for the same reason she saw the helping as good.

If we accept the above and think that a shared act of helping is done for a reason that is a reason to help and to help in a way that is seen by the beneficiary as good for that reason, not only can we see how it can be non-accidentally true that benefactor and beneficiary see the benefactor's act of helping as good, we can also see a role for the beneficiary to play in the helping action. Although we might initially have doubted the possibility of benefactor and beneficiary sharing a helping action on the grounds that it seemed the beneficiary has no active part to play, now we see a role that she can and must play for the action to be successful. The beneficiary sees the benefactor's act as good. This is the active part she plays in what is done. And her doing this contributes to the success of the action, to its being true that what there was reason to do was done.

The beneficiary's merit recognition is a part of helping done for a reason that is a reason to help and to help in a way that is seen by the beneficiary as good for that reason. If we think an act of helping is shared and that the beneficiary's part in the helping is her seeing the act as good, then we will clearly be thinking that the beneficiary's merit recognition is a part of the helping that is done. However, it can seem that further argument is needed to establish the fact that merit recognition is a part of helping done for a reason that is a reason to help and to help in a way that is seen by the beneficiary as good for that reason.

A benefactor who acts in accordance with a reason that is a reason to help and to help in a way that is seen by the beneficiary as good for that reason clearly does something that is aimed at her beneficiary's merit recognition. But, we might notice, a person can, in acting, aim at something that is not a part of her action when she aims to bring something about productively. However, a benefactor who acts for a reason that is a reason to help and to help in a way that is seen by the beneficiary as good for that reason does not aim at her beneficiary's recognition productively.

In later parts of my dissertation, I will present several ideas that might be used to make a case for thinking that, in friendship, a benefactor does not aim at her beneficiary's recognition productively. In the next section of this chapter, I will suggest that Aristotle thinks that a beneficiary's recognition, when the beneficiary is a character friend, can transform a benefactor's helping action. If a beneficiary's recognition can transform what a benefactor does, then, it seems that such recognition must be a part of what the benefactor does. Further, in the next chapter, I make a case for thinking that testimony is not production of belief using a couple of general observations about production. In particular, I use the observation that productive activity cannot be revised and also the observation that production ends with observation that the product aimed at has been realized.

Although more of a case might be made for thinking that a benefactor does not aim productively at her beneficiary's recognition using some of these ideas, here we will just notice the following feature of what a benefactor, who acts for a reason that is a reason to help and to help in a way that is seen by the beneficiary as good for that reason, does. The good that such a benefactor aims at, in aiming at her beneficiary's recognition, cannot be separated from the activity she does for it. In friendship, a benefactor aims for her beneficiary to see her act as good for the reason that it is. A friendly benefactor, in valuing this (her beneficiary's seeing her act as good for the reason that it is) must also value her activity, what she does for this. We can notice, however, that a distinguishing feature of productive activity is the fact that the good of

productive activity lies outside of productive activity. Necessarily, when a person acts productively, what she values is something other than what she does. So, for this reason, we can say that a benefactor who acts for a reason that is a reason to help and to help in a way that is seen by the beneficiary as good for that reason, does not aim productively at her beneficiary's merit recognition. Rather, the beneficiary's merit recognition is, I think we can say, something that such a benefactor aims at as a part of what she is doing.

Small acts of helping in friendship are shared, done for a reason that is a reason to help and to help in a way that is seen by the beneficiary as good for that reason, and include merit recognition from beneficiaries as a part. Using these ideas, we can see one non-brute way of explaining the non-instrumental value of a certain kind merit recognition for us. The helping that we do in friendship, like other activities of friendship is good in itself activity. We clearly value it in this way. And we are right to do so. Merit recognition from friends for the small acts of helping that we do for them is a part of our good in itself helping activity. As such, it is itself good in itself for us.

Small acts of helping in friendship aim at merit recognition in a way that makes merit recognition a part of those acts. However, we need to ask, does helping outside of friendship aim at merit recognition in a way that makes merit recognition a part of those acts? I think the answer to this question is yes. We can notice that some small pieces of evidence that this is true came out in the previous section's discussion of problems with the brute account. It seems, we said there, that a person can go wrong in helping a stranger by holding the door or returning keys if she does not, in helping, care about recognition from the stranger. This is true, we might think, because helping generally aims to be seen as good for the reason that it is by those who are helped. Clearly though more robust argument is needed to defend the idea that helping in general aims at merit recognition in a way that makes merit recognition a part of the act.

Further, in this section, we have assumed that the small acts of helping in friendship are good in themselves. And we simply added to that the idea that small acts of helping in friendship

are aimed at merit recognition and include merit recognition as a part. However, I think there is a connection between the helping in friendship's being good in itself and both its being aimed at merit recognition and its receiving merit recognition. Plausibly, I think, a helping's being aimed at and receiving merit recognition makes it good in itself. Clearly, argument would be needed to establish this, though.

As I said at the end of the previous section, I will not, in this dissertation, be able to argue for these additional claims. However, I will, in the next section, take a step towards doing this. In the next section, I will suggest that we can find in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* Book IX section 9 argument that a virtuous person needs a virtuous friend, the idea that the small-scale activities of practical virtue, generally, aim to be done for and recognized by a character friend in a way that makes recognition from a character friend part of the activity. Further, I think we can find in Aristotle's thinking about the activity of practical virtue and the ways in which it distinguishes itself from production, some resources we might use in starting to think about how it could be the case that aiming at and receiving recognition might make helping activity good in itself.

III. Finding the Idea that Merit Recognition is a Part of Good in Itself Helping in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* Discussion of Friendship

In Book IX section 9 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle addresses the question of whether or not a person needs friends to be happy. As commentators have pointed out, there are at least two distinct things that someone who is wondering whether or not a person needs friends to be happy might be wondering. Someone who is wondering whether or not a person needs friends to be happy might be wondering whether or not a person can be happy only if she has friends (and so whether or not a person who does not have friends needs to get friends in order to be happy). Alternatively, she might be wondering whether or not a person who has

friends can only be happy if she has her friends, that is, if she is able to be and act with the (any) friends she has. (It might be true both that a person who has friends can only be happy if she has her friends and that a person who does not have friends can be happy.)²⁹

At the beginning of section 9, Aristotle seems to be interested in the first version of the question. He seems to be interested in considering whether or not a person can be happy only if she has friends. The following passage starts section 9:

“It is also disputed whether the happy man will need friends or not. It is said that those who are blessed and self-sufficient have no need of friends; for they have the things that are good, and therefore being self-sufficient they need nothing further while a friend, being another self, furnishes what a man cannot provide by his own effort; whence the saying ‘when fortune is kind, what need of friends?’” (EN 1169b3-7)

Some people, Aristotle says, think that the happy person does not need friends because the happy person is self-sufficient. The happy person is self-sufficient, I take the idea to be, in the sense that she has a good that, on its own, makes her life desirable and lacking in nothing. Consider a person who is happy. We can ask: does this person need, in addition to what she already has, friends? The answer to this question will clearly be no. The person is, we are supposing, already happy and so already in possession of a good that makes her life desirable and lacking in nothing. However, as Aristotle quickly points out, the fact that a person who is happy will not need, in addition to what she already has, friends, does not mean that a person

²⁹ Cooper (1977b) discusses this distinction. And the distinction is in the background or foreground of many discussions of EN Book IX section 9.

might be happy without friends.³⁰ It might still be the case that a person who is happy necessarily has friends.

Aristotle continues to say that many people, in fact, do think that a person needs friends to be happy. Friends are thought to be “the greatest of external goods” (EN 1169b10). Further, the best kind of beneficence is beneficence directed towards a friend. Finally, a solitary life is not desirable even when it includes every good aside from companionship. And it is better to spend time with friends rather than with strangers. So, a person whose life is desirable and lacking in nothing must spend her time with friends.

According to Aristotle at EN 1169b22-28, a person does not need utility friends to be happy. And a person has, at most, a small need for pleasure friends.³¹ It is possible to imagine a person being happy without utility friends. A person might, on her own, outside of utility friendship, have enough of the goods that utility friendship might provide (external goods necessary to live and act).

For Aristotle, the pleasures that are most important to a person’s happiness are the pleasures associated with what we might call serious activity, that is, the pleasures associated

³⁰ After presenting the idea that the happy person does not need friends because she is self-sufficient Aristotle says: “But it seems strange, when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods” (EN 1169b8-10).

³¹ At the beginning of his *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship, Aristotle distinguishes utility and pleasure friendships from character friendship. Neither utility friendship nor pleasure friendship is the focus of this essay. As such, I do not defend a view of what is essential to these kinds of friendship. However, I can say that utility friendship, as I understand it, is a relationship in which each party is interested in the other’s good either because the other person’s good is useful or a means to some advantage or because acting for the other person’s good is useful or a means to some advantage. For example, one friend might provide a second friend with a place to stay when she is in town because doing this means that she will be offered a place to stay when she travels. Pleasure friendship, as I understand it, is similarly a relationship in which each party is interested in providing the other with pleasure either because doing so is pleasant or because doing so is a means to pleasure. For example, two witty people might give each other the pleasure of witty conversation because this is a means to the pleasure of witty conversation and is itself pleasant.

with the activity of practical virtue or contemplation.³² Still a virtuous person, as a human being, will need to take a break from the serious practical and/or theoretical activity that she devotes her life to. And, when she does, she may benefit from a pleasure friend with whom she might, for example, have a witty conversation.³³ However, still, we might think that a person could be happy without a pleasure friend. Maybe being unable to have the down-time pleasure of, for example, witty conversation is not enough to make a person who, aside from this, has a life that is desirable and lacking in nothing, fall short of happiness. Or, maybe down-time pleasure could be adequately provided by a stranger or a character friend.

Might, in some instances, a person need a utility or pleasure friend to be happy? A person might need to get from others external goods that she needs to live and act. And this may compel a person to enter utility friendship. If there is only one grocer in town, a person is likely to fall into a utility friendship with the grocer if she needs to buy food. Alternatively, a person's character friend may not be witty, and there might not be friendly strangers with whom she can

³² The pleasures that pleasure friends provide are not supposed to be these pleasures. Rather, Aristotle's examples suggest that he is imagining pleasure friends providing each other with things like the pleasure associated with witty conversation, the pleasure of sight, the pleasure associated with flattery.

Aristotle, for example, talks about pleasure friendships that provide these pleasures in the following passage:

“Among men of these sorts too, friendships are most permanent when the friends get the same thing from each other (e.g. pleasure), and not only that but also from the same source, as happens between ready-witted people, not as happens between lover and beloved. For these do not take pleasure in the same things, but the one in seeing the beloved and the other in receiving attentions from his lover...” (EN 1157a3-6)

³³ Aristotle says that the happy person will devote herself to serious practical and/or theoretical activity but will still need down-time in EN Book X section 6. He says for example:

“But to amuse oneself in order that one may exert oneself, as Anacharsis puts it, seems right; for amusement is a sort of relaxation, and we need relaxation because we cannot work continuously. Relaxation, then, is not an end; for it is taken for the sake of activity.” (EN 1176b33-35)

talk in her down-time.³⁴ It could be the case that a person is able to get the down-time pleasure of witty conversation only from a pleasure friend. Is it, then, sometimes true that a person needs utility and pleasure friendships to be happy? Utility and pleasure friendships, it seems, could be, in certain circumstances, instrumentally necessary for happiness, or, at least, the relationships could be necessary consequences of the instrumentally necessary things (for example, buying food) a person does to be happy.

Aristotle indicates immediately after the passage that occurs at EN 1169b22-28 that there is a kind of friendship that a person does need to be happy (not just, at most, in certain circumstances, instrumentally). A person needs character friendship to be happy.³⁵

The end of EN Book IX section 9, 1169b29-1170b19, seems intended to be an argument (possibly two or three) for thinking that a person must have character friends to be happy. However, again, as commentators have pointed out, understanding the end of section 9 as an argument (possibly two or three) for thinking that a person must have character friends to be happy is difficult. Several parts of that text can seem to make sense only if they are taken to be just argument in favor of thinking that a person who has character friends needs her character friends, needs to be and act with the character friends she has, to be happy.

³⁴ In EN Book IV section 8 Aristotle describes a virtue having to do with humor. The person with this virtue is supposed to have good taste with respect to humor, in the jokes she appreciates and in the jokes she makes. It seems to me like a person might have good taste when it comes to humor but not be very skilled at making jokes. For example, the person might appreciate good jokes when they come, avoid making bad jokes, and only rarely made good jokes herself. So, a person may not be able to get very much the pleasure that comes from witty conversation from a character friend.

³⁵ Immediately following EN 1169b22-28 Aristotle indicates that it does not follow from the fact that a person does not need utility or pleasure friends to be happy that a person does not need friends to be happy. Again, earlier in his discussion of friendship Aristotle distinguished utility and pleasure friendships from character friendship. And so the implication seems to clearly be that a person needs character friendship to be happy. Further, at EN 1170a13-14, Aristotle says: "If we look deeper in to the nature of things, a virtuous friend seems to be naturally desirable for a virtuous man." This, I take it, confirms that the end of section 9, EN 1169b29-1170b19, is aimed at clarifying what need a virtuous person has for character friends.

The passage at EN 1170a13-b19 where Aristotle argues from “the nature of things” that a virtuous friend is desirable for a virtuous person, in particular, strikes many people in this way, that is, as something that can be made sense of only if it is taken to be an argument that a person needs to be with the (any) character friends she has to be happy. Because of this a number of people have taken EN 1169b29-1170a4 and/or EN 1170a4-12 to be the place(s) where Aristotle argues (in some cases, where he argues successfully) that a person needs character friends to be happy.³⁶

In what follows, I will try to show that there are problems with proposals that have been made about how we can understand EN 1169b29-1170a4 and EN 1170a4-12 as argument that a person needs character friends to be happy. I do not think that this means that we need say that the entire concluding passage of EN Book IX section 9, 1169b29-1170b19, is intended only to say that a person needs to be and act with the (any) character friends that she has to be happy.

Rather, I think that there is a way of understanding the entire concluding passage, including EN 1170a13-b19, as argument that a good person needs a character friend to be happy.

³⁶ Cooper (1977b) points out that EN 1170a13-b19 is particularly difficult to understand as an argument that a person needs friends to be happy. He thinks that it must be read just as an argument that a virtuous person needs to be with the (any) friends she has to be happy (and further he thinks that this is an argument that it is unnecessary to give, since it is obvious why a person needs her friends). Cooper says: “One seems forced, then, to regard the ‘more scientific’ argument of the NE as abortive” (Cooper, 1977b, p. 296). Cooper thinks that Aristotle does succeed at arguing that a virtuous person needs friends to be happy earlier at EN 1169b29-1170a12.

Kraut (1989) thinks EN 1170a13-b19 must be understood as just an argument that a person needs to be with the (any) friends she has to be happy. (See Kraut, 1989, footnote 56.) Aristotle argues that a person can only be happy if she has friends at EN 1169b29-1170a4 and EN 1170a4-12, according to Kraut.

Reeve (1992) seems to understand both EN 1169b29-1170a4 and EN 1170a13-b19 as just argument that a person needs to be with the (any) character friends she has to be happy. And he seems to take Aristotle to argue that a person can be happy only if she has friends at EN 1170a4-12.

Bostock (2000) also seems to understand both EN 1169b29-1170a4 and EN 1170a13-b19 as just argument that a person needs to be with the (any) of the friends she has to be happy. Even rendered as such, he thinks these arguments are largely unsuccessful. Bostock seems to think EN 1170a4-12 is an argument that a person can only be happy if she has friends. This argument, also, he does not find persuasive.

Early parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics* make it clear that Aristotle thinks that a person needs help from other people to acquire practical virtue. A person will only become practically virtuous if her natural dispositions are shaped by a (practically virtuous) parent, teacher, or politician and, further, if someone teaches her what she needs to learn to acquire practical wisdom.³⁷ However, at the end of EN Book IX section 9, Aristotle does not bring up the fact that a person depends on others to acquire practical virtue in the ways he has pointed out earlier in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This is because, it seems, EN Book IX section 9 is interested in the question of what need a person who has already acquired practical virtue has, either for friends or for her friends.

Further, at the end of EN Book IX section 9, Aristotle, again, seems to be intending to argue that a person needs character friends to be happy. And character friendship is, I take it, a relationship that a person can stand in only once she has acquired practical virtue.

Aristotle starts his discussion of friendship in Book VIII of the *Nicomachean Ethics* by talking about perfect friendship. Describing perfect friendship, Aristotle says: “Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in excellence; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves” (EN 1156b8-10).

³⁷ At various points, Aristotle suggests that he has it in mind that people acquire practical virtue by being guided by others who are practically virtuous. For example, he says: “for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator; and those who do not effect it miss the mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one” (EN 1103b3-6).

Aristotle is clear that practical virtue is acquired through the performance of virtuous acts (acts that are such that the virtuous person would do them) (EN Book II section 1-4). Further, he is clear that virtuous acting and feeling is a mean that it can at least sometimes be very difficult to find (EN Book II section 9). As such, it is clear that Aristotle thinks that a person’s becoming practically virtuous on her own is extremely unlikely. Although I cannot defend the idea here, I think that there is a stronger reason that Aristotle has for thinking that a person relies on others to be practically virtuous. Plausibly, I think, a person’s dispositions and practical thinking can only count as practical virtue if they are acquired from someone with practical virtue.

Perfect friendship is, I take it, the only relationship of equality in which parties love each other because of their virtue that Aristotle talks about in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This perfect friendship, further, is the relationship that Aristotle means to consider the value of at the end of EN Book IX section 9. It is what I think should be called *character friendship* insofar as the term *character friendship* is meant to refer to the relationship of equality in which parties love each other because of their virtue that Aristotle talks about in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and distinguishes from pleasure and utility friendship.

Some who have written about Aristotle's account of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* call *character friendship* any relationship of equality in which parties love (and mutually know themselves to love in a way that is mutually known to be mutual) each other because they take each other (possibly rightly or wrongly) either to be virtuous or to have some part or aspect of virtue.³⁸³⁹ It cannot be denied, I take it, that perfect friendship, for Aristotle, is a relationship between people who are actually virtuous. And so character friendship, in the view of these writers, is something that at least can fall short of perfect friendship.

³⁸ Aristotle thinks that a person must have all of practical virtue (complete virtue) to really have a part. He says, for example:

“But in this way we may also refute the dialectical argument whereby it might be contended that the excellences exist in separation from each other...This is possible in respect of the natural excellences, but not in respect of those in respect of which a man is called without qualification good; for with the presence of the one quality, practical wisdom, will be given all the excellences” (EN 1144b32-1145a2).

So, thinking that someone has only a part of virtue is, I take it, itself a somewhat mistaken thought, as Aristotle sees it.

³⁹ I say this inclusive kind of character friendship is a relationship of equality for the following reason: As I mention also in the text below, Aristotle thinks that the more a relationship deviates from perfect friendship, the less of a friendship it is. The primary cases of pleasure and utility friendships, then, are relationships that are equal, in the sense that friends get the same amount of good from each other. Likewise, I think that someone who wants to recognize an inclusive kind of character friendship should think that the primary case of this is a relationship of equality.

Cooper (1977a) has an inclusive understanding of character friendship. He gives a description of character friendship as he understands it. (He uses the term *virtue-friendship* instead of *character friendship* in describing it.) Cooper says first that:

“What gives a friendship its character as a friendship of a particular kind is the state of mind of the partners - their intentions toward and their conceptions of one another.”

(1977a, p. 627)

And then, after pointing out that pleasure and utility friends may find each other to be pleasant or useful in more or less respects, Cooper says:

“It would be natural to suppose that within the class of virtue-friendships there could be a similar variation. Some virtue-friendships might involve the recognition of complete and perfect virtue, virtue of every type and in every respect, in the associates; other friendships of the same type might be based, not on the recognition by each of perfect virtue in the other, but just of some morally good qualities that he possesses (or is thought to possess). Thus, one might be attached to someone because of his generous and open spirit, while recognizing that he is in some ways obtuse, or not very industrious or somewhat self-indulgent. Such a friendship would belong to the type, virtue-friendship, because it would be based on the conception of the other person as morally good (in some respect, in some degree), even though the person does not have, and is not thought to have a perfectly virtuous character...” (1977a, p. 627)

It is character friendship understood in an inclusive sense that Aristotle means to consider the value of at the end of EN Book IX section 9, it might be thought.

Cooper (1977a) argues that Aristotle talks about character friendship, understood in an inclusive sense, at several points in his *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship. For example, Cooper says that Aristotle must be talking about an inclusive kind of character friendship in EN Book IX section 3, at 1165b23-31. This is the passage we find there. Speaking of character friendship Aristotle writes:

“But if one friend remained the same while the other became better and far outstripped him in excellence, should the latter treat the former as a friend? Surely he cannot. When the interval is great this becomes most plain, e.g. in the case of childish friendship; if one friend remained a child in intellect while the other became a fully developed man, how could they be friends when they neither approved of the same things nor delighted in and were pained by the same things? For not even with regard to each other will their tastes agree, and without this (as we saw) they cannot be friends; for they cannot live together.” (EN 1165b23-31)

EN Book IX section 3 is concerned with the question of how it can happen that friendships dissolve. Character friendship, Aristotle says, can dissolve either because one of the friends becomes wicked (a possibility discussed immediately before the above passage at EN 1165b13-23) or because, as we see above, one of the friends comes to exceed the other in virtue. (Character friendship can also dissolve, Aristotle says earlier at EN 1157b5-13, if character friends are prevented from living together for too long.) If people in character friendship can grow in virtue, then it must be the case that a person can stand in character friendship without being fully virtuous, Cooper (1977a) reasons.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ “Even more significant for our purposes is Aristotle’s discussion in IX 3, 1165b23 ff., of a virtue-friendship which starts out equal but is threatened with dissolution as one part improves in character and accomplishments and eventually outstrips the other. In this case it is clear that

However, there is, I take it, a way in which a person who is fully virtuous might grow in virtue. A person can expand the scope of her virtue. That is, a person can go, for example, from having practical virtue only as a private citizen to having practical virtue also as a politician. A person who has practical virtue only as a private citizen is not fully virtuous in the sense that she might still acquire the practical virtue of a politician. However, a person who has practical virtue only as a private citizen must also be fully virtuous in another sense. She must have complete virtue within the sphere in which she is said to have virtue (the private sphere). Such a person must be taken to have all of the virtues Aristotle distinguishes and describes in EN Books II-V of the *Nicomachean Ethics* along with practical wisdom.⁴¹

I take it that a person might stand in character friendship without being a politician. (If she is a politician she may need to stand in a character friendship with another politician.) But, to stand in character friendship, a person must have virtue that is complete within some sphere. I do not think that Cooper (1977a) is right that we can only understand EN 1165b23-31 if we think that Aristotle is talking about an inclusive kind of character friendship there.

Aristotle says at the beginning of EN Book VIII section 13 that there are unequal versions of all three kinds of friendship, not only pleasure and utility friendship, but also character friendship. Cooper (1977a) takes this to be further evidence in favor of thinking that Aristotle has in mind (sometimes at least) an inclusive kind of character friendship. The beginning of EN Book VIII section 13 shows, Cooper thinks, that the distinguishing feature of character friendship, as Aristotle sees it, is found not only in relationships between people who both have

Aristotle is willing to countenance a virtue-friendship where *both* parties are quite deficient with respect to their appropriate excellences.” (Cooper, 1977a, p. 628)

⁴¹ This is perhaps a little imprecise for the following reason: Aristotle distinguishes virtues concerned with greater and lesser honor and also greater and lesser expenditure. And there may be debate about whether or not a person who is virtuous must have both the greater and the lesser virtue concerned with honor and money. We can set aside this complication, though.

complete virtue but also in relationships between people who have virtue to varying degrees, at least one of whose virtue is incomplete.

Cooper (1977a) thinks that when Aristotle is talking about an unequal version of character friendship he has in mind a relationship between a person who has more of the parts of virtue (possibly complete virtue) and a person who has less of the parts of virtue (virtue that is to some degree incomplete).⁴² However, when Aristotle talks about an unequal version of character friendship, I think he can be read as talking about a relationship that arises between two people when one of them gives the other virtue (the relationship between a citizen and a politician might be understood to be a relationship in which this occurs). Such a relationship would be unequal, not because (at least) one of the parties to it had virtue that was less than complete. Rather, it would be unequal because one party gives the other a great benefit (virtue) the equivalent of which cannot be returned to her by her friend and also, possibly, because one party has the virtue of a politician while the other does not. Unequal character friendship need not be understood as a relationship in which one of the parties lacks complete virtue.

In many places in his *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship, Aristotle contrasts the interest that character friends take in each other with the interest that pleasure and utility friends take in each other.

For example, in EN Book VIII section 3 Aristotle says:

“Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for the

⁴² “But Aristotle also recognizes unequal virtue-friendships between those whose natural status is equal (1162b6-13), and in that case the inequality must consist in one of the partners being not only less morally good than the other, but deficient with respect to his own appropriate excellences. So in this case we will have a virtue-friendship where the superior person likes the inferior for such virtues as he has (or some of the), while recognizing that his character is not perfectly good.” (Cooper, 1977a, p. 628)

sake of pleasure; it is not for their character that men love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant. Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant.” (EN 1156a10-17)

Those who stand in perfect friendship, in contrast, Aristotle goes on to say, “wish well to their friends for their sake” (EN 1156b10).

In EN Book VIII section 4 Aristotle says:

“For the sake of pleasure or utility, then, even bad men may be friends of each other, or good men of bad, or one who is neither good nor bad may be a friend to any sort of person, but for their own sake clearly only good men can be friends; for bad men do not delight in each other unless some advantage comes of the relation.” (EN 1157a17-19)

In EN Book IX section 5 Aristotle says:

“And so one might by an extension of the term say that goodwill is inactive friendship, though when it is prolonged and reaches the point of intimacy it becomes friendship - not the friendship based on utility nor that based on pleasure; for goodwill too does not arise on those terms.” (EN 1167a10-13)

It is clear that Aristotle thinks that there are relationships other than character friendship in which parties take a non-instrumental interest in each other's good. These

relationships include parent-child relationships, relationships between siblings and also, I take it, relationships between subject and ruler or we might say citizen and politician.⁴³

Some who have written about Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* account of friendship seem to have taken passages like the three presented above to indicate that Aristotle thinks that (outside of family and citizen-politician relations) it is only in character friendship that people can take a non-instrumental interest in the good of other people.⁴⁴ Alternatively, others deny that Aristotle thinks that it is only in character friendship that people (again, outside of family and citizen-politician relations) can take a non-instrumental interest in the good of other people. Pleasure and utility friends also take a non-instrumental interest in each other's good.⁴⁵

It can seem reasonable for those who take the former position (those who think that it is only in character friendship that, for Aristotle, two people can [outside of family and citizen-

⁴³ Aristotle discusses these kinds of friendship in EN Book VIII section 7 and section 12. Section 12, in particular, makes it clear that Aristotle thinks these relationships involve non-instrumental concern.

Aristotle says in section EN Book VIII section 12: "...parents love their children as being a part of themselves, and children their parents as being something originating from them" (EN 1161b18-20).

And he also says in section 12:

"Parents, then, love their children as themselves (for their issue are by virtue of their separate existence a sort of other selves), while children love their parents as being born of them, and brothers love each other as being born of the same parents; for their identity with them makes them identical with each other..." (EN 1161b28-31)

If politicians are understood to give citizens their characters, then the considerations that Aristotle offers in section 12 would suggest also that politicians and citizens love each other because each sees the other as herself.

⁴⁴ There are a number of commentators who think that pleasure and utility friends do not take a non-instrumental interest in each other, for example, Bostock (2000), Reeve (1992). There is often some unclarity about whether or not those who think this also think that it is only in character friendship, family relationships, citizen-politician relationships that people can take a non-instrumental interest in each other's good. Some, though, I think can be read as thinking this.

⁴⁵ Cooper (1977a) takes this position.

politician relations] take a non-instrumental interest in the good of other people) to maintain additionally that Aristotle is talking about character friendship understood in a more inclusive sense, in at least some of the places where he talks about the difference in the interest character friends take in each other as compared to the interest pleasure and utility friends take in each other. Aristotle cannot think that everyone except those who are fully virtuous must relate to the good of other people (other than family, rulers or subjects) instrumentally, it might be thought. Cooper (1977a) suggests this line thought.⁴⁶

I take Aristotle's comments about the difference in the interest that character friends take in each other as compared to the interest that pleasure or utility friends take in each other to leave a lot open. For example, I think Aristotle could think that pleasure and utility friends as such do not need to take a non-instrumental interest in each other's good, that is, that two people might be pleasure or utility friends while not caring non-instrumentally about each other's good. But, along with this, I think Aristotle could also think that it is possible for people outside of character friendship (and also family and citizen-politician relationships) to take a

⁴⁶Cooper (1977a) says:

“By calling the parties to such a relationship [character friendship] ‘good men’ and describing their friendship as ‘perfect’ Aristotle seems to imply that only to fully virtuous persons - heroes of intellect and character - is it open to form a friendship of this basic kind. So, it would follow, ordinary people, with the normal mixture of some good and some bad qualities of character, are not eligible partners for friendships of the basic type; they would be doomed, along with the thoroughly bad people...to having friendships of the other two types, at best. Does Aristotle mean to imply that one who is not completely virtuous can only be befriended for the sake of some pleasure or advantage he brings, that no one can associate with him (unless under deception: cf., 165b8-15) for the sake of his good qualities of character?” (p. 624)

And later adds:

“It should be observed that if Aristotle holds both that pleasure and advantage-friends are wholly self-centered, and that only perfectly virtuous persons are capable of having friendships of another type, he will be adopting an extremely harsh view of the psychological capabilities of almost everyone.” (Cooper, 1977a, p. 625-626)

non-instrumental interest in others' good. So, I think Aristotle could also think that it is possible for pleasure and utility friends to care non-instrumentally about each other's good.

Aristotle seems to say in EN Book IX section 5 that a mere wish for another person's good for its own sake can sometimes just arise in people. He says:

“...goodwill may arise of a sudden, as it does towards competitors in a contest; we come to feel goodwill for them and to share in their wishes, but we would not do anything with them; for, as we said, we feel goodwill suddenly and love them only superficially.” (EN 1166b35-1167a3)

It may be the case that Aristotle thinks that there are only certain kinds of people for whom goodwill (a mere wish for another person's good for its own sake) can just arise like it does for competitors in a sporting competition. Aristotle says:

“In general, goodwill arises on account of some excellence and worth, when one man seems to another beautiful or brave or something of the sort, as we pointed out in the case of competitors in a contest.” (EN1167a18-20)

And it may also be the case that Aristotle thinks that, outside of character friendship, familial relationships and citizen-politician relationships, goodwill and any disposition to act for another's good for its own sake that it may give rise to are fleeting. However, Aristotle seems to indicate in EN Book IX section 5 that people can at least feel as if the good of another person is good for its own sake outside of character friendship, familial relationships, and citizen-politician relations.

The psychological question of, under what circumstances can a person be made to wish or to act for another person's good for its own sake, can be separated from the normative question of, under what circumstances can one person's good be good for another person for its own sake (that is, under what circumstances can one person's good be another person's good). Whenever a person wishes or acts for another person's good for its own sake, she can be understood as treating that other person's good as her own. However, it could be the case that people sometimes treat (in feeling and acting) the good of others as their own, even though it is not.⁴⁷

Understanding fully what Aristotle thinks about the psychological question would require an examination of Aristotle's psychology and theory of action that is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I do not see, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship, reason to think that Aristotle would not be at least somewhat liberal in answering the psychological question. A somewhat liberal answer seems to me suggested by EN Book IX section 5.

The normative question is something that I think Aristotle means to take up directly in his *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship. In particular, I think Aristotle means to take up directly the question of how it can be the case that the good of one good person can be good

⁴⁷ Millgram (1987), I take it, thinks that we can and should draw this distinction when we are reading Aristotle on friendship. He says:

"We have here two apparently distinct notions: that of wanting the good for one's friend for his own sake, and that of the friend's being another self. How are they related? One might think that the fact that one desires the good for one's friend for the friend's sake is constitutive, perhaps exhaustively constitutive, of the friend's being another self: to say that the friend is another self is just to say that one desires the good for one's friend for his own sake. As a treatment of friendship, I think this approach to have many merits; however, I doubt that it can be successfully imported into Aristotle exegesis." (Millgram, 1987, p. 364)

for another good person for its own sake. An explanation of Aristotle's taking this up can be found in Plato's *Lysis* (L).⁴⁸

As has been pointed out by, among others, Annas (1977), there are a number of places in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship that Aristotle seems to be responding to ideas that come up in Plato's *Lysis*.⁴⁹ For example, Aristotle's insistence in EN Book VIII section 2 that a person cannot be in a relationship of friendship with lifeless objects is, as Annas points out, one place in which Aristotle appears to be responding to the *Lysis*. In the *Lysis*, Socrates and Menexenus reject the idea that friendship requires mutual love for the reason that a person might stand in friendship with someone or something that is not capable of loving, with very young children, wine, horses, dogs, quail, wisdom, and so on (L 212c-e). It is clear that Aristotle does not think that this is a good reason to give up the idea that friendship requires mutual love. Aristotle insists throughout his *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship that friendship requires not only mutual love but mutual love that is mutually known to be mutual.

Aristotle's steady insistence that character friends love each other for each other's own sake can, I think, also be understood as a response to the *Lysis*. About midway through the *Lysis* (L 216d), Socrates, along with Menexenus and Lysis, considers the idea that love occurs when and only when something neither good nor bad badly lacks some good. Something neither good nor bad that badly lacks some good loves the good that it lacks, according to this proposal. For example, a person who is not fully ignorant loves the wisdom that she lacks.

Socrates, I take it, finds the following important problem with this proposal (L 218c-220b): If the proposal is true, then it seems like one person can only love another person on

⁴⁸ All quotes from the *Lysis* that I include come from text translated by Stanley Lombardo. See the bibliography for full citation.

⁴⁹ Also Price (1989), Penner and Rowe (2005).

account of something else and for the sake of something else. A sick person might love a doctor on account of her sickness and for the sake of health, if this proposal is true. But everything, according to this proposal, is loved on account of something, namely a bad lack in the person who loves. And one person might love another person not for the sake of something else, only if she can be said to badly lack that other person directly and not as a means. A person who lacks health might also be said to lack a doctor who could provide her with health when she does not have one. She will lack the doctor, though, not directly but as a means. We can see (perhaps) how a person might badly lack wisdom or health directly. But in virtue of what might one person be said to badly lack another person directly? This is a problem with the account because when a person really is a friend, as Lysis and Menexenus are said to be to each other throughout the dialogue, she is at least supposed to love her friend for her friend's own sake and not for the sake of something else.⁵⁰

Socrates, along with Menexenus and Lysis, eventually rejects the idea that love requires the presence of a bad lack in something neither good nor bad. There would still be love, it is suggested near the end of the dialogue (L 220c-221d), even if no lacks were bad.

There remains, at the end of the *Lysis*, questions about the revised proposal, the idea that love occurs when and only when there is, in someone, a lack of something. What is loved is what is lacked or a means to what is lacked, according to the revised proposal. Socrates, along with Menexenus and Lysis, wonders whether or not one person can be said to directly lack another person and what might make that true, since on this revised proposal as well, it seems that one person can love another person not for the sake of anything else only if she can be said to directly lack that other person. Socrates says to Menexenus and Lysis that, "if you two are friends with each other, then in some way you naturally belong to each other" (L 221e).

⁵⁰ "Then the real friend is not a friend for the sake of a friend" (L 220b).

Socrates, along with Menexenus and Lysis, further, wonders, at the end of the dialogue, whether or not two good people, in particular, might be understood to directly lack each other (if they are good must not it be true that there is nothing at all that they lack?) and so to love each other not for the sake of anything else.⁵¹

In the *Lysis*, psychological questions about when a person can be made to love and normative questions about when love is apt are not treated separately.⁵² However, when Socrates, in the *Lysis*, makes claims about the conditions under which love arises, he is at least in part making normative claims about when love is apt. I think Aristotle would accept the normative proposal grappled with at the end of the *Lysis* (at least, that is, as a proposal about what is true of people outside of family and citizen-politician relations), the proposal that one person, A, can be really lovable to another person, B, for her own sake, only if A can be said to directly lack B.⁵³

⁵¹ The idea that love occurs between two people who are alike in goodness is considered earlier in the dialogue (L 215a-b). The idea is rejected there because two good people cannot be useful to each other because a good person is self-sufficient and not in need of anything. This problem comes up again at the end of the dialogue as well.

⁵² Annas (1977), I think, thinks this also. She suggests that it is not clear whether or not the L 216d proposal is supposed to be that love is caused by a bad lack or by a lack that is perceived as bad (Annas, 1977, p. 536). This is not clarified, she suggests, because the cases considered are ones in which normally a lack is both bad and perceived as bad.

⁵³ As I will go on to talk about later, I think that Aristotle thinks a good person lacks another good person because he thinks that the activity of practical virtue is completed by a virtuous friend. A good person lacks a good friend directly when she does not have one because her good practical activity will be incomplete unless she has a friend.

The way in which a person lacks food when she is hungry or health when she is sick is different from the way in which a good person lacks another good person when she does not have a friend for Aristotle. A person might have her lack of health or lack of food remedied when someone else acts upon her. A doctor might perform a procedure on a person to restore her to health, for example. However, a person's lack of good activity is not something that can be remedied by the person's being acted upon. A person must herself act to get the good activity she lacks. And a friend, in completing a good person's practically virtuous activity, cannot be understood to remedy the good person's lack of her (the friend) by acting upon the person.

Despite the fact that there is a difference in the way in which a good person lacks a good friend for Aristotle and the way in which someone might lack something like health, I think it is still ok to say, first, that Aristotle thinks that a good person directly lacks a good friend when she

Aristotle, in insisting repeatedly that character friends love each other for each other's own sake, can be understood to, in part, be insisting that one good person can be said to directly lack another good person. And, in EN Book IX section 9, Aristotle can be understood as offering an explanation of how one good person directly lacks another good person which is an explanation of how the good of one good person can be good for another good person for its own sake.⁵⁴

In the *Lysis*, Socrates is particularly worried about the possibility that two good people might be understood to directly lack each other. Aristotle, I take it, alternatively, thinks that it is a person's being good that makes her need another person, a virtuous friend, in the special way that makes for itself love for another (outside of family and citizen-politician relations) appropriate. Rather than thinking that there is special difficulty in explaining how one good person might directly lack another good person or how the good of one good person might be good for another good person for its own sake, Aristotle thinks that it is a person's being good

does not have one and, second, that it is the fact that this is true that makes it the case that the good of one good person is good for its own sake for another good person, for Aristotle.

⁵⁴ Price (1989) does not give the same interpretation of *Lysis* I suggest above. He takes Plato to leave the topic of friendship at (L 218c-220b). However, I take Plato to have friendship in mind there. The point of the discussion is, I think, to suggest that it is difficult to see how friendship (something that involves for its own sake love of another person) is possible, given the proposal under discussion. It points us to the problem of understanding how one person might be understood to directly lack another person.

Price says that Plato keeps the idea that love requires loss that the *Lysis* ends with Socrates introducing and considering. I take it that the problem at the end of the dialogue is the problem of understanding how one person might directly lack another person (again I do not think this is just introduced at the end of the dialogue. Rather I think it is under consideration at 218c). Losing another person is one way of directly lacking them. But it might not be the only way.

Price ends his discussion of the *Lysis* by talking about the *Symposium's* myth of Aristophanes. This is something that naturally comes to mind, if one thinks that the problem the *Lysis* leaves us with is the problem of understanding how one person might directly lack another person. Aristotle, I think gives an alternative (to Aristophanes), real way in which one person might directly lack another person.

that makes it true that she directly lacks another good person and that the good of another good person (outside of family and citizen-politician relations) is good in itself for her.

We have been considering whether or not it is possible to understand some specific parts of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship (Aristotle's EN Book IX section 3 claims about the dissolution of character friendship, his EN Book VIII section 13 claim that there is an unequal version of character friendship, and finally his claims about the different kind of interest character friends take in each other (as compared to pleasure and utility friends)) without supposing that Aristotle refers to an inclusive kind of character friendship (a kind of friendship understood to occur whenever two equals love (and mutually know each other to love in a way that is mutually known to be mutually) each other because they take (possibly rightly or wrongly) each other to be virtuous or to have some part or aspect of virtue). As I have indicated, I do not think that Aristotle, in his *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship, has in mind an inclusive kind of character friendship. I do not think that an inclusive kind of character friendship is ever really what he means to refer to when he talks about friendship between men who love each other as good. Defending that position fully is not something I can do here. I will, however, try to provide a couple of additional considerations that I think count against thinking that Aristotle was interested in an inclusive kind of character friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Again, Aristotle clearly says that perfect friendship is friendship between two equals who are actually practically virtuous (who have complete virtue) and who love each other as virtuous. Aristotle says that this relationship is most fully friendship. And he says that other relationships count as or are called friendship because they resemble this perfect case. Insofar as other relationships are dissimilar to this perfect case and fall short of it, they are less fully friendship.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Speaking of friendship between virtuous people who love each other as virtuous Aristotle says: "Love and friendship therefore are found most and in their best form between such men" (EN 1156b23-24).

And he says a little later:

Aristotle mentions a variety of relationships that are called friendship, though they fall short of perfect friendship. Utility and pleasure friendships are friendships that fall short of perfect friendship. A kind of mixed utility and pleasure friendship in which one party receives something useful and the other party receives pleasure is a friendship that falls short of perfect friendship. Friendship between parents and children and friendship between siblings are friendships that fall short of perfect friendship.⁵⁶ Friendship between ruler and subject is friendship that falls short of perfect friendship. In discussing all of these imperfect friendships, Aristotle says clearly that the relationship falls short of perfect friendship. And, further, he says something about how the relationship falls short of the perfect friendship. In fact, significant portions of EN Book VIII and the beginning of EN Book IX are spent discussing the ways in which the above-mentioned relationships fall short of perfect friendship.

“Friendship being divided into these kinds; bad men will be friends for the sake of pleasure or of utility, being in this respect like each other, but good men will be friends for their own sake, I.e. in virtue of their goodness. These, then, are friends without qualification; the others are friends incidentally and through a resemblance to these.” (EN 1157b1-5)

And also:

“However that may be, the aforesaid friendships involve equality; for the friends get the same things from one another and wish the same things for one another, or exchange one thing for another, e.g. pleasure for utility; we have said, however, that they are both less truly friendships and less permanent. But it is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing that they are thought both to be and not to be friendships. It is by their likeness to the friendship of excellence that they seem to be friendships (for one of them involves pleasure and the other utility, and these characteristics belong to the friendship of excellence as well); while it is because the friendship of excellence is proof against slander and lasting, while these quickly change (besides differing from the former in many other respects), that they appear not to be friendships; i.e. it is because of their unlikeness to the friendship of excellence.” (EN 1158b1-12)

⁵⁶ Aristotle says the least about how friendship between siblings falls short of perfect friendship. But Aristotle does say that sibling friendship is bound up with parent-child friendship which falls short of perfect friendship with respect to equality. He says for example: “The friendship of kinsmen itself, while it seems to be of many kinds, appears to depend in every case on paternal friendship...” (EN 1161b17-18).

Notably, Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish, from perfect friendship, relationships between people who love each other because they take each other to have just some part or aspect of virtue. (I will call such relationships *partial-character friendships* going forward.) This is true even though partial-character friendship clearly would fall short of perfect friendship.

It might be thought that Aristotle does not bother to talk about the ways in which partial-character friendship falls short of perfect friendship, first, because it is clear why partial-character friendship is thought to be friendship (it is clear how partial-character friendship resembles perfect friendship) and, second, because it is clear how partial-character friendship falls short of perfect friendship. However, given the detail Aristotle goes into in explaining how the other kinds of imperfect friendship fall short of perfect friendship, it would be strange, I think, for Aristotle to just start talking about a kind of friendship that falls short of perfect friendship without making it clear that that kind friendship falls short of perfect friendship and without saying something about how it falls short.

Further, we can, I think, see a reason why Aristotle would not talk about partial-character friendship in his *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship. Partial-character friendship is not a necessary kind of friendship. It is not, in this respect, like the friendship that occurs between parents and children, between siblings, and between citizens and politician. And, further, there is, I think, no good found in perfect friendship that might be provided by partial-character friendship but not by the other kinds of imperfect friendship Aristotle discusses in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

In Book IX section 12, at the end of his *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship, Aristotle says the following:

“And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends; and so some drink

together, others dice together, others join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in the study of philosophy, each class spending their days together in whatever they love most in life; for since they wish to live with their friends, they do and share in those things as far as they can.” (EN 1172a1-7)

When we return to discussing the concluding portion of EN Book IX section 9 and when I make my own suggestion about how we might understand the text there as argument that a virtuous person needs a character friend to be happy, I will suggest that Aristotle thinks that people who participate in perfect friendship, when doing activities of practical virtue towards each other, act together in a special and valuable way. All kinds of people, though, we see Aristotle saying above, can in some way act with other people and enjoy so doing. When non-virtuous people drink, play dice, exercise, hunt, and so on together, they will not, I think, be acting together in the same way that virtuous friends do when they are doing certain activities of practical virtue together. However, they will be doing something that they value and find pleasant.

Partial-character friends might be useful to each other. And they might get pleasure from their interactions with each other, as pleasure friends do, if they are, for example, witty or good looking. They might do things together like anyone might with those who share her interests. However, partial-character friends will not be acting together in the way that virtuous character friends do when they do activities of practical virtue together. And partial-character friends will not get a kind of good from each other that they might not have gotten without taking each other to have some part or aspect of virtue. Partial-character friends might do things together because they take each other to have some part or aspect of virtue. But they might have acted together in a similarly valuable way because of any shared interest.

At this point, I will return to the concluding portion of EN Book IX section 9, 1169b29-1170b19. To start, I will point out problems with some proposals that have been made about how

we can understand the first part of this section, EN 1169b29-1170a12, as argument that a person will need a character friend to be happy. I will then sketch a proposal about how we can understand the entire concluding section of EN Book IX section 9, 169b29-1170b19, to be argument that a person will need a character friend to be happy.

To begin, I will discuss the passage at EN1170a4-12, since my remarks about proposals that have been made about this portion of the text will be briefer than my remarks about proposals that have been made about the text before this at EN 1169b29-1170a4.

In the text at EN 1170a4-12, Aristotle says two main things. First, he says that the activity of a person who lives with and towards others will be more continuous and more pleasant. Second, he says that a good man “delights in excellent actions and is vexed at vicious ones” and that, “a certain training in excellence arises also from the company of the good” (EN 1170a9-12).

Cooper (1977b) says that the passage at EN 1170a4-12 indicates that Aristotle thinks that people in general will be able to act well for a longer period of time when they act with other people. Cooper presents several reasons he sees for thinking this. First, when a person acts with other people, she will be best positioned to sustain her sense that what she is doing is worthwhile. This is because, first, when a person acts with other people, she knows that other people also value the kind of activity that she is doing (they are doing that kind of activity too) in a particularly powerful way (in a way that is more powerful than the way she would know that other people also value the kind of activity that she is doing if she merely knew that other people were separately doing the kind of activity she is doing). And this is also because, second, when a person acts with others, what she is doing can just be more worthwhile. People acting together can do more than a person acting on her own can. Second, when a person acts with others she can act well for a longer period of time because the activity of those she is acting with also, in a sense, counts as her activity. If those a person is pursuing some shared project with work on the project while the person is sleeping, the person’s activity on the project continues (indirectly but still in some sense, Cooper says) on while she is sleeping.

A virtuous person's life will be spent, Cooper (1977b) says, on moral projects. Moral projects can only be pursued jointly by those who are similarly virtuous. So, a virtuous person needs a friend who is alike in virtue to do moral projects with, if she is to be as active as possible, in the sense of acting well for as long as possible. This idea is implied by EN 1170a4-12, which is intended to give a reason why a virtuous person needs character friends to be happy, according to Cooper.

I think that Cooper needs to say more about the moral projects that he thinks Aristotle's virtuous person will be pursuing with others, if she is happy. Virtuous people act together on moral projects, as Cooper (1977b) sees, by working together towards a shared goal that both aim at.⁵⁷ But what kind of virtuous activities are virtuous people supposed to be doing in this way with others, when they are happy?

Large activities of practical virtue might be things that a virtuous person could pursue jointly, in Cooper's sense, with other virtuous people. For example, if a virtuous person were, in accordance with magnificence, building some kind of building for the city, she might work on this with another person who similarly possessed the virtue of magnificence. However, it is difficult to see how a virtuous person would do the small activities of practical virtue with another virtuous person, in Cooper's sense. Is a person supposed to work jointly with another person on a small act of liberality, for example, giving someone a small sum of money? It seems implausible to think that a virtuous person would do best to work with another virtuous person on the project of giving a third person a small sum of money.⁵⁸

⁵⁷“ In general, where an activity is shared one finds the following features: (1) there is a shared, and mutually known, commitment to some goal (whether something to be produced or something constitutive of the activity itself), (2) there is a mutual understanding of the particular role to be played by different persons in the pursuit of this common goal, and (3), within the framework of mutual knowledge and commitment, each agrees to do, and in general does do his share of the common effort.” (Cooper, 1977b, p. 305)

⁵⁸ It might be thought that two virtuous people could work together on a small act of practical virtue, not by each taking a part in realizing some clear goal but rather by deliberating together

As Aristotle sees it, the most blessed person will not be doing the large activities of practical virtue like building some building for the city in accordance with magnificence. And perhaps she will not even be doing much (or, if possible, any) of the small activities of practical virtue. But, the most blessed person will, I take it, still need a character friend. Cooper could

to figure out what should be done and what goal to be brought about should be pursued. The thought might be that two virtuous people might work together on a small act of liberality by working together to figure out how much money some person should be given, for example. There are some questions that this proposal will need to answer though.

First, it seems like one person can help another person decide what to do without counting as doing what the other person ends up doing with her. A might ask B for advice about what to do in some situation, and B might give advice. Still, B need not count as doing whatever A ends up doing. As such, someone who wants to give this account of how two virtuous people might work together on small acts of practical virtue, will need to say what makes it true that two people who work together to decide what should be done count as doing what is done together.

It might be thought that two people who work together to figure out what should be done will count as doing what ends up being done together when what they are deliberating together to decide is what they should together do about some situation that they face. Price (1989) thinks that virtuous friends will deliberate together about what to do together and that this plays an important role in explaining how the activity of each belongs also to the other. If A and B see someone in need they might deliberate and decide about what they together should do to help. They might decide that the person in need should be given a certain amount of money and that A should be the one to write the check. In this case B may count as doing A's act of giving the check. However, the situations that call for small acts of practical virtue in which people might act together in this way with friends will be limited. It would be strange to think that the virtuous person is supposed to approach all situations that call for small acts of practical virtue by thinking about what she and her character friend should do together about the situation.

Second, plausibly, aside from the limited situations in which the virtuous person might deliberate together with her character friend about a small activity of practical virtue they might do together, the situations in which the virtuous person will deliberate with her friend to decide what to do will be situations in which what should be done is hard to see. However, there will be questions about whether or not the most blessed person will find herself in these situations. There are, plausibly, many situations in which what liberality calls for will be clear to the virtuous person. In these situations it is implausible to think that a virtuous person should deliberate with her friend to determine what she should do. The situations in which what liberality calls for is not clear might be ones that are such that, as Aristotle sees it, a person being in them takes away from her blessedness even more so, perhaps, than does being in situations in which straight-forward liberality is called for.

Further, even if we thought that a blessed person might deliberate with another virtuous person before doing some small act of practical virtue, we will be wondering, if we are thinking about EN 1170a4-12, whether or not she might count as more active for doing this. Maybe her character friend, in helping her decide what to do, can count as doing what she is doing. But does the person who acts herself increase her activity by deliberating with her character friend before acting? Since Aristotle says a person is more active when she acts together with another as compared to when she acts on her own at EN 1170a4-12, it will be important to answer this.

think that text EN 1170a4-12 is only meant to give a reason for thinking that a person whose life includes large activities of practical needs a character friend. However, if Cooper agrees that Aristotle thinks that even the most blessed person, though she will not be doing the large activities of practical virtue, will still need a character friend to be happy, this would leave him to find elsewhere in the text, argument or explanation for that.

I do not think that we need to give up on the idea that the text at EN 1170a4-12 is intended to help explain why even the most blessed person will need a friend. When I return to give my own suggestions about how we can understand the concluding portion of EN Book IX section 9, I will suggest that Aristotle thinks that a virtuous person benefits from doing the small-scale activity of practical virtue with a character friend.⁵⁹ However, I do not think that a virtuous person shares the small-scale activity of practical virtue with a character friend in the way Cooper's discussion of shared virtuous activity suggests we envision this.

A virtuous person, I take it, can do the small activity of practical virtue with a character friend by doing that activity towards (for the sake of) a character friend. A virtuous person will not act in accordance with liberality with her character friend to benefit a third person. But she can act in accordance with liberality with her character friend to benefit her character friend. Thinking more about this and how it is possible, will, I take it, help us see to a reason Aristotle may have for thinking that even the most blessed person needs a character friend.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ As I explain below, I use 'small-scale' to describe the activity of practical virtue that aims to help just one or a couple of people as opposed to, for example, the whole city.

⁶⁰ Cooper is not the only one who thinks that at EN 1170a4-12 Aristotle is thinking of virtuous people who act with their character friends in pursuit of some shared goal that both aim at. This is also the view of Hitz (2011). Hitz suggests that Aristotle has it in mind, at the end of EN Book IX section 9, that both people who do moral projects and also people who do intellectual projects, that is, I take it, people who learn together, benefit from having friends to pursue these projects with. People doing moral and intellectual projects will be more active when they do these projects with a friend, according to Hitz.

Hitz's thinking suffers from the same problems as Cooper's. As we said above, the moral projects that a virtuous person might work on with a friend, in the way Cooper and Hitz imagine this, are not ones that the most blessed person will do. And we can add now, in response to Hitz, that the most blessed person will also not be learning. Hitz seems to be ok with thinking that the

I will now move on to considering the text at EN 1169b29-1170a4 and proposals that have been made about how we can understand this portion of the text as argument that a person needs a character friend to be happy.

In the text at EN 1169b29-1170a4, Aristotle says that, “if we can contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own,” then we will need character friends to best contemplate good activity that is our own (EN 1169b33-35). And the implication is that we can contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own. A person’s character friend, Aristotle says (previously at EN 1160a30-33 and also subsequently at EN 1170b6) is her other self. And so, when a person has a character friend, the character friend’s activity belongs also to the person. Aristotle seems to be relying on

truly blessed person, for Aristotle, does not need a friend. However, I think this is a mistake. Leading into the concluding discussion of why a virtuous person needs friends in EN Book IX section 9, Aristotle is investigating how someone who thinks that the blessed person, as self-sufficient, does not need friends goes wrong. Such a person goes wrong in thinking that, because the blessed person does not need pleasure or utility friends, the blessed person does not need friends. The blessed person does not need pleasure or utility friends, but she does need character friends, Aristotle’s suggestion seems clearly to be.

It can, further, be noted that in the *Eudemian Ethics* (EE) Book VII section 12 (discussion that runs parallel to the discussion in *Nicomachean Ethics* Book IX section 9) Aristotle seems to say a number of things that stand in tension with Hitz’s proposals.

For example, Aristotle seems to reject the idea that the good of having a character friend is having someone to learn with. He says (These quotes come from text translated by J. Solomon. See the bibliography for full citation.):

“Further, for friends who are self-dependent neither teaching nor learning is possible; for if one learns, he is not as he should be: and if he teaches, his friend is not; and likeness is friendship...” (EE 1245a16-18).

And Aristotle says about the idea that someone who contemplates will not need a friend:

“For because a god is not such as to need a friend, we claim the same of the man who resembles a god. But by this reasoning the virtuous man will not even think; for the perfection of a god is not in this, but in being superior to thinking of anything beside himself.” (EE 1245b16-18)

It might be debated whether or not Aristotle’s view changes in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But I take these passages to serve as at least some evidence against some of Hitz’s claims about the end of *Nicomachean Ethics* Book IX section 9.

the idea that a character friend is another self, at EN 1169b29-1170a4, when he says that a character friend's activity has the "attribute" of "being one's own" (EN 1169b33). A person needs a character friend to best contemplate good activity that is her own because the character's friend's activity can be better contemplated and also has the attributes of being good and one's own.

Some aiming to understand EN 1169b29-1170a4 as an argument that a person needs a character friend to be happy, have drawn from the *Magna Moralia* to explain and fill in the details of the argument.

In the *Magna Moralia* we find the following passage:

"Since then it is both a most difficult thing, as some of the sages have said, to attain a knowledge of oneself, and also a most pleasant (for to know oneself is pleasant) - now we are not able to see what we are from ourselves (and that we cannot do so is plain from the way in which we blame others without being aware that we do the same things ourselves; and this is the effect of favor or passion, and there are many of us who are blinded by these things so that we judge not aright); as then when we wish to see our own face, we do so by looking into the mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the friend is, as we assert, a second self. If, then, it is pleasant to know oneself, and it is not possible to know this without having some one else for a friend, the self-sufficing man will require friendship in order to know himself." (1213b13-26)⁶¹

Drawing from this part of the *Magna Moralia*, Cooper (1977b) proposes the following as a filling in of the EN 1169b29-1170a4 argument: People are by nature and unavoidably biased in

⁶¹ This quote from the *Magna Moralia* is taken from text translated by St. G Stock. See the bibliography for full citation.

their own favor. They are likely to overestimate their skills and virtues and underestimate their vices. As such, people cannot, on their own, outside of character friendship, be sure that any favorable assessment they make of their own character or of their own activity is accurate. People can, however, be sure that favorable assessments they make of other people (their characters and activity) are accurate. So, a person can be sure that her character friend is virtuous or acts virtuously when she judges this to be the case. Furthermore, character friends must be alike in character. And so a person can reason from the fact that her character friend is virtuous to the fact that she is similarly virtuous. In character friendship, then, a person comes to be able to know that she is virtuous and that her activity is virtuous activity. A person, in character friendship comes to be able to contemplate activity that she knows to be good and her own.

There are a number of problems with the argument so rendered. First, as Cooper (1977b) himself acknowledges, it can seem doubtful that people who are by nature and unavoidably biased in their own favor can, nonetheless, be unbiased observers of their friends. Rather, it is natural to think that people are likely to show close friends, character friends, the same kind of favorable bias that they show themselves. This seems even more likely, we can suppose, if people who are biased in their own favor are thought to be measuring their own characters by looking at their friends.

Furthermore, again as Cooper (1977b) himself acknowledges, it can seem implausible to think that a person who is unsure about the nature of her own character can be certain enough that she has the same character as her friend, for the person to use judgments about her friend's character to inform her view of her own character.

Cooper thinks that the argument he attributes to Aristotle at EN 1169b29-1170a4 has merit and can withstand these challenges. According to Cooper (1977b), it is at least true that people are less biased towards their friends than they are towards themselves. Although we may still have some favorable bias towards friends, friends are the only people whom we can know to

have the same character as us. And so looking at friends is an important source of evidence about our own characters. Further, Cooper says that with enough time and shared activity, two people who are each uncertain about their own characters can come to know with certainty that they share the same kind of character. About these things he says:

“For it does seem fair to believe that objectivity about our friends is more securely attained than objectivity directly about ourselves. And the reliance we are being invited to place on our intuitive feelings of kinship with others is not after all, either unchecked or unlimited. For it is the sense of kinship as it grows up, deepens and sustains itself within a close and prolonged association that the argument relies on. And it does seem right to trust such tried and tested feelings.” (Cooper, 1977b, p. 300)

I do not think that Cooper addresses all the reasonable worries someone might have about the argument he attributes to Aristotle at EN 1169b29-1170a4. There is, I take it, something very strange about the idea that a person can only be certain about the goodness of her character and activity by looking at a friend and using, in reasoning about her own character, the fact that she and the friend have the same character. Consider a person who devotes her life to promoting justice within her city. It seems very strange to think that this person can know herself to be just only if she sees that a close friend (a character friend of hers) is just. How can it be the case that this person's lifetime of just actions and feelings and thoughts about justice, as she is aware of them, are not sufficient grounds for her to know that she is just, and, yet, these things plus observation that her friend is just (along with knowledge that she and her friend have the same character) is sufficient grounds for her to know that she is just? The observation that a close friend is just seems like it should hold very little weight in this person's

deliberation about whether or not she is just, and so it is hard to see how it can be something the person might depend upon to know that she is just.

However, even if we set aside questions about the plausibility of the argument and its premises, there is, I take it, reason to think that the argument Cooper attributes to Aristotle is not actually what Aristotle has in mind at EN 1169b29-1170a4.

Cooper's (1977b) argument, I take it, implies that a person can only be virtuous once she has entered character friendship. However, again, character friendship is, I take it, supposed to be a relationship that person needs practical virtue to stand in.⁶²

A person who has practical virtue, as Aristotle understands it, cannot have mistaken ideas about the goodness of her character (she cannot over or even underestimate the goodness of her character). And she cannot be unsure (not know) about the goodness of her character, in the way Cooper imagines people to be outside of friendship. This is because one of the virtues that a virtuous person as such has, according to Aristotle, is the virtue of magnanimity and/or the virtue concerned with lesser honor. A person with virtue concerned with honor, as we said above, has the right relation to honor. She pursues, accepts and rejects honors well. And, what determines what honors a person should pursue, accept and reject is, in part, the goodness of a person's character. So, a person with virtue concerned with honor cannot have mistaken ideas about the goodness of her character. And she also cannot be unsure about the goodness of her character in the way Cooper imagines people to be outside of friendships.

Again, I think that the relationship that Aristotle is considering the value of at the end of EN Book IX section 9 is a relationship that a person must be practically virtuous to stand in. However, it might be thought by others that people who are in a position to have the virtues aside from magnanimity or the lesser virtue concerned with honor (they would have the virtues were they to acquire the last part of virtue, virtue concerned with honor), can enter character

⁶² Price also makes this point in passing (Price, 1989, p. 123).

friendships. That is, it might be thought that being in character friendship does not require a person to have practical virtue. Rather, it just requires a person to have all parts of virtue in place except for the virtue concerned with honor. When people enter character friendship, then, they come to acquire the whole of practical virtue through acquiring the last part.

However, if this were Aristotle's view, it seems strange that Aristotle is not clearer about the fact that character friendship is required to acquire practical virtue. And it also seems strange that character friendship is not said to be something that is required to acquire practical virtue earlier in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, since, earlier (for example, in Book II) Aristotle makes a number of very practical observations about how people are made to acquire character virtue. Finally, if Aristotle's idea is that a person needs a character friend to acquire practical virtue, it is strange that he does not mention the kinds of friendship that he has already indicated are required for a person to acquire practical virtue. The idea that there is one more kind of relationship a person depends on to become virtuous is much less radical sounding than the text at the end of EN Book IX section 9. Again, I think it is a mistake to think that a person might stand in character friendship without complete practical virtue (even if one thinks a person needs most of virtue to stand in it). And, in light of the considerations mentioned in this paragraph and others mentioned above, I think it is a mistake to read Aristotle as suggesting that a person needs character friendship to become practically virtuous.

I have suggested that a person's being biased towards herself in a way that makes her mistaken or unsure (unable to know) about the goodness of her character is incompatible with a person's being practically virtuous. However, we might try to understand Aristotle's idea that we (even if we are practically virtuous) can contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves and their activity better than our own in a way different from the one that Cooper proposes. For example, there might be aspects of good practical activity that a person cannot appreciate about

her own good practical activity while she is doing it.⁶³ The way it looks to do good practical activity might be one such aspect. Alternatively, the fact that good practical activity is the activity of a finite and fallible being might be another such aspect. However, if we take Aristotle at EN 1169b29-1170a4 to be suggesting that a good person needs to have a character friend and see her character friend's good practical activity so that she can appreciate one or the other of these aspects of good activity, and, even more, if we think that Aristotle thinks that a good person should use the appreciation of good activity she gains from her friend later when she is sitting and contemplating good activity that is her own, we will again run into some problems.

First, it is hard to see why Aristotle would place such a great importance on being able to think about the look of good practical activity. Why would he think that a person can only be happy if she can contemplate good activity that is her own in a way that takes into account how that activity looks? It is unclear how much a person might reasonably move from the fact that her character friend looks some way when she (the character friend) is doing some kind of good practical activity to conclusions about the way that she herself (the observer friend) or people in general look when they are doing that same kind of good practical activity. It would be a mistake for a person look at a friend playing the piano and think, 'that it is how I must look when I am playing the piano, since we are friends'. This is true no matter how close the person is to her friend and no matter how similar to her friend's character her own character is. Anyone might have a different style of playing the piano (sway in a different way when they are playing the

⁶³ Kraut (1989) uses this kind of thought in his explanation of why a person can better contemplate a neighbor. Kraut offers a proposal different from those I suggest above about what aspect of virtuous activity a virtuous person cannot appreciate while she is acting. Kraut seems to think that the virtuous person cannot appreciate the virtuousness of her action while she is doing it, if she is to act well. He says that, "too much self-consciousness about the performance of an act undermines its chances of success," and this is why, "the courageous person thinks about how to win this particular battle, and is too engaged in this activity to step back and enjoy the observation of a courageous man in action" (Kraut, 1989, p. 143). Kraut's account would, I think, suffer from the same kind of problems that I point out for the similar proposals I do consider.

piano, for example). Since a friend is another self, a person might contemplate her friend's activity to contemplate good activity that is her own in a way that takes into account how that activity looks, it might be thought. But if the look of her friend's good practical activity is not revealing of the way good practical activity in general looks (if there is no such thing as this), it is hard to see why appreciating this aspect of her friend's good practical activity would be crucial to her happiness.

Furthermore, when a person is around a character friend, she will often be acting or interacting with her character friend in a way that will actually make it difficult to appreciate the way her character friend looks doing what she is doing. If a person is fighting courageously in battle and a character friend of hers is near her, the character friend will most likely be fighting too and so the character friend will be unable to appreciate what her courageous fighting looks like. And even if two character friends are just sitting around talking, it seems like one friend's attending in a serious and extended way to the way the other friend looks while she is talking would be incompatible with the conversation going well.

A similar issue will arise if we think a person needs a character friend to appreciate practical activity that is her own in a way that takes into account the fact that that activity is the activity of a finite and fallible being. Attending in a serious and extended to this feature of her friend's activity, while the activity is occurring, will often be difficult for a person to do, given the ways in which she will be acting and interacting with her friend when she is around her friend.

Finally, we can notice that a person might, it seems, appreciate her own finitude and fallibility as a practical being when she is sitting and contemplating good activity that is her own. A person cannot, while she is fighting courageously in battle, think about the fact that she is a finite and fallible practical being. This is incompatible with fighting well, it might be thought. However, when a person gets back to her house after the battle and starts contemplating her

previous courageous fighting, she can, perhaps, think about the fact that it was the courageous fighting of a human, finite and fallible being.

There are cases in which it seems plausible to think that a person's ability to evaluate her own activity depends upon her ability to see the activity of another person. For example, suppose a parent, for a period of time, dedicates herself to the project of helping her child learn to play the piano and become a professional piano player. We might think that, in order for the parent to evaluate her own activity during the period of time when she is dedicated to this project, she has to look at the child's activity. Is the child playing the piano professionally? The parent will have succeeded and done well, we might think, only if the answer to this is yes.⁶⁴ And, further, the parent will know that she has succeed only if she sees her child playing the piano professionally. We can explain both the dependence of the goodness of parent's activity on the child's activity and the fact that the parent needs to see the child's activity to evaluate her own activity, by saying that the parent acts productively to bring about her child's activity, her child's professional piano playing.

Might a person need to look at her character friend's activity to evaluate her own activity like the parent in the above case? Character friends might need to look at each other's activity to evaluate their own activity, if, as character friends, they must be understood as acting productively towards each other.

Suppose we think that it is true that character friends as such must be understood as acting productively towards each other and that, because of this, it is true of character friends that each must look at the other's activity in order to evaluate her own activity (like the parent must look at the child's activity to evaluate her activity in the above case). This will not show us a

⁶⁴ We can set aside here worries about whether or not it is morally ok for the parent to act productively towards her child like this.

reason why a person needs a character friend to be happy. It is because two people are character friends (and as such acting productively towards each other) that each needs to look at the other's activity to evaluate her own activity. If we think that Aristotle is suggesting at EN 1169b29-1170a4 that a person can contemplate her character friend's activity better than her own activity because, as a character friend, she acts productively towards her friend, then we must be thinking that EN 1169b29-1170a4 is really just an argument that a person needs the (any) character friends she has to be happy. She must be with and see what her friends are doing to evaluate and contemplate her own activity. Even if we are willing to accept that Aristotle is only arguing at EN 1169b29-1170a4 that a person needs to be with the (any) character friends she has to be happy, there are, I think problems with the idea that character friends must be understood as acting productively towards each other.

Millgram (1987) suggests a way in which character friends might be understood as acting productively towards each other. Character friends, according to Millgram, sustain each other's virtuous characters and because of this can be said to produce each other's virtuous characters. Millgram says that it is because character friends produce each other's virtuous characters that they are other selves and that the good of each is good in itself for the other. Drawing from Millgram, we might consider the possibility that character friends, as such, produce by sustaining each other's virtuous characters.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Reeve (1992) thinks that Millgram (1987) is right that character friends are other selves because they produce by sustaining each other's virtuous characters (Reeve, 1992, p. 181). There are differences between Reeve and Millgram in how they interpret the concluding portion of EN Book IX section 9, though. Millgram takes EN 1169b29-1170a4 to be an explanation of how character friends sustain each other's virtuous characters. (He also seems to interpret EN 1170a4-12 in this way.) Reeve, alternatively, interprets EN 1169b29-1170a4 as argument that a virtuous person needs to be with the character friends she has to be happy.

Kraut (1989) also seems to think that the idea that character friends make each other's characters is important to understanding Aristotle's argument at EN 1169b29-1170a4 (p. 143).

Millgram does not make the mistake of saying character friends start out lacking practical virtue and work together to make each other practically virtuous. Practical virtue, I take it, must be acquired from someone with practical virtue. It is not something that two people who lack practical virtue might bootstrap their way to. If one person who has practical virtue gives another person who starts off lacking practical virtue, practical virtue, the relationship between these people will be one that falls short of the equality found in perfect friendship or character friendship or the relationship that Aristotle means to consider the value of at the end of EN Book IX section 9.

I think that there is a problem with Millgram's argument that character friends are other selves because they produce each other's characters (by sustaining each other's virtue). Millgram (1987) relies, in his argument, on Aristotle's idea that a producer's product is the producer in actuality and that this is the cause of the producer rightfully loving her product as herself. Two people who produce each other's characters by sustaining each other's characters, for Aristotle, could rightfully love each other for each other's own sake. However, not everything that a person effects in the world is her product or herself in actuality. Someone making a pot might splatter some clay on the wall in the process of making a pot. But, clearly, the clay splatter will not be this person's product or herself in actuality, something she loves as herself. It is clear this person will not have the same relation to the clay splatter as she has to the pot. Millgram's argument requires more than its being true that character friends have the effect of making each other's virtuous characters more stable. He needs for it to also be true that a virtuous person's sustained virtuous character is her character friend's product or her character friend in actuality.

It will, I take it, be difficult for Millgram to argue for this further point. Aristotle thinks that a person's character is a stable, enduring, and difficult to change to thing.⁶⁶ As such, it is

⁶⁶ This comes up several times in the *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship. Aristotle says, for example:

implausible to think that a person or her activity would aim at sustaining her friend's virtuous character. (Why bother?) In most cases, as Aristotle seems to see it, a person's character will persist as it is without the help of anything. It is implausible, then, I take it, both to think that character friends are other selves because they sustain each other's characters and to think that character friends as such act productively towards each other by sustaining each other's characters.⁶⁷⁶⁸

“Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good - and excellence is an enduring thing.” (EN 1156b10-12)

And he also says: “Now equality and likeness are friendship, and especially the likeness of those who are like in excellence; for being steadfast in themselves they hold fast to each other...” (EN 1159b3-5).

⁶⁷ Aristotle does say that a person who sees her character friend starting slip from virtue should try to help her friend sustain her virtue (EN Book IX section 3). Millgram, perhaps, could try to argue that character friends produce each other's characters because they are ready to step in if they see each other beginning to slip from virtue. However, it just does not seem plausible to think that a person counts as actively keeping another from all the things that the person is prepared to help the other avoid. For example, a person might be prepared to try and stop her partner from becoming a pirate, if it ever seemed like her partner was considering becoming a pirate. But it is implausible to think that a person who is so disposed, living in present day Los Angeles, perhaps, is actively keeping her partner from becoming a pirate just because it is true she would try to talk her partner out of becoming a pirate if her partner ever seemed to be considering becoming a pirate. A sign that such a person is not actively keeping her partner from becoming a pirate, we might think, is the fact that she is not looking for signs that her partner is considering becoming a pirate. Plausibly, a person will similarly not be looking for signs that her character friend is slipping from virtue.

⁶⁸ If we were to accept Millgram (1987)'s thinking about why character friends are other selves, we would still need to know what the good of character friendship is and why Aristotle thinks (assuming we still think he thinks) that a person needs a character friend to be happy. It would be natural for someone who accepts Millgram's view to suggest that a person needs character friends to be happy because a person needs character friends to sustain her practical virtue. But, as is likely clear, it is not plausible to think that Aristotle thinks a person needs a friend for this reason. It is true that in EN Book IX section 3, Aristotle says that character friendship can dissolve when one of the character friends becomes wicked. However, it could be true that Aristotle thinks both that is possible for a person who is virtuous to become wicked and also that a person, normally, does not need anything special to sustain her virtuous character. This would be true if, for example, only extreme and extremely rare hardship were capable of causing a virtuous person to lose her virtuous character. If a character friend is only needed to sustain virtue in the face of extreme and extremely rare hardship, then, it is hard to see why a person

Might there be another way in which character friends act productively towards each other that might explain why a person would need to look at her character friend's activity to evaluate her own activity? We might follow Lawrence (1993) in thinking that, as Aristotle sees it, the activity of practical virtue aims at making others practically virtuous and at making changes in the world that allow others to contemplate. Sometimes the activity of practical virtue will make a change that impacts many others. For example, a person's courageous fighting may be for the sake of everyone in her city. But other times the activity of practical virtue will make a change that impacts only one other person or a couple of other people. For example, a person might, in accordance with liberality, give one person some money. Suppose we thought that character friends do small-scale practically virtuous activity towards each other. And suppose we thought that, in doing this, they aim productively at each other's contemplation. (Character friends are already practically virtuous.) Then, we might think that character friends would need to look at each other's activity in order to evaluate their own activity. Each friend would need to ask, is my friend contemplating, and see whether or not she is, in order to evaluate her small-scale practically virtuous activity.

There is an obvious problem with this proposal that immediately disqualifies as a proposal about Aristotle's thinking about character friends. Aristotle contrasts the activity of practical virtue with production. He says, for example, explicitly that the activity of practical virtue is not good just in virtue of what it produces and that it is clearly distinguished from productive activity in this.⁶⁹ So, character friends cannot be understood as doing their small-

would need a character friend to be happy. This natural addition to Millgram's view is not promising.

⁶⁹ He says this in describing virtue of character in EN Book II section 4: "Again, the case of the arts and that of the excellences are not similar; for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves..." (1105a27-28)

And he also says in EN Book VI section 4:

scale practically virtuous activity towards each other, and, in doing this, to be acting productively towards each other.

Might character friends act productively towards each other when they are not doing what practical virtue requires and when they are not contemplating? They might. But Aristotle seems to think that character friends are important for more than just making better a person's down-time (the time she must, as a human being, take away from her serious activity). Pleasure friends, he seems to think, are primarily for making better a person's down-time. But, again he says that a person only has, at most, a small need for them. Further, when Aristotle suggests that a person will need to contemplate good activity that is her own to be happy at EN 1169b29-1170a4 he does not mean that a person must contemplate what she does in her down-time to be happy.

I think it is right to think that it is characteristic of character friends to do the small-scale practically virtuous activity that they do towards each other. Aristotle says a couple of times that the best beneficent activity is beneficent activity direct towards a friend.⁷⁰ And I believe that he thinks that it is good for a person to have a character friend because it is good for a person to, when she does do the small-scale activity of practical virtue, do it towards a character friend. However, clearly, work needs to be done to understand why Aristotle thinks this. We need to understand why Aristotle thinks the small-scale activity of practical virtue is best when done

“...making and acting are different (for their nature we treat even the discussion outside our school as reliable); the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Nor are they included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor is making acting.” (EN 1140a2-6)

⁷⁰ Above we mentioned that he says this at the beginning of EN Book IX section 9. And he also says at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship, in Book VIII section 1:

“For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends?” (EN 1155a5-9)

within a relationship in which parties know each other to be practically virtuous and in which this knowledge is mutually known to be mutual. (Aristotle clearly says that character friends love each other as virtuous and share a mutual knowledge that this is true that is mutually known to be mutual. Here I focus on one part of that.)

Good activity is good for a good person. And character friends stand in a relationship that is long-lasting. As such, we might think the following is a special feature of beneficent activity directed towards a character friend: When a person acts beneficently towards a character friend, what she does is something she knows to be good in part because it gives her friend an opportunity to act beneficently in return. This same thing, it might further be thought, will be true of the character friend's beneficent activity towards her. Her friend's beneficent activity towards her will be good in part for providing her with an opportunity to act beneficently in return. If this kind of thing were true of the beneficent activity between character friends, then, beneficent activity in character friendship might to come to have a special kind of value.

To understand how this might happen, I think it will be helpful to consider the following example: Suppose two friends engage in a kind of beneficence rivalry. One friend does something nice for the other friend, and then the other friend tries to return the favor and more in a creative way. Suppose on some occasion one of these friends buys the other a donut. The next day the friend who received the donut buys her friend a dozen strawberry donuts. The following day the person who received a dozen strawberry donuts enrolls her friend in a strawberry-themed cooking class and so on. ⁷¹

⁷¹ Kraut (1989) finds in Aristotle the thought that the virtuous person will engage in moral rivalry with other virtuous people (p. 115-119). Virtuous people will try to outdo each other in their practically virtuous activity, according to Kraut. Although Kraut does not use the idea of moral rivalry to make a proposal like the one I suggest here, it is a natural friend to such a proposal.

We can see how the activity of the friends in this example acquires a value beyond the value it has in virtue of what it does in the world to materially benefit the friend. The first friend's buying the second friend a donut is good, we can suppose, in part because it provides the second friend with good tasting nourishment. However, it is also good because it provides the second friend with an opportunity act creatively in return. The second friend's buying the first friend a dozen strawberry donuts, is likewise good in part because the donuts provide good tasting nourishment. But, again, the act does more this. It provides the first friend with an opportunity to act creatively in return. There is, we might say, a valuable pattern of activity that emerges in the above case.

This example is exaggerated. But if it were true that in character friendship, character friends acted beneficently towards each other in part for the sake of their character friend's beneficent activity, then I think we might be able to find something similar happening in character friendship. We might be able to say that beneficence in character friendship forms a valuable pattern of activity.

However, there is reason to think that Aristotle would not think that the goodness of beneficent activity is ever, in part, allowing another person to act beneficently in return. Practically virtuous activity (when it is not making people good) aims at allowing people to contemplate, not at giving people more practical tasks, some of Aristotle's remarks suggest.⁷² We should try to find a different way in which small-scale beneficence in character friendship distinguishes itself.

Suppose that the activity of small-scale practical virtue aimed to do good in the world for certain individuals (perhaps, to make the world such as to allow for certain individuals to contemplate) and also to be seen as good for the reason that it is by those individuals. The

⁷² For example, Aristotle says in EN Book X section 7 that, "happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure..." (EN 1177b4-5).

goodness of small-scale acts of practical virtue would depend, then, both on the acts really making good changes in the world for certain individuals (perhaps, changes that allow for certain individuals to contemplate) and on the acts being seen as good for the reason that they are by those individuals.

Aristotle seems to think that there is an understanding of practical virtue that a person will only have if she is practically virtuous.⁷³ As such, it is plausible to think that, for Aristotle, a person's practically virtuous activity can be seen as good for the reason that it is only by a person who is likewise practically virtuous. Further, in order for a person to see some activity of practical virtue as good for the reason that it is, she must know that the person who does it is practically virtuous.

Character friends are practically virtuous and know each other to be practically virtuous. But it is possible for two people who are practically virtuous and who know each other to be practically virtuous to still not be such that they share a mutual knowledge of each other's virtue that is mutually known to be mutual. Suppose A and B are both virtuous. And suppose that A knows that B is virtuous and that B knows that A is virtuous. Still, it could be true that A does not know that B knows that she (A) is virtuous and that B does not know that A knows that she (B) is virtuous. Suppose this is true. A and B will fail to be character friends. Aristotle thinks that character friends must mutually know each other to be virtuous and mutually know that this mutual knowledge is mutual.

If we assume that the small-scale activity of practical virtue aims to do good in the world for certain individuals and to be seen as good for the reason that it is by those individuals, can we find a reason for thinking that the small-scale activity of practical virtue done in character friendship is better than the small-scale activity of practical virtue done between people like A and B described above? If A does a small-scale act of benevolence for B, B, as practically

⁷³ Aristotle says that practical wisdom requires the character virtues in EN Book VI section 13.

virtuous, is in possession of what she needs to see A's act as good for the reason that it is. So what might be missing when A does a small-scale act of beneficence for B that B, using the knowledge she has as a similarly practically virtuous individual, sees as good?

I think the following might be true: When one character friend does a small-scale act of beneficence for the other and the other sees the activity as good for the reason that it is, the beneficiary's seeing the act as good for the reason that it is makes the benefactor's act good in a special way. The beneficiary's seeing the act as good for the reason that it is makes the benefactor's act good not just because it is the realizing of a state that the benefactor's act aimed to realize. The beneficiary's seeing the benefactor's act as good for the reason that it is, rather, is a part of the benefactor's activity. It completes and transforms the benefactor's act.

In character friendship, when one character friend acts beneficently towards the other, it is not just true that the one friend acts, in accordance with practical virtue, to, perhaps make the world amenable to the other's contemplating and, additionally, that the other friend sees that the first friend does this. The beneficiary's seeing the benefactor's act as good for the reason that it is, when benefactor and beneficiary are character friends, makes it true that the benefactor was, in acting, doing a seeing of good beneficent activity. In this way it completes and transforms the activity. This, we might think, is really what the small-scale activity of practical virtue aims at, in addition to making good changes in the world. The small-scale activity of practical virtue aims at being seen as good for the reason that it is by a character friend. And when it so seen it becomes a seeing of good practical activity accomplished together.

The idea that, for Aristotle, the activity of practical virtue aims at being seen as good for the reason it is is not something that I take to be only wild speculation. Again, Aristotle says that one of the virtues that a practically virtuous person as such must have is the virtue of magnanimity and/or the virtue concerned with lesser honor. The person with one or both of

these virtues will have a proper relation to honor. She will, again, pursue, accept or reject honors well. A person does this, Aristotle indicates, in part, when she pursues and accepts honors from good people who know her character for good deeds.

I take it that a person's having the virtue of magnanimity and/or the virtue concerned with lesser honor impacts the way in which she does all practically virtuous activity, for Aristotle. It does this, not just by making the person, first, such as to not stop doing other practically virtuous activity to pursue bad honors and, second, such as to stop doing other practically virtuous activity when she should instead accept or directly pursue good honors. A person's having the virtue of magnanimity and/or the virtue concerned with lesser honor, further, makes it true that, in doing practically virtuous activity in general, in, for example, fighting courageously or in giving money in accordance with liberality, she does what is aimed at being seen as good for the reason that it is.

I take it that two things are speculative about the above proposal. These are: first, the idea that the small-scale activity of practical virtue aims at being seen as good for the reason it is by, in particular, the person whom it benefits and, second, the idea that when one character friend benefits another, the other character friend's seeing her beneficent action as good for the reason that it is is a part of the benefactors activity and completes and transforms the benefactor's activity, making that activity a jointly accomplished seeing of good practical activity.

I cannot here fully defend these speculative aspects of the above proposal. But I will say a few things about why I think it makes sense to accept the above proposal as whole. First, thinking that the small-scale activity of practical virtue aims to be seen by a character friend and that when it is seen by a character friend it is completed in a special way that makes it a jointly done seeing of good practical activity, allows for what I take to be a compelling reading of the concluding section of EN Book IX section 9. I will provide a sketch this reading below. And I

hope that the above discussion has shown some of the difficulties that one encounters in trying to interpret the first part of concluding section of EN Book IX section 9 without relying on the above proposal.

Further, with respect to the first speculative aspect of the above proposal, the idea that the small-scale activity of practical virtue aims at being seen as good for the reason it is by, in particular, the person whom it benefits, I can say the following:

It was mentioned above, in our discussion of Millgram that Aristotle says that a producer rightfully loves her product as herself. This idea is discussed in *Nicomachean Ethics* Book IX section 7 by Aristotle. There Aristotle says that craftsmen love the things that they create because these things are themselves in actuality. A potter loves his pots, for example. Aristotle says that benefactors similarly love those they benefit, for the same reason, because beneficiaries are benefactors in actuality. About these things Aristotle says:

“This is what happens with craftsmen too; every man loves his own handiwork better than he would be loved by it if it came alive; and this happens perhaps most of all with poets; for they have an excessive love for their own poems, doting on them as if they were their children. This is what the position of benefactors is like; for that which they have treated well is their handiwork, and therefore they love this more than the handiwork does its maker. The cause of this is that existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved, and that we exist by virtue of activity (I.e. by living and acting), and that the handiwork is in a sense, the producer in activity; he loves his handiwork, therefore, because he loves his existence. And this is rooted in the nature of things; for what he is in potentiality, his handiwork manifest in activity.” (EN 1167b33-1168a9)

The discussion in EN Book IX section 7 presents itself as aimed at answering the question of why benefactors love beneficiaries more than beneficiaries love benefactors. The fact

that benefactors seem to love beneficiaries more than beneficiaries love benefactors is, Aristotle says, puzzling to many and also not well explained by the supposition that benefactors are like creditors and beneficiaries are like debtors. We can, I take it, set aside Aristotle's remarks about the *difference* in the way that benefactors feel about beneficiaries and the way that beneficiaries feel about benefactors and just focus on the idea that comes out in Aristotle's discussion of this difference, namely, the idea that, when one person helps another, the person who helps can see herself, herself in actuality, in the person she helps.

If it is true that the activity of practical virtue aims to be seen as good for the reason that it is, then we might think that it must also be true that it is good to see the activity of practical virtue as good for the reason that it is. With this in mind we might consider the following:

Suppose one person, A, in accordance with practical virtue, builds a chair for another person, B. Suppose A does this so that B can sit in the chair when she is contemplating. A helps B by providing B with a chair that helps B to contemplate. But there is another good we might think that A makes available to B. A makes available to B good seeing of good practical activity (that is, good seeing of good practical activity as good for the reason that it is). A sees herself in the chair that she makes for B and in the conditions that she creates that aid B's contemplating, we can suppose. As practically virtuous and a chair-builder, A knows how to bring these things about and sees herself in actuality in them. However, can A see herself in B's good seeing of the good practical activity that she (A) does, supposing that B does this good seeing?

There is, we might think, always an extra benefit that someone who acts beneficently (in accordance with practical virtue) makes available to the person she helps. This further benefit is good seeing of good practical activity. It is good, we might suppose, for someone who acts beneficently towards someone to act for and in providing this further benefit. A benefactor will be more active if she does. However, we might also think that a person can act for and in another person's good seeing of the good practical activity she does, only under certain conditions. We might think that a person can do this only when she benefits a character friend.

Consider A and B from the example above. Suppose, first, that A does not know whether or not B is virtuous. A will not then be able to see herself in B's seeing of her good practical activity. Even if B is virtuous and does see A's activity as good for the reason that it is, A did not know that B would see her activity as good for the reason that it is. So, A cannot see herself in B's seeing of her (A's) activity as good for the reason that it is. Suppose, second, that A does not know whether or not B knows that she (A) is virtuous. Again, if this is true, A will not be able to see herself in B's seeing of her good practical activity. Again, A will not know that B will see her activity as good for the reason that it is.

Suppose, as a third possibility, that A does not know whether or not B knows that A knows that B is virtuous and that B knows that A is virtuous. Again, we might think that A will not be able to see herself in B's good seeing of the good practical activity that she (A) does. In order for A to see herself in B's good seeing of the good practical activity that she (A) does, A will need to know that B knows that A knows that B will see her activity as good for the reason that it is, we might suppose. Put roughly, we might think that B must see A in her (B's) own seeing of the good practical activity that A does, in order for the seeing that B does to be A in actuality. And A must see B seeing A in her (B's) seeing of good practical activity, for A to see herself in B's seeing of the good practical activity that she (A) does.

A benefactor can act and see herself in her beneficiary's seeing of the good practical activity that she (the benefactor) does, only if the benefactor knows, first, that the beneficiary is virtuous, second, that the beneficiary knows that she (the benefactor) is virtuous and, third, that the beneficiary knows that she (the benefactor) knows that the beneficiary is virtuous and that the beneficiary knows that she (the benefactor) is virtuous. These conditions will only be met in character friendship, when two people know each other to be virtuous and when this knowledge is mutually known to be mutual.

At the start of this discussion of how a benefactor sees herself in actuality in her beneficiary we were considering the first speculative aspect of the proposal about why small acts

of beneficence are best done for a character friend. We were considering, that is, the idea that small-scale beneficence aims to be seen as good for the reason that it is by the person whom it benefits. We suggested that this could be true because seeing good practical activity is good and so is a further benefit that a benefactor, already helping some beneficiary, might act to provide and might see herself in. A benefactor who acts for and in this further benefit will be more active we said.

In considering how a benefactor might see herself in her beneficiary's seeing of the good practical activity that she does, we have found some support for the second speculative aspect of the above proposal, the idea there is something special about benefitting a character friend who sees the beneficent act as good for the reason that it is. We have suggested now that it might be only a character friend whose seeing of the good beneficent activity that a person does can be something that a person (a benefactor) is and sees herself in.

Above we suggested that when a character friend sees a beneficent act as good for the reason that it is, the character friend's seeing the act as good completes and transforms the act. It makes the act, we said, a jointly done seeing of good practical activity. The idea that a benefactor can only see herself in her beneficiary's seeing of the good practical activity that she (the benefactor) does when her beneficiary is a character friend, might get us a step closer towards accepting this idea. However, does a benefactor acting and seeing herself in her beneficiary's seeing of what she (the benefactor) does as good transform a benefactor's act of beneficence? More needs to be done to explain and make a case for thinking that it does.

Towards the end of providing such explanation and defense, we might notice there is some strangeness surrounding Aristotle's ideas about the activity of practical virtue. Aristotle is clear that the virtuous person chooses the activity of practical virtue (each activity of practical virtue that she does, for example, courageous fighting on some occasion) for its own sake. She sees the activity that practical virtue calls for as what it is to be happy when it is called for and chooses it as such. Further the virtuous person values things correctly. And so if she chooses the

activity of practical virtue for its own sake, then it must be true that the activity of practical virtue is good for its own sake for her. However, it can be difficult to understand how the activity of practical virtue is supposed to be good for its own sake.

Let us suppose here, as we did above, that the activity of practical virtue, makes changes in the world that are aimed at making others good and allowing others to contemplate. Let us set aside the part of virtue that aims at making others good and consider the part that aims at allowing others to contemplate. The world being such that people can contemplate is something that is good, we can notice, independently of how it is brought about, for Aristotle. If the world just maintained itself in a way that allowed for everyone to contemplate as much as is possible, for example, that would be a good thing, as far as Aristotle is concerned.

A person with practical virtue correctly chooses to remedy defects in the world that prevent possible contemplation and acts knowingly to do so. She can knowingly recognize such defects. She knows how to correct such defects in the best way. And she knows why doing this is a good thing. Can we use these facts to explain how a practically virtuous person's practically virtuous activity is good in itself? Consider a person who knows how to make a shoe. This person's exercising shoe-making knowledge will be good only when and because making a shoe is good. Further, making a shoe by way of exercising shoe-making knowledge will not make an act of shoe-making that was a production (an act the goodness of which lies outside of it) turn into an action (an act the goodness of which lies in the act).

Consider a person who chooses to make a shoe because she correctly sees both that she needs a shoe and that she should make a shoe. This person, suppose, then makes a shoe, exercising the knowledge of how to make a shoe that she has. Does this person's correctly choosing to make a shoe make her act of making a shoe into something that is good in itself? This might be doubted. We might think that it is good (maybe even in itself) that this person appreciates the fact that she needs a shoe and should make a shoe. But we might also think that, still, what this person does in the world will be good, not in itself, but only insofar as it results in

a shoe. We might worry that something similar is true of the activity of practical virtue. It is good (maybe in itself) that a virtuous person appreciates the fact that she should act to remedy some defect in the world to allow for contemplation. But, still, we might think that what a virtuous person does in the world (even though it is an exercise of knowledge) is good, not in itself, but only insofar as it has, as its effect, the world being such as to allow for contemplation.

If we thought that the activity of practical virtue aims to be seen as good for the reason that is and is such that when it is seen as good for the reason it is (in the case of small-scale activity, by a character friend) it can be completed and transformed into a jointly done seeing of good practical activity, then we could see how the activity of practical virtue could be such that it is good in itself for a person. Seeing (thinking or perceiving) is good in itself and pleasant for a person. And so if a person was, in acting in the world, doing a seeing of good practical activity, what she was doing would be good in itself.

Our discussion of the speculative aspects of the above proposal about why beneficence is best when done for a character friend has not provided definitive argument in favor of the speculative aspects of the above proposal. However, it has, I hope, allowed us to see a couple of things. First, I hope it has allowed us to see that Aristotle need not be thinking that it is primarily the similarity of character friends' characters that makes character friends important to each other. We do not need to say, like Cooper (1977b), that a person needs to, if she is to have knowledge of her own character, use in reasoning about her own character, observations that she makes of her character friend's character, to understand the importance of having a character friend, for Aristotle. A character friend might, we have seen, be important to a person because it is important to a person to have someone whom she knows to be virtuous, who knows her to be virtuous and with whom this mutual knowledge is mutually known to be mutual. When a person benefits someone with whom she shares such knowledge, a character friend, she can be and see herself in not only the things that she knowingly does in the world but also in her friend's seeing of her good activity, we suggested.

Second, the discussion of the speculative aspects of the above proposal has, I hope, allowed us to see that character friends might act together in a unique way when one character friend benefits another. A person can be more active when she does beneficence towards a character friend, we suggested above. She can be and see herself in more of the good she does when she benefits a character friend because she can be and see herself in a character friend's seeing of her good activity. Further, we suggested that a character friend's seeing her beneficent activity as good for the reason that it is, might transform a person's beneficent activity and make what she does a good in itself seeing of virtuous activity. If a character friend's seeing her activity as good for the reason that it is transforms what she does, it must then be a part of what she does. And beneficence done towards a character friend must be beneficence done with a character friend. We can suppose that character friends do practically virtuous activity together without thinking, like Cooper (1977b), that they work together towards the goal of some practically virtuous activity (a building for the city, providing a small loan for a person, for example). Some support is, I think, given to the speculative aspects of the above proposal by the fact that the above proposal as a whole provides an alternative to readings of EN Book IX section 9 that are problematic as interpretations of Aristotle's thought or that present the text as making unpersuasive arguments.

I have suggested that we can understand the entire concluding section of EN Book IX section 9, EN 1169b29-1170b19, as argument that a person needs a character friend to be happy. I will turn now to using the idea that the small-scale activity of practical virtue aims to be seen as good for the reason that it is by a character friend and is completed and transformed by being so seen to sketch what I take to be a good way of doing this.

To start, I will make a suggestion about how we can understand the final portion of the concluding section of EN Book IX section 9, 1170a13-b19, as argument that a virtuous person needs friends to be happy.

In the text at EN 1170a13-b19, Aristotle claims to be arguing from “the nature of things” that a virtuous friend is by nature desirable for a virtuous person. As mentioned above, many commentators have taken this section to be the part of EN Book IX section 9 that is most difficult to understand as an argument that a virtuous person needs a character friend to be happy. And some think it is intended just to be an argument that a virtuous person needs to be with the (any) character friends she has to be happy. If a person has a character friend, she must be with her character friend to be happy, roughly because if a person does not, then her life will lack an important pleasure it might have otherwise had, namely the pleasure of seeing her friend’s activity, which, since her friend is another self, is also her own.

I take Aristotle in the text at EN 1170a13-b19 to be arguing that a person who is most blessed will need a character friend to be happy. The most blessed person, let us suppose for now, is one who never needs to receive small-scale acts of beneficence and who is never called upon to act beneficently in accordance with practical virtue.⁷⁴ This is because, again, let us suppose for now also, the activity of practical virtue aims to make others good and to allow others to contemplate. The most blessed person will not be doing these things, and she will not need help to contemplate. Aristotle in the text at EN 1170a13-b19 can be understood to be arguing that anyone who has practical virtue as a disposition needs a character friend to be happy. And he has already indicated a human being can only be happy, if she has practical virtue at least as a disposition.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ As is likely clear from above, even the most blessed person, will need to receive from others her good character.

⁷⁵ Kraut (1989) also argues that any person who has the ethical virtues needs a character friend and that all people need the ethical virtues to be happy. However, his reason for thinking that a person with the ethical virtues needs a character friend is different from mine. He says, describing the idea he finds at 1170a4-12:

“You need friends because if you understand your own happiness correctly, you will want to have and exercise the ethical virtues; and friends, properly conceived, are the sorts of people who will help you accomplish these goals.” (Kraut, 1989, p. 135)

Aristotle indicates that he thinks that a person must have practical virtue as a disposition to be happy in Book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. There, in section 7, Aristotle says that practical virtue is chosen in part for its own sake. People choose to have practical virtue, even if nothing further comes from it. If a person gets lucky and never finds herself in circumstances in which she needs small-scale beneficence or in which she would be called upon to act beneficently in accordance with practical virtue, she will still need to have practical virtue as a disposition to be happy.

Above I suggested that the activity of practical virtue aims to be seen as good for the reason that it is by a character friend and is completed and transformed by being so seen. If we accept this, then we can say that being disposed to do practically virtuous activity is being disposed, in part, to do what depends for its success and completion, on a character friend's seeing it as good for the reason that it is. Being so disposed is enough, Aristotle can be read as thinking, to make it true that a person needs a character friend to be happy. She needs someone whom she knows to be practically virtuous and who knows her to be practically virtuous. And she needs for it to be true of this person and her that their knowledge of each other's virtue is mutually known to be mutual. We can see this as what Aristotle is primarily arguing at EN 1170a13-b19. This person that a practically virtuous person needs (a person whom she knows to be good, who knows her to be good, and with whom such knowledge is mutually known to be mutual) will be someone whose good is her good, who she has reason to love for her (the person's) own sake.

A person who is most blessed, we are supposing, will not need to do or receive the small-scale activity of practical virtue. So, she will not do the small-scale activity of practical virtue with her character friend. What will a most blessed person and her character friend do together, then? Aristotle says of the most blessed person that:

“He needs...to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well, and this will be realized in their living together and sharing in discussion and thought; for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of man, and not, as in the case of cattle feeding in the same place.” (EN 1170b10-b14).

Aristotle does say that a person must be with the character friends she has in the text at EN 1170a13-b19. However, this is not all he means to say there, I take it.

I will now continue to sketch an interpretation of the EN Book IX section 9 text at 1169b29-1170a12. At EN 1169b29-1170a4, Aristotle can be taken to have something like the following in mind: The time for contemplating good practical activity that is one’s own is the time when a person is doing good practical activity or receiving it from a character friend. A person who is best contemplating good activity that is her own will be contemplating good practical activity that is her own, when and only when she is doing it or receiving it from a character friend. This would leave other time open for a better form of contemplation. If a person is called upon to do small-scale acts of beneficence, she will then be able to best contemplate good activity that is her own only if it is a character friend towards whom she does the small-scale acts of beneficence she is called upon to do. It is only when she acts beneficently towards a character friend that she can count as seeing good practical activity in doing the small-scale beneficent activity that she does.

Continuing, at EN 1170a4-a12, Aristotle can be taken to have something like the following in mind: A person will be able to be more active in doing small-scale acts of beneficence when she does the small-scale acts of beneficence she does towards a character friend. Above we suggested that a person can be and see herself in more of the good that she does when she benefits a character friend. And we said that small-scale acts of beneficence done for a character friend are completed and transformed by a character friend’s seeing them as good for the reason that they are. So, a person is more active when she benefits a character

friend. And the small-scale acts of beneficence done towards a character friend are more complete than the small-scale acts of beneficence done towards anyone else. If these things are true, then, the small-scale acts of beneficence done towards a character friend will be also more pleasant than small-scale acts of beneficence done towards someone who is not a character friend. If a person is called upon to do small-scale acts of beneficence, then, she will be most active, do activity that is most complete and have the most pleasure, only if she does the small-scale acts of beneficence she does towards a character friend.

As I have just explained them, the passages at EN 1169b29-1170a4 and EN 1170a4-12 suggest reasons for thinking that a person who is called upon to do small-scale acts of beneficence will need a character friend. The most blessed person, though, we have been supposing, will not be called upon to do even these acts of beneficence and will also not need to receive them. Are the passages at EN 1169b29-1170a4 and EN 1170a4-12, then, meant only to suggest a reason for thinking that someone who falls short of the absolutely most blessed life will need a character friend? I do not think we need to say so. In addition to suggesting reasons for thinking a person who is called upon to do the small-scale acts of beneficence will need a character friend, these passages additionally can be understood as helping us to see the feature of practical virtue that makes it true that even the most blessed person will need a friend. They help us to see, that is, that the small-scale activity of practical virtue aims to be and is completed in a special way by being seen by a character friend. Anyone who is disposed to such activity needs a character friend.

There are some parts of the above proposal about how we might interpret the entire concluding section of EN Book IX section 9 as argument that a good person needs a character friend to be happy that are awkward. One awkward part of the above proposal is the idea that Aristotle thinks that best contemplating good activity that is our own requires us to contemplate good practical activity that is our own when and only when we act beneficently or receive beneficence from a character friend. Further, a second awkward part of the above proposal is the

idea that most blessed person will need a character friend but will not act with her character friend in the way that is characteristic of character friends. Aristotle says that the most blessed person must live with her character friend “not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place” (EN 1170b13). But how do character friends live together in a distinctly human way if they are not benefiting each other and completing each other’s beneficent acts by seeing them as good for the reason that they are? Cows grazing in the same place can look at each other and see each other living, we can suppose. What more than looking at a character friend is the most blessed person supposed to do with her character friend? Aristotle says that character friends must live together “and share in discussion and thought” (EN 1170b11-12). But how do people doing this count as being together in a way that is different from the way in which cows grazing in the same pasture might count as being together?

The above proposed interpretation of the concluding portion of EN Book IX section 9 might be revised and the awkward parts amended if we were willing to make a change to our thinking about Aristotle’s background commitments. The above interpretation of the concluding portion of EN Book IX section 9 aimed to be sensitive to the fact (what we were taking to be the fact) that Aristotle thinks the following four things: first, that the activity of practical virtue aims at making others good and making the world such that others can contemplate (and, as I have suggested, being seen as good for the reason that it is), second, that the most blessed person will not be called upon to do the small-scale activity of practical virtue, third, that the most blessed person will not need to receive small-scale beneficence from others (help contemplating), and, fourth, that the concluding section of EN Book IX section 9 is intended to make a case for thinking that even the most blessed person will need a character friend. The most blessed person, Aristotle thinks, we were supposing, will spend the time available to her for serious activity, not on acting in the world and doing (or receiving) the activity of practical virtue. Rather, the most blessed person will spend her time contemplating. Still, she will need a character friend we said Aristotle might be read as suggesting.

I think that we should hold on to the following ideas: I think we should hold on, first, to the idea that the most blessed person will not receive help in contemplating (beneficence of this kind). Second, I think we should also hold on to the idea that the most blessed person will not be acting to remedy defects in the world that prevent the possible contemplation of others or to make other people good. And, third, I think we should hold on to the idea that the concluding section of EN Book IX section 9 is intended to make a case for thinking that even the most blessed person will need a character friend. However, we might consider the possibility that the activity of practical virtue aims at more than just remedying defects in the world that prevent possible contemplation and making others good. Thinking that the activity of practical virtue aims more than these things will allow us to say that even the most blessed person might do and receive small-scale activities of practical virtue.

Suppose A and B are character friends. And suppose that A acts in accordance with practical virtue to give B some benefit that is not a good character or help in contemplating. Suppose that this act of A's aims to be seen as good for the reason that it is and that it is good for B to see this act of A's as good for the reason that it is. And suppose A acts for and in B's seeing her (A's) activity as good for the reason that it is. B, in seeing A's activity as good for the reason that it is needs to be seeing her (B's) own seeing of A's activity, it would seem. B's seeing A's activity as good for the reason that it is is part of A's activity (A is and sees herself in this and her activity is completed by this, we said). This seeing of her own seeing that B, as A's character friend, does when she sees A's activity as good for the reason that it is might be something that Aristotle thinks is good and uniquely available within character friendship.

If we think that there is a kind of practically virtuous activity that the most blessed person will be doing and receiving, then we might interpret the text at EN 1170a13-b19 in a different way. We might think that Aristotle, rather than making a case for thinking that even someone who never does the small-scale activity of practical virtue or receives help in contemplating will need a character friend, is actually arguing that even the most blessed person

needs a character friend in order to see her own seeing of good activity in the valuable way that she does when she sees the practically virtuous activity her character friend does for her as good for the reason that it is.⁷⁶

Further, if we think that there is a kind of practically virtuous activity that even the most blessed person will be doing and receiving, we might also interpret the text at EN 1169b29-1170a4 in a different way. We might think that Aristotle thinks that a person best contemplates good activity that is her own when she sees her own seeing in the way that she does when she sees her character friend's practically virtuous activity as good for the reason that it is.

Our being able to interpret EN 1170a13-b19 and EN 1169b29-1170a4 in the ways suggested in the previous two paragraphs depends upon our being able to say that the most blessed person still does and receives small-scale acts of practical virtue. To do this, we will, I think, need to identify further things that Aristotle thinks practical virtue aims at beyond making others good and allowing others to contemplate.⁷⁷ Further, the interpretations given in

⁷⁶ The tentative suggestion has been that there is special good, a kind of valuable seeing of her own seeing, that is available to a person when she is benefited by a character friend. If we accept this suggestion, and if we are able to defend a reading of Aristotle, according to which practical virtue aims at more than making others good and making the world such as to allow for contemplation, then we will naturally have a further question: Does beneficence towards a character friend make available to the benefactor as well a valuable self-awareness? Depending on the answer that we give to that question, we may need to make further adjustments in our interpretation of the concluding section of EN Book IX section 9.

⁷⁷ The ideas here require more explanation and defense than I can provide in this chapter. However, they are, I think, plausible. There would be a very worrisome tension in thinking both that being called upon to do and receiving acts of practical virtue takes away from a person's blessedness and also that being involved in acts of practical virtue makes available a special kind of valuable seeing of our own seeing.

Further, there are clearly acts of practical virtue that Aristotle does think take away from a person's blessedness. This comes out in EN Book X when Aristotle says, for example:

“And happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace. Now the activity of the practical excellences is exhibited in political or military affairs, but the actions concerned with these seem to be unpleasurable. Warlike actions are completely so (for no one chooses to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake of being at war; any one would seem absolutely murderous if he were to make enemies of his friends in order to bring about battle and slaughter); but the action of the statesman is also unpleasurable...” (1177b3-12)

the previous two paragraphs leave us with a big question: what is good about the seeing of her own seeing that a person does when she sees her character friend's practically virtuous activity as good for the reason that it is? Aristotle may be interpreted as saying that such seeing is pleasant at EN 1170a13-b19. However, we will likely want to know more about the good of it.

I will not here decide between the above two proposed interpretations of the concluding section of EN Book IX section 9. I will not try to say whether or not we can interpret Aristotle as thinking that practical virtue aims at more than making others good and making the world amenable to others' contemplation. And I will not here try to answer the question of why it might be good for a person to see her own seeing in the way she does when receives beneficence from a character friend. I do hope to have shown that we can find the idea that helping aims at recognition in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship. Whether or not we think that helping is something the most blessed person, as Aristotle understands her, will do, we will, I take it, benefit in interpreting the concluding portion of EN Book IX section 9 using the idea that small-scale acts of beneficence aim at and are completed by recognition from a character friend.

Plausibly, I think, making the world amenable to others contemplation and making others good are acts that take away from a person's blessed, for Aristotle. And needing help to contemplate, additionally, would be something that marked someone as less than fully blessedness, as Aristotle sees. However, there still might be other acts of practical virtue that the most blessed person does and receives.

CHAPTER TWO

I. Introduction: Recognition and Testimony

In the previous chapter, I started to make a case for thinking that helping aims at merit recognition and that merit recognition can be a part of good in itself helping. In this chapter, I turn to considering the value of merit recognition for good thinking. The main thing that I will do in this chapter is discuss in detail an account of testimony coming from Moran (2018), according to which, merit recognition is a part of successful testimony.⁷⁸

Moran's account of testimony is one that implies that someone who tells has an important interest in recognition. However, in this respect, Moran's account of testimony is not unique. It is widely agreed that, when one person tells another person something, she (the teller) aims to *herself* influence the person she tells. That is, it is widely agreed that a teller aims for it to be the case that she herself, either something she makes known about herself (what she believes or what she intends) or some illocutionary act she does, be the thing that influences what another person believes. As such, it is also widely agreed that a telling can succeed only if the teller is given a certain kind of regard or is taken to have a certain kind of standing.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ My discussion of Moran's account of testimony is all discussion of the account as given in Moran (2018) (with the exception of footnote 112). For stylistic reasons, I sometimes omit the date in mentioning Moran. Where there is no date but is mention of Moran, Moran (2018) is being discussed.

⁷⁹ Grice (1957), for example, says:

“What we want to find is the difference between, for example, ‘deliberately and openly letting someone know’ and ‘telling’ and between ‘getting someone to think’ and ‘telling’.” (p. 382)

And the difference he finds is that when a person tells she intends for her intention to get another person to believe something to get another person to believe something.

Both helping and telling aim to make a difference to another person. Helping aims to provide a benefit to another person. And telling aims at another person's believing something. However, the fact that telling is widely agreed to involve a person aiming to herself be the thing that makes difference to another person (to what another person believes), as described above, makes telling, perhaps, initially a more plausible candidate for an activity that includes recognition as a part.

Clearly, when a person helps she acts. She takes it upon herself to bring about a benefit for another person. However, it might be thought that a person can, in helping, benefit another person in any number of ways, many of which will not require her (the benefactor) to be regarded in any particular way or taken to have any particular kind of standing. A busy person with an important job might help someone in part by publicly taking time to do that other

Grice (1957) says (making a point about non-natural meaning but expressing this idea as well):

“Shortly, perhaps, we may say that ‘A meantn something by x’ is roughly equivalent to ‘A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention.’” (p. 384)

Moran (2018) attributes to Grice the further thought that, when one person tells another person something, the teller intends for her intention to get her hearer to believe something to serve as a reason for her hearer to believe that thing by its being a reason for her hearer to believe that she (the teller) believes that thing.

Thinking of telling as getting someone to believe by reveling either that one believes something or that one is intending to get someone to believe something is thinking of telling as a way of getting someone to believe something that a person will succeed at only if she is given certain kinds of regard. A will believe what B reveals she believes or intends to get A to believe only if A has certain kinds of ideas about or attitudes towards B. There are different explanations of what these ideas or attitudes are that might be given. For example, it might be thought, that A will need to see B as a trustworthy partner in some shared conversational pursuit, in order for B's revealing her intention to get A to believe something to actually get A to believe that thing.

Thinking of telling abstractly as an illocutionary act, one that licenses others' believing or maybe asserting, is a step towards thinking that telling is something that a person needs to be recognized as having a certain kind of standing to do. Illocutionary acts can have uptake conditions. It is widely agreed, for example, that a person can promise to X by saying, ‘I promise to X’, only if her promise is in some sense accepted. And for her promise to be accepted, plausibly, as Moran (2018) suggests, she must be taken to have the standing to perform such an illocutionary act of promising (and to be using the standing to actually perform such an act).

person a small favor. The CEO of a company might, for example, hand-deliver soup to a friend of a friend who is sick, intending for part of the benefit to be her, as a CEO, hand-delivering the soup. In such a case, the benefactor's being regarded in a certain way is required for her to help in the way she wants to help. However, a person need not help in this kind of way. Telling, alternatively, it might be thought, just is, by definition perhaps, getting someone to believe in a particular way that will be successful only if the person who does it is given a certain kind of regard or taken to have a certain kind of standing.

In the last chapter, I began to argue that helping aims at recognition. And the suggestion was not that this is because helping is best when it is like the helping the CEO does in the above example. Rather, in the last chapter, I suggested, first, that when we help a friend, we act for a reason that is a reason to help in a way that can be seen by our friend as good for that reason. What we do in helping a friend, then, includes our friend's recognition as a part when it succeeds. Second, I suggested that we can find, in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion of friendship, the following two ideas: First, we can find the idea that helping generally aims to be seen as good for the reason that it is by those who are helped. And, second, we can find the idea that when helping is seen as good for the reason that it is by a character friend towards whom it is directed, a special kind of good is realized. Helping done for a character friend who sees it as good for the reason that it is, in being completed by the character friend's recognition, becomes a jointly done, good in itself, seeing of good practical activity.

Although I was not, in the previous chapter, able to go beyond locating the idea in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, I do take it to be the case that a person who helps has an interest in recognition because recognition is a part of successful helping and because helping that is completed by recognition realizes a special kind of good, a good, the goodness of which is not just a sum of the goodness of its parts (the goodness of doing good for someone and the goodness seeing someone do that). Further, I take it that something similar is true of testimony. A teller does not have an interest in recognition just because of the way that she, as a teller,

chooses to pursue the thing she wants, another person's believing something. Rather, a teller has an interest in recognition because recognition is a part of successful telling and because successful telling, in being completed by recognition, realizes a special kind of good.

Moran's account of testimony is unique in being clear about the fact that a teller's interest in recognition is not well explained just by the fact that a teller chooses to pursue what she wants, another person's believing something, in a way that requires her to be recognized to have a certain kind of standing or given a certain kind of regard to be successful. For Moran, telling *p* is an activity that is aimed, not just at another person's believing *p*, but, more specifically, at another person's believing on the basis of trusting the teller that *p*. In this chapter, I will discuss in detail the idea that telling aims at another person's (a hearer's) believing on the basis of trust. I will make a case for thinking that, for Moran, a hearer's believing on the basis of trust completes a teller's act of telling. Further, I will suggest that when a teller's act of telling is completed by a hearer's believing on the basis of trust, what the teller does in telling is transformed by being so completed.

Although I will suggest that a teller's act of telling, in being completed by hearer's believing on trust, is transformed, I will not, in this chapter, be able to say what good is realized through such a transformation, through successful telling. As such, my discussion of Moran in this chapter will only be one step towards understanding the interest that tellers have in recognition or the interest that people have in telling. If we accept Moran's view of testimony, we will think that telling aims at merit recognition, includes merit recognition when it succeeds, and is such as to be transformed by being completed through merit recognition. But, what good is realized through successful telling? This is something that will largely remain unexplained in this chapter. However, I will, in the concluding portion of this introductory section, make a suggestion about how we might begin to answer this question: Successful telling, it might be thought, constitutes an epistemic good. This idea, is one that, I think, follows naturally from some of Miranda Fricker's ideas about epistemic injustice.

Fricker (2007) argues that there is a harm a person suffers as a knower whenever her testimony is afforded less credibility than it deserves as a result of prejudice on the part of her interlocutor(s).⁸⁰ Fricker calls this phenomenon (having one's testimony afforded less credibility than it deserves as a result of prejudice) *testimonial epistemic injustice*. And she calls the harm that a person suffers immediately, whenever her testimony is afforded less credibility than it deserves as a result of prejudice, the *primary harm* of testimonial epistemic injustice.

What explains the existence of the primary harm of testimonial epistemic injustice for Fricker is the fact that telling or giving knowledge is something that is good in itself for knowers. Part of being a knower is having a capacity to give knowledge. And exercising the capacity to give knowledge is something that is good in itself for those who have it.⁸¹

Fricker (2007) distinguishes the primary harm of testimonial epistemic injustice, the harm a person suffers whenever she is prevented because of prejudice from giving knowledge, from *secondary harms* that a person can suffer as a result of the fact that what she says is not taken seriously enough because of prejudice. Fricker says that secondary harms associated with testimonial epistemic injustice can be divided into *practical* and *epistemic* secondary harms.⁸²

⁸⁰My discussion of Fricker's ideas about epistemic injustice is all based on Fricker (2007). For stylistic reasons, I sometimes omit the date in mentioning Fricker. Where there is no date but is mention of Fricker, Fricker (2007) is being discussed.

⁸¹ "The primary harm is a form of the essential harm that is definitive of epistemic injustice in the broad. In all such injustices the subject is wronged in her capacity as a knower. To be wronged in one's capacity as a knower is to be wronged in a capacity essential to human value. When one is undermined or otherwise wronged in a capacity essential to human value, one suffers an intrinsic injustice. The form that this intrinsic injustice takes specifically in cases of testimonial injustice is that the subject is wronged in her capacity as a giver of knowledge. The capacity to give knowledge to others is one side of that many-sided capacity so significant to human beings: namely, the capacity for reason." (Fricker, 2007, p. 44)

⁸² "Turning now to the secondary aspect of the harm, we see that it is composed of a range of possible follow-on disadvantages, extrinsic to the primary injustice in that they are caused by it rather than being a proper part of it. They seem to fall into two broad categories distinguishing a *practical* and an *epistemic* dimension of harm." (Fricker, 2007, p. 46)

Testimonial epistemic injustice can come with secondary practical harms, according to Fricker. It can be the cause of a person's suffering physical injury or otherwise being hindered in the pursuit of practical ends. A person is likely to suffer secondary practical harms when what she says is not taken seriously enough by a police officer, a judge, or jury. And a person can also suffer such harm when what she says is treated dismissively by colleagues or bosses, teachers, doctors, anyone from whom help is sought etc.⁸³

Testimonial epistemic injustice can also come with secondary epistemic harms, according to Fricker. Fricker says that suffering testimonial epistemic injustice can undermine a person's confidence in her beliefs or intellectual abilities and thereby interfere with her ability to think well or come to know.⁸⁴ It can prevent a person's ideas from being part of wider discussions and limit a person's ability to get serious feedback. Further, a person who thinks she will suffer testimonial epistemic injustice may choose not to share her thoughts. And this might mean that she loses an important source of motivation for settling what she thinks or for thinking well.⁸⁵ People often feel strongly both a self-interested reason and also a moral or

⁸³ Fricker discusses in some detail secondary practical harms that a person might suffer as a result of experiencing testimonial epistemic injustice in a courtroom or in the workplace (Fricker, 2007, p. 36-47). These are meant to be examples, and we can see other contexts and ways in which a person might suffer secondary practical harms.

⁸⁴ "The second category of secondary harm caused by testimonial injustice is (most purely) epistemic harm: the recipient of a one-off testimonial injustice may lose confidence in his belief, or in his justification for it, so that he ceases to satisfy the conditions for knowledge; or alternatively, someone with a background experience of persistent testimonial injustice may lose confidence in her general intellectual abilities to such an extent that she is genuinely hindered in her educational or other intellectual development." (Fricker, 2007, p. 47-48)

⁸⁵ Fricker talks in detail about the idea that prospect of giving knowledge plays an important role in motivating a person to settle what she thinks (Fricker, 2007, p. 51-59). Fricker, presents her discussion of this as an examination of the significance of the primary harm of epistemic injustice. But, I think it makes sense to put 'losing an important motivation to settle what one thinks' in the class of secondary epistemic harms.

otherwise other-regarding reason to try their best to settle their thoughts and think well, in particular, about what they plan to share.

As damaging as both kinds of secondary harm (practical and epistemic) can be, Fricker stresses that there is a serious and distinct harm that a person as a knower suffers when and just because she is unable exercise her capacity to give knowledge.

Fricker (2007) herself does not seem to want to explain the fact that telling is good in itself for knowers by directly tying the giving knowledge to a knower's own epistemic success. That is, she does not want to say that the cognitive states of a person who gives knowledge are improved just through the giving of knowledge or that there is some epistemic standard that can be met only through the giving of knowledge. And I think she does not want to say that a belief had but not shared will, just because it is not shared, be epistemically lacking in some way.

While I think that Fricker is correct that telling or giving knowledge is good in itself for knowers, I think she makes a mistake in not saying that there is a kind of epistemic success essentially realized through telling. This is, I think, a natural conclusion to draw from Fricker's observations and something that I think is necessary to recognize in order to give a satisfying explanation of why it is that a person, as a knower, loses something any time she suffers testimonial epistemic injustice.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ I do not think that Fricker's attempts to say more about the primary harm of testimonial epistemic injustice (beyond the fact that it is a denial of an opportunity to exercise a capacity to give knowledge) are successful in explaining the primary harm. Fricker has many persuasive things to say about the significance of the primary harm and about what can happen when a person is a frequent victim of testimonial epistemic injustice.

She says for example:

“When someone suffers a testimonial injustice, they are degraded qua knower, and they are symbolically degraded qua human. In all cases of testimonial injustice, what the person suffers from is not simply the epistemic wrong in itself, but also the meaning of being treated like that. Such a dehumanizing meaning, especially if it is expressed before others, may make for a profound humiliation...” (Fricker, 2007, p. 44)

And also that:

What is the epistemic good realized through telling? That question is not one I will be able to answer in this dissertation. However, the discussion of Moran's account of testimony in this chapter will, I think, be a first step towards answering it. Thinking of testimony in the way Moran suggests we do not only helps us to see recognition as a part of successful telling. It also gives us resources for thinking about what epistemic good might be realized through successful

"It would be melodramatic to suggest that whenever someone suffers testimonial injustice they are thereby inhibited, at least a tiny bit (whatever that would mean), in the formation of their identity. But I do not think it is an exaggeration to suggest that persistent cases of this sort of wrongful epistemic exclusion could, especially if they are also systematic, genuinely inhibit the development of an essential aspect of a person's identity." (Fricker, 2007, p. 54)

However, I do not think her explanation of the primary harm is successful. Fricker says, first, that testimonial epistemic injustice harms by being epistemic objectification. About this she says:

"The moment of testimonial injustice wrongfully denies someone their capacity as an informant, and in confining them to their entirely passive capacity as a source of information, it relegates them to the same epistemic status as a felled tree whose age one might glean from the number of rings. In short, testimonial injustice demotes the speaker from informant to source of information, from subject to object. This reveals the intrinsic harm of testimonial injustice as epistemic objectification: when a hearer undermines a speaker in her capacity as a giver of knowledge, the speaker is epistemically objectified." (Fricker, 2007, p. 132-133)

Second, Fricker says that testimonial epistemic injustice harms because the concept of a knower bears an important relationship to the concept of a giver of knowledge and to the practice of giving knowledge. About this she says:

"If the core of our concept of knowledge is captured in the concept of the good informant, because (as the State of Nature story shows) essentially what it is to be a knower is to participate in the sharing of information, then another dimension to the harm of testimonial injustice now comes into view. When someone is excluded from the relations of epistemic trust that are at work in a co-operative practice of pooling information, they are wrongfully excluded from participation in the practice that defines the core of the very concept of knowledge." (Fricker, 2007, p. 145)

However, these observations seem only to be partial explanations of the primary harm. What does a person lose in being epistemically objectified or in being denied an opportunity to do the kind of thing the doing of which is responsible for our having a concept of knowledge? I think that more explanation of these things than Fricker provides is needed.

testimony. I will not say much about this in this dissertation. But, in the final section of this chapter, I will make some small remarks about this.

II. The Basics of Moran's Account of Testimony

In his book, *The Exchange of Words: Speech, Testimony, and Intersubjectivity*, Richard Moran develops and defends an account of testimony, according to which, testimony is understood to give reason for belief by being an assurance of truth. Moran (2018) describes the view in outline in the following two passages:

“When someone gives me her assurance that it’s cold out, she explicitly assumes a certain responsibility for what I believe.” (p. 44)

“On the assurance view, dependence on someone’s freely assuming responsibility for the truth of P, presenting herself as a kind of guarantor, provides me with a characteristic reason to believe, different in kind from anything provided by impersonal evidence alone.” (p. 45)

Telling for Moran (2018) is a self-conscious act of reason-giving. According to Moran, in order for a speaker to be telling a hearer something, the speaker must understand herself to be giving the hearer her assurance that what she is saying is true. In giving her assurance that what she is saying is true, the speaker must, first, understand herself to be giving the hearer a special kind of reason to believe what she says, a reason that Moran calls *non-evidential*. Second, a

speaker must understand herself to be making herself accountable to the hearer for the truth of what she says.⁸⁷

A speaker will succeed in telling a hearer something, according to Moran, only when the speaker and the hearer have the same understanding of what the speaker is saying. That is, they must have the same understanding of the content the speaker aims to tell. Further, a speaker will succeed in telling a hearer something, for Moran, only when the hearer understands the speaker to be offering the hearer assurance that what she is saying is true and, in doing this, to be giving the hearer non-evidential reason to believe what she says and to be making herself accountable to the hearer for the truth of what she says. The fact that speaker and hearer have

⁸⁷ Moran (2018)'s entire book can be understood as aimed at explaining the idea that telling is a self-conscious act of reason-giving. Some parts where this topic is more of a focus include: ch1.5, ch.5, ch.6 (Moran, 2018). The idea that a speaker must know what she is doing in telling in order to tell comes up in a number of other places as well, for example, ch.4.4 (Moran, 2018). There Moran says:

“The person must understand what she is doing for her verbal act to be the kind of thing that a promise or an assertion is. A speaker who, in Hume’s words, ‘knows not the meaning’ of the verbal expression or uses it ‘without any sense of the consequences’ has not just done the thing of promising or asserting poorly; she has not done it at all. The knowledge and understanding that are necessary conditions for performing such acts as these will naturally include semantic understanding of the language in question, practical knowledge of what one is doing with these words on this particular occasion, and the understanding of the social practices of asking, answering promising, etc.” (2018, p.112)

The specifics I mention here about what a speaker must understand herself to be doing when she tells are presented in detail in ch.2 and discussed for the remainder of the book (Moran, 2018). There are many mentions of them, but, for example, Moran (2018) says: “In the speech act of telling, the speaker commits herself to her audience with respect to a particular proposition and with respect to the kind of reason being presented (p.72)”. And the reason a teller *commits herself to* is not an evidential reason but rather one tied to the teller’s free and “explicit assumption of responsibility” (p.61). Moran (2018) says: “To offer some phenomenon as evidence is to present it as belief-worthy independent of the fact of one’s presenting it as belief-worthy” (p.64). However, for a speaker who is telling: “The epistemic status of her words as a candidate for belief is something publicly conferred on them by the speaker...” (Moran, 2018, p.57).

the same understanding of the content the speaker aims to tell and of what the speaker is doing, further, must be non-accidentally true, for a successful telling to occur.⁸⁸

When a speaker succeeds at telling a hearer something, a speaker really gives the hearer non-evidential reason to believe what she says. And a speaker also really makes herself accountable to the hearer for the truth of what she says. Moran (2018) says:

“When all goes well, in testimony a speaker gives her interlocutor a reason to believe something, but unlike other ways of influencing the beliefs of others, in this case the reason the audience is provided is seen by both parties as dependent on the speaker’s making herself accountable...” (p. 66)

Moran says that the fact that a successful teller is accountable to the hearer she tells for the truth of what she tells is indicated by the fact that the hearer has a right to make a complaint against the teller if what the teller told her was false. Those who merely overhear a successful act of telling (while not being the teller’s intended audience, *the hearer* as I have been using the

⁸⁸The specifics of what a hearer must understand a teller to be doing for a teller’s act of telling to be successful are again presented in detail in ch.2 and discussed for the remainder of the book (Moran, 2018). They are discussed in many places, but, for example, Moran says:

“When an act of telling completes itself, speaker and audience are aligned in this way through their mutual recognition of the speaker’s role in determining the kind of reason for belief that is up for acceptance, so that when the speaker is believed, there is a non-accidental relation between the reason presented and the reason accepted.” (2018, p. 72)

And also that: “For the act of telling to complete itself there must be a correspondence between the reason being presented by the speaker and the reason accepted by her audience” (Moran, 2018, p. 73).

term) and believe what the teller said because she said it, do not have this right, according to Moran.⁸⁹⁹⁰

Moran (2018) says that an act of telling can result in the hearer's having both evidential and non-evidential reason to believe what is told. To take an example close to one that Moran uses, suppose one person tells another that she is from Boston by saying, 'I'm from Boston'. And suppose the teller speaks with a Boston accent in doing this. The speaker's accent provides the hearer with what Moran would call evidential reason to believe that the speaker is from Boston. And the telling, if successful, also provides the hearer with non-evidential reason to believe that the speaker is from Boston, according to Moran.⁹¹ Although an act of telling can provide hearers with both evidential and non-evidential reason for belief, it is the providing of non-evidential reason for belief that makes something a telling.

⁸⁹“If one person gives her word on something to another, whether as promise or assertion, someone overhearing this may derive a sufficient reason to believe, say, that the speaker will in fact do what she promised or that what she asserted is true. And the overhearer improves his epistemic situation in this, without entering into the altered normative relationship of two parties involved in giving and accepting of words. He has not himself been *told* anything, much less promised anything, and no right of complaint has been conferred upon him.” (Moran, 2018, p. 67)

⁹⁰ Although I agree with Moran that a teller bears a special responsibility to her hearer for the truth of what she says, the claim that those who merely over-hear a false telling have not been wronged by the teller seems to me to require more defense. A speaker who tells someone something makes it reasonable for those other than her intended hearer to believe what she says.

I think it is plausible to think that we are under a *prima facie* (and pretty easily defeasible) obligation to correct the mistaken beliefs of others when we find them that might be called epistemic, in that it (the obligation) is not explained by the fact that we have a duty of beneficence and the fact that a person's having mistaken beliefs can have bad practical consequences. It would be strange, though, to think that we are under that kind of obligation to correct the mistaken beliefs of others while also thinking that we are not under a *prima facie* (again very easily defeasible) obligation not to make it reasonable for others to believe things that are false that similarly is epistemic or not explained by the fact that we have a duty of beneficence and the fact that a person's having mistaken beliefs can have bad consequences.

⁹¹ “My regional accent may provide my audience with a reason to believe something about me without my having any understanding of how it does so, that it does so, or the meaning of the words I am speaking. But my *telling* my audience something must ‘provide a reason for belief’ in a different sense because here if I don't understand the words I am saying, then I have made no assertion at all that might be believed or disbelieved.” (Moran, 2018, p. 158)

Moran (2018) says that a speaker must present herself as sincere and knowledgeable with respect to what she is saying in order to tell.⁹² I take it that a speaker is *knowledgeable* with respect to what she is saying when she is related in a way that produces reasons for believing what she is saying to facts that make what she is saying true or to facts that are regularly or rationally connected with facts that make what she is saying true. (For short, I will say that a speaker is knowledgeable about what she is saying when she is in a position to know what she is saying.) According to Moran, a speaker is *sincere* in what she is saying when what she is saying is what she would believe were her beliefs fully under her control as a thinker and in line with

⁹² Moran has much more to say about the sincerity condition. But, he mentions the knowledgeable condition also in several places. For example, he says:

“For the speaker to be able to do this [tell] it must be assumed by both parties that the speaker does indeed satisfy the right conditions for such an act (e.g. that she possesses the relevant knowledge, trustworthiness, and reliability).” (Moran, 2018, p. 58)

And speaking of a successful telling Moran also says:

“When the background of the speaker’s knowledge and sincerity can be assumed, and the speaker is in fact believed by her audience (a common enough occurrence, after all), the two parties are in sync with each other in a way that they would not be if the audience were to take the utterance either as a reason for some other belief rather than the one stated, or a different kind of reason for that belief (as with double bluffing). (2018, p.72)

About the sincerity condition Moran says that: “Hence sincerity matters to testimony because it is from this position that the speaker assumes responsibility for the meaning and justification of what she says” (2018, p. 94).

And he also says:

“The Sincerity condition itself tells us that a speaker’s telling another person that P will count for her audience as a reason to believe P, only insofar as the speaker presents herself as believing what she says.” (Moran, 2018, p.105)

And:

“...when the speaker is acting with knowledge and understanding of the relevant kinds, the utterance may still count as an act of telling or promising even when insincere, purely in virtue of the speaker’s presenting herself as doing so to an audience who understands and recognizes her act.” (Moran, 2018, p. 113)

what she takes to be true.⁹³ (For short, I will say that a speaker is sincere when she believes what she says.) Moran does not say that a speaker needs to actually be sincere and/or knowledgeable with respect to what she says in order to tell. Rather, again, a teller just needs to present herself as sincere and knowledgeable, according to Moran.

The fact that a teller must present herself as sincere and knowledgeable with respect to what she aims to tell in order to tell is shown, in part, by the fact that a person cannot tell if, along with saying something, the person also explicitly denies being sincere and/or knowledgeable with respect to what she says. For example, normally a person cannot succeed at telling someone that it is raining with either of these phrases: ‘It’s raining, but I don’t believe that it’s raining’ or ‘It’s raining, but there is no way for me to know that it’s raining’.⁹⁴

The fact that a teller must present herself as sincere and knowledgeable with respect to what she aims to tell in order to tell is also, I take it, shown by the following fact: In many cases, when a hearer thinks that a speaker is trying to tell her something, a hearer will try to interpret the speaker as saying something that she (the speaker) believes and is in a position to know. When there is evidence (other than the speaker’s explicit denial that she is sincere and/or knowledgeable) that a speaker is not sincere and/or not knowledgeable with respect what she is saying, given a standard interpretation of her words and gestures, a hearer might ask the

⁹³ About this aspect of the sincerity condition, Moran says:

“If someone fails to know her actual belief about some matter, whether through self-deception or more innocently, she will still be speaking sincerely when she asserts the belief she takes herself to have.” (2018, p. 91)

And:

“...if someone has the repressed belief, for example, that she is a coward, but takes herself to believe no such thing, she will have failed to speak sincerely if, for her own reasons, she nonetheless says that she is a coward, even though by hypothesis what she asserts here expresses what she actually thinks about herself.” (2018, p. 91)

⁹⁴ Moran discusses failures like the first of these / Moore’s Paradox (Moran, 2018, p.112-121).

speaker for confirmation of or clarification about what she means to be telling. Alternatively, a hearer might interpret the speaker's words and gestures in a non-standard way, as conveying something that the speaker actually believes and is in a position to know. Often, when there is evidence (other than the speaker's explicit denial that she is sincere and/or knowledgeable) that a speaker is not sincere and/or not knowledgeable with respect to what she is trying to tell, given a standard interpretation of her words and gestures, a hearer will do one of these things.

For example, one person might ask another for the time at the airport. If the person who is asked for the time answers by saying '5:05' but clearly does not look at a clock before saying this, the person who asked for the time might check that the person who answered is reporting the current time (and not, for example, the time a flight is scheduled to leave). If the hearer needs but gets confirmation that the teller in this case is saying that it is now 5:05, the hearer can accept the teller's testimony, and the teller can succeed in telling. The hearer does not need to know how the teller knows the time. Alternatively, one person might say to another person 'these chips are terrible' while she (the speaker) is eating the chips by the handful. The hearer, thinking that speaker means to *tell* her something about the chips, might correctly interpret the speaker's words in a non-standard way, as conveying something that she (the speaker) believes. The hearer might correctly understand the speaker to be saying that the chips are great.

I take it that we can start to understand why a person can tell only if she presents herself as sincere and knowledgeable in the following way: First, what a person does in telling is governed by norms of sincerity and knowledgeability. What a person does in telling *p* is something that she should do only if she believes and is in a position to know *p*. Second, what a person does can only be a telling if the person, in doing what she does, has a certain relation to these norms. A person can be telling only if she is *following* norms of sincerity and knowledgeability.

In saying that a person must be *following* norms of sincerity and knowledgeability in order to be telling, I mean to remain vague (for now) about what kind of relation a person must

have to norms of sincerity and knowledgeability in order to tell. A person might be following norms of sincerity and knowledgeability without being actually sincere and knowledgeable. A person might fail to follow norms of sincerity and knowledgeability while being actually sincere and knowledgeable. And it may not even be the case that a person must be trying to be sincere and knowledgeable in order to count as following these norms.

Consider a person who is playing basketball and makes a foul shot. The person can be making a foul shot only if she is following the rules of basketball which include a rule that says only make a foul shot if you have been fouled. The person can be making a foul shot, though, even if she is not trying to make a foul shot only if she has been fouled. The person might have pretended to be fouled in order to take a foul shot.

We will be able to understand what relation a speaker needs to have to the norms of sincerity and knowledgeability that govern telling in order to tell once we understand what Moran means by *non-evidential reason*. However, before continuing to discuss Moran's idea of a non-evidential reason, I will first discuss Tyler Burge's paper, "Content Preservation". I take it that there are important similarities between Burge (1993/2013)'s account of the reason we have to believe what comes to us from interlocution and Moran's thinking about the non-evidential reason tellers give hearers to believe what they are told. In the next section, I will talk about the account of the epistemology of testimony that Burge (1993/2013) presents. I will then explain some of the overlap I see between Burge's account of the warrant a person has for believing what is publicly presented as true and Moran's accounts of the non-evidential reason testimony gives hearers to believe what they are told.

III. Burge: "Content Preservation"

Before I begin presenting the account of the warrant we have for believing what comes to us from interlocution that Burge (1993/2013) gives, I need to note the following:

Burge does not talk about 'the reason testimony gives hearers to believe what they are told'. Rather, he talks about the warrant people have for believing intelligible statements presented as true. Further, Burge (1993/2013) does not give a full account of the difference in warrant that a person has for believing an intelligible statement presented as true coming from within herself, for believing an intelligible statement presented as true that she just finds (not being aware of its origin), for believing an intelligible statement presented as true by another person that is not aimed at warranting belief, for believing an intelligible statement presented as true by another person that is not directed towards her but is aimed at warranting some belief, for believing an intelligible statement presented as true by another person that is directed towards her and aimed at warranting some belief. He does, however, allow for there to be a difference in warrant in these cases.⁹⁵

When I talk about *tellings* and *tellers* in the context of talking about Burge, I mean to be talking about all public presentations as true done by other people and all people who publicly present as true, respectively. And when I talk about *hearers* in the context of discussing Burge, I mean to refer to all people who come across intelligible statements publicly presented as true by other people. As such what I mean by *telling*, *teller*, *hearer* in the context of discussing Burge will be different from what I mean by *telling*, *teller*, *hearer* in the in the context of discussing Moran. Again, for Moran, a *teller* understands herself to be giving a hearer a reason to believe what she tells and a *telling* is an act of self-conscious reason-giving. Further, in discussing Moran, I have meant for a *hearer* to be the audience the teller's act of telling aims at.

I will now present the account of the warrant we have for believing what comes to us from interlocution that Burge (1993/2013) gives, as I understand it.

⁹⁵ "The Acceptance Principle and its justification are formulated so as to be neutral on whether what is 'presented as true' comes from another person. Its application does not depend on an assumption that the source is outside oneself (although further articulation will, I think, give this source a place in the account)." (Burge, 1993/2013, p. 242)

A person may find intelligible statements presented as true coming from within herself, for example, coming from some capacity of her own. A person's own memory, for example, may be the source of an intelligible statement presented as true that she finds within herself. A person may also, alternatively, find intelligible statements presented as true that come from outside of her, from another rational being or from something like a computer designed by a rational being to, "to mimic aspects of rationality" (Burge, 1993/2013, p. 240). A person has an a priori prima facie warrant to believe any (coming from within or without) intelligible statement presented as true, according to Burge (1993/2013).

Describing this warrant for believing intelligible statements presented as true, Burge writes:

"A person is a priori entitled to accept a proposition that is presented as true and that is intelligible to him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so, because it is prima facie preserved (received) from a rational source, or resource for reason; reliance on rational sources - or resources for reason - is, other things equal, necessary to the function of reason." (1993/2013, p. 238)

According to Burge (1993/2013), a person is a priori prima facie warranted in believing that something intelligible comes from a rational source or resource for reason.⁹⁶ And rational sources and resources for reason aim at arriving in a good way at truth and preserving it.⁹⁷

The aim of arriving in a good way at truth and/or preserving it is something that resources for reason (Burge (1993/2013) gives memory and perception as examples of *resources for reason*) cannot deviate from while functioning properly.⁹⁸ A person is a priori prima facie entitled to rely on the fact that, if a resource for reason is functioning properly, it is aiming at arriving in a good way at truth and/or preserving it, according to Burge (1993/2013). Further, a person is a priori prima facie entitled to rely on the fact that a resource for reason is functioning properly. A person does not have to have evidence that a resource for reason is functioning properly to treat a resource for reason as if it is functioning properly and to treat what it generates as something aimed at arriving in a good way at truth and/or preserving it. If a person finds some intelligible statement coming from a resource for reason that is presented as true, she is a priori prima facie entitled to believe it, according to Burge.

Burge (1993/2013) says the following about rational sources: “Rational sources are sources that themselves are a capacity to reason or are rational beings” (p. 239). A being with

⁹⁶ “I think that one is apriori prima facie entitled to presume that the interlocutor is a rational source or resource for reason - simply by virtue of the prima facie intelligibility of the message conveyed. That is enough to presume that the interlocutor is rational, or at least a source of information that is rationally underwritten.

The idea is not that we reason thus: “If it looks like a human and makes sounds like a language, it is rational.” Rather, in understanding language we are entitled to presume what we instinctively do presume about our source’s being a source of rationality or reason. We are so entitled because intelligibility is an apriori prima facie sign of rationality.” (Burge, 1993/2013, p. 240)

⁹⁷ “...if something is a rational source, it is a prima facie source of truth. For a condition on reasons, rationality, and reason is that they be guides to truth.” (Burge, 1993/2013, p. 239)

⁹⁸ “Our account distinguishes rational sources and resources for reason. Resources for reason - memory and perception, for example - need not themselves be rational beings or capacities to reason. In these senses they need not themselves be rational. Yet they may provide material and services that a rational being is apriori entitled to rely upon.” (Burge, 1993/2013, p. 239)

both theoretical and practical reason (a human rational being) is a rational source. Such a being has the aim of arriving in a good way at the truth and preserving it in part because she is subject to a certain norm for action that governs public presentations as true, for Burge. This norm says, when publicly presenting as true, “present[ing removed] truth independently of special personal interests” (Burge, 1993/2013, p. 242). Further, as is implied in Burge (1993/2013) and made explicit in Burge (2011/2013), this norm requires theoretically and practically rational beings to publicly present as true only what they believe.⁹⁹ (A presentation as true of something by a rational being who does not herself believe that thing is not a good route to the truth for the following reason, according Burge (1993/2013): Believing on the basis of such a presentation as true can be entitled, and what is believed might be true. But believing on the basis of such a presentation as true will fail to be knowledge. I say more about Burge’s ideas about this below.) Importantly, this norm for public presentations as true can stand in conflict with the recommendations of practical reason, according to Burge (1993/2013). We can say that it is an epistemic and not a practical norm (although it governs action) in virtue of this.

Theoretically and practically rational beings cannot deviate from the aim of arriving in a good way at the truth and preserving it while functioning properly in part because they are subject to the above-described norm that governs public presentations as true, according to Burge (1993/2013). A human being might find that it is in her personal best interest to publicly present as true something that is not true and/or something that she does not believe. But, even though practical reason may recommend publicly presenting as true something that is not true and/or something that is not believed in such a case, the epistemic requirement to publicly present as true only what is true and believed does not go away, as Burge sees it. A human being

⁹⁹ From footnote 15 in Burge (2011/2013): “I continue to think that if one is warranted in finding an individual rational, one is *pro tanto* warranted in taking the individual to be sincere...Since rationality has an impersonal function of supporting truth, and individual who has shown rationality can be presumed to be sincere, in the absence of evidence for doubt.” (p. 263)

whose practical reason recommended publicly presenting as true something that is not true and/or not believed would be divided (subject to conflicting rational norms) in a way that meant she was not functioning properly, according to Burge.¹⁰⁰ A person is a priori prima facie entitled to rely on the fact that, if a rational source is functioning properly, the rational source is aiming at arriving in a good way at the truth and preserving it.

Is a person a priori prima facie entitled to rely on the fact that a rational source (even another theoretically and practically rationally being) is functioning properly? Human rational beings can choose, in acting, to deviate from the aim of arriving in a good way at the truth and preserving it. And they can do this not only in cases in which this is recommended by practical reason. As Burge (1993/2013) points out, not only lying for self-interest but also lying for its own sake is possible. According to Burge, though, despite this, people are a priori prima facie entitled to rely on the fact that a rational source is functioning properly. They do not need, then, evidence that a rational source is functioning properly in order to rely on the fact that a rational source is functioning properly. And so, if a person finds some statement coming from a rational source that is publicly presented as true, she is a priori prima facie entitled to believe it.

According to Burge (1993/2013), a person can be a priori warranted in believing that some statement was publicly presented as true.¹⁰¹ Well-functioning perceptual capacities and

¹⁰⁰ “One of reason’s primary functions is that of presenting truth, independently of special interests. Lying is sometimes rational in the sense that it is in the liar’s best interests. But lying occasions a disunity among the functions of reason. It conflicts with one’s reason’s transpersonal function of presenting truth, independently of special personal interests.” (Burge 1993/2013, p. 242-243)

¹⁰¹ The way I put the point here is somewhat imprecise. Burge (1993/2003) is clear that, as he sees it, when a person believes on the basis of the Acceptance Principle, she believes what she finds presented as true immediately and not on the basis of an argument that includes the Acceptance Principle and the fact that something has been presented as true as premises. Burge says:

“The Acceptance Principle is not a premise in an argument applied by recipients of information. It is a description of a norm that indicates that recipients are sometimes entitled to accept information from others *immediately* without argument.” (1993/2013, p. 244)

accurate perception of some aspects of a public presentation as true are necessary for a person to come know that some statement was publicly presented as true. However, Burge (1993/2013) maintains that it is possible for a person to have warrant sufficient for knowledge for believing that something was publicly presented as true that is not at all empirical.

Burge (1993/2013) uses some examples to support this idea. Well-functioning purely preservative memory can be necessary for a person to come to know the conclusion of some deductive argument. But, even when this is true, the warrant for believing the conclusion of the argument need not be, in part, empirical (empirical warrant for believing memory functioned or is functioning properly). A person can be a priori entitled to rely on the fact that her memory is functioning properly when she does a deduction. A person can also be a priori entitled to rely on the fact that her perception is functioning properly when she relies on it in getting information from interlocution. This can mean that sometimes, at least, a person's warrant for believing what she learns from interlocution is not, in part, empirical. Perception can merely facilitate interlocution.

So, a more precise way of putting the point here would be to use the language that Burge (2011/2013) uses. Following Burge (2011/2013), we might say that the idea is that a person can be a priori entitled to rely on the fact that a "seeming comprehension" of a statement presented as true is a "genuine comprehension" (p. 273). Burge describes the point this way: "One must be epistemically entitled to rely on one's (seeming) comprehension of the other person's report as genuine comprehension" (Burge, 2011/2013, p. 273). And he says: "In 'Content Preservation', 'Interlocution, Perception, and Memory', and 'Reason and the First Person' (last section), I argued that the warrant for *particular exercises* of our comprehension of others' communication sometimes *is non-empirical*" (Burge, 2011/2013, p. 273).

I will continue to say that the idea in (Burge 1993/.2013) is that a person can believe that some statement is publicly presented as true with a warrant that is not empirical because it is simpler and because I think there is no harm, so long as it is kept in mind that this really is short-hand for saying that a person can be a priori entitled to rely on a seeming comprehension of a presentation as true as a genuine comprehension.

Alternatively, Burge (1993/2013) points out that a person may need to see some diagram to come to know some mathematical truth. However, even when this is true, warrant for believing the mathematical truth need not be, in part, empirical.¹⁰²

Finally, Burge (1993/2013) relies on the differences between ‘seeing’ that something is being presented as true and seeing ordinary objects or states in the world to further make a case for thinking that a person can know some intelligible statement was presented as true on the basis of warrant that is not empirical. About this he says the following:

“When we receive communication, the situation is different. The objects of cognitive interest - the contents and their subject matters - are not the objects of perception. We do not perceive the contents of attitudes that are conveyed to us; we understand them. We perceive and have perceptual beliefs about word occurrences. We may perceive them as having a certain content and subject matter, but the content is understood, not perceived. The subject matter, word occurrences, of our perceptual experiences and beliefs bears a non-constitutive (quasi-conventional) relation to the content and subject matter of the beliefs to which we are entitled as a result of communication. So the accounts of our non-inferential entitlements to perception and to interlocution must be different.” (Burge, 1993/2013, p. 245)

¹⁰² “The epistemic status of perception in normal communication is like the status it was traditionally thought to have when a diagram is presented that triggers realization of the meaning and truth of a claim of pure geometry or logic. Perception of physical properties triggers realization of something abstract, an intentional content, expressed by the sentence, and (often) already mastered by the recipient. Its role is to call up and facilitate mobilization of conceptual resources that are already in place. It is probably necessary that one perceive symbolic expressions to accept logical axioms - just as it is necessary to perceive words in interlocution. But perception of expression is not part of the justificational force for accepting the contents.” (Burge, 1993/2013, p. 246)

According to Burge, (1993/2013) believing on the basis of perceiving something that some statement is being publicly presented as true is more like being made to understand a mathematical truth by seeing a diagram than it is like believing that it is raining on the basis of seeing water falling down outside the window.

Burge (1993/2013) thinks that a person is a priori prima facie warranted in believing any intelligible statement presented as true that she comes across. And, a person can believe an intelligible statement presented as true without knowing where it comes from (again, because she can know from the fact that it is intelligible that it comes from a rational source or resource for reason and because she can rely on both of these things to be functioning properly and so to be aiming at arriving in a good way at the truth and preserving it).

In most cases in which a person believes something on the basis of encountering some intelligible statement being presented as true (at least in most cases in which an adult believes something on such a basis), a person knows where the statement presented as true came from. This is true in common cases of testimony in which one person, standing in front of another, tells the other person something by uttering some words. When it is clear that an intelligible statement is being publicly presented as true by another person, it seems, a hearer's believing that statement can be understood as something she does in response to the norm for public presentation as true that the teller is subject to (publicly present as true what is true and believed).

I will now turn to pointing out some of the ways in which I see Burge (1993/2013)'s account interlocution and Moran's account of testimony overlapping and interacting.

For Burge, (1993/2013) a person's entitlement to believe what another person publicly presents as true is one she has only because the other person is subject to a certain norm for action, a norm that governs public presentations as true and says to publicly present as true only what is true and believed. A plausible reading of Moran understands Moran, likewise, to be thinking that a teller's giving a hearer non-evidential reason to believe what she tells depends

upon the teller being subject to certain norms for action that govern telling. As is likely clear from above, for Moran, these are norms that say tell only what you believe and are in a position to know.

I think there may be a part of the account of the warrant people have for believing what comes to them through interlocution given by Burge (1993/2013) that would be easier to accept after the epistemic difference between intelligible statements presented as true that are directed towards a person and aimed warranting some belief and other intelligible statements presented as true that a person might come across is fully explicated. Moran is interested in intelligible statements presented as true that are directed towards a person and aimed warranting some belief. This is what he is talking about in talking about tellings.

As we saw, Burge (1993/2013) defends the ideas that sometimes perception merely facilitates the acquisition of entitled belief from other people and that it is possible to know with a completely a priori warrant something known from interlocution. Burge (2011/2013) later gives up this view, arguing that something known through interlocution must always be known, in part, on the basis of empirical warrant because warrant for believing that something was publicly presented as true is always partially empirical.

In my discussion of Moran, I will try to make a case for thinking that, when one person gives another person a reason to believe something through testimony, as Moran understands this, the reason-recipient's understanding of the reason that the reason-giver aims to give plays a role in determining what reason is given. A person might find an intelligible statement presented as true written in the sand, not knowing why someone put it there. Or a person might find a letter addressed to another person or overhear a conversation and be in a good position to judge that some of what was said was presented as true to warrant certain beliefs. However, when a person is the person towards whom an act of presenting as true in order to give warrant is directed, her understanding of the act can, I think, play a role in determining its nature and the warrant that it gives.

According to Burge (1993/2013), a teller's warrant for believing what she publicly presents as true determines some important things about a hearer's warrant for believing what she finds publicly presented as true. A hearer's warrant for believing what she finds publicly presented as true will be sufficient for knowledge only if the teller knows what she is publicly presenting as true. That is, it will be sufficient only if, first, the teller has warrant sufficient for knowing what she publicly presents as true, and, second, the teller believes what she publicly presents as true on the basis of that (sufficient for knowledge) warrant. This idea is explained by Burge (1993/2013) in the following way: A hearer who believes something on the basis of testimony from a person who does not know that thing has a belief that is only accidentally connected to the truth.¹⁰³ As such it fails to be knowledge. (Burge (1993/2013) does say that this is somewhat imprecise. He says: "In requiring that the source have knowledge if the recipient is to have knowledge based on interlocution, I over simplify. Some chains with more than two links seem to violate this condition. But there must be knowledge in the chain if the recipient is to have knowledge based on interlocution" (Burge, 1993/2013, p. 251).)

Burge (1993/2013) says that when a hearer acquires an entitled belief that counts as knowledge from the public presentation as true of another person, the nature of the warrant that the source of the public presentation as true had (its being a priori or empirical, for example) for believing what she publicly presented as true plays a role in determining the nature of the warrant that the hearer has for what she believes on the basis of the teller's public presentation as true. Burge says the following two things about this:

¹⁰³ From footnote 24: "Because the interlocutor must have knowledge and because of Gettier cases, the interlocutor must have more than true, justified belief if the recipient is to have knowledge. The recipient's dependence for having knowledge on the interlocutor's having knowledge is itself an instance of the Gettier point. The recipient could have true justified belief, but lack knowledge because the interlocutor lacked knowledge." (Burge, 1993/2013, p. 251)

First: “The recipient’s [the recipient of an entitled belief from testimony that counts as knowledge] own justification is incomplete and implicitly refers back, anaphorically, to fuller justification or entitlement. Call the combination of the recipient’s own proprietary justification with the proprietary justifications (including entitlements) in his sources on which the recipient’s knowledge depends ...the extended body of justification that underwrites the recipient’s knowledge.” (1993/2013, p. 251)

Second: “The extended body of justification - the one that reaches beyond the individual is the relevant one. If I am apriori entitled to accept an interlocutor’s word, but the interlocutor provides me with empirically justified information, it would be wrong to characterize my knowledge of the information as apriori.” (1993/2013, p. 251)

Why we need to look at a hearer’s *extended body of justification* in order to understand and evaluate the warrant she has for something she knows on the basis of interlocution and so, why, for example, a hearer can have fully a priori knowledge of something known from interlocution (again, something Burge (1993/2013) allows for but not Burge (2011/2013)) only if the source of the testimony had an a priori warrant sufficient for knowledge on the basis of which she believed what she told is not directly explained.

Some have understood Burge (1993/2013) to be saying that testimony preserves belief as it passes between persons in a way that is causally similar to the way in which purely preservative memory preserves belief within a person over time. Because there is enough similarity between the causal mechanism that purely preservative memory uses and the causal mechanism that testimony uses, we can give the same kind of explanation for how it is that justification is preserved through testimony as we do for how it is that justification is preserved through purely preservative memory, some have taken Burge’s idea to be. Owens (2002, 2006,

2016), for example, seems have this understanding of Burge (1993/2013). Owens has, further, used this idea that he finds in Burge, in developing his own account of testimony.

I think it is a mistake to think that similarity in the causal mechanism that purely preservative memory uses and the causal mechanism that testimony uses can be used to explain how justification is preserved through testimony for Burge (1993/2013).¹⁰⁴ Trying to understand testimony as something that transfers beliefs from one person to another in a way that is causally similar to the way in which purely preservative memory transfers belief from one point in time to another within a person and trying to use such similarity to explain how justification is preserved through testimony can result in an account of testimony that implies that beliefs gained through testimony are defective. Owens (2002, 2006, 2016), who does want to use a similarity in the causal mechanisms that purely preservative memory and testimony use to explain how justification is preserved through testimony, may I think give an account of testimony that implies that beliefs gained through testimony are defective. Below I will say something about why I think that this may be true. Further, when we, following Burge (1993/2013), think that a person is a priori prima facie entitled to rely on the truth of what comes to her through purely preservative memory and that, when she does, the warrant for the belief she holds in the present depends on the warrant for the belief she held in the past, we are thinking of purely preservative memory as a rational entity, a resource for reason, and not as a material thing employing a certain kind of causal mechanism that makes this true.

When a belief comes to us in the present from purely preservative memory, it is not a belief that we form in the present as a result of seeing our past belief. Purely preservative memory, rather, keeps us believing. It pushes the very same belief we had in the past into the present. Owens (2002, 2006, 2016) seems to think that it is this aspect of purely preservative

¹⁰⁴ I do think that it is true that both must be reliable in order for a person to be entitled to rely on them and for justification to be preserved when she does. But reliability alone does not make for a justification preserving mechanism.

memory that is key to understanding how purely preservative memory preserves justification. And he seems to think that testimony can similarly be understood to push belief from one person into another in a way that makes it true that justification is preserved.

Owens (2002, 2006, 2016) says that, when a person tells, she expresses belief in something and that this tends to cause those who encounter the expression to acquire the belief. Owens (2006), draws a distinction between a person's indicating that she believes something and a person's expressing belief in that thing. When a person expresses belief in something, Owens says, she acts directly from a belief in that thing with the intention of expressing belief in that thing. A person indicates that she believes something whenever she does something that makes sense only if she believes that thing. It is expressions of belief, in the sense just described, that cause others to believe in a way that preserves justification, according to Owens.

Owens (2002, 2006, 2016) does not spell out fully how he thinks the causal mechanism that testimony uses makes it true that justification is preserved through testimony. However, I think that the following is a plausible rendering of Owens' view: A person's expressing belief in something causes others to believe that thing in a way that is similar to the way in which a person's expressing anger in something can make another person sympathetically angry.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Owens (2016) says:

“Testimony involves assertion and assertion involves the expression of belief and so it is natural to compare the latter with the expressions of emotion. The transmission of belief by testimony depends on our shared human emotional psychology and, in particular on two underlying instincts. First, our need to express what we believe...Second our tendency to react to other people's expressions of belief in a specific way, namely by coming to share the conviction in question.” (p. 14-15)

And Owens (2002) says:

“Now cognitive inertia exists not just within a single person but between different people. Other things being equal, I am inclined to believe what others believe, and the firmer they seem in their convictions the stronger the belief I acquire from them.” (p. 172-173)

And Owens (2006) says:

When one person, A, becomes sympathetically angry after hearing another person, B, express anger, the following can seem plausible: in order to assess the aptness of A's anger, we need to look at the aptness of B's anger. If B is irrationally angry, then A likewise will be irrationally angry for the same reason, because of how A's anger was caused by B's.

Owens (2002, 2006, 2016), I take it, may think that something like this true when one person believes something because another person expressed belief in that thing. When one person, A, is caused to believe something by another person, B, expressing belief in that thing, B's warrant will determine the nature of A's warrant because of the way in which A's belief was caused by B. Sympathy is such that the aptness of emotions acquired through it depends on the aptness of other people's emotions. The psychological mechanism through which people acquire beliefs they find others expressing is such that warrant for beliefs acquired through it depends on the warrant other people have for those beliefs.

I think that testimony cannot be understood to push beliefs from one person into another, in the way that Owens (2002, 2006, 2016) may think that it does. We cannot, in the regular course of things, be understood to be infected with beliefs from other people. A person might just find herself angry after hearing someone express anger. But, it cannot be the case that people regularly (whenever they believe on the basis of testimony) just find themselves believing something after hearing another person express a belief in that thing. Owen's account of testimony, on one reading of it at least, implies that beliefs gained through testimony (although they are not buried) are like beliefs that a therapist might help a person become aware of in that they are beliefs that we are not, at first at least, first-personally aware of. I take it that beliefs like this must be understood as defective.

“But when I *assert* that our colleague is dishonest with a view to ensuring that they believe this on my say so, I am employing a rather different mechanism for influencing their beliefs. I mean them to acquire this belief, not by reflecting on the information that I myself believe it (and intend to inform them of this etc.) but rather by ‘catching’ the belief from me, together with its judgmental force.” (p. 111)

Again, as I suggested above, I do not think it is the causal mechanism that purely preservative memory or testimony uses that is supposed to explain how justification is preserved for Burge (1993/2013). It is in thinking of purely preservative memory as a resource for reason and a person as rational source, it is in thinking of these as rational entities, that we can think of them as, first, things that a person is a priori prima facie entitled to rely on and, second, as being such that, when a person believes in accordance with the a priori warrant she has to rely on them, warrant can be preserved. Burge says that, “memory is no more intrinsically an empirical faculty than it is a rational faculty,” in making a case for thinking that we can be a priori entitled to rely on it (1993/2013, p. 234).

A detailed look at Moran’s account of testimony will suggest a way (preferable to the one attributed to Owens above) of understanding why, when we are evaluating and trying to understand the nature of a hearer’s warrant for believing what she believes on the basis of testimony, we need to consider the source of the testimony’s warrant for believing what is told.

I will now return to Moran. In the next section, I begin discussing his idea of a non-evidential reason.

IV. Returning to Moran: Moran’s Idea of a Non-Evidential Reason

The first thing we can say about the non-evidential reason that Moran thinks a teller gives a hearer to believe what she tells is that it is a reason of trust.¹⁰⁶ Telling someone *p* is something that a person should do only if she believes and is in a position to know *p*. When a teller tells a hearer *p*, then, the hearer can trust the teller to be telling only what she believes and is in a position to know. And the hearer can believe, on the basis of such trust, that *p*.

¹⁰⁶ Ross (1986) (whom Moran (2018) himself discusses) can be understood to suggest that tellers give hearers a reason of trust. My discussion of the idea here is much more detailed than Ross’s. And I distinguish the reason of trust tellers give from other reasons of trust.

A person can believe on the basis of trust things other than the content of what someone tells her. For example, if it were possible to just see another person's beliefs, a person could believe the content of what another person believes on the basis of trust. A person could trust the observed believer to be believing only what she has some reason to believe. Alternatively, a person can believe on the basis of trust generally that the conditions that make good and permissible what another person is doing as her intentional action obtain. This is because a person can trust another person to be doing something as her intentional action only if it is good and permissible. Finally, a person can believe on the basis of trust that another person does something as her intentional action, if doing that thing is required of her (the other person). A person can trust another person to do what she is obligated to do. Trusting another person and believing on the basis of such trust always involves viewing the person trusted as free and responsive to reason. What a person can be trusted to do is what she has reason to do in response to the reasons she has to do it.

Believing something on the basis of trust is incompatible with viewing the person trusted as determined. Believing something on the basis of trust, further, is incompatible with recognizing as reasons for or against what is believed things that are reasons for or against what is believed only if the person trusted is determined. There might be regular, observed (or expected on the basis of observation) connections between what people in general tell or what some person tells and what is true, between what people in general or what some person believes and what is true, between what people in general or what some person does as her intentional action and the conditions that make doing that action good and permissible obtaining, between a person or some particular person's being obligated to do something and the person's doing that thing. These connections might serve as reasons for believing that what some person tells or believes is true, that what some person is doing is good and permissible, that some person is doing what she is obligated to do.

Alternatively, a person might have failed in the past to tell what is true, to believe what is true (about a certain subject maybe), to have done what is good or permissible (when doing a certain kind of thing maybe), to do what she is obligated to do. Or observation might show (or be grounds for expecting) that people in general are likely to lie about certain things, to believe falsely about certain things, to fail to do what is good or permissible when doing certain things, to fail to do certain things they are obligated to do. There might be regular, observed (or expected on the basis of observation) connections that give reason to believe that what some person tells or believes is not true, that what some person is doing is not good and permissible, that a person is not doing what she is obligated to do. However, others cannot both believe on the basis of trust that the content of what a person tells or believes is true, that conditions that make what the person is doing good and permissible obtain, or that a person is doing what she is obligated to do and also at the same time recognize, as reasons for or against believing what they believe on the basis of trust, observed (or expected on the basis of observation) connections like the ones mentioned earlier here and in the previous paragraph. These connections serve as reasons for or against believing what can be believed on the basis of trust only on the assumption that the person who might be trusted is determined.¹⁰⁷

It can seem appropriate to call all reasons of trust for belief non-evidential because believing for them not only permits but requires a person to disregard certain kinds of evidence, evidence that is only evidence on the assumption that the person trusted is determined. However, I do not think that all reasons of trust for belief should be called non-evidential, in

¹⁰⁷ Here is the kind of thing I have in mind: Suppose A has promised B that she will keep the porch light on for her. B's believing that A will keep the porch light on for her on the basis of trusting A to do what she has promised to do is incompatible with B's taking as a reason for thinking that A will not keep the porch light on the fact that A has many times failed to keep the porch light on when she promised to keep the porch light on. And it is also incompatible with B's taking as a reason for thinking that A will keep the porch light on the fact that, if she does not, B will make a lot of noise coming into the house and B always does what she can to sleep soundly.

Moran's sense. The reason of trust that a person has to believe what someone tells has features that distinguish it and make it non-evidential.

Telling is aimed at another person's believing on the basis of trust in a way that makes it true that telling depends, in a special way, for its success on another person's believing on the basis of trust. Suppose it is true that a person should sit on top of a car only if she owns the car. And suppose a person is sitting on top of a car. This person's success at doing what she is doing, it seems, need not depend upon others believing that she owns the car she is sitting on top of on the basis of trusting her to sit only on cars she owns. Telling is, I think, not like sitting on top of a car. And the reason of trust we have to believe what another person tells us is not just like the reason of trust we have to believe that another person owns a car she is sitting on top of.

Telling, as Moran understands it, is an act of intentionally giving reason for belief. A teller as such intends to give a hearer reason to believe something. A teller, as such, however, does not intend to give a hearer reason to believe something in just any way. A person who intends to give another a reason to believe something might go about this in different ways. One person might intentionally give another person a reason to believe something by putting that other person in touch with an argument for that thing and by taking care that that other person goes through the argument. For example, a person who intends to give another person reason to believe that God exists, might intend to do this by having someone explain Anselm's ontological proof to that person.

Alternatively, one person might intentionally give another person reason to believe something by doing what causes that other person to see that thing or something regularly or rationally connected with that thing. For example, one person might intentionally give another person a reason to believe that there is a fire outside by drawing that other person's attention with a loud sound to a window through which fire or smoke can be seen. Or one person might intentionally give another person a reason to believe it is drizzling by drawing that other

person's attention with a loud sound to a window through which a person carrying an open umbrella can be seen.

A person who intends to give another a reason to believe something by doing what causes that other person to see something might be intending to give reason by doing what causes the other person to see her (the reason-giver's) own intentional action (this might be something she is just doing to give reason or it might be something she has independent reason to do). A person intending to give reason in this way might intend to do what causes the other person to see her (the reason-giver's) taking on a practical obligation. And the person may do this in order to give that other person a reason of trust to believe that she will do what she has become obligated to do or that something that follows from her doing what she has become obligated to do will obtain. For example, one person might intentionally give another person a reason of trust to believe that she will be at the airport tomorrow by loudly promising to pick someone else up at the airport tomorrow within hearing distance of that person.

Alternatively, a person who intends to give another person a reason to believe something by doing what causes that other person to perceive her own (the reason-giver's) intentional action might intend to give that other person a reason of trust to believe that the conditions that make what she (the reason-giver) is doing good and permissible obtain or that something that is regularly or rationally connected with the conditions that make her action good and permissible obtains. For example, one person might intentionally give another person a reason of trust to believe she owns some car by sitting on top of that car after parking it in front of the person's house (supposing here that she is permitted to sit on top of the car only if she owns the car). Alternatively, one person might intentionally give another person a reason of trust to believe the restaurant is around the corner by agreeing loudly to give someone else standing nearby a hundred dollars if the restaurant is not around the corner (supposing here that it is good for the person to take on this obligation only if she is sure the restaurant is around the corner).

Telling as such involves openly intending to give a hearer reason to believe something by openly intending to give the hearer reason to believe that thing. A teller aims for her intending to give reason to give reason. This is, I take it, what Moran means when he says that telling involves giving assurance. A person should only openly intend to give reason to believe *p* by openly intending to give reason to believe *p* if the person believes and is in a position to know *p*. A teller who tells *p* openly intends to give reason to believe *p* by openly intending to give reason to believe *p* in order to give her hearer a reason of trust to believe *p*.

A person might openly intend to give someone a reason to believe something without intending for the openly intending to give reason that she does to itself be a reason to believe what she openly intends to give reason to believe. For example, suppose two people hold (in comparison to each other) deeply incompatible religious views. These people know each other well and know that this is true of them. Suppose it is also true, though, that each frequently tries to convince the other to change her religious views. Suppose one of these people openly intends to give the other a reason to believe that God exists by reciting Anselm's ontological proof. The person who recites the proof knows that her openly intending to give reason to believe God exists is not going to be taken as a reason by her interlocutor to believe God exists. As such, she does not intend for her openly intending to give reason to believe that God exists to be a reason for her interlocutor to believe God exists.

There are many cases in which a person might openly intend to give others reason to believe something that she (the reason-giver) does not believe or that she (the reason-giver) is not in a position to know without, I take it, violating any norms. For example, this can happen when someone is struggling to decide between two alternatives. Often people will openly intend to give such a person reason to believe one alternative or the other is preferable or true without themselves believing that the alternative is preferable or true. And they will not go wrong in so doing. Suppose a person is buying a car and wondering whether blue paint or red paint will hold up better over time. Another person might tell her that a friend owned a blue car and noticed the

paint eroding quickly. This person who passes on the story about her friend might not herself believe that blue paint holds up worse over time (the evidence she has for this is not strong enough). But she does openly intend to give the car-buyer reason (a small reason) to believe this and does not, I take it, do anything wrong in so doing.

It is also possible for a person to openly intend to give another person reason to believe something that she is not in a position to know without violating any norms. For example, suppose one person says to another that she is starting to think p. The person who hears this might say that she may remember someone writing a paper arguing that p, although she cannot be sure because her memory of it is foggy. The person reporting on the paper in this case openly intends to give the person starting to think p a reason (again a very small one) to believe p even though she is not in a position to know p (suppose she has available to her no reason for believing p aside from a foggy memory that someone wrote a paper arguing p). Despite this, again, I do not think the person who passes on information about her foggy memory violates any norms.

The following might be true: People are under a general, prima facie obligation not to make it reasonable for others to believe what they do not believe and are not in a position to know. This obligation is, however, easily defeasible. In the above examples, both the fact that is passed on in the exchange (the story about the paint, the fact that the reason-giver has a foggy memory of a paper that argues p) and the fact that the person who passes on the fact in the exchange openly intends to give reason can be understood as grounding reasons for the reason-recipient to believe something. Prima facie, the reason-giver in the first case should not do what she does unless she believes and is in a position to know that blue paint holds up worse over time. And, prima facie, the reason-giver in the second case should not do what she does unless she believes and is in a position to know p. However, these prima facie obligations are outweighed and defeated by the value of the reason-givers helping the reason-recipients to gather evidence. Further, the fact that these prima facie obligations are outweighed and defeated

is explained in part by the fact that the reason-givers do not do very much to make it reasonable for the reason-recipients to believe what they give them reason to believe. The reason-givers only give a small reason for belief.

In the cases presented two paragraphs back, what the reason-givers do unambiguously gives the reason-recipients reason to believe certain things, that blue paints holds up worse over time, that p. But sometimes it may not be clear why a person is doing what she is doing. And so sometimes it may not be clear what seeing a person doing something supports believing. For example, a person's eating chips by the handful might be explained in different ways. It might be explained by the fact that the person is starving or the fact that the chips are great, for example. Sometimes seeing a person eating chips by the handful provides, at best, a small reason to believe that one particular of the possible explanations obtains. When this is true, it will be easier for a person's prima facie obligation not to make it reasonable for another person to believe something unless she believes and is in a position to know that thing to be defeated, it might be thought. It can be true that a person need not worry about the fact that her eating chips by the handful might suggest to an observer that the chips are great even though she is just eating them quickly because she is starving. The value of eating chips however she wants outweighs the obligation not to make it reasonable for another person to believe something unless she believes and is in a position to know that thing, in part because what the person does gives at most a small reason for believing that the chips are great.

It might be thought that openly intending to give reason by openly intending to give reason is both something that unambiguously makes it reasonable for others to believe something and also something that there is no reason to do except in cases in which a person believes and is in a position to know the thing that she is openly intending to give reason to believe by openly intending to give reason. As such, it is not possible for the prima facie obligation not to make it reasonable for others to believe something unless you believe and are in a position to know that thing to be defeated when a person openly intends to give reason by

openly intending to give reason. Tellers, it might be thought further, use this fact to tell. They openly intend to give reason by openly intending to give reason because this is the activity that is always subject to norms sincerity and knowledgeability.

It could be the case that norms of sincerity and knowledgeability apply to action in general but are only non-defeasible when a person is openly intending to give reason by openly intending to give reason. Alternatively, though, it could also be the case that the norms of sincerity and knowledgeability that govern telling are specific to telling. It could be the case that tellers use the norms of sincerity and knowledgeability that govern telling to give non-evidential reason and also that norms of sincerity and knowledgeability govern telling because it gives non-evidential reason. There could be other, weaker epistemic norms that apply to action in general in virtue of the fact that people have a baseline responsibility for others' beliefs. For now, I will set aside the question of whether or not telling uses norms of sincerity and knowledgeability that apply to action in general or is such that the norms of sincerity and knowledgeability that govern it are specific to it.

V. Understanding What is Special About the Reason of Trust Given Through Testimony by Considering the Fact that Telling Is Not Producing Belief

We have said that openly intending to give reason to believe *p* by openly intending to give reason to believe *p* is something that a person should do only if she believes and is in a position to know *p*. A person who tells *p* aims to give her hearer a reason of trust to believe *p* by doing the activity of openly intending to give reason to believe *p* by openly intending to give a reason to believe *p*.

I suggested above that the reason of trust a teller gives a hearer to believe what she tells can be distinguished from other reasons of trust. When a person tells she does something that is aimed at her hearer's believing on the basis of trust in a way that makes it true that her success

at doing what she is doing depends, in a special way, on her hearer's believing on the basis of trust. Again, it seems that a person can be succeeding at what she is doing in sitting on top of a car even though no one believes that she owns the car on the basis of trusting her to sit only on the cars that she owns. Telling, it was suggested, is not like sitting on top of a car.

A person's success at telling might be thought to depend on another person's believing on the basis of trust for different reasons. A teller might be understood as a person who acts productively to give her hearer a reason of trust to believe something. A person might sit on top of car, aiming productively to give another person a reason of trust to believe that she (the person sitting on the car) owns the car. A person might sit on top of a car without this aim. But when she has this aim, the success of her activity, part of which is her sitting on top of the car, will actually depend upon another person's believing on the basis of trust that she owns the car, since, we are supposing, this is the product her activity aims to realize. Telling does not depend for its success on another person believing on the basis of trust like this, because it aims productively at another person's believing.

Moran (2018) is clear that he does not think that a teller acts productively to get her hearer to believe what she tells. And Moran makes his own case for thinking this.¹⁰⁸ In this

¹⁰⁸ Moran (2018) offers several considerations in favor of thinking that telling cannot be understood as producing belief. Moran points out that the fact that a teller aims to give reason when she tells does not detract from the epistemic value of what a teller does in telling. In fact, if a teller does not aim to give reason, what she says will not give the reason that testimony characteristically gives at all. If the teller was producing belief by giving evidence in telling, then it seems that the teller's aim of giving reason might make worse the reason for belief that she gives, according to Moran (2018):

“And if we are considering speech as evidence, we will have eventually to face the question of how recognition of its intentional character could ever enhance rather than detract from its epistemic value for an audience. Ordinarily, if I confront something as evidence (the tell-tale footprint, the cigarette butt left in the ashtray) and then learn that it was left there deliberately, and even with the intention of bringing me to a particular belief, this will only discredit it as evidence in my eyes. It won't seem *better* evidence, or even just as good, but instead like something fraudulent, or tainted evidence.” (p. 43)

Further, neither teller nor hearer can view what the teller does as aimed at producing belief in the hearer. Either party viewing what the teller does as aimed at producing belief makes

section, I will offer some additional considerations that count in favor of thinking that testimony cannot be understood to aim productively at another person's believing.

In what follows I will, first, use some observations about productive activity in general to make a case for thinking that a hearer's acquiring a reason of trust to believe what is told is not a product that a teller aims at that stands outside of her telling activity. In the course of doing this, I will make a case for thinking that a hearer's acquiring of a reason of trust can be understood as a part of the teller's activity. It can be understood, I will say, as the proper finishing of the teller's activity. Continuing, I will argue that a hearer can only be said to acquire, from an act of telling *p*, a reason of trust to believe *p*, if she believes *p* on the basis of trusting the teller. It is not possible for a hearer to see that a teller is openly intending to give her reason to believe *p* by openly intending to give her reason to believe *p* and, in virtue of this, have a reason of trust to believe *p*, while not believing on the basis of trusting the teller that *p*. A hearer's having a reason of trust to believe what a teller tells her is, really, her believing on the basis of trust what the teller tells her.

it impossible for the hearer to accept or reject *the* thing that teller says. Telling involves a teller presenting something to the hearer that the hearer can accept or reject, according to Moran (2018).

Moran says, for example:

“If the speaker is conceiving of her own act as the production of a result, then she will be conceiving of the hearer as responding to her act as an event or state of affairs with a certain possible epistemic interest, possibly something directed to his attention, like Grice's example of the broken china left lying around, either deliberately or inadvertently. But while the broken china on the floor may be a good source of true beliefs about what happened, it is not something of the right logical type to be capable of truth or falsity itself, affirmation or denial.” (2018, p. 163)

And also:

“If we think of the meaning of the act unilaterally, in terms of one person (the speaker) seeking to produce a certain result (belief) in the mind of another person (the hearer), then it could only be an accidental matter that the same content is known by both parties to be at issue between them, as the object of possible agreement or disagreement. The model of production of belief in a hearer does not provide for the possibility of a ‘we,’ such that the two parties can say ‘we agree/disagree about P.’” (2018, p. 166)

To start, I will make a couple of general observations about productive activity, activity with a product outside of it as its end. First, when it comes to productive activity, success (the product) and the activity stand apart. This means a couple of things. First, it means that it is possible for it to be true that a person did some productive activity even though she did not realize the end of the activity or succeed at doing what she was doing. Consider a person who is doing a productive activity of building a chair. She might be building a chair, run out of materials, and then stop building a chair before the chair is complete. The builder in this case was building a chair even though no chair was built and she did not succeed.

The fact that the end of productive activity (the product) and the activity stand apart, second, means that productive activity cannot be revised. It can only be stopped or completed. A person who starts the productive activity of building a chair, thinking that she is going to use one method to build a chair might end up using a different method to build the chair. It is possible to revise productive activity in this way. However, at the moment a person starts doing the productive activity of building a chair it is true of her that she is building a chair at that point. And nothing that happens in the future can change this. A person who gets out her tools, doing the productive activity of building chair and then changes her mind, deciding instead to do the productive activity of building a table, must be understood as having been building a chair before she started building a table. She was not building a table all along.

Someone who is engaged in productive activity will not have practical knowledge (knowledge without observation) that her product, the thing she aims at outside of her activity, has been produced. A producer will, instead, need to rely on observation to know that the product she aimed at realizing has been realized. A person who knows how to do some productive activity can know without observation (practically) that certain changes in world are occurring as she does the activity. A person can know without observation that a nail is going into a joint in the chair as she hammers it, if she knows how to hammer and how to build a chair. However, a person who just wants to exercise her chair building knowledge and stops her

activity without checking by observation that a chair has been built will not be acting productively to build a chair in chair building. It is a feature of productive activity as such that observation that confirms that the product aimed at has been produced is required to end the activity without giving it up.¹⁰⁹ Of course, a person can be building a chair productively, decide not to do this anymore, and end her activity without checking that a chair has been built.

With these features of productive activity in mind, we can see that a teller who aims to tell p does not have her hearer's acquiring of a reason of trust to believe p as a product that stands outside of her activity that she aims realize. First, a teller can change her mind midway through telling (even after having taken some steps towards telling) about what she wants to give the hearer reason to believe without performing two different acts of reason-giving.

For example, a person telling might start off aiming to give someone reason to believe that the restaurant is one block to the east and might take some steps towards doing this. The person might then change what she is intending to give the person reason to believe. She might start intending to give the person reason to believe that the restaurant is two blocks to the east. Such a teller need not be understood as performing two different acts of reason-giving. For example, the teller might say 'The restaurant is one block, no actually two blocks to the east.' She will not have performed one (unsuccessful and incomplete) act of telling her interlocutor that the restaurant is one block to the east and another act of telling her interlocutor that the restaurant is two blocks to the east. This teller will have just performed one act of telling her

¹⁰⁹ In Anscombe's (2000) pumping to poison example, the poisoner aims to bring about the kingdom of heaven on earth by poisoning. This is something that stands outside of her action and is something that she does not know herself practically to be doing. It is not possible to acquire the skill of bringing about the kingdom of heaven on earth. No one can know how to do this. But, even with respect to things that a person can know how to do, she will only be acting productively if her activity ends with observation that the product aimed at is realized. A person knows how to open a window, but, if she is opening the window productively, in order to have the window open for some period of time, for example, still, her action will end without being given up only upon observation that the state she aimed at has been realized.

interlocutor that the restaurant is two blocks to the east. This is what she was doing from the start of her act of telling.

Following Moran, we will say that in telling, a person gives reason for believing something by intending to give reason to believe that thing. The teller, in the above case then, we must say, was intending to give her hearer reason to believe the restaurant was two blocks to the east from the start. What the teller was intending later in her act of telling changed the nature of what she was intending earlier in her act of telling.

Further, I do not think a teller needs to be understood as performing two different acts of reason-giving even in the following case: Suppose one person asks another what bar she went to this past weekend. The bar-goer responds by saying, 'Bar B' pausing, and then saying, 'No actually I went to Bar B the weekend before. This past weekend I went Bar A'. The bar-goer can be understood as performing a single act of telling her interlocutor she was at Bar A this weekend. This kind of thing happens most clearly when a person is struggling to express a difficult thought.

Continuing, we can notice that a teller's act of telling a hearer something does not end with the teller getting observational confirmation that the hearer has acquired the reason of trust she (the teller) aims to give her. Of course, no one can confirm that another person has some reason for belief by looking into that other person's head. But a person can look for signs that a person has acquired some reason for belief. A person who aims productively to give another person a reason to believe that she owns a car by parking in front of her house and sitting on top of the car might look for signs that the reason-recipient believes what she is trying to give her a reason to believe. The reason-giver might be looking to see if the reason-recipient mentions the car the next time she talks to her.

Seeing that a teller who tells a hearer that *p* does not do something that ends with the teller having observational confirmation that the hearer has acquired a reason of trust to believe *p* is complicated, somewhat, by the fact that perception facilitates telling. In order for telling to

occur, a hearer needs to accurately perceive a teller. That is, a hearer needs to accurately perceive at least some aspects of a teller and/or of what a teller does in telling. People generally know how to tell. That is, people generally know how to put themselves in relations with others that allow for tellings to occur. As such, people do not generally need evidence that hearers they aim to tell things to are accurately perceiving what they need to be perceiving in order for telling to occur. However, if a teller has reason enough to think that her hearer may not have accurately perceived what she needs to accurately perceive for the telling to occur, the teller may need to confirm that her hearer has accurately perceived what she needed to perceive (or that her hearer is in a position to do so) in order for her act of telling to occur.

Often a teller who needs confirmation that a hearer accurately perceived what she needs to accurately perceive for a telling to occur will get confirmation from the hearer's telling her that she got the message or heard what she said. In some cases, though, the teller may get confirmation in a different way. Suppose one person tells another that the coffee pot is broken. Suppose the teller does this by shouting 'the coffee pot is broken' to the hearer who is in another room. The teller in this case may need to get confirmation from the hearer that she (the hearer) heard what she said, since the hearer was far away, in order for the telling to occur. She might need to shout 'Did you hear me?' and hear 'Yes' back for the telling to occur. Alternatively, though, suppose one person is talking to another person on a phone that is plugged into the wall. Suppose the person talking on the phone plugged into the wall says, 'Our coffee pot broke'. While she is saying this the teller remembers that the phone plug keeps falling out of the socket in the wall. The teller in this case may need to confirm by observation that the phone plug is currently in the socket in the wall in order for the telling to occur. When a teller needs but gets confirmation that a hearer has perceived what she needed to perceive for the telling to occur, the teller's getting confirmation and the end of the telling may coincide. But it will not be the getting of the confirmation that ends the act of telling. Rather, the getting of the confirmation allows for the telling to occur.

A person often expects, in accordance with conversational norms, for someone she tells something to respond by saying something in return pretty quickly. If one person tells another person something and does not get a response, this can give the teller reason to doubt that a successful act of telling occurred. The teller might then seek out observational confirmation that an act of telling occurred. However, seeking out observational confirmation that an act of telling occurred is not the same thing as seeking out observational confirmation to conclude an act of telling.

There are cases in which a teller will not be expecting a hearer to respond quickly or at all to what she tells her. This happens when the teller tells the hearer something that it is clear the hearer needs to think about before responding to. Or it might happen when a teller knows that the person she tells something to does not want to have a conversation with her. In cases in which a teller does not expect a hearer to respond quickly or at all to what she tells, observation of the hearer may give the teller reason to believe that the hearer has acquired the reason she aimed to give her. The hearer may be looking at her (the teller) with a knowing look on her face. However, sometimes a teller will not have anything that might count as observational confirmation that the hearer acquired the reason for belief that the teller aimed to give her. It is possible, in such a case, for a teller's act of telling to conclude and for a successful telling to occur.

Consider a person who calls another on the phone to tell her the coffee maker is broken. The teller in this case knows the person she is calling, the hearer, does not want to have a conversation with her. After hearing the hearer says hello, the teller says, 'The coffee pot is broken'. The teller might not hear anything else from the hearer, and the teller might hang up the phone herself. The teller's act of telling can end during the phone call and can be successful even though she has no observational confirmation that the hearer acquired the reason she aimed for her to acquire. Suppose the teller and the hearer never have any further interactions. (And so the teller never gets confirmation that the hearer acquired the reason she aimed to give

her by, for example, seeing that the hearer has bought for them a new coffee maker.) Still, an act of telling can end and be successful in such a case.¹¹⁰

I think it is true of all acts of telling, not just ones in which a teller has available to her no way of confirming by observation that the hearer has acquired the reason she (the teller) aims to give her, that they do not end with observation that confirms that the hearer has acquired the reason the teller aims to give her. Although tellers often have available to them many things that can provide observational confirmation that their hearers have acquired the reasons they aim for their hearers to acquire, I think it is also true that, with respect to any act of telling, if you took away the teller's means of confirming observationally that the hearer acquired the reason the teller aimed to give her (so long as the teller can rely on the fact that the hearer is accurately perceiving what she needs to perceive for the telling to occur), the telling would still end and succeed in the same way. Consider a teller whose only means of confirming by observation that the hearer received the reason she aimed to give the hearer is the knowing look she can see on the hearer's face. The telling this teller does could end and succeed even if this teller closes her eyes. And it will end in the same way in cases in which the teller's eyes are open and in cases in which the teller's eyes are closed.

Telling is not production aimed at a hearer's acquiring of a reason to believe what is told. It does not end with the teller having observational confirmation that the hearer has acquired the reason for belief the teller aims to give her. An act of telling must still end, though, in order for what the teller is telling to be determined. A teller, as we have said, openly intends to give a hearer reason to believe something by openly intending to give the hearer reason to believe something. However, what a teller is intending to give a hearer reason to believe, we have seen, can change over the course of a teller's act of telling. What a teller intends to give a hearer

¹¹⁰ Also, successful telling can occur through written communication (a text, a letter, an email) that is not responded to even when it is also true that the teller receives no confirmation that the hearer acquired the reason she aimed to give her.

reason to believe at any point during act of telling is not determined until her act of telling is over. A teller will do an act of telling p only if she finishes the act of telling p and only if, upon finishing the act of telling, it was true she was intending to give the hearer reason to believe p.

What finishes a successful act of telling is the hearer's having a reason to believe what the teller intends to give her reason to believe. Consider a teller who is telling p. The teller openly intends to give the hearer reason to believe p by openly intending to give the hearer reason to believe p. This is something the teller should do only if she believes and is in a position to know p. The teller understands this and aims to give the hearer a reason of trust to believe p by doing what she should do only if she believes and is in a position to know p. Importantly, the teller's aim of giving the hearer a reason of trust to believe p is not something separate from what she does that gives the hearer a reason of trust to believe p. When a teller tells she does not openly intend to give reason by openly intending to give reason and also, in addition, aim to give her hearer a reason of trust. Aiming to give her hearer a reason of trust is part of what she does in openly intending to give reason by openly intending to give reason.

In order for a person to do an activity like telling that is such that the nature of it will be determined only once it is finished, a person must aim at the end, that is at the finishing, of the activity. This is because a person can only count as doing an activity that is such that the nature of it will be determined only once it is finished, if it is not an accident that the person finishes what she does. An activity like telling might, like productive activity, be given up. Someone who starts trying to tell another person something might give up, either because she realizes it is not possible (for example, because she is talking on the phone and the phone plug will not stay in wall socket and she has no other way of reaching the person she is talking to) or just because she decides she no longer wants to tell. In order to be doing an activity that is such that the nature of it will be determined only once it is finished, a person must aim, not at her activity's finishing in any way (possibly by being given up), but rather at her activity's finishing in the proper way. I take it that, it is in aiming at her hearer's acquiring of a reason of trust to believe what she tells,

that a teller can be said to aim at the proper finishing of her telling activity. The hearer's acquiring of a reason of trust to believe *p* is not a product apart from what the teller does but rather the last part, the proper finishing of what she does. A telling is completed and successful when a hearer acquires a reason of trust to believe what the teller tells.

In order to see that a speaker is telling a hearer something, a person must see that the speaker is aiming at the hearer's acquiring a reason of trust to believe what she is telling as the proper finishing of what she does. Further, in order to tell, a speaker's aim of giving the hearer a reason of trust must be open to her hearer. A speaker whose aim of giving someone a reason of trust is not open to that someone must be acting productively in giving that someone a reason of trust. In order to see that a speaker is telling a hearer something, a person must, further, then, see that the speaker's aim of giving her hearer a reason of trust is open to her hearer.

Suppose one person is sitting on top of a car in order to give another person a reason of trust to believe that she owns the car. Suppose that the person sitting on the car, though, does not make her aim of giving this reason of trust open to the person she aims to give a reason of trust to. She does not want the person she aims to give a reason of trust to to know that she is aiming to give her a reason of trust. The reason-giver does not make eye contact with the reason-recipient, suppose. Suppose the reason-recipient in this case walks by and does acquire a reason of trust to believe that the person sitting on top of the car owns the car. The reason-recipient believes that the person sitting on the car owns the car on the basis of trust. The reason-giver in this case acts productively to make it the case that the reason-recipient acquires a reason of trust to believe she owns the car.

A person who aims to give another person a reason of trust by openly intending to give reason by openly intending to give reason might, similarly, not make her aim of giving a reason of trust open to the person she aims to give a reason of trust to. Suppose A aims to give a reason of trust to believe *p* to another person, B, by openly intending to reason to believe *p* by openly intending to give reason to believe *p*. Suppose A does not make this aim open to B though.

Instead, she tells another person, C, that p loudly and near B. B might acquire the reason of trust that A aims to give her. But this will be something that A acted productively to bring about and cannot be the proper finishing of her activity.

There are reasons for belief that a person can have without believing for. A person can see water pouring down outside from a window, and, in virtue of this, have a reason to believe that it is raining. (I take it that a person does not have reason to believe that it is raining just because there is water pouring down outside her window. To have reason to believe it is raining she must be connected in the right way to the fact that water is pouring down outside her window.) A person who has reason to believe that it is raining because she sees water pouring down from her window still might not believe that it is raining. For example, she might be too distracted to move from seeing the water pouring down to believing that it is raining.

It can seem like the following is possible: A hearer sees that a teller is openly intending to give her reason to believe p by openly intending to give her reason to believe p in order to give her a reason of trust to believe p. In virtue of this the hearer has a reason of trust to believe p even though she does not believe p for this reason. Maybe she is distracted, like a person might be who sees water pouring down from her window but does not believe it is raining. Or maybe she does not trust the teller to do what she should do. Although both of these can seem possible, I do not think they are.

A person cannot absent-mindedly see that another person is telling her something like a person might absent-mindedly see water pouring down through a window. A person who is distracted might hear words being spoken, but if a person sees that another person is telling her something, she must be aware of what she is seeing in a way that makes it impossible for her to fail to believe what follows immediately from what she sees because she is distracted. It is hard enough for a person to fail to believe that it is raining when she sees water falling down outside of a window. A person has to be very distracted for this to occur. And, when it comes to telling something, one person will not see that another person is doing it, unless she both perceives

certain things and interprets them. Suppose a person walks in the door drenched from the rain. This person might tell someone inside that it is raining by saying, 'Not a cloud in the sky today'. The person inside that the teller in this case is speaking to will not count as seeing that the teller is telling her it is raining just in virtue of the fact that she hears the words the speaker says. And the person inside also will not count as seeing that the teller is telling her that it is raining just in virtue of the fact that she both hears the words that the teller says and sees that the teller is drenched. She must see these things and interpret them in light of the fact that the teller aims to tell. Further, this kind of thing is true of all acts of telling, even those in which tellers do not use sarcasm to tell, since, when a person tells, what is supposed to give reason is the fact that the person (the teller) intends to give reason.

A hearer also cannot have a reason of trust to believe what a teller tells her while failing to believe for that reason because she does not trust the teller. As mentioned above, a person cannot believe something on the basis of trusting another person while at the same time taking that person to be determined or recognizing as reasons for or against what is believed on the basis of trust things that are reasons only if the person trusted is determined. But, then, if a hearer is viewing some attempted teller as determined (either directly or by recognizing as reasons things that are reasons only if the teller is determined) she cannot be said to have a reason of trust to believe what the teller tells her even if she sees that the teller is trying to tell her something. It is not available to such a hearer to believe what she is told on the basis of trusting the teller. So, a hearer will have a reason of trust to believe what a teller tells her only if she does not view the teller as determined. A hearer then cannot have a reason of trust to believe what she is told but not believe it because she does not trust the teller.

Suppose one person sees another person sitting on top of a car. The following might seem possible: seeing the person sitting on top of the car gives the observer a reason of trust to believe that the person owns the car. But the observer does not believe that the person owns the car on the basis of this reason because she is not thinking about the norms that govern sitting on

top of cars (the observer does not think about the fact that a person should sit on top of a car only if she owns the car).

There is a straight-forward way of explaining why this kind of thing cannot happen when one person sees another person telling. A teller aims to give her hearer a reason to believe something, using the norms that govern telling. And a teller's aim of using these norms to give reason must be seen by someone who sees her telling. A person cannot see that another is telling her something while not thinking about the norms that govern telling like she might see that another person is sitting on top of a car while not thinking about the norms that govern sitting on top of a car.

Might a hearer see that a teller is telling her something in a way that gives her a reason of trust to believe what the teller tells but not believe what the teller tells, not because she is distracted or because she is not thinking about the norms that govern telling (she cannot be distracted or fail to think about the norms that govern telling and still see a telling), but rather just because or as result of suffering from some kind of brute failure? Might it still, then, be possible for a person to have the reason of trust a teller aims to give her while failing to believe for it?

Suppose a person looks out the window and sees water pouring down. This person will have reason to believe that it is raining (in most cases). The reason this person has to believe that it is raining, plausibly, stands as something against which the person's beliefs can be evaluated whether or not the person responds to it. If the person believes that it is raining on the basis of seeing the water pouring down, seeing the water pouring down makes this belief good. And, if the person does not believe on the basis of seeing the water pouring down that it is raining, seeing the water pouring down makes this lack of belief a bad thing (at least in cases in which she has no other reasons that bear on the question of whether or not it is raining).

The reason a teller gives a hearer to believe what she tells differs from the reason to believe it is raining had by the person in the above case. The reason a teller gives a hearer to

believe what she tells makes it good for a hearer to believe what the teller tells when the hearer believes what the teller tells while not being the kind of thing that stands as something against which a hearer's lack of belief might be criticized. Seeing that a teller is telling her p (while not viewing the teller as determined) makes a hearer entitled to believe p. The hearer's believing p, if she does it, is made good by her seeing that a teller is telling her p. However, the hearer's not believing p is not made bad on the basis of this. Because of this, we can say that a hearer who sees that a teller is trying to tell her something (and does not view the teller as determined) but just because or because of a failure of belief does not believe what the teller tells her does not have the reason of trust the teller aims to give. She will have this reason only if she believes for it.

What explains whether or not a hearer who is in a position to believe on the basis of the reason of trust some teller aims to give her actually does believe on the basis of the reason of trust that the teller aims to give her cannot be a decision on the part of the hearer. It is never possible for people to directly decide to believe. Sometimes Moran talks as if he thinks hearers can decide to accept or reject the reason tellers aim to give through testimony.¹¹¹ However, what Moran must have in mind is only that a hearer will not go wrong in failing to believe on the basis of the reason a teller aims to give her because the teller gives her this reason and she fails to respond to it. The reason makes good believing what is told but does not stand to make bad

¹¹¹ For example, Moran (2018) may sound like he is saying this here:

“Nonetheless, it is clear enough what Anscombe means when she speaks of the insult and injury in not being believed...The offense lies in his [the hearer who does not believe for the reason the teller aims to give] refusing to accept what the speaker freely and explicitly offers him, in favor of privately attending to what the speaker's action passively reveals, just as someone might refuse an apology...What makes sense of such refusals is the fact that acceptance of an assertion or apology doesn't just put one in a different epistemic position with respect to the facts, but brings with it certain vulnerabilities and responsibilities of its own. Accepting an apology, for instance, brings with it the responsibility to put away one's resentment, and makes one vulnerable to a particularly bruising possibility of deceit. These risks are avoided by simply taking the apology as more or less good evidence for remorse, and then making of it what one will.” (p. 74)

failing to believe what is told. The reason is a reason the hearer will have only if she believes for it.

Having a reason of trust from testimony to believe what someone tells is, I take it, the same thing as believing on the basis of trust what someone tells. A teller, in aiming to give a hearer a reason of trust to believe what she tells can also be said to be aiming at a hearer believing on the basis of trust what she tells. And, the final step of telling, the proper finishing of an act of telling, can also be said to be a hearer's believing on the basis of trust what is told.

A clarification is needed at this point. There are some things that a person cannot believe just on the basis of testimony, even when the testimony comes from a teller she trusts. For example, plausibly, a person cannot believe just on the basis of testimony that pleasure is awareness of God's activity. Furthermore, a hearer might have evidence for or against what someone tells that does not have to do with the teller and that does not presuppose that the teller is determined. A person who has pretty good evidence that what someone tells her is incorrect or someone who already believes something obviously inconsistent with what someone tells her will likely not just believe what she is told, even if she trusts the person who tells. Testimony that *p* can still succeed even when *p* is such that it cannot be believed just on the basis of testimony and even when the telling is directed towards someone who has pretty good evidence in support of believing not-*p* or, alternatively, someone who already believes not-*p*. It can succeed if the hearer, while not believing *p* on the basis of testimony, adopts what might be called a belief-adjacent attitude towards *p* on the basis of testimony, on the basis of trusting the teller. So, saying that telling succeeds when a hearer believes on the basis of trust what is told, is speaking imprecisely. Really, telling can succeed both when a hearer believes what is told on the basis of trust and also when the hearer forms a belief-adjacent attitude towards what is told on the basis of trust.

A person might show that she has adopted a belief-adjacent attitude towards *p* in a number of ways. If *p* is something that she cannot believe just on the basis of testimony, she

might try to understand why p. If she believes not-p she might try to recall the reasons she has for believing not-p and review them. Or she might just be disposed to take more seriously than she otherwise would have evidence in favor of p when it comes along. If, alternatively, a person has evidence that counts against believing p, she might review the evidence to make sure it really is what it seems and really counts against believing p. Someone who, for example, always believed that Kant meant one thing when he said humanity has a dignity above price will not just believe that Kant meant a different thing when someone tells her that Kant meant a different thing. However, an act of telling a person who always believed that Kant meant one thing when he said humanity has a dignity above price that Kant meant a different thing might still succeed if the hearer adopts a belief-adjacent attitude towards what the teller tells her. She might, in virtue of having adopted such an attitude, notice, when she otherwise would not have, that parts of the text that support the teller's reading. I will continue to say that telling succeeds when a hearer believes on the basis of trust what a teller tells her. But again this is imprecise. Really, I have it in mind that telling can succeed both when a hearer believes on the basis of trust what a teller tells her and also when a hearer forms a belief-adjacent attitude on the basis of trust towards what a teller tells her.

VI. The Connection Between a Hearer's Reason for Believing What She is Told and the Teller's Reason for Believing What She Tells

A teller gives a hearer a reason of trust to believe what she tells. A person who tells p does what she should do only if she believes and is in a position to know p, aiming to give and, if successful, actually giving a hearer a reason of trust to believe p. Hearers can believe what tellers tell on the basis of trusting them. But is the reason for belief that tellers give to hearers one that tellers themselves could believe for? This matters because what is a reason for belief for one person must be such that it would be a reason for belief for any other person who was similarly

situated. That is, what is a reason for belief for one person must be such that it would be a reason for belief for any other person who was in the same circumstances and who had the same background information and beliefs.

Consider a person who is seated in front of a window. She looks out and sees water falling down. Seeing the water falling down serves as a reason for this person to believe that it is raining, and the person believes that it is raining on the basis of it. Seeing water falling down outside of a window (even seeing the same water outside of the same window) might not give everyone a reason to believe that it is raining. Someone who was just told that an upstairs neighbor is emptying buckets of water from her window may be a person for whom it is true that seeing the water falling down outside the window is not a reason to believe it is raining. But, if seeing water falling down outside of her window really gives a person reason to believe it is raining, it must be true that any person in her position, any person in the same circumstances, with the same background information and beliefs would be such that seeing the water falling down gave her reason to believe it is raining.

Consider now an act of telling. Suppose one person, A, tells another person, B, that p. If this act of telling really gives B a reason of trust to believe p, it must be true that any person who is similarly situated, that is, any person who is in the same circumstances, who has the same background information and beliefs and who finds herself as the recipient of such a telling would be such that the telling would make available to her a reason of trust to believe p.

It can seem true that a person who is doing something cannot believe well, on the basis of trusting herself, that, in doing what she is doing, she is following certain norms that govern the kind of action that she does. That is, it can seem true that a person cannot have a reason of trust to believe that, in doing what she is doing, she is following certain norms that govern the kind of action she does. Consider a person who is sitting on top of a car. Suppose again that it is true that you should sit on top of a car only if you own the car. Suppose this person wonders, do I own this car? And then she reasons that, since she is sitting on the car and since a person

should sit on a car only if she owns the car, she must own the car. Clearly this would be a strange way for a person to come to believe that she owns a car. But more than this, the reasoning can seem problematic. A person who is trusted is taken to be responsive to reason. A person is trusted to do what she has reason to do in response to the reason she has to do it. In the above case the person trusts herself to respond to the reason she has to only sit on top of cars that she owns. But, in wondering if she owns the car she is sitting on top of and needing to reason to the conclusion that she does, the person shows that she is not responsive to the reason she trusts herself to be responsive to.¹¹²

Consider the case of A telling B that p and try to put A in B's position. This is difficult to do, but, imagine that A now has B's background information and beliefs (suppose p is something that B has reason to believe before A tells her and suppose that B actually has the same reason as A for believing p). Suppose that A tries to tell herself p by saying 'p'. She says p and wonders if she believes and is in a position to know p. She reasons that, since she is telling p and since a person should tell only what she believes and is in a position to know she must believe and be in a position to know p. This reasoning can seem, like the reasoning above, flawed. A is trusting herself to be responding to the reason she has to tell only what she believes and is in a position to know. But, in wondering if she is telling what she believes and is in a position to know and needing to reason to the conclusion that she is, A reveals that she is not responding to the reason she is trusting herself to respond to.

If the considerations in the previous paragraph show that the reason of trust that B gets from A's testimony would not be a reason for everyone who was similarly situated, then, rather than saying that a hearer does not really have a reason of trust to believe what a teller tells her, I think we should instead say the following: the reason of trust that a hearer has to believe what a teller tells her should be understood as part of a reason. It is a part of a reason whole made up of

¹¹² Moran (2012) makes a point similar to this in his discussion of Sartre.

the teller's reason for believing what she tells and the hearer's reason of trust for believing what she is told.

However, do the considerations presented two paragraphs back show that the reason of trust B gets from telling would not be a reason for everyone who is similarly situated? It might be doubted that they do for the following reason: When B is told p by A she is told p by a different person. When A is told p by A she is both teller and hearer. So, B and A are not similarly situated. Or so it might be thought.

There is an important connection between a teller's reason for believing what she tells and a hearer's reason for believing what she believes on the basis of testimony. And, if the above argument is not taken to be good grounds for thinking that the reason a teller gives to a hearer must be understood as part of a reason whole that includes the teller's reason for believing what she tells, there is I think, another way of showing that there is an important connection between a teller's reason for believing what she tells and the reason a teller gives to a hearer through testimony.

Consider two people who are sitting on a couch together. One of these people opens a bag of chips, and, over course of several minutes, eats many chips. After this, the person says, 'these chips are terrible' to the person who is sitting next to her. I take it that the person who eats the chips in this case can be understood to be telling the person sitting next to her that the chips she is eating are great. Suppose, in fact, that the person who eats the chips is telling the person sitting next to her that the chips are great. The person sitting next to the teller believes, as the teller aims for her to believe, that the chips are great. About this act of telling, we can ask, when did it start?

This act of telling might be thought to start when the teller starts talking about the chips, when she starts uttering the phrase 'these chips are terrible'. However, the teller is only able to tell the hearer that the chips are great with this phrase because she (the teller) has been eating a bunch of chips while sitting next to the hearer. The fact that the teller in this case has been

eating a bunch of chips might be understood as just part of the context against which the teller means for her words to be interpreted. However, the teller in this case need not be understood as treating what she just did (eating a bunch of chips) as just part of the context against which her words should be interpreted. Sometimes it will be plausible to think that such a teller uses her eating of the chips in telling in a way that makes her eating of the chips a part of the telling. Suppose that that is true in our case. We need to say then that the telling began before the teller began talking about the chips, while she was eating the chips.

In the above-described case in which one person tells another about the chips, a teller uses what might be called an expression of belief, not initially intended to for use in telling, in order to tell. By an *expression of belief* here I mean something that, first, shows that a person believes something, and, second, is done in response to a reason for believing that thing. Tasting the chips gives the teller a reason to believe the chips are great. She believes the chips are great for this reason we can suppose. Tasting the chips also gives her reason to eat the chips. Further, the teller's eating the chips is a response to her tasting the chips. The teller's eating the chips is an expression of her belief that the chips are great.

So far we have said that a teller who tells p does what she should do only if she believes and is in a position to know p (she openly intends to give reason to believe p by openly intending to give reason to believe p), aiming, in a way that is open to the hearer, to give her hearer a reason of trust to believe p. With this in mind, we can say that telling p always presents itself as an expression of belief in p that has the aim of giving a hearer a reason of trust to believe p. Telling p presents itself first, as something done in response to a reason for believing p that shows that a person believes p. Second, telling p is aimed at giving a hearer a reason of trust to believe p. When a person tells she does what presents itself as expression of some belief and is aimed at giving another person a reason of trust.¹¹³

¹¹³ Whenever a person intentionally does something that she should do only if X is true, what is done presents itself as an expression of her belief in X. If it were true that a person should sit on

Sometimes a person can make use of an already existing expression of belief in telling. In order to make use of an already existing expression of belief to tell a person may need to draw a hearer's attention to the expression of belief or clarify what belief is expressed. And a person will have to openly aim to give her interlocutor a reason of trust through the expression of belief. Importantly, again, a person can make use of a pre-existing expression of belief to tell not only in the sense that she can trust her hearer to interpret what she is saying in light of the pre-existing expression of belief. A teller can tell through a pre-existing expression of belief.

A person can try to tell someone something that she does not believe and/or something that she is not in a position to know. When a person does this, she will present herself as expressing some belief without actually expressing that belief. However, when a person tries to tell something that she does believe and is in a position to know, the telling can not only present itself as but be an expression of belief. It can be something that shows that the teller believes something and that is done in response to some reason for believing that thing.

Consider a person who tells without making use of a pre-existing expression of belief. Suppose one person tells another person that the train leaves at 5:05. The teller looks at the train schedule and then says immediately after, 'the train leaves at 5:05'. This teller openly intends to give reason to believe the train leaves at 5:05 by openly intending to give reason to believe the train leaves at 5:05. Since this is something she should do only if she believes and is in a position to know that the train leaves at 5:05, it presents itself as expressing her belief that the train leaves at 5:05. Since she is telling, this person must be understood as expressing her

top of a car only if she owns the car, then a person's intentionally sitting on a car would present itself as an expression of her belief that she owns the car. (It will really be an expression of her belief that she owns the car only if she believes she owns the car and is sitting on the car in response to a reason she has for believing she owns the car).

In telling p a person does intentionally (as her intentional action) something that she should do only if she believes and is in a position to know p. As such, we can say that what a teller who tells p does presents itself as an expression of her belief that she believes and is in a position to know p. What presents itself as an expression of a person's belief that she believes and is in a position to know p can also be said to present itself as an expression of the person's belief in p.

belief that the train leaves at 5:05 in order to give her hearer a reason of trust to believe the train leaves at 5:05.

When does this act of telling someone when the train leaves begin? About this we might say the following: it begins with teller's having reason to believe that the train leaves at 5:05. It begins with her seeing the train schedule. Suppose the teller saw the train schedule awhile before she told someone what time the train leaves. Suppose a person looks at the train schedule in the morning. Then, in the afternoon, after looking at a clock and seeing that it is close to 5:05, she tells someone that the train leaves at 5:05. Again we might say the teller's act of telling begins with her seeing the train schedule. In the case described above in which one person tells another that the chips are great, the teller, we supposed, was able to reach back and tell through a pre-existing expression of belief. Similarly, a teller who sees the train schedule in the morning and then tells someone when the train leaves in the afternoon, might be understood as reaching back to include her reason for believing the train leaves at 5:05, her seeing the train schedule, in her act of telling.

If a teller's act of telling is always thought to start with her reason for believing what she is telling, then we might arrive in a different way at the conclusion that there is an important connection between a teller's reason for believing what she tells and a hearer's reason for believing what she believes on the basis of testimony. The whole of the teller's act of telling is the hearer's reason for believing what she believes on the basis of testimony and this includes, as a part, the teller's reason for believing what she tells. This might be thought to have important implications. It might be thought to mean that the goodness or badness of a hearer's reason for believing what she believes on the basis of testimony directly depends upon the goodness or badness of the teller's reason for believing what she tells. However, work will need to be done to show this.

One reason might be part of another reason in the following way. Suppose a person looks at her phone and sees today is Tuesday. And suppose this person also remembers that on

Tuesdays she has class. Seeing her phone and remembering that on Tuesdays she has class together give this person reason to believe that she has class today. And, together, we might say these things compose a reason whole that supports the person's believing she has class today. The person will have good reason to believe she has class today only if both of the following are true: first, seeing her phone gives her good reason to believe it is Tuesday. And, second, remembering that she has class on Tuesdays gives her good reason to believe she has class on Tuesdays. If either of these reason parts are bad the reason whole will be bad. The whole reason that a hearer has to believe what she is told of which a teller's reason is, we might think, a part, is not like the whole reason in this case. And so we need to explain in a different way why the goodness or badness of a teller's reason, as a part of the whole that is the hearer's reason, might determine the goodness or badness of the hearer's reason.

Consider the following two cases. In the first case a person has just been told by a psychic to trust her instincts. She has a hunch that it is raining but also no way of knowing whether or not it is raining. This person tells another person that it is raining by shouting 'It's raining' to the other person who is in another room. It is raining. Suppose in the second case a person looks out the window and sees rain water pouring down. She then tells another person that it is raining by shouting 'It's raining' to the person who is in another room. Again, it is raining. Suppose in both cases that the hearers believe that it is raining on the basis of what they are told. Things look the same to the hearers in both of these cases we can suppose. But, the reason that the hearer in the first case has to believe what she is told will be worse than the reason that the hearer in the second case has to believe what she is told.

The badness of the hearer's reason for believing that it is raining in the first case presented above is, I think, not fully explained by the fact that belief for the reason the first teller gives can only be accidentally true. For example, consider a third case. Suppose a person looks out the window and sees water pouring down. It is raining. But the water visible from the window is water that is coming from an upstairs neighbor who is emptying buckets out of her

window. The person who sees the water pouring down outside of the window tells another person that it is raining, again by shouting, 'It's raining' so she can be heard by the other person who is in a different room. Suppose the hearer in this case also believes that it is raining. And things appear to her (the third hearer) as they appeared to the hearers in the first two cases. The reason that the hearer in this third case has for believing that it is raining differs from the reason had by the hearer in the first case presented above, despite the fact that belief on the basis of testimony in both the first and the third cases is accidentally true.

It is true that the teller in the first case gets lucky that what she believes and tells on the basis of what her psychic says and a hunch is true, while, alternatively, the teller in the third case gets unlucky in the fact that the water she sees pouring down is bucket rather than rain water. It is more of an accident that belief on the basis of testimony is true in the first case than it is in the third case. However, I think it is natural to think that there is a more direct way in which the mistake the teller in the first case makes impacts the reason the hearer in the first case has for believing what she believes on the basis of testimony. I think it is natural to think that the teller in the first case gets the hearer she tells involved in believing on the basis of what her (the teller's) psychic said and a hunch.

I have said that a person can tell through a pre-existing expression of belief and can also, perhaps, reach back to include her reason for believing what she tells in her act of telling. But a person cannot tell through just anything. A person might rely on anything as part of a context against which she means for her words to be interpreted (so long as she can trust or get her hearer to see that thing and interpret her words in the way she wants them to be interpreted in light of it). However, a person cannot tell through just anything in the way in which we have supposed the person eating chips told through her eating of the chips in the above example. If it is true that a person can reach back to tell through a pre-existing expression of belief or to include her reason for believing in her act of telling, then it must be true that the person's previous expression of belief and reason for believing were reaching forward to her telling.

What could it mean for a reason to reach forward? There is a sense in which a reason reaches forward that is easy to recognize. Suppose a person looks out the window and sees water pouring down. This gives her reason to believe it is raining now. And it gives her reason to believe it was raining later. Seeing water pouring down now makes good not only present believing that it is raining. It also makes good future believing that it was raining. It reaches forward in this sense.

Seeing water pouring down outside of the window gives reason not only for present and future belief. It also gives reason for present and future action. If water frequently drips into the house through the open window when it is raining, then seeing water pouring down outside the window gives a person reason to close the window now. And it might also reach forward to future action. It might give the person reason later to put on shoes before she goes out in the yard because the grass will be wet. It might give the person reason not to water the plants outside tomorrow, and so on.

How can action that expresses belief in something be understood to reach forward to telling? In the above example in which one person tells another something about the chips, the person eating the chips, we can suppose, first ate the chips and then later decided to tell the person sitting next to her they were great through this. And, a person who closes the window to stop the rain from coming in or who puts on shoes because the grass is wet might do these things and then later decide to tell through them, if the opportunity to do so arises. In what sense can expressions of belief like these be understood to reach forward to telling even when a person does not have telling in mind when she does them?

There is a sense in which a person's expressions of belief can reach forward to her own future belief and action that again is fairly easy to recognize. Suppose a person leaves some window open except when it rains. This person might walk into the room where this window is located and see that the window is closed. Suppose the person closed the window because she saw water pouring down earlier in the day. But when she enters the room again and sees that

she closed the window, she no longer remembers seeing water pouring down through the window. Seeing that she closed the window makes it good for this person to believe that it was raining. And it can make it good for her to put shoes on before going out in the yard because the grass will be wet. We can notice that this person's seeing that she closed the window can make it good for her to believe it rained and for her to put on shoes before going in the yard even though (we can suppose) the person did not, when she closed the window, have giving her future self such reasons in mind.

A person's expression of belief not only reaches forward to her future action and belief in the way described above. It can also reach out to other people in a similar way. Suppose a person is walking down the street carrying an open umbrella. This is a pretty clear expression of her belief that it is raining. And the person's doing this (carrying an open umbrella) can make it good for other people who see her to believe that it is raining or grab an umbrella before they walk out the door. It can do this even if the person carrying the umbrella does not have giving others reason in mind.

Suppose a person walks into a room and sees that she closed the window. The person believes on the basis of this that it rained. Sometimes a person who does this will believe it rained on the basis of a reason, the goodness of which, does not depend upon the goodness of a reason for believing that it is raining that she had at a previous time. This will be true, for example, if the person believes it rained on the basis of the statistical fact that nine times out of ten when she closes the window it is raining and the fact that she saw that she closed the window. Whether or not this statistical fact and seeing that she closed the window give the person a good reason to believe that it rained does not depend upon the goodness of the reason the person at a previous time had for believing that it is raining.

Sometimes, alternatively, a person who believes that it rained because she sees that she closed the window, believes that it rained on the basis of a reason, the goodness of which, does depend upon the goodness of a reason for believing that it is raining that she had at a previous

time. This will be true when the person believes on the basis of trusting her past self that it rained.

So far we have been talking about believing on the basis of trust that the conditions make what a person does as her intentional action good and permissible obtain as if it were believing on the basis of the following kind of inference. X makes A good. B is doing A. So, X. However, we can now understand believing on the basis of trust in a different way. Suppose a person does some action A for some reason R. And suppose R is a reason to believe Z. Seeing a person's doing A can directly give another person or herself at another time reason to believe Z. It can do this because the person does A for R. When a person does A for R, a person's doing A inherits from R the power of giving reason for what R gives reason for. When a person does A for R and so when her doing A (when seen) can directly give reason for what R gives reason for, then the goodness of A (seeing A) as a reason for what R is a reason for depends on the goodness of R as a reason for what R is a reason for. The power that A has as a reason for what R is a reason for comes from R and so cannot be greater than R's power as a reason.

Suppose a person looks out the window and sees water pouring down. This gives her reason to close the window, and suppose she closes the window for this reason. The person's closing the window can directly give her future self or others a reason to believe that it rained. Or it can directly give her future self reason to put on shoes before she goes out into the yard. The person's closing the window inherits from her seeing water pouring down outside of the window the power to be a reason for what seeing water pouring down outside of the window is a reason for. When a person believes directly from seeing that she closed the window that it rained or when a person puts on shoes before going into the yard directly as a result of seeing that she closed the window, a person does something (believes or acts) on the basis of trust. Whenever a person believes or acts on the basis of trust she believes or acts on the basis of a reason, the goodness of which, depends on the goodness of a reason held by another person or by herself at a previous time.

Earlier we said that if a person can tell through a previous expression of belief, it must be the case that the expression of belief was reaching forward to her telling. But an expression of belief must do more than just make a telling good (directly, via trust) in order for it to be such that a person can tell through it. A person's closing the window might make it good for the person later to put on her shoes before she goes into the yard. But, even when a person's closing the window makes it good for her to put on her shoes before she goes in the yard (directly, via trust) the person will not be putting on her shoes to go in the yard through closing the window.

Consider again the case in which a person's closing the window makes it good for her to put on shoes before she goes in the yard. A person's closing the window makes it good for her to put on shoes before she goes in the yard because the person closes the window for a reason that is also a reason for her to put on shoes before she goes in the yard. Can the reason a person responds to in expressing some belief explain how it is the case that that expressing of a belief not only makes future telling good (like closing the window might make putting on shoes to go in the yard good) but also can be something through which telling is done? Suppose the reason a person had to do something that expresses some belief were a reason to do that thing and to do that thing in order to tell someone the belief it expresses. Then, the expression of belief might not only be something that could make telling good but would be something through which telling could be done, even in cases in which a person did not have telling in mind when she was doing the relevant expressing of belief.

Consider again the case of someone who sees water pouring down outside of the window. Seeing water pouring down outside of the window is a reason for this person to believe it is raining now, to believe it was raining later, to close the window now, to put on shoes before going in the yard later and so on. Suppose that seeing water pouring down outside of the window really was a reason to believe it is raining now and to believe it is raining now in order to tell someone it is raining, to believe it was raining later and to believe it was raining later in order to tell someone it was raining, to close the window now and to close the window now in

order to tell someone it is raining, to put on shoes before going in the yard later and to put on shoes before going in the yard later in order to tell someone that it was raining. If this all of this were true, then, plausibly a person could tell someone that it is/was raining through believing it is raining, through believing it was raining, through closing the window now, through putting on shoes before going in the yard. She could tell through doing these things even if she was not thinking about telling while she did them. These things could also be understood to inherit from the reason they are done for the power to be part of a telling. Insofar as we think it is possible for a person to tell through some previous expressions of belief, we should, I take it, think that the reason for doing the expression of belief is like this. It is a reason both to do what is an expression of belief and to do what is an expression of belief in order to tell.

Might a person who tells through a pre-existing expression of belief just be understood as clarifying what belief some pre-existing expression of belief was an expression of? Consider again the case of someone who tells someone the chips are great by saying, 'these chips are terrible' after eating a bunch of chips. The hearer in this case might not have originally known why the person was eating the chips. Maybe the person eating the chips was starving, for example. It is only after the person eating the chips (sarcastically) clarifies that she was eating the chips because the chips were great, that the person sitting next to her can believe directly (on the basis of trust) from having seen her eat the chips that the chips were great. Although telling through a pre-existing expression of belief will often involve clarifying what belief some pre-existing expression of belief expressed, telling through a pre-existing expression of belief must involve more than this. A person who tells through a pre-existing expression of belief, does something further with the pre-existing expression of belief. She aims to give her hearer a reason of trust through the pre-existing expression of belief. And so, I take it that it must be the case that the reason for which a person acts in expressing some belief is a reason also to do the relevant expression of belief in order to tell, if the expression of belief is to be something through which a future telling might be accomplished.

At this point, we are in a position to see why the goodness or badness of a teller's reason for believing what she tells directly determines the goodness or badness of a hearer's reason for believing what she believes on the basis of testimony. The reason a teller has for believing what she tells is that from which a teller's act of telling inherits its status as a reason for the hearer to believe what is being told. Suppose a person looks out the window, sees water pouring down, and then tells someone that it is raining. The hearer's seeing that the teller is telling her it is raining can directly give her a reason to believe that it is raining. Seeing that the teller is telling her it is raining serves directly as a reason for the hearer to believe it is raining because the teller tells because she saw that it is raining and because the teller's seeing that it is raining is a reason for the hearer to believe that it is raining. The teller's telling the hearer that it is raining inherits from the teller's reason for believing that it is raining, its status as a reason for the hearer to believe that it is raining.

Earlier in this section we considered the possibility that a teller's act of telling might reach back to include her reason for believing what she tells. We suggested that if a teller's act of telling can reach back to include her reason for believing what she tells, then her reason must reach forward to her telling. We have now seen ways in which a teller's reason for believing what she tells can be understood to reach forward to her telling. A teller's reason for believing what she tells makes her telling good, is a reason for her hearer to believe what she tells, and also makes beliefs and expressions of belief possible parts of telling. We can see now that, although a teller might reach back to include, in her act of telling, her reason for belief, the fact that the goodness of her hearer's reason for believing what she (the teller) tells depends on the goodness of her (the teller's) reason for believing what she tells does not depend on her doing this. There will be this kind of dependence whenever the teller tells in response to a reason for believing what she tells and the hearer believes what the teller is telling, directly, on the basis of trust.

Earlier in the paper, I criticized some parts of Owens' (2002, 2006, 2016) account of testimony. Further, I suggested that a closer examination of Moran's idea of non-evidential

reason could provide a better way of understanding Burge's (1993/2013) claim that, when a person knows something on the basis of testimony (the public presentation as true of another person), we need to look at what Burge calls *the extended body of justification* to understand fully how what the person knows is warranted. At this point, I have said that one person's expression of belief (when seen) can directly be a reason for another person to believe what the expression of belief is an expression of. And I have said that when one person believes something directly on the basis of another person's expression of belief, the person believes on the basis of a reason the goodness of which depends on the goodness of the reason for which the expression of belief was done. An expression of belief inherits from the reason for which it is done its power to be reason for belief. Finally, I have said that telling is one kind of expression of belief.

There is, we can now note, an important difference between what I have said about how a person comes to believe from an expression of belief that is a telling and what we suggested earlier Owens (2002, 2006, 2016) might think about how one person's expressing a belief in telling gets another person to believe. Again, Owens, we said, might think that one person's expressing a belief in testimony causes another person to believe that thing in a way that is similar to the way in which one person's expressing anger might cause another person to be angry. I have said, alternatively, first, that one person's expressing a belief (when seen) can be a reason for another person to believe that same thing directly. And, second, I have said that when one person's expressing a belief is such a reason for another person, the expression of belief inherits, from the reason for which it is done, its power to be a reason to believe what the reason it is done for is a reason for believing. This allows us to say both that belief on the basis of testimony is belief for reason and that the reason for belief that a teller gives a hearer is dependent for its goodness as a reason on the reason a teller has for believing what she tells.

Whenever a person believes on the basis of trust, she believes on the basis of a reason that is such that its goodness as a reason depends upon the goodness of a reason held by another

person or by herself at another time. If one person sees another person walking down the street carrying an open umbrella and believes on the basis of this and trust that it is raining, the goodness of the reason this person (the observer) has to believe it is raining depends upon the goodness of the reason the person carrying the umbrella had to believe it is raining. So, it is not only in telling that we give other people reasons for belief the goodness of which depend upon the goodness of our own reasons for belief. There is, however, I take it, still something special about the relationship that a successful teller and hearer stand in. Someone who tells p not only expresses belief in p. A teller expresses belief in p aiming to give her hearer a reason of trust to believe p as the proper finishing of what she does. A successful teller gets her hearer involved in what she does to give reason.

If a teller can tell through some belief or through some pre-existing expression of belief, then it must be the case that the reason for that belief or the reason for the pre-existing expression of belief was a reason also to believe in order to tell or to express belief in order to tell. Are all beliefs and expressions of belief such that a person might tell through them? Work would need to be done to establish this. However, without a reason for thinking that there is something special about the pre-existing expressions of belief that we see being used as parts of tellings, we can, I think, think this. We can think that any belief or expression of belief is such that a person might tell through it.

VII. Failed v. Successful Telling

What happens when an act of telling fails? I have said that a person who is telling must be understood as aiming at the proper finishing of what she is doing which is her hearer's believing on the basis of trust. It is only once an act of telling is over that its nature is determined, I have also said. This naturally leaves us with a question: what happens when a teller, although she is aiming at the proper finishing of what she does, does not achieve it? What

happens when a person trying to tell is not believed on the basis of trust? In this section, I will consider this question and sketch a proposal about what the difference is between successful and unsuccessful acts of telling.

In order to tell, a person will normally be doing things in the world. And whether or not the telling succeeds (results in a hearer believing on the basis of trust), those things will have occurred. Even more than this, the things that a person does in attempting but failing to successfully tell will need to be understood as attempted telling. Suppose a person, trying to tell, says 'the train leaves at 5:05' immediately after looking at the train schedule. Suppose the hearer this person is trying to tell does not believe what she is saying on the basis of trusting her, and so the telling attempted is not successful. The attempted teller in this case did something that must be understood as an attempted telling. She looked at the schedule and said 'the train leaves at 5:05'. She expressed her belief that the train leaves at 5:05 with the aim of giving her hearer a reason of trust to believe that the train leaves at 5:05. Finally, what she did was apt to be completed by the hearer's believing on the basis of trusting her that the train leaves at 5:05.

I think that all of this can be true and, nonetheless, it can still also be true that the teller did not do, even partially, the thing that she would have done if her hearer believed on the basis of trust what she was attempting to tell. Attempted tellings are things that are apt to be completed by a hearer's believing them. But, I think that it could be and is the case that, if attempted tellings are completed by a hearer's believing them, they become something different from what they are when they are not complete. An incomplete house is the same kind of thing as a complete house. And a complete house is just an incomplete house plus what is needed to complete the house. However, a complete telling is not just an attempted telling plus a hearer's believing, in the sense that, we cannot understand a complete telling just by thinking about what an attempted telling is and adding to that the idea of a hearer's believing on the basis of such a thing. In being completed, a telling becomes something different from what it is when it is incomplete.

A teller's attempted telling might give others reason to believe what the teller was aiming to give her hearer reason to believe. A teller who attempts to tell *p* can express her belief in *p*. This can give others a reason of trust to believe *p*. But, if a teller merely attempts to tell *p*, her expression of her belief that *p* will give reason like any other expression of belief might.

Openly intending to give reason to believe by openly intending to give reason to believe might be a particularly precise way of expressing belief. There are a variety of reasons that a person might have for getting a tattoo of a bag of chips. She might do this honor some person or in remembrance of some event. She might just like the way such a tattoo looks. Or she might do this because chips are her favorite food. Suppose a person goes to tattoo artist to get a tattoo of a bag of chips. And suppose the tattoo artist asks her why she is getting this tattoo. Suppose the person says that chips are her favorite food. The tattoo artist learns through testimony that chips are her client's favorite food and that that is why her client is getting a tattoo of a bag of chips. After the testimony, the tattoo artist can see her client's getting a tattoo of a bag of chips as an unambiguous expression of her client's belief that chips are her (the client's) favorite food. But her client's getting a tattoo of a bag of chips, after the testimony, does not present the tattoo artist with a reason to believe that chips are her client's favorite food that is just like the reason she got from her client's testimony, even though it is similarly unambiguous.

An attempted teller expresses her belief in something, aiming, in doing this, to be giving her hearer a reason of trust to believe that thing. Not only an attempted teller's expression of her belief but also the fact that she aimed to give a hearer a reason of trust to believe what she expressed belief in might give others reason to believe what an attempted teller attempted to tell. Others might trust an attempted teller not to be aiming to give reason to believe something unless she has good reason for believing that thing and might believe what she is attempting to tell for this reason too.

However, a hearer's believing on the basis of trust what a teller tells her, when a telling is successful, is not just a hearer's believing what the teller is telling her on the basis of seeing that

the teller is expressing belief in something and that the teller is, in doing this, aiming to give a reason of trust, as any observer of an attempted telling might do.

Explaining what the difference is between believing something on the basis of an observed attempted telling and believing something as the person towards whom a successful act of telling is direct is difficult. But, I take it that, in the case of a successful telling, what belief a teller is expressing and so what reason a teller is giving is revealed to her hearer by the thing the teller does to express her belief but not fully determined by it. A teller has the last word over what reason is given when she engaged in a successful telling, and so a hearer cannot be understood as just reading off of the thing a teller does in expressing her belief what belief is expressed and what reason is being given when she is a part of a successful telling. In successful telling, it is the teller's intending to give reason to believe something, along with the hearer's acquiring of the reason, that makes it true that the teller gives reason to believe that thing.

If a person knows how to build a chair, it will not be an accident that a chair comes into being when she decides to build a chair. And if a person builds a chair and leaves it in the room, it will not be an accident that another person who comes into the room believes there is a chair in the room on the basis of seeing the chair that the person built. If the chair builder wanted to give the other person reason to believe there is a chair in the room, the fact that it is not an accident that the other person acquires the reason the chair builder wants to give her will be explained by, first, the fact that the chair builder knew how to build a chair, second, the fact that chair builder knew where to leave the chair for the other person to see and, third, the fact that the other person saw the chair.

People generally know how to express their beliefs through telling. People generally know, for example, things like the fact that they will express belief that the train leaves at 5:05 by saying 'the train leaves at 5:05' in a certain tone that indicates they mean to tell. However, when it comes to successful telling, the fact that the hearer acquires the reason the teller aims to give her is not explained just by, first, the fact that the teller knows how to express the belief she

wants to tell, second, the fact that the teller knows how to leave an expression of belief for the hearer to see, and, third, the fact that the hearer sees the expression of belief the teller creates.

A teller aims for her hearer's seeing that she (the teller) is expressing some belief to be a condition of her expressing that belief. This can, I think, be understood to be involved in the teller's aiming at her hearer's acquiring a reason of trust to believe what she tells as the proper finishing of what she does. If the telling fails, the hearer's seeing that the teller is expressing belief in *p* will not be a condition of the teller's expressing belief in *p*. But, if the telling succeeds, then the hearer's seeing that the teller was expressing belief in *p* was a condition of the teller's expressing belief in *p*. And the fact that it is not an accident that the hearer acquired the reason the teller aimed to give her is not explained just by the fact that the teller knew how to express her belief and leave it for her hearer and by the fact that the hearer saw the teller's expression of belief. It is also explained by the fact that the hearer's seeing the teller express some belief was a condition of the teller's expressing that belief.

VIII. The Epistemic Stakes of Telling

I have said that a hearer's believing on the basis of trust what a teller tells completes a teller's act of telling. The belief that completes a successful act of telling must not be revisable, in the sense that it must not be part of a larger belief whole in a way that makes it true that later stages of that belief whole might change the nature of earlier stages.

We have said that what a teller is intending to give her hearer reason to believe can change over the course of the teller's act of telling. What a teller intends later in an act of telling can change the nature of what she is intending earlier in an act of telling. When a speaker is telling, further, we have said she is aiming to give reason by intending to give reason. In order for a person to give reason by intending to give reason, what a person is intending to give reason for must be fixed. That is, there must a truth of the matter about it. What a teller is intending to

give reason to believe will be fixed, we have said, only once an act of telling has finished. But if the belief that was thought to complete and finish a successful act of telling could be revised, then the teller's act of telling could not really be completed by it.

Suppose a teller performs some act of telling, call it T, that is thought to be completed by a hearer's belief, B. Suppose B is such that it continues on and later stages of B can change the nature of earlier stages of B. If this were true, then T would not be complete until B was complete. And what might complete B? If beliefs are such that later stages of them can change the nature of earlier stages of them, and if being part of tellings does not change this, then it is hard to see what might put a stop a processes of believing. The beliefs that complete acts of telling must not be revisable.

I have said that a teller's telling p inherits from the teller's reason for believing p its power to (when seen) be a reason (of trust) for believing p. This means that the goodness of seeing that a teller is telling p as a reason of trust for believing p depends upon the goodness of the teller's reason for believing p. I have also now said that the belief that completes an act of telling is not revisable. Together, these things mean that telling is an epistemically serious activity. If a teller tells a hearer something that she (the teller) believes for bad reason and if the hearer believes what she is told on the basis of the teller's testimony and trust, then the hearer will be believing for bad reason and her belief will be such that it cannot be revised. Of course, a person can acquire new reasons for believing what she first believed on the basis of testimony. Or a person can give up a belief that she formed on the basis of testimony. A person might even be able to find out what reasons a teller had for believing what she told and make a judgement about whether or not those reasons are good reasons to believe what the teller told. However, there is nothing that can remedy the badness of person's believing on the basis of testimony from a teller that had bad reason for believing what she told.

Consider again the case in which a person was just told by her psychic to trust her instincts and has a hunch that it is raining. On the basis of this alone, she shouts to tell another

person in a different room that it is raining. Suppose this other person believes on the basis of trust what she is told, that it is raining. But, this time, it is not raining. The hearer in this case might soon after the telling occurs walk to a window and see that it is not raining and that there is no sign of rain outside. She might then stop believing that it was raining. She might next go to the teller and ask why the teller told her it was raining. The hearer might find out what the teller's reason for believing that it was raining was. And the hearer might judge that to be a bad reason. However, none of this will fix the badness of her (the hearer's) believing on the basis of the teller's testimony that it was raining. The hearer no longer has the belief that it was raining. But neither giving up the belief on the basis of evidence that it is false nor judging that the reason for which the belief was held was bad, remedies the badness of the hearer's having held the belief. The belief the hearer formed on the basis of testimony is not revisable, in the sense that these later changes to her thinking about the rain cannot make better her earlier belief.

IX. Returning to the Initial Presentation of Moran's Account of Testimony

At this point, I will return to Moran and discuss briefly how the initial characterization of Moran's view given earlier fits with the picture of the view that has emerged from an examination of Moran's idea of non-evidential reason. Moran, says that a teller gives a hearer her assurance of the truth of what she says. We have said that a teller counts as doing this because she openly intends to give reason by openly intending to give reason.

Moran says that a teller makes herself accountable to a hearer for the truth of what she says. We can now see that this is true for a couple of reasons. A teller gives a hearer a reason of trust to believe what she tells. The goodness of seeing that a teller is telling *p* as a reason of trust for believing *p* depends directly on the teller's reason for believing *p*. Furthermore, a teller gets her hearer involved in her act of reason giving by doing what is aimed at her hearer's having a reason of trust, as its proper finishing. A teller aims for her hearer's seeing her expressing some

belief to be a condition of her expressing that belief. If the teller succeeds at telling, it will be true that her hearer's seeing that she was expressing some belief was a condition of her expressing that belief. Further, when a telling succeeds, a hearer's belief completes a teller's act of telling. And this belief cannot be revisable.

Moran might be understood, contrary to what I have suggested in this chapter, to be saying that a teller makes a hearer a set of promises related to the truth of the proposition she wants to tell.¹¹⁴ A teller who tells *p* promises to listen to a hearer complain if *p* is not true. A teller who tells *p* promises to explain her reasons for believing *p* if her hearer asks why *p*. A teller who tells *p* gives her hearer the right to refer others to her if others ask her hearer why *p*, and so on.¹¹⁵ A teller who tells *p* makes these kinds of promises and in so doing gives her hearer a reason of trust to believe *p*. This is because it is good for the teller to make the promises she makes to the hearer in telling only if the teller has pretty good reason for believing *p*.

This view is, I take it, not Moran's and also not the most plausible version of a Moran-inspired view. One thing that counts against the view is the fact that it will be difficult to spell out, in a plausible way, what promises a teller as such makes a hearer she tells. For example, it seems implausible to think that someone who tells a stranger on the street what time it is or where a restaurant is located actually promises the stranger she tells that she (the teller) will listen to the hearer complain if the information she tells is wrong, that she (the teller) will explain her reasons for believing what she tells to the hearer if the hearer asks. And it also seems implausible to think the teller in such a case gives her hearer a right to refer others to her (the teller) if they ask the hearer why what was told is true. It is hard to see what promises at all,

¹¹⁴ This may be Graham's (2020) reading of Moran. At least, Graham's reading of Moran would be subject to the same kind of complaints as the view under consideration in this paragraph. It is implausible to think that a person who tells a stranger on the street the time gives the stranger a right to sanction her if what she says is incorrect, as Graham understands Moran's view to imply.

¹¹⁵ Goldberg (2006) talks about the phenomenon of hearers referring others back to tellers.

what commitments to future action, someone who tells a stranger something like the time or directions to a restaurant on the street might be plausibly understood as making, in telling. I hope that the interpretation of Moran provided above shows that a teller can be understood to make herself accountable in special way to a hearer for the truth of what she tells without making that hearer promises related to the truth of what she tells.

Earlier in the paper we said that a teller must be following norms of sincerity and knowledgeability in order to be telling. We are now in a better position to understand that claim. Tellers aim in a way that is open to their hearers to give their hearers reasons of trust to believe something by doing what they should do only if they believe and are in a position to know that thing. A speaker will only be telling if she aims, in a way that is open to her hearer, for her hearer to believe something on the basis of trusting her to be sincere and knowledgeable.

A teller's aiming, in a way that is open to her hearer, for her hearer to believe *p* on the basis of trusting her to be sincere and knowledgeable is incompatible with the teller's doing what makes it impossible for her hearer to believe *p* on the basis of trusting her (the teller) to be sincere and knowledgeable. A hearer will not be able to believe what a teller tells on the basis of trusting the teller to be sincere and knowledgeable if the teller explicitly denies being sincere and/or knowledgeable. Reasons of trust, generally, are not available when a person explicitly denies following the norms she might have otherwise been trusted to follow.

The fact that tellers aim, in a way that is open to their hearers, for their hearers to believe what they are saying on the basis of trusting them to be sincere and knowledgeable also explains why tellers can tell in unconventional ways. If a speaker is understood to be telling, then she is understood to be aiming in a way that is open to her hearer to give her hearer a reason of trust to believe something by doing what she should do only if she believes and is in a position to know that thing. If it seems to a hearer like a teller does not believe or is not in a position to know what she is saying, given a standard interpretation of her words and gestures, a hearer can

interpret what the teller is saying in a non-standard way. In some cases at least, the hearer can trust that a teller means for her to do this and the teller can trust the hearer to do this.

Suppose a speaker does not believe and is not in a position to know p. She might still try to tell some hearer p. Such a speaker might openly intend to give reason to believe p by openly intending to give reason to believe p, aiming to give some hearer a reason of trust to believe p. And her hearer might believe p, taking her (the speaker) to be sincere and knowledgeable. It is possible for all of this to happen in cases in which a speaker does not believe and is not in a position to know p. Does a speaker in such a case succeed in giving her hearer non-evidential reason and in making herself accountable to the hearer for the truth of what she says? Moran (2018), himself, says that the answer to this is yes. He says that a speaker can give a hearer non-evidential reason and can make herself accountable to a hearer for the truth of what she tells even when she (the speaker) does not believe and is not in a position to know what she says.¹¹⁶

However, when a speaker tries to tell without believing and being in a position to know p, she will do what presents itself as expression of belief in p but is not really an expression of belief in p. Such a speaker tells p but not in response to a reason for p. As such her telling p

¹¹⁶ Moran is clearest about the fact that he thinks that person can succeed at telling while being actually insincere. (Again, he has much more to say about the sincerity norm for telling than he does about the knowledgeability norm.) For example, he says:

“...an utterance may in fact fail to be sincere and yet still be the performance of the act in question: an act of telling or promising. The fact of the speaker’s insincerity does not annul its character as an act of that type, and, as Hume notes, even if the hearer knows that the speaker is insincere, the hearer will nonetheless understand the speaker to have told him that P or promised him to X.” (Moran, 2018, p. 113)

I take it that Moran also thinks that a person can successfully tell while failing to be actually knowledgeable. Some of his remarks about what is required for telling to succeed are somewhat general. For example, Moran (2018) says:

“Thus, what matters for the accomplishment of an act like assertion, and thus for the provision of a reason for believing someone’s assertion, lies on the level of the explicit presentation of oneself in speech, as opposed to everything that may reveal itself in one’s speaking and other behavior.” (p. 115)

cannot inherit from a reason for p that she has, the power to itself (when seen) be a reason to believe p. When a hearer believes p on the basis of trusting a speaker who tries to tell her p without believing and being in a position to know p, a hearer has reason to believe the speaker expressed belief in p. But seeing the speaker's telling p cannot give such a hearer reason to believe p in the same way in which it would if the speaker believed and was in a position to know p.

Can a speaker who aims to tell succeed in giving a hearer non-evidential reason for believing what she says and in making herself accountable to a hearer for the truth of what she says, if her hearer thinks that she (the speaker) is not sincere and/or not knowledgeable? A teller can succeed in doing these things even when a hearer has evidence that the teller is not sincere and/or not knowledgeable. A hearer can trust a teller to be sincere and knowledgeable even when faced with evidence that she is not. Sometimes evidence that a teller is not sincere and/or not knowledgeable with respect to she is saying, given a standard interpretation of her words and gestures, might cause a hearer to interpret a teller in a non-standard way. If the teller did not mean for her words and gestures to be interpreted in a non-standard way, then a teller might need to clarify what she means to tell. A teller can still succeed in giving non-evidential reason and making herself accountable to her hearer, when such clarification is needed, if she gives it.

I take it that a speaker cannot unintentionally fail to be sincere (as we have been using the term). So, if a hearer thinks that a speaker is not sincere but trying to tell her p she must be thinking that the speaker is doing what she should do only if she (the speaker) believes p in order to give the hearer a reason to believe p while she (the speaker) knows that she (the speaker) does not believe p. Can a speaker succeed in giving her hearer non-evidential reason to believe what she says and in making herself accountable to her hearer for the truth of what she says when her hearer thinks she is insincere, then? Moran (2018), himself, says that the answer

to this is yes.¹¹⁷ However, I do not think that a hearer could believe what a speaker is saying on the basis of trusting her (the speaker) to be sincere and knowledgeable when she does not believe that the speaker is sincere.

It is possible for a hearer to waver between thinking that a teller is insincere and trusting her to be sincere. This kind of wavering can happen frequently when one person is depending on another person to do something that the other person should do. Suppose A has promised to pick B up at the airport. Suppose also though that A has, many times in the past, failed to be at the airport when she has promised to be. It would not be strange, in this case, for B to waiver between trusting A to be at the airport to pick her up and thinking that A will not be at the airport based on her past failures and/or evidence that B will not be at the airport that A has leading up to the pick-up time.

A person who generally thinks that some speaker does not believe what she is trying to tell might in some moments be moved by trust to think that the speaker believes what she is trying to tell and to believe what the teller is trying to tell on this basis of trusting her to be sincere. However, a hearer who believes on the basis of trusting a teller to be sincere what the teller tells, cannot, while doing this, I take it, think that the teller is not sincere. And a hearer cannot decide to trust a teller to be sincere or to believe on the basis of trusting the teller to be sincere what the teller tells.

A speaker might intentionally or, possibly, unintentionally try to tell something that she is not in a position to know. Can a speaker succeed in giving her hearer non-evidential reason to believe what she says and in making herself accountable to her hearer for the truth of what she says when her hearer thinks she is not in a position to know what she is saying and is aware of

¹¹⁷ Moran says: “It is understood by both speaker and hearer that an act of promising or telling has been performed when the interlocutor knows the speaker to be insincere” (2018, p. 113). And he also says: “It is thus not either the fact of insincerity or the knowledge of the speaker’s insincerity (‘mutual’ or not) that is incompatible with the performance of the act of telling someone something...” (2018, p. 115).

this fact or, alternatively, when her hearer thinks she is not in a position to know what she is saying and is unaware of this fact? Again, I take it that Moran would answer these questions in the affirmative.¹¹⁸ However, again, I take it that, if a hearer believes on the basis of trusting a teller to be knowledgeable what the teller tells her, the hearer cannot at the same time think that teller is not knowledgeable. And a hearer cannot decide to trust a teller to be knowledgeable or to believe on the basis of trusting a teller to be knowledgeable what the teller tells her.

A speaker who is attempting to tell *p* and is sincere and knowledgeable with respect to *p* might do what is apt to be completed by her hearer's believing *p* on the basis of trusting her even if her hearer does not believe *p* on the basis of trusting her. But if a speaker's hearer does not believe what she (the speaker) tries to tell on the basis of her trusting her (the speaker), can the speaker still count as giving her hearer non-evidential reason and making herself accountable to her hearer for the truth of what she says? Such a speaker will express belief in *p* and aim to give her hearer a reason of trust to believe *p*. And these things will make available to her hearer a reason of trust to believe *p*. But, if the hearer does not believe on the basis of trust what the speaker is trying to tell, then the hearer will not be a part of the teller's act of reason giving. And the hearer will not believe for a reason the goodness of which depends upon the goodness of the teller's reason for believing *p*. The teller will not then succeed in giving the hearer a non-evidential reason for believing *p* or in making herself accountable to the hearer for the truth of *p* in the way a successful teller does.

The fact that Moran thinks that a telling can be successful (that a teller can succeed in giving a hearer non-evidential reason to believe what she tells and in making herself accountable to the hearer for the truth of what she tells) when the teller is not sincere and/or knowledgeable

¹¹⁸ Again, the lack of much discussion in Moran (2018) of the knowledgeability norm for telling makes this claim more difficult to establish (than the parallel claim about telling that is thought by the hearer to be insincere). But I do take this to be his view. For the same reason Moran thinks that a speaker might succeed in telling when she is thought by her hearer to be insincere, he would also, I take it, think that a speaker might succeed in telling when she is thought by her hearer not to be knowledgeable.

with respect to what she tells or, alternatively, when the hearer thinks that the teller is not sincere and/or not knowledgeable with respect to what she (the teller) tells, might be thought to tell against the interpretation of Moran provided in this chapter. However, I hope the above discussion has shown that there are a number of complexities surrounding the issue of when a telling can be successful. We can, I think, still interpret Moran, in the way I have proposed in this chapter.¹¹⁹

X. The Point of Telling: A Small Remark

Earlier in this chapter, in section VI, we said that the reasons that make it good for one person to believe something also make it good for others to believe that same thing. My seeing the rain makes good not only my believing that it is raining but also my neighbor's believing that it is raining. We said that it is, in part, because this kind of thing is true that, when one person does an action A for a reason R, another person who sees her can believe directly on the basis of seeing her do A what R is a reason for believing. If one person feels the rain and opens up her umbrella, another person can believe that it is raining directly on the basis of seeing the person open up her umbrella because, in part, the umbrella-holder's feeling the rain makes good that other person's believing that it is raining.

¹¹⁹ Additional things might be said about why it could be the case that Moran thinks that a person can succeed at telling even when she is not sincere and/or not knowledgeable and even when her hearer thinks that she is not sincere and/or not knowledgeable. One thing that Moran seems to take as evidence for this, is the fact that a hearer has a right to complain if what a speaker says is false, even if the speaker is insincere and/or not knowledgeable and even if the hearer thought all along that the speaker was insincere and/or not knowledgeable. I mentioned above, in a footnote in section II, that I think Moran might do more to consider the baseline responsibility that people likely have for each other's beliefs. Recognizing people as, prior to telling, being in some ways responsible for others' beliefs, might remove some of the incentive for thinking that insincere and/or unknowing telling and also telling that is thought to be insincere and/or unknowing might succeed.

Some of the reasons for belief that we have are reasons that frequently make it good to do a variety of different actions. Seeing the rain, we said, can give a person reason to do many different things. For example, it can give a person reason to close the window, to put on shoes before going in the yard, to avoid watering the plants outside tomorrow, and so on. Some reasons that a person can have for believing, alternatively, are such that there are not many actions that a person might do for them. For example, consider the reason, R, a person has to believe that pleasure is awareness of God's activity. If we are not thinking about the act of telling, it will be difficult to see what actions R would make it good for a person to do and how a person might act for it.

There are, we might say, some things that a person might do for R. She might, for example, work on interpreting a text on the assumption that the author thought pleasure was awareness of God's activity. However, others will not be able to see what this person is doing in a way that makes it possible for them to directly, on the basis of such seeing, believe what R is a reason for believing without the agent explaining what she thinks and what she is doing. If we are not thinking about telling, it is hard to see what a person might do for R that others could see and, on the basis of this, believe directly what R is a reason for believing.

There are many reasons that are like R in being such that, if we are not thinking about telling, it is hard to see what a person might do for them that others could see and believe directly of the basis of such seeing what the reasons make it good to believe. For example, the reasons that there are for believing many philosophical truths, scientific truths, and truths about art seem to be like this. Further, the following will sometimes be true even of the reasons that a person may often be able to act for in ways that others can see and believe directly on the basis of such seeing what the reasons make it good to believe: given the circumstances a person finds herself in, there are no actions (aside from telling) that she might do for such reasons. For example, a person who sees rain pouring down outside her window might have no yard or outdoor plants, and her window might already be closed.

We might begin to consider what the value of telling might be with the following observation: Telling is an activity that our reasons for belief always support doing and that is such that others who see it can believe what our reasons support believing directly on the basis of seeing it. Even if a person has no yard or outdoor plants and her window is closed, seeing the rain will still make it good for her to do something, namely, tell someone that it is raining. One person's seeing the rain can, through telling, always support others' beliefs that it is raining.

Telling, we might think, is an activity that exists, in part, because it is good to act for the reasons that we have in ways that others can see and believe directly on the basis of such seeing what our reasons support believing. Making it possible, with respect to a wide range of our reasons, for others to believe what those reasons support believing directly on the basis of seeing us act for them is part of what telling adds, we might think, to human affairs.

At the end of the previous chapter, we considered the possibility that Aristotle might think that even the most blessed person will do some activity of practical virtue. The most blessed person, perhaps, we said, will not spend all of the time she has for serious activity contemplating but rather will spend some of her time acting in the world. In considering telling and in making this small observation about its point, we might find some support for pursuing that idea. If we think that telling exists, in part, because it is good for us to act for the reasons for belief that we have (in ways that others can see and believe directly on the basis of such seeing what those reasons support believing), then we might think that Aristotle has a reason for thinking that it is good for a person to act, not just to contemplate. Of course, we will still need to know what the good of acting for our reasons in ways that others can see and believe directly on the basis of such seeing what those reasons support believing is.

In this chapter, we have said that telling has some features that distinguish it from other ways in which a person might act for the reasons for belief that she has. Telling aims at being believed on trust as its proper finishing and, as such, someone who tells gets her hearer involved in the acting for reason that she does. To fully understand the value of telling, then, I think we

will need to say more than just the that telling allows us to act for our reasons in ways that others can see and believe directly on the basis of such seeing what those reasons support believing. In the previous chapter, we considered the possibility that Aristotle thinks that the seeing of her seeing that a person does when she sees the beneficent act her character friend does for her as good for the reason that it is, is an important good and one that a person needs to be happy. We might, in considering what the further value of telling is, consider that idea from Aristotle and the possibility that telling might make available to a person a similar and similarly valuable awareness of herself.

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