ABSTRACT
Campus committees for supervising research ethics have developed rules and procedures that are indifferent to the emergent nature of ethnographic research. As a result, participant-observing fieldworkers have appreciated that, independent of their ethical commitments, they cannot comply with official regulations. Resolution of the fieldworker’s dilemma requires limiting review jurisdiction to funded studies; articulating the meaning of regulatory language defining auspices, exemptions, waiver, and research; and, above all, developing a culture of legality in campus ethics administration.

U.S. colleges and universities have developed rules and procedures for protecting the rights of research subjects that have forced participant-observation field researchers underground. As currently articulated by campus-based administrators in units known as institutional review boards, or IRBs, federal regulations prohibit faculty and students from gathering research data by interacting with subjects without first obtaining formal authorization from a university human-subjects’ protection committee. Participant-observing ethnographers, who commonly appreciate that their field interactions were research only in retrospect, must as a result either abandon their methodology or gather data in the uneasy awareness that they might be charged with violating ethics rules.

The fieldworker’s dilemma is not an inevitable result of federal law. It has been constructed by interpretations of rules and elaborations of procedures that depart from regulatory intent. After describing features of ethnographic data gathering in sociology that make prior approval impossible, I describe several ways the regulatory framework should be reinterpreted, both to be more consistent with regulatory purpose and to enable much if not all participant-observation fieldwork to be conducted aboveground.

Then I argue for the need to develop a culture of legality in IRB administration. Fieldworkers would not be in their current dilemma had they sufficient clout to ensure that IRB administrators attend closely to their problems. But there are no prospects that ethnographers will bring in sufficient research funding to induce administrators to be more consistently responsive. Accommodations may be achieved on one campus or another, but a nationally reliable route for taking ethnographic fieldworkers out of the shadows depends on institutionalizing an ongoing dialogue between researchers and administrators that will shape the evolution of IRB power. This, in turn, depends on changing the culture of IRB administration. The transformation could begin if IRB administrators would respect a few basic norms of legality—a form of administrative ethics—as they review the ethics of researchers.
How fieldworkers become IRB outlaws

When their research has one or more of the following features, ethnographers find it impossible to seek preauthorization for observations and interviews, no matter how sincere the will to comply.

First, when researchers participate in naturally occurring social life and write field notes on what they observe, they often encounter people and behavior they cannot anticipate. Indeed, one of the strongest reasons for conducting participant-observation research is the view that the current state of knowledge, as shaped by fixed-design research that prescribes the kind of people to be studied and the ways to study them (sampling designs, formalized questions and protocols, and time- and space-delimited situations in which to observe), is artificial, a product not of the subjects’ social lives but of prejudice. Put in positive terms, the distinctive virtue of ethnographic research is establishing “salience,” or what is relevant to the people studied independent of any outsiders’ preconceptions (Stinchcombe 2005:8). The “grounded discovery” theme has been appreciated for decades and remains vivid in current methodological thinking (Becker 1958; Glaser and Strauss 1967).

Thus, the very rationale for fieldwork is often unpredictable. On the understanding that social life is created through interaction, a common feature of ethnographic fieldwork is the in situ description of the people with whom the subjects of research interact. Because the local field of social interaction is precisely what must be discovered, the most sincere efforts to anticipate with whom the researcher will be interacting, and how those interactions will proceed, often become vacuous as soon as the researcher enters the field.3

Second, participant-observation research cannot be preapproved when it is the upshot of a life retrospectively defined as a resource for scientific study. Examples are common, although the researcher’s use of his or her biography is not always articulated extensively. Howard S. Becker (1953), in a famous article on marijuana use, alludes to interviews facilitated by a research institute, but he nowhere describes precisely how he obtained his data. The piece was written when he was still a graduate student. Anyone familiar with his biography will suspect that the article exploits observations he made while working as a musician at parties, in dance halls, and in jazz clubs, even before he entered graduate school. John Irwin (1970) entered graduate school as an ex-con. Having been imprisoned as an armed robber, his study of “the felon” drew on his preuniversity life and had unique value because of its real-world grounding.4 When an ethnography is in part autobiographical memory, it can carry distinctive authority, but it will be unable to meet the preapproval requirements of IRBs.

Third, participant-observation fieldwork will be incompatible with the preapproval requirement when new data emerge from experiences in which the line between personal life and research activities is blurred. Erving Goffman’s empirical materials often came from observations he made in the course of his everyday life in public places. Elijah Anderson has drawn on decades of everyday experience in diverse areas in Philadelphia to write on race relations in urban life. (For a recent example, see Anderson 2004.) I wrote up a study, “What Is Crying?” that was based primarily on episodes that emerged unexpectedly: witnessing audience reaction to a sign-language version of “Silent Night” at a primary school’s holiday show; watching what happened when eight year olds struck out at Little League baseball games; listening to a store clerk describe his anguish over the need to send his delinquent son back to El Salvador to avoid the U.S. criminal-justice system; casually asking a University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) human-subjects administrator about her vacation plans (Katz 1999:164, 181, 188, 199–200).

Blurring boundaries between personal and research life does not necessarily indicate an incapacity to plan research. It is a strategically valuable way to gain firsthand data on behavior in a range of social contexts at once diverse and mundane. The diversity of naturally occurring situations enables the analyst to find patterns of constancy in conduct across variations in context and, thus, to rule out explanations that would misguidedly attribute causal power to conditions that appear in only some of the behavior’s contexts. For example, the UCLA administrator began crying, not in response to my complaints about the IRB system but because she anticipated experiencing another mountaintop sunrise. Positive forms of crying are, in fact, frequent in everyday social life, their systematic logic is to register perceptions of metamorphosis, and they had been systematically neglected in research on the nature and contingencies of crying.

Ethical escape routes

If the requirement for preauthorization condemns most participant-observation fieldwork to an underground existence, this was not the original intent. At least five paths have been available for reconciling ethnographic fieldwork with the IRB system. Each has been blocked by a combination of administrative failure to develop implementing guidelines; the private character of IRB decision making, which blocks researchers from learning about the accommodations that have been worked out by some of their colleagues; and discretionary interpretations that do not constrain future decision making even within a given campus administration.

The limits of university auspices

In the Federalwide Assurances (FWAs) through which universities define an IRB system that will satisfy federal law, the regulatory system is limited to research conducted under the school’s auspices or with campus resources. The following
language is taken from UCLA’s FWA. Similar language is used as a standard limiting set of conditions.

This Assurance applies to all research involving human subjects, and all other activities which even in part involve such research, regardless of sponsorship, if one or more of the following apply:

1. the conduct or recruitment of the research involves institutional resources (property, facility or funding, including extramural funds administered by the institution), or
2. the research is conducted by or under the direction of any employee, student or agent of this institution in connection with his or her institutional responsibilities, or
3. the research is conducted by or under the direction of any employee, student or agent of this institution using any property or facility of this institution, or
4. the research involves the use of this institution’s non-public information to identify or contact human research subjects or prospective subjects. [University of California Regents 2005]

Much ethnographic fieldwork in sociology falls outside these limiting conditions. What is retrospectively recognized as fieldwork often occurs before the researcher takes on any university responsibilities as a student or faculty member. Much participant-observation occurs without using university funds or affiliation to get access.

IRBs generally have not defined the boundaries with case illustrations, although auspices constitute a threshold jurisdictional issue. In one UCLA case, an undergraduate applied for IRB approval and received, as the first official response, a formal declaration that he had “violated” IRB rules for data-gathering activities undertaken before he applied. “Data gathering” had started off campus, at a cocktail party, during a political fund-raising event, when an unanticipated topic emerged in a casual conversation. (The topic was about generational differences in the memories of a 1960s-era social-movement event.)

One set of especially significant problem situations arises out of the public-advocacy activities of people employed as university researchers. Ethnographic case studies have a narrative potential that makes them attractive vehicles for translating technical research findings into publicly consumable forms. Researchers who have developed prestigious academic careers based on formally defined, quantitative research that is routinely processed through IRB review may find that portraying individual biographies is more effective in generating public discourse. The line between intellectual activity within and beyond university jurisdiction may then become a matter of contention.5

At a recent national conference of sociological field-workers, a senior ethnographer at an East Coast university described her dilemma. Earlier in her career, she had been appointed by the governor of her state to an unpaid position on a committee overseeing professional service deliverers in a regulated health field. As she began to organize a book reporting what she had learned about the workings and limits of this form of public regulation, she realized that her data had been collected over the course of many years without IRB review. Her academic stature was a basis for her appointment by the governor, but was this sufficient connection to her university to justify IRB jurisdiction? And if she had changed her university affiliation during the course of her public service, from which institution should she have sought authorization, and when?

Limiting IRB oversight to funded research

Richard A. Shweder (this issue) has effectively clarified that the federal regulatory framework allows universities to limit IRB oversight to funded research.6 At a national conference of sociological ethnographers at UCLA in 2002, Stuart Plattner, an anthropological ethnographer and then a human-subjects-protection official at the National Science Foundation, acknowledged that it was a local-campus option to include nonfunded research within the FWA. This was a surprise to most of the faculty present, and the point was disputed by some IRB staff. As Shweder puts it, “At many (perhaps most) colleges and universities today, the decision to extend the regulations has been taken by academic administrators without the full knowledge, involvement, and direct consent of faculty ruling bodies. It has been a completely elective internal administrative action.”

Putting aside issues of academic freedom and the balance of power between university administrators and faculty, this peremptory administrative move sacrificed an opportunity to shape a regulatory system that researchers could practically apply to the realities of their research. The extension of IRB jurisdiction to nonfunded research inevitably leads to the development of an uncomfortable culture of dishonor in the relationship between research faculty and university administration. The informality of unfunded research, and the usual lack of real risk to subjects, means that researchers often do not know when to bring a project to the IRB in the first instance or when to return when research practices diverge from early plans.

The neglected waiver clause

Federal policy for the protection of human subjects is defined in 45 Code of Federal Regulations 46. Under 45 CFR 46, “Department or agency heads may waive the applicability of some or all of the provisions of this policy to specific research activities or classes of research activities otherwise covered by this policy” (Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS] 2005:101[i]). Waivers offer a legal basis to fashion university ethics policies flexibly and creatively. But a national initiative would be required to negotiate waivers.
for no- or low-risk forms of social research, and IRBs have been developed to dramatize ethical sensibilities on a local basis.

**Resurrecting the exemption provision**

Under section 45 CFR 46, research is said to be exempt from all review, whether pre- or postdata gathering, under certain conditions. In the section most relevant to ethnographers, research is exempt when it consists of

- interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified... and
- (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability, or be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing, employability, or reputation.

[DHHS 2005:101; emphasis added]"7

This language means that most interview and much observational research is outside the requirements of IRB review if data are recorded without identifying subjects, whether or not there is a reasonable basis for anticipating that subjects, if identified, would suffer legally, economically, or socially.

Despite the literal meaning of the language, IRBs have evolved so that they now require review before researchers can rely on the exemption language. The commonsense reading of the regulatory language, that exempt research is exempt from review, was not undermined through an abrupt policy change. The first wiggles in a straightforward reading developed when IRBs began to require that department committees or chairs review and approve claims of exemption. Although impinging on the researcher’s freedom beyond the letter of federal requirements, this extension of IRB oversight continued the traditional deference to discipline-based ethics cultures.

In 1999, a series of problems in biomedical research at prominent universities, most famously, injury to subjects at Duke University and deaths at the University of Pennsylvania and Johns Hopkins University, led to a widespread reexamination of the rigor of IRB protections. In response, local ethics administrations elaborated a culture of compliance. Across the nation’s campuses, industrious efforts to manifest compliance soon included required training courses in research ethics, a flow of reports to federal overseers of violations by researchers, and the formal certification of exemptions, which now became rebuttable “claims.”

For ethnographic fieldworkers and many other campus researchers, the exemption language became a catch-22. A researcher could not receive retrospective certification of the exempt status of prior interaction with subjects, but observational fieldworkers often could not meaningfully describe the data gathering they planned to do without conducting fieldwork to describe the site and some of its social contours. IRB policies now generally assert that there is no exception for “pretests.” The demand for a formal precertification of exempt status meant that a substantial part of observational field research would inevitably be conducted underground.

As the process for obtaining certificates of exemption has become routinized, the affected research community has lost awareness of this revision of the regulatory language. But regulatory history is clear that the exemption provisions were inserted specifically to accommodate social researchers who had criticized proposed versions of the regulatory scheme as violating what they saw as constitutional protections against prior restraints. Charles R. McCarthy, the head of the committee responsible for the regulations, recalled that,

in 1979, after issuance of controversial proposals... my quiet corner of HHS, OPRR [Health and Human Services, Office for Protection from Research Risks], was buffeted by strident criticism. Threats and epithets were hurled at us from all sides... The charges were led by Ithiel de Sola Pool, who insisted that our four pages of fine print in the Federal Register were about to lay waste to the First Amendment of the Constitution... Friendly champions of social and behavioral sciences showed us how to back away from our unpopular positions while continuing to offer what we felt were reasonable protections for the dignity and rights of subjects... We discovered that we could write exemptions for broad categories of social and behavioral research—categories in which subjects’ behavior seemed to us little different than the commerce of daily life. It has been estimated that up to 80% of social and behavioral research funded by our Department is now exempt. For the rest, we thought it not unreasonable to concern Institutional Review Boards with matters of privacy and confidentiality, and with efforts to protect unsuspecting and vulnerable subjects. [1984:8–9]

No evidence supports a view that there was an official intention to use “exemption” language in some tortuous manner to require human-subjects’-protection administrators to concern themselves with exempt research. The drafters of the regulations clearly wished to respect researchers’ fear that prior restraints would do fundamental damage to traditions of free inquiry. The intent is so clear that the practice by federal granting agencies of making the release of funds contingent on IRB certification of exemption appears to be a direct violation of the regulations under which the federal officials operate.

Many additional reasons support the view that, by imposing a blanket ban on self-exemption, universities have undermined regulatory intent. If the drafters had intended to deny self-exemption, why would they have used such misleading language? It is telling that self-exemption was the practice for several years after the regulations were in effect. Universities initially read the regulations with the commonsense understanding that, when a law mandating a review
An objective definition of “research”

The federal regulatory scheme applies to “research” on human subjects. In the definitions of the federal regulations, “Research means a systematic investigation . . . designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge” (DHHS 2005:102[d]). A major expansion of IRB jurisdiction is being institutionalized through a novel, vague, unnecessary, and impractical reading of “research.”

Oral historians clearly study “human subjects” but have long protested that their work should not be within IRB jurisdiction. In October 2003, the Chronicle of Higher Education reported, “Federal Agency Says Oral History Is Not Subject to Rules on Human Research Volunteers” (Brainerd 2003). Michael A. Carome, the associate director for regulatory affairs of the federal Office for Human Research Protections, was quoted as writing to an association of oral historians that their work is typically beyond regulation because they “do not reach for generalizable principles of historical or social development” that could be used to predict the future. . . . Rather, they explore “a particular past” (Brainerd 2003: A25).

Oral history is a borderline discipline that merges, on the one side, with ethnographic interviewing in the social sciences and, on the other side, with research in the humanities. Although the federal regulatory framework does not limit its reach to disciplines in the “sciences,” it has never been seen to reach all forms of university-based inquiry conducted through interaction with human subjects. Write-ups from student outings and recollections have been understood as part of pedagogy, not “research.” A university’s artists and fiction writers assume that they may exploit their social observations and personal memories without clearing intellectual retrieval operations with IRBs. Administrative studies used to form policy are outside of IRB jurisdiction, although the boundaries of this category may not be clear. (Are the articles in this AEForum administrative studies or contributions to scientific research or both or something else?) Many observers of the evolution of IRB jurisdiction have imagined that journalism schools would be immune because they would raise First Amendment–like protests against the IRB as a prior restraint or licensing mechanism. If oral history is officially regarded as outside IRB jurisdiction because it does not “reach for” generalization, journalistic investigation, political muckraking, and historical research that explores “a particular past” might also be left outside of IRB review.

The meaning of the oral-history exception is not yet settled. It is already apparent, however, that, as with the extension of IRB jurisdiction to nonfunded research and the gutting of the exemption clauses, policy evolution is widely being handled by administrative fiat. Local negotiations have developed privately, on the basis of each campus’s power dynamics. At the University of California, Berkeley, where an oral-history program is unusually well institutionalized and the absence of a medical school seems to moderate administrative anxieties, research that otherwise might be subject to IRB review were it to be conducted within social-science departments may avoid that review if it is accepted for administration within the oral-history program (Richard Candida Smith, personal communication, April 2004). At UCLA, an IRB staff member expeditiously responded to Carome’s statement by holding a phone conversation with the federal official. The campus human subjects administration then quickly sent faculty a declaration that “open ended qualitative type interviewing” is within the scope of 45 CFR 46 and, thus, IRB jurisdiction, when “the person engaged in such activities intends to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge” (e-mail to UCLA researchers, December 10, 2003, emphasis added).

Although presented as a neutral reading of the regulatory language, a highly consequential choice is made when “research” turns on “intention.” The regulatory language actually speaks of “design,” not intention, and links “design” to a concept of “systematic investigation”: Research is “a systematic investigation . . . designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge” (DHHS 2005:102[d]). A straightforward reading is that systematic investigation means prespecified protocols and research design means formalized research procedures, such as sampling design, questionnaire design, the design of experimental manipulations, and the standardized control of the researcher’s interaction with subjects. The last includes formalized instructions for introducing a study to potential subjects, for gaining rapport, for responding to subjects’ confusions about questions being asked, and so on.

Read as limited to investigations that are systematically designed, as that concept is understood within the traditional rhetoric of science, the “research” governed by IRBs would not cover the unsystematic, constantly changing, informally devised methods of ethnographic fieldwork. Typically, the “design” of a participant-observation study emerges in the field and is clearly visible only in retrospect.

The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research was created under the National Research Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93–348). In the “Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research,” a document created by the commission in 1979 and universally referred to by IRBs as providing the theoretical framework for human-subject protections, initial definitions are provided to limit the scope of concerns. To set off “practice” from “research,” the report states: “Research is usually described in a formal protocol that sets forth an objective
and a set of procedures designed to reach that objective” (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979:5). The commission appreciated that ethical issues arise in practices conducted outside of “research”; it did not attempt to prescribe a normative framework for all interactions that university investigators have with the people they write about.

In addition to departing from the historical meaning of the phrase within the development of the federal regulations, the adoption of a subjective standard is administratively unwise. As opposed to a commonsense reading of designed as a matter of formal protocol, the construction of intention is ambiguous; it encourages invasive investigations into researchers’ states of mind; and it hinges on an unstated, eternally unsettled distinction between the humanities and sciences. An objective reading of research as a matter of formal design would protect science researchers who make personal inquiries to develop biographical case materials that vividly illustrate the points they have developed through IRB-approved, fixed-design studies.

The need for legality

Except for the waiver clause, each of the escape routes discussed here has been recognized to some extent on one campus or another. Harvard University allows professors to check whether graduate-student work is exempt; review by the IRB is not required.10 The University of Chicago has opted out of requiring IRB review for nonfunded research.11 The University of Oklahoma at Norman has adopted an objective standard that defines “research” according to investigative formalities, not intention.12 Claims of violations of IRB policies seem to have been rejected at several campuses on the basis that the investigations were conducted independent of university auspices (Elizabeth F. Loftus, personal communication, February 2004; Loftus and Guyer 2002a, 2002b). The University of Pennsylvania, recognizing the practical difficulties of prior review of ethnographic research, does not require it.13 At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, explicit policies exclude investigations using case materials to illustrate journalistic-type writings, thus, insulating researchers who publish controversial advocacy from attacks alleging failures to obtain prior approval from an IRB.14

There is no reason to believe that unique grounds exist for special ethical philosophies on these campuses. More likely, some faculty members have been able to get their administrations to attend responsively to reasoned proposals on accommodating the regulatory system to the realities of research. What is needed is a national process to accommodate ethnographic research with the IRB system. What is needed for such a process is the development of a culture of legality in IRB administration.

Legality is a culture for shaping the interactions between the powerful and those they govern. Three features of legality are critically important for solving the ethical fieldworker’s dilemma. A baseline principle is that those in power should never command the impossible.15 If universities wish to outlaw ethnographic fieldwork, they might do so consistent with legality (although given the role of ethnographic texts as political speech, prohibition would not necessarily be consistent with the U.S. Constitution, much less with academic freedom). If they do not, they must devise a regulatory system that is amenable to compliance by good-faith researchers.

A second requirement is that, before policies become effective, those who would be affected have the opportunity, in a discourse open to the entire research community, to show regulators how they would be affected. Such a requirement does not limit the freedom of the governors. Public consultation with the governed before policies are implemented enables those in power to anticipate the meanings their commands will have in fact, and, thus, to better implement the ruling will.

A third necessary feature of legality would be the publication of IRB decisions, at least in those instances in which the subject’s privacy needs and the researcher’s property rights permit. This means not just the current practice of publishing model consent forms but also publishing the applications submitted and the consent requirements, if any, that were imposed. It would quickly follow that subsequent researchers, both within and across campuses, would use prior IRB decisions as precedents referenced in their own applications. IRB decision makers would respect precedent even when varying from it, were they to articulate justification for differential treatment. Public review of IRB decisions and justifications would press toward consistency and toward more probing understandings for the requirements that IRBs impose and for IRB decisions to deny applications.

Legality is an intermediary remedy for the problems of IRB governance; it is not a quick fix but neither does it abolish the system. Philip Hamburger (2005) has recently argued for abolishing IRBs on the logic that, by requiring prior government consent for inquiry, IRBs are censorship mechanisms that unconstitutionally license the exercise of First Amendment rights. But even if courts would block government entities from making research grants contingent on prior IRB review, private philanthropies might retain the condition, and in any case, schools would not necessarily abandon a role in overseeing research ethics.

As the examples of accommodation noted above suggest, the ability of faculty to influence administration in higher education may be linked to academic status. University prestige is based on faculty eminence, and eminent faculty have more success in getting the ear of their administration, even without hauling a sack of research funds to meetings. Legality is an especially fertile process for growing a culture that would overrun stratification differences within and among schools. By encouraging reviewable, reasoned explanations for decision making, legality would facilitate
ongoing, unrestricted debates over ethics administration, which, in turn, would foster patterns of national consistency.

The key issue about IRB administration is not what decisions to make on any given question or even how to read the regulations; the central matter is the process that will be used to make decisions and authoritative interpretations. Ambiguities about the reach of a school’s “auspices,” the definition to be given “research” that falls within IRB control, how to apply the “exemption” clauses so that all researchers of good will can comply with ethics requirements—all of these issues must be worked out somehow. A long list of other troublesome issues comes up when proposals receive full IRB review, such as how to anticipate and assess “risk,” the role that IRBs should take in judging the scientific worth of a project when they balance its benefits with its risks, and what the sanctioning regime should be if violations are found. Just as the discretionary character of IRB power throws deep shadows onto ethnographic fieldwork, it keeps local researchers in the dark about the treatment of the applications of neighboring colleagues and blinds local administrators to thoughtful resolutions achieved on other campuses. For all affected parties except tyrannical or insecure administrators, legality should be an attractive way of pooling intelligence into a horizontally and vertically collaborative evolution of the power to oversee research ethics.

Notes

1. For the evolution of human-subjects’ protection measures as applied to social and behavioral scientists, see Citro et al. 2003. For a brief summary, see Singer and Levine 2003.

2. Noncompliance is a widely discussed secret.

   According to Berkeley’s Ann Swidler, IRBs “turn everyone into a low-level cheater,” in much the way that unreasonably low speed limits encourage disrespect for traffic laws. “We are pushing for compliance among the faculty and grad students in the cultural anthropology department,” [Kathy] Ewing [cultural anthropology chair at Duke University] says, weighing her words. “But I’m not sure there is much relationship between what people agree to do for the human-subjects committee and what they do in the field.” [Shea 2000:4]

3. What is at stake is not a mere formality. Participant-observers usually come across conduct that, if revealed, would embarrass subjects and which subjects, if asked, might not consent to see in publication. (For an unusually frank discussion, see Bosk 2001; also see Emerson and Pollner 1988.)

4. In a phone interview, Irwin explained to me that the data for his book came from the contacts he had at San Quentin, which dated back to his “cohort” in the 1950s. When he began to do his Ph.D. research, he knew many inmates who had remained in or returned to prison, and he could not divide the social relations and knowledge for the book into pregrad-school and grad-school phases of his biography.

5. This is what happened to psychologists Elizabeth Loftus and Michael Bailey, active in two independent lines of research, who were brought under investigation by their IRBs for developing illustrative case material for rhetorical purposes (Burt and Jorgensen 2003; Tavris 2002).

6. More precisely, it is limited to federal-government-funded research. No doubt some colleague of Shweder’s at the University of Chicago will argue that, just as there is no free lunch, there is no unfunded research.

7. The multiple negatives in the regulatory language sometimes confuse researchers and IRB administrators alike. The correct reading is that either anonymity or an absence of reasonably likely risk from disclosure will sustain the exemption defined for interviews and observation of public behavior. Even if risk from disclosure is reasonably likely, anonymity in recording preserves the exemption. Note also that the regulation speaks of anonymity at the moment in which “information . . . is recorded”; it does not require a prediction that subjects will remain anonymous. This is important because anonymity often is ultimately out of the researcher’s control, given that the research subjects or others aware of the study could often disclose their own and other subjects’ identities.

8. The e-mail to which this document was attached contained the warning “Information contained within is confidential and should be treated as such.” I rely here on phone advice from the chief human-subjects’ staff administrator that this restriction was a matter of form that could be disregarded.

9. I have argued that a lack of preset design for data gathering is not accidental, not equivalent to a lack of forethought, and not a basis for understanding ethnographic field studies as lacking in methodological rigor. Participant-observation fieldwork rests its methodological strengths specifically on its ability to find unanticipated variations or exceptions in the field and on its potential to build systematic analytic character retrospectively. See Katz 1982, 2001.

10. As of December 14, 2005, the following language was found on the Harvard website:

   Final determination of whether research is exempt should be made by the investigator—in consultation with a faculty or department adviser for student or staff investigators—only in unambiguous cases. For example, interviews with political candidates about their views on issues of public relevance, or anonymous surveys of adults on non-sensitive topics. [President and Fellows of Harvard College n.d.]

11. But, as Shweder notes, opting out of promising the federal government that IRBs will review nonfunded research does not mean that a university will not compel IRB review of nonfunded research, and the University of Chicago still does. Moreover, as compelling as Shweder’s arguments are, they will become moot if legislation removes the ability of research institutions to opt out of IRB review for nonfunded research. See HR 4697 and S3060 of the 107th Congress; HR 3594 of the 108th Congress.

12. The University of Oklahoma’s website guides researchers to a decision tree on which, at the branch relevant to ethnographers, a study is thrown out of IRB jurisdiction unless “observation and interview” are conducted on non-sensitive topics. [President and Fellows of Harvard College n.d.]

13. The University of Pennsylvania language, which embraces a post hoc censorship role, is far from ideal, but at least it demonstrates that campuses can recognize the observational fieldworker’s dilemma and that IRBs, even at a university where harm to a research subject led to death and a threat to close down all research funding, are not obligated by federal regulations to review ethnographic research before data are gathered.

If an investigator begins a project and later finds that the data gathered could contribute to generalizable knowledge, has changed in some fashion as to now require IRB review, or that he or she may wish to publish the results, the investigator should submit a proposal to the IRB for review as soon as possible. If the IRB does not approve the
research, data collected cannot be used as part of a study, thesis or dissertation nor may the results of the research be published. (University of Pennsylvania 2004)

14. “Research does not include interviews used to provide quotes or illustrative statements—used in journalism or related projects” (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2003).

15. For foundational statements, see Fuller 1969 and Davis 1980.

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