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INTRODUCTION

Is a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in northern Europe feasible? In its classical form the NWFZ is proposed to include neutral states (Sweden and Finland) and NATO members (Norway and Denmark) but no Warsaw Pact territories. Hence it is lopsided, demanding some concessions from the West and none from the East. Could then the Baltic republics be added to such a zone, to establish some East-West balance? The latter question has been raised recently by fairly different people, and consequently the Ninth Conference on Baltic Studies in June 1984 spent three sessions to examine the issue, its background, and its broader context. Altogether six papers were presented, followed by a round-table discussion. The revised versions of the three central papers are presented in this issue of the *JBS*.

Gary Guertner (California State University, Fullerton) reviews the broad strategic significance of northern Europe, including the Baltic republics, as perceived by the United States and also as perceived by the Soviet Union in the opinion of US analysts. Guertner considers the Baltic republics the only Soviet-controlled territory that could conceivably be included in a NWFZ, because of the relatively low and decreasing level of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces in the Baltic Military District. Removal of nuclear weapons from the area may have symbolic importance; however, it may have little impact on the US targeting policies as long as significant conventional forces remain. Professor Guertner reviews at some length the evolution of the general US targeting policies. Despite considerable shifts in other aspects, these policies always have treated the Soviet Union as a unitary state. Little has been done to examine the multinational character of the USSR and its potential effect on the American-Soviet mutual deterrence relations. Withholding an attack on the Baltic republics while targeting the Russian republic (RSFSR) is a political/ethnic strategy that has never been incorporated in US strategic planning. Professor Guertner

concludes on a skeptical note regarding the usefulness of NWFZs in Europe in general and in the Baltic area in particular. He feels there is no local substitute for broad superpower arms control.

George Maude (University of Turku) presents the Finnish and Norwegian attitudes toward the Nordic NWFZ and also touches on those in the other Scandinavian nations. The conceivable inclusion of some Soviet-controlled territories is not mentioned. For over twenty years Finland's President Kekkonen personally was a main promoter of the NWFZ idea, but he and other Nordic proponents (such as Sweden's Prime Minister Palme) always saw it as part of a wider European settlement. Finland as a state has been remarkably reticent in pushing such a wider proposal, partly because it does not want to get embroiled in the larger European concerns of the great powers, but also because the other Nordic states have at times shown considerable reluctance to accept the idea of a formal NWFZ. Professor Maude feels that such a zone would be in Finland's as well as Sweden's national interest and observes that in Norway a change toward a greater acceptance of the NWFZ took place in Spring 1981.

Rein Taagepera (University of California, Irvine) surveys recent suggestions to make the Nordic NWFZ proposal more balanced and hence more viable by including some Warsaw Pact territories. Among these the Soviet Baltic republics offer the greatest potential, since Poland is part of a Central European settlement, and the Kola Peninsula has too much global importance. In 1981, inclusion of the Baltic republics was proposed in an unusually well-composed letter (despite some remaining tactical flaws) by thirty-eight residents of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. At least five of them have by now been sentenced to prison, and the NWFZ memo figured explicitly in the charges in at least one case. In 1982, former US presidential advisor Brzezinski repeatedly made similar proposals (sometimes including the Kola peninsula), but like Kekkonen he always linked the Nordic settlement to the Central European one. The Soviet attitude toward inclusion of Soviet territories may have become slightly less negative. President Reagan's response, apparently written for him by some Baltic exiles, was negative to the point of insulting the courageous thirty-eight signatories of the Baltic Open Letter on the NWFZ.

As in many Scandinavian debates on the NWFZ, a recurring theme in the three articles seems to be that a breakthrough would have to come in Central Europe before anything can change in Northern Europe. As a confidence-building measure preparing the way for Central European disarmament, the Nordic NWFZ may be not only unrealizable but also ineffective. "Building confidence for what exactly?" as Professor Toivo Miljan (Wilfried Laurier University) asked at the Conference discussion. Inclusion of the Baltic republics in the Nordic NWFZ does not seem to be a sufficient incentive to increase the American interest in the zone, and it meets resistance not only from the Soviet side but also from many Nordic proponents of the NWFZ. The Nordic concern is that inclusion of any Soviet territory would make the USSR a permanent participant in the NWFZ agencies, and

given its size it could completely dominate them. One might expect that the Nordic NWFZ would need the guarantees of both superpowers anyway, to a degree where both the US and the USSR would effectively become members of the NWFZ agencies, the more so because some NWFZ proposals also include Iceland and Greenland where there are US bases. While from the global viewpoint the two superpowers would then balance each other out, from the viewpoint of the Nordic countries the superpower dominance in the NWFZ decisions would become overwhelming. This is the dilemma of the independent Nordic countries: they would like to keep the superpowers out of it, but a NWFZ without superpower participation has little significance beyond symbolism.

Given the slim prospects for a Nordic NWFZ within any boundaries, the degree of likelihood of the Baltic republics being included in it may not matter. The issue may be "purely academic." However, moods and attitudes sometimes change unexpectedly, and brief windows of opportunity may open and close before one has time to act, unless the possibilities have been academically investigated ahead of time. In retrospect, the West may have missed such a window for permanent relaxation in the mid-1950s when apparently sincere offers by post-Stalin Soviet leaders (witness the withdrawal from Austria and Porkkala) took the West by surprise and failed to elicit appropriate response. In a very different direction, the West again missed opportunities in 1956, because a major revolution in East Europe was considered a "purely academic" possibility until it happened. This is why the inclusion of the Baltic republics in the Nordic NWFZ may need even further discussion.

As for the US nuclear targeting of the Baltic republics (which it formally does not even recognize as belonging to the Soviet Union), it not only may but will have to be discussed over and over for as long as such targeting continues. Imagine the United States during World War II bombing Paris on a par with Berlin (since both were unquestionably under German control). The overall counterproductive effect of such a policy would be easy to imagine. It could have achieved what Hitler never could: obtain widespread French support for the German war effort. But now the US is targeting pro-Western populations. Is the goal to convert Balts into Soviet patriots?

Rein Taagepera