Understanding Intraethnic Diversity: The Formation of a Taiwanese American Identity

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Acknowledgments
The authors thank Valerie Matsumoto and Jinqi Ling for their helpful comments in the earlier version of the paper. This research is partially supported by the Walter and Shirley Wang Endowed Chair in US-China Relations and Communications.

Abstract: This paper fills a scholarly gap in the understanding of the intraethnic diversity via a case study of the formation of a Taiwanese American identity. Drawing on a review of the existing scholarly literature and data from systematic field observations, as well as secondary data including content analysis of ethnic organizations’ mission statements and activity reports, we explore how internal and external processes intersect to drive the construction of a distinct Taiwanese American identity. The study focuses on addressing three interrelated questions: (1) How does Taiwanese immigration to the United States affect diasporic development? (2) What contributes to the formation of a Taiwanese American identity? (3) In what specific ways is the Taiwanese American identity sustained and promoted? We conceive of ethnic formation as an ethnopolitical process. We argue that this ethnopolitical process involves constant negotiation and action in multiple spaces beyond nation-state boundaries. We show that immigration dynamics and homeland politics interact to create diversified rather than homogenized patterns of diasporic development and ethnic identification. The lifting of martial law in 1987 and democratization in Taiwan since then have led to increased public support for Taiwanization and Taiwanese nationalism in Taiwan. Rising nationalism in the homeland has in turn invigorated efforts in constructing an ethnonational—Taiwanese American—identity in the diaspora through proactive disidentification from the Chinese American community and civic transnationalism. This ethnopolitical identity is re-affirmed through cultural reinvention, outreach and networking, and appropriation of Taiwan indigenous cultures and symbols. We conclude by discussing the complexity of diasporic development and identity formation.

Key Words: Intraethnic diversity, diasporic development, identity formation, nationalism, Taiwanese American
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Introduction

In diasporic communities around the world, people of Chinese descent are often perceived as culturally homogeneous with a shared sense of Chineseness rooted in thousands of years of Chinese civilization (Fei 2017). Despite the tremendous intraethnic diversity in places of origin, languages/dialects, kinship systems, religions, and ways of life, the boundary shifting toward a panethnic identity — Chinese, or Chinese overseas (海外华人 haiwan huaren in Mandarin) — has been a salient feature of the Chinese Diaspora (Huang 2010; Wang 1993). The reverse trend toward reaffirming and reclaiming sub-ethnic identities in migrant-receiving societies was uncommon. At the turn of the 21st century, however, from Hong Kong to Taiwan and from Southeast Asia to Oceania to North America, many people of Chinese descent are beginning to proactively foster and assert different ethno-national identities, such as “Chinese Singaporean”1 and “Taiwanese Americans,” or place-based identities, such as “Hong Kongers,” that are distinct from the pan-Chinese ethnicity (Ngan and Chan forthcoming; Chun 1996; Lien and Harvie 2018). Reasons behind what has transpired seem to be more political than cultural, and the issue of intraethnic dynamics has remained relatively understudied in existing social science research. This study aims to fill the gap by exploring in greater depth the emergent phenomenon of intraethnic diversity. We do so via a case study of the formation of a Taiwanese American identity in the United States (U.S.), based on a review of the existing scholarly literature and data from systematic field observations, as well as secondary data including ethnic organizations’ mission statements and activity reports.4

Before the surge of Taiwanese immigration to the U.S. in the 1980s, Taiwanese Americans and Chinese Americans were homogenized as a single ethnic group, and the two identities conflated. As they have established themselves socioeconomically in the U.S. society, Taiwanese immigrants and their children, born or raised in the U.S., have constructed and reaffirmed an ethnic identity that is distinguishable from the ethnic Chinese identity. In this paper, we focus on analyzing how internal and external processes interact to drive the construction of a distinct ethnonational—Taiwanese American—identity among Taiwanese immigrants in the U.S., addressing three interrelated questions: 1) How does Taiwanese immigration to the U.S. affect diasporic development? (2) What contributes to the formation of a Taiwanese American identity? (3) In what specific ways is the Taiwanese American identity sustained and promoted? We conceive of ethnic formation as an ethnopolitical process. We argue that this ethnopolitical process involves constant negotiation and action in multiple spaces beyond nation-state boundaries and that a distinct Taiwanese American identity is formed and reaffirmed through diasporic development, activism and cultural reinvention in transnational spaces.
Taiwan as Homeland

Taiwan was known as “Formosa,” meaning “beautiful island,” a name arguably given by the Portuguese sailors passing through the Taiwan Straits in the mid-16th century (Hung 2000; Lin 2012). The island had a lengthy history of colonial rule, first by the Europeans (the Dutch from 1624 to 1662 and the Spanish from 1626 to 1642), then by the Manchu Qing Empire from 1683 to 1895, and by the Japanese from 1895 to 1945 (Storry 1999). Before the Dutch colonists set foot on the island, Taiwan was populated by the Austronesian-speaking indigenous peoples, along with a small group of Chinese in the Southwest region. Since the mid-17th century, emigrants from South China had begun to arrive in visible numbers. The earlier Chinese arrived mostly as merchants and traders lured by opportunities emerging from European colonization and later as settlers fleeing hardship and turmoil, which resulted in the growing Han Chinese presence (Andrade 2008; Chang 2008). Most of these earlier Chinese migrants to the island were Holo (or Hoklo) hailed from Fujian (Fukien) and Hakka from Guangdong (Kwangtung) (Hung 2000). The co-colonization of the European and Chinese colonists and the eventual fall of the Dutch colonial rule consolidated the development of a Han Chinese nation on the island (Andrade 2008). After World War II, the KMT-led Republic of China (RoC), as one of the victors, took control of Taiwan from the defeated Japanese. However, the loss of the Chinese civil war in 1949 forced the Kuomintang (KMT)-led RoC government to retreat to Taiwan with about two million supporters, mainly soldiers and their families. The bitter standoff between two Chinas—the RoC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-ruled People’s Republic of China (PRC) led to a Chinese “homeland” becoming bifurcated for its diaspora communities around the world (Han 2019).

Colonization and cross-strait migrations led to the exponential growth of the Chinese population and Sinicization on the island. At the turn of the 21st century, Taiwan has become an ethnically and linguistically diverse island-state with a population of 23.6 million, including 95% Han Chinese, 2% Malayo-Polynesian peoples making up 13 officially recognized indigenous tribes, and 2% new immigrants primarily from China and Southeast Asia. Of the Han Chinese, 73% are descendants of Holo, 12% are descendants of Hakka, and another 15% are Chinese mainlanders, who were KMT nationalists evacuated to Taiwan around 1949, and their offspring (Hung 2000; Kang and Yang 2011). The Han Chinese are generally known to constitute two distinct groups: Native Taiwanese, or benshengren in Mandarin, including the migrants from mainland China before the end of World War II and their descendants, and Mainlander Taiwanese, or waishengren, including KMT nationalists and post-1949 migrants from mainland China and their descendants (Gu 2012; Lin 2011; Yang and Chang 2010). While Mandarin Chinese, written in traditional Chinese characters, is the national language, Holo (the Southern Min dialect), Hakka, and Austronesian languages are officially recognized. The majority of the Taiwanese population speak either Mandarin or Holo.

Taiwan has existed as an independent nation-state since 1949 despite its ambiguous political status. The CCP-ruled PRC has insisted on Taiwan as an inseparable part of China, while the KMT-led RoC maintained that it was the rightful ruler of all China (Alagappa 2017). In fact, the KMT had rejected demands for Taiwan’s independence and declared martial law to
suppress political dissidents, including freedoms of press and of association, until 1987. After relocating to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT-led authoritarian regime managed to regain administrative accountability and governing capacity through institutional innovations with the support and conditionality from the U.S. (Ngo and Chen 2008). It subsequently implemented programs of land reform, industrialization, and state-sponsored education, which contributed significantly to the island’s rapid industrialization (Morris 1996). By the 1980s, Taiwan had emerged as one of the four “little tigers” or “little dragons” (along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea) from the developing “Third World” to Asia’s newly industrialized economies (NIE). In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was established as an oppositional party to the KMT in defiance of the martial law.

Economic developments, coupled with the growth and maturity of oppositional forces, created favorable conditions for Taiwan’s democratization (Leng and Lin 1993). In 1987, the KMT-rule government lifted the 38-year martial law. In 1996, the first direct presidential election was held in Taiwan, with KMT’s Lee Teng-hui winning the election. Subsequently, the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian won the presidency in 2000 and was reelected in 2004, ending more than half a century rule of KMT on Taiwan. The KMT regained power in 2008 with Ma Ying-jeou elected for the next two terms, but the DDP won back in 2016 with Tsai Ing-wen elected to presidency and reelected in 2020. As Taiwan becomes increasingly democratized, nation-building has also become an urgent issue. The Great China ideology promoted by the KMT gradually lost favor while the DPP-promoted Taiwan First ideology gained support (Lin 2011).

For Taiwanese immigrants in the U.S., the notion of the homeland is not fixed. While those of benshengren origin tend to consider Taiwan as their homeland unambiguously, those of waishengren origin are ambivalent, and some are reluctant to reject China as their ancestral homeland. The bensheng-versus-waisheng divide is both cultural and political, which the immigrants carry with them to their new homeland. However, the notion of Taiwan as homeland is gradually converging in the diasporic community.

Immigration and Diasporic Development

Post-WWII Immigration from Taiwan

Taiwanese immigration to the U.S. was directly impacted by the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, a revolutionary bill which opened door to the immigration of skilled workers while prioritizing family reunification. The trend shows a bell shape, growing drastically in the 1970s and peaking in the 1990s (see figure 1). Prior to the passage of the 1965 Act, which was implemented in 1968, migration from Taiwan was already under way. Post-war US involvement in Taiwan was a driving force. The U.S. put Taiwan under its protection by providing military aid to shield Taiwan from Communist takeover and fueling Taiwan’s economic takeoff with development assistance (Lin 1992). Such bilateral interaction led the U.S. to become the most preferred destination for Taiwanese in search of political refuge, better livelihood, and better educational and economic opportunities.
The Taiwanese emigrated in different distinct periods of time that would shape their diasporic identity. In the 1950s, a small but visible number of Taiwanese immigrants arrived in the U.S. This earlier group was made up of Chinese mainlanders who were twice migrants, first to Taiwan and then to the U.S. primarily for political refuge. Many of them were former RoC government bureaucrats and KMT military personnel. They held on to a strong Chinese cultural identity, considered mainland China as their lost homeland, and supported KMT’s goal of “Retaking the Chinese Mainland” (光復大陸). From the late 1960s to the late 1980s, students from Taiwan began to come to the U.S. in large numbers. These students were both the children of waishengren and descendants of benshengren. They had benefited from the reformed school system and came to the U.S. to pursue graduate studies, mostly in the fields of science and engineering (Lu 1991). Taiwanese students formed one of the largest groups of international students in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s (Wang 2013). While most Taiwanese students intended to return to Taiwan upon graduation, about 10% actually returned during the 1970s and about 20% in the 1980s (Arrigo 2006; Lin 2012). Most students found employment in the US labor market after receiving advanced graduate degrees and stayed, setting off a huge brain drain (Zhou 2006). This trend was gradually reversed in the late 1980s, partly due to active government recruitment and partly due to rising opportunities created by rapid economic development (Leng 2002; Saxenian 1994). The student migrants of the 1970s and 1980s grew up under Taiwan’s martial law and were influenced by KMT’s Greater China ideology. Once
resettled in the U.S., they tended to be professional driven without much interest in homeland politics. In contrast, the post-1990 student migrants, even those of waishengren parentage, grew up in a more liberal and economically prosperous Taiwan and were supportive of Taiwan’s democratization and actively participating in electoral politics in Taiwan. In the 1980s and 1990s, Taiwanese investors and business people joined the migratory journey (Arrigo 2006; Tseng 1995). This group of entrepreneurial Taiwanese was attracted to the U.S., especially Southern California, for better returns on capital investment and better market opportunities for business growth (Tseng 1995).

Political uncertainty and labor market constraints, especially lacking suitable job opportunities commensurate with improved levels of education and investment opportunities, in Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s created the brain drain and capital outflow from Taiwan, making Taiwanese one of most highly selected immigrant groups in the U.S. (Kang and Yang 2010; Lin 2012; Tseng 1995; Ying 2003). As of 2010, 31% of Taiwanese immigrants have a bachelor’s degree and 38% a master’s degree or higher (compared to 18% and 10%, respectively, of the total U.S. adult population (McCabe 2012). While most of the Taiwanese immigrants hailed from middle-class backgrounds, a large proportion of them were not new arrivals, but were formerly students who had been in the U.S. for a lengthy period of time with US academic degrees, proficiency in English language, and familiarity with American society and cultural ways. Since the turn of the 21st century, migration from Taiwan has slowed down as figure 1 shows. The more recent immigrants are more deeply influenced not only by democratization in Taiwan and intense US-China and cross-strait relations at the rise of China but also by a diasporic community being transformed by these transnational dynamics than their predecessors.

The Development of a Diasporic Community

The 2010 U.S. census data recorded a total number of 230,382 people who self-identified themselves as Taiwanese. Apparently, this number was a severe undercount because of the complexity in ethnic self-identification (Gu 2012; Lien & Harvie 2018; Yang and Chang 2010; Zhou and Chiang 2012). The census form did not include a box for Taiwanese to check, but only allowed write-in under “other Asian” category at the end of the list of Asian boxes with Chinese listing first. This would contribute to the undercount as many Taiwan-born people or those of Taiwanese origin would have checked the Chinese box rather than written in Taiwanese on form. For example, the 2010 U.S. census recorded 358,000 Taiwan-born persons, but U.S. immigration statistics show about 443,888 immigrants from Taiwan were admitted to the U.S. as permanent residents from 1950 to 2009. Thus, the actual number of Taiwanese or Taiwanese Americans in 2010 should be more than 600,000, much higher than the 2010 census number, assuming the rate of the foreign born at 65% and that of returnees at 15% (McCabe 2012).

Taiwanese immigrants are hyper-selected. The majority of them hailed from advantageous socioeconomic backgrounds and their pattern of diasporic development is distinct from earlier and contemporary immigrants from Mainland China (Tseng 1995; Zhou, Tseng, & Kim 2008). Unlike Chinese immigrants, Taiwanese had not experienced the history of legal exclusion, which forced the Chinese to retreat to Chinatowns for survival. They lacked a pre-existing ethnic community to received them and did not need the ethnic community as a
springboard to launch their integration into the mainstream society. Instead of first setting foot in ethnic enclaves, like Chinatowns, they have resettled straight into white middleclass suburbs, achieving a measure of residential assimilation. They also spread out geographically. Since most of the Taiwanese immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s were student migrants in the STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) fields, they were spread out to places with job growth in STEM or towns where major research universities and institutions are located. Once they received their green cards, they had greater flexibility to move places of better employment and entrepreneurial opportunities, such as Silicon Valley and Los Angeles (Tseng 1995; Saxenian and Li 2002).

As they have become settled, Taiwanese immigrants have established their own diasporic community separate from Chinatown. Their diasporic community building takes two interrelated forms: ethnoburbs and ethnic organizations. Ethnoburbs are multiethnic middleclass suburbs, a phenomenon directly impacted by contemporary international migration, especially the arrival of hyper-selected immigrant groups (Li 1997). The development of a vast Chinese ethnoburb in the San Gabriel Valley, Southern California, which began as the first suburban “Chinatown” in Monterey Park, is a case in point (Fong 1994; Li 1997; Tseng 1995; Zhou et al. 2008). In the early 1970s, Monterey Park was suburban bedroom community dominated by white (85% of the city’s population in 1960). Finding Los Angeles enticing because of high-tech engineering jobs, economic connections to Asia, and educational opportunities, Taiwanese investors, developers, and business people poured money into the suburb’s real estate development in the 1980s and lured socioeconomically resourceful Taiwanese immigrants already in the U.S. and potential emigrants in Taiwan to purchase homes there (Tseng 1995; Zhou et al. 2008). Many Taiwanese immigrants indeed did so immediately upon arrival or even prior to arrival. Economic development in Monterey Park also experienced drastic changes in the 1980s, thanks to the financial contribution of Taiwanese investors, real estate developers, and entrepreneurs. From the start, the Taiwanese ethnic economy was highly transnational, relying on foreign capital from Taiwan and, in turn, strengthening the economic and social linkages across the Pacific (Tseng 1995).

The visibility of Taiwanese capital, Taiwanese-owned businesses, and later immigrant Taiwanese involvement in local politics earned Monterey Park the nickname, “Little Taipei” (Fong 1994; Tseng 1995). By the late-1980s, Monterey Park had been completely transformed from an Anglo bedroom town into an ethnoburb with an Asian majority, in which Taiwanese made up the largest foreign born group, and a wide range of Taiwanese-owned businesses (Tseng 1995). White population shrank to 12% in 1990 and 5% 2010, which Asians grew to 56% in 1990 and further to 67% in 2010 (Zhou, Chin, & Kim 2013). Once the ethnoburb took shape, subsequent family and student migrations from Taiwan followed. Migration from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia also ensued. By 1990, the number of mainland Chinese immigrants surpassed that of the Taiwanese in Monterey Park. As more and more Chinese immigrants from mainland China and Southeast Asia moved in, ethnoburban development expanded eastward to Rosemead and Alhambra, and for the Taiwanese, branched out to more affluent suburbs, north to Arcadia and San Marino and southeast to Hacienda Heights, Rowland Heights, Walnut, and Diamond Bar (Zhou et al 2013).
With the influx of highly educated and relatively affluent immigrants from Taiwan to the San Gabriel Valley, a full-fledged diasporic Taiwanese community began to take shape to serve as the center of ethnic for Taiwanese living in or out of the geographic area. Building on the physically visible diasporic community is a wide range of Taiwanese American organizations across the country. Between 1980 and 2010, more than 700 ethnic organizations registered with the Culture Center of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Los Angeles (TECO-LA) (Chen 2020). These ethnic organizations vary in types. The most common types are benevolent associations, alumni associations based on universities in Taiwan, business or trade organizations, and religious and civic organizations, including political and cultural organizations. Some of the older and larger ethnic organizations in Los Angeles include: the Taiwan Benevolent Association of California founded in 1979, the Taiwanese Hakka Association of America in 1988, the National Taiwan University Alumni Association of Southern California in 1974, the Taiwanese Association of America in 1975, the Monterey Park Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1977, the Taiwanese-American Chamber of Commerce of Greater Los Angeles in 1980, North America Taiwanese Professors’ Association in 1980, the Taiwanese American Foundation in 1982, the Formosan Association for Public Affairs in 1982, the Taiwanese American Citizens League (TACL) in 1985, and the Taiwanese United Fund in 1985, the Taiwan Center Foundation of Greater Los Angeles in 1998, just to name a few (Chen 2020, 199-279). Professional organizations are also visible, such as Taiwanese American Professionals, which began as a program of TACL in 1991, and North American Taiwanese Engineering and Science Association in 1991. While most of these ethnic organizations are open and inclusive, others, especially the dialect-based groups, tend to be more ethnically exclusive (Avenarius 2007). Most American cities with sizable concentrations of Taiwanese Americans have a Taiwanese Association or Taiwan Center. These ethnic organizations form the institutional basis of the Taiwanese American community, providing spaces for Taiwanese Americans to socialize and network for support. They maintain close ties not only with the Taiwanese government, such as TECO, but also with the U.S. government at local, state and federal levels in advocating for the rights and interests of Taiwanese in America and lobbying for international recognition of Taiwan.

Identity Formation as an Ethno-Political Process

The diasporic Taiwanese community, along with its various ethnic organizations, provides self-protection, mutual support, cultural preservation, and social networking for Taiwanese immigrants as they strive to integrate into the US society. It also serves as physical and symbolic bases for identity formation, promoting ethnic businesses and cultural practices, such as festivals, holiday celebrations, social events and gatherings, and street fairs, while enhancing the visibility of the place of origin—Taiwan as opposed to China—in public and bridging Taiwanese Americans to mainstream American society and to their homeland Taiwan. The development of the Taiwanese American identity is thus a dynamic process subject to political changes in the homeland and diaspora.
Democratization and Taiwanization in the Homeland

The diasporic Taiwanese community in the U.S., at the outset, has been deeply influenced by homeland politics in Taiwan. After the defeat in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the KMT-ruled RoC government retreated from mainland China as the Communists proclaimed the establishment of the PRC. Although the KMT declared Taipei the temporary capital of the RoC, the ROC and PRC each claimed to be the sole legitimate government of China in the diplomatic arena. Both sides maintained the “One-China” policy to avoid declaring Taiwan’s independence. In international sporting events, participants from Taiwan must don the “Chinese Taipei” flag and attire to represent Taiwan. China threatens invasion of Taiwan if Taiwan declare independence by revealing their arsenal of missiles pointed at Taiwan. Before the United Nations replaced the RoC with the PRC in 1971 and the US normalized diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1978, the Chinese American community was largely anti-Communist PRC and pro-nationalist RoC. However, because of differences in contemporary immigration dynamics, highly skilled Taiwanese immigrants have never been integrated into the existing Chinese American community but established their own community in which boundaries of ethnonational—Chinese American v. Taiwanese American—identities were blurred.

Under martial law in Taiwan, anti-KMT dissent, both in Taiwan and in the U.S., was severely suppressed. Speaking the local Hokkien dialect—also referred to as “Taiwanese” (taiyu)—or advocating Taiwan independence, was forbidden and heavily punished by the KMT (Meyer 2020). The KMT regime, backed by the US government, executed a widespread transnational system of surveillance and policing (Ng 1998). The KMT considered Taiwanese student groups overseas a threat to its authoritarian rule while the U.S. backed the KMT in the belief that anti-KMT ideologies and activities would foster anti-capitalist and pro-Communist sentiments. The KMT government sent student spies to the U.S. to observe and report anti-KMT activities on college campuses and collaborated with the FBI and CIA to assert ideological control and surveillance over diasporic Taiwanese organizations (Chen 2008; Cheng 2017; Ng 1998).

After the lifting of martial law in 1987, opposition groups came out of the shadows, ushering in the period of Democratization. Taiwanization, prompted by anti-KMT sentiments and rising nationalism, contributed to the development of a Taiwan-centric identity distinct from that associated with Chineseness and the communist PRC. A series of de-Sinification efforts gained traction. The government began to allow languages other than Mandarin to be spoken, including Hokkien, Hakka, and various indigenous languages, and school curriculum reform to raise the awareness of indigenous cultures (Mao 1997). Calls for Taiwan’s independence separate from China became louder and won greater public support, culminating in opposition parties challenging the decades-long authoritarian rule of the KMT. The first direct Taiwanese presidential election was held in March 1996. While the KMT held onto power, other parties ran formidable opposition campaigns with the DPP rising as the main challenger (Rigger 2001). Running on a platform of freedom, democracy, human rights, and Taiwan’s sovereignty, the DDP defeated the KMT in 2000 and again in 2016 and 2020 presidential elections (Avenarius 2007).
The shift in political power in Taiwan since the new millennium has galvanized wider and stronger public support for Taiwanization (Chang 2004; Kaeding 2009). Even *waishengren* were pressured to re-evaluate the meaning of being Chinese (Wu 1997). Survey data from the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University show that two-thirds (67%) of those surveyed identified themselves univocally as “Taiwanese” in 2020, up drastically from 18 percent in 1992, and that, in contrast, those self-identified as “both Taiwanese and Chinese” dropped to 28% in 2020 from 46% in 1992. The increasing trend toward identification with the Taiwanese national identity is arguably shaped by Taiwan’s external relations with mainland China and the world, and not by Taiwan’s internal ethno-cultural reconstruction (Zhong 2016). When most people in Taiwan say they are Taiwanese instead of Chinese, they are simply identifying themselves as nationals of Taiwan, acknowledging that Taiwan is a sovereign state separate from the PRC rather than rejecting Chinese culture (Zhong 2016).

**Identity Formation through Pan-Ethnic Political Participation**

Taiwanese immigrants, who arrived in the U.S. between the 1960s and 1980s and who were either born in mainland China or were born in Taiwan of *waishengren* parentage, used to self-identified themselves as Chinese under the One-China policy, but their Chinese identity was highly political with a strong anti-Communism or anti-China sentiment. Taiwan’s accelerated democratization process has a transformative effect on the development of the ethnonational identity in the U.S. (Lien and Harvie 2018; Wang 2013). On the domestic political front, the Taiwanese American identity is a flexible sub-ethnic identity, aligning well with the Chinese American community and other Asian American communities for civil rights, political participation and representation. For example, the growth in Asian population and the shrinking size and influence of whites in Monterey Park created opportunities for political participation among Taiwanese immigrants. In 1983, Lily Lee Chen, an immigrant from Taiwan, was inaugurated as the mayor of Monterey Park, the first ever Chinese American female mayor in the U.S. In the San Gabriel Valley, 38 Chinese Americans were elected to office between 1982 and 2012, 14 (37%) were immigrants from Taiwan (Chen 2020). The success in electoral politics among diasporic Taiwanese is built on a more pan-ethnic than ethnonational political agenda because of shared lived experiences in the U.S. (Lien and Havie 2018; Toyota 2009). At times, Taiwanese Americans are taking on the identities of “Chinese American” and “Asian American” in domestic politics, as in political movements against anti-Asian racism, hate crime, linguistic discrimination, and xenophobia, as well as in the celebration of multi-faceted Chinese American contributions to American Society and collective memory of Chinese American history (Chen 2020).

Taiwanese American political activism in the U.S. also centers on gaining visibility as an ethno-national rather than an ethno-cultural group in American society. In this sense, the formation of a Taiwanese American identity represents a conscious disidentification from the Chinese American community. For example, the 2010 and 2020 “write-in Taiwan” campaign, organized by second-generation Taiwanese Americans, is a case in point. The campaign was originated by TACL and joined by other Taiwanese American organizations to dis-identify with Chinese Americans by checking the “Other Asian” box and write in “Taiwanese” on their census
forms. The campaign sold merchandise that enhanced the visibility of Taiwanese America, such as t-shirts, mugs, and flags. One of the most popular items for sale was a T-shirt highlighting “TAIWANESE AMERICAN” in capital letters, as shown in Figure 2. This shirt allows Taiwanese Americans to show their cultural pride for Taiwan and the Taiwanese American community while raising awareness of the significance of the 2020 census write-in campaign.

**Figure 2: “Taiwanese American” T-Shirt**

![Image of T-shirt](https://www.taa-usa.org/tw2020)

Source: Taiwanese Association of America [https://www.taa-usa.org/tw2020](https://www.taa-usa.org/tw2020), accessed on December 31, 2020

Unlike first-generation Taiwanese immigrants who used to face constant surveillance from KMT officials under martial law, second-generation Taiwanese Americans were free of such surveillance and free of the fear that their anti-KMT sentiments could result in jail time or even being killed (Wang 2013). Thus, second-generation Taiwanese Americans tend to be more vocal in their political activism and they do so by creating a “borderless” virtual community in facilitating the process of constructing the Taiwanese American identity (Kang and Yang 2011). However, the development of a distinct Taiwanese American identity concerns not only the second-generation but also the diasporic Taiwanese community as a whole.

**Civic Transnationalism**

Civic transnationalism, which is defined as “the attempt to pursue a transnational political agenda through civic participation and affirmation of ethnic identity” (Wang 2013, 91). Democratization and Taiwanization in the homeland further inspire and invigorate political activism in the diaspora. The opening up of opportunities for participation in homeland politics
enable Taiwanese Americans, *waishengren* and *benschengren* alike, to become more proactively engaged through civic transnationalism. The Taiwanese American community can work more closely with their democratized homeland government to advance the interest of Taiwanese in transnational spaces, and Taiwanese immigrants and those holding dual citizenship can now return to Taiwan to vote in election years. For example, in April of 1999, Chen Shui-Bian, then Taiwanese presidential candidate and nominee for the DPP, visited Pasadena City College in Southern California. Over 2,000 Taiwanese Americans came out to support their eventual president (Chen 2008). This support of the Taiwanese presidential candidate by Taiwanese Americans represents a revived interest in transnational politics. The Taiwanese government also allows their compatriots to hold dual citizenship and make travel back and forth Taiwan more convenient. In the most recent presidential election in January 2020, an estimated 6,000 Taiwanese Americans travelled from Southern California to Taiwan to take part in the election. Most of those flying back to Taiwan to participate in the election voted for Tsai Ing-Wen, the DPP incumbent president. Taiwanese Americans came out to support Tsai Ing-Wen because many of first-generation immigrants, *waishengren* included, left Taiwan to escape political oppression and authoritarian rule of the old KMT regime. Taiwanese Americans also felt that flying to Taiwan to vote for Tsai was worth the price because of her strong stance against reunification with China and promotion of Taiwan as a free and sovereign state.

Civic transnationalism is facilitated through diasporic organizations. For example, the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) is a Washington DC-based non-profit organization established in 1982. Over the years, this grassroots organization has grown to a membership of more than 2,500 individuals of all ages and diverse socioeconomic and religious backgrounds and 44 chapters across the U.S. It functions as a key resource center for Taiwanese Americans while serving as “a leading voice for Taiwan,” providing US policymakers, the media, scholars and the general public with information on issues related to Taiwan. Some of the FAPA efforts include lobbying Congress to abolish the ROC blacklist and to allow Taiwan to join the United Nations and gain full membership in the World Health Organization and supporting the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Alliance and the selling of American military equipment to Taiwan (Lin 2006). It also focuses on outreach to young adults, offering a wide variety of resources for young Americans to develop their interest in politics, particularly foreign policy and local Taiwanese politics, as well as creating opportunities for the youths to network with other Taiwanese in Taiwan and diasporic Taiwanese around the globe. For example, the FAPA Emerging Leaders Workshop, held biennially, is organized for young Taiwanese Americans to learn about US-Taiwan-China geopolitics.

**Re-Affirming the Taiwanese American Identity**

The Taiwanese American identity is re-affirmed through diasporic development in several specific ways—cultural reinvention, outreach and networking, and indigenization—in transnational spaces. First, Taiwanese Americans reify an alternative cultural system through traditional rituals, foodways, symbols and signs to rearticulate and redefine what it means to be Taiwanese in America (Kwon 2004). For example, the annual celebrations of traditional Chinese
festivals, such as Lunar New Year, Lantern Festival, Dragon Boat Festival, and Mid-Autumn Festival, reveal stronger religious contents and ancient customs than those in China or Chinese America, some of which have disappeared in mainland China (Ng 1998). Foods (e.g., stinky tofu, xiaolongbao, and beef noodle soup), drinks (e.g., Boba tea and Alisan tea), Taiwanese monuments (e.g., Taipei 101), cultural symbols (e.g., Daxi spinning tops, Pingxi sky lanterns, Formosan blue magpie, and the OhBear mascot), and popular Taiwanese celebrities (e.g., Miss Taiwanese America beauty queens, baseball player Chien-Ming Wang, tennis champion Michael Chang, basketball player Jeremy Lin, and Chef Eddie Huang) are also highlighted during festival celebrations. For instance, some of these Taiwanese symbols, signs, monuments and celebrities were prominently featured in the award-winning float of China Airlines in the annual New Year Tournament of Roses Parade in Pasadena, Ca., in close proximity of the Taiwanese ethnoburb, to exalt ethnonational pride and promote Taiwanese visibility in the eyes of the American public.16

Second, Taiwanese Americans push for a distinct Taiwanese American identity through the creation of spaces for outreach and networking. The Taiwanese diasporic community and its various organizations, which we have just discussed, serve as important actual and virtual sites to outreach to younger generation Taiwanese in America and help them connect with one another and to the homeland through various programs. A survey of the websites of 18 large Taiwanese American organizations show that furthering the welfare and interests of Taiwanese American communities and offering resources for navigating identity and networking among people of Taiwanese origin in the US are clearly written in their mission statements.17 For example, the Taiwanese American Citizens League (TACL) focuses on developing leadership qualities and an ethnonational identity for Taiwanese youths, helping them understand Taiwanese culture and encourages them to take pride in Taiwanese American identity, through outreach programs and public events for Taiwanese Americans of all ages to attend. TACL also forms strong networks among Asian Americans and other minorities as a means of connect, inspire and empower for mutual respect and equality.18 The Taiwanese diasporic community also works closely with the Taiwan government in developing national pride for Taiwan and crafting a Taiwanese American identity. One prime example is the “Overseas Chinese Youth Language Training and Study Tour to the Republic of China,” or known colloquially as “Love Boat,” which began in 1967 with funding support from the KMT government and facilitated by Taiwanese American organizations. The summer program offers Mandarin and later Taiwanese language classes, cultural activities, and a bus tour of Taiwan to North American Taiwanese youth in ages from 14–26. It serves as a propaganda machine to instill nationalist pride in the homeland. Taiwanese Americans returning to the U.S. after the tour have gained an increased appreciation for Taiwan and a stronger sense of ethnonational identity (Wu 2005).

In addition, the ethnic print and virtual media play an important role in promoting the Taiwanese American identity. The World Journal19 is a major Chinese language newspaper originated in the U.S. and has grown globally, targeting Taiwanese in the diaspora to enable them easy access to local and global news. Since its founding in New York in 1976, the newspaper has increased in readership and spread its influence far and wide beyond the U.S., with many Taiwanese and Chinese immigrants using it as their daily news feed. It is an effective way to maintain transnational ties between Taiwan and the U.S. At the World Journal, the
majority of the staff and administration are Taiwanese Americans. For this reason, the World Journal is a helpful source of news for Taiwanese Americans and facilitates community building even as demand from mainland Chinese immigrants increases. While the World Journal has primarily a first-generation readership, online news sources, such as TaiwaneseAmerican.org and Taiwan99USA.org,\textsuperscript{20} are formed by young Taiwanese American volunteers who are passionate about being Taiwanese Americans, aiming at connect those who associate with the ethnonational identity, heritage and culture, and Taiwanese American life. With hundreds and thousands of second-generation followers, these online sites post daily updates on the Taiwanese American community, news on Taiwanese American public figures, events organized by Taiwanese Americans, and life stories of ordinary Taiwanese Americans in English.

Third, Taiwanese Americans re-affirm their Taiwanese American identity through the appropriation of Taiwanese aboriginal cultures and symbols. This is influenced by the indigenization process in Taiwan. As Taiwan becomes democratized, Taiwanese are breaking away from the Sino-centric cultural framework to assert the position of Taiwanese as subjects and construct their own sense of identity as Taiwanese rather than as Chinese. This conscious construction of a Taiwanese national identity was in part through the indigenization of history, local cultures, and language in nationalist education (Mao 1997), and in part through the politics of nation-building that stresses indigenous Taiwanese cultural and historical uniqueness, setting it in contrast with mainland China (Ku 2005). Since the 1990s, Taiwanese government has paraded indigenous groups in various formal settings, such as the Double Ten National Day celebrations, as a simulacrum of Taiwan’s multicultural inclusiveness in its nation-building project (Jennings 2008; Wang 2020). On August 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2016, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen offered a historic formal apology to Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, fulfilling one of her campaign promises to rectify centuries of abuse, including armed invasion, land seizure, and indigenous erasure, against indigenous peoples. Leaders from Taiwan’s sixteen recognized groups donned their traditional attire to recognize her apology.\textsuperscript{21}

Taiwanese Americans have followed suit in integrating Taiwanese indigenous cultures and symbols into the articulation of the Taiwanese American identity separate from Chinese Americans. Cosponsoring Taiwanese aboriginal groups to tour the U.S. to raise visibility is a prime example. The 2015 Taiwanese Aborigines Culture Tour, with the theme “Finding Us: The Real Face of Taiwanese Aborigines,” performed in nine US cities, including Austin, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, Orange County, San Diego, Las Vegas, San Francisco, San Jose, Portland, and Seattle. This tour coincided with Taiwanese American Heritage Week, celebrated annually beginning on Mother’s Day weekend in May. Prominent Taiwanese American organizations, such as local chapters of the Taiwanese Association and Taiwan Center Foundation, Taiwanese Heritage Society of Houston, and Formosan United Methodist Church of San Francisco Bay Area, coordinated and sponsored the performances (Wang 2020). The message of a distinct Taiwanese national identity, in contrast to the Chinese cultural identity, is clearly conveyed in the flyer shown in figure 3, such as “Our country is Taiwan,” “Our people are beautiful,” “Our cultures are colorful,” and “Our heritages are unique.” The diasporic Taiwanese American community proactively interact with the Taiwanese government, through TECO, in organizing public events that are open not only to Taiwanese Americans but also to
Chinese and Asian Americans and other Americans. An example of one such public event is the TECO-sponsored annual October 10th (Double-Ten) National Day celebrations. The Double-Ten festivities celebrate the end of thousands of years of dynastic rule in China and the establishment of the RoC. In these celebrations, Taiwanese Americans hang flags of the RoC and sing the Taiwanese national anthem to further a sense of Taiwanese nationalist pride outside of the homeland.

**Figure 3: 2015 Taiwanese Aborigines Culture Tour in USA Flyer**

Source: TaiwaneseAmerican.org.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

In this paper, we conceive of ethnic formation as an ethnopolitical process and argue that this ethnopolitical process involves constant negotiation and action in multiple spaces beyond nation-state boundaries. We show that the Taiwanese American community is shaped by the intersection of immigration dynamics, diasporic development, and homeland politics. The influx of highly skilled and socioeconomically resourceful Taiwanese immigrants has led to patterns of resettlement and diasporic development that differ significantly from those of the immigrants from mainland China. However, Taiwanese diasporic development is not simply a matter of disidentification from Chinese Americans. Rather, it is a conscious political effort in response to nation-building in the homeland and the demand for international recognition of Taiwan’s sovereign status. Rising nationalism in Taiwan impacted by the lifting of martial law in 1987 and democratization since then have invigorated the construction of an ethnonational—Taiwanese American—identity. This ethnonational identity is formed through diasporic development and civic transnationalism, and re-affirmed through conscious organizational efforts in cultural reinvention, outreach and networking, and promotion of Taiwan indigenous cultures and symbols.

Our analysis suggests that ethnic identity is fluid, mutable, and dynamic. Immigration dynamics, intersecting diasporic development and homeland politics, create diversified rather than homogenized patterns of ethnic formation. Taiwanese Americans, on the one hand, have
joined forces with other Chinese Americans and Asian Americans to fight for civil rights, racial equality, and political representation, which have brought ethnic group members to the norms and standards of the mainstream civil society and further strengthened ethnic political power base (Toyota 2009). On the other hand, they have proactively disidentified themselves with the ethnic Chinese community and Chineseness through the politics of dis-identification with its colonial past, symbolized by Chinese in Taiwan and mainland China (Lien and Harvie 2018; Wang 2013). Thus, becoming Chinese/Asian American and becoming Taiwanese American constitute two ethnopolitical processes that are not mutually exclusive and contradictory (Rigger 2001). The construction of the Taiwanese American identity is just as pragmatic as that of the Asian American identity. It empowers group members by fostering a sense of ethnonational consciousness for effective political mobilization in the call for recognition of Taiwan in the international arena.

We also note that the appropriation of Taiwanese aboriginal cultures and symbols to establish a distinct Taiwanese or Taiwanese American identity needs more scrutiny. Although Taiwan has been under the control of several imperial powers—European, Japanese, and Chinese, Taiwan itself is a settler colonial nation. The aboriginal population in Taiwan continues to fight for their land and status recognition within Taiwanese politics. Ninety-eight percent of Taiwanese are of Han Chinese ancestry, and most Taiwanese immigrants do not claim aboriginal heritage. Yet, Taiwanese and Taiwanese Americans use aboriginal rituals and symbols and parade them in celebrating a distinct Taiwanese and Taiwanese American culture. Such appropriation ignores the specificity of Taiwanese indigenous cultures, assuming that all indigenous groups are alike. This extends a superficial understanding of Taiwanese indigenous peoples without addressing settler colonialism in Taiwan and centuries of oppression and displacement experienced by Taiwanese indigenous groups.

Furthermore, in addition to the friction between Taiwanese Americans and Chinese Americans, we should also take note of the friction between Taiwanese and Taiwanese indigenous peoples. The lack of knowledge about Taiwanese indigenous peoples by Taiwanese Americans can perpetuate the violence and dispossession that indigenous groups have faced in their history and continued to suffer through. Since mainland China and much of the world does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, Taiwanese Americans’ political engagement in “Free Taiwan” independence movements is based on the affirmation of identity that paints China and Taiwan as two opposites—China as communist and authoritarian versus Taiwan as free and democratic. However, we have to consider who is being “freed” in the self-determination movements? There is still debate over who the “Taiwanese” people really are. Taiwan includes the indigenous peoples, who have lived on the island longer than anyone else, whether benshengren, Chinese settlers who came before the Chinese Civil War and after Dutch colonization, or waishengren, Chinese settlers who arrived after the Chinese Civil War. For the same reason, what the Taiwanese identity really means remains a complex ethnopolitical issue for further investigation.
References


Notes


4 This paper draws on Bing Wang’s MA thesis research (Wang 2020). Data on which the analysis is based are from the U.S. censuses, printed and online media reports, mission statements and activity reports of selected ethnic organizations in the U.S. posted on websites, and field observations of organizational activities and community events.


8 The total number of Taiwanese immigrants admitted to the U.S. from 1950 to 2019 is 498,038. The detailed numbers are: 721 in the 1950s, 15,657 in the 1960s, 83,155 in the 1970s, 119,051 in the 1980s, 132,647 in the 1990s, 92,657 in the 2000s, a substantial drop from the previous decade, and 54,150 in the 2010s, a further substantial drop from the previous decade, as figure 1 shows.

9 Hyper-selectivity refers to a phenomenon where the percentage of college-educated members of an immigrant group is higher than that of the general populations of both sending and receiving countries (Lee and Zhou 2015).


11 The KMT utilized bilateral intelligence networks in the United States to spy on anti-KMT activities and assassinate those threatening to the KMT regime. For example, in the 1970s, Taiwanese students in the U.S. led the Baodiao Movement to protest against Japanese militarism and US imperialism and protect Taiwanese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. The movement worried the KMT regime, because it called for the ousting of the regime if the KMT failed to defend its own territory. The KMT government sent envoys to the U.S. to quell the student movement (Wang 2013). In 1984, the KMT-regime allegedly hired two gang members to assassinate Henry Liu, known by his pen name Chiang Nan (江南), a Taiwanese journalist residing in California, who wrote a critical biography of Chiang Ching-Kuo, the president of Taiwan at the time.


20


