

Baltic Values and Corruption in Comparative Context

Rein Taagepera, University of California, Irvine

Abstract. The Balts may have been pulled mentally into the Soviet cauldron more deeply than they thought it possible, according to the World Values Surveys. These surveys find that opinions can be mapped in two dimensions: traditional/secular and survival/self-expression. Third-world countries are near the traditional-survival corner and Protestant Europe near the opposite secular-self-expression corner. The cases most deviant from this main diagonal are the United States in the traditional yet self-expressive direction and, in the opposite corner, all three Baltic states in the secular yet survival-oriented direction, rather close to the Orthodox societies. The present study also ties the Perceived Corruption Index scores to World Values locations. The conclusion is that in merely adopting Western institutions and other external forms the Balts have reached a stage of diminishing returns. If they wish to join northwestern Europe in a cultural sense, they would have to revise their hard but uncooperative work habits, their attitudes toward foreigners, and the relations between women and men.

Many Balts would like to believe that their countries are outposts of Western culture against the East. They would like to believe they are temporarily separated from the West and rapidly rejoining it. A major survey, World Values Survey of 1995-98, however, paints a different picture. There, the Baltic countries emerge as a group barely distinct from the Orthodox crowd. They are a world apart from their Scandinavian neighbors across the Baltic Sea. The more specific issue of corruption sets the Baltic states apart from each other. The Corruption Perception Index for 97 countries places Estonia 28th from the honest end, while Lithuania is 50th and Latvia 65th.

The objective of this study is to discuss the location of Baltic values and corruption in the world context. The broad conclusions are the following. No methodological flaws in the surveys involved seem to account for the Baltic results. The Balts seem to have been Sovietized mentally more deeply than they thought it possible. This situation must be faced squarely, if "return to the West" (Lauristin, Vihalemm *et al.*) is to continue. Adopting Western institutions and other external forms worked wonders during the 1990s, but it has now reached a stage of diminishing returns. If the Balts wish to join northwestern Europe in a cultural sense, they would have to revise, in particular, their habits of hard but uncooperative work, their attitudes toward foreigners, and the relations between women and men.

Not surprisingly, poor countries such as Pakistan, Nigeria and Bangladesh occupy the corner corresponding to strong traditional and survival values. Here people struggle for survival within a largely pre-industrial context. Not surprisingly either, wealthy countries such as Sweden, Norway and West Germany occupy the opposite corner, corresponding to strong secular-rational authority values and emphasis on self-expression. Here survival is taken for granted and conformist religious attitudes have shifted to Protestant individualism and then to indifference.

The diagonal path from Bangladesh through Italy to Sweden corresponds roughly to increasing GNP per capita. This seems to be the main axis of technological development. World Value Survey results suggest that, by and far, belief in god and country tends to go with intolerance and feeling insecure and unhappy, while secularism tends to go with tolerance and happiness.

Yet, the corners far away from this main axis are not quite empty. In one offside corner, the USA (along with Ireland) combines belief in god with tolerance and feeling secure and rather happy. The opposite combination, giving up on god while still feeling insecure, unhappy and intolerant, is the realm of formerly and presently communist-ruled countries. And the country deepest ensconced in that offside corner is Estonia, closely followed by Lithuania and Latvia.

What does such location mean? Are the Baltic countries truly the attitudinal antipodes to the USA? Or could there be a flaw in the methodology? Survey questions are notoriously hard to translate into different languages without introducing different connotations, but one can guard against it by back-translation into the original language. Moreover, it is unlikely that the same mistranslations would happen in all three languages of the Baltic area -- and only in those. Thus the chances of a massive methodological flaw are minimal. One has to face the possibility that the Baltic countries may be far away from the Nordic countries in their values, and rather close to Russia and China.

The only formerly communist-ruled area that appears to have evolved in step with the values of western Protestant Europe is East Germany. The Czech Republic occupies the location in Figure 1 where one might have expected Latvia and Estonia to be -- one leg in Protestant Europe and the other in the Orthodox marches. One probably has to take into account deeper layers -- Jan Hus in the Czech case, and the long tsarist Russian rule in the Baltic. Along with the Baltic countries, Hungary also is a surprising case, surrounded as it is in Figure 1 by Orthodox countries, while Slovenia and even Croatia pull more in the direction of western Catholic Europe.

The survey includes the Soviet-period settlers in the Baltic countries, essentially Russians. To what extent could they pull the Baltic values in the

direction of Russian values? Could the ethnic Balts be much closer to an attitudinal "return to the West"? In Lithuania the settlers' share is small. Assume for the argument's sake that the Russians in Latvia and Estonia have the same values as those in Russia. Given their percentage in the population, where would the ethnic Latvians and Estonians have to be located so as to yield the observed combined location?

It turns out that the ethnic Estonians would still be more "Orthodox" than Latvia as a whole. Only the ethnic Latvians might, indeed, be located close to the Czech Republic. But of course, the distinction between the Baltic Russians and ethnic Balts is not that clear-cut. There is appreciable evidence (Rose; Rose and Maley; Mikkel) that Baltic Russians have picked up so many Baltic manners that upon visiting Russia they are often felt to be foreigners.

Is the location of the Baltic populations on the values mapping a temporary effect of Soviet occupation or something more permanent? The Baltic countries were first included in the World Values Survey during its second wave, in 1990. In a conversation with Inglehart in the mid-1990s he politely conceded that the effect of Soviet occupation might already have worn off. Yet his own worldwide age cohort analysis intimated that people essentially maintain the values they adopted around age 20. Therefore, a country's overall pattern would change only slowly as older age cohorts die and new ones emerge under different conditions that motivate them to adopt different values. Indeed, as the third round of World Value Survey was carried out in 1995-1998, the location of the Baltic states in their odd corner of the graph hardly changed.

The conclusion is that the locations in Figure 1 may well reflect accurately the values of ethnic Balts -- and these locations are likely to shift markedly only over several generations. An attitudinal revision still remains a possibility, even among people over 30, if awareness spreads among the Balts that they have been affected mentally by the Soviet rule more deeply than they thought it possible. There is appreciable smug belief in the Baltic area that one already has a Nordic outlook, except for being free of such decadent western features as silly optimism and trust, caring about environment and considering women equal to men. Squarely facing up to the discrepancy might speed up a process of mental "return to the West", Protestant or Catholic. Meanwhile, one might take consolation in the fact that, for the first time to my best knowledge, some outsider has delineated the Baltic as a separate cultural area, as distinct as the Orthodox, Confucian and African areas.

Of course, one should not take Inglehart's findings as absolute and complete, but they point out the importance of values, an issue rather neglected in Baltic studies, with the marked exception of King and

Barnowe. Value aspects of various practices should be kept in mind. Among these, I'll discuss only corruption. Here the Baltic states present a rather disparate picture.

Baltic Corruption in the World Context

While corruption in Eastern Europe in general has received fair attention (see e.g., Miller, Grodeland, and Koshechkina), only Karklins and Zepa seem to have recently discussed it regarding the Baltic states. Understandably, much of the discussion worldwide has been on specific countries, but such isolated approaches risk blurring the distinctions. By Finnish standards, even minor corruption in Helsinki may sound more intolerable than what is routine in Nigeria. Where do the Baltic states stand in the world context?

Fortunately, a "Corruption Perceptions Index" has been recently devised by Transparency International. It is a "poll of polls" compiling assessments by resident and non-resident business people, general public and country experts. I have reversed these scores, so that the least corrupt countries have the highest scores. As suggested by Welzel, Inglehart and Klingeman, it will be called the elite integrity score (EI). Table 1 shows these elite integrity scores for selected countries. On a 0 to 10 scale Denmark comes out the least corrupt (9.4) and Bangladesh the most (1.0). Surprisingly, the three Baltic countries appear quite different from each other. Estonia (5.7) is placed between Costa Rica and Spain. Lithuania (3.8) is flanked by Jamaica and El Salvador, while Latvia (3.0) has as closest neighbors Bulgaria, Nicaragua and Russia.

Table 1. Elite integrity scores for selected countries

Rank	Country	EI	Rank	Country	EI	Rank	Country	EI
1	Denmark	9.35	15	Germany	8.12	50	Lithuania	3.80
2	Iceland	9.25	16	USA	7.75	51	El Salvador	3.75
3	New Zealand	9.25	20	Japan	6.73	56	China	3.46
4	Finland	9.15	25	Slovenia	6.00	64	Bulgaria	3.10
5	Sweden	8.99	27	Costa Rica	5.72	65	Latvia	3.05
6	Canada	8.96	28	Estonia	5.70	66	Nicaragua	3.05
7	Singapore	8.93	29	Spain	5.59	67	Russia	3.01
8	Netherlands	8.84	32	Czech Rep.	5.05	74	Ukraine	2.70
9	Norway	8.77	39	Slovakia	4.48	96	Nigeria	1.26
10	Switzerland	8.76	45	S. Korea	4.15	97	Bangladesh	1.02
			49	Jamaica	3.80			

Source: Condensed from Sandholtz and Gray, based on Transparency International. The scale runs from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). I have included only the top ten and the bottom two countries, plus USA, the countries appearing in Figure 2, and the countries flanking the Baltic states in the list.

Is the degree of corruption connected with people's values? The elite integrity scores do show some concordance with Inglehart's both dimensions.¹ In previous Figure 1, I have indicated the EI scores for the extreme cases, in the four corners. It can be seen that the EI scores improve only moderately as secularism replaces traditional attitudes. In contrast, the change is steep when self-expression displaces survival concerns.

On the traditional/secular axis the Baltic states are about as high as one can be. Their relatively high corruption is connected mainly with their location on the survival/self-expression axis. Figure 2 compares the Baltic states with other countries that are also quite high in secular values, namely those with World Values traditional/secular scores above 0.5. For these highly secular countries, graphing the elite integrity scores (EI) vs. self-expression scores (S) yields a fairly linear pattern. The simple equation $EI=2S+6$ approximates the best fit in Figure 2. Keep in mind that this relationship applies only to countries where the traditional/secular score is high.




Figure 2. Elite integrity (EI) vs. survival/self-expression (S), for countries with traditional/secular-rational score higher than 0.5. EI data from table 1; S is scaled off from Figure 1.




Figure 3. Typology of corruption (World Bank, xviii), with addition of a) delineation of cultural-religious areas; and b) elite integrity scores and equal-EI contours.

Lithuania and Latvia fit the general pattern quite well, adding confidence that both indices (EI and S) have some validity. Estonia, on the other hand, is the most extreme outlier in Figure 2, suggesting that either its degree of self-expression is underestimated or its perceived elite integrity is overestimated. Of course, Estonia's lack of corruption is relative. As *The Economist* put it: "Compared with their Nordic peers (as

they like to call them), Estonians still fall short in terms of honesty, efficiency, politeness, trust, flexibility and openness, though they are stellar when set beside the Russians.”²

Some detail on the nature of corruption is added by a World Bank report which distinguishes two separate aspects of corruption: “state capture” by private business interests, and “administrative corruption”. Broadly, state capture refers to corruption in *making* laws and regulations, while administrative corruption enters in *executing* them -- essentially bribe taking by officials.³

Figure 3 graphs these two aspects for various formerly communist-ruled countries. The World Bank report stresses that even a low value of those indices still means a medium level of corruption rather than a low one. Unfortunately, it does not supply any Western data so as to offer a point of reference for what is achievable.

In previous Figure 1 Inglehart delineates cultural areas that most often follow religious lines. In the top part of Figure 3, I have superimposed these cultural areas to the World Bank graph. Apart from Kazakhstan, a compact pattern emerges, with Catholic/Protestant countries the least corrupt and the Muslim countries the most corrupt. It may of course be argued that the World Bank and Transparency International norms for what constitutes corruption are not universal, based as they are on the so-called Protestant work ethic, now heavily embraced by Catholic Europe as well. In other world cultures different criteria of ethical behavior may prevail. This may well be so. But then the people involved might have to accept poverty as inherent part of their culture. Respect for Protestant criteria of elite integrity promotes trust and synergy, which in turn tends to lead to greater material wealth and well being.

Latvia is seen in Figure 3 to be quite high in state capture but one of the lowest in Eastern Europe in bribe taking. Lithuania is higher on bribes but lower in state capture. Estonia is relatively low on both accounts, along with Slovenia, Hungary and Poland. Could it be that the EI scores discussed earlier emphasize the state capture aspect, where Latvia is on a par with Russia? This would explain Latvia’s unfavorable EI score, compared to Lithuania. The latter is on a par with Russia on administrative corruption but relatively low in state capture.

Superimposing the elite integrity scores on the previous graph and drawing in the equal integrity contours, as done in the bottom part of Figure 3, paints a more varied relationship. Still, the fact that such equal integrity contours can be drawn without excessive contortions indicates some basic agreement between the EI and the World Bank approaches.

The separation curve between the Catholic/Protestant and the Orthodox countries is close to the EI=3.7 contour, while the separation curve

between the Orthodox and the Muslim countries is reminiscent of the EI=2.7 contour. It is risky to make long-term predictions on the basis of one snapshot in time. Practices may change, but presently the degree of corruption in Eastern Europe does follow cultural-religious lines to a fair extent. The EI scores for Muslim countries in Figure 3 range from 1.7 to 2.3 (mean: 2.1). For Orthodox countries the range is 2.3 to 3.2 (mean: 2.8), and for Catholic/Protestant countries 3.0 to 6.0 (mean: 4.5).

This statement could be qualified by another look at Figure 3. On the state capture dimension, the Catholic/Protestant-Orthodox-Muslim differences are less marked. It's on the administrative corruption dimension that disparity becomes more salient. As far as limited administrative corruption goes, Latvia appears typically Catholic/Protestant, but it differs by its high state capture index. What causes it? The question is of such interest that World Bank (70) devotes a special box insert to Latvia, arguing the following.

Latvia's position on east-west trade and energy transit routes exposes it to strong corruption pressures. Its economy is highly concentrated, and political parties are unusually closely aligned with economic interests. Although the Parliament adopted a conflict of interest law in 1995, this law languished until 1997, when the Prime Minister convened the first anticorruption workshop. While crediting various Ministers of State Revenue, Finance and Justice with a bevy of surveys, discussions and programs, World Bank (70) stresses the need to clean up political party financing and implement the conflict of interest law "in a more convincing way", if the strategy "is to become fully credible and sustainable". Translated from bureaucratese into plain language, World Bank report deems Latvia's anti-corruption campaign unsatisfactory.

A table in World Bank report (13) specifies different forms of state capture. It lists the percent share of firms feeling that their activities are hemmed in by lack of openness and competition. Table 2 reproduces only the Baltic scores and the average score for 20 countries (those appearing in Figures 3 and 4).

Table 2. Components of the State Capture Index

Country	Estonia	Lithuania	All 20	Latvia
Parliamentary Legislation	14	15	24	40
Presidential Decrees	7	7	21	49
Central Bank	8	9	25	8
Criminal Courts	8	11	18	21
Commercial Courts	8	14	20	26
Political Party Finances	17	13	20	35
State Capture Index	10	11	21	30

Source: World Bank (2000).

Lithuania's and Estonia's scores are quite similar and markedly below the 20-country average, except for Estonia's party finances, which are the country's weakest point. In Latvia the Central Bank looks as resistant to capture as its Lithuanian and Estonian counterparts, and the courts are close to the 20-country average. What supposedly bogs down Latvia are party finances, parliamentary legislation and, most severely, presidential decrees. In the latter aspect, Latvia's capture (49%) is supposedly the highest of all 20 countries, with Azerbaijan (48%), Ukraine (37%) and Russia (32%) coming next. But here we run into some mystery, because Latvia's president has no decree power! He/she only countersigns ministerial decrees (as well as parliamentary legislation). Thus the meaning of the "decree" category in World Bank report remains hazy.

What Bogs the Balts Down: Interpretive Musings

In this section I try to connect quality of life in Estonia to the various components of the survival values that join the Balts to Russians and Pakistanis and separate them from the Nordic countries. I am here on soft ground, going beyond empirical findings and mixing in my impressionistic views. The reader may well form a different opinion.⁴

In their attitudes on the two axes of traditional/secular authority and survival/self-expression, the Baltic countries emerge distinct from the Orthodox crowd, but barely so. They are much further away from their Scandinavian neighbors across the Baltic Sea, but in a selective way. The difference with Scandinavia is practically non-existent on the traditional/secular dimension, but this is so because there is little difference in this dimension between Protestant rationality and the communist-induced secularism in the traditionally Orthodox countries.

It's on the other dimension, survival/self-expression, that the Baltic states are almost poles apart from Scandinavia and Finland. They are hardly less survival-bent than Russia or Ukraine. In this sense, they have more in common with Romania or Bangladesh than Sweden, Germany or France. If the Baltic inhabitants feel happy with it, then so be it. But if they feel that they have been pulled away from the West ever since the Russian conquest in the 1700s, then the questions that load heavily on the survival/self-expression dimension supply a handy set for national and personal re-evaluation. These questions have such varied foci that one might not expect them to bunch together -- but empirically, they do. Tentatively, I have distinguished six separate foci, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Items that enter a survival-oriented outlook, with loadings on survival/self-expression dimension

<i>Unhappiness</i>	<i>Exclusiveness</i>
.83 Not very satisfied with life	.86 Men make better leaders
.81 Not very happy	.81 University more important for boys
.79 Dissatisfied with one's finances	.80 Reject foreigners, homosexuals as neighbors
.76 Not in very good health	.78 Reject drunkards as neighbors
	.78 A woman must have children
<i>Stern life of work and isolation</i>	.76 Homosexuality never justified
.85 Security over self-expression	.62 Scarce jobs should go to men
.73 Teach children to work hard	.61 Prostitution never justified
.71 Income, not sense of achievement	.54 No foreign aid to poorer countries
.67 Material possessions important	
.62 Friends not important	<i>Technology over environment</i>
.59 Leisure not important	.78 Has not recycled garbage
	.75 Favors development of technology
<i>Respect for authority</i>	.74 No support for environmental protection
.77 Would not sign petitions	.65 Scientific discoveries will help
.65 Absolute respect for one's parents	
.59 Democracy not always the best	<i>State socialism</i>
.56 Favor strong leader, no parliament	.74 State ownership of business may be good
.55 No participation in boycotts	.65 Government should provide more

The first group (labeled "Unhappiness") reflects unhappiness with one's own life, quite widespread in all formerly communist-ruled countries where the transition to market economy has added new woes before abolishing the old. Here it is not a question of mental attitudes but of objective reality. The sharp transformation pains probably pull these countries even further toward survival values than is the case under conditions of steady misery in Bangladesh and Nigeria. But alone, these relatively few items could not account for the low total scores on self-expression. The nexus is that misery breeds indifference, resentment and hate toward fellow-humans. These, in turn, prolong misery.

The desire to exclude some groups from acceptability or equality appears in the large group labeled "Exclusiveness" in Table 3. The loadings on opinions that put down women are so high that this can be the case only if many women themselves share the view that women come in second. My casual observations in Estonia confirm it. This exclusiveness may well contribute to social stress and misallocation of human capital, thus adding to feelings of unhappiness.

Instead of hoping for improvements in life through social synergy based on mutual trust, the survival package places hopes on individual struggle, reflected in the group labeled "Stern life of work and isolation". Teach the children early on the value of hard work for its own sake, not for the joy of accomplishing something. It's the income and income security that matter. Friends are less important than material goods. This set of

norms is a parody of the Protestant work ethic, deprived as it is of any further motive, be it god in older times or solidarity with fellow humans in modern Nordic countries. Ironically, it fails in its objective -- material improvement. Joyless work, often taking bitter pleasure in blocking other people, is unproductive, adding to unhappiness. And I recognize this overworked, embittered, and tired type in Estonia.

The groups labeled "Technology over environment" and "Respect for authority" link up with stern work in two logical directions. Hope for technological-scientific solutions rather than cooperation with fellow humans naturally ties in to the belief in hard but individual work. And respect for authority once more places hopes in some outside force rather than teamwork with fellow humans with whom one interacts. From unconditional respect and formal love for one's parents (who, after all, inculcated this outlook of stern work in you!), the slide toward preferring a strong leader over democracy makes sense.

The small group labeled "State socialism" might enter more heavily in ex-communist countries than in South Asia or Africa. It hints at a desire for return to full state ownership of the means of production, with the concomitant extensive, though low-quality social welfare.

Have I parodied the values that enter the survival-oriented package? The contrasting self-expression values could be presented in equally dire colors, predicting the collapse of the self-indulgent Nordic countries through loss of family structure and willingness to work hard. These are serious concerns. The Scandinavians may well have gone overboard, enjoying the fruits of the labors of past generations whose values were different and bequeathing to their own descendants hidden time bombs. However, traditional family structure tends to load not on the survival/self-expression but on the traditional/secular dimension, in which the post-communist societies are on a par with Protestant Europe. The specific problems of the formerly communist-ruled societies, the Baltic included, lie in an overemphasis on survival values.

Conclusion

This study has tried to map the present situation of Baltic societies regarding values and corruption. How permanent is this mapping? Hardware, such as computers, is easier to change than attitudes, habits and values. From 1990 to 1995-98, World Values Surveys indicate little change in the Baltic area, but the time span is too short for extrapolating into the future. For corruption, we lack any baseline data for the early 1990s. Should the Balts consciously try revise their values toward those of northwestern Europe? It's up to them. If they should wish to do so, they

might fruitfully start by rethinking their ingrained attitudes toward foreigners, hard but uncooperative work habits, and the relations between women and men.

Appendix: Inglehart's World Values Survey

World Values Survey is an ongoing inquiry the results of which have been presented in numerous articles and books, most prominently in Inglehart, 1990 and 1997. There is some general tension between culturalist and institutionalist approaches to politics and society (see e.g., Amorim Neto and Cox). Often it overlaps with the tension between philosophizing and measuring, given that culture is harder to measure and some people think culture is non-measurable by definition. World Values Surveys with its quantitative analysis infringes on the taboo against measuring culture and hence is controversial.

It should be stressed that Inglehart's two dimensions are not based on preconceived philosophical notions but emerge rather mechanically from systematic analysis of people's responses to a large number of questions on personal values. The method is called factor analysis, and it may result in the various responses bunching together along one, two, three or more axes. It just so happens that for the questions in World Values Survey two major factors emerge. One axis ranges from "traditional" to "secular-rational authority" attitudes and essentially contrasts traditional religious values and secularism. The other axis ranges from "survival" to "self-expression" as major goals.

Some questions "load" heavily on only one of these factors, meaning they correlate strongly with the core of the factor. Thus "God is very important in respondent's life" loads with 0.91 (out of a possible 1.00) on the traditional values, and "Men make better political leaders than women" loads with 0.86 on the survival values. Some other questions may load moderately on both dimensions. "One must always love and respect one's parents regardless of their behavior" loads with 0.50 on traditional values and 0.64 on survival values (Inglehart 2000). Some other questions (including the one on corruption -- see Note 1) may be isolates, loading little on either main dimension.

Traditional values load most heavily on the following five items:

- God is very important in respondent's life (0.91);
- Religion is very important in respondent's life (0.91);
- It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination (0.88);
- Respondent believes in Heaven (0.87);

- One of the respondent's main goals in life is to make his/her parents proud (0.83).

Secular-rational values take the opposite position (Inglehart 2000). The bundle of traditional values also includes, with loadings of over 0.50, national pride, respect for authority; and opposition to abortion, foreign goods, suicide, euthanasia, divorce, and international environmental agreements.

Survival values load most heavily on the following five items:

- Men make better political leaders than women (0.86);
- Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over self-expression and quality of life (0.85);
- Respondent is not highly satisfied with life as a whole (0.83);
- A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl (0.81);
- Respondent rejects foreigners, homosexuals and people with AIDS as neighbors (0.80).

Self-expression values take the opposite position (Inglehart 2000). The bundle of survival values is further dissected in Table 3.

One of the more general surprises of the values mapping is that clusters corresponding to conventional cultural-religious regions can be located, as Inglehart does in the graph reproduced as my Figure 1: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Confucian, plus an implicit Muslim area ranging from Azerbaijan to Bangladesh and Pakistan. What this suggests is that common religion facilitates interaction of cultural habits and values that may have nothing to do with religious dogmas. Hence comparatively homogenous cultural-behavioral regions are formed that can survive even the abolition of the traditional religion, as attempted by communists across Christian, Muslim and Confucian lands. These clusters by no means imply immutability of values. World Values Surveys themselves document generational shifts. But the ability to delineate such clusters suggests that countries in the same broad cultural areas do tend to move in step.

When the analysis leads to delineation of cultural areas largely based on traditional religions, it becomes controversial in still different social science circles, those where it is an article of faith that faith does not matter -- or shouldn't, and therefore must not be brought in as an explanatory variable. Doing otherwise is interpreted as contributing to inflaming religious hatreds. I disagree, believing that hatreds thrive on ignorance and are weakened by knowledge. And sometimes it is downright pathetic when shallow causes like duration of communist rule are brought in to explain poorly what traditional religion explains much better. So I recommit the

sin, by superimposing religious contours to the corruption graph in Figure 3.

Like any systematic method, factor analysis has its problems and pitfalls. The choice of questions included and excluded affects the outcome. If linear relationships are assumed, curvilinear ones may be missed. And so on. Until better methods are devised, one is left with a choice between something or nothing: cautious inclusion of Inglehart's results or pontificating solely on the basis of preconceived notions and selected facts.

Notes

1. The World Values Survey itself asked only one question on corruption, and the responses did not load prominently on either axis. Question V213 in 1995-1998 read: "How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in your country? -- 1. Almost no public officials are engaged in it. 2. A few public officials are engaged in it. 3. Most public officials are engaged in it. 4. Almost all public officials are engaged in it. 5. Don't know." (Ronald Inglehart, e-mail, 20 December 2000).
2. "Happy Birthday, Estonia", *The Economist*, 24 February 2001. Estonia's independence dates to 24 February 1918.
3. The World Bank report words it as follows. "*State capture* refers to the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials" (World Bank, xv). It differs from legitimate political influence and lobbying by making use of nontransparent and highly preferential channels of access, reducing competition and blurring the boundaries between the political and business interests of state officials (World Bank, 3). On the other hand, "*administrative corruption* refers to the intentional imposition of distortions in the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules, and regulations to provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private-gains to public officials" (World Bank, xvii).
4. I have lately discussed Estonian attitudes, habits and values regarding human interaction in a book, *Võta võim!* [Empower Yourself!]. Moreover, after a hiatus of seven years, I have become active in Estonian party politics, being elected in December 2001 temporary chair of a new political party in Estonia, Rally for the Republic - Res Publica. The decision to get involved in politics was based on two factors: 1) the impressionistic observation that Estonia's social atmosphere worsened markedly in 2001, with widespread hopelessness about the transitional belt-tightening period ever ending; and 2) sociological analysis such as Inglehart's pinning down the deep underlying causes and thus offering a potential way out.
5. When faced with a female political opponent, Estonian males are want to avoid discussing matters at their face value, preferring to blame the opponent's menstrual cycles or unsatisfactory sex life. A characteristic incident was reported in *Postimees*, 17 March 2001. One of the vice-mayors of Tallinn was overheard saying that a female reporter, who had asked awkward questions about city management, "is in need of a vibrator". Note that the incident was considered newsworthy, which it probably would not have been five years earlier. This in itself marks a shift. But the vice-mayor was allowed to continue in office after this incident, until removed for other reasons. When the incident became public, he actually rubbed in the gender disparity by sending the

offended reporter roses, something he hardly would do regarding a male person. I have not noted Estonian politicians ascribing sexual dissatisfaction to male opponents.

Works Cited

- Amorim Neto, Octavio, and Gary W. Cox. "Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997): 149-174.
- Inglehart, Ronald. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- . *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- . "Political culture and democratic institutions: Russia in global perspective." Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 31-September 3, 2000.
- Karklins, Rasma, and Brigita Zepa. "Political participation in Latvia, 1987-2001." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 32.4 (Winter 2001): 334-346.
- King, Gundar J., and J. Thad Barnowe. "The new managerial generation in Latvia: The nature and role of values." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 31.2 (Summer 2000): 148-171.
- Lauristin, Marju, Peeter Vihalemm *et al.*, eds. *Return to the Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition*. Tartu: Tartu University Press, 1997.
- Mikkel, Evald. "The opinion proximity of Russians and Estonians in Estonia during the early 1990's." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 30.2 (Summer 1999): 162-179.
- Miller, William L., Ase B. Grodoland, and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina. "Are the people victims or accomplices? The use of presents and bribes to influence officials in Eastern Europe." Budapest: Open Society Institute, Discussion Paper No. 6, 1998.
- Postimees*, 17 March 2001.
- Rose, Richard. *New Baltic Barometer II -- A Survey Study*. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1995; also Baltic Data House, "Towards Civic Society" (survey undertaken in November-December 1998).
- , and William Maley. "Nationalities in the Baltic States: A Survey Study." *Studies in Public Policy* 222. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1994, 56-57.
- Sandholtz, Wayne, and Mark Gray. "International norms and national corruption." Manuscript, University of California, Irvine, USA, October 2000.
- Taagepera, Rein. *Võta võim!* [Empower Yourself, or literally, Seize Power], Tallinn: Kirjastus, 2001.
- The Economist*. "Happy Birthday, Estonia", 24 February 2001.
- The World Bank. *Anticorruption in transition: A contribution to the policy debate*. Washington, DC, 2000.
- Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. "The theory of human development: A cross-cultural analysis." Research Monograph CSD 02-01, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, USA, February 2002.