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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO

Mediating the Message: Book Culture and Propaganda in Mao's China, 1974-1977

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Matthew Wills

Committee in Charge:

Professor Karl Gerth, Co-Chair Professor Paul Pickowicz, Co-Chair Professor Todd Henry Professor Sarah Schneewind Professor Shen Kuiyi

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University of California San Diego

2021

DEDICATION

Dedicated to Athina Garcia.

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Modern Chinese History Pre-modern Chinese History East Asian History Bibliography and Book History Visual and Material Culture

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Mediating the Message: Book Culture and Propaganda in Mao's China, 1974-1977

by

Matthew Wills

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California San Diego, 2021

Professor Karl Gerth, Co-Chair Professor Paul Pickowicz, Co-Chair

This dissertation answers the question: How do material and human constraints shape political communication? Historians of China and other societies have studied the discourses of political propaganda, their efficacy, and how people subvert them. Much less is known, however, about the material basis of political communication and the material limits of state autonomy. Within the scope of communications employed by modern states, books and other print publications offer fertile ground for analyzing these processes. In this, the first full-length study of book publishing in the People's Republic of China, I combine archival research, book history and bibliography to understand how the Chinese Communist Party communicated with ordinary people during the 1970s.

Through discussion of book production during a 1970s political campaign, I demonstrate how material factors both bolstered and limited the state's communicative power and, by extension, influenced the course of political movements in China. By harnessing technologies of industrial production and cheap paperback publishing, state publishers and printers could saturate society with printed material. A sophisticated network of bookstores, distribution points and libraries brought books to the masses and extended the Party's influence, while the expertise of book designers and editors in manipulating technological capabilities welded established genres onto revolutionary political programs. Yet, at the same time, propaganda activities ran up against quotidian practical limitations. Paper shortages, fluctuating book supplies, conflicting workloads and political instability numbered among the many factors that mediated the reach of the state. Furthermore, material considerations overlapped with geographic, ethnic and class differences across the country to ensure that propaganda publications retained the book's historical value as an index of status. Finally, regime change after the death of the Party's paramount leader revealed the risks associated with tying publishing, printing and politics so closely together.

Overall, I paint an in-depth picture of a powerful Cold War state committing huge quantities of resources – technological, manual, mental and physical – to political communication and yet finding that these investments were sometimes still insufficient or paradoxically counter-productive. On one level, this conclusion has the potential to transform the way historians think about state power by refuting latent assumptions about the state's unbridled ability to produce large amounts of propaganda material. More fundamentally, it reminds us that

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technology and material resources occupy a central place in the political economy of information distribution.

While transforming the way historians think about propaganda and information, I also demonstrate the contributions methodologies from book history and bibliography can make to such studies. This dissertation deploys a range of material techniques – such as typeface and paper analysis, comparison of multiple copies of the same book, and reconstruction of a book's printing process from evidence left in copies – to provide quotidian information unrecorded in standard publisher and printer archives. For instance, I identify when books printed in different parts of the country used the same parent set of printing plates, thereby finding new evidence for publishers coordinating with each other to accelerate propaganda production.

Where Chinese studies and propaganda studies can learn from the (mostly Euro-centric) fields of book history and bibliography, so the reverse is also true. My study challenges the European and American biases of modern book history. Quantitatively, the scope of China's publishing sector eclipsed most other countries, yet book historians are far more familiar with the likes of Penguin Books than with Beijing People's Press. Therefore, this dissertation is an early call to recast the history of the book in the twentieth century as dominated by the ever closer union of politics and print.

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INTRODUCTION

Mediating the Message: Book Culture and Propaganda in Mao's China, 1974-1977

In the 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) governing power rested on a national apparatus of information production, dissemination, and consumption. In everyday life, the state required people to read or listen to others reading aloud as ways of consuming and practicing the Party's revolutionary political program.¹ Within this network of social control, newspapers, periodicals and books acted as the vehicles for circulating information but, while magazines and especially newspapers afforded the readiest access to ideas, books offered a more durable, expansive format to transfer political propaganda into homes, workplaces, and institutions. The technology of the book, therefore, served as a key part of the CCP's state control toolkit in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The Party's information-based, bibliographic approach to governance presupposed and relied on the successful production and dissemination of large amounts of this reading material. It should scarcely surprise us, therefore, that soon after it came to power in 1949 the CCP swallowed pre-existing publishers and printers into a new giant state-owned publishing system. As with many industries, the transition to full state control happened haphazardly, with a lack of unity and centralization causing some persistent problems during the 1950s.² Two decades on, however, the Party had significantly consolidated its control of the publishing industry. By the early 1970s, China had no private publishers or bookstores, major printing facilities fell under the control of provincial and central bureaucracies, and the trials of the early years of the Great

¹ A point appreciated by Jennifer Altehenger in her *Legal Lessons: Popularizing Laws in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1989* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2018).

² Ibid., 77 and 275n4. For the gradual transition of two publishers to state control, see Robert Culp, *The Power of Print: Intellectuals and Industrial Publishing from the End of Empire to Maoist State Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), chapter 6.

Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) had injected fresh political struggles into the dayto-day mechanics of book production and circulation. To cite just one example, between 1968 and 1973, a national campaign to "Cleanse the Class Ranks" (清理阶级队伍) resulted in nine members of Shanghai's state-owned bookstore system dying or being permanently injured, with a further 393 beaten and 384 subject to investigation.³ To support its goals, the Party could call on a group of central presses specializing in particular content genres such as art, literature and education, while every province, autonomous region, and major municipality had its own "people's press" (人民出版社) to produce large quantities of propaganda to further the CCP's latest political campaigns and ideological goals. Books, comics, pamphlets, wallcharts, and posters circulated concepts, messages, language and information to a range of overlapping audiences: urban and rural dwellers, Mandarin and non-Mandarin speakers, and officials and civilians. Print served the state.

In terms of its productivity and the audience it served, China's publishing industry in early 1974 was one of the largest in the world and expanding fast. After the sector contracted in the late 1960s to focusing on printing the writings and speeches of CCP Chairman Mao Zedong, in 1970 a new dedicated government department assumed control over book production and the industry began to grow again with the encouragement of the state Premier, Zhou Enlai.⁴ After

³ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Shanghai juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华 书店发展大系·上海卷: 1949-2017》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·上海卷 (1949-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Shanghai Volume, 1949-2017*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2017), 88.

⁴ Beijing shi difang zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 北京市地方志编纂委员会, ed., 北京志·工业志(医药工 业志·印刷工业志) [Beijing Gazetteer (Industry Volume): Medicinal and Printing Industries] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2011), 413; Zhongguo xinwen chuban yanjiu yuan 中国新闻出版研究院, ed.,中华人 民共和国出版料 [Historical Materials on Publishing in the People's Republic of China], volume 14 (Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 2013), 462; Fang Houshu 方厚枢 and Wei Yushan 魏玉山, 中国出 版通史 [A History of Chinese Publishing], volume 9 (Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 2008), 171;

this revival, the CCP relied on publishing to further its political goals, and thus here I can quickly dispense with the assumption (still sadly prevalent in some quarters of the Chinese studies and book history fields) that Cultural Revolution-era publishing was monotone and thus undeserving of serious inquiry.⁵ National-level data speaks for itself to demonstrate the renewed vibrancy of publishing work by the early 1970s: the number of new titles (not including textbooks) published each year dropped from 8,536 in 1965 to 4,596 in 1966, staying doggedly below 2,100 for the next four years, but in 1973 this figure once again exceeded its 1966 level as publishers began to find the political room and demand to expand their catalogues.⁶ The coming chapters form the first dissertation or book in any language to chart the political, editorial and logistical decisions required to publish and print the hundreds of unique titles and millions of volumes released in the late Mao period and in the years immediately following his death in 1976.

To investigate both these decisions and the links between propaganda publishing in China and twentieth century book history, I study material released during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign (1974-1976, 批林批孔运动). This campaign - arguably the last major throw of the Maoist dice before the Chairman's death - exhorted people to mutually attack Lin Biao (a disgraced former heir apparent to Mao Zedong) and the ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius. Chapters One and Two lay out the underlying ideological tenets of this campaign, but

[&]quot;Beijing chuban shi zhi" bianji bu 《北京出版史志》编辑部, ed., 北京出版史志第6辑 [*The Gazzetteer of Publishing in Beijing: Part 6*] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1995), 210.

⁵ For a typical passing comment on Cultural Revolution publishing, see J. Soren Edgren, "The History of the Book in China," in *The Book: A Global History*, ed. Michael F. Suarez and H. R. Woudhuysen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 591. Another passing comment is from Deng Zhonghe (邓中和) who has described Cultural Revolution-era book design as a "practically nonexistent" (几乎是一片空白"): Deng Zhonghe 邓中和, "回顾新中国书籍装帧艺术六十年" [Looking Back on Sixty Years of Chinese Book Design], *Chuban Shiliao* 出版史料 no. 1 (2010): 10. As early as 1980, cultural historians were pushing back against this generalization of Cultural Revolution-era publishing. For example, see Geramie Barmé, "Notes on Publishing in China 1976 to 1979," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* no. 4 (July 1980): 167.

⁶ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 482.

put briefly it represented a state crusade against regressive historical forces. CCP propaganda accused Lin - now dead thanks to a mysterious plane crash in Mongolia in 1971 - of seeking to stall and reverse the Maoist revolution, while Confucius (and Confucianism) stood accused of consistently delaying social and political progress throughout Chinese history. In this contrived model, the last 2500 years extending up to the time of Lin Biao himself became a constant struggle between progressive forces and Confucians for political control.

The fate of Confucianism in modern China, as well as the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, has been extensively analyzed by scholars. In his seminal *Confucian China and It's Modern Fate*, Joseph Levenson chronicled the history of Confucianism in China from the Ming up to the end of the 1960s, showing how it has been affected by political, intellectual and social trends.⁷ More recently, Tien-Wei Wu, Te-Sheng Meng and Kam Louie have explored the intellectual history of Confucianism and anti-Confucianism in the PRC.⁸ These accounts excel at dealing with the campaign's intellectual ideas, and I advise the reader to consult these studies rather than repeat their ideas here. Wu, Meng and Louie do not, however, pay much attention to the day-to-day cultural production which circulated these views. For the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign specifically, Deborah Sommer, Paul Clark and Barbara Mittler have discussed some of its propaganda, while multiple scholars have tackled its local and national politics.⁹ As the rest of this introduction will discuss, however, my approach to

⁷ Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and It's Modern Fate*, 3 volumes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958).

⁸ Tien-Wei Wu, *Lin Biao and the Gang of Four: Contra-Confucianism in Historical and Intellectual Perspective* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983); Meng Te-Sheng, "The Anti-Confucian Movement in the People's Republic of China" (PhD. diss., St. John's University, 1980); Kam Louie, *Critiques of Confucius in Contemporary China* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980); Kam Louie, *Inheriting Tradition: Interpretations of the Classical Philosophers in Communist China* (Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

⁹ Deborah Sommer, "Images for Iconoclasts: Images of Confucius in the Cultural Revolution," *East-West Connections: Review of Asian Studies* 7, no. 1 (2007): 1-23; Barbara Mittler, *A Continuous Revolution:*

Confucianism and the campaign differs markedly from all of these scholars in that I focus less on the history of ideas and more on the CCP's system of political communication itself.

In my analysis, I employ the term "propaganda" to describe the overwhelming majority of books published in China in the early 1970s. Of course, propaganda studies is its own field, with the exact definition of the term a matter of consistent scholarly debate.¹⁰ I think, however, that I can avoid these scholarly semantics and restrict myself to saying that I use the word 'propaganda' as a catch-all because all of the books I discuss in the following chapters were intended to elucidate, reinforce and develop the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. This propaganda included, to use Jacques Ellul's tried and tested formulation, both agitational and integrational material.¹¹ Agitational propaganda tried to whip up and sharpen popular resentment of named and unnamed enemies, while integrational propaganda worked to conscript people into following a socio-political anti-Confucian, anti-regressive consensus. Besides tracts and other blatant examples of agitprop, therefore, I also argue that classical text reprints, comics books, biographies of Confucian villains and anti-Confucian heroes, dictionaries, and many other genres of book supplied a drip, drip, drip of information aimed at drawing readers into the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and allying them with the Party promoting it.

Making Sense of Cultural Revolution Culture, paperback edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2016); Paul Clark, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Andrew Walder and Dong Guoqiang, "Nanjing's "Second Cultural Revolution" of 1974," *The China Quarterly* 212 (December 2012): 893-918; Keith Forster, "The Politics of Destabilization and Confrontation: the Campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius in Zhejiang Province, 1974," *The China Quarterly* 107 (September 1986): 433-462; Keith Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism in a Chinese Province: Zhejiang, 1966-1976* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1990); Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics During the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2007).

¹⁰ A good place to start with these debates is Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Published online at https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199764419.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199764419.

¹¹ See the section "Jacques Ellul's Contribution to Propaganda Studies" in Auerbach and Castronovo's *Handbook of Propaganda Studies*.

Indeed, publishers recognized that these subtler genres could be significantly more powerful tools of persuasion than the vitriolic language and imagery conjured up by our popular notions of propaganda.

In placing most books from the 1970s within Ellul's agitation and integration formulation, I am both responding to and disagreeing with recent attempts to differentiate between propaganda and other types of publishing under the CCP. In particular, Robert Culp has portrayed the PRC in the 1950s as both a "propaganda state" and a "pedagogical state." In other words, besides producing books to galvanize people's participation in politics, publishers also released books to "instill knowledge in its [the state's] citizens for socialist construction." Such books had to be practically useful, factual, and be accepted as legitimate by a wide range of people.¹² I have my doubts about Culp's distinction first because socialist construction was a very political project and second because instilling knowledge is also a form of integrational propagandizing. But, irrespective of any differences in the 1950s, I frame my dissertation around my argument that propaganda and pedagogy had fully collapsed into one by the 1970s. To make the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign a success, the state needed to impart a significant amount of knowledge to people. As we shall see, this included knowledge of classical texts, history, philosophical argumentation, and linguistic expertise. A significant part of the campaign involved studying and learning, with the ultimate end of furthering the vilification of regressive elements past and present. With pedagogy and politics fused together, I hence am comfortable using the term 'propaganda' to describe all these genres. This inevitably leaves me open to charges of rendering the term so broad as to be meaningless, but for my purposes it is a useful

¹² Culp, Power of Print, 20-21.

shorthand to remind us that the publishers featured in the following chapters <u>explicitly operated</u> to further the interests of the one-party state.

Ever since the Cold War, scholars of different societies have spilled considerable ink theorizing and investigating the function of propaganda communication and its relationship to the state. For the modern Chinese case, in an under-recognized 2003 dissertation, Nicolai Volland outlined how the CCP has consistently grouped media organizations under a relatively stable propaganda apparatus.¹³ Tracing the growth of media institutions, he also showed how the CCP has leveraged control over the media for its state-building goals since its inception.¹⁴ With respect to publishing, Volland posited that within just a few years of taking power in 1949 the CCP had managed to turn a culturally vibrant sector into an organ of the state.¹⁵ Volland is just one example of a scholar working on Chinese media, and to cover even a fraction of the broader literature on these topics would lengthen this introduction considerably.¹⁶ Instead, I want to take up Piers Robinson's recent call to incorporate propaganda studies into the broader field of political communication. In an article published in 2019, Robinson decried the tendency of communication studies to remain preoccupied with elite-level actors and the impact of political messages on the audiences who receive them. This he calls the "who says what to whom and with what effect" approach.¹⁷ Robinson doesn't quite say so explicitly, but implicit in his argument is the idea that understanding the way these messages are packaged and distributed can

¹³ Nicolai Volland, "The Control of the Media in the People's Republic of China" (PhD diss., Heidelberg University, 2003), 13-72.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 289.

 ¹⁶ Patricia, Stranahan's *Molding the Medium: the Chinese Communist Party and the Liberation Daily* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1990) is another insightful study of an early CCP propaganda institution.
 ¹⁷ Piers Robinson, "Expanding the Field of Political Communication: Making the Case for a Fresh

Perspective Through "Propaganda Studies," *Frontiers in Communication* 4, no. 26 (July 2019). Published online at <u>https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2019.00026</u>.

shift studies of political communication out of just the "who says what to whom and with what effect" paradigm.

While it may seem obvious to study the processes undergirding political communication, modern Chinese history as a discipline has rather neglected such questions in its desire to reject Cold War stereotypes of the totalitarian state and chase individual, grassroots experiences.¹⁸ The field's profound shift toward investigating resistance to state power perhaps explains, for example, why scholars of publishing and reading under the CCP have more recently favored analyzing fractures in Chinese print culture and the survival of underground print cultures during the Cultural Revolution.¹⁹ In pursuing this path of most resistance, however, it is tempting I think to go too far the other way and forget the immense power of governing bureaucracies like the CCP's. After all, if underground reading is an important part of the cultural history of modern China, how much more so is the official system pumping out and distributing hundreds of millions of books across an area larger than Europe each year? The end result of this historiographical skew is that we lack any systematic study of official book production and dissemination in Mao's China. Most recently, Robert Culp has described how the CCP modified China's existing publishing sector after it came to power to begin shaping a state book production system, but he is most concerned with transitions across the divide of the CCP's

¹⁸ For an example of a study infused with the totalitarian stereotype, see Alan Liu, *Communications and National Integration in Communist China*, revised paperback edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), xxvii.

¹⁹ Song Yongyi, "A glance at the Underground Reading Movement during the Cultural Revolution." *Journal of Contemporary China* 16, no. 51 (May 2007): 325-333; Song Yongyi 宋永毅, "文革中的黄皮 書和灰皮書" [Internal Publications in the Cultural Revolution Period], *Ershi yi shiji* 二十一世紀 42 (August 1997): 59-64; Lena Henningsen, "What Is a Reader? Participation and Intertextuality in Hand-Copied Entertainment Fiction from the Chinese Cultural Revolution," *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture* 29, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 109-158; Maghiel van Crevel, "Underground Poetry in the 1960s and 1970s," *Modern Chinese Literature* 9, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 169-219; Nicolai Volland, "Clandestine Cosmopolitanism: Foreign Literature in the People's Republic of China, 1957-1977," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 76, no. 1 (February 2017): 185-210.

takeover.²⁰ Indeed, several unanswered questions hang over the head of print culture scholarship and research citing Chinese propaganda sources. Where did the paper to make all these materials come from? How did propaganda travel from publisher to reader? What technological processes and human labor undergirded the circulations of immense quantities of print and information? We still have much to learn about how China's propaganda state actually *worked*.

In the following chapters, I fill in some of these gaps and move beyond a paradigm of state messaging and reader response by considering how the physicality and materiality of publishing, printing, and bookselling mediated top-down political communication and, ultimately, state control. With this goal, I am especially concerned with the institutions and individuals sandwiched between elite politicians and grassroots consumers of print that were tasked with translating the CCP's political lines into printed words. Of course, the top and bottom layers also have parts to play in my story, and it is worth nothing that political communication did not segment vertically so nicely, but my methodology argues that more attention to the goings on in between these extremes embellishes previous views of how the state operated.

This is not, however, a matter of embellishment for embellishment's sake, for the operations of the propaganda state's middle layers directly and tangibly changed the shape of political communication under the CCP. Overall, this dissertation argues that a dynamic of negotiation, compromise, and idealism versus practicality - between publishers, authors, printers, suppliers, readers, and ideologues - heavily directed the course of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. No scholar has yet realized the extent to which these negotiated contingencies mediated and curtailed the CCP's information state. With respect to book

²⁰ Culp, *Power of Print*, 20.

publishing, Geremie Barmé claimed in 1980 that China's publishing industry had finally "realized that providing reading material for the world's largest literate population is not merely a matter of politics, but also requires vast numbers of trained editors, huge printing presses, a steady supply of paper and an efficient distribution network."²¹ His observation is correct and yet horribly misdated. Publishers were well aware of all these truisms long before the end of the 1970s, and only the tension between both what was politically necessary and physically possible produced the landscape of propaganda publishing so recognizable to historians of modern China.

To find one of the few attempts to understand the logistics and practicalities of the CCP's political communication, we must go all the way back to Alan Liu's *Communications and National Integration in Communist China*, published in 1971 and re-released in 1975. Liu characterized China as a "movement state," whether these movements took the form of factional struggle or study and "ideological remolding."²² In brief comments on the direction of publishing after the beginning of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, Liu alluded to the practical limitations on the "elite's power to manipulate." In particular, he cited a lack of transport and low rural literacy levels as two factors hampering print propaganda's efficacy.²³ My dissertation takes Liu's analytical line to a much deeper level by providing a structural perspective on official publishing. Propaganda books and other materials did not suddenly appear in the hands or vicinity of ordinary Chinese; rather, their presence was predicated on the interaction between editorial decision-makers, advanced technologies of mechanical reproduction, broad circulation networks, industrial and piecemeal production of paper, bureaucratic cooperation, and, ultimately, copious amounts of human labor. Understanding all

²¹ Barmé, "Notes on Publishing," 167.

²² Liu, Communications and National Integration, xxvii.

²³ Ibid., xliii.

these dynamics explains how, between 1974 and 1976, the frenzied, egalitarian flavor of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign gave way to parochialism, stratification, and contradiction.

This last observation concerning the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign brings us to the contribution my perspective makes to the way historians and political scientists think about Chinese political campaigns. State-orchestrated campaigns weave in-and-out of the grand narrative of modern Chinese history; scholars have written extensively on elite politics, mass activism, indoctrination, and how individuals manipulate or traverse these upheavals.²⁴ Gail Hershatter has even coined the term "campaign time" to describe how our histories are indexed by these movement waypoints.²⁵ Implicit in many of these studies, however, is the sense that a campaign's origins and general course are both more important than its day-to-day organization. A basic question remains unresolved: how does a CCP political campaign actually work?

Scholars have begun to answer this question, providing excellent detailed studies of campaign administrative organization and work conducted in the field by cadres and others. For example, in his *Yundong: Mass Movements in Chinese Communist Leadership*, Gordon Bennett

²⁴ Examples are too numerous to list. Some recent favorites include: Yang Kuisong, *Eight Outcasts: Social and Political Marginalization in China under Mao*, trans. Gregor Benton and Ye Zhen (Oakland: University of California Press, 2020), published in Chinese as Yang Kuisong 杨奎松, "边缘人"纪事: 几 个"问题"小人物的悲剧故事 [Records of the Marginalized: The Sad Tale of Several 'Problematic' Individuals (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2016); Jeremy Brown, *City Versus Countryside in Mao's China: Negotiating the Divide* (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Anita Chan, Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger, *Chen Village Under Mao and Deng*, second edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard, 2006); Jeremy Brown and Matthew Johnson, eds., *Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China's Era of High Socialism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). Also, see the chapters in Joseph Esherick, Paul Pickowicz, and Andrew Walder, eds., *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

²⁵ Gail Hershatter, *The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China's Collective Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 65-66.

outlines a general blueprint for campaign work and propaganda dissemination.²⁶ Bennett's broad-brush schematic covers the creation of the apparatus needed to coordinate activities at multiple bureaucratic levels, as well as the formation of guiding policies. More recently, Tyrene White's study of birth planning lays out an "architecture of mobilization" based on the dissemination of targets, collection of data, leveraging of bureaucratic controls, and the recruitment of individuals into campaign activities.²⁷ Miriam Gross has also recently identified the three "arms" supporting the day-to-day workings of the Mao-era drive to eradicate snail fever.²⁸ To add another dimension to models sketched by Gross and others, I consider how 'Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius' transformed from a broad concept first aired on the pages of newspapers into a multifaceted, developed propaganda genre driving other parts of the campaign.

But my approach to exploring how campaigns materialize also proves its utility when applied to campaign breakdown. Some scholarship follows Gordon Bennett's observation that campaigns peter-out or are superseded by new initiatives, rather than having a clear end date. Historians also mark endpoints by looking at explicit reversals in propaganda messages or the halting of factional struggle. In the case of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, scholars have pointed to changing elite political concerns and the cessation of local factional struggle to tell a narrative of decreasing intensity in the campaign through 1974.²⁹ While not contesting their conclusions, a publishing perspective reminds us that the campaign involved

²⁶ Gordon Bennett, *Yundong: Mass Movements in Chinese Communist Leadership* (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1976), 38-74.

²⁷ Tyrene White, *China's Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People's Republic, 1949-2005* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2006), 71-110.

²⁸ Miriam Gross, *Farewell to the God of Plague: Chairman Mao's Campaign to Deworm China* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016).

²⁹ Elizabeth Perry and Li Xun, *Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 181; Teiwes and Sun, *End of the Maoist Era*, esp. chapter 2; Walder and Dong, "Nanjing's "Second Cultural Revolution" of 1974"; Forster, "The Politics of Destabilization and Confrontation."

more than just factional struggle. In fact, in this dissertation, I show how it endured well into 1976 as a concern for propagandists, publishers, authors, printers, and, ultimately, the ordinary people required to read the material these actors produced.

Historians of China are also used to thinking about the waning of political campaigns in terms of the idea that those ruled by Maoism quickly grew wearied by politics and were skeptical of state-issued material. I locate campaign breakdown, however, in the intense destruction of the material manifestations of the campaign and the breaking down of the processes that keep it running. In the case of the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius, an orgy of destruction and censorship marked its final political, and often literal, obliteration. In 1976, a post-Mao leadership looking to make its mark ordered the recall and destruction of almost all campaign materials; the fact that publishers had issued these now politically *passé* materials in huge print runs meant that a large amount of material was destined to be pulped. Though this iconoclastic recall could never be uniformly enforceable, publishers' archives tell of the mass cannibalization of the materiality of anti-Confucianism. The campaign ended neither by quietly fading out or through petty score-settling, but with a vengeance. Publisher-propagandists eradicated the fruits of their labor, and once these books were no more, the campaign was a dead letter.

My unfolding perspective on printed propaganda joins a group of historians of modern China harnessing archive studies and print culture studies to write the history of the CCP's information economy. This is very important work because it provides methodologies to interrogate the presence of the printed official sources - archives, books, newspapers, and periodicals - on which many historians of the PRC rely. Knowing how these sources came into being, as well as the factors shaping how they appear to us today, can only help scholars in their search for accurate histories. Approaches from archive studies are already making the jump into

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Chinese studies: in his doctoral dissertation, Lu Yi is piloting research into the formation of archives in China and abroad across the twentieth century, while Chris Chang has described the bureaucratic processes and procedures whereby "elaborate routines of investigation were often impoverished by the banality of the problems they purported to address."³⁰ In the following chapters, I outline multiple ways historians can approach books (and to a lesser extent newspapers) as material objects circulating through society. Paying attention to such material considerations avoids us over-privileging the influence of content producers and editors on the creation of these sources at the expense of print workers, machinery, resource availability, and other practical considerations.

If archival studies offers new ways of thinking about our sources, this dissertation also trumpets the benefits book history and critical bibliography can offer the study of modern Chinese history, propaganda, and political communication. To quote Robert Darnton, book history is concerned with "how ideas were transmitted through print and how exposure to the printed word affected the thought and behavior of mankind during the last five hundred years."³¹ Darnton conceived the "Communications Circuit" model in 1982 as a way of describing the life of a book in society, with the circuit involving different parties including authors, publishers, printers, binders, suppliers, shippers, booksellers and readers.³² Unlike any other study of propaganda production under the CCP, I engage with all parts of Darnton's model, but I especially pay attention to the individual and institutions that impacted texts once they had been written. We will see how publishers marketed their offerings, the role printers played in bringing

³⁰ Lu Yi, "Paper Gleaners: Archives and History in 20th-century China" (forthcoming PhD diss., Harvard University); J. M. Chris Chang, "Paper Affairs: Discipline by the Dossier in a Mao-Era Work Unit," *Administory* 4, no. 1 (December 2019): 137. See also his "Communist Miscellany : the Paperwork of Revolution" (PhD diss., Colombia University, 2018).

³¹ Robert Darnton, "What is the History of Books?," *Daedalus* 111, no. 3 (1982): 65. ³² Ibid., 68.

books to bookstores quickly, how suppliers of paper could make or break publishers' plans, and how bookstores and libraries sustained a culture of print consumption. Of course, we will also see how readers and their embedded expectations shaped the state's approach to political communication through books.

As already noted, no previous study of twentieth-century Chinese print has taken such a comprehensive approach. In her recent study, Jennifer Altehenger tackled some of Darnton's communications circuit by investigating the dissemination of legal knowledge in the PRC between 1949 and 1989. Altehenger showed that propagandists, publishers, and cultural workers were all involved in creating, shaping, and disseminating legal knowledge. She found, for example, how problems with delays at printing plants, books sitting in warehouses, and a lack of coordination between storage facilities and bookstores upset efforts to popularize legal knowledge.³³ Studies by Sun Peidong, Lara Henningsen, Nicholai Volland and Christopher Reed have also touched on some of these areas.³⁴ This dissertation demonstrates why looking at all elements of Darnton's cycle can yield insights missed by partial perspectives and why future scholarly research might follow the same approach.

To cite just one example of such an insight, Chapter Five makes a convincing case that paper makers and suppliers exerted an influence on propaganda publishing as equally significant as authors and editors. I am not the first to realize the importance of industrial paper production to modern culture, but the list of scholars making this link is remarkably short. As Heidi Tworek states, paper is a "chokepoint in the production of knowledge largely unacknowledged by

³³ Altehenger, *Legal Lessons*, 13-16 and 80.

³⁴ Henningsen, "What is a Reader?"; Volland, "The Control of the Media"; Volland, "Clandestine Cosmopolitanism": Sun, "The Stratification of Individual Reading"; Christopher Reed, *Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937* (Vancouver & Toronto: UBC Press, 2004).

historians."³⁵ Tworek directly traces the link between deficient paper supplies in Weimar Germany and both the decline in trust of the media and the rise of larger, sometimes right-wing, media monoliths.³⁶ For North American newspaper production, Michael Stamm has likewise concluded that that "success in the business of selling printed newspapers was...the result of developing an industrial and organizational apparatus to manufacture and distribute journalism and advertising printed on sheets of paper made from trees."³⁷ The Faculty of English at Cambridge University also held a conference dedicated to paper in 2018 in recognition of the rise in paper studies.³⁸ I undertake the first study of the history of paper and its links to book publishing in modern China, with Chapter Five arguing that a steady, affordable supply of paper was as important to the CCP as it was to early twentieth century American newspapers.³⁹ When this supply chain broke down in 1970s China, propaganda production soon began to go off the rails. Therefore, in the same way that Barbara Mittler has used textual analysis to question the communicative power of early twentieth century Chinese newspapers, my analysis of paper rejects any lingering assumptions concerning the inherent capacity of Cold War propaganda states to produce vast amounts of material.⁴⁰

Among their founding tenets, book history and critical bibliography recognize how the medium of the book affects the reader's interaction with a text, and Criticize Lin, Criticize

³⁵ Heidi Tworek, "The Death of News? The Problem of Paper in the Weimar Republic," Central European History 50, no. 3 (September 2017): 345.

³⁶ Ibid., 332.

³⁷ Michael Stamm, Dead Tree Media: Manufacturing the Newspaper in Twentieth-Century North America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2018), 27. ³⁸ "Paper stuff,"

https://web.archive.org/web/20200413223332/https://www.english.cam.ac.uk/events/paper/ (archived April 13, 2020).

³⁹ Stamm, *Dead Tree Media*, 34.

⁴⁰ Barbara Mittler, A Newspaper for China?: Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai's News Media, 1872–1912 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004), conclusion.

Confucius campaign material certainly does not stand outside this reader-reading relationship.⁴¹ Megan Ferry has already shown how the design and format of print culture guided modern Chinese readers "in *how* to see and understand."⁴² At various points in this dissertation, I likewise argue that the medium mediated the message. Most notably, publishers gave extensive thought to page size, binding, format, and page layout. These elements acted as paratexts to communicate particular ideas to readers in much the same way that firms in other twentieth century contexts (such as Penguin Books) famously used format markers so effectively to construct and interact with their audiences.

With all these material perspectives, this dissertation joins Robert Culp and others in stressing how books published in the twentieth century represent industrial products. In his *The Power of Print in Modern China*, Culp demonstrates that "print industrialism" - the mass production of books - gave intellectuals a new way to mold modern Chinese culture.⁴³ As he states, "we cannot fully understand the development of cultural and intellectual life in the twentieth century without exploring the nexus between culture and the industrial economy with the same rigor and intensity that we have dedicated to the intersection between culture and politics."⁴⁴ Similarly, in his *Dead Tree Media*, Michael Stamm describes how North American newspaper production involved "mass-producing a consumer good through the labor of hundreds

⁴¹ Donald McKenzie, *Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts* (London: The British Library, 1986). Within the growing field of book history and bibliography, other scholarship I have found particularly useful includes: Bonnie Mak, *How the Page Matters* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011); Roger Chartier, *Forms and Meanings* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); Anthony Grafton, *The Footnote: A Curious History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Paul Gutjahr, and Megan Benton, eds., *Illuminating Letters: Typography and Literary Interpretation* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001); and Gerard Genette, *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation*, trans. Jane Lewin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

 ⁴² Megan Ferry, *Chinese Women Writers and Modern Print Culture* (Amherst: Cambria, 2018), 4-5.
 ⁴³ Culp, *Power of Print*, 5 and 259.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 259.

and even thousands of skilled and unskilled workers, forming networks stretching from the forest to the delivery person."⁴⁵ Ted Striphas has also recognized this with respect to North American book retailing in the late twentieth century, observing that "it is through living labor's hard work that the growth of culture sustains itself."⁴⁶ Striphas calls for more scholars to study the "back-office apparatuses, processes, and labor practices through which books have become everyday commodities."⁴⁷

This dissertation, unlike many propaganda scholars, takes a multi-disciplinary perspective to explore in more depth the intersection of technology and the sociology of work with propaganda, publishing, printing and bookselling. The advent of industrialized book production in the 19th century provided states and organizations with the technology needed to disseminate ideas on a gargantuan scale. For China, Chris Reed has charted how the arrival of Western printing technology in China recast a nexus of social, industrial and cultural relationships. He leaves little doubt that the mechanization of printing processes profoundly changed these relationships and led to the development of print capitalism in late Qing and Republican China.⁴⁸ After 1949, the CCP inherited these structures and redeployed them for the political interests of the state. Similarly, Megan Ferry argues that, for modern Chinese gender discourses, "the capacity of printing technology for large-scale reproduction allowed for broad territorial distribution, ensuring that a larger community of readers had access to and could share in the messages being communicated."⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Stamm, *Dead Tree Media*, 2.

⁴⁶ Ted Striphas, *The Late Age of Print: Everyday Book Culture From Consumerism to Control* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 108.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 83.

⁴⁸ Reed, *Gutenberg in Shanghai*.

⁴⁹ Ferry, *Chinese Women Writers*, 2.

When placed in the CCP's hands, industrial production became a potent tool.

Acknowledged in, but largely absent from, Culp's picture is the labor of typesetters, designers, papermakers, bookshop staff and printers who turned manuscripts into final products, as well as the technology and financial capital required to sustain the book industry. This is not a criticism, but rather an observation of how Culp's narrative of industrial book production can be reinforced and how we can heed Tom Mullaney's call for more studies of those who did the "grindingly technical" work in the history of Chinese information technology.⁵⁰ When looking at Darnton's communications circuit, therefore, I analyze the industrial processes employed at every stage. I find that vast pools of labor, energy, and technological investment and experimentation allowed the state to expand the scale of its political communication and, ultimately, the reach of its power. I argue that the success or otherwise of the Chinese propaganda state depended as much on the vagaries of industrial production as well as on the more familiar cast of characters generating content. Conversely, when these industrial inputs were conspicuously absent, information circulation quickly stagnated.

While modern Chinese historical studies can learn a lot from book history and bibliography, the Chinese case can likewise compensate for these fields' ongoing focus on Euro-American publishing and pre-industrial printing. One glance at the recently released *The Book: A Global History* or *A Companion to the History of the Book* is enough to remind us of this skew.⁵¹ East Asian book, publishing and printing history, however, continues to grow as a field, and my dissertation joins a number of other scholarly studies to have been written recently.⁵² Some of

⁵⁰ Thomas Mullaney, *The Chinese Typewriter: A History* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2017), 14. ⁵¹ Michael Suarez and H. R. Woudhuysen, eds., *The Book: A Global History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Simon Eliot and Jonathan Rose, eds., *A Companion to the History of the Book* (Malden: Blackwell, 2007).

⁵² A selection, far from complete, includes: Martin Heijdra, "The Development of Modern Typography in East Asia, 1850-2000," *The East Asian Library Journal* 11, no. 2 (Autumn 2004): 100-168; Cynthia

these situate developments in China in a global context, in a way that the fields of American and European book history are often reluctant to do with respect to China and other 'marginal' book histories.⁵³ Furthermore, within China, there is an extensive literature on the history of twentieth century publishing, often narrated from the perspective of publishers themselves, although these rarely give much serious credence to Cultural Revolution-era publishing.⁵⁴

If book historians wish to accurately appreciate the history of the book in the modern world, studying propaganda production can remind us that the field continues to miss an important point: a large percentage, and maybe even a majority, of books published in the twentieth century have been sponsored by states and explicitly intended to support particular political viewpoints rather than for commercial profit. English-language studies routinely provide fascinating insights into such topics as the activities of famous mass-market publishers like Penguin, the growing availability of paperback books across the twentieth century, and the growth of book culture in the United States and Europe.⁵⁵ Discussions of propaganda publishing,

Brokaw and Christopher Reed, eds., *From Woodblocks to the Internet: Chinese Publishing and Print Culture in Transition, circa 1800-2008* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2010); Fei-Hsien Wang, "A Crime of Being Self-interested: Literary Piracy in early Communist China, 1949-1953," *Twentieth-Century China* 43, no. 3 (October 2018): 271-294; Fei-Hsien Wang, *Pirates and Publishers: A Social History of Copyright in Modern China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019); Mittler, *A Newspaper for China*?; Justin Schiller, *Quotations of Chairman Mao 1964-2014* (New York: The Grolier Club and Battledore Limited, 2014); Paola Iovene, *Tales of Futures Past: Anticipation and the Ends of Literature in Contemporary China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), chapter 3; Shuyu Kong, *Consuming Literature: Best Sellers and the Commercialization of Literary Production in Contemporary China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), chapter 2; Reed, *Gutenberg in Shanghai*. Robert Culp's *Power of Print* has a great bibliography of the field as it stands. Readers may also be interested in browsing volumes of the journal *East Asian Publishing and Society* which has been running since 2011. ⁵³ Examples include Culp's *Power of Print* and Reed's *Gutenberg in Shanghai*.

⁵⁴ Anything written or edited by Fang Houshu (方厚枢) is a great place to start. The fact that only one volume of the series *Historical Materials on Publishing in the People's Republic of China* [中华人民共和国出版料] covers the years 1966-1976, after the thirteen previous volumes cover 1949-1966, indicates this tendency to gloss over much of Cultural Revolution-era publishing.

⁵⁵ Striphas, *The Late Age of Print*; Ben Mercer, "The Paperback Revolution: Mass-circulation Books and the Cultural Origins of 1968 in Western Europe," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 72, no. 4 (October 2011): 613-636; Peter Mandler, "Good Reading for the Million: The 'Paperback Revolution' And the Co-Production of Academic Knowledge in Mid Twentieth-Century Britain and America," *Past & Present*

lamentably, appear far less frequently. Books like *The Russian Reading Revolution: Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Era* and *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers* have begun to foreground political publishing in book history, but propaganda is still losing out in broader visions of publishing and reading in the twentieth century.⁵⁶ Within Chinese studies, only Robert Culp's new book has begun to seriously examine the activities of state publishers under the CCP.⁵⁷ In ignoring propaganda, book historians continue to put a premium on the minority at the expense of the majority. For modern China, the book after 1949 stands as a measure of the state's constantly fluctuating ability to communicate with ordinary people.

In addition to developing Culp's linking of book history and industrial production, I also support his arguments concerning the importance of intellectual cultural norms to modern Chinese publishing. In *The Power of Print*, he differentiates between the "managerial" and "intellectual" labor involved in industrial book production. The managerial denotes everything to do with the commissioning, production, and distribution of titles, while intellectual labor stands for content generation and the arrangement of this content to produce desired effects. In his book, Culp tackles both types of labor from the perspective of the intellectuals working as editors and writers in Republican and early Mao-era publishing houses. Publishers poured significant time and resources into cultivating a pool of writing talent ("capital investment") to sustain their

^{244,} no. 1 (August 2019): 235–269; Ned Drew and Paul Sternberger, *By Its Cover: Modern American Book Cover Design* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2005); William Wootten and George Donaldson, *Reading Penguin: A Critical Anthology* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013). ⁵⁶ Stephen Lovell, *The Russian Reading Revolution: Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras*

⁽New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Matthew Lenoe, *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). See also essays by Vadim Volkov, Valerie Holman and Joanna Lewis in James Raven, ed., *Free Print and Non-Commercial Publishing since 1700* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).

⁵⁷ Culp, Power of Print.

activities. Overall, he argues that publishing after the fall of the Qing maintained familiar aspects of past literati culture, for example through banqueting and personal scholarly networks shaping the composition of editorial offices. Overall, "historically rooted cultural attitudes and practices helped sustain the labor mobilization and work culture that shaped the development of modern industrial publishing."⁵⁸

Culp traces aspects of literati culture in publishing all the way through to the 1960s, and I argue that the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign - and its preoccupation with history - necessitated a resurgence of these patterns. Intellectuals - so important to the success of more specialized propaganda production in the campaign - maintained membership of formal and informal networks. They worked together in writing groups, poured over rare manuscripts, and frequently interacted with CCP bureaucrats who were also cultural aficionados themselves.⁵⁹ All this activity was explicitly packaged in politically acceptable doctrine, but there can be no denying that literati culture found renewed life amidst the day-to-day grind of campaign propaganda publishing.

At the same time, my findings cast doubt on Culp's argument that the early 1960s marked a "shift from a concern with the efficiency of cultural production to meet social needs to an exclusive focus on the politics of cultural production."⁶⁰ According to *The Power of Print*, by the time of the Cultural Revolution, "the restricted official cultural production of the propaganda state took center stage" and "the cultural politics of production came to trump productive efficiency for socialist pedagogy."⁶¹ I can understand how looking through the long lens of

⁵⁸ Ibid., 7-9, 42 and 254.

⁵⁹ Elizabeth Perry and Li Xun have previously remarked on the close links between intellectuals and prominent politicians in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution. See their *Proletarian Power*, esp. chapter 1.

⁶⁰ Culp, Power of Print, 250.

⁶¹ Ibid., 24 and 252.

publishing between the late Qing and the early 1960s might produce this binary, but it is flawed. For publishing work in the 1970s, efficiency and the demands of mass cultural production continued to be of paramount importance, even sometimes at the expense of politics. Scholarly experts were recalled to work on major projects, streamlining book production sometimes led to political considerations taking a step back, and the day-to-day business of running a publisher could not all be subsumed to strict Maoist dictums. The best example of this, perhaps, is my argument that publishers inserted pages with quotations from Mao into the front of books to fillout space and that, when space was tight, these quotation pages were axed. Furthermore, as I show in multiple chapters, propaganda from the 1970s drew on long-established publishing genres and practices for their legitimacy and effectiveness, further disaggregating the boundary between books released either side of the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.

In terms of broader connections to book history, the example of Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign propaganda shows the cross-cultural endurance of books as indices of value and status in the twentieth century. The early popularity of Penguin Books, for example, derived from its bold decision to produce cheap paperbacks in direct contrast to expensive hardbacks. Propaganda likewise reflected socio-political fault lines. To meet its political objectives, the CCP tried to create a mass readership that absorbed the same ideas from the same pages, but sometimes even propaganda reflected the status of their owners. Elites read luxury editions, urbanites often had access to a wider variety of new books, as well as a secondhand and antiquarian market, while others made do with poorly produced volumes. Those with privileged political connections also received access to internal publications kept out of the hands of the non-Party hoi polloi. Books unified people and divided them around class, location, and proximity to centers of political power. Similarly, China joined other twentieth century states

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intervening in the book market to protect literate culture and the value of books in their societies. In the United Kingdom, for example, the 1898 Net Book Agreement forbade booksellers from discounting books for sale.⁶² In the 1950s, when the government considered undoing the agreement, parts of the book trade argued that fixed prices worked in favor of the consumer by promoting sustainability in the book trade, protecting bookstore margins, and guaranteeing the publication of less commercially successful titles.⁶³ In China, the state set book prices in a way that covered the costs of production and distribution of materials, while also preventing publishers and bookstores making large profits at the expense of the consumer. As we will see, the state also subsidized some publications and gave tax relief to papermakers to guarantee book production and ensure that consumers were not unfairly out of pocket.

Studying 1970s propaganda also locates us in an interesting moment in terms of modern mass book production, namely the history of the paperback book. Print historians talk of a midtwentieth century "paperback revolution," during which book-buying behavior shifted to the consumption of cheap, more disposable books. While publishing houses such as Penguin produced some of the iconic early paperbacks, the paperback's "modern, truly mass-market identity arrived in the 1960s. In the postwar period, developments in graphic design and photography, and the paperback's ability to reflect a broad range of reading tastes and multimedia synergies, including television and film tie-in editions, firmly established its modern credentials." Although the idea of books being published first in hardback and then released in a paperback edition remained prevalent, it was the paperback that brought information to a wider

⁶² Charles Wilson, *First With the News: The History of W. H. Smith, 1792-1972* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1986), 321.

⁶³ Hubert Wilson, "The Bookseller's Problems," in *Books Are Essential*, ed. Norman Birkett et al. (London: André Deutsch, 1951), 79-96. A good summary of developments concerning the Net Book Agreement up to the 1960 is Basil Yamey's "The Net Book Agreement," *The Modern Law Review* 26, no. 6 (November 1963): 691-99.

range of people, with one estimate from 1960 suggesting sales of over one million paperbacks per day in the United States.⁶⁴

Ben Mercer recently charted the importance of the paperback revolution in relation to the 1968 social protests across Western Europe, writing of the paperback's democratizing, but also culturally contested, role. In his words,

the novelty and power of the paperback lay not so much in its cost, distribution or print run, but in [its] blurring of the divide between high and low culture, the consequent desacralization of the book, the destabilization of the canon, the clerisy which interpreted it and the elite university which educated them. The cultural conflicts of 1968 emerged from contradictions between the new and old regimes of reading (struggles over access, over commodification between professors beholden to sacralized books and traditional modes of the transmission of knowledge, and the desacralizing, democratizing desires of students), as well as contradictions within the new order (the ever greater availability of elite culture combined with anti-intellectualism).⁶⁵

Chinese propaganda publishing did not inherit the same distinction between hardback and paperback as seen in Western Europe and the United States, but the paperback's re-shaping of knowledge circulation directly fed into state power. From the 1950s, hardback was a format assigned to reference works, important texts like Mao's writings, and selected books. Rather than a book first coming out in hardback and then in paperback, for many reasons including cost, publishers printed the majority of their publications between simple paper covers, and this largely remained true in the 1970s. In China, therefore, the paperback emerged as an effective technology of mass dissemination in support of authority rather than, as in Mercer's case, challenging it. The paperback undoubtedly democratized access to official information in China,

⁶⁴ Claire Squires, "The Publishing Industry: The Rise of the Paperback," in *The Encyclopedia of Twentieth-Century Fiction*, volume 1, ed. Brian W. Shaffer (Wiley Online Library: 2010). Published online at <u>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444337822.wbetcfv1p009</u>; Robert Escarpit, *The Book Revolution* (Sydney: George G. Harrap & Co., 1966), 68.

⁶⁵ Mercer, "The Paperback Revolution," 635. Claire Squires also stresses the paperback's democratizing role in her "The Publishing Industry: The Rise of the Paperback."

but only because the state used it as a cheap, efficient form of political communication. Cheaper paperback technology also turned more readers into book purchasers and allowed individuals to replicate the home and work unit libraries they saw in propaganda imagery. In other words, the paperback hastened the intrusion of political narratives into public and private spaces.

Alongside notions of value and access to information, the Chinese case also represents another, more extreme, example of how twentieth-century states used censorship to sustain their visions of correctness in society. In Britain, one of the most famous cases of censorship in the 20th century concerns *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, D.H. Lawrence's 1928 tale of love and sex which contained profanities and explicit descriptions and was banned up to 1960 in Britain (and America) for its supposed obscenities.⁶⁶ In the Cold War, the United States and other countries likewise resorted to banning ideologically 'impure' material or material which violated ideological norms.⁶⁷ In China, however, censorship was a much more important part of the state's day-to-day operations because the Party invested print material with significant amounts of symbolic power. Of course, as Song Yongyi and many others have discussed, the period witnessed both a thriving circulation of material published underground and underground reading, as well as state efforts to clamp down on this activity.⁶⁸ But unlike this recent flurry of studies looking at underground activity, I look at censorship of official publications. Chapters Two and Seven chronicle how censorship was commonplace in the 1970s as the state

⁶⁶ D. H. Lawrence, *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, 50th anniversary edition (London: Penguin, 2010). For the fascinating transcript of the obscenities trial, see C. H. Rolph, *The Trial of Lady Chatterley: Regina v. Penguin Books Limited* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1961).

⁶⁷ For example, copies of *How To Read Donald Duck* were initially banned from entering the United States due to possible violations of Disney's copyright. See the introduction in Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*, fourth edition, trans. David Kunzle (New York: OR Books, 2018).

⁶⁸ Song, "A Glance at the Underground Reading Movement"; Song, "Internal Publications," Sun, "The Stratification of Individual Reading," van Crevel, "Underground Poetry"; Henningsen, "What is a Reader?".

manipulated print culture to suit changing political narratives. Creating a stable propaganda genre involved eliminating books which now bucked ideological trends, and thus I argue that political communication was fundamentally undergirded by routine, destructive, censorship.

Methodology

In addition to making multiple new scholarly arguments, I have written this dissertation to advocate for an improved, more academically responsible, method of using and citing printed sources. Due to a complex interaction of source fetishism, latent Orientalism, and the relative youth of the field, it is sadly common among historians of modern China - especially among those doing grassroots research - to pepper their citations with sources problematically ascribed to "personal collections" and other personal archives. For instance, in *Maoism at the Grassroots*, the citations attached to the works of Yang Kuisong, Daniel Leese, Jeremy Brown & Sha Qingqing, and Wang Haiguang are almost all of little use to anyone looking to substantiate the research because their materials are either marked as from their own collections or are not attributed to any archive or collection at all.

This is a major problem because it contravenes the spirit of the Open Access movement in academic knowledge production. The academic prestige an author gains from publishing an article or a monograph stems partly from the understanding that they have had the courage to open up their ideas to the scrutiny of others, especially those who work on similar topics. When historians use materials from their own collections and fail to make these collections open, they are not fulfilling one side of the bargain. No historian, be they a graduate student or a tenured

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professor, is exempt from their responsibility to the profession's standards of scrutiny and openness.

But, even worse than hindering peer review and scrutiny, PRC historians are creating informal and power-laden networks of access to information in a manner oddly reminiscent of prohibitive Chinese state archives themselves. If a scholar must approach another scholar directly to try and get hold of a source from the latter's personal collection, this introduces the dynamics of people-to-people relationships into access to scholarly knowledge. If scholar A and scholar B don't get along, how receptive will A be to sharing with B? If A is a tenured professor and B a first-year graduate student, how likely is it that B will email A requesting pdf copies of every "author's collection" source used in A's recent article? Scholars citing their personal collections are, in some ways, on a par with the petty bureaucratic gatekeepers that hinder the freedom of information around the world.

To push back against the academically spurious culture of "personal collection" citations, I am the first to deposit all my personal collections in a recognized repository <u>ahead of</u> <u>publishing my research</u>, thereby making mine the first study of PRC history in which readers looking to scrutinize my use of my personal collections need not go through me to do so. As I cite the unique characteristics of individual copies of propaganda publications in my collection, I have deposited all these books into the Special Collections at the Library of the University of California, San Diego. This collection is freely open to scholars looking to both check my findings and undertake further research on modern Chinese book history and the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. I hope that this might become a best practice for the next generation of grassroots historians.

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In addition, I intend my chapters to show the ongoing need to appreciate the uniqueness of every single copy of a published book. In his recent *The Invention of Rare Books: Private* Interest and Public Memory, David McKitterick discusses some of the challenges posed by digitization to those studying the materiality of the book.⁶⁹ In particular, he laments the fact that digital collections often include just one copy of a book because of a lack of appreciation of the ways different copies can vary. "The norm in these and other datasets is for a single copy; and that is what is liable to be assumed as adequate, whether by scholars who should know better or are simply short of time, or more insidiously and more influentially, by library managers. Increasingly, the individuality of what we still call books is thereby concealed."⁷⁰ In 2021, as the COVID pandemic has driven research even more firmly into digital spaces, the need to preserve physical materials is now the renewed subject of roundtables by academic groups like the Modern Languages Association. For modern Chinese propaganda, many materials which at first glance appear identical may actually be from a different impression or edition, they may have been printed in different printing factories, and they may have amended pages or idiosyncratic printing features. As the reader will see, recognizing these properties routinely allows me to make arguments and assertions undetectable in archival documents. Future historians can undoubtedly benefit from comparing multiple copies of the same title and making some surprising discoveries.

Careful consideration of books and other printed matter has also helped me compensate for a paucity of archival sources from the 1970s. As Chinese archives remain unwilling to release many files from the Cultural Revolution era, I am confined to using the records of publishers in

⁶⁹ David McKitterick, The Invention of Rare Books: Private Interest and Public Memory, 1600-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1-14. ⁷⁰ Ibid., 9.

Beijing and Shanghai. As Jennifer Altehenger notes, these cities formed the center of print culture production and thus the history of publishing in Beijing and Shanghai is also a history of the national production network.⁷¹ Through broader collecting and careful bibliographic analysis, however, I am able to extend the scope of my chapters to include other parts of China and make more than cursory observations concerning Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign propaganda in these areas. For scholars of modern China, the techniques from critical bibliography employed in this dissertation affords another way to escape attempts by the Chinese government to shape understanding of the PRC's past.

Open Access and the Writing Process

Fitting with my commitment to Open Access, my dissertation project has experimented with innovative approaches to scholarly knowledge production in the hope of inspiring others to do the same. Specifically, I authored this entire introduction over the course of a year as a licensed Open Access document on Google Drive. The final version, along with every iteration, can be viewed at http://bit.ly/mattwillsdissertation. This open format made the major fruits of my publicly-funded research available freely outside of the informal scholarly "old boy network" and allowed others researching related topics to more readily engage with my research. Furthermore, it opened up my writing process, puncturing the myth of the brilliant scholar working feverishly on a teleological road to the final product. According to a comment left on the document, one teacher from Canada even showed it to their high school students preparing to begin academic careers as undergraduates. It seems fitting to end the introduction to a

⁷¹ Altehenger, *Legal Lessons*, 19.

dissertation on mediated communication with this demonstration of why Open Access is so important and with this short "stump speech" for others to embrace these principles too.

CHAPTER ONE

Power, Peril, and Precarity: Launching the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign on the Printed Page

While the foundational ideas of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign slowly germinated in the early 1970s, senior CCP leaders did not enshrine them as an official campaign until the very beginning of 1974. This sudden development generated an immediate problem: how to widely disseminate the seemingly implausible notion that Lin Biao and Confucianism shared the same counter-revolutionary bed? In this opening chapter, I examine the production of millions of copies of four different publications which I refer to as the "Four Books." These titles contained the foundational party lines for the unfolding campaign, offering cadres and ordinary people the rational for linking Lin and Confucius, as well as providing them with the language necessary to study privately, participate in open group discussions, and write big-character posters. Through multiple editions of the Four Books, publishers and printers propelled the new movement forward on a national scale among all types of readers.

Overall, this chapter will deconstruct the logistics of political communication in Mao's China. By charting the production and dissemination of the Four Books, as well as the challenges these activities engendered, I begin answering questions analyzed in more detail in later chapters. How did the state manage to produce such large quantities of material? By what means did these books reach readers? What pitfalls and problems threatened the successful operation of the print propaganda state? Did everybody share the same reading experience? How did physical volumes, operating as texts and material objects, articulate their own messages about state power, political unity, and correct ideology?

Here, I do not shy away from emphasizing the importance of centralized control to the

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effective dissemination of campaign propaganda. The idea that a one-party state exercised topdown control is nothing new, but historians of propaganda and printing have not fully appreciated that centralization allowed the Chinese state to use technologies of mass reproduction more efficiently and effectively. Only the central government's ability to exercise control of an entire national publishing sector (when it wanted to) allowed for rapid, prolific reproduction of the Four Books and other flagship titles.

Tracing the printing of the Four Books also exposes major structural weaknesses in the organization of the propaganda state. Local conditions, including outdated technology and ineffective management of supply and demand, severely hampered the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign right from its inception. But, perhaps more importantly, while China's centralized publishing sector offered untold advantages for party propagandists, its centralized economy (where state planners divided up total expected national resource output between provinces and municipalities) alienated those in power from local officials tasked with carrying out national-level instructions. As an example of this, I show how printing the Four Books destabilized paper supplies across the country. The unexpected beginning of the campaign in January 1974 forced local publishers to reallocate large quantities of paper - resources already assigned to them by state planners for other projects – to printing the Four Books. Consequently, publishers found themselves without sufficient resources to print other books, and as a later chapter shows, this had devastating ramifications for the subsequent course of propaganda publishing. Therefore, a significant consequence of the outbreak of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign was the beginnings of a paper shortage crisis which plagued the publishing sector for many years to come.

Finally, the multiple editions of the Four Books demonstrate at once the willingness of

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the state to expend resources and how it tried to shoehorn as many people as possible into an imagined community of politically-conscious propaganda readers. I am among the first to both study the production of books in non-Mandarin languages for China's ethnic minorities and demonstrate how the state subsidized these materials. At the same time, such 'generosity' did not extend to visually impaired and blind readers. Whether by negligent oversight or deliberate omission, these groups did not merit the same subsidy. Considering that people faced strong pressure to participate in political life through reading, I argue that this propaganda ended up levelling a small, but highly symbolic, tax on readers outside the 'norm.'

Setting the Stage, Prepping the Page

The story of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign begins with an urgent telephone call placed by Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong on the night of 12 September, 1971. Zhou informed Mao that Lin Biao, long described in state newspapers as Mao's "close comrade in arms" (亲密战友), had boarded a plane with his family to flee to the Soviet Union.¹ With the plane almost out of domestic airspace, Zhou asked Mao whether the army should shoot the Lins down. Mao demurred, and yet the Lins never reached safety. At some point, their plane ran out of fuel and crashed in Mongolia. Nobody survived.²

The exact circumstances leading to Lin's flight remain locked away in China's central

¹ References to Lin as Mao's "close comrade in arms" are found regularly in *The People's Daily* in the years preceding Lin's death. For example, see "毛泽东主席和他的亲密战友林彪副主席亲切会见齐奥 塞斯库同志和罗党政代表团" [Chairman Mao Zedong and his close comrade in arms Lin Biao warmly meet with Comrade Ceauşescu and a group of Romanian party and government officials]. *The People's Daily*, June 4, 1971, 1.

² This account is based on the summary in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 335.

archives, but available evidence strongly suggests that Lin believed he had lost Mao's favor and considered his political safety in jeopardy.³ Once the shocked central leadership had come to terms with Lin's apparent desertion, party media responded by painting Lin as a traitor, an enemy of the people, and an ally of China's bitter enemy, the Soviet Union.⁴ Newspapers and local party personnel urged citizens to adjust to a new truth: Lin was, and had always been, betraying the revolution, even as he masqueraded as a revolutionary at Mao's side. Beginning in 1971, state media decried every aspect of Lin's life, attacking him obliquely for two years and then by name from August 1973.⁵ Official rhetoric neither broached nor answered the awkward question of why Mao had failed to recognize Lin's true, traitorous nature.

What did all this have to do with Confucius? On the face of it, a prominent ancient philosopher and the disgraced, deceased Lin have little in common, but they both drew the ire of party propagandists in the early 1970s. Following a decline in studies of Confucius and his thought in the late 1960s, in the early 1970s intellectuals again began using state publications to launch new attacks on Confucius and Confucianism.⁶ Newspapers and scholarly journals printed waves of articles attacking Confucius and Confucian ideas from a Marxist-Leninist and Maoist perspective, with the flow of articles reaching a crescendo in 1973. As many scholars have

³ Ibid., 335. For information on contrasting accounts of Lin's demise and death, see page 580, footnotes 52 and 53.

⁴ For discussion of the "shock and uncertainty created by the Lin Biao affair," see Teiwes and Sun, *End of the Maoist Era*, 31-36.

⁵ After his death, Lin's name abruptly disappeared from *The People's Daily* until 30 August 1973 when the newspaper reported on the Tenth Congress of the CCP: "中国共产党第十次全国代表大会新闻公报 一九七三年八月二十九日" [The bulletin of the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 29 August 1973]. *The People's Daily*, August 30, 1973, 1. For discussion of oblique criticisms of Lin Biao in the CCP's principle theoretical journal, see Wu, *Lin Biao and the Gang of Four*, 20.

⁶ Confucius, and his philosophical offspring, did not use the word "Confucianism" and there is no direct Chinese equivalent. In the 1970s, as now, scholars used "儒家" [Confucianism] as an umbrella term to encompass a range of philosophical, social, ritual and political ideas loosely and sometimes very distantly related to core concepts in Confucius' teachings. For convenience, I follow this general usage.

described, these articles decried Confucius as a reactionary who wished to buttress ancient China's waning slave society. Exploiting classes were charged with using Confucianism continuously for over two thousand years to suppress revolutionary movements and delay progress along the Marxist historical timeline. Confucius and Confucianism could have no positive place in revolutionary China.⁷

Conveniently, a probe for damning evidence concerning Lin after his flight supposedly revealed that the Marshal had more than a mild interest in Confucian philosophy. At Lin's state residence, investigators allegedly found that he had written scrolls, annotated Confucian texts, and expressed pro-Confucian views in his private diary.⁸ This evidence may have been fabricated: one well-connected intellectual recalls that when his colleagues went to Lin's former residence to amass his annotations on books, they failed to find a single note.⁹ In any case, the truth mattered much less than expediency. With Confucianism now seen as an anchor weighing down the revolutionary progress of history, Lin's alleged devotion to these ideas added further weight to the state narrative that he was an enemy of the people and the nation. In January 1974, therefore, the central leadership initiated the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, with state media exhorting ordinary people to study the Lin-Confucius connection, participate in criticism sessions, and pen their own polemics. The mass campaign against Confucianism had begun.

As the campaign gathered steam, books had an important role to play in popularizing and legitimizing this new political development. First, by targeting Confucius and Lin in a mass

⁷ Wu, *Lin Biao and the Gang of Four*, chapter 2 is an informative guide to the early 1970s and the conflating criticisms of Lin Biao and Confucius.

⁸ Teiwes and Sun, *End of the Maoist Era*, 122.

⁹ Zhou Yiliang 周一良, 毕竟是书生 [*I am Ultimately an Intellectual*] (Beijing: Beijing shiyue wenyi chubanshe, 1998), 72.

campaign, the CCP shifted interpretation of the former's utterances out of the confines of intellectual discussion and made these ideas relevant to all. This situation, therefore, demanded a large amount of printed material that could propel the movement forward in everyday life. Second, given that the Lin-Confucius link was convenient and contrived, the campaign could only succeed if people received a significant amount of guidance on its principles. While official newspapers provided an immediate avenue to communicate ideas, books represented a more expansive, durable format to circulate and preserve ideas over the long-term.

The CCP leveraged its control of the national publishing sector to co-ordinate the nationwide distribution of the campaign's premises in book form. In mid-January, the National Bureau of Publishing (NBP) – the branch of government responsible for managing the activities of all publishers, printers, and bookstores – decided to release four slim volumes. Referred to above as the "Four Books," these titles elaborated on the rhetoric of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and provided reference material for individual or group study. Within a matter of weeks, the Four Books sat on library shelves and in bookstores, collectively costing a paltry 0.5 *yuan* at a time when China's average per capita income was around 22 *yuan* per month.¹⁰

As the bibliographic vanguard of the campaign, the Four Books offered readers a range of dry material introducing the core charges against Confucius and Confucianism and providing a range of pro- and anti-Confucianism quotations from important twentieth-century intellectual and political figures. Two titles collated criticism of Confucius by the prominent twentieth-

¹⁰ In 1973, the average per capita income in China was 263 *yuan* per year. See Guojia tongji ju zonghe si 国家统计局综合司, 全国各省、自治区、直辖市历史统计资料汇编 1949-1989 [*Historical Statistics for China and its Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Municipalities, 1949-1989*] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1990), 5.

century writer Lu Xun (鲁迅) and pro-Confucian statements by recent "reactionaries" and "landlord-capitalist intellectuals" - loose labels to encompass anyone deemed an enemy of the Communist Party.¹¹ The other two volumes anthologized scholarly anti-Confucianism, with the titles of articles in the lengthier of the two perfectly capturing the political thrust of the campaign's rhetoric. Within An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius *Volume One* (批林批孔文章汇编(一), hereafter "Anthology Volume One"), readers could find pieces with titles such as "Confucius: a philosopher who ardently defended the slaveowning society" (孔子——顽固地维护奴隶制的思想家) penned by the prominent historian Yang Rongguo (杨荣国). Similarly, Anthology Volume One offered an argument that "Confucius's idea of the 'Middle Way' is a philosophy opposed to social revolution" (孔子的中 庸之道是反对社会变革的哲学), written under a pseudonym by an important theoretical study group at Beijing's Peking University. Also included was a piece by the noted philosopher Feng Youlan (冯友兰) renouncing his "previous pro-Confucius mentality" (尊孔思想), an indication that intellectuals, including well-known advocates of Confucian ideas, were now united in their condemnation.¹² Much later, Feng recalled making this volte face because he trusted in Mao and because he wanted to avoid coming down on the opposite side of the debate to the party and the masses.13

¹¹ Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 五四以来反动派、地主资产阶级学者尊孔复古言论辑录 [A Collection of Sayings from Post-May Fourth Reactionary and Landlord-Capitalist Intellectuals Praising Confucius and Old Ways] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1974); Zhongyang dangxiao bianxie zu 中央党校编写组, ed., 鲁迅批判孔孟之道的言论摘录 [A Collection of Lu Xun's Criticisms of the Way of Confucius and Mencius], first edition (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1974).

¹² Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(一) [An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume One] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1974), table of contents.
 ¹³ Feng Youlan 冯友兰, 冯友兰自述 [The Autobiography of Feng Youlan] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2004), 150-152.

The academic articles in Anthology Volume One and An Anthology of Articles Criticizing

Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two (批林批孔文章汇编(二), hereafter "Anthology

Volume Two") presented readers with a haphazard grab-bag of historical theorizing, Communist

philosophy and anachronistic analysis of ancient Chinese history.¹⁴ For example, Yang

Rongguo's critique of Confucius for defending the slave-owning society opened with the

following:

For the past two thousand years, Confucius has been constantly revered by the reactionary controlling classes as a "Sage." But what kind of person was he really?

Lenin said: "when analyzing any social problem, Marxist theory's absolute requirement is that the problem be placed in its historical context" (On Self-Governance). When analyzing Confucius from a historical materialist perspective, it is vital to start with the class struggles of the time, see whose side Confucius was on, and see what class interests his ideas served.

二千多年来,一直被反动的统治阶级尊为"圣人"的孔子,究竟是个什么人?

列宁指出: "在分析任何一个社会问题时,马克思主义理论的绝对要求,就 是要把问题提到一定的历史范围之内"(《论民族自决权》)。用历史唯物 主义的观点来分析孔子,就一定要根据当时阶级斗争的形势,看一看孔子是 站在那个阶级的立场上,他的思想是为那个阶级的利益服务的.¹⁵

Yang's overall argument, which he belabors, is that Confucius opposed the natural course of history by propping up a waning class of slave-owning aristocrats as they struggled to survive challenges to their power from emerging feudal landlords. The remaining articles in *Anthology Volume One*, as well as a longer anti-Confucius tract by Yang Rongguo printed as *Anthology Volume Two*, peddled a similar line. Filled with such content, the Four Books were cheap,

¹⁴ Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(二)[An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1974).

¹⁵ Renmin chubanshe, *Anthology Volume One* (Beijing renmin chubanshe), 1.

accessible weapons ready for wielding on the stage of the latest Maoist political drama.

All Hands to the Press

In line with the almost overnight explosion of references to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign in state media, the NBP exerted its full control over the publishing sector to rapidly usher the Four Books to publication. With media coverage manufacturing a huge demand for campaign study material, providing books to readers as fast as possible became the publishing industry's priority. While the average process for turning a manuscript into a printed book in the mid-1970s lasted between six months and one year, the Four Books reached people within weeks of the campaign's start. Although China's printing technology lagged behind that of other countries in terms of efficiency, the NBP co-opted a nationwide technological infrastructure of mass reproduction to scale-up production and overcome the printing industry's lower productivity. Yet local conditions and poor management of demand caused the campaign to unfold sporadically and unevenly. The publication of the Four Books thus displayed the power of the state and at the same time showed how this power was contingent on the most mundane of circumstances.

NBP staff already occupied an advantageous position in early 1974 because the content of the Four Books suited rapid distribution. Besides the volumes' short overall length, in all cases the books used material already published elsewhere and contained very little newlywritten text. For example, nearly all 60,000 characters (equivalent to a total length of 120 pages) of *Anthology Volume One* previously appeared elsewhere in 1973 or early 1974.¹⁶ As a result,

¹⁶ Ibid.

compiling *Anthology Volume One* simply involved deciding on the order of the articles, adding suitable explanatory notes, proofreading, and choosing a quotation from Chairman Mao to serve as an epigram. The publisher of *Anthology Volume One* – People's Press (人民出版社) – then added elements such as a title page, table of contents, a copyright page, and covers. Although the other three of the "Four Books," did not anthologize newspaper articles, and although compiling the two volumes of quotations from various people required more thought, the same observations are applicable. Work on the Four Books proceeded apace.

To further simplify matters, People's Press opted for a plain aesthetic for the Four Books. Editorial guidelines from the period suggested that major political works should appear in a nofrills style shorn of much decoration, and the designers of the Four Books stuck closely to these guidelines.¹⁷ As shown in figure 1.1, for example, for three of the Four Books the designers adopted a threadbare design with the title and press name both printed in black on creamy-yellow paper. One horizontal red line offers the only other design feature. The fourth title is even plainer, containing only black typography. When compared to other publications dotted throughout this dissertation, the Four Books struck a deliberately plain, somber tone. By creating an unappealing front cover, the press paradoxically heightened the chance of readers focusing their attention on the text between the covers.

¹⁷ Shandong renmin chubanshe bianwu zu 山东人民出版社编务组. 编辑工作手册 [Handbook on Editorial Work] ([Ji'nan?]: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1974), 271.



Figure 1.1: The front covers of the Four Books.¹⁸

Plausible documentation illustrates the intense interest of China's most senior leaders in

¹⁸ Image source: Renmin chubanshe, *Anthology Volume One* (Beijing renmin chubanshe); Renmin chubanshe, *Anthology Volume Two* (Beijing renmin chubanshe); Zhongyang dangxiao, *A Collection of Lu Xun's Criticisms* (Renmin chubanshe); Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 五四以来反动派、地主资产阶级学者尊孔复古言论辑录 [A Collection of Sayings from Post-May Fourth Reactionary and Landlord-Capitalist Intellectuals Praising Confucius and Old Ways] (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1974).

moving the publication of the Four Books forward at a breakneck speed. In the evening of 23 January 1974, Xu Guangxiao (徐光霄), the head of the NBP, wrote to Zhou Enlai about the publication of *Anthology Volume One*. By this point, People's Press had already sent a draft manuscript – titled *An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Confucius* (批孔文章汇编) – to printing factories for typesetting and Xu estimated that books could begin rolling off presses in just four to five days' time. In the letter, Xu asked Zhou to approve changing the name of the anthology to include Lin Biao as well as Confucius and thus parallel the language of the campaign. Zhou agreed the following day, in the process also signing-off on a draft preface for the volume. Jiang Qing, another senior leader, took the extra step of adding the characters for "Criticize Lin" (批 林) at every occurrence of the draft title in Xu's letter to make the link between Lin and Confucius unmissable.¹⁹ Clearly, the book was already fully drafted by January 23, and senior leaders did not waste any time greenlighting final publication: politicians and publishers viewed publishing the Four Books as an urgent and important matter.

In addition to producing the Four Books quickly, the NBP faced significant political pressure to deliver them to the broadest possible readership. In correspondence with senior leaders, Xu suggested restricting circulation of one of the Four Books, namely *A Collection of Sayings from Post-May Fourth Reactionary and Landlord-Capitalist Intellectuals Praising Confucius and Old Ways*. Due to the book's content, Xu most likely feared the ramifications of providing ordinary people with unfettered access to heretical material ripe for misuse or misinterpretation. In Xu's eyes, circulating the title internally and providing no copies to bookstores for public sale would forestall significant potential trouble. Jiang, however, overrode

¹⁹ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 172-174.

this suggestion, ordering Xu to disseminate the book as widely as possible. Jiang apparently understood that for people to properly criticize contemporary adherents to Confucian ideas, they paradoxically needed to know as much as possible about these insidious views.²⁰

With Xu given his marching orders to publish quickly and for a broad audience, People's Press sent manuscripts of the Four Books to press, with final proofs (清样) ready the following morning. Next, People's Press sent these to the central government, with the NBP (or perhaps even higher-level leaders) approving the proofs on January 25.²¹ One day later, *The People's Daily* used the formulation "Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius" for the first time in an article.²² As the campaign gathered pace in newspapers, the NBP was ready to throw all its energy into disseminating the Four Books.

Despite People's Press having yielded to pressure, the retarded state of Chinese printing technology threatened to scupper the NBP's efforts before they had even begun. As Chapter Six explains, while contemporary industries in Japan and the United States already made wide use of phototypesetting, China's printing factories still mostly typeset by hand.²³ Therefore, a significant limitation to high-volume printing was not only the number of presses available in each factory, but also the time and lead type required to typeset one forme (a specialized term referring to a collection of type locked in position within a chase) ready for printing. For factories using more than one printing machine to maximize production, large amounts of skilled labor was needed to cast type and prepare multiple formes. Furthermore, while other countries

²⁰ Ibid., 172-174.

²¹ Ibid., 180-181.

²² "人民解放军广泛开展拥政爱民运动" [The People's Liberation Army begins an expansive movement to support the government and cherish the people]. *The People's Daily*, January 26, 1974, 1.

²³ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 473.

had access to faster offset printing, Chinese printers continued to use letterpress (凸版印刷), whereby the ink is applied to protruding lead surfaces and transferred to the page.²⁴ In this process, the lead type had a tendency to wear down quickly, decreasing the quality of impressions on the paper as the run proceeded. This meant that type would need regular recasting to print the runs required for the campaign, threatening further delays.

Chinese state publishers successfully circumvented these difficulties, however, by harnessing the power of nineteenth century technology in a twentieth century context. In the 1830s, British printers began employing papier-mâché to make molds ("flongs") of printing plates, with lead then poured into these molds to cast copies of printing plates. This entire process is known as "stereotyping." One hundred years later, research by scientists in Japan and elsewhere developed new lead alloys for use in casting plates. By the 1970s, Chinese printers could create reusable flongs either by hand or by using a mechanized molding press. Once the mold had been baked, they then poured a combination of lead, tin and antimony – one of the Japanese discoveries – into each flong and waited for the metal to solidify. Printers used stereotyping to quickly produce multiple impressions of the same set of type for loading into printing machines, with one flong able to make many stereotypes in its lifespan.²⁵

The NBP used stereotyping and its control of the printing industry to spread the burden of printing the Four Books nationwide and grow production exponentially. By January 26 and 27 - less than 48 hours after central officials approved the proofs of the Four Books – it sent airplanes carrying papier-mâché flongs of each title to almost every municipality, province, and

²⁴ Shandong renmin, *Handbook on Editorial Work*, 231-232.

²⁵ Leslie Newell, *Stereotyping and Electrotyping* (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1952), 261-264; ibid., 230; Shanghai fu Zang jishu peixun zu 上海赴藏技术培训组, 凸版印刷手册 [*A Handbook on Relief Printing*] ([Lhasa?]: Xizang xinhua yinshua chang, 1973), 83 and 88.

autonomous region.²⁶ With flongs in hand, factories could start printing only a short time after the plane from Beijing had landed. Furthermore, as stereotype plates wore out, factories could easily melt them down and recast them off another flong, and if they ran out of flongs they simply made new ones using one of the stereotyped plates. As a precaution, printers kept the lightweight flongs in reserve in case they needed to issue further printings of a title at a later date, giving them maximum flexibility to meet unexpected demand for material. Stereotyping, while a relatively simple technological process, provided the foundation of the state's mass circulation of ideas.

The system of dividing printing responsibilities geographically using stereotypes - termed "mold-renting" (租型) - allowed for truly enormous print-runs of the Four Books. The printing of over one billion copies of *Quotations from Chairman Mao* (毛主席语录, known informally as "Mao's Little Red Book") is a well-known example of how China's state publishing sector could print untold volumes of material using mold-renting.²⁷ Likewise, by conscripting the country's entire provincial-level printing apparatus into the mold-renting system, the NBP facilitated astronomic output of the Four Books that exceeded even its own projections. A report drawn up by the NBP on February 8 – less than two weeks after the stereotypes left Beijing for the provinces – predicted that printers nationwide would collectively churn-out over 57 million copies of *each* volume, equivalent to one copy for every fifteen to sixteen people.²⁸ In early March 1974, the party media mouthpiece *The People's Daily* triumphantly reported that the

²⁶ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 180-181.

²⁷ For an estimate of the total number of copies of *Quotations from Chairman Mao* printed, see Daniel Leese, *Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China's Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 108.

²⁸ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 180-181. In early 1974, China's population was approximately 900 million. For population figures, see Guojia tongji ju, *Historical Statistics*, 2.

nation's bookstores had distributed over 200 million copies of the Four Books in total. The paper had nothing but praise for the way booksellers and book distribution staff had thrown themselves into the effort to "closely support the development of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign" (密切配合了批林批孔运动的开展).²⁹ Considering that Xinhua Bookstore sold approximately 3.1 billion books in 1974, this initial distribution of the Four Books accounted for almost eight percent of these sales.³⁰ Yet even this figure underestimated the true extent of printing: by May, an internal report put the number of copies sold at around 270 million.³¹

Although state statistics were not always reliable in this period, print-run data from the provinces suggest that the NBP's estimates and the claims of state media came closer to reality than exaggeration. In Zhejiang, Zhejiang People's Press (浙江人民出版社) released a first wave of 1.5 million copies of *Anthology Volume One* and *Anthology Volume Two*.³² In February, it produced another half a million copies of *Anthology Volume Two* to meet additional demand.³³ In Gansu, the first print-run of *Anthology Volume Two* reached 1.12 million copies, while at the end of January and the beginning of February Beijing produced 2.8 million copies of each of the

 ²⁹ "各地新华书店积极发行批林批孔图书" [Xinhua Bookstores across the country enthusiastically distribute Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign books]. *The People's Daily*, March 3, 1974, 2.
 ³⁰ For information on Xinhua's total sales, see "Xinhua shudian liushi nian jishi" bianweihui 《新华书店 六十年纪事》编委会, ed., 新华书店六十年纪事: 1937-1997 [*A Record of Sixty Years of Xinhua*

Bookstore: 1937-1997] (Beijing: Haiyang chubanshe, 2001), 242.

³¹ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 192.

 ³² Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(一) [An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume One] (Zhejiang: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1974), copyright page; Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(二) [An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two] (Zhejiang: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1974), copyright page.
 ³³ Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(二) [An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two], Second Printing (Zhejiang: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1974), copyright page.

Four Books.³⁴ Such mass printing far exceeded the NBP's early expectations. In his letter to Zhou Enlai on January 23, Xu Guangxiao estimated that publishers would print ten million copies of *Anthology Volume One*, but as the importance of distributing Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign literature to officials and the public increased, the NBP's network of printing presses printed six times Xu's original predictions.³⁵

Unofficial reprinting of the Four Books by organizations outside of the official publishing sector pushed the numbers even higher. Without statistical data – which may not exist – it is hard to exactly gauge the extent of reprinting, but surviving editions suggest that this practice was widespread. For example, the propaganda department in the central government's Third Ministry of Machines (三机部政治部宣传部) produced its own, distinctive version of *Anthology Volume Two*.³⁶ The department's version lacks the (minimal) design trappings of the normal People's Press edition, while it set the main text in a smaller font, reducing the overall length of the book by ten pages compared to the mass-produced version. Furthermore, the department decided to aid readers by adding two appendices and a short dictionary of key terms. Other organizations similarly invested resources in producing their customized versions of the Four Books. The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) General Logistics Department (总后勤部) published their own combined version of the two anthologies, while another unattributed edition of *Anthology Volume One* was typeset entirely from scratch. Units such as these able to print their own copies contributed to a substratum of propaganda proliferation that compounded the extraordinary

³⁴ Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(二)[An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two] (Gansu: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1974), copyright page; Zhongguo xinwen, Historical Materials, vol. 14, 180-181.

³⁵ Ibid., 172-174.

³⁶ San ji bu zhengzhi bu xuanchuan bu 三机部政治部宣传部, 批林批孔文章汇编(二)[*An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two*] (Beijing: San ji bu zhengzhi bu xuanchuan bu, 1974).

output of official publishers.

A media blitz at the beginning of the campaign stoked demand for the Four Books and piled on the pressure for printers to deliver them to the hands of readers quickly. On January 22, a CCP notice required work units to begin studying anti-Confucianism materials, driving demand for the Four Books and other titles.³⁷ Six days later, *The People's Daily* proudly announced that distribution of the Four Books in Beijing would begin the same day, billing the titles as tools to help party cadres and the masses participate in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.³⁸ Alongside this national level media splash, provincial newspapers such as Shanghai's *Wenhui*

Daily (文汇报), The Inner Mongolia Daily (内蒙古日报) and The Xinjiang Daily (新疆日报)

featured news of the books' release on the same or the following day.39

More in-depth media reporting and local government intervention further bolstered demand for the Four Books. In early February, *Wenhui Daily* printed an article on the volume of Lu Xun's anti-Confucian criticisms, describing the book as a "finely honed ideological weapon for criticizing Lin and criticizing Confucius" (这是批林批孔的锐利思想武器).⁴⁰ In Yunnan,

³⁷ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shi 中共中央文献研究室, ed., 毛泽东年谱 1949-1976 [A Chronology of the Life of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976], Volume 6 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2013), 519.

³⁸ "配合工农兵群众和干部深入批林批孔: 四本批林批孔书籍出版" [Support the workers, peasants and soldiers, as well as cadres, and deepen their participation in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign: four Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign books have been published]. *The People's Daily*, January 28, 1974, 1.

³⁹ "配合工农兵群众和干部深入批林批孔" [Support the workers, peasants and soldiers, as well as cadres, and deepen their participation in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign]. *Wenhui Daily*, January 28, 1974, 1; "为配合广大工农兵群众和干部深入批林批孔" [Publishing to support the workers, peasants and soldiers, as well as cadres, and deepen their participation in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign]. *The Inner Mongolia Daily*, January 28, 1974, 4; "配合工农兵群众和干部深入批林批孔" [Support the workers, peasants and soldiers, as well as cadres, and deepen their participation in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign]. *The Inner Mongolia Daily*, January 28, 1974, 4; "配合工农兵群众和干部深入批林批孔" [Support the workers, peasants and soldiers, as well as cadres, and deepen their participation in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign]. *The Xinjiang Daily*, January 29, 1974, 4. ⁴⁰ Zhong Bin 钟彬, "批孔是为了更好地批林" [The purpose of criticizing Confucius is to better Criticize Lin]. *Wenhui Daily*, February 4, 1974, 3.

the provincial government ordered bookstores to set up special display stands to advertise the new publications, while in Guizhou the provincial Xinhua Bookstore leadership sent a notice on January 29 calling for workplaces to speedily acquire the Four Books.⁴¹ Media and bureaucracy worked in tandem to maximize awareness of the new propaganda titles.

Yet despite the widespread printing of the Four Books, local conditions stratified access to them and caused the campaign to develop haphazardly in its crucial early phase. Unsurprisingly, developed cities such as Beijing with long histories of book publishing possessed the most advanced printing networks. Located in the same city as People's Press, Beijing's municipal publishing network began printing books on January 27 and had successfully issued 2.8 million copies of each volume (11.2 million in total) by February 5.⁴² As table 1 shows, to produce these 11.2 million volumes in only ten days, municipal officials deployed an extensive network of printing presses under local and central government control to maximize the number of printing machines in operation. At least three printers (including two belonging to Beijing municipality and one belonging to a central publishing house) shared production of the lengthier *Anthology Volume One*, with the same centrally-controlled printer also producing the slimmer volume of Lu Xun's anti-Confucian criticisms. At least six different printing facilities, and probably many more, contributed to the mass production of the Four Books in Beijing.

⁴¹ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Yunnan juan (1950-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华 书店发展大系·云南卷(1950-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·云南卷(1950-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Yunnan Volume, 1950-2017*] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2017), 84; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Guizhou juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华书店发展大系·贵州卷(1949-2017)编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·贵 州卷(1949-2017)[*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Guizhou Volume, 1949-2017*] (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 2017), 58.

⁴² Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 180-181.

Title	Known Factories Responsible For Printing
An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and	Beijing No. 1 Printing Press 北京印刷一厂
<i>Criticizing Confucius Volume One</i> 批林批孔文 章汇编(一)	Beijing No. 2 Xinhua Printing Press 北京第二 新华印刷厂
	新华印刷) China Youth Press Printing Press 中国青年出
	版社印刷厂
An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and	Beijing No. 1 Printing Press 北京印刷一厂
Criticizing Confucius Volume Two 批林批孔文	Beijing No. 2 Printing Press 北京印刷二厂
章汇编(二)	Beijing No. 3 Printing Press 北京印刷三厂
A Collection of Lu Xun's Criticisms of the Way	China Youth Press Printing Press 中国青年出
of Confucius and Mencius 鲁迅批判孔孟之道	版社印刷厂
的言论摘录	
A Collection of Sayings from Post-May Fourth	Agricultural Press Printing Press 农业出版社
Reactionary and Landlord-Capitalist	印刷厂
Intellectuals Praising Confucius and Old Ways	
五四以来反动派、地主资产阶级学者尊孔复	
古言论辑录	

Table 1.1: Printing the Four Books in Beijing.⁴³

Like Beijing, Shanghai could also mobilize a large, easily press-ganged printing workforce to produce material as fast as possible. Archival reports and newspaper articles from Shanghai tell of labor 'heroes' who threw themselves into the printing of the Four Books, and we can read these accounts as evidence of the pressure staff faced in the workplace to prioritize work over all else. Older workers turned to pedal-operated stapling machines to bind books when automated binding machine capacity ran out, binding 10,500 titles in a single shift. Another elderly worker apparently manned folding machines at two-thirty in the morning so that she could help produce *Anthology Volume One*.⁴⁴ On New Year's Eve (January 22, 1974), other workers distributed over 1800 reams of paper around the city, and after the holiday they drove

⁴³ Data in this table is compiled from my own collections, as well as copies from the University of California, Irvine's Langson Library and the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.

⁴⁴ SMA B167-3-271-28, "上海市印刷工业公司革命委员会关于突击印制中央的政治印件的情况汇 报" [A report of the Shanghai Municipal Printing Company Revolutionary Committee on prioritizing the printing of centrally-mandated political documents].

into the night to get paper to printers as quickly as possible.⁴⁵ In a full-page splash of photos charting the new campaign, one of Shanghai's two main newspapers included an image of staff at Shanghai Xinhua Printing Press (上海新华印刷厂) hard at work printing campaign materials (figure 1.2). The picture does not record the titles of the books stacked at the front, but as this photo was published in early February they are probably copies of one or more of the Four Books. A banner hanging above the printers urges them to "print more and bind faster to provide artillery shells for criticizing Lin and criticizing Confucius" (多印快订,为批林批孔提供炮 弾). A few days after this picture was published, the same newspaper carried another article drawing attention to printers and their efforts to produce books as quickly as possible.⁴⁶



Figure 1.2: All hands on deck printing the Four Books at Shanghai Xinhua Printing Press.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶"认真做好出版工作,为批林批孔服务" [Earnestly undertake publishing work to serve the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign]. *Wenhui Daily*, February 5, 1974, 2.

⁴⁷ Image source: Wenhui Daily, February 2, 1974, 4.

Elsewhere, the variable condition of provincial printing infrastructure directly affected how the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign unfolded. When announcing the release of the Four Books in Beijing on January 28, The People's Daily itself conceded that the books would only become gradually available nationwide, and in practice readers in some parts of the country had to wait a lot longer than others before their bookstores received copies.⁴⁸ Besides Beijing, some provinces and municipalities in the eastern third of the country – including Guangdong, Liaoning, Shanghai, Tianjin, Henan, and Jiangsu – began distributing books for purchase by the end of January. On the other hand, provinces such as Shandong, Hebei, and Anhui had not even begun printing by February 8. Ironically, eight outlying provinces with the least advanced printing facilities acquired stocks of books faster than many other parts of the country precisely because of their poor infrastructure. Beijing municipality printed books on behalf these areas, with half a million copies of each book sent to these underdeveloped regions by February 6.49

In addition to advanced printing facilities, sophisticated book distribution networks in major areas also helped put the Four Books into the hands of work units and ordinary people very quickly. In the week before the release of the Four Book, Xinhua Bookstore officials in Beijing held two meetings of booksellers from all district and county bookstores to make preparations. Similar to all good bookshops preparing for a major launch, bookstore managers in some key retail branches set up cases and shelves to display the new release. Special supply

⁴⁸ "Support the workers, peasants, and soldiers, as well as cadres." *The People's Daily*, January 28, 1974, ⁴⁹ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 180-181.

stations liaised with government departments and other work units (机关单位) to take pre-orders for copies.⁵⁰ According to *Wenhui Daily* reporting, staff in Shanghai worked feverishly to deliver books to readers, and the city's bookstores ran special displays of the titles.⁵¹

Yet even in these developed urban areas, the state's relentless pressuring of people to consume propaganda ultimately exposed its inability to supply such material. Despite careful planning, swarms of readers caught Beijing's bookstores unprepared on the day the Four Books went on sale. Between the morning of January 28 and the evening of January 29, the city's bookstores distributed 100,000 copies of *Anthology Volume One* and 130,000 of *Anthology Volume Two*, as well as 340,000 of Lu Xun's criticisms of Confucius and 50,000 of the fourth of the Four Books. Queues quickly formed at larger Xinhua Bookstore branches in the Wangfujing and Qianmen areas, while the branch in Xidan saw queues develop at seven o'clock in the morning. In Wangfujing, queues at their peak numbered 160 to 170 people. Across Beijing, stocks ran out almost as soon as they arrived, with some people willing to wait three to four hours to lay their hands on the next batch.⁵² As further evidence of shortages, on February 10, Jiang Qing sent one hundred copies each of three of the titles to the National Defense Intelligence and Information Research Institute (国防科委情报资料研究所) because they could not track down copies of the books.⁵³

The crowds competing for copies at bookstores included a handful of foreigners resident in Beijing. Booksellers made detailed notes of their interactions with these visitors, and their

⁵⁰ BMA 201-3-51, "新华书店、中国书店关于图书发行工作情况" [Reports from Xinhua Bookstore and China Bookstore concerning book distribution].

⁵¹"认真做好批林批孔材料发行工作" [Earnestly undertake distribution of Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign materials]. *Wenhui Daily*, February 12, 1974, 3.

⁵² BMA 201-3-51.

⁵³ John Sisyphus, 毛泽东的旗手: 江青与"文革"(下) [*Mao Zedong's Standard Bearer: Chiang Ching and the Cultural Revolution (II)*] (New Taipei: Sisyphus Publishing, 2015), 223.

reports to superiors convey these foreigners' perception of the buzz surrounding the Four Books when they launched in Beijing. On January 29, staff at the Wangfujing branch saw Japanese embassy staff purchase three copies of one title and two copies of another. The demand for copies prompted the diplomats to ask a clerk whether it compared with the launch of *Quotations from Chairman Mao* in 1966. They also snapped photos of the noteworthy queues. The previous day, a staffer from the Romanian embassy also went to Wangfujing to buy the Four Books, but a search by staff revealed that the branch had completely run out of copies. The Romanian proactively introduced himself to avoid any suspicion that he came from China's ideological friend-turned-foe, the Soviet Union. This was a smart move: on January 30, Soviet citizens (possibly officials from the Soviet embassy) were politely but firmly asked to leave when they tried to buy the Four Books at another Xinhua branch in the city.⁵⁴

While a curiosity, foreigners were the observers rather than the creators of the pressure placed on the limited supply of books in the capital. Instead, work unit cadres keen to acquire study materials as soon as possible bypassed conventional supply channels and directly competed with everyday purchasers at retail branches. Typically, for major publications, work units such as farms, factories, and workshops received allocations of key propaganda titles through separate internal supply channels, but they saw bookstores as an immediate and reliable supply line for the new campaign material. For example, a timber yard and a mine both sent trucks with three to five people to retail stores to buy copies of the Four Books. When confronted with work unit representatives, booksellers assured them that they could secure materials through the usual internal channels, but the representatives often preferred to stake out the next delivery of books to the bookstore instead. To try to ease the pressure, on January 30 Xinhua officials sent

⁵⁴ BMA 201-3-51.

bookstores an urgent message telling them to re-emphasize to work unit purchasers that they should obtain copies through normal supply routes. At the same time, Xinhua informed work units that it would complete internal dispersion of the Four Books by February 10 at the latest. Asking work units to wait until February 10 (almost two weeks later) can hardly have dissuaded cadres keen to secure copies as soon as possible from competing for them at bookstores.⁵⁵

Copies of the Four Books also ran out because of the lackluster attempts by the military's propaganda production arm to provide soldiers with material. At this time, the PLA's General Political Office possessed its own publishing outfit – People's Liberation Army Soldiers Press (中国人民解放军战士出版社, hereafter "Liberation Army Press") – charged with producing books for soldiers to study.⁵⁶ High demand from the troops, coupled with an underwhelming production pace, however, led Liberation Army Press to estimate that it would not complete its scheduled printing of the Four Books in Beijing until February 20 – over three weeks after the titles first became available in bookstores.⁵⁷ To make up for a lack of copies, soldiers like those from Beijing's 8779 Platoon (部队) thus joined cadres and the public shopping at retail stores for copies. Even worse, many military units ordered material from both Liberation Army Press and Xinhua Bookstore to maximize their chances of securing copies as quickly as possible.⁵⁸ This action doubled demand from the military at a time when demand already outstripped supply.

Even in an advanced printing hub such as Beijing, shortages and competition for books

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Jiefang jun chubanshe 解放军出版社, ed., 为国防现代化服务四十年 1948-1988: 解放军出版社成立 四十周年纪念 [Forty Years Serving the Modernization of National Defense, 1948-1988: Commemorating the Fortieth Anniversary of the Founding of Liberation Army Press] (Beijing: Jiefang jun chubanshe, 1988), 37.

⁵⁷ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 180-181. ⁵⁸ BMA 201-3-51.

left the progress of the campaign in rural suburbs lagging behind the city center. When planning the release of the Four Books, Xu Guangxiao and senior party leaders committed to providing a plentiful supply of materials to work teams within rural agricultural communes.⁵⁹ Around two weeks after the release of the titles, however, officials already knew that not enough books were finding their way to Beijing's surrounding countryside. Xinhua estimated that the 2.3 million copies of each title distributed in Beijing municipality had satisfied demand from central and local party organizations, and production had also met the needs of work units responsible for seventy to eighty percent of the city's factory and mining workforce. Books had likewise reached street-level revolutionary committees and party cells. In complete contrast, while cadres in the municipality's rural work teams (大队) had access to copies, this left few remaining for sale to farmers and city youth working on farms (知识青年). While Jiang Qing sent 200 copies of each of the Four Books to some rusticated youth in Henan province, Beijing's rural communities enjoyed no such luck. Such disparity became the inevitable consequence of Xinhua's practical inability to holistically manage the day-to-day distribution of printed material. The only obvious solution was to print yet more copies: Beijing's printers set themselves a target of printing another 700,000 copies of each title in just one week and distributing them straight off the press.60

In summary, the launch of the Four Books perfectly captures both the enormous strength and the inherent weakness of political communication in 1970s China. The NBP divided the burden of printing nationwide and used stereotyping technology, in turn ensuring production of huge quantities of books across the country in the shortest possible timeline. Powerful printing

⁵⁹ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 172-174.

⁶⁰ All details on the situation in Beijing in this paragraph are taken from ibid., 180-181. For Jiang Qing's distribution of copies, see Sisyphus, *Mao Zedong's Standard Bearer*, 221.

centers such as Beijing also stepped in to print material on behalf of areas with under-developed infrastructure. On-the-ground conditions, however, exposed disparities in the growth of the campaign in different parts of the country. A range of groups – urban residents, people in provinces with the most advanced printing systems, and those who joined queues at bookstores earliest – found themselves with earlier, precious access to more of the printed political capital they needed to participate in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Previous research on the Cultural Revolution has shown how local conditions affected the development of campaigns at a local level.⁶¹ Here, I have shown how attention to the production and circulation of printed books provides another methodology to explore the varying local histories of national political movements.

The Liabilities of Mass Circulation

As the above account of the Four Books aptly demonstrates, the Chinese state distributed important printed political information in massive quantities. Such a strategy promised significant rewards – the dissemination of ideas on a national scale – but correspondingly entailed significant risks. Other parts of this dissertation, for example, argue that politicized printing sucked the stability out of the country's entire publishing system and repeatedly undercut the progress of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. With the Four Books, however, the state shouldered a different kind of risk, namely that each title's content accurately reflected the nuances of the CCP's binary 'good versus bad' political culture. The following

⁶¹ For examples of this research, see: Andrew Walder, *Fractured Rebellion: the Beijing Red Guard Movement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Walder and Dong, "Nanjing's "Second Cultural Revolution" of 1974"; Forster, "The Politics of Destabilization and Confrontation"; Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism*.

pages chart the significant, surely irreparable, damage that an error in one of the books inflicted on the campaign in its early stages. Mass reproduction, so recently a sign of the state's power over a national network of publishers and printers, amplified the fallout from this error. From this case, I argue that the state's system of printed political communication included a structural tenuousness that could quickly sabotage the best laid plans of mice and Mao.

In the early weeks of the Criticize Lin, Criticize campaign, bookstores became one of the principle distributors of illicit political material. State leaders had intended some of this from the start. As discussed earlier, one of the Four Books contained statements from "reactionaries" and "landlord-capitalist intellectuals," but these labels clearly signaled to readers the correct way to interpret this content. In another of the Four Books, however, the manuscript editors from the Central Party School (中央党校) inadvertently included comments from Lu Xun in which he quotes the early CCP theoretician Qu Qiubai (瞿秋白).62 This was a serious oversight. By the 1970s, the CCP had consigned Qu and his ideas to posthumous political oblivion because he represented "the liberal intellectual who vacillated between his commitment to the revolution and commitment to his work, the kind of ambivalent intellectual the Cultural Revolution sought to reject."⁶³ Almost immediately after receiving word of the error, in the evening of February 8 the CCP's Politburo discussed the next steps, doubtless mindful of the embarrassing fact that central government officials had personally approved proofs of the book in January. Ultimately, it decided to recall the first edition and issue a revised second edition with the offending material removed. Zhou Enlai tasked Xu Guangxiao and the Central Party School with cleaning up the mess.64

⁶² Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 179.

⁶³ Merle Goldman, "The Political Use of Lu Xun," *The China Quarterly* 91 (September 1982): 451.

⁶⁴ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 179.

Following the overnight transformation of the first edition from essential to subversive reading material, the NBP now had cause to rue its actions of the previous few weeks. Its ability to spread printing loads across multiple sites, coupled with the large print-runs of the Four Books and the high demand for the books stoked by state media, became a double-edged sword. As a first step, the NBP issued a nationwide order on February 8 stopping all printing and distribution of the first edition.⁶⁵ This measure proved more effective in some areas than others. For example, the Xinhua Bookstore administration in Guizhou did not direct its bookstores to stop selling the book until February 15, one full week after the bureau's original order.⁶⁶ At the same time, personnel from the Central Party School finalized the content of the second edition and by February 12 local printers had almost finished preparing a set of papier-mâché stereotypes ready to send to publishers nationwide.⁶⁷ With only a few alterations, the second edition mirrored the length and design of the faulty first edition while carrying an amended copyright page.⁶⁸ Despite lauding the publication of the Four Books in January, *The People's Daily* understandably decided to keep quiet about the embarrassing reissue.

Publishers which had seized the initiative by rapidly printing the Four Books now had the largest fire to fight. Beijing – where printing proceeded at a breathtaking pace – faced a doubled workload of recalling huge quantities of the old version and distributing the revised edition in its place. Efforts proceeded most straightforwardly in centralized work units and organizations where bureaucracies exercised effective control over their personnel. For example, Xinhua

⁶⁵ Ibid., 183.

⁶⁶ Zhongguo xinhua shudian Guizhou juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui, *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Guizhou Volume, 1949-2017*, 58.

⁶⁷ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 183.

⁶⁸ Zhongyang dangxiao bianxie zu 中央党校编写组, ed., 鲁迅批判孔孟之道的言论摘录 [A Collection of Lu Xun's Criticisms of the Way of Confucius and Mencius], second edition (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974).

reported success in swapping copies in political organizations, factories, mines, schools, and the armed forces. By mid-March, it estimated that around seventy percent of work units in Beijing's built-up area had organized exchanges, with a corresponding percentage of the incorrect editions successfully recovered by the state. Conversely, in smaller workshops and countryside communes, the recovery-rate stood at only one third, with swapping proving especially difficult in Beijing's rural production teams. To complicate matters, Xinhua found that some organizations had previously sent copies of the faulty first edition to areas outside of the city's administrative control. For example, one railway bureau sent 15,000 copies elsewhere, while Airforce Command (空司) dispatched 10,000 copies away from the capital.⁶⁹ Xinhua had no way to retrieve these copies.

To compound matters, the small difference between the first and second editions led many organizations and readers to hold on to their original copies for two completely opposing reasons. On the one hand, some work units saw no need to worry about "troublesome" (嫌麻烦) swapping, because they argued that either of the almost-identical editions suited campaign study activities. On the other, recall activities paradoxically increased popular awareness of the small error and turned copies of the first edition into collectables. Xinhua staff in Beijing reported that, on hearing that the first edition contained problematic material, curious readers searched for copies to compare them with the new edition. The low price of the book – 0.09 *yuan* – only made such illicit collecting even easier.⁷⁰ In making so much of so small a change, the state undermined its subsequent attempts to set the political record straight.

Problems with the recall removed any pretense on the part of Xinhua Bookstore officials

⁶⁹ All information in this paragraph comes from BMA 201-3-51.

⁷⁰ All information in this paragraph comes from ibid.

that they could fully resolve the mess and forced them to confront the consequences of this failure. By mid-March 1974, the organized recall of the book had secured only 1.1 million – less than half – of the original 2.3 million copies distributed in Beijing, with more copies successfully recalled in urban areas than surrounding counties. While ostensibly committed to recalling more copies before the end of March, Xinhua officials came to the inevitable conclusion that they had no way to recall books sent to other places or those sold to individuals through retail stores. In addition to the political damage caused by the fiasco, the incomplete recall left them with around 600,000 unused copies of the second edition. Rather than leave the books languishing in warehouses, they sent 540,000 copies to two nearby provinces in need of extras.⁷¹ Today, copies of the incorrect first edition circulate freely in large quantities – the ultimate proof that nationwide recall activities enjoyed only partial success.

Of course, party propagandists were human beings capable of errors and oversights, but the state sowed the seeds of danger by attaching so much political meaning and strategic importance to the mass reproduction of the printed word. The mistake with one of the Four Books, amplified by the determination of the publishing sector and Xinhua Bookstore to spread the titles across the country, inhibited the state's promotion of a unified, politically-correct campaign message. Once the state addressed the problem, it unavoidably drew attention to its own incompetence, caused confusion, and increased demand for forbidden knowledge. Historians such as Sun Peidong and Nicolai Volland point to how underground printing operations, personal connections, and backchannels gave people access to banned literature and

⁷¹ All information in this paragraph concerning Beijing's recall situation comes from ibid.

other material.⁷² These reading practices indeed undermined official efforts to ensure that the population consumed "correct" information and ideas. Nonetheless, we should also appreciate the major and direct role propaganda slip-ups played in undermining the state's legitimacy and scuppering the progress of campaigns.

The debacle also highlighted how the campaign evolved in a precarious ideological environment ripe with possibility for damaging inconsistencies.⁷³ The compilers of the problematic title obviously forgot that Lu Xun, writing several decades before the CCP came to power, could not possibly adhere to the same stringent binary division of "right" and "wrong" seen in later party ideology. Similarly, as the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign developed, bookstores found it difficult to track how its ideas affected China's already-existing print culture. In January 1974, for example, astute readers in Beijing pointed out to Xinhua booksellers that, alongside the Four Books, they were still stocking copies of Fan Wenlan's (范 文澜) *A Short History of China* (中国通史简编). Fan's work contained a number of pro-Confucius viewpoints that contradicted some of the arguments in the Four Books.⁷⁴ With publishing so closely tied to politics, fluctuations in what counted as the "right" political line at any one moment left the country's propaganda publishers and distributors on constantly shifting, unpredictable ground.

⁷² Sun Peidong 孙沛东, "文革時期京滬知青階層化的個人閱讀" [The Stratification of Individual Reading Among Rusticated Youth from Beijing and Shanghai During the Cultural Revolution], *Ershi yi shiji* 二十一世紀 156 (August 2016): 78-98; Volland, "Clandestine Cosmopolitanism."

⁷³ For a short discussion of the difficulties propagandists faced following shifts in the party's assessments of Lin Biao's political errors after his death, see MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 354-356.

⁷⁴ BMA 201-3-51.

Inclusion at all Costs: Propaganda for Minority Readerships

To give the campaign a truly national dimension, it was essential for the party to target Chinese who did not speak the national language, Mandarin Chinese. Beginning in the early 1950s, the state classified the different groups of people living within the borders of the People's Republic of China into distinct ethnic groups.⁷⁵ Two decades later, while Han Chinese accounted for over ninety percent of the country's population, the remainder belonged to another 55 recognized groups.⁷⁶ Rough estimates place the population of non-Han minorities at between 40 and 60 million in the middle of the 1970s.⁷⁷ As many of these groups had their own language, state media and specialized publishers produced material in translation to incorporate this ethnic minority audience into mainstream political life and a broader national ideological community. Over the course of 1974, publishers spurred on the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign among some of the country's largest minority groups via a publishing program focused on eight different scripts (table 1.2).

⁷⁵ For the history of ethnic classification in the People's Republic of China, see Thomas Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.

⁷⁶ "Dangdai Zhongguo de minzu gongzuo" bianji weiyuanhui 《当代中国的民族工作》编辑委员会, ed., 当代中国的民族工作(下)[*Ethnic Minority Work in Contemporary China, Volume Two*] (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe and Xianggang zuguo chubanshe, 2009), 501.

⁷⁷ Guojia minzu shiwu weiyuanhui jingji si 国家民族事务委员会经济司 and Guojia tongji ju guomin jingji zonghe tongji si 国家统计局国民经济综合统计司, ed., 中国民族统计年鉴 1949-1994 [*An Annual of Chinese Ethnic Minority Statistics*, 1949-1994] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1994), 155.

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Title				Languag	Language and Month of Publication in 1974	ublication in 1	974		
	衩文 Chinese	蒙古文 Mongolian	藏文 Tibetan	维吾尔文 Uyghur	维吾尔新文字 Uyghur (Romanized script)	哈萨克文 Kazakh	哈萨克新文字 Kazakh (Romanized script)	托脱蒙古文 Todo Mongolian	朝鲜文 Korean
An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume One	Jan	Feb	Feb	Feb	April	Feb	Nov	Feb	Feb
An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two	Jan	March	May	March	Sept	April	Oct	March	Feb
A Collection of Lu Xun's Criticisms of the Way of Conflucius and Mencius (withdrawn first edition)	Jan				NO EDITIG	NO EDITION PRINTED			
A Collection of Lu Xun's Criticisms of the Way of Conflucius and Mencius (revised second edition)	Feb	Feb	March	Feb	March	Feb	April	March	Feb
A Collection of Sayings from Post-May Fourth Reactionary and Landlord-Capitalist Intellectuals Praising Confucius and Old Ways	Jan	March	June	Feb	March	March	Sept	March	Feb

Note: This table is based on information in Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju banben tushuguan 国家出版事业管理局版本图书馆, ed., 1974 全国总书目 [A Comprehensive Bibliography of National Publications: 1974] (Beijing: Zhonghua Books, 1977), 37-40.

As with the Chinese editions of the Four Books, publishers shared production responsibilities to speed along the publishing process. The task of translating, publishing, and printing each version fell to publishers and printers possessing the staff expertise and the typefaces needed for the relevant language. Thus, Inner Mongolia People's Press took charge of the Mongolian-language editions (with translation assistance offered by the province's principal newspaper and some linguists), while Yanbian People's Press (延边人民出版社) supervised production of the Korean translation and Xinjiang People's Press handled the Uyghur, Kazakh, and Todo Mongolian editions.⁷⁹ Perhaps due to the less developed printing infrastructures in Tibet and other Tibetan-speaking regions, Beijing's Minorities Press (民族出版社) and students from the capital's Central Nationalities College (中央民族学院) managed all of the Tibetanlanguage translations.⁸⁰ Again, as with the original editions of the Four Books, publishers and printers mobilized staff to usher the books to completion as soon as possible (figure 1.3).

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ This is not surprising. For the whole of 1974, Minorities Press published all the most important Tibetan-language materials, including translations of Mao Zedong's writings, major newspaper editorials, and speeches by Chinese delegates to the United Nations (see ibid., 641-646).



Figure 1.3: Staff at Minorities Printing Press (民族印刷厂) typeset campaign materials in translation.⁸¹

Despite the state's obvious desire to print materials fast, the publication dates of the various translations echo my earlier arguments about the campaign's uneven development nationwide. Above, I showed that the quality of local printing facilities and the level of competition for books affected how soon the Four Books reached the hands of readers. Table 1.2 illustrates that while publishers finished many minority-language translations by the end of March, readers of some titles had to wait as much as eight months before they could finally obtain copies. Whereas Yanbian People's Press's Korean translation operation proved extremely efficient, translations of several titles into reformed Uyghur and Kazakh scripts only finally rolled-off presses in the fall.

⁸¹ Image source: *Minorities Pictorial* no. 2 (February 1974), special insert, 4.

Like their mainstream peers, minority-language publishers also experienced the dangers of prioritizing speed over care. As with the content error in the volume of Lu Xun's criticisms of Confucius, rapid translation sometimes resulted in a sloppy final product containing errors that undermined the authority of the publication. The Kazakh translation of *Anthology Volume One*, published in February 1974, contained two errors discovered only after printing had commenced. Short of starting over, the publisher had no choice but to distribute the book with an accompanying erratum slip.⁸² Although far from ideal, these two errors in an important political text paled into insignificance alongside the twelve mistakes included on an erratum slip in one of the Uyghur reformed script translations.⁸³ As with the Lu Xun title withdrawn in February, these two titles with their error slips embodied the risks associated with rapidity.

To incorporate minority readers into the broader national campaign and remove financial barriers to political knowledge, the state also overtly manipulated the prices of the translations. The CCP believed that printed material should be as cheap as possible, and this notion undergirded a new industry-wide set of pricing guidelines formally introduced in summer 1973.⁸⁴ The NBP estimated that the new plans reduced the cost of political texts (such as the works of Mao, Marx and Lenin) by 25 percent compared to their pre-1966 level, while other political

⁸² Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(一)[An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume One], Kazakh translation ([Urumqi?]: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1974). I viewed this copy, including the inserted erratum slip, in the library of Minzu University of China (中央民族大学), Beijing.

⁸³ Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(一)[An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume One], Romanized Uyghur translation ([Urumqi?]: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1974). I viewed this copy, including the inserted erratum slip, in the library of Minzu University of China (中央民族大学), Beijing.

⁸⁴ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 99-103, 124-129 and 150-151; SMA B244-3-586-60, "中共国家计划革命委员会关于转发出版口《关于图书定价试行标准的请示报告》的函" [A notice from the State Planning Commission Party Revolutionary Committee forwarding the National Publishing Office's "Report and request for instructions concerning new preliminary book pricing standards"].

books and study materials would be 16 percent cheaper.⁸⁵ Under the new regulations, publishers were to set book cover prices according to a title's content and production complexity. Various pricing bands corresponded to different publishing genres, with the relevant band then used to calculate a cover price from the book's length and the design of its front cover.⁸⁶ For the Four Books, Zhou Enlai and other senior leaders directed that the Chinese versions should fall under the cheapest possible pricing band, in effect making them as inexpensive as possible (table 1.3).⁸⁷ The cover prices of the translations then mirrored the prices of the originals without regard for each translation's respective length or complexity. In other words, price parity trumped all physical disparity.

Book Title	Length (units of	Total Value of Contents	Cost of Front Cover	Cover Price (yuan)
	paper)	(yuan)	(yuan)	
An Anthology of Articles	4	$4 \ge 0.045 = 0.18$	0.03	0.21
Criticizing Lin and				
Criticizing Confucius				
Volume One				
An Anthology of Articles	2.75	$2.75 \ge 0.045 \approx$	0.03	0.15
Criticizing Lin and		0.12		
Criticizing Confucius				
Volume Two				
A Collection of Lu Xun's	1.25	1.25 x 0.045 ≈	0.03	0.09
Criticisms of the Way of		0.06		
Confucius and Mencius				
(second edition)				
A Collection of Sayings	1.75	$1.75 \ge 0.045 \approx$	0.03	0.11
from Post-May Fourth		0.08		
Reactionary and				
Landlord-Capitalist				
Intellectuals Praising				
Confucius and Old Ways				

Table 1.3: Pricing the Four Books in Chinese.

⁸⁵ To see the change in prices, compare documents on pages 99-103 and 124-129 of Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 124-129.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 172-174.

This price-matching in effect represented a state subsidy to ensure that the campaign's nationally-unified rhetoric circulated at a nationally-unified price. The size of subsidies could be considerable for languages such as Mongolian which used more space to present the same information compared to Chinese. As table 1.4 demonstrates, all the Mongolian translations should have cost more than their eventual cover price, with the subsidy for one title almost twice as much as the final cost to the reader. Multiplying the size of the subsidy for each Mongolian title by known print-run figures reveals that the final subsidy given to printing the Four Books in Mongolian totaled 30,000 *yuan*. It is unclear whether state publishers absorbed this subsidy as losses on their balance sheet or received reimbursement from the central government's coffers. Either way, including minority readers into a national community of readers through subsidies required only minimal financial outlay for a significant symbolic return.

Book Title	Length (units of paper)	Total Value of Contents (yuan)	Cost of Front Cover (yuan)	Projected Cover Price (yuan)	Actual Cover Price (yuan)	Subsidy (yuan)
An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume One	6.5	6.5 x 0.045 ≈ 0.29	0.03	0.32	0.21	0.11
An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two	4.5	4.5 x 0.045 ≈ 0.20	0.03	0.23	0.15	0.08
A Collection of Lu Xun's Criticisms of the Way of Confucius and Mencius (revised second edition)	2	2 x 0.045 = 0.09	0.03	0.12	0.09	0.03
A Collection of Sayings from Post-May Fourth Reactionary and Landlord-Capitalist Intellectuals Praising Confucius and Old Ways	6	6 x 0.045 = 0.27	0.03	0.30	0.11	0.19

Table 1.4: Pricing the Four Books in Mongolian.⁸⁸

United by Design: Creating Common Campaign Aesthetics

⁸⁸ Data sourced from: Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(一) [An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume One], Mongolian translation (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 1974); Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(二) [An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two], Mongolian translation, (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 1974); Zhongyang dangxiao bianxie zu 中央党校编写组, ed., 鲁迅批判孔孟之道的言论摘录 [A Collection of Lu Xun's Criticisms of the Way of Confucius and Mencius], second edition, first Mongolian translation (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 1974); Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 五四以来反动派、地主资产阶级学者尊孔复古言论辑录 [A Collection of Sayings from Post-May Fourth Reactionary and Landlord-Capitalist Intellectuals Praising Confucius and Old Ways], Mongolian translation (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 1974). I viewed copies of all these books in the library of Minzu University of China (中央民族大学), Beijing. See also Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1974, 37-40.

Beyond their content and price, the aesthetics of the Four Books and similarities between the Mandarin and minority-language editions invested the campaign with unity and coherence in its crucial early stages. In addition to acting as vehicles of communication, books acted as icons layered with symbolic meaning. Front covers and font choices articulated specific messages about the function of the Four Books and the broader tenor of the campaign. In this situation, industrial printing technologies such as stereotyping yielded another, often overlooked, benefit besides mass reproduction: across the country, copies of the Four Books appeared exactly the same. In effect, this technology guaranteed that all copies produced by official publishers contained the same text, presented in the same fonts and formats.⁸⁹ Furthermore, it avoided any danger of individual presses disrupting the carefully and tactically chosen design schemes of the volumes. Publishers of the translations likewise quoted the cover design of the Chinese originals to incorporate minority readers into broader reading communities. This common aesthetic linked readers in different parts of the country, even as local political factions seized on the campaign as a new chance to wage political warfare and settle old scores.⁹⁰

The scholarship of Marcos Sonzogni and Megan Ferry provides a useful perspective on modern Chinese print culture. In his *Re-Covered Rose*, Sonzogni discusses Umberto Eco's theory that the design of a front cover is a process of "manipulation," whereby the designer(s) use the cover to convey selected aspects of a book rather than encapsulate all of its content.⁹¹ In

⁸⁹ Printers used stereotyping to produce many other key publications including the works of Chairman Mao and anthologies of documents from key party meetings. For more on the printing of Mao texts, see Chapter Seven.

⁹⁰ For scholarship on local factionalism, see Walder and Dong, "Nanjing's "Second Cultural Revolution" and Forster, *Rebellion and Factionalism*, 131-176.

⁹¹ Marco Sonzogni, *Re-Covered Rose: a Case-Study in Book Cover Design as Intersemiotic Translation* (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2011), 21-22.

addition, he highlights the front cover's role as a visual advertisement to reel in a reader.⁹² Megan Ferry, in her recent study of Republican-era books written by women writers, examines how front covers constructed visual discourses of gender.⁹³ Together, this scholarship prompts me to view the covers of the Four Books as spaces where the state communicated with readers.

As shown in figure 1.1, the designers of the Four Books chose a plain, no-frills design encouraging readers to view them as means to an end (political study) rather than design objects in themselves. When compared to many of the titles discussed in other chapters, the Four Books offer readers few reasons to admire the front cover, pushing them instead to open the book and begin considering the content. In other words, the books do not try to garner reader interest as much as proactively hasten a reader's exposure to the state's propaganda. The centralized control of the printing of the Four Books nationwide ensured that local publishers and printers did not disrupt the messages of this cover design.

Extending the same analytical perspective to the pages between the covers, I suggest that the designers of the Four Books used typefaces to articulate each title's functional and practical purpose to readers. Publishing and editing manuals from the 1970s show that the publishing industry invested different typefaces with specific meanings. For example, by 1974 New Songti (新宋体) had become the standard face for presenting the main text in books because it offered clarity, simplicity, and a business-like feel.⁹⁴ In the words of one manual, New Songti transmitted information in a "comfortable and eye-catching" (舒适醒目感) way.⁹⁵ As an added advantage,

⁹² Ibid., 15.

⁹³ Ferry, *Chinese Women Writers*, esp. chapter 3.

⁹⁴ Jilin renmin chubanshe 吉林人民出版社, ed., 编辑手册 [Editorial Work Manual] ([Changchun?]: Jilin renmin chubanshe, nd.), 323; Shanghai fu Zang, Relief Printing, 45.

⁹⁵ Shanghai fu Zang, *Relief Printing*, 45.

the face lent itself to quick and easy carving and casting, meaning printers could rely on the availability of the face when needed.⁹⁶ All of the Four Books employ New Songti in a size and weighting that ensures that most readers do not even register its presence (figure 1.4). This clever page design focuses attention instead on the ideas contained in the text, strengthening the book's communicative role. Once again, stereotyping eliminated the risk that local printers would alter this page setup or produce their own inferior in-house design schemes.

⁹⁶ Jiangsu renmin chubanshe bianwu zu 江苏人民出版社编务组, 编辑手册 [Editorial Work Manual] ([Nanjing?]: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe bianwu zu, 1976), 144.

顽固地维护奴隶制的思想。 杨荣国 二千多年来,一直被反动的统治阶级尊为"圣人" 的孔子,究竟是个什么人? 列宁指出:"在分析任何一个社会问题时,马克思 主义理论的绝对要求,就是要把问题提到一定的历史 范围之内"(《论民族自决权》)。用历史唯物主义的观 点来分析孔子,就一定要根据当时阶级斗争的形势,看 一看孔子是站在那个阶级的立场上,他的思想是为那 个阶级的利益服务的。 孔子的政治立场 孔子(公元前五五一年到前四七九年),鲁国人,是 一个已经没落的殷氏族奴隶主贵族的后代。他所处的 时代,正是春秋(公元前七七〇年到前四七六年)晚期。 由于奴隶主的残酷剥削和压迫,奴隶不断起来反抗。如 公元前五五〇年,陈国筑城的奴隶暴动;公元前五二〇 年,周王室的"百工"(大部分是手工业奴隶)起来造反;

Figure 1.4: The first page textblock of *Anthology Volume One* typeset mostly with variations on the New Songti typeface family.⁹⁷

Additionally, the consistent design of the Four Books made them nationally recognizable, thereby increasing the power of images to encourage people to read and study the campaign's themes. For example, figure 1.5 shows a painting where the recognizable light-toned cover of

⁹⁷ Image source: Renmin chubanshe, Anthology Volume One (Beijing renmin chubanshe), 1.

one of the Four Books (circled) protrudes from the young woman's hand. This recognition more clearly links printed material, politics, and revolutionary activism. Similarly, readers across the country would have had no problem identifying that people in figure 1.6 are holding copies of either *Anthology Volume One* or *Anthology Volume Two*. The images play on this recognition to suggest that because others are reading the Four Books the viewer should too.



Figure 1.5: A propaganda image by the artist Shen Yaoyi (沈尧伊) reprinted in early 1974.98

⁹⁸ Image source: Story-Book Magazine no. 7 (April 1974), 1.




Figure 1.6: Residents of Qinghai browse the Four Books.99

To take this line of analysis one step further, I also argue that coordinating designs among different editions powerfully linked different ethnic groups together into one collective experience of political reading. For the translations into Mongolian, Korean and other languages, publishers mirrored the minimalism of the originals and avoided distinguishing their editions as much as possible. For example, the covers of *Anthology Volume Two* in Tibetan and Korean almost exactly replicate the spacing and color scheme of the Chinese version (figure 1.7). All the other translations I have seen have the same mirroring properties, with the exception of the Mongolian versions which by necessity present the text and the design elements vertically.¹⁰⁰ This aesthetic consistency echoes the CCP's wider preference for producing visual propaganda – such as art, posters and comic books – relatable across China's broad geographic, social and cultural constituencies.

⁹⁹ Image source: *Minorities Pictorial* no. 4 (March 1974), special insert, 1.

¹⁰⁰ For details of these books, see earlier notes in this chapter and the bibliography.




Figure 1.7: The front covers of two translations of the Four Books. The designers replicated the aesthetic of the Chinese originals.¹⁰¹

Clearly, the NBP and state publishers used books as objects layered with meaning to extend the reach and effectiveness of political communication. Technology played a key role in regulating and standardizing the appearance of the Four Books across the country, ensuring that publishers and printers had no opportunity or need to tamper with the carefully devised design scheme of each title. A central preoccupation of later chapters will be to argue that many different books played the role of physically embodying the ideological goals of the state during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.

¹⁰¹ Image source: Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(二) [An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two], Korean translation (Yanbian: Yanbian renmin chubanshe, 1974); Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(二) [An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two], Tibetan translation (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1974).

Specialized Political Publishing

The number of versions of the Four Books already considered in this chapter reflect the state's desire to spread anti-Confucianism narratives en masse to diverse audiences. These books provide a compelling case for the vibrancy, sophistication, and reach of Cultural Revolution-era publishing, and a few additional editions complete my picture of a publishing system committed to bringing everyone into the campaign's ideological fold. At the same time, these books – aimed at readers with poor eyesight – contravened the NBP's plans to build a national community of readers. Unlike translations for minorities, officials did not enforce price parity for large-print and Braille publications – a tacit admission that the state's largesse had its limits. While many editions of the Four Books symbolize state power, these specialized printings show practicality sometimes took precedence over politics.

Large-print versions of the Four Books signaled to their readers that they should not expect the same subsidies indirectly given to ethnic minorities. While the mass-produced Chinese versions used a font offering 22 lines per page, this format could not meet the needs of those with bad eyesight. People's Press, therefore, designed large-print paperback editions with expansive pages, increased space ('leading') between lines, and a font around twice the size of the standard text (figure 1.8).¹⁰² A printing press with supplies of the unusually large type produced the entire print-run – a modest 6,000 copies per title – and in February 1974 Xinhua

¹⁰² Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(一) [An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume One], large-print edition (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1974); Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(二) [An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two], large-print edition (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1974); Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 五四以来反动派、地主资产阶级学者尊孔复古言论辑录 [A Collection of Sayings from Post-May Fourth Reactionary and Landlord-Capitalist Intellectuals Praising Confucius and Old Ways], large-print edition (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1974).

Bookstore sent them to select bookstores across the country.¹⁰³ Some of these editions eventually found their way to the shelves of libraries where they circulated to readers as loans.¹⁰⁴ Whether bought by libraries or individuals, however, each copy cost almost double the price of the standard edition due to the large amount of paper used to make them.¹⁰⁵ For institutions purchasing copies, the extra cost represented only a miniscule proportion of their budgets, but symbolically the price difference reminded readers with poor eyesight that they did not deserve the same treatment as ethnic minorities and should expect to pay a premium for propaganda.

¹⁰³ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 180-181.

¹⁰⁴ See my large-print copies of *Anthology Volume One* and *Anthology Volume Two* marked with the stamp of the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee Party School's library (中共江西省委党校图书资料 室).

¹⁰⁵ Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1974*, 37-39.

了。统治者再也不能象西周那样按氏族,而必 分进行统治了。与此相适应,对奴隶的强制教 按地域进行了。在一个诸侯国中存在着不同好 他们有"民"有兵,对"公室"是很大的威胁。孔	练,也不得不 生氏的大夫,
<text><section-header><text><text></text></text></section-header></text>	已类"说成是 未作任何解 在见把在何解 在又把定封我" 历代问教" 历代问教育是 民"之类论调
奴隶主贵族的等级; 天子, 诸侯, 卿大夫等等, 也只能世袭, 不得僭越。孔子是"周礼"的忠实卫道士, 他对于春秋时代奴隶制等级制度的崩溃, 即由于"犯上作乱"所造成的"君不君, 臣不臣, 父不父, 子不子"的局面痛心疾首, 大声疾呼要维护"君君, 臣臣, 父父, 子子"秩序, 怎么可能去"打破阶级界限"呢? 很明显, 所谓"有教无	家"? 「问政治',都 L十九是受教 ³¹

Figure 1.8: A page from the large-print edition of *Anthology Volume One*, overlaid with a page from the standard-size original.¹⁰⁶

The argument that books taxed and excluded the disadvantaged equally applies to copies made for Braille readers. In 1953, the government introduced a unified Chinese Braille script and

¹⁰⁶ Image source: Renmin chubanshe, *Anthology Volume One*, large-print edition, 31.

by 1974 the country had 170 work units and organizations for the blind.¹⁰⁷ Presses in Beijing and Shanghai took responsibility for supplying Braille titles to the whole of the country, and a bibliography compiled in 1977 indicates that these presses produced at least 145 titles during 1974.¹⁰⁸

Braille copies of *Anthology Volume One* and *Anthology Volume Two* in my collection pointedly remind us that not all people consumed information in the same way. Beijing Braille Printing Press (北京盲文印刷厂) finished preparing the Four Books in translation by February 1974, and the copyright pages of my editions show that the press produced around 5000 copies by the end of March.¹⁰⁹ Asides from their content, these volumes have little in common with those made with ink. Braille printing involved punching thick paper to create relief arrangements of dots denoting particular Chinese characters, and because Braille requires more space per character than conventional printing, the finished productions were always large and bulky. For instance, in the case of *Anthology Volume One*, the mathematical volume of the Braille edition is twenty times that of the Chinese one.¹¹⁰ Moreover, the books take the idea of the front cover as a communicative space to its negative extreme. Neither *Anthology Volume One nor Anthology*

¹⁰⁷ "北京盲文出版社成立" [Beijing Braille Press Founded]. *The People's Daily*, December 31, 1978, 4; SMA B105-4-1258-6, 关于要求上海市盲文印刷所出版盲文批林批孔学习材料一事的调查 [An investigation concerning requests for Shanghai Braille Printing Press to publish Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign materials].

¹⁰⁸ Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1974, 2.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 37-40; Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇编(一) [*An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume One*], Braille translation, second printing (Beijing: Beijing mangwen yinshua chang, 1974), back cover; Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 批林批孔文章汇 编(二) [*An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume Two*], Braille translation, second printing (Beijing: Beijing mangwen yinshua chang, 1974), back cover.

¹¹⁰ For example, compare the Braille edition of *An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume One* with the Chinese original.

Volume Two contain any Braille script on their covers, meaning that a reader *must* turn the page to discover what book they are holding (figure 1.9).




Figure 1.9: The front cover of the Braille translation of Anthology Volume One.¹¹¹

While the state's coffers heavily subsidized Braille publications, it stopped short of pricematching the books with other editions and required purchasers to pay more for the privilege of reading in Braille. Braille printing used large quantities of more expensive dense paper strong enough to withstand punching and sustain a firm relief impression. Disregarding the front and

¹¹¹ Image source: Renmin chubanshe, *Anthology Volume One*, Braille translation.

back covers, one copy of *Anthology Volume One* uses approximately 6.5m² of high-density paper, meaning that with a cover price of 0.38 *yuan* buyers spent around 0.06 *yuan* per square meter. This figure is a lot less than the cost per square meter of the Chinese edition, showing that the state significantly underwrote the cost of the materials needed for Braille editions. But, at the same time, cover prices always exceeded those of the Chinese-language equivalents, guaranteeing that political participation came at a higher price for an already disadvantaged community.

Material Struggles: The Unfolding of a Paper Crisis

The publication history of the Four Books demonstrates how the propaganda publishing system operated and the challenges it faced, in addition to revealing how books as physical objects articulated narratives to readers. The tens of millions of each title circulating around China helped turn criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius into a mass political exercise, while specialized editions ensured that readers of every major linguistic group could not escape the campaign in print.

Printing the Four Books, however, mortgaged the longer-term health of the entire official publishing system in the pursuit of short-term political benefits. In this final section, I explain how mass printing consumed huge quantities of paper and fueled a paper crisis that destabilized publishing for the remainder of the Mao period. Since the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign began suddenly in early 1974, the printing of hundreds of millions of copies of the Four Books was not part of long-term publishing plans. The NBP asked publishers to print the Four Books using part of their annual paper allocations, and this unanticipated, compulsory

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demand on paper supplies derailed many future publishing goals. The long-term consequences of publishing the Four Books were a painful reminder that propaganda production could not happen without resources.

Under the planned economy, the NBP and other government departments set each publisher's annual paper allocation based on the papermaking industry's expected output and the individual needs of each press. In the second half of any given calendar year, the NBP would ask publishers, newspapers and other media organizations to report their expected paper consumption for the following year and decide how to distribute the country's available paper resources. If demand outnumbered supply, the NBP had to triage conflicting priorities. For 1974, while the NBP made 20,000 more tons of publishing paper available for 1974 compared to 1973, there remained an almost 100,000-ton gap between what publishers wanted and what the NBP could provide (table 1.5). Moreover, to allow for more publishing of school textbooks, the NBP could not avoid reducing the amount of paper available for *book* publishing to an amount 23,000 tons below the allocation for 1973. The NBP urged publishers to increase the quality and range of books and pay attention to the needs of specific audiences, while at the same time ensuring adequate supplies of Communist theoretical writings and political documents – an unhelpfully demanding request given that it had just cut the amount of paper available for such projects.¹¹²

¹¹² SMA B167-3-253-67, "国家出版事业管理局关于 1974 年新闻出版印张计划和用纸计划的通知" [A notice from the National Bureau of Publishing concerning planned paper and paper use for 1974].

	Year-on-year change in amount of publishing for book production, 1973-1974	-23,000				
	Amount of publishing paper allocated for book production, 1974	000'26				
	Year-on- year change in allocation of publishing paper, 1973-1974	+20,000				
	Shortfall of publishing paper for 1974	93,500				
tons	Allocation of publishing paper for 1974	220,500	50,642	169,858	3,235	15,400
Unit: tons	Year-on- year change in allocation of newsprint, 1973-1974	+15,700				
	Shortfall of newsprint for 1974	48,000				
	Allocation of newsprint for 1974	220,000	119,560	100,440	2,750	11,700
	Organizational level	Total	Central-level organizations	Provincial-level organizations	Beijing	Shanghai

Table 1.5: Statistics on paper allocations for 1974.

Note: This table is based on SMA B167-3-253-67. "Shortfall" refers to the difference between organizations' estimated paper consumption and the amount of paper eventually allocated to them; "provincial-level organizations" refers to publishers in provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions.

With publishing paper already scarce, the unanticipated task of printing the Four Books left publishers in extremely precarious positions. In Beijing Municipality, for instance, officials already felt considerable dissatisfaction with their paper allocation, and the extra burden of printing the Four Books only heightened their feeling of precarity. Having applied for 155,000 reams of book paper for 1974, the state could only promise 55,530. In a letter to the NBP, Beijing staff wrote made their feelings clear: "the distance between [our allocation] and the amount we need is just too large" (我们感到离实际需要的差距太大). Moreover, by the end of January printing the Four Books had eaten up over 12,000 reams of paper. Put another way, Beijing had used one fifth of its total allocation for 1974 in only one week. One month later, print-runs for *Anthology Volume One* and *Anthology Volume Two* now both exceeded three million, and printing of the Four Books had collectively needed over 25,000 reams of paper – almost fifty percent of all the publishing paper the municipality had at its disposal for the year.

In Shanghai, publishing staff faced an equally dire predicament. For the first two weeks of printing the Four Books, they used up to 50,000 reams of paper. Production rates at local paper mills (responsible for providing Shanghai with most of its allocation) reached only sixty percent of Shanghai's rate of consumption, with printers forced to raid 600 tons from emergency paper supplies stockpiled to print future volumes of Mao's writings.¹¹⁵ Even worse, in the rush to

¹¹⁴ BMA 201-3-52, "北京市出版办公室关于出版用纸的申请报告" [Applications from the Beijing Publishing Office for publishing paper].

¹¹⁵ SMA B167-3-253, "人民出版社关于纸张申请、调拨和使用等问题报告及上海市革委会文教组的 意见" [Reports from Shanghai People's Press regarding allocation, re-allocation, and use of paper, as well as opinions from the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee Culture and Education Group]. Another document from the Shanghai Municipal Archives gives a figure of 33,000 reams of paper used to print the Four Books. There is no immediate way to reconcile discrepancies between these figures, but in any case even the conservative number of 33,000 reams is a significant amount of paper. See SMA B167-3-240-

manufacture product, some mills missed quality-control targets, making their output useless for printing.¹¹⁶

Across the country, the Four Books upset publishers' carefully laid plans for the year. Assuming a minimum printing of 57 million copies per title, the Four Books used at least 555,000 reams of paper – equivalent to all the paper allocated to Shanghai for printing books in 1974. Put another way, the Four Books used thirteen percent of the total paper allocated by the NBP for printing books in China in 1974.¹¹⁷ While state media proclaimed the successful publication of the Four Books to the public, behind the scenes the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign dragged the publishing sector into the early stages of a profound paper crisis.

Conclusion

Publishing key political titles was a task of nationwide proportions. It involved central government bureaucrats and politicians, publishers from nearly every province and municipality, dozens of printing factories working from the same production template, and booksellers bringing books to readers. To cater to the widest possible audience, publishers produced many different editions to meet different needs. Translators reproduced the Chinese originals in ethnic minority languages, typesetters set large-print versions of each text, and a specialist press produced copies for blind readers. There should be no mileage left to the tired generalization that

^{23, &}quot;上海人民出版社编辑部编印的《情况交流》1974 年第 5 期" ["The Current Situation," 1974, no. 5, edited by the Shanghai People's Press Editorial Office].

¹¹⁶ SMA B167-3-253.

¹¹⁷ SMA B167-3-253-67 allocated a total of 4,131,470 reams of paper to central and provincial organizations.

"during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), publishing and bookselling in China came to a standstill."¹¹⁸

The above account of the printing and distribution of the Four Books reveals the ways the state exercised its power and the limitations on that power. The NBP divided the burden of printing nationwide and assisted provinces without the means to print large quantities of books. After the devolution of tasks, however, on-the-ground conditions and the inability of Xinhua bookstores to moderate and channel demand led to disparities and inconsistencies in distribution. A range of groups – urban residents, those in provinces with the most advanced printing systems, and people who joined queues at bookstores earliest – found themselves with privileged access to political capital and thus to the means to participate in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Previous research on the Cultural Revolution by the historians Andrew Walder and Dong Guoqiang has shown how local conditions affected the development of campaigns at the grassroots level. Studying political communication provides a further methodological perspective through which we can explain the varying local histories of national political movements.

The organization of the publishing sector also facilitated the formation of a shared national reading community. Stereotyping technology empowered the state to give the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign a consistent appearance and message. By ensuring that information appeared in the same format and to the same standard across the country, the state tied together audiences reading not only in different geographical areas but also in different languages. Similarly, the state's subsidizing of resource-intensive editions for minorities included readers from these communities in the broader campaign. At the same time, stereotyping helped magnify the political damage caused by an error in one of the Four Books,

¹¹⁸ Edgren, "The History of the Book in China," 591.

while the higher prices of large-print and Braille books separated their readers from the broader revolutionary whole.

The advantages of centralized publishing did not extend to the flexible allocation and use of paper. Despite the premium it put on propaganda, the state did not possess an endless supply of resources. Moreover, central planners and NBP staff operated in a fluid political environment on an issue-by-issue basis, harnessing the power of mass-printing without accounting for the practical consequences of their actions. As a result, when the campaign launched unexpectedly, publishers across China had to abandon previous plans and re-allocate a large amount of paper to print the Four Books. The state's decision to circulate the Four Books fueled a paper crisis that would shape the course of publishing for years to come.

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CHAPTER TWO

From New Idea to Established Genre: Forming a Long-Term Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign

Following the mass publication of the Four Books, publishers faced a new challenge: helping the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign take root as an established political and ideological genre. Pivoting away from focusing resources on a few titles, presses now switched to the long-term filling-out of their front catalogues with supporting publications. In the pages that follow, I chart how publishers tried to apply the new mantra of "Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius" to long-running bibliographic genres and sub-genres. At stake here are several questions: how did publishers adapt to this new political priority? And how did they navigate thorny questions of 'correct' versus 'incorrect' knowledge production? As a prelude to Chapter Three's detailed analysis of one title, this chapter paints an overall picture of a publishing sector channeling, or sometimes trying to channel, huge quantities of resources into exploring new ideological questions in print. First, I chronicle activities at several presses between 1974 and 1976 to show their unfulfilled aspirations for propaganda publishing in the late-Mao era. Then, I discuss in more detail the process and politics surrounding a nationwide plan to bring Legalism (Confucianism's rival philosophical school) to the masses in book form. In the penultimate section, I discuss how censorship underwrote the state's efforts to build the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius publishing genre. Finally, I develop Chapter One's discussion of books provided for ethnic minorities. Supplying books to these demographics was a critical target for late-Mao publishers, and yet I show that state propaganda production quickly left them behind.

Promotion, Proliferation, Popularization: Anti-Confucianism for the Masses

Between the campaign's beginning and its abrupt termination after Mao's death, countless books emerged exploring its themes, developing its ideas, and linking it to new politico-historical questions. Patchy data makes it impossible to tell how many titles hit bookstore and library shelves, but a post-Mao investigation of the years 1973-1976 found that publishers had released 1403 titles criticizing Confucianism and praising Legalism. Print-runs of these titles alone amounted to almost 19.5 million volumes. This latter figure appears like an extreme underestimate considering that many of the titles discussed in this dissertation have known print-runs in the hundreds of thousands. Equally as crucially, neither of these figures included the campaign's mainstream titles – those which explored criticism of Confucius and Lin Biao *together* – making the final number of volumes printed almost inestimably high. Post-Mao investigations also did not tally figures for reprinted books or those printed in languages other than Chinese for domestic audiences.¹ Short of specifics, all the historian can do is conclude that the printing of tens of millions of books and pamphlets turned the campaign into a wide-ranging publishing genre.

Returning to the early 1974 moment, editors, authors, typesetters, printers and binders pooled their resources into continuing the campaign's momentum in the wake of the Four Books (see Chapter One). In Shanghai, Shanghai People's Press and municipal printers – tasked with producing books that would circulate across the country – kept books in press for often as little as only one month. As shown in table 2.1, eight out of nine titles sent to press in February 1974 had been published by the end of March. These included *Old Confucius*, a narrative of

¹ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 194.

Confucius's life (replete with dramatic illustrations) for younger readers that would become a bestseller. Printers also ushered through the first installment of the long-running *Selected Commentary Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius* series. April and May witnessed further swathes of titles coming to fruition, and we should not take such rapid publications rates for granted. Prioritizing timely titles maximized the chance of books reaching their target audiences when most needed.

Table 2.1: Selected Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign publishing by Shanghai People's Press, early 1974.²

Title	Manuscript Finished and Sent to Press (发稿)	Publication
<i>Selected Commentary Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Volume 1</i> 批林批孔 言论摘编(一)	February 1974	March 1974
Selected Articles from Shanghai's Workers, Peasants and Soldiers Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius 上海工农兵批林批孔文选	February 1974	March 1974
Stories of Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Volume 1 批林批孔故事(一)	February 1974	February 1974
Stories of Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Volume 2 批林批孔故事 (二)	February 1974	March 1974
Assorted Essays Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Volume 1 批林批孔杂文 (一)	February 1974	March 1974
Decapitate Confucianism and Exhume its Roots 斩草除根	February 1974	March 1974
Old Confucius 孔老二	February 1974	March 1974
Be a Pioneer in the Campaign to Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius 争当批林 批孔的小尖兵	February 1974	February 1974
<i>In the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, Shanghai's Women Bravely</i> <i>March Onward</i> 上海广大妇女的批林批孔中奋勇前进	February 1974	April 1974
Selected Commentary Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Volume 2 批林批孔 言论摘编(二)	March 1974	April 1974
Selected Commentary Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Volume 3 批林批孔 言论摘编(三)	March 1974	April 1974
Study Earnestly, Criticize Continuously 认真学深入批	March 1974	April 1974
Never Let the Wheels of History Reverse Course 历史车轮不容倒转	March 1974	March 1974
Be in Master of this New Era 做新时代的主人	March 1974	April 1974
On Qin Shi Huang 论秦始皇	March 1974	June 1974
Selections from the Works of Han Fei 韩非子选	March 1974	June 1974
Assorted Essays Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Volume 1 批林批孔杂文 (二)	March 1974	May 1974
Selected Poems Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius 批林批孔诗选	March 1974	June 1974
<i>Thoroughly Criticize Confucius' Reactionary Approach to Education</i> 彻底批 判孔丘的反动教育思想	March 1974	April 1974
We Must Energetically go to War 我们必须努力作战	March 1974	July 1974
<i>The Anti-Confucian Struggles of Working People Throughout History</i> 历史上 劳动人民的反孔斗争	March 1974	May 1974
<i>Ironclad Evidence</i> 铁证如山	March 1974	March 1974

² Information in this table is drawn from: SMA B167-3-240-16, "上海人民出版社编辑部编印的《情况 交流》1974年第4期" ["The Current Situation," 1974, no. 4, edited by the Shanghai People's Press Editorial Office]; SMA B167-3-240-23, "上海人民出版社编辑部编印的《情况交流》1974年第5期" ["The Current Situation," 1974, no. 5, edited by the Shanghai People's Press Editorial Office]; SMA B167-3-240-37, "上海人民出版社编辑部编印的《情况交流》1974年第7期" ["The Current Situation," 1974, no. 7, edited by the Shanghai People's Press Editorial Office]; Wang Yaohua 汪耀华, "文革"时期上海图书出版总目 [*A Catalogue of Books Published in Shanghai During the 'Cultural Revolution' Period*] (Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu chubanshe, 2014).

Table 2.1 (continued): Selected Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign publishing by
Shanghai People's Press, early 1974.

Title	Manuscript Finished and Sent to Press (发稿)	Publication
Selected Commentary Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Volume 4 批林批孔 言论摘编(四)	April 1974	May 1974
Selected Commentary Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Volume 5 批林批孔 言论摘编(五)	April 1974	May 1974
Selected Commentary Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Volume 6 批林批孔 言论摘编(六)	April 1974	May 1974
The Essential Xunzi with Annotations 荀子简注	April 1974	July 1974
Develop the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and Uphold the Revolution in Education 深入批林批孔坚持教育革命	April 1974	July 1974
A Special Collection of Calligraphy and Seal Scripts on the Theme of "Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius"书法刻印专辑——批林批孔	April 1974	May 1974

Indeed, only by scrapping previous plans could publishers facilitate the array of Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign titles which appeared across China in 1974. As highlighted in Chapter One, publishing the Four Books upset publishers' budgeted paper use because the campaign only began after plans for the coming twelve months had been set in stone. The campaign's sudden beginning similarly destabilized in-progress titles, in the process giving us a taste of the precarity and unpredictability embedded in China's day-to-day propaganda apparatus. For example, while planning its 1974 catalogue in August 1973, Shanghai People's Press planned to publish exactly zero books on anti-Confucianism.³ When the campaign arrived the following year, parts of this plan quickly became defunct. As for Beijing People's Press, despite drafting its 1974 plan in August like Shanghai, in December 1973 it made a last-minute pivot toward the campaign's emerging themes. While no proposed books contained the mantra

³ SMA B244-3-588, "人民出版社关于人民出版社、毛著办、文汇、解放、红小兵报、刊、全国报 刊索引、1974年用纸计划" [Documents from Shanghai People's Press regarding publishing, the Office for the Publication of Mao's Works, *Wenhui Daily*, *Liberation Daily*, *Little Red Guard News*, *Little Red Guard Magazine*, the *Index of National Newspapers and Periodicals*, and planned paper usage for 1974].

"Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius" (yet to exist as an official formulation) in their title, they nonetheless provided the foundation for many future campaign publications. At least 29 of 337 titles in the December plan now related to anti-Confucianism, classical texts, historical personages and past popular uprisings. As the campaign's rhetoric evolved, Beijing People's Press editors could tweak these book manuscripts to tie them to the latest political narratives and ideological currents.⁴

Even when publishers opted against outright cancellation, the growth of a new book genre nonetheless significantly delayed progress on many other projects. Titles that survived in revised plans were now overshadowed in every stage of the publishing process by pressing political titles. In Shanghai, almost all of the seventy books and posters (besides textbooks) sent to press in February 1974 related to the campaign, and printing anti-Confucianism materials set back printing of an important introduction to political economy (政治经济学) by 40 days.⁵ Overall, the archives show that Shanghai People's Press staff traded a focus on extra educational and scientific publishing in early 1973 for producing more periodicals and art books – genres ripe for conveying campaign messages – after the campaign began the following year.⁶

At times, presses resorted to adjusting pre-existing commissions or planned print-runs to please superiors and align themselves with the campaign's goals. For example, in December

⁴ BMA 201-2-120, "北京市出版办公室 1974 年图书出版计划和季度出版统计表" [Tables from the Beijing Publishing Office of planned publishing for 1974 and publishing data for each quarter]; BMA, 201-2-118 "北京市出版办公室报送北京人民出版社 1974 年选题计划" [A report from the Beijing Publishing Office concerning a titles of planned for 1974 by Beijing People's Press].

⁵ SMA B167-3-240-16; SMA B167-3-240-23 notes that archival figures for 1974 do not include textbook production and materials for use in schools. Wang Yaohua's *A Catalogue of Books Published in Shanghai* shows that Shanghai People's Press printed textbooks and other materials in the first quarter of 1973 too, so I have treated these as a separate part of the publisher's activities when making these statistical judgements; SMA B167-3-217-100, "上海人民出版社关于《青年自学丛书》编写的情况问题和意见的综合报告" [A comprehensive report from Shanghai People's Press regarding the drafting of the "Teach Yourself for Young People" series].

⁶ SMA B167-3-240-23.

1973 Shanghai People's Press possessed the finished manuscript of a new edition of Wang Huanbiao's (王焕镳) *Selections from the Works of Han Fei* (韩非子选, first published in 1965).⁷ The new edition no-doubt had been commissioned because of the revival in academic discussions of Legalism in the early 1970s. As shown in table 2.1, however, the book did not go to press until March 1974, leaving a window of several months for appropriate revisions. In addition, while in 1965 the first printing of Wang's *Selections* numbered a paltry 5,300 copies, Shanghai People's Press ordered an initial run of 200,000 in June 1974.⁸ A second printing in the same month brought the total number of copies printed up to 450,000 – almost 100 times 1965 levels.⁹ Whereas demand in 1965 only came from a select audience, the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign made reading Han Fei's (韩非) writings politically *de rigueur*, thereby warranting six-figure print-runs.

Reissuing past titles offered chances to refresh book designs and thus maximize their communicative power. In 1973, Beijing People's Press commissioned the intellectual Li Xifan (李希凡) to write a volume developing ideas first found in his preface to the famous literary work *Dream of the Red Chamber*.¹⁰ With the novel and its historical messages again in the spotlight during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, Li's analysis merited broader

⁷ SMA B167-3-240-1, "上海人民出版社编辑部编印的《情况交流》1974年第1期" ["The Current Situation," 1974, no. 1, edited by the Shanghai People's Press Editorial Office]; However, SMA B167-3-240-23 dates the completion of the manuscript to March 1974, perhaps because the unfolding of the campaign prompted editors to go back and check that the content fit with current political currents. ⁸ Wang Huanbiao 王焕镳, 韩非子选 [*Selections from the Works of Han Fei*], (Beijing: Zhonghua Books, 1965), copyright page (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com); Wang Huanbiao 王焕镳, 韩非子选 [*Selections from the Works of Han Fei*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974), copyright page (my collection).

⁹ Wang Huanbiao 王焕镳, 韩非子选 [Selections from the Works of Han Fei], second printing (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974), copyright page (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com).

¹⁰ Li Xifan 李希凡, 曹雪芹和他的《红楼梦》[*Cao Xueqin and His "Dream of the Red Chamber"*], first edition (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1973), 61.

distribution. Therefore, the press republished Li's *Cao Xueqin and His "Dream of the Red Chamber*" [曹雪芹和他的《红楼梦》] in a run of 400,000 copies in 1975.¹¹ By enlarging the typeface for the second edition, designers created less dense (and thus more legible) page textblocks, while their revised front cover distinguished the old edition from the new.¹² In the same vein, we can compare editions of Zhao Jibin's *A Discussion of Whether Confucius Killed Shao Zhengmao* (关于孔子诛少正卯问题) printed in 1973 and 1974. For the reissue, the book's title changed to include less literary and starker language: the honorific, venerable form of Confucius' name (孔子) is dropped in favor of its more mundane version (孔丘), and "killed" is rendered as the straightforward character '杀' rather than the more sophisticated '诛.'¹³

Adjusting or reissuing content, however, presented many potential pitfalls in China's capricious ideological environment. In particular, publishers had to keep pace with changing rules on correct terminology and formulations.¹⁴ The campaign's rhetoric grew on an ad-hoc basis, with CCP theoreticians and newspaper commentary gradually shaping the key battlegrounds of attack rather than beginning with a fully-formed notion of what criticizing Lin and Confucius actually entailed.¹⁵ Therefore, Beijing's chief propaganda officials had to remind municipal subordinates in February 1974 that texts should not use the honorific '孔子' when

¹¹ Li Xifan 李希凡, 曹雪芹和他的《红楼梦》[*Cao Xueqin and His "Dream of the Red Chamber"*], second edition, second printing (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1975), copyright page.

¹² Compare the two versions. With a more spacious textblock, the 1975 second edition is longer than the 1973 first edition.

¹³ Zhao Jibin 赵纪彬, 关于孔子诛少正卯问题 [A Discussion of Whether Confucius Killed Shao Zhengmao], first edition (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1973) (copy held in the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford); Zhao Jibin 赵纪彬, 关于孔丘杀少正卯问题 [A Discussion of Whether Confucius Killed Shao Zhengmao], first edition (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 1974).

¹⁴ For the topic of political language as a form of control, see Michael Schoenhals, *Doing Things With Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies* (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992).

¹⁵ See the narrative sketched in Wu, *Lin Biao and the Gang of Four*.

referring to Confucius. Likewise, propaganda was to avoid describing Lin Biao as "China's present-day Confucius" (现代中国的孔子) or claiming that "opposing regressive ideas is our most important priority" (把反复辟当作我们万事中最大的事).¹⁶ One month later, Beijing People's Press received a warning from higher-ups not to forget the campaign's "seriousness" (严肃性), in the process barring publication of any cartoon images of Confucius and Lin Biao not approved by the Beijing municipal leadership.¹⁷ Presumably, officials worried that the press had issued, or might issue, overly cavalier images without a discernible political message.

Because publishers prioritized printing correct ideas, following well-worn campaign themes made sense but also resulted in a sea of samey content. During the campaign, Beijing People's Press staff worried that too much of their catalogue overlapped with other publishing houses. Put differently, their titles did not offer readers particularly topical or distinctive material that might set them apart from other presses.¹⁸ Several years later, looking back after the end of the campaign, the NBP counted 907 titles on Legalism published between 1973 and 1976. These 907 included 217 collections of reprinted newspaper articles, 224 politically-annotated editions of Legalists texts, 294 pamphlets, 138 discussions of either Legalist figures or the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle, along with a smattering of academic editions of various Legalist writings.¹⁹ As well as genre overlap, the NBP found that publishers had covered similar subjects: it counted 69 titles on the works of Shang Yang (商鞅), 69 on Han Fei, and 63 on Qin Shi Huang

¹⁶ BMA 182-7-56, "在批林批孔的文字宣传中有关四点提法的通知" [A notice concerning four formulations in Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign textual propaganda].

¹⁷ BMA 201-2-105, "国家出版局、市委宣传组等单位关于出版、发行方面的通知" [Notices from the National Bureau of Publishing and the Municipal Party Committee Propaganda Group concerning publishing and distribution].

¹⁸ BMA 201-2-164, "北京市出版办公室关于出版发行方面的通知以及对所属书店关于发行工作的批 复" [Notices from Beijing Publishing Office concerning publishing and book distribution, as well its replies to enquiries from subsidiary bookstores].

¹⁹ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 194.

(秦始皇).²⁰ Post-Mao analysis also unearthed 22 books with the title *The Story of Liu Xiazhi's Anti-Confucian Struggle* (柳下跖反孔斗争故事) and over eighty books commenting on the classic novel *Water Margin*.²¹ By choosing safer topics, individual publishers protected their own interests at the expense of greater variety.

At this juncture, I want to address a burning question: to what extent can we view the whole Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign as an attack on Zhou Enlai? Scholars familiar with the historiography of the late Cultural Revolution period will recognize the prevalent view that Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and other radical politburo leaders (often labelled as the "Gang of Four") orchestrated allegorical attacks on Zhou.²² After Mao's death, criticisms of Jiang's faction alleged that they tasked special writing groups with penning articles attacking Zhou. Such criticisms cast members of these groups as scholarly lackeys penning attacks on the Premier, with a 1977 newspaper article accusing writers of "distorting and fabricating history" (歪曲和杜 撰历史) and engaging in counter-revolutionary activity on behalf of Jiang and her allies.²³ During the campaign, books and periodicals often followed the lead of (and sometimes directly reprinted) articles produced by these high-level writing groups with close connections to Zhang Chunqiao and others, implying therefore that, if indeed the campaign sought to bring Zhou down, publishers knowingly or not stoked the flames of this factional attack.²⁴

²⁰ Ibid., vol. 9, 194.

²¹ Zhongguo xinwen chuban yanjiu yuan 中国新闻出版研究院, ed., 中华人民共和国出版料 [*Historical Materials on Publishing in the People's Republic of China*], volume 15 (Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 2013), 76.

²² MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 370.

²³ Teiwes and Sun, *End of the Maoist Era*, 159; Wu Jiang 吴江, "现代复辟派和古代变革史" [The present-day restorationists and the history of reform in ancient China]. *The People's Daily*, June 4, 1977, 1.

²⁴ For the longer history of the links between radical leaders and writing groups, see Perry and Li, *Proletarian Power*, chapter 1.

While elite-level animosity toward Zhou cannot be in doubt, I am not convinced that writing groups churning out the eventual content of newspapers and books deliberately wrote anti-Zhou screeds.²⁵ Certainly, writing group members happily admit that they received article commissions from senior figures such as Jiang, but at the same time they reject the notion that these commissions came with orders to target particular politicians. ²⁶ A decade or more ago, Teiwes and Sun were undecided about whether to believe these claims, but since then these denials have continued to proliferate.²⁷ According to Zhu Yongjia, a senior cultural bureaucrat in Shanghai during the first half of the 1970s,

Mao and the 'Gang of Four' never openly or subtly told us to use the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, the movement to praise Legalism and criticize Confucianism, or the campaign to study *Water Margi*n to criticize or indirectly attack Zhou Enlai. I never authorized or signed-off any speeches or articles on this subject. As far as I know, during both the nationwide Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and the movement to praise Legalism and criticize Confucianism, nobody ever directed that articles should attack Zhou Enlai, and up to today nobody has produced any direct evidence to confirm that such instructions existed

毛泽东和"四人帮"从来没有公开或暗示过我们,要结合批林批孔运动、遵法 批儒、评《水浒》来公开批判或影射周恩来。我也没有授意和同意过写作和 发表过这方面的文章。据我所知,全国的批林批孔和尊法评儒运动中,也根 本没有任何人指令过要在文章中含沙射影地暗中批判周恩来,至今没有任何 直接的证据来证实这件事.²⁸

²⁵ Teiwes and Sun's *End of the Maoist Era* shows fairly conclusively that Zhou Enlai's political standpoint was far removed from that of his more radical rivals.

²⁶ For example, Fan Daren recalls how Jiang Qing ordered his writing group to write an article concerning "Confucius the Man" (孔丘其人): Fan Daren 范达人, 昔日梁效今安在? [*Where are the Past Members*

of Liangxiao Today?] (Np.: Meiguo jiazhou VIP yinshua chang, 2010), 55.

²⁷ Teiwes and Sun, *End of the Maoist Era*, 159.

²⁸ Zhu Yongjia 朱永嘉, with Zhu Shaojun 朱紹君, 晚年毛澤東重讀古文內幕 [The Inside Story of Mao Zedong's Re-reading of Classical Chinese Texts in His Later Years] (Hong Kong: Xingke'er chuban (Xiang Gang) youxian gongsi, 2012), 139.

According to Zhu, post-Mao investigations into the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai also found no direct evidence for the ordering of attacks on Zhou Enlai.²⁹

As a casualty of the Gang of Four's fall after Mao's death, Zhu might well misrepresent the situation, but others involved with the writing groups corroborate his story. During post-Mao investigations of the high-level Liangxiao theoretical writing group, Tang Yijie (汤一介, recruited to Liangxiao in fall 1973) steadfastly refused to admit that the group had worked to oppose Zhou Enlai.³⁰ Zhou Yiliang (a member of Liangxiao from its inception until its demise) wrote in 1998 that "while I worked in the Liangxiao group, I never got a sense that criticizing Confucius was also about criticizing Premier Zhou Enlai, and I never heard Chi Qun or Xie Jingyi [the group's liaisons with elite politicians] in any meeting hint about attacking Zhou" (我 在梁效期间,从未意识到批儒是指周总理,也从未听到迟谢二人在任何会上暗示过).³¹ More recently, Wang Zhichang likewise maintained that the early criticisms of Confucius in 1973-1974 were not targeted at Zhou Enlai, stating that neither Zhang Chunqiao nor Yao Wenyuan (members of the Gang of Four alongside Jiang Qing) directed them to attack Zhou and

that Shanghai's main theoretical journal never carried any article aimed at Zhou.³² Finally, Fan

Daren (范达人) – a member of Liangxiao – said the same in his 2009 memoirs. Concerning a famous article from the campaign, he remarked that "our leadership never gave any hints to us

that the article should attack Zhou Enlai - really, nobody gave us such an instruction!" (当时"梁

²⁹ Ibid., 139.

³⁰ Yue Daiyun and Carolyn Wakeman, *To the Storm: The Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 323 and 364.s

³¹ Zhou, *Ultimately an Intellectual*, 71 and 75.

³² Wang Zhichang 王知常 et al., "我与《学习与批判》等刊物" [My Involvement with "Study and Criticism" and Other Periodicals], *Yanhuang chunqiu* 炎黄春秋 no. 3 (2015): 29.

效"大批判组的领导,他们也没有任何人向我暗示,你们写这篇文章要影射周恩来,没 有!).³³

As ever, the truth probably lies somewhere in between. But, until historians gain access to significantly more source material, we cannot detail the exact relationship between the campaign, its propaganda narratives, attacks on Zhou Enlai, and the publishing industry. What *is* certain, however, is that writers charged with producing the raw textual material for newspapers and books worked in high-pressure, high-stakes environments. In the capital, Liangxiao members toiled under conditions of secrecy, with members barred from discussing their work with others.³⁴ Zhu Yongjia recalls how the Luo Siding (罗思鼎) theoretical writing group in Shanghai worked as hard as possible with little reward to complete assigned tasks. In particular, the scholar Wang Shoujia (王守稼) was the driving force behind many of the campaign articles penned in Shanghai, including an early piece on the Qin dynasty that appeared in both the first issue of the journal *Study and Criticism* (学习与批判) and later, at Jiang Qing's behest, in *The People's Daily*.³⁵ Another industrious member of the *Study and Criticism* editorial board drafted a piece over four days and four nights, burning through ten packs of cigarettes in the process.³⁶ The contents of books, magazines and newspapers grew out of these intense labors.

Intellectuals' work on other projects, especially the production of specialized texts for Mao's personal use in his reading life, could also be conveniently translated by publishers into

³³ Fan, *Where are the Past Members*, 25. Fan also refutes the claim about "Confucius the Man" attacking Zhou in his 梁效: 我的记忆 [*Liangxiao: My Recollections*] (Np.: Meiguo jiazhou VIP yinshua gongsi, 2009), 26.

³⁴ Fan, Where are the Past Members, 41-43.

³⁵ Zhu with Zhu, *The Inside Story*, 284; Wang et al., "My Involvement," 29.

³⁶ Chen Hanrong 陈菡蓉, "关于《学习与批判》的人和事" [Information on the People and Events Surrounding "Study and Criticism"], *Shi Lin* 史林 no. 1 (2010): 130; Wang et al., "My Involvement," 30.

mainstream campaign publications. In one instance, Mao requested a new annotated edition of Zhang Taiyan's (章太炎) poetry, with successive volumes sent to his residence up to the month before his death in 1976.³⁷ Capitalizing on the annotator's work, Shanghai People's Press compiled *Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose By Zhang Taiyan: Volume 1* (章太炎诗文选注(上)) and published the volume in June 1976.³⁸ Similarly, in 1973, Yao Wenyuan phoned Zhu Yongjia observing that Mao was interested in the text *General Investigation into the Life Chronology of Wang Jinggong* (王荆公年谱考略). Zhu promptly instructed Shanghai People's Press Press to reprint a new popular edition of the text.³⁹

Where they did not produce entire books, intellectuals working on special tasks also transformed their labors into the ideas which peppered state media, periodicals and, ultimately, books. Parallel to organizing publication of the *General Investigation into the Life Chronology of Wang Jinggong*, Zhu Yongjia worked with Wang Shoujia on an article linking the text to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism. The resulting article – "Reading Wang Anshi's reforms as a guide to the evolution of the Confucian-Legalist theoretical dispute" (从王安石变法看儒法论战的演变) – received Mao's approval on 4 February 1974 and was placed by Yao Wenyuan in the CCP's leading theoretical journal.⁴⁰ Mindful of his colleagues, Yao instructed the journal's staff to translate as

³⁷ Zhu with Zhu, *The Inside Story*, 145.

³⁸ Ibid., 145; Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju banben tushuguan 国家出版事业管理局版本图书馆, ed., 1976 全国总书目 [*A Comprehensive Bibliography of National Publications: 1976*] (Beijing: Zhonghua Books, 1980), 141.

³⁹ Zhu with Zhu, *The Inside Story*, 282-283. The text was eventually published as Cai Shangxiang 蔡上 翔, 王荆公年谱考略 [*General Investigation into the Life Chronology of Wang Jinggong*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1973).

⁴⁰ Zhu with Zhu, *The Inside Story*, 282-283.

much as possible of the classical Chinese quoted in the article into modern Chinese because some Politburo members struggled to comprehend the classical language (!)⁴¹

In the campaign's complex, ever-shifting environment, authors regularly struggled to finish books presciently because they could not formulate a correct political veneer for their texts. Examples from Shanghai of the difficulties authors faced are surely not exceptional. Groups working on revisionist humanities-themed volumes for Shanghai People's Press's Teach Yourself for Young People (青年自学丛书) series made slow progress because they did not entirely know "how to write the wrongs of existing scholarship using the spirit of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign" (如何以批林批孔的精神来翻历史的案). As they perceived a pro-Confucian bias in most sources, their research process additionally required cutting through these distortions and re-assessing sources to reach the (politically correct) heart of the matter.⁴² Authors also worried that writing about historical topics risked exposing readers to more undesirable information. Those working on Chinese literature queried how to correctly analyze an author like the Ming dynasty playwright Tang Xianzu (汤显祖) – who mostly wrote love stories – without inadvertently "giving readers other ideas" (生产副作用). To cut through the bureaucratic euphemism, they worried that their book might heighten young people's interest in relationships and sex.⁴³ Even as propaganda articles fleshed out the campaign's ideas over 1974, Confucian confusions did not always disappear. Around mid-1975, the short-staffed group writing An Introduction to the History of Chinese Literature (简明中国文学史) for the Teach

⁴¹ Ibid., 282-284.

⁴² SMA B167-3-217-100.

⁴³ SMA B167-3-217-107, "上海人民出版社关于《青年自学丛书》编写中存在的问题和意见的综合 报告" [A comprehensive report from Shanghai People's Press concerning the writing of the "Teach Yourself for Young People" series].

Yourself for Young People series remained unsure how to use literature to demonstrate the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism. As a result, one third of the manuscript remained uncompleted and the book would not be published until July 1976.⁴⁴ A follow-up second volume never materialized – a fitting symbol of the difficulties involved in correctly criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius and producing some materials promptly.

In addition, book projects promoting collective production and de-exoticizing individual authorship floundered in the face of human interest. After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, collective production proliferated due to its "congeniality and compatibility" with "Maoist mass line politics."⁴⁵ Working together, the masses could participate in political life and bring credit to the group rather than the atomized individual. By the 1970s, big publishing houses such as Zhonghua Books (中华书局) and Shanghai People's Press maintained a steady stream of book projects involving cooperation between the masses and staff, with titles appearing under the name of a group or pseudonym and most traces of individual involvement eliminated.⁴⁶ In 1975, for instance, around one third titles published by Shanghai People's Press

⁴⁴ SMA B167-3-292-38, "上海人民出版社关于青年自学丛书编写出版进展情况的报告" [A report from Shanghai People's Press concerning progress with the writing and publication of the *Teach Yourself for Young People* series]. The book was published as Shanghai shifan xueyuan zhongwen xi "Jianming zhongguo wenxue shi" bianxie zu 上海师范大学中文系《简明中国文学史》编写组, 简明中国文学史 (上册) [*An Introduction to the History of Chinese Literature, Part One*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1976).

⁴⁵ Christine Ho, "*The People Eat for Free* and the Art of Collective Production in Maoist China," *The Art Bulletin* 98, no. 3 (2016): 355.

⁴⁶ For example, in the *Selected and Annotated Materials from the History of Peasant Warfare* (农民战争 史资料选注) produced by Zhonghua Books, front covers attributed titles to writing groups and their pseudonyms. For example, see: Beijing qiche zhizao chang gongren lilun zu 北京汽车制造厂工人理论 组 and Yan Longge 严龙戈, 王小波李顺起义资料选注 [Selected and Annotated Materials from the Uprising of Wang Xiaobo and Li Shun] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976); Beijing yinshua san chang shuban yinshua chejian lilun xiaozu 北京印刷三厂书版印刷车间理论小组, 陈涉世家注释 [The Annotated Biography of Chen She] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975).

fell under this category, and it planned to raise this figure to two thirds by 1985.⁴⁷

Unsurprisingly, however, some participants in these authorial groups remained infatuated with the economic and cultural capital they could accrue from their involvement. In March 1974, The People's Daily identified how members of authorial groups were more interested in making money and becoming famous than in collaborative content creation.⁴⁸ In Shanghai, publishing staff reported members of the masses showing-off for having contributed to a book in print, while others objected when their group's final manuscript was circulated informally rather than published formally. Some contributors to writing groups even tried to claim royalties from book sales, perhaps because taking time away from economic production to work on book projects sometimes cost writers their work points and salary.⁴⁹ While publishers could design books to stress collective rather than individual achievements, they could not prevent resistance from authors looking to capitalize on their own personal labors and thereby hampering broader publishing work.

While they could not say so pejoratively, presses inevitably suffered from the demands other political activities placed on staff and author time. In the first few months of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, Shanghai People's Press experienced a drop in author and editor output. Whereas its divisions finished 61 out of 74 planned manuscripts in December 1973, by February 1974 (the first full month of the campaign) they had finished only 70 out of a planned 121.50 Overall, in the first quarter of the year, press staff finished eleven fewer

⁴⁷ SMA B167-3-285-13, "上海人民出版社革命委员会办公室关于下发十年规划(草稿)并要求组织 讨论的函" [A letter from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee distributing a 10-year plan and calling for group discussion of the plan]. ⁴⁸ Liu, *Communications and National Integration*, xxxiii.

⁴⁹ SMA B244-3-938, "国家出版局、人民出版社关于出版工作会议材料" [Meeting materials from the National Bureau of Publishing and Shanghai People's Press concerning publishing work]; Zhongguo xinwen, Historical Materials, vol. 14, 92-94.

⁵⁰ SMA B167-3-240-16; SMA B167-3-240-1.

manuscripts compared to the same period for 1973, equivalent to a 690,000-character drop.⁵¹ Progress on the *Teach Yourself for Young People* books slowed in the spring because senior editors were too busy participating in rallies and study meetings. The writing groups assigned to each *Teach Yourself* manuscript also suffered from a "brain drain" of members on-loan from other institutions.⁵² For instance, as of May 1974, the six faculty and eight students working on the Chinese literature volume could devote little significant time to writing because they had to join-in with political activities on their respective campuses.⁵³

Irrespective of these difficulties, as the campaign showed no sign of abating, publishers doggedly proceeded to turn its ideas into an expansive propaganda genre. In Beijing, Beijing People's Press beefed-up the presence of relevant titles in its publishing plans for the second half of 1974. Revised plans produced in June and August 1974 included over 65 titles related to Confucianism, Legalism, other related historical events, or the campaign more generally. A significant number of titles concerned Legalist works, coinciding with the central government's increasing interest in making these writings available widely (see below).⁵⁴ In February of the following year, the press added a further sixteen titles to its planned 1975 catalogue, including ten edited volumes of ancient Legalist and Confucian texts.⁵⁵ Further commissions followed twelve months later.⁵⁶ Indeed, Beijing's steady focus on growing the campaign genre eventually distracted it from newer political developments. Reviewing their progress in fall 1975, press staff

⁵¹ SMA B167-3-240-23.

⁵² SMA B167-3-217-100.

⁵³ SMA B167-3-217-107.

⁵⁴ BMA 201-2-118.

⁵⁵ BMA 201-2-166, "北京市出版办公室关于北京人民出版社 1975 年选题计划和发稿统计" [A plan from the Beijing Publishing Office for Beijing People's Press titles for 1975, as well as statistics on books sent to press].

⁵⁶ BMA 201-1-295, "北京人民出版社 1976 年选题计划(草案)" [A draft plan for Beijing People's Press titles for 1976].

highlighted their failure to stay abreast of the latest national currents and criticized themselves for maintaining a front-list of books about Legalism while neglecting one of 1975's hot ideological topics (the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat).⁵⁷

Building on pre-campaign plans to disseminate copies of famous texts, Shanghai People's Press emerged as a foremost distributor of classical sources to support study activities. Before the campaign had formally started, senior municipal leaders had already approved the reprinting of a range of writings (by Zhuangzi 庄子, Han Fei and Xunzi 荀子 among others) to further historical research and satisfy demand from CCP researchers.⁵⁸ Shanghai People's Press was also planning a series of mass-market pamphlets presenting classical texts with notes and annotations. As staff noted in 1973, materials would "have a targeted scope and audience" (有一定的范围和 对象) and all print-runs would be relatively small.⁵⁹ The campaign's arrival accelerated these plans, and by June 1975 the press had published over 40 Legalist texts and commentaries.⁶⁰ Overall, for the 11 years between May 1966 and October 1977, three quarters of the classical texts published nationwide related to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.⁶¹

Besides spurring classical text publication forward, the campaign demanded dissemination of these texts to a much broader audience than previously envisioned. Above, I have already mentioned the printing of 450,000 copies of *Selections from the Works of Han Fei*

⁵⁸ SMA B244-3-587-65, "上海市革命委员会文教组关于送上上海人民出版社"整理出版部分古籍请示报告"的报告" [A report from the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee Culture and Education Group forwarding documents related to publishing classical texts]; SMA B244-3-587-64, "中共上海市委办公室、上海市革命委员会办公室抄告单——徐景贤、王秀珍同志对整理出版部分古籍的意见" [Instructions from Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen concerning publishing classical texts].
⁵⁹ SMA B244-3-587-65.

⁵⁷ BMA 201-2-164. For the campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, see T and Sun, *End*, 282-292.

⁶⁰ SMA B167-3-279-1, "上海人民出版社关于上海出版战线的简况" [A report from Shanghai People's Press on the frontlines of publishing work in Shanghai].

⁶¹ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 166; Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 154.

in 1974. Even a smaller outfit such as Scientific Press (科学出版社) felt comfortable printing over 78,000 copies of a Ming dynasty technological text and 201,250 copies of *Dream Pool Essays: Readings from the Natural Sciences Sections*.⁶² Only the period's anti-Confucian context legitimized such extensive distribution of this classical material.

The yearly publishing plans of Shanghai People's Press typify publishers' lofty, and yet ultimately unfulfilled, aspirations for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius book genre. As shown in table 2.2, for 1975 the press planned north of 150 titles related to different thematic strands of the campaign. These included copious annotated classical texts, small monographs, biographies of key figures, and important reference works. This expansive selection promised to substantiate the claims of the Four Books, cater to a broad spectrum of readers, and support grassroots studies. However, while some titles rolled off presses by year-end, the sea of red in the table's "date of publication" column indicates that around two thirds of these titles have no record of ever being published. Another 15 appeared after the campaign had faded into obscurity, and over a dozen did not appear until 1976. Most likely, titles appeared late or never at all due to shifting priorities and production shortages, leaving successfully published Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius titles as relics of what might have been.

⁶² Qinghua daxue jixie chang gongren lilun zu 清华大学机械厂工人理论组,《天工开物》注释(上册)["*The Exploitation of the Works of Nature" with Annotations, Volume One*] (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1976), copyright page (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com); Li Qun 李群,《梦溪笔谈》选读(自然科学部分)[*Dream Pool Essays: Readings from the Natural Sciences Sections*] (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1975), copyright page.

Key: published before the end of the campaign; published between the end of the campaign and the end of 1978;		
not published. Title and Translation	Date of Publication	
批孔与路线斗争——学习毛主席关于批孔论述		
Criticizing Confucius and Line Struggles: Study Chairman Mao's		
Criticisms of Confucius		
研究儒法斗争 坚持古为今用	/	
Research the Struggle Between Confucianism and Legalism to Uphold		
"Using the Past to Serve the Present"		
斩断束缚人们的四条绳索	/	
Cut the Four Ropes that Bind the People		
《女儿经》剖析`	Published in April 1975 《女儿经》批	
Analyzing the Classic for Girls	判 Criticize the Classic for Girls	
奴隶主是怎样残酷压迫奴隶的		
How the Slaveowners Cruelly Oppressed the Slaves		
姓孔的不是一家人		
Those With the Surname Kong Are Not All Alike		
哲学斗争与阶级斗争	May 1975	
Philosophical Struggle and Class Struggle		
人民群众是历史的主人		
The Masses are the Masters of History		
上海工人哲学论文选(六)	June 1975	
Selected Philosophical Essays by Shanghai Workers (6)		
历代法家著作选注(二)	September 1975	
Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts (2)		
历代法家著作选注(三)	September 1976	
Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts (3)	September 1970	
历代法家著作选注(四)		
Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts (4)		
《韩非子》洗注	February 1976	
Selected and Annotated Writings by Han Fei	1 contaily 1970	
《韩非子》新注(上、下)		
The Han Feizi: A New Annotation (2 volumes)		
《盐铁论》选注		
Annotated Selections from the "Record of the Debate on Salt and		
Iron"		
王安石诗文选注		
Selected and Annotated Poems and Essays by Wang Anshi		
《王安石集》校点	/	
The Writings of Wang Anshi		

Table 2.2: Selected planned titles for Shanghai People's Press, 1975.⁶³

⁶³ The plan can be found in SMA B167-3-287, "人民出版社纲要一九七五年选题计划" [An outline plan of Shanghai People's Press titles for 1975]. For publication data, I rely on Wang Yaohua's *A Catalogue of Books Published in Shanghai*, Duxiu.com, kongfz.com, and multiple years of the *Comprehensive Bibliography of National Publications* edited by Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju banben tushuguan 国家出版事业管理局版本图书馆. As sometimes books were published under a slightly different title or with a different author, an element of informed detective is needed for this research.

Key: published before the end of the campaign; published between	the end of the campaign and the end of 1978;
not published. Title and Translation	Date of Publication
《梦溪笔谈》选注	January 1978
Annotated Selections from the Dream Pool Essays	
《四书评》校点	May 1975
The Commentary on the Four Books	
章炳麟著作选注 Annotated Selections from the Writings of Thang Binglin	·
<i>Annotated Selections from the Writings of Zhang Binglin</i> 《章炳麟集》校点(一)(二)	/
The Writings of Zhang Binglin (parts 1 and 2)	
《訄书》注释	/
The Book of Urgency with Translations and Annotations	
《管子》选注	
Annotated Selections from the Guanzi 《邓析子》注释	
The Deng Xizi with Annotations and Notes	
	April 1978
Eleven Commentaries on the Art of War	
《孙子兵法》注释	
The Annotated Art of War	
《经法》注释 Annotated Texts from the Huang Lao Tradition	
Thinotated Texts from the Thiding Luo Tradition 西门豹资料辑注	April 1975
An Annotated Anthology of Materials Concerning Ximen Bao	1
《慎子》注释	1
The Annotated Shenzi	
《申子》注释	
The Annotated Shenzi 《司马法》注释	
The Annotated "Laws of Sima"	
《尉缭子》	/
The Wei Liaozi	
秦始皇文集注释	
Annotated Writings of Qin Shi Huang	
高祖本纪注释 The Annotated Biography of Gao Zu	·
The Annotated Biography of Odo Zu 萧何资料注释	
Annotated Materials Concerning Xiao He	
曹参资料注释	
Annotated Materials Concerning Cao Shen	
《贾谊集》校点 The Washe of Key Vi	Published in June 1976 as 贾谊集 <i>The</i>
<i>The Works of Jia Yi</i> 贾谊著作选注	Works of Jia Yi
页 山 省 1F 远注 Annotated Selections from the Writings of Jia Yi	
《晁错集》注释	June 1976
The Annotated Writings of Chao Cuo	

Table 2.2	(continued):	Selected planned	titles for Shanghai	People's Press, 1975.
	()	1	8	1 ,

Key: published before the end of the campaign; published between the not published.	end of the campaign and the end of 1978;
Title and Translation	Date of Publication
汉武帝本纪注释	/
The Annotated Biography of Han Wudi	
桑弘羊资料注释	/
Annotated Materials Concerning Sang Hongyang	
《盐铁论》新注	/
The Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron: A New Annotation	
《九章算术》选注	/
Annotated Selections from the Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art	
《新论》校点	/
New Theory	
《论衡》选注	/
Annotated Selections from "On Balance"	
《曹操集》注释	
The Annotated Works of Cao Cao	
	May 1975
The Annotated Biography of Guo Jia	
《齐民要术》选注	/
Annotated Selections from the "Main Techniques for the Welfare of the	
People"	
武则天资料辑录	1
An Anthology of Materials Concerning Wu Zetian	
《史通通释》校点	1
A Commentary on Works of History	
《刘禹锡集》选注	
Annotated Selections from the Works of Liu Yuxi	
李白诗选注	December 1978
Annotated Selections from the Poetry of Li Bai	
李长吉歌诗集注校点	Published in October 1977 as 李贺诗
Annotated Poems and Songs by Li Changji	歌集注 Annotated Poems and Songs by
	Li He
叶适著作选注	
Annotated Selections from the Works of Ye Shi	
陆游诗选注	
Annotated Selections from the Poetry of Lu You	
辛弃疾诗文选注	Published in June 1977 as 辛弃疾词文
Annotated Selections from the Poems of Xin Qiji	选注 Annotated Selections from the
	Words of Xin Qiji
陈亮著作选注	Published in July 1977 as 陈亮诗文选
Annotated Selections from the Works of Chen Liang	注 Annotated Selections from the
	Poems and Prose of Chen Liang
李卓吾批点《皇明通纪》	
Li Zhuowu's Annotations of the "Comprehensive Annals of the	
Imperial Ming"	
林则徐著作选注	
Annotated Selections from the Works of Lin Zexu	

not published. Title and Translation	Date of Publication
法家诗歌选注	
Annotated Selections from Legalist Poems and Songs	
法家哲学思想言论选编	
Selections from the Ideological Writings of Legalist Philosopher	s
儒法对立自然观	Published in January 1976 as 儒法对立
The Conflict Between the Confucian and Legalist Naturalist Work	rldview 的自然观 The Conflict Between the Confucian and Legalist Naturalist
	Worldview
古代文选(40 instalments) Selected Classical Texts	Only two additions to the series – numbers 26 and 27 – published in October 1975.
孙武和孙膑	/
Sun Wu and Sun Bin	
吴起	November 1975
Wu Qi	
荀子	
Xunzi	
韩非	
Han Fei	
刘邦	
Liu Bang	
吕后	
Lü Hou	
张良	March 1976
Zhang Liang	
萧何、曹参	Published in March 1976 as 萧何曹参
Xiao He and Cao Shen	传注 Annotated Biographies of Xiao He and Cao Shen
文、景二帝	
Wen and Jing; Two Emperors	
泉错 	Published in May 1976 as 晁错传注
Chao Cuo	An Annotated Biography of Chao Cuo
贾谊	
Jia Yi 汉武帝刘彻	
次氏市 Xi1190 Han Wudi Liu Che	
桑弘羊	February 1976
Sang Hongyang	1 contaily 1970
王充	October 1976
Wang Chong	
诸葛亮	/
Zhuge Liang	
曹操	April 1975
Cao Cao	
范缜与《神灭论》	
Fan Zhen and "On the Perishing of the Soul"	

not published. Title and Translation	Date of Publication
李世民	/
Li Shimin	
式则天	/
Wu Zetian	
柳宗元	/
Liu Zongyuan	
山禹锡	/
Liu Yuxi	
王安石	/
Vang Anshi	
—————————————————————————————————————	/
Chen Liang	
尤括与《梦溪笔谈》	Published in October 1975 as 沈括
Shen Kuo and the "Dream Pool Essays"	Shen Kuo
长居正	/
Zhang Juzheng	
李贽	/
Li Zhi	
龚自珍	/
Gong Zizhen	
平法批儒论文集 (published in instalments)	/
Essays Analyzing Legalism and Criticizing Confucianism	
工农兵评法批儒论文集 (2 books)	/
Worker Essays Analyzing Legalism and Criticizing Confucianism	
从《盐铁论》看法家的经济思想	/
Seeing Legalist Economic Thought in the "Record of the Debate on	
Salt and Iron"	
中国古代经济思想史 (3 volumes)	/
Economic Thought in Ancient China	
去家教育思想资料 (part 1)	Published in January 1976 as 先秦法:
Materials on Legalist Educational Thought	教育思想资料 (Materials on Pre-Qir
	Legalist Education Thought)
去家教育思想资料 (part 2)	
Materials on Legalist Educational Thought	
需家教育思想批判(孔丘)	
Criticizing Confucian Educational Thought: Confucius	
需家教育思想批判(孟轲)	/
Criticizing Confucian Educational Thought: Mencius	
《学记》批注	/
In Annotated Critique of the "Record of Learning"	
中国哲学史讲话	
Varrating the History of Chinese Philosophy	
需法斗争史话	July 1975
Narrating the History of the Confucian-Legalist Struggle	
中国古代史话	
Varrating the History of Ancient China	

not published.	end of the campaign and the end of 1978;
Title and Translation	Date of Publication
古代文学作品选读	/
Selected Reading from Ancient Literature	
简明中国文学史	First volume published July 1976. No
An Introduction to the History of Chinese Literature	record of a second volume.
中学生课外阅读文选专辑——《红楼梦》选析	Published in August 1975 as 封建末世
Selected Articles for Extra-Curricular Middle School Student Reading:	的形象图画——《红楼梦》选析
Analyzed Selections from the Dream of the Red Chamber	Picturing the End of Feudalism:
	Analyzed Selections from the Dream of
革命小将批林批孔文选(三)	the Red Chamber
半晌小符班种班记义远(二) Selected Articles from Little Revolutionary Soldiers Criticizing Lin	
Biao and Confucius	
劳动人民批孔斗争的故事	Published in January 1975 as 劳动人民
The Story of the Working People's Struggle to Criticize Confucius	反孔斗争故事 The Story of the
The story of the monthing reopte 5 bit uggle to childred conjuctus	Working People's Anti-Confucian
	Struggle
法家著作中的文言虚词	
Literary Function Words in Legalist Writings	
学样板戏批孔孟之道	
Study Model Operas and Criticize the Way of Confucius and Mencius	
学习鲁迅评法反儒的战斗精神	Published in July 1975 as 学习鲁迅批
Study the Antagonistic Spirit of Lu Xun's Analyses of Legalism and	孔评法的革命精神 Study Lu Xun's
Critiques of Confucianism	Revolutionary Criticisms of
	Confucianism and Praise of Legalism
红楼梦评论集(二)	
Commentaries on the Dream of the Red Chamber (Part 2)	/
评《红楼梦》	
Evaluating the Dream of the Red Chamber 批林批孔杂文集	1
此你知道比示又来 Essays Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius	
批判旧戏曲中的孔孟之道	/
Critiquing Manifestations of the Way of Confucius and Mencius in Old	
Operas and Plays	
《乐记》选批	/
Selections from the Classic of Music with Criticism	
陈玉成	May 1976
Chen Yucheng	
商鞅变法	March 1976
Shang Yang's Reforms	
西门豹治邺	October 1975
Ximen Bao Governs Ye County	
怒捣大成殿	November 1975
Angrily Trashing the Great Hall of Confucius	
鲁迅批孔文摘大楷字帖	Published in March 1975 as 大楷字帖
Natarta d Christianian at Charles and has I a Very Lana a Vai Callina and a	——鲁迅批孔言论摘录 Model Large
Selected Criticisms of Confucius by Lu Xun Large Kai Calligraphic Script	Calligraphic Script: Extracts from Lu

Key: published before the end of the campaign; published between the one of the campaign is published.	end of the campaign and the end of 1978;
Title and Translation	Date of Publication
法家人物墨迹选	/
Selected Calligraphy by Legalist Personages	
	/
The Annotated Songs of Chu	
法家人物的故事(2)	Published in September 1975 as 法家
Stories of Legalist Figures (2)	人物故事 (2) Stories of Legalist
	Figures (2)
法家人物的故事(3)	Published in April 1976 as 法家人物故
Stories of Legalist Figures (3)	事 (3) Stories of Legalist Figures (3)
曹操的故事	May 1975
The Story of Cao Cao	
秦始皇的故事	May 1975
The Story of Qin Shi Huang	
小刀会起义的故事	1
The Story of the Xiaodaohui Uprising	
陈玉成的故事	July 1977.
The Story of Chen Yucheng	
祖冲之的故事	Published in August 1976 as 祖冲之 Zu
The story of Zu Zhongzhi	Zhongzhi
商鞅的故事	
The Story of Shang Yang	
刘邦的故事	
The Story of Liu Bang	
柳下跖痛骂孔老二	Published in April 1975 as 柳下跖痛斥
Liu Xiazhi Denounces Old Confucius	孔老二 Liu Xiazhi Denounces Old
	Confucius
李自成反孔斗争小故事	Published in May 1975 as 李自成反儒
The Story of Li Zicheng's Anti-Confucian Struggle	斗争小故事 The Story of Li Zicheng's
	Anti-Confucian Struggle
红小兵怒批《神童诗》	June 1976
Little Red Soldiers Angrily Criticize the "Poems of an Infant Prodigy"	
中国近代史(上)	
Recent Chinese History (Part 1)	
章太炎	
Zhang Taiyan	
洪秀全	April 1978
Hong Xiuquan	N 1075
谭嗣同	November 1975
Tan Sitong	A
严复传	August 1976
The Biography of Yan Fu	
历代农民斗争简史	
An Introductory History of Peasant Struggles Throughout History	
中国古代创造发明,	
Innovation and Invention in Ancient China	

Key: published before the end of the campaign; published between the end of the campaign and the second sec	end of the campaign and the end of 1978;
not published. Title and Translation	Date of Publication
春秋战国简史	
An Introductory History of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States	
Periods	
三国史话	/
Narrating the History of the Three Kingdoms	
两晋南北朝史话	
Narrating the History of the Two Jin and Northern and Southern	
Dynasties	
隋朝史话	/
Narrating the History of the Sui Dynasty	
五代史话	
Narrating the History of the Five Dynasties	
中国科技发展史话	
Narrating the History of Chinese Science and Technology	
五代会要(校点)	Published in January 1978 as The
The History of the Five Dynasties	History of the Five Dynasties 五代会要
五代史考异(校点)	/
Different Examinations of the History of the Five Dynasties	
The The Dynasties of the Thistory of the Prive Dynasties 天下郡国利病书(校点)	
<i>A History of China Under the Ming</i> 太平天国诗文选	
Selected Poems and Writings from the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 《四书》批注选	
Annotated Selections from the Four Books with Criticism 《德道经》注释	
The Annotated Daode Jing	
《左转》标点 The Zue Communitient	
The Zuo Commentary	
《国语》校点 Diana and Succession	Published in March 1978 as 国语
Discourses of the States	Discourses of the States
《战国策》校点	Published in May 1978 as 战国策
Annals of the Warring States	Annals of the Warring States
楚辞通释 Community Functions of the Source of Chu	June 1975
Comprehensive Explications of the Songs of Chu	
秦会要订补(校点)	
A Revised Collection of Important Qin Documents	
《潜夫论》校点	
Comments of a Recluse	. 1077
西汉会要(校点)	August 1977
Essentials of the Western Han	
《三国志》选注	
Annotated Selections from the Record of the Three Kingdoms	
《大唐西域记》标点	October 1977
Great Tang Records on the Western Regions	
中国农民战争史	
A History of Chinese Peasant Wars	

Key: published before the end of the campaign; published between the end of the campaign and the end of 1978; not published.	
Title and Translation	Date of Publication
中国科技史	/
A History of Chinese Science and Technology	
古汉语	Published in July 1976 as 古代汉语
Classical Chinese	Classical Chinese
诗韵新编	July 1978
An New Anthology of Poetical Rhyme	
经籍纂诂	
Collected Interpretations of the Classics	

By the end of 1975, Shanghai's failure to follow through on much of its plans fed into broader industry concerns that publishers had woefully underdeveloped the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius genre. A November meeting of publishers from several provinces and municipalities (including Shanghai) maintained that the number of books released in important political genres such as anti-Confucianism remained too low. Attendees also argued that even when they managed to print books on Confucianism and Legalism, these titles contained misleading and erroneous ideas. For instance, some authors, in their rush to attack Confucianism, ended up overly praising Legalist philosophers without explaining Legalism's historical context and limitations. Other titles described the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism as an issue internal to the landlord class, thereby negating the 'party line' emphasis on the laboring masses' place in ancient China's revolutionary tumult.⁶⁴ Even *Old Confucius* (a runaway success published by Shanghai People's Press in its first batch of campaign books) suffered from an overemphasis on elites at the expense of the masses, to the point where press editors commissioned additional titles for children to make up for this deficiency.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 294.

⁶⁵ SMA B167-3-295-28, "上海人民出版社少儿读物编辑室关于少儿历史读物出版情况的汇报" [A report from the children's books editorial office at Shanghai People's Press concerning publishing books for children].

Shanghai People's Press clearly heeded the warnings of the November gathering because its planned catalogue for 1976 teemed with Legalist texts, historical monographs and many other titles in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius genre. Although its politics editors were now concentrating their labors elsewhere, other divisions – especially the parts of the press dealing with history and classical text publishing – proposed over 100 titles (table 2.3).⁶⁶ But, once again, these aspirations proved fleeting. My searching has found only a handful of titles published before Mao's death, with another 15 (predominantly classical texts) released by the close of 1978. Mao's death put paid to an unknown number of those books never published, and factors including material limitations and political changes pre-September 1976 probably dispensed with the rest. The plans in tables 2 and 3 thus offer both a glimpse into the publishing industry's vision of a comprehensive genre and how this vision spectacularly bottomed-out.

Table 2.3: Selected planned titles for Shanghai People's Press, 1976.⁶⁷

Key: published before the end of the campaign; published between the end of the campaign and the end of 1978;	
not published.	
Title and Translation	Date of Publication
上海工人哲学论文选(7)	
Selected Philosophical Essays by Shanghai Workers	
(7)	
先秦哲学思想研究	
Research on Pre-Qin Philosophical Thought	
董仲舒思想批判	
Critiquing the Ideas of Dong Zhongshu	
朱熹思想批判	
Critiquing Zhu Xi's Thought	

⁶⁶ SMA B167-3-335-7, "上海人民出版社编辑部关于 1976 年出书工作的报告" [A report from the Shanghai People's Press editorial office concerning publishing work in 1976].

⁶⁷ SMA B167-3-335-32, "上海人民出版 1976 年选题计划" [Planned titles from Shanghai People's Press for 1976]. For publication data, I rely on Wang Yaohua's *A Catalogue of Books Published in Shanghai*, Duxiu.com, kongfz.com, and multiple years of the *Comprehensive Bibliography of National Publications* edited by Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju banben tushuguan 国家出版事业管理局版本图书馆. As sometimes books were published under a slightly different title or with a different author, an element of informed detective work is needed for this research.

	hed between the end of the campaign and the end of 1978; ublished.
Title and Translation	Date of Publication
论《水浒》与反动理学	
On the Water Margin and Reactionary Science	
中国古代历史故事(共三册)	
Stories from Ancient Chinese History (3 volumes)	
中国农民起义的故事(共二册)	/
Stories of Chinese Peasant Uprisings (3 volumes)	
中国古代著名战役的故事	
Stories of Famous Battles in Ancient China	
中国古代创造发明的故事	
Stories of Innovation and Invention in Ancient China	
鸦片战争的故事	/
The Story of the Opium War	
太平天国的故事	
The Story of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom	
义和团的故事	
The Story of the Boxer Rebellion	
罪恶的地主庄园——揭露孔府的罪行	/
Residence of An Evil Landlord : Exposing the Crimes	
of the Confucian House	
反动老古话选批	/
Critiques of Selected Reactionary Past Sayings	
四书选批	
Selections from the Four Books with Criticism	
三字经选批	
Selections from the 'Three Character Classic' with	
Criticism	
历代法家著作(4)	
Selected Legalist Texts (4)	
历代法家著作(5)	
Selected Legalist Texts (5)	
韩非子新注	
The Han Feizi: A New Annotated Edition	
王安石诗文选注	
Annotated Selections from the Poems and Essays of	
Wang Anshi	
章太炎诗文选注(下)	
Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose By Zhang	
Taiyan: Volume 2	
訄书注释	
'The Book of Urgency' with Translations and	
Annotations 訄书注释	
先秦早期法家著作辑注	
An Anthology of Early Pre-Qin Legalist Writings	
经法注释	
Annotated Texts from the Huang Lao Tradition	
十大经注释	
The Annotated Ten Great Classics	
The Annoluleu Ten Oreul Clussics	

	hed between the end of the campaign and the end of 1978;
Title and Translation	ublished. Date of Publication
盐铁论注释	
The Annotated 'Record of the Debate on Salt and	
Iron'	
论衡选注	/
Annotated Selections from 'On Balance'	
李白诗选注	/
Annotated Selections from the Poetry of Li Bai	
叶适著作选注	
Annotated Selections from the Works of Ye Shi	
野议、谈天、论气注释	June 1976
The Annotated 'Unofficial Opinions,' 'Discussing the	
Heavens, ' and 'On Qi'	
孙子兵法注释	
The Annotated 'Art of War'	
孙膑兵法注释	
Sun Bin's 'The Art of War' with Annotations and	
Notes	
楚辞新注	
The Songs of Chu: A New Annotated Edition	4 1070
尉缭子注释	August 1978
The Annotated "Wei Liaozi'	
法家教育思想 Materials on Pus Oin Localist Education Throught	
Materials on Pre-Qin Legalist Education Thought (continued)	
(commuted) 陆游诗词选注	
Annotated Selections from the Poetry of Lu You	
林则徐诗文选注	February 1978
Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of	1 columy 1970
Lin Zexu	
Yu Hu Writings	
陆游集	
The Works of Lu Yu	
龙州集	September 1978
Longzhou Writings	
履斋遗集	
The Luzhai Collection	
李白集注	
Annotated Works by Li Bai	
李商隐集评注	
Commentaries on the Works of Li Shangyin	
杜牧集	
The Works of Du Mu	
王安石集(共三册)	
The Works of Wang Anshi (3 volumes)	

Key: published before the end of the campaign; published between the end of the campaign and the end of 1978; not published.	
Title and Translation	Date of Publication
学习纪言序目	
Preface to Notes on Learning	
章太炎集(一)	
The Works of Zhang Taiyan (part 1)	
卢川归来集	
Writings Returning to Luchuan	
徐霞客游记	/
Xu Xiake's Travels	
尹文子注释	Published in April 1977 as 尹文子简注 The
The Annotated Wen Yinzi	Introductory Annotated Wen Yinzi
惠子注释	
The Annotated Hui Zi	
孙武孙膑	
Sun Wu and Sun Bin	
刘邦	
Liu Bang	
萧何曹参	Published in March 1976 as 萧何曹参传注 The
Xiao He and Cao Shen	Annotated Biographies of Xiao He and Cao Shen
李贺	
Li He	
王安石	
Wang Anshi	
西汉初期法家人物资料选注	
Selected and Annotated Materials Concerning Early	
Western Han Legalists	
《商君书》研究	/
Research on the 'Book of Lord Shang'	
评《盐铁论》	/
Evaluating the 'Record of the Debate on Salt and	
Iron'	
中庸批注	
An Annotated Critique of the 'Middle Way'	
大学批注	
An Annnotated Critique of the 'Great Learning'	
中国哲学史讲话	
Narrating the History of Chinese Philosophy	
简明中国文学史(上册)	July 1976
An Introduction to the History of Chinese Literature	
(Part 1)	
简明中国文学史(下册)	
An Introduction to the History of Chinese Literature	
(Part 2)	
中国历代文学作品选讲	
Lectures on Chinese Literature Throughout the Ages	
太平天国革命英雄故事	
The Story of the Revolutionary Taiping Heavenly	
Kingdom Heroes	

Key: published before the end of the campaign; published between the end of the campaign and the end of 1978; not published.	
Title and Translation	Date of Publication
农民革命运动史画	
A Pictorial History of Revolutionary Peasant	
Movements	
一部宣扬投降主义的反面教材	Published in January 1976 as 一部宣扬投降主义的反
A Negative Example to Teach Us About	面教材——《水浒》选评 A Negative Example to
Capitulationism	Teach Us About Capitulationism: Selected Discussions
	of the Water Margin
中国文学发展史(二)	August 1976
A History of the Development of Chinese Literature	
(part 2)	
中国文学批评史	
A History of Chinese Literary Criticism	
中国历代文学作品选讲(上)(下)	
Lectures on Selected Works of Chinese Literature	
(parts 1 and 2)	
投降派宋江 (poster)	
The Capitulationist Song Jiang	
中国历史故事丛书(1)	
Chinese Historical Stories (1)	
中国历史故事丛书(2)	
Chinese Historical Stories (2)	
中国历史故事丛书(3)	
Chinese Historical Stories (3)	
中国历史故事丛书(4)	
Chinese Historical Stories (4)	
中国历史故事丛书(5)	
Chinese Historical Stories (5)	
中国历史故事丛书(6)	
Chinese Historical Stories (6)	
大泽烈火 (comic book)	July 1977
An Ocean of Flames	
方腊起义 (comic book)	
Fang La's Rebellion	
黄巢起义 (comic book)	
The Huang Chao Uprising	
成皋之战 (comic book)	
The Battle at Chengkao	
小楷字帖——评《水浒》	
Small Kai Script Calligraphy Models: Extracts from	
Analyses of the Water Margin	
大唐西域记 (woodblock edition)	
Great Tang Records on the Western Regions	
社会发展史基本常识:农民战争推动了历史发展	
Elementary Knowledge of Social Development:	
Peasant Wars Advanced the Development of History	
方腊起义的故事	
The Story of the Fang La Rebellion	
ine story of the I wing Bu Rebethon	

Title and Translation	Date of Publication
辛弃疾	
Xin Qiji	
陆游	Published in November 1978 as 陆游的古诗 Ancient
Lu You	Poems by Lu You
陈玉成的故事	July 1977
The Story of Chen Yucheng	
法家人物故事(4)	
Stories of Legalists (4)	
李逵扯诏骂钦差	/
<i>Li Kui Destroys the Imperial Decree and Denounces</i>	
the Imperial Commissioner	
冲天大将军黄巢	
Huang Chao: the Great General Reaching to the	
Heavens	
中国近代史(上册)	
Recent Chinese History (part 1)	
洪秀全	
Hong Xiuquan	
袁世凯	
Yuan Shikai	
章太炎	
Zhang Taiyan	
康有为	
Kang Youwei	
梁启超	
Liang Qichao	
林则徐	
Lin Zexu	
李鸿章	
Li Hongzhang	
孙中山 Sun Zhanashan	
Sun Zhongshan 陈天华	
<i>Chen Tianhua</i> 秋瑾	
秋理 Qiu Jin	
<i>Qnu Jm</i> 春秋战国简史(中国通史之一)	
存代成四间文(十四進文之)) An Introductory History to the Spring and Autumn	
and Warring States Periods (The History of China,	
part 1)	
中国农民战争简史	
An Introductory History of Chinese Peasant Warfare	
中国农民战争中的女英雄	Published in June 1976 as 农民革命女英雄
Female Heroes in Chinese Peasant Wars	Revolutionary Female Peasant Heroes
黄巾起义	/
The Huang Jin Uprising	

Key: published before the end of the campaign; published between the end of the campaign and the end of 1978; not published.	
Title and Translation	Date of Publication
黄巢起义	
The Huang Chao Uprising	
王小波、李顺起义	
The Uprising of Wang Xiaobo and Li Shun	
李自成起义	
The Li Zicheng Uprising	
太平天国	
The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom	
中国古代史话(上、下)	
Narrating the History of Ancient China (parts 1 and	
2)	
春秋战国史话	
Narrating the History of the Spring and Autumn and	
Warring States Pseriods	
秦汉史话	
Narrating the History of the Qin and Han Dynasties	
三国史话	
Narrating the History of the Three Kingdoms Period	
宋代史话	
Narrating the History of the Song Dynasty	
中国古代天文学家	
Astronomers of Ancient China	
祖冲之	March 1977
Zu Chongzhi	
中国古代医学家	
Doctors of Ancient China	
中国历史上的女科学家	
Female Scientists in Chinese History	
中国农民战争资料(第一册)	
Materials on Chinesse Peasant Wars (book 1)	
昭明文选(第4、5、6册)	
Writings by Zhao Ming (books 4, 5 and 6)	
唐诗别裁	
Tang Poems	
唐诗选注	
Annotated and Selected Tang Poems	D
词综	December 1978.
Collected Poems	
宋词选注	Published in March 1978 as 宋词选 Selected Song
Annotated Selections from Song Poetry	Poems
太平天国诗文选注 American Science from the Destance and Duran of the	Published in November 1978 as 太平天国诗歌选
Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of the	Selected Poems and Songs from the Taiping Heavenly
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 应文随空	Kingdom July 1978
容斋随笔 Inttings from Pong Thai	July 1970
Jottings from Rong Zhai 亜辺 今西	August 1977
西汉会要 Essentiale of the Western Han	August 1977
Essentials of the Western Han	

Key: published before the end of the campaign; published between the end of the campaign and the end of 1978;	
not published. Title and Translation Date of Publication	
东汉会要	June 1978
Essentials of the Eastern Han	
五代会要	January 1978
The History of the Five Dynasties	
通志二十略	
Comprehensive Records	
竹书纪年辑证	
The Bamboo Annals	
续资治通鉴长编	
The Extended Continuation to the Zizhi Tongjian	
宋史纪事本末	1
Records of the History of the Song	
国语	
Discourses of the States	
唐代人物传记索引	
An Index to Biographies of Tang Figures	

Creating an Anti-Confucian 'Legalist' Canon

During the campaign, publishers began implementing the most comprehensive statebacked curation of a classical text canon since the 18^{th} century *Complete Library of the Four Treasuries* (四库全书).⁶⁸ While the pre-Cultural Revolution Ministry of Culture had promoted some textual republishing and cultural stewardship, the scale and ambition of efforts in the 1970s dwarfed these earlier steps.⁶⁹ It is this textual curating – part of what one contemporary observer described as the campaign's "stimulating effect" on the publication of classical texts – which lies at the heart of this section.⁷⁰ In 1974, in a bid to promote the study of Legalism and its opposition

 ⁶⁸ For more on this Qing dynasty project, see R. Kent Guy, *The Emperor's Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch'ien-lung Era* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
 ⁶⁹ Culp, *Power of Print*, 202-211 and 222-231.

⁷⁰ Harald Richter, *Publishing in the People's Republic of China: Personal Observations by a Foreign Student, 1975-1977* (Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1978), 81.

to Confucianism, senior CCP figures green-lit a national project to annotate, edit and republish a range of writings by past philosophers and intellectuals lumped together as "Legalists." This ambitious plan not only aimed to generate the raw intellectual material needed for everyday study activities but also constituted part of the campaign's evolution into a broader publishing genre. At the same time, the plan also demonstrated what counted for politically "correct" campaign knowledge production. Overall, I argue that in substance and practice the Legalist text project embodied a useful charade of collective authorship that lay at the heart of wider state attempts to garner popular legitimacy for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. As I show in the next chapter, this same charade produced contradictory, confusing and counterproductive publications.

By spring 1974, the campaign showed no signs of petering out. On 10 April, in an order forbidding armed uprisings and absconding from work to participate in the campaign, senior CCP leaders signaled that anti-Confucianism was here to stay.⁷¹ Relentless coverage in *The People's Daily* and other newspapers during the spring told the same story. At the same time, however, politicians desired to deepen the campaign's substantive ideas, and in this spirit Jiang Qing convened a meeting at Beijing's Great hall of the People in June to plan the way forward.⁷² Furthermore, over the course of 1974, editorials in state media increasingly pushed a new idea that Chinese history represented a constant struggle for dominance between Confucianism and Legalism. In this highly reductionist historical worldview, all philosophers and scholars – as well as their writings – fit into either of these camps and actively participated in this struggle.⁷³ This

⁷¹ Zhonggong zhongyang, *A Chronology*, vol. 6, 529.

⁷² Ibid., 538-539.

⁷³ Editions of *The People's Daily* for 1974 are peppered with this viewpoint, as a search for "儒法斗争" [Confucian-Legalist struggle] quickly shows.

outlook mirrored the CCP's penchant for dividing its own history into a series of "line struggles" (路线斗争).

Amidst the media's attention to the Confucian-Legalist struggle, Mao's personal scholasticism provided the impetus other politicians needed to launch full-scale revisions of the Legalist canon. In his later years, Mao spent considerable time (re-) reading and annotating historical texts, famous novels and philosophical works. In the spring, during a meeting of the Politburo, Mao mused on the importance of re-annotating well-known Legalist texts to fit the new lines of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Rather than publishers just printing criticisms of 'bad' Confucian texts, Mao argued that they should also release 'good' Legalist texts.⁷⁴ While Mao hunkered down to more scholarly reading at his state residence, Yao Wenyuan got on with creating a new nationwide effort to annotate and publish editions of Legalist texts.

In the same way that party leaders wanted the campaign to spread nationwide, planning for the Legalist texts project brought together party members, officials, and scholars from across the country. In late May 1974, at a national conference on publishing, Yao instructed staff from the State Council Science and Education Group (国务院科教组) to draw-up a preliminary plan for annotating Legalist texts.⁷⁵ After some bureaucratic back-and-forth, delegates from far and

⁷⁴ Chen Jin 陈晋, "晚年毛泽东对读书的矛盾情结" [Mao Zedong's mixed feelings on reading in his later years],

https://web.archive.org/web/20200406224517/http://history.people.com.cn/n/2014/0716/c372327-25290069-4.html (archived April 6, 2020).

⁷⁵ SMA B177-4-347-1, "上海市电影局政宣组关于参加市法家著作注释出版座谈会的汇报提纲" [A summary report from the Shanghai Municipal Film Bureau Propaganda Group concerning participation in the national roundtable for annotating Legalist texts].

wide met in Beijing for one month in the summer to hash-out the particulars.⁷⁶ The 52 attendees included publishers, hand-picked representatives of the masses, and activists from twelve provinces and municipalities spanning the length of the country.⁷⁷ Shanghai, as a first-tier publishing city, sent seven people including Zhu Yongjia, leading theorists, a member of the Fudan University (复旦大学) Department of History, and a representative of a model Shanghai factory.⁷⁸ To forge an alliance between politics and established intellectuals, organizers also invited several noted scholars of philosophy (such as Feng Youlan 冯友兰) to participate.⁷⁹ During proceedings, Jiang Qing met with all the delegates to give the project her political blessing, although she could not help raise an eyebrow at the fact that nearly all of them were men.⁸⁰

The conference, presided over by Zhou Enlai's secretary, needed to establish the best practices for welding the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign to canonical editing. Agenda items included clarifying the purpose of annotating Legalist texts, devising the theoretical outlook annotation groups would use when commenting on the texts, and sharing strategies for cultivating annotation groups with a correct understanding of Marxism-Leninism.⁸¹ The draft "National Plan for Publishing Legalist Texts" (法家著作注释出版规划), passed by the meeting shortly before it closed and then quickly approved by senior politicians, outlined the precepts which shaped how each province and municipality conducted their apportioned share of

⁷⁶ Ibid.; SMA B244-3-702-24, "法家著作注释出版规划座谈会领导小组关于报审《法家著作注释出版规划》(草案)的报告" [A report from the steering committee of the national roundtable for annotating Legalist texts approving the draft "National Plan for Publishing Legalist Texts"]. ⁷⁷ SMA B244-3-702-24.

⁷⁸ SMA B177-4-347-1; Zhu with Zhu, *The Inside Story*, 139.

⁷⁹ SMA B244-3-702-24; Zhu with Zhu, *The Inside Story*, 140.

⁸⁰ SMA B177-4-347-1; Zhu with Zhu, The Inside Story, 139.

⁸¹ Zhu with Zhu, *The Inside Story*, 139.

the annotation work. Most critically, annotation groups were warned to be wary of the flaws in pre-existing interpretations of Legalist texts. In the view of the conference, these annotated editions of Legalist texts lacked integrity because annotators often corrupted their work with their own pro-Confucian standpoints. Annotation groups were to expunge these biases from their own work and single-out the most heinous for criticism.⁸² Perhaps a later quote from *Wenhui Daily* sums up the conference's viewpoint best: "Annotation has always been a tool of class struggle. Throughout history, pro-Confucian elements have done their utmost to use annotations to slander and distort Legalism's progressive role in history" (注释从来就是阶级斗争的工具, 历来的尊儒反法派总是利用注释这个工具竭力污蔑、歪曲法家及其著作在历史上的进步作用").⁸³

The conference proceedings also affirmed that the annotation work should serve the broad population rather than niche scholarly communities. In February 1974, when the campaign had just started, Zhou Enlai had remarked to China's most senior publishing official that "textual exegesis and analysis can be compared to expensive medicine. A minority use it, but most do not, so the ratio [of resources allocated to it] must be appropriate" (古籍整理好比贵重药品,少数人吃的,多数人吃不起,要有一定的比例).⁸⁴ However, in the months after Zhou's comments, campaign rhetoric advocated for unparalleled grassroots generation and consumption of textual learning. While the following chapter explores this topic in more detail, here it suffices to say that the Legalist text project aimed to deliver texts into the hands of target education

⁸² SMA B244-3-702-24.

⁸³ Shanghai shi Luwan qu tushuguan gongren pinglun zu 上海市卢湾区图书馆工人评论组,""三结合" 批儒评法的胜利成果" [The victorious results of using the '3-in-1' system to criticize Confucianism and analyze Legalism]. *Wenhui Daily*, February 18, 1975, 2.

⁸⁴ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 474.

groups: everyday proletarian, rural, and military readers, as well as educated youth rusticated to the countryside.⁸⁵ The size of this public far exceeded the intended audience of textual republishing series from the Republican period, thereby distinguishing the Legalist plan from these earlier attempts to widen access to classical knowledge.⁸⁶ Similarly, unlike earlier projects with their high production costs and sale prices, books would be distributed widely rather than as exclusive high-brow commodities: the August 1974 plan duly required that the print-run, price and distribution of finished books meet the needs of target audiences.⁸⁷ Once work had begun, officials in Beijing cautioned local teams annotating various texts to keep the masses at the center of their work, as well as extolling them not to sacrifice cross-class participation in annotation work for the sake of efficiency.⁸⁸

However, the dubious intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign ensured that the conference, in many ways, failed to delineate a cohesive blueprint for textual annotation in a highly ambiguous political moment. For one, when debriefing colleagues in Shanghai on the Beijing meeting, the head of the Shanghai delegation admitted that the meeting did not actually discuss how many figures from Chinese history were Legalists.⁸⁹ Furthermore, sessions often centered on intellectual questions rather ideological ones. Years later, Zhu Yongjia recollected that the conference "in reality was an academic roundtable with very little new on the political front" (实际上是一个学术讨论会,政治上并没 有什么大波澜).⁹⁰ Furthermore, during proceedings, Yao Wenyuan voiced his opinion that the

⁸⁵ SMA B244-3-702-24.

⁸⁶ Culp, *Power of Print*, 130, 136 and 141-142.

⁸⁷ SMA B244-3-702-24; Culp, Power of Print, 152.

⁸⁸ BMA 201-2-119, "北京人民出版社编印的《法家著作注释工作简报》第 1-7 期" [Legalist Text Annotation Work Bulletin, issue 1-7, edited by Beijing People's Press].

⁸⁹ SMA B177-4-347-1.

⁹⁰ Zhu with Zhu, *The Inside Story*, 140.

meeting had not "given sufficient time to discussing [Mao's dictum] of 'using the past to serve the present'" (这次会议对古为今用讨论不够充分). Not surprisingly, in light of Yao's comments, the writers of the final conference report were quick to ensure that their text delivered more guidance on using research on Legalism to inform China's present-day political situation.⁹¹ Yet, even considering the high-level political will promoting politicized investigations of Legalism, in a striking example of dissent one delegate spoke up to oppose the very notion that the Confucius-Legalist struggle could be linked to the CCP's revolutionary goals.⁹² As I show below, the lack of clarity surrounding many of these complicated theoretical questions would significantly hamper progress with the annotation projects.

The summer planning conference, while failing to resolve some of the underlying tensions at the heart of annotation work, did result in a concrete plan for action for embedding the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign into the classical texts publishing genre. Appendix 1 lays out the 75 separate projects selected for publication and the division of labor agreed upon at the conference. Attendees countenanced a two-year timeline for completing the project and prioritized the publication of anthologies of key texts for grassroots consumption. The resources and experience of Beijing and Shanghai, as well as Zhonghua Books' specialism in classical text publishing, brought with them increased responsibility – namely the task of completing almost half of all the workload. In contrast, smaller publishing outfits such as Fujian People's Press took on only three titles. In addition to the work in appendix 1, the plan also

⁹¹ SMA B177-4-347-1.

⁹² 陈菁霞 Chen Jingxia, "刘泽华:我是个一直有压力的人" [Liu Zehua: I am someone always under pressure], <u>https://web.archive.org/web/20190110224225/http://epaper.gmw.cn/zhdsb/html/2015-03/04/nw.D110000zhdsb_20150304_2-07.htm?div=-1</u> (archived January 10, 2019).

encouraged publishers to arrange shorter annotated editions of standalone essays by 23 major Legalist thinkers.⁹³

As we will see time and again in this study, long-term expansion of the campaign's propaganda genres proceeded underwhelmingly and even abortively. Appendix 1 details the results of my extensive efforts to track the publication of these titles. Originally, planners wanted 27 titles published before the end of 1974, with a further 43 scheduled for 1975 and 5 for the first half of 1976. Glance through this table, however, and you will see that a significant number of projects finished months or years behind schedule, with 31 never finishing at all. Amongst the major publishers, only Zhonghua Books finished all of its workload. Shanghai People's Press managed less than half, while Beijing completed only slightly more than one third. Two provinces produced nothing.

This slow progress partly stemmed from publisher resources being overstretched by conflicting political priorities, but doubtlessly the campaign's general vagueness also left annotating groups treading on ideological eggshells. Update reports from Beijing mention how groups had difficulty devising the correct theoretical approach to annotation.⁹⁴ In Shanghai, Zhu Yongjia devoted extensive time at a municipal Legalist text planning meeting to the "very important question" (很重要的问题) of how to annotate the Legalist classics from a correct, Marxist perspective.⁹⁵ Zhu's focus on this issue implies that he worried that groups, left to their own devices, would do the annotating equivalent of running amok.

The substance of Zhu's remarks provides further information on the immense challenge facing those trying to patch together communist theory and Legalist philosophy. Annotators

⁹³ SMA B244-3-702-24.

⁹⁴ BMA 201-2-119.

⁹⁵ SMA B177-4-347-1.

needed to tread very carefully when combining revolution and antiquity because of the many opportunities for misinterpretation and harmful assumptions. For instance, annotators had to differentiate between everyday proverbs and specifically reactionary sayings, so as to avoid criticizing sayings which had been invented by ordinary people. Moreover, some maxims from Confucian texts now appeared frequently as commonplace expressions – criticizing these would be to explicitly spurn the language of the masses. Annotators also risked lazy inaccuracies such as the erroneous claim, voiced at the nationwide conference in Beijing, that social elites wrote the Confucian *Three Character Classic* (三字经) to school the working people. As Zhu pointed out, this analysis made no sense because social elites in ancient China wrote texts for each other and definitely not for farmers in the fields.⁹⁶

While avoiding all these pitfalls, Zhu and others did not want anti-Confucian annotation to turn into unmitigated, uncontextualized support for Legalism. Annotation in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius era meant looking at the historical context which produced Legalists and their ideas. In particular, this meant recognizing the limitations of Legalist thinkers. Zhu brought up Han Fei as an example: Han represented one exploiting ruling interest seeking to replace another, and definitely could not be seen as a true advocate for the interests of the masses. As a record of Zhu's remarks put it, "for Legalist texts and ideas, proceed from reality and avoid unequivocal affirmations." (对法家的著作、思想,要从实际出发,不能作绝对的肯定).⁹⁷

In one final upping of the pressure on annotators, another senior Shanghai official who addressed the same meeting as Zhu reminded them to not to disjointedly investigate different Legalists and not follow reactionary approaches. Citing a recent volume of Legalist texts

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

published by a Shanghai newspaper, he criticized it for devoting significant space to Xun Zi (荀 子) – described as a Legalist by party propaganda – while barely touching on Han Fei. At another point in the book, the editors' annotation for a character matched a definition scribbled by Lin Biao in one of his books, prompting questions about how politically progressive annotation could possibly match the work of a disgraced traitor.⁹⁸ This climate of mixed messages left annotators treading a fine, and often undefined, line.

On the face of it, provinces and municipalities successfully implemented the Beijing conference's vision of Legalist knowledge produced collectively under the leadership of the masses and for the masses. In Beijing, Beijing People's Press and the city's Federation of Trade Unions (北京市总工会) coordinated people from schools, factories, party committees and parts of the municipal bureaucracy to work on individual parts of the Legalist canon.⁹⁹ By November 1974, approximately 350 people across the capital were participating in projects mandated by the national Legalist text plan, with another 1500 involved with supplementary annotation work ordered by officials Beijing.¹⁰⁰ Some manuscripts, once drafted, were taken to factories, schools and communes to solicit grassroots feedback.¹⁰¹ Officials estimated that a staggering 15,000 people from over 1000 local organizations had contributed to the city's *Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts* anthologies.¹⁰² Down south in Shanghai, 118 people (35 factory workers, 19 rural residents, five from the finance & trade industries, 14 from the army, 36 from universities, and nine from the publishing industry) shared responsibility for the 13 projects given to Shanghai in

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ BMA 201-2-119.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.; BMA 182-7-77, "关于全市法家著作注释工作的情况报告" [A situation report on Legalist annotation work in the city].

¹⁰¹ BMA 201-2-119.

¹⁰² SMA B244-3-938.

the central plan (table 2.4).¹⁰³ Archival reports abound with tales like that of a Beijing soldier who declined to visit his sick wife in hospital and worked through the 1974 National Day holiday to annotate texts.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Table compiled from SMA B244-3-702-19, "上海市革命委员会文教组、上海市革命委员会写作组 关于举办法家著作注释成员学习班的报告" [A report from the Shanghai Municipal Revolution Committee's Writing Group and its Culture and Education Group regarding training for Legalist texts annotators].

¹⁰⁴ BMA 201-2-119.

Legalist Text	Units Responsible
Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts 历代法家	Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions
著作选注	
	Fudan University
	Shan ahai Namual University
Annotated Selections from Han Feizi 韩非子选注	Shanghai Normal University Fudan University Department of Philosophy
Annotated Selections from 11an Fel2t #PHP J 2012	r udan Oniversity Department of Thirosophy
	Shanghai People's Press
The Han Feizi: A New Annotated Edition 韩非子	Fudan University Department of Philosophy
新注	
	Shanghai People's Press
The Translated Han Feizi 韩非子集释 (reprint of	Shanghai People's Press
an earlier edition)	
Annotated Selections from the "Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron" 盐铁论选注	The Shanghai Library
Debate on sall and Iron 监伏化见注	Fudan University Department of Economics
Annotated Selections from the Poems and Essays	Shanghai Normal University Department of
of Wang Anshi 王安石诗文选注	Chinese
The Collected Works of Wang Anshi 王安石集校	Shanghai Normal University 24 Histories
	Punctuation and Annotation Group
Annotated Selections from the Dream Pool Essays	Shanghai Normal University
梦溪笔谈选注	
	The Shanghai Municipal Natural Dialectics
	Writing Group
The Commentary on the Four Books 四书评校点	Shanghai People's Press
The Collected Works of Gong Zizhen 龚自珍集	Fudan University Department of History
(reprint of an earlier edition) Annotated Selections from the Works of Zhang	Fudan University Department of History
Binglin 章炳麟著作选注	Putan Oniversity Department of History
Dingin + Almora I F Zeli	Shanghai May Seventh Cadre School Sixth
	Company History Group
The Collected Works of Zhang Binglin 章炳麟集	Fudan University Department of History
校点	
	Shanghai May Seventh Cadre School Sixth
'The Pools of Ungenery' with Translations and	Company History Group Fudan University Department of History
<i>'The Book of Urgency' with Translations and Annotations</i> 訄书注释	Fudan University Department of History
Annountons)也 174上7千	Shanghai May Seventh Cadre School Sixth
	Company History Group

Table 2.4: The division of responsibility in Shanghai for textual annotation.¹⁰⁵

Yet, a close look at table 2.4 hints at the dominant, and highly politically ambiguous, role intellectuals played in the day-to-day work of annotation groups. As Robert Culp argues, in the

¹⁰⁵ SMA B244-3-702-19.

1950s publishers continued to use intellectual labor – rather than newer, more politically prodigious talent – because they needed to produce books efficiently and reliably.¹⁰⁶ At key moments in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, the same expediency endured. Looking at the units listed in the table, nearly all projects discounting straightforward reprintings involved personnel from Fudan University. While some of those from Fudan were students, projects also required scholars with education and research skills to navigate the complex process of textual interpretation. Municipal officials established a group to review finished products staffed heavily with academics and staff from Shanghai People's Press.¹⁰⁷ The group also included representatives from worker organizations like the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions (上海市总工会), but I do not doubt which group provided the more vital labor.¹⁰⁸ That Shanghai officials were sensitive to the implications of intellectual involvement is clear in how Xu Jingxian (one municipal leader) reacted to advertisements for Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts Volume One. When the journal Study and Criticism announced the book's publication in its first 1975 issue, editors juxtaposed the names of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions and Shanghai Normal University (上海师大).¹⁰⁹ Xu deemed this equating of a worker organization and an academic institution politically inappropriate, and he ordered the journal editors to recall the whole issue. Interestingly, in a reminder to historians that the adjective "radical" can only go so far in describing Chinese political alliances Xu's objections

¹⁰⁶ Culp, *Power of Print*, 24.

 ¹⁰⁷ SMA B244-3-702-19; Ge Jianxiong 葛剑雄, 悠悠长水: 谭其骧后传 [*The Unhurried River: The Life of Tan Qixiang*] (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 2000), 55; Lin Licheng 林丽成, ed., 邹逸 麟口述历史 [*The Oral History of Zou Yilin*] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2016), 88.
 ¹⁰⁸ SMA B244-3-702-19.

¹⁰⁹ For the advert, see *Study and Criticism* no. 1 (1975): 69.

were overruled by none other than Zhang Chunqiao. Zhang saw no problem in promoting the idea that workers had to co-operate with intellectuals to properly annotate texts.¹¹⁰

Like many other parts of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, intellectuals also seized the chance to conduct more in-depth research and writing under the cover of campaign activities. The historian Chen Xulu (陈旭麓), for instance, wrote the preface to the reprint of *The Collected Works of Gong Zizhen* (龚自珍全集) published in February 1975 (see appendix 1). Far from political vitriol, the preface was reprinted in a later volume of Chen's history essays with edits to only the final sentence.¹¹¹ The scholar Zhou Xunchu (周勋初) turned his work on checking annotations of the *Han Feizi* into *Notes on the Han Feizi* (韩非子札记) published in 1980.¹¹² As for the intellectual Wang Zhongmin (王重民), he punctuated the *Guanzi* and advised annotators of the text on its different extant versions, how to assemble a coherent base text, and how to reconcile textual disparities between versions.¹¹³ These activities echo the way intellectuals in previous decades had used employment in publishers' editing offices to practice their own intellectual activities and consult library resources.¹¹⁴ In other words, at the same time as *The People's Daily* railed against Qing scholars whom "devoted themselves to stodgy evidential scholarship and writing empty articles" (去搞烦琐的考证工

¹¹⁰ Wang et al., "My Involvement," 29.

¹¹¹ Zhu with Zhu, *The Inside Story*, 306-307.

¹¹² Wang Huabao 王华宝, "周勋初: 朴学就要"求真求是求通" [Zhou Xunchu: Clear learning must "seek reality, seek veracity, and seek comprehensiveness"],

https://web.archive.org/web/20170708091124/http://www.guoxue.com/?p=42954 (archived July 8, 2017). ¹¹³ Liu Xiuye 刘脩业, "王重民教授生平及学术活动年表" [A Yearly Chronology of the Life and

Academic Activity of Professor Wang Zhongmin], *Tushuguan xue yanjiu* 图书馆学研究 no. 5 (1985): 43; Wang Jingui 王锦贵, ed., 王重民先生百年诞辰纪念文集 [*Essays Marking the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Birth of Mr. Wang Zhongmin*] (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2003), 456-458. ¹¹⁴ Culp, *Power of Print*, 14.

作,去做空洞的八股文章), Wang and other intellectuals spent at least part of their days performing activities more befitting researchers than anti-Confucian warriors.¹¹⁵

Overall, then, the annotation of Legalist texts presents a classic example of both how publishers used specialized genres to deepen the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and the tensions inherent in this process. This will not be the last time that such tensions appear in this dissertation. At the heart of the matter, publishers and authors found themselves defining a vague genre on the fly rather than according to forethought. State propaganda continued to promulgate the illusion that "serving the present struggle does not mean making a forced analogy between history and present-day reality" (现实斗争服务,不是把历史与现实的某些现象进行 牵强附会的类比) while in the same sentence contradictorily urging researchers to "come to the correct conclusions" (得出正确的结论).¹¹⁶ Chapter Three will show the full consequences of this *ad hoc* approach to making revolution.

Constructive Censorship

We must not overlook the vital role censorship played in building the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius book genre. It is a paradox of states reliant on intensive propaganda that when they announce with great fanfare forward-looking revolutionary change, their censors must immediately begin looking backwards. For publishers, the beginning of the campaign in 1974 meant scouring their back catalogues to expunge all titles with dated ideas. This anticipated the

¹¹⁵ Liu Zhenxiang 刘祯祥, "革新反儒的呼声" [Creating a new anti-Confucian cry]. *The People's Daily*, March 2, 1975, 2.

¹¹⁶ Shi Yige 石一歌, "坚持古为今用 正确评价法家" [Continue to use the past to serve the present, and correctly analyze Legalists]. *The People's Daily*, November 11, 1974, 2.

extensive search for heinous material precipitated by the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976 (see Chapter Seven). Forced to walk a political tightrope, it is little wonder that in 1969 some Shanghai publishers privately believed that "publishing is a risky business" (出版这一行是危险 地带) and that "editing is as tricky as eating a dish of disgusting food" (编辑这碗饭不好吃).¹¹⁷ Analyzing print censorship between 1974 and 1976, I chart how, as the tenets of anti-Confucianism developed, censorship evolved from recalling books published before 1974 into the campaign's cannibalization of its own print culture. Besides revealing the physical waste engendered by the pendulum swings of Chinese politics, censorship in the time of Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius shows how the CCP's political power thrived on frequent cultural violence.

Almost as soon as the campaign first appeared in newspapers, Beijing People's Press began undoing its hard work of the previous years. On 31 January 1974, staff ordered local branches of Xinhua Bookstore to withdraw from sale all copies of *A Conversation About the 'Romance of the Three Kingdoms'* (谈谈《三国演义》) and *Some Thoughts on the 'Water Margin'* (《水浒》浅谈). These two titles – both studies of classical literature – were then placed in storage.¹¹⁸ The following April, officials revised their advice to limit sales of the books to those with a permit to access Xinhua Bookstore's Beijing-based Restricted Books Outlet Store (内部图书服务部) and those with the connections to borrow a permit.¹¹⁹ Another study published in 1973, this time of the classic novel *Journey to the West*, shared a worse fate. Beijing

¹¹⁷ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 377.

¹¹⁸ Zhao Qiping 赵齐平, 谈谈《三国演义》[A Conversation About the "Romance of the Three Kingdoms"] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1973); Liao Zhongan 廖仲安, 《水浒》浅谈 [Some Thoughts on the "Water Margin"] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1973).

¹¹⁹ BMA 201-2-164; BMA 201-3-51, "新华书店、中国书店关于图书发行工作情况" [Reports from Xinhua Bookstore and China Bookstore concerning book distribution] shows that the unauthorized lending of cards by permit holders to family members, and by family members to friends, was a serious problem.

People's Press withdrew it at the end of November 1974, placed it on internal circulation the following month, and then pulped remaining copies in November 1975.¹²⁰

The arrival of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign also sounded the death toll for recent lexicography. Other observers of modern Chinese history have noted the power of dictionaries to enshrine a new "linguistic and conceptual universe," and in the 1970s the politics of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign demanded that dictionaries reflect an updated lingua franca.¹²¹ In May 1973, The Commercial Press (商务印书馆) published a new edition of its Dictionary of Modern Chinese (现代汉语词典), selling-out its first printing of 30,000 copies. By early 1974, The Commercial Press had ordered a second printing of 120,000 copies to cater to steep demand. Unfortunately, in March 1974 an article written by some Shaanxi Province coal workers criticized the dictionary for its unacceptably "objective" (客观主义) approach to defining Confucian terms such as "sage" (圣) and "benevolence" (仁). In their eyes, these definitions proved that the dictionary's editors wished to promote Confucianism and force it upon readers. The Shaanxi workers also charged that the editors failed to expunge problematic content when revising the pre-Cultural Revolution version of the dictionary for publication. What was needed was a new dictionary for the masses which incorporated correct socialist values. Even worse for the publisher, the article reached the desk of Yao Wenyuan and other senior leaders - one of whom ordered The Commercial Press to withdraw the dictionary from sale and seal all remaining copies in storage. Not even one year after the dictionary's release, The Commercial Press thus notified bookstores that they could no longer sell the title. In a show of obedience, a subsequent internal investigation by press staff affirmed the absolute correctness

¹²⁰ BMA 201-2-164.

¹²¹ Culp, Power of Print, 96.

of the coal workers' criticisms. Indeed, the investigation pointed out that the dictionary contained an entry for "to fart" (放屁) but did not index the Maoist dictum "serve the people" (为人民服务).¹²² In the world of politicized publishing, farting was less important than "serving the people."

The campaign's fluidity – exemplified by a major ideological plot-twist in 1975 born out of a deliberate misunderstanding – necessitated further rounds of censorship, with the result that censorship became a consistent publisher preoccupation in the late Mao-era. From May 1975, with Mao's eyesight failing, a teacher from Peking University occasionally came to the CCP's leadership compound in Beijing to read classical works to Mao. In mid-August, during one of these sessions, Mao made some comments about the novel *Water Margin* and criticized its chief protagonist Song Jiang (荣江) for surrendering to imperial authority.¹²³ In the novel, a group of heroes led by Song Jiang establish a mountain stronghold and combat the evils perpetrated by imperial officials. The rebels adopt the mantra "virtuous on the emperor's behalf" (替天行道). Eventually, the emperor offers amnesty and convinces Song and the rebels to join him and fight under his banner for a better, more virtuous world. As Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun note, Mao's "casual" and "almost benign" musings gradually took on increased significance as those around him capitalized on his comments for their own ends.¹²⁴

Yao Wenyuan, in particular, seized the opportunity to turn Mao's ramblings into a larger political event. He organized extensive coverage of Mao's comments in *The People's Daily* and the CCP's leading theoretical journal, as well as arranging the novel's republication, in turn

¹²² Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 184-190.

¹²³ Zhonggong zhongyang, A Chronology, vol. 6, 603.

¹²⁴ Teiwes and Sun, *End of the Maoist Era*, 368-369. While Teiwes and Sun provide the detailed political context and implications of the campaign, for discussion of its substantive content see Wu, *Lin Biao and the Gang of Four*, chapter 8.

sowing the seeds of a nationwide campaign to study the lessons of *Water Margin*.¹²⁵ In his musings, Mao had said that the 120-, 100- and 71-chapter versions of Water Margin should all be released with Lu Xun's criticisms of the text appended.¹²⁶ Yao promptly wrote a report addressed to Mao on publishing the three editions of Water Margin and received his consent.¹²⁷ In his report, Yao verbosely gushed how Mao's comments "have a significant and deep meaning for party cadres, the proletariat, and lower-middle peasants, as well as for all the revolutionary masses of the present and future, in this century and the next, as they uphold Marxism, oppose revisionism, and further Chairman Mao's revolutionary line"(对于中国共产党人、中国无产阶 级、贫下中农和一切革命群众在现在和将来、在本世纪和下世纪坚决马克思主义、反对修 正主义,把毛主席的革命路线坚持下去,都有重大的、深刻的意义).¹²⁸ On 20 August, Mao sanctioned a plan by Yao detailing how The People's Daily and The Guangming Daily (光明日 报) would publish articles criticizing capitulationism (投降主义), revisionism (修正主义), and conciliatory approaches to class struggle (阶级斗争调和论).¹²⁹ On 2 September, Mao read a draft of a flagship editorial published soon after on the front page of *The People's* Daily, and by this point he had also signed-off on an NBP plan to release three versions of the Water Margin.¹³⁰ The Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign had taken a bizarre turn late in the game.

¹²⁵ Teiwes and Sun, End of the Maoist Era, 368-369.

¹²⁶ Zhonggong zhongyang, A Chronology, vol. 6 602-603.

¹²⁷ Ibid.; Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 153.

¹²⁸ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 153.

¹²⁹ Zhonggong zhongyang, *A Chronology*, vol. 6, 604.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 605; "开展对《水浒》的评论" [Begin analyzing Water Margin]. The People's Daily, September 4, 1975, 1.

Publishers threw themselves into the task of censoring their previous work and adjusting to fast-paced developments. NBP staff, in particular, had good reasons to show enthusiasm because they stood on the wrong side of political developments. In 1974, the NBP had already come under attack for being an "ersatz version of the pre-Cultural Revolution Ministries of Culture and Propaganda" (旧文化部、旧中宣部的浓缩).¹³¹ This was a serious charge: in 1964, attacks on the Ministry of Culture had labelled it the ministry of "emperors, king, generals, and ministers," of "gifted scholars and beautiful ladies," and of "dead men and foreigners."¹³² Now, having led the way in re-issuing *Water Margin* and other classic literature in 1972 (see Chapter Four), the NBP back-pedaled feverishly. Staff wrote to Mao in August criticizing themselves for widely re-issuing the Water Margin and not having the insight to see the problems Mao had identified three years later.¹³³ Changes to a children's abridged version of the novel published by Shanghai People's Press similarly illustrate the influence the new political climate exerted on publishing. Editors added extra content from the full text on Song Jiang's surrender to the Emperor and his subsequent suppression of a peasant rebellion. Editors also deleted "superstitious ideas" (迷信) such as all references to spirituality in chapter titles. "Zhang Shun returns to the spirits at the Yongjin Gate" (涌金门张顺归神) thus became "Zhang Shun's death at the Yongjin Gate" (涌金门张顺身死) and "Zhang Shun's spirit ensnares Fang Tianding" (张 顺魂捉方天定) became "Zhang Shun lives on to ensnare Fang Tianding" (张顺活捉方天定).¹³⁴

¹³¹ Song Muwen 宋木文, 亲历出版三十年: 新时期出版纪事与思考 (上) [*30 Years as a Publisher: Recollections and Thoughts About Publishing in the New Era, Volume 1*] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2007), 6.

¹³² Culp, Power of Print, 251.

¹³³ SMA B244-3-821-64, "关于学习和贯彻毛主席关于《水浒》的重要指示的请示报告" [A request for instructions regarding studying and implementing Chairman Mao's important directions concerning *Water Margin*].

¹³⁴ SMA B167-3-292-20, "上海人民出版社关于《水浒》少年儿童版增补重印的初步打算" [An initial plan from Shanghai People's Press concerning editing and reprinting the children's version of

Throughout August and September 1975, press staff also wrestled with the problem of writing a preface to new *Water Margin* editions which accurately summarized the novel's problems.¹³⁵

Whether these linguistic subtleties really chimed with readers (especially younger ones) is debatable, but for presses print provided incorrect ideas with a simply intolerable level of legitimacy. One history of publishing in the PRC recounts how 5 and 6 year-olds were taught criticisms of the novel and would go home to tell their parents that they had learnt about "kettles and wooden combs" (水壺和木梳) – a phrase phonetically similar to the Chinese for "The novel *Water Margin*…." (水浒这部书)! While possibly apocryphal, this anecdote speaks to the difficulty of preaching politics to presumably bemused readers.¹³⁶ But, through formalist censorship, publishers signaled their allegiance to their superiors, delineated a body of canonically correct readings, and further defined the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius genre.

During late 1975, censorship continued to reveal itself as inextricably connected to privilege and social status. As previous scholarly editing and trimming of *Water Margin* became a political issue, this paradoxically led the NBP to assign resources to republishing these very expurgated versions now under attack. In October, articles began appearing critiquing Jin Shengtan's (金圣叹) late-Ming annotated commentary on *Water Margin (Water Margin, by the 'Fifth Genius' Shi Naien*, 第五才子书施耐庵水浒传). Jin's version became a target because he cut the last fifty chapters from the original 120-chapter text – a selection which included all the content related to the service of Song Jiang's rebels under the imperial banner following their

Water Margin]; Shi Naian 施耐庵 and Luo Guanzhong 罗贯中, with emendations by Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 水浒传: 儿童版 [Water Margin: A Version for Children], 2 volumes (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975).

¹³⁵ Lei Qunming 雷群明, 逝者如斯: 出版局时期日记 [*Time Marches Onward: A Diary of My Time Working for the Publishing Bureau*] (Np.: privately printed, 2011), volume 2, 630-634. My thanks to Jin Guangyao 金光耀 (Fudan University, Shanghai) for lending me his copy.

¹³⁶ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 158.

surrender.¹³⁷ In *The People's Daily*, the Liangxiao writing group wrote a pseudonymous piece accusing Jin of making his cuts for political reasons. According to their argument, Song Jiang had gained considerable rewards after surrendering to imperial authority and Jin was worried that this would encourage peasant rebels in the late Ming to likewise rebel for reward.¹³⁸ To facilitate additional criticism of Jin, the NBP tasked Zhonghua Books with printing a small number of copies of Jin's commentary as reference and research material.¹³⁹ Released for internal distribution only in December 1975, the edition represents a good example of publishers channelling significant resources into material deemed unfit or even too dangerous for common consumption.¹⁴⁰

Eventually, even books published earlier in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Campaign were sucked into the *Water Margin* ideological imbroglio. After Mao's comments, Song Jiang transformed almost overnight from a heroic leader of a grassroots rebellion into a closet lacky of elite social interests. Consequently, Beijing People's Press declined to fulfil orders from Xinhua's sister bookstore in Hong Kong for *An Introductory Anthology of Sources Concerning the Working People's Anti-Confucian Struggles Throughout History* (历代劳动人民反孔斗争史 料简编) because it contained one page of material on Song Jiang. Dispatching the book risked

¹³⁷ Bai Qing 柏青, "评金圣叹腰斩《水浒》" [Analyzing Jin Shengtan's decapitation of *Water Margin*]. *The People's Daily*, October 5, 1975, 2; Wen Zhong 闻钟, 评金圣叹腰斩《水浒》 [Analyzing Jin Shengtan's decapitation of *Water Margin*]. *The People's Daily*, October 7, 1975, 3; John Ching-Yu Wang, *Chin Sheng-t'an* (New York: Twayne, 1972), 54.

¹³⁸ Bai Qing, "Analyzing Jin Shengtan's decapitation." For the pseudonyms of the Liangxiao writing group, see Yin Jiamin 尹家民, "'文化大革命'中的梁效、罗思鼎写作组" [The Liangxiao and Luo Siding Writing Groups During the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'], *Dangshi bolan* 党史博览 no. 10 (2004): 33.

¹³⁹ SMA B167-3-292-30, ":国家出版事业管理局关于《水浒》的出版工作的通知" [A notice from the National Bureau of Publishing regarding publishing *Water Margin*].

¹⁴⁰ Shi Naian 施耐庵, and Jin Shengtan 金圣叹, 第五才子书施耐庵水浒传 [*Water Margin: As Presented by the Fifth Genius Shi Naian*], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975), copyright page (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com).

undermining the party line and inviting further contradictions in the future.¹⁴¹ For the same reason, officials refused the Beijing Library's request to include the book among titles exchanged with foreign libraries.¹⁴²

With Shanghai People's Press a key publisher of anti-Confucian material, Shanghai staff undertook a full appraisal of their backlist to root out all incorrect views. The search identified 28 books containing *Water Margin* references published since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Of these, the degree of censorship imposed on each depended on their content. Seven made only neutral references to the *Water Margin*, and so staff recommended that they could remain in circulation and on sale. Four titles required amending in future editions to alter minor positive comments on *Water Margin* and Song Jiang. Three titles, however, offered substantial praise in one place and so needed the requisite leaf exchanging (换页) for a new one with modified text.¹⁴³ Examples in this category included *Criticize the Reactionary Cultural Outlook of Confucius and Mencius* (批判孔孟的反动文艺观) published in a run of 50,000 copies in late 1974 and *Study Lu Xun's Revolutionary Criticisms of Confucianism and Praise of Legalism* (学习鲁迅批孔评法的革命精神) released as recently as July 1975.¹⁴⁴

 ¹⁴¹ BMA 182-7-72, "市出版办公室关于将《孔丘反动的一生》、《历代劳动人民反孔斗争史料简编》两书向香港发行的请示" [Documents from the Beijing Publishing Office related to whether *The Life of Confucius* and *An Introductory Anthology of Sources Concerning the Working People's Anti-Confucian Struggles Throughout History* can be sent to Hong Kong].
 ¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ SMA B167-3-292-1, "上海人民出版社关于有关出版物中涉及《水浒》内容的情况和处理意见的 报告" [A report from Shanghai People's Press outlining the content of books related to *Water Margin*, as well as comments on how to censor them].

¹⁴⁴ Ceng Rong 曾荣, ed., 批判孔孟的反动文艺观 [*Criticize the Reactionary Cultural Outlook of Confucius and Mencius*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974), copyright page (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com); Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, ed., 学习鲁迅批孔评法的革命精 神 [*Study Lu Xun's Revolutionary Criticisms of Confucianism and Praise of Legalism*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975).

Carefully comparing multiple copies of the same title is a great way for historians to detect censorship in action. My collection includes two editions of *Study Lu Xun's Revolutionary Criticisms of Confucianism and Praise of Legalism*, each with different text on page 39 (see figure 2.1). In the copy on the right, the publisher has taken out the original leaf containing page 39 and replaced it with a fresh leaf (known as a 'cancel'). The cancel omits several lines from the original discussing praise of *Water Margin* by a Ming dynasty Legalist. Not surprisingly, censors also chopped the description of *Water Margin* as "an excellent classical novel about a peasant uprising" (这部反映农民起义的优秀古典小说). Rather embarrassingly for those involved, the book's afterword namechecks "comrade Shi Yige" (石一歌同志) – the pseudonym of a writing group linked to Shanghai's top politicians – for helping to edit the book.¹⁴⁵ In other words, the municipality's senior propagandists had helped author politically problematic material. Omitting the offending references to *Water Margin* was a must.

¹⁴⁵ Shanghai renmin chubanshe, *Study Lu Xun's Revolutionary Criticisms*, 39 and 208.




Figure 2.1: Page 39 from two copies of *Study Lu Xun's Revolutionary Criticisms of Confucianism and Praise of Legalism*. Notice the different appearance of the bottom quarter of the page. The fore-edge of the replacement leaf is faintly visible in the right-hand picture.¹⁴⁶

When salvaging a title with cancels proved impractical, pulping served as the final option for resolving discrepancies in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius genre. In their search through the Shanghai People's Press back catalogue, staff found that *From Chen Sheng and Wu Guang to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: A History of Chinese Peasant Rebellions* (从陈胜吴广到太平天 国:中国农民战争史话, published before the campaign in 1972) and *Stories of Chinese Peasant Rebellions* (中国农民革命故事, 1974) contained too many problematic places to make the cancel route a feasible option.¹⁴⁷ For example, *Stories of Chinese Peasant Rebellions* had 3

¹⁴⁶ Image source: compare my two copies of Shanghai renmin chubanshe, *Study Lu Xun's Revolutionary Criticisms*, 39.

¹⁴⁷ Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, ed., 从陈胜吴广到太平天国: 中国农民战争史话 [From Chen Sheng and Wu Guang to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: A History of Chinese Peasant

relevant pages of text and an illustration of Song Jiang. Censoring would have required removing three leaves and re-drafting content for all unsold copies of the book's original 400,00-copy print-run.¹⁴⁸ Staff thus recommended pulping remainders of both titles and passed the message on to colleagues at Shanxi People's Press currently printing 100,000 copies of *Stories of Chinese Peasant Rebellions* under the flong-lending system.¹⁴⁹

Despite extensive censorship, this multifaceted attempt to construct a new legitimate book genre via expurgation inevitably could never totally succeed. Books themselves are the best evidence: an unknown reader bought my unaltered copy of *Study Lu Xun's Revolutionary Criticisms of Confucianism and Praise of Legalism* at a discount from a Shanghai bookstore, showing that it continued to circulate. Today, copies of all kinds of previously problematic titles are cheaply available via online book dealers. They convey both the impossibility of universal censorship and serve as a foil to the violent fate which befell many books because of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.

Publishing for Ethnic Minorities

To close this history of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius publishing genre, I return to a question raised in the previous chapter: how did presses cater to audiences who spoke languages other than Mandarin Chinese? For important titles like the Four Books, the state did its utmost to make them quickly available in five languages: Mongolian, Korean, Tibetan, Uyghur and Kazakh. At the same time, publishing officials realized that minorities needed access to a

Rebellions] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1972); He Zhuojun 贺卓君, 中国农民革命故事 [Stories of Chinese Peasant Rebellions] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974).

¹⁴⁸ He, *Stories*, 106-109 and copyright page.

¹⁴⁹ SMA B167-3-292-1.

wider range of titles than they currently enjoyed. This growing feeling led to the formation of a national plan aiming to publish hundreds of books from all kinds of genres between 1975 and 1977. Examining the results of this plan, the notion that the state systematically failed to incorporate minorities into the campaign's reading culture over the long term feels almost inescapable. Pointing to the underwhelming progress made by publishers specializing in ethnic minority languages, I argue that further studies of Chinese political campaigns and book history can provincialize narratives by noting the different experiences between different linguistic groups.

As expected, state media consistently sounded an up-beat note when reporting on publishing for ethnic minorities. To cite one example, *The People's Daily* announced in August 1974 article that Xinjiang People's Press (新疆人民出版社) had published over 4 million books related to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign in Uyghur, Mongolian and Kazakh.¹⁵⁰ Images embellished the same narrative. For example, Li Zhuo's painting (reprinted in *The Xinjiang Daily*, see figure 2.2) shows two Uyghurs transcribing a political poster from the contents of a book. Significantly, they write in Latinized script rather than using older-style Uyghur script. In the early 1960s, the state began promoting Latinized versions of the Uyghur and Kazakh languages to promote literacy and to mirror the *pinyin* system developed for Mandarin (figure 2.3).¹⁵¹ Li's painting, and the decision of *The Xinjiang Daily* to reprint it, encourages viewers to adopt the new script as a tool of anti-Confucian communication.

¹⁵⁰ "新疆人民出版社翻译出版少数民族文字的批林批孔书籍" [Xinjiang People's Press has translated Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign books into ethnic minority languages and published them]. *The People's Daily*, August 11, 1974, 4.

¹⁵¹ Chen Yunhua 陈云华, and Wang Chunyan 王春燕, "当代新疆两次重大文字改革刍议" [Thoughts on the Two Great Language Reforms in Contemporary Xinjiang], *Yuyan yu fanyi* 语言与翻译 no. 1 (2002): 29-30.



Figure 2.2: Li Zhuo (李灼), "Read and study earnestly to Further the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign" (认真看书学习 深入批林批孔).¹⁵²




Figure 2.3: A poster printed in December 1973 showing the Latinized Uyghur language.¹⁵³

¹⁵² Image source: *The Xinjiang Daily*, June 23, 1974, 4.

¹⁵³ Image source: University of Westminster Records and Archives, London, UK, reference CPC-1-G-010.

While the media primed minorities to read, central government officials were painfully aware that book output in non-Mandarin languages lagged significantly behind the wider publishing sector. In 1973, the NBP and Ministry of Commerce had already called on publishers to distribute more books in minority languages, especially for those living in rural areas.¹⁵⁴ Soon after the campaign kicked into gear, Zhou Enlai and Yao Wenyuan received a letter from a senior Xinjiang cadre detailing how a lack of minority-language publications left the needs of minorities unmet. In May, another Xinjiang official wrote to Jiang Qing observing that, with no existing Uyghur or Kazakh translations of classical Chinese literature and other history books, "study activities are jeopardized" (对学习很不利). Jiang duly wrote to the NBP in June 1974 to press for more campaign materials to be translated into minority languages.¹⁵⁵

The NBP's assessments likewise lacked the sanguine tenor of state media reports. In October, it concluded that the range of titles on offer was far too small and that printing them required too much time. Concurrently, a lack of good editorial, printing and distribution facilities impeded the state's ability to cater to minorities.¹⁵⁶ The state had done a fine job providing minorities with Mao's writings – some 44 million volumes since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution – but had not replicated this success with many other genres.¹⁵⁷ NBP officials also juxtaposed these lackluster efforts against rival powers' (especially the USSR's) use of radio broadcasts and books to spread propaganda to China's borderland minority communities.¹⁵⁸

Xinhua Bookstore sales in Inner Mongolia complete this picture of decline. Graphs 2.1 and 2.2 below show in turn Xinhua's total sales in the Inner Mongolia region between 1965 and

¹⁵⁴ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 167.


¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 204-206.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 200-201.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 210.


¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 200-201.

1980 and then sales of Mongolian-language materials.¹⁵⁹ In terms of overall sales, we can see that sales in 1974 counted for 75 percent of the same figure for 1966. But, when looking at Mongolian-language sales in the same two years, sales plummeted by around 90 percent. While sales recovered through the decade from their nadir of almost nothing in 1970, significant growth did not come until two years after the NBP decided to specifically bolster minority-language publishing.



Graph 2.1: Total sales for Inner Mongolian branches of Xinhua Bookstore (10,000s yuan).

¹⁵⁹ Graphs compiled from "Neimenggu zizhi qu xinhua shudian zhi" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《内蒙古自治区新华书店志》编纂委员会, ed., 内蒙古自治区新华书店志 1947-1995 [*The Gazzetteer of Inner Mongolia's Xinhua Bookstores, 1947-1995*] (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 1999), 467.



Graph 2.2: Sales of Mongolian-language books by Inner Mongolian branches of Xinhua Bookstore (10,000s *yuan*).

In light of clearly apparent problems, the state launched an unprecedentedly ambitious plan to provide minorities with reading material in their mother tongues. Spurred on by grassroots difficulties and elite-level concern, the NBP convened a meeting of 90 propagandists, publishers, educators, translators and researchers from across the country at the tail-end of 1974 to devise a list of titles that would be translated into one or more of five minority languages.¹⁶⁰ The meeting drafted a plan to translate and publish a combined total of 1214 titles over the following three years: 270 in Mongolian, 186 in Tibetan, 265 in Uyghur, 220 in Kazak, and 273 in Korean. Attendees planned 497 titles for completion in 1975, a further 464 in 1976, and the

¹⁶⁰ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 201-202 and 240.

remaining 253 in 1977.¹⁶¹ Appendix 2 presents the planners' vision of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign titles each minority group might need in the years after 1974, and thus it does not account for later developments such as the campaign to study *Water Margin*. As far as I am aware, the publishing sector under the CCP had never before attempted such a wide-ranging attempt to expand the country's print culture.

Appendix 2 lists over 200 translations connected to the campaign's themes, and their range closely mirrors the plans discussed earlier in this chapter, with everything from notable political diatribes and books for children to annotated Legalist texts and historical studies. Yet only a short look at the table is needed to see that only between 30 and 40 translations were eventually published. Of those unpublished, fifty or more could not be completed because the original publisher never finished the Mandarin Chinese base text. More than half – those in red – remained unfinished publication of the original.

Without access to the archives of these presses, we can only speculate why so much of the plan fell through. In the same way shifting currents in elite politics influenced the work Beijing People's Press and other publishers, these machinations probably pulled translators and minority-language printing resources away from the project. Furthermore, the end of the campaign shortly after Mao's death (see Chapter Seven) doubtless called a halt to much in-progress progress. Finally, scattered evidence implies scarce printing capacity for non-Mandarin books in the 1970s.¹⁶² Whatever the relative contribution of different factors, in 1976 minority-language books accounted for only 190 million (6.5 percent) of the 2.9 billion books printed

 ¹⁶¹ SMA B167-3-289-16, "国家出版事业管理局关于 1975 年至 1977 年蒙、藏、维、哈、朝五种文 字图书翻译出版的规划(草案)" [A draft plan from the National Bureau of Publishing outlining translation and publication of books in Mongolian, Tibetan, Uyghur, Kazakh, and Korean, 1975-1977].
 ¹⁶² For example, see BMA 201-3-109, "国家出版局、市计委等单位关于印刷方面的通知" [Notices regarding printing from the National Bureau of Publishing, the Municipal Planning Commission and other organizations].

across the country.¹⁶³ Most of these had nothing to do with the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.

The explanation, however, is less important than the implication. Compared to their fellow Mandarin-speaking citizens, those proficient only in the language of their ethnic grouping suffered from structured inequalities in their access to political knowledge. True, books did not represent a person's sole conduit of information, but they did embody advantages unavailable in other media – specialized genres, portable information, and even the prospect of reading for pleasure. As discussed above, when unable to obtain books, cadres working in ethnic minority communities saw this as a problem serious enough to warrant writing to the central government. The sources do not allow me to qualify how a shortage of reading material in parts of the country affected the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, but self-evidently the shortages *did* have an effect. With this endemic problem left unsolved, state leaders never hope to realize the kind of unified, national body politic they so desired.

Conclusion

After the launch of the Four Books with great fanfare in early 1974, publishers took over day-to-day responsibility for placing the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign in printed form into bookstores, libraries and, ultimately, people's hands. This required commissioning a disparate group of titles to appeal to specific audiences and keep pace with undulations in the campaign's theoretical narratives. Although presses succeeded in giving the campaign a life beyond the point at which intense local factionalism died down, the anti-Confucianism genre

¹⁶³ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 266.

developed gradually, sporadically and, because of censorship, violently. Later in this dissertation, I will make a convincing case that material difficulties compounded slow progress with the campaign. More immediately, the next chapter will draw out how the process of authoring books elicited challenges and tensions that caused tumult in the late Mao-era's anti-Confucian upsurge.

CHAPTER THREE

Reclaiming the Canonical, Reinforcing the Conventional: Authority, Access and the Confucian *Analects*

"Throughout history, those who encouraged people to read the Confucian classics were always out to harm others" (鼓动人们读儒家经典,历来都是坑人害人的).¹

"History is currently being liberated from the classrooms of historians and the pages of books. It is becoming an acute weapon in the hands of the masses." (历 史科学正进一步从史学家的课堂上和书本里解放出来,变为群众手里的尖锐 武器).²

"[We] must cast-off the shackles of old-style annotation that follows convention and stifles revolution." (一定要摆脱那种因循守旧、窒息革命精神的旧注解的 束缚).³

By February 1974, the mantra of "Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius" dominated the pages of state media. Under this political rubric, propaganda trumpeted the benefits of widening access to education and overturning the authority of traditional academic elites.⁴ Chapter One discussed the titles published in huge quantities to spur the campaign in its early stages, while Chapter Two analyzed the long-term development of campaign-related publishing. In complete contrast, I turn here to a specialized effort to analyze the Confucian *Analects* through the campaign's ideological prism. The resulting reinterpretation, published by Zhonghua Books in October 1974 as *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* (《论语》批注), contained the

¹Xi Min 席敏, "批判读经做官的反动谬论" [Criticize the reactionary fallacy of 'reading the Classics and becoming an official']. *The People's Daily*, September 2, 1974, 2.

² "Meet the needs of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign" [适应批林批孔的需要]. *The People's Daily*, December 12, 1974, 1.

³ Yan Yushan 阎玉山, [向工人阶级学习' [Learn from the working classes]. *The People's Daily*, September 9, 1974, 3.

⁴ Robert Culp has also stressed the democratizing power of earlier reprinting efforts in 20th century China. See Culp, *Power of Print*, 12.

complete text of the *Analects* accompanied by notes and political commentaries attributed to a group of students from the high-profile Peking University in Beijing. These students came from politically progressive worker, peasant, and soldier (工农兵) backgrounds because the campaign rhetoric painted members of these social groups as best-placed to reflect the political interests of the "people" and expose Confucianism's exploitative underpinnings. *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* thus symbolized a break from the supposedly 'ivory tower' intellectualism of traditional *Analects* exegesis. It demonstrated the merit of merging education and political revolution by displaying the students' ability to master and interpret a complex classical text. The age of the scholarly exegete had passed – the revolutionary masses sat in the driving seat.

I argue, however, that *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* subverted its own revolutionary underpinnings. Unfortunately, publishers struggled to present the project's iconoclastic anti-Confucianism without undermining the broader campaign's messages. In particular, the conventions of knowledge production, along with publishing industry practices, tied the hands of the cultural revolutionaries. For example, the editors included footnotes dealing with scholarly minutiae precisely because readers associated this practice with authoritative textual interpretations. Without meeting these culturally ingrained expectations, the book would have appeared illegitimate; yet, by abiding with convention, the book inevitably reinforced preexisting notions of what counted as "legitimate" knowledge.

Furthermore, the book's circulation contaminated state-sponsored anti-Confucianism. As the epigraph beginning this chapter makes clear, propaganda claimed that past elites promoted the Confucian classics to reinforce their own dominance over ordinary people. By reading the classics, these supposedly nefarious elites learnt the art of political "trickery" (权谋).⁵ Yet, running a campaign in which the masses refuted Confucianism necessitated first circulating these oppressive ideas widely. Official media therefore published hortatory articles stressing that ideal campaign participants should study the history of Confucianism and anti-Confucian struggles in China. Armed with anti-Confucian knowledge and political criticisms, ordinary people could throw-off the shackles of this pernicious philosophy. Once *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* left the printer, however, people used it to learn about Confucianism *sans* any ideological gloss. Furthermore, differences in political status stratified access to the book. For instance, political elites with privileged access to "internal" materials could devour the full edition, while the majority of readers could only read extracts widely serialized in newspapers and other publications. Propaganda images of people using the book and studying the *Analects* likewise reinforced hierarchies of access to knowledge. Ironically, while the tenor of the new *Analects* attacked notions of scholarly privilege, state officials and publishers simply swapped this form of privilege for others.

To analyze *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*, I consider the properties used by publishers to imbue subtexts, legitimacy, and authority into printed material.⁶ Some of these include references within a text to authoritative institutions – the citations of academics throughout my chapters are a case in point. Others, in the words of Gerard Genette, are "paratextual" because publishers append them to texts to form a book's familiar structure. By their very existence, paratextual elements alert readers to the presence of the authorial, editing,

⁵ Wu Zhanlei 吴战垒, ""经史'和'权谋'" ['Scholarship on the Classics' and 'trickery']. *The People's Daily*, October 18, 1975, 3.

⁶ When thinking about textual authority, I benefited from reading Christopher Connery's *The Empire of Text: Writing and Authority in Early Imperial China* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), esp. 1-19.

and design processes that together create a "book." These may include a preface, epigraph and title, as well as subtitles, notes, and text on the spine.⁷ Finally, choices over binding, cover design, typefaces, and page layout convey a book's membership in a particular genre. Imagine holding a printed copy of this dissertation without some of these elements – would you still consider it a serious piece of academic research?

In 1970s China, textual, paratextual and structural properties signaled to readers that they should accept books and newspapers as trustworthy representations of a particular idea, even if they did not agree with the idea itself. For example, while many no doubt viewed elements of Maoist ideology with skepticism or fear, historians do not find people questioning whether *Quotations from Chairman Mao* or the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* (毛泽东选集) faithfully represent Mao's ideas. These texts' official 'feel' stems from their presentation in a familiar, respected format: the book. Moreover, the symbolic authority of books explains why, once political leaders fell from power, their owners frequently desecrated traces of the leader's name and words in print (figure 3.1).

⁷ Genette, *Paratexts*.

1 + 13 3 1A 18 + 13 ATE 1/2 -121.5-7

Figure 3.1: Detail from a medical handbook published in 1969. Lin Biao's name and his exaggerated salutations for Mao have been crossed out. These additions occurred at some point after Lin's flight and death in 1971.⁸

Analyzing the textual authority of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* illustrates how propaganda states addressed captive audiences. This chapter shows that historians should pay more attention to the non-textual communicative elements of printed propaganda. The historian Barbara Mittler studies textual and visual rhetoric to analyze issues of creativity and continuity in the culture of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign (and the Cultural Revolution decade generally). For example, by analyzing a radical criticism of the *Three Character Classic* (三字经) published during the campaign, she concludes that "the Cultural Revolution…follows the rules of modern Chinese cultural history" rather than representing a cultural aberration.⁹ Approaches from book history and bibliography can widen Mittler's approach by showing how paratextual and structural elements of printed material likewise acted

⁸ Image source: Shanghai di yi yixue yuan geming weiyuanhui zhengjiao zu 上海第一医学院革命委员 会政教组, ed., 新针疗法手册 [*A Handbook of New Acupuncture Techniques*] ([Shanghai?]: n.p., 1969). ⁹ Mittler, *A Continuous Revolution*, 140 and, more generally, chapter three.

as rhetorical devices. ¹⁰ For *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*, such a perspective only strengthens Mittler's argument that anti-Confucian propaganda presented blurred, contradictory messages.¹¹

Exegetical Revolution

Political developments in the mid-1970s transformed the social position of classical learning and knowledge. In the late 1960s, as the Cultural Revolution's rhetoric of cultural millenarianism reached its zenith, studying the past became an irreverent, and sometimes dangerous, way to spend time (see Chapter Four). After the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign began, however, classical texts and writings of prominent imperial-era Confucians and Legalists acquired a renewed widespread relevance because they appeared as primary sources in scholarly debates. The polemical essays in the Four Books cited texts such as *The Analects* and *The Commentary of Zuo* (左传), as well as the works of scholars such as Wang Fuzhi (王夫之) and Zhang Taiyan, to substantiate their arguments and prove the existence of a 2500-year struggle between the opposing philosophical schools of Confucianism and Legalism.¹² Self-evidently, editions of these classical texts and scholarly writings printed before the campaign did not reflect its ideological lines. The state needed new interpretations and new editions to replace these politically outdated versions.

¹⁰ For the classic definition of modern bibliography's analytical purpose, see McKenzie, *Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts*. Within the growing field of book history and bibliography, other scholarship informing my approach includes: Mak, *How the Page Matters*; Chartier, *Forms and Meanings*; Grafton, *The Footnote*; Gutjahr and Benton, *Illuminating Letters*; and Genette, *Paratexts*.

¹¹ Mittler, Continuous Revolution, 136.

¹² For example, see the essays in Renmin chubanshe, *Anthology Volume One* (Beijing renmin chubanshe).

Releasing new versions could also provide more people with the specific classic knowledge demanded by campaign study activities. State media relentlessly stressed that Chinese should throw themselves into studying the pernicious influence of Confucianism, with passivity not an option. Most markedly, in mid-1974, *The People's Daily* began calling on readers to "investigate the history of the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism" (研究儒 法斗争的历史), with the phrase appearing in over three hundred articles in the newspaper up to the campaign's unofficial end in September 1976.¹³ Typically, these articles argued that studying the contest between Confucianism and Legalism could reveal how Confucianism had oppressed the people and retarded society's progress along the Marxist historical timeline. *The People's Daily*, not surprisingly, also billed Maoism as an emancipatory tool to escape this oppression.

State media frequently lauded model workers who engaged with classical texts, furthering the party line that the masses stood at the apex of knowledge production and consumption. For example, an article from July 1974 praised workers from Tianjin who, in a show of "inexorable revolutionary spirit" (势如破竹的革命气概), had studied the Confucian-Legalist struggle, researched the lives of key Legalist figures, and criticized prominent Confucian texts.¹⁴ In this rhetorical climate, publishers needed to equip people with the language, materials and knowledge to emulate what they read in the newspaper.

In addition to superseding previous editions and facilitating campaign participation, new exegeses symbolized radical interventions in China's hotly-contested history of textual commentary. Works such as the *Analects* had exegetical histories almost as old as the texts

¹³ This figure is based on a search for "研究儒法斗争" in the online database of *The People's Daily* published by OriProbe Information Services.

¹⁴ "工人阶级在批林批孔中又一创举" [Another innovation by the working class during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign]. *The People's Daily*, July 5, 1974, 1-2.

themselves, and various dynasties regularly undertook projects to curate and re-order the canon of classic texts.¹⁵ During the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, state propaganda argued that past Confucians used exegesis as a political weapon to mask unpleasant truths, thereby positioning reinterpretation as a way of righting past distortions. For instance, polemics in *The People's Daily* claimed that exegetes such as Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200) used their scholarship to beautify and promote Confucianism.¹⁶ Likewise, annotators such as Zhu were guilty of "helping the reactionaries dominate we laboring masses" (帮助反动派来治我们劳动人民).¹⁷ Even Confucius himself stood accused of manipulating the textual canon for his own ends. According to one piece first published in the CCP's leading theoretical journal, Confucius chose only 305 poems for the *Books of Songs* (诗经) and left out hundreds more because he only wished to preserve a particular aspect of ancient China's culture.¹⁸ Other pieces claimed that Confucius had deleted the poems "to bolster his restorationist agenda" (为了适应他搞反革命复 解的需要) and to "suffocate" (扼杀) the culture of the masses.¹⁹ As Shanghai's *Wenhui Daily*

¹⁶ Tianjin shi lishi yanjiu suo da pipan zu 天津市历史研究所大批判组,"阴险毒辣的中庸之道"[The Middle Way: a sinister concept]. *The People's Daily*, 6 March, 1974, 2; Kang Li 康立, "孔子和林彪都是政治骗子"[Confucius and Lin Biao are both political frauds]. *The People's Daily*, March 11, 1974, 2.

¹⁵ For example, see discussion of the Qing dynasty's sponsoring of textual curation in Guy, *Emperor's Four Treasuries*.

¹⁷ Henan sheng Yichuan xian nanfudian da dui pinxiazhongnong lilun xiao zu 河南省伊川县南府店大队 贫下中农理论小组, "程朱理学是吃人学" [Cheng-Zhu studies is a an exploitative approach]. *The People's Daily*, December 10, 1974, 2.

¹⁸ Wei Jin, 卫今, "从银雀山竹简看秦始皇焚书" [Using the Yinqueshan bamboo slips to study Qin Shi Huang's burning of the Confucian books]. *The People's Daily*, July 9, 1974, 2.

¹⁹ Jiang Tian 江天, "研究文艺史上儒法斗争的几个问题" [Several questions raised when researching the Confucian-Legalist struggle in cultural and art history]. *The People's Daily*, December 5, 1974, 3; Ren Yilin 任伊林, "从修订六经看孔老二的反动本质" [We can see Confucius' reactionary mentality in his editing of the Six Classics]. *The Xinjiang Daily*, July 2, 1974, 2.

opined, "annotation has always been a tool of class struggle" (注释从来就是阶级斗争的工具).²⁰

Releasing new interpretations even promised to undo the damage wrought by the CCP's most reviled traitors. Never afraid of flowery imagery, *The People's Daily* eviscerated Mao's two successive heirs apparent – Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) and Lin Biao – for "raising the political corpse of Confucius from the coffin of its ancient tomb and picking the Confucian classics off the rubbish heap" (刘少奇、林彪又从古墓陈棺里抬出孔老二这具政治僵尸,从垃圾堆里捡起儒家的经书).²¹ In this line of critique, Confucius and famous Confucians such as Mencius (孟子) and Zhu Xi represented Lin Biao's "restorationist ancestors" (复辟祖师).²²

The campaign's promotion of textual exegesis must also be seen as part of the state's broader efforts to dispel more recent models of academic authority and education. Up to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, higher education remained dominated by those with political connections and access to good intellectual training. The early years of the Cultural Revolution, however, upended social norms such as respect for expertise. In May 1966, for instance, *The People's Daily* railed against historians who believed that only those who had read primary source materials could conduct historical analyses.²³ Another article printed soon after accused prominent scholars of claiming that those without academic expertise lacked any

²⁰ Shanghai shi Luwan qu tushuguan gongren pinglun zu 上海市卢湾区图书馆工人评论组,""三结合" 批儒评法的胜利成果" [The victorious results of using the '3-in-1' system to criticize Confucianism and analyze Legalism]. *Wenhui Daily*, February 18, 1975, 2.

²¹ Zhe Jun 哲军,"《三字经》批判" [A critique of the *Three Character Classic*]. *The People's Daily*, October 24, 1974, 2.

²² "批判朱熹的《四书集注》" [Criticize Zhu Xi's Collected Commentaries on the Four Books]. The People's Daily, January 9, 1975, 2.

²³ "工农兵群众参加学术批判是划时代的大事" [The participation of the workers, peasants and soldiers in academic criticism is an epoch-defining event]. *The People's Daily*, May 3, 1966, 1.

credentials to judge historical figures. In the words of *The People's Daily*, "this is rubbish. What history do these scholars understand? They understand nothing but a dog's fart" (这是胡说八 道! 他们懂得历史吗? 懂个狗屁).²⁴

By the early 1970s, political credentials firmly outweighed intellectual ability, cultural status, and social connections in importance. State reforms to education policy abolished entrance exams and prioritized giving university education to those recommended by the masses because of their family's correct class background (worker, peasant, or solider) and their personal political commitment.²⁵ With the social value of intellectual credentials now at an alltime low, former bastions of authority on campuses – the faculty – now occupied a secondary role. Universities staged elaborate demonstrations to reinforce the idea that scholars were out of touch and lacked the right knowledge. For example, in January 1974, Shanghai's Fudan University made its faculty sit each department's entrance exam. The veteran scholar Tan Qixiang (谭其骧), a specialist in historical geography, unsurprisingly struggled to solve mathematical puzzles and answer questions on communist ideology. Fudan billed the faculty's poor performances as proof that they did not even possess the knowledge of freshman students.²⁶ Now that the apparent backwardness of intellectuals had been laid bare, the new exceptical projects supposedly offered scholars a way to better themselves under the pedagogy of the people.

As the second and third epigraphs of this chapter also make clear, the *Analects* project also derived its revolutionary credentials from a falsified history of classical text publishing in

²⁴ Wang Jinxi 王进喜, "瞄准黑线狠狠地打" [Target the black line and pound it with anger]. *The People's Daily*, May 12, 1966, 1.

 ²⁵ This change is chronicled in Joel Andreas, *Rise of the Red Engineers: the Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
 ²⁶ Ge, *The Unhurried River*, 37.

the twentieth century. Media rhetoric, epitomized by the two epigraphs, dismissed all previous work as elitist and exclusionary – only the new Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign could be counted on to finally wrestle control over knowledge from the hands of scholars and transfer them to the people. In fact, this project sat within a much broader history of widening access to classical material. As one Republican-era publisher put it, "we want to liberate each kind of learning from the grasp of the intellectual class and disseminate it to give to the whole populace."²⁷ The key difference, therefore, lay not as much in the project's democratizing streak as in its total disavowal of past exegesis as biased, suspect, and riddled with the stench of class oppression.

Analyzing the Analects and Claiming the Canon

As a flagship Confucian text dating back to antiquity, the *Analects* was a prime target for criticism in the anti-Confucian atmosphere of the late Mao period. While Confucius did not compose the text, and although there is no firm evidence that he uttered any of its sayings, the campaign followed scholarly precedent by assuming that the text is a stable expression of Confucius' teachings and the core of what would evolve into "Confucian" thought. Furthermore, like 18th and 19th century intellectuals before them, campaign propagandists saw the text as an important source of information on Confucius' life and times.²⁸ In addition to these established justifications for valuing the text, targeting the *Analects* fit with campaign propaganda's more

²⁷ Quoted in Culp, *Power of Print*, 167.

²⁸ John Makeham, *Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the* Analects (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003), 253 and 300. For a discussion of the rise of Qing historicism, see Benjamin Elman, *From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, 1984).

generalized suspicion of textual anthologies and their creators. Amongst his many errors, Lin Biao supposedly instructed lackies to compile "black words" (黑话) from Confucian texts and created a cento (集句) of these sayings in homage to Zhu Xi's *Collected Commentaries on the Four Books* (四书集注).²⁹

In *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*, the students from Peking University "claimed the canon" in the name of educational progression.³⁰ Scholars of the *Analects* and its commentaries have either mostly ignored the radical 1974 version or remain ignorant of it.³¹ Yet the volume marks a unique, and hence noteworthy, point in the history of modern Chinese exegesis. As products of the reforms to higher education and symbols of the creative power of the masses, the students pushed scholars aside and asserted their exegetical authority. In a syrupy piece from late 1973, *The People's Daily* mentioned the students working on the project as part of its broader salute to Peking University's first graduating class of worker-peasant-soldier students. The article proudly claimed that state reforms to education had bred a new generation of students proficient in making revolution and learning academically.³² To reinforce the media's

²⁹ Luo Siding 罗思鼎, "评朱熹的唯心论的先验论" [Analyzing the transcendentalism in Zhu Xi's spiritualism]. *The People's Daily*, February 13, 1974, 2; Zhongguo kexue yuan gu jizhuidongwu yu gu renlei yanjiu suo da pipan zu 中国科学院古脊椎动物与古人类研究所大批判组, "批判朱熹的反动的 "天理论" [Criticize Zhu Xi's reactionary 'theory of Heavenly Principles']. *The People's Daily*, September 14, 1974, 2.

³⁰ I borrow and modify the idea of "claiming a canon" from Michael Nylan's *The Five "Confucian" Classics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), chapter seven.

³¹ For example, Sébastien Billioud, and Vincent Goossaert comment that "during the Mao era, it was feasible only in the other polities of the Chinese-speaking world, especially Taiwan, to carry out a variety of different Confucianism-related enterprises, philosophical, religious, or ideological." See Sébastien Billioud and Vincent Goossaert, "Confucius and His Texts: A Century of Crisis and Revision," in *Confucius: The Analects*, trans. Simon Leys and ed. Michael Nylan, 238 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2014).

³²"一代新人在战斗中成长" [A new generation growing up in the fight]. *The People's Daily*, December 30, 1973, 3.

message, the front cover and spine of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* displayed the name of the "Peking University Department of Philosophy Worker-Peasant-Soldier Class of 1970" as a reminder to readers that revolutionary students, not established scholars, lay behind this interpretive endeavor. The whole project therefore gave full voice to the campaign's message that "the workers, peasants and soldiers are the masters of history and the masters of historical studies" (工农兵不仅是创造历史的主人,而且要做史学的主人).³³

The same messages concerning the superiority of political credentials and the innate ability of the masses appear in a major progress report on the *Analects* project from 1974. In February, at the second nationwide conference on developing the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign in the education field, a speaker updated delegates on the latest happenings at Peking University.³⁴ The report began by charting how various emperors and scholars had revered the *Analects*, commenting that all the editions of the text and the commentaries represented "an immense number" (汗牛充栋). Moreover, commentaries on the text published after 1949 had continued to peddle pro-Confucian perspectives and beautify Confucius. In other words, the project aimed for nothing less than overturning hundreds of years of distortion. Furthermore, the report argued that the students' voluntarist determination to succeed overcame their limited understanding of classical Chinese, their lack of historical knowledge, and their

³³ Beijing qiche zhizao chang gongren lilun zu 北京汽车制造厂工人理论组,"毛主席的革命路线指引 我们写出《读〈封建论〉》" [Chairman Mao's revolutionary line guided us in writing *Reading the 'Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron'*]. *The People's Daily*, July 8, 1974, 3.

³⁴ Zhongyang jiaoyu kexue yanjiu suo 中央教育科学研究所, ed., 中华人民共和国教育大事记, 1949-1982 [*A Chronicle of Major Events in Education in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1982*] (Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1983), 461-462; Zhao Zhenhai 赵振海, "在孔学'圣经'头上开刀" [Decapitate the "Sagely Classics' of Confucianism], in 批林批孔学习资料 (九) [*Study Materials for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign, Volume 9*], ed. Xinjiang ba yi nongxueyuan zhengzhi chu 新疆八一 农学院政治处, ([Xinjiang?]: Xinjiang ba yi nongxueyuan zhengzhi chu, 1964), 47-64.

unfamiliarity with the *Analects*.³⁵ This idealized determination to overcome a lack of education became one of the central themes of the campaign. To quote from a July 1974 piece published in *The People's Daily*, "the grammar won't phase us [because] we workers, peasants and soldiers are fully up to the task of understanding classical Chinese and annotating classical Chinese" ("之 乎者也" 难不倒我们, 工农兵能够学懂古文, 注解古文.)³⁶ To understand the real meaning of one of Confucius' sayings, the *Analects* team examined previous commentaries and other sayings. To refine their exegesis, they also printed 400 copies of the book's draft manuscript to solicit input from the masses. Feedback from workers, peasants, and soldiers identified where the book's commentary was insufficiently "deep or hateful" (不够深、不够狠) and needed changing.³⁷

The February conference update also touted the project's success by narrating how intellectuals had variously resisted or supported it. Apparently, when the students circulated the book manuscript, some intellectuals doubted whether they had the evidence to support their politicized interpretation of the text. One unnamed professor, in particular, resisted some of their ideas. In the face of such doubt, however, the students resolutely prioritized ideological correctness over evidential accuracy, arguing that the campaign "was not about just having a purely academic discussion" (不是在搞什么纯学术讨论). To signal the absolute correctness of the reinterpretation, the report even mentioned how some professors previously steeped in Confucian values had ended up joining the students to help them.³⁸ The truth of all these claims

³⁵ Zhao, "Decapitate," 49 and 54-55.

³⁶ Beijing qiche zhizao chang gongren lilun zu, "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line," 1.

³⁷ Zhao, "Decapitate," 56-57.

³⁸ Ibid., 57-62.

is irrelevant; rather, they demonstrate the new politics of knowledge present in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.

The Analects: Criticism and Commentary further challenged older models of textual exegesis and knowledge production by putting a premium on political "groupthink" as opposed to the scholarly activities of individuals. By attributing its content to one university class without naming any of the thirty-plus people involved, the book valorized collective cultural production over individual endeavors.³⁹ The attribution additionally distorted the project's actual division of labor by eliding the contribution of specialized scholars who assisted the Peking University students. The specialized skill required to master the *Analects* text suggest that experts contributed in significant, although unquantifiable ways, and later recollections of the project provide further evidence that intellectuals completed a lot of scholarly heavy-lifting.⁴⁰ Past editions of the *Analects* valued the academic credentials of compiler-commentators and credited them by name, but those involved in the 1974 exegesis merited only a brief, anonymized mention in the preface.⁴¹

Despite the above valorizing of cultural production, however, expert involvement best explains how the exegesis group could complete with sufficient speed to vindicate the

³⁹ Ibid., 49.

⁴⁰ Liang Gaoming identifies Zhang Dainian (张岱年), a prominent scholar of philosophy, as one of the experts tasked with providing assistance: Liang Gaoming 梁高明, "《论语》注疏史上的一大奇观——简谈 1974 年中华书局《<论语>批注》的出版" [A Major Deviation in the Life Cycle of the *Analects*: Introducing *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* published by Zhonghua Books in 1974], *Shaanxi jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao* 陕西教育学院学报 27, no. 1 (March 2011): 27 and 40n.3. In a published autobiographical account, Zhang Dainian writes that, in 1974, Peking University's Department of Philosophy tasked him with explaining Confucian and Legalist materials to students. See his 耄年忆往: 张岱年自述 [Recollections from Old Age: the Narrative of Zhang Dainian] (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1997), 45.

⁴¹ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan 北京大学哲学系一九七〇级工农兵学员, ed., 《论语》批注 [*The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), viii.

revolutionary approach to knowledge production. The December 1973 ode to Peking University in *The People's Daily* boasted that the students finished a first draft manuscript of 200,000 characters (approximately the length of Tolkien's *The Hobbit* translated into Chinese) in just over one month, and by February 1974 the team had circulated a first draft for feedback (see above).⁴² On a trip to Peking University in 1974, the French intellectual Roland Barthes noted the political significance of this speed: "They joyfully say that they can learn what people could not learn in the past. [For example].... twenty students in two months could criticize and explain the conversations between Confucius and his disciples. The students dare to do what the ancestors did not..."⁴³ Once again, as with the Legalist texts discussed in Chapter Two, when push came to shove, Zhonghua called up intellectuals to guarantee timely success.

Having discussed how the organization of the *Analects* project articulated a revolutionary politics of knowledge, it only remains to examine how the final published product similarly cast aside all pre-existing interpretations and respect for the text. The preface emphasized the project's qualitative departure from previous exegetical endeavors. The authors refused to respect the text, talking instead of "decapitating" (头上开刀) and "decapitating and chopping" (开刀动斧) the *Analects*.⁴⁴ This violent language mirrors both phrases such as "trample the *Analects* underfoot" (把《论语》踩在脚下) and images of destruction which circulated throughout 1974 (see figure 3.2).⁴⁵ The Peking University exegetes also took aim at those who

⁴² "A new generation growing up in the fight," 3.

⁴³ Roland Barthes, *Travels in China*, trans. Andrew Brown and ed. Anne Herschberg Pierrot (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 180.

⁴⁴ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, iv and vii.

⁴⁵ For example, see: Shi Guozuo 施国佐, "钢花迎国庆铁笔扫残云" [A spark of molten steel heralds National Day]. *The People's Daily*, September 20, 1974, 3; Li Guangyu 李光羽, "把《论语》踩在脚下" [Trample the *Analects* underfoot]. *Wenhui Daily*, June 23, 1974. The same *Wenhui Daily* article was reprinted in Yunnan renmin chubanshe 云南人民出版社, ed., 把《论语》踩在脚下: 批林批孔杂文选

argued that the Analects should not be criticized, dismissing this view as "nonsense" (一派胡言 乱语).⁴⁶ Through overt hostility, the team staked its claim to rewrite understanding of Confucianism's most famous work.

[[]*Trample the* Analects Underfoot: Selected Essays Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1974), 1-3. ⁴⁶ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, iv.



Figure 3.2: a montage of scenes from newspapers and magazines showing the destruction of Confucian books. Top left: Ming dynasty rebels destroy books at Qufu. Top right: Qing dynasty rebels destroy the Confucian Classics. Bottom left: Qing dynasty rebels incinerate the *Analects* and other texts. Bottom right: Qing dynasty rebels burn Confucian books such as the *Analects*.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Image sources: Shaanxi sheng yishu xueyuan shifan jiaoyan zu 陕西省艺术学院师范教研组, "劳动人 民历来是反孔斗争的先锋" [Throughout history, the working people have always been the anti-

Confucian vanguard]. Yan 'an Pictorial no. 5 (1974); Lianhuanhua bao 连环画报, ed., "太平天国反孔斗 争的故事" [The story of the Taiping Rebels and their anti-Confucian struggle]. Story-Book Magazine no. 12 (September 1974), 27; The Inner Mongolia Daily, October 17, 1974, 3.

The book's commentary on different passages similarly portrays Confucius in an extremely negative light by parroting the ideas of the campaign. As Kam Louie and Tien-wei Wu describe, the period's polemical rhetoric factitiously crammed Confucius and his ideas into a Marxist-Leninist historical framework.⁴⁸ Along these lines, *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* sacrifices accuracy for opprobrium, with the authors frequently injecting crude, overtly hostile language into their analyses. This represented no less than a wholesale rejection of conventional understanding.

Excerpts from specific commentaries exemplify the leaps of logic, faulty argumentation, and context-specific mis-readings that pervade the book. The authors' central message was that the *Analects* promoted a reactionary philosophy to oppose the interests of ancient China's "working people" and stall society's transition from a slave-owning system to feudalism. As for Confucius, they styled him as a plotter, a reactionary, and anything but sagely. In their eyes, he obsessed over maintaining ritual and propriety not to spread goodness but rather to preserve the political hegemony of the slave-owning class. An extract from their commentary on the opening to chapter one – a very well-known part of the *Analects* – encapsulates many of these ideas:

Primary text: 子曰: "学而时习之,不亦悦乎! 有朋自远方来,不亦乐乎! 人不知,而不愠,不亦君子乎!"

Standard translation: The Master said, "To learn and then have occasion to practice what you have learned – is this not satisfying? To have friends arrive from afar – is this not a joy? To be patient even when others do not understand – is this not the mark of the gentleman?"⁴⁹

1974 Commentary: "To learn and then have occasion to practice what you have learned – is this not satisfying?": here, Confucius is calling for his disciples to devote themselves to studying the *Classic of Music*, the *Book of Rites*, the *Book of Songs*, and the *Book of Documents*, so that they can become accomplices for the

⁴⁸ Louie, Critiques of Confucius; Wu, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four.

⁴⁹ Edward Slingerland, trans., *Confucius: Analects (With Selections from Traditional Commentaries)* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 1.

revival of the slave-owning system. "To have friends arrive from afar – is this not a joy?": here, Confucius asks his disciples to entice other counter-revolutionary elements and expand the ranks of his counter-revolutionary organization. "To be patient even when others do not understand – is this not the mark of the gentleman?": here, Confucius urges his followers not to harbor resentment when political authorities do not give them an official position. Rather, they should master the art of keeping a lower profile and wait for their chance to advance their interests.⁵⁰

Such cynical commentary broke with all convention. While earlier scholarly commentators cited the above passage as evidence of Confucius' commitment to self-cultivation and active learning, the Peking University students interpreted it as evidence of his plan to usurp the authority of the flourishing landlord class in his home state and restore a slave-owning system.⁵¹ This view echoed claims in the Four Books (see Chapter One) that Confucius fixated on bolstering the power of ancient China's slave-owners and fighting the progression of history along its Marxist timeline.⁵²

During their exegesis of all 20 chapters, the students rarely missed an opportunity to lambast Confucius' supposed animosity toward new feudal elites. His tendency to oppose ritual violations in a forthright, even sarcastic, tone provided fertile ground for portraying him as ardently committed to his vision of society. For instance, at the beginning of the third *Analects* chapter Confucius offers a barbed criticism of a new elite family for infringing on the Zhou royal family's ritual prerogatives. The radical commentary, however, imbues his words with strong emotion and pre-supposes his class-based antagonism toward powerful, parvenu families:

Primary text: 孔子谓季氏: "八佾舞于庭, 是可忍也, 孰不可忍也!"

⁵⁰ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 2.

⁵¹ Yang Bojun 杨伯峻, 论语译注 [*The Analects: With Translation and Notes*], first edition, sixth Shanghai printing (Beijing: Zhonghua Books, 1965), 2; ibid.

⁵² For example, see Gao Heng's (高亨) "孔子维护哪些奴隶制" [Which Slave System did Confucius Protect?] in Renmin chubanshe, *Anthology Volume One* (Beijing renmin chubanshe), 80-90.

Standard translation: Confucius said of the Ji Family: "They have eight rows of dancers performing in their courtyard. If they can condone this, what are they *not* capable of?"⁵³

1974 commentary: At the end of the Spring and Autumn period, the control of the slave-owning class was already breaking down. People constantly infringed the Zhou rites and disobeyed authority, and this was an inevitable consequence of the feudal system replacing the slave-owning system. The Ji family's decision to "have eight rows of dancers performing in their courtyard" is an example of how up-and-coming elites dared to ignore and violate ritual mores. Confucius' scorn for this shows his extreme hatred of the new elites. He is determined to reverse the course of history and save the slave-owning class from destruction.⁵⁴

The use of the word "hatred" (仇恨) encourages the reader to respond at a similar emotive level. Because Confucius despises the new elites and the class that they represent, he and his acolytes will stop at nothing to derail the Marxist-Leninist teleological historical timeline and keep the masses indentured. In this interpretation, Lin Biao and other fallen CCP figures charged with being closet Confucians became an existential threat that readers should likewise thoroughly condemn.

In addition to its exaggerated political critique, the antagonistic commentary signals its loyalty to the campaign with assertive *ad hominem* attacks. This tone becomes especially useful when the authors encountered a part of the *Analects* not easily spun. For example, in part of chapter ten, Confucius hears about a fire in his stables and yet only worries whether anyone is hurt; he gives no thought to his valuable horses. Struggling to find evidence of Confucius' insidious class interests at work, the commentary falls back on character assassination: "in reality, Confucius is nothing other than a hypocritical, malignant, and two-faced fake gentleman" (实际上孔丘完全是一个口蜜腹剑、面善心狠的伪君子). For good measure, this judgement is

⁵³ Slingerland, *Analects*, 17.

⁵⁴ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 45-46.

followed by a reference to his alleged execution of a robber while serving as an official in his home state, as if to prove that Confucius did not follow his own dictums of tolerance.⁵⁵

Creative Campaign Communication and Costing Textual Authority

The Peking University group and Zhonghua Books employed multiple creative techniques to maximize the book's contribution to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. For one, the book's comprehensive treatment of the text implied nothing less than the total re-writing of knowledge about the *Analects*. Furthermore, variations in the length of the commentaries signaled to readers the main lines of attack, while paratextual choices concerning punctuation and aesthetics reinforced key messages. And yet, paradoxically, the book's very iconoclasm pushed authors and Zhonghua Books to exploit many conventions of the textual commentary genre. In other words, to package the content as official and worthy of consideration, they had to appeal to established ways of signaling textual authority. This compromise unavoidably diluted the book's iconoclastic tenor and even sometimes allowed radicalism to descend into academic superfluity.

By engaging with the text exhaustively, *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* furthered the broader goal of recasting China's Confucian heritage in print. When published, it was the first attempt to attach campaign rhetoric to a central text of the Confucian canon and only the second fully annotated version of the *Analects* completed since the CCP came to power 1949. The publication thus indicated how representatives of the worker, peasant and soldier

⁵⁵ Ibid., 222. For a conventional interpretation of 10.17, see Slingerland, *Analects*, 106. Whether Confucius ordered the execution of the robber Shao Zhengmao (少正卯) has long been a point of debate. See the footnote in Wu, *Lin Biao and the Gang of Four*, 28-29 for discussion of the different sides to this debate.

classes had ostensibly made a major contribution to *Analects* scholarship in the People's Republic of China. Likewise, while their commentaries peddled the broader lines of the campaign, they also engaged with specific details and contexts for all 511 separate passages in the text. In effect, the book provided a final, 'correct' interpretation of the *Analects*.

At the same time, the commentary elaborated more extensively on some parts of the text and less on others, allowing the authors to develop the relationship between the *Analects* and the campaign. In a Zhonghua Books edition of the *Analects* published in the 1950s, the commentator Yang Bojun (杨伯峻) offered only sporadic and brief analyses.⁵⁶ In contrast, the length of each commentary in the new exegesis ranged from 76-line passages (over three pages) to one-line denunciations. The longest critique pertains to Confucius' only direct reference to his "doctrine of the mean" (中庸).⁵⁷ This idea – describing Confucius' dislike of extreme actions or words – is a central tenet of Confucian ideas, and campaign propaganda seized on it as evidence of Confucius' inherent conservatism.⁵⁸ The same propaganda also charged that Lin Biao and his followers had praised the "doctrine of the mean" for its contribution to Chinese philosophy.⁵⁹ The authors of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* made full use of their chance to expound on the primary source underlying such criticism. Similarly, Confucius' description of goodness (仁) for his favorite disciple at the beginning of chapter 12 merited 63 lines of commentary because Lin Biao allegedly liked to script quotes from it in his calligraphy.⁶⁰ By

⁵⁶ For example, see Yang, *Analects*, 2.

⁵⁷ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 133-136.

⁵⁸ Renmin chubanshe, Anthology Volume One (Beijing renmin chubanshe), 106.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 105.

⁶⁰ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 252-254. Commentators generally agree that Yan Hui (颜回) occupies a privileged position in the *Analects* because Confucius repeatedly praises him as exceptional. For example, in 6.7 Confucius lauds Yan Hui's rare ability to consistently act virtuously. For discussion of Yan Hui's position, see the commentaries offered in Slingerland, *Analects*.

giving weight to particularly important passages, the team created a definitive corpus of criticism for campaign participants.

At the sentence level, editorial decisions regarding formatting bolstered the book's revolutionary reconceptualization of knowledge. An easily overlooked part of every page – its full range of punctuation – represented the fruits of decades of reforms to the Chinese language. In the early twentieth century, high-profile intellectuals advocated incorporating Western punctuation markers into the Chinese language.⁶¹ Even with this support, however, punctuation only entered print culture slowly, especially for texts not already "born punctuated."⁶² Given its origins in classical Chinese, reprints of the *Analects* often continued to lack punctuation. As figure 3.3 illustrates, the widely-cited *A Concordance to the Analects of Confucius* (论语引得) published in 1940 contains only periods and enumeration commas (、) to break up segments of text.⁶³ At the same time, publishers experimented with punctuating editions of classical texts and by the 1950s this practice had become mainstream.⁶⁴ A 1958 annotated edition of the *Analects* uses a full range of punctuation marks, as does *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*. Hence, the book participated in a wave of publications presenting ancient writings in an overtly 'modern' fashion.

⁶¹ Thomas Mullaney, "Quote Unquote Language Reform: New-Style Punctuation and the Horizontalization of Chinese," *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture* 29, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 210.

⁶² Playing on the idea of "born digital" texts, Thomas Mullaney uses the term "born punctuated" to refer to texts originally written with full Western punctuation. This, of course, excludes all Chinese classical texts. See ibid., 215.

⁶³ Yinde bianzuan chu 引得编纂处. 论语引得(附标校经文) [A Concordance to the Analects of Confucius (With a Standardized Text Attached)] (Beiping: Yinde bianzuan chu, 1940), reprinted as Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series No. 16 by the Chinese Materials and Research Aids Service Center, Inc. (Taipei: 1966).

⁶⁴ Mullaney, "Quote Unquote," 207 and 211.




Figure 3.3: One extract of the original text from an edition of the *Analects* published in 1940. I have marked the punctuation using green lines.⁶⁵

Printing and editorial manuals from the 1970s show that publishers used punctuation very deliberately to improve the reader's experience. Typesetters in Beijing learnt how punctuation "turns a stiff article into a vivid spoken piece" (使得死板的文章, 就化为有声有色的说话了).⁶⁶ Another manual from Xinjiang argued that punctuation, when properly spaced on a page, "demarcated paragraphs and created a pretty aesthetic" (段落分明,比较美观).⁶⁷ Amongst various systems for spacing punctuation, many publishers favored the Kaiming (开明) method – periods, question marks and exclamation marks occupied one full space, while all other punctuation marks received only half a space. This spacing gave paragraphs clarity and a "nice cadence" (有抑扬顿挫之感).⁶⁸

The clarity afforded by punctuation in *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* not only created a pleasanter reading experience but also accentuated its arguments. When writing their commentary, the Peking University students presumed that Confucius' disciples compiled the text on the basis of Confucius' words and deeds.⁶⁹ This allowed them to treat each part as evidence of Confucius' personally-held heinous views. In the book, Zhonghua Books editors

⁶⁵ Yinde bianzuan chu, *Concordance*, 12.

⁶⁶ Beijing xinhua yinshua chang 北京新华印刷厂, 排版手册 [A Manual for Typesetters] (Beijing: Beijing xinhua yinshua chang, 1973), 37.

⁶⁷ Shanghai fu Zang, *Relief Printing*, 59.

⁶⁸ Beijing xinhua, *Manual for Typesetters*, 41-42.

⁶⁹ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, v.

chose to bracket words spoken by Confucius (or other interlocutors) with quotation marks, thereby surreptitiously strengthening the idea that the *Analects* captures Confucius' authentic 'voice.' This decision departed from most previous editions which relied solely on the character for speech (\Box) and contextual information to signal dialogue (figure 3.3). The addition of quotation marks to the *Analects* accentuates its orality and Confucius' image as a teacher preaching heretical ideas to others.⁷⁰

The symbolic power of the book's quotation marks also grew out of important changes in the function of quotations prompted by the popularization of Mao's writings.⁷¹ By the 1970s, quoting asserted power. Mao's words appeared in a whole range of printed contexts, while ordinary people used quotations in everyday situations as part of the "Mao cult."⁷² Publishers equally understood the significance of quotations, producing guidelines for editors on how to quote Mao and format his words correctly in print.⁷³ In a China rife with "quotation mania," quotations and the act of quotation conveyed authority and rhetorical weight, and surrounding Confucius' words with quotation marks made them into powerful speech acts.⁷⁴

Practically speaking, the legibility afforded by quotation marks and other punctuation widened engagement with the text. As observed earlier, the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign encouraged Chinese to vociferously produce and consume anti-Confucian knowledge. For its part, *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* symbolized the removal of textual

⁷⁰ Ruth Finnegan, *Why Do We Quote? The Culture and History of Quotation* (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2011), 99.

⁷¹ For an extensive discussion of the act of quotation and its history in modern China, see Jennifer May, "Sources of Authority: Quotational Practice in Chinese Communist Propaganda" (PhD diss., Heidelberg University, 2008). I am indebted to May's study for multiple leads on sources and approaches.

⁷² Leese, *Mao Cult*, esp. parts two and three.

⁷³ Shandong renmin, *Handbook on Editorial Work*, 24-28.

⁷⁴ The quote comes from Helmut Martin, *Cult & Canon: the Origins and Development of State Maoism* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1982), 26.

exegesis and classical writings from their lofty, ivory-tower heights. Tom Mullaney writes that the arrival of punctuation in the early twentieth century likely "exerted a profound impact on the at-a-glance legibility of classical Chinese texts."⁷⁵ Similarly, punctuating the *Analects* opened it to less confident readers by conveying information about the structure of a passage. For example, the highlights in figure 3.4 indicate how a wide variety of punctuation – including commas, periods, quotation marks, an exclamation mark and a question mark – impart a clearer structure to the following conversation between Confucius and two of his disciples (Yan Hui and Zilu):

The Master remarked to Yan Hui, "It is said, 'When he is employed, he moves forward; when he is removed from office, he holds himself in reserve.' Surely this applies to only you and me?"

Zilu interposed, "If you, Master, were to lead the three armies into battle, who would you want by your side?"

The Master replied, "I would not want by my side the kind of person who would attack a tiger barehanded or attempt to swim the Yellow River, because he was willing to 'die without regret.' Surely I would want someone who approached such undertakings with a proper sense of trepidation, and who came to a decision only after having thoroughly considered the matter."⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Mullaney, "Quote Unquote," 235.

⁷⁶ Slingerland, *Analects*, 67.

7.11 子谓颜渊1曰:四用之则行,舍2之则藏,惟我 Original与尔有是夫³!"子路曰:"子行三军⁴,则谁与⁵?" Text 子曰. 图暴虎6冯河7, 死而无悔者, 吾不与也。必 也临事而惧,好谋而成者也。" 【注释】 1 颜渊——颜回。 2 舍——舍弃,不用。 3 夫 (fú 扶)——语气词,相当于"吧"。 4 行三军—— Notes指挥三军。"三军"是当时大国所有的军队,每军一万 二千五百人。 5 与---在一起的意思。 6 暴虎 ——空着两手和虎搏斗。 7 冯(同"凭")河——无 船而蹚水过河。 【译文】 孔子对颜渊说: 用我,我就去干,不用我,我就隐 藏起来,惟独我和你能够做到这样吧!"子路问孔子说: "如果你统帅三军,那么你和谁在一起呢?"孔子说:"空 Trans -lation 手和虎搏斗, 蹚水过河, 死了都不后悔的人, 我不和他 在一起。必须是遇事小心谨慎,善于谋划而能完成任 务的人[才行]"

Figure 3.4: Punctuation in The Analects: Criticism and Commentary.77

Here, a wide variety of punctuation segments the primary text, inserts emotion into the dialogue, and signals who speaks and in what order. In contrast, *A Concordance to the Analects of Confucius* from 1940 offers readers only limited assistance in navigating their way through the same extract (figure 3.3). Punctuation created clarity, and clarity buttressed the campaign's attack on academic elitism.

Chapter One already argued that the Four Books bore covers designed to shape reader's engagement with the material, and the front cover of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* all but guaranteed that readers did not miss any political messages. As with their contemporaries in many other countries, Chinese publishers saw the front cover as critical because it was the first point of contact between a book and its reader. Publishing manuals stipulated that covers should

⁷⁷ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 145.

display a book's title, author, and publisher, as well as visual decoration reflecting the content. With cultural production always subservient to politics, the cover represented both "a piece of propaganda and a work of art" (一幅政治宣传画、一件艺术作品) that should pique readers' interest and give them a sense of a book's content and characteristics. Put another way, covers could never simply be "artistic for art's sake" (为艺术而艺术).⁷⁸

Staff at Zhonghua Books used the front cover to envelope the commentary in a revolutionary, non-elitist flavor. Various arrangements of a hammer, sickle and rifle – representing the Maoist holy trinity of workers, peasants, and soldiers involved in the project – fill the space behind the title (figure 3.5). Whereas the previous Zhonghua edition of the *Analects* presented the title in a calligraphic hand (figure 3.6), in 1974 Zhonghua opted for a less ornate combination of Songti and bold type. A combination of red and black ink introduces some variation, but overall the cover tacked close to the business-like design of the Four Books (see Chapter One). In addition, Zhonghua's preference for simplified characters over traditional characters on the cover articulated its commitment to the new politics of knowledge production. For instance, the Zhonghua name appears in simplified characters across the bottom of the cover. This is significant. In 1956, the state introduced simpler forms of many common characters and thereby reshaped the nature of day-to-day communication.⁷⁹ Yet, even during the Cultural Revolution, Zhonghua Books publications often carried the Zhonghua name in traditional characters to reflect its classical texts specialism.⁸⁰ In opting for the simplified format instead,

⁷⁸ Shandong renmin, *Handbook on Editorial Work*, 261-263 and 267.

⁷⁹ Ping Chen, *Modern Chinese: History and Sociolinguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 154.

⁸⁰ For example, see Cao Cao 曹操, 曹操集 [*The Works of Cao Cao*], volume 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), copyright page (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com).

the publisher affirmed that exceptical authority now lay with progressive students rather than antiquarians.



Figure 3.5: The front cover of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*.⁸¹




Figure 3.6: The front cover of Yang Bojun's The Analects: With Translation and Notes.⁸²

 ⁸¹ Image source: Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*,
 ⁸² Image source: Yang, *Analects*.

The book's use of simplified characters from cover to cover also chimed perfectly with the campaign's emphasis on how language reform empowered and unified ordinary people past and present. Glen Peterson argues that language reform conducted by the CCP after 1949 stemmed not only from the party's desire to promote literacy but also from a "nation-building imperative that identified national solidarity with linguistic uniformity."⁸³ During the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, the connection between politics, language and national togetherness appeared frequently. The People's Daily, for instance, effusively praised the first emperor of the Qin dynasty (third century BCE) for unifying ancient China's different written scripts.⁸⁴ Two years later, a newspaper piece by four printers scorned complex characters as exclusionary: "as printers, we work with lead type every day, and so we know the problems complex characters cause for the working class"(我们印刷工人每天和铅字打交道,很了解汉 字的繁难给劳动人民造成的困难).85 The specialized Language Reform Press (文字改革出版 社) even published several books between 1974 and 1976 expanding on the political implications of character simplification.⁸⁶ The type used for printing *The Analects: Criticism and* Commentary actively portrayed classical texts and radical exegesis as genres open to all.

⁸³ Glen Peterson, *The Power of Words: Literacy and Revolution in South China, 1949-95* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 107-108.

⁸⁴ Yu Wenjun 宇文钧. "秦始皇统一文字的功绩" [Qin Shi Huang's successes unifying the Chinese script]. *The People's Daily*, July 25, 1974, 2.

⁸⁵ Zhang Xuetaa 张学涛, Zhang Shirong 张世荣, Chen Jingzhao 陈景昭, and Li Shihong 李世宏, "反击 右倾翻案风" [Oppose the right-deviationist wind]. *The People's Daily*, July 18, 1976, 3.

⁸⁶ Wenzi gaige chubanshe 文字改革出版社, ed., 鲁迅论文字改革 [Lu Xun's Remarks on Language Reform (Beijing: Wenzi gaige chubanshe, 1974); Wenzi gaige chubanshe 文字改革出版社, ed., 工农兵 是文字改革的主力军 [The Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers are the Driving Force of Language Reform] (Beijing: Wenzi gaige chubanshe, 1975); Wenzi gaige chubanshe, ed., 评法批儒文选:两种不同的文字 观 [Analyze Legalism and Criticize Confucianism: Two Differing Views on Language Reform (Beijing: Wenzi gaige chubanshe, 1976).

So far, I have argued that content, punctuation and design choices enhance the book's mission of "comprehensively, thoroughly and resolutely waging the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign" (把批林批孔运动普及、深入、持久地开展下去).⁸⁷ The success of these communication strategies, however, contended with the authors' constant need to establish the authority of their critique. I argue that, to achieve this goal, they aped the best practices of textual exegesis to burnish their scholarly credentials and masquerade as scholarly experts. The tension between the book's rhetoric and the team's appeals to authority diluted and muddied anti-Confucian knowledge production.

To begin, the branding of the book under the Zhonghua name demonstrates how the new rested on the old. The evolution of Beijing People's Press's name during the 1970s supports my assumption here that publishers and readers viewed press monikers as brands possessing authoritative value. In 1968, municipal officials dissolved Beijing Press (北京出版社) and rusticated all of its staff to the countryside.⁸⁸ With no formal publisher serving the city, readers mistook a few titles released in 1970 for illegal or unauthorized publications because these books bore no recognizable publisher's name.⁸⁹ By late 1970, officials thus decided to revive the municipal press under the name Beijing Municipal People's Press (北京市人民出版社) and changed the name again to Beijing People's Press in 1971 because the word "municipal" (市) created "a bit of a tongue twister" ('市'字绕口).⁹⁰ This anecdote demonstrates how a publisher's

⁸⁷ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, iv.

⁸⁸ "Beijing chuban shi zhi" *Gazzetteer of Publishing Part 6*, 208.

⁸⁹ "Beijing chuban shi zhi" bianji bu 《北京出版史志》编辑部, ed., 北京出版史志 第 5 辑 [*The Gazzetteer of Publishing in Beijing: Part 5*] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1995), 230. ⁹⁰ Ibid., 230-231.

name connoted legitimacy and official status, and also shows staff giving careful consideration to how branding affected reader engagement with printed material.

While proclaiming a revolutionary approach to knowledge production, The Analects: Criticism and Commentary drew authority from the weight and longevity of the Zhonghua Books brand. In the language of the campaign, established publishers such as Zhonghua now served politics and the people rather than their past elite clientele. According to a The People's Daily article from 1974, "Zhonghua Shuju has existed for over 60 years, but before Liberation [in 1949]...so-called 'rustic' workers could not get through the door, let alone write books" (中 华书局已有六十多年历史了。解放前,工人"大老粗"别说写书,连这个门也进不去).⁹¹ By publishing the radical reinterpretation of the Analects under its imprint, Zhonghua thus signaled a departure from its past preoccupation with specialist, scholarly publishing. Yet, it was precisely Zhonghua's prestigious history that gave the book credibility. Founded in 1912, Zhonghua quickly emerged as a leading publisher of classical works, publishing two notable series of republished texts: the Essential Writings from the Four Categories of Learning (四部备要) and the Complete Collection of Past and Present Books and Illustrations (古今图书集成).92 After 1949, it gradually fell under the control of the state and reformed in 1958 as a specialist classical text outfit.93 Before the Cultural Revolution, it thus offered readers several important commentaries on the Analects, releasing new editions of Liu Baonan's (刘宝楠) Correct Meaning of the Analects (论语正义) and Zhu Xi's Collected Commentaries on the Four Books,

⁹¹ Beijing qiche zhizao chang gongren lilun zu, "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line," 1.

⁹² Culp, Power of Print, 2, 127.

⁹³ Ibid., 202-213.

as well as publishing an eight-volume collection of classic texts.⁹⁴ As already mentioned, it also published one of the first attempts at making the *Analects* accessible to ordinary readers: Yang Bojun's *The Analects: With Translation and Notes* (论语译注). With annotations, a translation and occasional light commentary, Yang's edition underwent six printings (81,250 copies in total) up to 1965.⁹⁵ Attaching the Zhonghua name to *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*, therefore, identified the exegesis as the new definitive interpretation overseen by the big-name brand in classical text publishing.

Consequently, the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign accelerated Zhonghua's resurgence after the damaging early years of the Cultural Revolution. From 1966, Zhonghua was criticized for cultural elitism, its senior editors were labelled "ox demons and snake spirits," and for a time it even had to rebrand as People's Cultural Press (人民文化出版社).⁹⁶ Around seventy members of staff – around one third of the total employees – found themselves subject to struggle sessions for having previously worked on annotating and organizing classical texts (古籍整理).⁹⁷ In September 1970, however, Zhou Enlai mooted reviving Zhonghua in a meeting with senior officials from the ministries of culture and education, asking "Are we really saying Zhonghua Books…should not exist? This is hardly 'serving the people.' Young people really want books to read, and if they don't have access to good books then they will start reading subversive and illegal material" (中华书局、商务印书馆就不能要了?那样做,不叫为群众

⁹⁴ Zhonghua shuju zongbian shi 中华书局总编室, ed., 中华书局图书目录 (1949-1991) [A Catalogue of Zhonghua Books Publications (1949-1991)] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1993), 372.

⁹⁵ Yang, *Analects*, copyright page.

⁹⁶ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 369-370; Culp, *Power of Print*, 251.

⁹⁷ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 369-370.

服务。青年一代着急没有书看,他们没有好书看,就看坏书.)⁹⁸ The press resumed work in 1971, and by 1974 it found its expertise and reputation once again needed for books such as *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*.⁹⁹ Although the ideas of the campaign contradicted Zhonghua's long-held scholarly values, anti-Confucianism paradoxically made it and other strongholds of cultural authority relevant once again.

Returning to the books' commentaries, they embody the same contradiction inherent in using Zhonghua's reputation to legitimize iconoclasm. Earlier, I discussed the hostile language of decapitation that peppered the preface. But, far from destroying the text, the exegetes performed an obligatory pretense of serious, academic engagement to validate wider reforms to higher education. For example, they leave the primary text uncorrupted – a mark of scholarly integrity – allowing readers to inadvertently use *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* to study Confucius' sayings. Furthermore, to avoid confusing the reader, the authors follow previous scholarship in arranging the text into 20 chapters rather than re-ordering the sayings to group them chronologically or by theme.¹⁰⁰ Abiding by such conventions encloses the text within the familiar genre of *Analects* exegesis rather than differentiating it.

Other elements likewise signal participation in the norms of the exegesis genre. *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* contains all the mechanics associated with serious textual criticism and academic authority. It begins by identifying Liu Baonan's scholarly *Correct*

⁹⁸ Zhou Enlai 周恩来, 周恩来选集(下卷) [*The Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Part Two*] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), 467.

⁹⁹ Zhonghua shuju bianji bu 中华书局编辑部, 中华书局百年大事记 (1912-2011) [A Record of One Hundred Years of Zhonghua Books (1912-2011)] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2012), 199.

¹⁰⁰ In this sense, *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* is far less radical than Brooks and Brooks' reordering of the *Analects* text published two decades later. This notable edition presents the passages in the *Analects* in historical order. See E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, *The Original Analects: Sayings* of *Confucius and His Successors* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

Meaning of the Analects as the base primary text for the radical edition, before proceeding to explain the exegetical approach taken by the Peking University commentators.¹⁰¹ As shown in figure 3.4, each part of the Analects is accompanied by a translation into modern vernacular Chinese (白话) and in-depth notes providing guidance on definition, interpretation and pronunciation of selected Classical Chinese characters.¹⁰² For example, readers are told in multiple places that the character "诸" denotes the combined sound of the interrogative phrase "之乎".¹⁰³ By providing notes, the team buttresses the idea that the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign is making classical texts available to non-specialist readers. At the same time, these scholarly apparatuses – a staple of the commentarial style – advertise the exegetes' mastery of the text and their qualifications to comment on it.

In some of the notes, the level of detail needed to substantiate an anti-Confucian argument leaves the text sharply reminiscent of previous serious scholarship. At these points, in particular, we can detect the knowledge of the experts assigned to 'help' with the exegesis. To take one case, in the *Analects* Confucius criticizes a former minister called Zang Wenzhong (藏 文仲). Zang was no average Zhou; according to Confucius, he kept tortoises used for divination rituals in a hall with inappropriate decoration. Predictably, *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* glosses Confucius' disdain for Zang as his wider resentment of newer noblemen. To justify this reading, the notes provide information on the ancient Chinese state of Cai (蔡), tortoise-shell divination, and ritual rules on who had the prerogative to store shells and where

¹⁰¹ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, no page number.

¹⁰² In the 1920s, modern vernacular Chinese gradually emerged as the prevalent written form of the Chinese language. See Chen, *Modern Chinese*, 76.

¹⁰³ For examples, see the notes for 6.6, 11.22, 12.11 and 13.2.

they could be stored.¹⁰⁴ This sudden attention to factual information implies that revolutionary exegesis should still be founded on tangible evidence.

By drawing heavily on factual information, the book reflected campaign propaganda's wider preoccupation with using facts to legitimize anti-Confucian discourse. In state media, intellectuals advanced arguments sprinkled with citations from old texts such as *A Collection of Conversations with Master Zhu* (朱子语类), Sima Qian's *Histories* (史记) and *The Family Sayings of Confucius* (孔子家语).¹⁰⁵ An article from February 1974 mobilized historical and linguistic evidence to prove that a famous anti-Confucian lived in the same period and place as Confucius.¹⁰⁶ In one final instance, a bibliographical discussion of another Confucian text in *The People's Daily* discussed its multiple editions and dated the text using its own content.¹⁰⁷ All this mirrored how Mao's "investigative research approach to seeking truth from facts integrated empirical investigation and fact collecting with social and political mobilization."¹⁰⁸ Like these articles, *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* sustained the age-old notion that a convincing argument possessed strong empirical credentials.

The book even exemplifies the campaign's wider obsession with trivial or niche historical points. In state media, Confucius came under attack for compiling another famous ancient text – the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (春秋) – incorrectly. In early 1975, staff from the Museum of Chinese History compared the work of a later chronicler with Confucius' "shoddy" (蹩脚)

¹⁰⁴ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 100-101. For a more orthodox discussion, see Slingerland, *Analects*, 46.

¹⁰⁵ Luo Siding, "Analyzing the transcendentalism in Zhu Xi's spiritualism," 2.

¹⁰⁶ Tang Xiao 汤啸, "关于柳下跖的反孔事迹" [On the achievements of Liu Xiazhi in opposing Confucianism]. *The People's Daily*, February 26, 1974, 3.

¹⁰⁷ Di Wen 翟闻,"《三字经》的出笼和流传简况" [An introductory publication and circulation history of the *Three Character Classic*]. *The People's Daily*, October 24, 1974, 2.

¹⁰⁸ Martin Fromm, *Borderland Memories: Searching for Historical Identity in Post-Mao China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 12.

organization of the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. In their words, "[a later chronicle argued that] Confucius used false logic and refused to correct [erroneous historical information]. He did not analyze truth and fiction in his sources, relying instead on hearsay, and he lazily refrained from finding new sources on lesser-known events" (孔丘还强词夺理,拒绝改正;对于史料的真伪 也不加甄别,道听途说,以讹传讹;对于缺乏现成材料的历史重大事件,又懒于下功夫去 搜集资料). According to the article, later scholars in Chinese history also name-checked Confucius for omitting historical events that might offend his political patrons.¹⁰⁹

Akin to the above concern with Confucius and his lack of scholarly integrity, in *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*, the authors' use of scholarly minutia to establish their authority distracts from their ostensible political goals. For the last part of chapter ten, a note observes how possible historical textual corruption makes translating one particular phrase harder. Keen to show their learning, they tell readers that they surmounted this corruption by looking at both previous commentaries and the context of the phrase.¹¹⁰ Another note for the same passage conveys their enthusiasm for textual studies by marking a one-character difference between two extant versions of the *Analects*. In this instance, identifying this difference allows the authors to provide a smoother translation of a knotty passage.¹¹¹ These two notes fail to link these finer details to a political purpose, articulating instead the innate usefulness of knowledge divorced from broader contexts. Nor is chapter ten the only place where the team show off their apparent mastery of the *Analects*. Elsewhere, they draw attention to how they swapped the

¹⁰⁹ Zhongguo lishi bowuguan tongshi bu da pipan zu 中国历史博物馆通史部大批判组, "史学为政治斗 争服务" [Historical studies serves political struggle]. *The People's Daily*, February 2, 1975, 2. ¹¹⁰ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 227. As the *Analects* and other ancient texts were first recorded on bamboo slips, this practice left ample room for inadvertent rearrangement and character losses.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

positions of two characters based on a passage's context, and at one point they even argue that the character "倦" should actually be changed to the character "传."¹¹² Finally, for the beginning of chapter 20, they split the passage into two parts based on linguistic analysis.¹¹³ All these scholarly tangents detract from the book's iconoclasm and leave the authors open to the same charges of self-absorbed intellectualism levelled at former academic elites.

Interestingly, scholarly material signaling academic prowess was deliberately added at a late stage in the project, even though this risked weakening the rhetoric of the book. At some point after the beginning of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, Zhonghua Books circulated a draft of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* to solicit feedback (known in the trade as a 征求意见稿).¹¹⁴ On the basis of this feedback, the authors added and deleted annotations, resulting in a net gain of thirty notes.¹¹⁵ Most additions clarified the meaning of individual characters in the *Analects*, presumably because readers of the draft asked for them. The authors thought it necessary, however, to also add a note to part of chapter 17 explaining how newer editions of the *Analects* include a character not found in the earliest versions.¹¹⁶ Knowing such detail is of no consequence in terms of using the *Analects* to criticize Confucius, but its inclusion burnished the credentials of the exegetes. By displaying scholarly knowledge

¹¹² Ibid., 362-363 and 430.

¹¹³ Ibid., 442-443.

¹¹⁴ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 70 ji gongnongbing xueyuan 北京大学哲学系七〇级工农兵学员, ed., 《论语》批注 (第三次征求意见稿) [*The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* (third draft circulated for feedback)] ([Beijing?]: Zhonghua books, [1974?]) (copy found in the University of California, Berkeley library).

¹¹⁵ Compare Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects* with ibid.

¹¹⁶ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 405. Compare with Beijing daxue zhexue xi 70 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 221.

like their commentarial predecessors, the authors legitimized Maoist educational reforms at the expense of the campaign's iconoclastic streak.

Similarly, the students from Peking University relied on citations and cross-referencing to establish their exegetical authority – yet another standard practice of the genre.¹¹⁷ In another context, Anthony Grafton observed that footnotes "convince the reader that the historian has done an acceptable amount of work."¹¹⁸ The authors of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* frequently draw attention to their industriousness. When annotating chapter 12, they cite the Eastern Han commentator Zheng Xuan (郑玄) for information on ancient Chinese land taxes.¹¹⁹ Likewise, Confucius' proclivity for quoting from the Book of Odes (诗经) offers them opportunities to show their scholarship. Confucius first quotes from the Odes in chapter one, and the students seized on this as a chance to explain the text's composition and how its three sections reflect differing class perspectives.¹²⁰ Later, when Confucius quotes from the Odes without saying so, they make the connection for the reader and explain where in the text the quote can be found.¹²¹ Nor is the team's knowledge of ancient texts confined to the *Odes*: they correctly identify a quote from the Book of Changes (易经) in chapter 13 and observe that chapter two quotes a lost part of the Book of Documents (尚书).¹²² The Analects: Criticism and *Commentary* thus supports Thomas Wilson's suggestion that "to read the *Analects* is to engage in

¹¹⁷ Ruth Finnegan's work on quotations and their function provided important inspiration for many of the ideas in the next two paragraphs. See Finnegan, *Why Do We Quote?*.

¹¹⁸ Grafton, *The Footnote*, 22.

¹¹⁹ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 263.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 18-19.

¹²¹ Examples of this are found in the notes to 11.6 and 12.10. See ibid., 232 and 265.

¹²² Ibid., 41 and 296.

a process of intertextual reading by seeking connections with...other classical works."¹²³ The group from Peking University invoked recognizable ways of conveying commentarial authority, blunting their message of revolutionary change.

To reiterate, the familiar scholarly feel of the notes strengthened the authority of the books and belied the iconoclastic, destructive tone of its preface. As with previous commentators, the students from Peking University showed their mastery of the *Analects*, their familiarity with a broad range of sources, and their ability to contextualize the work. The same ideas also applies to passages of critical commentary which sometimes cited classical writers, canonical texts such as the *Book of Rites* ($i \perp i \equiv$), and other parts of the *Analects* itself.¹²⁴ These quotations all represented the "expected artistry and ritual" and the "poetics" of the exegesis genre.¹²⁵ Through these signals, the authors claimed membership of an established scholarly lineage defined by "the belief in, knowledge of, or simply the use of certain texts."¹²⁶

In many ways, therefore, *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* operates inside the conventions of *Analects* exegesis. Certainly, in its rhetoric and stated purpose, the book departed from how scholars approached the *Analects* in the 1950s (let alone the 1850s, 1750s or 750s). At the same time, however, its paratextual and structural components sent the message that correct criticism of Confucius should emulate, rather than completely dismiss, the practices of earlier scholars. The book's sometimes decidedly un-revolutionary definition of "scholarship" and

¹²³ Thomas Wilson, "Reading the Analects in the Sage's Courtyard: A Modern Diner's Guide to an Ancient Feast," in *Confucius: The Analects*, trans. Simon Leys and ed. Michael Nylan, 229 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2014).

¹²⁴ Examples of these instances can be found on Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 29, 37, 154 and 325.

¹²⁵ I borrow this phrasing from Finnegan, *Why Do We Quote*?, 206.

¹²⁶ Here, I use ideas from May, "Sources of Authority," 16.

"scholarly knowledge," lies at the root of the contradiction between the exegetes' promise to "decapitate" the *Analects* and the printed product of their endeavors.

Making the Accessible Inaccessible

In *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*, the authors and Zhonghua Books presented readers with a blurred mix of intellectual iconoclasm and scholarly convention. A similarly fuzzy relationship between rhetoric and reality characterized the dissemination of the radical commentary. Publishers and newspapers circulated and reprinted excerpts from the critique widely, but only a select audience – what Nicholai Volland calls a "restricted public" – enjoyed access to the whole book.¹²⁷ The creation of these ordinary and privileged readerships exposed the emptiness of the project's earthy, anti-elitist pretensions.

Additionally, idealized representations of people studying the *Analects* and using the new commentary highlighted the above stratification. Whereas campaign discourse emphasized how everyone should be studying Confucianism's pernicious influence, socialist-realist images too often placed men in a dominant role. Furthermore, set-piece drawings sometimes showed people reading books that, in reality, they scarcely had access to. These visual 'own goals' poignantly reminded viewers that campaigns nearly always replaced one group of elites with another.

In the wrong hands, *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* was a very subversive text. The primary text and the linguistic notes, both key for the appended criticisms to make sense, left ample scope for readers to study the *Analects* in their own ways.¹²⁸ According to one veteran

¹²⁷ Volland, "Clandestine Cosmopolitanism," 192.

¹²⁸ Liang Gaoming makes this exact point but, regrettably, offers no evidence to substantiate it. See Liang, "A Major Deviation," 27.

reader revisiting the book in 2010, "everything I now know about Confucius' sayings and the *Analects* started with this so-called 'criticism and commentary'" (我所知道的子曰、论语便是 从此 "批注" 开始的).¹²⁹ Another former worker recalled how they started reading the book with the intention of criticizing Confucius but finished several days later appreciating his wisdom.¹³⁰ Given that scholars of the Mao era have drawn attention to many acts of resistance to state goals, the idea that readers surreptitiously read against the grain of the book is hardly surprising.

Beyond presenting the full text, the book enabled subversive readings via its comprehensive appendices. These include two reading aides of benefit to any serious student of the *Analects*: a thematic index of important sayings; and an index of all the individuals mentioned in the primary text.¹³¹ Readers can use these to quickly find out about major ideas such as the "middle way" (中庸), "goodness" (仁) and "gentlemen and petty men" (君子与小人). For those interested in Yan Hui and other followers of Confucius, the name index lists all of the passages where they appear. New to the 1974 edition, these appendices make the text's key ideas and protagonists accessible in a manner shorn of revolutionary overtones.

Finally, with the full book in hand readers could see places where the students had failed in their radical critique. As mentioned earlier, when failing to find fault with Confucianism's ideas, they often resorted to less persuasive *ad hominem* arguments. At other times, their interpretation entirely lacked controversy. Here, I dispute another scholar's assertion that all the criticism and notes in the book bear the mark of the Cultural Revolution.¹³² For example, the

¹²⁹ Jie Ziping 介子平, "重读《论语批注》" [Re-reading *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*]. *The Taiyuan Evening News*, January 27, 2010, 28.

¹³⁰ Wang Huiming 王慧明, "那本《论语批注》" [That book *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*]. *Daily Sunshine*, June 30, 2012, B09.

¹³¹Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 491-521.

¹³² Liang, "A Major Deviation," 26.

criticism of part of chapter 11 (where Confucius opposes his disciples' desire to give Yan Hui a lavish burial and is unhappy when they do so anyway) reads:

In Confucius' eyes, nobody should infringe the ritual prerogatives of the Zhou royal family, and he believes that Yan Hui's social position does not merit such an elaborate funeral. He believes that the disciples' action contravenes Zhou ritual rules.¹³³

Commentators past and present - such as Edward Slingerland (2003) - offer a similar reading; in other words, the book's portrayal of Confucius as committed to Zhou rituals above all else is anything but unconventional.¹³⁴

On the back cover of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* we find the state's own admission that granting access to Confucian knowledge was fraught with danger. The phrase "for internal distribution" (内部发行) printed above the price restricted copies to only those with the right institutional credentials or connections (for example cadres, researchers, and military officers).¹³⁵ Stated differently, Zhonghua Books and Xinhua Bookstore decided to make the volume an aid only for campaign study groups and cadres running study classes. It was explicitly *not* for individuals to take home and read. In the long run, this decision may have counter-productively heightened ordinary people's desire for a copy because internal publications were coveted commodities.¹³⁶ As Confucius put it: "if you try to guide the common people with coercive regulations…the common people will become evasive."¹³⁷

¹³³ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 235.

¹³⁴ Slingerland, *Analects*, 115.

 ¹³⁵ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 130-131. For recent discussion of access to foreign literature as internal publications in Mao's China, see Volland, "Clandestine Cosmopolitanism."
 ¹³⁶ Sun, "The Stratification of Individual Reading," 90-92; Song, "Internal Publications"; Song, "A

Glance at the Underground Reading Movement."

¹³⁷ Slingerland, Analects, 71.

With access to the new critique limited, I argue that editions of the *Analects* printed between the 1950s and the 1970s never lost their connotations of privilege. How widely *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* circulated is unknown, but printers rarely, if ever, produced internal materials in the same quantities as standard titles. Although six provinces reprinted the book using stereotypes, Liang Gaoming's view that publishers targeted a relatively small audience is undoubtedly correct.¹³⁸ This small, selective readership echoes the meagre 81,250 copies of Yang Bojun's *The Analects: With Translation and Notes* printed between 1958 and 1965.¹³⁹ Similarly, the first three printings of an eight-volume classical text anthology (including Liu Baonan's *Correct Meaning of the Analects*) between 1954 and 1957 amounted to only four thousand copies.¹⁴⁰ Despite disavowing the exegetical *ancien régime*, *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* ended up serving an equally narrow readership.

For everyone else, print media acted as gatekeepers moderating their access to the revisionist critique. *The Beijing Daily* (北京日报), an important provincial-level newspaper, outpaced many other newspapers and first published excerpts in its 30 January 1974 issue. The editors presented nine extracts from the *Analects*, each accompanied by notes, a modern Chinese translation and the commentary, spread over the front and second pages (figure 3.7).¹⁴¹ In mid-February, a second batch followed, increasing the total number of excerpted passages up to

¹³⁸ Zhongguo banben tushuguan 中国版本图书馆, ed., 1949-1986 全国内部发行图书总目 [A Catalogue of Internally-Circulated Books, 1949-1986] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988), 24; Liang, "A Major Deviation," 27.

¹³⁹ Yang, *Analects*, copyright page.

¹⁴⁰ Guo xue zhengli she 国学整理社, 诸子集成 [*The Collection of Classic Texts*], volume 1, first edition, third Shanghai printing (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1957), copyright page.

¹⁴¹ Beijing daxue zhexue xi gongnongbing xueyuan 北京大学哲学系工农兵学员,"《论语》批注(选

刊) "[Selections from *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*]. *The Beijing Daily*, January 30, 1974, 1-2.

eighteen.¹⁴² *The Inner Mongolia Daily* (内蒙古日报) featured extracts on 8 February 1974 and 9 March, while *The Xinjiang Daily* (新疆日报) published two batches separately in February.¹⁴³ Looking at the first splash of content in *The Beijing Daily*, the editors chose extracts most explicitly connected to the campaign or embodying Confucianism's core deals. Unlike those with access to the full edition, individuals had to make do with this limited textual diet.

¹⁴² Beijing daxue zhexue xi gongnongbing xueyuan 北京大学哲学系工农兵学员,"《论语》批注(选 刊之二)" [A second selection from *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*]. *The Beijing Daily*, February 16, 1974, 2.

¹⁴³ See issues of *The Xinjiang Daily* from February 17, 1974 and February 28, 1974.



Figure 3.7: The front page of *The Beijing Daily* from January 30, 1974. Key: original text; notes; translation; criticism.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ Image source: Beijing daxue zhexue xi gongnongbing xueyuan, "Selections from *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*," 1.

Publishers were equally stringent about sharing only a small part of *The Analects*:

Criticism and Commentary with everyday readers. Presses in Beijing, Liaoning and Yunnan released only extracts in February and March 1974, with other presses following suit throughout the year. Zhonghua Books, for example, issued the same material as *The Beijing Daily* in two pamphlets as part of its "Loose-Leaf Pamphlets" (活页文选) classical text series.¹⁴⁵ While affordable and convenient, these pamphlets offered readers nothing that they could not already find in *The Beijing Daily* and other provincial newspapers. No doubt the curated selections satisfied the demands of many readers but, by only offering these titles for general sale, Zhonghua Books and other publishers created haves and have-nots based on political rank and connections.

The approach of newspapers and publishers show a state unwilling to grant all Chinese readers equal access to a flagship re-examination of Confucianism's most famous text. In this context, images such as "Destroy Superstition, Advance in the Face of Difficulty" (figure 3.8) and "Dare to Trample the *Analects* Under Foot" (figure 3.9) appear disconnected from the real-life circumstances of the campaign and accentuate this inequality of access. Figure 3.8, for example, shows two young people reading *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* while ducking the issue of how they obtained this internal publication in the first place. Circulated extensively, "Dare to Trample the *Analects* Under Foot" shows a Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign study session involving workers at an industrial facility.¹⁴⁶ In the center,

¹⁴⁵ Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography*: 1974, 72 and 76.

¹⁴⁶ I have found the image in: Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, ed., 上海工人美术作品选 [Selected Artwork by Shanghai's Workers] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975); and Guowuyuan wenhua zu meishu zuopin zhengji xiaozu 国务院文化组美术作品征集小组, ed., 上海、阳 泉、旅大工人画展览作品选集 [Selected Art from the Exhibition of Works by Shanghai, Yangquan and Lüda Workers] (Beijing: Renmin meishu chubanshe, 1975). I found a loose-leaf copy of the image in on the stall of a bookseller in Shanghai, and the image was also featured in a full-page spread of artworks from Shanghai, Yangquan and Lüda in Wenhui Daily, November 6, 1974, 4.

one male worker denounces Confucianism while colleagues listen intently. I have already highlighted the ironic disconnect between talk of "trampling" the *Analects* and the scholarly approach *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*, and here all talk of "trampling" is purely figurative: on the table in front of the speaker sits an older copy of the *Analects* bound in silk and housed in a blue case. How the study group managed to lay their hands on this pre-Cultural Revolution, fine edition of the text is a mystery left unexplained. In any case, it does not square with the unwillingness of publishers and officials to share the radical exegesis of the Peking University students. The image conveys the message that the success of the campaign depends on widening access to Confucian knowledge – a viewpoint at odds with the distribution of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*.



Figure 3.8: Qing Yu (青于), Destroy Superstition, Advance in the Face of Difficulty (破除迷信,知难而进).¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ Image source: *Story-Book Magazine* no. 7 (April 1974), 1.



Figure 3.9: The Shanghai Muncipal Worker's Cultural Palace Woodcut Painting Study Group (上海市工人文化宫版画创作学习班), Dare to Trample the Analects Under Foot (敢把《论语》脚下踩).¹⁴⁸

Images such as *Dare to Trample the* Analects *Under Foot* also demonstrates gendered access to knowledge.¹⁴⁹ In their critique, the Peking University students attacked Confucius for his "extreme anti-female prejudice" (对妇女极端歧视) and argued that he equated women with slaves.¹⁵⁰ Figure 3.9, nevertheless, puts men front and center in the unfolding campaign. The speaker is male, men monopolize the foreground, and it is the men who hold the texts and

¹⁴⁸ Image source: this standalone version is found in my collection of materials deposited in the library at UC San Diego.

¹⁴⁹ A talk at UC San Diego by Barbara Mittler provided the starting point for this analysis. Mittler is exploring explore gender and imagery in her project *Portrait(s) of a Trope: New Women and New Men in Chinese Women's Magazines, 1898-2008.*

¹⁵⁰ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 1970 ji gongnongbing xueyuan, *The Analects*, 407.

engage with them. In contrast, the small number of women visible look on sternly and listen, bereft of any opportunity to actively participate. The Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign talked of widespread participation and the levelling of previous barriers to knowledge. Yet this was not to be. The circulation of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* and accompanying visual propaganda exposed these grand claims as false dawns.

Conclusion

The politics of knowledge production lay at the heart of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. In chapter 16 of the *Analects*, Confucius states that "those who are born knowing...are the best" (生而知之者上也).¹⁵¹ This concept of innate knowledge contradicted the campaign's emphasis on how knowledge derived from experience.¹⁵² *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*, in its content and paratexts, argued that politicized, revolutionary scholarship and textual exegesis could make up for the supposed elitism, distortions, and failings of past intellectuals. The book represented nothing less than a rejection of an older order in favor of Cultural Revolution-era reforms to education.

The Peking University exegetes could reject convention but could not fully escape it. Indeed, the exegetes and Zhonghua Books found themselves caught between two complementary yet competing goals. In *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary*, they employed established markers of textual and scholarly authority to establish their credentials and buttress their case. At the same time, however, these techniques paradoxically reinforced many established

¹⁵¹ Slingerland, Analects, 196.

¹⁵² Di Qing 翟青, "知识的源泉" [The source of knowledge]. The People's Daily, August 29, 1974, 2.

characteristics of the exegetical genre, softening the book's professed iconoclasm and blurring the relationship between the campaign and all that had gone before.

Knowledge is power, and access to knowledge reflects hierarchy.¹⁵³ The state disseminated the full volume to only a small number of politically privileged people, while offering most readers only snippets printed in newspapers and in other books. These differences expose the tension between the campaign's message of populist anti-Confucianism and the unequal opportunities afforded to people to participate. Visual depictions of people reading the book or studying the *Analects* drew attention to disparities between rhetoric and reality. The case of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* shows that after the anti-Confucian diapason seen in Chapter One subsided, the campaign as represented in print propaganda fragmented.

Knowledge production remained a contested political space for many years, and several years later the campaign's proponents were themselves charged with the same knowledge crimes that they had pinned on Lin Biao and Confucius. As explored in Chapter Seven, once Mao had died criticism of the so-called 'Gang of Four' also repudiated much of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Now, *The People's Daily* attacked surrogates of the Gang for previously distorting classical materials to further the cause of anti-Confucianism.¹⁵⁴ Another piece first published in the CCP's leading theoretical journal in 1977 labelled articles from the campaign as "lacking anything approaching 'academic' research" (该不上什么真正的学问). Their authors had failed to support their arguments with evidence, and they had "distorted and fabricated

¹⁵³ Michael Schoenhals elaborates on this relationship in his "China's 'Great Proletarian Information Revolution' of 1966-1967," in *Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China's Era of High Socialism*, ed. Jeremy Brown and Matthew Johnson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 230-258.

¹⁵⁴ Guan Lin 关林, "梁效的'断字演义'" [Liang Xiao's 'wordplay and word games']. *The People's Daily*, April 8, 1977, 4.

history" (歪曲和杜撰历史).¹⁵⁵ It was now the turn of the senior politician Jiang Qing – labelled as the leader of the Gang – to join Lin Biao in being accused of "lacking academic credentials" (不学无术).¹⁵⁶ Seen from this perspective, *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* represents one small part of the constantly undulating relationship between politics and intellectual endeavor in the People's Republic of China.

¹⁵⁵ Wu Jiang, "The present-day restorationists," 1-3.

¹⁵⁶ Xinhua she tongxun yuan 新华社通讯员 and Xinhua she jizhe 新华社记者, "'四人帮'的一支反革命 别动队" [The 'Gang of Four's' counter-revolutionary strike team]. *The People's Daily*, July 13, 1977, 4.

CHAPTER FOUR

Revolution, Reading, Reward and Risk: Creating and Sustaining the Reading Nation

Books need readers and readers need books. This fourth chapter discusses the institutions which encouraged and facilitated reading during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. In other chapters, I have already presented examples of books distributed on mass, the methods used to disseminate them, and inequalities in access to printed material. Building on these examples, I show the important role played by state media in spreading knowledge about books and encouraging people to read. I posit that newspapers and periodicals acted as pseudo-advertisers fashioning an image of the "reading nation" and fuelling demand for books. State media, in other words, turned people into library patrons and bookstore customers.

More generally, I register how the campaign both drove and thrived on the dramatic revival of libraries as centers of political activity, the expansion of Xinhua Bookstore's nationwide distribution network, and the recovery of the second-hand and rare books market. Librarians and booksellers, like publishers and printers, worked in the vanguard of the state's communication with its subjects. Similarly, libraries and bookstores manifested the reach of the state in bricks and mortar. The variable growth of these institutions in different parts of the country, however, qualified this reach and again highlights the disparity in political communication between urban and rural areas. Tracing this history also highlights the ambiguity built-in to the status of the book in modern China's politicized spaces. The state encouraged the commodification of books to achieve its political goals, vestiges of past cultural elitism returned, and politics left room for profiteering. State Media, Advertising, and Chinese Readers

To maximize the efficacy of printed propaganda, the state confronted two imperatives not new to the 1970s: first, circulating knowledge about books widely; and second, habituating Chinese to books, libraries, and bookstores. Of course, reading was nothing new to many people by this time. As Jennifer Purtle and colleagues have observed, the prominence of *Quotations from Chairman Mao* in the early period of the Cultural Revolution – whereby everybody had to own a copy – turned people into readers and book owners.¹ In propaganda, the *Quotations* often appeared as a personal possession held aloft triumphantly by its owner.² During the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, however, the state had to constantly *sustain* the same interest in and familiarity with books and reading as tools of making revolution.

In this context, the media was of paramount importance. True, some people learnt about new books through catalogues released by individual publishers like Beijing Braille Printing Press.³ Work units issued syllabi, such as those now found in the Beijing Municipal Archives and the Shanghai Municipal Archives, which informed people what they would be reading in forthcoming workplace political study sessions.⁴ However, newspapers and periodicals most

⁴ BMA 98-2-365, "关于加强学习, 深入批判林彪否定无产阶级文化大革命罪行的安排"

¹ Jennifer Purtle, Elizabeth Ridolfo, and Stephen Qiao, eds., *Reading Revolution: Art and Literacy during China's Cultural Revolution* (Toronto: Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, 2016). 14.

² Ibid., 16.

³ "北京盲文印刷厂 1975 年图书目录." Standalone catalogue deposited at the Geisel Library, UC San Diego.

[[]Arrangements for increasing study and deepening criticism of Lin Biao's criminal attempts to undermine the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution]; SMA B60-1-84-62, "上海市'五·七'干校关于第四单元读 点法家著作的实施计划" [A plan from Shanghai's May Seventh Cadre School for reading Legalist texts in the fourth study period]; SMA B60-1-85-72, "上海市'五 ·七'干校关于读点法家著作的实施计划" [A plan from Shanghai's May Seventh Cadre School for reading Legalist texts]; SMA B60-1-89-47, "上海市'五·七'干校委员会关于增加学习评论《水浒》计划的请示报告" [A report from the Shanghai May Seventh Cadre School Revolutionary Committee requesting instructions concerning its

regularly and efficiently exposed people to new propaganda publications and sold them the idea of book buying and reading. For the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, media portrayed purchasing and consuming printed material as ways to participate. The same outlets simultaneously fostered the notion that the whole country read propaganda – a fiction that pressured people to join the national reading community. More practically, state media stoked a market for books, in turn strengthening China's bookselling and book publishing industries. Finally, while book publishers generated reading communities through books' content and form, newspapers and magazines likewise segmented and organized China's readers into particular reading communities.⁵ State media, therefore, acted in concert with other parts of the state to further the latter's political and economic interests.

National and regional dailies – all controlled by political authorities – played by far the most important role in making books relevant to ordinary people. In provincial newspapers (several of which circulated nationwide), publishers placed announcements of newly released books for the readers. For example, Shanghai People's Press periodically advertised its front catalogue in *Wenhui Daily* using a distinctive banner typeface and a decorative border (figure 4.1). A notice printed in the 22 May 1974 issue included many new titles related to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign such as reprints of Legalist texts and new additions to the press' *Selected Classical Materials* (古代文选) series.⁶ Another notice carried in September listed further books on Legalism, as well as children's books and other anti-Confucianism

plan for expanding study of *Water Margin*]; SMA B167-3-317, "人民出版社关于一九七六年工作打算" [A work plan for Shanghai People's Press for 1976]. ⁵ For discussion of how earlier twentieth century publishers shaped reading communities through their

⁵ For discussion of how earlier twentieth century publishers shaped reading communities through their publication choices, see Culp, *Power of Print*, 15.

⁶ "纪念毛主席《在延安文艺座谈会上的讲话》发表三十二周年——介绍一批新书、新画" [Commemorating the 32nd anniversary of Chairman Mao's "Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art": introducing some new books and posters]. *Wenhui Daily*, May 22, 1974, 2.

publications.⁷ In the mid-1970s, over one hundred retail outlets in Shanghai sold copies of *Wenhui Daily*, many more copies circulated via institutional subscription, and the city had 276 points where the newspapers was publicly displayed for people to read.⁸ Additionally, over 600,000 copies reached other cities and provinces each day.⁹ In short, word of new Shanghai People's Press publications spread through plentiful channels.¹⁰ Further afield, *The Inner Mongolia Daily* also advertised new books in Chinese and Mongolian translation (figure 4.2), and *The Xinjiang Daily* printed new book listings in fall 1975.¹¹ Beyond making new books known to potential readers, these advertisements subtly placed newspaper readers within a broader bibliographic culture of literacy.

⁷ "庆祝中华人民共和国成立二十五周年——介绍一批新书、新画" [Celebrating the 25th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China: introducing some new books and posters]. *Wenhui Daily*, September 30, 1974, 4.

⁸ SMA G20-2-223, "文汇报社、解放日报社关于在上海市区零售和贴报问题的报告和批复" [Reports and responses from *Wenhui Daily* and *Liberation Daily* concerning retailing newspapers and posting newspapers on bulletin boards in the Shanghai city center].

⁹ SMA G20-2-246-5, "文汇报填报的 1976 年 1、5、9 月份发行情况月报表" [Tables from *Wenhui Daily* charting circulation in January, May and September 1976]. ¹⁰ SMA G20-2-223.

¹¹ For examples from *The Inner Mongolia Daily*, see: June 17, 1974, 4; July 8, 1974, 4; March 14, 1975, 4; and March 16, 1975, 4. For examples from *The Xinjiang Daily*, see: September 29, 1975, 8; and October 1, 1975, 7.



Figure 4.1: An advert (bottom of the page) from Wenhui Daily listing new books published by Shanghai People's Press.¹²

政治、文教、历史读物 列宁选集一至四卷 抵林批孔文章汇编 (一) 批林批孔文章汇编 (二) 鲁迅批判孔孟之道的言论摘录	8.00元 0.21元 0.15元 0.09元	介紹一	-#	七己經、目	R d	多 凹版的	5	進心线(進环回) 运动场上(進环回) 万元巨款归失主(進环回) 科学技术读物
普西批判孔血之通的言论现象 五四以来反动派、地主资产阶级 学者專孔复古言论辑录 深入批林必须批孔(革命大批判	0.11元		RE	、 文 图	=	ち		农村电工 实用儿科手册 中草药验方选编
一) 彻底批判林彪和孔孟之道(革命	0.19元							彩色摄影高血压与脑出血
大批判二) 批判"克己复礼"反对复辟倒退	0.13元	广阔天地大有作为(关于知识青 年上山下乡文章)	0.15元	一切行动听指挥《共产党宣言》中的历史事件和	0.08元	青春(中篇小说) 奶茶飘香(短篇小说)	0.86元 0.27元	兽医手册 炭疽病的防治
(革命大批判三) 开展对孔子反动思想的批判	0.14元 0.21元	 增强党的观念 加强党的 领导 	0.13元	人物介绍 学习《国家与革命》辅导讲话 学习《反杜林论》参考材料	0.12元	案外春花(小说) 边鼓声声(小说) 礼花(小说)	0.28元 0.21元	春小麦栽培技术 优选法对话
焚书抗儒鲜 孔丘是反动奴隶主阶级的教育家	0.11元 0.14元 0.11元	坚持辩证唯物论认识论 为实现党的基本纲领和最终 目的而奋斗(党课讲话参考) 	0.1376	巴黎公社人物介绍 义和团运动	0.19元	中流击水(诗) 军垦集(诗)	0.17元 0.31元 0.28元	猪饲料 怎样种胡麻 牧草栽培技术
学习鲁迅批判尊孔反法思想 批林批孔活页文选(1至11)		材料) 朝气蓬勃的共产党员	0.17元 0.18元	口头上的社会主义 实际上的帝国主义	0.24元	歌曲创作浅读 把 关 (演唱材料)	0.28元 0.05元	• 怎样找地下水
巩固发展文化大革命的伟大成果 • 把无产阶级教育革命进行	0.11元	敢于同旧传统观念决裂的好青年	0.13元 0.11元	文 艺 读 物 鲁迅小说诗歌散文选	0.45元	 金色的星(散文集) 石头开花(相声) 	0.31元	• 打 开 幼畜保育
到底 • 坚持乡村的伟大胜利(知识		农业要上去 干部要下去	0.09元	曹雪芹和他的红楼梦	0.15元	少年儿童读物(连环画)	0.08元	注: 有 • 标记的是即将
青年大批判文章)	0.15元	三大革命运动中的女尖兵	0.1250	坚持用阶级观点研究红楼梦	0.20元	神炮手 (连环圆)	0.11元	内蒙古人民出版社内蒙古新华书店发

Figure 4.2: A close-up of an advert for new books printed in The Inner Mongolia Daily. Titles related to the campaign appear in the far left column. Note the distinctive, eye-catching design of the banner text.¹³

¹² Image source: *Wenhui Daily*, May 22, 1974, 2.
¹³ Image source: *The Inner Mongolia Daily*, June 17, 1974, 4.

Besides adverts, references to new publications in newspaper articles directed readers towards the propaganda they should be reading. For example, a January 1974 edition of *The People's Daily* included a front-page splash covering recently issued titles. The piece name-dropped such titles as *Prioritize the Revolution of the Superstructure: Criticisms of Confucius's Counter-revolutionary Ideas* (重视上层建筑领域的革命——孔子反动思想批判) released by Beijing People's Press. It also featured a prominent anti-Confucian diatribe by Yang Rongguo and a book from Shanghai on Legalist reforms in ancient China.¹⁴ Regionals such as *Wenhui Daily* and *The Inner Mongolia Daily* carried the same article, suggesting that central government officials instructed state media to reprint this coverage of new books widely.¹⁵ Similarly, all three newspapers in January 1975 featured Xinhua News Agency copy announcing the release of Legalist text anthologies published in Beijing and Shanghai.¹⁶ *The People's Daily* also advertised the activities of specialist, non-provincial presses, as it did in July 1975 with coverage of the *Readings for Educated Youth with Worker-Peasant-Soldier Background* (工农知识青年自学读物) series issued by People's Education Press (人民教育出版社).¹⁷

¹⁴ "满足广大城乡人民政治、文化生活的需要" [Enrich the political and cultural lives of city and countryside dwellers]. *The People's Daily*, January 23, 1974, 1.

¹⁵ "全国各地出版发行大批革命书画" [Across the country, every region is publishing revolutionary books and posters]. *Wenhui Daily*, January 23, 1974, 3; "为满足人民群众在政治、文化生活方面的需要各地出版发行一大批革命图书、年画、连环画" [To enrich the political and cultural lives of the broad masses, different regions are publishing a large group of revolutionary books, new year pictures and comic books]. *The Inner Mongolia Daily*, January 24, 1974, 2.

¹⁶ "适应批林批孔需要 坚持'古为今用'原则" [Meet the requirements of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and uphold the principle of 'using the past to serve the present']. *Wenhui Daily*, January 31, 1975, 1; "适应批林批孔运动普及、深入、持久发展的需要" [Meet the need to proliferate, deepen, and lengthen the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign]. *The People's Daily*, January 31, 1975, 1; "适应批林批孔运动普及、深入、持久发展的需要" [Meet the need to proliferate, deepen, and lengthen the Criticize Confucius campaign]. *The People's Daily*, January 31, 1975, 1; "适应批林批孔运动普及、深入、持久发展的需要" [Meet the need to proliferate, deepen, and lengthen the Criticize Confucius campaign]. *The Inner Mongolia Daily*, February 2, 1975, 3.

¹⁷ "热情关怀青年一代的成长" [Warmly supporting the growth of a whole generation of young people]. *The People's Daily*, July 3, 1975, 3.

In addition to widely distributed announcements, regional papers kept readers abreast of local publishing news. As the campaign gathered pace, *Wenhui Daily* informed readers that Shanghai People's Press planned to release a tranche of books on anti-Confucianism.¹⁸ Some months later, the paper name-dropped *The Evil Life of Confucius* (孔老二罪恶的一生) and mentioned the book's print-run (2.5 million) to suggest its popularity.¹⁹ Editors at *The Xinjiang Daily* used one of their August 1974 issues to relate news of campaign books translated into ethnic minority languages by Xinjiang People's Press.²⁰ Further coverage of publishing activities in the region followed in October 1974.²¹

Finally, books reviews taught people what to read and how to read. Publications from Shanghai targeted at young people – including the colorful *Meng Ke: The Second Boss of the Confucian Shop* (孔家店二老板——孟轲) – received national coverage in *The People's Daily*, with the article praising the titles' use of historical source material and their accessible style.²² At the tail-end of the campaign, the same paper combined praise for Legalist text anthologies published in Shanghai with a hardy rejection of elitism in literary culture: "bourgeois elements in and outside of the party incredulously query why "those whom wear dungarees and use a spanner also want to look at silk-bound books." The reality [of recent years] forcefully rejects their cold satire" (党内外资产阶级胡说什么"穿背带裤拿摇手柄的也想看线装书?"事实对

¹⁸"认真做好出版工作" [Earnestly carry out publishing work]. *Wenhui Daily*, February 5, 1974, 2. ¹⁹"又出版一批配合现实斗争的连环画" [Yet another batch of comic books have been published to accompany the present-day struggle]. *Wenhui Daily*, October 3, 1974, 3.

²⁰ "新疆人民出版社翻译出版少数民族文字批林批孔书籍" [Xinjiang People's Press has translated Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign books into ethnic minority languages and published them]. *The Xinjiang Daily*, August 11, 1974, 1.

²¹ Xinjiang renmin chubanshe geweihui yewu zu 新疆人民出版社革委会业务组, "编译出版工作取得 好成绩" [Translation and publishing works had been extremely successful]. *The Xinjiang Daily*, October 29, 1974, 3.

²² Shu Haoqing 舒浩晴, "用阶级斗争的历史经验教育下一代" [Use the historical experiences of class struggle to educate the next generation]. *The People's Daily*, August 8, 1975, 3.

他们的冷嘲热讽给了有力的回击).²³ Here, *The People's Daily* not only gave book recommendations but also advanced the state's vision of a mass reading culture.

At times, editors clearly took their lead from Mao's own literary leanings. Utterances from the Chairman carried particular weight and his comments about particular books and authors shaped newspaper coverage of campaign books. In March and April 1976, the CCP's central apparatus widely distributed a collection of key quotes from Mao spoken between October 1975 and the following January. Amongst his other musings, Mao urged those around him to read more on the history of philosophy, praising for example Yang Rongguo's An Introduction to the History of Chinese Philosophy (简明中国哲学史). Similarly, having previously observed that "many people don't really understand Confucius properly" (我看许多 人对孔夫子不太懂呢), Mao recommended Feng Youlan's On Confucius (论孔丘) and Feng Tianyu's (冯天瑜) A Criticism of Confucian Pedagogy (孔丘教育思想批判).24 On cue, in March Wenhui Daily described Yang Rongguo's book as "invaluable for studying the history of Chinese philosophy" (它对我们认真学一点中国哲学史,有很大帮助."²⁵ Similarly, now that Mao had praised Feng Tianyu, The People's Daily, Wenhui Daily and presumably many other regionals carried a profile of the author in June 1976.²⁶ The piece narrated how Feng, first a biology major, had studied hundreds of pages of materials before composing his critique of

²³ "在毛主席革命路线指引下北京上海出版社开门办社成绩显著" [Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, publishers in Beijing and Shanghai have achieved clear success opening up editorial departments to the masses]. *The People's Daily*, September 6, 1976, 4.

²⁴ Zhonggong zhongyang, *A Chronology*, vol. 6, 542 and 639-645.

²⁵ Shi Song 施松, "一本批孔的好教材" [An excellent teaching resource for criticizing Confucianism]. *Wenhui Daily*, March 22, 1976, 3.

²⁶ "理论战线上的新兵" [A new soldier on the front lines of theory]. *The People's Daily*, June 18, 1976, 1 and 4; "理论战线上的新兵" [A new soldier on the front lines of theory]. *Wenhui Daily*, June 18, 1976, 1 and 3.

Confucianism.²⁷ All this media attention raised the public profile of books, bookstores, and reading.

In terms of regional newspapers, *Wenhui Daily* printed a markedly high number of book reviews, suggesting its editors wanted to promote politicized print culture in all the places it reached. In May 1974, the paper printed a laudatory discussion of *Articles by Lu Xun Criticizing Confucius and Opposing Confucianism* (鲁迅批孔反儒文集) which billed the book as "a sharply-honed weapon for criticizing Lin Biao and criticizing Confucius" (批林批孔的锐利武器).²⁸ At the end of the year, it likewise ran predictably glowing reviews of *Old Confucius* (孔老二), *Old Mencius: The Second Boss of the Confucian Shop* and other titles.²⁹ When Shanghai People's Press released its first volume of *Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts* (历代法家著作选注), a *Wenhui Daily* review authored by some Shanghai librarians extolled all the methodological and political virtues of the book. In the eyes of the reviewers, it was infinitely preferable to the lengthy, solitary scholarly annotating of past intellectuals.³⁰ When the same librarians published their review of *A History of the Confucian-Legalist Struggle* (儒法斗争史话), canny *Wenhui Daily* editors juxtaposed this positive coverage with details of 22 other titles

²⁷ "A new soldier on the front lines of theory." *The People's Daily*, 1.

²⁸ "批林批孔的锐利武器" [A sharply-honed weapon for criticizing Lin Biao and criticizing Confucius]. *Wenhui Daily*, May 31, 1974, 3.

²⁹ Luo Rong 罗荣, "'圣人'显原形" [A 'sage' shows his true colors]. *Wenhui Daily*, December 17, 1974, 3; Kong Jun 孔俊, "通俗历史读物园地上的新苗" [New seedlings in the garden of accessible books about history]. *Wenhui Daily*, December 17, 1974, 3.

³⁰ Shanghai shi Luwan qu tushuguan gongren pinglun zu 上海市卢湾区图书馆工人评论组,"'三结合' 批儒评法的胜利成果" [The victorious results of using the '3-in-1' system to criticize Confucianism and analyze Legalism]. *Wenhui Daily*, February 18, 1975, 2.

published in the same series to maximize the book's appeal.³¹ Newspapers like *Wenhui Daily* thus played a vital role in disseminating knowledge about books and normalizing reading.

Besides the extensive newspaper coverage outlined above, a dedicated bibliographical magazine both informed aspiring readers of new releases and symbolized the publishing industry's national coherence. *New Books Nationwide* (全国新书目), edited by the National Copyright Library (国家版本图书馆), thematically listed all titles received by the library from presses in the previous month. In one convenient format, readers could browse the range of propaganda released across the country and decide what to look for at local bookstores. *New Books Nationwide* also provided a space for presses to advertise important titles. In the October 1975 installment, Tianjin People's Press (天津人民出版社) publicized its series of annotated Legalist texts, and the same issue also announced that Shanghai People's Press had released 22 titles in its popular *Teach Yourself for Young People* (青年自学丛书) line.³² Other adverts for books tied to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign appeared occasionally throughout 1975.³³

Alongside texts, photographs and drawings hammered home the fiction that ideal campaign participants read newspapers and books avidly and productively. Photographs such as figure 4.3 placed state media – the source of so much information about books – at the literal center of everyday life. At other times, newspapers loomed large over campaign activities, providing the visual and rhetorical backdrop to reading, studying, and speaking (figure 4.4). For

³¹ Luwan qu tushuguan gongren xiezuo zu 卢湾区图书馆工人写作组,"学习儒法斗争历史的生动教 材" [Vivid learning material for studying the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle]. *The Wenhui Daily*, August 30, 1975, 3; "《青年自学丛书》现已出版二十二种" [22 titles have already been published in the *Teach Yourself for Young People* series]. *Wenhui Daily*, August 15, 1975, 3. ³² New Books Nationwide no. 10 (1975), 12 and 79.

³³ For example, see *New Books Nationwide* no. 1 (1975), 28.

books themselves, an assortment of artwork printed in newspapers, periodicals and books showed people comfortable with handling and reading materials (figures 4.5-4.7). Their expressions vary from earnest to happy, but all these emotions convey the inherent usefulness of books. For publishers and booksellers, these images were nothing but good publicity. For readers, such depictions framed reading propaganda as a life imperative.



Figure 4.3: Rusticated youth in Mongolia discuss the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign using *The People's Daily*.³⁴

³⁴ Image source: *Minorities Pictorial* no. 5 (May 1974), 28.



Figure 4.4: A drawing made to promote study of the novel Water Margin.³⁵



Figure 4.5: Art mirrors life, soldiers study politics. The cover of the white book in the soldier's hand reads "Materials for Criticizing Lin Biao and Criticizing Confucius."³⁶

³⁵ Image source: Qin Yuanyue 秦元阅, "学习毛主席重要指示 开展对《水浒》的评论" [Study Chairman Mao's Important Instructions, Begin Analyzing *Water Margin*]. *Story-Book Magazine* no. 25 (October 1975), 1.

³⁶ Image source: Ke Liangshun 柯良顺, "阵地怒火" [Fury at the Front]. *Story-Book Magazine* no. 11 (August 1974), front cover.



Figure 4.6: Zheng Tongxiao (郑通校), A Waitress and a Propagandist (既是服务员又是宣传 员).³⁷



Figure 4.7: A worker holds a volume from a thread-bound edition of *Water Margin* while the nurse grips a copy of the CCP's premier theoretical journal.³⁸

³⁷ Image source: Shanghai renmin, *Selected Artwork*, 60.
³⁸ Image source: *Hebei Worker, Peasant and Soldier Pictorial* no. 11 (1975), front cover.

Anti-Confucian Checking-In and Checking-Out: Libraries as Political Places and Propaganda Providers

Libraries generally serve as repositories of a society's knowledge, but in 1970s China libraries and librarians also lay within the state's nexus of political communication. Most importantly, they served as contact points between the propaganda bureaucracy and ordinary people. Furthermore, they provided research assistance during campaigns and, in the case of the larger libraries, acted as custodians of rare books and manuscripts with political value.³⁹ As with the bookstores discussed below, the state relied on libraries to foster activism and sustain the literate side of anti-Confucianism.

The place of libraries in the 1970s differed sharply from the chaotic early years of the Cultural Revolution. In these early years, library collections were officially off-limits to student and worker revolutionaries, and the central government outlawed casual bibliocide because library holdings counted as "national property" (国家财产).⁴⁰ As grassroots student and worker factions ran rampant in 1966 and 1967, however, library collections could not escape the threat posed by the period's profound political and cultural iconoclasm.⁴¹ When these radical groups managed to take over libraries, they sometimes used piles of old books to build defensive fortifications.⁴² At Peking University, campus activists dumped the library's rare texts in an old

³⁹ For an informative history of Chinese libraries in the twentieth century, see John Barclay, *The Seventy-Year Ebb and Flow of Chinese Library and Information Services: May 4, 1919 to the Late 1980s* (Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, 1995).

⁴⁰ Guojia wenwu ju 国家文物局编, ed., 中国文化遗产事业法规文件汇编 1949-2009 (上) [*Legal Regulations Concerning Protection of China's Cultural Heritage, 1949-2009 (Part One)*] (Beijng: Wenwu chubanshe, 2009), 61.

⁴¹ For more on this iconoclasm, see Denise Ho, *Curating Revolution: Politics on Display in Mao's China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), especially chapters 5 and 6. See also her "Revolutionizing Antiquity: The Shanghai Cultural Bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1968," *The China Quarterly* 207 (September 2011): 687–705.

⁴² "'文革'期间浙图抢救古籍亲历记" [Personal experiences of the Zhejiang Library's efforts to rescue books during the 'Cultural Revolution' period],

warehouse, although quick-thinking faculty members managed to rescue a valuable collection of enumerative bibliographies (古籍目录文献) for safe-keeping in the Library Sciences Department (图书馆学系).⁴³ In Shanghai, the Shanghai Library confined its books to closed stacks, while staff at Zhejiang Provincial Library pre-emptively secured its collection of over one million old books away from iconoclasts.⁴⁴ Most dramatically, perhaps, only instructions from Premier Zhou Enlai to the People's Liberation Army saved the Beijing Library (later renamed the National Library of China in 1998) from attack.⁴⁵ In 1967, the military took over full control of the library to safeguard its treasures.⁴⁶

Paradoxically, however, factional iconoclasm also helped ensure that some libraries resumed operations in the early 1970s with greatly expanded collections. With factions intent on ferreting out the "four olds" (四间) – a label standing in for anything deemed insufficiently revolutionary – anxious private individuals decided to donate rare books to libraries rather than risk discovery with them.⁴⁷ Lu Diyin has found how the Shanghai Museum received a large amount of antiquities in the early years of the Cultural Revolution, and libraries obtained similar

https://web.archive.org/web/20180909000221/http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5e40edd70101oklf.html (archived September 9, 2018).

⁴³ Sun Bing 孙冰, "'淡泊以明志, 宁静以致远': 记北大教授郑如斯先生" ['Simple Living Produces High Ideals, a Peaceful State of Mind Produces Greatness': Remembering Professor Zheng Rusi of Peking University], *Daxue tushuguan xuebao* 大学图书馆学报 no. 3 (2009):102.

⁴⁴ Barclay, *Seventy-Year Ebb and Flow*, 97; "Personal experiences of the Zhejiang Library's efforts to rescue books."

⁴⁵ "国图概况" [The general situation at the National Library of China],

https://web.archive.org/web/20171026104834/http://www.nlc.cn/dsb_footer/gygt/lsyg/index_1.htm (archived October 26, 2017); Charles Benton, "A Beijing Journal," *Bulletin of the American Society for Information Science* 6, no. 4 (April 1980): 15. In 1972, Chi Wang was also told on his visit to the Beijing Library that Red Guards had not managed to destroy the collections: Chi Wang, "Report of Visit to China: June 1-19, 1972," *Library of Congress Information Bulletin* 31, no. 39 (September 29, 1972): A172.

⁴⁶ Li Zhizhong 李致忠, ed., 中国国家图书馆馆史资料长编 (1909-2008) [*Historical Sources About the National Library of China (1909-2008)*], volume 2 (Beijing: Guojia tushuguan chubanshe, 2009), 573. ⁴⁷ For an account of the attack on the 'four olds," see MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 117-131.

windfalls.⁴⁸ For example, the Beijing Library, the Shanghai Library and Wuhan Provincial Library all acquired material from individuals offloading their collections.⁴⁹ More insidiously, libraries also shared in the fruits of Red Guard plundering by appropriating bibliographic loot ransacked from the houses of politically compromised individuals. Zhejiang Provincial Library, for instance, gained over 3000 books formerly in one scholar's collections and received an additional 500 old texts seized from another individual. When staff from the library went to collect books from a local school, they saw precious volumes "haphazardly arranged in piles" (散乱地堆放着书).⁵⁰ Undoubtedly, transferring printed treasures to libraries saved them from being pulped, but at the same time institutions gained valuable materials that would profit them enormously in the years to come.

After the iconoclasm of the late 1960s, the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign coincided with a revived vision of libraries as useful, accessible, and public-facing organizations.⁵¹ Although by 1976 the number of public libraries (公共图书馆) above county level (县以上) had dropped by one third of its 1965 level, this statistic masks a flurry of activity in the early 1970s.⁵² Compared to the 323 public libraries above county level open in 1970, this figure had grown year-on-year to 768 by the end of the Mao era.⁵³ Besides these institutions,

⁴⁸ For analysis of how the Cultural Revolution delivered privately-owned antiquities into the hands of the Shanghai Museum, see Lu Di Yin, "Seizing Civilization: Antiquities in Shanghai's Custody, 1949-1996" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2012), chapter 3.

⁴⁹ Barclay, *Seventy-Year Ebb and Flow*, 99; S. W. Wang, "Impressions of Chinese libraries and the Chinese book market," *Australian Academic and Research Libraries* 5, no. 1 (March 1974): 19. ⁵⁰ "Personal experiences of the Zhejiang Library's efforts to rescue books."

⁵¹ For an account of this revival, see Barclay, *Seventy-Year Ebb and Flow*, 108-118. This source pointed me toward numerous accounts of visits to Chinese libraries by foreign observers, many of which are cited in this dissertation.

⁵² Zou Huaheng 邹华享 and Shi Jinyan 施金炎, 中国近现代图书馆事业大事记 [A Record of Key Events in the Modern and Contemporary History of Chinese Libraries] (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1988), 231.

⁵³ Han Yongjin 韩永进, ed., 中国图书馆史: 现当代图书馆卷 [A History of Libraries in China: Modern and Contemporary Libraries] (Beijing: Guojia tushuguan chubanshe, 2017), 145. Han's account gives the

people could also access books and newspapers via small work unit libraries and commune-run services.⁵⁴ Within the army, in 1975 top brass ordered that each company (连队) establish a book room or a circulating book collection (流动图书箱) to provide soldiers with titles on politics, history, military strategy and art, as well as to furnish soldiers with a selection of periodicals and newspapers.⁵⁵ In other words, in the campaign, the state could reach Chinese through a substantial network of large and small information depositories.

Developments at some of the country's most important libraries encapsulate how the times were a-changin'. In 1971, a national roundtable of publishers and officials urged librarians to revive reader services, and in response the Beijing Library and several provincial libraries opened their doors to users again.⁵⁶ Conditions now permitted librarians to develop contacts with colleagues abroad. In Fall 1973, Liu Jiping (刘季平), the new director of the Beijing Library, led a delegation to the United States where they spent five weeks visiting the Library of Congress and other libraries.⁵⁷ While in Washington D.C., Liu and his companions viewed reading rooms, collections, and special departments.⁵⁸ The Beijing Library also began a book exchange with the

number of public libraries in 1965 at 573. The difference between this figure and the number of 1100 in Zou and Shi's book is hard to reconcile.

⁵⁴ Roger Howard, "Libraries in the People's Republic of China," *The Assistant Librarian* 67, no. 4 (April 1974): 55.

⁵⁵ "人民解放军总政治部最近向全军发出通知" [The General Political Office of the People's Liberation Army recently issued a notice to the whole army]. *The People's Daily*, December 13, 1975, 1.

⁵⁶ Han Yongjin 韩永进, "中国图书馆事业改革发展与刘季平同志的发轫贡献" [Comrade Liu Jiping's early contributions to the reform and growth of China's library services],

https://web.archive.org/web/20181126010100/http:/topics.gmw.cn/2018-09/11/content_31107740.htm (archived November 26, 2018); Han Yongjin 韩永进, ed., 中国图书馆史: 附录卷 [A History of Libraries in China: Supplementary Volume] (Beijing: Guojia tushuguan chubanshe, 2017), 134.

⁵⁷ Barclay, Seventy-Year Ebb and Flow, 110; Polly-Ann Proett, A History of Libraries in the People's Republic of China, Including Some Aspects of College and University Library Development, 1949-1974 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1974), 191; Liu Jiping 刘季平, 刘季平文集 [The Collected Essays of Liu Jiping] (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2002), 574.

⁵⁸ "Chinese Librarians Visit LC." *Library of Congress Information Bulletin* 32, no. 42 (October 19, 1973): 361.

State University of New York at Stony Brook.⁵⁹ In one other indication of the resurging importance of libraries, multiple major depositories began modernizing their buildings. The First Historical Archives of China and the Peking University Library received upgrades in 1974-1975, while in the same period the new Yunnan Provincial Library opened and workers finished expanding the Guizhou Provincial Library.⁶⁰ In 1975, Zhou Enlai approved plans for a new Beijing Library building costed at 78 million *yuan*, even though budgetary constraints and indecision delayed the beginning of work until 1983.⁶¹ Overly small, the existing building no longer met the state's information management needs.⁶²

The historical focus of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign helped drive a similar revival in special collections librarianship at flagship institutions. Studying Confucianism provided the perfect logic for preserving classical materials because criticizing ideas required first preserving them.⁶³ A Danish visitor in 1974 observed that "the concern now shown for classical works, their preservation and restoration, also confirms that the attitude prevailing during certain phrases of the Cultural Revolution, when old books were destroyed, has been succeeded by a desire to preserve them as a valuable treasure."⁶⁴ One year later, the Shanghai Museum could restore (整理) a newly discovered antique text because it shed light on the history

⁶¹ Beijing shi difang zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 北京市地方志编纂委员会, ed., 北京志·文化艺术卷·群众 文化志、图书馆志、文化艺术管理志 [*Beijing Gazetteer (Culture and Art Volume): Mass Culture, Libraries, and Management of Culture and Art*] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2001), 187; Barclay, *Seventy-Year Ebb and Flow*, 112; Li, *Historical Sources*, volume 2, 697 and 871-874; Han, *A History of Libraries in China: Modern and Contemporary Libraries*, 160.

⁵⁹ Liu, Communications and National Integration, xlii.

⁶⁰ Barclay, Seventy-Year Ebb and Flow, 111; Zou and Shi, A Record of Key Events, 231.

 ⁶² Jiangsu sheng Rudong xian zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 江苏省如东县政协文史资料委员会,
 ed., 纪念刘季平文集 [*Essays Remembering Liu Jiping*] (Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 1990), 95.
 ⁶³ John Barclay, "China: Libraries 'Serve the People,'" *The Australian Library Journal* 27, no. 4 (March 17, 1978): 56.

⁶⁴ Birgitte Goldberg, "Libraries and Mass Communication in the People's Republic of China," *Scandinavian Public Library Quarterly* 8, no. 2 (1975): 64. I have modified some linguistic errors in the original quote.

of Legalism in China.⁶⁵ As of 1973, the Beijing Library possessed two million old and rare books (善本), and foreign visitors to the library three years later noted the "loving care" given to rare book collections.⁶⁶ For instance, some library staff formed a team dedicated to rebinding Ming dynasty publications (300-400 years old) and remounting maps.⁶⁷ Moreover, staff travelled to areas such as Shanghai to purchase additional antiquarian books, adding over 4,000 books to the library's special collections in 1974.⁶⁸ In Shanghai, the municipal library conserved 1.24 million antiquarian books in its special collections by 1976, including rarities such as a seventeenth-century commentary on the *Book of Changes* (周易) printed with porcelain type.⁶⁹ At Peking University, the library looked after 120,000 rare books as of 1974.⁷⁰ Whereas antiquarian books had once suffered at the hands of Red Guard and worker factions, they now merited conservation and protection.

A wave of archaeological excavation, made possible by a renewed political interest in historical research, also yielded texts requiring identification, organization, and preservation. In 1972, archaeologists working at Yinqueshan (银雀山) in Shandong excavated ancient bamboo slips bearing the text of *The Art of War* (孙子兵法). In a major coup for Mao-era archaeology, they also found a version of *Sun Bin's Art of War* (孙膑兵法) – an ancient military treatise long considered permanently lost.⁷¹ A range of scholarly experts, including Yang Bojun (see Chapter

⁶⁵ "李贽的书札" [A letter by Li Zhi]. Wenhui Daily, July 22, 1975, 3.

⁶⁶ Li, *Historical Sources*, volume 2, 582; D.T. Richnell and Howard Nelson, "Libraries in the People's Republic of China: A Report of a Visit, June 1976," *Journal of Librarianship and Information Science* 9, issue 1 (January 1977): 15.

⁶⁷ Weiying Wan, "Libraries in the People's Republic of China: a First Hand report," *The University of Michigan Librarian* 77, no. 22 (May 1976): 5.

⁶⁸ Li, *Historical Sources*, volume 2, 601 and 611.

⁶⁹ Wan, "Libraries in the People's Republic of China," 6.

⁷⁰ Howard, "Libraries," 56.

⁷¹ "兵学圣典——孙子、孙膑兵法出土记" [A holy site for military history: digging up the military works of Sun Zi and Sun Bin],

Three) and the renowned historian Zhu Dexi (朱德熙), began processing the Sun Bin text for publication.⁷² Ever ready to supply events with a political veneer, state media related how the haul of texts fund at Yinqueshan included no Confucian works and argued that this absence suggested a deliberate intent to expunge Confucianism from the historical record.⁷³ Elsewhere in this period, archaeologists found copies of the *Book of Changes* and the *Lao Zi* (老子) at the Mawangdui (马王堆) dig, as well as a new version of the *Analects* at a tomb in Hebei.⁷⁴

With rare books conservation now sanctioned by political circumstances, bibliography and library science returned as important academic subjects on campuses. In 1966, as the education system collapsed, the country's two library science departments at Peking University and Wuhan University had ceased recruiting students.⁷⁵ Recruitment, however, resumed in 1972, with a focus on two-year courses for students from worker-peasant-soldier backgrounds.⁷⁶ Two years later, with the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign in full swing, Zhou Enlai greenlit a new class on antiquarian text collation at Peking University.⁷⁷ The specialist professors Wang Zhongmin (王重民) and Zheng Rusi (郑如斯) proceeded to teach a class of over twenty

⁷⁴ Song Yingli 宋应离, ed., 中国当代出版史料 [*Historical Sources on Contemporary Chinese Publishing*], volume 2 (Zhengzhou: Daxiang chubanshe, 1999), 630-631; Hebei sheng wensu yanjiu suo Dingzhou hanmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 河北省文物研究所定州汉墓竹简整理小组,定州汉墓竹简: 论语 [*The* Analects, *as Found on the Bamboo Slips from a Han Tomb in Dingzhou*] (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1997), 1.

https://web.archive.org/web/20180828012649/https://sns.91ddcc.com/t/84560 (archived August 28, 2018).

⁷² Winfred Lehmann, ed., *Language and Linguistics in the People's Republic of China* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), 67; "A holy site for military history."

⁷³ "文化大革命以来我国文物、考古工作取得又一新成果" [Our country's cultural relics and archeological work has achieved yet another success since the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution]. *Wenhui Daily*, June 8, 1974, 1.

⁷⁵ Han, A History of Libraries in China: Supplementary Volume, 132.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 134.

⁷⁷ Sun, "'Simple Living," 103.

students the year-long course.⁷⁸ The former also taught classes on the history of Chinese enumerative bibliography (中国目录学史) from 1973 until 1975.⁷⁹ With the campaign throwing up new questions about the textual history of Confucianism, Wang and his students sometimes received copies of texts such as the *Xun Zi* (荀子) to authenticate and date.⁸⁰

The suicide of Wang Zhongmin, however, is a poignant reminder that library science and bibliography existed at the pleasure of politics. In 1974, a new text called the *Critical Historical Commentary* (史纲评要) and attributed to the Legalist Li Zhi was unearthed in Fujian. Jiang Qing reveled in the discovery, sharing the triumphant news at a political rally in Tianjin.⁸¹ Capitalizing on the exciting find, the journal *Study and Criticism* printed a series of commentaries on the text, and in late 1974 Zhonghua Books republished the *Critical Historical Commentary* in concise and large-print versions.⁸² Yet despite official enthusiasm, experts including Wang doubted the text's authenticity. Instructed to give the text another look and come to the politically expedient conclusion, Wang finished a second examination with further evidence to support his conclusion. His exasperated superior asked him, "you say that the text is a fake – do you think this will end well for you?" (你说这部书是伪书, 对你有什么好处?).

⁷⁸ Liu, "A Yearly Chronology," 43; Sun, "Simple Living," 103.

⁷⁹ Wang, Essays Marking the One Hundredth Anniversary, 201.

⁸⁰ Du Weisheng 杜伟生, "忆王重民先生" [Recalling Mr Wang Zhongmin], Guojia tushuguan xuekan 国家图书馆学刊 no. 1 (2004): 80-81.

⁸¹ Lei Yi 雷颐, "王重民之死" [The death of Wang Zhongmin], https://web.archive.org/web/20181108202431/http://finance.ifeng.com/news/people/20100611/2308017.s

html (archived November 8, 2018).

⁸² Zhu with Zhu, *The Inside Story*, 143-144; Fang Houshu 方厚枢, "'文革'后期出版工作纪事(上)" [A Record of Publishing Work During the Latter Period of the 'Cultural Revolution' (Part One)], *Chuban kexue* 出版科学 no. 1 (2005): 64. The concise version was published as Li Zhi 李贽, 史纲评要 [*Critical Historical Commentary*], 3 volumes (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974) (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com). Bibliographic details for the large-print version can be found on Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1974*, 364.

failed to fit with the *zeitgeist*.⁸³ At a rally in April 1975, participants indirectly criticized the beleaguered Wang for his incorrect class mentality and political views.⁸⁴ The next day, he hanged himself.⁸⁵

Collections at China's top research library primarily served well-connected scholars and others like Wang working on campaign research projects. Despite committing to providing some ordinary borrowing services, the Beijing Library focused on the needs of institutes and work units, with access to materials open to those with a letter of introduction from their home organization.⁸⁶ For the whole of 1974, the library received around 230,000 visits from patrons.⁸⁷ One of these patrons included the scholar Jiang Yihua (姜义华), sent to Beijing by Shanghai officials to conduct research on the late-Qing intellectual Zhang Taiyan. Through his strong connections with Zhu Yongjia, Jiang managed to access the Beijing Library's collection of Zhang's original manuscripts.⁸⁸ The fruits of this research trip led to an article on two of Zhang's writings published in *Study and Criticism* the following year.⁸⁹ In his later years, Mao fed his intense reading habit with books borrowed from the Beijing Library. Supposedly, the last book Mao read before his death was a fourteen-volume edition of the *Informal Notes of Hong Rongzhai* (容斋随笔) dating to the Ming dynasty and borrowed on 28 August 1976.⁹⁰

⁸³ Liu, "A Yearly Chronology," 43.

⁸⁴ Lei, "The death of Wang Zhongmin."

⁸⁵ "文革期间自杀的文化名人都有哪些?" [Which famous intellectuals committed suicide during the Cultural Revolution period?]

https://web.archive.org/web/20140120223742/http://news.ifeng.com/history/vp/detail_2010_06/08/15966 70_19.shtml (archived January 20, 2014).

⁸⁶ Li, *Historical Sources*, volume 2, 581; Howard, "Libraries," 54.

⁸⁷ Li, *Historical Sources*, volume 2, 601.

⁸⁸ Zhu with Zhu, *The Inside Story*, 63-64.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 64. For the article, see Chen Pu 沈濮, "《秦献记》和《秦政记》的写作年代" [The Intellectual Era of *A Record of Qin Governance* and *A Record of the Qin's Contribution*]. *Study and Criticism* no. 6 (1975):70-71.

⁹⁰ Xu Zhongyuan 徐中远, 毛泽东晚年读书纪实 [*Mao Zedong's Reading in his Later Years*] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2012), 395.

Access to special materials, more generally, reflected a patron's connections or importance to campaign propaganda production. The Shanghai Library possessed a collection of restricted books accessible only to privileged cardholders from organizations such as Shanghai People's Press, some universities, municipal government departments, and Shanghai's elite propaganda writing groups. By 1975, however, the arrangement had become inundated with abuses of borrower privileges. Some credentialed units had tried to borrow valuable or "reactionary" (反动) materials unconnected to their political work. When a local naval unit, for instance, asked to borrow a copy of the classic romance novel The Plum in the Golden Vase (金 瓶梅), the Shanghai Library declined their request no doubt due to the novel's erotic content. Moreover, while each card could check out fifty volumes, the average user had borrowed double this limit. Most egregiously, editors from Shanghai People's Press working on a new comprehensive encyclopedia possessed 500 items on loan! Finally, many cardholding organizations had overdue books and some returned them damaged. Once again, Shanghai People's Press stood out for having kept hold of a copy of the Six Classics of the Great Tang (大 唐六典) for over three years. The severity of these problems forced the Shanghai Library to introduce an entirely new borrowing system for the restricted books in 1975.91

Although they could not access all library collections, urbanites looking for campaign reading material nonetheless enjoyed access to facilities unmatched in less developed areas. Citizens in the capital could borrow books from the Capital Library (首都图书馆) and, according to *The People's Daily*, Tianjin already had had over 8900 grassroots book rooms and

⁹¹ SMA B244-3-812-11, "上海市文化局革命委员会关于社科参考图书集体外借证使用情况和意见的 报告" [A report from the Shanghai Cultural Bureau Revolutionary Committee concerning information and opinions on use of institutional borrowing cards for social science reference books].

libraries to cater to the city's residents by October 1975.⁹² In Shanghai, the main library's multiple reading rooms – with a total of 1,000 seats – opened from 8.30am to 8pm every day except Friday.⁹³ After the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign began, staff in Shanghai created a special room for examining Legalist materials.⁹⁴ By 1976, a further ten district libraries, along with over 1000 community libraries and reading rooms, supplied Shanghai residents with books.⁹⁵ A reader's card developed by the Shanghai Library allowed Shanghainese to borrow books at any library in the area.⁹⁶

Major cities also had sufficient resources to bring library services to surrounding areas. In the mid-1970s, officials in Shaanxi Province re-organized (整顿) 91 rural book depositories surrounding the provincial capital.⁹⁷ Further south, seven suburban counties around Shanghai operated over 500 work team libraries (大队图书室) by 1974, and in the following year communes in the city's proximate countryside set up so-called "rural book rooms" (农村图书室) providing residents with reading material.⁹⁸ The Shanghai Library even established a travelling

⁹² Howard, "Libraries," 54; "天津市基层图书馆办得好" [Tianjin's grassroots libraries are being run splendidly]. *The People's Daily*, October 9, 1975, 2.

⁹³ Wang, "Impressions," 21; Josephine Fang, "Chinese libraries carry out Chairman Mao's Dictum:
'Serve the People," Wilson Library Bulletin 49, no. 10 (June 1975): 747.

⁹⁴ Wan, "Libraries in the People's Republic of China," 5.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 6. For multiple articles extolling the importance of grassroots libraries for children, see *Wenhui Daily*, July 2, 1975, 3.

⁹⁶ Wang, "Impressions," 21.

⁹⁷ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Shaanxi juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华 书店发展大系·陕西卷(1949-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·陕西卷(1949-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Shaanxi Volume, 1949-2017*] (Xi'an: Shaanxi xinhua chuban chuanmei jituan and Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 2017), 62.

⁹⁸ SMA B167-3-264-22, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于贯彻国家出版事业管理局、商业部《关于 进一步加强农村图书发行工作的意见》的报告" [A report from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee on implementing the National Bureau of Publishing and the Ministry of Commerce's "Opinions on increasing book distribution in rural areas"]; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Shanghai juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Shanghai Volume*, 91.

library (图书流动车) which brought items of interest to nearby places without major library services. At each stop, readers could conveniently borrow and return books.⁹⁹

Recently re-opened university libraries offered one further path to propaganda unique to those living in cities or nearby. At the end of the Mao era, the library at Xi'an Jiaotong University (西安交通大学) was opening daily not only to students but also to Xi'an's work units.¹⁰⁰ During the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, the library assigned space for technology students to read philosophy, history and poetry.¹⁰¹ In Beijing, the main library at Peking University kept current political titles on open stacks for ease of use.¹⁰² Members of the Liangxiao group, tasked with producing many important campaign polemics, enjoyed special library borrowing privileges whereby the library would deliver any books they requested to their door.¹⁰³ As a sign of the library's importance to the university, Peking University's leadership financed an expansive new building opened in 1975 (figure 4.8). Modern and imposing, the 24,500 meter-square space included 31 reading rooms and 2400 seats, as well as accommodating all materials from department libraries in one centralized collection.¹⁰⁴ One specialized reading room included history books, political study materials and complete runs of periodicals to cater to students and faculty needs.¹⁰⁵ Patrons could even borrow restricted titles if teachers had set them as assigned reading for classes.¹⁰⁶ University libraries thus stood at the core of campus

⁹⁹ "革命图书送亲人" [Sending revolutionary books to close friends]. *Wenhui Daily*, August 18, 1975, 4. ¹⁰⁰ Barclay, "China: Libraries 'Serve the People,'" 59.

¹⁰¹ Goldberg, "Libraries and Mass Communication," 65.

¹⁰² Howard, "Libraries," 57.

¹⁰³ Yue and Wakeman, *To the Storm*, 324.

¹⁰⁴ Zou and Shi, *A Record of Key Events*, 224; Richnell and Nelson, "Libraries in the People's Republic of China," 15; Howard, "Libraries," 57.

¹⁰⁵ Frances Wood, "Peking University Library," *Focus on International and Comparative Librarianship* 7, no. 3 (1976): 27.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

political activities, supplying the information necessary for students and members of the public to learn the vitriolic lines of anti-Confucianism.



Figure 4.8: Peking University's new library opened in 1975.¹⁰⁷

With the campaign's emphasis on grassroots research, libraries could not be stuffy intellectual fiefdoms. As explored in Chapter Three, state rhetoric put a premium on the masses – rather than scholars – researching Confucianism, Legalism and Chinese history. *The People's Daily* called in July 1974 for "breaking the independent kingdom of capitalist intellectuals" (打 破资产阶级知识分子的一统天下) and "liberating history from the classrooms of the historians" (让历史从历史学家的课堂里解放出来).¹⁰⁸ Before the campaign began, the central government had already affirmed that libraries needed to serve as propaganda institutions, and now state media spun libraries as accessible, welcoming spaces where people could acquire

¹⁰⁷ Image source: Beijing shi difang zhi, *Beijing Gazetteer (Culture and Art Volume)*, front matter for libraries section.

¹⁰⁸ Zhonggong huazhong shifan xueyuan zhongwen xi zhibu 中共华中师范学院中文系支部,"工农兵教师大有作为" [Worker, peasant and soldier teachers are extremely successful]. *The People's Daily*, July 27, 1974, 3; "'这是历史赋予咱工人阶级的使命'" [This is a mission given to us working classes by history]. *The People's Daily*, July 31, 1974, 1-2.

knowledge and participate in campaign events.¹⁰⁹ As always, *The People's Daily* led the chorus of optimism. Reporting on Tianjin's May Seventh Cadre School highlighted how school librarians both eviscerated the idea that librarianship should support 'detached scholarly research' and rejected all 'fetishization of collections.'" (图书资料组的同志,在批林整风和批 林批孔运动中,狠批图书资料工作为"纯学术研究"服务、"资料神秘论"). The same staff apparently established a small campaign library and helped school members find material for annotating the Han dynasty *Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron* (盐铁论).¹¹⁰ Other stories described how Yangzhou's librarians developed an index system to help grassroots researchers of Legalism, as well as how staff at the Shaanxi Normal University Library compiled a catalogue of their Legalist text collections and set up a new reading room to house Legalist materials.¹¹¹

Provincial newspapers echoed the above vision of user-friendly and politically active libraries. *The Xinjiang Daily*, for example, informed readers that the region's main library in Urumqi was reinvigorated by the campaign and committed to serving the people.¹¹² *Wenhui Daily* recounted how the library at a local medical college instituted a special section for campaign books and devised an index of relevant materials.¹¹³ Furthermore, an adulatory article in *Wenhui Daily* painted the Shanghai Library as a hub for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign in the municipality. Apparently, staff thematically indexed campaign newspaper

¹¹⁰ "表扬先进鼓舞干劲" [Praise advances and celebrate vigor]. *The People's Daily*, March 16, 1975, 3. ¹¹¹ "紧密配合努力作战" [Closely stay in step and energetically wage war]. *The People's Daily*,

¹⁰⁹ Li, *Historical Sources*, volume 2, 581.

December 11, 1974, 3; "陕西师大用马克思主义观点研究法家著作批判儒家的书" [Shaanxi Normal University uses a Marxist perspective to research Legalist texts and criticize Confucian works]. *The People's Daily*, July 11, 1974, 1.

¹¹² "建立工人文艺评论队伍" [Build a cohort of workers studying culture and art from a theoretical perspective]. *The Xinjiang Daily*, February 18, 1975, 3.

¹¹³ "中医学院图书工作为当前斗争服务" [Librarians at the College of Chinese Medicine are serving the present-day struggle]. *Wenhui Daily*, June 18, 1974, 2.

articles and lectured on the Confucian-Legalist struggle to over 50,000 attendees. Not to be outdone, the special collections librarians brought texts out of storage for workers, peasants and soldiers to use. Among the beneficiaries were workers from a famous local model unit researching the Confucian *Classic for Girls* (女儿经).¹¹⁴

As with the discourses of reading covered earlier, photographs and drawings told the same powerful story as text. On 6 August 1974, Wenhui Daily reported how students from a local middle school had worked industriously at the Shanghai Library looking through historical materials, with staff even remaining after the reading rooms had closed to let them finish transcribing.¹¹⁵ The accompanying photograph (figure 4.9) showed the students working industriously and comfortably in a busy reading room with ample resources to hand. Other pictures (figures 4.10 and 4.11 being two typical examples) showed well-stocked, wellcatalogued and well-attended smaller libraries. The trompe l'oeil in figure 4.11 – where the librarian appears to invite the viewer to take a book and read – is a particularly clever example of how visual media bridged the gap between libraries and readers. Huang Qingqi's We Learn Through Practice, Not Through Theory (figure 4.12) captures a library space which welcomes both genders, various classes, and all ages. Visitors earnestly scour the shelves for some new propaganda reading material, while in the background a friendly librarian is on hand to help patrons with their queries. All these figures exhorted libraries to prioritize everyday users and encouraged readers to interact with library spaces.

¹¹⁴ "搞好图书资料供应" [Perfect book distribution]. *Wenhui Daily*, July 25, 1974, 1. ¹¹⁵ "图书馆里的战斗" [The war inside the library]. *Wenhui Daily*, August 6, 1974, 3.



Figure 4.9: Middle school students in a reading room at the Shanghai Library.¹¹⁶



Figure 4.10: attendees of a county May Seventh Cadre School reading and studying in the library.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Image source: *Wenhui Daily*, August 6, 1974, 3.
¹¹⁷ Image source: *Minorities Pictorial* no. 5 (1974), 27.



Figure 4.11: An idealized drawing of a grassroots library.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Image source: Lao Rugen (劳汝根), "Run a Successful Culture Room and Occupy the Battlefield of Ideology and Culture" (办好文化室占领思想文化阵地), *Story-Book Magazine* no. 15 (December 1974), 5.



Figure 4.12: Huang Qingqi (黄清琪), We Learn Through Practice, Not Through Theory (实践中来), 1973.¹¹⁹

While rural library services inevitably trailed behind urban ones, media discourses crafted identical images of libraries irrespective of location. Images, in particular, idealized rural book rooms as well-supplied, bustling communal spaces where people of all ages and backgrounds could collectively throw themselves into politics. *The Production Team's Library* (figure 4.13),

¹¹⁹ Image source: Guowuyuan wenhua zu meishu zuopin zhengji xiaozu 国务院文化组美术作品征集小组, ed., 1973 年《全国连环画、中国画展览》中国画选集 [Selected Artwork from the 1973 'National Exhibition of Comic-Books and Chinese Painting'] (Beijing: Renmin meishu chubanshe, 1974), 5.

part of a widely-publicized group of paintings attributed to farmers from Hu county, is a good example.¹²⁰ In the image, a varied cast of characters read, study and listen. Community is everything – nobody sits in a corner reading alone. This rural library enjoys a plentiful supply of reading material, and the sheer number of different covers and genres on offer suggests a vibrant publishing industry and reliable distribution network. Here, reading and studying are also engrained parts of everyday life. The clock on the wall and the scene outside the window show that the time is 7:50 in the morning, and yet people are already in the library before they go about their day. Not even the mother with the baby has opted out.



Figure 4.13: Zhao Kunhan (赵坤汉), The Production Team's Library (大队图书室).121

¹²⁰ The painting appears as image 66 in Shaanxi renmin chubanshe 陕西人民出版社, ed., 户县农民画选

集 [Selected Paintings by the Peasants of Hu County] (Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1974).

¹²¹ Image source: University of Westminster Records and Archives, London, UK, reference CPC-1-H-079.

Multiple examples show that libraries stepped up to the task of spurring on the campaign. In 1974, the Beijing Library ran a series of seminars on themes such as the place of women in Confucian teaching.¹²² Likewise, the Beijing Capital Library also offered talks on Confucianism.¹²³ In Wuhan, a children's library served as an exhibition space for anti-Confucian placards, while librarians from a community library (街道图书馆) in Shanghai boasted to colleagues that around 300 people had come to each of their campaign-themed lectures in 1974.¹²⁴ Librarians also penned materials for publication elsewhere. For example, personnel from one of Shanghai's district libraries authored a *Wenhui Daily* piece extolling the involvement of the masses in book editing and publishing.¹²⁵ Staff at the Beijing Library compiled a draft collection of historical materials on anti-Confucian movements in Chinese history. After the library had circulated the text to other organizations for feedback, Beijing People's Press published it under the title *An Introductory Anthology of Sources on the Working People's Historical Struggles Against Confucianism* (历代劳动人民反孔斗争史料简编).¹²⁶ By politicizing librarians and libraries, the state swelled its capacity to wage war on Confucianism.

¹²² Goldberg, "Libraries and Mass Communication," 64.

¹²³ Howard, "Libraries," 54.

¹²⁴ Goldberg, "Libraries and Mass Communication," 66; SMA B172-3-128-102, "上海市长宁区周家桥 街道图书馆关于区、县街道图书馆工作经验交流会的材料——在批林批孔运动中充分发挥图书馆 的战斗作用" [Fully weaponize libraries during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign: materials written by the Zhoujiaqiao grassroots library in Changning District, Shanghai, for presentation at the meeting of county and grassroots libraries to exchange experiences of library work].

¹²⁵ Luwan qu tushuguan gongren pinglun zu 卢湾区图书馆工人评论组,"群众审书是'多此一举'吗?" [Is having the masses edit books really 'unnecessary'?]. Wenhui Daily, May 18, 1974, 2.

¹²⁶ Beijing tushuguan 北京图书馆, ed., 历代劳动人民反孔斗争资料初稿 [A Draft Collection of Sources on the Working People's Historical Struggles Against Confucianism] ([Beijing?]: np., 1974); Beijing tushuguan 北京图书馆 and Beijing daxue lishi xi "li dai laodong renmin fan kong douzheng shiliao jianbian" xuanbian xiaozu 北京大学历史系 《历代劳动人民反孔斗争史料简编》选编小组, eds., 历代劳动人民反孔斗争史料简编 [An Introductory Anthology of Sources on the Working People's Historical Struggles Against Confucianism] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1975).

Like their peers in other countries, librarians also took steps to guard against thieves squirreling away communal collections. To deter the light fingered, libraries today still commonly stamp or mark pages in their books, making volumes more conspicuous if stolen or not returned. Stamping frequently appears in books from this period, suggesting that China's librarians worried about the threat posed by thieves. For example, my copy of Zhao Jibin's *A Discussion of Whether Confucius Killed Shao Zhengmao* bears a library's stamp on its front cover, back cover, title page and 21st page.¹²⁷ Anyone stealing the book to pass it off as their own would have to dismember it to remove the stamps. Similarly, a middle school in Beijing stamped its copies of two annotated Legalist texts on their fifteenth page, indicating that they followed this practice as a rule.¹²⁸ Of course, libraries resorted to punitive measures for those who did not return loaned books. As a case in point, the library in Baoshan (宝山) county withdrew borrowing rights for anyone keeping overdue books for a total of forty days or more in a year, and also revoked privileges for those failing to return books on time four or more times in per annum.¹²⁹

In addition to acting as campaign centers and guarding communal collections, libraries assisted with the extensive amount of information management required to orchestrate a political campaign. Like publishers, some libraries printed their own in-house publications, providing

¹²⁸ Guangzhou tielu ju Guangzhou fen ju, Guangzhou gongju chang, Guangdong sheng jun qu, Zhongshan daxue Wang Anshi shiwen zhushi zu 广州铁路局广州分局、广州工具厂、广东省军区、中山大学 王 安石诗文注释组, 王安石诗文选注 [Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose by Wang Anshi]

¹²⁷ Zhao, *A Discussion* (Neimenggu renmin chubanshe). This book was reprinted from flongs provided by People's Press.

⁽Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1975); "Liu Yuxi shiwen xuanzhu" bianji zu 《刘禹锡诗文选注》, 刘禹锡诗文选注 [Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose by Liu Yuxi] (Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1975).

¹²⁹ See the library card holder in my copy of Renmin wenxue chubanshe 人民文学出版社, 我们都是小 闯将 [*We Are All Little Pathbreakers*] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1974).

staff and locals with pertinent reading material. The Henan Provincial Library (河南省图书馆) put together a series called *The Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Album* (批林批孔专辑), with one sample volume collating together accounts of Confucius' life as well as stories of Legalists who criticized Confucianism. The library of a middle school in southwest Henan owned at least three copies of this volume, suggesting that the provincial library's publications were circulated and used widely.¹³⁰ In Shanxi, the provincial library (山西省图书馆) published biographies of Legalists for ordinary people's reference.¹³¹ Even before the campaign began properly, a city library in Shandong province released a volume of Lu Xun's criticisms of Confucius to coincide with the growing nationwide tide of anti-Confucianism.¹³²

But beyond this publishing, libraries also helped a broad audience navigate the huge amount of campaign material being printed across the country. As previously discussed, the National Copyright Library – controlled by the NBP – edited the monthly periodical *New Books Nationwide*.¹³³ A small part of the magazine's work involved carrying publisher advertisements and disseminating bibliographical information on classical novels such as *Dream of the Red Chamber* and *Water Margin*.¹³⁴ For the most part, however, editors devoted space in each edition to listing all specimen copies received by the National Copyright Library from presses in the

¹³⁰ Henan sheng tushuguan 河南省图书馆, ed., 批林批孔专辑第九辑 [*The Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Album, Part 9*] ([Zhengzhou?]: np.: 1974). My collection includes three copies.

¹³¹ Shanxi sheng tushuguan 山西省图书馆, ed., 法家代表人物和进步思想家 [*Exemplary Legalist Figures and Progressive Thinkers*] ([Taiyuan?]: np.: [1974?]).

¹³² Shandong shifan xueyuan zhongwen xi 山东师范学院中文系, ed., 鲁迅批判孔子 [Lu Xun Criticizes Confucius] (Ji'nan: np., 1973).

¹³³ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 468; Liu Gao 刘杲 and Shi Feng 石峰, eds., 新中国 出版五十年纪事 [*A Record of Publishing in Fifty Years of New China*] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1999), 140-141.

¹³⁴ "《红楼梦》版本简介" [An introduction to the different editions of *Dream of the Red Chamber*]. *New Books Nationwide* no. 5 (1975), 52-53. This article was first printed in 光明日报 [*Guangming Daily*] in March 1975; "《水浒》版本简介" [An introduction to the different editions of *Water Margin*]. *New Books Nationwide* no. 10 (1975), 90-91.

preceding month.¹³⁵ State guidelines directed that publishers send three copies of all new books to the copyright library for cataloguing and storage, and publishers also sent in quarterly front-catalogue lists.¹³⁶ *New Books Nationwide* thus allowed subscribers to see the range of material released across the country and identify books of interest. As a possible marker of the periodical's importance, the editors of *New Books Nationwide* refreshed its design in time for the first issue of 1976, doubling the page size and making sections clearer.¹³⁷

A regular index run by Peking University Library helped people track the campaign's progress in state media and locate authoritative discussions of particular ideological points. A typical issue of *An Index of Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign Materials in Domestic Media* (国内报刊批林批孔资料索引) collated the titles and authors of articles from dozens of newspapers, magazines and academic journals nationwide. At first, the library used mimeographing to produce scratch volumes, but from May 1974 it switched to letterpress printing, creating a more professional, authoritative-looking final product. Stamps on many of the volumes in my collection show that copies of the index were used at least as far as Guangxi Province in south China. Through the volumes, we can also see how Peking University asserted from the outset its indispensability to campaign information management. At first, the library published the index under the title *An Index of Materials in Domestic Media Criticizing Confucius* (国内报刊批孔资料索引), but from February 1974 (issue fourteen) they adopted the new name. The back covers of issues fourteen to eighteen, however, are made from paper sheets

¹³⁵ New Books Nationwide no. 2 (1975), 60.

¹³⁶ Wang, "Report of Visit," A172; Wang, "Impressions," 19. For an example of how publishers reported their activities, see SMA B167-3-331-3, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于报送 1975 年报纸出版统计年报、杂志出版统计年报、图书出版统计年报等的报告" [A report from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee detailing annual publication data for newspapers, magazines, and books]. ¹³⁷ New Books Nationwide no. 1 (1976), 1.

printed with the old name, suggesting that the library ordered pre-printed covers for many issues in advance (figure 4.14).¹³⁸ Its unwillingness to waste any paper provides fortuitous evidence of the library's long-term desire to comprehensively accumulate information about the campaign as soon as it started..




Figure 4.14: Left: the front cover of volume 14; right: the inside back cover of volume 14. Contrasting the two, observe how the pre-printed cover of volume 14 bearing the old name has been recycled as the back cover.¹³⁹

The campaign enervated even from libraries' most academic, specialized cataloguing work. With their special collections intact, numerous provincial and university libraries produced new enumerative bibliographies of classical Chinese texts and historical sources. At the August 1974 national conference on publishing Legalist texts in Beijing (see Chapter Two), each

¹³⁸ Beijing daxue tushuguan 北京大学图书馆, ed., 国内报刊批孔资料索引 [An Index of Materials in Domestic Media Criticizing Confucius], numbers 11-13 (Beijing: np., 1973-1974); Beijing daxue tushuguan 北京大学图书馆, ed., 国内报刊批林批孔资料索引 [An Index of Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign Materials in Domestic Media], numbers 14-18 and 33-39 (Beijing: np., 1974-1975). ¹³⁹ Image source: Beijing daxue tushuguan, An Index of Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius, no. 14, front cover and back inside cover.

provincial and municipal delegation brought with them a catalogue of Legalist texts, and Wang Zhongmin eventually used these catalogues and other library collections to compile his *Integrated Catalogue of Rare and Unusual Legalist Text Editions* (法家著作稀见本联合目录) covering 29 libraries.¹⁴⁰ On a regional level, the Shanghai Library, for example, compiled the Joint Catalogue of Classical Chinese Books (中国古书联合目录) listing pre-1912 publications, while Zhongshan Library in Guangdong Province (广东省中山图书馆) released a catalogue of the Legalist texts held in its collections.¹⁴¹ Not to be outdone, in 1975 the library of the Central Minorities Institute (中央民族学院) finished its four-volume Catalogue of Writings, Biographies and Research Materials Relating to Legalists and Progressive Thinkers (历代法家 和进步思想家著作、传记及其研究资料目录.¹⁴² Before his death, the industrious Wang Zhongmin also led a team of students at Peking University working on a Synopsis of Legalist Writings and Publications (法家著作书目提要) to assist worker-peasant-soldiers and publishers.¹⁴³ In this capacity, Wang enlisted scholars to help him look for Legalist texts housed at the Shanghai Library.¹⁴⁴ All this cataloguing culminated with calls from Zhou Enlai in October 1975 for librarians and scholars to "produce a national catalogue of rare books as soon as possible" (要尽快地把全国善本书总目编出来). In the context of the campaign, Zhou thus

¹⁴⁰ Wang, Essays Marking, 474-475.

¹⁴¹ Wang, "Impressions," 20; Guangdong sheng Zhongshan tushuguan 广东省中山图书馆, ed., 馆藏法 家著作目录 [*A Catalogue of Legalist Texts in Library Collections*] ([Zhongshan?]: Guangdong sheng Zhongshan tushuguan, 1974) (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com).

¹⁴² A copy of the full catalogue is housed at the Hoover Institution. See collection 2002C15, "Zhongguo gong chan dang issuances," box 25.

¹⁴³ Liu, "A Yearly Chronology," 43; Wang, *Essays Marking*, 475-476.

¹⁴⁴ Shen Jin 沈津, ed., 顾廷龙年谱 [A Chronology of the Life of Gu Tinglong] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2004), 584.

fired the starting gun on a project that would continue into the post-Mao era and involve senior librarians and veteran scholars.¹⁴⁵

In the late Mao era, therefore, libraries and their staff manned the front line of politics. As libraries reopened and expanded, they protected, managed and disseminated information connected to anti-Confucianism. Access to libraries varied according to location and social position, but all libraries variously acted as local campaign satellites. In this role, they supported grassroots activities, facilitated people's access to pertinent resources, and extended the state's reach into everyday life. As the next section reveals, bookstores fulfilled many of the same functions, and together these two types of institution – one loaning propaganda, one selling access to it – lay at the heart of political communication in 1970s China.

Retailing Revolution: Bookstores and Booksellers as Propaganda Agents

The story of bookstores between the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and Mao's death follows the same arc as libraries. Factional struggle in the second half of the 1960s interrupted the operations of many city and county bookstores.¹⁴⁶ In August 1966, as Beijing's Red Guards set to attacking the "four olds," they went to branches of the state-owned Xinhua Bookstore chain and withdrew over 6000 titles from sale. These included many books on history, law, and philosophy.¹⁴⁷ Three years later, with the publishing industry swiftly becoming irrelevant, all staff working at Xinhua's national headquarters (新华书店总店) were rusticated to Hubei province along with colleagues from Xinhua's Beijing Distribution Center (北京发行

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 587-591.

¹⁴⁶ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 381.

¹⁴⁷ "Beijing chuban shi zhi" bianji bu, *Gazzetteer of Publishing in Beijing: Part 6*, 203.

所).¹⁴⁸ Likewise, in September 1969, all but 27 members of staff working for Xinhua in Shanghai left for the countryside.¹⁴⁹ More broadly, in 1969 unlucky Xinhua staff in every province were sent to the countryside, forcing bookstores to either close or continue with a skeleton operation.¹⁵⁰

Xinhua's nadir also marked the beginning of its resurgence. Alongside publishing houses and libraries, bookstores returned to prominence in the early 1970s as the energy of the early Cultural Revolution years subsided and demand for books returned. By the end of 1972, cadres from Xinhua's headquarters and the Beijing Distribution Center had resumed their duties in the capital.¹⁵¹ In the same year, Xinhua employed almost 46,000 people nationwide – around 37 percent more than in 1965.¹⁵² Over the following four years, Xinhua would expand its network to include 4,702 retail branches and small book stands (书亭). While less than the 5776 it operated in 1961, this figure far surpassed the 3,911 retail points run by the chain just before the Cultural Revolution began.¹⁵³ Moreover, between 1965 and 1975, Xinhua almost doubled the number of books it sold to 3.53 billion per year.¹⁵⁴

Urbanites, as expected, enjoyed access to more extensive bookstore networks than their rural counterparts, and during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign these facilities

¹⁴⁸ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 380.

¹⁴⁹ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Shanghai juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Shanghai Volume*, 83.

¹⁵⁰ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 380.

¹⁵¹ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 168.

¹⁵² Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 470.

¹⁵³ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Zongdian juan (1937-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新 华书店发展大系·总店卷(1937-2017)》编纂委员会, ed., 中国新华书店发展大系·总店卷(1937-

^{2017) [}*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Headquarters Volume, 1937-2017*] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1997), 306; Xinhua shudian zongdian shi bianji weiyuanhui 新华书店总店史编辑委员会,新华书店总店史 [*A History of the Xinhua Bookstore Headquarters*] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996), 478.

¹⁵⁴ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 284.

continued expanding. Beijing municipality, as the center of political power, had approximately one hundred bookstores by the middle of the 1970s.¹⁵⁵ It also boasted China's largest bookstore located on Wangfujing Street near to the Forbidden City. After almost one million *yuan* of investment, the imposing store opened in 1970 complete with six floors and 3,600 square meters of retail space, and management even laid on special late opening hours to accommodate workers shopping after their shift.¹⁵⁶ As for Shanghai, it possessed 44 bookstores and 43 book stands by 1975.¹⁵⁷ These key cities also had the budgets to develop new Xinhua spaces. In 1975, for instance, Beijing's municipal government allocated 25,000 *yuan* for a new Xinhua branch in the Shijingshan (石景山) district. The new store would both replace the existing unsafe structure and expand book distribution to this developing part of the city.¹⁵⁸ By 1976, Xinhua Bookstore's Shanghai division had grand aspirations to build new outlets or refurnish existing bookstores in over two-dozen locations. It also wished to build a new 15-20,000-square meter distribution warehouse close to the city's recently built rail transport hub.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Beijing juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华 书店发展大系·北京卷(1949-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·北京卷(1949-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Beijing Volume, 1949-2017*] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 2017), 62-65.

¹⁵⁶ "Xinhua shudian liushi nian," *A Record of Sixty Years*, 227; David Keightley, "Bookstores in China," *Early China* 1 (Fall 1975): 4.

¹⁵⁷ SMA B167-3-279-19, "上海人民出版社基本情况介绍(修改稿)" [A summary of the general situation at Shanghai People's Press (revised draft)].

¹⁵⁸ BMA 201-2-168, "北京市出版办公室关于基建任务的请示、报告和批复" [Requests for instructions, reports, and replies from the Beijing Publishing Office concerning essential development]; BMA 201-2-124, "北京市计委下达 1974 年基建任务的通知和北京市出版办公室关于基建项目的请示" [A notice from the Beijing Municipal Planning Committee concerning essential construction for 1974, as well as requests for instructions from the Beijing Publishing Office concerning essential development].

¹⁵⁹ SMA B167-3-324, "人民出版社关于《城市改造规划中出版、发行的设想》" [A document from Shanghai People's Press concerning "Matters in the municipal reform plan relating to publishing and book distribution"].

The expanding network of urban bookstores fulfilled roles as thriving political and social spaces serving the people. Overall, photographs from the 1970s present bookstores as bustling, with everyday people buying and reading books. Staged or not, these images show the kind of customer experiences bookstore managers tried to facilitate in their branches. Figure 4.15, for instance, shows a Beijing bookstore resplendent with well-stocked shelves and political slogans. Dozens of customers queue to buy books, with some already reading to pass the time. Comfortable in the space, the masses signal the connection between the state retailer of propaganda and the people. Another picture, this time of a reading room attached to a Xinhua branch in Shanghai (figure 4.16), clearly demarks bookstores as not just retail environments but also places where people can spend time reading, studying and learning. Again, the quantity of people shows that bookstores serve the many, not the few. Bookstores here are extensions of community life and, ultimately, agents of mass communication. In this sense, they paralleled the accessible, democratizing feel of big-box and mall consumer bookstores which emerged in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century.¹⁶⁰



Figure 4.15: A Xinhua bookstore in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ For more on the growth of American chain bookstores, see Striphas, *The Late Age of Print*.

¹⁶¹ Image source: "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Beijing juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Beijing Volume*, 4.



Figure 4.16: Captioned "A new bookstore climate" (书店气象新), this photograph shows the expanded reading room at the East Nanjing Road branch of Xinhua Bookstore in Shanghai.¹⁶²

Even if it could never match urban areas, rural book supply grew commensurate with the state's increasing concern that the countryside was being left behind. Two months before the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign began, the central government pressed the publishing industry to provide more books to rural areas, citing logistical difficulties, poor management and a general lack of enthusiasm as the problems hampering progress.¹⁶³ Across China, provinces invested significant effort in the first half of the 1970s expanding the supply channels bringing books to people (figure 4.17). In Inner Mongolia, after the number of sites selling books contracted to a record low in 1969, the subsequent years saw generally healthy increases in the number of grassroots book retailers.¹⁶⁴ Westwards in Tibet, by the end of 1974

¹⁶² Image source: *Wenhui Daily*, May 18, 1974, 2.

¹⁶³ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 166.

¹⁶⁴ "Neimenggu zizhi qu xinhua shudian zhi," *The Gazzetteer of Inner Mongolia's Xinhua Bookstores*, 470.

the number of Xinhua branches had risen to 67, providing sufficient coverage to fulfill the needs of the region.¹⁶⁵ Finally, in Shanxi, the province employed 308 rural travelling booksellers (农村 流供) in 1972 – 106 more than in 1971.¹⁶⁶ Overall, by 1975 Xinhua's total distribution network (图书发行网点) – including all entities from retail stores and book stands down to commune general stores and travelling carts – numbered one hundred thousand organizations. Curiously, this figure is actually 14,000 less than for 1970, complicating the picture of post-1969 expansion outlined above. Much more importantly, however, when we compare this number to the 1965 equivalent, we find that the Xinhua network doubled in numerical size during the Cultural Revolution.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Xizang juan (1951-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华 书店发展大系·西藏卷(1951-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·西藏卷(1951-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Tibet Volume, 1951-2017*] (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 2017), 26-27.

¹⁶⁶ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Shanxi juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华 书店发展大系·山西卷(1949-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·山西卷(1949-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Shanxi Volume, 1949-2017*] (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 2017), 43.

¹⁶⁷ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 284.



Figure 4.17: A montage of images showing rural bookselling.¹⁶⁸

In the same way that they funded suburban libraries, some larger cities could also devote resources to bookselling in their surrounding countryside. Shanghai is an excellent case in point.

¹⁶⁸ Image sources (clockwise from top-left): "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Guangxi juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华书店发展大系·广西卷: 1949-2017》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·广西卷 (1949-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Guangxi Volume, 1949-2017*] (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 2017), 9; *Minorities Pictorial* no. 9 (September 1974), 27; *Minorities Pictorial* no. 6 (June 1976), 6; *The Inner Mongolia Daily*, April 17, 1975, 3.

By 1974, Shanghai's ten suburban counties had 36 branches of Xinhua bookstore (5 more than before the Cultural Revolution) and over 360 co-operatives (供销社) selling books.¹⁶⁹ For the year, Xinhua sold in excess of forty million books and posters in these suburban areas, with these sales far exceeding any from the previous twelve years. By 1976, annual sales had risen to sixty million, helped along by the additional 130 booksellers assigned to work in the suburban countryside between 1970 and 1976.¹⁷⁰ Shanghai's government also expanded provision of books to important factories under its administrative jurisdiction in southern Anhui Province.¹⁷¹ In March 1974, Shanghai People's Press established a warehouse in Anhui's Qingxi (清溪) county manned by Xinhua staff from Shanghai. The warehouse provided books to work unit libraries and organized travelling book carts (流动服务供应). Although the warehouse subsequently passed out of Shanghai's control, this new operation exemplifies the role played by urban organizations as the cores of much larger geographic areas. Nor is it an isolated example: Shanghai's Xinhua bookstores had supply arrangements with other industrial bases close to the city too.¹⁷²

While bookstores turned propaganda readers into propaganda owners, they increased their effectiveness precisely became they book ownership did not become a prerequisite for reading. As already shown in figure 4.16, some bookstores ran library-style reading rooms where

¹⁷⁰ Zhang Zemin 张泽民 and Ren Junda 任俊达, eds., 风雨砥砺四十春秋: 上海新华书店简史 1949年-1989年 [Forty Years Refined by Wind and Rain: An Introductory History of Xinhua Bookstore in Shanghai, 1949-1989] (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaotong daxue chubanshe, 1993), 243.

¹⁶⁹ SMA B167-3-264-22.

¹⁷¹ SMA B167-3-264, "人民出版社关于图书、年月发行供应问题的报告及上海市革委会文教组的意见" [Reports from Shanghai People's Press concerning book distribution and yearly distribution problems, with replies and viewpoints from the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee Culture and Education Group].

¹⁷² SMA B167-3-309-10, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于上海市属各基地,外地农场图书供应问题的情况汇报" [A report from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee concerning book distribution in farms under municipal control].

customers could browse materials off the shelf. In addition, bookstores in some parts of the country allowed customers to rent books from the store for a modest sum (figure 4.18). Scattered evidence shows that a significant number of readers accessed books in this way. In the capital, Xinhua's flagship bookstore on Wangfujing street began renting books in March 1973, and by the end of the following year Beijing possessed 455 points where books could be rented. These points made tens of thousands of loans, charging between 0.05 and 0.1 *yuan* per day per title.¹⁷³ In Tianjin, renting started began in March 1974, with local television and newspapers advertising the service. Across the city and suburbs, 32 retail outlets lending books made 490,000 loans.¹⁷⁴ Over the whole of 1975, book distributors across the Guangxi Autonomous Region issued 2.65 million loans, and by June 1976, Zhejiang province had 39 bookstores and over 800 smaller rural co-operative stores making several hundred thousand book loans per month.¹⁷⁵ The publishing industry took pride in the renting system, trumpeting news of the services in May 1975's *New Books Nationwide*.¹⁷⁶ Targeting those who could not afford books or did not want to buy them, renting offered another path through which the state could get eyes on the printed page.

¹⁷⁵ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Guangxi juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Guangxi Volume, 1949-2017*, 121; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Zhejiang juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华书店发展大系·浙江卷(1949-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·浙江卷(1949-2017)[*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Zhejiang Volume (1949-2017)*] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2017), 87.

¹⁷³ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Beijing juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Beijing Volume*, 61-62.

¹⁷⁴ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Tianjin juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui《中国新华 书店发展大系·天津卷(1949-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·天津卷(1949-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Tianjin Volume, 1949-2017*] (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2017), 128-129, 131-132.

¹⁷⁶ "各地新华书店供销社开展租书借阅工作" [Bookstores and commune stores in different areas begin book rent-read activities]. *New Books Nationwide* no. 5 (1975), back cover.



Figure 4.18: A photograph from 1974 showing a shelf of books available for rent in an Anhui bookstore.¹⁷⁷

Similarly, Xinhua supported efforts by local governments to distribute books free-ofcharge to target audiences. As 1974 drew to a close, Xinhua Bookstore's Xinjiang division gifted a consignment of books (including some Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign titles and books in Uyghur and Kazak) to troops stationed in the Xinjiang Military Region (新疆军区). Xinhua's national headquarters covered the cost of this political generosity.¹⁷⁸ In Shanghai, between April and July 1974 the city sent 750,000 books to rusticated youth and to the municipality's suburban counties. The titles, ranging in genre from politics to literature and farming, were provided to furnish communal rural reading rooms where they could reach as

¹⁷⁷ Image source: "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Anhui juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华书店发展大系·安徽卷 (1949-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·安徽卷 (1949-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Anhui Volume, 1949-2017*] (Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 2017), 3.

¹⁷⁸ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Xinjiang juan (1950-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新 华书店发展大系·新疆卷 (1950-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·新疆卷 (1950-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Xinjiang Volume, 1950-2017*] (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2017), 68.

many readers as possible.¹⁷⁹ Most likely, Xinhua Bookstore took responsibility for sourcing and shipping stock. By September 1974, the municipal government had decided to gift another 2.1 million books to rusticated youth and suburban counties. Besides novels, the title list included anti-Confucianism staples such as the popular *Old Confucius* and *Meng Ke: The Second Boss of the Confucian Shop*.¹⁸⁰ Overall, between May 1974 and September 1976, Shanghai sent almost 6 million books to rusticated youth in the countryside.¹⁸¹

As bookstores devised ways to deliver books into the hands of readers, publishers meanwhile provided Xinhua with stock designed to entice target readerships. In particular, presses considered the needs of rural readers with special series. For the campaign, these "generated the discursive fields through which new systems of thought were configured."¹⁸² Of these, the most important was the *Countryside Books* (农村版图书) imprint overseen by Rural Publications Press (农村读物出版社, a division of People's Press). Between October 1973 and October 1975, a group comprised of Xinhua staff and publishers selected over one hundred titles for reprinting in the *Countryside Books* series, with combined print runs amounting to eighty million volumes. To produce these vast quantities, around ten percent of 1974's book publishing paper was earmarked for printing titles in the series.¹⁸³ National and regional media promoted the imprint in May 1974, drawing attention to already published titles such as *See the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign Through to the End* (把批林批孔斗争进行到底) and *Qin*

¹⁷⁹ SMA B167-3-240-65, "上海人民出版社编辑部编印的《情况交流》1974 年第 11 期" ["The Current Situation," 1974, no. 11, edited by the Shanghai People's Press Editorial Office]. ¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ SMA B167-3-343-24, "上海市革命委员会知识青年上山下乡办公室、上海人民出版社革命委员 会关于继续向下乡青年赠书的请示报告" [A request for instructions written by the Rusticated Youth Office of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee and the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee concerning continuing to send free books to rusticated youth].

¹⁸² Culp, Power of Print, 11.

¹⁸³ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 162-165 and 472.

Shihuang: The Progressive Expert (厚今薄古的专家秦始皇).¹⁸⁴ Other selected titles included bestsellers such as Old Confucius which had originally been published by Shanghai People's Press and subsequently translated into Korean, Mongolian, Uyghur, and Braille.¹⁸⁵ For just Old Confucius alone, Rural Publications Press issued one million copies in a special Countryside Books edition published in July 1974.¹⁸⁶ Coverage of the second batch of titles in the series - including several related to anti-Confucianism - followed in January 1975.¹⁸⁷

Rural Publications Press chose each title's format, price and design to maximize its appeal to readers. Series guidelines chose page and textblock sizes that used paper efficiently and thus reduced the base cost of producing each copy. When deciding cover prices, staff chose the lowest possible price per page and offered bookstores a thirty percent wholesale discount on copies to promote trade orders.¹⁸⁸ Titles had a 'cheap and cheerful' appearance, often numbering under one hundred pages and bearing reasonably engaging front covers (figure 4.19). The stapled bindings and occasional uncut pages in surviving copies make it hard to describe the books as high quality, but press and printers were more interested in disseminating ideas widely than bibliographic finery.¹⁸⁹ Large first printings – 130,000 copies of *The Ugly Posse of Confucians*

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.; "第一批《农村版图书》开始出版" [Publishing for the first batch of *Countryside Books* has begun]. *The Inner Mongolia Daily*, May 24, 1974, 2.

¹⁸⁵ SMA B167-3-295-28, "上海人民出版社少儿读物编辑室关于少儿历史读物出版情况的汇报" [A report from the children's books editorial office at Shanghai People's Press concerning publishing books for children]; Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1974*, 671; Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1975*, 588, 617 and 656.

 ¹⁸⁶ SMA B167-3-295-28; Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1974*, 514.
 ¹⁸⁷ "配合批林批孔运动普及、深入、持久发展的需要" [Meet the needs of spreading, deepening, and extending the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign]. *The People's Daily*, January 2, 1975, 4; "第 二批《农村版图书》陆续出版发行" [Distribution of the second batch of *Countryside Books* continues]. *The Inner Mongolia Daily*, January 3, 1975, 4.

¹⁸⁸ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 164-165.

¹⁸⁹ The uncut pages can be found on Pan Guoji 潘国基 and Wei Nong 卫农, 孔门群丑 [*The Ugly Posse of Confucians*] (Beijing: Nongcun duwu chubanshe, 1976), 73-80 and 83-86. The other three titles are: Nongcun duwu chubanshe 农村读物出版社, ed., 怒涛浓浓——批林批孔说唱选 [*The Angry Torrent: Selected Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Performances*] (Beijing: Nongcun duwu chubanshe, 1974);

(孔门群丑) and 215,000 of *The Three Character Classic of the Struggle Between Confucianism* and Legalism (儒法斗争三字文) – provided ample stock for booksellers.¹⁹⁰



Figure 4.19: Four of the Countryside Books.¹⁹¹

Nongcun duwu chubanshe 农村读物出版社, 把批林批孔的斗争去进行到底 [Continue the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign Through to the End] (Beijing: Nongcun duwu chubanshe, 1974); Hebei sheng Jing xian Dongguzhuang da dui pinxiazhongnong lilun zu 河北省景县董故庄大队贫下中 农理论组, 儒法斗争三字文 [The Three Character Classic of the Struggle Between Confucianism] (Beijing: Nongcun duwu chubanshe, 1976).

¹⁹⁰ Pan and Wei, *The Ugly Posse*, copyright page; Hebei sheng Jing xian, *The Three Character Classic*, copyright page.

¹⁹¹ Image source: these are the front covers of the four books listed two notes previously.

Series curated by provincial presses joined the *Countryside Books* in stocking the shelves of Xinhua's rural distributors. Shanghai People's Press regarded the millions of urban youth rusticated to the countryside as in need of their own reading material.¹⁹² Its *Teach Yourself for Young People* (青年自学丛书) collection, published between 1973 and 1976, featured over twenty political, scientific, social science and humanities titles commissioned for the series.¹⁹³ As indications of its importance, the series garnered front-page coverage in *Wenhui Daily*, while Yao Wenyuan also took a close interest in its content and availability.¹⁹⁴ In 1974, for instance, he ordered Shanghai People's Press to add a history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle to its forthcoming *Teach Yourself* titles.¹⁹⁵ He also objected that the press's plan to print 620,000 copies of each title would not suffice to furnish all people's communes and work teams with copies – a criticism which pushed the press to employ flong-lending to guarantee each title's availability.¹⁹⁶ At the very end of the Mao era, Shanghai People's Press also created the *New Countryside Treasury* (新农村文库), planning 220 titles for release in the coming years to meet

¹⁹² For discussion of the rusticated youth program, see Michel Bonnin, *The Lost Generation: The Rustication of China's Educated Youth (1968–1980)*, trans. Krystyna Horko (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2013).

¹⁹³ Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1974*, 752-753; Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1975*, 741-742; Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1976*, 846.

¹⁹⁴ "上海人民出版社在有关部门的支持下为上山下乡知识青年出版大批读物" [With the support of relevant administrative organs, Shanghai People's Press publishes a large group of books for rusticated youth]. *Wenhui Daily*, December 20, 1974, 1; "介绍一批知识青年上山下乡读物" [Introducing a group of books for rusticated youth]. *Wenhui Daily*, December 21, 1974, 2. For a survey of the series, see Lin Shengbao 林升宝, "上海《青年自学丛书》述评(1973-1975)" [Reviewing Shanghai's *Teach Yourself for Young People* series (1973-1975)], *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu* no. 2 (2015): 85-94.
¹⁹⁵ SMA B167-3-259-3, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于贯彻张春桥、姚文元同志对《青年自学丛书》批示的报告" [A report from Shanghai People's Press regarding implementing directions from Zhang Chunqio and Yao Wenyuan concerning the *Teach Yourself for Young People* series]. The added title was published as Cao Sifeng 曹思峰, 儒法斗争史话 [*Narrating the History of the Confucian-Legalist Struggle*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975).

the needs of rural readers.¹⁹⁷ While political changes after Mao's death killed the project in its infancy, in preceding months editors did manage to republish the best-selling *Old Confucius* in a revised *New Countryside Treasury* edition. Modified in accordance with political changes since 1974, the new edition was re-set and bound with a livelier front cover design.¹⁹⁸ Today, surviving copies evince the state's specialized catering to rural audiences and memorialize the type of publishing that surely would have continued in 1977 and 1978 if not for Mao's death.

Rural-focused publishing also took the form of printed miscellanies appealing to a wide range of residents simultaneously. Guangdong People's Press (广东人民出版社) offered readers an irregularly-published series called *Countryside Culture Room* (农村文化室) which mixed politics, entertainment and leisure. Debuted in early January 1974, each issue included politically-themed performance scripts, comics, songs, pictures and poems to drive propagandizing in rural areas, but the press also included content designed solely to engage reader interest. For example, the second volume issued in March 1974 topped off a steady diet of campaign-themed material with a Chinese chess puzzle at the end.¹⁹⁹ In total, the press published 24 issues up to the end of 1976, and one can imagine each title selling well.²⁰⁰

Despite these attempts to avoid the campaign becoming solely urban, unsatisfactory distribution channels and book shortages undercut progress away from the cities. In the first half of 1974, provision of books to rural residents in Shanghai suffered due to manpower shortages

¹⁹⁷ SMA, B167-3-335-7, "上海人民出版社编辑部关于 1976 年出书工作的报告" [A report from the Shanghai People's Press Editorial Office regarding publishing in 1976].

¹⁹⁸ Luwan qu jiaoshi jinxiu xueyuan "Kong lao er" bianxie zu 卢湾区教师进修学院《孔老二》编写组, ed. 孔老二 [*Old Confucius*]. Revised edition. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1976.

¹⁹⁹ Guangdong renmin chubanshe 广东人民出版社, ed., 农村文化室第2集 [Countryside Culture Room: Collection Number 2] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1974) (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com).

²⁰⁰ Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1976, 183.

and administrative problems.²⁰¹ Two years later, officials continued to report supply-line issues and book shortages on some farms in nearby provinces.²⁰² For Shanghai's *Teach Yourself for Young People* series, although staff found that books enjoyed a glowing welcome (surprise, surprise) when delivered to readers, they could not avoid the less favorable fact that some readers were missing out.²⁰³ As Lin Shengbao records, the number of *Teach Yourself* volumes reaching rusticated youth in nearby regions was simply not enough. Yunnan provincial authorities likewise found that their pre-ordered copies of the *Teach Yourself* titles either failed to arrive or did not satiate grassroots demand.²⁰⁴

Uneven availability of new books constituted part of the broader geographic disparity that I have already charted for libraries. At times, Xinhua deliberately skewed distribution because, like its contemporaries abroad, it knew that not all books appealed to all people in all areas equally. This adds a touch of discernment to the day-to-day operations of the propaganda state. In Beijing municipality, the quantity of a particular title received by each Xinhua branch depended on its content, intended audience, the needs of the store's customers, and the level of educational and economic development in the local area.²⁰⁵ As expected, the flagship branch on Wangfujng street tended to stock a wider range of titles than most other bookstores

²⁰¹ SMA B167-3-264-22.

²⁰² SMA B45-5-428-48, "上海市农业局革命委员会关于要求解决外省三个市属农场图书发行渠道的 函" [A letter from the Shanghai Municipal Agriculture Bureau Revolutionary Committee requesting improvements to book distribution channels for three farms under municipal control located in other provinces].

²⁰³ SMA B167-3-259-3.

²⁰⁴ Lin, "Reviewing Shanghai's *Teach Yourself for Young People* series," 92.

²⁰⁵ BMA 201-1-162, "北京市出版办公室关于对《北京市新华书店图书分配试行办法》等四个方案 的批复和批准试行《新印古籍发行分工试行办法》的通知" [Replies from the Beijing Publishing Office concerning the "Experimental procedures for distributing books among Xinhua Bookstores in Beijing" and three other plans, as well as the office's notice approving the "Experimental procedures for distributing newly-published classical texts in Beijing].

nationwide.²⁰⁶ More generally, on his travels around China in the mid-1970s, Harald Richter noted that larger bookstores stocked both books published locally and titles released elsewhere.²⁰⁷ These observations implicitly suggest that the majority of people had access to only a limited range of material at their bookstore.

Even Xinhua branches in the largest cities sometimes offered patrons a far from comprehensive selection of campaign publications. Shanghai's booksellers found that, in 1974, publishers in other provinces had regularly failed to provide them with copies of new additions to their front catalogues. Therefore, the city received copies of only around half out of the approximately 200 comic books (连环画) published nationwide, and for children's books (少儿 读物) the proportion stood at 40 of 266.²⁰⁸ A couple of years earlier, a librarian from the United States Library of Congress noticed that bookstores in Guangzhou stocked materials released by the local provincial publishing house that could not be found in Shanghai.²⁰⁹ Such stock gaps partly resulted from imbalanced allocation of supplies. In 1976, a bookstore in Beijing sent some new editions of classical texts to bookstores in Lanzhou, Changchun, Ji'nan and Changsha. Beijing was overstocked, while these cities desperately needed copies.²¹⁰ We should therefore recognize that urban bookstores, as agents of state communication, operated most effectively when stock circulated smoothly and Xinhua allocated it appropriately.

²⁰⁶ Wang, "Report of Visit," A173; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Beijing juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Beijing Volume*, 58.

²⁰⁷ Richter, *Publishing*, 14-15.

²⁰⁸ B167-3-309-21, "上海新华书店革命委员会关于拟去部分省、市书店组织书源的请示报告" [A report requesting instructions from the Shanghai Xinhua Bookstore Revolutionary Committee concerning planned trips to some provinces and cities to organize book supply chains for Shanghai]. ²⁰⁹ Wang, "Report of Visit," A170.

²¹⁰ BMA 201-1-297, "北京市出版办公室 1976 年度、月份北京市国营书店汇总会计报表" [Accounting tables from the Beijing Publishing Office regarding the monthly and whole-year performance of Beijing's bookstores for 1976].

For Shanghai, a long-running saga concerning a new Xinhua Bookstore distribution warehouse demonstrates that the state did not always have the infrastructure necessary to support mass communication through print. As of early 1974, Xinhua had two warehouses totaling 13250 square meters for shipping books out of the city. However, increasing book sales, inefficiencies in railway freight, and widening aisles to accommodate forklift trucks together put pressure on space in these buildings. The pressure sometimes forced work to spill over onto the street, and Xinhua had eventually resorted to borrowing local air force barracks and other warehouse space to house stock. Even worse, stacks of Mao's writings now lay piled up in awnings wholly unsuitable for storing books. By the mid-1970s, Xinhua had already spent years cajoling local officials to finance a new space.²¹¹ In 1975, it requisitioned an extra airplane hanger to store books while a further request for 1.9 million yuan of funding went unanswered.²¹² The archives do not indicate that Xinhua received any good news during the rest of the Mao era, and as of January 1976 it continued to borrow over 1000 square meters of storage space from other organizations.²¹³ While all levels of the state recognized the value of books, this value could not supersede the two quotidian barriers of finite resources and a lack of bureaucratic will.

A final piece of evidence – this time a remarkable letter from the Shanghai Municipal Archives – completes my picture of uneven propaganda distribution and its significance for the

²¹¹ SMA B244-3-600-182, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于要求将新华书店仓库排上 1974 年基本 建设预备项目的报告" [A report from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee requesting the addition of a new Xinhua Bookstore warehouse into the budgetary planning for construction work in 1974].

²¹² SMA B244-3-712-79, "上海市革命委员会文教组关于出版系统 1976 年基本建设计划的报告" [A report from the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee regarding planned infrastructure construction for the publishing sector for 1976].

²¹³ SMA B167-3-325-16, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于再次申请扩建新华书店仓库的报告" [A report from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee repeating a request to expand a Xinhua Bookstore warehouse].

Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. The letter's recipient is Xu Jingxian, at the time one of Shanghai's most senior political leaders. The letter's author had the task of organizing campaign study groups in imitation of a model Shanghai factory given national exposure in the press.²¹⁴ Her or his workplace – Meishan Engineering Headquarters (梅山工程指挥部) – was an industrial site near Nanjing, and it possessed a certain political cache having authored a book published by Shanghai People's Press in 1974.²¹⁵ As Xu learnt, progress with study groups had suffered due to an acute shortage of study materials. For instance, bookstores in Jiangsu had sent very few copies of classical text pamphlets published by Zhonghua Books and Shanghai People's Press. When some personnel from Meishan travelled to Shanghai to buy copies retail, they found that supplies of most titles were exhausted. For other anthologies of Legalist texts published in Shanghai, officials had thwarted Meishan's efforts to obtain copies by telling them that books would be sent through non-retail channels even though Meishan lay outside this part of Xinhua's distribution network. Workers had no option besides hand-copying articles, but paper shortages in Jiangsu Province made even this solution unsustainable. For this case, Xu personally intervened to arrange supplies, but most organizations had no such higher political authority to come to their aid.²¹⁶ Alarmingly, a Danish visitor saw books in only one of the three communes that they were shown.²¹⁷ Shortages of reading material in rural areas could clearly

²¹⁴ SMA B167-3-264-93, "梅山工程指挥部读书班周蔡先关于要求组织分配批林批孔学习材料和学 习一些法家著作的情况报告" [A situation report from Zhou Caixian, the organizer of the Meishan Engineering Headquarters Reading Group, requesting that the group be included in organizational distribution of Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign study materials and Legalist study texts]. ²¹⁵ Meishan gongcheng zhihui bu gongren xiezuo zu 梅山工程指挥部工人写作组,矿山的主人 [*The Masters of the Mines*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974) (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com).

²¹⁶ SMA B167-3-264-93.

²¹⁷ Goldberg, "Libraries and Mass Communication," 71.

stunt local campaign activities, forcing the state's vision of a reading nation to come face-to-face with a starker reality.

The Case of the Luonan County Bookstore

Thus far, I have offered general arguments about the availability of books at Xinhua Bookstore. The paper trail of books orders emanating from one bookstore in Luonan (洛南, Shaanxi province) in 1975, however, allows us to see how one Xinhua branch selected books for the surrounding population. By the beginning of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, Xinhua's Luonan store had been operating for twenty years.²¹⁸ While required to stock the "Four Books" and other important publications, staff exercised greater control over how many supplementary history, politics, philosophy and art titles they offered for sale. At the same time, the ordering process shows that Xinhua's distribution centers conveyed information about future titles to help bookstores choose stock that would sell. This combination of central direction and local autonomy helped propaganda reach the right audiences and increase the political efficacy of book stocks. At the same time, it undermined the visions of campaign coherency and a shared print culture so carefully crafted in the national and regional press.

Distribution centers in Beijing and Shanghai formed the heart of political communication through print in Mao's China. While some publishers handled orders for books directly from bookstores, for many titles these centers managed bulk distribution across the Xinhua network. To canvas individual branch stock needs, the centers issued order forms periodically – two to

²¹⁸ "Luonan xian zhi" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《洛南县志》编纂委员会, ed., 洛南县志 [*The Gazzetteer of Luonan County*] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1999), 520.

three times per month – which branches then completed and returned.²¹⁹ The typical forms received by staff in Luonan list titles forthcoming in the next few months, and each title is accompanied by its planned print-run, intended audience, content, format, length, binding, and price. Bookstore typically had one month from the date of the form to forward their orders to their municipal or provincial administration, which in turn sent aggregated requirements on to the distribution center.²²⁰

Surveying Luonan's ordering decisions for 1975, staff clearly believed that little demand existed for many Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign items. In January, they ordered exactly zero copies of a propaganda poster showing a soldier prepping a talk on the Confucian-Legalist struggle.²²¹ For the whole year, they also ordered none of Zhonghua Books' Loose-Leaf Pamphlets (活页文选) series of annotated classical texts. In terms of classical materials, they did pre-order 200 copies of *Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts* (历代法家著作选注, 2 volumes, People's Press), 100 of *A Commentary on the Book of Lord Shang* (读《商君书》, People's Press), and 50 of a critique of a Qing dynasty Confucian text (批《弟子规》, People's Education Press). *Selections from the Han Feizi with Commentary* (韩非子选评, Zhonghua Books) and the first volume of "*The Exploitation of the Works of Nature*" with Annotations (《天工开物》注释, Scientific Press) each merited orders of 50. But aside from a couple of other titles, staff declined to order a lot of Legalist and Confucian classical texts. For more

²¹⁹ As a side note, the order forms exemplify the job printing that competed with books publishing for printing resources. In most twentieth-century societies, a significant majority of printed output is day-to-day items such as forms, leaflets, tickets, vouchers, stationary and calling cards. The Beijing distribution center either had the facilities to print its forms in-house or outsourced this to one of the city's printing factories. Order forms were printed as one sheet of paper and then folded into a signature; at times, the distribution center sent the sheet unfolded to bookstores where they were then cut. Future historians of modern China will no doubt give this exciting topic the attention it deserves.

²²⁰ The order forms are visible in the collection of books I deposited at the Geisel Library.

²²¹ Order form 京甲 1, entry 11 (16 January 1975).

general campaign materials, Luonan ordered a few titles and passed on many.²²² In other words, the staff tacitly admitted that the vision of the reading nation found on the pages of the national press did not wholly apply at the grassroots.

To strengthen this point, we can also examine where the form listed old titles still in stock at the Beijing distribution center. Surpluses indicate both that publisher print runs overestimated initial bookstore demand and that branches could not see copies selling. As of April 1975, Beijing still had stocks of sixteen of the first thirty issues in Zhonghua's Loose-Leaf Pamphlets series. These issues all date from 1974 and include such titles as Selections from the Mencius with Criticism and Commentary (《孟子》批注(选刊)) and Annotated Selections from Cao Cao's Pronouncements (曹操令文选注).223 Throughout 1975, the center also invited orders of such titles as Zhao Jibin's Concerning the Question of Confucius Killing Shao Zhengmao (关于 孔丘杀少正卯问题, People's Press, 1974), An Introductory Anthology of Materials Concerning *the Historical Struggles of the Working Masses Against Confucianism* (历代劳动人民反孔斗争 史料简编, Beijing People's Press, 1975), and The Taiping Rebellion's Anti-Confucian Struggle (太平天国的反孔斗争, Cultural Relics Press, 1974).²²⁴ It is not unreasonable to imagine that some bookstores already had copies of these books languishing on their shelves and were loath to take on even more. During a spring 1975 trip to China, the historian David Keightley picked up copies of 3 books on anti-Confucianism all published in 1974 – further evidence that some propaganda lacked effectiveness for wont of a purchaser.²²⁵

 $^{^{222}}$ These orders are visible on order forms throughout the year between the ranges ${\bar {\rm g}} \boxplus$ 1 and ${\bar {\rm g}} \boxplus$ 30.

²²³ Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1974, 76.

²²⁴ These calls for orders are visible on order forms throughout the year between the ranges $\bar{x} \mp 1$ and $\bar{x} \mp 30$.

²²⁵ Keightley, "Bookstores in China," 4-5.

Finally, the Luonan forms reveal that bookstores frequently contended with unplanned publishing delays and changes which encumbered their political role. In addition to listing titles, the Beijing distribution center included important updates from publishers. These mostly took the form of notices, title changes, publication delays, order changes or even the scrapping of planned titles altogether. The 25 August 1975 form announced delays to several titles including five issues of the Loose-Leaf Pamphlet series and books on Lu Xun's anti-Confucian views. In October, the distribution center announced that China Finance and Economics Publishing House - a publisher beset with delays (see Chapter Six) - would not be publishing a critique of Mencius's economic philosophy on time. Paper shortages forced People's Press to reduce preorders of its Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts (Luonan had ordered 200 copies), while Scientific Press (科学出版社) had to curtail its Dream Pool Essays: Readings from the Natural Sciences Sections (《梦溪笔谈》选读(自然科学部分)) for the same reason.²²⁶ In early summer 1975, bookstores likewise learnt that a forthcoming analysis of Confucian ideas in past holiday woodcuts (批判旧木板年画中的孔孟之道) would never come to fruition.²²⁷ Once again, we return to a theme running through this section and the whole dissertation: the messiness of propaganda's dissemination matched the pervasiveness of its production.

The Ambiguity of Bookselling and Book-Buying

As participants in the circulation of state propaganda, bookshops and their patrons navigated both the ordinary challenges of the book trade and the additional complexities imposed

²²⁶ Order form 京甲 23, pages 12-13.

²²⁷ Order form 京甲 15, page 4.

by political circumstances. In this final section, I argue that bookstores consistently trod the ambiguous and contradictory lines between deducing and supporting the Party line, meeting customer needs, remaining financially viable, and promoting bibliographic culture. For their part, customers capitalized on these ambiguities to pursue their own reading interests, whether by securing precious and previously unobtainable material, building book collections, or dealing in rare books. Books and their customers thus stood for the tensions between state and private interests, rhetoric and reality, and compliance and subversion which together marked propaganda under Mao.

Although the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign did not start until 1974, the rerelease of selected classical literature in 1972 both foreshadowed later tensions over access to books and provided evidence that readers craved a revived publishing sector. That year, in a dramatic move, the state authorized the sale of four novels: *Dream of the Red Chamber* (红楼 梦), *Water Margin* (水浒传), *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (三国演义), and *Journey to the West* (西游记). Long considered landmarks of Chinese literature, these books would later take on new significance under the scrutiny of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. The novels had occupied a precarious status ever since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, when some bookstores such as those in Liaoning Province burnt all their copies and labelled them as "poisonous weeds" (毒草).²²⁸ Whereas almost six million copies of the novels were printed between 1949 and 1966, publishers issued no further printings after the Cultural Revolution broke out.²²⁹ By 1972, the novels continued to vex officials and publishers who were

²²⁸ Liaoning sheng xinhua shudian "dian zhi" bianxie zu 辽宁省新华书店《店志》编写组, ed., 辽宁图 书发行史料第 2 辑 [*Historical Sources on Book Distribution in Liaoning: Part 2*] (Shenyang: Liaoning sheng xinhua shudian, 1987), 124.

²²⁹ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 152-157.

unsure how to fit them into a constantly fluctuating ideologically climate so that people would read them the 'correct' way.²³⁰ As they would discover, the state's *volte face* in favor of the novels brought such concerns to a head.

The official change in attitude to the novels resulted unexpectedly from senior leaders' passion for showmanship. Anxious to show off Potemkin-esque bookstores during President Nixon's historic visit in 1972, Xinhua Bookstore lined the shelves of prominent branches with six works of literature including the famous four. With no time to typeset and print new editions, however, officials divided 3800 pre-Cultural Revolution copies between Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou and fifteen other cities.²³¹ Believing that Chinese would rush to buy the stock, publishing officials explicitly directed bookstores to only sell copies to foreigners. On February 15, Chinese formed lines outside Beijing's Wangfujing branch before opening time in the hope of securing one of the few copies.²³² According to one foreign reporter, the bookshop witnessed a "rare melee...where hundreds jostled each other at the counters to buy copies."²³³ Not surprisingly, when told that the bookstore would only sell copies to foreigners, the crowd became angry.234 Following this debacle, Zhou Enlai criticized the "mistaken" (错误的) decision to prevent Chinese buying books.²³⁵ As early as 1971, Zhou had argued that classic literature should be republished, asking rhetorically, "Do Dream of the Red Chamber and Water Margin really count as the 'four olds?'"(《红楼梦》、《水浒》这也能作'四旧'吗?).²³⁶ Now, Zhou directed that publishers should publish new editions as soon as possible, even if this meant that

²³⁰ Ibid., 87.

²³¹ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 151; Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 86-88.

²³² Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 86; Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 151.

²³³ John Burns, "Peking lifts ban on a dozen books." *The New York Times*, February 15, 1972, 1.

²³⁴ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 86; Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 151.

²³⁵ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 86; Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 152.

²³⁶ "Beijing chuban shi zhi" bianji bu, *Gazzetteer of Publishing in Beijing: Part 6*, 210.

they contained no forewords telling readers how to fit the books with current state ideology.²³⁷ Cross-country co-operation allowed publishers to begin reprinting within months, and the initial printings of *Dream of the Red Chamber*, *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and *Water Margin* totaled 200,000 copies.²³⁸

The re-release of the four novels showed both that readers yearned for a wider range of reading material and that only reviving the publishing sector could satiate this desire. Eager to take advantage of the unexpected availability of classical literature, book lovers quickly exhausted supplies of the reprints and the scale of demand paradoxically forced some bookstores to suspend all retail sales.²³⁹ Come launch day in Shanghai (29 June 1972), lines had already formed at 5 o'clock in the morning outside the East Nanjing Road branch of Xinhua Bookstore. With only five hundred copies of each title on hand, staff therefore decided to limit each reader to only one copy. When doors opened at nine, pushing and shoving ensued, and the fracas eventually forced the store to close its doors.²⁴⁰ Westwards in Chongqing, Xinhua had only four hundred copies of each title in stock sale, and it decided to send them directly to institutions around the city rather than putting them on general sale.²⁴¹ Not surprisingly, Mao did not have to queue at the bookstore: his office staff sent copies directly to him.²⁴²

As the most significant publishing event of recent years, demand for the novels remained high for many months, reinforcing the idea that people were restless for more books in different

²³⁷ Liu and Shi, *A Record of Publishing*, 139.

²³⁸ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 88; Liu and Shi, *A Record of Publishing*, 140.

²³⁹ Richter, *Publishing*, 25.

²⁴⁰ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Shanghai juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Shanghai Volume*, 87.

²⁴¹ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Chongqing juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华书店发展大系·重庆卷(1949-2017)》编纂委员会, ed., 中国新华书店发展大系·重庆卷(1949-2017)[*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Chongqing Volume, 1949-2017*] (Chongqing: Chongqing chuban jituan and Chongqing chubanshe, 2017), 56.

²⁴² Xu, Mao Zedong's Reading, 84.

genres. Up to July 1973, the state printed an extra 400,000 copies of *Dream of the Red Chamber* and *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, along with over 370,000 copies of *Journey to the West* and over 200,000 copies of *Water Margin*. Even with this extra printing, which raised the combined total of books to almost two million, demand continued. When bookstores ran out, lines of borrowers formed at libraries.²⁴³ Official reports compared these queues to those at the cinema, with people waiting for a lucky reader to return their copy.²⁴⁴ Shortages even caused some to leverage connections abroad: Guangzhou Customs reported that in the half-month after Spring Festival 1973, 6,909 copies of the four classic novels entered China by post. Between 12-20 October of the same year, 11,190 copies passed through customs.²⁴⁵

For the remainder of the Mao era, ongoing grassroots demand for the four novels constantly reminded publishers that their books must appeal to an audience more interested in culture for its own sake than in anti-Confucian diatribe. After the bumper sales of 1972 and 1973, publishers outside of Beijing and Shanghai planned a further 4 million volumes for readers.²⁴⁶ In 1975, printers produced another one million copies of *Dream of the Red Chamber*, along with the millions of copies of *Water Margin* needed once a political campaign to study the novel began in the fall.²⁴⁷ Many years later, one individual remembered queuing overnight with friends outside a Xinhua bookstore in Beijing to secure a copy of one of the novels. The press of the waiting crowd broke the store's glass frontage and anxious book-buyers came to blows.

²⁴³ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 152.

²⁴⁴ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 155.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 473.

²⁴⁶ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 152.

²⁴⁷ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Chongqing juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Chongqing Volume*, 60.

When the doors finally opened, people "swarmed in" (蜂拥而进).²⁴⁸ In September 1975, a staff member from Shanghai People's Press went to a Shanghai bookstore to queue for copies of *Water Margin*, and in the process witnessed the bookstore staff's displeasure over individuals with connections to senior Shanghai officials using their influence to secure copies via the back door while others queued.²⁴⁹ In some locales such as Sichuan's Beichuan county, to meet demand bookstores even enterprisingly retrieved cached pre-Cultural Revolution copies of the novels from stockrooms and sold them to customers.²⁵⁰ Although all this reader thirst for owning copies validated the state's portrayal of the reading nation, it undermined the spirit of communal, shared reading embedded in this portrayal.

The varying approach libraries took to lending copies of the four novels likewise recapitulated a debate that would later plague publishing throughout the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign: could the masses be trusted with reading material? As discussed in Chapter Three, publishers hedged against providing full editions of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* to general readers, and in 1972-1973 district and country libraries did not always buy into Zhou Enlai's idea that people should have open access to the four classical novels. According to a government survey, restrictive approaches varied between a blanket ban on all reading and borrowing of the novels, allowing users to read but not borrow, and granting access only to cadres. In contrast, other libraries allowed anyone to read and borrow the books. Some institutions which initially restricted circulation began instead to offer activities guiding people

²⁴⁸ "漫谈北京的书店" [Informal discussion of Beijing's bookstores],

https://web.archive.org/web/20180906202328/http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/archive/169121.htm (archived September 6, 2018). ²⁴⁹ Lei, *Time Marches Onward*, volume 2, 638.

²⁵⁰ Beichuan xian xinhua shudian 北川县新华书店, ed., 北川书店志 [*The Gazzetteer of Beichuan's Bookstore*] (Beichuan: Beichuan xian xinhua shudian, 1988), 12.

how to read the book 'correctly.' In sum, a minority of librarians believed the novels would "poison the minds of young people" (怕青年中毒), while the majority welcomed them as a chance to "understand the past, comprehend the present, and make predictions about the future" (认识古代,了解当代,推测未来). All, however, thought that readers needed guidance and education to help them derive the right messages from the novels.²⁵¹ For the *Analects*, classical literature and many other texts, the masses could not be trusted to resist the seductive charm of erroneous ideas.

State media and correspondence sent to officials also preached the doctrine of reader irresponsibility. In August 1975, *Wenhui Daily* published a column stressing that readers – especially young people – should read classical literature to glean information about the historical struggle and should learn to identify the bourgeoise ideas in these works.²⁵² One letter from a Beijing-based teacher sent to senior publishers argued that the brief prefaces in the new editions of the novels failed to tell readers how to read the books correctly. In Shanghai, a meeting attendee thought likewise. The Beijing teacher recommended more education about the novels and internal circulation of erroneous literary analyses to delineate the line between correct and incorrect views. Another letter requested more in-text annotation to highlight negative aspects of the novels. In the writer's view, literary commentary and analysis provided in newspapers could not tackle all pertinent questions and could not reach everyone. Inserting into the book a list of characters with information on their class status would therefore help readers view them appropriately.²⁵³ Almost certainly, these letters reflect reader anxiety surrounding

²⁵¹ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 155.

²⁵² Situ Weizhi 司徒伟智 and Xue Wen 学问,"可不可以读一点古典文学作品——答一位同学问" [Can we or can we not read some classical literature?: a response to a question from a classmate]. *Wenhui Daily*, August 23, 1975, 3.

²⁵³ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 155-157.

how to talk about the novels in a politically correct manner and avoid an ideological *faux pas*. At the same time, by including such views in the press and internal documents, officials acknowledged that the masses would read erroneously and subversively if left to their own devices. The ambiguity between the power of books to spread ideas and the power of readers to frame ideas idiosyncratically is the beating heart of modern Chinese propaganda history.

Despite the above case of the enterprising Beichuan booksellers putting pre-Cultural Revolution copies of the novels back on sale, elsewhere old books remained under a cloud of political suspicion. One blogger remembers waiting in a school office during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and coming across an incomplete old edition of *Dream of the Red Chamber* set vertically in traditional characters. The school's head allowed them to read the book on the condition that nobody else found out. The head also gave them two pre-Cultural Revolution books on classical Chinese poetry, again swearing them to secrecy.²⁵⁴ In some places, the "feudal, capitalist and revisionist" (封资修) aura surrounding the print culture of the past outlasted the early Cultural Revolution's iconoclasm.

With the above reader forced to read an old book surreptitiously, it is very surprising then to discover that a state-sponsored antiquarian and secondhand books market thrived in select urban areas. Residents of Beijing and Shanghai could shop at two local antiquarian and secondhand bookstore chains: the capital's China Bookstore (中国书店) chain and Shanghai Bookstore (上海书店, previously known as Shanghai Antiquarian and Secondhand Bookstore 上 海古旧书店).²⁵⁵ As established, sizeable institutions, China Bookstore employed almost 300

²⁵⁴"批林批孔得《红楼》"[Getting a copy of *Dream of the Red Chamber* during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign], <u>https://web.archive.org/web/20180908231913/http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5045b4240100jf3b.html</u>. (archived September 8, 2018).

²⁵⁵ Richter, *Publishing*, 13; SMA B167-3-279-19.

people while Shanghai Bookstore operated four branches.²⁵⁶ Alongside rare books, they also stocked Republican-era and early-PRC scholarly collections of bronze inscriptions and other ancient sources. The UC Berkeley academic David Keightley, on the hunt for research materials in 1975, found a 1918 edition of Kezhai's Record of Collecting Antiquities (8 斋集古录) by Wu Dacheng (吴大澂) and the 1961 edition of Guo Moruo's (郭沫若) A Study of the Inscriptions on Yin and Zhou Dynasty Bronze Wares (殷周青铜器铭文研究).257 Amongst Keightley's other purchases, he secured a copy of the Annals of the Warring States (战国策) from Zhonghua Books' scholarly Essential Writings from the Four Categories of Learning (四部备要) series published in the Republican period.²⁵⁸ Passing up the chance to buy a 1930s edition of a Daoist text, Keightley saw it quickly snapped-up by a teenager.²⁵⁹ China Bookstore also catered to institutional customers from outside Beijing, for example selling Republican-era compendiums of classical texts to Anhui Normal University (安徽师范大学) in 1976.260

The secondhand and antiquarian bookselling and book-buying described by Keightley feels a world away from the criticisms directed at bibliophilia several years earlier. In June 1966, The People's Daily printed an article accusing a prominent intellectual of encouraging young people to collect old books. According to the author, this intellectual hoped to "tempt young people to walk the capitalist road" (引诱青年走资本主义道路).²⁶¹ In this vein, Red Guards in

²⁵⁶ BMA 201-2-198, "北京市出版办公室关于 1976 年基建计划和申请报告等" [Applications and plans from the Beijing Publishing Office concerning infrastructure development in 1976]; B167-3-279-19. ²⁵⁷ Keightley, "Bookstores in China," 5.
²⁵⁸ Ibid. Culp, *The Power of Print*, chapter 5 tracks the origin of this series and others like it.

²⁵⁹ Keightley, "Bookstores in China," 5.

²⁶⁰ BMA 201-1-297.

²⁶¹ Liu Jingquan 刘景全, "揭露邓拓毒害青年的种种圈套" [Revealing the many traps Deng Tuo set to poison the minds of young people]. The People's Daily, June 12, 1966, 3.

Xinjiang seized antiquarian books from a Xinhua Bookstore warehouse and pulped the lot.²⁶² Online, one individual remembers their family burning the household collection of Qing handcopied books after a family member was criticized and struggled against.²⁶³ Another family saw Red Guards burn their antiquarian edition of the Twenty-Four Dynastic Histories along with many other fine editions of classical texts deemed representative of "feudal" culture. Ironically, many of the texts which went up in flames – such as the *Commentary of Zuo* (左传) and the *Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance* (资治通鉴) – were later reprinted and studied in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.²⁶⁴ In Shanghai, staff at the famous Duo Yun Xuan fine arts store on East Nanjing Road sealed the doors after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution to save the paintings and calligraphy inside from destruction.²⁶⁵ Finally, owners of books from the 1950s and 1960s, for example pamphlets published by Zhonghua Books, had their copies unceremoniously confiscated.²⁶⁶

Yet, as with libraries, official desire to avoid unmitigated cultural iconoclasm ensured that enough of the antiquarian and secondhand books trade survived for its revival in the 1970s. Once the Cultural Revolution began, nearly all of the 74 antiquarian and secondhand bookstores nationwide closed their doors or (as in the case of China Bookstore) converted to selling new

²⁶³ "文革时烧毁的古书" [Burning ancient books during the Cultural Revolution], <u>https://web.archive.org/web/20180909000600/http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_49e309570101dsh5.html</u> (archived September 9, 2018).

²⁶² "Xinhua shudian liushi nian," A Record of Sixty Years, 219.

²⁶⁴ "'文化大革命'焚烧书籍毁灭文化" [Burning books and destroying culture during the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'],

https://web.archive.org/web/20180908231747/http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6f3dc8460102v1jm.html (archived September 8, 2018).

²⁶⁵ Mao Ziliang 茅子良, 艺林类稿 [Manuscripts from Art Circles] (Shanghai: Shanghai shuhua chubanshe, 2009), 154.

²⁶⁶ "Burning books and destroying culture."

books, Mao's works, and Mao badges.²⁶⁷ Accompanying this preservation of retail infrastructure, politicians and the trade itself stepped in to protect rare books. In January 1967, Qi Benyu (威本 禹) – a prominent member of the Cultural Revolution's steering committee – argued against the destruction of rare books on the basis that they could only be criticized if they could be first scrutinized.²⁶⁸ In February of the same year, revolutionaries from Zhonghua Books, China Bookstore, Xinhua Bookstore, the Beijing Library and other organizations distributed a "Call for protecting rare and old books, calligraphy, and paintings" (关于保护古旧书刊、字画倡议书). The text argued in favor of preserving these materials and purchasing rare books from private citizens to afford institutional protection to valuable treasures. In the eyes of the call's authors, individuals looking to donate or sell their collections should be "welcomed" (欢迎) to do so, and paper factories ought to work with local authorities to avoid inadvertently pulping precious texts.²⁶⁹

In cultural centers and most likely elsewhere, official groups took action to save material for the state, thereby ensuring that it could surface for sale again in the 1970s. In the capital, the municipality's Rare Books and Antiquities Examination Small Group (北京市古书文物清理小组) began sorting through books ransacked from private residences as early as February 1967. 34 members of staff from China Bookstore joined the group's roster to identify valuable texts amidst the loot.²⁷⁰ Once revolutionary activism had died down, a similar group in Shanghai

²⁶⁷ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 54; Zhou Yan 周岩, 我与中国书店 [*Me and China Bookstore*] (Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2004), 9; Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 372.

²⁶⁸ Ho, *Curating Revolution*, 234; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 45.

 $^{^{269}}$ Ho, *Curating Revolution*, 235. Ho cites an "unpublished flyer" – a dead end citation for the researcher – but the text of the call is available in Zhonghua shuju bianji bu, *A Record of One Hundred Years*, 192. It is a shame that Ho did not make this flyer accessible in a public institution before citing it.

²⁷⁰ "Beijing chuban shi zhi" bianji bu, *Gazzetteer of Publishing in Beijing: Part 6*, 205.

picked through confiscated possessions and plucked the choice finds.²⁷¹ Sometimes, examination of Red Guard booty revealed items that directly fed into the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. For instance, in 1975 two innocuous-looking loose pages surfaced among a collection of ransacked books and papers passed to the Shanghai Library. The pages turned out to belong to a previously unknown Ming dynasty version of the novel *Water Margin* (in Chinese, this edition is known as the '京本忠义传'). Its rarity, and its relevance to the late-Mao campaign to study the novel (see Chapter Two), had senior cultural officials in Shanghai pouring over this bibliographic treasure.²⁷² Gu Tinglong (顾廷龙) and Shen Jin (沈津), both intellectuals, wrote about the discovery in the theoretical journal *Study and Criticism*, and their article tellingly reads more akin to a serious bibliographical study than a piece of political criticism.²⁷³ From the examination groups through to Gu and Shen, ongoing official valuing of antiquarian and rare books avoided gutting the trade.

In this context, antiquarian and secondhand bookstores resumed operations expeditiously ahead of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. In 1971, a national publishing roundtable loosened restrictions on the circulation of classical texts with a reference or research value.²⁷⁴ Hot on this heels of this decision, the branch of China Bookstore in Beijing's famous Liulichang (琉璃厂) cultural district reopened in May 1972, offering antiquarian titles and a range of books published before the Cultural Revolution.²⁷⁵ For example, an American visitor

²⁷¹ Shen, A Chronology of the Life of Gu Tinglong, 570-572.

²⁷² SMA B244-3-812-1, "上海市文化局革命委员会关于发现《水浒》明代残本的报告" [A report from the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Culture Revolutionary Committee regarding discovery of loose pages from a Ming dynasty edition of *Water Margin*].

²⁷³ Gu Tinglong 顾廷龙 and Shen Jin 沈津, "关于新发现的《京本忠义传》残页" [Concerning a new discovery of pages from the *Jingben Zhongyi Water Margin*]. *Study and Criticism* no. 12, 1975, 34-35. ²⁷⁴ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 75.

²⁷⁵ "Beijing chuban shi zhi" bianji bu, *Gazzetteer of Publishing in Beijing: Part 6*, 212.

saw a copy of Zhonghua's 1962 edition of the *Corrections to the Treatise on the Army in the History of the Tang Dynasty* (唐书兵志笺正) on the shelves when visiting in June.²⁷⁶ China Bookstore also proved the source for several of Chairman Mao's desiderata, including a Qing dynasty Shanghai Tongwen Books (上海同文书局) edition of *Water Margin, by the 'Fifth Genius' Shi Naien* (第五才子书水浒传) and an1819 edition of *The Original Meaning of the Journey to the West* (西游原旨).²⁷⁷ In April 1973, Luda's (旅大) Antiquarian and Secondhand Books Retail Store (古旧门市部) reopened its doors for business. Local residents fought over the store's stock placed on the shelves again for sale.²⁷⁸

Open for business, antiquarian and secondhand bookstores helped guarantee that print culture's commodification outlasted any opposition to commodity fetishism. In need of stock, booksellers expanded their search for materials they could resell. Secondhand bookstores tended to operate departments where customers could sell books at reasonable prices, with items either placed back on sale or transferred to libraries or other institutions.²⁷⁹ Archaeologists admitted to David Keightley during his visit that they retained a surreptitious interest in new texts appearing on the antiquarian books market. When rare texts came up for sale in stores, the scholarly grapevine passed the word around to interested antiquarians.²⁸⁰ Bookstores also faced a stark choice between running the book market themselves or allowing underground capitalist wheeling and dealing to run amok instead. Strong stock helped lure customers away from illegal private

²⁷⁶ Wang, "Report of Visit," A173.

²⁷⁷ Xu, *Mao Zedong's Reading*, 106 and 142.

²⁷⁸ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Liaoning juan (1948-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新 华书店发展大系·辽宁卷 (1948-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·辽宁卷 (1948-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Liaoning Volume, 1948-2017*] (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 2017), 84.

²⁷⁹ Richter, *Publishing*, 17.

²⁸⁰ Keightley, "Bookstores in China," 5.

book markets springing up. Shanghai Bookstore staff reported to superiors in 1973 about how a bustling *ad hoc* trade in old books had developed nearby, with sellers surreptitiously hawking illegal (and sometimes stolen!) books such as *The Plum in the Golden Vase* (金瓶梅) for handsome profits. In the opinion of staff, the lack of books circulating on the official secondhand market partly drove this unsanctioned, subversive buying and selling.²⁸¹

The sense that old books remained commodities amidst the storms of Maoist socialism chimes with evidence that newly-printed books – even propaganda – could not escape the same commodification. For instance, internal publications – sold only to selected cadres and other privileged insiders – became desirable due to their restricted status. As already discussed in Chapter Two, Beijing municipality operated a special Restricted Books Outlet Store established in May 1974 serving readers with special cards.²⁸² On offer was a range of publications not considered appropriate for open sale to the public, yet the security of the system was undermined by card owners lending them to others as favors.²⁸³ Down in Shanghai, cadres worried that books circulated internally to be criticized could become "commodities" (欣赏品) and therefore needed directing toward those who actually required them for revolutionary purposes.²⁸⁴ Owners of ordinary publications adorned them with signs of ownership evoking the notion of a treasured

²⁸¹ SMA B74-1-105-70, "文汇报党委办公室编印的《文汇情况》1973 年第 320 期" ["Wenhui Situation," edited by the office of the Party committee of Wenhui Daily, no. 320 (1973)].
²⁸² Zhongguo xinwen, Historical Materials, vol. 14, 130-131.

²⁸³ BMA 201-2-105, "国家出版局、市委宣传组等单位关于出版、发行方面的通知" [Notices from the National Bureau of Publishing and the Beijing Municipal Party Committee Propaganda Group concerning book publication and distribution].

²⁸⁴ SMA B244-3-702-48, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于改进内部图书发行办法的请示报告" [A report requesting instructions written by the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee regarding improvements to the distribution of internal publications]; SMA B244-3-702-47, "上海市革命委员会文教组关于改进内部图书发行办法的请示报告"]A report requesting instructions written by the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee Culture and Education Group regarding improvements to the distribution of internal publications].

personal library or private collection. The purchaser of *Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts: Volume 1* (历代法家著作选注(上)) in my collection, for example, wrote their name and a date on the front cover. Meanwhile, for my copy of *Essays Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume 1* (批林批孔杂文(1)), the back is stamped with the ink impression of Kunming's Xinhua Bookstore and someone has scribbled the date in 1974 on which they bought it.²⁸⁵ A copy of *The Struggle Between Two Epistemologies in Ancient China* (中国古代两种认识论的斗 争) carries the name of the owner and a date from 1973 on its title page, along with a stamp from the site of the CCP's First Congress.²⁸⁶ Once purchased from bookstores, books became possessions amidst wider ambiguities surrounding what counted as politically 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' ownership.

In the sense that they treated books as commodities, bookstores also acted no differently to other organs of the propaganda state. Publishers and media outlets regularly used books in lieu of money to reward staff and authors. My copy of *Qin Shi Huang* (秦始皇) by People's Press bears a stamp on its title page showing that the publisher gifted it to an unknown person or organization.²⁸⁷ The committee running *The Benxi Daily* newspaper gave a copy of *An Introductory Analysis of Lu Xun's Anti-Confucian Essays* (鲁迅批孔反儒杂文简析) to an unknown recipient, and a Shanghainese newspaper distributor received a free copy of an

²⁸⁵ "Li dai fajia zhuzuo xuanzhu" bianji xiaozu 《历代法家著作选注》编辑小组, ed., 历代法家著作选注(上) [Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts: Volume 1] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1974), front cover; Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, ed., 批林批孔杂文(一) [Essays Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume 1] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974), front and back covers.

 ²⁸⁶ Pan Fuen 潘富恩 and Ou Qun 瓯群, 中国古代两种认识论的斗争 [*The Struggle Between Two Epistemologies in Ancient China*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1973), title page.
 ²⁸⁷ Beijing daxue lishi xi Zhongguo shi zhuanye qi er ji gongnongbing xueyuan 北京大学历史系中国史

专业七二级工农兵学员,秦始皇 [*Qin Shi Huang*] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1974), title page.

internally published dictionary of philosophical terms from the Confucian-Legalist struggle.²⁸⁸ Shanghai People's Press editors often distributed gratis copies, even though some questioned the acceptability of such generosity. In February 1975, an editor gave twenty copies of a commentary on *The Dream of the Red Chamber* to writers who had helped revise a manuscript.²⁸⁹ In May of the same year, the editor responsible for *A Criticism of the Classic for Girls* (女儿经批判) distributed 50 copies to colleagues as well as another 120 to the volume's contributing authors and their bosses.²⁹⁰ All this happened despite the press trialing new rules in July 1974 to limit the practice.²⁹¹ Clearly, in commodifying print culture, secondhand and antiquarian bookstores trod a decidedly unexceptional path.

Slowly, this discussion of China Bookstore, Shanghai Bookstore and other resellers is foregrounding one of this chapter's key arguments: *only* by treating books as commodities could the state harness print to the service of politics. Fundamentally, propaganda was not free because the state possessed no bottomless pit of money to allocate to its production: cover prices helped publishers, printers and bookstores recoup costs and thus made these industries sustainable. On another level, however, secondhand and antiquarian bookstores needed to commodify books to effectively support the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. China Bookstore's annual report for 1974 noted how its insufficient stock of old and secondhand books might adversely affect its ability to support anti-Confucian activities. For sure, bookstores followed libraries in

²⁸⁸ Jilin shifan daxue zhongwen xi 吉林师范大学中文系, 鲁迅批孔反儒杂文简析 [An Introductory Analysis of Lu Xun's Anti-Confucian Essays] (Jilin: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1975), title page; Shanghai "Zhexue xiao cidian" bianxie zu 上海《哲学小辞典》编写组, 哲学小辞典(儒法斗争史部分)[A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms from the Confucian-Legalist Struggle] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974), back cover.

²⁸⁹ Lei, *Time Marches Onward*, volume 2, 597.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 571.

²⁹¹ SMA B167-3-266-24, "上海人民出版社关于改进赠送样书的试行办法(供讨论用)" [Experimental procedures from Shanghai People's Press to change distribution of sample and gratis copies (draft for discussion)].

getting books for free: between 1971 and 1980, an employee of China Bookstore rescued approximately half a million volumes from a local paper recycling station.²⁹² Yet, alongside this cut-price supply, bookstores bought collections. Staff from China Bookstore fanned out across China in 1974 find stock for the shelves, and shortly before Mao's death they purchased some rare editions of the Twenty-Four Dynastic Histories from a private citizen.²⁹³ After the beginning of the campaign, staff from Tianjin's Antiquarian and Secondhand Books Retail Store (古旧书 门市部) went to forty counties and bought over 2000 separate antiquarian books.²⁹⁴ Soon after, Shanghai's bookstores began buying-back individuals' secondhand books.²⁹⁵ These commercial activities restocked shelves, attracted customers, and met grassroots demand stoked by the campaign. In other words, buying and selling undergirded the political function of secondhand bookstores.

For understanding the interplay between stocked shelves and a bookstore's political role, the tense relationship between China Bookstore and Xinhua Bookstore tells all. As a specialist in antiquarian books and history, the former retailed newly published classical texts and history titles alongside Xinhua in Beijing. In fall 1973, the two chains therefore signed an agreement dividing up retail responsibilities between them. In the city center and some suburbs, China Bookstore would be the main seller of newly published reprints of specialized primary texts and research monographs. For books aimed at wider audiences – for example anthologies of classical

²⁹² "Beijing chuban shi zhi" bianji bu 《北京出版史志》编辑部, ed., 北京出版史志 第1辑 [*The Gazzetteer of Publishing in Beijing: Part 1*] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1993), 206.

²⁹³ BMA 201-1-224, "1974 年北京市国营书店汇总会计报表" [Reported accounts for 1974 for state-owned bookstores in Beijing]; BMA 201-1-297.

²⁹⁴ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Tianjin juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Tianjin Volume*, 130.

²⁹⁵ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Shanghai juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Shanghai Volume*, 91.

texts (古籍选本) and contemporary translations – Xinhua was to take the lead.²⁹⁶ In sum, the agreement maintained Xinhua's comprehensive status while protecting China Bookstore's reputation for excellence in historical, cultural, and antiquarian bookselling.

Fervent competition for scarce specialized stock derailed the agreement almost as soon as the ink had dried. Stores had to have stock to realize their political and commercial goals, and China Bookstore staff wrote to municipal officials in September 1974 with a litany of grievances against Xinhua. For copies of some dynastic histories newly republished by Zhonghua Books, Xinhua nabbed between 90 and 95 percent of all copies when China Bookstore expected to receive the lion's share. According to the complainants, Xinhua kept devising creative excuses to ride roughshod over the agreement. For another dynastic history, published in 1974, Xinhua siphoned off 1500 copies before splitting the remainder with China Bookstore. As of September, China Bookstore staff still awaited deliveries of already-published collections of classic poetry and reprinted Legalist texts.²⁹⁷ Without these, the bookstore could neither act as an agent of the propaganda state nor meet the needs of customers.

When it came to supplying China Bookstore's cut of books aimed at general audiences, Xinhua proved similarly uncooperative. For numbers one to sixteen in Zhonghua Books' Loose-Leaf Pamphlets series, Xinhua sent 500 copies when it should have sent 20,000. For second printings of the pamphlets, it fabricated an excuse to send zero copies. Additionally, China Bookstore received none of the 700,000 copies of *Selected Readings from Legalist Texts* (法家著 作选读) and the 600,000 of *Reading "The Debate on Salt and Iron"* (读《封建论》) sent to the capital. Overall, according to China Bookstore staff, Xinhua "monopolized stock, ignored

²⁹⁶ BMA 201-1-162.

²⁹⁷ BMA 201-3-51, "新华书店、中国书店关于图书发行工作情况" [Reports from Xinhua Bookstore and China Bookstore concerning book distribution].

higher-level instructions, and adopted a cavalier attitude toward China Bookstore's long-standing specialism" (掌握货源, 置上级的批准于不顾, 对中国书店长期以来的专业分工采取轻率的态度").²⁹⁸ The dispute forced Beijing's senior publishing cadres to intervene in 1975 on China Bookstore's side, but the archives do not tell us if this finally put the matter to the rest.²⁹⁹ Either way, for at least a year and a half, Xinhua's self-interest seemingly scuttled China Bookstore's ability to supply customers interested in learning more about the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.

China Bookstore's ire and its searches for stock represent predictable responses to the unprecedented reader pressure on bookstores during the campaign to supply classical texts and related writings. Staff from Shanghai People's Press used Shanghai Bookstore as a valuable resource while they worked on book manuscripts. For example, in 1974 one member of staff went in search of *The Pictorial 24 Obediences for Women* (女二十四孝图), different editions of the *Classic for Girls* (女儿经) and other texts.³⁰⁰ Shanghai Bookstore also told its booksellers to funnel important philosophical works by Zhu Xi, Cheng Yi (程颐) and Cheng Hao (程颢) toward work units needing them for criticism activities. Visitors to the retail could buy texts such as the *Analects*, the *Mencius* and Zhu Xi's *Commentaries on the Four Books* (四书集注) if they needed them for campaign activities.³⁰¹ When newspaper covered study activities at a model

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ BMA 201-2-164, "北京市出版办公室关于出版发行方面的通知以及对所属书店关于发行工作的 批复" [Notices from Beijing Publishing Office concerning publishing and book distribution, as well its replies to enquiries from subsidiary bookstores].

³⁰⁰ Lei, *Time Marches Onward*, volume 2, 563, 568 and 581.

³⁰¹ SMA B167-3-272-42, "上海市文物保管委员会关于上海海关与古籍门市在古书等出口标准掌握 上不一致问题并请求及早解决的汇报" [A comprehensive report from the Shanghai Municipal Antiquities Protection Committee both discussing differing interpretations of export rules between Shanghai Customs and antiquarian booksellers and requesting solutions to this problem].

Shanghai factory, this prompted a flurry of people to descend on a Shanghai Bookstore branch seeking copies of *Commentaries on the Four Books* and other materials. Booksellers reported that customers from as many as sixty work separate organizations visited on one Saturday afternoon – staff raided warehouse stocks of Confucian texts to meet this demand but even then copies of the *Commentaries* sold out before demand was satiated.³⁰² Come the beginning of the campaign to study *Water Margin*, Shanghai Bookstore was tasked with finding as many different versions of the novel's full text as possible.³⁰³

The Shanghai Municipal Archives chronicles the amazing range of materials everyday workplaces and institutions needed for their in-house campaign activities. As of October 1975, Shanghai People's Radio (上海人民广播电台) sought copies of the literary classic *The Plum in the Golden Vase* (金瓶梅), the *Collected Works of Ancient Chinese Philosophers* (诸子集成) and the *Collected Stories from the Tang Dynasty* (说唐全传).³⁰⁴ Over at a Shanghai school for cadres, a list of titles "needed for urgent consultation" (迫切需要查考) named over sixty items. Spanning the gamut of literature, history and philosophy, the checklist included the Twenty-Four Dynastic Histories, famous Confucian texts, the *Classic of Mountains and Seas* (山海经), the *Book of Changes*, the jottings of the Song dynasty writer Shao Bowen (邵伯温) and the *Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government* (资治通鉴). This sporadic assortment captures the depth and breadth of the school's needs. In the event, staff failed to procure copies from either

³⁰² SMA B167-3-260, "上海书店影印旧书《东方杂志》和重印《四书集注》的请示及上海人民出版 社的意见" [A request from Shanghai Bookstore to photomechanically reprint *The Eastern Miscellany* and reprint the *Commentaries on the Four Books*, accompanied by the opinions of Shanghai People's Press."

³⁰³ Lei, *Time Marches Onward*, volume 2, 629.

³⁰⁴ SMA B244-3-812-20, "上海人民广播电台革命委员会关于申请调拨图书的补充报告" [A supplementary report from the Shanghai People's Radio Revolutionary Committee requesting book transfers].

Shanghai Bookstore or the Shanghai Library, most likely because everybody else had the same idea. Taking a more flexible view of property ownership than bookstores, as a last resort the school looked to the treasure trove of books confiscated by the Red Guards to meet its needs.³⁰⁵

On top of this demand, propaganda transformed antiquarian and secondhand books formerly considered cultural fetish items into legitimate commodities of political activism. Figure 3.9 in Chapter Three shows an *Analects* study group using a traditionally bound version of the text, drawing a positive link between the campaign and fine-press publishing. Similarly, the worker in figure 4.20 holds an annotated, thread-bound, and vertically-printed edition of a classical text which he is either criticizing or using to support his argument. The image formed part of a painting anthology published by People's Fine Arts Press (人民美术出版社) in 1975 and also circulated as a standalone image.³⁰⁶ These striking depictions of the renewed relevance of old editions created an environment where secondhand bookshop footfall boomed.

³⁰⁵ SMA A98-2-74-15, "上海市财贸"五·七"干校革命委员会关于申请调拨图书学习资料的函" [A letter from the Shanghai Bureau of Trade May Seventh Cadre School Revolutionary Committee requesting transfers of books and other study materials].

³⁰⁶ This copy has been deposited to the Geisel Library at UC San Diego.




Figure 4.20: We are Ready to Judge One Thousand Years of Merits and Faults! (千秋功罪我们 评说!), attributed to the Agricultural Machinery Factory Worker Spare-time Art Group (手管局农机 厂工人业余美术组).³⁰⁷

For China Bookstore, Shanghai Bookstore and their contemporaries, re-commodifying rare and secondhand books in the name of anti-Confucianism meant higher sales and fatter profits. As one bookseller observed, the Cultural Revolution already offered significant profit potential because it markedly depreciated the value of books.³⁰⁸ In other words, even when bookstores bought items, they got a bargain. In 1974, China Bookstore's sales of antiquarian and secondhand stock surpassed 800,000 *yuan* – almost eight percent more than in 1973. When combined with forty percent increases in sales of newly reprinted classical texts, the bookstore ended the year with a strong balance sheet. Indeed, staff themselves made the connection to the

³⁰⁷ Image source: Yangquan shi renmin wenhua guan 阳泉市人民文化馆, ed., 阳泉工人画选 [Selected Paintings by Yangquan Workers] (Beijing: Renmin meishu chubanshe, 1975), 1. ³⁰⁸ BMA 201-1-297.

pecuniary and the political, writing to superiors how the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign had buoyed the chain's performance. China Bookstore's gain was another bookstore's loss: sales at the Foreign Languages Bookstore (外文书店) dropped by 62,000 *yuan* between 1973 and 1974 because the main publisher of language-learning materials had switched to issuing Legalist texts and other campaign materials.³⁰⁹

Undoubtedly, the Cultural Revolution provided a golden opportunity for state-run antiquarian book dealers to cash-in on rare and secondhand book purchases by offering well below their actual value. On the back of dealings with private sellers in early 1974, Shanghai Bookstore suggested to its superiors that it formalize a policy of offering thirty to fifty percent below the estimated value of antiquarian books (depending on their condition and rarity) and avoiding haggling as far as possible. Books could then be resold at a twenty to fifty percent markup – a healthy margin for a business dealing with high-value goods. It also recommended increased communication between rare book dealers in multiple cities to prevent them competing against each other. Yet accompanying these suggestions was a realistic awareness that driving down prices too much would reduce the incentive for the owners of rare materials to sell them back to the state, keeping antiquarian books in the hands of the cultured elites who typically owned them. With house ransacking no longer a commonplace practice, Shanghai Bookstore staff knew that "if we want to return these rare books to the hands of the working people, in most cases the only way to achieve this is to cough up the cash to buy them" (要使这些古书回到劳动

³⁰⁹ BMA 201-1-224.

人民的手中来,多数情况下又须通过出价收购的方式来实现).³¹⁰ The Cultural Revolution's climate depressed the antiquarian books market, but it did not eradicate it.

With political room to operate, rare books dealers could also cash in on a lucrative tourist market. While Shanghai Bookstore's antiquarian books retail outlet owned some books which could not be exported because of their content or rarity, it also maintain a special section for foreign visitors to browse older materials and purchase them at inflated prices.³¹¹ Although David Keightley noted that books did not receive the same exorbitant mark-ups as antiques, staff from China Bookstore nonetheless offered him a copy of a Republican era collection of brass rubbings for 300 US Dollars (equivalent to over 1500 US Dollars today). Keightley had to pass.³¹² While in Shanghai, he sat in a bookstore sipping tea "while books dealing with Shang and Zhou history were brought" for his inspection.³¹³ One forms a picture of bookstores extending privileged access to foreign guests in the hopes of securing their hard cash.

Yet despite the connection between antiquarian bookselling and the state's political goals, antiquarian bookstore staff still faced a daily grind juggling competing pressures. Specifically, they had to simultaneously follow Maoist dogma, make money, protect the nation's culture, and dodge allegations of capitalist behavior and what Robert Culp has called "bibliographic fetishism."³¹⁴ Managing these opposing goals exposed the ambiguities and weaknesses inherent in tying bookselling to political revolution.

³¹⁰ SMA B167-3-273-9, "上海书店革命委员会关于收购具有历史文物估价古书的意见的请示" [A report requesting instructions written by the Shanghai Bookstore Revolutionary Committee regarding thoughts on buying books with actual historical value].

³¹¹ Wan, "Libraries in the People's Republic of China," 8; Richter, *Publishing*, 24-25. For evidence that prices were inflated for foreigners, see SMA B167-3-272-42. See Lu, "Seizing Civilization," for discussion of dealing in other antiquaries.

³¹² Keightley, "Bookstores in China," 5-6.

³¹³ Ibid., 5.

³¹⁴ Culp, Power of Print, 154.

By the 1970s, the state subjected libraries and antiquarian booksellers to a range of measures designed to protect China's cultural inheritance. A 1973 central government notice prohibited libraries from selling any of their collections – a problem in recent years – and two years later another decree limited the range of rare books which bookstores could sell to foreign visitors.³¹⁵ While bookstores in different cities interpreted rules slightly differently, all were now deployed on the front line of cultural protection and responsible for preventing valuable items finding their way overseas.³¹⁶

Adding to their role as cultural guardians, the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign handed antiquarian bookstores the job of preserving important evidence in the struggle against Confucianism. From the central government's perspective, artifacts and archaeological discoveries could provide new insights into the history of Confucianism and anti-Confucianism in China.³¹⁷ Following this lead, in summer 1974 Shanghai officials introduced new municipal rules prohibiting valuable items from leaving the country. Measuring value was to be more than a question of cultural connoisseurship: "exporting cultural artifacts must always proceed from political considerations and we cannot just let a few experts have the final say" (出口文物工艺品一定要从政治影响上考虑,不能让少数专家权威说了算).³¹⁸ The axe fell on books or other antiquities with a Confucian message (such as "humanity, justice, virtue and morality" 仁义道

³¹⁵ Guojia wenwu ju, *Legal Regulations*, 63; BMA 201-3-107, "国家出版局关于出版发行工作方面的通知" [Notices from the National Bureau of Publishing regarding book publishing and distribution]. ³¹⁶ BMA 201-3-107. Shanghai Bookstore's antiquarian books retail outlet decided not to offer books published before 1911 for sale in the store, but foreigners looking for older books could still obtain them freely at branches of China Bookstore in Beijing (see SMA B167-3-272-42). ³¹⁷ Guojia wenwu ju, *Legal Regulations*, 65-66.

³¹⁸ SMA B167-3-272-34, "上海书画社革命委员会关于传达上海市革命委员会文教组对博物馆出口 文物的批示的报告" [A report from the Shanghai Calligraphy Press Revolutionary Committee forwarding instructions from the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee Culture and Education Group regarding export of antiquities by the Shanghai Museum].

德), along with any materials which "might precipitate adverse political consequences" (有可能 在政治上引起不良影响).³¹⁹

By the time of these new regulations, Shanghai Bookstore had already made a reinvigorated commitment to protecting rarities and toeing political lines. When dealing with foreign guests, staff were not to display the *Analects*, the *Mencius* and Zhu Xi's *Commentaries on the Four Books* and only sell copies to customers who specifically requested them. Other guidelines prohibited export sales of rare books, works printed before the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, scarce Republican-era collections of classical texts, maps, and historical gazetteers. Restrictions on sales of rubbings and recently acquired stock avoided premature losses of valuable primary texts.³²⁰

Almost inevitably, however, Shanghai Bookstore's appraisers encountered difficulties staying on the right side of the line between permissible and impermissible. Embarrassingly, in the second half of 1974 local customs officers confiscated books from departing foreign visitors even though the owners bought them at Shanghai Bookstore. Examples included a letterpress edition of *A Synoptical Index to the Complete Library of the Four Treasuries* (四库全书总目提要), a copy of the *Complete Works of Master Zhu* (朱子大全), and a lithographic printing of *Classical Exegeses in the Qing Dynasty* (皇清经解). According to customs, these books contradicted regulations. Not unduly, Shanghai Bookstore staff worried about the "negative

³¹⁹ SMA B167-3-272-36, "上海市文物保管委员会关于出口文物、旧工艺品、古旧图书题材内容的 几点意见的请示报告" [A report requesting instructions written by the Shanghai Municipal Antiquities Protection Committee regarding thoughts on the criteria for allowing exports of antiquities, old handicrafts and rare books].

³²⁰ SMA B167-3-272-42.

impression" (不好影响) such mix-ups and ambiguities caused among foreign customers. Politics did not always mix well with the realities of running a business.³²¹

Buying-back rare books similarly involved negotiating blurred boundary between legitimate commerce and illegitimate capitalist behavior. In early 1974, a Suzhou resident came to Shanghai Bookstore to offer for sale an old woodblock-printed divination text and another ancient manuscript. For the former, staff made an initial offer of 1000 *yuan* and then raised it to 1200 *yuan*, but the seller held out for a minimum price of 1600 *yuan*. When Shanghai Bookstore asked librarians from the Shanghai Library to appraise the items, they indicated that the library would pay over 2000 *yuan* to secure the divination text.³²²

With the seeds of a sale now sown, the specter of capitalism promptly upended the transaction. Other Shanghai Bookstore staff posted posters describing such high-price negotiations over rare books as an "erroneous political line" (路线问题). They argued that 1200 *yuan* already represented a large amount of money to pay for a text with no discernible political value, adding that haggling over prices was politically damaging. Their view clashed with others who thought little of paying some extra money to secure a valuable text and those who worried that if Shanghai did not buy it, book dealers in Suzhou or Beijing would quickly snap it up. Eventually, the ideological argument won out, and Shanghai Bookstore stuck with its offer of 1200 *yuan* for the divination text and no more than 200 *yuan* for the manuscript. Despite lowering the price to 1500 *yuan*, the seller eventually returned to Suzhou with the sale having fallen through. To prevent dealers in Beijing and Suzhou competing with Shanghai by offering

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² SMA B167-3-273-13, "上海人民出版社关于上海书店高价收购版本书的情况汇报" [A comprehensive report from Shanghai People's Press concerning moves by Shanghai Bookstore to buy rare books at high prices].

the seller more money – and thus to prevent "losses to the country" (国家损失) – Shanghai Bookstore informed them of all that had transpired in Shanghai.³²³ This could not, however, make up for the fact that a valuable text and a tidy potential profit had slipped through its fingers due to an internal ideological split.

To legitimize commercial activity and overcome objections, the trade sometimes appropriated political rhetoric. Shanghai Bookstore's dealings with another private seller provide a clear example. Soon after the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign begun, an individual offered 29 volumes of a woodblock-printed text dating back to the thirteenth century. The Beijing Library held none of the volumes on offer – making them a valuable acquisition for the state – and staff proposed to offer 3600 *yuan* for the items. This was a bargain price (the books would have fetched at least 5000 *yuan* before the Cultural Revolution) and Shanghai Bookstore staff wished to close the deal. Therefore, they argued to their superiors that the text was a material artifact of the working-class labor of Song Dynasty printers and paper-makers.³²⁴ Whether this argument worked is unknown, but it craftily deployed political dogma to justify treating books as valuable commodities.

Finally, like responsible book dealers around the world, antiquarian bookstores had to permanently guard against dealing in stolen goods and co-operate with the authorities in catching thieves. In May 1976, a person by the surname of Zhang came to Shanghai to sell a rare book called *Chronicles of Prosperity* (殷历谱). Staff queried how someone of his youth could have such a book, and Zhang said that it belonged to his father. Further investigation found this claim questionable considering that Zhang's father was "uneducated" (文化低). Zhang's work unit had

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ SMA B167-3-273-9.

long held suspicions that he had dipped into the loot confiscated during house raids in the early Cultural Revolution, and Shanghai Bookstore's reporting provided the hard evidence needed to begin criticism of Zhang. Shanghai's internal publishing newsletter chimed that Shanghai Bookstore's branches "ceaselessly promoted class struggle" (上海书店注意抓店堂阶级斗 争).³²⁵ Clearly, by the 1970s the state could not tolerate the lawless pilfering conducted by the Red Guards in the early Cultural Revolution, especially when it came to China's bibliographic treasures. With the reading nation restored, too much was at stake.

Conclusion

A host of institutions, including newspapers, publishers, libraries and bookstores together sustained the reading nation during the early to mid-1970s. The success of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign in part depended on whether people could obtain books, had the motivation to read them, and felt comfortable in spaces populated by books. Variations in the infrastructure of book provision thus meant that different people experienced the campaign in different ways. Furthermore, it directly spurred the revival of libraries and bookstores because the state needed these institutions to spread political information.

At the same time, the late Mao era inadvertently rationalized the valuing of books outside of their political function. In a charged political environment, such valuations remained fraught and opened librarians, booksellers and readers to charges of fetishizing books and holding

³²⁵ SMA B167-2-183-52, "上海人民出版社党委办公室编印的《出版间报》1976 年第 96 期" ["Publishing News," no. 96 (1976), edited by the Shanghai People's Press Party Committee Office].

inappropriate ideological views. Revolution, reading, reward and risk went hand-in-hand in a crucial period for the book in modern China.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Paper Cuts: Paper Shortages and the Scramble for Stability in Mao-Era Publishing

During the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, material constraints mediated the scale and scope of propaganda production. Picking up from where the first chapter left off, the following pages detail how chronic shortages of paper hindered the efforts of state publishers to circulate the campaign's messages. Elsewhere in the twentieth century, paper or a lack of it has proved a decisive check to the growth of media industries.¹ The Chinese case is no different. Archival records and published books narrate a tale of a paper crisis which gripped publishing in the early 1970s, curtailing book production and restricting titles to smaller audiences. Specifically, I chart the impact of paper shortages on Beijing People's Press and Shanghai People's Press. Forced to print more with less, these presses axed non-essential titles and cut corners wherever possible. Likewise, paper mills experimented with stretching pulp supplies to the limit, leading to lower quality paper stock and complaints from readers. Month by month, Beijing People's Press and other major publishers faced uncertainty regarding paper shipments from factories, in the process upsetting publishing plans, derailing large print runs, and causing significant intra-bureaucratic stress.

My perspective departs from mainstream scholarship on print propaganda. In the case of China, scholars such as Barbara Mittler, Paul Clark and Deborah Sommer have tended to overlook the materials needed to produce newspapers, books and other media, choosing instead to examine the messages of this media and how people responded to them.² As a corrective to

¹ For instance, wartime scarcities in the United Kingdom heavily impacted publisher operations. See Jeremy Lewis, *Penguin Special: The Life and Times of Allen Lane* (London: Viking, 2003), 154. For analysis of paper and the media in Weimar Germany, see Tworek, "The Death of News?"

² Mittler, *A Continuous Revolution*; Clark, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution*; Sommer, "Images for Iconoclasts."

this scholarly slant, I argue that historians and bibliographers can no longer take for granted the ability of authoritarian states to produce propaganda and communicate with their subjects. A large number of subsidiary processes formed the beating heart of the Chinese propaganda state, and these involved the circulation of huge quantities of resources and energy, the mobilization of labor, and the maximum possible exploitation of the natural environment. Even in a powerful Cold War state such as China, the most mundane interruptions to these processes undermined the government's influence and checked its reach.

Studying paper shortages also forces historians of China and print culture more generally to problematize historical archives and discard most of what we think we know about the magnitude of print propaganda production in the twentieth century. As I show below, publishers routinely reduced the scope of their activities because they lacked the necessary paper to complete all of their desired projects. What we will never know, however, is just *how much* production was scuppered by a lack of paper or other materials such as ink. The final published range of titles and their print-runs, therefore, underrepresent the willingness of the state to allocate raw materials to political campaigning in print. Scholars conventionally view Mao's China as a society saturated in propaganda, but that saturation point represents only the limit of what was materially possible at the time.³

³ For two different books with similar assumptions, see: MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*; and Frank Dikötter, *The Cultural Revolution: A People's History, 1962-1976* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016).

Dilating Demand and Growing Competition for Paper

Given the CCP's dependency on propaganda communications, we would expect the government to prioritize supporting publishing and printing. During the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, rhetorical bluster certainly presented these industries as of paramount importance. For example, a poem from 1974 couches printing within a militaristic language, portraying it as a weapon of struggle:

Little Lead Type 小铅字

Each piece of type like a bullet in a gun, Locked, loaded and ready to fire. Aim at Lin and the philosopher Kong [i.e. Confucius], The victory banner flies higher and higher!

个个铅字有份量, 当作子弹压枪膛—— 对准林彪、孔老二, 批林批孔打胜仗!⁴

The illustration accompanying this poem - of children running while holding aloft the metal type for "Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius" – reinforces the connection between politics and print (figure 5.1). The children do not walk sedately; rather, they surge forward, with inked typeheads exposed, as if they are about to make an impression on a big sheet of paper ahead. Type, and those who wield it, become a weapon to direct at Confucian enemies.

⁴ Renmin wenxue, *We Are All Little Pathbreakers*, 32.




Figure 5.1: The illustration accompanying the poem "Little Lead Type."⁵

State media and training manuals also extolled printing as progressive working-class labor of the kind favored in the People's Republic of China. State media periodically ran articles on printing factories, with *The People's Daily* praising political activities at Beijing Xinhua Printing Press (北京新华印刷厂) at several points during the 1960s and 1970s – including on its front page in 1969.⁶ Moreover, Jiang Qing signaled her support for printing by visiting Beijing Xinhua Printing Press ten times between February 1975 and September 1976 and even having one sit-down meeting with staff.⁷ Within the industry, a typesetting guide from 1973 informed employees that "the printing industry is a propaganda tool for the Party and serves Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line. It is a productive industry, but more importantly it is also a political industry" (印刷工业是党的宣传工具,是为毛主席的无产阶级革命路线服务的,他 是生产事业,更重要的是政治事业).⁸

⁵ Image source: ibid., 33.

⁶"北京新华印刷厂整党建党调查报告" [An investigative report of Party-rectification and Partybuilding at Beijing Xinhua Printing Press]. *The People's Daily*, December 16, 1969, 1. ⁷ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 378.

⁸ Beijing xinhua, *Manual for Typesetters*, 67.

Printing materials held a similar political valence. Government documentation described newsprint and publishing paper as "vital resources for promoting Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and essential for guaranteeing the publication of Party media, books and textbooks" (是宣传马列主义、毛泽东思想,保证党报、党刊、图书、课本出版的重要物 资).⁹ As for ink, it was "not only an important material for publishing...[but] also a product with strong political characteristics as it furthered the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought" (油墨不但是出版印刷的重要材料,而且是政治性很强的产品,它关系到 宣传马列主义、毛泽东思想的大事).¹⁰

Yet despite all this grandiose verbiage, as the campaign picked up steam in early 1974, officials wrestled with the thorny problem of finding the resources to fuel its print culture. At the end of Chapter One, I analyzed how the publication of the Four Books consumed a staggeringly high proportion of the nationwide supply of paper set aside for book publishing in 1974. On top of this feverish production, publishers also already knew that paper allocations for the coming year would be less generous than before. Several weeks beforehand, officials from the NBP had informed publishers that while more publishing paper would be available in 1974 compared to 1973, the quantity set aside for printing ordinary books (a category that did not include textbooks, magazines and posters) would be 23,000 tons less.¹¹ While the state dreamed of

⁹ SMA B109-3-248-73, "国务院批转轻工业部关于确保新闻纸凸版纸生产的报告" [A report, written by the Ministry of Light Industry and forwarded by the State Council, regarding guaranteeing newsprint and publishing paper production].

¹⁰ SMA B123-8-1383-3, "商业部、轻工业部、国家出版事业管理局关于油墨自 1976 年起统一由商 业部门收购供应的通知" [A notice from the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Light Industry and the National Bureau of Publishing about purchasing and distribution of ink to fall under solely the control of the Ministry of Commerce from 1976 onward].

¹¹ SMA B167-3-253-67, "国家出版事业管理局关于 1974 年新闻出版印张计划和用纸计划的通知" [A notice from the National Bureau of Publishing concerning planned paper and paper use for 1974].

expansive propaganda production, declining warehouse stocks provided publishers with a sobering dose of reality.

Even with these restrictions, central government officials piled on the pressure for publishers and newspapers to support the campaign in print. Rather cryptically, the NBP told publishers to increase their range of books and set print-runs appropriately, while at the same time requiring them to satisfy demand for a variety of genres from a variety of audiences.¹² Then, in a January 1974 meeting with the head of the NBP, Zhou Enlai remarked how the number of books and periodicals produced in the country kept failing to meet the demands of ordinary people. Zhou saw books and newspapers as a necessary corollary to radio propaganda broadcasts and directed that paper production should increase throughout the rest of the decade to allow for more printing.¹³ Clearly, government officials appreciated the extent to which maintaining the CCP's control through print depended on the vagaries of production, but Zhou and others would gradually discover that what was said was not so easily done.

Once rapid production of the Four Books began, panicky reports of deteriorating paper stocks flooded into Beijing, and the urgency of these messages gradually pushed government officials away from issuing platitudes to taking concrete action. In February, they initially called on provincial administrations to work harder to produce more paper – a typically vague bureaucratic response that presumed provinces had untapped production capacity on hand.¹⁴ Just one day later, however, the Ministry of Light Industry (轻工业部) issued a detailed plan providing an additional 38,000 tons of publishing paper nationwide for printing the Four Books

¹² Ibid.

¹³ SMA B167-3-253-15, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于上海增产凸版纸的情况反映及二点建议的 综合报告" [A comprehensive report from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee both reporting attempts to increase paper production in Shanghai and raising two suggestions]. ¹⁴ Ibid.

(see table 5.1). According to the plan, these supplies would come from a combination of increased production, transferring paper between different parts of the country, and reassigning paper earmarked for other projects.¹⁵


¹⁵ Ibid.

		Source	
Recipient	Publishing Paper	Self-produced	Transferred From Elsewhere
Total	38000	22700	15800
National Bureau of Publishing	10000		10000
Shandong	2800	2800	
Hebei	1900	1900	
Beijing	1700	1000	700
Hubei	1500	1500	
Jiangsu	1500	1500	
Shaanxi	1400	1000	400
Hunan	1400	1400	
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	1300	1300	
Tianjin	1300	1300	
Heilongjiang	1200	600	600
Yunnan	1100		1100
Shanghai	1100	500	600
Jiangxi	1100	1100	
Liaoning	1100	1100	
Sichuan	1000	1000	
Henan	1000	1000	
Shanxi	900	900	
Guizhou	800	300	500
Fujian	800	800	
Gansu	600 [sic.]	100	700
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	500	200	300
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region	400	100	300
Anhui	400	400	
Jilin	400	400	
Guangdong	300	300	
Qinghai	200	100	100
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region	200	100	100
Zhejiang	100	100	

Table 5.1: Additional paper allocations, February 1974. Unit: tons.¹⁶

¹⁶ Information in this table comes from ibid. The figures in this table do not exactly add up, but minor arithmetic errors do not affect the general sense of the source.

Based on the healthy production increases recorded in graph 5.1, such a plan at first glance appears more than feasible.¹⁷ The graph shows a spike in publishing paper output in the early Cultural Revolution period when printing of Mao's writings reached record levels.¹⁸ Predictably, production sharply dropped-off between 1969 and 1970 once everybody already owned copies of Mao's works. As the publishing sector started its revival in the early 1970s, production of publishing paper likewise grew to around 350,000 tons in 1975. Overall, the graph suggests a healthy papermaking sector with output trending in the right direction.



Graph 5.1: Nationwide Production of Paper, 1966-1980. Unit: 10,000 tons

¹⁷ Data in the chart is adapted from "Beijing gongye zhi" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《北京工业志》编纂委员会, ed., 北京工业志·印刷志 [*Beijing Industrial Gazzetteer: Printing*] (Beijing: Zhongguo kexue jishu chubanshe, 2001), 370-371.

¹⁸ Frank Dikötter notes that paper production increased in 1966-1967 to meet the demand for Mao books. See Dikötter, *The Cultural Revolution*, 97-98.

Contemporary reports similarly suggest that the state's emergency paper handouts could solve deficits. Paper output in multiple provinces remained on-target for the first four months of 1974, and by June nationwide production of publishing paper amounted to 22.5 percent more than in the previous year.¹⁹ In Beijing, the municipal government took receipt of all five hundred tons of paper expected from a key supplier in January and February 1974, and over the course of the year the supplier met its production target sixteen days ahead of schedule.²⁰ Producers of pulp also reported increases: for example, output of wheat straw pulp at Jiangnan Paper Mill (江南造纸厂) surpassed 21 tons per day by 1975 – a full 75 percent more than in 1963.²¹ With all these positives, what then caused the paper crisis that shook the stability of the publishing sector?

As alluded to in Chapter One, the crisis in part developed because of the shock to the system caused by the unexpected development of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Elite political leaders only decided to launch the nationwide movement in early 1974, meaning that publishers did not make any allowances for it in 1973 when planning their work for the coming year. The example of Shanghai People's Press suggests that publishers struggled to stay apace of rapidly changing publishing priorities and escalating demand for printed material. In April 1974, municipal officials estimated that Shanghai would use 22,164 tons of publishing paper in 1974 – almost fifty percent more than the 15,400 tons allocated by state planners – because they had used 1500 tons of paper to print materials for the campaign and needed another one thousand tons for the same purpose. With this usage, the extra 1100 tons assigned in the

¹⁹ "高举鞍钢宪法旗帜" [Raise high the standard of the An'gang Constitution]. *Chinese Papermaking* no. 5 (1974), 1.

²⁰ BMA 201-3-52, "北京市出版办公室关于出版用纸的申请报告" [Applications from the Beijing Publishing Office for publishing paper]; Beijing zaozhi yi chang 北京造纸一厂, "放手发动群众" [Relax the reins and mobilize the masses]. *Chinese Papermaking* no. 3 (1975), 1-3.

²¹ Shanghai jiangnan zaozhi chang 上海江南造纸厂, "改革制浆工艺" [Improve pulp-making methods]. *Shanghai Papermaking* no. 5 (1975), 11.

Ministry of Light Industry's February plan (table 5.1) promised to only partially alleviate the city's difficulties. Moreover, the shortfall threatened to be higher if local paper mills could not step-up production.²² In sum, the short-term pressure to print campaign materials left Shanghai People's Press confronting long-term consequences. Presuming Shanghai's experience typifies the national situation, central officials probably faced a beleaguering barrage of statistics as the resource cost of printing the Four Books became clear.

Beyond the fact that presses had to produce campaign materials on the fly, the graph does not convey how political campaigns inflated demand for paper far faster than production increased. Shanghai People's Press staff captured this reality in a telling sentence written for their 1975 review of their work: "Before the Cultural Revolution, if a book's print-run numbered several hundred-thousand copies this was a large number, and only a few books were printed in excess of one million copies. Nowadays, printing five to six hundred-thousand copies of a book is an everyday occurrence, and print-runs for a good number of books exceed one million copies" (文化大革命前, 一本书印几十万是很大的数字了, 超过百万的全国也没有几本。 现在, 一般书印五、六十万是常有的事, 超过百万的书也不少).²³ Besides escalating printruns, demand for paper also rose as publisher began to publish a wider range of titles to propagate political messages. For instance, in Wang Yaohua's exhaustive *A Bibliography of Material Published in Shanghai During the 'Cultural Revolution'* ("文革"时期上海图书出版总 目) the seven years between 1966 and 1972 cover just 208 pages, while entries for the four years

²² SMA B109-4-377-89, "上海市化工轻工供应公司革命委员会关于请求增拨批林批孔用纸的报告" [A report from the Shanghai Municipal Chemical Industry and Light Industry Supply Company Revolutionary Committee requesting allocating additional paper for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign].

²³ SMA B167-3-279-19, "上海人民出版社基本情况介绍(修改稿)" [A summary of the general situation at Shanghai People's Press (revised draft)].

between 1973 and 1976 occupy 256 pages.²⁴ The situation in Beijing mirrored Shanghai: for the first half of 1974, printers produced fifty percent more books than in the first half of 1973, with demand for paper up 47.5% on the same period.²⁵ Remembering the statistic, mentioned above, that the state allocated 23,000 tons less of publishing paper for 1974, expanding publisher catalogues and larger print-runs clearly put pressure on supplies. Indeed, by the end of 1974, officials from Shanghai's light industry sector began speaking out against unbridled book publishing because they could already see that in 1975 demand for paper in the municipality would vastly outstrip expected supplies.²⁶

Beijing People's Press's expansion of its front catalogue to include campaign titles from various genres demonstrates the pressure anti-Confucianism placed on paper. In the second quarter of 1974, Beijing's printers churned out almost 4.6 million books (excluding textbooks) using 20,000 reams of paper. Among these, almost two million volumes related to campaign genres such as politics, philosophy, economics and history.²⁷ Although publishing of anti-Confucianism books in Beijing had not yet peaked, the numbers began to add up (see table 5.2). In sum, the press devoted almost 3,000 reams of paper to 665,000 copies of campaign books, inevitably forcing the cancellation or reduced printing of other planned titles.

²⁴ Wang, A Catalogue of Books Published in Shanghai.

²⁵ BMA 201-2-120, "北京市出版办公室 1974 年图书出版计划和季度出版统计表" [Tables from the Beijing Publishing Office of planned publishing for 1974 and publishing data for each quarter].
²⁶ SMA B109-4-398-165, "上海市化工轻工供应公司革命委员会关于 1975 年纸张排产、分配会议情况的汇报" [A comprehensive report from the Shanghai Municipal Chemical Industry and Light Industry Supply Company Revolutionary Committee regarding a meeting to allocate paper production and distribution for 1975].

²⁷ BMA 201-2-120.

Table 5.2: Titles published in Beijing relating to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, quarter 2, 1974.²⁸

Title	Print- Run	Print-run Paper Usage (Reams)
Workers, Peasants and Soldiers are Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius, Volume 3 工农兵批林批孔 (三)	50,000	165
Never Permit Anyone to Defame the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Workers, Peasants and Soldiers are Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius, Volume 4) 无产阶级文化大革命不容诋毁(工农兵批林批孔 (四))	10,000	32
<i>The Soviet Revisionist-Traitor Group and Old Confucius</i> 苏修叛徒集团和孔老二	10,000	12
Focus on Summarizing Experiences and Deepen the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign 注意总结 经验、深入批林批孔	10,000	24
Read Earnestly, Study Seriously, and Deepen the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign 认真看书 学习深入批林批孔	35,000	84
<i>Lin Biao and Confucius are Reactionaries who Wished to Reverse the Course of History</i> 林彪孔丘都是开历 史倒车的反动派	60,000	61
Emphasize Revolution in the Superstructure: The Confucian-Legalist Struggle Throughout History (重 视上层建筑领域的革命——历史上儒法斗争)	330,000	1984
Han Fei: The Celebrated Legalist 法家杰出代表—— 韩菲	150,000	377
Total	665,000	2739

More tragically, perhaps, in Beijing and other cities valuable paper supplies were often squandered printing bland, unoriginal campaign paperbacks. Blandness characterizes Chinese publishing in this period and was certainly not unique to books made for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. For example, in 1970, publishers released 2773 titles nationwide, of which eighty percent consisted of reprinted propaganda articles first published elsewhere. In the politics genre, 993 of 1843 titles anthologized articles or study materials first published in

²⁸ This table is based on figures in ibid.

nationally-circulated newspapers and periodicals. Collectively, 912 million volumes of these 993 titles rolled off presses, using 42,000 tons of paper.²⁹ Publishing staff in Beijing knew that poorquality books – those reprinting or replicating content from other media – wasted huge amounts of paper and had little appeal to readers. An internal note from September 1975 recommended "focusing on producing a few quality, useful titles rather than a large number of different titles" (不要追求品种, 应注意书的质量和使用价值). The author starkly sketched the typical lifecycle of a Beijing People's Press title: "the editors pluck material from newspapers, the publishers send copies to languish at the city bookstore, the city bookstore sends them to its branches where nobody buys them, and the bookstore eventually sends them back for pulping. What a waste of paper" (说北京人民出版社的东西, 剪报纸, 出书后就往市店塞, 市店就往 区、县店发, 卖不出去, 送造纸厂, 糟踏了不少纸张).³⁰ The note also remarked how Beijing's offerings compared unfavorably with the popular, often more original, books published in Shanghai.³¹ Because copying political content took little time and because so many presses did this, a plethora of unoriginal, poor-quality products propelled demand for paper upward.

Many examples of paper-hungry, content-poor books reinforce the above picture of paper used in the pursuit of abject sterility. In February 1974, Henan People's Press printed 200,000 copies of *Reference Materials for Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius* (批林批孔参考材料). The preface states that the editors chose material from national and regional newspapers to help campaign participants understand key terms and ideas. The forty printed pages of this duplicated content come sandwiched between covers designed for convenience rather than luster (see figure

²⁹ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 37.

³⁰ BMA 201-2-164, "北京市出版办公室关于出版发行方面的通知以及对所属书店关于发行工作的批 复" [Notices from Beijing Publishing Office concerning publishing and book distribution, as well its replies to enquiries from subsidiary bookstores]. ³¹ Ibid.

5.2).³² Despite Beijing's positive opinion of books published in Shanghai, Shanghai People's Press' *Study Earnestly, Criticize Continuously* (认真学 深入批) is 43,000 characters of content culled entirely from newspapers and magazines. The publisher saw fit to print 100,000 copies, using over 200 reams of paper in the process.³³ *Lin Biao Was an All-Out Follower of Old Confucius!*, released by People's Press, is yet another dry collection of reprinted articles offering readers nothing new to chew on.³⁴ Throughout the campaign, publishers dedicated too much precious paper to churning out boiler-plate books with the same shopworn content.

³² Henan renmin chubanshe 河南人民出版社, ed., 批林批孔参考资料 [*Reference Materials for Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius*] (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1974).

³³ Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, ed., 认真学深入批——批林批孔的初步经验汇编 [Study Earnestly, Criticize Continuously: A Collection of Early Experiences in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign], (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974).

³⁴ Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, ed., 林彪是地地道道的孔老二的信徒 [Lin Biao Was an All-Out Follower of Old Confucius!] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1974).




Figure 5.2: The uninspiring front cover of *Reference Materials for Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius* published by Henan People's Press.

Publishers specializing in subjects far removed from anti-Confucianism also stoked demand for paper with books forcing tenuous connections to campaign themes. Petro-Chemical Industries Press (石油化学工业出版社), for example, brought out a small volume making elaborate links between the petro-chemical industries and the Confucian-Legalist rivalry. Amongst other points, it argued that Confucians had delayed the development of oil and natural gas exploitation in China.³⁵ The 5,300 copies in the first printing used around 8 reams of paper –

³⁵ Shiyou huaxue gongye bu shiyou huagong kexue yanjiu suo zonghe yanjiu suo yi shi lilun xiaozu 石油 化学工业部石油化工科学研究所综合研究所一室理论小组, 儒法斗争与石油 [Oil and the Confucian-Legalist Struggle] (Beijing: Shiyou huaxue gongye chubanshe, 1975), 26.

while a small amount, this number epitomizes how the politics of the campaign legitimized and demanded such a wasteful use of resources.³⁶ Likewise, two presses released titles framing the history of Chinese water conservancy (水利) against a backdrop of anti-Confucianism. One of these missives enjoyed a first printing of almost 25,000, while 50,000 copies of the other rolled off presses under the People's Education Press imprint.³⁷ These titles gave presses a contemporary political relevance and a safe political reputation both purchased with scarce paper supplies.

If wasteful printing had remained the sole prerogative of official publishing houses, paper shortages may not have become unmanageable. The unbridled printing, however, of almost endless numbers of books and other propaganda by all types of political, economic and social organizations – from central government departments down to ordinary workplaces – all but guaranteed the gap between supply and demand. As Fei-Hsien Wang has shown for the early 1950s, the CCP regarded private publishers as "as a potential threat to the party's monopoly on ideological truth."³⁸ Yet, by the 1970s, senior publishing officials saw non-publishing organizations and their endemic printing as the greater threat to the sustainability and efficiency of the propaganda state. A 1973 State Council notice restricted any units besides publishers formally publishing books, to counter the appearance of low-quality, error-ridden titles.³⁹ A later instruction issued a couple of years after the end of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius

³⁶ Shiyou huaxue gongye bu, *Oil*, copyright page.

³⁷ Shuili dianli bu zhengzhi bu xuanchuan chu 水利电力部政治部宣传处, ed., 法家路线与水利 [*The Legalist Line and Water Conservancy*] (Beijing: Shuili dianli chubanshe, 1975), copyright page; Wuhan shuili dianli xueyuan bianxie zu 武汉水利电力学院编写组, 儒法斗争与我国古代水利事业的发展 [*The Confucian-Legalist Struggle and the Development of Our Country's Ancient Water Conservancy Projects*] (Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1974), copyright page (physical copy held at the Universities Service Centre for Chinese Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong). ³⁸ Wang, "A Crime of Being Self-interested," 275.

³⁹ Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Yunnan juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Yunnan Volume*, 82; Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 148-149.

campaign banned a wide range of organizations from printing their own books for sale and prohibited state book printers from completing work for any unit other than an official publishing house.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the central government prohibited both the reprinting of informal anthologies of newspaper articles and the mass duplication of the same content in different publications, specifically highlighting the waste of paper these activities engendered.⁴¹ In its eyes, all levels of China's political, social and economic bureaucracy shared culpability: "at present, from the ministries of the State Council right the way down to grassroots units, China is drowning in official documents, reports, internal publications, meeting notes and self-published study materials" (现在,从国务院各部委到地方各级单位,普遍存在着公文多、简报多、 内部刊物多、会议文件多、自印学习材料多的'五多'现象"). Some of these materials possessed little or no use, while others circulated nationwide in huge print-runs.⁴² In the post-Mao period, the lesson learnt from years of political campaigns could not be clearer: the right to publish books belonged to publishers alone.⁴³

A post-Mao central directive's belief that the masses should "value paper" (爱惜纸张) could just as readily apply to organizations printing their own materials during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.⁴⁴ My collection includes dozens of volumes not issued by state publishers, and the quantity of different titles produced between the beginning of anti-Confucian critiques in late 1973 and the end of the campaign in 1976 must easily exceed number in the tens of thousands (see figure 5.3). Several examples serve to show the quantity, and unoriginality, of these books. In October 1974, the newspaper *The Tianjin Daily* (天津日报) printed a three-

⁴⁰ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 247-248.

⁴¹ Ibid., 247-248 and 290.

⁴² Ibid., 290-291 and 293.

⁴³ Ibid., 292.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 294.

volume set of campaign study materials totaling over 1100 pages.⁴⁵ A collection of articles issued by *Nanchang Daily* uses a lot of paper for 388 pages of material mostly plucked from other sources.⁴⁶ Likewise, *A History of the Struggle Against Confucianism Waged by the Working People* (劳动人民反孔斗争史话) produced by a grassroots Party committee openly acknowledges that all material is excerpted from the *Tianjin Daily*.⁴⁷ Finally, at Hangzhou University, in the first two months of the campaign the institution's official campaign office printed seven volumes of materials, with some issues exceeding 100 pages in length.⁴⁸ In simple terms, every sheet of paper used to print these materials left one less sheet for official publishers.

⁴⁵ Tianjin ribao bianji bu 天津日报编辑部, ed., 天津日报通讯 4: 批林批孔特辑 [*The Tianjin Daily Bulletin Number 4: A Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Special Edition*], 3 volumes (Tianjin: Tianjin ribao she, 1974).

⁴⁶ Nanchang ribao she 南昌日报社. 学习资料——批林批孔文选(第三集) [*Study Materials: Selected Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius (Part 3)*] (Nanchang: Nanchang ribao she, [1974?]).

⁴⁷ Zhonggong Neijiang diwei pilinpikong bangongshi 中共内江地委批林批孔办公室, ed., 劳动人民反 孔斗争史话 [*A History of the Struggle Against Confucianism Waged by the Working People*] (Np.: Zhonggong Neijiang diwei pilinpikong bangongshi, 1974).

⁴⁸ Hangzhou daxue pilinpikong bangongshi 杭州大学批林批孔办公室, ed. 批林批孔资料 [*Materials for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign*], volumes 4-7 (Hangzhou: Hangzhou daxue pilinpikong bangongshi, 1974).



Figure 5.3: a selection from my collection of unofficially-official volumes produced during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.⁴⁹

With ready access to the public purse, grassroots organizations could binge-buy propaganda material and fuel further printing in a vicious circle. Once again, criticisms made in the later 1970s typify the reality of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign period. After Mao's death, government officials lambasted how factories, schools, party branches and other organizations commonly bought books, newspapers and magazines with state funds (公费). In 1977, this public money financed half of all book purchases made from Xinhua bookstores nationwide and two-thirds of all periodicals dispatched to subscribers by Beijing's postal system. Such astonishing figures show that organizational purchase of large amounts of printed material

⁴⁹ These materials are now all housed at UC San Diego in the Geisel Library's Special Collections and Archives department.

had become completely normal by the 1970s.⁵⁰ In 1978, the government restricted organizations to buying only essential books and relevant newspapers with public funds, and in the same year *The People's Daily* pointedly reprinted a letter to the editor describing how, across the country, surfeits of newly-purchased and unnecessary material slowly gathered dust in workplaces or went straight for recycling.⁵¹ With Mao-era organizations likewise able to spend lavishly on printed material, demand for publications and the resources needed to make them could only skyrocket.

Ironically, books like those in figure 5.3 sometimes competed with material published by proper state publishers, leaving valuable paper tied-up in remaindered stock. For example, in Spring 1974 Beijing People's Press released some school language textbooks themed around the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Local authorities in the city's Haidian district, however, had the same idea, manufacturing their own materials and sending them on to other districts. Combined with student under-enrollment, this competition between titles left Xinhua Bookstores in Beijing with surplus holdings of the officially-sanctioned textbooks.⁵² Eventually, Xinhua pulped the now out-of-date books and press staff were left ruing the waste of paper.⁵³

⁵⁰ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 290.

⁵¹ Ibid., 292; Zhang Xiaoyi 张笑一 and Li Chenglin 李成林, "不要用公款买书订报发给个人" [Do not use public money to buy books and subscribe to periodicals for personal use]. *The People's Daily*, October 9, 1978, 2.

⁵² BMA 201-2-164.

⁵³ Ibid. Student underenrollment is an unknown but important variable in Mao-era publishing. As other documents in the same file folder show, in Spring 1975, Beijing once again experienced underenrollment, leaving some textbooks as dead stock in bookstores. These also went for pulping.

Paper Perils: Underproduction, Missed Deliveries, and the Instability of Supply Chains

Clearly, sizeable print-runs and endemic printing by both official publishers and other organizations placed huge demand on China's limited paper resources. Alongside increased consumption of paper and wasteful printing, severe production difficulties compounded the paper shortage and threatened the stability of propaganda publishing for the duration of the campaign. Publisher archives document dramatic production shortfalls and state efforts to address shortages of critical raw materials, giving the impression that the propaganda state rested on decidedly shaky ground. I argue that the state's power and its political projects relied perilously on paper's availability.

While some paper mills issued glowing production figures in early 1974, many sites struggled to stay on-target. By June, the government knew that output fluctuated enormously across the country.⁵⁴ Under-production of paper – even small amounts – contributed to sizeable warehouse deficits not easily made-up later. In the capital, fifty tons of paper due in Beijing from Hubei Province's Hanyang Paper Mill (汉阳纸厂) in January 1974 never materialized.⁵⁵ For the first two months of 1974, Shanghai's Xinhua Paper Mill (新华造纸厂) and Lihua Paper Mill (利华造纸厂) made only 1801 tons of their 2300-ton target.⁵⁶ Shanghai People's Press was no-doubt thankful for a May telegram from municipal officials informing them that paper production in April had improved, but progress did not equate to eliminating the historical deficit.⁵⁷ Around this time, the Ministry of Finance even allowed some provinces and municipalities to eliminate taxation on publishing paper in order to promote production and keep

⁵⁴ "Raise high the standard of the An'gang Constitution," 1.

⁵⁵ BMA 201-3-52.

⁵⁶ SMA B167-3-253-15.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

publishers well-supplied.⁵⁸ In the campaign's first year, therefore, the publishing sector already found itself caught between high demand for paper and underwhelming mill output.

As the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign matured into a long-term publishing genre, the paper lifeblood of propaganda production continued to dwindle. Warehouse stockpiles experienced "massive decline" (大幅度下降) and publishers inundated the NBP with urgent requests for supplies.⁵⁹ Planned state allocations of paper for 1975 had already not been generous. Publishers and media outlets needed 270,000 tons of newsprint and 340,000 tons of publishing paper, but the state had only promised 220,000 tons and 250,000 tons respectively. Even worse, the amount of paper planners allocated for publishing normal books fell by almost 21,000 tons on the 1974 level, squeezing the activities of publishers even further.⁶⁰ Compounding these contractions, in the first quarter of 1975 seven key mills responsible for onethird of China's publishing paper output underperformed by over 9,700 tons.⁶¹ By this point, publishers and media organizations had been steadily using stockpiled paper for almost two years to compensate for shortfalls.⁶² The NBP vaguely urged publishers to save paper, reduce paper losses, and "rationally determine" (合理确定) the print-run of each title, but in an acknowledgement of the crisis the government also launched several construction projects to increase publishing paper production by 33,000 tons per year.⁶³

⁵⁸ BMA 148-2-80, "财政部、本局关于对部分产品减免工商税的通知" [A notice from the Ministry of Finance and the local tax bureau regarding eliminating taxes on some products].

⁵⁹ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 248; BMA 201-3-83, "北京市出版办公室关于出版 用纸的请示、报告通知等" [Reports, notices and other materials from the Beijing Publishing Office related to publishing paper].

⁶⁰ BMA 201-3-83.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² SMA B109-3-223-60, "国务院批转轻工业部关于新闻纸凸版纸等重要纸张生产问题的报告" [A report from the Ministry of Light Industry, forwarded by the State Council, discussing important challenges for the production of newsprint and publishing paper].

⁶³ BMA 201-3-83; SMA B109-3-223-60.

While the Mao-era slowly drew to a close, paper production never recovered and publishers never escaped from their precarious predicament. As of the end of October 1975, Zhejiang Province had only met 40 percent of its annual paper production target, while Fujian Province recorded a passably better (but still worryingly low) 55 percent. Officials in Jiangsu Province now considered missing thirty percent of their annual production target a qualified success, indicating how difficulties had dramatically lowered production expectations. Some regions had exhausted their paper reserves, and Zhejiang resorted to appropriating 30,000 reams reserved for printing Mao's writings to supply other projects.⁶⁴ A lack of direct control over papermakers was also hampering publisher efforts to secure the resources they needed. At an inter-provincial meeting held late in the year, officials reported that many paper mills were opting to produce products other than publishing paper because the latter yielded little to no profit.⁶⁵ Overall, during the whole of 1975, China's paper mills accrued a 35,000-ton deficit in publishing paper output.⁶⁶ This enormous shortfall left demand far outstripping supply.

Given this holistic picture of an industry in turmoil, historians should not be misled by stories of individual production successes and year-on-year growth. As already mentioned, production levels varied wildly and strong performances by some mills buoyed production data and may have stoked false hope. For example, figures for January and February 1976 (available to the government in late March) showed that nationwide publishing paper output increased by seventeen percent to 45,000 tons compared to the first two months of 1975. On-target performances in Beijing, Tianjin, Jilin and several other regions contributed to this seemingly positive trend. We need to remember, however, that despite this comparative growth,

⁶⁴ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 296.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ SMA B109-3-248-73.

countrywide production still fell short of *target* levels, meaning that many publishers consistently received less paper than they needed and expected. In the first two months of 1976, for instance, the 45,000 tons of publishing paper which left mills for delivery represented only 68 percent of the state's target; in other words, publishers had to contend with missed deliveries worth 21,000 tons.⁶⁷ The figure of 17 percent year-on-year growth was no real cause for celebration.

As I will show time and again in this chapter, under-production had real world consequences for propaganda publishing. By 1976, some areas could not publish important titles due to a lack of paper, while elsewhere printers short of options continued to raid special paper stocks (amassed as strategic wartime reserves) in order to cover supply deficits. Although this chapter focuses on book publishing, similar problems with newsprint supplies left some provinces and cities unable to print enough copies of *The People's Daily*. For their part, central officials could do little besides plead with local areas to ensure important production facilities had adequate supplies of raw materials and equipment.⁶⁸

Why all these problems? As the pleadings of central officials highlight, production peril partly stemmed from a lack of ancillary raw materials. Industrial papermaking requires a steady supply of energy, water, chemicals and other resources. For example, Guangzhou Paper Mill (广州造纸厂) consumed as much as 50,000 cubic meters of water per day in March 1974.⁶⁹ Inconsistencies or interruptions in supply quickly jeopardized mill operations. In Shanghai, Xinhua Paper Mill and Lihua Paper Mill experienced trouble in February 1974 with the air supply pumped into the factories, causing an immediate drop in the amount of paper they could

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ "Six Chinese Paper Mills." Pulp and Paper International (July 1976), 33.

send to Shanghai People's Press.⁷⁰ Likewise, in April a mill making paper out of rice straw from Shanghai's farms reported difficulties finding the 200 tons of coal per month it needed to operate.⁷¹ As a sign of the threat such shortages posed to papermaking, the central government regularly exhorted provinces to waste as little as possible.⁷² In mid-June, a national roundtable on supplying paper for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign explicitly praised provinces such as Shandong province for reducing its consumption of papermaking chemicals. Conference delegates were encouraged to emulate Shandong's example in their own locales and thereby curtail demand for scarce raw materials.⁷³

Yet despite the government's urging, the danger posed by shortages of input materials never abated. A lack of electricity, chemicals and fuel led mills to miss the national 1974 production target. Moreover, for the first quarter of 1975, publishing paper output dropped eighteen percent on the same period for 1974. Barely one third of the way through the year, the Ministry of Light Industry already forecast that paper production would only reach 70-80 percent of the target amount by year-end. Central officials asked provinces to use "every conceivable means" (千万百计) to increase paper production, stating that "quarter two must see significant increases" (第二季度一定要大上). They also ordered local governments to protect all land providing reeds and other raw material for papermaking.⁷⁴ In the archives, these directions read

⁷⁰ SMA B167-3-253, "人民出版社关于纸张申请、调拨和使用等问题报告及上海市革委会文教组的 意见" [Reports from Shanghai People's Press regarding applying for, transferring, and using paper, as well as the viewpoints of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee Culture and Education Group].

⁷¹ SMA B109-4-398-70, "上海市化工轻工供应公司革命委员会关于上海农场生产凸版纸存在问题的 报告" [A report from the Shanghai Municipal Chemical Industry and Light Industry Supply Company Revolutionary Committee concerning current problems at Shanghai's farms producing publishing paper].
⁷² SMA B167-3-253-15.

⁷³ "Raise high the standard of the An'gang Constitution," 2.

⁷⁴ SMA B109-3-223-60.

as aspirational directions issued by bureaucrats unable to effectively intervene in day-to-day production.

Moreover, the concentration of production in a few major mills amplified the impact of raw material shortages at any one site. Seven mills accounted for one third of all publishing paper output.⁷⁵ With supply dependent on this small number of key factories, problems at one of these inflicted a significant blow on total output. In May 1975, government officials specifically called on local governments to arrange coal supplies for two mills, implying that a lack of coal had affected their output.⁷⁶ By July 1975, efforts to tackle shortages of ancillary raw materials had helped sixteen publishing paper and newsprint mills stabilize their electricity supply and their paper output, but improvement remained very uneven.⁷⁷ Even in the following year, insufficiencies of electricity, coal, oil and chemicals continued to hamper production.⁷⁸ For instance, a shortage of aqueous chlorine (液氣) left one Beijing mill only able to produce twenty percent of its yearly paper target in the first five months of 1976.⁷⁹ By July, with half the year elapsed, the mill had completed only forty percent and Beijing's publishers expressed serious doubts to city leadership that book publishing could continue as planned.⁸⁰

Dire straits pushed factories to trial various ways to use resources more efficiently, further demonstrating how the health of propaganda production depended on the state of

⁷⁵ Ibid. The newsprint factories were found in Yibing 宜宾, Guangzhou 广州, Nanping 南平, Fuzhou 福州, Jilin 吉林, Shixian 石岘 and Qiqihar 齐齐哈尔, along with one near the Yalu River 鸭绿江 and one in Jiangxi 江西 province. The seven mills producing publishing paper were based in Jincheng 金城, Yingkou 营口, Dandong 丹东, Tianjin 天津, Yueyang 岳阳, and Hanyang 汉阳, along with one on the Liu River 柳江.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ BMA 201-3-83.

⁷⁸ SMA B109-3-248-73.

⁷⁹ BMA 201-3-108, "北京市出版办公室关于出版用纸的报告" [Reports from the Beijing Publishing Office regarding publishing paper].

⁸⁰ Ibid.

industrial technology and research. In a 1975 issue of the magazine Shanghai Papermaking (上 海造纸), Shanghai Songjiang Pulp Plant (上海松江纸制浆厂) described how it had saved an average of 25 kilograms of coal per ton of pulp output and increased production rates by almost 50 percent compared to 1974 levels.⁸¹ Over in Shandong's Ye (掖) county, the local mill invented a new piece of sieving equipment to filter more impurities from the wheat stalks (麦草) sourced locally to make paper. This raised pulp extraction (as a proportion of the inputted wheat stalks) to almost 40 percent and concomitantly reduced the amount of alkali chemical used in pulping.⁸²

Elsewhere, mills reported other successful reductions in the amount of expensive alkali needed in the papermaking process. In addition to progress in Guangzhou, one Hunanese mill cut alkali consumption per ton of pulp output from 345 kilograms in 1973 to 309 kilograms in 1975.⁸³ Shanghai's Jiangnan Paper Mill pushed the same figure down to just 267.3 kg in 1975, while increasing the proportion of pulp extracted from raw materials to nearly 40 percent. While Jiangnan Paper Mill's changes increased consumption of coal and electricity, sourcing these resources cost significantly less than purchasing industrial chemicals.⁸⁴ Across the country, various papermaking journals featured these experiments to help other mills streamline production and make it more sustainable.

⁸² Qing gongye bu zaozhi gongye shuang ge diaocha zu 轻工业部造纸工业双革调查组,"山东掖县造纸 厂提高麦草浆收获率降低碱耗的几点做法" [Several ways Shandong Ye County Papermill improved wheat stalk extraction and reduced alkali consumption]. Chinese Papermaking no. 6 (1975), 15-18. ⁸³ "我省造纸行业推广优选法成果显著" [Our province has achieved obvious success with our improved papermaking methods]. Guangdong Papermaking Technology Bulletin no. 1 (1975), 19; Lingling zaozhi er chang 零陵造纸二厂,"关于生产凸版纸节约碱耗小结" [A summary of how we reduced alkali consumption while making publishing paper]. Hunan Papermaking Bulletin no. 3 (1975), 1.

⁸¹ Shanghai songjiang zhijiang chang 上海松江制浆厂,"自力更生打四仗 小改小革出成果" [Fight on four fronts in the battle to be self-reliant, and win successes from small changes and small reforms]. Shanghai Papermaking no. 5 (1975), 2-3.

⁸⁴ Shanghai jiangnan zaozhi chang, "Improve pulp-making methods," 11 and 18-19.

Paralleling shortages of ancillary materials, unsteady supplies of wood pulp (木浆) further hurt production. Papermaking requires a lot of organic material – as a guide, a mill in Nanping needed 220,000 cubic meters of wood from 4000 plantation acres to produce 38,000 tons of newsprint per year.⁸⁵ Despite the state's dependency on paper, however, by the 1970s the papermaking industry still had few dedicated plantations and remained almost completely reliant on the forestry industry to supply wood. This lack of dedicated forests prompted researchers from Guangdong province to recommend developing special plantations for growing trees in the journal *Chinese Papermaking* (中国造纸).⁸⁶ While the government began a series of projects to increase pulp production by 139,000 tons, these served as long-term solutions rather than shortterm fixes, and looking ahead to 1975, state planners estimated that pulp allocations would decrease by almost 46,000 tons compared to the 216,000 tons expected for 1974.⁸⁷

With dedicated plantations promising no immediate yields, papermakers resorted to using organic material wherever they could find it. Even in a first-tier area such as Shanghai, the municipality's paper partly derived from leftover straw (稻草) recovered from nearby farms, with four tons of straw making one ton of paper.⁸⁸ This creative use of an agricultural byproduct epitomizes papermakers' willingness to exploit every avenue to meet production quotas. In Beijing, papermakers estimated that proper management of nearby untapped poplar forests could yield 70,000-80,000 cubic meters of wood each year within a decade.⁸⁹ They also argued that

⁸⁵ Nonglin bu linye ju 农林部林业局, ed., 大力开展工矿造林 [Energetically Begin Mining for Afforestation] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1976), 97.

⁸⁶"关于建立木浆用材林基地的问题" [The question of building new plantations to provide materials for wood pulp production]. *Chinese Papermaking* no. 1 (1974), 35-36 and 54.

⁸⁷ SMA B109-3-223-60; SMA B109-4-398-165.

⁸⁸ SMA B109-4-398-70.

⁸⁹ Beijing shi zaozhi zongchang 北京市造纸总厂 et al., "北京地区七种杨木用作造纸原料的鉴定试验" [Appraising the suitability of using seven types of poplar tree in the Beijing area for paper production]. *Chinese Papermaking* no. 5 (1976), 21.

poplars planted around Beijing's suburbs after 1949 to beautify roads (公路绿化林) could be gradually thinned in fifteen-year cycles to yield 20,000 – 30,000 cubic meters of wood each year. With the agriculture and forestry industries uninterested in using poplar, the wood stood ready for the taking. Scientific testing suggested that an annual supply of 100,000 tons of poplar wood could yield 20,000 tons of chemical pulp for publishing paper. Decimating the city's natural and man-made landscapes promised to ameliorate all of Beijing's paper woes.⁹⁰

One final solution entailed using materials more efficiency without sacrificing too much quality. Multiple experiments with newsprint – cheaper and more transient than publishing paper – attempted to make more with less, thereby freeing up resources such as pulp for other types of papermaking. First, in 1973 Jilin Paper Mill (吉林造纸厂) produced usable newsprint between 5 and 8 g/m² lighter than the industry standard. Lowering paper density promised savings of one cubic meter of wood per 87,000-154,000 newsprint sheets.⁹¹ Second, scientists in Beijing began researching how to de-ink and reuse waste newsprint. By November 1975, two major regional dailies had successfully used de-inked newsprint made in the experiment for printing.⁹² Yet, while lower-density newsprint and recycling collectively promised to alleviate paper woes, they once again served as long-term solutions rather than immediate stabilizing measures. In sum, papermaking's search for a secure future grew out of its less-than-secure present.

Discussion of two other factors – the first being outdated technology – completes this picture of how paper shortages came to threaten the health of propaganda production in the mid-1970s. Despite modernization programs, the papermaking industry remained dependent on dated

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ "动态" [The current situation]. Chinese Papermaking no. 1 (1978), 55-57.

⁹² Beijing zaozhi zongchang 北京造纸总厂 et al., "废报纸脱墨再制新闻纸的试验" [Experimenting with de-inking waste paper and re-using it to create newsprint]. *Chinese Papermaking* no. 1 (1976), 10-16.

equipment. For instance, production at Shanghai's Xinhua Paper Mill suffered because its old equipment could not deliver paper of a consistent quality.⁹³ In early 1974, the nearby Lihua Paper Mill – one of the city's principle publishing paper suppliers – consistently produced paper one sixth thicker than standard stock. Because book-binding processes could not use paper of variable thicknesses concurrently, Lihua's problems made printing much more complicated.⁹⁴ Production of overweight publishing paper and newsprint wasted large amounts of valuable pulp that could otherwise have made additional paper.⁹⁵

The second factor – paper wasted through errors, transportation difficulties and freak environmental occurrences – became more significant in an industry already strapped for paper. Of Beijing's paper budget for 1974, five percent represented paper written-off during the production process, including for losses and errors.⁹⁶ Extant copies of campaign propaganda suggest errors occurred frequently across the nationwide printing sector. For example, in two copies of *Essays Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume 1*, the leaf for pages 79 and 80 has been printed separately and glued into the book. The same defect, however, is not visible in other copies – in other words, something went wrong mid-production which forced the printing press to substitute the original leaf with a replacement printed specially.⁹⁷ Similarly, a copy of *Commentary and Annotations on Selected Texts Concerning the Confucian-Legalist Struggle: Pre-Qin Volume* published in Sichuan begins with page 61 and has pages ripped-out elsewhere. Comparing this copy with another from the Shanghai Library suggests that the former was

⁹³ SMA B45-5-236-9, "上海新华造纸厂简介" [A short introduction to Shanghai's Xinhua Paper Mill]. ⁹⁴ SMA B167-3-253.

⁹⁵ Li Jiayou 李嘉友, "新闻纸生产中值得重视的发展趋势" [A new development worth noting in newsprint production]. *Chinese Papermaking* no. 1 (1978), 39. ⁹⁶ BMA 201-3-52.

⁹⁷ See my two copies of Shanghai renmin chubanshe, *Essays Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume 1*.

printed without the correct number of signatures or with the signatures in the wrong order.⁹⁸ Alongside this waste, sources tell of paper spoiling in transit to printing presses due to inadequate packaging.⁹⁹ Finally, the Tangshan earthquake in summer 1976 forced some mills to ship paper by sea rather than overland – water and paper did not mix well.¹⁰⁰ The earthquake also disrupted supplies of pulp from Tianjin to Beijing, further exacerbating paper shortages in the capital.¹⁰¹

With Mao and his Cultural Revolution both dead by 1977, the NBP had the political room to assess the extent of the 1973-1976 paper crisis, and its estimates reveal the full severity of shortages. The period's 21,000-ton deficit in newsprint production pales into comparison alongside the 190,000 tons of publishing paper that mills had failed to deliver.¹⁰² To provide some context, this shortfall represented *twice* the amount of publishing paper allocated for nationwide book publishing in 1974 (see Chapter One). From the paper perspective, propaganda publishing during the twilight years of the Mao era had limped on rather than ridden high.

Solving the crisis, however, was not just a matter of regime change. In keeping with the political tenor of the times, government officials ascribed the deficits of previous years to the deviant course of Cultural Revolution-era publishing more generally.¹⁰³ Yet, as the final chapter of this dissertation makes clear, many structural problems persisted across the Mao-era divide. For instance, in 1977, the publishing sector expected to receive 540,000 tons of newsprint and

⁹⁸ Xi'nan shifan xueyuan zhongwenxi 西南师范学院中文系, 历代儒法斗争文选评注——先秦部分 [Commentary and Annotations on Selected Texts Concerning the Confucian-Legalist Struggle: Pre-Qin Volume] (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1974).

⁹⁹ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 289-290.

¹⁰⁰ SMA G20-2-274-1, "中共文汇报委员会关于本报用纸告急的情况报告" [A report from the Wenhui Daily Party Committee regarding extreme shortages of newsprint].

¹⁰¹ BMA 201-3-108. As of September 1976, Beijing was still owed almost 40 percent (2007 tons) of its expected supply of paper from its suppliers.

¹⁰² Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 92.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 289.

publishing paper from mills, but only 480,000 tons materialized.¹⁰⁴ Papermaking generated little profit, and officials suspected that mills – especially smaller ones –were deliberately hoarding product to trade for other items like cars or using their production capacity to make more profitable goods.¹⁰⁵ The persistent link between publishing, politics and paper ensured that propaganda production remained perilously unstable for years to come.¹⁰⁶ The strenuous conditions of the 1970s – political unpredictability, escalating demand for paper, unsustainable production processes, and waste – sowed a decade of fragility at the heart of the propaganda state.

The Paper Crisis and the Demise of Campaign Publishing in Beijing

In the knowledge that paper ran short, we can no longer take the production of any propaganda in the late Cultural Revolution for granted. But how did paper shortages specifically affect the course of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign? Although we will never know exactly how much printed matter was *not* produced due to shortages, archives from Beijing People's Press, as well as printed books themselves, tell a story of overly-expansive publishing in the capital followed by tumult and contraction. As publishers tried to sell the Maoist state's last great political campaign, propaganda production had never been more necessary and more difficult. Shortages and competing priorities gradually curtailed early visions of mass dissemination, eventually transforming anti-Confucian publishing into a niche genre.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 290.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 94 and 290.

¹⁰⁶ For documents on post-Mao paper supply problems, see BMA 201-3-184, "北京市出版局关于出版用 纸向国家出版局的申请报告" [An application from the Beijing Municipal Publishing Bureau to the National Bureau of Publishing for publishing paper].

In the campaign's early months, Beijing People's Press had one clear task: to promote the campaign's ideas via staggering quantities of books and pamphlets. At the end of February, staff reviewed materials already published and those in the pipeline, affording a glimpse of the rapid progress the press made in just a few weeks. For eight titles already published (not including the Four Books discussed in Chapter One), printers made a total of 1.17 million volumes, with runs for individual volumes ranging from 50,000 to 200,000. For a further 21 forthcoming titles, including such books as *Confucians and their Reactionary Ideology* (儒家和儒家的反动思想), the press wanted 100,000 of each, along with 200,000 of a book aimed at middle-school students. Even with these large quantities in play, staff reckoned that they would not satisfy demand from grassroots organizations and thus entertained thoughts of printing even more.¹⁰⁷ Significantly, at this early point in the campaign the press already flirted with danger: bar some stock set aside for printing Mao's writings in the future, it possessed an average of zero tons of publishing paper in reserve at its warehouse.¹⁰⁸

As the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign gradually lengthened to encompass new subplots and lines of attack, these developments put presses under further pressure to print supporting publications. By mid-year 1974, Beijing People's Press staff estimated their total consumption of paper for the year to be over 200,000 reams – a figure far exceeding their allocation from the state.¹⁰⁹ As indicated in plans for the third quarter of 1974, they intended to spend almost 7000 reams printing 18 titles and 2.77 million books on anti-Confucianism (table 5.3). Discounting a large sum of paper assigned by the press for printing a novel and a book on

¹⁰⁷ BMA 201-3-52. Note on this source: the document has a column called "计划印数": this refers to both the the number of volumes already printed and planned future print-runs.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

Chinese medicine, campaign books accounted for as much as one third of projected day-to-day paper consumption in the quarter.¹¹⁰ A request from Beijing to the NBP for an extra 1234 tons of paper (on top of the 5516 tons already apportioned to them by the state) foreboded the shortages which would dog publishing for the next few years.¹¹¹

Shortages may well have prompted staff to scale-back the campaign in print when anti-Confucianism titles finally went to press. Table 5.3 shows that, for titles where their final printing figure is known, Beijing People's Press sometimes followed through on its print-run estimates or even, in the case of *The Reactionary Life of Confucius*, printed more. Yet, at the same time, the print-run of *Legalists of the Spring & Autumn and Warring States Periods* was cut by 75 percent, and printers made 50,000 fewer copies of *The Historical Regressivism of the Confucian Academic Clique* than initially proposed. This suggests not a publisher awash with resources but a publisher forced to make hard choices.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

Title	Proposed Length (Leaves)	Proposed Print- Run	Estimated Paper Use (Reams)	Length of Published Version (Leaves)	Actual Print Run
An Introduction to Legalists 法家代表人物 介绍	24	500,000	750		
Supplementary Materials on the Confucian- Legalist Struggle 关于儒法斗争的辅导材料	32	200,000	402		
Tales of the Legalists 法家的故事 (published internally as 法家的故事(征求 意见稿)[Tales of the Legalists (Draft Version)])	120	85,000	633	120	No information
A Selection of Lu Xun's Criticisms of Confucius and Confucians 鲁迅批孔与批尊 孔言论选辑	46	30,000	88	46	30,000
Legalists of the Spring & Autumn and Warring States Periods 春秋战国时期的法 家	32	400,000	800	32	100,000
Several Documents Extolling the Way of Confucius and Mencius 几份宣扬孔孟之道 的材料 (published internally)	36	30,000	32	24	No information.
The Struggle of Legalists Against Confucians During the Spring & Autumn and Warring States Periods 春秋战国时期法家反对儒家 的斗争	No data	200,000	800		
A Commentary on the Opening Section of the "Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron" 盐 铁论本议讲解 (published as 《盐铁论·本 义》评注 [The Opening Section of the "Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron" with Commentary and Notes])	16	200,000	200	16	200,000
The Pro-Legalism and Anti-Confucianism Spirit of "On Feudalism" 封建论的尊法反 儒精神 ¹¹³	36	100,000	225	36	100,000
Wang Anshi: a Legalist of the Northern Song 北宋时期的法家——王安石 (published as 北宋的杰出法家——王安石 [Wang Anshi: An Outstanding Legalist of the Northern Song])	36	100,000	225	36	100,000
The Historical Regressivism of the Confucian Academic Clique 开历史倒车的 儒家学派	36	200,000	450	36	150,000

Table 5.3: Planned publications from Beijing People's Press relating to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, quarter 3, 1974.¹¹²

¹¹² This table is adapted from ibid. Information on actual leaf count and print-run size for each book comes from copies in my collection, on Duxiu.com, or on Kongfz.com. Note: the publisher sometimes significantly changed a book's title before publication, and I have left blanks where a title-change to a book left me unable to locate its final published version. ¹¹³ This is the second edition. The first edition was published in January 1974.

Table 5.3 (continued): Planned publications from Beijing People's Press relating to the Criticize
Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, quarter 3, 1974.

Title	Proposed Length (Leaves)	Proposed Print- Run	Estimated Paper Use (Reams)	Length of Published Version (Leaves)	Actual Print Run
The "Three Character Classic" is a Deceptive Classic Written to Peddle the Way of Confucius and Mencius 三字经是贩卖孔 孟之道的骗人经	20	100,000	125	20	100,000
On Qin Shi Huang 论秦始皇	64	300,000	1200		
<i>The Reactionary Life of Confucius</i> 孔丘反动的一生	48	50,000	150	64	100,000
Selections from the Analects with Commentary 论语选批	36	100,000	225	18	100,000
<i>Mencius: The Saint of the Reactionary Class</i> 反动阶级的亚圣——孟轲	36	70,000	158		
Resolutely Use a Class Perspective to Research "The Dream of the Red Chamber" 坚持用阶级观点研究红楼梦	90	80,000	450	90	80,000
Little Generals Denounce Lin Biao and Old Confucius 小将痛斥林彪孔老二 (published as 革命小将痛斥林彪和孔丘 [Revolutionary Little Generals Denounce Lin Biao and Confucius])	24	25,000	38	24	25,000

Reading in-house reports written as the campaign wore on, my theory that Beijing People's Press had to scale-back publishing due to its paper woes appears increasingly likely. An April 1975 message to the NBP includes an astonishing statistic: four months into the year, almost 60 percent of Beijing's allocated publishing paper for the year was either already expended or committed to books in press. In other words, of the 68,000 reams (1546 tons) promised by the state, less than 28,000 reams remained. New political developments (such as the Fourth People's Congress and a top-down push to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat) had sucked-up supplies. With 633 tons of paper left in play, staff warned the NBP that they could not guarantee reprints of some Legalist texts – even though these titles fell under the Legalist text publishing plan linked to senior government leaders (see Chapter Two). Overuse of paper likewise threatened future important political titles and approximately one hundred other books planned for 1975. To stay on track, Beijing needed the NBP to rustle-up an extra 2454 tons of paper, equivalent to 1.5 times its original allocation for the year.¹¹⁴

Prudence dictated that staff avoid disclosing to the NBP the full extent of their frustration with the paper situation, but fortunately they filed a strongly-worded and revealing first draft of their letter in the archives. It tells how, even after the press curtailed its publishing plans for 1975 and refused outside orders for some titles, it still required 4000 tons to print forty million books. Moreover, the draft explicitly observed how the capital's allocation for 1975 had precipitously dropped to only forty percent of the 3810 tons given to them in 1974. Already, Beijing had had to reduce the print-run of a popular series of Legalist texts (different to the reprints mentioned above) because of conflicting publishing priorities. Consequently, the press could now only fulfil one-third to one-half of orders for these titles from Xinhua Bookstores.¹¹⁵

Privately, staff felt paper allocations discriminated against Beijing People's Press and did not reflect its status as a top-tier producer of propaganda books. They took particular umbrage at the fact that for 1975 their supply represented only half of the quantity promised to the nearby municipality of Tianjin. While home to several publishing houses, Tianjin was no Beijing: as the draft letter noted, "Beijing is a national political and cultural center. Its population, range of workplaces and organizations, responsibilities, demand for books, and the amount it sends to other places all far exceed Tianjin's" (北京市是全国政治、文化中心,机关、工厂、大专院 校、工农业人口,承担的任务,书籍的需要量和外流量都比天津市大).¹¹⁶ Nor was 1975 the first year Beijing lost out to its smaller neighbor. Initial allocations for 1974 (set at the end of 1973) gave Tianjin 1000 tons more publishing paper than Beijing, including twice as much for

¹¹⁴ BMA 201-3-83.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

everyday book production.¹¹⁷ Pithily put, NBP supplies to the capital were simply "unacceptably low" (过低).¹¹⁸

Countrywide shortages and competing claims on supplies put to bed any hope that Beijing People's Press could recover from these setbacks. Despite all its lobbying, its paper supply never returned to the levels seen even as recently as 1974. By 3 December 1975, the municipality exhausted its 1975 allocation with projects still outstanding for the year. Even worse, by this point the NBP had set Beijing's 1976 publishing paper amount at 2100 tons. While an improvement on the measly amount assigned in 1975, there would be no return to the heady days of 1974 when the state could bestow 3810 tons on the nation's capital.¹¹⁹ One of China's most important presses hobbled its way through the end of the Mao era.

Where the state once talked of launching a comprehensive, thorough and protracted movement to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, campaign publishing now survived as an esoteric sideline. While the ideas of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign swirled around until Mao's death, scholars rightly observe how it politically petered out in late 1974 and 1975 as elite level priorities changed and state media referenced its ideas less.¹²⁰ Up to the end of 1976, publishers continued releasing titles to support long-term study of anti-Confucianism, but this genre targeted ever smaller audiences. Shifting political winds, however, do not by themselves explain the campaign's increasingly niche scope. Paper shortages left publishers without the material means to sustain expansive print-runs of Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius titles, accelerating the campaign's fade from view.

¹¹⁷ SMA B167-3-253-67.

¹¹⁸ BMA 201-3-83.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Teiwes and Sun, *End of the Maoist Era*, 112n8. For a discussion of the campaign's ideas up to Mao's death and beyond, see Wu, *Lin Biao and the Gang of Four*.

Beijing's publishing data from the beginning of 1976 perfectly captures the difference two years can make. As shown in table 5.4, between January and March Beijing People's Press released nine books and one poster linked to the campaign and a the offshoot movement to study Water Margin. No individual print-run exceeded 30,000 copies and most did not pass 10,000. Moreover, whereas the press had once prioritized editions of annotated Legalist texts, now titles such as Selected and Annotated Writings by Wang Fuzhi and Selected and Annotated Essays by Li Zhi enjoyed only token printings. Even the image Song Jiang: a Classic Ancient Capitulationist (made to coincide with political interest in Water Margin) warranted only 10,000 copies – a paltry figure compared to other visual propaganda from the period. These books barely register in the context of the quarter's overall work. In these three months Beijing People's Press released 42 ordinary titles and used 26512 reams to print 4.1 million copies. The nine books in table 5.4, however, amount to only 234 reams and 65,000 volumes. Put another way, they represent only 1.5 percent of the volumes published by Beijing People's Press and less than one percent of its paper use.¹²¹ Bear in mind that, at this point, publishers had no idea that Mao would die within months and that the campaign would officially terminate soon after. These figures do not therefore represent the teleological waning of the Mao-era. Rather, paper shortages had propelled anti-Confucianism to the periphery.

¹²¹ BMA 201-1-293, "北京市出版办公室 1976 年度出版统计表" [Data tables from the Beijing Publishing Office for quarterly publishing in 1976].

Table 5.4: Publications relating to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and the campaign to study *Water Margin* from Beijing People's Press, quarter 1, 1976.¹²²

Title	Print Run (Copies)	Paper Used for Printing (Reams)
To Oppose Revisionism We Must	6000	12
Criticize Confucius 反修必须批孔		
Begin Discussing the 'Water	18000	72
Margin'开展对《水浒》的讨论		
Selected and Annotated Essays by	2000	5
Li Zhi 李贽文章选注		
Selected and Annotated Writings by	2000	5
Wang Fuzhi 王夫之著作选注		
Jia Yi: the Youthful Legalist of the	2000	9
Early Western Han Dynasty 西汉初		
期青年法家——贾谊		
Selected and Annotated Works by	2000	7
Chen Liang 陈亮著作选注		
An Outline History of the Laboring	2000	12
Masses and their Struggle Against		
Confucianism 劳动人民反孔斗争		
简史		
Selections from the "Debate on Salt	1000	5
and Iron" with Annotations《盐铁		
论》选注		
Selected Fables and Stories of Han	30000	107
Fei 韩菲寓言故事选		
Song Jiang: a Classic Ancient	10000	5
Capitulationist 一个古代投降派的		
典型——宋江 (image)		

One quarter later, things looked almost the same. This time, the press published 45 ordinary titles, representing 4.2 million copies and 22298 reams of paper. Three Legalist texts and a book on a figure from the *Water Margin* used a grand total of 40 reams of paper (table 5.5). In contrast, the press devoted 50 times this amount of paper to *reprinting* 300,000 copies of a short-story anthology.¹²³ This comparison starkly shows how criticizing Confucianism no longer merited precious resources. Forced to choose between making additional copies of a fiction collection or supporting front-catalogue titles, staff chose not to favor anti-Confucianism.

¹²² Table source: ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

Table 5.5: Publications relating to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and the campaign to study *Water Margin* from Beijing People's Press, quarter 2, 1976.¹²⁴

Title	Print Run (Copies)	Paper Used for Printing (Reams)
Selected and Annotated Works by	3000	8
Wang Anshi 王安石著作选注		
Annotated Selections from the	2000	19
Xunzi《荀子》选注		
Annotated Selections from the Book	2000	8
of Lord Shang《商君书》选注		
Li Kui Destroys the Imperial	6000	5
Decree 李逵扯诏		

Continuous Struggle: the Sudden Boom and Gradual Bust of Shanghai's Anti-Confucian Print Culture

While an important publisher, Beijing People's Press was but one organization in a nationwide network of propaganda producers. To what extent, therefore, does the story of the above section typify broader developments? In this section, I argue that the multi-year struggle waged by Shanghai People's Press in the face of declining paper stocks makes Beijing's experience the norm rather than the exception. Future research on other provincial presses may uncover different stories, but I do not think it likely. In the 1970s, Beijing People's Press and Shanghai People's Press numbered among the most important publishers in the country, and if they struggled then the chances of others riding high seem small. Keep in mind too that the NBP could not always help with shortages in Beijing and Shanghai precisely because it had to manage competing demands from dozens of publishing houses. Combining these two case studies, I contend that a chronic lack of paper rocked China's entire propaganda publishing industry during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.

¹²⁴ Table source: ibid.

No sooner had the campaign begun than a dangerous disparity between perceived and actual paper stocks opened up in Shanghai. As recorded in 5.1 at the beginning of this chapter, the state designated an extra 1100 tons of paper for Shanghai to compensate for the dent the Four Books had made in paper stocks. Crucially, however, 500 of this 1100 tons existed only theoretically – the NBP tasked Shanghai with producing extra paper and pre-emptively assigned this output to the city. In effect, the NBP passed part of the paper deficit back onto Shanghai's papermakers.¹²⁵ The municipality's overstretched main mills – Xinhua Paper Mill and Lihua Paper Mill – warned as early as March 1974 that they most likely could not shoulder the extra production burden.¹²⁶ Therefore, while the NBP's emergency assistance helped circumvent the consequences of the paper crisis in the short term, it did not avoid them. Instead, it adopted the risky approach of relying on unguaranteed increases in future production to bail-out presses from short-term pickles. If and when future production tanked, a surplus swiftly became a deficit. And thus the seeds of disaster in Shanghai were sown.

As winter turned into spring and early summer, propaganda publishing in Shanghai looked increasingly tenuous. In the first eleven days of February 1974, printers used 870 tons of publishing paper but only received 375 tons from their two main paper suppliers, leaving them already on the back foot.¹²⁷ By mid-year, Shanghai People's Press had used 57.2% (approximately 10,000 tons) of its revised paper allocation for 1974 but still had 444 titles (55.5% of its planned catalogue for the year) not yet in press.¹²⁸ As a sign of the shortage's

¹²⁵ SMA B167-3-253-15.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ SMA B167-3-253.

¹²⁸ SMA B167-3-253-8, "上海人民出版社业务组关于戌宝坤等四位同志去纸张供应站交谈 1974 年 上半年度的用纸情况及下半年用纸计划的情况汇报" [A report from the Shanghai People's Press Logistics Group regarding visits by Xu Baokun and three others to paper suppliers to discuss paper usage in the first half of 1974 and planned paper usage for the second half of 1974]; SMA B167-3-253-1, "上海 人民出版社革命委员会关于要求增拨 52 克凸版纸 3000 吨、双胶纸版 1000 吨的请示报告" [A

severity, officials knowingly sacrificed national security concerns by delaying plans to strategically stockpile 700 tons of paper for propaganda printing in the event China went to war.¹²⁹ Month on month, supplies of larger sheets of paper (used to print large-format books with bigger, more spacious pages) similarly ran low, with Shanghai forced to borrow 15,000 reams from elsewhere to meet its printing obligations for the first six months of the year. Even mustering thicker paper, used to print front and back covers, proved difficult: at mid-year, printers had only 28.8 percent of their offset paper (双胶版纸) allocation for 1974 remaining.¹³⁰

Paper paucity directly hampered the operations of Shanghai People's Press. With large paper sheets now at a premium, staff reserved spacious large-format publishing for new editions of Legalist texts and dynastic histories. Concomitantly, they restricted all other political, cultural and educational books to the standard size, foreclosing any possibility of printing these materials with more generous spacing.¹³¹ Lacking sufficient offset paper for covers, staff also recommended reducing the density (and hence the sturdiness) of covers for periodicals such as *Morning Clouds* (朝霞, 100 g/m² instead of 120 g/m²) and *Study and Criticism* (90 g/m² instead of 100 g/m²).¹³² Both flagship magazines frequently carried articles exploring anti-Confucianism and yet could not escape the consequences of material dearth. Indeed, by 1975 printers had had to adopt this recommendation and it did not pass unnoticed: the lower-quality covers caused some issues of these magazines to reach subscribers already damaged, and complaining readers sent their defective copies back to their local post offices demanding replacements. With

report requesting instructions written by the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee requesting reallocations of 3000 tons of 52-gram publishing paper and 1000 tons of offset printing paper]. ¹²⁹ SMA B167-3-253-8.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

magazines frequently over-subscribed, post offices could not fulfill such requests.¹³³ Here is direct evidence of paper shortages sowing ill will among readers.

Shanghai's problems heaped pressure on the NBP at a time when the latter was fighting fires all over the country. On top of the 1100 tons assigned by the center in February, Shanghai asked for an additional 3000 tons of publishing paper in late July 1974 and 1000 tons of offset sheets to support its activities.¹³⁴ A note in the archives suggests that the NBP granted the request, but its dating of February 1975 implies that central government officials, dealing with countrywide shortages, could find no immediate resolution.¹³⁵ With resources allocated centrally, all municipalities and provinces looked to higher-ups in Beijing for assistance, and this form of holistic control bred paralysis at a time when publishers needed ready solutions. For Shanghai, while extra supplies remained unforthcoming, it could do nothing except soldier on and make the best of a bad situation.

The Beijing People's Press pattern of a boom in 1974 followed by a gradual decline in 1975 and 1976 similarly appeared in Shanghai. In 1974, the press could still devote a significant amount of paper to furnishing readers with the materials they needed. For example, it printed 400,000 copies each of Wang Chong's (王充) *Critical Essays* (论衡) and *The Writings of Master Gongsun Long with Translations and Annotations* (公孙龙子译注) – two philosophical texts relevant to the campaign – in anticipation of major demand.¹³⁶

¹³³ SMA B167-3-305-21, "上海市报刊发行处革命委员会关于请改进期刊出版印刷工作的函" [A letter from the Shanghai Municipal Newspaper and Periodicals Distribution Point Revolutionary Committee asking for improvements in the publication and printing of periodicals].
¹³⁴ SMA B167-3-253-1.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Wang Chong 王充, 论衡 [On Balance] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974), iv; Pang Po 庞 朴, ed., 公孙龙子译注 [The Writings of Master Gongsun Long with Translations and Annotations] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974), ii.

As paper became scarcer and priorities shifted, however, staff increasingly opted to print books in smaller runs and focus on high-impact, accessible-to-all visual material. In 1975, Shanghai People's Press printed 161 million books (discounting political writings by Mao and other communist theoreticians) in Chinese, needing 579,000 reams of paper.¹³⁷ By the fourth quarter of the year, most of this printing concerned a small number of vital titles and a wider range of aesthetically engaging works. As shown in table 5.6, it pumped resources into printing 1.5 million pamphlet copies of Unite to Study the 'Water Margin' and Earnestly Study Theory – a reprint of the newspaper article which launched the whole campaign to study *Water Margin*.¹³⁸ Concurrently, printing presses churned out hundreds of thousands of copies of the novel itself to meet heightened demand.¹³⁹ All other titles with print-runs in the hundreds of thousands or million are all posters, comic books or calligraphic reprints. In keeping with the adage that "a picture says a thousand words," posters and comic books could convey striking political messages to a range of audiences without using large amounts of paper. For example, one standard sheet could make a comic book of 128 pages. As for the calligraphy, these primers invited readers to engage with anti-Confucianism through an interactive artform as opposed to plowing through pages of text. To complete the campaign's visual turn, text-heavy titles hit bookstore shelves in much smaller quantities during the quarter. For example, the second printing of Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts from Different Periods Volume 2 numbered only 10,000 copies even though the series received extensive coverage in state media (see

¹³⁷ SMA B167-3-331-13, "上海人民出版社革命委员会填报的 1975 年图书出版统计年报表" [Book publishing data tables for 1975 filled in by the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee]. ¹³⁸ See the front page of *The People's Daily*, November 4, 1975.

¹³⁹ In August 1975, the NBP had informed publishers that provinces and municipalities would have to make their own provision for paper for new editions of the novel, so Shanghai most likely had to reallocate paper resources from other projects to printing *Water Margin* (see SMA B167-3-292-30).

Chapter Four). Similarly, titles concerning history, historical figures, and classical texts now catered to a minority of readers.

Table 5.6: Print-run data for Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and *Water Margin* titles from Shanghai People's Press, quarter 4, 1975.¹⁴⁰

Title	Print-Run
秦始皇金石刻辞注 Annotated Bronze and Stone Inscriptions from the Qin Shi	25,000 1st printing
Huang Era	
The Confucian-Legalist Struggle in the Fields of Science and Technology 科学技	10,000 1 st printing
术领域中的儒法斗争史话	
Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts from Different Periods Volume 2 历代法	10,000 2 nd printing for 1975
家著作选注(二)	
Shen Kuo 沈括	50,000 1 st printing
Historical Struggles of the Working People Against Confucianism 历代劳动人民	10,000 1st printing
反孔斗争	
Jia Yi: An Annotated Biography 贾谊传注	40,000 1 st printing
Selected Tang Dynasty Kai Script for Calligraphy Learners Volume 3 唐人楷书	285,000 1st printing
选字帖(三)	
Lu Xun's Criticisms of Confucius in Dakai Script for Calligraphy Learners 大楷	400,000 2 nd printing for
字帖——鲁迅批孔言论摘录	1975
Han Script for Calligraphy Learners Volume 1 汉隶书字帖(一)	205,000 2 nd printing for
	1975
On Song Jiang 宋江析	50,000 1 st printing
<i>The Complete Water Margin</i> (3 volume set) 水浒全传(上、中、下)	150,000 2 nd printing for
	1975
<i>The Revised Children's Water Margin</i> (2 volume set) 水浒(儿童版)(第二版)(上、下)	400,000 1 st printing
The Capitulationist Song Jiang 投降派宋江(comic book)	1,200,000 1 st printing
Ximen Bao Governs Linzhang County 西门豹治邺(comic book)	1,000,000 1 st printing
Selected Stories Showing the Struggle Between the Military Strategies of	800,000 1 st printing
Confucianism and Legalism 儒法治军路线斗争故事选(comic book)	
Selected Revolutionary Struggles of Laboring Women Throughout History 历史	800,000 1 st printing
劳动妇女革命故事选(comic book)	
Angrily Trash the Great Hall of Confucius 怒捣大成殿(comic book)	800,000 1st printing
Historical Struggles of the Working People Against Confucianism 历代劳动人民	125,000 2 nd printing for
的反孔斗争 (poster)	1975
<i>Li Zicheng Enters Beijing</i> 李自成进北京(poster)	25,000 2 nd printing for 1975
Bombard the 'Classic for Girls' 炮轰《女儿经》(poster)	1,800,000 2nd printing for
· · ·	1975
Study Materials 1975 Number 35: Unite to Study the 'Water Margin' and	1,500,000
Earnestly Study Theory 学习文选(1975-35)结合评论《水浒》深入学习理	
论	
Selected Classical Materials Number 26: Sun Quan Encouraging Lü Meng to	3,500
Read 古代文选(26)孙权劝吕蒙读书	
Selected Classical Materials Number 27: Sima Qian's 'The Biography of	3,500
Cavalry General Wei'古代文选 (27) 司马迁《卫将军骠骑列传》	

¹⁴⁰ This table is based on SMA B167-3-331-24, "上海人民出版社填报的 1975 年第 4 季度图书出版情 况表" [Book publishing data tables for 1975, quarter 4, filled in by Shanghai People's Press]. I also used Wang Yaohua's *A Catalogue of Books Published in Shanghai* and Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1975*.

Even when Shanghai People's Press wished to issue large quantities of an important title, paper problems scuppered its plans. In July 1975, it released *Narrating the History of the Confucian-Legalist Struggle* (儒法斗争史话), with the book joining Shanghai's leading *Teach Yourself for Young People* series (see Chapter Four). The title was doubly important because the press commissioned it on the specific orders of the senior politician Yao Wenyuan.¹⁴¹ Nonetheless, declining warehouse supplies forced the press to scale-back printings of all new titles in the series including *Narrating the History of the Confucian-Legalist Struggle*. Although it eventually mustered enough paper for 300,000 copies, this fell well short of many other titles already in the series. For instance, staff ordered a staggering one million copies of an anthology of writings by Lu Xun in 1973.¹⁴² Similarly, printings of volumes on algebra and geometry (both first published in 1973) each exceeded 600,000 copies by summer 1975, while the two volumes of *A Foundational Course in Political Economics* (政治经济学基础知识, published in the first half of 1974) merited 850,000 copies within one year.¹⁴³ Moreover, the *first* printing alone of the

¹⁴² Fudan daxue zhongwen xi 复旦大学中文系 and Shanghai shifan daxue zhongwen xi 上海师范大学 中文系, ed., 鲁迅小说诗歌散文选 [*Selected Novels, Poems, Songs, and Essays by Lu Xun*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1973), copyright page (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com).

¹⁴¹ SMA B167-3-259-3, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于贯彻张春桥、姚文元同志对《青年自学丛书》批示的报告" [A report from Shanghai People's Press regarding implementing directions from Zhang Chungio and Yao Wenyuan concerning the *Teach Yourself for Young People* series].

¹⁴³ SMA B167-3-292-38, "上海人民出版社关于青年自学丛书编写出版进展情况的报告" [A report from Shanghai People's Press concerning progress with the writing and publication of the *Teach Yourself for Young People* series]; Cao *Narrating the History*, copyright page; "Zhengzhi jingji xue jichu zhishi" bianxie zu 《政治经济学基础知识》编写组, ed., 政治经济学基础知识(上) [*A Foundational Course in Political Economics (Part One)*], fourth printing (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975), copyright page (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com); "Zhengzhi jingji xue jichu zhishi" bianxie zu 《政治经济学基础知识》编写组, ed. 政治经济学基础知识(下) [*A Foundational Course in Political Economics (Part Two)*], fourth printing (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975), copyright page (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com):

algebra and geometry volumes each topped 450,000 copies.¹⁴⁴ As paper cuts bit, Shanghai People's Press simply did not have the resources to contemplate such extravagance. The print culture of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign lived and died by the availability of paper.

Methodology and the Mao Problem

The changing fortunes of Beijing People's Press and Shanghai People's Press show how paper poverty left indelible marks on the history of propaganda production in 1970s China. Comparing these experiences with those of other presses must await further research and access to archives. In books themselves, however, historians can also look for evidence that similar shortages forced the hands of publishers and printers elsewhere. Most obviously, lower printruns symbolize an industry in trouble. As a case in point, Hunan People's Press released *Comprehensively and Thoroughly Participate in a Protracted movement to Criticize Lin and Criticize Confucius* (深入、普及、持久开展批林批孔运动) in 1975 but only made 15,000 copies.¹⁴⁵ Elsewhere, Jilin People's Press initially released one critical edition of a Confucian text in a run of 127,000, but could only stretch to 20,000 of a later title in the same series.¹⁴⁶ The

¹⁴⁵ Hunan renmin chubanshe 湖南人民出版社, ed., 深入、普及、持久开展批林 批孔运动 [Comprehensively and Thoroughly Participate in a Protracted Movement to Criticize Lin and Criticize Confucius] (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1974), back cover.

¹⁴⁴ "Chu deng daishu" bianxie zu 《初等代数》编写组, ed., 代数 [*Algebra*], first printing (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1973), copyright page (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com); "Chu deng shuxue" bianxie zu 《初等数学》编写组, ed., 几何 [*Geometry*], second printing (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974), copyright page (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com).

¹⁴⁶ "Di zi gui" pizhu zu 《弟子规》批注组, ed., 《弟子规》批注 ['Standards for Being a Good Pupil and Child' With Annotations and Commentary] (Jilin: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1975), 27; 'Ming xian ji' pipan zu 《名贤集》批判组, ed., 《名贤集》批注 ['A Collection of Wise Men's Words' With Annotations and Commentary] (Jilin: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1975), ii.

paper used in books is another helpful clue. For example, a copy of *Analyzing the Capitulationist Song Jiang* (评投降派——宋江) published in Sichuan Province uses lower-grade dictionary paper – unusual in book publishing – suggesting that Sichuan People's Press had insufficient supplies of standard publishing paper on hand.¹⁴⁷ Combining archival and bibliographic evidence, future scholars can further judge the extent of the 1970s paper crisis.

Methodologically, such research must also accurately understand what I call the "Mao problem." One argument that could be advanced for declining printing of campaign material is that Chinese publishing focused on the publication of texts by Chairman Mao. After all, the Cultural Revolution period is well-known for the printing of billions of books serializing Mao's speeches, writings, and utterances.¹⁴⁸ One half of the "Mao problem" stands for this faulty assumption that large-scale printing of Mao's works happened consistently between 1966 and 1976. In fact, this fervent activity happened in the late 1960s; by the 1970s, China had reached a saturation point where everybody owned copies.¹⁴⁹ Even in a political center such as Beijing, 340,000 copies of an anthology of Mao's writings sat in storage between 1969 and 1974 because nobody needed to buy them.¹⁵⁰ With demand non-existent, during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, large-scale printing of Mao's works using only 193 reams of paper.¹⁵¹ In

¹⁴⁷ Sichuan renmin chubanshe 四川人民出版社, 评投降派——宋江 [Analyzing the Capitulationist Song Jiang] (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1975), ii.

¹⁴⁸ Schiller, *Quotations of Chairman Mao*.

¹⁴⁹ We can see the extent of this saturation by nothing the huge number of Mao books pulped after his death. See Geremie Barmé, *Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 5-11.

¹⁵⁰ BMA 201-3-64, "北京市出版办公室关于申请增拨资金、试制费等的报告" [A report from the Beijing Publishing Office applying for increasing and transferring money and research funding]. ¹⁵¹ SMA B167-3-331-13.

the second quarter of 1974, Beijing used no paper to print Mao's works.¹⁵² The paper crisis cannot be explained by the mass printing of Maoist texts.

Rather, the uncertain potential for future Mao-related printing played a significantly more important part in keeping the crisis going. The other half of the Mao problem refers to the struggles presses faced staying prepared for any unexpected release of the Chairman's new writings. Up to September 1960, the Party published four volumes of Mao's *Selected Works*, and planning for future volumes began in the 1960s. Politics interfered, however, and the volumes became an ongoing project with an indefinite deadline.¹⁵³ By the early 1970s, Beijing and other provinces and municipalities had paper amassed on permanent reserve ready for immediate use whenever the government decided to publish volumes five and six of the *Selected Works*.¹⁵⁴ Although publishers sometimes dipped into these stocks to cover supply shortfalls, during the paper crisis a majority of the the reserves gathered dust in warehouses. In 1972, Shanghai had 8000 tons of publishing paper gradually spoiling (发黄变质) in storage ready to print ten million copies of future installments of the *Selected Works*.¹⁵⁵ Three years later, despite paper shortages, the municipality still retained 6700 tons on permanent standby for the same purpose.¹⁵⁶ Up in Beijing, Beijing People's Press kept 2000 tons aside, eventually spioning off 700 tons in 1975

¹⁵² BMA 201-2-120.

¹⁵³ Giridhar Deshingkar, "The Fifth Volume of Mao's Selected Works," *China Report* 13, no. 4 (July-August 1977): 9-11.

¹⁵⁴ BMA 201-3-108.

¹⁵⁵ SMA B244-3-586-80, "上海市革命委员会文教组关于报送上海市印刷厂'《毛泽东选集》新卷本储备物资资金问题请示报告'的报告" [A report from the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee Culture and Education Group forwarding "A discussion of stockpiling money and resources for producing new volumes of *The Selected Works of Mao Zedong*" (written by a Shanghai printing press)].
¹⁵⁶ SMA B167-3-283-25, "上海人民出版社革命委员会、上海市轻工业局革命委员会关于申请建造出版印刷用纸仓库的报告" [A report from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee and the Shanghai Bureau of Light Industry Revolutionary Committee applying to build a warehouse for publishing and printing paper].

or early 1976 when left with no other choice.¹⁵⁷ Not only did this amount then need replacing in subsequent months, but paper held in storage also required regular swapping with fresh product to guarantee that Mao volumes would be of the highest quality.¹⁵⁸ In these ways, the specter of Mao's works hung over the publishing industry during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, tying-up valuable resources at a time when presses could ill afford to let them lie dormant in storage. As with so many other aspects of life during this period, the danger of appearing disloyal to Mao loomed larger than the man himself.

The Paper Crisis in the News

This chapter has proposed nothing less than an entirely new material angle from which to view China's propaganda state. In this final section, I turn attention briefly to newspapers to show that the same shortages besieging publishing likewise hampered state media. Throughout this dissertation, I demonstrate the important role state newspapers played in encouraging reading, advertising books, and supporting the activities of publishers. However essential newspapers were to political communication, they depended on a supply of newsprint that progressively shrank. Using Shanghai as a case study reveals how the paper crisis undermined the stability and influence of key political newspapers. For historians of modern China, the fact that important regional newspapers came perilously close to halting production has profound implications. Where we once took propaganda production in China for a given – a remaining bulwark amidst growing scholarly recognition of the fragility of state power – we must now recognize its conditional and complex characteristics.

¹⁵⁷ BMA 201-3-108.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

Nationwide, newspaper and periodical circulation from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution put ever increasing strain on newsprint supplies. According to 1975 calculations, between 1966 and 1975 the circulation of *The People's Daily* doubled, the distribution of *Red Flag* grew by 350 percent, the circulation of *Liberation Army Daily* (解放军报) increased by 250 percent, and the number of copies of *Reference Information* (参考消息) printed ballooned by 1500 percent compared to pre-Cultural Revolution levels. Over the corresponding period, however, newsprint output only increased by 44 percent.¹⁵⁹

As Shanghai served as the second political center of China, its newspapers – *Liberation Daily* (解放日报) and *Wenhui Daily* (文汇报) circulated nationwide (see table 5.7). Both contained important national and local Shanghai news, as well as content directly commissioned or influenced by senior government politicians and their acolytes. In 1975, average daily circulations reached 665,000 copies for *Liberation Daily* and 927,000 copies for *Wenhui Daily*, while producing this quantity required almost 600,000 reams (14,000 tons) of newsprint.¹⁶⁰ Significantly, these figures exceeded state-approved circulations, with resulting newsprint consumption always surpassing the 11,700 tons allocated by the NBP yearly to Shanghai from 1972.¹⁶¹ Put differently, Shanghai's demand for newsprint outpaced supplies by one fifth.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ SMA B109-3-223-60.

¹⁶⁰ SMA B167-3-331-10, "上海人民出版社革命委员会填报的 1975 年报纸出版统计年报表" [Publication data tables for newspapers and books for 1975, completed by the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee]; SMA B109-4-447-131, "上海市化工轻工供应公司革命委员会关于"两报" 用纸告急去有关产地的情况汇报" [A report from the Shanghai Municipal Chemical Industry and Light Industry Supply Company Revolutionary Committee regarding both emergency shortages of paper at *Wenhui Daily* and *Liberation Daily* and planned trips to production areas].

¹⁶¹ SMA B246-2-1121-79, "中共上海市委办公室、上海市革命委员会办公室对上海市革命委员会文 教组《关于今年《文汇报》、《解放日报》用纸的请示报告》的抄告单" [A cover sheet from the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee attached to the "Report from the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee Culture and Education Group regarding this year's paper use at *Wenhui Daily* and *Liberation Daily*"]. ¹⁶² SMA B167-3-253-67.

During the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, newspaper staff were to discover just how unsustainable this was.

Destination	Distribution on 1 December 1975	Distribution on 1 January 1976	Month-on-month change
Shanghai city 市区	218858	214827	-4031
Shanghai suburban counties 郊县	50473	46496	-3977
Jiangsu	82721	82740	19
Zhejiang	37086	37057	-29
Anhui	35361	35414	53
Fujian	17366	17359	-7
Jiangxi	27644	27614	-30
Shandong	24093	24048	-45
Henan	33718	33645	-73
Hunan	17212	17217	5
Hubei	28725	28682	-43
Guangdong	33399	33044	-355
Guangxi	19702	19684	-18
Shaanxi	29022	29022	0
Gansu	16714	16685	-29
Ningxia	4102	4098	-4
Qinghai	3123	3122	-1
Xinjiang	7216	7212	-4
Sichuan	55911	55911	0
Yunnan	7027	7027	0
Guizhou	10026	10026	0
Tibet	1363	1358	-5
Beijing Municipality	33589	33412	-177
Tianjin Municipality	9547	9547	0
Hebei	32475	32338	-137
Shanxi	13365	13341	-24
Liaoning	19833	19830	-3
Jilin	14846	14824	-22
Heilongjiang	25792	25789	-3
Inner Mongolia	8195	8148	-47
Other	6971	6971	0
Total	925475	916488	-8987

Table 5.7: Wenhui Daily's circulation in late 1975 and early 1976.¹⁶³

¹⁶³ SMA G20-2-246-5, "文汇报填报的 1976 年 1、5、9 月份发行情况月报表" [Tables from *Wenhui Daily* charting circulation in January, May and September 1976]. Note: the original source lists the total month-on-month change as -7987, but having made the calculations this is clearly a mathematical error.

From archival records, Shanghai's newsprint supply line appears unsteady and fragile, forcing personnel at both newspapers to spend significant time trying to keep their publications afloat. In June 1974, the NBP increased *Wenhui Daily's* allocation of newsprint by 420 tons up to 7420 tons in an effort to accommodate the newspaper's overly high circulation. In making this move, the NBP assumed that *Wenhui Daily* would receive all of its initial 7000-ton allocation of newsprint, but as the year progressed this prospect looked increasingly unlikely. Of the 7000 tons, Jiangxi Paper Mill (江西造纸厂) had the responsibility for 4000, with another 1700 coming from Nanping Paper Mill and three other mills sharing the remainder. By the end of August, Jiangxi and two other mills had underproduced 900 tons of newsprint. Most seriously, Jiangxi sent no newsprint to Shanghai between June and August. The deficit forced *Wenhui Daily* staff to raid stocks of newsprint put aside for wartime use, and by August the paper only had 30 days' worth of newsprint in its warehouse. Frustratingly for staff, Nanping Paper Mill possessed more finished product than it had space for and yet a lack of rail freight wagons prevented it from sending supplies to cover Jiangxi's shortfall.¹⁶⁴

Help from over-stretched central government officials did not materialize, forcing Shanghai to contemplate its own drastic measures. The NBP and Ministry of Light Industry made it clear that they possessed no surplus paper to cover an 1800-ton newsprint deficit caused by the exaggerated print-runs of *Wenhui Daily* and *Liberation Daily*.¹⁶⁵ As of September 1974, both newspapers combined had less than one hundred tons of newsprint in stock, sufficient for

 ¹⁶⁴ SMA B246-2-1123-44, "中共上海市委办公室、上海市革命委员会办公室对中共文汇报委员会 《关于解决新闻卷筒纸的报告》的抄告单" [A cover sheet from the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee attached to the "Report from the *Wenhui Daily* Party Committee regarding resolving shortages of rotary newsprint"].
 ¹⁶⁵ SMA B246-2-1121-79.

only several more days of editions.¹⁶⁶ With newspapers now living hand-to-mouth, Shanghai officials in charge of paper-making and supplying the printing sector discussed remedies. Obvious solutions involved gradually reducing newspaper circulation down to centrally-approved levels, cutting out waste in the printing process, and pushing mills to boost output. More seriously, they also considered using two thirds of the 1500 tons stockpiled in the *Liberation Daily* warehouse for wartime use (*Wenhui Daily* had already burned through its entire 1500-ton wartime reserve), thus demonstrating how their predicament pushed them to sacrifice future security for short-term gain.¹⁶⁷

In the high period of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, therefore, we find paper difficulties pushing Shanghai's newspapers to either curtail their reach or jeopardize wartime security plans. Only the close connection between the municipal leadership and the central government prevented these outcomes: when news of the paper dearth reached senior leaders in Shanghai, they pulled some strings and persuaded the NBP to summon-up 1200 tons of the 1800-ton deficit, with the remainder coming from an additional 300 tons of local production and 300 tons of wartime supplies.¹⁶⁸ In this respect, Shanghai's experience forms the exception rather than the norm. Other provinces running low on newsprint lacked the same political connections that came to the municipality's aid.

Even if *Wenhui Daily* and *Liberation Daily* could leverage contacts, the resulting measures came closer to treading water than providing sustainability. For the remainder of the campaign's duration until the death of Mao, both newspapers experienced a series of short-term

 ¹⁶⁶ SMA G20-2-224-5, "中共文汇报委员会、中共解放日报委员会关于解决 1975 年印报用纸问题的 紧急请示报告" [A report from the *Wenhui Daily* Party Committee and the *Liberation Daily* Party Committee regarding resolving emergency newsprint shortages for 1975].
 ¹⁶⁷ SMA B246-2-1121-79.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

crises abated by short-term solutions rather than long-term structural change. For the first two months of 1975, *Wenhui Daily* planned to receive 1400 tons of newsprint including 800 tons from the infamous Jiangxi Paper Mill, and yet by the end of February only 669 tons had arrived. Jiangxi met just one quarter of its target, and only a mill in Guangzhou met all its contractual commitments to the municipality. Into March, barely any more paper arrived, with a shortage of coal hampering production at mills in Jiangxi and Nanping.¹⁶⁹ Plans to expand pulp production at Jiangxi Paper Mill were aborted because it could not source all the steel needed for a new facility.¹⁷⁰

And so the woes continued. In the first quarter of 1975, *Wenhui Daily* received only half of an expected 2050 tons because so much of its newsprint supply relied on underperforming factories. While Guangzhou surpassed production targets by 25 percent in the first quarter, it only had to send a small amount to *Wenhui Daily*. In contrast, Jiangxi Paper Mill, the main supplier, met only sixty percent of its newsprint target, surely leaving newspaper staff lamenting their reliance on this one mill.¹⁷¹ Reporting to their superiors, they believed that "any marked improvement in the situation for April seems unlikely" (估计 4 月份情况不会有大的改变), and the newspaper's newly replenished stock of 1500 tons of newsprint for wartime offered the only lifeline for them to survive for 2 months.¹⁷² Electricity supply problems caused Jiangxi to provide only 645 tons of the 2180 tons it owed Shanghai between January and April, and in May the mill could only promise to deliver on fifty percent of its contractual obligations for the first

¹⁶⁹ SMA G20-2-224-1, "文汇报革命委员会关于 1975 年 1、2 月份新闻纸到货情况的汇报" [A report from the *Wenhui Daily* Revolutionary Committee regarding newsprint deliveries in January and February 1975].

¹⁷⁰ SMA B109-4-447-131.

¹⁷¹ SMA G20-2-224-2, "文汇报革命委员会关于 1975 年第一季度供纸计划未完成, 致使印用纸紧张 的情况汇报" [A report from the *Wenhui Daily* Revolutionary Committee reharding paper deliveries underperforming in the first quarter of 1975 and the consequent emergency shortages of newsprint]. ¹⁷² Ibid.

half of the year.¹⁷³ In the words of one report, "Newspaper printing in Shanghai lives or dies by whether production at Jiangxi Paper Mill is going well" (江西纸厂的生产好差,对上海的影响 极大).¹⁷⁴ For similar reasons, the situation at *Liberation Daily* looked equally bleak.¹⁷⁵

The negative political consequences of curtailing newspaper circulation pushed both papers to resist this move for as long as possible. At the end of June 1975, *Liberation Daily* had 1770 tons of newsprint in reserve (including 1500 tons put aside for wartime) and *Wenhui Daily* had only 1100 tons of newsprint left in the form of wartime stock. Based on their circulations, the newspapers estimated that even if newsprint orders came in on-time and on-target in the second half of the year, together they would end 1975 with a deficit of over 3300 tons. Staff knew that reducing circulations would be "very politically problematic" (政治影响很大) and so continued to favor using reserve supplies and addressing production difficulties. Staff pressed Shanghai's senior leadership to arrange for more newsprint to come from Guangzhou to make up the shortfall from the first half of the year. They also asked senior Shanghai officials to lobby the NBP for greater newsprint allocations for 1976.¹⁷⁶ Far from their image as standard-bearers for the state, the successful running of two of China's major political dailies thus depended on their staff pleading with local and national bureaucrats to intervene on their behalf.

Eventually, and almost inevitably, newsprint shortages forced changes in the circulation of propaganda newspapers. Restrictions at *Wenhui Daily* began at least by October 1975, with staff capping all circulation growth and limiting retail sales on Shanghai's newsstands to around 2500 copies per day (in the 1970s, most newspapers reached readers through institutional

¹⁷³ SMA B109-4-447-131.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ SMA G20-2-224-5.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

subscriptions rather than newsstand purchases).¹⁷⁷ These limits did not go unnoticed. A post office worker from Shandong wrote to Shanghai's senior leadership observing that despite significant demand for *Wenhui Daily* and *Study and Criticism*, circulation restrictions left their local county with only around 200 copies of each. In the eyes of the correspondent, newspaper circulation ought to be increasing rather than decreasing! Yet Shanghai could not magic paper from nowhere, and the municipal leadership directed staff from these outlets to politely reply explaining the paper shortages and to stand firm with circulation restrictions.¹⁷⁸

Newspaper staff always found themselves buffeted between a political climate that required the broadest possible circulation for mass media and the reality of a papermaking system without the capacity to deliver what the state expected from it. As the above paragraph intimated, restrictions only applied to growth and did not alter the status quo. Most likely because of the political damage caused by contraction, *Wenhui Daily* could not make the 100,000-copy reduction needed to align its distribution with centrally-permitted amounts. Therefore, between December 1975 and September 1976, the paper's daily circulation continued to hover between 915,000 and 930,000 (see table 5.7).¹⁷⁹

Like Mao's health, the situation kept getting worse and worse. In March 1976, *Liberation Daily* reported to the municipal government that it failed to receive 394 tons of its 1975 allocation, with current shortfalls at the paper totaling 1494 tons. Once again, they bailed themselves out with paper reserved for wartime. Despite receiving an increased allocation from the NBP in 1976, *Liberation Daily* noted with concern that Jiangxi Paper Mill was due to supply

¹⁷⁷ SMA G20-2-222-2, "文汇报革命委员会关于文汇报继续实行限额控制发行的函" [A letter from the *Wenhui Daily* Revolutionary Committee regarding continuing circulation restrictions].

¹⁷⁸ SMA G20-2-222-4, "上海市革命委员会办公室关于读者来信要求文汇报扩大发行问题的函" [A letter from the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee regarding a letter from a reader requesting *Wenhui Daily* expand its circulation].

¹⁷⁹ SMA G20-2-246-5.

them with 2600 tons of newsprint and yet had sent only 103 tons in the first two months of the year. At the end of February, *Liberation Daily* possessed only 700 tons of newsprint (according to state guidelines, it ought to have had 3000 tons including 1500 tons for wartime). Staff did not mince their words: "if this situation continues, by early April normal publication of *Liberation Daily* is going to be impossible" (这种情况如不及时改变,到四月上旬,将会影响本报正常 出版).¹⁸⁰

Wenhui Daily saw out the Mao era in an equally disastrous state. At year-end 1975, it was yet to receive 778 tons of its newsprint allocation for the year. True to form, Jiangxi Paper Mill had under-performed by 464 tons, with other mills adding on to the deficit. By late February 1976, Jiangxi Paper Mill – suffering from electricity outages – had only sent 136 tons of newsprint and nothing after January – hardly promising when it was due to supply half of the 8300 tons of newsprint allocated to *Wenhui Daily* for the year. At the same time, another supplier produced nothing for three months because of a shortage of oil. Like their colleagues at *Liberation Daily*, staff warned that the "extremely urgent" (十分紧急) situation could lead to them running out of the means to publish.¹⁸¹

Let's be clear: by February 1976, Shanghai's two premier newspapers – cornerstones of local and national political communication – faced uncertain futures. The Ministry of Light Industry promptly decided to transfer 2000 tons of Jiangxi Paper Mill's production to a mill in Jilin, and Shanghai officials advised central government officials that now was the time to

¹⁸⁰ SMA A73-2-166-8, "中共解放日报委员以关于新闻纸紧张给国家出版事业管理局的信" [A letter from the *Liberation Daily* Party Committee to the National Bureau of Publishing discussing newsprint shortages].

¹⁸¹ SMA B109-4-511-11, "中共文汇报委员会关于本报印报用纸只够维持一月的紧急报告" [A report from the *Wenhui Daily* Party Committee discussing how newspaper supplies are now only sufficient to support one month's worth of printing].

allocate any paper in the national reserve to meet the needs of the Shanghai media.¹⁸² Neither newspapers ceased printing, but Jiangxi's production difficulties continued into July and at the end of the month *Liberation Daily* <u>yet again</u> had only enough paper for one month of printing in stock, while *Wenhui Daily* possessed enough newsprint for just twelve days. As before, panicking staff from both outlets repeatedly sent urgent messages to higher ups calling for solutions.¹⁸³ These newspapers saw out the Mao era living paper paycheck to paper paycheck.

Newsprint shortages cast Mao's death on September 9 in an entirely new and negative light. It prompted a flood of special newspaper and magazine editions devoted to extolling Mao's life and ideas. In the fortnight following the news, *Liberation Daily 's* circulation increased significantly and each issue lengthened to eight pages, in the process doubling newsprint consumption. Before this period, the paper was already operating on borrowed time: at the end of August 1976, as its newsprint stocks completely ran out, Shanghai's leadership arranged for a supply of 1214 tons in September to keep the paper afloat. Now, even with this paper destined to last less time than originally planned, staff could do nothing but invoke the same short-term solutions such as pressing the NBP to relieve Jiangxi of even more of its production quota and asking municipal leaders to back-channel for paper.¹⁸⁴ While publication of *Wenhui Daily* and *Liberation Daily* never ceased, at the end of the Mao era and in the early years after Mao their struggle for stability was never-ending.

¹⁸² SMA B246-1-812-27, "关于请求支援解决上海新闻用纸的紧急报告" [An urgent request for help resolving Shanghai's extreme newsprint shortages].

¹⁸³ SMA G20-2-248-8, "中共文汇报委员会、中共解放日报委员会关于解决新闻纸的紧急请示报告" [An urgent report from the *Wenhui Daily* Party Committee and the *Liberation Daily* Party Committee regarding resolving newsprint shortages].

¹⁸⁴ SMA A73-2-166-14, "中共解放日报委员会关于解决新闻用纸的报告" [A report from the *Liberation Daily* Party Committee regarding resolving newprint shortages].

What should we remember from this topsy-turvy tale? In the late Cultural Revolution period, as they printed material in support of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, Shanghai's newspapers lacked any comfortable continuity. Staff working for the two dailies found themselves repeatedly subject to the shockwaves caused by unreliable paper production. The papers never stopped publishing, but this was only because their staffs co-opted the connections of the Shanghai municipal leadership to hustle for one-off paper shipments or changes to planned production quotas. These media outlets of the propaganda state lived a precarious existence hidden behind the glamorous, upbeat rhetoric of their editorials and articles.

Nevertheless, because of their national importance and Shanghai's political status, *Wenhui Daily* and *Liberation Daily* undoubtedly fared better than other regional newspapers in confronting newsprint shortages. Confirmation of this must await future archival research. Tellingly, personnel from *Wenhui Daily* and *Liberation Daily* wrote to their superiors in March 1977 lobbying for color televisions and vehicles for several major national paper mills. These factories had prioritized Shanghai's newsprint needs in previous years and staff wanted to do something in return.¹⁸⁵ For Mao-era publishers and newspapers, it paid to keep the papermakers on side.

Conclusion

We can no longer assume that China and other Cold War propaganda states could produce political material on a whim. Previous scholarship has rarely, if at all, questioned the

¹⁸⁵ SMA G20-2-274-5, "文汇报革命委员会、解放日报革命委员会关于解决造纸厂购置汽车、电视 机的报告" [A report from the *Wenhui Daily* Revolutionary Committee and the *Liberation Daily* Revolutionary Committee regarding helping paper mills buy cars and televisions].

relationship between industrial production and propaganda; in contrast, using a paper perspective, I have argued that resource deficiencies severely curtailed the scope of political communication in 1970s China. Significantly, these deficiencies arose predominantly due to internal competition, over-zealous grassroots printing, and shortages of the ancillary resources required for papermaking. The state was not a victim of circumstances out of control, but rather built the conditions for its own failure.

If this point is not jarring enough, my argument implies we should discard what we know about the scale of the Chinese state's intentions. Within the field of Chinese studies, innumerable scholars tacitly assume that the known propaganda output of publishers, printers and other organizations shows the true extent of the Maoist propaganda state. It does not. Beijing People's Press and Shanghai People's Press are just two examples of publishers forced to scrap or cutback on political publications because of paper shortages. Therefore, surviving sources in fact only convey the scaled-back goals of propagandists. Given sufficient material, publishers and printers would have churned out even more and relentlessly enlarged the textual, physical and environmental footprint of Chinese political communication.

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CHAPTER SIX

A Mediated Message: Bibliography and Anti-Confucianism Through a Techno-Labor Lens

The nineteenth century literature scholar Edward Arber once wrote that "at the back of all printed literature lie the conditions of its transliteration into type."¹ Arber's judgement gestures toward the editorial, practical and technical decisions folded into a piece of printed material. This chapter is concerned with these decisions as manifested in propaganda from the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Influenced heavily by professional bibliography with its meticulous examination of books as physical objects, the following pages discuss the challenging environment in which publishers operated and demonstrate the number of factors which mediated the propaganda they printed.

By attending to the material production of books as objects, I stress that the history of propaganda production in China is an intertwined history of labor and technology. Christopher Reed first broached these subjects in his research on early Chinese print capitalism, charting how the arrival of Western printing technology in China recast a nexus of social, industrial and cultural relationships. He leaves little doubt that the mechanization of printing processes profoundly changed these relationships and led to the development of print capitalism in late Qing and Republican China.² For the People's Republic of China, however, scholars of textual or visual cultural have mainly studied content creators, the everyday reception of these materials, and the politics of cultural production.³ In the previous chapter, I supplemented these

¹ This quote originally comes from Arber's *A Transcript of the Registers of the Company of Stationers of London, 1554-1640.* It is reprinted in Anthony Rota's *Apart from the Text* (Pinner: Private Libraries Association, 1998), 17.

² Reed, *Gutenberg in Shanghai*.

³ Clark, The Chinese Cultural Revolution; Mittler, A Continuous Revolution; Ho, "The People Eat for Free"; Richard Kraus, Brushes with Power: Modern Politics and the Chinese Art of Calligraphy

perspectives by following the paper trail between mills, publishers and printers. Now, I ask, how did this propaganda come into being? I argue that working-class typesetters, proofreaders, printers, binders and other press staff constituted the productive labor which undergirded the propaganda state during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. The sweat of press workers, along with their creative use of old technologies, sustained political communication on a mass scale. The productive limitations of the labor force and the technology it used likewise imparted a reality check to the political voluntarism of the period.

Ironically, the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign – which celebrated the exploits of working people in ancient China and the present – encouraged the mechanization that increasingly made skilled manual work such as hand-typesetting and binding redundant. In the 1970s, the government embarked on an ambitious plan of mechanization and automation to modernize the printing sector and boost output. With printing infrastructure lagging behind other countries, state planners invested in experimental research to shift the burden of production from people to machines. Whereas economic historians focused on dramatic economic reforms in the late 1970s, I portray the first half of the decade as a crucial transitionary period for light industries such as printing.⁴ By the 1990s, China's printing industry had undergone a full-scale transformation in its structure and capabilities, and the seeds for this was sown two decades earlier.

For publishers, remarkable parallels emerge between Chinese publishers and their contemporaries abroad. Of course, the former had significantly less choice when it came to both

⁽Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Chang-tai Hung, *Mao's New World: Political Culture in the Early People's Republic* (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011).

⁴ The scholarship dealing with the beginning of China's so-called "reform and opening up" (改革开放) is too numerous to list. Barry Naughton's *The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth*, second edition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2018) is a good place to start.

deciding which genres to favor and commissioning new books. And yet, like contemporaries abroad, Chinese publishing staff wrestled with finding the formats, cover designs, and content arrangements to communicate with readers as effectively as possible. Propaganda printing and the needs of different audiences merited, and received, careful consideration across the industry. At the same time, the Chinese case bears out David McKitterick's argument that "authorship in print is a process of compromise with manufacture."⁵ Like all technologies, those used to make books had their practical limits, shaping and sometimes circumscribing political communication in print.

The Type Beneath the Page

Let us start with a counterintuitive observation: propaganda publications in China cost money to buy. In nearly any context, the easiest way to spread information is to offer it for free. Readers today will be no stranger to the range of grocery store leaflets, political mailshots and other 'junk mail' which appear at no cost in the mailbox each week to try and proactively sell us particular ideas or products. City streets regularly play to host to religious groups offering pamphlets free for the taking to the unconverted. In World War Two, when the Axis and Allied powers fought battles of ideas as well as on the ground, the British and Americans dropped propaganda all across occupied France in what one participant called "the most extraordinary publishing operation in history."⁶ Why, then, did readers and organizations have to pay money for ideologically-infused publications during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign?

⁵ McKitterick, *The Invention*, 9.

⁶ Ellic Howe, quoted in Valarie Holman, "Air-Borne Culture: Propaganda Leaflets over Occupied France in the Second World War," in *Free Print and Non-Commercial Publishing since 1700*, ed. James Raven (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 194.

Exploring the obvious answer – that publishers had to cover their expenses – reveals the many steps involved in turning a book manuscript into a printed final tome. Each stage cost money, and centrally-determined price guidelines accounted for all associated labor and resource expenses. For example, during the Cultural Revolution, Beijing's printers paid workers according to set values placed on different types of labor. As table 6.1 demonstrates, a typical print-run required a large number of staff and their machines working at the right pace to keep the production line moving. Mass printing of propaganda books, therefore, could only happen through atomizing press workers in the act production.

Work Process	Unit	Worker Salary (yuan)
Chinese-language typesetting	Per 1000 characters 千字	3.00
Creation of flongs	Per leaf 每页	0.70
Letterpress printing	1000 impressions 千印	3.50
Rotary printing	Per ream 每令	2.30
Lead-plate printing and halftone	Per print 每次	3.60
printing		
Standard-size paperback binding	Per 10,000 leaves 万页	1.40
Standard-size hardback sewn	Per 10,000 leaves 万页	3.06
binding		
Standard-size gluing of covers	Per 100 covers 百个	2.10
Standard-size addition of covers	Per 100 covers 百个	4.90

Table 6.1: Worker salaries $(\pm m)$ for selected stages of book production in Beijing.⁷

With labor the bedrock of the propaganda state, making propaganda placed an intense and mentally draining burden on those manning the production line. For example, as a majority of printing continued to use moveable lead type, titles consumed significant typesetting labor. Typesetting manually in any language is a skilled art, but Chinese typesetters had to contend

⁷ Excerpted from a table on Beijing shi difang zhi, *Beijing Gazetteer (Industry Volume): Medicinal and Printing*], 444. As indicated on page 441 of this source, this schematic remained in force between 1961 and 1978.

with thousands of individual characters. As a result, they worked for hours to assemble pages of text while simultaneously paying painstaking attention to each page's aesthetics. Assembling type in a steel frame called a 'chase,' a typesetter would also aim to create neat paragraphs without a ragged-right margin and avoid leaving pages containing just one or two lines (one 1970s typesetting manual called this "unsightly" (不美观)).⁸ To reach these goals, typesetters continuously manipulated the amount of space between characters (known as "kerning") to fill-out lines and even-up margins (figures 6.1 and 6.2). A typical typesetter's dexterity improved with experience, but never to the point where they worked by rote.

上又分开明和全角等几种排法。各种版式都有其特点和规 □□□□,□□□,□□□□,□□□□□ (三个六分空) 定,不能随意更换或互相混淆。 _____, ____, ____, (两个四分空) "□□□□, □□□□□, □□□□□□ (两个四分空) (2) 无论全角和开明符号, 其本身不得超过全角地位。 (二分空) (3) 遇有标点连续使用时标点之间不得开空。而且前边 "_____", _____ 的标点必须更换二分符号,不得马虎从事。如: (两个四分空) °"?"!"。)?)!)。'"'。":" □□□□,|"□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□(两个四分空) (4) 与有关文字有连带关系的标点,不得在字与标点之 □□。"□□□□"□□□□,□□□□□□ (两个四分空) 间开空。 ("□□□□□"), □□□□□□□□(二分空) 另外在几种标点符号连续使用时,还要更换部分符号。 (5) 无论全角和开明标点, 其版口点一律使用二分点, 不能擅自更换。 例二: (凡划"一"线处表示换二分符号) (6) 行末标点不能脱离有关文字而转行。 ____."____. "____, ____ (7) 行首括号不论全角或开明符号一律使用二分的。 (8) 全角标点之间不能相背使用。 ("____?"_____。)____. ___ 二、版式排法:分开明、全角、二分、老开明共四种。 ____:"____·___'。"(____!), (1) 开明标点:是常用的符号,它是二分(也称对开)和 "___ ·____.'"____ (_____.)___ 全角并用的,除。?!为全角外,其它符号均为二分。这 种符号多用于一般书籍中,由于是二分和全角并用,故每行 除上述情况外,还有背点,背点的含义是:标点符号脱 需要的标点量不一,还需在符号后面或字中间嵌入不同规格 离了有关文字,出现在行末或行首,在阅读上产生了脱节,这 的铅空,以作补缺。例如一行字中遇有单数的二分标点时, 在印版中是不允许出现的,俗称"顶头"点。背点分两种形式: 这一行内必缺二分空,这就需要根据具体情况灵活嵌空(习 1. 行首背点,是指不允许在字行的起始出现,而可以出 称夹空)下面举出比较常用的例子,作为具体使用的根据。 现在行末的标点符号。如: 例一: (凡划" | "线处表示夹空) 。,、:;!?")']等。 □□□□□□□□, 1□□□□□□□ (二分空) 遇有这些标点出现在行首时,必须将前一行行末一个字 移至下一行的行首,然后在前一行的标点处或行末字间适当 □□□□□□, □□□□□. □□□□ (二分空) 夹空。但如遇行首背点前面是注码(①)时,就需将前一行 □□□□! □□□□□□□□□□□□, (三个六分空) 行末两个字移至下一行,也就是说行首是注码也是不允许

Figure 6.1: Directions from a typesetting manual on filling-out lines. The diagram with boxes spanning the two pages shows black lines where extra spaces (of various sizes) can be added to avoid a ragged-right edge.⁹

⁸ Beijing xinhua, Manual for Typesetters, 119.

⁹ Image source: ibid., 38-39.




Figure 6.2: A campaign book page spaced flush right. In the red box, the spaces separating characters vary in order to use the entire line.¹⁰

¹⁰ Image source: Guangxi Beiliu xian Xinwei gaozhong "Zhongxue zhengzhi ke pilinpikong de cankao cailiao" bianxie zu 广西北流县新圩高中《中学政治课批林批孔的参考材料》编写组,中学政治课: 批林批孔的参考材料 [Politics Lessons for Middle School: Reference Materials for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign] ([Guangxi?]: [Guangxi Beiliu xian Xinwei gaozhong "Zhongxue zhengzhi ke pilinpikong de cankao cailiao" bianxie zu?], 1974), 51.

Similarly, conditions within typesetting workshops and the lack of mechanization in the industry imposed harsh physical tolls. A typical workstation consisted of a series of racks placed side-by-side in one line, or racks arranged as a three-sided cubicle (figure 6.3). The linear setup offered a light and airy workspace, while also allowing two people to pick characters simultaneously. But, with no place to sit down, a shift demanded a lot of stamina.¹¹ Although the newer cubicle design saved space and could be manned by one person sitting on a swiveling stool, at the same time it slowed pick rates, blocked the circulation of fresh air and natural light, and created a cramped environment.¹² By the 1970s, Beijing Xinhua Printing Press (北京新华印刷厂) used a combination of setups and used "predictive text"-style arrangements to improve character retrieval, but at the time of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign typesetting remained in dire need of automation (figure 6.4).¹³




Figure 6.3: Standard arrangements of type racks. Left: two versions of the horizontal rack. Right: the cubicle setup.¹⁴

¹¹ Cao Hongkui 曹洪奎, 铅印排版技术 [Letterpress Typesetting Technology] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1975), 74.

¹² Ibid., 74.

¹³ Beijing xinhua, Manual for Typesetters, 28-31.

¹⁴ Image source: Cao, *Letterpress Typesetting*, 75-76.




Figure 6.4: Typesetting stations at Beijing Xinhua Printing Press.¹⁵

Despite some breakthroughs, the state of China's printing industry more generally remained far behind those in Japan, Europe and America. True, achievements such as the test printing of the first color edition of *The People's Daily* on 1 January 1974 demonstrate that technological experimentation never entirely stopped in the late 1960s and early 1970s.¹⁶ Yet, as late as 1980, most presses in China still employed lead-type letterpress technology for book printing, with only a few titles made with faster offset (胶印) processes.¹⁷ In the late Mao era, officials were acutely aware of China's deficiencies. In fall 1973, a delegation visited Japan to observe the country's printing industry.¹⁸ Japan presented a logical choice because printing in Japanese required complexities absent from languages derived from the smaller Latin alphabet. The delegation found that Japanese printers already universally used phototypesetting, cutting-

¹⁵ Image source: Beijing xinhua, *Manual for Typesetters*, 29.

¹⁶ "Beijing gongye zhi," *Beijing Industrial Gazzetteer: Printing*, 26. Shanghai's *Wenhui Daily* likewise printed its first experimental color edition on 23 January 1974 (see "关于发行彩色报纸的启事" [Announcing the publication of a color edition of *Wenhui Daily*]. *Wenhui Daily*, January 23, 1974, 1). ¹⁷ Song Yingli 宋应离, ed., 中国当代出版史料 [*Historical Sources on Contemporary Chinese Publishing*], volume 4 (Zhengzhou: Daxiang chubanshe, 1999), 7.

¹⁸ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 473.

edge technology and a high degree of automation.¹⁹ Comparing domestic and foreign printing in 1976, the NBP estimated that computerized phototypesetting in Western countries allowed for six times the productivity of a Chinese typesetter working by hand, while foreign printing machines provided between two and three times the output of Chinese printers. As for binding – still a predominantly manual industry in China – foreign binding equipment offered three times the productivity of manual labor.²⁰ These unfavorable comparisons exposed the need for major improvements.

As we saw with paper production, the revival of the publishing sector in the early 1970s also necessitated reforms to industrial output. Demand for large quantities of Mao's writings in the early years of the Cultural Revolution first focused the government's attention on the outdated condition of the printing sector, and by the beginning of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign leaders firmly grasped the need for innovation.²¹ In a December 1973 letter from the economic planner Gu Mu (谷牧) to senior CCP politicians including Li Xiannian (李先 念) and Hua Guofeng (华国锋), Gu reported that "our printing technology is outdated, while the quality and speed of printing and publishing falls significantly short of our current requirements" (而印刷技术落后,印刷质量、速度、出版时间都赶不上需要). To justify his point, Gu invoked the lack of automation and how typical books spent as long as six months in press.²² The situation in major publishing centers appeared equally bleak. In 1973, forty percent of printing machines in Beijing and sixty percent in Shanghai dated from before 1949.²³ Officials in

¹⁹ Ibid.


²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² SMA B246-1-659-129, "关于落实印刷行业技术改造任务的报告" [A report on implementing technological reforms in the printing industry].

²³ Zhongguo yinshua jishu xiehui 中国印刷技术协会, ed., 中国印刷年鉴 1981 [China Printing Annual: 1981] (Beijing: Yinshua gongye chubanshe, 1982), 10.

Shanghai labelled local printing infrastructure as "out-of-date and urgently in need of an upgrade" (比较陈旧, 迫切需要加以更新).²⁴ The significant upswing shown in graph 6.1 below – with publishing quantitatively doubling between 1970 and 1975 – meant that the printing sector could not afford to be static.²⁵



Graph 6.1: Total book and poster output, 1965-1976. Unit: 100 millions.

Reflecting printing's importance to mass political communication, funding for new technology poured forth from government coffers. Between 1966 and 1976, Beijing's printing industry alone received eighty million *yuan* of investment, with the majority coming from the state.²⁶ Funding for the years 1973-1976 accounts for over half of this figure, implying that the later years of the Cultural Revolution decade were a hotbed of state spending on technological

²⁴ SMA B244-3-586-101, "上海市革命委员会毛主席著作印制发行工作办公室 1974 年印刷机械申请 计划" [A plan from the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee Office for Printing and Distributing Chairman Mao's Works concerning applications for new machinery for 1974].

²⁵ Data in the chart comes from Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 480.

²⁶ "Beijing gongye zhi," *Beijing Industrial Gazzetteer: Printing*, 149-150.

developments.²⁷ In just 1974, planners pumped 5.5 million *yuan* combined into improving facilities in Beijing and Shanghai.²⁸ The capital's portion included money for new binding, finishing, letterpress printing and offset printing machines, as well as other equipment.²⁹

Alongside procuring new hardware, government officials supervised a multi-year effort to modernize typesetting. In 1970, the First Ministry of Machines (一机部) initiated research into automated phototypesetting (自动照相排字) which promised to make picking lead type from wooden racks a thing of the past.³⁰ Just a year later, a partnership between Beijing Xinhua Printing Press and Tsinghua University produced China's first working automatic machine for setting text.³¹ Over the long-term, this research became the foundation for Wang Xuan's (王选) historic invention of a computerized method of setting Chinese language texts in 1981.³²

More immediately, in 1974 Beijing Number One Printing Press (北京印刷一厂)

established the country's first commercial workshop using phototypesetting to compose books, equipping it with thirty hand-operated and domestically-made machines.³³ By the end of 1974, it had set over two million characters of text, including all 1.66 million characters of a study

²⁷ Ibid., 150.

²⁸ BMA 201-2-124, "北京市计委下达 1974 年基建任务的通知和北京市出版办公室关于基建项目的 请示" [A notice from the Beijing Municipal Planning Committee concerning essential construction for 1974, as well as requests for instructions from the Beijing Publishing Office concerning essential development].

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Zhongguo yinshua, *China Printing Annual: 1981*, 52.

³¹ Beijing shi difang zhi, *Beijing Gazetteer (Industry Volume): Medicinal and Printing*], 599; BMA 201-2-108, "北京市出版办公室关于科研项目的请示、计划统计以及下达科研费用的通知等" [Notices and other documents from the Beijing Publishing Office regarding requests for new technological research, unified planning, and information on allocation of funding].

³² "Beijing gongye zhi," *Beijing Industrial Gazzetteer: Printing*, 397; Qu Desen 曲德森, ed., 中国印刷法 展史图鉴 (下) [A Pictorial History of the Development of Printing in China (Part Two)] (Taiyuan: Shanxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 2013), 666-667.

³³ Beijing shi difang zhi, *Beijing Gazetteer (Industry Volume): Medicinal and Printing*], 599; BMA 201-2-108.

anthology called *Reading Selected Texts by Marx and Lenin* (马列著作选读).³⁴ Beijing Publishing Office staff extolled the "significant advantages" (优越性很大) afforded by the new process. Where a typical manual workshop could produce 2000 characters of printing plates per person per day, a staff member operating a phototypesetting machine could manage 3-4,000 characters.³⁵ Not only could the technology close the gap between Beijing's typesetting workload and its output, but staff would also no longer have to suffer prolonged exposure to lead.³⁶

Besides successfully trialing the workshop, Beijing printing officials sponsored an entirely new hand-operated phototypesetting machine and cemented the capital's reputation as a center of industrial innovation. A problem with the machines installed in 1974 was that only one facility in the country manufactured them. This Shanghai factory, manned by prisoners sentenced to labor reform (劳动改造), made machines derived from a 1950s Japanese model but could only produce several dozen per annum. Not only did Beijing need around 1000 machines to fully overhaul its typesetting industry, but it also competed with other regions hoping to strengthen their own printing sectors.³⁷ Therefore, at the same time as the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign gathered pace in 1974, engineers in the capital began constructing their own machine based on a recent Japanese design imported specially.³⁸ In a major breakthrough for the country's printing industry, the team had finished a prototype of the new ZXP-1201 hand-

³⁴ BMA 201-2-108; The volume was published without a date under the name of the Beijing Municipal *Reading Selected Texts by Marx and Lenin* Editorial Small Group 北京市《马列著作选读》编选小组. ³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Hints of this gap are visible in requests for more typesetting staff found in ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.; BMA 201-3-64, "北京市出版办公室关于申请增拨资金、试制费等的报告" [A report from the Beijing Publishing Office applying for increasing and transferring money and research funding].

operated phototypesetting machine (ZXP-1201 型手动照相排字机) by early the following year.³⁹ Unsurprisingly, preparations for formal production began immediately after.⁴⁰

Inventing the ZXP-1201 represented but one part of a large wave of research and development which reached a crescendo during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Because current printing infrastructure could not meet publishing's requirements, the First Ministry of Machines and the NBP jointly devised the "Development Plan for Important New Printing Technologies" (印刷机械重点新产品试制计划) to run between 1974 and 1976.⁴¹ The plan prioritized experimental production of 28 new pieces of machinery in different parts of the country. Naturally, planners assigned Beijing and Shanghai major roles, but they also enlisted several other provinces such as Jilin, Guangdong and Henan to galvanize innovation in phototypesetting, color printing, binding and plate-making technologies.⁴² During 1974, the government injected over 1.5 million *yuan* into research and by year-end prototypes of two new offset printing machines and a letterpress printing machine were either completed or nearing completion.⁴³

³⁹ "Beijing gongye zhi," *Beijing Industrial Gazzetteer: Printing*, 150-151.

⁴⁰ BMA 201-2-168, "北京市出版办公室关于基建任务的请示、报告和批复" [Requests for instructions, reports, and replies from the Beijing Publishing Office concerning essential development].
⁴¹ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 486-487; SMA B103-4-613-91, "第一机械工业部关 于重点印刷机械任务座谈会有关工作安排的通知" [A notice from the First Ministry of Machines regarding work arrangements stemming from a roundtable on important printing machinery projects].
⁴² SMA B103-4-539-120, "第一机械工业部、国家出版事业管理局关于安排印刷技术改造急需的重 点印刷机械新产品试制任务的通知" [A notice from the First Ministry of Machines and the National Bureau of Publishing dividing responsibilities for designing prototypes of urgently needed new printing technologies].

⁴³ SMA B103-4-613-91; SMA B246-2-1155-84, "第一机械工业部关于下达 1974 年印刷机械基建措施 投资的通知" [A notice from the First Ministry of Machines regarding funding for essential printing technology developments for 1974].

Even as elite politicians split over the course of China's broader economic modernization in 1975 and 1976, work on the plan proceeded apace.⁴⁴ In January 1975, the government earmarked 13.45 million yuan for the completion of thirteen projects by December, with funding for the twelve remaining projects to come the following year.⁴⁵ These thirteen schemes aimed to make book production more efficient, and included a binding machine capable of processing 3,000-6,500 books per hour, another machine for binding with staples, and a finishing machine (精装书芯加工联动机) capable of handling 18-36 hardback books per minute. In addition, to help compositors, the plan funded research into a new semi-automatic phototypesetting machine, an automatic typesetting machine capable of composing ten characters per second in four different typefaces, and an automatic typecasting and typesetting machine (自动铸排机) operating at ninety characters per minute.⁴⁶ Although progress took longer than expected, the First Ministry of Machines remained committed to this research and in April 1976 it urged researchers to finish all work by the end of the year.⁴⁷ In short, throughout the 1970s and beyond, the publishing and printing sectors reaped the benefits of the state's reliance on mass communication.

Concurrent to the "Development Plan for Important New Printing Technologies," individual provinces and municipalities instituted their own upgrade plans to bolster their printing capabilities. In June 1974, for instance, Beijing's municipal government provided 81,000 *yuan* for new paper folding machines and other book finishing equipment.⁴⁸ In the same

⁴⁴ Teiwes and Sun, *End of the Maoist Era*, 245 onwards.

⁴⁵ SMA B103-4-613-91.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ SMA B103-4-677-128, "第一机械工业部关于 1976 年重点印刷机械任务有关问题的通知" [A notice from the First Ministry of Machines regarding questions surrounding key printing technology research projects for 1976].

⁴⁸ BMA 201-2-108.

year, Shanghai trialed production of a new automatic typesetting machine (capable of setting 600-1200 characters per minute), a new hand-operated phototypesetting machine, and a color newspaper printing machine for making 100,000 prints per hour.⁴⁹ Into 1975, officials in the country's two largest publishing centers continued to spend on increasing output, with Shanghai's leadership happy to invest almost 300,000 *yuan* to double the municipality's bookbinding capacity by the end of the year.⁵⁰ The city also aspired to invent new equipment which would quadruple typesetting productivity and offer twenty to thirty percent gains in output for printing.⁵¹ The politics of the early 1970s thus sowed not stagnation but innovation.

The Problems Beneath the Print

Gu Mu's letter to Li Xiannian and Hua Guofeng hit on the fundamental problem driving the above flurry of research and development: the country's printing infrastructure could not satisfy the demands the state placed on it. While investment in new technologies offered medium-term and long-term solutions, I argue that the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign unfolded against a steep drop in the overall production capacity (生产能力) of the

⁴⁹ SMA B103-4-539-197, "上海市革命委员会工业交通组关于安排试制一批印刷机械的通知" [A notice from the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee Industry and Communications Group arranging for the designing of prototypes for the first batch of new printing technologies].
⁵⁰ BMA 201-3-85, "下达第二批技术改造项目指标的通知" [A notice containing details on the second batch of technology upgrade projects]; SMA B246-2-1396-73, "国家出版事业管理局关于一九七五年上海地区印刷技术改造投资计划" [A plan from the National Bureau of Publishing regarding investment for printing technology upgrades in the Shanghai area in 1975]; SMA B163-4-599-8, "上海市印刷工业公司革命委员会关于深入开展批林批孔、学大庆、搞"技改"、大打印刷工业翻身仗的材料" [Materials from the Shanghai Municipal Printing Company Revolutionary Committee concerning continuing the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, continuing studying the lessons of Daqing, continuing upgrading technology, and continuing waging a war to improve the printing industry].

printing sector. Self-evidently, therefore, the publishing upswing starting in the early 1970s strained the sector and heightened spending on equipment and labor. As we shall see, production realities shaped the campaign's course as much by preventing as by allowing publishing activity.

At first glance, industrial data looks deceptively healthy. In 1976, for instance, staff numbers in printing factories were 2.25 their level in 1965, while in absolute terms printing and binding output had all grown by around 1.5 times over the same eleven years.⁵² Spotlighting Beijing municipality in 1975 further supports this growth narrative. Production at printers for January to April 1975 rose ten percent on the same period in 1974, and by mid-year the city was on target to meet its annual planned production goals.⁵³ At Beijing Xinhua Printing Press, July 1975 was the seventh month in a row where the factory had exceeded targets.⁵⁴ Citywide, productivity increases came partly from extending work shifts and pushing workers to work quicker. In July, Beijing Xinhua Printing Press turned on folding machines half an hour earlier each day to raise daily production levels from 49 reams to 59 reams. It also boasted that some workers were hand-binding (手工包本) books at a rate of 10,400 per day when their target was only 6000. With a worker attendance rate standing at 93 percent, productivity may well have been even higher if staff had fully turned out for work.⁵⁵

These rosy figures, however, hide the alarming decline of the printing sector at a crucial juncture in the history of the book in modern China. In 1970, letterpress printing capacity (the maximum theoretical output) stood at over 16.5 million reams of paper (equivalent to 1.3 billion

⁵² Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 166; Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 379. ⁵³ BMA 201-3-86, "北京市出版办公室关于印刷管理方面的通知" [Notices from the Beijing Publishing Office concerning management of the printing industry]; BMA 201-3-89, "北京市出版办公室季度工业 生产计划" [Quarterly industrial production plans from the Beijing Publishing Office]. These figures are much higher than the quantities reported in my analysis of book publishing because they reflect total printing of all media - newspapers, magazines, books, and textbooks.

¹₅₄ BMA 201-3-86.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

copies of the fourth volumes of Mao's *Selected Works*), and offset color printing capacity numbered 13.2 million reams (equivalent to 2.1 billion newspaper-sized propaganda posters). In addition, the industry had the capacity to bind and finish ten million reams of printed sheets.⁵⁶ Five years later, with the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign now matured, letterpress capacity had almost halved to 9 million, offset color printing capacity was down by almost one third, and binding and finishing capacity was likewise down by twenty percent.⁵⁷ In other words, extra staff and new machinery were collectively doing quantifiably more work but much less efficiently. In this light, the growth of the publishing and printing sector in Beijing by 461 people during 1975 appears less like healthy expansion and more like workplace bloat.⁵⁸ Such industrial inefficiency did not bode well for increases in book publishing. Unsurprisingly, the NBP's longrange development plan outlined in 1975 called for substantial improvements by 1980 to arrest plummeting efficiency.⁵⁹

At the same time as efficiency tanked, wasteful and unexpected printing projects further stretched China's over-extended printing capacity. Chapter Five outlined how unoriginal content wasted paper, and the same proved true for time and labor. At a November 1975 gathering of publishers from seven municipalities and provinces, attendees drew attention to how different publishers across the country produced basically identical material (重复浪费), thereby consuming valuable machine and man hours.⁶⁰ Shanghai, for example, reported having five

⁵⁶ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 52.

⁵⁷ SMA B167-3-285-1, "国家出版局关于出版事业十年规划的初步设想(草稿)" [A draft plan from the National Bureau of Publishing outlining initial thoughts for the development of the publishing industry over the next decade].

⁵⁸ BMA 201-3-89; BMA 201-2-198, "北京市出版办公室关于 1976 年基建计划和申请报告等" [Applications and plans from the Beijing Publishing Office concerning infrastructure development in 1976].

⁵⁹ SMA B167-3-285-1.

⁶⁰ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 295.

hundred titles bottlenecked at printing factories due to a lack of resources. In terms of unexpected printing projects, new strands to the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign – in particular the beginning of the campaign to study *Water Margin* in late 1975 – also shunted other titles aside. In October 1975, Shanghai had 53 titles awaiting press work, but mass production of the novel to support study activities left over half of these titles uncompleted.⁶¹

Official criticisms issued later in the 1970s capture how production problems marred publishing at the tail end of the Mao era. These critiques, in particular, stressed how printing and binding acted as a bottleneck between a book going to press (发稿) and its final publication (出书). At times, titles needed as much as two years for printing, and sometimes printed sheets languished in factories because of insufficient binding capacity.⁶² This happened in Beijing: in March 1975, municipal staff reported that a lack of capacity had left over 100,000 reams of printed paper stockpiled in warehouses awaiting binding.⁶³ In 1974, the city's printers bound 950,000 reams of paper, but in early 1975 estimates for the coming year's binding output now stood at only 900,000 reams.⁶⁴ Their solution involved petitioning for an additional two hundred workers who could bind an additional 150,000-200,000 reams, thereby offering a good example of officials expanding the labor force to make up for insufficient production capacity.⁶⁵ In sum, a state so dependent on communicating with people in print relied on a strikingly inefficient production apparatus.

⁶¹ Ibid., 296.

⁶² Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 138.

⁶³ BMA 201-2-161, "北京市出版办公室关于申请增加生产工人的请示" [An application from the Beijing Publishing Office to increase production staff].

⁶⁴ BMA 201-1-214, "北京市出版办公室 1974 年工业统计年报" [Annual industrial data reports for 1974 from the Beijing Publishing Office]; BMA 201-2-161.

⁶⁵ BMA 201-2-161.

It is not enough to sketch the scope of these inefficiencies without also charting their tangible effect on anti-Confucian propaganda printing. In Beijing, Beijing People's Press staff compared their work unfavorably with presses in Shanghai and Jiangsu, singling-out the adverse consequences of delays bringing manuscripts to market.⁶⁶ For the political biography *The* Reactionary Life of Confucius (孔丘反动的一生), the press had the manuscript in hand by 6 June 1974 but printing did not finish until 21 January 1975.⁶⁷ Written under a pseudonym by the Beijing Municipal Party Committee's writing group, the book aimed to "expose and criticize old Confucius's principle counter-revolutionary words and deeds"(揭露和批判孔老二一生的主要 反革命言行).⁶⁸ Delayed publication, however, ensured that the book missed the most intense period of the campaign. In another instance, although a manuscript on two works by the Legalist Zhang Taiyan was ready in mid-1974, publication did not occur until 8 months later.⁶⁹ Finally, the comic book Exposing Confucius and Mencius (孔孟现形记) reached bookstores half a year late, missing peak demand for the title.⁷⁰ In the words of press staff, with books released haphazardly and behind schedule, Beijing People's Press thus "neglected the needs of the municipality's remote suburbs" (把山区忘了) who did not enjoy the same access to books as urbanites.71

⁶⁶ BMA 201-2-164, "北京市出版办公室关于出版发行方面的通知以及对所属书店关于发行工作的批 复" [Notices from Beijing Publishing Office concerning publishing and book distribution, as well its replies to enquiries from subsidiary bookstores].

⁶⁷ BMA 201-2-166, "北京市出版办公室关于北京人民出版社 1975 年选题计划和发稿统计" [A plan from the Beijing Publishing Office for Beijing People's Press titles for 1975, as well as statistics on books sent to press]. Note: the copyright page of Hong Guangsi 洪广思, 孔丘反动的一生 [*The Reactionary Life of Confucius*] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1974) lists the book's publication date as September 1974 but the archives are a more accurate record.

 ⁶⁸ Yin, "The Liangxiao and Luo Siding Writing Groups," 30; Hong, *The Reactionary Life*, 2.
 ⁶⁹ BMA 201-2-166.

⁷⁰ BMA 201-2-164.

⁷¹ Ibid.

Other examples from Beijing of delayed publication abound. Editors sent *Stories of the Struggle Between Confucian and Legalist Military Strategy* (儒法军事路线斗争故事) to press in January 1975 but the book was not finished until September.⁷² For the second volume of *Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts* (历代法家著作选注) – a flagship series advertised in official newspapers – the manuscript spent five months in press.⁷³ By the beginning of 1976, some annotated Legalist texts sent to press between March and June 1975 remained unpublished. *Selected Anti-Confucian Jokes and Fables from Ancient China* (古代反孔批儒寓言笑话选) experienced the record delay, going to press on 14 February 1975 and not being fully published until as late as December 24.⁷⁴ My laboring of the point with a surfeit of examples is hopefully repetitive and tiresome, as these emotions bring us as close as possible to imagining the frustrations of Beijing People's Press staff as they tried to usher titles to publication and confronted frequent delays.

Whereas printing and binding experienced growing output but declining capacity, typesetting bucked the trend with contraction across the board. Typesetting output decreased by one quarter between 1965 and 1976 to 2.34 billion characters per annum.⁷⁵ With a capacity of 2.56 billion characters in 1975, the industry was thus operating at full capacity while doing quantitatively less work than before the Cultural Revolution.⁷⁶ Data from Beijing again fits with this national trend. Although municipal typesetting output between 1970 and 1976 grew in line

⁷² BMA 201-2-166.


⁷³ Ibid.; for an example of newspaper coverage of the book, see: "适应批林批孔运动普及、深入、持久 发展的需要" [Meet the need to proliferate, deepen, and lengthen the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign]. *The People's Daily*, January 31, 1975, 1.

⁷⁴ BMA 201-2-166; Beijing tushuguan 北京图书馆, ed., 古代反孔批儒寓言笑话选 [Selected Anti-Confucian Jokes and Fables from Ancient China] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1975), copyright page.

 ⁷⁵ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 166; Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 379.
 ⁷⁶ SMA B167-3-285-1.

with the publishing sector's revival, in 1976 it represented only 54 percent of 1965 levels. Over the early years of the Cultural Revolution, publishing in Beijing and nationwide shifted emphasis from title variety to volumetric quantity, and thus printing and binding needed greater resources than typesetting (see graphs 6.1 and 6.2).⁷⁷ When publishers returned to publishing a broader range of titles in 1973 and 1974, typesetters once again became in demand.

⁷⁷ "Beijing gongye zhi," *Beijing Industrial Gazzetteer: Printing*, 150-153.



Graph 6.2: The number of unique titles published each year, 1965-1976.⁷⁸

Having focused on printing and binding in the late 1960s, printers now found themselves unable to satisfy the renewed need for typesetting work. Going back to the example of Beijing, a 1974 analysis highlighted a deficit of 200 million characters between the number of characters typesetters could compose in a year and the total length of the manuscripts dispatched from publishers for typesetting. This gap directly slowed the speed with which completed works became published books.⁷⁹ As expected, the following March officials requested permission to hire another 150 typesetters with the goal of increasing annual output by one hundred million characters.⁸⁰ The situation worsened when typesetters underperformed. In September 1975, staff in Beijing forecast that factories would miss 2.37 percent (equivalent to over 11,000 pages of set type) of the year's target output due to problems at some factories. Earlier in the summer, while

⁷⁸ Graph based on data from Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 482.

⁷⁹ BMA 201-2-108.

⁸⁰ BMA 201-2-161.

some staff averaged 3.72 pages of type per person per day, averages at two other factories dropped to 2.28 and 2.62.⁸¹

The East Is Red (Tape)

Supposedly, Kafka once proclaimed that "every revolution evaporates and leaves behind only the slime of a new bureaucracy." In China, technology needed bureaucracy to manage it, and bureaucracy almost inevitably created the kind of tussles and struggles which mired the dayto-day activities of the printing sector. When examining paper, we saw how books were birthed out of internal confrontations over paper supplies, and similarly other titles emerged only out of hard-fought contests over technological resources. Examining some of these tussles give us another window into the lives of those tasked with spreading the state's ideas in print and reveals the adverse consequences of scarcity for the operations of the propaganda state.

The case of Beijing municipality, typical or not, demonstrates how infrastructure upgrades were contingent on resource availability and bureaucratic co-operation. After successfully inventing the ZXP-1201 typesetting machine in 1975, officials wanted production of 35 units in 1976, but this could only be done with the co-operation of other officials tasked with allocating production resources.⁸² Likewise, difficulties securing a plot of land delayed construction of Beijing's new 4000 square meter Printing Technology Research Center (北京印 刷技术研究所) despite support for the research center coming directly from Gu Mu and the First Ministry of Machines.⁸³ Most seriously, shortages of machinery and mistaken price estimates

⁸¹ BMA 201-3-89.

⁸² BMA 201-3-85.

⁸³ BMA 201-2-168; SMA B246-1-659-129.

caused Beijing to miss some of its upgrade targets for 1974. By September, officials had already spent 551,000 *yuan* on products such as printing and phototypesetting machines, and predicted that they could complete another 500,000 *yuan* of investment by year-end. But at the same time, an additional 1.2 million *yuan* had gone uninvested because some machines had not yet been successfully designed or manufacturers were not currently producing them.⁸⁴ A progress report from February 1975 show that, as predicted in September, problems with the availability of machines had affected some technological upgrades in the capital. Factories had successfully installed some machinery, but a lot of the machines – for example some binding, cutting, printing, and phototypesetting machines – had either not arrived, had nobody to provide them, had not yet been installed, or the city had no way to source them.⁸⁵

This halting progress also propelled the Beijing Publishing Office into a bureaucratic struggle with municipal colleagues. Keen to maintain momentum with upgrades and avoid the bureaucratic palaver of submitting new applications for funding, officials asked the NBP to rollover almost 1.9 million *yuan* into the following year.⁸⁶ It also petitioned for more flexibility to spend money because some new machinery would cost more than expected and because planners had not allocated funds for purchasing ancillary equipment, transporting machines, and on-site installation.⁸⁷ Ironically, opposition (for unknown reasons) from other parts of the municipal government rather than the state derailed plans to carry over unspent funds, and the NBP eventually had to maneuver with other government departments to ensure Beijing received

⁸⁴ BMA 201-2-124.

⁸⁵ BMA 201-3-85.

⁸⁶ BMA 201-2-124.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

investment money afresh.⁸⁸ Propagandists could not escape the grinding existence of the bureaucrat.

The tumultuous, fraught relationship between a prominent Beijing-based publisher and a municipal printer further exemplifies the role bureaucracy played in mediating campaign propaganda. Luckily, the Beijing Municipal Archives still holds documentary evidence of the tensions between China Finance and Economics Press (中国财政经济出版社, hereafter 'CFEP') and Beijing Number Two Printing Press (北京印刷二厂). In their undulating work entanglement, both publisher and printer angled for control of printing resources in order to guard their own interests. The conflict left campaign books printed behind schedule and had knock-on ramifications for relations between CFEP and Xinhua Bookstore. The dispute immerses us in the madness of bureaucracy and the sometimes antithetical connection between the broader political interests of the state and the interests of individual actors.

Like Zhonghua Books and other publishers, CFEP fell prey to the early years of the Cultural Revolution. Only in 1973, at the instigation of Vice-Premier Li Xiannian, did the publisher resume its mission to publish books on economic topics.⁸⁹ In the interim, however, Beijing municipality had taken control of CFEP's dedicated printing press and merged it with another factory in 1972 to form Beijing Number Two Printing Press (北京印刷二厂).⁹⁰ In

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ma Zenglun 马增伦, "中国财政经济出版社历史渊源索隐" [Research on the origins of China Finance and Economics Press],

https://web.archive.org/web/20190626182422/http://www.cfemg.cn/2016/0530/6461.shtml (archived June 26, 2019).

⁹⁰ "Beijing gongye zhi," *Beijing Industrial Gazzetteer: Printing*, 25; BMA 201-1-213, "北京市出版办公 室关于财政部要求收回原财经出版社印刷厂的报告、以及与中国财经出版社关于安排印刷任务协 议书" [A report from the Beijing Publishing Office regarding a request from the Ministry of Finance to return the China Finance and Economics Press Printing Factory, as well as an agreement made between the Beijing Publishing Office and China Finance and Economics Press arranging printing tasks].

keeping with Beijing Number Two's heavy workload, it received significant municipal investment, and thus in May 1974 the Beijing Publishing Office advised city authorities against returning the facilities to CFEP even though the publisher was now active again.⁹¹

In lieu of ceding control, Beijing agreed that Beijing Number Two Printing Press would handle all of CFEP's printing jobs. The agreement placed a premium on order and predictability and avowed any haphazard arrangements: before the twentieth day of each month, CFEP staff were to send word of their printing requirements for the following month, and if they missed the deadline, the printer could exercise its right to refuse the job.⁹² In theory, this arrangement guaranteed stability for CFEP while protecting the printing capacity and investment of Beijing municipality.

If only. In December 1974, CFEP's frustration boiled over in a letter to Beijing's municipal government grumbling about problems with its publications. Staff claimed that while they had sent ten manuscripts to press, only *A Criticism of Confucian Economic Thought* (孔丘: 经济思想批判, printed August 1974) had been produced. Consequently, in a recent communication with the NBP concerning publishing delays, Xinhua Bookstore cadres had name-checked CFEP for operating significantly behind schedule. Moreover, CFEP had a range of new books on Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign themes included in its front-list, but these titles would not reach readers until January or February 1975 due to Beijing Number Two's stalling. In this timeline, CFEP fell "far, far behind the pace of wider political developments" (远远落后于形势的发展) and risked becoming irrelevant. Finally, with book quantities as important as title variety, staff were singularly unimpressed with what they perceived as Beijing

⁹¹ BMA 201-1-213.

⁹² Ibid.

Number Two's unwillingness to provide them with their required print-runs. For example, after the first printing of *A Criticism of Confucian Economic Thought* sold well, Xinhua Bookstore asked CFEP for another 280,000 copies to meet demand, but Number Two Printing Press could only commit to a run of 49,000. As of December 1974, these books had failed to materialize.⁹³

Given all these difficulties, CFEP wanted its printing facilities back. Appeals for help to Beijing municipality, Shanghai and Wuhan had failed to generate a sustainable solution, and gallingly other central publishers such as People's Education Press (人民教育出版社) and Metallurgical Industry Press (冶金工业出版社) had managed to recoup their original printing presses from Beijing's leadership. Only the return of the printing factory or a suitable substitute would solve the publisher's "urgent requirements" (迫切需要).⁹⁴

Beijing Number Two told a wildly different story, quickly dashing any chance of a speedy resolution to the conflict. It accused the publisher of failing to abide by its stated publishing plans, thereby disrupting the press's day-to-day work. For example, despite initially requesting 100,000 copies of its *Selected Translations from the 'Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron'* (盐铁论选译), once printing began (付印) CFEP raised its request to 600,000.⁹⁵ Eventually, despite this abrupt increase, Beijing Number Two managed to print 202,000 copies

⁹³ BMA 201-1-266, "北京市出版办公室关于承担财经出版社印刷任务情况的汇报" [A report from the Beijing Publishing Office regarding taking on printing tasks for China Finance and Economics Press]; Beijing daxue jingji xi da pipan zu 北京大学经济系大批判组 et al., ed. 孔丘经济思想批判 [*A Criticism of Confucian Economic Thought*], first edition, first printing (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1974) (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com); Beijing daxue jingji xi da pipan zu 北京大学经济系大批判组 et al., ed. 孔丘经济思想批判 [*A Criticism of Confucian Economic Thought*], first edition, first printing (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1974). (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com); Beijing daxue jingji xi da pipan zu 北京大学经济系大批判组 et al., ed. 孔丘经济思想批判 [*A Criticism of Confucian Economic Thought*], first edition, second printing (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1974). The copyright page of the first printing shows that the book was published and printed in August 1974. The copyright page in the second printing, accessible in my collection, dates the second production of the book to October 1974. Were the second printings lost on route from the printer or was binding delayed after the sheets had been printed? ⁹⁴ BMA 201-1-266.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

of the title.⁹⁶ Likewise, for the contentious *A Criticism of Confucian Economic Thought*, CFEP initially asked for 100,000 copies, reduced the figure to 51,000, and then asked for an additional 280,000 copies. Again, although this high demand could not be fulfilled, printers managed to make another 49,000 copies as a compromise. As staff from Beijing Number Two pointed out, issuing two printings of the same book – as opposed to one printing of 100,000 copies – involved preparing machines for printing and binding twice rather than once, thereby wasting labor, time, and other resources.⁹⁷

As for publication delays, Beijing Number Two staff would have none of it. They pointed out that CFEP routinely failed to deliver final manuscripts on time; as Number Two Printing Press printed materials for many different central and municipal organizations in Beijing, delayed print jobs automatically joined the back of the queue. The nine manuscripts cited by CFEP staff as still in press had arrived too late at the factory to be finished before February 1975 at the earliest. Delays apparently even upset the printer's best efforts to do CFEP a favor. The NBP allocated CFEP 20,000 reams of paper for 1975, but its planned publishing amounted to 44,500 reams-worth of books. Foreseeing trouble, Beijing Number Two staff proactively sourced an extra 10,000 reams of paper and aspired to cover all of the shortfall. For all this to happen, however, CFEP had to stick to its plans.⁹⁸

Irrespective of each side's blame for the problems, Beijing's leadership valued printing infrastructure too highly to give any part of it away. In March 1975, they wrote to CFEP ruling

⁹⁶ Shenyang di yi jichuang chang jiu hao chejian lilun xiaozu 沈阳第一机床厂九号车间理论小组, Shenyang dianlan chang luoxian chejian gongren lilun zu 沈阳电缆厂裸线车间工人理论组, and Liaoning daxue lishi xi "Yan tie lun" xuanyi xiaozu 辽宁大学历史系《盐铁论》选译小组, ed., 《盐铁论》选译 [Selected Translations from the 'Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron'] (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1974), copyright page.

⁹⁷ BMA 201-1-266.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

out any chance of returning the factory and put the onus to stick to the terms of the agreement on the publisher. CFEP had no choice except to beat a retreat and make the best out of the status quo.⁹⁹ At this point, the archival trail runs cold, but a chance find in the Bodleian Library, Oxford offers a clue as to what happened next. The Bodleian Library's copy of *Discussing the Western Han Conflict Over Salt and Iron: Reflections on Reading the "Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron"* states that, while Beijing Number Two typeset the manuscript, another printing press one province over handled the printing.¹⁰⁰ Evidently, CFEP managed to enlist help from elsewhere to get its work done. In this development and indeed the entire CFEP saga, we can see how books and other campaign materials emerged from a system in which competing parties advocated for their own interests and negotiated conflicting priorities. Whether it be infrastructure funding in Beijing or the activities of CFEP, losing out in negotiations engendered major adverse consequences.

Mediating the Message: The Art and Appearance of Propaganda

Since, in a little space, it has a high density of intellectual and formal content, since it can be easily passed from hand to hand, [and] since it can be copied and reproduced at will, the book is the simplest instrument which, from a given point, can liberate a multitude of sounds, images, feelings, ideas, by opening the gates of time and space to them...¹⁰¹

Moving on to propaganda publications themselves, I argue in this section that the acts of negotiation and weighing priorities – so crucial in the relations between different parts of the

99 Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe 中国财政经济出版社, ed., 谈西汉盐铁之争——读《盐铁论》 体会 [*Discussing the Western Han Conflict Over Salt and Iron: Reflections on Reading the "Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron"*], first edition, first printing (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1975), copyright page (copy held in the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford).

¹⁰¹ Escarpit, *The Book Revolution*, 19.

publishing industry – also mediated the appearance of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign in print. Through detailed analysis of a selection of titles, we can reconstruct the decisions editors and designers took as books evolved from an idea to a final product. For every title, publishers considered their wider political objectives, their resources available, the perspectives of future readers, and the limitations imposed by technology, with the final printed product representing the outcome of this balancing act. Only by considering all of these elements can we understand the face of political communication in Mao's China.

While propaganda brings to mind the top-down imposition of political narratives, I prefer to see the books printed during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign as shaped by a two-way dialogue between publisher and reader. In these materials, publishers signaled what a reader needed to think, while at the same time articulating their understanding of the boundaries of reader taste. Put differently, reader preferences and pre-existing print culture exerted a strong influence on modern Chinese propaganda publishing.

From archival evidence alone, we could argue that the people, as much as the state, shaped what they read. The records of Shanghai People's Pres note an instance in May 1974 when staff took politics, science and technology titles to nearby factories, rural communes and army units to solicit feedback. Respondents praised titles such as *Qin Shi Huang* which they found eye-catching and which showed the subject of the book, while criticizing covers where the topic of the book was not clear, the colors were gloomy, or the designers failed to present their subject vibrantly and in a revolutionary manner.¹⁰² However, all this evidence comes from press staff and we cannot know whether they purposefully exaggerated either their attentiveness to this feedback or ordinary people's willingness to provide feedback.

¹⁰² SMA B167-3-240-44, "上海人民出版社编辑部编印的《情况交流》1974 年第 8 期" ["The Current Situation," 1974, no. 8, edited by the Shanghai People's Press Editorial Office].

Within the publishing sector, however, perceived reader response perennially influenced the choices made by editors and designers. Like their contemporaries abroad, publishers viewed books not only as functional tools for spreading ideas but also as design objects. Before the Cultural Revolution began, municipalities such as Beijing held competitions to judge finely-printed works.¹⁰³ Although the political climate of the late 1960s and 1970s afforded no room for such obvious aestheticism, the quality of publications still had a political valence. Beijing's printers followed the slogan that "printing problems are political problems" (印刷出了问题就是政治问题) and, as an official history of Beijing's printing sector points out, the political importance attached to books raised the standard of publications printed during the Cultural Revolution.¹⁰⁴ Behind these ideas lurks the assumption that sub-standard publications would leave a negative effect on readers.

More specific guidelines concerning the design, layout and format of books tell the same story. A provincial press's handbook for staff editors from 1974 includes an instructional essay on the "art of books" (书籍的艺术). According to the piece, in a "quality book" (完整的好书) the content and the design worked in harmony, while the right format, binding and typesetting offered the reader convenience and avoided their reading becoming laborious. In the opinion of the essayist, all these considerations helped propaganda serve its communicative purpose, indicated a well-run publishing sector, and ultimately signaled the success of CCP ideology.¹⁰⁵ While the essay deals with practical matters such as how to leverage formats to make books portable and prolong their life, it also stressed that a well-designed book allowed readers "to find

¹⁰³ "Beijing gongye zhi," *Beijing Industrial Gazzetteer: Printing*, 344.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 345.

¹⁰⁵ Shandong renmin, *Handbook on Editorial Work*, 260-262.

the pleasure of artistic appreciation" (从中得到美术欣赏的愉快).¹⁰⁶ A successful publisher always kept the reader's needs and preferences on their mind.

Publications offer compelling evidence for the influence of reader taste on propaganda output. One of the defining characteristics of publishing during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius period is the range of genres mobilized to explore campaign ideas. Alongside the books we have already encountered in this dissertation – polemics, classical texts and detailed biographies of key thinkers – publishers produced language-learning materials, joke books, comic books, wallcharts and colorful exposés of Confucius's crimes (figure 6.5).¹⁰⁷ Other titles dealt with topics such as art, calligraphy, science, and economics. The appeal of these different genres to different people, along with the needs of particular audiences, partly explains this proliferation of variety. In the same way as *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* claimed authority by building on conventions (see Chapter Three), publishers tailored their offerings to reader requirements.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 262 and 269.

¹⁰⁷ For a fascinating analysis of visual imagery from the campaign, see Sommer, "Images for Iconoclasts." For a history of cartooning and comics in modern China, including during the Cultural Revolution, see John Lent and Xu Ying, *Comics Art in China* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2017).



Figure 6.5: Selected titles published during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign.¹⁰⁸

Within publications, editors and designers sometimes went to extraordinary lengths to

mold books to popular expectations and thus induce reader interest. Figure 6.6 shows a book

¹⁰⁸ Image sources (clockwise from top-left): Anhui shifan daxue zhongwen xi "Kong lao er zuie shi" bianxie zu 安徽师范大学中文系《孔老二罪恶史》编写组, 孔老二罪恶史 [*A History of Old Confucius and His Evil Crimes*] (Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1974); Shanghai shi yeyu waiyu guangbo jiangzuo 上海市业余外语广播讲座, ed., 外语学习: 日语 (1974:2) [*Foreign Language Learning: Japanese (1974:2)*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974). Beijing tushuguan, *Selected Anti-Confucian Jokes and Fables*; Shanghai di wu gangtie chang gongren xiezuo zu 上海第五钢铁厂工人写 作组,《三字经》是骗人经 [*The 'Three Character Classic' is a Deceptive Classic*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974).

recounting a story from Confucius's lifetime of his evisceration at the hands of an opponent. Aimed at helping students learn the Pinyin Romanization system for Chinese characters, the authors use a lively cover and action-packed drawings in the sure knowledge that young learners would rather engage with an exciting story than with a dense book. Elsewhere, editors of Narrating the Confucian-Legalist Struggle (part of Shanghai's Teach Yourself for Young People series – see Chapter Four) paired content with topical drawings (figure 6.7). As opposed to the drawings in figure 6.6, however, the artist deliberately aped an illustrative style found in Ming and Qing dynasty books. Touches such as text boxes with each figure's name and the chunkier, vertical caption to the right evoke older practices even as the figures adopt dramatic socialistrealist heroic "good guy" and timid "bad guy" poses. Similarly, the children's periodical shown in figure 6.8 presents the story of an ancient Chinese official's fight against superstition in a format meant to resemble older printing styles. The margins and the page's strongly linear dimension add up to a comic that is unusual and therefore more captivating. All of these books represent propaganda molded to fit reader preferences and play on the cultural symbolism of well-known aesthetics.



Figure 6.6: A book published to help students learn the Pinyin system for Romanizing Chinese characters.¹⁰⁹




Figure 6.7: The front cover and an illustration from Narrating the Confucian-Legalist Struggle.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Image source: Zhao Shugen 赵树根 and Huang Quanchang 黄全昌, ed., 柳下跖痛骂孔老二 [Liu *Xiazhi Denounces Old Confucius*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1976). ¹¹⁰ Image source: Cao, *Narrating the History*.




Figure 6.8: A political cartoon in a children's periodical.¹¹¹

Front cover designers continued the symbiotic link between politics and popular preferences through invoking the cultural power of calligraphy. In *Brushes With Power: Modern Politics and the Chinese Art of Calligraphy*, Richard Kurt Kraus chronicles how elite and everyday actors used calligraphy to articulate political messages during the Mao period and afterwards. In the Cultural Revolution, denunciation posters, political attacks and self-criticisms were often written with brush and ink, and the calligraphic hands of Mao Zedong and others were widely emulated.¹¹² During the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, Shanghai People's Press even issued 103,000 copies of a tailor-made anti-Confucian collection of calligraphy and seal carvings (figure 6.9). But calligraphy proliferated on the front covers of books not only because of its political currency but also simply because it looked nicer than standard printed typefaces. For reprints of classical texts, for example, their covers often featured the title printed in ornate, vertical calligraphy (figure 6.10). In doing so, these attractive covers gave books a scholarly, historical and less overtly radical aura, drawing in readers and lending

¹¹¹ Image source: *Beijing Youth* no. 9 (1974), 20-21.

¹¹² Kraus, Brushes, 98.

weight to the politicized interpretations contained within. Perhaps for these reasons, Zhonghua Books decided to replace a linear typeface with a more calligraphic look for its second volume of *Selected Readings from Legalist Texts* (see figure 6.11).



Figure 6.9: Selections from a collection of calligraphy and seal carvings with an anti-Confucian theme.¹¹³

¹¹³ Image source: Zhang Tongliang 张统良 and Han Tianheng 韩天衡, eds., 书法刻印——批林批孔专 辑 [*Calligraphy and Seal Carving: A Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Special Album*] (Shanghai: Shanghai shuhua she, 1974).



Figure 6.10: Books published during the campaign with titles displayed in vertical calligraphy.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ Image sources: Guangdong renmin chubanshe 广东人民出版社,《三字经》批注 [*The 'Three Character Classic' with Annotations and Criticism*] (Beijing: Beijing mangwen yinshua chang, 1974); Chen Qiyou 陈奇猷, 韩非子集释 [*The Annotated Collected Works of Han Fei*], 2 volumes (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974); Guangzhou tielu ju et al., *Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose*; : Nanjing shifan xueyuan zhongwen xi, Nanjing qiche zaozhi chang, 80344 budui "Gong Zizhen shiwen xuanzhu" zhushi zu 南京师范学院中文系、南京汽车制造厂、八〇三四四部队《龚自珍诗文选注》 注释组, 龚自珍诗文选注 [*Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose by Gong Zizhen*] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1976); "Qin Shi Huang jinshi keci zhu" zhushi zu 《秦始皇金石刻辞注》注释组, 秦 始皇金石刻辞注 [*Annotated Inscriptions on Bronze Vessels from the Qin Shi Huang Era*] (Shangai:



Figure 6.11: The covers of the first (left) and second (right) volumes of *Selected Readings from* Legalist Texts published by Zhonghua Books.¹¹⁵

To create the same historical and scholarly feel, artisan script stood in for other front cover elements such as the publisher's name and series branding. For some publications, the name of the publishing house is represented with a seal carving similar to those in figure 6.9. Figure 6.12 presents examples from a range of presses and a range of subjects spanning historical biography, the history of science, calligraphy, classical texts, and fables. This visual variety recalled the scholarly practice of stamping one's paintings and books with a personal seal,

Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975); Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe 中国财政经济出版社, 读《盐 铁论》 [*Reading the "Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron"*] (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1974).

¹¹⁵ Images sources: Zhonghua shuju 中华书局, ed., 法家著作选读 [Selected Readings from Legalist Texts] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974) (Copy held in the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford); Zhonghua shuju 中华书局, ed., 法家著作选读(第二辑) [Selected Readings from Legalist Texts: Volume 2] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975) (Copy held in the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford).

thereby creating a book that readers would be more likely to purchase and browse. If a book formed part of a series, calligraphy sometimes made for strong series branding. For example, Beijing's *Selected Readings from Legalist Texts* (法家著作选读) series, including such titles as *Annotated Selections from the Pronouncements of Cao Cao and the Works of Zhuge Liang* (曹操 令文、《诸葛亮集》选注) and *Annotated Selections from the Writings of Gong Zizhen* (龚自珍 著作选注), placed a seal-script design reminiscent of ancient Chinese graphs on the front covers to represent the name of the series.¹¹⁶ Likewise, Anhui People's Publishing House's *Introductions to Key Legalists and Their Works* (法家代表人物和著作介绍) series used a distinctive series branding styles after a form of calligraphic seal script.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ "Fajia zhuzuo xuandu" bianji zu 《法家著作选读》编辑组, ed., 曹操令文、《诸葛亮集》选注 [Annotated Selections from the Pronouncements of Cao Cao and the Works of Zhuge Liang] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1975); "Fajia zhuzuo xuandu" bianji zu 《法家著作选读》编辑组, ed., 龚自 珍著作选注 [Annotated Selections from the Writings of Gong Zizhen] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1976).

¹¹⁷ Anhui renmin chubanshe 安徽人民出版社, 荀况 [Xun Kuang] (Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1974).



Figure 6.12: A selection of front covers showing publisher names printed as seal carvings.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Image sources: Nanjing shifan xueyuan zhongwen xi et al., *Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose*; Jilin daxue lishi xi 吉林大学历史系, 诸葛亮 [*Zhuge Liang*] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1976); Beijing

So far, I have stressed both how book design involved reconciling a book's political content with broader tastes and how aesthetic choices packaged radical ideas within formats that would resonate with readers. A book's typography and page design had to do equally as important communicative labor. In a famous essay on typography in 1936, the artist Eric Gill wrote that "it is the act of reading and the circumstances of that act which determine the size of the book and the kind of type used."¹¹⁹ Gill's point – that typesetters had to primarily respond to the needs of readers – translates smoothly into the Chinese context. According to the "art of books" essay cited above, well-proportioned and aesthetically pleasing page layouts enhanced a reader's experience, and effective typography emphasized and clarified key ideas.¹²⁰ Trainee typesetters at Beijing Xinhua Printing Press learnt how typefaces were "one of the important manifestations of a printed product's artistic merit" (表现印刷品艺术性的重要标志之一), and good typesetting made reading easier while remaining economical.¹²¹ For all publications, therefore, the elements of textual presentation received careful consideration, with designers and typesetters working together to find the best layouts.¹²²

shi di yi pixie chang 北京市第一皮鞋厂 and Zhongyang minzu xueyuan yuwen xi 中央民族学院语文 系,韩非寓言故事选 [Selected Stories and Fables from the Writings of Han Fei] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1975); Guangzhou tielu ju et al., Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose; "Qin Shi Huang jinshi keci," Annotated Inscriptions; Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe 中国财政经济出版社, 批判反 动"生意经" [Criticize the Reactionary "Classic of Business"] (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1975); Shuili dianli bu zhengzhi bu, The Legalist Line and Water Conservancy; Chen Zhongyong 陈钟咏, 新魏书字帖——批林批孔文摘 [New Model Wei Calligraphy: Extracts from Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign Articles] (Shanghai: Shanghai shuhua she, 1974); Zhang and Han, Calligraphy and Seal Carving.

¹¹⁹ Eric Gill, An Essay on Typography (Boston: David R. Godine, 2016), 105.

¹²⁰ Shandong renmin, Handbook on Editorial Work, 265-269.

¹²¹ Beijing xinhua, Manual for Typesetters, 5.

¹²² SMA B167-3-266-3, "上海人民出版社业务组关于最近排校中图书改动情况的报告" [A report from the Shanghai People's Press Operations Group concerning recent changes to books made during typesetting].

The message of typesetting's innate importance came right from the top of government. In early 1975, no less than Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan observed that the type and leading (line spacing) of both key propaganda articles and books targeted at rural residents (农村 读物) were too small. In response, Shanghai People's Press resolved to change the fonts of several publications including the political periodical *Fine Art Materials* (美术资料) and request that authors write more concise articles so that the overall length of publications did not change.¹²³ More generally, several publishers along with NBP staff agreed new national typesetting standards to improve the legibility of books. The rules set minimum type and leading sizes for many genres of books such as those for rural farmers, cadres and rusticated youth. Slightly unreasonably, the standards asked publishers to introduce the changes while minimizing increases in paper consumption and cover prices, leaving publishers only with the option of cutting content in future book manuscripts.¹²⁴

Evidently, the publishing and printing industries had lofty aspirations when it came to text's appearance, but how often could they fulfill them? Looking at a broad sweep of books from the 1970s, we see how typography and page design, along with binding and other formatting choices, served to highlight important titles and series. Publishers did not have the paper and reliable printing processes required to make every book a work of art, and hence they pooled scarce resources into some publications at the expense of the majority. Put another way, practical limitations ensured that political communication took on many different forms varying enormously in their efficacy.

¹²³ SMA B167-3-307-3, "上海市革命委员会文教组关于落实中央领导同志对目前某些出版物排字太 小、行距太密所作重要批示的情况报告" [A report from the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee Culture and Education Group regarding responding to important directions from senior leaders that characters and line-gaps in printed materials are both too small].

¹²⁴ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 246-248.

Beginning in summer 1974, the NBP supervised the nationwide re-annotation and republication of texts associated with intellectuals of the Legalist school (see Chapter Two). The project aimed to make Legalist materials available to everyday readers who could then study the texts and write political tracts for campaign events. The bureau coordinated groups of scholars and student revolutionaries to compile each volume, write politically-charged annotations and translations, and work with publishing houses on paperback editions of the final manuscripts.¹²⁵ The resulting artistic, high-quality paperbacks stood-out in a publishing environment dominated by cheap-looking and inelegant books.¹²⁶ Their quality symbolized their importance to the state.

Publishers manipulated the size and layout of Legalist text editions to make them visually different to the bibliographic hoi polloi. After the standardization of paper sizes in 1959, page designers conventionally worked with paper sheets measuring either 787 mm by 1092 mm (standard) or 850 mm by 1168 mm (large).¹²⁷ They could then set the size of individual book leaves as a fraction of these sheets, with the vast majority of leaves formed from folding the sheets into halves, quarters, eighths, sixteenths and so on. Most books used leaves measuring 1/32 (tricesimo-secundo format, hereafter '32K') of a standard size paper sheet because the size used paper economically and was well-proportioned.¹²⁸ Many of the Legalist texts, however, are made up of 32K leaves formed from the larger paper sheets, giving each leaf dimensions of 220 mm by 140 mm. This format choice gave room for spacious pages suited to the academic style of the series. Figure 6.13 shows how in *Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose by Liu Yuxi* [刘禹

¹²⁵ SMA B244-3-702-24, "法家著作注释出版规划座谈会领导小组关于报审《法家著作注释出版规 划》(草案)的报告" [A report from the steering committee of the national roundtable for annotating Legalist texts approving the draft "National Plan for Publishing Legalist Texts"].

¹²⁶ Examples from the series include: Guangzhou tielu ju et al., *Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose*; Nanjing shifan xueyuan zhongwen xi et al., *Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose*; "Liu Yuxi shiwen xuanzhu," *Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose*.

¹²⁷ Zhongguo yinshua, China Printing Annual: 1981, 235-236.

¹²⁸ Shandong renmin, Handbook on Editorial Work, 263.

锡诗文选注] capacious margins accommodate and complement the smaller type needed for scholarly footnotes. The wide margins prevent the page feeling too crowded, and 'sinkage' - additional margin depth along the top of the page - at the beginning of each chapter further breaks up the text. Looking at other titles in the Legalist plan, the format of the Liu Yuxi volume is typical. Overall, the books offered readers clear visual access to the complex ideas of Legalist scholars and plenty of space to make their own notes.




Figure 6.13: An example of spacious page layout in an annotated Legalist text. Key: blue = primary text; red = textual annotations; yellow = explanation for readers.¹²⁹

If the individual Legalist texts represent the pinnacle of paperback publishing, other titles quickly pale in comparison. As part of the Legalist texts project, both Beijing People's Press and Shanghai People's Press published several volumes collating a range of Legalist texts with annotations. For these, however, their lesser significance equated to more austere page layouts. Beijing's *Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts: Volume 1* [历代法家著作选注 (上)] follows a

¹²⁹ Image source: "Liu Yuxi shiwen xuanzhu," Selected and Annotated Poems and Prose, 184-185.

32K format using large-size paper.¹³⁰ The typesetters, however, interspersed the text and notes together rather than using footnotes in order to save paper, making the resulting pages visually less clear than the pages in figure 6.13. For Shanghai's three volumes of anthologies, their 32K format using standard-size paper creates tighter margins and large blocks of text, leading some pages to feel very crowded (figure 6.14).¹³¹ Overall, the Beijing and Shanghai anthologies convey information efficiently and yet lack the elegance and immediate legibility of other titles.




Figure 6.14: An example of where formatting creates pages that are more crowded and harder to visually interpret. Key: blue = primary text; red = textual annotations.¹³²

Even more so than these anthologies, the large number of shabbier products printed

during the campaign are the foils to the highest-quality publications. Hunan People's Press's

series of Legalist Texts (法家著作) contain narrow margins which in some cases have forced

readers to annotate into the text-block due to the lack of space.¹³³ Three titles – Annotated

¹³⁰ "Li dai fajia zhuzuo xuanzhu," Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts: Volume 1.

¹³¹ Shanghai shi "lidai fajia zhuzuo xuanzhu" bianji xiaozu 上海市《历代法家著作选注》编辑小组,历代法家著作选注 [*Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts*], 3 volumes (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975-1976).

¹³² Image source: Shanghai shi "lidai fajia zhuzuo xuanzhu," *Selected and Annotated*, volume 1, 156-157.

¹³³ Hunan renmin chubanshe 湖南人民出版社, 法家著作选读 [Selected Legalist Texts], various numbers (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1974-1975).

Materials Concerning the History of Anti-Confucian Peasant Uprisings, Criticize Confucius's Reactionary Ideas Volume 2, and Commentary and Annotations on Selected Texts Concerning the Confucian-Legalist Struggle: Pre-Qin Volume – all leave readers to decipher content set in cramped text-blocks against tight margins (figure 6.15).¹³⁴ Text squeezes up to the outer ('fore-edge') margin, leaving little room for the either the reader's thumbs or productive annotation. As the figure shows, typesetters could resort to other typefaces like the calligraphic Kaiti (楷体) to introduce aesthetic variety and excitement, but in the process they further sacrificed legibility. 1970s typography handbooks acknowledge that Kaiti is harder to read than the regular, linear Songti typeface visible in figure 6.14. Sometimes, avoiding visual monotony took precedence over improving clarity, and for every title publishers and printers had to weigh such conflicting priorities.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Shanxi daxue da pipan zu 山西大学大批判组,农民起义反孔史料注释 [Annotated Materials Concerning the History of Anti-Confucian Peasant Uprisings] (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1975); Sichuan renmin chubanshe 四川人民出版社, ed., 批判孔子的反动思想(第二集) [Criticize Confucius' Reactionary Ideas: Volume 2] (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1973); Xi'nan shifan xueyuan, Commentary and Annotations.

¹³⁵ Beijing xinhua, *Manual for Typesetters*, 6.




Figure 6.15: Tighter fore-edge margins in three campaign publications. The red line marks Kaiti type.¹³⁶

My argument concerning the mediated appearance of print culture gains additional complexity when we account for discrepancies produced in the printing process itself. Remember that books were formed from sheets of paper, printed with multiple pages of text, which were then folded into gatherings and trimmed along three edges to allow the pages to freely turn. Hence, margin size changed according to where a page impression was made with respect to the overall sheet of printing paper and how finely the margins were trimmed after folding. Looking at figure 6.15, the middle page shows the tight fore-edge margin of page 174 in *Commentary and Annotations on Selected Texts Concerning the Confucian-Legalist Struggle: Pre-Qin Volume.* A copy of the same book title from the Shanghai Library, however, has more spacious fore-edge margins throughout (see figure 6.16). The difference stems from the amount of paper trimmed from the fore-edge during the binding of gatherings and the alignment of each

¹³⁶ Image sources (left to right): Sichuan renmin, *Criticize Confucius*', 55; Xi'nan shifan xueyuan, *Commentary and Annotations*, 174; Shanxi daxue da pipan, *Annotated Materials*, 73.

page of text printed on a sheet. Therefore, in addition to compromising on legibility or appearance for many books, publishers also could not avoid a book's appearance being affected by the idiosyncrasies of production.

不能用的 "今者网络 , 君臣上下离心, 外患内忧间盱出现, 诸 人间的灾异都是由人事混乱产生, 如果以 简 评 译 文 1648 义语出现, 国家就不会安宁。这个 道理祭浅 (庄子) 奈篇中的一 近,可是它远或的灾害却十分惨重。如果不 孔子和柳下李是朋友。柳下李约弟弟名叫跖。跖李领九 又朝司马迁说过, 汉朝司马迁说过,"庄子作《渔父》、《盗跖》、《肤 ,以诋讹(诽谤)孔子之徒,以明老子之术。"(《史 F人的一点仆伍,横行天下,用暴力侵犯害诸族国家,捻常 荒宝,瑶欢门户,起光平岛,抓走妇女,翕图利益两志禅荣 荒,不顺父非兄弟,不祭把祖光。军汉极过的国家,丈固因 13.76R (3) 我们认为,《盗跖》篇未必是 子的手笔。 汝 资表前录: 经书上不加解释,没有用的) 同时人根据劳动人民关于棒下跖类能事迹 无病而自灸也。 你可以抛开不管。至于君臣的道义, 义子 、国龟滨堡寨,老百姓都深感痛苦。 口哉!" 孔子对柳下季说:"做父亲的,一定能告诚几子,做哥 也方是明显的道家思想, 一字你并有弟弟。如果父亲不能告诉几乎, 哥哥不能 注意的 一,又现我有分别。以来又求不能也以此了,可有不能 5弟,那么父子兄弟的关系就没有侍道了。现在忽先坐 2有才能的人,弟弟贴当强盗为害关下,两愈不能救消 春秋末期,是我国历史上从奴隶制向封建制转变的社会 h时間, 行将灭亡的奴隶主阶级, 并不甘心自行退出历 30时梢。行持火亡的放来主新放,并不自心自行起而功 台。为了挑救奴隶制的崩溃,他们一方面采用反革命的 ,残酷镇压奴隶起义,一方面又以孔学的反功说 款和 厚禄来毒蜜和收买奴隶起义队伍,使之 放 弃 斗 争,充 我私下里颇为怨感到羞耻。请让我替想去劝说他吧。 保上了中的 柳下季说:"你先生说为人父亲必能告诫儿子,为人可 经长有品品, 如果几乎不听从父亲的告法, 弟弟不接住 可必能做用那麼一些來几了不可以又不可以做, 不不以及 哥哥的教育, 即使象你先生这样能说会道的人, 又能把他忽 么办呢? 风且點的为人, 思想象情象一样不能强道, 意志剪 [尼, 《盗跖》 篇中的柳下跖, 就是在奴隶和奴隶; 在天上的没有什么比目月更光明, 在地上的没有什么比 16万常会这两个相本最对阶级的你死我活的尖锐激烈] 《大灵明光,在万物中没有什么比林五灵光明, 行什么比此九灵走道辖。所以,自月不高,此辉湖 《大不充足, 纵词和照耀起不会普通;珠玉砖光 作前,王公大臣此认不出它是宝物; 北义不在国 山水山市市市市市市 获风一样不受束缚,强力足以抵御劲数,辨才足以制 次期》 篇通过月去 顺他的心意他就喜欢,不顺他的心意就发脾气,他还容 易出言伤人。你先生一定不要去吧!" 孔子不听柳下手的劝阻,就叫颜田驾车,子育在车子右 声名就不会显现。人的命运决定于自然 主治人民的国君,如果尊重礼义, 77

Figure 6.16: Wider margins in the Shanghai Library copy of Commentary and Annotations on Selected Texts Concerning the Confucian-Legalist Struggle: Pre-Qin Volume.¹³⁷

A book's binding weighs heavily on its usefulness, and publishers had to decide which titles merited the sturdiest and most durable bindings. In this period, the majority of books were bound either with thread, staples, glue, or a combination of staples and glue. For longer books such as the Classical History volume of the *Cihai Dictionary of Chinese* (辞海), sewing gatherings together was the only way to bind the book robustly and (usefully for a dictionary) allowed it to lie flat when open.¹³⁸ For shorter titles, however, publishers often opted for stapling along the inner margin to assemble books quickly, cheaply, and easily. The downsides of this approach are clear in my copy of Shanxi People's Press's *Reading "On Feudalism"* (读《封建

¹³⁷ Image source: Xi'nan shifan xueyuan, *Commentary and Annotations*, 77, 83 and 175 (copy found in the Shanghai Library, Shanghai, PR China).

¹³⁸ Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, ed., 辞海(修订稿):历史分册 [*The Revised Sea of Words: History Volume*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1976).s

论》): an excess of glue and tight stapling makes the book hard to handle. Adding in the fact that the text on the spine is printed off-center and the reader is left with a very poor product.¹³⁹ As most short books could be bound with staples, when publishers decided to use sewing they did so intentionally. The sewn gatherings of *Selected and Annotated Expositions by Shang Yang, Xun Kuang and Han Fei* (商鞅荀况韩非论述选注) creates a nicer volume and a more pleasurable reading experience.¹⁴⁰ In contrast, Shanghai Calligraphy and Arts Press made its *New Wei Script for Calligraphy Learners* (新魏书字帖) section-sewn because users needed to have their hands free for their calligraphy.¹⁴¹

Did book quality differ geographically? Considering their relatively advanced printing infrastructures, we would expect the likes of Beijing and Shanghai to produce higher-quality publications than their provincial counterparts. To take two examples, the anthologies of Legalist texts discussed several pages ago both have section-sewn bindings. In addition, *Selected Legalist Texts* (法家文选) – published by the in-house library at *The People's Daily* – is a sturdy, spacious product.¹⁴² This is far from surprising: as China's principal political newspaper, *The People's Daily* had access to a significant amount of technological, material and financial

¹³⁹ Beijing qiche zhizao chang gongren lilun zu 北京汽车制造厂工人理论组,读《封建论》 [*Reading 'On Feudalism'*] (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1974). Shanxi People's Press's printer likewise did a slapdash job printing the spine of *Annotated Materials Concerning the History of Anti-Confucian Peasant Uprisings*.

¹⁴⁰ Sun Weihuai 孙维槐, Yu Baiqing 俞百青, Li Wenbo 李文波 et al., 商鞅荀况韩非论述选注 [Selected and Annotated Expositions by Shang Yang, Xun Kuang and Han Fei] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974).

¹⁴¹ Chen, New Model Wei Calligraphy.

¹⁴² Renmin ribao tushu ziliao shi 人民日报图书资料室, ed., 法家文选 [Selected Legalist Texts] ([Beijing?]: [Renmin ribao she?], 1975).

capital. A glance through my collection and along the shelves of libraries would no doubt reveal many other high-quality final products printed in the nation's cultural and political centers.¹⁴³

Yet even the most important presses could not overcome difficulties associated with their available resources and technological capabilities, thereby demonstrating that there was no absolute correlation between geography and the quality of propaganda production. Beijing's *An Introductory Anthology of Materials Concerning the Historical Struggles of the Working Masses Against Confucianism* (历代劳动人民反孔斗争史料简编) is bound with staples and has unevenly-cut gatherings.¹⁴⁴ In *Cao Cao* (曹操, Shanghai People's Press), the text sometimes sits densely on the page, while my copy of CFEP's *Criticize the Reactionary 'Classic of Business'* (批判反动《生意经》) has blurred text printed on page 18 which the printer declined to replace.¹⁴⁵ Sometimes, typesetters chose odd composing styles – Beijing's annotated translation of texts by Zhang Taiyan displays the primary text in large type but the accompanying notes are in danger of being too small.¹⁴⁶ This selection of titles all embody low-quality books churned out by the country's most advanced printers. And, conversely, presses that often published poor-quality material could also outdo themselves. While we have already seen the worst Sichuan

¹⁴⁴ Beijing tushuguan, Beijing daxue lishi xi "lidai laodong renmin fankong douzheng shiliao jianbian" xuanbian xiaozu 北京图书馆、北京大学历史系《历代劳动人民反孔斗争史料简编》选编小组,历代 劳动人民反孔斗争史料简编 [An Introductory Anthology of Materials Concerning the Historical Struggles of the Working Masses Against Confucianism] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1975).
¹⁴⁵ Xiang Luo 项罗, 曹操 [Cao Cao] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975), 31 and 44;

¹⁴³ For instance, I have browsed the collections of the Bodleian Library (University of Oxford) and found many such examples.

Zhongguo caizheng jingji, Criticize the Reactionary, 18.

¹⁴⁶ Beijing shifan daxue zhongwen xi Zhang Taiyan zhuzuo yizhu xiaozu 北京师范大学中文系章太炎著 作译注小组,章太炎《秦政记》《秦献记》评注 [An Annotated Commentary on Zhang Taiyan's "A Record of Qin Governance" and "A Record of the Qin's Contribution"] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1974).

People's Press had to offer, its Song Jiang: A Commentary on Capitulationism (评投降派—— 宋江) is by contrast spaciously leaded and section-sewn.¹⁴⁷

Books released by organizations other than publishers also either upstaged official presses or further diluted the standard of anti-Confucian print culture. Groups with the right connections could muster everything needed for quality production. *An Introduction to our Country's Past Progressive Scientists and their Achievements* (我国古代进步科学家及其主要 成就简介), overseen by the high-level Peking University-Qinghua University Large Criticism Group (the forerunner to the Liangxiao writing group), is a fine specimen of unofficial publishing. The content appears in large print set against spacious margins on sturdy cream paper.¹⁴⁸ With direct links to senior figures such as Chi Qun (退群) and ultimately Jiang Qing, the group had all the political capital needed to secure the best materials.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, the top governmental bodies in Yunnan and Henan provinces commissioned professional reprints of various campaign publications.¹⁵⁰ These titles challenged the publishing sector's control of the printed political landscape.

But far more commonly, inferior and amateurish products countermanded the link between good book design and strong political communication. The paper in a volume of study materials made by a Xinjiang college is very thin, presumably because it had no resort to thicker,

¹⁴⁷ Sichuan renmin chubanshe, Analyzing the Capitulationist.

¹⁴⁸ Beijing daxue Qinghua daxue da pipan zu 北京大学、清华大学大批判组, 我国古代进步科学家及 其主要成就简介 ([Beijing?]: Beijing daxue Qinghua daxue da pipan zu, 1975); for the changing identity of the group, see Yin, "The Liangxiao and Luo Siding Writing Groups," 32.

¹⁴⁹ Teiwes and Sun, *End of the Maoist Era*, 124 and 159.

¹⁵⁰ Zhonggong Yunnan shengwei xuanchuan bu 中共云南省委宣传部, 批判林彪与孔孟之道参考材料 [*Reference Materials for Criticizing Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius*], 2 volumes ([Kunming?]: Zhonggong Yunnan shengwei xuanchuan bu, 1974); Yang Rongguo 杨荣国, 儒家和法家 的斗争以及孔子思想的影响 [*The Struggle Between Confucianism and Legalism, and the Influence of Confucian Thought*] ([Zhengzhou?]: Zhonggong Henan shengwei xuanchuan bu bangongshi, 1973).

sturdier sheets.¹⁵¹ Aside from its reduced durability, thinner and inferior paper caused difficulties because text could shine through to the other side, in turn decreasing page clarity.¹⁵² At times, organizations used whatever paper they could find, leading to situations where series or even individual volumes used paper of different colors, thicknesses and densities.¹⁵³ These haphazard and less user-friendly productions existed a world away from the state's preferred image of print culture.

Sticking with the subject of paper, I have been building up to the argument that the scarcity of paper outlined in Chapter Five tangibly impacted design and layout decisions made by editors. Where archival sources on this question are silent, physical books themselves speak volumes. *Annotated Materials Concerning the History of Anti-Confucian Peasant Uprisings* is formed of 88 leaves divided into five gatherings of sixteen leaves and one of eight. These numbers increased the complexity of production because a greater number of gatherings and gatherings of a smaller length required extra folding and cutting. To eliminate this extra work,

¹⁵³ For example, various issues of campaign materials produced by the Pujiang County Revolutionary Committee uses multiple types of paper in the same volume. Furthermore, issues 6 and 8 have no thicker paper for their covers (in contrast to other issues), and the paper in issue 4 is markedly low in quality. See Pujiang xian geming weiyuanhui zhenggong zu xuanchuan bangongshi 浦江县革命委员会政工组宣传 办公室, 批林批孔文章选编 [Selected Articles Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius], various volumes (Pujiang: Pujian xian geming weiyuanhui zhenggong zu xuanchuan bangongshi, 1974). For other examples, see: Xinjiang jiaoshi peixun bu zhongwen xi 新疆教师培训部中文系, 评论《水浒》资料 [Materials on Analyses of the 'Water Margin'], second volume (Urumqi: Xinjiang jiaoshi peixun bu zhongwen xi, 1975); and Hangzhou daxue pilinpikong, Materials, volumes 5, 6 and 10.

¹⁵¹ Xinjiang ba yi nongxueyuan zhengzhi chu 新疆八一农学院政治处, ed., 批林批孔学习资料 (九) [*Study Materials for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign, Volume 9* ([Xinjiang?]: Xinjiang ba yi nongxueyuan zhengzhi chu, 1974).

¹⁵² Examples include: Guangxi Zhuang zizhi qu zonggonghui 广西壮族自治区总工会, 学习资料 (8): 评《水浒》 [*Study Materials Number 8: Analyses of the 'Water Margin'*] (np.: Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhi qu zonggonghui, 1975); Shayang yinshua chang 沙洋印刷厂, ed., 批林批孔学习资料 [*Study Materials for the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign*] (Shayang: Shayang yinshua chang, 1974); and Zhonggong Kunming shiwei pilinpikong bangongshi 中共昆明市委批林批孔办公室, ed., 认 真学深入批 [*Earnestly Study and Deepen Criticisms*] (Kunming: Zhonggong Kunming shiwei pilinpikong bangongshi, 1974). The latter also suffers from significant over-inking.

editors could have added either blank leaves or enlarged the typeface and margins to spread the contents over a more convenient length (such as 96 leaves formed out of six gatherings of sixteen leaves each). Doing so, however, would have used more paper, suggesting that saving paper took precedence over convenience. The same conclusion applies to the 152-leaf *Commentary and Annotations on Selected Texts Concerning the Confucian-Legalist Struggle: Pre-Qin Volume*. To save paper, CFEP's *Reading the "Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron"* (读盐铁论) possesses cramped text-blocks even though the pages are the large-sheet 32K size.¹⁵⁴

With paper in short supply, publishers made expansive use of formats amenable to spreading information widely and economically. In particular, they presented content in short pamphlets with no covers, simple bindings, and tight margins. The *Loose-Leaf Pamphlets* [活页 文选] series (Zhonghua Books) and the *Selected Classical Texts* [古代文选] series (Shanghai People's Press) both use paper conservatively, in turn allowing for very large print-runs.¹⁵⁵ Hunan People's Press also made used the pamphlet format for issues of its *Selected Readings of Legalist Texts* (法家著作选读), and available bibliographies list over half a dozen other pamphlet series printed in other provinces.¹⁵⁶ When paper-strapped publishers needed to quickly

¹⁵⁴ Shanxi daxue da pipan, Annotated Materials; Xi'nan shifan xueyuan, Commentary and Annotations; Zhongguo caizheng, Reading the 'Record.'

¹⁵⁵ Copies I have seen of issues in Shanghai's *Selected Classical Texts* series list print-runs in the hundreds of thousands (see Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, ed., 古代文选 [*Selected Classical Texts*], various numbers (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1973-1975).Likewise, copies I have seen of issues in Zhonghua's *Loose-Leaf Pamphlets* series show that many went though second and even third printings (see Zhonghua Shuju 中华书局, ed., 活页文选 [*Loose-Leaf Pamphlets*], Various numbers (Beijing: Zhonghua Books, 1974).

¹⁵⁶ Hunan renmin chubanshe 湖南人民出版社, 法家著作选读 [Selected Legalist Texts], various numbers (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1974-1975); Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1974, 66-67 and 76-79; Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1975, 22-25.

spread useful information – in many cases new interpretations of classic texts – small pamphlets emerged as a powerful middle-ground solution.

If publishing staff did not already have enough variables to juggle with a book's typography, page design, bindings, and paper usage, they also needed to balance all of these against the parameters of printing technology. Sometimes, sacrifices with margins and typefaces fit content within a printer-friendly number of pages. As stated above, books were made by combining sheets of printed paper folded into gatherings, with a standard half-sheet of paper folding into a gathering of 16 leaves. Forming gatherings of 8, 4 or 2 leaves, however, required cutting sheets into smaller sizes before folding, and lengths outside of the 2ⁿ sequence presented further difficulties. Presses, therefore, had a clear incentive to set a book's content within a convenient length. For example, *Criticize Confucius's Reactionary Ideas Volume 2* (Sichuan People's Press) comprises 64 leaves in four gatherings of 16 – I take the book's smaller typeface and tighter margins to indicate that typesetters compromised on legibility to fit the content to this user-friendly number. Considering that printers made 600,000 copies, this drive for a convenient number of leaves scaled-up to a significant saving on machine time and human labor.¹⁵⁷ For this publication, quantity and rapidity appear to have triumphed over usability.

We can extend this mechanical perspective to the inclusion of political quotations as front matter in Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign books. As raised in Chapter Three, during the Cultural Revolution, Mao's words enjoyed a canonical status epitomized by the omnipresence of *Quotations from Chairman Mao*.¹⁵⁸ Inside books, readers often found one or more short quotations printed on leaves ahead of the table of contents. Adding quotation pages reaffirmed the relevance of Maoism to readers and reading matter, signaled the publishing

¹⁵⁷ Sichuan renmin, Criticize Confucius' Reactionary Ideas, copyright page.

¹⁵⁸ For more information on canonical Maoism, see Martin, *Cult & Canon* and Leese, *Mao Cult*.

house's political loyalty, and followed the wider fashion of plastering Mao's quotations everywhere and anywhere. Moreover, as a sign of their importance, quotations stood apart from other front matter. Having looked at hundreds of books from the period, I have found zero instances of quotations sharing a page or indeed a leaf with any other type of text or image.¹⁵⁹ Protecting the spatial sanctity of quotations, however, sometimes required shunting other elements to unusual places. For example, in *Essays Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume 1* [批林批孔杂文 (一)], the quotations, table of contents, main text, and afterword occupy all of the 48 leaves.¹⁶⁰ Assuming that lengthening the book was not a viable option, the designers had no choice except to place the copyright information on the back cover. For the follow-up second volume, the copyright information instead follows the afterword, suggesting that for volume one the copyright information moved to the back cover out of necessity rather than aesthetic preference.¹⁶¹ In effect, prioritizing Mao's words amidst technological constraints pushed other content aside.

Similar displacement occurs in a series of campaign-themed textbooks made for students of English in 1974. Volumes two and three both consist of 12 leaves bound within thicker paper covers.¹⁶² For volume three, 19 pages of content, plus two pages of Mao quotations, a contents page, and an afterword, occupy 23 pages in total. Printing the copyright information on the verso of the contents page leaf was illogical, leaving the outside back cover as the only place for it. In

¹⁵⁹ Leaf-sharing sometimes occurred in magazines.

¹⁶⁰ Shanghai renmin, Essays Volume 1.

¹⁶¹ Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, ed., 批林批孔杂文(二) [*Essays Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume 2*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974).

¹⁶² Shanghai shi zhongxiao xue jiaocai bianxie zu 上海市中小学教材编写组, 英语批林批孔教材(中册) [*Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius English Learning Materials (Volume 2)*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974); Shanghai shi zhongxiao xue jiaocai bianxie zu 上海市中小学教材编写组, 英语批林批孔教材(下册) [*Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius English Learning Materials (Volume 3)*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974).

volume two, 20 pages of content, plus the quotation page and the contents page (each blank on their verso), push the afterword and the copyright information onto both sides of the back cover. Making room for Maoism sometimes significantly disrupted the layout and appearance of a book.

On other occasions, quotation pages appear extremely useful as space fillers when publishers wished to optimize the length of a manuscript for printing. People's Post and Telecommunications Press (人民邮电出版社) offered readers a monthly 32-page dose of politics and science news in its periodical *Radio* (无线电). The March 1974 issue opens with a quotation page which, unlike in books, shares a leaf with other content. But even more unusually, across the 1974 issues *only* the March edition contains a quotation page.¹⁶³ In the absence of any clear ideological reason why March warranted this exception, I believe that the editors only had enough content for 31 pages and included the quotation to fill up the unused final page.

In fact, publishers could manipulate the position of all front and back matter to fit mechanical printing requirements. In *An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Volume One* (discussed extensively in Chapter One), the title page, quotation page, and other front matter all occupy their own leaves.¹⁶⁴ Such liberal spacing lengthens the book to four neat gatherings of 32 pages and avoids blanks. More conservative paper use could save four pages of space (for example with three gatherings of 32, one of 16, and one of 12) but this arrangement would have consumed a lot more time and labor. Another of the Four Books numbers 40 pages, with the copyright page and the title page occupying the recto and verso of

¹⁶³ *Radio* no. 3 (March 1974), 1.

¹⁶⁴ Renmin chubanshe, Anthology Volume One (Beijing renmin chubanshe).

the same leaf.¹⁶⁵ In this case, compressing front matter together rather than stretching it out made the most sense. *Reference Materials for Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius* (批林批孔参 考资料) and *Anthologized Articles Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius Volume 3* (批林批 孔文辑(三)), both published in February 1974, are further examples of books where the content is filled-out to a suitable number of leaves.¹⁶⁶ While guarding against a kind of bibliographic technological determinism, I do not doubt technological considerations steered the presentation of these titles to readers.

Knowing how books are made and that they could not be lengthened or shortened at will also shows that editors deliberately declined to include quotation pages at a time when Mao's words were supposedly omnipresent. A 1976 biography of the dynastic emperor Liu Bang (five gatherings of 32 pages each) begins with a blank leaf, as does a Zhonghua Books pamphlet on an obscure ancient text.¹⁶⁷ In both cases, the blank leaf is part of the first gathering. Although both these propaganda titles explore ideas related to the campaign, their editors left the dead leaves devoid of any Mao quotations. A life of the scholar-general Zhuge Liang, published in the same series as the biography of Liu Bang, also eschews a quotation page.¹⁶⁸ While it contains no blank leaf, the editors could have easily created one by moving the copyright information to the verso of the title page or to the verso of the final leaf.¹⁶⁹ The same statement applies to the highly-

¹⁶⁵ Zhongyang dangxiao, A Collection of Lu Xun's Criticisms (Renmin chubanshe).

¹⁶⁶ Henan renmin, *Reference Materials for Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius*; Qinghai renmin, *Anthologized Articles*.

¹⁶⁷ Xiang Liling 项立岭 and Luo Yijun 罗义俊, 刘邦 [*Liu Bang*] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1976); Beijing yinshua san chang, *The Annotated Biography of Chen She*.

¹⁶⁸ Jilin daxue lishi xi, *Zhuge Liang*.

¹⁶⁹ For examples of this technique in action, see: Luwan qu jiaoshi jinxiu xueyuan "Kong lao er" bianxie zu 卢湾区教师进修学院《孔老二》编写组, 孔老二 [*Old Confucius*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974); and Luwan qu gong xuan ban "Cao Cao de gushi" bianxie zu 卢湾区工宣办《曹操的故事》编写组, 曹操的故事 [*The Story of Cao Cao*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975).

politicized A 'Three Character Classic' for the Confucian-Legalist Struggle [儒法斗争三字 文].¹⁷⁰ The decision in all these cases to forego including Mao's quotations is a surprising exercise of editorial judgement in a charged political environment. Quotation pages confront the reader with the political significance of a book, and at times editors clearly decided that Mao's words were incompatible with the content of their publications or best left out.

But we should equally avoid the trap of attaching political significance to all absences of quotation pages in Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign propaganda. Sometimes, editors did not include quotation pages simply because they lacked space and did not wish to add extra leaves. In 1975, Shanghai People's Press printed two historical monographs on Cao Cao (曹操), a ruler and general from the second century CE. An Annotated Biography of Cao Cao [曹操传 注] contains 92 pages of historical information, as well as a title page, copyright page, and contents page.¹⁷¹ Because the contents page must always immediately precede the main text, its verso is blank. With a total of 96 pages across three gatherings, there is no room for a quotations page without adding a fourth gathering – and extra time and expense – into the production process. The second monograph – *Cao Cao* [曹操] – spreads across five gatherings of 32 pages and one of eight, with the final page left unprinted.¹⁷² As with the Annotated Biography, inserting a quotation page would have required adding extra leaves, this time increasing the number of pages in the final gathering to twelve or needing a new gathering altogether. Shanghai's folding machines could not fold a gathering of twelve, making such a change a costly use of manpower.

¹⁷⁰ Hebei sheng Jing xian, *The Three Character Classic*.

¹⁷¹ Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 曹操传注 [An Annotated Biography of Cao Cao] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975).

¹⁷² Xiang, Cao Cao.

With publishers constantly considering the labor and resources needed for each title, stereotyping technology – already encountered in Chapter One – helped lesser publishers project vigorous support for the campaign and efficiently peddle its ideas. Presses singled-out wellreceived books, in particular, for reprinting. For example, after Zhonghua Books' Reading the "Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron" met with praise, sixteen provincial publishers made their own versions using flongs. Including translations into minority languages and Braille, over one million copies of the book were eventually printed.¹⁷³ Through stereotyping, presses with less in-house resources for commissioning original products benefited from the work of their well-provisioned peers. Shanghai People's Press, one of the top publishers in the country, provided flongs for many other publishers. For example, its Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius *English Learning Materials Volume 3* [英语批林批孔教材(下册)] textbook circulated in Yunnan under the imprint of Yunnan People's Press.¹⁷⁴ Comparing volumes printed in Shanghai and Yunnan shows that the latter printed off the former's plates (figure 6.17). Yunnan's customers, however, paid one fen less for the textbook than buyers in Shanghai because the Yunnan volume dispensed with the colored ink on the front-cover of the Shanghai version.

¹⁷³ Fang and Wei, *Chinese Publishing*, vol. 9, 194.

¹⁷⁴ Shanghai shi zhongxiao xue, *Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius English Learning Materials (Volume 3)*; Yunnan sheng jiaoyu ju jiaocai bianshen shi 云南省教育局教材编审室, 云南省高中英语——批林 批孔课本 [A Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius English Textbook for Upper-Middle School Students] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1974).

Lesson One Lesson One Visiting Lu Hsun's Tomb Visiting Lu Hsun's Tomb (It is a fine Sunday morning. A group of students (It is a fine Sunday morning. A group of students are visiting Lu Hsun's tomb in Hungkow Park. Master are visiting Lu Hsun's tomb in Hungkow Park. Master Worker Li and their English teacher are with them.) Worker Li and their English teacher are with them.) Teacher: Today we're Teacher: Today we're here to pay here to pay our respects to our respects to Lu Hsun. Now Lu Hsun. Now let's sit in a let's sit in a ring in front of ring in front of the statue of the statue of Lu Hsun. Who Lu Hsun. Who can tell us can tell us something about Lu Hsun? something about Lu Hsun? Pupil A: May I speak fir t? Pupil A: May I speak first? Teacher: Yes, do. Teacher: Yes, do. Pupil A: Lu Hsun was a great writer, thinker and Pupil A: Lu Hsun was a great writer, thinker and revolutionary. With his pen he fought revolutionary. With his pen he fought bravely against the enemy. bravely against the enemy. Pupil B: Lu Hsun always showed great concern Pupil B: Lu Hsun always showed great concern • 1 1 .

Figure 6.17: Two copies printed in Yunnan and Shanghai of *Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius English Learning Materials Volume 3*, page 1. The red boxes highlight typographical quirks which suggest replication through stereotyping.¹⁷⁵

All in all, flong-lending formed a key component of information presentation and dissemination during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Six provincial publishers used flongs to print copies of *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* featured in Chapter Three.¹⁷⁶ In another instance, my version of People's Press's *An Explanation of Confucian Terms*

¹⁷⁵ Image sources: (Left) Shanghai shi zhongxiao xue, *Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius English Learning Materials (Volume 3)*, 3; (Right) Yunnan sheng jiaoyu ju, *A Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius English Textbook*, 1.

¹⁷⁶ Zhongguo banben, A Catalogue of Internally-Circulated Books, 1949-1986, 24.

(孔孟之道名词简释) was reprinted by Yunnan People's Press (云南人民出版社).¹⁷⁷ Finally, my collection includes standard copies of Zhao Jibin's (赵纪彬) *A Discussion of Whether Confucius Killed Shao Zhengmao* (关于孔丘杀少正卯问题) reprinted in Inner Mongolia and Hubei from flongs.¹⁷⁸ Post-Mao criticisms of Jiang Qing alleged that she ordered the mass reproduction of Zhao's book in two different formats, hinting at the role senior leaders played in identifying which books would shape the views of the broadest possible audiences.¹⁷⁹

Elite politicians certainly had a hand in the nationwide reproduction of Shanghai's flagship *Teach Yourself for Young People* volumes. Zhu Yongjia, at the apex of the city's cultural bureaucracy, personally approved the proposed front cover design for the series.¹⁸⁰ Then, in April 1973, Zhou Enlai directed that the series should circulate nationwide, and it soon joined a list of important books scheduled for countrywide stereotyping (全国重点图书供型印制计划).¹⁸¹ Zhou's move consists with his observations elsewhere that China would have 20 million rusticated youth by 1980 whose reading requirements would need catering for.¹⁸² Therefore, after publishing its *An Introduction to the History of Chinese Literature*, *Part One* (简明中国文学史 (上册)), Shanghai People's Press gave stereotypes to Shaanxi People's Press (陕西人民出版社)

¹⁷⁷ Beijing daxue zhexue xi 72 ji gongnongbing xueyuan 北京大学哲学系七二级工农兵学员, 孔孟之道 名词简释 [*An Explanation of Key Terms in the Way of Confucius and Mencius*] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1974).

¹⁷⁸ Zhao, A Discussion (Neimenggu renmin chubanshe); Zhao Jibin 赵纪彬, 关于孔丘杀少正卯问题 [A Discussion of Whether Confucius Killed Shao Zhengmao], first edition (Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1974).

¹⁷⁹ Fu Sun 傅孙, "评唐晓文的三篇代表作" [Analyzing three classic articles by the Tang Xiaowen group]. *The People's Daily*, January 20, 1978, 3.

¹⁸⁰ He Yueming 贺越明, ""青年自学丛书'出版内情" [Publishing the *Teach Yourself for Young People* Series], *Yanhuang Chunqiu* no. 6 (2014): 67-68.

¹⁸¹ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 470 and 472.

¹⁸² Ibid., 474.

for the title's re-issuing.¹⁸³ Shaanxi's copy is so exact a reprint that it did not even remove the name of Shanghai People's Press from the front cover. A casual observer would erroneously believe that this edition was published in Shanghai, proving why analyzing information a book's copyright page is so worthwhile.

In another example, however, of publishing trade-offs, the convenience afforded by stereotyping came at the expense of readers. The Legalist text project organized by the central government aimed to circulate more copies of texts for people to study in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. To do this, publishers sometimes used flongs surviving from earlier editions of the same material. To cite one example, in 1974 Shanghai People's Press reprinted Chen Qiyou's 1958 edition of *The Annotated Collected Works of Han Feizi* (韩非子集释).¹⁸⁴ Chen's work, however, was originally typeset using complex, traditional characters as opposed to simplified forms promulgated in the 1950s. As a result, Shanghai's 1974 reprint remained full of outdated characters that projected an unwelcome elitist flavor and excluded readers familiar only with the newer, simplified forms.¹⁸⁵ The same is true for *The Works of Cao Cao* (曹操集, reprinted in 1974) and Shanghai's re-release of *On Balance* (论衡), which both include the vertical, traditional-character text of the originals.¹⁸⁶ These layouts sat incongruously opposed to the mainstream of publishing during 1970s, questioning the extent to which the

¹⁸³ Shanghai shifan xueyuan zhongwen xi "Jianming zhongguo wenxue shi" bianxie zu 上海师范大学中 文系《简明中国文学史》编写组, 简明中国文学史 (上册) [An Introduction to the History of Chinese Literature, Part One] (Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1976).

¹⁸⁴ Chen, *The Annotated Collected Works*, copyright page.

¹⁸⁵ John Young, *Totalitarian Language: Orwell's Newspeak and its Nazi and Communist Antecedents* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1991), 204-205.

¹⁸⁶ Cao Cao 曹操, 曹操集 [The Works of Cao Cao] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974); Wang Chong; On Balance.

Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign upended the production and consumption of knowledge.¹⁸⁷

To summarize the argument of this section, the face of anti-Confucian propaganda emerged out of the constant balancing act performed by presses and printers. Across the state's system of information production and dissemination, quotidian decisions mediated what people read, how they read, their interactions with books, or indeed whether they read at all. One final factor, however, remains for consideration: what happened when publishing went wrong? Production errors are an inevitable part of any publisher's work past or present. In China, however, they took on a greater significance because printing was intertwined with politics, because books vocalized the authoritative voice of the state, and because errors wasted scarce resources.

Documents from the publishing industry make clear the potentially calamitous economic and political consequences attached to content defects. Between some point in 1973 and June 1974, Shanghai People's Press dealt with around 100 cases of incorrect, sensitive or damaging content finding its way into publications, and these errors cost it around 100,000 *yuan*. Draft internal guidelines exhorted Shanghai's editors to ensure that quotations from Mao and other communist theoreticians were correct, Mao's name and titles were error-free, and national imagery and maps reflected set standards. These guidelines were exacting enough to require that, as far as possible, Mao's name and titles were not to be split between two lines or spill-over the end of one page onto the next.¹⁸⁸ Editorial manuals from the 1970s likewise stress the importance

¹⁸⁷ These are just some examples of a wider problem with incongruous page layouts. For example, Shanghai's *The Writings of Master Gongsun Long with Translations and Annotations* [公孙龙子译注] is set vertically but nonetheless employs simplified characters (see Pang, *The Writings of Master Gongsun Long*).

¹⁸⁸ SMA B167-3-266-17, "上海人民出版社业务组关于防止、减少、避免出版事故损失、提高出版物质量的若干建议(草稿)" [Several suggestions from the Shanghai People's Press Operations Group

of quoting Mao correctly.¹⁸⁹ When editors noticed incorrect information too late, printed erratum slips were a cheap, but unsatisfactorily post hoc, method of damage limitation. For example, CFEP's *Criticize the Reactionary 'Classic of Business'* came with a slip instructing readers to delete an entire sentence on page 109.¹⁹⁰

Alongside content, technical difficulties and miscalculations left readers holding material that at best appeared poorly made or at worse became unusable. Readers of *Selected Readings from Legalist Texts Volume Two*, published by Zhonghua Books, saw how the printing of some pages had gone awry and left an air of sloppiness (figure 6.18). Elsewhere, part of the way through a book on *Water Margin*, the leading (line spacing) jarringly changes for several pages, indicative of either a typesetter's mistake or a last-minute alteration to the book's content (figure 6.19). Finally, defective cutting of gatherings left individual books with pages "stuck" together, rendering portions unreadable until the reader found a sharp blade or scissors.¹⁹¹

regarding preventing, reducing, and avoiding losses caused by publishing errors, as well as suggestions improving the quality of published books].

¹⁸⁹ Shandong renmin, *Handbook on Editorial Work*, 17 and 24-28.

¹⁹⁰ Zhongguo caizheng jingji, Criticize the Reactionary.

¹⁹¹ For example, see Pan and Wei, *The Ugly Posse*, 73-80 and 83-86.




Figure 6.18: defective printing in Selected Readings from Legalist Texts Volume Two.¹⁹²

¹⁹² Image source: Zhonghua shuju, *Selected Readings Volume 2*, 268.




Figure 6.19: a typesetting miscalculation in a volume discussing the novel Water Margin.¹⁹³

Yet, typesetting faults caused by human error appear as both the most common and the most damaging detraction from a book's communicative mission. Working at speed with hundreds of different unique pieces of type left typesetters prone to mistakes, especially when typesetting with reference to a handwritten manuscript. A manual from Xinhua Printing Press chronicles the many potential pitfalls awaiting staff in their work. On one level, pairs of characters looked similar – especially when handwritten – allowing for inadvertent character substitution. For a sense of this difficulty, consider the visual similarities between the following

¹⁹³ Image source: Wen Zhong 闻众, 反面教材《水浒》 [*Water Margin: A Negative Teaching Example*] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1975), 60-61 (Copy held in the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford).

pairs of characters: 如/为; 堂/望; 室/宝; 能/解; 五/玉; 公/么; 温/湿; 都/却; and 德/法. In some contexts, either characters in a pair fitted within a sentence's grammar, meaning that typesetters could not always rely on their innate feel for the language to detect errors in the moment. Typesetters could also commonly misread a string of scrawled characters. Actual examples discovered at Xinhua Printing Press included the handwritten number '121227' becoming '汉江 工厂' and '发表了一千个病例' ending up as '发表 3-4 个病例'. In these examples, incorrect characters distort meanings neutrally, but small changes in compound words could invert the entire political message of a sentence. For example, changing one of the characters in "socialism" (社会主义) generates "opportunism" (机会主义), and only one character separates the words for "proletariat" (无产阶级) and "bourgeoisie" (资产阶级). Finally, staff dealing with historical subjects needed in-depth knowledge of the written Chinese language in all its forms. Popular simplified characters such as 从 (the simplified form of 從) and 无 (the simplified form of 無) also appeared in their own right in ancient texts, so a typesetter had to know not to read them as a modern simplified character. Likewise, while modern language reforms simplified 於 (yu) to \mp , the honorific title "Chan Yu" (referring to the leader of a particular ancient Chinese tribe) had always appeared throughout history counter-intuitively as 單于 rather than 單於. At Xinhua Printing Press, new typesetters less familiar with traditional characters had proved liable to convert them to the wrong simplified form, with the common traditional character 對 (meaning 'correct', 'to treat,' and more) often simplified into 封 ('to seal') rather than the correct

form 对.194

¹⁹⁴ Beijing xinhua, Manual for Typesetters, 67-71.

Although the exact impact of topographical errors on readers is hard to know, such mistakes appear all too frequently in books from this period. Publishing houses often corrected these with erratum slips tucked inside bound copies. A Shanghai People's Press title on several Legalist thinkers came with just such a slip along with instructions for readers to paste the slip over the original incorrect content on page 6.195 As shown in figure 6.20, Tianjin People's Press printed an erratum slip to highlight an incorrect Mao quotation in its Selected Anti-Confucian Tales from History (历代反孔批儒故事选). But a significant number of books published by organizations other than publishers also contain errors, providing another reason beyond paper scarcity why the central government frowned on unofficial publishing. One county revolutionary committee's in-house propaganda contains on error on the contents page.¹⁹⁶ Shayang Printing Press' Study Materials for Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius is a typesetting disaster. Its erratum slip contains dozens of errors including two faulty Mao quotations, an incorrect page number, and many instances where typesetters chose the wrong character from the type rack (figure 6.21). Combined with the volume's uncut gatherings, any aspiring reader of the book has to navigate their way through a range of mistakes. Confronted by such carelessness, readers very possibly ended up more distracted by errors than the content itself. In one scrappy copy of a report given to a campaign meeting by the intellectuals Zhou Yiliang (周一良) and Tang Yijie (汤一介), a reader has corrected all defective characters with a pen, including one instance where the correction (of a quotation by Chairman Mao) is itself wrong.¹⁹⁷ For every minute a reader

¹⁹⁵ Sun et al, *Selected and Annotated Expositions* (copy held in the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford).

¹⁹⁶ Pujiang xian, *Selected Articles*, volume 1, i.

¹⁹⁷ Zhou Yiliang 周一良 and Tang Yijie 汤一介,周一良、汤一介同志关于《林彪与孔孟之道》(材料之一)的批判性讲解报告 [A Report on Critical Observations Made by Comrade Zhou Yiliang and Comrade Tang Yijie Concerning Material Found in 'Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius: Materials Collection One] (Np.: np., 1974), 12, 15 and 26.

worried about accuracy, they spent one less minute thinking about criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius.




Figure 6.20: The offending page and erratum slip for *Selected Anti-Confucian Tales from History*.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁸ Image source: Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun Tianjin jingbei qu mou bu yi lian rufa douzheng shi yanjiu xiaozu 中国人民解放军天津警备区某部一连儒法斗争史研究小组,历代反孔批儒故事选 [Selected Anti-Confucian Tales from History] (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1975).

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Figure 6.21: a disastrous contribution to the campaign from Shayang Printing Press, complete with a lengthy erratum slip.¹⁹⁹

Conclusion

Nearly all the books discussed in this chapter share in the late Mao era's elision of individual labor in favor of collective cultural production. Authorship is often ascribed to a group, while copyright pages do not mention the names of editors or designers. Where such details do appear, they are striking exemptions to the rule.²⁰⁰ With individuals overshadowed by

¹⁹⁹ Image sources: Shayang yinshua chang, *Study Materials*.

²⁰⁰ Examples of books which credit individuals include: Shanxi daxue da pipan zu, *Annotated Materials*; and Jilin shifan daxue, *An Introductory Analysis*. These books both list the cover designer on the back cover – a position of prominence very unusual for the period. Some Shanghai People's Press titles also

the anonymous collective, it is easy for us to forget that the decisions of individual designers, editors, machine operators, typesetters, binders, cutters and many others are embedded into each propaganda title. This chapter has reconstructed the contribution of these decision-makers, and the equipment they used, to the print culture of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Self-evidently, these day-to-day decision makers played a vital role in mediating how the state communicated political ideas and how readers consumed this information. The condition of the publishing and printing sector in the 1970s both lent itself to the mass dissemination of ideas and constrained how these ideas appeared. Future historians would do well to remember that propagandists could not make whatever they wanted whenever they wanted and however they wanted.

listed the names of designers and illustrators. For example, see: Luwan qu jiaoshi, *Old Confucius*; Luwan qu gongxuan ban "Meng Ke" bianxie zu 卢湾区工宣办《孟轲》编写组, 孔家店二老板——孟轲 [*Meng Ke: The Second Boss of the Confucian Shop*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974) (electronic copy found on Duxiu.com); and Luwan qu gong xuan ban, *The Story of Cao Cao*.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Using the Past to Serve the Present: Publishing After the Hua Guofeng Coup

"But seriously, whose thought did Confucius – someone who lived 2500 years ago – actually hope to 'revise?'" (试问,活在两千五百年前的孔丘,到底"修 正"了谁的思想?).¹

"When the 'Gang of Four' farted, *The People's Daily* would immediately present quite the performance on its pages, with large characters, banner headlines, lengthy exposition, and an onslaught of information" ("四人帮"放个屁,人民日 报的版面上立即做台戏——大号字体,通栏标题,连篇累牍,铺天盖地).²

"Every time a big political event happens, we publishers always have to withdraw and pulp books...When criticism of the 'Gang of Four' began, the impact on us was especially large. We had to decide what to do with books already published, in press, awaiting typesetting, or awaiting binding" (每出一次大的政治事件, 我们出版社总要停售、处理一批书...这次"四人帮"出来,对我们影响更 大,现在已出的,未出待印、待排、待装的,都等我们拿出处理意见).³

By a quarter past midnight on September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong breathed no more. Just

over one week later, CCP leaders who had survived or prospered in the Cultural Revolution

joined the weeping masses at a huge ceremony in Beijing's Tiananmen Square to mourn Mao's

passing. Photos printed in state media showed that the square's usual vibrant red appearance had

morphed into a sea of black – a fitting symbol of both officially-mandated sorrow and the

coming contest among political elites for control of the country.⁴

¹ Shi Jun 史钧, "评某教授的影射史学" [Analyzing a certain history professor's allegorical attacks]. *The People's Daily*, April 19, 1978, 2.

² Ye Chunhua 叶春华, "揭批'四人帮'控制时期人民日报的反动编排" [Expose the reactionary editing and designing of *The People's Daily* during the 'Gang of Four's' period in charge]. *The People's Daily*, March 31, 1978, 3.

³ Lei, *Time Marches Onward*, volume 2, 722.

⁴ Teiwes and Sun, *End of the Maoist Era*, 551. While acknowledging that tension between politicians existed right from Mao's death, Teiwes and Sun see the days after September 18 as the point when elite conflict became particularly ferocious. They describe discussions held before Mao's memorial ceremony on the Gang issue as "tentative at best" (551, 569).

Historians rarely describe the post-Mao political transition as a "coup," yet only this framing can accurately contextualize print history in the Hua period. On the night of October 6-7, Hua Guofeng, Mao's designated successor, ordered the arrest of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan – three members of the so-called 'Gang of Four' - after their arrival at a special Politburo meeting. At the same appointed hour, soldiers seized Jiang Qing (Mao's window and the fourth member of the Gang) at her residence.⁵ With these four Politburo members now detained under guard, the first military-backed palace coup in PRC history ended. The Politburo – now shorn of a few members – immediately made Hua the new Party Chairman and head of the military.⁶ In the months and years that followed, Hua's regime scoured around for evidence that Wang, Zhang, Yao and Jiang had collaborated during the Cultural Revolution to threaten the Party, the people, and the state (figure 7.1). In 1981, a courtroom convicted the Gang of severe crimes and the fallen four lived out their lives in obscurity.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.




Figure 7.1: Li Geng's *The Judgement of history: Commemorating a Great Victory in the Eleventh Great Ideological Line Struggle.* Here, the four members of the Gang hang pathetically.⁷

Despite arresting the Gang, Hua is not a hero or major personage in the CCP's political pantheon and hence his period in power is not a favorite research topic for political, social or, indeed, book historians. Moreover, scholarly perspectives on his two years in power have been forever tarnished by narratives of China's "reform and opening up." Party histories, along with the majority of Western scholarship, frame a major conference held in 1978 as the point when the CCP embraced revolutionary economic reforms.⁸ In this story, the narrative of the years after Mao's death might be summarized as follows: Mao died and Hua did a good job arresting the

⁷ Image source: Li Geng 李耕 et al., "历史的判决——记第十一次路线斗争的伟大胜利" [The judgement of history: remembering the great victory in the Eleventh Line Struggle]. *Story-Book Magazine* no. 44 (July 1977), special insert.

⁸ Teiwes and Sun's broad body of research is aimed to complicate this view. For instance, see their *Paradoxes of Post-Mao Rural Reform: Initial Steps Toward A New Chinese Countryside, 1976–1981* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 284.

Gang; Hua then mistakenly dabbled in Maoist policies for a couple of years; finally, the 1978 conference and Deng Xiaoping's return to political life sowed the seeds of the economically prosperous China that we know today. Here, the Hua Guofeng period becomes at best a transition period and at worst a deviant interregnum. In terms of the history of the book in modern China, if knowledge of the Cultural Revolution decade is scant, then understanding of the years that followed is scantier still.

By studying propaganda publishing and printing after Mao's death, this chapter joins a small group of other recent histories exposing how the common narrative of the 1970s decade elides the complexities of the Hua era. Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, for example, argue that Hua Guofeng initiated and supported some of the signature economic reforms ostensibly piloted by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁹ As their future scholarship will continue to claim, the '1978 as a turning point' thesis misrepresents the complexity of developments during the late 1970s.¹⁰ In a similar vein, Alexander Cook's recent monograph on the trial of the Gang of Four highlights the multiple policy and ideological options open to the CCP's leadership between 1976 and 1981. Cook warns that historians must not allow the benefit of hindsight to obscure how leaders felt their way forward in these crucial years rather than following a defined, teleological path.¹¹ Overall, Teiwes, Sun, and Cook reminds us that accurately understanding the Hua Guofeng period requires looking "in the moment" rather than burdening it with the weight of the future.

⁹ Ibid.; Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, "China's New Economic Policy Under Hua Guofeng: Party Consensus and Party Myths," *The China Journal* no. 66 (July 2011): 1-23.

¹⁰ Teiwes and Sun, *End of the Maoist Era*, xv.

¹¹ Alexander Cook, *The Cultural Revolution on Trial: Mao and the Gang of Four* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20160, especially chapter 1.

Looking at publishing and its links to CCP power allows us to analyze broader questions of continuity and change across the 1970s. On one level, I categorically refute the decades-long effort by publishing officials in China to portray the years after Mao's death as a period when publishing, freed from the tyranny of the Gang, made a fresh start. In fact, intense efforts to legitimize the new regime and eviscerate the Gang exacerbated the political trends and practical difficulties of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Furthermore, the sections which follow also demonstrate the perspectives lost when historians dismiss the Hua Guofeng period as an inconvenient interregnum. After Mao's death, the publishing sector fell into line with new political imperatives, drawing on experiences of the Cultural Revolution to spread new hyperpolitical mantras and messages. In the process, the state continued to devote significant manpower, material resources, and capital to maintaining its power and promoting a new politics. Therefore, the post-Mao quest to reform the economy thrived because of the CCP's all too familiar expansive and wasteful print propaganda apparatus. Propaganda and reform went hand in hand.

Good Versus Evil: Framing an Anti-Gang Consensus in the Publishing Industry

As a core part of the state's propaganda apparatus, the publishing sector served the political ideas in vogue first and particular factional interests second. In the mid-1970s, although presses might have wondered whether Mao would survive for much longer, they had every reason to expect Maoist ideology and political campaigns to persist well into the future. Therefore, in 1975, Shanghai People's Press unsurprisingly issued a ten-year plan committing to

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publishing new books on the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign and the Confucian-Legalist struggle.¹²

As we now know, when Mao died and China underwent its first major leadership transition, Hua Guofeng changed the country's course. What was once politically *du jour* quickly became outdated, and the ten-year plan of Shanghai People's Press lay dead in the water. Instead, publishers threw themselves behind a Hua Guofeng plan to publish new volumes of The Selected Works of Mao Zedong (毛泽东选集) and start compiling The Complete Works of Mao Zedong (毛泽东全集).¹³ With the Gang out of the way, Hua's plan claimed his right to curate Mao's ideological canon and control the official publishing industry. It called for releasing more of Mao's writings "as soon as possible" (尽快) and signaled Mao's pertinence in death as well as life. As the text stated, publishing Mao's writings possessed "a great contemporaneous significance and a deep historical significance" (伟大的现实意义和深远的历史意义). At the same time, the decision signaled that the new leadership intended to conscript publishers to their political agenda. This one document put to bed any notion that Hua Guofeng would divorce politics and print.

In the face of an entrenched official narrative painting the arrest of the Gang as the righting of an imbalance, historians must identify the continuities spanning this supposed watershed. Now that the authorities had the Gang safely in custody, publishers joined other industries in repudiating all that had come before. For example, a national publishing roundtable held in fall 1977 played host to politically-motivated anti-Gang struggle. At this point, state

¹² SMA B167-3-285-13,"上海人民出版社革命委员会办公室关于下发十年规划(草稿)并要求组织 讨论的函" [A letter from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee distributing a 10-year plan and calling for group discussion of the plan]. ¹³ *New Books Nationwide* no. 10-11 (1976).

leaders had deemed the Gang enemies of the people and not entitled to a trial.¹⁴ At the roundtable, delegates' assigned reading included an article on "The serious consequences resulting from the 'Gang of Four's' misdirection of publishing" (出书跟着"四人帮"另搞一转造 正的严重后果). Amongst many attacks on the Gang, the piece began by emphasizing how they had stifled creativity, pointing to the fact that around 80 percent of the 7506 recorded philosophy and social science titles published between 1971 and 1976 basically re-hashed the same ideological mantras. In short, the Gang had reduced publishing to the anodyne repetition of propaganda narratives and the publication of "a large group of anti-party, anti-socialist poisonous weeds" (一大批反党反社会主义毒草).¹⁵ In these attacks, publishing officials invoked shopworn rhetoric and tired modes of political criticism to bolster Hua Guofeng's post-Mao consensus.

Ironically, the article also criticized publishing in previous years for relentlessly "following campaigns" (跟着运动转) even as it pursued an identical strategy. Despite affirming titles published to further understanding of Maoism, Marxism and other political causes, the piece charged that 907 titles on the Confucian-Legalist struggle and 493 on the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign speciously manipulated political ideas to further the Gang's own schemes. Put differently, "after the Tenth Congress of the CCP [in 1973], books published to support political campaigns were basically tied to the schemes of the 'Gang'" (党的"十大"以 后, 配合运动的图书,基本上是按照"四人帮"另搞一套的调子转).¹⁶ But rather than lay

¹⁴ Cook, *Cultural Revolution on Trial*, 46-47.

¹⁵ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 74.

¹⁶ Ibid., 74-79.

out a convincing case for this judgement, the piece instead expressed allegiance to the latest political imperative: renouncing the enemies of Hua Guofeng at all costs.

The expedient aspersions cast on past publishing kept on coming, especially with respect to the notion of collective authorship by the masses. According to NBP staffers, using workerpeasant-soldier theoretical small groups (工农兵理论小组) to annotate classical texts (see Chapters Two and Three) constituted an "error in direction" (方向性的错误) because this direction was now out of favor.¹⁷ In the NBP's August 1977 internal bulletin, a comprehensive investigation of "the interference and destruction" (干扰破坏) wrought by the Gang in the publishing sector took aim at the notion of collective annotation, arguing that ordinary people lacked the classical Chinese skills to make anything more than perfunctory contributions compared to experts. In short, "dragging a large number of workers into annotating and punctuating classical texts is not how one develops Marxist theorists"(把大批工人拉来搞古籍 注释圈点,这也根本不符合建立马克思主义理论队伍的方向). Furthermore, the NBP accused publishers of "borrowing the worker-peasant-soldier brand" (借用工农兵的牌子) to "peddle" (贩卖) the Gang's "black line" (黑货). For example, the Liangxiao writing group had written A History of Chinese Peasant Anti-Confucian Rebellions (中国农民反孔斗争史话) which publishers than released under the name of a model production team to give the book more political legitimacy. While publishers had glorified workers, intellectuals lived out a degraded existence.18

¹⁷ Ibid., 78.

¹⁸ Ibid., 57-58.

Overall, publishers in the post-Mao period wrote-off much of the Cultural Revolution's "ultra-leftist" (极左) publishing as bland, wedded to political changes, and unrelated to what readers actually needed.¹⁹ These criticisms have some merit, but most importantly they reflect the Huaist state's conscious creation of an artificial watershed in PRC history framed around an anti-Gang consensus. Politics did not suddenly stop and publishing did not suddenly get 'better' after Mao. Rather, the Hua Guofeng era was the latest round of politically-motivated denunciation spearing the newest additions to the revolution's long line of supposed enemies. As we shall see, the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign provided a perfect reservoir of lessons for publishers to eviscerate Jiang Qing and her fallen comrades.

Criticize Jiang, Criticize Confucius

For all their criticism of the Gang's linking of radical politics and print, publishers nonetheless drew on the Gang's legacy to support Hua's leadership in print. The editions of *A Comprehensive Bibliography of National Publications* for 1976 and 1977 list a range of titles supporting Hua Guofeng and attacking the Gang.²⁰ I thus support Geramie Barmé's observation that "the year following the arrest of the Gang of Four saw little change in the type of book being published."²¹ Barmé bases his brief remarks on the massive publishing of the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volume Five* in 1977, but the Hua Guofeng era was about more than just ongoing reverence for Mao. Indeed, the narratives and methods of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign also found new life after 1976. As previous chapters make clear, books from the

¹⁹ Ibid., 484.

²⁰ Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography 1976*; Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju, *A Comprehensive Bibliography: 1977*.

²¹ Barmé, "Notes on Publishing," 168.

campaign heavily employed historical allegory, slanted academic interpretation, and striking visuals to attack Lin Biao and other figures. Now, with the Gang in prison, Jiang Qing and her gender inevitably invited comparisons with the default 'evil women' tropes of Chinese history: the empresses Lü Hou (吕后) and Wu Zetian (武则天). Having honed their propaganda expertise during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, publishers now turned on one of the campaign's main proponents in the service of the post-Mao consensus. From this perspective, Mao's death did not disrupt the state's carefully choreographed system of political communication.

In a political world ruled by men, Jiang Qing's gender became a profound liability.²² The level of discomfort surrounding Jiang can be seen in the vitriolic attacks directed at her after her arrest. The Han dynasty empress Lü Hou provided the perfect historical parallel to Jiang's supposed meddling in modern Chinese politics. As Yang Rongguo and others had done in previous years for Confucius, researchers dug-up evidence to argue that Lü usurped power and interrupted the legitimate Han dynasty imperial succession. The parallel shone clearly: like Lü, Jiang (also a woman, and also the widow of a paramount leader) had schemed to usurp the rightful transition of power. Moreover, like Lü's enemies who prevented her plans from coming to fruition, Hua Guofeng and his fellow leaders had forestalled an unnatural and inauspicious outcome. Accusations that Jiang wished to become a new empress of China proliferated across state media.²³

²² For a history of gender politics in the higher echelons of the CCP, see Wang Zheng, *Finding Women in the State: A Socialist Feminist Revolution in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1964* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017).

²³ For example, see Xu Baoyu 徐葆煜, "'女皇梦' 与'捧'" ['Dreams of becoming empress' and 'rushing']. *Wenhui Daily*, March 4, 1977, 3.

Comic books – a mainstay of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius propaganda genre – remained a striking and efficient way to transmit the 'nefarious Jiang Qing' narrative. In May 1977, Shanghai People's Press released *Lü Hou Steals Power* (吕后篡权), a 148-page comic featuring the dramatic, skilled drawing of famous artists such as He Youzhi (贺友直) and Zhao Hongben (赵宏本). Half the size of a standard paperback, it was both portable and not paper-intensive, with printers able to make as many as four hundred copies from one ream of paper.²⁴

The preface leaves no doubt that *Lü Hou Steals Power* aims to demonize Jiang and place Hua and his allies on the right side of history. It opens claiming that Mao once discussed the story of Lü Hou and her husband Emperor Liu Bang with Hua. According to the text, Mao told Hua how "on his deathbed, Liu Bang recognized that Lü Hou and her supporters were scheming to subvert the country and steal power" (刘邦临终时看出吕后和诸吕叛国篡权).²⁵ By implication, in his ailing years Mao foresaw the Gang's pernicious political goals. The preface also describes Lü – and by extension Jiang – as "overly-ambitious" (野心家) and a "plotter" (阴 谋家), while praising Liu Bang's loyal ministers for opposing the power grab, destroying Lü's faction, and continuing Liu's legacy after his death. The preface ends contending that the writers of *Lü Hou Steals Power* based it on historical texts such as the *Histories* (史记) and the *Book of Han* (汉书), thereby burnishing this allegorical vindication of Hua Guofeng with credibility.²⁶

By aping the symbolically intellectual and cultured design scheme of pre-modern texts, the book's designers further legitimize the Lü-Jiang story. Each page includes a segmented border, vertical rather than horizontal text, and numbers conveyed in Chinese characters rather

²⁴ Li Guangyu 李光羽 et al., 吕后篡权 [Lü Hou Steals Power] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1977).

²⁵ Li, *Lü Hou Steals*, 1.

²⁶ Ibid.

than Arabic numerals. The first frames (figure 7.2) introduce the story's heroes and villains with names embedded into the pictures – another facet of older illustration techniques also seen in Narrating the History of the Confucian-Legalist Struggle (Chapter Six).²⁷ Finally, as with countless Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius publications, the front cover employs calligraphic script to add an artistic sheen to the simplified Chinese characters (figure 7.3). As I argued in Chapter Six with other publications, here the press used design and formatting choices to make Lü Hou Steals Power more engaging, more authoritative, and at the same time less overtly didactic.



Figure 7.2: Lü Hou's faction named and shamed in Lü Hou Steals Power.²⁸

²⁷ For example, see Cao, *Narrating the History*, 8.
²⁸ Image source: Li, *Lü Hou Steals*, 2.



Figure 7.3: The front cover of Lü Hou Steals Power, complete with a white calligraphic title.²⁹

Invoking familiar visual styles, the drawings in *Lü Hou Steals Power* give full voice to the idea that women – whether historical or contemporary – threaten the political stability and health of the state. On the front cover, Lü is shown with a classic conspiratorial and malevolent expression, while a wisp of smoke creates a sense of threat and mystery. Separated from the silhouetted emperor by just a curtain, she is the power behind the throne wielding an illegitimate influence on politics. Similarly, at the point in the story when Liu Bang finally dies, the corresponding panel shows a furtive-looking Lü ready to make her move (figure 7.4). As with Confucius several years earlier, pictures made compelling political points in the service of those in power.

²⁹ Image source: ibid, front cover.



Figure 7.4: A shifty Lü plots her next move.³⁰

As Lü's tale reaches its denouement, the evil protagonists increasingly resemble demonic figures, thereby illustrating the contradictory and uncomfortable relationship between politicized critiques and Jiang Qing's gender. The "evil woman" trope warns against woman operating in a space – the political arena – considered the preserve of men. *Lü Hou Steals Power* conveys this moral lesson, but simultaneously it needs to rescue the idea of womanhood itself by making her look less and less female and increasingly male. Compared to the broadly defined, soft features of good characters, Lü's face becomes more angular and chiseled because the artists are trying to make her look like a witch.³¹ In figure 7.4, she sports a masculine jutting jaw and big nose – after all, female political enemies cannot be both plotters and models of feminine beauty. By page 125, as she lies on her deathbed and urges her allies to secure power by force, she is indistinguishable from the empty, ashen-faced depictions of Confucius that peppered Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius propaganda (figure 7.5) All this visual posturing formed part of the Gang's conviction in the Party's "manufactured court of public opinion."³²

³⁰ Image source: ibid., 43.

³¹ Ibid., 113.

³² Cook, Cultural Revolution on Trial, 44.



Figure 7.5: A barely recognizable Lü on her deathbed.³³

Across China, many other publications joined *Lü Hou Steals Power* in deploying triedand-tested historical allegory against Jiang Qing. *The Overly-Ambitious Lü Hou* (野心家吕后), a comic book published by People's Fine Arts Press, accused Jiang of wanting to be a "female emperor" (女皇帝).³⁴ Images in the story show Lü as both an unsightly witch-like figure and as a tyrant (figure 7.6). One million copies hit bookstore shelves to spread these ideas far and wide.³⁵ Similarly, on the front cover of *The Story of Lü Hou Usurping Power* (吕后篡权的故事), we find the evil protagonist and her allies plotting in a smoke-filled room with the character '纂' ('usurp') dead center and the title encased in smoke seeping out of a lamp (figure 7.7, left). According to the book's editors, Jiang Qing extolled Lü with the ultimate goal of seizing political power after Mao's death.³⁶ While not a comic book, *The Story of Lü Hou Usurping*

³³ Image source: Li, Lü Hou Steals, 125.

³⁴ Ren Min 任梅 et al., 野心家吕后 [*The Overly Ambitious Lü Hou*] (Beijing: Renmin meishu chubanshe, 1977), i.

³⁵ Ren, *The Overly Ambitious*, back cover.

³⁶ Shi Da 史达 and Li Siyi 励斯贻, eds., 吕后篡权的故事 [*The Story of Lü Hou Usurping Power*] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1977), 1.

Power nonetheless uses the same effective interplay between image and text to besmirch Jiang. Over the course of the 61-page story, 23 illustrations conveying different messages frame key plot moments. For example, several images manipulate Lü's figure to show the unsuitability of women for leadership. Her death, in particular, is a moment of high drama, with her deathbed wailings the culmination of the story's narrative of female excitability and hysteria (figure 7.7, right).³⁷ Here, Jiang Qing is damned by association.



Figure 7.6: Lü Hou as both a witch and a tyrant in The Overly-Ambitious Lü Hou.³⁸

³⁷ Ibid., 54.

³⁸ Image source: Ren, *The Overly Ambitious*, 10 and 20.




Figure 7.7: The front cover and an inside page from The Story of Lü Hou Usurping Power.³⁹

All these depictions of Lü Hou dovetailed with direct attacks on Jiang Qing in print, thereby mirroring a core propaganda strategy of previous years. The cover of *Jiang Qing: The White-Boned Demon* (白骨精江青) – published in an impression of 13,000 copies in November 1977 – depicts a stooping, puffy-faced Jiang drawing a sword with the message "usurp the Party and seize power" (篡党夺权) (figure 7.8, left). Not to be outdone, Qinghai People's Press issued a book titled *Jiang Qing and Lü Hou* (江青与吕后) with Jiang – dreaming of a crown – hiding behind a picture of her Han dynasty equivalent (figure 7.8, right). By eviscerating past and

³⁹ Image sources: Shi and Li, *The Story of Lü Hou*, front cover and 54.

present figures concurrently, presses could produce a wider range of material for more tastes while ensuring that publishing always promoted the interests of politicians in charge.



Figure 7.8: Two publications targeting Jiang Qing.⁴⁰

For the same reasons, post-Mao publishers also continued publishing historical texts with politicized annotations. Zhonghua Books, a mainstay in the annotated texts genre during the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign (see preceding chapters), brought out a chunky volume of primary sources connected to Lü Hou and her followers.⁴¹ Beijing Automobile

⁴⁰ Image sources: Hebei shifan xueyuan da pipan zu 河北师范学院大批判组, 白骨精江青 [*Jiang Qing: The White-Boned Demon*] (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1977), front cover; Qinghai renmin chubanshe 青海人民出版社, ed., 江青与吕后 [*Jiang Qing and Lü Hou*] (Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1977), front cover.

⁴¹ Beijing qiche zhizao chang gongren lilun yanjiu suo 北京汽车制造厂工人理论研究所, 吕后其人—— 吕后及诸吕叛国篡权资料选译 [*Lü Hou The Person: Selected and Translated Materials Showing the Traitorous Political Schemes of Lü Hou and the Lü Clan*] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju: 1977).

Factory (北京汽车制造厂), which had supposedly authored several anti-Confucianism books in 1974 and 1975 for Zhonghua, likewise appears on the title page of the primary source collection, showing how Zhonghua used the factory's political pedigree to lend the campaign against the Gang more popular credibility.⁴² Besides Zhonghua's volume, Beijing People's Press compiled its own 86-page collection of primary materials on the Lü Hou story, while other titles sometimes included a selection of sources in their appendices.⁴³ Like annotated texts in the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, these publications gave Hua's politicking a serious, rather than just a sensational, edge.

In one final echo of previous years, presses also introduced anti-Jiang narratives into the popular history genre for readers unwilling to wade through primary sources. For example, People's Press added *Lü Hou: Stealing Power and Usurping the Country* (篡权窃国的吕后) into its "Study Some History" (学点历史) series.⁴⁴ "Study Some History" was a flagship series which previously featured several anti-Confucianism titles in 1974 and expanded every year between 1974 and 1977.⁴⁵ In the latest addition to this series of accessible primers, the authors outlined

⁴² Beijing qiche zhizao chang gongren lilun zu 北京汽车制造厂工人理论组,读《封建论》 [Reading the "Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron"] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974) (Copy found in the library of the East China Normal University Documents and Materials Center 华东师范大学文献资料中心藏书, Shanghai, PR China); Beijing qiche zhizao chang gongren lilun zu 北京汽车制造厂工人理论组 and Zhonghua shuju 中华书局, eds., 儒法斗争故事 [Stories of the Confucian-Legalist Struggle] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975) (Electronic copy found on Duxiu.com).

⁴³ Beijing bei jiao mucai chang gongren lilun zu 北京北郊木材厂工人理论组 and Beijing shifan daxue lishi xi 北京师范大学历史系, 吕后篡权资料选注 [Selected and Annotated Materials Concerning Lü Hou's Power Grab (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1977); Huang Lin 黄霖, ed., 野心家吕后 [The Overly Ambitious Lü Hou] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1977), 46-69.

⁴⁴ Tian Renlong 田人隆, Zhou Shaoquan 周绍泉, and Liu Zhongri 刘重日, 篡权窃国的吕后 [Lü Hou: Stealing Power and Usurping the Country] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1977).

⁴⁵ For a full list of titles, see the relevant volumes of *A Comprehensive Bibliography of National Publications*, listed in the bibliography under the author "Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju banben tushuguan 国家出版事业管理局版本图书馆." Each volume has a specific section for books published in a series.

the case against Lü in just 36 pages, with the book's opening lines leaving the reader in no doubt that she and Jiang occupied two sides of the same evil coin.⁴⁶ Given its short length, *Lü Hou: Stealing Power and Usurping the Country* suited mass distribution without using too much paper, making it a useful contrast to the longer, more paper-intensive anti-Lü publications rolling off presses.

From a wider perspective, the genres and styles of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign clearly found new life in the service of a new master: Hua Guofeng. While historians often observe that the Hua Guofeng era continued much of what had gone before, they see this as evidence that Hua wanted to be a second Mao. In contrast, it would be more noteworthy if Mao's death *had* prompted significant changes. After the palace coup of October 1976, in a period of political uncertainty and possibility, it made total sense for industries like propaganda publishing to stick with what they knew best. Publishers had mastered the art of churning out historical allegories as a comment on current political events, and now they put this to good use in support of Hua's leadership. Bookstores, too, remained key sites for promoting the interests of the new regime: Tianjin's bookstores, for instance, sold over 850,000 books and photographs on the theme of criticizing the Gang.⁴⁷ The print campaign against Jiang Qing and her allies, therefore, represented the latest step in the long-running alliance between party, ink, and paper.

⁴⁶ Tian, *Lü Hou: Stealing Power*, 1.

⁴⁷ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Tianjin juan (1949-2017)," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Tianjin Volume*, 134.

Mao's Selected Works: Political Spectacle and Practical Challenge

Earlier, I noted that almost immediately after his coup, Hua ordered the publication of more volumes of Mao's Selected Works. The fifth volume had been on ice for quite a while editors readied a draft as early as 1960, but at the time Mao did not approve its publication. Several years later, the Cultural Revolution got in the way of any further progress.⁴⁸ Now, with Hua Guofeng reigning supreme, a join editorial between China's top state media outlets gushed that resuming work on the Selected Works constituted "a great event in the political life of the Chinese people" [中国人民政治生活中的大事] and a matter of "long-ranging historical significance" [深远的历史意义].49 Never missing an opportunity to vilify, the editorial also spun the resumption as a consequence of defeating the Gang. with the latter conveniently blamed for having delayed publication in the first place.⁵⁰ In March 1977, Hua Guofeng accepted the chairmanship of the newly-formed Committee for Editing and Publishing the Works of Chairman Mao Zedong (毛泽东主席著作编辑出版委员会), and officials seconded 60 staff from Shanghai People's Press to proofread the manuscript.⁵¹ When the Chinese version of *The* Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume Five (hereafter 'Mao 5') went on general release on 15 April 1977, state media reported soldiers in Beijing celebrating the event with "incomparable ecstasy"(无比喜悦的心情).52

⁴⁸ Song, *Historical Sources*, volume 4, 187.

⁴⁹ "亿万人民的共同心愿" [The common yearning of hundreds and millions of the people]. *The People's Daily*, October 10, 1976, 1.

⁵⁰ Deshingkar, "The Fifth Volume," 10.

⁵¹ Song, *Historical Sources*, volume 4, 188; Lei, *Time Marches Onward*, volume 2, 764 and 766-767.

⁵² "首都热烈欢庆《毛泽东选集》第五卷出版发行" [The capital excitedly celebrates the publication of *The Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume Five*]. *The People's Daily*, April 16, 1977, 1.

Once again, a book occupied the central place in a stage-managed spectacle with significant political implications. Chapter One charted how the Four Books launched the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, and in 1977 publishers and bookstores promoted a similar frenzy with Mao 5 to legitimize Hua's leadership and advertise the popular enthusiasm undergirding his premiership. An memo issued by Xinhua Bookstore's headquarters instructed bookstores to promote the book "with great fanfare" (大张旗鼓), and across the country local Xinhua staff did not disappoint.⁵³ In Chongqing, trucks took to the streets to celebrate the book's launch, and in Beijing trucks adorned with red flags carried copies on a 50-day pilgrimage to 150 villages.⁵⁴ Bookstore staff in Benxi spent a week preparing for the launch by hanging colorful lights and slogans, and on launch day the city's senior leadership joined sales clerks in selling over 300,000 copies in bookstores.⁵⁵ Finally, in Shanghai, the authorities created frenetic activity in a small number of locations by concentrating stock at the Xinhua Bookstore branches on Nanjing Road and Huainan Road. Staff from Shanghai People's Press went to the Nanjing Road branch to manage queues consistently 2-3000 people strong. Many dissatisfied customers left branches on launch day having failed to secure copies, suggesting that this risky strategy of creating both scarcity and artificially teeming bookstores nonetheless successfully stoked demand.⁵⁶ Figures 7.9, 7.10 and 7.11 depict how these carefully choreographed spectacles in

⁵³ SMA B244-6-29-67, "国家出版事业管理局关于《毛泽东选集》第五卷出版准备工作和召开全国 印制发行工作会议的通知" [A notice from the National Bureau of Publishing concerning preparation for the publication of *The Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume Five* and concerning arrangements for a national meeting to discuss the book's printing and distribution].

⁵⁴ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Chongqing juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Chongqing Volume*, 62; Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Beijing juan (1949-2017)," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Beijing Volume*, 66.

⁵⁵ Benxi shi xinhua shudian 本溪市新华书店, ed., 本溪图书发行志 1915-1988 [*The Gazzetteer of Book Distribution in Benxi, 1915-1988*] (Benxi: Benxi xinhua shudian, 1990), 24 and 162. ⁵⁶ Lei, *Time Marches Onward*, volume 2, 773-774.

different locations all displayed popular enthusiasm for the publication event of the year and its political impresario.



Figure 7.9: A truck arrives at a local car repair factory in Hainan with copies of Mao 5.57

⁵⁷ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Hainan juan (1950-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华 书店发展大系·海南卷 (1950-2017) 》编纂委员会, 中国新华书店发展大系·海南卷 (1950-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Hainan Volume, 1950-2017*] (Haikou: Hainan chubanshe, 2017), 1.



Figure 7.10: Hefei's Xinhua Bookstore apparatus begins issuing copies of Mao 5.58



Figure 7.11: Mao 5 hits the shelves in Chengdu.⁵⁹

None of the above photographs come from state media, but abundant visual coverage of

the launch in newspapers reinforced the ongoing connection between politics and print. To

⁵⁸ Image source: "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Anhui juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Anhui Volume, 1949-2017*, 3.

⁵⁹ Image source: "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Sichuan juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华书店发展大系·四川卷(1949-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系 四川卷(1949-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Sichuan Volume, 1949-2017*] (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2017), 6.

suggest Mao 5's national significance, media outlets in Shanghai dressed students from a local university in ethnic minority clothing and photographed them buying, reading and discussing the book.⁶⁰ Wenhui Daily splashed its pages with shopworn pictorial themes such as smiling patrons queuing to buy copies and clusters of happy readers.⁶¹ When translations for China's ethnic minorities appeared soon after the Chinese original, state media recorded the same jubilant scenes.⁶² But in a move reminiscent of early 1974 and the Four Books, newspapers and periodicals stressed not only sweeping reader demand but also the effusive enthusiasm of printing press workers. Full-page and individual photo spreads, all showing vibrant and dedicated activity, affirmed support for Hua and his ideas (figure 7.12). Three years on from the release of the Four Books, a nationwide book launch once again had provided a means to strengthen support for the state.

⁶⁰ Lei, *Time Marches Onward*, volume 2, 774.
⁶¹ See: *Wenhui Daily*, April 16, 1977, 4; and *Wenhui Daily*, April 18, 1977, 1.

⁶² Minorities Pictorial no. 9 (September 1977), 15.



Figure 7.12: A montage of images designed to show print workers' enthusiasm for *Mao 5*.
Clockwise from top-left: A Wenhui Daily back-page spread showing Shanghai's printers had at work producing *Mao 5*; a full-page periodical spread showing feverish production of *Mao 5*;
Tianjin printers welcome stereotyped printing molds of *Mao 5* to their printing press; molds for *Mao 5* from Shanghai arrive with much ceremony in Lhasa.⁶³

⁶³ Image sources: *Wenhui Daily*, April 11, 1977, 4; *Experimental Science* no. 5 (1977); *Wenhui Daily*, April 15, 1977, 4.

Beneath all this orchestrated optimism, however, propaganda production still suffered from the same fragility marring publishing in previous years. At the same time as they printed and advertised *Mao 5*, presses and newspapers battled an entrenched paper crisis. Broadly put, Mao's death precipitated a chain of events which destabilized an already volatile print culture industry. With paper firmly tied to the vicissitudes of political life, the post-Mao years and the Cultural Revolution gradually collapsed into one prolonged period of instability.

In 1977, *Mao 5* became the most significant publication of the decade – China needed saturating with copies. The NBP decided to make as many copies for the new volume as for each of the first four volumes of Mao's *Selected Works*, meaning it had to find the paper and other materials for an initial print-run of 200 million paperback copies, 100,000 hardbacks, and three million higher quality paperbacks.⁶⁴ Flong-lending facilitated printing across the country, and abundant local data suggests that print-runs reached, or perhaps even exceeded, the NBP's targets. In Shandong Province, planners set the volume's first printing at 14 million copies.⁶⁵ In the provincial capital of Shaanxi, one printing press produced 2.65 million copies between April and August 1977.⁶⁶ 7.12 million distributed in Heilongjiang Province, five million in the Guangxi Autonomous Region, 15 million in Sichuan Province, ten million in Hunan Province, 11 million in Liaoning Province...the numbers speak for themselves.⁶⁷ Overall, by September

⁶⁴ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 11; Song, *Historical Sources*, volume 4, 188.

 $^{^{65}}$ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Shandong juan (1943-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新

华书店发展大系·山东卷(1943-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·山东卷(1943-2017

^{) [}*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Shandong Volume, 1943-2017*] (Ji'nan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 2017), 100.

⁶⁶ Si Zhiqiang 司志强 and Changshi bian wei hui 厂史编委会, eds., 西安新华印刷厂厂史 1949-1996 [*The History of Xi'an Xinhua Printing Press, 1949-1996*] (Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1993), 19. ⁶⁷ "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Heilongjiang juan (1945-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国 新华书店发展大系·黑龙江卷(1945-2017)》编纂委员会, 中国新华书店发展大系·黑龙江卷

^{(1945-2017) [}*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Heilongjiang Volume, 1945-2017*] (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2017), 57; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Guangxi juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Guangxi Volume,* 127; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian

1977, Xinhua Bookstore estimated that it had dispatched 201 million copies of *Mao 5*, along with almost 2.5 million copies in ethnic minority languages.⁶⁸

By the time Hua Guofeng announced plans to publish *Mao 5*, the publishing sector was in no position to smoothly handle this large and unexpected task. As discussed in Chapter Five, by mid-1976 chronic underproduction and overconsumption of publishing paper had forced publishers to curtail projects, raid emergency stockpiles, and backchannel for precious supplies. Almost immediately after Hua's announcement, therefore, the NBP and the Ministry of Light Industry held a conference in Jinan to discuss sourcing paper for the forthcoming volume.⁶⁹ 190 representatives from central ministries, papermills and provincial governments met again soon after to tackle the paper issue.⁷⁰ Put simply, *Mao 5* needed huge quantities of top-quality paper and timely delivery at a time when the paper industry's quality control and production targets had ceased to be meaningful.

Information from Beijing typifies the strain *Mao 5* placed on printing and paper-making. With the municipality required to print five million copies, papermills had to supply 1300 tons of first-grade paper straight off the production line. Because the pre-print work finished ahead of schedule, however, printing began early and outpaced paper production. Moreover, one of

fazhan da xi: Sichuan juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Sichuan Volume*, 78; "Sichuan xinhua shudian zhi" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《四川新华书店志》编纂委员会,四川新华书店志 1949-1995 [*The Gazzetteer of Sichuan's Xinhua Bookstores, 1949-1995*] (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 140; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Hunan juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 中国新华书店发展大系·湖南卷(1949-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·湖 南卷(1949-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Hunan Volume, 1949-2017*] (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 2017), 76; Liaoning sheng, *Historical Sources Part 2*, 203. ⁶⁸ Song, *Historical Sources*, volume 4, 190.

⁶⁹ BMA 201-3-151, "北京市出版办公室关于申请增拨印刷纸张的报告" [Reports from the Beijing Publishing Office applying for extra allocations and redistribution of printing paper].

⁷⁰ SMA B244-3-940-23, "国家出版事业管理局、轻工业部关于召开毛泽东主席著作出版用纸生产安 排会议的通知" [A notice from the National Bureau of Publishing and the Ministry of Light Industry convening a meeting to arrange production of publishing paper for Mao's works].

Beijing's main suppliers continued to experience electricity and coal shortages which accentuated production difficulties. As if the situation could not get any worse, officials found that over half of all paper produced for Beijing fell below acceptable quality standards. The precarious situation forced them to divert production capacity at another Beijing mill into closing the supply-demand deficit.⁷¹ Significantly, NBP notices demonstrate that Beijing's problems reappeared across the country.⁷²

As with major publications from the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, the millions and millions of copies of *Mao 5* also hoovered up scarce paper resources at the expense of many other projects. By mid-year 1977, the national production deficit for publishing paper reached 26,000 tons, and by October 1977 the Ministry of Light Industry forecast "serious shortages" (严重不足) of paper for 1978.⁷³ In this context, mass production of *Mao 5* led to a 26 percent decline in the amount of paper available for book publishing in 1977 compared to 1976, with publishers slashing print-runs by up to 80 percent.⁷⁴ Quantifying the tangible impact of this decrease on particular publishing projects is currently impossible, but there can be no doubt that the breadth and depth of publishing continued atrophying into the Hua Guofeng era.

Eventually, even *Mao 5* – a volume with immense political and practical consequences – succumbed to the instability of the post-Mao years. By 1979, having informally shunted aside Hua, Deng Xiaoping solidified his position by accusing Hua of ersatz Maoist radicalism. In particular, Hua's decision to release *Mao 5* in 1977, combined with the quantities printed, became his weakness. In warehouses, "unpalatable but equally unpulpable political fiction" – in

⁷¹ BMA 201-3-151.

⁷² SMA B244-6-29-33, "国家出版事业管理局关于要求提供纸张质量材料的通知" [A notice from the National Bureau of Publishing calling for improvements in the quality of papermaking]. ⁷³ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 48, 85 and 93.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 93.

other words, unsold copies of *Mao 5* and other Cultural Revolution-era editions of Mao's writings – sat gathering dust.⁷⁵ Several years later, once Hua was no longer the titular leader of the CCP, the NBP quietly directed that remaining copies of *Mao 5* be withdrawn from sale and pulped to eliminate traces of Huaist formulations.⁷⁶ Long after the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, books remained shackled to China's turbulent politics.

State-Sanctioned Bibliocide: Censoring and Pulping the Gang of Four

Hua Guofeng's arrest of the Gang precipitated an enormous wave of iconoclasm. Determined to expunge all dangerous traces of the Gang's influence in print, senior leadership ordered publishers to identify and censor all books containing problematic references. Between October 1976 and late 1978, books from the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign were progressively subsumed into the broader elimination of the Cultural Revolution's print culture. In this situation, the rapidly changing fortunes of Deng Xiaoping after 1976 caused further headaches for publishers and almost risible levels of censorship. His triumphant return to political life in 1977 instantly made an assortment of books published *after* Hua's coup deeply flawed. State-sanctioned and increasingly destructive, all this bibliocide affirmed that post-Mao reformers would found their state on cultural violence.

On coming to power, Hua Guofeng could draw on a repertoire of political and cultural censorship long practiced or encouraged by the CCP. Sei Jeong Chin and Nicolai Volland have

⁷⁵ Barmé, *Shades of Mao*, 6.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 11; SMA B167-5-700-56, "上海市出版局关于转发国家出版局《关于"毛泽东选集"第五卷停 售问题的通知》的通知" [A notice from the Shanghai Municipal Publishing Bureau forwarding the National Bureau of Publishing's "Notice regarding withdrawing *The Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volume Five*].

tracked the beginnings of media censorship under the CCP in the 1950s, and by the 1970s editors of newspapers and books nearly always confined their publications to Party lines.⁷⁷ Retrospective corrections for earlier errors, however, formed another key part of how the state manipulated the landscape of print culture. For example, as the Cultural Revolution gathered steam in 1966 and 1967, bookstores withdrew or destroyed books about "feudal" ideas and those linked to the rapidly expanding group of overthrown cadres. By 1970, almost 340 million unsavory and unsaleable books languished in storage nationwide.⁷⁸ Two years later, the state set aside the huge sum of almost 250 million *yuan* partly to cover losses incurred from bibliocide since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.⁷⁹ Against this background, censorship emerged as the natural corollary to anti-Gang rhetoric after Hua's coup.

In a 1978 criticism of "ultra-leftism," NBP staff were quick to lament the political damage and economic losses inherent in Cultural Revolution publishing. "Because [the Gang] emphasized that publishing should stay in step with political movements, when a new movement started publishers scrambled to conform. They busied themselves ripping-out pages, changing pages, altering manuscripts, withdrawing books from sale, and pulping volumes" (由于片面强 调出书要紧跟运动,结果运动一来,大家抢着配合,情况一变,忙着撕页、换页、挖改、停售、销毁).⁸⁰ Yet the post-Mao creation of a new anti-Gang consensus required an upsurge in exactly this kind of destructive activity.

⁷⁷ Sei Jeong Chin, "Institutional Origins of the Media Censorship in China: The Making of the Socialist Media Censorship System in 1950s Shanghai," *Journal of Contemporary China* 27, no. 114 (July 2018): 956-972; Nicolai Volland, "The Control of the Media in the People's Republic of China" (PhD diss. Heidelberg University, 2003).

⁷⁸ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 14, 372-373.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 108.

⁸⁰ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 484.

After the night of the coup, the CCP's Politburo wasted little time kicking off the purge of the Gang. In October 1976, it prohibited the sale and display of print matter related to Jiang Qing and her fallen allies.⁸¹ Soon after, the NBP began a preliminary search for prohibited materials, approving 26 titles for withdrawal and pulping in November.⁸² By early January 1977, five publishers – including People's Press and Zhonghua Books - had identified 164 problematic titles. Their offending content included political and artistic philosophies associated with the Gang, as well as language distorting official criticisms of Deng Xiaoping issued in 1975 and 1976. Presses also targeted books from the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign that (in the NBP's view) distorted history, obliquely attacked central leaders, and challenged the central place of the masses in history.⁸³

In the early days of the purge, the NBP established a censorship bureaucracy indicative of the state's extensive experience re-writing history and its wish to avoid unchecked destruction. Rather than taking the easy road and pulping every book with even a hint of a problem, the NBP used specific criteria to evaluate titles and decide the severity of censorship. According to the guidelines, books with the Gang's writings, speeches and portraits needed withdrawing, as did content attributed to writing groups under their control. Likewise, books promoting the Gang's reactionary ideologies and schemes – typical titles include *An Introduction to the Confucian-Legalist Struggle* (儒法斗争史概况) and *Selected Readings of Legalist Texts* (法家著作选读) – no longer qualified for sale. At the same time, the NBP did not want presses disposing of books

⁸¹ Zhongyang xuanchuan bangongting 中央宣传部办公厅, ed., 党的宣传工作文件选编 (1976-1982) [Selected Documentation of Party Propaganda Work, 1976-1982] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), 507-508.

⁸² BMA 201-2-241, "北京人民出版社关于图书停止出版、报废处理的请示、通知等" [Requests, notices and other documents from Beijing People's Press regarding cancellation, withdrawal and pulping of book titles].

⁸³ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 15-18.

with only minor problems: as a case in point, titles with the names and images of Gang members but without heinous content could have the offending names and images ripped-out or redacted and put back on sale. The bureau also suggested that books not directly using Gang writings and still possessing a certain value for readers did not need to be withdrawn. After all, publishers could make corrections to any future editions.⁸⁴ In this spirit, Shanghai People's Press decided that its three-volume edition of the *Water Margin* (水浒全传) – published during the 1975 campaign to study the novel – could be sold as long as bookstores ripped-out the edition's politically passé preface.⁸⁵

Even in this early period, however, many books clearly could not survive the new regime's aggressive anti-Gang reckoning. In February 1977, therefore, People's Press wrote to provincial publishers, the Beijing Library, and other organizations authorizing the pulping of titles such as *An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius, Volume One* (one of the Four Books in Chapter One), *The History of the Struggle Between Confucianism and Legalism Over Military Matters* (儒法局势路线斗争史话) and *A 'Three Character Classic' for the Confucian-Legalist Struggle* (儒法斗争三字文). It also ordered publishers holding printing plates for these titles to destroy them so that no further copies could be made.⁸⁶ People's Press argued that these titles all promoted the Gang's radical view of historical change and the core ideas of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. The state allowing them to survive would thus legitimize some of the Gang's ideologies at a time when politics demanded the opposite. In this case and many others, mass pulping helped seal the Gang's fate and prop up the new regime.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ BMA 201-2-241.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

The NBP's changing view on the financial losses incurred by purging books shows that it did not anticipate how many titles would eventually become ensnared in its state-building dragnet. When the search for Gang material first started, officials decided that branches of Xinhua Bookstore should settle-up their losses directly with the publishers of individual books. This followed the convention, first established in 1964, that *publishers* should take responsibility for reimbursing bookstores forced to write-off books due to political reasons or editorial mistakes. Under this system, Xinhua branches reported losses internally to higher officials, who in turn liaised with the publisher to obtain and disburse the reimbursement.⁸⁷ In 1976, to prevent both a descent into unsupervised bibliocide and the unstated danger of fraudulent reimbursement claims, the NBP recommended that central and local government oversee the whole censorship process.⁸⁸

By early 1977, however, these compensation arrangements proved increasingly unfeasible. With 164 problematic titles from central publishers already identified, the NBP realized that presses would incur significant financial losses by reimbursing bookstores from their own coffers. Nor could bookstores shoulder the cost of stock write-offs. Like all businesses, bookstores had balance sheets and bottom lines, and they possessed no endless pot of money to cover politically-incurred expenses. In short, write-offs threatened to financially destabilize publishers and bookstores. To mediate the impact on publishers, the government resorted to creating a special fund under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance to cover losses.⁸⁹ In place by the one year anniversary of Hua's coup, the fund relieved financial worries and allowed

⁸⁷ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 69; Xinhua shudian zongdian 新华书店总店, ed., 图 书发行工作文件选编 1964-1981 [Selected Documents Concerning Book Distribution Work, 1964-1981] (Beijing: Xinhua shudian zongdian, 1982), 356-358.

⁸⁸ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 15-18.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 15-19.

publishing and bookselling staff to focus on censorship itself. The new procedures also entitled presses to recoup (from the state) compensation paid out to bookstores in the preceding twelve months.⁹⁰ In short, one year after the Gang's demise, the state had fully incorporated censorship and post-Mao propaganda work into its sophisticated politico-financial bureaucracy.

Now responsible for footing the bill, the state wanted to guarantee that publishers and bookstores did not exploit the anti-Gang moment to cover unrelated expenses. Central officials thus forbade any use of funds to cover losses incurred through stock mismanagement, wear and tear, or remaindering. It also ordered that bookstores calculate compensation according to wholesale rather than cover prices. This crucial stipulation accounted for the trade discount enjoyed by bookstores when they ordered from publishers; to compensate according to cover prices would have given bookstores a profit at the Ministry of Finance's expense on every single volume. To further keep costs to the state as low as possible, officials urged bookstores to enlist ordinary readers to help rip-out pages or block-out text in books not warranting pulping. Billed as fostering a "spirit of self-reliance" (自力更生精神), the state in effect outsourced part of the censorship workload to readers expected to work for free.⁹¹ This brazen drafting of ordinary people's labor to censor their own access to information mirrors the participatory politics present in officially-organized anti-Gang mass rallies.

Bureaucracy also played its part managing censorship and guarding against any bookstore profiteering. Whereas in the early months of censorship local-level oversight was minimal, officials in charge of the central reimbursement fund required control over the cash to remain at the provincial level, with each Xinhua bookstore required to submit applications for

⁹⁰ Ibid., 69-71. ⁹¹ Ibid., 69-71.

money to provincial authorities. To aid double-checking, bookstores needed to provide the copyright pages of each individual book sent for pulping as evidence to support their compensation claims. Provincial finance bureaus then transferred the money for disbursement down the bureaucratic chain. As for publishers, their applications for money to cover stock write-offs received similar levels of oversight.⁹² From the arrest of the Gang to book censorship and onwards to the 1981 show-trial, CCP leaders carefully stage managed the post-Mao transition to let nothing come in the way of their agenda.

In assuming financial control of the whole censorship operation, the state took on a process that nonetheless rapidly transformed from selective to widespread pulping of books. In July 1977, publishers believed 30 percent of the 7500 philosophy and social science titles published between 1971 and 1976 contained problems. By August, however, provincial publishers had decided 3007 of 3531 problematic titles contained errors severe enough to warrant pulping them. Only 126 merited modification and re-distribution, with a further 172 still temporarily withdrawn from sale pending review. For their part, central publishers reported in August that they had already pulped 392 of 492 problematic titles due to the amount of erroneous content in these books. Shanghai People's Press reported finding as many as 724 titles related to the Gang in its back catalogue, while publishing staff in Liaoning identified 372.⁹³ Censorship became increasingly widespread as the full extent of the Gang's influence became clearer.

The ever-widening scope of the purge required extending the deadline for compensation requests or risk jeopardizing the thoroughness and financial stability of the publishing and bookselling industries. Originally, central officials expected publishers to finish assessing their catalogues by the end of 1977, with Xinhua bookstore given until June 1978 to report all pulped

⁹² Ibid., 69-71.

⁹³ Ibid., 63-68 and 74.

stock.⁹⁴ However, in a tacit acknowledgement that the scale of the purge had exceeded all expectations, in March 1978 the NBP extended all deadlines to the end of 1978.⁹⁵ Documents from Beijing People's Press housed in the Beijing Municipal Archives show that publishing staff in the municipality looked through the complete text of every book so as not to miss any offending material, and this process no doubt took an inordinate length of time.⁹⁶ Appendix 3 gives a detailed picture of some of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign titles systematically condemned by municipal censors over the course of two years. The table's almost overwhelming detail emphasizes that censorship took so many months to complete because the Gang's ideas had thoroughly permeated the print culture of the late Cultural Revolution. But from another perspective, as more and more books fell victim to the search, censors in Beijing and elsewhere undermined tens of thousands of hours of editing, typesetting, printing and binding. The post-Mao era began tortuously, not triumphantly.

The fraught, uncertain ideological questions wrapped up in censorship further lengthened the already protracted process. Publishers, wary of allowing any problematic books to slip through the net, trod carefully. Some decided to find the obvious titles for purging first, or opted to withdraw books from sale and defer decisions on how to deal with them until later. In a small number of areas such as Ningxia Province, presses shifted blame for their slow progress onto the supposed ongoing influence of closet Gang saboteurs, but this scapegoating hid more complex realities. For example, officials in Fujian reported difficulties in deciding what constituted a

⁹⁴ Ibid., 70.

⁹⁵ TMA X0087-C-001791, "财政部、国家出版局、市财政局关于 核准涉及"四人帮"图书报废专项资金划转手续及资金延期使用的通知" [A notice from the Ministry of Finance, the National Bureau of Publishing, and the Municipal Finance Bureau regarding both procedures for receiving reimbursement for book censorship and lengthening the window for reimbursement applications].
⁹⁶ BMA 201-2-241.

"right" and a "wrong" political line, hindering efforts to ferret-out the Gang's philosophies.⁹⁷ This confusion is understandable: Hua arrested the Gang for political expediency rather than as a result of concrete and cohesive theoretical opposition, and the abstract wording of Chinese political language left the party line laced with ambiguities.

For books from the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, finding the right titles to censor proved an especially knotty question. People's Press, for example, admitted to the NBP that "we are not clear what exactly the 'Gang of Four' did to sabotage [the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign]...nor are we clear how they distorted the wishes of Chairman Mao" (人民出版社提出,关于批林批孔、评法批儒、评论《水浒》等问题,'四人帮'到底 搞了那些破坏,他们如何歪曲、篡改了毛主席的指示,现在还搞不太清楚). Such uncertainty delayed progress. Instructions to look for books obliquely attacking political leaders similarly confused censorship activities. For example, Henan Province did not know whether every title featuring historical figures had an outright presentist political motive. As for Hunan People's Press, it failed to find allegorical political attacks in its *Selected Readings of Legalist Texts* (法家著作选读) pamphlet series, even though senior officials had made it clear that the Gang directly promoted the study of Legalist texts. Both Henan and Hunan wanted the center to shoulder the responsibility, and hence the risk, of deciding the next steps.⁹⁸

In many instances, censorship mirrored the slow crystallization of the broader anti-Gang narrative in the years after Mao's death. Presses reported books where it didn't feel right to *not* purge a title even when the content possessed no discernable problems. For this reason, Hubei Province raised the case of *Selected and Annotated Works of Cao Cao and Zhuge Liang* (曹操、

⁹⁷ Ibid., 63-68.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 65-66.

诸葛亮著作选注) and *Selected and Annotated Works of Wang Fuzhi* (王夫之著作选注) – two books published in 1975 as part of the national project to re-annotate Legalist texts from an anti-Confucianism perspective (see Chapter Two). During a sweep of its stock, staff concluded that these books had no noteworthy aberrations, but still felt that the Gang's involvement with the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign indirectly delegitimized these titles. Elsewhere, publishers had trouble identifying all the pseudonyms used by the Gang's writing group acolytes, while others did not know how to deal with books relating to Gang pet projects but not directly extolling Jiang Qing and her allies. Some even asked, what about books praised by Mao Zedong but authored by writers with known political problems? In an August 1977 progress report, the NBP referenced one such title – Yang Rongguo's *A Simple Introduction to Chinese Philosophy* (简明中国哲学), but unhelpfully it offered nothing concrete besides advising publishers to "handle [the problem] carefully" (慎重处理).⁹⁹ While Hua and other politicians wrestled with how to treat the Gang's imprisoned members, the post-Mao era for publishers meant struggling to navigate vague guidelines and obsessing over the 'right' thing to do.

Publishers in areas like Shanghai with a history of proximity to the Gang had to navigate additional pressures almost immediately after the Gang's arrest. Following Hua's move against the Gang, the central government dispatched a taskforce to Shanghai to ferret out the Gang's supporters and stabilize China's second capital.¹⁰⁰ On October 15, cadres at Shanghai People's Press assembled to welcome Hua's leadership and condemn the Gang.¹⁰¹ This did not, however, stop printers in the city denouncing the press as a tool of the Gang and putting the press under

⁹⁹ Ibid., 63-68.

¹⁰⁰ This story is fully recounted in Li Haiwen 李海文 and Wang Shoujia 王守家, "四人帮"上海余党覆灭 记 [*The Fall of the 'Gang of Four's' Shanghai Faction*] (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2015).
¹⁰¹ SMA B167-2-185-117, "上海人民出版社党委办公室编印的《出版简报》1976 年第 135 期" ["The Current Situation," 1976, no. 135, edited by the Shanghai People's Press Party Committee Office].

significant pressure.¹⁰² By October 19, the publishing house's leadership were anxious to begin censorship because Beijing had already started, but staff remained unsure how to proceed.¹⁰³ Only on October 23 – over two weeks after the arrest of the Gang – did Shanghai People's Press call a halt to all books currently in press pending a review of the content.¹⁰⁴

Shanghai's delays caused disputes at a time when the national leadership wanted unity. By the beginning of November 1976, Shanghai was running out of space at bookstore warehouses and printing factories to store the 173 titles it had decided to withdraw from sale or stop printing.¹⁰⁵ By November 11 the number of problematic titles had risen to 313 and 20 had already been pulped.¹⁰⁶ Very soon, both Shanghai People's Press and Xinhua Bookstore were complaining that books awaiting resolution dominated all their available space.¹⁰⁷ When Shanghai People's Press dithered over what to do with two books by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, Xinhua Bookstore promptly dumped all the copies outside one of the publisher's offices in protest. Other books experienced the same fate, forming a small mountain that blocked the road outside the offices.¹⁰⁸ Xinhua also expressed exasperation with the lack of progress in Shanghai compared to Beijing. Whereas Beijing-based publishers sent one notice to nationwide bookstores outlining how to censor books, Shanghai People's Press apparently tended to send several documents per title while deciding what to do with it. With Xinhua Bookstore staff in

¹⁰² Lei, *Time Marches Onward*, volume 2, 723.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 722.

 ¹⁰⁴ SMA B167-3-342-70, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于停印部分发印图书的函" [A letter from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee ordering a halt to the printing of several titles].
 ¹⁰⁵ SMA B244-3-939-529, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于部分图书作报废处理的请示报告" [A report requesting instructions from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee regarding pulping several titles].

¹⁰⁶ SMA B244-3-939-534, "上海人民出版社革命委员会关于清理该社出版物的情况报告" [A report from the Shanghai People's Press Revolutionary Committee regarding progress purging its in-house catalogue].

¹⁰⁷ Lei, *Time Marches Onward*, volume 2, 730.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 730-731.

Shanghai responsible for forwarding around 3000 copies of these notices to other provinces and organizations, the paperwork mountain and administrative burden grew and grew.¹⁰⁹ Finally, Xinhua did not like the inconsistent approach taken by Shanghai People's Press staff when deciding what and how to purge, as well as resenting the amount of bookseller labor needed to insert cancels into books, rip pages out, and add erratum slips.¹¹⁰ Customers kept noticing books connected to the Gang on shelves, and naturally Xinhua Bookstore staff bore the brunt of browsers' criticisms.¹¹¹

Deng Xiaoping's fluctuating political fortunes in the mid-1970s injected further complexity into the bibliocide and the creation of a stable post-Mao consensus. Even before Mao's death, Deng's oscillation between political prominence and political disgrace presented a headache for publishers looking to stay in step with politics. For example, after Deng re-joined frontline leadership in 1975, the NBP arranged for the printing of millions of copies of a threevolume title on economic policy.¹¹² By February 1976, printers across the country had made 8.2 million of part one, 4.2 million of part two and 3.36 million of part 3.¹¹³ Unfortunately, by spring 1976, Deng had once again fallen from grace, and references to a signature Deng policy in part two forced the State Council to recall copies and substitute the offending pages with new content. On closer inspection in June, the NBP found that all three parts contained Deng's

¹⁰⁹ SMA B244-3-939-543, "上海新华书店革命委员会关于涉及"四人帮"图书处理的情况汇报" [A report from the Shanghai Xinhua Bookstore Revolutionary Committee discussing progress purging books related to the 'Gang of Four'].

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² BMA 201-3-95, "国家出版局等单位关于出版发行工作的通知" [Notices from the National Bureau of Publishing and other organizations regarding book distribution matters].

¹¹³ BMA 201-3-107, "国家出版局关于出版发行工作方面的通知" [Notices from the National Bureau of Publishing regarding book publishing and distribution].

"revisionist fallacies" (修正主义谬论). Only half a year (!) after the books' publication, political changes forced the pulping of remaining unsold copies.¹¹⁴

With a resurgent Deng formally rehabilitated in July 1977, the state's search for Gang material widened to include any material criticizing him. On July 26, the NBP ordered all distribution of materials containing criticisms of Deng to stop.¹¹⁵ Publishers and bookstores were now required to expunge all derogatory references to Deng and his ideas, and they could apply to the center's dedicated reimbursement fund to cover financial losses. Similar to the censorship of the Gang, expunging anti-Deng sentiment provoked the same uncertainties regarding what type of references merited pulping an entire book.¹¹⁶ For Beijing People's Press, however, it quickly became clear that Deng's return had jeopardized its more recent publications. During their search for books, they notified Xinhua Bookstore of titles needing embargoing or destroying, and one of these notices issued a few weeks after Deng's rehabilitation listed twelve titles for withdrawal and nine for pulping.¹¹⁷

Crucially, eliminating printed criticisms of Deng required censoring material praising Hua Guofeng and eviscerating the Gang, thereby muddying the whole transition. Looking at the notice issued by Beijing People's Press, for example, it ordered bookstores to pulp copies of *The* 'Gang of Four' Brought Disaster Upon the Country and People by Destroying Attempts to "Seize Revolution and Promote Production" ("四人帮"是破坏抓革命促生产的祸国殃民帮, published February 1977) because it included anti-Deng phrases. Amongst others, the same

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ TMA X0199-C-001872, "天津市委、市革委等单位关于出版发行工作的通知、电话批示" [Notices and telephoned instructions from the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee and the Tianjin Municipal Revolutionary Committee regarding book publishing and distribution].

¹¹⁶ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 68-69.

¹¹⁷ BMA 201-2-241.

document withdrew from sale *Comrade Hua Guofeng is the Leader our Party Deserves* (华国锋 同志是我们党当之无愧的领袖, published December 1976) and *The 'Gang of Four' Focused on Usurping the Party and Stealing Power* ("四人帮"的要害是纂党夺权, published December 1976).¹¹⁸ The notice also warned Xinhua to embargo any remaining copies of *The Memory of the Great Leader and Teacher Mao Zedong Will Live Forever* (伟大的领袖和导师毛泽东主席永垂 不朽, published September 1976).¹¹⁹ Almost inevitably, the press directed several months later that all the above withdrawn volumes be pulped. Thus, in 1977, we find publishers and bookstores withdrawing or destroying books commemorating Mao, lauding Hua, and attacking the Gang. There can be no better symbol of the turbulent, and almost absurd, progress of the post-Mao transition, the continuity either side of Mao's death, and the consequences reaped by party leaders who tied print culture and political legitimacy.

All this pulping and destroying points to one further feature of the mid to late 1970s transition beyond its destructiveness: it did not come cheap. No accurate final tally of bibliocide's raw economic impact is yet available, but available data concerning state compensation to publishers and bookstores highlights the real cost of the marriage between party and print. At the close of October 1977, one report estimated that publishers and bookstores had already sent 80 million *yuan* of books for pulping. Given that most titles cost significantly less than one *yuan* in the 1970s, this figure represents hundreds of millions of publications. Several months later, another official reckoned that Shanghai alone had lost eight million *yuan* of printed material through censorship up to the end of October 1977.¹²⁰ Speaking to their colleagues, these

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.; BMA 201-3-108, "北京市出版办公室关于出版用纸的报告" [A report from the Beijing Publishing Office regarding publishing paper].

¹²⁰ Zhongguo xinwen, *Historical Materials*, vol. 15, 122 and 176.

officials perhaps had cause reason to exaggerate the scale of the purge, but other evidence corroborates their statements. Late in the year, for example, Shanghai's publishing leadership received an extra three million *yuan* (on top of five million *yuan* already apportioned to them by the state) to cover Shanghai's expected losses from pulping.¹²¹ One document from late 1978 shows Shanghai receiving a total of 6.5 million *yuan* from the state to cover costs, and a recent history of the city's Xinhua Bookstores states that Shanghai pulped 8.3 million *yuan* of printed material – 78,369,954 items – in the purge.¹²²

Known figures from elsewhere give the same depressing picture: 3.55 million *yuan* in Sichuan province; one million *yuan* in the Guangxi Autonomous Region; 2.5 million *yuan* and 21,872,352 items in Hebei province; over one million *yuan* and 9.8 million items in Jiangxi province; over one million *yuan* in Fujian province; 700,000 *yuan* and 5.7 million books in Yunnan province.¹²³ For CCP leaders, sacrificing this cash to eliminate hundreds of millions of books represented money well spent, but in the process they chose to devote resources to

¹²¹ SMA B167-5-108-7, "上海市出版局、上海市财政局革命委员会关于申请追加涉及"四人帮"图书 报废专项资金拨款的报告" [A report from the Shanghai Municipal Publishing Bureau and the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Finance Revolutionary Committee asking for information on monetary compensation for books destroyed as part of the anti-'Gang of Four' purge].

¹²² Ibid.; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Shanghai juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Shanghai Volume*, 97.

¹²³ "Xinhua shudian liushi nian," A Record of Sixty Years, 250; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Hebei juan (1941-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华书店发展大系·河北卷 (1941-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·河北卷 (1941-2017) [*The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Hebei Volume, 1941-2017*] (Shijiazhuang: Hebei chuban chuanmei jituan and Hebei renmin chubanshe, 2017), 75; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Jiangxi juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华书店发展大系·江西卷 (1949-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·江西卷 (1949-2017)》编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·江西卷 (1949-2017)》 fianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华书店发展大系·江西卷 (1949-2017)》 编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·福建卷 (1949-2017)
(Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 2017), 92; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Fujian juan (1949-2017)" bianzuan weiyuanhui 《中国新华书店发展大系·福建卷 (1949-2017)》 编纂委员会,中国新华书店发展大系·福建卷 (1949-2017), 58; "Zhongguo xinhua shudian fazhan da xi: Yunnan juan," *The Development of China's Xinhua Bookstore: Fujian Bookstore: Fujian Yolume*, 95.

destructive rather than productive priorities. With politics tied so closely to print culture, the beginnings of the post-Mao reform era depended first on violent iconoclasm and economic waste.

Just when we might think that censoring the Gang could have no more ironic costs or consequences, it is worth remembering that the bibliocide occurred at the same time that China wrestled with the paper shortages outlined above and in Chapter Five. After hustling for years to find the paper for Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign publications, in 1977 publishers now received instructions to censor the same books and recycle them back into sub-standard pulp. In December 1977, one senior publishing official obliquely referenced this appalling waste of resources. In a speech to colleagues, he judged that the number of books already pulped in the purge equaled 40,000 tons of paper. This figure, in turn, equated to an estimated 100 million copies of the newly-released *The Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volume 5*. Further bibliocide in 1978 capped a key trend of the 1970s:: the use, and abuse, of environmental resources in the pursuit of outright political gain. This narrative of the 1970s deserves the same recognition as any scholarly determination to discover the seeds of economic reform.

Conclusion

Publishing in the early years of the Hua Guofeng era remained fluid and highly unstable. In their relentless quest to expunge heretical political ideas and control public perceptions of the Gang of Four, Hua and his publishers ended up drawing on the lessons of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign at the same time as they repeated many of the sins that they tried to lay at the Gang's door. Whether in political meetings, the printing of anti-Jiang Qing

propaganda, the release of *Mao 5*, or mass censorship, an all too familiar state compulsion to control the narrative whatever the cost lurked beneath the officially-manufactured jubilant enthusiasm of the Hua years. Of course, one quick look at the shelves of Chinese secondhand bookstores or online reminds us that the state could only censor books within its reach – getting problematic books from private hands or from libraries proved difficult or impossible. The true tragedy of post-Mao publishing was that the state expended significant time, money, and resources to achieve the unachievable.

When did Chinese publishing "normalize"? This is a question worth asking, especially considering the scholarly and popular obsession with China's "reform and opening up." Given book history's Eurocentric focus, this question really means, "when did Chinese publishing become something more recognizable to Western eyes?" Whatever its merits and faults, this is a question that I have no intention of answering here. After Mao's death, despite official criticism of the disruptiveness of the Cultural Revolution, publishing remained firmly wedded to the machinations of Chinese politics, firmly committed to the Party's modes of political discourse, and firmly mired in similar material restrictions on day-to-day activity. Changed happened gradually and haphazardly, rendering any dividing line – 1976, 1978 etc. – analytically limited. Even nowadays, in China's greatly expanded and diversified publishing industry, it is still possible to find traces of the commonplace publishing system of the 1970s. For example, Xinhua Bookstores continue to play obligatory host to cheap volumes of Xi Jinping's writings and speeches that nobody wants to read.

Unlike other studies of modern China that like to end on a moment of change, I leave you with a messy and pessimistic scene. This story has no triumphant denouement to show the 'craziness' of the Mao period in relief or validate post-Mao changes. In 1977 and 1978,

publishers felt their way through a tumultuous political situation and moved with the times. Hua Guofeng's period in power, and the beginnings of Deng Xiaoping's leadership, could not escape everything that had come before. Historians who promote a narrative of normalization and reform are choosing to make moments of change the anchor points of their histories. I choose differently. Rather than putting a premium on finding the road to change, I prefer to think of the 1970s as a decade marked by depressing continuity. The happy ending must wait for another study.

Selected material in this chapter will appear in the author's "Symbolism, Censorship, and the Politics of Truth: Expurgating the "Gang of Four" in the Publishing Industry, 1976-1978," *Transitional Justice Without Transition?* Edited by Daniel Leese and Amanda Schuman, (forthcoming 2021). The author will be the sole author of this publication.

CONCLUSION

If you have read the last seven chapters, it should now be clear that the complexities of book publishing, printing, and distribution shaped the ability of the CCP to communicate information to its subjects and run its propaganda campaigns. Here, I will recapitulate how a multitude of considerations – technological, logistical, material, and conceptual – affected the development of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. In the paragraphs which follow, I discuss each of these four considerations to demonstrate their importance for future research into the history of modern Chinese politics, propaganda, and print culture.

Mass reproduction of propaganda material represented, at its very core, a technological process fueled by machinery and labor. From the Four Books of Chapter One through to the specialized Legalist text reprints of Chapter Two and the popular genres of Chapters Four and Six, state printers made industrial products and faced the same considerations as any factory-based operation: how to maximize productivity; how to streamline workflows; and how to resolve gaps between demand and production capacity, especially when capacity was affected by unforeseen mini crises. The efficacy of state political communication, gauged by whether publishers managed to get books and other material into the eyeline of ordinary people, thrived or suffered according to the performance of its industrial dimension.

For Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign, the state could pull off spectacular industrial production successes, with the Four Books being by far the best example. Over the course of just a few weeks, tens of millions of copies of these flagship titles rolled off presses around the country, propelling the campaign forward in its crucial early phase. After this initial excitement, publishers across the country settled into long-term expansion of their anti-Confucian front-lists, deploying production capacity and labor resources to churn out titles in a

range of genres. Without this media infrastructure, political campaigns would have remained either narrow in scope or short-lived.

The same industrial perspective likewise helps explain the campaign's gradual fading from view through 1975 and 1976. As Chapter Two, in particular, demonstrated, publishers and printers faced tricky choices in these years concerning how to allocate their over-stretched production capacity amidst competing state priorities. Gradually, Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign genres became niche and esoteric as new pushes to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and criticize Deng Xiaoping's ideological standpoints took over.

Invoking publishing's industrial characteristics also accounts for differences between the campaign's course in different parts of the country. Self-evidently, areas with the most advanced facilities could print more books. The municipalities of Beijing and Shanghai, owing to their historical status as centers of publishing, possessed vast teams of typesetters, printers, and binders ready to produce propaganda. Distribution networks helped these books filter through to different provinces, but less-developed localities lacked their equivalent expansive in-house operations capable of producing large quantities of 'home-grown' propaganda. As a result, while Beijing People's Press and Shanghai People's Press were household names by the 1970s, the same could not be said for many other provincial presses. As with many other parts of life, therefore, industrial infrastructure – its presence and absence – shaped the day-to-day political experiences of people during the late Mao era.

Logistics, especially with respect to book distribution, further affected political communication and print consumption in different Chinese locales. The state relied on the mammoth network of Xinhua Bookstore to move books from printers and centralized distribution centers down to city, county, and even commune bookstores. Given that, to modify a

famous CCP slogan, "without Xinhua Bookstore there would be no propaganda books in New China," it is surprising that scholarly knowledge of this organization remains so scant. Obvious, but nonetheless worth noting, is the fact that readers in areas with a larger concentration of bookstores had readier access to materials. While Xinhua made significant efforts to funnel more books to the countryside during the 1970s, the very magnitude of these efforts shows how rural readers remained second-class participants in the Chinese information economy.

For my part, I have gone beyond questions of book availability to demonstrate how bookstores and other Xinhua Bookstore organizations acted as vanguard extensions of the propaganda state. Book retailers acted as vibrant spaces sustaining a nation of readers, facilitating grassroots access to political information, censoring existing print culture, and engaging in book launch performances aimed at hyping-up new campaigns and (in the case of Hua Guofeng) reinforcing the power of the CCP's elite leadership. In select cities, secondhand and antiquarian bookstores provided another conduit for people to secure the materials they needed for campaign study activities, and they also acted as state-backed bookdealers sourcing bibliographic treasures on behalf of campaign intellectuals and important research libraries. The bookstore thus represented part of the state's vast apparatus of political mobilization and control.

In Chapter Four, I argued that libraries – like bookstores - expanded the reach of the state in a climate where criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius meant researching and studying historical questions. Libraries hosted lectures, exhibits and study sessions where locals could explore the history of anti-Confucianism in China. Reading rooms and special collections afforded users access to primary sources and rare editions. Outside of major library buildings, a vast network of street-level and commune libraries were designed to draw everyone into campaign reading. As with bookstores, geography also determined access to library collections, with urbanites at a

considerable advantage compared to their countryside-dwelling peers. Little wonder, therefore, that workers and units in urban areas, more so than rural farms, led the way as model units on the pages of state newspapers.

While I place bookstores and libraries squarely within the apparatus of state political communication, I also wish to stress that bottom-level booksellers and librarians frequently gave their political role an idiosyncratic twist, accentuating the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign's distinctly localized appearance. Order forms from one county bookstore, for example, show clearly that its staff ordered in books that they thought would appeal (and ultimately sell) to their patrons. Differences in access to information across the country, therefore, was as much a matter of decision-making by the state's grassroots representatives as a consequence of structural inequalities in book distribution. Similarly, for libraries, librarians adopted multiple approaches to borrowing policies and the circulation of sensitive material, and often higher-profile libraries paradoxically implemented stricter and more exclusive borrowing practices than less well-stocked book depositories. Finally, as with the memorable case of China Bookstore and Xinhua Bookstore in Beijing, inter-bureaucratic rivalries over stock between bookstores produced winning and losing situations that tangibly affected readers. With books sometimes in short supply, book distribution could quickly transform from working for the interests of the state into working against it.

Material resources repeatedly appear throughout my story to make or break the structures of political communication and the broader Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign. Financial capital is one of these. Industrial production of books relied on investment in new printing technologies, workspaces and training, while distribution logistics needed money for bricks-and-mortar bookstores. Like publishers around the world, state publishers also had to

cover their costs, balance editorial desires against the expenses of book production, and ultimately pay attention to their bottom line. Most dramatically, when political changes throughout the 1970s precipitated mass censorship and destruction of stock, publishers and bookstores tellingly received a government bail-out to prevent crippling economic losses caused by write-offs. While acknowledging the importance of ideology in driving the culture of modern China, therefore, we should also recognize that financial acumen was a key qualification for provincial and central officials charged with overseeing the publishing, printing, and bookselling industries. The day-to-day business of the propaganda state included balancing budgets, ensuring financial viability, fundraising for new machines and buildings, and manipulating figures.

Besides finance, my dissertation makes a case for understanding the effect of raw materials on industrialized cultural production. In Chapter Five, I follow the paper trail between papermills, publishes and printers to show that shortages of paper profoundly curtailed the circulation of anti-Confucian discourses. Beginning in the early 1970s, China experienced a multi-year paper crisis where demand outstripped supply and where paper producers routinely under-performed. After expending huge quantities of paper to print the Four Books, publishers across the country realized that their longer-term publishing plans were unsustainable. Empty paper warehouses led to reductions in the quantity and variety of titles published, hastening the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign's constriction. By the end of 1977, battered publishers and newspapers found themselves living a precarious existence. Jarringly, despite the CCP's reliance on print propaganda to meet its goals, material shortages left political communication only several steps away from collapse. What might have happened if paper supplies further bottomed-out represents one of the great "what if" questions for the history of the book in modern China. All the above technological, logistical and material factors operated in concert with conceptual considerations to mediate the messages of political communication. In multiple chapters, I argued that publishers framed the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign genre in broad terms, producing materials appealing to specific audiences, playing on pre-existing facets of book and textual culture, and drawing a range of readers into a cohesive community of readers. While Cold War visions of propaganda often imagine its homogeneity, Chinese publishers knew as well as their contemporaries in other countries that a targeted book was more likely to be a successful one. As such, the need to make propaganda attractive could blur the distinctions between the past and the present, as all those involved with *The Analects: Criticism and Commentary* in Chapter Three quickly discovered.

Furthermore, publishers and officials brought their notions of who should read and how they should read to bare on print communication. For instance, presses classified publications with information deemed inappropriate for broad circulation as 'internal,' thereby limiting a title's availability. The members of this privileged reading class varied province by province and book by book, turning cultural bureaucrats into arbiters of access to information. Furthermore, publishers and their products shaped reader tastes as well as responding to them. Titles articulated a publisher's vision of what particular reading groups wished to read, what they should read, and what format they enjoyed, thereby playing a vital role in shaping the forms of political communication in China. In short, all those involved in the production of books played vital roles in constructing what today we commonly know as "Maoist" or "socialist" culture.

APPENDIX ONE

The Preliminary Plan for Annotating Legalist Texts, August 1974

Adapted from SMA B244-3-702-24, "法家著作注释出版规划座谈会领导小组关于报审《法家著作注释出版规划》(草案)的报告" [A report from the steering committee of the national roundtable for annotating Legalist texts approving the draft "National Plan for Publishing Legalist Texts"], with additional information on print-runs and publication date from physical copies of titles, electronic copies found on Duxiu.com and kongfz.com, and the yearly publishing bibliographies (authored by Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju banben tushuguan) indexed in the bibliography.

Author	Title	Responsible City/Province/Unit	Deadline	Publication Date	Print- Run (where known)
	Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts 历代法家著作选注	Beijing	1974	Volume 1: Dec 1974 Volume 2: August 1975 <i>No record of a third</i> <i>volume in this</i> <i>series.</i>	
		Shanghai	1974	Vol. 1: Jan 1975 Vol. 2: Sept 1975 Vol. 3: Sept 1976	Vol. 1: 1 st printing was 10,000 copies, 2 nd printing (April 1975) was 210,000. Vol. 2 and Vol. 3: no data.
Sun Wu 孙武	A New Annotation of Sun Zi's 'The Art of War' 《孙子兵法》新注	Academy of Military Sciences	1975	Feb 1977	1 st printing: 135,000 May 1981 second printing: 105,000.
Shang Yang 商鞅	Annotated Selections from the 'Book of Lord Shang'	Liaoning	June 1975	May 1975	DX 30,000

	《商君书》选注				
		Shandong	1974	Draft version (征求 意见稿) released in Dec 1974, published formally in August 1975	30,000 for Dec 1974 version.
	A New Annotation of the 'Book of Lord Shang' 《商君书》新注	Shandong	June 1975	Jan 1976	
		Shaanxi	1975	Dec 1975	11,300
	The Annotated 'Book of Lord Shang' 《商君书》集注	Shandong	June 1976	/	
Unknown 佚名	Annotated Selections from the 'Guan Zi' 《管子》选注	Jilin	June 1975	Sept 1975	50,000
	A Newly Punctuated Edition of the 'Guan Zi' 《管子》校点	Beijing	1975	/	
Sun Bin 孙膑	Sun Bin's 'The Art of War' with Annotations and Notes 《孙膑兵法》注释	Academy of Military Sciences	1974	Liaoning People's Press produces a title with a similar name in September 1975. The foreword mentions the involvement of the Academy of Military Sciences.	50,000
Xun Kuang 荀况	Annotated Selections from the 'Xun Zi' 《荀子》选注	Tianjin	1974	April 1975	100,000
		Jilin	1974	Dec 1974	20,000
	A New Annotation of the 'Xun Zi' 《荀子》新注	Beijing	June 1975	/	
		Jilin	1975	/	
	The Annotated 'Xun Zi' 《荀子》集注	Beijing	1976	/	
Han Fei 韩非	Annotated Selections from the 'Han Feizi' 《韩非子》选注	Shanghai	June 1975	Feb 1976	
		Jilin	1974	August 1976	10,000
	The 'Han Fei Zi': A New Annotation 《韩非子》新注	Shanghai	1975	/	

		Jiangsu	1975	/	
	The Annotated 'Han Fei Zi' 《韩非子集释》 (reprint)	Shanghai	1974	July 1974, 2 volumes, reprinted from the Zhonghua Shuju 1958 edition.	1 st printing: 100,000
Jia Yi 贾 谊 and Chao Cuo 晁错	Annotated Selections from the Works of Jia Yi and Chao Cuo 贾谊晁错著作选注	Tianjin	June 1975	/	
Sang Hongyang 桑弘羊	Annotated Selections from Huan Kuan's 'Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron' 桓宽《盐铁论》选 注	Tianjin	June 1975	/	
		Shanghai	1974	/	
	A New Annotation of Huan Kuan's 'Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron' (With Materials on Sang Hongyang Attached) 桓宽《盐铁论》新 注 (附桑弘羊资 料)	Liaoning	June 1975 1975	Released in March 1975 as a draft version (征求意见 稿). Published May 1975 as 盐铁论 注 释和语译 [The Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron: Notes and Translations].	Draft version: 50,000 May 1975 edition: 43,000.
Wang Chong 王充	Annotated Selections from 'On Balance' 《论衡》选注	Beijing	1973	May 1976	
		Zhejiang	June 1975	/	
	<i>'On Balance': A</i> <i>New Annotation</i> 《论衡》新注	Beijing	1975	/	
		Guangdong	June 1976	/	
	The Annotated 'On Balance'《论衡》 集注	Beijing	1976	/	
Cao Cao 曹操 and Zhuge Liang 诸 葛亮	Annotated Selections from the Works of Cao Cao and Zhuge Liang	Hubei	1974	March 1975	200,000

	曹操诸葛亮著作选				
	注				
		Tianjin	June 1975	/	
	The Works of Cao Cao 曹操集(reprint)	Zhonghua Books	1974	Dec 1974, 2 volumes. Large print.	
	<i>The Works of Zhuge Liang</i> 诸葛亮集 (reprint)	Zhonghua Books	1974	July 1974, reprinting 1960 version.	
Liu Zhiji 刘知几	Selected Annotations from 'The Comprehensive Perspectives on Historiography' 《史通》选注	Beijing	June 1975	/	
Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元诗文选注	Liaoning	1974	Published as a draft version (征求意见 稿) in Dec 1974. Published May 1975 (but listed as the second edition)	Draft version: 20,000 May 1975 version: 50,000
		Shaanxi	1974	July 1975	11,300
	A Newly Punctuated Edition of 'The Works of Liu Zongyuan' 《柳宗元集》校点	Beijing	June 1975	/	
Liu Yuxi 刘禹锡	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Liu Yuxi 刘禹锡诗文选注	Shaanxi	June 1975	October 1975	1 st printing: 11,300 April 1976 2 nd printing: 50,000
Li He 李贺	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Li He 李贺诗文选注	Jiangsu	June 1975	July 1976	
Wang Anshi 王安石	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Wang Anshi 王安石诗文选注	Shanghai	June 1975	/	

		Guangdong	1974	May 1975	1 st printing: 200,000.
	A Newly Punctuated Edition of 'The Works of Wang Anshi' 《王安石集》校点	Shanghai	June 1975	/	
Shen Kuo 沈括	Annotated Selections from the 'Dream Pool Essays'《梦溪 笔谈》选注	Shanghai	June 1975	Jan 1978	
Chen Liang 陈亮	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Chen Liang 陈亮诗文选注	Zhejiang	June 1975	/	
	A Newly Punctuated Edition of the 'Works of Chen Liang'《陈亮集》 校点	Zhonghua Books	1974	Dec 1974, 2 volumes	
Zhang Juzheng 张居正	Annotated Selections from the Works of Zhang Juzheng 张居 正著作选注	Hubei	June 1975	/	
Li Zhi 李贽	Annotated Selections from the Works of Li Zhi 李贽著作选注	Beijing	1974	上: Aug 1975	
		Fujian	June 1975	/	
	Books to Keep 藏书 (reprint)	Zhonghua Books	1974	July 1974, 2 volume edition.	
	More Books to Keep 《续藏书》 (reprint)	Zhonghua Books	1974	July 1974, 2 volumes.	
	The Annotated 'Books to Burn' 《焚书》注释	Fujian	1975	/	
	The Annotated 'More Books to Burn' 《续焚书》注释	Fujian	1975	/	
	A Newly Punctuated Edition of the 'Critical Historical Commentary' 《史纲评要》校点	Zhonghua Books	1974	Nov 1974, 3 volumes	

	A Newly Punctuated	Zhonghua Books	1974	Dec 1974, 2	
	Edition of the 'Writings from Chutan' 《初潭集》校点			volumes	
	《四律采》 校杰 A Newly Punctuated Edition of the 'Commentary on the Four Books' 《四书评》校点	Shanghai	1974	May 1975	50,000
Wang Fuzhi 王夫之	Annotated Selections from the Writings of Wang Fuzhi 王夫之著作选注	Beijing	June 1975	Feb 1976	
		Hubei	June 1975	July 1975	
	A Newly Punctuated Edition of 'On Reading the "Comprehensive Mirror"" 《读通鉴论》校点	Zhonghua Books	1974	July 1975, 3 volumes	
	A Newly Punctuated Edition of the 'Reading Notes on the Comprehensive Elaborations of the Four Books' 《读四书大全说》 校点	Zhonghua Books	June 1975	Sept 1975, 2 volumes <i>Notes: 3rd printing</i> <i>released as recently</i> <i>as 2009.</i>	
	Annotations to Master Zhang's 'Rectifying Ignorance' 《张子正蒙注》 (reprint)	Zhonghua Books	1975	Sept. 1975	
	Further Commentary on the Book of Changes 《周易外传》 (reprint)	Zhonghua Books	1975	Dec 1977, reprinting 1962 version.	
	An Elaboration on the Meaning of the Book of Documents 《尚书引义》 (reprint)	Zhonghua Books	1975	May 1976	
Gong Zizhen 龚自珍	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and	Jiangsu	June 1975	June 1976	

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	Prose of Gong				
	Zizhen				
	龚自珍诗文选注				
		Guangdong	June 1975	Dec 1975	
	The Works of Gong Zizhen 《龚自珍集》 (reprint)	Shanghai	1974	Published as 龚自 珍全集 [<i>The</i> <i>Complete Works of</i> <i>Gong Zizhen</i>] in Feb 1975.	50,000
Wei Yuan 魏源	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Wei Yuan 魏源诗文选注	Guangdong	June 1975	/	
	A Newly Punctuated Edition of 'The Works of Wei Yuan' 《魏源集》校点	Zhonghua Books	June 1975	March 1976. 2 volumes	
Yan Fu 严复	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Yan Fu 严复诗文选注	Jiangsu	1974	June 1975	
	A Newly Pucntuated Edition of 'The Works of Yan Fu' 《严复集》校点	Jiangsu	June 1975	/	
Zhang Binglin 章炳麟	Annotated Selections from the Writings of Zhang Binglin 章炳麟著作选注	Shanghai	1974	/	
		Zhejiang	June 1975	/	
	A Newly Punctuated Edition of 'The Works of Zhang Binglin' 《章炳麟集》校点	Shanghai	1976	/	
	The Annotated 'Words of Urgency' 《訄书》注释	Shanghai	1975	/	

Assignments by Region, Publisher, or Organization

Zhonghua Books: 13 (13 completed) Shanghai: 13 (6 completed) Beijing: 11 (4 completed) Tianjin: 5 (1 completed) Jiangsu: 5 (3 completed) Jilin: 4 (3 completed) Guangdong: 4 (2 completed) Liaoning: 3 (3 completed) Shandong: 3 (2 completed) Shaanxi: 3 (3 completed) Zhejiang: 3 (0 completed) Hubei: 3 (2 completed) Fujian: 3 (0 completed) Academy of Military Sciences: 2 (2 completed)

44 complete 31 incomplete

APPENDIX TWO

Planned Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign Publications in Ethnic Minority Languages, 1975-1977

Adapted from SMA B167-3-289-16, "国家出版事业管理局关于 1975 年至 1977 年蒙、藏、 维、哈、朝五种文字图书翻译出版的规划(草案)" [A draft plan from the National Bureau of Publishing outlining translation and publication of books in Mongolian, Tibetan, Uyghur, Kazakh, and Korean, 1975-1977]. Additional information in this table came from: the collections of the library at Central Minorities University (中央民族大学); Appendix 1; electronic copies found on Duxiu.com and kongfz.com, the yearly publishing bibliographies (authored by Guojia chuban shiye guanli ju banben tushuguan) indexed in the bibliography, and Zhongguo banben, *A Catalogue of Internally-Circulated Books, 1949-1986*.

Key: published ; not published despite publication of Mandarin Edition; no shading means neither
the Mandarin edition nor the translation were ever finished.

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Title	English Translation	Original Publisher	Language M=Mongolian T=Tibetan U=Uyghur Z=Kazakh K=Korean	Deadline	Date Mandarin Edition Published	Date published
鲁迅批 孔反儒 文辑	Anthologizes Articles by Lu Xun Criticizing Confucius and Opposing Confucianism	People's Literature Press	K	1975	February 1974	July 1975
大庆工 人批林 批孔文 选	Selected Articles by Daqing Workers Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius	人民出版 社	K	1975	May 1974	March 1975
防化连 批林批 孔文选	Selected Articles by a Chemical Warfare Unit Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius	人民出版 社	К	1975	March 1974	1
历史上 儒法斗 争的概 况	Introducing the Confucian-Legalist Struggle in History	人民出版 社	М	1976	February 1975	/
			Т	1975	February 1975	/
			U	1975	February 1975	/
			Z	1975	February 1975	/
			K	1975	February 1975	Published as 儒法斗争史 概况 [An Introduction

						to the History of the Confucian- Legalist Struggle] February 1976
春秋战 国时期 的儒法 斗争	The Confucian- Legalist Struggle During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Period	人民出版 社	М	1975	August 1974	/
			K	1975	August 1974	July 1975
宋代儒 法斗争	The Confucian- Legalist Struggle in the Song Dynasty	人民出版 社	K	1976	/	/
明清儒 法斗争	The Confucian- Legalist Struggle in the Ming Dynasty	人民出版 社	К	1976	/	/
近代儒 法斗争	The Confucian- Legalist Struggle in Recent History	人民出版 社	K	1975	/	/
儒法斗 争故事	Stories of the Confucian-Legalist Struggle	Zhonghua Shuju	Т	1975	March 1975	/
劳动人 民反孔 斗争史 话	Narrating the History of the Working People's Anti- Confucian Struggle	人民出版 社	М	1975	October 1974	/
			K	1975	October 1974	/
历史上 劳动人 民反孔 斗争史 话	Narrating the Working People's Anti-Confucian Struggles in History	Zhonghua Shuju	Т	1975	March 1975	/
我国历 史上劳 动人民 的反孔 斗争	The Working People's Anti Confucian Struggles in the History of Our Country	人民出版 社	Т	1975	September 1974	April 1976
			U	1975	September 1974	/
			Z	1976	September 1974	/
劳动人 民反孔 斗争简 史	An Introductory History of the Working People's Anti-Confucian Struggle	Shanghai People's Press	K	1975	Note: Possibly published as 芽动人 民反孔斗 争故事 [Stories of	/

					the Working People's Anti- Confucian Struggle] in January 1975	
历史上 劳动妇 女的反 孔斗争	Working Women and their Anti-Confucian Struggles Throughout History	人民出版 社	М	1975	/	/
			К	1975	/	/
劳动人 民反孔 斗争故 事新编	A New Anthology of Stories of the Working People and Their Anti-Confucian Struggles	Rural Publications Press	М	1975	April 1975	/
			Т	1975	April 1975	/
			K	1975	April 1975	/
关于孔 丘卯卯问 题(本)	A Discussion of Whether Confucius Killed Shao Zhengmao	人民出版 社	М	1975	October 1974	/
			Т	1975	October 1974	/
			K	1975	October 1974	June 1975
柳下跖 痛骂孔 老二	Liu Xiazhi Denounces Old Confucius	人民出版 社	М	1975	May 1974	/
			Т	1975	May 1974	August 1976
孔丘教 育思想 批判	Criticizing Confucius' Educational Philosophy	人民出版 社	М	1976	June 1975	
			Т	1975	June 1975	/
			U	1975	June 1975	August 1976
			Z	1976	June 1975	
	Monoiner the Survey		K M	1975	June 1975	August 1977
反动阶 级的"亚 圣"—— 孟轲	Mencius: the Sage of the Reactionary Classes	人民出版 社		1976		Ι
			U	1976	/	/
			Z	1976	/	/
			K	1976	/	/
孔家店 二老板	Mencius: the Number Two Boss of the Old Confucian Shop	Shanghai People's Press	K	1975	September 1974	June 1975

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孔孟之 道名词 简释	An Introduction to Terms in the Way of Confucius and Mencius	人民出版 社	М	1976	July 1974	/
			Т	1975	July 1974	September 1975
			U	1976	July 1974	/
			Z K	1975	July 1974	/
扫个里之圾	Sweep Away the Rubbish of the Way of Confucius and Mencius From Every Angle	Rural Publications Press	К	1975	Note: Possibly published as 扫除各 个角落的 孔孟之道 [Sweep Away the Rubbish of the Way of Confucius and Mencius From Every Angle] in November 1974	
The Kong Family Mansion is an Evil "Holy Place"	官美蝶、葛懋春编 写	Shandong People's Press	М	1975	September 1974	March 1976
			К	1975	September 1974	/
法家人 物故事 新编	A New Collection of Stories of Legalists	Rural Publications Press	К	1975	December 1974	/
法家主 要代表 人物小 传	Mini Biographies of Key Legalists	Rural Publications Press	М	1977	January 1975	/
18			Т	1975	January 1975	/
			U	1976	January 1975	/
			Z	1976	January 1975	/
			K	1975	January 1975	Published as 法家人物简 介 [Introductions to Legalist

						<i>Figures</i>] October 1976
商鞅变 法	Shang Yang's Reforms	Zhonghua Shuju	М	1975	July 1974	/
商鞅的 故事	The Story of Shang Yang	Shanghai People's Press	К	1975	September 1974	January 1976
荀况	Xun Kuang	人民出版 社	K	1975	August 1975	/
韩非	Han Fei	人民出版 社	М	1975	/	/
			K	1975	/	/
秦始皇	Qin Shi Huang	人民出版 社	М	1975	November 1974	/
			Т	1975	November 1974	October 1975
			K	1975	November 1974	/
晁错	Chao Cuo	人民出版 社	K	1975	/	/
王充— 一古代 的 唯物主 义者	Wang Chong: Ancient China's Combative Materialist	人民出版 社	K	1975	2 nd edition November 1973	/
刘邦	Liu Bang	人民出版 社	М	1975	January 1976	/
			K	1975	January 1976	/
刘彻	Liu Che	人民出版 社	K	1975	/	/
曹操	Cao Cao	人民出版 社	М	1975	/	/
		,	К	1976	/	/
诸葛亮	Zhuge Liang	人民出版 社	М	1975	January 1976	/
			К	1976	January 1976	/
范缜	Fan Zhen	人民出版 社	K	1975	/	/
武则天	Wu Zetian	人民出版 社	М	1975	/	/
			K K	1976	/	/
柳宗元	Liu Zongyuan	人民出版 社		1975	August 1976	/
王安石	Wang Anshi	人民出版 社	K	1976	July 1975	/
历代法 家著作 选注	Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts	Beijing People's Press	М	1975	1 st volume December 1974; 2 nd volume	

					August	
			К	1976	1975 1 st volume December 1974; 2 nd volume August 1975	/
法家著 作选读	Selected Readings from Legalist Texts	Zhonghua Shuju	М	1976	July 1974	July 1976
《孙子 兵法》	The Art of War	Zhonghua Shuju	М	1975	1977	/
			U	1976	1977	/
			Ζ	1976	1977	/
			K	1977	1977	/
《商君 书》选 注	Annotated Selections from the 'Book of Lord Shang'	Liaoning People's Press	M	1975	1977	1
			K	1976	1977	/
《商君 书》选 注	Annotated Selections from the 'Book of Lord Shang'	Shandong People's Press	U	1975	Draft December 1974; formal edition August 1975	/
			Z	1975	Draft December 1974; formal edition August 1975	/
《管 子》选 注	Annotated Selections from the 'Guan Zi'	Jilin People's Press	К	1976	September 1975	/
《 孙膑 兵法》 注释	Sun Bin's 'The Art of War' with Annotations and Notes	Antiquities Press	М	1975	September 1975 by Liaoning People's Press	/
			U	1976	September 1975 by Liaoning People's Press	/
			Z	1976	September 1975 by Liaoning People's Press	/
			К	1977	September 1975 by Liaoning	/

					People's Press	
《荀 子》选 注	Annotated Selections from the 'Xun Zi'	Jilin People's Press	М	1975	December 1974	/
			U	1975	December 1974	/
			Z	1975	December 1974	/
			К	1976	December 1974	/
《韩非 子》选 注	Annotated Selections from the 'Han Feizi'	Shanghai People's Press	М	1977	February 1976	/
			U	1976	February 1976	/
			Ζ	1976	February 1976	/
			K	1976	February 1976	/
贾谊、 晁错著 作选注	Annotated Selections from the Works of Jia Yi and Chao Cuo	Tianjin People's Press	К	1976	/	/
桓宽 《盐》 注 柔 张 新 附 羊 资料)	A New Annotation of Huan Kuan's 'Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron' (With Materials on Sang Hongyang Attached)	Liaoning People's Press	U	1976	Draft March 1975; formal edition May 1975	/
			Z	1976	Draft March 1975; formal edition May 1975	/
			K	1976	Draft March 1975; formal edition May 1975	/
《论 衡》选 注	Annotated Selections from 'On Balance'	Beijing People's Press	М	1975	May 1976	/
			U	1975	May 1976	/
			Ζ	1975	May 1976	/
			K	1975	May 1976	/
曹操、 诸葛亮 著作选 注	Annotated Selections from the Works of Cao Cao and Zhuge Liang	Hubei People's Press	М	1975	March 1975	/
			U	1975	March 1975	/

			Ζ	1975	March 1975	/
			K	1977	March 1975	/
《史 通》选 注	Selected Annotations from 'The Comprehensive Perspectives on Historiography'	Beijing People's Press	М	1975	/	/
			U	1976	/	/
			Z	1976	/	/
	4 4 10 1 4	т	K	1976		/
柳宗元 诗文选 注	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Liu Zongyuan	Liaoning People's Press	М	1976	Draft December 1974; formal edition May 1975	/
			K	1977	Draft December 1974; formal edition May 1975	/
刘禹锡 诗文选 注	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Liu Yuxi	Shaanxi People's Press	K	1976	October 1975	/
李贺诗 文选注	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Li He	Jiangsu People's Press	М	1975	July 1976	/
			K	1976	July 1976	/
王安石 诗文选 注	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Wang Anshi	Shanghai People's Press	K	1977	/	/
《梦溪 笔谈》 选注	Annotated Selections from the 'Dream Pool Essays'	Shanghai People's Press	U	1977	1978	/
			Z	1977	1978	/
			K	1976	1978	/
陈亮诗 文选注	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Chen Liang	Zhejiang People's Press	K	1976	/	/
张居正 著作选 注	Annotated Selections from the Works of Zhang Juzheng	Hubei People's Press	K	1976	/	/
李贽著 作选住	Annotated Selections from the Works of Li Zhi	Beijing People's Press	М	1976	First volume August 1976	/
			U	1977	First volume August 1975	/
			Ζ	1977	First	/

					August 1975	
			K	1975	First volume August 1975	/
王夫之 著作选 注	Annotated Selections from the Writings of Wang Fuzhi	Beijing People's Press	U	1977	February 1976	/
			Z	1977	February 1976	/
			К	1976	February 1976	/
龚自珍 诗文选 注	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Gong Zizhen	Jiangsu People's Press	К	1976	June 1976	/
魏源诗 文选注	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Wei Yuan	Guangdong People's Press	К	1976	/	/
严复诗 文选注	Annotated Selections from the Poetry and Prose of Yan Fu	Jiangsu People's Press	K	1975	June 1975	/
章炳麟 著作选 注	Annotated Selections from the Writings of Zhang Binglin	Shanghai People's Press	U	1975	/	/
			Ζ	1975	/	/
			K	1975	/	/
更法 农 战 开塞 (商鞅)	Texts by Shang Yang: Revising the Laws; Agriculture and Warfare; Opening the Barred.	As no publisher is listed for the next few texts I am presuming that a translation of any edition would suffice.	U	1975	n/a	January 1975 Note: another
			L	17/3	n/a	Note: another edition published in 1974 based on Zhonghua Shuju version so this title was possibly cancelled.
天论 (荀 况)	Xun Kuang: On Heaven	Ditto	U	1975	n/a	May 1975
			Ζ	1975	n/a	June 1976
五蠹 问 田 (韩非)	Han Fei: The Five Vermin; Asking Tian	Ditto	U	1975	n/a	Note: another edition

						1974 based on Zhonghua Shuju version so this title was possibly cancelled.
			Z	1975	n/a	January 1975
治安策 (贾谊)	Jia Yi: Plans for Reigning in Peace	Ditto	U	1975	n/a	/
			Z U	1975	n/a	/
问孔 刺 孟 (王充)	Wang Chong: Questioning Confucius; Needling Mencius	Ditto	U	1975	n/a	Note: another edition published in 1974 based on Zhonghua Shuju version so this title was possibly cancelled.
			Z	1975	n/a	Note: another edition published in 1974 based on Zhonghua Shuju version so this title was possibly cancelled.
神灭论 (范缜)	Fan Zhen: On the Annihilation of the Soul	Ditto	U	1975	n/a	/
			Z	1975	n/a	/
齐民要 术序 (贾 思勰)	Jia Sixie: Essential Skills for the Common People	Ditto	U	1975	n/a	/
			Z	1975	n/a	/
答司马 谏议书 (王安石)	Wang Anshi: A Reply to a Letter from Counsellor Sima	Ditto	U	1975	n/a	/
			Z	1975	n/a	/
读一点 法家著 作 (一)	Read Some Legalist Texts (1)	People's Education Press	Т	1975	July 1974	/
读一点 法家著 作 (二)	Read Some Legalist Texts (2)	People's Education Press	Т	1975	December 1974	/
读一点 法家著 作 (三)	Read Some Legalist Texts (3)	People's Education Press	Т	1976	March 1975	/

读一点 法家著 作	Read Some Legalist texts (4)	People's Education Press	Т	1976	August 1975	/
(四)读《商君书》	Reading the 'Book of Lord Shang	人民出版 社	Т	1975	July 1975	/
读韩非 《五 蠹》 篇	Reading Han Fei's 'Five Vermin'	人民出版 社	U	1975	January 1975	/
2424 // 7/114			Z	1975	January 1975	/
			К	1975	January 1975	November 1975
读《封 建论》	Reading 'On Feudalism'	Zhonghua Shuju	Т	1975	July 1974	January 1976
《论 语》批 注	The Analects: Criticism and Commentary	Zhonghua Shuju	М	1975	November 1974	/
			U	1976	November 1974	/
			Z	1975	November 1974	/
			K	1975	November 1974	/
《三字 经》批 注	The 'Three Character Classic' with Annotations and Commentary	Zhonghua Shuju	U	1975	/	/
			K	1975	/	/
《改良 女儿 经》批 注	The 'Revised Classic for Girls' with Annotations and Commentary	Zhonghua Shuju	М	1975	/	/
			К	1975	/	/
《神童 诗》批 注	'The Poems of an Infant Prodigy' with Annotations and Commentary	Zhonghua Shuju	U	1975	/	/
《弟子 规》	'Standards for Being a Good Pupil and Child' With Annotations and Commentary	Zhonghua Shuju	U	1975	/	/
《名贤 集》	A Collection of Wise Men's Words' With Annotations and Commentary	Zhonghua Shuju	U	1975	/	/
简明中 国哲学 史(修 订本)	An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy (revised version)	人民出版 社	М	1976	March 1975	/
·• · T · /	1		U	1977	March 1975	/

			Ζ	1977	March 1975	/
			K	1975	March 1975	/
中国古 代思想 史	A History of Ancient Chinese Thought	人民出版 社	М	1977	First edition May 1954; second edition July 1973	/
			K	1975	First edition May 1954; second edition July 1973	/
中国哲 学史讲 话	Narrating the History of Chinese Philosophy	人民出版 社	М	1977	January 1975	/
			Т	1977	January 1975	/
哲学史 话	Narrating the History of Philosophy	Shanghai People's Press	М	1976	/	/
			K	1977	/	/
哲学基 础知识	Elementary Philosophy	Shanghai People's Press	М	1976	/	/
			U	1976	/	/
			Z	1976	/	/
11 F A F			K	1976	/	/
劳动创 造了人	History Produces People	人民出版 社	М	1975	June 1972	/
			Т	1975	June 1972	/
中国古 代史话	Narrating Ancient Chinese History	Shanghai People's Press	U	1977	/	/
			Ζ	1977	/	/
			K	1977	/	/
中国农 民斗争 简史	An Introductory History of Chinese Peasant Struggles	人民出版 社	М	1975	/	/
			K	1975	/	/
黄巾起 义	The Huang Jin Rebellion	Zhonghua Shuju	М	1975	February 1974	May 1976
绿林赤 眉起义	The Lulin and Red Eyebrows Uprising	Zhonghua Shuju	М	1975	March 1974	/
			Z	1975	March 1974	/
黄巢起 义	Huang Chao's Rebellion	Zhonghua Shuju	М	1976	June 1974	March 1976
~~			Т	1977	June 1974	/
李自成 起义	Li Zicheng's Uprising	Zhonghua Shuju	М	1976	March 1974	June 1976
			Т	1977	March 1974	/
			U	1975	March 1974	March 1976

由団≁	Small Diaman 1		N	1076	Jul. 1076	
中国农	Small Biographies of	人民出版	М	1976	July 1976,	
民起义	Leaders of Chinese	社			published	
领袖人	Peasant Uprisings				as 中国农	
物小传					民起义领	
1213 14					袖小传	
					[Small	
					Biographies	
					of Leaders	
					of Chinese	
					Peasant	
					Uprisings]	
			Т	1975	July 1976,	/
					published	
					as 中国农	
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					袖小传	
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					of Leaders	
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					Uprisings]	
			U	1977	July 1976,	/
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					as中国农	
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			Z	1977	July 1976,	/
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					民起义领	
					袖小传	
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					Biographies	
					of Leaders	
					of Chinese	
					Peasant	
					Uprisings]	
			K	1975	July 1976,	/
			IX.	17/5		
					published	
					as 中国农	
					民起义领	
					袖小传	
					[Small	
					Biographies	
					of Leaders	
		I			of Chinese	

					Peasant	
太平天 国革命	The Taiping Revolution	Shanghai People's Press	М	1977	Uprisings] June 1973	/
			Т	1976	June 1973	/
我代人发造(点史书国劳民明 《历》)古动的创 学 丛	The Inventions and Innovations of Ancient China's Working People	人民出版 社	Μ	1976		/
			Т	1977	/	/
中国古 代科学 家 事	Stories of Ancient Chinese Scientists	Liaoning People's Press	Μ	1976	March 1974, published as 中国古 代科学家 史话 [Narrating the History of Ancient Chinese Scientists]	/
			К	1976	March 1974, published as 中国古 代科学家 史话 [Narrating the History of Ancient Chinese Scientists]	/
中国历 史上著 名的女 英雄	Famous Female Heroes from Chinese History	人民出版 社	М	1975		/
2 1 1			U	1976	/ /	/
			Ζ	1976		/
			K	1975	/	/
中国古 代著名 的军事 家	Famous Military Masters from Ancient China	人民出版 社	М	1975		/
~			K	1976	/	/

中国古 文选读	Selected Readings from Classical Chinese	Shanghai People's Press	K	1975	/	/
红楼梦	The Dream of the Red Chamber	People's Literature Press	М	1975- 1977	1973	1 st volume May 1976; 2 nd volume October 1976; 3 rd volume December 1977
			U	1975- 1976	1973	1 st volume July 1975; 2 nd volume March 1976; 3 rd volume September 1976; 4 th volume May 1977; 5 th volume October 1977
			Z	1976	1973	1 st volume June 1976; 2 nd volume July 1976; 3 rd volume June 1977
			K	1976	1973	/
水浒	The Water Margin	People's Literature Press	М	1977	1975	1 st volume August 1976; 2 nd volume September 1977; 3 rd volume October 1977
			U	1976	1975	1 st volume July 1976; 2 nd volume December 1976; 3 rd volume July 1977; 4 th volume September 1977
			Z	1977	1975	1 st volume November 1976; 2 nd volume December 1976; 3 rd volume November 1977; 4 th volume

						November 1977; 5 th volume November 1977.
三国演 义	The Romance of the Three Kingdoms	People's Literature Press	M	1975	1973	September 1975
			U	1976	1973	/
			Z	1977	1973	/
			K	1977	1973	/
西游记	The Journey to the West	People's Literature Press	М	1977	1973	/
			U	1976	1973	/
			Z	1977	1973	/
阶级斗 争的形 像历史 ——纤楼 梦》	Embodying the History of Class Struggle: an Analysis of the Dream of the Red Chamber	People's Literature Press	U	1976	1974	/
			K	1975	1974	/

APPENDIX THREE

Charting the Purge in Beijing: An Incomplete List of Censorship Orders Issued or Forwarded within Beijing Municipality Related to Books from the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign

The data in this table comes from: BMA 201-2-241, "北京人民出版社关于图书停止出版、报 废处理的请示、通知等" [Requests, notices and other documents from Beijing People's Press regarding cancellation, withdrawal and pulping of book titles]; and BMA 201-3-182, "北京人民 出版社关于图书报废和技术处理的通知" [Notices from Beijing People's Press regarding pulping and altering books].

Document Date	Title (Translation)	Title (Chinese)	Action
29 Jan 1977	Pay Attention to Summarizing Experiences, Deepen the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign	注意总结经验深 入批林批孔	Pulp
	Earnestly Read and Study, Deepen the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign	认真看书学习深 入批林批孔	Pulp
	Selections from the Confucian Analects with Criticism	论语选批	Pulp
	A Simplified Chart Showing Famous Slave and Peasant Rebellions, as well as Prominent Confucians and Legalists, in Chinese History	中国历代著名的 奴隶、农民起义 和儒法主要代表 人物简表	Pulp
	An Introduction to the Terminology of Legalist Texts	法家著作名词简 释	Pulp
	Anti-Confucian Thunder and Lightening	反孔风雷	Pulp
2 July 1977	An Anthology of Articles Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius, Volume One	批林批孔文章汇 编(一)	Pulp
16 September 1977	Prioritize Revolution in the Superstructure: the Line Struggle Between Confucianism and Legalism in History	重视上层建筑领 域的革命——历 史上儒法两条路 线斗争	Pulp
	Confucius's Reactionary Life	孔丘反动的一生	Pulp
17 September 1977	An Introduction Commentary on the Water Margin	《水浒》简评	Withdraw from Sale and Pulp
	Selected Poems by Wang Anshi	王安石诗文选	Withdraw from Sale and Pulp
	Liu Xiazhi: An Anti-Confucian Hero	反孔英雄柳下跖	Withdraw from Sale and Pulp
5 November 1977	The Biography of Fang La	方腊传	On page 2 of the foreword, line 12, reword one expression
	The Complete Water Margin	水浒全传	Rip out the foreword and continue selling.
28 November 1977	Selected Articles by Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Criticizing Lin and Criticizing Confucius	工农兵批林批孔 文选	Pulp

	Selected Articles by Workers, Peasants,	工农兵批林批孔	Pulp
	and Soldiers Criticizing Lin and	文选(一)	i uip
	Criticizing Confucius, Volume One		
	Lin Biao is China's Present-Day	林彪是现代中国	Pulp
	Confucius	的孔子	
	The Anti-Confucian Struggles of	历史上劳动人民	Pulp
	Working People Throughout History	的反孔斗争	
	Lin Biao is an All-Out Follower of	林彪是一个地地	Pulp
	Confucius	道道的孔老二的	
		信徒	
	Confucius and The Soviet Revisionist	苏修叛徒集团和	Pulp
	Traitor Clique	孔老二	
	Legalists in the Spring and Autumn and	春秋战国时期的	Pulp
	Warring States Periods	法家	
	Stories of Legalists (Preliminary	法家的故事(征	Pulp
	Version)	求意见稿)	
	The "Three Character Classic" is a	《三字经》是贩	Pulp
	Deceptive Text Peddling the Way of	卖孔孟之道的骗	
	Confucius and Mencius	人经	
-	A Criticism of Several Bad Books	批判宣扬孔孟之	Pulp
	Promoting the Way of Confucius and	道的几本坏书	-
	Mencius		
	The Confucian-Legalist Struggle in the	春秋战国时期的	Pulp
	Spring and Autumn and Warring States	儒法斗争	
	Periods Selected and Annotated Legalist Texts	历代法家著作选	Pulp
	from History (Volume One)		Pulp
		注(上) 劳动人民反孔斗	Dealer
	The Glorious History of Working People and their Anti-Confucian		Pulp
	Struggle	争的光辉史篇	
	The Story of the Struggle Between the	儒法军事路线斗	Pulp
	Confucian and Legalist Military Lines	争故事	1
	Observations on the Struggle Between	儒法军事路线斗	Pulp
	the Confucian and Legalist Military	争浅谈	1
	Lines		
	Selected and Annotated Historical	历史法家著作选	Pulp
	Legalist Texts (Volume Two)	注(中)	
	Annotated Translations from Li Si's	李斯《谏逐客	Pulp
	"Petition Against the Expulsion of	书》贾谊《治安	
	Guest Officers" and Jia Yi's "Tactics	策》注释	
 	for Peaceful Administration" "The Three Character Classic":	//二ウム》 地外	Pulp
	Criticism and Commentary	《三字经》批注	Pulp
<u> </u>	The Story of Legalism	法家的故事	Pulp
<u> </u>	Selected and Annotated Works by Chao	<u> </u>	Pulp
	Cuo	20旧有17起任	h
	Annotated Selections from the "Book of	《商君书》选注	Pulp
	Lord Shang"		-
	Annotated Selections from the "Record	《盐铁论》选注	Pulp
	of the Debate on Salt and Iron"		
	Annotated Selections from "On	《论衡》选注	Pulp
	Balance"		

Selected and Annotated Works by Liu	刘知几著作选注	Pulp
Zhiji	北日工業化水平	D-1
Selected and Annotated Works by Zhang Juzheng	张居正著作选注	Pulp
Selected and Annotated Essays by Li Zhi	李贽文章选注	Pulp
Selected and Annotated Works by Gong Zizhen	龚自珍著作选注	Pulp
Sayings from Lu Xun Criticizing Confucius and Confucians	鲁迅批孔与批尊 孔言论选辑	Pulp
"Distinguishing Traitors" and Lin Biao's Doctrine of Political Revolution	《辨奸论》与林 彪的政变经	Pulp
An Annotated Commentary on the "Original Meaning" from the "Record of the Debate on Salt and Iron"	《盐铁论·本义 》评注	Pulp
Ôn Cao Cao	论曹操	Pulp
Shen Kuo and the "Dream Pool Essays"	沈括和《梦溪笔 谈》	Pulp
Annotated Commentary on Zhang Taiyan's "A Record of Qin Governance" and "A Record of the Qin's Contribution"	章太炎《秦政 记》《秦献记》 评注	Pulp
Selected Counter-Revolutionary Sayings of Confucius and Mencius with Criticism	孔孟反动言论选 批	Pulp
Selections from the "Necessary Knowledge for Children" with Criticism	《幼学故事琼 林》选批	Pulp
The Story of Liu Xiazhi's Anti- Confucian Struggle	柳下跖反孔斗争 故事	Pulp
Selected and Annotated Works by Li Zhi (Volume One)	李贽著作选注(上)	Pulp
A Simplified History of the Historical Struggle of Working People Against Confucianism	劳动人民反孔斗 争简史	Pulp
Jia Yi: A Legalist from the Early Western Han	西汉初期的法家 ——贾谊	Pulp
Selected and Annotated Essays by Liu Zongyuan	柳宗元论文选注	Pulp
Selected and Annotated Works by Wang Anshi	王安石著作选注	Pulp
Selected and Annotated Works by Wang Fuzhi	王夫之著作选注	Pulp
Selected and Annotated Works by Chen Liang	陈良著作选注	Pulp
Selected and Annotated Works by Zhang Taiyan	章太炎著作选注	Pulp
Selected Poems Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius	批林批孔诗歌选	Pulp
Selected Anti-Confucian Fables and Jokes from Ancient China	古代反孔批儒寓 言笑话选	Pulp
Li Kui Destroys the Imperial Summons	李奎扯诏	Pulp

24 April 1978	Lin Biao and Confucius are Both Regressivists	林彪孔邱都是开 历史倒车的反动 派	Pulp
	Annotated Selections from the Xun Zi	荀子选注	Pulp
	Annotated Selections from the Han Fei Zi	韩非子选注	Pulp
8 May 1978	Cao Xueqin and his Dream of the Red Chamber	曹雪芹和他的红 楼梦	Pulp
13 June 1978	An Introduction to the Historical Sources Concerning the Working People's Anti-Confucian Struggle Throughout History	历代劳动人民反孔斗争史料简编	Pulp
	Song Jiang: A Classic Capitulationist from Ancient Times	一个古代投降派 的典型——宋江	Pulp
27 June 1978	Annotated Selections from "The Commands of Cao Cao" and "The Works of Zhuge Liang"	《曹操令文》 《诸葛亮集》选 注	Pulp
	Narrating the History of the Taiping Revolution's Anti-Confucian Struggle	太平天国反孔斗 争史话	Pulp
30 June 1978	Annotated Translations from Fan Zhen's "On the Annihilation of the Soul" and Jia Sixie's "Essential Techniques for the Welfare of the People"	范缜《神灭论》 贾思编《齐民要 术》注译	Pulp
	Selected Poems by Cao Cao	曹操诗文选	Pulp
	The Historical Regressivism of the Confucians	开历史倒车的儒 家学派	Pulp
7 July 1978	The Dream of the Red Chamber is a Political History Novel	红楼梦是一部政 治历史小说	Pulp

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