From Refugees to Immigrants: The Legalization Strategies of Salvadoran Immigrants and Activists

The legalization strategies pursued by Salvadoran immigrants and activists from the 1980s to the present demonstrate that migrants' and advocates' responses to policy changes reinterpret law in ways that affect future policy. Law is critical to immigrants' strategies in that legal status is increasingly a prerequisite for rights and services and that immigration law is embedded in other institutions and relationships. Immigration law is defined, however, not only when it is first formulated but also as it is implemented, enabling the immigrants who are defined according to legal categories to shape the definitions that categorization produces. Immigrants and activists also take formal legal and political actions, such as lobbying Congress and filing class action suits. Through such formal and informal policy negotiations, immigrants seek to shape their own and their nations' futures. Irrespective

strategies in turn shape immigration policy in t times redefine not only individual immigrants b ceedings that determine legalization.Moreov change policies to counter particular legalization relationship between immigration law and leg helps to account for the formulation, impact immigration policies.
Examining the policy implications of immig builds on recent public policy scholarship reg citizens participate in policy design on an Schneider andIngram (1988, 1993) identify t as key elements in the structure of policies; presence or absence of policy "publics" plays struction; and Maloney, Jordan, and McLa consultative nature of policymaking in Great of nonpolicymakers in shaping policy entails es in which policy can be said to be "made," p mentation phase of policy design.For instan define target populations are subject to negot matize those affected by policies (Schneid manipulated by these individuals for their ow out policies can be self-selecting, and both t may pursue goals that differ from those of p tion phase of policymaking is contested, not onl as "potentially powerful drags on policy desig 1991:198), but also because these groups active pret policy.To do so, participants in such str redefine legal and political discourses and pra ple contexts (Collier, 1973;Comaroff andYngvesson, 1980-1981;Merry, 1990; Yngv those who define official policy do not fully con tering policies, policy design does not end wh also Calavita, 1992).
Examining how policy agents and targets p redefinition of immigration policies makes tw migration theory.First, this project provides a in which immigration law is powerful.The often assessed by the law's ability to contro immigration is not eliminated by criminaliz appears weak.2In contrast, shifting the focus from trol entry to immigrants' attempts to negotiate United States suggests that, far from being powerles immigrants' and authorities' political maneuveri immigrants' and activists' legalization strategies deta immigrants attempt to shape their own identiti Castles and Miller, 1993;de Wenden, 1994;Glick 1990;Hammar, 1990;Miller, 1981).Since the dev cy theory during the 1970s (Kearney, 1986), mig depicted as pawns of global economic and political state repression and capitalist penetration {see H 1991). Though they correctly note the structural characterizations can depict migrants as largely l and Miller, 1993;Miller, 1981).In contrast, exam activists' legalization strategies reveals that immig ing the policies that affect their lives.The people tion law -including not only government offici Department of Motor Vehicle clerks, social workers, cials, and immigrants themselves -must formulate t of immigration categories in order to assess other on these understandings, both the people being doing the defining can influence the definitions tively "creating" law, in an informal sense.In ad negotiations, immigrants can seek to authenticate U.S. immigration law in the formal legal arena th and individual petitions for particular legal statu law is embedded in other institutions and relation and formal negotiation of law can affect these instit These issues of policy redefinition, legal categor agency are discussed in this article through an exami strategies pursued by Salvadorans who immigrated to the early 1980s to the present.The case of Salvadoran priate for examining these issues given that the 2This "weakness" of immigration law has been attributed to muster the funding and personnel that would be needed to c Harwood, 1985Harwood, , 1986;;Miller, 1985), the strength of the forces l (Bach, 1978;Calavita, 1992;Hamilton and Chinchilla, 1991;Portes, 1978;Salt, 1992;Sassen, 1989;Wilson, 1993), and the fac of U.S. society benefit from the presence of undocumented wo 1990;Jenkins, 1978;Portes, 1978Portes, , 1981)).
Salvadorans' legal status a focus of policy debate, Sa been highly organized since their arrival in the 1987), and Salvadorans have been in the United S their legalization strategies in response to shifts in section of the article describes the immigration to focus their legalization efforts on political asy second section discusses how, by reinterpreting Salvadorans as refugees, religious activists suppo obtain asylum.The third section turns to the 1990s and immigrants obtained and implemented legis legal status to Salvadorans and a legal settlemen reapply for political asylum.Salvadorans to enter the United States.By the mid-1980s, there w 500,000 to 800,000 Salvadorans in the United States (Aguayo and Fage 1988;Ruggles, Fix and Thomas, 1985), and by the early 1990s, commun activists estimated that this number had grown to approximately 1 mi individuals.While the laws barring unauthorized entry did not prevent the individuals -most of whom entered the country without authorizat including fieldwork conducted in the San Francisco East Bay and in Tucson, Arizona, w in the U.S. sanctuary movement, a grassroots network of congregations that declared t selves "sanctuaries" for Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees (see Coutin, 1993); particip in the legal services programs of several Central American community organizations i Angeles [CARECEN (Central American Resource Center), El Rescate (Spanish for Rescue"), and ASOSAL (Association of Salvadorans in Los Angeles)]; interviews cond with members of these organizations and their clients;and attending meetings organiz CHIRLA, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles.from coming to the United States, immigration law this country precarious.If apprehended, Salvadora mented persons, faced detention and possible deport siveness of civil war and human rights violations in willing to accept lengthy detention in the United State to depart voluntarily (see Ferris, 1987;Mahler, 199 they avoided apprehension, Salvadorans, again like othe grants, found their ability to live and work hampered ments.As one Salvadoran who had entered the coun mented, "We need to be here legally or it's like we'r of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, w on employers who hired unauthorized workers, made l for the undocumented (Mahler, 1995).
The only way for most Salvadorans to be in the Unit early and mid-1980s was to apply for political asylum Fix and Thomas, 1985).Other means of legalization, suc suspension of deportation, and labor certification, requ ily members with legal status, seven years of conti United States, or specialized job skills, all of which wer in this newly immigrated community.Political asylum able to migrants who could demonstrate a well-foun in their homelands, a characteristic that, unfortunatel among these early Salvadoran migrants.Prior t Salvadorans' primary legal need was to avoid deportatio stay (Mahler, 1995), therefore few Salvadorans applied were first apprehended by the INS (Ruggles, Fix and were apprehended, applying for asylum could delay Although only 2.6 percent of the asylum applicatio were being approved during this period (United Refugees, 1986), filing an application would allow applic United States while their original case and any app process that could last several years (Ferris, 1987).
For Salvadoran activists, defining Salvadorans as "r political strategy that sought not only to save lives and but also to affect the course of the Salvadoran Salvadorans who came to the United States in the ea of the political groups that made up the FMLN (Fa Liberation Front), the force opposing the Salvador activists formed political committees in the United to their organizations in El Salvador.Initially, focused on aiding their counterparts in El Salvador; from El Salvador to the United States continued and as Salvadorans were apprehended and placed in deportation proceedings, political committees created refugee committees to address the social, economic and legal needs of Salvadorans in the United States.In addition to helping detained Salvadorans apply for political asylum, refugee committees lobbied for federal legislation that would grant extended voluntary departure (EVD) status to Salvadorans on the grounds that they were refugees.Activists hoped that if the U.S. gov? ernment formally recognized Salvadorans as refugees, the U.S. government would be unable to continue sending military aid to the Salvadoran govern?ment, which would in turn promote either a guerrilla victory or a negotiated settlement {see also Pirie, 1990).
The legal and political strategies pursued by Salvadoran activists confront?ed powerful domestic and foreign policy interests in the United States.Illegal immigration was becoming a significant policy issue, with the formation of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy in 1978 {see Fuchs, 1985) and calls for employer sanctions and other more restrictive immigration measures.The 1986 amnesty program notwithstanding, the early to mid-1980s was a difficult period in which to advocate legalization for hundreds of thousands of "feet people" (Simpson, 1984).Moreover, the Reagan administration, which by 1987 was supplying over $1 million a day in military and other aid to the Salvadoran government (Hatfield et aL, 1988), adopted the stance that the human rights situation in El Salvador was improving and that the vast majority of Salvadorans in the United States were economic immigrants who did not deserve asylum.State Department offi?cials favored resettlement in the region instead of asylum in the United States for those Salvadorans who did face danger in their homelands (Aguayo and Fagen, 1988;Comptroller General of the United States, 1984;Fiederlein, 1991; Committee on the Judiciary, 1983).The stage was set for a major pol? icy confrontation in which the "social construction" (Schneider and Ingram, 1993) of Salvadorans as deserving refugees or undeserving illegal aliens was at issue.

SANCTUARY
During the 1980s, the large numbers of Salvadoran immigrants, the h profile of U.S. Central American policy, and the organizing effort Salvadoran activists gave rise to political movements that sought to def Salvadorans as refugees who deserved political asylum.One of the strong components of this activism was the sanctuary movem gregations that declared themselves "sanctuarie Guatemalan refugees.The sanctuary movement be religious activists who had helped detained Salva immigrants file for political asylum decided to als Central Americans avoid being detected by U.S. im

Activists took this step because the routine den
Guatemalans' asylum petitions led them to conclude ment was discriminating against asylum seekers fro tries.Movement members therefore assumed respo U.S. and international refugee law by bring Guatemalans into the United States, sheltering them or places of worship, and transporting them to join of the country.Some participants saw these practice fulfilling U.S. legal and moral obligations to refuge criticizing U.S. support for the Salvadoran and Gu By 1986, there were approximately 400 congregatio sanctuary movement (Basta, 1986).
The methods through which sanctuary activists refugee and Central American policy derived from itself.In seeking to define Salvadorans and Guatema tuary activists were taking advantage of the fact that, being a victim of political persecution is one of the gro son who has entered the United States illicitly can c from that of an illegal alien to an authorized reside drew on immigration law in three ways.First, wh requested the movement's assistance in entering th ment members "screened" the individual to determine a "refugee."In Tuscon, where I observed these scree and 1988, activists who were informed of someone ments aid gathered information about the person's reas sometimes sending a counselor to meet with the in side of the border.Border workers then used the 1967 U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (which was incorporated into U.S. law through the 1980 Refugee Act), the Geneva Conventions on refugees, and the principle of family reunification to evaluate individuals' asylum claims.Individuals who were deemed to be political refugees were brought into the United States, whereas those who were considered economic immigrants were either left to cross the border on their own or given some other sort of assistance.
Second, when they housed undocumented C activists took advantage of the fact that U.S. holds private citizens accountable for the lega By publicly sheltering Central Americans, activi required to assess the legal status of other in entitled to act on their own understandings o rather than separating themselves from "illegal umented Central Americans into their homes, well as into apartments or houses rented for only defined Salvadorans and Guatemalans as preted this category, suggesting that refugee st rience of fleeing persecution, not by the decis cial, and that private citizens as well as governm ity to recognize refugees.
Third, movement members publicized Cent persecution and flight -the same narratives t during an asylum interview as grounds for movements' term for these accounts, refugee of legal truth.Within the movement, Central A sanctuary congregations, high school and co gious gatherings, and at meetings and other sheltering Central Americans, refugee testim between the documented and the undocumen that deny services to those whose presence is moted refugee testimonies because they believ galvanized into action by hearing detained S accounts, other listeners' consciousness abou policy could be changed by these narratives.A went to a testimony where a woman passed ar then described how he'd been captured, tort could hear the shock in the room!That's wh instant."Such accounts promoted the mo Salvadorans and Guatemalans deserved politica Movement members' efforts to define Salvadorans and Guatemalans as refugees defined movement members as criminals in the eyes of U.S. author?ities.In 1984 and1985, sanctuary activists were convicted in Texas on charges of transporting illegal aliens, and in 1986, eight movement members were convicted of conspiracy and alien smuggling in Tucson, Arizona {see Blum, 1991;Coutin, 1995;Pirie, 1990).Despite these convictions, activists continued to attempt to obtain some form of blanket legal protection for undocumented Salvadorans and Guatemalans.Between 1983 and 1989, bills that would have granted Salvadorans temporary relief from deportation were proposed by Representative John Joseph Moakley and Senator Dennis DeConcini in the U.S. Congress (Aguayo and Fagen, 1988;Fiederlein, 1992;Rubin, 1991).In addition, in response to the indictment of sanctu?ary activists in 1985, sanctuary congregations and Central American service organizations sued the U.S. Attorney General and the INS Commissioner, charging that the prosecution of sanctuary activists violated activists' rights to freedom of religious practice and that the INS had discriminated against Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum applicants in violation of U.S. and international refugee law.The lawsuit, advocates' legislative work, and reli?gious activists' attempts to define Central Americans as refugees eventually produced policy changes permitting Salvadorans and Guatemalans to apply for temporary legal status in the United States.

TPS/DED/ABC
In 1990, hard work, strategic alliances, and changed circumstances resulted in legislation granting Salvadorans the right to apply for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and an out-of-court settlement of the lawsuit filed by sanctuary congregations and Central American service organizations in 1985.Prior to 1990, efforts to obtain some form of blanket protection for Salvadoran immigrants had been defeated by Congresspeople who were not convinced that deportation endangered Salvadorans (see Ferris, 1987:124;Francis, 1986:37)4 and who worried that any such program would trigger more immigration from El Salvador to the United States (Fiederlein, 1992).In the late 1980s, however, the Salvadoran government, which was reeling from costs of the civil conflict, added its voice to those who advocated legal status for Salvadorans, arguing that mass deportations would further desta?bilize the Salvadoran economy (San Francisco Chronicle, 1987).In addition, indications that the Salvadoran government was involved in the assassination of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador in 1989 drew international censure and gave human rights activists renewed ammunition.Senator DeConcini and Representative Moakley, long-time proponents of safe haven for Central Americans, cut a deal with Senator Simpson, a sponsor of the 1990 Immigration Act.A provision allowing Salvadorans who had been in the United States since September 19, 1990, to apply for eighteen months of 4In 1987, a General Accounting Office report concluded that it was not possible to assess the safety of deported Salvadorans, given the limitations of human rights data collected on El Salvador (see General Accounting Office, 1987).

TPS5 was incorporated into the act in ex
Moakley's agreement to support neither an ex tial eighteen-month period nor a grant of perm TPS recipients {Interpreter Releases, 1990a).Salvadorans who were in the United States had The TPS provision of the 1990 Immigration A second policy success -a negotiated settlement the ABC lawsuit, after the American Baptist C the suit.After the suit was filed in 1985, defen charges on the grounds that plaintiffs lacked st The judge did dismiss certain claims, but allo Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers ha to stand.In 1989, extensive discovery proceed burdensome for the defense, Congress had gr apply for TPS, and, in response to heavy criticis the INS had already revised its asylum pr Fiederlein, 1992).For these reasons (Blum, 1991), Salvadorans who had been in the United Stat and Guatemalans who had been present since de novo asylum interviews.To eliminate bias aga cers were to receive special training regarding Guatemala, previous denials were not to be he cers were to base their initial decisions solely on asylum petition.To obtain these benefits, AB register directly with the INS or, in the case of then submit an asylum application before a d INS {American Baptist Churches v. Thornburg 1991).Plaintiffs in the ABC case hailed this a 1991).

The TPS program and the ABC agreement were clearly what May terms
"policies] with a public" (1991:188) in that Central American activists, immigrant rights advocates, community organizations, immigration attor-5Section 244A of the 1990 Immigration Act "allows the Attorney General to provide nation?als from designated countries (who have been continuously physically present in the United States since date of last designation and are otherwise admissible) with temporary protected status on account of ongoing conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary or exceptional circumstances that make their return unsafe" (Interpreter Releases, 1990b: 1284).Once tem? porary protected status (TPS) was created, it became possible for immigrants from other coun?tries to seek this status.In addition to Salvadorans, nationals of Bosnia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia have been granted TPS (Frelick and Kohnen, 1994;Wasem, n.d.).neys, and even notary publics who provide legal service ties were poised to implement the TPS program an This public faced three immediate implementation eligible Salvadorans for TPS, extending the eighteen and helping ABC class members apply for the benefits ment.Each of these challenges gave Central Ameri advocates the opportunity to influence the implementa cies and thus to continue to "make policy" (see also C Baker, 1993).Discussion of the third policy challeng than that of the first two, as I was able to personal helped ABC class members apply for benefits durin Angeles in 1995-1997.First, regarding TPS, both legal service providers and cants debated whether or not it was in Salvadorans' int For example, staff members at one community organiz applicants' eighteen months of protected status expi detain and deport applicants.One Salvadoran immi doubts but decided to apply explained his reasoning is a risk that one has to take.That is, it was not a matt choosing, it was something that one had to do.Beca hidden all the time."Community activists reached a decided to process TPS applications and to encourage apply.One community organization in Los Ange 14,000 and 15,000 applicants, and 187,000 Salvad nationwide (Frelick and Kohnen, 1994).
Second, when the TPS registration period ended, turned their attention to the major shortcoming of TP To address this problem, community organizations l paign that included protests, lobbying, letter-writin lizing the support of various sectors of El Salvador Salvadoran government.The arguments that activi extending TPS and deferred enforced departure (D marked a shift in the rhetoric regarding Salvadoran im ties.Peace accords between the Salvadoran governm forces had been signed in El Salvador in 1992, maki argue that Salvadorans were "refugees" who faced p Therefore, while pointing out that the instability of permit persecution to continue, activists also contended that Salvadoran immigrants sent to relatives in El Salva Salvadoran economy, that cutting off these remit Salvadorans would plunge El Salvador into chao tances Salvadorans were reducing the amount of ernment needed to send to El Salvador.Moreover U.S. government's role in financing the war in E had a unique responsibility to aid Salvadorans wh due to the war.The alliances that had enabled Salvadorans to obtain TPS proved effective once again, and President Bush allowed TPS recipients to reg? ister for deferred enforced departure (DED) status.Salvadorans' DED status was extended until December 31,1994; when the program expired, the work permits held by DED registrants were extended several times, until the final expiration date of April 30, 1996.
Third, as the expiration date of Salvadorans' DED status approached, com? munity organizations turned their attention to the ABC agreement as a poten?tial form of relief for TPS/DED recipients.Though TPS and ABC were con? nected, there were significant differences between the two programs.All Salvadorans who were in the United States as of September 19, 1990, were eli? gible to apply for TPS as long as they were not excludable for some reason, such as having committed a felony.In contrast, to be eligible to apply for asylum under the ABC program, applicants had to individually claim to have a wellfounded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, member?ship in a particular social group, or political opinion (Frelick and Kohnen, 1994).In other words, to apply for asylum, an individual had to define him?self or herself as a refugee using a rhetoric that differed from -but did not con?tradict -the arguments in favor of extending the TPS and DED programs.
As they had done during the TPS registration period, the community orga?nizations whose activities I observed in Los Angeles encouraged TPS regis?trants to apply for ABC benefits, but not necessarily for the reasons envi?sioned by the policymakers who crafted the settlement agreement.Though the purpose of the agreement was to ensure that Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum applicants had fair hearings, some applicants used the ABC asylum process to preserve their rights to remain in the country.As a service provider explained to potential applicants during a community presentation in September of 1995, Salvadorans had nothing to lose by applying, whereas if they did not apply, they could be placed in deportation proceedings upon the expiration of the TPS/DED program.While waiting for their cases to be decided, applicants would receive work permits, gain time in the country, and perhaps become eligible for other forms of legalization, such as being peti?tioned for by a family member.Moreover, the special rules governing ABC class members' asylum interviews with INS officials improved applicants' chances of obtaining asylum.Additional changes in INS asylum procedures enhanced the advantages of being an ASCclass membe INS adopted a last-in/first-out policy in scheduling the applicants and instituted a six-month delay in issuing w applicants.Because they were governed by the policies in the settlement agreement, ABC class members were not track" scheduling process and received work permits as tions were processed.
Though ABC class members may have had a variety for the benefits of the settlement, to apply they had to refugees.Throughout the application period, comm known as "charlas," were a key means of teaching class m their experiences of the civil conflict as grounds for sol thing which had not been necessary in order to apply at an ABC charla in July of 1995, an attorney told his a uals who had come to the United States solely for e were never persecuted in any way, and who did not hav were persecuted were not eligible to apply for asylum.O said, individuals whose relatives were beaten or killed where the civil war was intense, or who belonged t members were persecuted were eligible to apply for application process enabled service providers and clients cants' life narratives were grounds for political asylu applicants as refugees.At some organizations, this proce forms that asked clients why they had come to the Uni they had been persecuted, feared returning to El Sal political or social groups in El Salvador.Such question ceive which of their previous experiences could be co asylum.To further substantiate applicants' asylum claim tioned applicants about particular instances of perse between events, and clients' motivations for immig clients' oral narratives, eliciting names, dates, and p clients' accounts, legal workers prepared narratives o clients' behalf.
As they filled out asylum applications under the term ment, community organizations not only negotiated the vidual applicants but also the boundaries of the ABC a ulation (see also Schneider and Ingram, 1993) and thu "political asylee" category.Each of the organizations who grams I observed developed broad notions of eligibility, bers' understanding of the arbitrary and pervasive n human rights abuses in El Salvador.Legal workers a tions told me that, because persecution was so many Salvadorans took experiences like being force being forced to give food to the guerrillas for gran selves as victims of persecution.It was therefore n for information by repeatedly questioning clien persecuted.A legal worker at one organization to to check off any of the forms of persecution listed egorized them as either unemployed by the war or tive zone "as these are general categories that al Though their definitions of eligibility were broad, submit applications for individuals who had known to have committed human rights abuse despite repeated questioning, insisted that they economic reasons.One staff member explained t told, "Of course, we are not Immigration, so we but we can't help you here.The best thing for y lawyer to work on your own particular case."By su tions that reflected their staffs' understanding of cution in El Salvador, community organizati Salvadorans had been driven to the United States promoting a broader definition of the "refugee" INS officials seem to be using.If their clients ultim or another status, then community organizatio legalizing a group of people whom they consider de Though it renegotiated the "political asylee" categ process at the organizations with which I worke that government officials' definitions of this categ actions.Alongside the broad definition of refugee t determining who they could serve existed a com "strong case."Legal workers were continually on with a "strong case," that is, a case that would be r judges and INS asylum officials as meeting the d the terms of the 1980 Refugee Act and the U.N. 6In fact, this is more or less what has occurred.In Nove Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, w and certain asylum applicants to apply for suspension of de nated by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant R 1996.Suspension cases are not easy to win, so suspension eli tion for ABC class members.Advocates are continuing to p ABC class members residency Status of Refugees.During an immigration charla at attorney described such a case as follows: "Suppose party X -it doesn't matter what party -and I'm act number of years, I pass out flyers, and eventually I'm a cal office.Suppose that the government doesn't like receive threats, then I see that there are people followin shooting and I flee for my life.That is political asylum.
of asylum to inform their assessment of cases enable their own resources efficiently in that they gave extra cases of individuals who had the best chance of winn this notion of the "strong case" approach also reinforced ition of refugee that is common within immigration co when preparing the applications of individuals who eligibility, legal workers still attempted to make clients tion come as close as possible to fitting this classic notio When the period in which eligible Salvadorans cou under the terms of the ABC agreement expired in Ja and activists faced new implementation challenges.The

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsib
September 1996 made it less likely that ABC class memb asylum would be eligible for other forms of legalizat views for ABC class members commenced in April of essary for activists to prepare applicants for their inter asylum officials regarding procedures, and pursue ot members who are denied asylum.Finally, Salvadoran the contribution that remittances make to the Salv Darling, 1996;La Opinion, 1996), have rallied around ate Salvadorans.In this context, a new campaign to secur ABC class members was launched.For, although the requires individuals to define themselves as refugees in fits, community activists have recently been definin constituencies as "immigrants" who are a permanent

FROM REFUGEES TO IMMIGRANTS
The strategies that applicants and advocates pursued in implementing th TPS program and the ABC agreement looked toward a past in which activists had defined Salvadorans as refugees and a present in which activists defi Salvadorans as immigrants.During the 1980s, Salvadoran activists h found it both empowering and politically necessary to define themselves and their community as refugees, given the Reagan Administration's contention that Salvadorans were economic immigrants.By Salvadorans had decided to remain in the United to El Salvador, activists redefined this term, asso lessness, dependency, and lack of control.For in "[A] refugee could be a person who is expecting s given to them.You know, like if you are an Ethiop for [from] the United Nation[s] help, food, and eve the term refugee as disempowering, activists claim that is part of the American immigrant story, acco individuals who are interested in bettering them roots in the United States {see Chock, 1991; Cou scholars who argue that there is an implicit cont the states that benefit from their labor (Bosniak, 1 Holston and Appadurai, 1996), activists contend tled to legal status in the United States, given their idence, the ties they have created, the work they h they have paid, and the role that the United States caused them to emigrate.This argument manipulate tizing category "immigrant" {cf Schneider and In that immigrants benefit rather than harm U.S. soc As they redefined their community, Salvadoran cates devised new legalization strategies.In contrast Salvadorans saw legalization as a means of preven life-threatening deportations, by the 1990s the become securing the legal rights enjoyed by citizen idents for Salvadorans who had made their lives in the United States.The TPS program and the ABC agreement advanced this goal in that they per?mitted formerly undocumented Salvadorans to obtain work authorization and other identity documents.Moreover, by the 1990s, the 1986 amnesty program, Salvadorans' marriages to U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents, and the amount of time that Salvadorans had been in the United States expanded the avenues of legalization available to Salvadorans.With U.S. cit? izen and legal permanent resident siblings, spouses, parents, and children, Salvadorans could qualify for family visa petitions.Those Salvadorans who had immigrated more than seven years ago were eligible to apply for suspen?sion of deportation, which requires demonstrating seven years of continuous residence in the United States, good moral character, and that deportation would be an extreme hardship.Ties with employers made work-related visas and labor certification an option for some.Accordingly, community organi?zations whose legal programs had focused exclusively on political asylum added suspension of deportation, adjustment of status naturalization to services they offered clients.These options influenced service providers' implementation of Although the ABC application process focused on although most class members had indeed fled El Salvador flict, service providers realized that the 1992 Peace A asylum unlikely for at least some of their clients.Advo a contingency plan, according to which those ABC cla denied asylum and placed in deportation proceedings pension of deportation.
The 1996 passage of IIRIRA jeopardized these leg IIRIRA replaced suspension of deportation with a new called "cancellation of removal."Qualifying for cancel strating ten years of continuous residence in the Un character, and that being deported would cause "ext hardship" to an alien's U.S. citizen or legal permanent re or child.In addition, according to the terms of IIR Notice to Appear in court stops the clock on the acc legalization purposes.As all TPS recipients were issued U.S. foreign policy, assessments of human rights violations in America, and even controversies about the boundaries of citizen a authority in enforcing international law (Coutin, 1995).Similarly discussions of Salvadorans' legal rights negotiate the extent of dem tion in El Salvador, the obligations of receiving states toward migrant ers, and immigrants' positions vis avis their countries of origin.Trans institutions, international relations, definitions of citizenship, and th icance of national boundaries are at stake in debates over immigra identities (Glick-Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc, 1995).The outc such negotiations affect not only receiving but also sending societi case at hand, recognizing Salvadorans as refugees during the 1980s cou led to a reduction in U.S. aid to El Salvador, which in turn could have ed the course of the Salvadoran civil war.Denying legal status to Salva in the 1990s could further marginalize these immigrants, jeopardi tances, and increase instability in the region.Law is therefore critical grants' efforts to shape their own and their nations' futures.
The diffuse and ongoing nature of policymaking enables immigr activists to influence immigration law over time.Policies take shap tiple contexts, including lawmakers' offices, administrators' decisions, rulings, and the actions that policy agents and t implemented.Immigrants and advocates therefor ties to shape policy through both formal and infor tutions.The fact that citizens are held legally accou status of those whom they shelter and transport en act in ways that defined undocumented Salvado refugees.When they were convicted on alien-sm activists and other solidarity workers sued U.S Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers had b under the law.The settlement reached in this lawsu al opportunities to argue that Salvadorans and G cal asylum.The broad notions of eligibility used that prepared ABC class members' asylum applicatio tion to individuals who were singled out for per indirectly but deeply affected by civil conflict mer current political context, including obstacles cr immigration policies, have led to new political ac Americans.Immigrants' responses to policy chan tionally pursue political change in order to aff instance, immigrants who are confronted with rest false identity documents (Calavita, 1990), create bac numbers of applications for particular forms of alter their migration patterns (Bean, Edmonston immigrants actively interpret and react to changes not only policymakers but also immigrants themse As immigrants have the potential to influence economically significant ways, nuanced analyses gies are critical to understanding the formulation, of immigration law and policy over time.Theo tools devised by legal ethnographers are particularl overt and implicit ways that immigrants and activi pret policies.Observations of contexts in which leg ed, such as court hearings, attorney-client interact forth reveal ways that policy publics interpret Comparing these notions to those of "official" polic which targets and agents invoke and reinterpret Examining how policies and policy debates chang from one context {e.g., negotiations between ABC p to another {e.g., the offices of community organiza applications for ABC class members) indicates th Finally, the article exa peace accords in El Salvador in 1992 and the pas immigration legislation in the United States in of activists' earlier goals; a reformulation that approval of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Cent 1997.My analysis is based on eighteen months o American activists in California and Arizona in 1 among Salvadoran immigrants, community organ advocates in Los Angeles from 1995 to 1997.3Th lyze how activists' and immigrants' actions reshape icy on an ongoing basis.SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS AND US.IMMIGRATION LAW Salvadorans' initial legalization strategies were formulated in the early 1980 when the outbreak of civil war in El Salvador led unprecedented numbe

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the document with which the INS charges an alien with immigration laws) upon the termination of the TPS Order to Show Cause was initially deemed the equiv Appear (see In re N-J-B-Int.Dec.:3309 1997), advoc recipients would not be able to demonstrate the requisit uous presence.Additionally, if IIRIRA were applied t those who did not have U.S. citizen or legal permanent r ents, or children would not meet the hardship requirem new 4,000 cap on the number of aliens who could be cancellation in a given year further reduced the viab cancellation as means of legalization for the 260 Guatemalans who make up the ABC class.Other avenu as family petitions or work-related visas, also have been to obtain.Petitioning for a relative now requires demon an income that is 125 percent of the poverty level.If th States without legal status, the beneficiaries of fami may be disqualified, as individuals who are illegally p States for six months or a year face three-year and ten tion, respectively (ACLU Immigrants Rights Project legalization would be impossible for most Salvadoran members, if IIRIRA were not amended or reinterpreted Fortunately for Salvadoran and Guatemalan asy have succeeded in exempting ABC class members sions.By lobbying U.S. officials, organizing fasts an with other affected groups (especially Nicaragua congressional allies, and securing the support of officials, advocates were able to obtain legislative bers.In November 1997, the U.S. Congres Adjustment and Central American Relief Act {se 1997).This act creates an "amnesty" for Nicaraguan States before December 1, 1995, and restores sus class members, Salvadorans and Guatemalans who April 1, 1990, and certain relatives of these individ probably critical to the success of this initiative.Fi negotiate the social construction of Salvadorans, bers as documented immigrants who have been nent residency, rather than as illegal aliens with pe Second, certain Republican leaders seemingly saw avoid being characterized as "anti-immigrant" 1997).Third, activists cleverly manipulated security situation of Salvadorans and Guatemalans to tho emphasizing the potentially destabilizing eff (McDonnell, 1997).Despite their success, advocat disparity between IIRIRA's treatment of Nicaraguan and Guatemalans.At a rally in Los Angeles short activists vowed to pressure President Clinton to and Guatemalans would face hardship if deporte greatly facilitate the approval of Salvadorans' an cases, creating a de facto amnesty.With an eye tow American organizations have also begun promoting istration, and civic participation in order to mob of the community on behalf of more legally margi The legalization strategies pursued by Salvador cates demonstrate that immigrants have some abili own legal situation but also conditions in their policies have domestic implications (Ingram and policies can affect foreign relations and political activists' efforts to obtain refugee status for Salvad specifically, all minor children, all spouses, and those unma the United States before October 1990 are eligible for susp actually referred to within the legislation as "special rule" can the domestic problem posed by the sudden influx of also foreign policy issues regarding human rights viola the United States' stance regarding the civil war.Activ as foreign policy considerations were influencing the a 1987), so too could granting asylum to Salvadorans d rights abuses committed by Salvadoran authorities continued U.S. support for the Salvadoran gove Similarly, in the 1990s, activists argue that enabli United States to become legal immigrants would pro El Salvador by maintaining remittances, forestalling po deportations, and increasing Salvadorans' political clo In short, in defining themselves first as refugees an activists and advocates have pursued policies that hav and economic implications.Salvadoran immigrants therefore have the potential to affect the conditions t to emigrate in the first place.CONCLUSION Because immigration law is embedded in other institutions and relation immigrants' legalization strategies have far-reaching implications.Arg about Salvadorans' legal status in the 1980s were connected to deb