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South Korean Popular Folk Music: The Genre That Defined 1970s Youth Culture

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Musicology

by

Rosaleen Rhee

2020

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

South Korean Popular Folk Music: The Genre That Defined 1970s Youth Culture

by

Rosaleen Rhee

Doctor of Philosophy in Musicology

University of California, Los Angeles, 2020

Professor Tamara Judith-Marie Levitz, Chair

This dissertation offers the first monograph-length exploration of South Korean popular folk—or *p'ok'ŭ*—music in English. *P'ok'ŭ* was tied initially to “youth culture” (*ch'ŏngnyŏnmunhwa*), which refers to the Western-derived musical and leisure activities of university-educated youth, and later to the student movement (*haksaengundong*), which was quickly expanding after Park Chung Hee initiated the 1972 *Yushin* constitution that legitimized his *de facto* dictatorship. I argue that *p'ok'ŭ* was a genre shaped by censorship due to its popularity among university students, who were also the primary actors protesting Park's escalating authoritarianism. I examine primary source newspaper reports that document *p'ok'ŭ*'s less politicized years between 1968 and 1973, when the media applauded its campus-bred

amateurism, anti-commercialism, and originality of singer-songwriters, as well as its more politicized years between 1974 and 1975, when Park prohibited the media from reporting on campus demonstrations. I show how government censorship aided *p'ok'ŭ* singers between 1971 and 1972 when broadcast producers promoted it as the “wholesome” alternative to other banned genres, and illustrate how the infamous blacklisting of 1975 targeted hit *p'ok'ŭ* songs, framing them as evidence of youth’s blind embrace of “decadent” Western trends.

Media portrayals of *p'ok'ŭ* singers took a turn in 1974 because widespread dissidence spread from the student movement to youth culture. The movement’s nationalist ideology of “people’s democracy” (*minjung juŭi*), which aimed to draw from the oppressed people in building resistance, instilled in *p'ok'ŭ* singers a desire to create a Korean aesthetic that harnessed domestic—rather than Japanese or American—culture. I illustrate how *p'ok'ŭ* came to signify both the romantic sentiment of youth culture and the courageous resistance of the student movement, by analyzing the 1975 film *The March of Fools*, which depicts how university students navigated the contradictions of a regime that touted an efficient form of nationalist democracy while suppressing freedom of expression. I contend that in such a paradoxical and restrictive environment, *p'ok'ŭ* underwent a paradoxical and restricted evolution. The government’s blacklisting of over two hundred songs and the Marijuana Incident of December 1975, which stigmatized top *p'ok'ŭ* singers as marijuana-smoking criminals, brought about the downfall of *p'ok'ŭ*.

This dissertation of Rosaleen Rhee is approved.

Dana Cuff

Nina Sun Eidsheim

Robert W. Fink

Tamara Judith-Marie Levitz, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2020

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Vita

2009	A.B., Music History Brown University
2012	M.A., Museology University of Washington, Seattle
2013-2014	Herb Alpert School of Music Fellowship University of California, Los Angeles
2014-2016	Teaching Assistant/Associate Undergraduate Education Initiative University of California, Los Angeles
2015	M.A., Musicology University of California, Los Angeles
2015	Graduate Certificate in Urban Humanities Urban Humanities Initiative University of California, Los Angeles
2015	Graduate Summer Research Mentorship Graduate Division University of California, Los Angeles
2016-2017	Graduate Research Mentorship Graduate Division University of California, Los Angeles
2017	Harry Yvonne Lenart Graduate Travel Fellowship Division of Humanities University of California, Los Angeles
2017	Korean Studies Dissertation Workshop Social Science Research Council
2017-2018	Hiroshi Wagatsuma Memorial Fellowship Asia Pacific Center University of California, Los Angeles
2019-2020	Dissertation Year Fellowship Graduate Division University of California, Los Angeles

PRESENTATIONS

- 2015 “Fatalistic Audiovisual Representation of AIDS in *Loving Memory*”
Annual Conference on Music and the Moving Image,
New York City, NY
- 2015 “Invisible Bodies in Contained Spaces: AIDS Representation in the
Korean Music Video *Loving Memory*”
Annual Conference of the Society for Disability Studies, Atlanta, GA
- 2018 “From Film to Music: Shifting Targets of Censorship in Authoritarian
Korea”
Annual Meeting of the American Comparative Literature Association,
Los Angeles, CA
- 2019 “The Shifting Censorship And Emergent Politics of South Korean *P'ok'ũ*
Music in the 1970s” (Printed Title on Program)
“Tracing Songs of Urban Plight from American Blues to Korean *P'ok'ũ*”
(Presentation Title)
Annual Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, Denver, CO

A Word on Korean Romanization

I use the McCune-Reischauer Romanization system, with the exception of select names and nouns that more commonly employ the Revised Romanization or alternate spellings, such as “Park Chung Hee” rather than “Pak Chŏnghŭi” and “Lee” instead of “I” when spelling out that particular family name. When addressing Korean names, I follow the Korean custom of stating their family names first, and I also hyphenate the given names of people and locations to aid readability. For example, I write the female *p'ok'ŭ* singer's name as “Yang Hŭi-ŭn” rather than “Hŭiŭn Yang” and I put a hyphen in “Myŏng-dong” when referring to the neighborhood seminal to *p'ok'ŭ*. While the English word “folk” has been transliterated as “hwŏ-kŭ” in addition to “p'ok'ŭ,” I adhere to the latter term due to its more prevalent use, and to differentiate South Korean *p'ok'ŭ* from both traditional Korean folk music as well as American popular folk music.

Introduction

South Korean *p'ok'ŭ* music lived and died with members of the youth generation (*ch'ŏngnyŏnsedae*) who experienced their twenties roughly during the time Park Chung Hee was in power (1963-1979). “P'ok'ŭ”—the Korean pronunciation of “folk”—music drew from American folk music and provided a respite for the youth generation, who were mostly university students searching for an alternative culture during times of rapid modernization and heightening oppression. If a reductive but frequently used timeline for the American Folk Revival begins with the hit of “Tom Dooley” by the Kingston Trio in 1958 and ends with Bob Dylan “going electric” while playing “Maggie’s Farm” at the Newport Festival in 1965, the South Korean *p'ok'ŭ* boom can be said to have occurred exactly a decade later, beginning with the debut of Twin Folio in 1968 and ending with the mass censorship of popular music and the infamous Marijuana Incident of 1975. *P'ok'ŭ* played a foundational role in the formation and undoing of 1970s youth culture (*ch'ŏngnyŏnminhwa*), which referred to the Western-derived musical and recreational activities popularized by university students due to their increased consumer power and cultural clout. This was the first post-war generation of educated urban youth who had the money and time for leisure pursuits; many were students whose access to higher education exposed them to the hypocrisies of Park’s escalating authoritarianism. I contend that under the scrutiny of such an authoritarian government, *p'ok'ŭ* singers experienced an inconsistent development, initially benefitting from censorship, only to be silenced by it after seven years in the popular music world.

I argue that *p'ok'ŭ* was a genre shaped by government-controlled media and censorship. I substantiate this argument by surveying *p'ok'ŭ*'s less politicized years between 1968 and 1973 when the media applauded its amateurism, originality, and anti-commercialism, and by disclosing how *p'ok'ŭ* benefitted from government censorship between 1971 and 1972, when broadcast producers promoted it as an alternative to other censored genres, such as *trot* and *rok*. I also unveil the contradictory impulses of *p'ok'ŭ* singers: in championing amateurism while gaining repute in the professional music industry; and in displaying anti-commercialist attitudes and upholding the singer songwriter model, despite the majority of early *p'ok'ŭ* songs being copies of international hit songs of various genres not limited to folk. Inversely, the media's treatment of *p'ok'ŭ* shifted from extolling it as "wholesome" music raising the quality of domestic popular music, to associating it with illicit activities such as the smoking of marijuana, to finally denouncing it as evidence of youth's blind embrace of "decadent" Western trends. I contend that the government criminalized fashion (such as blue jeans, mini-skirts, and men's long hair), recreational activities (such as the smoking of marijuana), and music (such as *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok*), painting these as evidence of youth's moral and cultural decline. This discredited student activists fighting to end oppression and create a new culture by and of the people (*minjung*), as well as young *p'ok'ŭ* singers drawing from Western culture to create original and progressively innovative music.

I propose a definition of *p'ok'ŭ* that hinges on the elite educated status, leisure activities, and political activism of university-educated youth, drawing from the concept of genre put forth by David Brackett. Brackett frames genre as an assemblage, in that it "articulates together notions of musical style, identifications, visual images, ways of moving and talking, and myriad

other factors.”¹ *P'ok'ŭ* conjures up the timbres of acoustic-guitar-accompanied vocal music, college-educated youth donning blue jeans and mini-skirts, and music listening rooms in Myŏng-dong stacked with bootleg foreign and domestic records. It also evokes the infamous blacklisting of over two hundred songs that transpired during the latter half of 1975 and the Marijuana Incident that made the news that December, in which star *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* singers were disgraced as marijuana-smoking criminals. Since these sounds, images, spaces, and actions all contribute to the assemblage that constitute the genre of *p'ok'ŭ*, understanding the story of *p'ok'ŭ* requires probing the impact of Park’s censorship of the media and popular music. Therefore, I analyze the moral guidelines and mechanisms of government-mandated and voluntary forms of censorship that affected *p'ok'ŭ*. I argue that censors—in addition to “music producers (musicians and music-industry workers), audience members, and critics”—played an integral role in what Brackett calls the “feedback loop in which ideas and assumptions about genre circulate.”² Censorship shaped *p'ok'ŭ* in authoritarian South Korea: the government promoted the genre when it was deemed apolitical and banned it when it was later deemed political.

Researching *p'ok'ŭ* necessitates the incorporation of three components that shaped the genre: 1) the youth generation, whose growing clout pushed *p'ok'ŭ* into the limelight, making the music indispensable to 1970s youth culture; 2) the Park regime, whose censorship of popular music initially aided before condemning *p'ok'ŭ*; and 3) the student movement (*haksængundong*), which was radicalizing especially after 1972 when Park initiated the *Yushin* constitution that legitimized his *de facto* dictatorship. I contend that *p'ok'ŭ*’s popularity among the predominantly

¹ David Brackett, *Categorizing Sound: Genre and Twentieth-Century Popular Music*, (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016), 10.

² *Ibid.*, 16.

university-educated youth generation provoked the regime, whose principle source of opposition came from student protestors. To be sure, youth culture was different from the student movement, even though the main actors of both were university students. Youth culture was primarily the recreational—rather than the political—culture of urban youth, who found in *p'ok'ŭ* and other Western-derived pop songs, new styles of music that resonated with their cosmopolitan tastes. On the other hand, university student activists who formed the student movement espoused the ideology of “people’s democracy” (*minjung juŭi*), which aimed to draw on the lived experience of the oppressed people in building resistance against Park. Youth culture came under media scrutiny in 1974 when a *Tongailbo* article naming top *p'ok'ŭ* singers as the flagbearers of youth culture sparked a public debate, which led to the conflation of youth culture and the student movement. This event, dubbed the Youth Culture Debate, happened while Park’s *Yushin*-era policies were galvanizing campus demonstrations, inspiring *p'ok'ŭ* singers to imbue their music with the ideology of *minjung* democracy. The politicization of youth culture meant the politicization of *p'ok'ŭ*, it being the quintessential genre fostered in university campuses.

The politicization of *p'ok'ŭ* was soon followed by the notorious blacklisting of 223 songs, over the course of three phases during the latter half of 1975. This blacklisting—regarded as the most extensive and absolute example of music censorship in modern Korean history—was carried out under the auspices of ridding popular music of songs that, in theory, threatened national security and harmony, and blindly imitated “decadent” Western trends.³ In practice, the timing and method of the blacklisting hit *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* singers the hardest. In December 1975, many of the same singers impacted by the blacklisting made headlines depicted as marijuana-

³ “The Control and Prohibition of Popular Music,” National Institute of Korean History, accessed May 4, 2020, http://contents.history.go.kr/front/hm/view.do?treeId=010804&tabId=01&levelId=hm_164_0020.

smoking criminals deserving of punishment. Due to the Machiavellian connection the Park regime drew between youth culture, Western-influenced music, and marijuana, *p'ok'ŭ* music died in 1975, only to experience a revival during the 1980s when collective action to end tyranny peaked.

Myŏng-dong As the Center of *P'ok'ŭ*

A key urban-geographical focus of my research is the downtown neighborhood called Myŏng-dong, which is in the middle of Seoul's northern region above the Han River. This neighborhood was the cultural epicenter of youth culture, and therefore is a pertinent area for scrutinizing how coveted places of music-making and recreation were policed by the regime. The case of Myŏng-dong offers me an opportunity to research how Park's crackdown on youth culture affected the social and aesthetic practices of *p'ok'ŭ*.

Since the 1950s, Myŏng-dong attracted domestic and foreign visitors due to its high concentration of boutiques and financial companies, as well as the presence of the U.S. Army Post Exchange, which served as a portal for U.S.-made consumer goods. While this sector of downtown was known for its modern architectural landmarks, which included the national theater, the Myŏng-dong Cathedral, the Chinese embassy, and the Central Post Office, above all, it was a hub for writers, actors, and musicians who patronized the numerous cafés that proliferated since the end of the Korean War. Massive urban reconstruction carried out during the mayorship of Kim Hyun-ok (1966-1970)—acting in accordance with Park's commands to modernize Seoul—introduced high-rise apartment buildings, major underpasses and overpasses, and large-scale department stores to areas in and around Myŏng-dong. By the early 1970s, it became a major destination for youth seeking the latest fashion and artistic trends. However, the

centrality of Myōng-dong began to weaken by 1976, due to the three-fold expansion of a raised parkway that cut through the neighborhood, combined with the relocation of major financial corporations from Myōng-dong to newly developed areas south of the Han River.

During its prime, Myōng-dong served as the mecca for South Korea's *p'ok'ū* boom. Urban youth flocked to this vibrant neighborhood, where they could choose from various “music listening rooms” (*ūmakkamsangshil*), the genres of music they desired to listen to, and the kinds of beer they preferred to drink. Seoul's first gateway to American folk music was a music listening room called C'est Si Bon, and as the popularity of *p'ok'ū* shot up, other music venues such as Shim-ji Cafe, Le Silence, and Nashville sprung up to accommodate the growing number of *p'ok'ū* enthusiasts and singers, who were seeking less commercial places to perform in that authenticated their commitment to amateurism.

Park Chung Hee's Rise to Power

Deliberating how Park Chung Hee's policies shaped the aesthetics, image, and artistic values of *p'ok'ū*, requires understanding his rise to power. Despite the modernization of colonial Korea during the 1920s and 30s under Imperial Japan, the Korean War (1950-1953) had left the country without infrastructure or a functioning economy necessary to feed a starving population. Twelve years of governance by President Rhee Syng-man (1948-1960)—the first president of the Republic of Korea—did little to alleviate the poverty and strife of Korean citizens desperate to turn the page on three decades of Japanese rule and a traumatic proxy war that split apart their home country. When Park Chung Hee organized a coup d'état in 1961, he recast himself from a military general to an authoritarian president. During his presidency between 1963 to 1979, Park momentarily changed the nation's economic and urban cultural landscape. In realizing his

promise to produce hyper economic growth, Park partnered with the *chaebol* (big corporations), revamping them into export-driven industrial conglomerates. And in realizing his promise of modernization, he redeveloped the infrastructure and built environment of the nation. According to calculations reported in *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961-1979*, Park oversaw the construction of nine expressways between 1967 and 1977, and the paving of nearly half of the nation's previously unpaved roads by 1975; this infrastructure forms the backbone of South Korean ground transportation to this day.⁴ The Mayor of Seoul, Kim Hyŏn-ok, earned the nickname “bulldozer,” for the manner in which he pushed forward the construction of high-rise apartment buildings, underpasses and overpasses, and major commercial structures during his time in office (1966-1970).

Park advanced a nationalist ideology that exploited the people's widespread desire to overcome the influence of Japanese colonialism and U.S. imperialism. From the early years of his presidency, Park argued that “in order to establish a firm national identity and overcome social apathy, [South Koreans] should reaffirm the superior legacies of [our] culture and tradition and foster the creation of a new culture on the basis of these legacies.”⁵ Notwithstanding the promotion of anti-colonial and anti-Western values, Park's acts of economic and political control reflected ideological influences that stemmed from both Japan and the United States. According to political scientists Chung-in Moon and Byung-joon Jun, Park “mixed the Japanese ethos of top-down mobilization and the U.S. ideas of technocracy with Korean nationalism in most un-

⁴ Hyung-A Kim, *Korea's Development under Park Hung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961-1979*, (London: Routledge, 2004), 210.

⁵ Chung-in Moon and Byung-joon Jun, “Modernization Strategy: Ideas and Influences,” in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2011), 123.

Japanese and un-American ways to clear the way for economic growth.”⁶ From a political standpoint, however, due to his Japanese education and training as a military officer in the Imperial Japanese Army, “U.S. military intelligence put him on its watch list throughout his military career.”⁷ Furthermore, “U.S. intervention made America the primary source of democratic ideals and support for political opposition groups in South Korea, encouraging the formation of a transnational alliance between Americans and South Korean opposition groups against Park’s authoritarian rule.”⁸ Taking these politically tense and precarious relationships into account, Park’s wavering stance on Westernization and aggressive restrictions on U.S.-derived fashion and music may seem less capricious.

Contemporary Relevance of Park Chung Hee

Park’s standing in Korean history remains a controversial topic due to his seminal role in shaping the nation’s current infrastructure and setting an example of absolute political control. Many of those who lived through Park’s repressive policies—some of whom participated in coordinated efforts of protest against him—bemoan the lack of Park-ian displays of autonomy, anti-communism, and capitalist drive in successive leaders. On the other hand, the dominating voice in current politics is a more socialist strand that brought about the 2016 impeachment of Park’s daughter Park Geun-hye, who had four years before been elected the first female president of South Korea. Ensuing president Moon Jae-in won the election of 2017 campaigning against corporate corruption and for transparency—antitheses to the preferential relationships

⁶ Ibid., 115.

⁷ Ibid., 132.

⁸ Ibid., 133.

with big corporations (or *chaebol*) and notorious blacklists of artists that *both* Parks had. The recent surge in academic articles that examine music and film from the 1960s and 1970s, reflects a renewed interest in the Park Chung Hee-era, denoting that it took forty years to generate enough critical distance to (re)visit and (re-)evaluate the music and culture that blossomed during times of drastic modernization and equally extreme forms of despotism.

Literature Review

My dissertation is the first monograph-length examination written in English that explores South Korean *p'ok'ŭ*'s cultural and political history. Existing appraisals of *p'ok'ŭ* thematize its stylistic and aesthetic development but take no account of how the music evolved as a result of the government's shifting targets of censorship.⁹ I intend to fill this lacuna through my research, which culls predominantly from primary source newspaper reports on *p'ok'ŭ*, in addition to studies that discuss censorship, intersect with *p'ok'ŭ*, or more broadly discuss Korean popular music during the latter half of the twentieth century.¹⁰ Two authors whose works are integral to my journalistic analysis of *p'ok'ŭ* are: Shin Hyunjoon, whose two-part series *The Archaeology of Korean Pop, 1960 and 1970*, provides a rigorously researched documentation of the tectonic shifts that occurred in Korean popular music with the rise of a youth-oriented music

⁹ Ki-yŏng Pak, "Plantation and Independence: Development and Completion of Korean Modern *P'ok'ŭ* Music (1968-1975)," Masters Thesis, Dongguk University, 2003; Chu-wŏn Lee and Sŏng-kyu Hong, "A Study on Acceptance Phase of the Foreign Music in Early Korean Modern Folk Music and Its Significance," *The Journal of Global Cultural Contents* 24 (June, 2018): 115-132.

¹⁰ Ok-pae Mun, *The Social History of Prohibited Songs in Korea*, (Seoul: Yesol, 2004); Pil-ho Kim and Hyunjoon Shin, "The Birth of *Rok*: Cultural Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Glocalization of Rock Music in South Korea, 1964-1975," *positions* 18.1 (2010): 199-230; Ae-kyung Park, "Modern Folksong and People's Song (*Minjung Kayo*)," in *Made in Korea: Studies in Popular Music*, eds. Hyunjoon Shin and Seung-Ah Lee, 83-93, (London and New York: Routledge, 2017); Yu-chŏng Chang and Pyŏng-ki Sŏ, *Introduction to Korean Popular Music History* (Seoul: Sŏngandang, 2015).

industry; and Kim Hyöng-ch'an, who hones in on the foundational institutions and venues that fostered the *p'ok'ũ* boom.¹¹

The most salient difference between English scholarship that discuss North American folk music and Korean monographs that evaluate South Korean *p'ok'ũ* music, is how American folk singers are celebrated because of their political activism while South Korean *p'ok'ũ* singers are often described as victims of repressive governmental politics.¹² Compared to American folk music, *p'ok'ũ* had an ambiguous positionality vis-à-vis protest, in part due to the student movement's ostensible failure under Park, but more so because the youth culture that formed around *p'ok'ũ* was more privileged than the increasingly inter-class coalition of student activists, who were radicalizing in proportion to the marginalization of laborers. Korean scholarship about 1970s youth culture discusses the unique identity of the youth generation, and the socioeconomic context that brought about its burgeoning.¹³ Most relevant to *p'ok'ũ* is Kim Chang-nam's conceptualization of youth culture focusing on the singular role Kim Min-ki played in creating music that “considers an alternative” and “fiercely denies and criticizes reality,” while other

¹¹ Hyunjoon Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop, 1960 and 1970* (Paju: Hankil Arts Press, 2005); Hyöng-ch'an Kim, “1970s Acoustic Guitar Music and the Infrastructure of Youth Culture,” in *Popular Music, Song Movement, and Youth Culture*, ed. Kim Chang-nam, (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2004) 159-192; Hyöngch'an Kim, *A Stroll in Korean Popular Music History: Decisive Scenes of Popular Music in the 1960s and 1970s*, (Seoul: Alma books, 2015).

¹² Seminal works that examine the American Folk Revival include: Robert Cantwell, *When We Were Good: The Folk Revival* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Ronald D. Cohen, “Stirrings of the Revival, 1955-1957” and “The Revival's Peak, 1963-1964,” in *Rainbow Quest: The Folk Music Revival and American Society, 1940-1970* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002), 93-124 and 194-228; Lawrence J. Epstein, *Political Folk Music in America from its Origins to Bob Dylan* (London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2010).

¹³ Chang-nam Kim, “The Cultural identity of Korean Youth Culture in the 1970s,” *Korean Journal of Popular Music* 2 (2008): 144-165; Yöng-mi Lee, “Why did Youth Culture Happen In The 1970s?” *Inmulgwa Sasang* 2 (2016): 168-181; Hye-rim Lee, “The Formation of 1970s Korean Youth Culture: Focusing on the Cultural Consumption of Popular Music,” *Social Research* 2 (2005): 7-40.

p'ok'ŭ singers were more vague in their expressions and superficial in their commitment to politics.¹⁴ And most perceptive is Song Ŭn-yŏng's conception of youth culture, as an antithesis to *both* the "ideologies of modernization and individual economic independence enforced by Park," as well as the opposing ideology of nationalist "people's democracy" (*minjung ju-ŭi*) espoused by student activists.¹⁵

Nonetheless, due to the conflation of youth culture and the student movement that occurred during the 1974 Youth Culture Debate, student *p'ok'ŭ* singers began using the music as a medium for candid, journalistic, and defiant expressions. Thus, in order to interrogate how the student movement influenced *p'ok'ŭ*, I review studies that document Park's military-enforced suppression of dissidence as well as the growing resistance of student protestors during the 1970s.¹⁶ I glean from recent articles that analyze the film *The March of Fools* (1975), for my critical evaluation of the film's employment of *p'ok'ŭ* in expressing the ideals of college-educated youth subjected to Park's increasing authoritarianism and violent forms of oppression.¹⁷

¹⁴ Chang-nam Kim, "Kim Min-ki and the Conceptualization of a New Youth Culture," in *Popular Music, Song Movement, and Youth Culture*, ed. Chang-nam Kim, (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2004), 26.

¹⁵ Ŭn-yŏng Song, "Choi Inho's Novel as a Phenomenon of Mass Culture: The Style and Consumption of Youth Culture/Literature in 1970s Korea," *Sanghur Hakbo* 15 (2005): 419-445.

¹⁶ Pyŏng-uk An, "The *Yushin* System And the Anti-*Yushin* Democratization Movement," in *Yushin and Anti-Yushin*, ed. Byong-wook Ahn (Sunin: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2005), 13-46; Ki-hun Lee, "Student Anti-*Yushin* Protests in the 1970s," in *Yushin and Anti-Yushin*, ed. Byong-wook Ahn, (Sunin: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2005), 457-514; Shin et al., "The Korean Democracy Movement: An Empirical Overview," in *South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society*, eds. Gi-Wook Shin, and Paul Y Chang, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 21-40; Myung-Lim Park, "The *Chaeya*," in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 373-400.

¹⁷ Chong-ho Ham, "The Nihilism and Tragic Nature, Appeared in Ha Gil-Jong's Movie *The March of Fools*," *The Review of Korean Cultural Studies* 39 (2012): 405-440; Sŏng-ryul Kang, *Ha Kil-Chong, Or The Fool Who Marched*, (Seoul: Theory and Practice, 2005); U-hyŏng Chŏn, "The Significance of Desecrated and Dissociated Textures in 1970s Korea: The March of Fools Experimental Images as Defiance to Censorship," *The Journal of Korean Modern Literature* 37 (2012): 387-415; Suk-yŏng Kang,

And my investigation of how *p'ok'ŭ* came to be linked with marijuana despite its previous reputation as intellectual, “high-class,” and “wholesome” music, is substantiated by primary source news articles that report on marijuana, expanding on Lee Yŏng-mi’s percipient examination of the Marijuana Incident of 1975.¹⁸

The critical framework of my research is inspired by scholarly texts that synthesize music history with urban-geographical analysis. I learned from *Dissonant Identities: The Rock ‘n’ Roll Scene in Austin Texas* (1994), in which Barry Shank brings to light the pivotal roles music venues in Austin played in securing the development of new musical genres during times of modernization, urbanization, and late capitalism. In *Music and Urban Geography* (2007), Adam Krims provides a perceptive analysis of how changes in urban structures affect the production and consumption of music, and how portrayals of cities as represented in songs reveal levels of autonomy and agency. Stephen Petrus and Ronald D. Cohen’s *Folk City: New York and the American Folk Music Revival* (2015) is most relevant to my urban historical research. In this book, Petrus and Cohen skillfully incorporate city planning history in their detailed descriptions of the battles fought between New York City’s urban establishment and the alliance formed amongst folk singers, beatniks, and young liberals who socialized in Greenwich Village. In Seoul, Park authorized the police to regulate the music, lighting, and appearance of the young

“The Whale and the Censorship in the Films based on Choi In-ho’s Novels Focus on March of the fools and the Whale hunting,” *Literary Criticism* 70 (2018): 7-30; Hyŏn-chŏng Kwŏn, “Regarding the Political Nature of Youth Behavior and their Resistance (Im)Possibility Focusing on the Movie *The March of Fools*,” *Cogito* 81 (February, 2017): 586-611; Hyo-in Lee, “The Centrifugal Aesthetics of The March of Fools,” *Contemporary Film Studies* 26 (2017): 7-36; Hyŏn'gyŏng Chŏng, “Depression of City People as a Symbol of Hybrid City in the 1970s: Focused on *Heavenly Homecoming To Stars*, *Yŏngja’s Heydays*, *The March of Fools*, and *It Rained Yesterday*,” *The Journal of Korean Drama and Theatre* 41 (2013): 253-283.

¹⁸ Young-mi Lee, “The 1975 Marijuana Incident and Its Meaning,” *History Critique* 112 (2015): 206-231.

patrons who frequented recreational venues clustered in Myŏng-dong. The above texts help me understand the disciplinary arrests of adolescents and youth carried out in this neighborhood, where key *p'ok'ŭ* venues provided spaces away from the capitalist popular music industry, for both amateur and professional singers. I thereby illustrate Myŏng-dong's ephemeral yet lasting identity as South Korea's urban *p'ok'ŭ* scene.

In constructing an evidence-based documentation about a musical genre that is the product of trans-Pacific cultural exchange and urbanization, I harness the mission of UCLA's Urban Humanities Initiative (UHI), which “integrates the interpretive, historical approaches of the humanities with the material, projective practices of design, to document, elucidate, and transform the cultural object we call the city.”¹⁹ Researching the rise and fall of South Korean *p'ok'ŭ* music demands a trans-disciplinary perspective because, as mentioned above, it involves learning about the geopolitical relationship between South Korea, North Korea, and the U.S. during the *détente* period of the Cold War, as well as the influence of U.S. cultural imperialism in the development of South Korean youth culture. Moreover, one of the primary goals of UHI includes creating a “thick map” that unveils the erased, overlooked, and multiperspectival stories of marginalized communities. I embrace UHI's multifaceted approach in mapping the multifarious impact—political, cultural, and musical—Park's repressive policies made on *p'ok'ŭ*.

Methodology and Chapter Roadmap

My research is substantiated by primary source data collected from: the Congressional Library of Korea; the archives of Professors Shin Hyunjoon and Kim Chang-nam at

¹⁹ “About” page, UCLA Urban Humanities Initiative, accessed May 6, 2020, <https://www.urbanhumanities.ucla.edu/about>.

Sungkonghoe University; and Naver News, which is an aggregate digital database of four major newspapers—*Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, *Tongailbo*, *Maeilgyŏngje*, and *Han'gyŏrye*—published between 1920 and 1999. My evidence consists of newspaper articles of varying political leanings, music magazines no longer published, and a copy of the official government document listing songs blacklisted between 1968 and 1980. Excerpts of primary source news included in this dissertation are all first and original translations. I investigate articles that discuss *p'ok'ŭ* and the censorship of popular music between 1963 and 1976 in my exploration of: 1) media portrayals that laud the scholarship, amateurism, and creativity of *p'ok'ŭ* singers, which contributed to *p'ok'ŭ*'s establishment as music that represented the elite and erudite culture of college-educated youth; 2) the media's portrayal of music venues seminal to *p'ok'ŭ* that were controlled by laws proscribing foreign goods, loud music, and “immoral” activities; 3) the moral guidelines of censorship condemning “vulgar” and “decadent” music that initially benefitted *p'ok'ŭ* at the expense of other genres, but later were used to denounce *p'ok'ŭ* as well; 4) the published responses of university students and professors who criticized the consumerist, bourgeois, and seemingly apathetic conceptions of youth culture, reflecting the radicalizing nature of the student movement; and 5) the media's framing of marijuana as a sign of “decadent” Western customs infiltrating students and the entertainers.

All four chapters of this dissertation are corroborated by the aforementioned primary source media reports. In the first chapter, I introduce the youth generation as affluent, urban, and mostly university-educated youth who cultivated the practice of singing *p'ok'ŭ* songs in university campuses and music venues situated in Myŏng-dong. I follow this introduction by exploring how mainstream media portrayed the stardom of student *p'ok'ŭ* singers between 1968 and 1973. Despite the media's approval of student *p'ok'ŭ* singers' intellectuality and amateurism,

the genre's reputation was tenuous. This was evinced by the policing of select music venues integral to *p'ok'ŭ* under charges related to marijuana in 1972. Nonetheless, the genre's amateur origins in university campuses made the student status of *p'ok'ŭ* singers their most distinct attribute. In chapter two, I trace *p'ok'ŭ*'s advancement in the popular music world catapulted by the craze for Western-derived *p'ap* music as well as the government-mandated Clampdown on Decadent Trends (*t'oep'yep'ungjotansok*), which was enforced starting in October 1971. I investigate how the censorship of “vulgar” and overly sentimental *trot* songs as well as “decadent” and loud *rok* music, precipitated the promotion of *p'ok'ŭ* as the “wholesome” and quiet substitute. The wholesome image of *p'ok'ŭ* led to the primacy of the acoustic guitar, eclipsing early attempts of *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* singers who experimented across the two genres. Starting in 1973 and surely by 1974, amplified hybrid productions of *p'ok'ŭ* music began topping the charts, attesting to *p'ok'ŭ* singers having embraced *rok* as an opportune mode for creating relatable and communicative music when the government was prohibiting the media from reporting on student demonstrations.

My overview of the student movement, which starts the third chapter, employs secondary sources due to the paucity of mainstream journalism that addressed student protests. Park's suppression of mainstream media pushed the communication of activists, leftists, and radicals underground, creating an eerie absence of protest reported in the overground press.²⁰ Comparing this dearth to the evidence of student activists tear-gassed, arrested, and tortured during the 1970s, one begins to comprehend the immense force deployed by Park to silence the student protestors. Such a repressive political milieu forms the backdrop to the 1975 film *The March of*

²⁰ For a systemic overview of how the media worked under Park, see: Sŏ-chung Kim, “The Power of the *Yushin* System and the Media,” in *Yushin and Anti-Yushin*, ed. Byong-wook Ahn (Sunin: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2005), 161-216.

Fools, which I analyze as an audiovisual object that captures the angst and dreams of university students whose education exposed them to the contradictions of a regime that touted economic growth and an efficient form of nationalist democracy, while restraining their personal liberties and freedom of expression. I argue that in such a paradoxical and restrictive environment, *p'ok'ŭ* underwent a paradoxical and restrictive evolution, and with the radicalization of student protests during the twilight days of youth culture, came to convey the inchoate articulations of political resistance of South Korea's debatably first modern generation of youth. Finally in chapter four, I scrutinize the demise of *p'ok'ŭ* by uncovering the patterns and targets of the peremptory blacklisting of 223 popular songs that occurred over three stages during the summer of 1975. While the blacklisting of 1975 targeted *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* singers idolized by youth, their ultimate fall from grace occurred with the crackdown on marijuana signaled by the sensationalized arrests of top *p'ok'ŭ* singers in December 1975. By elucidating the motivations behind the Park regime's most devastating acts of censorship and suppression, I illustrate the significance of *p'ok'ŭ*'s targeted silencing as concomitant with the downfall of youth culture.

Chapter 1. Towards a Social Definition of South Korean *P'ok'ŭ*

Introduction

In this chapter I argue that South Korean popular “p'ok'ŭ” (Korean pronunciation of “folk”) music was a genre identified by its provenance, patronage, and popularity among college-educated youth, who were the main actors of 1970s youth culture (*ch'ŏngnyŏnmunhwa*). By providing a social definition of *p'ok'ŭ*, this chapter sets up the framework for unpacking the story of *p'ok'ŭ*, whose connection to university students provoked an increasingly authoritarian government that was wary of dissent mobilized by student activists. While the amateur practice of playing *p'ok'ŭ* among university students dates back to at least 1963, I mainly focus on *p'ok'ŭ*'s emergence in mainstream media from 1969 through 1973, in order to explain how *p'ok'ŭ* became a genre identified by the educated status of its musicians and fans, as much as by its stylistic features such as the initially ubiquitous acoustic guitar accompaniment. In conjunction, I examine how the media presented student *p'ok'ŭ* stars who first broke into the music industry and early *p'ok'ŭ* concerts that proved youth's craze for Western-derived popular music. In doing so, I elucidate the contradictory dynamics underlying *p'ok'ŭ*: first, it espoused amateurism and displayed anti-commercialist attitudes, while copying international hit songs recorded by professional musicians of genres including but not limited to folk; second, it was associated with higher education yet came under the scrutiny of authorities cracking down on transgressive, “immoral,” and “decadent” activities, such as the smoking of marijuana.

P'ok'ŭ symbolized the privileged taste of educated urban youth, whose collective identity was dubbed the youth generation (*ch'ŏngnyŏnsedae*). That *p'ok'ŭ* originated as a leisure activity among university students who prioritized their studies over music, made amateurism, along with

the craze for and commitment to the acoustic guitar, foundational principles of the genre. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, music listening rooms and salons located in Seoul's downtown Myōng-dong area fostered the amateur and communal practice of singing *p'ok'ŭ* songs, making these venues instrumental to the development and popularization of *p'ok'ŭ*. Myōng-dong was the cultural hub of the youth generation, whose recreational and musical activities were restricted by the government. When the media reported on the use of marijuana having reached the student demographic, the police regulated the lighting, music, and activities of select venues in Myōng-dong that provided alternative spaces for *p'ok'ŭ* singers, signaling that customs associated with Western “hippie” culture, such as the smoking of marijuana, lead to cultural and moral decline. This process of linking marijuana to youth culture unfolded over the span of roughly two years between 1970 and 1972, during which *p'ok'ŭ* singers, after experiencing commercial success in the music industry, made coordinated attempts to return to their amateur roots by limiting their activities to school campuses and to anti-commercial music venues in Myōng-dong, such as the aforementioned ones that were policed. Thus in this chapter, I explore the student status of *p'ok'ŭ* singers as the defining trait of the genre, while also discussing the recreational culture of educated urban youth and the prohibitive policies of the Park regime that targeted students—respective components that precipitated *p'ok'ŭ*'s genesis and demise.

Before moving on to this exploration, I must first explain the nomenclature of South Korean popular music, which I will use throughout the dissertation. The two main and opposing streams of South Korean popular music during the late 1960s and early 1970s were “trot”-style music (commonly dubbed “ppong-tchak” due to the onomatopoeic way Koreans articulate the duple meter, which is an essential trait of the genre), and “p'ap” (Korean pronunciation of

“pop”)-style music. *Trot* or *ppong-tchak*-style music was developed during Japanese colonial rule and is known for its signature melismas and forlorn melodies outlining minor pentatonic scales, characteristically executed in an impassioned, vibrato-filled voice. On the other hand, *p'ap*-style music refers to a wide range of genres influenced by Anglo-American popular music. These genres included: *p'ok'ŭ*, “rok” or “group sound” (designating “rock” and rock bands respectively), country, soul, and “saiki” (an abbreviated term for psychedelic music).²¹ A common stereotype of the time aligned *trot* music with the older generation living outside the metropolitan area as well as young factory workers who migrated from the country to the cities in search of jobs, and *p'ap* music with young urbanites. This divide in musical taste mirrored divides in class (lower class laborers versus middle and upper class college students), region (rural versus urban), and most importantly generation (the older *kisŏngsedae* versus the younger *ch'ŏngnyŏnsedae*).²² By and large, *trot* was the dominating force in Korean popular music throughout the 1960s and 1970s in terms of record sales, domestic music charts, and appearances in radio and television shows.²³ However, by the late 1960s, thanks to the growing influence of the youth generation, *p'ok'ŭ* began to emerge as a competitive genre in the music industry, along with other styles of *p'ap* music adored by youth.

²¹ Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1960*, 258. According to Shin, the term “group sound” came to Korea via Japan, where they adopted the term as a substitute and easier pronunciation of “rock’n’roll.”

²² The term “*kisŏngsedae*” not only refers to adults or older generations, but those who represent the establishment. So, it is as much about power as it is about age. But to be consistent, I will translate the term as “older generation” and include explanations when necessary.

²³ Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1960*, 200: According to the list of “MBC Top 10 Singers” and “Best Singer” which respectively represent the ten most popular singers, and ostensibly, the *most* popular singer of the year, *trot* singers consistently make up the majority of the winners between 1966 and 1975. In addition, the primary source news articles that I surveyed spanning from roughly 1968 to 1975, frequently describe *trot* as the predominant genre in popular music that will prevail despite the upsurge of *p'ap* music favored by the youth generation.

Who Was The Youth Generation?

The social networks and urban scene of *p'ok'ŭ* played foundational roles in the burgeoning of youth culture, which in turn, fostered the development of *p'ok'ŭ*, making the link between the music and culture inextricable. I explained above the homological relationship between different generational populations and popular music: the musical taste of the “youth generation” (*ch'ŏngnyŏnsedae*) leaned toward Western-derived *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* music, while the “older generation” (*kisŏngsedae*) favored *trot* music.²⁴ Again, this divide in musical taste mirrored divides not only between different age groups, but also between different regions (Seoul and other big cities versus rural agricultural areas) and class (elite college students versus factory laborers). It is ironic that a privileged group of educated urban youth chose folk music—a foreign genre derived from the traditions of common, everyday people—to differentiate themselves from rural and lower class people.²⁵ *P'ok'ŭ*'s ties to the youth generation deserve explanation primarily to elucidate the music's connection to youth culture, but also to understand the reason *p'ok'ŭ* didn't break into the music industry until the tail end of the 1960s: because its fans—the youth generation—did not gain sufficient cultural and economic clout until then.

The identity of the youth generation can be described as middle to upper class, educated, and urban. I will explain these three characteristics in order, by summoning the governmental policies that precipitated such economic, social, and urban-geographical changes. After seizing power via a military coup in 1961, Park Chung Hee quickly turned his attention to economic

²⁴ Brackett, *Categorizing Sound*, 17: Brackett defines “the idea of homology” as “that categories of people are directly related to categories of music.”

²⁵ To be sure, South Korean *p'ok'ŭ* singers performed all varieties of folk music including national, traditional, and commercial folk music from the second folk revival. However, they still upheld the idea of “folk” music originating from the people.

growth in order to gain the support of a public desperate for national security and social uplift. During his nearly two decades as head of state, Park transformed the armed forces “into a defender of national security, a guardian of regime stability, *and* a modernizer of society,” generating hypergrowth, especially in the heavy manufacturing industries.²⁶ This led to drastic improvements in South Korea’s GDP per capita, which was \$254 in 1970 but surpassed \$1,000 in 1977.²⁷ Park’s export-oriented growth, however, came at the expense of laborers, who were exploited despite laws ostensibly protecting their rights—a fact worth mentioning because the inter-class coalition formed between labor and student activists mobilized and radicalized the pro-democracy student movement. In contrast, the relatively affluent youth generation was exempt from labor and instead pursued specialized jobs requiring longer preparation time to learn new knowledge and skills, which meant more time for leisure before attaining employment. Thus, the youth generation, in becoming an essential part of middle and upper class consumers, was the first post-war demographic who had the money and time to spend on recreational pursuits.

Essential to the specialization of the youth generation was their attainment of higher education between the late 1960s and 1970s. According to Lee Ki-hun, Park Chung Hee was “restrictive and selective about increasing the quota of university students” because “the university had the potential of becoming a threat to [his] military regime.”²⁸ Nonetheless, due to

²⁶ Byung-Kook Kim, “Introduction: The Case for Political History,” in *The Park Chun-hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 14.

²⁷ T’ae-wan Kim, “An Illustration of South Korea’s Growth in GDP Per Capita,” January, 2010 issue of *Monthly Chosŏn Newsroom*, accessed May 31, 2020, <http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?ctcd=&nNewsNumb=201001100082>.

²⁸ Ki-hun Lee, “1970s Anti-*Yushin* Student Movement,” 460-461.

the need to cultivate a skilled and educated workforce that would propel economic development, the regime increased the number of university students from 144,434 in 1970 to 208,985 in 1975.²⁹ Considering that the population of South Korea in 1975 was 20,452,453, university students made up about 1% of the entire population that year.³⁰ The actual proportion of university students compared to their peer demographic population was small enough to deem them a privileged elite, but sizeable enough to collectively mobilize and voice dissent. Citing the rise of high school attendance in the 1970s, Lee Ki-hun estimates that university students made up around 10% of their peer demographic, “enhancing the mobilizing capacity of student activism, and accelerating the speed in which campus issues spread throughout society.”³¹ In addition, referring to university research conducted in 1975, Lee states that by then, more than half of university students living in agricultural areas considered that “all men should receive university education.”³² Since students living in agricultural areas are considered more conservative than their counterparts who live in urban areas, this research suggests a predominant acceptance of higher education as a given, notwithstanding the patriarchal undertones in the survey’s emphasis on men over women. The disposition that everyone should attend college, in reverse, solidified “the political awareness of university students was the

²⁹ Ibid., 461.

³⁰ “Population by City and Region, 1967-1975,” KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information Service), accessed March 16, 2020, http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=110&tblId=TX_11001_A223.

³¹ Lee, “1970s Anti-*Yushin* Student Movement,” 462. High school attendance rose from 8.4% in 1970 to 9.3% in 1975, to 15.9% in 1980.

³² Ibid. Based on a 1975 dissertation by Lee Nam-ki titled “Survey Regarding Ethical Values of University Students in Agricultural Areas,” Agricultural Research Paper, Kyungnam University, Agricultural Resource Institute.

standard of the youth generation.”³³ This outlook became a hot-button issue during the 1974 Youth Culture Debate, when university professors and students criticized the recreational culture of youth as apathetic and consumerist: I analyze this discussion in chapter three in relation to the student movement and politicization of *p'ok'ŭ*.

And lastly, the youth generation was decidedly urban, not only because the majority of their schools were in Seoul, but also because downtown Myŏng-dong became the main attraction for teens and youth seeking the latest artistic trends. More than half of universities built during the 1960s and 1970s were in Seoul, creating an urban concentration of university students that facilitated contact and exchange of information.³⁴ This concentration of university students “provided the foundation and opportunities for the formation of a social consensus to be recognized as a special generation or class.”³⁵ Youth culture (*ch'ŏngnyŏnmunhwa*) refers to the musical and recreational activities enjoyed by this special generation or class—known as the youth generation—who flocked to Myŏng-dong and Mugyo-dong, where they could listen to recordings of Western popular music, and view live performances of rising domestic *p'ok'ŭ* singers. Later I recount the integral role downtown music venues played in cultivating the practice of listening to, singing, and making music for leisure, thereby catapulting *p'ok'ŭ* into the limelight.

³³ Ibid., 462-463.

³⁴ Hye-rim Lee, “The Formation of 1970s Korean Youth Culture,” 24.

³⁵ Ibid.

The Yu Se-hyŏng *P'okŭ* Singers: The First Documented Appearance of “P'ok'ŭ”

The status of *P'ok'ŭ*'s as a respectable amateur activity among college-educated students dates back to 1963. I analyze the first documented appearance of the word “p'okŭ,” which occurred in a *Tongailbo* article published on July 11, 1963, introducing the Yu Se-hyŏng *P'okŭ* Singers.³⁶

Yu Se-hyŏng (age, 24), of the Yu Se-hyŏng *P'okŭ* Singers, graduated from the English Department of Dong-guk University, and is a story-teller who has presented three English novels in the U.S. His fellow *p'ok'ŭ* singer is Jung Young-il (age, 24), who studied Voice at the Music School in Seoul National University and is a shy youth who doesn't like to brag. Yu started singing *p'okŭ* songs three years ago, motivated by a Mr. Jones who graduated from Princeton University in the U.S., and shares that the appeal of *p'okŭ* music is its ability to “communicate with the audience in a soft manner without special technique.” Yu and Jung have been well received on TV, by the Eighth U.S. Army, and especially by the intellectual audience who attend the “Monday Tuesday Wednesday” Jazz Festival held at the Drama Center. Saying that they prefer Burl Ives and Joan Baez rather than Belafonte who is a professional folk singer, the musicians made an innocent smile adding that singing for them is a hobby, not something they wish to pursue professionally. *P'okŭ* songs they enjoy performing include “Come Back Liza” and “I Love You Very Much” among others.³⁷

³⁶ “Vocal Team: Yu Se-hyŏng *P'ok'ŭ* Singers,” *Tongailbo*, July 11, 1963.

³⁷ *Ibid.*



Figure 1.1: Article introducing the Yu Se-hyöng *P'okŭ* Singers

The above article, which may be the first official introduction of Korean *p'ok'ŭ* singers, foregrounds their educational background and indirectly highlights their amateurism. The emphasis on their higher education and their warm reception by an “intellectual” audience, delimits *p'okŭ* as a type of music performed by and for an educated class of people. Then, discrepant to it being well received by “intellectual” listeners who attend jazz festivals, Yu describes *p'okŭ* as “soft” music that can be communicated “without special technique,” presumably in order to uphold its amateurism. Their amateurism is further accentuated in the modest depiction of Jung as a “shy youth,” the singers’ “innocent” smile, and the assertion that “singing for them is a hobby.” Adding confusion to incongruity, the singers contend that they prefer Burl Ives and Joan Baez over the “professional” Harry Belafonte, implying that Ives and Baez are amateurs while Belafonte is not. While all three musicians made discernable

contributions to folk, they had wildly different careers and each represent different generations, styles of performance, and political alliances.³⁸ Yu and Jung quickly contradict their disapproval of Belafonte in naming “Come Back Liza”—a song popularized by Belafonte—as part of their favored repertoire. The irony in saying that they prefer Ives and Baez over Belafonte but enjoy performing songs recorded by the latter, implies that Yu and Jung may have embraced the ideology of folk as an amateur art form, but in practice resorted to songs popularized by international commercial success.

Myōng-dong as the Cultural Hub of Youth

In order to contextualize the musical spaces that played essential roles in the development of *p'ok'ŭ*, I will introduce here the greater Myōng-dong area—densely occupied downtown neighborhoods north of the Han River—as the epicenter of youth culture in the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout most of the 1960s, *p'ok'ŭ* remained in the amateur arena of campus recitals and underground music venues, before entering the popular music world via radio at the tail end of the decade. In “1970s Acoustic Guitar Music and the Infrastructure of Youth Culture,” music scholar Kim Hyōng-ch'an provides a rigorously researched examination of the major institutions, downtown music venues, and media platforms that popularized *p'ok'ŭ* during the mid-to late 1960s. According to Kim, Christian institutions such as the YMCA—by organizing communal

³⁸ Ives was born in 1909 and had an expansive career in the entertainment business as a radio host, recording artist, and won an Academy Award for Best Supporting Actor in 1958. He is said to have cooperated with the HUAC during the McCarthy era. Belafonte was born in 1927 and is known foremost for popularizing *calypso* in the 1950s. He financed activists, organizations, and campaigns integral to the Civil Rights Movement. Baez was born in 1941 and played a prominent role in Civil Rights, Free Speech, and anti-war protests. Her first album was produced in 1960—the same year she made her New York concert debut. Regarding Baez's less professional, or more “traditional,” approach, see: David Kenneth Blake, “*Bildung* Culture: Elite Popular Music and the American University, 1960-2010,” PhD dissertation. Stony Brook University, 2014, 66.

singing programs, which catered to university students in search of leisure activities—played pivotal roles in disseminating what would become the core repertoire of *p'ok'ŭ*, as well as in cultivating the careers of future *p'ok'ŭ* stars. The types of music disseminated by the YMCA's "Sing Along Y" (named after Mitch Miller's "Sing Along With Mitch"), which started in April of 1965 and lasted well into the mid-1970s, ranged from traditional folk songs of various countries and foreign pop songs to hymns and government-recommended songs.³⁹ Prominent *p'ok'ŭ* singers such as Sŏ Yu-sŏk and Kim Se-hwan are said to have learned foreign folk songs through the YMCA's music programs.⁴⁰ Kim states that "Sing Along Y" promoted "bright, wholesome, and hopeful" songs that appealed to youth searching for music other than *trot*, which was "engraved with the pain and gloom of Japanese colonial rule and the [Korean] war."⁴¹ Between 1968 and 1970, late-night radio shows became the main platform for introducing foreign pop songs and domestic *p'ok'ŭ* music, thanks to music producers who discerned the rising clout of youth by frequenting downtown music venues.⁴² Until the mid-1960s, the media targeted adult audiences and were not proactive about purchasing music favored by youth.⁴³ Kim relays that radio broadcast companies had to borrow records from record collectors, many of whom owned and ran music listening rooms and cafes in downtown Seoul. If the YMCA's communal singing activities represent the wholesome branch of early practices of *p'ok'ŭ*,

³⁹ Kim, "1970s Acoustic Guitar Music and the Infrastructure of Youth Culture," 160-161.

⁴⁰ In the next chapter, I examine how Sŏ was accused of plagiarism for recording a version of an Israeli folk song he had learned at the YMCA.

⁴¹ Kim, "1970s Acoustic Guitar Music and the Infrastructure of Youth Culture," 162.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 169-170.

⁴³ Kim, *A Stroll in Korean Popular Music History*, 229.

downtown music venues, such as C'est Si Bon (its heyday in Mugyo-dong lasting between 1963 and 1969), satisfied the more recreational desires of youth, and provided the social connections amateur student singers needed to break into the music industry.

The status of Myōng-dong as a mecca for teens and young adults is illustrated in a full-page article titled “Generational Shift of Myōng-dong,” published in the weekly newspaper *Chuganjungang* on January 19, 1969. In this article, Myōng-dong is chronicled as a vibrant neighborhood that used to cater to bohemian writers and artists, who drank and womanized in the plentiful bars the neighborhood had to offer. But by 1969, those bars were hard to find, having been replaced by cheap pubs (*taep'otchip*) that served affordable beers in tall glasses—a beverage favored by youth. Alongside 45 of these pubs, Myōng-dong had 34 boutiques, 17 tailor shops, and 19 cobbler shops, boasting its standing as the fashion hub for young Seoulites.⁴⁴ While lamenting that the pre-1969 glory days of Myōng-dong have “undeniably faded,” author Chu Sōp-il asserts its status as “Korea’s symbol of pleasure and fashion.”⁴⁵

Music venues in Myōng-dong and adjacent Mugyo-dong, which ranged from intimate gathering spaces such as music listening rooms, salons, and cafes to large theaters such as hotel clubs, halls, and auditoriums, were essential in providing *p'ok'ū* singers an outlet for expression and a means of livelihood. The aforementioned YMCA and C'est Si Bon were both situated in Mugyo-dong. The centrality of such venues reflects the increased consumer power of youth who patronized these venues, as well as the growth of recreational culture catering to the youth generation. A crucial reason these venues became gathering places for youth is that they

⁴⁴ “Times May Have Changed but Myōng-dong is Still the Epicenter of Latest Trends and Romance: Generational Shift of Myōng-dong,” *Chuganjungang*, January 19, 1969.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

provided access to Western popular music. Despite South Korea's rapid economic growth throughout the 1960s, importation was not yet liberalized, making it difficult to obtain foreign pop records. Proprietors of these venues held vast record collections assembled from stores in Ch'ung-mu-ro and from U.S. military bases. C'est Si Bon not only offered a rich collection of foreign music, but also fostered a vibrant performative culture through weekly programs such as poetry hour on Wednesdays and "College Night"—which became a popular platform for campus talents—on Fridays. Kim emphasizes the cross-disciplinary and cross-generational connections made at C'est Si Bon. Older scholars, artists, critics, and most significantly, broadcast practitioners—producers and DJs—stimulated and advised budding acoustic guitar musicians, and “acted as a liaison introducing them to media outlets.”⁴⁶ The guidance of such mentor-figures made it possible for the young amateur musicians who performed at C'est Si Bon to “grow into celebrities symbolizing the youth generation.”⁴⁷ C'est Si Bon closed in 1969 due to the city's plan to redevelop the neighborhood. In the early 1970s, singers and fans of *p'ok'ŭ* patronized downtown music salons, such as Shim-ji café, Nashville, and Le Silence, which upgraded the format of music listening rooms by expanding their offering of live music and beverages. These intimate venues provided alternative spaces away from the profit-driven music industry, where *p'ok'ŭ* singers could stage original songs and cultivate their craft.

The Aesthetics of Early *P'ok'ŭ*

So far, I have described the composition of the youth generation and where the *p'ok'ŭ* scene flourished. Now, in order to convey the sound of *p'ok'ŭ*, I will briefly outline its stylistic

⁴⁶ Kim, “Infrastructure,” 165-166.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 166.

evolution by distinguishing three phases: the early years (1968-1971) were an imitative phase, during which *p'ok'ŭ* singers covered Anglo-American and Western popular hit songs; the developmental years (1971-1973) were when prominent *p'ok'ŭ* musicians returned to their amateur roots in an attempt to promote their careers of singer-songwriters; and the peak years (1973-1975) were when hybrid forms of *p'ok'ŭ*—mainly *p'ok'ŭ-rok*—arose and dominated the charts. The temporal focus of this chapter is the early years when the media was familiarizing the public with *p'ok'ŭ*. Chapter two focuses on the developmental years when *p'ok'ŭ* became one of the three main genres competing in the popular music world along with *trot* and *rok*. In chapter three I discuss the political milieu *p'ok'ŭ* singers negotiated during their peak years; and in chapter four, I describe the targeted censorship of *p'ok'ŭ* and its demise in 1975. For the purposes of this chapter, I present statistical data regarding which Western genres of music originally influenced *p'ok'ŭ*, and summarize how the lyrical and musical style of *p'ok'ŭ* matured throughout its early, developmental, and peak years.

The early phase and more imitative aspects of Korean *p'ok'ŭ* can be best described through a statistical analysis of *p'ok'ŭ* covers. In “Plantation and Independence: Development and Completion of Korean Modern *P'ok'ŭ* Music (1968-1975),” music scholar Pak Ki-yŏng divides songs covered by Korean *p'ok'ŭ* singers into five genres—US modern folk, US rock and standard pop, chansons, canzone, and national folk songs—and lists eleven singers who were covered more than ten times: Nana Mouskouri (18 songs), Bob Dylan (17 songs), Simon & Garfunkel (16), Joan Baez (14), Credence Clearwater Revival (12), Everly Brothers (11), Tom Jones (11), Peter Paul & Mary (10), Harry Belafonte (10), Glen Campbell (10), and Adamo

(10).⁴⁸ While these eleven musician groups represent various genres such as modern folk, pop, rock, country, and French chanson, they also reflect the predominant influence of Anglo-American popular music. In terms of the individual musicians who made the most impact in South Korea, the impressive reach and enthusiastic reception of Nana Mouskouri, the undeniable influence of Bob Dylan as torchbearer of the singer songwriter model, and the status of Simon & Garfunkel as archetypal folk duo, stand out. In addition, of the 16 songs that were covered more than five different times, seven are national folk songs of German, Irish, Greek, and Mexican origin. This reflects the transmission of a more traditional “folk” repertoire that occurred during the “sing-along” programs hosted by the YMCA in the 1960s, when students and youth found in Christian institutions places to learn and collectively sing international folk songs during a time when foreign records were hard to come by—information I laid out earlier in this chapter.⁴⁹ In a less comprehensive but still insightful study using different dates and categories of genre, Lee Chu-wŏn and Hong Sŏng-kyu surveyed the genres and nationalities of 57 cover songs released between 1969 and 1978. Lee and Hong show that of the 57 songs that were covered, 15 were US modern folk, followed by British pop/rock, French chanson, and Italian *canzone*. Of the 42 non-modern folk songs, 60% were adapted for voice and acoustic guitar, proving the centrality of the acoustic guitar in making a song sound like *p'ok'ŭ*.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Ki-yŏng Pak, “Plantation and Independence: Development and Completion of Korean Modern *P'ok'ŭ* Music (1968-1975),” Masters Thesis, Dongguk University, 2003, 131-134.

⁴⁹ In “1970s Acoustic Guitar Music and the Infrastructure of Youth Culture,” Hyŏng-ch'an Kim discusses the pivotal role Christian institutions such as YMCA and YWCA played in fostering the development of *p'ok'ŭ*.

⁵⁰ Lee and Hong, “A Study on the Adoption,” 126.

If the early phase of *p'ok'ŭ* between 1968 and 1971 can be distinguished by the preponderance of covers, by 1971, the release of solo albums by Sŏ Yu-sŏk, Kim Min-ki, and Yang Hŭi-ŭn signaled the arrival of the singer songwriter. In her quantitative analysis comparing the percentage of adaptations and original compositions of 1,773 *p'ok'ŭ* songs represented in 170 albums released between 1968 and 1976, Pak Ki-yŏng reveals that during the early years of *p'ok'ŭ* (1968-1971), approximately two-thirds of the repertoire were adaptations. However, the proportions reverse between 1971 and 1972, with the percentage of original compositions leaping up to 62.4% in 1972, and steadily increasing throughout the next three years: 76.5% in 1973, 81.0% in 1974, and 85.8% in 1975.⁵¹ The continued increase of original compositions between 1973 and 1975 reflects the prolific output of singer songwriters, such as Lee Yŏn-sil, Lee Chang-hŭi, and Song Ch'ang-sik, who mixed *p'ok'ŭ* with other styles of music ranging from traditional folk to electric *rok*, widening the sonic spectrum of music that constituted *p'ok'ŭ*. Content-wise, aloof, innocent, and idealized displays of *p'ok'ŭ* were getting replaced by lyrics with satirical and critical bite—aspects that were magnified with the escalating authoritarianism of Park.⁵²

Twin Folio and Ch'oe Yŏng-hŭi: The Original Student *P'ok'ŭ* Stars

The original student *p'ok'ŭ* stars who broke into the popular music world, heralding a formerly amateur and noncommercial genre's arrival into a professional and market-driven industry, were the male duo Twin Folio and the female singer/actress, Ch'oe Yŏng-hŭi. The members of Twin Folio were Yun Hyŏng-chu, a medical student at Yonsei University, and Song

⁵¹ Pak, "Plantation and Independence," table on p.123

⁵² Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1970*, 22.

Ch'ang-sik, who had to quit the prestigious Seoul Arts High School due to financial difficulties. Both Yun and Song launched their singing careers thanks to the opportunities and platforms organized by C'est Si Bon.⁵³ In fact, Trio C'est Si Bon—which consisted of the aforementioned Yun, Song, and third member Lee Ik-Kyun—was the precursor to Twin Folio. When Lee had to join the army right before the group's scheduled appearance on Tong-yang Broadcasting Company (TBC)'s "Melody In the Middle of the Night," remaining members Yun and Song quickly changed the group's name to Twin Folio, and made their TV debut in March, 1968.⁵⁴ Twin Folio held their independent debut recital over the course of two days on December 23 and 24, 1968, at the Drama Center, which would become a key launching pad for numerous *p'okū* musicians. They performed to a sold-out audience, successfully executing arguably the first large-scale *p'okū* concert, and released their first album in 1969.⁵⁵ Twin Folio's first album was a joint album, with half the album comprised of songs by the Pearl Sisters—a star *vocal group* who performed in the style of The Supremes. In *Archaeology of Korean Pop*, Shin Hyunjoon juxtaposes the two musician groups as such: the Pearl Sisters were vivacious and sensual performers who epitomized Korean *soul* music, and Twin Folio were intellectual and contemplative singers who initiated the urban *p'okū* boom.⁵⁶ That two college-aged youths

⁵³ "Singer Song Ch'ang-sik Likens Strange Western Music to Poison," interview of Song in *Kyŏnggyangshinmun*, December 3, 1992. In this interview Song said that the "College Night" hosted by C'est Si Bon incentivized him to become a singer.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Hyŏng-chu Yu, "C'est Si Bon, Our Story, Part 5: The Birth of Twin Folio," *Chosŏnilbo*, July 20, 2011, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/07/19/2011071902547.html. This article refers to Cho, who had a concert that fall, as the first "*p'okū* singer" who held a concert at the Drama Center, but I consider Cho as a versatile *p'ap* singer rather than a *p'okū* singer, and therefore pinpoint Twin Folio's concert as the first large-scale *p'okū* concert.

⁵⁶ Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop Music 1960*, 329.

performing dulcet songs with the sole accompaniment of an acoustic guitar, released a joint album with the flashy Pearl Sisters, exemplified the overlap between *vocal groups*, who were in their decline, and *p'okŭ* singers, whose popularity was gaining traction.

Despite being pioneers of the *p'okŭ* boom, Twin Folio had an ephemeral existence as a duo, due to Yun Hyŏng-chu's prioritization of education over music. Twin Folio disbanded in December 1969 because Yun "could not juggle both his studies and his singing [career]."⁵⁷ It is a notable coincidence that C'est Si Bon, which played a key role in advancing the career of Twin Folio, closed that same year. When Yun made his comeback about a year later, he halted speculations about the cause of his hiatus by explaining that he "earned the understanding of his father, who used to oppose his singing career."⁵⁸ That Yun needed his father's "understanding"—a euphemism for approval—evinces the older generation's imposing the precedence of academic pursuits over musical ones, in addition to the prejudice people had against professional musicians. After the announcement of their disbandment, Twin Folio held a farewell concert almost exactly a year after their debut recital, again at the Drama Center, and released their independent album *Twin Folio Recital*, in January 1970. Despite their breakup, however, both members of Twin Folio remained active: Song Ch'ang-sik successfully transitioned into a solo singer and songwriter, and after making his comeback, Yun Hyŏng-chu continued recording hit songs while hosting popular late-night radio shows. (I examine Song's contribution to the iconic youth film *The March of Fools* in the third chapter.) Both Song and Yun made frequent appearances in *p'okŭ* recitals publicized on the news during the first half of

⁵⁷ "Singer Song Ch'ang-sik [Says] Strange Western Music is Toxic," *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, Dec 3, 1992.

⁵⁸ "The New Year Entertainment Industry Special Topical Issue," *Chugan'gyŏnghyang*, January 20, 1971.

the 1970s, implying their status as an authenticating presence and generous supporter of emerging *p'okū* singers.

The viewpoint that students should prioritize their education over their musical careers applied to men and women alike. According to a brief report published on March 6, 1970 in the daily sports and entertainment newspaper, *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, female student singer Ch'oe Yŏng-hŭi, chose to cut short her career to return to campus:

Student singer Ch'oe Yŏng-hŭi retired from the entertainment industry to continue her studies in Composition at Yonsei University, where she had been taking time off. Her retirement was expected during her two-year career as a popular singer harnessing no small number of fans. ... TBC-TV, which is where Miss Ch'oe has an exclusive contract, will air a special program on “Show Show Show” at 8:40 on the 7th, for this “Retiring Student Singer.” ... Miss Ch'oe debuted in early 1968 singing “Blowin’ In the Wind” and “Mona Lisa” in the style of folk singer Joan Baez.⁵⁹

Here, Ch'oe is described strictly as a “student singer” who sang covers of American folk songs and imitated the singing style of “folk singer Joan Baez.” The article continues, “While she is leaving the entertainment business for good, she said that she’ll ‘decide when the time comes’ about her prospects once she graduates. ... Despite being accompanied by unfamiliar classmates after having taken two years off, Miss Ch'oe’s expression looked quite bright on the first day of class.”⁶⁰

A sizeable picture of Ch'oe is printed next to the article, showing her in the front row of formally dressed students, eyes up, her gaze focused presumably on the professor. While her expression looks a bit stiff and posed for the camera, the article ends by commenting on her “quite bright” expression, implying that she’s happy fulfilling her duties as a student. The message is clear: Ch'oe’s identity as a college student takes precedence over her brief diversion

⁵⁹ “Student Singer Ch'oe Yŏng-hŭi Returns to Campus,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, March 6, 1970.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

in the entertainment business. The disbandment of Twin Folio and the retirement of Ch'oe in 1970, however, should not intimate the lack of enthusiasm fans had for *p'okŭ*, but rather the fact that most *p'okŭ* singers were university students who prioritized their scholarly endeavors over musical ones.



Figure 1.2: Picture of Ch'oe Yŏng-hŭi

Early *P'ok'ŭ* Events Expose Inchoate Boundaries of the Genre

During the late summer and fall of 1970, three events dedicated to *p'ok'ŭ* were staged, revealing not only the growing enthusiasm fans had for *p'ok'ŭ*, but also the porous aesthetic boundaries of the genre, supporting my argument that *p'ok'ŭ* was a genre identified as much by the social status of singers, as by its stylistic markers. In addition, the infrastructure needed to cultivate professional careers for amateur college musicians was lacking. Evidence of *p'ok'ŭ*'s

climbing repute, and the somewhat haphazard manner in which *p'okŭ* events were carried out during its nascent days, can be found in articles that describe: the “Y *P'okŭ* Festival” and the “Hootenanny Go-go Festival,” which were respectively held at the YMCA and Citizen’s Hall in September; and the “Green Frog Sound” which was a concert held at the YWCA in November.

First, I discuss two contrastive articles that report on the first *p'okŭ* festival held at the YMCA on September 2, 1970, that substantiate the informality and stylistic heterogeneity of early *p'okŭ* events. A feature in *Sunday Seoul*, which was South Korea’s first weekly entertainment newspaper company, problematizes: the disorderly management, chaotic admittance, overcrowded audience, ignorant programming focused on pop songs rather than folk songs, and the fact that performers were not compensated despite the audience having paid admission.⁶¹ Coverage of the same event in the monthly music magazine *Kayosaenghwal* (roughly translated as “Song Life”) conveys a much more positive tone, addressing the “festive atmosphere” of “singers surrounded by the audience,” and lists in detail the names of musicians and titles of songs they performed.⁶² This article also informs the reader that the concert was recorded and is to be televised on CBS (Christian Broadcasting System).⁶³ The only criticism mentioned in this article is the festival’s insufficient focus on *p'okŭ*. Even though the objective of the event was to “develop and disseminate Korean-style *p'okŭ* songs ... there were only a few *p'okŭ* songs in the repertoire with the majority of the songs in the program being *p'ap* songs, in

⁶¹ “Unorganized Management Leaves Unpleasant Aftertaste: YMCA Hosts Folk Festival,” *Sunday Seoul*, September 13, 1970.

⁶² “1st Folk Festival: Enthusiastic Response of Late Teens,” *Kayosaenghwal*, December 1970, 43.

⁶³ CBS is a major broadcasting company in Korea. Its Christian identity reflects how missionary work was one of the key avenues through which Western culture was introduced in South Korea.

essence making the concert a *p'ap* festival rather than a *p'okŭ* festival.”⁶⁴ In response to this criticism, CBS producer and supervisor of the event, Ch'oe Kōng-sik, retorted that “regardless of where the song comes from, if it is sung in the style of *p'okŭ*, it will ultimately contribute to creating something new when combined with native Korean *p'okŭ* songs.”⁶⁵ The singing style of *p'okŭ* Ch'oe had in mind was most likely analogous to the slick harmonies of Simon and Garfunkel—the group South Korean *p'okŭ* duos emulated and were often compared to in the news. Regarding the employment of “native Korean *p'okŭ* songs,” although select *p'okŭ* singers drew from traditional folk music and poetry in the ensuing years, the movement to revive traditional art forms did not gain traction until the late 1970s and 1980s. To sum up, the reviews of the first *p'okŭ* festival demonstrate the attitude of first generation *p'okŭ* singers, who chose to cultivate their own Western-derived aesthetics rather than be purists.

A mere two days later, the “Hootenanny Go-go Festival” was held at the Seoul Citizen’s Hall for four days. The name of the event combines two seemingly distinct activities—the informal practice of group singing borrowed from American hootenanny events, and the provocative phenomenon of uninhibited go-go dancing derived from U.S. rock culture—but it reflects youth’s simultaneous craze for acoustic *p'okŭ* and *group sound* (or specifically, soul and *saik'i*, i.e., psychedelic music) during this time. According to a September 9, 1970 article published in *Chugan'gyōngnyang*, embarking on such a festival heralded that American folk music had planted its roots in Korea.⁶⁶ In other words, folk had become *p'okŭ*. Titled “*P'okŭ* challenges Soul and *Saik'i* (Psychedelic Music),” the article gives a condensed history of

⁶⁴ “1st Folk Festival,” 43.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ “*P'okŭ* challenges Soul and *Saik'i*,” *Chugan'gyōngnyang*, September 9, 1970.

American folk music asserting that the word “folk” refers to “homogeneous rural society” and how in recent years “folk music, which used to be ‘social’ transformed into an ‘individual’ art form”: “individual” due to its transition from being a communal practice to a “commercial product with individual composers and lyricists collecting royalties.”⁶⁷ The article defines hootenanny as a “folk revival movement,” and names Pete Seeger, Woody Guthrie, Burl Ives, and Alan Lomax as the veterans who successfully revived folk music, and lastly, identifies singer songwriter Bob Dylan as a representative contemporary folk musician. Despite including a historical account of American folk music, the article publicizes the festival’s focus on “easy listening music such as *p'okŭ*, country, and Western [music],” displaying yet another instance of *p'ok'ŭ* getting subsumed under the larger classification of “easy listening.”

The Scholarly, Anti-Commercial, and Respectable Image of *P'ok'ŭ*

Despite being introduced as *vocal groups* who sing “easy listening”-type music during its early days, the elite image and originality of *p'ok'ŭ* singers came to justify the genre’s sophistication. An example that stands out is a detailed description of the coed *p'okŭ* duet, *Toi et Moi*, printed in *Chugan'gyŏngnyang* on November 1, 1970. As a “team that emits a literary air” due to their French name, the duo is portrayed as a Simon and Garfunkel-esque team but with a women substituting for Garfunkel’s harmonies.⁶⁸ The male member Lee P'il-wŏn “has been singing in vocal groups since attending the School of Engineering at Hanyang University, plays the guitar, organ, and melodica, and has a singing style similar to Glen Campbell.” The female

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ “The Atmosphere of *P'ok'ŭ* Music,” *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*, November 1, 1970. All quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

member Pak In-hŭi is a “French scholar” at Sookmyung University and met Lee while MC-ing at a music salon. Their hit song “Promise,” along with “several others,” is an original composition, and they are “winning plaudits as a top-status *p'okŭ* couple” thanks to their “looks and attire, which exude an ambience of solitude, wandering, and nostalgia—characteristics thematic of *p'okŭ*.” The characterization that folk deals with themes of solitude, wandering, and nostalgia, stems from modern folk music’s rise during times of rapid modernization and urbanization, and brings to mind the detached perambulator of the modern city, the *flâneur*. Analogizing the *p'ok'ŭ* singer to the *flâneur* foregrounds the modern and urban aesthetics of *p'ok'ŭ*, and portrays the *p'ok'ŭ* singer as an observer who can articulate the emotional and psychological repercussions of urban life. Albeit lofty, the portrayal of Toi et Moi illustrates the media’s advancing an implicitly hierarchical categorization of music that ranks the wistful cosmopolitanism of *p'okŭ* at the top.

The reputable perception of *p'okŭ* was buttressed by events like the “Green Frog Sound,” a charity *p'ok'ŭ* festival held on November 20 to help raise funds for the YWCA’s Youth Center. Green Frog refers to the daily cultural program provided by the YWCA starting in June 1970. First generation *p'ok'ŭ* singers including Kim Min-ki, Yang Hŭi-ŭn, Song Ch'ang-sik, and Yun Hyŏng-chu, performed freely in the open and welcoming environment of the Green Frog, filling the gap created by C'est Si Bon’s closure the previous year. A report in *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* comments on the four hundred or so “high class,” “enthusiastic and cheerful” audience members, who were mostly college students, that made the event a “dignified concert.”⁶⁹ Country and yodel singers appeared side by side *p'okŭ* singers, revealing the heterogeneous styles of music that passed as *p'okŭ*. Songs performed during the event consisted of original Korean *p'okŭ* songs, such as “Friends,” by the male duo Tobidu, as well as contemporary American folk songs, such

⁶⁹ “P'ok'ŭ Festival, Green Frog Sound,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, November 22, 1970.

as translated covers of Joe South’s “Games People Play” and Simon and Garfunkel’s “Bridge Over Troubled Water.” This repertoire suggests that *p’okŭ* singers were simultaneously imitating and inventing their craft, and did not discriminate between folk and folk-rock songs. And lastly, that “Bridge Over Troubled Water” was released only 10 months before the event, indicates that Koreans were gaining quicker access to commercially successful songs produced in the U.S.




Figure 1.3: *P’ok’ŭ* singers performing during the “Green Frog Sound”
 Sŏ Yu-sŏk (left), Yun Hyŏng-chu (middle), and Kim Se-hwan (right) performing “A Kaleidoscopic World” on the night of the 20th (photo taken by journalist Min Pyŏng-t’ae)

In the popular music world, the growing clout of the youth generation manifested as a surge of not only *p’ok’ŭ*, but also *rok* music. As conveyed in the name of the “Hootenanny Go-go Festival” mentioned above, youth found attractive both the gentle tone of acoustic guitar-accompanied *p’ok’ŭ* music as well as the electric and dance-enticing timbres of *rok*, psychedelic, and soul music. By the summer of 1971, the music industry was essentially described as a “three-way race between *trot*, *p’ok’ŭ*, and *rok*,” attesting to the youth generation having become major

influencers of cultural trends.⁷⁰ A June 12, 1971 article in *Kyŏnghyangshinmun* titled “Generational Shift in Hit Songs,” connects the popularity of electric music and the success of new singers—such as *p'ok'ŭ* groups Toi Et Moi and Ranaerosŭp'o, and soloists Lee Kwang-rim and Sŏ Yusŏk, who are “especially popular among students”—to a “generational shift” in the music industry.⁷¹

Media portrayals show that *p'ok'ŭ* singers were lauded for their anti-commercialist attitude and romantic amateurism. In a July 31, 1971 article titled “*P'ok'ŭ* Singer Ŭn Hŭi, Writes and Even Arranges [her songs],” former member of Ranaerosŭp'o and newly established soloist Ŭn Hŭi is described as “detesting commercial music” and not caring about her financial compensation.⁷² Furthermore, the article analogizes her “characteristically fresh and sweet voice” as reflecting her “girl-like romantic character,” which aside from its sexist undertone, links a child-like innocence to *p'ok'ŭ* (bringing to mind the similarly innocent portrayal of the Yu Se-hyŏng *P'ok'ŭ* Singers back in 1963). Lastly, Ŭn Hŭi distances herself from other genres popular among young people by saying that she “doesn’t like psychedelic music but has the elementary skills to perform the go-go dance as an exercise in the privacy of her own room.” This statement attests to Ŭn Hŭi’s being aware of the latest trends in popular music, but reinforces the notion that *p'ok'ŭ* singers are partial to quiet acoustic—rather than electric, psychedelic music—and that they are modest in behavior.

⁷⁰ “Generational Shift in Hit Songs,” *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, June 12, 1971.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² “*P'ok'ŭ* Singer Ŭn Hŭi, Writes and Even Arranges [her songs],” *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, July 31, 1971. All quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

While *p'ok'ŭ* singers were lauded for their intellectualism, anti-commercialism, and originality, most other styles of foreign popular music and Western-derived electric music were regarded as harmful to students. This moralistic and condescending perspective, which I unpack in the next chapter as a rationale behind music censorship, comes into clear view in an article published in *Taehanilbo* on November 27, 1971, during the heyday of late-night radio shows. This article, drawing from a survey conducted at the Sorabol College of Arts finding that late-night radio programs disturb teens' sleep and studies, attacks radio broadcasting companies for airing too much foreign pop music, which "disturb the sleep and study of teens and cause daydreaming."⁷³ Of the 420 students attending high schools and colleges in the Seoul metropolitan area who participated in the poll, over half (54.2%) responded that they most prefer listening to radio programs that play foreign pop and domestic *p'ap* music, with 31.2, 30.2 and 22 percent listening to sports, news, and classical music programs respectively. (Respondents must have been able to choose more than one program for this question.) The way young people learned about foreign pop music was mostly through the radio (69.4%) rather than through records (14.3%) or TV (9.9%), proving the huge impact radio had in the early 1970s in disseminating Western popular music. Over 90% of those surveyed said that they listen to late-night pop shows on the radio "daily or seldomly," although this unspecific answer choice makes it hard to interpret these particular results. Late-night show times lasted varying intervals between 11pm and 1:30am, but such shows all maintained the format of accepting requests via postcards or call-ins. This appears to have encouraged listener participation because 81.6% said they had partaken in requesting music. Even though half of the respondents—precisely 50%—

⁷³ "Sorabol College of Arts Conducts Survey of Radio Ratings," *Taehanilbo*, November 27, 1971. All statistics and quotations in this paragraph are from this article.

admitted that they do not understand the lyrics of foreign pop songs, some—no percentage indicated here—are said to have criticized their vulgar lyrics. Despite the criticism and incomprehensible lyrics, pop music is affirmed to be “a key topic of conversation among youth according to teachers and professors.” Interestingly, though students said that they enjoy listening to music on the radio (95.2%), the report interprets this number as evidence that late-night radio programs cause “great disturbance to their studies.” It then concludes with a cautionary quote from music critic Lee Sang-man, who opines that “because young people tune in to the radio during these [late hours], broadcasting companies should more carefully compose program content.” Succinctly put, teenagers should study or sleep at night instead of getting distracted by foreign pop music programs on the radio.

Marijuana Gets Linked to the Youth Generation, 1970-1972

Such cautionary attitudes toward foreign pop music mirrored the media’s wariness of marijuana, which they presented as a drug that exemplified youth’s blind embrace of “decadent” Western trends; the regime later used this characterization to silence *p’ok’ŭ*—the topic of chapter four. Media portrayals show the scope of the drug’s effect moving from foreign military bases to recreational spaces in downtown Seoul between 1970 and 1972. During this process, select music venues in Myōng-dong, where *p’ok’ŭ* singers found communal spaces of music-making apart from the profit-driven popular music industry, were policed under the pretext of eliminating “immoral” and “decadent” activities. The Park regime used the concept of decadence to not only censor *rok* and *p’ok’ŭ* music, but also to cast youth culture as morally and culturally lacking, in order to discredit expressions of dissent, which were most emphatically voiced by student protestors.

While the existence of marijuana—dubbed “happy smoke”—was already acknowledged as a societal problem in 1970, it was deemed a relatively contained problem affecting U.S. military camp towns despite its spread to domestic students. A June 17, 1970 article published in *Taehanilbo* states that marijuana “used to be traded covertly in U.S. military camp towns since the Korean War,” but its “infiltration into student groups is becoming a nuisance for the authorities.”⁷⁴ The article reports that “there is no quantitative nor clinical test conducted in Korea, making it impossible to know how much one needs to consume the drug for it to work like a narcotic.” What *is* known is that “if continually smoked or drunk, [it] stimulates the central nerves and gives opium-like bliss and hallucination, in addition to sedative and hypnotic effects.” The absence of a standardized clinical report and the misinformed supposition that marijuana could be drunk illustrate the obscure reputation of marijuana. The article adds that: “In order to prevent the trading of ‘happy smoke,’ the Health Department prepared a bill establishing it as a habit-forming drug and submitted this to Congress in July, 1968.” But this bill, which would “imprison those who use or deal marijuana for up to five years and fine a penalty up to 500,000 won” (which is the equivalent of 10,671 dollars today) was not yet made into law, despite the authorities’ awareness of it “being cultivated in all parts of the country.” Furthermore, Japan’s Department of Health and Human Services is said to have claimed that “marijuana being dealt among Japanese adolescents [was] being smuggled from Korea,” and the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea had asked the Health Department to “better control marijuana trade in Korea.” Due to absence of adequate laws controlling its cultivation and distribution, “marijuana grown in Korea [was] being smuggled abroad to the U.S. via the mail of U.S. Armed Forces,” according to a

⁷⁴ “Happy Smoke Infiltrates Student Demographic,” *Taehanilbo*, June 17, 1970. All quotations up to next footnote are from this article.

report published in November, 1970.⁷⁵ The fact that 15 kgs of marijuana leaf was confiscated by the Korean Health Department, suggests that domestic cultivation of marijuana during the 1970s must have been sizable.⁷⁶ And more importantly, that the above two reports emphasize Korean-grown marijuana getting shipped to the U.S. and smuggled into Japan, indicates that as of 1970, marijuana was perceived as a foreign problem rather than a domestic one; despite its penetration into “student groups,” marijuana was not yet linked to domestic youth.

The Park regime constrained the activities of the youth generation under the guise of preventing the “corruption of public morals” (*p'unggimullan*), which meant restricting the music, dance, and curfew of teens and youth. This brought the policing of youth culture one step closer to musical spaces integral to *p'ok'ŭ*. Since the late 1960s, as Myōng-dong and surrounding neighborhoods shifted their offerings to accommodate an increasingly youthful clientele, they became hotspots for music and dance; and from the perspective of the adult generation, hotspots also for misdemeanors and transgressions. In preparation for the surge of pedestrian traffic during the year-end holiday season—a period including three of the only four holidays annually during which the nightly curfew was temporarily lifted—the National Safety Unit (NSU, former name of the Police Agency) cracked down on cafes, bistros, and music listening rooms to prevent “transgressions of dance and song.”⁷⁷ Designating a period dedicated to “purifying adolescent morals,” the SNU enforced stringent oversight of *waesaek* (Japanese style) and go-go-style music, and rang the “bell of love” at 10pm at schools, temples, and churches to

⁷⁵ “Happy Smoke Lifts Its Head,” *Taehanilbo*, November 24, 1970.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ “Cafes, Refreshment Houses, and Music Listening Rooms Regulated for Transgressive Music and Dance,” *Taehanilbo*, December 21, 1970. All remaining quotes are from the same article.

encourage teens to return home early. A *Tongailbo* article published on December 21, 1970 reporting on the NSU's crackdown enumerates the arrests carried out during the previous holiday season based on charges of the "corruption of public morals." Presumably, underscoring the excessive number of arrests was meant to justify police crackdown, but instead, the details accentuate the arbitrariness of authoritarianism. The total number of arrested came to 15,217, consisting of: "3,811 for drinking, 2,539 for smoking, 1,539 for entering a movie theater, 58 for carrying a deadly weapon, 1,032 for improper relationships, 656 for impure relationships with the opposite sex, 277 for being a member of an unruly organization, 885 for harassing women, and 4,420 for noisy activities and others." Aside from underage drinking and smoking, and charges related to weapons and harassment, all the other charges sound vague, benign, or raucous at worst. That it was illegal for underaged teenagers to go to the theater sounds excessively restrictive, and the redundant terminologies of "improper relationship" and "impure relationship with the opposite sex" suggest arbitrary arrests based on cursory judgements, as well as the older generation's inculcation of a strict moral code regarding sex. And last but not least, the sheer number of arrests implies rampant and haphazard arrests: a message conveyed through spectacle rather than well-founded execution of the law.

Marijuana Gets Linked to Music Venues Integral to *P'ok'ŭ*

While the media presented *p'ok'ŭ* as scholarly, intellectual, and respectable music, the genre's reputation was precarious because it was viewed as the representative genre of university students at a time when the regime was trying to suppress student protest. A decisive connection between "decadent" activities and *p'ok'ŭ* was drawn when police arrested Shim-ji Cafe owner Lee Chong-min in February 1972. I introduce the following three music venues—Shim-ji Café,

Nashville, and Le Silence—as places where *p'ok'ŭ* singers gathered to reinforce their commitment to amateurism. I examine how they were policed as places that condoned immoral and “decadent” behaviors. As we will learn in chapter two, the Crackdown on Decadent Trends in October 1971 precipitated the suppression of *rok* music in mainstream media, which benefited *p'ok'ŭ*'s advancement in the popular music world. Here, I explore how the Crackdown not only silenced the *rok* scene, but also affected major *p'ok'ŭ* venues, as can be seen in the following examination of Shim-ji Cafe, Nashville, and Le Silence.

Shim-ji Cafe was a precursor to one of *p'ok'ŭ*'s primary gathering places, OB's Cabin. In *A Stroll in Korean Popular Music*, Kim Hyŏng-ch'an relates that OB's Cabin manager Lee Chichae, who used to manage Shim-ji Cafe, opened a multi-story music salon upon realizing, as early as 1967, the potential gains of creating music venues that specifically catered to young people.⁷⁸ During the mid to late 1960s, Shim-ji Cafe was known as a place that “boasted the largest collection of records and high-class music,” but due to its “cave-like interior decoration, gave the impression” of fostering “underground” activities.⁷⁹ Indeed, the arrest of Shim-ji Cafe owner Lee Chong-min verified that marijuana use had spread to “decadent” cafes frequented by “long-haired” adolescents. I include the following excerpt from a February 12, 1972 article in *Tongailbo* as it displays the police casting a wide net of illicit activities and trumping up penalties, as if to make an example of Lee.

On the night of the tenth, Seoul City Police ascertained that Lee Chong-min (age 27), who owns Shim-ji Cafe, which is located in Jung-gu, Myŏng-dong 2-54, condoned the smoking of marijuana and illicit trading, and sold specialized foreign commodities such as coffee, and evaded taxes. The police charged Lee for violating narcotic law and selling specialized foreign commodities, and requested that the city cancel his business license, which was promptly carried out. According to the police, Lee turned a blind eye to

⁷⁸ Kim Hyŏng-ch'an, *A Stroll in Korean Popular Music*, 496.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 495 and 513, respectively.

frequent marijuana smoking in his café, which acted as a safe house for long-haired groups. On the third Mr. Kwōn Kwang-nam (age 21) was remitted to a summary trial for smoking marijuana at the café. Owner Mr. Lee is accused of doubling his sales statements since January, evading approximately 3,680,000 won in tax fees.⁸⁰

As can be seen above, articles reporting on marijuana couch it in legal jargon and group it with “foreign commodities” banned from distribution. And despite Shim-ji Cafe having played a seminal role for music lovers of various genres including *p'ok'ũ*, it was known that “decadent” venues referred to places that focused on *rok*, psychedelic, and soul music, rather than *p'ok'ũ*. Reporting on the same news on February 12, *Kyōnghyangshinmun* adds that: “the Seoul Police began its crackdown on decadent cafes after being informed of [people there] buying and selling the hallucinogenic drug, marijuana. In addition, the police requested that administrative punishment take place immediately following the exposure of those: corrupting public morals; disobeying the lighting rule, which is stipulated under the law regarding the entry of long-haired adolescents; and playing loud hippie-style music, etc.”⁸¹ An article published in *Maeilgyōngje* on the same day clarifies that Shim-ji Cafe was the first target of the crackdown on decadent cafes. It also discloses that the police had about 20 venues under their watch, and were planning to investigate the Public Health Center and the Tax Office for conniving at decadent and illicit activities in cafes.⁸² To articulate this from the perspective of authoritarian control, the government criminalized not only the buying, selling, and smoking of marijuana, but also

⁸⁰ “Shim-ji Café Licence Cancelled for Conniving at Dealings of Happy Smoke,” *Taehanilbo*, February 12, 1972. The report uses the English phrase “happy smoke” as a noun form when referring to marijuana cigarettes. While this was a common practice back then, to avoid writing “the smoking of ‘happy smoke’,” I use the term “marijuana” here. 3,680,000 won in 1972 converts to about 50,311 dollars today.

⁸¹ “Crackdown of Decadent Cafes, Shim-ji Cafe Loses License for Selling Hallucinogenic Drugs,” *Kyōnghyangshinmun*, February 12, 1972. Gleaning from this and other news reports, it appears that there were lighting rules that prevented proprietors from dimming their lights too dark.

⁸² “Myōng-dong’s Shim-ji Cafe Closes,” *Maeilgyōngje*, February 12, 1972.

criminalized proprietors who supposedly encouraged such behaviors by dimming the lights and playing “loud hippie-style” music.



Figure 1.4: Interior of Shim-ji Cafe with patrons⁸³

Lee Chong-min—the owner of Shim-ji Cafe—was imprisoned on February 15 for charges of bribery and sales of prohibited foreign products, setting off a response among other music venue proprietors to avoid a similar fate. The bribery “happened the previous December when Lee gave a Public Health Center employee hush-money of 20,000 won while trying to increase the square footage of his café without getting an official approval from the authorities.”⁸⁴ In addition, “between January 1 and February 5, he secretly sold 120,000 won-worth of US-brand canned juices.”⁸⁵ Considering the 3,680,000 won—today’s equivalent of

⁸³ Picture from “Kim Hyōng-ch'an’s Popular Music Story Part 3. The History of Cafes and Music,” *International News*, January 18, 2016, <http://www.kookje.co.kr/news2011/asp/newsbody.asp?code=0500&key=20160119.22023191053>.

⁸⁴ “Owner of Shim-ji Cafe Arrested for Graft and Hiding Foreign Goods,” *Kyōnghyangshinmun*, February 15, 1972.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

50,311 dollars—of tax evasion fees Lee was first accused of, the 120,000 won-worth of juice and the 20,000 won bribe not only sound benign, but suggests that Lee’s initial charges were trumped up.⁸⁶ Nonetheless, the arrest and imprisonment of Lee unnerved other proprietors, who began making sudden attempts to distance themselves from “long-haired groups.” The next day, *Tongailbo* reported that cafes and music listening rooms in neighboring Myōng-dong and Ch’ungmuro were “refusing the entrance of long-haired groups” and posting English and Korean signs prohibiting their entry, with some “even bringing in a security guard to prevent [the entry of] domestic and foreign hippie adolescents.”⁸⁷ The article adds that cafes made repeated indoor announcements requesting “long-haired groups [to] please voluntarily leave the premises,” with some taking extra-cautionary measures, such as having “their waitresses change their miniskirts into long-skirts,” and changing their music to “wholesome” repertoire. As of yet, government-mandated “wholesome” repertoire included acoustic guitar-accompanied *p’ok’ŭ* songs, such as “Morning Dew,” which would later become one of the most anthemic protest songs in South Korea’s democracy movement.⁸⁸

Due to being increasingly portrayed as spaces that condoned “decadent” behaviors such as the smoking of marijuana, *p’ok’ŭ* venues had a mixed reputation around 1972, which is when *p’ok’ŭ* singers were making a concerted effort to bolster the amateur underpinning of the genre. The next two music venues I discuss—Nashville and Le Silence—were integral spaces for *p’ok’ŭ* singers that validated their craftsmanship and pursuit of anti-commercial music. Nashville was a

⁸⁶ 120,000 won and 20,000 won in 1972 converts to approximately 1,640 and 240 dollars respectively.

⁸⁷ “Select Cafes in Myōng-dong and Ch’ungmuro Limit Entry of Long-Haired Groups,” *Tongailbo*, February 16, 1972.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

music salon located on Ch'ungmuro Street 1-24-3 that distanced itself from commercialism. According to musicologist Kim Hyŏng-ch'an, singers who performed at Nashville—Pak Tu-ho, Kim T'ae-kon, Pang Ŭi-kyŏng, and Ch'oe Sŏng-hwa—rejected night stages (i.e., gigs) which provided the largest source of income for most musicians, and produced a joint noncommercial commemorative album in June 1972, titled “Beautiful Person, Beautiful Songs.”⁸⁹ Compared to C'est Si Bon, which was a “major” gathering place, Nashville was more of an “underground” or “indie-type” venue that played “psychedelic and heavy music.”⁹⁰ According to *p'ok'ŭ* singer Yang Pyŏng-chip, who found the alternative atmosphere of Nashville appealing, and regularly performed there by getting acquainted with head DJ Kim Yu-pok, Nashville was situated on the third floor where customers bought tickets to enter the main hall, which was about 500 square meters. At the back was a DJ room with two Garrad turn tables, an equalizer, one Mackintosh amplifier, and around 500 licensed and 400 pirated LPs.⁹¹ There were approximately 15 rows of 20 individual sofa-like chairs facing the stage, and posters of Jimi Hendrix, Yes, Grand Funk, Janis Joplin, Deep Purple, and the Beatles covering the left side of the wall under black psychedelic lights. The bathroom was in the back right corner, next to a small beverage stand where customers could get a drink in exchange for the entry ticket. Underaged minors were not allowed, but Yang recalls seeing mature teens wearing plain clothes (as opposed to school uniforms), and the occasional marijuana smokers, who would get reprimanded by the bouncers for smoking next to the bathroom.

⁸⁹ Kim, “Infrastructure,” 166.

⁹⁰ Pyŏng-chip Yang, *An Automobile On Two Wheels*, (Paju: Hanul, 2012), 44.

⁹¹ Korean record companies did not enter contractual licensing agreements with foreign record companies until the 1970s, which meant that people often relied on pirated records to listen to foreign music.

Le Silence was run by producer and critic Lee Paek-ch'ŏn, who developed his intimate music listening space into a launching pad for *p'ok'ŭ* singers. Situated on the underground level of a Horugel piano company building in central Myŏng-dong, Le Silence was an intimate carpeted space of about 20-p'ŏng—the equivalent of 66 square meters—that prioritized music over business, emulating the nonprofit atmosphere of the YWCA's Green Frog (*ch'ŏnggaeguri*), which was a main gathering place for *p'ok'ŭ* singers after C'est Si Bon closed in 1969.⁹² Le Silence's appeal came from the uniquely bright color of the interior walls that made the ambience elegant, and its casual atmosphere, set by customers taking their shoes off upon entering the cafe.⁹³ Both Nashville and Le Silence, which focused on artistic endeavors over commercial ones, came under the scrutiny of the police for admitting underaged adolescents. A *Tongailbo* article published on September 9, 1972 states that Nashville, Le Silence, and a restaurant named Chun were “suspended from running their businesses for a month starting on the twelfth, for violation of the lighting law and for admitting minors.”⁹⁴ While neither Nashville nor Le Silence were forced to close as was Shim-ji Cafe, such venues faced increasing scrutiny from the police in the ensuing years.

At the same time, a positive review of Le Silence published a mere three months after the news announcing its suspension, conveys the amateur roots and reputable image *p'ok'ŭ* had around 1972 and 1973—a topic I address in chapter two. In this review published in

⁹² That Le Silence prioritized music over business is substantiated by Shin, who states Le Silence did not sell alcoholic beverages, including beer (*Archaeology of Korean Pop 1970*, 34). In addition, while the YWCA's Green Frog carried the baton of C'est Si Bon, which closed in 1969, the closing of Green Frog a mere two years later in the spring of 1971, is said to have motivated Lee to open Le Silence.

⁹³ Yang, *Automobile on Two Wheels*, 85.

⁹⁴ “Three Venues Including Cafe Accused of Catering to Minors Suspended,” *Tongailbo*, September 9, 1972.

Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ on December 11, 1972, TBC TV producer Lee Paek-ch'ŏn and his colleagues who together ran the café, are said to have avoided media publicity because they did not want to overcrowd their space. Thanks to its reputation for “being known only by those in the know,” Le Silence was able to provide a “calm respite away from the loud noises of city life.”⁹⁵ Abiding by its anti-commercial simplicity, Le Silence did not serve beer or alcohol, but instead encouraged customers to “enjoy a glass of coke or milk while comfortably sitting on a chair or the floor.”⁹⁶ It had also secured a “modest clientele in their 40s and 50s,” suggesting that it was successful in attracting patrons other than those in their twenties. Most importantly, Le Silence staged an ongoing program titled “Stage 73,” featuring prominent *p'ok'ŭ* singers such as Yun Hyŏng-chu, Lee Chang-hŭi, Kim Se-hwan, Song Ch'ang-sik, Yang Hŭi-ŭn, and Sŏ Yu-sŏk, verifying its status as a vital space of communal music-making. Alternative musical spaces like Nashville and Le Silence provided platforms that distanced themselves from the profit-driven system of the record industry, so *p'ok'ŭ* singers could authenticate and polish their craft.

***P'ok'ŭ* Returns to Its Campus Roots**

The emphasis *p'ok'ŭ* singers placed on amateurism reflected the unease they felt upon making music for profit as well as the growing desire to cultivate a campus-oriented aesthetics, eventually leading to a period of self-evaluation in 1972. It is no coincidence that the activist *p'ok'ŭ* singer Kim Min-ki, who participated in both the commercial music industry and the student movement, made his last official on-stage appearance during the “Maettol” (“Millstone”)

⁹⁵ “Bare Feet Music Café: Le Silence,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, December 11, 1972.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

performance that fall.⁹⁷ The Millstone performance presented new compositions by “hidden talents in the college sphere” and went through four iterations in the auditorium of the Koreana Department Store in Myōng-dong from June through July before being presented in expanded form on September 26, at the National Theater of Korea.⁹⁸ The performances introduced original works by first generation *p'ok'ū* singers, such as Song Ch'ang-sik, Sō Yu-sōk, Kim Se-hwan, and Yang Hūi-ūn, as well as second generation singers, such as Yang Pyōng-chip, April and May, and Onions. Representative music venues in Myōng-dong that fostered the talents of college-sphere *p'ok'ū* stars were the YWCA's Green Frog Hall, as well as the aforementioned music listening room Nashville and music salon Le Silence.

The Millstone performances displayed the resurgence of amateurism, which would distinguish *p'ok'ū* from other genres of popular music, as well as the formation of the “college music sphere” (*taehakūmakkwōn*), which would distance campus musicians from the establishment-run entertainment industry. A full-page feature published in *Ilgansūp'och'ū* on September 27, 1972 presents seven “star campus talents” including the aforementioned Kim Min-ki and Kim Kwang-hūi, who was known for writing the downcast yet memorable melody to poet Ko Ŭn's “Senoya senoya.” The tenets of campus-bred amateurism are itemized as: “(1) to completely reject commercialism, such as singing for monetary gains, (2) to strive to create original songs reflecting individual styles, and (3) to avoid media exposure, especially

⁹⁷ Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1970*, 31-32. Kim Min-ki participated in radical cultural groups such as PONTRA (Poem on Trash), which was led by activist poet Kim Chi-ha, and in the following years, Kim augmented his commitment to *minjung* issues by addressing the plight of laborers in performative works that revive traditional art forms such as masked dance. I discuss the influence of *minjung* ideology in *p'ok'ū* in chapter three.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

television.”⁹⁹ The feature interprets this last tenet as an overcompensation for any conceptual slippage between amateurism and professionalism. Such commitment to amateurism shows that campus *p'okŭ* singers had come a long way compared to the Yu Se-hyŏng *P'okŭ* Singers. In my examination of the 1963 feature introducing the Yu Se-hyŏng *P'okŭ* Singers, I revealed the feigned authenticity in their flawed comment about preferring “Burl Ives and Joan Baez rather than the professional Belafonte.” Even if it meant taking excessive measures, *p'okŭ* singers were now trying to live up to their innocent and anti-commercialist image.

For some, taking excessive measures meant choosing higher education over a wildly successful career in the popular music world. In December of 1972, the then enormously popular singer and DJ Yun Hyŏng-chu was leaving the entertainment industry once again to return to his medical studies, confirming Yun’s ultimate forsaking of music for his education. Yun, “who had been gaining explosive popularity among adolescents since re-debuting in March of 1971” as the DJ of Tong-a Broadcasting Company’s late-night radio show “Zero Hour’s Dial,” is “terminating his six-years in show business at the peak of his heyday because [he found it] impossible to accomplish both his music and (medical) studies.”¹⁰⁰ Yun held his farewell recital at the Drama Center for two consecutive days—December 22 and 23—ending his musical career where he first started.

In 1973, news outlets continued to uphold the educated status of *p'okŭ* singers, who were reinforcing their commitment to amateurism. The female *p'okŭ* duo Hyŏn-kyŏng and Yŏng-ae were introduced in a March 4, 1973 *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* article as such: “Seoul National University

⁹⁹ “Talented University Stars Put Singers to Shame,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, September 27, 1972.

¹⁰⁰ “Tonga Broadcast’s “Dial at Zero Hour” DJ Yun Hyŏng-chu Holds Farewell Recital on the 22nd and 23rd,” *Tongailbo*, December 18, 1972.

Art School-attending third-year painting students Miss Lee Hyŏn-kyŏng (20) and Miss Lee Yŏng-ae (20) have been gradually making their names over the last year as leading talents [on campus].”¹⁰¹ The translation is awkward because I have intentionally ordered the English words the same way it reads in Korean. This direct translation, with its prominent foregrounding of the musicians’ academic credentials, is meant to show how media portrayals of *p’okŭ* singers still prioritized their higher education. A 2004 interview conducted by Shin Hyun-joon with Lee Yŏng-ae substantiates the attitude of music being a leisure pursuit for student singers. When asked about the kinds of “activities” they took up as *p’okŭ* singers, Ms. Lee replied:

It was singing at school events or getting invited to perform for festivals at other schools or singing for radio broadcasts. Back then it was common to sing and play the guitar on campus. In any case, we were quite popular before releasing our independent album, but we made a promise between ourselves to sing just for four years; as amateurs from beginning to the end.¹⁰²

Indeed, college campuses were the accepted—and expected—breeding ground for *p’okŭ* musicians. Here are a couple more examples: the male *p’okŭ* duet Choyakdol (meaning “pebble”) whose members Kwŏn Na-gwŏn and Chong Se-yong are introduced as third year students in the Meteorology Department at Yonsei University and Civil Construction at Hanyang University respectively;¹⁰³ and the female *p’okŭ* duet LUV, are described as performing “calm and simple songs” while attending Ewha Womans University.¹⁰⁴ A *Tongailbo* article published in September

¹⁰¹ “Seoul National University Art School Duet Hyŏn'gyŏnggwa Yŏng-ae Build Popularity on Campus for Four Years,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, March 4, 1973.

¹⁰² Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1970*, 173.

¹⁰³ “*P’ok’ŭ* Duet Choyakdol,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, February 25, 1973.

¹⁰⁴ “Ehwa Womans University *P’ok’ŭ* Duet Rubŭ,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, April 22, 1973.

12, 1973 affirmed that “one of the largest yields of late-night radio programs” is the “mass production of university student *p'ok'ũ* singers,” or such “high-quality singer songwriters having formed a major branch in the popular music world.”¹⁰⁵ It was official: *p'ok'ũ* was now an acknowledged and acclaimed genre of Korean popular music.

* * *

The defining attribute of South Korean *p'ok'ũ* was the student status of the singer. In this chapter I demonstrated how *p'ok'ũ* was a genre defined by its provenance, patronage, and popularity among college-educated youth: first by delineating how it was introduced as a genre preferred and performed by college-educated student amateurs; second by describing the importance of Christian institutions and music venues in downtown Myōng-dong, in providing a platform and outlet for enthusiasts to learn, listen to, and sing *p'ok'ũ* music; and finally by tracing its rise as a competitive genre in the popular music world, which was possible due to the increasing cultural clout of the youth generation. I examined *p'ok'ũ*'s emergence in the popular music world in the late 1960s, when the success of Twin Folio and Ch'oe Yōng-hŭi and their prompt return to school to resume their studies, among other examples, revealed the precedence education took over music. While the poor organization and stylistic heterogeneity of early *p'ok'ũ* concerts held in 1970 received criticism, the contemporaneous popularity of Toi Et Moi demonstrated that the elite student status of *p'ok'ũ* singers and their ability to write original songs substantiated the “intellectual” and “high-quality” image of *p'ok'ũ*. I also showed how *p'ok'ũ*'s rising prominence in the popular music world overlapped with the crackdown on marijuana use

¹⁰⁵ Hwi-cha, Hong, “Late-Night Pop Song Programs,” *Tongailbo*, September 12, 1973.

among youth and the subsequent policing in 1972 of musical spaces that fostered the careers of prominent *p'ok'ũ* singers. The linkage between marijuana and youth culture culminated in the Marijuana Incident of 1975, which I argue in my final chapter as the culminating event that destroyed the *p'ok'ũ* boom. Until that incident, the popularity of *p'ok'ũ* singers continued to grow, and the media's upholding of their educational background and talent for songwriting, reinforced a double standard that while the self-composed music of college-educated students reflected their elite status, music-making was always a hobby for student singers. Thus, it becomes more impressive that student *p'ok'ũ* singers—despite the dominant expectation that studies take priority over music—matured into leading stars in the music industry. In the next chapter, I explore how the “wholesome” image of *p'ok'ũ* benefitted its advancement in the popular music world, which was encountering tighter governmental control and shifting targets of censorship.

Chapter 2. Censoring “Vulgar” and “Decadent” Music:

P'ok'ŭ As the Alternative to *Trot* and *Rok*

In this second chapter, I analyze the moral guidelines and methods of popular music censorship, in order to demonstrate how censorship shaped the stylistic evolution of *p'ok'ŭ* between 1970 and 1974. I disclose how the perception of *p'ok'ŭ* as music cultivated by university-educated youth—the thesis of chapter one—validated its intellectual and elite image, thereby making it the “wholesome” alternative to other genres censored by the government. I show how during the several months leading up to and after the government Clampdown on Decadent Trends (*t'oep'yep'ungjotansok*), which became an official policy in October of 1971, censorship of *trot* as “vulgar” and overly sentimental music, and *rok* as “decadent” and loud music, led to the advancement of *p'ok'ŭ* as the “quiet” alternative: an original art form that would elevate the status of Korean popular music. While *p'ok'ŭ* evaded getting censored due to the vague moral reasons associated with *trot* and *rok*, it experienced intermittent accusations of plagiarism, which reveal the arbitrary decision-making process and absolute power of the legal entities responsible for censoring music. And despite the media’s upholding of *p'ok'ŭ* as “quiet” and wholesome music, exchange and crossover between *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* began as early as 1971 when the growing influence of the youth generation led to the rise in popularity of both genres. I argue that the preference for “quiet” *p'ok'ŭ* music within the government-controlled media’s and broadcasting companies, overshadowed early attempts of exchange and hybridization between *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok*, until the popularity of *rok* music overcame government suppression at the end of 1973. By 1974, *p'ok'ŭ* musicians were abandoning their acoustic guitars and embracing *rok* as a more timely artistic medium that could better express the social conditions of life. This trend

catapulted *p'ok'ŭ-rok* songs into top-selling hits before the onset of an even harsher phase of suppression in 1975, which is the topic of the final chapter of this dissertation.

I argue that the dogmatic principles and irrevocability of music censorship in the early 1970s, delimited the aesthetic boundaries of *p'ok'ŭ* and eclipsed early ventures of crossover and stylistic experimentation with *rok*. Instead, the commercial success of *p'ok'ŭ* begot the unexpected phenomenon of *trot* singers imitating or transforming into *p'ok'ŭ* singers. However, by the end of 1973 *rok* overcame government suppression, precipitating the peak years of hybrid *p'ok'ŭ* until 1975. Thus, this chapter is an examination of how Korean popular musicians coped with censors who had ambiguous standards for evaluating music, which brought about divergent forms of hybridization: One between *p'ok'ŭ* and *trot*—genres that were in dichotomy both musically and socially; and the other between *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok*—genres that were more symbiotic, despite *p'ok'ŭ*'s rise at the expense of *rok*.

The Moral Guidelines and Methods for Censoring Popular Music

In order to understand how censorship shaped the stylistic evolution of *p'ok'ŭ*, I will first explain the moral guidelines and methods of the two main entities that were responsible for censoring music during the Park Chung Hee era (1961-1979): the Broadcasting Ethics Committee (BEC) and the Art and Culture Ethics Committee (ACEC).¹⁰⁶ The BEC was founded autonomously on June 14th, 1962, as part of the numerous ethics committees that emerged with Park's rise to power after the May 16th military coup of 1961.¹⁰⁷ With the enactment of the "Broadcast Law" in 1963, the BEC became a legal entity in 1964, and began screening music

¹⁰⁶ The BEC is the *pangsongyulliwŏnhoe* and the ACEC is the *yesulmunhwayulliwŏnhoe*.

¹⁰⁷ Mun, *The Social History of Prohibited Songs in Korea*, 102.

suitable for broadcast starting in November of 1965.¹⁰⁸ The ACEC was also established autonomously in January of 1966 as the Korean Arts and Culture Ethics Committee, but after the promulgation of the “Record Law” (proclamation number 1944) in March of 1967, began enforcing government-stipulated censorship of recorded music in 1968.¹⁰⁹ In theory, the ACEC was responsible for reviewing music before its production into records, while the BEC was responsible for weeding out music inappropriate for broadcast. But in reality, hasty and arbitrary review processes resulted in conflicting decisions between the two committees, which left those making music in a constant state of uncertainty.

In March 1970, Director of the Christian Academy Kang Wŏn-ryong hosted a debate titled “How Far has Korean Popular Music Come?,” which reveals how popular music was censored based on ambiguous ethical standards, restraining the artistic freedom of music practitioners. The debate, which was published as a series in the daily entertainment newspaper *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, gathered composers, critics, and singers, as well as representatives of record companies, broadcasting companies, and government agencies—such as the BEC and the Culture and Public Information Broadcasting Management Bureau—to discuss what they considered qualitative problems in the music world: vulgarity, plagiarism and proper copyright practices, limits of government intervention, and future directions. I will unpack the first three problems because they explain why and how popular music was censored, and hence disclose the ideological and moral incentives of censors.

Regarding the “vulgarity” of popular music, discussants seemed privy to the fact that this term—in conjunction with other morally ambiguous and subjective terms such as “decadent”—

¹⁰⁸ Mun, *The Social History of Prohibited Songs in Korea*, 102.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 133.

was being used to degrade and censor *trot* songs. Throughout the debate, those who produced and distributed music generally questioned the accusations of music being vulgar, while those who reviewed and censored music displayed more dogmatic attitudes. Here are two representative examples:

- Chang Il-yŏng (music department of the Munwha Broadcasting Company): Due to speculations about popular music being vulgar, we conducted a survey of 4,000 songs focusing on whether their lyrical contents are vulgar. The survey showed that most songs are about tears, love, parting, and sorrow. We cannot judge these sentimental feelings as simply vulgar.

- Mo Ki-yun (secretary-general of the Broadcasting Ethics Committee): In order to decipher whether or not popular songs are vulgar, I will provide some examples of vulgar lyrics taken from “broadcast songs” (*pangsonggayo*).¹¹⁰ “No Room for Mercy” and “I am a Brawler” are songs that praise violence. While the subject of love is not bad in and of itself, songs like “24,000 Kisses,” “What To Do,” “Night Flower,” and “Backstreet Romance” catalyze passion, and decadent songs like “I Don’t Like the Sun,” “Spit at the Blue Sky,” and “Our Dad is a Cheater” are difficult not to regard as vulgar. Not only are the lyrics vulgar, but so are singing styles that make the body twist, as is the case with “What To Do.”¹¹¹

Despite Chang Il-yŏng’s reasonable statement about the unfeasibility of judging sentiment, Secretary-General of the BEC Mo Ki-yun’s accusations about songs that incite violence, passion, and decadence, carried more weight due to his position of power. Most importantly, the songs Mo brings up—excluding “24,000 Kisses,” which is an Italian *canzone* by Adriano Celentano,

¹¹⁰ The somewhat forced distinction between “broadcast songs” (*pangsonggayo*)—songs broadcasted on the radio and television—and “popular songs” (*taejunggayo*) was disintegrating due to the ubiquity of radios and the rapid dissemination of television during the early 1970s. However, the BEC and ACEC continued screening music separately.

¹¹¹ Korean titles of songs mentioned in respective order: [인정 사정볼것 없다] [나는 난폭자] [2만 4천번의 키스] [어떻게 해] [밤의 꽃] [뒷골목 청춘] [태양은 싫어요] [푸른 하늘에 침을 뱉어라] [우리 아빠는 바람장이], and [어떻게 해].

and “What To Do,” which is a psychedelic-*rok*¹¹² song performed by the multifaceted star singer Kim Sang-hŭi—are all hit *trot* songs, corroborating the fact that denouncements of vulgarity were regularly directed against *trot* songs. Inversely, that the two non-*trot* songs he addresses—“24,000 Kisses” and “What To Do”—are an Italian *canzone*, which was a genre close to *p'ok'ŭ*, and an original hit song written and produced by the illustrious *rok* musician Sin Chung-hyŏn, prefigures the targeted censorship of *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* that transpired in 1975. In addition, one can surmise that accusations of decadence were applied to songs that convey rebellious or transgressive attitudes, and that such decadent aspects were also treated as vulgar. While “vulgar” was *mainly* used to censor *trot* songs, and “decadent” was *mainly* used to censor *rok* songs, the interchangeable use of the two terms during the government Clampdown on Decadent Trends, demonstrates that these were arbitrary terms applied to songs that irked censors. Mo’s stance regarding songs that “catalyze passion” and incite provocative bodily gestures is reminiscent of the way older U.S. audiences responded when they first witnessed the twist. Songs that convey—either topically or through singing style or bodily gesture—passion, violence, or pessimism were treated with suspicion.

After “vulgarity,” plagiarism was ostensibly the most rampant problem in the music industry that even affected top *p'ok'ŭ* singer songwriters, as I will show later in this chapter.¹¹³ In addition, plagiarism was used as a mechanism to disparage *waesaek* (“Japanese-ness”) in *trot*, similar to the way *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* were derided as reflecting youth’s blind embrace of decadent

¹¹² The song is designated as “psychedelic rock” in Korea, but “What To Do” sounds heavily influenced by doo-wop and soul and Kim is supposed to have replaced The Pearl Sisters, who were modeled after The Supremes.

¹¹³ “How Far Has Korean Popular Music Come? (Part 2): The Problem of Plagiarism and *Waesaek* Copyright,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, March 7, 1970.

Western trends during the blacklisting of 1975. BEC Secretary-General Mo Ki-yun connects the problem of plagiarism with *waesaek* by sharing an anecdote about premeditated acts of plagiarism, during which South Korean composers eavesdrop on Japanese radio to copy their songs.¹¹⁴ That the makers and distributors of music were frustrated with the lack of a transparent standard when screening music for plagiarism is apparent: composer Na Kyu-ho discusses the limitations of relying on scores, KBS TV-producer Oh Yong-hwan asserts that imitation and plagiarism should be differentiated, and MBC's head of music department Pak Chin-hyŏn claims that a few bars of similarity do not constitute plagiarism. In terms of the status of domestic and foreign copyright laws, participants agreed that the public's awareness of the concept was poorly established and expressed that the government's announcement about Korea's joining the International Copyright Association in 1971 is premature "considering the lack of protective measures set up in the country." In addition, lyricist Chi Ung objected that despite the existence of copyright law in theory, in practice, broadcasting companies pay only a meager portion of what they should be paying in licensing fees. And jazz critic Ch'oe Kyŏng-sik, stressed the point that unless "individuals stand up for their rights," domestic copyright practices will not make headway, implying the absence of a designated authority that oversees and enforces the observance of copyright law. The discussion showed that plagiarism was used to censor *waesaek*, more so than to enforce proper copyright practices. In other words, censorship of plagiarism stemmed from an ideological need to rid Korean popular music of Japanese traces,

¹¹⁴ In the same article, secretary-general of the BEC, Mo Ki-yun, is quoted as saying: "In domestic popular music, [cases of] plagiarism and *waesaek* are happening simultaneously. Some composers who can't even read scores, let alone understand the theories of counterpoint and harmony, are said to be hanging out in the southern ports near Pusan in order to overhear through the radio or television Japanese songs, so they can plagiarize them." The remaining quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

and was enforced as a moral corrective more so than for the financial gain of individual composers or recording labels (even though such disputes did happen as well).

Discussion of the "Limits of Responsibility and Administrative Intervention" comes closest to addressing the qualms media personnel had about the ACEC and BEC, while also revealing the heavy responsibility put on broadcast producers to make and selectively distribute music that "contribute[s] to elevating the quality of popular music."¹¹⁵ Unsurprisingly, opinions were polarized between those who argued that "[record] production companies focus too much on commercial success," and those who argued that "production companies are not at fault because they make musical commodities reflecting the same level of standards as that of the public." Participants also criticized broadcasting companies that blatantly pursue marketability, to which the broadcasting staff responded by denouncing the systems of censorship they have to cope with. MBC's head of music department Pak Chin-hyŏn boldly said: "Decisions regarding vulgarity or wholesomeness should be left to the broadcast staff, and I cannot agree that review processes conducted by the ACEC and BEC, which restrain musical activities, are shortcuts that elevate the standards of popular music." Despite Pak's audacious statement defending the freedom of expression, the article gives a relatively neutral summary regarding the validity and limits of governmental intervention, asserting that many argued for "the government to invest funds in ways that would encourage a more natural development of music towards the direction it desires." This acceptance of soft intervention suggests that the discussants were cognizant of the improbability of escaping government-mandated designations of "vulgarity" or "wholesomeness."

¹¹⁵ "How Far Has Korean Popular Music Come? (Part 3): Limits of Responsibility and Administrative Intervention," *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, March 8, 1970. Quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

The “How Far Has Korean Popular Music Come?” debate of 1970 exposed: how *trot* songs were criticized as vulgar and too Japanese; the nationalistic and moral incentives underlying the insufficient guidelines for judging cases of plagiarism; the charges against record producers preoccupied with monetary return rather than quality of product; and the conflicting viewpoints about popular music reflecting the tastes and wants of the public, as opposed to popular music needing to be purged and improved.¹¹⁶ Apart from these polarized viewpoints, Oh Yong-hwan and Lee Sang-man—both from KBS—bemoaned the absence of rigor in the music industry and stressed the need for trained and specialized leaders and “intellectuals,” who can purportedly raise the standards of music composition.¹¹⁷ This hierarchical viewpoint that learned specialists can elevate the status of popular music, goes hand in hand with the assumption that *p'ok'ŭ*, which was presented as quiet and intellectual music performed by university-educated students—a premise I laid out in chapter one—is the suitable and “wholesome” alternative to *trot* and *rok*.

In addition, the “vulgarity” portion of the debate exposed how *trot* was the antithetical genre to *p'ok'ŭ* in terms of affect and lyrical content. Regarding what *p'ok'ŭ* brought to the popular music industry between 1970 and 1971, Shin Hyun-joon posits that compared to *trot* songs, many of which were laments of love using abstract terms, original *p'ok'ŭ* songs such as Toi Et Moi’s “Promise” (1970) and Ŭn Hŭi’s “Wearing a Flower Ring” (1971) supplied “independent and individual conversations of love.”¹¹⁸ This perspectival shift from the abstract

¹¹⁶ “How Far Has Korean Popular Music Come? (Final Part): Future Directions and Conclusion,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, March 11, 1970.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1960*, 340.

to the “independent and individual” is noteworthy because early *p'ok'ŭ* hits, such as the aforementioned two, can be glossed over as remaining in the theme of romance. Nevertheless, on closer observation they are, per Shin, “rejections of the feudalistic and pre-modern conventions that persisted in Korean society, and a farewell to traditional conceptions of love.”¹¹⁹

Emotionally, the understated affect and innocent lyrics of “Promise” and “Wearing a Flower Ring”—which employ child-friendly metaphors and imagery such as “living clearly like the blue sky,” and “building a sandcastle”—stand in stark contrast to the emotive execution and woeful yet mature lyrics of *trot*, such as the ones listed above. The innocent lyrics and unassuming presentation of *p'ok'ŭ* made it a fitting substitute for *trot*, which according to singer Kim Hyŏn-chin, was habitually criticized as “vulgar,” despite being universally adored by the public.¹²⁰

Such vague accusations of “vulgarity” reflect the ill-defined and nontransparent censorship process of the ACEC and BEC, which during this time impacted *trot* more than other genres. In May 1970, the conservative daily newspaper *Taehanilbo* published an article titled “Distant Reality of Popular Music Purification,” condemning the ACEC and BEC’s practice of judging popular music based on ambiguous ethical standards. In theory, the pre-production review conducted by the ACEC was supposed to prevent record companies from producing albums containing songs deemed inappropriate. But those that passed the ACEC’s review process were getting banned by the BEC, to the chagrin of music industry practitioners who then had to cope with compounded losses.¹²¹ In their defense, the BEC claimed that “the committee’s

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ “How Far Has Korean Popular Music Come? (Part 1): The Meaning of Vulgarity,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, March 6, 1970.

¹²¹ Compounded from having produced a record and then losing the platform to publicize the music, which then promotes wider recognition and record sales.

post-production review bans songs *only* from broadcasting,” but for those in the popular music industry, being banned from broadcasting companies meant losing the primary means of promotion and circulation.¹²² This begs the question: Why was the BEC banning songs that had passed the pre-production review of the ACEC? The ACEC blamed inadequate funding and staff as reasons for such oversight, while also pointing to the overwhelming quantity of songs that needed to be assessed for plagiarism and *waesaek*. Rejoinders from the popular music industry arguing against the injustice of the preliminary review process were simply ignored or brushed aside with contrived justifications from the BEC about their review process needing to be more strict because “broadcast [content] invades households.” The BEC had control of censoring content that aired in the media, bringing to light the greater repercussions of the BEC’s review over that of the ACEC. Instances when the BEC decided to ban songs *after* they had already become hits and sold numerous records, suggest that those songs were politicized after gaining popularity, and therefore banned belatedly by the BEC. The article focuses on the unmethodical practices of the BEC rather than the problems of the music industry, and adds that rumors of wrongdoing, such as the one allegedly carried out by an evaluator who held unjust sway in what songs got evaluated, damaged the integrity of the BEC. While the article defends the “strict review of vulgar, immoral, and plagiarized songs running rampant in the music industry,” it condemns the BEC’s abuse of power and urges that it examine itself [to better fulfill its duties] as a “purifying agency.” Such denunciatory reports notwithstanding, the BEC and ACEC only grew more authoritarian during the post 1972 *Yushin* era, enforcing the increasingly repressive policies of Park.

¹²² “Distant [reality of] Popular Music Purification,” *Taehanilbo*, May 7, 1970, emphasis mine. Quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

While the media denounced the BEC's unsystematic and prejudiced practices, they approved *p'okŭ* for elevating the "musical standard of the public."¹²³ I explained in the previous chapter, how the overlap between the waning popularity of *vocal groups* and the precipitation of *p'okŭ* groups in the late 1960s brought about the confusing conflation of the two terms. Nonetheless, the public began to differentiate *p'okŭ* singers from other *vocal groups* on account of the former's quiet sound and reputable status. The conservative daily press *Taehanilbo* printed an article in November 28, 1970, which excoriates bands that use electric instruments and *vocal groups* for their deficient creativity, dearth in repertoire, and empty parroting of foreign songs. The article denounces loud electric music, claiming that "the global trend in popular music is moving on from psychedelic and soul music to high-class, quiet music such as *p'okŭ*." Of the many purportedly uncreative *vocal groups*, one exception is the coed *p'okŭ* duet *Toi et Moi*, who are described as a group that covers songs by "the world's most prominent vocal team Simon and Garfunkel." Quoting an anonymous composer who disapproves of singers who "can't even read scores," the article ends by arguing that *vocal groups* and electric bands ought to "switch to working with quiet music such as lyrical *canzones* or *p'okŭ* songs in order to heighten the musical standard of the public." This argument proscribed loud electric music and prescribed quiet, lyrical music. And the article shows that in addition to young teen and college-educated fans attracted to Western-influenced popular music, *p'okŭ* was winning the approval of a more conservative group, such as the writers and readers of *Taehanilbo*.

¹²³ "Vocal Group Popularity Dwindles," *Taehanilbo*, November 28, 1970. All quotations in this paragraph are from the same article.

1971, A Whirlwind Year for Korean Popular Music

1971 was a whirlwind year in Korean popular music because voluntary and government-mandated forms of censorship suppressed *trot* for being “vulgar,” and most damagingly, *rok* for being “decadent,” thereby catapulting *p'ok'ŭ* into the limelight. During the first half of 1971, the popularity of *both p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* reached unprecedented heights, which prompted musicians to crossover or blend the two genres. With the newfound stardom of *p'ok'ŭ*, select singers made the news for plagiarism, unearthing the censors’ unawareness of common practices in *p'ok'ŭ*, as well as their problematizing the increasingly critical tone of self-composed *p'ok'ŭ* songs. But with the enforcement of the Clampdown on Decadent Trends in October, not only *rok*, but also *trot* was subdued, leaving *p'ok'ŭ* the sole choice of broadcasting producers in search of a replacement. To unfold this story, I will first describe the media’s outlook on censorship during the first half of 1971, when broadcasting companies were already in the process of voluntarily censoring “vulgar” and “decadent” music. Then I will analyze early iterations of *p'ok'ŭ-rok* that demonstrate the competitive relationship and porous boundary between the two genres. Subsequently, I will examine how *p'ok'ŭ* encountered the scrutiny of censors that Fall, before the draconian suppression of *rok* enforced under the government Clampdown on Decadent Trends. And lastly, I will describe how the government clampdown also impacted *trot*, which led to the concentrated promotion of *p'ok'ŭ* the following year.

1971 began with news intimating the need to censor musical content in the media. On January 9, 1971, the conservative newspaper *Taehanilbo* printed a full-page cover article titled “The Generational Shift That Will Befall Popular Music,” which comments on the plethora of new singers—“around a hundred according to those registered with the Korean Entertainment Association”—that debuted the previous year, and remarks that the world of popular music,

which used to be riddled with *waesaek* and vulgar *trot* songs, is now showing “signs of a big change.”¹²⁴ It claims that the reason the recording industry floundered the previous year was not because of the economic recession, but because “the public is already tired of the monotony of decadent and vulgar trends in popular music.” The article thoroughly reproaches practically every type of popular music, finding fault in the *waesaek* and low quality of *trot* styles, the “exaggerated gestures” and “humdrum singing” of *vocal groups*, and the “monotony of decadent and vulgar” sounds of soul and psychedelic music (*saik'i*). It then discloses that broadcasting companies are reviewing a campaign, “the contents of which discuss the focused televising, promotion, and protection of wholesome songs.” The article views this campaign as a positive sign, indicating that both the broadcasting companies as well as the media deemed the aforementioned types of music as unwholesome genres worthy of being purged. Later that month *Taehanilbo* printed another denunciatory report—this time titled “The New Wind in the Broadcast Music World”—about the popular music industry’s “disorderly deluge of low quality, vulgar, and decadent trends.”¹²⁵ It specifies that all four broadcasting companies—TBC (Tongyang Broadcast Company), DBS (Dong-A Broadcasting System), MBC (Munwha Broadcasting Corporation), and KBS (Korean Broadcasting System)—were in the process of establishing and enforcing their own guidelines for the qualitative and quantitative control of music. It appears that the companies’ measures to regulate music on broadcast, which are stated as “stimulating the popular music industry, which was too monotonously vulgar,” was a

¹²⁴ “The Generational Shift That Will Befall Popular Music,” *Taehanilbo*, January 9, 1971. The following three quotes are from this article.

¹²⁵ “The New Wind in the Broadcast Music World,” *Taehanilbo*, January 30, 1971.

grassroots form of self-censorship.¹²⁶ As was the case in 1965 when *trot* songs were banned for being too Japanese, such voluntary acts of censorship were carried out by Park sympathizers who were in positions of power.

Media portrayals show that censorship committees conducted cursory, subjective, and reward-based evaluations. A May tenth report in *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* criticized the “authoritarian and vague review criteria” of censorship organizations, pinpointing that their “four, five-part review processes are vulnerable to differences in opinions.”¹²⁷ Hundreds of songs were in a state of limbo due to being banned from broadcast but permitted to be sold, or the converse, allowed to be broadcast but banned from being sold. This muddle was the unfortunate result of passing the pre-production review of the ACEC but not the review of the BEC, or of the ACEC banning the song *after* its release. The latter was an embarrassment for the ACEC because it indicated their having failed the task of catching censorship-worthy songs *before* record production. The article asserts that the “majority opinion of those in the entertainment industry is that current review systems of popular music contain significant flaws.”¹²⁸ That the ACEC only had three permanent members (one in charge of reviewing lyrics, and two in charge of reviewing the melodies) evaluating approximately 200 songs three times a week, intimates the perfunctory reality of the review process. What exacerbated this perfunctory process seems to have been that reviewers were incentivized to censor music, receiving 300 won (approximately 5,542 won today, which is the equivalent of 4.7 dollars) per banned song.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ “Overlapping Systems [Cause] Chaotic Review,” *Ilgansŭp'och'u*, May 10, 1971. All quotations in this paragraph are from the same article.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

While the media presented the BEC and ACEC in a dissatisfactory light, it solidified the image of *p'ok'ŭ* as “wholesome,” separating it from other genres competing in the music industry. On May 12, 1971, *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*—the same publishing company that depicted the coed duo Toi et Moi as literary and nostalgic—printed a fault-finding commentary when DBS (Dong-A Broadcasting System) recruited female member Pak In-hŭi to host a radio show, which complicated Toi et Moi’s schedule. The commentary asserts that it is the “responsibility of the media to promote wholesome *p'okŭ* music” rather than “threatening the teamwork of a first-class *p'okŭ* duo” by only hiring one of them.¹²⁹ Exactly a month later, an article in *Kyŏngnyangshinmun* encapsulating the popular music world as a “three-way race” between *trot*, *p'ok'ŭ*, and *rok*, commended the dissemination of “wholesome creative *p'ok'ŭ* songs,” as well as the “trustworthy and wholesome” popularity of *p'ok'ŭ* singers, who write and compose their own songs.¹³⁰ The article’s redundant use of the word “wholesome” and emphasis on creativity reflect the welcoming of *p'ok'ŭ*’s move away from singing foreign copies and embrace of the singer songwriter model. It also reflects the media’s heavy-handed and moralistic intervening in popular music in general.

Subdued Attempts of *P'okŭ-rok*: Cho Tong-chin and The Glasses

During its developmental phase (1971-1973), *p'okŭ* underwent periods of hybridization with other genres of popular music including but not limited to *trot* and *rok*. *P'okŭ*’s integration with *trot* was unexpected given *trot*’s reputation as music favored by the older generation, but *p'okŭ*’s integration with *rok* was expected given the collaborative relationship of musicians

¹²⁹ “Toi et Moi Buried in Disbandment Rumors,” *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*, May 12, 1971.

¹³⁰ “Generational Shift in Hit Songs,” *Kyŏngnyangshinmun*, June 12, 1971.

working in both genres. According to Shin Hyun-joon, “the dichotomy between *p'okŭ* and *rok* was relatively weak for those who actually made the music, compared to how *p'okŭ* was presented in the media or received ideologically by its consumers.”¹³¹ Indeed, while the government-controlled media’s preferment of “quiet” music extended the centrality of the acoustic guitar in *p'okŭ*, attempts of crossover or hybridization between *p'okŭ* and *rok*, can be traced back to the beginning of 1971.

A January 20th *Chugan'gyŏngnyang* article titled “*P'okŭ* Music Soloist Cho Tong-chin [and his] Peculiar Tone Called *P'okŭ-Rok*” describes former *rok* guitarist Cho as a “long-haired singer who recently transitioned to a solo *p'okŭ* musician” but likes to call his singing style “*p'okŭ-rok*.”¹³² Cho’s “peculiar tone” is described as one that “sounds like a combination of the folk group Bee Gees and the Puerto Rican soloist José Feliciano,” and two representative pieces from his repertoire are: José Feliciano’s “Rain” and The Young Bloods’ “Get Together.”¹³³ The way in which these three musician groups—the Bee Gees, José Feliciano, and The Young Bloods—are brought up to describe Cho’s vocal tone and favored repertoire, require some clarification. Firstly, designating the Bee Gees as a folk group can be explained by the pre-disco phase of their career. “Holiday,” which was released in 1967, displays the captivating, vibrato-filled voices of the Bee Gees, so likening Cho’s tone to the Bee Gees can be understood as complimenting his tenor voice. Secondly, it is noteworthy that Feliciano is described as a “Puerto Rican soloist” while the Bee Gees is simply labelled a “folk group.” This suggests that a national

¹³¹ Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1960*, 328.

¹³² “*P'okŭ* Music Soloist Cho Tongchin [and his] Peculiar Tone Called *P'okŭ-Rok*,” *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*, January 20, 1971.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

descriptor clarifying race or ethnicity was unnecessary for white musicians as famous as the Bee Gees, and that Feliciano was known primarily as a virtuoso guitarist rather than as a singer of a specific genre. Feliciano was applauded for his fluency across various genres such as jazz, blues, soul, rock, and of course Latin music, and his primary instrument was the acoustic guitar, which makes him a perfect model for a *rok-to-p'okŭ* crossover musician like Cho. And lastly, The Youngbloods recorded possibly the most famous version of “Get Together” in 1967 and re-released it in 1969 due to popular demand. Before The Youngbloods, the Kingston Trio recorded a folk version in 1964. Later that year, The Byrds recorded a folk-rock version, and then in 1966 Jefferson Airplane recorded their own version. The song’s varied folk and rock versions demonstrate its flexibility and fitness as a representative song for a singer who self-designates his singing style as *p'okŭ-rok*.

By the summer of 1971, leading *p'okŭ* singers made deliberate attempts to emulate *rok*, suggesting that they found appealing the beats and timbres of *rok* music. In June 1971, the same magazine that announced Cho’s transition into a solo *p'okŭ* singer introduced a group of leading *p'okŭ* musicians attempting a transition in the reverse direction. The name of this newly established *rok* group, “The Glasses” (“Ti Aenggyöngsŭ”), whose members were: former partners of Twin Folio Song Ch'ang-sik and Yun Hyöng-chu, singer songwriter Lee Chang-hŭi, and sought-after DJ Lee Chong-hwan.¹³⁴ The band’s comic name is a caricature of the bespectacled intellectual, student *p'okŭ* singer, and also a parody of the ubiquitous format of English band names entitled: “The [fill-in-the-blank]s” (e.g. The Beatles, The Byrds, The

¹³⁴ “The Glasses Attempts Magnification of P'ok'ŭ: The Four-Man Group Tackles *Rok* Group,” *Chugan'gyöngnyang*, June 30, 1971.

Monkees, The Youngbloods, The Doors, etc.).¹³⁵ Such self-criticism of *p'ok'ŭ* singers would later motivate them to question their commercial success and make a concerted effort to revive their amateur origins.

The goal of the project band “The Glasses” was to expand *p'ok'ŭ* beyond the scope of intimate music cafes and salons (which were mostly situated in and around Myŏng-dong), and into larger venues that demand electric amplification. Band member Song declares that “nothing is new about *p'okŭ* artists taking up electric guitars and participating in the development of a ‘*p'okŭ* group sound.’ But the significance of the band’s formation is that it heralds the first step towards the expansion of *p'okŭ* music.”¹³⁶ According to Song:

Acoustic guitar *p'okŭ* singers have been gaining popularity among academic clubs, school recitals, coffee shops, and music salons, but [they] have time after time been pushed aside by electric guitar *rok* groups when it comes to large-scale stages such as the Seoul Citizen’s Hall. This indicates that despite its deep lyrics and philosophy, *p'okŭ* music lacks the strong beat and loud volume craved by youth. In order to save *p'okŭ* music in 1971, new solutions will have to be devised.

Ti Aenggyŏngsŭ aimed to “supply beat and excitement to *p'okŭ* music” and proposed a blueprint for the “intensification of the *p'okŭ* boom” in four steps: First, the use of electric guitar and drums in combination with the acoustic guitar; second, singing in rounds as well as in four-part harmony in order to reenact the pleasures and excitement of original folk practices such as the “hootenannies” and “sing-alongs”; third, the adoption of exaggerated poses and gestures, which are hallmarks of *rok* groups; and fourth, wearing fancy primary-color costumes and being open

¹³⁵ “Ti” is a Korean pronunciation of “The” and “aeng-gyong” is an anglicized enunciation of the word “an'gyŏng” (“glasses”) achieved by changing the first syllable “an” to “aeng.” Then this anglicized Korean word is pluralized with the addition of “su,” like the way English is pluralized by adding an “s” at the end. All these minor adjustments add up to a funny and catchy name.

¹³⁶ “The Glasses Attempts Magnification of P'ok'ŭ,” *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*, June 30, 1971. All quotations in this paragraph are from the same article.

to donning wigs that trump the hairstyles of existing *rok* groups. Fans are said to have eagerly awaited the band's "challenge against *rok* groups" planned to take place in a "3-day event at the Seoul Citizen's Hall from [June] 18th through the 20th." News of *Ti Aenggyöngsü* is difficult to find afterwards, suggesting that the group's experimental transformation as a *rok* band did not last long.

What made the news instead, was the success of female *p'ok'ũ* singer Ŭn Hŭi. On July 31st, *Kyönggyangshinmun* published a feature highlighting Ŭn Hŭi's compositional and arrangement skills that resulted in the creation of "Wearing a Flower Ring," which was originally a "Western country song."¹³⁷ Ŭn Hŭi is quoted as saying that the song "was recommended by four broadcasting companies—KBS, MBC, CBS, and DBS—in July," and that she "is happy to hear compliments about the song having a bright and clean melody that is easy to sing yet still fresh/original."¹³⁸ Such preferential treatment catapulted "Wearing a Flower Ring" to a best-selling record in a matter of two weeks, attesting to the promotional power of the four main broadcasting companies.

Despite the media's favoring of *p'ok'ũ* over *rok*, in reality, *p'ok'ũ* and *rok* singers alike were benefitting from the *p'ap*, or "young music" boom, and outcompeting *trot*. According to an *Ilgansŭp'och'ũ* article published on August 4th, 1971, thanks to its "characteristic quiet atmosphere," *p'ok'ũ* was expanding their platform not only to entertainment shows, but also to cultural programs on both radio and television, shoving *trot* singers off their pinnacle status in

¹³⁷ "P'ok'ũ Singer, Writer, and Arranger, Ŭn Hŭi," *Kyönggyangshinmun*, July 31, 1971.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

the music industry.¹³⁹ The following observation reinforces the stereotype of the adult generation (*kisōngsedae*) in the country liking *trot* and the youth generation (*ch'ōngnyōnsedae*) in cities liking *p'ap* (domestically produced popular music influenced by Western popular music such as *p'okū* and *rok*):

theater shows—known to be the most insular and conservative—used to be headlined by top *trot* singers, who are getting elbowed aside to stages in rural areas, while the Seoul Citizen's Hall—known to be the hub of entertainment shows—are putting on commercially successful shows centered around *p'okū* or *rok*.

Trot singers, who were former kingpins of Korean popular music, began to feel the threat of music favored by youth:

That *p'okū* or *rok* singers have seized the realm of music salons, not to mention night clubs and beer halls, which cater to middle-aged and older clientele, evinces the elevated status of *p'ap*-style singers. In any case, the state of *trot*—after a fierce run generating a fifty-year legacy in the popular music world—is at a crossroads: it can either adopt the beats of *rok* and become “*rok-trot*” like in neighboring Japan, or it can degenerate and let the wave of new *p'ap* music take over. Even the recording industry, which is the last domain sustaining *trot* singers, is venturing into new styles of music in the hopes of overcoming the downturn in record sales.

That the popularity of *p'ap* music reached unprecedented heights was corroborated by the Ch'ōng-p'yōng Festival, which took place at the Ch'ōng-p'yōng Safety Amusement Park between August 17th and 23rd. The Ch'ōng-p'yōng Festival was modeled after the Woodstock Festival and the Newport Folk Festival, which are the consummate rock and folk festivals in the U.S. It was sponsored by the Popular Music Critics Association (*Kyōngūmak P'yōngnonga Hyōp'oe*), which indicates that this association was supportive of the establishment and expansion of *p'ap* music in Korea.¹⁴⁰ The festival marked the production of South Korea's largest outdoor concert, and the

¹³⁹ “*P'ap* Establishes Roots,” *Ilgansūp'och'ū*, August 4, 1971. The following two block quotes are also from this article.

¹⁴⁰ The term “*kyōngūmak*” translates to “light music,” but following WWII, it was commonly used to describe various styles of foreign popular music.

article boasts that “top-class” *rok* groups such as He-Six (*Hishiksŭ*), Key Voice (*K'iboisŭ*), and Rush (*Rŏshwi*), as well as prominent *p'okŭ* singers such as Yun Hyŏng-chu, Kim Se-hwan, Song Ch'ang-sik, Lee Yong-pok, and Toi et Moi, are joining a line-up of approximately 200 singers and ten MCs.¹⁴¹ The music adored by youth had expanded to the point of being able to entertain fans during a six-day music marathon.

Censorship Befalls *P'ok'ŭ*

While *p'ok'ŭ* singers were applauded for their original songwriting and “wholesome” image, they too came under the scrutiny of censors as they gained wide appeal. I address two instances—in 1971 and in 1973—when leading *p'ok'ŭ* singers were censored because the accusations they received reflect the lyrical and stylistic changes *p'ok'ŭ* was undergoing; between the early and developmental years which can be marked by the arrival of the singer songwriter, and between the developmental and peak years, which can be identified by the musical hybridity and professionalized production of *p'ok'ŭ* albums. I examine the first case here, which demonstrates the censors’ unawareness of (or indifference to) the practice of singing orally-transmitted songs in *p'ok'ŭ* as well as the increasingly critical self-expression of *p'ok'ŭ* singers.

Up to this point, high-profile songs talked about in the news for being censored were mostly *trot*, but by September of 1971, two *p'ok'ŭ* songs by Sŏ Yu-sŏk were blacklisted by the BEC, suggesting *p'ok'ŭ*’s status was by then seen as a prominent and influential genre in the popular music world. An article in *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* printed on September 17, 1971 about the “vague and rough-and-ready review process” of the BEC, states that two *p'ok'ŭ* songs by Sŏ Yu-sŏk titled “Rain Rain” and “A Kaleidoscopic World” were banned by the BEC during their

¹⁴¹ “Mammoth Outdoor Festival in Ch'ŏngp'yŏng,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, August 12, 1971.

regular meeting in September.¹⁴² In the case of “Rain Rain,” Sō combined lyrics of a Korean traditional folk song from the region of South Ham-gyōng, with the melody of the Israeli national anthem, Hatikva. The song is a stripped-down combination of the whispered, intimate singing of Sō and his dexterously performed acoustic guitar accompaniment, with a steady presence of soft rain and intermittent thunder in the background. “A Kaleidoscopic World” is a cover of Joe South’s 1969 hit-song “Games People Play,” with lyrics written by Sō that, like the original song but in a more detailed way, mock the commonly-experienced hardships and ironies of life. Sonically, “A Kaleidoscopic World” is the polar opposite of “Rain Rain” in that Sō’s voice is upfront and direct, and accompanied by electric guitar and syncopated percussion that accentuate the second beat of the duple-timed song. “Rain Rain” was banned for plagiarism of lyrics and “A Kaleidoscopic World” for the ill-defined reason of having “inappropriate lyrics for broadcast.” In the case of “Rain Rain,” Sō explained on the back of his disc [LP] that: “the orally transmitted *p’ok’ū* song “Rain Rain” is commonly sung during YMCA-type [sing-along] gatherings, but the author of the song is unknown, which is why I slightly revised the lyrics for my own rendition.” Despite this printed explanation, which indicates that Sō had no intention of plagiarizing or infringing on copyright, the belated discovery of the original lyricist Han T’ae-kūn resulted in the BEC’s swift banning of Sō’s song for plagiarism. The BEC’s decision demonstrates their unawareness of the common practice in *p’ok’ū* of singing orally transmitted songs that sometimes have unknown authorship. The entertainment industry condemned the BEC’s hasty decision-making process, adding that it did not even give Han and Sō a chance to negotiate a solution.

¹⁴² “Troubles of Vague Review Criteria,” *Ilgansūp’och’ū*, September 17, 1971. All quotations discussing the plagiarism of Sō’s two songs are from this article.

“A Kaleidoscopic World” was banned by the BEC due to its purported inappropriateness of lyrics. It appears that the BEC found portions of the song’s lyrics to be problematic, such as “After studying English for ten years, all I remember are song lyrics,” or “They say you can go to heaven if you pray for one day after sinning for ten days.” The article finds laughable that such harmless satire in a song written for adults is regarded as “inappropriate.” It also alerts the reader to the BEC’s roster, which consisted of 14 members: Chairperson Lee Hong-ryöl, seven members from the classical music world, three representatives from the broadcasting staff, and three representatives from the Theater Association, who had been boycotting the BEC’s decision for three months. That half of the committee members were from classical music connotes that popular music was considered a less prestigious genre meriting the judgement of classical musicians, bringing to mind the 1970 “How Far has Korean Popular Music Come?” debate which addressed the issue of soliciting classical musicians to improve the status of popular music. Problematizing the lyrics of “A Kaleidoscopic World” brought to attention the absence of a lyrics specialist in the BEC, let alone anyone from a literary field. While analyzing the lyrics of popular songs may not necessitate a literary specialist, the open-ended reasons given for censoring songs, such as having “inappropriate lyrics for broadcast,” left those being judged with no choice but to speculate about what aspects of their literary content irritated the authorities.

From a stringent standpoint, the lyrics of “A Kaleidoscopic World” *can* be interpreted as controversial. The message to relinquish greed and unnecessary desires conveyed in lines such as “[we are] born tight-fisted but leave empty-handed,” and “life is a circle, [you] come trying to win money but leave losing it all, leave with your mind at ease,” run contrary to the values advanced in government-mandated “wholesome songs” (*kōnjōn'gayo*), such as the unambiguously titled “Let’s Live Well,” which advocates hard work for the rewards of

prosperity, wealth, and honor. The prohibition of “A Kaleidoscopic World” attests to the scrutiny met by musicians whose artistic expressions deviated from the ideologies promulgated by the Park regime.

That *p'ok'ŭ* singers were making headlines for plagiarism, whereas previously it was *trot* singers making headlines for their songs being *waesaek* and vulgar, attest to *p'ok'ŭ* having entered the radar of censors as a result of coming to prominence. In November that year, member of the pioneering *p'ok'ŭ* duo Twin Folio, sought-after DJ, and popular songwriter Yun Hyŏng-chu also made the news for plagiarism. The BEC judged Yun’s “Rarara” to be a plagiarized song of composer Kil Ok-yun’s “The Two-letter Word Love.” According to the article, Yun’s “Rarara” had been a steady favorite among student fans since its release in June. Yun upheld his authorship and argued that “the chord progression and tempo [of his song] are totally different from ‘The Two-letter Word Love’,” and added that banning his song “just because the mood is similar to ‘The Two-letter Word Love’ is regrettable.”¹⁴³ Despite Yun’s resolute stance regarding his innocence, Yun was never absolved of the accusation that “Rarara” was plagiarized. As I will show in the final chapter, that the song was included in the over 200 songs blacklisted in 1975, illustrates the incontestable nature of censorship during the Park era.

Clampdown on Decadent Trends

The Park regime’s Clampdown on Decadent Trends (*t'oep'yep'ungjotansok*), which was already being carried out since August of 1970, became an official policy in October of 1971. That the appearance of the term “decadent” in mainstream media peaked between 1971 and 1972 and then increased again in 1975, mirrors the times when the regime used the concept of moral

¹⁴³ “Yun Hyŏng-ch’s ‘Rarara’ Banned from Broadcast,” *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*, November 3, 1971.

and cultural decline to implement the censorship of *rok*, and relatedly, the policing of recreational activities enjoyed by youth in downtown neighborhoods—processes I unfold in the final chapter.¹⁴⁴ This policy stunted the restrained yet lively *rok* scene, and instigated the promotion of *p'ok'ŭ* as a wholesome and quiet alternative. A report published in *Taehanilbo* on October 16, 1971, states that the crackdown resulted in “the suspension of all-night music venues, the closure of go-go clubs and salons, which was forced through imposition of heavy taxes, and the unemployment of 30 bands.”¹⁴⁵ Considering that the main stage for *rok groups* were all-night music venues and dance clubs located in the greater Myŏng-dong area, the closure of these venues meant eliminating their primary source of income.

¹⁴⁴ Naver News Library. Aggregate digitized data of four main newspapers (*Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, *Tongailbo*, *Maeilgyŏngje*, and *Han'gyŏrye*): the amount of times the term “decadent” appears in the news annually between 1970 and 1976 is: 53, 246, 205, 79, 74, 125, and 111. This corroborates the fact that “decadent” was used to discredit youth culture.

¹⁴⁵ “Suspension of Late-night Sales, Go-Go Clubs and Salons Suffer Bitter Blows Due to Heavy Taxes,” *Taehanilbo*, October 16, 1971. This review is discussed in fuller detail in chapter 3.



Figure 2.1: Photograph used in the *Taehanilbo* report

According to the weekly women's magazine, *Chuganyōsōng*, "the Crackdown on Decadent Trends initiated by the Ministry of Culture and Public Information annihilated *group sound* [i.e., rock bands] that used to dominate Seoul's night music scene."¹⁴⁶ Elaborating on the complete vanishment of *group sound* that used to represent a "new generation of music," this short report estimates that 50 bands were disbanded during the crackdown. The suppression of *rok* music catapulted *p'okū* musicians, who had been "steadily accruing popularity," into stardom. The article adds that "singers such as Lee Yong-pok, Ŭn Hŭi, and Yang Hŭi-ŭn, who have been quietly playing the acoustic guitar in seclusion(?), have won numerous popular music awards in November, raising *p'okū*'s status."¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ "Popular Music World Experience Biggest Change in November," *Chuganyōsōng*, December 15, 1971. All quotations in this paragraph are from the same article.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, "(?)" as is.

A 1971 year-end report of popular music published in *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* informs that Park's declaration of a state of emergency in December precipitated the Popular Music Purification Movement (*kayojŏnghwaundong*), propelling *p'ok'u* into the limelight.¹⁴⁸ The movement to purge popular music was a boon to *p'ok'ŭ*, because quiet *p'ok'ŭ* filled the vacancy of *rok*. Representative hit songs of the year that sold over 50,000 records were: Kim Ch'u-cha's "Faraway Beloved," the coed *p'ok'ŭ* duet Ranaerosŭp'o's "I Love You," and Ha Ch'un-hwa and Ko Pong-san's "Good, Good For You," respectively representing a *p'ap* ballad, *p'ok'ŭ*, and *trot* song.¹⁴⁹ These top-selling songs show that *p'ok'ŭ* was competing neck and neck with other mainstream genres. In addition, the moderately-paced, harmonized duet, and solo acoustic-guitar accompaniment of "I Love You" indicate how the tempo, singing style, and acoustic instrumental accompaniment of *p'ok'ŭ* validated its "quiet" image.

Suppression of *Trot* Begets the Unexpected Phenomenon of the *Trot-P'ok'ŭ* Singer

The Government Clampdown on Decadent Trends not only suppressed *rok*, but also *trot*, clearing the radio and television waves for *p'ok'ŭ*. An article commenting on the phenomenon of the "*trot-p'ok'ŭ* singer," which I discuss later, directly connects a government document criticizing the broadcast of "decadent music" to the rise of *p'ok'ŭ*. This document proves how the designation "decadent trends" did not target solely *rok*, but was rather used as an umbrella term to denounce songs regardless of genre. Before the government Clampdown on Decadent Trends, *p'ok'ŭ*'s scope of activity was limited to the "salon-world" of Myong-dong, because it was "dismissed by most record labels and broadcast companies." This "lonely march" of traditional

¹⁴⁸ "Popular Music World Year End Report (1)," *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, December 24, 1971.

¹⁴⁹ "Popular Music World Year End Report (2)," *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, December 25, 1971.

p'ok'ŭ singers changed overnight into a “splendid spotlight” because of an official document distributed by the Ministry of Culture and Public Information on December 8, 1971.¹⁵⁰ The key directive in the documents was: “Please do not broadcast decadent music that treat topics of love, tears, sigh, parting, and lament. This is a request to abide by the government’s Movement to Eradicate Decadent Trends (*T'oep'yep'ungjoilsoundong*).”¹⁵¹ This official document came as a shock to media producers who understood that the “request” needed to be obeyed. However, literal interpretation of the government document meant the banning of virtually all songs.

This was a big strike against *trot* in particular, because according to a March 1972 article published in *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*, “decadent elements are more pronounced” in *trot*, not to mention its “wringing singing style, which had suddenly become un-airable.”¹⁵² Broadcast producers desperately searched for songs that would pass the “decadence” barometer of centers, and discovered *p'ok'ŭ* during this process. The gentle and modern aesthetics of *p'ok'ŭ* proved to be the perfect alternative to sentimental *trot*. In *History of Korean Popular Music*, Lee Yŏng-mi uncovers that early *p'ok'ŭ* songs conveyed a pursuit for a clean and pure world through the use of adjectives such as “white,” “clear,” “small,” “poor,” and nouns such as “morning,” “tear,” “bird,” “thatch-roofed house,” etc.¹⁵³ In contrast, the lyrics as well as singing style of many *trot* songs are mournful (recall the topical analysis of 4,000 songs conducted by Chang Il-yŏng of the music department of MBC, for the 1970 “How Far has Korean Popular Music Come?” debate,

¹⁵⁰ “The New Wave of *P'okŭ*,” *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*, March 12, 1972.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ Kim, “Kim Min-ki and the Conceptualization of a New Youth Culture,” 22. Drawing from Lee Yŏng-mi’s *History of Korean Popular Music* (1999).

which revealed that most popular songs are about tears, love, parting, and sorrow). As I investigate in the fourth chapter, the Clampdown on Decadent Trends mainly targeted *rok* music rather than *trot* in the ensuing years. But as seen above, government-initiated repression of “decadent” songs at the tail end of 1971 suppressed not only *rok*, but also caused the music industry to turn “away from [the] incorrigible techniques and singing styles” of *trot*.¹⁵⁴ By the spring of 1972, even *trot* singers found attractive the marketability of *p'okŭ*, begetting the unlikely fusion of the two antithetical genres.

An article titled “The New Wave of *P'okŭ*” printed in *Chugan'gyŏngnyang* on March 12 1972, attests that “the rhythms of *p'okŭ* are shaking the foothold of *trot*,” and “singers who had made their mark in *trot* are transforming themselves into *p'okŭ* singers.”¹⁵⁵ The success of *p'okŭ* brought about the oxymoronic neologism, the “*trot p'okŭ* singer.” The term is said to have been “coined by *p'okŭ* singers who make a living in the salons of Myŏng-dong” expressing their disapproval of *trot* singers jumping on the bandwagon of the *p'okŭ* boom. The animosity *p'okŭ* singers felt towards *trot* singers seems reasonable given that “*trot* singers who had better ties with broadcasting companies had more success than *p'okŭ* singers in getting their *p'okŭ*-imbued songs on air.” *P'okŭ* singers resented the lack of proper social connections to hoist them out of being “stuck in the stages of music salons.” What begins as an article about *p'okŭ*'s threat to *trot*, changes into an exposé about the threat *p'okŭ* singers feel due to *trot*'s co-opting their music. Well-known *trot* singers preparing to transform into *p'okŭ* singers included Pang Chu-yŏn, Lee Su-mi, Na Sang-kuk, Chŏng Hun-hŭi, and Pae Sŏng. To sum up, *p'okŭ*'s uncontested popularity

¹⁵⁴ “A New Phase After the Purification Movement of Broadcast Music,” *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*, February 9, 1972.

¹⁵⁵ “The New Wave of *P'okŭ*,” *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*, March 12, 1972. All remaining quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

prompted *trot* singers to imitate and adopt *p'okŭ*-style music, which intimidated or at least made *p'okŭ* singers resentful. Nonetheless, the unexpected fusion of *trot* and *p'okŭ*, proved *p'okŭ*'s marketability.

P'okŭ's commercial success in the music industry must have incentivized *p'okŭ* singers to re-evaluate what *p'okŭ* meant to them because, as explained in chapter one, *p'okŭ* musicians made a concerted effort to return to their amateur roots during the latter half of 1972, as was the case with The Millstone performances, which presented new compositions by “hidden talents in the college sphere.” *P'okŭ* singers gathered in music venues in Myŏng-dong, such as Nashville and Le Silence, to distance themselves from the profit-driven system of the record industry, and to authenticate and polish their craft—a topic I examine in relation to the policing of these recreational spaces in chapter four. A broader perspective of what happened to *p'okŭ* around this time is that in compromising their campus-bred amateur roots in the profit-driven music industry, *p'okŭ* singers continued to cultivate their self-critical lens and authenticity by composing original songs, and began embracing *rok* as a timely artistic mode that better expressed the social conditions of life.

The Trouble with Plagiarism

Despite the increasing output of singer songwriters and the coordinated effort of *p'okŭ* musicians to promote original compositions, accusations of plagiarism persisted as a major problem in the music industry. These, in large part, stemmed from the lack of fair guidelines regarding what differentiates indirect similarity from direct imitation, but were presented as wrongdoings knowingly committed by prolific composers. On March 28, 1973, *Ilgansŭp'ochŭ* published a series of articles surveying the history of plagiarism in Korean popular music. It


enumerates the number of songs banned annually for plagiarism between 1965 and 1972—4, 4, 12, 32, 18, 17, 12, and 13 songs in chronological order—and relates that the works of five to six composers make up the majority of the 112 songs.¹⁵⁶ One of these composers, Kim Yǒng-kwang, wrote a song titled “Friend” that was banned in 1973 due to its near-identical melody to Hurricane Smith’s “Take Suki Home.”¹⁵⁷ Performed by *p'ok'ũ* singer Lee Yong-pok, “Friend” had been popular since its release in the fall of 1972, selling well over 10,000 records. But when “Take Suki Home” began airing, first on AFKN (American Forces Korean Network) and then on Korean broadcasting companies such as MBC FM’s “Music Salon” program, which played the song for three consecutive days between March 26-28, people started noticing its similarity to “Friend.” “Take Suki Home” was released as part of Norman “Hurricane” Smith’s 1972 album *Hurricane Smith*. Both songs are in triple time, constructed in F-major AABA form, and the first half of the A-part melody in “Friend” employs the same notes as that of “Take Suki Home.” Taking these into consideration, censors concluded that “Friend” was plagiarized, despite differences in tempo, rhythm of individual notes, and instrumentation. That the elongated contours of the B-part melody in “Friend” is completely different from the B-part melody of “Take Suki Home”—which is essentially a repeat of the A-part melody just raised a fourth—seems not to have mattered.

¹⁵⁶ “The Hit Song ‘Friend’ Was Plagiarized,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ũ*, March 28, 1973.


¹⁵⁷ In the article, the title of Hurricane Smith’s song is mis-spelled as “Take Suzie Home.”

Figure 2.2: Themes A and B of “Take Suki Home” and “Friend”

Theme A of “Take Suki Home”



Theme B of “Take Suki Home”



Theme A from “Friend”



Theme B from “Friend”



That Lee was not able to overturn the ban attests to the swift and absolute power of the BEC’s decision. According to a May 29, 1973 article in *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, of the estimated 600 songs banned by the BEC, approximately 130 songs are for plagiarism.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, if

¹⁵⁸ “130 Songs Plagiarized Since 1965,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, May 29, 1973. Remaining quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

blacklisted songs released before 1960—most of which are songs written by composers or lyricists who defected to North Korea— are put aside, then “out of 520, a quarter are banned due to plagiarism.” Categories of plagiarism consisted of “direct, indirect, double, mood, and deeply imitative” plagiarisms. These categories at first seem standardized, but the absence of such descriptors in future discussions of plagiarism in the media suggest that either these categories were not applied in practice or, if used, were undisclosed in official documents that listed prohibited songs. How “deeply imitative” plagiarism is different from “indirect” or “mood” plagiarism is not defined, leaving questionable how such interpretive decisions can be made in an objective manner. Such unsystematic and arbitrary standards suggest that the censors cast a wide net cast for judging plagiarism in popular music that left no room for subtle differences between unintentional similarity and calculated imitation.

The period of self-evaluation that began among amateur *p'okŭ* singers in the campus sphere induced a lull phase of *p'okŭ* music in the popular music world. A July 20, 1973 article in *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* comments on the attempt of *p'okŭ* singers to “reorganize the genre by going back to its origins of amateurism.”¹⁵⁹ Despite the diminished presence of *p'okŭ* singers in mainstream media, the article states: “that music in college campuses is still thriving—substantiated by the increasing distribution rate of guitars (200 per day in the Seoul metropolitan area)—is an indication that *p'okŭ* may make a comeback.”¹⁶⁰ The much delayed debut recital of the popular male *p'okŭ* duet Onions, made plain the dwindling popularity of *p'okŭ* during the latter half of 1973. A brief announcement in *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* acknowledges “the fact that such a top class *p'okŭ*

¹⁵⁹ “Seeking Sympathy of Young Audience, P'okŭ Musicians Find a Way Out,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, July 20, 1973.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

celebrity group is finally having their debut recital demonstrates the abatement in this kind of music.”¹⁶¹ As if to confirm the “abatement” of *p'okŭ*, rumors of the disbandment of Onions made the news in November.¹⁶² But the rumored hiatus of Onions seems to have been just that: a rumor. In November 1973, Onions released their debut album, which contained hit songs such as “Letter” and “Little Bird” that demonstrate *p'ok'ŭ* having become a more streamlined and hybrid product created by professional studio musicians versatile across a wide range of genres.

Rok Overcomes Suppression, Begetting the Heyday of P'ok'ŭ-Rok

By January of 1974, *p'ok'ŭ* singers were topping the charts and selling far more records than *trot* singers, who had been the undisputed top-sellers.¹⁶³ According to an *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* article published on January 11, the ratio in sales between best-selling *trot* vs. *p'ap* albums, used to be nearly 7:3, but changed to 2:8 in a matter of six months. The absence of hit *trot* songs was replaced with *p'okŭ* and *p'okŭ-rok* songs such as: “Little Bird” by Onions and “Rain” by Kim Se-hwan, which have ballad-type melodies; “That’s You” by Lee Chang-hŭi, and “Hello” by Chang Mi-hwa, which are more upbeat, funky tunes amplified by synthesized effects; and Lee Sŏng-ae’s recording of “Like the Old Times,” which is a translated cover of the Carpenters’ “Yesterday Once More” (1973). The stance of radio producers, who are said to be “most sensitive to the changing tastes of music fans,” are summarized by a quote from DBS’s deputy head of Music, Chŏng Chun-ki, who explains that: “even though we can’t ignore *trot* given the

¹⁶¹ “Onions Debut Recital,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, September 28, 1973.

¹⁶² “Onions Disband,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, November 28, 1973.

¹⁶³ “*P'ap* Music Boom Peaks,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, January 11, 1974. All information and quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

preference of the general public, ... the contents of our broadcast have been changing towards music preferred by young audiences and this shift has already been apparent since ... the end of last year.” The article identifies four main reasons of this big shift: (1) cyclical change of taste in popular music, (2) the shortage of PVC materials, which hiked record prices up and resulted a big reduction in adult consumers of music, (3) increase in demand of licensed foreign and cover songs since the enforced eradication of pirate records, and (4) increasingly sophisticated tastes of music fans overall. While the number of adult record buyers decreased, record consumption among middle and upper class youth increased, reflecting the increased economic and cultural influence of the youth generation.

As described above, the consumer power of youth outperformed that of adults, making their craze for electric music difficult to silence. Despite having been suppressed by the government’s Clampdown on Decadent Trends, *rok* made a comeback in the spring of 1974, proving the undeniable appeal of *rok* music among youth. The heyday of acoustic *p'okū* was over, and the era of *p'ok'ŭ-rok* had arrived.

The “young music” (*chŏl-mŭn ūm-ak*) boom sweeping the entertainment industry is manifesting as a resurgence in the sound of *rok*. Gone are the days when “one couldn't pose as a singer without an acoustic guitar.” Now, the “powerful rhythms and the brimming sounds of the electric guitar” are the craze.¹⁶⁴

So begins the article titled “*Rok* Sound Revs Up” published on May 11, 1974. Considering the government-enforced suppression of *rok* in the fall of 1971, a more apt titled might have been “*Rok* Resurrects.” Now, *p'okū* singers, such as Sŏ Yu-sŏk and male *p'okū* duo April and May were attempting to crossover to *rok*, while *p'okū* pioneers Kim Se-hwan and Yang Hŭi-ŭn were abandoning their acoustic guitars. Apparently, “*rok* groups who have been in the shadows during

¹⁶⁴ “*Rok* Sound Revs Up,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, May 11, 1974. The remaining three quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

the past three to four years have come back to the spotlight, winning the love of fans.” Noting the ubiquitous presence of *rok*-enhanced timbres in popular music, the article continues that “young fans have grown tired of schmaltzy *trot* songs and lackluster *p'okŭ* songs” revealing that acoustic *p'okŭ* had become hackneyed by mid-1974. In terms of *trot*, the article states that “old adopted formats of harmony and arrangement that were fashionable in Japan back in the 1920s have been perpetuated without much development.” Comparing American folk with Korean *p'okŭ*, the article relays the “well-known fact that folk-style music abroad had its heyday in the early-1960s and dissipated soon after, while domestically, *p'okŭ*-style music [belatedly and uniquely] enjoyed its heyday well into the mid-1970s.” Quoting domestic music practitioners, the article ends with the observation that given the “pivotal role of rock in global pop music,” the reinvigoration of *rok* in the domestic popular music scene seems natural.

The resurgence of *rok* in 1974 was buttressed by *p'okŭ* musicians who transitioned into *rok*, bringing with them the critical stance of *p'okŭ* to reflect life through music. Sŏ Yu-sŏk, a prominent solo *p'okŭ* singer attempting to crossover to *rok*, is featured in the June edition of the monthly music magazine *Stereo*. The feature publicizes his “forming a 4-person *rok*-style group after discarding the acoustic guitar he cherished for five years.”¹⁶⁵ To the question of why he jettisoned his guitar, Sŏ responds: “As the years passed by, I realized that with the acoustic guitar, it is impossible to convey the complexities of human life. It is a good but too dull an instrument.”¹⁶⁶ While Sŏ’s remark sounds harsh, it speaks to the conclusive shift in taste among young musicians towards the timbres of amplified, electric instruments. An article published the following month paints young musicians in the entertainment industry, such as the new music

¹⁶⁵ “Sŏ Yu-sŏk Transitions to *Rok* Singer,” June Issue of *Stereo*, 1974, 83.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

group Stray Dogs, working towards a *rok* aesthetic that “adheres to the reality of daily life.”¹⁶⁷ There seems, in comments from these musicians, to be a clear proclivity for making music that reflects lived experience: an intention to communicate the conditions of life through music. The name of the band, “Stray Dogs,” conveys impressions of disorder, wildness, and boisterousness. Stray Dogs consisted of five members: Paek Sun-chin and Kim T'ae-p'ung of the male *p'okŭ* duo April and May, bassist and lead singer Lee Su-man, organist Min Yŏng-chin, and drummer Kim Ch'an.¹⁶⁸ All five members of the band, including April and May—“the popular *p'okŭ* group with the deepest musicianship in Korea”—were well-known *p'okŭ* singers, which connotes that their venture into *rok* was not motivated by fame, but by a desire to find a fitting mode of expression.

* * *

The days when *p'okŭ* was adored for its quiet acoustic sound, non-sentimental lyrics, and “wholesome” image were gone. It is indicative that Toi et Moi—the coed duo I introduced in chapter one as “literary” *p'okŭ* singers who “exude an ambience of solitude, wandering, and nostalgia,” and whose hit song “Promise” topped the charts in 1970—officially announced their disbandment in the summer of 1974.¹⁶⁹ A brief report in the July 20, 1974 issue of *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* relays the disbandment of Toi et Moi in a regretful tone, describing them as “the

¹⁶⁷ “Inauguration of the Five-Person Band Stray Dogs,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, July 7, 1974.

¹⁶⁸ Lee Su-man would go on to create SM Entertainment, which is one of South Korea’s largest entertainment company that fostered and promoted the careers of leading K-pop stars.

¹⁶⁹ “The Atmosphere of *P'ok'ŭ*,” *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*, November 1, 1970.

best *p'okŭ* team in the country known for their quiet image and strong teamwork.”¹⁷⁰ It discloses Lee P'il-wŏn's busy DJ schedule as the reason for their breakup and includes a predictive quote from him saying that “*p'okŭ* singers will have to pay attention to [what's going on in] *rok* groups.”¹⁷¹ It is evident that Lee is speaking from his experience as a DJ, many of whom were *p'ok'ŭ* singers working at the forefront of new musical trends, and privy to the musical proclivities of young listeners.

In this chapter, I examined how censorship shaped the image and style of *p'ok'ŭ*, as a result of condemning *trot* as “vulgar,” too Japanese, and overly sentimental, and *rok* as “decadent” Western electric music. I explained how the derogatory and prejudiced assumptions that censors and those in the position of controlling and managing broadcast content held concerning *trot* and *rok*, prolonged the “quiet” and acoustic aesthetics of *p'ok'ŭ*, and delayed the development of *p'ok'ŭ-rok*. Early attempts of *p'ok'ŭ-rok*, which stem back to 1971, did not gain traction due to the Clampdown on Decadent Trends, which devastated the *rok* scene and also suppressed *trot*, clearing the path for *p'ok'ŭ* singers to dominate the media spotlight. While *p'ok'ŭ*'s rise in prominence resulted in top *p'ok'ŭ* singers getting accused of plagiarism, *trot* and *rok* singers were habitually impeded by vague moral accusations of vulgarity and decadence in the early 1970s. My examination of *p'ok'ŭ* songs banned for plagiarism revealed that such accusations were made hastily, without considering common practices of singing orally transmitted songs among *p'ok'ŭ* singers, and without fair guidelines regarding what differentiates similarity from imitation.

¹⁷⁰ “Rumors of Toi et Moi's Disbandment,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, July 20, 1974.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

I demonstrated how during the Park era, censorship—both nonmandatory and mandatory forms—of *trot* as vulgar and too Japanese, and *rok* as “decadent,” led to the simultaneous promotion of *p'ok'ŭ* as “wholesome” original music elevating the status of Korean popular music. I contend that the advancement of *p'ok'ŭ* at the expense of suppressing *trot* and *rok* was possible, because this process manipulated the public’s pre-existing desire to create a domestic art form untethered from Japanese colonialism and U.S. cultural imperialism—a political aspiration I will elaborate further in the next chapter, through my exploration of the student movement, youth culture, and the politicization of *p'ok'ŭ*.

Chapter 3. The Radicalization of Student Activism Politicizes *P'ok'ŭ*

In chapter one, I argued that *p'ok'ŭ* was a genre identified by its provenance, patronage, and popularity among college-educated youth, who were the main actors of youth culture (*ch'ŏng-nyŏn mun-hwa*). While *p'ok'ŭ* singers were gaining prominence, student protestors were mobilizing against Park, acting as the principle force of opposition against his authoritarian and antidemocratic practices. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, youth culture was separate from the student movement, but the boundaries between the two began to collapse less than two years before youth culture's dissipation in 1975. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, youth culture—the recreational culture of mostly university-educated youth—was mostly separate from the student movement—the mobilization and coalition of university student activists who resisted Park's authoritarianism. However, in 1974 the boundaries between the two began to collapse, before youth culture's dissipation in 1975. In the previous chapter, I delineated how *p'ok'ŭ* advanced in the popular music world between 1970 and 1974. In this chapter, I show how student reaction to Park's intensifying abuse of power changed during overlapping periods of time. While *p'ok'ŭ* was known for its intellectual and “wholesome” image rather than its political efficacy, *p'ok'ŭ* singers came to channel the radicalizing ideology of the student movement by 1974.

Unpacking the relationship between youth culture, student movement, and *p'ok'ŭ* entails understanding Park Chung Hee's exploitation of anti-communism and nationalism to serve his dictatorial powers, in addition to student protestors' adoption of the countering nationalist ideology of “people's democracy” (*minjung juŭi*) in building resistance against Park. In October 1972, under the auspices of “revitalizing reform,” Park instituted the *Yushin* constitution,

propagating the notion that his authoritarian policies served national security, economic growth, and an efficient form of “Korean” democracy. The *Yushin* constitution gave Park the power to rule by emergency decrees: a power he justified by employing anti-communist propaganda. Park’s initiation of the *Yushin* system, in exposing his unrestrained ambitions to rule indefinitely, galvanized the political activism of students, laborers, and intellectuals to an unprecedented degree. Park suppressed dissidence by prohibiting the media from reporting on student demonstrations, and authorizing the dispatch of military troops on university campuses, which were the battlegrounds for protests.

This prohibition skewed the media’s presentation of youth toward recreational subjects, but it did not prevent academia’s discussion of the ideologies that guided student activists. This discussion—dubbed the Youth Culture Debate—began in late March 1974, when *Tongailbo* journalist Kim Pyŏng-ik wrote the article titled “Today’s Young Idols,” naming six public figures—three of whom were *p’ok’ŭ* singers—as the flagbearers of youth culture. My analysis of the backlash that followed, criticizing the consumerist and recreational conceptions of youth culture, uncovers a tendency among contemporaneous university students and professors to radicalize youth culture, underscoring the need to resist political oppression by learning from the consciousness of the oppressed *minjung* (people). Park’s censorship of the media incentivized student musicians to create music that was both journalistic and candid. The *minjung* ideology of student activists instilled in *p’ok’ŭ* singers a penchant for acquiring Korean names (as opposed to the English or French names of early *p’ok’ŭ* groups), and the desire to create a “Korean” aesthetic by reviving national and traditional art forms. As a result of *p’ok’ŭ* singers having absorbed the political ideologies of their peer protestors, media portrayals of them after the Youth Culture Debate exposed a significant shift in tone, condemning their previously lauded attributes of

originality and amateurism. The politicization of youth culture meant the politicization of *p'ok'ũ*, it being the representative genre fostered among college students.

I examine how the politicization of *p'ok'ũ*, especially after the Youth Culture Debate, made the genre particularly apropos as a conduit for voicing resistance. Ha Kil-jong's film *The March of Fools*, released on May 31, 1975, during the height of students protesting Park's escalating authoritarianism, incorporated anthemic *p'ok'ũ* songs. An audiovisual analyses of two pivotal scenes incorporating the film's two theme songs composed and performed by *p'ok'ũ* singer Song Ch'ang-sik—"Why Call Me" and "Whale Hunt"—demonstrates how the film exhibits youth culture at its most defiant state. The goal of this chapter is to analyze the academic community's criticism of youth culture in relation to the growing student movement, in order to explain the politicization of *p'ok'ũ* in a film that depicts the life of college students—students who embodied bourgeois youth culture and who were also conscious of the responsibility and possibility to break the cycle of political oppression through higher education.

Before moving on to my analysis, it is necessary distinguish youth culture from the student movement. The South Korean democracy movement did not mobilize around youth culture, which differed from the student movement *and* the 1960s conception of U.S. counterculture. While youth culture referred to the music, fashion, and recreational activities of college-educated urban youth—often encapsulated as *p'ok'ũ* music, blue jeans, and draft beer—the fight for democracy was led by the student movement, which was made up of committed activists who mobilized through organized and coalitional methods protesting Park's *de facto* dictatorship. In other words, the student movement did not employ youth culture in the manner

described by sociologist William Roy, who writes that “Culture is not just something that movements have; it is something they *do*.”¹⁷² Roy further elaborates:

The work that social movements do to use culture on behalf of movement goals can be called a cultural project. For social movements, a cultural project is a self-conscious attempt to use music, art, drama, dance, poetry, or other cultural materials, to recruit new members, to enhance the solidarity of members, or to persuade outsiders to adopt the movement’s program. Often carried out by specialists in the movement, they typically deliberately decide which genres to adopt, the cultural forms that are appropriate, how culture contributes to the goals of the movements, and what makes culture political.¹⁷³

As I laid out in the first chapter, 1970s youth culture was primarily the recreational culture of elite university students, who embraced *p'ok'ũ* for its aesthetic pleasure, not for its political efficacy. The youth generation did not deliberately employ *p'ok'ũ* for the purposes of the student movement. Youth found in Western styles of fashion and music a liberatingly different mode of culture that they could emulate, and a means to differentiate themselves from older generations. University students, in particular, found in the sincere vocal harmonies and stripped-down acoustic timbre of modern U.S. folk music, a sensibility that clicked with their relatively affluent upbringing and cosmopolitan palate. Despite the strand of leftist ideology that cuts through American folk music, in South Korea’s political system that combined staunch anti-communism with military-enforced authoritarianism, the development of pro-democratic left-wing activism was cautious, not fully blossoming until the 1980s. And despite the reverberations of student movements world-wide, South Korean youth did not deliberately employ *p'ok'ũ* as a means to recruit and mobilize support for protests. Even when the lyrics turned more satirical and critical with the success of *p'ok'ũ* singer-songwriters in the early 1970s, *p'ok'ũ*’s appeal was its

¹⁷² William Roy, *The Reds, Whites, and Blues*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 6, emphasis mine.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 7.

originality, not—to borrow Roy’s terms—its suitability as a “cultural project.” In her perceptive analysis of youth culture, Song Ŭn-yŏng puts forth a definition of youth culture as an antithesis to *both* the “ideologies of modernization and individual economic independence enforced by Park,” as well as the opposing ideology of nationalist “people’s democracy”(*minjungjuŭi*) espoused by student activists.¹⁷⁴ I contend that the space between youth culture and student activism collapsed during the 1974 Youth Culture Debate, triggering the politicization of *p’ok’ŭ*, and in response, the regime’s complete stamping out of youth culture in 1975—the topic of my final chapter.

Park’s Suppression of Student Protests Using Military-Enforced Decrees, 1971-1975

That university students were at the forefront of the pro-democracy/anti-Park movement is indubitable. Park Chung Hee’s 1969 revision of the national constitution, which legalized his third presidential term in 1971, jolted students into action. University students organized the National Student Alliance for the Safeguard of Democracy (NSASD), making known their intentions to keep a check on the presidential election. Student demonstrations in 1971 were also prompted by Park’s military education program, which was believed to be a means to “incapacitate their resistance movements by creating a Red scare on the campuses.”¹⁷⁵ The military education program would have increased the collective training of university students from two to three hours a week—making the annual training time 88 hours (while fourth year students were obligated an additional 44 hours, bringing the total to 132 hours)—but over two

¹⁷⁴ Song, “Choi Inho’s Novel as a Phenomenon of Mass Culture,” 434.

¹⁷⁵ Park, “The Chaeya,” 387.

thousand students protested the program every day, resulting in its deferment.¹⁷⁶ Between March and November of 1971, 62,264 students participated in 269 student demonstrations, prompting Park to issue a “garrison decree” in October sanctioning the dispatch of military troops on campus. Armed forces that month seized “the campus of every major university in Seoul” where they carried out the arrest of 1,889 student activists.¹⁷⁷

When Park ushered in the *Yushin* system in October 1972, he turned South Korea into a repeatedly garrisoned and constantly monitored state. Park’s exploitation of power only radicalized dissidence. This time, dissident intelligentsia called *chaeya* and progressive Christian activists, who believed they were fulfilling the Mission of God (*Missio Dei*) by battling for justice, aided students in building resistance against Park. Student radicals were joined by Christian activists in initiating a movement against the *Yushin* constitution, when they held the Namsan Easter service on April 22, 1973. That spring and fall, students at Korea University and Seoul National University augmented the volume of resistance by staging anti-Park protests. While student protestors were unable to gather public support due to press censorship, the *chaeya* leaders harnessed the momentum of these protests by starting a nationwide campaign to collect a million signatures to revise the *Yushin* constitution on December 24, 1973. Threatened by the pace in which the campaign was progressing—30,000 people signed in eleven days—Park issued his first Emergency Decree, on January 8, 1974 prohibiting any criticisms of the *Yushin* constitution. He gathered the directors and managing editors of all media outlets and ordered them to “avoid news that may create social unrest.”¹⁷⁸ Park commanded that the press:

¹⁷⁶ Lee, “1970s Student Anti-*Yushin* Movement,” 464. I show later how this deferment ended in 1975.

¹⁷⁷ Park, “The *Chaeya*,” 389-390.

¹⁷⁸ Pyöng-uk An, “The *Yushin* System,” 28.

1. Never report on the happenings of campus life such as demonstrations, expulsions, and cancellations of classes; 2. Not report on the civil rights movements happening in religious sectors; 3. Never address incidents related to the anti-dictatorship movement; and 4. Not publish news that may create social unrest such as the shortage of coal briquettes.¹⁷⁹

As such, Park's employment of ruling by emergency decrees began with the suppression of mainstream media.

Expressing dissent against Park's *Yushin* system came with detrimental repercussions. Park justified his active utilization of the KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency) and dispatch of troops to suppress dissidence, by perpetuating a red scare. On April 3, 1974, the police and KCIA forestalled an attempt to actualize a countrywide demonstration by arresting "2,000 student activists under the charge that they had clandestinely organized a subversive National Democratic Youth Students Alliance (NDYSA) at North Korea's instigation."¹⁸⁰ Later that day, Park authorized Emergency Decree no.4, which, among other things, sanctioned military deployment for the purposes of national security, and introduced the death sentence as punishment for demonstrators. Emergency Decree no.4 triggered the arrest and investigation of over 1,000 people, which was carried out in a mere two days, and eight student leaders were sentenced to death. On the one hand, the NDYSA Incident disclosed the pervasive extent of the KCIA's surveillance net, and the government's attempt to discredit the student movement by fabricating a narrative about the NDYSA's communist ties. On the other hand, the "Declaration for the *Minjung* ("People"), Nation, and Democracy" announced by the students before their

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Park, "The *Chaeya*," 391.

arrests, revealed that student activists were advancing an increasingly theorized, intersectional, and radical political agenda.¹⁸¹

In an attempt to appease his opposition, Park announced Emergency Decree no.5, which lifted Emergency Decrees no.1 censoring the media and no.4 permitting the use of military forces to crackdown on protest, starting on August 23, 1974. Park's softer approach proved insufficient if not counterproductive. Throughout the end of 1974, protests persisted with university students staging hunger strikes and street demonstrations. In October 30, 1974, the Ministry of Education "close[d] down a total of 44 universities and issue[d] an administrative order to 13 others among South Korea's 77 four-year universities to stop the spread of protests."¹⁸²

The anti-*Yushin* movement continued to gain traction throughout that winter, and by March of 1975, students previously unassociated with the activists began to join the anti-*Yushin* movement, which drew thousands of protestors. Determined to quell student demonstrations, Park issued Emergency Decree no.7 on April 8, 1975, which forced the closure of Korea University—a crucial campus battlefield— prohibited assemblies or demonstrations, and legitimized again the dispatch of military troops on campus, again. Merely three days later, Seoul National University agriculture department student, Kim Sang-jin, committed suicide by disembowelment, after publicly reading a "Declaration of Conscience" and an "Open Letter to the President" disavowing dictatorial rule. Kim's death reflects the amplified commitment and sacrifice of post-*Yushin* student protestors. Park responded with comparable force and declared Emergency Decree no.9 for the Preservation of National Security and Public Order—Park's final

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 392.

¹⁸² Ibid., 393.

and most repressive decree which “prohibited anyone from engaging in activities to ‘deny, oppose, distort, slander, revise or abrogate the *Yushin* constitution,’ as well as from ‘initiating a petition for constitutional revision’.”¹⁸³ On May 20, 1975, a week after Emergency Decree no.9 came into effect, the Park regime disbanded student associations and councils across all high schools and universities, and re-instituted the Student National Defense Corps (which had been dissolved since 1960) “under the auspices of strengthening anti-communist education and national security education policies.”¹⁸⁴ The military education program that students successfully deferred in 1971 had come back, so to speak, with a vengeance. Schools became a space of constant surveillance. Intelligence agents working for the KCIA, the National Security Agency, and the Police monitored college campuses, noting the political climate and daily activities of students and professors. Park’s repressive policies prioritized national security in justifying the surveillance and suppression of dissent under the pretext of protecting the nation from the threat of communism.

The promulgation of Emergency Decrees no.1, 4, 7, and 9, which happened within the span of fourteen months, are proof of Park utilizing the military, intelligence, and the media, to silence student protest. And even though anti-*Yushin* demonstrations were persistently quelled, Chu Kang-hyön, author of “Anti-*Yushin* and the Arts and Cultural Movement,” reminds us that the sentiment of the anti-*Yushin* movement was shared by a silent majority.¹⁸⁵ Despite societal permeation of the anti-*Yushin* spirit, the fight for democracy took place mostly on college campuses, where students began to reckon the contradictions between Park’s anti-communist,

¹⁸³ Ibid., 394.

¹⁸⁴ Lee, “1970s Student Anti-*Yushin* Movement,” 467.

¹⁸⁵ Chu, “Anti-*Yushin* and the Arts and Culture Movement,” 677.

authoritarian, and “Korean” democracy, and the liberal democracies of the West, leading to a surged interest in the theories of revolution and social constructionism. In “The Anti-*Yushin* Student Movement in the 1970s,” Lee Ki-hun states that “60% of the political offenders arrested between 1971 and 1978 were students,” attesting to the leadership role students played in building resistance against the Park regime.¹⁸⁶ The political activities and tactics of student activists changed drastically after 1975 because of Emergency Decree No.9, which intensified the penalties for engaging in demonstrations and let loose on college campuses informants who infiltrated student organizations and intercepted protests before they took place or gained momentum. As stated poignantly by Lee, the era of “romantic moralism,” which coated the pre-1975 student movement’s commitment to advancing a nationalist “people’s democracy”(*minjungjuŭi*), had come to an end.¹⁸⁷

The Campus Music Debate

When Park was prohibiting the media from publishing “news that may create social unrest,” student musicians were advocating for candor and relatability in music, as if to say: if the media is censored, then music should speak truth. On January 7, 1974—a day before Park’s declaration of Emergency Decree no.1—the daily entertainment news outlet *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* published a special commentary titled “The Current Status and Standard of Domestic Campus Music.” This commentary—which gathered music critic Lee Sang-man, acclaimed *p'okŭ* singer and popular DJ Yang Hŭi-ŭn (then a senior in the History Department of So-gang University), and *rok* guitarist Paek Kwang-u (then in his second preliminary year in the School of Dentistry at

¹⁸⁶ Lee, “1970s Student Anti-*Yushin* Movement,” 513.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 503.

Seoul National University)—substantiated the status of the campus sphere as a central breeding ground for *p'okū* and *rok* musicians.¹⁸⁸ The preface of this conversation is worth quoting in full as it illustrates an authoritative and prescriptive understanding of “campus music”:

In places abroad, and especially in America, the campus music sphere is distinct from ‘music of the establishment’ (*kisōngŭmakkye*) in that it is the home ground of musical activities carried out by the sociologically classified generation of youth. This is the reason prominent music magazines such as *Billboard* or *Cashbox* have permanent attraction sections that solely deal with campus music. In the case of foreign campus music, the underlying attributes of lyrical content and mode of expression—as opposed to external attributes such as form and technique—are driven by ‘unadorned candor.’ And this is what separates [campus music] from popular music. As a result, campus music is not treated as lowly like popular art, but is acknowledged for its singular authority and territory. Interest in campus music and related activities are growing daily in domestic campuses as well. The saying that ‘one in five students know how to play the guitar’ speaks to this trend. It is true that many ‘campus talents’ are performing widely for various events and recitals regardless of their size. What is the current status and level of domestic campus music? What is the desirable direction of campus music as a relatable and amateur art form?¹⁸⁹

While the above prologue emphasizes the “unadorned candor” and “singular authority” of “campus music,” Yang Hŭi-ŭn suggests a more liberal definition of campus music as music consisting of “at least one element that youth can identify with,” and names the hit *p'okū-rok* song “That Is You” by Lee Chang-hŭi as the latest example.¹⁹⁰ Because such rock-infused *p'ok'ŭ* songs were widely popular, Paek resents *p'ok'ŭ* singers having a better reputation than *rok* bands, solely for writing their own songs, “regardless of quality.”¹⁹¹ Paek’s statement that virtually

¹⁸⁸ Yu-saeng Kim, “Quality Does Not Match Quantity: Free Commentary Regarding The Current Status and Standard of Domestic Campus Music,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, January 7, 1974.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1970*, 120: Lee’s album sold over 50,000 copies in 1973, making it one of the most commercially successful albums of the year.

¹⁹¹ Kim, “Quality Does Not Match Quantity,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, January 7, 1974. The two quotes in the following paragraph are from the same article.

every *p'ok'ŭ* singer writes their own song, confirms how the singer songwriter model—in addition to being upheld by broadcasting companies advancing *p'ok'ŭ* in lieu of *trot* and *rok*—was embraced by the *p'ok'ŭ* community themselves. While Yang posits popular reception as evidence of relatability, Paek suggests it is the singer songwriter model of *p'ok'ŭ* that wins the sympathy of fans. While their definitions of “relatable” music differ, both seem to prioritize the communicative capacity of music.

The most meaningful strand of the campus music debate surfaces when Lee Sang-man initiates a brief discussion on what he calls “journalism with tune” or “communication through song.” Lee questions whether the potential of youth culture would be realized if the trend of “communicating through song,” continues to develop through processes of trial and error. Yang responds that having a role model or “sample group” might help realize this trend, evincing the fact that while they are capable of theorizing their aspiration, the details of its execution had not materialized yet. Lee concludes the discussion with the proposition that “if young thoughts and circumstances” are expressed with “candor,” the vast quantity of domestic campus music will be matched in quality as well. Yang and Paek both concur “whole-heartedly,” but, cognizant of the fact that this is easier said than done, Yang raises the last unanswered question: “But who will hang the large bell around the cat’s neck?”, intimating the risks of candid expression during a time of heightening repression.

The 1974 Youth Culture Debate

In the midst of heightening repression and the related absence of media reporting on student protests, the media’s portrayal of youth culture—as illustrated in the previous chapters—centered around their craze for *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* music and opportunities for leisure in downtown

Myōng-dong. While *p'ok'ŭ* evaded, for the most part, the Crackdown on Decadent Trends, which decimated the *rok* scene, public perception of *p'ok'ŭ* took a turn when an article written by *Tongailbo* journalist Kim Pyōng-ik in March 29, 1974, titled “Today’s Young Idols” sparked a national debate deploring the Western musical activities and consumer-oriented culture of youth. I offer close readings of Kim’s article that sparked the debate, as well as other reports that address the academic community’s response to it.

While “Today’s Young Idols” was not the first discussion of youth culture—Song Ŭn-yōng unearths numerous occasions dating back to the early 1960s, when the media addressed the topic of Western youth culture and its spread in Korea¹⁹²—the timing, topic, and tone of the article unleashed a widespread debate that made “youth culture” a household term. First, I will discuss the timing. The aforementioned NDYSA Incident, which prompted Park’s promulgation of Emergency Decree no.4, happened a mere five days after Kim’s article was published. In relation to students who were arrested, tortured, and, in extreme cases, sentenced to death for attempting to mobilize a nation-wide anti-*Yushin* demonstration, Kim’s portrayal of youth highlighting their bourgeois lifestyle made it seem that youth were apathetic to the political situation. Next, I will discuss the topic. As the title suggests, the main topic of Kim’s article was the naming of the idols of 1970s youth culture. That three of the six people he names were *p'ok'ŭ* singers Lee Chang-hŭi, Yang Hŭi-ŭn, and Kim Min-ki, substantiated the seminal role *p'ok'ŭ* music played in the formation and development of youth culture. This also meant, as I will later illustrate, that any criticisms directed against youth culture impacted *p'ok'ŭ* as well. In addition, Kim Pyōng-ik’s article is often misunderstood as a reductive representation of youth culture being about consumption rather than action, and distance rather than involvement. This is

¹⁹² Song, “Choi Inho’s Novel as a Phenomenon of Mass Culture,” 426.

primarily because he begins and ends his article by encapsulating youth culture in three objects: blue jeans, acoustic guitar, and draft beer. While Kim's description of youth culture is more generous than that, it casts a net so wide that the term loses its temporal and social specificity.

According to Kim, the power of youth:

lies in the hatred of falsehood, mocking of the nonsensical, criticism of complacency, attack of conventionality, and grief over silence. Sometimes [youth] display extreme nihilism and other times progress due to [their] experimental spirit, or get lost in naïve sensuality and fantasy, or form ferocious demonstrations, but they are consistent in their unequivocal love for humanity, longing for equal society, and ardent desire for freedom.¹⁹³

But more problematic than Kim's focusing on the consumerist aspects of youth culture or his meandering definition of youth, is his decisive tone in designating 1970s youth culture as a continuation of student activism dating back to early 20th-century writers and patriotic martyrs who fought against Japanese occupation. Kim ends the article by stating:

Blue jeans, acoustic guitar and draft beer: These are the new outfit of the 70s youth movement, which continues the legacy of *Yuktang* [and] *Ch'unwŏn*, the March 1st Movement, the Kwangju Student Independence Movement, the April 19 Revolution, and the Six Three Struggle.¹⁹⁴

Yuktang and *Ch'unwŏn* were pioneering writers of Korean literature who participated in key independence movements—such as the March 1st Independence Movement and the Kwangju Student Movement—against Japanese rule. The April 19 Movement refers to the mass protests that led to President Syngman Rhee's resignation in 1960, and the Six Three Struggle refers to student-led demonstrations opposing Park Chung Hee's normalization of relations with Japan in 1964. Kim's analogizing youth culture to some of the most courageous forms of student activism in 20th-century Korean history, resulted in the major events of student protest displacing youth

¹⁹³ Pyŏng-ik Kim, "Today's Young Idols," *Tongailbo*, March 29, 1974.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

culture. The blurred boundary between student movements and youth culture augured badly for youth culture because now youth culture was erroneously perceived as having the same political agenda as student activism.

While Kim Pyŏng-ik conflated youth culture with student activism, a joint lecture given the following month by experts of politics, culture, and literature, provided more nuanced definitions of youth culture. This open lecture, hosted by the Christian Broadcasting System (CBS) and titled “Youth Culture: Its Structure and Status,” was described in an article published in *Tongailbo* on April 22, 1974. In gathering different perspectival definitions of youth culture, the discussion painted a phenomenon in the midst of change.¹⁹⁵ Korea University Professor Im Hŭi-sŏp argued that in the absence of a countercultural force resembling Western societies—that is, one that questions and challenges the status quo—youth culture resorts to becoming a sub-culture. While Im clarified that he was using a Western conceptualization of the term “counterculture,” his use of the term “sub-culture” deserves further explanation because this term in Korean could also mean “low grade culture.” Im considered this “sub-culture” inadequate for taking on a leadership role, due to its inevitable popular appeal, which suggests that he had a negative perception of not only “sub-, or low-grade-culture” but also of popular culture as well. Cultural critic Lee Ŏr-yŏng gave a more impartial observation, stating that youth culture is a combination of elite and popular culture that capitalizes on audiovisual media. Meanwhile, publishing critic Lee Chung-han observed a groundbreaking phenomenon that year, of youth studying literature in the both the social sciences and Korean history, which led him to assume

¹⁹⁵ Pu-yŏng Lee, “Christian Broadcast Open Lecture: Between Counterculture and Acoustic Guitar,” *Tongailbo*, April 22, 1974.

that “youth are trying to overcome the imperfections of reality by searching within, and [thereby] forming the foundations of autonomous thinking.”¹⁹⁶

Because university students were the key agents of both youth culture and the student movement, those who criticized youth culture were mainly university students who disapproved its detachment from political engagement and also its preoccupation with *p'ok'ŭ*, or acoustic guitar music. When Korea University held a symposium under the topics “The Essence and Degeneration of Youth Culture” and “The Task of Korean Youth Culture,” some students displayed a haughty prejudice regarding popular music: Pak Ch'öl-tong called acoustic-guitar-playing singers “ttantaras” who are “too crude to be deemed idols of youth culture,” making a reference to Kim Pyŏng-ik’s aforementioned article; while Ch'oe Yong-ch'ŏn distanced “university culture” from “less mature kids [who] laugh and play ‘kkangkkangi’ music all night.”¹⁹⁷ *Ttantara* is a pejorative term referring to all types of entertainers including singers; the word derives from the English word “tantara,” which the Merriam-Webster dictionary calls “a word for a short, lively sound of trumpets that may also be onomatopoeic in origin.”¹⁹⁸ *Kkangkkangi*, which is actually a purely Korean word for “haegŭm”—a traditional two-stringed instrument played upright with a bow—was used in a derogatory manner due to its association with beggars who played it for material compensation.¹⁹⁹ The allusions these students make

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ “Reports on Youth Culture Misleading,” *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, May 7, 1974.

¹⁹⁸ Hyŏkyŏn Cho, “The Etymology of ‘Ttantara’,” *Chungbumaeil*, November 3, 2003, <http://www.jbnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=93790>. The term was most likely introduced to Koreans via the Eighth U.S. Army.

¹⁹⁹ “*Kkangkkangi* Is Slang for Haegŭm,” Korea Creative Content Agency, accessed May 4, 2020, http://www.culturecontent.com/content/contentView.do?search_div=CP_THE&search_div_id=CP_THE008&cp_code=cp0206&index_id=cp02060067&content_id=cp020600670001&print=Y.

toward acoustic guitar and the *kkangkangi* indicate that their disdainful comments are directed against their peers who sing *p'ok'ŭ* music, reflecting an unfortunate yet prevalent prejudice against the music profession as a whole.

Kim Pyŏng-ik's crystallization of youth culture into three products symbolizing the trans-Pacific flow of Western sartorial and musical trends, incited rejoinders disputing U.S. cultural imperialism, couching it as a cycle of colonialism. Correspondingly, the majority of comments put forth during the symposium impart students' conflicting viewpoints regarding the dissemination of U.S. culture: at times aspiring to stop imitating Western trends and create their own culture, and at other times coveting the liberal customs—such as playing acoustic guitar, growing long hair, and wearing hip clothing—that came from the very country that intervened on South Korea's autonomy. For instance, Kim Sŭng-sim from Sook-myung University rejected the hedonism intimated in a culture symbolized by blue jeans and draft beer, while Chŏng Kŭn-wŏn of So-gang University acknowledged that “unconstrained attitudes can be objects of envy.”²⁰⁰ Kim Hye-suk of Ehwa Woman's University moralized that “university culture has the responsibility to correctly lead youth culture the moment it dissolves into popular culture.” Kim further emphasized that youth culture should stay separate from popular culture, in order to revitalize Korean society. Ku Pon-sang of Yonsei University pointed out that Korean youth culture “has not yet established a clear objective nor ideology, as if in a state of coma,” and stressed the need to “daringly escape the cycle of colonialism.” Ku's comment about youth culture needing an objective or ideology expresses his desire to mobilize youth culture for the purposes of the student movement. And finally, Professor of political science Ch'oe Ch'ang-kyu

²⁰⁰ “Reports on Youth Culture Misleading,” *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, May 7, 1974. All quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

defended the positive political potential of youth culture, saying that “it has the grave responsibility to surmount historical rupture (i.e., the colonial era), which is why relegating it as vulgar is a profound error.” Such repeated allusions to colonialism impart the insecurities Koreans had of having lost a cultural foundation during the Japanese colonial era. And Professor Ch'oe's appeal against vulgarity, speaks to the prejudice many had against popular culture, as illustrated—in the previous chapter—by the way *trot* was censored as “vulgar.”

The motivation to overcome the legacies of Japanese colonialism and U.S. cultural imperialism stem from the ideology of *minjung* democracy, which proposes that the people—as opposed to the oppressors—are the subject of historical and cultural renewal. Thus, it is no surprise that creativity was at the crux of the Youth Culture Debate: as a solution to breaking free from the repercussions of 30-years of colonialism as well as an indiscriminate adoption of Western ideas. On May 22, 1974, *Kyŏnghyangshinmun* devoted a column to Han Wan-sang, Professor of Sociology at Seoul National University, who argued that creativity must be the chief tenet of youth culture.²⁰¹ Han affirmed that youth culture is “the will and action to daringly break vicious cycles,” and in the absence of a pre-existing culture that youth can counter—“In the U.S. there is Protestantism, in the Arab Republic Muslim culture, in communist societies Marxism and Leninism,” but no equivalent in South Korea—youth culture could only be a culture of creation. Han came closest to describing the *minjung* democracy of the student movement when he proclaimed that university students should learn from the “simple culture of common people” which “contains a consciousness that objects to and criticizes irrationality, injustice, and threats to freedom.” In doing so, students can build the capacity to criticize social “irregularities” both

²⁰¹ Wansang Han, “Youth Culture Ought to be Creative,” column published in *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, May 22, 1974. All quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

abroad and at home, while avoiding “extreme cultural toadyism as well as extreme nationalism.” Contextually, “extreme cultural toadyism” refers to the Western-influenced music, fashion, and recreational activities of youth—such as *p'ok'ŭ* music, blue jeans, and draft beer—and “extreme nationalism” to Park’s dictatorial form of nationalism. Thus, in proposing that youth culture should learn from the “simple culture of common people,” Han was hoping to replace the Western-derived recreational culture of youth with the ideologies of the student movement. The academy, in their criticism of youth culture, was in fact trying to mobilize youth culture for the student movement. Thus, after the debate, youth culture was no longer separate from student activism; the 1974 Youth Culture Debate led to the conflation of youth culture and student activism, which enlarged the protest movement but led to the downfall of *p'ok'ŭ*.

Impact of the Youth Culture Debate on *P'ok'ŭ*

In the arts, dedication to *minjung* issues manifested in a movement to restore and revive traditional styles of performances, such as *talchum* (traditional masked dance), *samulnori* (traditional percussion performance), and *madanggŭk* (traditional form of communal theater). The turn to nationalistic *minjung* art turned out to be a perspicacious one: the Park regime itself was advancing the inheritance of a strong nationalistic tradition and therefore could not suppress the turn toward nationalistic traditionalism among student and artist activists. Evidence of *minjung* ideology filtering into *p'ok'ŭ* can be seen in the sudden increase, starting around 1973 and continuing through 1975, of Korean names among *p'ok'ŭ* groups. Considering the widespread use of English or Western names not only among early *p'ok'ŭ* groups, but also across various genres of popular music, the shift to using “pure” or sino-Korean was evident. Examples of *p'ok'ŭ* groups who gave themselves Korean names abound: the male *p'ok'ŭ* duet Choyaktol

(“Pebble”), who asserted their adherence to amateurism;²⁰² female *p'okŭ* duet Hiwa Rang (Sino-Korean for “Joy and Brightness”), who uniquely combined the acoustic guitar with organ;²⁰³ the coed *p'okŭ* duet Milbat (“Wheat Field”), who strived to sing “Korean songs and a repertoire suitable for students”;²⁰⁴ the *p'okŭ* trio Mujigae (“Rainbow”), who boasted their “rainbow-like harmony” and variety in repertoire that included “Latin music, *canzone*, and pop songs”;²⁰⁵ the marine engineering student group Milmulgwa Ssölmul (“Ebb and Flow”);²⁰⁶ and male duet Tul Tasöt (“Two Five”), whose aspirations were “getting famous before graduation” and “holding a respectable and quiet recital.”²⁰⁷ The turn toward using Korean names was most pronounced in *p'okŭ* compared to other genres, corroborating its status as the representative genre cultivated in university campuses. In addition, well-articulated motivations to engender an indigenous, and truly “Korean” aesthetic, can be seen in the special feature of *p'okŭ* singer Kim Ŭi-ch'öl in the June 1974 issue of music magazine *Kayosaenghwal*, which opens with Kim saying: “Our music is something that we ourselves have to care for and improve.”²⁰⁸ Such an imperative stance arguing for the ownership, preservation, and revival of a collective and domestic art form, reflects how ideologies developed among student activists influenced *p'okŭ* singers.

²⁰² “*P'okŭ* Duet Choyaktol,” *Ilgansŭp'och'u*, February 25, 1973.

²⁰³ “New Campus Talent, Hiwa Rang,” *Ilgansŭp'och'u*, May 14, 1973.

²⁰⁴ “New Amateur Coed *P'okŭ* Duet,” *Ilgansŭp'och'u*, February 17, 1974.

²⁰⁵ “*P'okŭ* Trio Mujigae,” *Ilgansŭp'och'u*, March 18, 1974.

²⁰⁶ “Amateur *P'okŭ* Group Milmulgwa Ssölmul,” *Ilgansŭp'och'u*, May 13, 1974.

²⁰⁷ “Dongguk University Amateur Group Tul Tasöt,” *Ilgansŭp'och'u*, June 9, 1974.

²⁰⁸ “A Musical Space for Something Korean,” a close-up feature of *p'okŭ* singer Kim Ŭi-ch'öl, in *Kayosaenghwal*, June 1974, 26.

While the media painted the inclination of *p'ok'ŭ* singers to revive national traditions as a welcome change, there was a shift in tone in addressing them after the Youth Culture Debate, denoting that *p'ok'ŭ* was now treated with suspicion rather than approval. In other words, due to the politicization of youth culture, *p'ok'ŭ* was deemed a conduit for dissent. By the fall of 1974, the heat of the Youth Culture Debate began to subside, but the craze for *p'ok'ŭ* music was at its zenith. An article published on October 2, 1974, lambasting *p'ok'ŭ*, gives evidence of the media's participation in the regime's propagandist strategy of discrediting youth culture as blind imitation of "decadent" Western trends. Titled "Musically Void *P'ok'ŭ* Songs Encourage Decadence," the article's perception of *p'ok'ŭ* as disreputable is shockingly different from the adulatory reports cited in the two previous chapters. The downfall of *p'ok'ŭ*'s reputation could not have been more drastic: from quiet acoustic guitar music performed by talented university students to, "noisy" and "clamorous" acoustic guitar music performed by singers donning "ragged clothes and long hair"; from "high-class" music embraced by intellectuals raising the standard of popular music to "musically destitute and technically lacking music eroding the popular music world."²⁰⁹ In addition to denouncing *p'ok'ŭ*'s amateur quality, the article associates *p'ok'ŭ* with a stereotypical look of hippiedom. This association with hippiedom is intensified by *p'ok'ŭ* being cast as "decadent"—a designation forced on blacklisted songs—on the basis of its "extremely decadent lyrics," which is groundless and redundant. Furthermore, the report denounces the Western origins of *p'ok'ŭ*, deeming it "compositions that are mere copies of foreign songs." Adding insult to injury, the article paints *p'ok'ŭ* singers as opportunistic mercenaries who "swiftly aim[ed] for the pockets of female high school students" when the pockets of elder women were empty. All

²⁰⁹ "Musically Void *P'ok'ŭ* Songs Encourage Decadence," *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, October 2, 1974. All quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

major tenets of *p'ok'ŭ* singers that used to make them distinct—their amateurism, originality, and anti-commercialism—are now pilloried as defects. Last but not least, the article depicted *p'ok'ŭ* as a virus spreading directionless, and “disturbing the emotional life of the people,” portending the sweeping censorship that would strike popular music the following year (a topic I explore in the final chapter). As blatantly displayed in the above article excoriating *p'ok'ŭ*, the government now deemed all expressions of university students—whether they came from demonstrations or were accompanied by “noisy acoustic guitar music”—to be an oppositional force that needed to be stamped out.

The March Of Fools (1975)

The film *The March of Fools* (1975) is the culminating work of three seminal figures of youth culture: writer Ch'oe In-ho, who was named one of the “popular heroes” of youth culture in Kim Pyŏng-ik’s 1974 article that ignited the Youth Culture Debate; *p'ok'ŭ* singer Song Ch'ang-sik, who after the disbandment of Twin Folio and brief training in the army, renewed his singing style harnessing the techniques and aesthetics of traditional Korean music; and director Ha Kil-chong, who was slightly senior to the other two, but committed to creating a realist film about 1970s college youth. Released a mere two weeks after Park’s announcement of Emergency Decree No.9, on May 31, 1975, the film is lauded for vividly capturing the conflicting sentiments of romance and anguish of youth culture, despite the 1970s being what film scholars agree was the darkest time in Korean cinematic history.²¹⁰ Film scholar Gang Seon-ryul poignantly summarizes that underneath the film’s romantic tone lies “the reality in which youth lethargically

²¹⁰ Ham, “The Nihilism and Tragic Nature,” 407. Film audiences significantly decreased in the 1970s—from 178 million at the end of the 1960s to less than 70 million by 1976—most largely due to the dissemination of television.

self-torment and passively rebel against an enormous authoritarian regime.”²¹¹ I contend that the film captures contradictory perceptions of the youth generation—that they are apathetic and pleasure-seeking versus that they are cognizant of social inequality and committed to political action—by juxtaposing the tone, structure, and characteristics of its two protagonists in dichotomy.

The original story “The March of Fools” was written by Ch'oe In-ho and published weekly in the sports and entertainment daily newspaper *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, from October 15, 1973 to May 13, 1974. Scholars often underestimate Ch'oe's original series as an episodic continuation of “simplistic and fun-seeking” content with characters “lacking inner struggle.”²¹² But literature scholar Song Ŭn-yŏng states that Ch'oe's original story displays a “keen sense of identity and reflection of the times.”²¹³ In addition, making a film about youth culture meant appealing to an audience demographic which had become a prime consumer sector.²¹⁴ Accordingly, the enormous success of director Lee Chang-ho's *Heavenly Homecoming to Stars* (1974), based on Ch'oe's best-selling novel of the same name, made Ch'oe a safe bet that would guarantee profit. Song contends that youth culture—as conceived in the literary oeuvre of Ch'oe—is not characterized by “active and practical resistance,” but rather represented in the spirit of “youth who wanted to break away from the ruling discourse and ideology.”²¹⁵ *The March of Fools* is about the fate and friendship of Pyŏng-t'ae and Yŏng-ch'ŏl, whose stories begin with leisure

²¹¹ Kang, *Ha Kil-Chong Or The Fool Who Marched*, 153.

²¹² Ham, “The Nihilism and Tragic Nature,” 409.

²¹³ Song, “Choi Inho's Novel as a Phenomenon of Mass Culture,” 430.

²¹⁴ Ham, “The Nihilism and Tragic Nature,” 408.

²¹⁵ Song, “Choi Inho's Novel as a Phenomenon of Mass Culture,” 435.

activities and romantic pursuits they experience together as male philosophy students of an elite university in Seoul, but end with Yǒng-ch'öl killing himself by jumping into the East Sea, and Pyǒng-t'ae taking the train to join the army—concluding actions that signify their succumbing, rather than breaking away from “the ruling discourse and ideology” Song mentioned above.

Director Ha Kil-chong’s multi-faceted career as a film professor, critic, and translator began after he received an MA and MFA from the University California Los Angeles and returned to Korea in 1970, and ended with his premature death in 1979. He introduced to the Korean audience the French New Wave and New Hollywood movements, alongside key directors such as Ingmar Bergman, Pier Paolo Pasolini, Akira Kurosawa, and Satyajit Ray, and major cinematic texts such as *The Exorcist*, *One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest*, and *Star Wars*. Ha’s frequently-quoted statement about the need of audiovisual media to “honestly show the beauty and horrible acts of reality” attests to his commitment to realism.²¹⁶ His use of the “candid camera” method, which hides the cameras from the actors on set in order to “draw out convincing acting and capture uncalculated and coincidental details,” confirms his intention to observe and document university students in their natural habitat.²¹⁷ Ha cast real-life university students for *The March of Fools* to double down on the credibility of the two main characters. He is also credited for creating the character Yǒng-ch'öl, who did not exist in Ch'oe’s original version of the story. Yǒng-ch'öl embodies the idealistic introvert, and therefore the tragic counterpart to Pyǒng-t'ae, who is the realist extravert. By adding to the screenplay the character Yǒng-ch'öl, who fails his military physical exam, gets rejected by the first girl he ever loves, and is treated with disdain by his wealthy but cold father, Ha injected pathos into an otherwise

²¹⁶ Kang, *Ha Kil-Chong, Or The Fool Who Marched*, 47.

²¹⁷ Chǒn, “The Significance of Desecrated and Dissociated Textures,” 400.

struggle-free plot. Ha repeatedly interjects the carefree yet reckless activities of university students—such as the interdepartmental rice wine drinking competition and the public stunt Pyöng-t'ae and Yöng-ch'öl pull off while running away from the police—with scenes in which Yöng-ch'öl struggles, doubts, and belittles himself.

Staying faithful to the dualism of the two characters, Ha structured the film as a duality of light and dark. In its mood, camera angle, and mise en scene, the film exhibits a dichotomy. During the first half, the animated and happy-go-lucky attitude of the characters are shot close-up, accentuating the bustle of indoor places of leisure, which are essentially pubs that serve as dating spots for college students, as well as the traffic of city roads, where Yöng-ch'öl bikes daringly—contrary to his unsure and self-effacing personality—amid buses and cars. In contrast, in the second half of the film, the despondent atmosphere and somber hue consists of extended shots taken from high above or far away, which allow the viewer to absorb the threatening sky behind Pyöng-t'ae and Yöng-ch'öl as they take their last stroll together, the chilling atmosphere of a closed-down and empty university campus, and the immensity of the East Sea as seen from atop a cliff. In addition, music is used continually in *The March of Fools*, but most prominently in two scenes that feature Song Ch'ang-sik's two theme songs. “Why Call Me” and Whale Hunt,” unfold less than ten minutes into and during the last ten minutes of the film respectively, bookending the film's dichotomous structure in both form and content. I zoom in on these two scenes to illustrate how the film politicizes the music through direct and abstract references of defiance and escapism.

Policing Youth's Long Hair

In order to understand the plot and grasp the satirical magnitude of the first “Why Call Me” scene, I need to explain the most visible and theatrical ways in which the Park regime disciplined youth: the crackdown on men’s long hair, which—vis-à-vis the crew cut of most older men and the even shorter buzz cut of young men conscripted to the military—was construed as an act of resistance, a rejection of Park’s military-controlled regime.



Figure 3.1: Picture of Park Chung Hee (left) and of authorities policing men’s long hair²¹⁸

The term “chang-bal-chok,” which literally means “long-haired group,” entered the press lexicon in the 1960s, peaked between 1970 and 1972, then subsided temporarily before peaking

²¹⁸ Pictures from: Sang-su Kim, “Ignorance of History Brought About National Crisis,” *Pressian*, April 15, 2009, <https://www.pressian.com/pages/articles/58495>; Kyōng-che Kim, “Crackdown on Long-haired Group in 1975,” *Tongailbo*, November 25, 2011, <https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?oid=020&aid=0002294088>; and T'ae-sōng Cho, “Sin Chung-hyōn A Rebellious Character? A Colored Memory of the Park Chung Hee Era,” *Hankookilbo*, December 18, 2017, <http://m.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/201702180495106185>.

again in 1975, mirroring the tightening and loosening of Park's crackdown on youth culture. Even though the policing of long hair did not gain legal basis until amendments were made to the Minor Offenses Act in 1973, long hair on men was policed under other offenses: according to a "hippie adolescent" police crackdown report conducted in Seoul on August 28, 1970, among youth aged between 15-25, 29 were remitted to a summary trial and 648 were dismissed with warnings.²¹⁹ News about *changbalchok* highlight the astounding number of those arrested or prosecuted: in July 1971, 4,000 *changbalchok* were forced to shave their hair;²²⁰ in June 1974, the police inspected the hair lengths of 6,000 *changbalchok* in one day;²²¹ and in July of 1975, 1,700 *changbalchok* were prosecuted for long hair.²²² The government's obsession with disciplining the hair of youth led also to the censorship of facial hair, as was the case with *p'ok'ŭ* singer Lee Chang-hŭi, who was prevented from appearing on a film named after his hit song "Memory of a Drink," for which he had already signed a contract, because of his mustache.²²³ It is no surprise that university students believed they were "restrained by too many regulations and

²¹⁹ The Minor Offenses Act made punishable: disposing of tissues or cigarette buds, spitting on the street, drunken behavior, circulation of (anti-governmental) rumors, donning long hair or uncivilized attire, teaching secret dancing classes or providing the space to do so, selling illegal tickets, cutting in line, trespassing on restricted areas, and tinkering with or concocting explosives, etc. The list of punishable offenses range from benign to disturbingly dangerous, denoting the illogic of repression. Words used in the ordinance document, such as "secret," "trespassing," and "tinkering with or concocting explosives" insinuate insidious operations, adding tenability to the notion the Park regime equated anything remotely subversive, whether recreational acts or criminal behavior, as signs of communist infiltration.

²²⁰ "First Day of Crackdown on Long Hair, Four Thousand People Get their Hair Cut," *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, July 7, 1971.

²²¹ "Inspection of Six Thousand Changbalchok in One Day," *Tongailbo*, June 8, 1974.

²²² "1,700 Prosecuted for Crackdown on Long-Haired Group," *Maeilgyŏngje*, July 24, 1975.

²²³ "Lee Chang-hŭi Banned Due to Mustache," *Ilgansŭp'och'u*, September 20, 1974.

tied down by the moral codes of the establishment.”²²⁴ In June of 1976, Park announced yet another round of crackdowns, declaring that the control and regulation of “hippie-style *changbalchok* will continue indefinitely until it vanishes without a trace.”²²⁵ Park’s compulsion to control the hairstyles of young men turned “the streets of Seoul into a theater of the absurd, where police officers, armed with measuring sticks, imposed ‘the discipline of the body’ on the hapless passersby.”²²⁶ And the film satirizes the government’s incessant crackdown on *changbalchok*, by lampooning the police chasing Pyōng-t’ae and Yōng-ch’ōl for their long hair.

Vignette 1: “Why Call Me”



Figure 3.2: Screenshot of 8:57 into the film²²⁷

²²⁴ Lee, “1970s Student Anti-*Yushin* Movement,” 473-474.

²²⁵ “Crackdown on Long Hair Starting on the Sixteenth,” *Tongailbo*, June 14, 1976.

²²⁶ Kim and Shin, “The Birth of *Rok*,” 216.

²²⁷ *March of Fools*, directed by Ha Kil-chong, produced by Pak Chong-ch'an, 1975. All screen shots have time marks and are from the film.

Pyŏng-t'ae and Yŏng-ch'ŏl are ducking away from cops because of their Beatles-style hairdos. Nearby, police are shouting “Hey *changbal* (“longhair”)!,” chasing two other men, or so they think; suddenly a policeman enters from their right, waving his index finger up and down their faces saying “Where do you think you are going?” The onset of Pyŏng-t'ae and Yŏng-ch'ŏl's ensuing runaway scene is synced to the song “Why Call Me,” which immediately begins with Song Ch'ang-sik belting out “why call me” twice, each syllable taking up a quarter note followed by a quarter rest. Except for the opening melismatic “why,” which slides up a major third interval from the minor third to the fifth scale degree, the remaining two syllables pounce on the same fifth degree note twice. The direct and repeated three-beat questioning of “why call me,” embodies what Pyŏng-t'ae and Yŏng-ch'ŏl want to say but cannot express, while running away from the ironically equally long-haired policeman. Pyŏng-t'ae and Yŏng-ch'ŏl beam as they make headway, dashing alongside cars and buses in the busy roads of Yeouido plaza, but the policeman chasing them looks silly and comic, due to his exasperated facial expressions and exaggerated gesticulations. The four-lane roads and overpasses that form the scene's backdrop signify the drastic infrastructural developments carried out during the 1960s and 1970s for the purposes of creating a modern nation that was rapidly urbanizing. That this chase scene is shot in Yeouido plaza, which used to be called “five-one-six” plaza referring to the date—May 16, 1961—when Park Chung Hee instigated the military coup that brought him to power, makes convincing Kang Suk-yŏng's argument that the scene “effectively displays the desire of youth to escape the Park regime's logic of developmental dictatorship.”²²⁸ And continuing that thread of analysis, the clown-like representation of the policeman can be interpreted as a satire of all authority figures who were puppets of Park.

²²⁸ Kang, “The Whale and the Censorship,” 19.

Pyŏng-t'ae and Yŏng-ch'ŏl run up a crowded pedestrian overpass, where Yŏng-ch'ŏl encounters a woman cradling a baby, begging for money. The pace and tone of the song suddenly shifts from the brazen questioning of the catchy A theme to the meandering hesitance of the regretful B theme, during which the camera lingers on Yŏng-ch'ŏl's sympathetic face as he hands the woman a few coins. The rhythm shifts from the A theme's quadruple meter with the emphasis on the first beat, to the B theme's duple meter with the emphasis on the second beat, which, combined with Song Ch'ang-sik's soliloquizing lyrics and tender execution, give the contrastive B theme a *trot*-like ambience. In her behavioral analysis of the film, Kwŏn Hyŏn-chŏng contends that the inclusion of this scene reveals the contradictions of a government that tried to depoliticize youth culture.²²⁹ The fleeting yet affecting interaction that Yŏng-ch'ŏl makes with the beggarwoman can be read as a retort to the trivializing notion that youth only care about their hairstyle and popular music, or that youth are apathetic to the intensifying economic and social marginalization of laborers and the poor. As the B theme ends, Yŏng-ch'ŏl looks up and realizes that he and Pyŏng-t'ae are trapped by two police narrowing in on them from both ends of the overpass. Desperate to get away but without much forethought, they pull a daredevil stunt hanging off the pedestrian overpass. The camera rotates, capturing the dizzying view of vehicles rapidly passing underneath them, and then pans, holding the view of both ends of the overpass just long enough for the audience to register the gaze of pedestrians staring at the two young men. The mob of strangers who stop and stare at Pyŏng-t'ae and Yŏng-ch'ŏl making their getaway a spectacle for passersby, brings to life "the theater of the absurd" playing out in the streets of Seoul, where police officers "imposed 'the discipline of the body' on the hapless passersby."²³⁰

²²⁹ Kwŏn, "Regarding the Political Nature of Youth Behavior," 596.

²³⁰ Kim and Shin, "The Birth of *Rok*," 216.



Figure 3.3: Screenshot of 10:25 into the film



Figure 3.4: Screenshot of 10:30 into the film

The A theme returns with Song shouting “can’t hear you” instead of “why call me,” while the two policemen pull Pyōng-t’ae and Yōng-ch’ōl back up to the overpass. The music fades out when the two students are taken to the police station, where they are reprimanded for behaving inappropriately. They try to cajole the policeman into letting them go, but he could not care less about their plea about being late for dates with “pretty ladies.” Pyōng-t’ae and Yōng-ch’ōl manage to sneak out of the station while the policeman is distracted, who trips and falls

shouting after them—his last act of slapstick humor. The opening bars of “Why Call Me” sound once again as the camera follows Pyöng-t'ae and Yöng-ch'öl exiting the station and running back up the pedestrian overpass, this time finally getting away, hair intact. Seeing the two escape, in a scene that bluntly vocalizes their defiance while caricaturing the police, is cathartic to watch.

The “Why Call Me” scene mobilizes humor for the purposes of achieving defiant satire. Song’s “Why Call Me” begins in response to the police’s question, “where do you think you guys are going?,” making it clear that the song is a stand-in for what the two protagonists *could* be saying. The lyrics of “Why Call Me” employ the informal speech form usually reserved for family and close friends, or used strictly by the senior in a hierarchical relationship. Thus, when directed against an authority figure, such as the police, this informal speech form is directly confrontational, undermining authority and power. The irony of a long-haired police chasing long-haired youth and the slapstick caricature of the police who catch and lose them, occasion humor at the *expense* of the police, augmenting the subversive work of the scene. That the chaser and authority figure is the one provoking laughter, enhances the defiant mood of the film. According to Lee Hyo-in, such elements of satire and defiance were nonexistent in the official tone of pre-existing Korean films.²³¹ This gives more weight to how the “Why Call Me” scene would have acted as an outlet for the rebelliousness that male youth must have felt when their hair was cut by the police in real life.

In her anthropological study, Lee Hye-rim contends that the identity formation of 1970s youth culture was carried out via the consumption of popular music, most notably, *p'ok'ü*. Lee relays an informant’s statement that “the lyrics of Korean *p'ok'ü* music, which include a wide

²³¹ Lee, “The Centrifugal Aesthetics,” 22. Lee discusses the display of bodily grotesquery in the film’s opening sequence in which a group of half-naked men undergo physical examination, which determines their fitness for military service.

variety of topics that range from quotidian personal concerns to larger societal problems, alleviated their sense of confinement and skepticism.”²³² Lee posits that, from the perspective of the older generation, the snowballing population of youth “collectively listening to and singing songs full of societal criticism, made youth culture a threatening existence.”²³³ While this statement runs the risk of over-politicizing *p'ok'ŭ*—not *all p'ok'ŭ* songs were full of societal criticism—Lee attempts to reach a corrective when she summarizes that “the music of youth was consumed in order to resolve the [feeling of] cultural poverty, and fulfill the need of differentiation; it was not consumed for the purposes of expressing resistance against a particular group.”²³⁴ However, “expressing resistance against a particular group”—i.e., police enforcing the crackdown on long-haired groups—is exactly what is happening in the “Why Call Me” scene. The literal manner in which director Ha mobilizes the song leaves little ambiguity that the scene is a display of youth’s defiance against authority.

Vignette 2: “Whale Hunt”

Whenever Yŏng-ch'ŏl gets drunk, he confesses that he dreams of catching a big whale. He reiterates this time and time again, as if to convince himself more so than others, who grow tired of his delusional pipe dream. His masculinity impaired by the military recruiters who disqualified him from the army, and his courtship unsuccessful, Yŏng-ch'ŏl feels the need to show courage. He longs for something different, bigger, implausible, perhaps fantastic, and

²³² Lee, “The Formation of 1970s Korean Youth Culture,” 27.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 31.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

leaves to catch his whale, in order to break out of his passive tendencies. Yǒng-ch'öl exchanges his last conversation with his best friend Pyǒng-t'ae on a gusty beach:

The whale is in the East Sea, but it is also inside me. I hadn't realized that until now. I am going to catch the whale. I will show you courage. If I don't, I cannot bear my present self. And also, we have a big hope. We have our valuable school that our seniors have protected. As long as we have our school, we are happy.



Figure 3.5: Screenshot of 1:31:58 into the film

Yǒng-ch'öl declares the psychological need to catch the whale, which he has just realized resides inside him. While the transition from whale to school seems abrupt, considering that the message about school becomes Yǒng-ch'öl's his last words, the gravity of his comments become clear: like his legendary whale, the school is where ventures toward an ideal happen; the school, or educational spaces that inspire the imagination of and quest for alternatives to the status quo, is the sole place of hope. Yǒng-ch'öl tells Pyǒng-t'ae to go back to school, ending their adventures and journey together. Then, Yǒng-ch'öl bikes alone: he bikes past piles of construction debris, in the middle of a bleak highway where the only passing vehicles are the monotonous dump trucks, and finally arrives at an elevated cliff that looks down on the East Sea.



Figure 3.6: Screenshot of 1:36:08 into the film

The blue ocean that lies beyond the starkly dark cliff where Yǒng-ch'öl stands is undulating wildly, tempting him to join it. The camera pans along the horizon before focusing on Yǒng-ch'öl on his bike panting, as if to show him taking in the immensity of the ocean. The camera jumps back to the ocean, zooming in until the water fills up the entire screen. The camera returns to hold a close-up shot of Yǒng-ch'öl as the marching beat of Song Ch'ang-sik's "Whale Hunt" enters: "Drinking, singing, and dancing, doesn't console the sadness in my heart." After the first half of the verse, the camera dives down to the vigorous waves synchronized to the soft, high-pitched guitar slide in the instrumental interlude between the two halves of the first verse. After making a disorienting leap further out and up from the ocean, the camera points back to Yǒng-ch'öl's now despondent-looking face during the remaining lyrics of the first verse: "Looking around, what to do, I see everyone's turned their back against me." As soon as the lyrics end, the close-up shot of Yǒng-ch'öl's face instantly cuts to a different scene: angled bottom-up, pointed at the sun, which is only half visible because of a diagonal shadow casting dark the entire right side of the screen; on the left side is a shadow, presumably of Yǒng-ch'öl, bent over and tapping his head on the diagonal shadow, seemingly dispirited.



Figure 3.7: Screenshot of 1:37:09 into the film

The flashback scene is ephemeral, taking up no more than four seconds between the last word of the song's verse and the first word of the soaring chorus: "Come, let's leave for the East Sea."

After a determined pause, Yǒng-ch'ŏl bites his lower lip and pedals over the cliff, throwing himself in the water. The stirring tone of the chorus echoes the resoluteness of Yǒng-ch'ŏl's leap: his first display of autonomy. The uplifting mood of the song seems to imply that Yǒng-ch'ŏl's choice to die is less tragic than not having a dream to die for. The chorus of "Whale Hunt" repeats once more as the camera slowly zooms into where the audience last saw Yǒng-ch'ŏl: "Come, let's leave for the East Sea, to catch the mythical whale."



Figure 3.8: Screenshots of Yǒng-ch'öl's suicide (1:37:21 and 1:37:25 into the film)

Suicide is a contradictory action in that it is a willful action forsaking that will; autonomous action forsaking life. Based on her examination of urban characters depicted in 1970s Korean cinema, Chǒng Hyǒn-kyǒng posits that Yǒng-ch'öl's “symptoms of self-dissolution and depression that lead to suicide ... go beyond the personal, and act as an allegory of ‘the era’s incompetence,’ and signifies youth’s defeat in a forced competition” against

authoritarianism.²³⁵ While Chŏng's allegorical analogy is convincing, her emphasis on youth's defeat and the era's incompetence overlooks the willful component of Yŏng-ch'ŏl's suicide. Kang Sukyŏng gives a much-overdue analysis of what the "whale" signifies in Ch'oe In-ho's works, in positing that Ch'oe's whale is not that dissimilar from Herman Melville's *Moby Dick*, which symbolizes, among other things, "the objects of man's struggle and resistance, and the yearning of life that is vibrant."²³⁶

I find in the wealthy but lethargic, privileged yet constantly failing character of Yŏng-ch'ŏl, resemblances to youth culture as refracted by the prism of the 1974 youth culture debate: affluent, highly educated, and therefore seemingly highly capable, yet thoroughly incapable and indulging in daydreams. Yŏng-ch'ŏl communicates the psychological need to "show courage," or break the cycle of his passive behavior that had so far dominated his life. This need to break out of the cycle of passivity harkens back to the need to "daringly escape the cycle of colonialism" that Yonsei University student Ku Pon-sang put forth during the Korea University symposium discussing youth culture.²³⁷ Relatedly, Yŏng-ch'ŏl's suicide is his final display of autonomous action, which brings to mind the "foundations of autonomous thinking" that was forming among youth whose interest in the social sciences and Korean history surged in 1974 according to publishing critic Lee Chung-han. Instances in which Yŏng-ch'ŏl uncharacteristically displays independent action are: when he gives money to the beggar women while getting chased by the

²³⁵ Chŏng, "Depression of City People," 273.

²³⁶ Kang, "The Whale and the Censorship," 11. Ch'oe In-ho's works that Kang examine include the screenplay for *The March of Fools*, the lyrics to the song "Whale Hunt," and a novel titled *Whale Hunt* published in 1983. It is evident that Ch'oe found the whale device compelling throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The significance of the whale did not go unnoticed by the censors. Ch'oe recalled receiving "harsh interrogation" from the censors about the meaning of the whale.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

police, when he leaves Pyŏng-t'ae in the classroom and heads out to join the campus demonstrations (which are hastily edited out and replaced by scenes depicting various campus sports events), and when he gambles on his trust in humanity by betting that a newspaper boy will return his money (which the boy does). These actions reflecting Yŏng-ch'ŏl's ethical stance, reinforces Ham Chong-ho's interpretation using Nietzsche's theorizations on nihilism as a framework discerning Yŏng-ch'ŏl's death as representative of "the overturning of pre-existing value systems and the strong will to break free from materialism."²³⁸

In a similar vein, I interpret Yŏng-ch'ŏl's suicide as a self-initiated death of youth culture for the necessary recalibration of a more committed, radical, and organized form of political activism. Employment of the rousing "Whale Hunt" evokes the intrepid acts of protestors, some of whom were injured or executed, while others committed suicide as radical acts of resistance. The lyrics, which were written by Ch'oe In-ho, are about the attainment of the ideal over reality, of the dream over life. They comment on how, even if worldly—materialistic and romantic—pleasures disappear, there remains "a pretty whale in our hearts." This reads as an allusion to the denouncement of materialistic and romantic portrayals of youth culture (as superficial and politically detached) that came into clear view during the Youth Culture Debate. The chorus, in a compelling performance by the composer and singer Song Ch'ang-sik, incites listeners to leave together to catch the whale that beckons with its mythical call. Despite being an abandonment of life, Yŏng-ch'ŏl's suicide is a willful and affirmative act, akin to the mindset of student activists who accepted the deadly consequences of protesting against military-enforced authoritarianism.

In making *The March of Fools*, Ha Kiljong aimed to capture youth culture *in the moment*. Unfortunately, Ha's career was bounded by the 1970s, which meant that he never had a chance

²³⁸ Ham, "The Nihilism and Tragic Nature," 428.

to work in a censorship-free environment. The scenario of *The March of Fools* was rejected at least three times, and even though Ha and Ch'oe repeatedly revised the scenario and re-edited the film, the censors cut 30 minutes of footage before the film's release. From preproduction to the time of the film's release, Ha kept testing the limits of artistic expression, and in the end, decided to leave the final expurgation of the censors *as is*, as a means of documenting the ramifications of censorship. This resulted in fragmented and illogical transitions in the film, but film scholar Chŏn Uh-yŏng argues that “the juxtaposition of such awkward scenes ... is a cinematic device that both satisfies and throws into confusion the desires of the main agents of censorship” as well as “a response to the state's interference and control of universities and university students.”²³⁹ That Ha chose his own film to document the process of censorship is an “important characteristic that differentiates him from other contemporaneous filmmakers” during the Korean film industry's most restrictive period.²⁴⁰ *The March of Fools* is a living document that exemplifies strategies by which cultural producers negotiated state censorship.

What pulls together an otherwise disjointed film is the music and voice of Song Ch'ang-sik. “Why Call Me” and “Whale Hunt” prove Song's uncanny ability to successfully meld traditional Korean folk, popular *trot*, and modern *p'ok'ŭ* music. In an interview conducted in 1992, Song expressed guilt for having performed foreign songs during his time as part of the pioneering *p'ok'ŭ* duo Twin Folio between 1968 and 1970, adding that he considers the repertoire of Twin Folio “poisonous songs” that distanced the public from “our music.”²⁴¹ Song's

²³⁹ Chŏn, “The Significance of Desecrated and Dissociated Textures,” 396.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 395.

²⁴¹ “Singer Song Ch'ang-sik Likens Strange Western Music to Poison,” interview of Ch'ang-sik Song in *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, December 3, 1992.

underlining that “The basis of [his] music is *Kugak* (“traditional Korean music”),” demonstrates a drastic shift in attitude compared to his formerly nonchalant practice of singing copies of Western pop music.²⁴² Song’s emphasis on “our music,” and preference of “singing form, which allows the music to flow naturally,” over “song form,” which is a more formal method of “adding music to poetry,” brings to mind the principles of *minjung art*, which advocated the political revival of national and traditional art forms. Correspondingly, Song identifies “Why Call Me” and “Whale Hunt” as examples that employ the “singing form,” which he finds to be more “Korean” and relatable. In addition, compared to the more refined and sleek timbre he used during his early years, Song’s voice in *The March of Fools* sounds: bold, as a result of his expansive timbre; raw, owing to his intermittent employment of guttural sounds; and compelling, thanks to his effective combination of sincerity, dynamism, and liberal use of vibrato. Such qualities, drawn from *Kugak*, coat the defiance and idealism of Pyöng-t’ae and Yöng-ch’öl with the sentiment of the oppressed *minjung*. That the songs reached anthemic status demonstrates not only their relatability, but also their power to galvanize listeners.

* * *

The March of Fools (1975) was created against the backdrop of a state that was garrisoned regularly to suppress student demonstrations, a cultural landscape in which intellectuals assumed the mantle of political leadership, and a film industry whose creative capacities were hampered by strict systems of censorship. Nonetheless, under the vision of Ha, Ch’oe’s words and Song’s music became vehicles of defiant feelings against authoritarianism,

²⁴² Ibid.

and release from the ruling ideology of individual economic achievement. I elucidated how “Why Call Me” enhances the satire and “defiant laughter” in a reality in which police were chasing after and apprehending young men for wearing their hair long. I also describe how “Whale Hunt” voices the determination of Yŏng-ch'ŏl's suicide, which in the framework of Nietzsche's conception of tragedy, can be understood as a “will to life.” Neither “Why Call Me” nor “Whale Hunt” was included in the 223 songs blacklisted in 1975, but both *are* included in the official blacklist printed in 1983 by the Korea Performance Ethics Committee, under vague charges of “untimeliness”—a discordance I resolve in the next chapter. That *The March of Fools* was released right before the notorious blacklisting of popular music and Marijuana Incident of December 1975—the acknowledged year when youth culture died—makes it a timely piece of art that re-imagined a generational phenomenon in the eve of its termination. *The March of Fools* captured the twilight of youth culture, which overlapped with a more organized and radical phase of student activism. And the politicized employment of Song Chang-sik's songs in the film, instantiates how *p'ok'ŭ* came to signify both the romantic sentiment of youth culture as well as the courageous resistance of student activism.

Chapter 4. The Downfall of *P'ok'ŭ*: The Blacklisting and Marijuana Incident of 1975

1975 is the year when *p'ok'ŭ* music died in South Korea. The demise of *p'ok'ŭ* was carried out under the guise of ridding popular music of songs that threatened national security, indiscriminately imitated foreign styles, and were deemed defeatist, licentious, or decadent. The Measure to Purify Performance Events and Popular Music precipitated the most draconian and extensive censorship of popular music, resulting in the blacklisting of 228 songs throughout the summer of 1975. While the Measure impacted various genres not limited to *p'ok'ŭ*, it hit *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* singers most devastatingly, because the blacklisting struck during the height of their popularity. My analysis of the blacklisted songs unveils how censorship of popular music during the Park-era reflected the consistently anti-communist, and opportunistically nationalist, and anti-Western stance of the regime. It targeted influential singer-songwriters as well as songs that had on paper vague, but in reality, political reasons for being censored. I elaborate on how the infamous Marijuana Incident of December 1975 began with the arrests of leading *p'ok'ŭ* singers, and disgraced not only their music, but also the culture of youth for which *p'ok'ŭ* played an essential role. The overarching goal of chapters three and four is to explain how the conflation of youth culture and the student movement that transpired during the 1974 youth culture debate led to the targeted censorship of *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok*, as the paradigmatic genres of the youth generation. In this chapter, I argue that the Arts and Culture Ethics Committee's blacklisting of top singers cut off their means of livelihood, and the Park regime's stigmatization of *p'ok'ŭ* singers as marijuana-smoking criminals—a maneuver carried out by the media's linking marijuana to the student population and the entertainment industry—sealed the downfall of *p'ok'ŭ*.

The Park Regime’s Use of the Concept “Decadence” in Relation to Marijuana

It is no coincidence that the infamous Marijuana Incident of December 1975 followed the censorship of “decadent” trends in popular music. As chronicled in chapter two, the same word—“decadent”—was applied in the suppression of *rok* music during the official Crackdown on Decadent Trends, enforced in the fall/winter of 1971. However, while the media’s use of terms such as “decadent” and “hippie” peaked between 1970 and 1972, reflecting the build-up to and impact of this Crackdown, the term “marijuana” appeared only sparsely throughout the early 1970s. After December 1975, however, reports about marijuana surged, reflecting Park’s draconian stance regarding the drug, as well as the media’s tendency to sensationalize news treating the drug. The following is a table that lists the number of times the terms “hippie,” “decadent,” and “marijuana” appeared in the aggregate digitized data of four major newspapers, between 1969 and 1977.

Table 4.1: Number of “key word” Count Per Year (with peak counts bolded)²⁴³

	“hippie”	“decadent”	“marijuana”
1969	78	30	0
1970	154	53	21
1971	149	246	6
1972	63	205	19
1973	19	79	17
1974	35	74	10
1975	22	125	85
1976	23	111	205
1977	15	62	94

The above table helps illustrate that the term “hippie” was used to police the hairstyle, fashion, and activities of youth that ostensibly threatened the “wholesome” atmosphere of

²⁴³ Search conducted on Naver News, which is an aggregate digital database of four major newspapers—*Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, *Tongailbo*, *Maeilgyŏngje*, and *Han’gyŏrye*—published between 1920 and 1999.

society in the early 70s.²⁴⁴ The fact that Park Chung Hee ordered the Ministry of Culture and Arts “to prohibit the airing of hippies on both state-run as well as private broadcasting companies,” reflects the regime’s isolationist stance regarding the infiltration of hippie culture.²⁴⁵ This explains why the Park regime used the vague but morally-charged word “decadent,” rather than the word “hippie”—an English word associated with drugs and sexually liberated behaviors—in enforcing the Crackdown on Decadent Trends, which became an official policy in October of 1971. The clampdown on the long hair, loud music, and provocative dancing (such as “go-go” dancing, a craze during this time among youth—i.e., the *rok* scene)—came under the pretense of ridding activities that led to moral and cultural decline. As the use of marijuana spread, and as the craze for *rok* music overcame this suppression around 1974, the regime brought back the notion of “decadence” not only to censor *p’ok’ŭ-rok* music, but also to police students as well as actors and singers in the entertainment industry for, purportedly, being the main culprits who smoked marijuana. In summation, while “hippie” was used mostly to condemn youth’s indiscriminate adoption of American music, fashion, and hairstyle, such elements were couched together with marijuana as “decadent,” i.e., signs of moral and cultural decline. I contend that the media’s depiction of students and their idol *p’ok’ŭ* singers as having a marijuana problem and therefore morally suspect, did more than stifle the recreation of university students and the music industry; I read the regime’s use of the concept “decadent” as an attempt to negate the morally and politically committed actions of student protestors.

²⁴⁴ In reports I read addressing “hippies,” they are conceptualized as young people with long hair and shaggy clothes who indulge in drugs, and enjoy loud/psychedelic music. In other words, the term “hippie” was used mainly to invoke such visible and sonic attributes.

²⁴⁵ “President Park Bans Hippies on Television to Boost the Wholesome Atmosphere of Society,” *Tongailbo*, January 22, 1971.

1974, Marijuana Gets Linked to Entertainers and Students

Before 1974, the connection between marijuana and *p'ok'ŭ* was indirect and even contradictory at times, but by February 1974, media reports directly linked marijuana use to the entertainment industry. As illustrated in chapter two, this occurred also when *rok* music was making a resurgence despite government suppression of Myŏng-dong's *rok* scene back in 1971-1972. The reinvigoration of *rok* music brought about the peak years of hybrid *p'ok'ŭ*, begetting electric songs, such as Yang Pyŏng-chip's "Seoul Sky 2" and April and May's "The Home of Clouds." Marijuana's linkage to the entertainment industry during the heydays of *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* music—genres admired by youth—augured badly for youth culture.

An exposé published in *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* on February 23, 1974, stating that actors are guilty of smoking marijuana, included a caricature of a singer smoking marijuana, giving the impression that the drug was more popular among singers than actors. The exposé condemns actors who smoke marijuana, and yet paints the drug as a vice not so different from drinking alcohol: "while there are actors who drink alcohol before appearing on-stage in order to display vivacious acting, there are actors who inhale 'happy smoke' in order to feel an attack of fever throughout the whole body."²⁴⁶ This bizarre description of a marijuana high suggests the misconception people had regarding the effects and purpose of smoking marijuana.

²⁴⁶ "Exclusive Report on the Weaknesses in the Entertainment Industry," *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, February 23, 1974.




Figure 4.1: Caricature Accompanying the Exposé

The hairstyle, fashion, and bodily gesture delineated in the above caricature printed alongside the exposé, give the impression of a rock singer high on marijuana, belting out a song. It depicts a male singer with hair long enough to cover his ears, mouth open wide without inhibition, and holding what appears to be a joint in his left hand. He is wearing a zigzag-striped long coat, which is open in the middle and falls along his hip in a way that suggests he is mid-movement, while singing into a mic held in his right hand. His freckled face and eyes barely piercing through his heavy bangs, capture an adolescent display of impudence. While the caricature portrays a singer, the caption accompanying it reads that actors—not singers—are indulging in marijuana. While the message conveyed through text and picture are inconsistent, the message of the caricature is explicit: young male singers are performing under the influence of marijuana to better express themselves bodily.

The marijuana problem was reported as centered not just among singers and actors, but also among youth who patronized alternative recreational spaces, some of which were key *p'ok'ŭ* venues, such as the aforementioned Le Silence. On March 30, 1974, *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*

reported on the mass hauling off to prison of 124 college students and repeaters* who were at the music listening room Le Silence and the women-only café Chanel.²⁴⁷ Police raided these venues “after being informed of adolescents smoking the hallucinogen marijuana, and confiscated all cigarettes in the premises but didn’t find any [marijuana].”²⁴⁸ The police released all students with warnings and instead booked owners Lee Paek-ch’ön and Lee Mun-yong on charges of violating Food Sanitation Law.²⁴⁹ The patriarchal and moralizing stance of those who disapproved of youth are conveyed in phrases such as: “Chanel café is rumored of being a safe haven(?) for women who smoke cigarettes”; and Le Silence “created an atmosphere of decadence where men and women stretch their legs together and hug.”²⁵⁰ Of the 124 taken to the police that day, 70 were underaged minors. A mere three days later, 77 youths experienced the same ordeal when the police busted restaurants and cafés known for catering to clubbers after curfew hours. A piece reporting on these incidents contended that the police’s “mass apprehension of adolescents,” despite the pretense of cracking down on decadent businesses such as all-night go-go clubs, “is an infringement of rights.”²⁵¹ Apprehended youths—“five of whom hadn’t even gone to go-go clubs”—questioned the police’s lack of evidence and protested such “abusive acts of authority.”²⁵²

²⁴⁷ * “repeats” or “repeat students” are post-high school students taking an extra year to study for their college entrance exams.

²⁴⁸ “124 Patrons of Women-Only Café Taken to Custody,” *Kyŏngnyangshinmun*, March 27, 1974.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid. “(?)” included in the original source.

²⁵¹ “Mass Hauling of Adolescents,” *Kyŏngnyangshinmun*, March 30, 1974.

²⁵² Ibid.

The news of police restricting the recreational activities of adolescents and youth was followed by reports recommending the censorship of the late-night radio shows enjoyed by young listeners. As mentioned briefly in chapter one, late-night radio shows played a foundational role in the development of *p'ok'ŭ* during the late 1960s and early 1970s. This brought about the trend of top *p'ok'ŭ* singers having dual careers as DJs, as was the case with Yun Hyŏng-chu and Toi Et Moi members Pak In-hŭi and Lee P'il-wŏn. An article published in *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ* on June 16, 1974 reported that late-night radio shows, which had been criticized for their “meaningless chatter and total dependence on *p'ap* songs,” had negotiated to change their program content to make it “fun and instructive for their targeted youth audience.”²⁵³ Specific plans to improve program content were: “(1) Widen selection of songs [focusing on] classical music, traditional folk songs of various countries, and high-class domestic songs; (2) Rather than having guests only from the entertainment industry, also invite influential people from various societal fields; and (3) Host DJs should decrease the amount of phone-in requests to prevent pointless and crude chitchat that stimulates the peripheral nerves.”²⁵⁴ Practitioners “voluntarily” arranging these improvements are quoted as saying that such an overhaul “would be an opportunity to provide high-class broadcasting that is both wholesomely recreational and culturally edifying.”²⁵⁵ Considering that a mere nine months before, late-night radio shows were applauded for cultivating the careers of disc jockeys and university student *p'ok'ŭ* singers, who contributed “high-class” songs of “original lyrics, compositions, and poetry” to the popular

²⁵³ “Rejection of Exclusive Devotion to Pop Songs,” *Ilgansŭp'och'ŭ*, June 16, 1974.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, The Korean expression “stimulating the peripheral nerves” is used to describe things that fail to fulfill the mind or soul and merely satisfies the body (i.e., bodily, instinctual, etc.).

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

music world, this complete change in tone comes as a surprise. Such a perspectival shift regarding *p'ok'ŭ* music and youth culture reflects the conflation of student activism and youth culture that occurred in the spring of 1974, triggering government clampdown on various platforms of *p'ok'ŭ*, including radio broadcasting.²⁵⁶

The Blacklisting of 1975 Targets *P'ok'ŭ* and *Rok*

The notorious Blacklisting of 1975 affected composers, lyricists, and singers from different time periods and virtually all genres of popular music, but hit *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* the hardest, due to their being, essentially, the soundtrack of youth culture. I substantiate this argument by identifying the genres of songs blacklisted for the first time, and by analyzing their purported reasons for censorship. As explained in the previous chapter, Park Chung Hee's issuance of nine emergency decrees in the span of sixteen months between January 1974 and May 1975 showed his fanatic need for suppression, but also the rise of those resisting his military dictatorship. Complying with Park's ninth and most tyrannical emergency decree, the Ministry of Culture and Public Information announced "Measures to Purify Performance Events and Popular Music," which became the new standard with which the Arts and Culture Ethics Committee (ACEC) evaluated popular music. The new standards stipulated the banning of songs that: "1) negatively influence national security and national consensus, 2) indiscriminately adopt and imitate foreign trends, 3) are defeatist, self-tormenting, or pessimistic, or 4) are licentious or decadent."²⁵⁷ On June 19, under the leadership of chairman Cho Yŏn-hyŏn, the ACEC conducted a three-step

²⁵⁶ Hwi-cha Hong, "Late Night Pop Song Programs," *Tongailbo*, September 12, 1973.

²⁵⁷ "The Control and Prohibition of Popular Music," National Institute of Korean History, accessed May 4, 2020, http://contents.history.go.kr/front/hm/view.do?treeId=010804&tabId=01&levelId=hm_164_0020.

review process of 1392 songs included in 141 albums, and banned the performance, broadcast, and sale of 43 songs.²⁵⁸ The ACEC blacklisted an additional 87 songs written by lyricists and composers who defected to North Korea after the termination of Japanese colonial rule. Then on July 9, the ACEC prohibited 44 additional songs, and on September 29, 48 more songs, bringing the total to 222 songs.

The official blacklist, which was published in 1983, is an extensive table of songs categorized by title, lyricist, composer, reason for censorship, and date of censorship. Of all the songs blacklisted between 1968 and 1980 (consisting of 382 domestic and 887 foreign songs), only six are curiously undated. Five of these six songs are *p'ok'ŭ* and the sixth was written by iconic rok musician of the 1960s and 1970s, Sin Chung-hyŏn. Furthermore, it is likely that these songs were indeed blacklisted in 1975, although by different means than the others; I analyze the evidence for this below. Thus, I include these six songs in my exploration of whether the government's "Measures to Purify Performance Events and Popular Music" targeted specific genres popular among youth—namely *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok*. And because the blacklist lacks a genre category, I conducted the work of identifying the genre of all 228 songs banned up to 1975.

In terms of quantitative representation, songs written by lyricists and composers who defected to North Korea, and *trot* songs accused of vulgarity and *waesaek*, heavily outweigh the number of *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* songs blacklisted. There are approximately 90 songs—the majority of which were released during Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945)—written by “wŏlbuk” (defectors to the North) composers and lyricists, and 80 *trot* songs, while there are 20 *p'ok'ŭ* and 20 *rok* songs, depending on how one categorizes songs that have hybrid or complex stylistic features.

²⁵⁸ Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1970*, 192. Here, Shin provides a directory of the ACEC, whose members included professors of music and law, composers, poets, and critics.

The sweeping prohibition of songs written by defectors mirrors the staunch anti-communist stance inculcated by the Park regime, while the prevalence of *trot* songs attests to its status and legacy of having been the dominant genre of Korean popular music for over fifty years. In contrast, *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* had come to prominence merely a decade ago, which in turn explains their relatively small proportion compared to *trot*. In fact, if one does the math, that *trot*'s fifty years of legacy lent 80 blacklisted songs means that *p'ok'ŭ*'s ten years in the limelight should have lent only 16 blacklisted songs; hence, proportional to their years in circulation, more *p'ok'ŭ* songs were blacklisted than *trot* songs.

In terms of justification, the most frequent reasons given for the blacklisting of *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* songs were: “lyrics or singing style decadent” and “fomentation of distrust,” followed by “inappropriate for broadcast” and “unwholesome.” Closer examination of such seemingly vague reasons ascribed to censored songs reveals a terminological pattern codifying the anti-Japanese and anti-Western ideologies of the Park regime: “vulgar” and “waesaek” were codes used to prohibit *trot* songs when the government wanted to exhibit an anti-Japanese stance; and “decadent” and “unwholesome” were codes used to prohibit *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* songs when the government capitalized on anti-Western sentiment to suppress youth-oriented resistance. Taken together, the profusion of indistinct descriptive justifications given for censorship—“too Japanese,” “too full of anguish,” “unwholesome,” “inappropriate for broadcast,” “lyrics and/or singing style too vulgar/decadent,” etc.—reveals a Catch 22 that the government set up for itself: when expressions of resistance are prohibited, songs do not contain explicit messages of protest, and therefore cannot be banned as protest songs.

An investigation of the blacklisting process of five of the six undated and most vaguely justified songs in the blacklist, reveals the political—rather than musical—motivations behind

the ACEC's decision-making process. One of these six songs is Yun Hyŏng-chu's "Rarara," the banning of which I mentioned in chapter two gleaned from an October 30, 1971 article about plagiarism.²⁵⁹ Regarding the other five songs, scholars Lee Yŏng-mi and Mun Ok-pae provide slightly different explanations that actually turn out to be concordant. Lee asserts that four of the five songs— Song Ch'ang-sik's "Whale Hunt" and "Why Call Me," Chŏng Mi-cho's "Flame," and Yang Hŭi-ŭn's "Morning Dew"—were voluntarily banned by the Korean Entertainment Association (EA) on December 11, 1975, due to the "lyrics and music's incongruity with the times."²⁶⁰ This is surprising because the EA was established to defend the rights of entertainers and was the organization that fought against broadcasting companies when they banned *waesaek trot* songs back in 1965. Given that the songs banned by the EA are included in the official blacklist printed in 1983 by the Performance Ethic Committee (PEC)—the governing body that replaced the ACEC in 1976—while additional songs banned by the Broadcasting Ethics Committee (BEC) were not, Lee speculates that the ACEC was behind the "voluntary banning" by the EA. On the other hand, musicologist Mun Ok-pae states that the Broadcasting Ethics Committee (BEC) blacklisted the aforementioned four songs on December 11, 1975, for being "inappropriate for broadcast" in contrast to the reasons given by EA.²⁶¹

Meanwhile, in the 1983 blacklist published by the PEC, only two songs—"Whale Hunt" and "Why Call Me"—have reasons listed as "incongruent with the times" while the reasoning for the banning of the other three is not given. Consolidating Lee and Mun's slightly different and

²⁵⁹ "Yun Hyŏng-chu's 'Rarara' Banned from Broadcast," *Chugan'gyŏngnyang*, November 3, 1971.

²⁶⁰ Yŏng-mi Lee, "The 1975 Marijuana Incident and Its Meaning," *History Critique* 112 (2015): 219.

²⁶¹ Mun, *The Social History of Prohibited Songs in Korea*, 145. Mun attributes "Morning Dew" to Kim Min-ki, who wrote it, rather than Yang Hŭi-ŭn, who popularized it.

confusing interpretations with PEC's 1983 blacklist, yields a probable, meandering, yet fuller picture. The ACEC must have realized the need to ban more songs after officially prohibiting 222 songs in June, July, and September, but rather than going through its multi-stage review process yet again, instructed the EA to voluntarily ban five more songs. Once the EA self-censored the songs, the BEC must have added those songs to their blacklist on the same day (December 11, 1975). And lastly, the fact that the PEC's 1983 blacklist designated two of the six undated songs as "incongruent with the times" rather than as "inappropriate for broadcast," which is the phrase used by the BEC, confirms that the ACEC—not the BEC—was the formal governing body responsible for the blacklisting of those four songs in 1975. This brought about greater repercussions for those impacted by the blacklisting.

Detailing the blacklisting of these undated songs provides a window into how censors operated behind doors. That all three bodies—the EA, BEC, and PEC—provided similarly vague justifications or did not include a reason at all, suggests that certain songs were blacklisted for reasons best left unstated. Mun substantiates this by quoting Chairperson of the ACEC, Cho Yŏn-hyŏn, admitting that Sin Chung-hyŏn's "Pretty Lady" and Song Ch'ang-sik's "Why Call Me" were banned for "extra-musical reasons" such as the common occurrences "in bars and elsewhere" of people's substituting the original lyrics for, most likely, politically dissentious ones.²⁶² Given this insight, I will quickly sketch what "extra-musical reasons" were associated with five of the six undated songs, since I already made clear that Yun's "Rarara" was banned for plagiarism. I already discussed the way Song Ch'ang-sik's "Whale Hunt" and "Why Call Me" were used in Ha Kil-chong's youth film *The March of Fools* (1975), in the previous chapter. The film, which captures the romance, campus life, and angst of 1970s youth, became a major hit,

²⁶² Ibid., 135.

catapulting Song's two songs to anthemic status. The catchy refrain of "Whale Hunt" and defiant lyrics of "Why Call Me" caught on, which aggravated the authorities who banned them for inciting nihilistic and rebellious emotions.²⁶³ Next, "Morning Dew" was originally designated a wholesome song when it was released in 1970, but when student protestors employed the song, the "long night" mentioned in its lyrics was problematized as criticizing the *Yushin*, even though the *Yushin* system did not begin until 1972.²⁶⁴ Such anachronistic justification only accentuates the authoritarian nature of censorship carried out during the Park regime. The remaining two songs, "Flutter" and "Flame," were written by Sin Chung-hyŏn and Song Ch'ang-sik, respectively—representative *rok* and *p'ok'ŭ* singers who were already treated with suspicion by censors. Considering that "Flutter" alludes to a fluttering heart's search in vain for love, and "Flame" personifies a flower that has sprouted and flames, one can imagine their being banned as futile and licentious (if you take the sprout, flowering, and flame metaphor far enough) songs, regardless of the serene mood of "Flutter" and upbeat melody of "Flame."²⁶⁵

The official blacklist lacks a singer category, which makes it difficult to ascertain which singers were affected by the blacklisting, but ironically accentuates the fact that trendsetting singer songwriters were hit the hardest. The list's absence of a singer category can be explained

²⁶³ Sŏng-wang Wang, "Revisiting Blacklisted Songs After 70 Years of Independence," *Archivist* 32 (2015): 81.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵ Hyŏng-ch'an Kim, "Kim Hyŏng-ch'an's Popular Music Story (Part 38): The Dissatisfactory Craftsman, Song Ch'ang-sik," *Kukcheshinmun*, October 17, 2016, <http://www.kookje.co.kr/news2011/asp/newsbody.asp?code=0500&key=20161018.22023195712>. Kim states that the phrase "I am a burning flame of flower" is what problematized Song's "Flame," which suggests that the censors interpreted the "burning flame" as a metaphor for the radical forms of dissidence, such as the self-immolation of labor activist Chŏn T'ae-il in 1970, but without firm evidence, this is all speculation.

by the industry's composer-oriented production system. At that time, records were commonly produced around a composer rather than a performer, so albums often consisted of songs written by an individual composer sung by different singers. This composer-centered format began to change with the success of singer songwriters; notable early examples were *p'ok'ŭ* singers such as Lee Chang-hŭi and Song Ch'ang-sik. As discussed in chapters one and two, the singer songwriter model was fostered among *p'okŭ* circles *and* encouraged by the media during the early 1970s, making it an essential trait of the genre despite the prevalence of copies in its early days. In addition to *p'ok'ŭ* singers, the composer, producer, and groundbreaking *rok* musician Sin Chung-hyŏn also created numerous hit songs during this time. The prolific output of these musicians, as well as the simultaneous targeting of all three of them, are visible in the blacklist, due to their success as singer songwriters of their respective genres: Sin Chung-hyŏn wrote 17 of the 20 blacklisted *rok* songs; Lee Chang-hŭi wrote 5 and Song Ch'ang-sik 4 of the 20 blacklisted *p'ok'ŭ* songs. These numbers suggest that while Sin was banned as a musician, *p'ok'ŭ* was banned as a genre.

In the end, what separated *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* from the other genres represented in the blacklist, was the *timing* and *method* of the censorship, more so than the quantity of songs banned in particular genres. *P'ok'ŭ* and *rok* singers were banned during the height of their popularity, which compounded the repercussions of censorship imposed by the ACEC rather than the BEC. The mass blacklisting of 1975 marked a shift in the regime's process of music censorship: whereas before 1975 the BEC's decision held more sway, now the ACEC was exercising full control over the censorship process. Shin Hyunjoon elaborates that getting banned by the BEC entailed prohibition from broadcast while still allowing the production and sale of records, but the ACEC's blacklisting was absolute: "albums out in the market were discarded,

and even if one or two songs in the album were blacklisted, all existing LP records with blacklisted songs were recalled for re-production.”²⁶⁶ The majority of blacklisted *trot* songs and songs written by *wōlbuk* artists were banned after years of circulation. In contrast, hit *p'ok'ū* and *rok* albums were swiftly confiscated and disposed of, resulting in financial and material losses for record labels that concentrated on creating music adored by youth, and of the latest trends.

The Marijuana Incident of 1975 Stigmatizes Top *P'ok'ū* Singers

The targeting of areas where students and singers gathered as epicenters of U.S. hippie culture led to the downfall of a burgeoning music scene that was made by and for the youth generation. The reports that broke the news of the Marijuana Incident of 1975 create a seamless connection between musicians, their student audience, and the places they converge. On December 4, *Tongailbo* printed an article reporting the spread of marijuana beyond the U.S. Army and their “comfort women,” to bars where the musicians were “mostly habitual smokers,” and the clientele were college and repeat students.²⁶⁷ The sensation of getting high from marijuana is described as such: “Upon inhaling the happy smoke cigarette, one loses sense of time and space while imagination becomes active, enabling one to get caught in a fantasy. The reason the use of happy smoke has increased among entertainers is because it is said to generate the illusion of being in a state of ‘excellent singing’ (*chōlch'ang*).” The article continues:

There are those who say that the reason happy smoke cigarettes are trending among youngsters is because of the ‘arrival of U.S. hippie culture’. The Prosecution is determined to use any means to prevent improper trends of escapism. ... The prosecution plans to investigate mainly students and entertainers. According to its sources, hotspots of collective smoking are cafes

²⁶⁶ Shin, *The Archaeology of Korean Pop 1970*, 193.

²⁶⁷ Chae-kon Kim, “Compulsive Smokers Abundant Among Entertainers and University Students,” *Tongailbo*, December 4, 1975. Remaining quotes in this paragraph are from the same article.

and pubs near the entrance of Y Woman's University, and among university students the main smokers are repeats or affluent students who do not study properly.

Descriptions of marijuana being an “improper trend of escapism” that makes one “get caught in a fantasy” or feel the “illusion of ‘excellent singing,’” are couched as a consequence of the “arrival of U.S. hippie culture” running rampant among affluent yet lazy youth. This portrayal of privileged but impassive youth, indulging in escapist misconduct could not be further from the reality of the time. The increasingly committed activism of student protestors supports the argument that the goal of Park regime's manipulation of the media regarding the censorship of youth culture that accentuated the “decadent” recreational representations of youth, was to discredit the radicalizing ideology and organization of the student movement.

Three celebrity *p'ok'ŭ* singers became the first victims of the marijuana scandal; this was even more detrimental to the youth culture that emerged with the rise of *p'ok'ŭ* than was the censorship of music. Addressing the same news as above, *Kyŏnghyangshinmun* details that “eight people, including singers Lee Chang-hŭi, Yun Hyŏng-chu, and Lee Chong-yong, were arrested for violating the habitual pharmaceutical management law, increasing the count of those arrested for either smoking or possession of marijuana cigarettes to 25 people.”²⁶⁸ Yun Hyŏng-chu was prosecuted for “possessing 10g of marijuana at his house,” and Lee Chong-yong for buying 60g, and distributing 12g and 30g to Yun Hyŏng-chu and Lee Chang-hŭi respectively.²⁶⁹ Lee Chang-hŭi, Yun Hyŏng-chu, and Lee Chong-yong were all highly admired *p'ok'ŭ* singers: Lee Chang-hŭi was a sought-after singer songwriter whose *rok*-tinged tunes and theme songs for

²⁶⁸ “Three Singers, Lee Chang-hŭi, Yun Hyŏng-chu, and Lee Chong-yong Arrested,” *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, December 4, 1975.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

films topped the charts; Yun Hyŏng-chu was one of the two members of the pioneering *p'ok'ŭ* group Twin Folio who had a successful career as a solo musician and DJ; and Lee Chong-yong was an up-and-coming singer whose hit song “You” ranked number one for a record-breaking eight months in 1975.²⁷⁰ That Yun is quoted as saying that he “smoked two to three times a week either in his bedroom or at his American friend’s house” ties the culture of marijuana back to the West, confirming the conception that it was a sign of Korean youth’s embrace of “U.S. hippie culture”: a symptom that had invaded Korea and needed to be eradicated.²⁷¹ Other top singers who made headline news for marijuana during their prime included *rok* singer, composer, and guitarist Sin Chung-hyŏn, female star Kim Ch'u-cha, who popularized Sin Chung-hyŏn’s songs, and award-winning *p'ok'ŭ* singer Kim Se-hwan.²⁷² Thus, in addition to pioneers and newcomers of *p'ok'ŭ*, top *rok* singers were publicly reprimanded and humiliated during the Marijuana Incident, stigmatizing musicians idolized by the youth generation as marijuana-smoking criminals.

²⁷⁰ Ku-hyŏn Chŏng, “Priest Lee Chong-yong, Who Sang ‘You,’ Held C’est Si Bon Performance at Church With Yun Hyŏng-chu,” *Joongangilbo*, July 15, 2011, <https://news.join.com/article/5794386>.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² Sin Chung-hyŏn and Kim Ch'u-cha’s arrests occurred on December 5 1975, and Kim Se-hwan on January 21, 1976. See “Sin Chunghyŏn Arrested on Warrant and Kim Ch'u-cha Charged for Smoking Marijuana,” *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, December 5, 1975; and “Singer Kim Se-hwan Taken Into Custody for Smoking Marijuana,” *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, January 21, 1976.




Figure 4.2: Pictures of celebrity musicians on trial²⁷³
 (Left: Lee Chang-hŭi, Kim Kit'ae, Lee Chong-yong, and Yun Hyŏng-chu;
 Right: Sin Chung-hyŏn)

Media coverage describing the offenses of *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* musicians arrested for marijuana was full of hyperbole, especially considering the comparatively lenient punishments they received. Lee Chang-hŭi, Kim Ch'u-cha, and Kim Se-hwan were fined between 100,000 to 200,000 won (which is the equivalent of approximately 870 to 1,740 dollars today), while Yun Hyŏng-chu, Sin Chung-hyŏn, and Lee Chong-yong were sentenced to a year in prison with two to three years of probation.²⁷⁴ And while marijuana-related reports persisted throughout most of 1976 during which approximately 1,700 people fell prey to the government's clampdown on marijuana, the media's persecution was directed mainly at students and entertainers.²⁷⁵ Quoting a December 10, 1975 article in *Tongailbo*, Lee Yŏng-mi affirms that of the 71 people arrested for

²⁷³ Picture on left from Kim, *A Stroll in Korean Popular Music History*, 530; and photo on right from Yŏng-ik Han, "The Dark History of Entertainers Entangled With Marijuana," *Chungangilbo*, June 1, 2017, <https://news.joins.com/article/21630308>.

²⁷⁴ Lee, "The 1975 Marijuana Incident and Its Meaning," 213.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

possessing or smoking marijuana, 44 were imprisoned, and, of those, 21 were singers and actors working in the entertainment industry.²⁷⁶ The Park regime exaggerated the penalties of marijuana charges, and threatened to transfer arrested musicians “to a psychiatric hospital to check their degrees of ‘chemical dependency’.”²⁷⁷ However, the Law on Hemp Control was enacted more than three months *after* the marijuana scandal broke, and even though the law made profit-driven use and habitual smoking of marijuana punishable by a minimum of ten years(!) in prison, there is no record of anyone having received such extreme punishment.²⁷⁸ Anecdotal evidence from the time compares weed-smoking to “drinking a glass of beer,” and bespeaks the fact that it was deemed a relatively benign and casual activity.²⁷⁹ This may explain the relatively moderate sentencing of the arrested musicians, in relation to the sudden and drastic shift in governmental stance regarding marijuana as reflected in the sensationalized and exaggerated reports I analyzed above. Nonetheless, for *p'ok'ũ* singers who were applauded for their university-level education and the “high-class” songwriting skills that elevated the quality of Korean popular music (elements I pointed out in chapters one and two), being stigmatized for marijuana proved to be a devastating fall from grace.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 212. Quoting a December 10, 1975 article published in *Tongailbo*.

²⁷⁷ Kim and Shin, “The Birth of *Rok*,” 222.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., emphasis mine.

²⁷⁹ Shin *The Archaeology of Korean Pop 1970*, 212.

The Aftermath of 1975

By the end of January 1976, the rhythms and timbres of “young music” that prevailed in the music industry were substituted for by *trot*, which had by that time nearly vanished from the charts. According to a report in *Kyŏngyangshinmun*, the music ranking program on MBC titled “Popular Song 20,” which rated songs based on postcard submissions and record sales, witnessed a drastic decrease in submissions advocating *p'ap*-style songs after the Marijuana Incident.²⁸⁰ Eighty percent of the estimated 30,000 postcards sent by viewers prior to 1976 had come from fans of *p'ap* music, but that changed with “the mass prohibition of *p'ap*-style hit songs combined with the Marijuana Incident.” However, the show’s producer Ch'a Chae-yŏng is quoted as saying that “since then, the lyrics and melodies of songs have greatly improved in quality and are becoming wholesome,” equating quality of improvement and wholesomeness with the dwindled activity of *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* singers. The report ends with the prediction that “middle music”—a combination of march music and *trot*—will become the prevalent mode of songs. What is meant by “march music” is not explained but is intimated as the rhythmic tunes that accompany lyrics emphasizing “wholesome and disciplined lifestyles.”²⁸¹

The singers who were arrested for marijuana-related charges were banished from the entertainment industry. Owing to pressure from the Ministry of Culture and Public Information, 54 entertainers were officially prohibited from broadcast starting on February 5, 1976.²⁸² Depending on the severity of their punishment, they were suspended for as short as 3 months to

²⁸⁰ “Shifts in the Domestic Popular Music World’s Popularity Chart,” *Kyŏngyangshinmun*, January 23, 1976. Quotes and terms used in the following three sentences are from the same article.

²⁸¹ Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1970*, 233. Shin writes that songs popularized in 1976 contained lyrics that underscore “wholesome” and “disciplined life.”

²⁸² “The Prohibition of Broadcast All Broadcasting Activities,” *Kyŏngyangshinmun*, January 31, 1976.

as long as indefinitely.²⁸³ When Park was informed of the New Year policies of the Justice Department by Minister Hwang San-tök, Park is said to have deplored the situation of marijuana smoking among entertainers and students: “That youth these days are smoking marijuana when the country is in a state of life and death fighting communists, is ruining our country.”²⁸⁴ Park likened the spread of marijuana smoking to the opium epidemic that transpired in China during the end of the 19th century. Stressing that marijuana smoking must be forestalled, Park ordered that maximum sentences of existing laws be applied to offenders.²⁸⁵

News objecting the singers’ suspension of activities were nonexistent. On the contrary, an editorial published in *Kyönghyangshinmun* on February 2, 1976, upheld the government’s purification of societal values by stating that “though for only a limited period of time,” the suspension of entertainers who have smoked marijuana and displayed decadent behaviors causing societal disturbance, “is an unavoidable response of the government.”²⁸⁶ The editorial continues, “As ‘icons of the public,’ who have enormous influence, entertainers should act responsibly not only during their public work, but also in their personal lives,” and be particularly mindful of their influence on “the developing emotions and characters of adolescents.” The following concluding sentence of the editorial is so convoluted in its support of government-advanced ethical values, that it almost reads as satire:

It is hoped that the unprecedented and firm restrictions imposed on entertainers associated with marijuana will catalyze the cultivation of a constructive national

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ “President Park Orders Maximum Sentence to Marijuana Smokers,” *Kyönghyangshinmun*, February 2, 1976.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ “Marijuana and the Morals of Entertainers,” Editorial in *Kyönghyangshinmun*, February 2, 1976. All quotations in this paragraph are from the same article.

mentality, and that through deep self-examination and as healthy members of society, the entertainers will help themselves in their endeavors to return to the stage as darlings of the public, while affiliated authorities and the [Arts and Culture] Ethics Committee dutifully show benevolent care in leading and restarting the careers [of these entertainers].

Advancement of such moralistic values pits “constructive national mentality” against “decadent behaviors,” and “healthy members of society” against “entertainers who smoked marijuana.” Literature scholar and historian Lee Yŏng-mi elaborates on the workings of a government that “needed a logical structure that would classify the resistance of college students as the blind and blanket pursuit of West[ern values].”²⁸⁷ Western-derived popular music such as *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok*, long hairstyles on men, and marijuana provided exactly what the regime needed to connect—in an audible, visible, and palpable way—the resistance of college students to the “blind and blanket pursuit of Western values.”²⁸⁸ I contend that the media’s formulation of the marijuana scandal around college students and entertainers—focusing on prominent *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* singers—supported the government’s intention to discredit youth culture. It moreover served as a means to direct attention away from the nationalist *minjung* ideology of student protestors, and instead to amplify the perception that the “decadent” music, fashion, and recreational culture of youth, were signs of their moral and cultural decline.

* * *

In this chapter, I showed how marijuana’s symbolic connection with hippie counterculture in the U.S. as well as its seemingly liberal use among young students and

²⁸⁷ Lee, “The 1975 Marijuana Incident and its Meaning,” 223.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 225.

entertainers—accentuated by the government-controlled media—made it the perfect target of the government’s crackdown on “decadent” Western trends. The visibility of recreational activities enjoyed by youth peaked in 1975, in the underground go-go clubs and music salons and in the overground platforms of radio, television, and film. Yet action brought about reaction. In the midst of experimenting with hybrid styles begetting visionary sounds, the pinnacle days of *p’okū* came to a sudden stop when the Park regime’s repressive grip on youth culture tightened, precipitating the blacklisting of 228 songs and the marijuana-related arrests of top *p’ok’ū* and *rok* musicians during the latter half of 1975. My analysis of the musical genres represented in the blacklist revealed that virtually all genres of popular music—from “classical” popular songs written during the colonial era by lyricists and composers who defected to North Korea, to Japanese-influenced *trot* songs and Western-influenced *p’ok’ū* and *rok*—were censored at one point or another due to Park’s anti-communist policies and, as mentioned in chapter three, his advancement of a strong nationalist heritage.²⁸⁹ Additionally I emphasized how leading *p’ok’ū* and *rok* singers received the harshest blow during the rampant blacklisting of popular music due to the ACEC’s timing and method of censorship, but even more so due to their physical apprehension, imprisonment, and public shaming under charges related to marijuana. By elucidating how marijuana was portrayed as a crime affecting students and singers, I argue that the Park regime created a Machiavellian connection between youth culture, Western-influenced music, and marijuana, for the purpose of disparaging the creative capacity of youth—touted during the Youth Culture Debate of 1974 as the principle hallmark of youth culture that would hasten the end of political oppression.

²⁸⁹ Im, “The Origins of the *Yushin* Regime,” 233.

Conclusion

The South Korean *p'ok'ŭ* boom began with youth's infatuation with the acoustic guitar, and is therefore remembered as music made of and for the acoustic guitar. Today, *p'okŭ* music is used interchangeably with the term “acoustic guitar music” (*t'onggit'aŭmak*), and relatedly, the term “youth generation” is used interchangeably with the term “acoustic guitar generation” (*t'onggit'asedae*). The metonymic usage of word “acoustic guitar” signifies the instrument's emblematic power to represent an entire generation, confirming how *p'ok'ŭ* and youth culture formed in dialogue with each other. However, these terms were not commonly used in mainstream media throughout the late 20th century.²⁹⁰ Works published in the 2000s by Kim Ch'ang-nam and Kim Hyŏng-ch'an seem to have played pivotal roles in disseminating the terms in academia. In addition, the popularity of the 2010 reunion concert of *p'okŭ* singers Song Ch'ang-sik, Yun Hyŏng-chu, and Kim Se-hwan, who had established their careers at C'est Si Bon during the late 1960s, prompted a spike in the acoustic guitar market, as well as a revival of *p'ok'ŭ* music. Thus, “acoustic guitar music” and “acoustic guitar generation” are retrospectively coined terms whose usage reflects the growing academic and popular interest in *p'ok'ŭ* since the turn of the century. Even though by 1973, industry *p'ok'ŭ* singers exchanged the acoustic guitar for studio-produced, professional, and amplified timbres, the acoustic guitar symbolizes how people recall the brief period between the late 1960s and early 1970s, when *p'ok'ŭ* music animated the university campuses, downtown Seoul, and the popular music world.

²⁹⁰ A search of these terms in the digital database Naver News illustrates that the word “acoustic guitar music” appears once each in 1974, 1985, and 1987, and its use only minimally increases to less than ten times annually throughout the 1990s. And similarly, the word “acoustic guitar generation” appears once each in 1985, 1989, and 1991 and spikes briefly in 1995 to seven times before decreasing again.

If the *p'ok'ŭ* boom began with youth's craze for the acoustic guitar, it ended with the blacklisting and Marijuana Incident of 1975. After the downfall of *p'okŭ-rok* in 1975, *trot-go-go* began in 1976. An undervalued genre according to Kim Suk-yŏng, *trot-go-go* melded *trot* ballads and dance music, to create a genre palatable to both the youth (*ch'ŏngnyŏnsedae*) and older generations (*kisŏngsedae*).²⁹¹ While *trot* was given another chance to revamp itself, 1970s *p'okŭ* and *rok* musicians never got to realize their potential. The few who were able to resume their careers in the music industry after the crack down were unscathed by the Marijuana Incident and able to transition into different genres, including *trot*. This group included *p'ok'ŭ* singers Song Ch'angsik and Yang Hŭiŭn and *rok* singers Ch'oe Hŏn (former lead singer of groups Charming Guys and He-Six among others) and Kim Hun (former leader and singer of the group Trippers).²⁹² These *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* musicians were able to gain popularity during the latter half of the 1970s because they switched to singing *trot*-infused songs, giving proof to the argument that the blacklisting and Marijuana Incident of 1975 stigmatized musical genres representative of the pre-1975 youth culture.

There were, of course, exceptions, such as the collective self-organized by singers called “The Submarine Carrying The Sparrow” (1975-79), which had a clear mission to “preserve the spirit of the people through creative musical experimentation that combines modern *p'ok'ŭ* with our traditional melodies.”²⁹³ “The Submarine Carrying The Sparrow,” produced distinguished *p'ok'ŭ* musicians such as Yu Hankŭru, Kwak Sŏngsam, Han Tol, and Chŏn In'gwŏn, and “played

²⁹¹ Su-kyŏng Kim, “Era of Ownerless Mountain: The Popularity of *Trot-Go-Go* After the Marijuana Incident,” *Popular Music* 8 (Second half of 2011): 127.

²⁹² Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1970*, 235-236.

²⁹³ Pak, “Plantation and Independence,” 204.

a seminal role in identifying *p'ok'ŭ* as the appropriate genre that could inherit our musical tradition.”²⁹⁴ Pak Ki-yŏng writes that, “for a nation who had experienced countless historical ruptures both politically and culturally,” such efforts to revive, re-create, and experiment with musical traditions have cardinal value.²⁹⁵ It is striking to see Pak reiterate the same arguments uttered during the 1974 Youth Culture Debate, attesting to how the impulse to break free from the remnants of political and cultural domination still exists in the 21st century.

The case of Park Chung Hee’s crackdown on Western-derived music and culture illustrates how censorship cast a wide net of suppression. In order to silence youth culture, the government banned everything associated with it, from hairstyles and fashion to music and recreational activities enjoyed by students. In retrospect, what made the silencing of top *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* singers in 1975 particularly devastating was that the second half of the 1970s coincided with major technological and structural advancements in the music industry. According to Sŏ Pyŏng-hu, who is lauded as the first music critic/columnist in South Korea, “the development of digital technologies, the advent of cassette tape, the proliferation of [home] audio systems,” precipitated massive growth in the music industry, bringing about a boom in record sales.²⁹⁶ Such developments reversed the power dynamics between the media and the music industry: the music industry, which used to be under the media’s sway, now had the power to influence the media.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 205.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Shin, *Archaeology of Korean Pop 1970*, 234. Quoting from “Korean Music Scene from the 1950s to the 1970s,” *Seoul Hit Line*, May 1, 1994, 48-51.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

Despite having been crushed before a major boom in the music industry, *p'ok'ŭ* left a lasting legacy in South Korea's popular music. Pak breaks down the musical and historical significance of *p'ok'ŭ* into four points: (1) it brought about "the first generational revolution in Korean popular music history"; (2) it pioneered and popularized the singer songwriter model, "opening up possibilities for popular music to be independent from capital(ism)"; (3) it created the grounds for qualitative advancement in the music industry thanks to the introduction of small independent record labels which carved out specific niches of style that reflected the collaboration of professionally trained studio musicians with amateur yet original *p'ok'ŭ* singers; and (4) while it was silenced in 1975, select *p'ok'ŭ* songs were revived and played seminal roles during the university campus-oriented song movement of the 1980s.²⁹⁸ It sounds idealistic if not impossible for a popular genre of music to be "independent from capitalism." More importantly, the emphasis on the use of *p'ok'ŭ* during the student-led song movement of the 1980s has eclipsed the music's Western provenance and bourgeois aesthetic, which run against the inter-class coalition formed between students and laborers that finally propelled the democracy movement in the 1980s. In an effort to insert nuance into the blanket notion that *p'ok'ŭ* was protest music, I disclosed its contradictory relationship with amateurism, originality, and commercialism, and examined its fluctuating relationship with the Park regime.

***Minjung* Or Protest Song of the 1980s**

Park was assassinated by confidant and head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Kim Jae-gyu, on October 26, 1979. However, the end of Park's sixteen-year-rule brought about an even more aggressive military dictatorship, augured by The Gwangju Massacre

²⁹⁸ Pak, "Plantation and Independence," 305-308.

of 1980. Also known as the Gwangju Democratization Movement, this popular uprising turned violent when young activists and citizens of Gwangju were brutally killed by the martial law army of soon-to-be president Chun Doo Hwan. Horrified by this event, artist activists propagated *minjung* art (or “people’s art”)—politically-engaged works that embraced Korean traditional and ritualistic art forms over Western techniques. According to Pak, during the 1960s and 1970s, the movement to revive traditional art focused on professional forms such as *t'alch'um* (masked dance), *madanggŭk* (yard or people’s theater), and *p'ansori* (musical story-telling), whereas the 1980s Folk Song Revival Movement, which was centered around university campuses, embraced traditional folk songs and *p'ungmulgut* (percussive performance) as non-professional art forms that truly reflected the daily musical culture of the *minjung*. By the 1980s, student protestors were singing *p'ok'ŭ* songs from the previous decade in their amplified demonstrations for democracy. Whereas *p'ok'ŭ* once reflected the taste and proclivities of a privileged niche of college-educated youth, it now reflected the spirit of protest upheld by student activists striving to implement art to fight political oppression.

Popular Musicians Get Arrested for Marijuana: A Recurring Theme

Since 1975, marijuana has appeared in the news most often in relation to the entertainment industry, especially popular music. Marijuana-related arrests of top musicians recurred again and again since 1975, suggesting that the Marijuana Incident of 1975 set a precedent in how the government disciplined popular musicians found using the drug. The vocal group Saranggwa p'yŏnghwa (Love and Peace) was arrested in 1980; seminal *p'ok'ŭ* and *rok* singer Chŏn In'gwŏn, and guitarist/leader of *rok* group Resurrection Kim T'ae-wŏn, in 1987; *rok*-turned-ballad singer Lee Sŭng-ch'ŏl, who also sang lead vocals for Resurrection before going

solo, for the third time in 1990; the trailblazing dance singer Hyŏn Chin-yŏng in 1991; the singer songwriter Kang Sa-ne in 2000; the songwriter and rapper Psy in 2011, a year before his “Gangnam Style” became a global Youtube sensation; and the megastar G-Dragon of the boy-group Big Bang in 2011.²⁹⁹ Although select non-singers also made the news for smoking marijuana, such as the actor Park Chung-hoon and the comedian Shin Tong-yŏp who were arrested during their heyday (respectively in 1994 and 1999), the connection between marijuana and popular musicians is most pronounced. That most of the singers mentioned above represent top stars of their respective eras, suggests that their fame is what made their offense deserving of public opprobrium. That the official, legal, and public perception of marijuana in South Korea is severe compared to Western countries, seems to have made the drug a useful tool for the government to keep the entertainment industry under control.

Attempts to legalize marijuana in South Korea have been, so far, futile. Enactment of the Law on Hemp Control in 1976 occasioned the apprehension of 1,460 smokers. Such large scale arrests for marijuana use have not occurred since the 1970s, but the re-enacted Law on Hemp Control (enforced starting in 2000) still strictly prohibits the smoking of marijuana.³⁰⁰ In 2005, the Seosan Branch of the Daejeon District Court reviewed a formal request to amend the Law on Hemp Control for violating both the constitutional right to pursue happiness as well as the principle of proportionality. The court denied this request, pointing to marijuana’s “harmful

²⁹⁹ Culled from two articles: T'ae-kyun Pak, “Special Feature on the 1970s as Debated by Kim Ho-ki and Pak T'ae-kyun: The Celebrity Marijuana Incident,” *Kyŏnghyangshinmun*, August 26, 2015, http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=201508262317215; and Yŏng-ik Han, “The Dark History of Entertainers Entangled With Marijuana,” *Chungangilbo*, June 1, 2017, <https://news.joins.com/article/21630308>.

³⁰⁰ Hyŏn Lee, “Since When Did Smoking Marijuana Become a Crime?” *Chungangilbo*, June 6, 2017, <https://news.joins.com/article/21640712>.

effects on the respiratory system,” high rate of recidivism among users, and “possibility of harming national health and economy if allowed to be used injudiciously.”³⁰¹ Furthermore, in 2016, “a clause sanctioning marijuana’s circulation and advertisement online was added to the law,” attesting to the government’s ongoing tight control of the drug. Administrations and ruling parties may have changed, but their stances toward marijuana have not.

South Korean Popular Music, 2020

In recent years, South Korean politics and popular music have come under the global media spotlight for a series of events that convey a nation undergoing a period of political awakening and cultural renewal. Most tragic was the Sewol Ferry Disaster of April 16, 2014, which took the lives of over 300 people, most of them high school students. This catastrophe ignited the fuse that led to national candle-light protests criticizing the incompetent administration of President Park Geun-hye (Park Chung Hee’s daughter) as well as the corrupt *chaebol* (conglomerates), which culminated in Park’s impeachment on December 9, 2016. Park was replaced by President Moon Jae-in on May 10, 2017, whose election shifted power from the conservative Saenuri Party to the liberal Democratic Party. The liberal party’s ascent set the stage for South Korea’s #MeToo Movement, sparked by the televised interview on January 29, 2018 of public prosecutor Ms. Seo Ji Hyun, who accused a Justice Ministry official of sexual harassment. In the popular music world, the suicides of female K-pop stars Sulli on October 14 and Goo Hara on November 24, 2019, exposed the sexist harm caused by cyber-bullying and spy cameras, which are prevalent in the South Korean entertainment industry.

³⁰¹ Yǒng-ik Han, “The Dark History of Entertainers Entangled With Marijuana,” *Chungangilbo*, June 1, 2017, <https://news.joins.com/article/21630308>.

While such political polarization and sexism suggest a divided nation, the phenomenal success of the reality competition television show *Miss Trot*, which aired between February 28 and June 1, 2019, and its successor *Mr Trot*, which aired between January 2 and March 12, 2020, evince the dazzling renaissance *trot* is undergoing, this time admired by old and young, women and men alike.³⁰² This revived adoration for *trot* is so widespread because unlike in the 1960s and 1970s when media executives and government censors condemned its Japanese-quality (*waesaek*), now—as recounted regularly in the aforementioned shows—it is publicly touted as a uniquely Korean genre distinct from K-pop but having the potential to reach an international audience of comparable size. *P'ok'ŭ* ushered in a new era in South Korean popular music that acknowledged singers as original artists representing an elite young demographic, and initiated efforts to revive, recreate, and experiment with the musical traditions of Korean culture. 21st century *trot* is heralding a new era in South Korean popular music that extols heartfelt performance, and embraces tradition as well as new aesthetic possibilities/opportunities—a proclivity that may not have been primed without *p'ok'ŭ*.

³⁰² “TV Ranking,” *Nielsen Korea*, accessed May 13, 2020, http://www.nielsenkorea.co.kr/tv_terrestrial_day.asp?menu=Tit_1&sub_menu=2_1&area=00&begin_date=today. The ratings for *Mr Trot* reached a record-breaking 35.7% during its final episode.

Appendix A. Song Lyrics

왜 불러	Why Call Me
<p>왜불러 왜불러 돌아서서 가는사람을 왜불러 왜불러 토라질땐 무정하더니 왜 에 에 에에에에에 자꾸자꾸 불러 설레게해</p>	<p>Why call me, why call me When I've turned to leave you</p> <p>Why call me, why call me When you were heartless when sulky Wh~~~~y~~~~~ Why keep calling and making my heart flutter</p>
<p>아니 안되지 돌아서면 안되지 아니 안되지 돌아보면 안되지 그냥 한번 불러주는 그목소리에 다시 또 속아선 안되지 안들려 안들려 마음없이 부르는 소리는 안들려 안들려 아무리소리쳐 불러도 아아아 아아아아아 이제 다시는 나를 부르지도마</p>	<p>No, I shouldn't turn around No, I shouldn't turn around</p> <p>Cannot be deceived again By that call of pity</p> <p>Can't hear you, can't hear you If you are calling without heart</p> <p>Can't hear you, can't hear you No matter how hard you call out A~~~~h~~~~~ Don't ever call me again</p>
<p>가던 발걸음 멈춰선 안되지 애절하게 부르는 소리에 자꾸만 약해지는 나의 마음을 이대로 돌이켜선 안되지</p>	<p>I shouldn't stop walking away Cannot resist</p> <p>My heart growing weak With your longing call</p>
<p>왜불러 왜불러 돌아서서 가는사람을 왜불러 왜불러 토라질땐 무정하더니 왜 에 에 에 에에에에에 이제 다시는 나를 부르지도마</p>	<p>Why call me, why call me When I've turned away</p> <p>Why call me, why call me When you were heartless when sulky Wh~~~~y~~~~~ Don't ever call me again</p>

고래사냥	Whale Hunt
<p>술마시고 노래하고 춤을 춰봐도 가슴에는 하나 가득 슬픔뿐이네 무엇을 할 것인가 둘러 보아도 보이는 건 모두가 돌아 앉았네 자 떠나자 동해 바다로 삼등삼등 완행열차 기차를 타고</p>	<p>Drinking, singing, and dancing Doesn't console the sadness in my heart Looking around what to do I see everyone's turned their back on me</p> <p>Let's leave for the East Sea On a third class local train</p>
<p>간밤에 꾸었던 꿈의 세계는 아침에 일어나면 잊혀지지만 그래도 생각나는 내 꿈 하나는 조그만 예쁜 고래 한마리 자 떠나자 동해바다로 신화처럼 숨을 쉬는고래 잡으러</p>	<p>The world I dreamt last night Will be forgotten when I awake But the one dream I remember Is of a small beautiful whale</p> <p>Let's leave for the East Sea To catch the mythical whale</p>
<p>우리들 사랑이 깨진다해도 모든 것을 한꺼번에 잃는다 해도 우리들 가슴속에는 뚜렷이 있다 한마리 예쁜 고래 하나가</p>	<p>Even if our love breaks Even if I lose everything all at once There is something clear in my heart: the beautiful whale</p>
<p>자 떠나자 동해 바다로 신화처럼 소리치는 고래 잡으러 자 떠나자 동해 바다로 신화처럼 소리치는 고래 잡으러</p>	<p>Let's leave for the East Sea To catch the whale with its mythical call Let's leave for the East Sea To catch the whale with its mythical call</p>

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