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BLACKS AND CUBANS IN METROPOLITAN MIAMI'S
CHANGING ECONOMY

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INTRODUCTION

The exponential growth in selected Sunbelt cities since 1960 is now well documented, and metropolitan Miami is recognized as one of the acknowledged targets of Sunbelt growth and development. What is less often acknowledged, is the impact of the transformation of such places on segments of the residential population. In this paper, primary attention will be directed at two subpopulations -- Blacks and Cubans residing in metropolitan Miami just prior to the takeoff era. At the time of takeoff, Blacks represented a

quasi-caste population whose role in the Miami economy was typical of that of Blacks in the economy of the urban South, a peripheral one. But far reaching changes were anticipated as a result of increased civil rights activity. The achieved political gains were thought to hold promise for altered economic opportunity. Cubans, on the other hand, were just beginning to enter the metropolitan economy in substantial numbers and the first wave of migrants from Cuba had yet to make its impact felt. At this point the position of Cubans in both the social and economic structure of metropolitan Dade County was viewed with uncertainty, as it represented a new addition to an essentially bi-racial city with a fixed set of traditions. Southern tradition established the position of persons in the social order on the basis of race, and consequently their position in the economic order as well. Needless to say, the entry of a third, easily distinguished population into this arena might be expected to produce a major alteration in the social order.

After the passage of almost a generation it is fitting to examine how well metropolitan miami's two primary ethnic minorities have fared in penetrating, and/or altering the metropolitan economy. The position and contribution of Cubans to the evolving economy of metropolitan Miami has been well documented (Wilson and Portes 1980; Portes 1987; Portes and Stepick 1985; Bach 1987), but the position of Blacks in the post-takeoff period has received only scant attention, most of which is anecdotal. Nevertheless, there is growing evidence that Blacks have fared less well (Porter and Dunn 1984; Kohl 1985; Winsberg 1983) than have Cubans. The primary goal of this paper is to document the comparative progress of the two groups in establishing themselves in the changing economy of metropolitan Miami, and the implications that this has for the social and economic well-being of the primary sub-communities in which these two ethnic populations have been concentrated.

To achieve this goal, we approach the problem by observing changes in the character and pattern of development of residential clusters in which the respective ethnic populations exhibit plural dominance. Since we are concerned with change over almost three decades, we must first establish the magnitude and character of the two populations in the base year, 1960. At the time of the 1960 Census [1], the combined total population of the two groups constituted less than twenty five percent of the total metropolitan population, a minority share that was smaller than that prevailing in such growing sunbelt metropolises as Houston, Atlanta, New Orleans, Memphis and Dallas. With the exception of Houston, each of these urban centers was the place of residence of a single large minority population, southern Blacks. Thus, the emerging ethnic mix in metropolitan miami distinguished it from its regional peers, a situation which has led to its being labeled the Casablanca of the United States (Buchanan 1987; Newsweek, Jan. 25, 1988).

THE POSITION OF BLACKS IN THE METROPOLITAN ECONOMY AT THE TIME OF THE CUBAN ARRIVAL

The Early Cuban Core Population

Prior to 1960, Cubans made up less than five percent of Dade County's population. Although Cubans had been present in Dade County for several decades, their presence was nominal. It is generally concluded that Cubans arriving during the decade of the thirties were dispersed throughout metropolitan Dade County. Yet evidence of an incipient concentration could be observed within a narrow radius of downtown Miami. Boswell and Curtis (1985) are more specific in that they suggest "Little Havana" had already begun to take shape prior to the arrival of anti-Castro exiles. According

to Winsberg (1979), however, Cubans accounted for only a small share of the population in "Little Havana" before the arrival of the first wave of Cuban exiles. The zone southwest of downtown Miami eventually became a conduit through which a large share of the post-1960 refugees would pass enroute to more permanent residences. Today, it is said that "Little Havana" or "La Saguesera", as it is called by Cubans, is simply the symbolic core community for Miami Cubans, as that population has spread far beyond the limits of the 1960 enclave. The character of that expansion should allow us indirectly to ascertain the economic success of this recently arrived ethnic population vis-a-vis that of the earlier arrived Blacks.

Traditional Black Residential Enclaves

Blacks at the time of the first wave of Cuban immigration to the United States occupied the lower rung on metropolitan Dade County's economic ladder. Nevertheless, high labor force participation rates among both males and females were prevalent in the county's two Black urban core communities (see Figure 1). The oldest of these primary Black enclaves, an area now labeled "Overtown" by the media, but identified in the pre-Cuban period as the "Central Negro District", has experienced major decline. Its dimensions were reduced through the demolition of housing for highway and public facility development. Thus, unlike "Little Havana", which is located only a short distance away, it no longer constitutes a symbol of the Black presence in Miami, as was the case prior to 1960 (Rieff 1987). The fate of the Liberty City-Brownsville district, approximately four miles to the northwest, has not been appreciably better. These two enclaves, in 1960, were the place of residence of almost two-thirds of metropolitan Miami's Black population (Rose 1964). Yet, even at this early date, residents of Black core communities experienced greater income inequality vis-a-vis the larger community than did residents of "Little Havana." The discrepancy in income inequality between the core ethnic communities was nominal in 1960 (see Figure 1). It is the changes in the economic progress of the two populations that have occurred since that date which constitute our primary interest.

Blacks, in 1960, were concentrated in a series of residential enclaves extending from the urban core to the county's outer ring. Both the character and location of these enclaves serve as an index of the economic position of Blacks in the urban economy (Rose 1964). Outside of the core location, there were an additional seven Black communities ranging in size from South Miami with fewer than 3,000 persons to Opalacka with its almost 11,000 Black residents. In only two of these communities, Opalacka and Richmond Heights, was there substantial evidence that Blacks had been able to penetrate the primary sector of the economy, and even there, penetration was largely confined to the lower rungs of the primary sector ladder. Nevertheless, it appeared that even in an economy dominated by southern folkways, it was possible for a segment of the Black population to gain access to residential environments which demonstrated their relative success in a predominantly service economy.

The remaining enclaves were dominated by persons who had been unable to improve their position in the economy, and were apparently confined to positions in the occupational hierarchy that had been traditionally assigned to Blacks -- e.g., laborers; private household workers; other service workers. Their respective locations often reflected access to employment sources that were highly dependent on an available unskilled labor pool. Those communities located in the inner ring of the metropolitan area were located adjacent to upper income White communities. The occupational structure was dominated by persons employed as low income

private household workers. Outer ring enclaves were even more marginal to the urban economy, as they included a sizeable share of workers employed in South Dade's agricultural sphere. As the influx of Cuban exiles was making its initial entry into metropolitan Dade's urban economy, the position of Blacks in that economy was marginal at best. Blacks occupied a niche in that economy based on the traditional racial job assignments dictated by southern culture. The central issue here, however, is what transpired during the post-1960 period, in terms of the position of these two populations in the local economy. Were Blacks and Cubans to become competitors for jobs in the secondary sector of the economy, or would they follow ethnically distinct paths in the job market, such that the relationship would be marked by complement rather than competition?

The Arrival of the Cuban Exiles

The rapid growth of the Cuban population during the 1960-1970 interval placed great pressure on the local economy. During that period more than 200,000 persons born in Cuba settled in metropolitan Dade. The Dade County settlers made up more than two-fifths of all Cubans immigrating to the United States during the decade. The magnitude of new labor force entrants greatly increased, and the flow was almost continuous. A slowed movement was observed only in 1964 and 1965. A number of researchers have noted differences in occupational status among the arrivee's based on date of arrival (Pedraza-Bailey 1985; Bach 1987; Fagen, Brody and O'Leary 1968). Those arriving between 1959 and 1962 have been labeled "Golden Exiles", as a result of their higher than average human capital investments. These were persons who were disproportionately engaged in professional occupations in Cuba, and who responded most intensely to the success of the Castro revolution. On arrival in the United States the golden exiles initially found it necessary to seek employment in occupations lower on the occupational ladder than they had held in Cuba (Moncarz 1978). Later arrivals, while better educated than the average citizen in Cuba, had fewer years of education and lower occupational status than persons arriving before the Bay of Pigs invasion. Skilled craftsmen were well represented among those arriving near the end of the decade.

The Rise of the Enclave Economy

The size and occupational diversity of Cubans arriving during the 1960's facilitated the emergence of a Cuban subeconomy within the larger metropolitan Dade County economy. The enclave economy absorbed approximately one-third of the Cuban origin population (Wilson and Portes 1980). Yet, by the end of the decade, it was noted that selected occupations previously dominated by Blacks were overwhelmingly filled by Cuban workers (e.g., hotel workers.)

Needless to say, this raises questions regarding the impact of new entrants to the labor market on the employment prospects of native workers. To date, these questions on this issue remain unresolved, as researchers have adopted a variety of postures based on their approach to the problem (Briggs 1985; Muller 1985). At the time of the initial entry of Cuban workers into the market, the local economy was somewhat distressed. A decade later, however, the economy had recovered and was characterized by a state of vibrancy that had not been witnessed for sometime. moreover, during the decade of the sixties, Cubans had moved from approximately five percent of the labor force to approximately one fifth of the labor force. The Black share experienced a slight decline during this period. The question becomes, did Blacks participate in the previously described

economic revival, and if so, where were they inserted in the industrial structure vis-a-vis Cubans? Did the development of the Cuban enclave economy protect both groups from the need to compete for scarce jobs by having them form separate job queues? Or did the enclave economy simply minimize what might have constituted a more serious problem for both groups had the enclave economy not diverted a large share of workers away from primary and secondary sectors of the economy? It is unlikely that we will be able to resolve these issues in this preliminary essay, but they establish a focus we think is important.

Government Assistance in the Adjustment Process

After ten years of protracted Cuban immigration to metropolitan Dade, it was quite evident that this population was making a successful adaptation to its new environment. Cubans had been able to reduce the income gap that distinguished their position from that of the Anglo population while simultaneously expanding the gap differentiating their position in the metropolitan economy from that of Blacks -- i.e., Black family income was 73.9 percent of Spanish Origin income in 1970. The economic miracle of Cuban adjustment has been frequently cited, and has been attributed primarily to the success of Cuban entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs were said to possess both the foresight and the entrepreneurial skill necessary to fashion a successful enclave economy while also taking advantage of accelerating opportunities in internationally oriented domestic firms (Portes 1987). The location of branch offices of a number of multinational firms was spurred by the presence of a large Spanish speaking population. Thus, the growth of the Cuban population was a source of positive feedback for firms wanting to strengthen their Latin American connection. Nevertheless, the role of government in assisting, fulfilling, and/or curtailing the aspirations of Cubans and Blacks should not be overlooked.

Cuban immigration to the United States during the 1960's differed from that of other foreign nationals entering the country at the same time. Cuban immigration is reputed to represent a politically motivated movement, although over time it is said to have taken on attributes of an economically motivated movement (Pedraza-Bailey 1985). Nevertheless, U.S. immigration policy played a substantial role in providing assistance to recent arrivals by assuming a heavy financial burden in assisting populations designated political refugees. It is true that the first of the "Golden Exiles" were admitted under the provisions of the regular immigration preference system, i.e., preferences granted Western hemisphere origin populations (Briggs 1984). Those persons arriving after the U.S. terminated diplomatic relations with Cuba, in December 1960, qualified as refugees. More than 400,000 persons were to enter the country during the remainder of the decade subject to the provisions of existing national refugee policy. Upwards of one-half this number settled in metropolitan Dade. It is within this context that the role of government in the adjustment process should be viewed.

Even before official relations between the U.S. and Cuba were severed, President Eisenhower was made aware of the negative impact that the sudden entry of a large new workforce could have on the local economy. It was out of this awareness that the federally financed Cuban Refugee Center was established. The goal of the Center was to aid entrants in the adjustment process by providing both financial assistance and social service counseling. Later the Kennedy administration launched a major federal program designed to resettle continuing arrivees from Cuba to other parts of the country, in an effort to relieve the miami economy of an extraordinary burden. The Migration and Refugee Assistance Act subsidized

the cost of retraining and recREDENTIALIZING a segment of the entering population, as well as providing welfare assistance. According to Pedraza-Bailey (1985), more than 400 million dollars made available under the provision of the migration and Refugee Assistance Act were spent between 1961 and 1969 in adjustment assistance. Mexicans immigrating to the U.S. during the same period, according to Pedraza-Bailey (1985), were not eligible for the same kind of support because they were labeled economic rather than political immigrants. Even Cuban immigrants, at least the early waves, who were endowed with higher than average human capital investments, were provided an additional leg up as an outgrowth of federal support for persons entering the country as political refugees. This source of support was unavailable to persons arriving as economic migrants.

Miami Blacks became potentially vulnerable in a competitive Dade County labor market as an outgrowth of our existing refugee policy. This situation was abetted further by federal support programs designed to ease the assimilation process and to relieve the local economy of an extraordinary burden. By decade's end, the local labor market had become more diversified or cosmopolitan and was thought by some to have entered a state of sustained growth. The position of Blacks in the economy, however, was generally perceived to have declined. Longbrake and Nichols (1977) raise questions about this perception, as their data do not support this thesis. The perceptions of persons in the Black community who concurred in the decline thesis may well have been effected by anticipated benefits that they assumed would accrue from civil rights legislation enacted at mid-decade. Since it was well known that the government was acting in ways thought beneficial to persons of Cuban origin, it was reasonable to assume that this would be the decade in which recently passed civil rights legislation would lead to the lowering of persistent barriers to Black social mobility as well. Among the barriers which were anticipated to come under attack were those that obstructed Black entry into selected sectors of the economy, outside of the caste system, as well as barriers which also placed access to selected housing off-limits, regardless of ability to purchase.

On the latter score, little seemed changed and the extent that Blacks judged their gains by the character and quality of housing in traditional Black communities, it is not difficult to understand the average person's perception that Blacks had lost ground during the decade. Of the ten communities within the metropolitan area that housed the largest share of the Black population in 1960, eight were sites of government sponsored housing treatment programs by 1970 (Metropolitan Dade County Community Improvement Program 1972). While government assistance at all levels was available to Miami Blacks during the sixties, it was not enough to offset the combined federal assistance, and higher human capital investment in the newcomer population. Based on these combined advantages it was not difficult for the newcomer to surpass the position of Blacks in the local economy.

By the end of the First decade of substantial Cuban presence in metropolitan Dade, change was occurring at a rapid pace. What had been described as a sleepy Southern tourist spa at mid-century was beginning to demonstrate signs of an emerging international trade and tourist center. Nevertheless, Anglo entrepreneurs were still in full control of the traditional corporate structure, and therefore, the position of Blacks in an economy undergoing transition appeared more uncertain. In the face of these changes, Black migration to Miami slowed during the 1960's. Winsberg (1979) in particular, attributes the slow-down to intensified competition with Cubans for jobs traditionally held by Blacks. It was during the following decade, however, that the position of the various competing

groups in the economy began to take on a clearer definition.

SLOWED CUBAN IMMIGRATION AND THE MATURATION OF THE ETHNIC COMMUNITY

The decade of the seventies saw a slowing of Cuban entry into the U.S., especially after 1974. The air bridge from Cuba to Miami was closed down in 1973, as the family reunification agreement between the two countries was terminated (Briggs 1984; Bach 1987). Even under the terms of that agreement, certain prospective immigrants were excluded from eligibility, e.g., males eligible for military service, skilled occupations which were in short supply. The Cuban entrants of the 1970's contained a disproportionate share of skilled blue collar workers. By the time immigration at an intense level halted, the composition of the immigrant pool had undergone a major alteration. Early arrivals were disproportionately drawn from the upper end of the social class spectrum, whereas later arrivals were drawn from a broader cross section of the Cuban population. Yet, as recently as 1973, the date of the initiation of slowed entry, arrivees still did not represent a cross section of the population remaining in Cuba.

Spatial Isolation and Ethnic Solidarity

How this rapidly growing population distributed itself within metropolitan Dade county provides some clues to its success in the metropolitan economy. At the same time, the level of spatial assimilation provides an indication of the extent to which ethnic solidarity persists. If the enclave economy is essentially dependent upon ethnic solidarity spatial isolation could be expected to strengthen and reinforce the role of solidarity in the overall development of the metropolitan economy. In 1980, before the arrival of the third wave of Cuban immigrants (the Marielitos), 80 percent of all Spanish Origin persons resided in 15 identifiable communities (see Figure 2). The vast majority of the arrivees had settled in the municipalities of Miami and Hialeah, and in both communities constituted a majority population by 1980. Residential occupancy extended westward from "Little Havana", veered northward and later extended to the western periphery of the built-up area. A pattern of ethnic succession permitted the development of a settlement corridor in which the vast majority of the residents are Spanish Origin persons. It is within this corridor that the core of the Cuban enclave economy is anchored. Other secondary Cuban enclaves developed simultaneously, but they are seldom far removed from the South River Corridor and/or its Hialeah extension (see Figure 3).

Hispanic populations are known to stimulate Anglo residential turnover, although less intensely than do Blacks (Massey 1985). The rate of arrival of the Cuban origin population led to excessive White abandonment over the past twenty years. In those metropolitan areas where the 1970-80 influx of Spanish Origin populations was large, spatial isolation was observed to have increased (Massey and Denton 1987). Pattern position is also observed in metropolitan Dade, as the Spanish Origin population experienced an increase in its level of spatial isolation both in the city and in the metropolitan ring (Santiago 1983; Winsberg 1983). Even though levels of isolation among Cubans were observed to have registered a modest increase, differences in levels of isolation of individuals between groups continue to vary. The level of spatial isolation separating Cubans from Anglos is substantially smaller than that separating Blacks from Anglos. Likewise, Cubans are as spatially isolated from Blacks in Miami as Blacks are isolated from Anglos. One implication of the previous observation is that the Cuban population possesses a higher likelihood of spatial interaction

with members of the Anglo community, and subsequently, more contact with persons at the upper levels of the mainstream economy. Cubans are more likely to permeate the mainstream economy than are Blacks, simply as a function of the opportunity to become part of mainstream social networks. Thus, while the burgeoning Cuban population continues to displace Anglos in neighborhoods contiguous to the periphery of the enclave, there is also evidence that some higher status Cubans are settling in selected upper income neighborhoods beyond the margin of the enclave.

Increasing Diversity in the Black Population

Since 1960, Miami's Black population also has experienced substantial growth moving from a total of 139,000 in 1960 to 281,000 in 1980, or a rate of 102 percent. It ranked 16th in size among Black metropolitan populations at the time of the 1980 Census. Nevertheless, Black population growth during the sixties was dampened by the large scale immigration from Cuba, as it influenced the migration decisions of prospective Black movers to Miami (Winsberg 1983). As Cuban immigration slowed, during the seventies, there was evidence of an upturn in Black immigration. But, unlike Black movement to Miami during the sixties, recent Black movement was from more diverse origins. Almost two fifths of the Black movers to Miami during the latter half of the seventies were foreign born. The majority of foreign born movers were from Haiti. Haitians established themselves in a set of contiguous neighborhoods previously occupied by Cubans and Anglos now labeled "Little Haiti" (Kohl 1985). The recent arrival of foreign born Blacks, plus the entry of Spanish Origin populations from elsewhere in Latin America, further complicates the ethnic mix. Yet, it is quite clear that other Spanish Origin populations tended to settle in close proximity to Cubans, while foreign born Blacks settle in close proximity to native Blacks. Thus, both an ethnic and race factor appears to be at work in influencing the ethnic specific residential allocation of housing in metropolitan Dade. The situation becomes even more complicated as one attempts to account for the settlement pattern of the Marielitos, a large percentage of whom are Black Cubans.

THE GROWTH AND WELL-BEING OF BLACK POPULATION CLUSTERS

In 1960, prior to the arrival of the new immigrants, most Blacks were tightly concentrated in two core communities with pockets of Black population dispersed throughout the metropolitan area. These communities, nine in all, housed 99 percent of the Blacks residing in metropolitan Dade. They formed the base from which further expansion might be expected, based on the normative racial housing allocation mechanism. Furthermore, the residential character of these communities signaled the objective status of Blacks in the metropolitan economy. At that time only two of these communities, Richmond Heights and Opalocka, projected an image of substantial well-being, although selected neighborhoods in the northwestern section of the core showed promise. Based on prior assumptions regarding growth and change, we will examine how well the 1960 Black settlements have fared in terms of their achieved position in the local economy. Since the Black population more than doubled over the period of interest, new communities have come into existence. This provides an opportunity to ascertain how these additional communities fit into the economic structure of Dade County. We will briefly examine how well the traditional Black settlements and the emergent settlements fared in competition with the evolving newcomer communities in their access to economic resources.

By 1980, the communities which had previously been home to the vast

majority of Black Miamians were home to fewer than one-third of that population. A number of new communities had come into existence to house the observed incremental growth. By 1980 fifteen communities[2] served as the primary zones of Black occupancy (see Figure 4). These fifteen communities housed approximately four-fifths of all Black residents in the metropolitan area. Fifteen communities, based on population size, were home to a similar share of Cuban residents. Yet, it is clear that the Cuban communities have fared better than Black communities in terms of gaining access to financial resources, i.e., median family income. The number of communities in the lower third of the income distribution is larger among Black communities than among Cuban communities (see Table 1). Fully two-thirds of the Black families located in the primary Black concentrations had incomes that placed them in the lower third of the metropolitan area's income distribution. Fewer than six percent of the Cuban families were in communities falling into this sector of the distribution. The largest share of all Cuban families (69 percent) were situated in the middle one-third of the distribution, a sector in which only 28 percent of the Black families were found. Few Black families (5.4 percent) in the primary communities were situated in the upper-third of the distribution, while more than one-fourth of the Cuban families resided in communities that were in the upper level of the distribution. Thus, after only two decades, a rapidly growing Cuban community made up of a number of distinct subcommunities occupied a position in the status hierarchy that stood between a concentration of Black communities at the lower end of the resource distribution and the Anglo community at the upper end.

ACCOUNTING FOR THE DIFFERENTIAL RANK AMONG BLACK AND CUBAN COMMUNITIES

The observed differences in the position of Black and Cuban communities along the resource hierarchy have been attributed to a variety of factors. Among the more frequently cited factors are the role of selectivity among the initial arrivees and the rise of an enclave economy. It is suggested, at least by implication, that the disproportionate share of upper White collar class persons among the early arrivals provided an opportunity for that group to participate in the primary sector of the economy, where they established a secure niche for themselves. Many of these persons became entrepreneurs who provided employment for later arrivals possessing smaller human capital investments. While this explanation goes a long way in explaining Cuban success in the metropolitan economy, it fails to directly address the comparative lack of Black success. It should be emphasized that Black success in this instance is measured in terms of the relative position of the ethnic populations in the metropolitan economy. The slow advancements made by Blacks in comparison to the progress achieved by Cubans is not easily explained, but nevertheless a number of factors appear to possess some explanatory potential.

Among the more apparent contributors to this outcome were: the limited human capital investment in the Black population at the date of the initial Cuban arrival; a bias initially favoring high status Cuban over low status Blacks for low status service jobs; the negative impact of the enclave economy on the potential for Black progress; the fixed position of Blacks in the South's racial stratification system; the image Cuban's held of Blacks in Pre-Castro Cuba; and the changing character of the Miami economy. We are not in a position to assign weights to these barriers to progress, but a brief statement regarding our rationale for choosing them is called for.

The barriers identified above are not independent of one another. A careful appraisal of these suggest that they may be summarized along three

general dimensions: the economic transformation of the Miami economy; the emergence of an exile culture; and the fixity of the role of race. The merits of our choice of barriers explaining comparatively slow Black economic progress will now be reviewed.

THE MIAMI ECONOMY IN TRANSITION

As indicated earlier, Blacks played an integral role in the growth and development of Miami, both before and after the real estate boom of the 1920's. While that role was largely confined to the provision of physical labor and personal service, it was nevertheless essential in the context of the growth and development of southern urban centers. There was the expectation that Blacks would continue in their role as a low wage servant population in the metropolitan economy based largely on the strength of the northern tourist trade. But the timing of the Cuban immigration, in conjunction with an incipient move towards the internationalization of the world's market economies, had an unanticipated impact on Miami Blacks.

Since Miami had an established reputation as a domestic tourist spa, it was expected that Blacks would continue to fill vacancies arising out of the demands associated with that industry. But early arriving Cubans pushed Blacks out of at least one segment of those jobs upon which the Miami economy was anchored, hotel jobs (see Aguirre, Schwirian and La Greca 1980; Rieff 1987). The growing presence of a rapidly expanding Cuban population, also facilitated the formation of both positive and negative links to the booming Latin American market to the south, i.e., tourism, trade, and illegal drugs. As Miami's population grew more cosmopolitan, major national corporations located international headquarters there, to take advantage of the Latin American connection as a means of boosting sales (Agnew 1987; Sherill 1987). By the mid-1970's, Miami had shed its image as America's foremost southern tourist center dependent upon northern visitors and retirees, and had adopted an image of a booming trade and tourist center catering to wealthy elites from Latin America (Burkholz 1980).

The transformation of the Miami economy from one whose primary orientation was domestic to one with increased dependence on foreign markets, does much to explain the relative lack of Black success in a changing labor market. At the same time, this new arrangement facilitated the growth and development of a segment of the Cuban community, and made it easier for another segment to be absorbed into the enclave economy. It has been argued that the marriage of Anglo capital and Cuban entrepreneurship was primarily responsible for Miami's emergence from its late 1950's doldrums to become a diversified post industrial service center dominated by financial services (Burkholtz 1980). But Blacks played almost no role in the observed economic transformation and feel that they have been left out of the process and consequently have benefited little from these changes (Burkeholtz 1980; Didion 1987). Benefits that have accrued to Blacks appear to be indirect, an outgrowth of a substantial increase in the metropolitan areas total population over more than twenty years of Cuban and other Latin and Caribbean immigration to the area. During the seventies, Blacks made major gains at the upper and lower ends of the rapidly growing service economy, e.g., teachers, professional health workers, hospital orderlies and attendants, and food service workers. This has led to a bifurcation within the Black community. This is illustrated in the growing divergence between individual Black communities (see Figure 1).

THE ROLE OF THE EXILE CULTURE

Cubans clearly benefited from the previously described changes in the

metropolitan economy as their presence, in part, influenced the direction of that change. Blacks, on the other hand, were simply passive actors in the economic transformation occurring around them, but the position of Blacks in the transition was notably influenced by the growing strength of the exile culture. The term "exile culture" is employed here instead of "Cuban culture" in order to address both the intellectual and political dimensions of that culture. The exile culture appeared to reach maturity by the mid 1980's, and its influence is now recognized as pervasive and no doubt permanent. Miami is now universally viewed as the center of Cuban culture in America, a fact that is said to lead Cubans residing elsewhere in the United States to engage in occasional pilgrimages, while others choose to return permanently (Rieff 1987). Besides changing the cultural landscape as vividly described by Boswell and Curtis (1983), the exiles have had a great deal of success in recreating the culture of Pre-Castro Havana in America. Since the position of Blacks in that culture was one of low esteem (Pedraza-Bailey; 1985), that no doubt hampered Miami Blacks in their effort to gain a foothold in an economy that has become increasingly Latin oriented.

The prevalence of Spanish as an important language of commerce should not be underestimated as a barrier making Black access to selected sectors of the economy difficult. As important as language has become in announcing to the world the importance of Cuban culture in Miami, it is the outlook, attitude, and world view of the exile population itself that does most to hamper support for policies that might best address issues of primary Black concern. The strong anti-communist stance of the newcomer population leads it to support conservative policies thought inimical to Black progress. Conflicting political ideologies tends to make cooperation between these growing populations difficult. While Cuban interest, at one level, often parallel national interest, they tend to work against the interest of Black or at least that segment of the Black population that has been hardest hit by the economic changes of the previous twenty-five years. Thus, the political views of overseas Cubans, many of which are dictated by their disdain for the Castro revolution, when combined with attitudes toward Blacks which persisted in Pre-Castro Cuba, strongly influenced the manner in which the exile culture addresses the situation of Blacks in Miami. It has been said that, while Cubans acknowledge the plight of Blacks in the northwest core community, they manifest an insensitivity to the plight of that group (Rieff 1987). Intuitively, Rieff (1987) has framed the Cuban position as follows: "In South Florida, one almost has the feeling that the Cubans wonder what these Black people are doing in this second Havana" (p. 174).

THE FIXITY OF RACE

The influence of race on the position of Blacks in American society is thought by some to have declined (Wilson 1978). A number of researchers, however, have challenged that assumption. Needless to say, the informal or institutional arrangements which were previously employed to maintain Blacks in a subordinate position have indeed disappeared. Keeping in mind that a variety of institutional constraints were still in place as recently as the latter half of the sixties, is it reasonable to assume that a residual race effect is no longer operative in impacting the position of Blacks in the metropolitan economy? We think not, and for that reason we will briefly identify some race related issues which continue to persist. Since the role played by race in governing Black/Cuban relations has already been discussed, we will now turn our attention to Black/White relations.

Dade County is comprised of a collectivity of 27 municipalities and a host of unincorporated settlements ranging in size from the city of Miami, with its almost 350,000 persons, to a number of unincorporated settlements with fewer than 15,000 persons. Anglos constitute the majority population in all but six of these politically enfranchised communities, whereas Blacks are absent or only nominally present in the remaining 21 communities. Cubans have fared substantially better in acquiring access to communities that exert some modicum of control over local resources. It should be noted that Cubans exercise control over local government in the largest municipalities in the metropolitan area, i.e., Miami and Hialeah. Thus, Cubans are acquiring political control over an increasing share of the population.

If we accept Clark's (1987) position that the observed race/ethnic patterns of spatial clustering reflects ethnic specific preferences, then it is reasonable to argue that these preferences extend beyond efforts to control the ethnic/racial make up of neighborhoods to stratification in the workplace as well. Although Clark views the observed demographic restructuring based on production shifts, we are unconvinced that this is true in the Miami case, for those who manipulate the former are also thought to manipulate the latter. In a southern metropolitan area with a history of race relations that distinguishes it from most of the nation, we conclude that race continues to represent an element influencing the position of Blacks in the local economy, and the larger social order as well. At the same time, we acknowledge the difficulty of providing conclusive evidence of the credibility of our position.

Blacks residing in the core communities previously described as declining are not reluctant to attribute the position in which they find themselves to continuing acts of injustice (Porter and Dunn 1983). For it was in the core communities of Liberty City (1980) and Overtown (1982) that the only two major urban riots since the late 1960's have occurred. The Liberty City riot of 1980 was said to be unusually brutal, as White persons randomly passing through the area during the height of the riot were dragged from their vehicles and viciously attacked. It has also been said that the Miami riots, unlike those occurring in the sixties, bore a number of the characteristics associated with traditional race riots (Porter and Dunn 1983). Cuban's were not immune from attack as their business were often targeted for destruction.

Evidence suggests that while race may play a less prominent role today in governing the relationship between Blacks and Whites, the strength of that role should not be underestimated especially in situations where the gap between the Black have-nots and the White haves becomes exaggerated, as is the case in Miami. The fixity of race, while not always apparent, continues to play a role in how resources are allocated. Prager (1987) contends that the current public restraint in addressing the race issue is related to the lack of an appropriate language with which to address the issue. Blacks in Miami, however, have adopted a language, appropriate or not, and are not likely to let the issue disappear, without engaging in unwanted violent behavior. Thus, as old attitudes continue to manifest themselves in the manner in which police interact with Blacks, in the way the judicial system addresses Black concerns, and in the general feeling that Blacks have been consciously left out of the system. The fire of continuing intergroup conflict continues to burn.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Metropolitan Miami has belatedly assumed a position as a leading sunbelt growth center. More than this it has become a cosmopolitan center which

ranks alongside New York and Los Angeles in terms of its international character. But unlike its southern and non-southern peers its transformation has occurred over a much shorter time interval. It is generally understood as the character of place changes (e.g., its economic function; its population composition), the population present prior to the onset of that change may need to make both major and minor adjustments. In light of the changes that have been underway in metropolitan Dade over the prior twenty five years we have chosen to direct our attention to how these changes have effected native Blacks compared with the newcomer Cuban population.

The Cuban presence in the metropolitan area, prior to 1959, was nominal. At that point in history Blacks were the predominant minority population. But the political tumult in Cuba, only 140 miles away, would change that as U.S. immigration policy, and subsequently its refugee provision, would provide some opportunity for those wishing to leave Cuba to settle in the United States. Thus, Miami became the major port of debarkation and place of final residence for a sizeable share of those Cubans who chose to join the exodus. It was this exodus that was to lead Dade County to take on a more cosmopolitan character. That exodus ultimately played a major role in the acceleration of the transformation of the local economy. Our primary interest has been in how these changes have affected the position of Blacks, who happened to be placed in the role of passive actors in an international drama, set against a backdrop of ideological challenge, i.e., capitalism versus communism. The Miami drama clearly illustrates how political turmoil beyond our borders can have more than a modest influence on U.S. population centers in close proximity to nations beleaguered by internal conflict.

The Cuban population in Miami has grown from fewer than 50,000 in 1960 to a population that approached a half million in 1980. A third wave of Cuban immigrants (125,000) arrived a short time after the census date in 1980, and it is estimated that upwards of seventy five percent remained in Dade County (Portes and Stepick 1985). During the twenty years following the initial Cuban entry, the county's Black population also continued to grow, although growth slowed appreciably during the height of Cuban arrival. By 1980, Cubans and Blacks made up 53 percent of the metropolitan area's population, a share which could be expected to increase as Anglos are said to be withdrawing to the less Latin Broward and Palm Beach counties to the north (Winsberg 1983). A future scenario showing Cubans, more recent arrivals from elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean, and native Blacks at the lower end of the economic totem pole, does not appear unrealistic. Anglo dominance at the upper end seems assured, but that dominance is not likely to go unchallenged. It is currently believed that the Miami economy is substantially fueled by capital derived from the illicit drug trade, a sector of the economy which is said to be dominated by Cubans and Columbians.

As Miami's economy becomes more internationally oriented and develops a stronger third world flavor, what will this mean for Black Americans? While the Cuban population has grown rapidly and has come to play an integral role in the growth and development of the economy, can it continue to provide economic opportunity for new arrivals? Despite the success of the enclave economy in promoting opportunity, it seems that a sizeable segment of that population occupies only a marginal position in the economy. Jorge and Moncartz (1987) describes the Cuban income distribution as bi-modal, and as a result of the growth of the population at the lower end of the distribution little progress has been made in raising the group's median income since 1979. This position finds additional support in the work of Portes and Stepick (1985) which analyzes the progress of the most recent

entrants, i.e., the Marielitos and Haitian boatpeople. They state that "without significant exception, these results confirm the characterization of recent Cuban and Haitian refugees as heavily disadvantaged groups even relative to their respective immigrant communities" (Portes and Stepick 1985, pp. 497-498).

There is little evidence to demonstrate that the emergence of the enclave economy has directly benefited Blacks, although apparently it has proven to be a beneficial strategy in support of Cuban workers in whom little human capital has been invested and/or who seek refuge in a work place where the Spanish language constitutes the normative medium of expression. It has been suggested that if the Black enclave economy was more robust, it could perform a similar role in the Black community, as that performed by the Cuban enclave (Wilson and Martin 1982). But the historical position of Blacks in American society works against that possibility. Furthermore, Sanders and Nee (1987) demonstrated that there are limits to which the enclave economy can be expected to absorb increasing numbers of new labor force entrants. While the enclave economy is often viewed as a viable strategy for reducing interethnic competition in the labor market, there are those who view this as an exploitative strategy. The growth of the informal economy in Miami (see Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987) further demonstrates the limits of the enclave economy, and the need to devise additional survival strategies to provide support for the third wave of Cuban immigrants.

There is little doubt, however, that the older Black core communities could benefit from the establishment of a larger number of enclave establishments. But that goal is not easily attained as external agencies appear to dictate the terms under which such a possibility may become a reality. Yet without such a network of establishments operated by friends and relatives, Blacks youth will encounter difficulty in plugging in to social networks that count in placing new labor force entrants (Freedman 1985). Portes (1987) also demonstrates that part of the success of the Cuban enclave is its preference for hiring co-nationals. As the volume of prospective workers continues to enlarge an increasing number of third world survival strategies tend to be incorporated into the functioning of the metropolitan economy.

Blacks in the older core communities have not fared well in the metropolitan economy during the previous twenty-five years. Since this group constitutes upward of one-fourth of all Blacks in the metropolitan area this imposes a potentially unstable situation and one that is to manifest itself in increasing intergroup tensions. Conditions can be expected to worsen if the economies of Central American and Caribbean nations show little progress in the future. Now that the U.S. is prepared to normalize its immigration policy with Cuba, we can anticipate further growth of that population in Metropolitan Dade County. Under conditions of increasing population growth, with the bulk of that growth contingent on changing political stability in Central America, it would not be reasonably illogical to assume that the position of Blacks in the lower half of the income distribution will be enhanced.

Since Florida represents one of the faster growing states in the nation, largely as result of the migration decisions made by persons from the Northeast and Middle West, the state's other metropolitan areas are outstripping Miami in terms of growth. Under these circumstances it would appear that a viable survival strategy for some Blacks would be to seek opportunity in selected growth centers elsewhere in the state. Otherwise, they too will need to seek protection in the growing informal economy that is establishing itself in Miami.

1. Throughout this paper the population described in Census reports as Spanish Origin will serve as a surrogate for the Cuban population. Clearly this practice represents a weakness, but because much of our attention is focused on small areas, the damage should be minimal. Furthermore, the Census does not identify persons of Cuban origin in its 1960 report. In 1980, however, the Cuban origin population accounted for more than 70 percent of the Spanish origin population.

2. In selected instances individual communities represent Census designated places, e.g., Gladeview, West Little River, and may not conform to the labels employed by residents. For instance the Gladeview and Brownsville census designated areas are in fact surrogates for the Liberty City-Brownsville configuration.

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TABLE 1

The Position of Primary Black and Cuban Communities
on the Resource Ladder - 1980

	Black Communities	Cuban Communities
Lower one-third of the Income Distribution	Miami Brownsville Gladeview Opalocka Perrine Homestead S. Miami Naranja Princeton	Miami Beach
Middle one-third of the Income Distribution	West little River Pinewood Carol City Richmond Heights S. Miami Heights	Miami Hialeah Carol City Leisure City N. Miami Coral Terrace West Little River S. Miami Heights

Upper one-third
of the Income
Distribution

Norland
Scott Lake

Coral Gables
Kendall
Kendale Lakes
Olympia Heights
Westchester
Tamiami

Source: Computed by author from 1980 Census Reports

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