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Ethnic Visibility, Context, and Xenophobia: A European Perspective

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Sociology

by

Shabnam Shenasi Azari

2014

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Ethnic Visibility, Context, and Xenophobia: A European Perspective

by

Shabnam Shenasi Azari

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of California, Los Angeles, 2014

Professor Min Zhou, Co-chair

Professor Jennie Brand, Co-chair

The purpose of this study is to answer the following overarching question: *how does ethnic diversity among immigrant and native populations impact xenophobia?* Many studies answer this question by examining the effects of relative immigrant group size. Instead, I argue that group size increases xenophobia when immigrants are ethnically visible, crossing salient linguistic, religious, or racial boundaries. In three investigations I look at the effects of the following factors on xenophobia: ethnic diversity in the immigrant population, ethnic diversity in the broader society, and being cultural marginal. Analyzing multilevel models using cross-national data from the European Social Survey (ESS), I examine the effects of regional and national contexts of immigrant visibility on xenophobia. I define xenophobia as the perception of immigrant threat. I also test the hypothesis that average xenophobia is higher among individuals living in more ethnically diverse countries. In the second investigation, I reexamine

immigrant visibility, this time using Swiss ESS data to compare across municipalities. I also

consider the effects of living adjacent to rather than in an immigrant-rich community. In a final

investigation, I again analyze cross-national ESS data to determine the effects of being different

from the cultural majority on xenophobia.

I find that xenophobia is higher among individuals living in more religiously diverse

countries. Also, for those living in communities with few to no immigrants, the presence of

immigrants in surrounding areas amplifies xenophobia. Comparing across countries and regions

within those countries, I find that the size of the ethnically visible population does not affect

xenophobia. However, immigrant visibility *does* increase xenophobia in the Swiss context. All

other things equal, cultural minority and majority members do not appear to differ in their levels

of xenophobia. However, individuals who *perceive* marginality tend to be *more* xenophobic than

those who do not. The interesting exception is religious minority members, who are least

xenophobic, but only when they perceive marginality.

The findings cast doubt on the size argument of group threat theory, which predicts that

xenophobia is higher where there are more immigrants. Even when measured in terms of the

most ethnically visible and potentially most culturally threatening, immigrant group size does not

explain cross-national differences in individual xenophobia. It seems to explain attitudes in

some national contexts, but not others. Group size may only evoke perceptions of immigrant

threat under certain necessary conditions as an interaction effect. Living adjacent to immigrant-

rich communities amplifies xenophobia, but in a way that is partly attributable to contact.

Counter to the predictions of cultural marginality theory, being culturally different does not

universally lead one to espouse more tolerant views toward immigrants. The religious exception

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may stem from increased contact with immigrants, rather than simply the increased sympathy for other marginalized peoples implied by cultural marginality theory.

The dissertation of Shabnam Shenasi Azari is approved.

Andreas Wimmer

David O. Sears

Min Zhou, Committee Co-chair

Jennie Brand, Committee Co-chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2014

To my family, for their love and support throughout the years.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my co-chairs, Min Zhou and Jennie Brand, for their guidance and support. I really appreciated their feedback, understanding, and guidance throughout the dissertation process. I am grateful to the other members of my committee, Andreas Wimmer and David O. Sears, for their time and feedback. I would also like to thank the UCLA Statistical Consulting Group and Christine Wells, PhD, in particular for advising me on statistical, methodological, and software-related issues. I thank the California Center for Population Research for providing me additional statistical guidance and access to necessary statistical software. I am also grateful to staff members at the Swiss Federal Statistical Office for being helpful and responsive to my questions and data requests.

My intellectual journey has been a long one. I started out as an undergraduate student intending to be a medical doctor, but found my passion in the social sciences and, ultimately, sociology. The field of immigration is a personal one to me. It is a fascinating phenomenon in part because it seems to always involve hope—hope for political freedom; economic success; a better future for one's children; escape from war; and, overall, a better life. It often also requires the courage to step into the unknown. Who knows who I would have become had my parents not decided to take the risk? Through stimulating courses at UCLA and a master's thesis that focused on the intersections of religion, ethnicity, and discrimination, I eventually found where my intellectual interests lie. I strive to understand the connections between immigration, integration, and race and ethnicity. In my dissertation, by looking at xenophobia I get to understand part of the reception context that can complicate the integration of immigrants into their new homes.

Curriculum Vitae

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EDUCATION

University of California, Los Angeles
  M.A., Sociology, September 2008
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Shenasi Azari, Shabnam. "Immigrant Visibility and Xenophobia in Switzerland."

CONFERENCE PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: IMMIGRATION AND NATIVE RECEPTION OF IMMIGRANTS

Introduction

For a long time scholars have tried to determine the factors that lead people to harbor more negative attitudes toward immigrants. There are many good reasons for this concern. Anti-immigrant attitudes can sometimes lead to outbreaks of xenophobic violence. From 2000 to 2006, recorded racist and xenophobic violence increased in eight European countries (Human Rights First 2008:1). Widespread xenophobic sentiment can lead to pervasive discriminatory treatment and prejudice that ultimately blocks the integration of immigrants into the receiving society. Such a negative reception context can lead to downward assimilation and reactive identities (Portes and Zhou 1993). Whether in the interest of democratic principles, promoting social cohesion, or some other reason, understanding the roots of xenophobia is as important (if not more) today as it was during the older migrations of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Many studies revolve around the question of ethnic diversity affects xenophobia. Measuring ethnic diversity in terms of immigrant group size, some argue that people living in more diverse societies feel less threatened by immigrants. Based on contact theory, they say geographic proximity to immigrants makes intergroup contact more likely and positive contact with an immigrant leads to a reduction in prejudice toward immigrants in general. Others say immigrant group size amplifies anti-immigrant attitudes. How so? According to the competitive threat perspective, individuals see immigrants as competitors over jobs, housing, and other material goods. According to the group threat perspective, anti-immigrant attitudes emerge

when the native majority sees immigrants as a threat to its collective interests, be they economic,

political, or cultural. For decades, scholars have tried to better understand xenophobia by

debating the effects of immigrant group size.

Findings in support of the size argument have been mixed. Many studies find a positive

effect for national immigrant group size (e.g., Coenders and Scheepers 1998), but many others

find no effect at (Kunovich 2004). Regional- and more local-level measures of overall

immigrant group size are more often found to be negatively related to xenophobia (Wagner et al.

2006). Even then, some studies find a positive (Schlueter and Davidov 2013), curvilinear

(Wagner et al. 2006), or no effect (Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2011). This leads some

scholars to conclude that immigrant group size may be only weakly related to attitudes toward

immigrants and immigration (e.g., Ceobanu and Escandell 2010) and some others to say that

national and regional immigrant group sizes may have differing impacts on anti-immigrant

attitudes (Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2011). The debate over the importance of

immigrant group size as a predictor of xenophobia continues.

Within this literature, some have suggested that only the size of more culturally different

immigrants impacts anti-immigrant attitudes. Several studies assess the effect of cultural

difference by measuring immigrant group size as the share of non-EU or non-Western citizens in

a country. At most these measures capture only a broad degree of cultural difference, but also

economic and citizenship disadvantages. Fewer studies closely consider the effects of the ethnic

composition of the immigrant population on xenophobia. Those that do examine the effects of

the shares of Muslims (Green, Fasel and Sarrasin 2010; Hjerm 2009; Hjerm and Nagayoshi

2011), the linguistically unassimilated (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011), or specific national groups

in a country, region, or community. A growing body of research connects Muslim group size to

perceptions of threat and anti-Muslim sentiment, but what is missing is a framework for considering the effects of immigrant ethnic or cultural visibility in a way that is both fine-grained and measurable in a cross-national context. In my dissertation I examine the effects of the size of the ethnically "visible" immigrant population. I use the concept of visibility to refer to immigrants that cross salient linguistic, religious, or racial boundaries. Aside from the racially visible, such immigrants are not necessarily easily seen, but are conspicuous because of their accents, names, religious garb, and potentially other ethnic markers.

Many historical examples suggest that the presence of immigrants that cross salient linguistic, religious, or racial boundaries evokes more xenophobia than does the presence of immigrants deemed to be more culturally similar. In Italy during the 1980s and 1990s, anti-immigrant hostilities did not the target the many Europeans that came to the country, but the much smaller number of North and East Africans who came during that time (Gabaccia 2000:170). According to Lucassen (2005), the current situation facing Turks and North Africans in France and other parts of Western Europe is not different from the one faced by Irish migrants to Britain during the first half of the nineteenth century. Pre-existing stereotypes and prejudices about Catholics as being backward racially and socially, stimulated by a heated anti-Catholic campaign, fueled the fire for many bouts of anti-Catholic violence and rioting during the early 1950s and again in the 1960s (Lucassen 2005). Today, the most frequent victims of xenophobic violence and discrimination in Western Europe are those of Afro-Caribbean, North African, and Sub-Saharan African descent, as well as Roma and Sinti (Human Rights First 2008:1). These historical examples illustrate how the presence of more ethnically visible immigrants can lead to higher xenophobia.

It is important to look at ethnic diversity in more than just broad strokes and in ways that may be generalizable to other societies and time periods. In the present study I test the size argument about ethnic diversity in four primary ways. First, I measure immigrant diversity in terms of the share of immigrants that are visible, crossing salient boundaries of language, religion, or race. Second, I measure the effects of diversity in a country at large. Third, I look at the effects of adjacent to but not in communities with many immigrants. Expanding on studies of electoral support for xenophobic parties, I test whether individuals are more fearful of immigrants just beyond the borders of their own communities than of the ones next door. Fourth, I reverse the focus of ethnic diversity and ask whether *culturally marginal* nonimmigrants are less xenophobic than their majority counterparts. That is, I ask whether domestic ethnic minority members, religious minority members, or those who feel marginalized are less xenophobic. Through such studies it will be possible to gain a better understanding of the effects of ethnic diversity on xenophobia.

To fully understand the effects of immigrant group size, we need to use more fine-grained measures of ethnic diversity in the immigrant population. We also need to move beyond measures of immigrant presence simply in the area of residence. By considering the interactions between immigrant group size in neighboring communities and the area of residence, we can better understand the contact and conflict dynamics that shape xenophobia. By testing cultural marginality theory we can see whether being cultural marginal leads one to espouse more tolerant views toward immigrants. This dissertation uses two large cross-national datasets and one national dataset to examine these issues and better understand how and in what ways ethnic diversity affects xenophobia.

Theoretical Background

Contact Theory

Contact theory emerged as far back as the 1930s when scholars and other writers began to investigate the effects of interracial contact. Contact theory predicts that having direct contact with a member of an outgroup leads to reduction in individual prejudice toward the entire outgroup. Through a meta-analysis of over 500 studies spanning 38 countries, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) offer convincing evidence that intergroup contact has a lowering effect on prejudice toward the target group.[1] They find this effect persists after they account for publication biases and participant selection. Contact theory applies to any target outgroup, including homosexuals, the disabled, and the chronically ill. The magnitude of the effect depends on the target group in question, but the result of prejudice-reduction is the same. Furthermore, Pettigrew and Tropp's results show that contact *causes* prejudice reduction. Studies have shown that prejudiced people tend to avoid intergroup contact (Herek and Capitanio 1996). However, the path from contact to prejudice reduction is generally much stronger (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Van Dick et al. 2004).

Studies since Allport's (1954) seminal work have led to the elaboration of contact theory. Allport outlined four optimal conditions for successful intergroup contact—equal status, cooperation, similar goals, and official endorsement. Pettigrew and Tropp's (2006) findings suggest these are *facilitating* conditions, but not essential for prejudice reduction to occur.[2]

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[1] Note that all the studies included in their sample had direct measures of contact, not indirect ones such as national immigrant group size. 94 percent of the samples analyzed supported contact theory.

[2] The negative effect of contact on prejudice still exists but more weakly when those conditions are not operating (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006:761). Furthermore, these conditions function together rather than as entirely separate factors (2006:766). For instance, institutional support for contact under conditions of unequal status or competition can lead to increased hostility between groups and, consequently, less potential for prejudice reduction (Sherif 1966).

Several studies show contact with an outgroup member can lead to reduced prejudice not just toward that outgroup but toward other outgroups not involved in the original contact (Pettigrew 2009).[3] Intergroup contact also often leads to greater trust and a more differentiated view of the outgroup in question (Pettigrew et al. 2011:276). Positive intergroup contact reduces prejudice by reducing anxiety over interacting with outgroup members (Blascovich et al. 2001; Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton and Tropp 2008) and increasing empathy (Pettigrew et al. 2011:277).[4] Instances of negative intergroup contact *can* lead to increases in prejudice, but occur less commonly than do positive intergroup contact and friendship (Pettigrew 2008:196). Negative intergroup contact typically occurs when the participants do no choose to enter the interaction and feel threatened (Pettigrew and Tropp 2013). The effects of negative contact are much smaller when the contact is voluntary (Pettigrew and Tropp 2013: 277). Finally, intergroup contact is more likely to lead to prejudice reduction when the contact is not superficial and salience of the group is sufficiently high (Pettigrew et al. 2011:276).

Conflict Theories

Competitive threat theory posits that xenophobia and racism arise from an "intensive rivalry" between migrant and native groups over individual goods such as jobs and cheap housing (Wimmer 1997:19). Individuals are assumed to be rational actors that act to maximize their own economic self-interests. The perceived threat is to individual rather than collective interests. Poor economic conditions can amplify feelings of hostility toward immigrants since they intensify competition over scarce resources (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Coenders and

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[3] For example, Pettigrew (1997) found that Germans who had positive contact with Turks revealed more favorable views of Turks but also of West Indians.

[4] Knowledge is also a mediator, but only a minor one (Pettigrew et al. 2011:277).

Scheepers 1998). There is substantial evidence that negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are most prevalent among economically vulnerable segments of the native population, such as the socioeconomically disadvantaged, low or unskilled manual laborers, the unemployed, and pensioners (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010:319). Considering that immigrants in developed countries are often nonspecialists (Scheve and Slaughter 2001), this general finding fits the competitive threat framework: the individuals most hostile to immigrants and immigration are those who potentially stand the most to lose from immigrant presence.

According to group threat theory, xenophobia arises from competition over *collective* goods and relative group position. The competition is not over jobs or housing, but over access to certain scarce resources, privileges, and status by virtue of one's group membership. According to this formulation, xenophobia arises when collective economic, cultural, or religious interests are threatened (Fetzer 2000a; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002). Immigrant presence need not threaten the xenophobe's own ability to get a job; rather, the "immigrant threat" is a threat to *his* country's culture and the ability of his countrymen to make a living.[5] Blumer (1958) makes a similar point when discussing the roots of racial prejudice in the U.S. From this perspective, xenophobia arises when immigrants are seen as *illegitimate* competitors, taking jobs and state resources that do not "belong" to them. According to the group threat perspective, xenophobia arises from the fear that immigrants could alter the prevailing way of life or foundation of national identity (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999).

Within the group threat perspective scholars differ on whether anti-immigrant attitudes are based on real competition. According to 'realistic group threat theory' school (Bobo 1983; Sears and Jessor 1996), such hostile attitudes arise from real experiences and interests. Others from the group threat perspective say it only matters whether the circumstances are *perceived* as

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[5] This includes access to jobs and housing but also state-provided such as social welfare benefits.

threatening, not whether immigrants have a "real" negative impact on the host society.

Empirical studies with the latter perspective use subjective indicators (Fetzer 2000a; McLaren

2003), such as perceptions of one's financial situation, while studies grounded in the former use

objective indicators (Bobo 1988; Quillian 1995), such as the unemployment rate. Drawing from

realistic group threat theory, Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) say that even if xenophobia is based

on purely imagined threats immigrants pose to natives' collective interests, it may still have

objective *sources* (2011:817). According to this view, certain conditions can lead members of

the majority group to view immigrants or immigration as threatening to the resources they

already have. Thus, xenophobia need not be related to real threats—how immigrants impact a

society is difficult to determine and a constant topic of debate—but can be based on real *sources*

of potential threat, such as the size of the low-skilled immigrant population (economic threat).

This dissertation looks at the ethnic visible population size as an objective *source* of potential

cultural threat.

Social Identity Theory

Aside from the contact- and conflict-based explanations of xenophobia, another

prominent perspective is based on symbolic interests, such as values and personal identifications.

According to social identity theory (Tajfel 1982), individuals tend to identify in groups. They

come to view their own groups positively and associate negative characteristics with outgroups.

This process of social identification and contra-identification leads to negative attitudes toward

outsiders (Mummendey, Klink and Brown 2001). The outgroups come to be seen as inimical to

ingroup values and traditions. One line of empirical studies motivated by this theory looks at the

relationship between nationalism and xenophobia (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; De Figueiredo

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and Elkins 2003; Hjerm 1998; Luedtke 2005). These studies distinguish between the effects of different aspects of national identity on xenophobia. Some studies report findings that go against this theory (Billiet, Maddens and Beerten 2003; Maddens, Billiet and Beerten 2000). A common criticism in this line of research pertains to the direction of causality—anti-immigrant attitude or prejudice can lead one to develop more restrictive conceptions of nationhood and citizenship.

More recently, Coenders, Scheepers, and their colleagues have come up with a theory that combines elements of contact and social identity theories. According to their ethnic group conflict theory, intergroup competition at the individual and contextual levels may reinforce the processes of social identification and contra-identification (Coenders and Scheepers 2008:3). When intergroup competition increases, members of the majority group will tend to identify more strongly with one another and increasingly view the immigrant outgroup negatively. Studies that do not necessarily use this theory find supportive evidence that symbolic factors and personal contact have more consequential influence on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration than do socioeconomic aspects or material interests (McLaren 2003; Sides and Citrin 2007; Wilkes, Guppy and Farris 2008).

Cultural Marginality Theory

Cultural marginality theory predicts that—*all else being equal*—those who are culturally marginalized will be more sympathetic toward other marginalized groups and thereby more tolerant toward immigrants (Fetzer 2000b:7).[6] This differs from the views of Myrdal, Sterner and Rose (1944) and Allport (1954), who both explain why "outsider solidarity" *could* happen, but do not state that it always does. Fetzer conceptualizes marginality as the condition of sharing

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[6] In his book, Fetzer (2000a) adds another element to this theory: he says that the native majority will be more threatened by immigrants and immigration when immigrants are culturally very different. My study does not test that part of his theory.

a trait that results in discrimination, ridicule, public hostility, or persecution (2000a:5). Fetzer

(2000b) distinguishes between economic and cultural marginality, the latter which he measures

in terms of racial, ethnic, and religious minority status. The experience of marginality leads one

to feel solidarity with other marginalized peoples. The strength of this solidarity depends on how

marginalized the individual feels. Since it is multivariately stipulated, cultural marginality

theory can be seen as a complement rather than alternative to contact- and conflict-based

explanations of xenophobia.

Findings on the effects of ethnicity, religion, and race on xenophobia are mixed. Hayes

and Dowds find that, net of demographic factors and immigrant contact, Catholics (the religious

minority) in Northern Ireland are more likely than Protestants to welcome immigrants and to

endorse the view that they 'would not mind at all' if a close relative were to marry an immigrant

(2006:472). Fetzer (2000b) finds that non-Catholics in France, as well as Catholics and Jews in

the U.S. are less supportive of nativist political movements and harbor less anti-immigration

sentiment than do those with other religious affiliations in those countries. Black Americans do

not differ significantly from whites in their levels of anti-immigration sentiment but were less

likely than White Americans to vote for Proposition 187, alongside Latinos and Asian

Americans[7]. Knoll (2009) finds that Jews and Mormons in the U.S. are more likely than

mainstream Protestants to favor legalization of immigrants over guest worker programs or

deportation. However, McDaniel and colleagues (2011) find that evangelical Protestants (a

religious minority) in the U.S. are *more* anti-immigrant than both Catholics and mainline

Protestants because they are more likely to espouse Christian nationalism, which sees God as

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[7] Net of foreign origin, Latinos were the least likely to support Proposition 187, followed by African-Americans and Asian-Americans. Those who marked "other race" did not differ from whites in their responses. These analyses are based on the November 1994 *Los Angeles Times* Exit Poll. Proposition 187 would have prohibited undocumented immigrants from using health care, public education, and other social services in California.

having a divine design on the U.S. and Christianity as having a prominent role in what it means to be an American. This suggests that Christian nationalism, rather than religious minority status, explains differences by religious affiliation in xenophobia. Past studies provide mixed support for the effects of being part of an ethnic, religious, or racial minority on anti-immigrant sentiment.

Cultural marginality theory can be seen as having predictions that go against group conflict explanations of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. According to a group conflict perspective, the more immigrants jeopardize or are perceived to jeopardize another group's position (political, racial, cultural, etc.) in the host society, the more negatively members of that other group will regard immigrants. In the Russian context, Alexseev (2010) compares the attitudes of ethnic Russians and members of several minority groups—"ethnic non-Russians"—toward immigrants and immigration. He finds that across the board ethnic Russians are the more xenophobic. However, *within* the group of ethnic non-Russians, members of *titular* ethnic minorities—who reside in provinces that bear their name (such as Tatars in Tatarstan)—are nearly as xenophobic as ethnic Russians by most measures. Titular ethnic minority members are also more against the immigration of ethnic Russians (from neighboring post-Soviet republics) than are ethnic Russians. Members of a titular ethnic group view immigration, particularly of ethnic Russians, as threatening to their respective group's privileged political status. This example illustrates how at least in some cases members of ethnic minorities may be more likely to view immigrants with suspicion and antagonism than solidarity. Further research is needed to determine how cultural marginality theory holds up to competing explanations of xenophobia.

Empirical Findings from Existing Research

In this study I consider the effects of immigrant ethnic visibility on xenophobia. Some scholars have proposed that the share of culturally more different immigrants increases anti-immigrant attitudes. However, up to now, more of these European studies have chosen to represent immigrant ethnic visibility in terms of non-EU or non-Western citizenship. The problem is that this is a very broad measure that raises more questions than it answers. Some scholars use more fine-grained measures of ethnic diversity, such as Muslim population size (Green, Fasel and Sarrasin 2010; Hjerm 2009; Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011). I argue that immigrant ethnic visibility is positively associated with xenophobia; that is, controlling for overall immigrant group size, when more immigrants in a state, region, or locale stand out ethnically, the average level of xenophobia among individuals is higher. I measure visibility in terms of language, religion, and race. When immigrants stand out in any of these ways, I argue, they are more likely to be seen as a cultural threat and blamed for societal ills. In what follows, I discuss literature that shows why linguistic, religious, and racial visibility in the immigrant population may lead to more xenophobia among host society inhabitants. After this discussion, I review findings on immigrant group size, both when measured more generally and as the share of visible immigrants.

Linguistic Visibility

When sizeable portions of the immigrant population do not speak the country's language or languages well, overall attitudes toward immigrants may be more hostile. Language is a strong marker of culture. Esser (2006) finds it is one of the best predictors of integration

outcomes. Immigrants that speak the common language poorly may be seen as more foreign and perhaps even *unwilling* to assimilate. Paxton and Mughan (2006) find that natives feel threatened when immigrant minorities do not assimilate. They argue that assimilation is a key element of cultural threat. When looking at the remarks of Dutch participants in a group discussion, Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) find that the majority felt uncomfortable when participants spoke other languages in front of them. When immigrants do not predominantly speak the common language or speak it well, they may be seen as more threatening culturally.

Religious Visibility

Today, many Europeans perceive a serious cleavage between liberalistic–or perhaps Christian–and Islamic values (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Historically, immigrants to the U.S. have achieved social and civic integration by participating in ethnic churches (Hirschman 2004). However, in Europe, Muslim immigrants are seen as challenging longstanding secular traditions. According to Kastoryano, this confrontation "is one that blurs the accepted boundaries between private and public" (2004:1235). Werbner suggests that, at a group level, secularism, not Christianity, is most threatened by Islam (2005:8) . This is seen in the controversies that have arisen over the use of the headscarf in various countries, notably France and Germany.[8] It is also evident in Connor's finding that in Western Europe public forms of religion (religious attendance, prayer) are more strongly associated with perceived immigrant threat than are the more private elements (2010:394).[9] From this, one can conclude that Muslims

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[8] Also, see cases of discrimination based on the headscarf in Canada and the United States.

[9] In his study Muslim immigrant religiosity is the *outcome* variable and "immigrant receptivity"—measured as perceived immigrant threat—is the predictor. It is also likely that more public religiosity leads to more hostile immigrant reception. On balance, the effects probably operate in both directions. Lucassen (2005) indicates that some Turkish immigrants in Germany became more religious than they had been in Turkey, perhaps as a "defensive reaction to the categorization as the 'essentialized ethnic other'" (2005:167).

are highly visible in part because they are seen as threatening European secular tradition and the cultural dominance of Christianity.

The elevated threat associated with religious visibility is not limited to the Muslim immigrants of today, nor is it a new phenomenon. According to Lucassen (2005), the experiences of Irish migrants to Britain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are similar to the situations faced by more recent groups such as Turks and North Africans in Western Europe. Specifically, they share common elements of low social status, the discourse on primitive races, "deviant" religion, and extreme nationalism (2005:48). During the "old" migrations, migrants who "crossed salient political, linguistic, and religious borders" often encountered discrimination, negative stereotyping, and, occasionally, violence (2005:27). Although the Irish were part of the British Empire, their migration was seen as an alien invasion (2005:29). The Irish migrants spoke English, but with a strong recognizable accent (2005:28-9). They were poor, and some had nationalist aspirations. Many deemed the Irish migrants socially and politically threatening, above all because they followed Catholicism. According to Lucassen, religion was the "most enduring, salient, and explosive ingredient of the anti-Irish mixture" (2005:41). Anti-Catholicism and negative stereotypes about the Irish had been around a long time. As Irish migrants started arriving in the 1830s, hostile environments grew in the areas where they settled (2005:40). In the early 1850s the Orange order, a prominent Protestant fraternal organization, used to spread anti-Catholic propaganda and hold marches in Irish Catholic cities and neighborhoods under the guise of patriotism expressly to provoke Catholic reactions. In the 1860s Protestant antipapal lecturers would tour the country, delivering scathing religious attacks on Catholicism in a "furious" style rife with offensive language (2005:43). These efforts spawned unrest and anti-Irish rioting in the 1850s and 1860s (2005:42-3). Irish

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migrants to Britain constitute one prime example from the old European migrations of how the most religiously visible immigrants can become targets of anti-immigrant attitudes and hostilities.[10]

Racial Visibility

Many scholars argue that race does not operate in the European context or at least not to the same extent. In many European countries, including France and Germany, race is not an acceptable terminology. In Britain today, state policies no longer construct difference and diversity in terms of "race relations" but rather in terms of "faith."[11] At least in Western Europe, a discursive shift has occurred whereby biologically-grounded racial categories have "increasingly given way to a wider presupposition of cultural difference as the fundamental and immutable basis of identity and belonging" (Silverstein 2005:365-66). Whether due to perceptions of immutable cultural or racial difference, some immigrant origins are seen as more threatening than others. Hungarians report somewhat more tolerance toward Chinese immigrants than towards Arabs, Africans, Afghans, or Gypsies, but less than toward most other nationalities (Nyíri 2005:660-61). Canadians report the least comfort toward West Indian blacks, Arabs, Muslims, Indo-Pakistanis, and Sikhs (Berry 2006). Hagendoorn et al. (1998) and Van Oudenhoven, Groenewoud and Hewstone (1996) find a clear preference hierarchy in Europe for different ethno-cultural and immigrant groups.[12] Swedes perceive people from Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand as the most alike and other groups as more socially distant

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[10] Other examples in nineteenth-century Western Europe include Polish migrants to Germany and Italian workers in (the eastern parts of) Switzerland and France (Lucassen 2005:27).

[11] They shifted from addressing "race relations" in the 1950s and 1960s to "ethnicity," "culture," and finally "faith" (Grillo 2010:50).

[12] By ethnic group I am referring to people of immigrant origin but who did not themselves immigrate.

(Hjerm 2005). These measures of tolerance, comfort levels, and perceptions of social distance suggest that some ethnic origins are seen as more foreign and less acceptable than others.

Whether certain groups of immigrants are viewed as culturally inferior or unassimilable, they may still be described with the language of race or seen as phenotypically visible. In the Netherlands, people refer to schools with many first- and second-generation Moroccan and Turks as "black schools" (Lucassen 2005:12). By contrast, the Dutch regard black Surinamese immigrants as far less alien and threatening than Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. The British initially reacted with hostility to West Indian immigrants and other immigrants of color (Lucassen 2005:141).[13] Notably, however, in British, French, and Germany societies West Indians "were perceived as being less alien than the more physically similar immigrants from Asian colonies (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) because of their similarities where religion, language, and other cultural markers were concerned" (2005:140). These findings suggest that immigrants from certain countries of Asia, Africa, and other continents can come to be seen as culturally different, threatening, and phenotypically distinct. The frequent overlap of linguistic, religious, and perceived cultural differences makes it likely that larger shares of racially visible immigrants lead to elevated perceptions of immigrant threat.

While in the U.S. the boundaries of race are particularly salient, in Europe the boundary between Christians and Muslims has become particularly salient. For many, the Islamic threat *is* the immigrant threat. Kastoryano (2004) argues that while in the U.S. Islam constitutes one element of diversity out of many, in Europe it emerges as a "minority religion". Until recently, a

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[13] While this has delayed West Indian integration into British society, it has not fundamentally blocked it (Lucassen 2005:141-2). Still, racial discrimination is evident; West Indian immigrants in Britain faced regular racial profiling. Interestingly, the negative reception of West Indians began to abate when the focus of xenophobia shifted to Muslims and the threat of Islam.

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large majority of immigrants settling in most European countries has been Muslim,[14] and most Western European Muslims are immigrants (Casanova 2007:61). According to Lucassen, color is not as important an organizing principle in Europe, but being Muslim is (2005:210). What exacerbates anti-Muslim prejudice is that in several countries the majority of Muslim immigrants come from a single country or region and are generally of a low socioeconomic status. Consequently, the "immigrant, the religious, the racial, and the socioeconomic disprivileged other all tend to coincide" (Casanova 2007:61).

Just as Poles in Germany were once seen as fundamentally threatening because of their nationalism (Lucassen 2005), Muslim immigrants in some European countries are seen as threatening because of growing transnational political and religious activity among some Muslim communities. This growing transnational element, Kastoryano says, has "led to increased tension and suspicion toward Muslims with respect to their citizenship and where their loyalties lie" (2004:1235). According to Silverstein, Muslims in Europe "remain racially suspect (like Jews and Gypsies before them) as 'witches,' as potential enemies within" (2005:366). Zolberg and Woon (1999) show that in Europe, Muslims have become the central outsiders referred to in discourse surrounding politics of immigration. Transnational religious activity serves many purposes. For some it is a way to maintain connection to family, culture, and the homeland. It can also provide an alternative identity to immigrants that are met with hostility and disdain in the receiving country. Religious identity has also become a means of making demands on the country or on the broader international community. Whatever the case, the transnationalism of Islam in Europe is one additional way Muslims have come to be seen as threatening.

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[14] In France and Great Britain, many were post-colonial migrants and their families. In other countries, economic reconstruction motivated migrations, particularly of Turks to Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, and other European countries (Kastoryano 2004:1234).

Findings on Immigrant Group Size

National Context. The findings on the effects of immigrant presence are inconsistent,

enough so that in their review of literature on negative attitudes toward immigrants Ceobanu and

Escandell (2010) conclude that immigrant presence may be only weakly related to negative

attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Some studies find *no* effect for national

immigrant group size (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Kunovich 2002; Kunovich 2004; Semyonov

and Glikman 2009). Many others find positive effects for national immigrant presence (Ceobanu

2011; Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 2006). [15] At the

national level, relatively fewer studies find a *negative* effect. Thus, when national immigrant

presence *does* have an effect, it seems to support conflict-based explanations of xenophobia.

Regional and Local Contexts. Findings on the effects of regional or more local

immigrant group size rather consistently support the contact hypothesis, though there is still

variation in the findings. Many European studies find a negative effect of local immigrant group

size, in line with expectations based on a generalization of contact theory (e.g., Wagner et al.

2006). Some studies find a positive effect of regional immigrant presence (Schlueter and

Davidov 2013). A number of studies find *no* effect for regional or more local immigrant group

size (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; 2010; O'Neil and Tienda 2010). The bulk of these studies

suggest that regional or more local immigrant group size is negatively related to xenophobia.

Visible Immigrant Group Size. Part of the reason for the discrepancies in the findings on

immigrant group size may because of the many ways group size is measured. Many European

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[15] The outcome variable varies here. The first measures support for ethnic discrimination, Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky (2006) look at perceived immigrant threat, and Ceobanu (2011) at perception of immigrant criminal threat.

studies have measured immigrant group size in terms of the share of non-European foreigners (e.g., Quillian 1995), non-Western foreigners (e.g., Schlueter and Davidov 2013), or all foreigners (e.g., Hjerm 2009). According to group threat theory, host country inhabitants will harbor more anti-immigrant attitudes when immigrants are seen as more of a threat to collective interests. Some interpret this to mean that overall immigrant presence is not threatening but that the share of more culturally different immigrants is. Non-Western and non-EU group sizes are often used as measures of the size of the culturally different immigrant population. However, these are blunt measures that capture cultural difference as much as they do other differences, such as ease of mobility between EU countries afforded EU citizens and not others. It is important to disentangle the effects of overall immigrant group size from those attributable to the presence of particularly visible segments of the immigrant population.

Some studies have looked more closely at the effects of cultural difference or visibility. Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) measure visibility in terms of the size of the population that is not linguistically assimilated, but find no effect. Additional studies have considered the effects of Muslim population size in a country on perceived immigrant threat (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2011; Strabac and Listhaug 2008) and either found a positive (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2011) or no effect (Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Hjerm (2009) considers the effect of the municipal share of immigrants that are perceived as more socially distant in Sweden. He finds a negative effect for this measure of visibility, but *no* effect for overall immigrant group size. Overall, the findings are inconclusive. More work needs to be done in both national and more local contexts to determine whether ethnic visibility, measured in terms of language use, minority religious affiliation, or race, has an effect on xenophobia.

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Central Research Questions

   In this dissertation, I try to better understand how immigrant ethnic visibility, geographic proximity to immigrants, and cultural marginality relate to xenophobia. More broadly speaking, my dissertation investigates the effects on xenophobia of ethnic diversity that comes from the following sources: 1) the immigrant population; 2) broader society; and 3) the nonimmigrant individual. It considers national, regional, and more local contexts of diversity to better understand how contact and threat dynamics inform perceptions of immigrant threat. Altogether, this dissertation addresses the following overarching question: *How does ethnic diversity in immigrant and native populations impact xenophobia?* Each of the substantive chapters aims to address part of this main research question. In Chapter 2 I ask: *How do immigrant ethnic visibility and broader ethnic diversity in a country affect xenophobia?* In Chapter 3 I ask: *What are the effects of immigrant ethnic visibility and living adjacent to a community with many immigrants on xenophobia?* In the Chapter 4 I ask: *Do the culturally marginalized harbor less hostility and fear toward immigrants?*

   My dissertation is based theoretically on both contact and group threat theories. Both contact and threat dynamics inform perceptions of immigrant threat. When nonimmigrants live within close proximity to immigrants, their perceptions of threat are tempered by the prejudice-reducing effects of personal contact. In areas with more immigrants, there are more opportunities for intergroup contact and, thus, xenophobia tends to be lower.

However, where more of the immigrants are ethnically visible, the dominant pattern will support group threat theory. Compared to immigrants as a whole, ethnically visible immigrants will evoke elevated perceptions of threat because nonimmigrants will be more likely to see them as

potential challengers to the traditions, customs, and ideals of the country. Following Hjerm and

Nagayoshi's (2011) interpretation of realistic group threat theory, I posit that objective *sources*

of cultural threat amplify xenophobia among nonimmigrants.

More broadly speaking, this study is grounded in theory about how different people react

to cultural and ethnic difference. By looking at immigrant visibility, I am expanding upon other

studies that measure cultural difference in terms of overall, non-EU, or non-Western immigrant

group size. By looking at nonimmigrant *cultural marginality*, I consider whether members of the

native population who themselves are ethnically or culturally "different" are more tolerant

toward immigrants. It seems intuitively plausible that those who experience discrimination or

prejudice on the basis of race, ethnic, or religion would more strongly sympathize with other

marginalized peoples. The question is whether this explanation is generalizable across countries

and types of cultural marginality. By testing cultural marginality theory, I am testing whether—

contrary to immigrant visibility—*being* culturally marginal leads an individual to harbor less

xenophobia.

Methodologies

Conceptual Discussion

According to Ceobanu and Escandell (2010), one of the problems with research on

attitudes toward immigrants and immigration is the inconsistency of terminology used to refer to

these phenomena. In the interest of clarity, I will define my terms below. This dissertation looks

at the effects of ethnic diversity on *xenophobia*, which I define as a generalized perception of

immigrants as threatening. As Hjerm (2009) points out, the term literally means "fear of

strangers." According to this conceptualization, xenophobia is an attitude with an affective

element. It involves negative attitudes toward a particular category of people, but also fear. That is why I measure it based on attitudes about how immigrants impact the economy, cultural life, and other aspects of the country.

In this dissertation I use the terms *xenophobia* and *perceived immigrant threat* interchangeably. I use the term *xenophobic violence* to refer to violent behavior based on anti-immigrant attitudes. I use *anti-immigrant attitudes* and *anti-immigrant sentiment* as umbrella terms that refer generally to negative attitudes toward immigrants, of which xenophobia is just one measure. By *anti-immigration sentiment* I mean attitudes opposed to immigration or in support of restricting it, not views toward the immigrants themselves.

In this dissertation I use the term *immigrant* to refer to both people who leave their countries of origin to settle in another country and their children. It is a general term that includes both the first and second generation. I use the terms *foreigners* and *foreign nationals* to refer to host country inhabitants who do not have host country citizenship. By *foreign-born* I am referring to first generation immigrants, regardless of citizenship status. I use the terms *natives* and *nonimmigrants* to refer to people who were born in the country of residence to parents who were both native-born as well. Such individuals can still have an immigrant background, but will be considerably removed from the immigrant experience.

Data

In three analytic chapters, I investigate the relationships between ethnic diversity, geographic proximity of immigrants, and xenophobia using hierarchical linear modeling. In Chapter 2, I estimate three-level models of individuals nested in subnational regions and countries to determine the effects of immigrant visibility and broader societal diversity on

xenophobia. I use cross-national data from the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS),

collected from 2002 to 2003, which I supplement with regional- and country-level demographic

data from other sources.[16] In Chapter 3, I estimate two-level models of individuals nested in

municipalities to determine the effects of immigrant visibility and of living adjacent to an

immigrant-dense municipality. Analyses for that chapter are based on restricted-use data from

the first round of the Swiss ESS. In Chapter 4, I test the effects of cultural marginality using

cross-national data from the fourth round of the ESS (ESS Round 4), the data for which were

collected from 2008 to 2009.

Hypotheses

      The analytic chapters are structured around hypotheses designed to help answer the

central research questions. The hypotheses are listed below by chapter.

Chapter 2: *How do immigrant ethnic visibility and broader ethnic diversity in the country affect*

xenophobia?

      (H1): Immigrant visibility is positively related to xenophobia.

      (H2): Ethnic diversity is positively related to xenophobia.

Chapter 3: *What are the effects of immigrant ethnic visibility and living adjacent to a community*

with many immigrants on xenophobia?

      (H1): I expect to find a "halo effect" of immigrant group size on xenophobia.

      Specifically, neighboring immigrant group size will have a positive effect on xenophobia

      in municipalities with a small immigrant presence, but little to no effect in immigrant-

      dense municipalities.

      (H2): Immigrant visibility is positively related to xenophobia.

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[16] I discuss the data in the respective chapters.

Chapter 4: *Do the culturally marginalized harbor less hostility and fear toward immigrants?*

> *(H1)*: Cultural minority status is negatively related to xenophobia.

> *(H2)*: Perceived marginality is negatively related to xenophobia.

> *(H3)*: The effects of cultural minority status and perceived marginality interact, such that
>
> the negative effect of minority status is stronger among those who perceive marginality.

Chapter-to-Chapter Outline

This dissertation builds on sociological and psychological research on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration by looking at the effects of immigrant and native visibility on xenophobia. I consider whether the presence of immigrants that stand out phenotypically or culturally lead to elevated perceptions of immigrant threat, as well as the effects of national, regional, and more local immigrant group sizes. Then, turning the focus onto the native population, I ask whether nonimmigrants that belong to a cultural minority or perceive discrimination are less xenophobic than their mainstream counterparts. In three stand-alone chapters I investigate the effects of ethnic visibility and marginality on xenophobia. In the first two, I focus on the effects of visibility of the immigrant population. In the final investigation, I consider the effect of visibility of the native population; specifically, I look at whether culturally marginalized nonimmigrants harbor less negative views toward immigrants.

In Chapter 2, I use cross-national data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to test the effects of ethnic diversity in two ways. I test the hypothesis that visibility of the immigrant population is positively related to xenophobia, measuring visibility in terms of language (lack of country language proficiency), religion (Muslim identification), and race (origins in Asia or

black Africa). I also test the effect of broader ethnic diversity in the society, using measures of

linguistic and religious heterogeneity that capture pluralism contributed not just by first

generation immigrants but also by domestic ethnic minorities and more longstanding immigrants.

Counter to expectation, I find evidence that broader religious diversity is positively associated

with xenophobia.

In Chapter 3, I look at the effects of neighboring immigrant group size and immigrant

visibility on xenophobia. Using restricted-use data from the Swiss ESS, I first test for a "halo

effect" of immigrant group size, such that for those living in municipalities with few immigrants,

living adjacent to immigrant-rich communities amplifies perceptions of immigrant threat. The

reason to expect such an effect is that people fear not so much the strangers next door as the

nameless, faceless ones just beyond the gates of their cities or towns. By doing this, I expand

upon studies of xenophobic party support in France and Sweden (Perrineau 1997; Rydgren and

Ruth 2011; 2013), which have found such an effect of immigrant group size on voting behavior.

Next, I test the hypothesis that visible immigrant group size is positively related to xenophobia.

The findings provide support for both hypotheses, particularly for the effect of immigrant

visibility.

In Chapter 4, I turn my attention to visibility among the native population. I do an

extensive test of cultural marginality theory, which postulates that—all other things being

equal—individuals who share a trait with others that is the target of ridicule, hostility, and

mistreatment feel solidarity with other marginalized peoples and, accordingly, have less negative

views toward immigrants and immigration. I test this theory by looking at the effects of

religious minority status, ethnic minority status, and perceived marginality on xenophobia. The

results provide, at best, mixed support for the theory.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 contain the analytic chapters and Chapter 5 the discussion and conclusion of the combined research. Each chapter is presented as a stand-alone article containing introduction, literature review, methods, results, and discussion sections. Tables, figures, appendices, and references are contained in each chapter.

CHAPTER 2

IMMIGRANT ETHNIC VISIBILITY AND XENOPHOBIA

Introduction

Social scientists have long tried to understand the factors that explain hostile attitudes toward immigrants. Part of this is because of the potential for such attitudes to inspire violent behavior. For instance, on July 17, 2011, a Norwegian man, feeling threatened by multiculturalism and Muslim immigration, attacked a youth camp in Utøya Island and set off a bomb in Oslo, leaving 92 people dead and many injured (Townsend, Beaumont and McVeigh 2011; Lewis and Lyall 2012). Even when anti-immigrant sentiment does not lead to violence, it can lead to discriminatory treatment and detract from the standards of a democratic society. When widespread, such hostile attitudes can slow or block the integration of immigrants. In many ways, anti-immigrant attitudes can negatively affect society.

In light of extensive immigration to Europe since the Second World War, many studies have debated the effects of ethnic diversity on social cohesion. Social identity theorists, for instance, argue that the presence of immigrants leads people to interact and identify more strongly with their native ingroup and to negatively stereotype and avoid immigrants. By contrast, Putnam (2007) contends that when people encounter ethnic diversity they feel threatened and, consequently, "hunker down," associating less with ethnic ingroup and outgroup members alike. Other scholars say ethnic diversity can lead to elevated perceptions of threat, which ultimately decrease levels of generalized trust in a country or community. Understanding the relationship between ethnic diversity and xenophobia is important because it may impact how much and with whom people choose to interact.

A wealth of research considers the effects of immigrant group size on negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Generalizing from contact theory, some argue that larger immigrant presence leads to increased intergroup contact and, as a result, a reduction in negative views toward immigrants. Based on a conflict perspective, others say that immigrant group size amplifies perceptions of immigrant threat. Findings on the effect of country-level immigrant presence are rather inconsistent, with many studies finding a positive effect (e.g., Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 2006) and many others no effect (e.g., Kunovich 2002). Findings on the effects of regional and more local-level immigrant group size more consistently support the contact hypothesis (cf. Schlueter and Davidov 2013). Almost no studies have modelled the effects of national and regional immigrant group sizes simultaneously.[1] Doing so would reveal whether the net effects of national and regional immigrant group size on xenophobia differ. This is important because it would show whether national immigrant group size has an effect above and beyond the effects of exposure to immigrants in one's regional environment.[2] Also, few studies consider how ethnic diversity in the country as a whole—rather than just among foreigners and the foreign-born—might impact perceptions of immigrant threat.

In this study, I assess the effect of immigrant ethnic "visibility," as well as broader ethnic diversity, on xenophobia. I consider as ethnically visible immigrants that cross salient linguistic, religious, or racial boundaries.[3] This study proposes that the size of the ethnically visible immigrant population in a country amplifies xenophobia, or perceptions of immigrant

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[1] To my knowledge, only Rustenbach (2010) does this to look at effects on xenophobia. Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers (2011) examine the effects of national and regional immigrant group sizes on informal social capital, including perceived immigrant threat as a mediating variable.

[2] Past studies show that regional immigrant group size predicts the odds of immigrant contact, but national immigrant group size does not (e.g., Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2011).

[3] Aside from the racially visible, such immigrants are not necessarily easily seen, but are conspicuous because of accent, name, religious garb, and potentially other ethnic markers.

threat. Many studies of European countries measure immigrant presence as the proportion of

non-EU or non-Western foreigners in a country (e.g., Quillian 1995). Some such studies treat

non-EU and non-Western citizenship as indicators of cultural difference. However, such broad

measures capture socioeconomic and citizenship disadvantages as much as they do cultural

differences between the immigrant and native populations. A few studies use more fine-grained

measures to represent cultural difference, looking at the effects on xenophobia of the sizes of

Muslim (Green, Fasel and Sarrasin 2010; Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011), linguistically

unassimilated (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011), and socially distant immigrant populations (Hjerm

2009).[4] I propose that the presence of more ethnically visible immigrants is directly related to

xenophobia. I hypothesize that where there are more immigrants that differentiate with respect

to language use, religious affiliation, or race, natives will tend to see immigrants as more

threatening. In such places, the native population will perceive greater risk to the country's

culture and be more likely to blame immigrants for societal ills. I also hypothesize that

xenophobia is higher in more ethnically diverse countries. In countries where the population is

more distributed among different language groups or religious affiliations, the dominant ethnic

majority may feel more acutely the threat of foreign encroachment.

Theoretical Considerations

Debates about the effect of immigrant group size generally stem from two opposing

perspectives. Those who adopt a threat approach believe that where there are more immigrants,

people will tend to harbor more anti-immigrant attitudes. An opposing perspective argues that a

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[4] Hjerm (2009) measures what he refers to as visible immigrant group size as the regional share of residents born in Africa, Asia, or South America. In Sweden, these groups are perceived to be the most socially distant (Hjerm 2009:50).

larger presence of immigrants increases the chances that nonimmigrants will engage in interethnic contact and, by virtue of that contact, have less negative views toward immigrants in general. Given the wealth of conflicting findings, the question remains whether and how immigrant group size relates to xenophobia. Xenophobia may be better explained by the size of the visible minority population or extent of a country's overall ethnic diversity.

Contact Theory

Contact theory predicts that having direct contact with an outgroup member leads to reductions in individual prejudice toward the entire outgroup. Through a meta-analysis of over 500 studies spanning 38 countries, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) offer convincing evidence that intergroup contact has a lowering effect on prejudice toward the target group.[5] They find this effect persists after they account for publication biases and participant selection. The contact hypothesis applies to any target outgroup, including homosexuals, the disabled, and the chronically ill. The magnitude of the effect depends on the target group in question, but the result of prejudice-reduction is the same. Furthermore, Pettigrew and Tropp's results show that contact *causes* prejudice reduction: there is also an effect in the opposite direction—that is, the less prejudiced are more likely to *choose* to engage in intergroup contact—but it is small by comparison.

Conflict Theories

Perhaps the theoretical models most frequently used to explain xenophobia are those pertaining to threat. Competitive threat and group threat theories are primarily divided over

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[5] Note that all the studies included in their sample had direct measures of contact, not indirect ones such as national foreign-born population size. 94 percent of the samples analyzed supported the contact hypothesis.

whether they conceive of threat as stemming from struggle—real or perceived—over individual or collective goods. What unites them is that both associate immigrant presence with greater threat. Proponents of the group threat model fall generally into two camps. According to the 'realistic group threat theory' school (Bobo 1983; Sears and Jessor 1996), anti-immigrant attitudes result from *real* experiences and interests. Scholars in the other camp (e.g., Fetzer 2000a) argue that it only matters that threats are perceived to be real, not whether they actually are.

Competitive threat theory posits that xenophobia and racism arise from an "intensive rivalry" between migrant and native groups over individual goods such as jobs and cheap housing (Wimmer 1997:19). Individuals are assumed to be rational actors that act to maximize their own economic self-interests. The perceived threat is individual rather than collective interests. Thus, what predict xenophobia are actual economic conditions and competition over scarce resources. There is substantial evidence that negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are most prevalent among economically vulnerable segments of the native population, such as those of low socioeconomic status, in low or unskilled manual labor, the unemployed, and pensioners (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010:319). Considering that immigrants in developed countries are often nonspecialists (Scheve and Slaughter 2001), this general finding fits the competitive threat framework: the individuals most hostile to immigrants and immigration are those who potentially stand the most to lose from immigrant presence.

According to group conflict theory, xenophobia arises from competition over *collective* goods and relative group position. The competition is not over jobs or housing, but over access to certain resources, privileges, and status by virtue of one's group membership. Immigrant presence need not threaten the individual's own ability to get a job; rather, the "immigrant

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threat" is a threat to *his* country's culture and the ability of his countrymen to make a living[6].

Blumer (1958) makes a similar point when discussing the roots of racial prejudice in the U.S.

From this perspective, xenophobia arises when immigrants are seen as *illegitimate* competitors,

taking jobs and state resources that do not "belong" to them. For example, in the late 1800s and

early 1900s, when job competition between immigrants and native whites increased, the result

was an increase in conflict of native whites with those categorized as *blacks* and Chinese, *not*

with immigrants (almost exclusively white at the time).[7] The latter additionally suggests that

such conflict is not related to competition, *per se*, but to who is considered a *legitimate*

competitor (Wimmer 1997:21). In this example, those workers categorized as blacks and

Chinese were targeted, probably because their economic integration was perceived as more of a

threat to the racial order.

Insight from Existing Research

Effects of Regional and Local Immigrant Group Size

Findings on the effects of regional or more local immigrant group size rather consistently

support the contact hypothesis. Many studies find a positive effect of regional immigrant

presence (Schlueter and Wagner 2008; Schlueter and Davidov 2013). Some studies comparing

counties or municipalities find evidence for a curvilinear relationship whereby increased

immigrant presence initially increases xenophobia, but after a certain size leads to a negative

effect as residents become accustomed to the newcomers. Escandell and Ceobanu (2009; 2010)

and O'Neil and Tienda (2010) find *no* effect for regional and county immigrant presence,

respectively. Many studies find that regional and local immigrant group sizes have *negative*

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[6] This includes access to jobs and housing but also state-provided such as social welfare benefits.

[7] Wimmer (1997), discussing findings of Olzak (1992).

effects on levels of xenophobia (e.g., Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2011; Wagner et al. 2006). Semyonov and Glikman (2009) and Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) both find a *negative* effect for neighborhood ethnic diversity. These studies suggest that at the regional and local levels immigrant group size is negatively related to xenophobia.

Effects of National Immigrant Group Size

Findings on the effects of immigrant presence are inconsistent, enough so that in their review of the cross-national literature on negative attitudes toward immigrants Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) conclude that immigrant presence may be only weakly related to negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Another possibility is that national, regional, and more local relative immigrant group sizes have different effects on xenophobia. Cross-national studies tend to come to one of two conclusions. Some studies find *no* effect for national immigrant group size (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Kunovich 2002; Kunovich 2004; Semyonov and Glikman 2009). Many others find a positive effect find positive effects for national immigrant presence (Ceobanu 2011; Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 2006). [8] In the absence of intergroup contact, anti-immigrant sentiment is likely to be higher. When the national share of immigrants is larger, immigration may also be a more salient topic in politics and in the media. Thus, when national immigrant presence *does* have an effect, the findings support threat explanations of xenophobia.

Multiple Contexts of Diversity

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[8] The outcome variable varies here. The first measures support for ethnic discrimination, Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky (2006) look at perceived immigrant threat, and Ceobanu (2011) at perception of immigrant criminal threat.

What explains the differences in effects of immigrant group size? Part of the explanation can be found in how well national and regional immigrant group sizes predict opportunities for intergroup contact.   Most of the studies discussed up to now have looked at the effect of regional or national immigrant presence in isolation. Some recent studies demonstrate the importance of simultaneously considering the effects of *multiple* contexts of immigrant group size. Rustenbach (2010) and Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers (2011) find no effects for regional and national foreign population size when they include both variables in models of immigrant group threat. Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers (2011) find that regional but *not* national foreign population size predicts the odds of intergroup contact. Thus, one can expect the effects of regional immigrant group size to conform to contact theory. How national immigrant group size affects anti-immigrant sentiment is still an unsettled issue. Whether it matters may depend on characteristics of the immigrant population.

Immigrant Visibility

Perhaps the reason for the inconsistent findings on the effects of national immigrant group size is that only certain segments of the national immigrant population garner media and political attention or are seen as particularly threatening. I argue that the relative size of the ethnically visible immigrant population is positively related to xenophobia. I ground my argument in realistic group conflict theory, which says that anti-immigrant attitudes are based on "real" experiences and collective interests. Interpreting the theory in a way done by Hjerm (2009), I test whether xenophobia is higher when there is a larger objective *source* of cultural threat.

There are several reasons to believe immigrant ethnic visibility would be tied to more negative attitudes toward immigrants. In his arguments of racial Europeanization, Goldberg (2006) argues that ethno-religious factors play a similar role in Europe to that of race in the U.S. He highlights Islamophobia as a recent example of European racism and anti-Semitism as an example of racism in Europe in the past.[9] An individual might not be able to identify a Muslim visually in a group, but will know *of* them and probably whether there is a sizeable presence of Muslims in his or her country, region, or local community. The greater presence of immigrants who look most different phenotypically from their European counterparts or who primarily speak a foreign language may lead to higher levels of xenophobia.[10] Since xenophobia is by definition fear of what is foreign, then it may be that those who are perceived to be more different in terms of religion, race, or language are seen as more threatening. Thus, visibility may be a better predictor of xenophobia than overall immigrant presence.

Studies that account for Muslim population size find partial support for the relationship between visibility and xenophobia. Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) find that the relative size of the Muslim population in the country is positively related to perceived immigrant threat, but that the negative effect on xenophobia of having immigrant friends is stronger in countries with many Muslims. Green, Fasel and Sarrasin (2010) find that Muslim presence increases levels of xenophobia, but this effect is blocked in ethnically diverse places: relative Muslim population size is positively related to perceived immigrant threat, but only in municipalities with few Northern and Western European immigrants. Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) also test for

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[9] For more on how Muslims are racialized in the European context, look at Silverstein's review of studies of anthropology on the topic (Silverstein 2005).

[10] There is some evidence to suggest that some natives feel threatened when people speak a foreign language in public. They interpret the action as a refusal to assimilate or as an indication of recency of immigration and thus elevated "foreignness."

linguistic visibility—measured as the size of the population that is not linguistically assimilated—but do not find a significant effect. Much fewer cross-national European studies have considered the effects of the size of the racially visible immigrant population on xenophobia. These findings suggest that religious visibility may affect xenophobia and point to a gap in the literature with respect to how racial and linguistic visibility relate to anti-immigrant sentiment.

Ethnic Diversity in Society

Studies looking at the effect of immigrant group size on xenophobia are more broadly interested in the effects of ethnic diversity on views toward outsiders. However, ethnic diversity is not determined exclusively by immigrant presence, nor can it be represented in its entirety by the shares of foreigners or the foreign-born. Ethno-regional minority groups,[11] longstanding immigrant populations,[12] and domestic ethnic or ethno-religious minorities are not counted by such measures, [13] but still contribute to the ethnic plurality of a country. The question is whether this additional level of ethnic plurality leads to higher perceptions of immigrant threat. Are people living in countries that are highly pluralistic more welcoming toward immigrants, or do they see immigrants as more threatening? In this chapter, I consider the effects of ethnic diversity, measured both in terms of linguistic and religious groups. Using Alesina et al.'s (Alesina et al. 2003b) fractionalization indices, which account for both the numbers and shares of

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[11] Examples would include Basques and Catalonians in Spain, as well as Walloons in Belgium.

[12] Examples include Italians in Switzerland and France.

[13] Examples would include South Asians in the United Kingdom. The Sami constitute an ethnic minority in Sweden and Finland. Russia has many domestic ethnic minority groups.

linguistic and religious groups in a country, I examine the effects of religious and linguistic diversity on xenophobia.[14]

Looking at the effect of broader ethnic diversity is somewhat different from looking at the effects of immigrant visibility or group size. The relevance of ethnic diversity to attitudes toward immigrants may not be entirely direct. The extent to which one or a few linguistic or religious groups dominate numerically can impact the extent to which immigrants in that country are seen as a realistic or symbolic threat. According to Blumer (1958), group position is communicated through media and in discourse. Like national immigrant group size, country-level ethnic diversity is probably a poor predictor of intergroup contact. Based on group threat theory, one would expect ethnic diversity to be positively related to xenophobia. When more groups are competing over scarce resources, foreign newcomers may appear as more of a burden to the state and overall threat. Conversely, individuals living in very ethnically diverse countries may be accustomed to difference, broadly speaking, and thereby more accepting of newcomers. In countries where people speak different languages or a single religion denomination does not dominate, residents may have more ethnically inclusive images of national belonging.

Some scholars make the case that ethnic diversity leads to higher xenophobia. Putnam (2007) argues that in more ethnically diverse societies, there are fewer shared norms, leading people to have less social trust and "hunker down," associating with fewer people, be they ingroup or outgroup members. This lower social capital, he argues, leads to higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Economic inequality can also have this effect. Putnam's theory is a variation on social identity theory, which predicts that in response to ethnic diversity people tend to turn inward, associating more with ingroup members. As a result, ingroup identity strengthens

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[14] They make separate indices for ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization. However, a lot of the data they use to construct the ethnic fractionalization index is rather dated, so I do not use it. Since cross-national data on race are not available, I am not able to measure the effects of racial diversity.

and views toward outgroup members become more negative. Overall, these and conflict theories

would suggest a positive effect of ethnic diversity on attitudes toward immigrants.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Immigrant visibility is positively related to xenophobia.

Hypothesis 2: Ethnic diversity is positively related to xenophobia.

As this review has tried to show, there is still much to learn about how exactly the size of

a foreign population affects levels of individual xenophobia. The degree of religious and

linguistic diversity in a country may impact how individuals view immigrants. Also, overall

foreign presence in a country may not matter to levels of xenophobia so much as does the size of

visible immigrant population in a country.

Data and Measurement

Data

I use data from the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS), carried out from

2002 to 2003. The survey is based on a stratified multi-stage probability sample. It is

representative of all persons age 15 and over living within private households, regardless of

nationality, citizenship, language, or legal status. The original dataset contains 42,105 individual

observations from 22 countries. This investigation draws from responses to a 58-item rotating

module on immigration and asylum issues, available only in Round 1 of the ESS (ESS Round 1).

Through the steps delineated below, I narrow the sample to 13 countries, 106 regions, and

18,484 individuals. I supplement the dataset with contextual data from Eurostat, Alesina et al. (2003b), and the Association of Religious Data Archives (ARDA).

I test the two sets of hypotheses using multilevel regression modeling. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are not appropriate for this investigation because they assume observations are independent. Individual observations within the same country or region may be statistically dependent on unmeasured factors. Individuals within the same country or region may resemble one another in certain ways due to shared political, economic, and social environments. Differences in how different countries collect data can also lead to within-country dependence in observations. Furthermore, multi-stage probability sampling—the sampling design employed in ESS participant countries—leads to dependent observations (Snijders and Bosker 1999). When looking at a cross-level effect, such as that of country-level immigrant presence on individual-level xenophobia, it is important to use a model that accounts for the nestedness of observations in hierarchically structured data. Models that do not do this estimate standard errors of regression coefficients too small. Multilevel regression modeling accounts for data clustering and adjusts the standard errors accordingly.

Multilevel modeling also has stringent data demands. Snijders and Bosker (1999:44) argue that a group-level sample of 10 is sufficiently large; thus, estimating a two-level model on a sample with at least 10 level-two units would not pose substantial problems to the statistical outcome. However, since then studies have suggested this may not be the case. Maas and Hox find that 2-level models based on samples of only 10 groups underestimate the standard errors of both regression coefficients (2005) and group level variance components (2004; 2005). They conclude that a level-2 sample size of 10 is enough if one is interested only in fixed effects

(2004).[15] Bell et al. (2010) find that when they run 2-level models on 10, 20, and 30 groups,

Type 1 error rates do not increase, but the statistical power is weak—substantially below the

desired value of 0.80.[16] That means that the chances of rejecting the null hypothesis when the

null hypothesis is true does not change, but the model's ability to reject the null hypothesis when

the null hypothesis is false weakens considerably. If a model lacks statistical power, a variable

will only appear as statistically significant when the effect size is large. Overall, when a

multilevel model is estimated on a sample with a small number of groups (30 or fewer), the

standard errors of both regression coefficients and variance components will be estimated too

small and the statistical power of the model will be weak.[17]

Practically speaking, the enormous costs associated with carrying out a cross-national study

limit the number of countries that can participate. In such a case, modeling on data with many

country-level units is not a possibility. In this study I use ESS data because the survey has

several relevant variables and is known for its high methodological standards. To reduce the

biases that come from estimating multilevel models on a small number of groups, I analyze only

fixed effects and include only one variable at the third level of the model.[18] Also, I estimate the

models with robust rather than asymptotic standard errors, since the former are consistently

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[15] They recommend a group sample size of 50 if one is interested in contextual effects and 100 if one wants correct standard errors.

[16] The power estimates for higher levels are more strongly affected by sample sizes in other levels than they are for level-one power estimates. This probably one reason why Snijders (2005) and says the sample size at the highest level is "the main limiting characteristic of the design" (2005:2).

[17] The impact of low level-two sample size on variance components appears to be far worse, reducing the standard errors by 15 percent or more (Maas and Hox 2005). Maas and Hox (2004) and Bell et al. (2010) also identify downward bias on variance estimates as the main problem that occurs in models based on few higher-level units.

[18] I could include more regional-level variables if I wanted, since the regional sample sizes in both the full and reduced samples are large (106 and 98, respectively). Bell et al. (2010) find that including two or three predictors in a 2-level model does not create substantial problems in the output, but this might not be the case in a 3-level model, so I include just one level-three variable in a model at a time.

higher and, thus, provide a more conservative test of the hypotheses. Estimating with robust standard errors also helps address heteroskedasticity, which is an issue with these data. Finally, I compare model fit by means of the Wald test.[19] In these ways I try to limit the potential biases associated with running multilevel models on data with a small number of country-level units.[20]

I narrow the sample in three ways. First, I restrict the sample to respondents age 18 and older. By age 18, many individuals have completed their formal education and entered the work force. Second, I only analyze the responses of *nonimmigrant* respondents, whom I define as individuals born in the survey country to native-born parents. Third, I exclude countries for which it was not possible to construct regional categories.

To make the regional variable, I make use of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), a regional classification system created and regulated by the EU for statistical purposes. Each country has a set of three nested regional categories. The EU designed NUTS 1, 2, and 3 regions to range in average population size from 3 million to 7 million; 800,000 to 3 million; and 150,000 to 800,000, respectively (Rydland, Arnesen and Østensen 2008). The ESS has a variable that indicates region of residence. Most participant countries reported region in terms of NUTS classification. A few countries, such as the United Kingdom, used their own sets of regional categories. I limit the analytic sample to countries for which 1) region of residence is reported at the NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 level; and 2) the data are representative at the regional

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[19] Likelihood ratio tests, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) cannot be used because they are based on true log likelihood, whereas models with robust standard errors are based on pseudolikelihood functions. According to Treiman (2014:222), pseudolikelihood functions "may be substantially different from true likelihoods and may even vary in a non-monotonic way across nested models."

[20] One potential solution was to just do a regional analysis, since the regional sample size is large. To decide the complexity of the model I calculated the design effect (DEFF) at both the regional and national levels using the following formula: 1 + (average cluster size-1)*(intraclass correlation). According to Muthén and Satorra (1995), a design effect greater than 2 indicates that clustering should not be ignored. The design effects were both larger than two, indicating that clustering cannot be ignored at either level.

level.[21] When a country reported region of residence in terms of NUTS 3 regional categories, I

aggregated those data to their corresponding NUTS 2 categories.[22] I excluded from the analysis

countries that did not fulfill one or both of these criteria. The final sample contains observations

from Austria; the Czech Republic; Finland; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; the Netherlands; Norway;

Portugal; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; and Switzerland.

Analytic Approach

This chapter expands upon studies of the effects of immigrant group size by looking at

whether, as hypothesized, ethnic visibility in the immigrant population is positively related to

xenophobia. Visibility is measured as the share of foreigners in a country or region that cross

linguistic, religious, or racial boundaries. This chapter also tests the hypothesis that diversity in

the broader society amplifies perceptions of immigrant threat. Diversity is measured in two

ways. It is measured as the probability in a country that a member of a language "group" will

encounter a member of another. Secondly, it is measured as the probability in a region that a

member of a racial "group" will encounter a member of another.[23] I test the hypotheses using

the following models. Racial visibility is measured at the regional level, so its equation is

different. To run the models, I use *HLM 7*.[24]

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[21] Each participant country specifies whether statistical inference is possible at the regional level. This information
is available in the country reports section at the end of the ESS Round 1 Documentation Report.

[22] For its region variable, the Swiss ESS combines the NUTS 2 regions of Northwestern Switzerland and Zurich into
a larger regional category. The Finnish ESS does the same with Åland and Southern Finland. In these two cases, I
calculate regional foreign population size and racial visibility for the combined region. The rest of the regions
included in the final sample are NUTS 2 regions.

[23] By group I simply mean a set of people that share a trait, as in share a mother language or phenotype.

[24] I estimate all models without weights. For a discussion of why all analyses were performed on the unweighted
sample, please refer to the Appendix.

For Hypothesis 1:

$$(XEN.)_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{001}*(\text{VISIBILITY})_k + \gamma_{010}*(\text{REG. F. POP. SIZE})_{jk} + \gamma_{100}*X_{ijk} + r_{0jk} + u_{00k} + e_{ijk}$$

$$(XEN.)_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{010}*(\text{REG. F. POP. SIZE})_{jk} + \gamma_{020}*(\text{RAC. VIS.})_{jk} + \gamma_{100}*X_{ijk} + r_{0jk} + u_{00k} + e_{ijk}$$

For Hypothesis 2:

$$(XEN.)_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{001}*(\text{DIVERSITY})_k + \gamma_{010}*(\text{REG. F. POP. SIZE})_{jk} + \gamma_{100}*X_{ijk} + r_{0jk} + u_{00k} + e_{ijk}$$

I define **xenophobia** as a generalized perception of threat from immigrants. I measure it with an additive index based on responses to six survey items that ask respondents' opinions about the effects of immigrants on the economy, cultural life, crime rates, and other aspects of the country of residence. Answers ranged from 0 to 10 on a Likert scale, with 0 representing the most negative view toward immigrants. I added respondent scores for these 6 items, reversed their direction so that higher scores would indicate more anti-immigrant sentiment, and rescaled the index to range from 0 to 100. I calculated this for all individual cases with nonmissing responses to at least 4 of the 6 survey items.[25] Using principal component analysis, Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) find that these six items produce a one-factor solution in all the countries they investigate.[26] Also, the loadings on that factor are very similar across countries. These results suggest that people do not make distinctions about their views toward immigrants in these questions; "they are simply positive or negative towards immigrants in general" (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011:10).[27] This provides justification for combining the six survey items into a single indicator of xenophobia.

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[25] I counted the following responses as missing: 1) refusal to answer; 2) don't know; and 3) no answer.

[26] 21 of the 22 countries participating in the ESS in Round 1.

[27] They find similar results when they do the same analysis with comparable questions from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).

X is a vector of individual respondent characteristics. I include variables for age, gender, urban residence, educational attainment, and political orientation. The last is based on a survey item that asked individuals to rate their political orientation on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means left and 10 means right.[28]

I measure **regional foreign population size** as the percentage of resident *foreigners*— individuals with foreign citizenship—out of the total regional population.[29] I include this variable in the analyses as a control. Ideally, I would measure it as the percentage of *foreign-born*. Foreign citizenship underestimates the size of the immigrant population and the *degree* to which it does this depends partly on the openness of the country's citizenship regime, i.e. how easy the policies in place make it for immigrants to naturalize. Unfortunately, information on country of birth is only available at the country level. For this reason, I measure immigrant presence in terms of the proportion of residents with foreign citizenship. The values for this variable are based on 2001 Eurostat data (Eurostat 2001).

I examine three types of immigrant **visibility**: linguistic, religious, and racial. I measure **religious visibility** as the percentage of resident Muslims out of the total country population. The data for this variable come from the Association of Religious Data Archives (Finke and Grim 2005), which reports Muslim population sizes for over one hundred countries.[30] The source of these data is the World Christian Database (WCD). It is difficult to collect cross-nationally comparable data on the count of Muslims in a country. Grim and Hsu (2011) find that

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[28] I recode responses of "don't know" to a score of 5.

[29] In a side analysis, I test the effect of national foreign population size on xenophobia. I find national foreign population size has no statistically significant effect on xenophobia. The values for this variable are based on 2002 Eurostat data (Eurostat 2002).

[30] This measure is *not* limited to Muslim immigrants but describes the proportion of all Muslims in the country. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that the vast majority of Muslims are of immigrant background. This variable is based on data from 2005, since such data are not available for 2002 or 2003.

estimates from the WCD correlate reasonably with those of other widely used sources (2011:10).

Such data are not available for 2002, the year the ESS began data collection, so I use the 2005

estimates and assume that the share of the Muslim population did not change substantially

between 2002 and 2005. Since these data do not distinguish by nationality, religious visibility is

measured as the share of all Muslims in a country.

I construct the values for **linguistic visibility** from language usage data collected by

Alesina et al. (2003b). The dataset lists the languages spoken as "mother tongues" in the country

and the proportion of the country population that speaks each, according to national census data.

Following Hjerm and Nagayoshi's (2011) example, I calculate linguistic visibility as the

percentage of people in a country who speak a "mother tongue" other than the country's official

language.[31]

I construct a variable for **racial visibility** that represents, out of the total *regional*

population, the proportion of foreigners with citizenship from countries in Africa or Asia, not

counting citizenship from North Africa, post-Soviet states, or the Middle East. Which racial

categories might be visible in Europe? This is not an easy question to answer, especially since

most European countries do not collect information on race. To prevent too much overlap with

the measure of religious visibility, I exclude citizenship from North African and Middle Eastern

countries. Many immigrants from these countries are Muslim, or else presumed by others to be

so. Furthermore, in the absence of religious markers, immigrants from North Africa, the Middle

Eastern, or post-Soviet states may "pass" for European or, like South Asians in the U.S., be

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[31] Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) use the same data and calculation to test the effect of lack of linguistic assimilation. I define official language in each country the same way they do: German for Austria; Czech for the Czech Republic; Finnish, Sami and Swedish for Finland; Hungarian for Hungary; Irish and English for Ireland; Italian, German, French and Sardinian for Italy; Dutch for the Netherlands; Norwegian for Norway; Portuguese for Portugal; Spanish, Catalan and Galician for Spain; Swedish for Sweden; Slovenian for Slovenia. They do not report values for Switzerland. I count German, French, Italian and Romansh as the official languages of Switzerland. Note that in the Netherlands, the respondents from whom these data were obtained were allowed to give multiple answers (2011:24). Thus, the meaning of the proportion for the Netherlands is different from those in other countries.

regarded as "ambiguous nonwhites" (Kibria 1996). There *is* evidence that black African and

Afro-Caribbean immigrants encounter prejudice and discrimination in France and the UK (e.g.,

Lucassen 2005). I decide to count as racially visible those foreigners whose country origins

correspond least to white Anglo-Saxon phenotype. By counting all African nationals except

those from North Africa, I assume I am including mainly black Africans. By excluding Asian

nationals from former Soviet states and the Middle East, I am following U.S. racial classification

of immigrants from these regions: the U.S. census counts Middle Easterners as white, but South

East Asians as Asian. Thus, my racial visibility variable approximates the proportion of black

and Asian foreigners out of the total country population.[32]

      There are clearly limitations to this measure of racial visibility. The assumption I make

that African nationals are mostly people of color is a large one. However, the only available way

to determine the size of the racially visible immigrant population is by triangulating from

nationality.[33] Race cannot be said to operate in Europe in the same way or to the same extent

that it does in the U.S. Actually, some scholars argue that in Europe Muslims are treated as a

racial "other." Whether the language used to describe them implies racial, religious, or cultural

inferiority, the fact remains that in African, Afro-Caribbean, and Asian immigrants are the most

frequent targets of racist and xenophobic violence in Europe (Human Rights First 2008).[34] By

looking at racial visibility, I ask whether a larger presence of foreigners who might *look* different

evokes higher levels of xenophobia among nonimmigrants.

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[32] For the sake of simplicity I limit my count of racially visible foreigners to people of African or Asian nationalities. Future researchers may choose to generate a more fine-grained measure of racial visibility that includes nationalities from other continents and countries.

[33] I could have constructed a *national*-level racial visibility variable based on country of birth, but chose not to because the equivalent regional-level information was not available. I measure racial visibility in terms of citizenship so that I define the immigrant outgroup in a consistent way.

[34] People of African and Afro-Caribbean origin are the most targeted in Western Europe, while those of African and Asian origin are the most targeted in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Due to data limitations, I constructed racial visibility as a regional-level variable.   The

source dataset (from Eurostat) presented the necessary information at the NUTS 3 level. Out of

106 regions in the broader sample under analysis, only 78 had complete information on racial

visibility. One or more regions from seven of the thirteen countries did not report the number of

residents of North African, Near or Middle Eastern, former Soviet, or Asian nationality. Rather

than test racial visibility on the six remaining countries with complete information, I chose to test

the effect of regional-level racial visibility on a reduced sample of 12 countries, 78 regions, and

13,498 individuals.   I estimate all remaining models on the full analytic sample of 13 countries,

106 regions, and 18,484 individuals.

I measure **diversity** using data for indices of religious and linguistic fractionalization

created by Alesina et al. (2003a). The religious fractionalization index represents the probability

that two randomly selected individuals from a country population will belong to different

religious groups. The religious index covers 294 different religions in 215 countries and

dependencies (Alesina et al. 2003b:159). Alesina and his colleagues use the following formula

to calculate each index:

$$\text{FRACT}_j = 1 - \sum_{i=i}^{N} s^2{}_{ij}$$

where s_{ij} is the share of group i ($i = 1 \ldots N$) in country j. They calculate linguistic

fractionalization from the shares of languages spoken as "mother tongues," based on national

census data. Their linguistic fractionalization index covers 1,055 major linguistic groups in 201

countries or dependencies. They also create an index for ethnic fractionalization, but I do not use

this since they base their calculations for that index on dated sources. For instance, while the

data for Switzerland is from 2001, the data for the Netherlands is from 1995 and for Italy dates

back to 1983. These fractionalization measures are unique because they account for both the

share of the different groups out of the whole population as well as the *number* of different

groups. Index values range theoretically from 0 to 1, but I rescale them to range from 0 to 100.

The variables representing ethnic diversity and immigrant visibility are, unsurprisingly,

rather strongly correlated (Table 1). Still, these two sets of variables capture somewhat different

things. The religious diversity variable is only a little correlated with national immigrant group

size (r=0.232), but moderately correlated with religious visibility (r=0.480). That the correlation

with religious visibility is not higher shows that Islam is not the only religious denomination

contributing to the religious diversity of a country. A case in point is the Czech Republic, which

has few immigrants and next to no Muslims, but is very religiously diverse. The immigrant

visibility variables capture ethnic diversity stemming mostly from first and second generation

immigrants. The ethnic diversity variables are more expansive, accounting for pluralism in the

native population as well.

[Table 1 here]

Results

The purpose of this investigation is to determine whether and in what ways immigrant

visibility and ethnic diversity in a country impact individual perceptions of immigrant threat.

Coming from a group threat perspective, I expected to find visibility and diversity were each

positively related to xenophobia. To investigate whether this is the case, I estimated a series of

three-level models of xenophobia, each containing a set of control variables, regional immigrant

group size, and a measure of diversity or visibility.[35] I include regional immigrant group size to

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[35] First, I calculated regional- and national-level design effects to determine whether there is a sufficient degree of
data clustering to merit multilevel analysis. I use the following formula provided by Muthén and Satorra (1995): 1 +

control for the likelihood of contact with immigrants.[36] Doing this allows me to see whether

visible immigrant group size has an effect over and above the effects of intergroup contact.

Overall, the results partially support the hypothesis that religious diversity is positively related to

xenophobia.

Descriptive Statistics

All models but the one of racial visibility are based on a sample of 18,484 individuals

nested in 106 regions and 13 countries (see Table 2). Analysis of the effect of racial visibility is

based on a reduced sample of 13,498 individuals nested in 78 regions and 12 countries. In both

samples, the mean xenophobia score is 54. A respondent who gets an index score of 50 chooses,

on average, the middle response on each of the six survey items that comprise the index.[37] The

analytic samples are each split about evenly between men and women. A fifth of respondents

completed tertiary education and two-fifths, upper secondary. The average respondent is 48

years old, an urban resident, and politically centrist.

[Table 2 here]

Table 3 presents the country-level values for immigrant group size, diversity, and

visibility.[38] The share of immigrants with foreign citizenship ranges from 0.9 percent in

Hungary to 20.5 percent in Switzerland. The largest shares of Muslims are found in the

(average cluster size - 1)*intraclass correlation. The design effects at both levels were larger than 2, indicating that the clustering in the data needs to be taken into account during estimation.

[36] Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers (2011) find regional immigrant group size predicts the odds of intergroup contact, but national immigrant group size does not.

[37] Recall that each of the survey items responses were on a Likert scale ranging from 0 to 10, where one side indicated a very positive view toward immigrants and the other a very negative view.

[38] Values for regional immigrant group size and racial visibility are available by request. National immigrant group size is measured similarly to regional immigrant group size. It is the share of non-nationals out of the total resident population.

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Netherlands and Switzerland. The Netherlands and the Czech Republic are the most religiously heterogeneous countries in the sample. The Netherlands is at the top of the range in all country-level measures of societal diversity and immigrant visibility, even though it does not have nearly as many foreigners as four other countries in the sample. Portugal is near the bottom on every measure, except with respect to immigrant group size.

[Table 3 here]

Ethnic Visibility and Its (Lack of) Effect

We will begin by looking at the control model (see Table 4, Model 2). The fit of all other models is compared to the control model. A number of studies find a positive effect for age. In this study, age does not have a statistically significant effect. In line with previous studies, urban residence reduces xenophobia, while rightwing orientation (indicated by an increase in the political orientation variable) increases it. Educational attainment is negatively associated with xenophobia. Some say this is because education has a liberalizing effect (Hjerm 2007:1263). Others say higher education leads one to give more socially approved responses. Finally, and perhaps most notably, we see that at the regional level, immigrant group size has a negative effect on xenophobia. This finding goes in line with many other studies that find effects of regional and local immigrant group size conform to the contact hypothesis (e.g., Wagner et al. 2006).

The results do not support the first hypothesis that immigrant visibility is positively related to xenophobia. As predicted, the coefficients for linguistic, religious, and racial visibilities are positive (see Models 3, 4, and 5c). However, their effects are not statistically

significant.[39] Furthermore, Wald test results reveal that none of the visibility models predict xenophobia better than does the more parsimonious control model (Model 2). Thus, the results fail to support the hypothesis that immigrant visibility is positively related to xenophobia.

[Table 4 here]

[Table 5 here]

Ethnic Diversity: The Exception?

The findings partially support the second hypothesis that xenophobia is higher in ethnically pluralistic societies (see Table 6). The coefficient for linguistic diversity is positive, as predicted, but not statistically significant (Model 6). The effect of religious diversity (Model 7) is both positive and statistically significant (p=0.026). A one-percent increase in religious diversity contributes a 0.15 increase to xenophobia score (Model 4). The religious diversity model improves upon the fit of the control model (p=0.013). Overall, the findings suggest that a country's religious diversity is positively related to xenophobia.

[Table 6 here]

It is interesting that religious diversity impacts perceptions of immigrant threat, while religious visibility, measured as the share of Muslims (immigrant or otherwise) in the country, does not. At the country level, Muslim group size in itself does not appear to heighten xenophobia. Apparently, what is more important is how fragmented the society is into different religious denominations. Long-standing immigrants, more recent ones, and the native population can all contribute to this heterogeneity. One can expect that competition between ethno-religious

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[39] Due to missingness on the racial visibility variable, I carried out related analyses on a subsample of the data. This reduced sample contains 12 countries, 78 regions, and 13,509 individual observations. I excluded Slovenia, which, for reasons of data confidentiality, did not report the specific nationality information needed to construct values for racial visibility.

groups for cultural influence, political status, and potentially material resources will lead to less tolerance toward foreign newcomers.

Ancillary Analyses

Ancillary analyses were performed to see how adding additional controls for intergroup contact and economic competition would impact the effect of religious diversity on xenophobia. Adding a variable for neighborhood diversity does not alter the coefficient for religious diversity,[40] nor does including variables for immigrant contact (at work or through friendship) or perceived economic vulnerability.[41] The effect of religious diversity remains statistically significant with a *p*-value of 0.026 or lower. Furthermore, the effect of religious diversity persists, whether or not regional immigrant group size is included in the model. From this, one can conclude religious diversity has a positive effect on xenophobia that is not explained by differences in economic vulnerability, intergroup contact, neighborhood diversity, or regional immigrant group size.

Discussion

This study set out to determine whether immigrant visibility and broader ethnic diversity in a country affect xenophobia. Many studies have shown that regional and more local immigrant group sizes are inversely related to xenophobia. Findings on country-level dynamics

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[40] The variable for neighborhood diversity is based on a respondent perception of whether in their area of residence some, many, or almost no people are of a different race or ethnicity from the majority of people in that country. The variable is coded 1 for responses of "some" or "many" and 0 for "almost none." Neighborhood diversity was found to be negatively related to xenophobia.

[41] Perceived economic vulnerability is based on a question about how the respondent feels about his or her current household income.

have been far more inconsistent. In this study, I argued that it is not national immigrant group size as a whole, but the presence of *visible* immigrants that amplifies perceptions of immigrant threat. I measured immigrant visibility in terms of lack of linguistic assimilation, adherence to a minority religion (Islam), and racial difference. I predicted that ethnic diversity in the country, measured in terms of religious and linguistic heterogeneity, would be positively related to xenophobia. The findings of this study demonstrate the importance of considering the effects of multiple levels of ethnic diversity simultaneously. They provide support for both conflict- and contact-based explanations of xenophobia.

The findings of this study highlight the differential effects of ethnic diversity at the levels of the region and country. A model that only considers the effects of national-level ethnic diversity may pick up the prejudice-reducing effects of more local-level contact. After all, regional immigrant group size predicts odds of intergroup contact, but national immigrant group size does not (Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2011). By controlling for regional immigrant group size, this investigation isolates the effect of immigrant group size in a country, independent of the chances of immigrant exposure. It was expected that the larger presence of immigrants that are ethnically visible and thereby present a greater potential source of cultural threat would lead to amplified perceptions of immigrant threat. The findings point to an inverse relationship between regional immigrant group size and xenophobia. However, net of regional immigrant group size, national-level visibility has *no* effect. The latter finding calls into question the size argument of threat theory. Counter to realistic group threat theory, native perceptions of immigrant threat do not appear to be proportional to objective sources of cultural threat. An alternative explanation is that the effect of immigrant presence depends on the presence of certain other elements of context. For example, Hjerm (2009) finds that municipal immigrant

group size is positively related to xenophobia, but only in communities with poor economic conditions. Studies looking at electoral support for xenophobic political parties find a similar interaction between immigrant group size and the state of the economy.

Why might religious diversity impact xenophobia and not immigrant visibility or linguistic diversity?[42] That the language-based measures of diversity and visibility have no statistically significant effects can be because religion is seen as a sign of more permanent difference than language. Religious cleavages can be seen as more persistent than linguistic ones. A large portion of immigrants develop host language proficiency; native language retention generally does not last beyond the third generation (Alba and Nee 2003). By contrast, religious affiliation and practice may endure across time and generation.[43]

The effect of religious diversity may stem from heightened religious competition for followers.[44] This study finds that net of constant regional immigrant group size, religious diversity is positively related to xenophobia. This finding conforms to others that individuals who live in more religiously pluralistic countries tend to perceive more immigrant threat (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello 2002) and harbor more ethnic prejudice (Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002). According to Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello's religious competition hypothesis, this positive relationship may occur because in more religiously heterogeneous countries different denominations compete more strongly to gain believers and "preserve a religious market share" (2002:148). As a strategy to prevent religious switching, local and

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[42] Note that all these variables had positive effects, but only the one for religious diversity was statistically significant.

[43] Findings from a rather recent French survey show that of second generation North African immigrants who identify with Islam, the majority of them are not that religious observant. Compared to the first generation, children of North African immigrants in France are more secular, like their native French counterparts.

[44] Conclusions based on this finding need to be taken with a grain of salt, since the p-value for this coefficient was only 0.026. Given the small country sample size on which this result is based and the potential for downward bias of standard errors (of regression coefficients?) as a result, a lower p-value would be preferable.

national religious leaders may emphasize religious, social or even ethnic alignments. This emphasis may lead to stronger perceptions of "us" versus "them," where "us" refers to one's own ethnic or religious group and "them" to other such groups. In such an environment, the native population may be more likely to see immigrants as threatening. The size of the visible immigrant population in a country does not appear to impact xenophobia, but religious composition in the broader society does.

The main limitation of this study was that the sample size of countries was small, below the ideal of at least 30 to avoid the problem of downwardly-biased standard errors (Maas and Hox 2004). In the interest of comparing similarly-sized regions, I only compared countries that reported NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 regions. This resulted in a substantially reduced the number of countries that could be included in the sample. Unfortunately, the ESS does not offer a very large country sample to begin with. Other available multi-national surveys with data suitable for this kind of study similarly sample from fewer than 30 countries. By estimating the models with robust standard errors I was able to perform a more conservative test of hypotheses, while also accounting for heteroskedasticity.

This study contributes to the literature by looking at the effects of cultural difference both in terms of immigrant ethnic visibility and ethnic diversity in the broader society. It demonstrates the importance of considering multiple contexts of ethnic diversity simultaneously. When measured in terms of the size and composition of a country's immigrant population, ethnic diversity does not appear to affect xenophobia. However, religious diversity in the country as a whole *does* have an effect. To further this line of investigation, future studies should examine further the effects of immigrant visibility at different levels of geographic proximity. I do this in

the next chapter by considering the effects on xenophobia of 1) municipal-level immigrant

visibility; and 2) living adjacent to a municipality with a dense immigrant population.

Tables

Table 1. Correlations between region- and country-level variables (based on 106 regions, unless otherwise specified).

	National foreign population size	Linguistic diversity	Religious diversity	Linguistic visibility	Muslim visibility	Regional Racial visibility (78 regions)	Regional foreign population size	Regional foreign population size (78 regions)
National foreign population size	1.000	0.484	0.232	0.112	0.645	0.489	0.899	0.929
Linguistic diversity		1.000	0.760	0.402	0.669	-0.042	0.357	0.336
Religious diversity			1.000	0.410	0.480	-0.242	0.171	0.094
Linguistic visibility				1.000	0.111	-0.052	0.167	0.069
Religious visibility					1.000	0.135	0.501	0.393
Regional racial visibility (78 regions)						1.000	N/A	0.643
Regional foreign population size							1.000	N/A
Regional foreign population size (78 regions)								1.000

Notes: Based on 106 regions, unless otherwise specified.

Table 2. Individual-level descriptive statistics for the full (N=18,484) and reduced (N=13,498) samples.

Variable	Full sample		Reduced sample	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Xenophobia	53.98	15.70	53.54	15.75
Female	52%		52%	
Urban residence	57%		60%	
Age	47.69	17.19	47.89	17.12
Educ: Less than lower secondary	15%		13%	
Educ: Lower secondary	25%		25%	
Educ: Upper secondary	39%		38%	
Educ: Post-secondary non-tertiary	1%		2%	
Educ: Tertiary	20%		22%	
Political orientation	5.10	2.03	5.18	2.06

Table 3. Country-level figures, sorted by national foreign population size.

	National foreign population size	Linguistic diversity	Religious diversity	Linguistic visibility	Religious visibility
Hungary	0.9	2.97	52.44	1.50	0.2
Czech Republic	1.2	32.33	65.91	18.82	0.0
Finland	1.8	14.12	25.31	1.82	0.3
Slovenia	2.0	22.01	28.68	12.12	1.3
Portugal	2.2	1.98	14.38	1.00	0.2
Italy	2.3	11.47	30.27	3.31	1.2
Spain	3.8	41.32	45.14	0.75	1.0
Norway	4.1	6.73	20.48	3.45	1.9
Netherlands	4.2	51.43	72.22	34.88	4.9
Sweden	5.4	19.68	23.42	10.46	2.0
Ireland	7.1	3.12	15.50	0.00	0.5
Austria	8.9	15.22	41.46	8.01	2.9
Switzerland	20.5	54.41	60.83	8.91	4.1

Table 4. Multilevel analysis of xenophobia, relationships between visibility and xenophobia.

	M1: Unconditional Model		M2: Controls		Model 3: Linguistic visibility		Model 4: Religious visibility	
	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.
Intercept	54.41 ***	1.25	56.89 ***	1.77	55.13 ***	2.11	56.69 ***	2.50
Individual-level								
Age			0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Urban residence			-1.07 ***	0.26	-1.07 ***	0.26	-1.07 ***	0.26
Female			0.34	0.39	0.34	0.39	0.34	0.39
Political orientation			0.70 ***	0.18	0.70 ***	0.18	0.70 ***	0.18
Educ: Lower secondary			-1.67 ***	0.47	-1.68 ***	0.47	-1.67 ***	0.47
Educ: Upper secondary			-5.47 ***	0.39	-5.49 ***	0.37	-5.48 ***	0.39
Educ: Post-secondary non-tertiary			-6.57 ***	0.52	-6.58 ***	0.52	-6.57 ***	0.52
Educ: Tertiary			-10.97 ***	0.44	-10.98 ***	0.44	-10.98 ***	0.44
Regional level								
Foreign population size			-0.39 ***	0.10	-0.39 ***	0.10	-0.39 ***	0.10
National level								
Foreign population size								
Linguistic diversity								
Religious diversity								
Linguistic visibility					0.31	0.21		
Religious visibility							0.14	0.69

Notes: *** p<.001, ** *p* < .01, * *p* < .05. Models 1-4, 6, and 7 are based on 18484 individuals, 106 regions, and 13 countries. Models 5a-5c are based on 13498 individuals, 78 regions, and 12 countries. All variables are uncentered. All models are based on robust standard errors.

Table 4. (Continued)

	M1: Unconditional Model		M2: Controls		Model 3: Linguistic visibility		Model 4: Religious visibility	
	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.
Random effects								
Country level variance	18.88 ***	4.35	19.69 ***	4.44	17.03 ***	4.13	19.69 ***	4.44
Regional level variance	6.30 ***	2.51	3.67 ***	1.92	3.68 ***	1.92	3.68 ***	1.92
Individual level variance	223.77	14.96	207.92	14.42	207.92	14.42	207.92	14.42
Model fit								
Wald test (compared to M2)								
χ2 statistic					2.08		0.04	
Degrees of freedom					1		1	
p-value					0.149		0.849	

Table 5. Relationship between racial visibility and xenophobia.

	Model 5a: Unconditional model		Model 5b: Controls		Model 5c: Racial visibility	
	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.
Intercept	53.61 ***	1.38	57.46 ***	2.11	57.48 ***	2.06
Individual-level						
Age			0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
Urban residence			-1.00 ***	0.25	-1.01 ***	0.25
Female			0.30	0.46	0.31	0.46
Political orientation			0.66 **	0.21	0.66 **	0.21
Educ: Lower secondary			-1.95 ***	0.47	-1.95 ***	0.47
Educ: Upper secondary			-5.48 ***	0.40	-5.48 ***	0.40
Educ: Post-secondary non-tertiary			-6.64 ***	0.57	-6.64 ***	0.57
Educ: Tertiary			-11.09 ***	0.47	-11.10 ***	0.48
Regional level						
Foreign population size			-0.37 ***	0.08	-0.45 ***	0.16
Racial visibility					0.61	0.81

	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.
Random effects						
Country level variance	20.85 ***	4.57	21.37 ***	4.62	22.86 ***	4.78
Regional level variance	6.62 ***	2.57	3.81 ***	1.95	3.75 ***	1.94
Individual level variance	224.17	14.97	208.94	14.45	208.93	14.45
Model fit						
Wald test (compared to M2)						
$\chi 2$ statistic					0.52	
Degrees of freedom					1	
p-value					0.469	

Notes: *** p<.001, ** *p* < .01, * *p* < .05. Models 1-4, 6, and 7 are based on 18484 individuals, 106 regions, and 13 countries. Models 5a-5c are based on 13498 individuals, 78 regions, and 12 countries. All variables are uncentered. All models are based on robust standard errors.

Table 6. Multilevel analysis of xenophobia, relationships between diversity and xenophobia.

	M1: Unconditional Model		M2: Controls		Model 6: Linguistic diversity		Model 7: Religious diversity	
	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.
Intercept	54.41 ***	1.25	56.89 ***	1.77	55.71 ***	2.32	51.34 ***	2.59
Individual-level								
Age			0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Urban residence			-1.07 ***	0.26	-1.07 ***	0.26	-1.07 ***	0.26
Female			0.34	0.39	0.34	0.39	0.34	0.39
Political orientation			0.70 ***	0.18	0.70 ***	0.18	0.70 ***	0.18
Educ: Lower secondary			-1.67 ***	0.47	-1.67 ***	0.47	-1.69 ***	0.47
Educ: Upper secondary			-5.47 ***	0.39	-5.48 ***	0.39	-5.49 ***	0.39
Educ: Post-secondary non-tertiary			-6.57 ***	0.52	-6.58 ***	0.52	-6.61 ***	0.52
Educ: Tertiary			-10.97 ***	0.44	-10.98 ***	0.44	-10.99 ***	0.44
Regional level								
Foreign population size			-0.39 ***	0.10	-0.40 ***	0.09	-0.40 ***	0.09
National level								
Foreign population size								
Linguistic diversity					0.06	0.05		
Religious diversity							0.15 *	0.06
Linguistic visibility								
Religious visibility								

Notes: *** p<.001, ** *p* < .01, * *p* < .05. Models 1-4, 6, and 7 are based on 18484 individuals, 106 regions, and 13 countries. Models 5a-5c are based on 13498 individuals, 78 regions, and 12 countries. All variables are uncentered. All models are based on robust standard errors.

Table 6. (Continued)

	M1: Unconditional Model		M2: Controls		Model 6: Linguistic diversity		Model 7: Religious diversity	
	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.
Random effects								
Country level variance	18.88 ***	4.35	19.69 ***	4.44	18.82 ***	4.34	12.20 ***	3.49
Regional level variance	6.30 ***	2.51	3.67 ***	1.92	3.68 ***	1.92	3.71 ***	1.93
Individual level variance	223.77	14.96	207.92	14.42	207.91	14.42	207.91	14.42
Model fit								
Wald test (compared to M2)								
$\chi 2$ statistic					1.17		6.12	
Degrees of freedom					1		1	
p -value					0.279		0.013	

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Appendix

Outliers on National-Level Variables

The Netherlands was an outlier on religious visibility. None of the other national-level variables had outliers. I kept the Netherlands in the sample for two reasons. First, it is not a strong outlier; its value for religious visibility is 4.9 percent, compared to 4.1 for Switzerland (which is not an outlier). Second, three other European countries—Germany, Spain, and Greece—have similarly high values for religious visibility. I include the Dutch data so that the final sample includes the full range of religious visibility observed in the Europe.

Weights and Limitations

The ESS instructs scholars to use their two population weights when doing carrying out cross-national analyses. For two reasons, I decide *not* to use these weights. First, in the full dataset of 22 countries and over 43,000 observations, one of these weights sums to 0.89, rather than 1. The ESS data team tells analysts to multiply this weight variable, PWEIGHT, with a second, DWEIGHT, and to use this product weight in analyses. However, doing so produces a design population size that is *smaller* than the sample size. Second, regional- and country-level weights are not available for ESS data.[45] Statistically speaking, a weight is necessary at every level of a weighted hierarchical linear model. *Stata 13* and *HLM 7* can estimate 3-level models with weights at one or two levels, but only by making assumptions about the sampling probabilities at other levels. *Stata* assumes weights not included are equal to one and that the levels in the model correspond to the clusters in the sampling design (StataCorp 2013). Rather than further complicate the analysis with faulty weight variable and potentially strong

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[45] Furthermore, country-level weights do not really make sense, since the countries were not chosen by probability sampling.

assumptions about regional and national-level sampling probabilities, I choose to carry out all

analyses without weights. I reduce my sample to nonimmigrants using casewise deletion. In

doing these things, I am essentially assuming a simple random sample. The implications are that

generalization of study findings must be exercised with caution.

CHAPTER 3

GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY AND XENOPHOBIA IN SWITZERLAND

Introduction

Widespread xenophobia in Europe has attracted much public and academic attention. The examples of its manifestations are numerous. Its presence is evident in the influence of radical right xenophobic political parties such as the Golden Dawn in Greece, Swiss People's Party (SVP), Swedish Democrats, and National Front in France. Anti-immigrant hostility shows up in bouts of violence against Muslims in Greece, the 2011 attacks on a summer camp and Oslo in Norway, and in less publicized ways throughout Europe. Eight European countries experienced a rise in recorded racist crime from 2000 to 2006 (Human Rights First 2008:1).[1] In this context, many ask whether increasing ethnic diversity affects anti-immigrant attitudes.

One particular point of academic debate revolves around the effect of immigrant group size on negative attitudes towards immigrants. Many scholars, adopting a conflict-based perspective, argue that immigrant presence amplifies anti-immigrant sentiment. Some argue this is because greater immigrant presence means more competitors with natives over individual interests in scarce resources such as jobs, housing, and social benefits. Others say the native population or particular ethnic groups within it then see immigrants as threatening their collective interests such as in political status or cultural influence. These competitive and group threat explanations are prominent in cross-national studies examining the effects of national-level immigrant group size. A lot of studies looking at the effects of immigrant presence at regional or more local levels have instead found evidence in support of contact theory that ethnic

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[1] Also, xenophobic and racist violence increased from 2006 to 2007 in at least 10 European countries (Human Rights First N.d.). Finland, Ireland, Slovak Republic, Sweden, and the UK had moderate to high rises in violent hate crimes motivated by racism and xenophobia. Based on unofficial data, there were also rising levels of such violence in Greece, Switzerland, Italy, the Ukraine, and the Russian Federation.

diversity *diminishes* negative attitudes toward immigrants. Contact theory states that positive

contact with an outgroup member leads to a reduction in prejudice toward the whole outgroup.

Generalizing from contact theory, many scholars say those living in areas with more immigrants

have more opportunities for intergroup contact, so people living in such areas tend to be less

xenophobic. This study tries to better understand the local dynamics of contact and conflict that

inform anti-immigrant attitudes, in part by looking at whether the presence of ethnically visible

immigrants evokes greater perceptions of immigrant threat.

Many studies find that, net of socioeconomic factors, individuals living in communities

with more immigrants tend to be more tolerant toward immigrants. Yet, findings from studies on

electoral support for xenophobic political parties suggest that living adjacent to an immigrant-

rich community can have the opposite effect. Rydgren and Ruth (2013) find a "halo effect" of

immigrant group size in Sweden: electoral support for the xenophobic Swedish Democrats is

highest in districts with few immigrants bordered by immigrant-rich communities. In the

absence of ethnic diversity in one's immediate community, the presence of immigrants in nearby

municipalities and counties leads to stronger support for radical right populist parties. This study

looks at whether immigrant group size impacts perceptions of immigrant threat in a similar way.

In this chapter I present a more complete picture of how immigrant group size affects

xenophobia by closely examining the effects of geographic proximity to immigrants and the

ethnic composition of the immigrant population. Using restricted-use data from Switzerland's

participation in the European Social Survey (ESS), I examine the effect of ethnic "visibility,"

which I measure as the share of immigrants that cross salient linguistic, religious, or racial

boundaries, on xenophobia.[2] I also test for a halo effect of immigrant group size on xenophobia,

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[2] Aside from the racially visible, such immigrants are not necessarily easily seen, but are conspicuous because of accent, name, religious garb, and potentially other ethnic markers.

based on the supposition that people feel most threatened not by the immigrants next door but by those just beyond the borders of their immediate communities. I do this by examining whether the effects of local immigrant group size depend on immigrant presence in neighboring municipalities. The results show that relative proximity to immigrants as well as their ethnic composition can impact levels of xenophobia among the native population.

Theoretical Background

The primary purposes of this investigation are to 1) test the halo effect; and 2) determine whether, net of immigrant group size, larger *visible* immigrant population size leads to higher xenophobia. In what follows, I discuss what past studies have found on these issues. While many studies have looked at non-EU or non-Western group size to measure the effect of broad cultural difference, this study reframes difference in terms of ethnic visibility, measured as the share of immigrants that cross salient linguistic, religious, or racial boundaries. Reframed thus, the question is whether people living in communities with more ethnically visible immigrants feel more anti-immigrant sentiment.

In this investigation, I define xenophobia as a generalized perception of immigrants as threatening. The word stems from the Latin roots *xenos* and *-phobos*, which mean "stranger" and "fearing," respectively ("xenophobia"). As Ceobanu and Escandell (2008) point out, anti-immigrant and anti-immigra*tion* sentiment are distinct. While the two are related, the latter is more concerned with policy implications. My investigation focuses on the former and is better described as a view of immigrants as generally threatening, be it to cultural life, jobs, safety of neighborhoods, or overall quality of life in the country.

Contact Theory

There are two dominant perspectives used to explain the effect of immigrant group size on xenophobia. According to contact theory, developed by Allport (1954) and elaborated extensively ever since, contact with an outgroup leads to reduced prejudice toward the outgroup as a whole. Based on a meta-analysis of over 500 published and unpublished studies, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) determine that intergroup contact *causes* prejudice reduction. Prejudiced people tend to avoid intergroup contact (Herek and Capitanio 1996), but the path from contact to prejudice reduction is generally much stronger (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Van Dick et al. 2004). Experiences of negative intergroup contact *can* lead to increases in prejudice, but occur less often than positive intergroup contact and friendship (Pettigrew 2008:196). The effects of negative contact are much smaller when the contact is voluntary (Pettigrew and Tropp 2013:277). Intergroup contact is more likely to lead to prejudice reduction when the contact is not superficial and salience of the group is sufficiently high (Pettigrew et al. 2011:276). Those who take a contact theory approach to understanding xenophobia argue that larger immigration presence increases the odds of intergroup contact, thereby leading to less xenophobia.

Conflict Theories

A number of theories conceive of anti-immigrant attitudes as stemming from conflict over either individual or collective interests. Competitive threat theory argues that those who stand to compete most with immigrants over jobs, housing, and other material goods have the highest xenophobia. Since more immigrants are of low socioeconomic status (Scheve and Slaughter 2001), natives who are of similarly low socioeconomic status or unemployed feel the most threatened, since they see immigrants as challenging their individual interests. Group

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conflict theory argues anti-immigrant attitude is more intense when immigrants are seen as threatening collective economic, cultural, or religious interests (Fetzer 2000a; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002). According to this understanding, xenophobia arises from the fear that immigrants could alter the prevailing way of life or foundation of national identity (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999).

Within this conflict perspective, a number of studies argue that larger immigrant group size intensifies anti-immigrant attitudes (Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 2006). Those based on competitive threat theory say this can happen because a larger immigrant group size intensifies competition over scarce resources and, thus, poses a greater threat to individual interests. From a group threat perspective, the greater presence of immigrants can be seen as threatening the native majority or particular domestic ethnic or racial groups within the host society. Within the group threat framework, scholars in the "realistic group threat theory" school (Bobo 1983; Sears and Jessor 1996) say anti-immigrant attitudes are based on 'real' experiences and interests. Those in the "perceived threat" school say it only matters whether the circumstances are *perceived* as threatening, not whether immigrants have a 'real' negative impact on the host society. Empirical studies with the latter perspective use subjective indicators (Fetzer 2000a; McLaren 2003), such as perceptions of one's financial situation, while studies grounded in the former use objective indicators (Bobo 1988; Quillian 1995), such as the unemployment rate. According to one interpretation of realistic group threat theory, xenophobia may have objective *sources*, even if it is based on purely imagined threats (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011:817). According to this view, xenophobia is based on real *sources* of potential threat, such as the size of the low-skilled immigrant population (economic threat). This study looks at visible population size as an objective *source* of potential cultural threat.

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Effects of Immigrant Group Size

Studies of regional and local contexts of immigrant presence often find a negative effect on anti-immigrant attitudes (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002; Wagner et al. 2003), though there is still some variation. Some studies find a positive (Schlueter and Davidov 2013) or no effect (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; 2010; O'Neil and Tienda 2010). Hjerm (2009) finds that overall municipal immigrant group size has no effect on perceived immigrant threat, but the size of the socially distant immigrant population is *negatively* related to xenophobia. Some scholars speak of a curvilinear 'familiarization effect', whereby low levels of outgroup size stimulate perceived threat but higher levels lead to familiarization and less threat. Schneider suggests this is because "there is an effect of familiarization over and above individual contact" (2008:55). Still, it seems the bulk of studies find that larger regional and local immigrant group size leads to less perceived group threat.

A number of studies find that regional or local level immigrant group size is indirectly related to anti-immigrant attitude through intergroup contact. Gijsberts and Dagevos (2007) find immigrant group size is positively related to intergroup contact but has no impact on anti-immigrant attitudes (Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2011; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Semyonov and Glikman 2009).[3] Wagner et al. (2006) find that the proportion of ethnic minorities in a district is negatively related to perceived group threat, but that at least part of this effect is explained by the positive effect of immigrant group size on intergroup contact. Analyses based on multilevel structural equation modeling show that immigrant group size has a positive direct effect on anti-immigrant attitudes but a stronger negative indirect effect by increasing the odds of intergroup contact (cf. Schlueter and Wagner 2008; Schlueter and

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[3] Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers (2011) find this for regional but not national immigrant group size. Semyonov and Glikman (2009) find this for neighborhood diversity but not national immigrant group size.

Scheepers 2010). Based on these findings, it is plausible that when immigrants in an area appear

more culturally different, the native population will less readily develop friendships with them

and be more likely to see them as threatening. In such a circumstance, the net effect of visible

immigrant group size could be positive.

Halo Effect

In their studies of radical right voting, some have proposed the existence of a halo effect

of immigrant group size (Bon, Cheylan and Brunet 1988; Bowyer 2008; Perrineau 1997; Rey

1996; Rydgren and Ruth 2011; 2013). According to this theory, the propensity to vote for

radical right political parties is highest among people living in communities that have few

immigrants but border immigrant-dense areas. This effect occurs because people in such areas

live close to the 'imagined other' but not the 'experienced other'" (Rydgren and Ruth 2013:723).

For those with few personal experiences with immigrants to counter their threat perceptions, the

presence of immigrants just beyond the city or town of residence may make the 'immigrant

threat' appear all the more looming and real. In a French study on support for the right radical

populist party voting, Della Posta (2013) finds a negative relationship between municipal

immigrant group size and municipal-level votes for the National Front (FRN), but a positive

relationship between regional immigrant group size and municipal-level FRN votes.[4] This

suggests that while immigrant group size in one's immediate community leads to lower

xenophobia, immigrant presence in the broader region can heighten it. Rydgren and Ruth (2011;

2013) find that neighboring immigrant group size is positively related to the district-level share

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[4] Note that Della Posta's (2013) study does not use individual-level data. In this case, region refers to French departments.

of votes for the Sweden Democrats.[5] Similar findings in England (Bowyer 2008) and France (Perrineau 1985) provide additional support for a halo effect of immigrant group size on xenophobic voting.[6] Altogether, these findings suggest that "it is the unknown that bothers, the stranger with whom one does not live but whom one sees beyond the city limits" (Perrineau 1985).[7] This leads to the first hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 1:* I expect to find a "halo effect" of immigrant group size on xenophobia. Specifically, neighboring immigrant group size will have a positive effect on xenophobia in municipalities with a small immigrant presence, but little to no effect in immigrant-dense municipalities.

Ethnic Visibility

Based on realistic group threat theory, I propose that objective sources of cultural threat, measured in terms visible immigrant population size, is positively related to xenophobia. Some European studies measure immigrant group size as the share of non-Western or non-EU (Quillian 1995) immigrants, under the view that only this more culturally different population evokes threat. However, such measures can capture a number of differences other than culture, including differences in socioeconomic status and in the rights and geographic mobility implied by EU citizenship. Some studies have used more fine-grained measures of cultural difference,

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[5] "Neighboring immigrant group size" is measured as immigrant group size of the most immigrant-dense bordering municipality. The Sweden Democrats are a radical right populist political party in Sweden. Rydgren and Ruth (2013) and Rydgren and Ruth (2011) look at district- and municipal-level voting, respectively.

[6] Perrineau (1985) observes that the radical right in France often garners the most support in city centers of cities that contain large concentrations of immigrants on the outskirts.

[7] This is my translation. The original text reads: "*C'est l'inconnu qui dérange, l'étranger avec lequel on ne vit pas mais qu'on devine aux limites de la Cité*" (Perrineau 1985:29).

such as the share of immigrants that are linguistically not assimilated (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011), Muslim (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Savelkoul et al. 2011; Schneider 2008), or considered socially distant (Hjerm 2009). I conceptualize immigrant difference in terms of linguistic, religious, and racial visibility. I define as ethnically visible those immigrants that cross salient boundaries of language, religion, or race. I argue that net of overall immigrant group size, *visible* immigrant group size is positively related to xenophobia. In what follows, I cite evidence that suggests immigrants that lack host language proficiency are viewed as more threatening. I show that in Switzerland, the setting of the current study, Muslim immigrants are viewed as the main outsider group. Finally, I make a case for looking at racial visibility. Immigrants that are relatively more different phenotypically may evoke greater perceptions of immigrant threat, even if their supposed difference is understood in terms of culture and socioeconomic background rather than race.

Linguistic Visibility

Even if, as Bail's (2008) findings suggest, the linguistic boundary is not that salient in Switzerland, there are still good reasons to suspect that xenophobia would be higher in locales where many immigrants do not speak at least one of the country's languages well. After all, language is a central element of culture. It is one of the best predictors of integration outcomes (Esser 2006). Paxton and Mughan (2006) find that natives feel threatened when immigrant minorities do not assimilate. They argue that assimilation is a key element of cultural threat. Immigrants that speak the common language poorly may be seen as more foreign and perhaps even *unwilling* to assimilate. Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) find that in a group discussion involving Dutch participants, the majority of Dutch participants felt uncomfortable when

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participants spoke other languages in front of them. When immigrants do not predominantly speak the country language or speak it well, they may be seen as more culturally threatening.

In the Dutch context, Gijsberts and Dagevos (2007) find that ethnic minority members in more ethnically concentrated neighborhoods ethnic minorities speak Dutch more poorly. They note that this can be a circular effect; relative to mixed neighborhoods, ethnic minorities in ethnically concentrated neighborhoods have both 1) fewer opportunities for contact with native Dutch; and 2) less necessity to learn the country language. They have fewer opportunities to practice the language, so their language skills improve more slowly than do those of immigrants in other types of neighborhoods. This lack of proficiency exacerbates views of immigrant foreignness, leading to higher perceptions of immigrant threat in locales with high concentrations of linguistically disadvantaged immigrants. One can expect a higher sense of threat and fewer possibilities for intergroup contact when the immigrants in question have difficulty communicating with nonimmigrants.

Compared to other European countries, Switzerland does not have high rates of residential segregation on the basis of ethnicity (Koopmans 2010). Still, the ethnic concentrations of Turks, former Yugoslavs, and Muslims in Swiss cities are substantial.[8] Their geographic isolation and generally lower socioeconomic status are reflected in the lower linguistic integration outcomes of their children. While 80 percent of Swiss-born Spanish immigrants claim one of the national languages as their primary language, the same is true of only 69 percent of Portuguese,[9] 65 percent of Turks, and 58 percent former Yugoslav immigrants

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[8] In 2000, the segregation indices for Turks in Zurich and Bern were 26 and 36, respectively (Arend, Baur and Schuler 2005:69). The segregation index for Muslims in Bern was 27 (Koopmans 2010:16), and for former Yugoslavs in Basel and Lucerne were 35 and 36, respectively (Arend, Baur and Schuler 2005:69).

[9] Portuguese immigrants are also somewhat spatially segregated, but to a lesser extent than are Turks and former Yugoslavs.

born in Switzerland (Piguet 2004:100).   Ethnic concentration may slow the language integration

of immigrants and consequently contribute to heightened perceptions of immigrant threat among

native Swiss.

Religious Visibility

The Muslim population in Switzerland is comprised primarily of immigrants from

Turkey, former Yugoslavia, and Albania (Green, Fasel and Sarrasin 2010:180).[10] A number of

these came in the 1970s during the postwar era as low-skilled guest workers. Their stays were

expected to be temporary, and migration policies were specifically constructed to make

permanent residence difficult and undesirable.[11] In the 1990s large numbers of people fled the

former Yugoslavia to Switzerland as refugees. Afonso (2005) observes that despite their

heterogeneous origins, Muslim immigrants in Switzerland tend to be of low socioeconomic

status. Over 9,000 former Yugoslav nationals have a provisional permit (permit F), which—

meant as it is for only temporary asylum—places many obstacles to integration to

(unsuccessfully) prevent permanent residence.[12] By the mid-1980s, asylum "emerged as a

metaphor for undesirable immigrants" (D'Amato 2011:190). In public debates, refugees were

often called the derogatory term "asylants" to suggest they did not deserve refugee status

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[10] Small numbers come from Arab countries and Africa, but their numbers are smaller. In 2000, Switzerland had about 59,000 Turkish-born residents and nearly 277,000 born in the Balkan region, compared to about 26,000 from North Africa; 18,000 from the Middle East; 41,000 from the rest of Africa; 34,000 from South Asia; and 48,000 from the rest of Asia.

[11] The federal government placed restrictive conditions on family reunification and increased the period of residence required for obtaining a permanent residence permit from five to ten years (D'Amato, 2011, p.168).

[12] One study found that 60 percent of those with such a permit had been living in Switzerland for at least five years and another 21 percent for over 10 years (Piguet 2004:107). Holders of this permit face many obstacles to integration, including the following: 1) no right to family reunification; 2) limited access to the labor market, with preference given to Swiss citizens and foreign residents; 3) restrictions in the access to post-compulsory education; 4) and restrictions on the inter-cantonal mobility (2004:107-8).

(2011:170). Altogether, immigrants that affiliate with Islam tend to have multiple layers of marginality.

Findings on attitudes towards different ethnic groups in Switzerland suggest that animosity directed toward Muslim immigrants is not explained away simply by their lower socioeconomic position. In the 2002 UNIVOX survey, three-quarters of respondents said Albanians are either "out of place (in Switzerland)" or "sometimes a source of concern" (Piguet 2004:111).[13] The figures were 72 percent, 71 percent, and 61 percent for Serbians, Bosnians, and Turks, respectively.[14] By comparison, only eight percent of respondents held similar views toward Portuguese immigrants, who entered the country as guest workers around the same time with low socioeconomic background and, like Yugoslavs and Turks, have faced difficulties with integration. Over a fifth of respondents saw Portuguese immigrants as enriching to Swiss society,[15] while only 6 percent said the same for Turks and 2 percent for each of the Yugoslav groups. Helbling (2008) finds that in Switzerland those from former Yugoslavia, Turks, and Arab countries are the least liked groups.[16] Something about the religion or the cultural difference Islam is seen to represent at least partly explains the much more negative views toward Muslim immigrants than Portuguese immigrants.

Muslims and immigrants assumed to be Muslim in Switzerland face discrimination in the areas of hiring and naturalization, in particular against immigrants from Muslim countries. Fibbi, Kaya and Piguet (2003) found discrimination in hiring when in 2002 they sent job

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[13] My translation. The original wording is "*pas à sa place (en Suisse)*" and "*parfois source de preoccupation*."

[14] The shares of people who said those groups were out of place were 34, 25, 25, and 15 percent for Albanians, Serbians, Bosnians, and Turks, respectively. Note that many immigrants of these origins are Muslim.

[15] "Un enrichessement."

[16] The shares of people who said immigrants from former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Arab countries were little or not at all likeable were 19, 23, and 33 percent, respectively. Mahnig and Wimmer point to additional research that finds that Turks, Tamils, Africans, and persons from former Yugoslavia have become objects of prejudice (2003:152).

applications of candidates that were identical in everything except nationality. Out of 100 applications in which a Swiss candidate got an interview, a Turkish candidate was rejected 30 times and a Kosovo Albanian 39 times. Comparing Portuguese, Yugoslavs, and Turks, Fibbi, Lerch and Wanner (2006) found the discrimination rate was highest against Yugoslavs in German-speaking Switzerland and lowest against the Portuguese.[17] When they did the same experiment in four other countries they found Yugoslavs in Switzerland were the most discriminated, followed by Turks in German-speaking Switzerland.[18]

Non-Europeans, especially those from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey, face a more difficult time getting naturalized. One of the unique things about Switzerland is that the federal government is rather weak, while municipalities enjoy a great deal of autonomy. Municipalities stipulate their own naturalization criteria.[19] Those with less formalized naturalization procedures require candidates "to prove that they have adopted the 'values and traditions of the local community'" (Mahnig and Wimmer 2003:148). Under this system, non-Western immigrants have been denied political rights more so than others. According to news reports, applicants of Eastern European and Asian origins were prevented from naturalizing in several small German-speaking towns (D'Amato 2011:186). Naturalization rejection rates increase immensely when naturalization decisions are settled by popular vote (Helbling 2008:87), even more so when the

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[17] They calculate the *minimum discrimination rate* (discrimination is considered as occurring only when the discrimination rate is higher than the critical threshold) as the ratio between the number of positive answers given to the foreign applicant minus the number of positive answers given to the Swiss candidate and the number of total valid observations" (Fibbi, Lerch and Wanner 2006:356). For Yugoslavs in German-speaking regions, this rate was 59.4 percent, compared to 9.6 percent for Portuguese (2006:357).

[18] Their experiment tested discrimination against the following groups, listed in order from most to least minimum discrimination rate: Yugoslavs in Switzerland; Turks in German-speaking Switzerland; Moroccans in Spain; Moroccans in the Netherlands; Moroccans in Belgium; Turks in Germany; and Portuguese in French-speaking Switzerland.

[19] A potential candidate must meet separate national, cantonal, and municipal criteria to be eligible for citizenship.

applicants hail from Muslim countries (2008:91).[20] Since July 2003, when the Federal Tribunal

declared public votes on naturalization in certain municipalities unconstitutional, this has become

less a source of discrimination. The preference to exclude non-European and particularly

Muslim immigrants from citizenship provides further evidence that immigrants that are Muslim

are generally viewed negatively and subject to discrimination in the job market as well as the

naturalization process.

Negative representations of Muslim immigrants in mainstream Swiss media exacerbate

views that Muslim immigrants pose a threat. According to Gianni and Clavien, Muslims in

Switzerland are constructed as the main figure of the Other (2012:114). Analyzing news stories

from the prominent liberal French-language newspaper, *Le Temps*,[21] they find that gender issues

rank among the most important topics (in number of occurrences) in media coverage of the cases

they examine (2012:123).[22] All the news stories in their sample, regardless of topic, refer to

gender, often highlighting markers of the feminine, such as the Islamic headscarf, stoning, and

the non-mixing of sexes in swimming pools (2012:125). According to Gianni and Clavien

(2012), Swiss news reporting about Islam and Muslims uses gender issues to create an

essentialized, generalized Muslim identity comprised of two main attributes: that 1) Muslim

women unquestioningly support some inherently oppressive Islamic practices; and 2) Muslim

men force them to follow practices that compromise Muslim women's autonomy and freedom of

choice (2012:127). Overall, these findings suggest that in some mainstream Swiss news media,

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[20] Helbling (2008) uses a sample of 74 municipalities, which he argues is nationally representative. The coefficient for "popular votes at ballot" is 28.4 when the outcome is overall rejection rate, but 53.2 when the outcome is the rejection rate for applicants from Muslim countries (2008:87, 91). By "Muslim countries" Helbling is referring to applicants from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey.

[21] The debate over cultural differences follows a similar logic in French- and German-speaking areas (2012:117).

[22] They analyze 858 news stories tied to 8 topics, printed 2004 to 2006, which include 1) the issue of headscarves in Switzerland; 2) the political debate surrounding a popular initiative to facilitate access to citizenship for second- and third-generation foreigners; and 3) the publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad in a Danish newspaper.

Muslims are represented as culturally too different, unassimilable, and overall a *problem* for Swiss society.

Racial Visibility

Many scholars argue that race does not operate in the European context or at least not to the same extent as it does in the United States. In many European countries, including France and Germany, race is not an acceptable terminology. In Britain today, state policies construct difference and diversity in terms of 'faith', rather than 'race relations'.[23] At least in Western Europe, a discursive shift has occurred in which biologically-grounded racial categories have "increasingly given way to a wider presupposition of cultural difference as the fundamental and immutable basis of identity and belonging" (Silverstein 2005:365-66). Whether perceived as cultural or racial difference, some immigrant origins are seen as more threatening than others. Hungarians report the least tolerance toward Chinese immigrants, Arabs, Africans, Afghans, and Gypsies (Nyíri 2005:660-61). Hagendoorn et al. (1998) and Van Oudenhoven, Groenewoud and Hewstone (1996) find clear preference hierarchies in Europe for different ethno-cultural and immigrant groups.[24] Differences in tolerance and ethnic perceptions suggest that some ethnic origins are seen as more foreign and less acceptable than others. The question remains whether larger shares of these ethnically more visible immigrants in a country or region lead to higher xenophobia among natives living there.

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[23] They shifted from addressing "race relations" in the 1950s and 1960s to 'ethnicity', 'culture', and finally 'faith' (Grillo 2010:50).

[24] By ethnic group I am referring to people of immigrant origin but who did not themselves immigrate.

The term "race" may not be a meaningful concept in Switzerland today. Racial

terminology is not used in mainstream discourse, nor is official data on race collected.[25] Some

studies based on survey data find that religious boundaries are weak in the Swiss context (Bail

2008; Duemmler 2013). Racial boundaries are socially constructed, so they cannot be expected

to follow the American model. For instance, when Dutch policymakers refer to "black schools,"

they are referring to schools where a large proportion of students are first- and second generation

Moroccans and Turks (Lucassen 2005:12).[26] Still, even if immigrants are described in terms of

cultural or socioeconomic difference, those who stand out as more phenotypically different may

still disproportionately be the targets of xenophobia. From the 1920s to the 1960s federal and

local Swiss governments tried to regulate the reproductive sexuality of Jews, the Yenish

('Gypsies'),[27] and other so-called 'bad weeds' to eliminate difference and control what it meant

to be Swiss (Mottier 2008). From 1926 to 1972, they forceful removed over 600 Yenish and

other 'traveler' children from their families, partly on the grounds that traveler children were

"racially inferior" (2008:266).[28] Although the term race may no longer be used, immigrants

from certain country origins are regarded with prejudice and dislike. In Switzerland today,

prejudice is directed toward Turks, Tamils, Africans, and immigrants from the former

Yugoslavia (Hoffmann-Nowotny et al. 1997:72-77). In 2007, the principal victims of racist

violence in Switzerland were Muslims, people of African origin, and Jews (Human Rights First

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[25] However, non-governmental organizations such as the Swiss Foundation against Racism and Antisemitism do monitor incidence of racism and xenophobia in the country.

[26] By contrast, Surinamese immigrants, who would be viewed as black in the U.S., are seen as less "black" because they do better in school and the job market (Lucassen 2005:12).

[27] The Yenish are a people found predominantly in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and France who have traditionally led a nomadic lifestyle (Mottier 2008:265). About 30,000 Yenish lived in Switzerland in 2008 and several hundred thousand in Europe overall.

[28] The children were sent to be raised in penal institutions, orphanages, foster homes, workhouses, and psychiatric facilities.

2008:10). Immigrants in Switzerland from Africa and Asia also tend to be marginal in terms of residential status, which can lead them to be seen even more negatively.[29] Measuring racial visibility as the share of "migrant stock" from black Africa, East Asia, and South Asia, this study looks at whether immigrants that would be considered racially identifiable as "black" or "Asian" in the American context are regarded with increased threat in the Swiss setting.

Findings on Visible Immigrant Group Size

Findings on the effects of visible immigrant group size have been mixed. Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) measure visibility in terms of the size of the population that is not linguistically assimilated, but find no effect. Additional studies have considered the effects of Muslim population size in a country on perceived immigrant threat (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Savelkoul et al. 2011; Strabac and Listhaug 2008) and either found a positive (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2011) or no effect (Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Hjerm (2009) finds the municipal share of culturally distant immigrants is negatively related to xenophobia, while overall group size has no effect. Overall, the findings are inconclusive. More work needs to be done in both national and more local contexts to determine whether ethnic visibility, measured in terms of language use, minority religious affiliation, or race, has an effect on xenophobia.

Literature on immigration in various European and American contexts suggests that immigrants seen as standing out in terms of language, religion, or race, are regarded as particularly threatening to the dominant native majority. Compared to other immigrants, ethnically visible immigrants may be viewed as a symbolic threat to the culture, traditions and

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[29] Approximately 8,000 Cambodians and Vietnamese escaping newly-established communist regimes were let admitted between 1979 and 1982 on the basis of yearly quotas (D'Amato 2011:169). Sri Lankans make up 27 percent of Permit F holders and Somalis, 13 percent (Piguet 2004:107).

customs of the country. Based on realistic group threat theory and past studies looking at

immigrants that cross linguistic, religious, and racial boundaries, I arrive at the second

hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: Immigrant visibility is positively related to xenophobia.

In this study, I test whether a halo effect operates, whereby people living in communities

with few immigrants experience heightened xenophobia when they are bordered by immigrant-

rich communities. I also look at the effect of visible immigrant group size on xenophobia.

Data and Measurement

Data

For the present analysis I use Switzerland's restricted-use data from the first round of the

European Social Survey (ESS) (Joye, Schöbi and Wälti 2005), carried out from 2002 to 2003.

The survey is based on a stratified multi-stage probability sample. It is representative of all

persons age 15 and over living within private households, regardless of nationality, citizenship,

language, or legal status. The original dataset contains 2,040 individual observations from 198

municipalities.[30] This investigation draws from responses to a 58-item rotating module on

immigration and asylum issues, available only in Round 1 of the ESS. I supplement the dataset

with contextual data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO).

I narrow the sample in two ways. First, I restrict the sample to respondents age 18 and

older. By age 18, many individuals have completed their formal education and entered the work

force. Second, I only analyze the responses of *nonimmigrant* respondents, whom I define as

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[30] Switzerland has 26 cantons total. It had 6,806 municipalities in January 2002 [Raumgliedrung_Jan_2002.xls].
Municipality boundaries changed considerably and many new ones have been created since then.

individuals born in Switzerland to Swiss-born parents.[31] I use casewise deletion to eliminate

observations with missing responses on the variables of interest. The final sample contains

responses from 1,354 individuals and 197 municipalities.[32]

Multilevel Regression Modeling

I test the two sets of hypotheses using multilevel regression modeling. For this

investigation, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are not appropriate because they assume

observations are independent. Individual observations within the same country may be

statistically dependent on unmeasured factors. Individuals within the same municipality may

resemble one another in certain ways due to shared political, economic, and social environments.

When looking at a cross-level effect, such as that of municipal-level immigrant presence on

individual-level xenophobia, it is important to use a model that accounts for the nestedness of

observations in hierarchically structured data. Models that do not do this estimate standard

errors of regression coefficients too small. Multilevel regression modeling accounts for data

clustering and adjusts the standard errors accordingly.

I use *HLM 7.0* to run these models. I report results based on *robust* standard errors,

which are consistently higher than asymptotic standard errors. I compare goodness-of-fit of

models using the Wald test. According to Treiman (2014:222), it is not appropriate to estimate

the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) on weighted or clustered samples because such designs

are based on pseudolikelihood functions. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), likelihood

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[31] All but nine of the included respondents are Swiss citizens.

[32] The restricted-use dataset does not report municipality of residence, but instead zip code and locality of residence.
I determine municipality of residence from zip code and locality of residence using a macro file ("Liste des
communes et des localités, 2002") I obtained directly from the SFSO. The file lists municipalities by locality and
zip code according to 2002 classifications.

ratio test, and BIC are all based on true log likelihood. Since the models in this study are

estimated with robust standard errors and are, thus, based on log pseudolikelihood, none of these

are suitable options for comparing goodness-of-fit. The Wald test is appropriate for comparing

nested models estimated with robust standard errors.[33]

Research Setting

Switzerland is like a number of Western European countries, but stands apart in some

ways. Immigration figures highly in Swiss politics and receives a lot of press. Swiss citizens see

immigration as one of the country's most pressing problems (Nicolet and Sciarini 2006).

Switzerland has a very large share of immigrants,[34] second after Luxembourg, but does not

consider itself an immigration country (D'Amato 2011:165). Like many countries, Switzerland

engaged in extensive postwar labor recruitment from Turkey and Southern Europe (Bail

2008:39).[35] It has a large, culturally heterogeneous Muslim population,[36] comprised mostly of

immigrants from Albania, former Yugoslavia, and Turkey (Green, Fasel and Sarrasin 2010:180).

Even though the Swiss appear to be less opposed to immigrants and immigration than many EU

countries and the U.S., they are also the most opposed to living next to Muslims (Helbling 2008;

Sides and Citrin 2007).

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[33] I estimate all models without weights. In addition, even though the ESS dataset comes with individual-level sampling weights I carry out all analyses without weights. I explain the decisions to use casewise deletion and estimate unweighted models in the Chapter 2 Appendix.

[34] In 2000, 20.5 percent of the population was made of Swiss- and foreign-born foreign nationals (Wanner 2012:25). Another 7.4 percent of the population was comprised of Swiss- and foreign-born naturalized Swiss citizens. In total, 27.9 percent of the Swiss population was of immigrant origin.

[35] France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain, Sweden, Austria, and Luxembourg also did this.

[36] According to the 2000 census, 4.3 percent of the country population was Muslim. Only 12 percent of them had Swiss citizenship (Based on compiled data obtained directly from the SFSO: "Réligions par communes, sexe, et nationalité, 2000.").

Studies suggest that Switzerland has weaker symbolic boundaries than many European countries (Bail 2008; Duemmler 2013). Bail (2008) finds that Switzerland's racial, linguistic, and cultural symbolic boundaries are far weaker than the European average.[37] He speculates this may be because historically language and religion were not as central to nation-building strategy in Switzerland and Scandinavian countries as they were in old immigration countries such as France. Wimmer (2002) says in Switzerland there is a "transethnic" patriotism that places importance on diversity in language and culture, though within European limits (Wimmer 2002). *Geistige Landesverteidigung* (spiritual defense of the country) "united disparate linguistic and religious groups into a single republic in the face of threats from its more powerful neighbors" (Bail 2008:56). Based on this national understanding, Swiss people are probably more open to diversity than many Europeans, but can still feel threatened by non-European linguistic and cultural diversity within their country borders.

Swiss people may express openness toward immigrants and immigration, but their social policies are less conducive to immigrant integration. Data from the 2007 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) shows that out of the EU-28 countries, Switzerland ranks 15th overall in its immigrant integration policies (Niessen et al. 2007:3).[38] Findings from the MIPEX and the 1995 Legal Obstacles to Integration (LOI) index show that in Switzerland, Austria, and Germany there is a high degree of legal inequality between immigrants and nonimmigrants (Koopmans 2010:4). That means that only with great difficulty and with many preconditions can immigrants obtain equal rights to nonimmigrants. Switzerland's Alien Law of 1999 lead to a more proactive

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[37] Duemmler's (2013) findings also support weak symbolic boundaries in Switzerland, both with respect to perceptions of immigrant threat and attitudes toward immigration admissions (2013:8).

[38] The overall ranking is based on how much the following dimensions of a country's policies promote immigrant integration: labor market access; family reunification; long-term residence; political participation; access to nationality; and anti-discrimination. Switzerland ranks toward the bottom in the dimensions of antidiscrimination and long-term residence, but ranks sixth in labor market access.

federal integration policy, which includes support for language and integration courses and training for integration leaders (D'Amato 2011:180). However, the more recent Alien's Law of 2008 "explicitly foresees that it is the immigrant's duty to make every effort necessary to facilitate his or her own integration" (D'Amato 2011:181). While the Swiss federal government has stepped up its efforts since 1999 to incorporate immigrants, integration is seen as largely an individual responsibility.

Analytic Approach

In these analyses, I test the first hypothesis that immigrant group size has a halo effect on xenophobia; when municipal immigrant group size is small, high immigrant presence in bordering municipalities leads to higher xenophobia, but when municipal immigrant group size is large this effect is weak or nonexistent. It also tests the second hypothesis that people living in municipalities with a larger share of ethnically visible immigrants tend to be more xenophobic. The two hypotheses are tested using the following models:

For Hypothesis 1:

$XEN_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + \gamma_{01}*(\text{municipal immigrant group size})_j$

$\quad + \gamma_{02}*(\text{neighboring immigrant group size})_j$

$\quad + \gamma_{03}*(\text{municipal immigrant group size*neighboring immigrant group size})_j + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$

For Hypothesis 2:

$XEN_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + \gamma_{01}*(\text{municipal immigrant group size})_j$

$\quad + \gamma_{02}*(\text{visible immigrant group size})_j + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$

I define **xenophobia** as a generalized perception of immigrant threat. I construct the variable as an additive index based on responses to six survey items that ask respondents'

opinions about the effects of immigrants on the economy, cultural life, crime rates, and other aspects of the country of residence. Answers ranged from 0 to 10 on a Likert scale, with 0 representing the most negative view toward immigrants. I added respondent scores for these 6 items, reversed their direction so that higher scores would indicate more perceived threat, and rescaled the index to range from 0 to 100. I calculated a value for all individual cases with nonmissing responses to at least 4 of the 6 survey items.[39] Using principal component analysis, Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) find that these six items produce a one-factor solution in all the countries they investigate. Also, the loadings on that factor are very similar across countries. These results suggest that people do not make distinctions about their views toward immigrants in these questions; "they are simply positive or negative towards immigrants in general" (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011:824).[40] This provides justification for combining the six survey items into a single indicator of xenophobia.

X is a vector of individual respondent characteristics. I include variables for age, gender, educational attainment, political orientation, and urban residence. The last is based on a survey item that asked individuals to rate their political orientation on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means left and 10 means right.[41] Also included among the controls is a variable for friendship contact. This is based on a survey question that asked respondents to indicate with they had several, few, or no immigrant friends. Responses of "several" or "a few" were coded as 1 and responses of "none at all" as 0. Some might argue against including this variable, since it can lead to selection

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[39] I counted the following responses as missing: 1) refusal to answer; 2) don't know; and 3) no answer.

[40] They find similar results when they do the same analysis with comparable questions from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).

[41] I recode responses of "don't know" to a score of 5.

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bias in the results—those who are less xenophobic may choose to have immigrant friends. The same models without this variable yielded the same qualitative results.

The main variables of interest are immigrant group size, neighboring immigrant group size, religious visibility, linguistic visibility, and racial visibility. The variable for **municipal immigrant group size** is measured as the share of foreign-born residents out of the total resident population in 2002[42]. Neighboring immigrant group size is measured as the largest immigrant group size in any bordering municipality. To determine which municipalities bordered the municipalities of residence I used a 2003 map of municipal classifications as of January, 2003 (Office fédéral de la statistique, ThemaKart 2003).

Religious visibility is measured as the share of Muslim foreigners out of the total municipal resident population.[43] I measure **linguistic visibility** with data from an index constructed by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) to determine the extent of linguistic non-integration in different parts of the country (Office fédéral de la statistique 2005). On the basis of individual level 2000 census data, the SFSO counts as linguistically non-integrated the following populations: 1) those who do not speak the regional language at home; 2) who speak the regional language neither at home nor at work; 3) those who do not speak a Swiss language or English (the *lingua franca*) at home or at work either; and 4) those whose main language (in which they think, typically the language they learned first) is not a German or Romance language. The index is measured as the share of linguistically non-integrated peoples out of the total municipal population.

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[42] Based on compiled data obtained directly from the SFSO: "Wohnbevölkerung nach Staat zur Zeit der Geburt und Gemeinden, 2000."

[43] By foreigner I am referring to residents with foreign citizenship.

I measure **racial visibility** as the share of residents born in any part of Africa or Asia not including North Africa, the Middle East, or former Soviet states.[44] Through my chosen measurement, I essentially assume racial phenotype from country of birth. This may be a strong assumption, particularly given Africa's long colonial history—immigrants from South Africa, the Congo, and other African countries may be European descendants. In the absence of data on race, this is the available alternative. I exclude immigrants from North Africa, the Middle East, and the former Soviet states, which comprise much of Switzerland's Muslim population. This way the religious and racial visibility measures are more distinct.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

The final sample consists of 1,354 individuals nested in 197 Swiss municipalities. Some municipalities are represented by as little as 2 observations, while others by up to 55. The average respondent is middle aged, has completed an upper secondary level of education and is politically centrist (see Table 1). The sample is nearly evenly divided between men and women. Respondents average 52 points on the xenophobia index, which means that on average they chose the middle response to each of the index questions. Also, 71 percent of them have either some or many immigrant friends. The average municipality in the sample has an immigrant group size of 19 percent. By comparison, the average municipality in Switzerland has an immigrant group size of 13 percent.[45] The average neighboring immigrant group size is 24

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[44] By using this measurement I build upon a previous study in which I look at racial visibility in a cross-national context. The difference is that in this country I use information on country of *birth*, rather than country of citizenship.

[45] This calculation is based on data from the 2000 Swiss census.

percent immigrant. Racial visibility is rather uncommon, while linguistic visibility is very

prevalent. On average, Muslims do not make up a large share of the municipal population.

[Table 1 here]

Looking at the municipal-level variable correlations, it is evident that linguistic and racial

visibility are substantially correlated with immigrant group size, but much less so with

neighboring immigrant group size (see Table 2). These findings are not surprising. Linguistic

visibility will tend to be highest where immigrant presence is largest. Racially visible

immigrants tend to come from more recent migration flows and will tend to concentrate in the

cities, where immigrant presence is highest. Religious visibility is less correlated with

immigrant group size and is practically unrelated to neighboring immigrant group size.

[Table 2]

Halo Effect

The findings support the first hypothesis of a halo effect of immigrant group size,

measured as an interaction between municipal and neighboring municipal immigrant group size

(see Table 3). Model 3 includes the grand-mean centered variables for immigrant group size

and neighboring immigrant group size, but no interaction term.[46] In this model, the effect of

municipal immigrant group size on xenophobia is nearly statistically significant (p=0.051) and

negative. That is, those who live in communities with more immigrants tend to feel less

threatened by immigrants. The size of immigrant presence in neighboring municipalities does

not appear to impact xenophobia. I compare the fit of Model 3 to the control model (Model 2),

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[46] The model with the uncentered interaction term and these two variables suffers multicollinearity, with the interaction term getting a variance inflation factor (VIF) value of 19. To prevent this, I center the two group size variables and multiply them together to create a centered interaction term. Bickel (2012:43) recommends this method to deal with multicollinearity.

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which only differs from Model 3 in that it does not contain the variable for neighboring immigrant group size. Based on Wald test results, Model 3 does not explain variance in the dependent variable any better than does the control model.

[Table 3 here]

The results of the interaction model (Model 4) provide support for the halo effect hypothesis, but also point to an unexpected effect. The interaction model contains centered terms for municipal and neighboring immigrant group sizes, as well as the interaction between the two. The overall interaction term is significant, the main effect of immigrant group size remains negative, and the main effect of neighboring group size is positive.[47] I find evidence of a halo effect, whereby immigrant presence in adjacent communities amplifies xenophobia, but only in municipalities in the bottom 2 percentile of immigrant group size in the sample (see Figure 1). Specifically, for people living in municipalities where immigrants make up 3.5 percent or less of the population, neighboring immigrant group size amplifies xenophobia.

In municipalities where immigrants make up 33.7 percent or more of the population the effect of neighboring immigrant group size is *negative*. This means that for people living in communities with many immigrants, neighboring immigrant group size contributes a further reduction in their perceptions of immigrant threat. This occurs in municipalities in the top seven percentile of immigrant group size in the sample. Based on Wald test results, the interaction model improves upon the fit of the control model. These findings also show that for residents of immigrant-rich communities, large immigrant presence in neighboring communities further reduces xenophobia.

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[47] To determine under which conditions of municipal immigrant group size that neighboring immigrant group size would has a significant effect, I use a test of margins. This test shows whether the slope of neighboring immigrant group size is different from 0 at particular values of municipal immigrant group size.

Still, these findings are qualitatively interesting both in Switzerland and other country contexts. In 2000 a little over 8 percent of the Switzerland's 2,896 municipalities had populations that were 3.7 percent foreign-born or less. These are small municipalities, each comprised of no more than 3,000 inhabitants, which together make up only 1.4 percent of the country's total population of nearly 7.3 million. The halo effect does not impact a large share of the Swiss population, but does affect a large number of people. Similarly, 2.6 percent of Switzerland's municipalities in 2000 were 33.7 percent or more foreign-born. Those municipalities contain 11.1 percent of the country's population. Such dynamics would be important to consider when conducting research in either ethnically homogeneous or highly diverse parts of the country. More broadly speaking, these interaction effects may be stronger in countries with fewer immigrants and shorter immigration histories.

[Figure 1 here]

Ethnic Visibility

The results support the second hypothesis; people living in municipalities with larger shares of linguistically or religiously visible immigrants perceive more immigrant threat (see Table 4). Net of controls and immigrant group size, a one point increase in linguistic visibility corresponds to a 0.28 point increase in xenophobia index score (Model 5). Similarly, all other things equal, a one point increase in Muslim population size contributes an increase of 0.75 in xenophobia index score (Model 6). Notably, the negative effect of overall immigrant group size intensifies when either linguistic or religious visibility is introduced into the model (compared to Model 2). This suggests that when few of the immigrants in a municipality are ethnically visible, immigrant group size has a stronger downward effect on xenophobia.

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The findings for racial visibility do not support the second hypothesis (see Model 7). Net of controls and immigrant group size, racial visibility has a *negative*, but statistically insignificant effect on xenophobia. Including racial visibility in the model causes the coefficient for immigrant group size to decrease and lose statistical significance. When overall immigrant group size is removed as a control, the negative effect of racial visibility remains statistically significant (not shown). This suggests the negative effect of racial visibility is explained by immigrant group size. The presence of racially visible immigrants in a municipality does not appear to evoke increased xenophobia. By contrast, the positive effects of linguistic and religious visibility are statistically significant even without the control for overall immigrant group size. That is, the gross and net effects of linguistic and religious visibility on xenophobia are positive.

[Table 4 here]

The positive effect of linguistic visibility on xenophobia can be interpreted as a response to non-Western immigrant presence. The measure of linguistic visibility counted only people who did not speak 1) a Swiss language; 2) English; or 3) a romance language. This would exclude immigrants from Italy; France; Germany; Portugal; Spain; South America; and Francophone or Anglophone countries. Given Switzerland's immigration history, the measure of linguistic visibility primarily counts immigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, but also includes immigrants from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Many of the immigrants from these countries arrived as guest workers, family members of guest workers, or asylum seekers and tended to be socially disadvantaged.[48] The positive effect of linguistic visibility on xenophobia may stem from native Swiss reacting to local immigrants' multiple layers of

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[48] Among the refugees, some came from a rural background, some had not finished primary school, and still others had university degrees not recognized in Europe (D'Amato 2011:170). Immigrants from these regions who entered as highly-qualified immigrants probably came in with some proficiency in English or a Swiss language.

difference and disadvantage both in terms of language ability, culture, and socioeconomic background.

Altogether, the results provide support for both hypotheses. As expected, neighboring immigrant group size does have a positive effect on the xenophobia of people living in municipalities with few immigrants. Unexpectedly, neighboring group size has a *negative* effect on the xenophobia of those living in immigrant-rich communities. However, these interactions impact only a few municipalities in the sample and overall explain only a small amount of the heterogeneity in the dependent variable. Linguistic and religious visibilities are each negatively related to xenophobia, as expected. These findings suggest that a larger presence of immigrants viewed as culturally different leads to amplified perceptions of immigrant threat.

Discussion

In a broader perspective, the findings of this study support realistic group threat theory predictions about the effects of immigrant visibility. Overall immigrant group size conforms to contact hypothesis expectations. The presence of more immigrants in a community generally leads to more opportunities for intergroup contact, leading to lower xenophobia. The higher presence can also have a familiarization effect such that even in the absence of personal contact, residents become more accustomed to having immigrants around. The increase in ethnic diversity reduces xenophobia over and above the impact of personal contact.

Living next to a community with many immigrants proves only to affect the attitudes of those living in the most and least ethnically diverse municipalities. As hypothesized, a halo effect operates in communities with the smallest shares of immigrants. For natives in such

communities, larger immigrant presence in neighboring municipalities amplifies perceptions of immigrant threat. Residents of municipalities with few immigrants likely have little personal contact with people of immigrant origin. To the extent that they work outside their communities, residents of such communities may encounter a wider variety of opinions and types of people. Otherwise, in the absence of regular intergroup contact, they may regard foreigners in neighboring communities with uncertainty, concern, and fear. Schlueter and Davidov (2013) find media coverage has a stronger positive impact on xenophobia in regions where there are few immigrants. Uninformed by personal experience, Swiss in more ethnically homogeneous communities may more readily accept negative messages about immigrants in public discourse and feel more readily threatened by nearby ethnic diversity.

The finding of a halo effect of immigrant group size in the third chapter provides a fine-grained understanding of how the geographic proximity of immigrants relates to xenophobia. This effect "is due to the discrepancy between living close to the 'imagined other' but not the 'experienced other'" (Rydgren and Ruth 2013:723). A number of studies put forward this hypothesis to explain electoral support for radical right-wing political parties (Bon, Cheylan and Brunet 1988; Bowyer 2008; Perrineau 1997; Rey 1996). The current study finds a similar halo effect on perceptions of immigrant threat. Individuals living in communities with few immigrants have little personal contact with immigrants, so they tend to be more xenophobic. To people in such communities, when an immigrant-dense community is nearby the specter of the "imagined other" appears more menacing, since such fears are not countered by the prejudice-reducing effects of friendly contact. These findings help us better understand contact and threat dynamics at more local levels.

The findings from the third chapter suggest that local ethnic visibility *does* amplify perceptions of threat. Like many studies (e.g., Wagner et al. 2006), the third chapter finds that overall immigrant group size is negatively related to xenophobia. However, net of overall group size, people living in communities with a larger visible immigrant population are more anti-immigrant. Other studies have found similar visibility effects in Spain and the Netherlands (Savelkoul et al. 2011; Schlueter and Davidov 2013).[49] This goes in line with Green, Fasel and Sarrasin's (2010) findings, also in the Swiss context, and Schlueter and Davidov's (2013) findings, which are based on regions in the Spanish context. These findings provide support for realistic group threat theory, which state that anti-immigrant attitudes are related to real threats to collective interests. Specifically, this study finds that *objective* sources of cultural threat amplify levels of xenophobia. Immigrant visibility is positively related to xenophobia because, more so than other immigrants, immigrants seen as standing out ethnically, will be seen as more threatening to the culture, ideals, and traditions of the country.

Placing this study's findings in the context of the literature, the positive effect of immigrant visibility can be said to result from both less intergroup contact and higher cultural threat. Through multilevel structural equation modeling, Schlueter and Wagner (2008) find that immigrant group size both directly increases perceived immigrant threat and indirectly decreases it by increasing intergroup contact. In their study the net effect of overall immigrant group size is negative. However, the positive effect of immigrant group size on intergroup contact appears to be weaker when the measure is limited to visible immigrants (Green, Fasel and Sarrasin

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[49] Neither study controls for overall group size. Schlueter and Davidov (2013) measure group size in terms of the share of non-Western foreigners. Savelkoul et al.'s (2011) study looks at the effect of Muslim group size.

2010).[50] Also, the direct positive contribution of immigrant group size to perceived threat is probably higher when immigrants are visible. Thus, the finding of a positive effect of immigrant visibility conforms to conflict theory, but is a result of both contact and threat dynamics.

What is interesting about these findings is that they occur in a multicultural country. This may be because although Swiss national identity may appear diverse and expansive, at the regional level it is mono-ethnic. As Mahnig and Wimmer point out, "Swiss national identity is dominated by the projection of local particularities on the national level" (2003:152). This makes it possible for regional and linguistic diversity to be seen as elements of the national ingroup. The present study shows that despite this expansive national understanding and purportedly weak symbolic boundaries (Bail 2008; Duemmler 2013), Switzerland has a salient cultural boundary that marks certain non-Westerners and particularly Muslims as unwanted outsiders. This is perhaps already apparent in its immigrant admissions policies, which have been partly motivated by the desire to limit the *Grad der Überfremdung*, or "degree of overforeignization."[51] The concept of "overforeignization" sets the boundaries of national identity by marking what the Swiss nation is *not*. In the 1960s and 1970s, Italian migrants were seen as the prominent threat to Swiss national identity (Mahnig and Wimmer, p.152). Today, Muslims seem to be seen as the primary source of Überfremdung.

Practically speaking, the findings on religious and linguistic visibility are particularly concerning in the Swiss context because of what increased threat can mean for the chances of integration of a large segment of the immigrant population. Immigrants that do not meet

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[50] Green, Fasel and Sarrasin (2010) find that Northern and Western European immigrant group size in a municipality is more positively associated with intergroup contact than is Muslim group size.

[51] According to D'Amato, "Nationwide political census to ensure cultural purity in Switzerland prevented the drafting of any consistent immigrant policy until very recently" (2011:167).

stringent municipal standards of linguistic and cultural assimilation are denied citizenship and,

thereby, secure residential status. Until 2003, citizens in many Swiss municipalities could decide

on naturalization requests by popular vote. In such places, the views of the native majority

toward immigrants had very real consequences on the latter's abilities to integrate successfully

into Swiss society. While this particular source of potential discrimination has largely

disappeared,[52] there remain many other ways that Swiss natives as voters impact the fates of

immigrants. In a country where citizens can and do vote on many issues,[53] local dynamics of

xenophobia have real consequences for immigrants, particularly since political actors may feed

the fear of the "imagined other" in ethnically homogeneous communities to win votes.

Campaigns to promote intergroup contact, depict immigrants in a more nuanced way, and put in

place and enforce more binding anti-racism laws would help immigrants to integrate into the

society more positively and on a more equal footing with native Swiss.

     The main limitation of this study was the potential for residential selection bias. It is

possible that people who are more xenophobic will move to more ethnically Swiss

municipalities. Since immigrants tend to concentrate in urban centers, it seems that, if anything,

such "flight" would probably downwardly bias the effects of immigrant group size. Thus, part of

the negative effect of immigrant group size and the halo effect could owe in part to self-selection

of more xenophobic individuals into ethnically homogeneous communities. Residential mobility

is more extensive in Switzerland than it is in many other European countries (Strassmann 2001),

so such movement is feasible.[54] Past research demonstrates that Swiss inhabitants do not move

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[52] In July 2003, popular voting to decide on naturalization requests was declared unconstitutional in most municipalities.

[53] Note that there is a very high voter participation rate in Switzerland, particularly among Swiss men.

[54] According to 1986 figures, annual mobility was 16.0 percent in the five largest Swiss urban agglomerations (Strassmann 2001:13).

when the percentage of immigrants increases (Arend 1982:361-72). To the extent this pattern still holds, the bias of residential selection on study results should be minimal. Future studies may want to find a way to account for residential mobility. Wagner et al. (2006) do this by controlling for migration into and out of the area of residence.

Many studies have debated how, if at all, immigrant group size affects attitudes toward immigrants and which theories describe such dynamics. This study finds that evidence that both the contact hypothesis and realistic group conflict theory help explain the phenomenon. Local immigrant group size is negatively related to perceptions of threat, but immigrant visibility counteracts this relationship. Specifically, when a larger share of immigrants in a locale is marked by cultural difference in terms of language or religion, nonimmigrants perceive more immigrant threat. More research is needed to understand how and under what circumstances immigrant visibility and the geographic proximity of immigrant populations impact xenophobia. Future studies may want to consider the impacts of religious and linguistic visibility in neighboring communities on xenophobia. The halo effect examined here may have a broader effect when immigrant group size is measured as the size of the culturally visible immigrant population. To better understand the relationship between immigrant visibility and xenophobia, future studies may want to look at the relationships of different types of intergroup contact with xenophobia and anti-Muslim attitudes to better understand how the latter two are related. Helbling (2008) and others (Kuhnel and Leibold 2007; Stolz 2005) argue that in Switzerland today, Islamophobia is simply a concretization of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Tables

Table 1. Individual- and municipal-level variable means and standard deviations. 1354 individual observations and municipalities.

Individual-level	Mean	S.D.
Xenophobia	52.40	13.27
Contact	71%	
Political orientation	4.96	1.74
Educ: Second stage of tertiary	3%	
Educ: First stage of tertiary	11%	
Educ: Post-secondary, non-tertiary	13%	
Educ: Upper secondary	58%	
Educ: Lower secondary	12%	
Educ: Primary not completed	3%	
Female	51%	
Age	49.45	16.84
Municipal-level		
Immigrant group size	19.39	9.03
Neighboring immigrant group size	24.16	8.42
Religious visibility	3.51	2.58
Linguistic visibility	48.80	7.44
Racial visibility	1.41	0.91

Table 2. Level-2 variable correlations. N=197 municipalities.

	Immigrant group size	Neighboring immigrant group size	Linguistic visibility	Religious visibility	Racial visibility
Immigrant group size	1.000				
Neighboring immigrant group size	0.660	1.000			
Linguistic visibility	0.649	0.271	1.000		
Religious visibility	0.378	-0.001	0.772	1.000	
Racial visibility	0.693	0.422	0.550	0.342	1.000

Table 3. Relationships between immigrant group size, neighboring immigrant group size, and xenophobia.

	M1: Unconditional model		M2: Controls		Model 3: Municipal and neighboring immigrant group sizes		M4: Halo effect interaction	
	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.
Intercept	52.38 ***	0.47	54.14 ***	3.44	51.40 ***	3.12	51.88 ***	3.12
Individual-level								
Age			0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
Female			2.04 **	0.73	2.04 **	0.73	2.03 **	0.73
Political orientation			1.17 ***	0.23	1.16 ***	0.23	1.17 ***	0.23
Educ: Lower secondary			1.60	2.48	1.62	2.49	1.75	2.49
Educ: Upper secondary			-2.61	2.34	-2.59	2.35	-2.47	2.36
Educ: Post-secondary, non-tertiary			-3.70	2.52	-3.67	2.53	-3.56	2.52
Educ: First stage of tertiary			-8.60 ***	2.50	-8.57 ***	2.52	-8.45 ***	2.52
Educ: Second stage of tertiary			-10.20 ***	2.65	-10.14 ***	2.67	-9.77 ***	2.69
Friendship contact			-4.76 ***	0.79	-4.76 ***	0.79	-4.82 ***	0.79
Municipal level								
Immigrant group size			-0.14 **	0.05	-0.13 +	0.06	-0.11	0.06
Neighboring immigrant group size					-0.02	0.06	0.01	0.06
Interaction effect								
Immigrant group size*neighboring immigrant group size							-0.01 **	0.00

Notes: *** p<.001, ** p< .01, * p< .05. Models are based on 1,354 individuals and 197 municipalities. Omitted category for educational attainment is "primary education not completed". In Models 3 and 4, municipal and neighboring immigrant group sizes are grand-mean centered.

Table 3. (Continued)

	M1: Unconditional Model		M2: Controls		Model 3: Municipal and neighboring immigrant group sizes		M4: Halo effect interaction	
	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.
Random effects								
Municipal level variance	17.65 ***	4.20	12.07 ***	3.47	12.08 ***	3.48	11.29 ***	3.36
% explained			31.62		31.57		36.03	
Individual level variance	158.94	12.61	137.65	11.73	137.63	11.73	137.48	11.72
% explained			13.40		13.41		13.51	
Model fit								
Wald test (compared to M2)								
$\chi 2$ statistic					0.14		9.81	
Degrees of freedom					1		2	
p -value					0.708		0.007	

Figure 1. Slopes representing the effects of neighboring immigrant group size at different municipal immigrant group sizes.

Xenophobia by neighboring and municipal immigrant group sizes.

Notes: Graph displays *centered* values for neighboring immigrant group size. The uncentered values for the x-axis range from 13.6 to 35.1.

Table 4. Relationships between immigrant visibility and xenophobia.

	M1: Unconditional model		M2: Controls		M5: Linguistic visibility		M6: Religious visibility		M7: Racial visibility	
	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.
Intercept	52.38 ***	0.47	54.14 ***	3.44	43.13 ***	4.23	53.18 ***	3.47	54.11 ***	3.45
Individual-level										
Age			0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
Female			2.04 **	0.73	2.12 **	0.73	2.14 **	0.72	2.07 **	0.73
Political orientation			1.17 ***	0.23	1.16 ***	0.23	1.15 ***	0.23	1.15 ***	0.23
Educ: Lower secondary			1.60	2.48	1.82	2.43	1.53	2.49	1.72	2.49
Educ: Upper secondary			-2.61	2.34	-2.48	2.29	-2.73	2.35	-2.49	2.34
Educ: Post-secondary, non-tertiary			-3.70	2.52	-3.57	2.46	-3.79	2.54	-3.51	2.51
Educ: First stage of tertiary			-8.60 ***	2.50	-8.30 ***	2.45	-8.53 ***	2.52	-8.39 ***	2.50
Educ: Second stage of tertiary			-10.20 ***	2.65	-10.01 ***	2.62	-10.13 ***	2.66	-9.78 ***	2.65
Friendship contact			-4.76 ***	0.79	-4.77 ***	0.79	-4.75 ***	0.78	-4.78 ***	0.79
Municipal level										
Immigrant group size			-0.14 **	0.05	-0.30 ***	0.06	-0.22 ***	0.05	-0.05	0.07
Linguistic visibility					0.28 ***	0.07				
Religious visibility							0.75 ***	0.19		
Racial visibility									-1.17	0.64

Notes: *** p<.001, ** p< .01, * p< .05. Models are based on 1,354 individuals and 197 municipalities. Omitted category for educational attainment is "primary education not completed".

Table 4. (Continued)

	M1: Unconditional model		M2: Controls		M5: Linguistic visibility		M6: Religious visibility		M7: Racial visibility	
	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.
Random effects										
Municipal level	17.65 ***	4.20	12.07 ***	3.47	9.88 ***	3.14	9.90 ***	3.15	11.27 ***	3.36
% explained			31.62		44.01		43.92		36.17	
Individual level	158.94	12.61	137.65	11.73	137.52	11.73	137.14	11.71	137.78	11.74
% explained			13.4		13.48		13.72		13.31	
Model fit										
Wald test (compared to M2)										
χ2 statistic					14.39		14.65		3.37	
Degrees of freedom					1		1		1	
p-value					0.000		0.000		0.066	

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CHAPTER 4

CULTURAL MARGINALITY AND HOSTILITY TOWARD

IMMIGRANTS

Introduction

In the previous chapter I investigated the effects of immigrant visibility on xenophobia. Specifically, I asked whether nonimmigrants feel more threatened by immigrants when a larger share of the latter is religiously, linguistically, or racially visible. I also looked for signs of a "halo effect" of immigrant group size, whereby xenophobia is highest among people living in municipalities with few immigrants but bordered by municipalities with many. This chapter shifts the focus of visibility to nonimmigrants and asks whether those who are culturally marginal feel less threatened by immigrants.

For decades, scholars have tried to understand what factors lead individuals to espouse more negative views toward immigrants. Contact theorists have shown that positive exposure to an outgroup member (be it racial, religious, or otherwise) leads to lower prejudice against the whole outgroup. Scholars taking competition or group threat perspectives say individuals view immigrants more negatively when they see themselves or their ethnic or national ingroup in competition with immigrants over individual or collective interests. Many of these studies have focused on understanding the views of a native majority toward the immigrant minority. Fewer have considered how members of ethnic, racial, or other cultural minorities in the native population may differ from the cultural majority in their levels of perceived immigrant threat.

In this chapter I provide an extensive test of cultural marginality theory, as set forward by Fetzer (2000b). I look at whether, net of socioeconomic factors, members of ethnic or religious minorities are less xenophobic than majority group members and whether those who perceive

marginality are less xenophobic than those who do not. I test this theory against the alternative

of group threat theory. Depending on the interpretation, group threat theory would predict either

that cultural marginality has a positive effect on xenophobia or that its effect depends on the

particular minority group in question. This alternative explanation suggests that cultural

marginality does not always diminish xenophobia and proposes alternative mechanisms for how

being cultural marginal might affect one's views toward immigrants. This study utilizes

multilevel data from the fourth round of the European Social Survey to carry out a

comprehensive, cross-national test of Fetzer's (2000b) formulation of cultural marginality

theory.

Theoretical Background

Studies trying to explain xenophobia have tended toward explanations based on conflict,

contact, or social identity theories. Conflict theories differ in whether they think the threat is

realistic or perceived, to the individual or collective interests, or cultural/symbolic or

economic/political. Typically these studies have assumed a dichotomy between a native

majority and immigrant minority. Few have considered the effects on xenophobia of belonging

to a domestic ethnic minority or being marginalized in some other respect. This study aims to

address this gap by testing Fetzer's cultural marginality theory, which by comparison has

received little attention.

Terminology

In their review of the literature, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) critique the inconsistent terminology used to describe attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Some examples include "immigrant derogation" (Schlueter and Wagner 2008), "ethnic exclusionism" (Coenders and Scheepers 2003), and "antiminority attitudes" (Semyonov and Glikman 2009). Following Hjerm (2007), I call the outcome of interest "xenophobia." As Hjerm and Nagayoshi explain, the word comes from the roots *xeno* and *phobia*, which mean "stranger" and "fear," respectively (2011:9). The term quite literally means "fear of strangers." It refers to a generalized negative attitude but also involves an affective element of fear. Hjerm and Nagayoshi define xenophobia as "an antipathy towards immigrants or foreigners based upon fear" (2011:10). This is how I conceptualize the outcome of interest. Thus, the focus of this study is to test the effects of cultural marginality on xenophobia.[1]

Cultural marginality theory

Cultural marginality theory predicts that—*all else being equal*—those who are culturally marginalized will be more sympathetic toward other marginalized groups and thereby more tolerant of immigrants. Fetzer conceptualizes marginality as the condition of sharing a trait that results in discrimination, ridicule or public hostility, or persecution (2000a:5). The experience of marginality leads one to feel solidarity with other marginalized peoples. The strength of this solidarity depends on how marginalized the individual feels. The multivariate stipulation of the theory means that the theory complements rather than refutes contact and competitive threat theories of xenophobia. These are testable predictions that have heretofore been explored in a limited number of studies. Based on cultural marginality theory, one can predict that: *1)*

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[1] When discussing my study I also refer to "perceived threat" and sometimes "anti-immigrant sentiment" as synonyms for xenophobia. These both get at the same idea, but I think the former term is the more accurate substitute.

religious minority status, 2) ethnic minority status, and 3) perceived marginality are all negatively associated with xenophobia. Additionally, *the effects of 4) ethnic or 5) religious minority status will be stronger among those who perceive marginality.*

Group Threat Theory

Group conflict theory postulates that xenophobia arises from competition over *collective* goods and relative group position. Individuals see themselves in competition with immigrants over access to certain resources, privileges, and status by virtue of their group membership. The native sees immigrants as a threat to *his* or *her* country's culture and the ability of fellow countrymen to make a living.[2] Xenophobia arises when immigrants are seen as *illegitimate* competitors, taking jobs and state resources that do not "belong" to them (Blumer 1958). Thus, xenophobia increases when natives are in real or perceived struggle with immigrants over group position and collective interests.

Within the group threat perspective, scholars differ on whether they believe anti-immigrant and –immigrant attitudes are tied to actual or "real" conditions. Proponents of the 'realistic group threat' school (Bobo 1983; Sears and Jessor 1996) argue these negative views are based on objective threats and experiences, such as poor economic conditions. Those from the "perceived threat" school believe anti-immigrant and -immigration attitudes arise from imagined experiences and threats. Studies based on this perspective focus on subjective indicators, such as the perceived risk of losing one's job or life satisfaction (e.g., McLaren 2003). How might cultural marginality fit into this framework? One interpretation, based on the "perceived threat" camp, would be that those who perceive themselves to be in a margin position will feel threatened about losing the resources they have. Another interpretation, based on group threat

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[2] This includes access to jobs and housing but also state-provided such as social welfare benefits.

theory more generally, would be that cultural marginality does not have a universal effect; ethno-cultural groups, dominant and minority, will differ in their views based on their particular collective interests and the extent to which they see some or particular immigrant populations as threatening them.

Insight from Existing Research

Religious Affiliation

There is some evidence from European cases that being a religious minority leads to less hostile views toward immigrants and immigration. Based on data from Northern Ireland, Hayes and Dowds (2006) find evidence that between social contact theory, cultural marginality, and economic self-interest theories, the first two are independently important in predicting pro-immigration attitudes. Specifically, they find that even after controlling for a range of background factors such as gender, age, education, and immigrant contact Irish Catholics are more likely to welcome immigrants (of same or different race or ethnic group as the majority group) and to endorse the view that they 'would not mind at all' if a close relative were to marry an immigrant (2006:472). Fetzer (1998) finds that, net of socioeconomic status and other demographic factors, non-Catholics in France are more supportive of immigrant rights than are Catholics. These findings suggest that members of religious minorities view immigrants more positively than do majority group members.

A number of the studies have looked at the effect of religious affiliation on xenophobia in the American context. Fetzer (1998) finds that when he controls for race, region of residence, and various socioeconomic factors Catholics, agnostics/atheists, and Jews in the U.S. are more supportive of immigrant rights than are Protestants, with Jews being the most tolerant and the

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irreligious measuring between Catholics and Jews. Knoll (2009) finds that Jews and Mormons are more likely than mainline Protestants to favor legalization of immigrants over guest-worker programs or deportation.[3] Both are Jews and Mormons are marginalized groups, shown by the extent of anti-Semitism and anti-Mormon sentiment in the country.

McDaniel, Nooruddin and Shortle (2011) provide a competing explanation for the religious differences in xenophobia found in the American context. They argue that Christian nationalism is an omitted variable that explains the effect of religious affiliation on xenophobia. Comparing only Christians in the U.S., McDaniel and colleagues find that evangelical Protestants are *more* anti-immigrant than both Catholics and mainline Protestants. However, the moderating factor is Christian nationalism, which is a worldview that "the American nation holds a special connection with God and has a central role in the divine plan" (2011:212). They find that both religious conservatism and Christian nationalism are associated with higher xenophobia, and that the latter is more prevalent among Protestants.[4] After they control for Christian nationalism, the significant effects for religious affiliation disappear. These findings provide an alternative explanation for why xenophobia may vary by religious affiliation and why members of religious minorities as a whole may be less xenophobic than their majority counterparts. Members of the religious majority members may see their religion as more strongly tied to what it means to be a citizen.

Ethnic Group Position

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[3] Jews and Mormons are 13.8 and 10.1 percent more likely to support increasingly liberal immigration policies, respectively (Knoll 2009:327). Part of the effect for Mormons may be due to an affinity to Latinos they gain from going on 2-year missions in Southern or Central America.

[4] In the initial model they find that in evangelical Protestants rank highest in anti-immigrant sentiment, followed by mainline Protestants (the religious majority), Catholics, and Christians of minor denominations (McDaniel, Nooruddin and Shortle 2011:225).

The evidence for the effect of ethnic minority status is mixed. If cultural marginality theory is correct, then one can expect that—all other things being equal—domestic ethnic minorities in a society are less xenophobic than ethnic majority members. While a number of studies do look at natives' views toward particular immigrant origin groups, few distinguish between different ethnic segments of the native population. When Alexseev (2010) compares the immigration views of various ethnic minorities in Russia to those of ethnic Russians, he finds that *as a whole*, ethnic non-Russians have less negative views toward immigration.[5] However, Leong and Ward (2011) find that the Maori in New Zealand are far more anti-immigrant than the European ethnic majority. Similarly, Lewin-Epstein and Levanon (2005) find that Arabs in Israel harbor the most negative views toward Jewish immigrants, since Jewish immigrants add to the Israeli majority and represent an economic threat. Berry finds that Anglophone Canadians hold more positive views toward immigrants than do their Francophone counterparts, who constitute only 24 percent of the population (Berry 2006:732). Overall, studies comparing immigrant attitudes of ethnic minorities and majorities provide at best mixed support for cultural marginality theory.

Some of these studies actually provide support for conflict-based explanations of xenophobia**.** Taken as a group ethnic non-Russians are less xenophobic than ethnic Russians, but within that category political status is a dividing factor. Alexseev (2010) finds that those ethnic minorities with titular status—with a republic or district named after them (such as Tatarstan)—support more exclusive immigration policies than do non-titular ethnic minorities. For instance, Adygeyans and Tatars (both titular ethnic minorities) are much more supportive of wholesale deportation of immigrants and less likely to support granting residency rights to migrants than are non-titular ethnic non-Russians. Actually, on these two issues titular ethnic minority

[5] They support more inclusive policies toward them (Alexseev 2010:96).

responses are nearly comparable to those of ethnic Russians. With titularity comes political status and related privileges that titular ethnic minorities want to defend. According to Alexseev, titular ethnic minorities are more anti-immigrant than non-titular ones because they see newcomers, *especially* those who are ethnically Russian,[6] as threats to their elevated political status. Similarly, since the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 the Maori have held privileged status as one of two cultures in a bicultural New Zealand society. The Maori are more xenophobic than the European ethnic majority because they see immigrants as threats to the meaning and import of Maori history and culture in New Zealand. These two examples show how certain ethnic minorities may view immigrants as threatening their political and symbolic collective interests.

Ethnic Nationalities

Evidence on ethnic and regional nationalities suggests that the relationship between ethnic minority status and xenophobia is not as clear-cut as suggested by cultural marginality theory. In some countries, certain ethnic groups may support nationalist or separatist movements. Where ethnic minority status is associated with a nationalist or separatist movement, the strength of one's national and subnational attachments may impact one's attitudes toward immigrants. Escandell and Ceobanu (2010) find that in the Spanish regions of the Basque country, Catalonia, and Galicia—all regions with strong minority nationalist movements[7]—those who identify with their region and not Spain are more likely to express anti-

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[6] Many of the newcomers are ethnic Russians coming from the Autonomous states. Not surprisingly, titular ethnic minorities are more opposed to the immigration of ethnic Russians than are ethnic Russians themselves. This is more so the case because many titular ethnic minority groups do not constitute a numerical majority.

[7] According to Escandell and Ceobanu, it would be an oversimplification to describe these nationalisms as either 'ethnic' or 'civic', since both discourses are present (Escandell and Ceobanu 2010:159).

immigration sentiment.[8] Their findings suggest that exclusive regional identification may lead to higher perceived immigrant threat, protectionism, and ultimately exclusionism (2010:175). However, this is not the same pattern found in Belgium. In the region of Flanders, those who identify strongly as Flemish espouse more immigrant exclusionism than those who identify primarily as Belgian. However, in Wallonia, those who identify strongly as Walloon (the ethnic minority) are *less* anti-immigrant than those with a strong Belgian identity. These differences may be due to the social representation of nation associated with each identity (Billiet, Maddens and Beerten 2003; Maddens, Billiet and Beerten 2000). Elite discourse on Flemish identity emphasizes protection of Flemish cultural heritage, while the Walloon identity "is primarily associated with the socio-economic emancipation of the Walloon region" (Maddens, Billiet and Beerten 2000:47). The monarchy puts forward an image of a Belgian nation that is tolerant and accepting of diversity, but in Wallonia that image competes with the ethnically exclusionary Belgian identity put forward by radical right political parties. These findings do not directly address cultural marginality theory, for they do not compare the sentiments of ethnic majority to minority members (in this case, of Flemish to Walloons).   However, they do suggest that the effect of being an ethnic minority might not be the same for all ethnic groups. If they are tied to separatist or nationalist movements, ethnic minorities may be more hostile to immigrants. Kymlicka (2001) argues that minority nationalists tend toward immigrant exclusionism, for they believe that immigrants are more likely to integrate into the dominant culture than the minority one.

Hypotheses

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[8] This relationship was not found to operate in Spain's other 14 autonomous communities.

A review of the literature provides at best mixed support for cultural marginality theory. The strongest evidence for the theory comes from findings on religious minorities. Work comparing the attitudes of different ethnic groups or considering the effects of ethnic nationalism seem to find more evidence for a group threat explanation of xenophobia. Finally, findings from social exclusion studies imply that, to the extent that cultural marginality results in a feeling of a loss of control, it could lead to more negative attitudes toward immigrants. Using data from the European Social Survey, the present study aims to test cultural marginality theory in three different respects in a cross-national perspective. It will test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Cultural minority status is negatively related to xenophobia.

Hypothesis 2: Perceived marginality is negatively related to xenophobia.

Hypothesis 3: The effects of cultural minority status and perceived marginality interact, such that the negative effect of minority status is stronger among those who perceive marginality.

This investigation will be performed in two parts. In the first part, conducted on a sample of 12 European countries, I measure cultural minority status as belonging to a religious minority. I measure perceived marginality as self-identification with a discriminated group. In the second part of the investigation, I measure cultural minority status as belonging to an ethnic minority. I measure perceived marginality as: 1) self-identification with a discriminated group; and 2) the frequency of experienced prejudicial treatment over the past year.

Data and Measurement

Data

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The analyses in this chapter use data from the fourth round of the European Social

Survey (ESS Round 4), for which data was collected from 2008-2009. The survey is based on a

stratified multi-stage probability sample. It is representative of all persons age 15 and over living

within private households, regardless of nationality, citizenship, language, or legal status. The

original dataset contains 56,752 individual observations from 29 countries. It contains survey

responses supplemented with a variety of country- and regional-level demographic, health, and

other variables drawn from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD), Eurostat and other national and international statistical databases.[9]

I reduce the population sample in a few specific ways. First, I limit the sample to

individuals age 18 and older. By this age individuals have finished mandatory schooling and

many have entered into the working force. Second, I narrow the sample to nonimmigrants—that

is, native-born individuals with 2 native-born parents.[10] Third, I used case-wise deletion,

reducing the sample only to those cases with observations for every variable of interest.[11]

Fourth, I only include countries for which at least 3.5 percent of the final sample responded

affirmatively on the four measures of marginality.[12]

This chapter examines what is essentially a relatively rare but nonetheless important

event. The ESS was designed to be representative of country population, so it did not

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[9] With these data, it is possible to control for contextual factors at both the national and NUTS regional levels. However, this study considers only the effects of the national context on individual xenophobic attitude. Additional models controlling for foreign population size were estimate, but they did not lead to qualitatively different results.

[10] Including immigrants in the sample would bias results, since they would likely think about themselves and co-ethnics while answering xenophobia index questions. Such attitudes would then not be toward a potential outsider, but the immigrant's in-group. Studies find that immigrants have more favorable views toward immigration (e.g., Sides and Citrin 2007).

[11] Performing multiple imputation on survey data to be used for a multilevel modeling would introduce more problems than it would resolve.

[12] These are religious minority, ethnic minority, belonging to a discriminated group (perceived), treated with prejudice in the past year (perceived).

oversample for marginalized segments of the population. Some countries had too few positive

cases of perceived marginality to be included in the analysis.[13]   Many countries had too few

nonimmigrants that belonged to a minority religious denomination. For this reason, I use two

different data samples to test the hypotheses. I test the effects of religious minority status and

perceived marginality on a small sample of 12 countries and 15,683 individual observations.[14]

These countries are primarily from Eastern Europe. I test the effects of ethnic minority status

and perceived marginality on a large sample of 20 countries and 28,315 observations.[15]

Multilevel Regression Modeling

I test the two sets of hypotheses using multilevel regression modeling. Ordinary least

squares (OLS) regressions are not appropriate because they assume observations are

independent. Individual observations within the same country may be statistically dependent on

unmeasured factors. Individuals within the same country or region may resemble one another in

certain ways due to shared political, economic, and social environments. Differences in how

different countries collect data can also lead to within-country dependence in observations.

Furthermore, multi-stage probability sampling—the sampling design employed in ESS

participant countries—leads to dependent observations (Snijders and Bosker 1999). When

looking at a cross-level effect, such as that of country-level immigrant presence on individual-

level xenophobia, it is important to use a model that accounts for the nestedness of observations

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[13] Specifically, in a number of countries less than 3.5 percent of the case-wise deleted sample of non-immigrants
indicated belonging to a group they thought faced discrimination in that country.

[14] These countries are: Bulgaria; Estonia; the United Kingdom; Croatia; Hungary; Israel; Latvia; Norway; Romania;
Russia; Slovakia; and the Ukraine.

[15] These countries are : Bulgaria; Switzerland; Germany; Denmark; Estonia; Spain; Finland; the United Kingdom;
Croatia; Hungary; Ireland; Israel; Latvia; the Netherlands; Romania; Russia; Sweden; Slovakia; Turkey; and the
Ukraine.

in hierarchically structured data. Models that do not do this estimate standard errors of regression coefficients too small. Multilevel regression modeling accounts for data clustering and adjusts the standard errors accordingly. This study does not consider country-level determinants of xenophobia, but still employs multilevel modeling to account for random country-level variation in xenophobia.

Stringent data demands can make multilevel modeling on cross-national survey data a challenging endeavor. Snijders and Bosker (1999:44) say that a group-level sample of 10 is sufficiently large. By this standard, estimating a two-level model on a sample of individuals and at least 10 countries would not pose substantial problems to statistical outcomes. However, several studies have suggested otherwise. Maas and Hox find that 2-level models based on samples of only 10 groups underestimate the standard errors of both regression coefficients (2005) and group level variance components (2004; 2005). They conclude that a level-two sample size of 10 is enough if one is interested only in fixed effects (2004).[16] Bell et al. (2010) find that when they run 2-level models on 10, 20, and 30 groups, Type 1 error rates do not increase, but the statistical power is weak—substantially below the desired value of 0.80.[17] That means that the chances of rejecting the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true does not change, but the model's ability to reject the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false decreases considerably. If a model lacks statistical power, a variable will only appear as statistically significant when the effect size is large. Overall, when a multilevel model is estimated on a sample with a small number of groups (30 or fewer), the standard errors of both

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[16] They recommend a group sample size of 50 if one is interested in contextual effects and 100 if one wants correct standard errors.

[17] The power estimates for higher levels are more strongly affected by sample sizes in other levels than they are for level-one power estimates. This probably one reason why Snijders (2005) and says the sample size at the highest level is "the main limiting characteristic of the design" (2005:2).

regression coefficients and variance components will be estimated too small and the statistical power of the model will be weak.[18]

Practically speaking, the enormous costs associated with carrying out a cross-national study limit the number of countries that can participate. In such a case, modeling on data with many country-level units is not a possibility. In this study I use ESS data because the survey has several relevant variables and is known for its high methodological standards. To reduce the biases that come from modeling on a small number of groups, I analyze only fixed effects. Since this chapter is only concerned with individual determinants of xenophobia, I do not include national-level variables in the models.[19] Also, I estimate the models with robust rather than asymptotic standard errors, since the former are consistently higher and, thus, provide a more conservative test of the hypotheses.[20] Estimating with robust standard errors also helps address heteroskedasticity, which is an issue with these data. I compare model fit using the Wald test.[21] In these ways I try to limit the potential biases associated with running multilevel models on data with a small number of country-level units.

Analytic Approach

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[18] The impact of low level-two sample size on variance components appears to be far worse, reducing the standard errors by 15 percent or more (Maas and Hox 2005). Maas and Hox (2004) and Bell et al. (2010) also identify downward bias on variance estimates as the main problem that occurs in models based on few higher-level units.

[19] To decide the complexity of the model I calculated the design effect (DEFF) at the national levels using the following formula: 1 + (average cluster size-1)*(intraclass correlation). According to Muthén and Satorra (1995), a design effect greater than 2 indicates that clustering should not be ignored. The design effect was larger than two in both the 12-country and 20-country analytic samples, indicating that national-level clustering cannot be ignored.

[20] Also, according to Maas and Hox (2004), they are more reliable.

[21] Likelihood ratio tests, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) cannot be used because they are based on true log likelihood, whereas models with robust standard errors are based on pseudolikelihood functions. According to Treiman (2014:222), pseudolikelihood functions "may be substantially different from true likelihoods and may even vary in a non-monotonic way across nested models."

This chapter will determine whether the predictions of cultural marginality theory hold true cross-nationally. Using two different data samples, I test the hypothesis that culturally minorities are less xenophobic. I look at minority belonging in terms of religion and ethnicity. I also look at whether those who feel marginalized are less xenophobic, measuring perceived marginality in terms of discriminated group affiliation and experiences with prejudice. Finally, since minority status may only matter among those who actual perceive mistreatment I look at whether, as hypothesized, only cultural minority members who perceive marginality are less xenophobic. I test these hypotheses by estimating two-level models of individuals nested in countries. I estimate models using the program *HLM 7*.[22] I estimate all models without weights.[23] Below are the mixed models for each of the research questions.

For Hypothesis 1:

$\text{XEN}_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + \gamma_{20}*(\text{cultural minority})_j + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$

For Hypothesis 2:

$\text{XEN}_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + \gamma_{20}*(\text{perceived marginality})_j + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$

For Hypothesis 3:

$\text{XEN}_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + \gamma_{20}*(\text{cultural minority})_j + \gamma_{30}*(\text{perceived marginality})_j$

$+ \gamma_{40}*(\text{cultural minority*perceived marginality})_j + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$

I define **xenophobia** as a generalized perception of threat from immigrants. I measure it with an additive index based on responses to three survey items that ask whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy, enrich or undermine cultural life, or make the country a worse or

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[22] *HLM 7.0* does not compute robust standard errors for some of the larger models. In those cases, I used the robust standard errors reported by *Stata 13*. The results reported by the two statistical packages were identical, except that *Stata 13* reported robust standard errors in the few cases in which *HLM 7.0* did not.

[23] One reason for doing this is that one weight variable sums up to 1.3, leading to inflated population size estimates. Refer to the Chapter 2 Appendix for further discussion of weights and the decision to not use them.

better place to live.[24] Answers ranged from 0 to 10 on a Likert scale, with 0 representing the

most negative view toward immigrants. I added respondent scores for these 3 items, reversed

their direction so that higher scores would indicate more anti-immigrant sentiment, and rescaled

the index to range from 0 to 100. I calculated this for all individual cases with nonmissing

responses to at least 2 of the 3 survey items.[25]

        X is a vector of individual respondent characteristics. It includes variables for sex; urban

residence; age; educational attainment; political orientation; and labor force status (see Table 2).

The variable for political orientation asks respondents to place themselves on a spectrum ranging

from 0 to 10, where 0 is left and 10 is right. Three separate dummy variables are used to indicate

whether the respondent is a student, in paid work, and/or unemployed. A variable for frequency

of religious service attendance is included as a measure of religious commitment, which many

studies have found to be negatively related to xenophobia (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello 2002).

        I test two different measures of perceived marginality. One is a based on a survey item

that asked respondents whether they belong to a group that is discriminated in their country of

residence. Yes responses received a code of 1, no responses a code of 0. Non-substantive

responses were excluded from the analysis. A second measure, included only in the second part

of the analysis, asked respondents how often in the past year they had been treated with prejudice

on the basis of ethnic background. Possible responses ranged from 0 for never to 4 for very

often. I converted this into a three-category variable by collapsing prejudice scores of 2-4 into

one category.[26] A cross-tabulation suggests that these two variables are related; those who

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[24] In the way I conceptualize and operationalize xenophobia, I follow Hjerm and Nagayoshi's (2011) example.

[25] For the calculation of the xenophobia index, I counted the following responses as missing: 1) refusal to answer; 2) don't know; and 3) no answer.

[26] The three upper response categories had relatively few observations, so keeping them as they were may have led to an unstable point estimate.

reported a prejudice score of 2-4 were considerably more likely to also identify as a member of a discriminated group.[27]

I measure **cultural minority** status both in terms of religious and ethnic minority statuses. I construct the religious minority variable from two survey items relating to religious affiliation (see Table 1). One asks respondents whether they belong to a religion. The other asks to which religious denomination they belong. The category "irreligious" is used to identify those who either 1) said they do not belong to a religion; 2) belong to a religion but do not know which one; or 3) do not know whether they belong to a religion. I define the majority religion as the denomination historically tied to the country and followed by the demographic majority of country natives.[28] I identify as a religious minority member any individual affiliated with a religious denomination other than the majority religion of the country. I count the United Kingdom statistically as one country unit, but identify separate religious majorities for England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Catholics in Northern Ireland have historically been marginalized. Today, they remain socioeconomically disadvantaged in several ways, relative to Protestants (Hayes and Dowds 2006), but I count them as the religious majority since they are the demographic majority. Running the analysis with Catholics as the minority got the same overall results.

[Table 1 here]

Similar to how I constructed the religious minority variable, I defined an ethnic minority member as anyone who did not belong to the ethnic majority (see Table 2). I identified the

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[27] The chi-square test was significant at 0.001 level of confidence.

[28] According to Alesina et al.'s (2003b) raw religion data, in 2001 largest share of residents in Estonia were Eastern Orthodox. However, that is followed by primarily by the country's Russian minority. The country has been historically Lutheran and that is the religion followed by ethnic Estonians, so I count Lutheranism as the majority religion.

ethnic majority using the same criteria used by Wimmer (2013) to investigate whether ethnic groups differ in their values.[29] He identified ethnic groups based on stringent criteria of language(s) spoken at home, the absence of experienced ethnic or national discrimination,[30] often religious affiliation, and in a few cases the perception of belonging to an ethnic minority.[31] On the basis of these criteria I identified the religious majorities in Israel, Croatia, Latvia, and Romania. In countries with a religious criterion, irreligious respondents and those missing on the religion variable but *who fit all other criteria* for religious majority group membership were counted as part of the religious majority.[32] Exceptions were those who indicated belonging to a religion other than the ethnic majority religion in the past. Those cases were counted as ethnic minority members.[33] It was not possible to identify minorities within the Jewish population of Israel, as responses for different denominations of Judaism were not provided. Thus, in the case of Israel the ethnic minority variable distinguishes between Jewish and non-Jewish residents.

[Table 2 here]

There are a number of ways one can operationalize ethnic minority, religious minority, and perceived marginality. To verify that these variables measure what they are intended to measure, I examine their relationships with each other and related variables using cross-

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[29] Wimmer's programming codes provided the basis for the construction of my ethnic minority variable.

[30] Those who said they belonged to a discriminated group were asked to indicate the bases on which they were discriminated.

[31] In number of countries religious affiliation was not used as a criterion for ethnic majority determination. In the case of Ukraine, where people might claim to speak Russian when they speak Ukrainian, since ethnic determination was tricky they also used a variable asking about belonging to an ethnic minority as an additional criterion.

[32] The original coding counted these outliers as missing, but excluding these observations would lead to 1) a case of missing-not-at-random; and 2) massive reductions in the sample sizes for the UK, Ukraine, Ireland, and Estonia.

[33] That means people who said they did not used to belong to another religion or those who refused the question were coded as the majority. So were those who said they belonged to a religion in the past but either 1) refused; 2) did not know; or 3) provided no answer to the question.

tabulations and Chi-squared tests.[34] All the relationships are statistically significant. Both ethnic

and religious minority members are more likely to see themselves as members of discriminated

groups. They also tend to report more bases of discrimination than majority members.[35] Ethnic

minority members in the sample are more likely to have been treated with ethnic prejudice in the

past year. Those identified as ethnic minorities according to study criteria are far more likely

than majority members to see themselves as belonging to an ethnic minority.[36] Those who self-

identify as ethnic minority members are also more likely to see themselves as members of a

discriminated group. The results of these cross-tabulations show that those identified in this

study as minority members are more likely to see themselves as such and more likely to report

perceiving marginality in terms of prejudice or discrimination.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Analyses relating to the effects of religious group status and perceived marginality are

based on an analytic sample of 12 countries and 15,683 individual observations. The average

respondent is middle-aged, politically centrist, and scores midway on the xenophobia index (see

Table 3). The latter means that, on average, he or she responds halfway between very favorable

and very unfavorable on each survey item of the xenophobia index. A little over one-third of the

respondents are irreligious or undecided and only 12 percent belong to a minority religion. Only

about a quarter of respondents attend religious services at least once a month or more. Half

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[34] Tables are available by request.

[35] This is based on a survey question that asks those who identify with a discriminated group to identify all the bases of discrimination.

[36] This is based on responses a survey item that asked whether the respondent belonged to an ethnic minority.

attend religious services only on special holy days or less often, and a little over a quarter never

attend religious services. As expected, perceived marginality is a relatively rare event, with only

8 percent of the sample claiming to belong to a discriminated group.

[Table 3 here]

Analyses relating to the effects of ethnic minority status and perceived marginality are

based on an analytic sample of 20 countries and 28,315 individual observations. As in the first

analytic sample, the average respondent is middle-aged, politically centrist, and scores midway

on the xenophobia index (see Table 4). Only 16 percent belong to an ethnic minority, based on

the criteria used to determine majority group status. About one quarter of respondents attends

religious services at least once a month or more, and one third never does so. Only 8 percent of

respondents claim to belong to a discriminated group. Interestingly, respondents were more

likely to experience prejudicial treatment than to identify with a discriminated group. On a scale

of 0 to 4, with 0 indicating "never" and 4 indicating "very often," nine percent of respondents

gave a score of 1 to describe the frequency with which they were treated with prejudice on the

basis of ethnic background in the past year. Another six percent reported a score ranging from 2

to 4.

[Table 4 here]

Minority Status

The results of the analyses are displayed in Tables 5, 6, and 7. Table 5 displays the

results of analyses on the smaller analytic sample of 12 countries and 15,683 individual

observations. In these models, cultural minority status is measured in terms of whether one

belongs to a minority religion, the majority religion, or is irreligious. Tables 6 and display the

results of analyses on the larger analytic sample of 20 countries and 28,315 individual observations. In these models, ethnic minority status is the measure of cultural minority status. In Tables 5 and 6, as well as Models 9 and 11 in Table 7, perceived marginality is measured in terms of identification with a discriminated group. In Models 10 and 12, it is measured in terms of how much one has been treated with ethnic prejudice in the past year.

Contrary to the first hypothesis, belonging to a cultural minority does not appear to lower xenophobia (see Tables 5-7). Religious minority members do not differ significantly from religious majority members or the irreligious in levels of xenophobia (Model 3). I use a Wald test to compare the fit of the religious minority model (Model 3) to the control model (Model 2), which differs only in that it does not contain the variable for religious group status. The test result reveals that the religious minority model does not fit the data any better than the control model (Model 2). Similarly, ethnic minority status is not associated with lower xenophobia (Model 8). The regression coefficients for both measures of cultural minority status are negative, as expected, but neither is statistically significant. These results fail to support the hypothesis of a negative main effect of cultural minority status on xenophobia.

Perceived Marginality

The findings fail to support the second hypothesis that those who perceive marginality are less xenophobic than those who do not (Tables 5, 6). Results based on the smaller analytic sample of 12 countries show that discriminated group identification does not have a statistically significant effect on xenophobia (Model 4).[37] Results based on the sample of 20 countries reveal that discriminated group identification has a statistically significant *positive* effect on xenophobia

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[37] The effect is the same whether or not one controls for religious minority status.

(Model 9).[38] The discriminated group model in the large sample (Model 9) fits the data

significantly better than do the control or ethnic minority models (Models 7, 8). Ethnic prejudice

experienced in the past year is unrelated to xenophobia (Model 10); those who report being

treated with more ethnic prejudice do not differ from others in how they view immigrants. These

findings suggest that perceived marginality is *positively* related to xenophobia, but only when

measured in terms of identification with a discriminated group.

Discriminated Minorities and Tolerance toward Immigrants

In support of the third hypothesis, the results demonstrate that the effect of perceived

marginality depends on whether one belongs to a religious minority (Table 5, Model 5).

Identifying with a discriminated group adds nearly 3 points to xenophobia index score.

However, belonging to a religious minority *reverses* this effect; religious minority members who

perceive marginality score on average 3 points lower on xenophobia than religious majority

members who do not perceive cultural marginality and 6 points less than those who do. The

model of the interaction between religious group and discriminated group identification explains

xenophobia considerably better than does the control model (Model 2). These findings suggest

that the effect of perceived marginality depends on religious group position. Net of other factors,

religious minority members tend to harbor less anti-immigrant sentiment than religious majority

members and the irreligious, but only when they see themselves as part of a discriminated group.

A similar interaction is not found to occur between the effects of perceived marginality

and ethnic minority status (Tables 6, 7). Models 9 and 11 differ only in that the latter contains a

term for the interaction between discriminated group identification and ethnic minority status.

Including the interaction term does not improve the goodness-of-fit, and the interaction itself is

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[38] The effect is the same whether or not one controls for ethnic minority status.

not statistically significant. The effect of the interaction between experienced ethnic prejudice

and ethnic minority status is not statistically significant either (Model 12). These results suggest

that the effect of perceived marginality is positive, regardless of ethnic group status.

[Table 5 here]

[Table 6 here]

Overall, these findings do not support cultural marginality theory, except in the case of

religious minority members who perceive marginality. Belonging to a cultural minority did not

in itself lead to lower xenophobia. Ethnic minority members did not differ significantly from

their majority counterparts in how negatively they viewed immigrants. Those who reported

experiencing ethnic prejudice were not any more tolerant of immigrants than those who reported

no such experiences. The reason for these findings may be that ethnic or religious minorities are

not necessarily treated with prejudice or discrimination. In countries where religious boundaries

are less salient, belonging to a particular minority religion might not be a shared trait leading to

ridicule or hostility, to use Fetzer's (2000a) definition of marginality. If only specific minority

religions are treated with disdain, then one might expect a reduction in anti-immigrant sentiment

only among individuals affiliated with those groups. Since it was not possible to check this

possibility on the present dataset, I tested for an interaction between the effects of perceived

marginality and religious group status. The results demonstrate that seeing oneself as belonging

to a discriminated group leads to a reduction in xenophobia *only among religious minority group*

members.[39] For everyone else, perceived marginality is associated with *higher* xenophobia.

DISCUSSION

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[39] It does lead to moderate reduction in xenophobia among the irreligious, but that interaction effect is not statistically significant.

The purpose of this chapter has been to thoroughly test cultural marginality theory. This theory provides an explanation for the effect of being culturally "visible," saying that culturally marginalized individuals are more likely to relate to and feel less threatened by immigrants. My results provide limited support for this theory and suggest that a conflict perspective may more accurately explain the patterns observed in the data.

The findings of a positive effect for perceived marginality may be better understood within the framework of group threat theory. Scholars within the "perceived threat" camp of group threat theory think anti-immigrant attitudes are based on imagined experiences and threat. Studies motivated by this perspective tend to use subjective indicators of competition, such as perception of one's financial situation or the economy in general (McLaren 2003). Based on this perspective, those who see themselves as part of a marginalized group are likely to feel more vulnerable and, consequently, see immigrants as threatening to their group's already insecure position.

More generally, a group threat perspective may explain why ethnic minority members do not differ from their majority counterparts in how they view immigrants. The findings indicate that, contrary to cultural marginality theory, belonging to a cultural minority does not universally lead to more tolerance toward immigrants. One potential explanation for this finding is that immigrants pose more of a threat to some ethnic minority groups than to others. This was apparent in Russia, where Alexseev (2010) found that titular ethnic minority members were more xenophobic than members of other ethnic minorities, since titular ethnic minorities stood more to lose politically from immigration. All other things equal, how cultural minority members receive immigrants may differ based on their particular group's interests. Future research could examine the views of members of various ethno-cultural groups within a country toward

members of other ethno-cultural groups, native- and foreign-born, as done by Berry (2006). Research in this direction would help isolate how collective interests and marginality inform views toward immigrants.

Only the finding that xenophobia is lower among discriminated religious minorities provides support for cultural marginality theory. Self-identification with a discriminated group is linked to higher perceived threat among religious majority and irreligious members but a *decrease* in the same among religious minorities. Net of other factors, discriminated religious majority members are *more* xenophobic than the discriminated irreligious members and discriminated religious minority members are *less*. What can explain this religious exception? One possibility is that simply belonging to a cultural minority does not make a person less xenophobic; maybe one must also perceive marginality in order to relate to other marginalized people.[40] Still, the theory cannot explain why perceived marginality amplifies xenophobia and ethnic minority status has no effect. Other theories may better explain these findings.

Differences in intergroup contact and nationalism may better explain the differences in xenophobia based on religious group position and perceived marginality. To the extent that discriminated religious minority members are socially disadvantaged, they may be more likely to live in close proximity to immigrants. Also, the congregations to which discriminated religious minorities belong may be more open to immigrants. This seems particularly likely, considering religious minorities may be the descendants of immigrations three or four generations past. Either scenario would likely result in more personal intergroup contact and, consequently, less xenophobia. Another potential explanation, based on McDaniel, Nooruddin and Shortle's (2011) finding of Christian nationalism, is that religion plays a bigger role in nationalism among

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[40] Fetzer (2000a) defines marginality as having a trait shared by others that is the subject of hostility, ridicule, and discrimination. Recall that religious group status is based on one's relationship to the numerical majority religion in the country, not on how much followers are subjected to religious discrimination or prejudice.

nonimmigrant religious majority members than it does in nonimmigrants that are irreligious or belong to a minority religion. That would explain why religious majority members feel most threatened by immigrants and religious minorities, the least. Altogether, differences in intergroup contact and nationalism may explain why discriminated religious minorities are the less xenophobic than others.

The main limitation of this study is that the survey data used is not ideal for investigating a relatively rare event such as cultural marginality. Data for the ESS was collected in such a way that each country dataset would be nationally representative. This is useful for a wide variety of investigations. However, ethnic and religious minorities typically constitute a small share of the overall population, so a number of country samples had too few affirmative cases of the variables of interest. Consequently, a number of countries had to be excluded from the analyses. This probably had a larger effect on the findings for religious minority status, since only 12 of 29 available countries could be included, most of them Eastern European. This last fact makes generalization of results to the broader European region tricky.[41] For the same reason some potentially useful survey items could not be included in the main analysis.[42] Future studies would benefit from carrying out a survey that oversamples for ethnic and religious minorities.

This chapter has conducted a thorough test of cultural marginality theory to see how it fares across national contexts. The results cast doubt on Fetzer's (Fetzer 2000b) formulation of cultural marginality theory. They suggest that group threat theory may provide a better explanation of how cultural marginality relates to xenophobia. Future studies may want to include national-level religious indicators that get at how much religion is policed and

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[41] Past studies have found differences between Eastern and Western Europe in the effects of education, the politics of immigration, and other factors on xenophobia.

[42] One variable asks the respondent whether he or she belongs to an ethnic minority. Another set of questions asks the bases on which the respondent is discriminated.

institutionalized in the country of interest. Grim and Finke (2007) find that 40 percent of Eurasian countries have religious persecution. Incidence of religious persecution and legal protections against it may impact the extent to which religious minorities are treated with hostility, ridicule, and negative treatment. In other words, accounting for the broader national context will help one better understand how and under what conditions belonging to a religious minority leads to lower xenophobia. Finally, some recent studies in the field of psychology have looked at the integration expectations of various ethno-cultural groups in a country toward native- and foreign-born members of other ethno-cultural groups in the country (Berry 2006). By doing this they are able to compare attitudes between more recent and longstanding ethnic minorities. A similar survey design would help scholars better understand how and under what conditions minority status leads to elevated threat or a sense of solidarity with other immigrants. Like this study, such an investigation would contribute to the further development of group threat theory. More broadly, it would help scholars better understand how visibility in immigrant and nonimmigrant populations relates to xenophobia.

Tables

Table 1. How religious majority members were identified by country.

Country	Religious majority
Bulgaria	Eastern Orthodox
Estonia	Protestant (Lutheran but not possible to specify)
England	Church of England/Anglican
Scotland	Presbyterian/Church of Scotland
Wales	Church of England/Anglican
Northern Ireland	Roman Catholic
Croatia	Roman Catholic
Hungary	Roman Catholic
Israel	Judaism
Latvia	Roman Catholic, Lutheran
Norway	The Norwegian Church
Romania	Eastern Orthodox
Russia	Eastern Orthodox
Slovakia	Roman Catholic
Ukraine	Orthodox church of the Moscow patriarch, Ukrainian orthodox church (Kyiv patriarch)

Table 2. Criteria for determining ethnic majority members, by country.

Country	Language	Religion	Do not belong to ethnic minority
Belgium	Dutch only		
Bulgaria	Bulgarian only	Not Muslim	
Estonia	Estonian only		
Spain	Spanish only		
Finland	Finnish only		
France	French only	Not Muslim, not Jewish	
United Kingdom	English and/or Gaelic only	Catholic or Protestant	
Croatia	Croatian only	Catholic or irreligious	Yes
Hungary	Hungarian only	Not Jewish, not other non-Christian religions	
Ireland	English and/or Gaelic only	Catholic or Protestant	
Israel		Jewish or irreligious	Yes
Latvia	Latvian only	Catholic or Protestant	Yes
Netherlands	Dutch only		
Norway	Norwegian only	Catholic, Protestant, or irreligious	
Romania	Romanian only	Eastern Orthodox or irreligious	
Russia	Russian only	Eastern Orthodox or irreligious	
Sweden	Swedish only	Not Jewish, not Muslim, not Eastern religion, not other non-Christian religions	
Slovakia	Slovak only	Not Eastern Orthodox, not Jewish	
Turkey	Turkish only	Muslim	
Ukraine	Ukrainian only		Yes

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Small Sample. N=15683, 12 countries.

Variable	Mean	S.D.
Xenophobia	53.19	22.50
Age	48.17	17.86
Urban residence	65%	
Education		
Less than lower secondary	7%	
Lower secondary	19%	
Upper secondary	40%	
Post-secondary non-tertiary	3%	
Tertiary	31%	
Female	56%	
Political orientation	5.27	2.13
In paid work	52%	
Student	7%	
Unemployed	7%	
Religious group		
Religious majority	52%	
Religious minority	12%	
Irreligious/undecided	36%	
Religious services attendance		
Never	27%	
Less often	22%	
Only on special holy days	26%	
At least once a month	10%	
At least once a week	14%	
Discriminated	8%	

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Large Sample. N=28315, 20 countries.

Variable	Mean	S.D.
Xenophobia	50.96	21.99
Age	48.12	17.89
Urban residence	62%	
Education		
Less than lower secondary	15%	
Lower secondary	19%	
Upper secondary	35%	
Post-secondary non-tertiary	3%	
Tertiary	29%	
Female	54%	
Political orientation	5.24	2.12
In paid work	52%	
Student	7%	
Unemployed	7%	
Religious services attendance		
Never	32%	
Less often	21%	
Only on special holy days	22%	
At least once a month	9%	
At least once a week	15%	
Ethnic minority	16%	
Prejudice in past year		
Score: 0 (never)	85%	
Score: 1	9%	
Score: 2-4 (very often)	6%	
Discriminated	7%	

Table 5. Effects of Religious Minority Status. N=15683, 12 countries.

	Model 1: Unconditional model		Model 2: Controls		Model 3: Religious minority (Hypothesis 1)		Model 4: Discriminated (Hypothesis 2)		Model 5: Religious minority*discriminated (Hypothesis 3)	
	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.
Intercept	53.41 ***	1.47	54.90 ***	3.37	55.27 ***	3.43	55.13 ***	3.38	55.06 ***	3.36
Age			0.06 *	0.03	0.06 *	0.03	0.06 *	0.03	0.06 *	0.03
Urban residence			-0.35	0.46	-0.36	0.41	-0.37	0.42	-0.37	0.41
Education										
Lower secondary			-0.90	1.33	-0.91	1.33	-0.93	1.37	-0.89	1.37
Upper secondary			-1.94	1.98	-1.98	1.97	-1.97	2.01	-1.95	2.01
Post-secondary non-tertiary			-3.80	1.98	-3.82	1.97	-3.81	1.99	-3.78	1.99
Tertiary			-6.67 **	2.48	-6.71 **	2.45	-6.70 **	2.49	-6.67 **	2.49
Female			0.44	0.36	0.42	0.53	0.43	0.54	0.43	0.55
Political orientation			0.02	0.31	0.01	0.29	0.01	0.29	0.00	0.29
In paid work			-0.65	0.65	-0.65	0.65	-0.63	0.65	-0.62	0.65
Student			-3.77 ***	1.04	-3.78 ***	1.04	-3.77 ***	1.03	-3.79 ***	1.04
Unemployed			-0.34	0.91	-0.32	0.87	-0.41	0.89	-0.41	0.89
Religious services attendance (omitted: Never)										
Less often			-0.10	0.84	-0.16	0.89	-0.14	0.89	-0.12	0.90
Only on special holy days			-0.56	0.75	-0.65	0.88	-0.63	0.87	-0.62	0.86
At least once a month			-1.35	1.34	-1.44	1.39	-1.42	1.39	-1.42	1.39
At least once a week			-1.26	1.78	-1.31	1.86	-1.31	1.88	-1.29	1.85
Religious group (omitted: majority)										
Religious minority					-0.57	2.38	-0.61	2.39	0.02	2.33
Irreligious/undecided					-0.30	0.85	-0.28	0.84	-0.17	0.82
Discriminated							1.34	1.03	2.93	1.65
Interaction effects										
Discriminated*										
Religious minority									-5.99 **	2.12
Irreligious/undecided									-1.50	1.84

Table 5. (continued)

	Model 1: Unconditional model		Model 2: Controls		Model 3: Religious minority (Hypothesis 1)		Model 4: Discriminated (Hypothesis 2)		Model 5: Religious minority* discriminated (Hypothesis 3)	
	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.
Random effects										
Country level	23.52 ***	4.85	26.58 ***	5.16	26.88	5.18	26.66 ***	5.16	26.51 ***	5.15
Individual level	480.16	21.91	470.32	21.69	470.28	21.69	470.16	21.68	469.83	21.68
Model fit										
Wald test (compared to M2)										
$\chi 2$ statistic					0.13		1.68		10.95	
Degrees of freedom					2		1		5	
p -value					0.938		0.195		0.052	

Table 6. Effects of Ethnic Minority Status. N=28315, 20 countries.

	Model 6: Unconditional model		Model 7: Controls		Model 8: Ethnic minority (Hypothesis 1)		Model 9: Discriminated (Hypothesis 2)	
	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.
Intercept	51.22 ***	1.46	54.89 ***	1.55	55.12 ***	1.37	54.98 ***	1.37
Age			0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Urban residence			-0.84 *	0.33	-0.86 **	0.31	-0.89 **	0.32
Education								
Lower secondary			-2.43 ***	0.43	-2.45 ***	0.42	-2.48 ***	0.43
Upper secondary			-4.84 ***	0.84	-4.88 ***	0.82	-4.89 ***	0.83
Post-secondary non-tertiary			-6.50 ***	0.82	-6.53 ***	0.80	-6.54 ***	0.80
Tertiary			-10.60 ***	1.25	-10.63 ***	1.22	-10.64 ***	1.23
Female			0.33	0.40	0.32	0.40	0.32	0.41
Political orientation			0.41	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.41	0.22
In paid work			-0.89 *	0.41	-0.91 *	0.41	-0.89 *	0.42
Student			-4.51 ***	0.61	-4.53 ***	0.60	-4.52 ***	0.61
Unemployed			0.04	0.62	0.08	0.60	-0.02	0.61
Religious services attendance (omitted: Never)								
Less often			-0.16	0.45	-0.16	0.45	-0.15	0.46
Only on special holy days			-0.23	0.48	-0.23	0.48	-0.20	0.48
At least once a month			-1.19	0.75	-1.19	0.75	-1.17	0.75
At least once a week			-0.95	0.90	-0.94	0.89	-0.96	0.91
Ethnic minority					-0.64	1.09	-0.84	1.11
Discriminated							2.03 *	0.81

Table 6. (continued)

	Model 6: Unconditional model		Model 7: Controls		Model 8: Ethnic minority (Hypothesis 1)		Model 9: Discriminated (Hypothesis 2)	
	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.
Random effects								
Country level variance	42.39 ***	6.51	43.47 ***	6.59	43.78 ***	6.62	43.62 ***	6.60
Individual level variance	436.61	20.90	418.89	20.47	418.84	20.47	418.59	20.46
Model fit								
Wald test (compared to M7)								
$\chi 2$ statistic					0.33		5.97	
Degrees of freedom					1		2	
p -value					0.564		0.051	

Table 7. Effects of Ethnic Minority Status. N=28315, 20 countries.

	Model 6: Unconditional model		Model 7: Controls		Model 10: Prejudice (Hypothesis 2)		Model 11: Ethnic minority* discriminated (Hypothesis 3)		Model 12: Ethnic minority* prejudice (Hypothesis 3)	
	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.
Intercept	51.22 ***	1.46	54.89 ***	1.55	55.05 ***	1.40	54.98 ***	1.36	55.05 ***	1.45
Age			0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02 *	0.02	0.02	0.02
Urban residence			-0.84 *	0.33	-0.86 **	0.31	-0.89 **	0.32	-0.87 **	0.32
Education										
Lower secondary			-2.43 ***	0.43	-2.44 ***	0.42	-2.48 ***	0.43	-2.45 ***	0.43
Upper secondary			-4.84 ***	0.84	-4.86 ***	0.81	-4.90 ***	0.43	-4.85 ***	0.83
Post-sec., non-tertiary			-6.50 ***	0.82	-6.51 ***	0.78	-6.55 ***	0.80	-6.53 ***	0.80
Tertiary			-10.60 ***	1.25	-10.61 ***	1.21	-10.65 ***	1.23	-10.61 ***	1.24
Female			0.33	0.40	0.32	0.41	0.31	0.41	0.33	0.42
Political orientation			0.41	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.41	0.22
In paid work			-0.89 *	0.41	-0.90 *	0.41	-0.89 *	0.41	-0.91 *	0.42
Student			-4.51 ***	0.61	-4.52 ***	0.60	-4.53 ***	0.60	-4.52 ***	0.62
Unemployed			0.04	0.62	0.07	0.59	0.01	0.61	0.05	0.61
Religious attendance										
Less often			-0.16	0.45	-0.17	0.46	-0.15	0.46	-0.17	0.47
Only special holy days			-0.23	0.48	-0.24	0.48	-0.20	0.48	-0.25	0.49
At least once a month			-1.19	0.75	-1.20	0.75	-1.17	0.75	-1.21	0.77
At least once a week			-0.95	0.90	-0.96	0.91	-0.96	0.91	-0.96	0.93
Ethnic minority					-0.69	1.03	-0.68	1.15	-0.65	0.76
Discriminated							2.45 ***	0.69		
Prejudice in past year										
Score: 1					0.00	0.91			0.44	0.99
Score: 2-4 (very often)					0.63	1.48			0.01	1.38
Interaction effects										
Discriminated*										
Ethnic minority							-1.42	1.78		
Prej. Score: 1									2.03	1.25
Prej. Score: 2-4									1.72	2.81

Table 7. (continued)

	Model 6: Unconditional model		Model 7: Controls		Model 10: Prejudice (Hypothesis 2)		Model 11: Ethnic minority* discriminated (Hypothesis 3)		Model 12: Ethnic minority*prejudice (Hypothesis 3)	
	variance comp.	s.d.	variance comp.	s.d.	variance comp.	s.d.	variance comp.	s.d.	variance comp.	s.d.
Random effects										
Country level variance	42.39 ***	6.51	43.47 ***	6.59	43.57 ***	6.60	43.62 ***	6.60	43.55 ***	6.60
Individual level variance	436.61	20.90	418.89	20.47	418.82	20.47	418.56	20.46	418.73	20.46
Model fit										
Wald test (compared to M7)							(to M9)		(to M10)	
χ2 statistic					1.55		0.92		16.03	
Degrees of freedom					3		1		5	
p-value					0.671		0.338		0.007	

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this dissertation has been to examine the effects of ethnic diversity, measured in terms of immigrant group size and nonimmigrant cultural marginality, on xenophobia among nonimmigrants. In Chapters 2 and 3, I accomplish this by focusing on immigrant visibility, both in terms of geographic proximity of the immigrant population and its ethno-cultural composition. Chapter 2 considers national- and regional-level contexts of ethnic diversity, while Chapter 3 deals with immigrant presence at the municipal level. In Chapter 4, I ask whether culturally marginal nonimmigrants are more sympathetic toward immigrants than are members of the cultural majority.

Summary of Main Findings

Religious Diversity Matters More than Immigrant Group Size

In Chapter 2, I asked how the size of the ethnically visible immigrant population and broader ethnic diversity in society at large impact perceptions of immigrant threat among nonimmigrants. I conceived of ethnically visible immigrants as those who cross salient linguistic, religious or religious boundaries. I hypothesized that immigrant ethnic visibility and broader ethnic diversity were each positively related to xenophobia. I examined these questions using national- and regional-level measures of visible immigrant population size and national-level measures of linguistic and religious diversity. My findings did not support the first prediction that immigrant visibility is positively related to xenophobia. The results supported the second hypothesis, showing a positive relationship between religious diversity and xenophobia. Religious visibility, measured in terms of the relative size of the country's entire Muslim

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population, is *not* significantly related to xenophobia. However, religious diversity, measured as the probability that a member of a religious group will encounter someone with a different religious affiliation, *is*. The findings imply the size of a country's visible immigrant population bears no direct relationship to xenophobia. However the religious composition of the country, native- and foreign-born alike, does impact xenophobia.

Local Visibility Increases Xenophobia

In Chapter 3, I took up the question of immigrant visibility again, this time at the level of the municipality in the Swiss national context. I tested the hypothesis that the effects of immigrant group size in one's community of residence and in neighboring communities interact. I predicted overall immigrant group size in the municipality of residence would be negatively related to perceptions of immigrant threat. Immigrant presence in *neighboring* communities would be positively related to xenophobia, but only for those living in ethnically Swiss municipalities. I found evidence for this halo effect of immigrant group size among people living in municipalities with the fewest immigrants. To those for whom intergroup contact is not that likely, the presence of immigrants in nearby municipalities is all the more menacing. For those living in the most immigrant-rich communities, I found that greater immigrant presence in adjacent communities has the *opposite* effect, further decreasing perceptions of immigrant threat. Second, I tested the hypothesis that immigrant visibility is positively related to xenophobia. I measured visibility in three ways: as the share of immigrants in the municipality that 1) are not linguistically integrated; 2) are Muslim; or 3) are racially visible. The findings on the effects of linguistic and religious visibility supported this hypothesis. Immigrant ethnic visibility, unlike overall immigrant group size, is positively related to perceptions of immigrant threat.

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Marginality Matters, Sometimes

In Chapter 4, I turned the focus to the nonimmigrant population, asking whether

nonimmigrants that are ethnically or culturally "different" are less antagonistic toward

immigrants. I tested this prediction, put forth by cultural marginality theory, by determining the

effects of ethnic minority status, religious minority status, and perceived marginality on

xenophobia. The findings cast doubt on this theory. Counter to expectation, those who see

themselves as belonging to a discriminated group tend to be *more* xenophobic. Furthermore,

belonging to an ethnic minority does not result in less xenophobia. However, religious minority

members *are* less xenophobic, but *only* if they also perceive themselves as part of a marginalized

group. Among religious majority members, perceptions of marginality amplify xenophobia,

while they do the opposite among members of religious minorities. Overall, the findings suggest

that culturally marginal nonimmigrants tend to be *more xenophobic* than their mainstream

counterparts, except when their marginal status stems from religious affiliation.

Theoretical Implications

One implication of this dissertation is that the source of cultural threat can be located in

the religious composition of the country as a whole, rather than of just its immigrants.

The results of the present study demonstrate that national immigrant group size does not impact

xenophobia, even when measured in terms of the most ethnically visible. By contrast, religious

diversity in a country is positively related to xenophobia.[1] If Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello's

(2002) religious competition hypothesis is correct, this occurs because in more religiously

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[1] Past studies also find this effect on perceived threat (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello 2002) and ethnic prejudice (Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002).

diverse societies national and local religious leaders may place more emphasis on ingroup

solidarity to discourage followers from leaving the flock. As a result, people in religiously

diverse societies will be more inclined to view immigrants negatively. My findings support this

hypothesis. They cast doubt on the size argument of group threat theory, at least when it is

measured at the level of the country. Xenophobia emerges not when there is a large share of

immigrants, but rather when the population is more evenly distributed between different

religious affiliations. Immigrant group size *can* matter, but only inasmuch as it contributes to

religious diversity and, therefore, competition.

The findings of my dissertation cast doubt on the size argument of group threat theory.

That national immigrant group size has no effect on xenophobia suggests that by itself immigrant

presence is not a source of threat. Immigrant group size may only correspond to xenophobia

under certain social, economic, or political conditions. Inhabitants of countries with frequent

negative reporting on immigrants may be more likely to associate immigrants with social

problems or illegitimate competitors for jobs and government support. The size argument may

only hold when a country is suffering economically; politicians may then blame immigration as a

way to shift negative attention away from themselves, and individual insecurities about one's

financial situation may lead to increased suspicion toward outsiders.[2] Furthermore, the strong

politicization of immigration in Switzerland may explain why xenophobia is higher in Swiss

municipalities with a greater presence of ethnically visible immigrants.

Findings in the local Swiss context suggest that local immigrant group size can lead to

higher xenophobia, but that this relationship stems in large part from the effects of contact.

Immigrant group size in surrounding communities is *positively* related to xenophobia, but only

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[2] In the Swedish context, Hjerm (2009) finds that immigrant group size only amplifies immigrant threat in municipalities with poor economic conditions.

for those residing in ethnically homogeneous communities. A likely reason for this halo effect of immigrant group size is that the residents of ethnically Swiss municipalities are unlikely to have personal contact with immigrants or the familiarity that comes from having them in the community. Their interactions with immigrants in surrounding communities are likely to be superficial and infrequent. Lacking personal experiences to temper their fears about the foreign "other," residents of ethnically Swiss municipalities are likely to perceive immigrant threat more acutely when there is a sizeable immigrant presence in surrounding communities. The "imagined other" may appear all the more menacing when immigrants are close enough to pose a potential risk but not close enough for people to develop personal contact with them.

In a similar way, contact and group threat theories together can explain why in Switzerland visible immigrant group size is positively related to xenophobia. Past studies based on structural equation modeling have shown that local or regional immigrant group size has a direct positive effect on perceived threat, but a stronger indirect negative effect through intergroup contact (cf. Schlueter and Wagner 2008; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010). Based on the findings of this study and past research, I speculate that in the Swiss context the effect of ethnic visibility on xenophobia is positive in part because people are less inclined to develop friendships with visible immigrants.[3] Individuals tend to want to associate with people they perceive to be like themselves in status or values. Communication difficulties with ethnically visible minorities and their ethnic concentration in neighborhoods may further weaken the relationship between visible immigrant group size and odds of intergroup contact. Altogether, immigrant visibility in Switzerland may amplify perceptions of immigrant threat in part through its effects on intergroup contact.

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[3] Green, Fasel and Sarrasin (2010) find that the size of the Northern and Western European immigrant population has a stronger positive effect on the odds of contact with immigrants than does the size of the Muslim population.

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The findings of this study cast doubt on Fetzer's (2000a; b) formulation of cultural marginality theory. Culturally marginal nonimmigrants are not always less xenophobic than their majority counterparts. Ethnic minority members do not differ from ethnic majority members in their perceptions of threat. Furthermore, those who perceive marginality are *more* xenophobic than those who do not. This finding may be better explained by the "perceived threat" school of group threat theory. Those who see themselves as belonging to a discriminated group may fear that immigrants will worsen their group's already vulnerable position in society. In such a case, cultural marginality "matters" only insomuch as it leads people to feel more insecure or vulnerable about their relative position in society, just as some have found to be the case with economic vulnerability (cf. McLaren 2003). Group threat theory could also explain why belonging to an ethnic minority does not have a uniform effect on xenophobia; as in the case of Russia (cf. Alexseev 2010), particular ethnic minority groups may feel they have more to lose from immigration than do others. Overall, group threat theory may provide a better explanation of when and how cultural marginality impacts xenophobia.

Finally, the findings of an interaction effect between perceived marginality and religious group position point to at least one alternative explanation that can be explored further in future research. One possibility is that marginalized religious minority members are more tolerant of immigrants because of greater intergroup contact. To the extent that minority groups are socioeconomically disadvantaged, they are more likely to live in close proximity to immigrants. Also, the churches and temples of minority religious groups may have more incentive to welcome immigrants into their congregations. Under such conditions, members of religious minorities would be less xenophobic as a result of greater immigrant contact, not greater sympathy for other marginalized peoples.

Limitations

Unweighted Analysis

  One limitation of this dissertation is that the analyses for the three investigations were performed without the use of the available individual-level sampling weights. I discuss this issue at length in Chapter 2. Ultimately, only individual-level weights were available, one of the variables used to needed to make the weight variable was flawed, and the only way to carry out a 3-level analysis with only one set of weights would be by assuming equal sampling probabilities at both the regional and national levels. Given these complications, I decided to forego the use of weights altogether.[4] Instead, I assumed a simple random sample, used casewise deletion to limit my analyses to the population of interest, and estimated all models with robust standard errors. Unfortunately, many published studies that employ multilevel modeling to look at xenophobia, particularly the ones that use data from the ESS, provide no discussion of the sampling weights. These are important considerations that impact the generalizability of study findings. Since the findings from this dissertation are based on unweighted analyses, generalization of findings must be exercised with caution.

Country Sample Size

  The analyses of Chapters 2 and 4 were limited by small country sample sizes. Multilevel modeling was needed to accounts for the nestedness of the data. Unfortunately, multilevel modeling has stringent data demands that are difficult to meet in cross-national studies. To limit the extent of bias that could result from having a small number of countries and to deal with heteroskedasticity, I estimated all models with robust standard errors. I also never included more than one variable at the country-level of analysis and interpreted with caution regression

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[4] Refer to the Chapter 2 Appendix for thorough discussion of weights.

coefficients with *p*-values close to 0.05. In these ways, I tried to limit the downward bias in standard errors of estimates and the extent to which any bias could lead to biased findings.

Measures of Marginality

The primary limitation to the fourth chapter was the small share of cases of marginality. The ESS was not the ideal cross-national dataset for studying what is essentially a rare event. Since the data were collected to be nationally representative, there were relatively few observations of perceived marginality, or religious or ethnic minority status. This limited the analyses in a few ways. First, the lack of affirmative cases for the variables of interest limited which variables could be included in the analyses for the third chapter. Responses from a survey item asking respondents whether they belonged to an ethnic minority could not be used because too small a share of respondents answered affirmatively to this question. For similar reasons, it was not possible to construct a more fine-grained measure of perceived marginality that accounted for the basis of perceived discrimination. Most importantly, this data limitation limits the generalizability of the findings. Countries without enough cases of each type of cultural marginality among nonimmigrants (at least 4 percent of nonimmigrant observations) had to be excluded from the analysis. This was particularly an issue for the sample used to analyze the effects of religious group position, which contains a disproportionate number of Eastern European countries. This matters because the findings might not cover all the range of religious marginality found across Europe. However, since the analyses are based on an unweighted sample, already findings must be generalized with caution. Future research on this topic would benefit from cross-national surveys that oversample marginalized populations. Alternatively, one could examine these same issues in depth using detailed data from one country.

Sources of Threat

Finally, it must be emphasized that this study does not try to understand or explain the whole spectrum of possible xenophobia. The main delimitation of this study has been to look at the effects of immigrant ethnic visibility and thereby sources of cultural threat. While my models include basic socioeconomic indicators to control for individual-level competitive threat, this dissertation does not consider sources of economic threat. Good work looking at the effects of economic sources of threat can be found elsewhere (Hjerm 2009; Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011). The patterns of xenophobia found toward socially and culturally similar highly-skilled German immigrants in Switzerland, for instance, appear different from those found toward Muslim immigrants in the same country (cf. Helbling 2008). For instance, "Germanophobia" in Switzerland does not decrease with level of education (Helbling 2010). Understanding the nuances of this more economically-motivated xenophobia is a task for other studies to address.

Future Research Agenda

Beyond the dissertation, I would like to better understand the dynamics of threat and contact in local contexts through an extended investigation of the halo effect of immigrant group size. Chapter 3 found that immigrant ethnic visibility is positively related to xenophobia. This extended study will consider the effects of immigrant visibility, as well as *changes* in immigrant group size. Some past studies have found that big changes in immigrant group size in a span of a few years leads to increases in xenophobia (Hopkins 2010; Zick, Pettigrew and Wagner 2008). Since changes in the Swiss census since 2010, municipal population data is available every year. In addition, in this extended study I can at whether perceptions of immigrant threat are based on

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real sources of threat, such as crime in community of residence or neighboring communities. Ceobanu (2011) does this in a cross-national study by looking at whether perceptions of immigrant criminal threat map onto real crime statistics in the country. Such a study will help us to further understand the threat and contact dynamics that inform anti-immigrant attitudes and provide an extended test of realistic group conflict theory.

As a direct extension to the fourth chapter study, I could conduct a similar cross-national test of cultural marginality, this time including national level indicators of religious freedom, the extent of religious persecution in the country, and religious diversity. The first two measures would show how much religious boundaries are policed. The third would show how much society is divided in terms of religious affiliation. These additional measures may help us to account for the salience of religious boundaries, which would impact how religious minorities see themselves in relation to immigrant and ethnic others.

To further understand how and when cultural marginality relates to attitudes about immigrants and immigration, I would find or produce a survey with detailed questions about interactions with coethnics, immigrants, and others in various settings, such as church and social organizations. The survey would ask about national, religious, and ethnic identities, experiences with prejudice and discrimination, and attitudes toward immigrants from particular countries. Such a survey would provide the data needed to determine the "thickness" of one's ethnic and religious identities, which could be used to better understand the relationships between cultural marginality, national identity, and negative views toward immigrants. The survey would include information on municipality or more local context of residence so that multilevel modeling could be employed to consider the effects of immigrant group size, economic conditions, and other contextual elements. Chapter 4 found that marginalized religious minority members are the most

tolerant toward immigrants and religious majority members, the least. The proposed study would go further by using more nuanced measures of cultural marginality and looking closely at how intergroup contact fits into the picture. To the extent that nonimmigrant cultural minorities live in the same communities with immigrants and go to the same religious establishments, any increase in tolerance is a result of contact, not shared cultural marginality.

Such a survey would also help to better understand group threat theory as it applies to different domestic religious and ethnic minority groups. Using the same survey described above, it would be possible to determine how different ethno-cultural groups in a country view immigrants from particular countries. Such data could be used to determine whether, in line with group threat theory, people who identify strongly with a particular group (be it national or ethnic) will feel most threatened by immigrants that threaten the collective interests of the group. Future research could look at how well cultural marginality and social identity theories explain the relationships between cultural marginality, national identity, and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Altogether, with such data it would be possible to understand how contact, identities, and cultural marginality impact attitudes toward immigrants and immigration.

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