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Philosophy of an Indian War: Indian Community Action in the Johnson Administration's War on Indian Poverty, 1964-1968[1]

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When Lyndon Baines Johnson took the oath of office on November 22, 1963, he inherited a fragile, ambiguous federal Indian policy. The Kennedy administration had instituted reforms and deemphasized termination, but missed its opportunity to elucidate a coherent vision of its own. Indeed, scholars characterize the entire period from 1961 to 1975 as one of policy in transition.[2] Not until 1975, in the wake of Richard Nixon's Indian message of 1970, would Congress replace House Concurrent Resolution 108, the termination bill, with the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act.[3] But simply to glance over the preceding years, and particularly the administration of Lyndon Johnson, would ignore a period of dynamic and controversial change both at the federal level and in Indian communities. This article explores the Johnson administration's most provocative and contested innovation, the Community Action Program (CAP), and how its philosophy of "maximum feasible participation" served as the harbinger of tribal self-determination.

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For more than four years a seemingly erratic Johnson administration lurched and convulsed its way toward a formalized Indian policy. To be sure, forced termination, the program that dominated the 1950s, found no friend in Lyndon Johnson. Yet not until March 6, 1968, in his special message to Congress entitled "The Forgotten American," would he elucidate an alternative vision. In his address, Johnson called for an Indian policy "expressed in programs of self-help ... and self-determination."[4] This indicates much more than a nascent idea. "The Forgotten American" synthesized preexisting *programs* into a coherent *policy* founded on the philosophy of Indian Community Action (ICA).

Several factors contributed to Indian inclusion in the War on Poverty. Pan-Indian activism, spearheaded by the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), emerged from the termination era. Reacting to the heavy-handed, arbitrary actions of Congress and the Bureau of Indian Affairs during the early 1950s, the NCAI played a critical role in forcing a reexamination of federal policy. By 1961, this activism, and the disasters following termination of the Menominee and Klamath, culminated in the federal government's adoption of a gradualist termination policy based on on-reservation economic development and tribal consent and consultation.[5]

The ascendance of the civil rights movement and growing concern for poverty in America also drew Native Americans more directly and visibly into the realm of public policy. In 1962, President Kennedy's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency conducted research in impoverished areas, including Indian reservations.[6] These studies were the genesis of what would become the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA). However, after Kennedy's assassination, the responsibility for providing the energy and legislative skill to bring the antipoverty program to life fell on Lyndon Johnson's shoulders. Although larger societal shifts certainly broadened the scope of future antipoverty legislation, Indian inclusion was by no means a *fait accompli.*

Lyndon Johnson's inclusive definition of poverty shaped the contours of the Economic Opportunity Act. Poverty, as he understood it, did not discriminate by race, ethnicity, or location. Accordingly, the antipoverty program encompassed areas as diverse as inner-city Chicago, rural Oklahoma, and Appalachia. He expressed his intention to address the needs of American Indians early in his administration. As vice president, he had met with delegates of the influential American Indian Chicago Conference (AICC).[7] Working from their *Declaration of Indian*

Purpose, Johnson and the AICC representatives discussed how future legislation could incorporate the need for tribal self-determination, local control of resources, and federal assistance with economic development.[8] The actions taken by Johnson in 1964 suggest he intended to follow through on at least some of the recommendations made by the AICC.

In his State of the Union Address on January 8, 1964, Johnson declared "unconditional war on poverty in America," identifying Indian reservations as specific targets.[9] To underscore this commitment, Johnson again met with members of the NCAI. On January 20, 1964, Walter Wetzel, then president of the NCAI, outlined needed policy initiatives.[10] Johnson assured Wetzel that their proposal, which resonated with the AICC's, would be considered. He recited statistics which indicated the intolerable economic and health conditions on reservations, adding, "[T]hese are the reasons why I have directed that in our attack on poverty program we put our Indian people in the forefront.... I pledge a continued effort to eradicate poverty and to provide new opportunity for the first citizens of America."[11] Johnson then sent the Economic Opportunity Act to Congress on March 16, 1964.

While the EOA made no specific mention of Native Americans, the House and Senate hearings revealed the weight of Johnson's directive. In March and April 1964, members of the House of Representatives challenged the funding of Indian tribes from sources other than the Bureau of Indian Affairs.[12] On April 7, Congressman Peter H.B. Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) related his concern with Interior Secretary Stewart Udall's conviction that Indians would be included in the War on Poverty. Frustrated by the ambiguity of the EOA, Frelinghuysen noted, "There is nothing to protect Indians, as such, in here. There is no assurance that there is going to be anything available for Indians."[13] Referring to Johnson's NCAI meeting, Udall contended, "There is the assurance, Congressman, that the President ... has said in very flat language that he wants the Indians in the forefront of the program. If you think that the Director [of OEO] will ignore the President, you may assume so. I do not."[14] Specific wording notwithstanding, Indians would participate in OEO programs.

In addition to Johnson's own direction, political activism figured significantly in securing Indian inclusion in the War on Poverty. During the interim between the House and Senate hearings, nearly one thousand Indians and non-Indians con-

vened the American Indian Capital Conference on Poverty (AICCP). Held in Washington, D.C., between May 9 and 12, 1964, the AICCP organized work groups to discuss Indian poverty and sent delegates to urge their respective senators to support tribal participation in the EOA. Senator Lee Metcalf of Montana communicated their concerns during Sargent Shriver's June Senate testimony.[15] Shriver related the Poverty Task Force's participation in the AICCP's conference. Using words reminiscent of Johnson's, he assured Metcalf that OEO fully intended to emphasize Indian inclusion in community action.[16] Less than two months later, on August 20, 1964, Lyndon Johnson signed the Economic Opportunity Act into law; the War on Indian Poverty had begun.

Title IIA of the Economic Opportunity Act established the Community Action Program. Under this title Native American tribal councils formed Community Action Agencies (CAAs). These CAAs then contracted with a variety of federal departments for direct funding. While maximum feasible participation, the very soul of community action, conveyed numerous things to any number of people, many Indians understood it as an opportunity to control program development, implementation, and administration. To them, it meant empowerment, freedom from BIA paternalism, and that the federal government, through the Office of Economic Opportunity, supported a drive toward tribal self-determination.

The Office of Economic Opportunity's control of Indian Community Action played an integral role in this development. During the EOA hearings, for instance, Interior Secretary Udall portrayed the purpose of Indian Community Action in terms indistinguishable from the parent program. Essentially, Udall described it as a means of promoting closer coordination between state, local, and federal agencies. In this context, maximum feasible participation simply meant involving Indians in decision-making; locally initiated programs would encourage Indians to enter the mainstream of American life.[17] But the NCAI countered that such a policy failed to recognize that many Indians did not "want to swim in the mainstream they largely regarded as polluted and that they should be free to refuse."[18] Udall's analysis belied deeper issues such as the right to remain culturally distinct and the assurance that greater local control would not threaten Indians' special relationships with the federal government.

Shriver conceptualized Indian Community Action in dra-

matically different terms. Early in the War on Poverty, Shriver elucidated a clear philosophy to guide OEO's Indian programs. He argued that the federal government needed to provide the resources for Indians to make reservation life economically viable and stressed the importance of tribal self-determination.[19] In a speech to the NCAI in 1965, he stated:

> I would like to see the day when the tribal council has a real say in the makeup of the tribal budget—not just an approval after the fact, not just the right to come begging for this or that—but the right to say: *This is my money, this is my heritage, this is my land*—I have now come of age [emphasis added].[20]

Indian Community Action's emphasis on local initiative not only promoted tribal self-determination, but also undermined the monolithic conception of Indians—an idea which had guided federal policy more often than not in the past. Shriver argued that *only* individual Native American tribes could develop programs to meet their distinct and specific cultural, economic, political, geographic, and demographic situations. In so doing, the philosophy of Indian Community Action refuted the concept of *a* single solution to *the* "Indian problem."

The very structure of Indian Community Action set a precedent in federal-Indian relations. Within the Office of Special Field Programs of CAP, Shriver established an Indian Desk (also referred to as the Indian Branch, Division, or Section). In 1966, Shriver appointed James J. Wilson, a Sioux originally from Pine Ridge, as its director.[21] Indian CAAs submitted program proposals directly to the Indian Division which functioned analogously to other regional OEO offices. Wilson had the authority to give initial approval to proposals, monitor and evaluate Indian CAPs, and handle all administrative affairs.

The Indian Division held four significant meanings. First, it broke the Interior Department's near monopoly on federal-Indian affairs. Second, Wilson's office coordinated all OEO Indian programs. Third, 85 percent of Indian Division positions were staffed by Indians. Finally, in the person of James J. Wilson, Indians had a powerful advocate for distinguishing Indian participation from that of other minorities. In 1969, Wilson described his philosophy in this regard: "Tribal plans must have philosophic goals in relation to Indianness, culture, and reservations."[22] Collectively, Native Americans secured the

opportunity to access funds and programs from nearly every department in the federal government, gained a contact point within the Executive Office of the president, and had reason to believe that decisions would be made increasingly by people who understood reservation life.

Division within the Johnson administration and in Congress immediately imperiled the innovative qualities of OEO's Indian programs. Established departments such as Interior, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) formulated Indian projects with their own specific goals in mind. At the same time, the Bureau of the Budget and key members of Congress pursued separate agendas. Constant bureaucratic infighting over control of OEO programs made its existence tenable. By 1965, the Johnson administration considered transferring OEO to HUD, a decision many warned would prove detrimental to rural areas.[23] Subsequent transfer proposals submitted by Interior and HEW dealt directly with OEO Indian programs. Such discussions became one of several factors that mired Indian affairs in conflict throughout the 1960s.

From 1961 to 1966, Kennedy's 1961 Task Force on Indian Affairs report informed Indian policy. It counseled on-reservation economic development and an overhaul of termination, making it explicitly voluntary.[24] The Interior's emphasis on encouraging Indians to enter the mainstream of American life predominated. While the federal government officially called for a moratorium on termination, economic self-sufficiency lent itself to a justified severing of trust relationships.[25] Despite the general appearance of consensus, however, Interior Secretary Udall and Indian Commissioner Philleo Nash clashed over the issue of termination. They were not, as two recent scholars suggest, ideologically indistinguishable.[26]

Secretary Udall recognized that each tribe valued its distinct culture; however, he did not consider Indianness to be inextricably bound to a distinct legal status. Thus, severing federal trust relationships posed little threat to Indian identities or lifeways. Similarly, Nash supported "guided acculturation."[27] However, in 1964 and again in 1966, Nash challenged congressional attempts to terminate the Senecas and Colvilles, respectively. This conflict with the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and Udall led to Nash's forced resignation in 1966.[28] After his dismissal, and perhaps as a consequence of it, Indians continued to question Interior's Indian policy. In the ensuing

years, Udall's policy initiatives continued to stress incorporating Indians into the modern industrial society and neglected the legal concept of Indianness.

In 1967, Interior introduced the Indian Resources Development Act (IRDA), its most ambitious attempt to define Indian policy during the 1960s. Indians immediately castigated Udall for excluding them from drafting the bill. As the NCAI discovered, the nine regional hearings held to gather Indian opinions presented only the illusion of tribal input; the actual legislation evidenced none of their suggestions.[29] Many Indians also criticized substantive aspects of the IRDA. For instance, the bill allowed tribes to use land as collateral for development loans. The high probability of default on these loans portended a massive loss of Indian lands.[30] The Omnibus Indian Bill, as it became known, also allowed off-reservation tribal members to relinquish their individual legal status as Indians in return for per-capita portions of their tribes' assets. In a memo to Johnson's special assistant, Joseph Califano, the Budget Bureau pointed out a second potential consequence: "This would add an option to the Indian who is still living on the reservation, perhaps to protect his share in the tribal holdings, but is thinking about leaving for employment or other purposes."[31] The ambiguity of the IRDA led the NCAI to dub it the "Ominous Bill."[32] Vine Deloria considered it a "betrayal" antithetical to the president's promises of Indian participation and the ideas suggested during the regional meetings.[33]

The Interior drafted a presidential message in January 1967, apparently to coincide with the introduction of the Indian Resources Development Act. The draft included no refutation of termination, no commitment to on-reservation economic or cultural development, no discussion of Indian treaties which made their lands inviolate, and no mention of the importance of tribal self-determination.[34] This message, however, never came to fruition; Johnson's support for the IRDA was lukewarm at best.[35] Although Congress never enacted the IRDA and Johnson did not deliver the Interior's message, both provided vivid reminders that Interior seemed content with dictating policy for Indians.

Between 1964 and 1967, Congress remained decidedly in favor of termination. After Nash's forced resignation, Johnson appointed Robert L. Bennett (Oneida) as commissioner of Indian affairs. During his confirmation hearings, the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee firmly reasserted its support for termination.[36] In its final report, the committee

expressed its impatience with the Interior's failure to introduce termination legislation for tribes the BIA had deemed "qualified for full management of their own affairs" in 1947.[37] Contrary to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' initiatives, then, key members of both the House and Senate Interior subcommittees continued to support a strong termination policy. While in the House this resulted more from neglect than intent, the Senate subcommittee actively pursued the termination of the Senecas, Colvilles, and several California rancherias.[38] Such sentiments in Congress precluded either Nash or Bennett from openly steering the BIA toward a policy of tribal self-determination.[39]

Udall made several efforts to secure Interior control over OEO Indian programs between 1965 and 1967. In April 1966, a meeting in Santa Fe, New Mexico, brought together BIA officials and several key members of Congress.[40] Udall conducted the deliberations behind closed doors and initially denied Indian participation. Upon hearing of the session, Vine Deloria, then executive director of the NCAI, called an emergency meeting. Representatives from sixty-two tribes congregated in Santa Fe, gained access to the government meeting, and secured a promise from Udall to seek Indian input in developing future legislation, including the IRDA. Deloria argued that, had the NCAI not flanked the transfer proposal, Interior would have taken over OEO Indian programs.

The NCAI-Interior showdown became a watershed in the formulation of Indian policy. Moreover, in this context, Shriver's firm commitment to tribal self-determination became increasingly important. "The Poverty Program is extremely popular," Deloria wrote in the wake of the Santa Fe fiasco, "and for the first time tribes can plan and run their own programs for their people without someone in the BIA dictating to them."[41] While Udall also pledged support for active Indian participation, the concealed development of the IRDA and the attempt to usurp OEO Indian programs seemed intolerable contradictions.

Udall continued to pursue either the transfer or joint HEW-Interior control of Indian programs nonetheless. In April 1967, he notified Johnson's top domestic adviser, "John Gardner and I have had our people poised for nearly a month now to launch a new HEW-Interior cooperative effort for Indians."[42] Their plan dated back to 1966, when Udall, Special Assistants Joseph Califano and James Gaither, Larry Levinson from the Bureau of the Budget, and HUD Undersecretary Robert Wood met to dis-

cuss the future of Indian affairs.[43] Johnson expressed his desire to have an Outside Task Force on Indian Affairs (OTF) organized to clarify the administration's Indian policy; they had met to set the parameters of the study.

The recurring possibility of "organizational changes" arose twice during their conference. First, they discussed the potential for a complete transfer of all Indian education programs to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. According to Udall and HEW Secretary John Gardner, the Interior would then assume control of OEO's Indian programs.[44] Secondly, Interior Secretary Udall and HUD Undersecretary Wood supported the "developing nations concept ... which [would] enable the Indian to enter the mainstream of American life."[45] According to this plan, both HUD and Interior would have gained control of OEO programs. Such a move would have given new life to the policy of gradual termination. Both examples illustrate many departments' tendencies to merge their desires for control of OEO programs with the formulation of Indian policy.

The Outside Task Force held its first meeting on October 11, 1966. It brought together professionals with particular interests in Indian affairs. Yet, despite the collection of prominent names, it included only one Indian—W.W. Keeler (Cherokee). Keeler served on both the Commission on the Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of the American Indian and Kennedy's Task Force. He also held a prominent position in the Phillips Petroleum Company. The rest of the task force members were professors, lawyers, bankers, and CEOs of major corporations.[46] The Johnson administration intended to keep their final report confidential. However, if the OTF ever came to light, regardless of their findings, its very composition promised certain controversy.

In "A Free Choice Program for American Indians," issued December 23, 1966, the Outside Task Force argued that beyond the Office of Economic Opportunity, there had been no meaningful commitment to Indian involvement in policy development. The OTF called for a presidential message explicitly to disavow termination, encourage cultural pluralism, recognize Indian lands as inviolate, and support Indian participation in all stages of federal program and policy development.[47] In the latter case, it recommended that the administration use OEO as a model for its initiatives.[48]

The Outside Task Force's final recommendation, the trans-

fer of BIA to HEW, obfuscated the more substantive aspects of the report.[49] Two task force members, Lewis Douglas and W.W. Keeler, openly opposed the transfer. In a letter to Task Force Chairman Walsh McDermott, Douglas wrote, "I dissent completely with the concept that the Indian is a welfare subject. He can and ought to be a self-sustaining and self-reliant personality."[50] Richard Schifter, another member of the OTF, initially concurred with the transfer but, in January 1967, reversed his position. In a letter explaining his decision, Schifter wrote that after the controversy surrounding the IRDA, "the transfer would be interpreted as another termination move.... I am inclined to think that a proposed transfer to HEW would give rise to a hurricane."[51] The Budget Bureau, however, agreed with the transfer. They argued further that the rationale for transferring the BIA to HEW made transfer of OEO's Indian programs logical as well.[52]

The Johnson administration divided over the recommendations of the Outside Task Force. The Budget Bureau questioned the wisdom of committing to on-reservation development. They contended that the high birth rates and general lack of economic development would necessitate an enormous financial commitment. Both HUD and the majority concerned in Congress concurred with the bureau's misgivings. The Budget Bureau also took issue with the recommendations that Johnson proclaim Indian lands inviolate in a presidential message and that he advocate absolute tribal discretion in regard to termination.[53] Recognizing the explosive potential of the debate, McDermott counseled "no mention of termination"; no member should "affirm nor deny" it and thus "preserve [the Johnson administration's] options."[54] The positions taken by Douglas, Schifter, the Budget Bureau, and McDermott underscore the basic philosophical bifurcation between the goals of HUD, HEW, and the Interior as opposed to those of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Moreover, they underscore the theme of a constant dialectic between the concepts of self-determination and termination, separation versus integration, and distinctness versus assimilation. These dialectics were manifest throughout the rest of Johnson's tenure. Indeed, this pervasive division exacerbated the Johnson administration's inability to pull its myriad programs under a precise Indian policy. But, as Interior initiatives continued to fail, OEO programs gained stronger support from Indian communities. Interior found itself on the defensive by 1967; in reaction to

OEO success, the BIA launched its own community development program.[55] Despite the Interior's effort to regain primacy in Indian affairs, events in the latter half of 1967 catapulted OEO programs from its shadow.

As Schifter predicted, conflict surrounding the transfer shrouded the Outside Task Force's other recommendations. The jolt proved sufficient enough, as had the resulting internal conflict, to mandate a second task force—this one to be staffed by representatives from within the Johnson administration. The Interagency Task Force on American Indians (ITF) began its work in August 1967. One month later, the president's National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty (NACRP) submitted its final report. Together, these two studies increased and refined federal recognition of Indian Community Action and convinced the Johnson administration to place its philosophy at the center of Indian policy.

The Interagency Task Force on American Indians brought together representatives from Interior, HEW, Commerce, Labor, HUD, Treasury, BOB, and OEO.[56] Building from the OTF report, the Interagency Task Force sought to create a proposal "consistent with Indian self-help, eventual self-sufficiency, and long-term social and economic development."[57] In the final report, the ITF singled out the philosophy of Indian Community Action and recommended, "OEO ... should make available some experienced people to assist the BIA ... in adjusting their program."[58] The OEO's Indian programs had finally captured the attention of the Johnson administration.

The proceedings of the president's National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty increased the visibility of Indian Community Action. Established in September 1966, the NACRP studied the problem of rural poverty in America. Specifically, the commission considered the impact of OEO programs. The NACRP held three regional hearings in which the poor and their advocates testified. Indians figured significantly in one held in Tucson, Arizona, between January 26 and 27, 1967. The regional hearings provided a highly publicized forum for Indians to voice their concerns on issues such as their status as an impoverished minority, assimilation, and termination. Agustin Aguilar, a seventy-three-year Santo Domingo Pueblo, related the federal government's past policies to the recent advances of Indian Community Action. In so doing, he went to the heart of the matter for many of those who testified.

> [A]ll efforts to improve the conditions of life at Santo Domingo will prove futile, if two general wishes of the people are not respected. The people will not sacrifice their tradition, their culture, and their history as a sovereign tribe in order to more cheaply purchase the benefits of modern American society. The people will not sacrifice control of their land and their affairs as guaranteed by solemn binding treaties. Through the years, many well-meaning agencies and officials have disregarded these wishes; and by doing so, they have already taken far too much from the Indian people.... [I]t is encouraging that many are beginning to recognize the critical needs of the special problems of Indian people, and that the community action program is demonstrating its responsiveness to these needs and problems.... Community action represents a new spirit on the reservation: a spirit of cooperation that should be encouraged and strengthened....[59]

Aguilar underscored the unmistakable connection between Indian Community Action and the realization of economic and cultural tribal self-determination.[60] Unlike any other federal department, the OEO-Indian Division consciously recognized the differences between Indians and other minorities. And, unlike any other federal program, the Indian Division emphasized the participation of Native Americans and specially trained professionals who understood their particular concerns.[61]

To be sure, some Indian CAAs failed to live up to people's expectations, were ill-conceived or poorly funded, foundered under the weight of tribal factionalism, or simply bolstered tribal councils perceived by many to be unrepresentative of the entire reservation.[62] But the positive impacts of ICA were also evident—in some cases dramatically revitalizing tribal governments, in others providing critical economic boosts. In many other communities, Indians shaped ICA programs to serve unique cultural purposes.

Indian Community Action programs took several forms. The majority served Indians of a single reservation. However, other reservations, such as Southern Ute in Colorado, Turtle Mountain in Minnesota, and Standing Rock in South Dakota, contained significant numbers of non-Indians. While the tribal government served as the sponsoring agent, OEO mandated representation proportionate to the non-Indian population on the CAA boards.[63] In still other cases, several Indian communi-

ties created joint ICAs, such as the Eight Northern Pueblos Community Action Program.[64]

Indian Community Action represented a significant break from the Bureau of Indian Affairs' paternalistic means of developing and implementing reservation programs. Raymond Kane, director of the White Mountain Apache Community Action Program, contended, "[P]rofessional people ... no matter how high a level of education, he hasn't lived the problem like we have ... we feel that we are the best qualified whether we are subprofessional or just laymen; we feel that we know the problems; we know how to cope with it."[65] Community action provided an opportunity for Native Americans to organize committees that went into their communities, discussed their people's most urgent needs, and then created programs accordingly.[66] The increased responsibility and flexibility of direct federal funding rejuvenated many tribal governments and quickly won their support.[67]

In contrast with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which relied on a multilayered bureaucracy including area and regional offices, ICA provided a direct link to the federal government. Moreover, the BIA was located deep within the Department of the Interior, languishing beneath the Office for Public Land Management. The commissioner of Indian affairs was subordinate to an assistant secretary whose other responsibilities often ran counter to Indian interests.[68] Consequently, bureaucratic inertia, rather than malevolent intent, often led to the BIA's inefficacy. Housed in the Executive Office of the President and given considerable latitude within OEO, the Indian Desk provided a more direct and responsive link to the federal government.[69] Moreover, unlike the BIA, which had one employee for every twenty-two Indians, the Indian Division carried only five administrators. Rather than controlling every aspect of Indian affairs from program development to implementation, the Indian Division served primarily as a granting agency.[70]

Tribal CAAs could apply for several kinds of programs that focused on social development. These programs trained local people to serve as health aides; provided preschool, remedial, and adult education classes; established after-school study halls; hired counselors for youths and recovering alcoholics; taught homemaking and vocational skills; and provided employment for community beautification projects. Several factors distinguished the programs of Indian Community Action from those previously conducted by the BIA. The pri-

mary difference rested in ICA's emphasis on developing human potential. The BIA, as it redefined itself during the early 1960s, emphasized economic and industrial development. Moreover, these programs precluded Indian participation and were largely considered to be imposed from without. Indians remained, at least as defined by the BIA, passive recipients of federal beneficence. Indian Community Action, however, involved Indians in each stage of their CAP.

Through section 204's program development grant, a CAA could hire a director and staff to conduct a survey of their community's needs and the efficacy of existing programs. They also considered methods of funding. Central to the program development grant was the participation of local residents in the planning.[71] In theory, this contributed to community action's "building block approach." The CAA developed an initial set of programs following the program development research, and then reassessed their communities' needs, redefining existing programs, dropping some, and adding others as specific conditions warranted.[72] When it functioned properly, the results represented a significant divergence from BIA policy.[73]

The section 205 grant, conduct and administration, represented a second bifurcation from past BIA policies. Through the administrative component, a tribal CAA received funds to administer, direct, and coordinate all OEO programs, including those delegated to other federal departments such as the Neighborhood Youth Corps (Labor), College Work-Study (HEW), Adult Basic Education (HEW), Rural Loans (Agriculture), Small Business Loans (Commerce), and Work Experience (Labor).[74] While other departments approved, funded, and evaluated these programs, ICAs retained administrative control.

The Office of Economic Opportunity also developed a set of national emphasis programs including Legal Services, Foster Grandparents, Nelson Amendment, Head Start, and Upward Bound. Although much less flexible than local initiative programs, Indian CAAs hired the staffs and took full responsibility for implementing them. Over the course of OEO's existence, Congress consistently increased appropriations for national emphasis projects. Despite the "packaged" nature of these programs, once implemented they took forms and served functions unique to the communities that controlled them.

Through section 207, OEO contributed to joint demonstration programs with other federal agencies. The OEO generally

provided the social development programs for comprehensive reservation projects in conjunction with Labor, HEW, and BIA. The Oglala Sioux Model Reservation Program and the Gila River Reservation's "Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju" or "It Must Happen" plan sought to develop reservation infrastructures, improve health and education, and provide job training and development.[75] These comprehensive programs broadened the scope of federal aid while maintaining the philosophy of Indian Community Action.

Sections 206 and 209 of the EOA provided for technical assistance and training programs. On July 16, 1965, Shriver announced grants to Arizona State University, the University of South Dakota, and the University of Utah to establish a three-university consortium. Initially dubbed the Indian Community Action Centers (ICAC), they trained community action staffs and provided technical assistance in the operation of Indian CAPs.[76] In 1966, the consortium was renamed the Indian Community Action Project (ICAP); it expanded to include the University of New Mexico, the University of Montana, and Bemidji State College (Minnesota) in 1968.

To remain consistent with the concept of local initiative, the universities adopted a policy of providing services only at the request of tribal CAAs. The Office of Economic Opportunity underscored the importance of maintaining the direct link to the Indian Desk—ICAPs were not to become regional offices. Indian Community Action Projects sent out field representatives to answer questions regarding OEO guidelines, funding, and component conflicts. They also organized formal workshops for leadership, administrative, and skills training for all ICA programs.[77] The technical assistance component called for providing directors with help in explaining ICA programs and developing proposals that conformed with OEO requirements.[78] Alonzo Spang, a Northern Cheyenne and director of ASU's ICAP, stressed the importance of offering assistance to, rather than imposing their will on, the tribal CAAs.[79] These stated goals, in contrast to the impersonal and bureaucratized methods of the BIA, attested to OEO's goal of empowering tribes to exert control over their own programs.

Stronger, more empowered tribal governments emerged from the War on Indian Poverty. Rather than serving as mere conduits, tribal CAAs were responsible for developing, administering, and coordinating federal programs. In many cases, tribal control of federal programs resonated with a growing

sense of Indian nationalism. Ronnie Lupe's (White Mountain Apache) testimony during Senate hearings held in Albuquerque, New Mexico, suggested this. Senator Joseph Clark (D-PA) asked several tribal leaders whether their CAAs had implemented "population service" (family planning) programs. Lupe stated that theirs had not and, in fact, he discouraged it. When Clark pursued his rationale, Lupe replied, "I would like to see the Indians outnumber the foreigners."[80] Indian Community Action, then, complemented the goals of those tribes that sought to distance themselves from BIA paternalism, redefine their relationships with the federal government, and take a more active role in their communities.[81]

During the 1960s, the War on Indian Poverty contributed to a political and cultural renascence among the Gros Ventres. Indian Community Action bolstered the prestige of the tribal council, the programs led to the creation of a community center for public gatherings, and the creation of new jobs drew people back to the reservation.[82] The economic growth allowed Gros Ventres to reestablish previously neglected rituals such as giveaways. An integral method of asserting one's status, the giveaways underscored the importance of generosity and reciprocity. The rejuvenation of the tribal council ushered in an era of "new tribalism."[83] The leaders of this new tribalism, called the "education clique," were a part of the younger generation that had attended college, were encouraged to take pride in their cultural heritage, and showed interest in being "Indian in new ways."[84] Their interest in revitalizing Gros Ventres rituals, values, and kinship patterns forged closer bonds between the younger and older generations.[85] Their interaction brought back, in somewhat redefined terms, the previously dormant pipe ceremony. The Gros Ventres exemplified the ability of Indians to accommodate political and economic changes in ways consistent with their own, if contested, values.

Added to Title II of the EOA in 1965, the Nelson Amendment employed people over the age of thirty-six in projects such as fencing and weeding cemeteries, trash collection, remodeling community buildings, improving roads, building and renovating recreational facilities, and constructing bus shelters for school children.[86] While not a source of economic development, programs begun under the Nelson Amendment provided employment for heads of households and other adults. Known as the "oldsters' program" at the Santo Domingo Pueblo, the Nelson Amendment, one participant

remarked, brought about a stronger sense of community for those involved.[87] The community centers they built provided a place for gatherings and dances which, in some areas, had impacts that defy objective measurement.

Indian Community Action provided the first steps toward Indian self-determination in education.[88] Head Start, a preschool program for four- and five-year-olds, prepared Indian children for elementary education. In addition to providing nutritional, medical, and social services, Head Start involved parents in all aspects of their children's education. Parents' contributions to the development of curricula that stressed their people's unique cultures and histories were unprecedented.[89] The emphasis on maximum feasible participation led to parental involvement as Head Start directors, teacher's aides, nurses, bus drivers, cooks, janitors, and members of policy advisory committees.[90] "Long estranged parents," Alfonso Ortiz (San Juan Pueblo) argued, "no longer felt that they were giving their children over to another world."[91] While some non-Indians undoubtedly understood Head Start as a means of teaching English and "new behaviors to take the place of the ones learned in the child's own culture," local participation allowed Indians to set their own agendas.[92]

Head Start and other OEO education programs sought a balance between cultures.[93] Domingo Montoya (Sandia Pueblo), director of the All-Indian Pueblo Council, discussed this principle in 1967. He argued that Head Start and other education programs would teach the three R's and "include education in [the child's] own tribal government, history, and culture. It probably means that English will be taught as a foreign language and that [the student] will need skills and understanding in his native tongue."[94] In this sense, he viewed education as a means of strengthening children's capacities to serve as "cultural brokers." In these capacities, they would feel comfortable maneuvering in both reservation and non-reservation settings. In negotiating the middle ground between Indian and non-Indian worlds, these children would serve as teachers, lawyers, doctors, artists, musicians, and tribal leaders.[95] John Dick (Navajo) expressed similar sentiments: "[The students] need a modern education to make their way, but they have to know both worlds—and being Navajo will give them strength."[96] As future leaders of their people, these children would bring a unique ability to articulate Indian concerns in an ever-changing world.

Through some ICA programs, women reasserted their presence in the political, economic, and social lives of their community.[97] On the Salt River Pima and Maricopa Reservation, married and unmarried women of various ages participated as aides for Head Start, health care, and services to the elderly. Older women, serving as Head Start aides, taught Pima and Maricopa heritage and language to the preschoolers.[98] Many of these women were able to use their roles as springboards into tribal politics. In situations such as theirs, the impact of Head Start far transcended the overt goals of improving children's education or creating jobs for adults. Rather, though perhaps unappreciated by OEO, local initiative programs had the potential to alter the social and political atmospheres of entire communities.

The Office of Economic Opportunity also supported the research and development of two precedent-setting schools on the Navajo Reservation. Founded in 1966, the Rough Rock Demonstration School (RRDS) represented what one contemporary study called a "radical departure from the conventional approach [to Indian education]."[99] Rough Rock served as an elementary and secondary school and provided a bicultural and bilingual curricula established by an exclusively Indian school board. It set a precedent for using Navajo as a medium for instruction and treated English as a second language.[100] Its Navajo Curriculum Center recorded all aspects of Navajo life in both English and Navajo.[101] In keeping with the philosophy of Indian Community Action, Rough Rock employed people from the community to serve as dorm hosts, staff, and teachers. Rough Rock also hired elders to come in to relate Navajo oral histories and set up a curricula that stressed knowledge of Navajo history, language, arts and crafts, and culture. The Navajos' name for Rough Rock reflected the dramatic change it represented. Whereas English translations of Navajo names for BIA and public schools were "school of the federal government" and "white children's school," respectively, Rough Rock translated "the Navajo's school."[102] After studying Rough Rock in 1969, four Navajo leaders reported that parental and community involvement fostered a "feeling of great pride in the people—pride in what they are doing for their community, pride in what they are doing for their school, and pride in what they are doing for their children."[103] Rough Rock would be a model for future Indian-controlled educational institutions.

Like Rough Rock, the Navajo Community College (NCC) became the first institution of its kind. The philosophy of ICA

informed both its structure and practice.[104] Founded in 1968, and opening for classes in 1969, NCC emphasized its Native Studies Program which offered courses in Navajo culture, language, crafts, and Indian-white relations, as well as traditional academic subjects and vocational training.[105] Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, NCC strove to hire an all-Indian faculty. While this produced some conflict, it proved consistent with the shift toward Navajo nationalism. The Navajo Community College anticipated the founding of several other Indian colleges, and spurred the creation of Indian studies programs across the nation.

Together, Head Start, Rough Rock, and the Navajo Community College set precedents for Indian-controlled elementary, secondary, and post-secondary schools. But the Office of Economic Opportunity did not "cause" these changes. Undoubtedly, Indians had sought, and were prepared for, control of their schools for years before the War on Indian Poverty began. However, OEO and ICA provided the long anticipated means to effect Indian self-determination in education. Moreover, their success encouraged other Native American communities to establish, or demand and win control of, their own schools throughout the 1970s. Reacting to the advances made by Head Start and Rough Rock, the Bureau of Indian Affairs altered their approach to education and instituted similar curricula in their schools.[106]

In 1967, the University of New Mexico and OEO founded an Indian pre-law program with an Upward Bound grant. OEO claimed that in 1968 there were only eight Indian lawyers in the United States.[107] This program trained many of the Indian lawyers that would represent Native Americans in future cases involving religious freedom, control of mineral and energy resources, water rights, and federal recognition. Indeed, John E. Echohawk, the current director of the Native American Rights Fund (NARF), participated in the first Indian law courses offered by the University of New Mexico. The training he and other Indians received through these programs led directly to the formation of NARF and other legal organizations. Like the general education programs, UNM's Indian law program set a precedent that other universities across the country followed during the 1970s.[108]

In 1965, OEO launched Legal Services as a community action program.[109] Legal Services offered free legal counsel and representation and conducted campaigns to inform reservation resi-

dents of their legal rights.[110] Some Legal Services projects used this role to raise consciousness among Native Americans regarding termination.[111] The Office of Navajo Economic Opportunity's (ONEO) Legal Aid and Defender Society, initiated in 1967, brought suits against reservation trading posts and car dealers for exploitative business practices. It later became the independent DNA (*Dinébeiina Nahiilna Be Agaditahe*, or "Attorneys Who Contribute to the Economic Revitalization of the People").[112] In time, DNA took on cases related to tribal sovereignty and the right of states to tax Indian reservations.[113] By 1968, OEO had launched Legal Services programs on ten reservations.

Although only reservation communities were eligible for Indian programs at the outset, the philosophy of local initiative fostered important changes in some nonreservation areas. Oklahoma Indians initially participated in the War on Poverty as minorities in county and city CAPs. Given the diversity of Indian perspectives on cultural, social, and political integration, this structure proved satisfactory to some but anathema to others.[114] The latter group had experienced discriminatory hiring practices, were frustrated by inequitable representation on community action boards, or did not identify with the goals and concerns of non-Indian-dominated CAPs.[115] These frustrations, in addition to OEO's restrictions governing its Indian programs, drove Oklahoma Senator Fred Harris to send a scathing letter to Sargent Shriver in 1965. Although he underscored his general support for OEO, Harris railed, "[the] general policy regarding the treatment of Indians is geared to reservation Indians and is almost completely useless in Oklahoma."[116] While her husband took the issue to OEO, LaDonna Harris (Comanche) developed an organization in Oklahoma to encourage Indian participation in OEO programs.

LaDonna Harris became a nationally recognized leader after she successfully organized the first collective meeting of eastern and western Oklahoma tribes in June 1965. Supported by a grant from the University of Utah's ICAP, representatives from nineteen Oklahoma tribes, along with some non-Indians, formed the Oklahomans for Indian Opportunity (OIO).[117] LaDonna Harris, with the help of several congressmen, convinced OEO to allow ICAPs to contract with organizations like theirs to provide technical assistance and training programs for off-reservation and nonreservation Indians.[118]

The OIO initially utilized these "Special Condition" grants to develop leadership training and youth programs. However,

in 1968 OIO secured a research and demonstration grant from OEO to develop economic programs specifically for Indians. OIO argued that to alleviate poverty, Indians needed to have control over the economic forces that shaped their lives, including industries, businesses, and financial institutions.[119] While OIO met with opposition from various city and tribal councils, it provided a means for Oklahoma Indians to assert their right to a viable existence distinct from the larger society. Members of the Oklahomans for Indian Opportunity also used their increased visibility to reveal the federal government's failure to reach off- and nonreservation Indians; OIO highlighted their unique circumstances and the need for focused federal attention. LaDonna Harris carried this experience with her when she became a member of the National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO). The NCIO, created by executive order in 1968, was located in the Office of the Vice President and brought together Indian leaders and several federal department secretaries. They studied federal-Indian affairs and made policy recommendations; working with other Indian leaders, Harris conducted an influential investigation of urban and rural Indians. She later founded a national organization called Americans for Indian Opportunity (AIO).

Though less immediately tangible, a generation of Indian leaders who would direct the continued drive for self-determination, nationalism, and sovereignty developed their skills in Indian Community Action. Prior to 1964, reservations experienced "brain drain" as many educated Indians left for urban areas to find higher-paying employment. To address this problem, ICA targeted educated Indians for on-reservation leadership roles. People such as Peter MacDonald, a Navajo engineer and World War II veteran, returned to the reservation when OEO funds created employment opportunities. MacDonald became the director of the Office of Navajo Economic Opportunity (ONEO) in 1965. He later led a movement for Navajo nationalism and served three terms as tribal chairman of the Navajo Nation. His successor, Peterson Zah, also gained leadership experience working in OEO programs.[120] As already mentioned, LaDonna Harris and John Echohawk assumed nationally prominent positions with AIO and NARF, respectively. The stories of countless others remain unknown or untold.

Throughout the 1960s, Native Americans and policymakers struggled with the notion of Indian poverty. The crux of the issue was whether Indian poverty could be equated with the

poverty present in the dominant society. Clearly, the Johnson administration divided over the issue. As evidenced in Oklahoma, OEO's definition of "Indianness" did not incorporate nonreservation Indians, at least at the outset. The situation in Oklahoma also revealed that, at times, Native Americans defined Indian poverty in conflicting terms. The same held true for on-reservation Indians. For instance, Domingo Montoya (Sandia Pueblo), chairman of the All-Indian Pueblo Council, argued, "[N]o Indian problem exists. There is instead, a basic human problem that involves Indians."[121] Others, however, contended that Indian poverty derived from conditions unique to their status as wards of the federal government and the limitations of reservation economies. Moreover, the deleterious effects of BIA paternalism and the continued demand for tribal self-determination necessitated a strategy which deviated from that implemented in other impoverished areas.[122] Community action synthesized these conflicting perspectives. It worked from the assumption that poverty did not discriminate by race or ethnicity; it was indeed a "human problem." Yet community action also recognized the myriad factors which caused poverty and the need for flexible responses.

The Johnson administration desired political revolution no more than the critics of Community Action. And while Indian Community Action *did not* revolutionize Indian affairs, it emerged from five years of conflict as the defining force in federal Indian policy. The state of federal-Indian relations by 1968 had been inconceivable two decades earlier. Yet, when Johnson left office in 1969, poverty remained. The life expectancy for Native Americans was forty-four years, two-thirds the national average; unemployment rates on Indian reservations averaged 38 percent; and infant mortality rates in Indian communities were ten times higher than the nation's as a whole.[123] Reservation schools and health facilities remained inadequate.[124] In these terms, the War on Indian Poverty fostered only modest improvements.

However, this is not to say that important changes did not occur. New responsibilities and increased funding breathed life into tribal governments. Local control of education programs such as Head Start and Upward Bound afforded opportunities to incorporate Indian history, language, and culture into curricula. Support for Indian law programs and the creation of Legal Services advanced the drive toward tribal self-determination and sovereignty. In the hands of some tribal councils,

Nelson Amendment and education programs brought women and the elderly back into the center of community life. In places like Oklahoma, Community Action contributed to the increased recognition that off- and nonreservation Indians were not "just another minority." Maximum feasible participation and local initiative provided Indian communities with the latitude necessary to effect these changes.

While "The Forgotten American" came late in Johnson's tenure, the comments on a draft of the message capture an important theme. "This message," the reviewer scribbled, "is primarily one of policy rather than program. We have a considerable range of programs for Indians. What is necessary is a clear and intelligent policy through which those programs can be focused. This message suggests that."[125] Nonetheless, Richard Nixon successfully exploited the Johnson administration's errant attempts to establish its formal policy statement. Consequently, his much heralded Presidential Message to Congress on Indian Affairs in 1970 has been equated with the federal policy of Indian self-determination.[126] In contrast, the Johnson administration assumes only a minor role in this era of "policy in transition," and little effort is given to unfold the four critically formative years between 1964 and 1968. Yet during these years a relatively obscure office, tucked deep within the Office of Economic Opportunity, transcended tremendous conflict to forge the policy of tribal self-determination. At the heart of "The Forgotten American," Nixon's message, and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, rested the philosophy of an Indian war.

NOTES

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2. Numerous scholars have noted the importance of the Johnson administration in this transition period, though most are cursory treatments. For some of the more extensive accounts, see Sar A. Levitan, *The Great Society's Poor Law: A New Approach to Poverty* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 263-70; Kenneth R. Philp, ed., *Indian Self-Rule: First-Hand Accounts of Indian-White Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan* (Chicago: Howe Brothers, 1986; Logan: Utah State University Press, 1995), 191-227; Sam Steiner, *The New Indians* (New York: Delta Publishing, 1968), 193-214; Robert L. Bee, *Crosscurrents Along the Colorado: The Impact of Government Policy on the Quechan Indians* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1981), 122-59; Robert L. Bee and George Pierre Castile, eds., *State and Reservation: New Perspectives on Federal Indian Policy* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1992), 137-86; D'Arcy McNickle, *Native American Tribalism: Indian Survivals and Renewals* (1973; reprint with a forward by Peter Iverson, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 113-26; Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indian*, Vol. 2 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 1087-1109; Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., *Red Power: The American Indians' Fight for Freedom* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971; Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 211-12; James S. Olson and Raymond Wilson, *Native Americans in the Twentieth Century* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 202-03; and Christopher Riggs, "Indians, Liberalism, and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, 1963-1969," Ph.D. diss (University of Colorado, Boulder, 1997).

3. For analyses of the termination policy, see Larry W. Burt, *Tribalism in Crisis: Federal Indian Policy, 1953-61* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982); and Donald L. Fixico, *Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986). For a good discussion of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 at the national level, see E. Fletcher McClellan, "The Politics of American Indian Self-Determination, 1958-75: The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975," Ph.D. diss (University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1988).

4. *The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, 1968-1969*, Book 1 (Washington D.C.: United Government Printing Office, 1970), 336.

5. Burt, *Tribalism in Crisis*, 66.

6. Allen J. Matusow, *The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s* (New York: Harper Torchbooks), 117, 121.

7. Lawrence Hauptman and Jack Campisi, "The Voice of the Eastern Indians: The American Indian Chicago Conference of 1961 and the Movement

for Federal Recognition," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 132:4 (1988): 329.

8. American Indian Chicago Conference, *The Voice of the American Indian: Declaration of Indian Purpose* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1961), 5-8.

9. *A Time for Action: A Selection from the Speeches and Writings of Lyndon B. Johnson, 1953-64* (New York: Atheneum; New York: Pocket Books, 1964), 173-74. Johnson would make a similar speech to the Conference on Women in the War on Poverty in which he also included Indian reservations. See James MacGregor Burns, ed., *To Heal and to Build: The Programs of President Lyndon B. Johnson* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 348-49.

10. Walter Wetzel to Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1-20-64, Ex In 11/22/63-2/29/64, Box 1, White House Central Files (hereafter, WHCF), Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (hereafter, LBJL).

11. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64*, Book 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1965), 149-50.

12. House Committee on Education and Labor, *Examination of the War on Poverty Program: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the War on Poverty Program on H.R. 10440*, Part 1, 88th Cong., 2nd sess. (17-20, March; 1-10, 13-14, April 1964), 313.

13. Ibid., 366.

14. Ibid.

15. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Economic Opportunity Act of 1964: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Poverty on S. 2642*, 88th Cong., 2nd sess. (17, 18, 23, and 25, June 1964), 122-23, 138-40.

16. Ibid., 138.

17. House Committee on Education and Labor, *Examination of the War on Poverty Program*, Part 1 (1964), 330, 347-48, 362-63.

18. Joint Economic Committee, *Toward Economic Development for Native American Communities: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee on Economy in Government*, Vol. 2, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1969), 411.

19. Address By Sargent Shriver, NCAI, Scottsdale, AZ, 11-5-65, "2. Shriver 1965," Office of Economic Opportunity, Box 8, Federal Records, LBJL, 5.

20. Ibid., 2.

21. "Wilson New Head of OEO Indian Section," *War Cry: Official Voice of the Pine Ridge OED Office* 1:4 (8 April 1966): 1.

22. Joint Economic Committee, *Toward Economic Development for Native American Communities*, Vol. 2, 373.

23. Chris Weeks to Sargent Shriver and Bernard Boutin, 1-6-65, "CAP January 1966," Box 8, Personal Papers of Bernard Boutin, LBJL.

24. Agenda Indians Meeting, Thursday, August 25, 1966, "Indians," Box 330, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL.

25. Guy B. Senese, *Self-Determination and the Social Education of Native Americans* (New York: Praeger, 1991), 53-60.

26. Ibid., 65-70; M. Annette Jaimes, "The Hollow Icon: An American Indian Analysis of the Kennedy Myth," *Wicazo Sa Review* 6:1 (Spring 1990): 36.

27. Senese, *Self-Determination*, 67-73.

28. Philleo Nash in Philp, ed., *Indian Self-Rule*, 132; McClellan, "The Politics of American Indian Self-Determination," 87-88; and James J. Rawls, *Chief Red Fox Is Dead: A History of Native Americans Since 1945* (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996), 59.

29. Resolution No. 4, NCAI 25th Annual Convention, Omaha, Nebraska, September 24-27, 1968, "NCAI Fund, Inc. (General Support) Spring-1967," 2S454, Box 47, Field Foundation Archives, 1940-1990 (hereafter, FFA), Center for American History (hereafter, CAH), University of Texas, Austin (hereafter, UTA); and Josephy, ed., *Red Power*, 67.

30. Christopher Riggs, "Indians, Liberalism, and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society," 113-18.

31. Memo for Joe Califano, "Indians," Box 330, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL; Richard Schifter to Walsh McDermott, 1-20-67, attached to Walsh McDermott to James Gaither, 1-23-67, "American Indians," Box 329, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL.

32. *NCAI Sentinel Bulletin* 9:2 (Late Winter 1967), attached to Joseph Carter to James R. Jones, 2-28-68, "Ex In 3/1/68-9/30/68," Ex In Gen In 11/22/63-8/20/64, Box 1, WHCF, LBJL.

33. Vine Deloria to Sol Tax, 1-20-67 attached to WPG to LEL, 1-27-67, "Ex In 10/5/64-2/29/68," Ex In Gen In 11/22/63-8/20/64, Box 1, WHCF, LBJL.

34. President's Message on Indians, draft, 1-26-67, attached to Joe Califano to Doug Cater, 1-27-67, "Panzer: Indian Message Response," Box 368, Office Files of Fred Panzer, LBJL.

35. Lee C. White to Joe Califano, 11-20-67, "Gaither: Indians General (3)," Box 15, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL.

36. Rawls, *Chief Red Fox Is Dead*, 59-60; and S. Lyman Tyler, *A History of Indian Policy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, BIA, 1973), 198.

37. Quoted in Robert L. Bennett to Agnes Dick, 5-10-66, "Gen In/M," Ex/In A-Z Gen In/A-M, Box 3, WHCF, LBJL. In 1954, the Zimmerman Plan was formalized in House Report 2680. For more on the Zimmerman Report, see Fixico, *Termination and Relocation*, 33; and James Officer in Philp, ed., *Indian Self-Rule*, 114-15.

38. McClellan, "The Politics of American Indian Self-Determination," 83-7; Rawls, *Chief Red Fox Is Dead*, 59; Resolution 2 and 6, NCAI 24th Annual Convention, Portland, Oregon, October 2-6, 1967, "Ex In 3/1/68-9/30/68," Ex In Gen In 11/22/63-8/20/64, Box 1, WHCF, LBJL; and Resolution 11, NCAI 25th Annual Convention, Omaha, Nebraska, September 24-7, 1968, "NCAI Fund, Inc. (General Support) Spring-1967," 2S454, Box 47, FFA, CAH, UTA.

39. Philleo Nash to Mrs. Sanford Fowler, 7-21-64, and Robert Bennett to Agnes Dick, 5-10-66, "Gen In/M," Ex/In A-Z Gen In/A-M, Box 3, WHCF,

LBJL.

40. Vine Deloria to Leslie Dunbar, 4-30-66, "NCAI Fund, Inc. Spring-Summer 1966," 2T53, Box 113, FFA, CAH, UTA. Unless otherwise noted, the Santa Fe meeting draws from McClellan, "The Politics of Indian Self-Determination," 94-6; and Steiner, *The New Indians*, 251-61.

41. Vine Deloria to Sol Tax, 1-20-67, attached to WPG to LEL, 1-27-67, "Ex In 10/5/64-2/29/68," Ex In Gen In 11/22/63-8/20/64, Box 1, WHCF, LBJL.

42. Stewart Udall to Joe Califano, 4-27-67, "American Indians," Box 329, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL.

43. Agenda Indians Meeting, Thursday, August 25, 1966, "Indians," Box 330, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL.

44. Stewart Udall to Joseph Califano, 4-27-67; and John Gardner to LBJ, 3-22-67, "American Indians," Box 329, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL.

45. Meeting on Indians, Thursday, August 25, 1966, "American Indians," Box 329, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL.

46. The members and their affiliations were as follows: Charles Abrams (Urban Planning Department, Columbia University), Lewis Douglas (Mutual Insurance of New York), Everett Hagen (Professor of Economics and Political Science, MIT), Bruce Jessup (California State Department of Public Health), W.W. Keeler (Chairman of the Executive Committee, Phillips Petroleum Company), Richard Lasko (Technical Adviser, Battelle Institute), Walsh McDermott (Chairman, Department of Public Health and Preventative Medicine, Cornell University Medical College), Robert Roessel (Director, Rough Rock Navajo Demonstration School), Richard Schifter (Strasser, Speigelberg, Fried, Frank, and Kampelman, Attorneys at Law), Milton Stern (Union Carbide Corporation), Herbert Striner (Director of Program Development, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research), and Sol Tax (Professor of Anthropology, University of Chicago). Members of Task Force on Indian Affairs, "Indians," Box 976, Office Files of John Macy, LBJL.

47. A Free Choice Program for American Indians: Report of the President's Task Force on Indian Affairs, December 1966, "Pricing Files: Indians [2 of 2]," Box 10, Office Files of John E. Robson and Stanford G. Ross, LBJL, 3, 10.

48. Ibid., 9.

49. Ibid., 3.

50. L.W. Douglas to Walsh McDermott, 1-3-67, "Pricing Files: Indians [1 of 2]," Box 10, Office Files of John E. Robson and Stanford G. Ross, LBJL.

51. Richard Schifter to Walsh McDermott, 1-20-67, attached to Walsh McDermott to James Gaither, 1-23-67, "American Indians," Box 329, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL.

52. Memo for Joe Califano, 12-30-66, "Indians," Box 330, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL.

53. Ibid.

54. Notes, n/d, Box 10, Office Files of John E. Robson and Stanford G. Ross, LBJL.

55. Bee in Bee and Castile, eds., *State and Reservation*, 147.

56. Rebecca Robbins, "The Forgotten American: A Foundation for Contemporary American Indian Self-Determination," *Wicazo Sa Review* 6:1 (1990): 30.

57. Report of the Interagency Task Force on American Indians, October 23, 1967, "Indians 1968," Box 142, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL, 33.

58. Ibid., 35; Task Force Report, "Indians 1968," Box 61, Office Files of James Gaither, LBJL.

59. National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty, *Rural Poverty: Hearings Before the National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty, Tucson, Arizona*, 26-7, January 1967 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967), 155.

60. For another testimony in a similar vein, see Statement of Benito Garcia (Papago), ibid., 166.

61. Statement of Leonard C. Burch (Southern Ute), ibid., 385.

62. For criticisms of Indian Community Action or OEO Indian programs in general, see Human Sciences Research, Inc., *A Comprehensive Evaluation of OEO Community Action Programs on Six Selected American Indian Reservations* (September 1966); Donald L. Parman, *Indians and the West in the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 151-52; Senese, *Self-Determination*, 87-114; and Steiner, *The New Indians*, 203-07.

63. HSR, *Comprehensive Evaluation*, 278; Ian Traquair Ball, "Institution Building for Development: OEO Community Action Programs on Two North Dakota Indian Reservations," master's thesis (Indiana University, 1968), 103; and NACRP, *Rural Poverty, Tucson, Arizona*, 385-86.

64. It consisted of the Nambe, Picuris, Pojoaque, Santa Clara, Taos, Tesque, San Juan, and San Ildefanso pueblos. HSR, *Comprehensive Evaluation*, 244.

65. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Examination of the War on Poverty: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty*, Part 3, 90th Cong., 1st sess., Albuquerque, New Mexico, 24 April 1967, 1120-121.

66. Ibid., 167, 373-76, and 392; HSR, *Comprehensive Evaluation*, 111; Ball, "Institution Building," 126; and NACRP, *Rural Poverty, Tucson, Arizona*, 124.

67. Prepared Statement of Vine Deloria, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, Part 3, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1085; and Josephy, ed., *Red Power*, 152-53.

68. Josephy, ed., *Red Power*, 111-112; and Edgar Cahn, ed., *Our Brother's Keeper: The Indian in White America* (New York: New Community Press, 1969), 142-63.

69. Prepared Statement of Vine Deloria, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, Part 3, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1084.

70. Alonzo Spang (Northern Cheyenne), ibid., 1130-131.

71. OEO Public Affairs Release, 1-27-67, microfilm, Roll 31, FG 11-15, Federal Records, LBJL.

72. The Office of Economic Opportunity During the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, November 1963-January 1969 (hereafter, OEO Administrative History), "Volume I, Part Two, Narrative History, [1 of 3]," Box 1, Administrative History of the Office of Economic Opportunity, LBJL, 161-64.

73. NACRP, *Rural Poverty, Tucson, Arizona*, 167.

74. OEO Public Affairs Release, 10-28-66, microfilm, Roll 31, FG 11-15, Federal Records, LBJL; OEO Administrative History, "Volume I, Part Two, Narrative History, [2 of 3]," Box 1, Administrative History of the Office of Economic Opportunity, LBJL, 402-06.

75. HSR, *Comprehensive Evaluation*, 56; Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn, *Oglala Sioux Model Reservation Program*, "Oglala Sioux Model Reservation Program," Box 4, Office Files of Matthew Nimetz, LBJL; and The Gila River Indian Community, "Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju, Progress Report the First Twelve Months" (July 1967).

76. The administrative groups for the ICACs were the Indian Education Center at ASU, the Institute for Indian Studies at USD, and the Bureau of Indian Services at UU. Arizona State served Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and California; the University of Utah served Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming; the University of South Dakota served North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan. OEO Public Affairs Release, 8-16-65, microfilm, Roll 31, FG 11-15, Federal Records, LBJL; and Tyler, *A History of Indian Policy*, 211.

77. Robert Roessel, Jr., ed., *Indian Communities in Action* (Tempe: Bureau of Publications, Arizona State University, 1967), 4; and Alan L. Sorkin, *American Indians and Federal Aid* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1971), 166.

78. Larry L. Berg and John L. Sorenson, *Evaluation of Indian Community Action Programs at Arizona State University, University of South Dakota, and University of Utah* (Santa Barbara: General Research Corp., October 1967), 7, 23-5; and Indian Community Action Project Consortium, *1968 Progress Report of the Indian Community Action Projects ASU-USD-UU* (1968), 35.

79. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, Part 3, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1122.

80. Ibid., 1118.

81. In regard to the Papagos, Oglala Sioux, Salt River Pima and Maricopa, Gros Ventre, Santo Domingo Pueblo, White Earth Anishinaabeg, Standing Rock Sioux, and the Cree, see HSR, *Comprehensive Evaluation*, 101, 110, 136, 177, 306-07; Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn, *Oglala Sioux Model Reservation Program*, "Oglala Sioux Model Reservation Program," Box 4, Office Files of Matthew Nimetz, LBJL, 47; Päivi H. Hoikkala, "Mothers and Community Builders: Salt River Pima and Maricopa Women in Community Action," in Nancy Shoemaker, ed., *Negotiators of Change: Historical Perspectives on Native American Women* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 218-20; Statement of Agustin Aguilar, NACRP, *Rural Poverty, Tucson, Arizona*, 162; and Ball, "Institution Building," 75-6, 145.

82. Loretta Fowler, *Shared Symbols, Contested Meanings: Gros Ventres Culture and History, 1778-1984* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 115-16.

83. Ibid., 117, 124.

84. Ibid., 144-45.

85. Ibid., 195.

86. Comptroller General of the United States, *Effectiveness and Administration of the Community Action Program Administered by the Gila River Indian Community Under Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964* (July 11, 1969), 27-9; and Statement of Agustin Aguilar (Santo Domingo), NACRP, *Rural Poverty, Tucson, Arizona*, 158.

87. Statement Submitted by Marcus Coriz (Santo Domingo), NACRP, *Rural Poverty, Tucson, Arizona*, 387.

88. Margaret Connell-Szasz, *Education and the American Indian: The Road to Self-Determination Since 1928* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977), 167.

89. Ibid.; and Reports by Federal Departments on Plans to Implement Presidential Message of March 6, "Conference File: Outside D.C. Conference of National Council on Indian Opportunity, Albuquerque, New Mexico, June 5, 1968," Box 55, Personal Papers of Bertrand Harding, LBJL.

90. Reports by Federal Departments, "Conference File," Box 55, Personal Papers of Bertrand Harding, LBJL; and Philp, ed., *Indian Self-Rule*, 221.

91. Alfonso Ortiz (San Juan Pueblo) in Philp, ed., *Indian Self-Rule*, 221; and Agustin Aguilar (Santo Domingo), NACRP, *Rural Poverty, Tucson, Arizona*, 158.

92. Statement of Mamie Sizemore, NACRP, *Rural Poverty, Tucson, Arizona*, 172.

93. Resolution No. 26, NCAI 25th Annual Convention, Omaha, Nebraska, September 24-7, 1968, "NCAI Fund (Miscellaneous) 1966-68," 2S454, Box 47, FFA, CAH, UTA; and Roessel, ed., *Indian Communities in Action*, 205-07, 219-20.

94. Statement of Domingo Montoya (Sandia Pueblo), Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Examination of the War on Poverty*, Part 3, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1115.

95. For an outstanding treatment of cultural brokerage, see Margaret Connell-Szasz, ed., *Between Indian and White Worlds: The Cultural Broker* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994); see also L.G. Moses and Raymond Wilson, eds., *Indian Lives: Essays on Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Native American Leaders* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985).

96. Quoted in Rawls, *Chief Red Fox Is Dead*, 95.

97. Hoikkala, "Mothers and Community Builders," 214, 227.

98. Ibid., 221-22, 223, 227-28.

99. Robert Bergman, Joseph Muskrat, Sol Tax, Oswald Werner, and Garry Witherspoon, *Problems of Cross-Cultural Educational Research and Evaluation: The Rough Rock Demonstration School*, eds. Arthur Harkins and Richard Woods (Minneapolis: Training Center for Community Programs in coordination with the Office of Community Programs Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, 1969), 5.

100. Ibid., 5, 19.

101. Olson and Wilson, *Native Americans in the Twentieth Century*, 202.

102. Connell-Szasz, *Education and the American Indian*, 172; and Roessel, ed., *Indian Communities in Action*, 204-15.

103. Quoted in Connell-Szasz, *Education and the American Indian*, 173.

104. Navajo Community College Brochure, "Dine, Inc. (Rough Rock Demonstration School) Spring-1968," 2T2, Box 111, FFA, CAH, UTA; Sar A. Levitan and William B. Johnston, *Indian Giving: Federal Programs for Native Americans* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 43; and Philp, ed., *Indian Self-Rule*, 219.

105. Connell-Szasz, *Education and the American Indian*, 178; and Olson and Wilson, *Native Americans*, 203.

106. Connell-Szasz, *Education and the American Indian*, 152-53, 157-58, 171, 176; and McNickle, *Native American Tribalism*, 121.

107. OEO Public Affairs Release, 3-7-68, microfilm, Roll 31, FG 11-15, Federal Records, LBJL; and Reports by Federal Departments, "Conference File," Box 55, Personal Papers of Bertrand Harding, LBJL. Margaret Connell-Szasz puts the number of Indian lawyers in 1966 at twelve. Connell-Szasz, *Education and the American Indian*, 167.

108. Riggs, "Indians, Liberalism, and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, 1963-1969," 345-46.

109. OEO Administrative History, "Volume I, Part Two, Narrative History, [1 of 3]," Box 1, Administrative History of the Office of Economic Opportunity, LBJL, 284.

110. OEO Public Affairs Release, 1-12-66, microfilm, Roll 31, FG 11-15, Federal Records, LBJL.

111. For a good example of this, see "An Explanation of Termination," (Santa Rosa, California: California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., 1968).

112. George M. Lubick, "Peterson Zah: A Progressive Outlook and a Traditional Style," in Moses and Wilson, eds., *Indian Lives*, 194-97.

113. Ibid., 196-97.

114. "Problems in Finding out the Peculiar Needs of Indians in Poverty," attached to Lois Gatchell to LaDonna Harris, 2-18-66, Box 282, Folder 27, Fred R. Harris Collection, Carl Albert Center for Congressional Research and Studies (hereafter CACCRS), University of Oklahoma (hereafter, OU).

115. Alice Marriot to Congressman John Jarman, 11-2-66, Box 53, Folder 34, Carl Albert Collection, Departmental Files, CACCRS, OU; Statement of Clyde Warrior, NACRP, *Rural Poverty, Memphis, Tennessee*, 2-3, February 1967, 151-52; and James L. McElrath, A Multi-County Community Action Program Planning for Action, August 1968, Box 72, "OEO (1968) CAP-Program Data," Carl Albert Collection, Departmental Files, CACCRS, OU, 8.

116. Fred Harris to Sargent Shriver, 7-15-65, Box 8, Folder 14A, Fred Harris Collection, CACCRS, OU.

117. LaDonna Harris in Philp, ed., *Indian Self-Rule*, 222.

118. Sanford L. Kravitz to Theodore Berry, 5-9-66, Box 283, Folder 12, Fred R. Harris (LaDonna Harris), CACCRS, OU; and Kay M. Haws to LaDonna Harris, n/d, Box 283, Folder 1, Fred R. Harris (LaDonna Harris), CACCRS, OU.

119. "Oklahomans for Indian Opportunity, Incorporated, Rural Development Program Proposal for Refunding Grant, Dec. 1, 1969-November 20, 1970," attached to clw to Mr. A, n/d, Box 78, "OEO-Oklahomans for Indian Opportunity," Carl Albert Collection, Departmental Files, CACCRS, OU, 4.

120. Emma Gross, *Contemporary Federal Policy Toward American Indians*, Contributions to Ethnic Studies, No. 25 (New York: Greenwood, 1989), 54-5; and Philp, ed. *Indian Self-Rule*, 221; and Lubick, "Peterson Zah," 191, 194-201.

121. Understanding Pueblo Indians, "NCAI Fund, Inc. (AIPC) Nov. 1966," Box 50, FFA, CAH, UTA. It should be noted that during the Senate hearings in 1967, Montoya would deliver one of the most eloquent discussions of the distinct circumstances of Indian poverty. For that statement, see Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty*, Part 3, 1113-116.

122. Resolution No. 1, NCAI 25th Annual Convention, Omaha, Nebraska, September 24-27, 1968, "NCAI Fund, (Misc.) 1966-1968," Box 47, FFA, CAH, UTA.

123. Levitan, *The Great Society's Poor Law*, 264.

124. An influential account of reservation conditions, published shortly after Johnson left office, is Cahn, ed., *Our Brother's Keeper*.

125. Ex SP 2-3/1968/IN, Indian Message 3/6/68, Box 122, WHCF, LBJL.

126. For a text of Nixon's message, see "Message to Congress on Indian Affairs," in Josephy, ed., *Red Power*, 213-30. For specific references to OEO, see pages 219, 225, and 227.