Corporate Empire: Fordism and the Making of Immigrant Detroit

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture and the Designated Emphasis in Global Metropolitan Studies in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley

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Abstract

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This dissertation examines the imperial reach of a major American corporate power in the first third of the twentieth century. With the Ford Motor Company (FMC) and its social programs at the center of the study, I trace the paths of commercial images and forms of spatial organization that were essential to the workings of Fordism. As a lesser-known aspect of the company’s global dealings, I focus on the company’s transnational exchanges with the people and regions of the greater Middle East and examine the formulation of Fordist strategies as immigrant groups from these regions traveled to and settled into the city of Detroit.

The first half of the study begins with Henry Ford’s view of the world, as his company produced some of the earliest commercial images of American automotive enterprise in emerging markets, as early as the First War. These visual devices advocated for the use of Ford products by equating American technology with modernity, civility, and Americanism, forging the cornerstones of the Ford promise. The messages were distributed worldwide, including the regions that the FMC collectively termed “the markets of the Orient,” (Egypt, Turkey, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and India) as a means to civilize cultures and sell Ford products. As immigrant laborers followed Ford commodities and commercial appeals to their point of origin, Detroit, they found Ford’s promise refashioned as social engineering programs for workers arriving to work in the newly made industrial capital.

By the 1920s, Ford’s Detroit was mapped through lines of racial and ethnic exclusion by the city municipality, alongside the backing of its industrial giants. With the FMC as the principle corporate actor, the second half of the study shows how the factory, worker home, and city became tools of social control for the regulation of labor and enforcement of Fordist principles. Through an archival and visual analysis of the FMC’s social, filmic and domestic programs, I understand space as a vital mode of contestation and subject making for both the corporation and immigrant groups. More broadly, the dissertation contends that Ford’s coupling of social engineering programs with spatial organization allowed his company (and Detroit) to emerge as a major center of national and cultural power, even during moments of intense economic and global uncertainty.
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Introduction

Our Oriental employees, namely, Armenians, Indians, Syrians, Kurds, and Turks are equally benefitted by the share of the profits. The most of these people live in groups in a house, having their own cooks, and kept by their own nationality. These boarding houses have been decidedly improved since our investigation. However, a majority of these boarders, after taking their meal *al-Orientale* [sic], are rooming in American, respectable furnished houses, paying on an average of $2.00 to $3.00 per week. The profit-sharing plan made these men ambitious to save their money and taught them the first moral lesson of how to be useful to humanity. So most of these [men] are members and contributors to different benevolent societies. In many cases they are the sole support of families in the old country, and are sending their money for their support. These men in the shop cling to their respective duties as children attach themselves to toys. Regardless of hard or easy work, there is a smile on their faces.

This is only a very short cut of what the profit sharing plan has done during the last eight months.

M.G. Torossian, Ford Sociological Agent.

*Human Interest Story, Number Eight.*

On January 25, 1914, M.G. Torossian was given what he considered a herculean task. Just two weeks after the launch of the Ford Motor Company’s (FMC) profit-sharing plan, he was told to investigate the homes of the company’s “Asiatic” employees in Detroit. After his first visit, he described the daily investigations as limited to the parameters of a few blocks, or a cluster of homes, and the employees as “living in the slums, in overcrowded conditions, and in filthy tenements.” Investigator Torossian would enter these houses with a fistful of checklists and question workmen about everyday things such as daily hygiene, marital sanctity, spending habits, and use of English in the home; an impartial set of requirements instituted by the newly formed Sociological Department in 1914 for the corporation to determine which Ford workers qualified for their share of the 5-dollar profits. At the end of the week, Torossian wrote a report of his observations and included his opinion on the effects that profit sharing had on the living conditions and character of the company’s foreign workforce. What was left unwritten in the reports, however, was that he himself was a recent immigrant from Cairo, Egypt.

Torossian’s position of authority as a new immigrant within a rapidly expanding American corporation gives rise to a series of questions: what conditions, at the outset of

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1 “Profit Sharing Plan Testimonials” in Acc. 1098, Benson Ford Research Center (BFRC). Emphasis in text.
2 Ibid.
the First War, led to the emigration of “Asiatic” laborers to Detroit? How did their experience compare to other migrant and immigrant workers in Detroit, and how did some climb in rank while others did not? Moreover, what was FMC’s purpose in instituting industrial “welfare” programs that adopted progressive values and documented the intimate lives and living conditions of its foreign workers? What advantage did this give to Henry Ford and his Ford Motor Company? All of these questions have a place in Torassian’s story, whose circumstances unravel over the course of the next several chapters. His story, like many other Eastern European, Hispanic, and East and South Asian immigrant workers who found themselves in Ford’s Detroit, is complex and filled with tensions that are linked to the way in which American industry, with the Ford Motor Company arguably at the forefront, operated simultaneously as a social and industrial enterprise.

Broaddrily speaking, this is a study about the imperial reach and form of a major American corporation in the early third of the twentieth century. It focuses on the Ford Motor Company and the social and material worlds shaped by the Fordist philosophy, with an interest in the transnational exchanges that took place between Detroit and the people and regions of the greater Middle East. As such, the chapters oscillate between the global and local, beginning with Henry Ford’s visualization of dominant and emerging world markets, which followed the path of labor migrations and traveling commercial images, and ultimately found form in the built environment. Urban forms and images produced by the company are read as visual evidence of the company’s activities, and are found in advertisements, worker homes, industrial exhibitions, the design of sales branches and factories, and the footprint of the industrial city. The study relies on these scales, in part, to highlight how space, geography, and the built environment were integral to the spread and success of Fordism in the moments leading up to the Second World War. The second half of the dissertation more explicitly shows how architecture and the city were used as modes of social control for the regulation of labor and Fordist principles in the company’s home base, Detroit. The overarching argument contends that Ford’s coupling of social engineering programs with spatial organization allowed the company (and Detroit) to emerge as a major center of national and cultural power, even during moments of intense economic and global uncertainty.

Integral to the underlying structure of this analysis are the ways in which dimensions of the global and local encompass and inform each other. Scholars of globalization have been effective in highlighting how cutting edge technologies have had the effect of making and remaking global geographies and social life, in inclusive and exclusive ways. Social theorists, in particular, focus on the sources that have altered the relationship between social space and time, ranging from the extraction of labor and raw material between core and peripheral countries in the development of the modern world system (Immanuel Wallerstein), to the more recent accelerated movement of capital (David Harvey), global risk management (Anthony Giddens), communication networks and flows of information (Manuel Castells), and mobilities of labor in the rise of global
cities and nation-states (Saskia Sassen). Despite differences in how scholars identify root sources of globalization, most agree that the transition to a post-Fordist or flexible mode of economic production and consumption has been a major determining factor of the alterations between space and time, loosely dating to the 1970s. Substantial debates by economic historians and geographers serve to characterize this shift and the advancements that followed in varying ways, yet a focus on the physical forms and images that shaped the Fordist era itself and the continuities and visual threads that extend from one period to another, have been less commonly addressed. The following chapters build on these debates by paying close attention to the spatial and temporal shifts in social life that were caused during the Fordist era by corporate and state actors who developed and executed Ford’s economic/social strategies and those whom they actively engaged.

The intention, then, is to apply a spatial understanding of globalization to the rise of Fordism to show that, perhaps, the making and rise of the “global city” as we know it can be traced back to the Fordist impulse on society and turn-of-the-century industrial urbanization. This is where the global meets the local, and vice versa. Urban and spatial sites are drawn together in this study, as sociologist Henri Lefebvre writes, through social practices. Society (laborers, corporate and state actors) and space are about each other and they contain each other, hence producing what Lefebvre calls “social space”. The production of space, in this sense, consists of everyday practices, representations, and symbols that participate in the production, reproduction, and maintenance of power dynamics and political relationships. Harvey draws on Lefebvre’s spatial practices to link processes of globalization (time-space compression) to the rise of modernism as an exercise of social power and cultural transformation. He identifies Fordist modes of production, and its shift to more flexible forms of accumulation, as building on and contributing to the “aesthetics of modernism,” the international spread of economic regulation, and a geopolitical reconfiguration that placed the United States at the helm. Moreover, he is keen to note that what drew Ford apart from Taylorism and other forms of economic organization, was that Ford explicitly recognized “that mass production meant mass consumption, a new system of the reproduction of labour [sic] power, a new politics of labour control and management, a new aesthetics and psychology, in short, a new kind of rationalized, modernist, and populist democratic society.” However, what is
less clear, and what this study grapples with, is how these processes, and the spaces in which they took place, brought together and affected the powerful and non-powerful alike.

This dissertation is situated in the real and the visual, across continents, cities, factories, and homes. But the story it tells is just a fraction of a longer, more expansive history of “quiet” empire. It shows how a corporate enterprise, under the guise of civility and nationalism, utilized goods, land, and labor to expand into established and nascent industrial markets. It seeks to highlight the ways in which the force of global capital placed and displaced people, and shaped their identities and environments. For this reason, part of this story takes place outside of Detroit and traces the paths of FMC commodities and commercial images, and those who manufactured and consumed them. Even these trajectories were contained within the unseen corporate parameters that shaped the city. In the company’s appeal to people and cultures in the margins of emerging markets, many were drawn to Detroit by the promise of its products. The city, then, became the meeting point for identities, capital, and culture, making it the strongest argument for what Jane M. Jacob calls the “spatial edge” of corporate empire.

0.1 Situating the Argument

Ford’s Profit-sharing plan and the Sociological Department, both created in 1914 in the name of corporate welfare, were powerful articulations of the merging of social and economic capital. They offered workers, regardless of color or creed, a stable five-dollar wage (the highest offered by any industry at the time), and a way for the company to reduce worker turnover by requiring that they met social conditions (hygiene, work ethic, English fluency, etc.) laid out by the Sociological Department. Together, the profit-sharing plan and the department are broadly recognized as the symbolic initiation of Fordism, and form the core around which this study evolves. The department, about which there are few comprehensive histories written, was wholly consumed with all aspects of the Ford brand, including the recruitment and monitoring of its foreign workers, the distribution of shares of profit, and the company’s global marketing. While

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8 This research builds on a number of studies that examine how (American) dynastic, political, and corporate alliances have utilized the city to claim empires “quietly,” as opposed to more violent military interventions. See for example Gray A. Brechin, Imperial San Francisco: Urban Power, Earthly Ruin, 2007 ed., California Studies in Critical Human Geography 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006) and Mona Domosh, American Commodities in an Age of Empire (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).

9 Jane M. Jacobs, Edge of Empire: Postcolonialism and the City (London: Routledge, 1996), 1-12. Though, Jacobs is primarily concerned with the “cultural politics of place and identity in contemporary First World cities.” I am interested in following this line of thinking regarding the co-option of space through corporate or commercial practices to create diasporic, or what she calls “Fourth World,” cities.

10 In-depth examinations of the FMC Sociological Department exist primarily in the form of articles, chapters, or undergraduate theses. See Kristy Lambe, Getting the Ducks Out of the Bathtub: The Hygiene and Americanization Campaigns of the Ford Sociological Department, 1914-1921 (University of Michigan
proving useful to the company’s success in first decade of its run, the programs began to falter by the early 1920s, only to be revived as education and welfare programs during the Great Depression, and ultimately dissolving in the mid-1950s. Fordist historians are sure to underscore how fundamental these programs were to the workings of Ford’s philosophy – yet, their accounts only preliminarily account for the many (non-European) immigrant workers who were recruited by industry to fuel the productivity of the assembly-line in the absence of European or “native” American workers during the First war.11

At a basic level, these “social engineering” programs allowed FMC middle management to meticulously collect data about its employees, and calculate the relationship between worker efficiency, production, and profits. But they were also the primary tools by which the company simultaneously advertised itself and administered welfare, while internally monitoring its strict social and spatial requirements. While a primary aim of this study is to highlight how these social programs utilized the built environment to enforce these requirements, and how buildings and cities, in turn, informed the spatialization of Fordism, a corresponding aim is to attend to the ways in which non-capitalist economies and not yet de-colonized nations and peoples were drawn into the wider net Ford cast around Detroit. A notable gap in the historical documentation of Ford’s global expansion, for example, includes the many attempts that the company made to enter into non-Atlantic markets at the start of the First War, invariably through in-house commercial advertisements and publications. This is what draws the present study apart from existing literatures on the growth of Ford, Fordism, and American enterprise at the turn of the twentieth century: a focus on the FMC’s targeting (and categorical homogenizing) of regions and people in the greater Middle East at a time when few other western enterprises were able to do so, and the transnational forging of cities and subjects under the banner of Fordism.

The unfolding of the FMC’s commercial appeals in domestic and international realms had, in no uncertain terms, decided effects on the way the world saw the United States and how Americans saw themselves. On the surface, FMC commercial activity in non-US markets as early as 1904 gave the company a slight edge over competing American enterprises. At the same time, however, the project of Fordism was also tied to

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the formation and formulation of Americanism, which was deeply rooted in commercialism and consumer culture. The launch of the Ford brand coincided with the Americanization movement of the 1910s, but had been used years prior as a term to describe the influence that American-made products had on popular culture, technology, business, and politics internationally.\(^\text{12}\) Antonio Gramsci, commenting on “Fordism” and Americanism as a classical example of hegemony, noted that pairing the two resulted in “the biggest collective effort to date to create with unprecedented speed, and with a consciousness of purpose unmatched in history, a new type of worker and a new type of man”.\(^\text{13}\) In this sense, the difference between Americanism as an early 20\(^{th}\) century political ideology, and Americanization as a national project that was meant bring immigrants and foreign cultures into alignment with the dominant American cultural paradigm, came into close contact through business and commerce. This study draws on the wealth of scholarship produced about these terms and their rich social and economic dimensions,\(^\text{14}\) and it also hopes to extend the frame of Americanism and Americanization to include American involvement in markets and regions that existed outside of the Transatlantic and those who were drawn to the United States by the promise of those narratives.

By the late nineteenth century, a number of companies participated in promoting industrialism through the idea of Americanism. Geographer Mona Domosh effectively shows how the production of visual and verbal foreign worlds in commercial advertisements positioned the United States as a dominant producer, and foreign people and nations as subjugated consumers.\(^\text{15}\) These advertisements, she notes, engaged in a narrative that sought to racialize and feminize a large portion of the world over which American corporations had economic dominance, and was “as much about ‘civilization’ and consumption as it [was] about conquest and production.”\(^\text{16}\) Likewise, the FMC’s development of a Hollywood-style film studio was an integral part of this project. It distributed moving images about Ford technology, the workers who made them, and the cities that they transformed, to willing consumers in a form that sought to educate and entertain. The ability of film, as urban historian Nezar AlSayyad writes, “to capture images, process them, and then project them to the public contributed substantially to the

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\(^\text{12}\) For example, the term was used shortly after the FMC’s incorporation of Ford-Canada in 1904 in regards to the efficiency of the Ford assembly-line system. See also: Samuel E. Moffett, *The Americanization of Canada* (New York, 1907).


\(^\text{16}\) Ibid, 5.
making of the modern.”¹⁷ Ford films, produced and disseminated through a medium that the company itself helped to innovate, ingeniously attached ideas of a more moral, civil America to technologies that were rapidly transforming the viewer’s temporal relationship with the industrial city.

In this sense, the FMC can be seen as at the brink of a new frontier in advancing ideas of industrial Americanism and national identity, which were forged through men, images, and the built environment. As the international circulation of Ford commodities and advertisements conjured up images of the American melting pot, efficiency, and progress, at home, they also had the effect of shaping people, places, and imaginations around a more exclusionary national identity. The crux of this study arises in the interstices of these moments; between the act of selling American commodities abroad and the extraction of cheap global labor to manufacture those very products when Euro-American labor waned during periods of war. The commercial narrative of Americanism abroad depended on the efficiency and progress of migrant and immigrant workers who formed the backbone of American industry. In turn, the success of Ford and Fordism was part of a manufactured unified national identity, that triggered streams of migrations from the American south and “global South” to northern cities, fueling divisions, flaring tensions, and leaving a lasting mark on American industrial centers.

The latter half of this study turns back towards Detroit to examine the city as a site for these intersections. I draw on scholarship produced by urban historians and sociologists on the relationship between labor/immigration, the social construction of race, and the architecture of segregation in American cities. The semantics of the American “ghetto,” for example, have deep roots in the relationship between migrant and immigrant labor and the city. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Progressive Era coincided with the Great Migration, the Great War, and an explosion in American manufacturing to drastically shift the racial composition of cities, and the term came to include all inner-city districts where newcomers, lower-class immigrants from Southeastern Europe, and African Americans gathered.¹⁸ Towards the middle of the century, however, the racial politics of labor organizing changed with the coming of welfare capitalism and new forms of solidarity and exclusion along ethnic and racial lines.¹⁹ Although industrial jobs offered migrating black workers new economic opportunities, racism consistently denied them the ability to develop an ethnic “mass

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culture” along the same lines. The concept of the ghetto went through further iterations that sought to keep up with the shifting relationship between race and the city, ranging from race-based to labor- or class-based: Oscar Lewis wrote of a growing “culture of poverty,” while others, like Kenneth Clark sought out structural causes, claiming that America’s “dark ghetto’s” are “economic colonies.” The deindustrialization of industrial centers further gave rise to a set of literatures that shed light on institutional racism and spatial seclusions particular to the black urban experience in America. William Julius Wilson’s description of the most disadvantaged of these communities, the “urban underclass,” were those who were left out of the mainstream labor force by the economic restructuring of the inner-city. Dougal Massey and Nancy Denton bear further on Wilson’s and others arguments by highlighting the significance of segregation in the making of the underclass. Others, like Loïc Wacquant, have argued that the joint withdrawal of the market and state as backed by public policies of racial separation resulted in a “peculiar” type of urbanization, the “hyperghetto,” that is shaped by the contemporary carceral state.

These twentieth century formulations of “ghettoization” can be seen as bound to the design and subsequent disintegration of the Fordist economic paradigm. The systems of urban governance that perpetuated social segregation and urban inequality in the late 1800s slowly found their way into corporate hands as an extension of the welfare state for industrial workers. In fact, urban and industrial historians have shown, in varying ways, that corporate towns and industrial landscapes were designed to implement the social devices that were linked to progressive values and the efficiency movement.

Architectural historian Margaret Crawford describes how nineteenth and twentieth century company towns were carefully designed by professionals to reflect the prevailing social and economic needs of their industrial sponsors. The paternalistic values of the nineteenth century, for example, were reflected in plans that sought to impose social order and control, whereas welfare capitalist schemes (spurred by the Pullman strikes)

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24 See Loïc Wacquant, Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality (Cambridge; Malden, MA; Polity, 2008); Loïc Wacquant, “Deadly Symbiosis When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh” in Punishment & Society 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2001), 95–133.

sought to attract and improve the worker through Garden City-inspired planning, didactic architectural styles, and raised housing standards. The decentralization of the industry, as landscape historian Louise Mozingo argues, led to the dispersion of the corporate town into corporate campuses and parks situated in the leafy green suburbs outside of cities, resulting in a “pastoral landscape.”

The harkening of American business planners to Garden City ideals associated “greenness with goodness” and enabled the corporation to insert itself into the pastoral suburbs and coopt the moral order it implied. However, even the postwar disintegration of corporate capitalism and its physical refashioning among the lakes and meadows of the American suburb had deep roots in pre-1920s industrialism and its affiliation with City Beautiful aesthetics, as I show through the example of Henry Ford and his relentless efforts to link industrialism with social progress through design.

Lingering for a moment in the postwar era, we see that the suburbanization of industry triggered, in simple terms that require complication, “white flight” and the swelling of white suburbs around a black/low-income inner core. A slew of recent historical studies on postwar American industrial cities and race work to structure and complicate these arguments, often reaching back to the 1920s to locate initial processes of deindustrialization and the urban crises that followed. Robert Self, in his account of postwar Oakland, argues that many of these crises were borne out of the racial inequalities spurred by the New Deal and Great Society liberalism. Self breathes life into the struggles of black communities to fight for urban rights, and by doing so, shows more clearly how the city and suburb functioned as part of one metropolitan system. More broadly, Self creates a portrait of a mid-sized industrial city that links it to industrial giants like Detroit in the 20s and 30s, and while it neither failed nor succeeded to the extent of its counterparts, it still encountered the social and economic strife that came with the promise of American industrialism. The effect of this promise in postwar Detroit was more pronounced, as Thomas Sugrue demonstrates in one of the most influential urban histories of the city. He draws on Massey, Denton, and others to show that the discriminatory housing policies and redlining tactics of the 50s and 60s laid the framework for an enduring residential (and racial) segregation. He argues that the “urban crisis” in Detroit that is so often attached to 1970s deindustrialization actually stemmed from the post-World War Two economic boom and the subsequent creation of “categories of racial difference” across social and urban strata. In these path-breaking accounts, Sugrue and Self lay critical foundations for the application of recent understandings of race formation, labor politics, and spatial segregation to the historical underpinnings of urban crisis. Together, they glance back, if briefly, to the early public-

27 Ibid, 11.
private partnerships forged through American industry that spurred a complete social and urban reconstitution of old industrial belt cities.

Building on and further historicizing these accounts, this study aims to delve deeper into the processes by which municipalities brought corporate power into their fold and vice versa. A number of historical studies have worked towards doing just this, pulling apart social stratification in early twentieth century corporate environments to offer nuanced portraits of ensuing social and urban orders. Historian Olivier Zunz, in *Making America Corporate*, examines middle-level managers and white-collar workers in late nineteenth century corporations and their role in promoting “a new work culture” and shaping social relations in the workplace. Most notably, he points to the development of skyscrapers as an example of the restructuring of corporate environments to fit the needs and activities of the new (primarily white) managerial class. On the other hand, scholars have also taken a close look at the blue-collar and immigrant workers who comprised the bottom of the corporate totem poll. Lizabeth Cohen, for example, provides detailed “bottom-up” accounts of how Polish, Italian, Hungarian, Mexican, and black workers fared in forming alliances against the rifts of corporate capital in first few decades of the twentieth century. Further examining a strain of Cohen’s study, Zaragosa Vargas focuses on the journey of two waves of Mexican laborers from the American south to the industrial north. They, too, equally benefited from the opportunities and economic benefits afforded by Ford’s new plan, yet endured the tensions that came with filling the void left by European and American workers on the assembly line. Vargas gives a powerful account of life inside the Mexican colonies, including adaptation to factory regimen, and discriminations faced and alliances formed by Chicanos among a crowd of European immigrants and black workers.

Alongside these groups was a small, but significant community of immigrants from the greater Middle East (Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, India, Turkey) whose arrival in the American Midwest at the turn of the century also created sustained roots for one of the largest diaspora of Arabs and South Asians in the United States. Much of the current scholarship on these groups owes a great deal to anthropologists who documented waves of Arab arrival to America and provided nuance for the many regions, creeds, and cultures that constitute these communities. In recent decades, some of these scholars have shifted their focus to Detroit, where, by the mid-1990s, Arab-Americans became a substantial minority and their entrepreneurial activities engaged a significant sector of the

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32 Ibid, 103-124.
33 Cohen, *Making a New Deal*.
35 Barbara C. Aswad, ed., *Arabic Speaking Communities in American Cities* (Staten Island, N.Y: Center for Migration Studies of New York; Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1980); Sameer Y. Abraham and Nabeel Abraham, eds., *Arabs in the New World: Studies on Arab-American Communities* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University, Center for Urban Studies, 1983);
local economy. Through their research and ethnographic work, these authors sought to “create a representative portrait of Arab Detroit,” and after 9/11, identify how Arab communities were targeted and surveilled, their citizenship contested, and how these groups drew together through community engagement and political activism. Scholars of the Middle East and Islam in America have also documented the fraught ways that Arabs and Muslims have been documented and depicted in the media before and after 9/11, and the ethnic, racial, and gendered reconstitutions of Arab-Muslim identity from invisible to visible. They have also attempted to grapple with the overlapping, and problematic, categories of “Arab,” “Islam” and “Muslim,” and provided us with evidence of Muslim presence in the US that dates back to the late 1800s, including Nation of Islam and those arriving from the dispersed Ottoman empire and British-held India.

This study situates these groups within the contours of the global migrations that were triggered by the force of early twentieth century American industrial capital. Within this framework, I seek to deepen and broaden prior historical studies of these groups by framing local processes within the global, and attending to the pull-factors that triggered labor migrations from these regions to Detroit, which represented the apex of American industrialism. I, too, grapple with categories related to nationality, race, ethnicity, and religion by seeking to unravel how and why a major American automobile industry singled out a heterogeneous set of nations and people and appealed to them as one – “the markets of the Orient.” The early 1920s were the “formative” years, as Shryock et al. identify, when chain-migrations from Muslim-majority countries to the United States intensified, the majority of them men flocking to work on Ford’s assembly line. This was, of course, partially a result of shifting geopolitical relationships at home and abroad, but that Detroit was marked as the final destination for many of these immigrants also indicates the reach of industrial Americanism and its promise to make real the narratives it constructed. In Detroit, the stories of immigrant laborers arriving from “the Orient” echoed those of other working-class South and Eastern Europeans, who eventually were able to “work” their way “toward whiteness,” and whose paths undoubtedly crossed on

37 Shryock, et al., Arab Detroit, 18.
40 Shryock et al, Arab Detroit, 95.
the shop floor. However, by examining the houses, industrial complexes, and cities that shaped and were shaped by these workers, we can begin to see their lives pulled apart through the FMC’s own social and spatial requirements, particularly from black migrants, who as Bates shows, were subject to separate and unequal forms of socialization and housing. From Detroit, we may begin to understand the broader design of Fordism, the transnational exchanges of economic and human capital that upheld it, and types of immigrant needed to power it.

In this study, Ford’s Detroit is situated as much within the parameters of its city lines as it is in the long shadow it cast over the regions and people from which it benefitted, grew, and faltered. The site is located between the city and what Grey Brechin calls in ecological terms, its “contado,” or the territory that the city could dominate and draw upon. This is made crystal clear in the example provided by political scientist Robert Vitalis in his historical exposé on the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia during the establishment of American-run ARAMCO worker camps in Dhahran in the 1930s. He argues that the adoption of the Jim Crow system in the American camp, enacted through segregated housing and discriminatory access to services, had the effect of creating and maintaining hierarchies and dividing workers by racial categories to inhibit union building.

Western oil companies and auto industries in Latin America had also made their mark by the turn of the century. Historian Greg Grandin, in Fordlandia, tells of the FMC’s deforestation of a portion of the Brazilian Amazon to make room for a rubber plantation in the 1920s. This project ended in disaster due to Ford’s cultural hubris, the failed workings of a Detroit-styled company town in the middle of the Brazilian rainforest, and the resistance of local workers to the paternalistic practices of the company. Across US-run company towns, from Dhahran to Fordlandia, we see the same mechanisms in place: the promise of opportunity, the corporate provision of welfare services to further discourage workers from organizing or forming unions, and the architecture of paternalism as a claim of benevolence over state-led or third party welfare initiatives to maintain order in the camps and control over labor.

In this sense, the industrial city is, as Jane M. Jacobs writes, the place where “people connected by imperial histories are thrust together in assemblages barely predicted, and often guarded against, during the inaugural phases of colonialism.”

42 Bates, Black Detroit. Bates provides a nuanced account of what the Ford promise meant for the average African-American worker: he was able to work for the same wage as a man of another race, yet was still marginalized in the factory and in the crowded neighborhoods of Black Bottom and Paradise Valley.
city makes glaringly apparent the nature of the interdependent relationship between the “First” and “Third” worlds, particularly in the appearance of a “Fourth World” as a site where First world cities contain within its boundaries the Third world.\footnote{Jacobs, \textit{Edge of Empire}, 5-6.} The imperial processes that went into making the twentieth century American industrial, or corporate, city, were just as powerful in establishing territory and difference as nineteenth century British imperialism and its contemporary residues, and they were just as self-referential. Empires, as Edward Said notes, could not have been without the execution of philosophical and imaginative geographies through which they were executed and sustained.\footnote{Edward W. Said, \textit{Culture and Imperialism}, 1st ed (New York: Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1993).} Throughout its history, empire and imperialism, in various forms, has been explicitly spatial. This was just as apparent in the FMC’s commercial visualization of new geographies of consumption and production, as it was in its planning and monitoring of corporate towns, factory spaces, homes, and the laborers who resided within them.

0.2 Structure

This dissertation is divided into two parts, consisting of six chapters and a conclusion. The first half provides a history of the Ford Motor Company’s international activities, beginning with the company’s inception in 1903. Thematically, its primary concern is with the “global,” beginning with Ford’s visual understanding of the world and proceeding to the architectural and social processes devised by the company to carry its products into non-Western territories. The second part turns inward to examine Detroit as the city from where these activities were carried out. It is grounded in the “local,” and examines the municipal partnerships that the FMC forged in the wake of the Model T’s international success, and its joint management of the largest influx of immigrants in the city’s history. Each part follows a relatively chronological timeline, with the development and execution of Ford’s sociological programs as the connecting thread. Together, however, the timelines loosely overlap in order to show how the global and local were informing one another, merging in places, and shaping the decisions that the company made in its efforts to uphold its philosophy at home and abroad.

In Chapter One, I layout the central tenets of the Fordist vision and suggest that its execution was largely reliant on the urban; on the relationship between identity, society, and space. I examine Ford’s early ambitions, the company’s strategies to expand internationally, and the challenges posed by non-Atlantic Fordist economies in the first decade of the twentieth century. In this moment, I am particularly interested in Ford’s establishment of Canadian and British headquarters within the first seven years of its existence. From these three global nodes, the Ford enterprise tactically divided the world map into three regions that would each be responsible for making commercial appeals, identifying consumers, and, if the market was willing, establishing sales branches on the
ground. With an eye on these regions, I highlight two key phenomenon: the process by which the FMC branched into regions beyond Transatlantic between 1908 and 1928, and the simultaneous refinement of Fordist economics, organizational structure, and architecture to extend the reach of the three Ford headquarters into areas where each had a colonial presence.

During these initial years, the Canadian and British affiliates established a formidable enough Ford presence in Eastern Europe, Latin America, India, Egypt, Palestine and Turkey, that the company’s pull in these regions to the U.S. created what American municipalities considered, an “immigrant problem.” Chapter Two begins against the backdrop of an impending war, when immigrant workers, their national allegiance, temperament, and thrift were billed as the most threatening and unpredictable variable in turn-of-the-century American industry – yet, their labor was also essential in this moment. The FMC tackled this “problem” head-on with the creation of a Sociological Department, which instituted welfare, behavioral, and immigrant educational programs in an effort to ensure worker loyalty and maintain industrial efficiency. Within a few years, news of the department’s investigations made headlines and workmen along with the citizens of Detroit decried the social programs as invasive, forcing the company to launch a publicity campaign that had no equivalent at the time. The company began to circulate investigative reports publicly as Human Interest Stories based on reports like Torossian’s, which provided a window into the lives of immigrant workers in Detroit and showcased the “positive progression” of foreign character under Ford’s direction. The stories were featured in one of many in-house corporate publications that were devised between 1908 and 1920, including in Ford films and photography.

Chapter Three shows how these images and films created a Fordist vision. The company disseminated in-house publications and films across the nation and into existing and potential international markets, including the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia – regions that the company dubbed generally as the “Orient.” The central focus of the chapter is the imaging of people and places from these regions as the “Other” by the advertisement wing of the Sociological Department. On the surface, these public relations materials were meant to bolster consumer faith in the very arm that was responsible for their publication. But the messages far exceeded this aim in their global distribution. The department not only became instrumental in softening the public appearance of the company’s paternalism over immigrant and migrant workers, but also worked to devise a narrative by which American enterprise, and the United States writ large, improved the social conditions of these workers and maintained economic benevolence over the regions from where they came.

Chapter Four serves as a transition between the two halves of the dissertation. It is situated at the site of the Highland Park factory complex in Detroit, but is symbolic of the replicable nature of Ford’s (and his architect Albert Kahn’s) blueprints for efficiency, social control, and subject making. The chapter takes the reader through the public factory tours that were offered by Ford of his Highland Park plant in 1910. Ford Factory guides were handed to tourists upon arrival, and these booklets form the basis of the
chapter. The analysis takes place between the factory architecture, the images and text of the tour booklet, and the design of the tour. Industrial tourism was, in itself, a developing phenomenon, but as factory tourists lined up to see Ford’s new factory, it signaled a turning point in the public’s interest in American industrialism and assembly-line architecture. The factory complex and its innovative machinery, however, simply served as backdrops for the main attraction on the tour: Ford workers and their part in a rapidly globalizing Fordist ideology. The factory is seen as a microcosm of the Fordist “contado” and its process of reproducing and maintaining a certain set of social relations.

In a matter of time, elements of Ford’s Highland Park “factory city” were imposed onto the plan of Detroit. Chapter Five pivots from Ford’s factory city paradigm to more fully examine the relationship between the FMC and the Detroit municipality at the scale of city. In returning to the pre-war years, I revisit the effects of this global crisis in forging public-private partnerships across the span of the First War. I view the crisis of war, for example, as marking a schism in the relationship between human and industrial capital in Detroit: in the very moment that there was a temporary lull in labor migration from warring regions to the United States, growing American industries were profiting immensely from European wartime demands and Detroit proved to be central to the war economy. In turn, a rather inconspicuous relationship developed between corporate enterprises and municipalities, as industries became the principle generators of socio-economic growth. Chapter Five begins by giving an historical overview of the establishment of the Detroit Board of Commerce (DBC) in 1903 and its engagement in projects of social order, which included commerce, urban restructuring, and beautification projects in the city. The development of the Americanization Committee of Detroit by the DBC nearly a decade later, occurred in conjunction with the FMC’s Sociological Department and was bolstered by the support of the city’s major industrial actors. I follow the main actors who formed this corporate-municipal partnership to show that Ford’s factory city was more than just a symbol: the industrial-as-social policies developed by the Sociological Department to guide the logic of Ford’s factory city provided a basic template for planning the city of Detroit and the placement of workers in it.

Chapter Six argues that these planning collaborations set the course for the corporatization (and urban fracturing) of the city under the banner of a broad nationalist aim: Americanization. The processes of globalization, and the meeting of “local” practices with Ford’s “global” ambitions, become manifest in domestic, public, and corporate spaces. Outside of the factory, the worker home was the mechanism by which the FMC monitored the spending habits, ethics, patriotism, and citizenship of foreign workers. The immigrant worker, who has otherwise remained largely figurative in the preceding chapters, makes his strongest appearance. Through the example of a cluster of Arab, Turkish, Persian, and Indian immigrant worker neighborhoods, situated at the edge of the Highland Park factory site, this chapter examines how, despite being drawn to and benefiting from the Ford plan, these workers sought to create spaces of social cohesion to shield themselves from the paternalistic practices of the company. The chapter makes use of local “ethnic” newspapers, letters written by immigrant factory workers, agent testimonials, and oral histories to create a portrait of the ensuing urban and social order.
Architecture and the built environment were the instruments by which the social and economic dimensions of Americanization were engendered and resisted. Moreover, these groups illustrate that Ford’s brand of Americanization, which was quickly adopted and enforced by industries through deliberate national efforts, drew apart various factions of the Ford worker. The essence of the Ford promise (the five-dollar wage and profit-sharing) that made it so appealing, was that any “man,” regardless of race, class or creed, could earn the same wage as his co-worker and afford the product upon which he was working. The added requirement of Americanization, then, engaged some Ford workers over others in social exercises that created inherent inequalities between workers and their homes, leaving a discernible mark on the plan of the industrial city.

0.3
A Note on Sources

Most of the primary evidence used in this dissertation comes from the Ford archives. As a researcher, I was fortunate to have received a fellowship to work in the Benson Ford Research Center, which is an archive and library funded and maintained by a non-profit arm of the Ford Motor Company. Henry Ford was a man who took great pride in posterity and despite failing fast in his first two attempts to start an automobile company, he was keen on documenting his third and final attempt in full detail. This may seem strange coming from a man who is famously quoted as saying that “history is more or less bunk.” The Chicago Tribune, in an interview with the rising industrialist and professed pacifist at the start of the First War, criticized Ford for having the sensibilities of “an anarchist” and “an ignorant idealist.” The Tribune, which at the time trumpeted US preparedness for the war, was later sued by Ford for $1 million in libel. It was a publicly drawn out trial that revealed more about Ford’s disposition towards history and tradition than it did to protect his name. When asked about his quote, Ford later responded that “history as it is taught in schools deals largely with the unusual phases of our national life: wars, political controversies, territorial extensions and the like...” and little to do with everyday existence. The FMC archival collection (and museum) was a result of Ford’s response to the trial, which, in his words, would “give people a true picture of the development of the country...through the only history that is worth observing”: industrial history that isn’t bunk.

The Benson Ford Research Center (BFRC) archives exist apart from an ongoing corporate collection, which is based in the Ford Motor Company world headquarters a few miles east of the center in Dearborn, Michigan. The documents are divided between

49 Interview, Chicago Tribune, May 25, 1916. The full quote reads: “History is more or less bunk. It's tradition. We don't want tradition. We want to live in the present and the only history that is worth a tinker's damn is the history we make today.”
51 Ibid.
the center and the corporate collection by time period: anything existing before 1960 is housed in the research center, and anything from 1960 onwards is closed off to the public in the corporate headquarters. The bulk of my research in the center had been completed by the spring of 2012 and the librarians and archivists could not have been more accommodating and supportive in my research. I worked partially in folders containing information on Ford foreign workers who attended the Henry Ford English and Trade Schools from Russia, China, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia in the interwar period. The files are filled with wonderful stories, photographs, anecdotal notes, and personal histories of migrant workers. They are living records of the hierarchy and power dynamics that existed within the corporation, particularly since the files about the foreign workers were the result of middle management paperwork. The Ford agents who filled out migrant worker forms would often document the daily struggles and small victories that were won on the shop floor. On occasion, letters written by an individual worker would slip into the file; the letters would vary in subject matter, ranging from an unrelenting admiration of Ford, the mechanics of the assembly line, complaints about factory conditions, to concerns about sending remittances to families back home.

These interactions, few as they may be, are striking in light of the archives own history and Ford’s insistence on the inclusion of “everyday existences” within the corporate archive. Yet, their scant appearance also leaves partial omissions in the corporation’s history that subdues some voices and advances others. It is how the archive, as an extension of power, controls the act of writing history, which, as Edward Said argued, can easily be “made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and rewritten, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated.”53 The archive works to link historical inquiries of the past with the ongoing transformations of the present, in what Foucault called a “history of the present.”54 The potential impact of the silence of the worker, particularly in regards to histories located in and about centers of power, is considerable. In the short course of my fellowship, I met dozens of researchers, historians, and social scientists, who were keen on writing another personal account of Henry Ford or history of his corporation, from perspectives and disciplinary angles that will make their way among the hundreds of scholarly and journalistic pieces that currently exist. These authors, representing a mere fraction of researchers who circulate through the BFRC on a daily basis, are producing knowledge from what was formerly (and still presently) a major industrial seat of power. There is no greater example than the Ford Motor Company archives where the present becomes the past with more rapidity. The company and its founder introduced to the world new rates of turnover, industrial expansionism, and innovations in capitalism and technology that permanently altered perceptions of time, space, and social change.55 To be aware of these historical gaps, the languages they use, the discourses they create, and

our own temporal distance from them, as historian Reinhart Koselleck notes, is to create historical knowledge that is itself always provisional and open to revision.56

The question that arises from these silences is perhaps more about the brand and image that the FMC is concerned with constructing today versus what it crafted in the past. My initial intent in writing about immigration to Detroit at the turn of the century was to focus on urban planning and the built environment. Yet, the photographs and films that I encountered in the archive were so captivating (their provocation spanning the course of a century), that the company’s visual depiction of urban modernity and progress became central to my analysis. Even today, the corporate wing of the Ford establishment understands the power of the image in communicating across geographies, languages, and cultures, and to this day carries on public relations campaigns based on creating connections between industry, integrity of character, and American resilience. We see this in the current spectacle of consumer culture and trends in commercial retaliation, where one American competitor is constantly pit against another. Chrysler, GM, and Cadillac, in addition to Ford, have co-opted old industrial tactics to associate images of Detroit rising and American work ethic with the strength of the automobile industry. A well-known example of this is Chrysler’s comeback moment during the Super Bowl in 2011, when the company aired a commercial featuring Detroit rapper Eminem, monumental shots of the city, and the tagline: “Imported From Detroit.” Putting aside Chrysler’s implication that Detroit is a foreign country, the claim of automakers that the city’s success is dependent on their own has a long history of false correlations. Using these claims, the big three automakers, particularly after the 2008 bailout, have consistently neglected the contradictions in capitalism that allow American corporations to prosper, even if the cities they are based in fail.

Beyond drawing parallels between the Ford of the past, present, and future, my intention here is to show how the corporate archive is an integral part of corporate empire and the construct of Americanism. The politics and perils of writing through the corporate lens are present throughout the dissertation; despite Henry Ford’s claim, they provide a top-down, patriarchal view that allows only a glimpse into everyday existence, for both men and women. Yet, as part of a provisional set of histories about the extent of American commercial power in the early twentieth century, this project has room to grow on many fronts. The voices of the “subaltern,” so to speak, make appearances throughout the dissertation, but are only strongest in the final chapter.57 This means that the bulk of this study focuses on a history of the corporation that seeks to contextualize the arrival and arrangement of immigrants from a region of the world in which Ford was dealing, thus shedding light on the reach and limitations of the company’s social, spatial, and cultural appeals. To provide a fuller picture of these years outside of the corporate view, I supplement material from the Ford archives and the United States National Archives (where Ford films are kept), with oral histories recorded in the 1960s featuring the sons

and daughters of early Arab autoworkers (Arab American National Museum), labor histories (Walter P. Reuther Labor & Urban Affairs Library, Wayne State University), and the many popular newspapers and journal articles that were commenting on Ford’s impact on global affairs. These documents marginally breathe life into the top-down and bottom-up encounters that, in many instances, were aligned as often as they conflicted. I have only touched on the surface of these encounters, particularly from beyond the male white collar and immigrant worker perspective.

The geographic and temporal stretch of this dissertation has its limits. Current scholarship on Henry Ford and his enterprise is extensive, but there is still much to be done in regards to the company’s international growth and its impact abroad, particularly in its early years and in regard to the “markets of the Orient.” The foundational book on the company, American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents by Mira Watkins and Ernest Hill, spans a vast terrain in the course of the FMC’s business history, yet still focuses more on Ford’s relations with the “west” than it does with the “rest.”58 Watkins and Hill’s account is based on the BFRC files, oral interviews, and the Leed archive in Windsor, and like my own research, reflects the close reading of a certain discipline and geographic outlook. Even the small amount of scholarship about Ford in Latin America, North Africa, and Southeast Asia have been produced by scholars using the same archives, where there exist some of the only paper copies of FMC international dealings, reinforcing the notion that one must return to the center of empire in order to write about its margins. From here, however, we can stand to benefit from further understandings of the reception of American commodities and commercial images as they were sent abroad, and the ways in which international states, corporations, and workers reacted to (or rejected) Fordist labor reformations and the subsequent reorganization of capital.59

Given this, there is still much to be uncovered from the documents at hand. In sifting through the hundreds of vertical files on Ford’s international relations, welfare and education programs, internal correspondences, and oral reminiscences, one thing that struck me was that I did not come across a single piece of paper that had been marked, commented upon, or signed by Henry Ford. When I asked the archivists about this, they noted that although Ford was keen on organizing and filing any and all paperwork produced by the FMC with the mechanical vigor with which he ran his company, he also

59 There is still substantial untapped evidence of Ford’s actions across the Canadian Dominion in the University of Windsor’s Leed library, a set of film archives in Trieste, Italy, and there may be documentation of the early formation of Ford France (Ford Société Anonyme Française) in Bordeaux and its equivalent in Cairo and Alexandria (Société Anonyme Égyptienne). A few scholars have taken an interest in Egypt in this regard, though generally concentrating on the postwar period. Robert Tignor, for example, has written a substantial amount on the making of Egyptian nationalism in relation to its economic activities. One article in particular gives insight into the nationalist sentiments that wore down American commercial presence in Egypt after 1945, with the Ford Motor Company as his prime example. Robert Vitalis has also written extensively on the Middle East and political economy across the twentieth century. See: Robert L. Tignor, “In the Grip of Politics: The Ford Motor Company of Egypt, 1945–1960,” Middle East Journal 44 (1990): 383–98; and Robert Vitalis, When Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of Empire in Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
had an aversion to leaving behind his own traces in the public record.\textsuperscript{60} The few documents that do exist with Ford’s handwriting often had to do with his correspondences with other rising or prominent industrialists. Thomas Edison, in particular, was a longtime hero of his and it was Edison who Ford first dedicated the archive and museum to when it first opened in 1929. Ford’s absence from the records of his own company continues to drive historians in their quest to create portraits of a man who was controversial, even in his own time. As Upton Sinclair later remarked about Ford’s peace activities in 1914 and his actions on behalf of the workingman, “[a] furious controversy arose – on the one side labor and the social uplifters, on the other side manufacturers, businessmen, and newspaper editors…the former said that Henry Ford was a great thinker, a statesman of industry; the latter said that he was of unsound mind, a menace to the public welfare.”\textsuperscript{61} The archival record shows that even the workingman’s (and sometimes woman’s) view of Ford was not as rosy as even Sinclair claims. Nor were the views of the many industrialists and businessmen so one-sided, who soon adopted Ford’s welfare programs as their own in the name of corporate benevolence. Nevertheless, it is from these historical junctures and scattered sources that Ford’s Detroit is constructed, and the stories of those who helped build it unfold.

\textsuperscript{60} Adding to the difficulty of the corporate papers, is Henry II’s (Henry Ford’s grandson) decision to destroy most of his and his fathers personal papers when he held leadership of the corporation.

Chapter One

Mapping the World as Ford

By establishing two global headquarters in Canada and the UK, Henry Ford and his Ford Motor Company expanded to six continents by the start of the Second War. In this chapter, I examine the means and methods by which the company sought a presence in markets in and beyond the Transatlantic during the pre- and interwar periods and I show how specific regions and cities were chosen as instrumental to the establishment of a Ford “empire.” The company’s first international venture in Windsor, Canada serves as an example of how the combination of Fordist business tactics, “assembly line” architecture, and imaginative mapping enabled the company to enter into unpredictable automotive and agriculture markets when few other American or European commercial entities were able to do so. These experimental aspects of Fordism drew the FMC apart from other companies that were operating in the moment, and allowed it to move beyond Euro-American markets at a much quicker pace. This argument also informs how the presence of the Ford enterprise altered the spatial and temporal nature of the cities in which it was operating, which ultimately served as a challenge once the company gained entry into what it unambiguously called “the markets of the Orient,” which focused primarily on the cities of Cairo, Mumbai, and Istanbul. By way of conclusion, I bring these case studies together by discussing the theoretical strands of Fordism and its spatial dimensions, by which the remaining chapters in this study, differing in scope and scale, can be held together.

1.1

Territorial Pursuits

Less than a year after the Ford Motor Company was incorporated in Detroit, Henry Ford received a visitor from neighboring Canada with a proposal that allowed the company to burst into the area of international trade. In 1904, Gordon M. McGregor, a thirty-one year old businessman from Walkerville, Ontario set before Ford a proposal to begin manufacturing the Model A throughout the Canadian Territory. At the time, this was not a novel proposition; the sixth car ever produced by the FMC was sold by a Toronto-based distributor through connections made by the FMC’s Canadian-born secretary, James Couzens. Yet, the company’s initial impression was that protectionist tariffs and taxes would prevent it from enjoying a competitive advantage in any context outside the United States. Nevertheless, McGregor’s plan was convincing enough, since he proposed to avert the 35% tariff on American cars entering Canada by establishing a Ford

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63 James Couzens, “Oral Reminiscences” in Acc #65, Box 87, BFRC. Not long after Couzens reported to FMC stockholders an initial profit of $36,957 in the company’s first four months of existence, he took the lead on aggressively setting up and overseeing FMC foreign operations in its initial years.
manufacturing plant in Walkerville. Another advantage of the plan was that Walkerville was just a thirty-minute journey across the Detroit River, where Ford could have easy oversight in exchange for gaining access to the entire Dominion. Still, there was considerable risk involved.

The same year marked President Roosevelt’s declaration that Americans stood “at the very forefront in the giant international competition of the day” – a sign that the FMC was not the only American enterprise looking to expand internationally. American exports found a strong presence in the European market and managed to maintain it in the transition from agricultural items to iron and steel-related products after the Second Industrial revolution. Colt revolvers, Yankee locks, Waltham watches, and McCormick reapers were among a few hundred products that resonated in European markets and reached as far as Canada and Mexico. The increased production and sales of American small arms and military goods fueled wars in far-away countries, long before the mass-production and consumption of these transactions carried a heavier moral and political weight in the warring decades to come. At the turn of the century, American automotive companies began to bid for European markets, which was the point of origin for the first commercial automobile. Cadillac’s, Pope’s, White’s, Waltham’s, and Oldsmobile’s appeared alongside Renault’s, Peugeot’s, and Panhard-Levassor’s, artfully crafted French vehicles that were patented by Gottlieb Daimler and Karl Benz. In time, Europeans preferred European machines to American ones, which were regarded as low quality, loud, nasty, shaky, uncomfortable, and clunky in comparison. To boot, the Canadian market initially showed very little interest in the automobile industry. The challenge for Ford, then, was to enter into a market where the American automobile was already ill-received and protectionist tariffs were partly representative of nationalist prejudices against American products.

As Ford probed European markets for a global headquarters, he soon learned that his company’s method of pairing innovations in manufacturing technology with labor reforms distinguished it from global competition (mainly European at this point) in more ways than one. First, it enabled the company to offer automobiles at far lower prices than European competitors. European resistance to the incorporation of machinery went hand-in-hand with their preference for high quality, handcrafted, individualized automobiles, which European manufacturers feared would be compromised by the machine and mass production. An American automobile producer traveling in Europe marveled at this refusal, and returned to Detroit to express in bewilderment that

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64 Theodore Roosevelt, Presidential Addresses, NY, n.d., I, 302 (Roosevelt’s speech on April 4, 1903).
65 Mona Domosh, American Commodities in an Age of Empire (New York: Routledge, 2006) and Wilkins and Hill, American Business Abroad.
66 Sorenson, “Oral Reminiscences,” 79 and “Peace Ship,” Ford Times, 1914. Here I am making a side reference to the difficulties that Henry Ford faced in the interwar period when the European demand for war vehicles surpassed the need for the tractors and luxury vehicles. As a professed pacifist, Ford struggled to resolve his public persona with the actions of his company, which caved under pressure from FMC stockholders, board members, his son Edsel Ford, and President Roosevelt to meet wartime machinery demands and keep the company (and nation) economically afloat.
67 Wilkins and Hill, American Business Abroad, 7-21.
“manufacturers abroad [did] not use much labor-saving machinery, apparently regarding labor as too cheap to justify costly machines with which to save it.” Second, that the European automotive industry remained resistant to mass production techniques until the First War gave American automotive enterprises the advantage of time to improve the quality and cost of Ford automobiles sold abroad.

After weighing the risk of turning the Canadian affiliate into the FMC’s first international venture, Ford, in close partnership with McGregor, forged ahead. The gamble in Walkerville paid off. Aside from an enormous return in capital, the incorporation of Ford-Canada gave the FMC the right to manufacture and sell Ford automobiles throughout the then-existing British colonies, possessions, and dependencies with the exception of Great Britain and Ireland. This also meant that British Malaya, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, and India fell under the auspices of the Canadian company, all of which remained under the control of Ford-US stockholders. This sequence of events benefited Canadian and US stockholders on multiple fronts; the latter received up to 51% in share capital with the expectation that the former would periodically receive up-to-date patents, designs, technical know-how and assistance.

With its incorporation in 1904, Ford-Canada became the second of what I call three “international nodes” from where the FMC would launch its products in emerging and established automotive markets. With a footing in Canada, the company quickly began developing an advanced method of international expansion, primarily employing architecture and spatial logic to gain ground. International headquarters, sales and assembly branches, all designed to Ford’s specifications, swiftly opened up the world market in Ford’s favor, slowing only for short periods during moments of recession following years of intense conflict.

In its first year of operation, Ford-Canada showed the largest volume of Ford sales in markets outside North America. This was the genius behind the Walkerville plan. As David Roberts writes in his study of McGregor and the Ford-Canada affiliate, “[p]roximity to Detroit was a prime factor in Windsor’s rapid growth after 1910, and central to that growth was the burgeoning automotive industry – the indigenous and branch plants; the makers of tops, fenders, spark plugs, and a wide range of other parts; the dealerships; and the personnel who set up and ran the plants and garages.”

“Motoropolis,” as Windsor became known, benefitted immensely from its proximity

69 Wilkins & Hill, American Business Abroad, 18.
70 "Canadian Agreement from Records Secretary’s office, Ford Company of Canada, Limited, 1904-1971, Acc. 97-002, University of Windsor - Leed Library.
71 David Roberts, through an illuminating biographical account of McGregor’s journey from a struggling wagon dealer to an industrial tycoon, writes about how his relationship with Ford transformed the nature of exchange between American/Canadian border cities along the Detroit River and the urban development of Walkerville/Windsor. See: In the Shadow of Detroit: Gordon M. McGregor, Ford of Canada, and Motoropolis (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2006), 5.
Figure 1.1: An in-house illustration showing Ford’s mapping of the Americas, starting with sales branches in Buenos Aires and St. John, which were offshoots of Ford-US and Ford-Canada. (Ford Times, 1913)
to the parent company, particularly in its position to respond to consumer demands in the only existing Ford operation outside of the United States. No other American or European organization at the time integrated and proliferated its products in this way. The decision to incorporate Ford-Canada as the first international assembly plant created markets for Ford products in a range of new territories and set the stage for the company to fully emerge onto the international scene when the Model T was introduced in 1908. The significance of this was not lost on the company, as FMC executives quickly began producing and distributing maps that tracked its geography of production in the form of publicly distributed newsletters [Figure 1.1].

In the FMC’s appeal to markets outside of the Canadian Dominion, however, Ford met the prejudice of European consumers against American-made products with trepidation. In another fortunate encounter with a young, persistent British-born automotive dealer named Percival L. D. Perry, Ford decided to pursue the same strategy that he used in Canada to open up markets in Europe, starting with the UK. He immediately constructed two assembly plants in Dagenham and Manchester and put Perry in charge, effectively establishing the FMC’s third and final principal headquarters, Ford-UK. Assembly plants and sales branches were set up in 1909, and incorporated in 1911, marking the start of Ford operations in the heart of the British Empire. Within six years of Ford-US’ existence, the company incorporated two major international headquarters that, by the First War, were on record as surpassing even the US in the sales of Ford products abroad. Among the highest sellers were an Australian branch managed by Ford-Canada, as well as three South American and five Western European sales branches operated under the direction of Ford-US.

With its newly incorporated Canadian and European headquarters, the company aggressively began producing and distributing commercial illustrations that showed its emergence on the world stage, with Detroit always as the point of origin [Figure 1.2]. The FMC hired Chicago-based advertising agent Glen Buck to serve as editor of Ford in-house publications in early 1912, who was known to “spice up” Ford ads by creating illustrations that conveyed “dozens of parables with a message.” Of these “Buck-isms” were aerial maps like the ones pictured in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, which marked Ford headquarters and branches with his self-designed Ford winged pyramid logo and represented the growth of the Ford enterprise in world on the cusp of war. This type of “pictorial cartography,” as geographers Denis Cosgrove and Veronica della Dora write of similar advertisements made by Charles Owen during the Second War, created an “interplay between geography, imagination, and culture” and their relationship to “geopolitical and propaganda mapping.” It also spoke to the technologies that allowed

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73 Wilkins & Hill, American Business Abroad, 26.
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Buck to picture advertisements in a way (exchanging Ford goods across the Atlantic against a sunlit horizon) that allowed customers to understand new global spatialities with Ford at the center. The narrative of these advertisements spoke to the larger strategy at play within the company. Once manufacturing plants were permanently established in Atlantic-based economies, “foreign” markets were more accessible as colonies and territories already in the possession of FMC global affiliates. This is partly what gave Ford an edge over its competitors. By the tail end of the First World War and into the interwar period, the company had set up over 40 sales branches and assembly plants across 6 continents, roughly dividing the map into three administrative regions overseen by each global headquarter. Ford-US overwhelmingly fell into favor with Latin and European markets early on due to pre-established economic channels established by American commercial and petroleum ventures, and struck deals with a resistant Russian economy shortly after 1918. Ford-Canada oversaw business across the entire Dominion, including Australia, New Zealand, and later, India and South Africa, while Ford-UK distributed Ford products and set up sale branches throughout Europe and probed for markets in North Africa, the Middle East, and Singapore.

This type of advertising could be seen as bearing strands of militarism, even though, at first, Ford was initially interested in carrying out a global economic expansion without the weight of military intervention. However, the nature of its expansion shifted as the world veered towards war and the demand for military equipment in European territories overwhelmed the need for tractors and automobiles. Between the two wars, the company made quick and calculated attempts to catch up to shifting socio-economic conditions, political barriers, and demands. The timeframes represented by the maps in

Figure 1.2: An in-house FMC drawing illustrates the exchange of Ford goods across Atlantic, between FMC sales branches and assembly plants in Europe and Detroit. (Ford Times, 1913)
Figure 1.3: FMC Growth, 1903-1919: Ford-US, Green; Ford-Canada, Pink; Ford-UK, Purple (Map by author based on data from FMC International Branch Files, Acc #712, Box 1, BFRC)

Figure 1.4: FMC Growth, 1903-1938: Ford-US, Green; Ford-Canada, Pink; Ford-UK, Purple (Map by author based on data from FMC International Branch Files, Acc #712, Box 1, BFRC)
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 provide an historical framework from which these actions can be understood: they represent a crucial set of years that marked the FMC’s entry into nascent markets, and more pointedly, illustrate that an appeal to emerging markets was integral to Ford’s vision for global expansion by the end of the First War. Figure 1.3 shows the FMC’s growth as limited to the Americas, Western Europe, and Australia by the end of the First War, but less discernable during this time were the strategic decisions that allowed FMC business to rapidly expand to six continents by the beginning of the Second War.

Equally less understood was the company’s use of social and cultural diplomacy to accelerate the process of economic intervention in resistant markets. From 1914 to 1921, the company’s social programs emerged from deep growing pains, which contributed to the design of Fordism as we know it. It was a time when Henry Ford, as a publically proclaimed “pacifist,” struggled to come to terms with his company’s role in manufacturing machines for warfare while, at the same time, aggressively pursuing markets that were in need of combat vehicles over agricultural machinery and luxury automobiles. This was a central challenge for Western industrialists at the time, who looked to set their businesses apart from colonial endeavors for the purposes of economic longevity. A way in which American enterprises attempted to distinguish themselves from the militarism of imperial Europe, for example, was through messaging that suggested they were better, more noble, and peaceful. This was also one of the driving forces for the Sociological Department’s production of images and films, which worked to create links between nationalism and identity and American commercialism.

The contribution of American commercial culture to the pacifying of American militarism abroad had roots in late nineteenth century business culture, which was a burgeoning industry of textiles, farming equipment, food products and small technologies that promoted civility through non-forceful means such as advertisements and “American made” products. As geographer Mona Domosh writes, this was a guise that facilitated the connectedness between selling commodities overseas for revenue generation and international soft diplomacy. Domosh, in her study of five major turn-of-the-century commercial enterprises, shows that this was part of what distinguished American “formal imperialism” from a less invasive, informal project, where “the United States’ political and economic elites were not interested in establishing territorial colonies, nor did they want to be involved in the administration of political subjects. Rather, they sought worldwide markets for American mass produced goods.” The FMC was part of this

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76 Political scientist Joseph Nye has written about the use of “culture, political values, and foreign policy” to succeed in international politics over coercion. Culture, he wrote, was the most influential of the three, allowing countries to shape views on socio-political issues through mediums such as cinema and advertisement. The development of this concept of cultural diplomacy, or soft power, came to be debated in a number of disciplinary arenas. See: Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1st ed (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).


nineteenth and twentieth century trend in commercial advertising, which continued beyond the First War, and United States’ involvement in it, and put pressure on some American companies to juggle the act of commercial advertisement with direct complicity in acts of war.

The following section builds on this point by examining how the FMC made architectural and spatial interventions in the city of Windsor, Canada, as the first experimental laboratory for Ford’s international ventures. Due to its proximity, the Canadian territory acted as a launching pad for Ford presence in other non-American cities, towns, and villages. Together with the examples of Cairo, Mumbai, and Istanbul, these cases illustrate that images, space, and architecture were central to the economic undertakings of the FMC and the processes associated with Fordism in moments of conflict and crisis. More broadly, while not intending to be territorial in the militaristic sense, the establishment of Ford plants in the agricultural markets of the greater Middle East (and elsewhere) can be understood as an American re-territorialization (of, at times, former colonies) that was both spatial and economic in nature.

1.2 Making Motoropolis

When Ford and McGregor came to terms in 1904, the former wagon salesman was quick to offer his existing production facility, Walkerville Wagon Works, to house the process of Ford assembly for Canada. Around the same time, Ford hired the firm Smith, Hinchman & Grylis (later SmithGroup) to design and construct the Piquette plant in Detroit. It was a small New England mill-style brick building on Piquette Avenue that was in operation long enough to house Ford’s ideas for a low-cost, easily reproducible car. In comparison to the Piquette plant, the Wagon Works building was considered like-sized and an ideal space from where to launch Canadian operations. In its first year, seventeen Ford-Canada employees produced 117 finished automobiles, without the assistance of streamlined production of the assembly line. The introduction of the Model T and assembly line in 1908 rendered both the Piquette plant and the Wagon Works buildings impractical. As demand for the Ford goods across the Canadian territory boomed, the Wagon Works building was adapted so that it did not meet the same fate as the Piquette plant, which was abandoned in favor of a state-of-the-art Highland Park Plant.

Ford partnered with Albert Kahn to vastly improve and speed up manufacturing and assembly in Highland Park’s fifty-five acre space to meet global demands for the Model T. Yet, he was much more cautious about introducing such a large facility into Walkerville’s small industrial landscape. To build an entirely new production plant would require the company to either demolish the existing Wagon Works shop or forego it for another location – a difficult feat to achieve given the small industrial parameters that set Walkerville apart from the rest of the Canadian waterfront. Instead, Ford and Kahn decided to wrap a Highland Park-styled plant around the back of the existing Wagon
Figure 1.5: The original location for Ford-Canada was based in McGregor’s Walkerville Wagon Works building (left-center), and as operations grew, an addition was built at the edge of the Detroit River (right), 1910

(Detroit Publishing, Co., June 4, 1914; Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division)

Works building, with points of connection between the old and new buildings [Figure 1.5]. This arrangement benefitted Ford and Walkerville in many ways: the north and south façades of the complex served as separate domestic and international storefronts for the company. The façade of the old Wagon Works building operated at the street scale, sitting rather inconspicuously along an uninterrupted tree-lined residential road. On the side, Kahn’s modular addition faced the edge of the Detroit River facing Belle Isle, displaying an enormous “Ford Motor Company of Canada” sign which served to advertise the company’s presence along international waters. The arrangement proved particularly fruitful when the city of Detroit, along with the FMC, hosted a global industrial exhibition between downtown Detroit and Belle Isle, the city’s designated “urban park,” in 1910, the same year that the Canadian facility was finished. In this way, Ford-Canada and Belle Isle came to symbolize the parallel and divergent urban processes that were taking place behind them.

“Motoropolis,” consisting of the neighboring towns of Walkerville, Ford City, and Windsor, illustrated how Ford’s plan played out to a larger degree in the areas immediately adjacent to Detroit. Like many forthcoming international projects, Ford found a footing in the Canadian industrial belt when it was still a growing hub that was based around the parameters of another small industry – in this case, the whiskey distillery of Hiram Walker. In the 1850s, Walker built a distillery that became so successful that a modest company town grew around it, which Walker then bought out and steadily operated for more than 50 years. Walker had a notoriously tight grip on the planning and operation of the town up until his death, just three years before the FMC
struck a deal with McGregor.\textsuperscript{79} Walkers death and Ford’s subsequent entry into the Dominion caused Walkerville to swell, along with the area immediately around it. In a matter of years, the site of the Ford-Canada plant became the most vibrant automotive production region in all of Canada and, as the Ford industry grew, so did the number of workers who moved to work there. The Ford factory neighborhood went from housing a little more than a dozen Ford workers in 1910 to over 1,400 by 1913. Between 1913 and 1915, the institution of the Five Dollar plan in Canada caused the neighborhood to swell to such an extent, that the industrial patch broke away from Walkerville, first as a village, and then as a town incorporated as Ford City. This was a name that, from the start, was a misnomer for its ability to stand-alone as a municipality – not unlike the fate of many towns that hosted Ford industrial manufacturing at the time, including Highland Park. Business owners and municipal actors petitioned for incorporation to protect their industrial tax bases, in effect, gambling their towns future on the success of a single industry [Figure 1.6].\textsuperscript{80}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure16.png}
\caption{With the birth of Ford-Canada, the entire Border City region became part of the Ford-US ecosystem. The early success of Ford in Canada had the effect of splintering the town of Ford City (on the far right) from Walkerville and the surrounding cities. (William C. Sauers, Windsor: Topping-Sanders Company, 1920)}
\end{figure}

From 1915 onwards, the neighboring towns of Walkerville and Ford City became a study of contrasts. Under the command of Hiram Walker, Walkerville enjoyed constant

\textsuperscript{79} Carl Morgan, \textit{Birth Of A City Commemorating Windsor’s Centennial} (Tecumseh, Ont.: Natural Heritage, 1992).

and measured growth, and as was characteristic of industrial towns of the era, was crowded around a series of industries including Walker’s mill and distillery. Like Ford, Walker took a lead in providing infrastructure for the town’s employees, from paved roads to employee housing and civic buildings. He was a strong proponent of British Garden City plans, and hired architects and planners to help him separate industrial Walkerville from residential areas through streetscape design. Curiously enough, Walker enlisted many of the popular industrial architects who were building industrial properties across the river in Detroit, most prominently Mason & Rice and their apprentice, Albert Kahn. Kahn had as much influence in the architectural character of Walkerville as he did in Detroit, advocating for the design of homes and public institutions in the tradition of Arts & Crafts and Beaux Arts, while at the same time, pioneering the style of factories and industrial landscapes as purely utilitarian, with clean lines void of ornament. After Walker’s death, his son James, an aspiring architect himself, continued his father’s plans to create a model town with parks, monumental roundabouts, and interrupted street grid patterns that would reduce traffic and further to distinguish residential Walkerville from its burgeoning industrial south, which came to include a General Motors factory by 1919 [Figure 1.7]. All of these activities were bolstered by the enforcement of Prohibition in the U.S., and a rising interest in Walker’s distillery through rum running and bootlegging in the 1920s.

On the other hand, Ford City experienced mushroom-like, haphazard growth from the start. It was incorporated as a village in 1912 and recognized as an independent town by 1915. Ford’s profit-sharing plan set the Ford-Canada wage at $4 an hour for a 48-hour workweek, still far more than the average wage that existed in the Dominion at the time. As news of this opportunity spread, workers from neighboring communities, including rural Essex County, greater Canada, and Europe, flooded Ford City and spilled into the neighboring town of Sandwich East. Within its newly established municipal boundaries, Ford City’s landowners had little idea of how to accommodate to rising housing demands. With no housing plan in place (as Ford had done in Detroit through the Sociological Department), houses were built purely on speculation and demand, which rose sharply between 1910 and 1915. The absence of stern (paternalistic) figures like Walker or Ford to control or manage the new influx of workers resulted in Ford City’s rise as an instant city, planned by and large in the interests of landowners and speculative landlords who built according to the fluctuating demands of its newest residents. The unintended effect of this was that by 1923, 85% of Ford residents owned their own homes, which helped to finance the construction of schools, public buildings, libraries and civic and municipal services along the city’s main thoroughfare, Droullard Road.

Much like many other growing industrial cities, the street hosted ten different places of

83 Price and Kulisek, “Portrait of Ford City.”
Figure 1.7: A plan of Walkerville and Ford City in 1923. Note Walkerville’s relatively uninterrupted grid as compared to Ford City. In comparison, Ford City grew from the original Ford plant in the north (at the edge of the Detroit river), towards the south in a sporadic manner, with wide industrial blocks fitted between crisscrossing railways and large industrial facilities.
worship, from Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Pentecostal, and Baptist churches that represented the many Russian, Slovak, Serbian, Romanian and Spanish groups who worked for Ford-Canada.  

Still, Ford City was never built to last, and its decline visibly strained the adjacent Border City regions. The presence of the Ford plant in Motoropolis had the effect of catalyzing and accelerating the processes of urban incorporation, migration, and growth. Worker infrastructure was erected almost immediately, wedged between large industrial complexes and intersecting rail lines. In addition, the construction of a Chrysler factory in the region adjacent to Ford City in 1929 resulted in its incorporation as a town called East Windsor, since it could no longer be known as a single company town. The same year, the city’s population, which peaked at 16,000, went into sharp decline during the Depression. Financial strife gripped the Border City belt, with Ford City as the hardest hit. Large swathes of the city suffered from irreparable urban decay; workers were laid off, lost their homes, and were unable to pay municipal taxes to keep up the appearances of a functioning industrial town. By 1935, each Border City was absorbed into the municipal boundaries of Windsor, and only Walkerville managed to retain its character as a separate neighborhood. The border cities of Motoropolis grew and shrank so quickly in the post-Depression years, that their total incorporation was the only way to stabilize the region. The creation of Ford-Windsor as an umbrella region reflected this amalgamation and served as a way to house the bulk of Ford operations across the towns of Walkerville, Ford City, and East Sandwich. In this way, the towns became distinct neighborhoods within the bounds of a municipality that generated revenue based on a diversified set of industries. While no longer operating independently, the border cities remained connected through a shared industrial infrastructure: worker housing, plants, and factories. Together, they formed a distinct industrial belt along the Canadian waterfront [Figure 1.8].

The examples of Ford City and Motoropolis shed light on the effect of the Ford project outside of Detroit and the fate that befell many industrial cities that housed large industrial operations in years leading up to the Depression. In Ford’s case, these towns were built on the Ford promise: that hard work and an honest five-dollar wage would enable Ford employees to afford the very product they made, save money, and invest in real estate. Unlike the diversified set of industries that the Walkers insisted on in Walkerville, the foundation of Ford City was hastily built on the potential of a single industry, making Motoropolis an example of the precarious nature of manufacturing-based factory towns as the global industries they supported expanded and shrank. Moreover, the Windsor/Detroit dichotomy shows the ability of commerce to bypass, traverse, and reshape physical and imagined boundaries. The Detroit-Windsor borderland, as Michigan historian David Smith notes, “served as both a protective yet

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85 The impact that Ford plants had in the city of Detroit is discussed at length in chapters 4 and 5, where in moves similar to the ones taken in Motoropolis, Ford pushed for an independent tax base in regions bound by the city of Detroit. Thus, the incorporation of Highland Park, like Ford City, led to isolated prosperity and decline that significantly strained the regions adjacent to it.
Figure 1.8: A view of downtown Detroit from the Border City industrial belt, 1925
(FMC-Canada, Leed Library Collection, University of Windsor)
One: Mapping the World as Ford

A permeable barrier that selectively permitted capital, goods, and labor to migrate through the Great Lakes region” while protecting American markets and allowing unfettered movement of Canadian goods and people. The international boundary, he adds, did “not correspond with the wider boundaries of the basin’s economy in which labor and capital migrate.” As such, while the Detroit River created a physical separation between the bordering cities of Detroit and Walkerville, the corporate territory of the FMC was continually shifting in accordance with US-Canadian economic and socio-political relationships. As Ford looked to FMC-Canada as a launching pad for international expansion in the global market, he encountered, as business historian Allan Nevins writes, “every conceivable obstacle, including alien prejudice and condescension; waves of nationalism expressed in tariff walls, unfair taxes, quota restrictions, and government decrees…growing out of geography, climate, and unpredictable variations in taste; and all the vicissitudes of both hot and cold war.”

Through Ford operations in the industrial belt of Motoropolis, the FMC was still in a more favorable position to launch operations in Europe, South America, and beyond. Despite its struggles in Ford City, the company became a fully functioning multi-national enterprise in the Americas and Europe by the first decade of the twentieth century. Assembly branches in Detroit, Windsor, and London were each equipped with their own state-of-the-art assembly plants and were all English-speaking entities led by the strong personalities of Ford, McGregor and Perry – a mix of variables that led to their natural convergence in representing Ford to the Western world. The wave of industrialization that swept through European and American cities at the turn of the century eased this process and factored largely into raised sales numbers and broken records among Ford’s largely Western customer-base in its initial years of existence. The early introduction of the automobile in these markets accelerated the passage of Highway Acts and national investments in infrastructure, accounting for rapid urban growth and the widespread use of motorized vehicles. By the interwar period, the presence of auto assembly plants in American and European factory towns discernably shifted the temporal nature and scope of how cities functioned and how urban and rural commuters operated in relation to it.

However, in his aim to expand operations outside of the Americas and Europe, Ford soon recognized that his company’s impediments in foreign markets were not limited to political strife and nationalistic resistance, but also to the ways in which cities worldwide responded to the introduction of the Ford enterprise and its machinery. The examples of Cairo, Mumbai, and Istanbul in the next section allow an understanding of the challenges the company encountered in its strategy to expand through its “global nodes,” and the role that they played in the advancement of infrastructure in developing contexts.

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86 Price and Kulisek, “Portrait of Ford City.” 121.
87 Wilkins & Hill, American Business Abroad, xvii.
Ford arguably pushed the frontiers of permanent American overseas investment. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil was a close rival, since it established a relatively early presence in South America and parts of the Middle East before other Western enterprises. At the turn of the twentieth century, American commercial investment was limited primarily to the Americas and Europe, leaving the Middle East and vast regions in Asia virtually untouched. According the Bureau of Foreign Relations, by 1900 only 5% of U.S. foreign trade was with Asia and, with the exception of two cotton mills in China, American manufacturing in regions beyond Europe was largely unsubstantial. Rich historical overviews of American commercial expansion have carefully recorded the actions of the FMC and other corporate actors in the Western world, yet there is still much to be understood about American involvement in the commercial markets of the greater Middle East. The cases of Cairo, Mumbai, and, to some extent, Istanbul, offer glimpses into the relationships fostered between these regions through commerce and the role that these markets played in strategizing the growth of a major American industry. The FMC made an appeal to colonial actors, consumers, and governing officials in the Middle East and India at a time when the company saw extreme potential for selling American-made automobiles to these regions. By incorporating international headquarters in the centers of three powerful, industrializing nations, the FMC readied itself to capture the three capitals of the region it indiscriminately called the “markets of the Orient.”

With access points established across the Canadian Dominion and British-held colonies, the FMC had a leg up on the competition in the markets of the British colonies. In fact, within the first year of Ford-Canada’s incorporation, the FMC had the opportunity to expand into its first non-domestic territory: India. An enterprising friend of McGregor’s who had worked as a bookkeeper for Rockefeller’s Standard Oil in Canada joined the group as they began production on the Model C and B, two of the three models that had succeeded the Model T. In the course of his previous work, he had established working relationships with British colonels who were posted in Calcutta and Mumbai. By the end of the year, the new Ford employee managed to solicit an order for the Model C via Oakes & Company (a small London-based automotive motor garage) for shipment to India.

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89 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries, 1900.
90 Wilkins & Hill, American Business Abroad. This two volume edition stands as the only thorough documentation of FMC international activities and focuses largely on investments made in Europe and South America, with large gaps in regards to the Middle East, North and South Africa, Persia and India – areas where the Benson Ford Research Center has a considerable amount of evidence showing that these regions were key to FMC expansion in its early stages. This book, Wilkins & Hills’ research folders at the BFRC, and subsequent works by Wilkins have served as the historical basis from which this chapter has been written. See also: Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).
91 FMC International Branch Records, “Meeting Notes,” BFRC.
Calcutta. This would be the Canadian teams’ first attempt at exporting to a country outside the Dominion, making the Model C its first non-domestic export. The only remaining challenge was the question of how a newly incorporated Canadian office, with only a staff of three and fewer than two-dozen hourly employees, would set out to appeal to the Indian market in 1905. Pushing ahead, the staff of Ford-Canada took this first shipment as a favorable omen, noting that of all the markets in its Dominion, India showed the most promise.

As exports to India became more frequent, local conditions presented another set of challenges – the existence of few automobiles in the subcontinent, fewer paved roads, and the lack of automotive expertise to fix them. The reception of the Model C was mixed at best. A Ford sales agent from FMC-Canada described the on-the-ground difficulties in the following account after a visit to Mumbai:

[A] dozen years after the first Olds had appeared in Bombay (1893), when the first Model C arrived in the colony, there were only about 150 cars in the entire Indian peninsula, and these in the larger cities. The earlier promise of a brisk market had not been fulfilled. There were obvious reasons for this condition: The lack of experienced drivers, the absence of knowledgeable mechanics, and the non-existence of repair shops. Too common were experiences such as that of His Highness the Nijem of Secunderabad, one of the wealthiest princes in India. The prince had heard of the new invention, and had paid 12,000 rupees (about $3800) for an electric carriage which was shipped to him from Paris. One of his grooms undertook to operate it, and burned out the motor in a day. His Highness promptly asserted that the machine was a humbug and ordered it removed from his sight.

Though largely anecdotal, the agents report had some insight. A few American competitors, like General Motors, had begun exporting to British personnel in India in small shipments in the early 1900s, but the vehicles failed to resonate within colonial factions or the general public. As Ford-Canada gathered reports on the Model C’s reception, they worked with Ford-US to tackle the problems associated with a horse-based infrastructure that was transitioning to one that could accommodate automobiles if the technical expertise was present. Since ground conditions limited FMC presence on Indian roads, the company had to find solutions for a car that could withstand existing conditions until the Indian market opened up to the idea of Ford sales branches and repair shops in Indian cities.

Agreements made between FMC-Canada and the British-owned Oakes & Company alleviated the company’s fears about minimal local interest or infrastructure.

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92 Horseless Age, XIV, July 20, 1904, 66-67.
The British subsidiary agreed to store and sell Ford cars to Indian elite and British personnel from an existing garage in Chennai, or Madras. By 1911, the British had built a sufficient enough amount of highway mileage in Ceylon, Malaya, and India for military purposes that the problem of infrastructure was minimized and the demand for automobiles rapidly increased Ford sales in British territories. This, and the tropical weather of the region, made Ford Canada’s year-round foreign sales invaluable, especially when domestic and European sales dropped in colder weather conditions. The combination of these factors led to Ford-Canada’s strong performance in the quarter ending 1911, when the Canadian division managed to sell more cars in the Dominion than any of its competitors, including Ford-Detroit’s international sales.

Lacking a more formal presence on the ground did little to slow Ford sales among colonial factions, but did not improve the automobiles appeal outside this group. Buyers in the “East” remained European and British firms largely purchased vehicles on behalf of personnel based in British territories, which were then manufactured and distributed through British subsidiaries like Oakes & Co. The many accolades that the FMC received from British generals operating in major Indian cities worked to boost sales among British elite in India. The Ford Times boldly announced in 1914 that, “GENERAL BOOSTS FORDS FOR INDIA,” wherein one Brigadier General H.P. Leader waxed “enthusiastic over the ease with which his Ford takes the terrific grades in the Himalaya mountains.” Alongside this testament were detailed descriptions of border-crossings between Punjab and Kashmir and the mountainous terrain that the Ford automobile easily cleared on trips between Kohat, Simla, Delhi, Lucknow, and Lahore. The general’s account, which doubled as an advertisement for the company, lauded the Ford automobile not only by its endurance, but also by the degree to which it enabled colonial actors like him to traverse and observe the varied landscapes of the colonies they were overseeing.

The establishment of Ford in India began with small British firms, in Chennai, Ceylon, Calcutta and Mumbai until the company’s incorporation in Mumbai in 1926 established Ford presence in all the British territories of South Asia. Colonial factions began setting a trend with the car that had the effect of gaining traction among the Indian maharajas and wealthy elite, and then, very minimally trickled down to the general Indian public. The first set of Ford Model T’s were shipped to the Oakes & Co. branch in Chennai in 1914, which arrived in ready-to-assemble kits that were transported by bullock carts due to a lack of a proper assembly plant [Figure 1.9]. Seizing the moment,
Ford-Canada hired several export houses and British firms to handle Canadian business in all of the Indian territories, as far south as Ceylon – or modern day Sri Lanka. Two Canadian sales agents, who were sent to observe the use of the car throughout India, Ceylon, Burma, and Malaya, noted that the cars use was quite minimal and that “the advent of the Ford car into Ceylon is comparatively recent…there are one hundred and ten of them in use in the island.” The agents, employed by the British firm Messrs. Brown & Co., Ltd., were told to sell Model T’s to “Ceylon residents [who were drawn to the car] owing to its remarkably cheap running cost.” Ultimately these middle-class residents fell to the wayside and the cars were primarily sold to the “many Ceylon Government officials,” who held posts as medical officers of health, assistant superintendents and officials in the Public Works Department. The Ford agents’ mission was so successful among elite members of society that in December of that year when George V was crowned Emperor of India, one Ford agent in attendance wrote back

Figure 1.9: A “shipment” of Ford cars to the FMC British subsidiary, Oakes & Co., in Chennai (Madras), India, 1914
(Ford Times, August/September 1914, 104-105)

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100 Ibid, 352.
to Ford-Canada that “[t]he procession was magnificent. There were elephants, camels, Ford cars, and everything all mingled together in oriental magnificence…a beautiful showing.”

For the higher-ups in the corporation, the agents’ words summoned a portrait of the Ford car at the center of contrasting cultures and modernities. Accounts like these also played a foundational role in Ford’s advertising strategy, which slowly began to compare mass assembly and the modern machine it created to the regions in which the company wanted to sell. In Figure 1.9, the image ox-pulled carts, which held the unassembled parts of the Ford machine, against the backdrop of a forested area in Chennai was the beginning of a series of images in which the Ford machine was compared to the buildings and people that surrounded it.

Ford-UK took a slightly different approach from Ford-Canada in its appeal to the British territories. This, in part, was due to the difference in leadership between McGregor and Perry. To create a broader consumer appeal for the Ford automobile, Percival Perry thought it best to create agreements with national factions in establishing sales and assembly branches in European and non-European cities alike. As head of the British branch, Perry was a captivating and charming figure who, by immediately winning Ford’s confidence, was put in charge of managing all the British operations. For all his charm, he was also strong-minded and cunning – unlike McGregor, who admired and emulated Ford and who was known to acquiesce “to repeated, sometimes demeaning demands from the office of Henry Ford.” Perry, conversely, worked in a somewhat contentious relationship with the managing director of foreign sales in Detroit, Robert Roberge, which signaled the beginning of a tumultuous start for Ford-UK. Perry had a distinct vision that set him apart from his counterparts in the US, as noted by Roberge, who staunchly opposed Perry’s recommendations:

It is Perry’s contention that all of Ford’s European business and export business will in the long run be determined by what the Ford Motor Company of England does….Number one, a large portion of the European market was mainly interested in American-type cars at the time. They weren’t interested in the Model Y that they were trying to build in England which wasn’t very successful in the beginning…The Scandinavian market – Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden was strictly an American car market. They were what we’d call a “big car” market. They didn’t like the small European cars. France and Germany were extremely nationalistic. They wanted their own type of locally built automobile…The Near East wanted American-type cars. Perry felt that the small European-type car that he was going to build in England, the Model Y, was the salvation of the entire European market.

Perry made a strong case for the benefits that England’s geographic proximity played in overcoming nationalistic buying preferences, tariffs, and quotas, and Ford sided with him.

101 Personnel Records, Ford-Canada, Leed Library.
102 Roberts, In the Shadow of Detroit, 9.
103 Robert Roberge, “Oral Reminiscences,” 90-92, Acc. #65, Box 56, BFRC.
in the matter. The company transferred the countries of the “European market” from Ford-US oversight to Ford-UK under the helm of Perry, with the understanding that he had a better sense of the market than did his American partners. By the time Perry was pushing for a newly designed Model Y, he had already convinced Henry Ford to consolidate all of the existing European branches under the Ford Motor Company, Ltd. of England and make public companies of each one in the country they operated.

This caused all sorts of confusion among Henry Ford’s close confidants. Charles Sorenson, founding partner of the FMC and Ford’s right-hand man, recalled his surprise and intrigue upon hearing Perry’s new plan:

The Ford Motor Company, Ltd. of England would promote the over-all plan and control of [the new territories] by owning fifty-one percent of the stock issue for each company. Ford Motor Company of Dearborn was to own fifty-one per cent of Ford Ltd. of England. All of these companies [were to be] owned by Ford of Dearborn. This plan called for liquidating these companies which would mean that Ford of Dearborn would get back all their investments in these companies and still own fifty-one percent of the new corporation and the control of each company. It meant for the first time Ford would be issued stock that would be on the market.

This new economic arrangement shifted the nature of the relationship between Ford-US, UK, and the territories that Perry presided over. It also meant that, unlike Ford-US’ and Canada’s approach towards Latin America and Asia, any sales or assembly plants established by Ford-UK would be nationalized in much the same way that they were nationalized in European cities. Since Egypt was a lucrative British territory to the south, Perry turned his immediate attention to Cairo, which he determined would act as the main entry point into the rest of the “Near East.” And he was quick to act. The first Ford branch in North Africa was built in Cairo around 1914 under joint agreements with the Egyptian government. Perry’s method of expansion throughout Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East granted the company easy access and oversight to non-European territories already under British governance.

By 1928, Ford-UK took charge of territories that included Ireland, Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Egypt, Greece, and Romania. Sorenson described this new grouping as “eleven new companies [which] each had its own board of directors and a chairman...[and] when listed looked like a Who’s Who of Europe.”

Egypt’s position as the only North African/Middle Eastern country in a listing of European nations not only singled it out as a strategic territory of interest, but placed tremendous pressure on its representatives to appeal to the automotive markets of its surrounding regions. This fell on the shoulders of a man with close ties to Perry, a British-born salesman by the name of Mr. M Hofinger. Hofinger shuttled between his

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residence in Alexandria and Cairo, as he oversaw the construction of the first Ford sales branch in Cairo and set up Ford bureaus both there and in Alexandria. From these two cities, Hofinger and his associates were responsible for overseeing automotive sales and manufacturing in Iraq, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Italian Somaliland, Oman, Muscat, Bahrain, Malta, Sudan, Syria, Iran, Eritrea, Yemen, Albania, Sinkiang, Mongolia, Transjordan, Hadramaut, Kuwait, and of course, the rest of Egypt.106

The in-house Ford advertisements announcing the company’s arrival in these regions picked up from where Ford-India left off. For the Ford Model T photo shoot, a site sitting adjacent to the Giza pyramids was chosen – an unusual choice for its location about ten miles outside the infrastructure of a bustling city center [Figure 1.10]. This would become a recurring theme in the still and moving images Ford created in Egypt, which took Egyptian monuments and architectural wonders (Giza pyramids, the Sphinx, the Citadel) and placed them next to the Ford machine, not unlike Le Corbusiers comparison of the evolution of the Greek temple and the evolution of the car just a few years later.107 The choice was as much aesthetic as it was symbolic. Photographs of the modest sized Cairo salesroom flooded the pages of Ford promotional materials and circulated throughout Ford-affiliated sales branches and garages. “The Home of Ford Cairo,” read October 1914 issue of Ford Times, did not have the outward appearance of the Kahn-esque brick, glass, and steel structures that were being constructed across North American and European cities in the same year.108 Instead, the building consisted of simple, orthogonal walls made of sun-dried brick and perforated with small square windows, primarily for circulation. The building sat relatively unhindered in an open landscape, apart from a few sparsely planted palm trees and the faint outline of the pyramids in the distance. Local Egyptians were employed to sell the Model T touring cars, which were gaining popularity among government officials, and wealthy Egyptians and Turks.

The decision to base the main Ford manufacturing facility in Alexandria came ten years after the Cairo sales branch was built, perhaps not coincidentally because Hofinger took up permanent residence there. At the time of its establishment in 1926 and before its incorporation in 1932, it was known, by and large, as Ford Africa. In Ford’s ambition to service the entire African continent, the company constructed a fully functioning assembly facility in Alexandria. Much like the design of Euro-American Ford branches and factories, the Alexandrian assembly plant had Khanesque characteristics [Figure 1.11]. The skeletal structure alone required half a city block to accommodate the same assembly line technology that made streamlining and mass assembly possible in the Highland Park plant. The result was a plant that looked much the same on the inside, while mimicked the muted off-white concrete exterior and flat roofs of adjacent buildings on the outside. Through the establishment of Ford-Alexandria, the FMC was able to make earlier, more aggressive business decisions in Egypt as compared to India due

106 Gathered from files in the International Branch Files, BFRC and Wilkins & Hill, American Business Abroad, index.
Figure 1.10: “Forty centuries look down upon you.” “Home of the Ford at Cairo, Egypt,” 1914. (Ford Times, October 1914, 26)
In contrast to Mumbai and Cairo, Ford looked to Istanbul as he contemplated expanding his business into the Mediterranean after the First War ended. Not unlike the deal that Perry struck with the Egyptian government, the company entered into talks with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on February 2, 1929, six short years after he formed his Government of the Turkish Republic. Atatürk’s efforts to “modernize” his newly formed republic included opening up Turkish economy to foreign enterprises and establishing free zones or “exterritorial territories” in the country’s Tophane port region. The agreement made between the government and the Ford Motor Export Inc. Company to its partnership with the officials in the Egyptian government.  

109 Egypt, in particular, merits attention because it is one of the few cases in which local businesses and government interests resisted the will of multinationals like the FMC. One of the reasons is that FMC business grew in Egypt through partnerships with the Egyptian government. Robert Tignor provides a detailed account of some of the challenges that Ford and other multinational enterprises faced in Egypt during the postwar period. See Robert L. Tignor, “In the Grip of Politics: The Ford Motor Company of Egypt, 1945-1960,” *Middle East Journal* 44, no. 3 (July 1, 1990): 383–98.

(operated through Ford’s subsidiary in Treiste, Italy) formed the basis of a new law called “the Ford law.” The roots of the law can be traced to the appeal made by Henry Ford to the Finance Ministry of the Turkish Republic as early as 1925. Urban historian Asli Odman writes that in June or July of that year, when Ford inspector J.J. Harrington was visiting Treiste, Piraeus, and Istanbul, he “referred in detail to the insufficient production capacity of the Treiste plant,” and immediately after receiving “free port concession” from the Turkish government during a trip to Istanbul, Ford gained the rights of delivery to the Treiste territory in addition to the Italian colonies from the Istanbul plant. Much like the relationship established between Ford-Detroit and Canada, the agreement reflected the permeability of political and economic borders between the territories served by the existing Treiste plant for an “indeterminable period,” which included: “Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Georgia, Greece, Turkey-in-Europe, Turkey-in-Asia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Iran, Syria, Arabia except Aden, Oman, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Abyssinia/Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan-in-Egypt, Eritrea, Italian Somalia, Tripoli, Azerbaijan, Djibouti, Crete, Cyprus, Malta, Rhodes, Sardinia, and Sicily.” The result was the first assembly-based automobile plant in the new Republic in late 1929, which delivered Ford goods to a large part of the “Near East” and Asia.

The establishment of the Istanbul Free Port was, without doubt, beneficial to the territory of the Republic and marked the beginning of Turkey’s international trade in the 20s and 30s. Ford’s presence there made the port of Trophane one of the most important trading partners to Italy between 1924 and 1929 and the main distributor of Ford goods to the Mediterranean and Soviet Russia in the following years. Moreover, when Ford-Trieste was forced to shut down after fierce competition from Fiat and resistance from Mussolini’s “national protectionist industrial policies,” Ford shifted production to the interior regions of Italy and Alexandria. The negotiations for this arrangement were made primarily through Ford actors in Alexandria and Ankara, establishing a new line of connection between major port cities that were to service the African and Asian continents. The resulting agreement, the Ford Law (Law number 1391), established the parameters of Ford production between Istanbul and Alexandria and defined distribution, worker ethics, and payment on Ford’s terms. Odman describes the details of the laws as the following:

111 Ibid, citing “Türkiye Cümhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Ford Motör Kumpani Eksports Enkorporeyet fiirketi arasında aktedilen mukavelenaminin tasdikona dair kanun”, Düstür, Üçüncü Tertip,” 1353-1529, Volume: 10, 1928-1929, 2 February 1929, which was a law fashioned by Atatürk specifically for the type of agreement his government made with the FMC, called the Ford Law.
112 Ibid, 108, citing “Plant in Turkey said to be Plan of Ford,” Los Angeles Times, August 1, 1925.
113 Ibid, citing a letter sent by Ford inspector J.J. Harrington, dated July 25, 1925 from the Ford Motor Company Trieste, to the vice president Edsel Ford in Detroit, Benson Ford, Acc.6, Box 401, Territory Reports - J.J.Harrington.
Ford Motor Company Exports, Inc., a branch of the main Ford Motor Company registered in the U.S.A., would not be liable for import-export customs and tax regulations for the manufacture of automobiles, trucks, tractors and airplanes in the free zone for a period of 25 years. The loading and unloading of cargo ships filled with knocked-down products…would take place with its “own means of vehicles and Turkish workers.” In the first two years, 60% of the “officials and employees” that would be employed in the free zone would consist of “Turkish subjects” and at the end of the sixth year, it would constitute 70%. A bonus of 30 dollars would be given for each vehicle that was imported to Turkey because the automobiles manufactured by “local workers” in the free zone were considered as a know-how transfer.\textsuperscript{115}

Built into this Ford law were mandates that clearly articulated aspects of the Ford profit-sharing plan to reduce worker turnover and instill a sense of loyalty among his employees. Fordist labor regimes were introduced when workers signed a contract stating that “they will not consume alcoholic drinks and tobacco” on entry to the plant, and, just like in Detroit, those who had a family were preferred over those who did not.\textsuperscript{116} In line with the social engineering programs that were introduced in Detroit more than a decade earlier, Turkish Ford workers were also asked to take “practical and theoretical courses” at the Ford School, a scene that a visiting New York Times reporter described as a place where “[s]warthy Egyptians and morose-looking Afghans could be seen rubbing shoulders with trim Rumanians and athletic Greeks” [Figure 1.12]\textsuperscript{117} The exception made for Ford by Atatürk not only allowed Ford goods to freely move between territories for which American industrial goods were a relative novelty, but also Fordist practices, which were no longer limited to the confines of Detroit.

The law also spelled out the architectural features for Ford plant in Istanbul. As described by Odman, the law stated that “[t]he Tophane warehouses,” single story buildings that were once used to produce cannons and other military munitions, “shall be evacuated and given to the Ford Company.”\textsuperscript{118} Between May and December 1929, the FMC Exports, Inc. rearranged a 144,600 square foot space by dividing the building into six separate units in order to accommodate its moving assembly line – an arrangement that was reportedly modeled off the Ford plant in Yokohama, Japan [Figures 1.13 and 1.14].\textsuperscript{119} The free zone was situated along the Bosphorus and the designated Ford plot sat adjacent to the eastern wall of the Nusretiye Mosque. A corner of the plant rested against and accommodated for a zigzagging corner of the mosque. Outside of this corner, the plan largely followed the clean, orthogonal lines that dictated most Kahn-designed Ford

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, 111-112.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Odman, “‘Galata Rıhtımı’nda ‘Modern Zamanlar’”, 111-112.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, citing March 2, 1929, Acc.880, BFRC, Mira Wilkins Research Papers, Box 7.
Figure 1.12: First class of employees in the Ford School of Trophane-Istanbul
(Odman, “‘Modern Times’ at the Galata Docks,” 111)

Figure 1.13: Ford at Istanbul, 1928 (branch); 1929 (assembly)
(Photographic Series, International Branch Files, BFRC)
plants. Upon its completion, Alexandria shifted some of equipment and spare parts operations to Istanbul, and the legal representation for all of Ford Motor Company Export, Inc. was moved to Trophane. Positioned between the Bosphorus and the cascading domes of the Ottoman mosque, and more broadly between Europe and Asia, the construction of the Ford plant in Trophane represented the short-lived emergence of the FMC beyond the Trans-Atlantic, to be cut short by the financial crisis of the 30s and nationalist resistance to American-made products through 1940s and 50s.

Nevertheless, corporate meeting notes from Detroit in the years preceding the First War reveal that the establishment of FMC international branches in India and Egypt, and later Turkey, were viewed as necessary points from where the company could expand. So much so that the company dubbed them together as gateways into the Orient. The comparative examples of Mumbai, Cairo/Alexandria, and Tophane also provide a window into the adaptability of FMC international expansion, especially in its early years. Ford automobiles, among other European and American brands, were driven in Indian cities three years prior to the establishment of Ford-Cairo in 1914, but FMC

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120 Odman, “‘Galata Rıhtımı’nda ‘Modern Zamanlar’,” 115.
121 International Branch Files, “Meeting Notes,” BFRC.
expansion in India occurred at a much slower pace due to the limits of infrastructure and market access. On the other hand, under the Ford-UK’s joint agreement with the government of Egypt, sales branches and fix-it garages in Cairo and Alexandria were installed the same year that the company went public, making the process quicker and more geographically expansive. Public-private collaborations with the governments of Egypt and the Republic of Turkey also made it easier for the company to employ local Egyptians and Turks in construction, sales, and manufacturing to fulfill regional production demands quickly, and receive input on the design of branches and garages to suit local needs and tastes. The company’s two-pronged method of accessing markets in the Middle East and India via Ford-UK, Canada, and Italy, was purposeful and spatially strategic, leading to the establishment of several FMC sales branches and garages on the ground as early as 1914 and operating successfully through the mid-1940s. This, along with the innovation of Ford’s business strategy and the architecture of mass assembly, distinguished the FMC’s operations from other multinationals at the time. The consideration of space and architecture as integral to business was key to the success of Fordism during the company’s initial phase of international expansion.

1.4 The Architecture of Fordism

As a shrewd entrepreneur, Ford was well aware of the disadvantages that the lack of cultural posturing posed to the growth of his company in international markets. He sought to accompany his labor reformation with a plan to afford workers their own products, in turn, transforming existing business models. By the early twentieth century, there were two main modes of foreign selling for American businesses: manufacturers either sent their goods abroad through U.S.-based agents or they set up sales branches and made permanent investments in chosen territories.\(^\text{122}\) Ford’s model followed the latter strategy, and amended it to vertically integrate marketing, production, and management across borders to diversify economic interests at home and abroad.\(^\text{123}\) This meant that, in an effort to sidestep tariffs and international requirements against wholly American-made products in foreign markets, the FMC planned to build plants at each foreign branch to give the company complete control of all production processes, including making its own


\(^{123}\) Ford used vertical integration in order to have complete control of the supply chain. What distinguishes vertical integration from other types of industrial organization is the merging together of businesses or a firm that handles different parts of the production process, whereas horizontal integration is the consolidation of firms that handle the same part of a production process. Another example of vertical integration is the oil industry, which is primarily engaged in every step of the production process. Horizontal integration typically occurs through the merging of conglomerates to form a monopoly. See Kathryn Rudie Harrigan, “Vertical Integration and Corporate Strategy,” *The Academy of Management Journal* 28, no. 2 (June 1, 1985): 397–425 and “Moving on up.” *The Economist*, March 27, 2009, [http://www.economist.com/node/13173671](http://www.economist.com/node/13173671), Accessed October 15, 2014.
steel, tools, and assembly lines. By owning the entire chain of command, the FMC controlled each supply part and ensured that the company met production demands even during recessions and great depressions. This centralized control of production later represented the type of industrial organization that was criticized for stifling competition by monopolizing production systems from the top down. Nevertheless, Ford displayed his business acumen by innovating vertical integration as a means to protect his business against the economic rifts in capital and stabilize growth. A less considered aspect of this new economic arrangement, however, and one that enabled the success of Ford’s business model abroad, was the inextricable relationship between the organization of business and space.

In the company’s first attempt to establish an international presence in Motoropolis, Ford proved that spatial thinking was fundamental to the company’s international success. His partnership with Detroit architect Albert Kahn was essential to crafting the architectural component of the Ford model, and offered him a way to interpret the economics of Fordism through design. Their initial collaboration over Detroit’s Highland Park plant in 1910 was credited as the first model of industrial design to streamline the process of assembly and, subsequently, gave birth to the mechanics of mass production. Together, the two applied their architectural and business acumen to innovate the assembly line and mass production at the intersection of architectural experimentation and the logic of commerce. Building on the spatial aspects of the design, Ford popularized the FMC business model by applying the very principle of mass production to the assembly line, thereby creating duplicates of the Ford-US factory model in national and international contexts with varying degrees of cultural sensitivity built in. While seemingly insignificant to many multinationals operating at the time, to Ford, the requirement of carving out large industrial spaces in cities of varying sizes and geographies was not.

On the surface, the outward appearance of assembly plants and sales branches, including the materials used and façade designs, were a mechanism by which the FMC could distinguish cities from one another while connecting the company through a broader corporate geography. Whether in moments of maturation or stagnation, Ford sales branches and assembly plants provided a way for the company to retain an element of control over the way business was perceived on the ground in and outside of Detroit. While largely adhering to Fordist principles, the flexibility of FMC operations on the ground in non-US locales had the effect of alleviating national fears of foreign intervention and automotive competition. In the words of FMC foreign affairs manager Robert Roberge, what enabled the company to grow in volatile periods was the idea of treating the company as a total work of art designed from the ground up – an economic and spatial strategy that allowed every stage of the production process to fall under the command of the Ford-US.\textsuperscript{124} Fordism in this sense requires a deeper understanding of its individual socio-economic and spatial components, as it sought to span and link together corporate geographies, factories, industrial towns, and the people who built and occupied them.

\textsuperscript{124} Robert Roberge, “Oral Reminiscences,” Acc. #65, Box 52, BFRC.
Characterizations of Fordism and its transition to (post-)Fordism, or the organization of prevailing modes of social, political, and economic regulation and growth following the economic crisis of the early 1970s, are varied and contested. Among these debates are three broad economical transitional models and alternative post-modern spatial models which draw a clearer picture of the nature of Fordism and the Fordist vision as I see it in relation to FMC international expansion, regulation of capital, migrant workers and laborers, and space. Using this framework, in the remaining chapters, I pay close attention to the changing role of social and economic regulation of skilled and unskilled workers across this transition to suggest that the installment of US-Fordism in Atlantic Fordist economies (around which many of these debates are centered: US, UK, Germany, France, Benelux, and Sweden) took on a more “flexible” form when applied across non-Atlantic contexts and societies. Central to this flexibility, was a fluid portrayal of culture and identity that served the company’s economic aims, while shaping the spaces and societies within which these processes took place.

Certain economic models define Fordism, its permutations, and transitions, in primarily economic terms, but they also open up opportunities to examine more closely social regulation and the role of the worker in economic models and post-modern spatial considerations. Critics of economic approaches have pointed to their lack of consideration of more variable non-Taylorist/Keynesian forms of organization and state policies for being technologically deterministic, and for posing false dualisms that reduce and flatten the diversity of the processes associated with industrial divides – yet, there remain fruitful overlaps and tensions among them. Of particular interest here is the spatial turn of these approaches, which draw on what regulation theorist Bob Jessop terms “societalization,” a Marxian term he develops to capture the evolution of capitalism in its broader social context. The process of societalization involves the restructuring of institutional domains and regimes of complex inequalities to bring them into alignment, thus creating a territory that would be deemed “a society.” A dominant or binding project of societalization secures acceptance of the so-called “rules of the game” associated with the formation of a society, while its absence, as Jessop writes in regard to the period following Fordism, puts into jeopardy a stable and self-reproducing growth regime. The role of societalization, in this sense, can be seen as one that was prominently played by Americanism in the Fordist era - an ideology that had strong roots.

126 Hirst and Zeitlin, “Flexible Specialization” and Amin, Post-Fordism, introduction.
in the economic workings of Fordism, nationalism, and space. Architectural historian Andrew Shanken offers

Certain continuities and ruptures arise as the processes associated Fordism find form in the built environment.¹²⁹ Allying with strands of the flexible specialization approach, geographer David Harvey uses the term “flexible accumulation” to refer to the loosening of modes of production and consumption as a reaction against the rigidities of Fordism. For Harvey, along with political theorist Frederic Jameson, the end of Fordism (and its form of organized capital) marks the shift from modernity to post-modernity, just as it opens the door for the postmodern rebellion of architecture and urbanization against the austerity of high modernist styles of buildings and planned cities – though Harvey does not strictly write off a survival of continuities in cultural styles.¹³⁰ Cultural theorist Stuart Hall goes further to say that the postmodern “aestheticization” of culture and economy might as well be one and the same, since “through marketing, layout, and style, the ‘image’ provides the mode of representation of the body on which so much of modern consumption depends.”¹³¹ All portray a “flexibility” of urban and cultural styles as a reaction to and against Fordism and modernist shifts. Writing about the rhetoric developed by planners and architects about the American home front in the 30s and 40s, architectural historian Andrew Shanken writes that even language was a powerful tool, used to translated “nineteenth-century biological and organic metaphors [about the economy] into twentieth-century planning ideology, inflecting the language that planners used for decades to ‘rehabilitate’ urban areas.”¹³² Going back further, I suggest that the that the roots of the flexibility between capital, culture, and space can be found at the heart of Fordist principles themselves, which were designed by Ford to work in the service of production and consumption regardless of context.

As Ford prepared to go global, the meeting of capitalist aims with what Hall calls the “aestheticization of culture” culminated in his close partnership with Kahn and the design and construction of factories, sales branches, and garages that sought to represent Fordism on the ground. The buildings became the spaces by which Ford tied together modes of production and consumption; they acted as portable modules that extended the Fordist ideology outside American settings while, at the same time, operating in the service and sales of Ford cars and as points of architectural intervention in new villages, towns, and cities. With Canada serving as successful grounds for experimentation, the

company quickly began building in non-US markets that were open to American enterprise. Not unlike the strategy of building in Cairo and Mumbai, the FMC’s spatial presence in non-western markets was differentiated from regions outside of Europe and North America by having the appearance of a more careful and architecturally tailored approach.

This approach connected a broader corporate geography; from territories worldwide to the Middle East and South Asia. In 1913, the year prior to Ford’s first foray into the Middle East via Cairo, Ford-US had found a willing and profitable market in Latin America. The first sales branch in Buenos Aires (1913) was a sizable building that could be easily converted into a manufacturing facility, if demand warranted – which it did in 1959 [Figure 1.15]. The building, also designed by Kahn, was a hybrid between the type of factory architecture that he was experimenting with in Detroit and the local styles that characterized Argentinian churches and monuments. Kahn managed to retain his signature scalable plan, which incorporated a series of architectural repetitions that lent the building flexibility in adapting to whatever context suited it. As part of this scheme, a series of glass and steel window panels spanned the building from front to back, allowing light to open up the interior of the plan. A prominent tower, stamped with the Ford insignia, rose from the center of the factory to join in the chorus of bell, clock, and church towers that decorated the Argentinian skyline.

Not all buildings were designed from scratch in this way. The FMC set foot in Brazil in a gentler manner, at first, because it wanted to test out the Brazilian auto market via sales branches before proceeding to larger assembly plants. The company started its business just north of Buenos Aires, in Porto Alegre, through a series of small branches that were often based in pre-existing buildings. The branches were so successful, that the FMC’s growth in that country led to Ford’s temporary takeover of a portion of the Brazilian Amazon in the late 1920s for the purpose of a rubber production plant – a project by the name of Fordlandia whose eventual demise was rooted in serious cultural and economic insensitivities. Nevertheless, in its early years, Ford treaded lightly on the city of Porto Alegre and subsequent Brazilian branches. Old banks, apartments and commercial buildings were converted to fit the company’s sales and assembly needs; no matter the size or shape, the buildings allowed the company to make discrete interventions on the ground while still bearing Ford’s notoriously prominent signage [Figure 1.16].

By the early 1920s, it was apparent to the readers of the Ford Times that the company was aggressively vying for traction in the Asian market by way of agent accounts of the viability of Chinese and Japanese roadways for Ford products. The FMC eventually advanced into Asian markets by way of a sales branch in Yokohama in 1926.

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133 The audacious project of Fordlandia is well documented in a book by Greg Grandin of the same name. In it, Grandin tells the story of the rubber plant that Ford attempted to build in the middle of Brazilian Amazon in 1928, by wiping parts of the forest away and recreating an American-style factory town in its place. The project was deemed culturally insensitive, unsustainable, invasive, and failed within a few years. See Greg Grandin, *Fordlandia* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009).
Figure 1.15: Ford of Buenos Aires; 1913 (branch), 1959 (incorporated)

Figure 1.16: A Sales branch in Porto Alegre, 1926 (branch) was fitted into a former bank
and shortly after, a small branch in Shanghai [Figures 1.17 and 1.18]. This was no easy feat for an American enterprise by any measure, which, even in industries beyond automotives, was competing for a portion of the Chinese market against equally competitive Japanese enterprises. FMC sales branches in both countries therefore were decidedly smaller and more localized than in American and European markets, since they functioned purely for the purposes of consumerism and minor assembly. This was, in large part, due to the unwillingness on the part of Asian host countries to welcome fully integrated on-the-ground American manufacturing facilities, which would enable the FMC to bypass international taxes and tariffs – an difficulty that the FMC continued to face in non-Allied countries during the war.

As such, the design of the Asian branches struck a measured and discrete tone. They were single story structures with long rectangular plans that hung low to the ground, and unlike the glass and steel that characterized most Ford-affiliated factories and branches, the materials for Japanese and Chinese branches were primarily wood and concrete. The materials dictated the plans and deviated from the signature Khan-esque hypostyle plans, which created large, open interior spaces that were brightly lit by floor to ceiling windows. Instead, varied rooflines, small wall openings, and distinct Ford signage distinguished Yokohama and Shanghai from other branches, as well as from each other. The Japanese branch featured a saw-tooth roof that zigzagged against the grain of the plan. The roof had a decorated effect as well as a functional purpose: saw-tooth roofs dated back to nineteenth century industrial architecture and were meant to shield workers from direct light while shedding natural light deep into the factory plan. In turn, window openings on the surface of the walls were minimal, and where openings existed, thatched overhangs shaded the interior spaces. The roof structure in the Shanghai branch, a monitor roof that was placed atop of a hipped roof, stretched across the length of the plan, and also had the effect of minimizing the need for large exterior window openings. Small vents ran along either side of the monitor and could operate as clerestories to let light in, or as air ventilators. In both branches, the standard Ford signage was translated into Japanese as a prominent, elevated sign, and into Mandarin, as white characters that were painted over the wooden exterior walls.

Between North and South America, Eastern and Western Europe, and South and East Asia, the territorial gains that the FMC made up until the Second War marked a period of tremendous sales for Ford products abroad. While I maintain that there is little doubt that Fordist design principles eased the Ford enterprise into new contexts, what ultimately determined its enduring success was how the process of Fordism factored the cities and societies in which it was operating into its economic plan. Ford’s venture marked an era characterized by the explicit recognition that mass production meant mass consumption. As David Harvey writes, this demanded “a new system of the reproduction of labor power, a new politics of labor control and management, a new aesthetics and psychology, in short, a new kind of rationalized, modernist, and populist democratic
Figure 1.17: Ford at Yokohama, Japan, 1926 (branch)

Figure 1.18: Ford at Shanghai, 1928 (branch)
society”. The Fordist transformation of labor was a platform from which to shape societies, nation-states, and economies, and essential to this were the spaces within which they were reconfigured. This is evident in the interwar period, when the onset of political and social unrest in advanced capitalist countries forced economies open to the idea of mass production as a solution for urban renewal and reconstruction, in a sense, refashioning citizenry. Space then becomes essential to understanding the backlash against the rigidity of mass production, planning, and the deep social, psychological, and political problems that Fordism posed. Thus, drawing on Lefebvre’s framework of the production of space, the exercise of power, capital, and politics in these moments can be seen as integrally linked to spatial practices and the social and cultural transformation of society and space. Integral to modes of accumulation and regulation were circulating images, films, and advertisements, in addition to the architecture of enterprise, that culminated in a specific Fordist vision that infused visual mediums with the Fordist philosophy, as I show in the next two chapters.

135 The resistance of certain European economies towards the establishment of Ford automobile branches before 1930 was obvious in letters written between Ford’s head of international relations, Charles Sorenson, and heads of state, particularly in Mussolini’s Italy and France. This attitude changed dramatically during and after WWII, with a rising demand for military vehicles and machinery needed for reconstruction. From Charles E. Sorenson, “Oral Reminiscences” in Acc #65, Box 67, BFRC.
136 Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 126.
Chapter Two
Sociological Experiments

Figure 2.1: Ford Motor Company global expansion by 1916
(Map by author based on data from Wilkins & Hill, 2011 and Acc #712, Box 1, BFRC)

Figure 2.2: Representation of national diversity in Highland Park plant, 1916-7
(Ford Guide vol, 1, issue 1, c.1916-7, 18-19)
Two years after the launch of the Profit-sharing plan, the Ford Motor Company sat at the crossroads of global migrations that stretched as far as the southern tip of Latin America and the eastern edge of Europe. With a rapidly expanding and diverse labor force, the company quickly began to focus on taking its corporate presence to the very places from which it drew labor. In the same year, 1916, the FMC had established Ford-US, UK, and Canada, and set up sales branches in 10 cities across 4 continents [Figure 2.1]. Upon hearing of the highest working wage offered by any industry, aspiring Ford workers traveled to the Highland Park plant from 42 cities across six continents. As immigrant workers arrived, they were presented with the *Ford Guide*, a booklet that featured a map titled “Foreign Countries and Capitals at the Ford Plant” across its centerfold. The world map showed the United States and Detroit squarely placed at its center, with dotted lines connecting all 42 cities from where laborers traveled to the Highland Park plant in Detroit. Each line was marked with a yellow dot and a number that indicated the number of “nationalities represented” at the Ford plant [Figure 2.2]. The map served as the centerpiece of the first issue of the *Ford Guide* in 1916, which was distributed to immigrant workers “with the desire to cultivate and establish the broadest fellowship among Ford workers through understanding each other.”

The company’s mapping of the world, as demonstrated in Chapter One, was not limited to the tastes and potentials of the global marketplace. The FMC also took into consideration the nationalities present within the company itself. With Ford’s new plan in effect, no matter the viewer, everyone was a potential consumer – even the immigrant worker. This was one of the major ideological forces behind Ford’s creation of the Sociological Department, which acted simultaneously as the company’s social welfare distributor, and its marketing organ. Regardless of the type of document, whether it was internal and limited in reach or commercially and publicly circulated, every visual device that emerged from the department had the same intent: to contribute to a brand that was didactic and alluring in its commercial appeal, and treated every viewer as a potential Ford consumer. In this sense, the Ford promise and the Sociological Department were very much part of the same project, where the former relied on the central tenants produced by the latter. As such, the parameters of this chapter are bounded by the visual aspirations and cultural limits of the company as represented by the diagrammatic maps in Figures 2.1 and 2.2; the first, which is based on the regional locations of FMC branches in 1916, and the latter, which was produced by the company based on the migratory geographies of its workers. Both maps tease apart how the FMC “pictured the world” within itself, and itself as everywhere in the world, particularly as it began devising its own socio-economic policies and advertising strategies.

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139 This idea borrows from Timothy Mitchell’s writings on world expositions and his idea of enframing, or the colonial exercise of giving order to the world by displaying and ordering it in one place. Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
This chapter begins by providing a history of the Sociological Department in its nascent stages, as the company grew from the core Atlantic Fordist economies and Latin America, to the Middle East and Asia, until its initial demise in the late 1920s. Using textual and visual documents from the FMC social programs as primary evidence, I show how the company adopted the language and promise of a type of Americanism that set immigrants apart from the larger Ford workforce through additional social requirements, such as English language learning and ceremonial exercises. This narrative is part of a larger history that had discernable impacts on the planning, urbanization and, using Jessop’s term, the societalization, of places where the FMC had a visual and physical presence. In my analysis, I borrow conceptually from Chapter One, and the “flexible” frameworks offered by Jessop, Harvey, and Domosh to describe how Ford’s capitalist enterprise adapted social identity and culture in its management of workers and marketing of Ford products to shape imaginative and real geographies around Americanism at home and abroad. The use of what one might call “flexible Fordism” in the FMC’s mapping of world economies enabled a direct translation of the civilizing aims that were used in Ford’s social engineering programs in Detroit, and their depiction in promotional advertisements, films, and architectural projects writ large.

2.1 The Immigrant Question

The announcement of the Profit-sharing plan on January 5, 1914 dramatically altered the global industrial landscape and placed the Ford Motor Company at its center. Nearly doubling their earnings, workers could receive a path-breaking $5 wage that afforded them the very product that they assembled. However, beneath the public image of this plan was a lesser known social spectre: in the same instance that the principles of Ford’s economic plan were being put into place, the company was less overtly designing social programs that would enable them to monitor spending and behavior among its employees. As workers from all corners of the world rushed to Detroit for a chance to work on FMC assembly lines, the company strictly enforced policies that ensured minimal turnover among Ford workers, and that they also spent their profits wisely. As part of this plan, investigators like Torassian would report to “Special Advisors,” who would evaluate whether each (immigrant) workman deserved their share of the profits based on the investigators judgment of his thrift, domestic conditions, work ethic, and national allegiances. This begs the question, why did the company think it necessary to attach such extensive social conditions to what seemed like a purely economic plan? And why focus on the immigrant worker? To answer, I begin by laying out the types of

140 Bob Jessop, ed. The Politics of Flexibility: Restructuring State and Industry in Britain, Germany, and Scandinavia. Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield, Vt., USA: E. Elgar, 1991; Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 141-172; Domosh, American Commodities, 181-195. Each author uses the term flexibility to characterize transitions caused by the reorganization of political, social, and economic relations, either through labor formations (Jessop) and capitalist accumulation (Harvey) in the late 1970s, or, as Domosh shows, through “flexible racism” in turn-of-the-century American advertisements.

141 “A Brief Account of the Educational work of the Ford Motor Company,” 1916 in Acc. 951, Box 3, BFRC.
transformations that were underway in Detroit in the first decade of the FMC’s operation, before describing the measures taken by the company in response to these transformations, in the form of the Sociological Department.

Between 1910 and 1930, Detroit experienced more of a rapid influx of black migrants and immigrants than any other major American city. In each of the three decades after 1900, the city’s population nearly doubled: from 285,284 people in 1900, to 993,000 in 1910, and 1.72 million in 1930. In response, the city municipality annexed adjacent territories to increase its square mileage, growing from 28.35 square miles in 1900 to more than 80 by 1930. Outside of the effects of industrialization, the influx was the result of a confluence of factors, including the “great migration,” displacements resulting from the First War, and the easing and restricting of immigration from Eastern Europe and Asia. Nevertheless, Detroit’s industries were at the forefront of territorial annexations, with Ford and his Five Dollar day arguably as the central catalyst. As documented by labor historians of this moment, black migrants left inhospitable conditions in the South to fill the void left by labor shortages in the industrial North, only to face deep structural inequalities that were borne of these moments. While there is no doubt that Ford was the primary employer of black workers in their (and his) quest for more fair and equal wages in Detroit, black migrants also bore the brunt of the socio-economic inequalities that stemmed from early forms of industrial ghettoization and labor hierarchy. That said, going beyond the black/white binary, there were also a significant number of immigrant workers who categorically escaped identification as black or white, and whose “unpredictable” nature also posed a problem for the industrial order of the city.

Ford’s response to this “problem” was developed and shaped according to events unfolding as far back as 1910 and coming to fruition in 1913. Historian Stephen Meyer III, in one of the few thorough accounts of The Five Dollar Day, has written extensively on the formulation of Ford’s economic program in the years preceding and following its introduction. He details the development of sizable colonies of largely unskilled workers that came to a head between 1912 and 1914, due mostly to a rise in immigration from regions surrounding Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Despite this new volume of workers, however, many industries still suffered from labor shortages in the form of foreign, unskilled labor. The shortage was so severe, he writes, that it prompted the Detroit Board of Commerce to send “‘immigration commissioners’ to Ellis Island to

142 United States Census reports of 1910, 1920, and 1930.
143 Ibid.
secure ‘newly arrived immigrants’ and to send them ‘directly to [Detroit].’” At the same time, the increasing heterogeneity of Ford’s workforce, the primary employer of newly arriving immigrants, contributed to the hindrance of the company’s overall productivity. The paradox of the moment was that in the same instance that more foreign workers were needed, their overwhelming presence was accompanied by the cultural, social, and linguistic complexities that could not be overcome by the Fordist mechanization of the assembly line.

Demographically speaking, between 1910 and 1920, Detroit’s total population consisted of about 67% “native born” or “American”, 30% foreign born (white), and around 4% black. The major ethnic groups within the foreign-born population were English, Scottish, German, and Polish, and remained so for a decade, before the number of black migrants and unaccounted for “Others” (ethnic categories that were mixed but were made of 800 or more individuals) shot up 6% and 17% respectively by 1930. This diversifying worker demographic marked a sea change in the type of immigrant worker that was beginning to work alongside more dominant nationalities on the assembly line. Those foreign-born groups (German, English, Irish) maintained a presence but were beginning to give way to a “new” set of immigrant workers who were arriving from Eastern Europe, Southern Italy, Japan, Mexico, and the region formerly designated as the Ottoman Empire. Black workers remained a minority when compared to the numbers of “native born” and foreign-born workers and were therefore given significantly less attention in the formulation of Ford’s social programs. Not only did race factor into their status as consistently at the bottom of the industrial hierarchy, but as neither truly “native” nor “foreign,” black workers also fell outside of the propositions of language learning and naturalization that could be made to newly arriving immigrants. These variations in appeals and benefits based on citizenship and race would eventually lead to its own set of problems for American industry, with the arrival of black worker unions and the strengthening of existing organizations like the Industrial Workers of the World, or IWW. Suffice it to say that the international diversification of Ford workers, and growing conflicts between industry and the worker were clearly taking root and demanded immediate attention.

Oral records internal to the FMC indicate that Henry Ford attempted to maintain a Ford worker composition that was representative of Detroit’s broader demographic,

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146 Detroit Tribune, January 10, 1910 and Detroit Free Press, July 14, 1912 in “Automobile Industry History,” Box 1, Edward Levinson Papers, Archives of Labor History and Urban Affairs., Wayne State University, Detroit, as cited in Meyer, The Five Dollar Day, 76.
148 Ibid.
149 Joyce Shaw Peterson documents this change as a shift between “old” and “new” immigrants. Old immigrants (British, Irish, German) made up 75% of Detroit’s population in 1910 and decreased to 52.4%, whereas “new” immigrants from Poland, Austria, Russia, and Italy increased from 25% in 1910 to 47.6%, eventually surpassing the former group. This, she writes, had a significant impact on developing labor hierarchies within the factory setting. Joyce Shaw Peterson, American Automobile Workers, 1900-1933 (SUNY Press, 1987), 16.
which, at the outset of the Five dollar Day, revealed quite a vivid picture.\textsuperscript{151} Eleven months after the installation of Ford’s profit-sharing programs, \textit{The New York Times} made the first pronouncement that publicly detailed the international composition of Ford workers. It reported the following in its “Automobile Trade Notes” section on November 15, 1914:

In the army of Ford employes the Triple Alliance is represented by 606 Germans, 269 Hungarians, 750 Rumanian, 388 Austrians, and 330 Syrians. There are also 81 Turks and 690 Italians and Sicilians. The Triple Entente, on the other hand, has among Ford workers 380 English, 133 Scotch, 148 Irish, 226 Canadians, 3 Australians, 2,016 Russians, 2,677 Poles, 73 Lithuanians, 18 Croatians, 55 Frenchmen, 21 Danes, 6 Belgians, 26 Hollanders, 31 Japanese, and 210 Servians [sic].\textsuperscript{152}

The \textit{Times}’ description of Ford’s foreign-born population was politically inscribed with as much fervor as was lingering in the American consciousness – and weighed equally on public discourse. Nationally circulated papers, like \textit{The New York Times}, and local ones like the \textit{Detroit News} and Ford’s very own \textit{Dearborn Independent}, worked in one way or another to constitute a public narrative that later gave credence to industrialists and Americanization campaigners who rallied for the cultural, linguistic, and national “incorporation” of foreigners into the American mainstream [Figure 2.3].\textsuperscript{153}

Yet, if the ethnic composition of Ford’s Highland Park workforce was merely representative of a larger trend, it is important to consider how Ford’s worker composition compared to the general demographic in Detroit during the years that the Sociological Department was initiated – particularly given the shocked and politicized response to the revelation of Ford’s official statistics.\textsuperscript{154} According to statements made by FMC officials to major news outlets, the majority of Ford workers at the precipice of the First War were immigrants – in fact, in the inaugural year of the Profit-sharing program, Henry Ford reported to \textit{The New York Times} that a whopping \textbf{70.7\%} of the FMC’s 12,880 workers were foreign born.\textsuperscript{155} The largest groups at the time of reporting were Polish,

\textsuperscript{151} Hooker, \textit{Life in the Shadows}, 85.


\textsuperscript{153} Richard D. Alba and Victor Nee, \textit{Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration} (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003). This is a contemporary study of Hispanic and Asian working immigrants, but I’m interested in how Alba and Nee rework the idea of the “mainstream” and how occupation, education, housing, and legislation sustained systemic forces of assimilation in first waves of migration.

\textsuperscript{154} An addendum to this “official” figure that the company floated in public outlets: there were also lesser known exchanges between the FMC and the Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding quotas that the US government instituted through the Immigration Act of 1924. I look more closely at the politics regarding these quotas in Chapter 5, which in and of themselves were a complicated negotiation between corporate needs and the political theatre of nationalism.

Figure 2.3: Front page of Ford-owned Dearborn Independent, warning of public cost of growing immigrant population in Detroit, 1923
Austrian, Russian, Italian, Romanian, and Syrian. These “new” groups, as historian Joyce Peterson notes in her study of early twentieth century American autoworkers, replaced an “older generation” of workers who arrived from Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany a few decades earlier. The older immigrants and their children, at this point, would more likely be skilled, moving out of the working class, and no longer associated with the predominant auto industry in Detroit. Thus, the distribution of the “type” of worker throughout the workforce was uneven, with more skilled (or American, German) workers on the machine lines and deskilled (Russian, Polish, Croatian, Austrian, Italian, black, Syrian) as press operators, grinders, or the lowest class laborers.

The difference between the skilled and unskilled (or de-skilled) worker in Taylorist or Fordist terms, then, had as much to do with the race, ethnicity, and the citizenship of workers as it did with the level of skill they were bringing with them to the factory. In his 1912 testimony to the House of Representatives Special Committee, Taylor laid out the four principles that were key to successful management of workers, the second of which was the “scientific selection and progressive development” of the workingman. While there is little evidence that suggests Ford and his team of managers were directly consulting Taylor’s writings and lectures (in fact, Taylor is documented as having given talks to Detroit area industries on two separate occasions in 1909 and 1910), it is clear that elements of Taylorist thought on scientific management found their way into Ford’s social philosophy. While not “scientifically selected” in the way of Taylor’s prescription, Ford foreign workers were indeed kept in the workforce based on their regional ties, work ethic, and propensity for American loyalty. The implementation of additional social requirements and educational programs for foreign workers were supplemental tools used by the company to scientifically shape men’s minds, just as the innovation of the assembly line was meant to hasten human efficiency through the application of the machine. Oftentimes, as I expand upon later in this study, the “skill” of an entry-level black migrant or immigrant worker had less to do with their actual skill-sets, their placement in the factory, or what type of work they were assigned, than with their national origins and the ceremonial requirements of Fords social programs.

That said, a deep dive into the ethnic composition of foreign workers shows a rise in numbers for immigrants coming from regions who were not yet accounted for by established color lines, and a decline in the number of what Peterson calls “new” immigrant workers in the years that the Sociological Department was most active. In 1914, “native” American workers made up 3,773 (or 29.3%) of Fords 12,880 workers. The second most populous groups were the Polish at 20.8%, Russian at 15.7%, and “Other” at 10.7%. By 1920, “native” American workers still outnumbered the general composition of Ford workers at 52.9% or 57,160 workers, but the “Other” category

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156 Peterson, *American Automobile Workers*, 16.
surpassed all other immigrant (and black migrant) numbers, reaching 17.5%, or 10,000 workers. In the city of Detroit more generally, by 1930, the percentage of overall “native-born white” autoworkers decreased from 60.6 to 40.8 of the total population while “foreign-born white” autoworkers increased in percentage from 35.9 to 43.3 and black migrant workers increased about three percentage points from 4 to 6.9.\textsuperscript{161} “Other” and to some degree “foreign-born white,” as defined by the FMC Employment Department, was “a mixed category, with no single nationality and having more than 800 members.”\textsuperscript{162} In this ambiguous category were a few hundred Mexicans who migrated north from Texas and who, as social historians have shown, had varied experiences of towing the color line – yet were set apart from Anglo workers based on housing, religion, and citizenship.\textsuperscript{163} East Asians, too (primarily Chinese workers), comprised a small but growing number of Ford workers, even though immigrants from these regions experienced the earliest and most severe forms of American exclusion in the mid-nineteenth century. Another significant portion of the “Other” category, and the one most pertinent to this study, were a group of Syrian, Egyptian, Palestinian, Indian, Turkish, Armenian, and Kurdish workers who were extremely varied in their cultural, religious, and linguistic affiliations and whose lives were most likely affected by the reconstitution of their homelands in the aftermath of the war. In fact, a scan for these nationalities in the Ford Trade and English School records shows that almost 20% of immigrant workers arrived from these countries to the FMC between 1919 and 1927 – and these records are incomplete, which means there may have been many more.\textsuperscript{164}

The records also lend insight into the company’s confused classification of immigrant workers, which ranged from designations like “non-English speaking,” “ethnic,” “foreign,” “Catholic,” “Mohammedan,” or “Hindu,” along with categories used by the US Census. These “racial” identifiers are not only problematic because they were unevenly used and oftentimes misused, but also because it is unclear whether workers categorized themselves or were categorized by the social agents who were assigned to them. As a number of studies have shown, there was a shifting relationship between labor and the social construction of race across the twentieth century, and the ability to “work towards whiteness” had less to do with skin color and more to do with power structures and state regulations.\textsuperscript{165} In determining naturalization at the turn of the century, for

\begin{itemize}
  \item Peterson, \textit{American Automobile Workers}, 17, and J. Herkel, Employment Department, Acc #284, Box 10, September 16, 1920, BFRC.
  \item Authors estimate based on data collected from the “The Henry Ford Trade School Record” series, 1919-1927, Acc. #774, BFRC. The Sociological Department went through a series of managerial changes and policy disagreements during this period that, according to the BFRC archivists, reportedly resulted in a manager angrily setting a portion of the student files ablaze before ending his tenure at the company.
  \item Roediger, \textit{Working toward Whiteness}, 138. By no means comprehensive, but for a few studies that have shaped my work in relation to labor and race formation, see: David R. Roediger, \textit{Working toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the
example, judicial courts would often determine their own color lines, as Ian Haney-López shows, ruling in some instances that “applicants from Mexico and Armenia were ‘white,’ but vacillated over the Whiteness of petitioners from Syria, India, and Arabia.”

Likewise, studies of “white” immigrant and “native” American workers in Detroit present further complications if we factor in the large numbers of Canadian and British workers who were considered as immigrants, but who spoke English fluently and were not subject to the same social scrutiny as non-English speaking immigrants.

While the demand for foreign labor in the early years of automotive industry resulted in new immigrant compositions that defied existing national and corporate ethnic/racial categorizations, it led to an even more heterogeneous set of immigrant workers in the city and on the factory floor. One of the most glaring signs of this shift in industry was worker inefficiency on Ford’s assembly line prior to the First War, which was severely disrupted by high rates of turnover and absenteeism due to overall labor dissatisfaction. Turnover rates at the FMC plant were 2 to 3 times that of other industries by 1913. Immigrants, in particular, could be replaced on a whim, could easily move from one factory job to the next based on rates of pay, or found it difficult to adjust to dismal factory conditions and seemingly unending working hours. In addition, the increasing stratification between “old” American and German skilled workers and “newly arriving” deskill ed immigrant workers led to an increasing stratification in the occupational structure of the Ford workforce, leading to the distinction between the aristocratic English-speaking workers and the rest. This translated into residential segregation, socio-economic inequality, and conscious and unconscious class tensions. The social condition of industry thus became the social problem of the city, and “required a new degree of cultural conformity” from Ford and other leading industrialists.

So significant was the decade following 1913, that a host of national and industrial organizations became unified in their mission to lessen the supposed threat posed by these immigrants to the overarching national identity. The most prominent of these were actions taken by the Johnson administration through the Johnson-Reed Act (Immigration Act of 1924), which prohibited the immigration of Arabs, East Asians, and Indians “to preserve the ideal of American homogeneity.”

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166 Haney-López, White by Law, 203-208.
the same concerns preoccupied the FMC and spurred its invention of the Sociological Department and its education programs. Not only was the company intent on “preserving” national allegiances among its foreign workforce at a time when they largely outnumbered “native” American workers, but it found a way to couple these intentions with policies that ensured that the immigrant worker was also a productive and thrifty member of the assembly line system. As Ford’s workforce transitioned from major groupings of North Americans and Western Europeans in 1914, to that of Eastern Europeans, Asians, Latinos, and Arabs in the 1920s, the company adapted its language and imagery according to its shifting worker demographic, along with a series of social requirements that sought to tame the nature of the “foreign element.” To counter the supposed immigrant problem, the FMC implemented additional requirements that, if followed, would result in Ford’s guarantee of a share in profits and the promise of naturalization and homeownership – the hallmarks of Americanization. These are the kinds of socio-economic distinctions between Ford workers that bring the core of this study into focus.

2.2 Sharing Profits

*The New York Times*, on the day that the profit-sharing plan was announced, headlined its front page with “Ford Gives $10,000,000 to 26,000 Employees.” The article outlined all the major points of the plan, including how the creation of three 8-hour shifts resulted in the 24 hour operation of the plant, the $5 minimum wage, and that “no employee to be discharged except for unfaithfulness or hopeless inefficiency.” It marveled at the amount of capital the company was willing to share with its workers in the form of semi-monthly payments added to pay checks, and that the company was adding an additional 4,000 workers due to the mechanics of the 8-hour shift. The paper interviewed James Couzens, then Treasurer of the FMC, who elaborated further:

> It is our belief that social justice begins at home. We want those who have helped us to produce this great institution and are helping to maintain it to share our prosperity. We want them to have present profits and future prospects. Thrift and good service and sobriety, all will be enforced and recognized.172

According to Charles Sorenson, a longtime FMC exec, the impact that the Five Dollar day had on the “revolution in business outlook and economic thought, and the evolution of the distinctly American productive system of free enterprise” did not bear out until many years later.173 The plan came into being in a meeting between Henry Ford, Sorenson, railroad mogul and early Ford partner James Couzens, engineer Ed Martin, and Head of Personnel John R. Lee on January 4, 1914. Couzens, who is described as one of

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172 Ibid.
173 Ibid, 135.
Henry’s major “lieutenants,” is credited by many Ford historians as the brains behind the business, while Henry Ford, after working for many years for Thomas Edison, was more like the tinkering engineer who gave the company its wheels. Couzens quickly became the face of the company when it came to business dealings, as he had a fiery personality and a penchant for the limelight that was perhaps better suited for the political career he chose after his tenure at the FMC. In this sense, Henry Ford’s relaxed persona stood in direct contrast to Couzens, whose reported persistence could convince Ford of almost anything business related. While the group expected resistance from the notoriously reactionary Couzens, they were surprised to find that not only did he wholeheartedly agree with the plan, but he also was excited by its humanitarian aspects, which had the possibility to generate “great positive publicity [for the company] rather than pure philanthropy.” 174

The birth of the Sociological Department alongside Ford’s Profit-sharing plan was no coincidence. Its existence was essential to the introduction of the Five Dollar Day program, with a written purpose to provide economic benefits to workers who abided by Ford’s social contingencies. As an ideological, sales, and social arm of the FMC, the department took many forms and titles, was led by multiple personalities, waxing and waning throughout the company’s early history until it eventually dissolved in 1948. At its prime, the department helped the company to find its footing as an industrial force on the world stage, and produced a host of manuals, guides, and films that were developed to train and tame employees at all levels to comply with the FMC’s developing code of efficiency. The opening passage of the FMC Manual of Procedures stated as much from the outset:

> The value of social work through our plant relations is fast becoming one of the major considerations to harmonious employment. Mechanical engineering coordinated with what we now term Human Engineering (that is, intelligent interest in and respect for the human elements involved), should, if honestly sought and instantly applied, develop into a better and all inclusive industrial efficiency [sic]. 175

This particular manual assisted Ford investigators in methods of social surveillance with a central thesis that machines were easily interchangeable with men. The systematic, rational formulas used to innovate mass production were expected to yield equally productive, rational beings through the application of social work programs. In the public sphere, the program was introduced as part of an equal opportunity measure, which ensured that every FMC worker who sought to benefit from the profit-sharing plan was subject to the same social and moral code. Ford’s announcement of the Five Dollar day


175 “The Procedure Manual Subseries,” c. 1933 in Acc. #280, BFRC, Section IV, page 2. This was the first in a series of manuals produced for social agents, or investigators, of the Ford Motor Company. The manual was distributed internally as an instructional guide for handling foreign employees in the plant and in their homes.
hit the newsstands to much fanfare and was initially described as a one year “experiment.” As the yearlong experiment wore on, however, the immigrant worker arguably became the departments primary concern when it came to the enforcement of its policies. In this sense, the social arm of the company was established to temper the most unpredictable variable in Ford’s industrial equation: the foreign human element.

The foundational aspects of the plan can be traced to John R. Lee’s comprehensive reforms of October 1913, which stemmed from a study that Ford requested from him on labor conditions in the factory. Lee was a former executive of the Keim Mills company, which was bought out by Ford and moved to Detroit. Lee then became employment manager at the FMC and took the lead on social reforms on the factory floor. He became a key figure in the formation and formulation of the Sociological Department in its first few years before he left the FMC to form another company town called Marysville. A section from his report addressed the set of problems that the Profit-sharing and social programs would determine to resolve:

1. Too long hours. A man whose day is too long and whose work is exhausting will naturally be looking for another job.
2. Low wages. A man who feels that he is being underpaid will always be looking for a change in occupation.
3. Bad housing conditions, wrong home influences, domestic trouble, etc.
4. Unsanitary and other undesirable shop conditions.
5. Last and perhaps the most important case of dissatisfaction is the unintelligent handling of the men on the part of the foremen and superintendents.

Drawing on his findings, Lee recommended strategies to make the FMC administration more effective in its handling of FMC employees while reducing turnover. In turn, the first installment of Lee’s reforms attended to the scientific management of Ford employees. His initiatives were the first step in linking the skill level of workers to the wage system, which, before the reforms took place, took the form of “some sixty-nine different rates of wage” by which the company “was employing men at their face value in the employment department, trying them out, and if they did not fit, letting them go.” In turn, he suggested that the company consolidate the wage system into eight different rates that classified men into six groups, so that men would understand upon arrival what their earning potential was, and simultaneously, put checks on each individual case.

The result of these checks and balances, managerially, was that a foreman could not fire an employee from the company on his own volition; rather he could only discharge a worker from his department until, after a full review, the FMC management attempted to lift “him up to the requirements of the Company, and to the equal of his fellow men.”

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180 Ibid.
thereby finding him a more suitable track within the factory. While this new method significantly reduced the turnover rate among Ford workers by giving them “a second chance,” it also meant, for the first time, the company was forced to account for human failure in its promotion of “harmonious employment” within the FMC workforce. In this light, the profit-sharing plan was a natural extension of Lee’s October 1913 measures, which, as Clarence Hooker notes, emphasized “the more scientific management of labor [while] the Five Dollar Day added the extra dimension of welfare-work to the industrial betterment program of the company.”

Henry Ford’s request of Lee to examine the causes of worker dissatisfaction in the summer of 1913 stemmed from a year-long contemplation about two things: his aim to expand the company in a way that would resolve its production problems and his prediction that the Highland Park plant would soon be rendered obsolete by increased demand for the Ford product. In Ford’s estimation, if the company began producing its own materials, the cost of production and product would decrease, while demand and profits would increase. If his calculations proved correct, the company would be able to invest those profits back into the company in the form of an increased wage. This was one of the first propositions by a major American company to reinvest profits into what was primarily considered the bottom of the corporate totem poll: wage workers.

Sorenson, one of the few men present during the formulation of the plan, recalled the immediate reactions the plan provoke from those who labeled it ‘business philanthropy.’ “There’s no philanthropy about it,” Sorenson retorted to leading competitors who balked at the plan. The plan, he continued, “was denounced as ‘socialism,’ ‘economic madness,’ ‘industrial suicide,’ and ‘undermining business.’ But it was none of these things. It was just good, sound business. As Henry Ford said at the time, it was not ‘charity’ but ‘profit sharing and efficiency engineering.’” By raising the buying power of the Ford wage earner, the plan increased the buying power of other people “in a sort of chain reaction.” Contrary to what observers believed at the time, price reduction was not the same as reducing the income of the business. In fact, it had the opposite effect, as Sorenson notes: “Our sharing profits with the public by lowering the price had a stimulating effect on our business. When prices went lower, we did more business and employed more men. Wages and profits rose and car prices dropped.”

The creation of the profit-sharing plan and Five Dollar day was, as Meyer writes, an ingenious way for company to make administration more efficient and reduce worker turnover, while adding an extra dimension of social welfare.

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185 Ibid.
186 Ibid, 143.
FMC execs were quick to appoint Lee to test out and enact Ford’s hypothesis and, soon after, the Sociological Department was created. Between 1914 and 1916, Lee laid the framework for the department by hiring “investigators” to interview workers and document their living conditions to determine whether they met the departments strict guidelines, like speaking English in the home, cleanliness, and thriftiness. If they fell short, they would have more difficulty receiving the five-dollar wage. More often than not, immigrants would be susceptible of falling short of the language requirements, which put more pressure on them to fulfill the departments’ requirements, and thus conform to Ford’s Americanization strategies.\(^1\) In 1915, Henry Ford asked his Episcopalian pastor, Reverend Samuel S. Marquis, to volunteer his services to Lee as he see fit. Marquis, at the time, had reached a point of exhaustion as acting dean of the newly constructed St. Paul’s church, which Henry and his wife Clara attended. Though known to be nominally Episcopalian (and most probably an agnostic), Ford would spend time with Marquis to keep up appearances and, in due time, the couple learned about Marquis’ interest in family economics and working conditions.\(^2\) One of his major objectives, in fact, was to emphasize religion for the workingman, a concept that immediately appealed to Ford. Marquis eventually took over the department from Lee in 1916, and an elated Ford responded in kind by reportedly saying “I want you, Mark, to put Jesus Christ in my factory.”\(^3\) According to Marquis’ memoirs, he also perceived Lee to be “a man of ideas and ideals”:

He [had] a keen sense of justice and a sympathy with men in trouble that leads to an understanding of their problems. He [had] an unbounded faith in men, particularly in the ‘down and outs,’ without which no man can do constructive work. Under his guidance the department put a soul into the company…Mr. Lee must be credited with being one of the makers of the Ford Motor Company on its human side.\(^4\)

Marquis’ appointment put a particular moral and ethical slant on sociological operations in the FMC. Between Lee and Marquis, the social programs became loosely based on the tenants of the welfare work that was common in the early decades of the twentieth century, in line with the intellectual traditions of the Social Gospel and Progressivism. The enforcement of these codes and their attachment to economic rewards became a marker of the effectiveness of Ford, and a powerful example of using monetary incentives to mold, shape, and discipline Ford workers for mechanized factory work.\(^5\)

Lee’s tenure with the FMC lasted a few years, until he left to start his own automotive company. His signature achievement was a “skill-wages classification system,” which increased the wages of Ford workers (before the installment of the Five Dollar day), rationalized wage policies that offered workers socio-economic mobility

\(^{188}\) *Ford Motor Company Industrial Relations Records Collection*, 1915-1963, BFRC.

\(^{189}\) Bryan, *Henry’s Lieutenants*, 205.

\(^{190}\) Ibid, 206.


within the company, and in effect, created the need for an Employee’s Savings and Loan Association to address the concerns of financial insecurity for the working-class. His October 1913 report became a blueprint for addressing the major concerns of Ford labor reform, the inspiration for which he expands upon in reflecting upon his research:

It was along in 1912 that we began to realize something of the relative value of men, mechanism and material in the threefold phase of manufacturing, so to speak, and we confess that up to this time we had believed that mechanism and material were of the larger importance and that somehow or other the human element or our men were taken care of automatically and needed little or no consideration…a little talk with the operator revealed a condition of things entirely outside of business, that was responsible for our depleted production. Sickness, indebtedness, and fear and worry over things that related entirely to the home, and crept in and had put a satisfactory human unit entirely out of harmony with the things that were necessary for production.¹⁹³

A repeated concern in connection with these observations was poor housing and home conditions, which Lee claimed was the principal source of worker inefficiency. Following wage increases and systemization, the FMC instituted three 8-hour shifts, thus reducing the 10-hour day that laborers had been accustomed to working. Eligible Ford employees would loosely fit into one of three categories:

1. All married men living with and taking good care of their families.
2. All single men, over twenty-two, of proven thrift habits.
3. Men, under twenty-two years of age, and women, who are the sole support of some next of kin or blood relative.¹⁹⁴

Together, under Lee and Marquis’ leadership, the investigative activities of the department were fully fleshed out. An enormous effort went into making sure that no man was left behind, as this was crucial to reducing high rates of turnover at the Highland Park plant. In effect, “no man was to be discharged until every possible effort had been made, and every means exhausted, toward lifting him up to the requirements of the Company, and to the equal of his fellow men.”¹⁹⁵ So extensive was this effort, that both men emphasized finding jobs for the “deaf, blind, and crippled,” and paroled criminals were placed on the line whenever possible – in fact, a large number of parolees in the Detroit area were sent from prison directly to Marquis for rehabilitation. With increasing pockets of foreign immigrants and black migrants in 1913 and 1914, in addition to existing “native” American laborers, the company was successful in drawing workers to the factory floor, but in the same instance, created one of the most diverse workforces in the nation. The collective goal for the top and middle management (FMC heads, administration, and superintendents), then, was to retain men by presenting to them the

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, 302.
¹⁹⁵ Bryan, Henry’s Lieutenants, 207.
unique financial benefits offered by the FMC, so the profit-sharing scheme would successfully bear out.

But even these unique benefits needed close monitoring. In addition to overseeing worker’s home condition, cleanliness, marital sanctity, and ability to speak English, the investigative program had an added component of free financial services (the Employee’s Savings and Loan Association was part of this scheme). Lee notes further that:

The profits are paid to each employee [sic] with his wages in his pay envelope every two weeks. He is not influenced or coerced to spend his money for any one especial [sic] thing. The policy of the company is not to sell its men anything or influence them to buy anything – with the exception of Ford cars.¹⁹⁶

As I show in the next section, the structure of this program took on a decidedly urban dimension due to Lee’s preoccupation with the domestic realm. It included free legal services, real estate appraisals, and investment advice that encouraged workers to put their profits towards investments the Ford deemed worthy. The appropriate means of investment for a Ford worker was either homeownership, a Ford product, or to keep savings in a FMC approved bank. Lee goes on to describe how the profit-sharing plan helped workers meet these ends:

As a part and parcel of the legal department also, we have a committee that makes appraisals of property for employees [sic]. A man who has picked out a home and gotten a price upon it, may submit the facts to our legal department, and without charge get from them an idea as to the worth of the property in connection with the price asked, also a general report as to the worth of the house, from the standpoint of construction, finishing and equipment.¹⁹⁷

Outside of the investigative program, three major pillars of the profit-sharing plan also came into being during Lee’s tenure: the Education, Motion Picture, and Medical Departments. The English School had been operating since 1913 and had already hired Ford workers internally to fill spots as interpreters and/or English language educators. The school was incorporated as part of the Sociological Department in 1914 with a Trade School component, which became world-renowned as the Henry Ford Trade School. The Trade school “provided a practical education [in industrial trades] for thousands of boys from needy families” and became so well-known that industry-minded immigrants traveled to Detroit just to gain two to three years worth of hands-on training with Ford engineers on the assembly line.¹⁹⁸ The Motion Picture Department also existed one year

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.
¹⁹⁸ Bryan, Henry’s Lieutenants, 207. How this played out in the favor of immigrants was another story entirely. Depending on their financial situation and their mobility, some made successful careers back in their home countries (often acting as international agents of Ford) while others remained on the assembly line in poor working conditions because they did not have the means to move elsewhere. For more, see Chapter 5.
prior to the establishment of the Sociological Department, formerly known as the Time-Motion Study Department – devoted to studying the efficiency of the laboring body and contributed significantly to the development of the assembly line. It became a major player in the sales and marketing of the company when it was incorporated as part of the Sociological Department’s to produce silent “educational” films in partnership with the Education Department. The Medical Department also used Ford technology to feature fully equipped facilities, operating rooms, and laboratories established under a newly appointed chief of surgery, Dr. James E. Mead.  

All in all, at its peak, the entire Sociological Department employed as many as 160 men, with about half performing investigative work.

The structure of the Sociological Department ensured that FMC middle management retained as many men as possible while keeping the factory and its overwhelmingly diverse workforce in order. The general scheme of the Sociological Department under Marquis (as seen in Figure 2.4) shows that, to an extent, the profit-sharing plan introduced organizational change in the efficiency of the administration. Every worker case was systematically filed by phone, mail, or office interview, sent to the appropriate department, and investigated according to a standardized checklist. In this sense, Ford was successful in achieving the scientific management of labor that Lee’s October 1913 reforms aspired to. However, organizational efficiency alone was not sufficient enough to unite all the diverse sub-departments that the Sociological Department housed. While the collective goal of reducing turnover and controlling the administration of profits was an overarching goal for the entire department, it was not until the company was forced to respond to public accusations over the “paternalistic” nature of its programs, that an effort was made to create a unified aesthetic around which the departments sub-departments coalesced. This “Fordist” aesthetic, as I argue here and elsewhere in this study, was a powerful means by which the company advanced its economic interests, while putting forth a vision that flattened identities and cultures under the idea of industrial American might.

This collective effort catalyzed three years after Ford’s social programs were enacted, when news of the company’s home investigations created an uneasy stir among labor activists, segments of Detroit’s citizenry, and workers themselves – all of whom claimed that the company’s actions were invasive. In response, and at the behest of the FMC board, Lee published a lengthy rebuttal titled “The So-Called Profit Sharing System in the Ford Plant” in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* special volume on “Personnel and Employment Problems in Industrial Management”. The article is one of the first early insights into the thinking behind the reformation

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199 At the same time that Henry Ford was innovating the industrial wage system, he also had a hand in restructuring the Detroit healthcare system. He took control of a stalled Detroit General Hospital project in 1914, hired medical experts from Johns Hopkins and elsewhere, and established the first system in the area with a closed medical group and standardized patient fees. Dr. James Mead was one of four doctors who served as administration staff for what would become Henry Ford Hospital, while also working for the FMC in a medical capacity. See: Henry Ford Department of Medicine. History of Medicine (Website). Retrieved from http://www.henryford.com/body.cfm?id=58754.

Figure 2.4: Organizational structure of the renamed “Department of Education” under Reverend Samuel S. Marquis, October 30, 1920
(“Preliminary Report Covering General Survey of Various Departments”, Dec. 15, 1920, Acc #572, Box 20, BFRC)
process, and argued that the plan was instituted for the workers own benefit rather than the business:

Now, I should like to impress upon you the fact that this profit sharing work was in no sense instituted as a spasmodic thing, [and] was not designed or conceived for the sake of business expedient or advertising…We did not seek to advertise the car nor the company through this plan, but rather we felt that we owed it to our men at that time to give them all the help we consistently could to better their financial and moral status, and to insure, as far as we could, a life worth while, and not merely a bare living [sic].

It was established some time prior to this work that a man who comes out of a home well balanced, who has no fear for the necessities of life for those he is taking care of, who is not in constant dread of losing his position for reasons beyond his control, is the most powerful economic factor that we can use in the shape of a human being.201

He concludes by warding off circulating theories that the company hired experts and calculated the effect that these social programs might have on the prosperity of the company:

As I told you from the start, the Ford Motor Company have [sic] done all this work with their own men; there has been no theory used; no mapping out of various courses that we have pursued; we have employed no minds trained in philanthropy or sociology, or any other knowledge gained through books or university courses. We have rather fed our men, so far as we could, with fresh human encouragement, in a sane, sound, man-fashion way.202

Contrary to the broader claim, however, Lee’s opening and closing statements make two points clear: the first is that the programs were crafted, in part, as a response to the perceived lack of state welfare provision, and second, that they were meant to work benevolently and in concert with the economic needs of the company. His article is timely, because it was one of the first publicly detailed pronouncements of the role that the Ford Motor Company would play in strengthening the worker and the state. Yet, as the company attempted to refine the language it used to describe its social programs, it was consistently caught between depicting the corporation as a benevolent actor (acting sentimentally on behalf of the forsaken worker) and one that reduced the worker to a “powerful economic factor”; simply a cog in the vast machinery of the assembly line. This is a tension that would remain throughout the Sociological Department’s tenure.

202 Ibid, 310.
2.3

Making Men

When Lee left the company, Marquis continued leading the department with the same core values in place, but operating under another name. In the year that Lee’s article appeared in the *Annals*, the company also decided that the department should undergo a radical rhetorical shift because “it was too human for such a name.” The Sociological Department, in turn, became the Education Department (see Figure 2.4), “investigators” became known as “advisors,” and Marquis was given the title “Dean Marquis.” A statement that appeared in a 1916 company newsletter that was distributed to FMC shareholders presents a more negotiated reason for the public name-change:

At the outset the department, for the want of a better name, was called the sociological department, and the men in it were called investigators. The name of the Sociological department brought numerous applications from men who were making a study of sociology in the various colleges and who wished to become connected with our work, and who obviously would have difficulty in it because they would have so much to unlearn…the name ‘investigator’ brought about numerous applications from members of private detective agencies, etc., men who thought that their experience would qualify them for our work. The name further suggested prying into the affairs of men and it was apparent that the proper feeling between the department and the employees did not prevail.

Mr. Ford believes that the giving of profits to employees without educating them in its proper use would be useless and for this reason the Dept. of Education was formed, this department is mainly solely in the interest of the employees and through it [sic] teaches the employees in the matter of thrift, sobriety and better living generally. It is not the purpose of the company to dictate as to how an employee is to use his share of profits, but desires, through the Dept. of Education, to advise the employees as to the manner of use which gets best the results for the individual. 

It is clear that public perception of the department affected how the company was positioning itself in regard to people who had a stake in the company – stakeholders and consumers. Yet, the enforcement of this policy within the company was less radical than it appeared on the surface. Documents internal to the department show that the use of the terms “sociological” and “investigator” continued without interruption until the departments end, as seen in sociological records that investigators used when entering into the worker home (dated 1918) [Figure 2.5].

\(^{203}\) *Ford Factory Facts* 1918, 47.

\(^{204}\) *A Brief Account of the Educational work of the FMC*, December 1916.
The department’s new name was a harbinger of the growing role that the education would have in the profit-sharing plan. The “applications” that the newsletter refers to were required as part of the application system set up for entry into the Henry Ford Trade School. The idea for the school stemmed from Henry Ford’s long-held belief in the “practicality” of the industrial arts for young men. The Trade School began in the Highland Park factory plant in 1916 and opened with six boys and one instructor. As the Trade School Records describe it:

Classes not only emphasized the mechanical arts leading to tool-and-die making but also included English, history, drafting, chemistry, physics, metallurgy, and bookkeeping, with classwork alternating bi-weekly with shop practice. Admission was based on need, and the school was unique in
that it provided scholarships to each student and did not require that the
student be an employee of the Ford Motor Company.\textsuperscript{205}

The school quickly built up a reputation as the most sought after program in the industrial
world, drawing students from across the country and the world. At its peak, the school
educated close to 2,800 students with 135 instructors and two branches. It existed in
tandem with the Ford English School and the Motion Picture Studio, which together,
produced thousands of educational materials, ranging from booklets, pamphlets, and
instructional films. These materials were emblazoned with the Ford brand, and were
meant to circulate in educational facilities and cinemas well beyond the Ford school
campuses.

The Trade School student records from 1919 to 1927 contain information for both
“American” and “foreign” students and are arranged according to nationality and name,
and are an incredibly telling source for the direction that the Sociological Department and
its educational programs would take in the coming years. More than thirty feet of these
records were destroyed in a fire, yet they provide the most detailed insight into the types
of students drawn to the Trade School, their national origins, ambitions, progress, where
they lived in Detroit, and whether they remained at the FMC or returned to their
homelands. Of the existing list, approximately 20\% of students in this 8 year stretch were
identified as “Persian,” “Hindu,” “Indian,” “East-Indian,” “Anglo-Indian,” “Syrian,”
“Mohammedan,” “Armenian,” “Turkish,” “Albanian,” and “Egyptian.” The remaining
“foreign” students were largely of Western/Eastern European, Chinese, and Russian
origin. This, in addition to the \textit{The New York Times} reporting that 70.7\% of Ford’s
workforce was foreign-born on the launch of the Five Dollar day\textsuperscript{206} and the following
passage from Lee’s 1916 statement, we can begin to see that welfare and education
became the central means through which the FMC brought immigrants into the fold:

As you probably know, of necessity rather than choice, a large part of our
working force is made up of non-English-speaking men. It was utterly
impossible to reach these men with an explanation of our work through the
medium of interpreters, and besides, we found a mercenary unwillingness,
if you please, on the part of sophisticated fellow countrymen to aid us in
helping this great army of men, which comprised 50 to 60 per cent of the
entire number of Ford employes [sic].\textsuperscript{207}

A significant portion of Lee’s article was dedicated to the idea that the immigrant worker
was the primary reason why the social programs were necessary. The public’s sudden
curiosity about the FMC programs were met with a concerted effort by the company to
emphasize that there were, in fact, a \textit{majority} number of non-English speaking
immigrants who worked at the FMC. Lee’s argument is in part an attempt to justify the
paternalistic nature of the company’s social programs, but more telling, is that the

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Henry Ford Trade School Student Records series} description, 1919-1927, Acc. 774, BFRC.
\textsuperscript{207} John R. Lee, “The So-Called Profit Sharing System in the Ford Plant,” \textit{Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science} 65 (May 1, 1916): 305.
expansion of the company’s social programs into the public sphere by way of public writing and the subsidized offering of Ford schooling to men who wanted to participate, put the company’s activities squarely in line with an early strain of New Era politics.

The scale and span of its social programs as early as the 1910’s, and the precedence it set for manufacturers who would follow suit, was what drew the FMC apart from the rest. There is no doubt that Ford was among a myriad of industrial actors who were participating in rise of welfare capitalism, where the benevolent corporation would lead in the creation of a more benign industrial society as opposed to the state. But the foundation of the Ford social programs were deeply embedded in turn-of-the-century Progressive thought and the rhetoric of Americanization and naturalization campaigns. Key among them was the educational component of the programs, which worked to pry immigrant workers apart from their ethnic and national allegiances. This was a strategy that was on the rise in factories throughout the American Northwest a half a decade later. Education became closely allied with warding off the threat of ethnic alliances and worker militancy on the factory floor, in effect, prompting large manufacturers from the East Coast to the Midwest to, as Lizabeth Cohen writes in regard to Chicago, turn “corners of their factory floors into classrooms and substitute English primers for machine tools several hours a week.” Education in the Sociological Department took a prescribed form. English and trade courses were a required part of the workday for immigrant workers and its lessons were enforced at every turn. Workers were guided, directed, and given instructions on the shop room floor, in the classroom, in the theater, through several in-house publications, films, athletic or musical courses, and even in the home.

The Ford English School began as part of the Sociological Department in May 1914 with one teacher and twenty students. Courses were first required for immigrants from a “Safety-First” perspective, but quickly evolved beyond that to include seventy-two lessons on “proper care of the body, bathing, cleaning teeth, etc., daily helps [sic] in and about the factory, including safety first and first aid; matters of civil government of the state and the nation; how to obtain citizenship papers, etc.” The company recruited teachers from among its American and Canadian workers and their participation was voluntary. Courses were taught using the “Ford Method,” drawn from the Cumulative Method created by Francois Gouin. Gouin emphasized learning languages through whole sentences that were organized around “themes” that formed a narrative. This was then dubbed the “Ford Method” because materials were created to help teachers train in a standardized way. By choosing this teaching method, each course was cleverly organized around prominent Americanization themes like nationhood, civics, or how to lead a proper “American” lifestyle. Even then, only a portion of men received the coveted Ford diploma:

Of the thirty-two hundred men in the school it is not possible to give diplomas to those who have merely a sufficiently satisfactory knowledge of the American language [sic], because some men may lack familiarity

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208 Ibid, 165.
209 Ford Factory Facts 1918, 54.
with the principles of the government of the state or the nation. Every graduate must be thoroughly familiar with the basic principles of civil government.  

The added requirement of civics knowledge is what made the English school diploma so valuable. By slowly adding in elements required by citizenship courses nationwide, the FMC was readying its immigrant workforce for naturalization. In fact, because each diploma was “signed by officers of the Company…his diploma is accepted in lieu of an examination when he applies for his second citizenship papers.” This was a blatant sign of the alliance forming between industry and the state, but for the immigrant, it was no easy task. As it is further described:

In addition to the basic principles of civil government the simple fundamentals of table manners are taught; how to sit down at the table, how to place the napkin, how to put sugar and cream into coffee and how to drink from a cup and not from a saucer. The men are taught how to use a knife and a fork; that the knife is made to cut with and the fork to convey food to the mouth.  

As I show in Chapter 6, many English school students felt this was an infantilizing learning process, even if as a result they were put on a fast track towards citizenship [Figures 2.6 to 2.7]. To boot, Canadian or American workers who would voice concern over their inability to communicate with their fellow immigrant workers would be sent to the “Ford plant to be trained as teachers of the Ford method” and those who were foremen holding prominent positions in the plant would remark that the English courses made it many times easier to “handle” foreign men. Through education, the immigrant experience at the Ford plant was significantly shaped by the likenings of its North American workforce, and on a whole, considered immigrants a homogenous group with no civilizational attachments to the “American language” or culture.

This was proven further by the graduation ceremony that celebrated students who successfully completed the program. The ceremony took place around a melting pot, which was erected against a wooden plank and underneath a Latin inscription that read “E Pluribus Unum,” or “One From Many.” Dean Marquis and the superintendent of the English School stood at center stage while students ascended and descended from two sets of staircases on either side of the pot [Figures 2.8 and 2.9]. The events of the day were described as follows:

Commencement exercises were held in the largest hall in the city. On the stage was represented an immigrant ship. In front of it was a huge melting pot. Down the gang-plank [sic] came the members of the class dressed in

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210 Ibid, 57.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
their national garbs and carrying luggage such as they carried when they landed in this country. Down they poured into the Ford melting pot and disappeared. Then the teachers began to stir the contents of the pot with long ladles. Presently the pot began to boil over and out came the men dressed in their best American clothes and waving American flags.214

Soon after the ceremonies were over, the graduates, employees, employers, and citizens of Detroit flooded into the streets of the city to celebrate Americanization Day [Figure 2.10]. Now out of their “native garb,” the immigrants were paraded around on floats, applauded and cheered, and once off the boat, were though to disappear into the crowds as one of their own.

As the company and its immigrant workforce grew, the philosophy that the Ford applied to the production of automobiles soon found their way other aspects of the company’s activities, including the socialization of its foreign-born workers. What began as 20 students in 1914 became 115 graduates in 1915, and 3,200 in 1918.215 The company quickly set up a second school to accommodate overflow in the Highland Park plant, and when it was rendered insufficient (and the weather was agreeable) classes would be held outdoors in the courtyard of the plant [Figure 2.11]. In turn, more American and Canadian workers were recruited and trained in the Ford method, and the “making of men” in the manner of the basics of everyday living, language, and civics, as Ford called it, became an exercise in mass production in itself. Beyond the mechanics of it, however, what most significantly connected the English school to other parts of the sociological program, was the connection between the factory and the home. Documents that described the nature of the curriculum in 1914, stressed that it was important to adapt early lessons “to home study, and teaching in the Ford shops.”216 In effect, this meant that the lessons that were learned in the classroom (which went far beyond language learning) could then be enforced and monitored in the domestic realm as part of the eligibility process required by the profit-sharing scheme.

This is a point that is visually apparent in every photograph taken of the English school classroom, whether indoors or outdoors. Figure 2.6 shows that homes silently figured into the background on the chalkboard, but were in actuality a significant tool used to teach language, “daily living,” time, and the virtues of American civics and citizenship. Just as industrialists viewed ethnic and racial alliances as a threat on the factory floor, the domestic realm was seen as equally dangerous. The home was an isolated space where immigrants could collude with one other, speak in their native tongues, and draw themselves apart from the broader American populace. In line with Progressive tactics, and through the medium of the English school, the home was repeatedly shown as a place where lessons from the factory were to be taken back and practiced. In this way, the home was made an extension of the classroom or shop floor, where the Ford brand of Americanization could continue.

216 Ford Factory Facts 1914, 51.
Figure 2.6: “Teaching good table manners at the English School of the Ford Motor Company” (Photographic Vertical File Series, Acc 1660, Box 167, BFRC)

Figure 2.7: The Ford English School diploma could be used by U.S. officials for naturalization, 1919 (Photographic Vertical File Series, Acc 1660, Box 167, BFRC)
Figure 2.8: “The Ford English School graduating class as they emerge out of ‘The Melting Pot.’” (1915)
(Photographic Vertical File Series, Acc 1660, Box 167, BFRC)

Figure 2.9: Graduates entering into “The Melting Pot” with “native garb” on, are “stirred” in the pot, and emerge wearing suits and waving an American flag, 1916
(Photographic Vertical File Series, Acc 1660, Box 167, BFRC)
Figure 2.10: “Americanization Day, July 5th, 1915. The parade of 6,000 Ford employees through Campus Martius, Detroit to take part in exercises held in Belle Isle.
(Helpful Hints and Advice to Employees, page 10, Acc #951, Non-Srial Imprints, Box 23, BFRC)

Figure 2.11: English classes held outdoors for thousands of Ford’s immigrant workforce in the Highland Park plant, 1918
(Photographic Vertical File Series, Acc 1660, Box 167, BFRC)
The "domestic checklist," shown in Figure 2.12, is an example of a lesson that was enforced in the classroom through pedagogy and in the home through investigative inspections. The checklist would be taught using the Ford method, with the verbs pulled apart from the sentence in the left hand column, and the sentences that employed them on the right. The lesson was constructed around the theme of daily, hygienic living and would include sentences like: "I lift up the kettle. The kettle is empty. I fill the kettle with water. I put the kettle on the fire. The fire burns brightly." Consequently, the Ford investigators would use a similar "checklist" to ensure hygiene and good living among workers in their homes. In this way, the requirements that would qualify an immigrant worker his share of the profits were very much a part of a conditioning process that was executed through the Ford English School, and would ensure the immigrants participation in both the school and factory work.

The English School curriculum was "tested out," in a way, by the agents of the Sociological Department’s investigative program. The defining feature of the department, as Lee put it, was the "so called investigative program" that he developed in collaboration with Marquis. Lee and Marquis chose "investigators" among Ford men (like Torossian) to inspect and report on the Ford worker to determine distribution of profits. As Lee described it:

"The company organized a band of thirty men who were chosen because of their peculiar fitness for the work to act as investigators. The whole work..."
was put into effect and supervised by the employes [sic] of the company – no outside talent or assistance was asked. We have worked out the whole scheme with Ford men.\textsuperscript{217}

Using the domestic checklist these investigators would mark the Sociological Record and write reports to make judgments on worker character and the condition of the home. These reports would then be used to determine worker status within the industrial hierarchy of the factory. Workers would be placed into one of four groups that would determine if they would qualify for their share of the profits and/or the level of assistance the FMC could offer to “strengthen their purpose” going forward:

\textit{First Group}

Those who were firmly established in the ways of thrift and who would carry out the spirit of the plan themselves were catalogued as one group.

\textit{Second Group}

Those who had never had a chance but were willing to grasp the opportunity in the way every man should, were catalogued in the second group.

\textit{Third Group}

Those who had qualified but we were in doubt about as to their strength of character to continue in the direction they had started in, were placed in the third group.

\textit{Fourth Group}

And the men who did not or could not qualify were put into a fourth group. The first group of men were [sic] never bothered except when we desired information for annual or semi-annual reports or something of that kind.

The second group were [sic] looked up as often as in the judgment of the investigation department, so called, we could help them or strengthen their purpose by kindly suggestion. The third group were dealt with in much the same fashion, although some detailed plans had to be laid for them. The fourth group were very carefully and thoroughly studied in the hope that we might bring them, with the others, to a realization of what we were trying to accomplish, and to modifications, changes and sometimes complete revamping of their lives and habits, in order that they might receive what the company wanted to give them.\textsuperscript{218}

These categories worked in tandem with the wage-categories that Lee instituted when he first took over as Head of Personnel. In the case of the latter, the wage would be dependent up on skill level of the worker and would allow even the lowest skilled worker

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid, 302.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid, 303. Emphasis in text.
some economic mobility within the hierarchy. When the investigative reports and group categories factored in, however, the wage was no longer purely based on the skill level of the worker, but was also a judgment of his ability to “Americanize.” This marked a clear difference in the way “native” and “English-speaking” workers could qualify for their share of the profits versus “non-native” or “foreign-born” or “non-English-speaking” workers. Immigrants were required to take part in added English school sessions and extra-curricular activities that would help them learn the “American way.” This, in addition to ceremonial requirements of the graduation ceremony and the reinforcement of lessons through home investigations was what made the profit-sharing program, contrary to Ford’s public statements, inherently unequal.

During the Marquis years, the FMC was actively responding to lessons that it had learned from the intrusion of Progressive Era policies on the autonomy of the corporation and the discontent it caused among the working class. As Lizabeth Cohen shows in her study of immigrant workers in Chicago, large industrial actors were reacting in much the same way half a decade later in the 1920s, after the failure of immigrant communities to organize against the paternalistic practices of the corporation but around the time when unions and strikes were arising as notes of dissent that were becoming impossible to ignore (particularly in 1919 and 1920). With the coming of mass culture and welfare capitalism in the 1920s, national ties among immigrants, which were facilitated through ethnic services, were slowly eroding as “chain stores, motion picture theaters, radio, and other forms of commercial recreation threatened neighborhoods shops and ethnically organized leisure.” Citing the Wrigley Company and McCormick, Cohen shows that rethinking the factory-worker relationship not only kept the ability to organize among workers at bay, but also discouraged workers from creating ethnic/faith/race-based alliances on the factory floor (though they did not always succeed). As she writes, in this new order, “industrialists’ social responsibilities went beyond their employees. Outside the plant, in the community at large, they had a similar leadership role to play.”

These were the ambitions that marked the end of Marquis’ short tenure with the Sociological Department, which also coincided with the company’s efforts to become more actively involved in shaping the public’s perception. Interviews and speeches by Marquis during these years indicate that had the intent of keeping the same sense of good will, moral high ground and soul that Lee initially attempted to impart. In Marquis’ words, it was “not just for the betterment of the corporation, but were the principles that should be followed by all of humanity.” He stated that he had a deep belief in Ford’s reasons for instituting the Sociological Department, recalling a conversation where Henry Ford stated that the FMC had:

outlived its usefulness as a moneymaking concern, unless we can do some good with the money. I do not believe in charity [...] but I do believe in

220 Ibid, 55.
221 Ibid, 161.
222 Samuel S. Marquis, Oral Reminiscences, BFRC.
the regenerating power of work in men’s lives, when the work they do is given a just return [...] I want the whole organization dominated by a just, generous and humane policy.\textsuperscript{223}

In response to those who thought it was unusual for a reverend to take such a prominent position in one of the most prosperous industries in the world, Marquis remarked that he did not think of himself “as entering the employ [sic] of an impersonal thing called a corporation, but as working with a man whom [he] had known for many years and for whom [he] had an unbounded admiration.”\textsuperscript{224} In a way, Marquis had an unflinching confidence in the company’s ability to put morality, justice, and humanity above profits and production. Ford’s first request of him to “make men in this factory as well as automobiles” was, in fact, an ideology that would be repeated in sociological manuals for years to come, just not in the way that Marquis had intended.\textsuperscript{225}

The “ideas and ideals” that were present in 1914 and 1915, as Marquis put it, quickly faded five years into his term. He resigned in 1921, citing ideological differences between himself and the group of executives at the FMC, claiming that profits over the “making of men” became king. “The old, humane policies were still professed,” Marquis wrote, “but the new influence which had gained ascendancy [that fear is a better incentive to work than loyalty] made impossible an honest and consistent application of those policies...’Pay them well, and then see to it that you get your money’s worth out of them,’ seemed to be the new policy of the company.”\textsuperscript{226} The department became inactive after Marquis left, but was revived in the 1930s to help Ford workers through the Great Depression.\textsuperscript{227} Sir Percival Perry, head of the FMC-UK, noted later that the department collapsed, in part, because Ford, Sorenson, and the other executives disliked being seen as “paternal,” which they thought was the “doing of Lee and Dean Marquis.”\textsuperscript{228} From the early 1920s to the mid 1940s, a man named Harry Bennett was left in charge of personnel and a rather mute Sociological Department.

Bennett was an interesting figure in the history of the FMC, as he was an unlikely candidate for the job. Ford was taken with his character as a former boxer, ex-Navy sailor, and his general life-on-the-streets lifestyle. He was rough, acted tough, and became infamous at the FMC for his union busting tactics. Fiercely loyal to Ford, he was quickly elected in charge of all personnel, labor relations, public relations, and helped Ford craft company policy from the late 1930s until Ford’s retirement in 1945.\textsuperscript{229} The Sociological Department dissolved two short years later, but it is fair to say while the organizational structure remained more or less in tact, Bennett had little to no interest in enforcing the “humane and moral” policies that were enacted by his predecessors; a

\textsuperscript{223} Marquis, \textit{Henry Ford: An Interpretation}, 154.
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid, 153-4.
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid, 155.
\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Ford Motor Company Industrial Relations Records Collection, 1915-1962}, BFRC.
\textsuperscript{228} Sir Percival Perry, \textit{Oral Reminiscences}, Acc #65, Box 52, BFRC.
characteristic that made him a foe of employees and unions alike, and marked a relative end to the entanglement between “social justice” and business at the FMC [Figure 2.13].

Going forward, I focus on the policies enforced and materials produced by the “marketing arm” of the Sociological Department during the Lee and Marquis years. In their time, the company made socio-economic reforms that revolutionized labor relations, the Fordist workforce, and the role that industry played in it. As the company scaled nationally, and then internationally, the FMC, as an industrial corporation, became a major player in attempting to shape the disposition of the immigrant worker and to an extent, his ideological leanings outside of FMC factory walls. The creation and collaboration of the Education and Motion Picture Studio Departments, in particular, sped up the ways in which the FMC’s industrial-as-social philosophy was projected on the world stage, and increased the potency of its message through the medium of film and photography. In the next chapter, I show how the Motion Picture Studio depicted, related to, and positioned the FMC in relation to its immigrant workforce and the regions from where they were coming. It is here that old “adage” by which the company advertised its egalitarian and humane socio-economic policies is fully brought into consideration:
The striking thing about this whole [profit-sharing] plan, when it is understood, is the simplicity of it all. There is absolutely nothing new or unusual in the way in which it is working or in the policy and layout. We are simply demonstrating over and over again the absolute truth of that ancient adage known as The Golden Rule. We have learned to appreciate men as men, and to forget the discrimination of color, race, country, religion, fraternal orders and everything else outside of human qualities and energy.\textsuperscript{230}

Through its educational programs, “The Golden Rule” had already begun to falter and fragmented further with the development of the company’s global image. In other words, the image of the company put into sharp distinction the difference between the treatment of immigrant workers (and their homelands) on film for the purposes of publicity and profits and its treatment of the Ford immigrant workforce and their homes in Detroit for the purposes of maintaining efficiency and social order.

A host of Ford biographers, business historians, and wage efficiency theorists, have questioned why Ford raised wages when he did. Many have concluded that since the program represented a $10 million increase in its 1914 costs (an amount that totaled only half of the projected annual profits), the decision for the profit-sharing plan and Five Dollar day must have taken into consideration reasons outside of purely philanthropic aims, namely a desire for publicity and profits.\textsuperscript{231} As the company made international gains, Ford made it a point to innovate existing commercial strategies to consider the role that culture and space played in selling the Ford product, and alleviate the impact that its interventions had on the ground. As I showed in Chapter One, Ford made use of factory and branch architecture to make subtle interventions into new cities and regions. These appeals moved beyond architecture when the company began mass-producing materials that included the production of pamphlets, films, instructional guides and engineering handbooks in dozens of languages.

This chapter engages with the FMC’s three visual modes of “selling”: film, photography, and newsletters. I show how the Sociological Department, through the Educational Department and Motion Picture Laboratory, created visual and didactic worlds through which the company advertised its corporate philosophy and brand. During the Lee and Marquis years, between 1914 and 1921, the company distributed close to a dozen different types of in- and out-house publications (among them, \textit{Ford News}, \textit{Ford Times}, \textit{Ford Factory Facts}, \textit{The Ford Man}, \textit{Ford Rouge News}, \textit{Ford Life}, and \textit{The Dearborn Independent}) and had its very own photographic and filmmaking division, which produced its own set of moving pictures (\textit{Ford Animated Weekly}, \textit{Ford Educational Weekly} and several independent commercial films) [Figure 3.1]. By 1916, the department was a well-oiled publicity machine, fending off suggestions that its social programs were paternalistic and instead creating the image of a benevolent and humane enterprise. As the company excelled technologically, so did the reach of these promotional materials, which were disseminated with the efficiency and speed of Ford products themselves and signaled the FMC’s attempts at cultural engagement for an economic and nationalist purpose. The latter half of the chapter shows how the company’s visual devices created and reinforced racialized/Orientalist tropes about cultures and peoples that suited the needs of the Fordist philosophy. These materials circulated within the factory and far beyond it, beginning shortly before 1914 and lasting well into the mid-century, during the peak of Ford’s expansion into non Euro-American markets.

Ford’s Hollywood

The practice of “time-motion study” expanded the role of the FMC into previously untested spheres. The company used film and moving images to examine the relationship between the worker and the machine, and documented what the company’s in-house paper *Ford Times* called the problem of “waste motion” to maximize the efficiency of laboring bodies. The studies proved critical to the innovation of the Ford assembly line in 1913 and led to the subsequent development of the Photographic Department and Motion Picture Laboratory later that year. In collaboration with the Education Department, the FMC created materials that resulted in a rhetoric that closely resembled turn-of-the-century Taylorist thinking, with its emphasis on rationality, empiricism, and the elimination of waste. While there is no written evidence that Ford or any of his executive team were directly influenced by Taylor, the company’s use of time-motion studies indicate that the theory of scientific management weighed heavily on early experimentations at the Ford plant. In other words, the broad application of technology stemming from these studies to all areas of FMC production was an attempt by the company to apply the principles of industrial mass production to the mass production of efficient workers. Moreover, the use of time-motion to innovate photographic and filmic advertising demonstrates the value that the FMC placed on the image in advancing Fordism beyond the limits of any single culture, nationality, or language.

The novel use of images at the FMC emerged in an era of what media studies scholar Lee Grieveson calls “corporate liberalism.” He describes it as an early twentieth century economy that was dominated by large corporations and industrial actors who sought to lessen the effects of industrialization in order to ensure their survival. In this setting, Ford’s ability to take on multiple roles worked to “defuse public criticism and effective state regulation.” The effect of this is nowhere more obvious than in the influential positions that Ford and the members of his executive team had on the politics of industry and the state. The company’s decision to create social programs that infused strands of scientific management and progressive tactics had a twofold effect: as I showed in Chapter Two, it worked to steady what industrialists considered the “unpredictable nature of the foreign element” through welfare, but it also offered the company a more “humane” public appearance. James Couzens, early Ford partner cum mayor of Detroit and U.S. senator, immediately recognized the advantage that the Profit-sharing and Five Dollar day plans offered to the company by way of positive publicity. Out of all the executive team members present on the day that the plans were approved, Henry Ford was sure to get Couzens approval due to his “growing appetite for personal publicity and a heightened interest in public affairs.” Couzens knew that the plans would offer him a platform from which to approach the political apparatus, remarking to Ford vice president Charles Sorenson at the time, “I want to be governor of Michigan,

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and this will help elect me."\textsuperscript{235} While the plans produced clear economic benefits in reducing turnover and ensuring worker allegiance through profit-sharing, there is little doubt that the social and educational aspects of the Ford plans (and the time-motion studies that gave birth to them) were geared towards advertising the company and the men behind it.\textsuperscript{236}

The latter function took on a life of its own when Henry Ford was exposed to the utility of motion pictures through his fabled friendship with inventor Thomas Edison. Edison notoriously pushed the boundaries of experimentation with light, photography, sound, and motion, which he pioneered to construct the Black Maria, or Kinetographic Theater in the 1890s. Edison’s lab assistants named the small, cramped studio after the dark prisoner transport vans that it resembled, and the building itself was a seemingly hastily constructed tarpaper shed with a retractable roof that could be rotated on a track to capture sunlight \textsuperscript{237} The studio is credited for producing the first copyrighted motion pictures and became the first to produce “movies” or film shorts for commercial consumption.\textsuperscript{238} Ford became fascinated with what Edison called the invention of a “living picture,” which did for the eye what the phonograph did for the ear.\textsuperscript{239} Edison was in no small way a formidable presence in Henry Ford’s life and career. While Ford held Edison up as an intellectual model, the two also managed to forge a close rapport and supported one another in their quests to innovate the world through already existing technologies. In the same instance (November 1912) that Edison agreed to help Ford construct a new factory to manufacture storage batteries for Ford automobiles, Ford lent Edison $1.2 million over the course of two years to help market a “home projecting kinetoscope.”\textsuperscript{240} This, of course, would later aid Ford’s ambition to breathe life into Ford products in cinemas across the country in the coming decade, but suffice it to say that both Ford and Edison reaped benefits from their investments in one another.

Beginning in 1914, the two men would go motor camping and take road trips with essayist John Burroughs and famed inventor Harvey Firestone, and created headlines across the nation that served as the most grandiose advertisements for the Ford car and the mobile, outdoorsy lifestyle that if offered to potential consumers.\textsuperscript{241} Dubbing themselves the “Vagabonds,” the men traveled in style with full amenities and butlers, and later in 1921, took their wives and children along to illustrate the utility of the Ford

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\textsuperscript{235} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{236} Chapters 4 and 5 delve further into the developing neoliberal collaborations between the FMC and political figures representing the city of Detroit and the state of Michigan. The growing commonalities between the corporation and state during the rise of industrialization skewed the planning of the city of Detroit in favor of big corporate interests – which was doubly beneficial for men who served on the FMC board and advocated for policies that would later benefit them when they served as politicians in local government, like James Couzens.
\textsuperscript{237} Caption for Object ID P.188.5616, \textit{Personal for Henry Ford Photographic Subseries}, BFRC.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{240} The Thomas Edison Papers, 1879-1931, Rutgers University.
\end{flushright}
car and truck as a family vehicle. In the summers stretching from 1914 to the mid 1920s, the four men toured through California, Michigan, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, New York, Vermont, and New Hampshire, inviting presidents to come along (Harding in 1918) or visiting them along the way (Coolidge in 1923). They engaged in shenanigans, fell wood, set up tents, made fires, and engaged in political conversations, all of which were recorded by newsmen and photographers who would report on the men’s activities and, unsurprisingly, were later shown in theaters as examples of American innovation in action [Figures 3.2]. Headlines followed the men in sound bites: “Henry Ford Demonstrates He's Not Afraid of Work; Repairs His Damaged Car,” “Millions of Dollars Worth of Brains Off on a Vacation,” “Genius to Sleep Under Stars,” and “Kings of Industry and Inventor Paid City Visit.”

Reflecting on the “Vagabonds'” last trip in 1924, Ford lamentably wrote in his autobiography that although the trips were “good fun,” they “began to attract too much attention.” By any other account, however, the trips were clearly constructed for the purpose of publicity. The Chicago Tribune, for example, still reeling from the libel case that Ford brought against it regarding accusations of anti-Semitism, reported on comments over the wire in 1921 concerning the men’s conversations on programs of

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242 Lewis, “The Illustrious Vagabonds.”
disarmament and war during a time when Ford was known as the man who advocated for an end to the war through his infamous “Peace Ship” project. Charles Sorenson, on the other hand, was much more direct in his memoirs, even calling into question the nature of the friendships Ford forged on these trips:

With squads of news writers and platoons of cameramen to report and film the posed nature studies of the four eminent campers, these well-equipped excursions into readily accessible solitudes were as private and secluded as a Hollywood opening, and Ford appreciated the publicity. [Henry Ford] admired Edison, who was a busy, retiring person like himself, and he was ever grateful for Edison’s encouragement when as a young man when he was experimenting with gasoline motor. When they were together, they had much in common; but aside from this annual camp get-together and an occasional Edison visit to Detroit and Dearborn they seldom saw each other.

Sorenson, cutting and seemingly disenchanted with Ford and his enterprise by the end of his tenure, still touches upon the contentious nature of the camping trips and the images of recreation and leisure they conjured in the American imagination, equating the trips themselves to the theatrics of Hollywood. News of the trips reached millions of people

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244 Lewis, “The Illustrious Vagabonds.”
and were meant to inspire auto owners to take to the roads and enjoy all that American infrastructure, technology, and nature had to offer – albeit, without butlers and private drivers in tow.

Sorenson was not so far off in his judgment. The most newsworthy trip of all was made by Ford and Edison in 1915 to the Panama-Pacific Exposition in San Francisco, followed by a road trip to Los Angeles for the inauguration of the studios at Universal Film Manufacturing Company (now known as Universal Studios) [Figure 3.3]. The trip serves as a powerful example of Ford’s use of film and imaging to display FMC prowess on the world stage, and California provided the perfect platform. The exposition marked the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914, providing a passage between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean for the unfettered exchanged of American-made goods to new world markets, and the emergence of the US as the world’s dominant economic power.\(^{246}\) Just as Ford sought to compress space and time in his promotion of goods through the establishment of the Ford’s Motion Picture studio in 1914, so too, was the exposition’s celebration of the canal a symbolic representation of the expansion of American goods

into Latin American markets. The opportunity was not lost on Ford. He had attended the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago and witnessed cutting-edge technology on display—most notably a fire-fighting pump powered by a two-cylinder engine that inspired his future experimentations with gasoline motors to power automobiles. For the exhibition at the Pan Pacific Exposition, and a number of future world’s fairs in which the FMC took part, Ford similarly thought to put the wonders of mechanized mass-assembly on display.

The “Assembling Exhibit,” or “Palace of Transportation” was one of three displays of the Ford exhibit, but it was the one that left the deepest mark on passersby since it publicly unveiled the process of mass assembly and efficiency in real-time. The exhibit consisted of a live demonstration of a moving assembly line, with workers quickly assembling machines on either side of the conveyor belt and, at the end, a completed Model T driven off the line. Between eighteen to twenty-five cars were produced during the three-hour period that the line functioned each day, making the Ford exhibit the most popular site at the exposition and winning the company a gold medal for its unrivaled “contribution” to the fair. However, as compelling as the mechanics behind mass assembly were, it would not have been complete without a demonstration of how the technology enabled the FMC to visualize its product to the rest of the world. Completing the tripartite display at the exposition were the Motion Picture and Educational components of the FMC that proved so vital to the foundations of mass assembly and Fordist practices writ large. They, too, were given names that respectively matched their function and grandeur: the “Sociological Exhibit,” or “Palace of Mines” was placed next to the “Motion Picture Exhibit,” or “Palace of Education,” which exhibited the “[m]aking of an American” as well miniature models and photographic views inside the famed Ford plant in Detroit [Figure 3.4]. The sociological portion of the display demonstrated, “by means of a ‘before and after’ model village” the way in which the five-dollar wage improved the living standards among Ford employees.

Education was the thread that tied all three thematic exhibits together. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the educational approach that Ford took towards the displays reflected the corporate structure that was taking shape back in Detroit – namely the use of visual devices and didactic techniques to mold men into moral, efficient beings. Brazenly displaying the “sociological” title at the exhibit, the public name-change that was forced upon the company following accusations of paternalism had not yet taken effect (occurring two years from this date), but the push for promoting sociological aspects as “educational features” had already taken root by the time Ford made his big debut in San Francisco. The Palace of Education, for example, showed films produced by the Motion Picture Department that were meant to convey to viewers lessons about new industrial and labor practices innovated by the FMC and their growing importance in

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248 Ibid, 118.
250 Lewis, The Public Image of Henry Ford, 118.
251 Ibid.
Figure 3.4: Photographic view into the Highland Park plant, which was accompanied by a miniature model made by Ford workers

Figures 3.5 and 3.6: Stills from “Where and How Fords Cars are Made” (1919) and “Ford Model T Assembly Line” (1919)
(Ford Film Collection, Motion Picture, Sound, and Video at the National Archives)
urban and rural regions across the country. The very first film made by the company, *How Henry Ford Makes A Thousand Cars A Day* (1914) showed how the assembly line process increased the speed of production at the Highland Park plant in Detroit. These early Ford films, including the *Ford Animated Weekly, Give Her Gas* (1918), *Where And How Ford Cars Are Made* (1919), *Ford Model T Assembly Line* (1919), focused on disseminating short films for free to educate the public about the novelty of Ford technology and current events as a subtle promotion of Ford goods [Figures 3.5 and 3.6]. They stand in stark contrast to its later films, such as *A Century of Progress* (1921), *Ford Way of Coal Mining* (1923), and *The Road to Happiness* (1924), and the educational series *The Ford Educational Weekly*, which coincided with wartime politics to more aggressively infuse entertainment with moralistic and ethical lessons about the potential of Fordist technology to shape the future of cities and societies, and advertise “Americana in motion” more broadly.²⁵²

Situated within this educational frame, the Motion Picture display at the exposition presented cinema as an example of new practices of mass assembly and the emergence of a new “Fordist cultural form.”²⁵³ The placement of film within the “Palace of Education” was no coincidence, as it was the ultimate “lesson” that potential customers would potentially take away from their visit to the fair. This point was exemplified in the filmic depiction itself, where cameras were often mounted as part of the moving machinery of the factory, literally becoming an element of the Fordist production process.²⁵⁴ Summing up the experience that Ford hoped to create through this three-part display, Grieveson sharply observes that by simply “wandering among the Ford exhibits, [viewers] could watch not only the sped-up process of actual automobile construction but also the even more compressed filmic representation of the production process that, through the dissection and reassembling that is film editing, transformed the lived time and space of the assembly line into what we might call the Fordism of filmic time and space” [Figures 3.7 and 3.8].²⁵⁵ Drawing on this, I show further that through the moving and still image, Ford used film as a pedagogical tool to subtly combine commercial advertisement with entertainment to project American technological prowess on the world stage. This was no small task, yet Ford managed to outrival a rising American cultural form of the early twentieth century, Hollywood.

Ford’s relationship with Hollywood was cemented by the much-publicized road trip he and Edison took from the Pan Pacific Exposition to inaugurate the film industry in Los Angeles. The emergence of film as an art form at the turn of the century, and its transition to a product of entertainment, coincided with its industrialization in the

²⁵² Phillip W. Stewart, “Henry Ford: Movie Mogul? A Titan of Industry Conquers Filmdom,” *Prologue*, Winter 2014, 10. Reading these films across the warring years, in fact, sheds light on how the moving image was used to publicly maneuver Ford’s wavering political stances in an effort to shield his business from the economic upturns and downturns caused by military intervention.
²⁵⁴ Ibid, 33.
²⁵⁵ Ibid, 32.
Figure 3.7: Film still from “Mirror of America” showing assembly process of negatives for Ford films
(Record Group 64.28, Records of the National Archives and Records Administration)

Figure 3.8: Film still from “Mirror of America” showing filming process
(Record Group 64.28, Records of the National Archives and Records Administration)
1910s. Michael Storper, writing on the history of the film industry and its relationship to mass-production, notes that “by the time film-making was established in California in the 1920s, it had become industrialised [sic]. While we now classify it as a ‘service’ industry, one of the earliest studios was named the Universal Film Manufacturing Company [and its] artificially lighted stage was dedicated by the mass-production capitalist of the age, Henry Ford.”

Nothing symbolized the intimate relationship that developed between Hollywood, commercialism, and corporate industry more than Edison and Ford’s presence and dedication of the 500-foot open stage at the new studio at Universal City. The Ford exposition pamphlet is further evidence of the significance in drawing the connection between the exposition and Hollywood: the company’s in-house tour booklet, *Ford Factory Facts*, designed a pamphlet that features the Ford plants in San Francisco and Los Angeles spanning opposite sides of the back cover [Figure 3.9]. An aerial drawing of San Francisco, where the exposition was to be held, sits between two illustrations and twenty-six national branches span the distance between San Francisco and Los Angeles. The text describes in detail the three exhibits on display and the wonders of film in bringing Ford production to life.

The moment gave birth to a series of encounters between the FMC and Hollywood executives, with the latter leaning on the former to revolutionize filmmaking techniques through Fordist technology. This came to a head in 1917, when Ford in-house papers (*The Ford Man* and *Ford Times*) reported that company films were being shown in three thousand theaters a week to between four and five million people, and by mid-1918 the company surpassed Hollywood to become the largest motion picture distributor in the world, spending $600,000 a year (the equivalent of $9.4 million today) on film production and distribution. The relationship strengthened as film became a major political and cultural enterprise in the onset of the First War. During the same years 1917-18, the period of US intervention, the Wilson administration relied on film as a ready-made propaganda machine with little room for dissent. Paramount, Fox, Universal, Vitagraph (Warner Brothers), and Metro and Goldwyn Studios (MGM) each had one or more production plants, popular actors, and massive advertising and distribution apparatuses. Hollywood was a dynamic weapon of expanding US capitalism and the end result was a triumph for both, with the appearance of D.W. Griffith’s *Hearts of the World* (1918), Burton L. King’s *The Lost Battalion* (1919), and the star of the silent era, Charlie Chaplin and his *Shoulder Arms* (1918).

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257 Ibid. Emphasis in text.


Figure 3.9: A pamphlet for Ford’s exhibition at the 1915 Pan Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco, showing Ford plants in Los Angeles, CA (upper left) and San Francisco, CA (upper right) with an aerial illustration of the exposition in the center. Twenty-six national Ford branches line the bottom of the page.

Film as means of propaganda and dissent shifted through the 1910’s and 20s, with more room for creative expression in the early years. Carl Laemmle, president of Universal Film Manufacturing Company (later Universal pictures), was a friend and fierce supporter of Ford in his attempt to organize a peace mission (via the Peace Ship SS Oscar) to end the war in Europe. In a letter to Ford and Edison dated December 1915, Laemmle expressed sympathy for Ford’s effort “to stop the most frightful slaughter in the history of the world.” In the years leading up to the war, Ford vehemently opposed the outbreak of the war for fear of the disruption that it would cause to his business operations, and until the U.S. formally declared war, Universal executives and cameramen accompanied Ford’s “Peace Pilgrims” to Europe. As an avid film enthusiast, Ford publicly endorsed the three-part anti-war series The Horrors of War (1916), and as his popularity among pacifists and filmgoers grew, so did the relationship between his company, Universal and Metro and Goldwyn. The idea of Ford and Hollywood was so appealing to the company, that the collaboration between the biggest players in Hollywood and industry was alluded to in a full-page advertisement that appeared on the final page of the Panama Pacific exhibition pamphlet, where the word “universal” was liberally used to describe the new luxury Touring Car that Edison and Ford drove down to Universal City to meet with Laemmle.

It was not long before political dissent in cinema faced some resistance. Immigrants in particular felt the pressure once the U.S. entered the war, pro-German sentiment was quelled, and Wilson’s signing of the Espionage Act in June 1917 made illegal any forms of speech that were critical of the war, including anti-war films. After several British papers accused Hollywood films of being backed by German capital, execs like Carl Laemmle (a German immigrant) quickly distanced themselves from the German alliance and sided with the Wilson administration. When war was declared on the Germans, Universal entered into a partnership with the US government and announced the launch of Universal Preparedness Productions, which produced pro-war serials, shorts, and feature films, as well as anti-Kaiser propaganda. Ford himself was torn between his self-professed pacifism and the military might demanded by the Allied powers in the form of war machinery. In addition to the moral dilemma posed by war and profit, Ford’s majority immigrant workforce (who fueled the production of luxury, agricultural, and war machinery) needed immediate attention by the company’s Sociological Department in the form of patriotic slogans and nationalistic rhetoric to keep foreign allegiances in check and the “threat of communism” at bay. By early 1920, the company also suffered a backlash from customers who found Ford’s anti-Semitic positioning distasteful (as communicated through the Ford-owned Dearborn

260 Letter from Carl Laemmle to Thomas Edison and Henry Ford, December 13, 1915, Edison General Files Series (1915), The Thomas Edison Papers at Rutgers University.  
Independent), to the extent that many theaters refused to show the company’s popular Ford Education Weekly, which went out of circulation by the end of the year. Despite building the largest studio outside of Hollywood, producing over 20 miles of film per week (1.8 million feet total), and surpassing any other industry in the novelty and viewership of its commercial advertisements, Ford soon faced social and political challenges at home and abroad that were difficult to confront solely through his cinematic undertakings.

The Motion Picture Laboratory fruitfully operated through the 1920s, until it began to falter under the economic pressures of the Great Depression. During its run, some popular filmmakers, writers, and actors turned their attention from the war to the effects of industrialization at home, and the profits industries reaped from crisis and immigrant labor. America’s favorite Little Tramp, Charlie Chaplin, along with Aldous Huxley, Upton Sinclair, and other artists who were contemplating the relationship between humanity and the machine, were inspired by Ford and his Highland Park and River Rouge complexes. Chaplin, in a way, led the charge with his biting humor and relentless critique of a system that he viewed as widening existing rifts in American society. The comedy shorts Easy Street (1917) and The Immigrant (1917) notably dissected poverty and the class system, and post-Depression Modern Times (1936) directly challenged the capitalist system that the Ford Motor Company (as representative of a larger industrial complex) upheld. In it, Chaplin’s Little Tramp is a factory worker who is overwhelmed by the anxieties of the industrial age, and acts out a story line that critiques all that Fordism, factory life, and mass production and consumption had to offer.

Chaplin’s cinematic themes spoke to the politics of race, class, and industry, and reflected broader changes that were brought on by new waves of immigrants populating American cities. In this sense, film and manufacturing industries were responding to the same stimulus: the social and economic challenge posed by immigrants. His sharpest work appeared in the same moment that industry executives were forced to give way to the pressure of nickelodeons and vaudeville to “develop the mass market of new immigrants” by quickly adapting what was previously seen as a strict art form to a form of entertainment that attended to rapidly shifting demographics. The Profit-sharing and Five dollar day plans, and the subsequent development of Ford’s visual industrial complex was also spurred by the presence of immigrants in the factory. Ford’s scientific study of time and motion took on various forms that reflected this, with one area dedicated to engineering the exact time it took for a worker to perform a task, and another to engineering the habits of the worker to ensure the highest efficiency of the assembly line. Chaplin’s work, then, fit neatly into the space between these industries, and their parallel efforts to mold the habits and ideologies of a newly adapting population.

In this light, Chaplin’s *Modern Times* cut at the intersection of both operations, and in the course of 90 minutes, epitomized the industrial policies and practices that took shape in the two decades prior that eventually led to the precarious condition of the industrial worker in the 1930s. Unlike the depiction of workers in FMC films, Chaplin’s version of events brought the figure of the worker front and center, and forced the viewer to confront the everyday realities of working class struggles. In doing so, through humor and satire Chaplin demonstrates how the capitalist – played by the president of the factory – took control of the laborers time, and typified the relationship between the worker and the machine. These moments were distilled into frames that captured the essence of what Marx called the condition of the proletariat: when the factory worker’s ever-present boss, who bore an uncanny resemblance to Ford, scolds him for taking a smoking break in the privacy of a bathroom [Figure 3.10] or when the worker struggles to keep up with the frantic pace of the assembly line which is purposefully sped up to extract more labor and increase the factory’s overall efficiency. With searing clarity, these scenes render visible the relationship between time, motion, and value, and give life to Marx’s observation that “moments are the elements of profit.”\(^{267}\) Chaplin’s character is

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depicted as a misfit who felt the pressures of the capitalist surveillance mechanism and though he attempted to conform, he consistently fell behind. Yet, the Tramp’s non-conformism represented the danger of the freethinking worker, particularly immigrant workers who arrived to the factory with cultural and political values that were thought to inherently clash with mainstream “Americanism.” This possibility of dissent was precisely the challenge taken up by Ford’s Sociological Department, and summed up in a poignant scene where Chaplin’s character is caught between the churning wheels of the assembly line system [Figure 3.11]. The image can be read in two ways: as emblematic of the Fordist mantra of “making men” as efficient as the machine, and symbolic of the unpredictable nature of the “human element,” a cog in the wheels of the machine.

![Figure 3.11: Charlie Chaplin’s Little Tramp caught in the machinery of the assembly line, “Modern Times” (1936)](image)

### 3.2 Total Work of Art

The two-fold challenge for American film and manufacturing industries was to produce images that resonated locally and globally. In responding to the overwhelming presence of immigrants in American cities, moving pictures were made to carry out the necessary functions of “entertaining,” “educating,” and “taming” immigrants at home, and creating exemplary images of American cultural prowess abroad. For this reason, the bulk of materials produced by the Motion Picture Lab and Educational Department
during the Lee and Marquis years were geared towards Ford’s majority immigrant workforce. As Grieveson writes, the FMC’s use of film and social programs worked to “shape workers’ lives outside factories and create a capitalist civics among working-class immigrant populations that would override the traditions of community and mutuality that characterized the unions banned by the company.”

The Sociological Department infused Ford’s belief in the power of education with materials that took a strong pedagogical approach and primarily attended to immigrants who worked within the Ford factory. These same images subsequently shaped notions of American industrial culture outside of Detroit.

Alongside film, the material drivers of Ford pedagogy were photography and in-house newsletters. Mirroring the didactic form of the Pan Pacific exposition, the Motion Picture Lab released as its first project the *Ford Animated Weekly* in 1914, consisting of 10-15 minute animated short films that featured up-to-date news spattered with subtle Ford advertising [Figure 3.12]. Through independent film distributors, these informational newsreels were released weekly for no charge and played in an estimated 3,500 theaters a week daily. The in-house tour booklet, *Ford Factory Facts*, reported that the films covered a “wide range of current news events as the average news service,” such as “the Mardi Gras celebration in New Orleans,” “President Wilson opening the baseball season in Washington,” and “[m]atters of interest throughout the state and city of Detroit.” It continued, “[c]onventions, dedication ceremonies of importance, parades, strikes, fires, and everything which holds interest for the public finds its way into the Ford films,” which were “being shown simultaneously from Maine to California, from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, and also in foreign countries.”

Before the Pan Pacific exposition, the company’s film distribution was limited to the Gulf region, Canada and Western Europe. The exposition coincided with Ford’s desire to expand the circulation of Ford films beyond the Gulf, further into South America and beyond the Transatlantic. The nature of the *Animated Weekly*’s content also reflected this desire: it went from largely focusing on national news to integrating features “descriptive of Ford Factory Operations, the Assembly of Ford Cars and the Ford Educational System.”

In 1917, the Lab followed up with another project, the *Ford Educational Weekly*, which more forcefully advertised the Ford product and focused on in-depth coverage of single topics that related to larger industrial projects. These educational films featured the role of Fordist technology in travel (nationally and to “exotic” regions), industry, history, geography, infrastructure, agriculture, and the home [Figures 3.12 to 3.15]. The company tourist brochure, *Ford Factory Facts*, again described this new series as seeking “to entertain and at the same time to be instructive or informative.” The mission of this new “educational” series was to supplement the inward looking *Animated Weekly* series,

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271 Ibid.
272 Ibid.
Figure 3.12: Film still from “Mirror of America” showing workers in the Motion Picture Laboratory filming a scene for the educational series
(Record Group 64.28, Records of the National Archives and Records Administration)

Figure 3.13: The Educational Weekly showing how Ford tractors assist in agricultural work
(Record Group 64.28, Records of the National Archives and Records Administration)
Figure 3.14: The Ford Educational Weekly often featured pieces on the importance of American infrastructure – particularly roads and highways
(Record Group 64.28, Records of the National Archives and Records Administration)

Figure 3.15: The Ford Educational Weekly, showing how technology assisted women in the domestic realm. Here, a woman washes clothes with a washing machine.
(Record Group 64.28, Records of the National Archives and Records Administration)
and slowly phase it out as the company began to turn outwards. The in-house tour guide stated as much:

Many of the Ford Motor Company’s activities have been filmed. Now for the first time these are being shown in foreign countries. “How Ford Cars Are Made” presents the Ford car in process of manufacture. Other pictures portray methods employed in safeguarding and educating Ford workers to the ways of safety first…Another film offers the Ford idea of teaching foreign born workmen the English language, civil government, history, and other academic subjects. For School and University work, a series of educational films, known as the “Ford Educational Library,” has been prepared…and is greatly in demand by educational institutions throughout the country.

Because of their nature Ford films are not confined to theatres alone but constantly are requested by churches, national associations, public schools, and colleges; and many penal institutions claim to have found in them a solution to their problem of entertaining and instructing the inmates.275

The popularity of these films coincided with the company’s interest in expanding outside factory walls, to cities across and beyond the nation. By 1917, Ford had set foot in 3 continents, set up 2 international headquarters and oversaw 10 international branches, and the film series’ featured content to reflect the FMC’s presence in the world:

While Ford camera men throughout the country are snapping pictures of nature-scenics [sic], trips through principal cities, or manufacturing processes, still others, laboratory experts, are carrying similar films over the round of developing, printing, reviewing, revising, packing and shipping. From this effectively organized picture-producing plant, one hundred and fifty some odd thousand feet of film weekly starts its long journey through the theatres of America, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentine [sic], South Africa, Spain, France, Russia, Scandinavia, Japan, China, Alaska.276

The same year, the September 1917 issue of the in-house paper The Ford Man reported that:

Over 1,000 miles of Ford films are shown weekly…in the United States alone – likewise throughout the Dominions of Canada, the British Colonies, South Africa, India, Japan, and most of the countries of Europe. It is a conservative estimate that between four and five millions of people [sic] are entertained by the pictures in this country every week.277

275 Ibid.
276 Ibid.
In 1920, the *Ford Times* informed its readers that Ford films “received between ten to twelve million viewers in 7,000 theaters in the United States, plus circulation in foreign markets such as France, Mexico, and Japan.”278 The *Facts from Ford* added that the *Educational Weekly* was shown in “nearly half the moving picture theaters in the United States; and has gained for the Ford Motor Company the distinction of having the largest circulation of motion pictures in the world.”279 By the end of the First War, the *Ford Educational Weekly*, and subsequent silent films and newsletters distributed by the company, were subtitled and translated into eleven languages.280

There was a clear push in the first few years of the Lab’s existence to get the message out: Ford films were a global phenomenon and they could not be missed. The features about the film projects in *Ford Factory Facts* were part of a brochure that was given to tourists upon arrival to Ford’s famed Highland Park plant. The exhibition pamphlet distributed at the Pan Pacific exposition was also a *Factory Facts* production, and all of the material relating to the publication aimed to inform laypersons about the latest developments at the Ford factory. Photography and film were a big part of the draw, since they showcased Fordist technology in an accessible way – those reading the brochures would then look for Animated and Educational Weeklies in their local theaters, and in a matter of years, would be inclined to integrate Fordist technology in the domestic realm, through the purchase of home-made cameras, projectors, vacuums, washing machines, lawn care machines, cars, etc. The “still picture” time-motion studies, which was originally part of Ford’s engineering wing, suddenly became housed by the Motion Picture Laboratory. Touted as “hardly less interesting” than the film department, the company described the new photography division as equaling “that of the commercial photographer and news-picture services combined. Lantern slides and photographs…including all those used in Ford literature come from there.” The division held 30,000 pictures of Fords industrial and educational “activities” by 1920.281

The move to integrate and project all of Ford’s advertising and educational ambitions through photography and film was swift and costly. This quickness capitalized on the utility of assembly-line technology, but it also signified Ford’s ability to recognize that technology allowed him to broadcast his innovations more widely than ever before. So prominent was the breadth of his advertising strategy that journalists and industrialists speculated about whether Ford was preparing the nation for a possible 1924 presidential run. In 1923, *Pipp’s Weekly*, an opinion-based newspaper based in Detroit, featured a full issue dedicated to the question [Figure 3.16]. The man behind the weekly, Edwin Gustav Pipp, was no stranger to Henry Ford or his company. Pipp was employed as a writer for *The Dearborn Independent*, which was essentially Ford’s corporate sponsored public-facing newspaper. As soon as the paper began to feature anti-Semitic stories, Pipp resigned, founded his Weekly, and “conducted a revealing muckraking crusade against Ford for the following three years.” Pipp often dedicated his journalism to countering

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279 Facts from Ford, 1920, Fourth edition, 47.
281 Facts from Ford, 1920, Fourth edition, 47.
claims made in the Independent, but “could not hope to compete against Ford’s mighty, ready-made, mass-circulation machine, but while he was able... he made his newspaper a veritable ‘mine of fact and commentary on the inner workings of the Ford Motor Company.’”

Many of the public attacks on Ford and his company emerged from disgruntled ex-Ford employees or competitors, yet they still provide a nuanced view of the politics of the moment. Regardless of the veracity of Ford’s political ambitions, the article asks legitimate questions about the weight that a $7 million budget for advertising carried:

It is the Ford policy to have the local agents spend as much as does the home office, or more. That is going to mean a total advertising expenditure of between $15,000,000 and $20,000,000. That will be about $1,000 for every paper in the country. What a pulling power that is expected to have with the newspapers of the country! Henry Ford is going to put the papers of this country to a test to which they never before have been subjected [sic]. He believes in the great pulling power of the dollar – and with reason.


Pipp continued to dissect visually Ford advertisements by commenting on their appearance in “Republican papers,” the prominence of the newly featured Ford signature, and his enlarged photograph alongside various models of Ford cars. “This big appropriation comes just a year ahead of the Presidential campaign,” he notes, “[a]nd into Ford’s advertising is being thrown his own personality in a way that leaves a very favorable impression of Ford himself. In fact, in some of the advertisements Henry Ford is being advertised as much as is his car.”

The educational aim of the Sociological Department existed alongside Ford’s own personal ambitions, part of which was to provide for the workingman what the state could or would not. Though Ford never entered a bid for the presidential race, his cinematic projects worked alongside investments in public and corporate advertising to shape Ford employees and consumers alike in the manner of what the Educational Weekly dubbed “the Ford idea”: to educate Ford foreign workers in the way of American living and of affording the very goods they produce.

The appearance of the Ford Guide coincided with distribution of the Ford Educational Weekly to reinforce its “idea” on the shop floor. As the films made rounds on the global circuit, the company began distributing the Guide to employees as a way to “help” them best achieve their share of the Ford profits. Its stated purpose was to “gather between the covers of one publication…the labors of several departments into one medium of communication to the end that the entire Ford family may profit, individually and collectively.”

The idea was to rid the notion of individuality among Ford workers and instill a work ethic that relied on communalism and dependence; the concept of “family” as a euphemism for this was key. Henry Ford’s editorial in the opening pages stated as much:

We all want to make progress toward better conditions and our mutual progress must, will, and does depend upon each individual one of us…He or she must give as freely of conscientious efforts for the welfare of all as they are to receive benefits of our efforts for the prosperity of our Company [sic] – [this] means as much to us individually as the general results do to the Company [sic]. Let us be one big family of earnest workers.

The publication of the Guide was essentially a type of “help us help you” plea to Ford workers (or in the words of Ford, “help the ‘Ford Guide’ to be a help”) and a warning that profit shares depended not only on their work ethic but also that of their peers.

While not explicitly stated, the Guide was a mechanism by which the company carried out the Ford idea by directly addressing its bulk of foreign workers. The contents, ranging from “Health,” “Safety First,” “Suggestions,” “Real Estate,” “Banking,” and “Education,” were generally applicable to the broad workforce but the pedagogical

284 Ibid.
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid.
lessons about American culture, civics, and learning the English language to promote safety only applied to non-English speaking foreign workers. The enforcer of the Ford idea himself was pictured facing its own editorial holding a newspaper and a pen, above the caption “Henry Ford – Common Sense Educator” [Figure 3.17].

The Ford idea of education was all encompassing, and left no aspect of everyday living unaccounted for. The beginning of each Ford Guide would begin with a famous piece of art, a popular presidential quote, or national anthem. The first Guide, for example, featured a reproduction of Jean Francois Millet’s “The Gleaners” with an accompanying lesson on art and all things artistic:

A Word About Art: What do we mean by Art? Perhaps we may say that the beautiful things in the world around us, that give us pleasure and that make us able to give pleasure to others is Art [sic]. A beautiful picture like “The Gleaners,” or a statue like many in a museum of art, please us…We get pleasure from listening to beautiful music or from playing such music ourselves. So music is another kind of art…It is the same with buildings. If a house or a church or other building is beautiful we say that its architecture is artistic, and architecture is another form of art. Then, too,
ideas expressed in beautiful language is \[sic\] an art that we call literature...We have, then, several kinds of art: music, painting, sculpture, architecture, and literature.\[288\]

By introducing the Guide with a lesson in “Art,” the company attempted to instill in workers a common artistic sensibility. The text goes on to describe how “man became interested” in art, each time expressing that “the beautiful” in sound, painting, and architecture was necessary since “we get our real pleasures in life from one kind of art or another” whether in work or play.

The Sociological Department and Guide featured literature and music in much the same way. As part of the Ford Trade and English Schools, students could take part in extracurricular activities, including learning an instrument and joining the Ford Symphony. One student was so overjoyed by the pleasures of music, that he was inspired to write a letter to the Ford conductor about the parallels between musical composition and the rhythmic motion of the Ford plant. The student essentially did the work of the company in connecting the value of artistic expression to the value of industry. In turn, his letter was illustrated and published in a two-page spread in the third issue of the Ford Guide. An excerpt of the letter reads as follows:

But man, think of it, all that [Richard] Wagner heard dwarfs beside the musical story of industry, which has never yet been scored. Take a week of some time \[sic\] and wander around the greatest factory in the world, where you work, and listen – listen to yourself, multiplied by 35,000 times by your fellow workers and see if you can grasp something of it in a musical way, the great undertone hum of acres upon acres of throbbing, palpitating belts, leaping, racing, a myriad throng of live THINGS \[sic\], chasing one another over dizzily-whirling wheels, vicing, \[sic\] striving, madly joyous over something. WHAT? \[sic\] Each one singing as it bounds along, up and down, and around and around, occasionally one shrieking and dropping dead, a flapping agony, and then still. Occasionally one screeching like an angry wildcat as its course, without warning, is changed – and then jumping on again. Thousands upon thousands of ‘em \[sic\]. Of course, at first blush, this reads idiotic, but study it, see if you can’t get something out of it.\[289\]

As a prominent nineteenth century German composer and key figure in German nationalism, Wagner was credited for innovating opera by introducing Gesamtkunstwerk, or the concept of a “total work of art.” In the vein of what I call a developing “Fordist aesthetic,” the student points to Wagner as an example of the company’s attempts to bring together varying art forms into a comprehensive synthesis – yet he goes as far to say that even Wager fell short of the musical story of Ford’s industry.

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\[288\] Ibid, 31, bold in text.

The “story” that the student refers to was animated on the margins of his letter [Figure 3.18]. At the bottom of the page, the Ford symphony is illustrated in action, the conductor stands as the central figure with his back to the page and his arms are raised, poised to direct music. The audience fades into the background, doubling as industrial workers making their way to the machinery that awaits them in the distance. Smoke billows above the chimney of the factory, swirling and dancing above the heads of the workers and orchestra, essentially celebrating the rhythmic union of music and industry. With scenes like this, Ford captured the global imagination, and like Wagner, he was able to join together artistic mediums to offer his theater of industry to the world.

Underneath the spectre of poetry and image, however, was a troubling condition that the letter-writer brought to life. Ford workers called this condition “Forditis,” or the series of illnesses brought on by the pace of the assembly line. Workers would complain of shakes, ulcers, headaches, and some were unable to loosen their limbs from the
positions their bodies maintained for hours on the assembly line.\textsuperscript{290} The frantic nature of the letter is apparent from start to finish, and perhaps unaware of its significance, the editors and writers of the Sociological Department brandished the letter as a celebration of industry without noting the effects it had on the mental and physical well-being of Ford workers. This was the eternal disconnect between the company and its workers in Ford visual devices—what may have seemed unsettling or obscure to the majority of Ford (immigrant) employees was upheld as a feat of industry through imaging.

This is most evident in the company’s representation of workers themselves, whose identities, like art, music, and poetry, did not escape the pages of Ford educational films and guides, and was perhaps thought of by FMC execs as key to creating a unified identity among Ford workers. The first step taken towards this aim was the map distributed to immigrants on arrival, which showed newly arriving workers which international cities they and their peers had arrived from. The map visually captured the industrial might and global draw of the company, marking Detroit as the center of global migrations and the industrial world, but for immigrant workers, it also drew attention to how far they had come. This was further reinforced by the educational lessons that accompanied the map. With a turn of the page, the map was followed with lessons on “Why America is the Land of Liberty” with an accompanying image of the Statue of Liberty:

“Liberty” is represented by a woman holding a torch, giving light to the world. She stands at the door of America. American is a land of “Liberty.” This means that in American the people make their own laws, and see to it that these laws are obeyed...In some countries the people do not make their own laws. In those countries there are not many schools. Good laws cannot be made unless one knows something about the need for the laws, and how they can best be made so that they will be fair to everyone.\textsuperscript{291}

The connection made between education and civility in relation to the “foreigner” is immediate, and the contrast between the migrational map of the world (with Detroit at its center) and the emphasis on American exceptionalism as compared to the rest of the world was a theme that underscored the Fordist construction of identity. Following Lady Liberty was a lesson about English words, spelling, and pronunciation, then an introduction to Greek goddesses, a section on art (“Art That Everyone Should Know”), geography (“Observe the Location of Detroit”), Science (“Care of the Human Body, the body is like a machine because it needs some kind of power to run it”), and American history (“European Homes of the Original Americans”).\textsuperscript{292}

\textsuperscript{291} \textit{Ford Guide}, Volume 1, Issue 2, c. 1917, 8-9.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid, 8-23.
The lessons on geography, American people and history present this exceptionalism in what was considered to be the most scientific way. In one instance, the two hemispheres of the world are displayed side by side, clearly differentiating the “East” from the “West” [Figure 3.19]. The captions read: “This is the Western Hemisphere in which we live” and “This is the Eastern Hemisphere in which the people of Europe Asia Africa and Australia live.”

Facing the page, was a “scientific” breakdown of how “Man Progresses Because He Uses His Knowledge, or Science.” Shying away from an evolutionary stance, the page illustrates how men are different from apes, “the most like man of any animal known,” because of his ability to “store-up knowledge in his brain.” “This is the way,” it continues, “man has ‘got ahead’ and other animals have stayed behind.” The lesson concludes by asking, “In what ways have human animals [sic] changed in their manner of living since Washington’s time, about one hundred and fifty years ago?” The accompanying illustrations show an ape in its natural surroundings and in a cage, progressing to an anachronistic drawing of a Neanderthal with dinosaurs roaming in the background, and finally, a suited white man, working at a desk with skyscrapers rising behind him. This insistence on the artistic use of a dominant gender (male), race (white), and their attachments to American historicity (“since Washington’s time”) was meant to shape foreign understandings of American advancement and Ford’s role in it.

Figure 3.19: Two pages from the Ford Guide showing geography and science lessons (Ford Guide, Volume 1, Issue 2, c. 1917, 14-15)

Within the same series of lessons, a page dedicated to “How We Live: The Races of Man (In America)” employs the same “scientific” method used in the previous lesson to breakdown and identify five basic racial groups in the U.S.:

In our country we can see at least five kinds of people.

1. People with white skins [sic] whose fathers or grandfathers or great grandfathers came from Europe.
2. People with yellow skins [sic], such as Chinese, came from Asia.
3. Those with brown skins [sic] came, perhaps, from the Islands of Hawaii.
4. Those with red or copper-color skins [sic] are American Indians.
5. Negroes with black skins [sic]. Their grandfathers or great grandfathers were probably born in Africa.

Before the white man lived here, America was home to the Indians. White men brought black men from Africa to live here as slaves. Yellow and brown people also made their homes in our country. White people, then, lived in Europe before they came to America. They were called civilized because they had learned to help themselves in a great many ways. The home of the yellow people is Asia. They have been called half-civilized, because they have not got ahead quite as well as the white people. The home of the red people is America. They were once savage because they lived a wild out-of-door life. The white man has changed their manner of living. Black people came from Africa where they lived like the other animals in the jungle. White men brought them to America and made them civilized. Brown people lived once very much like the black people. In America where all must go to school, the people from all over the world soon become civilized. American is like a garden where one cultivates plants, so that all have a chance to grow strong and healthy.\(^{296}\)

\(^{296}\) *Ford Guide*, Volume 1, Issue 2, c. 1917, 22.
The imagery used to illustrate the difference between animals and men in how “Man Progresses” was superimposed on the gradation of races from civilized to savage in text and image [Figure 3.20]. The foregrounding of men in their “natural habitats” served to further racialize them through the silent figuration of architectural backdrops and clothing: the “brown race” donned in a turban standing in front of an onion-shaped dome; the “yellow race” with a pole balanced on his shoulder in front of a pagoda; the “red race” with a feather in his hair in front of a tipi; the “black race” spear in hand standing in straw; and finally the “white race” suited up in front of a light pole. The differences between these images rested on the false premise that though education (in this case, Ford schooling and profit-sharing) all races could achieve equal footing.

The company’s pedagogic approach aimed to instill in workers an appreciation of beauty in the industrial. It is ultimately how all facets of the Ford workers life took on a measurable aesthetic values: the machine upon which they were working, art, domestic and industrial architecture, the condition of the home, and commerce, in addition to culture and race – these last two were central to Ford’s mission to unify his workforce at home. Philosopher and critical race theorist David Theo Goldberg also argues that racial classification and exclusion were central to the emergence of the modern state, which in turn, created its own meanings and implications of race: mainly to act as a homogenizing force that excluded those viewed as “Other” through segregation or by requiring assimilation. The FMC, along with a host of twentieth century American industrial actors, was essential to the capitalist workings of the state in defining race and the meaning of Americanism. American moral imperative, race, and nationalism worked hand in hand to produce a clear hierarchy from animalistic and savage to civilized, and even more starkly, from darkest to whitest. By the end of the First War the motion picture and photography arm of the Sociological Department would pair these images with others that aimed to infiltrate the very countries from which Ford foreign workers were coming from. In this way, the imagery constructed around Ford goods for Ford consumers (“native” American and immigrant), shaped understandings at home and abroad about commercial culture and Americanism.

3.3
Camels for Tractors

As the FMC advertising team in Detroit hastened to catch up to shifting global conditions at the start of the First War, they drew on the wealth of observations made by Ford “agents,” or salesmen, who traveled internationally on behalf of the company. Their writing was featured in the publically distributed in-house publications (Ford Times and Ford News), giving readers a sense of Ford’s activities in and beyond American and European markets. The Ford Times, which was originally distributed bi-weekly to American, Canadian, and European dealers to keep them up to date on the company’s latest mechanical innovations, would often include anecdotes on how the vehicles fared on the roads of the company’s newest foreign markets, and how design changes for

international vehicles were being made accordingly. The *Times* cover features and stories would give dealers a sense of the company’s breadth, while also allowing them to update their customers on the latest Ford innovations. One such cover was inspired by an account received from a Ford-Canada agent in India, who described the use of the Ford Model T in King George V’s coronation ceremony, as “magnificent. There were elephants, camels, Ford cars, and everything all mingled together in oriental magnificence…a beautiful showing.” A colorful rendering of the imagined scene landed on the next issue of the *Ford Times*’ 1912 issue, which showed four distinguished Indian maharajas sitting in a gold-plated Ford Model T foregrounding a decorated elephants and princes in tow with a Taj Mahal-inspired building glistened in the background [Figure 3.21]. The slogan for the image read, “Ford Model T: The Car for the People, Good Enough for the Princes.”

The *Times*, a union of *Ford Man* and *Fordson Worker*, which were written to convey the strength of the Ford worker, was sent to dealers to convince them that the Ford product excelled in comparison to all others – and it worked. The illustration and accompanying news story gloated over the favorability of the Ford T in royal East Indian ceremonies over the “traditional” elephant. “Indian Princes Prefer Yankee Ford Car to Elephants,” and continued, “[n]ot all the Princes of India rode in Ford cars, but the more progressive ones did while elephants, camels, and gaily caparisoned horses conveyed to others who adhered to the time honored customs followed throughout the ages.” The objective of the cover was clear: driving a Ford ushered cultures and regions into modernity, leaving tradition behind. These features became so popular in dealer waiting rooms, that customers who read them would often find the stories “enchanting” and take them home. Upon realizing its draw among dealerships, the *Times* editors shifted the look of the cover and the arrangement of its content to suit a wider public. Coinciding with the start of the profit-sharing plans in 1914, the periodical began featuring a new section called “Motoring through the East,” where Ford agents would write about their experiences traveling to parts of Asia and the Middle East to sell Ford goods. The covers had a more structured appearance, complete with volume and issue numbers, were dated, and adorned with “charming artwork of seasonal motifs or faraway, exotic places.”

Almost overnight, the “mechanic” appearance of the original *Ford Times* for dealers, which began in 1908, vanished, and in its place was a travel magazine by which potential Ford customers could view the world through the FMC.

The inaugural story in the 1914 issue was titled “Motoring through Japan,” and in it, a Ford agent cheekily described his experience as a passenger in a Ford car on the streets of Yokohama and Tokyo:

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298 Personnel Records, Ford-Canada, Leed Library.
Figure 3.21: Ford Times cover, 1912
Unhappy is the man who drives in his own car in Japan, for he will see nothing at all of the country; if he takes his eyes off the road immediately in front of the bonnet for even a minute there will be a terrible accident...An expedition from Tokyo to Miyanoshita will be full of interest to the motorist, especially if it be [sic] his first acquaintance with the Land of the Rising Sun. Tokyo is not pleasant to motor through, with its badly laid tram lines, rickshaws, contemplative coolies, and other forms of road lice. It is, moreover a depressing town, and ugly. Contrary to what one expects in a land where the sun shines [sic] kindly, there are no gaily washed walls and glistening roofs, but a wearisome gray and slate-colored monitory – squalid native houses, with here and there an ill-conceived European erection. One must not, however, be too hard on Tokyo, for the lives of its people are ever shadowed by the thought of earthquakes. For this reason the houses are not fixed to the ground, but just rest on their foundations, and the numerous factory chimneys, which now vomit filthy smoke into the hitherto peerless turquoise of the eastern [sic] sky, are built of thin iron tubing instead of bricks and mortar, for the same reason. The way to Miyanoshita goes through Yokohama, and the eighteen-mile drive from Tokyo to that town is a nightmare. Just think of it! Tokyo is the capital of a powerful nation.

Figure 3.22 “Motoring through Japan” feature story in the Ford Times, 1914

300 Ford Times, Volume 3, Number 1, October 1914, 5-6.
While these accounts were meant to impress Ford customers with tales of the latest Ford adventures, they also had the effect of signaling to competitors worldwide the company’s potential markets of interest. The purpose was not lost on this agent, whose provoking account touches upon the diplomatic tensions that existed between the United States and Japan at the turn of the century, which were further fueled by their mutual interest in commercial opportunities in China — a territory that the FMC also aggressively sought to enter. The twofold intent of the featured pieces, then, was to position the company in a way that appealed to emerging markets by pointing to advancements that could be made through the use of Ford products, and as a means of entertaining Ford readers, whose ideas of an “East” were actively being shaped by the accounts at hand.

The stories were strewn with images taken from the agents’ travels, and written with dramatic prose akin to a travelogue [Figure 3.22]. Besides detailing infrastructural potential (or lack thereof) of the cities they visited, the agents would provide accounts of historic sites they passed along the way or geographic wonders; the Ford car, however, was always central to the story. Shortly after skirting the banks of the Pacific Ocean close to the Isles of Izo, the agent goes as far as personifying the car, exclaiming: “How well the car goes! Perhaps it is because it knows that only 4,500 miles of that blue ocean separate it from the land of its birth and the orange groves of California.”301 Not unlike an industrial version of 19th century Euro-American travelogues, these accounts worked to set apart Ford agents (and thereby the company) from the “exotic” regions they were visiting. Edward Said, in his critique of such Euro-American travel accounts and literature, notes that these types of works reflected their authors’ interests and fears in creating static representations of foreign lands and people.302 The characterization of the “East” by the “West” as stagnant, effeminate, irrational, and mired in tradition had the effect of distinguishing the latter from the former as more rational, masculine, advanced, and modern. A full century later, Ford travel accounts worked in the service of a major industrial enterprise in the same way, by utilizing the very technology that the company advertised to depict clear imbalances in power and assert American technological dominance over the “Other.”

Many more Ford agents were sent with the same directives to Tokyo, Shanghai, Cairo, Mumbai, Istanbul, among other cities of the “East,” to observe, record, and relay their experiences. They were told to report on Ford performance in the infrastructures of these cities and, in turn, accounts like “Motoring in Japan” littered the pages of company publications and filled screens showing Ford films to showcase the agility of the Ford automobile and allow Ford customers to live vicariously through Ford agents. Ford’s entry into India and Egypt via Canada and London marked the earliest appearance of such images, and continued to reinforce the binary between ancient or traditional, and modern or progressive. A *Time* feature in 1909 shows an image of an Egyptian man being driven in a Ford Model T by the child of an unknown Ford agent, with another Egyptian man trailing behind in an ox-driven cart. The caption reads: “Ancient and Modern Locomotion” [Figure 3.23]. The image, grainy and a relatively unclear compared to later

301 Ibid, 7.
publications, pre-dates the official formation of the Sociological Department or its photographic studio, but indicates, that alongside time-motion studies, the company was already thinking about the commercial (and cultural) use of its developing technology.

Figure 3.23: “Ancient and Modern Locomotion. A Ford in Fayoum, Egypt.”
(Ford Times, Volume 2, Number 13, 1909, 5)

With the official establishment of a Ford sales branch in Cairo in 1914, and the general emergence of Ford in the industrial sphere, images of Ford presence in Egypt, India, Japan, China, and later Turkey, became grandiose. The editors of the same October 1914 issue of Ford Times that featured “Motoring through Japan” concluded the issue with a two-page photographic spread of four British Ford agents sitting in the Ford Model T in front of the Sphinx and Pyramids [Figure 3.24]. The caption for the photograph was an excerpt taken from an influential 1821 British poem by Horace Smith titled “Address to the Mummy at Belzoni’s Exhibition”:

Tell us, for doubtless thou canst recollect, to whom should we assign the Sphinx’s fame?
Was Cheops or Cyprenos architect of either Pyramid that bears their name?
Was Pompey’s Pillar really a misnomer? Had Thebes a hundred gates as sung by Homer?303

303 Ford Times, Volume 3, Number 1, October 1914, 24-25
In the poem, the poet relentlessly interrogates a mummy brought back to England from Egypt by explorer Giovanni Belzoni, inquiring about the mysteries surrounding the wonders of the world, the mummy’s personal life, and after life, to which the mummy never replies – a sort of euphemism, perhaps, for a silent and laconic East. It was likely a triumphant moment for the British agents, as Egypt (via Alexandria) would serve from this point forward as a major distributor of Ford vehicles to the African continent.

By this point, in mid-1914, the Sociological Department’s advertising departments began operating in close concert with one another. Film stills from the Motion Picture Laboratory and photographic features from the Photographic Department were integrated into news stories about the latest developments and discoveries made by the company. The advertisement adjacent to “Motoring through Japan,” for example, coincided with the first well-publicized road trip taken by the four “Vagabonds” to encourage Ford readers to gather up their families and take to the roads in their new Ford sedans: “It’s easy to drive – safe – sound – dependable – economical. It’s the car for all

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The family.” As Ford films circulated through national theaters, these seemingly innocuous appeals were interspersed with quirky anecdotal stories, reminders of safety in the workplace, and significant developments in the industrial world; in two words, all things related to what the company considered the importance of Ford times, or as the tagline for the issue put it, “[e]vidence that Ford Times are the Best Times.” Seeing that the company could broaden its appeal beyond dealerships, however, Ford execs, along with Lee and Marquis, phased out the *Ford Times* in 1917 in favor of the *Ford News*, which appeared in 1920 and ran until 1942. Its mission statement was to distribute “information of current interest in the Ford industries as well as descriptive and informative articles…a digest of events in the Ford World.”

The *Ford News* was a more global version of the *Ford Times*, and offered critical analyses of world events that reflected on the daily operations of the company coming out of the war. The semi-monthly publication closely resembled that of any local newspaper, and its editors hoped it would provide the same kind of veracity for its readers. The *News* looked outwards from the U.S. onto the world unlike any other Ford publication preceding it, which was essential in a moment when Ford products were sought after for militaristic, agricultural, and leisurely purposes and geopolitical relationships were aligning themselves in unpredictable ways. A story on Japan and China, for example, adopted a sympathetic tone that contrasted sharply from the Ford-Canada’s description in “Motoring through Japan.” Nine years later, a headline read “Automotive Transportation in Japan Gains Popularity: Island Nation Foremost Exponent of Motor Cars in Orient”. After the war, European cars largely fell out of favor with Japanese customers and American-made cars were on the rise. After the death of Prince Yamashina, head of Japan’s Imperial family and the number one advocate of Ford goods in Japan, the paper expressed its regret at the Great Kanto earthquake of 1923 that hit Yokohama and Tokyo, and wished the people of Japan a speedy recovery. After previously poking fun at the country’s “squalid, depressing, and ugly” infrastructure, the *News* ensured its readers that the “characteristically sturdy” cities of Japan would rise once again.

Signaling deals struck in China, the newspaper also featured a piece on 100 Chinese students who were being specially trained at the Ford Trade School [Figure 3.25]. The photograph appeared just like any other immigrant class who took part in the profit-sharing plans or applied to be trained at the Trade and English schools, but as an anomaly, a special class was dedicated to the 100-student delegation, each handpicked by a professor, Dr. Joseph Bailie, of Peking University. “These men are dreaming of and working for a new China,” the article read, “a China with good roads and rapid transportation, where want and starvation will no longer exist not far from abundant supplies [sic], a China in which the Ford car and Fordson tractor will play a very

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305 *Ford Times*, Volume 3, Number 1, October 1914, 4.
306 *Ford Times*, Volume 5, Number 2, September 1912, 385.
important part.” The last sentence lends insight into a relatively under-publicized exchange that the company arranged between countries with markets of potential interest and worker training programs. Throughout the 1920s, FMC Trade School records show that immigrant workers from Persia (Iran), Turkey, Egypt, and India were accepted in relatively large numbers with the tacit agreement that those workers (who often had backgrounds in agriculture or mechanical engineering) would return to their home countries and aid the company in selling the Ford product or setting up Ford branches.

The softer tone struck by the Ford News towards Japan and China was not consistently applied in the company’s representation of Africa, Asia, and the “Near East” – regions that dominated its publications throughout the early and mid-1920s. The company’s attitudes towards these regions were largely determined by pre- and post-First War politics, creating a direct link between the actions of American industries abroad and the nation from within they were operating. Ford’s positioning in Eastern Europe during the Italo-Turkish and Balkan Wars was particularly interesting from a commercial standpoint: it was neither militaristic nor leisurely, but positioned the Ford touring car as a sign of aid and strength at the frontier of both conflicts. In a Times article dated November 1911, “natives” from Bulgaria and Turkey are pictured gathered around and piled on top of the Model T [Figure 3.26]. The caption reads:

> It is very evident that the strength of the Vanadium steel in Ford cars has been impressed very strongly upon the minds of the natives of Turkey and Bulgaria. These people seem to consider that as long as the Ford car is built of Vanadium steel there is no limit to its carrying capacity. Fifteen passengers in one Model T Town Car certainly ought to be a good test of

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308 Ford News, Volume 2, Number 22, June 22, 1923, 3.
Figure 3.26: Ford Model T at the Turkish-Bulgarian border, 1911
(Ford Times, Volume 5, Number 2, November 1911, 51)

Figure 3.27: Ford Touring Car transformed into ambulance for Turkish army
(Ford Times, Volume 5, Number 2, September 1912, 418)
ADVERTISING consists of hammering away at the same point until the inert covering of the public mind has been penetrated.

Advertising is the systematic sowing of seed: not the scattering of salt on the sea shore.

Advertising is the steady laying of the axe at the root of the tree of obscurity, until by persistent endeavor, the tree is chopped down.

Advertising is all these things and many more.

But above all, advertising is a persistent and regular attack on the mind of the buying public.

Using publication space, whether magazine or newspaper, haphazardly, with no definite plan of campaign: placing an ad whenever the spirit moves or the solicitor is particularly ingratiating, is not advertising. It is a foolish waste of money which might better be given to the poor.

How many automobile dealers buy “space” for one insertion in a newspaper, resist all the efforts of the paper’s solicitor to get them to follow this up the week following, and on the week following that; but finally yield, and then complain they get no results?

The trouble is they have but given one tap with the hammer where there should be consistent driving. They have scattered a handful of seeds and expected their crop to grow in rows. They have but taken one chop at the root of the tree.

You can’t convince people your car is reliable, if your advertising is unreliable.

People who read advertising—who read your advertising—should be able

Representatives of the Ford Car in War-Devastated Turkey

Corner of the stock room of our dealers in Constantinople, Messrs. Avigor and Benykisch

Figure 3.28: A page from the Ford Times on the art of advertising, interrupted with an ad about Ford in war-torn Turkey, 1912

(Ford Times, Volume 6, Number 2, November 1912, 72)
the strength of the Ford car. Notice the variety of costumes used by the people of these Oriental countries.309

A year later, at the start of the Balkan Wars, the Ford Touring Car, normally advertised and used for luxury purposes, was pictured as “doing government service in Turkey.”310 A series of photographs show how the transformation occurred, stating that “the car was remodeled from a touring car into a government ambulance and is now engaged in the Red Cross Service of the Turkish army in Constantinople” [Figure 3.27]. Not more than three months passed and the Times again ran a full page advertisement about the art of advertisement, interrupted with an ad about the presence of Ford in “war-devastated” Turkey [Figure 3.28]. The page was rather ironically titled “A Ford Advertisement, Like a Bullet, is Cutting Its Way When You Can’t See It,” and explained the Ford philosophy behind advertising: “Advertising consists of hammering away at the same point until the inert covering of the public mind has been penetrated…but above all, advertising is a persistent and regular attack on the mind of the buying public.”311 The use of violent, war-related metaphors (bullet, cutting, hammering, penetrate, attack) juxtaposed with an advertisement about the continued presence of Ford agents and dealers in warring Constantinople was itself an example of the lesson that the ad was attempting to convey, as crude as it was.

Both the Ford Times and the Ford News stayed relatively silent on Ford activities in the region until the war was over, a republic was formed, and Western enterprises could once again resume business. The geopolitical reshaping of the region also had the effect of rearranging relationships among Ford producers, assemblers, and consumers. Bulgaria, for example, fell into Ford-Italy in Trieste’s jurisdiction (see Chapter 1). Agents from Ford-Italy approached officials in the country in the early 1920’s with a keen eye on its subsistence agriculture and proximity to other lucrative agricultural markets. The resulting headline (“Bulgaria Sees Tractor Value: Fordson Offers Boon to Backward Farming Country”) was a stepping-stone towards Ford’s deal with Atatürk a few years later (resulting in the Ford Law), but kept in line with the representation of Bulgarians and Turks as “backwards” and traditional.312 Not more than a year after the tractors boomed in Bulgaria, a photograph appeared as part of the Ford Photographic Series showing the Ford Model T outside the Blue Mosque in Istanbul in preparation for Ford’s bid for the dock on Tophane [Figure 3.29]

Monumental sites were often used to sell the Ford brand in publications and films even if those sites were nowhere near production and assembly facilities, much like Ford’s publicity project in Egypt. In Africa, Ford’s visual devices told the same story. From Ford in Cairo and Alexandria, the company set foot into Southern and Northern Africa and featured stories about the teams trials and tribulations along the way. In the tradition of Orientalism, the Ford News featured several pieces through the 1920s about

309 Ford Times, Volume 5, Number 2, November 1911, 51.
310 Ford Times, Volume 5, Number 2, September 1912, 418.
311 Ford Times, Volume 6, Number 2, November 1912, 72.
Figure 3.29: 1924 Ford Model T outside Blue Mosque, Istanbul, Turkey, c. 1924-1940

Figures 3.30 and 3.31 (right and bottom): Ford News features on FMC entry into South Africa

(Ford News, Volume 3, Number 2, August 22, 1923, 2-7)
Three: Visions of Empire

how the “Heart of the Darkest Continent” was “penetrated” by Ford cars [Figures 3.30 and 3.31]. The paper consistently applied Conrad’s literary title to its stories about Africa and the novelty of Ford motion pictures and cars, leaving out the critical stance he took on European colonialism on the continent, and keeping intact his savage descriptions of the Africans and Africa. The Ford photographic and motion picture teams were described as “adventurers setting forth, penetrating jungles and veldts alike…through thousands of miles of trackless country, inhabited only by wild beasts and scantily clad, black skinned savages.” The articles would state repeatedly how the presence of film and Ford vehicles “created stampedes” and caused natives to “travel afoot often hundreds of miles, just to get a view of them.” Film stills and photographs from the Ford agents visit accompanied the news stories, making visible the acute racialization of people and places depicted in the Ford Guide a decade earlier.

These themes carried over into writings on Egypt and Egyptians, and by the mid-1920’s, Ford agents had been in the country for nearly a decade. The visual project remained the same: using monuments to sell the Ford brand to show stark contrasts between “tradition” and “modernity,” and introducing anecdotal stories to make the Ford entrepreneurial adventures more relatable to the News’ largely Euro-American audience. One such anecdote was contributed by an agent working out of Ford-UK, who traveled to Palestine to sell farmers Ford tractors:

From London – England – We forward a story from Alexandria [Egypt] which is amusing:

A Ford representative recently in Palestine selling Fordsons asked a native, after a demonstration, what he thought. The response was that the native’s camel was useful. He plows, moves furniture and tent and is good for riding. It was explained that all this could be done with the Fordson only 500 times better and quicker, to which the native responded, “That is true, your tractor is very good, but, my friend, when my camel dies I eat him.”

The farmer’s wisdom is undermined by the story’s tongue-in-cheek humor, which represented a resistance by local agriculturalists against the onslaught of Fordist technology that was being pushed upon them. Moreover, Ford’s method of tackling the agricultural market throughout Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Asia was part of a broader project of industrial colonialism that was being carried by corporate figures on behalf of national entities. Signs of this were present throughout FMC commercial advertising, in and beyond its Orientalist depictions of peoples and places.

Cartography, for example, was a primary mechanism of visual colonial endeavor, and maps became commonplace illustrations in Ford adventures about the “Orient,” as can be seen in Figures 3.31, 3.32, and 3.33. A potent example of this was paving the

313 Ford News, Volume 3, Number 2, August 22, 1923, 2.
314 Ibid, 7.
315 Ford News, 1922.
“Cairo-Bagdad Air Mail Line” in 1923 [Figure 3.32]. Agents from the Ford-Jerusalem division were tasked with the project of using the Fordson tractor to plow “from Amman in an easterly direction to a station half way to Bagdad [sic], or approximately 270 miles.” A News article describing the project states that three Ford agents were already placed along the route, and an accompanying map traces the path of the Fordson, an American-made product paving a way for three major Middle Eastern cities to communicate more easily with one another. Another Ford project took the form of a travelogue, and described how three four cars replaced a pack of camels and astounded the “isolated people” of the Siwa desert by reducing a “2-Week Camel Trip Across Hot Desert Sands to 2 Days” [Figure 3.33]. The accompanying map, still frames, and photographs were similar to the stories featured about Japan in the Times a decade prior, though arguably more scientifically presented and less caricatured.

**Figures 3.32 and 3.33**: Fordson tractors (left) and cars (right) in Egypt, Ford News, 1922

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316 Ford News, 1922.
Figure 3.34: "Oxcart Passing Ford Automobiles Dealership, India, 1920"
(American Road Marketing Photographs, 1920, BFRC)

Figures 3.35 and 3.36: Film stills, “Ford at Alexandria,” under construction (left) and producing cars (right)
Images of the FMC traveling through photographs and films were so successful, that the company created a project within the Photographic Department dedicated to “American Road Marketing Photographs.” Its mission was to bring to Euro-American viewers photographs of road conditions and infrastructure from cities around the world. India was a favorite in this category, and like cities in Africa and the Middle East, was depicted in much the same way: an anonymous man on an oxcart passing by a new steel and glass constructed Ford automobile dealership [Figure 3.34]. And just like photographs of Ford assembly workers in Highland Park, Alexandria, Cairo, Istanbul, and elsewhere, the worker was just a passing figure with no discernable identity or active role in the scene being presented, and Ford technology took center stage. Alexandria, even when it became a major assembly point for goods in the Mediterranean, Africa, and Asia, was depicted in much the same way. The wonders of the Alexandrian assembly plant were shown on film in cinemas around the world, yet the Egyptian worker fell to the wayside and instead the Citadel of Cairo, Giza, the Sphinx (despite not being located in Alexandria), and sparkling Ford models that rolled off the assembly line came into focus [Figures 3.35 and 3.36].

The company’s use of “American Road Marketing Photographs” took an unusual turn when Ford expressed interest in using the images to recreate roadways at the 1934 Century of Progress Exhibition in Chicago. That Ford was interested in international expositions and fairs was no surprise, given his attendance at the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair and subsequent participation in the Pan Pacific exposition in San Francisco. However, by 1934, Ford had conjured up enough industrial might and capital that he could very literally gather up, project, and build the world in one setting. The same photographs that were used by Ford expeditions to gather data on road conditions and narrate stories in Ford in-house publications were quickly compiled to recreate famous roadways in Chicago. The Ford exhibit was appropriately titled “Roads of the World” wherein “fairgoers could tour reproductions of famous roadways in brand new Fords.” The idea was to present various infrastructures that eased or prevented the introduction of Ford vehicles on roadways around the world, and allow visitors to experience the performance of the Ford car and the “essence” of a famous road in one place. Unlike the workers, here the visitor’s would be pictured front and center, like the executive of Ford-India, who traveled to from India to Chicago to pose near a recreated section of South Asia's historic Grand Trunk Road [Figure 3.37].

Perhaps even more astonishing than this was Ford’s $176,000 investment in landscaping various historic and modern sections of the roadways to “ensure a realistic, immersive experience.” The catalogue goes on to describe the process, where “crews used reference photographs – like this one – to recreate the 19 ‘Roads of the World’ [Figure 3.38]. The non-descript Saharan scene shows a pack of camels strutting down a jagged, mountainous path in dead heat, much like that described previously of the Siwan oasis. In these popular recreations of the India and the Middle East, fairgoers and executives drove through purposefully unpaved paths, posing next to Ford vehicles, and acted out the very stories that were narrated by Ford publications and shown in films. In this way, the Ford vision – researched, documented, carefully curated, and recreated –
Figure 3.37: Ford of India Executive posing next to recreation of India’s Grand Trunk Road at Ford’s “Roads of the World” Exhibit in Chicago, 1934
(American Road Marketing Photographs, 1934, BFRC)

Figure 3.38: “Camel Pack Train Crossing a Stream on a Stone Road,” at Ford’s “Roads of the World” Exhibit in Chicago, 1934
(American Road Marketing Photographs, 1934, BFRC)
was exactly what Timothy Mitchell would call an exercise in enframing.\footnote{Timothy Mitchell, \textit{Colonising Egypt} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 34-62.} That is, a creation of a hierarchy that makes knowledge about people and objects more accessible, oftentimes using the means of representation described by Said. Orientalism operated in this way through the FMC’s advertising tactics and promotional materials, which were used in large part to open up markets in Japan, China, India, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Singapore, and South Africa, and broaden the global appeal of its brand. For this reason, it is important to keep in mind that the processes associated with seeing the world as Ford were not unique to one place, but in teasing apart the company’s own monolithic category of an “Orient,” and people and places its encompassed, we can allow for a more complex story to unfold in the locations in which Ford operated, both in and between the United States and its “markets of the Orient.”
Chapter Four

Factory as City

The Ford Motor Company’s production of promotional films, images, and newsletters depicted foreign worlds and cultures to create some of the earliest moving images of its kind at the start of the First War. As I showed in Chapter Three, the global circulation of Ford’s visual devices contributed to the shaping of Americanism and “foreignness” at home and abroad through the consumption and use of Ford products. In this chapter, I turn to Detroit. I draw on my analysis of the promotion of the “Ford idea” through these visual and literary devices to argue that these ideas were continually reinforced in the spatial logic and experience of the Highland Park factory complex in Detroit. I examine the architecture of FMC factory space and in-house guides made for industrial tourism to show how Ford’s paradigm of the “factory as city” created a lived space for hierarchical ideologies and notions of American exceptionalism that were advocated through its visual devices. The social and industrial attitudes championed by the company through its promotional materials were guided by the need to control the immigrant or “foreign” body and the spaces they occupied, in turn, creating a panoptical model that eventually piqued the interests of the city municipality and the major political players of Detroit.

The second half of this study pivots back towards Detroit to examine the development of the city’s public-private collaborations more closely, which were accelerated by Ford’s immense success in the years leading up to the war. In returning to the first decade and a half of Ford’s operations, I revisit the effects of crisis from another angle. I view the crisis of war as marking a schism in the relationship between human and industrial capital in Detroit; in the same moment that there was a temporary lull in labor migration from warring regions to the United States, growing American industries were profiting immensely from European wartime demands and Detroit proved to be central to the war economy. In turn, a rather inconspicuous relationship developed between corporate industrial enterprises and municipalities, as industries became the principle generators of socio-economic growth. This chapter lays the foundation for the start of that relationship, beginning with Ford’s decision to open up his Highland Park factory to industrial tourism, which in effect, significantly shaped the image of the rising industrial capital and handed Ford the power to extend the parameters of his “factory as city” model to Detroit, as well as other industrial cities that housed Ford operations.

4.1 Manufacturing Tourism

Splashed across the centerfold of the Ford Factory Facts booklet was an image of the Big Power House, the engineering marvel that brought assembly operations in the Highland Park plant to life. The booklets were the first items handed to visitors as they arrived to tour the newly built Highland Park plant [Figure 4.1]. Tours of the assembly plant began two years after it opened and were one of many strategies the company
devised to experiment with public relations locally. Photographs and sketches, like the one of The Big Powerhouse, were made to be as fanciful as the machinery itself. As visitors waited in the main lobby for their tour to begin, they thumbed through their personal copies of the Factory Facts, and within a few minutes, a “tour guide” would greet them in the lobby, and guide them through the main mechanical operations of the plant. The tours, which began a few years before the official formation of the Sociological Department, were crafted with extreme attention to detail by FMC execs – an unusual marketing decision for a still-growing company. Yet, in anticipation of the notoriety that the assembly line would achieve for the company, the Ford and his team of executives looked to open up the factory to the public.

The phenomenon of industrial tourism was not new; its lineage can be traced back to 18th century Europe, when wineries, chocolatiers, slaughterhouses, and cheese and textile producers partnered with state tourism boards to offer visitors and residents tours and treats. In the United States, industrial tourism had slightly earlier roots with the rise Jack Daniel’s famous distillery in Tennessee, which began tours as early as 1866. Industrial tourism offered as much as an opportunity for private industries as it did for the cities in which they were based. As economist Alexander Otgaar, et al. note, the practice was particularly fruitful for “cities with a considerable industrial base” which provided “possibilities to strengthen the economic structure (direct and indirect employment) and to increase the supply of tourist products. For such cities industrial tourism [was] a potential growth sector that matched with their identity.”

The decision for a city to promote industrial tourism, then, was essentially a matter of whether companies would or would not cooperate, depending upon their willingness to take the risk of revealing too about the industrial process by opening up operations to the public.

Ford took the unusual step of launching industrial tourism as part of his own marketing experiment. The company quickly produced tourist literature to cater to the concerns needs that visitors might have about technological innovation and the treatment of its workforce. The Factory Facts booklets were designed to pair the tourists experience of the plant with “factual” views of the working lives of FMC workers. When the Sociological Department was created to deal head-on with advertisement and outreach, it expanded upon the first edition of the guide by integrating writing, photos, and films stills from its other divisions. The department went on to publish three more issues between 1915 and 1920, until the River Rouge plant in Dearborn replaced Highland Park as the world’s first fully integrated plant. The benefits that industrial tourism reaped for city of Detroit was a matter happy circumstance, until heads of the municipality realized more fully the strength of industrial advertisement and marketing.

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319 Alexander Otgaar, Leo van den Berg, Christian Berger, and Rachel Xiang Feng, *Industrial Tourism: Opportunities for City and Enterprise* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 1.
Figure 4.1: The first cover of the Ford Factory Facts booklet features a sketch of the Highland Park plant in 1912
In the span of the *Factory Facts*’ publication, the booklets revealed how the company crafted its image to the public over the course of eight years. Four separate editions appeared in 1912, 1915, 1917, and again in 1920, each featuring titles with varying alliterative titles that rearranged the words “Ford,” “Factory,” and “Facts.” The titles acted as rhetorical devices that were meant to be memorable, persuasive, and associated the experience of the grand tour and the information presented to them as “fact.” The basic layout of the booklet was similar to those created by the department in the same years: the covers were generally colorful and attractive, often illustrated with scenes depicting Ford’s serene, modern industrial plant seamlessly integrated into a Midwestern pastoral landscape. Inside, a photograph of Henry Ford graced the frontispiece, followed by an editorial and a short biographical history of Henry Ford. Without fail, the tour booklet would uphold his entrepreneurial spirit as exemplary of the working class ethic that made the American worker industrious. The format was relatively consistent across the four editions but began to vary in content and geographical scope as the company diversified and gained global prominence through the years.

What differentiated the tour booklet from other Ford publications was a short history of Ford Motor Company history as it related to the architectural evolution of the Ford plant. It began as a small garage in the back of Henry Ford’s house in Dearborn, to the Piquette Plant, a brick building the size of a residence in which many of the assembly line experimentations took place, to its implementation in the state-of-the-art Highland Park plant. Like the other publications, however, in the 1915 and 1917 editions, the booklets visibly thickened as whole sections were dedicated to explaining the efficiency of the new profit-sharing plan and the social programs that accompanied it. As public criticism of the programs paternalistic practices grew, the tour booklets more space to lauding the accomplishments of the Ford Sociological Department, its welfare programs, and the benefits that industrial progressivism offered to American society. The *Factory Facts* final publication, dated 1920, was an eighty-odd paged booklet that served as a template for tour booklets made and distributed in the company’s two other global headquarters: Ford-Canada and UK.

The tour booklet’s served a purpose that exceeded existing purposes of industrial tourism; rather they were very deliberately crafted to also serve the company in posterity and in its commercial efforts. The first edition states its mission accordingly:

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320 Four different versions of the booklets currently exist in the BFRC archives, dated 1912, 1915, 1917, and 1920, but it may be possible that more than four editions were published by the company. The titles of the existing booklets range from *Ford Factory Facts* to *Factory Facts from Ford* to simply, *Facts from Ford*. Acc. #951, Box II. Benson Ford Research Center.

321 *British Facts from Ford* and *Facts from Ford-Canada* began printing in 1923.

322 Henry Ford’s relationship to posterity, from a personal and corporate perspective, is a complex one as he was occupied with the idea of posterity very early in his career. His quest to archive corporate materials (as a testament to his success and as an historical artifact for future generations) began as early as 1908, only four years after the company had been incorporated and the year that the huge success of the Model T launched the company onto the national and international stage. The result of these collections have materialized in the form of the Benson Ford Research Center in Dearborn as well as private archives kept
This is not a catalogue – it is, rather, in the nature of a souvenir volume, a profusely illustrated trip through the great Ford plant, that you may see and be convinced that the Ford automobile is both the best and the most economically made car in the world. We present this copy with our compliments and with the hope that you will find in it much that is entertaining and instructive, and that you may deem it worthy of a permanent place in your library. As a contribution to motor car literature…this volume is a distinct departure, for it has been written, not as an appeal for further patronage, but in recognition of that confidence and splendid support which has achieved for Ford cars, in eight short years, a success that has no parallel in automobile history.323

As was the case with the Sociological Department’s commercial projects, the booklet was intended to entertain and instruct, turning even the tour of the factory into a pedagogic lesson from which visitors could benefit and learn. Situating the tour booklets among a genre of automotive “literature” was a further attempt to change the perception of its content as having a literary rather than commercial appeal. Ford hoped that these complimentary commercial souvenirs would potentially have a place among the bookshelves of industrial enthusiasts, giving the booklets a longevity that would not otherwise exist with other, more dispensable commercial advertisements. Though intended to work that way, the Factory Facts “volumes” were not branded as a strategy to gain commercial patronage; rather, the company’s intent was much more lucrative: to get FMC patrons to place their faith in the Ford idea, the economics of Fordism, and the spaces within which all these processes took place.

4.2
Assembly Line Architecture

The tour booklets’ effectiveness depended upon the visitor’s ability to believe in the world Ford created around them: inside the pages of the booklet and in the environment around them, which appeared to have the functionality of a city entirely on its own. This “factory as a city” metaphor was integral to the tour’s narrative and was, in many respects, a foundational aspect of the company’s branding mission in the city of Detroit. Detailed descriptions of factory architecture and spatial arrangement were essential to its depiction as a functioning city in the booklets, and more broadly, across Ford promotional and industrial management materials. The Highland Park factory, designed by Ford’s favored architect Albert Kahn, was at the center every edition. It was the largest and most innovative construction of its kind, only to be replaced years later by the River Rouge plant. At the time of the Highland Park plant’s construction in 1910, it covered three hundred and five acres and housed more than 50,000 employees, which was about 10% of Detroit’s total population. It was no wonder that Ford undertook the industrial

by the Ford Motor Company corporate headquarters, also in Dearborn, which contain material from the 1960s onwards.

management of his employees and visitors with the language and rigor of managing a bustling, “entertaining” city with its draw of cosmopolitan tourists. But as the social composition of the FMC workforce diversified, so did the company’s social programs, which were expanded into hidden spaces of the factory that were obscured from the tour, yet essential to the operation of the plant.

The metaphor of the city operated on three levels: plant architecture, corporate literature, and the visitor experience. All three began with the nucleus of the Big Powerhouse, around which plant operations and departmental activities orbited. From the waiting room, visitors were taken to a lookout point that had an aerial view of the operations. As glanced down from this view to their guides, they saw a photograph that replicated this image [Figure 4.2]. The black and white panorama of the Big Powerhouse filled the centerfold of each guide, and was always accompanied by a description of the factory as “a city in itself”:

The big Ford factory resembles a busy, bustling city with its numerous activities. It operates its own power, heating and lighting plant, fire department, telephone and telegraph exchanges, freight, and express offices, laundry, laboratories, and machine shops; and it maintains its own schools, hospital, safety and hygiene department, motion picture studio, park and athletic field, band and auditorium, educational and legal departments, home and rental exchange, grocery, drug, and shoe stores, meat market, tailor shop, and publishes its own newspaper...There is a trace of the cosmopolitan in [visiting] parties for they include people not only from the United States and Canada, but from all over the world. Foreign government officials, industrial leaders, educators, men of affairs and sightseers come to observe the Ford way of doing things – and to marvel. As many as 43,800 have been entertained in a single month. The visitors are conducted into the factory. It is like a vast city under roof, blocked off into departments with aisle-ways or streets between.

From this general view of the Big Powerhouse, between the body of the text and the experience of the tour, the visitor also saw versions of themselves leaning against the rails and admiring the massive steam engines sunken into the tiled floor, the soaring ceiling and the sturdy columns that held it, the large panes of glass and the seemingly infinite hypostyle corridor that they illuminated. If the visitors had not realized it already, the photograph illustrated to them their own scale and that of the factory.

The intention behind the design of the plant was borne out of conversations between Henry Ford and Albert Kahn, the man later be dubbed as “the architect of Detroit,” largely due to his relationship with Ford. Kahn was Ford’s favored architect, and as the FMC expanded internationally, so did Kahn’s architectural work in Detroit.

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324 Ibid, 9.
Figure 4.2: “The Big Powerhouse,”
ground floor of Highland Park Plant

(Facts From Ford, Fourth edition,
September 1920, 36-37)
Kahn designed all of Ford’s industrial structures, nationally and internationally, using the plan of the Highland Park plant as a basic template and adjusted factory façades according to vernacular tastes and climates. He was drawn to Ford and vice versa because of the technological innovations that the FMC offered him. Unlike his twentieth century contemporaries, Kahn focused on perfecting the factory plant and industrial design. He innovated factory architecture by adopting new building materials – reinforced concrete, steel, and large windows – and improved his practice of industrial architecture by vertically integrating the process of design, just as Ford had done with his business model. Kahn’s business of industrial design echoed the Ford format, which fully integrated the efforts of engineers, architects, and construction workers from the initial plan of the building through completion. The experts worked together under Kahn’s direction, creating a “plan factory” that mastered the mass-production of factory buildings. The Highland Park plant, from conception to completion, served as a tribute to and physical manifestation of Fordist practices. The Highland Park factory tour guides and their booklets made an effort to highlight Ford’s “innovations in building” as part of the tour.

From the view of the Big Powerhouse, visitors were guided through the rest of Ford’s factory city, full of static, moving, and interchangeable parts. First, visitors were taken into a large Machining Department and into the Tool Construction department, where more than 3,000 toolmakers and machinists improved upon the assembly line to increase production and lighten manual labor. From here, visitors came into view of long factory lines of workers waiting to receive payments, designated to be given on specific hours and assigned days. The humming of the conveyor system could be heard just beyond the lines as the belts carried rough materials that morphed into parts and finished as fully assembled systems [Figure 4.3]. Following the direction of the moving conveyor belt, the tour proceeded to the Cutting and Sewing Departments. On either side of the assembly line, seated workers hurriedly stitched together leather material for cushions and seats that glided by at twenty-four feet per minute. This was a rare instance where visitors would have sightings of female FMC assembly line workers, who were often relegated to secretarial positions or to labor that required smaller, nimbler fingers.

The visitors were then led through the factory’s very own built-in set of emergency services. The plant had its own fire department, complete with ninety experienced firefighters and two hundred men on stand by. The fire department’s main duty was to nurture the connective architectural tissue that ran through the factory plant by producing a fire alarm system that the booklets proclaimed to be “more effective and up-to-date than any other in the country, even including those of New York and Chicago.” To boot, the Ford Power Plant, which furnished the factory with electric

325 The idea of designing factories for local contexts stemmed from the vertically integrated business model that set the FMC apart from other industrial enterprises in its initial years. See Chapter 1 for a discussion on how this strategy figured into FMC international expansion.
327 Ibid. 5.
power, light, hot and cold water, steam, gas and compressed air boasted having the “equipment sufficient to furnish a modern city of 500,000 inhabitants with water, gas, electricity, and ice, and produce heat enough to supply the entire business district and all of the public buildings” of any cosmopolitan city.\textsuperscript{329} Here, the factory-city metaphor began to hold weight. The tour was designed to support this transition: at this point, the visitors were led from what was essentially the central “business district” of the Big Powerhouse, through the machining departments, and into the peripheral infrastructure that supported it. In the span of a turn, factory architecture began to meet the Factory Facts lofty descriptions of the metropolitan factory space and fed into the visitor experience. The metaphor of the city stretched into the familiar: a state-of-the-art set of emergency services, firemen, security, and, as they ventured further into the periphery, welfare, social services and a cluster of “public buildings” to boot.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{assembly_line_system.jpg}
\caption{Assembly Line System}
\footnotesize{(Facts from Ford, September 1920)}
\end{figure}

After a walk through emergency services, the guides ushered the group to the final assembly line, where fully assembled cars theatrically glided by on moving conveyor belts to the edge of the factory, where they would be driven off the lot. Here, to the delight of visitors, the guides explained that this system of assembling was exclusive to Ford assembly plants in the United States and were being installed in “principle cities” throughout North and South America, Europe, and Australia. In this section of the tour, the angular lines of the factory began to soften against the backdrop of a carefully choreographed dance between steam-powered machines and men. Much like in a previous workers’ comparison of the dance of industry to Wagner’s opera, Ford’s

\textsuperscript{329} Ibid, 25.
workmen established a steady rhythm with Kahn’s assembly-line architecture. In a sense, they had no choice. Under Ford’s clock, every minute of movement and labor was accounted for, and at times, sped up to meet production demands. The rhythmic movement of the assembly line found its way from within the walls of the factory to winding, mechanic pathways just beyond it, as freight traffic hauled raw and finished parts into and out of the factory.

As the tour came to end and visitors stepped outside the plant, the line that marked the division between the infrastructure of Detroit and the Highland Park plant came into focus. The time-sensitive, intricate movement of the factory city required a complex transportation planning system to keep plant traffic in check. The guides explained that a “milling in transit” system was engineered as part of the design to keep up with the assembly-line process, the handling of inbound-outbound freight traffic for Highland Park operations, and to supply parts to other assembly plants. Quality control was implemented to check materials from their raw form on freight trucks to machines, and from machines back to freight cars for loading and shipping to various other locales. In its entirety, this system necessitated one thousand yard operations for every twelve hours from start to finish. For this to be possible, the plant utilized every system of transportation around it, including municipal railroads, express companies, parcel post, and motor trucks [Figure 4.4]. For the Highland Park plant to operate at its full potential, it had to rely on the utilities and transportation services offered by the city of Detroit and could not exist in total isolation. Even the “factory as a city” metaphor had its limits, though in the coming years, Ford’s involvement on the board of planning in Detroit, the metaphor would hold true.

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331 In Chapter 4, I elaborate on the FMC’s incorporation of Highland Park as a city-suburb or island city within the bounds of the city of Detroit in 1918. This, of course, was to protect the company’s tax base against Detroit’s growing city lines but has had a profound effect on the prosperity of the city of Detroit and its ability to retain workers and industry over the years.
Figure 4.4: Ground floor plan of Highland Park factory, 1914. The plant required more than two city blocks to fully function, from John R. Street eastward. Tourists would enter the factory through the “Reception Area” entry off John R. Road, and tour the eastern section before heading outdoors. The new buildings dedicated to the Ford social programs, included on the 1920 tours are not shown on this map, but were eastern additions to the complex.

(Arnold and Faurote, Ford Methods and the Ford Shops)
The first edition of the guided tour stopped here, yet subsequent editions of Factory Facts continued to give its readers a descriptive window into the spaces internal to the Sociological Department. For this, visitors could only to rely on what they had seen in the tour and the “facts” that the booklet presented to them, which were presented as scientific fact through an insurmountable presentation of figures, graphs and charts. The mechanics of assembly-line architecture were discretely woven into descriptions about the FMC social programs to highlight its importance in innovating sociological processes. The scientific management of Ford middle-management and labor, the booklet explained, allowed the company easy oversight, but also made production more efficient. The booklets made strong connections between assembly line technology and social progression to make for a more convincing argument.

In the first edition, only a few lines in its final pages were dedicated to describing the nature of Ford work life and the company’s treatment of its workforce, encouraging visitors to stay through the workday so they could watch workers clock out and return home, making for a “fitting climax” of the tour:

Nothing is omitted which will add to the comfort, health, and safety of the men. Splendid light, perfect ventilation, immaculate cleanliness, and the most modern and complete protection against fire, applies to every room in the building throughout the plant. Pure drinking water, individual clothes, lockers, and roomy, sanitary wash rooms, are important features…The Ford Motor Company has done everything in its power to encourage, protect and satisfy the people it employs, and in return it enjoys their confidence, the benefits of their best efforts, and their loyal support and good will. And now, we must bring our trip of inspection to a close. In five minutes the men will quit for the day, and it will be a fitting climax to watch them stamp their time cards and hurry to their homes and suppers – and as they file out, a laughing, jostling, army of well-paid, high-grade workmen, of all nationalities, the sight inspires a feeling of profound admiration for the splendid plant that gives them work, and for the wonderful country whose people and resources have made the Ford factory the greatest of a great American industry.332

This passage concluded the visitor tour and marked the end of the Ford workday. A new edition of the booklet was released two years later, when the workday expanded to three separate shifts and resulted in a plant that operated 24-hours a day. This new strategy of breaking up the workday into three 8-hour shifts made an official exodus of workers at the end of the day an impossible spectacle to reproduce for the tourists. Despite the addition of multiple pages to the description of profit-sharing programs, persistent visitor inquiries made it difficult for the FMC to avoid addressing their rationale for the Five

Dollar day, its treatment of workers, and the vast (invisible) spaces that were used to assist an around of the clock workday.

Tour booklets published from 1914 onwards addressed this gap by attempting to situate more fully the Ford worker within the larger narrative of the Highland Park plant and its innovative assembly line technology. The second and third editions expanded upon the first edition by adding more than twenty pages to explain the responsibilities that fell under the auspices of the Sociological Department. This time, as the tour came to a “non-climactic” end, visitors would be directed to the last third of the tour booklet for any remaining questions, which featured a boldly titled “Educational and Profit-Sharing” section. The title page of this section prominently featured photographs of newly emigrated Polish and Romanian families alongside anecdotal stories of “Human Interest.” The spaces that were subsidiary to the Sociological Department were pushed further into the periphery of the factory complex, beyond the infrastructure that powered the plant. The tone and language of the section also transitioned to a more persuasive, conversational tone to account for the spaces of the social programs as off the beaten path of the tour; the editors of the booklet could no longer rely on the interplay between the text and the tour. Readers were no longer viewing these spaces first-hand as excited, wide-eyed cosmopolitan tourists, but through the lens of a distant third-person whose mission was to describe the many benefits of the Ford sociological experiment.

The company wove together the human side of industry with quantifiable “facts” to create convincing narratives about the space beyond industry. Humanizing photographs and personal stories about Ford workers accompanied profit sharing wage breakdowns that compared the old wage system to the new profit sharing one. Homeownership among immigrant employees, as I explore in Chapter 6, became a centerpiece of the thesis, along with the argument that although the company shied away from telling the workers what to do with their share of the profits, “[f]or the best interests of the men, however, the Company [did] suggest…that their savings be placed in a State or National Bank, because they will be safest there. Or to prepare for a rainy day, that the money be invested in a home or good property.” A graph of “Interesting Figures” illustrated how the production of Ford cars increased from 1,700 in 1904 to over 250,000 with the introduction of the Model T to elevate worker wages in their benefit. Statistical figures were liberally used to tout the beneficial effects of the Ford social programs for the company’s immigrant workforce via the courses and extracurricular activities. The section concludes with a final figure: fifty-one. This was the number of FMC factories and sales branches that were operating nationwide by 1915 and illustrated with a page

334 Ford social agents recorded fifty-one Human Interest stories during their investigations of Ford immigrant worker homes in the 1920s and 30s. Some of these stories were featured in the “Educational and Profit-Sharing” sections of the tour booklets, others remained unpublished and internal to the corporation. The content and purpose of these stories as drivers of immigrant home-ownership and naturalization are detailed more fully in Chapter 5.
335 *Ford Factory Facts*, Second edition (September 1915), 45-47. The place of the home and the idea of homeownership as conceived of and advertised by the FMC to its workers (and how it was received in return) is the basis for Chapter 4.
Figure 4.5: Sketches of Kahn’s Ford factories in fifty-one cities across the U.S. in 1915
(Facts from Ford, 1915)
checked of the Ford sales and assembly branches that were scattered through the major cities of the United States [Figure 4.5].

By 1920, the *Factory Facts* booklet abandoned statistical explanations for the benefits of the profit-sharing plan in favor of a return to the technical innovation that made Ford a household name in the first place: the assembly line. By this point, the incorporation of assembly line technology pervaded every function of the factory, and the argument could be made that its success led to the success of the workers who labored over it. Factory machinery, the assembly process, and spaces dedicated to the company’s sociological activities were described as part of the same design. The FMC had, in fact, streamlined the processes associated with the Sociological Department so that many more social investigators and Ford specialists could surveil and monitor workers on the line. Just as with the first edition of *Facts* that created the image of a factory city, the argument for social engineering took on a characteristically spatial form. The sociological spaces that were tangentially mentioned in the previous edition (Educational and Profit-Sharing) were broken down into several subsidiary departments and services, which included the Ford educational programs, a motor band league, athletic park, medical department, motion picture studio, welfare department, safety and hygiene department, and a chain of Ford stores.\(^{336}\) The tour booklet was retooled to breathe life into these buildings and spaces, as an integral extension of the factory city’s social infrastructure.

More than half of the 1920 edition was dedicated to FMC social programs and the Ford worker. This was particularly notable in a year where the number of cars in production *per* worker was the highest than it had ever been. This was, in part, due to the effect of lessened worker turnover created by the Five Dollar day and profit sharing programs, but mostly due to rising wartime demands in 1917 and 1918.\(^ {337}\) It was evident that the 1920 tour was crafted to focus on the character of Ford’s immigrant worker rather than workers as a collective mass. The immigrant or foreign worker was highlighted time and again through human interest and homeownership stories, which became points of entry into describing the effectiveness of the sociological programs and the spaces in which they were executed. One such passage brings to the fore the company’s intent in using business acumen to accelerate the processes of socialization and nationalization:

The Ford Schools: When, one day in May, 1914, twenty foreigners, representative of half a dozen different races, met after work with a teacher in a small factory office to study the English language, the Ford Motor Company was experimenting with a new force in business. Few large corporations had even considered the beneficial results sure to come from such a course. True, It \([\text{sic}]\) was hardly a business proposition – at least had seldom been thought of as such. Yet, that Ford officials did appreciate its potentialities \([\text{sic}]\) is a matter of fact. It will, said they, make


\(^{337}\) Ibid, 29.
the man a more valuable worker; it will broaden his daily intercourse with fellow men; and it will prepare him for a more substantial citizenship.\textsuperscript{338}

The example of the immigrant worker provided a type of blank slate upon which the FMC showcased its improvement upon human character as though it was a machine. Learning the English language was described to factory tourists as a “movement” among foreign workers that “spread overnight by seeming magic” [Figure 4.6].\textsuperscript{339} The twenty foreigners who took part in this initial English program were said to stir a demand among other Ford workers for the establishment of other types of basic skills training schools (Apprentice, Trade, and Service), which were open to native “American” and immigrant workers, also becoming part of the tour.

Figure 4.6: By 1920, immigrant workers in the Ford English School had grown from 12 students to thousands.

(Photographic Vertical File Series, Acc 1660, Box 167, BFRC)

As the demand for schooling increased and when weather-permitted, classes would spill outside into the factory’s central courtyard. Surrounding this open-air classroom on all four sides were buildings dedicated to welfare, safety and hygiene, and medical care – all of which had interconnected functions. The Welfare department took care of nourishing the workers and supplying food, the efficiency of which lunch-time tourists would also witness:

Three minutes, the company decided, is sufficient [for lunch], and arrangements were made accordingly. Lunch cards, hot soup wagons, hot

\textsuperscript{338} Ibid, 31.
\textsuperscript{339} Ibid.
sandwich vendors, with their moving loads of eatables, went their way from department to department, arriving always on schedule to handle the ‘rush’ and be on their way again within four or five minutes... A hundred-odd lunch carts handle the bulk of the lunches, and it is possible for each to serve as many as two hundred in the allotted three minutes. It is all a proposition of schedule and efficiency. There is no haphazard hurrying and scurrying about – no uncertainty. The stage ‘is set’ at the proper time; the bell rings, the men fall in line, and then in a twinkling they have their lunches and are eating.\(^{340}\)

The Medical Department was another added stop on the tour, which ensured safety and hygiene among plant workers as they ate, and returned to work. In a joint collaboration with the Research Lab, in the Medical Department, bacteriologists were trained and sent to constantly gauge the correct temperature of machining rooms to keep infections from spreading and performed daily checks for cleanliness and health among the workers. This responsibility of the Chemical, Research Lab and the Medical Departments, were aligned with Safety and Hygiene in this respect, but eventually became more specialized and surpassed solely enforcing hygienic standards required by the Sociological Department. These departments employed more than one hundred physicians and first-aid men and were collectively described in the tour booklet as “the most modern institution of its kind in the world,” passing as “far beyond the confines of a first aid department.”\(^{341}\) Physicians gave workers regular check-ups and kept a close eye on diet, nutrition, and related ailments such as overdrinking and obesity. The provision of personal health benefits for FMC workers was emphasized in the tour booklet and through walking tours of the company’s health facilities, as an institution of state-of-the-art scientific methods in keeping employees healthful.

One of the most potent examples of the factory as city was the implementation of Ford stores across the factory complex, which tourists would stop, peer into, and walk through. The research and medical teams helped devise the stores, which were types of commissary store that offered a narrow assortment of food, medical, and health items to workers at discounted costs. During their development, the stores were described in the booklet as having “reached the proportions of a modern department store.”\(^{342}\) They carried an array of items at bulk cost: food, medical and beauty supplies, and clothes in “car-load” quantities. They, too, were designed to function at their highest efficiency so as not to risk any opportunity for wasted time:

The cash-and-carry plan prevails. Customers enter one door, pass along the counter, choose their articles, pay for them and leave through another door. While the saving varies, it averages easily from eight to twenty per cent. Everything is sold at cost... Under the direct supervision of the main plant stores are three groups of branch stores, one operating at the Fordson

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\(^{340}\) Ibid, 48.
\(^{341}\) Ibid, 43.
\(^{342}\) Ibid, 51.
Tractor Plant, Dearborn, one at the Ford Blast Furnaces, River Rouge, and one at Henry Ford Hospital. Thus this service extends to some 75,000 Ford workers. It is the desire of Henry Ford and the Ford Company to furnish its men and women workers with all the necessary commodities of life at cost.343

The efficient and low-cost Ford stores garnered so much attention city and nationwide that, by popular demand, they were built as chain-stores outside of Ford complexes to serve city dwellers throughout the city of Detroit. By this point, the company had clearly overreached in its role as solely an automotive industry, to an entity that applied the mechanics of mass-assembly and mass-production to everyday, affordable goods that were in demand by the residents of Detroit. This outraged existing industries that supplied such goods to convenience and commissary stores in cities like Detroit.344 Yet, the city’s reliance on Ford also revealed a significant gap in the welfare services that the FMC provided for its own workers, and the lack of state capital to fund the same quality of services to the public citizens of Detroit.

343 Ibid, 48.
344 Meat producing companies from as far away as Pennsylvania wrote angrily to Ford in the 1920s when the FMC store chain was gaining ground outside of Ford employees. They claimed that the company’s streamlining of products, mass-production, and reduction in prices was driving business away from local meat producing firms and accused Henry Ford of unfairly monopolizing products that were outside the realm of his automotive industry. (BFRC, Garden Reports).
The Motion Picture Laboratory was perhaps one of the more alluring innovations to come out of assembly-line architecture, and a point in the tour that drew the most gasps from tourists. As described in the last chapter, the mechanics of mass-assembly were applied to the production of films in order for the company to have a global reach for its advertisements ("How Ford Cars Are Made" was one of the most widely disseminated "foreign" films at the time). As stated in the mission statement for the first Factory Facts and its vision of the factory city, industrial tourism was incorporated as a mechanism to guide cosmopolitan citizens of the world through the factory to entertainment and educate visitors about the mechanics of Fordism. The same can be said for the company’s use of moving pictures and its design of in-house theaters for workers and visitors as part of the factory complex. The Labs producers and filmmakers worked in close proximity with the Educational arm of the company to reveal how film was an effective method for teaching foreign Ford workers about the basics of the English language, civil government, history, work ethic, and hygiene, and a special section in the theaters was set aside for visitors to sit and observe workers as they watched the films [Figure 4.7]. As the last stop on the newly revamped tour, the assembly-line architecture seamlessly tied together the mechanics of Ford automotive production, education, health inspections, to lunch lines, Ford Stores, and cinema; all fashioned to work with one another as part of the Ford factory city.

The final tour booklet featured a final section titled “The Human Side of Industry,” which attempted to answer any remaining questions the touring visitors may have had. The questions lend insight into the concerns that Ford production piqued among its consumers, neighbors, and visitors: “What proportion of your men are foreigners?” and “What does the Company do for its men?” The response to both questions was a presentation of Henry Ford’s infamous “Ford Policy” (akin to the “Ford idea presented in other in-house publications), wherein he emphasized his strong belief in a “simple economic justice” that gave every employee the opportunity to work with the Company and to participate in its benefits, and that those employees [sic] who remain with the Company will share increasingly in its earnings. Through the tour booklet, the company made an argument about the economics of this principle that rested heavily on the improvement of foreign character under the company’s direction:

[Foreign workers] are treated as Ford men and not as foreigners. There is no separate work carried on for them except the classes of the Ford English School. All Ford policies are designed for the benefit of all Ford men and not for any distinct or separate groups. Fifty-eight different nationalities were to be found among the Forty Thousand men in the Highland Park Plant three years ago. With the present enrollment, it is probable that even a larger number of the nations of the earth and most of the great religions are represented in the Ford family. But no distinction is recognized that denies the same justice and the same opportunity to every man of whatever land and faith.

345 Ibid, 55.
346 Ibid, 53.
Ford’s call for “social justice” was essential a call for the workings of industrial capitalism to replace, or improve upon, welfare as it existed. This was perhaps the most powerful argument that could be made for the spatialization of Ford policies throughout the factory: that the ineffectiveness of the safety net at the turn of the century required the construction of an isolated space that provided for the precarious position of wage-earning laborers and immigrant workers in a way that they were not accounted for. But the egalitarian nature of that space, as made by the Ford promise, was undermined time and again in the way that immigrants were made to move through the space.

Moreover, in the course of its publications, it may seem curious that the Factory Facts booklet would focus more on the mechanics of its social programs than its cutting-edge industrial operations. As I have shown, the various iterations of the tour booklets and their presentation of “facts” were indicative of an underlying concern: in the same instance that the booklets attempted to legitimize the “factory as city” paradigm, the company became equally concerned with presenting itself as a benevolent body governing over its working “citizens.” In this sense, the booklet’s presentation of facts in the form of numbers, graphs, charts, photographs, and fanciful illustrations were not only meant to establish the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Ford corporation to visiting tourists, the general public, and FMC employees locally, but also nationally, as the country began to galvanize around the innovative capabilities of mass-production and its application worldwide. As the FMC looked outwards in this moment, officials of the city of Detroit turned inwards to take advantage of the lull in immigration created by the war to strategize around the city’s looming “immigrant problem.” The moment coincided with the company’s factory as city tour paradigm and, as city board members watched the FMC successfully appeal to local and national interests, they may have been convinced by its effectiveness. Nowhere was this appeal more apparent than in company’s shift in focus, from advertising Ford-made goods to its ability to “make men.” This was represented in the last two pages of the final Factory Facts guide, which replaced the FMC’s fifty-one American sales branches with the faces of fifty-one nationalities of men who passed through the Ford plant [Figure 4.8]. Years before this final publication, at the height of the popularity of Ford factory tours, officials from Detroit’s municipality approached the company to create one of the most tightly-knit corporate-municipal collaborations at the turn of the century.

\[347\] Ibid, 55.
Figure 4.8: The closing page of the Facts from Ford booklet show the faces of FMC foreign workers, 1920. (Factory Facts from Ford, Fourth edition, September 1920)
The chapter begins with a brief historical overview of the establishment of the Detroit Board of Commerce in 1903 and its relationship to commerce, urban restructuring, and beautification projects in the city. This history contextualizes the formation of the Americanization Committee of Detroit (ACD) nearly a decade later, a venture launched by the Board of Commerce in 1915 in conjunction with the FMC and heads of other major industries. I follow the actors who formed this corporate-municipal partnership and show that the social and industrial policies that guided the spatial logic of Ford’s factory city provided the basic template for planning the city of Detroit and the placement of immigrants in it. More broadly, I argue that these planning collaborations set the course for the privatization of the city under the banner of a broad nationalist aim: Americanization.

The moment coincided with a growing national interest in the City Beautiful Movement – a city planning ideology that became integral to conversations and plans that reshaped industrial cities across the United States. City Beautiful principles were gaining traction among urban thinkers at the turn the century, beginning with Daniel Burnham’s turn towards European ideals of social and urban order in his plans for Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition. In this chapter, I examine the map of Detroit in the years spanning 1903 and 1915 – between the simultaneous births of the FMC and DBC and the events leading to Detroit’s first International Industrial Exhibition. The DBC made urban beautification a priority and offered Detroit as a candidate for the implementation of City Beautiful aesthetics. Here, the DBC is a central urban actor that simultaneously paid homage to the civic and cultural ambitions of this movement, while also working in service of the commercial interests whose capital fueled the reconstruction of the city.

I shed light on how “industrial as social” principles in the Ford factory and Detroit guided an attempt at social order in the city. The coinciding aims of various early twentieth century urban and social movements (Garden City, City Beautiful, Progressive) were particularly suited to the desires of the DBC, Ford executives, and heads of industry to relegate foreign presence to designated areas of the city. The chapter culminates in a case study that exemplified this municipal-industrial collaboration: the Detroit’s First International Industrial Exhibition, which was an event that served to strengthen the states relationship with industry in its attempt to establish Detroit as the industrial capital of the world.
The map of Detroit is now a map of nations.

*Detroit Board of Commerce, 1915*

Figure 5.1: Detroit Annexation Growth, 1805-1926. Between these years, Detroit’s total land area grew from 46.9 square miles to its current 139 square miles. The area enclosed by the green line represents Detroit’s growth until 1915 and the regions shaded in blue are areas annexed by 1926. The red line represents Woodward Avenue, the main boulevard that cuts through the city from the Detroit River beyond downtown. Highland Park and Hamtramck, centers of industrial production at the time, resented annexation and established independent municipalities in 1918 and 1922, respectively.

The Detroit Board of Commerce (DBC) was borne out of a meeting in an ornamented Turkish room of the Cadillac Hotel in 1903, where a group of 253 businessmen decided that it was best to consolidate their businesses into an integrated organization. Settling on the slogan “For the General Good of Detroit,” the members’ initial priority was to assist in attracting lucrative businesses to the city, and they delivered. Key individuals established the Board of Commerce within the very first year of its existence: Henry B. Joy, a Michigan native and businessman, managed to convince the Packard brothers to base their headquarters in Detroit; Charles Moore, known as the first master planner of Detroit, was appointed to the Board and formed the Committee on Civic Improvement; other prominent artistic and educational entrepreneurs joined the organization and took an active part in aiding the city to acquire and expand educational and cultural centers like the Detroit Public Library and the Museum of Art, later known as the Detroit Institute of Arts. These initial architectural projects sealed the DBC’s position within the municipal body and in critical city planning decisions. As the organization paved its way into the realm of urban planning, it took an interest in bridging the public and private through fostering cultural cosmopolitanism in the city. The DBC was responsible for making Detroit a hotbed for industrial activity, in addition to investing newly generated capital in projects that made the city lucrative for industrial newcomers.

Charles Moore’s nineteenth century memoirs provide a glimpse into the history of grand planning in Detroit, and the direction he took in planning the city in nearly a century later. Moore and his DBC peers worked off the plans of Judge Augustus B. Woodward, who was commissioned to rebuild the city after it went up in flames in 1805. Employing baroque style top-down planning, Woodward’s plan was “generated from ideal geometric forms – circles, squares, triangles,” and a series of grand boulevards that radiated out from a central roundabout, Grand Circus, and cut across the orthogonal plots of the city – this had the effect of creating a series of smaller triangular plots in the center of the city’s street system [Figure 5.2]. Woodward took cues from other grand planners like Haussmann, who planned cities with wide avenues that plowed through existing neighborhoods in the hopes of reducing squalor, increasing sanitation, creating

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351 Details about Moore were chiefly collected from a speech he gave in 1891 and letters of correspondence kept in the archives of the Detroit Institute of Arts and the Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. See Charles Moore, *Governor, Judge, and Priest Detroit, 1805-1815. A Paper Read before the Witenagemote on Friday Evening, October the Second, 1891. Witenagemote Paper*, no. 6. (New York: De Vinne Press, 1891) and *The Charles Moore Papers, 1905-1917*, The Detroit Institute of Arts Archives.
352 Ibid.
Figure 5.2 Judge Augustus B. Woodward’s 1807 plan for Detroit
outlets for traffic, and creating monumental cities. His inventive 1807 plan created connections through vacant triangular plots, which were intended for public use as parks, civic and religious buildings, and monumental points of interest. In this way, civic and commercial spaces could be distinguished from one another, though public spaces were meant to dominate the plan.

Woodward’s plan was never fully realized [Figure 5.3]. Grand Circus was reduced to a semi-circular park, from which significantly narrowed avenues radiated outwards into a rectilinear grid that deteriorated his original axial plan. Grand Circus still managed to serve as an anchor for the plan, surrounded by a central square, Cass Park, and a French Renaissance-style Opera House. The triangular plots of land set aside for civic use gave way to what the city called more “pragmatic” commercial considerations for land use. Soon, the industrial innovations of the 1860s and 70s rapid dissolved the downtown’s civic character. Detroit’s industrial growth caused the city to swell, putting pressure on elite sections of the city and filling downtown with working-class
This was the beginning of what would be the slow exodus of Detroit’s elite to the outskirts of the city. The subsequent demolition of the museum and the construction of the Center for Arts and Letters along the northern corridor of Woodward Avenue in the early 1900s were early indications of this movement. Civic centers and cultural institutions generally followed the patrons who supported them, and in this moment, a particularly wealthy set of patrons essentially drove the competition between civic and commercial monumentality downtown. Members of the DBC who were already involved in urban projects familiarized themselves with the language of planning to support broader City Beautiful plans aimed at resolving this rising tension between civic and commercial monumentality, or the struggle over the city between the rich and poor.

Charles Moore was suited for this task. Formerly a politician in Washington, D.C., Moore chaired the National Commission of Fine Arts, and had a leading responsibility in carrying out the extension of the L’Enfant plan for the District of Columbia. Through these experiences he met with leading city planners, worked with Daniel Burnham and Edward Bennett, and eventually wrote a biography of Burnham in 1921. As a native from Michigan, Moore was constantly active and aware of business and banking endeavors in Detroit and returned to prominence in the city as a DBC member and during his tenure as the director of the Museum of Art from 1914 to 1917. In his correspondence letters, he expressed particular concern over finding a new location for the museum at a time when local papers, politicians, and elite’s showed a lack of interest in arts and cultures as having a more central role in the city’s life. His involvement in grand planning schemes and institution building gave him the ability and professional connections to adopt the language of “civic improvement” and consolidate it into a comprehensive plan for Detroit.

Moore’s influential position within the DBC earned him the directorship of the Committee on Civic Improvement in 1904, from where he would create and head the city’s first planning commission, called the City Plan and Improvement Commission. As director, he advised the DBC to appoint prominent planning professionals as consultants – among them Charles Mulford Robinson and Fredrick Law Olmsted, Jr. Wasting little time, the DBC hired Robinson and Olmsted, Jr. to assess the potential for “civic improvement” in the city, focusing on four key areas of the city: the Detroit river boardwalk, Belle Isle, the Grand Boulevard that encircled the city’s perimeter, and the downtown central square. Moore favored Robinson and Olmsted, Jr. in particular because of their growing notoriety in urban issues, most notably on the topic of improvement. Moore sought after Robinson for his “well known connection with the propaganda for civic improvement,” emphasizing that Robinson’s writings on the subject had “wide

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354 The Charles Moore Papers, 1905-1917, The Detroit Institute of Arts Archives.
circulation” and he was one of few mainstream writers to describe in visual detail the idea that a city could be made beautiful.\textsuperscript{357} Robinson rose to prominence at the turn of the century through his writings (\textit{The Fair of the Spectacle} [1893], \textit{The Improvement of Towns and Cities} [1901]; \textit{Modern Civic Art, or the City Made Beautiful} [1903]), which drew broad connections between education, commerce, and art, and stressed the didactic possibilities of architecture and monumentality in the city. On the other hand, city officials of Detroit’s past had a more familiar relationship with the Olmsted family. Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., like his father, was a professor of landscape architecture at Harvard University and had also worked on planning the city’s island park, Belle Isle. Unlike Robinson, Olmsted, Jr. was twice commissioned in 1904 and 1915 to spend time in Detroit and had significantly more detailed and nuanced suggestions for what he referred to as the “long successful future of Detroit.”\textsuperscript{358}

Together, the two were instructed to “develop” the four areas of the city and stylistically string them together to create a semblance of a “unified city.”\textsuperscript{359} A report on Robinson and Olmsted, Jr.’s recommendations was finalized in 1905, titled \textit{The Improvement of the City of Detroit}. Both planners broadly advocated for landscaped parks and groupings of monumental buildings to strengthen the city’s civic spaces while linking the core of the city to Detroit’s international riverfront. The idea, they wrote, was that these changes would prove vital to the DBC’s desired effect of promoting a global “image of the city.”\textsuperscript{360} Beyond these basic agreements, the two diverged slightly. In his suggestions for improvement, Robinson was somewhat vague and broad and constantly held Detroit in the same light as the Haussmannian cities that he revered. He stressed that the idea of “remodeling” the city should be discarded for “development,” and lamented the “awkward, annoying, dangerous and retarding ‘jog’” of the street grid that compromised its original “beauty and harmony” – noting that “[n]early all the most serious mistakes of Detroit’s past have arisen from a disregard of the spirit of the Governor and Judges’ plan.” He urged the committee to consider rearranging the monuments and fountains which were “somewhat promiscuously scattered” between the Campus and the Square and similarly chided the “pathetic” layout of parks and public space along the riverfront, which, to both him and Olmsted, Jr., had the potential to serve as the “backbone of the city.”\textsuperscript{361}

While essentially agreeing with Robinson about a return to Woodward’s plan, Olmsted, Jr. was in fact, was more concerned about connecting the city’s past with the actions of “future generations.” Instead of suggesting a rearrangement of existing public buildings, like Robinson, Olmsted, Jr. advised the board to hire other planners and architects who would build monumental additions to existing ones and imagined the addition of “museums, theaters, halls for concerts and conventions, and similar quasi-public purpose” buildings to the existing plan. Employing much more caution than

\textsuperscript{357} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{358} Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. and Charles Mulford Robinson, \textit{Improvement of the City of Detroit: Reports made by Professor Frederick Law Olmsted, Junior and Mr. Charles Mulford Robinson to the Detroit Board of Commerce}, (Detroit Board of Commerce, 1905), 18
\textsuperscript{359} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{360} Ibid, 4.
\textsuperscript{361} Ibid, 56.
Robinson, he was aware of his superficial understanding of the city and urged the DBC members to consider how their decisions for the city’s past and present could have grave consequences for its future.

Figure 5.4: Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr.’s sectional diagram illustrating his suggested changes for Detroit’s Riverfront
(Improvement of the City of Detroit, 1905, 16)

Rallying around their common agreements, together Robinson and Olmsted, Jr. drew connections between what they perceived to be a disconnected Detroit “river margin” and a growing industrial district downtown [Figure 5.4]. Olmsted, Jr. elaborated this point:

This section pre-eminently THE FRONT OF THE CITY [sic] on the river is mainly appropriated, not only by present use but by the logic of its situation, to passenger and local freight business. On account of its central location, opposite the heart of the city where all the main streets and care lines converge, where the financial and office district is permanently centered, and whence the principal retail districts are bound to radiate, no matter in which direction they chiefly grow, this half mile has permanent exclusive advantages for transshipping all the steamboat passengers
between Detroit and every point on the vast river and lake system which
Detroit commands.\footnote{Ibid, 9.}

Olmsted, Jr. and Robinson pushed to re-orient the city towards the international border
centering Canada. The riverfront had previously been used as a dumping ground for
industrial waste, and was wholly devoted to operations that supported the city’s growing
industries. Instead, the civic improvement report sketched out scenarios whereby the
riverfront could serve functions beyond industrial production and become the point from
where the city created its public facing image. Olmsted, Jr. urging caution again, warned
the DBC about driving the development of the city, and primarily its waterfront, solely
based on the interests of the city’s growing industrial base:

\ldots I am absolutely confident that such intelligent, patient, comprehensive
study of the waterfront problems will be able to evolve some method of
treatment which will, if adopted and consistently followed, bring to the
community in the long run an enormously greater return from the asset
which it possesses in its central river frontage than it is likely to get by
letting matters drift along under the impulse of diverse private initiative,
directed almost solely by a regard for immediate cash returns.\footnote{Ibid, 18.}

In this regard, Olmsted, Jr. was much more bold in his suggestions. His vision for the
waterfront would converge electric cars, steamships, freight traffic, and covered public
promenades and revolutionize the riverfront concept for Detroit as it stood, extending it
far beyond the City Beautiful principles of civic cultivation and monumental building. In
his suggestions, Olmsted, Jr. encouraged the DBC towards a prosperous and efficient
society that did not betray the cosmetic ideals that the City Beautiful promised. His
warning about the effect of private capital on these ideals was especially powerful in a
report that was addressed to a board wholly comprised of Detroit’s wealthiest
businessmen and elite. After city members adopted aspects of the reports suggestions, the
“River Front” was born, becoming the point from where the DBC’s urban improvement
schemes radiated. Olmsted, Jr.’s designs placed the River Front at the center of Detroit’s
plan for civic improvement, and recommended that the DBC “develop the enormous
possibilities of the summer resort business of the Great Lakes.”\footnote{Ibid, 9-10.}
The DBC took a gamble on a one and a half mile stretch of road that they hoped would be the point from
where social and industrial capital would accumulate and spread to rest of the city.

The development of Belle Isle, the island park that was located southeast of the
main section of the riverfront in the Detroit River became an important part of this
redevelopment plan. Moore asked Olmsted, Jr. to research the possibilities it presented as
a place for relaxation and tourism, including gambling. The casino venture on the Isle
was especially attractive to the DBC since it was located in the middle of the
international border between the United States and Canada. The highlights included a
plan for a new casino, promenades, and vistas from the island to the rest of the city. Upon
consideration, Olmsted, Jr. recommended that the old casino be demolished in favor of one that was located in a more visible position and would, itself, overlook the Detroit riverfront. He suggested that the new casino be upgraded and moved to a more “commanding” site next to the main channel of the river, where a procession of ships would pass by, in proximity to the most popular picnic groves on the island.

Figure 5.5: Albert Kahn’s Conservatory on Belle Isle, 1904
(Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library)

By this time a prominent industrial architect in his own right, Albert Kahn was hired by the DBC to expand the architectural vocabulary of the island park. He produced plans for two cultural attractions that opened in the summer of 1904: the Belle Isle Conservatory and Aquarium. The Conservatory was designed with the lofty ideals of the City Beautiful movement: its “exquisitely proportioned central dome, flanked by symmetrical wings...was indebted to garden pavilions and architectural exhibitions of the later nineteenth century” [Figure 5.5]. Kahn’s incorporation of glass, steel, and wood frames paid homage to the materials he used to innovate industrial architecture on both sides of the river, for Ford in Detroit and Walkerville-Windsor. The new casino, on the other hand, departed from the early nineteenth century Shingle Style that characterized the previous building, and instead was designed in a Beaux-Arts tradition that borrowed

365 Ibid, 266.
Figure 5.6: The old casino on Belle Isle demolished in 1908
(Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library)

Figure 5.7: Belle Isle’s new casino placed strategically along waterways, a man-made lagoon, and in sight of the Detroit riverfront
(Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library)
freely from “classical motifs, including open arcades and squared towers” [Figures 5.6 and 5.7]. The architects, Van Leyen and Schilling, employed historical mannerisms that played with Italian and French baroque for sculptural decoration, incorporated flat rooflines, symmetry, and classic architectural details. Along with Kahn’s Conservatory and Aquarium, Belle Isle served to diversify the architectural trend of the city, falling stylistic in line with the European traditions that Robinson so revered. A newly remade Belle Isle, and its casino, opened its doors in 1908 to a new class of citizens who were more than willing to take a gamble on it.

Belle Isle’s rapid transformation sparked a change that permeated through downtown Detroit. The island park was heavily influenced by the interventions and suggestions made by Olmsted, Jr. By restyling and repositioning the casino, he annexed a portion of the River Front vista into his landscaping proposal, staying consistent with his and Robinson’s opinion that it should remain central to the city’s new plan. Despite this, Olmsted, Jr.’s constant hesitance about privately driven “development,” led him to voice his concerns about how the economic redevelopment of the park at such a large scale would compromise its natural qualities. He emphasized that the “special beauty” of Belle Isle owed a great deal to the forest and the river, which without a massive amount of labor and upkeep, would override the costs of what was considered a beautiful natural environment. He quoted his father’s 1883 commission, where the elder Olmsted stressed that parks were meant to be places to enjoy “harmony and melody and poetry of actual nature” and a way for city-dwellers to avoid the fussiness and disturbing business of the industrial urban center.

The strained dance between planning consultants (like Olmsted Jr. and Robinson) and members of the DBC continued well into the first decade of the twentieth century. The DBC eventually redeveloped the entire island park beyond the casino, conservatory, and aquarium to include seasonal amenities for those who canoed along the Grand Canal in the summer and a Skating Pavilion for the winter – harbingers of the expansion of this project a year later in the heart of the city [Figure 5.8]. For Moore, the decision to build out the social and cultural attractions on Belle Isle paid off: Canadian tourists, nationals, and locals flocked to the newly developed island park and the city gained notoriety as a developing entrepreneurial and entertainment hub. By 1909, the city had drawn enough international business, that Moore took the initiative to arrange a convention that promoted freer trade with Canada, less than a year after Ford and McGregor set up Ford-Canada. As Moore and the DBC fostered development, tourism, and trade around the river’s edge, they secured the committee’s position in future municipal decisions on civic and urban restructuring, and paved the way for their sponsorship of Detroit’s first international industrial exposition in 1910.

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368 These events unfolded in conjunction with President Taft’s repositioning towards US-Canada trading – a key political moment that facilitated easier trade relations at the international border and benefited the city of Detroit (and Windsor, Canada) immensely.
Charles Moore had little trouble convincing wealthy industrialists and businessmen to support him in putting on the city’s first industrial exposition. Its importance on the national stage was confirmed during the events of the opening ceremony, where President Taft was said to have gleefully “pressed the button which opened the Detroit Industrial exposition [and] opened the best summer show ever held.”\textsuperscript{369} Two hundred and seventy-five local manufacturers were solicited to serve as members of the Exposition Committee, all who commended the DBC for advancing the effort to display “Detroit-made goods” and the “first real opportunity in which [municipal interests] could advance the welfare of Detroit by combined effort.”\textsuperscript{370} Trade journalists in attendance estimated that the 275 participating manufacturers represented a total capital of $150 million and the cost of the exhibits themselves would exceed $1 million.\textsuperscript{371} In comparison to similar

\textsuperscript{369} “Motor Cars in Detroit Exposition,” \textit{Motor Age}, Volume 17, June 23, 1919, 12.

\textsuperscript{370} Ibid, 10.

\textsuperscript{371} \textit{Trade: A Journal for Retail Merchants}, Volume 17, 26.
attempts made in other emerging industrial centers – Cleveland, Buffalo, and Rochester – members of the DBC echoed the sentiments of the city’s manufacturers, also concluding that “an exhibition of home products was a splendid medium for advancing the welfare of a municipality,” and that it would serve to stir a “civic awakening” for the people of the city.\textsuperscript{372}

Through the exposition, the DBC put City Beautiful and Progressive principles into actionable terms. Like the FMC’s advertising mission, which had been active for two years prior to the exposition, the DBC advocated for industrialism primarily through educational propaganda (in the name of welfare) and building (“civic improvement” schemes). This was made apparent in the DBC’s local advertisement for the exposition, which took the form of memos and promotional material released by a newly formed Exposition Committee. The materials aligned with Robinson and Olmsted, Jr.’s outline for civic improvement, and promised the citizens of Detroit that the exhibition platform would “give widespread and much desired publicity to [the] city, advancing its industrial, commercial and educational interests.”\textsuperscript{373}

\begin{figure}[h!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig59.jpg}
\caption{“The City Beautiful,” Detroit Industrial Exposition souvenir book, 1910}
\end{figure}

The Exposition Committee created a souvenir booklet that was crafted around these aims. It opened with an introduction of its twenty-one member executive committee, all men of industry with involvements in multiple entrepreneurial or

\textsuperscript{372} Souvenir of the Detroit Industrial Exposition (Detroit Board of Commerce, 1910), 7.

\textsuperscript{373} Ibid.
education-related ventures. A list of the 275 industrialists followed, Henry Ford among them, whose responsibility was to advise the DBC on the direction and scope of the exposition. The booklet described DBC’s role as “not, as its name might seem to imply, exclusively a commercial organization” but rather that “[t]he Board has, in short, been an important factor in the municipal, commercial and educational life of the city.” An “Industrial Detroit” sectioned highlighted the achievement of industry in the city, and transitioned into feature on “The City Beautiful” [Figure 5.9]. The two sections were relatively indistinguishable from one other; they both emphasized “the advantages offered by Detroit as a place in which to do business and…the attractions which it presents as a place to live.” Chief among these sites, of course, were Belle Isle, from where “residents could enjoy a view of both Canada and the United States,” in addition to its horticultural building, zoological garden, and landscaped park – all attractions that the DBC itself was responsible for constructing in the year leading up to the exposition.

In its search for a suitable building, the Exposition Committee expressed frustration at the lack of spacious buildings along the riverfront, the chosen site for the exposition. The Committee, unsurprisingly, consisted only of Detroit industrialists, who imagined their products displayed like those they had seen in the grand exhibitions of the Chicago World’s Fair. Since no existing site in Detroit fit this description, the DBC hired architectural firm Donaldson & Meier to built a temporary site along the rivers edge. The result was a building with a floor area of 45,000 square feet – “the largest ever to be erected in so short a period” and fashioned after “world’s fair structures” with a “temporary hall constructed of wood and staff...far greater than that of any exhibition hall in the United States.” In line with the Committee’s desires, the architects of the exhibition hall made prominent connections between industry, education, and welfare in its design. All of which was communicated to visitors before they entered the exposition in a reception area where they were handed the Exposition Committee’s souvenir booklet and were encouraged to “get a sense of their bearings.”

The scene was undoubtedly impressive. The hall was made by Donaldson & Meier to mimic the minimalist Khan-esque factory buildings in design and material. The result was an exposition building with a body that resembled a factory, complete with flat rooflines and large, multi-paned windows. On opening night, the building was lit with a string of lights that stretched across its flat roof and a grand façade, filled with a mix of architectural and sculptural references. Mammoth sized block columns structured the front of the building, and were topped with two steel globes that spun on alternate axes. A writer from a national merchant’s trade journal marveled at the “decorated approached a half mile long, leading to the building [and the] 25,000 incandescents [sic] included in the general illuminating scheme.” The building was sited at the edge of the Detroit River, positioned so that a sliver of Belle Isle and the Canadian skyline were in view.

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374 Ibid, 15-16.
375 Ibid, 36.
376 Ibid, 8.
A meeting of Detroit manufacturers held in the assembly room of the Board of Commerce, January 26, 1910, the following resolution was enthusiastically endorsed.

Figure 5.10: The souvenir book’s illustrative account of the Detroit Industrial Exhibition building (Souvenir of the Detroit Industrial Exposition)

Figure 5.11: The Exposition Building under construction with two workers standing on top (Souvenir of the Detroit Industrial Exposition)
Imaginative illustrations of the exposition building show ships passing underneath crisscrossed searchlights as a mass of people gathered around the grand entrance of the building, putting the human scale and the industrial scale in sharp contrast [Figures 5.10 and 5.11]. Three figural sculptures sat at the top of the entryway, depicting an industrialist sitting on a chair with his hands reaching over the heads of two kneeling workers. Underneath, in capital letters, was: INDUSTRY. The façade was indeed a visually corollary to the municipality’s relationship with industry.

The inner nucleus of the building was formed by two independent structures joined by a single roof, which stretched for half a mile across the riverfront. The two structures were separated by large aisles which acted as thoroughfares for people walking from one end to another [Figure 5.11 and 5.12]. The plan of the exhibition hall was guided and informed by the existing infrastructure of the city, as well as the innovative technologies of its industries. The architects described its function as follows:

The equipment of the two halls is marked by a completeness rarely known in exhibition buildings. Both electricity and gas are used in the illuminating scheme, and a network of pipes carries gas and water to various parts of both buildings. There are drinking fountains, rest rooms and reading rooms for the accommodation of guests. Beside the suite of four administration offices, there is a general office for the Board of Commerce, headquarters for different departments of the exposition force, a check room and storage hall. An information bureau is maintained in connection with the executive offices, and a daily paper is printed in the exposition building. Bulletin boards convey information concerning the exposition, railroad rates, the weather indications and news pertaining to the industries of the city. The exposition has proved to be the most valuable single medium of publicity the city has known.378

The exposition and exhibition halls were temporary advertisements for industrial advancement at the scale of the city. Under Moore’s watch, the Exposition Committee hired the executives of Detroit’s most successful industries to guide the design of an exhibition hall, which like Ford’s Highland Park, was equipped with the technology, facilities, and utilities of a small metropolis. In designing the hall, Donaldson & Meier, who were both École des Beaux-Arts trained, were told to abandon their signature styles in favor of Kahn’s latest innovations in industrial design. The plans for the building incorporate the ideal factory form, incorporating brick, glass, concrete, and steel materials that formed large, open spaces, massive windows, and a flexible plan that allowed for seemingly infinite configurations.

378 Souvenir of the Detroit Industrial Exposition, 8-9.
Figures 5.12 and 5.13: Ground (left) and Second floor (right) plans of Exposition Building with a main dividing hall running horizontally down the center
(Souvenir of the Detroit Industrial Exposition)

With an impressive set of architectural projects in their portfolio, the DBC used the exposition as a platform to advocate for industrial progress in the enrichment of civic and social projects in the city. Months prior to the exposition, the DBC collaborated with various heads of education and press to develop campaigns, publications, newsletters, media stories, and photographs to produce a more streamlined message:

…[D]uring the five months prior to the opening, the names and dates of the exposition have been announced many million times beyond the city’s borders. The local newspapers have given the committee their valued cooperation [sic] in advancing general interest in the exposition. Proof sheets and statistics concerning the project and stories relating to industrial Detroit have been sent at intervals to 300 representative trade journals of the United States, the publications of Michigan and the leading newspapers and magazines of the United States and Canada. One million gummed seals have been distributed through the mail on the correspondence of 500 merchants and manufacturers. Many local companies adopted the committee’s suggestion of printing the phrase, “Visit the Detroit Industrial Exposition, June 20 to July 6, 1910,” upon their advertising matter.379

Unlike the FMC, and its methods of mass-production, the DBC relied on municipal, industrial, and public service to spread information quickly and widely. The production of the souvenir book, for example, was an artefact of this moment. It was the first publically distributed pronouncement of the DBC’s plans for the city and the role that

379 Ibid.
urban restructuring would play in Detroit’s growth on the world stage. This claim was effectively made in the concluding sections of the book, where the DBC noted an 86% increase in manufacturing capital from 1904 to 1909 evidenced that “Detroit has proved an inviting field for the investment of foreign capital.”

Upon a closer look, however, the figures showed that as the city’s industries grew, its net debt shot up by 96%. This was due to costly infrastructural improvements made by Moore and his team, and the cost of annexing villages adjacent to the city to accommodate for industrial growth, the in-migration of the working class, and the out-migration of the elite (see Figure 5.1). In other words, the finances of the city fell well below what it needed to make the city grow. Acting as the city’s treasury, the DBC began to look beyond the exposition to plan further restructurings of Detroit as it angled for a wider reach of the metropolitan region’s speculative real estate and capital – and it could not embark on this task alone.

Members of the DBC, including Ford, were enchanted by the promise that nineteenth century world’s fairs presented to the industrialist, but not society at large. Detroit’s reconstruction, which continued well into the twentieth century, was manufactured apart from the social conditions of the city, yet existed as part of them. The creation of the industrial exposition was erected at the edge of the city in the manner of a fair, sitting apart from the heart of the city. The exposition brought together, if briefly, consumers and manufacturers in a moment when Detroit-made goods were just as awe-inspiring to consumers as consumers were to the industrialists who sold to them. The challenge, however, was to make real the City Beautiful and progressive principles promised by the exposition to the citizens of Detroit, who increasingly consisted of a growing majority of native and immigrant workers. In the coming years, the DBC allied with industrialists to adopt scientific modes of management in a concerted effort to “educate” and “manage” the city. The DBC’s enlisted its Education Committee for the task, which consisted of leading heads of public and private education in Detroit, including FMC Sociological Department head John R. Lee. When asked about where to begin, all of its members pointed to the educational activities taking place across the way, in Ford’s Highland Park.

5.3
Meeting on Terms

At one o’clock on Tuesday afternoon, August 31, 1915, John R. Lee invited the Education Committee of the Detroit Board of Commerce for a luncheon at the FMC headquarters. The purpose of the gathering was to reflect on the experience that members of the Ford Sociological Department had in attending a meeting at the Y.M.C.A. eighteen months earlier. Lee, who presided over the meeting, stated that at first he knew “little, if

380 Ibid, 31-33.
381 “Americanization Committee of Detroit,” ACD Meeting Notes, 1914-1931, Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan – Ann Arbor
anything, about why [we] were going there and when [we] found out that it was for the purpose of discussing the problems of teaching English to the foreign workmen, [we] were very skeptical but...[we] were sufficiently interested to return to the factory and begin a study of [our] foreign workmen. The result was the Ford English School for Immigrants." The meeting was the first in a series that unraveled the process by which municipal and industrial actors collaborated to formulate a plan to educate the immigrants of Detroit.

Six of the Education Committees eleven members were in attendance: Henry W. Hoyt was vice-president of the Great Lakes Engineering Company; F.S. Bigler was president of Michigan Bolt and Nut Company; Ernest L. Lloyd was president of Lloyd Construction Company; Horace Rackham was an attorney, businessman, and Ford’s legal counsel; W.E. Scripps headed the Scripps Motor Company and the Detroit News; and the host of the occasion, John R. Lee, director of the Ford Sociological Department. The other five members of the committee doubled as industrialists and key municipal officials: Frank D. Cody, assistant superintendent of city schools; A.J. Tuttle, a judge on the U.S. District Court; Thomas J. Farrell, county clerk who dealt with the city’s immigration matters; A.G. Studer, general secretary of the Y.M.C.A; and Detroit’s mayor, Oscar B. Marx, a prominent industrialist and president of the Michigan Optical Company. The Board’s intent in forming an Education Committee was clear from the start: to incorporate industry with education to manage Detroit’s influx of immigrant laborers.

Lee chose the attendees of Ford’s luncheon carefully. Fifty-four leaders of Detroit’s major automotive, steel, copper, and tool industries were present – including the managing editors of the Detroit Free Press and the Detroit Journal and the head administrators of Detroit public schools. The luncheon was carefully crafted to persuade the major employers of Detroit to implement Ford’s educational techniques in concert with one another. Henry Ford, the most prominent industrialist, was absent, but his presence and message were conveyed to those who attended, as documenting the luncheon meeting notes:

After the luncheon was served, Mr. Lee presided and spoke both for the Ford Motor Company and for the Educational Committee of the Board of Commerce, of which he is a member...The result [of the English Schools] has been very satisfactory to the Ford Motor Company from every standpoint and in suggesting it for the good of other manufacturers in Detroit, they cannot set forth its value in too strong terms...Mr. Ford was very much interested in the work which the Board of Commerce was starting in cooperation with the Board of Education to call the attention of the value of this work to the manufacturers of Detroit and to have them take vigorous measures to urge their non-English speaking employes [sic]

382 Ibid.
383 Ibid; Zunz, The Changing Face of Inequality, 313-316.
384 “Americanization Committee of Detroit,” August 31, 1915, ACD Meeting Notes, Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan – Ann Arbor.
to attend those night schools. Mr. Ford hoped that every one present would return to his company and take immediate steps to cooperate as requested by the Board of Education and the Committee on Education of the Detroit Board of Commerce.

The guests were then taken to visit the several classes of foreign workmen in session and every one went away endorsing the value of [Ford’s] work. Many of them assured Mr. Ford, Mr. Lee and members of the committee their companies would cooperate as suggested.  

The twin births of the Board of Commerce and Henry Ford’s automotive company in 1903 meant that both the Board and the FMC grew in tandem with one another, allowing the municipality to more easily incorporate and adapt Fordist policies on education and immigrants as the DBC took on more social responsibilities in the city. By the time the profit-sharing plan was announced in 1914, the DBC overlooked a Committee on Immigrants and an Education Committee, which grew in membership once the DBC tapped Lee as the first major industrial actors to serve towards the city’s educational aims. The luncheon meeting evidenced that Lee was highly influential in the DBC’s effort to address the “problem” of the immigrant in the city, and curiously placed the DBC (originally a municipal organization with an economic purpose) as a major administrator of social and educational policies in the city of Detroit.

Not long after the luncheon, the DBC decided to combine the functions of the Committee on Immigrants and the Education Committee into a newly formed Americanization Committee of Detroit (ACD from hereon). The stated purpose of the ACD and its overarching goals were:

- to promote and inculcate in both native and foreign born residents of the metropolitan district including and surrounding the city of Detroit, the principles of American institutions and good citizenship, to the end of encouraging and assisting immigrants to learn the English language, the history, laws, and government of the United States, the rights and duties of citizenship; and in becoming intelligent Americans.  

The statement echoed the sentiment of the “Ford idea,” which tied educational aims with “good” patriotism and citizenship. Later that year, the DBC commissioned Raymond E. Cole to write a report on the condition of “The Immigrant in Detroit.”  

The report, exaggerated in parts and working to fan the fears of those who were already wary of the presence of immigrants in American cities, further worked to justify the DBC’s actions in mandating night schools throughout the municipality of Detroit. Cole warned that that the moment was ripe, since “the present European War has temporarily stopped the incoming tide which gives Detroit an opportunity to develop a community program of

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385 Ibid.
386 Articles of Association of the Americanization Committee of Detroit, Article 1, Section 2, 1925, ACD Papers.
Americanization of its present large foreign-born population.”

He outlined major reforms, around which the mission of the DBC and ACD coalesced:

The Immigrant’s unfamiliarity \([sic]\) with American means of transportation, the frequent presence of immoral men and unprincipled cab-drivers, together with their ignorance of the city and its ways, presents the need of \([sic]\) directions and assistance on arrival which comprises Depot Work…

The greatest handicap of the newly arrived immigrant is his ignorance of the English language and in many cases his complete illiteracy. Therefore, his greatest and most pressing need is Education…

On account of our naturalization laws and requirements, complex to the immigrant, and the importance of impressing right principles of democracy and American citizenship upon him, he needs to be guided and instructed in becoming a citizen. This need may be classified as Naturalization.

The immigrant does not understand us, and we do not understand the immigrant. For these reasons, he and his environment need interpretation through Publicity.

His most fruitful contribution to the DBC’s cause was perhaps an emphatic call on American municipalities to bear the responsibility of enforcing these reforms:

What is to be the future [of] the great City of Detroit? What is Detroit going to do to digest her large heterogeneous mass of humanity? Does it not seem that, because of its large foreign-born population, this national question on immigration resolves itself for Detroit into a responsibility primarily Municipal?

The ACD wholly embraced Cole’s call for municipal reform, which spurred major collaborations between the DBC and national organizations across the country. The same year, the National Americanization Committee was also formed under the leadership of Frances Kellor, and together with the Committee for Immigrants in America, the organizations published a manual for the Federal Bureau of Education titled “Americanizing a City: The Campaign for Detroit’s Night Schools,” which campaigned for the nationalization of Detroit’s night schools.

In turn, these organizations distributed these manuals at annual conferences, having a major impact on discussions.

\(^{388}\) Ibid, 1.

\(^{389}\) Ibid, 2-3. Underline in text.

\(^{390}\) Ibid, 25. Underline in text.

about the shifting ethnic and social composition of American cities. These municipal-national collaborations were especially powerful in shaping national policy-oriented positions, which according to the National Americanization committee, weighed significantly on the social experiments that were taking place in Detroit.392

The general aim of the manual was to tame the presence of the immigrant using the city as a central agent. Its offered solution was to flatten the identities of immigrants so that they could serve as a potential source of contribution to the American industrial city. An excerpt from the manual reads as follows:

The immigrant is a powerful industrial, social and political factor. All the forces of industry, society and political wisdom are needed to accomplish his assimilation. In the Detroit experiment, imperfect and far from consummated as it is, is exemplified that [a] unified cooperation of forces...can weld the many peoples of any community into one body politic, and create throughout the nation the unity and power that come from common ideals, a common language, a uniform interpretation of citizenship. A night school campaign for the English language and citizenship in every city and town is an immediate practical approach to the vast and complicated problem of assimilation. The end to be attained is a social ideal. And the ways and means are those of social cooperation involving every constructive factor in the civic organism. 393

The “civic organism,” or the municipal city, was upheld as the primary means by which this vision could be achieved. The manual described a city with Platonic undertones that, in the words of historian Lewis Mumford, worked to “smooth out differences, reduce potentialities to become a city that slowly began to displace people with buildings.” 394

The DBC did not act alone in using the city form model American citizens. In fact, its ideologies were rooted in the same brand of Americanization as the FMC, which sought to “make men” in the same mechanical way that Ford engineered machines. 395

392 “Why Detroit was an Appropriate Place for the Experiment,” National Americanization Committee in cooperation with the Detroit Board of Commerce and the Board of Education, Americanizing A City (New York, 1915), 5.
397 Ibid, 23.
The DBC’s Americanization project had a transformative effect on the shape of the city, and sought to break up what Cole called dense “colonies” of immigrants taking over the city:

The immigrant races in Detroit have in many cases formed colonies taking, like an invading army, section after section of the city exclusively for themselves. They have been allowed to settle according to racial lines and come in contact with the least successful class of Americans. In these districts – cities within a city – many of the old foreign customs are still observed and the traditions and prejudices of centuries are perpetuated.396

Following Cole’s recommendation, the ACD placed Alien Free Information Bureau’s (AFIB’s) in immigrant heavy neighborhoods, which dispensed information on war drafts, citizenship, and naturalization [Figure 5.14].397 The first two bureaus in Detroit catered to the cities’ growing Italian and Polish communities, would often carry the names of the major nationalities of the neighborhoods in which they were located (i.e., Polish, Italian, Armenian, Syrian), and even offered to speak to immigrants in their native tongues. In addition to AFIB’s, night schooling was offered in all of Detroit’s public schools, as well as community centers, churches, gymnasiums – any space that could accommodate the thousands of industrial workers whose company’s were mandated by the city to require

night school programs [Figure 5.15]. One member of the ACD, an Assistant Superintendent for Detroit public schools, went as far as suggesting:

placing a red, white and blue light upon each of the public schools open in the evening for the instruction of foreigners in English...Such a light would enable the prospective pupil to quickly locate the schools and would be a constant reminder to passers-by of the work being done in connection with the Americanization movement in Detroit. 398

The DBC approved the plan, and well into the 1930s, AFIB’s and night schools visibly dictated how immigrants moved through the city, settled, and placed themselves in relation to one another and the schools they were required to attend.

In this way, the aim to Americanize Detroit’s immigrants quickly took on a material form: English language schools and naturalization bureaus across the city. The ACD attended to his by very clearly stating that it was a shared concern between manufacturers and city officials of possible unrest among immigrant groups, which had grown to 41% of Detroit’s total population by the year the committee was founded. 399 The FMC’s new wage and profit-sharing programs accounted for a majority of this population, which coincided with the Great Migration to draw laborers from within the United States and far corners of the world. Americanization ideals, as espoused by the ACD, were based loosely in the tenets of the Progressive movement and focused on fashioning immigrants into model American citizens, speaking the English language, and diminishing loyalties to their home countries. However, the ACD was unique in that it also followed a strain of industrial or business Americanization, most likely influenced by Fordist practices at Highland Park. Business historian Ann Brophy, in her study on Detroit Americanization, notes that industrial Americanization differed markedly from national, or state-led programs, in that an effort to negotiate citizenship and allegiance with immigrant workers in their own language was not in the interest of national Americanization projects. 400 Ford went a step further, by using economic conditioning to transform the lifestyle and attitudes of foreign workers, in factories and in their own homes. Since the FMC was the only industry with the economic means to institute its own Americanization programs at the scale that it did, the ACD cleverly included Lee and other industry executives on its planning board. By putting them in conversation with

399 This percentage does not include the number of domestic migrants from across the United States who came to Detroit looking for work. Black migrants, who figure most prominently into demographic shifts in Detroit from 1913 onwards, increased the existing black population by 623.4%; from 5,751 in 1910 to 41,532 in 1920 – an increase that was higher than any other city in the nation. Hooker, Life in the Shadows of the Crystal Palace, 48.
400 Ann Brophy, “‘The Committee...Has Stood out against Coercion’: The Reinvention of Detroit Americanization, 1915-1931” in Michigan Historical Review 29, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 1-39. Emphasis mine. While Ford did not employ the tactic of speaking to immigrants in their language, the closest the company came was to hire social agents who had some linguistic and cultural knowledge about the immigrants they were investigating.
GO to Night School Sept. 13th

Can you speak English well?
Do you want to be an American citizen?
Do you want a better job?
It is hard to get a job in America without English.

GO TO NIGHT SCHOOL AND LEARN IT.
FILL OUT THE SCHOOL LIST AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE AND GO THERE ON SEPTEMBER 13TH AT 7:00 O’CLOCK IN THE EVENING.

Board of Commerce Handbill

Figure 5.15: Detroit Board of Commerce, Night school flyer, 1915
(Americanizing a City, 15)
one another, the DBC gained the consent of Detroit’s major industries to strongly recommend night school programs for most of the city’s immigrant workers by 1915.401

What was revealing about this industrial-municipal collaboration was the concerted effort to ward off any perceived threats of foreign influence on the national economy, a project that expanded far beyond the city’s parameters and amplified on a national level.402 The act of retaining immigrants through these spatial and social practices was emblematic of the collaboration between American enterprise and the state, and their use of nationality and culture in the First and interwar period. Just as foreign workers were told to be, buy and serve militarily as Americans, anxieties flared nationally about what it meant to be American. This was the purposeful predicament of American commercial empire in the first half of the twentieth century. As major American multinationals, like the FMC, produced powerful narratives about Americanism, foreign worlds, and cultures through commodities sales at home and abroad, immigrant workers migrated through open national borders to meet the demands of labor shortage, shifting the social composition of American industrial cities.403 In turn, industrial cities became concentrated sites of contestation, where state and corporate agents of a newly forming industrial political economy aimed to temper any outward allegiances of “foreign” identity to protect the nations economic interests. In order to examine this moment more fully, I turn to Ford’s Detroit and the stories of immigrant workers to examine how Fordist social policies were enforced and contested in spaces closer to industry.

401 “Americanization Committee of Detroit,” February 1915, ACD Meeting notes. Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan – Ann Arbor.
403 Domosh, American Commodities in An Age of Empire, 23.
As Ford’s relationship with the Detroit Board of Commerce strengthened, so did the integration of Fordist principles in the industrial plan of Detroit. Through corporate-municipal planning, the FMC’s “factory as city” paradigm turned inside out, as the majority of Detroit’s industries were mandated to follow the basic requirements of Ford’s social programs. The enforcement of these rules took place in the neighborhoods where immigrants were encouraged to live, the ways they inhabited their homes, traveled to and from work, and how they perceived each other. Ford’s version of industrial or business Americanization went further, and used economic conditioning to transform the lifestyle and attitudes of foreign workers. The company’s sociological agents were assigned to certain routes and neighborhoods, where they would investigate homes to ensure that workers were meeting hygienic and moral requirements, and if they fell short, their share of the profits would be revoked.

In this chapter, I examine the urban enforcement of Ford’s social programs from the point of their institution until the late 1920s. I begin again with a map of Detroit, this time drawn by the FMC Sociological Department as a means to monitor its workforce and ensure social order in the city. The home was a major focal point for the company, both as a recurring image in Ford in-house publications and films, and as a means to determine whether workers would earn their share of the profits and continue working. As the FMC grew, Ford annexed land adjacent to the Highland Park factory and incorporated the neighborhood as a separate city, adding to its role as a corporate body and a body governing over the everyday life of a city. As immigration picked up after the war and the company made major gains outside of Euro-American markets, Ford’s shifting workforce social composition (and their increasing demand for worker rights) complicated the relationship between Ford agents and the workers they oversaw. The chapter concludes with brief portraits of FMC immigrant workers, and offers a window into the lives of workers on the receiving end of Ford’s promise.

6.1
The Home Front

*Helpful Hints and Advice to Employes to Help Them Grasp the Opportunities Which are Presented to Them By the Ford Profit Sharing Plan.* This was the title-cum-sentence of the first manual handed to Ford workers upon the start of the profit-sharing plan. Its opening pages showed a row of houses that would be “a good representative home owned by a Ford employee” [Figure 6.1]. The emphasis on good, safe, and clean urban living was of primary importance to the company and was connected to the tenants laid out in its profit-sharing and social programs in inseparable ways, namely better morals, hygiene, and habits of thrift and saving. It continued:
In this book will be found types of so-called good and bad homes; sanitary and insanitary living conditions; good and bad neighborhoods. These views are presented for the purpose of showing the benefits, which can be obtained by imitating the good, and avoiding the bad, in the home and surroundings. The Company does not undertake to select neighborhoods or plan homes for its employees, but it does expect that they, to be profit-sharers, will choose wholesome and decent neighborhoods and buildings, and keep their homes and surroundings clean, sanitary and healthful.\textsuperscript{404}

Although it was unusual for a corporation of this size to require such a high standard of living among its employees, these domestic conditions were part of the requirements of profit-sharing plan, just like the English and Trade schools. Ford materials made it a point to note that the social programs benefitted “all its employes [sic],” yet, as I have argued elsewhere, the nature of their enforcement repeatedly singled out immigrant workers.\textsuperscript{405} In this sense, the company’s focus on the domestic realm was just another dimension of the plan. It ensured that Ford’s investment in his workers (the profits he shared with them) was spent in a manner that would allow his company to profit (home ownership, savings). In other words, Ford’s profit-sharing plan made workers themselves the shares, and Ford the principle investor.

That the home was a “sacred” space away from the closely surveilled factory floor was precisely what made it a point of interest for Ford investigators. In fact, the \textit{Helpful Hints Guide} acted as a supplement to the work of investigators in making personal calls to employee homes; it was a sort of cheat sheet for home investigations. Upon arrival, agents would take out a Sociological Record form, meticulously record their observations, and write thorough reports – some of which were featured as “Human Interest Stories” in the company’s in-house publications [Figure 6.2]. One such story read as follows:

The investigators have found upon going into the homes of many employees, and particularly those of foreign birth, that in many cases they were living and sleeping in over-crowded rooms and tenements. Often these rooms and tenements were dark, ill-ventilated and foul smelling, with poor sanitary conditions...The Company expects employees to improve their living conditions...employees should use plenty of soap and water in the home and upon their children, bathing frequently. Nothing makes for the right living and health so much as cleanliness. Notice that the most advanced people are the cleanest.\textsuperscript{406}

The observations made here were not unlike those made by Egyptian-born investigator Torossian (whose “Human Interest Story #8” was featured in the Introduction), who

\textsuperscript{404} \textit{Helpful Hints and Advice to Employees to Help Them Grasp the Opportunities Which are Presented to Them By the Ford Profit-sharing Plan}, 1915, Acc. #951, FMC Non-serial prints, Box 23, 7.
\textsuperscript{405} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{406} Human Interest Stories, FMC Sociological Department Records, BFRC.
Figure 6.1: “A good representative home owned by a Ford employe,” Helpful Hints Guide, 1915 (Acc. #951, FMC Non-serial prints, Box 23, BFRC, 6-7)

Figure 6.2: “The Making of Men and Homes,” Sociological Department Record
wrote in equal contempt about the “crowded, filthy” nature of immigrant homes, and often equated “native” American worker homes with cleanliness and order.

It was no wonder that these observations came so naturally to Torossian, despite his Egyptian nationality. Highly racialized images of Asian, African, Arab, and Indian societies and cultures flooded the pages of Ford publications, and were consistently associated with the conditions of their built environments. As Ford expanded globally, company publications, like the *Ford News* and *Guide*, described the infrastructure of the cities they encountered in the same way (see Chapters 1 and 3). Tokyo and Yokohama as “ugly, depressing, filthy, and squalid,” Cairenes as “isolated” desert people, South Africans as living in tents as “savages,” and the list continued. Sharp distinctions were made between these cities and European “enlightened” principles of planning. New York City’s “sturdy” infrastructure [*Figure 6.3*], and of course, Detroit, as “beautiful, wholesome, and democratic.” Figure 6.4, for example, shows the urban equivalent of the *Ford Guide*’s version of “How We Live” featuring race (see Chapter 3). The descriptions are one and the same; this time, race is equated with infrastructural achievement:

The Caucasian (white man) has driven the red man away, has made the Ethiopian (black man) his slave, and has used the Malay (brown man) and the Mongolian (yellow man) as his servants.

In spite of the fact that all the races are represented here, the Caucasian has become the dominating one. It has given its languages to the United States. It has built up practically all of the large factories and other places of business.

There are good reasons for this, although they may be difficult to give. The white race has shown a far greater capability to help itself, to overcome difficulties…Contrast this to the American Indian who lived on this continent hundreds of years before any other race of mankind, and who now, as in the ancient times, is still living in tents.407

While symptomatic of turn-of-the-century social thinking, the company’s constant presentation of race without the structural advantages it operated in pervaded its materials and practices. These omissions worked in favor of the Fordist philosophy, which did not account for the fact that social conditions of men were attached to their labor conditions; that the “Caucasian” use of “black, brown, and yellow” men as slaves hindered their ability to build up “large factories and other places of business.” Contrary to the principles of right and honest living that Ford investigators impressed upon workers, the aspects of “Caucasian” building that were considered “good” (the erection of skyscrapers, factories), had more to do with business and commerce than it did with the making of moral men and societies.

Figure 6.3: Still from “Mirror of America” showing the Brooklyn Bridge, NYC

Figure 6.4: “How We Live” Ford Guide, c. 1916-7, 28-29
From left to right: “How the black man lives in Africa; How millions of yellow people live in Asia; What the white man found when he reached America; What the white man has done in America”
Still, the company’s focus on homes continued throughout the Sociological Department’s prime years up until the Great Depression. Henry Ford’s own home was held up as the utopian standard, and was bundled together with Anglo churches, government buildings, and commercial complexes to represent the “highest form of civilization.” Underneath an image of his home [Figure 6.5], a caption expanded on this point:

The attractive Cathedrals and other churches in our country are in marked contrast with the early colonial houses of worship on the one hand, and with temples of heathen nations on the other hand. Our church buildings are an expression of the religious ideals of a Christian people.

Business edifices, such as the skyscrapers of New York City, and public buildings like the Capitol at Washington…are monuments of the tremendous growth of commercial interests and the political developments in America. They speak eloquently for the magnitude and the enterprise of the American world of commerce and trade and the growth of American nationalism.

Residences reveal distinctive racial and social ideals. Often they are built purely for display. Homes, both inside and out, reflect the solidarity of a nation’s character. A country home, like Mr. Ford’s Dearborn residence, embodies the ideas of beauty, quietude, and wholesome enjoyment.⁴⁰⁸

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Here, hierarchies are created through building types, just as they were created through race and culture. Built within the bounds of Euro-American standards, places of worship achieved the religious ideal, places of governance the political ideal, and homes racial and social ideals. This was why immigrants and their homes were seen as a threat to Detroit’s industries and municipalities across the country, and their inaccessibility posed a serious conundrum to those in governance. In the same year that the ADC and DBC collaborated with Ford to build and mandate naturalization bureaus and English schools throughout the city, the DBC convened politicians, industrialists, and educators to brainstorm over the following questions:

1. Is America irrevocably an immigration country?
2. Is immigration essential to American economic development?
3. Is America a necessary asylum for the people of the world?
4. Shall the basis for assimilation be Anglo-Saxon?
5. Shall America become a one-language country?
6. What shall be done with the foreign-language press?
7. Shall American citizenship be compulsory?
8. What is to be the status abroad of the American naturalized citizen?
9. Shall aliens be registered?
10. Shall the status of the alien be fixed solely by national laws?
11. Shall America adopt a national system of assimilation?
12. Shall immigration be dealt with abroad?
13. Shall the troubles of Europe be solved in America?\(^{409}\)

These broad questions give insight to the frantic concerns that guided Detroit’s urban and social policies, which for Ford, attempted to be resolved within the confines of the home.

Ford’s own version of the naturalization bureau took the form of an investigative unit where, if a domestic investigation caused concerned, immigrants who were “falling behind” would meet with agents to be counseled [Figure 6.6]. In the meetings, workers would be asked about their marital life (Ford preferred workers who were married), practice of English in the home, political leanings, and their progress towards homeownership and naturalization. This type of questioning became increasingly less unusual when the U.S. entered the war, and fear of communist leanings or German sympathizing was at an all time high. Plain-clothes agents were placed within earshot of many workers on the assembly line who were thought of as suspicious, escalating tensions between agents and workers, and planting the seeds for worker unrest through the mid-to-late 1920s. Nonetheless, the meetings would be oriented around conditions of the home, and after questioning, immigrant workers would be shown a series of “Before” and “After” examples of Ford homes that had improved through the company’s profit-sharing program and home investigations [Figures 6.7 and 6.8].

\(^{409}\)”Questions on Immigration,” 1915, ACD Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan – Ann Arbor.
Figure 6.6: Ford social agents, investigative unit
(FMC Sociological Department, Photographic vertical files series, Acc 1660, Box 167, BFRC)

Figure 6.7: Examples of a Ford employees home before the profit sharing plan (top left), four months after receiving shares (bottom left), and fourteen months into the plan (top right)
(Ford Guide, c. 1916-7, 62-3)
Figure 6.8: Before and After “representations” of the effect of the profit-sharing plans
(FMC Sociological Department, Photographic vertical files series, Acc 1660, Box 167, BFRC)
The images centered on savings and finances. It was how the company tied aspects of the profit-sharing program to behavior, work ethic, and homeownership. Figure 6.7 illustrates the condition of a home “before the inauguration of the profit-sharing plan, January 12th, 1914,” while the second and third images show how “four months after receiving a share of the profits” an addition was built to “double the rise of the house,” and finally, a finished home is shown “fourteen months after receiving a share of the profits.” Figure 6.8 has the same general effect, showing in the top image “undesirable home surroundings found on first investigation,” and the bottom image, a “representative home of a Ford Employee on time of second investigation.” The stated “double purpose” of enforcing profit-sharing was to “provide money for future needs; second to foster self-control. The second,” it continued, “is the more important of the two, because, having that, the first is quite assured.” The purpose of the profit-sharing plan, which, at the outset, was instituted to reduce turnover in the factory, was expanded to include the stability of the city. It was crucial, then, that images created by the Sociological Department accounted for every aspect of the workers inclination (leisurely activities, artistic appreciation, cultural attachments, national belonging), so that any unpredictability in behavior was accounted for. Homeownership guaranteed stability outside of the factory, which reduced housing speculation (as occurred in Walkerville, Chapter 1), and after the incorporation of Highland Park by Ford in 1918, guaranteed that worker unpredictability would not lead to the collapse of Ford’s factory town, as I show in the next section.

The lessons continued beyond the counsel that workers received from investigative agents. To emphasize the point, the Sociological Department compiled and visualized data gathered by the home investigations a year and a half into the start of the plan. One such graph showed charts of how worker behavior and financial soundness led to their success within the spectrum of wage-earners in the factory, and more broadly, in life. The same photograph that illustrated a “good representative” of Ford home in Figure 6.8, was featured again in a statistical analysis that separated Ford homes into classes of “good, fair, and bad” over the course of three home investigations [Figure 6.9]. The majority of homes are shown to “improve” by the second and third investigations. The results were described as follows:

Improvement in living conditions has been especially marked, chiefly among the foreign-born employees [sic], who represent quite a percentage of the force. Since the inauguration of the Profit-Sharing Plan, due to the advice of the Advisors on home conditions, between 10,000 and 11,000 families have moved to better quarters. This can be readily seen in a comparison of the tabulation of the first, second and third investigations of home conditions, in which the surroundings of the employee [sic] and his family have been dived into three classes, good, fair and bad.

411 Ibid, 23.
In visiting the homes of foreigners the Advisors explain to the people, through an interpreter if necessary, the joy and healthful advantage of cleanliness and order, and as in one of the pictures, try to impress this fact especially upon the housewife. Books of photographs showing the desirable home conditions are very often used to good advantage.

This was the standard depiction of women in Ford materials, as either showing off the marvels of Ford technology through the use of dishwashers or vacuum cleaners, or by helping their husbands to maintain their wages by keeping the home in “good” conditions.

All of these materials, the hiring and training of agents, collection of data, and the creation of an investigative unit, were thrown together within the first year of the profit-sharing plan. Between 1915 and 1916, the lull in immigration gave the company enough pause to breathe life into these images through its Motion Picture Lab and Photographic department, and communicate to the world the benefits afforded to Ford workers in the domestic realm. One such film rendered the profit-sharing project as one of “Recreation

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and Settlement Work,” through which benevolence and patriotism were distributed and enforced. In the film, Ford agents were shown teaching mothers how to properly care for their babies and sick family members, and horrid interior conditions of immigrant homes were shown, transforming into orderly, clean spaces by the next frame. In these scenes, the FMC took on a distinctly benevolent character and, through moving images, shed light on its activities as primarily operating in the name of industrial welfare.

![Figure 6.10: Still from Ford Foreign Worker film, “Recreation and Settlement Work,” 1916 (Ford Film Collection, Motion Picture, Sound, and Video at the National Archives – College Park)](image)

Just as with thematic depictions of race and culture, Ford materials were also woven together through depictions of and stories about the domestic realm. As I showed in Chapter 3, the home was ever-present, either figuring prominently in the foreground of photographs and newsletters, or silently behind Ford products or in classrooms where lessons were taught [Figure 6.11]. In the English school, sentences were constructed around immigrant loyalty (“Are you an American?”; “Have you brushed your teeth today?”), as well as maneuvering in their homes, the importance of keeping time to track daily chores, and the importance of domestic orderliness. Between the war winding down and the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, a new set of immigrants arrived to Highland Park eager to be trained in the Ford method, and for whom yet another set of domestic and urban conditions were devised.
Figure 6.11: The questions “Are you an American?” and “Have you brushed your teeth today?” next to an enduring image of the home, drawn as an elevated section, on the blackboard during a Ford English School lesson, 1916
(FMC Sociological Department, Photographic vertical files series, Acc 1660, Box 167, BFRC)

6.2 Immigrant Islands

Two undated 35-millimeter film reels titled “Ford Trade School” and “Ford Motor Company Workers” were cut up and placed among a string of negatives in the Ford Educational Weekly series. In the Ford film catalogue, a few words abruptly describe the passing scenes of each film: “night scene – workers walking in plant yard – lights from plant – workers walking on elevated walkway – workers on ramp – elevated platform – streetcars – buses below – workers milling about.”

The description of each still frame gives a sense of a certain tempo, where the camera lingered on each scene, like a photograph, before moving to the next. The films, recorded visibly early in the start of the profit-sharing plan, were shown all over the world and were meant to give viewers a glimpse into the everyday life of a Ford factory worker. One still frame captures a line of workers on their way to the Ford Trade School class, each one looking at the camera as he passes by, some puzzled and others amused [Figure 6.12]. This was one of the rare instances in which any in-house publication or film presented a Ford worker in full view, face to face with the films viewer.

The films worked as intended. Workers, many times with their back to the camera, are shown as they carry on with their daily activities: the mundane task of walking to work, clocking in, working on the assembly line, clocking out. The viewers get a partial, if not complete, sense of their routines inside the factory. What becomes immediately apparent is that the needs of the worker were generally within arms length,

413 “FMC Workers,” 200FC – 1172 (e), Ford Film Collection Catalogue, Motion Picture, Sound, and Video at the National Archives – College Park, Maryland.
too convenient for him to move out of line. This was the careful planning of the Highland Park “factory as city” design, which was as technologically innovative as it was a panoptical design that allowed the workers every move to be seen.

![Image](image.png)

*Figure 6.12: Still from Ford Trade School, showing workers walking to the plant (Ford Film Collection, Motion Picture, Sound, and Video at the National Archives – College Park)*

The workers’ housing proximity to the factory worked in much the same way, which made for densely populated neighborhoods around the Highland Park plant that were also easily within reach. By 1917, the Sociological Department enlisted 18 “special” investigative agents from among Ford men, meticulously mapped out routes through the surrounding neighborhoods, and assigned each agent a set of blocks to investigate [Figure 6.13]. The description of the map reads as follows:

There are 18 Special Advisors whose advisory roles range from being in charge of all the advisors, roll employees, factory girls, anti-social cases, special criminal cases, insanity and epileptic cases, aid to sick and charity cases, crippled children, deficient children, appraisals for real estate, sanitation and preparation of lunch sold in factory, lost badges cases, absentee cases, and finally, money sent abroad through private bankers. At
this moment in 1917, there were about 37,000 and an average of 727 cases per advisor.\textsuperscript{414}

![Map of the City of Detroit](image)

Figure 6.13: FMC Sociological Agent Route Map, July 1917
(Industrial Relations, Sociological Department, Acc. 280, Box 1, BFRC)

The map, and the immensity of the social project that it represented, was a feat in and of itself. What made each agent “special,” was his specialization in one of the categories listed, as well as (sometimes) his ability to speak languages other than English. The involvement of an agent like Torossian, then, becomes less peculiar. Starting most probably as wage-worker on the assembly line, he was able to work his way up to a point where Ford execs realized the potential he offered to the profit-sharing plan, by way of communicating directly with the company’s growing Arabic-speaking workforce.

Torossian’s position was not only a testament to worker mobility within FMC labor hierarchy (which was more rare than it was common) but also signified the growing presence of immigrant laborers from the greater Middle East at the FMC. Torossian most likely was assigned to neighborhoods filled with Persians, Turks, Armenians, Indians, in addition to Arabs. He, like the other 17 agents, was assigned to blocks siphoned off by each square on the map. Faint lines marked agent routes from the Highland Park factory

\textsuperscript{414} “Map of the City of Detroit,” Ford Agent Routes, Industrial Relations, Sociological Department, Acc. 280, Box 1, BFRC.
to the homes they were to investigate (yes, even the agents were closely monitored), and the number inside each square indicated how many worker homes were in each designate section. The further the sections were from the plant, the larger they were in terms of square mileage and the fewer homes there were to be investigated; indicating that most tightly-knit quarters were located adjacent to the plant.

This meticulous mapping was symptomatic of a much larger concern. The importance of monitoring the spatial proximity between the worker and the plant was stated time and again in profit-sharing materials. In Lee’s “So-Called Profit Sharing Plan,” article in 1916, he mentions that:

A map has been prepared of the city which we have divided into districts, each district characterized by its physical environment and the kind of inhabitants. This has been so maintained through the directory we have, as to form [sic] most convincing proof of the whole-souled response [sic] made by our men in the direction of our aims and desires. I would like you to know that one of the greatest crimes a man of the Ford organization can commit is not to keep us posted as to change of address.415

The Helpful Hints Guide more emphatically pressed upon Lee’s latter point:

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

It is of the utmost importance that the employes [sic] give their new address immediately after the change is made to the time clerk in their department, or the head watchman in the watchman’s office. Failure to do so may mean the loss of their position.416

The severity of the punishment seemed disproportionate to the “crime,” yet there was a reason why addresses were as important to the company as keeping up on the assembly line. The FMC kept track of worker addresses by placing their information on the back of each timecard. Every time a worker stamped in or out of the factory, he would have a chance to update his address in the company files. If he did not supply his information, or forgot to update his address, the investigative agent would lose track of the worker on the route map and fail to conduct the home investigation. This was how critical the home investigations were to a functioning Ford plan, which struggled to keep up with the transient domestic lives of its workers.

Before long, more services and plans were offered to stabilize the home lives of Ford workers. Real estate advice, which was previously offered by a single Ford agent, became an institutionalized service of the FMC Legal Department. The homeownership mantra that was trumpeted by the social programs in its initial years was tempered down to warn workers that “there is great harm in buying too much real estate merely for

416 Helpful Hints, 11, BFRC. Caps and emphasis in text.
speculation.” The company demanded to be kept informed of any real estate dealings among its workers and were told to “have all first payments or deposits made on real estate subject to this Company’s [sic] approval.” Savings and investments were encouraged through banking, and the company advised workers to follow in the tradition of “a great many Ford men.” A personal experience from one such man was shared:

‘My first rule was to deposit something every two weeks, and second not to withdraw to meet current bills unless…it became absolutely necessary. With these resolutions and rules firmly fixed in mind, I soon began to watch my growing deposits with interest. I grew ambitious to become an investor and wondered if I could rise by way of my savings and investments above the class of work.’

The curious ideal set before workers if they saved their share of the profits was the ability to be free from work, which created an odd juxtaposition between that, and Ford’s emphasis on “making men” who had a strict work ethic and moral groundings.

Figure 6.14: Real Estate and Banking Service advertisements, 1917 (Ford Guide, 1917, 33-34)

418 Ibid.
419 Ibid, 34.
The economic aspects of the housing question were also used to justify the social hierarchy that Ford materials constructed through images and narratives. Data collected from home investigations and the Legal Department were tabulated to create charts with an enormous amount of detail. Financial analyses were made comparing the finances (from savings, land and home investments), religion, and nationality of every Ford employee over three years of profit-sharing, from January 1914 to January 1917 [Figures 6.15 and 6.16]. Compared to publically released figures, the FMC’s internal documents had an astounding amount of information, indicating that the institution of scientific management at the start of the profit-sharing plan extended from middle management to the mid-level wage worker (notably, low-level black workers were left out of the calculations entirely). A close look at the financial savings charts shows that workers more than tripled their savings between 1917 and 1914, going from saving $75.20 per year to $223. The most revealing numbers were those calculated for savings based on religion and nationality. Not withstanding the reliability with which Ford agents identified workers by religion, Figure 6.15 shows that “Mohammaden” workers saved the most by January 1917 than any other Ford worker within the ten religious categories identified (“Roman Catholic, Protestant, Greek Catholic, Hebrew, Russian Orthodox, Hindu, Buddhist, Spiritualist, No Religion,” listed in order of number of workers from highest to lowest). “Mohammaden” workers, comprising 226 workers, saved an average of $864.94 per employee, Buddhist workers, comprising of 4 workers, came in second at $689.33 per employee, and Greek Catholic, numbering 2,309 workers, came in third at $541.18 per employee. The final statement on savings by nationality is equally remarkable [Figure 6.16]. Out of 58 nationalities surveyed, including “American” and Western European, those individuals who had more than 1000% gains in profits (showed the most thrift) between 1914 and 1917 were 1) Albanian, 2) Macedonian, 3) Arabian, 4) Turkish, and 5) Croatian. These results show that immigrant workers from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia reaped more profits individually than other type of worker at the FMC by 1917.

The company’s endeavor to chart its workers based on race, religion, and nationality, exposes the faulty premise of the Ford promise. All men were not on equal footing in Ford’s plan, but were categorized according to their financial worth, race, religion, and nationality. Across the board, the results of the financial statements nullified the Euro-American ideal that Ford materials upheld as an attainable standard for immigrant workers. On the contrary, those immigrant workers who endured additional social and educational requirements to qualify for their wages, were the most “thrifty” and economical participants in Ford’s plan. Moreover, in the three years this data were collected, practically the duration of the war, Ford made critical and strategic decisions in Cairo and Mumbai to expand business on the ground in the regions from where the company’s most profitable employees came. As I show in the next section, these workers

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420 Comparative Financial Statements, January 1914-1917, Financial records series, BFRC
421 It is unclear in FMC financial statements how much these immigrants were worth when they arrived to the company, or how much in savings they brought with them to Detroit. The calculations are thought to be based on each workers thrift based solely on their profits from Ford’s profit sharing plan.
Figure 6.15: Bank Accounts and Worth by Religion, 1917
(Comparative Financial Statement of Ford employees, Financial records series, BFRC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
<th>Number of Employees With no Bank Accounts</th>
<th>Amount in Bank Accounts</th>
<th>Average Amount Per Employee With Bank Account</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>18,946</td>
<td>5,757</td>
<td>13,189</td>
<td>$4,470,183.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>17,064</td>
<td>6,070</td>
<td>10,994</td>
<td>$3,582,950.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>2,309</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>1,815</td>
<td>$982,243.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>1,433</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>$282,015.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Orthodox</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>$283,030.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammendan</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>$750,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$670,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$2,068,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritualist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$10,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>$11,960.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40,903</td>
<td>11,612</td>
<td>29,291</td>
<td>$93,197,091.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.16: Savings and investments by nationality, 1914-1917
(Comparative Financial Statement of Ford employees, Financial records series, BFRC)
would return home from their Ford training with the understanding that they would jumpstart the Ford business using the knowledge they gained in Detroit.

Despite the workers’ financial revelations, the company’s domestic monitoring program continued, and its scrutiny over “Asiatic” employees remained constant. This was, perhaps, in preparation for Henry Ford’s anticipated incorporation of the Highland Park to protect his tax base from Detroit’s annexation efforts. Ford was not alone in his thinking. The Dodge Brothers opened another large plant to the northeast of the Highland Park plant, and though not as large as Ford’s enterprise, together the two factories employed 85% of northeastern Detroit’s population. Highland Park and Hamtramck (the region around the Dodge Brother’s plant) were created to be factory towns, and were incorporated as stand-alone cities in 1918 and 1922, respectively. A 1920 *New York Times* article proclaimed “Detroit Suburbs Ahead in New Census: Ford Auto Plant Boosts Population of Highland Park 1,000 Per Cent”.422 Within a few years, Detroit’s city lines encircled Highland Park and Hamtramck, creating cities within a city. What resulted were two small factory towns that had very little to do with each other, but were economically, politically, and socially embedded within the city lines of Detroit. The need to manage homeownership and draw workers within the orbit of Highland Park, then, became a priority for Ford – not only because it was foundational to the workings of his plan, but also because the sustainability of his factory city depended on it.

The Henry Ford Trade School’s (incomplete) list of foreign students from 1919 to 1927 reveals that more than 20% of the student population immigrated to Detroit from the Middle East (Syria, Egypt, Turkey, Persia) and India.423 Using data from these files, which included timestamp cards that listed students’ addresses, date of birth, place of birth, education, and languages spoken, and isolating for the categories “Persian,” “Hindu,” “Indian,” “Armenian,” “Turkish,” “Egyptian,” “Albanian,” and “Syrian,” I mapped residential locations [Figure 6.17]. Many students listed multiple locations during their 2-3 year training at the Ford English and Trade Schools, some addresses overlapped, were in close proximity to one another, or indicated that students swapped houses/apartments with one another. The yellow star shows the location of the Highland Park plant, the red pins represent students of Arab/Indian origin, yellow of Persian origin, and blue of Turkish origin, and the numbers on the pins indicate the number of students at that location. The map shows that the majority of student-workers (from within these categories) were Arab/Indian, and as a group, they generally resided on the south side of the plant in a dense cluster along Victor Street, Gerald Street, and West Grand Street.

423 The Henry Ford Trade School Student Records series, 1919-1927 (7 cubic ft), Accession 774, BFRC. These vertical files are arranged in alphabetical order by student last name with a listing of their “nationality” and timestamp cards, which included address, birthdate, birthplace, education, languages spoken, and badge number. I chose names that were listed under categories “Persian,” “Hindu,” “Indian,” “Armenian,” “Turkish,” “Egyptian,” “Albanian,” and “Syrian” to calculate the number of students arriving from these regions. The records are incomplete, as a number of cubic feet were burned in a fire.
Figure 6.17: Residential location of Ford workers from the greater Middle East in Highland Park
(Data mapped by author using The Henry Ford Trade School Student Records series, 1919-1927, BFRC; map representational)

Figure 6.18: Residential location of Ford workers from the greater Middle East in Detroit
(Data mapped by author using The Henry Ford Trade School Student Records series, 1919-1927, BFRC; map representational)
Figure 6.18 also shows that a new wave of Ford immigrant workers from these regions (and elsewhere) began to take up residence in downtown Detroit, closer to the Detroit-Windsor riverfront by 1919. Arab/Indian workers were still present in large numbers throughout the city, but the ratio was still higher in Highland Park (369 immigrant residents) than in downtown Detroit (103 residents). If we reimagine the Sociological Agent Route map produced in 1917 with these residential configurations, we would see that a majority of workers from Ford’s “Orient” were still located in the most concentrated square adjacent to the plant. Nevertheless, the slow and steady out-migration of immigrant workers from Ford’s factory city from the interwar years onwards, and Ford’s eventual construction of a new River Rouge plant outside the parameters of the city of Detroit, gives insight into increased bookkeeping vigilance among Ford agents after the First War. As the residential locations of new immigrants fell outside Ford’s “orbit of surveillance” (or, outside of Highland Parks municipal boundaries), the company hurried to cast a wider net around its domestic and social programs, and contain rising dissent as strikes and union-building became common practice among “native” and immigrant workers against the paternalistic practices of Detroit’s industries.
6.3
Portraits

A closer look at this student-worker group gives us better understanding of the impact that industrial movement had on out-migration and the economic stability of Detroit’s immigrant-heavy neighborhoods in later years. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Arab and Turkish immigrants who arrived to Detroit were predominantly Christian. By the early 1920’s both groups had grown large enough that they worked together (along with a growing group of Syrian Muslims) to create a semblance of a community. Regardless of religious affiliation, Turkish, Syrian, Palestinian, Albanian, Persian and Indian immigrants organized around community centers and mosques as early as 1921. These community centers allowed immigrant groups to gather and socialize outside of their houses, which continued to be a space monitored by Ford’s social agents. These spaces, and our knowledge of them, limited as it is, allowed workers the ability to escape the strict socio-economic categorizations of the Ford hierarchy, and through social organizing in the 20s and 30s, served to significantly weaken the potency of Ford’s plan.

One such community lived around the Moslem Mosque of Highland Park on Victor Street, located across from an entryway to the Highland Park plant. Built in 1921, the mosque was the first purpose-built structure that catered to workers from Syria, Palestine, Turkey, Mexico, India and Lebanon. On the eve of their first ‘eid celebration (or religious holiday marking the end of the fasting month) on June 5, 1921, the Detroit Free Press wrote:

…Mohammedans of Greater Detroit will hold their first religious service in the new mosque now under construction at 843 Victor avenue, Highland Park…The basement of the building has been covered and will be used for this service but as there are 16,000 of the faith in Detroit, and as it will be first opportunity any of them have had to attend a full service since they left the old country, it is expected there will be a large overflow audience.  

If the total foreign-born population for metro Detroit was 412,000 in 1920, the number of immigrants who identified as Muslim (according to the article) accounted for almost four percent. Mohammad Karoub, the brother of one of the appointed imams (religious leader) of the mosque who doubled as a successful real estate speculator, recognized the need for a communal gathering space and donated an initial $50,000 for the building. Living within the vicinity of the Highland Park plant, he identified and turned over a 3-story building on Victor Street for administrative use. Dr. Mufti Mohammed Sadiq, a Muslim missionary from India, and Syrian imams Hussein Karoub and Khalil Bazzy were appointed

424 “Moslems to Worship First in New H.P. Mosque Tuesday,” The Detroit Free Press, June 5, 1921, D5.
heads of the mosque.\textsuperscript{426} The \textit{Free Press} article fancifully details the events of the day, starting with a parade that began from Karoub’s administrative building. The procession was led by Sadiq who donned a green turban, followed by the two imams dressed in white, and members of the Arabian-American Association and the Mohammedan Young Men’s association.\textsuperscript{427} The mosque’s location just a block away from the Highland Park plant gates was proof that it catered to many immigrants who preferred to stay in the

\textsuperscript{426} Sadiq also founded and edited \textit{The Moslem Sunrise}, a newsletter aimed to spread the word about a sect of Islam known as the Ahmadiyya faith to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. He ran the publication out of the same administrative building that Karoub donated to the mosque.

\textsuperscript{427} “Moslems to Worship in New H.P. Mosque Tuesday,” \textit{The Detroit Free Press}, D5.
vicinity of the FMC.

Karoub hired an American architect to draw up plans of the proposed mosque. Not long after, an elevation sketch from the commission was published in an anti-Islam Presbyterian missionary magazine called *The Moslem World* [Figure 6.20]. The sketch shows a house with a sign hung above the door that read: “The Mosque.” The façade featured horseshoe arches and onion shaped domes with ornamented minarets capped with crescent-stars. Underneath the sketch, a caption read that the mosque was built to accommodate “a small auditorium and the usual prayer niche, or qibla [sic], toward Mecca. The minarets are solid and cannot be used for the ‘The Call to Prayer’.” In a later interview with the *Free Press*, Karoub expressed his desire to “span the distance between their home in the Middle East and that of urban America through the design of the mosque.” The fate of the building, however, lasted less than a year, before it was sold to the city of Highland Park.

The example of the mosque is one among many that reveals the complex cast of characters, identities, and desires within the parameters of the FMC’s Highland Park plant. Journalists and immigrants wrote stories about Detroit’s changing landscape and their views of one another. That the *Detroit Free Press* took such an interest in the activities of Muslims around Highland Park (writing more than a dozen stories between 1921-1922) indicates a certain curiosity about the groups growing presence. By 1920, as Cohen shows in her study of immigrant workers in Chicago, the “survival strategies” that these groups developed through organizing social groups, writing, and building, come together in the story of the Moslem mosque. Karoub’s administrative building, for example, became a type of Muslim publication press for *The Moslem Sunrise*, and other apartments in his building served as social gathering spaces. These spaces became strongholds for immigrants through the Great Depression. The United Citizen’s Syrian Society, a non-sectarian Syrian immigrant group, purchased a building down the street from what used to be the Moslem Mosque in 1937 and established a center for Arabic language and religion courses.

Even if immigrants were not participating in these social and cultural activities, they were operating around it. Some Ford workers, in fact, had little interest in establishing a permanent presence in Highland Park’s immigrant community. They came to Detroit to advance their own careers, in effect, falling perfectly in line with aims of Ford’s broader plan of training immigrants in Detroit and sending certain ones back to strengthen the presence of the company abroad. Information gleaned from the timestamp

cards and files of the Ford Trade and English Schools show that a majority of workers from the greater Middle East were highly educated, spoke multiple languages, and came to Detroit to strengthen their technical skills before pursuing goals of their own. Contrary to the monolithic, unthinking characterization of “Oriental” immigrants that were depicted in Ford publications and films, immigrant workers from these regions were varied in their skills sets and ambitious, and largely skeptical of Ford’s social plan, as were their peers from Latin America, China, Japan, Russia, Eastern Europe, Mexico, and elsewhere. Seven brief portraits from these files serve to illustrate this point, and bring the story of the Ford enterprise in the “markets of the Orient” back to Detroit:

**Portrait 1: A Second Chance**

*Krishna Banerji, Hindu, Age 29, Married, Graduated from Calcutta University Speaks Hindustani and English*

Mr. Banerji was brought to the U.S. as a non-quota immigrant to attend the Ford Service Course on June 20, 1923. Frustrated by the paternalistic practices of the company, he quit on May 2, 1924. Upon returning to India and realizing the opportunities he left behind, he pleaded with the company to re-hire him:

Dear Mr. Hutchins, you tried to help me when I had that trouble only a couple of months ago but it was my fault to leave Detroit without accepting the job… Will you please see if anything could be done for me if I get back to Detroit? I used to criticise [sic] sometimes the treatment of some of the foremen but I did that nevertheless with a loving heart of the wonderland of my dream. I have now become an ardent admirer of the American method of working fast. Hard work is a healthy sign and a grand mission of our life. India is now passing through a transitional period of her political, economic, and social progress and her people are quickly adopting the American methods of scientific culture. Thousands and thousands of Ford cars are roaming in the streets of Calcutta as well as on the rough roads in the interior. I am so unhappy as I did not learn the trade thoroughly. But there is time yet. I can go back to Detroit if you please give me another chance. I would start for Detroit as soon as I hear from you. I am now studying the market of India for Ford products and doing some salesmanship work along this line. Please remember me [sic] to employment officer [sic]… and all others who know me.  

After receiving the letter, FMC officials hired Banerji for another 3 years until the Indian government urged him to return. Unwilling, he asked the Ford Motor Company to intervene on his behalf, at which point, they forwarded his file to Ford-Canada.

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Portrait 2: Economically Abused
Gurbax Bons, Hindu, Age 28, Married, Educated at Punjab University
Speaks Hindustani and English

Mr. Bons arrived to Detroit from Amristar, India on January 1, 1924 and was terminated by the company just a year later. On October 2, 1925, Bons wrote an angry letter to the company expressing his distaste for Ford’s preference for profits over the well being of his workers:

I used to hear that in old days of slavery while masters used to cane their chattred [sic] slaves in order to give them exercise; he cause man [sic] is sure to move his limbs when hit. I believe the days are not gone. It is still practiced by judicious men of caliber, though impractical physically but right to the end economically. When man will lose honor and money after honest labour [sic] for these are of lesson only I believe he is sure to inscript [sic] it on his very cerebrum.\(^{434}\)

On May 2, 1925, the FMC Chief Medical clerk wrote Bons a letter, addressed to an office at the University of Michigan – Ann Arbor, where he took up work:

Dear Sir, (Nervousness & Fistula) [sic] Owing to your protracted absence it will be necessary to terminate your leave on August 5, 1925. This procedure is a custom with the Company [sic] and does not prejudice your opportunity for re-instatement [sic], if on your return, you will bring a letter or certificate from your doctor or hospital, or produce other satisfactory evidence to justify your absence. This letter will also serve to protect any Investment Certificates you may have with the Company for a period of three months from date. Bring this letter with you when you return.\(^{435}\)

Mr. Bons never returned to the company. Instead, a Detroit Free Press article dated July 23, 1927 and titled “Honored by the US tropics school, Hindu Gets First Certificate from Medical Institute in Porto Rico [sic],” revealed that he pursued a successful career in medicine in Puerto Rico.

Portrait 3: Overqualified and Bored
Henry Newson, Hindu, 37, Single, Education: ME and BA in Graduate Civil Engineering, MS in Electrical Engineering, 5 years Auditor & Accountant, 8 years as an Engineer for Water Supply and Railroads, Professor of Engineering and Mathematics, Speaks Hindustani, French, and English

\(^{434}\) Ibid, Mr. Bon to Mr. Searle on January 1, 1924.
\(^{435}\) Ibid, FMC Chief Medical Clerk to Mr. Bon on May 2, 1925.
Mr. Newson arrived to the Highland Park plant from Allahabad, British India. He came highly recommended to Henry Ford by a British General who had served in the war, who wrote a letter to Ford on behalf of Newson saying:

He served under me in India before the War [sic] when I was Sanitary Engineer to Government, United Provinces. I formed then the highest opinion of his qualifications and ability. He was always keen on his work and had plenty of drive and organizing power. I can confidently recommend him for any position of responsibility or trust for which his high qualifications and his varied experience undoubtedly fit him.436

On arriving to the plant, Newson found factory conditions unbearable and his talents severely underutilized. He wrote to head of Ford Personnel, Mr. Holmwood:

I am sorry that I am so unhappy – more so because you have often expressed how much money had been spent by the Company for my training. I have endured factory conditions because I make my living but I want to say very respectfully that I do not feel justified in letting myself remain a labourer all my life. I see no prospects ahead of me and your organization seems to be so enormous that a man is lost. Everything moves so much like clockwork that you do not need men looking for careers.437

A flurry of letters from the Ford Personnel department followed, attempting to convince Newson to stay, to no avail. Newson left the company that same year in 1925.

**Portrait 4: Valuable in Persia**

*Mohamed Farchi, Persian, 21, Single, Education in Tabriz and Park College, Missouri Speaks Persian, Turkish, French, and English*

Mr. Farchi came to Detroit with one year of experience in a wholesale business with his father in Tehran. He was a mediocre student, but served a valuable role for the FMC in Persia. An internal FMC memo noted that:

The Trieste Plant is arranging to have Farchi-Wekili & Company handle the sale of Ford products in Teheran, Persia. M.H. Farchi one of the members of this firm, came to the United States some time ago to learn American business methods, and is now desirous or spending a few months in our plants to acquire some practical knowledge of the construction, operation and repair of Ford products before returning to Persia.438

437 Ibid, Mr. Newson to Mr. Holmwood on May 23, 1925.
438 Ibid, FMC memo from RI Roberge to PE Martin on June 18, 1925.
To surpass the quotas imposed by the Johnson-Reed Act on Persian immigrants arriving in the US, the FMC-Trieste arranged for an attorney to represent Farchi at the American border:

Dear Sir: The bearer of this letter is the son of Mr. Hadji Mirza Agha Farchi, the owner of the Firm of Farchi-Wekili & Co. of Persia, importers and exporters. He has three letters of introduction from your foreign agent Joseph Goricas to the US Senator Honorable M. Mc Cormick and other influential citizens. Mr. Farchi is interested in opening a Ford Selling Agency in Persia, in order to carry out his program he desirous to take your foreign student’s course.439

The exception was granted at Ellis Island and Farchi arrived to work at the FMC on April 23, 1925, and returned to Tehran on September 16, 1926.

Portrait 5: From Persia to Russia
Yoel Rustam, Persian, 30, Single, Educated 5 years at American Presbytarian College and Columbia University, New York in Accounting and Banking
Speaks Persian, English, Russian, Turkish, Assyrian

Mr. Rustam arrived in Highland Park on May 15, 1925 via a letter of introduction from a Mr. Cooper of Ford-Trieste in Italy “from where he will endeavor to secure a dealership in Persia.” Rustam wrote to Ford Personnel that he comes from wealth, and he could “start with $2000 capital and cover his own expenses in coming for an interview.” He continued to write that “oil fields nearby and gas is inexpensive as there are massive railways between the countries,” and that he had “ties to Russia.” He was trained at the Ford Trade and English Schools before returning home to Persia.

Portrait 6: Better Than He Looks
Fayez Youssef, Egyptian, 26, Single, Educated at Coptic College in Cairo
Speaks English, French, and Arabic

Mr. Youssef previously worked in the Egyptian ministry and had an interest in transitioning to the Ford dealership in Cairo. He interviewed at the Immigration Department in New York City in order to gain entry into the U.S. for training in Detroit. Letters from the foreign department in New York to Ford Personnel in Detroit attest to his character, noting that “he doesn’t look as good in appearance as in his demeanor and personality.”440 Fayez eventually gained entry to be trained at the Ford Trade and English Schools.

439 Ibid, Alexander J. Jemal, attorney at Law to Mr. Searle on June 16, 1925.
440 Ibid, Immigration Department of New York to Mr. Searle, undated.
**Portrait 7: Not a Native**  
*Bakhtawar Singh Samra, Hindu, 23, Single, Education, 1 year college*

Mr. Samra was highly regarded at the Ford-Canada plant in Walkerville but asked to be transferred to the plant in Detroit. In his letter, he noted that “he intended to stay in the country longer, but the Canadian branch of the Ford company was so rude to [him] and his countrymen, calling them ‘natives’ that [he] had to leave. Hope the Detroit affiliates will be kinder.”

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441 Ibid, Mr. Samra to Mr. Searle on August 14, 1924.
In this dissertation, I pay close attention to the visual and spatial aspects of Fordism as a way of reconsidering globalization. The Ford Motor Company’s Sociological Department is illustrative of this: it was a department that utilized architecture and the arts to enforce the principles spelled out by the Profit-sharing and Five Dollar Day programs. The department was a key contributor to the development of Ford aesthetics, which carefully wove together the design of state-of-the-art factories and sales branches, in-house newsletters, newspapers, advertisements, tour booklets, photographs, and films. As Ford moved business beyond the Americas and Europe, the company took hold of the urban structure of the cities in which it was operating, and was forced to carefully consider the visual spectacle of the factory and the effect that it would have on existing social cultures and urban conditions.

The pairing of aesthetic and economic value in the Fordist philosophy was, in a way, what connected the social experiments in Detroit to a larger global phenomenon (or the first half of this dissertation with the second). In urban and social theory, the aesthetic is often drawn together with the either the economical, social, or political as an inseparable tripartite, the material veneer that signals the coming and going of epochs. Marshall Berman argued that that Haussmann’s transformation of Paris, for example, relied heavily on creative destruction and “aesthetic” transformation to usher in an era of modernity. Cultural theorist Stuart Hall also wrote extensively on what he called the “aestheticization” of culture and economy, which to him began to look one and the same, since “through marketing, layout, and style, the aesthetic ‘image’ provides the mode of representation of the body on which so much of modern consumption depends.”

Ford’s depiction of people and buildings, as I showed in chapter 3, equated human progress with the built environment, and vice versa, with the implication that Fordist technology would bring civilization to the uncivilized and make the traditional modern.

The outcome of this moment in Ford’s Detroit built on, and worked in concert with, existing Euro-American principles of planning and monumentality. By the end of the 19th century, manufacturing was booming across the American industrial belt and in pockets across Europe, particularly in cities like Manchester where Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City movement was taking root. The homegrown version of this in the United States similarly responded to the overwhelming industrialization of cities and interspersed factory districts and worker neighborhoods with gardens and parks. American planners and industrialists veered more towards the City Beautiful movement, borne out of the Chicago World’s Fair and Daniel Burnham’s exaggerated Euro-American monumentality principles, signaling the beginning of particular kind of

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industrial American aesthetic that focused on reforming the ideals and ethics of the poor, working-class, and immigrants. The moment was ripe for Henry Ford and his Ford Motor Company to intervene in ongoing conversations about social order in the industrial city, and the vocabulary of the industrial American aesthetic was key. By 1926, Ford owned more capital than any governmental or corporate entity in the state of Michigan. As I show in the latter half of the study, this marked the turning point of the reliance of the state on the corporation, which by the First War, turned into a mutually dependent partnership. The earliest example of this relationship was the appointment of FMC Sociological Department executives on the municipally run Detroit Americanization Committee, Social Planning Committee, and Board of Commerce.

This emerging partnership was embodied in Detroit’s first International Industrial Exposition and the strengthening of private-public alliances against the threat posed by the so-called “immigrant problem.” The event was a platform from which to “beautify” the city and demonstrated the city’s allegiance to industry. Monumental roundabouts, boulevards, parks, gardens, and public bathhouses were installed to heighten the aesthetic appeal of the city. Belle Isle, the island park situated in the river between the US and Canada, was entirely redesigned, and old venues were demolished and made anew. The construction of the city happened at a pace that the metropolitan region had never before seen. But what differentiated it from other corporate brands or the aesthetic urban programs of Europe and elsewhere, was that after 1914, Ford single-handedly developed an industrial aesthetic image, vocabulary, and economic plan, that was only associated with the Ford promise. This included the training of his predominantly immigrant workforce to aspire to certain moral and aesthetic codes that centered on the image of the worker and the condition of his domestic realm.

Yet, as I show in the end, individual portraits of Ford workers complicate the story further. Some were well educated, spoke multiple languages, and expressed frustration with factory conditions and the mechanical vigor with which the shop floor was run; others were grateful for the training provided by the Ford schools and the opportunities it opened up for them in Detroit and elsewhere. The effect of the Ford aesthetic on the viewers’ receiving end (the worker and consumer) is more difficult to discern than its economic and national success up until the Great Depression. If we narrow the focus to visual distinctions between the industrialist and worker, there also appear notes of dissent. In Fordist literature, across the turn of a page, immigrant workers were represented using the same techniques that the company used to show its national factories and sell Ford goods. Harvey, reflecting on Gramsci’s Americanism and Fordism, writes that for Ford to know that “mass production meant mass consumption,” he recognized that he needed a new system of labor reproduction, a new politics of labour [sic] control and management, [and] ultimately new aesthetics and psychology. If true, unpacking the hegemonic force of aesthetics is not so easy: how do we understand its breadth across cultures and uneven power dynamics, and also find its limits? It may be here, between the commodification of cultures and peoples and modes of resistance, where even the aesthetic has its limits.

444 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity


http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000967080.


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**Popular Press and Corporate Publications**

*Dearborn Independent*

*Detroit Free Press*

*Ford News*

*Ford Factory Facts*

*Factory Facts from Ford*

*Ford Guide*

*Ford Times*

*Horseless Age*

*Motor Age*

*The New York Times*

*Pipp’s Weekly*
Films
Around the World with Ford (1946)
English School (1918)
Factory Worker in Detroit (undated)
Ford and A Century of Progress Exposition, Chicago (1933)
Ford Motor Company Workers (c. 1926)
Give Her Gas (1918)
Henry Ford’s Mirror of America (1921)
Henry Ford Trade School Exhibits (1928)
Housing Construction in Detroit (1921)
Modern Times (1936)
Road to Happiness (1924)
The Vagabonds (1923)