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Measuring *Communidad*: Latino Serving Organizations and Latino Political Participation

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Eddie Alberto Lucero

Committee in charge:

Professor Jessica Trounstine, Chair
Professor Daniel de Kadt
Professor Matthew Hibbing
Professor Nathan Monroe

2023

The Dissertation of Eddie Alberto Lucero is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and

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University of California, Merced

2023

I dedicate this dissertation to my wife Stephanie and my son Gabriel for all of their support throughout this process. And to my parents, Angel and Paulina, whose sacrifice made all of this possible.

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Acknowledgments

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Publications

- Hansford, Thomas G., **Eddie Lucero**, Ricardo Robles, and Chanita Intawan. Forthcoming. "The Effect of State Supreme Court Selection Method on Perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court." *Journal of Law and Courts*.
- Collins, Jonathan, **Eddie Lucero**, & Jessica Trounstine. (2020). "Will Concurrent Elections Reshape the Electorate?." *California Journal of Politics and Policy*, 12(1): 1-8.
- **Lucero, Eddie**, Jessica Trounstine, Jennifer M. Connolly, & Casey Klofstad (2020). "A matter of life or death: How racial representation shapes compliance with city disaster preparedness orders." *Journal of Urban Affairs*, printed online: 1:18.

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Abstract

Measuring *Communidad*: Latino Serving Organizations and Latino Political Participation

Eddie Alberto Lucero
Ph.D. Political Science
Chair: Professor Jessica Trounstine
University of California, Merced, 2023

In the Spring of 2006, cities across America were rocked by a sudden wave of large-scale, Latino-led protests demonstrating against the recent passage of H.R. 4437 in the United States House of Representatives. H.R. 4437, represented a significant, racialized political threat to the Latino community due to its criminalization of undocumented immigrants and their allies. In response, Latino community organizations across the U.S. amassed the resources and people needed to stage over 250 protests across 100 cities that spring. Yet, the expected surge in Latino voter turnout expected in the midterm elections that fall failed to materialize. How do contextual factors, such as political threats and community organizations, interact to shape Latino political participation, in particular voting?

In this dissertation, I argue that political threats, in the form of immigration enforcement, can have a demobilizing effect on Latino participation in elections through its targeting of Latino individuals, regardless of citizenship status, based on phenotypical features. Yet, I also argue that Latino serving organizations (LSOs); descriptively representative, community-level organizations engaged in advocacy and service-providing activities can counter the demobilizing effects of immigration enforcement. They do so by building civic capacity and psychological capital in the communities they operate in. I test this argument by conducting a cross-sectional analysis of rates of Latino voter registration and turnout in the 2016 general presidential election in Texas.

In gathering data for this project, I draw from several sources. My data include two novel datasets on the presence of Latino-serving organizations constructed using the IRS Exempt Organizations Business Master File and a newspaper search of chapters of the Viva Kennedy campaign in 1960. I also gather immigration enforcement data from the Secure Communities program accessed via the Transactional Record Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University. I construct measures of Latino electoral participation generated using precinct-level election results from the 2016 election in Texas accessed via the Redistricting Hub.

In Chapter 2 I show that the increasing presence of LSOs in some counties, but not others, is associated with increasing rates of Latino voter registration and turnout in 2016 Texas. In Chapter 3, I show that while increased immigration enforcement negatively impacts both Latino voter registration and turnout, the presence of Viva Kennedy LSOs, but not tax-exempt LSOs, increase Latino voter turnout. In Chapter 4, I show that the presence of LSOs increased the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton's, vote share among Latino voters. Chapter 5 discusses future avenues of research.

Chapter 1: Marching Toward the Ballot Box?

Introduction

In the Spring of 2006, cities across America were rocked by a sudden wave of large-scale, Latino-led protests demonstrating against the recent passage of H.R. 4437 in the United States House of Representatives. *The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005* called for a significant increase in border and interior immigration enforcement, changed the penalty for being in the United States without proper documentation from a civil violation to a federal felony, and criminalized individuals who assisted undocumented immigrants living in the United States.[1] From Los Angeles to New York City, networks of Latino community organizations spread the news of the widespread damage this bill would cause to entire communities. The result was the launching of the largest social movement in the United States since the 1960s. Between January and May of 2006, it is estimated that over 260 protests denouncing HR. 4437 had taken place in more than 160 cities across the U.S. with an upper estimate of 5 million cumulative participants (Bada et al., 2006).[2]

These protests came as a shock to many political observers given a perceived lack of political activity among Latinos. While many political pundits at the time saw these protests as a series of spontaneous, leaderless events, several scholars argued that they were the result of Latino community organizations' efforts to mobilize their members, constituents, and neighbors onto city streets in response to the significant threat H.R. 4437 posed to the broader Latino community (Barreto et al., 2009; Cordero-Guzmán et al., 2008; Felix et al., 2008; Martinez, 2008; Zepeda-Millán, 2017).

In his study of the 2006 immigration protests, Zepeda-Millan (2017) argues that the threat posed by the potential passage of H.R. 4437 provided the impetus for Latino communities to mobilize in response to an increasingly anti-Latino, anti-immigrant political environment. Further, he argues that it was primarily the work of *local-level Latino organizations* that amassed resources, knocked on doors, and developed political platforms on the broader issue of immigration reform that laid the groundwork for the Spring movement (Barreto et al., 2009). His case studies on the organizational activities leading up to the protests in Los Angeles, C.A., New York City, and Miami, F.L. reveal the complexity of Latino organizations' efforts in each city to negotiate agendas and coordinate activity. Similar studies, centered on the protests in Chicago, IL (Cordero-Guzmán et al., 2008), Denver, CO (Martinez, 2008), and across Nebraska (Benjamin-Alvarado et al., 2009) arrived at similar conclusions regarding the importance of Latino organizations in mobilizing Latinos in the Spring of 2006.

While H.R. 4437 did not ultimately pass into law, many activists and scholars would come to label the marches as a mobilizational failure given that the anticipated surge in Latino electoral turnout was nowhere to be seen in the 2006 midterm elections.

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[1] https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/4437.

[2] The database can be found at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/Data.pdf.

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Studies of Latino participation in the 2006 elections revealed that the proportion of Latino voters in the national electorate increased by only a fraction of a percentage point relative to the previous midterm elections in 2002 (Leal et al., 2008, p. 310).[3] The mass of Latino voters marching toward the ballot box that many political observers had anticipated following the protests failed to materialize.

Yet, as the dust settled in the aftermath of the 2006 spring movement, one thing was clear. The monumental feats of the 2006 immigration protests could, in large part, be attributed to the mobilizing efforts of *Latino community organizations* in neighborhoods across the country that were central in mustering political participation among their Latino co-ethnics. Throughout the U.S., seemingly apolitical organizations from Latino chambers of commerce to human service organizations shared the role of mobilizing their Latino neighbors in response to a looming *political threat*, in this instance characterized by a racialized, punitive, anti-immigration bill whose weight would almost certainly have disproportionally fallen on the Latino community. These Latino community organizations not only mobilized Latino immigrants who were the most threatened by H.R. 4437 but also Latino citizens who, legally, had much less to fear from this anti-immigration bill given their citizen status.

Given this display of politically mobilizing potential in the face of threat, one would think that Latino politics research would be focused on developing theories and empirical measures of both threat and community organizations. Instead, we know little about how community organizations and political participation are related and how this relationship is affected by political threats. This is largely because scholars have faced extreme challenges in gathering data to develop and test relevant theories. Much of what we do know about Latino organizations and their politically mobilizing activities has come from small *n* case studies of organizations already engaged in mobilizing activities at a particular point in time and place. Without variation in the independent variable, we lack a complete understanding of the role that organizations might play.

The rich qualitative nature of these case studies allows for an excellent understanding of the motivations and mechanisms by which these entities mobilize Latinos (the why and how) yet is less useful in helping us to understand which organizations are most likely to mobilize in the first place (the who) and to quantify the extent of their impact. This, coupled with the lack of large n-datasets of Latino community organizations, has significantly limited our ability to generalize the effect of Latino community organizations on Latino political behavior in the many diverse Latino communities across the United States.

While scholars have written extensively about the role of political threats and Latino political participation, it is still unclear whether threat mobilizes or depresses

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[3] Leal et al. synthesize statistics from several sources regarding Latino voter turnout in the 2006, 2004, and 2002 midterm and presidential elections. According to the National Election Pool, it was estimated that Latinos made up 8.4% of all ballots cast in the 2004 presidential election. The same source estimates Latino voters made up 8% of all ballots cast in 2006 midterm elections. Estimates from the Current Population Survey 2006 and 2002 indicated that Latinos made up 5.8% of all ballots cast in the 2006 midterms, a slight increase from 5.3% of all ballots cast in the 2002 midterm elections.

Latino political participation. While some scholars argue that threat can motivate Latino political participation by activating politicized ethnic identity (Bowler et al., 2006; Sanchez, 2006b; Shaw et al., 2000) others have argued that threat alone is not enough to mobilize. Instead, the existence of a threat must be accompanied by some external stimulus, like community organizations, that mobilizes Latinos into prolonged political participation (Reny et al., 2018; White, 2016). Yet, no study to date has included both a measure of threat and community organizations in analyzing Latino political participation. This limits our understanding of the complex process that is Latino mobilization.

Understanding the relationship between political threats and community organizations is all the more important given that both are still important factors shaping Latino politics today. Since the 2006 immigration protests, legislative bodies at the national, state, and local levels continue to debate and legislate on immigration policy. In particular, national, state, and local governments continue to debate if, and to what degree, state and local police forces should be used in enforcing U.S. immigration laws and the potential damage this might cause between local police and the Latino community (Farris & Holman, 2017; Kohli et al., 2011; *The 287(g) Program: An Overview*, 2021; K. E. Walker & Leitner, 2011; White, 2016; T. K. Wong, 2012). At the same time Latino community organizations continue to play an important role in the social and political development of Latino communities. A 2016 survey of Latino-serving community organizations in Indiana, the only such survey of Latino community organizations known to the author, reveals that community organizations not only provide valuable services to their constituents; such as childcare, bilingual services, elder care, and access to job training but that they also advocate, or are directly linked to organizations that advocate, for policy issues that are relevant to Latino community (Thelin & Sapp, 2016).

How do contextual factors, such as political threats and community organizations, interact to shape Latino political participation, in particular voting? That is the question this dissertation seeks to answer.

Thesis

The main claim of my dissertation is that *Latino serving organizations* (LSOs); descriptively representative, community-level, advocacy, and service-providing entities, can increase Latino political participation through what I call *passive mobilization*, the mobilization of Latinos that is a byproduct of LSO activities. I count among LSOs human services organizations, advocacy organizations, community building organizations, Hispanic chambers of commerce, and immigrant centers. While these organizations are not inherently political institutions, their core missions and activities directly tie them to the political process whether it be by directly advocating for their Latino constituents' interests to state and local governments or building networks among people, organizations, and social welfare agencies to increase underserved Latinos' access to public resources. In carrying out their organizational goals, I argue that LSOs passively mobilize Latino communities by developing the level of *civic capacity* and *psychological capital* within the communities they serve. In carrying out their goals,

LSOs provide ample opportunities for their constituents to become familiar with and participate in politics. In addition, LSOs, as a type of ethnic community organization, promote and maintain their constituent's positive attachments and evaluations of their ethnic identities, identities that are often stereotyped and villainized by mainstream society given Latinos' marginalized status. Through these two mechanisms, LSOs initiate and sustain prolonged political participation among Latinos, including costly behaviors such as voting.

LSOs are often the first and primary link between Latino communities and the polity. Through their advocacy and service-providing activities, LSOs incorporate Latinos' interests into the policy-making process at various levels of government. In doing so they build their community's civic capacity, or their constituents'[4] ability and aptitude to participate in politics, by providing more opportunities for Latinos to partake in civically oriented activities. LSOs build civic capacity by doing things like seeking volunteers for their advocacy or service-related operations from within their community, holding citizen education workshops, and in some cases, even participating in local Get-Out-The-Vote efforts. LSOs can also make their communities more politically knowledgeable by making the political process more transparent.

In addition, because LSOs are descriptively representative of their communities and serve more homogenous ethnic populations, they also build psychological capital, or the construction of collective identities that are imbued with a sense of personal agency among the people they serve (Garcia-Bedolla, 2005). As a group, Latinos have faced significant institutional and individual discrimination based on language differences (i.e., Spanish), skin color, ethnicity, and immigration status. This has led to feelings of political alienation among Latinos that have been linked to lower levels of political engagement. LSOs, work in part, toward fostering their constituents' positive affective attachments toward their community and encouraging a sense of personal agency. Thus, LSOs can increase the political participation of Latinos in the places they are present.

The community-building aspects of LSOs, I argue, serve as a counter to the demobilizing effect that political threats can have on Latino political participation. Over the last several decades, the policy issue of immigration has become deeply intertwined with the politics and political experiences of Latinos. Among the Latino population in the U.S., about 30% of Latinos were foreign-born in 2020 (down from a high of almost 40% at the beginning of the century) (Zong, 2022). Over the past 20 years, immigrants

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[4] While common in the interest group literature, this dissertation makes no distinction between membership organizations and non-membership organizations. The distinction between the two is that the former refers to organizations in which individuals pay membership fees or subscriptions and in return receive some sort of incentive such as a magazine, apparel or some other benefit. Non membership organizations do not maintain a base of dues paying members. Instead, their base, within the context of community organizations, is composed of constituents, individuals who rely on the organization to provide some sort of good or service, and volunteers who help deliver these services and participate in other organization activities. The networks of individuals LSOs maintain is the conduit by which LSOs spread the benefits of their civic capacity and psychological capital building efforts.

from the Americas have made up more than half of all foreign-born people in the United States (*Regions of Birth for Immigrants in the United States, 1960-Present*, 2013). As such, the Latino community has frequently been the target of political attacks from nativists and anti-immigrant politicians who view the immigrant Latino population as a threat to American society and values and a drain on public resources (Chavez, 2008).

While many kinds of policies can be threatening to Latinos (anti-sanctuary state/city laws, English-only laws, etc.), I focus here on the effect that immigration enforcement has on Latino political participation. I focus on immigration enforcement for two reasons. First, immigrant enforcement is a highly salient and *racialized* issue for the Latino community. According to the Transactional Record Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University, the number of immigrant deportations skyrocket in the wake of the 2006 immigration protests, peaking in 2012 under the Obama administration. Immigration law enforcement programs disproportionally target Latino immigrants for removal relative to Asian and European origin immigrants (Kohli et al., 2011). Accusations that law enforcement personnel use phenotypical and linguistic cues (skin color and language) to target Latinos and inquire about their immigration status were common throughout the early 2010s as immigration enforcement programs co-opted state and local law enforcement officers into immigration enforcement duties. Finally, research shows that fear of deportation is not only present and high among foreign-born Latino immigrants but is also present among native-born Latino Americans (Asad, 2020).

The second reason for focusing on immigration enforcement is that the level of threat varies significantly at the community level. Given the variegated landscape of immigration enforcement policies across the United States, Latino communities can experience varying levels of threat within a single place across time. This variation allows me to understand the impact of the threat on Latino political behavior.

In such environments, Latinos may feel politically and socially alienated and become politically demobilized as they retreat into the shadows to avoid becoming targets of immigration enforcement efforts. Yet, I contend that such depressive effects on Latino political participation can be mitigated by the activities of LSOs. Through their efforts in building civic capacity and psychological capital, LSOs can maintain a level of political engagement among Latinos greater than would be achievable in their absence.

Latino Mobilization

Theories of Latino Mobilization

Traditional theories of participation in American elections have placed significant emphasis on individual-level resources (time, money, skills, political knowledge, and education) as important prerequisites for political participation (Verba et al., 1995). Thus, the wealthy, better educated, and more partisan (typically white Americans) are more likely to be targeted for political mobilization by parties in elections. In contrast, the relatively lower socio-economic status of Latinos and a higher proportion of foreign-born individuals within the Latino population means that Latinos participate in politics (both formal and informal activities) at lower rates than their white and African American

counterparts (De La Garza, 1992; Leighley & Nagler, 1992; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Nuño, 2007; Rosenstone & Wolfinger, 1980; Shaw et al., 2000).

However, scholars have noted that this resource-based model of Latino political participation is at odds with displays of feverish political engagement by Latinos in certain contexts, such as the significant surge in Latino immigrant naturalization, registration, and electoral turnout in California related to, then governor, Pete Wilson's anti-immigrant, anti-Latino political agenda in 1994 (Bowler et al., 2006; Pantoja et al., 2001), the 2006 immigration protests against H.R. 4437 (Zepeda-Millán, 2017), and the increases in Latino electoral turnout that tends to follow the presence of viable Latino candidates on the ballot, particular in local and state elections (Barreto, 2007; Orr & Morel, 2018). Racial and ethnic theories of minority political participation stress that:

> given the lower level of individual-level resources that minorities typically control, engagement in politics is tied to group characteristics that subsidize the costs of political participation through the provision of information or psychological benefits (Leighley, 2001, p. 5).

Thus, theories of Latino political participation have looked beyond individual-resource models to explain patterns of Latino political participation (Garcia-Bedolla, 2005; Leighley, 2001).

More recent theories of Latino mobilization have instead emphasized the importance of threat (in particular anti-immigration policy and rhetoric), to explain patterns of Latino political participation. It can be argued that for much of history, Latino politics has been driven by politically threatening stimuli as a direct result of the Latino community's status as a "conquered" group (Francis-Fallon, 2019; Garcia-Bedolla, 2005, 2014).[5] Yet, it is only within the last 30 years that American immigration policy and rhetoric has become one of, if not, the most salient and threatening political issue for most Latinos. So intertwined is the policy issue of immigration and Latino politics that at the 2020 American Political Science Association meeting, a panel of influential Latino politics scholars agreed that threat in the form of anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric is **the** most powerful mobilizer of Latino voters in contemporary American politics (Ramirez et al., 2020).

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[5] Political threats to the Latino community have varied across time and national origin (Francis-Fallon, 2019; Garcia-Bedolla, 2014). For early Mexican Americans in the southwest U.S., racial prejudice in the economy, housing and education has been a constant threat to Mexican American socio-economic status and integration. While prejudice was certainly and issue for Cuban-Americans in the 1960s, most of the community and its political elite were more concerned with the U.S. government's opposition to and action against the Communist Castro regime. Indeed, Cold War era politics still shape much of Cuban Latino politics today (Francis-Fallon, 2019; Garcia-Bedolla, 2014, Chapter 4). Among early Puerto Rican Americans, political threats were often viewed in terms of U.S. governments attempts to exert more control over Puerto Rico's government and economy. As the U.S. Puerto Rican population grew after the 1960's, racial prejudice, urban poverty, and limited opportunities to advance socio-economically become critical issues to the Puerto Rican community (Garcia-Bedolla, 2014, Chapter 3; Jones-Correa, 1998).

Political Threats

Beginning in the 1990s, nativist rhetoric from political elites, primarily members of the Republican party, has characterized the quickly growing Latino population in the United States as an "invasion" of undocumented immigrants from south of the U.S. border (Chavez, 2013). This demonization of Latinos as "foreign invaders" and a burden to the American welfare system, has not only been made in speeches but has also been embedded in legislation as immigration policies often directly reference the presence of undocumented Latino immigrants in the U.S. and continued migration from Latin America through the U.S.-Mexican border.

Over the last 30 years, threatening political stimuli in the form of anti-immigrant, and thus perceived anti-Latino, legislation and rhetoric have been abundant. These include the hundreds of immigration reform bills aimed at militarizing the southern border to stem the flow of immigration, including H.R. 4437 (Zepeda-Millán, 2017) at the national level, scores of bills at the state level that seek to exclude immigrants from accessing public services or seek to change the state's official language to English (thereby erecting linguistic barriers for non-English dominant Latinos seeking to access the political system) (Bowler et al., 2006; Hero & Preuhs, 2007; Rocha & Espino, 2010; Shaw et al., 2000), and debates over sanctuary cities and the use of local police officers and resources to enforce immigration law at the local level (Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010; K. E. Walker & Leitner, 2011; White, 2016; T. K. Wong, 2012).

To understand how H.R. 4437 sparked such a mass wave of Latino political activity, Zepeda Millan (2017) develops a theoretical framework to explain how different political threats to the Latino community incite or dampen Latino political activity. Building on social movement theory, he argues that a threat to the Latino community can manifest itself in either a *narrow* or *broad scope* (whether the threat targets a specific group of individuals or a wider population) and whether the threat is *single-sourced* or *multiple-sourced* (whether the threat emerges from a single actor or multiple actors). Generally speaking, as the scope of a threat broadens it becomes easier for groups to mobilize against the threat as it becomes easier for activists to mobilize across various intersectional communities affected by the threat. Relatedly, single-sourced threats elicit greater political activity than multiple-sourced threats, because activists can concentrate their mobilization efforts on a specific target.

Under this framework, much of the literature on threat and Latino political behavior has focused on examining the impact of single-sourced, broad politically threatening stimuli in the form of anti-immigrant legislation. Studies of Latino electoral turnout in California during the 1990s showed that the placement of Props 187, 209, and 227[6] on the ballot, which were widely perceived as anti-immigrant and anti-Latino, had a

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[6] Prop 187, passed in 1994, would have prohibited illegal immigration from using non-emergency healthcare services, public education and other state service. Prop 209, passed in 1996, banned the state's consideration of race, sex, and ethnicity in public employment, contracting, and public education. Prop 227, passed in 1988 eliminated bilingual classes in public schools. All three propositions were proposed in response to a

significant mobilizing effect among California Latino voters. Shaw et al. (2000) use validated survey data to show that Latino voter turnout in the 1996 presidential election was significantly higher in California, where a flurry of anti-immigrant ballot initiatives had been passed, compared to Texas and Florida (states with large Latino populations but where such types of bills had not been debated). A similar effect was found among Arizona Latinos following the passage of SB 1070 in 2010[7] (Espino, 2012).

A growing number of papers have begun to focus on the relationship between multi-sourced threats, in particular immigration enforcement, and Latino political participation. Yet the findings within this literature have been mixed. On the one hand, some work has found that immigration enforcement can have a chilling effect on Latinos' participation in a range of activities including voting (Kuhn, 2022; H. Walker et al., 2020), contacting local police (Casellas & Wallace, 2018), and participating in public health programs (Cruz Nichols et al., 2018; Rocha et al., 2015) and generally decreases Latinos' trust in government. Yet other scholars have found that increased immigration enforcement is associated with increases in political activity, particularly voting (Kuhn, 2022; H. Walker et al., 2020; White, 2016).

Both camps conceptualize immigration enforcement as a racialized and *punitive* policy, one that seeks to punish its target population. Building on work from the policy-as-an-information-environment literature (Soss, 1999; Watson, 2014), the immigration enforcement literature argues that the racialized nature of immigration enforcement teaches Latinos that they are stereotyped as the intended targets of immigration enforcement efforts (based on phenotypical and linguistic cues, regardless of one's actual citizenships status). Its punitive nature teaches Latinos that their participation in American social, political, and economic life is less valued than those of other racial and ethnic groups. Thus, immigration enforcement leads to a "chilling effect" on participation as Latinos withdraw from public life.

White (2016) argues instead that immigration enforcement can lead to heightened political engagement among Latinos by transforming Latino ethnic identities into mobilizing identities. These identities generate feelings of solidarity with other group members, define boundaries against other categories, and motivate political action (Garcia-Bedolla, 2005, p. 15, 2005, p. 6; McClain et al., 2009).[8] Yet whether mobilized

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surge in the number of undocumented immigrants from Mexico and Central America settling in California.

[7] SB 1070, passed in 2010, required Arizona police officers to determine a detained individuals immigration status if there was reasonable suspicion that the person may be in the country unlawfully.

[8] Scholars argue that the increasing association of the Latino pan-ethnic group with "illegal" immigration, the racialization of Latinos as a group, and the shared cultural characteristics of Latinos in the U.S. has led to the development of a Latino *group conscious* and *linked fate,* which are both types of mobilizing identities centered around pan-ethnicity (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2010; Barreto, 2010; Dawson, 1994; Sanchez & Masuoka, 2010). Higher levels of Latino group consciousness and linked fate among individuals have been found to significantly influence Latino public opinion (Sanchez, 2006a), voter turnout, vote choice (Martinez, 2008; Sanchez, 2006b; Stokes, 2003;

identities are enough to sustain prolonged and costly political participation in threatening environments is less clear.

In their study of the effects of proximal contact with immigration enforcement, Walker et al. (2020), find that Latino citizens who have had a loved one come into involuntary contact with the immigration enforcement system led not only to an increased sense that immigration enforcement is racially biased but it also increases Latinos' propensity to engage in protests activity. But contact does not induce *voting*. In the discussion of their null findings, the authors suggest that because protest allows Latinos a more immediate outlet to express their frustration it is a preferable course of action compared to the costly and sometimes, far into the distance, option of voting. The idea that threat alone is not enough to sustain prolonged political engagement among Latinos is supported by Reny et al (2018). In an analysis of Latino voter turnout in the 2016 presidential election, they find among a sample of Latinos living in threatening environments, modeled in several different ways, that only respondents who were contacted to vote by a political party, campaign, or other organization, were more likely to report voting in the election compared to those who were not contacted to vote.

The literature reviewed above indicates that threat alone is not enough to initiate and sustain prolonged political engagement. Rather, threats must be accompanied by a mobilizing stimulus. Scholars within the immigrant political incorporation and community organizations have argued that community organizations can provide such a stimulus.

Latino Organizations in American Politics

Latino organizations have had an important role in the economic, social, and political development of Latino communities in the United States (Browning et al., 1984; Dahl, 1971; Fraga et al., 2010; Garcia-Bedolla, 2005; Hero, 1992; Jones-Correa, 1998; Leighley, 2001; Marquez & Jennings, 2000; Orr & Morel, 2018; Padilla, 1984; Portes et al., 2008; J. Wong, 2006) As a minority, migrant, and conquered ethnic group in the U.S., Latinos have faced, and continue to face, significant levels of discrimination and exclusion from American politics through the imposition of institutional barriers that limit Latino political participation (Garcia-Bedolla, 2014; Hero, 1992). Latinos, like many other racial/ethnic minority groups, tend to be under-mobilized by traditional agents of politics (i.e., political parties and elites) and have thus developed indigenous organizations to represent their interests in the political system and spur participation. Marquez and Jennings note that Latino "organizations were often the only outlets for political representation and self-defense in a society where Latinos were outnumbered and barred from effective participation in the institutions of government" (2000, pg. 541). Yet, despite their central role in the development of Latino politics what we know about Latino organizations is disjointed and fragmented given that the literature on Latino organizations spans multiple subfields driven by a variety of research puzzles.

Stokes-Brown, 2006), and Latinos' evaluations of political parties (Jackson, 2011; Street et al., 2015).

Generally, the literature has approached the study of Latino organizations from a pluralist perspective (Dahl, 1971). This literature characterizes Latino organizations as interest group organizations that seek to increase their Latino constituencies' access to the political system to pursue a set of policy objectives.[9] Early work on Latino organizations explored the competing ethnic, political, and class identities that divided Latino communities across the United States and the evolution of professional, national-level, Latino-focused lobbying organizations (Francis-Fallon, 2019; Garcia-Bedolla, 2014; Marquez, 2001, Marquez, 2003; Minta, 2020; Strolovitch, 2007). Marquez and Jennings (2001) characterize Civil Rights era Latino organizations as being largely focused on the construction of mobilizing identities to attract support from the community and advance their particular agendas. In their transition to national-level political organizing, many of these organizations subdued their radical political rhetoric and hardline national-origin identities to attract a wider constituency from a diversifying Latino community thus making themselves more appealing potential partners to national-level grantmaking institutions (Marquez, 2003). While important for understanding the emerging national presence of Latino organizations, this body of work has little to say about Latino organizations' mobilizing capacity because it is largely focused on elite behavior and organizational activities on the Hill).

To understand the mobilizing aspects of Latino organizations we must instead turn to the literature on immigrant/Latino political incorporation, urban politics, and the nonprofit sector. While still taking a pluralist perspective of Latino organizations, the research in these fields is generally motivated by questions of how Latino organizations affect the attitudes and behaviors of Latinos (citizens and immigrants) in the communities served by these organizations. In an era of weak civic institutions (DeSipio, 2011) and the devolution of social welfare policies (Hero & Preuhs, 2007; Marwell, 2004) this literature has argued that Latino organizations, among other ethnic and community organizations, have taken over important roles in the social, political, and economic development of these communities.

Given the large share of foreign-born individuals (currently at 32% as of the 2020 American Community Survey 2020 (Zong, 2022)[10] within the Latino population, much of the literature on Latino community organizations has centered on their role in the political assimilation and incorporation of Latino immigrants (DeSipio, 2011; Hula & Jackson-Elmoore, 2001; Jones-Correa, 2001; Portes et al., 2008; J. Wong, 2006). Wong (2006), writing on immigrant community organizations generally, argues that these institutions have largely replaced urban political machines in the role of assimilating

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[9] It is important to note however, that much of this work has focused on the experience of Mexican Americans in the Southwest. For work that examines identity and group formation among non-Mexican-American Latino groups from a historical perspective see Francis Fallon (2019), Garcia-Bedolla (2014), and Beltran (2010).

[10] According to a demographic profile of the Latino population in the U.S. published by the Latino Policy & Politics Institute at UCLA, the share of Latinos that are foreign has decreased from a high of 40% in 2000 to 32% in 2020. However, this statistic varies significantly across Latino national origin groups. For example, in 2020 28% of Mexican Latinos were foreign-born compared to 54% of Cuban born Latinos.

ethnic immigrants into American politics. Ethnic immigrant organizations, she adds, are uniquely positioned, and have certain incentives, to politically mobilize their immigrant constituents. However, Wong also notes that such community organizations differ in important ways from political machines. Ethnic organizations exert much of their effort on advocacy, service, or other missions and thus have a limited set of resources to engage in mass mobilization efforts. Instead, she argues that community organizations engage in *limited mobilization* efforts, which involve the limited recruitment of individuals to take political action on certain issues. This type of mobilization, over time, leads to greater political mobilization of a community.

Ethnic community organizations' newfound role has largely been driven by the decline in the presence of party organizations at the local level. Throughout the mid-1800s and early 1900, newly arriving immigrants in large cities were swept into American life and politics primarily through the efforts of partisan political machines in big cities (Erie, 1988). Yet, several factors including the nationalization of American politics, the rise of candidate-centered elections, and the decline of urban political machines meant that the interpersonal contact between local party structures and voters that were so commonplace before is now largely absent.[11]

Ethnic community organizations on the other hand rely on deep interpersonal contacts within their community to gather resources and direct their services to the individuals that need them. This deep connection with their constituency allows organizations to mobilize members and constituents with culturally sensitive approaches. Additionally, they are not impeded by the language barriers faced by outside organizations. Ethnic organizations are incentivized to mobilize their constituents because, only by exerting political influence on their representatives and the policy-making process, can organizations win more support for their programs or change policies to better align with the interests of their community (Landolt et al., 2011; Marwell, 2004[12]).

This literature on Latino organizations has offered an important explanation for changing patterns of Latino mobilization across several historical periods. Yet, much of this literature has focused on informal modes of political mobilization owing to the large share of immigrants among the Latino population. As a result, it remains unclear just how effective Latino community organizations are in influencing Latino electoral

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[11] While urban machines have not declined everywhere, Wong notes that surviving political machines may be hesitant to incorporate newly arriving Latino immigrants into their coalition structures as urban machines have limited resources with which to provide as spoils to Latinos. In addition, the inclusion of Latinos to existing coalition structure might upset current members of a machine's electoral coalitions. This was certainly the case in 1960s Chicago and 1980s New York (Amezcua, 2019; Jones-Correa, 1998).

[12] Marwell (2014) takes this a step further. She argues that the federal government's decision to partner with non-profit community-based organizations (CBOs) to deliver services to the poor and give local leaders more power over the distribution of program funds has opened CBOs to electoral politics. Under such conditions, CBOs are incentivized to mobilize their constituents to exert pressure on local officials to influence the allocation of program funds.

participation, particularly within the context of varying levels of multiple-sourced, punitive, threats to the Latino community in the form of deportations.

In the next section, I present a theoretical framework that outlines 1) how deportations as a multi-source, punitive, and racialized policy can dampen Latino political participation in particular voting, 2) outlines the logic behind LSOs as a mobilizing institution relying primarily on shaping mobilizing identities and building civic capacity within Latino communities and 3) how the presence of LSOs can dampen the negative effect of deportations on Latino political participation.

<div style="text-align:center">A Theory of Threat, LSOs, and Latino Electoral Outcomes</div>

The argument made in this book is that LSOs play a significant role in shaping Latino electoral outcomes, specifically turnout and vote cohesion (the degree to which Latinos in a particular election favor one candidate over another), through their passively mobilizing activities. In turn, these organizations dampen the de-mobilizing effects of multi-sourced threats to the Latino community, specifically immigration enforcement. I begin by defining and outlining the mechanism by which immigration enforcement decreases Latino political participation. I then theoretically define LSOs and the mechanism by which they stimulate Latino political participation. LSOs are community-based organizations that are descriptively representative of the communities they serve in terms of both leadership and constituency (although not necessarily exclusively). These organizations, which can range in their level of politicization[13], are tied to the political process through their advocacy and/or service-related activities and depend, in part, on the active involvement of the community for their survival. By providing an increased number of opportunities for constituents to participate in organizational activities related to their advocacy or service-related missions and increasing their constituents' positive evaluations and attachments to their ethnic identities LSOs can increase Latino voter turnout in elections. Through their generation of civic capacity and psychological capital, LSOs sustain costly Latino political participation, such as voting, in the face of increasing immigration enforcement efforts.

Immigration Enforcement

I define immigration enforcement as a type of political threat to the Latino community that is multi-sourced, racialized, and punitive. By multi-sourced, I mean that the threat of immigration enforcement is not derived from a single institution but is instead derived from several institutions given the recent decentralization of immigration enforcement efforts. While authority over the enforcement of American immigration laws is the purview of the national government, specifically Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a number of initiatives and political trends have led to the decentralization of immigration enforcement policy to state and local governments (Kohli

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[13] By politicization, I am referring to the degree to which an organization supports a particular party or particular candidate. I assume this to be a separate organizational characteristic from their ability to mobilize.

et al., 2011; *The 287(g) Program: An Overview*, 2021). In particular, programs such as 287(g) and Secure Communities have allowed ICE to co-opt local and state resources to apprehend, detain, interrogate, and ultimately hand over individuals suspected of being in the country with proper authorization or committing crimes that might impair an authorized immigrant's legal status to ICE.[14]

By racialized, I mean that because the issue of immigration has become intertwined with the Latino community and because Latinos are often stereotyped as being undocumented immigrants, immigration enforcement efforts are generally biased against the Latino community. As stated in the literature review and discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, immigration policy often references migration from Latin America as a motivation for the implementation of restrictive immigration policy. When it comes to immigration enforcement, Latino activists have often accused immigration enforcement officers of profiling Latinos, unlawfully detaining them to question their immigration/legal status. These accusations, activists claim, stem from immigration/police officers' use of phenotypical and linguistic cues (i.e., whether a person has browner skin tones or speaks Spanish) to detain individuals for questioning. Kohli et al.'s (2011) demographic analysis of a sample of individuals detained and deported through the Secure Communities program between 2008 and 2011, estimated that almost 97% of individuals deported through Secure Communities were of Latino descent.

The racialization of immigration enforcement policy in combination with its punitive nature, in that it is intended to punish individuals, can lead to Latinos feeling increased fear and alienation from society such that they think that their participation is less valued. While in any society laws must be obeyed, immigration activists have argued that American immigration enforcement is often overly punitive and harms not just those individuals detained but also their entire families who are often of mixed status. Again, according to Kohli et al (2011), 39% of individuals in their sample reported having at least one family member who was a U.S. citizen. Kohli et al.'s analysis estimates that as many as 88,000 mixed-status families, mostly mixed-status Latino households, might have been impacted by having a loved one come into involuntary contact with ICE through Secure Communities between 2008 and 2011. Asad (2020) provides further evidence that even Latino citizens may become fearful of immigration enforcement. Their analysis of survey data before and after the 2016 election of Donald

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[14] The 287(g) program is an initiative that began in the 1990's but expanded greatly in the 2000s. This program allowed ICE to enter in Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs) with local/state police agencies for the purposes of expanding their ability to enforce U.S. immigration laws. Under these agreements ICE was allowed to deputize a number of officers within a partnered police agency for the purpose of carrying out immigration enforcement duties. The Secure Communities program on the other hand was an information sharing initiative that allowed local/state policies agencies to share detained individuals' data with the Department of Homeland Security. This program allowed ICE to flag individuals detained by local police officers for further questioning as to their immigration status. Both of these programs are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Trump saw a significant increase in Latino citizens who reported fearing that they or someone they know may be deported.[15]

I argue that the multi-sourced, racialized, and punitive nature of immigration enforcement efforts increase Latinos' fear of engaging in public life and may particularly decrease their participation in visible activities such as voting.[16] Thus, as immigration enforcement increases in a particular place, I would expect Latino political participation to decrease in response. However, I further argue that the presence of Latino Serving Organizations can act as a counter-mobilizing force to the depressing effects of immigration enforcement by initiating and sustaining prolonged political engagement among the communities they serve.

Latino Serving Organizations

At their core, I conceptualize LSOs as *interest group organizations*: formal associations of individuals who share one or more attitudes regarding certain aspects of public policy (J. L. Walker, 1983). These groups attempt to influence the government to achieve their goal of altering public policy to better align with the interests of their community. Interest group scholars argue that by mobilizing communities around niche issues, organizations work toward becoming the legitimate representative of their community in the eyes of other organizations and the government, creating recognizable identities (Browne, 1990; Gray & Lowery, 1997). I argue that LSOs possess two characteristics that uniquely situate them to passively mobilize Latinos. These are 1) that they are descriptively representative of the Latino community they serve and 2) that they engage in some sort of advocacy or service-related work.

Pluralist scholars championed organizations as a vehicle by which different groups in society might influence the political process (Dahl, 1971; Schattschneider, 1960), yet, as other scholars have noted, not every group in American politics is equally

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[15] These fears of deportation among Latino citizens where not without justification as at the time President Trump, and many of his allies, suggested the possibility of abolishing birthright citizenship (Oprysko & Hesson, 2018). This would mean that American-born citizens who had parents who themselves were not native-born Americans would lose their citizenship. Although the threat was never credible, birthright citizenship is protected under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, given the large number of 2nd generation Latinos in the U.S. this caused a significant uproar in the Latino community. In addition, Kohli et al.'s (2011) demographic analysis of a sample of individuals detained and deported through the Secure Communities program between 2008 and 2011, estimated that .as many 3,600 American citizens might have been wrongfully detained and interrogated by ICE as to their citizenship status.

[16] Based on the literature review above, this is just one possible outcome of immigration enforcement. Other scholars have argued that immigration enforcement instead activities a sense of Latino group consciousness among those that are affected which in turns leads to higher turnout. In this dissertation, I do not adjudicate between these causal pathways and instead assume that immigration enforcement decreases Latino political engagement through heightened levels of fear.

represented by mainstream interest organizations (Hero, 1992; Strolovitch, 2007). Latinos in the U.S. have been largely excluded from political mobilization efforts on behalf of political parties and excluded from other organized groups. Throughout the history of Latino politics in the U.S., the positive and negative evaluations of Latino ethnic identities have waxed and waned, but as a minority group (along cultural, linguistic, and religious lines) Latinos have largely been marginalized and stigmatized as foreigners, unassimilable, and as a growing threat to American society (Chavez, 2008; Francis-Fallon, 2019; Garcia-Bedolla, 2014; Zepeda-Millán, 2017). Such actions have had a significant negative effect on Latino political participation across time and space (De La Garza, 1992; I. Garcia, 2000; Garcia-Bedolla, 2014; Hajnal, 2010; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Leighley, Jan E, 2014).

Thus, that LSOs are *descriptively representative,* in terms of their leadership[17] and the Latino communities they serve, matters because these identity-based links aid LSOs in building psychological capital in the communities they serve. What I mean by descriptive representation is that LSOs share one (or more) of the many ethnic/racial identities that exist within the broader category of Latino/Hispanic identity with their Latino community. These can typically be grouped into national origin (Mexican American, Chicano, Cuban, Puerto Rican) or pan-ethnic identities (Latinx, Latino, Hispanic). Socially, these identities bind individuals into groups based on certain cultural, linguistic, or ancestral characteristics. Politically, these identities can signal support or opposition to policies and serve as a vehicle to initiate political action within communities of individuals.

I argue that in their capacity as descriptively representative organizations, LSOs build psychological capital within the communities they serve through their culturally sensitive approaches to organizing. As descriptively representative organizations, LSOs are typically founded and led by the most well-educated and politically sophisticated of the community they are serving (Marquez, 1993; Orr & Morel, 2018; J. Wong, 2006). Descriptively representative leaders have insight into and knowledge of the needs and cultural customs of their community, allowing them to incorporate such aspects into their organizational activities. Services, meetings, and other organizational functions may be conducted in multiple languages (Spanish/English) which is important when Latino populations have a large share of immigrants. Organizational activities also typically promote the retention of ethnic identity (Garcia-Bedolla, 2005; Marquez, 1993, 2001). For example, LSOs may partake in establishing and maintaining cultural festivals that bring positive exposure to the community they serve. In this way, LSOs help build their communities' positive affective attachment to their group ethnic identities and allow for that ethnic identity to become a mobilizing identity rather than restricting political participation[18].

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[17] In turning this dissertation into a book, I plan to collect data on the ethnic makeup of LSOs leadership.

[18] This theoretical framework assumes that all Latino ethnic identities, both national-origin and pan-ethnic, are potential mobilizing identities. While some literature has found that certain Latino ethnic identities are more mobilizing than others (specifically pan-ethnic identities), other research has shown that Latinos often hold both national-

Given the diversity within the Latino community, one might imagine that the rise of Latino ethnic organizing would lead to a Latino electorate that is more fractured and competitive. While it is certainly true that the diversification of the Latino population in the wake of historic migration from Latin America in the 21st century has also led to an explosion in the number and types of Latino community organizations, these organizations are often organized along intersectional identities (gender, class, ideology) and are more likely to work in a cooperative rather than competitive fashion. The limited surveys of Latino organizations that exist reveal that Latino organizations often work in coalitions with other Latino, minority, and/or immigrant organizations based on certain issues (healthcare, police brutality, community improvement, etc.). My data on tax-exempt LSOs derived from nonprofit tax-exempt filings with IRS (discussed in more detail in Chapter 2) indicate that some organizations, like individual Latinos, often represent multiple Latino ethnic identities, sometimes shifting between them. One notable case is when the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund formally changed its name to Latino Justice (PRLDEF) to reflect the changing nature of the Latino community and the clients it served.[19]

LSOs' engagement in advocacy and service-related activities builds civic capacity and is key to their passive mobilization of Latinos. While all citizen-oriented organizations may have the potential to increase their constituents/members' civic skills, I argue that LSOs' direct link to the political process and their ethnically descriptive nature allow them to provide increased opportunities for their Latino constituents/members in particular to become politically engaged.

Service-related LSOs are defined as those organizations that are involved in the distribution or administration of social welfare programs, specifically those engaged in direct service programs aimed at serving underprivileged populations. These organizations typically take the form of human service agencies, immigrant centers, and other organizations focused on ameliorating socio-economic issues in underserved communities. Advocacy-related LSOs are defined as organizations that represent certain niche interests within a Latino community and engage in activities to bring awareness and support to that community. These organizations do so without engaging in direct service provision. For example, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) rose to prominence within the Latino community by lobbying Texas county and state governments for an end to the discrimination of Mexican Americans in the voter registration process and by private businesses. More contemporary examples include Latino/Hispanic Chambers of Commerce which advocate for the interests of small Latino/Hispanic-owned businesses at the local and state level. Also included are Hispanic Roundtables, organizations of concerned Latino community leaders who come together to share resources and knowledge on community resources and pressing issues in the Latino community. These organizations are often the only link between the polity and the community they serve.

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origin and pan-ethnic identities with both type of identities susceptible to being transformed into mobilizing identities (Beltran, 2010; Garcia-Bedolla, 2014; Sanchez & Morin, 2011).

[19] https://www.latinojustice.org/en/new-history-1.

Both types of LSOs build civic capacity by providing more opportunities for their Latino members and constituents to become politically engaged. Service LSOs may set up information campaigns to bring awareness to issues and services available in the community, (e.g., housing, afterschool programs, job training programs, etc.). They may also mobilize their constituents to protect their vulnerable service programs or establish new ones. Because most local service programs are funded by public tax dollars controlled by local decision-makers (Leroux, 2007; Levine, 2016; Marwell, 2004), LSOs often engage in the small-scale mobilization of their constituents to pressure decision-makers into protecting the funds for their service programs. These mobilization activities can range from letter-writing campaigns to protests and, in some cases, involve Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) campaigns.

Advocacy LSOs may also establish resident education workshops to educate their community members about their rights and their potential to better their communities' outcomes by being civically engaged. These workshops may encourage greater participation in city council meetings, school board meetings, and other participatory institutional events. Other programs, may focus more on the rights of the individual including workers' rights, immigrants' rights, parents' rights in schools, and voters' rights.[20] These organizational activities provide Latino community members with significantly more opportunities to learn and engage in the civic and political process and increase Latino political participation overall.

While LSOs can increase Latino political participation in the communities they serve, their most important function lies in helping their communities overcome the negative effects of immigration enforcement on Latino political participation.

In building psychological capital, LSOs help their Latino communities maintain a positive attachment to their ethnic identities (DeSipio, 2011; Garcia-Bedolla, 2005; Jones-Correa, 1998; J. Wong, 2006). This in turn helps to combat the negative effects of racial stereotypes of Latinos that develop under increased immigration enforcement in a place. For example, during the 2006 immigration protests against H.R. 4437, LSOs combatted stereotypes of Latinos as undocumented immigrants living on welfare with images and anecdotes of the contributions Latinos have made to the United States (Zepeda-Millán, 2017). These included Latino representation in the agricultural sector as farmworkers, their service in the military, and the importance of education in the Latino community as a shared value with other Americans.

In building civic capacity, LSOs can reduce the uncertainty among the Latino community that is created by increased immigration enforcement. In cases where individuals come into involuntary contact with immigration enforcement, LSOs can often

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[20] It is important to note that LSOs are not necessarily inherently political institutions. By this, I mean that they are not typically created with the intent to mobilize support for particular candidates in elections. Rather LSOs' mobilizational activities stem from their desire to better serve their community either in maintaining and increasing an organization's funds to maintain direct service programs or raising awareness and support for a particular niche group within the Latino community. That being said there are some LSOs that are political by nature although they are more often the exception rather than the rule.

provide legal, emotional, and financial support for those who are at risk of deportation and their family. In particular, LSOs may provide outlets for sustained and visible political activity against increased immigration enforcement. As in 2006, LSOs may organize protests, rallies, and other forms of informal political participation to protest increased immigration enforcement. LSOs can also increase Latinos' formal political response to immigration enforcement. Their organizational activities, which include voter registration drives and GOTV campaigns, can provide the necessary mobilizing infrastructure for Latinos to engage in costly political acts such as registering to vote and turning out to vote in elections. The organizational activities of LSOs can empower Latinos and convey the message that their participation and existence matter in the face of political threats that stereotype and punish Latino communities.

Hypotheses

I draw several testable hypotheses from the theoretical framework above. The first is that as the presence of LSOs increases in a particular place so too does Latino political participation increase. As the presence of LSOs increases in a particular place, LSOs generate greater levels of psychological capital and civic capacity, and thus civically and politically empower Latinos in that community[21]. While Latino politics scholars have largely focused on studying informal modes of Latino political behavior, given the group's low-voting rates and a large share of unnaturalized immigrants within the population, I analyze formal modes of Latino political behavior, specifically voter registration, and turnout in elections.

> *Hypothesis 1: As the presence of LSOs in a place increases so too does the rate of Latinos registered to vote compared to places where the presence of LSOs is weaker.*
> *Hypothesis 2: As the presence of LSOs in a place increases so too does the rate of Latinos turning out to vote compared to places where the presence of LSOs is weaker.*

Yet, LSOs are capable of stimulating more than just Latino turnout. I also argue that LSOs can shape Latino vote choices as well. Given that one type of LSO is defined through an organization's participation in direct services to marginalized communities, it

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[21] This dissertation argues that Latino civic capacity and psychological capital are increased in places where there is a greater presence of LSOs compared to places where LSOs are absent. I plan to test this assumption in the future by merging my data on the presence of LSOs with survey data on Latino individuals' feelings of ethnic political power (psychological capital) and political knowledge (civic capacity). Given that my data on LSOs is geocoded, and assuming that the individuals in a survey are geocoded as well, I should be able to test whether Latinos who live in places with a higher number of LSOs are more likely to report higher feelings of psychological capital and civic capacity compared to Latinos in places that lack LSOs. The implementation of this research design has been hampered by a lack of survey data on Latino political attitudes that is also geocoded to below the county level and accessible to graduate students. I plan to execute this research design in the process of turning this dissertation into a book.

can be reasoned that LSOs will mobilize their members/constituents to support candidates that are in favor of expanding, or at the very least maintaining, funding for their organizational activities. When it comes to the two dominant political parties in the United States, the Democratic Party is broadly recognized as the party in favor of increasing spending on programs for poorer communities (Kim, 2020; Marwell, 2004).

When it comes to the policy issue of immigration, the Democratic party (compared to the Republican party) has also generally supported immigration reform that aligns with the interests of the Latino community. In 2012, President Barack Obama used an executive order to grant undocumented immigrants who entered the country as children relief from deportation under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. There is also evidence that suggests that more ideologically conservative local law enforcement officers, specifically Sheriffs, are more likely to check detained individuals' citizenship status during traffic stops (Farris and Holman, 2017). Thus, I expect that the greater presence of LSOs in a place should increase Democratic candidates' share of the Latino vote.

> *Hypothesis 3: The greater presence of LSOs in a place will increase Democratic candidates' vote share among Latino voters, compared to places where the presence of LSOs is weaker.*

I further argue that LSOs can mitigate the negative effects of immigration enforcement on Latino electoral participation. Given the racialized nature of immigration enforcement in that law enforcement officers may use phenotypical characteristics (such as skin color) and language (if someone is heard speaking Spanish) to detain individuals and question them about their immigration/citizen status, Latinos may feel more fearful of participating in various aspects of society. This in turn will lead to lower levels of political engagement among Latinos in that particular place.

> *Hypothesis 4: In places where immigration enforcement is greater Latino voter registration will decrease compared to places where immigration enforcement is lower.*
>
> *Hypothesis 5: In places where immigration enforcement is greater Latino voter turnout will decrease compared to places where immigration enforcement is lower.*

I hypothesize that in environments where the threat of immigration enforcement is higher LSOs can increase Latino political participation by mitigating the negative effects of immigration enforcement. With their ability to politically empower Latinos by building positive attachments to Latino ethnic identity, LSOs can offset the feelings of fear and alienation Latinos develop from the racialized and punitive nature of increasing immigration enforcement efforts. The mobilizing infrastructure built by LSOs provides more opportunities for Latinos to engage in costly and prolonged political engagement such as voting.

> *Hypothesis 6: As immigration enforcement increases in a place, the greater presence of LSOs, will lessen the negative effect of threat on Latino voter registration compared to places where the presence of LSOs is weaker.*
>
> *Hypothesis 7: As immigration enforcement increases in a place, the greater presence of LSOs, will lessen the negative effect of threat on Latino voter registration compared to places where the presence of LSOs is weaker.*

In sum, this theoretical framework argues that immigration enforcement has a significant negative effect on Latino political engagement. I argue that LSOs' ability to build psychological capital and civic capacity within Latino communities not only serves to increase Latino political participation but also mitigates the negative effect immigration enforcement has on Latino political engagement.

Chapter Roadmap

Successfully testing any of the hypotheses developed in this book requires a large n-dataset of LSOs at the community level. The lack of such datasets has been a significant challenge in generalizing the effects of community/civic organizations on American political participation across multiple subfields including racial and ethnic politics, urban politics, and the immigration incorporation literature. Developing a dataset of LSOs is one of this book's major contributions to the literature. In Chapter 2, I describe a data-generating process that uses the IRS Exempt Organizations Business Master File of Tax-Exempt Organizations to generate a dataset of tax-exempt Latino serving, advocacy, and service-providing organizations. I then use this dataset to conduct a cross-sectional, county-level analysis that tests the relationship between the presence of LSOs on rates of Latino voter registration and turnout during the 2016 presidential election in Texas (Hypotheses 1 and 2). I find that as the presence of LSOs increased in a county so did rates of Latino voter registration and voter turnout in the 2016 election.

In Chapter 3, I present the second empirical analysis of this dissertation. I combine the Texas Exempt LSO dataset generated in Chapter 2 with a measure of immigration enforcement which is the count of the number of immigrants deported in 2016 Texas measured at the county level. This variable is calculated using the *Removals Under Secure Communities* dataset accessed through the TRAC at Syracuse University. I then analyze how the presence of LSOs affects Latino electoral participation during the 2016 election conditional on the level of threat in a county at that time. I find mixed evidence that the presence of LSOs mitigates the negative effects of immigration enforcement on Latino registration and turnout in 2016 (Hypotheses 4 – 7).

In Chapter 4, I extend my analysis to examine whether the presence of LSOs not only affects Latino voter turnout but also shapes the preferences of the Latino electorate. Here, I estimate each of the 2016 presidential candidates' vote share among Latino registered voters at the county level using ecological inference. I then analyze whether the presence of LSOs increases the Democratic presidential candidate's vote share among Latino voters (Hypothesis 3). I find that the increasing presence of LSOs does increase Hillary Clinton's vote share among Latino voters. In an exploratory analysis, I also find that the increasing presence of LSOs decreased Donald Trump's (the Republican candidate) vote share among Latino voters.

In Chapter 5, I discuss future avenues of research that stem from the theoretical framework and data-generating process developed in this dissertation. I discuss how the outcomes predicted by the theory may change as researchers expand their analysis to states with less homogenous Latino populations where some Latinos may not perceive deportations as threatening and national-origin cleavages are much more socially and politically salient. I also propose that the theory and data-generating process developed

in this dissertation can be used to explain the political behavior of other racial and ethnic minority groups, in particular the Asian American community which has the most similar history and political development to that of the Latino diaspora.

Chapter 2: Measuring *Communidad*

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argue that Latino serving organizations (LSOs), descriptively representative, community-level, advocacy, and service-providing entities, can increase Latino political participation through what I call passive mobilization. In carrying out their organizational goals LSOs passively mobilize Latino communities by developing the civic capacity and psychological capital of the communities they serve. I further argue that the mobilizing effects generated by the presence of LSOs mitigate the negative effects of political threats, operationalized in this dissertation as immigration enforcement, on Latino political participation.

To test the set of hypotheses derived in the last chapter, I conduct a county-level, cross-sectional analysis of Latino participation in the 2016 general presidential election in the state of Texas. I use Texas as a case study to test the relationship between political threat, LSOs, and Latino political participation for several reasons. Demographically, Texas has the second largest population of Latinos (3rd largest in terms of percentage of the population) of all the 50 states in the United States. This is due in part to Texas belonging to Mexico for 100 years before becoming an American state but also due to its location on the U.S.-Mexico border. This has made Texas an immigration destination for the millions of Latin American immigrants who have crossed into the U.S. over the last century.

As a result of its border state status, Texas has also been at the center of the most intense debates regarding the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement. In the rollout of the Secure Communities program, a federal program that required partnered police agencies to share detained persons' biometric data with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Department of Homeland Security, Texas was one of the few states in which a state-level memorandum of agreement (MOA) brought all law enforcement jurisdictions into the program. Yet, several counties resisted the statewide agreement waiting until the last minute to enroll in the program (White, 2016). Because the detention and apprehension of immigrants through Secure Communities depends on the discretion of individual officers there exists important variation in the level of immigration enforcement across Texas counties.

When it comes to the presence of Latino-serving organizations, Texas Latinos have had a rich history in community organizing. Texas is the home of both the League of United Latin Citizens (LULAC) and the American GI Forum (AGIF), two large national-level Latino organizations that can trace their humble beginnings to South Texas (Francis-Fallon, 2019; Marquez, 1993). Texas' position at the border and its large Latino population mean that it has been a "gateway destination" for millions of immigrants from Latin America who are often in need of assistance once they have settled in the United States (Fraga et al., 2010). As such, a robust network of nonprofit organizations emerged in Texas to provide Latino-immigrant communities with a variety of services including daycare, translation, and immigrant services, and civic education and political

representation (Hung, 2007). Thus, Texas provides a suitable arena to test the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation.

Yet, to successfully test my hypotheses on the mobilizing impact of LSOs, as well as the rest of the hypotheses developed in this book, I need a large n-dataset of community organizations below the state level. No pre-existing datasets met my needs. In general, datasets of community, civic, or ethnic organizations are difficult to construct given that groups do not need to register their organization with any local, state, or national agency to regularly meet or engage in some sort of organized activity. In addition, few systematic efforts have been made to collect data on past or present community organizations, on a nationwide scale. The lack of existing datasets on community organizations, particularly those that serve ethnic communities, has posed a significant challenge in generalizing the effects of community/civic organizations on American political participation.

This chapter of the dissertation does two things. First, I develop a dataset of tax-exempt LSOs using a novel data-generating strategy that uses the IRS Exempt Organizations Business Master File of Tax-Exempt Organizations (EO BMF) to identify a sample of Latino-serving organizations. I then use this dataset to analyze how the presence of these Exempt LSOs affects rates of Latino voter registration and participation during the 2016 presidential election in Texas. In the following section, I describe the EO BMF and my novel data-generating strategy in greater detail.

<center>Seeking a Source of LSO Data</center>

Exempt LSO Dataset

The EO BMF is the IRS master file of tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations[22]. This dataset is an individual-level, cumulative record of all nonprofit organizations that have been granted tax-exempt status under U.S. Code § 501(c) of the United States tax code and contains observations as far back as 1960. This file lists an organization's name, address, Employer ID Number, the date an entity was ruled a tax-exempt organization, and the last known date an entity filed a tax return. It also contains several hundred IRS codes that help identify for which qualifying activities an entity was granted tax-exempt status. This wealth of information allows me to use the definition developed in this dissertation to identify a sample of Latino-serving organizations from the EO BMF. To better understand which organizational entities are and are not included in this dataset it is important to understand what nonprofit and tax-exempt organizations are and why an organization might seek to be recognized as such.

Nonprofit organizations are legally recognized entities that are organized for purposes other than generating a profit and in which no part of their income is distributed

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[22] The EO BMF is continuously updated and available to the general public for download at https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/exempt-organizations-business-master-file-extract-eo-bmf. The data presented in this paper was accessed on January 21st, 2021.

to their members, directors, or officers (*Non-Profit Organizations*, n.d.).[23] Nonprofits are all organized at the state level and thus there is some minor variation from state to state as to how nonprofits are formed and how they are regulated. Nonprofits are typically organized as corporations, individual enterprises (for example, individual charitable contributions), unincorporated associations, partnerships, or foundations and are organized for some sort of collective, social, or public benefit. Typically, the main reason an organization may wish to incorporate as a nonprofit entity is for the legal and tax benefits that come from nonprofit status. Nonprofit organizations are exempt from taxes in the state in which they are incorporated and, in some states, may be granted other legal privileges.

Nonprofit status is required for an organization to apply for federal *tax-exempt* status through the IRS. Under U.S. Code § 501(c) a nonprofit organization may file for tax-exempt status if it meets one of the 29 types of organizations described in the section. Of particular interest in this dissertation are those organizations that file for tax-exempt status as operating exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes (501c3), civic leagues (501c4), labor and agricultural organizations (501c5), business leagues, chambers of commerce, and professional societies (501c6), clubs organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofit purposes (501c7) and fraternal organizations (501c8). Nonprofit organizations that are granted tax-exempt status by the IRS are exempt from paying federal income taxes and may qualify to receive tax-deductible contributions. Once an organization has been granted tax-exempt status, they enter the EO BMF dataset.

Tax-exempt organizations have limits on the extent to which they can engage in political activities. While tax-exempt organizations are allowed to lobby elected officials regarding policymaking to a limited degree, they are not allowed to campaign in elections on behalf of candidates. They are allowed, though, to engage in nonpartisan activities including voter registration, education, and promoting participation in elections as long as these activities fulfill their tax-exempt activities. In addition, these regulations do not prohibit members of tax-exempt organizations from participating in politics, including campaign-related activities, so long as they are not speaking for their organization when doing so.[24] Given these restrictions, explicitly political organizations that are created to fund political candidates for office, collect campaign contributions, and create and spread campaign materials for candidates are not found in the EO BMF dataset. Instead, what is included in this dataset is a variety of organizations including religious, education, charitable, recreational, community building, labor, and membership-based organizations.

Given that LSOs are primarily focused on serving the Latino community either through service provisions or advocacy, it makes sense that they often seek nonprofit, tax-exempt status. Organizations typically apply for nonprofit status to invest any revenue they do make back into their organization's activities. In addition, LSOs may also seek tax-exempt status to compete for the various grants and contracts the federal

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[23] In this way, nonprofits are legally differentiated from business which generate profit for their owners, employees, and stakeholders.

[24] https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/limits-political-campaigning-501c3-nonprofits-29982.html.

government has made available to organizations working on a variety of social issues (such as housing, environmental justice, community building, food insecurity, etc.) in communities across the U.S (Leroux, 2007; Marwell, 2004). These grants and contracts provide organizations with funding streams to rent, purchase, or construct community centers, conduct information-sharing programs, and provide a variety of other social services to the communities they serve. For these reasons, I argue that the EO BMF is an excellent source from which to draw a large-N dataset of Latino-serving organizations.

It is possible that the bureaucratic process an organization must navigate to achieve tax-exempt status might prohibit certain LSOs from entering the dataset. In particular, lower-resourced organizations that might not have the personnel and time to do the necessary research and paperwork to apply for nonprofit, tax-exempt status would be excluded from the dataset. On the other hand, given the costly nature of mobilizing activities, I view the barrier to entry into the EO BMF dataset as making it more likely that organizations capable of overcoming this resource barrier are large enough to have a meaningful mobilizing effect on their community.

A limited set of scholarly works has had success in using the EO BMF as a source from which to identify datasets of certain types of ethnic, civic, and community organizations. Diaz (1996) uses the EO BMF to generate a sample and descriptive statistics of Hispanic serving non-profits using a key search term that includes a range of Latino ethnic labels to subset the EO BMF dataset. Hung (2007) uses the EO BMF's available Activity and National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) codes, a series of alpha-numeric codes that indicate the activity for which an organization received tax-exempt status, to show that increases in the Latino and Asian immigrant populations among the 10 largest metropolitan statistical areas in the U.S. led to a significant increase in the number of active immigrant serving, tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations between 1950 and 2000. The richness of the EO BMF data coupled with the work reviewed in this section makes a strong case for using the EO BMF as a source for identifying a sample of LSOs. In the next section, I describe the strategy I use to identify a sample of Latino-serving organizations present in Texas in 2016.

The Data-Generating Process

To construct the Exempt LSO dataset, I begin by first downloading the raw data of the EO BMF from the IRS website. In this format, the file contains over 1.7 million tax-exempt organizations located across the United States and its territories. I then use the IRS "Ruling Date" column and "State" column to eliminate all organizations that were ruled tax-exempt after 2016 and who register a filing address outside the state of Texas. This subsets the raw data file to only those entities registered in Texas on or before 2016.

I use the various components of my definition of LSOs to further trim the raw EO BMF data. To identify tax-exempt organizations that are "community-based", I use the

dataset's Activity[25], NTEE[26], and Foundation codes to remove organizations that self-identify as research/medical institutions (such as hospitals), private foundations[27], and organizations with a focus on international affairs[28]. This parsing of the data ensures that my dataset only includes those organizations that are local to their community and engaged in community-level activities. In other words, it only includes the kinds of organizations that I predict should affect the mobilization of voters.

To identify organizations that are primarily Latino serving, I use the U.S. Census Geocoder website[29] to geocode each tax-exempt organization's filing address to Census 2020 census tracts[30]. Next, working under the assumption that an organization's filing

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[25] According to the EO BMF Codebook, the Activity code was the IRS' initial classification system used to classify tax-exempt organizations based on an organization's purpose, activities and operations. Organizations could list up to three activity codes. When using Activity codes to subset the EO BMF data, only the first activity code is used based on the assumption that the corresponding activity is the organization's main activity for which they were granted tax-exempt, nonprofit status.

[26] Introduced in 1995, the NTEE codes replaced the use of Activity codes to identify tax-exempt organizational activities. When possible, NTEE codes are used to identify LSOs over Activity codes given that they are what the IRS currently uses.

[27] The IRS makes a distinction between private and community foundations. Private foundations typically have one large donor from which the organization provides grants and other charitable gifts to other nonprofit organizations. Community foundations on the other hand rely on smaller donations from various members of their community to sustain their operations. Private foundations, relative to community foundations, typically are organized and operate above the community level. Thus, they do not fit my definition of Latino serving organizations.

[28] Most of the research institutions within the EO BMF dataset are government-funded institutions located at universities and would not fit the definition of community-based organizations. Private foundations, as identified by the IRS, are typically organizations created for the sole purpose of distributing funds to other nonprofit organizations and do-little community organizing themselves. As the name implies, organizations identified as being focused on international activities, include missionary organizations, disaster relief organizations, and organizations focused on humanitarian missions in other countries.

[29] https://geocoding.geo.census.gov/geocoder/.

[30] Using the website's "Find Geographies" tool, I uploaded a .csv file of every tax-exempt organization's filing address to the website. The website returns the .csv with several new columns appended indicating whether a particular organization's address matched Census 2020 records. If an address is a match, the website returns the entity's state, county, census tract, and block group FIPs codes from the 2020 census. If the website fails to match an organization's address to census records, it simply returns a "NA" result for that organization in the following columns. Because the Census geocoder website uses addresses to geolocate tax-exempt organizations, entities that use a PO Box as their filing address are unable to be matched to census records. Tax-exempt entities that are unable to be matched to census records or use a PO Box as their filing address are dropped from the dataset.

address is also the location where the entity carries out the majority of its tax-exempt activities, I determine that organizations that are located in a primarily Latino neighborhood are more likely to serve a primarily Latino constituency. To determine which nonprofit entities are located in a predominantly Latino neighborhood I merge in 2020 census population counts at the census tract level for each geocoded organization. I then calculate the share of the total population that is Latino in each organization's census tract.[31] I then extract only those organizations that are located in a census tract where the share of the Latino population is greater than 0.75 (or 75%). I identify these organizations as serving predominately Latino constituencies.

In the final step, I use the available NTEE and Activity codes to identify organizations that are engaged in advocacy or service-providing activities. I code an organization as such if it self-identifies as engaging in activities relating to civil rights, community improvement/housing, providing services for immigrants, human resources, or if the organization identifies as a chamber of commerce, labor organization, or professional organization.[32] The resulting dataset identifies 835 active Exempt LSOs that are community-based, descriptively representative of the Latino community, and are engaged in advocacy or service-related activities in 2016 Texas.

From the Exempt LSO Dataset

In this section, I briefly describe one of the many LSOs that is included within the Exempt LSO dataset. In San Antonio, Texas, the Avenida Guadalupe Association (AGA) has been organizing the Mexican American community since 1979. Self-identified as an NTEE Type S (Community Building Organization), the AGA website's[33] "About Us" section describes how the organization was founded by a concerned group of citizens who wished to preserve and revitalize the Avenida Guadalupe neighborhood in San Antonio. The neighborhood has long been considered the commercial and cultural center of the Mexican American community in the city. Yet, severe public and private neglect had made the neighborhood one of the poorest and most physically deteriorated neighborhoods by the last half of the 20th century.

Over the last three decades, the AGA has implemented several surveys and development plans to identify the most pressing social, economic, and physical issues impacting the Guadalupe neighborhood. They have also worked in conjunction with local and county officials, and faculty at the University of Texas at San Antonio to develop and implement a 3.5-acre urban renewal project. This project used local, state, and federal dollars to demolish dilapidated buildings, preserve historic sites, and build new economic centers and community housing in the Guadalupe neighborhood. President Ronald Reagan, on a visit to San Antonio, hailed AGA's efforts as an example of urban renewal.

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[31] I calculate this as the $\frac{total\ \#\ of\ Latino/Hispanic\ Individuals}{total\ \#\ of\ Individuals}$ in each census tract.

[32] To see the distribution of LSOs across NTEE and Activity group codes see Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in the appendix.

[33] https://avenida.org/.

In terms of activism, in 2018 the AGA become a sponsor of Inner-city Advocates[34] (InCA) a separate community organization that has worked toward politicizing and mobilizing members of the Latino community in San Antonio since the late 1990s. Over the last two decades, InCA, with the support of AGA and other Mexican American organizations, has educated and mobilized community members on issues including labor, immigration reform, and racial discrimination. AGA is also affiliated with Unidos US[35], formerly known as the National Council of La Raza, a national-level Latino advocacy organization focused on defending Latino civil rights through supporting the organizational activities of local-level Latino organizations.

Situated within the theoretical framework of this book, AGA is an example of a strong and active Latino-serving community organization with a long track record of passively mobilizing the Latino community in San Antonio. In terms of building civic capacity, AGA's efforts toward revitalizing the Guadalupe neighborhood necessitated the building of strong relationships with the San Antonio city council and county-level municipal governments. These relationships opened the way for the significant financial investment and urban planning needed to carry out their mission. In this way, the AGA provided new opportunities for members of the Latino community to become engaged. This is evidenced by their Board of Directors, which apart from having the conventional officers (President, Treasure, etc.), also includes several seats for residents of the community. These seats provide one of many opportunities AGA has created for citizens to become engaged with the polity.

The AGA has also developed a strong commitment to building psychological capital in their community through their ethnic-centered activities. AGA's mission to revitalize the Guadalupe neighborhood, the cultural and economic center of the San Antonio Mexican-American community, highlights AGA's commitment to preserving Mexican-American identity and culture. In addition, the AGA has also founded and sponsored several other ethnic-centered activities including annual Cinco de Mayo festivals, Mexican Independence Day parades, and *dia de los ñinos* (day of the young child) celebration. Moreover, the AGA's sponsorship of InCA indicates its commitment to a more direct politicization and mobilization of the Latino community in San Antonio.

My goal is to use the Exempt LSO dataset to predict Latino turnout and vote choice. However, it is possible that Latino communities with a strong tradition of active political mobilization correlate with the formation and emergence of active Latino-serving community organizations. This endogenous relationship becomes a problem when attempting to make causal claims about the relationship between the presence of LSOs and Latino electoral participation. As such, in analyzing the relationship between LSOs and Latino political participation, I use a second historical dataset of LSOs that emerged as part of the Viva Kennedy movement in the 1960s. This dataset is described in more detail below.

Viva Kennedy LSO Dataset

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[34] http://icadvocates.org/.
[35] https://unidosus.org/.

The Viva Kennedy movement began as an effort by Texas Latino leaders to catapult the strength of the Mexican-American vote to the national stage. In the fall of 1960, prominent Latino politicians Henry B Gonzales, Edward Roybal, and Dennis Chavez, came together to craft the idea for an ethnic outreach campaign that would mobilize Mexican-Americans across the southwest to participate in the 1960 presidential election. Their membership in the Democrat party prompted them to approach the John F Kennedy campaign with their plan. The idea was presented to Robert Kennedy, the JFK campaign manager, who quickly endorsed the plan and expanded it to mobilize "Spanish-speaking"[36] voters across the United States (Francis-Fallon, 2019; Garcia, 2000).

The Viva Kennedy campaign was unique for several reasons. First, while the campaign was centered around a presidential candidate and organized by federal and state Latino elected officials, it was local-level community organizations, co-opted by the Viva campaign, that did much of the mobilizing on the ground. In particular, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and American GI Forum (AGIF), two of the oldest and most respected national Latino organizations today but regionally focused organizations in 1960, were documented as being heavily involved in the Viva Kennedy movement. So strong were these organizations' involvement that scholars claimed that wherever there was a LULAC or AGIF chapter, one would also find a Viva Kennedy club during the 1960 election (Francis-Fallon, 2019; Garcia, 2000).

Second, Viva Kennedy was unique in that it was the first political campaign to mobilize Latinos nationwide using pan-ethnic appeals. Surviving memorabilia from the time shows campaign posters, buttons, and banners with Spanish language messages urging "Spanish-speaking" Latinos to not only vote in the election but also to support John F. Kennedy. As part of the campaign, Kennedy's wife, Jacky Kennedy, used her fluency in Spanish to record the first-ever Spanish-language presidential campaign ad in history. Kennedy's Catholicism become a selling point to "Spanish-speaking" Americans who also tended to identify as Catholic. Surviving campaign material depicts John F. Kennedy riding a burro and sporting a sombrero with the Mexican and American flags in the background. News clippings reveal that Viva Kennedy events often featured *barbacoa* (Mexican barbecue) and Mariachi music("Viva Kennedy Chapter, Harlingen, BBQ," 1960). At these events, Viva Kennedy club members would hand out campaign materials, hold rallies, fundraise to pay individual poll taxes, and generally drum up excitement for the election and support for JFK among Latino voters ("Viva Kennedy, Victoria, Activity," 1960). In some cases, prominent Latino elected officials from across the southwest were invited to give speeches and encourage Latinos to get registered and turn out to vote.

While only active for 2 months before the 1960 general election, the Viva Kennedy movement was significant in increasing voter turnout in heavily Latino

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[36] At the time, the political and social idea of a united Latino/Hispanic community was in its infancy (Beltran, 2010; Francis-Fallon, 2019, Chapter 1). Many communities that would be considered Latino/Hispanic today strongly preferred to use national-origin-like identities to define themselves. These groups often saw themselves as independent communities rather than as belonging to a larger umbrella group that encompassed all Latin American descent, Spanish-speaking groups.

precincts (Garcia, 2000, p. 105)[37] and laid the groundwork for the idea of a united "Latino vote". Within the context of the theoretical framework developed in this book, the Viva Kennedy clubs were instrumental in both building civic capacity and psychological capital across the Texas Latino community. The success of the Viva Kennedy movement would inspire a new wave of Latino-serving community organizations dedicated to mobilizing Latinos across the United States including the Mexican American Political Association (MAPA) in California and the Political Association of Spanish Speaking Organizations (PASSO) in Texas. InCA, which the Avenida Guadalupe Association sponsors in San Antonio, Texas, was founded by Judge Albert A. Pena, one of the leaders of the Viva Kennedy campaign.

Methodologically speaking, this historic dataset on a particular set of Latino-serving community organizations is temporally prior to the characteristics of the Latino population in 2016 Texas.[38] Using this dataset in my analysis allows me to make stronger claims about the causal relationship between the presence of LSOs and Latino political participation.

The Date-Generating Process

To compile a dataset on the presence of Viva Kennedy clubs during the 1960 election, I conducted a search of historical newspapers for mentions of Viva Kennedy via newspapers.com. Newspapers.com is a website that archives hundreds of American historical newspapers that date as far back as the 18th century. To collect data on the formation and activities of Viva Kennedy chapters, I conduct a keyword search, restricted to the state of Texas in the year 1960. I searched for mentions of the term "Viva Kennedy" across Texas newspapers using the website's search tool. The search query revealed well over 100 matches. I then manually inspected each search hit to determine whether an article mentions the formation of a Viva Kennedy chapter, the city and county where the chapter was formed, and what activities the chapter engaged in.

My search identified 22 Viva Kennedy chapters in Texas during the fall of 1960. I combine this dataset with a dataset of existing LULAC and AGIF chapters that were

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[37] According to Garcia (2000) who examined reported elections results from newspapers in Texas, Kennedy won 91% of the Mexican American vote. Of the 17 counties in Texas with Mexican American majorities, Kennedy carried 16 of them, some with as much as a 2-1 margin (p. 105).

[38] This being said, it is still possible that a more politically engaged Latino population in 1960 led to the initial formation of Viva Kennedy chapters in that year and is correlated with a more engaged Latino population in 2016. This is unlikely given that the whole point of the Viva Kennedy campaign was to increase Latino electoral participation nationwide. At the time, Latinos like African Americans face significant barriers to exercising their political rights including poll-taxes, languages tests, intimidation, and in some cases even lynchings. It is also impossible to generate socio-economic measures that are correlated with heighted political participation for Latinos in 1960 as the Census did not begin counting Latinos/Hispanics/Spanish persons as a separate ethnic group until 1970.

present in Texas before 1961 (Estrada, n.d.)[39]. In total, I identify 205 Viva Kennedy chapters/affiliates recorded across 61 Texas counties in 1960.[40] This dataset of Viva Kennedy, AGIF, and LULAC chapters documents the farthest possible reach of the Viva Kennedy campaign and provides me with a historical dataset of Latino-serving community organizations.

In the next section, I test my hypotheses that the presence of LSOs increases Latino electoral participation by analyzing the relationship between the presence of LSOs and Latino voter registration and turnout during the 2016 presidential election in Texas.

Analysis and Results

To test my hypotheses that the presence of LSOs increases Latino political participation, I use ordinary least squares regression (OLS) to conduct a county-level, cross-sectional analysis of Latino voter registration and turnout during the 2016 presidential election in Texas.

Independent Variables

My key independent variables are five measures of the presence of LSOs in Texas counties during the 2016 election. The first three measures are constructed using the Exempt LSO dataset. Using this dataset, I construct two versions of the variable *Exempt*. The first is, $Exempt_{dummy}$, a dummy variable which $= 1$ if at least one tax-exempt LSO was present in a Texas county by 2016, $= 0$ otherwise. This variable allows me to examine how counties with at least one LSO differ in terms of Latino political participation compared to counties without any LSOs. This is particularly useful in this analysis because as Fig A2.1 in the appendix indicates, a large number of Texas counties do not have any LSOs. I also generate $Exempt_{count}$ which is simply the number of tax-exempt LSOs present in a Texas county by 2016. This variable allows me to gauge whether an increasing presence of LSOs matters in increasing Latino political participation in elections.

I also generate a third version of the variable $Exempt_{prop}$, which divides the number of Latino-serving organizations that engage in advocacy or service-related activities by the total number of organizations drawn from Latino-heavy census tracts in a

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[39] Data accessed through the *Mapping American Social Movements* website housed at Washington University https://depts.washington.edu/moves/. The data on LULAC and AGIF chapters is compiled using available membership rosters that have survived over the last century. These membership rosters document the number of LULAC and AGIF chapters at various points in time between 1929 and the late 1990's. The two data points nearest to the 1960 presidential election are 1955 and 1961. I use the datapoint from 1961 as, temporally, it is nearest to the 1960 presidential election. Yet, there is a possibility that the Viva dataset might contain observations of LULAC/AGIF chapters that emerged after the 1960 presidential election.

[40] Table A2.3 in the appendix shows the breakdown of Viva Kennedy chapters and affiliate organizations in 1960.

Texas county.[41] One of the main arguments of this book is that not all Latino organizations have a mobilizing effect on Latino political participation. The purpose of this variable is to show that it is Latino-serving organizations that engage in passively mobilizing activities, such as advocacy, civil rights, and human services organizations, that increase Latino political participation relative to other organizations that may be Latino serving but are not politically engaging, such as cultural or recreational organizations.[42]

    With the Viva LSO dataset, I created a similar set of variables that measures the presence of LSOs in Texas counties. The variable $Viva_{dummy}$ is a dummy variable that = 1 if a Texas county had at least one Viva Kennedy chapter or an affiliated organization in 1960, = 0 otherwise. $Viva_{count}$ aggregates up to the county level the number of Viva Kennedy chapters/affiliated organizations present in 1960. Given the lack of data on historical Latino community organizations, it is not possible to construct a similar measure to $Exempt_{prop}$ using the Viva LSO dataset.

Dependent Variables

    The data used to construct measures of Latino voter registration and turnout come from the Texas Voting and Elections Science Team 2016 precinct-level election results (for the general presidential election) accessed via the Redistricting Hub's website[43]. This file contains precinct-level counts of voter registration and turnout in the 2016 general presidential election. In addition, the VEST dataset also contains counts of "Spanish-surnamed" registered voters[44] at the precinct level making it possible to

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[41] Calculated as $LSO_{(Prop)} = \dfrac{\#\ of\ LSOs}{\#\ of\ Orgs\ in\ Latino-heavy\ Census\ Tracts}$.

[42] This distinction is important given that some work has theorized that membership or participation in any group is enough to increase individual participation in politics.

[43] Data accessed at https://redistrictingdatahub.org/dataset/vest-2016-texas-precinct-and-election-results/.

[44] According to the state of Texas redistricting website (https://redistricting.capitol.texas.gov/glossary#S), the count of "Spanish-surnamed" registered voters that is provided with the VEST data is a precinct-level summation of registered voters with Spanish surnames, as identified by the Texas Secretary of State using a Hispanic surname list prepared by the Census Bureau, last updated in 2002.

construct measures of Latino voter registration and turnout without relying on surveys of self-reported voter turnout[45] (Grofman & Garcia, 2014)[46].

I construct two key dependent variable measures of Latino political participation. *Latino voter registration* (*LVR*) and *Latino Share of Turnout (LST)* (at the county level) during the 2016 presidential general election in Texas. I generate *LVR* by aggregating the number of Spanish-surnamed registered voters from the precinct to the county level. I then merge in counts of the Latino citizen voting age population (CVAP)[47] accessed from the 2016 American Community Survey (5-year estimates) for each county. I calculate *LVR* by dividing the count of Spanish-surnamed registered voters by the count of the Latino CVAP.[48] This measure theoretically ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating that among the Latino CVAP, none are registered to vote. A value of 1, on the other hand, indicates that among the Latino CVAP, all are registered to vote.

To estimate the *Latino Share of Turnout* (*LST*), I use the VEST precinct-level data to derive point estimates of Latino voter turnout at the county level using King's Ecological Inference (King, 1997). Ecological inference is the process of using aggregate data to infer discrete individual-level relationships of interest when individual-level data

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[45] There are generally three methods by which social scientist can measure individual-level participation in an election. The first is to use election-eve polls to ask a sample of citizens whether or not they have voted in a particular election. However, this method can produce significant inaccuracies as studies have shown that Americans are prone to overreporting their participation in elections. This social-desirability bias tends to affect voters of color more strongly than white voters, thus, making surveys a less than ideal tool for measuring Latino electoral participation (Ansolabehere et al., 2022). The second method relies on using voter registration and history files (generated by state election officials or private companies) to generate estimates of Latino participation in elections. However, the 50 states vary in who is allowed to access their voter files and the costs to purchase vote files in some states can limit their use by social scientists. The third method involves the use of the ecological inference technique which uses aggregate level data to make inferences about individual level behavior. This dissertation opts for this third method to generates estimates of Latino electoral participation in 2016 presidential general election in Texas.

[46] Grofman and Garcia argue that using counts of Spanish surnamed voters to conduct ecological inference at the voting tabulation unit level produces more robust estimates of the Hispanic share of registered voters casting ballots in an election. However, they do note that this type of voter data is prone to certain types of error such as Hispanic/Latino identifying individuals not being counted as Hispanic/Latino voters due to the changing of last names when couples marry or children taking on the surname of a non-Hispanic parent.

[47] Due to the high rate of non-citizens within the Latino population in the United States, analysts often use the CVAP rather than simply the VAP (voting age population) to calculate Latino voter registration rates. Using the Latino VAP typically tends to deflate the share of Latinos registered to vote within a population.

[48] The mathematical formula for *LVR* is then $LVR = \frac{Count\ of\ Spanish-surnamed\ Registed\ Voters}{Count\ of\ Latino\ CVAP\ (2016\ ACS\ 5-year\,)}$. This variable is calculated at the county-level.

are not available. In the absence of individual-level measures of Latino voter turnout (see footnote 25), the ecological inference problem can be visualized in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 – Ecological Inference Dilemma

	Vote	No Vote	
SSR Voters	β_i^b	$1 - \beta_i^b$	X_i
Non-SSR Voters	β_i^w	$1 - \beta_i^w$	$1 - X_i$
	T_i	$1 - T_i$	

Within the context of the 2016 VEST dataset, *i* is a precinct in the 2016 election. The VEST data allows us to observe X_i, the fraction of registered voters that are Latino (or Spanish-surnamed), T_i, the fraction of people that turned out to vote, and N_i the total number of people eligible to vote (the total number of registered voters). What we cannot observe directly from the data are β_i^b, the *share* of Latino registered voters that voted, and β_i^w the share of non-Latino (Non-Spanish-surnamed) registered voters that voted.

Over the last century, a variety of techniques have been developed to estimate these unobserved parameters. Some strategies have employed deterministic solutions that use the information in the observed proportions to bound the unobserved quantities of interests (Grofman, 2000). Others, like Goodman's regression, have employed a statistical approach. King's ecological inference combines both approaches to extract estimates within the bounds.

To derive estimates of the share of Latinos turning out to vote at the county level, I feed the VEST data into the *ei_est_gen* command from the "ei compare package" in R. The *ei_est_gen* command takes as inputs the share of registered voters that are Latino, the share of registered voters, and the total number of registered voters to estimate β_i^b at the precinct level. It then averages β_i^b, across all the precincts in a county to generate an average of the share of Latino registered voters that cast a ballot (*LST*) in the 2016 election in that county. This measure theoretically ranges from 0 to 1.[49] A value of 0 for a Texas county indicates that on average the share of Latino registered voters that cast a ballot in the 2016 presidential election was zero. A value of 1 indicates that on average all Latino registered voters in that county cast a ballot in the election.

In my analysis of the relationship between the presence of LSOs and Latino electoral participation, I control for several variables that represent alternative explanations as to why Latino participation in the 2016 election in Texas would be higher in some counties but not others. Specifically, I control for the total population (in 100,000) (*TotPop*), the proportion of the county that is foreign-born (*Prop FB*), Median

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[49] Due to some Texas counties being particularly small (both in terms of population and number of precincts), I am unable to produce points estimates of Latino voter turnout for three Texas counties.

Hispanic Household Income (in $10,000) (*Med Hisp HHINC*), and the proportion of the Latino population in a county that has a bachelor's degree or higher (*Prop Coll*). All of these measures are recorded at the county level and are accessed from the 2016 ACS (5-year estimate). *TotPop* controls for the size of a county with the expectation that larger counties may be the target of stronger electoral mobilization efforts on the part of the Democrat and Republican parties. This would lead to higher Latino electoral participation in 2016, regardless of the presence of LSOs. *HH Inc Hisp* and *Prop Coll* control for the possibility that heightened Latino political participation in some counties, but not others, is due to Latinos in that particular county having more access to resources associated with higher levels of turnout (such as higher levels of education and income). The inclusion of *Prop FB* is based on similar logic in that *Prop FB* serves as a proxy for low-resourced Latino communities given the high correlation between the Latino and immigrant population in Texas.

Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for the independent, dependent, and control variables used in the analysis.

Table 2.2 – Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Min	Max	Median	Var	Std.dev
LST	0.224	0	1	0.136	0.06	0.245
LVR	0.727	0.258	1	0.712	0.024	0.154
non-Latino LST	0.69	0.02	0.947	0.696	0.01	0.1
Viva$_{count}$	0.807	0	21	0	4.338	2.083
Viva$_{dummy}$	0.24	0	1	0	0.183	0.428
Exempt$_{prop}$	0.105	0	1	0	0.075	0.273
Exempt$_{count}$	3.287	0	149	0	321.929	17.942
Exempt$_{dummy}$	0.15	0	1	0	0.128	0.357
TotPop (in 100k)	1.061	0.001	44.343	0.184	14.586	3.819
Prop FB	0.095	0.008	0.371	0.074	0.005	0.072
Med Hisp HHINC (in $10,000)	4.103	1.556	14.625	3.975	1.589	1.26
Prop Coll (Latino)	0.072	0	0.28	0.064	0.003	0.052

Note: N = 254 Texas counties.

During the 2016 general presidential election in Texas, about 72% of the Latino citizen voting age population was registered to vote. Regarding voter turnout, the average share of Latino registered voters casting a ballot in the election was 22%, significantly lower than the share of a non-Latino registered voter casting a ballot which was 69%. It is important to note, however, that *LST* exhibits significant variation ranging from 0 to 1. In other words, in some counties, the average share of Latinos casting a ballot was zero while in other counties the average share was one. On average, foreign-born individuals made up 9.5% of a county's population and 7% of a county's Latino population held a

bachelor's degree or higher. The average Texas county had a Median Hispanic Household Income of $41,000.

Regarding the main independent variables, *Viva* LSOs were present in almost 24% of Texas counties with the maximum number of organizations located in a single county at 21 (in Hidalgo County)[50]. *Exempt* LSOs were located in 15% of Texas counties by 2016 with a single county being home to 149 *Exempt* LSOs (in Bexar County)[51]. A Kendall's rank correlation test reveals a high and positive degree of correlation between *Viva$_{dummy}$* and *Exempt$_{dummy}$* ($\tau = .54$, $p < .000$). This correlation strengthens my assumption that the Viva Kennedy movement spurred greater political mobilization in the areas where it was present in 1960.

Results

I use OLS to estimate a series of models wherein I regress my two dependent variables, *LVR* and *LST*, on my measures of LSOs, *Exempt* and *Viva*, separately. Table 2.3 shows the results of regressing *LVR* on the dummy versions of *Viva* and *Exempt,* separately*,* with the aforementioned control variables included in both models (bivariate models are included in the appendix). Model 1 presents the results of the multivariate regression between *LVR* and *Viva*. We can see that the coefficient for *Viva* is positive and statistically significant ($p<0.05$). Substantively, this means that, on average, the presence of at least one Viva Kennedy chapter/affiliate in a Texas county in 1960 led to an increase in the share of the Latino CVAP that was registered to vote in the 2016 election by 5 percentage points compared to counties in which no Viva Kennedy chapter/affiliate were present, all else constant. This provides strong support for Hypothesis 1 that the presence of LSOs increases Latino voter registration.

Looking at the rest of the control variables in Model 1, the estimated coefficient for *TotPop* is negative and statistically significant ($p<0.01$) which indicates that as the size of the population increases, Latino voter registration decreases. Interestingly, the coefficient for *PropFB* is positive and statistically significant indicating that as the size of the foreign population increases so too does the share of the Latino CVAP registered to vote in 2016. This, on its face, seems counterintuitive given that foreign-born individuals are unable to register to vote unless they have naturalized as American citizens. The positive effect of *PropFB* on *LVR* might be driven by the high correlation between Texas' foreign-born population and its Latino population. Thus, *PropFB* might also be acting as a control for the Latino population in a county. The coefficients for *Prop Coll* and *Med Hisp HHINC* are negative and not statistically significant. These results are in line with some literature that has found that increased socioeconomic status and education do not increase Latino political participation the way it does among Black and white Americans. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that these variables are aggregate and not individual-

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[50] To see the distribution of Viva Kennedy LSOs across Texas counties please see Figure A2.1 in the Appendix.

[51] To see the distribution of Exempt LSOs across Texas counties please see Figure A2.2 in the Appendix.

level measures, which limits my ability to make inferences about their effect on individual-level behavior.

Model 2 presents the results of a multivariate regression between *LVR* and *Exempt$_{dummy}$*. The coefficient for *Exempt* is positive and statistically significant (p<0.05) which indicates that the presence of at least one tax-exempt LSO increases the share of the Latino CVAP registered to vote in 2016 by almost 6 percentage points, all else constant. This provides additional support for Hypothesis 1. Moreover, it shows the utility of using the IRS EOBMF as a source from which to build large n datasets of mobilizing community organizations. Moving on to the rest of the control variables, we can see that the coefficients for *TotPop* and *PropFB* maintain the same statistical significance, magnitude, and direction as in Model 1. *Prop Coll* and *Med Hisp HHINC* are also not statistically significant. In sum, the results in Table 2.3 indicate that Texas counties in which LSOs have at least some presence have heightened levels of Latino voter registration compared to counties that lack the presence of any LSOs. This provides strong evidence for Hypothesis 1.

Table 2.3 – Effect of LSOs (Dummy) on Latino Voter Registration in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:	
	Latino Voter Registration	
	(1)	(2)
Viva	0.055**	
	(0.022)	
Exempt		0.059**
		(0.028)
TotPop(per 100K)	-0.007***	-0.007***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
PropFB	0.704***	0.667***
	(0.130)	(0.134)
Prop Coll (Hisp)	-0.170	-0.159
	(0.200)	(0.201)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.692***	0.697***
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Observations	245	245
R^2	0.150	0.144
Adjusted R^2	0.132	0.126

Residual Std. Error	0.140 (df = 239)	0.140 (df = 239)
F Statistic	8.446*** (df = 5; 239)	8.012*** (df = 5; 239)

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2.4 repeats the analysis in Table 2.3 but uses the count versions of *Viva* and *Exempt* in a multivariate analysis (bivariate models are included in the appendix). Model 1 presents a multivariate model which regresses *LVR* on *Viva$_{count}$*. The coefficient for *Viva* is positive and statistically significant (p<0.1). Substantively, a county with 0 Viva Kennedy LSOs is estimated to have a share of the Latino CVAP registered to vote at .72, when all other variables are held at their mean values. On the other hand, a county with the maximum number of Viva Kennedy LSOs is estimated to have a share of the Latino CVAP registered to vote at .92.

Model 2 presents the results of regressing *LVR* on *Exempt$_{count}$*. While the coefficient is in the expected direction, its magnitude is quite small, and it is not statistically significant. It is possible that the nonsignificant result can be attributed to the overdispersion of *Exempt$_{count}$*. As previously mentioned, *Exempt* LSOs are located in less than half of Texas counties (*Exempt* LSOs are present in 15% of Texas counties). Within these counties, there are a few prominent outliers in the data. Three counties each have more than 140 LSOs out of 835 total LSOs whereas most counties typically have less than 10 LSOs. This skew in the data might be introducing a significant amount of noise in the estimation of the results.

To correct for the overdispersion of *Exempt$_{count}$*, I rerun Model 2 in Table 2.4 this time taking the $\log_{10}$ of *Exempt$_{count}$* and using that as the main independent variable. This model is presented in Table A2.8 in the appendix. The coefficient for *Exempt$_{log}$* in Model 2 of Table A2.8 is positive but not statistically significant (β = .042, se = .033). In sum, the results from Table 2.4 provide additional support for Hypothesis 1. Stronger networks of *Viva* LSOs significantly increased Latino voter registration in 2016. Yet, I find no comparable results using the *Exempt* LSO dataset.

Table 2.4 – Effect of LSOs (Count) on Latino Voter Registration in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:	
	Latino Voter Registration	
	(1)	(2)
Viva	0.010*	
	(0.005)	
Exempt		0.001
		(0.001)
TotPop(per 100K)	-0.008***	-0.008**

	(0.003)	(0.004)
PropFB	0.684***	0.713***
	(0.133)	(0.132)
Prop Coll (Hisp)	-0.168	-0.079
	(0.204)	(0.198)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.699***	0.699***
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Observations	245	245
R^2	0.141	0.132
Adjusted R^2	0.123	0.114
Residual Std. Error	0.140 (df = 239)	0.141 (df = 239)
F Statistic	7.822*** (df = 5; 239)	7.253*** (df = 5; 239)

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The next set of results explores how the presence of LSOs affects the share of Latino registered voters that cast ballots in the 2016 election, that is the Latino share of turnout (*LST*). Table 2.5 Model 1 presents the results of a multivariate regression that regresses *LST* on *Viva$_{dummy}$*, with controls (bivariate models are available in the appendix). The coefficient for *Viva* is positive and statistically significant ($p<0.1$). Substantively, the presence of at least one *Viva* LSO in a Texas county in 1960 increased the share of Latino registered voters casting a ballot in the 2016 general presidential election by 7 percentage points relative to counties that did not have any Viva Kennedy chapters/affiliates, all else constant. This provides support for Hypothesis 2 that the increasing presence of LSOs increases the share of Latino voter turnout in an election. Looking at the control variables included in the model, none are statistically significant.

Model 2 shows the results of a multivariate regression that regresses *LST* on *Exempt$_{dummy}$*. The coefficient for *Exempt* is positive and statistically significant ($p<0.01$). On average, counties with at least one tax-exempt LSO had a share of Latino registered voters that cast a ballot in the 2016 election that was 12 percentage points higher than counties without any tax-exempt LSOs, all else constant. Similar to Model 1, none of the control variables achieve statistical significance.

Table 2.5 – Effect of LSOs (Dummy) on Share of Latinos Voting in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:
	Latino Share of Turnout

	(1)	(2)
Viva	0.070[*]	
	(0.037)	
Exempt		0.121[***]
		(0.046)
TotPop(per 100K)	0.001	-0.0003
	(0.004)	(0.004)
PropFB	0.172	0.071
	(0.214)	(0.218)
Prop Coll (Hisp)	-0.244	-0.297
	(0.327)	(0.325)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	0.203[***]	0.207[***]
	(0.055)	(0.055)
Observations	241	241
R^2	0.024	0.037
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.017
Residual Std. Error	0.228 (df = 235)	0.226 (df = 235)
F Statistic	1.174 (df = 5; 235)	1.827 (df = 5; 235)

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.

[*]$p<0.1$; [**]$p<0.05$; [***]$p<0.01$

Table 2.6 repeats the previous analysis this time using *Viva$_{count}$* and *Exempt$_{count}$* as the main independent variables in the analysis. This analysis helps us to understand whether the increased strength of LSO networks has an impact on Latino electoral participation. Model 1 shows the multivariate results of regressing *LST* on *Viva*. The coefficient for *Viva* is positive and statistically significant ($p<0.05$), although as in Table 2.3, the standard errors are quite large relative to the magnitude of the coefficient. Substantively, Model 1 predicts a Texas county with zero *Viva* LSOs to have a value of .19 on the dependent variable *LST* when the values for the control variables are held at their mean. At the high end of the scale, the model predicts a Texas county with the maximum number of *Viva* LSOs, at 21, to have a value of .60 on the dependent variable. This is a pretty large effect with an almost 40 percentage point increase in the share of registered Latino voters casting a ballot moving from the low end of the independent variable to the high end. These results provide additional support for Hypothesis 2.

Model 2 presents the results of regressing *LST* on *Exempt$_{count}$*. The coefficient for *Exempt* is positive and statistically significant ($p<0.05$). Substantively, a Texas county

with zero tax-exempt LSOs is predicted to have a share of Latinos voting in the 2016 election at .20. when all control variables are held at their mean values. On the high end of the scale, a county with the maximum number of tax-exempt LSOs, at 149, is predicted to have a share of Latinos voting at .55. This is an increase of about 35 percentage points and provides strong support for Hypothesis 2.

To account for the possibility that the results in Model 2 Table 2.6 are driven by the outliers in the $Exempt_{count}$ data, I rerun the analysis in Model 2 this time taking the taking the $\log_{10}$ of $Exempt_{count}$ and using that as the main independent variable. This model is presented in Table A2.9 in the appendix. The coefficient for $Exempt_{log}$ in Model 2 of Table A2.9 is positive and statistically significant ($\beta = .151$, se $= .052$) providing evidence that the results in Model 2 Table 2.6 are not being driven by outliers in the data. The results presented in Table 2.5, Table 2.6, and Table A2.9 provide strong support for Hypothesis 2.

So far, the results have shown that the presence of Latino-serving organizations significantly increased rates of Latino voter registration and ballots cast in the 2016 election. Yet, one might be concerned that the effect I am observing is being driven not by the presence of these mobilizing Latino community organizations but instead by the presence of other non-mobilizing Latino organizations. After all, the number of Latino community organizations that engage in advocacy and service-related activities is quite small compared to the total number of community organizations that operate in predominately Latino neighborhoods. The results in Table 2.7 show that it is indeed passively mobilizing LSOs that drive increased rates of Latino electoral participation in 2016 Texas.

Table 2.6 – Effect of LSOs (Count) on Share of Latinos Voting in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:	
	Latino Share of Turnout	
	(1)	(2)
Viva	0.020**	
	(0.008)	
Exempt		0.002**
		(0.001)
TotPop(per 100K)	-0.001	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.006)
PropFB	0.108	0.148
	(0.216)	(0.215)
Prop Coll (Hisp)	-0.318	-0.143
	(0.330)	(0.320)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)	-0.001	-0.002

	(0.013)	(0.013)
Constant	0.210***	0.210***
	(0.055)	(0.055)
Observations	241	241
R²	0.032	0.026
Adjusted R²	0.011	0.005
Residual Std. Error	0.227 (df = 235)	0.228 (df = 235)
F Statistic	1.556 (df = 5; 235)	1.233 (df = 5; 235)

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2.7 presents the results of regressing *LVR* and *LST*, separately, on *Exempt$_{prop}$* which in this table is measured as the share of Latino community organizations that engage in advocacy or serviced-related activities among all Latino community organizations operating in predominately Latino neighborhoods in a county. This variable is intended to capture the share of Latino organizations that are passively mobilizing Latino political participation as not all Latino community organizations are passively mobilizing. Model 1 regresses *LVR* on *Exempt* and includes the aforementioned controls. The coefficient for *Exempt* is positive and statistically significant (p<0.1). This indicates that as the share of passively mobilizing Latino community organizations increases in a Texas county, so too does the share of the Latino CVAP that was registered to vote for the 2016 election. Substantively, a Texas county in which the share of LSOs among all organizations in predominately Latino neighborhoods is zero is predicted to have a share of the Latino CVAP registered to vote at .72, when all control variables are held at their mean. A county in which *Exempt$_{prop}$* has a value of one is predicted to have a share of the Latino CVAP registered to vote at 0.78.

Model 2 regresses *LST* on *Exempt* and includes the aforementioned controls. The coefficient for *LST* is positive and statistically significant (p<0.1). Substantively, the model predicts a Texas county with a value of zero on the *Exempt$_{prop}$* variable to have a value of .20 on the dependent variable *LST*, or the share of Latino registered voters casting a ballot in the 2016 election. On the other end of the scale, a county in which *Exempt$_{prop}$* has a value of one is predicted to have.35 of Latino registered voters casting a ballot in the 2016 election. This is more than a 15 percentage point increase.

Table 2.7 provides strong evidence that for community organizations to have a mobilizing effect on Latino political participation, they must be connected to the political system in some way. It is not enough for community elites to form social or cultural organizations that do not directly engage in politics. Latino-serving community organizations that do not engage in advocacy or service-related activities make up the vast majority of community organizations in most Texas counties. Yet, as we see here, Latino political participation is at its highest in those places where the passively mobilizing LSOs make up a majority of the community organization infrastructure.

Table 2.7 – Effect of LSOs (Prop) on Latino Electoral Participation in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:	
	LVR	LST
	(1)	(2)
Exempt	0.091[*]	0.150[*]
	(0.052)	(0.085)
TotPop(per 100K)	-0.007[**]	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)
PropFB	0.696[***]	0.145
	(0.132)	(0.217)
Prop Coll (Hisp)	-0.140	-0.232
	(0.201)	(0.328)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)	-0.006	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.013)
Constant	0.696[***]	0.207[***]
	(0.034)	(0.056)
Observations	245	241
R^2	0.139	0.022
Adjusted R^2	0.121	0.001
Residual Std. Error	0.141 (df = 239)	0.229 (df = 235)
F Statistic	7.720[***] (df = 5; 239)	1.049 (df = 5; 235)

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016. $^{*}p<0.1;\ ^{**}p<0.05;\ ^{***}p<0.01$

Discussion

The results in Tables 2.3 through 2.7 provide support for my hypotheses (Hypothesis 1 and 2) that the presence of Latino-serving organizations increases rates of Latino political participation in the form of voter registration and voter turnout. While scholars have long argued that community organizations are the key to mobilization in ethnic minority communities, this dissertation is the first to show an empirical link between the presence of Latino community organizations and increased rates of Latino political participation.

These findings are also particularly significant given that Latinos consistently exhibit lower rates of voting in elections and other political activities, relative to Black and white Americans. Like other racial and ethnic minority groups, Latinos are under-

mobilized by traditional party agents. Yet, unlike other groups, higher levels of socioeconomic status do not typically lead to heightened levels of political participation among Latinos. The results of this chapter support the conclusion of other scholars, that institutions, particularly, in the form of community organizations are key to the politicization and mobilization of Latino voters.

However, it would be prudent to take the results presented here with some caution. Due to the observational nature of the data, I am unable to isolate the causal effect of Exempt LSOs on Latino political participation. It might be the case that some unmeasured omitted variable could be driving the results between the presence of LSOs and Latino political participation. As previously mentioned, the greatest concern is that an already mobilized population in a particular place leads to the development of a denser network of passively mobilizing Latino-serving organizations.

The results derived from the analysis of the effect of Viva Kennedy chapters/affiliates on Latino voter registration and turnout guard against concerns of endogeneity to some extent. The main advantage of this dataset is its historical nature. That is, the population characteristics of a Latino population in a Texas county in 2016, such as level of political activity, are temporally subsequent to the emergence of a 1960 Viva Kennedy chapter. Yet, it might also be the case that an already mobilized Latino population in 1960 led to the emergence of Viva Kennedy chapters/affiliates in 1960 and is also correlated with increased political activity among Latinos in 2016. Unfortunately, due to a lack of 1960 Census data on Latino populations, it is impossible to test this relationship.

Another potential issue with the analysis presented here is the use of ecological inference to estimate the dependent variable *LST* as the share of Latinos turning out to vote (among registered Latino voters). These estimates are not individual-level measures of Latino turnout. They are instead inferences about individual-level patterns generated using aggregated data. As previous scholars have noted, the bias generated in producing these estimates may also bias the results generated using OLS.

A more robust empirical strategy would be to leverage the available Texas voter registration and history files to construct more accurate measures of Latino voter turnout in recent elections in Texas. Voter files are snapshots of the number of individuals registered to vote in an electoral jurisdiction at a particular point in time. When combined with the corresponding voter history files, it allows scholars to analyze individual voter turnout in recent elections. Because the Exempt LSO dataset also has a temporal element (the EO BMF indicates what year an organization was ruled tax-exempt), it is possible to create a panel dataset that measures the presence of LSOs and Latino voter registration and turnout across several elections. Such a dataset would allow for the implementation of two-way fixed effects analysis. I plan to implement such a design in the future as I turn this dissertation into a book.[52]

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[52] I have recently come into possession of a Texas voter registration and history file covering the period between 2014 and 2000. I plan to use this voter file in the future to implement this two-fixed effects analysis of the presence of LSOs and Latino political participation in Texas.

Conclusion

How can we explain patterns of Latino mobilization? The results presented in this paper suggest that it is not enough to simply analyze individual-level characteristics in studying patterns of Latino mobilization. We must take into consideration the context in which Latino participation occurs. This chapter makes several important contributions to the literature.

First, I use the definition of Latino-serving organizations developed in Chapter 1 to show that the Exempt Organizations Business Master File is a viable source from which to build large *n*-datasets of mobilizing organizations. The EO-BMF with its collection of tax-exempt organizations dating back to the 1950s and its wealth of information on tax-exempt organizations' activities, location, and finances offers a variety of ways to identify organizations that are more likely to engage in the passive mobilization of their constituencies. I then use this definition to create two unique datasets of LSOs present in the state of Texas up until 2016. The first dataset is generated using the EO BMF and identifies LSOs based on their type of organization activity and whether they are located in a census tract that is predominantly Latino. The second is a historical dataset of all Viva Kennedy LSOs that emerged during the 1960 presidential election.

Second, I use both of these datasets to show that, among Texas counties, the increasing presence of these Latino-serving organizations significantly increases the share of the Latino CVAP registered to vote and the share of Latino registered voters casting a ballot in the 2016 presidential election. This is the first instance, to this author's knowledge, where an empirical relationship is shown between the increasing presence of ethnic community organizations and increased ethnic political participation. These findings underscore the importance of community organizations in explaining patterns of Latino political participation.

In extending the work in this dissertation, I believe my definition of Latino community organizations and the EO BMF dataset can be applied to other subfields within Racial and Ethnic Politics to identify samples of ethnic community organizations. In particular, this analysis might help us better understand patterns of Asian American mobilization, whose electoral participation is similarly lower, relative to Black and white Americans, and where ethnic community organizations are also theorized to engage in mobilization efforts. Doing so will help us better understand the critical role ethnic community organizations have in mobilizing ethnic political participation. It will also help us gain greater insight into understanding how ethnic community organizations may vary from place to place in terms of their type and the mobilizing activities they engage in.

Chapter 3: When the Rooster Crows

Introduction

In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I argue that Latino-serving organizations can counter the negative effects politically threatening contexts have on Latino political participation. While the literature on immigration enforcement is split on whether this type of multi-source threat stimulates or depresses Latino participation, I hypothesize that the racialized and punitive nature of immigration enforcement decreases Latino political participation (Hypotheses 4 and 5). Yet, LSOs' efforts in building civic capacity and psychological capital within Latino communities can mitigate the negative impact of increased immigration enforcement on Latino political participation (Hypotheses 6 and 7).[53] To test this set of hypotheses, this chapter extends the county-level, cross-sectional analysis of Latino participation in the 2016 presidential election in Texas from the previous chapter to include a measure of immigration enforcement.

In this chapter, I discuss in more depth the variegated landscape of immigration enforcement in the United States and in particular, how Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has co-opted local-level officers and resources to enforce federal enforcing immigration law. Due to its racialized and punitive nature, increasing immigration enforcement is perceived as a threatening context to many in the Latino community. This discussion helps motivate my operationalization of immigration enforcement as a political threat. To measure immigration enforcement in 2016 Texas, I use the *Removals Under Secure Communities* dataset, accessed from TRAC at Syracuse University. I combine this measure with my measures of the presence of LSOs constructed in Chapter 2, to analyze the presence of threat and LSOs on rates of Latino voter registration and turnout in the 2016 election in Texas. I then discuss the results.

The Variegated Landscape of Immigration Enforcement

While a majority of the Latino population in the United States is native-born, the share of the foreign-born population has ranged from a high of 40% in the early 2000s to a low of just over 30% as of 2020 (Zong, 2022). The significant levels of immigration from Latin America in the first quarter of the 21st century that generated this substantial increase in the foreign-born share of the Latino population also served as fuel for nativist political forces who viewed these waves of migration as a threat to American society and the economy (Chavez, 2008). As such, this period saw intense debates regarding the development and enforcement of immigration policy. While immigration policy is a complex issue covering a variety of topics including; entry requirements for immigrants, border security, and immigrants' access to public services the detention and deportation

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[53] Although I do not test the mechanism by which this hypothesized relationship operates in this dissertation, I argue that LSOs strengthen Latino ethnic identity (psychological capital) and help sustain prolonged and costly political participation through building civic capacity (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2010; Asad, 2020; Segura, 2012; Street et al., 2015)

of immigrants, particularly those that are undocumented, has been an issue of great concern for the Latino community (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2010; Asad, 2020; Fraga et al., 2010; Sanchez, 2006a; Segura, 2012; Street et al., 2015).[54]

As of 2003, immigration enforcement in the United States falls under the purview of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency housed under the Department of Homeland Security. According to ICE's website, the agency's mission is largely focused on the enforcement of immigration laws in the interior of the United States and includes the investigation and removal of individuals found to have violated U.S. immigration law.[55] As such, much of the public's attention on ICE has centered on their enforcement and removal operations that target undocumented immigrants living in the U.S., many of whom are from Latin American countries.

According to TRAC, ICE has been responsible for the removal of over 5 million individuals between October 2002 and June 2020.[56] Of these, just over 3 million individuals were immigrants of Mexican nationality (63%). About 65% of all removals were immigrants of Latin American descent. Yet, according to data compiled by the Migration Policy Institute, immigrants from the Americas have never constituted more than 55% of the total foreign-born population in the United States (*Regions of Birth for Immigrants in the United States, 1960-Present*, 2013).[57] In other words, Latino immigrants are often overrepresented in immigrant removal operations conducted by I.C.E.

When looking exclusively at interior immigration removals, many of these have been initiated under a variety of federal programs that facilitate cooperation between ICE and local law enforcement agencies. These programs, such as Secure Communities (Kohli et al., 2011) and 287(g) program (*The 287(g) Program: An Overview*, 2021) have

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[54] Using data from the Pew Hispanic Research Center, Abrajano & Alvarez (2010) find that while a majority of Latinos do not rank immigration as one of their top issues, they do oppose immigration policies that criminalize undocumented immigrants and support policies that offer a pathway to citizenship. Segura (2012) finds in a separate survey that Latinos in Arizona widely opposed SB 1070, the state law that required local and state police officers to determine a detained person immigration status if they suspected that person of being in the country without proper authorization. Street et al. (2015) find in an experiment that when Latinos are told that former president Barack Obama, a Democrat, deported the most immigrants of any president during his tenor, their support for the Democratic party drops, compared to those that are not told this information.

[55] https://www.ice.gov/mission.

[56] Website at https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/. I specifically reference the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Removals dataset.

[57] While estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population are hard to construct, given that unauthorized immigrants are often hesitant to reveal their immigration status, the Migration Policy Institute has constructed a rough estimate of this population for 2019. They estimate that in 2019 there were 11,047,000 unauthorized immigrants in the United States. Of these 78% were from Latin American countries. 15% came from Asian countries, 4% were from Canada, Europe, or Oceana, and 3% were from Africa (*Profile of the Unauthorized Population - US*, n.d.).

been found to have a disproportionate impact on Latino communities. They have also sparked concerns of racial profiling from both the Latino and law enforcement communities (Casellas & Wallace, 2018; Espino, 2012; Rocha et al., 2015; *The 287(g) Program: An Overview*, 2021).

The 287(g) program, written into law as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, allows state and local law enforcement agencies to collaborate with the federal government to enforce immigration laws. Under this program, the Department of Homeland Security is allowed to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with state and local law enforcement agencies. Homeland Security then deputizes a select number of law enforcement agents within a partnered agency to execute certain responsibilities as federal immigration agents. These actions include interviewing detained individuals to ascertain their immigration status, issuing immigration detainers to hold individuals until they can be transferred into ICE's custody, searching and entering detained individuals' information into ICE's database, and making recommendations for the detention and removal of individuals. Under such agreements selected local law enforcement agents become de facto federal immigration officers. According to ICE's website, I.C.E. has a combined 139 active MOAs with law enforcement agencies across 23 states as of 2023.[58]

The Secure Communities program, similarly allows ICE to co-opt local law enforcement resources to identify, detain, and eventually remove immigrants who are suspected of or have committed crimes in the United States or are suspected of being undocumented. The Secure Communities program is a federal-level immigration enforcement program that was begun by the Bush administration and expanded by the Obama administration. The program mobilized local law enforcement agency resources to enforce federal immigration laws by making it easier to crosscheck the information of individuals detained by local police officers with ICE's immigrant database.

While it has long been the case that local law enforcement agencies shared the fingerprint data of detained individuals with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), if the fingerprints come from a law enforcement agency enrolled in the Secure Communities program, the FBI would then forward the fingerprints to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (Kohli et al., 2011). DHS can then match the detained person's fingerprints against the fingerprints in their immigrant database. If the detained individual is found to have an order of deportation or if DHS wishes to investigate the detained person's immigration status further DHS can then issue a detainer requesting to the submitting law enforcement agency to hold the individual until an ICE agent can take them into custody. Unlike the 287(g) program, the Secure Communities program is more widespread, as it is merely a system by which local law enforcement agencies may streamline the sharing of information with Homeland Security and ICE.

Both programs have been the subject of intense scrutiny from the Latino community as leaders have accused law enforcement agencies of racially profiling all Latinos as undocumented immigrants. A fact sheet published by the Migration Policy Institute summarized some of the more egregious instances of racial profiling by law enforcement agencies operating under 287(g) agreements (*The 287(g) Program: An*

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[58] Website accessed on April 12, 2023 at https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-arrest/287g.

Overview, 2021). In 2011, the Department of Justice investigated claims that the Maricopa Sheriff's Office in Arizona was engaging in the racial profiling of Latinos in exercising their duties under their MOA. In their investigation, the Department of Justice found that Maricopa deputies frequently conducted "sweeps" in Latino neighborhoods searching for undocumented immigrants. They also found that Latino drivers in certain parts of Maricopa County were nine times more likely to be stopped by deputies compared to non-Latino drivers. So egregious were these civil rights violations that the Obama administration terminated Maricopa County's 287(g) agreement.

The Secure Communities program has similarly come under fire from Latino community leaders who argue that in the enforcement of the program, local law enforcement officers racially profile Latinos as undocumented immigrants (Kohli et al., 2011). According to a report from the University of California, Berkeley Law School, Latinos comprised almost 97% of all individuals taken into ICE custody through the Secure Communities program. In addition, almost 1/3 of individuals arrested reported having a spouse or child that was a United States citizen, increasing the number of Latinos both citizens and noncitizens impacted by the immigration enforcement program. The report also estimated that as many as 3,600 American citizens of Latino descent had been detained through Secure Communities by mistake.

Both programs were championed by Homeland Security as targeting immigrants in the United States with serious criminal records for removal. However, reports noted that a large share of immigrants removed under both programs had no past criminal records or had been previously arrested for petty crimes. The Migration Policy Institute found that half of all detainers issued under the 287(g) program in 2011 were for individuals arrested for traffic violations or misdemeanors (*The 287(g) Program: An Overview*, 2021). Kohli et al. (2011) found that 1/3 of all individuals removed under Secure Communities in 2011 had only been convicted of misdemeanor crimes (Kohli et al., 2011). In both programs, there were instances of individuals being detained by ICE who previously had no criminal convictions. This review makes it clear that immigration enforcement has disproportionally and unjustly impacted the Latino community.

While both the 287(g) and the Secure Communities programs have been the subject of research by scholars, I opt to use data on the removal of immigrants under the Secure Communities to construct measures of political threat for my analysis. I opt for using data on Secure Communities removals for two reasons. The first is that data on Secure Communities is more accessible. The Department of Homeland Security maintains a list of all current law enforcement agencies that have entered into an MOA with them but it is much more difficult to access historical data on where and when these MOAs are signed and when they expire. On the other hand, TRAC maintains a large dataset on all removals that have been initiated under the Secure Communities program which they have compiled through their use of Freedom of Information Act requests. From a data-generating perspective, the *Removals Under Secure Communities* dataset made available by TRAC is more complete than any dataset on 287(g) agreements.

Second, data on Secure Communities removals is a more accurate operationalization of political threat as it is conceptualized in my theory. I conceptualize threat as racialized, punitive, immigration enforcement that impacts the Latino community and alienates them from participating in society. Data on 287(g) agreements

only indicate if a local law enforcement agency has entered into an MOA with Homeland Security. It is much more difficult to ascertain the intensity of immigration enforcement and the ethnic background of individuals detained under 287(g) agreements. Data on the actual removal of Latino immigrants, such as that found in the *Removal Under Secure Communities* database is a much better operationalization of political threat and immigration enforcement. According to Kohli et al. (2011), and my analysis of removals under Secure Communities, Secure Communities removals disproportionally impacted Latino communities and targeted Latino immigrants for removal procedures. This ensures a stronger link between immigration enforcement and Latinos' perception of immigration enforcement as a threat.

Secure Communities Dataset

To operationalize political threat, I rely on the counts of deportations that occurred under the Secure Communities program calculated from the *Removals under the Secure Communities* database compiled by TRAC at Syracuse University.[59] This dataset contains individual-level records of all individuals that were detained and deported under the Secure Communities program between 2008 and 2020[60]. What makes this dataset so useful to this dissertation project is that it contains a wealth of information for each case including the state and county from which a fingerprint search was first submitted as well as the date of the search. This information allows me to calculate the counts of individuals apprehended through Secure Communities at the county level in a given period.

Because Secure Communities functions as an information-sharing program between local law enforcement agencies and Homeland Security the vast majority of removals in this dataset would be considered internal removals as opposed to border removals.[61] This is a key feature of this dataset as some might be concerned that Texas counties on the border with Mexico are more likely to have more removals given the frequent crossing of migrants. Yet, as Figures A3.1 – A3.5 show in the appendix, a large share of removals under Secure Communities are concentrated in urban Texas counties. This is most likely due to many apprehensions under Secure Communities being initiated

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[59] In order to gain access to this dataset I applied for and received an Outside Fellowship under TRAC's Fellowship program. My fellowship is listed at https://trac.syr.edu/fellows/fellows.html.

[60] While the Secure Communities program is still active, TRAC has noted that Homeland Security has recently taken significantly longer and has been more critical in processing FOIA request. This had made updating their dataset more difficult.

[61] In most datasets of immigrant removals, removals are classified as either interior removals or border removals. Interior removals are removals of immigrants that take place away from the border either initiated by state or local police officers or I.C.E. agents. Border removals on the other hand are removals that occur through the apprehension of migrants at the border or at other points of entry, typically seaports or airports. TRAC has compiled a separate dataset on these removals and is available on their website.

by traffic stops, misdemeanor crimes, and other low-level, nonviolent offenses that are more common in urban areas (Capps et al., 2011; Kohli et al., 2011). A Pearson's correlation test between the number of individuals apprehended through Secure Communities in Texas between 2008 and 2020 and the number of those individuals that reported being from a Latin American country was .99 ($\tau = 277.69$, p<.001). Almost all of the individuals in this dataset are immigrants from Latin American countries.

<p align="center">Analysis and Results</p>

Independent Variables

For the analysis in this chapter, I operationalize threat to the Latino community as the number of immigrants apprehended and removed in each Texas county between January and October of 2016, the months before the 2016 election. Using the *Removals Under Secure Communities* dataset, I construct the variable *Deported* by dropping all observations outside of the state of Texas and then extracting those observations within Texas that were recorded between January and October of 2016. I then aggregate the counts of immigrant removals to the county level. This generates a county-level dataset of the number of immigrant removals that occurred in each county in 2016 before the general election.

The other key independent variable in this analysis includes the dummy and count versions of *Viva* and *Exempt* LSOs generated in Chapter 2. As explained in Chapter 2, the count and dummy versions of *Viva* are generated using the historical dataset of Viva Kennedy chapters and affiliated organizations that emerged in Texas in 1960 as part of the John F. Kennedy presidential campaign. The count and dummy versions of *Exempt* are generated using a dataset of tax-exempt nonprofit Latino-serving organizations identified using the IRS EO BMF. These LSOs are identified by extracting all those organizations located in predominantly Latino neighborhoods that engage in advocacy or service-related activities.

Dependent Variables

To operationalize Latino political participation, I use the measures of Latino voter registration and turnout (*LVR* and *LST*) generated in Chapter 2. *LVR* is a county-level measure of the share of the Latino CVAP that is registered to vote in the 2016 general presidential election. *LST* is the share of Latino registered voters that voted in the 2016 election. Both of these variables are constructed using the 2016 VEST precinct-level presidential election results accessed via the Redistricting Hub. As explained in Chapter 1, I expect immigration enforcement to have a negative effect on both Latino voter registration and turnout (Hypotheses 4 and 5). I also expect, that as immigration enforcement increases, the increasing presence of LSOs will decrease the negative effect of immigration enforcement on both Latino voter registration and turnout (Hypotheses 6 and 7).

In my analysis, I also include the same set of control variables included in the analysis in Chapter 2. These are the size of the county measured by population *TotPop*, the share of the population that is foreign-born *PropFB*, and measures of Latino median household income (*Med HHINC*) and the share of Latinos that have a college education or higher (*Prop Coll Latino*). More detailed explanations of the construction of the dependent and control variables are included in Chapter 2.

Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of all the variables included in the regression models in this chapter. According to the entry for *Deported*, there are some significant outliers in the data. *Deported* has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 3,630 individuals apprehended and removed under the Secure Communities program. The median value for *Deported* is 3 but the outliers in the data pull the mean value to 82. The standard deviation of the variable is 374. To account for the outliers in the data, I take the log of *Deported* and use this mathematically transformed variable as one of my main independent variables in the analysis below.[62]

Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Min	Max	Median	Var	Std.dev
LST	0.224	0	1	0.136	0.06	0.245
LVR	0.727	0.258	1	0.712	0.024	0.154
Viva$_{count}$	0.807	0	21	0	4.338	2.083
Viva$_{dummy}$	0.24	0	1	0	0.183	0.428
Exempt$_{count}$	3.287	0	149	0	321.929	17.942
Exempt$_{dummy}$	0.15	0	1	0	0.128	0.357
Deported (2016)	82.642	0	3630	3	139987	374.149
TotPop (in 100k)	1.061	0.001	44.343	0.184	14.586	3.819
Prop FB	0.095	0.008	0.371	0.074	0.005	0.072
Med HHINC Latino (in $10,000)	4.103	1.556	14.625	3.975	1.589	1.26
Prop Coll (Latino)	0.072	0	0.28	0.064	0.003	0.052

Note: N = 254 Texas counties.

Results

I begin by testing my hypotheses that the increasing threat of immigration enforcement has a negative effect on Latino political participation in elections (Hypotheses 4 and 5). In Table 3.2, I present the results of two regressions wherein I regress *LVR* and *LST*, separately on my measure of threat, *Deported*, and my set of control variables. Model 1 of Table 3.2 presents the results of the model that uses *LVR* as

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[62] I use the following formula to transform *Deported*, $Deported_{(log)} = log_{(10)}(Deported + 1)$. This formula accounts for counties in which the number of individuals removed under the Secure Communities program was 0 in 2016.

the dependent variable. The estimated coefficient for *Deported* is negative and statistically significant (p<0.01). This indicates that, on average, as the log count of deportations under Secure Communities increased in a Texas county in 2016, the share of the Latino CVAP registered to vote decreased. Substantively, this means that a Texas county that experienced zero deportations in 2016 is estimated to have a share of Latino CVAP registered to vote of .77 when all other variables are held at their mean values. At the other end of the scale, a county that had the highest possible value for *Deported* is estimated to have a share of Latinos registered to vote of .55 an over 20 percentage point drop on the scale of the dependent variable.

Model 2 of Table 3.2 presents the results of the model that uses *LST* as the dependent variable. The estimated coefficient for *Deported* is negative but not statistically significant (β = -0.013, se = 0.011). While the negative sign on the coefficient is in the expected direction, I cannot differentiate the effect of *Deported* from 0. This lack of a finding might, in part, be attributed to the already low rates of turnout among Latino registered voters in Texas in 2016. It is possible that the low average share of Latino registered turnout in the 2016 election is causing a floor effect in the estimation of the model. In sum, I find that threat in the form of immigration enforcement decreases rates of Latino voter registrations which is indicative of support for Hypothesis 4. Yet, I find no support for my hypothesis that immigration enforcement decreases rates of turnout among Latino registered voters (Hypothesis 5). My finding that immigration enforcement decreases the share of Latino citizens registered to vote is counter to some findings in the literature that threat alone is enough to mobilize Latino political participation. Instead, the results seem to support scholars who argue that threat has a chilling effect on Latino political participation.

Table 3.2 – Effect of Deportations(log) on Latino Political Participation in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:	
	LVR	LST
	(1)	(2)
Deported	-0.024[***]	-0.013
	(0.007)	(0.011)
TotPop(per 100K)	-0.002	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.005)
Prop FB	0.959[***]	0.336
	(0.143)	(0.241)
Prop Coll (Hisp)	0.126	-0.007
	(0.201)	(0.336)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)	-0.009	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.013)

Constant		0.709***	0.218***
		(0.033)	(0.056)

Observations		245	241
R^2		0.172	0.015
Adjusted R^2		0.155	-0.006
Residual Std. Error		0.138 (df = 239)	0.230 (df = 235)
F Statistic		9.931*** (df = 5; 239)	0.701 (df = 5; 235)

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Next, I test the rest of my hypotheses that the presence of Latino serving organizations mitigates the chilling effect of immigration enforcement on Latino political participation (Hypotheses 6 and 7). I run a series of OLS models in which I regress, my dependent variables *LVR* and *LST* on my main set of independent variables: my measure of the presence of LSOs (*Viva* or *Exempt*), my measure of immigration enforcement (*Deported*) and the interaction between the two. I first show the set of results that use the dummy version of the variables *Viva* and *Exempt* to show how the binary presence of LSOs shapes Latino electoral participation in the 2016 election.

Table 3.3. shows the results of two sets of analysis, one that regresses my measure of Latino voter registration, *LVR*, on the dummy indicator for the presence of at least one Viva LSO in a Texas county *Viva* and *Deported* (with and without controls). The other set of models uses as the dependent variable *LST*, the share of Latino registered voters that cast ballots in a Texas county.

Table 3.3 – Moderating Effect of Viva (Dummy) on Immigrant Deportations and Latino Participation in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Political Participation			
	LVR		*LST*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Viva	0.051	0.051	-0.033	0.010
	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.057)	(0.055)
Deported	-0.034*	-0.074***	-0.086***	-0.071**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.031)
*Viva*Deported*	0.020	0.024	0.109**	0.077*
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.043)
TotPop(per 100K)		-0.004		0.001
		(0.003)		(0.005)

Prop FB		0.955***		0.316
		(0.140)		(0.239)
Prop Coll (Hisp)		0.026		-0.123
		(0.199)		(0.335)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)		-0.007		-0.003
		(0.007)		(0.013)
Constant	0.735***	0.707***	0.265***	0.229***
	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.056)
Observations	253	245	250	241
R^2	0.038	0.212	0.043	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.027	0.189	0.031	0.019
Residual Std. Error	0.151 (df = 249)	0.135 (df = 237)	0.242 (df = 246)	0.227 (df = 233)
F Statistic	3.300** (df = 3; 249)	9.123*** (df = 7; 237)	3.690** (df = 3; 246)	1.665 (df = 7; 233)

Note: OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Model 1 in Table 3.3 regresses *LVR* and my set of key independent variables without controls. The estimated coefficient for *Viva* is positive but not statistically significant. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient for *Deported* is negative and statistically significant (p<0.1). This indicates that as the number of immigrant removals under the Secure Communities program increases (in a county without any historical presence of Viva Kennedy LSOs) the share of the Latino CVAP registered to vote in the 2016 election decreases.

Yet, the estimated coefficient for the interaction term *Viva*Deported* is positive but not statically significant. This lack of statistical significance means that there is no interactive effect between increasing immigration enforcement and the presence of LSOs on Latino political participation. In other words, the presence of LSOs does not mobilize increased Latino voter registration when immigration enforcement increases. Thus, I find no support for Hypothesis 6.

Model 2 includes the set of control variables in the regression model yet the results are largely the same. Again, the estimated coefficient for *Viva* is positive but not statistically significant. The coefficient for *Deported* is negative, statistically significant, and increases in magnitude compared to Model 1 (β = -0.074, p<0.01). This indicates that as immigration enforcement increases (in a county without any LSOs) the share of Latino citizens registered to vote decreases. The interaction term *Viva*Deported* is positive but not statistically significant. Again, while the sign for *Viva*Deported* is in the expected direction I cannot differentiate the effect from 0.

Looking at the control variables, only *PropFB* achieves statistical significance at p<0.01 indicating as the share of the foreign-born population increases in a Texas county, all else constant, the share of Latino citizens registered to vote increases. Again, as stated in Chapter 2, *PropFB* is most likely acting as a control for the share of the population that is Latino/Hispanic given the high correlation between the foreign-born and Latino population in Texas. The rest of the control variables, *TotPop(per 100k)*, *Prop Coll (Hisp)*, and *Med Hisp HHINC* are not statistically significant. In summary, Models 1 and 2 do not provide support for Hypothesis 6.

Models 3 and 4 of Table 3.3 present the results of two OLS regression models regressing the share of Latino registered voters that cast ballots in the election, *LST*, on the set of key independent variables, with and without controls, respectively. Looking at Model 3, the estimated coefficient for *Viva* is negative but not statistically significant. The coefficient for *Deported* is negative and statistically significant (p<0.01). The interaction term *Viva*Deported* is positive and also achieves statistical significance at the p<0.05 level. In other words, increasing immigration enforcement increases the share of registered Latino voter turnout, conditional on the historical presence of Viva Kennedy LSOs in a Texas county, relative to counties where LSOs are absent.

These results in Model 3 are robust to the inclusion of control variables in the regression model as can be seen in Model 4. The estimated coefficients for my key variables maintain their expected direction. *Viva* is now positive, but not statistically significant, while *Deported* is significant at p<0.05 and *Viva*Deported* is significant at (p<0.1). None of the control variables achieve statistical significance.

To give a better visual representation of the interactive effect between the presence of Viva LSOs and immigration enforcement, Figure 3.1 displays an interactive effects plot displaying the effect of *Deported* on *LST*, conditional on whether a Texas county had a least one Viva Kennedy LSO in 1960 or not. This figure is generated using Model 4 in Table 3.3. The dashed line in Figure 3.1 displays the predicted effect of *Deported* on *LST* conditional on a county having no Viva LSOs. The slope of the line is negative indicating that as the log number of deportations increases in a Texas county (with zero Viva LSOs) the share of Latino registered turnout in the 2016 elections decreases. At the left end of the scale, a Texas county with zero Viva LSOs is estimated to have a share of Latino registered turnout of .24 when the log number of deportations equals zero. At the right end of the scale, a Texas county with the maximum value of immigration enforcement is predicted to have a share of Latinos voting of zero. In the absence of LSOs, immigration enforcement takes a significant toll on Latino voter turnout.

Yet, the solid line in Figure 3.1 is positive, albeit just so, indicating that as immigration enforcement increases in counties with at least one Viva LSO, the share of Latino registered voter turnout increases. On the left end of the scale, the model predicts that a county with at least one Viva LSO is estimated to have a share of Latino registered turnout at .25 when the value for *Deported* is zero. At the right end of the scale, a Texas county with at least one Viva LSO is estimated to have a share of Latino registered turnout of .27 when *Deported* is at its maximum value.

The results from Table 3.3 Models 3 and 4 and Figure 3.1 indicate that LSOs may not only mitigate the depressive effect of immigration enforcement but can also mobilize

Latino turnout in response to increased levels of threat. These findings are consistent with other work that has found threat must be paired with a call to action to stimulate increased Latino political participation. These findings also open the possibility that LSOs are not simply passively mobilizing their communities but rather are actively engaged in Get-Out-The-Vote efforts in response to increased levels of threat. It is not possible to determine whether LSOs are actively engaged in GOTV efforts based on the data collected for this dissertation. Yet, future iterations of this project will conduct a qualitative investigation of the activities of LSOs to ascertain the extent of their electoral mobilizing activities. In summary, the results so far provide strong evidence for Hypothesis 7 but not Hypothesis 6.


Figure 3.1 – Interactive Effects Plot of Viva and Deported 2016 (Log) on Latino Share of Turnout in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas
Note: Figure is generated using Model 4 in Table 3.3. To generate this plot all control variables were held at their mean values. Bands display 90% confidence intervals. All interactive effects plots are generated using the "interactions" package in R software.

Table 3.4 presents a similar analysis, this time using the dummy version of *Exempt* in the set of key independent variables used in a regression model. Model 1, displays the results of regressing *LVR*, the share of Latino citizens registered to vote on *Exempt*, *Deported*, and interaction terms between the two. The results are similar to those in Table 3.3. *Exempt* is positive but not statistically significant. *Deported* is negative and statistically significant (p<0.01). The estimated coefficient for the interaction term is positive but not statistically significant. The results indicate that increased immigration enforcement in Texas counties that lacked the presence of tax-exempt, nonprofit LSOs decreased the share of Latino citizens registered to vote in the 2016 election. Yet, the statistical insignificance of the interaction term *Exempt*Deported* does not allow me to conclude that Latino voter registration increases in the face of

increasing immigration enforcement, conditional on the presence of Exempt LSOs. Thus, I find little support for Hypothesis 6.

These results remain largely unchanged with the addition of control variables as seen in Model 2. *Deported* is still negative and statistically significant while the coefficients for *Exempt* and *Exempt*Deported* are positive but not statistically significant. Among the control variables, only *PropFB* is positive and statistically significant. None of the other control variables achieve statistical significance. Again, I find little support for Hypothesis 6.

Table 3.4 – Moderating Effect of Exempt (Dummy) on Immigrant Deportations and Latino Participation in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Political Participation			
	LVR		LST	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Exempt	0.069	0.059	0.045	0.086
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.080)	(0.079)
Deported	-0.042**	-0.071***	-0.077***	-0.058**
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.028)
*Exempt*Deported*	0.026	0.022	0.078	0.045
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.050)
TotPop(per 100K)		-0.004		0.001
		(0.003)		(0.005)
Prop FB		0.895***		0.222
		(0.143)		(0.242)
Prop Coll (Hisp)		0.045		-0.134
		(0.200)		(0.335)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)		-0.006		-0.001
		(0.007)		(0.013)
Constant	0.743***	0.712***	0.257***	0.224***
	(0.015)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.056)
Observations	253	245	250	241
R^2	0.051	0.206	0.050	0.054
Adjusted R^2	0.039	0.183	0.039	0.026
Residual Std. Error	0.151 (df = 249)	0.136 (df = 237)	0.241 (df = 246)	0.226 (df = 233)
F Statistic	4.417*** (df = 3; 249)	8.784*** (df = 7; 237)	4.333*** (df = 3; 246)	1.912* (df = 7; 233)

Note: OLS regression.
Observations are Texas *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
counties in 2016.

      Models 3 and 4 of Table 3.4 display the results of regressing *LST* on my set of key variables, with and without controls respectively. Looking at Model 3 (without controls), we can see that the results are similar to those for *LVR*. The estimated coefficient for *Exempt* is positive but not statistically significant. *Deported* is negative and statistically significant indicating that as immigration enforcement increases, in counties without any Exempt LSOs, the share of registered Latino turnout in the 2016 election decreases. The coefficient for the interaction term *Exempt*Deported* is positive but not statistically significant. This indicates that there is no interactive effect between the presence of Exempt LSOs and increased immigration enforcement on the share of Latino registered voter turnout. Thus, I find no additional support for Hypothesis 7.

      The results in Model 4, which include control variables in the regression model, are consistent with those of Model 3. All of the estimated coefficients maintain their direction and magnitude. None of the control variables are statistically significant. Unlike in Model 4 of Table 3.3, the lack of significance in the estimated coefficient for the interaction term *Exempt*Deported* indicates that conditional on increased immigration enforcement, the presence of at least one tax-exempt LSO does not increase the share of registered Latino voter turnout in the 2016 election.[63]

      Figure 3.2 uses Model 4 in Table 3.4 to construct a second interactive effects plot showing the lack of an interactive effect between *Exempt* and *Deported* on *LST*. According to this plot, immigration enforcement has a negative effect on the share of Latino registered voter turnout in counties with and without the presence of at least one Exempt LSO. While, visually, it seems that counties with at least one Exempt LSO seem to have higher overall Latino registered voter turnout compared to counties without any Exempt LSOs the complete overlap of the confidence intervals does not allow me to conclude support for Hypothesis 7.

      Overall, the results from Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 provide no support for Hypothesis 6 that the presence of LSOs mitigates the negative effects of immigration enforcement on Latino voter registration. However, there is mixed support for Hypothesis 7 that the presence of LSOs mitigates the negative effects of immigration enforcement on Latino voter turnout. Specifically, it seems that the presence of Viva

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[63] The inconsistencies in the results for *LST* across Tables 3.3 and 3.4 can be most likely attributed to differences in the distribution of Viva Kennedy and Exempt LSOs across Texas counites. Viva Kennedy LSOs are present in a larger number of Texas counties compared to tax-exempt LSOs This is a result of using a high Latino population threshold to identify Latino serving organizations at the census tract level. It could be the case that the tax exempt LSO dataset is suffering from a missing data issue where potential Exempt LSOs are not being captured by the data generating strategy due to the high Latino population threshold. This in turn leads to more noisy results in the estimation of the models. Future iterations of this project should include different Latino population thresholds from which to identify a subset of LSOs from the EO BMF.

LSOs increases the share of Latino registered voter turnout in the face of increasing immigration enforcement.

Fig 3.2 – Interactive Effects Plot of Exempt and Deported 2016 (Log) on Latino Share of Turnout in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

Note: Figure is generated using Model 4 in Table 3.4. To generate this plot all control variables were held at their mean values. Bands display 90% confidence intervals. All interactive effects plots are generated using the "interactions" package in R software.

The previous results indicate the Texas counties with at least one LSO differ in levels of Latino electoral participation in the 2016 election, compared to Texas counties without any LSOs, when immigration enforcement is higher. In the next set of results, I investigate whether the increasing presence of Latino serving organizations, operationalized with the count variables of *Viva* and *Exempt,* decreases the negative effects of immigration enforcement on Latino voter registration and turnout in the 2016 election in Texas.

Table 3.5 displays the results of regressing *LVR* and *LST*, separately*,* on *Viva$_{count}$*, *Deported*, and an interaction term between both variables. Again, two models are run for each dependent variable. One with controls and one without controls. Model 1 displays the results of regressing *LVR*, on my key set of independent variables without control variables. The coefficient for *Viva* is positive and statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) indicating that as the historical count of Viva Kennedy LSOs increased in a given Texas county so too does the share of the Latino CVAP registered to vote in the 2016 election (among counties where the number of deportations was zero).

The coefficient for *Deported* is negative and statistically significant ($p < 0.1$). As the log count of immigrant removals under the Secure Communities program increased in a county the share of the Latino CVAP registered to vote decreased (among counties where there were zero Viva LSOs). The key result in this model is the estimated

coefficient for *Viva*Deported* which is negative, which is not in the expected direction and is not statistically significant. Again, I find no support for Hypothesis 6.

Table 3.5 Model 2 repeats the analysis in Model 1 this time adding the aforementioned control variables in the regression model. The results in Model 2 remain largely the same as those in Model 1. The coefficient for *Viva* is positive and statistically significant (p<0.05). The coefficient for *Deported* is also negative and statistically significant (p<0.01). The interaction term *Viva*Deported* is still negative and not statistically significant. In summary, these two models provide no support for Hypothesis 6.

Models 3 and 4 of Table 3.5 examine how Latino voter turnout is shaped by immigration enforcement and the presence of Latino-serving organizations. Model 3 regresses the share of Latino registered voter turnout in the 2016 election (*LST*) on the key set of independent variables. The coefficient for *Viva* is positive but no longer statistically significant. The coefficient for *Deported* is negative and statistically significant (p<0.05) indicating that as immigration enforcement increased in a Texas county (that had no Viva LSOs) the share of Latino registered voters casting a ballot decreased. The interaction term for *Viva*Deported* in Model 3 is positive but not statistically significant and small in magnitude (β = 0.003).

Model 4, reruns the analysis in Model 3, this time including the aforementioned control variables in the regression. The coefficient for *Viva* is still positive and larger in magnitude but not statistically significant (β = 0.028). The estimated coefficient for *Deported* is negative and statistically significant (p<0.01) indicating that as the log number of immigrant removals under secure communities in a Texas county increases (without any Viva LSOs), the share of Latino registered voters casting a ballot in the 2016 election decreased. The coefficient for *Viva*Deported* is now positive although not statistically significant. Overall, Models 3 and 4 provide no evidence that the presence of Latino-serving community organizations mitigates the negative impact of immigration enforcement on Latino voter turnout (Hypothesis 7).

Table 3.5 – Moderating Effect of Viva (Count) on Immigrant Deportations and Latino Participation in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Political Participation			
	LVR		LST	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Viva	0.027**	0.029**	0.016	0.028
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Deported	-0.026*	-0.061***	-0.054**	-0.045*
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Viva*Deported	-0.005	-0.006	0.003	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)
TotPop(per 100K)		-0.003		0.002

		(0.003)		(0.005)
Prop FB		0.944***		0.291
		(0.141)		(0.240)
Prop Coll (Hisp)		-0.019		-0.199
		(0.203)		(0.341)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)		-0.006		-0.002
		(0.008)		(0.013)
Constant	0.733***	0.704***	0.248***	0.217***
	(0.015)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.056)
Observations	253	245	250	241
R^2	0.037	0.205	0.035	0.045
Adjusted R^2	0.025	0.182	0.024	0.016
Residual Std. Error	0.152 (df = 249)	0.136 (df = 237)	0.243 (df = 246)	0.227 (df = 233)
F Statistic	3.184** (df = 3; 249)	8.753*** (df = 7; 237)	3.000** (df = 3; 246)	1.560 (df = 7; 233)

Note: OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.

$^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 3.6 displays four regression models that use $Exempt_{count}$ as one of the main independent variables along with *Deported* and *Exempt*Deported*. Model 1 displays the results of regressing *LVR* on the set of key independent variables, without controls. As can be seen by the estimated coefficients. None of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant, however *Exempt* and *Deported* are in the expected direction. Model 2 reruns the analysis in Model, this time including the set of control variables. Again, *Exempt* is positive but not statistically significant. *Deported* is negative and achieves statistical significance (β = -0.058, p<0.01). Yet, the estimated coefficient for *Exempt*Deported* is negative, and thus not in the expected direction, and is not statistically significant. In sum, there is no support for Hypothesis 6.

The nonsignificant results in Models 1 and 2 of Table 3.6 are most likely due to the over-dispersed nature of the $Exempt_{count}$ data. The Exempt LSO dataset has some significant outliers with some Texas counties having hundreds of LSOs within their boundaries and some counites having none or just one. These outliers add a significant amount of noise in estimating the regression results as indicated by the large standard errors in Models 1 and 2.

A similar set of results emerges in Models 3 and 4 of Table 3.6. Model 3 regresses *LST*, the share of Latino registered voters that cast ballots in the 2016 election, on *Exempt*, *Deported,* and *Exempt*Deported*, without control variables. According to Model 3, the coefficient for *Exempt* is positive but not statistically significant with large

standard errors. *Deported* is negative and statistically significant (p<0.05) indicating that as the log number of immigrants removed unde Secure Communities increases in a county (without any Exempt LSOs) the share of Latino registered voters who cast a ballot in the 2016 election decreased. The interaction term *Exempt*Deported* is negative but not statistically significant. Thus, there is no interactive effect between threat and the presence of Exempt LSOs on Latino voter turnout. Model 4 reruns Model 3 also including the set of control variables. None of the variables are statistically significant. The results from Table 3.6 provide no evidence for Hypotheses 6 and 7.

Table 3.6 – Moderating Effect of Exempt (Count) on Immigrant Deportations and Latino Participation in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Political Participation			
	LVR		LST	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Exempt	0.001	0.002	0.006	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Deported	-0.018	-0.058***	-0.047**	-0.037
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Exempt*Deported	-0.0001	-0.0003	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
TotPop(per 100K)		-0.005		-0.003
		(0.004)		(0.006)
Prop FB		0.945***		0.304
		(0.143)		(0.241)
Prop Coll (Hisp)		0.120		-0.025
		(0.201)		(0.334)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)		-0.008		-0.003
		(0.008)		(0.013)
Constant	0.738***	0.709***	0.251***	0.217***
	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.055)
Observations	253	245	250	241
R^2	0.007	0.179	0.030	0.035
Adjusted R^2	-0.005	0.155	0.018	0.006
Residual Std. Error	0.154 (df = 249)	0.138 (df = 237)	0.244 (df = 246)	0.228 (df = 233)
F Statistic	0.608 (df = 3; 249)	7.404*** (df = 7; 237)	2.558* (df = 3; 246)	1.223 (df = 7; 233)

Note: OLS regression.
Observations are Texas counties   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
in 2016.

Conclusion and Discussion

        Overall, the results in this chapter provide strong support for Hypotheses 4 and 5
and mixed support for Hypotheses 6 and 7. It is clear from the analyses that threat,
operationalized as the apprehension and removal of immigrants under the Secure
Communities program in 2016, has a significant and negative effect on rates of Latino
voter registration and turnout in the 2016 election in Texas.
        That threat in the form of immigration enforcement has such a negative effect on
Latino electoral participation is quite striking given that Latino citizens in particular are
not at all directly affected by increased immigration enforcement. However, as stated in
Chapter 1, this strong relationship is likely driven by 1) the racialized nature of
immigration policy enforcement which has become associated with the Latino
community in the United States, and 2) the strong ties between the Latino immigrants and
citizens in the United States. It is also possible that Latino voters might have been
particularly sensitive to heightened levels of immigration enforcement given the context
surrounding the 2016 election.
        The candidacy of the Republican candidate, former president Donald Trump, and
his rhetoric demonizing Latino immigrants did much to sour his relationship with many
Latino voters and heightened the saliency of immigrant enforcement. However, recent
scholarship on Latino voter turnout and vote choice has shown that a significant share of
Latino voters supported Donald Trump, either despite or because of his anti-immigrant
policies. Turnout data on the 2020 election has found that the share of Latino voters that
supported Trump increased in the 2020 election four years later. Whether immigration
enforcement continues to hurt Latino electoral participation is a topic ripe for
investigation by future scholars.
        The results in this chapter also highlight the vital role Latino-serving community
organizations have in mitigating the negative impact of immigration enforcement on
Latino electoral participation. The results in Table 3.3 indicate that LSOs not only
mitigate the negative effects of immigration enforcement on Latino electoral
participation, but they might also mobilize heightened participation among Latino voters
in response to an increasingly threatening environment. Yet, I only observe this pattern
in models that use the historical Viva LSO data to measure LSO presence.
        In Chapter 1, I argued that LSOs can mitigate the negative effects of threats by
building civic capacity and psychological capital within the Latino communities they
serve. Observationally, I theorize that Latinos in places with a greater presence of LSOs
are more likely to be more politically knowledgeable and active and have stronger ethnic
identities. Yet, without access to representative survey data at the county level, it is
difficult to test these causal mechanisms. This is another avenue of research that this
project will explore in future iterations.
        While the analysis so far has focused on the presence of Latino serving
organizations and Latino participation in elections it is still unclear *how* these

organizations might shape Latino voter choice, if all. Given the ideologically liberal orientation of many of the LSOs identified in this project, it might well be the case that the presence of LSOs might affect who Latino voters cast their ballots. I turn to this topic in the final empirical chapter of this dissertation.

Chapter 4: Shaping the Latino Vote

Introduction

In Chapter 1, I hypothesize that Latino Serving Organizations (LSOs) not only mobilize Latino communities to participate at greater rates in elections, but they may also shape the choices Latinos make in elections. More specifically, I hypothesize that in an election the greater presence of LSOs in a place will increase the Democratic candidate's vote share among Latino voters, compared to places where the presence of LSOs is weaker (Hypothesis 3).

As shown in Chapter 2, historical LSOs, in the form of the Viva Kennedy organizations, had a deep connection with the Democratic party. Many of the founding Latino members of the Viva Kennedy movement were Democrat elected officials from Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, and California. John F Kennedy's praise of the Viva Kennedy campaign led many Latino politicians and their communities to gravitate toward the Democratic party in the years after the 1960 election. The Democratic Party's platform of ending racial/ethnic discrimination further cemented the relationship between the Democratic Party and many local and national level Latino organizations who had long fought the political, social, and economic discrimination of Latinos in the United States (Beltran, 2010; Francis-Fallon, 2019; I. Garcia, 2000; Garcia-Bedolla, 2014).

This relationship between the Democratic party and the Latino community is somewhat reflected in patterns of partisan identification among Latino voters. According to Gallup polling data, between 2011 and 2021 a majority of surveyed Latinos identified as Democrat/lean Democrat (between 55% and 60%). Within this same period, no more than 1/3 of Latinos identify as Republican (Newport, 2022). Yet, Democrats have not always commanded such a large share of the Latino electorate. Using the older Latino National Survey from 2006, Abrajano & Alvarez (2010) show that among a nationally representative sample of 8,000 Latinos (including both citizens and immigrants) in the U.S., only 33% identified as Democrats while 11% identified as Republicans, 14% identified as independents and 36% of respondents stated that they did not know or did not care.[64] Rather than reflecting shifts in the Latino population, Carlos (2018) finds that most of these undecided Latinos are 1st and 2nd generation immigrants who are going through a prolonged period of political socialization. Because a large share of the Latino population consists of 1st generation immigrants and their children, partisan identity is not

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[64] The 2006 Latino National Survey also reveals that there are some important differences in partisan identification among Latino national origin groups. In particular, Cuban Americans have historically aligned themselves with the Republican party. This is largely a result of most Cuban Americans having fled the communist Castro regime that took over Cuba in the 1950's. The Republican party's hard line stance against communism ideology appealed to Cuban refugees (Francis-Fallon, 2019; Garcia-Bedolla, 2014). Given that this dissertation examines Latino vote choice in Texas, differences in partisanship within the Latino community are minimal given that Texas Latinos are largely of Mexican descent.

typically passed from parent to child as in the traditional story of American political socialization (Campbell, 1960). Rather Latino political socialization often happens later in life when partisan identity and political ideology are learned from the various institutions, such as LSOs, that Latinos come into contact with as adults (DeSipio, 2011; Jones-Correa, 1998; T. K. Wong, 2012)

Contemporary Latino-serving community organizations' focus on alleviating the social and economic issues that their communities face through their provision and administration of social welfare programs also makes their politics align closer to the Democratic party than the Republican party. The Democratic party's platform of increasing government spending on programs for marginalized communities supports the mission statements of many LSOs compared to Republican party politics which often lead to disinvestment in social welfare programs and grants (Kim, 2020; Marwell, 2004).

On the issue of immigration, one of the most salient issues to the Latino community, the Democratic party's embrace of immigration reform with a pathway to citizenship has appealed to many Latino voters (see Chapter 3). On the other hand, the Republican party's focus on immigration enforcement and border security has alienated many Latino communities and organizations with a large share of immigrant constituents (Bowler et al., 2006; Chavez, 2008; Jackson, 2011; Zepeda-Millán, 2017). The potential passage of H.R. 4437 in the 2005-2006 Congress sparked the nationwide spring protests in 2006 led primarily by Latino organizations (Barreto et al., 2009; Cordero-Guzmán et al., 2008; Martinez, 2008; Zepeda-Millán, 2017). Across the U.S. many Latino organizations such as LULAC, Unidos US, and MALDEF have made liberal immigration reform the center of their organizational missions (Garcia-Bedolla, 2014; *LULAC Immigration*, n.d.; *Unidos Immigration*, n.d.). At the community level, organizations continue to protest against state and local level policies that seek to increase immigration enforcement or block immigrants' access to public services (Cordero-Guzmán et al., 2008; DeSipio, 2011; Hung, 2007; Jones-Correa, 1998; Thelin & Sapp, 2016). Thus, I expect the presence of LSOs to increase Democratic candidates' vote share among Latino voters in an election.

To test Hypothesis 3, I extend the cross-sectional analysis of Latino voter participation in the 2016 presidential election in Texas, utilized in Chapters 2 and 3, to examine the relationship between the presence of Latino serving organizations and Latino vote choice. I utilize the same set of independent variables in the series of analyses presented below, count and dummy measures of the presence of Viva Kennedy affiliations (*Viva*) and tax-exempt nonprofit organizations (*Exempt*) active in Texas between 1960 and 2016. To generate measures of Latino voter preferences in the 2016 election, I rely on estimates of Latino group voting generated using Rosen et al. (2001) *RxC* ecological inference technique. In the next section, I present the construction of the independent and dependent variables and then present the results of the analysis.

<center>Analysis and Results</center>

Independent Variables

The key independent variables in this analysis include the dummy and count versions of *Viva* and *Exempt* LSOs generated in Chapter 2. The count and dummy versions of *Viva* are generated using the historical dataset of Viva Kennedy chapters and affiliated organizations that emerged in Texas in 1960 as part of the John F. Kennedy campaign's effort to mobilize "Spanish-speaking" Americans into participating in the presidential election.

The county and dummy versions of *Exempt* are generated using a dataset of tax-exempt nonprofit Latino-serving organizations identified using the IRS EO BMF. These LSOs are identified by extracting all those organizations located in predominantly Latino neighborhoods that engage in advocacy or service-related activities.   For the sake of brevity and to avoid repetition, I direct the reader to Chapter 2 for a detailed construction of these variables.

Dependent Variable

Due to the use of the secret ballot, we typically do not know for which candidate an individual votes for in an election. So unlike in the case of voter turnout, where voter registration rolls can be used to generate individual-level measures of turnout by race (assuming the race of a voter can be estimated), generating estimates of vote choice by racial group necessitates the use of ecological inference techniques to draw individual level inferences about vote choice from aggregate data.[65] As such, I employ ecological inference to generate estimates of Texas Latinos' vote choice among the candidates running in the 2016 presidential election. The data used to generate these estimates comes from the Redistricting Hub's VEST Texas precinct-level election results from the 2016 General Presidential election.[66]

In Chapter 2, I employ King's Ecological Inference to estimate Latino voter turnout. Here I employ the Rosen et al. (2001)[67] *RxC* method of ecological inference made available through the "eiCompare" package in R. This method uses Bayesian and frequentist approaches to extend the 2x2 method developed in King (1997) to the *RxC* case where there may be more than two racial groups and more than two candidates for which estimates must be derived. The *RxC* ecological inference case is presented visually in Table 4.1

Table 4.1 – RxC Ecological Inference Case

	Cand A	Cand B	Cand C	Cand D

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[65] The other option is to use survey data, although see footnote 45 on issues with using survey polls to estimate measures of electoral participation among racial and ethnic minority groups.

[66] For more information on this dataset see the "Dependent Variables" section from Chapter 2.

[67] For more information on this method I direct the reader to Rosen et al. (2001). To see how the RxC method compares to the 2x2 method see Collingwood et al. (2016).

$$
\begin{array}{c|ccccc}
\textit{SSR Voters} & \beta_{11}^{i} & \beta_{12}^{i} & \beta_{13}^{i} & 1 - \sum_{c=1}^{3} \beta_{1c}^{i} & X_{1i} \\[2em]
\textit{Non-SSR Voters} & \beta_{21}^{i} & \beta_{22}^{i} & \beta_{23}^{i} & 1 - \sum_{c=1}^{3} \beta_{2c}^{i} & 1 - X_{1i} \\[2em]
& T_{1i} & T_{2i} & T_{3i} & 1 - \sum_{c=1}^{3} T_{ci} &
\end{array}
$$

where i is a precinct in a Texas county. For each precinct $i,$ we can observe from the VEST dataset the marginals; that is the fraction of individuals voting for Cand A through D $(T_{1i},\ldots,T_{Ci})$ and the fraction of registered voters in our two racial groups of interest, Latinos (SSR Voters $= X_{1i}$) and non-Latinos $(1 - X_{1i})$. What is not observed, but can be estimated using ecological inference, is the fraction of individuals in racial group r that voted for candidate c (β_{rc}^{i}, $r = 1, \ldots, R, c = 1, \ldots, C$). Given that the 2016 election had multiple candidates running for office, RxC is the best ecological inference method suited to generate estimates of each candidate's share of the Texas Latino vote in 2016.

The VEST dataset already provides researchers with the marginal counts of registered voters by racial group in the form of the number of Spanish-surnamed and non-Spanish-surnamed registered voters (i.e. Latino and non-Latino registered voters) (see footnote 44) for each precinct i in a Texas county. These counts make up the rows, $R,$ in the dataset and are inputted as fractions of the total number of registered voters in precinct i.

In the 2016 presidential election in Texas, there were a total of 4 candidates running for office: Hillary Clinton (Democrat), Donald Trump (Republican), Jill Stein (Green), and Gary Johnson (Libertarian). Vote counts for each candidate in precinct i are included in the VEST dataset in addition to a column for write-in candidates. To lessen the computational demand required by the RxC technique, the total vote counts for Stein, Johnson, and write-in candidates are summed into a single *Other* candidate column in each precinct. In addition, a fourth column for candidate *NoVote* is generated by subtracting the number of ballots cast for Trump, Hillary, and Other candidates from the total number of registered voters in each precinct. This candidate is generated because in order to estimate an RxC model the total number of ballots cast across candidates must equal the total number of registered voters in a precinct. The vote totals for each of the four candidates are inputted as fractions of the total number of registered voters in precinct i.

I derive estimates of a candidate's share of the Latino vote at the county level using the *ei_results_rxc* command from the "ei compare package" in R.[68] The *ei_results_rxc* command estimates each candidate's vote share among Latino and non-Latino registered voters in each precinct i in a single county. It then averages each candidate's estimated vote share among Latino and non-Latino registered voters,

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[68] For more information on how to derive RxC ecological inference estimates using the "ei compare" package see the package's github page at https://rpvote.github.io/voting-rights/ei/.

separately, across all the precincts in that county. This generates an average of each candidate's share of the vote among Latino and non-Latino registered voters at the county level. These eight measures (two per candidate) theoretically range from 0 to 1. Looking at only the estimates for each candidate's vote share among Latino registered voters, a value of 1 for a candidate indicates that, on average, that candidate received all of the votes cast by Latino registered voters in that particular county. A value of 0 indicates that on average that candidate received none of the ballots cast by Latino registered voters.

In my analysis, I include the same set of control variables included in the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3. These are the size of the county measured by population *TotPop*, the share of the population that is foreign-born *PropFB*, Median Hispanic household income (*Med HHINC*), and the share of the Latino population that has a 4-year college education or greater (*Prop Coll Latino*). I included *TotPop* to control for the fact that larger counties, in terms of population, tend to be more urban and tend to favor Democratic candidates over Republican candidates. I also control for the proportion of the population that is foreign given that some research has found voters may react negatively to larger increases in the foreign-born population and thus favor candidates or policies that have restrictionist views on immigration policy (i.e. Republican candidates). I also control for median Hispanic household income and the proportion of Latinos with a college education or higher given that higher socio-economic is known to correlate with support for the Republican party while higher levels of education correlate with increased support for the Democratic party.

Table 4.2 provides a set of descriptive statistics for the key dependent variables. Rows one through four in the Table are the county-level ecological inference estimates for each of the 2016 presidential candidates' vote share among Latino registered voters: *Trump Share*, *Clinton Share*, *Other Share*, and *NoVote Share*.[69]

Table 4.2 – Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Min	Max	Median	Var	Std.Dev
Trump Share	0.198	0.018	0.517	0.207	0.009	0.097
Clinton Share	0.272	0.087	0.463	0.278	0.006	0.078
Other Share	0.111	0.002	0.449	0.082	0.01	0.1
NoVote Share	0.419	0.179	0.8	0.377	0.024	0.154
TotPop (in 100k)	1.061	0.001	44.343	0.184	14.586	3.819

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[69] The estimates of candidate vote shares among non-Latino registered voters for the 2016 presidential election can be found in Table A4.1 in the appendix. Because this book concerns itself with the electoral behavior of Latinos these estimates are not analyzed in this chapter. In addition, because the main hypothesis of this chapter revolves around Latino voters' preference for the democratic candidate in the election, Hillary Clinton, I do not analyze the estimated Latino vote share for the *Other* and *NoVote* candidates. For descriptive purposes, the estimated Latino vote share for the Republican candidates, Donald Trump, are analyze in this chapter. I chose to analyze Trump's vote share among Latino voters given that he was the other major contender for the office of President in 2016.

Prop FB	0.095	0.008	0.371	0.074	0.005	0.072
Viva$_{count}$	0.807	0	21	0	4.338	2.083
Viva$_{dummy}$	0.24	0	1	0	0.183	0.428
Exempt$_{count}$	3.287	0	149	0	321.929	17.942
Exempt$_{dummy}$	0.15	0	1	0	0.128	0.357
TotPop (in 100k)	1.061	0.001	44.343	0.184	14.586	3.819
Prop FB	0.095	0.008	0.371	0.074	0.005	0.072
Med HHINC (in $10,000)	4.103	1.556	14.625	3.975	1.589	1.26
Prop Coll (Latino)	0.072	0	0.28	0.064	0.003	0.052

Note: *N* = 254 Texas counties. Candidate vote shares shown are for Latino registered voters in the 2016 election.

Looking at row one of Table 4.2, we can see that the average vote share for the Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, among Latino registered voters was .20. The minimum value of *Trump's Share* was .018 and its maximum value was .51. The descriptive statics in row two indicate that the average vote share for the Democratic presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton, among Latino registered voters was .27, considerably higher than the republican candidate's average share in the 2016 election. The minimum value for the variable *Clinton Share* was .08 and its maximum value was .46. The third row in the table shows that, on average, the *Other* candidate's vote share among Latino registered voters was .11. *Other's Share* minimum value was .002 and its maximum value was .45. The fourth row *NoVote* does not represent the vote share for a particular candidate but rather the average share of Latino registered voters that did not turn out to vote. According to the statistics generated, on average, the share of Latino registered voters that did not cast a ballot in the election was .42. *NoVote* had a minimum value of .17 and a maximum value of .80. In the aggregate, Latino registered voters were more likely to not vote in the 2016 election. While I compute vote shares among Latino voters for the *Other* and *NoVote* candidates I do not include these estimates in the analysis below. This is because I do not have prior theoretical expectations as to how the presence of LSOs shapes these candidates' vote shares among Latinos voters and because these variables do not represent real candidates.

Results

In Chapter 1, I hypothesize that the greater presence of LSOs benefits Democratic candidates for elected office by increasing their vote share among Latino voters (Hypothesis 3). To test this hypothesis, I estimate a series of OLS models wherein I regress Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters on my measures of LSOs, *Viva* and *Exempt*, separately. Table 4.3 presents the results of regressing the dependent variable, *Clinton's Share* on the dummy versions of *Viva* and *Exempt* separately. Control variables are included in both models.

Model 1 of Table 4.3 presents the results of a multivariate regression model between *Clinton's Share* and *Viva*. The estimated coefficient for *Viva* is positive and

statistically significant (p<0.1). This indicates that on average Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters in counties that had at least one Viva Kennedy affiliate was two percentage points higher compared to counties where there were no Viva Kennedy affiliates, all else constant. While the magnitude of the coefficient is on the smaller side this is quite a significant finding. These results demonstrate a link between the presence of LSOs and Latino support for the Democratic candidate in elections, providing evidence for Hypothesis 3. These results also demonstrate the power of historical LSOs in shaping the Latino vote in a contemporary election.

Looking at the rest of the variables in the model we can see that the estimated coefficient for *TotPop* is positive and statistically significant (p<0.1) but is near zero in magnitude. This indicates that the size of a county (in terms of population) had a small but positive effect on Clinton's vote share among Latino voters in the 2016 election. *PropFB* is negative and statistically significant indicating that as the share of the foreign-born population increases Clinton's vote share among Latino voters decreased. While these results might seem counterintuitive at first, they may be a result of Latino voters in border counties, where immigration is most heavily felt, rejecting Clinton and the Democratic party's embrace of liberal immigration policies. As we would see later in the 2020 election, Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters would grow in that election, particularly among later-generation Latinos in the conservative Rio-Grande Valley of Texas who more strongly support border immigration enforcement (Dominguez-Villegas et al., 2021; Herrera, 2020).

The coefficient for *Prop Coll (Hisp)* is positive but not statistically significant. The positive direction of the estimated coefficient is in line with the previous scholarship that has found more educated populations to prefer Democratic candidates. The estimated coefficient for *Med Hisp HHINC* is negative and statistically significant (p<0.01) indicating that as the median Hispanic household income increases in a Texas county, Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters decreases. This is interesting in itself since previous studies have found mixed results when examining the relationship between Latino income and vote choice (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2003; Nuño, 2007).

Table 4.3 – Effect of LSOs (Dummy) on Clinton's Vote Share Among Latinos (2016 Texas)

	Dependent variable: Clinton's Vote Share	
	(1)	(2)
Viva	0.023[*]	
	(0.012)	
Exempt		0.023
		(0.015)
TotPop(per 100K)	0.002[*]	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)
PropFB	-0.252[***]	-0.266[***]
	(0.070)	(0.072)

Prop Coll (Hisp)	0.145	0.151
	(0.107)	(0.108)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)	-0.013***	-0.013***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.331***	0.334***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Observations	245	245
R^2	0.101	0.096
Adjusted R^2	0.083	0.078
Residual Std. Error (df = 239)	0.075	0.075
F Statistic (df = 5; 239)	5.390***	5.103***

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Model 2 of Table 4.3 presents the results of regressing Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters (*Clinton's Share*) on the dummy indicator for the presence of at least one tax-exempt LSO in a Texas county (*Exempt$_{dummy}$*), with the inclusion of control variables. The estimated coefficient for the variable *Exempt* is positive but just misses statistical significance at conventional levels (β = 0.023, se = 0.015). Thus, this model provides little evidence for Hypothesis 3. The estimated coefficients for the control variables in Model 2 are similar to those in Model 1. *TotPop* is positive but not statistically significant. In this model, the size of a county, in terms of population, does not affect Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters. The estimated coefficient for *PropFB* is negative and statistically significant indicating that, on average, Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters decreased as the share of the foreign-born population in a Texas county increased. The estimated coefficient for *Prop Coll* is positive but not statistically significant. *Med Hisp HHINC* is estimated to have a negative and statistically significant effect (p < 0.01) on Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters in the 2016 election.

The results so far provide evidence that the presence of LSOs can shape the outcome of the Latino vote. In 1960, the Viva Kennedy organization was credited with increasing turnout among Spanish-speaking Americans and funneling their support toward the Democratic candidate, John F. Kennedy. Almost half a century later, I find a similar pattern. Hillary Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters was higher in counties where a Viva Kennedy Org was present in 1960 compared to those that did not have a Viva Kennedy LSO. The results in Model 2, show mixed evidence that the presence of tax-exempt LSOs can increase the Democratic candidate's vote share among Latino registered voters. While the estimated coefficient for *Exempt* is in the expected direction it does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance.

The results in Table 4.4 test whether the increasing presence of LSOs, measured as the count of *Viva* and *Exempt* organizations, increased Hillary Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters. Model 1 regresses the dependent variable *Clinton's Share* on the count version of the variable *Viva* which denotes the number of Viva

Kennedy affiliates in a county in 1960. This model also includes the set of control variables The estimated coefficient for *Viva* is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.007, se = 0.003). I consider this additional support for Hypothesis 3. Substantively speaking, the model predicts Hillary Clinton's vote share among Latino voters in a county with zero Viva Kennedy affiliates at .26 when all control variables are held at their mean values. At the other end of the scale, a county with the maximum possible number of Viva Kennedy affiliates, at 21, is estimated to have a value of .42 on the dependent variable, *Clinton's Share*. The magnitude of this effect is impressive given the historical nature of the Viva Kennedy organization.

Looking at the rest of the variables in Model 1, the estimated coefficient for *TotPop* is positive but not statistically significant. *PropFB* is shown to have a negative and statistically significant effect on Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters. *Prop Coll* is positive but not statistically significant. The estimated coefficient for *Med Hisp HHINC* is negative and statistically significant indicating that as median Latino household income increases in a county, Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters decreased.

Table 4.4 – Effect of LSOs (Count) on Clinton's Vote Share Among Latinos (2016 Texas)

	Dependent variable:	
	Clinton's Vote Share	
	(1)	(2)
Viva	0.007***	
	(0.003)	
Exempt		0.001***
		(0.0004)
TotPop(per 100K)	0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)
PropFB	-0.276***	-0.266***
	(0.070)	(0.070)
Prop Coll (Hisp)	0.113	0.174*
	(0.108)	(0.104)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)	-0.012***	-0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.334***	0.334***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Observations	245	245
R^2	0.113	0.114

Adjusted R^2	0.095	0.095
Residual Std. Error (df = 239)	0.074	0.074
F Statistic (df = 5; 239)	6.097***	6.128***

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

       Model 2 of Table 4.4 presents the results of regressing *Clinton's Vote Share* on the count version of *Exempt* (the number of tax-exempt LSOs in a Texas county) and the set of control variables. According to Model 2, the estimated coefficient for *Viva* is positive and statistically significant ($\beta = 0.001$, se = 0.004). Substantively, the model predicts Clinton's vote share among Latino voters to be .27 in a county that had zero exempt LSOs, when all control variables are held at their mean values. On the other end of the scale, the model predicts Clinton's vote share among Latino voters to be .42 in a county that had the maximum possible number of exempt LSOs, which is 149 organizations. The estimated coefficients for the control variables in Model 2 maintain the same magnitude and direction as in Model 1.

       The results from Table 4.4 indicate that the increasing presence of LSOs, both historical and contemporary, play a powerful role in shaping Latino vote choice. In the 2016 election, the increasing historical and contemporary presence of Latino serving organizations increased Hillary Clinton's vote share among Latino registered voters by a margin of over 15 percentage points. The consistency of the results across Models 1 and 2 of Table 4.4 provides strong support for Hypothesis 3.

       While in Chapter 1, I developed hypotheses regarding the relationship between the presence of LSOs and Latino voters' preference toward Democratic candidates, I did not present any hypotheses as to the relationship between LSOs and Latino voters' preference toward Republican candidates for office. In this next set of results, I present a series of descriptive models wherein I regress the variable *Trump's Share* on dummy versions of *Viva* and *Exempt*, separately, including control variables. I present these models to better understand the covariates of Donald Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters in the 2016 election.

       Model 1 of Table 4.5 presents the results of a multivariate regression between *Trump's Share* and *Viva* (a dummy variable which = 1 if a county had at least one Viva Kennedy affiliate, 0 otherwise). The estimated coefficient for *Viva* is negative and statistically significant ($\beta = -.097$, se = .011). This indicates that on average Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters fell in Texas counties that had at least one Viva Kennedy LSO in 1960 compared to counties that did not have any Viva LSOs, all else constant.

       Looking at the results for the control variables in Model 1, we can see that *TotPop* is negative and statistically significant ($\beta = -.003$, se = .002) indicating that in larger counties, Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters decreased. Interestingly, the coefficient for *PropFB* is negative but not statistically significant. If it is the case that the negative effect of *PropFB* in Tables 4.3 and Table 4.4 can be attributed to Latino voters rejecting Democratic candidates over increasing immigration, one might expect that this same force would increase Latino voters' support for the Republican candidate

in 2016. Yet, this does not seem to be the case. Additional analysis is needed to discern the role of the foreign-born population in Latino voters' electoral choices.

The coefficient for *Prop Coll* is negative and statistically significant (β = -.621, se = .103). As the share of the Latino population with a 4-year college education (or greater) increased in a county Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters in 2016 decreased. The estimated coefficient for *Med Hisp HHINC* is positive and statistically significant indicating that as Median Latino household income increased in a Texas county in 2016 Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters also increased.

Table 4.5 – Effect of LSOs (Dummy) on Trump's Vote Share Among Latinos (2016 Texas)

	Dependent variable: Trump's Vote Share	
	(1)	(2)
Viva	-0.097***	
	(0.011)	
Exempt		-0.126***
		(0.015)
TotPop(per 100K)	-0.003**	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)
PropFB	-0.088	0.001
	(0.067)	(0.068)
Prop Coll (Hisp)	-0.621***	-0.608***
	(0.103)	(0.103)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)	0.012***	0.010**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.228***	0.219***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Observations	245	245
R^2	0.458	0.464
Adjusted R^2	0.446	0.453
Residual Std. Error (df = 239)	0.072	0.072
F Statistic (df = 5; 239)	40.332***	41.392***

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016. $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Model 2 in Table 4.5 presents the results of a multivariate regression between *Trump's Share* among Latino registered voters and a dummy indicator for the presence of

Exempt LSOs (=1 if present, 0 otherwise) in a Texas county. Control variables are included in this model. The estimated coefficient for *Exempt* is negative and statistically significant (β = -.126, se = .015). This indicates that on average, Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters decreased in counties with at least one Exempt LSO in the 2016 election. The coefficient estimates for the control variables maintain the same direction and magnitude as in Model 1.

The results in Table 4.5 indicate that there is indeed a negative relationship between the presence of LSOs and the Republican presidential candidate's vote share among Latino registered voters in the 2016 election in Texas. To get a better look at this relationship, Table 4.6 repeats the previous analysis this time substituting the count versions of the key independent variables *Viva* and *Exempt*.

Model 1 of Table 4.6 presents the results of a multivariate regression between *Trump's Share* of Latino registered voters and *Viva* (the number of Viva Kennedy affiliates in a Texas county in 1960). Again, control variables are included in this model. The estimated coefficient for *Viva* is negative and statistically significant (β = -.013, se = 0.003). This indicates that as the number of Viva Kennedy affiliates increased in a county Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters in the 2016 election decreased. Substantively, the model predicts Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters to be .19 in a Texas county with the minimum number of Viva Kennedy LSOs in 1960 when all control variables are held at their mean values. In counties with the maximum number of Viva Kennedy LSOs, Trump's vote share of Latino registered voters is estimated to be at -.07. This prediction is clearly outside the realistic bounds of the dependent variable as a candidate can't have a negative share of a group's vote in an electoral contest. Nonetheless, the results show a clear link between the increasing presence of Viva Kennedy LSOs and decreased support for the Republican presidential candidates among Latino registered voters in 2016.

Looking at the control variables in Model 1 of Table 4.6, *TotPop* has a negative effect on Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters. The sign of the estimated coefficient for *PropFB* is negative but not statistically significant. *Prop Coll* has a negative and statistically significant effect on Trump's vote share among Latinos while *Med Hisp HHINC* has a positive effect.

Table 4.6 - Effect of LSOs (Count) on Trump's Vote Share Among Latinos (2016 Texas)

	Dependent variable:	
	Trump's Vote Share	
	(1)	(2)
Viva	-0.013***	
	(0.003)	
Exempt		-0.0001
		(0.0004)
TotPop(per 100K)	-0.003*	-0.005**

	(0.002)	(0.002)
PropFB	-0.071	-0.135[*]
	(0.074)	(0.077)
Prop Coll (Hisp)	-0.661[***]	-0.796[***]
	(0.114)	(0.115)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)	0.012[***]	0.014[***]
	(0.004)	(0.005)
Constant	0.216[***]	0.214[***]
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Observations	245	245
R^2	0.352	0.294
Adjusted R^2	0.338	0.279
Residual Std. Error (df = 239)	0.079	0.082
F Statistic (df = 5; 239)	25.923[***]	19.920[***]

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.   [*]$p<0.1$; [**]$p<0.05$; [***]$p<0.01$

Model 2 in Table 4.6 conducts a similar analysis regressing, *Trump's Vote Share* on the count version of *Exempt*, the number of Exempt LSOs in a Texas county. The estimated coefficient for *Exempt* is negative but not statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient is quite small in magnitude making it difficult to interpret what substantive effect, if any, *Exempt* has on Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters in the 2016 election. Among the control variables, most of the results are similar to those in Model 1. The only difference is that the coefficient for *PropFB* achieves statistical significance ($p<0.1$). In Model 2, as the share of the foreign-born population increased in Texas counties, Trump's vote share among Latino registered voters decreased in 2016.

Discussion and Conclusion

The results from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 provide strong support for Hypothesis 3 that the presence of LSOs will increase a Democratic candidate's vote share among Latino voters in elections. The results from Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide descriptive evidence of a relationship between the presence of LSOs and the Republican candidate's vote share among Latino voters in the 2016 election.

The results from Table 4.3 Model 1 and Table 4.4 Model 1 are quite intriguing given the data used to construct the independent variable, *Viva*. Given the historical nature of the Viva Kennedy LSO dataset, it is impressive to see that the politicization of Latino-serving community organizations by the Democratic party in the 1960s continues to have a reverberating impact on the aggregate preferences of the Latino vote even in 2016. While the cross-sectional results show that Viva Kennedy LSOs matter in shaping Latino electoral outcomes in 2016 the process by which Viva LSOs shape not only Latino

electoral outcomes but also the development of contemporary tax-exempt LSOs is less clear.

As I covered in Chapter 2, there is evidence that some tax-exempt LSOs active today have linkages to the Viva Kennedy movement of 1960. According to the Exempt LSO dataset, some organizations in the dataset are decades-old LULAC chapters that were active during the 1960 election and remain active today. Other organizations, such as Avenida Guadalupe Association, have a more indirect link to the Viva Kennedy Movement through networks with other organizations. While it is clear that the Latino community has a robust history of organizing, the path by which these organizations developed is less clear. A deeper qualitative study on the activities of LSOs across time will help us better understand the mechanisms by which LSOs develop and shape the preferences of Latino voters.

Understanding these links is important as it might push back on the narrative that Latinos are less socialized into the American political party system than their Black and white American counterparts. As early as the 2000s, a series of surveys on Latino political behavior have found that Latinos often tend to have weak part attachments. While this is certainly logical in the case of newly arriving immigrants and their children who, research has found, often go through a prolonged socialization process, much less has been written about later-generation Latinos and their partisanship. The connection between Viva Kennedy and contemporary Latino organizations implies that partisanship may stickier among Latinos than previously anticipated. More research is needed in understanding the role of Viva Kennedy in shaping Latino partisanship. As this dissertation evolves into a broader book project, a survey of LSOs in Texas will be undertaken to better understand the history of LSOs, how they view their role in politicizing their constituents and members, and how they work toward supporting certain candidates in elections.

Chapter 5: Future Avenues of Research

Conclusion and Thoughts for Future Research

In this dissertation, I have constructed a theory to explain how contextual factors, specifically political threats and Latino community organizations, shape Latino political participation in elections. I argue that racialized political threats in the form of immigration enforcement negatively affect Latino political participation due to its punitive nature and stereotyping of the Latino community as a threat to American society. Yet, I go on to argue that Latino serving organizations; descriptively representative, community-level, advocacy, and service-providing entities, can increase Latino political participation through their passively mobilizing, community-building activities. LSOs' ability to build civic capacity and psychological capital in their communities negates the demobilizing effects of heightened political threats to Latino electoral participation. In testing the hypotheses generated by my theory, this dissertation makes several contributions to the literature.

In Chapter 2, I construct two unique datasets of Latino-serving organizations to test my hypothesis that the presence of LSOs increases Latino political participation in elections. The first is a dataset of contemporary Latino-serving community organizations identified using the IRS EOBMF. The dataset built from the EO BMF includes a variety of LSOs including Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, immigrant centers, youth organizations, and community-building organizations. The second is a dataset of historical LSOs linked to the 1960 Viva Kennedy campaign. This was the first national-level GOTV campaign specifically created to mobilize Latino participation in the 1960 presidential election by co-opting already existing Latino community organizations. In Chapter 2, I employ a cross-sectional analysis of Latino participation in the 2016 election in Texas to show that the presence of both tax-exempt and Viva Kennedy LSOs across counties increased Latino voter registration and turnout compared to those counties where LSOs were absent.

In Chapter 3, I test the main set of hypotheses that the presence of LSOs can mitigate the negative effects of political threats, conceptualized as immigration enforcement, on Latino participation in elections. First, I use data on the removal of Latino immigrants in Texas through the Secure Communities program in 2016 to show that increasing immigration enforcement decreased Latino participation in the 2016 presidential election. I then combine this data on immigration enforcement with my datasets on the presence of LSOs to show that the presence of Viva Kennedy, but not tax-exempt, LSOs mobilized Latino voter turnout in the 2016 election when immigration enforcement increased.

In Chapter 4, I test my hypothesis that the presence of LSOs will lead to an increase in the Democratic candidate's vote share among Latino voters. To test this hypothesis, I generate measures of each of the 2016 presidential candidate's vote share among Latino registered voters in each Texas county using ecological inference. I then show that the presence of both Viva Kennedy and tax-exempt LSOs is associated with increases in the Democrat candidate's, Hillary Clinton, vote share among Latino

registered voters in 2016. In a descriptive analysis, I also show that the presence of LSOs is associated with a decrease in the Republican presidential candidate's, Donald Trump, vote share among Latino voters.

In testing these hypotheses, this dissertation's most significant contribution to the literature is its construction of a dataset of ethnic-serving community organizations generated from publicly available data (the EOBMF). For decades, the difficulty of constructing large-n datasets of community organizations forced scholars to limit their analyses of the relationship between community organizations and American political participation to small-n case studies. Such studies have limited our ability to generalize theories of the effect of community organizations on political participation across time, space, and ethnic groups. In response to this gap in the literature, this dissertation shows the utility of the EO BMF in constructing large n datasets of Latino-serving community organizations.

In addition, this dissertation, to my knowledge, is the first study to employ a measure of Latino community organizations in an analysis of Latino political participation and political threat. This is important because this study provides empirical evidence to support what Latino scholars and other racial and ethnic politics scholars have been arguing for decades. That is that ethnic community organizations matter in shaping the political behavior of racial and ethnic minorities. Given that minority communities have typically been under-mobilized by traditional political forces, ethnic community organizations have stepped up to fill the role of mobilizing civic and political action in their communities. The blueprint for identifying Latino-serving community organizations from the EO BMF developed in Chapter 2 will be useful for analyzing the relationship between community organizations and political participation in Latino communities outside of Texas. It can also be extended to identify ethnic community organizations among other minority groups. These two areas are ripe for research by future scholars.

This dissertation has provided evidence of a relationship between Latino-serving community organizations, the presence of increased political threats, and increased Latino participation in Texas in 2016. Yet, these results may be specific to this particular place and time. First, the Latino population in Texas is largely homogenous due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of Latinos in Texas are of Mexican descent. The Latino community in Texas is not representative of other Latino communities, particularly in the midwestern and eastern states where Latino populations are much more heterogeneous in terms of national origin (J. A. Garcia & Sanchez, 2021). In these regions, Cuban and Puerto Rican communities have historically constituted the majority of older Latino communities. In addition, over the last two decades increased immigration from Central and South America to the U.S. has greatly diversified both old and newly emerging Latino communities. Given that national origin has historically been a salient social and, sometimes, economic and political divide within the Latino community it would be interesting to see how the relationship between Latino community organizations and political participation operates in these communities. Do Latino organizations mobilize across national origin lines? Are there any political cleavages between Latino community organizations differentiated by national origin? Do non-Mexican Latino communities view immigration enforcement as a salient political threat

given that the Mexican-Latino community has largely borne the brunt of immigration enforcement?

A more basic question to ponder is whether the makeup of Latino-serving community organizations in heterogeneous Latino communities differs from those in homogenous communities. As noted in Chapter 2, some Latino organizations go to great lengths to highlight the national-origin identity of their community (i.e., Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Venezuelan, etc.). To these organizations, protecting their national-origin identities is a core part of their existence. On the other hand, other organizations emphasize the diversity of the Latino community by adding pan-ethnic identifiers to their organization's name (i.e., Latino/a/x, Hispanic, Spanish American). In these contexts, datasets of Latino-serving community organizations from the EO BMF will help us gain some insight into how Latino organizations in these heterogenous communities develop and whether these organizations change their names, mission statements, or activities in response to the changing demographic profile of their community.

Moving beyond the case of Latinos, the use of the EO BMF in identifying ethnic community organizations within other minority groups will aid scholars in gaining a broader understanding of the relationship between ethnic organizations and political participation. As a start, scholars might begin by employing the data-generating strategy I developed in Chapter 2 to develop datasets of tax-exempt ethnic community organizations in Asian American communities.

Asian Americans, like Latinos, are a very heterogenous population, with a number of national-origin, and linguistic groups under the Asian pan-ethnic umbrella (Espiritu, 1992; Lopez et al., 2017). Like Latinos, Asian Americans also have a strong connection to the immigration experience. As Espiritu (1992) writes, ethnic community organizations were key in shaping a pan-ethnic Asian American identity beginning in the 1960s. Yet, as in the Latino literature, we know little about the makeup and impact of Asian American community organizations across time and space. Scholars in the Asian American politics field might gain more insight into the makeup and distribution of Asian American organizations by employing the data-generating strategy developed in this dissertation in their studies.

This dissertation has shown the importance of Latino-serving community organizations in mitigating the demobilizing effects of political threats and shaping Latino electoral participation. The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation will be valuable in understanding Latino politics well into the future as many of the factors that were relevant in sparking the 2006 immigration protests are still relevant today. As of the time of this writing, the policy issue of immigration and immigration enforcement continues to be a salient issue to the Latino community. In the last 10 years, migrant caravans of people fleeing violence in Central America and seeking asylum in the U.S. have been designated as invasions by nativist politicians (Ainsely, 2021). Like in 2006, Congress is still struggling to find a solution to the U.S.' broken immigration system (Weissert & Licon, 2023). In the meantime, millions of Latino immigrants at the border, in detention centers, and in the interior of the U.S. remain in legal limbo and continue to shape the politics of the Latino community. No doubt, Latino community organizations will continue to play an important role in Latino political mobilization.

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Appendix

Table A2.1 – Distribution of Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Organizations by NTEE Code Located in Heavily Latino Census Tracts (Texas 2016)

NTEE Group Code	Description	Count	Exempt Org
A	Arts, Culture and Humanities	97	0
B	Education	268	0
E	Health-General and Rehabilitative	67	0
I	Crime, Legal-Related	39	0
J	**Employment, Job-Related**	**27**	1
K	Food, Agriculture and Nutrition	25	0
L	**Housing, Shelter**	**94**	1
M	Public Safety, Disaster Preparedness, and Relief	16	0
N	Recreation, Sports, Leisure, Athletics	108	0
O	**Youth Development**	**65**	1
P	**Human Services-Multipurpose and Other**	**269**	1
Q	International, Foreign Affairs, and National Security	21	0
R	**Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy**	**13**	1
S	**Community Improvement, Capacity Building**	**76**	1
T	Philanthropy, Voluntarism and Grantmaking Foundations	49	0
W	**Public, Society Benefit - Multipurpose and Other**	**28**	1
X	Religion-Related, Spiritual Development	805	0
Y	Mutual/Membership Benefit Organizations, Other	12	0
NA	NA	1932	0
Total		4011	

*Note: Table shows the number of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations located in majority Latino census tracts in Texas in 2016 after removing organizations that were deemed not to be community organizations and organizations whose IRS filing addresses, were unable to be matched to Census 2020 records. Organizations are grouped by NTEE code (see footnote 8). Of the 4011 organizations identified as Latino-serving, community-level organizations, 1,932 do not have NTEE codes. For those organizations that do have NTEE codes, only those that belong to groups that are **bolded** are identified as Latino Serving Organizations (LSO) based on the assumption that their primary tax-exempt activity will lead them to engage with the political process more frequently (N = 572). For organizations that did not have NTEE codes, I instead used their activity codes to determine whether they are LSOs are not (See Table A2).*

Table A2.2 – Distribution of Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Organizations by Activity Group Code Located in Heavily Latino Census Tracts (Texas 2016)

Activity Group	Count	Exempt Org
Advocacy	**9**	**1**
Business and Professional Organizations	**58**	**1**
Civil Rights Activities	**27**	**1**
Employee Membership Benefit Organizations	**80**	**1**
Housing Activities	**13**	**1**
Inner City or Community Activities	**26**	**1**
Legislative and Political Activities	**1**	**1**
Litigation and Legal Aid Activities	**1**	**1**
Other Activities Directed to Individuals	**17**	**1**
Other Purposes and Activities	85	0
Religious Organizations	730	0
Schools Colleges and Related Activities	389	0
Sports Athletic Recreational and Social Activities	33	0
Youth Activities	**31**	**1**
NA	423	0
Total	1923	

*Note: Table shows the distribution of Latino-serving, community-level organizations that did not have NTEE codes. Of the 1923 organizations that did not have NTEE codes, 1500 had at least one Activity code. These were used to determine whether an organization is considered a Latino Serving Organization or not. Organizations that fell within a group code that is **bolded** were determined to be LSOs (N = 263). Organizations that did not have either an NTEE code or an Activity code were dropped from further analysis. In total, I identify 835 LSOs present in Texas during the 2016 Presidential Election.*

Table A2.3 – Distribution of Viva Kennedy Affiliates in 1960

VIVA	22
LULAC	146
AGIF	37

Total	205	

Note: Distribution of the number of Viva Kennedy
Organizations and affiliates active during the 1960
presidential election. VIVA refers to the number of Viva
Kennedy chapters. LULAC refers to the number of League
of United Latin Americans chapters and AGIF refers to the
number of American GI Forum chapters.

Table A2.4 – Effect of LSOs (Dummy) on Latino Voter Registration in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:	
	Latino Voter Registration	
	(1)	(2)
Viva	0.054[**]	
	(0.022)	
Exempt		0.069[**]
		(0.027)
Constant	0.714[***]	0.717[***]
	(0.011)	(0.010)
Observations	253	253
R^2	0.022	0.026
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.022
Residual Std. Error (df = 251)	0.152	0.152
F Statistic (df = 1; 251)	5.741[**]	6.576[**]

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.
Independent variables *Viva* and *Exempt* are dummy
variables. Equal 1 if a *Viva* (*Exempt*) LSO is present in a
Texas county, equal 0 otherwise.

[*]$p<0.1$; [**]$p<0.05$; [***]$p<0.01$

Table A2.5 – Effect of LSOs (Count) on Latino Voter Registration in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:	
	Latino Voter Registration	
	(1)	(2)
Viva	0.009[*]	
	(0.005)	

Exempt		0.0003
		(0.001)
Constant	0.720***	0.726***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	253	253
R^2	0.015	0.001
Adjusted R^2	0.011	-0.003
Residual Std. Error (df = 251)	0.153	0.154
F Statistic (df = 1; 251)	3.764*	0.283

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.
Independent variables *Viva* and *Exempt* are count variables. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Equal the number of *Viva* (*Exempt*) LSOs in a Texas county.

Table A2.6 – Effect of LSOs (Dummy) on Latino Share of Voter Turnout in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:	
	Latino Share of Turnout	
	(1)	(2)
Viva	0.050	
	(0.036)	
Exempt		0.095**
		(0.043)
Constant	0.212***	0.209***
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Observations	250	250
R^2	0.008	0.019
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.015
Residual Std. Error (df = 248)	0.245	0.243
F Statistic (df = 1; 248)	1.901	4.864**

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.
Independent variables *Viva* and *Exempt* are dummy variables. Equal 1 if a *Viva* (*Exempt*) LSO is present in a Texas county, equal 0 otherwise.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A2.7 – Effect of LSOs (Count) on Latino Share of Voter Turnout in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:	
	Latino Share of Turnout	
	(1)	(2)
Viva	0.014[*]	
	(0.007)	
Exempt		0.002[*]
		(0.001)
Constant	0.212[***]	0.218[***]
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Observations	250	250
R^2	0.015	0.013
Adjusted R^2	0.011	0.009
Residual Std. Error (df = 248)	0.244	0.244
F Statistic (df = 1; 248)	3.752[*]	3.161[*]

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016.
Independent variables *Viva* and *Exempt* are count variables.   [*]p<0.1; [**]p<0.05; [***]p<0.01
Equal the number of *Viva* (*Exempt*) LSOs in a Texas county.

Table A2.8 – Effect of LSOs (Logged) on Latino Voter Registration in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:	
	Latino Voter Registration	
	(1)	(2)
Exempt	0.035	0.042
	(0.025)	(0.033)
TotPop(per 100K)		-0.008[***]
		(0.003)
PropFB		0.685[***]
		(0.136)
Prop Coll (Hisp)		-0.111
		(0.200)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)		-0.006
		(0.008)
Constant	0.722[***]	0.699[***]
	(0.010)	(0.034)

Observations	253	245
R^2	0.008	0.134
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.116
Residual Std. Error	0.153 (df = 251)	0.141 (df = 239)
F Statistic	1.966 (df = 1; 251)	7.413*** (df = 5; 239)

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016. The main independent variable, *Exempt*, is logged by base 10 in order to account for the number of outliers in the count version of *Exempt*. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A2.9 – Effect of LSOs (Logged) on Latino Share of Voter Turnout in the 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Dependent variable:	
	Latino Share of Turnout	
	(1)	(2)
Exempt	0.091**	0.151***
	(0.040)	(0.052)
TotPop(per 100K)		-0.006
		(0.005)
PropFB		0.036
		(0.219)
Prop Coll (Hisp)		-0.262
		(0.321)
Med Hisp HHINC (per 10K)		-0.0001
		(0.013)
Constant	0.212***	0.211***
	(0.016)	(0.055)
Observations	250	241
R^2	0.021	0.043
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.023
Residual Std. Error	0.243 (df = 248)	0.226 (df = 235)
F Statistic	5.287** (df = 1; 248)	2.122* (df = 5; 235)

OLS regression. Observations are Texas counties in 2016. The main independent *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

variable, Exempt, is logged by base 10 in
order to account for the number of outliers
in the count version of Exempt.

Figure A2.1 - Location of Viva Kennedy (1960) LSOs and Latino Population in Texas 2016

Note: Map displays the reach of the 1960 Viva Kennedy Campaign across Texas counties. A dot indicates the presence of at least one Viva Kennedy, LULAC, or AGIF Chapter. Also displayed is the proportion of the Latino population in each county calculated using statistics from the 2016 American Community Survey (5yr).

Figure A2.2 – Location of Exempt LSOs and Latino Population in Texas 2016
Note: Note: Map displays the presence of Exempt LSOs across Texas counties in 2016. A square indicates the presence of at least one Exempt LSO. Also displayed is the proportion of the Latino population in each county calculated using statistics from the 2016 American Community Survey (5yr).

Figure A2.3 – Distribution of Viva LSOs by Texas Counties

Note: Scatterplot shows the distribution of Viva LSOs across Texas counties. Counties that are named had at least one Viva LSO in 1960.

Figure A2.4 - Distribution of Exempt LSOs by Texas Counties

Note: Scatterplot shows the distribution of Exempt LSOs across Texas counties. Counties that are named had at least one Exempt LSO in 2016.

Figure A2.5 - Distribution of Latino Voter Registration by Texas Counties in 2016 Presidential Election

Note: Scatterplot shows the distribution of Latino Voter Registration (LVR) across Texas counties in the 2016 general presidential election. LVR is calculated as the share of the Latino CVAP that is registered to vote.

Figure A2.6 – Distribution of Share of Latino Turnout by Texas Counties in 2016 Presidential Election

Note: Scatterplot shows the distribution of the Share of Latino Turnout (SLT) across Texas counties in the 2016 general presidential election. SLT are estimates of the share of Latino registered voters in a county that cast ballots in the 2016 election calculated using King's Ecological Inference.

Figure A3.1 – Count of Deportations Under Secure Communities in Texas in 2016
Note: The bar plot displays the raw count of the number of individuals deported under the Secure Communities program by county in Texas in 2016. Counties in which more than one hundred individuals were deported are named.


Figure A3.2 – Count of Deportations Under Secure Communities in Texas in 2015
Note: The bar plot displays the raw count of the number of individuals deported under the Secure Communities program by county in Texas in 2015. Counties in which more than one hundred individuals were deported are named.

Figure A3.3 – Count of Deportations Under Secure Communities in Texas in 2014
Note: The bar plot displays the raw count of the number of individuals deported under the Secure Communities program by county in Texas in 2014. Counties in which more than one hundred individuals were deported are named.


Figure A3.4 – Count of Deportations Under Secure Communities in Texas in 2013
Note: The bar plot displays the raw count of the number of individuals deported under the Secure Communities program by county in Texas in 2013. Counties in which more than one hundred individuals were deported are named.

Figure A3.5 – Count of Deportations Under Secure Communities in Texas in 2012
Note: The bar plot displays the raw count of the number of individuals deported under the
Secure Communities program by county in Texas in 2012. Counties in which more than
one hundred individuals were deported are named.

Table A4.1 – Candidate Vote Share Among non-Latino
Voters in 2016 Presidential Election in Texas

	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Dev
Trump's Share	0.205	0.775	0.511	0.506	0.09
Clinton's Share	0.021	0.461	0.096	0.112	0.071
Other's Share	0.002	0.125	0.01	0.015	0.016
NoVote Share	0.114	0.545	0.369	0.367	0.068

Note: *N* = 254 Texas counties. Candidate vote shares shown
are for non-Latino registered voters in the 2016 election