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Military Achievement and Late-Republican Aristocratic Values, 81-49 BCE.

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by

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For Ranjani.

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ABSTRACT

Military Achievement and Late-Republican Aristocratic Values. 81-49 BCE.

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Our modern attempts to understand the aristocratic values of the Roman Republic have long held that military achievement was the most important sources of political prestige. Based largely upon middle-republican evidence, surveys of the aristocratic ethos often focus upon military activity at every stage of the senatorial career: aristocrats were expected to serve for long periods in the army as youths and then, upon obtaining political office, distinguish themselves as commanders. In discussions of aristocratic values, therefore, non-martial pursuits are frequently relegated to secondary importance. This model, however, reconciles poorly with the evidence we have from the Republic's best-attested period, the Late Republic. In the Republic's final generation we see clearly a number of sure signs that the aristocracy was increasingly spurning military activity in favor of non-martial political action. To name a few prominent examples: youthful military service was in decline, praetors and consul rejected traditionally-coveted command positions, and the frequency of triumphs fell precipitously.

These changes are part of a larger cultural renegotiation of the importance of military achievement that was taking place during the last decades of the Republic, and this dissertation aims to provide a more nuanced understanding of the extent of this shift in aristocratic values and the implications it had for the period. The middle-republican evidence does seem to suggest an elite preoccupation with military service, but the influence of this evidence has clouded our view of the ideological changes of the first century BCE. Rather than a monolithic system of aristocratic values, what we see in the Late Republic is competition between different views on what kind of actions should form the basis of aristocratic legitimacy, and disagreement often centered upon the role of military achievement. This project approaches the topic in three different ways: Chapter 1 examines how common youthful military service was among the Roman elite. Chapter 2 takes a closer look at a problem we have some evidence for in the first century: inexperience among military commanders. And the final chapter provides a new, values-focused reading of the epistolary exchange between Cicero and Cato about Cicero's pursuit of triumph. A better understanding of this cultural shift will also have some major implications for many of the main historical narratives regarding the Late Republic.

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1. Introduction:
A Farewell to Arms?

Prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest, in qua multi apud maiores nostros existiterunt; semper enim fere bella gerebantur. Tua autem aetas incidit in id bellum, cuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, altera felicitates parum. Quo tamen in bello cum te Pompeius alae [alteri] praefecisset, magnum laudem et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare equitando, iaculando, omni militari labore tolerando. Atque ea quidem tua laus partier cum re publica cecidit.

Now, the first recommendation for a young man seeking glory is to obtain it, if he is able to, by military means. Many among out ancestors distinguished themselves in this way; indeed, they were always waging war. Your youth, however, has come during a war in which one side had too much wickedness and the other too little luck. Yet, when Pompey gave you a cavalry command in this war you gained great praise from that best man and from the army for your riding, javelin-throwing, and ability in all the labors of the soldier. But when the Republic died the praise you gained from these things did as well. (Cic. *Off.* 2.45)

This advice from Cicero to his son in 44 BCE reads like a roller coaster. It is, of course, surprising that the first recommendation from a man who mostly avoided military activity throughout his own career was for his son to gain *gloria* via military activity. Cicero, however, swiftly qualifies his statement: this route to *gloria* was more common among the *maiores* than it was contemporarily. Further undermining his own *prima commendatio,* Cicero pours more cold water on the prospect of military activity: Marcus' youth has coincided with the Civil War, a type of conflict which did not yield prestige as foreign wars did. But he then switches direction again; even in this war Marcus acquitted himself well and managed to win *laus* from the army and from Pompey himself. Yet, in a final *volte-face*, Cicero laments that the good reputation Marcus earned under Pompey was rendered void by the result of the conflict: the death of the Republic. It must have been a difficult portion of the *de Officiis* for young Marcus to make sense of, and the modern reader is in no different a position. It is no surprise that the elder Cicero hastily moved on to a discussion of *opera animi*, a field of activity with which he had more experience.

Despite this ambivalence, this passage, along with two others from the Ciceronian corpus, is cited by William Harris as an instance in which Cicero, despite the efforts he made throughout his career to the contrary, "admits that military achievements are the pre-eminent source of fame at Rome, the most glorious of the three standard aristocratic occupations (the others being jurisprudence and oratory)."[1] Even a cursory glance at the passage, however, shows that what Cicero is suggesting is rather more complicated than a momentary acknowledgement of a political reality he had gone to great lengths to avoid. In fact, the reader comes away from *de Officiis* 2.45 rather unclear regarding Cicero's valuation of military activity, an uncertainty which is better understood as a reflection of the author's own uncertainty on the subject than as dissimulation. Harris sees Cicero admitting that military activity trumped others in terms of political prestige, but in reality what we have is simultaneously simpler and more difficult to account for: contradiction. The other "admissions" cited by Harris can be similarly problematized. We can travel back nearly 20 years from the *de Officiis* to 63 BCE, the year of Cicero's greatest triumph. In defending Murena Cicero clearly argued for the superiority of military achievement relative to legal and oratorical activity in yielding political prestige, but later he would memorialize his own actions in 63 with the equally transparent epitaph: *arma cedant togae.*[2] Likewise, most of the figures of Roman greatness cited by Cicero in *Tusc.* 1.110 are primarily remembered as men of military achievement (with the notable exception of Cato Uticensis), but in the same work Cicero calls military command the "shadowy phantom of

[1] Harris 1979: 22. He also cites *de Or.* 1.7; *Tusc.* 1.109-10; *Mur.* 19-30.

[2] Cic. *Mur.* 19-30. *Off.* 1.77.

gloria."[3] In fact, earlier in the *de Officiis* (1.74) Cicero did not attempt to conceal the importance of military activity at all, confessing that many thought that achievements in war were more important than domestic triumphs (*sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quam urbanas*). This was an idea, however, he felt needed to be corrected (*minuenda est haec opinio*).

As we have seen, Harris reconciles Cicero's contradictory statements by labeling one group artiface and the other reality, but this oversimplifies. Instead, I shall argue that the confusion displayed by Cicero on the value of military achievement is indicative of a more complicated cultural phenomenon in the Late Republic. Aristocratic values in this period are rarely discussed by scholars in their own right (Harris's work is on imperialism, and he only discusses aristocratic values *passim*) and when they are we are often presented with a monolithic model which focuses upon the importance and value of military achievement.[4] These attempts to understand republican aristocratic values have most often taken a *longue durée* approach that has privileged the evidence pertaining the the Middle Republic, a time when the Roman aristocracy has been most frequently characterized as a kind of warrior elite. In this model, it was of paramount importance for the young aristocrat to prove his *virtus* in order to launch his political career, and for continued success on the *cursus honorum* it was crucial to prove himself a capable commander of Rome's legions. The pinnacle of his career would be his consulship,

[3] Cic. *Tusc.* 3.2.3

[4] E.g. Most notably Harris 1979: 22ff and throughout; Develin 1985: 90ff; Richardson 1986: 41, 177; Rich 1993: 54; McDonnell 2006: 181-195; Rosenstein 2006 & 2007; Mouritsen 2015: 158; Tatum 2015: 258-9; and recently Van der Blom 2016: 54-9 (commenting on shifts to other forms of political capital in the first century).

when he would more than likely be expected to command Rome's armies in the most-pressing theaters of war, and his crowning achievement – if he were lucky – would be to ride in the triumphal chariot to dedicate the spoils from his victory. These were the primary functions and ambitions of the governing class.

Most who present this militaristic understanding of the republican aristocracy have trouble, however, reconciling their model with aristocratic behavior in the Republic's last generation, a period in which participation in domestic political activities – most recognizably oratory – was on the rise and more figures without claims to martial *virtus* appear among the powerful in the Curia. Throughout this project I will discuss in detail several unmistakable signs that the attitude of the aristocracy towards the traditional military ethos was changing dramatically. To tease a few prominent examples: Youthful military service seems to have been on the decline among the elite, praetors and consuls were rejecting opportunities to command armies in the field, the rate of triumphs fell sharply.[5] Trends such as these point somewhat straightforwardly to an obvious conclusion: The Roman aristocracy was less interested in achieving and displaying excellence in war. Yet, this conclusion pairs rather awkwardly with the hyper-militaristic conceptions of republican aristocratic values we are presented with, and as we have already seen from Harris's use of *de Officiis* 2.45 this model can influence how we read the late-republican evidence.

This project seeks to provide a more-nuanced account of the status of military achievement as a political value in the period between the dictatorship of Sulla and the Civil

[5] Chapter 2 of this work gives a detailed examination of this trend, but at the moment see Rich 2014: 235-7

War between Caesar and Pompey. Without a doubt, military achievement was of vital importance to the aristocracy's claims to power and could yield immense political capital to the successful general; I will not be arguing against this. Yet, despite the fact that the primacy of military achievement is often taken for granted in modern scholarship, in the period between 81-49 BCE we find an aristocracy which cannot agree on precisely this issue, one much more complex than simply "who should be in charge?" It may be that the middle-republican evidence shows a strong community consensus on the foundational importance of military achievement to both the individual aristocratic career *and* the legitimacy of the elite as a group, although even this is perhaps somewhat overstated at times.[6] Yet, I will show in this project that our evidence from the Late Republic shows clearly that there were different, competing ideas within the aristocracy about how military achievement should be valued in the community and on what foundation aristocratic authority should rest. Recognition and analysis of this cultural renegotiation is crucial for our understanding of the period.

This project, although it deals with military activity, is not primarily concerned with battle tactics, equipment, or even the narrative of military events in the Late Republic *per se.* Instead, I will deal with the political value of military activity and how such activity was evaluated by different members of the political community. Centering this study upon values addresses an important gap in the scholarly discussion on political culture of the Late Republic, but at the opening of this project I want to stress that I am not claiming that the changes and events I am discussing were a result *only* of shifting values; pragmatic concerns

[6] Rosenstein's (2006) piece on aristocratic values will be discussed in detail but does a much better job of addressing non-military sources of prestige in the Middle Republic.

(such as the expansion of the Senate, wealth, administrational changes in the army, and the changing nature of provincial commands, etc.) were certainly influential and could themselves provide an impetus for changes in values. But scholarship, as we shall see below, has focused almost exclusively on pragmatic concerns in explaining the different ways in which we see the aristocracy shifting away from military activity. Thus, while I do not believe we should discount the effect such pragmatic concerns may have had on how aristocrats determined the relative value of military and domestic activities, it is time for ideology to have its day in this discussion.

Of course, if we wish to understand the changes of the late second and early first centuries BCE we must begin by casting our eye further in the past. After all, it is the values of the Middle Republic that the men of the first century inherited as "traditional." This presents something of an interpretive problem since the sources for the period of change – the Late Republic – are much more plentiful and substantial than the time preceding the shift. Nevertheless, there exists a network of texts which have come to define our understanding of aristocratic values in the Middle Republic, and I will take this opportunity to discuss a few prominent examples. The inscription on the tomb of L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (cos. 298 BCE) gives us a brief but valuable piece of evidence from the early third century BCE:

Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus Gnaivod patre | prognatus, fortis vir sapiensque, quoius forma virtutei parisuma | fuit, consol censor aidilis quei fuit apud vos Taurasia Cisauna | Samnio cepit, subigit omne Loucanam opsidesque abdoucit. (*CIL* VI.1285)[7]

Lucius Cornelius Scipio Barbatus, son of Gnaeus. He was a strong and wise man whose good looks matched his *virtus.* He was consul, censor, and aedile among you. He seized Taurasia and Cisauna in Samnium and conquered all of Lucania and led back hostages.

[7] Admittedly the text of the *elogium* on the front of the tomb, quoted here, is after 200 BCE – later than the epitaph on the front.

Looking at the inscription on this tomb, what should we imagine a young Roman was supposed to aspire to? It seems wisdom, attractiveness, and military achievement. Good looks are hard to come by outside of genetic luck, but all young aristocrats were able to aspire to deeds of *virtus* on the battlefield. Barbatus' son apparently did not share his father's handsomeness, so his *elogium* focuses on the capture of Corsica and Aleria. In the case of L. Cornelius Scipio (quaestor 167 BCE), his tomb championed most prominently his *father's* splendid victory over Antiochus III at Magnesia. One other Scipio is remembered as having become *flamen dialis,* but sadly a premature death kept him from *honos, fama, virtusque* – martial prowess and its rewards.[8]

The tombs of the *Scipiones*, it would seem, place a premium on military achievement, even if such a conclusion requires some small measure of reading in between the lines. Polybius was much more straightforward. In a world where war was an almost constant reality, Polybius conceded that courage was important in all states, but he argued it was most valued in Rome.[9] By this Polybius did not mean that Rome went to war more often than other Mediterranean states;[10] the distinction he was making is ideological: Rome *prioritized* martial prowess to a greater extent than other political communities. This fact, as Polybius saw it, was at the heart of his explanation of how the Romans "in less than 53 years conquered almost the entire world and brought it under their sole governance."[11] In a later passage he provided an

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[8] *CIL* VI.1286, 1288 and 1296.

[9] Polyb. 31.29.1 ***Λοιποῦ δ' ὄντος τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν <μέρους> καὶ κυριωτάτου σχεδὸν ἐν πάσῃ μὲν πολιτείᾳ μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ,***

[10] See notably Eckstein 2006.

[11] Polyb. 1.1.5 ***τίς γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥᾴθυμος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιτο γνῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν***

example of his theory in action. The Romans were able to come back from continuous defeats at the hands of Hannibal thanks to their customs (**ἐθισμῶν**), which worked to motivate young Roman men to accomplish great deeds.[12]

In the passage from Polybius book 31 I just mentioned the author used the term **ἀνδρεία** for courage, but the Romans probably would have used the Latin word *virtus* as the epitaphs of the Scipiones did. *Virtus* was perhaps the most important value for republican aristocrats, and the best study on the subject recognizes clearly that in the Middle Republic *virtus* denoted prowess on the battlefield.[13] The two major temples to *Virtus* in the city were both dedicated as a result of and in celebration of military achievements.[14] On a coin from 70 BCE *Honos et Virtus* are depicted as military virtues, *Honos* wearing a laurel crown and *Virtus* wearing a helmet.[15] Myles McDonnell highlights fragment of Ennius, a friend to the Scipiones, which illustrates the meaning of *virtus* nicely:[16]

οὐχ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὑρίσκεται γεγονός,

[12] Polyb. 6.52.10-1 ***διαφέρουσι μὲν οὖν καὶ φύσει πάντες Ἰταλιῶται Φοινίκων καὶ Λιβύων τῇ τε σωματικῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ ταῖς ψυχικαῖς τόλμαις· μεγάλην δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθισμῶν πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ποιοῦνται τῶν νέων παρόρμησιν.***

[13] McDonnell 2006. Balmaceda 2017 is more recent and also excellent, but more limited in its scope than McDonnell.

[14] M. Claudius Marcellus built an addition to an already existing temple of *Honos* to celebrate his capture of Syracuse in 211 BCE. His son dedicated it in 205 BCE Marius built another temple to *Honos et Virtus* after his victory over the Cimbri and Teutoni. See Scullard 1981: 165-6.

[15] *RRC* 403. Also see *RRC* 401 (71 BCE). See also Scullard 1981: 165-6; for the coin see Plate 41.30.

[16] McDonnell 2006: 6ff.

Melius est virtute ius: nam saepe virtutem mali
Nanciscuntur: ius atque aecum se a malis spernit procul. (Enn. *The Ransom of Hector* Fr. 200-1)

Justice is preferable to *virtus*: for evil men often stumble upon *virtus*.
Justice and equality, however, despise the evil from a distance.

The meaning of *virtus* in the Late Republic possessed a much broader ethical range, but here – given that "evil men" are able to obtain it – it would be hard to argue that *virtus* entailed much more than skill on the battlefield. Again, our sources are not so plentiful as we should like, but from the limited amount of evidence we have it is evident that even in earlier Roman history, when it signified little else than martial ability, *virtus* was the value around which the aristocratic identity was organized. The potency of *virtus* is attested by late-republican authors as well. Sallust, looking longingly backwards (as was his custom), wrote of the aristocracy during the earlier Republic as a time when the "only competition" among the elite was to distinguish themselves in respect to their *virtus*.[17] In the preface to his *Jugurtha* he says that gazing upon the masks of his ancestors lit the spirit of the young man ablaze to live up to their example of *virtus*.[18] In his *de Republica* Cicero has Scipio Aemilianus say that eagerness for *gloria*, a concept closely related to *virtus*, motivated Roman aristocrats to do great deeds and that Rome's *principes* were nourished by it.[19]

The goal for young Roman aristocrats was to climb the *cursus honorum* by repeatedly securing election to political office. Karl Hölkeskamp refers to the necessity of a political career

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[17] Sall. *Cat.* 7.

[18] Sall. *BJ* 4.5-6.

[19] Cic. *Rep.* 5.7.

as the "fundamental fact of Roman aristocratic life."[20] Naturally, the curriculum of the aristocratic education can tell us much about what the community envisioned service to the state entailed. This is not unique to Rome; from an Althusserian perspective education is one of society's foundational institutions for producing and reinforcing ideology.[21] Studies which focus upon the militaristic nature of the Roman elite therefore naturally highlight the rigorous martial education young Romans were accustomed to receive.[22] Certainly many also received some literary training, but by all indications such pursuits were limited in scope and secondary in emphasis. Cato the Elder's sons likely received a more robust literary education than others given their father's efforts as an author but they were also busy with the rest of their studies: to throw the javelin, to fight while wearing armor, to ride horses, to box, endure the elements, and swim.[23] Even Cicero, who more often than not eschewed the camp, comments upon the same activities in the education of his son. [24]

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[20] Hölkeskamp 2010: 91.

[21] See most notably Althusser 1970.

[22] Bonner 1977: 9ff; Harris 1979: 14ff; Meier 1982: 56ff; McDonnell 2006: 181ff; Goldsworthy 2006: 37ff.

[23] Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 20.4.

[24] Cic. *Off.* 2.45. We might also connect to this the account of the education of Jugurtha in Sallust (*BJ* 6.1). Morstein-Marx 2001 has commented on the perception that Jugurtha's upbringing reminds the reader of the Persian youth education from Herodotus and Xenophon, his argument is compelling. I would also suggest that the Numidian past times as presented by Sallust (*equitare, iaculari, cursu cum aequalibus certare*) could just as easily (perhaps even more easily) remind one of the traditional Roman education. Meier 1982: 56-72 is a good source for those interested in how the curriculum of the aristocratic education broadened in the Late Republic.

The military education of young aristocrats also swiftly transitioned from theoretical to practical. At age 17 young Roman elites were expected to begin their service in the cavalry. According to Polybius, those who wished to have a political career (again, we should imagine this included nearly all the aristocratic youth) were obligated to serve 10 campaigns with the army before seeking public office.[25] This meant that every future senator would have spent nearly his entire young life in camp. Further, it was not enough to be present, future politicians needed to prove their *virtus* through exemplary achievements in battle. Sallust, for example, singles out being the first to strike an enemy or the first to mount a wall.[26] It was, of course, always most dangerous to be the first, and even more daunting when one considers that cavalrymen did not even wear protective armor until the Second Punic War.[27]

Since Roman society placed such importance on martial activity, the community also naturally developed symbols and decorations to distinguish and honor them. Battlefield citations were material recognitions of *virtus.* There were at least seven different classifications of *coronae* that were distributed for various acts of valor, with recipients ranging from common

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[25] Polyb. 6.19.4. **πολιτικὴν δὲ λαβεῖν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔξεστιν οὐδενὶ πρότερον, ἐὰν μὴ δέκα στρατείας ἐνιαυσίους ᾖ τετελεκώς.**

[26] Sall. *Cat.* 7. See also Polyb. 6.39.4 where he mentions that cavalrymen were encouraged to seek dangerous actions even when the battle did not necessarily require them: **τυγχάνει δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἐὰν ἐν παρατάξει τις ᾖ πόλεως καταλήψει τρώσῃ τινὰς ἢ σκυλεύσῃ τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἐν ἀκροβολισμοῖς ἤ τισιν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς μηδεμιᾶς ἀνάγκης οὔσης κατ᾽ ἄνδρα κινδυνεύειν αὐτοί τινες ἑκουσίως καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν αὑτοὺς εἰς τοῦτο διδόασι.**

[27] Rosenstein 2006: 367. This not only allowed the cavalryman a wider range of movement while on horseback, but also often resulted in scars which could later be used as proof of *virtus.*

soldier to consular commander.[28] The feats recognized by these *coronae* were, naturally, quite dangerous. The *corona obsidionalis* (also called the "grass crown," or "siege crown") was given to one who raised a siege and thereby saved lives.[29] The *corona civica* (or "civic crown") was given to one who saved the life of a fellow citizen on the battlefield without yielding any ground. Being the first to mount an enemy wall (an achievement which, as we saw above, Sallust praised specifically) was rewarded with the *corona muralis.* Nor did the expectation that an aristocrat would put his life in extraordinary danger on battle end once he left the cavalry for a command position. Up to the middle of the second century BCE there was still an active tradition of monomachy – dueling with an enemy leader or champion: M. Servilius Pulex Geminus (cos. 202 BCE) claimed to have fought at least twenty-three duels. Scipio Aemilianus' duel with a Celtiberian chieftain in the middle of the second century is the last known example.[30] Thus, young Romans were encouraged not only to serve in the army, but to do so in a manner that exposed them to the harshest realities of war and the most intense types of combat.

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[28] See Gell. *NA* 6.5; as well as Maxfield 1981 and Le Bohec, Yann (Lyon) "Decorations, military," in *BNP*.

[29] See Pliny *NH* 22.4-6. The grass crown was bestowed rarely, usually to officers or soldiers who managed to rescue a seemingly-doomed group of troops. Pliny wrote that the crown was always awarded *in desperation*. Maxfield (1981: 68) mistakenly claims that Pliny listed six recipients, he actually listed eight: L. Siccius Dentatus, P. Decius Mus (cos. 340 BCE), Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator (dic. 221, 217 BCE), M. Calpurnius Flamma (a military tribune during the First Punic War), Cn. Petreius Atinas (a centurian in the Cimbrian War), Sulla (in recognition of the siege at Nola during the Social War), Q. Sertorius (as a military tribune in Spain in 97 BCE), and Augustus.

[30] For Geminus see Livy 45.39.16-9; Plu. *Aem.* 31.2. For Scipio see Polyb. 35.5.1. Harris 1979: 38-39 gives a summary of known examples of Roman monomachy in the notes.

When he returned from the field the tokens of *virtus* earned by an aspiring politician could be put to effective use. Pliny the Elder tells us that when a recipient of the *corona civica* entered the games it was custom for everyone, including the senatorial members of the audience, to stand up.[31] Julius Caesar, for example, was awarded the *corona civica* in 80/79 BCE for his valor during the storming of Mytilene; he was only twenty years old at the time.[32] This recognition of his *virtus* must have greatly aided his early career. Like the warriors themselves, aristocratic homes could also accumulate signs of military prowess of their inhabitants. The most famous example of this was the display of wax ancestor masks (*imagines*) in the atrium of the home.[33] Young aristocrats would pass these masks daily, and to some extent we are given the impression that these masks seemed to stare back at their living counterparts. In exceptional cases the exterior of home would be decorated with the spoils won by its inhabitant, and these spoils often remained even after the home came into another's possession.[34]

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[31] Plin. *NH* 16.5; See also Gell. 5.6.11; Luc. 1.358.

[32] Suet. *DJ* 1.2; App. 2.106 tells us that some of Caesar's later statues featured him wearing the *corona civica*, although recently Brigit Bergman 2010 (following Weinstock 1971) argues convincingly that this was in reference to his *clementia* shown to citizens during the Civil War and not to his award from Mytilene. For the date of the storming of Mytilene see Butler & Cary 1982: 45.

[33] Flower 1996 is still the best study of *imagines*.

[34] Ascon. 43.13-4; Polyb. 6.39.9-10; Suet. *Nero* 38.2 is often cited for the decoration of homes with the spoils from foreign wars (in this case ones that had burned down). See also Ovid *Met.* 1.168-76; Pliny *NH* 35.6ff. Useful in secondary literature: Wiseman 1987; Flower 1996: 41ff; McDonnell 2006: 182-3

No military honor was as coveted or prestigious as the triumph. That there has been a long and lively debate over whether or not the *triumphator* took on a divine status during his chariot ride up the Capitoline Hill betrays the importance and grandeur of a successful general's welcome home.[35] During the aristocratic funeral, Polybius tells us, those who had reached the consulship were represented in togas with purple borders, those who had been censor with an entirely purple toga, and those who had triumphed wore a toga embroidered with gold. This interesting sartorial distinction not only shows the importance of the triumph, but also its kinship with high public office.[36] Put simply and literally, the triumph was the crowning achievement of the aristocratic career. It was the moment, T.P. Wiseman once wrote, "that a Roman knew he was first, best, and greatest."[37]

Military decorations and triumphs were not only valuable to the individual senator; the political class gained their legitimacy from broadcasting their success on the battlefield. There has been much debate on how much political power the Roman People wielded in the republican system of government, and it is not within the purview of this project to review the bibliography exhaustively.[38] What is important for our purposes is that it *is* generally agreed

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[35] See Harris 1979: 25-7; Rosenstein 2006: 370ff; Rüpke 2006.

[36] Polyb. 6.53.7 ***οὗτοι δὲ προσαναλαμβάνουσιν ἐσθῆτας, ἐὰν μὲν ὕπατος ἢ στρατηγὸς ᾖ γεγονώς, περιπορφύρους, ἐὰν δὲ τιμητής, πορφυρᾶς, ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τεθριαμβευκὼς ἤ τι τοιοῦτον κατειργασμένος, διαχρύσους***. See also Rosenstein 2006.

[37] Wiseman 1985: 4

[38] The so-called "traditional" understanding of Roman political life emphasized the oligarchic nature of political culture and the web of patronage relationships through which the inner elite controlled the affairs of the state. The authors most commonly associated with this view are Gelzer 1969, Münzer [1920]1963, and Syme 1939. More recent scholarship has questioned this view, beginning with Fergus Millar through a series of articles largely

that there was an understanding within the Roman political community, at least at an ideological level, that the People entrusted the management of state affairs to the political class in view of the common good. It was crucial, therefore, that the elite be perceived to be administering the state effectively in order to retain this trust. Senatorial legitimacy within the community rested on the body's ability to communicate the effectiveness of its administration, and military achievement played an indispensable role in this effort.

To this end, Polybius wrote that the triumph was an opportunity to "bring the actual spectacle of their achievements before the eyes of their fellow-citizens."[39] Although the triumph was technically a thanksgiving to Jupiter and in practice a celebration of an individual *triumphator,* we should also understand that the procession did much to bolster senatorial claims to successful administration of state affairs.[40] That is to say, the individual *triumphator* certainly gained immense personal prestige from the triumph, but regardless of who celebrated the honor, it also served as a powerful reminder of senatorial capability and success. Further, we have already seen some examples of how the private spaces inhabited by Roman aristocrats communicated the importance of military achievements, but in public spaces in Rome were

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represented in Millar 2002, but also importantly in his monograph *The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic* 1998. North 1990 is a very insightful discussion on the debate (at least as of 1990). More recent work has built upon Millar's findings and rolled back some of his more radical claims. See also Morstein-Marx 2004; 2013 & the more critical Hölkeskamp 2010. The most compelling recent contribution is Morstein-Marx 2015. Finally, most recently Mouritsen 2017 has attempted (unsuccessfully in my opinion) to undermine any sense of a democratic element within the Roman constitution.

[39] Polb. 6.15.8 *τοὺς γὰρ προσαγορευομένους παρ' αὐτοῖς θριάμβους, δι' ὧν ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ἄγεται τοῖς πολίταις ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἡ τῶν κατειργασμένων πραγμάτων ἐνάργεια…*

[40] Hölkeskamp 1987: 219; Rüpke 2006: 252.

also filled with reminders of military success. The Rostra, of course, was so-called because it displayed the beaks of ships captured during the defeat of Antium in 338 BCE. Also erected in the Comitium in the fourth century BCE in celebration of victory over Antium was the Columna Maenia. The temple of the Dioscuri in the Forum was originally a fifth century monument commemorating the victory of the Battle of Lake Regillus, but the Dioscuri were also invoked in several other Republican military conflicts and frequently received spoils from new victories.[41] The Forum itself would have been filled with statues of individuals, but unfortunately little is known about them aside from the anecdotal evidence. Not all statues commemorated military achievement. We know, for instance, that a statue of Attus Navius, an augur from the regal period, stood in the Comitium.[42] There was also a statue (albeit not in the Forum) of Cornelia, the daughter of Scipio Africanus and mother of the Gracchi.[43] Yet, Cicero gives us the impression that the majority of commemorative statues made use of military

[41] For the foundation of the temple and its connection to the Battle of Lake Regillus see Dion. Hal. 6.13.1-2. Some examples of later appropriations of the Dioscuri for military purpose: Marcius Tremulus dedicated an equestrian statue in from of the temple to commemorate his victory over the Samnites in 305 BCE (Plin. *HN* 34.23.2). T. Quinctius Flamininus alleged that the Dioscuri had contributed to his victory at Cynoscephalae in 197 BCE (Plut. *Flam.* 12) The gods themselves were rumored to have appeared in the Forum to announce L. Aemilius Paullus's victory at Pydna in 167 BCE (Plin. *HN* 7.86; Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.6; Plut. *Aem.* 24.4-6). A similar story is linked to Marius' victory at Vercellae in 101 BCE (Plin. *HN* 7.86.3) Sulla had also claimed the aid of the Dioscuri in his capture of Jugurtha (*LIMC* III.1.622-23, no. 109). See Rebeggiani 2003: 55-6.

[42] Livy 1.36.5.

[43] Plin. *HN* 34.14. The statue was in the colonnade of Metellus; the pedestal inscription still survives (ILS 68). See also Flory 1993 for a useful history of statues dedicated to women in the Roman Republic.

imagery.[44] These are just some of the visual reminders of past military success that the Senate wished to bring before the eyes of the People. What is clear is that in the most important discursive spaces in the city, the Senate chose to emphasize military achievements.[45]

This has been a necessarily brief catalogue of some of the most prominent pieces of evidence we have about the role of military achievement in republican political culture, but the strength of this and similar evidence has produced a somewhat monolithic understanding of aristocratic values in the Republic. The most prominent work on aristocratic preoccupation with military achievement is William V. Harris's (1979) *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome.* Harris's work responded to the theory, orthodox up to that point, that Rome's empire had expanded not because of bellicosity of desire for territorial expansion, but through a series or military actions in defense of her friends and allies. In place of this "defensive imperialism," Harris argued that Roman foreign policy was aggressive rather than reactionary, and that it was the political community's insatiable desire for military achievement which drove the expansion of Roman *imperium.* As we have already seen (and as anyone familiar with republican political culture will doubtlessly be already aware), each generation of aristocrats was under pressure not only to live up to the achievements of their ancestors, but also to surpass them. This pressure, Harris argues, motivated aristocrats to seek out conflicts in which they might distinguish themselves. Further, as I have already discussed above, the senatorial class rested their

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[44] Cic. Off. 1.61. *maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnitudine excellit. Declaratur autem studium bellicae gloriae, quod statuas quoque videmus ornatu fere militari.*

[45] Harris 1979: 20ff, 261-2 for a helpful catalogue of "The Fame of Victorious Commanders as it was Reflected in the Monuments." See also Morstein-Marx 2004: 92ff; Hölkeskamp 2012.

legitimacy on claims to service to the Republic, particularly military service. Thus, Harris's understanding is that these intra-societal political pressures drove the state to nearly constant war in order to feed the ambitions of the aristocracy and the political narratives within the community that supported their hegemony.

There have been effective challenges to Harris in recent years, but mostly ones which deal with his understanding of foreign policy – not aristocratic values.[46] For the time period Harris examined (327-70 BCE) the supremacy of military achievement within the political sphere is still widely accepted. More recently (2006) Harris' student Myles McDonnell advances a similar understand of traditional aristocratic values in his study: *Roman Manliness:* Virtus *and the Roman Republic,* in which he asserts that the term denoted courage in battle until the meaning expanded in the Late Republic. Even more important for scholarship in the last decade is Nathan Rosenstein's piece (2006) on aristocratic values which provides a more nuanced view by discussing other important sources of glory. Oratory, for instance, had always played a significant role in Roman politics, and it is clear that by at least the time of Scipio Aemilianus aristocrats were expected to plead in the courts. Yet, while excellence in public speaking could help to distinguish an aristocrat from his peers, Rosenstein maintains that without some evidence of military valor it was difficult to launch a political career. The

[46] Gruen 1984 argues for Rome's reluctance to become directly involved in the Greek east; Kallet(=Morstein)-Marx 1995 takes Gruen's findings further into the late Republic and finds a similar Roman reluctance to become directly involved in eastern conflicts; Eckstein 2006 uses International Relations Theory to show that Rome's militarism was not exceptional within the network of Mediterranean communities; Richardson 2008 uses a philological approach to argue that the Republic lacked an idea of a territorial empire until the reign of Augustus; Burton 2011 furthers Eckstein's IR model to include IR Constructivism, and examines how Roman ideas of *fides* and *amicitia* constrained its foreign policy.

preoccupation with military activity even bleeds into Rosenstein's conception of non-military activity; pleading in the courts could, he argues, be seen as a form of ritualized combat.[47] The military-focused understanding of republican aristocratic values fits well with the middle-republican evidence upon which it is based, and we might therefore think of it as our best picture of "traditional" aristocratic values. But scholarship has increasingly recognized that the middle-republican aristocratic militaristic ethos and the evidence from the Late Republic reconcile poorly. In response scholars have most often attributed change in this period to pragmatic concerns. Starting again with the aristocratic youth and education, the values and skills emphasized in the first century differ from those outlined above. By the second century BCE oratory had already gained a strong foothold in the aristocratic education. Harris makes much of Cicero's comment that there was not a practioner of "legitimate and proper" oratory until the middle of the second century BCE.[48] But Scipio's lament to Polybius, that he was thought "un-Roman" because he refused to plead in the courts illustrates how important forensic activity had become for the aristocratic identity.[49] Certainly by the Republic's last generation the aristocratic education now centered upon oratorical learning.[50]

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[47] Rosenstein 2006: 368ff.

[48] Cic. *Brut.* 82. Servius Galba (cos. 144 BCE). Further, Cicero doesn't allow for a Roman orator who deployed Greek rhetorical theory until M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina (cos. 137 BCE). See also Harris 1979: 14.

[49] Polyb. 31.23.10-2

[50] We will see example of this throughout the project, but for the moment see especially Tac. *Dial.* 28-35, which gives us a much less militaristic picture of the aristocratic education.

On the battlefield too, aristocratic experience was changing dramatically. Cavalry service, formerly the defining *sine qua non* of aristocratic life, was outsourced to provincial units. The latest evidence we have for a Roman citizen serving in the cavalry is around 96 BCE, and even this is tenuous. The Battle of Athesis in 102 BCE is our last solid evidence for the citizen cavalry in combat outside of Civil War. We know certainly that Caesar did not make use of a citizen cavalry in Gaul or in the Civil war.[51] This does not mean that aristocrats stopped serving in the army entirely, only that the nature of their service changed. Aristocrats gradually migrated from service in the cavalry to the commander's general staff – positions in which they usually experienced combat from a distance, rather than on the front lines. As early as Marius' first consulship (if we trust Sallust) we can see that the aristocracy's retreat from cavalry service was becoming a political liability for the group.[52]

Even while aristocratic service in the cavalry was decreasing, command of Rome's armies was still the province of the elite. Previously, commands (barring crisis) had been spread throughout the aristocracy, ensuring that a wider portion of this group could expect access to

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[51] Rosenstein 2007: 143; McCall 2002: 101. Val. Max. 5.4 records that the son of M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115 BCE) killed himself after fleeing with the rest of the *Romani equites.* For L. Orbilius Pupilius, who would have served in the cavalry in the 90's BCE if Suetonius is to be trusted, see Suet. *Gramm.* 9. Caes. *BG* 1.42 details the terms for parley with Ariovistus: Caesar was only allowed to be accompanied by cavalry, but *volebat neque salutem suam Gallorum equitatui committere audebat*. Therefore, Caesar took horses from his Gallic cavalry and mounted *milites* of the Tenth Legion. Caes. *BC* 1.102 does not mention a citizen cavalry in the list of groups that received donatives. We have already seen that Cicero's son served under Pompey during the Civil war, and Plut. *Pomp.* 64 says that Pompey's cavalry was the "flower of Italy." But the presence of citizens in the cavalry may have been a result of the unique nature of civil war and out of step with the contemporary practice. See also Plut. *Caes.* 45.3.

[52] Sall. *Jug.* 85.10-4; Plut. *Mar.* 9.2-4; Cic. *Balb.* 47.

command and the honors that usually followed it.[53] Since military achievement was the core of political clout the aristocracy policed itself to ensure that there were opportunities for earning achievement and to prevent any one senator from accruing too much *gloria.* Restricting the number of times one could hold the consulship, for example, was a way of making sure that more senators had access to command of consular armies (those usually allocated to the most significant theaters of war).[54] In the Late Republic, however, access to significant commands seems to have become more restricted; experience became a significant factor for selecting commanders. Military action, so scholars have argued, became simultaneously less threatening on an existential level and more complex logistically.[55] The result was that significant military campaigns were fewer, and military achievement became the concern of a smaller group within the aristocracy.[56] Thus, starting in the late second century BCE we see commanders being given

[53] Rosenstein 2007: 138-43.

[54] Kunkel & Whitmann 1995: 564ff; Elster 2003: 408ff; Rosenstein 2007: 139-40, who points out that starting in 342 BCE a ten-year gap was imposed between consulships, and a second consulship was prohibited starting in 151 BCE. We should, of course, note that this rule (like many other Roman rules) could be and was disregarded in certain circumstances. See Livy 10.13ff for the election of Q. Fabius Macimus Rullianus to the consulship of 297 BCE even though he had just held the office in 310 BCE. Livy writes: *Acuebat hac moderatione tam iusta studia; quae verecundia legum restinguenda ratus, legem recitari iussit qua intra decem annos eundem consulem refici non liceret. Vix prae strepitu audita lex est tribunique plebis nihil id impedimenti futurum aiebant: se ad populum laturos uti legibus solveretur. Et ille quidem in recusando perstabat: quid ergo attineret leges ferri, quibus per eosdem qui tulissent fraus fieret. Iam regi leges, non regere. Populus nihilo minus suffragia inibat, et ut quaeque intro vocata erat centuria, consulem haud dubie Fabium dicebat.* Also the obvious case of C. Marius (cos. 107, 104-100, 86 BCE).

[55] Harris 1979: 9-53; Gruen 1974: 113ff; Cornell 1993; Blösel 2016: 80-1.

[56] Harris 1979: 5 cites this trend towards specialization as the impetus for change in the first century BCE. For an excellent synthesis of the theories surrounding this phenomenon see Cornell 1993.

multiple consulships or special commands in order to deal with particularly stubborn problems abroad.[57] The result was that fewer and fewer senators were able to claim significant military victories, the traditional foundation of the group's political legitimacy.

This model suggests that although military command still afforded an *imperator* significant political gain, access to command positions was more limited in the Late Republic than previously. In such a situation, we would imagine that commands were highly coveted by (if not available to) senators. Yet, if this is true it is difficult to explain the noticeable trend of *rejection* of command in this period.[58] Wolfgang Blösel found that from 80-50 BCE 15% of known praetors turned down provincial commands they were offered. Likewise, at least a quarter, but possibly as much as half of the consuls in this period refused provincial commands in favor of remaining in the city.[59] J.P.V.D. Balsdon found a similar trend among consuls in the Republic's last generation.[60] Blösel's article cites diminishing financial gain for the disinterest

[57] Scipio Aemilianus was given the consulship in 134 BCE in order to command Rome's forces in Numantia, despite the fact that he had already been consul in 146 BCE (and held command during the Third Punic War). Marius famously held the consulship five times consecutively (104-100 BCE) in order to combat the Cimbri and Teutoni, even though he had already been consul just three years earlier in 107 BCE. See also an interesting gloss in Sallust (*Cat.* 59.6): *Homo militaris, quod amplius annos triginta tribunus aut praefectus aut legatus aut praetor cum magna gloria in exercitu fuerat, plerosque ipsos factaque eorum fortia noverat.*

[58] Brennan 2000: 400-3; Steel 2012; Blösel 2016.

[59] Blösel 2016: 68-9. See also Rosenstein 2016 (in the same volume) who questions the profitability of middle Republican imperialism, and Blösel 2011 which provides an analysis of the growing trend of rejections of provinces in the late Republic and concludes that absence from the city was politically costly.

[60] The rejection of command by magistrates will be discussed in depth in Chapter 2, but for now see Balsdon 1939: 63.

in military commands, but this should also signal to us that there has been a change in the political value of military achievement as well. Even if an aristocrat could not hope to enrich himself financially by means of a command, as scholarly orthodoxy has long held was common, we would still expect the political capital of conquest to be alluring. That senators of the Late Republic were turning down commands at such significant rates points to something other than only financial concern – a shift in values.

The triumph, Rome's highest military honor, was also not immune to change in this period. Triumphs had been celebrated after military victory, if the *Fasti Triumphales* are to be believed, since the origins of the city. In light of its revered status within the Roman economy of honor, aristocrats coveted the procession, and often went to great lengths to obtain it. Yet, the late Republic saw a decline in triumphal frequency, despite considerable opportunities for victory over foreign enemies. The period between 81 - 69 BCE had averaged one triumphal celebration per year, but the period between 68 - 50 BCE averaged only about one every three years.[61]

The political terminology itself reflects this movement away from the camp. Already in the late second century *virtus* was undergoing a cultural redefinition. Caesar's use of the word cleaves to its traditional martial meaning,[62] but Cicero used *virtus* as the rough equivalent of the Greek **ἀρετή**, an ethical term that may include some martial aspects, but which certainly

[61] Rich 2014. L. Licinius Lucullus in 63, Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus in 62, Pompey in 61, C. Pomptinus in 54, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio in 54, and P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther in 51.

[62] Eg. Caes. *BC* 3.59-60.

exceeded them. For example, in *de Amicitia,* when using *virtus* Cicero was clearly referring to an ethical sense of the word, and not a military one.[63] Outside of Cicero, one of the most surprising examples of this shift is in Sallust. If we imagine that *virtus* still carried a primarily military connotation in the late Republic, we should be surprised that one of the two men of *virtus* Sallust singled out in the *Catiline* was Cato Uticensis.[64] Cato had some military service, but no significant military achievement to speak of. That Pompey, who up to his defeat in the Civil War was Rome's most successful general, was not considered by Sallust as one of the men with the most *virtus* signals clearly to us that the meaning of the word must have stretched beyond military considerations.[65]

One popular way of understanding these trends holistically has been to apply the lens of specialization. Traditionally, the best route to political prestige had been as a soldier and commander, but other factors such as skill in public speaking or wealth could also help considerably. In the Late Republic, however, we see more and more aristocrats focusing their efforts on domestic activities like oratory or legal pleading. Cicero once claimed (albeit in a forensic setting where one must consider how accurately he was representing reality) that there were two main paths to power in Rome in the first century: the general and the orator.[66] Some

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[63] Cic. *Amic.* 21. *Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae nostrae sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur, virosque bonos eos qui habentur numeremus—Paulos Catones Gallos Scipiones Philos—his communis vita contenta est; eos autem omittamus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur.*

[64] Sall. *Cat.* 53.6.

[65] See McDonnell 2006: 241ff.

[66] Cic. *Mur.* 30.

modern scholars have accepted his suggestion.[67] Of those studies which have turned to specialization in order to understand aristocratic activity the most influential articulation of this idea came from Keith Hopkins's *Conquerors and Slaves* (1978) in which he argues for seeing aristocratic behavior in this period through the lens of "structural differentiation." This model argues that as a society becomes more complex its institutions become more independent of each other and end up competing for the community's power and resources.[68] Hopkins's argument is satisfying in many ways, especially in its discussion of the education and legal systems. As I hope to show, however, when thinking about the developments in the militaristic ethos in the Late Republic, specialization has some challenges as a model. As my first and second chapters will show, military activity was in a much more precipitous decline than we might have imagined, and even many of those whom we might think of a "military specialists" were serving less time in the legions and taking up fewer command positions than previous, "non-specialists" had.

It is, I believe, clear that the political value of military activity was undergoing a significant cultural renegotiation in the Late Republic, and this project aims to examine this phenomenon in three new ways. My first chapter. "Youthful Military Service and Aristocratic Values in the Late Republic," examines the diminishing amount of pre-*cursus* service performed by aristocrats in this period. Scholars have been willing enough to acknowledge that aristocrats of the first century served in the camps less than their ancestors, yet there has been no clear

[67] Afzelius 1946; Rawson 1985: 3-18; De Blois 2000; Rosenstein 2007: 144; and Balmaceda 2017: *passim* but esp. 14-47 who sees a divide in the meaning of *virtus* as a result.

[68] Hopkins 1978: 74-98.

consensus about *how much* military service was normal in the period. Since there is quite a wide spectrum between zero and, say, nine campaigns to be undertaken between the ages of about 17 and 27 (military tribune) or 30 (quaestor), it is correspondingly uncertain just *how much* less "military" the Roman aristocracy of the Late Republic had become. My first chapter provides a more nuanced account of norms for military service in this period.

The fundamental challenge in creating such an account is the scarcity of evidence on aristocratic youth. Our sources usually focus upon historical narratives, and therefore mention figures only when they enter into the series of events – rarely in their youth. I have found, however, a way to compensate for this evidentiary obstacle. Plutarch's *Lives,* being biographies, are more interested than our other sources in their subjects' early careers, and while these subjects are virtually by definition exceptional as the most prominent senators of their time they can be expected to have fulfilled all essential expectations of Roman voters. Accordingly, I used Plutarch's late-republican *Lives* to curate a list of examples from which we might draw some conclusions. If the extent of military service was an important qualification for a public career, then one would expect them to have had significantly *more* of it than the norm. As we shall see, my findings suggest that the amount of military service among the aristocrats of the Late Republic was much less than we have previously imagined, and I will discuss the implications this evidence has for our understanding of the period.

My second chapter, "'We Will Have to Raise Marius from the Underworld!': Cicero's *Pro Fonteio* and the Shortage of Commanders in the Late Republic," moves forward in the aristocratic career and focuses upon command experience among the late-republican senatorial class. In the *pro Fonteio,* Cicero rests a large portion of his argument for acquittal on the idea

that the Republic could ill afford to lose a military man like Fonteius since the state did not have at its disposal as many capable commanders as it had enjoyed previously. This is a radical claim given our understanding of traditional aristocratic values in the Republic. The evidence in the *pro Fonteio* alone may be enough to accept that there was a *perception* that there were fewer military leaders circa 70 BCE, but my chapter goes one step further and offers some ways we might test the truth of Cicero's claim. I first collect the data on pre-consular command experience among the consuls of 81-49 BCE. Of course, this sample does not give us definitive proof of military experience among the entire aristocracy, but I do believe there are some compelling reasons to think that the sample does reflect larger aristocratic trends. In order to investigate Cicero's claim that the amount of military experience among the elite was in decline, I also compare my findings from 81-49 BCE with an earlier period of republican history and find that the orator's rhetoric does seem to represent truthfully (albeit hyperbolically) contemporary reality.

My final chapter, "Procession Recession: Triumphs, Letters, and Ideology in the Late Roman Republic," puts my previous findings in dialogue with the sharp drop in triumphal frequency during the Late Republic via one of the most intriguing pieces of source material on the subject: the epistolary exchange between Cato and Cicero on the topic (*Fam.* 15.4-6 = SB 110-112). Cicero's initial request for Cato's support for a *supplicatio* en route to a triumph, Cato's refusal, and Cicero's reply give the modern scholar an excellent resource for understanding the politics that went into such a request. Given the conservative reputation of both Cato and his family, and perhaps skepticism of Cicero's qualification for triumphal consideration, some have chosen to see Cato's withholding of support as a defense of

traditional militaristic Roman values. I instead argue that such an understanding of Cato's letter (15.5 = SB 111) overlooks the ways in which Cato rewrites Roman aristocratic values in respect to the triumph. In his response to Cicero, Cato describes an honorific economy that greatly devalues military achievement and the glory assigned to successful *imperatores*. Such a conception of the triumph stands in stark contrast to other contemporary understandings of the triumph and its role within Roman political life.

Of special importance in this chapter are philosophical responses to the traditional Roman militaristic ethos. I first analyze the ways in which Cato's Stoicism influenced his position *vis a vis* military honors in his letter, but on a broader level philosophical engagement had a larger impact on aristocratic rejection of traditional military values than has been previously imagined. Cicero himself within his letters to Cato and elsewhere provides us with his own Stoic-flavored critique of military achievement. In the *Somnium Scipionis* he encourages the reader to disregard *homnium gloria* and instead focus on the more philosophical eternal form of virtue. Likewise, in his *de Officiis* he twice warns against the overzealous pursuit of war and the destruction that can accompany too much bravery.[69] "Divine *virtus*," he wrote in book six of the *de Republica,* "desires not lead statues, nor triumphs with ephemeral laurels, but for those rewards which are more stable and lasting."[70] On the other side of the philosophical spectrum, Epicureanism also adopted a hostile position against the traditional Roman military ethos as well. Five years before the epistolary exchange between Cicero and Cato, Cicero

[69] Cic. *Off.* 1.38, 1.81.

[70] Cic. *Rep.* 6.8.8. *tamen illa divina virtus non statuas plumbo inhaerentes nec triumphos arescentibus laureis, sed stabiliora quaedam et viridiora praemiorum genera desiderat.*

delivered his blistering *in Pisonem* against his enemy L. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 58 B.C.). Piso had failed to even request a triumph upon his return from Macedonia, despite having some ability to do so. From Cicero's speech it seems that Piso, informed by his Epicureanism, defended his triumphal apathy by claiming that he did not care to have one. We can notice a similar critique of Rome's obsession with warfare in the Epicurean poem of Lucretius.[71] It is fascinating that both Stoicism and Epicureanism, so often pitted against one another, seem to agree on this point.

What I hope the reader will emerge from this project with is an appreciation of how fluid the valuation of military achievement was during this period. It will be clear, I hope, that the militarism of the aristocracy – a foundational part of elite identity according to our understanding of republican aristocrat values – underwent a dramatic cultural renegotiation in the Late Republic. Further, that this has been at times difficult to detect is a reflection of contemporary cognitive dissonance among the elite on the topic. Romans of the first century existed in a political space which still acknowledged traditional views on military achievement *and* simultaneously radically reinterpreted them. This is to say, we will see that Romans of the Late Republic were simultaneously venerating the traditional values they had inherited while also behaving in ways that contradicted them.

[71] E.g. Lucret. 1.29-49.

2. Youthful Military Service and Aristocratic Values.[1]

I. Introduction: *multae imagines et nullus stipendi.*

"Bellum me gerere cum Iugurtha iussistis, quam rem nobilitas aegerrume tulit. Quaeso, reputate cum animis vostris num id mutare melius sit, si quem ex illo globo nobilitatis ad hoc aut aliud tale negotium mittatis, hominem veteris prosapiae ac multarum imaginum et nullius stipendi..." (Sall. *Iug.* 85.10)

You have commanded me to wage war against Jugurtha, and the nobility is most troubled by this. I ask you, reconsider whether or not it would be better to change your minds, to send someone from that cabal of nobility or someone similar to this conflict – a man from an old family who had a plethora of *imagines* and zero military experience."

In the prologue to the *Jugurtha* Sallust wrote that he decided to write a monograph about the war with Numidia – hardly an obvious choice given the options available to him – because it was difficult and great, and because it was the first time the *superbia* of the aristocracy had been challenged.[2] It comes as no surprise then that the work casts the Roman political class in an unflattering light. In Sallust, as in his role model Thucydides, speeches are privileged moments in the text, and the two major speeches in the *Jugurtha* build upon the author's stated theme. The first such speech is appropriately given by a firey tribune, Memmius, and centers on aristocratic corruption and violence against popular leaders. The second speech is given by Marius, then the consul-elect for 107 BCE. In this speech Marius attacks the aristocracy for their laziness and luxury, two classic Sallustian watchwords, and in doing so returns repeatedly to one issue: aristocratic disinterest in military achievement.

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[1] A condensed version of this chapter was presented at the 2019 annual meeting of the Society for Classical Studies in San Diego, CA under the title "Youthful Military Service and Aristocratic Values in the Late Roman Republic." I am indebted to the panel's chair, Matthew Roller, and to those in attendance for their thoughtful feedback. I am also grateful to Cary Barber, who gave very helpful comments on a draft of the conference presentation.

[2] Sall. *Iug.* 5.

The passage above is how Marius (or perhaps I should say Sallust) frames the speech, a comparison of his merit-based *auctoritas* as a new man and the inactivity of the hereditary elite. The consul-elect goes on to allege that many aristocrats were so lacking in actual military experience when they were appointed to command positions that they were frequently forced to seek the opinions of a more-seasoned subordinate, or to undergo a crash course on the topic via Greek military handbooks.[3] To Marius this is unacceptably hypocritical; the nobility, he argues, are entitled to a prominent place in society not on the basis of their own actions but due to the military valor displayed by their (sometimes quite distant) ancestors. If we want to imagine the kind of *virtus*-obsessed aristocratic culture of the ancestors which Sallust had in mind we could look to his other surviving monograph, the *Catiline,* in which he wrote that the Roman elite of the past competed with each other most of all over *gloria*.[4] Conversely in the *Jugurtha* Marius complains that the aristocrats of 108 were no longer interested in the traditional concerns of their class: spears, standards, and military decorations. Instead, young aristocratic Romans spent their time eating, drinking, falling in love, and learning Greek.[5]

In the Introduction to this work I outlined how important military achievement was to the political class in the Roman Republic, both individually and collectively. Interestingly, Marius' speech seems to confirm both this importance while also attesting to declining interest in military affairs among the Roman elite. As always with direct speeches, howevever, we ought

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[3] Sall. *Iug.* 85.11-12.

[4] Sall. *Cat.* 7.6 *Sed gloriae maximum certamen inter ipsos erat; se quisque hostem ferire, murum ascendere, conspici dum tale facinus faceret, properabat;*

[5] Sall. *Iug.* 85.32 and 41.

to approach the evidence with caution. The speech of Marius in the *Jugurtha* is foremost a literary construction and therefore has rarely been taken seriously in its claims.[6] Further, Sallust's penchant for prioritizing literary effect over historical accuracy undermines the writer's reliability in instances such as these, when his text suggests something surprising or controversial.[7] Therefore, from a historical perspective the speech of Marius asks rather than answers the question this chapter seeks to address: how much military service was normal for an aristocrat in the Late Republic?

Polybius, who may have met Marius while the two were with Scipio Aemilianus at the siege of Numantia, is the most important text for our understanding of youthful military service among the Roman aristocracy. He maintained that any Roman seeking public office could only do so after having served in ten military campaigns, a regulation commonly referred to in scholarship as the *decem stipendia*.[8] This meant that young aristocrats who aspired to

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[6] See also Plut. *Mar.* 9.2-4. Skard 1943; Von Fritz 1943: 166-8; Carney 1959 (who thought that the speeches are close to actual Marian rhetoric); Syme 1964: 168-70; Paul 1984: 207-15; and Evans 1994: 71-2 who argues that some parts of the speech (thanks for support, preparations for the new campaign, the changes to the conscription process) are contextually expected and therefore likely reminiscent of what Marius would have said, but in reference to Marius' attack upon aristocratic military service he goes on to write, "Orations such as these do not deserve to be analyzed too precisely for hidden meanings or pertinent historical messages since more often than not they are inserted into a text purely as entertainment or as an illustration of the writer's creative ability." Rosenstein 2007: 139 mentions that the idea that commanders were learning from Greek rhetorical handbooks "may reflect contemporary political polemic rather than reality."

[7] Syme (1964: 1) wrote that Sallust's works, "betray all manner of disquieting features." See also in the same work pp. 123, 136ff, 186, 248ff.

[8] Polyb. 6.19.4. **πολιτικὴν δὲ λαβεῖν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔξεστιν οὐδενὶ πρότερον, ἐὰν μὴ δέκα στρατείας ἐνιαυσίους ᾖ τετελεκώς**. Other evidence we possess confirms a ten-year term of cavalry service but does not mention any connection with eligibility for public office: Plut. *C. Gracc.* 2.4-5 wherein C. Gracchus claims to have served more than was customary (12 years);

political office – and we should assume that almost all did – were expected to spend almost the entirety of their young lives in camp. Military service traditionally began at 17, which meant that a young man would have to serve until the age of 27 in order to initiate his canvass. Given that this meant a young man's pre-*cursus* life was mostly spent at war, it is hardly surprising that the Roman aristocracy has so often been styled as a kind of warrior-elite. This understanding aligns well with Marius' conception of nobility in his speech.

Yet, it is certain that youthful military service among aspiring politicians was declining in the Republic's last generation. A popular example for the shirking of the *decem stipendia* in the first century BCE is Cicero, who seems to have had at best two years of military service before he stood for the quaestorship in 76. This is not shocking from a man Erich Gruen once called "very unmilitary."[9] More surprising is the case of Julius Caesar, a more than capable military man; as we shall see, he too certainly fell short of ten campaigns. Perhaps he was only slightly exaggerating in the early 60's BCE when Cicero said that military service had been "forgotten" by the youth.[10] The *decem stipendia* requirement was clearly not strictly enforced in the first century BCE, but the problem is that modern scholarship lacks a more detailed sense of this trend. Agreement that the *decem stipendia* was defunct is as close to universally accepted

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Plut. *Pomp.* 22.4-6 about an equestrian ritual following the end of military service, and Livy 27.11.14 wherein the censors wiped out the previous service of cavalrymen at the Battle of Cannae and imposed a new ten-year term of service. *Illis omnibus et multi erant adempti equi qui Cannensium legionum equites in Sicilia erant. Addiderunt acerbitati etiam tempus, ne praeterita stipendia procederent iis quae equo publico meruerant, sed dena stipendia equis privatis facerent.*

[9] Gruen 1974: 495.

[10] Cic. *Font.* 42-3

as possible in our field, but there is no correspondingly clear consensus on *how much* military service was normal in this period. William Harris provided the current *opinio communis* on this subject: "The rule [requiring ten campaigns before running for office] had lapsed a generation or so earlier [than Cicero], but among Cicero's contemporaries most candidates for office had probably still done some military service."[11] He is technically correct, but rather vague. How many senators were seeking office without ten campaigns of military experience? How much military experience was normal for aristocrats of this period? Since there is quite a wide spectrum between zero and, say, nine campaigns to be undertaken between the ages of about 17 and 30 (quaestor), it is correspondingly uncertain just *how much* less "military" the Roman aristocracy of the Late Republic had become. At stake is nothing less than the place of military valor in the value-system governing public service in the last generations of the Roman Republic. Therefore, my first task in this chapter is to give a sense of scale to this phenomenon. I do so by examining a group of late-republican senators for whom we have some account of their youth. Finally, after establishing a more precisie sense of the norm, I will consider the implications that the neglect of the *decem stipendia* had for Roman aristocratic ideology in the Late Republic.

II. The *decem stipendia.*

The phrase *decem stipendia* never occurs in our primary sources; it is a modern designation for the regulation mentioned by Polybius. The Greek historian is our main and – as I will argue here – only evidence for the existence of the *decem stipendia,* but before turning

[11] Harris 1979: 12.

our attention to the Polybian evidence we must first examine two passages from Plutarch which are also relevant. The first comes from his *Life of Gaius Gracchus.* In 125 BCE Gracchus had been quaestor in Sardinia and the winter that year was especially harsh. The Romans were ill-equipped to withstand the cold, but the surrounding communities had already successfully petitioned the Senate in order that they not be compelled to provide the Romans with provisions. Nevertheless, Gracchus was out of options on how to properly equip his men and therefore went to directly to the communities himself to appeal for aid. Gracchus' enemies in Rome viewed this episode with suspicion, they thought the younger brother of Tiberius Gracchus was trying to gain popular support. Gaius felt that the campaign against him in Rome was serious enough that he left Sardinia in order to return to the city and defend himself, but this decision in turn opened him up to accusations that he had prematurely abandoned his duties in Sardinia. Ultimately the matter came before the censors (presumably in connection with their *lectio*), who questioned Gracchus about his actions in Sardinia and his departure from his post. Gaius spoke in his own defense:

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κατηγορίας αὐτῷ γενομένης ἐπὶ τῶν τιμητῶν, αἰτησάμενος λόγον οὕτω μετέστησε τὰς γνώμας τῶν ἀκουσάντων ὡς ἀπελθεῖν ἠδικῆσθαι τὰ μέγιστα δόξας. ἐστρατεῦσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔφη δώδεκα ἔτη, τῶν ἄλλων δέκα στρατευομένων ἐν ἀνάγκαις, ταμιεύων δὲ τῷ στρατηγῷ παραμεμενηκέναι τριετίαν, τοῦ νόμου μετ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπανελθεῖν διδόντος· μόνος δὲ τῶν στρατευσαμένων πλῆρες τὸ βαλάντιον εἰσενηνοχὼς κενὸν ἐξενηνοχέναι, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἐκπιόντας ὃν εἰσήνεγκαν οἶνον, ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου μεστοὺς δεῦρο τοὺς ἀμφορεῖς ἥκειν κομίζοντας.
(Plut. *C. Gracc.* 2.4-5)

But when [C. Gracchus] was accused before the censors, having asked to speak he changed the minds of those listening so that he seemed to have been done a great injustice. He said that he had done twelve campaigns of service in the army, others had only done ten ***ἐν ἀνάγκαις***. Further, he had served over two years in addition as a quaestor under the general, even though legally he was able to return after one year. He alone in the army set out with a full purse and returned with an empty one, since the others had drunk the wine which they had seized and returned with the jugs full of gold and silver.

What is certainly clear is that Gracchus used his lengthy and exemplary military service record in order to justify his actions; it is less clear, however, whether he was referencing a regulation which required ten campaigns of service prior to seeking public office.

The first point of interest is the phrase **ἄλλων δέκα στρατευομένων ἐν ἀνάγκαις**. It is unclear exactly what Plutarch has Gracchus suggest here. The TLG gives two meanings of **ἐν ἀνάγκαις** relevant to this passage (although the entry does not cite this passage specifically). The first, which in this instance would indicate a requirement *à la* Polybius, supports the idea that Gracchus was referring to a regulation; we might even go so far as to render it "according to law." The second meaning, however, is closer to "in emergencies," which would imply that ten campaigns were only expected during pressing times. The only other time Plutarch uses this phrase it is clearly to indicate the second meaning, one implying an emergency, although in using the term he was quoting Simonides.[12] It is unclear, therefore, exactly what Gracchus was saying in his speech in 125 BCE, and without the influence of Polybius there is no reason to prefer one reading over the other.

The second point of consideration with this passage is that the way in which Gracchus recounts his service record aligns poorly with the Polybian conception of the *decem stipendia.* If we were to use this passage as evidence for the *decem stipendia,* then the thrust of Gracchus' argument would be that while others had served only the required ten campaigns, he had served 12. Yet, if we examine the passage more closely, the two additional years of service Gracchus boasts about came *as a quaestor.* This is important because the Polybian *decem stipendia* was

[12] Plut. *Arat.* 45.5 (quoting Simonides) **ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνάγκαις γλυκὺ γίνεται καὶ σκληρόν, κατὰ Σιμωνίδην**.

supposed to be fulfilled *before* an aristocrat sought public office. Thus, if the *decem stipendia* as Polybius understands is in the background of this passage, Gracchus' boast becomes somewhat awkward. He is not saying that he exceeded the service requirement, but rather that he did the same amount of service as everyone else was required to do and then did some additional service after he began his political career. This is a much different suggestion, and a much less impressive one. We should not, therefore, count this passage as firm evidence for the existence of the Polybian *decem stipendia.*

The second Plutarchian passage of interest comes from the *Life of Pompey,* and tells of the *tranvectio equitum,* a public ritual which equestrians underwent after they completed their military service:

Ἔθος γάρ ἐστι Ῥωμαίων τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν, ὅταν στρατεύσωνται τὸν νόμιμον χρόνον, ἄγειν εἰς ἀγορὰν τὸν ἵππον ἐπὶ τοὺς δύο ἄνδρας οὓς τιμητὰς καλοῦσι, καὶ καταριθμησαμένους τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων ἕκαστον ὑφ' οἷς ἐστρατεύσαντο, καὶ δόντας εὐθύνας τῆς στρατείας ἀφίεσθαι. νέμεται δὲ καὶ τιμὴ καὶ ἀτιμία προσήκουσα τοῖς βίοις ἑκάστων. (Plut. *Pomp.* 22.4)

It was a custom for Roman knights, whenever one had been on campaign for the amount of time required by law, to lead his horse into the Forum before the two men called "censors," and having accounted for his campaigns, each general under whom he served, and the nature of his service then to be discharged. According to their conduct each was either rewarded or punished.

Again, one might see this as a confirmation of the *decem stipendia* outside of Polybius, but this passage is also mired with uncertainty. The strongest argument for not associating this ritual with the Polybian *decem stipendia* is that the *transvectio* was restricted to *equites equo publico*, and thus – unlike Polybius' regulation – would not have been required of all aristocrats.[13] More importantly, the *transvectio* was not at all connected with running for public office. Even if we were to overlook this major difference, what will become clear by the end of this chapter is that

[13] For other references to the ritual see Livy 9.46.16; Val. Max. 2.2.9; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.13.4; *Vir. Ill.* 32.3; Plin. *HN* 15.19; Tac. *Ann.* 2.83.5; Suet. *Aug.* 38.3; Plut. *Cor.* 3. See also Hill 1952: 19, 37-9; McCall 2002: 7-8, 82; McDonnell 2006: 186ff.

while Pompey was able to claim ten campaigns, it would have been impossible for many others to do so. Cicero, for example, would have had a particularly awkward ceremony if the amount of service required by law was ten campaigns. Thus, at best this ritual is a remnant of the Polybian *decem stipendia* which no longer signified what it previously had.

These two Plutarchian passages may in fact suggest a formal – perhaps even legal – ten-year period of military-service obiligation, but they stop short of confirming the *decem stipendia* as most scholars have understood it. I would argue, therefore, that Polybius 6.19.4 is our *only* direct evidence for a regulation that requires this service before running for public office. This difference is important. Further, even if there had been a legal requirement along the lines Polybius suggests, we will see that there can be no doubt that such a regulation was being ignored by the time Pompey performed the *transvectio.* Let us turn, therefore, to Polybius. The historian mentions it at the opening of his section on the Roman military system:

Ἐπειδὰν ἀποδείξωσι τοὺς ὑπάτους, μετὰ ταῦτα χιλιάρχους καθιστᾶσι, τετταρασκαίδεκα μὲν ἐκ τῶν πέντ' ἐνιαυσίους ἐχόντων ἤδη στρατείας, δέκα δ' ἄλλους σὺν τούτοις ἐκ τῶν δέκα. τῶν λοιπῶν τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς δέκα, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς ἓξ καὶ <δέκα> δεῖ στρατείας τελεῖν κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐν τοῖς τετταράκοντα καὶ ἓξ ἔτεσιν ἀπὸ γενεᾶς πλὴν τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς τετρακοσίας δραχμὰς τετιμημένων· τούτους δὲ παριᾶσι πάντας εἰς τὴν ναυτικὴν χρείαν. ἐὰν δέ ποτε κατεπείγῃ τὰ τῆς περιστάσεως, ὀφείλουσιν οἱ πεζοὶ στρατεύειν εἴκοσι στρατείας ἐνιαυσίους. πολιτικὴν δὲ λαβεῖν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔξεστιν οὐδενὶ πρότερον, ἐὰν μὴ δέκα στρατείας ἐνιαυσίους ᾖ τετελεκώς. (Polyb. 6.19.4)

After they elect the consuls, they next choose the military tribunes: 14 from those who had served five campaigns, and ten from those who had served ten campaigns. Of the rest, cavalrymen must serve ten campaigns, and infantrymen must serve 16 campaigns before they are 46, not including those who have less than 400 drachmae – these are put into the navy. Should there be an urgent danger, the infantrymen are required 20 campaigns of service. No one is able to obtain any public office if he has not completed ten campaigns.

This passage comes from Polybius' description of the *dilectus* – the process by which Rome enlisted men for the legions. The most important sentence (for our purposes) is the last one, which articulates the *decem stipendia* in a helpfully clear and succinct manner.

In addition to being our lone citation for the *decem stipendia*, Polybius is also not without problems as a source for the *dilectus*. Some other parts of the section in which Polybius mentioned the *decem stipendia* show that the author's understanding of Roman military procedure was imperfect. The number of troops in a legion at this time provided by Polybius clashes with Livy's testimony, and the evidence suggests that Livy is probably the more reliable account in this instance.[14] Further, the procedure for the levy described by Polybius is clearly incorrect, or at the very least incomplete. Before the first century BCE the *dilectus* took place on the Capitol which would have made it difficult to assemble the massive number of people Polybius suggests. It would have been unrealistic in terms of both travel and space available to expect every Roman citizen eligible to meet in Rome for the *dilectus* annually. More likely is that non-urban citizens were conscripted remotely and then reported to Rome having already been selected.[15] In light of these problems and the dearth of ancient testimony about the *decem stipendia*, some have argued that Polybius misunderstood the nature of the practice and that service in ten campaigns was more of an expectation than a legal requirement.[16] It is difficult to

[14] Polybius records 4,500 men per legion, Livy (40.1) suggests 5,200 men starting from 184 BCE on. De Ligt: 2007: 115-6 suggests that Livy is to be favored here given his general reliability on second century army figures. De Ligt argues that Polybius' number probably reflects earlier military handbooks he consulted.

[15] These are just the major issues. See Walbank 1957: 698-9 and De Ligt 2007: 115-7 for a thorough catalogue of the problems with Polybius' account.

[16] Harris 1979: 11ff seems to accept that the *decem stipendia* were supported by *lex* but does open the possibility of a less formal arrangement. Most recently Beck 2005: 336-7. See also Astin 1958: 42-46; Kunkel & Whitmann 1995: 60-3; Develin 1979: 58ff.

say one way or the other based on this meager evidence, and as I believe that my findings have some impact on this issue I will reserve my judgement until later in the chapter.

For those who have accepted the existence of the *decem stipendia* the first challenge has been to date it. As we have already seen, it is widely accepted that the rule (if it existed) was no longer being observed rigorously in the Republic's last generation, and more will be said about that below. When was this rule actually being enforced? The first major debate around the dating of the *decem stipendia* has to do with Scipio Africanus' candidacy for the curule aedileship in 214 BCE. The young Scipio already had a reputation for *virtus* when he presented himself as a candidate. He had served alongside his father, allegedly saving his life at the Battle of the Ticinus in 218 BCE, and survived the disaster at Cannae in 216 BCE.[17] In 214 BCE, when he was only 22 years old, Scipio stood for the curule aedileship. Livy is our source for the event:

Huic petenti aedilitatem cum obsisterent tribuni plebis, negantes rationem eius habendam esse, quod nondum ad petendum legitima aetas esset, "Si me" inquit "omnes Quirites aedilem facere volunt, satis annorum habeo." Tanto inde favore ad suffragium ferendum in tribus discursum est ut tribuni repente incepto destiterint. (Livy 25.2.6-8)

The tribunes of plebs opposed him as he was seeking the aedileship, denying that Scipio had the right to run since he had not yet reached the required age. "If all the citizens want to make me aedile," he said," then I am old enough." Then there was such fervor in the sorting into tribes for the vote that the tribunes suddenly relented.

Scipio was made aedile, and he would certainly go on to justify the exception made on his behalf. The question facing us, however, is where the *decem stipendia* fit into the controversy surrounding Scipio's candidacy. Mommsen used this event to claim that the *decem stipendia* was

[17] There are diverging accounts about Scipio's actions at the Battle of the Ticinus. In one version (Plin. *HN* 16.14) Scipio saved the life of his father, but then rejected the *corona civilis* because it would have confusingly obligated the elder Scipio to treat his own son as his father. The Livian account (21.46.7-10 apparently following Cloelius Antipater) credits a slave with saving the elder Scipio's life. See Maxfield 1981: 71

not yet in effect in 214 BCE. The hostile tribunes, he argued, would have included the *decem stipendia* in their objection to Scipio's candidacy if the rule was being enforced.[18] Complicating Mommsen's view, however, Polybius does not mention any tribunician opposition to Scipio's candidacy at all.[19]

Again relying on Livy, Mommsen suggested that the *decem stipendia* only came into existence in 180 BCE with the *lex Annalis*, but Livy recorded only that the law specified at what age one might seek and obtain magistracies.[20] Mommsen speculated that the *lex Annalis* did this by formally requiring three things: the *decem stipendia*, the order in which one could hold each magistracy, and the *biennium* (the period of two years in between offices).[21] If Mommsen was right this would mean that the *decem stipendia* would have actually been established as a regulation rather recently at the time Polybius was writing. There are not, however, any sources supporting Mommsen's theory on the details of the *lex Annalis*, and Livy's brevity hardly invites this level of speculation.[22] In light of this, others have argued Livy recorded the objections of the tribunes as related to Scipio's age anachronistically, since the *lex Annalis* had not yet been passed. The objection of the tribunes in 214 BCE, they argue, was more likely related instead to

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[18] Mommsen *StR* I^3.505ff. Gelzer 1969: 7. Others followed Mommsen's lead for a post 214 BCE date: B. Kübler, *RE* s.v. "magistratus" (1928); Astin 1958: 45 n.1.

[19] Polyb. 10.4-5.

[20] Livy 40.44.1 *Eo anno rogatio primum lata est ab L. Villio tribuno plebis, quot annos nati quemque magistratum peterent caperentque.*

[21] Mommsen *StR* 1.523-577.

[22] See Astin 1958.

the *decem stipendia*.[23] Each argument is speculative. This is further problematized by the nature of the event in question. Scipio's candidacy in 214 BCE should not be taken to represent normal practice and can be explained in light of the irregularities in magistracies brought on by the crisis of the Second Punic War and his own extraordinary popularity, rather than the absence of the rule in question.[24] We cannot, I believe, use the events of 214 BCE to prove the existence of the law.

Given Polybius' laconic mention of the *decem stipendia,* there has also been much ink spilled over what such a regulation would have actually entailed. Since the translations of Polybius often discuss the requirement in terms of "years," the impression is that one needed to spend a calendar year in the field. This interpretation is no doubt aided by modern vernacular regarding military service. If we use a more accurate translation, however, it is less clear how much time a young Roman was expected to spend, "on campaign." On one extreme end of interpretation, Mommsen doubted that "service in a campaign" necessarily required actually being selected for service at all. Instead he suggested that ten years of simply standing for the equestrian levy was sufficient.[25] The first reason for this was (as I have already mentioned) that Mommsen thought that the *decem stipendia* came about as part of the *lex Annalis* (180 BCE). Thus, since the important mechanism of the *decem stipendia* (according to Mommsen) was to regulate the age at which one could seek office, actual military service in the

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[23] Harris 1979: 11n3, suggesting that Livy was wrong about Scipio in 214 BCE but correct about the *lex Annalis* in 180.

[24] Rögler 1962: 78; Harris 1979: 11.

[25] Mommsen *StR* I^3. 506; Gelzer 1969: 7; De Sanctis 1953: 4.1.510; Afzelius 1946: 276.

field was a secondary concern. Mommsen's second reasoning was that requiring active service on campaign would have given consuls the opportunity to avoid enlisting the children from rival families and thereby delay their advancement on the *cursus honorum*, a practice he believed would have been untenable. This is an imaginative (and, I suppose, possible) concern, but it appears nowhere in our sources. Plinio Fraccaro disagreed with Mommsen and argued convincingly that active service was more likely the requirement.[26] Fraccaro rightly divorced the *decem stipendia* from the *lex Annalis,* and instead emphasized the importance of military service for those seeking to hold a magistracy.

Fraccaro is, however, silent concerning the nature of military service that the young aristocrat was likely to encounter. Harris provided the most useful argument for this question when he helpfully pointed out that the *Tabula Heracleensis* (a set of bronze inscriptions that preserve local statues for the Italian city of Heraclea, as well as a portion of the *lex Iulia Municipalis*) stipulated that service was only counted for candidates if they spent at least half of the year on what we might think of as "active duty."[27] This meant that if one spent half the year in the camp, this qualified as service in a campaign, and this makes sense when we consider that aristocrats often appear in Rome during years in which they also rendered some service. It should be noted, of course, that the *Tabula Heracleensis* gives details on what was required of local candidates, not candidates at Rome, but it is still reasonable to imagine that the periphery

[26] Fraccaro 1934.

[27] Crawford *RS* 1.375ff.

was taking cues from the center in this instance and that the municipal regulation reflected a familiar expectation.

The last puzzle involving the *decem stipendia* is when exactly it fell into disuse (again, assuming that it was ever "in use"). Those who mention it often use a somewhat broad periodization when identifying the lapse, usually the late second - early first century BCE. This is understandable given the paucity of evidence. Some have attempted to narrow the dating by connecting the lapse of the *decem stipendia* to the disappearance of the citizen cavalry, the customary locus of elite military service.[28] Broadly speaking, this must have happened at some point between 102 and 63 BCE[29] We know from a conveniently detailed anecdote that Caesar did not use citizen cavalry units while in Gaul.[30] Caesar, however, never mentions the practice of using provincial cavalry units as being particularly unique or novel. We should imagine that he was not the first to neglect the services of a citizen cavalry unit. There is one instance of citizens serving the cavalry after 63 BCE: Pompey's army at Pharsalus. Plutarch called Pompey's cavalry the "flower of Rome and Italy."[31] This, however, is likely an anomaly brought on by civil

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[28] McCall 2002: 100-36; Rosenstein 2007: 143-4.

[29] McCall 2002: 100-13. Val. Max. 5.4 records that the son of M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115 BCE) killed himself after fleeing the Battle of the Athesis (102 BCE) with the rest of the *Romani equites.* For L. Orbilius Pupilius, who would have served in the cavalry in the 90's BCE if Suetonius is to be trusted, see Suet. *Gramm.* 9.

[30] Caes. *BG* 1.42. Caesar and Ariovistus agreed to meet for a parley, but only if both parties were accompanied by cavalry, not infantry. Caesar feared that his Gallic cavalry would betray him if left alone, so he mounted infantrymen on their horses. Likewise, Caesar also does not seem to have used a citizen cavalry during the Civil War as the unit is absent from the list of his donatives (Caes. *BCiv.* 1.102).

[31] Plut. *Pomp.* 64 **ἱππεῖς δέ, Ῥωμαίων καὶ Ἰταλῶν τὸ ἀνθοῦν, ἑπτακισχίλιοι**... See also Front. *Strat.* 4.32.

war, rather than an indication that Pompey and his contemporaries had previously used citizen cavalry in non-civil engagements.[32]

Nathan Rosenstein has speculated in passing that the decline in military service among the aristocracy may have been connected to challenges faced by the Romans during the Social War.[33] The allies had been a large source of legionary manpower for Rome, and during their rebellion Rome was challenged to find a way to replenish their ranks. The solution, so it has been argued, was that Rome effectively "outsourced" their cavalry needs by hiring provincial cavalry units; Romans who would have served in the cavalry now shifted to other roles in the legion. After the Social War the Roman cavalrymen never returned to the cavalry, and provincial cavalry units became the norm thereafter.[34] The theory, then, is that aristocrats gave up cavalry service during the Social War and did not come back after the reconciliation with the allies. Without cavalry service, aristocrats stopped serving the *decem stipendia,* and the regulation was thereafter ignored. The Social War theory is a neat one. Its first, and most straightforward, strength is that it fits the range of dates most often cited for the shift away from the *decem stipendia*. Second, this theory (albeit indirectly) attaches the lapse of the *decem stipendia* to a significant event – one to which the aristocracy was responding. As we shall see, however, the evidence available to us does not fully support such a tidy explanation, but rather I believe that it suggests a more active move away from military by the Roman aristocracy. But I

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[32] McCall 2002: 101-2.

[33] Rosenstein 2007: 143.

[34] Rosenstein 2007 following McCall 2002: 100-36.

will turn to this line of thought following my examination of the youthful military service rendered by some late-republican examples.

III. A Sample of Late-Republican Pre-*Cursus* Service Records.

We know frightfully little about the youth of any given Republican statesman. Our sources for many Roman senators do not extend past their involvement in the period's borader historical narrative; in the case of most this does not exceed a passing mention. The nature of the evidence relevant to this study is significantly bleaker considering that even in the case of notable senators we often know very little about their lives before they held public office. For example, we know more about Cicero than any historical figure before him (and any figure after until Saint Augustine in the 4th - 5th century CE). Yet, we still are left uncertain about much of Cicero's early life. Cicero does not even mention his mother in any of his extant writings.[35] The landscape of the evidence for youthful military service would seem to be something of wasteland, and this has doubtlessly contributed to the hesitancy of scholars to comment on how widespread the neglect of military service was in the Late Republic. Yet, while there is hardly as much evidence as we should like, we do have some useful sources for approaching this problem.

All, however, is not lost. We do possess one significant set of source material for reconstructing the early lives of important Romans: the biographies of Plutarch. Writing at the turn of the second century CE, Plutarch wrote (among other things) biographies of Greek and Roman subjects. In the existing Plutarchian corpus we have 23 *Parallel Lives,* as well as four

[35] Quintus does briefly mention *matrem nostram* in *Fam.* 16.26.2.

unpaired *Lives*. Of these, 11 Roman *Lives* fall in the time period relevant to this study: three are from just before the chronological period that is the focus of this work, what we might call the "second-to-last generation of the Roman Republic" (*Marius, Sulla,* and *Sertorius*). Eight more *Lives* are from the Republic's last generation (*Lucullus, Cicero, Pompey, Caesar, Crassus, Cato Minor, Brutus,* and *Antony).*[36]

The Plutarchian evidence offers the historian some significant advantages. First, these biographies preserve the lives of some of the most important and influential senators of the period. One, of course, could always wish for more biographies; Plutarch's *Lives* in no way represent an extensive list of important senators in the Late Republic. Still, in the 36 years this chapter covers, Plutarch's biographies cover ten consulships and a dictatorship (not counting Caesar's future dictatorship since it is technically outside of the chronological limits I am interested in). The *Lives* also include all three generals who led a major campaign against Mithridates VI of Pontus, a command which was repeatedly the object of fierce competition amongst the most elite senators. Not included in these groups, but still immensely important figures in the post-Sullan period, are Caesar's staunchest political adversary M. Porcius Cato Uticensis and his future assassin M. Iunius Brutus. Neither reached the consulship, but both were influential, perhaps even defining figures in the crisis of the Late Republic. We may not get an image of the normal senatorial career from these biographies, but it is fair to consider most if not all of the Plutarchean subjects "successful," if we equate success with influence and renown.

[36] Except for the *Lucullus,* scholars have argued that the remaining six were written at the same time. See Pelling 1988: 3-4.

Second, Plutarch had access to some sources from the Late Republic which are now lost to us. *Quellenforschung* was a subject taken up with enthusiastic interest by scholars of Plutarch in the 20th century, and as a result we have some useful insights into Plutarch's likely sources.[37] I will draw attention to particularly relevant examples in the list itself, but a few major examples bear mention at the outset. On the early side of our period, it is clear that Plutarch had consulted Sulla's now lost autobiography. It is unclear where exactly Sulla began the narrative of his own life, but some studies have argued that he started from his birth.[38] On the other end of our chronological range, Plutarch also had access to Asinius Pollio's lost *Historia.* It is uncertain where exactly Pollio's history began and ended, but it certainly was an invaluable (and in some instances firsthand) source for the events of the Republic's last generation.[39] There were also other biographical sources available to Plutarch. He seems, for instance, to have had access to Tiro's biography of Cicero, and we should expect also that some now-lost biographies by Cornelius Nepos, a contemporary witness, provided Plutarch with some material for his *Lives.* In addition to these notable works, there also must have been a wealth of speeches and letters from Late Republican sources available to the biographer.[40]

Finally, Plutarch's evidence is particularly useful for our purposes precisely because he wrote biographies and not histories. He tells us this explicitly in his *Alexander:*

οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους, οὔτε ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις πράξεσι πάντως ἔνεστι δήλωσις ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα βραχὺ πολλάκις καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ παιδιά τις ἔμφασιν ἤθους ἐποίησε μᾶλλον ἢ

[37] Pelling 1979 and 1988: 26ff; Van Hoof 2014: 136ff.; Van der Stockt 2014: 322ff.

[38] For an excellent discussion see *FRH* 1.284-6

[39] *FRH* 1.430ff.

[40] Pelling 1979: 89. Plutarch also probably knew of Tiro's *de Iocis.*

μάχαι μυριόνεκροι καὶ παρατάξεις αἱ μέγισται καὶ πολιορκίαι πόλεων. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ζωγράφοι τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἰδῶν, οἷς ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἦθος, ἀναλαμβάνουσιν, ἐλάχιστα τῶν λοιπῶν μερῶν φροντίζοντες, οὕτως ἡμῖν δοτέον εἰς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα μᾶλλον ἐνδύεσθαι καὶ διὰ τούτων εἰδοποιεῖν τὸν ἑκάστου βίον, ἐάσαντας ἑτέροις τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας. (Plut. *Alex.* 1.2)

I am not writing histories, but rather *Lives.* For the image of virtue or vice is not always clear in the most famous events; but a small thing, such as a saying or a joke, often reveals the character more than battles in which thousands perish, or the greatest sieges od cities. Just like painters take up the likeness of a person after seeing it from the face and the eyes through which the character is revealed, and then ignore the other parts, in this way I must be allowed to focus on the signs of the soul, and through these to craft the *Life* of each, allowing others to handle the description of their great feats.

Thus, whereas a history might detail only a significant event, Plutarch's *Lives* are concerned with uncovering the character of his subjects using details from over the course of their entire lives. Although at least one scholar has objected to the use of Plutarch for evidence about the youthful campaigns of his subjects, the evidence, I believe, suggests quite the opposite.[41] Now, for the historian the passage above presents an obvious challenge when using Plutarch as a source; the moralizing project that is the foundation of the *Parallel Lives* is less desirable than other sources which at least claim to approach a topic without particular bias. Such hesitancy is entirely appropriate when dealing with Plutarch as evidence. Yet, whereas histories might seek to narrate events, and thus largely ignore a subject's life up to that point wherein he assumes a significant role within the narrative being presented, Plutarch's mission to reveal the character of his subjects often leads to a discussion (albeit brief) of their birth and upbringing. Outside of Plutarch's *Lives* the chances of discovering significant biographical detail on any given subject before his political career are bleak. There is, however, one figure from the Late Republic about whose youth we can speak with some certainty. M. Caelius' close association

[41] Ridley 2010: 105 claims that Plutarch was rarely interested in youthful campaigns but compare this with the catalogue of early campaigns provided by Pelling 2011: 137, who says that Plutarch, "likes such first campaigns" when commenting on the biographer's *unusual* silence on Caesar's service in Bithynia and Cilicia.

with Cicero has given us some epistolary evidence and, more importantly, a surviving defense speech that accounts for much of his youth. Therefore, I have decided to include Caelius in addition to our other Plutarchean subjects. Finally, this is not to say that I have consulted Plutarch *exclusively.* In every instance I have brought in as many relevant sources as I was able to collect. Rather, Plutarch's list of late-republican lives has served to curate this sample since the existence of a biography on a subject assures we will have at least *some* information on his youth.

In analyzing these early careers I am seeking to establish how much service each man had prior to his first public office (for most the quaestorship). Throughout what follows I will also be keeping in mind the *decem stipendia* in order to see how many of these men fulfilled it (or even had the ability to). Many of the details of any given senator's early life are uncertain, especially in respect to dating. A source like Plutarch may mention one anecdote from a subject's military service without commenting on the duration of a posting. As a result, in many cases scholars have engaged in debates over these details and have in certain instances disagreed as to the amount of military service undertaken by a subject. In such cases I have provided an account of the differing arguments. In order, however, that my findings not appear skewed by opportunistic readings and decisions I am applying what seem to me to be the most reasonable conservative criteria in both the dating of campaigns and in determining what qualifies as "service" and what does not. Our sources are not explicit about how this might have been determined, and in their absence I have chosen to err on the side of caution. Thus, for example, some aristocrats may have undertaken military action while holding no official

position, but rather having raised a force as a *privatus*.[42] I have counted such action as service, even though it is conceivable that the formal satisfaction of the *decem stipendia* may have required the holding of an official position within the army. Likewise, I have chosen to count service as a *contubernalis* (time spent on a commander's staff) in reckoning the amount of service rendered. Finally, I have also counted official military positions served in peaceful provinces, even though there could be some debate as to whether this would have been an adequate form of service for fulfilling the campaigns. Where relevant, I have provided important texts and my translations of them. I have found relevant those texts which mention youthful service or suggest military inexperience when discussing a senator's later campaign.

III.1 C. Marius (b. 157 BCE Consul 86 BCE)

[C(aius) Marius C(ai) f(ilius)] / [co(n)s(ul) VII pr(aetor) tr(ibunus) pl(ebis) q(uaestor) a]ugur tr(ibunus) mil(itum) (*CIL* 6.41024)

πρώτην δὲ στρατείαν στρατευσάμενος ἐπὶ Κελτίβηρας, ὅτε Σκηπίων Ἀφρικανὸς Νομαντίαν ἐπολιόρκει, τὸν στρατηγὸν οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν ἀνδρείᾳ τῶν ἄλλων νέων διαφέρων καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν τῆς διαίτης, ἣν ὑπὸ τρυφῆς καὶ πολυτελείας διεφθαρμένοις ἐπῆγε τοῖς στρατεύμασιν ὁ Σκηπίων, εὐκολώτατα προσδεχόμενος. (Plut. *Mar.* 3.2)

Sed is natus et omnem pueritiam Arpini altus, ubi primum aetas militiae patiens fuit, stipendiis faciundis, non Graeca facundia neque urbanis munditiis sese exercuit; ita inter artis bonas integrum ingenium brevi adolevit. Ergo ubi primum tribunatum militarem a populo petit, plerisque faciem eius ignorantibus, factis notus per omnis tribus declaratur. (Sall. *Iug.* 63.3-4)

I began this chapter with a quote from a speech attributed to Marius by Sallust in the *Jugurtha*, and he is also the first figure in our sample. He was also one of the most accomplished military men in Roman history. In praising Marius' achievements on the

[42] See III.5 Crassus, III.9 Caesar. It is unclear exactly what is meant by *privatus* in this instance. It is possible that instead of meaning "private citizen" in the usual sense (we might think of the anachronistic designation "civilian") it means that one did not hold a command position. On these grounds I have elected to count such terms as service.

battlefield, the Roman People were forced to turn to the city's semi-mythical past to find suitable company for the new man from Arpinum.[43] In the speech in the *Jugurtha*, as we have seen, Marius was critical of aristocrats who shirked military service, and it makes for an appropriate foil – perhaps suspiciously appropriate – that Sallust says Marius began military service "as soon as age allowed." Much like the content of Marius' speech, the confluence of the opacity of Sallust's comment, its role in Sallust's literary project, and hyperbole undermines the value of this evidence. When does age allow one to enter the army?

There are only a few other hints about Marius' life before the Jugurthine War. Plutarch was much more specific than Sallust on this topic while also strongly contradicting him. Regarding military service, Plutarch only mentions that Marius served under Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia (134-33 BCE) before moving on to his term as tribune of plebs in 119 BCE.[44] In accounting for Marius' time in Numantia, Plutarch's Greek is helpfully clearer than what we encounter in other subjects on this list; he says that the campaign was Marius' *first* (**πρώτην δὲ στρατείαν στρατευσάμενος**). Marius was 23 years old at the time, much older than the earliest age which would first allow service in the army; Romans were traditionally eligible for service at 17. Outside of Plutarch, we are also told that Marius held a military tribunate, mentioned by Sallust and the existing Augustan *elogia* of Marius from the Forum of Augustus (see above for

[43] Plut. *Mar.* 28.5 After the victory at Vercellae Marius was hailed as Rome's "third founder" after Romulus and Camillus.

[44] Plut. *Mar.* 3.2-3. Marius seems to have made a strong impression upon Scipio Aemilianus while at Numantia. Fascinatingly, if we trust the Sallustian testimony, Marius would have shared his commander's approbation with his future adversary Jugurtha.

both).[45] The dating and location of this posting is also unclear, since some have thought it came as early as 129 BCE while others have placed it as late as 119 BCE.[46] There is no other record in our sources of a campaign undertaken by Marius before his quaestorship – another Marian office about which the details are uncertain. Thomas Carney places Marius' quaestorship in 121 BCE, others have argued for 123 or 122 BCE[47] In fact, another modern biographer of Marius doubted that the *novus homo* held the quaestorship at all, although his argument is one from silence and in contradiction of other sources.[48]

Thus, the sources provide some useful information while leaving much to the imagination. It should come as no surprise that there have been many different reconstructions of Marius' early life. Two of Marius' (relatively) recent biographers agree that he must have fulfilled the *decem stipendia* before his first office but provide very different accounts of how he

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[45] Suet. *Aug.* 31.5. In 2 BCE Augustus dedicated a series of statues and inscriptions commemorating great Romans. The *elogia* we have for Marius is from this project. See Sage 1979.

[46] Badian 1961: 496 favors 129 BCE in Asia under M. Aquillius (cos. 129 BCE) due to Marius' later familiarity with the cult of the Magna Mater and his close association with Aquillius' son of the same name, who would serve as Marius' consular colleague in 101 BCE Evans 1994: 28-9 also suggests 130/129 BCE because he felt that Marius would not have waited long after his success in Numantia to capitalize at the polls. Carney [1962]1970: 17 favors 124 BCE because it would allow Marius to serve his tribunate under the command of Q. Caecilius Metellus Balearicus (cos. 123 BCE). Gabba 1972: 770 puts the military tribunate in 123 BCE Suolahti 1955: 312, 405 dates the office to "around 119 BCE" but gives no justification for doing so.

[47] *MRR* 3.139-40. Carney [1962]1970: 17-8 suggests 122 BCE for Marius' quaestorship, assuming that he stood for the office immediately following his military tribunate.

[48] Evans 1962: 32-5, on the basis that Sallust and Plutarch do not mention a quaestorship by Marius (although neither mentions him "skipping" the office either). Marius' quaestorship is attested in the epigraphic evidence provided above as well as Val. Max. 6.16.

must have done so. Carney accepts Plutarch and agrees that Marius' first campaign was in 134 BCE in Numantia and therefore he places the military tribunate in 124 BCE (believing that Marius would have needed to fulfill the *decem stipendia* before seeking this office). This, however, is an interpretive mistake by Carney. He assumes that the *decem stipendia* mentioned in Polybius (6.19.1-2) applied to the military tribunate, but this cannot be the case since Polybius, in the very same passage, mentions a different standard for military tribunes. There were 24 military tribunes in a given year, and while it is true that *some* (10) military tribunates required 10 years of prior service, others (14) only required five – we have no indication from the sources that Marius held the former position rather than the latter.[49] Thus, we cannot assume that Marius had fulfilled the *decem stipendia* by the time of his military tribunate on these grounds.

Richard Evans takes a different approach in assigning more years of service to Marius' record. He doubts that Numantia in 134 BCE was Marius' first campaign (as Plutarch tells us it was) on the grounds that it was unlikely that Marius began his military service so late in life. Evans looks elsewhere in Plutarch to support his thesis:

τὸν στρατηγὸν οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν ἀνδρείᾳ τῶν ἄλλων νέων διαφέρων καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν τῆς διαίτης, ἣν ὑπὸ τρυφῆς καὶ πολυτελείας διεφθαρμένοις ἐπῆγε τοῖς στρατεύμασιν ὁ Σκηπίων, εὐκολώτατα προσδεχόμενος. (Plut. *Mar.* 3.2)

He attracted the attention of his (new?) general by excelling the other young men in bravery, and by his cheerful acceptance of the changed régime which Scipio introduced into the army when it had been spoiled by luxury and extravagance.[50] (Evans' translation)

This gives the impression (according to Evans) that Marius had been a member of the army *before* Scipio's arrival and that the young Marius had ingratiated himself to the new commander by

[49] See Polyb. 6.19.1. Also Suolahti 1955: 51-7. This is noted by Evans 1962: 26-7 when discussing this problem.

[50] Evans's translation *ad loc.*

zealously embracing Scipio's reforms. This is possible, but not supported at all by the text. Without the hesitant interpolation that Scipio was Marius' "(new?) general" there is nothing to suggest that Marius' service in Spain predated Scipio's tenure, and certainly not enough to overturn Plutarch's own clear assertion that Numantia was Marius' first campaign.

How do we account for Marius' youthful military service in the face of so much uncertainty? First, I accept Plutarch's testimony that Marius' first campaign was in 134 BCE because I fail to see a compelling reason not to, and I have chosen to adopt the most conservative (and reasonable) dating (i.e. the dating which allows for the most time for Marius to serve) of Marius' quaestorship: 121 BCE. This leaves a 13-year window in which Marius may have fulfilled the *decem stipendia* – and it is entirely possible that he did. It is, however, important to remember that we only have evidence for three campaigns (two with Scipio at Numantia and at least one as military tribune in an unknown theater). If we follow Badian and Evans in dating Marius' military tribunate to 129 BCE, this would have given him just enough time to fulfill the minimum five years of service required to seek that office *if* he served continuously from Numantia until his election. Including these purely hypothetical years, Marius' total rises to six campaigns. The question, naturally, is what Marius did between 128 and 121 BCE – again, a question we are unable to answer.[51] There, of course, would have been plenty of opportunity for Marius to have added more campaigns to his résumé in this period; the *Fasti Triumphales* show

[51] Evans 1994: 30-2 suggests that Marius spent this time *away* from military service tending to business in Arpinum and amassing wealth in anticipation of his political aspirations. While this argument aids the idea that Marius did not serve ten campaigns before seeking the quaestorship, it is too speculative to be taken as evidence.

military action in Illyria and Liguria during the 120's.[52] Yet, we have no explicit mention of Marius having undertaken any service during this time.

What makes the case of Marius so challenging is his extraordinary reputation as a soldier. Our sources suggest that his military record (even before his victories in Africa and Gaul as consul) was the backbone of his electoral success and self-presentation. Yet, we should not overlook the possibility that our sources were influenced by Marius' post-quaestorship success. We may detect, perhaps, the kind of rhetorical exaggeration Marius' later career inspired in the interesting disagreement between two of the brief passages I have provided above, in which Plutarch claimed Marius' first campaign came when he was already 23, while Sallust suggested Marius began his service at the earliest possible age. The Sallustian passage fits nicely with the author's portrayal of Marius as a man of action, but this could be an example of the great general's future achievements infecting and account of his youth. Uncertainty abounds.

For the purposes of this paper and in the spirit of providing a conservative account I add four years of service to the six I have already counted, bringing Marius' total to ten years. Seven of these years are unaccounted for, but I believe that Marius' reputation and the sources insistence that he traded on his military deeds early in his career should hold sway.

III.2 L. Cornelius Sulla Felix (b. 138 BCE Consul 81 BCE)

Igitur Sulla, uti supra dictum est, postquam in Africam atque in castra Mari cum equitatu venit, rudis antea et ignarus belli, sollertissumus omnium in paucis tempestatibus factus est. (Sall. *Iug.* 96.1)

L. vero Sulla usque ad quaesturae suae comitia vitam libidine, vino, ludicrae artis amore inquinatam perduxit. qua propter C. Marius consul moleste tulisse traditur quod sibi asperrimum in Africa bellum gerenti tam delicatus quaestor sorte obvenisset. (Val. Max. 6.9.6)

[52] See Rich 2014: 250.

Our view of Marius' early life is considerably obscured by uncertainty, but the account of his rival Sulla's youth is effectively redacted by comparison. The combination of Sulla's massive impact on the political community and the complete uncertainty about his youth have inspired so much speculation that no other figure on this list has been the focus of more discussions on the *decem stipendia* than Sulla. Like Marius, he was a man of considerable military ability and also heavily emphasized his military achievement in order to enhance his political prestige.[53] Further, that he was able to keep pace somewhat with Marius, Rome's "third founder," in terms of military achievement places him in the rarified air of Rome's most famous generals. Yet, it has often troubled modern scholars that, despite Sulla's subsequent and extensive military success, we have no indication whatsoever that he served in the army prior to his quaestorship in 106 BCE.[54]

It is important at the beginning of our assessment of Sulla to recognize that while we have no evidence attesting to any campaigns served by Sulla before his quaestorship, the sources for his youth are also not ideal. Appian's *Mithridatic War* and *Civil War* give us a great deal of our evidence about Sulla but do not deal with his early life at all. Plutarch only dedicated the first two chapters of his *Sulla* to the dictator's youth prior to his quaestorship under Marius in Africa. The biographer does spend some time on Sulla's humble beginnings and moral turpitude as a youth but he does not mention any military service prior to 106 BCE. Sallust painted with broad strokes as well. Like Plutarch, he attested both to Sulla's incredible

[53] For his political exploitation of his role in the capture of Jugurtha see Plut. *Sulla* 6.1, *Marius* 11.5; See Keaveney [1982]2005: 24ff; Behr 1993: 114-121.

[54] Esp. Keaveney 1980 & Ridley 2010.

natural talent and the moral shortcomings. The Sallustian evidence, as with his testimony on Marius, is tainted by the historian's reputation for inaccuracy, especially when such inaccuracy lends rhetorical value.[55] Above I have provided the most relevant quote from the *Jugurtha* which states that before going to Africa to join Marius Sulla was *rudis antea ignarus belli* ("before this he was inexperienced and ignorant of warfare"). Sallust's meaning is fairly clear; he only used the word *rudis* twice in his extant corpus, both in the *Jugurtha:* this passage about Sulla, and another (49.2) where Jugurtha is reassuring his men by pointing out the Roman's *ignorance* of the landscape. We have 17 uses of *ignarus* scattered throughout all three existing Sallustian works, but all would suggest unfamiliarity, rather than simply disinterest or limited experience.[56] Yet, although Sallust's meaning is clear we must weigh this statement against his penchant for inaccuracy. In this instance, Sallust's reputation should give us pause indeed since the author's portrayal of Sulla as *rudis* and *ignarus* in respect to war provides a nice foil to his commander in Africa and future rival, Marius.[57] Marius' rhetoric in the Jugurtha emphasized his military experience as legitimizing his aspirations and position; Sallust's Sulla spent his youth in frivolous vice but excelled in Africa thanks to innate talent. While discussing this issue Ronald Ridley calls the problem one of "contrived history."[58] I have also included above a

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[55] Sallustian character sketches are often broad-brushed; his portraits of major figures such as Catiline, Caesar, Cato, Cicero, Jugurtha, and Marius often betray literary (rather than historical) concerns.

[56] Sall. *Cat.* 17.7, 51.27; *Iug.* 12.5, 18.7, 19.7, 28.5, 36.3, 49.4, 52.4, 67.1, 80.1, 85.10, 91.1, 96.1 (the Sullan passage), 104.2; *Hist.* 1.103, 3.102.

[57] Harris 1979: 257; Paul 1984: 236.

[58] Ridley 2010: 103

brief piece of evidence from Valerius Maximus which likely follows the Sallustian evidence and tells us that Marius was concerned over his new, *delicatus* quaestor.

Then there are the sources we do not have. Somewhat tantalizingly, Sulla's autobiography looms behind all our extant ancient accounts of Sulla's life. Plutarch clearly had read Sulla's autobiography, and Sallust certainly had access to it as well.[59] Sulla had not finished his memoirs when he died in 78 BCE (they were completed by Sulla's freedman Epicadus), but he had made significant progress – the work spanned 22 volumes.[60] Unfortunately we do not know precisely how much attention Sulla paid to his youth in his work. Some have argued that Sulla ignored his ancestry and youth in an effort to pass over embarrassing material. Instead, it is argued, Sulla began in earnest with his quaestorship in Africa.[61] This idea is undermined, however, by the fact that other authors who are almost certainly using material from Sulla's autobiography display a familiarity with Sulla's ancestry, which in turn suggests that Sulla did devote some space to a review of his family history – and perhaps even a robust section at that.[62] Further, Sulla also undoubtedly had a familiarity with a previous autobiography written by a Roman aristocrat, M. Aemilius Scaurus, since Sulla married Scaurus' widow.[63] This is significant for us because we know that Scaurus *did* include

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[59] Sallust: Mellor 1999: 39.

[60] *FRH* 1.284-6; Keaveney [1982]2005: 168.

[61] E.g. Valgiglio 1975, Keaveney [1982]2005: 168-9 (list borrowed from the helpful review in Lewis 1991: 512n13).

[62] Badian 1970: 4ff; Lewis 1991: 512-3.

[63] *FRH* 1.268-70.

information on his youth and pre-*cursus honorum* life in his *de Vita Sua*.[64] Finally, some have suggested that Sulla would have omitted information about his early life because he would have found it embarrassing,[65] but such an assumption takes (in my opinion) too many interpretive liberties. We simply have no evidence for such a decision on his part and we should be loath to psychoanalyze. Finally, the theme of Sulla's autobiography was clearly his *felicitas,* and few narrative arcs would match this leitmotif as well as a rags-to-riches story. Scaurus seems to have deployed a similar tactic in his own memoir.[66] This is all to say that it is possible that Sallust and Plutarch both had access to detailed source material on Sulla's early life, and if this is true it is worth noting that neither mentioned any military service by Sulla until his quaestorship. We ought not, however, place too much weight on this argument *ex silentio.*

Our sources, therefore, cannot speak conclusively as to how much (if any) military service Sulla had rendered prior to 106 BCE. In the face of such uncertainty scholarship has predictably split. On one side, many have accepted the existence of the *decem stipendia* in this period and have fallen back on the Sallustian evidence's unreliability and lacunose nature to suggest that Sulla *must have had* some military experience before his quaestorship which we simply do not hear about.[67] Propping up this interpretation is the assumption that Sulla's candidacy for quaestorship would have been disqualified if he lacked ten campaigns. Ridley

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[64] Lewis 1991: 512.

[65] Keaveney [1982]2005.

[66] Lewis 1991: 215; *FRH* 1.268-70.

[67] Afzelius 1946: 263-78; Ridley 2010: 102-6.

uses the Plutarchian evidence to show that no policy change *vis a vis* the *decem stipendia* had taken place by Sulla's youth, citing examples (many of which we will see in this catalogue) of pre-*cursus* service by Plutarch's subjects.[68] Yet, there is a serious problem with Ridley's methodology: he takes *any* military service prior to one's quaestorship as indication that the subject had fulfilled the *full* term of the *decem stipendia.* For some, as we will see, well under ten campaigns of service can be accounted for. Further, if we are to glean Ridley's definition of service from his list of instances then his definition is very broad indeed.[69] Based on these findings, the argument that Sulla had fulfilled the *decem stipendia* prior to 106 BCE fails to convince. Further, it is clearly a circular one.

Others who are less certain about the nature and level of observance of the *decem stipendia* during Sulla's lifetime point to a more logical basis for supposing some military experience for Sulla prior to his quaestorship: he was simply too talented for a beginner.[70] While Sallust did mention that Sulla was inexperienced when he arrived in Africa, he finished the sentence by writing: *sollertissimus omnium in paucis tempestatibus factus est.* Sulla was a "natural" according to Sallust, but how likely could this be? Ridley is also skeptical on these

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[68] Ridley 2010: 105ff.

[69] E.g. Ridley 2010: 105. It is fair enough to assume that M. Crassus (cos. 70 BCE) served under his father during the Social War, but it is important to remember that we have no evidence stating that. M. Brutus accompanied his uncle Cato Uticensis to Cyprus in 58 BCE, but there is no indication that he did so in an official capacity. Antony is said to have gone on "military exercises" in Greece in 58 BCE, but there is no suggestion in our sources that he held a military position, and Plutarch focuses more on his rhetorical training undertaken there than his military training.

[70] Long 1864: 1.467, 2.215; Paul 1984: 237; Hinard 1985: 21, 26, 31; Ridley 2010: 102-3.

grounds.[71] He has trouble imagining that Sulla was placed in charge of the cavalry without having had any previous cavalry service. From a practical standpoint, so it is argued, Sulla was simply too capable. The foundation of Ridley's objection is that the horsemanship required of cavalrymen was too difficult to be learned in so brief a period of time. Ridley writes: "The cavalry had to be able to ride a variety of mounts. 'Normal riding is difficult enough to master. Good riders spend years perfecting techniques.'"[72] This objection is fair, but the author fails to note the difference between training and experience. Even if we were to accept that 106 BCE was Sulla's first campaign in the cavalry (admittedly, in my opinion, an overly-literal interpretation of the evidence), it would be ridiculous to imagine that it was his first time on a horse. Mastery of horsemanship was a major focus of the education of young Roman aristocrats.[73] The young Caesar, to cite a famous example, was already an expert rider before he was old enough to go out on campaign.[74] The reality was that young aristocrats were *trained* for war even before they took up their first military service. Thus, Ridley's interpretive mistake is to assume that military training began in the army. Sulla may have been inexperienced in actual service but still possessing of the skill set necessary to serve as a cavalry commander.

On the other side of the scholarly discussion of Sulla's youth are those who are friendlier to the Sallustian evidence. Mommsen (albeit in passing) agreed with Sallust and

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[71] Ridley 2010.

[72] Ridley 2010: 108 citing Hyland 1990: 110-6.

[73] See the discussion of aristocratic education in the Introduction.

[74] Plut. *Caes.* 17.6.

Valerius Maximus and accepted the narrative that Sulla came to Africa "untried" but quickly proved himself a brilliant military officer.[75] Many others have echoed the Sallustian/Valerian narrative without considering that Sulla's biography as we have it may omit youthful service.[76] Ernst Badian claimed, based on Sallust, that Sulla did no military service, but he takes this to mean that Sulla had initially not intended upon a political career since, in his view, the *decem stipendia* were still being enforced.[77] More recently, Arthur Keaveney believed that we should not dismiss the Sallustian evidence.[78] Instead, Keaveney offered some suggestions of how Sulla may have avoided military service and still stood for office. His first suggestion resurrects the opinion of Mommsen and posits that merely standing for the levy was sufficient for counting service in a campaign. A I discussed above, I believe this interpretation highly unlikely. Second, Keaveney believed that the *lex Annalis* may have – perhaps even gradually – replaced military expectations with age requirements. Such an argument is interesting, but there is little evidence to support it. Finally, Keaveney pointed to the *lex Iulia municipalis*, which stated that anyone running for magistracy in a *municipium* or colony must be 30 years old *unless* he had served three campaigns in the cavalry or six in the infantry.[79] Keaveney believes that it is possible that

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[75] Mommsen *RG* 4.142ff

[76] Ridley 2010 provides a very thorough and useful bibliography, although much of the scholarship he cites is by now quite antiquated. See Hooke 1818: 7.1201; Lau 1885: 28, 47, 52, 69 (Sulla's first modern biographer); Neumann 1881: 1.334-5; Liddell 1855[1901]: 514; Shuckburgh 1894: 576; Drumman 1902: 2.365; Greenidge 1904: 444-6.

[77] Badian 1970: 6. Gabba 1972: 704 follows Badian.

[78] Keaveney 1980: 165ff.

[79] See Crawford *RS* 366ff. *quei minor annos* (*trigenta*) *natus est erit, nei quis eorum post k*(alendas) *Ianuar*(ias) *secundas in municipio colonia praefectura IIuir*(atum) *IIIIuir*(atum) *neue quem*

this law, technically for the *municipia*, may have been based on an older Roman precedent, perhaps one that Sulla was in adherence with when he ran for the quaestorship. Again, an entirely possible solution that also lacks any support from our sources.

On level it excessive to argue that Sulla had *no* military experience before his quaestorship; our sources are simply not strong enough to warrant such an extreme interpretation, and one would imagine this would have seemed worthy of more comment by those who wrote on Sulla's early career in antiquity. It would also be difficult, however, to claim that Sulla had fulfilled the *decem stipendia* without *any* record of service before 106 BCE. Therefore, for the moment I am reserving judgment on Sulla. At the end of this chapter, when a normal range of years of service is clearer from our examples, it may in fact be appropriate to consider whether or not we should consider Sulla to have done some amount of service in line with our findings. The disproportionate relationship between Sulla's success and his experience in youth may have been dramatic, but we shall see that it was less extraordinary for a senator of this period to serve less than ten campaigns.

III.3 Q. Sertorius (b. circa 123 BCE Praetor circa 85 BCE)

ἤσκητο μὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ δίκας ἱκανῶς, καί τινα καὶ δύναμιν ἐν τῇ πόλει μειράκιον ὢν ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἔσχεν· αἱ δὲ περὶ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ λαμπρότητες αὐτοῦ καὶ κατορθώσεις ἐνταῦθα τὴν φιλοτιμίαν μετέστησαν. (Plut. *Sert.* 2.1)

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν Κίμβρων καὶ Τευτόνων ἐμβεβληκότων εἰς Γαλατίαν στρατευόμενος ὑπὸ Καιπίωνι, (Plut. *Sert.* 3.1)

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alium mag(istratum) *petito neue capito neue gerito, nisei quei eorum stipendia equo in legione* (tria) *aut pedestria in legione* (sex) *fecerit…* Scholarship now generally agrees that we cannot conclusively identify the regulations on the *Tabula Heracleensis* as the *lex Iulia municipialis* of 45 BCE. There is, however, a good likelihood – following Crawford – that the regulations are Caesarian in date.

δεύτερον δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπερχομένων μυριάσι πολλαῖς καὶ δειναῖς ἀπειλαῖς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ μένειν ἄνδρα Ῥωμαῖον ἐν τάξει τότε καὶ τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ στρατηγῷ μέγα ἔργον εἶναι, Μάριος μὲν ἡγεῖτο, Σερτώριος δὲ κατασκοπὴν ὑπέστη τῶν πολεμίων. (Plut. *Sert.* 3.2)

τότε μὲν οὖν ἀριστείων ἔτυχεν· ἐν δὲ τῇ λοιπῇ στρατείᾳ πολλὰ καὶ συνέσεως ἔργα καὶ τόλμης ἀποδειξάμενος εἰς ὄνομα καὶ πίστιν ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ προήχθη. μετὰ δὲ τὸν Κίμβρων καὶ Τευτόνων πόλεμον ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Δειδίῳ στρατηγῷ χιλίαρχος ἐπὶ Ἰβηρίας ἐν τῇ πόλει Καστλῶνι παρεχείμαζε τῆς Κελτιβήρων. (Plut. *Sert.* 3.3)

Ἐκ τούτου Σερτώριος ἐν τῇ Ἰβηρίᾳ διεβοήθη· καὶ ὅτε πρῶτον ἐπανῆκεν εἰς Ῥώμην, ταμίας ἀποδείκνυται τῆς περὶ Πάδον Γαλατίας, ἐν δέοντι. τοῦ γὰρ Μαρσικοῦ πολέμου συνισταμένου, στρατιώτας τε προσταχθὲν αὐτῷ καταλέγειν καὶ ὅπλα ποιεῖσθαι, σπουδὴν καὶ τάχος προσθεὶς τῷ ἔργῳ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων νέων βραδυτῆτα καὶ μαλακίαν ἀνδρὸς ἐμπράκτως βιωσομένου δόξαν ἔσχεν. (Plut. *Sert.* 4.1)

Quintus Sertorius was born into a Sabine equestrian family in Nursia (modern Norica).[80] We do not have a solid date for Sertorius' birth, and scholarly theories as to the date rest most often on Sertorius' entry into the army. Sertorius' first recorded campaign is in 106 or 105 BCE (for reasons I will explain below, I favor 106), if one assumes that Sertorius joined the army at 17 then 123 BCE would have been his birth year. This has been the traditional view.[81] This of course works from the assumption that he would have joined the army at 17, but we shall see throughout this work that it was not uncommon for young men to join up earlier or later.[82] Little is known about his family other than that he lost his father and was raised by his mother,

[80] Cicero (*Brut.* 180) referred to Sertorius as someone "of our order."

[81] Schulten 1926: 38 was the first to suggest 123 BCE; others have followed: Sumner 1973: 108; Katz 1984: 44-9; *DNP* Elvers, "Q. Sertorius" takes 123 BCE for granted.

[82] Spann 1987: 158-9 argues that Sertorius joined later than 17, believing that Plutarch suggests that Sertorius gained some notability as an orator *before* joining the army and thinking that it would have been difficult to do so at 17. Konrad 1994: 37-8, however, convincingly argues that Plutarch's separation of rhetorical achievements and military ones is a product of theme rather than chronology.

Rhea.[83] We also have some evidence of his early non-military career; Cicero mentioned having seen Sertorius speak and classified Sertorius among the *rabulae* ("ranters") who were characterized by their ignorance, rudeness, and rusticity.[84] Whether or not Sertorius was a good public speaker, we have no reason to doubt Plutarch when he tells us that Sertorius' military ability steered his career primarily towards the camp rather than the forum.

While it is generally accepted that Plutarch suggests the fight against the Cimbri and Teutoni as Sertorius' entrance into the army, it is not actually as clear as we might like that this was what Plutarch meant. Elsewhere (as we have already seen in Marius' case, and as we shall see in other entries) Plutarch is rather intentional about identifying his subject's first campaign, usually doing so with some form of **πρώτη στρατεία**. Here, however, the **πρῶτον** is connected to the later **δεύτερον**, and thus not referring explicitly to the campaign (**στρατευόμενος**).[85] While this does leave the possibility that Sertorius served before this time, we have no source material to base such a thesis on. Further, if Sertorius first served against the Cimbri and Teutoni, in what year did his service begin? The details provided by Plutarch are from the disaster at Arausio in 105 BCE, but Caepio took command in 106. In order to accept the most conservative date in

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[83] Konrad 1994: 35. Two other Roman subjects of Plutarchean biographies were raised by their mothers (see *Cor.* 1.2 and *Ti Grac.* 1.5-7). Although Plutarch's words on Sertorius' upbringing are laconic, we may also compare with Tacitus' account of Agricola's upbringing (*Agric.* 4.2ff). There is an intriguing connection throughout Plutarch's *Lives* between the early loss of a father and future rebellion/betrayal of one's country (Coriolanus, Alcibiades, the Gracchi, and Sertorius).

[84] Cic. *Brut.* 180 *Sed omnium oratorum sive rabularum, qui plane indocti et inurbani aut rustici etiam fuerunt, quos quidem ego cognoverim, solutissimum in dicendi et acutissimum iudico nostri ordini Q. Sertorium.*

[85] An excellent point advanced by Konrad 1994: 40.

respect to my argument I am assuming Sertorius joined Caepio at the start of his command in 106 BCE.[86] Whenever he arrived at the front, it is from this campaign that we get a harrowing (albeit almost certainly apocryphal) episode wherein an injured Sertorius swam across the Rhone in full armor without even yielding his shield.[87]

The next we hear of Sertorius is his posting under Marius, who assumed command in Gaul in 104 BCE. At least one scholar has argued that Sertorius spent some time between Arausio and his service under Marius in Rome and not with the army, but his argument lacks any support in the evidence.[88] Again we cannot have the level of certainty we would like, but without solid evidence that Sertorius spent time away from the army there is no reason to interpose a gap in between his postings under Caepio and Marius.[89] Here also Plutarch includes an anecdote that reveals Sertorius' prowess and bravery: this time Sertorius went undercover among the enemy and obtained valuable information for Marius.[90] Helpfully for our purposes,

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[86] Spann 1987: 159; Konrad 1994: 41ff who points out an obscure passage from the *Scolia Berensia* (Mommsen 1861: 451) on the *Georgics* that suggests Sertorius was a *signifer* at Arausio: *Sertorius effodit signa, pugnavit et victus est, vix ipse ut evaderet, Rhodanum transnatavit.* If indeed Sertorius was a *signifer,* it was likely not his first year in the army.

[87] Sertorius' swim is also mentioned by Ammianus (24.6.7). Konrad 1994: 43 points out that the similarities between this episode and the famous swim of Horatius Cocles (also one-eyed) "invite skepticism." Katz 1984: 290 argued that Sallust must have given considerable attention to this event in a now-lost portion of the *Histories*, suggesting that Sallust would have modeled it on Caesar's famous swim in the Nile (Caes. *BAfr.* 21.2-3; Plut. *Caes.* 49.7-8; Suet. *DJ* 64). This is intriguing, but entirely speculative.

[88] Rijkhoek 1992: 74-5 suggests that Sertorius spent 104-103 BCE at Rome, but there is no evidence for this in the sources.

[89] Following Konrad 1994: 45.

[90] When exactly this took place is uncertain. Some (Schulten 1926: 29; Spann 1987: 14-7) place Sertorius' mission just before the Battle of Aquae Sextiae. Konrad 1994: 46 gives some

Plutarch is fairly clear that Sertorius served through until the end of the conflict with the Cimbri and Teutoni.[91] Thus, in order to adopt the most conservative position possible, it is fair to assume that Sertorius served continuously from his first posting in 106 BCE until 101 BCE.

After this, Sertorius went to Spain under the command of Titus Didius (cos. 98 BCE); nothing is known about his life in between 101 BCE and this point.[92] It is also unclear exactly when Sertorius began this campaign. The note in the current Loeb edition of Plutarch's *Sertorius* suggests 97 BCE when Didius became a proconsul after his term in office, but others are less certain. Broughton accepts Didius' term in Spain as 97-93 BCE, but Konrad believes that Didius began his campaign while consul in 98 BCE.[93] Konrad suggests this on the basis of a brief aside in Obsequens (47) "*Hispani pluribus proeliis devicti*," but this passage is too weak to hold up the argument – there was, of course, military activity in Spain before Didius' tenure. In fact, L. Cornelius Dolabella held a Spanish triumph in 98.[94] Thus, I see no good reason to adopt 98

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other options: the fall of 104 BCE (when the Romans apparently expected an invasion – see Plut. *Mar.* 14.9-10) or fall of 102 BCE (when Marius seems to have had good intelligence about the subsequent invasion – see Plut. *Mar.* 15.1-5, 23.2). Ultimately, I agree with Konrad when he conceeds that Sertorius' mission could conceivably have happened at any time between 104 and 102.

[91] Especially considering some of Plutarch's phrasing: ***ἐν δὲ τῇ λοιπῇ στρατείᾳ*** and ***μετὰ δὲ τὸν Κίμβρων καὶ Τευτόνων πόλεμον***.

[92] Spann 1987: 18 believes he remained in the army, which is possible, but there are no sources to support this.

[93] *MRR* 2.4-7, volume 3 records no dispute about Didius' term in Spain. Konrad 1994: 48ff argues (briefly) for 98-93 BCE.

[94] *MRR* 2.5. C. Cloelius Caldus was also a proconsul in the region during Didius consulship in 98 BCE.

BCE in lieu of the start of Didius' proconsular term in 97 BCE. This is significant for us because, as with Sertorius' posting under Caepio, it is reasonable enough to expect that Sertorius joined his commander at the beginning of his tenure rather than later.

As with his arrival, we are also in the dark about when exactly Sertorius returned. Didius came back to Rome in 93 BCE and held a triumph. It would seem natural for Sertorius to have returned with his commander, but whenever he returned he did not stay long. Plutarch tells us that Sertorius was made quaestor for Cisalpine Gaul "as soon as he returned." Further, Plutarch added that Sertorius' posting came at an opportune time for the newly-minted quaestor to make an impact during the outbreak of Social War. This creates something of a chronological problem. If Sertorius was elected "as soon as he returned," 92 BCE would be an attractive dating for his year in office, but we also know that Sertorius' tenure came ***τοῦ γὰρ Μαρσικοῦ πολέμου συνισταμένου*** – the Social War did not break out until 91 BCE. One scholar has argued that Sertorius must have stayed on in Spain for a year following Didius' departure. The Celtiberians did rebel in 92 BCE while Didius' replacement C. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 93) was in command, and it is *possible* that Sertorius stayed on to aid the new commander. In this way, Sertorius would have returned in 92 in time to be elected for 91. We do not, however, have any indication of this in our sources.[95] Broughton originally dated Sertorius' quaestorship to 90 based on the reference to the Social War, but emended this in his third volume in favor of 91 BCE based on Plutarch's mention that Sertorius was elected quickly upon his return.[96] Konrad provides, in my opinion,

[95] Spann 1987: 161-2 see also Sumner 1973: 108ff.

[96] *MRR* 2.27; 3.193.

the most reasonable suggestion. He argues that Plutarch was likely compressing events at this point to form a convenient narrative: Sertorius did well in Spain, he was elected quaestor soon after, his quaestorship saw participation in the early period of the Social War. If Sertorius returned with Didius in 93 BCE, he would have had to begin to organize his campaign for the elections in 92 quickly. Thus, it is reasonable given the laconic nature of our lone source to think that Plutarch considered a return in 93 and a successful election in 92 (for 91) to be rather swift, and that a term of office in 91 BCE would have included the outbreak of the Social War.[97] Therefore, for our purposes, 97-93 BCE is the most prudent dating of Sertorius' service in Spain.

Judging from this analysis, Sertorius had nine years of military service when he stood for the quaestorship in 92 BCE (106-101 and 97-93 BCE). This would leave him one year shy of fulfilling the *decem stipendia.* If we accept Spann's rather tenuous suggestion that Sertorius stayed on an extra year in Spain then our tally would rise to 10. On the other hand, however, if we were to also accept Rijkhoeck's equally speculative argument that Sertorius spent two years in Rome between his postings under Caepio and Marius, then the tally would drop again to eight (seven, if we do not include Spann's argument regarding 92 BCE). Given our sources, I believe that nine is our most reasonable option.

III.4 L. Licinius Lucullus (b. 118 BCE Consul 74 BCE)

Νέος δ' ὢν ἐν τῷ Μαρσικῷ πολέμῳ πολλὰ μὲν τόλμης δείγματα παρέσχε καὶ συνέσεως, μᾶλλόν γε μὴν αὐτὸν δι' εὐστάθειαν καὶ πρᾳότητα Σύλλας προσηγάγετο, καὶ χρώμενος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὰ πλείστης ἄξια σπουδῆς διετέλεσεν· ὧν ἦν καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα πραγματεία. (Plut. *Luc.* 2.1)

Post ad Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium quae de virtute eius erat sed etiam gloriam superiorum; idque eo fuit mirabilius quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur qui adulescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. (Cic. *Aca.* 1.1-2)

[97] Konrad 1994: 52-3.

With Plutarch's *Lucullus* we creep onto more stable footing in our sources. The dawn of the Republic's last generation brings with it more source material useful for prosopographical research. In Lucullus' case we are fortunate to have some Ciceronian information in addition to Plutarch's extant biography. As with Sulla, however, now-lost works lurk in the background of the existing accounts. Plutarch cited both Sallust and Livy in his *Life of Lucullus,* but most of the works referenced by Plutarch are lost. Despite its fragmentary state we are able to tell that Sallust's *Histories* seem to have been the primary source for Plutarch's account.[98] In addition, the poet Archias was a companion of Lucullus on his campaigns in the east and apparently wrote a poem in praise of his patron. As with the vast majority of Sallust's *Histories* this is now lost, but was consulted by Plutarch for his *Life.*[99] Antonius of Ascalon (another member of Lucullus' traveling literary circle) was also consulted by Plutarch, and the biographer also had access to the account of Strabo in his now-lost *Historical Sketches*.[100] Last among our missing sources, Plutarch's *Life* was likely not the first biography of Lucullus – the author claims to have consulted the work of Cornelius Nepos, who possibly had written his own account of Lucullus' life.[101] Finally, Cicero was a colleague and occasional collaborator of Lucullus, who appears *passim* in the Ciceronian corpus. Most significantly, Cicero dedicated the second book of his

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[98] Plut. *Luc.* 11.6; 33.3. Tröster 2008: 23 gives a useful review of the scholarship: Gleitsmann 1883: 12-24, 27ff; Otto 1889: 315-7; Maurenbrecher 1891: 48-54; Reinach 1895: 441ff; Bauhofer 1935: 24ff, 100-9; McGushin 1994: 202. Plutarch also cites Livy in the *Lucullus* (28.8, 31.9)

[99] Schettino 2014: 423ff

[100] Plut. *Luc.* 28.8.

[101] Plut. *Luc.* 43.2

Academia to Lucullus, which (usefully for the purpose of this study) includes a brief summary of Lucullus' career at its opening.

Only just over a chapter of Plutarch's account is dedicated to the period before Lucullus' quaestorship in 87. Yet, he does mention that Lucullus did have some (distinguished) military experience during the Social War (91-88 BCE).[102] Cicero, on the other hand, mentions no military service by Lucullus until his quaestorship.[103] Certainly, Lucullus would go on to capitalize on significant military achievement, but Cicero tells us that Lucullus' later military success came as a surprise to his peers since he had spent his youth *in forensi opera*.[104] Plutarch also noted that, although Lucullus served honorably in the Social War, it was his non-martial virtues that attached him to Sulla.[105]

Keaveney's biography of Lucullus assumes that he had military experience previous to his military tribunate in 89 BCE based on two assumptions: 1) The pre-requisite of at least five years of service before holding a military tribunate, and 2) his brother Marcus Terentius Varro Lucullus' (cos. 73 BCE) military record.[106] His first point is in line with a somewhat tenuous interpretation accepted previously by Broughton, namely that Lucullus held the military

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[102] Plut. *Luc.* 2.1 ***Νέος δ' ὢν ἐν τῷ Μαρσικῷ πολέμῳ πολλὰ μὲν τόλμης δείγματα παρέσχε καὶ συνέσεως, μᾶλλόν γε μὴν αὐτὸν δι' εὐστάθειαν καὶ πρᾳότητα Σύλλας προσηγάγετο, καὶ χρώμενος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὰ πλείστης ἄξια σπουδῆς διετέλεσεν· ὧν ἦν καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα πραγματεία.***

[103] Cic. *Aca.* 2.1

[104] Cic. *Aca.* 2.2

[105] See Plut. 2.1 (above).

[106] Varro Lucullus was a legate of Sulla's in 82 BCE See Keaveney 1992: 15ff.

tribunate. The only evidence cited by Keaveney and Broughton is Plutarch's *Lucullus* 2.1 (provided above) which does not mention in what capacity Lucullus served under Sulla during the Social War.[107] Perhaps Lucullus was a military tribune, perhaps not. Further, even if we were to say that Lucullus was, in fact, a military tribune in this period, this does not necessarily mean he would have served the traditional five years beforehand. Michael Sage has argued convincingly that by the first century BCE the pre-requisite of five years of service had lapsed.[108] A late-republican example is instructive. Caesar, describing the panic that went through his army at the prospect of facing the Germans in battle, says the fear began with his *tribuni militares* who, *ex urbe amicitiae causa Caesarem secuti non magnum in re militari usum habebant* (had followed Caesar out of the city out of friendship and did not have much experience in military affairs).[109] This hardly suggests that Caesar's military tribunes were seasoned veterans. We cannot, therefore, assume that simply holding a military tribunate in the first century meant that the officer had served for five years prior to his office. Keaveney's second reason for assuming some military service by Lucullus before 89 BCE (his brother's military record) is easier to deal with, if only because we have no record of any military service by M. Terentius Varro Lucullus until 82 BCE when he was a legate under Sulla.[110] Perhaps he too did not fulfil the *decem stipendia.*

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[107] *MRR* 2.35 puts a question mark before Lucullus' name (no mention of this office in volume 3); Keaveney 1992: 15ff.

[108] Sage 2008: 104.

[109] Caes. *BG* 39. See also Keppie [1984]1998: 98.

[110] Plut. *Sull.* 27.7; App. *B Civ.* 1.424; Vell. Pat. 2.28; *MRR* 2.65.

Despite its absence from Cicero's dedication in the *Academia,* I believe it is prudent to accept that Lucullus served during the Social War. Keaveney's arguments for assuming service past that point are, however, highly problematic. Finally, the dating of Lucullus quaestorship, the *terminus ante quem* for youthful military service, is either 88 or 87 BCE. Broughton initially dated the office to 87 but changed to 88 in his third volume based largely on the popular – but tenuous – assumption that Lucullus was the lone officer to follow Sulla to Rome in 88.[111] For our purposes, however, it matters little as I see no reason to ascribe more than two years of pre-*cursus* service to Lucullus.

III.5 M. Licinius Crassus (b. 115. Consul 70 BCE)

Ἐμπειρίας τε γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἦν καὶ τῶν πράξεων αὐτοῦ τὴν χάριν ἀφῄρουν αἱ συγγενεῖς κῆρες ἐπιφερόμεναι, φιλοκέρδεια καὶ μικρολογία. (Plut. *Crass.* 6.5)

Crassus was born in 115 BCE or early 114 BCE.[112] He grew up in close proximity to a sterling example of military achievement and political success. His father, P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 97 BCE), spent 96-93 BCE in Spain and returned to celebrate a triumph over the Lusitanians and obtain the censorship in 89 BCE.[113] It is possible, perhaps even probable, that M. Crassus served under his father during his Spanish campaign, potentially as a

[111] *MRR* 2.52n5, 3.121

[112] This is based on the passage in Plutarch (*Crass.* 17.1) which says that Crassus had just turned 60 when he joked that King Degotarus of Galatia was too old to found a new city. Crassus would have passed through Galatia on his way to Syria in either late 55 or early 54 BCE. See Ward 1977: 46 citing Sumner 1973: 123-4.

[113] For P. Crassus' Spanish campaign see *CIL* I[1]. 661; Plut. *Crass.* 4.1. Cicero twice commented on P's reputation for bravery (*de Or.* 3.10; *Sest.* 48).

contubernalis.[114] Likewise, Crassus was already 24 when the Social War began; he was not a teenager during the conflict as Cicero and Pompey were. This may make it more likely that he served in the war with the allies. Although Plutarch does not mention Crassus' service in the Social War we know that his father was a legate under the consul L. Iulius Caesar, and thus scholars have fairly enough assumed that the younger Crassus served under his father.[115] Other biographical accounts of Crassus' life skip over the Social War to the more firm footing of the Civil War between Marius and Sulla.[116] During the *dominatio Cinnae* Crassus' father and one of his brothers died while Crassus fled to Spain.[117] While there Crassus raised a private army and went to Africa, originally to join forces with Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80 BCE). Their association, however, did not last long and Crassus joined Sulla in Italy in 83 BCE. Crassus was a useful officer for Sulla and played an integral role at the Battle of the Colline Gate in 82 when he commanded the decisively successful right wing of Sulla's forces.[118] The date of

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[114] Adcock 1966: 1 says it is *possible* that Crassus accompanied his father as a contubernalis. Marshall 1976: 10 cites Adcock in favor of Crassus' service as a *contubernalis*. Ward 1977: 49 does not speculate as to Crassus' position while serving under his father in Spain.

[115] App. *B Civ.* 1.40-41. P. Crassus was driven out of Grumentum in 90 BCE. Will, *DNP* "Licinius: I.11."; Adcock 1966: 1; Marshall 1976: 10; Ward 1977: 49. Adcock is the first to raise the possibility that Crassus served as a military tribune under his father, but it is unclear on what basis he suggests this role for Crassus. Marshall (again following Adcock) also suggests that Crassus served as a military tribune, but only cites Adcock's testimony. Ward opts instead for legate but is silent on why he does so.

[116] Cadoux 1956: 154.

[117] Livy *Per.* 80 says that Crassus' father committed suicide, but Plut. *Crass.* four says both he and Crassus' brother were executed. For Crassus' father's suicide see also Appendix II.

[118] Plut. *Crass.* 6; *Sull.* 29.4-30.1.

Crassus' quaestorship is uncertain, but *Der Neue Pauly* places it in 77 BCE at the earliest. Regardless of the exact year of Crassus' quaestorship, we do not hear of any military action on his part until his takeover of the command against Spartacus as proconsul in 72 BCE.[119]

One interpretive challenge in considering Crassus in terms of military achievement is the obvious baggage that accompanies his death: the disaster at Carrhae 53 BCE. In light of this dramatic defeat Crassus has somewhat unfairly had the reputation of being a poor soldier.[120] It does not mention Carrhae, but a Plutarchean example illustrates this nicely:

Ἠνία δὲ Πομπήϊος αὐτὸν εὐημερῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίαις καὶ πρὶν ἢ βουλῆς μεταλαβεῖν θριαμβεύων καὶ Μάγνος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ μέγας, ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναγορευθείς. καί ποτε καὶ φήσαντός τινος ὡς Πομπήϊος Μάγνος πρόσεισι, γελάσας ἠρώτησεν ὁπηλίκος. ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἐξισώσασθαι πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, ὑπεδύετο τὴν πολιτείαν, σπουδαῖς καὶ συνηγορίαις καὶ δανεισμοῖς καὶ τῷ συμπαραγγέλλειν καὶ συνεξετάζεσθαι τοῖς δεομένοις τι τοῦ δήμου κτώμενος δύναμιν ἀντίπαλον καὶ δόξαν ᾗ Πομπήϊος εἶχεν ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων στρατειῶν. καὶ πρᾶγμα συνέβαινεν αὐτοῖς ἴδιον. (Plut. *Crass.* 7.1-3)

Now it bothered [Crassus] that Pompey was successful in his campaigns, that he had celebrated a triumph before becoming a member of the Senate, and that he was called Magnus (that is, *Great*) by the People. And once when someone said: "Pompey the Great is coming," Crassus laughed and asked: "How great is he?" Therefore, he put off all efforts to equal Pompey in military achievements, and focused on politics; and through his eagerness, his legal work, his money-lending, and his collaboration in the canvassing and examinations which candidates for office had to undergo, the influence and fame he obtained was equal to that which Pompey had acquired from his many great campaigns.

Thus, early in his biography Plutarch prepares us for the familiar comparison between the two rivals: Pompey the super-soldier and Crassus the oligarch. If, however, we consider the actual details of Crassus' career it is clear that he did not put off pursuing military achievement. The reckoning of his pre-*cursus* service just given shows an amount which, we shall see, is actually

[119] See *DNP* Will, "Licinius [I 11]"; *MRR* 2.118.

[120] For rehabilitations of Crassus' military ability see Cadoux 1956: 154-5; Ward 1977: 64.

somewhat high relative to his peers.[121] Add to this his command against Spartacus (after which he zealously pursued military laurels) and his (albeit disastrous) Parthian campaign and we can see plainly an enthusiastic interest in military affairs. If we total Crassus' youthful campaigns, this amounts to at best seven years of service before his quaestorship: three years under his father in Spain, two years during the Social War (again under his father) and two years during the Civil War; it is important to remember, however, that five of these seven years are unattested in the sources.

III.7 M. Tullius Cicero (b. 106 BCE Consul 63 BCE)

Memini colloquia et cum acerrimis hostibus et cum gravissime dissidentibus civibus. Cn. Pompeius Sex. f. consul me praesente, cum essem tiro in eius exercitu, cum P. Vettio Scatone, duce Marsorum, inter bina castra collocutus est. (Cic. *Phil.* 12.27)

Nam de angue illo qui Sullae apparuit immolanti, utrumque memini[122] *et Sullam, cum in expeditionem educturus esset, immolavisse, et anguem ab ara extitisse, eoque die rem praeclare esse gestam non haruspicis consilio, sed imperatoris.* (Cic. *Div.* 2.65)

Haec ego novi propter omnis necessitudines, quae mihi sunt cum L. Tuberone: domi una eruditi, militiae contubernales, post adfines, in omni denique vita familiares; magnum etiam vinculum, quod isdem studiis semper usi sumus. (Cic. *Lig.* 21)

ἅμα δὲ τοῖς περὶ Μούκιον ἀνδράσι συνὼν πολιτικοῖς καὶ πρωτεύουσι τῆς βουλῆς εἰς ἐμπειρίαν τῶν νόμων ὠφελεῖτο· καί τινα χρόνον καὶ στρατείας μετέσχεν ὑπὸ Σύλλᾳ περὶ τὸν Μαρσικὸν πόλεμον. (Plut. Cic. 3.2)

Unlike the other subjects on this list, we have an immense amount of biographical detail for Cicero's life, and with the added value that much of it is autobiographical. he is, as I have already noted, often mentioned by scholars when discussing the lapse of the *decem*

[121] *DNP* give 85 BCE as the year Crassus fled to Spain. Plutarch says that Crassus raised his force there **ἅμα τῷ πυθέσθαι τὴν Κίννα τελευτὴν** which would be 84 BCE I am conservatively including the entire period between the death of Cinna and the decisive Sullan victory at the Battle of the Colline Gate in 82 BCE

[122] The specific meaning of *memini* is important to my argument and will be discussed below.

stipendia.[123] This should come as no surprise; Cicero's distaste for soldiering features prominently in many discussions of his life. Perhaps most famously, the praise Cicero lavished on himself for his domestic suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy as consul was widely mocked, especially his famous line: *Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi.*[124]

Unsurprisingly then, Plutarch also emphasized Cicero's antipathy towards violence and military service.[125] In comparing him with his counterpart in the *Parallel Lives,* Demosthenes, Plutarch assessed that both orators were **κινδύνους καὶ πολέμους ἄτολμον**.[126] Among the Pompeians during the Civil War Plutarch suggested that Cicero's largest contribution to the campaign was his ability to provide a well-timed *bon mot*, and later recounts that he was thought cowardly by some when he abandoned the cause after Pharsalus.[127] Again, after the Civil War, the conspirators against Caesar decided to leave Cicero out of their plans because he lacked the bravery necessary for the undertaking.[128] It is important to note, however, that Plutarch's portrait of Cicero in this respect is somewhat overwrought. For example, the biographer also makes much of Cicero's discomfort with presence of soldiers during his account of Milo's trial

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[123] Harris 1979: 12; McCall 2002: 113n72; Rawson 1983: 15-6. Rosenstein 2007: 143 says that Julius Caesar is the first known example, but he perhaps means Caesar is the first example of this phenomenon from a patrician.

[124] Cic. *Off.* 177. Plut. *Comp. Dem. Cic.* 2.1.

[125] Moles 1988: 150.

[126] Plut. *Dem.* 3.2.

[127] Plut. *Cic.* 38.1, 39.1-2

[128] Plut. *Cic.* 42.

in 52 BCE, but he almost certainly misunderstood the purpose for the presence of the soldiers at the trial.[129] This characterization of Cicero has (perhaps not entirely unjustly) followed him to the present: Erich Gruen gave the *opinio communis* most succinctly when referred to Cicero as "very unmilitary."[130]

Most discussions of Cicero's youth focus on his savant-like experience as a young student and his rhetorical training, first at Rome and then later abroad. Yet we do know that Cicero did have some military experience when he approached his quaestorship in 76 BCE: he had served in the army during the Social War. We can be certain that this activity was the only military experience he had before the start of his public career, but less clear is exactly what form this service took. All agree that Cicero served under Cn. Pompeius Strabo, the consul of 89 BCE and father of Pompey Magnus. This can hardly be questioned given Cicero's very clear language in *Twelfth Philippic* provided above, where he claims to have been with Strabo as a *tiro* (recruit) in his army. In addition, Cicero is listed among Strabo's officers on an inscription from 89 BCE. This would have been a fascinating camp indeed, since we know from the same inscription that Cicero was joined in camp by Pompey (naturally serving under his father) and his future nemesis L. Sergius Catilina.[131]

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[129] Plut. *Cic.* 35.1-5. The orator makes this clear in the version of the speech extant today: Cic. *Milo* 1.

[130] Gruen 1974: 459. See also e.g. Shackleton Bailey 1971: 8; Harris 1979: 12; Rawson 1983:15-16. Tempest 2011: 155.

[131] *CIL* I^2 709.

The details of Cicero's service in the Social War, however, are quite opaque. It is certain that Cicero spent at least some time under the command of Pompeius, but less clear is whether or not he also spent time under the command of Sulla. Plutarch flatly stated that Cicero's activity during the Social War was **ὑπὸ Σύλλᾳ**; but Bernadette Perrin's Loeb edition (1919), however, issues a note to this passage suggesting that the biographer had made a mistake and that Cicero's service was under Pompeius alone. This does not account, however, for an interesting series of passages focusing on an event from the Social War in Cicero's *de Divinatione.* In this dialogue (2.65) Cicero described an apparently well-known scene from the Social War at which he claimed to have been present. While besieging a town, Sulla made a sacrifice during which a snake came out from under the altar. Sulla's *haruspex,* a Gaius Postumius, then urged Sulla to lead the army out immediately. Sulla did so and captured a Samnite camp.[132] It is true that Cicero's analysis (*Div.* 2.65) of the irregularities of Sulla's sacrifice does not mention that he himself was under Sulla's command. Yet, this can be reasonably inferred from an earlier passage in *de Divinatione* (1.72) where Cicero makes his brother Quintus allude to the event and mention that the sacrifice was held *te* [Marcus Cicero] *inspectante* (the language of Cicero's description in *Div.* 2.65 *nam de angue illo* also makes reasonably clear that Cicero is responding to Quintus' having brought up the topic previously). Further, Cicero uses the same verb to describe both Sulla's sacrifice, and the meeting between

[132] Aside from the Ciceronian evidence provided, the event is attested by several sources. Plut. *Sull.* 9.6 (without mentioning the snake); Val. Max. 1.6.4; *FRH* Sulla F17. The *haruspex* Postimius is also mentioned in a fragment of Livy preserved by St. Augustine (*Civ.* 2.24).

Pompeius Strabo and P. Vettius Scato (*memini*), which may indicate that the memory is a personal one rather than just a familiarity with the story. What can we make of this?

Unlike Perrin's Loeb, J.L Moles' commentary accepts Plutarch's account without further discussion, presumably unaware of the evidence from *de Divinatione*.[133] Thomas Mitchell, Cicero's excellent biographer, claimed that the evidence makes it "certain" that Cicero served first with Sulla, and then with Strabo – both in 89 BCE. He bases this certainty on the dating of the surrender of Nola, which he placed firmly to the first half of 89.[134] Andrew Lintott acknowledges that Cicero seems to have served in two armies, but stops short of offering a solution and only admits that we do not know how Cicero came to serve in two different armies in the same year.[135] Mitchell, then, believes that Cicero served in the army for only one year during the Social War. He supports this view with Cicero's assertion that he attended multiple *contiones* held by the tribune of the plebs in the early part of 88 BCE[136]

The landscape, however, has been complicated since Mitchell's account. The key issue for our purposes is when exactly Sulla's memorable sacrifice took place. The Ciceronian evidence is not clear on the issue. Traditionally scholars have agreed with Mitchell and

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[133] Plut. *Cic.* 3.3. Moles 1988: 150 accepts Cicero's service under Sulla without comment.

[134] Mitchell 1979: 8-9. He suggests that Cicero's reference to a parley with Vettius Scato (mentioned in *Phil.* 12.27) probably occurred in the latter half of 89 BCE under Pompeius.

[135] Lintott 2013: 134.

[136] See Cic. *Brut.* 306ff. Although we should remember (as previously discussed) that men were able to return to Rome for periods of time while still "serving" in the army.

associated this episode with Sulla's campaign in Campania in 89 BCE[137] There is some reason, however, to doubt this dating. Valerius Maximus records that Sulla oversaw this sacrifice as consul, which would mean that it occurred in 88 BCE and not 89.[138] Shackelton Bailey's Loeb edition of Valerius provides a note claiming that the author was mistaken, and that Sulla was not consul at the time, but was filling for the consul L. Porcius Cato.[139] Yet, not all have agreed. Keaveney (in at least one publication) and Smith, however, have both accepted 88 for this event.[140] The implications are important for this study; if we assume that Cicero served under two commanders in the same year, then he would have had only one year of military service on record before standing for office. If, on the other hand, Cicero served under Pompeius in 89 BCE and then under Sulla in 88 (when Sulla was consul) then he would have had at least two campaigns to his credit.

The evidence clearly shows that Cicero served under both commanders, so Perrin's dismissal can be ignored. The evidence we have for his presence in Strabo's camp (his attestation in the *Twelfth Philippic* and the *consilium* of Strabo) would put him with Strabo during the fall of Ausculum in 89 BCE, for which Strabo triumphed later that year.[141] The

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[137] *MRR* 2.36 citing.

[138] Val. Max. 1.6.4 L. *Sulla consul sociali bello, cum in agro Nolano ante praetorium immolaret, subito ab ima parte arae prolapsam anguem prospexit. qua visa Postumii haruspicis hortatu continuo exercitum in expeditionem eduxit ac fortissima Samnitium castra cepit.*

[139] Keaveney 2005B: 211.

[140] *FRH* 3.295; Keaveney [1982]2005: 48. Although Keaveney 2005B: 211 seems to contradict this.

[141] Liv. *Per.* 74; App. *B Civ.* 1.207-16.

remaining question is what to do with his time under Sulla; and the evidence for whether or not Cicero served under Sulla in 89 or 88 BCE is, I confess, too murky for me to take a position firmly. Fortunately, the aims of this project incline me to choose 88, since I have decided to accept the most conservative (and yet, still reasonable) positions in such debates with respect to my study. Therefore, I will consider Cicero as having served in two different campaigns.

After his time in the Social War (however long it was) Cicero avoided military service until he reluctantly went to Cilicia as a proconsul in 51 BCE.[142] The choice to avoid the camp was obviously an intentional one. During his suppression of the Catilinarian Conspiracy as consul in 63 BCE he left the military operations to the praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60 BCE), his colleague C. Antonius Hybrida, and the collection of *imperatores* waiting outside the *pomerium* while pursuing a triumph.[143] After his consulship Cicero bartered away his chance at a proconsular command in Macedonia, a highly coveted province, to Antonius and stayed in Rome. He was forced by the *lex Pompeia de provinciis* of 52 BCE to take up proconsular command. He reluctantly did so, a decision about which he became more anxious given that at the time it seemed as though Cilicia might become a particularly active military theater. Relations with the empire's eastern neighbor Parthia were still tense following the disastrous Battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE. In fact, In 51 BCE, after Cicero had arrived in his

[142] On Cicero's reluctance see *Att.* 5.15.1.

[143] Plut. 16.1; Cic. Sall. *Cat.* 56.4. Others were involved as well - Metellus Creticus and Marcius Rex were both awaiting triumph outside the *pomerium* (and thus still retained their *imperium*) and were sent against Manlius. Pompeius Rufus, a praetor in 63 BCE, was also sent to Capua.

province, a force of Parthians under the command of the crown prince Pacorus invaded Roman-controlled Syria. Pacorus (much to Cicero's relief) never made it past Antioch, and Cicero's time in Cilicia will be dealt with in detail in chapter two of this work. For the moment, it is enough to note that Cicero sailed east to Cilicia with a military résumé that only included two years as a *tiro* over 30 years before, when he was a teenager.

III.8 Cn. Pompeius Magnus (b. 106 BCE Consul I 70 BCE)[144]

Ἔτι δὲ μειράκιον ὢν παντάπασι καὶ τῷ πατρὶ συστρατευόμενος ἀντιτεταγμένῳ πρὸς Κίνναν, (Plut. *Pomp.* 3.1)

Ἐκ τούτου Πομπήϊος ἔτη μὲν τρία καὶ εἴκοσι γεγονώς, ὑπ' οὐδενὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀποδεδειγμένος στρατηγός, αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ δοὺς τὸ ἄρχειν, (Plut. *Pomp.* 6.3)

Ἐκ τούτου Σικελίαν ἠγγέλλετο Περπέννας αὐτῷ κρατύνεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περιοῦσιν ἔτι τῆς ἐναντίας στάσεως ὁρμητήριον παρέχειν τὴν νῆσον, αἰωρουμένου καὶ Κάρβωνος αὐτόθι ναυτικῷ καὶ Δομετίου Λιβύῃ προσπεπτωκότος, ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἐπέκεινα μεγάλων ὠθουμένων φυγάδων, ὅσοι τὰς προγραφὰς ἔφθησαν ἀποδράντες. ἐπὶ τούτους Πομπήϊος ἀπεστάλη μετὰ πολλῆς δυνάμεως. (Plut. *Pomp.* 10.1)

τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ποθούντων τὸν Πομπήϊον οὐ διεμέλλησεν ὅπη τράπηται, προσθεὶς δὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἑαυτὸν ἀπεδείχθη στρατεύματος ἡγεμὼν ἐπὶ τὸν Λέπιδον ἤδη πολλὰ τῆς Ἰταλίας κεκινηκότα καὶ τὴν ἐντὸς Ἄλπεων Γαλατίαν κατέχοντα διὰ Βρούτου στρατεύματι. (Plut. *Pomp.* 16.2)

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἁψάμενος ὁ Πομπήϊος, οἷα φιλεῖ πρὸς νέου δόξαν ἡγεμόνος, ἑτέρους ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἐποίησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὰ μὴ πάνυ βεβαίως τῷ Σερτωρίῳ συνεστῶτα τῶν ἐθνῶν ἐκινεῖτο καὶ μετεβάλλετο, (Plut. *Pomp.* 18.1)

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτῳ τὸν Πομπήϊον εἰσποιούσης ἁμῶς γέ πως τῷ κατορθώματι τῆς τύχης, πεντακισχίλιοι φεύγοντες ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἐνέπεσον εἰς αὐτόν, οὓς ἅπαντας διαφθείρας, ἔγραψε πρὸς τὴν σύγκλητον ὑποφθάσας ὡς Κράσσος μὲν ἐκ παρατάξεως νενίκηκε τοὺς μονομάχους, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκ ῥιζῶν παντάπασιν ἀνῄρηκε (Plut. *Pomp.* 21.2)

Due to his prodigious military talent and remarkable achievements we know more about Pompey's youthful service than about any other subject in this study. Pompey was born

[144] The source tradition for Pompey's youthful service is significantly more robust than most other figures on this list, since he did most of his service as his own commander. Thus, I am only quoting the Plutarchean evidence at the outset of this entry. I will, of course, refer to other sources throughout.

on September 28, 106 BCE.[145] He received a military education from his father, and later (at age 15) served under him when he was a legate in the northern theater of the Social War and was later made consul for 89 BCE.[146] The Social War concluded in 89 and the next we hear of Pompey is that he was with his father in 87 BCE when he returned (somewhat sluggishly) to the city in an attempt to stave off Cinna and Marius.[147] Pompey's father died suddenly in 87, while wildly unpopular in Rome. The newly ascendant Cinna was hostile to the young Pompey and so it makes sense that while the former had control in Rome Pompey seems to have stayed in Picenum, an area still friendly to his late father and family.[148]

In 83 BCE Pompey raised a private army from Picenum and the surrounding region and pledged his support to Sulla, who gained control of Rome in 82. After Sulla's victory in Italy, Pompey was given propraetorian *imperium* and tasked with crushing Sulla's enemies abroad in Sicily and Africa. There has been some debate over the precise dates for this period in Pompey's biography. Pompey went out against Sulla's enemies in 82 BCE, but the duration of this period of service is unclear. The problem is that we have a significant divergence in our sources concerning Pompey's age at the time of his first triumph; there are sources for every

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[145] Vell. 2.53.4; Plin. *NH* 37.13.

[146] On Pompey's training see Sall. *Hist.* 2.19; Diod. 38.9; Vell. 2.29.3. Pompey is mentioned on a list of his father staff at the fall of Ausculum in 89 BCE (*CIL* I^2 709). See also 3.7 Cicero

[147] For Pompey's presence in his father's army see Plut. *Pomp.* 3; Dio 36.25.2.

[148] Pompey was prosecuted either in 86 or 85, probably for *peculatus* from his father's appropriation of the booty after the fall of Ausculum. See Alexander 1990: no. 120.

age between 23 and 26.[149] Some of these possibilities can be reasonably dismissed: Civil war was ongoing in 82 BCE and further would have left Pompey very little time to complete his campaigning and arrange for a triumph, thus we should dismiss this possibility.[150] On the other end of this range, Ernst Badian has argued convincingly against 79 BCE – this leaves 81 and 80 BCE.[151] Badian suggests that Sulla's seemingly decisive influence over whether or not Pompey obtained a triumph may indicate that Sulla was still dictator at the time, and thus would date Pompey's procession to 81 BCE.[152] For this study, however, because I am adopting the most reasonable, conservative dating in such instances, I will assume Pompey celebrated his triumph in 80.

Starting in 77 BCE Pompey was sent to Spain to combat another subject of this study, Q. Sertorius, who had been operating a kind of second government there since 83 BCE. Sertorius was initially successful against his younger adversary but was murdered by his own officer in 72 BCE – allowing Pompey to subsequently defeat Sertorius' less-competent usurper. While returning to Rome Pompey stumbled into more luck when he encountered the last remnants of Spartacus' army, which had previously been routed by M. Crassus. Pompey returned to Rome with a second triumph and was elected to his first public office, the consulship for 70 BCE.

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[149] Eutrop 5.9.1 (23); Liv. *Per.* 89 (24); Gran. Licin. 31 (25); *vir. ill.* 77.2 (26).

[150] Badian 1955: 107 suggests Eutropius likely confused "years completed" with "years of life."

[151] Badian 1955. Mommsen was the original proponent of 79 BCE (*RG* 4.94ff).

[152] Badian 1955: 115ff. Seager [1979]2002: 29 prefers 81 to 80 BCE.

To sum up: Pompey served from 91-89 BCE in the Social War (two years), 83-82 BCE as a partisan of Sulla and a *privatus* (one year), 82-80 BCE as a propraetor in Sicily and Africa (two years), and 77-71 BCE under a special commission against Sertorius in Spain (six years). This amounts to 11 years of service, one above the *decem stipendia* and the most of any figure examined in this chapter. Of course, we must also take into account that Pompey's career was exceptional and that he did not stand for office (the consulship!) until he was 35, which gave him more time to serve relative to his peers.

III.9 C. Julius Caesar (b. c.100 BCE[153] Consul I 59 BCE)

Stipendia prima[154] *in Asia fecit Marci Thermi praetoris contubernio…* (Suet. *DJ* 2.1)

Meruit et sub Servilio Isaurico in Cilicia, sed brevi tempore. Nam Sullae morte comperta, simul spe novae dissensionis, quae per Marcum Lepidum movebatur, Romam propere redit. (Suet. *DJ* 3.1)

Vastante regiones proximas Mithridate, ne desidere in discrimine sociorum videretur, ab Rhodo, quo pertenderat, transiit in Asiam auxiliisque contractis et praefecto regis provincia expulso nutantis ac dubias civitates retinuit in fide. Tribunatu militum, qui primus Romam reverso per suffragia populi honor optigit, actores restituendae tribuniciae potestatis, cuius vim Sulla deminuerat, enixissime iuvit. (Suet. *DJ* 4.2-5.1)

Τοῦ δὲ δήμου πρώτην μὲν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίας ἔλαβεν ὅτε πρὸς Γάϊον Ποπίλιον ἐρίσας ὑπὲρ χιλιαρχίας πρότερος ἀνηγορεύθη· (Plut. *Caes*. 5.1)

[153] There was previously some debate about whether he was actually born in 102, 101, or 100, based on how old he would have been when assuming magistracies. 100 BCE is now widely accepted. See Badian 2009: 16.

[154] It is hard to understand *prima stipendia* (whether it should be rendered in the plural or singular); Suetonius is the only author to use the term in this form and does so only twice (see also *Tib.* 9.1). Caesar joined Thermus in 80 BCE, but he left in 78 BCE This could represent two campaigns. Yet, in the case of Tiberius Suetonius was referring to the future emperor's service as a military tribune against the Cantabri in 25 BCE, one campaign. Nor does there seem to be a popular alternative in the singular; Cornelius Nepos is the only author to use the phrase *stipendium primum* (*Cat.* 1.2).

In Julius Caesar we have another well-attested figure. Current scholarship has coalesced around July 12th, 100 BCE as the birthdate for Caesar.[155] He was elected quaestor for 69 BCE when he was 31 years old. At 16 or 17 (84 or 83 BCE, the precise date is unclear) Caesar was nominated as Flamen Dialis at the recommendation of the consul Cinna, whose daughter he later married (perhaps in keeping with the rule that the Flamen Dialis was required to marry a patrician woman). It is now widely accepted that Caesar was never inaugurated as a flamen officially. Some have argued that he was appointed but that his appointment was undone by Sulla when he retook the city in 88 BCE and undid all of Cinna's *acta*.[156] This, however, clashes with the testimony of Tacitus (*Ann.* 3.58.2) who wrote that there was no Flamen Dialis appointed for over 70 years after the priesthood of Caesar's predecessor L. Cornelius Merula. In any case, it is unlikely that Caesar was ever officially installed as Flamen Dialis.[157] His nomination is still, notable; the flaminate was a prestigious position, especially for a young man from a family which (at the time) was not especially powerful politically.[158] Yet, the

[155] There was previously some debate about whether he was actually born in 102, 101, or 100, based on how old he would have been when assuming magistracies. 100 BCE is now widely accepted. See Badian 2009: 16.

[156] See Taylor 1941: 121.

[157] I agree with Pelling 2011: 134-5 who thinks it unlikely that Caesar was ever officially installed in the priesthood. See also *MRR* 3.105. Interestingly, had Caesar been inaugurated, this meant that Caesar could have potentially joined the Senate at 17, considerably earlier in life than his peers.

[158] Pelling 2011: 134. See also Tatum 2010: 29-31 who fields the fascinating, but highly speculative suggestion that Caesar may found the flamenate attractive given his epilepsy (although it should be noted that we do not know whether or not his condition had manifested itself at this point).

posting also would have prevented Caesar from a military and political career. It is hard to imagine a hypothetical history in which Caesar took up the flamenate with its the strict guidelines for behavior. He certainly would not have been able to become an effective force on the battlefield since he would have been barred from riding a horse, touching a corpse, spending more than two nights away from Rome, or even seeing a Roman army in the field.[159]

In 82 BCE Sulla marched upon Rome and set about re-establishing his authority; there is some disagreement in our sources about how this affected Caesar, but in every version of the event he was released from his priesthood and thus unburdened of its strict code of conduct.[160] After being relieved of his priesthood, Caesar seems to have set out on almost immediately on the career path that had been previously closed to him: the life of a soldier. In 80 BCE he joined the staff of M. Minucius Thermus (the governor of Asia at the time), and Suetonius tells us Caesar did so as a *contubernalis.* It was during this period that he spent time with the king of Bithynia Nicomedes IV Philopator, whence came the scandalous rumor that Caesar had been the passive sexual partner in a relationship with the king.[161] To shift from the scandalous to the

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[159] The Flamen was subject to a rather extreme code of conduct so that he could avoid any ritual pollution. For the much longer list of regulations that came with the Flamen Dialis see Gell. *NA* 10.15. It is unclear just how strictly these rules were being observed in the first century BCE; Merula had managed to become consul in 87 BCE, which one would think was challenging in light of the stringent lifestyle to which he was obligated. Still, regarding military involvement we have no indication that Merula held any kind of military command as a proconsul after his term in office. See Pelling 2011: 134.

[160] Plut. *Caes* 1.3; Suet. 1.1; Vell. 2.43.1.

[161] Suet. 49, 2.1. Plutarch avoided mention of the scandal; see Gelzer 1968: 22, 30n1, 88n1, 285; Goldsworthy 2006: 65-70; Pelling 2011: 137. A recent and convincing article by Josiah Osgood (2008) argues that there is evidence for believing that the whole scandal was likely manufactured by Cn. Cornelius Dolabella when Caesar prosecuted him for maladministration in 77 or 76 BCE.

heroic, while serving under Thermus he won the *corona civica* for his actions during the storming of Miletus in 80 BCE.[162] From Bithynia he next went to Cilicia under the command of P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (cos. 87, 79 BCE).[163]

Thereafter it is possible, but not certain, that Caesar was a *legatus* under M. Antonius (pr. 74 BCE, father of Caesar's future collaborator), probably in 73 BCE. A "C. Iulius" is mentioned by and inscription from Gytheum in Laconia as a legate on Antonius' staff. This is, however, probably unlikely to be the future dictator.[164] Caesar was involved in the fight against Mithridates in the winter of 74/3 BCE when he helped to prevent Bithynia from taking up the Pontic king's cause after the death of Nicomedes, but his position while doing so is unclear.[165] Velleius wrote that Caesar was a *privatus* during this period, but we also know that Caesar was

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[162] Suet. *Iul.* 1.2; App. *B Civ.* 2.106 tells us that some of Caesar's later statues featured him wearing the *corona civica,* although the crown was perhaps more a symbol of Caesar's *clementia* after the Civil War rather than as a remembrance of the storming of Mytilene. Bergmann 2010: 109-31 makes a compelling argument that the crown featured in Caesar's later iconography is the *corona graminea,* an honor given to him by the Senate, not by the army. For the date of the storming of Mytilene see Butler & Cary 1982: 45. See also Gelzer 1968: 22; Meier 1982: 64; Goldsworthy 2006: 65-6; Pelling 2011: 137-8.

[163] Suet. *Iul.* 3.1. This position was less eventful than his time spent in Bithynia. Pelling 2011: 137 says that the year was "given mainly to preparations." See *MRR* 2.88.

[164] *MRR* 2.113-5, 3.105; *SIG*[3] 748. Gelzer 1968: 24-5 argues that this was indeed the future dictator. This would have been unusual, since legates were usually senators and Caesar was not yet a member of the body. It is possible that Caesar's *corona civica* may account for the irregularity of the post; note also that Q. Cicero wished to make his brother-in-law Atticus his legate in 61 BCE (Nep. *Att.* 6.4). Yet, Sumner 1973: 137-8 makes an argument for the other C. Iulius attested at this time, the otherwise obscure Catilinarian conspirator (Sall. *Cat.* 21.1). Will *DNP* "Caesar" still accepts that the inscription refers to C. Iulius Caesar.

[165] Kallet-Marx 1995: 300 n34 dates this to the winter of 74/3 BCE, immediately following the Caesar's famous capture by pirates.

elected as military tribune for either 72 or 71 BCE.[166] Caesar may have been serving against Mithridates as a military tribune. We hear nothing of Caesar's actions while military tribune except that he was a vehement supporter of a bill to reinstate the rights of the tribunate previously curtailed by Sulla, and another to recall some exiles from the Marian Civil War and the uprising of Lepidus.[167]

The next we hear of Caesar is his election to the quaestorship for 69 BCE.[168] To put his record together: Caesar began his military activities in 80 BCE; this left him 11 years in which to accrue ten years of service if he was to fulfill the *decem stipendia* but it is clear that he did not. Judging only from the sources, he seems to have served 5 years: 80-78 BCE in the east, first under Thermus and then briefly under Isauricus; 73 BCE in Asia, either as a legate or (more likely given his age) a *privatus*; and one year (in 72 or 71 BCE) as a military tribune.[169] It is

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[166] Suet. *Iul.* 4.2. Plut. makes no mention of this event. Vell. 2.42.2 calls Caesar a *privatus*. See Gelzer 1968: 24n4 (who accepts that Caesar did this without any formal authority); Meier 1982: 109-10. The debate over the dating is due to the lack of clarity in the sources and is largely based on how much time would be left for his colleague in the military tribunate, C. Popilius, to attain his tribunate of the plebs in 68 BCE Gelzer 1968: 25-6 and Sumner 1973: 136 accept 72 BCE, Taylor 1941: 121n32 and Syme 1963: 57 prefer 71 BCE See also Ryan 1995: 295-7 and *MRR* 3.105. Yet, it is possible that this is a different C. Popilius, see Pelling 2011: 149.

[167] Suet. *Iul.* 5.1. The rights were restored in 70 BCE during the first consulship of Pompey and Crassus, a year after Caesar's military tribunate. Regarding the recall of the exiles, Suetonius says that Caesar, *habuitque ipse super ea re contionem.*

[168] Suet. *Iul.* 6.1; Plut. *Caes.* 5. The dating in 69 BCE is now widely accepted. See *MRR* 3.105-6; Pelling 2011: 150.

[169] Military tribunates could be extended at the discretion of the commander, but this was not the norm. Without any attestation to the contrary I do not think we should assume Caesar had his tribunate extended.

possible that there are other campaigns that we do not hear of from our sources, but since the life of Caesar is so well-documented this would be a hard claim to make. We know Caesar was in Rome in 77 and 76 BCE, thanks to legal action, and presumably he spent 70 BCE canvassing.[170] The other years are uncertain, so in an attempt to offer the most conservative position possible I am suggesting Caesar had 7 years of service before his quaestorship. Of course, serving less than ten years did not disqualify Caesar from being considered a military man. As attested by his *corona civica*, Caesar had served with distinction while making a name for himself in his youth. Pliny the Elder tells us that when a recipient of the *corona civica* entered the games it was custom for everyone, including the Senate, to stand up.[171] This must have provided the young Caesar with a significant amount of political capital as he set out on the *cursus honorum.*[172]

III.10 M. Porcius Cato Uticensis (b. c. 95 BCE Praetor 54 BCE)

Τοῦ δὲ δουλικοῦ πολέμου συνεστῶτος, ὃν Σπαρτάκειον ἐκάλουν, Γέλλιος μὲν ἐστρατήγει, Κάτων δὲ τῆς στρατείας μετεῖχεν ἐθελοντής, διὰ τὸν ἀδελφόν· ἐχιλιάρχει γὰρ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Καιπίων. (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 8.2)

Verum ut huius viri [Scipio Africanus] *abstinentiae testis Hispania ita M. Catonis Epiros, Achaia, Cyclades insulae, maritima pars Asiae, provincia Cypros.* (Val. Max. 4.3.2)

Ἀποδειχθεὶς δὲ χιλίαρχος εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἐπέμπετο πρὸς Ῥούβριον τὸν στρατηγόν. (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 9.1)

ille [Cato the Elder] *semper alioquin universos ex Italia pellendos censuit Graecos, at pronepos eius Uticensis Cato unum ex tribunatu militum philosophum, alterum ex Cypria legatione deportavit;* (Plin. *NH* 7.113)

[170] *TRR* no. 140 & 141.

[171] Plin. *NH* 16.5; See also Gell. 5.6.11; Luc. 1.358.

[172] See Goldworthy 2006: 65-6.

Despite how he is usually portrayed on stage and screen, M. Cato was significantly younger than Cicero, Pompey, and Caesar. Born in 95 BCE, he was far too young to participate in the Social War, although a Plutarchian anecdote alleges that even as a boy Cato made his opposition to Italian citizenship known to Pompaedius Silo.[173] In 72 BCE Cato volunteered to serve in the army of consul L. Gellius Publicola against Spartacus; his half-brother Caepio was a military tribune under Publicola at the time. It is unclear exactly what happened during Gellius' command. Our main sources (Plutarch and Appian) give differing accounts. There is agreement that Gellius won a victory over the portion of Spartacus' forces commanded by the latter's lieutenant Crixus. Appian then records two victories by Spartacus, first over Gellius' co-consul Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus, and then over Gellius. Plutarch mentions the first victory over Lentulus, but no subsequent battle with Gellius. What we do know for certain is that the Senate was unimpressed with the performance of both consuls and replaced them with M. Crassus.[174] Whether or not Gellius suffered a major defeat at the hands of Spartacus, Plutarch tells us that Cato served with distinction while under Gellius' command. Due to the poor manner in which the war was conducted, according to the biographer, Cato did not display his valor as much as he would have liked, but he still did enough to earn **ἀριστεῖα καὶ τιμὰς** from Gellius himself. Cato, however, declined these awards because he did not think he had earned them, which caused others to think him "strange."[175]

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[173] Plut. *Cat. Min.* 2.1-4.

[174] App. *BCiv.* 1.117; Plut. *Crass.* 9.7-10.1.

[175] Plut. *Cat. Min.* 8.2

We get no indication that Cato continued with the army against Spartacus after 72 BCE. Because Plutarch suggests that he had only volunteered to be close to his half-brother Caepio, it is reasonable to assume that he did not continue on after Caepio's year in office was up. We do not hear about military service by Cato again until c.67 BCE, when he was military tribune under a Rubrius in Macedonia.[176] The details surrounding this post are also quite opaque: Rubrius is not attested outside Plutarch, and it is difficult to identify him with any of the known proconsular governors of Macedonia. Likewise, the dating of this posting is also somewhat uncertain, although I find Broughton's argument for 67/66 BCE compelling, given that Cato was a candidate for the quaestorship in 65 BCE[177] If this is true, this means that for Cato we have only two recorded years of military service before he stood for the quaestorship.

III.11 M. Iunius Brutus (b. c.85 BCE)

Ἔτι δὲ μειράκιον ὢν Κάτωνι τῷ θείῳ συναπεδήμησεν εἰς Κύπρον ἐπὶ Πτολεμαῖον ἀποσταλέντι. (Plut. *Brut.* 3.1)

M. Iunius Brutus was probably born c. 85 BCE, the son of the people's tribune in 83 BCE of the same name and Servilia, Cato the Younger's half-sister. [178] Brutus' father was

[176] Plut. *Cat. Min.* 9-11; Val. Max. 4.3.2; Plin. *NH* 7.113 says that he brought back *unum ex tribunatu militum philosophum,* it is not clear who this was. c.f. *DNP* "Rubrius" I.2.

[177] For both the identity of Rubrius and the dating of Cato's military tribunate see *MRR* 2.150 at n.12. Others have attempted to identify Rubrius as L. Culeolus, the addressee of Cic. *Fam.* 13.41,42; but this would necessitate an incredibly early date for these letters.

[178] *MRR* 3.112; Dettenhofer 1992: 100-1. This dating hangs on his eligibility for the praetorship of 54 BCE (See also Plut. *Brut.* 24; App. *B Civ.* 2.134; Val. Max 1.5.7).

executed by Pompey in 78 BCE, although it is unclear on exactly what grounds.[179] It is not surprising then that we hear of Brutus' suspected involvement in the "Vettius Affair" in 59 BCE, a failed attempt to assassinate Pompey.[180] From 58-56 BCE Brutus went with his uncle Cato who was overseeing the annexation of Cyprus; there is no suggestion in the sources that Brutus did so in any official capacity, although perhaps we can assume he accompanied his uncle as a *contubernalis*.[181] In 54 BCE Brutus stood for and won a quaestorship, which took him back to Cyprus.[182] If we consider that Brutus went abroad from 58-56 with Cato simply as his uncle's companion, this would mean that we have no record of military service from Brutus until his involvement in the Civil War. For the purposes of the project, I am counting his two years with his uncle as service, even though they seem to have required nothing of Brutus militarily.

III.12 M. Antonius (b. 83 BCE, Consul 44 BCE, Triumvir)

[Antony] *φοβηθεὶς τοὺς συνισταμένους ἐπὶ τὸν Κλώδιον, ἀπῆρεν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ διέτριβε τό τε σῶμα γυμνάζων πρὸς τοὺς στρατιωτικοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ λέγειν μελετῶν.* (Plut. *Ant.* 2.4)

Ἐπεὶ δὲ Γαβίνιος ἀνὴρ ὑπατικὸς εἰς Συρίαν πλέων ἀνέπειθεν αὐτὸν ὁρμῆσαι πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν, ἰδιώτης μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔφη συνεξελθεῖν, ἀποδειχθεὶς δὲ τῶν ἱππέων ἄρχων συνεστράτευε. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπ' Ἀριστόβουλον Ἰουδαίους ἀφιστάντα πεμφθεὶς αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπέβη τοῦ μεγίστου τῶν ἐρυμάτων πρῶτος, ἐκεῖνον δὲ πάντων ἐξήλασεν· εἶτα μάχην συνάψας καὶ τρεψάμενος ὀλίγοις τοῖς σὺν αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐκείνου πολλαπλασίους ὄντας ἀπέκτεινε πλὴν ὀλίγων ἅπαντας· αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ παιδὸς Ἀριστόβουλος ἦλω. (Plut. *Ant.* 3.1)

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[179] Plut. *Pomp.* 16.

[180] See Gruen 1974: 95-7 who points out how little we actually know about the details of this event, and how much of the narrative preserved is tenuous at best.

[181] Plut. *Brut.* 3.1; *Cat. Min.* 34, 36.

[182] *MRR* 2.229. Auct. *vir. ill.* 82.3-4

In reconstructing Antony's early life, we are aided (as we have been with others on this list) by both a surviving *Life* by Plutarch and a relative wealth of Ciceronian testimony. Again, Plutarch would have had access to some intriguing source material lost to us today (e.g. Augustus' autobiography might have given us more information, albeit hostile; Asinius Pollio's history of the Civil War would have given us a less polemic sketch of Antony) but these would not likely have said much about Antony's early life before he entered the broader historical narrative. This dearth of source material for Antony's youth can be sensed in Plutarch's *Life.* As we have seen Plutarch enjoys including evidence about a subject's formative years, but the *Antony* is among the most laconic on its subject's youth.[183] The Ciceronian evidence is more intriguing, although one must always be cautious when dealing with Ciceronian rhetoric (especially invective) as evidence. Nevertheless, the orator rarely missed an opportunity to criticize and – helpfully for us – enjoyed starting from the very beginning when undertaking character assassination.

Antony was born in 83 BCE.[184] We do not hear of any military service for him until 58 BCE, when he was 24 years old, when he went to Greece for what Plutarch called ***τό τε σῶμα γυμνάζων πρὸς τοὺς στρατιωτικοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ λέγειν μελετῶν*** ("training his body for combat and giving attention to oratory"). We could reasonably categorize this trip as a personal one, rather than a military one. It had become common place in the years prior to Antony's time in Greece for young aristocrats to spend brief "study abroad" periods in Greece, and while

[183] Pelling 1988: 26-31

[184] Dettenhofer 1992: 64; *MRR* 3.19.

the passage does mention training for combat it does not indicate any official service.[185] Additionally, Cicero does not mention this year in his catalogue of Antony's youth in the *Second Philippic.* After Greece, from 57 until 55 BCE he was a cavalry prefect under Aulus Gabinius, a posting confirmed by Plutarch, Cicero, and Josephus.[186] Antony was sent to Judaea to combat Aristobulus II, and while there acquitted himself well on the battlefield. Plutarch tells us he was the first to mount the highest wall, a feat traditionally aspired to by aristocratic warriors and awarded with the *corona muralis*.[187] In 54 BCE Antony next joined Caesar's staff in Gaul, and seems to have done so as a *legatus,* since Caesar referred to him as such during his narrative of the siege of Alesia in 52 BCE.[188] One complication with Antony's Gallic service is that he also appears in Rome somewhat frequently during this period. In one famous instance he returned to Rome in August or September of 53 to seek the quaestorship but became entangled in the political chaos of that year.[189] Cicero tells us that during a riot in 53 Antony

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[185] See Daly 1950; Rawson 1985: 3-18.

[186] Plut. *Ant.* 3; Joseph. *AJ* 14.84, 86, 92; *BJ* 1.162, 165, 171-2. *MRR* 2.205.

[187] Plut. *Ant.* 3. Josephus' account (*AJ* 14.86) says: ***Μᾶρκος Ἀντώνιος ἐπιφανῶς ἀγωνισάμενος καὶ πολλοὺς ἀποκτείνας ἔδοξεν ἠριστευκέναι.*** Elsewhere in Josephus (*BJ* 1.165) the author says that Antony, "always fought bravely). See also Sall. *Cat.* 7.6 *Sed gloriae maxumum certamen inter ipsos* (aristocrats) *erat; se quisque hostem ferire, murum ascendere, conspici dum tale facinus faceret, properabat; bonam famam magnamque nobilitatem putabant.*

[188] Caes. *BG* 7.83.3 and 90.6.

[189] Cic. *Phil.* 2.49. *venis e Gallia ad quaesturam petendam.* Ramsay 2003 *ad loc.* notes that we can date Antony's return due to his involvement in the violence surrounding Clodius' canvass for the praetorship.

almost killed Clodius while acting in Caesar's interests.[190] Antony did not kill Clodius, but Milo did so in the following year. Surprisingly, Antony then appears opposite Cicero as a prosecutor of Milo.[191] It is difficult to account for Antony's *volte-face* in respect to Clodius; Maria Dettenhofer speculates that Antony staged the attempt on Clodius' life in 53 BCE for the benefit of Cicero.[192]

Given Antony's repeated appearances in Rome during the political chaos surrounding the rivalry between Clodius and Milo: should we count these years as "service?" It is clear that Antony was spending some time in Rome during his tenure under Caesar. Yet, as mentioned above, it is possible that service in a campaign meant spending an entire calendar year in the field. We cannot know exactly how Antony split his time between the camp and the city, but in the interests of providing the most conservative reckoning possible, I am counting Antony's career from 54 up to his quaestorship in 51 BCE as continuous service. Antony was clearly a capable soldier. Yet, this amounts to only seven years of service prior to his quaestorship: one year of "military exercises" three years with Gabinius in Syria as a cavalry prefect, and three years as a legate in Gaul with Caesar. In this instance, we have further reason to doubt that Antony had any other service to his credit: Cicero's exhaustive (albeit polemic) catalogue of

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[190] Cic. *Phil.* 2.49 *Acceperam iam ante Caesaris litteras ut mihi satis fieri paterer a te: itaque ne loqui quidem sum te passus de gratia.* Caesar had sent a letter to Cicero asking the orator to reconcile with Antony.

[191] Ascon. 41C.

[192] Dettenhofer 1992: 66-7.

Antony's life provided in the *Philippics*. Cicero, always thorough when on the attack, started from boyhood (*a puero*) and mentioned only Antony's positions under Gabinius and Caesar.[193]

III.13 M. Caelius Rufus (b. 82 BCE)

Cum autem paulum iam roboris accessisset aetati, in Africam profectus est Q. Pompeio pro consule contubernalis, castissimo homini atque omnis officii diligentissimo, (Cic. *Cael.* 73)

Caelius is the only subject on the list who does not have a Plutarchian *Life*, but thanks to his closeness with Cicero we have more information about the youth of M. Caelius than we do about some others. For the purposes of this catalogue, one concerned with the youthful activity of senators, we are especially blessed by Cicero's *pro Caelio*. Cicero gave a thorough account of Caelius' youth, some of which was overseen by Cicero personally. There has been some debate about the birthdate of M. Caelius. Pliny gives us an exact date: May 28th, 82 BCE, but he is probably mistaken.[194] Others have pointed out that this too late to account for Caelius' praetorship in 48 BCE, since the *lex Villia* (180 BCE) stipulates that a praetor should be at least 39, meaning Caelius would have had to have been born in 88 BCE.[195]

[193] Cic. *Phil.* 2.44-48.

[194] Plin. *NH* 7.165.

[195] *MRR* 3.44; Dettenhofer 1992: 80-1; Ramsay 2013: 4n17. Pliny's point is more concerned with astrology, and thus perhaps he had the day correct, but the year wrong. Dyck 2013: 4ff suggests that Pliny possibly confused Caelius with Gaius Scribonius Curio, who is paired with the poet C. Licinius Calvus – the person Pliny said shared a birthday with Caelius – elsewhere (Cic. *Brut.* 208, 283). Lintott 2008: 431 suggests that Pliny may be right, and that Caelius may have obtained special permission to run for office early; but we have no evidence of such a dispensation, and one imagines Cicero would have mentioned it in his defense speech on Caelius' behalf.

Some have questioned whether or not Caelius attempted to hold the quaestorship at all. We do not hear of him holding an office in our sources until he was people's tribune in 52 BCE, but it is possible that he mounted a run for the quaestorship in 56 BCE. This is based on an apparent *ambitus* charge from that time period mentioned by Cicero in the *pro Caelio*, but the Ciceronian testimony is too vague to be certain.[196] Thus, both based on the nature of the evidence and in order to utilize the more conservative date as it is relevant to the present study, it is best to proceed as if 53 BCE (when Caelius was 35) was Caelius' first candidacy for public office. Cicero mentions only one period of military activity by Caelius in his youth, his service as a *contubernalis* of Q. Pompeius Rufus (pr. 63 BCE) from 62 - 60 BCE.[197] Caelius had been placed in Cicero's charge at age 16 (in 66 BCE) and remained there until he departed for Africa in 62 BCE. After his return in 60 BCE, we do not hear of another military posting for Caelius until the Civil War. This leaves Caelius with only two campaigns, and it is difficult indeed to imagine that Caelius has eight years of military service in between 60 - 52 BCE that we hear nothing about.

IV. Conclusion.

Prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest, in qua multi apud maiores nostros exstiterunt; semper enim fere bella gerebantur. (Cic. *Off.* 2.45)

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[196] Cic. *Cael.* 16. *Numquam enim tam Caelius amens fuisset, ut, si se isto infinito ambitu commaculasset, ambitus alterum accusaret, neque eius facti in altero suspicionem quaereret, cuius ipse sibi perpetuam licentiam optaret, nec, si sibi semel periculum ambitus subeundum putaret, ipse alterum iterum ambitus crimine arcesseret.* Sumner 1971: 248; Wiseman 1985: 66 believe that the charge did stem from an otherwise unattested quaestorship. Jackson 1979: 55 doubts this. Dyck 2013: 5, 82 provides a brief review of the various possibilities and a helpful bibliography but does not indicate a personal opinion on the topic.

[197] We know Caelius was back in the city in 60 BCE because of his ambitious prosecution of C. Antonius Hybrida (cos. 63 BCE). See Cassius Dio 38.10.4.

Therefore, my first recommendation for a young man concerned with glory is that if he is able he should obtain it through military activity. Many of our ancestors came to prominence in this way, because they were always at war.

This is Cicero's advice to his son in 44 BCE. It is traditional in its military emphasis, but – in light of what we now know about youthful aristocratic service from the figures in our sample – was it contemporary? Even in just this brief passage Cicero, by invoking the *maiores*, leaves us with the impression that prominence via military achievement was more common in the past then in was in the middle of the 40's. With the final portion of this chapter I will explore consider what implications the mass of prosopographical information above has for our understanding of youthful military service among elites in the Late Republic. This will include, most importantly, a reexamination of *decem stipendia* and a suggestion of another piece of evidence from which it may be more appropriate to generalize.



Figure 1.1: Years of Pre-*Cursus* Service Among the Sample.

Figure 1.1 shows my findings. Each bar shows the amount of service I have estimated for each subject in the sample based on the prosopographical evidence I presented above. In

addition to my estimate, I have also included two markers on each bar. The lower marker shows what I believe to be a minimum reasonable number, the higher marker a maximum reasonable number. Note that in the case of Antony and Pompey there is only one marker, because we can be fairly certain about the amount of service for these two figures, and therefore the presentation of only on amount is necessary. In most cases, the lower marker reflects the amount of service mentioned in our sources and the higher marker the amount of service *possible* in light of the various points of biographical uncertainty for each subject. As I expressed *ad locum* above, in the case of the earlier figures such as Marius and Sertorius our dearth of evidence means that these estimates are somewhat vague. I assumed that mention of service in one event of a longer conflict meant that service throughout the duration was likely. Similarly, I assumed that years about which we are totally clueless could have been spent in camp. In the later, better-attested lives from Lucullus onward the upper limit was brought down more easily thanks to evidence of presence in Rome or other non-military activity in any given year.

Before discussing the implications of the evidence in figure 1, there are two points of interest that beg for mention. For the most part the graph proceeds in chronological order, but I have moved Pompey to the edge rather than keeping him adjacent to Cicero (both were born in 106). Pompey is an obvious outlier in the sample, and this is not surprising since his pre-*cursus* service was unique in two major ways. First, Pompey spent the majority of his youthful service as a commander rather than a soldier, and thus the nature of his service was quite extraordinary. Secondly, Pompey did not stand for public office until he sought the consulship for 70 BCE at the age of 35. If we assume that his peers sought the praetorship at 30, as was

customary in the Late Republic, then Pompey's unconventional political career gave him five additional years in which to serve. Therefore, I have kept Pompey on the graph, but moved him to an edge so that we may get a better sense of the data from more normal careers. I have also left Sulla's entry as uncertain, rather than zero. As I mentioned above, scholarship on how much military service Sulla is likely to have had before 106 is split between two poles: those who believe he had absolutely none, as Sallust seems to suggest in the *Jugurtha,* and those who assume he must have had ten campaigns of experience. We simply lack, I believe, the necessary evidence to make an argument for either extreme, or to support any number in between (which I suspect is most likely). Thus, I have left Sulla out of the calculations that follow.

In terms of averages, if we begin with my estimates of the likely amounts of service, the subjects averaged only 5.5 years of military service before seeking their first public office. If we remove Pompey, the amount drops to five. Even if we accept the maximum figures the amount of pre-*cursus* service rises only to 6.9, and without Pompey 6.5. On the other end, the minimum amounts average to 4.4 years, and without Pompey this drops to 3.7. In every instance this is well below the 10-campaign figure that scholars have lean upon when discussing youthful aristocratic service in the Republic. I would caution, however, against overreacting to this data alone, because discussing these findings in terms of averages is misleading. Instead, the clearest trend shown by figure 1 is a split between low amounts – two is the most common entry – and relatively higher ones such as Crassus, Caesar and Antony, all of whom had seven years of service by my estimate.

These numbers, at least in this admittedly small sample, leave little doubt: if aspiring politicians were *ever* required to serve in ten campaigns before their first canvass, we can say with

even more certainty that this does not seem to have been the case in the Late Republic. Obviously we do not have as much evidence as we should like in order to make a definitive claim, but our sampling suggests that it was actually common for men to seek their first office with well under ten campaigns to their name. In fact, in this period I suggest we flip the articulation of such an interpretation: it seems rare for someone to have stood for their first office having fulfilled the *decem stipendia.* Of all of these subjects, only Marius and Pompey (two of Roman history's most-celebrated soldiers) seem to have accomplished the feat. Further, in Marius' case I have assumed rather a great deal (four years) of service for which we have no mention in our sources, and the circumstances of Pompey's service were (as I mentioned above) extraordinary.

This data show how harmful an influence the *decem stipendia* has had on our interpretation of the evidence. We have seen frequently in the prosopographical analysis above that scholars are accustomed to turn to the *decem stipendia* in making chronological arguments, but given how rare it seems to have been for someone to fulfill the *decem stipendia* in the Late Republic such arguments rest on rather precarious foundations. Further, this knowledge should effectively break the circular arguments that claim that some of these senators *must have* had some military service we have not heard of on the grounds that their candidacy would not have been admitted without the *decem stipendia*. In some cases, as we have seen, this argument (e.g. the *decem stipendia* was still in effect, therefore Sulla *must have* served ten years prior to his quaestorship) has been used to undermine sources that explicitly say otherwise. Again, based on these findings I suggest that such arguments are founded upon rather tenuous assumptions.

At least in the period between Marius and Caesar (if not even before Marius) I do not think we can assume that *anyone* fulfilled the *decem stipendia* before the age of 30.

Then what happened to the regulation? As I discussed above, one prevailing theory about the *decem stipendia* is that it fell into disuse following the Social War after military practice shifted away from employing a citizen cavalry. If we return to the beginning of this chapter and Marius' speech in the *Jugurtha*, however, we should notice that Marius was describing an aristocracy that avoided military service in 107 BCE – 16 years before the Social War. Of course, the speech of Marius in the *Jugurtha* was a Sallustian creation and thus one may argue that Sallust was anachronistically describing his own times. Yet, Marius' career was not so far removed from Sallust's lifetime that there would not have been some memory within the community of Marius and his rise to prominence. Further, this evidence undermines the idea that the Social War marked a sharp decrease in aristocratic military service. I have counted Marius as having fulfilled the *decem stipendia* based upon his reputation and out of a desire to interpret the evidence as conservatively as possible, but we only have evidence for six campaigns. Further, it is unlikely that Sulla had *no* military experience when he stood for the quaestorship (even though Sallust suggests as much), but as I have argued above and as the other evidence present in this chapter has corroborated it would be highly speculative to assume he had at least ten campaigns. Therefore, his election to the quaestorship would have come too early for the Social War to explain how he avoided the *decem stipendia.* Likewise, Lucullus was twenty-eight when he first served in the military during the Social War; unless he had been planning to start his political career when he was nearly forty, it is likely that he

planned to run for office with less than ten campaigns under his belt.[198] The argument that the Social War caused the disappearance of the *decem stipendia* already lacked sources strongly supporting it; now I believe that it is quite possible that this tenuous solution actually lacks a problem as well. Aristocratic cavalry service appears to have been declining before the allies rebelled in 91.

Instead of searching out a new date for the lapse of the *decem stipendia* I believe the evidence here supports those who have questioned whether or not the regulation ever existed.[199] Polybius is our only explicit evidence for this rule, and he himself seems to undermine its existence elsewhere. His friend Scipio Aemilianus was an excellent soldier but was famously criticized as "un-Roman" for refusing to plead in the courts – a fair enough criticism given the importance of legal pleading among the Roman elite.[200] Later, however, Polybius reveals how Scipio won his reputation for bravery:

διὸ καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην καὶ προσλαβὼν τὸν τοῦ Πολυβίου πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐνθουσιασμόν, ἐφ' ὅσον οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν νέων περὶ τὰς κρίσεις καὶ τοὺς χαιρετισμοὺς ἐσπούδαζον, κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν ποιούμενοι τὴν διατριβήν, καὶ διὰ τούτων συνιστάνειν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπειρῶντο τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὁ Σκιπίων ἐν ταῖς κυνηγεσίαις ἀναστρεφόμενος καὶ λαμπρὸν ἀεί τι ποιῶν καὶ μνήμης ἄξιον καλλίω δόξαν ἐξεφέρετο τῶν ἄλλων. (Polyb. 31.29.8-10)

Therefore, returning to Rome and taking as a companion Polybius who was also interested in this (hunting), as much as the rest of the young men busied themselves in legal cases and greetings and passing time in the forum and through these activities attempted to win over the People, Scipio instead turned to hunting and

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[198] Although we have very little information about him at all, the same could presumably be said of Lucullus' consular colleague M. Aurelius Cotta. Harris 1979: 257 includes Cotta in his catalogue of early magistrates who may have shirked the *decem stipendia*. Appian *Mith.* 71 may suggest that Cotta suffered from a lack of military experience while proconsul in Bithynia (73 BCE).

[199] Again, Kunkel & Whitman 1995: 60-3 call it *ein traditionelles Prinzip*; Develin 1979: 58ff; Beck 2000: 336 calls the *decem stipendia* a guideline (*Richtlinie*) rather than a regulation.

[200] Polyb. 31.23.10-2. Rosenstein 2006: 368ff suggests that legal pleading itself was a kind of "ritualized combat."

through the brilliance of his deeds and the memory of them obtained a reputation more splendid than that of others.

Hunting, it seems, was the source of Scipio's reputation, not his considerable efforts in war. If Polybius is correct here – a big "if," admittedly – then this hardly seems like an aristocratic culture that places a premium on battlefield prowess. In this light, the speech of Marius in the *Jugurtha* seems less like a rhetorical exercise from Sallust and more plausibly like a reflection of contemporary issues in 108 BCE.

Additionally, we should consider the logistics of enforcing the *decem stipendia*. Until 218 BCE, shortly after the date of this figure, the normal cavalry complement for a legion was 200-300 men. The Republic fielded four legions at this period, so we should assume a total cavalry enlistment to be between 800 and 1200 men total.[201] Thanks once again to Polybius, we have a fairly reliable figure for the number of citizens eligible for cavalry service in 225 BCE: 23,000 men.[202] Now, not all of the men counted in Polybius' figure would be under the age of 27 nor would all be aristocrats, but even if only a small minority of this number was comprised by aristocrats it would be hard to imagine that they were all able to serve ten campaigns before their first office given the size of the pool of potential cavalrymen and the number of spaces available in each legion. McCall's study on the Roman cavalry estimates that

[201] Polyb. 3.107.9-15. Walbank 1984: 439; 677-83; Afzelius 1944: 62, 72; McCall 2002: 36ff, 100, 151.

[202] Polyb. 2.23.9ff. See Walbank 1984 ad loc. Polybius' figures are thought to be relatively reliable, given their sourcing (Fabius Pictor). There is some question as to whether the figures provided by Polybius include men already serving under arms or just those available but not conscripted. I follow Walbank, who favors reading the figures as a full muster. See also Mommsen *StR* 3.575; Beloch 1886: 355-70; De Sanctis: 1953: 2.385, 462, 3.330; Rosenstein 2004: 89-91.

out of the 23,000 men mentioned by Polybius, 9,000 would be between the ages of 17-30 and therefore prime targets for conscription. McCall concludes that if each man between 17-30 years old served in the cavalry, then the average amount of service would only come to three years.[203] Of course, not all members of the cavalry class would expect to serve ten years, but the numbers make it challenging to imagine that even all aristocrats would be able to. It is not within the purview of this study to pursue this line of inquiry too far, but it is hard to imagine that these numbers – firmly within the Middle Republic – would support a system that required a decade of cavalry service prior to *beginning* a political career.

The inability to rely upon Polybius for the amount of youthful military service expected of aristocrats should force us to look elsewhere, and we are not without other options. I offer one here which we have already seen: the *Tabula Heracleensis*. The inscription probably does not (as has been previously supposed) give us the text of the *lex Iulia municipalis* of 45 BCE but is more likely a digest of several different texts. Yet, the entirety of the *Tabula Heracleensis* is thought to be Caesarian in date.[204] The most relevant passage for the current study is from a section of the *Tabula* which deals with qualifications for magistrates and senators in the *municipia*:[205]

quei minor annos (triginta) natus est erit, nei quis eorum post K(alendas) Ianuar(ias) secundas in municipio colonia praefectura IIvir(atum) IIIvir(atum neve quem alium mag(istratum) petito neve capito neve gerito, nisei quei eorum stipendia equo in legione (tria) aut pedestria in legione (sex) fecerit…

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[203] McCall 2002: 150-1. He uses the life table in Parkin (1992: 147) to conclude that 24.058% of the sample would be between 17-30 years old. Although note that his number works from what he estimates to be the total population of the cavalry class in 225 BCE (i.e. Polybius' 23,000 plus those *under* the age of 17), 37,700.

[204] Crawford *RS* 1.358-60.

[205] Crawford *RS* 1.366.

After the Kalends of next January, no one who is less than 30 years old is to seek, to obtain, or to hold the office of IIvir, IIIvir, or any other magistracy in a *municipium*, colony, or prefecture unless he has served three campaigns in the cavalry or six campaigns in the infantry.

This regulation is directed at communities outside of Rome, but in light of the service records of the subjects examined here it is hard not to notice some similarity. The most frequent amount of campaigns in our sample is two – well under the *decem stipendia* but just one campaign shy of the three-campaign minimum recorded in the *Tabula*. If we consider the possibility that the regulations on the *Tabula Heracleensis* were applying Roman standards to municipal communities – and others have[206] – then I suggest that this is a more attractive option for discussions of military service minimums than the *decem stipendia*.

Finally, the last major implication I wish to discuss is one of acculturation. If we were to imagine that the Roman Senate was populated by men who had all spent the majority of their developing years in the army then it would follow that the sharing of a universal formative experience would have greatly influenced the group's identity. Senators may have gone on to pursue more or less bellicose political careers after their youthful military service, but service in the cavalry would still have been a major (perhaps the only) shared experience to which all members of the body could relate. Additionally, it has been shown that military service in during this period (and others) had a powerful socializing effect on those who participated.[207] Thus it is natural for a group's identity to coalesce around such shared experiences, and we have already seen in the Introduction and throughout this chapter that military service foundational to aristocratic legitimacy and therefore emphasized in the group's

[206] See Harris 1979: 12ff; Crawford *RS* 1.358ff.

[207] See most notably Rosenstein 2012.

efforts to communicate its identity to the broader political community. What happens when a group like the Roman Senate decides to shift away from an important shared experience?

Within the Senate itself, one would naturally expect that the loss of a shared formative experience would lead to fragmenting and disagreement within the body concerning what the basis of the aristocratic identity should be. This is exactly what we see in our sources. I will discuss this in much greater depth in my third chapter, which focuses upon aristocratic attitudes towards military honors, but at the moment we might think briefly about the famous Sallustian synkrisis in the *Catiline.*[208] Sallust compares the virtues of Caesar and Cato – the men he singles out having great *virtus* – in a way that contrasts their beliefs and methods. In the comparison Caesar and Cato are presented as holding opposite views on what kind of activity was important in aristocratic life. For our purposes, it is important to recognize that military activity is a major difference between the two men: Cato's efforts in the competition over *virtus* focused on moral, internal achievements such as *modestia, innocentia,* and *abstinentia,* while Caesar wished most for a "great command, an army, and a new war." Much ink has been spilled attempting to identify a "winner" in Sallust's comparison,[209] but such pursuits are – in my opinion – not particularly useful. Sallust tells us from the beginning of his synkrisis that *both* men "won" the distinction of having great *virtus.* Rather than the triumph of the

[208] Sall. *Cat.* 53-54.

[209] Bibliographies can be found a Vretska 1976: 2.618-22; McGushin 1976: 309-11; Batstone 1988: 1-2. Syme 1964 is still the standard-bearer for a pro-Catonian interpretation of the Synkrisis. Shwartz 1897 and Schur 1934 represent some pro-Caesar readings. Batstone's reading, which emphasizes the differences between the men rather than attempting to identify a "winner," is still in my opinion the best and most useful work on the subject

Caesarian or Catonian conception of what makes a good Roman Senator (Cato wins the debate in the *Catiline,* Caesar wins the Civil War) what we see is the coexistence of competing value systems and that military activity was an important point of difference between them. We would, to put it simply, expect that a Senate deprived of a shared formative experience would become more divided, and that factions within the body would have increased difficulty communicating with each other. Moments like the Sallustian synkrisis (and many others we have already seen and will see later in this project) show us that this was the case in the Late Republic.

I began this chapter with a quote from the speech of Marius in the *Jugurtha,* a portion of the text that has often been discredited as "pure entertainment" or merely "an illustration of the writer's creative ability."[210] I would not go so far as to suggest that we consider the speech a preservation of words spoken in 108, but after this examination I do believe we should take its claims more seriously. We should also remember that changes in aristocratic career pattern do no only signify shifting elite values but also indicate *voters'* priorities as well. Whereas previously military achievement seems to have been by far the most significant variable in Roman voters' decision making, this evidence suggests that candidates no longer felt compelled to advertise themselves as soldiers. In fact, with this evidence, the importance of youthful service to the voters of the Late Republic may be somewhat analogous to American political landscape during the years of the draft, wherein most candidates had only to prove a minimum amount of military service while few who could claim more distinguished and lengthy terms of service were able to trade more heavily upon their military record. Certainly there was a deeply-

[210] See above n.4.

ingrained sense of the importance of military service among the political class. But while republican oratory, historiography, and culture often paid service to this idea, their assertions do not match the reality. Cicero, whose quote above began this section, illustrates this nicely. On the whole the *de Officiis* clearly privileges non-military political action, and yet Cicero still felt compelled to offer service in the army as his "first recommendation" on the path to *gloria*.

3. "We Will Have to Raise Marius from the Underworld!": Cicero's *Pro Fonteio* and the Shortage of Commanders in the Late Republic.

I. "*Excitandus nobis erit ab inferis C. Marius.*"

Magna mehercules causa, iudices, absolutionis cum ceteris causis haec est, ne quae insignis huic imperio macula atque ignominia suscipiatur, si hoc ita perlatum erit in Galliam, senatores equitesque populi Romani non testimoniis Gallorum, sed minis commotos rem ad illorum lubidinem iudicasse. Ita vero, si illi bellum facere conabuntur, excitandus nobis erit ab inferis C. Marius, qui Indutiomaro isti minaci atque adroganti par in bello gerendo esse possit, excitandus Cn. Domitius et Q. Maximus, qui nationem Allobrogum et reliquas suis iterum armis conficiat atque opprimat, (Cic. *Font.* 36)

By Hercules, judges, among all the reasons for acquittal, a great one is to prevent a conspicuous and shameful stain upon our *imperium* if this will be spread throughout Gaul, that the senators and knights of the Roman People have ruled not in consideration of testimony of Gauls but rather in light of threats and according to their desire. Truly then, if they attempt to wage war, we will be forced to raise from the underworld C. Marius, who would be able to equal this threatening and arrogant Indutiomarus[1] in waging war. We will be forced to raise Cn. Domitius and Q. Maximus, that they might again press and subdue the Allobroges and the rest.

This passage comes from one of Cicero's less-studied forensic speeches, the *pro Fonteio.* Sometime in either late 70 or early 69 BCE Cicero defended a provincial governor, M. Fonteius, against charges of extortion stemming from the latter's time administering Transalpine Gaul.[2] The trial marked Cicero's return to his preferred role of defense counsel

[1] The Indutiomarus in this speech is not to be confused with the rebellious leader of the Treveri who opposed Caesar in 54. See Caes. *BG* 5.55-8.

[2] For a discussion of the dating see Dyck 2012: 13-4. Coçkun 2006: 358-61 pushes for 70 BCE, but this leaves little time for the promulgation of the new law, the enrollment of new jurors, and - most fundamentally - time for the plaintiff Gauls to travel to Rome. See Alexander 2002: 60-1. The precise term of his governorship in Transalpine Gaul (probably a propraetorship) is disputed but was almost certainly either from 75-73 or from 74-72 BCE (although Brennan 2000: 509-11 suggests 77-75) See *MRR* 2.104; 3.93; Badian 1966: 911-2; Alexander 2002: 60ff, 274n.3; Lintott 2008: 101. Cicero tells us (§44) that Fonteius was in Macedonia in 77, and we know (§16) that he was in Gaul at a time that allowed him to help Pompey's forces winter there. Pompey wintered in Transalpine Gaul twice: 77-76 BCE, which we can rule out because Fonteius was in Macedonia, leaving 74-73 BCE. Badian argues for 74-72, since Cicero fails to mention that Pompey's colleague in Spain, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius,

after he had just won a terrific victory in the prosecution of C. Verres, who had also been charged *de repetundis.* The charges should be familiar to anyone who has knowledge of Roman provincial administration in the Late Republic. The prosecution claimed that Fonteius took kickbacks in the construction of infrastructure in the province (§17-18), that he profited personally from a new tax on wine (§19), that he waged warfare unjustly against the Vocontii (§20), and that he distributed troops into winter quarters oppressively (§20).[3] Much of Cicero's defense follows the xenophobic path one would expect: the plaintiffs were Gauls and therefore not to be trusted.[4] There is, however, a line of Cicero's argument that connects it to the questions of this project and that opens an avenue into an intriguing issue in the Republic's last generation: he claims the court should acquit M. Fonteius because of his military experience.

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wintered in Transalpine Gaul in 75-74 (see Plut. *Sert.* 21). Critics of 75-73 argue that a prosecution in 69 BCE is too late but see note on the dating of the trial below.

[3] I am using Dyck's organization of the text, which is preferable to the traditional organization of the fragments. See also Alexander 2002: 59-77. The manuscript tradition is somewhat complicated, and Dyck points out that the fragmentary state of the text probably contributes to this dearth of scholarly treatment about the speech. §1-6 were discovered as a palimpsest and §11-end are on Quire V of Vativan Arch S. Pietro H.25. Riggsby 1999: 120 says it is "apparently in an intermediate degree of preservation," while contrasting it with the *pro Flacco* (more fragmentary) and the *pro Rabirio* (essentially complete).

[4] The reverence Cicero had shown for Sicilian testimony during his prosecution of Verres no longer applied. Such arguments are certainly flawed and distasteful to the modern reader, but Riggsby (1999: 134ff) was right to caution against underestimating their rhetorical effectiveness in *de repetundis* trials. In doings so he was pushing back against Kurke 1989: 175 who characterizes these racial characters as "empty rhetoric." For similar arguments in other Ciceronian forensic speeches see See *Flacc.* 10-1; 65; *Rab.* 35; *Scaur.* 42. See also Vasaly 1993: 193ff.

Cicero argued that military men were in short supply in 70 BCE. We have already seen in Chapter 1 that youthful military experience among aristocrats of the first century was in precipitous decline during the middle of the first century BCE. The evidence presented there showed clearly that aspiring statesmen – quite contrary to the values they inherited – felt their prospects were better served by domestic activity rather than extended service in the camps and proving their prowess on the battlefield. In the *pro Fonteio* Cicero tells us that the elite eschewing of the camps continued as men climbed the *cursus* honorum. The advocate states clearly that Rome did not have as many experienced *commanders* as it had enjoyed in the past. In this chapter I will first examine the perception Cicero seems to be exploiting in his speech. Once we have a better idea of what exactly Cicero was suggesting in the *pro Fonteio*, I will then attempt to test Cicero's claim against our evidence. Of course, our source material is not plentiful enough to approach the question head on as it would be impossible to determine exactly how many men of military experience there were among aristocrats of the Late Republic – or for that matter in any other period. Instead, I will work with a smaller sample, the consuls from 81-49 BCE, in order to see what their service records can tell us about command experience among the holders of Rome's highest annual magistracy. The principle question here is not unlike that of my first Chapter: how much command experience did consuls have in this period? Once we have seen how the evidence in the *pro Fonteio* aligns with contemporary reality, I will close by examining some other loci in which we might detect this anxiety and close by discussing the implications of my findings.

Let us return to the trial. Above I have given a portion of §36 of Cicero's speech. Up to this point in his defense, Cicero had gone to some lengths to suggest that the situation in Gaul

was unstable and a conviction of Fonteius would embolden those eager to move against Rome.[5] This was, so far as we can tell, a fiction created by the speaker to serve his interests and those of his client, but his focus on potential military threat reveals an intriguing part of Cicero's strategy. If the Gauls do rebel, he argues, Rome will be forced to raise up from the underworld (*excitandus nobis erit ab inferis*) its former heroes from the perpetual struggle with Gaul. He gives us some suggestions. The first entry on the list is the most obvious, Marius, the man who repelled the Cimbri and Teutones. Next came Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 122 BCE) who fought as consul against the Salluvi, Alloborges, and Averni. And finally Q. Fabius Maximus, the consul of 121 BCE who joined Domitius.[6]

This rhetorical necromancy did a large amount of argumentative work for Cicero's defense. By bringing these illustrious *exempla* into his speech Cicero was associating his client with them, even though Fonteius' achievements paled in comparison.[7] The invocation of large-

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[5] Cic. *Font.* 17, 36.

[6] Following the order of Cicero's mention, not chronological order: Marius' command against the Cimbri and Teutones concluded with battles at Aqua Sextiae in 102 BCE and at Vercellae in 101 (For Aqua Sextiae see: Cic. *Cat.* 4.21; *Leg. Man.* 60; Plut. *Mar.* 15-22; Dio Cass. 27; Livy *Per.* 68; Vell. 2.12.4; Val. Max. 1.2.4; Oros. 5.26.9-14. For Vercellae see: Cic. *Cat.* 4.21; *Prov. Cons.* 32; Caes. *BG* 1.40.5; Livy *Per.* 68; Vell. 2.12.5; Val. Max. 5.2.8, 6.1; Plin. *NH* 22.11; Plut. *Mar.* 24-7). For Domitius see: Caes. *BG* 1.45.2; Livy *Per.* 61; Vell. 2.10.2-3, 39.1; Strabo 4.1.11, 4.2.3; Val. Max. 9.6.3; Suet. *Nero* 1.2, 2.1; Flor. 1.37.4-6; App. *Celt.* 12. For Fabius in addition to the sources for Domitius see also Plin. *NH* 7.166, 33.141. He took the cognomen "Allobrogicus" (Val. Max. 3.5.2, 6.9.4; Senec. *Ben.* 4.30.2; Amm. Marc. 15.12.5; Ps. Ascon. 211). His mention of Maximus is potentially a cheeky one, one of Fonteius' prosecutors was a M. Fabius. Whether or not he was actually descended from the consul of 122 is unknown, that Cicero fails to mention this explicitly may suggest he was not. Nevertheless, the similarity of the names would be apparent to the audience.

[7] Van der Blom has argued persuasively (2010: 3ff) that by using *exempla* in his speeches Cicero was able to compensate for his lack of family prestige. Presumably this also worked for his client. In *de Partitione Oratoria,* (§96) for example, Cicero writes that *exempla* are useful for

scale conflicts with Gaul also helped bolster a sense of urgency which Cicero has been carefully cultivating in his listeners. He has already suggested that the Gauls may be so emboldened by the prosecution of Fonteius that revolt could follow. In invoking his fellow-Arpinate Marius, Cicero was bringing to mind the crisis of the previous generation. Some in the audience would have remembered how surprising and dire the situation had been.[8] More importantly for our purposes, in addition to bringing the crisis of the end of the second century to the minds of the listeners Cicero has also made a somewhat radical claim given what we know about military response to crisis in the Roman Republic. In saying that it will be necessary to raise the dead to meet the enemy he was indirectly (but undeniably) suggesting that there are not living senators fit for the task.

As we saw in the Introduction to this work, leading Rome's armies had traditionally been the foremost responsibility of the senatorial class. Their time was consumed with it, their political legitimacy rested upon it, and thus their self-presentation focused upon it. Further, nearly universal desire among the elite for command positions had produced an ideology which valued amateurism in order to diffuse opportunities more widely among aristocrats. This in turn produced, as Nathan Rosenstein put it, the expectation in the Middle Republic (generally speaking) that *any* member of the aristocracy should be prepared to lead the legions

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"amplification." He further recommends the speaker have old and recent *exempla* on hand because the former carry more *auctoritas* and the latter will be more recognizable. See also Cic. *Or.* 120 where he says that *exempla* (Roman and non-Roman) give *auctoritas* and *fides* to an argument. He gives a definition at *Inv.* 1.49: *Exemplum est quod rem auctoritate aut casu alicuius hominis aut negoti confirmat aut infirmat,* and *Rhet. Herenn.* 4.62. See also Roller 2018: 11-22.

[8] It is important to remember that the jury in 69 was only 35 years removed from the panic of 105 BCE.

successfully.[9] Again, as we saw in the Introduction, the political culture of the Republic has often been interpreted as a national predisposition towards militarism. While we ought not overemphasize this idea, it would also be foolish to suggest that the community was not – in the modern parlance – obsessed with military achievement. Nor should we be surprised by the centrality of military activity in the Roman political sphere; this was, at its most basic level, a necessity. The gates of the Temple of Janus, which closed during times of peace, were opened (so the story goes) by Rome's third king and stayed so until a brief opening after the First Punic War in 235 BCE. Augustus closed them next after the Battle of Actium in 29 BCE. Peace during the Late Republic was exceedingly rare.[10] To put this chapter in dialogue with the first, the Republic forced its leaders to train as soldiers because it needed commanders.

Contrast this traditional expectation with Cicero's words in the *pro Fonteio* (§43):

Age vero, nunc inserite oculos in curiam, introspicite penitus in omnis rei publicae partes; utrum videtis nihil posse accidere, ut tales viri desiderandi sint, an, si acciderit, eorum hominum copia populum Romanum abundare? Quae si diligenter attendetis, profecto, iudices, virum ad labores belli impigrum, ad pericula fortem, ad usum ac disciplinam peritum, ad consilia prudentem, ad casum fortunamque felicem domi vobis ac liberis vestris retinere quam inimicissimis populo Romano nationibus et crudelissimis tradere et condonare maletis.

Truly now, turn your attention to the Curia, scrutinize the deepest corners of the Republic. Do you think there is no possible situation which calls for such men? Or, if something should happen, do you think the state has an abundance of these men? Think on this carefully, judges, and without doubt you will prefer to retain this man for the sake of your homes and children instead of convicting him and handing him over to the most wicked nations which are most hostile to the Roman People, a man energetic in the face of war's labors, one brave against dangers, one experienced in the practice and discipline of war, one wise in counsel, one who is proven lucky in war.

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[9] Rosenstein 2006: 381; 1990: 172ff calls this the "myth of universal aristocratic competence."

[10] For the practice of closing the Temple of Janus see Livy 1.19; Plut. *Num.* 73. and Augustus' *Res Gestae* §13. For the closure in 29 see Dio Cass. 51.20 (and again in 25 BCE – 53.27).

Cicero's description of Fonteius should be familiar; he casts his defendant in the mold of the traditional aristocratic leader. Fonteius is energetic, brave, experienced, wise, and lucky. He is, simply put, someone equal to the task of leading the army. What stands in sharp contrast, however, to the values inherited by the men of the Late Republic is Cicero's assertion that men like Fonteius are a rarity. Whether one is searching inside the Curia or outside of it (*inserite oculos in curiam, introspicite penitus in omnis rei publicae partes*), Cicero claims that there is no abundance of capable military leaders. Rather, Fonteius must be preserved because there is a dearth of such men.

Elsewhere in the *pro Fonteio* Cicero had put this even more bluntly (§42):

Quare si etiam monendi estis a me, iudices, quod non estis, videor hoc leviter pro mea auctoritate vobis praecipere posse, ut ex eo genere homines, quorum cognita virtus, industria, felicitas in re militari sit, diligenter vobis retinendos existimetis. Fuit enim maior talium virorum in hac re publica copia; quae cum esset, tamen eorum non modo saluti, sed etiam honori consulebatur. Quid nunc vobis faciendum est studiis militaribus apud iuventutem obsoletis, fortissimis autem hominibus ac summis ducibus partim aetate, partim civitatis discordiis ac rei publicae calamitate consumptis, cum tot bella aut a nobis necessario suscipiantur aut subito atque inprovisa nascantur? Nonne et hominem ipsum ad dubia rei publicae tempora reservandum et ceteros studio laudis ac virtutis inflammandos putatis?

Therefore, judges, if you need to be reminded by me – although you do not – it seems that on account of my authority I can gently offer you this advice: you should resolve to protect one from that group of men whose *virtus*, work ethic, and good fortune in military matters is known. Indeed, there was once in this Republic a greater body of such men, and even though this was the case, nevertheless their honor was a point of consideration, to say nothing of their safety. Now what should you do, when military service has been forgotten among the youth, when our bravest men and best generals have been spent either by age, civil war, or disaster, when so many wars are taken up by us either because of necessity or which arise suddenly and unexpectedly? Do you not think that this man should be preserved for this doubtful period for the Republic in addition to exciting the enthusiasm for praise and *virtus* among the rest?

He claims that this problem is so manifest that the judges themselves need no reminding (*si etiam monendi estis a me, iudices, quod non estis*). It is here too that we see Cicero present the problem as ubiquitous throughout the stages of senatorial career. As young men have forgotten military service (see Chapter 1), so too have capable generals been "spent" without adequate

replenishment. In addition to the pragmatics of his appeal, it is important to note how skillfully Cicero has deployed contemporary Roman society's valuation of military achievement. The traditional privilege enjoyed by military men entitled them to special considerations when faced with situations like prosecution even though in that period there was an abundance of such men. Cicero argues *now* that it is even more important to protect not only the honor, but also the basic safety of such men since there are fewer of them at the Republic's disposal. Before 70 BCE the Republic did this out of a consideration for the prestige of its conquering heroes. Now it needed to do so out of necessity – or so he claims. From Chapter 1 of this work we can imagine that Cicero's mention of the neglect of military service among the aristocratic youth rang true. Although one might argue that Cicero was ill-suited to make such an argument since he had done a very bare minimum of military service by the time of the trial (and, indeed, after it),[11] on the other hand – if we take Cicero at his word and assume that the body he is addressing lack men with military experience – his own dearth of service further illustrates his point.

These passages produce, therefore, an interesting argumentative thread in Cicero's defense of Fonteius. It is clear that Cicero was attempting to utilize a contemporary *perception* that there were fewer capable military commanders than previously, and we should not take this lightly. As a master of persuasion Cicero was uniquely adept at recognizing and manipulating societal concerns and anxieties. We should imagine that in the crafting of his speeches Cicero considered the perceptions and ideas held by his audience just as much, if not

[11] See Chapter 1 III.7.

more, than he did style and structure. We should also note that the *pro Fonteio* would not be the last time Cicero deployed this argument in defense of a "military man." In 63 BCE Cicero, as consul, defended M. Licinius Murena against charges of electoral malpractice and used a similar strategy. According to Cicero's speech, the prosecution claimed that Murena's extensive military experience was a liability to his consular campaign since it had frequently taken him abroad for long periods of time and was relatively less valuable politically when compared to his opponent-*cum*-prosecuter's background in jurisprudence. Not only does Cicero disagree with this premise (recall from the Introduction that this is one of the passages Harris cites as an "admission" by Cicero that military activity really was the primary source of political power), but he also argues that given the current crisis surrounding the Catilinarian Conspiracy Murena's experience should be valued at a premium.[12]

What is unclear, unsurprisingly, is how much we should trust his claims to reflect reality. Ciceronian rhetoric is difficult source material for the ancient historian. After all, this is the same man who managed to talk the Roman People into voting down agrarian legislation which would have directly benefited them. How can we judge the truthfulness of Cicero's claims? If we had more certain information, the most basic criteria we might look at is whether or not Cicero's argument worked for his client. Our sources, however, do not provide us with information about the verdict in this trial, although it seems *likely* that Fonteius was acquitted.[13] And, even if we had some solid evidence that Fonteius escaped conviction, we

[12] See Cic. *Mur. Passim* but especially §15-20, 78, 83-85.

[13] Some have taken Cicero's sale of a Neapolitan property to a M. Fonteius to suggest that Fonteius was in exile following his prosecution (Cic. *Att.* 1.6.1, for the sale as evidence of Fonteius' conviction see Schneider 1876: 33-4; against Dyck 2012: 15), but such a sale - if

would nevertheless have trouble crediting this thread of Cicero's argument alone with the acquittal. We need, therefore, a different way to explore how connected to reality Cicero's argument was. Therefore, in my next section, I have devised a way in which we might – using the word cautiously – "test" Cicero's claim.

II. *Fuit enim maior talium virorum in hac re publica copia*: Pre-Consular Command Experience 81-49 BCE.

I put "test" in quotations because, as so often with ancient material, the amount and nature of the source evidence does not afford us the ability to approach this issue directly. There is no preserved roster of available military commanders in any given period of republican history. Nor can we reproduce a prosopographical record for the entirety of the Roman Senate sufficiently comprehensive enough to afford us strong conclusions. As with Chapter 1, I instead suggest testing a more manageable sample and therefore have chosen to examine the command experience of the consuls from after the dictatorship of Sulla until the Caesarian Civil War, 81-49 BCE. I will be looking primarily at how many consuls had some form of command experience prior to their election to the Republic's highest annual magistracy. In the previous chapter, due to the dearth of evidence for aristocratic youth I was forced to curate my sample somewhat creatively, relying on Plutarch to ensure that *some* evidence on the subject existed. But by turning our focus to military command rather than

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indeed this is the same Fonteius - would actually confirm his acquittal. Fonteius would not have been able to reside in an area under direct Roman control if he was in exile. It is also possible that the "Fonteius" mentioned by Cicero (*Att.* 4.15.6) is our defendant, and this would put him in Rome in 54 BCE.

service in the rank and file comes with significant advantages. We are on – relatively speaking – much firmer ground in the source record when discussing military command. Finally, similar to our sample in Chapter 1 we can assume from the success of these men that their careers are better attested than others. Likewise, their success also indicates to some extent that their actions coincided with contemporary political values. That is to say, their careers can be considered somewhat exemplary.

Before presenting my findings, I should offer a few explanations about how I approached the data. I am considering "command" as the holding of *imperium* (as a praetor, propraetor, proconsul, or legate). I have not counted as command the holding of legateships as envoys or ambassadors.[14] As with Chapter 1, I have tried to provide a conservative interpretation of the evidence, and therefore I have counted command positions in peaceful provinces. This is both because even peaceful provinces often required overseeing troops and because it is possible that some provincial officials participated in smaller-scale military activity about which we have no existing evidence. Here are my findings:

[14] I follow Broughton's on the categorization of legates (lieutenant, envoy, ambassador), see also Salomonsson 2001: 79.



Figure 2.1 Pre-Consular Command Experience 81-49 BCE.

Figure 2.1 shows the ratio of consuls who had held *imperium* prior to election against those for whom we have no record of command before being sworn in. Between 81 and 49 BCE 61 different individuals held the consulship, of these 32 (possibly 31)[15] held *imperium* as a legate, praetor, propraetor, or proconsul. To put it in terms of percentage, 52.5% of consuls between 81 and 49 BCE had held *imperium* prior to their election. A full catalogue of pre-consular Command experience in this period is available in Appendix I.

This evidence suggests some intital conclusions. To begin with, these results hardly support Cicero's *hyperbole* in the *pro Fonteio.* If this evidence is indicative of the senatorial

[15] Either C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75 BCE) or M. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 74 BCE) may have been the propraetor in Spain defeated by Sertorius at sea in 80 BCE (Plut. *Sert.* 12.3), but it is unclear. Konrad 1978 suggests that neither of these men was the propraetor in question but that is was their younger brother L. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 65). See *MRR* 3.31. The legateship of Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69 BCE) is also somewhat uncertain. Cic *Leg. Man.* 58 mentions a Q. Metellus who was tribune of plebs one year and then legate the next, but this could also have been Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60 BCE). See *MRR* 3.38.

population in this period, then Cicero's exhortation to his listeners to look around the audience for capable military men would not have been very effective – just over half of this sample had experience and just under half had actual warzone experience. Therefore, if our sample is indicative of the broader senatorial population then there was a good chance that there would be *someone* in the audience with some experience. We should not, however, put too much weight on the hyperbolic articulation in the *pro Fonteio.* This kind of exaggeration was genre-approriate for forensic speeches. On the other hand, we should also note that these findings also undermine the similarly hyperbolic characterization that the Roman Senate was an order focused primarily upon military activity. In the Republic's last generation, it would seem, one was almost equally as likely not to have held any *imperium* prior to their consulship as to have done so.

It is more productive to engage with the implication of Cicero's rhetoric rather than the hyperbole. More than a complete absence of military men, what Cicero argued for in the *pro Fonteio* is a noticeable decline in the amount of such men. He clearly suggests that the Republic c.70 BCE had at its disposal a smaller amount of militarily capable men than it had previously. Now, of course the figures for 81-49 BCE are insufficient in themselves to indicate such a trend; we need another data set to compare them with. Therefore, to engage with Cicero's suggestion of decline I have compiled a similar set of data for the consuls from the period 200-170 BCE. Two variables make this period well-suited for such study. First, I wanted to work with a period of similar chronological length, but the challenge was to find an earlier 30-year period which enjoys a relatively ample amount of evidence. Obviously no earlier period of Roman history – and, frankly, much of later Roman history – can approach the amount and

variety of source material we have for the Republic's last generation, but the period between 200-170 BCE is covered by complete books of Livy's helpfully annalistic *Ab Urbe Condita* (books 31-43). This gives us some assurance that the major events of these years are attested. Here then are my findings:



Figure 2.2 Pre-Consular Command Experience 200-170 BCE.

Between 200-170 BCE 61 different individuals held the consulship (there were three consuls in 176 BCE), a number conveniently equal to the number of consuls from 81-49. As Cicero suggested in the *pro Fonteio,* and as we might have expected given the evidence and implications from Chapter 1, the number of consuls with pre-consular command in the period between 200-170 BCE is much higher; of these 61 consuls, 44 held some form of pre-consular *imperium.* For the remaining 17 we have no record of any command prior to their election to the highest annual magistracy. In terms of percentages, 72.13% of consuls in this period held command prior to election. As I mentioned above, I did not count as command service legates

who served as envoys or ambassadors, as opposed to officers, and I have not counted L. Cornelius Merula (cos. 193 BCE) and M'. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191 BCE) as having held *imperium* prior to their consulships even though both suppressed slave revolts during their terms as praetor.[16] If we were to count Merula and Glabrio then the percentage would go up to 75.41%. Even if we accept the more conservative number, 72.13%, this is just over 18% higher than the consuls between 81-49 BCE, a significant increase. One could, of course, argue still that this amount of pre-consular command-holders – just over 70% of consuls between 200-170 BCE – indicates that the senatorial class was still not a warrior-elite, but it is certainly closer to indicating an aristocratic preoccupation with military activity than the figures for the Republic's last generation. Most importantly for our purposes, the decline from 200-170 BCE to 81-49 BCE is undeniable.

These are just the cursory conclusions we can draw from comparison of the numbers involved; closer examination of the evidence the data represents reveals more substantive implications. Perhaps somewhat contrary to intuition, the figures in our samples who did not hold pre-consular command actually tell us more than a comparison of those who did. Out of 17 consuls without record of previous military command between 200-170 BCE 11 went on to hold command positions during and/or after their term in office. L. Cornelius Merula and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus held consular commands against the Boii in Cisalpine Gaul. Merula won a significant victory at Mutina, and Ahenobarbus went on to be a legate against

[16] Merula suppressed a budding revolt of slaves and Carthaginian captives. See Livy 32.26.4-18, although Livy mistakenly gives him the cognomen "Lentulus" (a mistake echoed by Zon. 9.16). Glabrio war praetor *inter perigrinos* in 196 BCE and suppressed a slave revolt in Etruria (see Livy 33.36.2-3).

Antiochus III at Magnesia.[17] M'. Acilius Glabrio defeated Antiochus at Thermopylae and triumphed in 190 BCE. M. Iunius Brutus, Q. Petillius Spurinus, P. Mucius Scaevola, and M. Popillius Laenas all held command against the Ligurians. Spurinus died in battle, but Scaevola triumphed in 175 BCE. Laenas did not achieve anything notable on the battlefield, although he did famously draw a circle in the sand around Antiochus IV in order to force his cooperation with the Senate's wishes.[18] P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 171) initially turned down a command on religious grounds, but later held the supreme command against Perseus in Macedonia – although he had little success.[19] C. Hostilius Mancinus (cos. 170) also held command against Perseus.[20] Finally, C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171) was so disappointed to not be assigned an active military role as consul that he attempted to march his army through Illyria to Macedonia to join in the fight against Perseus.[21]

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[17] For Merula see: Livy 34.6.5-9, 35.4-8, 55.6, 56.12-23. For Domitius see: Livy 35.20.2-7, 22.3-4, and 40.2-4. Appian (*Syr.* 30-6) tells us that Domitius filled in during Scipio's period of illness. See also Livy 37.39.5; *MRR* 1.359.

[18] For Brutus' campaigning in 178 BCE see Livy 41.5, 9-12. Both consuls of 176 BCE died in office. Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispallus died after being injured during the celebration of the Latin Festival (Livy 41.16.3-4) and Spurinus was killed in battle in Liguria (Livy 41.14.8-10, 15.5, 17.6-18.16; Val. Max. 1.5.9, 2.7.15). Scaevola earned a triumph for his efforts as consul in 175 BCE, see Livy 41.19.1-2. Laenas had an uneventful tenure as proconsul in Liguria in 172 BCE (see Livy 42.21.2-22.8, but for Laenas' famous meeting with Antiochus IV see Polyb. 29.2.1-4, 27; Livy 44.19.13, 29.1-5; 45.10-12.8, and 13.1; Cic. *Phil.* 8.23; Vell. 1.10.1-2; Val. Max. 6.4.3.

[19] Polyb. 27.8.1-15; Livy 42.31.1, 32.1-5, 36.7 48.4; 57-62, 43.4.5; Plut. *Aem.* 9.2; App. *Mac.* 11.9. See also *MRR* 1.416.

[20] Polyb. 27.16.1-6, 28.3.1 Plut. *Aem.* 93; Livy 43.9.1-4, 11.9, 17.9, 44.1.5-8, 2.6, 36.10; Diod. 30.5.

[21] Livy 42.31.1, 32.1-5, 43.1.2-12. See also *MRR* 1.416.

Therefore, if we extend our view past their respective consular elections only six of the consuls between 200-170 BCE have no known record of military command throughout their entire career.[22] How does this compare with their counterparts from 81-49 BCE? Of the 28 consuls for whom we have no record of pre-consular *imperium,* 14 (only 50%) went on to hold some kind of command. For 200-170 BCE the number was higher, nearly 65%. Now, we should keep in mind an obvious caveat. While we usually imagine the Late Republic to be better-attested than any earlier period of Roman history, it is important to acknowledge that in the instance – one concerned with pre-consular commands – Livy may actually provide more source material for the earlier period. The great strength of the late-republican evidence come from Cicero, and this evidence only begins in earnest in the early 50's. Meanwhile, Livy's habit of listing annual magistrates gives us an excellent idea of praetorships (and thus pre-consular military command) in the earlier period. Two tests of the amount of evidence we possess for these periods relative to each other using Broughton's *Magistrates of the Roman Republic* suggested conflicting conclusions: The period between 81-49 BCE has more total pages (177 pages vs. 100), but the earlier period has more attested praetorships (162 between 200-170 vs. 145 in the later period). It is unclear, therefore, which period is *better* attested, but I would suggest that even if one period has a slight edge over the other that these two periods are nevertheless comparable.

[22] Sex. Aelius Paetus Catus (cos. 198 BCE), M. Valerius Messalla (cos. 188 BCE), Sp. Postumius Albinus (cos. 186 BCE), Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispallus (cos. 176 BCE), C. Popillius Laenas (cos. 172 BCE), and P. Aelius Ligus (cos. 172 BCE).

Returning to the results, it is interesting to note that the difference in percentage for this subset of the data is consistent with the difference between the pre-consular *imperium* holders in both periods (a difference of 18% vs. 15%). Finally, more revealing than the raw percentages are the details. Among our 11 consuls in the earlier sample who held command positions only during or after their term of office but not before, all held command under their own auspices either as a consul or proconsul at least once. Further, all of them saw combat while in command. One died in battle and two – nearly three – of these men went on to triumph.[23] Among the corresponding 14 consuls from 81-49 BCE who gained some experience after their consulship, only nine held command as a consul or proconsul. Of these nine, only six saw battle in their term as commander.

Q. Lutatius Catulus was forced to quash his colleague's uprising as consul, Q. Marcius Rex was awarded a triumph for his time as proconsul in Cilicia (although he died before celebrating it), and C. Calpurnius Piso led the effort against the Allobroges during his term as consul in 67 BCE and his subsequent proconsulship.[24] But others did not have such successful or challenging terms in command: Illness hampered the proconsulship of Cn. Octavius, C. Cassius Longinus was bested by Spartacus, thanks to the *lex Manilia* M. Acilius Glabrio was

[23] Again, Q. Petillis Purinus (cos. 176 BCE) died in battle in Liguria. M'. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191 BCE) triumphed in 190 BCE, C. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 177 BCE) triumphed in 177, and P. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 175 BCE) was denied a triumph for his victory at Mutina.

[24] For Catulus see: Cic *Cat.* 3.24; Sall. *Hist.* 1.54-73M; Livy *Per.* 90; Suet. *Iul.* 3; Plut. *Sull.* 34.4-5; *Pomp.* 15.1-16.2; App. *BC* 1.105-107; Gan. Ic. 43-45B; Flor. 2.11.1-6; Dio 44.28.2, 47.4; Eutrop. 6.5.1; Oros. 5.22.16. For Marcius see: Sall. *Cat.* 30.3, 33.1-34.1; Cic. *Sull.* 34; *Fin.* 2.62; *Att.* 1.16.10 as well as John Malalas (p. 225, II.4-11[ed. Bonn 1831]). For Piso see: Cic. *Att.* 1.1.2; *Flacc.* 98; Sall. *Cat.* 49.2; Dio 36.37.2-3.

only briefly proconsul in Bithynia, Cicero's term in Cilicia saw limited resistance and he suggests that Bibulus' simultaneous proconsulship also featured only minor engagements. Ser. Sulpicius Rufus saw no action as proconsul in Achaea.[25] The difference in practice between the two periods is clear. Between 200-170 BCE, even if a consul ostensibly lacked command experience prior to his term in office he was nevertheless subsequently entrusted with major commands in the most active theaters. This, generally speaking, does not seem to have been true for the period between 81-49 BCE, when the Republic's most pressing commands were more often allotted to experienced generals.

One could argue that the decline seen in the later period was at least partly a result of a decline in opportunity for command, but in fact the period offered many theaters of conflict for the ambitious, military-minded aristocrat. On the earlier end of this period, Robert Morstein-Marx has argued convincingly that the 70's BCE saw an "unprecedented commitment of military resources to the East in a succession of campaigns," in an effort to reestablish the Roman *imperium* in the East after conflict with Mithridates.[26] In Macedonia, Greece, and Asia Minor Rome not only attempted to reassert itself and check the still troublesome Mithridates, but it also combated the familiar problem of piracy in places like

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[25] For Octavius see: Sall. *Hist.* 2.25M; Frontin. *Str.* 4.1.43. For Cassius see: Livy *Per.* 96; Plut. *Crass.* 9.7; Flor. 2.8.10; Oros. 5.24.4; App. *BC* 1.117. For Acilius see: Cic. *Man.* 5,26; Plut. *Pomp.* 30.1; App. *Mith.* 90; Dio 36.42-3. For Cicero see (focusing on his military activity and *supplicatio*): Cic. *Fam.* 8.7.2, 9.25.1, 2.15.1, 3.9.4, 3.15.5-6, 3.10.2, 3.13.2; *Att.* 6.8.5, 7.1.5 and 7, 7.2.6, 7.3.2, 7.4.1, 7.7.3-4; Plut. *Cic.* 37 For Bibulus see: Cic. *Fam.* 2.10.2, 15.1.1, 15.3.2; *Att.* 5.16.2, 5.18.1, 5.20.4, 5.21.2; *Phil.* 11.34-5; Livy *Per.* 108; App. *Syr.* 51; *BC* 5.10; Dio 40.30.1. For Sulpicius see: Cic. *Fam.* 4.3 and 4, 6.6.10, 1.6, and 4.5, 13.1.17ff. See also *MRR* 2.299.

[26] Kallet-Marx 1995: 291-311.

Cilicia and Crete. This surge of military activity is reflected as well in the surge of triumphal celebrations in the late 80's and 70's BCE.[27] The amount of military activity in the East in this period was truly exceptional, but the West also offered some opportunities for obtaining military *gloria.* The late 70's saw four Spanish triumphs stemming from the conflict with Sertorius; a fifth would have been added in the 60's if Cato had not obstructed Caesar's pursuit of a praetorian triumph.[28] Gaul was also becoming more active leading up to Caesar's actions in the 50's. C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75 BCE) died in 73 before he could celebrate his triumph from Cisalpine Gaul, and two uprisings of the Allobroges were put down in this period.[29] Thus, opportunities were available to aristocrats who wished to make a name for themselves by commanding Rome's legions.

Additionally, two institutional shifts are relevant to this trend. The first and most noticeable is a change in the expectations for a sitting consul from the pre-Sullan period to the post-Sullan period. Traditionally, the main responsibility of the consul was to lead the legions in the most pressing theaters of war. One or both of the consuls, thus, were usually expected to be absent from Rome during their term.[30] After the dictatorship of Sulla, however, this

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[27] This trend will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

[28] Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, Pompey, L. Afranius, and M. Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus all triumphed *ex Hispania ulteriore* between 71 and 69 BCE. See Rich 2014: 251. Caesar's Spanish propraetorship in 61 BCE failed to yield a triumph because of Cato's obstruction. I also discuss all of these triumphs in detail in Chapter 3.

[29] For Cotta see Cic. *Brut.* 318; *Pis.* 62; Ascon. 14C; Sall. *Hist.* 2.98M. C. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 67 BCE) defeated the Allobroges in 154 BCE (Cic. *Att.* 1.13.2, 1.1.2; Dio 36.37.2). C. Pomptinus did the same in 176 BCE (Cic. *prov. Cons.* 32; Dio 37.47-48; 39.65.1-2; Liv. *Per.* 103).

[30] See Beck et al. 2011: esp. 7ff.

changed, and both consuls regularly stayed in the city in order to oversee domestic affairs. Mommsen saw in this development the formal bisection of the *imperium* that had hitherto characterized the consulship; the civic, domestic power of the consul was retained by the magistrates in Rome while their military *imperium* was bestowed on proconsuls who were not always ex-consuls. Yet, as is somewhat usual with the work of Mommsen, his theory is plagued by an anachronistic sense of legalism. His suggestion of a *lex Cornelia de provinciis ordinandis* (a purely theoretical law, the existence of which was suggested by Mommsen to support his own theory) has been dismissed and the idea that there was any formal bisection of the consular *imperium* cast aside.[31] Nevertheless, the new trend of consuls remaining in the city during their term limited the opportunity for these men to hold commands after their election.

Another administrational shift in this period is the emergence of the position of legate.[32] Of our consuls between 200-170 who held command prior to their consulship only two did so exclusively as a *legatus*: L. Quinctius Flamininus (cos. 192 BCE), Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 185 BCE).[33] Some others had been legates but had additionally held command either as a praetor, propraetor, or proconsul prior to their consulship. Compare this to the

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[31] See most notably Giovannini 1983; also Balsdon 1939; Valgiglio 1957: 132-40; Girardet 2001: 155-61; Beck et al. 2011: 1-16.

[32] See Lange 2016: 71ff.

[33] Flamininus was a legate in Macedonia in charge of the fleet in Greece from 198 until 194 BCE (Livy 32.16.2; 28.9, 33.17.2 and 15). Claudius served under Flamininus from 195-194 (Livy 34.40.10) and then returned to Greece as a legate in 191 (Livy 36.10.10-14, 13.1, 22.8, and 30.2; App. *Syr.* 16). There is some debate about the nature of his role under Flamininus – see *MRR* 1.331-2.

nine consuls between 81-49 BCE who had only held command as legate before their election: Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus (cos. 77 BCE), C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76 BCE), M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73 BCE), Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus (cos. 72 BCE), Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (69 BCE), L. Manlius Torquatus (cos. 65 BCE), C. Antonius Hybrida (cos. 63 BCE), A. Gabinius (cos. 58 BCE), and Cn. Domitius Calvinus (cos. 53 BCE).[34] This increase in service as a legate is also noticeable among those who held command only after their term as consul. Only one of the 11 figures from 200-170 BCE who held command only after their consular term did so as a legate: Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 192 BCE) served as a legate at Magnesia. In the period between 81-49 BCE 4 out of the 14 figures were legates after their term.[35]

Therefore, the evidence suggests that those who did have some military experience prior to their consulship (and, indeed, after it) increasingly earned this experience as legates rather than as proconsuls. This trend in our evidence fits well with the findings of Mia-Maria Salomonsson in her excellent study on legates throughout the Republic's entire history.[36] I reproduce her graph here because it shows nicely how dramatic this change was:

[34] See Appendix I.

[35] L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 64 BCE), Cn. Domitius Calvinus (cos. 53 BCE), M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (cos. 53 BCE), and L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 50 BCE).

[36] Salomonsson 2001.



Figure 2.3 Salomonsson's table showing the increase of legates throughout Roman history. Date along the X axis are in BCE.

Closest to the period with which we are concerned, Salomonsson finds a gradual increase in lieutenant legates beginning in 109 and continuing until 80 BCE. What impact might this trend have on the issues considered in the present study? Most obviously service as a legate, although frequently requiring similar responsibility to an *imperium*-holding commander, was nevertheless a subordinate position. We have some evidence from Cicero which suggests that the community say commands held as legates as significantly inferior to supreme commands.[37] Legates also, for example, were not able to lay claim to triumphal processions since their command was technically under the auspices of their superior *imperator.*[38] This development, which naturally would have yielded more men with experience as legates and fewer who

[37] Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 5. Cicero characterizes Macedonia as easily held by Rome following its conquest and cites the fact that it was overseen mostly by legates who were *sine imperio.* Likewise, in *Att.* 5.21.3, Cicero lamented Bibulus' absence from his province in Syria because the Parthians were threatening and important provinces ought not be left to legates.

[38] Val. Max 2.8 See also Lundgreen 2014.

commanded forces under their own auspices, may well have partially informed the perception that Cicero was utilizing in the *pro Fonteio*. If Romans were accustomed to look first for experienced military men among commanders who had held positions under their own auspices, then this number would have been declining in the face of the increased frequency of legateships.

This theory is especially interesting if we refer back to §43 of the *pro Fonteio*. At this point in the speech Cicero compares the dearth of contemporary commanders with the depth of senatorial command talent in the Social War just under 20 years prior. He specifically asks his listeners to think about the *legates* in that conflict and lists some: M. Caecilius Cornutus (pr. by 90 BCE), L. Cinna (pr. 90 BCE), L. Sulla (pr. 93 BCE), C. Marius (cos. 107, 104-100), T. Didius (cos. 98 BCE), Q. Catulus (cos. 102 BCE), and P. Crassus (cos. 97 BCE). Starting with the men who had reached the praetorship by the outbreak of the war, little is known about the career of Cinna or Cornutus before their service in this conflict. Sulla had, of course, advertised himself as crucial in the ending of the Jugurthine War due to his role in the capture of the Numidian king.[39] He had also served with distinction during the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones. The rest of the Social War legates mentioned were all of consular rank at the time of their commission. This was a rarity initself.[40]

[39] See Plutarch (*Sull.* 6.1) says that King Bocchus of Maurentania, who aided the Romans by betraying Jugurtha to them, dedicated trophies and images on the Capitoline highlighting Sulla's involvement. See also a coin minted by Faustus Sulla in 56 BCE (*RRC* #426) which depicted the capture of Jugurtha.

[40] See *MRR* 2.27-28, 34-35.

What is even more striking about the consular legates alluded to by Cicero is that all of them were also *triumphatores* by the outbreak of the Social War. Marius had already celebrated two triumphs, one for his victory over Jugurtha and the other for turning back the Cimbri and Teutones. T Didius may not be as recognizable a name as Marius or Sulla but he had also triumphed twice before his commission as a legate in 91. Q. Catulus shared a triumph in 101 BCE with Marius, even though the two were not particularly friendly. Finally, P. Crassus held a triumph over the Lusitanians in 93 BCE.[41] Thus, just among the consular legates there were 6 triumphs. If we do as Cicero asks and compare our findings about his contemporaries with the men of the previous generation, we do in fact see a stark difference. The earlier legates often had military laurels of their own while the legates of 81-49 BCE more frequently recorded service under another commander. It is easy to see how this may have aided at least the perception that there were fewer accomplished military men available to the Republic in 70 BCE. This is perhaps further supported by the lack of political success enjoyed by legates in Late Republic. Excepting notably the brief surge of the Pompeian legates in the consulship during the late 60's and early 50's, Salomonsson notes correctly that "from 110 to 31 B.C. hardly any of the former legates reached any higher offices. During this time, it is obvious that the office of legate was no longer a regular part of a political career."[42]

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[41] For Marius' triumphs see: *CIL* I^2.1; Sall. *Iug.* 114.3; Livy *Per.* 67; Val. Max. 2.2.3; 6.9.14; 8.15.7; Vell. 2.12.1; Luc. 3.903; Plin. *NH* 33.12; Suet. *Iul.* 11; Plut. *Mar.* 12.2-5; *Sull.* 3.3; Flor. 1.36.17; Dio Cass. 48.4.5; Eutrop. 4.27.6; Oros. 5.15.19. Didius' first triumph from his proconsul in Macedonia was either in 100 or 99, see *MRR* 1.571, 573 and 3.81. His second triumph, earned in Spain against the Celtiberians, was in 93, see Cic. *Planc.* 61; *Inscr. Ital.* 13.1.85; *MRR* 2.15. For Catulus' triumph with Marius see: Plut. *Mar.* 25-7; Vell. 2.12.5; Plin. *NH* 17.2, 22.11. For P. Crassus' see: Cic. *Pis.* 58; Ascon. 14C; *MRR* 2.15.

[42] Salomonsson 2001: 88.

To sum up this section, if we strip away the hyperbolic (but given the setting appropriate) rhetoric of Cicero's claim then the evidence presented here in principle supports his assertion. Judging from the consuls of the period, officials seemed to have had less command experience upon entering office than earlier generations *and* were less likely to go on to obtain military command after their term in office. Further, the changing nature of Roman practice in allocating command during the Republic's last generation may have also contributed to the strength of the perception that the senatorial class was less militarily capable than previous generations. In the next section I will present some other evidence from outside the *pro Fonteio* which supports this finding.

III. *Age vero, nunc inserite oculos in curiam*: The Shortage of Commanders.

Nam saepe ego audivi Q. Maxumum, P. Scipionem, <alios> praeterea civitatis nostrae praeclaros viros solitos ita dicere, quom maiorum imagines intuerentur, vehementissume sibi animum ad virtutem adcendi. Scilicet non ceram illam neque figuram tantam vim in sese habere, sed memoria rerum gestarum eam flammam egregiis viris in pectore crescere neque prius sedari quam virtus eorum famam atque gloriam adaequaverit. At contra quis est omnium, his moribus, quin divitiis et sumptibus, non probitate neque industria cum maioribus suis contendat? Etiam homines novi, qui antea per virtutem soliti erant nobilitatem antevenire, furtim et per latrocinia potius quam bonis artibus ad imperia et honores nituntur; proinde quasi praetura et consulatus atque alia omnia huiusce modi per se ipsa clara et magnifica sint, ac non perinde habeantur ut eorum qui ea sustinent virtus est. Verum ego liberius altiusque processi, dum me civitatis morum piget taedetque. (Sall. *Iug.* 4.5-9)

For often I heard that Q. Maximus, P. Scipio, and other famous men of our state used to say that whenever they looked upon the *imagines* of their ancestors their spirits were set ablaze for *virtus*. Certainly neither the wax nor the figure had in itself such power, but the memory of their achievements fed the flame in the chest of these excellent men which could not be quenched before their *virtus* equaled theirs in fame and glory. Conversely, under the current values is there anyone who does not compete with his ancestors in wealth and luxury rather than righteousness and work ethic? Even the new men strive for commands and honors clandestinely through crime rather than through good practices – those who previously were accustomed to exceed the nobility through *virtus*. As if the praetorship, consulship, and all other things of the sort were prestigious and renowned on their own rather than judged according to the *virtus* of those who hold them. Truly I have gone on too long and too freely in loathing and lamenting the character of my state.

I start this section not with a portion of the *pro Fonteio,* but with the end of the prologue of Sallust's *Jugurtha.* Before launching into his narrative of the war in Numidia Sallust took some time (apparently an overly indulgent amount by his own estimation) to comment upon the *mores civitatis* of his time. I also referenced this passage in the Introduction along with the passage from the *Catiline* in which the author complains that aristocrats of his time no longer competed amongst each other in *virtus,* but in luxury and greed.[43] Given Sallust's choice of examples and activities, it is clear that foremost on the author's mind is the aristocratic aversion to military service. The *praeclari viri,* for example, referenced in the *Jugurtha* are probably the two most famous bearers of those names: Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator and P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus – the heroes of the Second Punic War.[44] In this passage I have left *virtus* untranslated, partly because it is a difficult word to render in English and partly because I wanted to highlight the repetition of the word which, in Sallust, is mostly connected to military prowess. The ability of the *imagines* to motivate young Romans to military glory should also be familiar since it was also mentioned earlier by Polybius in his famous

[43] Sall. *Cat.* 9-10.

[44] Kostermann 1971: 39 identifies them instead as the sons of L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 168) but does not offer reasoning for this choice. Paul (1984: 16) prefers, as I do, Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator but is inconclusive about Scipio. He suggests that this could be either Scipio Africanus or Scipio Aemilianus. Africanus would make sense given that Fabius was his contemporary, but Aemilianus appears in the *Jugurtha* shortly after the prologue as Jugurtha's mentor at Numantia. The advice given by Aemilianus, even though it went unheeded, presents him as a worthy object of emulation. The difference is less important for my argument; both men were primarily remembered as great generals.

description of the aristocratic funeral.[45] Meanwhile in the *Catiline*, Sallust again stressed that earlier generations of Romans were concerned primarily with *virtus*.[46] Thus, although he cites different reasons, in his prologues Sallust seems to agree with the *pro Fonteio*: aristocrats in his time were not as martial as they used to be.

I prefaced this section with these prologues to signal that this portion of the work will look outside of the *pro Fonteio* for other indications that the Late Republic had fewer men of military experience at its disposal than it had once had. Cicero's message in the speech was clear, and now that we have seen that the data presented in the previous section seems to support his claim it is time to ask what other sources might be brought to bear on this topic. I will here discuss several other pieces of evidence which, when taken together with the findings of section 2, strongly suggest that we should take Cicero's claim in the *pro Fonteio* seriously. Before exploring new material, however, it will be instructive to briefly review some evidence I presented in the Introduction.

Traditionally command positions seem to have been almost universally coveted by aristocrats. This ubiquitous desire in turn had produced a practice in the distribution of command which favored amateurism. By denying repeated commands to successful commanders the state both provided more command opportunities to a wider group of senators and prevented any one commander from accruing too much prestige from his

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[45] Polyb. 6.53, esp. 53.10 **οὗ κάλλιον οὐκ εὐμαρὲς ἰδεῖν θέαμα νέῳ φιλοδόξῳ καὶ φιλαγάθῳ· τὸ γὰρ τὰς τῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ δεδοξασμένων ἀνδρῶν εἰκόνας ἰδεῖν ὁμοῦ πάσας οἷον εἰ ζώσας καὶ πεπνυμένας τίν᾽ οὐκ ἂν παραστήσαι; τί δ᾽ ἂν κάλλιον θέαμα τούτου φανείη;**

[46] Sall. *Cat.* 7-9.

campaigns.[47] This understanding of Roman practice reinforces the idea that commands at Rome were nearly universally desired and the subject of intense aristocratic competition. In the first century, however, we can clearly detect a surprising phenomenon: aristocrats rejecting commands. In the Introduction I mentioned the recent study by Wolfgang Blösel which shows convincingly that a significant number of magistrates were declining to take up commands following their year in office. Blösel's study found that between 80 and 50 BCE only 52% of praetors definitely took over a province following their term in office. Further, we know for certain that at least 15% rejected the opportunity, and it is likely that some portion of the remaining 33% also did so.[48] Moving up the *cursus honorum,* an earlier study by J.P.V.D. Balsdon found that between 79-53 BCE – a period which comprised 48 consuls who could take up a province following their year in office– we know that at least 14 declined to do so. Concerning a further 10 we are uncertain.[49]

As to *why* aristocrats were rejecting commands at unprecedented rates in the first century, our sources provide insight into several possible factors. Blösel's argument focuses on

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[47] Gruen 1991: 253-4; Rosenstein 1990: esp. 114ff; 1993; 1995: 45ff; 2006; 2007: esp. 138ff.

[48] Blösel 2016. On the praetorship see also Brennan 2000: 400-2.

[49] Balsdon 1939: 63. Two consuls died in 68 BCE: L. Caecilius Metellus (Dio Cass. 36.4.1) and a suffect consul – possibly a Servilius Vatia – about whom little is known (again, Dio Cass. 36.4.1). See also *MRR* 2.137. In 78 BCE Q. Catulus stayed in Italy to combat the insurrection of his colleague M. Lepidus (see Cic. *Cat.* 3.24; Sall. *Hist.* 1.54-73M; Livy *Per.* 90; Suet. *Iul.* 3; Plut. *Sull.* 34.4-5; *Pomp.* 15.1-16.2; App. *B. Civ.* 1.105-107; Dio Cass. 44.28.2; *MRR* 2.85-6), and in 72 BCE both consuls held unsuccessful commands against Spartacus in Italy (see Sall. *Hist.* 3.106M; Livy *Per.* 96; Plut. *Crass.* 9.7-10.1; *Cat. Min.* 8.1-2; App. *B. Civ.* 1.117; *MRR* 2.116). Cicero's colleague C. Antonius Hybrida stayed in Italy to combat Manlius and Catiline (see Cic. *Fam.* 5.2.1; Sall. *Cat.* 1.19, 1.26, 30.5, 42.3, 57.2; Plut. *Cic.* 16.1; Dio Cass. 37.32.2; *MRR* 2.165-6).

the financial motivations behind such a decision; military command does not seem to have been as profitable as we have previously imagined.[50] There were, however, other considerations that must have influenced such a decision. An obvious, but perhaps overlooked factor for the would-be *imperator* is the risk posed to one's life by military service. By the first century it was relatively rare for a commander to die on the battlefield, but that does not mean that such positions were entirely without risk. As we shall see below, in the previous generation magistrates had died in office much more frequently, and we should remember that in dismissing this concern for the Republic's last generation we benefit from hindsight. At the outset of his proconsulship in Cilicia Cicero was quite concerned for his safety when rumors of a Parthian invasion reached him.[51] And Crassus' death at Carrhae in 53 BCE would have certainly served as a *momento mori* to his senatorial colleagues.

Even if the threat to one's life was a relatively minor concern for those considering a provincial posting in the first century BCE, such positions were taxing. Cicero went out to Cilicia only when compelled by the *Lex Pompeia de provincia,* and earlier his brother also seems to have taken little pleasure in having his position extended in 60 BCE, nor does he seem to

[50] In addition, see Rosenstein 2016 in the same volume. Interestingly these figures match proportion of consuls with command experience offered above.

[51] Cic. *Fam.* 15.1 & 3. See also Caelius' letters to Cicero. The rumors of a Parthian incursion into Syria were taken very seriously at first (*Fam.* 8.10). Caelius said he took comfort in the idea that Cicero's military resources in Cilicia were so meagre that he would not commit to battle with them and reveals that the Senate was considering sending Pompey or Caesar to confront the incursion. In (*Fam.* 8.7) he expresses some concern about the breakout of a full-scale Parthian war *dum istic eris, de belli Parthici periculo cruciabor, ne hunc risum meum metus aliqui perturbet.*

have profited much financially.[52] In addition to being onerous, there is also a sense in the sources that foreign postings involved a level of political opportunity cost; we have a good amount of strong evidence that in this period time away from Rome was seen as politically risky, even if the destination was a provincial governorship. The *Commentariolum Petitionis* stresses the value of staying in the city:

iam adsiduitatis nullum est praeceptum, verbum ipsum docet quae res sit; prodest quidem vehementer nusquam discedere, sed tamen hic fructus est adsiduitatis, non solum esse Romae atque in foro sed adsidue petere, saepe eosdem appellare, non committere ut quisquam possit dicere, quod eius consequi possis, se abs te non [sit] rogatum et valde ac diligenter rogatum. (*Comm. Pet.* 43)

Presence requires no explanation; the word explains itself. Certainly it is quite useful to never leave town, but the value of presence is not only being in Rome and in the Forum but also constantly canvassing, and often calling on the same people, so that nobody – so far as you are able to follow up – will be able to say that they were not engaged by you, and engaged meaningfully and diligently.

This sentiment is echoed by Cicero elsewhere. We might, for instance, be reminded of his humorous account of his own return from his quaestorship in Sicily, when he found that his time abroad had garnered little interest from those in Rome. Admittedly he was not abroad in a military capacity, but the anecdote shows the dangers of leaving the city for the young man aiming to raise his profile among the People. This is clearly what Cicero took from the experience; he resolved thereafter to "live within in eye-sight."[53] In 50 BCE Cicero, frustrated with his position in Cilicia, pleaded with his young correspondent Caelius:

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[52] Cic. *Q Fr.* 1.1ff *Etsi non dubitabam quin hanc epistulam multi nuntii, fama denique esset ipsa sua celeritate superatura tuque ante ab aliis auditurus esses annum tertium accessisse desiderio nostro et labori tuo, tamen existimavi a me quoque tibi huius molestiae nuntium perferri oportere.*

[53] Cic. *Planc.* 65-66 esp. *Sed ea res, iudices, haud scio an plus mihi profuerit, quam si mihi tum essent omnes congratulati. Nam posteaquam sensi populo Romano aures hebetiores, oculos autem esse acres atque acutos, destiti quid de me audituri essent homines cogitare; feci, ut postea quotidie me praesentem viderent; habitavi in oculis; pressi forum; neminem a congressu meo, neque ianitor meus, neque somnus absterruit.*

Urbem, urbem, mi Rufe, cole et in ista luce vive! omnis peregrinatio, quod ego ab adulescentia iudicavi, obscura et sordida est iis quorum industria Romae potest illustris esse. quod cum probe scirem, utinam in sententia permansissem! (Cic. *Fam.* 2.12.2)

Rome! Stay in Rome, dear Rufus, and live in the bright light. All travel is wretched obscurity for those who are able to be famous through their efforts in Rome; I learned this in my youth. I wish I had followed my own advice since I knew this well.

In the *pro Murena* the importance of presence in Rome is directly compared with that of military service with, apparently, at least one party claiming that military service outside Rome greatly hindered one's effectiveness at the polls.[54]

Finally, as I will discuss in detail in Chapter 3, even if one made the decision to go out to the camp and managed to accomplish something noteworthy in the defense or expansion of Rome's *imperium,* the process of getting one's achievements recognized was difficult in the first century. The 60's and 50's BCE saw frequent and innovative instances of triumphal obstruction. Even commanders like Caesar who achieved historically remarkable feats at the head of the legions were not safe from having their subsequent *honores* threatened by the political machinations of their enemies. If the prospect of foreign service was already unappealing, the withering hope of achieving a triumph may have further disincentivized command positions. John Rich has argued that the low rate of triumphal processions in this period is partly a result of the intensity of obstruction returning commanders faced in trying to obtain honors and that we should assume that many commanders opted not to pursue a triumph at all in light of the prospect of such resistance.[55] This logic is easily extended to

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[54] Cic. *Mur.* 21. Note, however, that Brennan 2000: 400-2 finds no discernible electoral advantage in consular elections for those praetors who turned down provincial positions.

[55] Rich 2014: 237.

aristocrats considering whether or not to accept a command at all. If the chances of obtaining honors after command were low, perhaps some chose to forego command altogether. Finally, not only did provincial command expose an aristocrat to the dangers of the battlefield, but it also made him vulnerable to prosecution upon his return. We can see a surge in prosecutions – some seemingly dubious – against provincial governors in this period.[56]

We see, therefore, several different indications that the aristocracy of the first century had reasons to be less interested in pursuing provincial positions and military commands than we have traditionally imagined. But what impact does this have on Cicero's claim in the *pro Fonteio*? This phenomenon would naturally lead to an aristocracy with relatively less military experience than previous iterations, and we have already seen in section 2 that this was likely the case. And we can detect evidence of a decline in military *experience* among the elite outside of the *pro Fonteio* as well. One example has received little attention in the secondary literature but is nevertheless noticeable: there is a recurrent topos in our sources of the use of literature and handbooks by newly-appointed commanders. In Chapter 1 we already saw a relevant passage from the speech of Marius in Sallust's *Jugurtha*:

Atque ego scio, Quirites, qui postquam consules facti sunt et acta maiorum et Graecorum militaria praecepta legere coeperint: praeposteri homines, nam gerere quam fieri tempore posterius, re atque usu prius est. "Comparate nunc, Quirites,

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[56] Steel 2013: 220-1, 242-3. See also *Comment. Pet.* 8-9. *in petitione autem consulatus caupones omnis compilare per turpissimam legationem maluit quam adesse et populo Romano supplicare.* Gruen 1974 is still the best analysis of lawsuits in this period, one which saw an immense amount of legal activity. No thorough catalogue of the *de repetundis* trials of the Republic's last generation is possible or necessary here, but I can offer a few examples of the weaponizing of extortion prosecutions in service of politics. Catiline's candidacy for the consulship of 65 had been disqualified by a hasty prosecution *de repetundis,* and in 54 the prosecutors of M. Scaurus were clearly trying to stall his campaign. Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54) was proconsul in Cilicia from 53 to 51 BCE. When he returned he was prosecuted for extortion, see: Cic. *Fam.* 3.9.2, 8.6.1-3; *Att.* 6.2.10.

cum illorum superbia me hominem novom. Quae illi audire aut legere solent, eorum partem vidi, alia egomet gessi; quae illi litteris, ea ego militando didici. Nunc vos existumate facta an dicta pluris sint. (Sall. *Iug.* 85.12-14)

I know, citizens, of those who after they have been made consul begin to read about their ancestors achievements and the military handbooks of the Greeks; these are absurd men, for although action comes later than election, experience is earlier. Compare now, citizens, their arrogance with me, a new man. The things they are accustomed to hear about or to read about I have I have either seen personally or done myself. The things they have learned from literature I have learned from soldering. Now judge for yourself which is better: words or actions.

Marius' emphasis on experience supports several Sallustian rhetorical projects. His speech explicitly criticizes the *superbia* of the aristocracy, something the author highlighted as a focus of his monograph at the opening of the work, and his pride in his merit-based *novitas* also foils him against one of the monograph's other major characters, Sulla, who displays a formidable natural ability despite little military experience. Also, in having Marius pit words against deeds Sallust was picking up a theme from his Greek model Thucydides. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, however, Marius' speech in the *Jugurtha* is plagued by uncertainty for the historian. But if we put aside the questions of dramatic date this passage can be connected with other first century compositions that mention the aristocracy's reliance on literature to make up for inexperience in command. We have now seen this concern echoed by Cicero in the *pro Fonteio*. In comparing Fonteius with the military men of the past (C. Marius, T. Didius, Q. Catulus, and P. Crassus) Cicero said that these men were *non litteris homines ad rei militaris scientiam, sed rebus gestis ac victoriis eruditos.*[57]

Whether or not Marius actually said anything similar to the speech attributed to him by Sallust, his rhetoric reflects a well-attested aversion among the Romans to "book-learning" as opposed to hands-on experience. Even Cicero, one devoted to the *praecepta* of the Greeks, voiced

[57] Cic. *Font.* 43.

anxiety about the value of developing skills via theoretical study. Cicero consistently gave priority to actual experience.[58] His ambivalence on the subject is perhaps best expressed by Scipio in the *de Republica*:

sed neque his contentus sum, quae de ista consultatione scripta nobis summi ex Graecia sapientissimique homines reliquerunt, neque ea, quae mihi videntur, anteferre illis audeo. quam ob rem peto a vobis, ut me sic audiatis, neque ut omnino expertem Graecarum rerum neque ut eas nostris in hoc praesertim genere anteponentem, sed ut unum e togatis patris diligentia non inliberaliter institutum studio-que discendi a pueritia incensum, usu tamen et domesticis praeceptis multo magis eruditum quam litteris. (Cic. *Rep.* 1.36)

I am not, however, content with the writings on this matter left to us by Greece's best and wisest. Yet, I do not dare to prefer my thoughts on the matter to theirs. Therefore, I ask that as you listen to me as though I am somewhat familiar with the Greek material but as one who does not necessarily prefer it – especially in this instance. Think of me as a Roman – educated broadly by the attention of my father and enthusiastic about learning from my childhood, but nevertheless trained by the lessons learned at home more than by literature.

Scipio walked a fine line; his interlocuter Philus was blunter when he said that he hoped Scipio's insights "will be more useful than anything in the treatises of the Greeks.[59] This emphasis on experience over study is related to a larger ideological difference between Greeks and Romans. Matthew Roller's recent (2018) study on the importance of exemplarity (*Models from the Past in Roman Culture*) discusses convincingly the unique emphasis placed on events in Roman thinking. Indeed, unlike their Greek counterparts, Roller points out that Romans – even in literature – rarely examined abstract virtues on their own but rather preferred to ground discussions of virtues in exemplary events and figures, thus moving from concrete example to treatment of the abstract.[60]

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[58] E.g. In the study of rhetoric, see *Or.* 1.85ff; 2.121ff.

[59] Cic. *Rep.* 1.37 *spero enim multo uberiora fore, quae a te dicentur, quam illa, quae a Graecis hominibus scripta sunt, omnia.* Although, Cicero tells us in a letter to Quintus (1.1) that Scipio apparently kept a copy of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* because of its instructive value.

[60] Roller 2018: 13ff. He makes sure to distinguish his point from the tired and false dichotomy of "abstract Greeks" and "concrete Romans." See also Haltenhoff 2005: 86-91 and 2000: 22-7; Van der Blom 2010: 68. 77; Hölscher 2001: 199-201.

In a more famous passage on rhetorical training, Cicero turned to the study of military experience to argue for the superiority of experience over literary study. In the *de Oratore* (2.75) Cicero tells the story of when the Peripatetic philosopher Phormio visited the court of Antiochus III in Ephesus. Cicero says that Phormio, whom he called *copiosus* ("prolific"), lectured for hours on generalship and that the audience was delighted except for a notable guest. Rome's arch-nemesis Hannibal was at that time in the court of Antiochus and when asked his opinion of Phormio's lecture he said that he had never seen someone so crazy as Phormio. Cicero approved of the Carthaginian's estimation:

Neque mehercule iniuria; quid enim aut arrogantius, aut loquacius fieri potuit, quam Hannibali, qui tot annis de imperio cum populo Romano, omnium gentium victore, certasset, Graecum hominem, qui nunquam hostem, nunquam castra vidisset, nunquam denique minimam partem ullius publici muneris attigisset, praecepta de re militari dare? (Cic. *Or.* 2.76)

By god he was not wrong. Indeed, what is more arrogant or more empty talk than a Greek who had never seen an enemy or camp – or participated in the most meager public public service – to give lessons in military affairs to Hannibal, who fought for so many years against the power of the Roman People, the conquerors of all peoples?

Marius' criticism of his contemporary aristocrats for turning to reading in place of practice was, therefore, a recognizably traditional position within Roman ideology.

Despite the ridicule he had for Phormio, Cicero did not feel so strongly about this principle when faced with the prospect of leading an army himself. In a letter to Papirius Paetus in 50 BCE, Cicero thanks his addressee for having sent him some instructive reading material:

Summum me ducem litterae tuae reddiderunt. plane nesciebam te tam peritum esse rei militaris; Pyrrhi te libros et Cineae video lectitasse. itaque obtemperare cogito praeceptis tuis; hoc amplius, navicularum habere aliquid in ora maritima. contra equitem Parthum negant ullam armaturam meliorem inveniri posse. sed quid ludimus? nescis quo cum imperatore tibi negotium sit. ***Παιδείαν Κύρου,*** *quam contrieram legendo, totam in hoc imperio explicavi.* (Cic. *Fam.* 114.1)

Your letters have made me into a general. I was entirely unaware that you are so experienced in military affairs; I see you have read the books of Pyrrhus and Cineas. Therefore, I am minded to follow you instructions and to have a small naval presence on the coast. They say that one cannot find a better defense against Parthian

cavalry. But why am I joking? You are unaware of the type of *generalissimo* you are talking to. In my administration I have set out the entire *Cyropaedia,* which I have shredded by reading.

Paetus' instructions have turned Cicero, so he claims, into a *generalissimo*. Now, certainly we should assume some sarcasm here, but the exchange is nevertheless telling. Cicero reveals familiarity with two military handbooks, a treatise on tactics by Pyrrhus of Epirus and Cineas' epitome of Aelian on the same subject – both now lost.[61] Cicero added to these Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, a purely literary work.

This is not the first time Cicero has mentioned the instructive value of Xenophon's work, he recommended it to his brother when Quintus' governorship in Asia was renewed in 59 BCE without a hint of sarcasm:

qua re permagni hominis est et cum ipsa natura moderati tum vero etiam doctrina atque optimarum artium studiis eruditi sic se adhibere in tanta potestate ut nulla alia potestas ab iis quibus is praesit desideretur, <ut est> Cyrus ille a Xenophonte non ad historiae fidem scriptus sed ad effigiem iusti imperi, cuius summa gravitas ab illo philosopho cum singulari comitate coniungitur. quos quidem libros non sine causa noster ille Africanus de manibus ponere non solebat. (Cic. *Qfr.* 1.1.23).

The truly great man, one checked by capture and schooled by the lessons and enthusiasm for the best pursuits can control himself while holding such power that those whom he rules over desire no other rule. Cyrus was like this – a model for just rule – but in Xenophon, not according to the histories. He was composed with the height of seriousness and exceptional kindness by that philosopher. Thus our Africanus, not without reason, used to keep his books at hand.

Scipio's literary interests were exceptional for his time period, but we should not use this passage to suggest that the practice of using literature to prepare for such activity extends back to the second century BCE.[62] Yet, in this letter and in the later letter to Paetus we have two instances of aristocrats recommending literature to those about to set out upon provincial service. Of course, Cicero's recommendation of the *Cyropaedia* in his letter to Quintus is not specifically related to

[61] See Shackleton Bailey 1977: 453.

[62] Cicero mentions Scipio's affinity for the work again at *Tusc.* 2.62

military study, especially since service in Asia at the time was unlikely to involve significant campaigning. But Paetus' recommendations to him in 50 certainly were, and Cicero seems to have counted the *Cyropaedia* useful in military training as well.[63] Thus, despite reaffirming the traditional Roman prioritization of experience over theoretical learning we can see anxiety among Cicero and Sallust over the role of literature in training, and in Cicero's case we can see on two occasions actual participation in it. Even if we are dismissive on the historical accuracy of the speech of Marius as an artifact from his first consulship, we should neverthless recognize that Sallust, writing as he was from the first century, may have been influenced by contemporary practice.

There is one other piece of evidence which is especially relevant to this issue. Catherine Steel once wrote in passing that "The last (a shortage of commanders) seems to be a genuine feature of the post-Sullan period."[64] She wrote this while discussing the *lex Pompeia de provinciis* of 52 BCE, and the connection between the law and the questions at hand are intriguing. Our only explicit source for the nature of this law is Cassius Dio, not an ideal witness for the regulation given his chronological distance from the event. He first tells us that the consuls of the previous year passed a senatorial decree (**δόγμα**) which stipulated that henceforth all office holders were obliged to wait five years before holding *imperium*. He later records that Pompey as consul in 52 BCE went the further step of making this regulation law. Dio does not give insight into why Pompey proposed this measure, but instead he focuses on the hypocrisy of

[63] On the military preoccupation of the *Cyropaedia* see Shackleton Bailey (1977: 453) who says that the work is largely concerned with "Ruler as General."

[64] Steel 2013: 220.

Pompey for enacting a law which he immediately broke by taking a command in Spain after his consulship.[65] For the problem which Dio believed this measure was addressing we have to go back to the senatorial decree of 53 BCE:

δόγμα τε ἐποιήσαντο μηδένα μήτε στρατηγήσαντα μήθ' ὑπατεύσαντα τὰς ἔξω ἡγεμονίας, πρὶν ἂν πέντε ἔτη διέλθῃ, λαμβάνειν, εἴ πως ὑπὸ τοῦ μὴ παραυτίκα ἐν δυνάμει τινὶ αὐτοὺς γίγνεσθαι παύσαιντο σπουδαρχοῦντες. οὔτε γὰρ ἐμετρίαζον οὔθ' ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἐποίουν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀλληλους παρώρμηντο πολλὰ μὲν δαπανώμενοι πολλῷ δ' ἔτι πλείω μαχόμενοι, ὥστε καὶ τὸν ὕπατόν ποτε τὸν Καλουῖνον τρωθῆναι. οὔκουν οὔθ' ὕπατος οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτε πολίαρχός τίς σφας διεδέξατο, ἀλλὰ ἄναρκτοι κατὰ τοῦτο παντελῶς οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ πρῶτα τοῦ ἔτους ἐγένοντο. (Dio Cass. 40.46.2-3)

They passed a decree lest anyone having previously been praetor or consul obtain a command until five years had passed. They hoped that by prohibiting these men from holding any power immediately after their term in office they might temper the desire for office. For they had abandoned shame and decency and competed with each other in bribing with great amounts and further by fighting. Once even Calvinus, the consul, was wounded. The consuls, praetors, and prefects had no successors, and the Romans were entirely without magistrates at the beginning of the year.

Naturally Dio cites the political chaos of the mid-to-late 50's as the reason for the senatorial decree. The period from 55 to 52 BCE was characterized by a crescendo of political chaos as factions in the Senate pushed back against the recently reaffirmed union of the "big three;" each year required an *interregnum*. This would seem the most pressing issue of the time and therefore the most tempting candidate for the impetus of the law, but we should consider possible connections with the shortage of commanders.

Steel has twice suggested that the *lex Pompeia de provinciis* may have been in response to the dearth of magistrates willing to leave Rome for the provinces.[66] The traditional scholarly view has followed Dio and assumed that the measure was meant to calm the chaotic political

[65] Dio Cass. 40.56.1-2

[66] Steel 2012 & 2013: 220-1 (in passing). For other interpretations to which Steel was responding see Marshall 1972; Gruen 1974: 457-60; Giovannini 1983; Ferrary 2001: 101-54; Hurlet 2006: 467-85.

climate by somewhat disincentivizing obtaining office, but Steel's argument may be at least equally plausible. Of course, Dio's mention gives significant credence to the traditional interpretation of the law, but it is certainly possible that the historian interpolated the most pressing motive in the narrative onto a law which was focused on addressing a separate problem. More substantively, if we think back to the pattern of rejection of command outlined at the beginning of this section then Steel's theory is in some ways more tempting than the traditional view, despite lacking explicit textual evidence. Further, with magistrates rejecting commands with noticeably high frequency, it is hard to imagine that removing the prospect of command immediately after office greatly disincentivized the aristocracy. Certainly some aspiring praetors and consuls would have been looking forward to a command after their year in office, but it seems clear that many did not relish the prospect. Likewise, returning to the recent works by Blösel and Rosenstein mentioned above, provincial positions were likely not as profitable as we have previously imagined, in which case it might have been unlikely that magistrates coveted such positions to offset the bribery they undertook in order to secure election.[67] On the other hand, if a growing number of magistrates were *unwilling* to go out to provincial commands this could have put a strain on the Republic's ability to fill positions necessary for administering the provinces, and in this case a law like the *lex Pompeia* may well have been aimed at expanding the pool of commanders.

When coupled with the data presented in the previous section this evidence is compelling. Cicero appealed to a perception that there were relatively few experienced

[67] Again Blösel 2016 but see also Rosenstein 2016 in the same volume. Additionally Churchill 1999.

commanders in 70 BCE, and the evidence has suggested that his claim was rooted in reality. In addition to the findings on pre-consular command experience we have now also seen evidence from outside the speech that aristocrats were increasingly disinterested in taking up provincial commands and, when they did take such positions, many were ill-prepared to lead and inexperienced in the requirements of camp life. With this next section I will explore the natural question: why?

IV. *fortissimis autem hominibus ac summis ducibus…consumptis*: Exploring the Causes of the Shortage.

In transitioning away from evidence *of* the shortage of commanders towards explanations of it, we need not look far for a starting point; Cicero himself offers some causes in passing (§42):

Quid nunc vobis faciendum est studiis militaribus apud iuventutem obsoletis, fortissimis autem hominibus ac summis ducibus partim aetate, partim civitatis discordiis ac rei publicae calamitate consumptis, cum tot bella aut a nobis necessario suscipiantur aut subito atque inprovisa nascantur? Nonne et hominem ipsum ad dubia rei publicae tempora reservandum et ceteros studio laudis ac virtutis inflammandos putatis?

Now what should you do, when military service has been forgotten among the youth, when our bravest men and best generals have been spent either by age, civil war, or disaster, when so many wars are taken up by us either because of necessity or which arise suddenly and unexpectedly? Do you not think that this man should be preserved for this doubtful period for the Republic in addition to exciting the enthusiasm for praise and *virtus* among the rest?

In addition to the aversion to military service among aristocratic youth (dealt with in Chapter 1) Cicero cites attrition as the cause of this phenomenon; many of Rome's best and bravest commanders have been "spent." The orator's suggestions for what happened to the state's supply of commanders are fairly straightforward, but – as always – we have to ask ourselves whether or not Cicero was right. Unlike our previous testing of Cicero's claims, we can approach this statement more or less directly.

Cicero's first cause, age, was not unique to the Late Republic, but this does not mean that it was not a formidable challenge. Keith Hopkins estimates that if the average life expectancy for an aristocrat in the Late Republic was 25 years, one third of a given age group would die before reaching the age of 40, and just under 60% would die before reaching the age of 60. He put it bluntly: "what is important in this respect it that death rates were high and, and average expectations of life were low."[68] This high mortality rate made it difficult for the Senate to replace itself and was therefore frequently augmented by the admittance of outsiders into the senatorial ranks. Ostensibly this means that Cicero was correct: age was a legitimate force to contend with in keeping the Republic stocked with capable leaders, but not one unique to his generation.

In connection, however, with the natural attrition experienced by the Senate and the supply of capable military men we should also consider the findings of this chapter and of Chapter 1. If aristocratic interest in military service was in decline in the Late Republic then each successive generation would struggle even more to replenish the military men lost. This is to say, there would be fewer young men interested in pursuing a military career to replace the older generation. This would result in exactly the problem Cicero described in the *pro Fonteio,* and this problem would be a relatively new challenge for the Roman aristocracy. It is possible that we see evidence of this dynamic in the distribution of legates between patricians and plebeians. Figure 2.3 (above), Salomonsson's analysis of legates in the Republic, shows that unlike earlier periods in the Republic legates in in the Late Republic were overwhelming plebeian. This does not necessarily mean that legates were not aristocrats; many long-

[68] Hopkins & Burton 1983: 2.70-74 with special attention to Table 2.8.

established aristocratic families were plebeian. But it may indicate, to some degree, that the there were less members of the elite's inner circle to to fill the military positions required by the needs of the empire. It follows then that openings in the aristocracy could be filled by ambitious and capable *novi homines*, just the type of men we would expect to be interested in military positions. Yet, even this process (replenishing the ranks of the aristocracy with new men) may have been challenging in the Republic's last generation from a military stand point. If we look back to the prologue of Sallust's *Jugurtha* I mentioned above, he suggests that even new men – the ones who would be augmenting the ranks of the aristocracy when the body failed to replenish itself – were no longer as interested in *virtus* as they had once been. Just judging the most famous *novi homines* from these two generations (not, admittedly, a perfect metric), Marius and Cicero, we can nevertheless see such a shift in career activity. Therefore, the problem Cicero calls "age" might have actually been a combination of the natural attrition the pool of commanders experienced in a community in which mortality rates were high *combined* with the shift in aristocratic values away from the traditional militarism which had helped alleviate this problem.

The next factor mentioned by Cicero is civil war. I am assuming that Cicero was thinking both of the Social War (91-88 BCE) and the Civil War between Sulla and Marius (88-80 BCE), which adds up to over a decade of civil conflict. Mortality in war was a persistent point of concern in republican history. Rosenstein has postulated (cautiously) that between 200-168 BCE the overall casualty rate in foreign wars may have been as high as 34-40%.[69]

[69] Rosenstein 2004: 107-37.

William Harris has suggested that the casualty rate among military tribunes – young senatorial aristocrats – may have been as high as 20-25%, although Rosenstein finds this estimate too high.[70] Regardless of the disagreement on the precise rate of casualty among the elite in the legions, there would have been at least *some* attrition from war. This would, however, have been a heavier burden in the conflicts mentioned by Cicero, civil war. In civil conflicts the outlook for the community as a whole was twice as bad since the losses on both sides hurt the overall strength of the same community.

It was also problematic in the generation prior to the Republic's last that the attrition from these civil conflicts stretched beyond the battlefield. In addition to the battles of the Social War and the Civil War, this generation also experienced the proscriptions which accompanied civil conflict, the rebellion of Sertorius in Spain, and the uprising of Spartacus in Italy. Just how much attrition did the Roman aristocracy face in this period? In order to get some sense of this figure I collected data on how many magistrates died during their term in office in this period. If you examine Appendix II the numbers are actually quite staggering. Between 91 BCE (the start of the Social War) and 71 BCE (the conclusion of Spartacus' uprising) – a period of just 20 years – 54 magistrates died while in office due to battle or civil strife. If we include those who died of illness, the number rises to 59. Seven sitting consuls died in this period and in 87 and 86 two consuls died each year. In just the year 87 BCE nine sitting magistrates died: both consuls, a tribune of the plebs, a military tribune, two legates, a prefect, a priest, and a proconsul who was stuck by lightning. In 82 BCE another nine magistrates died in office.

[70] Harris 1979: 40; Rosenstein 2004: 86. See also Eckstein 2006: 219.

Of course, the natural question is whether or not such attrition was normal. After all, for a commander to die in office (from combat or from other causes), especially before the Late Republic, was not a rare occurence.[71] We could not blame the calamitous events of the 80's and 70's for a dearth of military men at the time of the *pro Fonteio* if this rate of attrition was normal. So, as with section 2 of this chapter, I sought out a time period with which to compare the Republic's second-to-last generation. I chose the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE) for two reasons. Again, source material was a major factor in this decision; we have more evidence about this particularly dramatic period in Roman history than most others. Second, I wanted to choose a period in which we would expect a higher than usual rate of magisterial mortality. The massive defeats at the hand of Hannibal and intense combat in Spain should account for a higher than average amount of magisterial attrition. Yet, in the 17 years between 218 and 201 BCE only 21 magistrates are recorded to have died in office.[72] As we might expect, the peak came in 216 BCE when five magistrates died at the disastrous battle of Cannae: the consul L. Aemilius Paullus, one praetor, one quaestor, and two promagistrates.[73] This number

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[71] Eckstein 2006: 219 citing Harris 1979: 40 and Rosenstein 2004: 86.

[72] By year: 217 BCE: Cos. C. Flaminius and Promag. C. Centenius. 216 BCE: Cos. L. Aemilius Paullus, Pr. L. Postumius Albinus, Q. L. Furius Bibaculus, Promag. M. Atilius Regulus, Promag. Cn. Servilius Geminus, 212 BCE: Promag. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. 211 BCE: PC Ap. Claudius Pulcher, PC P. Cornelius Scipio, PC Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus. 210 BCE: PC Cn. Fulvius. 208 BCE: Cos. M. Claudius Marcellus, Cos. T. Quinctius Crispinus, MT A. Manlius, Pref. L. Arrenius, Pref. M'. Aulius. 205 BCE: MT P. Matienus, MT M. Sergius. 203 BCE: MT M. Maevius. 201 BCE: Pref. C. Ampius.

[73] Consul L. Aemilius Paullus (see *MRR* 1.247); praetor L. Postumius Albinus (Livy 23.24.6-13; Front. *Str.* 1.6.4; *MRR* 1.249); quaestor L. Furius Bibaculus (Livy 22.49.16); M. Atilius Regulus, whose *imperium* had been prorogued from the previous year (Polyb. 3.106.2, 114.6, 116.11; Livy 22.34.1); Cn. Servilius Geminus, whose *imperium* had also also prorogued

was equaled again in 208 BCE when both consuls died in Venusia in addition to a military tribune and two prefects.[74] Clearly the amount of magisterial attrition in the period between 91-71 far exceeded that of the Second Punic War. Further, between 91-71 BCE sitting magistrates died at a rate of almost three per year (2.7 – 2.95 per year if we include magistrates who died of illness), a number over twice as high as in the years of the Second Punic War (1.24). Note as well that all four consular legates cited by Cicero in §43 of the *pro Fonteio* were wither killed or committed suicide during the Social and Civi wars. Perhaps in mentioning them the orator was drawing attention to the costly events of the previous generation.

Cicero also cites *calamitas* as a reason source of attrition, and it is difficult to understand whether or not he was referencing something I have not already discussed. I have not yet, for example, mentioned the uprising of Spartacus, which claimed the life of at least one, possibly two, praetors in 73 BCE.[75] Keep in mind too that I have only collected data on those aristocrats who died while holding a magistracy. This does not give us the full picture of aristocratic attrition during the period. I have not taken into account young aristocrats who

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(Polyb. 3.106-107, 109.1, 114.6, 116.11; Livy 22.40.6, 43.8, 45.8, 49.16; Nep. *Hann.* 4.4; Cic. *Tusc.* 1.89; Sil. It. 8.665, 9.271-3, 10.222-5; Enn. *Ann.* 234V).

[74] Consuls M. Claudius Marcellus and T. Quinctius Crispinus (Polyb. 10.32; Cic. *Tusc.* 1.89; *Flam.* 1; Livy 27.26-7; Val. Max. 1.6.9; Plut. *Marc.* 29; App. *Hann.* 50; Sil. It. 15.334-380; Eutrop. 3.16; Oros. 4.18.6-8; Zon. 9.9); Military tribune A. Manlius (Livy 27.26.12, 27.7); Prefect L. Arrenius (Livy 27.29.1-4); Prefect M'. Aulius (Livy 27.26.12, 27.8).

[75] Sall. *Hist.* 3.90-93M; Livy *Per.* 95; Plut. *Crass.* 8-11; Appian *B. Civ.* 1.114-8; Front. 1.5.21; Flor. 28.4; Oros. 5.24. It is possible that C. Claudius Glaber died during his praetorship in 63 BCE. No source mentions his death, but he is never mentioned again in our sources. His nomenclature is uncertain given differences in our sources. Plutarch and Frontius call him "Clodius." Florus calls him "Clodius Glaber." Livy refers to him as "Claudius Pulcher," and Appian calls him "Claudius Glaber," although he confuses his rank.

died in battle while in the cavalry or rank and file; surely there were many. It is also worth noting the obvious fact that these casualties would impact those aristocrats most dedicated to military service disproportionately. Given these factors, in this instance one could actually argue that Cicero was *understating* the seriousness of the challenge that faced the Roman aristocracy in Republic's last generation. But limited as this evidence is, it is it still presents a massive amount of attrition among the elite – *especially* those involved in leading the army. When we put together the natural challenge of replacing senators with the long list of magisterial casualties stemming from civil conflict *and* the growing aristocratic disinterest in military activity we see, I believe, a materializing crisis of what we might call "elite manpower."

V. Conclusion.

It is helpful to begin the conclusion of this chapter with a brief summary. Cicero's rhetoric in the *pro Fonteio* provided us with a way into an intriguing question: Was there a shortage of capable military commanders in the Republic's last generation? A test of a manageable sample, the consuls of 81-49 BCE, showed that there might have been some truth to Cicero's claim. Consuls seem to have had noticeably less command experience upon entering office in the period between 81-49 BCE than their counterparts from 200-170 BCE did. We also saw that consuls from the post-Sullan period who lacked command experience prior to office were less likely to obtain some after their year as consul than those from the earlier period examined here. In addition to this statistical support, there are other sources of evidence for the idea that Romans of the first century lacked military experience and ambition relative to their ancestors, not the least of which is that they seem to have sometimes turned to literature in order to familiarize themselves with the qualities and responsibilities of a

commander. Finally, we examined the reasons Cicero himself provided for the contemporary dearth of commanders and found that he and his contemporaries actually were likely hard-pressed to replace the military commanders of the previous generation. Looking at all of this evidence together we should accept that the Republic of the first century BCE actually was facing a shortage of commanders and that the anxiety Cicero utilized in the *pro Fonteio* may have been a recognized contemporary concern. These findings have significant implications for our understanding of the Late Republic. One example of how these findings can affect our understanding of events in the Late Republic is my discussion of the *lex Pompeia de provinciis* above. We must keep this concern in mind when trying to unravel the motivations and concerns of the first century BCE.

Here in the conclusion, however, I wish to highlight the larger, less episodic implications of the evidence. The first is a question of narrative. Polybius tells us that his goal in writing the *Histories* was to answer a question: how did the Romans come to conquer so much territory in such a brief period of time?[76] Polybius' answer (broadly speaking) was that Rome had access to a vast pool of manpower. Even after sustaining devastating losses the Republic was able to field more armies and prolong conflicts until their enemy suffered a defeat which they were conversely ill-equipped to absorb.[77] Now, this narrative has traditionally

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[76] Polyb. 1.1-6 *τίς γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥᾴθυμος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιτο γνῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν οὐχ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὑρίσκεται γεγονός, τίς δὲ πάλιν οὕτως ἐκπαθὴς πρός τι τῶν ἄλλων θεαμάτων ἢ μαθημάτων ὃς προυργιαίτερον ἄν τι ποιήσαιτο τῆσδε τῆς ἐμπειρίας;*

[77] This narrative appears in secondary scholarship frequently but see e.g. Brunt [1971]2001: 418-25; De Ligt 2007.

focused upon the Republic's ability to mobilize armies, but the importance of the aristocracy's ability to consistently provide capable leadership for these armies is also often commented upon.[78] The emphasis placed on aristocratic resiliency can be detected in some of Rome's semi-mythological stories. Scaevola, so the story goes, terrified the invader Lars Porsenna by swearing that the supply of would-be Roman assassins was large. In Plutarch's *Life of Pyrrhus* the subject's advisor Cineas returned from his meeting with Senate anxious that they were up against an assembly of kings and the Lernaean Hydra.[79] Such stories should, of course, be treated as fictions, but they nevertheless show how on an ideological Romans valued the resiliency of their political class. Shifting to an example on firmer historical footing, Polybius' famous description of the aristocratic funeral culminates in an appreciation of its use, namely that it inspired the young men present to accomplish great deeds similar to those on display.[80] An important key to Rome's success, therefore, was its ability to replenish its manpower both among the rank and file *and* at the level of aristocratic command. The evidence from this chapter indicates that Sallust's repeated assertions that the aristocrats of his day no longer felt such compulsion may have been accurate.

It is interesting, then, that in a generation of chaos and in the midst of an ultimately terminal crisis for the republican system of government we can detect an anxiety (which, as we

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[78] See e.g. Harris 1979 *passim*; Rosenstein 2004; Rosenstein 2007.

[79] For Scaevola see Livy 2.12. For Cineas see Plut. *Pyr.* 19.5.

[80] Polyb. 6.52-3. (52.7-8 are especially relevant) **διὸ κἄν ποτε πταίσωσι κατὰ τὰς ἀρχάς, Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν ἀναμάχονται τοῖς ὅλοις, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τοὐναντίον. <ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ> ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἀγωνιζόμενοι καὶ τέκνων οὐδέποτε δύνανται λῆξαι τῆς ὀργῆς, ἀλλὰ μένουσι ψυχομαχοῦντες, ἕως ἂν περιγένωνται τῶν ἐχθρῶν.**

have seen, was ostensibly rooted in reality) over the aristocracy's ability to replenish its roster of military commanders. If the evidence presented above reflects Republican realities, we should consider the possibility that this was a result of both pragmatics and shifting values. The battles, proscriptions, suicides, and – in one occasion – lightning bolts of the generation prior to Cicero, Pompey, and Caesar left the last generation of the Roman Republic with the daunting task of replacing those lost to the high rates of attrition of the previous 30 years. If these events had occurred 100 years prior, perhaps the elite may have been in a better position to replace those they lost. But with fewer aristocrats interested in military pursuits and command positions the task was, logic would dictate, likely much more difficult. This is all to say, it is hard not to notice that the Republic's much-admired ability to replenish its ranks seems to have broken down at the elite level at the same time that the political community entered its final crisis. This is a speculative observation, but one which could yield interesting fruit in future study.

Finally, this evidence also suggests that by the time Cicero rose to speak on behalf of Fonteius in 70 (or 69) BCE, the Roman idea that nearly *any* member of the senatorial class should be able to lead the legions effectively was long gone. In the *pro Fonteio* Cicero's appeal operates on the assumption that militarily-capable aristocrats were a shrinking subset of the senatorial class. He argues from a similar position in the *pro Murena* later in the 60's BCE. Again, we should look back to the findings presented above on consular command experience. In the period from 200-170 BCE even those who (so far as we can tell) had no command experience prior to their consulship went out to the Republic's major theaters of war during or after their term in office – or both. In the period from 81-49 BCE we see more consuls who

continued avoiding the camp even during and after their term. To refer back to a study I mentioned in Introduction, the aristocracy seems to have been specializing along the lines presented by Keith Hopkins,[81] but this specializing came at the expense of the traditional military ethos of the aristocracy. In just a little over 100 years, the Republic had gone from having a wealth of potential military commanders to a noticeable shortage.

[81] Again, see Hopkins 1978: 74-98.

4. Procession Recession: Triumphs, Letters, and Ideology in the Late Roman Republic.

I. Introduction[1]

The Roman triumph has been fecund source material for a number of excellent and celebrated works of art. Carle Vernet took two years to paint his massive *Triomphe de Paul Emile* (1789) which depicts Aemilius Paullus' famous triumph following the Battle of Pydna in 168 BCE. 60 years earlier (1729) the Italian painter Giovanni Tiepolo debuted his depiction of the triumph of Marius over Jugurtha in 104 BCE – which now graces the cover of Mary Beard's influential monograph, *The Roman Triumph* (2007). Less famous, but also noteworthy, is Tiepolo's 1730 painting of the triumph of Manius Curius Dentatus over Pyrrhus (275 BCE).[2] Rubens's *A Roman Triumph* (c. 1630) is another famous work on the subject. Although the artist did not link the image with a specific celebration from Roman history, Rubens' work itself was based on the famous series of paintings (c. 1485-1506) depicting the triumphs of Julius Caesar over Gaul and Pontus at the end of the Civil War painted by Andrea Mantegna. Rubens either saw these paintings himself or based his own work on woodcuts of the series made by Andrea Andreani. Clearly the triumph has inspired artists, but for the historian this catalogue poses a question: Where is the period between Marius and the end of the Republic?[3]

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[1] A condensed version of this work was presented at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Society for Classical Studies in Toronto under the title "Cato's Triumph: Cato's Attempt to Redefine the Roman Triumph." I am grateful to the panel's chair, Michele Salzman as well as to the audience and my fellow panelists for their thoughtful feedback.

[2] Before either of these Tiepolo had also painted a satirical *Triumph of Pulcinella* (1754).

[3] There is a charcoal/watercolor drawing (1765) of Pompey's triumph in 61 BCE by Gabriel de Saint-Aubin but given the amount of attention this particular triumph receives in our ancient sources it is surprising that it has inspired relatively little artwork.

As it turns out, this gap between Marius and the end of the Republic in this artistic catalogue is perhaps more than a result of chance artistic inspiration; the last generation of the Roman Republic was also a difficult period in which to obtain a triumphal celebration. A recent study by John Rich found that the frequency of the procession dropped dramatically during this time. Where the period between 81 - 69 BCE had averaged one triumphal celebration per year, the period between 68 - 50 BCE averaged about one every three years - a frequency comparable to the disastrous years of the Second Punic War. Rich and others have previously attributed this decline to pragmatic concerns: major commands were becoming increasingly monopolized by a small group of commanders, or perhaps the intense obstruction one could expect to face when lodging a triumphal claim discouraged seeking the honor at all.[4] Neither of these explanations, we shall see, is entirely satisfactory. Triumphal frequency had been much higher in the past, even though the process for obtaining the celebration was often rigorous and important commands were repeatedly granted to exceptional military leaders. In this chapter I will argue that the underlying impetus for the decline in triumphs in this period was not a specific pragmatic issue, but rather was the byproduct of ideological conflict.

That ideological reasons for triumphal decline in this period have been largely overlooked is partly a result of the relative scarcity of source material we have on the topic. Yet, we are not completely without evidence: Cicero's letters from this period offer us a useful window into this topic. In particular, Cicero's epistolary exchange with M. Porcius Cato has featured prominently in

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[4] Rich 2014: 237. See also Lange 2016: 71ff who agrees with Rich that the monopolization of commands played a role, but also accounts for the increasing profile of *legati* in this period. For obstruction see also Brennan 2000: 532-35, 865-6.

discussion of triumphal politics. This comes as no surprise given the nature of the letter (a request for support in pursuit of a *supplicatio* and eventual triumph) and the historical record of the addressee; no other figure from the Late Republic looms as large over triumphal policy. Cato's reluctance to support triumphal claims has in the past been explained in light of factional politics. This makes some sense given that the more famous instances of Cato's obstruction are associated with his hostility towards first Pompey and then later his nemesis Caesar. Yet Cato, as we shall see, did not reserve obstruction only for his staunch political enemies. As I will argue below, we cannot dismiss the intensity of triumphal debate amongst the Republic's last generation as merely pragmatic.

The second part of my chapter will look closely at the entire epistolary exchange between the two men (*Fam.* 15.4-6) in order to see what kind of evidence it gives us for the arguments upon which Cato based his position. Previous scholarly discussion has overlooked this aspect of the exchange, and (as we shall see) the letters do in fact give us a clear picture of Catonian values regarding about Rome's highest military honor.

II. Triumphal Decline in the Republic's Last Generation

Fluctuation in triumphal frequency was not unique to the Late Republic; throughout Roman history the amount of triumphs held responded to both internal and external concerns. During the Second Punic War, for example, the frequency of triumph dropped significantly. From 218 BCE until 201 BCE on average there was only one triumph every three years; this was the lowest rate of triumphs since the late 4th century. Most obviously, the dearth of triumphs during the Second Punic War reflected poor performance in the field against Hannibal and the subsequent avoidance of major conflict. Rich also demonstrates that the Senate became more

sparing of the honor during this period, likely as a result of strategic and financial concerns.[5] After the Second Punic War such a low frequency would not be matched until the period in question here (68-50 BCE, which had six triumphs for an average of .32 per year). Before considering *why* this period yielded a noticeable dearth of triumphs, it will be useful to assemble the evidence for triumphal debates in this period. After providing a more detailed account of this statistical trend, I will then consider the strength of current scholarly theories on the impetus for this decline.

Given that civil war prevented all triumphal celebrations between 87 and 82 BCE, it is surprising that the 80's BCE actually saw a spike in triumphal frequency. Before the civil war between Sulla and Marius, P. Servilius Vatia (cos. 79 BCE, not yet styled "Isauricus") celebrated an increasingly rare propraetorian triumph in 88 following his governorship. The first two Mithridatic Wars (88-84, 83-81 BCE) yielded two triumphs, although both were in celebration of controversial commands. Sulla, now firmly in control of Rome, took the opportunity in 81 BCE to celebrate his victory over Mithridates' forces from four years earlier in 85 BCE even though the rise of Cinna in Rome had forced Sulla to conclude the hasty and generous Peace of Dardanus. After Sulla's departure for Rome, his former legate L. Licinius Murena took over command of the two legions left in the east after the suicide of C. Flavius Fimbria. It is unclear in what role and with what authority Murena was left in Asia, but he took the opportunity to renew the conflict with Mithridates. This culminated in Murena's defeat at the hands of Mithridates in Cappadocia and his subsequent recall to Rome. Nevertheless, Murena also triumphed *de rege Mithridate* in 81.[6] Also

[5] Rich 2014: 220-4.

[6] Cic. *Man.* 8; *Mur.* 11, 15, 88. *FT* 84ff; *MRR* 2.77.

in 81 BCE, C. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 93) celebrated a triumph *ex Celtiberia et Gallia*.[7] The date of Pompey's first triumph is uncertain, and the differing sources and scholarly arguments have been previously discussed in my first chapter. Based on the evidence, either 81 or 80 BCE seem to be our best options for Pompey's triumph *ex Africa*.[8] Thus the last two year of the 80's BCE featured four triumphs (potentially all in 81 BCE).

The triumphal boom of the late 80's continued into the 70's BCE, this decade featured as many as seven triumphs. The entirety of the 70's is in part of a lacuna within the *Fasti Triumphales*, which is missing around 29 lines between Murena's triumph in 81 and Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus' controversial triumph over Crete in 62 BCE. Nevertheless, the literary record for this decade is rather strong, especially thanks to Cicero's *in Pisonem* (the importance of which I will discuss thoroughly below). Cn. Cornelius Dolabella (cos. 81) had been proconsul in Macedonia since 80 BCE when he returned to triumph, probably in 77 BCE.[9] P. Servilius Vatia returned from his proconsulship in Cilicia in 74 BCE and celebrated a triumph over the Isauri (from whom he would hereafter take an honorific cognomen) in which he famously displayed pirates.[10] Two years

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[7] Cic. *Quinct.* 28; Gran. Lic. 39B. *MRR* 2.77-8; *FT* 563.

[8] See Ch. 1 III.8; *MRR* 3.161. The problem is a disagreement in the sources over how old Pompey was at the time of his first triumph: Eutrop 5.9.1 (23); Liv. *Per.* 89 (24); Gran. Licin. 31 (25); *vir. ill.* 77.2 (26), the years 82-79 BCE. 82 BCE is unlikely given that the Civil War was ongoing, and Pompey would have had very little time to complete his campaign and return for his triumph. Likewise, Badian 1955 has argued convincingly against 79 BCE. Broughton recommends 80 BCE, but see also Keaveney 1981.

[9] Cic. *Pis.* 44 confirms his triumph. Dolabella was also prosecuted by Julius Caesar in 77 BCE after his triumph (Suet. *DJ* 4.1).

[10] Cic. *Pis.* 58; *Verr.* 2.1.56-57, 5.66; Val. Max. 8.5.6; Eutrop. 6.3,5; *CIL* I^2.2.742.

later another proconsul in Macedonia, C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76), celebrated a triumph over the Dardani.[11] Finally, a decade after the exceptionally triumphal year of 81 BCE, 71 saw three triumphs and an *ovatio.* M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73) celebrated a Macedonia triumph, this time over the Bessi.[12] Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80) received a triumph for his proconsulship in Spain, even though Pompey had to be sent to support him against Sertorius.[13] Finally, Pompey celebrated his second triumph for his help Spain.[14] Additionally, although not counted here, M. Crassus celebrated an *ovatio* in 71 BCE for his victory over Spartacus.[15] Finally, it is unclear exactly when L. Afranius celebrated his triumph *ex Hispania citeriore,* but Rich places it in 70 BCE.[16]

Between 81 and 70 BCE there were 11 triumphs (and one *ovatio*), an average of one triumph per year. The next 20 years, however, would only see seven triumphs: four in the 60's and three in the 50's – or just under one triumph every three years. This is a dramatic shift in triumphal frequency and has led to much speculation. As I mentioned in passing above, Rich and

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[11] Cic. *Pis.* 44, 58; Eutrop. 6.2.2, 6.5.2.

[12] Cic. *Pis.* 44; Plut. *Crass.* 11.2; Eutrop. 6.10; Strabo 7.6.1; Plin. *NH* 4.92, 43.36,39; App. *Illyr.* 30. App. *BC* 1.120 confuses Varro Lucullus with his brother.

[13] Sall. *Hist.* 4.49M; Vell. 2.30.2; App. *BC* 1.121; Eutrop. 6.5.2; *CIL* I^2.2.733; *MRR* 2.123.

[14] Cic. *Leg. Man.* 62; *Pis.* 58; *Sest.* 129; *Div.* 2.22; Vell. 2.30.2 (which gives us the date: Dec. 29th); Val. Max. 8.15.8; Luc. 7.14, 8.809ff; Plin. *NH* 7.95-6; Plut. *Pomp.* 22.1, 23.2, 45.5; *Crass.* 11.8, 12.4; App. *BC* 1.121. *MRR* 2.124.

[15] Cic. *Pis.* 58; Plin. *NH* 5.125; Plut. *Crass.* 11.8; Gell. 5.6.23. *MRR* 2.123.

[16] The 70's would have featured two additional triumphs were in not for the premature deaths of C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75) and Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 79). See (Cotta) Cic. *Pis.* 62; Ascon. 14C. (Pulcher) Liv. *Per.* 91; Flor. 1.39.6; Eutrop. 6.2.1; Ammian. Marc. 27.4.10.

others have cited two causes for the dearth of triumphs in this period: the monopolization of commands by Pompey and Caesar, and the political anarchy of the period. Neither, I believe, is satisfying. Rich's first reason is already perhaps a misnomer, if Caesar's monopolization of command in the Late Republic prevented others from triumphing, then he himself did no better. Caesar would not hold his first triumph until 46 BCE. Likewise, Pompey's commands against the pirates and subsequently against Mithridates were huge undertakings, but it would be hard to argue that these actions prevented a significant amount of triumphs. First, pressing commands had been given to Pompey since the late 80's BCE, but as we have seen this practice did not result in a dearth of triumphs in the 70's. In fact, one could argue that Pompey's second triumph *helped* the overall frequency in the 70's, since Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius' triumph in 71 BCE was only made possible with Pompey's assistance. Finally, even with Pompey in the East in the 60's and Caesar in Gaul in the 50's, there was no lack of commands for other promagistrates; Roman armies were active in Spain, Gaul, Macedonia, Cilicia, Syria – just to name a few prominent examples. We cannot, therefore, blame the lack of triumphs in the 60's and 50's on Pompey and Caesar.

Rich's second reason for the decrease in triumphal celebrations in this period is the political anarchy that characterized this period. The lead up to the Civil War was certainly a tumultuous time in Roman politics, and this no doubt had an effect on all of the city's political institutions. This does, however, merit more discussion than Rich afforded it.[17] One way to think about the effect of political chaos on triumphal frequency is to compare the 60's and 50's BCE with another chaotic period from republican history. The obvious choice would be the tribunates of the Gracchi. The period between Tiberius Gracchus' tribunate in 133 and his brother's death in

[17] Understandably so, since he was surveying the entirety of triumphal history.

121 saw eight triumphs (and one *ovatio*) in 12 years, or one triumph every 1.5 years. This means that triumphal frequency during the period of the Gracchi was twice as high as the last two decades of the Republic.

It is also worth considering just *how* "political chaos" would affect such a precipitous decline in triumphal frequency. In this respect we should not confuse a chaotic political climate with the malfunction of institutions. It is true that the ferocity of political quarrels in this period brought on irregularity, especially in the late 50's when elections were frequently delayed due to violence or intransigence, but holding elections was different from granting triumphs. Elections, since they were both hotly contested and held on a specific day, were especially susceptible to the kinds of disruption we see in the 50's, but triumphal debates were the purview of the Senate and the assemblies. Thus, in order to satisfyingly blame political chaos for the drop in triumphal frequency in the Late Republic we would need to see a continuous malfunctioning in the Republic's more quotidian political processes and institutions, and we do not. It is understandably tempting to cite the extraordinarily hostile political climate of the period for aberrations in practice, but in the case of the triumph the societal structures responsible for granting them were functioning in the Late Republic. We should not blame political chaos out of hand.

More precisely, Rich and T. Corey Brennan have also pointed out that obstruction played a role in the dearth of triumphs in the 60's and 50's BCE, and this is a much more intriguing explanation. It is true that obtaining a triumph almost always seems to have involved debate and, in some cases, included obstruction. The frequency of triumphal debates in Livy shows that the honor was traditionally closely guarded by the Senate.[18] Still, it has been shown that the refusal of

[18] For an excellent discussion of the triumphal debates in Livy see Pittenger 2008.

a triumphal request from the Hannibalic War to the 160's was somewhat rare.[19] Further, within our period of study, from 81 until the mid 60's BCE we do not have an example of an acclaimed *imperator* who did not obtain at least an *ovatio*.[20] Beginning in the 60's, however, the frequency of triumphal obstruction within our sources skyrockets. Of course, finding instances of triumphal obstruction is not straightforward, but there is one phenomenon in the Late Republic that indicates such an increase in opposition to aspiring *triumphatores*: extended waiting periods outside the city. Commanders wishing to hold a triumph faced a constitutional dilemma upon their return to the city. In order to retain the command over his soldiers a general was required to maintain his *imperium*, but no citizen with *imperium* was permitted to enter the city's sacred boundary while also retiaining his *imperium*, the *pomerium*, unless they were given a special dispensation to do so. Such an exception was usually obtained via a popular bill, but only gave the *triumphator* the right to enter the city during his triumph. Thus, those waiting for a triumph were forced to remain *ad urbem*.[21] From 150 BCE until Lucullus' triumph in 63 BCE we get no example of *imperatores* undergoing a lengthy waiting period between their return from the front and the celebration of their triumph. This does not necessarily mean that it did not happen, but if it did our sources do not mention it. Conversely, in the 60's it was more likely than not that a would-be *triumphator* would have to spend

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[19] Brennan 1996: 315-37; 2000: 534.

[20] Brennan 2000: 534.

[21] Senatorial meetings to discuss triumphal grants were therefore held outside of the *pomerium* (e.g. Livy 28.9.5, 31.47.7, 33.22.1, 34.39.5). Liou-Gille 1993; Beard 2007: 202ff; Drogula 2007; Pittenger 2008: 3, 250, 282ff; Lange 2016: 77-82. The exception would be sitting magistrates, since consular *imperium* was not limited by the *pomerium*, see Develin 1978.

years awaiting the honor. Lucullus (cos. 74) waited three years for his triumph in 63 BCE, as did Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69) for his in 62. Q. Marcius Rex (cos. 68) also waited for three years outside the city but died before he was able to celebrate his triumph in 61. Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57) spent two years waiting outside the *pomerium* after his command in Cilicia. C. Pomptinus waited four years before his triumph in 54 BCE.[22] Further, we know of a number of commanders who were proclaimed "*imperator*" by their armies, but failed to triumph.[23] In fact, in the 18 years before Caesar's Gallic request in 50 BCE only Pompey's triumph in 61 BCE was granted in the same year as the return of the commander.

Clearly something had changed in how the triumph was awarded. In order to understand what this trend means, we must examine these events in more detail. The first three examples, those from the late 60's, all have one similarity: the commander in question had come into conflict with Pompey during his command. Lucullus received the command against Mithridates after his consulship and had brilliant successes with victories against Mithridates at Cabira, and against Mithridates' son-in-law Tigranes (the king of Armenia) at Tigranocerta and Artaxata.

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[22] Lucullus: Cic. *Mur.* 37, 69; *Arch.* 21; *Acad.* 2.3; Strabo 12.5.2; Vell. 2.34.2, Plin. *NH* 14.96; Plut. *Luc.* 37.2-4; *Pomp.* 30.2; *Cat. Min.* 29.3-4; App. *Mith.* 77. Creticus: Cic. *Pis.* 58; Vell. 2.34.2; App. *Sic.* 6; Sall. *Cat.* 30.3-4; Livy *Per.* 99. Rex: Sall. *Cat.* 30.3, 33.1-34.1; Cic. *Sull.* 34; *Fin.* 2.62; *Att.* 1.16.10. Spinther: Cic. *Fam.* 1.9; *Att.* 5.21.4. Pomptinus: Cic. *Att.* 4.18.4; *QF* 3.4.6; *Pis.* 58; Dio 39.65.

[23] L. Manlius Torquatus, C. Antonius Hybrida, C. Octavius (Macedonia), C. Memmius (Bithynia), A. Gabinius (Syria), Ap. Claudius Pulcher (Cilicia), M. Tullius Cicero (Cilicia). See Rich 2014: 237 n.205. It is also interesting to ponder whether or not Crassus' *ovatio* in 70 BCE came after obstruction to a triumph request. Plutarch (*Cras.* 11) denies that Crassus sought a triumph and the assumption has been that the status of Crassus' foe prevented him from being considered for the honor, but Cic. *Pis.* 58 seems to suggest that he at least attempted to gain a triumph for defeating Spartacus: *Crasse, pudet me tui: quid est quod confecto per te formidolosissimo bello coronam illam lauream tibi tanto opere decerni volueris a senatu?*

Trouble, however, came with a difficult winter in 68 BCE. Lucullus was unable to capture either rogue monarch, and his troops were becoming increasingly mutinous – apparently partly under the influence of Lucullus' brother-in-law P. Clodius Pulcher. In 66 BCE, with his soldiers refusing commands, the People (via the *lex Manilia*) relieved Lucullus of his command and sent Pompey to take over the campaign. Lucullus returned to Rome hopeful for a triumph, but aside from the obvious obstacle (that he had left his command in disgrace before the end of the war) he also faced significant political opposition. Although apparently cordial at first, Lucullus and Pompey had a (predictable) falling out, and the locus of their mutual vitriol was the triumph. Lucullus accused Pompey of playing the vulture and claiming credit (i.e. honors) for wars which were in reality already won by previous commanders. Likewise, Pompey accused Lucullus of having avoided the real conflict with Mithridates in favor of fighting with lesser kings.[24] C. Memmius, a tribune in 66 BCE friendly to Pompey, first attempted to prosecute Lucullus' brother for his quaestorship under

[24] Plut. *Pomp.* 31. Lucullus argued that Pompey's victories over Sertorius, Lepidus, and Spartacus were actually won by Metellus, Catulus, and Crassus. In 77 BCE Pompey had received *imperium,* probably as a propraetor, in order to fight against the insurrection of M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 78 BCE). Lepidus was defeated in a battle on the Campus Martius by Q. Catulus, Lepidus' co-consul in 78 BCE. Pompey besieged Lepidus' supporters under the command of M. Iunius Brutus (trib. 83 BCE) at Mutina. Brutus surrendered, and then Pompey (controversially) had Brutus killed. See Liv. *Per.* 90; Plut. *Pomp.* 16.2-5; *Brut.* 4.1-2; Cic. *Att.* 9.14.2; *Leg. Agr.* 2.89, 92; Sall. *Hist.* 1.79M; Val. Max. 6.2.8; App. *BC* 2.111. After the uprising of Lepidus, Pompey received proconsular *imperium* in order to fight Q. Sertorius in Spain (see Liv. *Per.* 91; Plut. *Pomp.* 17.1-4; *Sert.* 18.1-2; App. *BC* 1.108; Cic. *Leg. Man.* 30, 62). Lucullus' critique concerning this conflict is less convincing, since he would ascribe credit to Pompey's predecessor Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80 BCE) who was nearly forced out of his own province by Sertorius. See Plut. *Sert.* 12.4-13.6. *MRR* 2.83. Gruen 1974: 18-19. Finally, Pompey does seem to have attempted to take some of the credit for the suppression of Spartacus and his followers in the Third Servile War. Crassus had defeated Spartacus in a pitched battle, but those who fled from the battle were met, and slaughtered, by Pompey returning from Spain. Pompey, according to Plutarch, wrote a letter to the senate claiming that Crassus had defeated the army, but he had ended the war. See Plut. *Crass.* 11; *Pomp.* 21.1-2; Cic. *Leg. Man.* 30; App. *BC* 1.120.

Sulla, and when that was unsuccessful, obstructed the *lex curiata* Lucullus required in order to triumph.[25]

Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus also came into conflict with Pompey while on campaign. After his consulship in 69 BCE, Metellus was made proconsul in Crete and Achaea in order to deal with the pirate problem in the region. In 68 BCE he had some success, winning a naval engagement and besieging some Cretan towns. In 67 BCE, however, the situation in the region became more complicated. The *lex Gabinia* gave Pompey command of the Mediterranean and all regions 50 miles inland.[26] In light of this development, some Cretan communities preferred to surrender to Pompey rather than Metellus, apparently believing that Pompey would be more lenient.[27] Pompey agreed to accept the surrender of these communities, and thereby angered Metellus who refused to recognize the validity of this arrangement and continued prosecuting the war on Crete until he had the island organized as a province in 66.[28] The disagreement led to

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[25] Plut. *Luc.* 37.1-2; *Cat. Min.* 29.3; Cic. *Acad.* 2.3. Memmius is an interesting figure for this study. He is rumored to have obstructed Lucullus on Pompey's behalf. Additionally, Memmius allegedly had affairs with both the Luculli's wives (Cicero compared Memmius to Paris, and the brothers to the Atreidae in *Att.* 1.18.3) Memmius (perhaps in accordance with poetic justice) is also among our generals who seem to have been acclaimed *imperator,* but not to have triumphed. See *MRR* 2.203.

[26] Cic. *leg. Man.* 44, 52-8; *leg Agr.* 2.46; P. *Red. in Sen.* 11; *Phil.* 11.18; Sall. *Hist.* 5.21-24M; Livy *Per.* 99; Vell. 2.31-2; Val. Max. 8.15.9, Tac. *Ann.* 15.25; Plut. *Pomp.* 25-6; *Luc.* 37.4; App. *Mith.* 94; Dio 36.23-7. *MRR* 2.144-5.

[27] Plut. *Pomp.* 29; Dio 36.18ff; Cic. *Flacc.* 30, 63, 100; *ad Brut.* 1.8; Livy *Per.* 98; Vell. 2.34.1, Val. Max. 7.6, App. *Sic.* 6.2.

[28] Cic. *Flacc.* 30, 100; *ad Brut.* 1.8; Livy *Per.* 100; App. *Sic.* 6; Strabo 17.3.25. The historian Sisenna was a legate under Pompey and was tasked with convincing Metellus to yield, unfortunately Sisenna fell sick and died on Crete (Dio 36.19.1).

hostility between the two men. Pompey worked to prevent Metellus' triumph until 62, and Metellus fought Pompey's ratification in the East until it finally passed in 59 BCE.[29]

Q. Marcius Rex was consul in 68 BCE and then given the province of Cilicia for a term as proconsul in 67.[30] While in Cilicia he notably caused trouble for Lucullus, who was still in command against Mithridates. Marcius' brother-in-law P. Codius Pulcher had fanned the flames of discontent among Lucullus' soldiers, and then in 67 BCE was received by Marcius.[31] Much of the detail of Marcius' time in Cilicia is unclear; a once-mentioned trip to Antioch has been the source of much speculation.[32] We do know, however, that at some point during his proconsulship Marcius was acclaimed *imperator* by his troops.[33] In the following year, 66 BCE, Marcius was relieved of his command in favor of Pompey. Nevertheless, he returned to Rome and waited *ad Urbem* for a triumph. Marcius, however, died before he was able to celebrate his triumph.[34] In a

[29] Plut. *Pomp.* 29. For a more detailed discussion of the clash between Metellus and Pompey see Seager [1979]2002: 46-9.

[30] Sall. *Hist.* 5.13-4M; Dio 36.15.1, 17.2; *CIL* I^2. 2.747. *MRR* 2.146.

[31] For Clodius service under Lucullus: Cic. *Har. Resp.* 42; Plut. *Luc.* 34.1-2; Dio 36.14.3-4, 17.2. For his transfer to Marcius see additionally Dio 38.30.5; App. *B. Civ* 2.23.

[32] 6th century CE chronicler John Malalas (p. 225, II.4-11[ed. Bonn 1831]) mentioned a **Κόϊντος Μαρκιανὸς** ῥηξ who came to Antioch **τυπῶσαι φόρους διδόναι αὐτὸν Ῥωμαίοις**. This has been accepted to be Q. Marcius Rex, although it is entirely uncertain when during his proconsulship Marcius visited Antioch, and unclear what the goal of his mission was. For a useful discussion see Downey 1937.

[33] Sall. *Cat.* 30.3-4, 33.1.

[34] Sall. *Cat.* 32.3-34.1; Cic. *Att.* 1.16.10.

fortunate coincidence, both Marcius and Metellus (along with their troops) were near to the city and able to be deployed against the Catilinarian conspirators in 63 BCE.[35]

It is clear that the obstruction these commanders faced was part of a larger political conflict in the 60's. Sallust laconically blamed the obstruction of Metellus and Marcius on those senators *quibus omnia honesta atque inhonesta vendere mos erat,* but we have no evidence that bribery or lack thereof played a direct result in these obstructions.[36] All three commanders were closely aligned with senatorial policy in the important eastern conflicts against the pirates and Mithridates, and all three were replaced by popular laws in favor of Pompey. This strongly suggests that the triumphal obstructions of the 60's were a result of factional politics. Lucullus was a vehement opponent of Pompey's rise in the 60's and was heavily involved in the blocking of Pompey's eastern resolutions in the Senate.[37] Further, there is also a noticeable methodological consistency in these triumphal obstructions. In the cases of Lucullus and Metellus, both faced some level of obstruction from tribunes. C. Memmius attacked first Lucullus' brother and then excited the People against the general. Cassius Dio records that Pompey used a tribune to prevent two prominent pirate kings from appearing in Metellus' triumph, although he does not give the name of the tribune.[38] We lack almost entirely the details of the obstruction of Marcius' triumph, but given that Pompey had

[35] Sall. *Cat.* 30.3-5.

[36] Sall. *Cat.* 30.3.

[37] See Keaveny 1992: 131ff.

[38] Dio 36.19.3. Although we do get the names of the pirate kings: Panares and Lasthenes. Pompey's argument was that these pirates had surrendered to *him* and not to Metellus.

had success using tribunes to frustrated *imperatores* it is certainly possible that Marcius faced similar problems.[39]

This level of triumphal obstruction, hitherto unheard of, seems to have emerged in the 60's as a political tool for frustrating one's opponents. Lucullus and Metellus eventually obtained their chariot ride and Pompey was able to push through his eastern *acta* with the help of new friends, but the practice of using triumphal debate as a political weapon endured. In all three of these examples Pompey and his adherents appear to have blocked the aspirations of those associated with his political opposition, but after 62 BCE the conservative faction within the Senate turned Pompey's triumphal obstruction against him, and one man in particular is singled out by our sources in this effort: M. Porcius Cato. Cato's political career began in the 60's while this new trend of triumphal obstruction was taking place. Already in 66 BCE Cato, who was 29, fought hard against the tribune Memmius' opposition to Lucullus' triumph, apparently at significant political risk.[40] In 62 BCE, the year in which Metellus finally held his Cretan triumph, M. Porcius Cato was tribune of plebs. It is possible that Cato co-sponsored a law on the triumph during his tribunate, the *lex Porcia Maria de triumphis*, but the law is poorly attested.[41]

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[39] Plut. *Pomp.* 46.4 says that in the face of opposition from Lucullus and Cato Pompey ***ἠναγκάζετο δημαρχοῦσι προσφεύγειν καὶ προσαρτᾶσθαι μειρακίοις·***

[40] Plut. *Cato* 29.3. ***ὁ δὲ Κάτων…ἀντέστη τῷ Μεμμίῳ, καὶ πολλὰς ὑπέμεινε διαβολὰς καὶ κατηγορίας, τέλος δὲ, τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκβαλλόμενος ὡς τυραννίδος, τοσοῦτον ἐκράτησεν ὥστε τὸν Μέμμιον αὐτὸν ἀναγκάσαι τῶν δικῶν ἀποστῆναι καὶ φυγεῖν τὸν ἀγῶνα.*** Lucullus was Cato's brother-in-law.

[41] Val. Max. 2.8.1. This law is sometimes confused (e.g. Wistrand 1979: 25) with an apparently earlier law that required 5,000 enemy casualties for triumphal consideration, but the existence of the earlier law is questionable. Valerius says that the law introduced by Cato (and his otherwise unattested colleague in the tribunate L. Marius), *poenam enim imperatoribus minatur qui aut hostium occisorum in proelio aut amissorum civium falsum numerum litteris senatui ausi essent referre,*

In the next year, 61 BCE, Pompey himself felt the sting of triumphal obstruction when Cato opposed his efforts. Pompey was returning victorious from the East, and this meant the Senate had to consider the honors that it would grant the *imperator*. Pompey's achievements during his campaign were unparalleled; he had cleared the Mediterranean of pirates, defeated Rome's old foe Mithridates, and organized much of Rome's eastern holdings.[42] Pompey, however, wished to use his popularity to help M. Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus canvass for the consulship of 61 BCE. Piso had been one of Pompey's legates in Asia, and Pompey was no doubt eager to ensure that a friendly consul was in office during the debate over his settlements. Pompey was, however, unable to cross over the *pomerium* while awaiting his triumph and unable to aid Piso without entering the city. Accordingly, Pompey wrote to the senate and requested that the consular elections be postponed until after his triumph. Given the spectacular nature of Pompey's *res gestae,* it is reasonable to assume that the new Alexander felt he was entitled to some constitutional leniency, Plutarch says as much explicitly. Cato, however, was troubled by Pompey's attitude and successfully lobbied his fellow senators to reject the pleas of the returning *imperator.* Thus, Cato forced Pompey to choose between holding his triumph and assisting his lieutenant at the elections. The choice was likely a simple one – Piso was elected even without Pompey's physical presence in the city, and Pompey's triumph in 61 BCE was arguably the most splendid in Roman history up to that point. Still, Cato had used triumphal obstruction to expose some weakness in Pompey, even

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iubetque eos, cum primum urbem intrassent, apud quaestores urbanos iurare de utroque numero vere ab iis senatui esse scriptum.

[42] Pompey's campaigns, and more precisely his triumph, have often been cited as the beginning of Rome's (self-imagined) identity as *the* dominant world power see Kallet-Marx 1995: 331-4. His procession included a trophy of the *oikumene*. See Nicolet 1991: 31-33; Ostenberg 2009: 284-287; Osgood 2014: 154.

during his victorious return. Pompey seemed to recognize Cato's potential to cause trouble in the future and offered him a marriage alliance, which Cato refused.[43]

In the following year, Cato again forced a returning general to choose between a triumph and involvement in the elections; this time the commander in question was Julius Caesar. Caesar had left Rome in 61 BCE to become proconsul in Hispania Ulterior, and on his arrival he added ten cohorts to his two legions and defeated the Callaici and Lusitani.[44] Caesar left Spain with his typical celerity (before his successor arrived, possibly with an eye to the coming elections) and upon his arrival *ad urbem* asked for permission to stand for the consulship technically *in absentia*, since he could not enter the *pomerium*.[45] Cato, seeing that Caesar's request was gaining support in the

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[43] Plut. *Cato Minor* 31; *Pomp.* 44. However, Dio 37.44 states that Pompey did get his delay. The problems with sources pertaining to this event will be discussed in detail below. Plut. *Cat. Min.* 30.3-6; *Pomp.* 44.2-4.

[44] Cic. *Att.* 2.1.6-10, 3.3; Plut. *Caes.* 12-14; *Pomp.* 47; *Crass.* 14.1-3; *Cat. Min.* 31; *Luc.* 42.5-6; App. Livy *Per.* 103; Dio. 37.54-58.

[45] For an excellent discussion on the subject see Morstein-Marx 2007: 168-169; also Pelling 2011: 187-188, as well as Linderski 1965. We have evidence for the election *in absentia* of some priests, and an aedile. Scipio Nasica Serapio was possibly elected Pontifex Maximus in 141 BCE while fighting the Scordisci; Marius was elected augur in 98 BCE while he was in Cappadocia. See Cic. *ad Brut.* 1.5.3. L. Lucullus, Cato's brother-in-law, was elected aedile for 79 BCE (Plut. *Lucull.* 1.6; Cic. *Acad.* 2.1. See also, Balsdon 1962: 140). In respect to those running for the consulship, C. Marius had been elected *in absentia* three times, Pompey and Crassus had been elected *in absentia* for the consulships of 70 BCE, and Pompey again was elected while absent in 52 BCE via a proposal that was made by Bibulus and seconded by Cato himself (Plut. *Mar.* 12.1, 14.9; Livy *Per.* 67,68). Pompey's second two consulships are less relevant, but still serve to show the flexibility in procedure. Linderski (1966) argues that considering Pompey's election in 71 BCE as *in absentia* is anachronistic, as candidates were not legally required to give a *professio* (the official declaration of one's candidacy) in person until later – see Levick 1981 and Lintott 1999: 45. This is correct in a legalistic sense, but I follow Morstein-Marx 2007: 168 n. 44 who argues that Pompey's absence still breaks significantly with tradition, and thus provides a good precedent for Caesar's hopes. See Kunkel & Whittman 1995: 70-78 concerning the importance of the *professio* as a presentation of the candidate to the People.

senate, was unable (as he had been with Pompey) to convince his colleagues to vote against the measure. Instead of yielding the vote, Cato turned to what Caesar would later call his "old-time custom" and filibustered until sundown, when the law required that the senate adjourn.[46] Caesar decided to relinquish his bid for a triumph and instead ran for the consulship of 59 BCE, which he won. Cato's victory would, however, be short-lived – in the face of predictable Catonian opposition, Caesar went on to broker a political alliance with Pompey and Crassus. This would not be the last time that Cato's stubborn opposition to honors for Caesar would have far-reaching consequences for the entire community.

It seems that during this period Cato had discovered a new kind of political tool to wield against returning generals. Cato had utilized the constitutional quandary faced by *imperators* to sour their returns and threaten their ability to capitalize on their military success at the polls. The maneuver was no doubt frustrating for the commanders, but not time consuming; Cato was able to force the dilemma precisely because the elections were a fast-approaching *sine qua non* for each general. This was not the case for C. Pomptinus. Pomptinus was a career military man.[47] He had been a legate to Crassus during the Third Servile war in 71 BCE and as praetor had provided the damning evidence against the Catilinarian conspirators after intercepting the Allobrogian ambassadors on the Pons Milvius. After 63 Pomptinus served *pro consule* in Gallia Narbonensis (62-

[46] Plut. *Cat. Min.* 31.3-4. Caes. *BC* 1.32.3 calls the filibuster Cato's "*pristina consuetudine*."

[47] Sall. *Cat.* 45.2 refers to Pomptinus as a *homo militaris.* For general discussions of *viri militares* see Campbell 1975, De Blois 2000. Rosenstein 2007.

59 BCE), where he put down the rebellion of the Allobroges under Catugnatus.[48] Pomptinus was replaced in 59 BCE and returned to Rome, where he requested a triumph for his efforts.[49] Unlike Pompey and Caesar, Pomptinus does not seem to have had electoral plans, but Cato still opposed his request; this time the commander opted to wait for the opportunity to triumph. Pomptinus waited outside the *pomerium* until 54 BCE when, only by some procedural trickery done behind Cato's back, he was finally able to celebrate his return.[50]

It is not explicitly confirmed in our sources, but it is fairly certain that Cato also obstructed the triumphal request of L. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57) in 53 BCE. As consul in 57 BCE Lentulus had striven hard for and brought about the recall of Cicero from exile.[51] After his consulship Lentulus received Cilicia for his proconsulship, and he was acclaimed imperator by his

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[48] Sall. *Cat.* 45.2. For service under Crassus in 71 see Frontin. *Str.* 2.4.7. For his aid against the Catiline see Cic. *Cat.* 3.5ff, 14; *Flacc.* 102; Sall. *Cat.* 45.1-4. For his proconsulship see Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 32; Dio. 37.47-48, 39.65.1-2; Livy *Per.* 103.

[49] Pomptinus was likely Caesar's immediate predecessor in Gaul. Metellus Celer (cos. 60 BCE) was appointed to succeed Pomptinus, but (possibly) had his office taken away by the tribune Flavius. Whether or not Metellus was actually removed from office, he died suddenly before leaving the city. See Cic. *Cael.* 59; *Sest.* 130-131; *Vat.* 19; *Att.* 2.5.2; Dio 37.50.4; *MRR* 2.183.

[50] Cic. *Pis.* 58; Dio 39.65.1-2. It is unclear on what grounds Pomptinus' request was objected to, but both Cato and Caesar seem to have opposed it. Beard (2007: 370) alleges an improper vote of *imperium,* but while possible considering the uncertainty surrounding his successor, this seems speculative. Cato was joined in his opposition in 54 BCE by his fellow praetor P. Servilius Isauricus (cos. 48, 41 BCE) and the tribune Q. Mucius Scaevola, whom Cicero (*Q. Frat.* 3.4.6) rather poetically claimed was ***Ἄρη πνέων*** on the issue (quoting Aesch. *Aga.* 375).

[51] *MRR* 2.200. Cic. *Att.* 3.22.2; *QF* 1.4.5; *Fam.* 1.1.1-17, 3.7.5; *P. Red. in Sen.* 5, 8-9, 26-7; *P. Red. ad Quir.* 11, 15, 17ff; *Dom.* 7, 30, 70-1, 75; *Har. Resp.* 12; *Sest.* 70, 72, 107, 117, 144, 147; *Pis.* 34, 80; *Mil.* 39; Dio 39.6-8. On the law: Cic. *P. Red. in Sen.* 27; *P. Red. ad Quir.* 17; *Dom.* 75, 87, 90; *Sest.* 109, 128; *Pis.* 35-6; Dio 39.8.2.

troops.[52] Lentulus was replaced in 53 BCE and he returned to Rome to seek a triumph for his service. He finally celebrated his triumph in 51 BCE.[53] The only source material we have relating to the details of this triumphal obstruction comes from a letter Cicero wrote to Cato (*Fam.* 15.4, which will be discussed in length below). In it Cicero wrote that Cato opposed the *supplicatio* of a certain *vir optimius clarissimus.*[54] Given the context this man is almost certainly Lentulus.

The last Catonian triumphal obstruction (save his opposition to Cicero in 50 BCE which will be discussed in detail below) for which we have evidence is the most famous: Cato's opposition to Caesar in 50 BCE. There is no need to recount Caesar's achievements in Gaul. Although there were several close calls, Caesar had ultimately been wildly successful against Rome's oldest, traditional enemy.[55] Almost equally famous are Cato's efforts to end Caesar's command, including his rather ridiculous demand that Caesar be surrendered to the Germans.[56] Caesar received a total of fifty-five days of *supplicationes* from the Senate while in command in Gaul

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[52] Lentulus was initially commissioned to restore the Egyptian king Ptolemy XII Aluetes to his throne but was prevented from taking up the task by a prohibition from the Sybilline Books and the efforts of Pompey and Crassus. See *MRR* 2.210. Cic. *Fam.* 1.1-7; *QF* 2.2.3, 2.3.2; *Pis.* 50; *Rab. Post.* 21; *Cael.* 23-6; Plut. *Pomp.* 49; Dio 39.12-16. For his acclamation as *imperator* see Cic. *Fam.* 1.8.7, 1.9.2.

[53] Cic. *Att.* 5.21.4.

[54] Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.11 *te denique memini, cum cuidam clarissimo atque optimo viro supplicationem non decerneres, dicere te decreturum si referretur ob eas res quas is consul in urbe gessisset. tu idem mihi supplicationem decrevisti togato, non, ut multis, re publica bene gesta sed, ut nemini, re publica conservata.*

[55] e.g. Cic. *Marc.* 4-10; *Prov. Cons.* 34-35.

[56] Plut. *Caes.* 22.3, *Cat. Min.* 49.1; Suet. *Iul.* 24.3; App. *Celt.* 18. The demand was clearly absurd, and likely an attempt to prevent the granting of a *supplicatio* to Caesar. See Morstein-Marx 2007: 161.

(more than any commander had ever enjoyed), a clear sign that he would easily obtain a triumph for his efforts.[57] This time, unlike in 60 BCE, Caesar had prepared in advance to shield his ambitions from Cato's obstinacy. In 52 BCE all ten tribunes had joined to carry a law that granted Caesar the ability to stand for the consulship *in absentia*. Caesar clearly desired this law to protect himself from the kind of dilemma Cato presented him with in 60. In the face of tribunician unanimity, Cato's attempt to filibuster the legislation was ultimately unsuccessful,[58] and the dispute over the conditions of Caesar's return from Gaul ended in civil war.

There are noticeable differences between the triumphal obstructions of the late 60's (Lucullus, Metellus Creticus, and Q. Marcius Rex) and these Catonian efforts. First, Pompey seems to have turned to friendly tribunes for assistance in obstructing the triumphs of his political rivals, but Cato acted as his own agent in the cases discussed above. Beginning with Pompey Cato had devised a new tactic in checking the ambitions of returning generals by forcing them to choose between the triumph and electoral concerns. In Pompey's case in 61, Cato was able to persuade the Senate to agree with him and even though Pompey got all that he wanted Cato did manage to land a blow to Pompey's prestige. In the following year he was forced to rely upon the filibuster to obstruct Caesar and this time was successful in depriving Caesar of his procession, which clearly grieved Caesar since he made careful provisions against suffering from such a predicament in the 50's. Cato spent his early career in the 60's when a new breed of intransigent triumphal

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[57] Morstein-Marx 2007: 169 n.46. See also Cic. *Prov. Cons* 32-35, 26, 29. Marius had gotten five days after the battle of Aquae Sextae in 102 BCE; Pompey had gotten ten days after defeating Mithridates.

[58] Caes. *BC* 1.32.3, 1.9.2; Cic. *Att.* 7.1.4, 7.3.4, 7.6.2; *Fam.* 6.6.5, 8.3.3, 16.12.3; *Phil.* 2.24; Livy *Per.* 107; Suet. *Iul.* 26, 28; Plut. *Pomp.* 56; App. *BC* 2.25.

obstruction debuted in Roman politics; in the late 60's and 50's Cato provided further innovation to this phenomenon.

In respect to Pompey and Caesar it would be easy to understand Cato's behavior as principally similar to the other triumphal obstructions of the 60's: factional politics. Cato had been at the forefront of opposition to Pompey since the latter's return from his campaigns in the East, and Cato had already locked oratorical horns with Caesar in 63 during the debate over the punishment of the Catilinarian conspirators. Yet, other Catonian triumphal obstructions undermine such an understanding. Cato's opposition to Pomptinus lacks a clear explanation and is further complicated by the fact that Caesar, who was rarely aligned with Cato, also worked to obstruct Pomptinus' claim. Neither can Cato's opposition to Spinther's request be explained away by political rivalry. Finally, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter, Cato also opposed the request of his friend and frequent collaborator Cicero in 50 BCE. It would be hard to argue that Cato and Caesar were on the same side of a political faction that put them at odds with Pomptinus, and Cicero's appeal to Cato heavily emphasized their shared political views.

III. Cato and Cicero's Epistolary Exchange.

Cicero did not want to serve a provincial governorship; he had even bartered away his opportunity to govern normally-coveted Macedonia after his consulship in 63 BCE. Unfortunately for the metropolitan Cicero, the *lex Pompeia de provinciis* of 52 BCE changed the way in which provincial governors were selected and he was obligated to take up a posting in Cilicia for 51

BCE.[59] Cicero arrived in his province to a rather distressing situation, especially for such an unmilitary man: two years after Crassus' disastrous defeat and subsequent death at the Battle of Carrhae Roman allies in the region informed Cicero that the crown prince of Parthia, Pacorus, had crossed the Euphrates into Roman Syria with a sizeable force.[60] Syria's governor M. Bibulus had not yet arrived in that province and Antioch (under the command of proquaestor C. Cassius Longinus) was the only Roman position of any strength between Pacorus and Cilicia. Preparing for the worst, Cicero led his army into Cappadocia and prepared to face the Parthians should Pacorus head in that direction.[61] While Cicero moved his army into the Amanus mountain range on the border with Syria, Cassius held Antioch and repelled the Parthians. The crisis had passed, but Cicero took the opportunity to renew conflict with the inhabitants of that region, who were perpetually hostile to Rome and welcoming to its enemies across the Euphrates. Cicero wrote that he killed many of the enemy, took some prisoner, and burned their strongholds. In recognition of his success his soldiers acclaimed him as *imperator* at Issus. That Alexander the Great had defeated Darius there just over 280 years earlier was not lost on the orator-cum-*imperator*. [62]After this success

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[59] Cic. *Fam.* 3.2.1, 15.12.2; *Att.* 5.15.1 *denique haec* (provincial govenorship) *non desidero: lucem, forum, urbem, domum, vos desidero. sed feram ut potero, sit modo annuum; si prorogatur actum est.* Once resigned to his provincial duty, Cicero went to great efforts to ensure that his tenure would be as short as possible, see Cic. *Att.* 5.1.1, 5.2.3, 5.9.2, 5.11.1 and 5, 5.13.3, 5.17.5, 5.18.1, 5.20.7; *Fam.* 2.7.4, 2.8.3, 2.10.4, 3.8.9, 15.9.2, 15.12.2, 15.13.3, 15.14.5. See also Dio Cass. 40.46.2. Rawson 1983: 164-82; Mitchell 1991: 204-5; Tempest 2011: 151ff. Steel 2012 for an excellent discussion of the details of the law.

[60] For narratives of Cicero's campaign see *Fam.* 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4.2-10; also see below.

[61] Cic. *Fam.* 15.2.2; 15.4.4.

[62] Cic. *Fam.* 2.10.3 *ita victoria iusta imperator appellatus apud Issum, quo in loco, saepe ut ex te audivi, Clitarchus tibi narravit Dareum ab Alexandro esse superatum…*

Cicero went further into the Amanus, where he besieged Pindenissem, a town of free Cilicians. After 57 days the city surrendered on the Saturnalia in 51 BCE.[63]

So went Cicero's one season as general. Once the soldiering was done, Cicero set out on another massive campaign, the campaign to obtain a triumph for his efforts. He allegedly wrote to almost every member of the Senate, which at the point boasted roughly 600 members.[64] Scholars concerned with the triumph have noted that what we still have available of Cicero's epistolary campaign shows that obtaining a triumph was not, as some have imagined, a question of box-checking the proper criteria, but rather was a political exercise.[65] Cicero often took the time to tailor the letter to suit the specific interests of the addressee.[66] The most recent study that attempts

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[63] Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.10. Cicero claims that the pro-Parthian elements in the Amanus mountain range were threatening to strengthen anti-Roman elements in the region. For the end of the siege on the Saturnalia see Cic. *Att.* 5.20.1.

[64] Cic. *Att.* 7.1.8 *litteras…ad omnis mitterem.* There were two senators that Cicero did not write to: C. Lucilius Hirrus who had been defeated for the curule aedileship by Cicero's friend Caelius, and his former son-in-law Furius Crassipes. *Att.* 7.1. Hirrus was also on the receiving end of some Ciceronian wit concerning an apparent speech impediment, see *Fam.* 2.9-10. Also, Shackelton Bailey 1971: 123ff.

[65] There is no strong consensus, but recent scholarship has tended to favor a less legalistic understanding. Gruen 1990: 131-133 was an early, if brief, critic of the idea of a legalistic triumphal standard. He has since been followed by more thorough attacks on the *ius triumphandi*. Beard 2007 is perhaps the most high-profile denunciation of strict regulations. See also, Itgenshorst 2005; Pittenger 2008. Lundgreen 2014 is the most recent comprehensive study; he follows Beard in denying the existence of set rules but does reserve space for some "principles." The older, legalistic view can be traced back to Gibbon [1796]2014 or Mommsen *StR* (or, indeed, to Valerius Maximus), but more recent arguments have been lodged by Petrucci 1996, Brennan 1996, and Auliard 2001.

[66] For some examples, see *Fam.* 15.10 to C. Claudius Marcellus Minor (cos. 50), in which Cicero appealed to his good relationship with other Marcelli. To the other consul of 50 BC, L. Aemilius Lepidus Paullus, Cicero brought attention to past favors. See Beard 2007: 191ff.

to understand the basic nature of the triumph defines the procession simply as "an honour conferred by peers."[67] The triumph was still a military honor and an *imperator* was still expected to have some significant achievement under arms, but obtaining a triumph also required some adept politicking after one's campaign concluded. For our purposes this means that it is important to remember that Cicero crafted his letter to meet what he perceived to be Cato's specific concerns. Yet, Cicero's effort would be unsuccessful – but why? I will argue that Cato's refusal to support Cicero's triumphal claim shows us that Cato's triumphal obstruction came from an ideological conflict, rather than from personal or pragmatic concerns (as has often been imagined). Therefore, what follows is a close reading of the letters (*Fam.* 15.4-6) that seeks to uncover the grounds on which Cato opposed military honors. Such a reading has thus far been missing from the analysis of these letters.

III.1 Cicero's Initial Letter (*Fam.* 15.4 = SB 110).

Cicero's letter to Cato was special. One could protest that since Cicero possibly wrote to almost all of the Senate's 600 members one letter to Cato hardly constituted a extraordinary honor, but the content is what clues us in to this letter's special status. Other letters from this epistolary campaign are all much shorter, and none gives the amount of narrative detail that this letter does.[68] Cato would have had access to all the details of Cicero's campaign from the

[67] Lundgreen 2014: 28.

[68] Cic. *Fam.* 15.1 & 15.2 (to the magistrates and the Senate), 15.3 (to Cato), 15.10 (to C. Claudius Marcellus), 15.13 (to L. Aemilius Paullus), and 15.4 (to Cato). Cicero's account of his campaign in *Fam.* 15.4 is much more sophisticated than other examples in his extant corpus (see *Att.* 5.20 and *Fam.* 2.10). See also Fehrle 1983: 226ff; Hutchinson 1998: 89ff; Beard 2007: 191-2.

imperator's dispatches to the Senate and especially the letter (now lost) that Cicero sent to the body formally requesting the honor, but Cicero did his addressee the honor of sending him a personalized version.[69] Of course receiving his own letter would have appealed to Cato's sense of prestige, but Cicero had another reason for crafting an appeal specifically for Cato. As we have already seen, Cato was a familiar fixture in triumphal debates (often to the detriment of the would-be *triumphator*). It was important for Cicero to secure Cato's support, and thus also important to appeal not only to Cato's sense of self-importance, but also to his principles in the letter of request.

The first thing I believe we need to note about *Fam.* 15.4 is the sophistication of its structure. It is tempting (in light of the author) to see the letter as a long-winded exercise in self-praise, but it is actually an excellent example of Rome's master of persuasion plying his trade. In fact, the structure of *Fam.* 15.4 bears a similarity to another branch of the Ciceronian corpus: it can be analyzed like a forensic speech, complete with an *exordium*, *narratio, propositio, argumentatio,* and *peroratio*.[70] This is not to say that Cicero sent a speech to Cato; a persuasive letter is not the same as a persuasive speech. Yet, the structure of the letter does show that Cicero put great care into his appeal. Further, there are some advantages to reading *Fam.* 15.4 as we might read a speech – often when lacking the speech for the prosecution we are able to look closely at Cicero's argument to reconstruct what kind of arguments he anticipated having to engage with. Similarly,

[69] Those who wished to obtain a triumph sent a "laurelled letter" to the Senate to formally request the honor; e.g. Cic. *Phil* 14.23-4, Luc. 1.12, Dio Cass. 42.18.1. See also Oakley 1998: 714; Beard 2007: 201-3; Rich 2014: 211. Cicero had previously sent Cato his own version of a dispatch to the Senate (*Fam.* 15.3).

[70] Wistrand 1979: 16; Hutchinson 1998: 87.

in *Fam.* 15.4 we can look at Cicero's argument and reconstruct the concerns he expected his addressee to have.

An ideological reading of *Fam.* 15.4 is lacking from current scholarship. Modern scholarly discussion of this letter has traditionally focused upon the military narrative (§2-10), and the awkwardness of Cato's refusal.[71] In his commentary Shackleton Bailey characterized *Fam.* 15.4 simply as "a lengthy account of military operations."[72] Magnus Wistrand's study of Cicero's pursuit of a triumph provides a close reading of this letter but one focused mainly on the weakness of Cicero's request on qualitative grounds.[73] His reading usefully highlights some inconsistencies between this account other narratives in different letters, but only mentions in passing non-

[71] Shackleton Bailey's commentary (1977: 1.109-113) is valuable, but I believe he misunderstands the tone of the exchange, particularly Cato's response (*Fam.* 15.5) which he calls "humbug." Magie 1950: 396-9 focuses entirely on the military narrative; Syme 1995: 118-24 & 127-43 deals with the geographic details we are able to glean from Cicero's letter as well as the narrative of his involvement with the Roman vassal Deiotarus (Mitchell 1993: 1.33-6 & 55-7 also focuses on what we can learn about Roman Anatolia); Gelzer 1969: 225-42 is a narrative of Cicero's time in Cilicia, with only a brief mention of the epistolary exchange with Cato (Sherwin-White 1984: 290-7 also uses the letters to help reconstruct Cicero's time in the province); Mitchell 1991: 235 (esp. n14) only mentions Cato's refusal in passing, and in the notes speculates that Cato may have done so "on an objection in principle to honors for minor successes." Fehrle 1983: 224-34 is a good starting point, because he acknowledges the special status of these letters, but he only nods to Cato's aversion to military honors. Griffin 1989: 35-6 briefly uses these letters as a case study for how philosophy impacted elite interaction in this period. Wistrand 1979 provides a useful reading but largely ignores the ideological conflict. I will refer to it throughout. Hutchinson 1998: 86-100 is an excellent overview of the rhetorical strategies Cicero deployed in his campaign narrative (§2-10) in *Fam.* 15.4 - including an intriguing discussion of the similarities between Cicero's narrative and Caesar's *Bellum* Gallicum - but leaves much of the rest of the letter undiscussed. Hall 2009 is a useful resource for thinking about rhetorical and persuasive strategies throughout the Ciceronian epistolary corpus, but he only mentions these letters *passim* (mostly in isolating repeated phrases).

[72] Shackleton Bailey 1977: 109

[73] Wistrand 1979: 10-18.

military concerns within the letter. He concludes: "To sum up: if we penetrate the rhetoric of Cicero's letter *fam.* 15, 4, it will be found that Cicero is asking Cato to support a triumph on the grounds of the unjust treatment he had suffered in the past, of his moral excellence and their common interest in philosophy." This is partly true, but I believe that Wistrand did not penetrate the rhetoric of the letter deeply enough. In addition to these rhetorical strategies Cicero crafted his plea to fit the criteria and values which he knew Cato promoted in such questions. I offer here a new reading that includes this important aspect of *Fam.* 15.4.

Shackleton Bailey dated Cicero's this letter to January of 50 BCE, when Cicero had returned to Tarsus after the campaign season. Here is how Cicero began his request:

Summa tua auctoritas fecit meumque perpetuum de tua singulari virtute iudicium ut magni mea interesse putarem et res eas quas gessissem tibi notas esse et non ignorari a te qua aequitate et continentia tuerer socios provinciamque administrarem. iis enim a te cognitis arbitrabar facilius me tibi quae vellem probaturum. (Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.1)

Your great *auctoritas* and my eternal admiration for your outstanding *virtus* have led me think that it is very much in my interest that the things I have achieved be known to you, and that you not be ignorant of my just and fair protection of our allies and administration of this province. Once these are known to you, I believe you will easily approve of what I want.

Cicero begins by referencing Cato's *auctoritas* and *virtus* so as to highlight his recipient's prestige; this type of language is crucial in aristocratic epistolary culture, especially when the topic is a favor.[74] Cicero took great care throughout the letter to make sure that Cato felt respected. In addition to setting a deferential tone, he also introduced the subject matter he thought most important. First, he communicated his wish that his *res gestae* not be unknown to Cato. Cicero's use of the phrase *res gestae* surely refers to his military action; but it is noticeably efficient, especially when we recognize that Cicero was requesting military honor. The *imperator* gave much more linguistic space to his civil administration (*non ignorari a te qua aequitate et continentia tuerer socios*

[74] Hall 2009: 8ff terms this register the "politeness of respect" or "*verecundia*."

provinciamque administrarem). If Cicero aimed for balance in this important sentence, one might imagine that he could have expressed his pride in his civil administration with equal concision.[75]

§2-10 cover Cicero's account of his campaign season, which I pass over. I do not suggest that this part of the letter is superfluous, only that it has been well-discussed and does not highlight the strategies in the letter that I seek to prioritize here. After the conclusion of his military narrative, Cicero articulated what his actual request was:

Nunc velim sic tibi persuadeas, si de iis rebus ad senatum relatum sit, me existimaturum summam mihi laudem tributam si tu honorem meum sententia tua comprobaris, idque, etsi talibus de rebus gravissimos homines et rogare solere et rogari scio, tamen admonendum potius te a me quam rogandum puto. tu es enim is qui me tuis sententiis saepissime ornasti, qui oratione, qui praedicatione, qui summis laudibus in senatu, in contionibus ad caelum extulisti; cuius ego semper tanta esse verborum pondera putavi ut uno verbo tuo cum mea laude coniuncto omnia adsequi me arbitrarer. (*Fam.* 15.4.11)

Now, I hope that you can be convinced that, if there is a discussion of this in the Senate, I would judge it as the highest praise for myself if you would approve of my honor with your vocal opinion. Further, although I know that the most important men are accustomed to ask and to be asked about such things, I think that you are to be encouraged by me rather than asked. After all, you have honored me most frequently with your voice in debate and have exalted me to the sky with your speech, with your public announcements, with the highest praise in the Senate, and in public meetings. I have always thought your words to be of such weight that I judge that I have gained all with one word of praise from you.

The phrase *velim sic tibi persuadeas* is a common one in the Ciceronian epistolary corpus.[76] This type of language again offers deference to Cato in terms of respect, but it also signaled to the reader that what followed was an articulation of the request: Cicero wanted Cato to support the vote on his honor in the Senate with his *sententia*, in this case the voting of a *supplicatio* (with an eye to a subsequent triumph) in honor of Cicero's victories in Cilicia. Cicero's request should not

[75] Cato's views on provincial administration are the subject of an excellent recent study by Kit Morrell. See Morrell 2017: 98-128.

[76] Hall 2009: 74 notes that the phrase *tibi persuadeas…velim* seems to be a "stereotyped formula of politeness." It appears elsewhere in the Ciceronian epistolary corpus, including in an awkward letter from M. Antonius (*Att.* 10.8A.1). See Hall 2009 Appendix 10 for other uses of the phrase. See also Roesch 2004. Elsewhere in Cicero see *Fam.* 1.8.6, 3.2.2, 5.8.3, 6.20.3, 7.10.4, 9.13.2, 11.5.3, 11.6A.2, 11.17.2, 11.21.4, 12.1.2, 12.30.7, 13.1.6, 15.4.11; *Att.* 2.22.5, 14.13B.5. We shall see below that Cato uses this phrase as well in his response.

be surprising to the reader, but the language he used is worth a closer look. Cato's support, claimed Cicero, would be the *summa laus* in this situation. This, of course, further glorifies Cato, but it also presents an honorific hierarchy important to Cicero's rhetorical project in *Fam.* 15.4: the devaluing of recognition for military achievement. As we shall see, Cicero expected that Cato's praise would be reserved for his non-military achievements, so in this way Cicero is following the lead of his addressee: Cato's praise is more important than the triumph itself. This also hearkens back to the beginning of the letter (§1), where Cicero stressed the importance of his achievements as a provincial administrator rather than a military commander.

Later in §12, we get even more insight into Cato's triumphal policy (as Cicero understands it):

te denique memini, cum cuidam clarissimo atque optimo viro supplicationem non decerneres, dicere te decreturum si referretur ob eas res quas is consul in urbe gessisset. tu idem mihi supplicationem decrevisti togato, non, ut multis, re publica bene gesta sed, ut nemini, re publica conservata. (*Fam.* 15.4.11)

I recall that you, when you rejected a *supplicatio* in honor of a certain great and most notable man, said that you would have approved the honor if it had been requested in connection with the things he had done in the city as consul. Indeed, you approved of a *supplicatio* for me when I was in the toga, not (as for many) for good done on behalf of the Republic but (unprecedentedly) for having saved the Republic.

As I mentioned above, the *vir optimus clarissimus* referred to here is certainly P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57 BCE). As mentioned above, the details of Spinther's campaign are unclear, but he was acclaimed *imperator* by his troops sometime in 55 BCE.[77] If Cicero's testimony here is to be trusted in this instance, apparently Cato had said that he would have honored Spinther for his domestic actions as consul in 57 BCE. During his consulship, Spinther had worked for Cicero's

[77] Shackleton Bailey 1977: 1.110. Cic. *Fam.* 1.8.7 & 1.9.2. Shackleton Bailey's Loeb note assumes that he campaigned against the free Cilicians, as Cicero would during his governorship of the province.

recall from exile and eventually obtained a law to that effect from the centuriate assembly.[78] This implicit calculation (that Cato valued domestic achievements above military ones) is bolstered by the next sentence, wherein Cicero recalled that Cato had voted him a *supplicatio* for his suppression of the Catilinarian Conspiracy in 63 BCE – an achievement that Cicero always championed as a domestic achievement.[79] Cicero's suggestion is clear: Cato preferred to recognize non-military achievements with such *honores;* and since Cicero is saying this to Cato directly, we should suppose that this must have been close to the truth (although for the moment I reserve confirmation for discussion of *Fam.* 15.5).

Thus, in both his opening and in his request, Cicero declined to stress the military nature of the honor he was ultimately pursuing. As we have seen, he instead focused on earning Cato's approval for his domestic achievements. This does, however, create an awkward rhetorical position: the triumph (Cicero's clear aim) *was* a military honor. If he is presenting himself as sympathetic to Cato's rather unusual challenge, why should Cicero care for the honor at all? Cicero next (§13) addresses this natural question:

Quaeres fortasse quid sit quod ego hoc nescio quid gratulationis et honoris a senatu tanti aestimem. agam iam tecum familiariter, ut est et studiis et officiis nostris mutuis et summa amicitia dignum et necessitudine etiam paterna. si quisquam fuit umquam remotus et natura et magis etiam, ut mihi quidem sentire videor, ratione atque doctrina ab inani laude et sermonibus vulgi, ego profecto is sum. testis est consulatus meus, in quo, sicut in reliqua vita, fateor ea me studiose secutum ex quibus vera gloria nasci posset, ipsam quidem gloriam per se numquam putavi expetendam. (*Fam.* 15.4.13)

Perhaps you wonder why I place so much value on this token of congratulation and honor from the Senate. I will be frank with you, as is worthy of our mutual interests, obligations, close friendship, and paternal family

[78] *MRR* 2.199-200; for Spinther's efforts see Cic. *Att.* 3.22.2; *QF* 1.4.5; *Fam.* 1.1.1, 1.1.9, 16-17, 3.7.5; *P. Red. in Sen.* 5, 8-9, 26-7; *P. Red. ad Quir.* 11, 15, 17ff; *Dom.* 7, 30, 70-1, 75; *Har. Resp.* 12; *Sest.* 70, 72, 107, 117, 144, 147; *Pis.* 34, 80; *Mil.* 39; Dio 39.6-8. For the law obtained by Spinther see Cic. *P. Red. in Sen.* 27; *P. Red. ad Quir.* 17; *Dom.* 75,87,90; *Sest.* 109, 128; *Pis.* 35-6, Dio 39.8.2. Spinther also aided Cicero in the recovery of his home (Cic. *Har. Resp.* 13).

[79] This spawned Cicero's (in)famous boast *Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi* (*Off.* 1.77).

ties.[80] If anyone was by nature and especially (as I think of myself) by reason and education more removed from the banal praise and eulogy of the mob, I declare I am so disposed. My consulship is proof of that, in which (as in the rest of my life) I confess I pursued zealously those things that give birth to *true* glory, but I have never thought to seek after glory for its own sake.

This begins something of a Ciceronian apology for triumphal ambition. Cicero has already reinforced the notion that Cato cared little for military honor, but he went further and asserted that he too shared Cato's aversion to such honors. To convince Cato that he shared his opinion, Cicero alluded to his consulship in 63; his description of this period is short but significant: *fateor ea me studiose secutum ex quibus vera gloria nasci posset, ipsam quidem gloriam per se numquam putavi expetendam* ("I confess I pursued zealously those things that give birth to *true* glory"). The concessive valence of the verb *fateor* shows that Cicero knew his addressee disapproves of pursuing glory *at all.* Cicero confessed that he has sought after glory, but never for its own sake. In addition to his domestic role in the suppression of the Catilinarian Conspiracy, Cicero also mentioned that he declined the opportunity to govern the triumph-rich province of Macedonia and instead stayed in the city. What then changed Cicero's mind about the triumph? he explained:

idem post iniuriam acceptam, quam tu rei publicae calamitatem semper appellas, meam non modo non calamitatem sed etiam gloriam, studui quam ornatissima senatus populique Romani de me iudicia intercedere. itaque et augur postea fieri volui, quod antea neglexeram, et eum honorem qui a senatu tribui rebus bellicis solet, neglectum a me olim, nunc mihi expetendum puto. (*Fam.* 15.4.13)

After the wrong I suffered (which you always call a disaster of the Republic – but not for me a crisis, in fact, an honor) I have desired that the Senate and People of Rome issue the most decorous judgements possible concerning myself. Therefore, after this I wished to be made augur (which previously I had neglected) and I also wished for this honor, which is customarily bestowed by the Senate in recognition of military events. Although this honor was once neglected by me, now I believe it I should pursue it.

[80] This is the only reference in our sources to a friendship between Cicero's father and Cato's. Cicero tells us that his father's poor health kept him from spending much time in Rome (*Leg.* 2.3), but nevertheless we do know of a few important connections that the orator's father had; aside from this acquaintance with M. Porcius Cato (tr. 99 BCE), we also know that he knew L. Licinius Crassus and C. Iulius Caesar Strabo (see *de Or.* 2.1ff, 2.265).

Here Cicero gave his justification for desiring an honor he previously ignored. Cicero's return from exile is often painted as one of the high points of his career, but Cicero is also clear here and elsewhere that his physical return to Rome did not restore his financial situation or his position within the political community.[81] Of course, this adds considerable weight to the theme of obligation – now not only is the triumph something Cicero desires, but to refuse him would be to ignore a plea for help. At the same time Cicero was also aligning himself ideologically with Cato by providing an apology for wanting something that most Romans would have seen as inherently desirable.[82] This may be how Cicero authentically felt about the triumph, though it is difficult to know given the obvious incentives Cicero had for agreeing with Cato in this context. Whether or not Cicero truly believed this, however, his goal was to give Cato the ability to approve of *this* request without condoning behavior Cicero knew he disapproved of.

Thus far, Cicero was able to justify his interest in obtaining a triumph in such a way that (at least in Cicero's expectation) Cato might understand. Yet, Cicero has had little to say about why he actually *deserved* the award. Thus far in the letter Cicero has presented a mostly political and pragmatic case. Admittedly I have passed over the military narrative (§2-10), but outside of this portion he spends little time referencing his military achievements. Rather, in light of the passages I have analyzed, it seems clear that Cicero did not expect that his military campaign would win Cato's approval. We have also been able to understand some aspects of Catonian philosophy *vis à vis* the triumph by examining how Cicero broached the topic. Cicero has pointed out Cato's

[81] Rawson 1983: 122-45; Mitchell 1991: 158-68; Tempest 2011: 125ff.

[82] Cicero's other existing letters asking for support for his *supplicatio* do not include any such ideological evaluation.

reluctance to approve honors for military achievements and voiced his approval of such a policy. Now, Cicero's task is to present himself as worthy of an honor normally granted for military achievements.

Cicero began §14 by fortifying the legitimacy of his claim:

paulo ante me negaram rogaturum, vehementer te rogo, sed ita si non ieiunum hoc nescio quid quod ego gessi et contemnendum videbitur sed tale atque tantum ut multi nequaquam paribus rebus honores summos a senatu consecuti sint. (*Fam.* 15.4.14)

Earlier I said I would not ask you, but now I ask whole-heartedly. Yet, what I have accomplished is seems to me neither meager nor to be looked down on, but rather it is of such a quality and scale that many others with achievements not equal to my own have obtained the highest honors from the Senate.

He has made it clear by now that he will not be appealing to Cato in the usual way. Whereas among other colleagues the main question about *supplicationes* and triumphs was military achievement, Cicero has left no doubt that he knows with Cato the criteria are different. Still, lest Cato or anyone else who might read the letter misunderstand, Cicero states firmly here that his military achievements were more than sufficient to warrant the recognition he sought. The more fascinating claim, however, comes after this:

equidem etiam illud mihi animum advertisse videor (scis enim quam attente te audire soleam), te non tam res gestas quam mores <et> instituta atque vitam imperatorum spectare solere in habendis aut non habendis honoribus. (*Fam.* 15.4.14)

Further, it seems to me that in the awarding or withholding of honors you (indeed you know how attentively I listen to you) are accustomed to consider the habits, and lifestyle of commanders rather than their campaigns.

Cicero has put it plainly: Cato's record on the triumph shows that he was more concerned with honoring the *mores instituta atque vita* of commanders than their *res gestae.* That Cicero would characterize Cato's views so clearly in a letter to the man himself strongly suggests that Cato was fairly clear on this issue in his public life. That is to say, although Cicero was a gifted twister of words, for him to misrepresent Cato's own beliefs to him and expect it to aid in his request is highly unlikely. Now that Cicero established this positive criterion, he began to argue his worthiness on these grounds:

quod si in mea causa considerabis, reperies me exercitu imbecillo contra metum maximi belli firmissimum praesidium habuisse aequitatem et continentiam. his ego subsidiis ea sum consecutus quae nullis legionibus consequi potuissem, ut <ex> alienissimis sociis amicissimos, ex infidelissimis firmissimos redderem animosque novarum rerum exspectatione suspensos ad veteris imperi benevolentiam traducerem. (*Fam.* 15.4.14)

If you will examine my case, you will find that I made my fairness and justice the most solid guard against the fear of a massive war – not my weak army. Fortified with these virtues I achieved things which I would never have been able to with any legion: our allies were hostile and aloof, but from their disloyalty I have restored their spirits to a position of greatest reliability – even though previously they were desirous of revolution I have led them to goodwill towards their old empire.

Here Cicero presented his tenure in Cilicia as a working example of Catonian values: fair and just civil administration had succeeded in securing a province when the army could not. This is the part of this letter that has been so often overlooked. Cicero is not saying that his army was weak and therefore he had to turn to diplomacy. Rather, Cicero is confirming for his addressee that his fairness as a provincial governor has left Cilicia in better shape than any military action could have. This must have been the logical foundation of Cato's position. Separate from any sense of friendship, obligation, or shared philosophy, Cicero argues here that according to Cato's own criteria he deserves the *honor* he seeks on the merit of his service.

Cicero's closing of this part of the letter works to reinforce the idea that Cato should consider him worthy of his support:

Sed nimis haec multa de me, praesertim ad te, a quo uno omnium sociorum querelae audiuntur. cognosces ex iis qui meis institutis se recreatos putant; cumque omnes uno prope consensu de me apud te ea quae mihi optatissima sunt praedicabunt tum duae maxime clientelae tuae, Cyprus insula et Cappadociae regnum, tecum de me loquentur, puto etiam regem Deiotarum, qui uni tibi est maxime necessarius. quae si etiam maiora sunt et in omnibus saeculis pauciores viri reperti sunt qui suas cupiditates quam qui hostium copias vincerent, est profecto tuum, cum ad res bellicas haec quae rariora et difficiliora sunt genera virtutis adiunxeris, ipsas etiam illas res gestas iustiores esse et maiores putare. (*Fam.* 15.4.15)

But too much about me – especially to you, through whom the complaints of all our allies are helped. You will learn from those who think themselves renewed by my administration. All will tell you about me as if with one voice, and in terms which are most desirable to me – especially two of your client communities, Cyprus and Cappadocia, will discuss me with you, as will your close friend king Deiotarus. These qualities are more important when you consider that in all the ages there have been found few who conquered their own desires rather than the enemy. When you add to my military achievements these rarer and more challenging fruits of *virtus* you will judge these things and my military achievements to be greater and worthier.

For those who can see past the somewhat humorous opening ("but I have gone on too much about myself") and the author's subsequent dismissal this section reinforces the ideological program Cicero has been advancing, a program I am arguing is actually Catonian. Cicero alluded again to the personal obligation Cato is under for the good turn he has done unto two of Cato's client communities, but more importantly he also once more advertised himself as Cato's ideal provincial administrator. In doing so Cicero playfully mixed Stoic philosophical language with a military metaphor to present himself not only as Cato's ideal provincial governor, but as Cato's ideal *triumphator*.[83] Cicero (unlike others) has conquered himself and his desires and believes himself fully deserving of a triumph according to Cato's preferences.

What can we say in closing about *Fam.* 15.4? Cicero's strategy was more complex than embellishing his achievements or cultivating a sense of obligation in his addressee; what we have seen was Cicero's attempt to engage with well-known Catonian principles. Cicero first took efforts to show that he and Cato shared a triumphal ideology that deprioritized military achievement, and then expressed his need. In this way, Cato would not only be helping a friend, but would also be helping *himself* by aiding someone who supported his program. This required Cicero (if he shared Cato's hostility to military honors) to explain why he would wish for the honor at all. Finally, Cicero presented himself as Cato's ideal candidate for senatorial recognition, which once again aligned Cicero's wish with the advancement of Catonian principles. Judging from what we know of Cato's *modus operandi* (even if our image has been distorted by his post-mortem hagiographical tradition)

[83] On conquering one's self see e.g. Seneca *Ira* 13.1 *Pugna tecum ipse! Si vis vincere iram, non potest te ilia. Incipis vincere, si absconditur, si illi exitus non datur.* Also, *Ben.* 5.20.7, *Ep.* 9.19.

personal appeals were not likely to persuade him. So, Cicero instead attempted to present his pursuit of a triumph as not only useful to Cato, but as an ideal example of Catonian principles in practice.

III.2 Cato's reply (*Fam.* 15.5 = SB 111).

M. CATO S. D. M. CICERONI IMP.

1 Quod et res publica me et nostra amicitia hortatur libenter facio, ut tuam virtutem, innocentiam, diligentiam, cognitam in maximis rebus domi togati, armati foris pari industria administrare gaudeam. itaque, quod pro meo iudicio facere potui, ut innocentia consilioque tuo defensam provinciam, servatum Ariobarzanis cum ipso rege regnum, sociorum revocatam ad studium imperi nostri voluntatem sententia mea et decreto laudarem, feci.

2 supplicationem decretam, si tu, qua in re nihil fortuito sed summa tua ratione et continentia rei publicae provisum est, dis immortalibus gratulari nos quam tibi referre acceptum mavis, gaudeo. quod si triumphi praerogativam putas supplicationem et idcirco casu<m> potius quam te laudari mavis, neque supplicationem sequitur semper triumphus et triumpho multo clarius est senatum iudicare potius mansuetudine et innocentia imperatoris provinciam quam vi militum aut benignitate deorum retentam atque conservatam esse; quod ego mea sententia censebam.

3 Atque haec ego idcirco ad te contra consuetudinem meam pluribus scripsi ut, quod maxime volo, existimes me laborare ut tibi persuadeam me et voluisse de tua maiestate quod amplissimum sim arbitratus et quod tu maluisti factum esse gaudere. Vale et nos dilige et instituto itinere severitatem diligentiamque sociis et rei publicae praesta.

I do freely what the Republic and our friendship encourage me to do: rejoice that your virtue, integrity, and attentiveness, all recognized already in the most important domestic affairs, are equally deployed under arms abroad. Therefore, I did what I was able to do according to my judgment – namely I praised in a speech and on record the defense of your province through your integrity and wisdom, the salvation of Ariobarzanes' reign and life, and the recovery of our allies' hearts and minds to support of our rule.

In respect to the *supplicatio* that has been decreed, if you prefer that we give thanks to the immortal gods for the benefit done to the Republic (which came about not at all by chance, but through your great prudence and self-control) rather than to you, I rejoice. But, if you think that the *supplicatio* is a precursor of a triumph, and therefore prefer that chance be thanked instead of yourself, a triumph does not always follow a *supplicatio*. Yet, much more splendid than a triumph is for the senate to judge that your province was preserved and saved through the grace and integrity of its commander, rather than by the soldiers or the favor of the gods. I said as much in my speech.

I have written to you at length, contrary to my custom, so that you might recognize (as I dearly desire you to) that I am taking pains to persuade you that concerning your reputation I wanted what I judged to be best, and that I rejoice that what you wanted has been accomplished.

Goodbye, think well of me, and according to the path set down provide discipline and diligence to the Republic and our allies.

In my analysis of *Fam.* 15.4 I provided only a few salient passages from a rather lengthy letter. Although in his response Cato claimed to have written "at length, contrary to my custom," it was not difficult to provide the entirety of his letter to Cicero. Whether or not Cato's remark about the length of his letter was tongue-in-cheek is impossible to know, but it is certainly clear

that if Cato considered this letter lengthy his others must have been incredibly brief. Thanks in part to its brevity it is important, but simultaneously difficult to determine the overall tone of *Fam.* 15.5. It is clear in the letters that we do have from the Late Republic that there was a sense of *decorum* associated with aristocratic interaction. In writing letters to fellow senators, the writer had to make sure to preserve the addressee's sense of self-esteem, what politeness theorists Brown and Levinson have termed "positive face." If one side of the epistolary conversation neglected to pay attention to the other's interests or prestige this threatened to damage his correspondent's perceived and actual value in the larger community of aristocrats. Naturally, the risk of offending one's interlocutor was much higher in situations (like *Fam.* 15.5) that required the refusal of a request.[84]

Cato's response (*Fam.* 15.5) has traditionally been regarded as a curt response to Cicero's passionate plea. One reason for this interpretation is, of course, the brevity of the letter. Cicero's letter was about 1,700 words long. If you read it aloud at an average rate (three words per second) it would take you almost ten minutes to read. Cato's response is just 188 words long; at the same pace you would finish it in about one minute. It has been hard for some to take seriously such a brief explanation of such a delicate political situation. Shackleton-Bailey found little in the letter to suggest that Cato was actually attempting to explain his motives to Cicero. He twice called Cato's reply, "humbug," and disapprovingly observed that every sentence ends in a verb.[85] These

[84] Hall 2009: 111-17 discusses some other examples (*Att.* 1.1, 8.10; *Brut.* 1.12). The *Commentariolum Petitionis* recommended not refusing anything at all (*Comm. Pet.* 44-45).

[85] Shackleton-Bailey 1971: 124 & 1977: 449. See also the note in Tyrrell & Purser 1904: 33 which says the syntax of Cato's letter was prose was characterized by, "ponderous pedantry," and that the prose was "stiff," and, "architectural."

assumptions about tone, not unlike the content of the letter, seem to have been gleaned from Cato's reputation rather than close reading.[86] I believe, however, that the letter is not so overtly impolite as some have claimed. Indeed, Cicero himself initially called Cato's letter, "most agreeable" in a letter to Atticus. It is only after Cicero is told that Cato was supporting Bibulus' lesser claim that he became openly frustrated with Cato's objection.[87] The tone of *ad Familiares* 15.5 is important. As we have seen, reading a dismissive or disingenuous tone into the letter naturally leads to discrediting its content. If, however, we agree with Cicero (as I am suggesting) and assume that Cato responded in amity, and in an honest attempt (as Cato claims) to persuade his longtime friend and ally that he believed he had acted in his best interests, then the ideology deployed in Cato's argument would represent a legitimate articulation (i.e. one that Cato believed Cicero could actually accept) of Catonian principles in respect to military honor.

There has been a tendency in modern scholarship to attribute Cato's refusal to his high standards for approving the honor. Magnus Wistrand, to cite one example, has suggested that Cato did not support Cicero because Cicero's campaign, limited in scope and lacking a formidable enemy, failed to live up to Cato's standards. It is clear from the other obstructions listed above, however, that Cato *opposed* commanders who boasted vast campaigns against serious and feared

[86] Hutchinson 1998: 87; Wistrand 1979: 31-34. While I believe that Wistrand misunderstands the reasons for Cato's objection, his discussion of the politeness of Cato's tone in *Fam.* 15.5 is an excellent treatment of the topic. Hall 2009 is also a useful discussion of politeness in Cicero's epistolary corpus, and although he does not specifically treat this letter *Fam.* 15.5 seems to fit with his conclusions about acceptable language in potentially awkward exchanges.

[87] *Att.* 7.1.7; 7.2.6-7; 7.3.5.

enemies.[88] As we have seen above, however, we have no other example of Cato objecting to a triumph on such qualitative grounds. This is supported by the fact that in §1 (as in the rest of the letter) we get no indication that Cato looked down on the scale or nature of Cicero's achievements in Cilicia. Instead, Cato's language is manifestly laudatory. Cato addresses Cicero as *imperator* and immediately praises him for his deeds while *armatus.* He went on to describe Cicero's province as having been "saved" and "defended." Cato next praised Cicero for having preserved Ariobarzanes' life and rule, an achievement that Cicero accomplished primarily through diplomacy, but also with the aid of his army. Finally, at the end of §1 Cato thanked Cicero for the "recovery of our allies' hearts and minds to support of our rule."

At first glance Cato's opening shows great promise for Cicero's request, but if we think (as we did with Cicero's letter) about what Cato is trying to emphasize at the beginning of his reply, Cicero's prospects seem much more tenuous. Above I argued that in *Fam.* 15.4 Cicero sought to gloss over the military nature of the honor he desired, and instead framed his request to emphasize non-military achievement. In his opening, however, Cato has not engaged explicitly with Cicero's rhetorical project from the previous letter. Rather than starting his response with praise for Cicero's philosophical approach to his governorship or his just provincial administration Cato seems to have focused on the narrative portion of the previous letter. In doing so Cato was ignoring the true substance of Cicero's request. Cato did profess that Cicero's province had been "saved" and "defended" which *could* refer to Cicero's honorable administration of affairs in Cilicia (as Cicero had imagined in *Fam.* 15.4). Cato, however, leaves this portion ambiguous.

[88] Wistrand 1979: 24-5. Others have made similar suggestions: Afzelius 1941: 126ff; Fehrle 1983: 222-234; Hutchinson 1998: 87.

In §2 Cato sets about his refusal in earnest, one rather more artful than most readings give it credit for. The *supplicatio* has been decreed (*suppliactionem decretam*), although (as with most of §1) the passive voice is noticeable – likely in this instance because it was decreed without Cato's official support. Cato did not give details on the vote of the *supplicatio* (it passed easily) but rather shifted subjects in order to control Cicero's ambitions.[89] In what follows, Cato constructed an ethical web through which he attempts to control (retroactively) Cicero's motivations for seeking the *supplicatio* in the first place. Cato gave Cicero two options. The first option:

supplicationem decretam, si tu, qua in re nihil fortuito sed summa tua ratione et continentia rei publicae provisum est, dis immortalibus gratulari nos quam tibi referre acceptum mavis, gaudeo. (*Fam.* 15.5.2)

In respect to the *supplicatio* that has been decreed, if you prefer that we give thanks to the immortal gods for the benefit done to the Republic (which came about not at all by chance, but through your great prudence and self-control) rather than to give you credit, I rejoice.

The first point of interest is that it appears as though Cato construes the *supplicatio* strictly as a thanksgiving to the gods, giving *no* credit to the general. On one level, Cato was technically correct: the *supplicatio* was a religious ritual that thanked the gods.[90] It is clear from a mass of our evidence, however, that the *supplicatio* also gave honor to the general on whose behalf it was issued. Léon Halkin identified three different types of *supplicationes.* The first two were focused on communication with the gods either in response to some misfortune (*la supplication expiatoire*) or as a preemptive measure against a perceived threat (*la supplication propitiatoire*). The third kind of *supplicatio,* the one Cato seems to have forgotten, what Halkin calls *la supplication gratulatoire.* This type of *supplicatio* is often translated as "thanksgiving." While it is true that this type of celebration

[89] For the passing of the *supplicatio* see *Fam.* 8.11.2.

[90] *Supplicationes* were also given in times of great distress, e.g. after the Battle of Lake Trasimene. See Livy 22.10.8.

was presumably always formally directed at the gods, Halkin rightly points out that by the first century BCE this type of *supplicatio* clearly honored the commander, and political concerns often determined whether or not a general received a *supplicatio* in his honor, and for how long.[91] Further, it is only logical to assume that Cicero would not have coveted a *supplicatio* if it did not afford him some benefit.

This thesis is supported by the clear evidence that commanders of the first century took pride in the number of days of thanksgiving that they accrued and compared their number of days to others'. Caesar proudly announced that 15 days of thanksgiving were decreed for his actions in 57 BCE, a number unprecedented in Roman history.[92] Furthermore, we have evidence that Cato was being somewhat obtuse in his letter to Cicero; he himself understood the political value that the *supplicatio* afforded its celebrant. In 50 BCE Cato himself voted Bibulus a thanksgiving of 20 days. This is a telling decision on Cato's part, and it exposes the politicking he was engaged in concerning the distribution of honors. The exact details of Bibulus' campaign are unclear; Cicero is our best source and he is undoubtedly invested in downplaying Bibulus' achievements *vis à vis* his own. There is, however, no reason to suspect that Bibulus' *res gestae* were significantly greater than Cicero's (or remotely comparable to Caesar's). The more likely explanation is that Cato and others were attempting to aid Bibulus (his son-in-law) in keeping honorific pace with his political enemy and former consular colleague.[93]

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[91] Halkin 1953: 108.

[92] Caes. *BG* 2.35. He also received two twenty-day *supplicationes*, first in 55 BCE (Caes. *BG* 4.38) and again in 52 BCE (Caes. *BG* 7.90). Pompey had previously been granted two ten-day *supplicationes*, first in 63 BCE and again in 62 BCE (Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 27).

[93] Cic. 7.2.6-7.

From this first option then, the aristocratic general, according to Cato in *this* letter, is unable to win any credit via a *supplicatio* for success on the battlefield, since it is a purely religious ceremony in honor of the gods. The second option that Cato gives Cicero extends this idea to the triumph:

quod si triumphi praerogativam putas supplicationem et idcirco casu<m> potius quam te laudari mavis, neque supplicationem sequitur semper Triumphus et Triumpho multo clarius est senatum iudicare potius mansuetudine et innocentia imperatoris provinciam quam vi militum aut benignitate deorum retentam atque conservatam esse; (*Fam.* 15.5.2)

But if you think that the *supplicatio* is a precursor[94] to a triumph, and therefore prefer that chance be thanked instead of yourself, a triumph does not always follow a *supplicatio*. On the other hand, much more splendid than a triumph is for the senate to judge that your province was preserved and saved through the grace and integrity of its commander, rather than by the soldiers or the favor of the gods.

Immediately noticeable is that, although Cato was able to imagine a *supplicatio* devoid of personal honor, the triumph did not lend itself to this kind of reimagining. This is because the honorific economy presented by Cato in this sentence is strikingly divergent from the political and cultural significance of the triumph, as we know it from virtually all other texts. As with the *supplicatio,*

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[94] The word *praerogativa* is difficult to render in English. In the Republic the *praerogativa* was the century that voted first in *comitia centuriata.* Originally, the *equites* (eighteen centuries) voted first together; but by the Late Republic the *praerogativa* was granted to just one of the first-class centuries (seventy in total). Because the centuries announced their votes publicly, and only voted until a majority of centuries was reached, Cicero tells us that the *praerogativa* massively influenced the following centuries and often indicated the results of the vote. (Cic. *Planc.* 49 *una centuria praerogativa tantum habet auctoritatis ut nemo umquam prior eam tulerit quin renuntiatus sit aut eis ipsis comitiis consul aut certe in illum annum.*) This is, perhaps, something akin to the Iowa Caucus or the New Hampshire Primary in American presidential elections. Shackleton-Bailey's Loeb text translates it as "an earnest," a descendant from the Latin *arrabo* via the Middle English *ernes* – which is a down payment confirming a contract. The sense of "an earnest" well represents Cato's meaning, but the usage of the word peaked in the middle of the 1800's and is rare today. Taylor's discussion of the *praerogativa* is seminal, see 1966: 91-96, also Staveley & Levick's 2016 entry "*praerogativa*" in the *OCD*) calls the *praerogativa* "omen," which nicely renders the sense, but oversteps the boundary between the religious and political that Cato crafted carefully in his letter. I have chosen "precursor" to capture the indicative nature of the *supplicatio* while upholding the secular meaning.

Cato redirected the credit and value of the Roman triumph away from the aristocratic commander. In the case of the *supplicatio,* Cato was able to redirect this positively: Cicero must have intended his *supplicatio* to be a religious affair, thanking the gods for their hand in his success. In the case of the triumph, however, Cato's revisions do not suggest anything so redeeming. The triumph, Cato argues would thank "chance," (*casus)* "the soldiers," (*vis militum*) or "the favor of the gods" (*benignitas deorum*) as the forces that bring about military success.[95] In light of Cato's Stoicism *par excellence,* I here follow Shackleton-Bailey in compressing these three options to two – the favor of the gods and the agency of the soldiers.[96] Yet, regardless of whether or not one wishes to accept three or two options, in both cases there is no option in which a *triumphator* receives any personal credit or benefit from celebrating a triumph. Thus, Cato recognizes that the triumph celebrates military achievement, but he directs the praise from the celebration away from *triumphatores*.

This is not to say that Cato's argument that honors like the *supplicatio* and the triumph were primarily in recognition of the soldiers and/or the gods had no foundation in the tradtional

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[95] Cato's suggestion that "chance" is thanked by the triumph (and not the skill or ability of the commander) is picked up on by the Neronian poet Lucan in his eulogy of Cato: *Si veris magna paratur/ Fama bonis et si successu nuda remoto/ Inspicitur virtus, quidquid laudamus in ullo/ Maiorum, fortuna fuit. Quis Marte secundo,/ Quis tantum meruit populorum sanguine nomen?/ Hunc ego per Syrtes Libyaeque extrema triumphum/ Ducere maluerim, quam ter Capitolia curru /Scandere Pompei, quam frangere colla Iugurthae.* It is speculative, but I believe entirely possible, that this passage was directly influenced by *Fam.* 15.5.

[96] Shackleton-Bailey 1977: 450. The concepts of both chance and divine favor, according to Stoic theology, fall under the category of ***πρόνοια***. Broadly speaking, this suggests that an intelligent divinity guides the operating of all things. Take, for instance, the assertion of Imperial Stoic author Seneca: *sic nunc naturam voca, fatum, fortunam. omnia eiusdem dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua patestate* (*Ben.* 4.8.3). The best modern touchstone (although of course a problematic one) is the Calvinist conception of Predestination, where by all events and occurrences in the world occur according to the already decided upon plan of god (the connection between Calvin's theology and Stoicism is perhaps betrayed by Calvin's first published work – a commentary on Seneca's *de Clementia*).

aristocratic ethos, it did. But it is strain of Roman ideology more concerned with military defeat than with victory. In his seminal work *Imperatores Victi* (1990) Nathan Rosenstein discusses the ways in which the aristocracy of the Middle and Late Republic protected the reputations of defeated commanders. In his search for an explanation for why generals often suffered little political consequence following even major defeats, Rosenstein found that the aristocracy worked to protect its unsuccessful members in order to safeguard the group's legitimacy within the community. Just as a *triumphator's* celebration aided the entire aristocracy in their claim to effective administration of the Republic's affairs, so defeat threatened their narrative. Thus, the aristocracy developed ways of shifting blame away from defeated aristocratic commanders, and it is interesting to note that the two main reasons they favored were divine displeasure and the common soldiers. These are, as we have just seen, the two groups cited by Cato's as the true recipients of military honors. It would seem then that Cato was applying an aristocratic narrative usually associated with *defeat* to the honors bestowed on victorious commanders.

Cato's prioritization of the gods and the soldiers, therefore, should not be seen as an entirely eccentric position, but rather a testament to the flexibility of traditional Roman values. It would be difficult in light of the evidence presented on how much prestige generals gained from *supplicationes* and triumphal processions to argue that the gods and soldiers monopolized the credit for victory as they sometimes did in defeat. Rather, it seems that Cato has reappropriated the logic of a position designed to preserve the aristocracy's claim to *virtus* in order to undermine the value of military achievement on principle. This dynamic is what makes this letter such an excellent source for the renegotiation of aristocratic values in this period.

Cato's letter ends in a conciliatory tone, but one quite different from the congratulatory spirit of §1:

Atque haec ego idcirco ad te contra consuetudinem meam pluribus scripsi ut, quod maxime volo, existimes me laborare ut tibi persuadeam me et voluisse de tua maiestate quod amplissimum sim arbitratus et quod tu maluisti factum esse gaudere. Vale et nos dilige et instituto itinere severitatem diligentiamque sociis et rei publicae praesta. (*Fam.* 15.5.3)

I have written to you at length, contrary to my custom, so that you might recognize (as I dearly desire you to) that I am taking pains to persuade you that concerning your reputation I wanted what I judged to be best, and that I rejoice that what you wanted has been accomplished. Goodbye, think well of me, and according to the path set down provide discipline and diligence to the Republic and our allies.

I have above dealt with Cato's amusing reference to the length of the letter. Cato again rejoices, but this time because "what you (Cicero) wanted has been accomplished." Here, as above, we see Cato attempting to control Cicero's motivations for seeking military honor. His statement is ambiguous, and likely intentionally so. On the one hand, Cato is referring to the passage of the *supplicatio*. Even if his principles did not allow him to vote in favor of Cicero's honor, nevertheless he could still be pleased that Cicero obtained the *supplicatio* despite his abstention. On the other hand, Cato made clear above, in §2, that he "rejoiced" (and it is important to note that in both instances he uses the same verb, *gaudeo*) only if Cicero obtained the *supplicatio* in service of the proper motivations. This kind of flexibility in meaning is a useful tool in this type of epistolary situation: Cicero is afforded the opportunity to read the statement the first way, one that allows him to disagree with Cato's honorific economy. Likewise, however, Cato is simultaneously able (again) to answer on Cicero's behalf as to his estimation of the *supplicatio* and the triumph. In just 188 words Cato has woven a rhetorical web that leaves his addressee little room to openly disagree.

III.3 Cicero's response (*Fam.* 15.6 = SB 112).

As awkward as it is to refuse a request, it is perhaps more awkward to respond to a refusal. The first half of this brief letter (*Fam.* 15.6) restates some of what Cicero had explained in *Fam.*

15.4; in doing so Cicero communicated that he was likewise unconvinced by Cato in *Fam.* 15.5:

Sed causam meae voluntatis (non enim dicam cupiditatis) exposui tibi superioribus litteris. quae etiam si parum iusta tibi visa est, hanc tamen habet rationem, non ut nimis concupiscendus honos sed tamen, si deferatur a senatu, minime aspernandus esse videatur. spero autem illum ordinem pro meis ob rem publicam susceptis laboribus me non indignum honore, usitato praesertim, existimaturum. (*Fam.* 15.6.2)

But I have already explained the reason for my wishes (I will not even call them "desires") to you in the previous letter. Maybe these reasons seem unworthy to you, but this is point: the honor is not to be sought after excessively, but if the Senate grants it ought not to be looked down upon. Still, I hope that body will judge me and the labor I have done on behalf of the Republic worthy of the honor – especially since it is in accordance with custom.

Here Cicero abandoned the main project of *Fam.* 15.4, namely to convince Cato that he was deserving of honor according to the values Cato had espoused in triumphal debates. Cicero had failed to convince Cato using the criteria he imagined Cato would value, but this *did not* mean that Cicero despaired of his triumphal ambitions – quite the opposite. Instead, Cicero now appealed to custom. This is an important point, and a fitting one on which to end the close-reading portion of this chapter: having failed to convince Cato on his own ideological ground, Cicero now appealed to the traditional. This means that, at least from Cicero's perspective, the two were not the same. This is yet another strong contrast drawn between Cato's behavior and expected senatorial practice. Cicero went on to request that if Cato could not support his triumphal claim, then he should at least not oppose it. We do not know if Cicero would have gained this concession from Cato or not – the vote on Cicero's triumph never took place. The senatorial discussion of Cicero's triumph was postponed in favor of the more pressing issue: Caesar's return from Gaul. The Civil War effectively ended Cicero's pursuit of a triumph, although he would not officially give up his *imperium* until 47 BCE.[97]

[97] Cic. *Fam.* 16.11. In the *pro Ligario* (§7) Cicero suggests that Caesar would have allowed him to triumph following his pardon and return to Rome following the Battle of Pharsalus: [Caesar], *cum ipse imperator in toto imperio populi Romani unus esset, esse me alterum passus est; a quo hoc ipso C. Pansa mihi hunc nuntium perferente concessos fascis laureatos tenui, quoad tenendos putavi; qui mihi*

To return to the ideological level of analysis, the first section of *Fam.* 15.6 is far more significant:

'Laetus sum laudari me' inquit Hector, opinor, apud Naevium 'abs te, pater, a laudato viro.' ea est enim profecto iucunda laus quae ab iis proficiscitur qui ipsi in laude vixerunt. ego vero vel gratulatione litterarum tuarum vel testimoniis sententiae dictae nihil est quod me non adsecutum putem, idque mihi cum amplissimum tum gratissimum est, te libenter amicitiae dedisse quod liquido veritati dares. et si non modo omnes verum etiam multi Catones essent in civitate nostra, in qua unum exstitisse mirabile est, quem ego currum aut quam lauream cum tua laudatione conferrem? nam ad meum sensum et ad illud sincerum ac subtile iudicium nihil potest esse laudabilius quam ea tua oratio quae est ad me perscripta a meis necessariis.' (*Fam.* 15.6.1)

"I am happy to be praised by you, father, a praised man," said Hector, I think, in Naevius.[98] Indeed, the praise that comes from those who have spent their life in applause is certainly delightful. Either due to the congratulations expressed in your letter or the testimony you gave in the Senate, I believe there is nothing else from me to gain. That you have freely attributed to friendship what you acknowledge openly as truth is the most rewarding and moving thing to me. If only there were many Catos in our state (not even only Catos). In our state it is miraculous that one Cato exists – what chariot or laurel crown could I compare to you? In accordance with my judgement and with that exact and precise knowledge nothing is able to be more flattering than that speech of yours (a copy of which has been made for me by my friends)."

Cicero first glossed over Cato's refusal and instead focused on Cato's kind words. In doing so, Cicero is saving face for both parties. First, he is (for the moment) ignoring the fact that Cato did not offer his support in pursuit of a triumph and was actually cautionary on the subject. Secondly, in expressing his pleasure at the praise Cato bestowed upon him, Cicero defused some of the tension that comes naturally with responding to a refusal.

This does not mean that Cicero omitted tension from the letter. Unlike in §2, where Cicero was rather neutral about the divide between Cato's ideas about the triumph and what was traditional, here Cicero veiled this thought in flattery: "If only there were many Catos in our state!" There were not. The thought is phrased as if to compliment Cato, but Cicero is also communicating the distance between Cato and his peers. Cato's ideals may be praiseworthy, but they are not in line with the political community in which he lived. This is the same idea Cicero had conveyed a decade

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tum denique se salutem putavit reddere, si eam nullis spoliatam ornamentis dedisset. See also Wistrand 1979: 199.

[98] This quotation of Naevius is a favorite of Cicero, see also *Fam.* 5.12.7 & *Tusc.* 4.67.4

earlier in much less flattering terms in a letter to Atticus, when he famously groaned that Cato lived in Plato's *Republic,* rather than Romulus' cesspool.[99]

IV. Conclusion: Triumphal Philosophies.

This reading of *ad Familiares* 15.4-6 shows that political values were at the heart of Cicero and Cato's discussion of honoring military achievement. We should no longer imagine that ad hoc pragmatic concerns or disputes about the quality of Cicero's campaign or rigorous application of "triumphal rules" were the only issues involved in Cato's rejection of Cicero's request. With the conclusion of this chapter I will move beyond the somewhat strict confines of this epistolary exchange and consider the motivations and scope of this type of behavior. We might put this simply in two questions: 1) Was Cato alone in this type of revisionism, or were other aristocrats also questioning the honoring of military achievement? And, 2) Why might Cato – and others – have formed a value position so divergent from Roman tradition?

Before moving onto new ground, however, it is important to acknowledge that Cato had political motivations in obstructing the triumphs of men like Pompey and Caesar. He was clearly aligned with those in the Senate who were concerned about the power military men were gaining from their campaigns, and triumphal obstruction offered Cato an avenue to check their rapidly growing influence. Plutarch hinted as much during his account of Cato's opposition to Pompey in 61.[100] We may also see the influence of political considerations in Cato's *support* for the triumphal

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[99] Cic. *Att.* 2.1.8

[100] Plut. *Cat. Min.* 30.2 ***τῶν δὲ πλείστων ὑπεικόντων, οὐ τὴν ἀναβολὴν μέγιστον ὁ Κάτων ἡγούμενος, ἀλλὰ τὴν πεῖραν ἀποκόψαι καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ Πομπηΐου βουλόμενος, ἀντεῖπε καὶ μετέστησε τὴν βουλήν, ὥστε ἀποψηφίσασθαι.***

ambitions of his kinsman M. Bibulus. As I mentioned above, one possible reason that Cato supported Bibulus may have been to help Bibulus compete with Caesar, who was gaining immense political prestige from his campaigning in Gaul at the time. This is to say that while my project focuses on the impact of values, I do not wish to suggest that political considerations were absent from Cato's motivations. Indeed, Kit Morrell has shown that Cato's political goals did outweigh his philosophical principles in other areas.[101] It is also important to note, however, that his opposition to the triumphal requests of other figures cannot be easily attributed to purely political reasons. Most obviously, there was no danger that one triumph would transform Cicero into a military despot.

In addressing the question of whether or not Cato was alone in opposing the traditional military ethos of the Roman aristocracy we can look within his own lineage. There is a tempting argument that Cato the Younger inherited his aversion to glorifying military achievement from his famous ancestor Cato the Elder (234-149 BCE). Similar to Cato the Younger's rivalry with Pompey and Caesar, Cato the Elder had often been in conflict with the military hero Scipio Africanus.[102] Cato the Elder was already a larger than life figure in Roman history by the time the younger Cato was born, and his crowning literary achievement was his *Origines,* a history of Rome from its founding and (possibly) the first work of history in Latin. Further, it is clear that Cato the Younger's parsimonious and severe manner was influenced by his ancestor.[103]

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[101] Morrell 2017: 98-128

[102] Plutarch wrote that Cato and Scipio had **πολλὰ διερισάμενος ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ** See *Cat.* 4, 9, 15, 18.

[103] Besides spawning a number of anecdotes which had already become *exempla* for aristocrats of the first century BCE, Cato also produced a large amount of literature which was still

The *Origines* exist today only in fragments, but one odd stylistic element is discernable from what is left of the text and the testimony of ancient readers. Cato the Elder seems to have excised the personal names of officers and commanders from his military narratives.[104] Instead, he preferred to use official titles. This is an example from one of the fragments of the *Origines*:

consul tribuno *gratias laudesque agit.* ***tribunus*** *et quadringenti ad moriendum profiscuntur. hostes eorum audaciam demirantur; quorsum ire pergant in expectando sunt. sed apparuit ad eam verrucam occupandam iter intendere, mittit adversam illos* ***imperator Carthaginiensis*** *peditatum equitatumque, quos in exercitu viros habuit strenuissimos.* (F76)

The consul thanked the tribune. The tribune and 400 men set out to certain death. The enemy admired their courage and waited to see where the Romans would go. But, when it was clear that they were aiming to take up position on that hill, the Carthaginian commander sent a force of cavalry and infantry against them – the most active he had in his army.

This is an episode from the First Punic War, specifically 258 BCE. It is unclear exactly what the name of the military tribune in question was, but this is a good example of Cato's commitment to omitting personal names from such scenes.[105] Even the Carthaginian commander is referred to

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in circulation by the Ciceronian age. Cicero knew of over 150 speeches of Cato the Elder, and he wrote monographs on agriculture, military science, and a work entitled the *Carmen de Moribus,* the nature of which is uncertain. *FRH* 1.193ff. For the speeches see Cic. *Brut.* 65-7; this collection included a speech concerning the fate of Rhodes after the 3rd Macedonian War in 167 BCE which, according to Sallust (*Cat.* 51), Caesar used against Cato the Younger. *De Agri Cultura* survives, but *de Re Militari* is lost and Cato's legal text is poorly attested. Gell. 2.2.1 quotes *Carmen de Moribus,* but its precise nature and subject matter remain unclear.

[104] Other Roman authors commented on this practice: Nepos *Cato* 3.4 *atque horum bellorum duces* (Cato) *non nominavit, sed sine nominibus res notavit*; Apparently, however, elephants who distinguished themselves in battle could expect to be named: Pliny *NH* 8.11 *certe Cato, cum imperatorum nomina annalibus detraxerit, eum, qui fortissime proeliatus esset in Punica acie, Surum tradidit vocatum, altero dente mutilatio.*

[105] *FRH* 3.121-126. The date and location (Camarina) of this event are gleaned from other accounts (Livy *Per.* 17; Oros. 4.8.1-3; Zonar. 8.12.1-3). Gellius, who does not omit personal names, called the tribune in question Q. Caedicius while also mentioning that Claudius Quadrigarius called him Laberius; Frontius (*Strat.* 1.5.15; 4.5.10) used the name Calpurnius Flamma. It has also been noticed that this scene is similar to accounts of the *devotio* of P. Decius Mus as military tribune in 343 BCE during the First Samnite War (Livy 7.34-7; Cic. *Div.* 1.51; Front. *Strat.* 1.5.14, 4.5.9; *Vir. Ill.* 26.1-2). Both the tribune mentioned here, and Mus were said to have received the *corona graminea.* It is likely that Cato gave the name Caedicius earlier in his narrative, given that it

simply as *imperator Carthaginiensis*.[106] It is possible, perhaps even likely, that Cato the Elder provided names of figures relevant to military events at their entrance into the narrative and thereafter referred to them by ranks, but even with such a concession it is undeniable that Cato's writing actively sought to obscure the identity of individual commanders. One could argue then that the younger Cato was taking his cue from his ancestor in seeking to undermine personal claims to military success.

Cato the Elder's point in removing these names was likely an ideological one. The beginning of the *Origines* claimed that the work was about the deeds of the *populi Romani*, and we should see his style of narrative in this light. The "hero" of the work was not any individual but rather the Roman People, and in removing the personal names from achievement Cato emphasized that commanders were representatives of the People.[107] We should not, however, conflate this ideological position with the one presented by Cato the Younger in *ad Fam.* 15.5. Cato the Elder was making a point about the burden of duty that Roman magistrates and commanders carried; when it came to the militaristic ethos of the Roman aristocracy he seems to have been an enthusiastic participant and supporter. This is obviously evidenced by the fact that

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is the name Gellius uses and he does not mention obtaining the name elsewhere – see Astin [1978]2000: 232; Albrecht 1989: 28.

[106] The commander in passage above is uncertain, but Cato referred even to Hannibal simply as *dictator Carthaginiensis* (F78 = Gell. 10.24.7).

[107] *FRH* 1.215ff. Cato *Orig.* F1B (=Pomp. *GL* 5.208) *si ques homines sunt quos delectat populi Romani gesta discribere…*

Cato the Elder celebrated a triumph in 194 BCE following his victory at Emporiae as proconsul in Spain.[108]

Even if we were to dismiss his triumphal celebration as not necessarily indicative of his ideological beliefs, there is some additional testimony in our literature that suggests Cato the Elder's dedication to traditional Roman militarism. Cato the Elder was memorably present for a famous event in Roman cultural history: the so-called "embassy of the philosophers" in 155 BCE. Three prominent philosophers – one Stoic, one Academic, and one Peripatetic – came to Rome to dispute a fine levied on Athens by the Achaen League. While the philosophers waited for the Senate to hear and debate their position they took to the streets to argue amongst each other and made a point of arguing each side of any given argument. The youth of Rome were enchanted with the rhetorical prowess of the ambassadors, but Cato the Elder was anxious about the affect their speeches would have on young Romans. Plutarch recorded the source of Cato's unease:

ὁ δὲ Κάτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε τοῦ ζήλου τῶν λόγων παραρρέοντος εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἤχθετο φοβούμενος, μὴ τὸ φιλότιμον ἐνταῦθα τρέψαντες οἱ νέοι τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ λέγειν δόξαν ἀγαπήσωσι μᾶλλον τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν στρατειῶν. (Plut. *Cat.* 22.4)

But from the instant that enthusiasm for this kind of speaking began to flow throughout the city Cato was troubled. He was afraid that young men would turn their ambition towards this, and prefer to pursue an reputation based on speaking rather than deeds or military service.

If this truly was Cato's anxiety in 155 BCE, and we have no reason to imagine that Plutarch was wrong, then we cannot reconcile Cato the Younger's anti-military disposition with the beliefs of his famous ancestor. Cato the Censor may have had some influence on his successor's opposition to contemporary *generalissimos* like Pompey and Caesar – the elder Cato himself was in frequent

[108] Livy 34.46.

conflict with the military hero of his generation, Scipio Africanus – but Cato Uticensis' hostility to honoring military achievement in principle was not an inherited anxiety.

There is one anxiety of Cato the Elder that does have some possible bearing on the Younger's aversion to military achievement: Hellenistic philosophy. It is impossible to date precisely when the Roman aristocracy embraced the study of Greek philosophy. There may be some truth to the influence of Pythagoreanism among the Romans of the 4th century BCE thanks to the philosopher's residence in Croton, but it is impossible to know for sure.[109] Our sources, however, begin to address the arrival of Greek philosophical ideas in Rome in the middle of the second century BCE following the Macedonian Wars (214-148 BCE) and the destruction of Corinth (146 BCE).[110] Before we have any direct evidence for philosophical engagement we can detect anxiety about the topic via the expulsion of the philosophers and rhetoricians in 161 BCE.[111] The embassy of the philosophers, which so troubled Cato the Elder, came six years later in 155 BCE. Personal associations between prominent Roman politicians and Greek philosophers

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[109] See Gruen 1984: 1.251. Cicero (*de Or.* 2.154) says *Nam et referta quondam Italia Pythagoreorum fuit tum, cum erat in hac gente magna illa Graecia,* although the connection between Numa and Pythagoras to which he refers was certainly ahistorical. He also mentions (*Tusc.* 4.4) a Pythagorean poem written by Ap. Claudius Caecus (cen. 312 BCE). There is also some evidence to suggest that a statue of Pythagoras was erected in Rome during the Samnite Wars, see Plin. *NH* 34.26; Plut. *Numa* 8.10.

[110] Gruen 1984: 1.255ff; Griffin 1989: 3. Gruen cites Cic. *Rep.* 2.34: *influxit enim non tenuis quidam e Graecia rivulus in hanc urbem, sed abundantissimus amnis illarum disciplinarum et artium…* as referring to this period.

[111] Suet. *Rhet.* 1; Gell. *NA* 15.11. The Urban Praetor, M. Pomponius, was instructed to do so by decree of the Senate. There is a less well-attested event in 173 BCE in which the Senate expelled two Epicurean philosophers from the city, see Athenaeus 12.547a; Aelian *VH* 9.12. Griffin 1989 does not acknowledge a well-attested expulsion of philosophers before 161.

became increasingly more common. Scipio Aemilianus may have been in the audience for the embassy of the ambassadors in 155 BCE, but even if he was not, he clearly embraced the enthusiasm for philosophy that gripped his peers. This was, so Plutarch suggests, in part thanks to his biological father Aemilius Paullus (cos. 182, 168 BCE), who emphasized Greek culture in his sons' education, employing the Greek painter and philosopher Metrodorus as a tutor.[112] As an adult Scipio surrounded himself with many Greek intellectuals, most notably Polybius, but the Stoic philosopher Panaetius lived with him and accompanied him abroad.[113] Scipio's nephew Tiberius Gracchus was also frequently accompanied by a philosopher, Blossius of Cumae, whose loyalty to Gracchus was so strong that the philosopher admitted to the consuls that if Gracchus had asked him to burn the Capitol he would have.[114]

The close association between Roman aristocrats and Greek philosophers increased as time went on. Cicero mentioned that the take-over of Athens by the Mithridatic faction in 89 BCE forced many prominent Greek intellectuals to flee to Rome, notably Philo of Larissa who was then head of the Academy.[115] Scipio's keeping a philosopher in his home may have been a novelty, but by the period we are discussing it was common for a prominent senator's entourage to feature

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[112] Plut. *Aem.* 6.8. See also Cic. *Brut.* 77; Diod. 31.26.5. For modern discussion: Gruen 1984: 1.256-6; Astin 1967: 15ff.

[113] Cic. *Mur.* 66; *Amic.* 104; *Tusc.* 1.5; *Brut.* 84; *Verr.* 2.4.98; *Rep.* 1.17, 1.29, 1.34, 3.5; Vell. 1.12.3, 1.13.3; Plut. *Mor.* 777a. Panaetius also had relationships with other prominent Romans, usually with some connection to Scipio. See also Astin 1967: 15, Appendix 6.2.

[114] Cic. *Amic.* 37; Plut. *Ti. Gracc.* 20.4; Val. Max. 4.7.1.

[115] Cic. *Brut.* 306. Cicero cited this event as one that fueled his desire to learn philosophy. For more on the influx of Greek intellectuals into Rome during this time see Rawson 1985: 7-9.

philosophers. The Stoic philosopher Diodotus lived with Cicero, and Athenodorus Cordylion (also Stoic) lived with Cato the Younger. Both Diodotus and Athenodorus died in their Roman patron's home. Brutus lived with the philosopher Aristius, and Aristius' brother, the Academic Antiochus of Ascalon, accompanied L. Licinius Lucullus on his campaigns during the 3rd Mithridatic War, and Lucullus brought the Peripatetic Tyrannion of Amisus to Rome following his return from the east.[116] Pompey's campaigns also brought Greek philosophers into his circle; Pompey met the Stoic philosopher Posidonius at Rhodes and the two became friends, so much so that Posidonius wrote a monograph on his conquests. The Epicurean Philodemus may not have lived in the same house with Caesar's father-in-law L. Calpurnius Piso, but the two were clearly close. Cicero chose his own former instructor M. Pupius Piso Frugi (cos. 61 BCE) to voice the Peripatetic position in his *de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum,* perhaps in light of Pupius' connection to the Peripatetic Staseas of Naples. Plutarch tells us that the only one of M. Crassus' intimates to always accompany him was the Peripetetic philosopher Alexander Cornelius who, despite the immense wealth of his Roman companion, always returned his travelling cloak at the end of their journey.[117]

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[116] Cicero employed Tyrannion as a tutor for his son Marcus and nephew Quintus: *ad Q.f.* 2.4.2.

[117] Cicero/Diodotus: Cic. *Brut.* 309. Cato/Athenodorus: Plut. *Cat. Min.* 10, 16; Strabo 14.5.14. Brutus/Aristius: Plut. *Brut.* 2.1-4. Lucullus/Antiochus: Cic. *Aca.* 2.11. Lucullus & Cicero/Tyrannion: Strabo 12.18, 13.54; Cic. *ad Att.* 12.6.2, 4.4A; *ad Q.f.* 2.4.2, Plut. *Sull.* 26.2. Pompey/Posidonius: Strabo 11.1.6. Piso/Philodemus: Cic. *Pis.* 68-72; also Nesbit 1961: 183-6, Grimal 1966: 47-8. Pupius/Staseas: Cic. *Fin.* 5.8, see also Syme 1960. Crassus/Alexander: Plut. *Crass.* 3.6-8. In addition see Balsdon 1979: 54-8; Griffin 1989: 5-6.

It also became increasingly common for young aristocrats to go abroad for philosophical training. It was somewhat common in the late second century BCE for politicians to attend some philosophical lectures in the east while on their way to or back from an eastern posting but beginning in the early first century young men often went east in a private capacity for philosophical and rhetorical training. Cicero and Caesar went to Rhodes as young adults to study rhetoric with Apollonius Molon, and Cicero went also to Athens. By the following generation "study abroad" was quite common. Cicero refers to travel for study in passing, suggesting its normalcy.[118] Brutus studied with Aristius in Athens, and Cassius was said to have lived more in Rhodes than in Rome.[119] Cicero's son Marcus went to Athens in March of 49 BCE and later commanded a cavalry unit against Caesar at Pharsalus. Marcus returned to Athens in 45 BCE to study with Cratippus and was again recruited for military duty, this time with the so-called "Liberators." Horace too was enlisted to the Liberator's cause while studying in Athens.

This has been the briefest of surveys, but it does show that interest in Hellenistic philosophy among Roman elites had been trending upward since at least the middle of the second century BCE and that by the Republic's last generation a large portion of the Roman aristocracy was engaged in philosophical study – of course to varying degrees. It is not hard to detect this trajectory, what is more difficult is to understand the effect it had on aristocratic leadership. Miriam Griffin has argued previously that attempts to connect philosophical teachings with

[118] Rawson 1985: 10. Cic. *Tusc.* 2.26 in which Cicero assumes his interlocutor spent time in Athens for study, *Rep.* 1.3.6 in which he says that Epicureans go abroad.

[119] Brutus: Cic. *Brut.* 332; Plut. *Brut.* 24. Cassius: App. *B.Civ.* 4.67; Plut. *Brut.* 40.2.

Roman policy decisions is futile.[120] Hellenistic philosophical schools often eschewed politics, and – as the ambassadors in 155 BCE had shown – their teachings were so flexible as to be theoretically capable of justifying many different positions. She was correct to preach caution, and her conclusion that philosophical learning provided Roman elites with a method of debate, rather than a set of rigid principles, is certainly valid.

There are, however, reasons I believe we should consider Hellenistic philosophy's possible role in the questioning of the aristocratic military ethos. First, recent scholarship has, I believe, convincingly argued against Griffin's skepticism concerning the influence of philosophical engagement on decision making among Rome's political class. Kit Morrell's study (2017) on the influence of philosophy on first century Roman foreign policy positions is compelling. Morrell finds that rather than simply providing the semantics through which aristocrats could express themselves to each other (as Griffin argues), "Romans consciously applied philosophical principles in the practice of imperialism."[121] Her study focuses not only on Cato, who could perhaps be considered an outlier in his enthusiasm for philosophical engagement, but also on Pompey, whom we would be hard pressed to characterize similarly. Morrell's project focuses on reform in provincial government but there is no reason, given the nature and strength of her argument, that we should limit our acknowledgment of the influence of philosophy to interactions outside of the city; philosophical influence permeated politics foreign and domestic.

[120] Griffin 1989.

[121] Morrell 2017: esp. 8-10; 98-128.

Further, Griffin's argument deals primarily with situations in which Greek philosophical dogma was able to be manipulated in order to align with traditional Roman values, but in the case of Cato and the questioning of military achievement's role in society we see precisely the opposite. That is to say, the rejection of the aristocratic military ethos as expressed by Cato is so *untraditional* that I believe it is fair to bring philosophical concerns into the discussion about its impetus. Thus, I believe it is relevant that Cato the Younger was a Stoic *par excellence.*[122] Stoicism struggled with the idea that personal honor and prestige was a reward. Stoics argued that the only true good thing was virtue, the only true evil was vice, and that virtue alone was necessary for happiness. Living virtuously meant living in accordance with nature, but this focused primarily on decision making, and not benefits. Living virtuously was itself the only true good, and thus could be the only true goal. Because virtue is the only good and vice is the only evil, Stoics argue, they are the only two things about which we should have concern.

This anxiety about glory is not restricted to *Fam.* 15.5 but appears in many texts where political concerns collide with philosophical tenets. Cicero himself seems to have shared much of Cato's concern on this issue. It is unfortunately now lost, but Cicero mentions a treatise he wrote on this subject, the *de Gloria*.[123] Despite the loss of the treatise, some of Cicero's foundational beliefs about military glory are preserved in his *de Officiis.* There should of course be renown for those who have provided service to the Republic, but the community's estimation of those who

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[122] Cicero called him *perfectus Stoicus,* (Cic. *Stoic Paradoxes* Prooemium 2); Seneca frequently held him up as the model of Stoic virtue (e.g. *Ep.* 104.21, 29, *de Const.* 7.1). I am aware of a forthcoming work by Fred Drogula, *Cato the Younger: Life and Death at the End of the Roman Republic,* which is rather skeptical of the image of Cato as a "perfect Stoic," but its publication (April, 2019) is sadly too late to be included in the present iteration of this project.

[123] Cic. *Off.* 2.31.

found success on the battlefield should hinge upon the *intent* of the commander, and not the result:

…maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnitudine excellit. Declaratur autem studium bellicae gloriae, quod statuas quoque videmus ornatu fere militari. Sed ea animi elatio, quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute communi, sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est; non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis. Itaque probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt propugnantem pro aequitate. Quocirca nemo, qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est insidiis et malitia, laudem est adeptus; nihil enim honestum esse potest, quod iustitia vacat. (Cic. *Off.* 1.61-2)

…above all, the Roman People as a nation are celebrated for greatness of spirit. Their passion for military glory, moreover, is shown in the fact that we see their statues usually in soldier's garb. But if the exaltation of spirit seen in times of danger and toil is devoid of justice and fights for selfish ends instead of for the common good, it is a vice; for not only has it no element of virtue, but its nature is barbarous and revolting to all our finer feelings. The Stoics, therefore, correctly define courage as "that virtue which champions the cause of right." Accordingly, no one has attained to true glory who has gained a reputation for courage by treachery and cunning; for nothing that lacks justice can be morally right.

He also makes a similar argument in the *Republic*:

Agros vero et aedificia et pecudes et inmensum argenti pondus atque auri qui bona nec putare nec appelare soleat, quod earum rerum videatur ei levis fructus, exiguous usus, incertus dominates, saepe etiam deterrimorum hominum immensa possessio, quam est hic fortunatus putandus, cui soli vere liceat omnia non Quiritium, sed sapientium iure pro suis vindicare nec civili nexo, sed communi lege naturae, quae vetat ullam rem esse cuiusquam nisi eius, qui tractare et uti sciat; qui inperia consulatusque nostros in necessariis, non in expetendis rebus, muneris fugendi gratia subeundos, non praemiorum aut gloriae causa adpetendos putet. (Cic. *Rep.* 1.27)

How fortunate must he be considered who is not accustomed to call or consider that fields, buildings, cattle, and heaps of gold and silver are "goods" because the benefit of these things seems to him negligible, their use brief, their mastery uncertain, and who acknowledges that even the worst men possess these things in abundance. It is appropriate for this man to claim all things as his own based on the assent not of the citizens but of the wise, not by societal obligation but by the laws of nature – which forbids that anything be of anyone except for him who knows its use. This man thinks our consulships and commands necessary things not to be sought after but to be undertaken for the sake of duty and service, not reward or glory.

Not only is it clear that these conceptions of military honor are heavily influence influenced by Stoicism, it is important to note how similar this argument sounds to Cato's response in *Fam.* 15.5. The ethical web that Cato deployed in his refusal of Cicero's request sought primarily to constrict Cicero's intent in seeking honor. Using Cicero's own application of Stoic ethics in respect to military honor, we can possibly read further into Cato's response: perhaps Cato felt that

Cicero was not seeking the honor for the right reasons. Cicero himself says elsewhere in the *Republic* that *virtus* does not desire "lead statues, nor triumphs, nor laurels."[124]

There is also some evidence that philosophical considerations influenced triumphal policies of at least one other senator. Five years before the epistolary exchange between Cato and Cicero concerning the *supplicatio,* Cicero delivered his *in Pisonem,* a blistering invective against L. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 58 BCE). Piso, allegedly in thanks for his complicity in the exiling of Cicero, received Macedonia as his province following his consulship, where he was proclaimed *imperator* by his troops in 57 BCE. Meanwhile, back in Rome, Cicero attacked Piso on the grounds that he had criminally mismanaged his province and argued that Piso be replaced. This happened in 55 BCE, and when Piso returned to Rome he neglected to pursue a triumph for his efforts in Macedonia. To be certain, evidence from invective is problematic. Cicero targeted Piso's Epicurean interests in his assassination of Piso's character, but this does not mean that the orator was accurately representing Piso's motivations for spurning the triumph. Yet, we should also consider that Cicero's argument was intended to persuade his audience; if he made ridiculous or unbelievable claims about Piso he would have risked undermining the efficacy of his invective. That is to say, if Cicero targeted the influence of Epicureanism on Piso's political decisions then it stands to reason that Cicero's elite audience would have found this *at least* possible.

Cicero makes the connection between Piso's philosophical interests and his neglect of the triumph explicitly:

At audistis, patres conscripti, philosophi vocem: negavit se triumphi cupidum umquam fuisse. (Cic. *Pis.* 56)

But you have heard, conscript fathers, the voice of a philosopher: he denied that he had any desire of a triumph.

[124] Cic. *Rep.* 6.8.8. *tamen illa divina virtus non statuas plumbo inhaerentes nec triumphos arescentibus laureis, sed stabiliora quaedam et viridiora praemiorum genera desiderat.*

Not only does this passage clearly show Cicero's rhetorical investment in connecting Piso's Epicureanism and his behavior, it also indicates that Piso himself articulated an explanation along those lines. Shortly after comes the highlight of Cicero's criticism of Piso regarding the triumph, his humorous rebuke of famous *triumphatores* past and present. This begins with a sarcastic expression of sympathy for Pompey, who was consul at the time:

Non est integrum Cn. Pompeio consilio iam uti tuo. Erravit enim; non gustarat istam tuam philosophiam: ter iam homo stultus triumphavit. (Cic. *Pis.* 58)

Pompey is unable to follow your advice. Indeed, he has made a mistake; he has not partaken in that philosophy of yours: the idiot has already triumphed 3 times.

Here again Cicero clearly suggests that *philosophia* influenced Piso's decision to shun military honor and, conversely, that Pompey's lack of philosophical interest allowed him to triumph multiple times. Finally, Cicero refers to Piso himself as "Epicurus" when mockingly asking him why he has not been able to persuade his son-in-law, Julius Caesar, to shun military honors. This is only one other source, but it does show both that Cato was not alone in devaluing military honors and that philosophical engagement was at least thought to have played a role in one other senator's position.

The decline in triumphal frequency in the 60's and 50's BCE may have begun through factionally-motivated obstruction, but I believe that by the beginning of the Civil War this trend was indicative of an aristocratic debate concerning values. The triumph and its frequency may seem a relatively minor concern when compared to other signs of political instability in the 50's, but I argue that this kind of institutional change is a result of a wider renegotiation of aristocratic identity. Discussions of the Caesarian Civil War often focus on personal rivalries and battlefields – but these are the results of a much longer process. In order to understand the crisis of the Late Republic it is important to understand the ideological conflict around Rome's political values. In

attempting to explain the sudden decrease in triumphal frequency in the 50's BCE, John Rich blamed the "anarchic political conditions of the time" – and, as I have said above, he is surely correct in part.[125] We should, however, consider whether we might be able to flip this cause and effect. Perhaps the decrease in triumphal frequency was itself a symptom of the political anarchy and instability of the 50's.

[125] Rich 2014: 237.

5. The Aristocratic Ethos and Historical Narratives.

After Caesar's legions repelled Pompey's cavalry and crushed the wing of his army at Pharsalus, the victorious Caesarians overran the Pompeian camp. The men (allegedly) found some strange fixtures among the tents of the Pompeians: gazebos, silverware, turf mattresses, ivy trellises, and other things which Caesar attributed to "excessive luxury and confidence in victory."[1] These were not the things Caesar's men had been accustomed to seeing during their long service in Gaul or the months of maneuvering that led up to the Battle of Pharsalus. The material in the camps reflected somewhat the character of much of Pompey's entourage. In this project we have seen that the decline of the aristocratic military ethos was even more precipitous and complex than we had previously imagined. The final fate of the Republic may have been decided by two military leaders, but it would be a mistake to understand the Civil War of the 40's as the result of rampant militarism among the elite as a whole. After Pompey's flight and death, the resistance rallied around Q. Metellus Scipio and Cato, neither of whom claimed much military experience. Cato's suicide did more damage to Caesar than any military effort he put forth. Caesar's former officer Labienus lingered in Spain until 45 BCE, but the reality was that after the death of Pompey the resistance's

[1] Caes. *B. Civ.* 3.96 In *castris Pompei videre licuit trichilas structas, magnum argenti pondus expositum, recentibus caespitibus tabernacula constrata, Luci etiam Lentuli et nonnullorum tabernacula protecta edera, multaque praeterea quae nimiam luxuriem et victoriae fiduciam designarent.* For a useful discussion of this passage see Grillo 2012: 121ff. We should not, of course, take Caesar entirely at his word about what he found in the Pompeian camp. Cassius Dio (46.61-3), Velleius (2.52), and Appian (*B. Civ.* 2.81) do not mention such luxuries. Plutarch does mention decorated tents and wine. This scene also plays into a larger effort by Caesar to "orientalize" Pompey (see Rossi 2000: 254; Tronson 2001 and again Grillo 2012). Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that Caesar fabricated the decorations of the Pompeian camp entirely.

bench of commanders was rather shallow. Put too simply, but nevertheless in accordance with our reception of the Civil War, a group which previously seems to have required (in a *de facto* sense) military activity for both entrance into ranks and continued success as a member now lacked warriors.

The decline in strength of the aristocratic military ethos has not escaped the notice of the scholars I mentioned in the Introduction to this work, but what I have provided here is a more nuanced understanding of the nature of this phenomenon. The emphasis placed on military activity in discussions of elite behavior and motivations by Harris and others does to some extent seem to accurately represent the political culture of the Middle Republic, but it is a poor foundation upon which to build a conception of late-republican aristocratic values. In the Introduction I cited Harris's desire to see the primacy of military achievement as political reality which endured into the Republic's last generation even in the face of obfuscation by figures such as Cicero, but it is clear now that the evidence does not support so reductive a view. The Late Republic was a political landscape in which the traditional aristocratic preoccupation with military achievement still existed but was also being questioned and challenged by members of the elite. Therefore, Cicero's ambivalence on the topic in texts like the *de Officiis* and the *de Republica* is better understood as a product of the ideological division of the community he inhabited rather than an inconsistent program of misrepresentation. A monolithic conception of aristocratic values simply cannot account for the variety of opinions we find among the elite on this issue in the Republic's last generation.

It should also be clear that the active role some aristocrats took in challenging the status of military achievement in the hierarchy of sources of political prestige was an important catalyst for change. As we have seen throughout, phenomena such as the decline of youthful military service, the

increasing number of magistrates who rejected command opportunities, and the decline in the frequency of triumphal processions have most often been explained by ad hoc pragmatic concerns in modern scholarship, and I again want to stress that such explanations are entirely plausible and, in many cases, likely. But we also must acknowledge (following the lead of Geertz) that the negotiation of community values is both a passive and an active process. The emphasis placed on military service among young aristocrats would not have disappeared *only* because the state hired provincial infantry units, aristocrats considered more than financial gain when mulling taking up provincial commands, and while some in the Late Republic may have avoided the triumph due to the difficulty of the process we also have strong evidence that others rejected military honors on principle.

As we saw in Chapter 1, the aristocratic shift away from military activity began early for young elite men of the first century. Whether or not aristocrats of the Middle Republic had been required to serve ten campaigns before running for office, the amount of youthful service undertaken by the figures examined from the first century fell well short of the traditional expectation. More significantly, just within our sample, the evidence of *decline* was starkly noticeable. Men like Cato and Brutus may have lamented contemporary mores and turned to conservative rhetoric to bolster their positions in the political disputes of their day, but at least in this respect – military service – their actions did not align with their reverence for the *mos maiorum.* Further, in terms of acculturation, this shift away from youthful military service – once a foundational shared experience for the senatorial class as a whole – would have had a significant impact on the body. It is entirely possible that some of the intransigence we see in the debates over aristocratic behavior in the Late Republic were exacerbated by this trend.

In Chapter 2 the evidence showed that the growing aristocratic aversion to military service continued when the men of Cicero's generation entered the Senate and began holding magistracies. When Cicero spoke of a dearth of capable commanders relative to earlier generations at the trial of Fonteius he was not, so far as we can tell, being dishonest. Calamity after calamity had thinned the ranks of aristocratic military men at a startling rate in the generation prior to the Republic's last. When we consider the material from Chapters 1 and 3, the challenge of replenishing the aristocracy's military roster must have been more difficult in the first century when increasingly less men were showing interest in serving the army or even in holding previously much-coveted command positions. Rather, the Senate of the Republic's last generation had largely been content to entrust the most pressing military engagements to experienced military leaders, especially Pompey, with lengthy terms of command. This may make perfect sense by modern American standards, but it was a radical departure from traditional republican practice and no doubt contributed to the shrinking number of aristocrats with meaningful command experience. It is possible then that the republican aristocracy experienced an unusually grave depopulation in the chaos of the early first century BCE and the generation that followed, thanks in part to its growing distaste for military activity, was ill-prepared to absorb the blow.

Finally, Chapter 3 provided a glimpse into the ideological nature of this shift away from the traditional military ethos. The first two chapters primarily looked at evidence of decreased engagement and considered the practical causes of these trends, but in the third we saw Cato make an argument based upon values. Cato's family name and posthumous reputation as a defender of old-school *Romanitas* has muddied the water in the interpretation of his letters to Cicero "*Imperator.*" Cato's arguments in *ad Familiares* 15.5 reveal how innovative and – in light of our understanding of

the values inherited by his generation – we might even say iconoclastic his views on military achievement's role in Roman society were. He objected to Cicero's pursuit of a triumph not on qualitative grounds but rather in protest of honoring military achievement on principle. Nor was his objection to *triumphatores* based solely on the political enmity he held against prominent generals of his day; it is clear that Cato's devotion to philosophy informed his position. If we are to believe Cicero, Cato was not alone in allowing his philosophical devotions to influence his estimation of the traditional militaristic ethos. Scholarly orthodoxy has held that despite the clear enthusiasm for philosophical learning among the Roman elite of the first century we should refrain from connecting their study with their policy positions, but Cato's letter to Cicero shows, I believe, that it is time to reconsider this argument.[2] As I mentioned in the chapter itself, a new study has compelling shown the influence of philosophy on the provincial administrations of Cato an Pompey; this chapter further supports Kit Morrell's findings.[3] In the middle of the second century BCE Cato the Censor had worried about the impact the Greek philosophical schools would have on the Roman youth; the behavior of the aristocracy just a century later, and specifically in this instance of a man who shared his name, shows his concerns were legitimate.

Late-republican political culture, therefore was a landscape which included traditional ideas about the primacy of military achievement *and* one in which that primacy was being actively and aggressively challenged. As I mentioned briefly in the Introduction, one popular way to understand this ideological dissonance has been to view it through the lens of specialization. Just over 40 years

[2] Griffin 1989.

[3] Morrell 2017.

ago Keith Hopkins made a compelling argument for viewing the changes in aristocratic behavior in the Late Republic through what he called "structural differentiation."[4] As Roman society became more complex, Hopkins's claims, institutions within society began to "separate out and become more functionally specific." Some have gone further to suggest that this differentiation followed two principle paths: military and domestic, an opinion first voiced by Cicero, albeit in a forensic setting.[5] Structural differentiation along the lines presented by Hopkins helpfully accounts for the fragmenting and increasingly specialized aristocratic activity (e.g. lawyer, orator, military man), but if we approach this phenomenon focusing on traditional republican aristocratic values then the process is slightly more complicated. The differentiating institutions within Roman society were in competition with each other for power and access to the Republic's resources – the fruits of election to high office.[6] But with the entirety of this study now in view, we have to ask ourselves what it meant to "specialize" in military affairs, and what kind of success those who focused their attention on the army actually achieved.

Thinking back to Chapter 1, it is somewhat paradoxical that, in an era of specialization we saw a nearly total shift *away* from traditional expectations for youthful military service. Logic would dictate that if previous, less-differentiated iterations of the aristocratic community had expected significant amounts of military service prior to seeking office then later, more-specialized aristocratic communities would show, naturally, more young elite Romans shirking duty in the camps but *in addition to* a group of men who spent *more* time in the army in an effort to specialize. Instead, as the

[4] Hopkin 1978: 74-98.

[5] Again, see Afzelius 1946; Rawson 1985: 3-18; de Blois 2000; Rosenstein 2007: 144; and Balmaceda 2017: *passim.*

[6] Hopkins 1978: 74-5.

evidence in Chapter 1 showed, the movement away from the camp was more comprehensive, with even future *generalissimos* serving less than we would expect.

Certainly if we look past youthful service and examine military activity during political careers we are presented with the gargantuan figures of Pompey and Caesar, both of whom fit the description of military specialists. These two men focused their efforts (mostly) on obtaining long, *extra ordinem* commands and subsequently capitalizing on the prestige afforded them by their success. They did not, however, have much company. That is to say, the success these two men had in competing with specialists of other republican institutions such as the law or oratory is certainly worth mention but few others were able to follow their example – or even seem to have tried. Further, outside of Pompey and Caesar, many of those who did focus their attention on gaining prestige through military activity failed to translate such activity into political success. Some of Pompey's legates were able to ride their commander's wave of popularity to consulships in the late 60's, but none were particularly effective as politicians.

More interesting is the group some have called *viri militares.* The term is somewhat plagued by association with a later, Imperial group of men who – if perhaps professionally descended from our late-republican examples – tell us little about their predecessors.[7] But nevertheless these are the men we would expect in a specializing aristocracy. In the *Catiline* Sallust twice uses *homo militaris* to describe men of exceptional military experience. The first describes L. Valerius Flaccus and C. Pomptinus, the praetors of 63 BCE:

Cicero per legatos cuncta edoctus L. Valerio Flacco et C. Pomptino praetoribus imperat ut in ponte Mulvio per insidias Allobrogum comitatus deprehendant. Rem omnem aperit quoius gratia mittebantur; cetera, uti facto opus sit, ita agant permittit. Illi, homines militares, sine tumultu praesidiis conlocatis, sicuti praeceptum erat, occulte pontem obsidunt. (Sall. *Cat.* 45.1-2).

[7] See Campbell 1975; De Blois 2000.

Cicero having been informed of everything through legates ordered the praetors L. Valerius Flaccus and C. Pomptinus to arrest the band of Allobroges in an ambush on the Milvian Bridge. He made entirely clear the reason they were being sent but left the rest to them according to what the deed required. These men, being *military men*, occupied the bridge secretly after posting a guard without any noise as instructed.

Later, we get an even more revealing passage, this time about M. Petreius:

At ex altera parte C. Antonius, pedibus aeger, quod proelio adesse nequibat M. Petreio legato exercitum permittit. Ille cohortis veteranas, quas tumulti causa conscripserat, in fronte, post eas ceterum exercitum in subsidiis locat. Ipse equo circumiens unum quemque nominans appellat, hortatur, rogat ut meminerint se contra latrones inermis pro patria, pro liberis, pro aris atque focis suis certare. Homo militaris, quod amplius annos triginta tribunus aut praefectus aut legatus aut praetor cum magna gloria in exercitu fuerat, plerosque ipsos factaque eorum fortia noverat; ea conmemorando militum animos adcendebat. (Sall. *Cat.* 59.4-6)

But on the other side Gaius Antonius turned over the army to his legate M. Petreius, because his feet were diseased and he was not able to join the battle. Petreius placed the veteran cohorts (the ones he had enlisted because of the uprising) at the front and behind these the rest of the army as reinforcements. He himself was riding around horseback calling upon each man by name, encouraging them and asking that they remember that they were up against unarmed criminals for the sake of their fatherland, liberty, altars, and homes. He was a *military man*, because he had served with great distinction as military tribune, or prefect, or legate, or praetor in the army for 30 years. He was familiar with many of the men and their brave deeds personally, by mentioning their deeds he was enflaming the spirits of the soldiers.

What can we make of this evidence? First, in the cases of Petreius and Pomptinus we should recognize the time-honored ability of outstanding military service to raise the profile of *novi homines*. This means, however, that we should not take the careers of these new men as evidence of *elite* specialization. They were behaving as ambitious men from non-elite families had often behaved in the past.

More interesting is the patrician example L. Valerius Flaccus. Perhaps his extended military service is evidence of such a trend. Gruen discusses his career in his treatment of the professionalization of the army and rightly cautions against "exaggerated conclusions" about military specialization.[8] What Gruen was arguing against was the idea that men were abandoning civic political careers in favor of military ones, and he is surely right. Of the few figures we can find in this period who seem to be *homines militares*, most show some active interest in climbing the

[8] Gruen 1974: 380ff.

cursus honorum. Where I would split from Gruen, however, is in assessing their success. Let's examine Sallust's three military men. L. Valerius Flaccus was son of the suffect consul of 86 BCE, whom he accompanied on campaign in Asia from 86-83 BCE. He then served in 82 or 81 as a military tribune under his uncle, C. Valerius Flaccus, in Transalpine Gaul, and again from 78-76 BCE in Cilicia under P. Servilius Vatia. He held the quaestorship in Spain in 70 BCE (coincidentally, this gave him at least seven years of service before his quaestorship) and was next a legate, first under Metellus Creticus from 68-66 BCE then under Pompey from 66-65.[9] The other two men, C. Pomptinus and M. Petreius, were both *novi homines*, and thus we know little about their life before adulthood. Petreius was the son of a first spear centurion and Pomptinus is the only significant figure from Roman history bearing his name.[10] Both men gained some prominence as a result of their efforts. Petreius was praetor in 64 BCE and Pomptinus held the office in the following year. Pomptinus triumphed in 54 BCE *de Allobrogibus* and later accompanied Cicero to Cilicia. Petreius went on to be a Pompeian commander in Spain and later committed suicide after Thapsus.[11]

This amount of evidence alone would not suffice to claim that a significant portion the aristocracy was specializing militarily, but even if we were to accept these three as part of new group of military personnel it is important to note that their choice of specialization does not seem to have

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[9] *DNP* Valerius [I.24]; *MRR* 2.71, 78. For his action under Creticus see Cic. *Flac.* 6, 62ff; *Planc.* 27. Under Pompey: Cass. Dio. 35.54. See also Ramsey 2007: 177.

[10] For Petreius see Plin. *HN* 22.11; for Pomptinus see Fündling, "I.Pomptinus," in *DNP.*

[11] *MRR* 2.161,167. Cic. *Pis.* 58; Dio 39.65.1-2. Petreius was bested by Caesar at Ilerda in 49 BCE – see Caes. *BCiv.* 1.38-85; App. *B.Civ.* 2.43.168-71). Caesar allowed Petreius to flee and he rejoined Caesar's enemies; he committed suicide after the Battle of Thapsus (Livv. *Per.* 110; Vell. Pat. 2.50.3; Caes. *Bell. Afr.* 18.1-19.6; App. *BCiv.* 2.95.299ff; Cass. Dio 41.62.2ff, 43.2.1-3).

resulted in much political success. Neither Petreius, who had 30 years of military experience when he was a praetor (!), nor Pomptinus advanced to the consulship. After his praetorship Valerius survived a trial for extortion thanks to Cicero in 59 BCE but seems to have died shortly after a posting as legate in Macedonia from 58-56. In the cases of these three men, military service did not, it seems, yield enough political capital to obtain the consulship. This is more striking when we consider a man like Cicero reached the consulship with only two campaigns of military service as a *tiro.* In fairness, Gruen also includes Q. Marcius Crispus (pr. c. 54 BCE), M. Anneius (a Ciceronian legate in Cilicia), Q. Sertorius (pr. c. 85/4 BCE), L. Murena (cos. 62 BCE), L. Afranius (cos. 60 BCE), and T. Labienus (pr. 59 BCE) as examples of military men staying politically active. Indeed, this list features some consuls, but is somewhat underwhelming if we consider it to be the best examples of politico-military careers outside of Pompey and Caesar. Little is known about Marcius before his service under L. Calpurnius Piso in Macedonia in 57-55 BCE. Nothing is known about Anneius other than that he was a legate under Cicero in Cilicia. I have discussed Sertorius above, but – like Pomptinus and Petreius – he did not advance past the praetorship, although he might have in different circumstances. Perhaps Labienus would have reached the office as well if he had chosen the winning side, but we should also note that he does not seem to have had much of a military career prior to his praetorship and subsequent service under Caesar. Afranius was a new man, and thus hardly an example of elite military specialization. Of all these examples Murena is the most likely to fit the billing as an elite military-specialist who obtained the consulship, and it is fair to characterize him thusly.

The main point here is that if the late-republican aristocracy was specializing along the lines laid out by Hopkins and others, then in most cases their efforts to specialize seem to have included

less military experience than the previous, less-differentiated society had expected, and the military specialists were – on the whole – not very successful in the competition for the Republic's power and resources. The importance of this point is that the temptation to rely on specialization in order to understand the behavior of the Roman aristocracy in the first century misleads. The senatorial class certainly did not divide along two career paths, one military and one domestic. Instead, what the evidence presented in this work suggests is a nearly comprehensive shift away from the traditional militaristic ethos during this period.

This could fundamentally change the way we view the rise of Pompey and Caesar. The breakdown of the republican form of government is often presented as a result, at least partially, of the political community's inability to accommodate the immense prestige of politico-military "dynasts" who were increasingly monopolizing command and dangerously outpacing their peers in the accumulation of political capital.[12] Such accounts normally make the conclusion – in fairness, a logical one given our understanding of traditional aristocratic values – that men like Pompey and Caesar had found innovative ways to gain repeated commands at the expense of their peers. In this way, the ambition of a few powerful men helped destabilize the Republic's fragile political equilibrium to the point of collapse, and indeed past it. How differently we might conceive of the *extra ordinem* commands of the first century in light of this evidence for the shortage of commanders!

[12] See e.g. Syme 1939 *passim*; Hopkins 1978: 92ff; Rich 1993, Rose 1995: 388; Steel 2013: 242; 2014: 235ff; Vervaet 2014: 214-52; Stevenson 2015; Hammer 2015: 510ff; Lange 2016: 71ff. Contra Gruen 1974: 102ff.

What is now clear is that the temptation to view these men as military dynasts glosses over the fact that Pompey and Caesar were pursuing military positions at a time when others were increasingly avoiding such opportunities. In the Introduction I began by citing a tension between the decline in strength of the traditional militaristic ethos and the "dynast narrative," in which Pompey and Caesar dominated the political landscape on the foundation of their military prestige. Recall a passage I spent some time on in Chapter 2:

Quid nunc vobis faciendum est studiis militaribus apud iuventutem obsoletis, fortissimis autem hominibus ac summis ducibus partim aetate, partim civitatis discordiis ac rei publicae calamitate consumptis, cum tot bella aut a nobis necessario suscipiantur aut subito atque inprovisa nascantur? Nonne et hominem ipsum ad dubia rei publicae tempora reservandum et ceteros studio laudis ac virtutis inflammandos putatis? (Cic. *Font.* 42)

Now what should you do, when military service has been forgotten among the youth, when our bravest men and best generals have been spent either by age, civil war, or disaster, when so many wars are taken up by us either because of necessity or which arise suddenly and unexpectedly? Do you not think that this man should be preserved for this doubtful period for the Republic in addition to exciting the enthusiasm for praise and *virtus* among the rest?

I focused on examining Cicero's reasons for the dearth of military men, but now we should note the argument this point was supporting. Cicero's logic here is quasi-economic: the demand for capable commanders – conflict – had stayed consistent, but the supply of such men had dropped drastically. In light of the shortage of commanders in this period, which Chapter 2 found evidence to support, we may instead think of these two careers in terms of supply and demand.

Thinking about military achievement and political power in terms of supply and demand can help us reconcile our two competing narratives. In the past, when there was a large amount of demand for military commanders and a large supply of them, the political value of military service was high primarily because military affairs were important to the survival of the community. The community had agreed, so to speak, that military activity was important and confirmed this with their votes. Up to this point in the project we have seen the ways in which aristocrats had found

other routes to political prominence, and the corresponding decline in aristocratic military service – both in youth and as magistrates. This decline in activity represents a decline in the supply of capable commanders, and since there is no corresponding decline in demand for commanders we should naturally expect those who can fulfil that role to reap greater rewards. Looking at the first century in this way makes it possible to reconcile elite disinterest in military service with the rise of politico-military giants like Caesar and Pompey: in terms of supply and demand these trends would naturally go hand in hand. Further, perhaps these men were not as much military "dynasts" as opportunists who saw a chance to capitalize on military achievement even while the importance of such activity seemed to be declining in political value.

The implications of this evidence and their influence on orthodox historical narratives stretches even past the end of the Republic. Since Ronald Syme's *The Roman Revolution* (1939) one interpretation of the Augustan settlement has been that the *princeps* brought *pax* partly by monopolizing the prestige associated with military achievement and thus disincentivizing military activity. The Late Republic, so the argument goes, had suffered from the unchecked ambition of its elite and Augustus stopped the chaos abruptly by centralizing the benefits of military action within the imperial house.[13] This interpretation makes sense if we understand the Late Republic as an succession of military warlords; Tacitus did, as did Syme.[14] But if we think of the trends in aristocratic behavior outlined here we see something more complex. It is certainly true that Augustus emerged from two generations of almost constant civil bloodshed, much of it stemming

[13] E.g. Syme 1939: esp. 2ff; 15ff, 513-4; Richardson 2012: 76-77.

[14] Tac. *Hist.* 2.38; Syme 1939: 9.

from the community's inability to grapple with its military leaders. Yet, we could also see the monopolization of military achievement by the imperial house as the end of a shift in aristocratic values which had developed alongside the historical narrative of Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar. This is to say that Augustus' "monopolization" of military pusuits looks rather different when we consider this evidence. These arguments are speculative, but they are also areas where further research may build upon the findings of this project.

Appendix I: Evidence for Pre-Consular Command Among the Consuls of 81-49 BCE.

Key: PM = promagistrate (exact position uncertain); Leg. = legate; P = praetor; PP = propraetor; PC = proconsul.

Name (*RE* number) (consular year)
- Year. Position. (Citation in *MRR*).[1]

1. Q. Caecilius (98) Metellus Pius (cos. 80 BCE).
   - 88-87 BCE. PC in the Social War. (*MRR* 2.42, 48)
   - 86-83 BCE. Command of Sullan forces in Africa. (*MRR* 2.54, 58, 61)
   - 83 BCE. PC in Campania. (*MRR* 2.63)
   - 82 BCE. PC in Northern Italy. (*MRR* 2.68)

2. L. Cornelius (392) Sulla Felix (cos. 80 BCE)[2]

3. P. Servilius (93) Vatia Isauricus (cos. 79 BCE).
   - 90-89 BCE. P or PP in Sardinia(?). (*MRR* 2.26, 35)
   - 87 BCE. Leg. under Sulla at Ariminum. (*MRR* 2.51)
   - 82 BCE. Leg. under Sulla at Clusium. (*MRR* 2.72)

4. Ap. Claudius (296) Pulcher (cos. 79 BCE)
   - 87 BCE. Probably a PP under Sulla at Nola. (*MRR* 2.48)

5. M. Aemilius (72) Lepidus (cos. 78 BCE)
   - 77 BCE. PP in Sicily. (*MRR* 2.89)

6. Mam. Aemilius (80) Lepidus Livianus (cos. 77 BCE)
   - 82 or 81 BCE. PM (Leg.?) at Norba. (*MRR* 2.71)

7. C. Scribonius (10) Curio (cos. 76 BCE)
   - 86 BCE. Leg. under Sulla in Athens. (*MRR* 2.56)
   - 85 BCE. Leg. in Bithynia. (*MRR* 2.59)

[1] For brevity's sake I am providing the citation in MRR rather than an exhaustive review of the sources. I also have consulted the new and excellent *Digital Prosopography of the Roman Republic* (romanrepublic.ac.uk) and recommend that interested readers do the same.

[2] Sulla's record of command experience up to 80 BCE was quite extensive and well known, nor was this his first consulship. For details see *RE* ("Cornelius" no.392) and for a scholarly review of his career see Keaveney's biography, now in its second edition ([1982]2005).

8. C. Aurelius (96) Cotta (cos. 75 BCE) OR M. Aurelius (107) Cotta (cos. 74 BCE)[3]
   - 80 BCE. Possibly a PP in Spain. (*MRR* 2.80)

9. L. Licinius (104) Lucullus (cos. 74 BCE)
   - 77-76 BCE. PP in Africa. (*MRR* 2.90, 94)

10. M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (Licinius 109) (cos. 73 BCE)
   - 82 BCE. PP in Gaul. (*MRR* 2.70)

11. L. Gellius (17) Popicola (cos. 72 BCE)
   - 93 BCE. PC in Asia. (*MRR* 2.15)
   - 89 BCE. Leg. under Pompeius Strabo. (*MRR* 2.36)

12. Cn. Cornelius (216) Lentulus Clodianus (cos. 72 BCE)
   - Before 75 BCE. Leg.[4]

13. Cn. Aufidius (32) Orestes (cos. 71 BCE)
   - 76 BCE. PM (PP?) in Spain. (*MRR* 2.94)

14. Cn. Pompeius (31) Magnus (cos. 70, 55, 52 BCE)[5]

15. M. Licinius (68) Crassus (cos. 70, 55 BCE)
   - 82 BCE. Possibly Leg. under Sulla. (*MRR* 2.71)
   - 72-71 BCE. PC against Spartacus (*MRR* 2.118, 123)

16. Q. Caecilius (87) Metellus Creticus (cos. 69 BCE)

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[3] Again, either C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75 BCE) or M. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 74 BCE) *may* have been the propraetor in Spain defeated by Sertorius at sea in 80 BCE (Plut. *Sert.* 12.3), but it is unclear. Konrad 1978 suggests that neither of these men was the propraetor in question but that is was their younger brother L. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 65). See *MRR* 3.31. The legateship of Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69 BCE) is also somewhat uncertain. Cic *Leg. Man.* 58 mentions a Q. Metellus who was tribune of plebs one year and then legate the next, but this could also have been Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60 BCE). See *MRR* 3.38.

[4] Cicero (*leg. Man.* 58) gives examples of men who held the tribunate on year and a legateship the next, this may the Cn. Lentulus mentioned although it could also be Cn. Cornelius (228) Lentulus Marcellinus (cos. 56 BCE).

[5] Like Sulla, Pompey's command résumé is well known and well attested. See *RE* ("Pompeius" no. 31) and for a scholarly review of his career see Seager's biography, now in its second edition ([1979]2002).

- 81 BCE(?). Leg.[6]

17. L. Caecilius (74) Metellus (cos. 68 BCE)
    - 70 BCE. PP in Sicily. (*MRR* 2.128-9)

18. L. Manlius (79) Torquatus (cos. 65 BCE)
    - 67 BCE. Leg. under Pompey against the pirates. (*MRR* 2.149)

19. C. Antonius (19) Hybrida (cos. 63 BCE)
    - 65 BCE. Leg. (*MRR* 2.160)

20. L. Licinius (123) Murena (cos. 62 BCE)
    - 73-71 BCE. Leg. under Lucullus. (*MRR* 2.109n.5, 113, 119)

21. M. Pupius (10) Piso Frugi Calpurnianus (cos. 61 BCE)
    - 71-69 BCE. PC in Spain (*MRR* 2.124, 129, 133)
    - 67-65 BCE. Leg. under Pompey. (*MRR* 2.149)

22. Q. Caecilius (86) Metellus Celer (cos. 60 BCE)
    - 67 BCE. Leg. under Pompey in Armenia. (*MRR* 2.145)
    - 63 BCE. P against Catiline. (*MRR* 2.168-9)
    - 62 BCE. PC in Gaul. (*MRR* 2.176)

23. L. Afranius (60) (cos. 60 BCE)
    - 75-72/3 BCE. Leg under Pompey. (2.99, 119)
    - 70-69 BCE. PC in Spain. (2.128, 133)
    - 66-64 BCE. Leg. under Pompey (2.156, 160, 164)

24. C. Iulius (131) Caesar (cos. 59 BCE)
    - 61 BCE. PC in Spain. (*MRR* 2.180)

25. M. Calpurnius (28) Bibulus (cos. 59 BCE)
    - 51-48 BCE. PC in Syria and Macedonia. (*MRR* 2.242, 250, 261, 275)

26. L. Calpurnius (90) Piso Caesonius (cos. 58 BCE)
    - 60 BCE. Possibly PC in Spain.[7]

27. A. Gabinius (11) (cos. 58 BCE)
    - 66-63 BCE. Leg. under Pompey. (*MRR* 2.156, 164, 170)

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[6] Possibly another man mentioned by Cicero in *leg. Man.* 58, but unclear. See *MRR* 3.38.

[7] Unclear. See Syme 1956: 129-134; *MRR* 3.47.

28. P. Cornelius (238) Lentulus Spinther. (cos. 57 BCE)
    - 59 BCE. PM (PC?) in Spain. (*MRR* 2.191)

29. Q. Caecilius (96) Metellus Nepos (cos. 57 BCE)
    - 67-63 BCE. Leg. under Pompey. (2.148, 160, 164, 170)
    - 59 BCE. PM (PC?) in Spain. (*MRR* 2.180)

30. Cn. Cornelius (228) Lentulus Marcellinus (cos. 56 BCE)
    - 67-65 BCE. Leg. under Pompey. (2.148)
    - 59-58 BCE. PC in Syria (*MRR* 2.190, 197)

31. Ap. Claudius (297) Pulcher (cos. 54 BCE)
    - 56 BCE. Leg. under Lucullus. (*MRR* 2.210)
    - 56 BCE. PM in Sardinia (*MRR.* 2.210)

32. Cn. Domitius (43) Calvinus (cos. 53 BCE)
    - 62 BCE. Leg. under Valerius Flaccus in Asia. (*MRR* 2.177)

Consuls with no record of having held *imperium* prior to their consulship:

1. Q. Lutatius (8) Catulus (cos. 78 BCE)

2. D. Iunius (46) Brutus (cos. 77 BCE)

3. Cn. Octavius (22) (cos. 76 BCE)

4. Cn. Octavius (26) (cos. 75 BCE)

5. C. Aurelius (96) Cotta (cos. 75 BCE) OR M. Aurelius (107) Cotta (cos. 74 BCE)

6. C. Cassius (58) Longinus (cos. 73 BCE)

7. P. Cornelius (240) Lentulus Sura (cos. 71 BCE)

8. Q. Hortensius (13) Hortalus (cos. 69 BCE)

9. Q. Marcius (92) Rex (cos. 68 BCE)

10. C. Calpurnius (63) Piso (cos. 67 BCE)

11. M. Acilius (38) Glabrio (cos. 67 BCE)

12. M'. Aemilius (62) Lepidus (cos. 66 BCE)

13. L. Volcatius (8) Tullus (cos. 66 BCE)

14. L. Aurelius (102) Cotta (cos. 65 BCE)

15. L. Iulius (143) Caesar (cos. 64 BCE)

16. C. Marcius (63) Figulus (cos. 64 BCE)

17. M. Tullius (29) Cicero (cos. 63 BCE)

18. D. Iunius (163) Silanus (cos. 62 BCE)

19. M. Valerius (266) Messalla Niger (cos. 61 BCE)

20. L. Marcius (76) Philippus (cos. 56 BCE)

21. L. Domitius (27) Ahenobarbus (cos. 54 BCE)

22. M. Valerius (268) Messalla Rufus (cos. 53 BCE)

23. P. Cornelius (352) Scipio Nasica (cos. 52 BCE)

24. Ser. Sulpicius (95) Rufus (cos. 51 BCE)

25. M. Claudius (229) Marcellus (cos. 51 BCE)

26. L. Aemilius (81) Paullus (50 BCE)

27. C. Claudius (216) Marcellus (cos. 50 BCE)

28. L. Cornelius (218) Lentulus Crus (cos. 49 BCE)

29. C. Claudius (217) Marcellus (cos. 49 BCE)

Appendix II: Casualties Among Magistrates 91-71 BCE.

Rank	Name	Cause of Death
91 BCE		
1. Pr.	Q. Servilius (29)	Mob violence.[1]
2. Leg.	Fonteius (2)	Mob violence.
3. PC	M. Porcius (14) Cato	Unclear.[2]
90 BCE		
1. Cos.	P. Rutilius (26) Rufus	Killed in action.[3]
2. Pr.	L. Postumius	Killed in action.[4]
3. PC.	Sex. Iulius (151) Caesar	Illness.[5]
4. PC.	Q. Servilius (50) Caepio	Killed in action.[6]
5. Leg.	C. Baebius (11)	Executed.[7]
89 BCE		

[1] Servilius is recorded as a praetor in Vell., Diod., and Oros. but Livy and App. call him a proconsul. Mommsen thought he was a praetor with *imperium pro consule* (*StR* 2.235). The murder of him and his legate Fonteius began the Social War. See Diod. 37.13.2; Livy *Per.* 72; Vell. 2.15.1; Flor. 2.6.9; App. *BC* 1.38; Oros. 5.18.8.

[2] The only source for his death is Gell. 13.20.9. He had performed well in the Battle of Pydna (see Cic. *Off.* 1.37; Plut. *Aem.* 21.1-3; *Cat. Mai.* 20.6-8; Val. Max. 3.2.16.

[3] Rutilius ignored Marius' cautioning about the preparedness of his troops and was killed in Tolenus Valley. Livy *Per.* 73; Vell. 2.16.2; App. *BC* 1.40, 43; Flor. 2.6.12. See also Dio 29, Oros. 5.18.11-12, and Ovid *Fast.* 6.563-566.

[4] Killed by the Samnites at Nola. Livy *Per.* 73; App. *BC* 1.42.

[5] He died of illness while besieging Asculum. Livy *Per.* 73; App. *BC* 1.48.

[6] He received part of Rutilius' command after the consul's death but was killed in an ambush. Livy *Per.* 73; App. *BC* 1.44; Eutrop. 5.3.2; Oros. 5.18.14; Flor. 2.6.11.

[7] Served under Sex. Iulius Caesar, but was arrested in the proscriptions and executed at Asculum. App. *BC* 1.48.

1.	Cos.	L. Procius (16) Cato	Killed in action.[8]
2.	Pr.	A. Sempronius (17) Asellio	Mob violence.[9]
3.	Leg.	T. Didius (5)	Killed in action.[10]
4.	Leg.	A. Gabinius (9)	Killed in action.[11]
5.	Leg.	A. Postumius (36) Albinus	Mutiny.[12]

88 BCE

1.	Cos.	Q. Pompeius (4) Strabo	Mutiny.[13]
2.	Pr.	Q. Ancharius (2)	Executed.[14]
3.	Trib. Pleb.	P. Sulpicius (92) Rufus	Executed.[15]
4.	Leg.	M'. Aquilius (11)	Killed in action.[16]
5.	Leg.	M. Gratidius (1)	Mutiny.[17]

87 BCE

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[8] Killed during a defeat at the hands of the Marsi. Sisenna fr.52; Dio 30-5; Livy *Per.* 75; Vell. 2.16.4; App. *BC* 1.50; Eutrop. 5.3.2; Oros. 5.18.24.

[9] Killed in Rome by a mob. Livy *Per.* 74; val. Max. 9.7.4; App. *BC* 1.54.

[10] Killed on June 11th after he captured Herculaneum. Ovid *Fast.* 6.567ff.

[11] Killed during a siege in Lucania. Livy *Per.* 76; Flor. 2.6.13; Oros. 5.18.25.

[12] Killed by his own men. Livy *Per.* 75; Val. Max. 9.8.3; Plut. *Sull.* 6.9; Oros. 5.18.22.

[13] Livy *Per.* 77; Vell. 2.20.1; Val. Max. 9.7; App. *BC* 1.63.

[14] Killed at the command of Marius. Plut. *Mar.* 43.3; App. *BC* 1.73; Flor. 2.9.16.

[15] He had been one of the main movers against Sulla during his tribunate. Upon Sulla's return to Rome he was betrayed. *Herenn.* 1.25, 4.31; Cic. *Or.* 3.11; *Vat.* 23; *Cat.* 3.24; *Leg.* 3.20; *Phil.* 8.7; *Har. Resp.* 41; *Brut.* 227, 307; *Lael.* 2; Sall. *Hist.* 1.77.7M; Nepos *Att.* 2.1; Livy *Per.* 77; Vell. 2.19.1; Val. Max. 6.5.7; Ascon. 64C, 80C; Plut. *Sull.* 10.1; App. *BC* 1.55-60; Flor. 2.9.8; Oros. 5.19.6.

[16] Captured by Mithridates and executed. Livy *Per.* 77-78; App. *Mith.* 17, 19, 21, 112; Val. Max. 9.13.1; Vell. 2.18.3; Plin. *NH* 33.48; Cic. *Leg. Man.* 11; *Scaur.* 3.2; *Tusc.* 5.14.

[17] Sent by Marius to take over Sulla's army but was killed by the soldiers. Val. Max. 9.7; Oros. 5.19.4; Plut. *Mar.* 35.4; *Sull.* 8.4.

1.	Cos.	Cn. Octavius (20)	Executed.[18]
2.	Cos. Suff.	L. Cornelius (106) Merula	Suicide.[19]
3.	PC	Cn. Pompeius (14) Strabo	Illness.[20]
4.	Trib. Pleb.	Sex. Lucilius (15)	Executed.[21]
5.	Leg.	P. Licinius (61) Crassus	Suicide.[22]
6.	Leg.	C. Milonius (2)	Executed.[23]
7.	M. Trib.	C. Flavius (88) Fimbria	Killed in action.[24]
8.	Pref.	P. Caelius (13)	Suicide.[25]
9.	Pont.	C. Iulius Caesar Strabo	Executed.[26]

86 BCE

1.	Cos.	C. Marius (14)	Illness.[27]

[18] Killed by the partisans of Cinna after taking the Janiculum in protest. Cic. *Cat.* 3.24; *Har. Resp.* 54; *Phil* 8.7, 3.1-2; *Tusc.* 5.55; Livy *Per.* 80; Vell. 2.22.2; Ascon. 23C; Plut. *Mar.* 42.4-5; *Sull.* 12.8; App. *BC* 1.71; Flor. 2.9.14.

[19] Diod. 38.3; Val. Max. 9.12.5; Vell. 2.20.3, 22.3; Tac. *Ann.* 3.58; Plut. *Mar.* 41.1, 45.2; App. *BC* 1.65-66, 70, 74; Flor. 2.9.16; Dio 30-35.

[20] Struck by lightning. Sisenna fr. 129; Livy *Per.* 79; Vell. 2.21.1-4; Val. Max. 5.5.4; Plut. *Pomp.* 1, 3; App. *BC* 1.66-68, 80; Gran. Lic. 25-29B; Oros. 5.19.10-13, 18.

[21] Thrown from the Tarpeian Rock. Vell. 2.24.2; Liv. *Per.* 80; Plut. *Mar.* 45.1; Dio 30-35.

[22] He killed himself after his son was killed. Cic. *Sest.* 48; *Or.* 3.10; *Scaur.* 1-3; *Tusc.* 5.55; Diod. 37.29.5; Livy *Per.* 80; Ascon. 23, 25C; Lucan 2.124; Plut. *Crass.* 4.1, 6.3; App. *BC* 1.72; Flor. 2.9.14.

[23] Killed on the Janiculum with Octavius. Gran. Lic. 23, 25B.

[24] He killed Crassus' son, but was apparently killed himself. Livy *Per.* 80; Flor. 2.914; Augustine *CD* 3.27.

[25] Committed suicide before he could be captured by the partisans of Cinna. Val. Max. 4.7.5.

[26] Killed by Marians. Cic. *Brut.* 307; *Or.* 3.10; *Tusc.* 5.55; Livy *Per.* 80; Val. Max. 5.3.3, 9.2.2; Ascon. 25C; Suet. *Cal.* 60; App. *BC* 1.72; Flor. 2.9.14; Augustine *CD* 3.27.

[27] Died early in the year, January 13th. Cic. *ND* 3.81; *Rosc. Amer.* 33; Livy *Per.* 80; Vell. 2.23.1; Plut. *Mar.* 45.2-46.5; App. *BC* 1.75; Flor. 2.9.17; Oros. 5.19.23.

	2. Cos. Suff.	L. Valerius (57) Flaccus	Mutiny.[28]
85 BCE			
	1. Leg.	C. Flavius (88) Fimbria	Suicide.[29]
84 BCE			
	1. Cos.	L. Cornelius (106) Cinna	Mutiny.[30]
82 BCE			
	1. Cos.	Cn. Papirius (38) Carbo	Executed.[31]
	2. PC	C. Norbanus (5)	Suicide.[32]
	3. Pr.	Q. Antonius (41) Balbus	Killed in action.[33]
	4. Pr.	C. Carrinas (1)	Executed.[34]
	5. Pr.	L. Iunius (58) Brutus Damasippus	Executed.[35]
	6. Trib. Pleb.	Q. Valerius (50) Soranus	Executed.[36]

[28] Killed in a mutiny led by his own legate. Cic. *Flacc.* 61; Sall. *Hist.* 3.33, 5.13M; Diod. 38.8.1; Stabo 133.1.27; Livy *Per.* 82, 98; Vell. 2.24.1; Plut. *Sull.* 20.1; *Luc.* 7.2; App. *BC* 1.75; *Mith.* 51-53; Dio 30-35; Oros. 6.2.9.

[29] After some success against Mithridates he committed suicide when his army defected to Sulla. Diod. 38.8; Livy *Per.* 83; Vell. 2.24.1; Stabo 13.1.27; Plut. *Sull.* 25.1; App. *Mith.* 59-60; Oros. 62.9-11.

[30] Killed by his own troops at Ancona. Livy *Per.* 83; Vell. 2.24.5; Plut. *Sert.* 6.1; *Pomp.* 5.1-2; App. *BC* 1.77-78; Oros. 5.19.24.

[31] Forced from Gaul he fled to Africa where he was captured and executed by Pompey. Cic. *Fam.* 9.21.3; *Att.* 9.14.2; Sall. *ad Caes.* 1.4; *Hist.* 1.52M; Livy *Per.* 89; Val. Max. 5.3.5, 6.2.8, 9.13.2; Lucan 2.548; Plut. *Pomp.* 10.1-4; App. *BC* 1.96; Flor. 2.9.26; Oros. 5.21.11, 24.16.

[32] Defeated at at Faventia and fled to Rhodes where he killed himself. App. *BC* 1.91, 94; Oros. 5.20.7, 21.8; Livy *Per.* 89; Vell. 2.28.1.

[33] By Sulla's legate Marcius Philippus. Livy *Per.* 86.

[34] After the Battle at the Colline Gate. App. *BC* 1.87-93; Oros. 5.20.5-9, 21.10.

[35] After the Battle at the Colline Gate. Sall. *Cat.* 51; App. *BC* 1.92, 95; Dio 30-35.

[36] Revealed the secret name of Rome and was executed. Plin. *NH* 3.9.3, 5; Cic. *Or.* 3.43; Plut. *Pomp.* 10.4.

7.	Pro. Pr.	C. Fabius (82) Hadrianus	Killed in action.[37]
8.	Leg.	C. Marcius (43) Censorinus	Killed in action.[38]
9.	Pont.	Q. Mucius (22) Scaevola	Executed.[39]

81 BCE

1.	Promag.	Cn. Domitius (22) Ahenobarbus	Executed.[40]
2.	Leg.	Paccianus (12)	Killed in action.[41]
3.	Leg.	L. Iulius (453) Salinator	Killed in action.[42]

80 BCE

1.	Q.	C. Mallelous (14)	Killed in action.[43]
2.	Leg.	C. Papirius (34) Carbo	Mutiny.[44]

79 BCE

1.	PC.	M. Domitius (44) Calvinus	Killed in action.[45]
2.	Leg.	L. Thorius (4) Balbus	Killed in action.[46]

77 BCE

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[37] Burned alive in his tent during an uprising. Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.70, 5.94; Diod. 38.4; Livy *Per.* 86; Val. Max. 9.10.2; Oros. 5.20.3; Ps. Ascon. 241.

[38] At the Battle at the Colline Gate. App. *BC* 1.88, 90, 92-3.

[39] By the praetor Damasippus. Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 33; *Or.* 3.10; *Brut.* 311; *ND* 3.80; *Att.* 9.15.2; Diod. 37.29.5, 38.17; Livy *Per.* 86; Vell. 2.26.2; Lucan 2.126-129; App. *BC* 1.88; Oros. 5.20.4; Augustine *CD* 3.28.

[40] By Pompey. Cic. *Leg. Man.* 30-31, 61; Sall. *ad Caes.* 1.4.1; Livy *Per.* 89; Val. Max. 6.2.8; Plut. *Pomp.* 11.1-13.5; App. *BC* 1.80; Oros. 5.21.13-14, 24.16.

[41] Killed fighting against Sertorius. Plut. *Sert.* 9.2-3; *Crass.* 4.2.

[42] Served under Sertorius, was killed in the Pyrenees. Sall. *Hist.* 1.96M; Plut. *Sert.* 7.

[43] Killed in Cilicia. Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.41-102 *passim*; Ps. Ascon. 234, 244.

[44] While besieging Volaterrae. Gran. Lic. 39B; Val. Max. 9.7.3.

[45] Defeated by Sertorius' quaestor on the Anas. Sall. *Hist.* 1.11M; Livy *Per.* 90; Plut. *Sert.* 12.3-4; Flor. 2.10.7; Oros. 5.23.3.

[46] Defeated by Sertorius at Consabura. Plut. *Sert.* 12.3; Flor. 2.7.6; Cic. *Fin.* 2.63.

1.	PC.	Ap. Claudius (296) Pulcher	Illness.[47]
2.	Leg.	Cornelius (318) Scipio	Executed.[48]
3.	Leg.	M. Iunius (52) Brutus	Executed.[49]
76 BCE			
1.	Leg.	D. Laelius (5)	Killed in action.[50]
75 BCE			
1.	Promag.	C. Memmius	Killed in action.[51]
2.	Leg.?	L. Hirtuleius (3)	Killed in action.[52]
3.	Leg.	C. Herennius	Killed in action.[53]
74 BCE			
1.	PC	L. Octavius	Unclear.[54]
73 BCE			
1.	Pr.	L. Cossinius (2)	Killed in action.[55]
72 BCE			

[47] Livy *Per.* 91; Flor. 1.39.6; Eutrop. 6.2.1; Ammian. Marc. 27.4.10; Oros. 5.23.17-19.

[48] Son of the rebel consul of 77 M. Aemilius Lepidus. Oros. 5.22.17, 24.16.

[49] By Pompey. Plut. *Pomp.* 16.2-5; *Brut.* 4.1-2; Sall. *Hist.* 1.79M; Livy *Per.* 90; Val. Max. 6.2.8; Oros. 5.22.17.

[50] Against Sertorius at Lauro. Sall. *Hist.* 2.31M.

[51] Under Pompey against Sertorius at Turia. Plut. *Sert.* 21.1; Oros. 5.23.12; Cic. *Balb.* 5.

[52] Under Sertorius against Metellus Pius. Sall. *Hist.* 2.59M; Livy *Per.* 91; Oros. 5.23.12.

[53] Under Sertorius against Pompey at Valencia. Plut. *Sert.* 19; Oros. 5.23.14.

[54] Died while proconsul in Cilicia. Sall. *Hist.* 2.98M; Plut. *Luc.* 6.

[55] Plut. *Crass.* 9.4-5; Sall. *Hist.* 3.94M. It is possible that his colleague C. Claudius Glaber also died in office. He was defeated by Spartacus and never heard from afterwards. Plut. *Crass.* 9.2; Flor. 2.8.4; Oros. 5.24.1; Sall. *Hist.* 3.90-93M; Livy *Per.* 95; Plut. *Crass.* 8-9; App. *BC* 1.116.

1.	?	Q. Sertorius (3)	Murdered.[56]
2.	?	M. Perperna (6) Vento	Executed.[57]

71 BCE

1.	PC	M. Antonius (29) Creticus	Illness.[58]

[56] By his own men at Osca. Sall. *Hist.* 3.84087M; Diod. 37.22A; Livy *Per.* 96; Vell. 2.30.1; Plut. *Sert.* 25-28; *Comp. Sert. et Eum.* 2.3-4; *Pomp.* 20.2; App. *BC* 1.113-114; *Ib.* 101; Flor. 2.10.8-9; Eutrop. 6.1.3; Oros. 5.23.13.

[57] By Pompey. Sall. *Hist.* 3.81-85; Diod. 37.22A; Livy *Per.* 96; Val. Max. 6.2.8; Vell. 2.30.1; Plut. *Sert.* 25-27; *Pomp.* 20.2-4; App. *BC* 1.114-115; *Ib.* 101; Flor. 2.10.8-9; Ammian. Marc. 26.9.19; Oros. 5.23.13.

[58] Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.213; Livy *Per.* 97; Plut. *Ant.* 2.1; Ps. Ascon. 202, 239; Sall. *Hist.* 3.16M.

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