Title
Mobilizing Bogotá: The Local and Transnational Politics of Inter-City Policy Circulation

Author
Montero, Sergio

Publication Date
2015

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

Mobilizing Bogotá:
The Local and Transnational Politics of Inter-City Policy Circulation

by

Sergio Montero

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

City and Regional Planning

and the Designated Emphasis in

Global Metropolitan Studies

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Teresa Caldeira, Chair
Professor Ananya Roy
Professor Karen Chapple
Professor Katerina Linos

Summer 2015

Abstract

Mobilizing Bogotá:
The Local and Transnational Politics of Inter-City Policy Circulation

By

Sergio Montero

Doctor of Philosophy in City and Regional Planning

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Teresa Caldeira, Chair

In this dissertation, I critically examine the local and transnational actors, networks and agendas that allowed Bogotá (Colombia) to emerge as a world policy model of urban sustainable transport by analyzing the different ways in which Bogotá's policies –particularly *Transmilenio* BRT and *Ciclovía*- were mobilized in Guadalajara (Mexico) and San Francisco (United States). Policy models are either celebrated as inspirational examples that can spur policy learning in many places at once or rejected as "one-size-fits-all" recipes that do not consider the complexity of local contexts. My dissertation departs from both arguments by demonstrating that although models and "best practices" can indeed be powerful catalyzers of policy change, practices of inter-city policy circulation inevitably take place in a local and transnational field of power in which different actors strategically mobilize other cities' references to legitimize particular agendas and translate their beliefs about how the city should be organized into policy. In this dissertation I show that the wide circulation of Bogotá policies in the last decade reflects an increasing focus by the apparatus of international development on the circulation of city models as an arena to effect global impact, what I call the "leveraging cities" logic. Bogotá's *Transmilenio* and *Ciclovía* are, then, part of a larger set of cost-effective, impact-oriented and financially-sustainable policy models promoted by international development banks and global philanthropy that seek to intervene in global climate change through their replication in as many cities as possible. Yet, the politics behind the global circulation of Bogotá policies are not about "coercion from above" but rather a politics of learning, persuasion and local coalition-building that takes place through a mobile infrastructure of policy circulation in the form of policy forums, study tours, best practices guides, images and videos. A careful and qualitative analysis of who organizes these events and objects and the practices of learning and persuasion that take place in and through them is key to understand the friction between global and urban agendas that underpinned the wide circulations of the Bogotá model since the early 2000s. To study transnational policy circuits and their effect on urban policy agendas and planning, I used a combination of methods that included archival research, participant observation and more than 90 interviews with mayors, planners, bicycle advocates, bus company owners, local NGO leaders, philanthropists and others in the many sites and situations where the Bogotá model took me during two years of fieldwork.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of acronyms

BRT: Bus Rapid Transit

C40: Cities Climate Leadership Group

CTS: Centro de Transporte Sustentable

ITDP: Institute for Transportation and Development Policy

LRT: Light Rail Transit

SFBC: San Francisco Bicycle Coalition

PAHO: Pan-american Health Organization

RIT: *Rede Integrada de Transporte* (Curitiba's bus rapid transit system)

TRB: Transportation Research Board

WHO: World Health Organization

Acknowledgements

This research project has been a long journey that I could have not undertaken without the help and support of many people. At UC Berkeley, I have been very fortunate to have a team of brilliant scholars and great mentors on my PhD committee. Teresa Caldeira has been an exceptional advisor, from my first theoretical and methodological experiments during my master's thesis to the very last year of my PhD. Teresa has seen me struggle and grow at Berkeley and without her continued support and guidance I would not have been able to survive a PhD. Ananya Roy is one of the most brilliant and eloquent people I have ever known. She introduced me to the world of urban and international development theory in 2007 and I have not been able to stop reading about it ever since. But if Teresa and Ananya have guided me through the intricate twists and turns of urban theory, Karen Chapple kept me grounded by bringing the world of planning and economic development practice to the stage. I have learned so much with her and in the many projects on networks and local and regional economic development that have taken us from California to Argentina and back. The most recent addition to this team, Katerina Linos, has provided a very welcome engagement with the empirics of my research and the most comprehensive set of comments I have ever received on a draft. Beyond my committee, I have also been lucky to have a very smart group of PhD colleagues in the Department of City and Regional Planning. For their patience to read my crazy drafts and their astute comments, Ricardo Cardoso, Sara Hinkley and Hun Kim deserve a big thank you. Similarly, Jennifer Tucker, Pedro Peterson, Mike Mendez, Chris Mizes and Jacob Blintiff have provided feedback, additions and suggestions that have contributed to improve my research outcomes, both in form and content.

Although my committee and colleagues at UC Berkeley have been key in shaping this research, this project has also greatly benefited from my involvement in a number of international research networks. I developed the first ideas for this project during the thought-provoking workshop Provincializing Global Urbanism led by Helga Leitner, Eric Sheppard and Ananya Roy that took us from Monterey, California to Jakarta, Indonesia. In it, Michael Goldman destroyed my initial research plans and brilliantly exposed me to what academic critique looks like outside the protection of your home department. From those workshops a paper emerged that was accepted in a series of stimulating panels on urban policy mobilities at the 2012 Association of American Geographers (AAG) conference in New York. Since then, Kevin Ward, Eugene McCann, and other urban geographers in the *Imagining Urban Futures* research program have provided inspiration, constructive criticism and great feedback on different pieces of this research. But if there is a network that has been particularly supportive during the last four years that is the *Latin American Cities Working Group*, an initiative that I have had the pleasure to co-organize and grow together with Julie Gamble. Clara Irazábal, director of the Latin Lab, has been a great mentor in this collective effort. During the many panels that we have organized for the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) congresses, I have discussed and presented my research but also met new colleagues that I am now glad to consider dear friends such as Luisa Sotomayor, Abigail Friendly, Erik Vergel or Catalina Ortiz among many others.

It would be impossible to thank the more than 90 people that I interviewed or that shared their knowledge with me in Bogotá, Guadalajara, San Francisco, New York and Washington DC in my almost two years of fieldwork between 2012 and 2013. However, I do want to acknowledge here some key informants and interviewees that had the time and patience to meet with me more than once. In Bogotá, I would like to thank Jaime Ortiz and Carmenza Saldías for sharing their knowledge of Bogotá and Colombia with me. Darío

Hidalgo from EMBARQ and Carlos Felipe Pardo from *Despacio* are passionate advocates of sustainable transportation from whom I learned not only about the history of transportation in Bogotá but also about the transnational circuits through which Bogotá's transportation policies became known worldwide. Víctor Raúl Martínez helped me understand transportation policy from the lens and struggles of bus company owners. In Guadalajara, the members of the environmental NGO *Colectivo Ecologista Jalisco* made me feel at home from the first day I arrived and provided me with rich archival material and plenty of interesting contacts, from civil society organizations such as the *Plataforma Metropolitana para la Sustentabilidad* or *Ciudad para Todos,* to high-ranking public officials at the local and state levels, to their philanthropic funders in Mexico City and the US. The people from *Guadalajara 2020*, and particularly Rocío Herrera, were extremely helpful in helping me reconstruct how Bogotá ideas first arrived in Guadalajara and how and why they were useful in their attempt to transform the city with more cars per capita in Latin America. Diego Monraz was also helpful in revealing the partisan politics of BRT in Mexico. Luis F. Aguilar and his team at the *Instituto de Gobierno y Políticas Públicas* were very generous and offered me a physical and intellectual space to start writing and discussing the first outcomes of my research. In San Francisco, Susan King has been a key informant since I first interviewed her in 2010. Her passion for promoting car-free cities is unparalleled. Interviews with Andy Thornley, former policy director of the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition, were really master classes of the politics of bicycling in San Francisco. Similarly, José Luis Moscovich provided a comprehensive review of the history BRT in San Francisco, from its inception to the frustrating difficulties and delays regarding its implementation.

I also have to acknowledge here the generous financial support of several agencies that made this multi-sited and multi-year research endeavor possible. The SSRC Dissertation Proposal Development fellowship (DPDF) provided initial funds to start conceptualizing this project in 2011. Fieldwork in 2012 and 2013 was possible thanks to the UC Pacific Rim Research Program and the John L. Simpson Memorial Research Fellowship in International and Comparative Studies. The last semesters of data analyzing and writing in 2014 and 2015 could have not happened without a writing fellowship from the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the Michael Teitz fellowship and a summer grant from UC Berkeley's Graduate Division.

Some years ago, my good friend Harris Kornstein introduced me to the idea of the "logical family," a phrase coined by San Francisco author Armistead Maupin. It was during a Thanksgiving in Berkeley, when I met with a group of close friends -also including Marc Boucai, Alex Brennan, and Maziar Toosarvandani. We had a lovely time cooking, having dinner together and sharing personal stories. We might not have had our biological families with us that night but we were each other's chosen families, our logical families. Six years later, those dear friends have either already moved outside the Bay Area or are about to move to another place (in my case, to Bogotá). Yet, wherever they are, wherever I am, they remain family.

It would have been impossible to survive this dissertation without the logical families that I developed in the four countries that I have called home in the last five years. Oscar Sosa, Julie Gamble and Sophie Gonick have been fundamental pieces of my life in the San Francisco Bay Area. They kept me grounded and their company and friendship made the first years of the PhD fly by. The last year of dissertation writing and applying for jobs in Berkeley was particularly painful and stressful. I could have never survived that last push

without the support, love and laughs that Harris Kornstein, James Pappas and Nicole Rosner provided. In Guadalajara, Mario Silva became not only my family for several years but also my best critic and an amazing guide that helped me navigate the convoluted politics of urban mobility in the city. I admire him immensely. My family in Guadalajara eventually grew when Lucía Ortiz, Eduardo Díaz-Recasens and Nicolás Pacheco came into my life. They provided me support when I most needed it. Our Sunday nights of tacos, *cucuruchos* and laughs at the Plaza del Expiatorio are happy memories that I will carry with me for life. In Bogotá, Miranda Hamilton, Alejandro Rodríguez, Federico Pérez and Yvette Salom were my neighbors and dinner companions in Chapinero. With them I rode bikes during *Ciclovía* and explored the city at night. Together with José Antonio Ramírez, Andrés Salcedo and Manuel Rosaldo, they became not only my favorite *Bogotanos* but also my Bogotá family. And last, but definitely not least, is my family in Spain. Jaime Suárez has been a brother to me for more than ten years now. Despite the distance, everytime we see each other it feels like time has not passed. It only takes a big hug to start the conversation where we left it. But there are more: Leticia Gallego and José Manuel Blasco make my annual yet brief visits to my native Alpujarras much more fun and exciting. We have all grown up now, but they have grown up to become those kinds of special people that are able to make you laugh and feel at home at the same time. My biological family has constantly been a source of inspiration. We have been living in different continents for eight years now. And even though this has meant missing numerous birthdays, celebrations and special occasions, they have never hesitated to encourage me to follow my goals wherever they take me, even if they do not always understand what I do. I might be the only academic in the family but they have taught me things that I will never be able to teach my students. I dedicate this dissertation to my family, logical and biological.

Introduction: Circulating Paradoxes

A new urban imaginary of Bogotá, Colombia emerged in the last decade. Traditionally portrayed as an urban dystopia and a city of fear during the 1980s and early 1990s, Bogotá became a world policy model of sustainable urban transport in less than a decade. In 2007, the American Planning Association dedicated its World Planning Keynote Address to the capital of Colombia under the title "The Miracle of Bogotá." A year before, the Venice Architecture Biennale gave its prestigious Golden Lion Award to the city of Bogotá. *La Biennale's* official website read:

> "Bogotá has applied Mies van der Rohe's dictum 'less is more' to the automobile: less cars means more civic space and civic resources for people. The city provides a model for streets which are pleasing to the eye as well as economically viable and socially inclusive. Bogotá is, in short, a beacon of hope for other cities, whether rich or poor."[1]

The transformation of Bogotá during the 1990s and early 2000s, based on the promotion of public space, non-car transportation alternatives and teaching citizens "cultura ciudadana,"[2] has been nationally and internationally celebrated and, more recently, replicated by cities in the global North and the South. There are, however, three intriguing paradoxes about the recent and extensive global circulations of Bogotá's urban planning policies.

First, from all the policies and reforms experimented in Bogotá in the last decades, two programs have been particularly circulated: 1) *Transmilenio,* Bogotá's famous Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), a system of high-frequency rapid buses with dedicated lanes and stations that carries over one million passengers per day; and 2) *Ciclovía,* a 70-mile weekly street closure program to promote urban biking and physical activity that gathers one million Bogotanos every Sunday in streets normally reserved for car traffic. Since 2001, cities as diverse as Guangzhou, Johannesburg or Guadalajara, among more than one hundred others, have implemented a BRT system drawing inspiration from Bogotá's *Transmilenio*. In the same time period, mayors and bicycle advocates in more than 400 cities, including Los Angeles, Santiago de Chile, Jakarta and San Francisco, have referenced *Ciclovía* to pass similar street closure programs.

Interestingly, other successful programs experimented in Bogotá in the 1990s, including innovative ways of increasing urban tax collection or the promotion of urban citizenship, have not been so mobile and have hardly been replicated in other cities. Why do some of the programs and policies experimented in Bogotá became world models and others did not? Is there a "Bogotá model" of urban planning? And, if so, what is it? Even if *Bogotanos* are skeptical of the wonders of their city's transportation planning given the deterioration of transportation and public space infrastructure in recent years, images of bicycles and shiny red rapid buses with dedicated lanes are what now often comes to mind of city planners, bicycle advocates, and mayors around the world when they think of Bogotá.

---

[1] *La Biennale di Venezia*, 10th International Architecture Exhibition: Official Awards, http://www.labiennale.org/en/news/architecture/en/67078.1.html (accessed Nov 25, 2008).

[2] Literally, a "citizenship culture," this concept was introduced by Bogotá mayor Antanas Mockus and guided his interventions in the city during his two administrations (1995-1997 and 2000-2003). For a contextualization of Mockus framework see Mockus 2001a (in Spanish).

Figure 1. Bogotá's TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit System

Source: Photograph by Author (2008)

Figure 2. Bogotá's Sunday Ciclovía

Source: Photograph by Author (2008)

A second paradox has to do with the fact that neither of these two globally circulated programs –*Transmilenio* BRT and *Ciclovía*- are new ideas. For example, BRT has been already happening and working well in Curitiba since 1974[3] and Ciclovía has been happening in Bogotá since 1974 and in many other cities since the 1960s.[4] Yet, both programs experienced an exponential growth in the early 2000s (see figure 3 below for BRT). Why this peak in the early 2000s? Why do BRT and Ciclovía circulate widely only then if neither are new policies?

Figure 3. Number of Cities with a BRT (1974-2013)



Source: Own elaboration based on Global BRT data [5]

Finally, the third paradox is related to the circulatory directionalities of Bogotá policies, which in the last fifteen years have travelled not only South-South to other cities in Latin America, Africa and Asia but also South-North to cities in the US, Canada and Europe. Although urbanism has been traditionally shaped by urban planning models drawn from European and North American cities for centuries, the rapid spread of Bogotá's *Transmilenio* and *Ciclovía* in the last decade shows that the current transnational traffic of urban policy knowledge, models and ideas of the "good city" is more complex than a simple North-to-South transfer.

Indeed, in recent decades, not only Bogotá but several Latin American cities –including Porto Alegre, Curitiba or, the most recent addition, Medellín- have become policy models for urban planners and advocates around the world. In many ways, one could argue that this is nothing new. Colonial cities have traditionally been a "laboratory" or a "tabula rasa" to experiment with the most avant-garde Western ideas about how cities should be planned and organized (Wright 1987). In

[3] For an analysis of the key actors, socio-political contexts and institutional factors that allowed the emergence of bus transportation innovations in Curitiba in the 1970s see Rabinovitch 1996, Ardila 2004 or Irazábal 2005.
[4] Ciclovía first took place in Bogotá in 1974. Before that, some US cities have also experimented with street closures to promote bicycling and waking in the city. For example, Seattle did "Bicycle Sundays" for the first time in 1965, which inspired New York to close the inner loop of Central Park in 1966 (Lydon & García, 2015, p. 42). For more on the history of Bogotá's Ciclovía, see Gomescasseres 2003, Montezuma 2011 and Montero forthcoming.
[5] I elaborated this graph with a dataset from Global BRT data (brtdata.org) that I received on Aug 11, 2015.

Latin America, this has been the case during colonial times, when Spanish colonists followed the *Laws of the Indies* to build exemplar Christian cities in the Americas, but also more recently, during the mid-20th century, with Brasília being one of the most complete built examples of the French-inspired modernist architecture of the *Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* (Holston 1989).

However, there are also important novelties about this Latin American moment of urban policy experimentation and circulation. For instance, Bogotá's *Ciclovía* and *Transmilenio* are not cases of avant-garde planning theory implemented by Northern experts or based exlusively in Northern planning theories and models. Both programs were started and innovated by policy actors from Bogotá drawing from the experience of other cities in Latin America and the rest of the world. Although international development banks and global think tanks have been involved in constructing and circulating these policies as "world models," they become involved not during the process of policy experimentation and design but rather at a later stage. For example, while the World Bank has become an enthusiastic funder of BRTs around the world since the early 2000s and has often used Bogotá as a poster child in other cities in the global South, they initially refused to give money to Enrique Peñalosa to build *Transmilenio* in the 1990s. The fact that Bogotá policies have been replicated in cities of the global North, particularly in several US cities, suggest also interesting novelties in the ways in which urban planning knowledge circulates nowadays. Are we witnessing the emergence of new centres of calculation and urban planning knowledge in the global South or are Southern policies packaged and circulated by North-based interests and organizations? How and why are certain policies turned into world policy models and how are world models able to influence agendas in other cities?

This dissertation critically examines the local and transnational actors, networks and agendas that allowed Bogotá (Colombia) to emerge as a world policy model in sustainable urban transportation since the early 2000s. In particular, it seeks to answer three specific questions: 1) What circulates as the "Bogotá model" (and what does not)?; 2) Why does it circulate now?; and 3) How does it circulate?

Mobilizing Bogotá: Beyond Celebrations and Contextual Critiques of the Model

In the last two decades, a prolific literature has emerged in architecture and urban studies around Bogotá's "miraculous" urban transformation. While much has been written in the last decade about Bogotá's urban transformation, both from a celebratory (Gilbert & Dávila, 2002, Martin & Ceballos 2004, Montezuma 2005, Cervero 2005, Gilbert 2006) and a critical perspective (Duque Franco 2008, Gilbert 2008, Berney 2011, Galvis 2014), less is known about the local and transnational politics and power dynamics that allowed certain urban policies and interventions experimented in Bogotá to become policy models and circulate around the world whereas others were silenced and ignored.

A Neo-Marxist Critique: The Bogotá Model as an Urban Marketing Strategy

One of the few attempts to critically analyze the making of Bogotá as an international model is Isabel Duque Franco's (2011) piece *Bogotá: Between Identity and Urban Marketing*. Resorting to neo-Marxist theories of urban marketing (Arantes, Vainer & Maricato 2000), Duque Franco explains the international recognition of Bogotá during the 2000s as the outcome of two types of urban marketing campaigns orchestrated by Bogotá's mayors and local government agencies: 1) internal marketing campaigns aimed at Bogotá citizens that, during the mid 1990s, sought to construct a positive image and identity of the city as a way to improve the governability of Bogotá and its citizens; and 2) external marketing campaigns that, since the late 1990s, have sought to use the improvements in the city public space and new non-motorized modes of transportation, particularly the *Transmilenio* and bicycle lane improvements, to sell the city abroad and attract tourists, firms and investors to Bogotá. In doing so, she joins a tradition of neo-Marxist scholarship that seeks to

explain the current emphasis of local government agendas on urban marketing and competitiveness as a manifestation of a new "city entrepreneurialism" (Harvey 1989, Jessop & Sum 2000); a new way of managing cities in the context of neoliberalism in which entrepreneurial mayors and public-private partnerships increasingly make policy decisions based on image-making strategies and competitiveness objectives rather than the comprehensive needs of urban populations.

While 'entrepreneurial city' frameworks have been useful to illuminate the increasing primacy of economic growth and competitiveness objectives in local agendas around the world, this metanarrative also obscures the diverse constellation of actors, networks and agendas that are behind the construction and mobilization of certain cities and policies as world models. World recognition is important in the context of urban policy and planning because it legitimizes certain policy models as appropriate ways of organizing, governing and managing urban space, both in the cities where they originally appeared as well as in the ones that adopt it (Bulkeley 2006, Roy 2011). Yet, constructing and circulating certain policies as models is not an exclusive practice of profit-seeking private sector actors or entrepreneurial mayors seeking neoliberal agendas. In fact, activists and social movements have traditionally relied on the construction and global circulation of policy models and best practice repertoires (e.g. Appadurai 2002). Furthermore, by focusing on the agency of mayors and local government agencies as they react to global forces such as neoliberalism, "city entrepreneurialism" frameworks fail to account for the politics and power dynamics behind the local and transnational actors and experts, both in the global North and the South, that have used Bogotá as a model to promote agendas as diverse as sustainable urban transport, climate change planning, BRTs, or bicycle planning around the world.

Alternative Approaches to Study Policy Circulations

In recent years, scholars in a variety of disciplines have tried to make sense of these accelerated policy exchanges between cities by developing new critical approaches to urban policy formation and circulation. Using theoretical frameworks such as policy diffusion (Simmons et al. 2008, Shipan & Volden 2008), policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, Stone 2001) and lesson-drawing (Rose 1993, Radaelli 2004), several authors in political science, international relations and sociology have sought to conceptualize the role of external policy ideas in shaping domestic policy choices. In these debates the emphasis has often been on why, what and by whom policy diffusion/transfer happens, seeking to unveil different mechanisms that explain why country A would adopt a policy from country B (Simmons et al. 2008) as well as different typologies of actors that promote policy diffusion, often using the idea of "policy entrepreneur" (Mintrom 1997, Stone 2001). For example, Shipan & Volden (2008) analyzed antismoking policy choices in 675 US cities and distinguished between four policy diffusion mechanisms at play: learning from earlier adopters, economic competition among proximate cities, imitation of larger cities, and coercion by state governments. Related with policy diffusion and transfer debates although with a more explicit focus in the role of learning is the lesson-drawing framework (Rose 2002, Radaelli 2004). Highly critical of "best practices" and policy recipes from other countries, these authors favor an approach in which learning from evidence-based actions, rather than just copying particular programs and policies, is key to successful policy change. However, reflecting on the recent literature on policy learning, Gilardi & Radaelli (2012: p. 162) have noted that "we still do not know much about how communities of social actors –especially policy-makers- learn." Policy diffusion/transfer approaches have also been critiqued for their rationalistic interpretations of learning as well as their silence about

"the politics of learning" or how learning from abroad is shaped by domestic politics (Stone 2001, Meseguer & Gilardi 2009, Peck & Theodore 2010).[6]

Here, recent debates in urban studies can help us conceptualize the practices that facilitate policy travel and circulation between cities while situating them in a field of politics and power. Moving beyond typologies of actors, modalities of learning and the rationalistic assumptions of policy diffusion/transfer debates, policy mobilities authors have sought to analyze the mobilization of urban policies as an open-ended, socially constructed, and power-laden process where power and politics come to the forefront (Peck & Theodore, 2010). In other words, models and "best practices" travel not because they are best but rather because they have been constructed as "best" at a particular moment of time by a set of actors. They have argued that a critical analysis of policy circulations should take a relational-territorial approach (McCann & Ward 2010), that is, as much as policy is shaped by ideas, models and agendas that are circulating at a particular time, it is also shaped by situated economic and socio-political struggles. The circulation of policy ideas and models is conceptualized not happening at some higher or "global" scale different from the "local." Policy actors learn from other places when they experience policies in other contexts (Cook et al. 2014) but also in their home cities through everyday practices such as reading reports, telling or hearing stories of other places or consulting websites (McFarlane 2011, Cook & Ward 2012). This is what Manuel DeLanda (2006) and other actor-network theorists have called a "flat ontology."

Urban Planning and Transportation Policy in Motion

Urban planning scholars have also argued for the need to develop new critical approaches to study the increased *transnational flow of planning ideas* (Healey 2013, Lieto 2015, Healey & Upton 2010). For Healey (2013), looking at these flows from an actor-based and evolutionary perspective based on the complex dynamics, situated contingencies and micro-practices of urban policy actors can help planners move away from the rational and modernization perspective that has often prevailed in the discipline. The work of Aihwa Ong and Ananya Roy (2011) on *worlding cities* can also be productively brought to critical debates on policy circulations, particularly to illuminate the relationship between cities, urban policy references and world recognition. Looking specifically at city-making strategies in contemporary Asia, Ong and Roy (2011) have sought to shift the debate on contemporary global urbanism from world cities and world-systems to particular "worlding practices." In this context, they see urban models and inter-city references in and between aspiring "world-class" Asian cities as power-laden practices used by different actors with the aim of acquiring world recognition that also parallel circuits of capital circulation. While coming from different academic traditions, these critical approaches to urban policy and planning –transnational flow of planning exchanges and worlding practices- share with the policy mobilities approach a common concern about the importance of examining urban policy exchanges and travels as a socially constructed, uneven, and power-laden process rather than a rational transfer of the "best" policies between context A and context B.

Finally, while the rapid spread of BRTs has been the focus of much research in transportation policy studies (Hidalgo & Gutiérrez 2012, Marsden et al. 2011, Cain et al. 2006, Hidalgo & Hermann 2004) including the spread of Latin American BRT models in Asian cities (Matsumoto 2007), this research has often privileged "policy diffusion" and "policy transfer" perspectives that emphasize what and where local officials and planners learn about the policy. Although the recent work of Ricardo Montezuma (2011) has quantified and created an interesting typology of the many cities that have adopted a Ciclovía-style program in recent years, my

[6] For a recent exception see Linos (2013). Analyzing the adoption of health and maternal leave policies in Southern European countries, her book *The Democratic Foundations of Policy Diffusion* sought to incorporate the important role of voters in the adoption of foreign policy models.

ethnographic research seeks to move this literature beyond quantification and provide a new method of analysis that critically examines the specific articulation of local and transnational actors, networks, institutions, and discourses that allowed Bogotá to emerge as an urban model for cities in the North and the South. By politicizing the networks and policy circuits through which *Transmilenio* and *Ciclovía* were constructed as "best practices," I aim also to introduce the new conceptual tools of the policy mobilities approach in transportation policy studies.

On Methods: Mobile Policies and Multi-Sited Research

The intervention of policy mobilities authors in studying policy travel has not been only theoretical but also methodological by favoring qualitative and ethnographic methods of inquiry that stay close to the everyday practices of policy actors without losing sight of political economy analysis (Peck & Theodore 2012, McCann & Ward 2012). While ethnographic methods have been traditionally applied to study the specificity and complexity of single-sites, my research on urban policy circulations is inevitably transnational and multi-sited. Anna Tsing (2005), however, provides insightful examples of how to re-tool ethnography to study global connections. For Tsing, exploring the *friction* through which universals or global ideas become effective and transformed in particular places is a more productive approach than thinking of global ideas as being imposed/resisted. I find Tsing's concept of *friction* very useful to study how Bogotá's "best practices" are transformed as they travel and how, conversely, they alter local politics and processes of policymaking as they touch ground.

The object of analysis of "policy mobilities" is, in broad terms, the movement of policy ideas as well as their transformations and mutations during those travels. However, how to study this object varies according to different authors. For example, Peck and Theodore (2010) have been interested in studying policy mobilization as a socially constructed and power-laden process against the rational assumptions of policy transfer/diffusion approaches that have dominated in sociology and political science. More recently, in an *Environment and Planning A* special issue on methods to study policy mobilities, they have advocated for a "distended case approach" (Peck & Theodore 2012) that draws from Michael Burawoy's (1998) "extended case approach" and George Marcus' (1995) "follow the thing" approach, which they replaced with the idea of "follow the policy:"

> "[follow the policy] calls for a methodological approach sensitive both to movement (for instance, transnationalizing policy models, peripatetic modes of expertise) and to those variable experiences of embedding and transformation underway in `downstream' sites of adoption/emulation" (Peck & Theodore 2012: p. 24)

Drawing from debates in the "anthropology of policy" (Shore and Wright 1997, Wedel et al 2005), McCann and Ward (2012) have advocated for not just following the policies but also "studying through" the site and situations of policy-making. As geographers concerned with notions of relationality, they see the limitations of "place" to study policy travel and offer the notion of "situation" as additional nodes to the sites in which policy is mobilized:

> "In theorizing the different 'wheres' in and through which policies are molded and mobilized, we highlight a need to attend to the various situations in which policy knowledge is mobilized and assembled. These include conferences, seminars, workshops, guest lectures, factfinding field trips, site visits, walking tours, informal dinners and trips to cafès and bars, among many others – the sorts of situations in which we have found ourselves doing research (Cook and Ward 2011)" (McCann & Ward 2012: p. 47).

Ananya Roy has sought to move the debate and methods of policy mobilities beyond uncovering or identifying powerful actors and networks that move policies around. Drawing from Rabinow and

Foucault, she is instead interested in how studying the practices that make policy mobile can lead us to understand the "apparatus"[7] the movement of those policies suggests (Roy 2012). For example, in her book *Poverty Capital* (Roy 2011) she is interested in the travels of microfinance models but only in the way that they allow her to speak about the emergence of what she calls "the apparatus of millennial development," a kindler and gentler form of development that entails a democratization of capital and development even if North-based institutions still dominate the circulation of development mechanisms and their associated capital circuits.

Following the Bogotá Model

But where does one study global policy circulations? Initially, I thought that to understand the global circulation of Bogotá policies I needed to "follow Bogotá's policies" wherever they took me. I envisioned that the outcome of my research would be a map of the key transfer agents of the Bogotá model, a sort of a social network analysis of all actors involved in these circulations. However, I quickly realized that this would leave me with a long list of names of people and organizations, a thin description of how these actors relate to each other, and very little understanding of the ways in which the practice of referencing Bogotá was able to change policies and agendas in other cities. I therefore chose to focus in two specific cities –Guadalajara, Mexico and San Francisco, US- to better understand how Bogotá ideas arrived in those cities and the kind of policy changes and power dynamics that referencing Bogotá allowed in those cities. My idea was not to do a comparison of these two cities but rather to use them to understand the process of construction and circulation of Bogotá as a world policy model. In other words, I used these cities as sites not cases. It is the circulation of Bogotá policies what is my case or unit of analysis, not the cities themselves.

What I also realized in the process of doing fieldwork for this project is that, beyond the sort of general "follow the policy" instruction, policy mobilities authors are often silent about the process of selecting research sites and situations. This is surprinsing since this is such a crucial step in research design and one that will have important consequences in the research outcomes. If we are to take serioulsy qualitative and ethnographic approaches to the study of policy circulation, then we need to be reflective about the limitations that we, not-pefectly-mobile researchers, have to "follow the policy." As much as policy actors are constrained by beliefs, languages, institutions, agendas and political economy factors so are researchers, particularly qualitative researchers. Not reflecting on these constraints would be making the researcher a cosmopolitan actor against the contingency of policy actors that policy mobilities, and critical policy scholars more broadly, often emphasize in their analysis.[8]

Multi-sited Research and the Limits of Language

For me, one of the main limitations to follow Bogotá policies was language. For example, as much as I would have liked to understand how Bogotá's policies arrived in Guangzhou, which has been an important catalyzing example for BRT expansion in China, and Asia more broadly, my lack of knowledge of Chinese would have been a serious constraint to undertake in-depth qualitative research. Despite the post-positivist epistemology that has prevailed in city planning and urban studies in recent years (Allmendiger 2002), the question of why are you studying this or those cases needs to be justified often in the very positivist ways that the theory is trying to escape. If

[7] Roy draws from Foucault's definition of apparatus or *dispositif* as a "thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic proposition" (Foucault 1980: p. 194; cited in Roy 2012).

[8] For more on the role and limitations of ethnographers in studying mobile policy professionals see Mosse (2007).

proponents of single-site ethnographies in urban studies often struggle to justify the reason why they chose to do an in-depth analysis of this or that city or neighborhood or how this or that process manifests in this particular geography, for proponents of multi-sited ethnography case selection is a cause of major anxiety. In my research funding applications the official storyline of why I chose to study Guadalajara and San Francisco to understand the making of Bogotá as a world model was often explained through two main reasons: 1) both cities have adopted a BRT system and a *Ciclovía* program using explicit references to Bogotá; and 2) I was interested in including a city of the global South and the North to analyze the different ways in which Bogotá policies have been circulated South-South and South-North. The reality is that there was a third reason that had been perhaps even more important in that selection: I chose these cities because I felt my language skills allowed me to undertake in-depth qualitative research there. As a native Spanish-speaker that have gone to graduate school in the United States, I spoke both English and Spanish fluently and I also had some initial contacts in these cities that would be able to connect me with key actors and decision-makers related to urban planning and policy-making. As much as there was a South-North divide across these two cities there was also an Anglo-Saxon and a Spanish-speaking world divide that my particular language skills allowed me to bridge. In this context, I find George Marcus' (1995: p. 101) reflections on language, fieldwork and the selection of cases in multi-sited ethnography are helpful:

> "Just as "knowing the language" guarantees the integrity of traditional fieldwork and gives the bounded field -e.g. a people, an ethnic group, a community- its most important coherence as a culture, this skill is as important in multi-sited fieldwork and with even more exactitude. It is perhaps no accident that exemplars thus far of multi-sited fieldwork have been developed in monolingual (largely Anglo-American) contexts in which fine-grained knowledge of the language is unproblematic for native English speakers. Yet, if such ethnography is to flourish in arenas that anthropology has defined as emblematic interests, it will soon have to become as multilingual as it is multi-sited. In this sense, it conforms to (and often exceeds) the most exacting and substantive demands of traditional fieldwork."

Transient Sites and Sites of Long Engagement

Another important limitation in "following the policy" as a method is, of course, funding. When doing pre-dissertation research for this project, I realized that the links between Bogotá and Guadalajara or between Bogotá and San Francisco were not straightforward and, very often, the ideas travelled from one city to the other through people and organizations located somewhere else. For example, Washington DC became one of my research sites, not as a city that has implemented Bogotá policies but because many of the organizations that have been key in mobilizing the Bogotá model in Guadalajara or San Francisco, such as ITDP, EMBARQ or the World Bank, were based there. But there were also many other sites and situations where the Bogotá model was invoked and mobilized: The Transportation Research Board (TRB) conference and the Transforming Transportation event in Washington DC every January, the CTS/EMBARQ Annual Sustainable Transport congress in Mexico City, Transmilenio BRT Fairs in Bogotá, the BRT Institute in Santiago de Chile, etc. Was I supposed to travel to all of them?

I resolved this dilemma by distinguishing between two different types of research sites: *transient sites* and *sites of long engagement*. In my case, Bogotá, Guadalajara and San Francisco became my sites of long research engagement whereas Washington DC or events and conferences celebrated in different cities were transient sites that helped me understand the circulatory dynamics of the Bogotá model. In the transient sites I needed to be immersed in the circuit not necessarily the inner dynamics of those cities; they helped understand the key practices of knowledge creation and dissemination through which the model circulates (the mobilizing actors, the type of circulating discourses and narratives about Bogotá, etc.). In the other sites, I needed to be immersed both in the

circuit and in their historical and contemporary urban political dynamics. Therefore, my research strategy envisioned three different sites of research engagement to study the construction and circulation of Bogotá as a world policy model: 1) sites of policy experimentation (Bogotá during the 1970s-2000s); 2) sites of "best practice" construction (Washington DC, conferences around the world, digital policy platforms, etc. during the 2000s); and 3) sites of policy mobilization (Guadalajara, San Francisco, during the 2000s-2010s).

Tracing Past Mobilities

During my fieldwork, I also quickly discovered that there was a particular value in referencing policy models in the early stages of policy formation. Introducing a new item or policy in the local public agenda is not an easy task and the collaboration between different policy actors and resources is needed to make this happen. This is what the political science literature calls the agenda-setting moment (Kingdon 1984), something that some of my interviewees referred to as the "proceso de enamoramiento" ("falling in love" process) or "inspiration." It was then when policy actors –be it transportation planners, consultants, bicycle advocates, etc- found particularly useful and powerful to have the Bogotá reference: to understand how this new policy or program that people have not seen before would look like in practice. It also served as a powerful legitimacy and reassurance mechanism for policymakers: if Bogotá and all of these many cities around the world have already implemented it, then it should be working well. During the process of implementation, however, more variables came into play –technical problems, political-partisan confrontations (in Guadalajara), long processes of participatory community meetings (in San Francisco), etc.- and the reference to international "best practices" and models quickly lost part of its value.

Therefore, I increasingly focused my interviews and archival research to better understand the moment in which Bogotá policy ideas –specifically *Transmilenio* BRT and *Ciclovía*- first entered the local "agenda" of other cities through their inscription in some kind of official document, be it a city plan, a ballot, a municipal agency strategic document, etc.

This, however, also meant that most of my research was going to be focused on past moments: the moment that Enrique Peñalosa, former mayor of Bogotá, first went to Guadalajara to give a talk in 2003, the many study tours from Guadalajara to Bogotá that followed this visit between 2004 and 2010, the first time Bogotá's Ciclovía was mobilized in San Francisco to demand more bicycle policies in the city in 2006-2008, etc. This focus on identifying this type of important past moments, events and situations in the introduction of a policy also meant that participant observation would have certain limitations as a method for my goals. Many of these events had already happened by the time I conducted research for this project in 2012-2013. The construction of Bogotá as a model seemed to have already peaked some years ago. I was, however, resolved to include participant observation in my research. For example, I participated in a study tour of a Chinese delegation to *Transmilenio* in 2012 as well as in many conferences on sustainable transportation that took place in Bogotá, Guadalajara, San Francisco and Wahsington DC during 2012 and 2013.

In order to reconstruct these past stories and first encounters with Bogotá ideas, I used a combination of methods that included archival research and interviews with the key people that helped introduced Bogotá policies in Guadalajara and San Francisco. Indeed, the benefits of having some years of distance between the policy learning process and my research ended up being an advantage as it also meant that interviewees were open to reflect and even critique their own role in the process as well as their motivations, beliefs and strategies at the time. Local media archives and online policy blogs were also very useful to trace the emergence of the new imaginary of Bogotá worldwide and to identify key moments, practices and events when this imaginary arrived in a particular city (e.g. speeches at policy forums, study tours, etc.). Some of the participants in these

events kept personal archives that proved very helpful. Photographs, highlighted pamphlets, recorded audio or schedules of activities during trips to Bogotá helped me understand what were the key "aha" moments –of inspiration, of persuasion, of "energizing"- for these actors to become determined to replicate Bogotá policies in their home cities as well as the everyday practices in which these moments took place. It was thanks to these moments that the long process of mobilizing Bogotá policies in another city was put into motion.

I spent two years in the field for this research project. I did more than 90 interviews during six months in Bogotá, one month in DC, almost a year in Guadalajara and six months in San Francisco. I used a combination of methods that included archival research, participant observation and semi-structured interviews with mayors, planners, bicycle advocates, bus company owners, local NGO leaders, philanthropists and others in the many sites where the Bogotá model took me during my fieldwork (2012-2013). I complemented this material with a set of interviews that I did in San Francisco during the Spring 2010 with bicycle advocates and public officials in the city. For some of the evidence in Chapter 1 on the history of Bogotá's urban planning I drew from interviews and other materials that I gathered in Bogotá during the summer of 2008 while I was conducting research for a previous research project on the role of decentralization reforms in the transformation of urban and regional governance in Bogotá.[9]

Theoretical Engagements and Contributions: What, Why, How

While the design of this research project has greatly benefited from the analytical and methodological tools of the policy mobilities approach, the aim of this dissertation is not just using Bogotá as a case study of this framework. In answering the three key research questions that drove my research –what circulates as the Bogotá model?; Why does it circulate now?; How does it circulate?- this dissertation provides not only empirical evidence about the actors and political dynamics involved in the circulations of the Bogotá model, it also offers new theoretical contributions to understand the increasing phenomena of urban policy circulation. In the following sections I offer a brief summary of the main empirical findings and theoretical contributions of this dissertation.

What circulates as the "Bogotá model"?

In this research I found that what circulates as the "Bogotá model" is a particular set of interventions related with transportation and public space, specifically those that can be labeled as "sustainable transportation." But, perhaps most interestingly, what often lubricates the circulations of these interventions is a narrative of urban transformation. In a recent article that seeks to intervene in the debates on transnational planning exchanges, Laura Lieto (2015) has argued that when policies travel from one city to another what travels is not the policy itself but a socially constructed "mythical narrative" about the success of that policy in the city where it was implemented. In the case of Bogotá, this myth was a simplified story of urban transformation from a chaotic Third World city into a sustainable transportation model thanks to a set of public space and transportation planning interventions.

Good stories, as good myths, have powerful morals that emotionally move and influence the listener. If Bogotá, this chaotic city in the Third World has become a sustainable city in a matter of years, why can't your city do it? This was the powerful moral of the Bogotá story that was told over and over in many conferences, study tours and digital platforms worldwide. For instance, the visit of Enrique Peñalosa, former mayor of Bogotá, to Guadalajara in 2003 was key to create a local coalition of local businessmen in the jewelry industry and local media elites. As noted by one of the

[9] For more details on this project see Montero (2009)

leaders of this organization, more than the programs, it was the Bogotá story of urban transformation that provided inspiration for the formation of this coalition:

> "Bogotá had its origins in Curitiba but Bogotá had an absolutely Latin American context and it is a city with apparent misfortune, drug trafficking… More than specific programs… I think what Bogotá gave us was the aspiration of a better city that, you know… yes, we can… that transformation was possible in Guadalajara too" (GDL 2020 leader 3, personal interview, 2013)

Precisely because of the capacity of this urban transformation narrative to inspire and move local policy actors to action, several organizations, both local and international ones, have sought to mobilize the Bogotá story in the last two decades. This is the case of the World Bank, the Inter-american Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank but also the Institute of Transportation and Developent Policy (ITDP) and EMBARQ, two sustainable transport think tanks based in Washington DC funded by global philanthropy.

The question of what circulates begs another question: what does not circulate? As much as *Transmilenio* and *Ciclovía* have been widely mobilized around the world, an interesting finding of this research is that many other programs and urban interventions experimented in Bogotá during the 1990s have remained immobile despite their success. What it is often not included in the Bogotá story of urban transformation are the political reforms that allowed Bogotá to have more political and financial resources, such as for instance the democratization of city governments and planning that took place during the 1990s in Colombia, including popular election of mayors (1989), the passing of Law 388 in 1997, which transferred territorial planning responsibilities to cities in Colombia, as well as the different programs and reforms undertaken by mayors Jaime Castro and Antanas Mockus during 1992-1997 which gave increasing financial capacities to the city (e.g. Castro's *Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá* or Mockus' tax increase programs such as *Bogotá al 110%*). These elements are often left out of the simplified Bogotá story that circulates globally which equates urban transformation with non-car transportation improvements even though it was the increased political, administrative and fiscal capacities of the city what allowed Enrique Peñalosa to implement new transportation infrastructures such as *Transmilenio* in the first place.

In short, what circulates as the "Bogotá model" then is not the most exemplar policies that took place in Bogotá but rather a set of urban interventions related with transportation and public spaces, specifically BRT and bicycle policies. However, beyond the policies and interventions, it is this simplified narrative of urban success and transformation (from dystopia to model) associated to those interventions that lubricates and facilitates the circulation. This finding opens up a new set of questions in the debate of urban policy circulation and mobilities: can we use the narrative power of models for other objectives? For example, can we use the Bogotá story of urban transformation to argue for expanded fiscal capacities for cities?

Why (now)?

In asking why are Bogotá policies widely circulating now, this dissertation tackles an issue that the policy mobilities literature has often taken for granted: why is the speed of urban policy exchange and circulation increasing in recent years? The circulation of urban policies and certain planning mechanisms as models is not a new phenomenon, certainly not in Latin America, where, already in the 16th century, the *Law of the Indies* constituted a comprehensive urban planning model that Spanish colonists followed in locating, building and populating human settlements in the New World (Solano 1996, Socolow & Johnson 1981). While it is by now widely acknowledged in urban studies that the travel and mobilization of urban planning policies is not new (Harris & Moore 2013), several urban scholars have also noted that their circulation has accelerated in the last decades (Peck & Theodore 2015, McFarlane 2011, Healey 2013).

Anwers to the question of why the speed of urban policy circulation has increased in recent years have often been limited to technological advances such as improved ways of transmitting information thanks to the internet and social media or as a result of cheaper air fares. Initially, policy mobilities authors argued that the faster travels of policies seemed to be associated to the faster spread of neoliberalism (McCann 2007, Peck and Theodore 2010). More recently, several authors have argued that resorting to neoliberalism as the main cause to explain the increased speed at which policies travel is a limited view, especially when conceptualizing urban policy processes in cities of the global South (Parnell & Robinson 2012, Jacobs 2012, Bunnell 2013). For example, in his review of recent debates in the policy mobilities literature, Tim Bunnell has argued that:

> "While critical policy mobilities scholars' mappings of diverse geographies of antecedence suggest possibilities for less EuroAmerican-centred academic urban studies, the realization of such possibilities will remain severely curtailed if it continues to be largely restricted to a neoliberal policy subset of referential effects. There is a need first of all, then, for more analyses of policy mobilities and referential effects beyond neoliberalisation." (Bunnell 2013: p. 1996)

Indeed, in their most recent book, Peck & Theodore (2015) have called for policy mobilities and critical policy researchers to develop new methodologies and theoretical concepts that are attentive to the diverse logics, discourses and constellation of actors through which policy models are constructed and mobilized beyond neoliberal frameworks of analysis.

One key finding in this dissertation is that the travels of the Bogotá model around the world cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of international organizations, particularly the World Bank and two global think tanks -ITDP and EMBARQ- funded by global philanthropy. This, however, is not a story of a powerful set of international organizations imposing their agendas top-down but rather an ongoing shift in their logics and modes of operation. In my analysis, I found that the rapid circulation of BRT and Ciclovía-style programs around the world since the early 2000s – and not before- points to a particular historical conjuncture in the apparatus of international development that is characterized by four features. First, the "greening" of development or how the project of development increasingly relies on narratives of sustainability and climate change to legitimize its interventions (Goldman 2005, Adams 2003). In this context, international development institutions are conceptualizing the developing world not only as a space for poverty and economic development interventions but also as places to be saved from environmental threats and global climate change through market mechanisms and cost-effective policies. This, on the other hand, has made development officials and experts increasingly interested in the ongoing paradigm shift in the field of transportation policy from modernization towards sustainability ideals (Banister 2005). In this transporation policy paradigm, cities such as Curitiba and Bogotá are perceived as world examples given their cost-effective investments in non-car modes of transportation via BRT and bicycle policies (Suzuki et al. 2013, Cervero 2005, Hidalgo & Hermann 2004).

Second, this "greening" of development is taking place in parallel with another important change: the rising number of actors involved in international development funding. While official development assistance (commonly known as ODA, or international development funding coming from governments) constituted the majority of the total flows of investment from OECD countries to developing countries during the 1990s, ODA represents currently only a fraction. In the meantime, private financial flows, remittances and philanthropic funding have increased significantly. For instance, Greenhil et al. (2013) have estimated that non-traditional forms of development assistance –which includes private financial flows, remittances, and philanthropic funding- have grown from representing 22% of the total of development assistance in 2000 to 43.8% in 2009. Particularly relevant for the travels of the Bogotá model has been the increase in philanthropic funding, a usual funding source for the many conferences, study tours and digital

platforms that has contributed to spread the model across the world. The increased availability of funding from philanthropy is of course associated with the rise of billionaires and increasing income inequality in the countries where philanthropy headquarters are based. For instance, since 2013 the largest donor of the World Health Organization is not a country government anymore but the Gates Foundation. By 2012, philanthropy contributed with $70 billion to international development flows, half of the total investment in ODA that year. The power of philanthropy, however, does not only reside in its funding resources but also in its capacity to introduce certain issues as global agendas and promoting certain policy models as solutions.

Third, this philanthropic emphasis on scaling up proven technologies and "best practices" coincides with a turn in the World Bank to "solutionism" or a focus on solutions that can be quickly spread. In this logic, it is important to have examples and "success stories" of cities that can help these model solutions to be quickly disseminated. Even if paradoxically the World Bank refused to fund Bogotá's *Transmilenio* in 1999, Bogotá has become in the last decade a poster child for the World Bank to spread their agenda of promoting cost-effective sustainable transport solutions in cities around the world.

Finally, given the constant failures at reaching a multilateral climate agreement among national leaders, international organizations and global philanthropy are increasingly turning their attention to cities and city models as a new way to intervene in global climate change or, in the language of philanthropy, to "leverage the power of cities"[10] to solve global climate change. This has made international development organizations and foundations increasingly interested in urban planning as an important space to promote international development and global change. Indeed, in the post-2015 development goals proposed in Rio+20, cities will have their own development goal for the first time.

So under this historical conjuncture, global impact for international development organizations is increasingly conceptualized through affecting the largest number of cities directly or reaching "the tipping point" as some development officials put it. This is an emerging logic of development intervention that I call "leveraging cities" and that explain in more detail in chapter 2. In doing so, I relate the increasing speed of urban policy circulation with the changing landscape of international development Under this logic, Bogotá's *Transmilenio* and *Ciclovía* are two among the many cost-effective, impact-oriented and financially sustainable urban policy models that seek to solve global climate change through their replication in as many cities as possible. This contrast with previous strategies, such as structural adjustment for instance, where global development change was mostly focused on affecting national level institutions, policies and organizations with the assumption that this change would then trickle down to cities.

How does it circulate?

When looking at the practices through which Bogotá ideas arrived in Guadalajara and San Francisco, it becomes clear that as much as global philanthropy and international organizations can mobilize extensive funding and expert networks for the causes and policy problems they want to prioritize, they can also not impose their models and interpretations of urban sustainability on cities. Local actors have their own agendas, beliefs and aspirations and are embedded in particular urban politics and governance dynamics. In other words, rather than through coercion "from above," Bogotá's *Transmilenio* and *Ciclovía* have circulated when influential local leaders –which include mayors and high ranking officials but also coalitions of local advocates, business leaders or journalists- have persuasively learned them and formed local coalitions to implement them. Moving influential local actors from knowledge to action requires not only knowledge circulation but active processes of

[10] http://www.bloomberg.org/about/our-approach/ (accessed May 1, 2015)

learning and persuasion that, in the case of the "Bogotá model," was done through an infrastructure of inter-city policy circulation in the form of policy forums, study tours, as well as printed and online "best practice" guides, images and videos. The politics behind the global circulation of Bogotá policies is therefore not about coercion but rather a politics of learning, persuasion and local coalition-building that takes place at the intersection of local and transnational agendas. A careful and qualitative analysis of who organizes these events and the practices of learning and persuasion that take place in them is key to understand the friction between global and urban agendas that allowed the circulation of the Bogotá model and its different mutations in each city.

In studying urban political dynamics in Guadalajara and San Francisco, I am less interested in the question of "who governs/who rules?" that has traditionally characterized pluralism and elite theory debates in Anglo-American political science (Dahl 1961, Hunter 1953, Stone 1989). Instead, I use the process of policy learning from Bogotá in Guadalajara and San Francisco to understand *how* local decision-makers actually learn about new policies and, perhaps more importantly, *how* these inter-city learning practices take place in a field of power and politics in the learning city. In shifting from "who" towards "how" questions, I follow an analysis of power that focuses on the ways in which power is operationalized through everyday practices and techniques rather than starting with particular people or institutions (Foucault 1977). Policy instruments are analyzed as instantiations of power that are, in turn, able to change and alter urban governance dynamics (Le Galès 2011). Here, the role of knowledge -and therefore learning- is key and, inevitably, related with power: "there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations" (Foucault 1977: p. 27).

Finally, in grounding my analysis in the experience of inter-city policy learning processes between Latin American cities and between Latin America and the US, this dissertation also contributes to the call to de-center urban politics from its narrow focus on the politics of inter-urban competitiveness for mobile global capital (MacLeod & Jones, 2011) and the experience of EuroAmerican cities (Robinson 2006, Roy 2009) towards a more relational understanding of the different actors, networks, and knowledges that shape urban politics and policy in both the global North and the South. In this way, my project builds on a new generation of scholarship interested in analyzing urban politics and urban policymaking processes beyond the developed/developing country divide (Irazábal 2005, Robinson 2006, Pasotti 2010).

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized in two parts. The first part, which includes chapter 1 and 2, traces the construction of Bogotá as a world policy model. Chapter 1 is a brief history of urban planning in Bogotá that situates the celebrated transformation of Bogotá during the 1990s and early 2000s as part a broader process of decentralization, democratization and neoliberalization of the state in Colombia that started in the late 1980 in a context of extreme urban violence and profound delegitimation of the state. In Chapter 2 I identify four transnational networks of actors that have been key in constructing and circulating a particular "Bogotá model" around the world since the early 2000s. This model is a simplified version of all the reforms that happened in Bogotá that highlights public space and transportation initiatives while rendering other important political and fiscal reforms in the city anonymous and, therefore, immobile. Chapter 2 examines these transnational actors as part of a broader transformation in the apparatus of international development characterized by an increasing interest in cost-effective, impact-oriented and financially-sustainable urban policy models and "best practice" solutions, what I call the "leveraging cities" logic, as a way to intervene in global problems and, particularly, global climate change.

In the second part of the dissertation, which includes chapter 3, 4 and 5, I analyze the actual practices through which this Bogotá model was circulated through a series of infrastructures of

policy circulation that include policy forums, study tours and digital platforms. I show that while these infrastructures are often funded and organized by international organizations, particularly global philanthropy, their outcomes are ultimately shaped by the dynamics of urban politics and governance in each city. In Chapter 3, I analyze policy forums as important relational sites for the circulation of the Bogotá model and identify a particular type of expert, what I call "persuasive practitioners," which have been key to inspire and move urban policy actors around the world from knowledge to action. In Chapter 4, I investigate the organization of study tours to Bogotá and show their capacity to generate policy ownership, build coalitions and mobilize public opinion. This chapter shows also that South-South or South-North is often a poor characterization of the many local and transnational actors that have been involved in the organization and funding of Bogotá study tours. Finally, Chapter 5 reveals the existence of a virtual infrastructure in the form of policy blogs and other digital platforms that have contributed to the circulation of the Bogotá model by circulating texts, images and videos about Bogotá. In analyzing the practices and digital materialities behind the online circulation of an online Ciclovía video that was key in the establishment of a Ciclovía-style program in San Francisco, this chapter shows the role digital objects are to persuade urban policy actors and leverage urban policy change in cities around the world.

PART I. CONSTRUCTING BOGOTÁ AS A WORLD POLICY MODEL OF SUSTAINABLE URBAN TRANSPORT

Assembling the Bogotá Model, Leveraging Cities

Chapter 1. Assembling the "Bogotá Model"

"Bums, beggars, recyclers with wooden carts and dogs,
crazies, pimps, hunting queers, whores,
loners, sleepless, alcoholics, drug addicts:
the nocturnal fauna of the city center in action.
He recalled the words he had heard one night in a bar:
"To be a Bogotano is to belong to the sewers of hell.
For being a citizen here is synonymous of being a rodent"
Mendoza 1998, *Scorpio City:* p 19.

"And so, I ask, what the hell is Bogotá? Bogotá is a big, ugly and badly-planned city that is several decades behind in road and service infrastructure; it's increasingly polluted with smoke, ads, noises; it's unsafe, grey and rainy. And, in this setting, millions of undisciplined, aggressive and frightened inhabitants move around with no sidewalks to walk on or parks to rest at; looking at each other like strangers and feeling like they live in an increasingly unwelcoming and foreign place. Someone once described her accurately:
Bogotá is the suburb of a city that does not exist."
Revista Semana 1994 [11]

"In just a few years, innovative planning transformed Bogotá, Colombia
into the world's leading model for sustainable urban design.
The once polluted and congested city, where many people were unable to reach vital destinations,
now has one of the world's most efficient and accessible transportation networks."
Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP) 2003 [12]

Introduction

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, narratives of urban chaos, fear and ungovernability dominated local and international accounts of Bogotá. A rapidly growing metropolis in a country where *guerrillas* and *paramilitares* fought to control drug trade flows, the early 1990s was also the period when Bogotá registered the highest homicide rate in its modern history. The high homicide rate, the massive disappearance and killing of street children and prostitutes earned Bogotá the title of *city of fear*. And as fear of violence began to dominate everyday life in the city, avoiding public space became a common practice among *Bogotanos* (Martín Barbero 2003). Violence and urban disorder in Bogotá was real but it was also reproduced and enhanced through its circulation through the media and everyday conversations (Silva 1992, Niño et al. 1998). For instance, in an analysis of textual representations of the city in public documents and local newspapers during the early 1990s, Samuel Jaramillo (1998: p. 193) found that "chaotic, monster, disaster, unmanagable, ungovernable" were among the most common adjectives used by *Bogotanos* to describe their city. Violence, traffic,

[11] Original in Spanish: "Y a todas estas, ¿qué diablos es Bogotá? Bogotá es una ciudad grande, fea y mal planificada, con un atraso de varias décadas en su infraestructura vial y de servicios, cada vez más contaminada de humos, avisos y ruidos, insegura, gris y lluviosa. Y en ese escenario se mueven millones de habitantes indisciplinados, agresivos y atemorizados, que no tienen andenes por dónde caminar ni parques para descansar, que se miran unos a otros como extraños y que se sienten viviendo en un lugar cada vez más despedidor y ajeno. Alguien la describió alguna vez con gran acierto: Bogotá es el suburbio de una ciudad que no existe."
http://www.semana.com/opinion/articulo/hokus-pokus-mockus/22365-3 (accessed Apr 23, 2015)
[12] Source: https://www.itdp.org/bogota-shares-urban-revolution-with-the-world/ (accessed May 2, 2013)

insecurity, pollution, inadequate provision of public services and education and health problems were among the most referred concerns. Violence and inadequate provision of public services were not, however, a specifically "urban" issue. Indeed, during the 1980s and 1990s, rural areas in Colombia experienced violence and displacement in more dramatic ways than Bogotá (Ballve 2012).

In this context of extreme violence and profound state delegitimation, a series of reforms took place in Colombia including a series of political, fiscal and administrative decentralization initiatives as well as the passing of a new Constitution in 1991. As authority, responsibilities, and resources were transferred from the central government to local and departmental governments in the 1990s, decentralization reforms brought into play new logics of government in Colombia and a new generation of elected and independent mayors in Bogotá that made use of their enhanced capacities to invest in the city and re-invent the role of public space as a new form of public action (Salazar 2003, Berney 2008). In the context of decentralization, Bogotá mayors created a new and rescaled version of urban modernity in which urban citizenship programs, bicycle paths, BRT lines and urban public parks replaced traditional developmentalist projects of national pride such as dams, ports or highways.

By the early 2000s, a new global imaginary of Bogotá started to circulate around the world. It portrayed the city not as the capital of violence and drug trafficking but rather as a city in transformation with modern rapid buses and people riding bicycles. This new imaginary of Bogotá as having gone through "a city reinassance"[13] or an "urban revolution"[14] was also a simplified narrative of urban transformation that highlighted certain reforms and silenced others. Of all the changes and reforms that took place in the city during the 1980s and 1990s, it was mostly transportation and public space interventions such as *Transmilenio, Ciclovía* and the bicycle lane network built during Enrique Peñalosa's administration during the late 1990s which figured prominently as central features of Bogotá's "urban revolution." The decentralization and democratization reforms that underpinned these reforms in earlier years were often ignored.

This chapter analyzes the many policy reforms and interventions that took place in Bogotá during the late 1980s and 1990s. It examines four key decentralization reforms and the ways in which they affected Bogotá local government priorities and policies. In particular, it shows that the urban transformation and re-conceptualization of public space that took place in Bogotá in the 1990s cannot be understood without referring to the decentralization reforms that empowered and gave more fiscal resources to Bogotá local government in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Decentralization in Colombia: Experimenting with Neoliberalism and Democracy

Decentralization, Neoliberalism, Democracy

Abundant theoretical work has been produced in the last two decades that relates the resurgence of subnational entities, such as the city and the city-region, to increased global competition among territories and a new dynamic of agglomeration economies at the local/regional level. Work in this area suggests that the global economy is now driven not only by global cities (Sassen 1991) but also by a hierarchy of global city-regions that are considered the motors of the economy in a world where

[13] *El Renacer de una Ciudad* (The Renaissance of a City) was the title of a symposium on Bogotá's transformation that took place at the Department of City and Regional Planning of UC Berkeley in October 2008.

[14] In a 2003 press release called "Bogotá shares urban revolution with the world" one of the leading global think tanks in the area of sustainable transport -the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP)- declared: "In just a few years, innovative planning transformed Bogotá, Colombia into the world's leading model for sustainable urban design. The once polluted and congested city, where many people were unable to reach vital destinations, now has one of the world's most efficient and accessible transportation networks." Source: https://www.itdp.org/bogota-shares-urban-revolution-with-the-world/ (accessed May 2, 2013)

nation-states and macroeconomic analysis seem to have lost their significance (Ohmae 1995, Porter 2001, Scott 2001). This literature presents cities and city-regions as the new key territorial units for accumulation and governance in an inevitably competitive and globalizing world (Scott & Storper 2003).

While early analyses of globalization and global cities postulated the eventual *dissolution* of the nation-state, developments in different disciplines soon pointed towards a criticism of post-national discourses and a reassertion of state power, which was seen as being reconfigured rather than dissolved by global forces (Del Cerro 2004). This conclusion is in line with Neil Brenner's (2004) argument pointing to the emergence of "new state spaces," subnational spaces of government such as cities and city-regions, which constitute a *rescaling* rather than the *dissolution* of the state. Brenner and a growing neo-Marxist literature on *state rescaling* interpret the rise of local, regional and multi-scalar structures of governance as an adaptive response of the state to the increasing local- and regional-based dynamics of capital in the context of neoliberalizing and globalizing capitalism. This body of literature sees the need for capitalism to constantly remake the geography of the state and political-institutional frameworks in order to allow new regimes of accumulation to occur. *State rescaling* theorists interpret the emergence of cities and city-regions since the 1970s as a new restructuring phase of a neoliberalizing capitalism that comes after the exhaustion of the Fordist regime of accumulation where the national scale was the pre-eminent geographical basis for accumulation and regulation (Brenner & Theodore 2002). As Brenner puts it: "it is no longer capital that is to be molded into the (territorially integrated) geography of state space, but state space that is to be molded into the (territorially differentiated) geography of capital" (Brenner 2004: p. 16).

Although this investigation finds *state rescaling* theories useful to understanding certain aspects behind the rise of subnational state geographies, their reliance on the existence of advanced liberal democracies as system of government and the assumption of the previous existence of a Fordist accumulation regime makes this theoretical framework work for a rather limited number of countries in Western Europe and North America. As this study will show, the decentralization processes that facilitated the shift in Colombia to a decentralized and multi-scalar government cannot exclusively be explained by a neoliberal logic and the dynamic and desires of global capital. The role of decentralization in Colombia as a technique to legitimate and negotiate the state with a broad set of internal actors - including civil social movements, the *guerrilla* insurgency and business elites - and the potential of the emerging decentralized paradigm of government to democratize Colombia's subnational state institutions should not be underestimated.

In their critique of both global city-region theories and *state rescaling* literature, Jonas and Ward (2004) have argued that "the emphasis on competition for mobile capital hardly exhaust the full range of imperatives (fiscal, legitimation, social control, etc.) underpinning state intervention and territorial reorganization" (Jonas & Ward 2004: p. 2126). Similarly, Caldeira and Holston have argued that the introduction of participatory planning mechanisms and public-private partnerships in Brazil since the 1980s cannot be studied as a matter of neoliberalization or democratization alone. Rather, they represent a mix of both logics of government:

> "In Brazil, democratisation and neoliberalisation coincided in the late 1980s. Each informed a notion of participation in the paradigm of participatory planning that developed with both coincident and contradictory effects. They became entangled in projects to dismantle the modernist developmentalist-authoritarian state as Brazilians rebelled against deep social inequalities and military dictatorship." (Caldeira and Holston 2015: p. 2005-06).

In this chapter, I show how decentralization[15] in Colombia is a state project where initiatives of democratization and neoliberalization coexisted in tension. And yet, the neoliberal and democratic agendas could not be more different. While social justice, equality and citizenship are central elements of the democratic agenda, the neoliberal agenda privileges a different set of priorities including entrepreneurialism, competitiveness and self-regulation.

The neoliberal state is not a disempowered state or a state in retreat. Instead, the neoliberal state is constantly in search of new modes of action and regulation based on entrepreneurial, competitive and market or pseudo-market mechanisms:

> "Just as early liberalism did not mean that regulatory, legislative, and creative governmental activity was rejected or abandoned, so too modern forms of neo-liberalism define positive tasks for a governmental activism. Here it becomes a question of constructing the legal, institutional and cultural conditions that will enable an artificial competitive game of entrepreneurial conduct to be played to best effect… Government must work for the game of market competition and as a kind of enterprise itself, and new quasi-entrepreneurial and market models of action or practical systems must be invented for the conduct of individuals, groups and institutions" (Burchell 1996: p. 27).

When writing about the state in Latin America, however, questions of democracy cannot be ignored. This study interprets democratization not only in the sense of electoral politics, i.e. popular election of political representatives, but also as a logic of government that relies on popular participation mechanisms and imagines a society of active and informed citizens that can positively contribute to the formulation and implementation of policies and planning. Under this democratic logic, laws, policies and planning are constructed with participatory mechanisms rather than imposed by technocrats or planning experts. For instance, Caldeira and Holston have argued that, as Brazil moved away from the previous modernist and dictatorial regime, the main mark of democratization in the country was not electoral politics but rather "the explosion of popular political participation and the massive engagement of citizens in debating the future of the country" (Caldeira and Holston 2005: p. 402). The interpretation of democracy beyond electoral politics is important for this investigation. Limiting the definition of democracy to electoral politics would lead to the naïve statement that Colombia has been a democratic country since 1958, despite the sixteen years of elitist government of *Frente Nacional* (1958-1974). The democratization of the state in Colombia is rather a process in the making, with an important milestone being the enactment of the new 1991 Constitution as well as new laws such as Law 388 of 1997 which not only decentralized planning to the local level but also introduced popular participation mechanisms in the making of planning instruments.

Violence, Civil Protests and the Crisis of Legitimacy of the Colombian State

In 1982, the presidential candidates of the Conservative Party, Belisario Betancur, and the Liberal Party, Alfonso López Michelsen, agreed on the promotion of decentralization to recover the legitimacy of the national government and achieve greater administrative efficiency in the provision of public goods and services (Restrepo 2004). The crisis of legitimacy derived from the existence of *Frente Nacional,* a national agreement between the two traditional parties that enabled them to govern the country jointly for sixteen years (1958-1974), alternating between a conservative and a liberal president every four years. The Conservative and Liberal parties initially conceived *Frente Nacional* as

[15] This study interprets decentralization as a three-dimensional process that entails the transfer of authority (political decentralization), responsibilities (administrative decentralization) and resources (fiscal decentralization) from the national to subnational levels of government (Falleti 2005).

a mechanism to put an end to the military dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas (1953-1957) and discourage the creation of a third political party. However, by erasing the minimal possibility of political struggle within formal state institutions and their authoritarian ways of dealing with dissent, *Frente Nacional* not only failed to decrease violence and armed conflict in Colombia but actively contributed to it by displacing the struggle onto the *guerrilla* insurgencies that emerged in rural areas and claimed to represent the rural poor (Sudarsky 1992: pp. 89-90). Since the 1970s, the Colombian rural elite, with the support of the state, funded several paramilitary groups to fight the *guerrilla.* Confrontations for the control of the territory between *guerrilla* groups (including FARC, ELN and M-19 among others) and paramilitary organizations have left a legacy of more than four decades of violence and armed conflict in Colombia.

However, decentralization reforms in Colombia cannot be understood as a response to the demands of FARC and *guerrilla* groups alone. Civil social movements did play a very important role in the territorial reconfiguration of the state that took place in the 1980s. Among the most effective methods these movements used to put pressure on the government were the numerous civil protests (*paros cívicos)* undertaken in different peripheral cities and provinces of Colombia in protest of the inadequacy and poor quality of basic public goods and services provided by the central government in Bogotá. Civil protests became an effective mechanism that destabilized the centralized and elitist Colombian political system. Civil protests in peripheral cities and provinces became not only an effective method of protest but also a breeding ground for the strengthening of new social and civil movements in Colombia that reclaimed more democratic approaches to governing, planning and the provision of public goods and services. For example, during the 3rd National Meeting of Civil Movements of Colombia celebrated in 1983, different movements from throughout the country demanded popular elections of mayors and governors, planning at the subnational level and open city governments with increased popular participation (Restrepo 2004).

The intensification of the violent activity of the *guerrilla* and counter-*guerrilla* paramilitary organizations in rural Colombia as well as civil protests in peripheral cities of Colombia since the 1970s (Restrepo 1992) revealed two circumstances about the Colombian state. First, the inadequacy of the highly centralized state institutions inherited from the 1886 Constitution to efficiently provide the population with public goods and services throughout the country. Second, the inability of the state, despite its use and abuse of the monopoly of military and police violence, to control a territory increasingly fragmented and dominated by different militant organizations. The eruption of drug trafficking in the 1980s gave both *guerrilla* groups (including FARC, ELN and M-19 among others) and paramilitaries new funding possibilities and contributed to a steep increase in the levels of violence. By the late 1980s, the homicide rate in Colombia was among the highest in the world, reaching a peak of 74.4 per 100,000 people in 1990. The rate is disturbingly high even when compared to other violent countries in Latin America at the time: Brazil (20.2 in 1989) and Mexico (17.2 in 1991) (United Nations 1995: pp. 484-505; cited in Caldeira 2000: p. 127). It is in this context of extreme violence and profound state delegitimation where decentralization as a new technique of government emerged in Colombia.

In his book *Descentralizar para Pacificar* (Decentralize to Pacify), Jaime Castro, Minister of Government during the 1984-85 Peace Agreements with FARC, member of the 1991 Constituent Assembly and mayor of Bogotá (1992-94), argued that decentralization was a critical piece of the new social and political pact that Colombia needed in order to overcome the lack of legitimacy of the state and the emergency situation in which the country found itself (Castro 1998). Actors as different as *guerrilla* groups, civil social movements, the private sector, and business elites welcomed the decentralization processes anticipated by the state in the mid 1980s although each with different expectations. For instance, although civil social movements demanded improved provision of public goods and services in the provinces and peripheral cities and the democratization of state

institutions, they embraced the government language of decentralization as it matched some of their demands, such as popular elections of mayors and governors, planning at the subnational level and open city governments (Restrepo 2004). The rhetoric of decentralization was also useful for the state to engage the *guerrilla* insurgency - which demanded participation in state revenues and popular election of mayors in order to access state institutions - as well as the private sector and business elites - which welcomed a larger participation of the private sector in subnational goverrnments and relative autonomy from the developmentalist ambitions of the central government (Castro 2008). According to Castro (1994: pp. 128-129), the spaces for local governance were created to "devolve citizens the political responsibility of their own management" but also to "modernize and give more legitimacy, solidity and projection to the state."

Four Key Decentralization Reforms that Transformed Urban Governance in Bogotá

Negotiations between the state and multiple internal actors in the mid-1980s in Colombia resulted in a package of political, administrative and fiscal decentralization policies that included, among others, popular election of mayors, the decentralization of education and health policies, and the devolution of 50% of the value added tax from the nation-state to subnational "territorial entities" (Restrepo 2004). Decentralization in the 1980s largely ignored the intermediate geographical level (*departamento*) and mainly focused on the transfer of authority, responsibilities and resources from the central government to the local level. The following sections analyze in more detail key four decentralization reforms in Colombia tht took place during the late 1980s and 1990s that were key in shaping the kind of urban reforms and interventions that would later take place in Bogotá.

Popular Election of Mayors (1988)

Political decentralization reforms in Colombia began in 1986 with the removal of the power of governors to appoint mayors. These reforms advanced the democratization of local governments until popular election of mayors was established eventually in 1988. The novelty resided in the transformation of the local government from a mere administrative subdivision of the state, run by appointed mayors, to a new and more sophisticated entity run by democratically elected mayors. Local governments in Colombia became, for the first time, capable of making decisions and administering resources with relative autonomy from national desires and interests. In this context, Bogotá mayors became accountable not only to national political elites but also to the voting population of the city. This resulted in a renewed interest in the city as a scale for both economic development and governance and in a different kind of urban politics, something that Eleonora Pasotti (2010) has called "political branding." Moving beyond the clientelist networks that traditionally assured votes to the candidates of the two traditional Colombian parties (Partido Liberal and Partido Conservador), Pasotti has argued that, during the 1990s, Bogotá independent mayors experimented with new political strategies and sought popular support and votes by attaching themselves to a carefully chosen branded vision of the city rather than relying on traditional clientelistic relationships. Political branding is different from urban marketing because it emphasizes the emergence of a different kind of politics to govern the city rather than an orchestrated effort to sell the city in the face of inevitable inter-city competition. However, political branding is not necessarily a more democratic way of governing. For example, Pasotti has argued that a branded vision of politics depoliticizes previous and contentious cleavages around class, race, or party identification by including everyone in a "collective" territorial vision or brand. In this context, the role of emotions, public opinion mobilization and evocations of ideal collective identities become key prominent features of urban politics while the charisma and leadership skills of mayors becomes more important than their political trajectory or party affiliation.

Law 388 of 1997

As part of the broader move towards a more decentralized government, the new 1991 Constitution assigned cities, for the first time, the responsibility of formulating land use and territorial planning, a task traditionally assumed by the nation or planning experts appointed by the central government's planning department. After the enactment of Law 388, cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants in Colombia became responsible for the formulation and implementation of an entirely new set of urban planning instruments including: *Programa de Gobierno* (government plan for candidates to mayor), *Plan de Desarrollo* (3-year term plan, to be developed by elected local representatives), and *Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial* or POT (9-year term plan). Law 388 aimed to give a territorial dimension to the process of economic and social planning. Article 2 established the "social and environmental function of property", the "prevalence of the general interest over the private interest" and the "equitable distribution of benefits and losses" as basic guidelines of local territorial planning in Colombia.

Law 388 also conceived urban planning in more participatory ways than the previous model of national and centralized planning. For instance, article 4 of Law 388, under the title *participación democrática,* put participatory planning on the agenda of local governments by requiring local administrations to make use of participatory techniques in planning and planning-related activities. This represents a substantial difference from the previous centralized and top-down conception of planning based on experts appointed by the central government[16]. Law 388, not only opened the door of city planning meetings to the city's inhabitants (*pobladores*) but also to their organizations (*organizaciones*). Under this new approach, civil society groups, the private sector, and other "stakeholders" of the city were expected to participate in urban governance dynamics and shape local planning ordinances. The use of the term *governance* here, instead of *government*, is not accidental. Governance, as opposed to the traditional concept of top-down government, is understood as a new way of governing in which civil society organizations, the private sector and other local actors are given a more significant and active role in public decisions and policy-making. Governance makes use of public-private partnerships and instruments such as strategic and participatory planning as opposed to traditional expert-led comprehensive plans and bureaucratic planning institutions. It is precisely in this notion of governance where the logics of neoliberalism and democracy are profoundly entangled.

Law 60 of 1993

The first indicators in favor of fiscal decentralization in Colombia appeared in the 1968 reforms of the Constitution, which established a regional fund for education and health funded by national revenues but to be administered by subnational territorial entities. However, "because the national government appointed governors, who appointed mayors, this represented less a decentralization than a deconcentration of the budget to subnational administrative units" (Dillinger and Webb 1999: p. 4). It was not until the mid 1980s that Colombia experienced a clearer movement towards a more decentralized fiscal system. Until then, the national government remained the main tax collector and main provider of public goods and services (Iregui, Ramos and Saavedra 2001). For instance, Acosta and Bird (2003) have noted how while in 1973 only 13 percent of central government current revenues were transferred to subnational governments in Colombia, by 2001, the comparable figure was almost 50 percent.

Continuing the experiments with fiscal decentralization initiated in 1968 and reinforced in the mid 1980s, the 1991 Colombian Constitution "redefined the assignment of functions to different

16 See Le Corbusier's 1951 master plan for Bogotá for an example of top-down and expert-led approach to planning in Colombia (Tarchópulos 2006).

levels of government and established a completely new transfer system, which came into effect with Law 60 of 1993" (Acosta and Bird 2003, 6). Law 60 of 1993 committed the national government to gradually expanding the amount of shared revenues with *municipios* and *departamentos* to all current national revenues, not only value added tax as in the 1980s. The final objective of Law 60 was for the national government to share with subnational entities half of all the current national revenues by 2002. While the percentage in 1987 was 18%, by 2002, the figure had reached 45 %. Since the 1980s, the expenditure capacity of cities in Colombia has notably increased and, by 2002, it represented almost 22% of total government expenditures (from a 6% in 1980). The central government, however, still remains the main tax collector (82% in 2002). Therefore, although cities, and to a lesser degree *departamentos*, have been given more financial resources to spend, they are still dependent on transfers from the central government since their capacity to raise revenues through taxes is limited.

Per capita local tax revenues in 2001 varied greatly among *municipios,* ranging from 732 Colombian *pesos* per capita collected in the city of Majagual (*departamento* of Sucre) to 324,966 *pesos* per capita collected in Yumbo (in the *departamento* of Valle and headquarters of a division of the national oil company Ecopetrol) (Iregui, Melo and Ramos 2004, 268). The high level of variation in the capacity to raise own local tax revenues has led no only to increasing inequalities in spending capacity among *municipios* but has also facilitated the introduction of a new neoliberal logic of competition among city administrations for transfers. For instance, Restrepo (2002) has noted how the participation of cities in current national revenues after decentralization reforms in Colombia is conditioned to certain fiscal and administrative thresholds set up by the central government. Through the elaboration of different local performance indices, the National Department of Planning ranks cities and *departamentos* and provides a framework that stimulates constant comparison and competition amongst territories:

> "Decentralization should *stimulate competition* among local governments for transferred resources. This is reflected in the fact that the 16% of the participation of cities in the current revenues of Colombia is conditioned to obtaining [positive] fiscal, administrative and poverty reduction performance measures" (Restrepo 2002: p. 519).

Again, this contrasts with the previous logic of territorial distribution of resources based on clientelistic relationships within the traditional political parties and the Congress or acquired rights of territories. Although in 2001 Law 715 replaced Law 60 of 1993, the mechanisms to rank cities and *departamentos* and the competitive logic to distribute national transfers are still in place.

Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá (1993)

Bogotá, as other Colombian cities, held its first popular election of mayor in 1988. Following the mandates of Andrés Pastrana (1988-1990) and Juan Martín Caicedo Ferrer (1990-1992), Jaime Castro, the "engineer" of decentralization in Colombia, became mayor of Bogotá in 1992. During his three years in power, Castro devoted himself to the reorganization of local public finances and to the inception of a new legal and institutional order for the city, what later became the *Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá*. Castro came to office in a difficult moment in Bogotá and Colombia's recent history. He was convinced that the main problem that the city faced was its lack of *gobernabilidad* (governability) and fiscal autonomy (Castro 1994). Castro, a lawyer, politician and a firm supporter of decentralization, became concerned with reforming the institutional and financial regime of the city as the first step in recovering political control of the city. His efforts during the first part of his political term as mayor concentrated in the numerous political negotiations needed to pass the *Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá* (EOB) at the national and local level in order to increase the financial autonomy and self-management capacity of the city. EOB is the "mini-Constitution" of Bogotá; a

structural reorganization of the institutional, financial and legal order at the local level that sought to increase the financial autonomy and self-management capacity of the city. EOB is a mandate of the 1991 Constitution that allowed Bogotá to have faster access to increased legal and fiscal autonomy, acknowledging the specific management complexities of the largest city and capital of Colombia. EOB introduced two key changes in Bogotá's local government: a division of powers between the mayor and the *Concejo* (the city council) and a renovated pursuit of local fiscal autonomy among local politicians and administrators. Before EOB, *concejales* (representatives of the *Concejo*) were in charge of both the design and implementation of local norms and laws, which, according to Castro, put them in a privileged position to exercise corrupt and clientelistic practices (Castro 1994). EOB established a division of powers between the mayor (executive powers) and the *Concejo* (legislative powers) and removed *concejales* and their representatives from administrative and implementation meetings related to planning, taxes, and procurement. Reducing the responsibilities of *concejales,* however, also meant increased decision-making powers for the mayor.

Fiscal decentralization reforms provided city governments in Colombia with a substantial increase in expenditure capacity. This was done mainly through direct cash transfers from the central government but also through the transfer to the *municipio* of a limited number of taxes including: taxes on property (*impuesto predial*), on gross turnover of businesses (*impuesto de industria y comercio*) and overcharges on oil (*sobretasa a la gasolina*) to cities. But EOB went further and improved the mechanisms to collect the different taxes transferred to Bogotá's local government. The objective was to move beyond Bogotá's dependency on central transfers and to achieve local fiscal autonomy through a higher reliance in its own local tax revenues and investments (Castro 1994).

After EOB was passed in 1993, two elected and independent mayors, Antanas Mockus and Enrique Peñalosa, came to office. Empowered by decentralization reforms, the urban policies they implemented in less than a decade deeply affected the ways in which space is produced and organized in contemporary Bogotá. As the next section will show, Mockus and Peñalosa resorted to urban pedagogy, public space and non-car transportation policies as new instruments of public action in their particular effort to transform the city, improve the quality of life of *Bogotano*s and decrease the high levels of urban violence.

Bogotá Urban Experiments: Beyond Public Space and Transportation

Antanas Mockus: Urban Pedagogy and Public Space as New Strategies to Govern the City

Antanas Mockus took office in 1995 and became the first elected mayor of Bogotá who was not affiliated with either of the two major political parties in Colombia. A philosopher, mathematician and university professor, Mockus' strategy for making Bogotá governable focused on the promotion of *cultura ciudadana*. *Cultura ciudadana* is a difficult term to translate into English. Literally, it can be translated as "citizenship culture," although translations of the term into the English literature have varied from "civic culture", to "civic consciousness" or "culture of citizenship." An explanation of Mockus' hypothesis would probably give the reader a better understanding of how he interpreted *cultura ciudadana*.

Mockus' approach to Bogotá's high rate of homicide, fear of violence, and lack of hope of its citizens became teaching *Bogotanos* civic values. His goal was "to achieve self-regulation in the behavior among citizens" (Mockus 2001: p. 3). Mockus turned the city into a social experiment making use of the enhanced capacities and resources of Bogotá's local government after decentralization reforms. His initial hypothesis was that a "divorce" existed in Bogotá among law, morality and culture and that this divorce allowed for the consolidation of a systematic use of violence and corruption in everyday life, as "illegal and morally censurable behaviors" became culturally accepted in certain contexts (Mockus 2001a: p. 3).

To translate his hypothesis into urban policies, Mockus chose not to focus on changing legal norms nor altering individual morals of behavior. Instead, he concentrated his efforts on the "cultural" element in his model and his strategy became concerned with teaching citizens values of *cultura ciudadana*. Mockus' urban policies emphasized "the cultural regulation of interactions among strangers in public spaces, means of transport and [public] establishments, and between citizens and [public] authorities" (Mockus 2001a: p. 9). Enhanced policy-making powers and resources at the local level proved to be powerful and effective pedagogical instruments in the hands of professor and mayor Mockus. Bogotá became a big classroom and urban public space became the laboratory in which the Mockus administration tested innovative urban policies that included, for instance, a symbolic vaccination of 45,000 people against violence (in coordination with specially trained psychologists and psychiatrists), a voluntary disarmament program through which arms and ammunitions were exchanged for Christmas present vouchers or the embracement of community police schemes through the creation of more than 7,000 local security fronts that surveilled neighborhoods.

One of the most revered pro-*cultura ciudadana* policies implemented under the Mockus administration is the *Mimes and Zebras Campaign*. Starting in July 1995 and for 3 months, 420 young mimes paid by the City taught *Bogotanos* how to respect standard conventions of car and pedestrian traffic. Situated all over the city and without saying a word, mimes taught citizens values such as helping old people cross the street and not littering urban public space. Mimes also made fun of drivers who would not respect red lights, or pedestrians who would not use zebra crossings to cross the street. Mimes were coordinated with police and traffic agents in specific intersections. For example, if a driver stopped in the middle of a zebra crossing and would not move the car back after the initial playful and friendly request of a mime, a police agent would intervene. In many cases, people in the street applauded the police agent giving a fine to the car driver. This situation reinforced the pedagogical effect of the campaign and showed increased levels of internalization among Bogotanos of the values of cultura ciudadana that Mockus envisioned for the city (Mockus 2001a, Berney 2008).

Under Mockus, *Ciclovía* received a lot of attention and significant amounts of public funds from the local government. It became, in fact, one of the central axes through which Mockus sought to implement his *cultura ciudadana* ideas (Bromberg personal interview 2012) as the encounters of strangers in urban public space that occurred during the weekly street-closure was precisely the kind of scenario that Mockus envisioned to promote his ideas. During Mockus' first administration, Ciclovía underwent a substantial expansion and makeover in its meaning and practice with a new kind of concern among city planners and local government officials: decreasing urban violence and fear of public space. However, it was not by any means a new program. Ciclovía originated in 1974 as an urban experiment of Pro-Cicla, a non-registered bicycle organization led by 3 young bike enthusiasts. While it was institutionalized in 1976 and expanded in 1981, the program lost momentum during the 1980s as oil prices decreased and automobile dependence and suburbanization ceased to be key worries for Bogotá's planners. By the early 1990s, Ciclovía's extension had decreased from 33 miles (50 kms) in 1983 to only 12 miles (20 kms).

In 1995, Mockus named Guillermo Peñalosa -Enrique Peñalosa's brother- Bogotá's Commissioner of Parks and Recreation. Guillermo Peñalosa brought his previous experience in the private sector to Bogotá's local government and introduced three key innovations to *Ciclovía*. First, he moved the management of the program from the Transportation Department to the Parks, Recreation and Sports Institute (IDRD), a decentralized unit of Bogotá's Mayor's Office. IDRD provided Guillermo Peñalosa with a less bureaucratic and more professional environment where he had more flexibility to partner with different agencies, non-profits and the private sector in order to supplement the agency's limited budget. Starting in 1997, *Ciclovía* began to receive approximately

25% of its funding from private sources (Del Castillo et al. 2011). Second, this flexibility to partner allowed his IDRD team to make *Ciclovía* more attractive for the general public by introducing Recreovía, a program that offered free activities during *Ciclovía* events, including aerobics and dance workshops, in collaboration with different local institutions and non-profits. Third, he introduced a volunteer program that allowed the expansion of *Ciclovía* without having to increase the number of IDRD employees. His small but professional team, together with a large number of volunteers, helped him achieve his objective of expanding *Ciclovía*'s length over 100 kilometers. By the late 1990s, *Ciclovía* had reached 75 miles (121 kilometers) and attracted more than a million *Bogotanos* to the street every Sunday.

The Expansion of Bogotá's Tax Base: A Less Known Aspect of the Bogotá Model

The Mockus administration, driven by a desire to expand the local tax base and the investment capacity of the city, also experimented with local tax schemes. Mockus' notion of *cultura ciudadana* applied to the fiscal management of the city derived in what he called *cultura tributaria* (tax culture). Changes between 1993 and 1997 in Bogotá's fiscal structure under Mockus expanded the investment capacity of the city through the increase of both local tax revenues and local real expenditure per citizen. Among Mockus' most innovative and successful fiscal initiatives was *Bogotá al 110%*, in which he asked Bogotanos to voluntarily pay 10 percent more than what they owed in tax. In return, they could tell the city which programs they wanted to favor with their extra contribution. More than 63,000 Bogotanos chose to participate in this initiative when they filed their taxes. Interestingly, Usme, one of Bogotá's poorest neighborhoods, contributed the most in relative terms.

Figure 4. Per Capita Local Tax Revenues in Bogotá and Colombia, 1990-2001 (in 1998 Colombian Pesos)

	1990	1996	2001
Bogotá D.C.	73,660	161,765	164,814
National Average	20,052	34,371	46,185

Source: Iregui, Melo and Ramos 2004

Mockus' urban policies reflect the complex interplay between neoliberal and democratic logics of government that decentralization reforms introduced in local agendas in Colombia. According to Carmenza Saldías, Head of Bogotá's Planning Department under the first Mockus administration, while the IMF and the World Bank viewed Bogotá's fiscal reforms and institutional reorganization in a positive light from Washington DC, what happened in Bogotá in the mid 1990s was not an orthodox application of their neoliberal and structural adjustment recipes. Instead, the Mockus administration experimented with neoliberal instruments and practices to pursue a more comprehensive mixture of objectives:

> "[Bogotá's] fiscal adjustments, tax rationalization, organization of the local public apparatus, reorganization of the educative, health, and mobility systems, etc. is probably something that was not typically neoliberal but that tried to be very rational. Following Kalecki, who said that the socialist project should sometimes rely on the use of capitalist instruments, I think we used neoliberal instruments for more progressive purposes (Saldías, personal interview, 2008)

Enrique Peñalosa: Public Parks, Bicycle Lanes and Transmilenio

In 1998, Enrique Peñalosa took office as Bogotá mayor. Although he continued some of Mockus' *cultura ciudadana* policies, his administration gave a more central role to the physical improvement of public spaces and transportation infrastructure. While Mockus' efforts focused in teaching civic values to the citizenry as a means of decreasing violence and re-gaining their trust in local institutions and public space, Enrique Peñalosa focused on the construction and re-construction of parks and non-car means of transportation. Less eccentric but equally charismatic as his antecessor, Peñalosa shared with Antanas Mockus a "can-do" attitude and a lack of affiliation with any of the two traditional parties in Colombia. In his three-year term, Peñalosa undertook a profound physical re-organization of the city. Taking advantage of the increased spending capacity of the city, during his 3 years in office, Enrique Peñalosa built *Transmilenio*, the largest Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system in the world, 82 miles of bike lanes and rebuilt more than 1,000 public parks. Peñalosa built also three new mega-libraries in the city (Virgilio Barco, El Tintal and El Tunal) and several new schools in peripheral areas in the South of the city.

Interestingly, while Bogotá's *Transmilenio* has become "the most powerful BRT reference for planners and practitioners worldwide" (Hidalgo & Gutiérrez 2013), Bogotá's BRT was itself based on the experience of other cities, mostly in Latin America and Europe. For instance, among that McKinsey & Co. transportation experts -who Peñalosa hired as advisors during the *Transmilenio* planning process- visited and analysed in depth the cases of Curitiba, Quito, Santiago de Chile and Sao Paulo. Similarly, Berney (2008: p. 2) has noted how Peñalosa was influenced by "Curitiba's transportation planning innovations, the Barcelona model of public space and Dutch bicycle networks." But beyond the example of other cites, Peñalosa was also heavily influenced by the ideas put forward by his own father, an international expert in urbanism who started to criticize the car-oriented American model of urbanism in the 1970s and who served as the Secretary General of the first UN Habitat conference in Vancouver in 1976:

> "when I speak of urban transport I do not mean that we have to continue copying the North American model of great freeways and subways. Why cannot develop a model more adapted to our particular needs? Why do we have to assume either that each family will have its own car or else travel by subway?" (Enrique Peñalosa father, cited in Currie 1977: p. 59).

Mockus II: Cultura Ciudadana, Tax Culture and Economic Competitiveness

In 2000, after Peñalosa's term, Antanas Mockus won again Bogotá's local elections and became the first mayor of Bogotá to be elected for a second time. Interestingly, while Enrique Peñalosa has run for mayor on several occasions after his first term, he has never been re-elected. Despite the global buzz around *Transmilenio* and the world recognition that he has achieved worldwide, at home, *Bogotanos* seemed to favor Mockus' approach to changing the city more than Peñalosa's infrastructure-centered vision.

During his second administration, *cultura ciudadana*, public space and tax culture continued to be at the center of Mockus' strategy for Bogotá.[17] He also continued to expand *Transmilenio* and became more concerned with issues of economic productivity and competitiveness after hiring Michael Porter's consultancy company Monitor to do a diagnostic to improve Bogotá's competitiveness. Mockus' objectives for Bogotá also reflect the complex interplay between neoliberal and democratic logics of government present at the local level in Colombia. Under the label of *cultura ciudadana*, a *poutpourri* of priorities and strategies combined in original and innovative

[17] Mockus' 2001 *Programa de Gobierno* reads: "Good order and public space maintenance allows to achieve contexts associated with civic behaviors [*comportamientos ciudadanos*]. Because Bogotá was built scarcely in public space – green areas, common areas – that oblige us to sacralize it" (Mockus 2001b, 10)

ways notions of citizenship, social justice, and equality with ideas of competitiveness, productivity, and self-regulation.

Figure 5. Key Strategic Objectives: Mockus I (1995-97) and Mockus II (2001-03)

Plan de Desarrollo 1995-97	**Programa de Gobierno 2001-2003**
1.*Cultura Ciudadana* - Central Axis	1. *Cultura Ciudadana* * *Seguridad y Convivencia* (Security and Coexistence) * Democratic Culture and Construction of the Public * Contribution of *Cultura Ciudadana* to Productivity and Social Justice * Public Space Management * Institutional Legitimacy * *Cultura Tributaria* (Tax Culture)
2. Environment	2. Productivity
3. Public Space	3. Social Justice
4. Social Progress	4. Education
5. Urban Productivity	5. Environment
6. Institutional Legitimacy	6. Family and Childhood

Source: Mockus 1995 and Mockus 2001b

The re-conceptualization of public space in Bogotá that took place under Mockus and Peñalosa comes after two decades of decentralization and legal reforms in Colombia. Before the 1980s, government projects were oriented towards larger infrastructure and social development projects which often followed clientelist priorities (Salazar 2003, 69; cited in Berney 2008, 92). The re-making of the notion of public space began in Colombia in the early 1990s after the establishment of popular elections of mayors and a renewed focus on the public interest (Salazar 2003; cited in Berney 2008, 92-93). Public space, *cultura ciudadana,* and the relationship between the two of them became for the first time key objectives in Bogotá's local agenda with the first Mockus administration. Mockus' 1995 *Plan de Desarrollo* for Bogotá reads: "the improvement of public space favors good citizen behavior" (Mockus 1995). A major turning point from a private to a public focus in Bogotá's urban spatial development occurred in the early 1990s and was solidified in Bogotá's *Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial* (POT) in 2000 (Berney 2008).

As analyzed earlier, POT is the main instrument of territorial planning at the local level in Colombia and it became a legal requirement for all cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants after Law 388 passed. Initiated by Mockus and completed during Peñalosa's administration, Bogotá's first POT passed in 2000. POT aims to give a territorial dimension to the process of economic and social planning at the local level. In Bogotá, Law 388's "public function of urbanism" soon became linked with the promotion of urban public space as a "new form of public action":

> "The first planning efforts based on POT directives focused exclusively on public space (Del Castillo 2003: p. 47); this public space theme was seen as a "new form of public action" (Salazar 2003: p. 74) with the potential to address inequality" (Berney 2008: p. 94).

By re-inventing the role of public space, Bogotá became a remarkable exception to global trends, as cities move towards the privatization of urban public space, *fortified enclaves* (Caldeira 2000) and *splintering urbanisms* (Graham & Marvin 2001). However, legitimized by the discourse of public space, Enrique Peñalosa gave also birth to questionable interventions in Bogotá's urban fabric. Among Peñalosa's most controversial interventions is the demolition of the entire *El Cartucho* neighborhood, a central slum settlement located a few blocks from Colombia's Parliament and Presidential House. Peñalosa justified the complete bulldozing of the neighborhood and the forced displacement of its inhabitants in order to make space for a new central public park:

> "We needed a center of the city with life where every Colombian could go visit the city and enjoy life… [*El Cartucho*] was a big nursery and a hotbed for crime and drugs. We even had an expert in drug addicts: a priest. The priest said it was a great idea to get rid of this."[18]

The Decline of Bogotá's "Golden Planning Era"

In 2003, during the last year of Mockus' second adminstration, the sustainable transport think tank ITDP organized a four-day international seminar in Bogotá that brought hundreds of city planners, elected officials, academics, transportation planning consultants and representatives of civic organizations to the city from more than 30 countries. As the next chapter explores, this seminar was an important step in worlding Bogotá as a model of sustainable urban transport.

Interestingly, 2003 marks both the taking off of Bogotá as a model for mayors, urban planners and transportation advocates around the world and the decline of the "golden era" of planning in Bogotá. Between 2004 and 2015, three members of the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* party have been elected as mayors –Garzón, Moreno and Petro- all of which have been characterized by a lack of capacity to implement programs and projects at the rhythm of their antecessors Mockus and Peñalosa. If 85 kms of BRT were built in only 6 years between 1998 and 2003, less than 20 kms were built during the following 12 years (2004-2015). But not only the pace of construction has decreased, the lack of investment in *Transmilenio* made many *Bogotanos* have complained about the decline in the quality of service. For example, in an evaluation of the system in 2008, Gilbert gathered significant evidence about the mounting complaints on *Transmilenio* since 2004 including the deterioration of stations, capacity problems, infrequency of buses on some routes, increased in violence and pick-pocketing inside the buses and decreased efficiency of Transmilenio S.A. managers (Gilbert 2008). *Bogotanos* have also increasingly lost faith in the institutions of the local government as cases of local corruption became common since the late 2000s. For instance, former mayor Samuel Moreno was arrested in 2011 and is currently in prison in relation to a corruption scandal over the concession of a BRT line. Therefore, as much as the emergence of Bogotá's innovative urban reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s were facilitated by decentralization and democratization reforms, there was also an important element that had to do with the individual can-do attitude and capacity of the mayors –and their teams- to implement the programs promised in their plans.

[18] This quote belongs to a symposium "Bogotá, the Reinassance of a City" that took place in 2008 at UC Berkeley's Department of City and Regional Planning where Enrique Peñalosa was keynote speaker.

Conclusions

In this chapter I showed that the transformation of urban governance and planning that took place in Bogotá in the late 1990s cannot be understood without situating them within the broader decentralization reforms that took place in Colombia in the 1980s as a reaction to the high levels of violence and profound legitimacy crisis of the state. As authority, responsibilities, and resources were transferred to cities, decentralization reforms in Colombia brought two new logics of government in cities. First, a democratizing logic, based not just on popular election of mayors and governors but also on the idea that citizens should actively participate in public-decision making processes and planning; and, second, a neoliberal logic that welcomed, and invented when necessary, more competitive and entrepreneurial approaches to government. These two new logics intersected with the old paradigm of centralized, authoritarian and expert-led way of governing and planning cities in Colombia and resulted in a transformation of urban governance and planning priorities in Bogotá during the 1990s.

In Bogotá, decentralization reforms such as popular election of mayors, Law 388, Law 60, and the *Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá* (EOB) facilitated the emergence of a new generation of elected mayors who made use of their enhanced political authority, administrative responsibilities, and financial resources to re-invent urban planning as a new and powerful form of public intervention. But beyond public space and the investment in non-car transportation infrastructure that has often become associated with the "Bogotá model" worldwide, Bogotá mayors implemented a series of innovative local fiscal programs that significantly expanded the spending capacity of the city. Changes between 1992 and 1997 in Bogotá's fiscal structure under mayors Jaime Castro and Antanas Mockus significantly expanded the investment capacity of the city through the increase of both local tax revenues and local real expenditure per citizen. This is an important element of Bogotá's urban transformation that is less known worldwide and that has, often, not circulated, even if this increased spending capacity was essential to implement the many public space and transportation programs executed during the late 1990s.

Chapter 2. Leveraging Cities: Scaling up Urban Policy Models to Solve Global Development Problems

"The change that happens in cities can change the world... And whether it is facilitating the spread of good ideas between cities to help mayors tackle some of their toughest challenges, or leading a global coalition of large cities to take real action against climate change, Bloomberg Philanthropies leverages the power of cities [to] create lasting change – especially when national and international bodies refuse to act"
Bloomberg Philanthropies, 2015 [19]

"We've been called a knowledge bank and I've been referring to the Bank that we need to take the next step and be the solutions bank"
Jim Yong Kim, President of the World Bank, 2013 [20]

Introduction

The room was full. It was a cold January morning in Washington DC and only those that arrived early enough to go through the World Bank security system half an hour before the event started were able to secure a seat. The rest of us were placed in an adjacent room where a giant screen broadcasted the event live. Spanish, Hindi, Portuguese, Chinese and English with multiple accents mixed together in the background chatter. The 500+ people audience included transportation experts from different Multilateral Development Banks, bicycle advocates, academics, bus and light rail manufacturers, transportation consultants, philanthropists, NGO leaders and representatives of local, state and national governments from around the world. On the stage, Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank, and Michael Bloomberg, president of Bloomberg Philanthropies and mayor of the city of New York at the time, were about to start a discussion moderated by the economics editor of *The Economist* about the new hot topic in the world of development: sustainable urban transport.

The occasion was *Transforming Transportation 2013*, a 2-day event co-organized by the World Bank and EMBARQ, a sustainable transport think tank established in 2001 by the *World Resources Institute* thanks to a Shell Foundation grant. Rachel Kyte, vicepresident of the *World Bank Sustainable Development Network*, introduced the session:

> "We want to discuss today how to make urban transport systems more sustainable in every sense of that word, [this is] one of the most important development challenges for a rapidly urbanizing planet; which solutions in urban transport exist, which are the ones that can be scaled up, where do best practices exist, how they can be replicated, how can poor people have access to transport solutions which will improve their productivity, make their cities more competitive, make their lives more livable, make their air cleaner to breath, and make their transport safer."

Transforming Transportation 2013 is a snapshot of the new landscape of international development and aid. Bicycle advocates in suits negotiating their identity as experts and consultants, World Bank investment portfolio managers and philanthropists interested in finding cost-effective and replicable transport solutions from around the world, mayors from Africa, Latin America and Asia looking for development funding and transport projects that can be implemented during their short 3-4 year

[19] http://www.bloomberg.org/about/our-approach/ (accessed May 1, 2015)
[20] Jim Yong Kim's intervention during the *Transforming Transportation 2013* event in Washington DC (January 18, 2013).

political terms, salesmen for Volvo buses and Siemens trams, university professors and PhD students summarizing the implications for sustainable development of their transportation research, journalists looking for newsworthy stories of transport and climate change… these are some of the profiles that meet and collide at the World Bank during the coffee breaks of *Transforming Transportation*. In fact, as I wandered through the halls of the World Bank looking for free coffee, I encountered some of my colleagues from UC Berkeley's Department of City and Regional Planning as well as many transport experts and bicycle activists that I have interviewed in Bogotá in previous months. One of them, a bicycle activist and head of a Bogotá NGO, could only briefly greet me from the distance as he hurried to distribute business cards among the many MDBs transport portfolio managers, philanthropists and local government representatives attending the event. Later he would excuse himself and tell me that a significant part of the consultancy assignments of his Bogotá-based NGO are dealt over coffee breaks and dinners during that week in DC.

But beyond representing the increasing diversity of actors currently involved in development, *Transforming Transportation* illustrates also the increasing emphasis on scaling up city models and "best practices" as a logic of intervention to attend the most pressing challenges of international development: poverty, sustainability, rapid urbanization, climate change, public health and competitiveness. Indeed, the most waited moment of *Transforming Transportation 2013*, the discussion between Jim Yong Kim and Michael Bloomberg, was a collection of stories and "best practices" from cities in the global North and the South that have been able to improve their transport systems according to a particular interpretation of sustainability, that is, in a way that reduces greenhouse gas emissions and, somehow, also improves the lives of the poor. These stories and "best practices" were far from being examples or illustrations of a clearly defined framework of action. Instead, they become a logic of intervention in themselves; a way to frame the problem of urban transport given the unwillingness to reach a consensus and intervene in the structural factors that produce unequal transport access and environmental degradation in cities across the global South. Therefore, many of the discussions and presentations centered on how to replicate and scale up cost-effective policy solutions that have proved to decrease emissions in rapidly urbanizing cities in the global South. Bogotá's *Transmilenio* is, in this context, a favorite case.

In this chapter, I show that the rapid circulation of Bogotá as a world policy model of sustainable urban transport since the early 2000s reflects an increasing focus of global philanthropy and internaitonal development organizations on scaling up cost-effective, impact-oriented and financially profitable policy models and "best practice" solutions to solve global development problems. Because this emphasis on scaling up models has coincided with an increasing attention to cities as a space for development interventions -to attend both the challenges associated with a rapidly urbanizing planet and to tackle global issues in which national-level agreements or reforms have proved difficult to reach, particularly, climate change-, this has made philanthropists and development institutions increasingly interested in urban planning and the dynamics of inter-city policy transfer as new arenas to effect global impact or, in the language of philanthropy, to "leverage the power of cities."[21]

Key to this logic of *leveraging cities* is the construction and mobilization of particular urban policies and planning experiments as *world policy models* or, in the language of consultants and policy-makers, international "best practices." These are not necessary the "best" policies available but rather those that have been constructed as "best" by a transnational community of experts and practitioners at a particular moment of time. These are often policies that can be easily abstracted, measured and packaged under a narrative of urban success that can seduce key decision-makers in both international development institutions as well as in city government across the world. Through

[21] http://www.bloomberg.org/about/our-approach/ (accessed May 1, 2015)

the circulation of these urban policy models, international development organizations and philanthropic foundations comply with their increasingly stringent impact goals and quantitative performance indicators. But why now? And, is this new? In this chapter, I first situate the logic of *leveraging cities* within the larger history of innovation diffusion theory and the more recent concept of "best practice." A review of the literature in these topics reveals that while using models and best practices to intervene in many places at once is not a new phenomenon, many authors agree that the circulation of policy models has, indeed, accelerated in recent years. Second, I explain the fast speed at which Bogotá's *Ciclovía* and *Transmilenio* BRT have circulated as a reflection of a particular historical conjuncture in the apparatus of international development. Finally, I identify a set of four transnational networks of actors that have been key in constructing and circulating Bogotá as a world policy model of sustainable urban transport since the early 2000s.

A new Iteration of an Old Idea

From Diffusion of Innovations to "Best practices"

The strategy of replicating models and "best practices" to catalyze change in many places at once is not by any means new among development banks and US foundations. In the world of international development, the origins of this logic can be traced back to the popularization of diffusion of innovations theory in the 1960s and 1970s. One of the key thinkers in this area was Everett Rogers, whose 1962 book *Diffusion of Innovations* set an important precedent in using social science methods to study and promote the spread and diffusion of development ideas, particularly the agricultural extension model of rural development. Indeed, much of the current research on policy diffusion in Political Science and International Relations is based on the diffusion of innovations theory.

Rogers, a professor of communication theory, defined diffusion as "the process by which innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system" (Rogers 1995 [1962]). For him, the two main communication mechanisms for diffusion of new ideas were interpersonal networks, what he later called "trusted peer networks," and the mass media. His diffusion model consisted of a linear sequence comprised of five stages (knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation and confirmation) and he divided the receiving audience on a scale of five, with innovators on one extreme and laggards on the other. The tenets of Rogers' classical diffusion theory have been criticized for presenting a model of diffusion in which Western innovations entered the non-Western rural periphery through "modern" and pro-development individuals in contrast to "traditional" and passive receivers (Blaut 1977, in Chabot & Duyvendak 2002). Despite criticisms, Rogers' ideas had a great impact in the context of rural development in the 1970s and 1980s and have continued to influence organizations interested in spreading new ideas and models around the world.

While related with these theories, the genealogy of the more recent concept of "best practice" can be traced back to the 1980s, when benchmarking became a popular management practice among companies seeking to improve their production processes (Francis & Holloway 2007). Best-practice benchmarking consisted in "identifying aspects of an organization's activity that could be more efficient or effective by comparison with other relevant organizations' performance" (Francis and Holloway 2007: p. 172). With the rise of the "new public management" in the late 1980s and 1990s, the idea of "best practice" benchmarking started to become increasingly adopted by governmental agencies and policymaking processes in the US (Hood 1995) and beyond (Aguilar 2006). Authors in the lesson-drawing and policy transfer debates were among the first ones to critique the concept of "best practice" in the context of public policy, highlighting the difficulties of replicating a successful policy in another policy context. For example, Radaelli (2004) has critiqued "best practices" as de-contextualized lists and favors instead a lesson-drawing approach in which learning from evidence-based actions (Rose 2002) is preferred to de-contextualized examples of "best practice." Planners

and practitioners have also often pointed to the impossibility of naming a policy "best" or better than others, because the very reason why one policy would be considered better than another depended on the context in which the policy takes shape.

However, while this contextual critique is valid and powerful, it cannot explain the increasing popularity of "best practices" among mayors, planners, advocates and other decision-makers or why international development and philanthropic organizations continue to create "best practice" guides and fund study tours to influence policy change around the world. It seems, then, that there is something powerful about "best practices" that the "contextual critique," focused on the difficulty of successful policy transfer between different contexts is not able to capture.

Beyond the Contextual Critique of "Best Practices"

Using a Foucauldian approach rather than the conceptual tools of lesson-drawing and policy transfer, Harriet Bulkeley (2006) has argued that "best practices" in the area of urban sustainability can be better understood as a *technology of government* through which the policy problem of "urban sustainability" is framed, defined and eventually territorialized. Drawing on examples from British cities, she sees the "practice of best practice" as an inherently unstable discursive process that "serves as a means through which actors seek both to understand the messy politics of policymaking, and to lend legitimacy to their interpretations of urban sustainability" (Bulkeley, 2006: p. 1030). Building on Bulkeley's critique, Vettoretto has highlighted that the process of making practices into best practices "not only constructs a repertoire of models as guide for local actions, but also demonstrates the empirical possibility (and rightness) of certain principles" such as the idea of international competitiveness, the "good governance" approach or the EU concept of territorial cohesion (Vettoretto 2009: p. 1078). More recently, Susan Moore has showed how New Urbanism proliferated in Toronto because different networks of actors recognized that, by converging around the idea of New Urbanism as a "best practice," they could "constitute a socio-political force for achieving ends" (Moore 2013: p. 3). In other words, as local policy actors recognized the power and legitimacy that a best practice provides, new networks and collaborations of actors and interests were created around it. Other authors have also recently pointed to "best practices" as an important governance mechanism to define the joint mission of governance networks. For example, Sorensen and Torfing (2009) have argued that storytelling through the dissemination of "best practices" can be an effective tool to align the goals of diverse actors and convince them of the urgent need for coordination and joint action.

These critiques of the idea of "best practice" share a focus in the "practice of best practice" (Bulkeley 2006) as the key object of analysis rather than focusing on the possibilities and limitations of "best practices" for successful policy transfer. In doing so, they go beyond the traditional contextual critique of "best practices" to focus on the analysis of new forms of power, legitimacy and governance behind the construction and circulation of policy models. These critical approaches to "best practices" are similar to the theoretical and methodological tenets of policy mobilities authors (Peck & Theodore 2010, McCann & Ward 2011). They also resonate with Roy's (2012) call to analyze the practices that make a policy mobile not just to unveil the names of key actors or transfer agents but as as a way to better understand the broader "apparatus" that the movement of those policies suggests.

Scaling up Urban Policy Models as a Development Intervention Logic

As we have seen, the idea of intervening in problems through "best practices" is not a new idea in the world of development. Yet, the fast speed at which Bogotá's *Ciclovía* and *Transmilenio* has been circulated since the early 2000s thanks to funding coming from global philanthropy and international development organizations suggest that there might be new logics are at play in the relationship

between international development and the making and circulation of urban policy models. Building on critical approaches to "best practices" beyond the "contextual critique," in the following sections, I will show that the fast speed at which Bogotá's *Ciclovía* and *Transmilenio* BRT have circulated since the 2000s is a reflection of a particular historical conjuncture in the apparatus of international development that has made the logic of 'leveraging cities' more prominent in development interventions. This historical conjuncture is characterized by four features: 1) the "greening" of development; 2) the increasing number of actors involved in development, particularly philanthropy; 3) the shift of the World Bank from knowledge bank to solutions bank; and 4) the increasing attention to cities as sites to effect global impact.

The "Greening" of Development

While international development interventions have been legitimized since the 1970s under the broad goal of achieving "a world free of poverty," several authors have shown how the project of development increasingly relies on narratives of sustainability and climate change to legitimize its interventions (Adams 2003, Goldman, 2005). For example, Michael Goldman has argued that the World Bank has not only become a central node in producing green authoritative knowledge but also that the Bank's largest capital investments are "explicitly framed through the lens of a global environmental discourse, albeit one not necessarily of critical social movements' choosing" (Goldman 2001: p. 193). In this context, international development institutions are re-conceptualizing the developing world, and particularly rapidly urbanizing areas in the global South, not only as spaces for poverty and economic development interventions but also as places in need to be saved from environmental threats and global climate change through market mechanisms and cost-effective policies.

This has made World Bank officials increasingly interested in the ongoing paradigm shift in the field of transportation from modernization towards sustainability ideals. This emerging paradigm has been gaining currency among transportation experts in recent decades and, thanks to the increasing interest and availability of philanthropic funding for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, it has been slowly infiltrating the agendas and investment portfolios of international development institutions. If the modernization transport paradigm typically privileged the individual car and modern highways to minimize travel time and cost from point A to point B, the emerging sustainable transport paradigm sought to promote public and non-motorized modes of transportation (cycling and walking) and had an explicit emphasis in reducing the environmental impacts of transport (Banister 2008).

In that sense, the 2013 edition of *Transforming Transportation* was particularly exciting for attendees and organizers alike for two reasons. First, the World Bank president had, for the first time, agreed to sit down in one of the sessions to speak about the importance of sustainable transport for development. Second, six multilateral development banks had just announced, during the 2012 Rio+20 meeting, the commitment to jointly devote $175 billion to help advance the sustainable transport agenda in cities during the following ten years. This marked for many attendees a "tipping point" for sustainable urban transport. As noted by Manish Bapna, from the *World Resources Institute*: "as someone who comes from the environment and sustainability community, it is quite remarkable how 10 years ago transport was not on any agenda in the sustainability conversation and yet in Rio+20, in the post-2015 [development agenda], it is one of the most important topics that are being discussed."[22] After years of being at the margins of transportation policy discussions and investments, building bicycle lanes or improving bus systems had left the realm of ranting bicycle activists and transportation planning nerds to become a core issue at the

[22] Notes from Transforming Tranportation 2013 (Jan 18, 2013)

most powerful development institution. However, at the heart of the World Bank, transport could not be discussed only in terms of modernization vs. sustainability but rather within the context of development. If the emerging sustainable urban transport paradigm was to penetrate World Bank transportation investment portfolios, it needed to be framed not only as sustainable but as *sustainable development*. Important for the many consultants and business leaders in the audience, *Transforming Transportation* is also a venue to discuss the new business of sustainable urban transport in the form of public works and consultancy assignments to design and build new bicycle lanes, pedestrian pathways, bike-share systems or BRTs in a double effort to reduce transportation-related emissions in cities of the global South while improving transport options for the poor. This is what Bank officials and consultants love to call "a win-win situation."

Increased Heterogeneity of Actors in Development and the Rise of Philanthrocapitalism

The "greening" of development is taking place in parallel with another key change: the rising number of actors involved in development (Kharas 2007), with philanthropic foundations playing an increasingly important role not only in providing funding but also in setting global development agendas (McGoey 2012). While development assistance in 2000 was overwhelmingly provided by traditional bilateral and multilateral donors, the percentage of non-traditional actors such as philanthropists, climate finance funds, social impact investors, and global funds has risen from 22.8% in 2000 to 43.8% in 2009 (Greenhill et al. 2013). The increases in the availability of philanthropic funding are of course related with the increasing economic inequality and wealth concentration in the last half-century, specifically in North America and Europe, the countries where philanthropy headquarters are located (McGoey 2012, Piketty & Zucman 2014). The parallel decrease in official development assistance provided by national governments, particularly after austerity measures hit European countries in the late 2000s, has made philanthropic funding more visible and instrumental to keep the international development apparatus moving.

For example, in 2013, the Seattle-based Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation became the largest contributor to the World Health Organization (WHO) budget, well beyond the amounts provided by the US or the UK governments. The impact of philanthropy in development however goes beyond their provision of funds; it lies also in its increasing capacity of setting frameworks of action and particular solutions to intervene in the global problems they deem appropriate. For example, while the Gates Foundation may appear as a benefactor hero given their generous provision of funds for global health challenges, WHO officials have recently complained about their dependency on the interests and logical frameworks of the Gates foundation when making key strategic decisions about global health.

The fact that efforts to fight global problems are increasingly governed by the logic and interests of the richest families on earth is certainly disturbing and calls into question the extent to which the incorporation of new actors actually democratizes development (Roy 2010). Concerns have also been raised that the current emphasis of global philanthropy on scaling up models with a clear impact on their performance metrics, such as greenhouse gas emission reductions, is at risk of ignoring the structural causes that create problems such as poverty, inequality and environmental degradation in the first place (Edwards 2009). While a discussion about the relationship between philanthropy and the democratization of development is beyond the scope of this chapter, in the following paragraphs I focus on analyzing the ways in which this new philanthropic logic operates and how it is influencing the agenda-setting capacity of international development institutions.

In 2006, Matthew Bishop, US business editor of *The Economist,* published an article titled "The birth of philanthrocapitalism" to describe a new trend among philanthropic foundations "to become more like the for-profit capital markets." Praising the superiority of business and market logics against those of governments and non-profits, the article pointed in fact at the Gates

Foundation, established in 2000, as a prime example of this new way of operating for charitable foundations. As noted by McGoey (2012), philanthrocapitalism can be defined as the "tendency for a new breed of donors to conflate business aims with charitable endeavors, making philanthropy more cost-effective, impact-oriented, and financially profitable." But is there something new about this? There is a heated debated about this question among development scholars as Rockefeller already used the notion of "venture philanthropy" in the 1960s to point at a then new generation of US philanthropists, popularly known at the "big three" –Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford- that were already applying business-inspired methods and performance measurements into the "business of giving." Indeed, as Jeffrey Sachs has stated: "[t]he Rockefeller Foundation was the world's most important development institution of the 20th century, and the Gates Foundation can be that of the 21st century" (Jeffrey Sachs cited in Robert & Witte 2008). However, researchers and commentators of philanthropy and development have pointed out that while there are continuities, there are also important novelties in the making. For instance, McGoey (2012) has argued that while "philanthrocapitalism" could be seen as a continuation of "venture philanthropy," there are also two important novelties in how philanthropy and development currently operate and relate to each other: 1) the unprecedented level of philanthropic spending for international development purposes; and 2) the generalization of the belief that capitalism, market logics and searching for private enrichment can, through charity and philanthropy, advance the common good. The increasing explicitness and acceptance of this belief among government officials and the general public is, according to McGoey (2012: p. 197), at risk of generalizing the parallel belief that "increases in wealth concentration [are] to be commended rather than questioned."

While much has been written about the increasing use of business-inspired tools, market logics and performance metrics among philanthropic foundations under the idea of "philanthrocapitalism" (Bishop & Green 2008), less is known about the interest of this new breed of donors and foundations in intervening in policymaking and policy agendas, both at the local and global levels. For example in their book *Money Well Spent: A Strategic Guide to Smart Philanthropy,* Paul Brest and Hal Harvey (2008), from Hewlett Foundation, are not shy to write about the importance of influencing policy in order to achieve lasting social impact.[23] In this context, Robin Rogers (2011) has argued that critics of the new protagonism of philanthropy in the world of development are not so much worried about the unprecedented increase in the availability of philanthropic funding but rather in the empowerment of a global elite in making decisions about global development agendas and policymaking strategies, what she calls "philanthro-policymaking." Rather than an interest in mobilizing particular business practices or public policies, what this philanthropic logic seeks to mobilize and scale up are models ("what works") that have proved effective in decreasing the foundations' mandated goals and performance indicators. For example, when I asked the program officer of Hewlett Foundation's Environment Program why Hewlett was interested in promoting Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems in Guadalajara, she answered:

> "we have a theory of change, and in that theory we need to have a technology or best practice that can be implemented and is replicable…we're interested in BRT because we're interested in reducing [global greenhouse gas] emissions." (Hewlett Foundation program officer, personal interview, 2013)

[23] Even though Hewlett Foundation has a mandate that their funding can only benefit civil society actors such as NGOs or non-profit entities so that they could maintain an image of political neutrality that gives them legitimacy, the authors include a chapter on 'influencing individuals, policy-makers and businesses.'

World Bank: from knowledge bank to solutions bank

This philanthropic emphasis on scaling up technologies and best practices coincides with a turn in the World Bank to "solutionism" or a focus on solutions that can be quickly spread. In this logic, it is important to have examples and "success stories" that can help these models be quickly disseminated. As mentioned earlier, the most waited moment of the 2013 edition of *Transforming Transportation* was the discussion between Jim Yong Kim and Michael Bloomberg as this pointed for many of the attendees "a tipping point" for sustainable urban transport in global development debates. When asked about what should be the role of the World Bank in transforming transportation worldwide, Jim Yong Kim answers:

> "Our role is to bring knowledge and experience. But it's a very specific kind of knowledge and experience… It´s not the knowledge that I was dealing with mostly when I was at the university, the knowledge that is sort of linear and hypothesis-based and takes you a long time to come to a very narrow conclusion. It's the kind of knowledge that says: we've built these canals and are transporting people and we've built this bus rapid transport system and, you know, there is a theory about it, there are specific sort of scientific principles but it's really this broader experiential knowledge what we've been talking about, the knowledge of how we actually deliver.... So we would sit down and say… here are 50 innovations in other cities across the world. We think given all this information a good strategy for you might be this…. *We've been called a knowledge bank and I´ve been referring to the Bank that we need to take the next step and be the solutions bank*, it's not about doing a study and giving them the result... I think if we can do that efficiently and effectively we can have an enormous impact in how cities in the future are built."

Interestingly, while the World Bank has been a key conduit for the transnational mobilization of the Bogotá model since the early-mid 2000s, particularly *Transmilenio* BRT, it was think tanks such as ITDP and EMBARQ, funded by global philanthropy, which helped introduce BRT in World Bank transport investment portfolios. For example, in 1998, when Enrique Peñalosa was designing Bogotá's BRT system *Transmilenio*, the World Bank did not believe in the project and did not invest in it even though BRT systems existed and worked well in Curitiba or Quito. After ITDP and EMBARQ experts helped construct and circulate Bogotá's *Transmilenio* as a success story that the World Bank and other development banks have used to promote the sustainable transport agenda around the world.

Increasing attention to cities as arenas to effect global impact

Finally, given the constant failures at reaching a multilateral climate agreement among national leaders, international organizations and global philanthropy is increasingly turning its attention to cities and city models as a new way to intervene in global climate change. Indeed, in the post-2015 development goals proposed in Rio+20, cities will have their own development goal for the first time. This has made philanthropists increasingly interested in urban planning and the dynamics of inter-city policy transfer as a way to effect global impact and change or, in the language of philanthropy, to "leverage the power of cities:"

> "The change that happens in cities can change the world... And whether it is facilitating the spread of good ideas between cities to help mayors tackle some of their toughest challenges, or leading a global coalition of large cities to take real action against climate change, Bloomberg Philanthropies leverages the power of cities [to] create lasting change – especially when national and international bodies refuse to act" [24]

[24] Bloomberg Philanthropies Website. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.org/about/our-approach/ (accessed May 3, 2015)

Similarly, in describing the objectives of EMBARQ, the *World Resources Institute* highlights:

> "Today, 160 cities around the world use BRT and busway systems—up from just 45 cities since WRI's EMBARQ program was founded in 2002. EMBARQ has played a major role in expanding the BRT concept to cities throughout the world… The BRT concept has reached a tipping point, with massive new investment and significant expansion planned on six continents… Since EMBARQ's founding in 2002, our experts have helped implement and develop the BRT concept around the world. We collaborate with local, regional, and national-level decision-makers to provide research and expertise that is both technical – advising on aspects such as safety, operations, fare integration, and branding – and political – navigating relationships to create a common vision." [25]

This logic of action is not limited to new foundations like Bloomberg, the World Resources Institute or Hewlett, established philanthropic organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation are also quickly incorporating this emphasis on intervening in cities as, for instance, the recent Rockefeller Foundation program *100 resilient cities challenge* illustrates in their effort of scaling up the idea of resilience through intervening in one hundred cities across the world. The graph below - produced by EMBARQ to show the adoption of sustainable transport initiatives in cities around the world- illustrates how Bogotá's best practices are part of a larger set of models and also to show this logic of leveraging cities and the obsession of philanthropy with scaling up models and policies in as many cities as possible as a way to have a global impact.

[25] World Resources Institute website, available at http://www.wri.org/our-work/top-outcome/160-cities-adopt-bus-rapid-transit-%E2%80%93-key-tipping-point (accessed Aug 7, 2015).

Figure 6. Sustainable Urban Transport Initiatives in Cities Worldwide



Source: EMBARQ [26]

Leveraging Cities: Constructing and Circulating Urban Policies as World Models

Therefore, under the current historical conjuncture, global impact for international development organizations and global philanthropy is increasingly conceptualized through affecting the largest number of cities directly (reaching the "tipping point") as opposed to traditional strategies, such as for instance structural adjustment recipes, where global change was conceptualized as affecting the national level and then this change was supposed to trickle down to cities.

Key to this logic of action based on *leveraging cities* is the construction and mobilization of a particular set of urban policies and planning mechanisms as *world policy models*. Through the circulation and replication of these policy models, often labeled "best practices" to make them appear as politically-neutral devices, philanthropic foundations and development banks satisfy their impact and performance metrics but also, and despite their invocations of political neutrality, intervene in the political realm by helping place particular topics and policy frames in local and global agendas. In order to leverage an urban policy as a *world policy model* it is necessary, therefore, to have not only a 'success story' but also a transnational infrastructure of institutions and experts that can legitimize and spread the policy solution associated to that success story. Of particular importance is the existence of transnational network of internationally recognized experts and practitioners. In the case of BRT and bicycle policies, this is something that ITDP and EMBARQ, with funds from global philanthropy, have been doing since the early 2000s through the organization of international research networks, conferences, study tours and other events. For instance, since its establishment in 2003, *Transforming Transportation* has taken advantage of the

[26] Available at http://thecityfix.com/blog/on-the-move-pushing-sustainable-transport-concept-tipping-point-dario-hidalgo-heshuang-zeng/ (accessed Jul 1, 2015)

concentration of academic experts that attend the *Transportation Research Board* (TRB) conference in DC every January to "catalyze [the] widespread adoption of sustainable transport solutions."[27] While the discussions and presentations in TRB are more academic and are often dominated by the positivist and technical language of transportation engineers, what characterizes the sessions of *Transforming Transportation* is a refusal of technical language and abstract theorizing towards exchanging "success stories" and "what works." It is precisely this concentration on stories and "best practices" what allows global philanthropy to bring into conversation and collaboration a transnational community of experts and a transnational community of practice (including government officials, development bank officials, civil society actors and private investors and consultants from around the world) around the sustainable transport paradigm. As it is made clear by Holger Dalkmann, EMBARQ director, during the inauguration speech of *Transforming Transportation 2013*:

> "Sustainable transport is not a theoretical concept, it can be a reality. It's proven, it's cost-effective, it's healthier, it's safer, it protects the environment. Particularly, it provides better accessibility. And from all these numbers… at the local level I would like to highlight Mexico City. The average person in Mexico City travels for 2 hours every day, but more so the poor people. I want to tell you the story about how a woman that used to spend 3 hours to go to her work, now, since the investment in BRT and other [transport solutions], her travel has been reduced by half. So now she can spend more time with her family. So really sustainable transport is about the people" (Holger Dalkmann, Transforming Transportation 2013)

According to Darío Hidalgo, a Bogotá native and currently research head of EMBARQ, "there are about 60 to 75 people including students, professors, consultants, World Bank and NGO officials… that meet every year in Washington DC for TRB… and there is a lot of movement, of contacts," they are what he calls "the usual suspects" of the sustainable transport community of experts and practitioners (Hidalgo, personal interview, 2012).[28] But far from being strangers, many of the attendees know each other already. *Transforming Transportation* is only one of the many events and conferences around the world where these "usual suspects" meet, greet, and exchange knowledge: The Developing Countries and Non-Motorized Transportation committee of TRB, the ITDP Sustainable City Award in DC, the CTS/EMBARQ Congress in Mexico City, the biannual *Transmilenio* BRT Fairs in Bogotá, and the many events on climate change, sustainability, transport and cities that bring them together. The interesting thing about this network of experts is that it is formed by people from both the global North and the South: university professors (Robert Cervero and the late Lee Schipper from UC Berkeley, Juan Pablo Bocarejo from Bogotá's Universidad de los Andes, BRT experts at the University of Florida's National BRT Institute and Santiago de Chile's BRT Center of Excellence), global think tanks and NGOs (ITDP, EMBARQ, World Resources Institute, Cities 8-80), former mayors and public officials from cities that are deemed as paradigmatic models of the sustainable transport paradigm (Jaime Lerner from Curitiba; Enrique Peñalosa and Gil Peñalosa from Bogotá; Janet Sadik-Khan and Michael Bloomberg from New York), consultants (LOGIT, LOGITRANS, Steer Davies Glee, GSD Plus), bicycle and sustainable transport advocates

[27] Transforming Transportation 2013 website. Available at: http://transformingtransportation.org/(accessed Jan 20, 2013)

[28] Original in Spanish: "Hay un grupo de sospechosos usuales de la… del comité del… hay un comité de países en desarrollo de TRB, y normalmente la reunión de ese comité todos los años en enero… son unas sesenta, setenta y cinco personas entre estudiantes y profesores y consultores, oficiales del Banco Mundial y de ONGs como la mía. Sí es como una… pero todos los años… y ahí se arma mucho contacto y eso genera como mucho movimiento de contactos. Entonces uno se ve con toda esa gente… son los sospechosos usuales en el circuito de conferencias académicas de transporte de desarrollo urbano por diferentes esquinas"

(Streetsblog, Transportation Alternatives, Despacio, among others), international development institutions (World Bank transport officials, who are often trained in the universities), international public health organizations (the World Health Organization, the Pan-american Health Organization), philanthropic foundations (Rockefeller, Hewlett, Bloomberg Philanthropies, etc.), among others.

It is this collaboration between North and South that allowed Bogotá policies to travel as part of this transnational network of experts and practitioners. It is rarely a South-South circulation but always mediated by North organizations, many of them based on DC, and transnational circuits that permeate North and South all the time. But how did this transnational network of experts become empowered? Buses with dedicated lanes, cycling and, definitely, walking are nothing new in the world of transportation policy and many cities and transportation planners have implemented this kind of policies and written about it since the 1970s, even before the notion of sustainability was defined in the famous UN Brundtland report. However, the increasing availability of philanthropic funding for climate change and public health issues since the early 2000s has empowered this network of experts and practitioners and their particular understanding of sustainability and urban transport. In the following sections I show how the Bogotá's *Ciclovía* and *Transmilenio* has served as leverage mechanisms for these networks to spread their message and agendas worlwide.

Leveraging Bogotá as a World Policy Model

From 1974 until 2000, some cities in Colombia and Latin America made references to Bogotá to make changes in their urban planning. While Mockus' *cultura ciudadana* programs were tried out in some cities, it was transportation and public space programs, particularly *Ciclovía* and *Transmilenio*, what in the early 2000s started to become recognized as flagship forms of the "Bogotá model" and replicated internationally, even though both programs have been happening in the 1970s. As noted by Enrique Peñalosa: "at some point… Bogotá became famous, it became sexy" (Peñalosa, personal interview, 2013). World recognition is important in the context of urban policy and planning because it legitimizes certain models as appropriate ways of governing, organizing and managing urban space, both in the cities where they originally appeared as well as in the ones that adopt it (Bulkeley 2006, Roy 2011). World recognition is, of course, socially constructed and, as we will see in the following sections, it depends on the alignment of certain policies with the agendas of transnational actors with the power to put issues on the global agenda.

Figure 7. Sexy Bogotá Sign during Ciclovía

Source: Photograph by author (2012)

Enrique Peñalosa and his brother Gil Peñalosa have been key to the emergence of Bogotá's new imaginary worldwide as well as the extensive circulation of Bogotá policies around the world. Trained in the US and both bilingual in English and Spanish, the Peñalosa brothers became Bogotá 'ambassadors' around the world. In their well-attended talks, they simplified the complex story of decentralization, democratization, "cultura ciudadana," etc. that happened in the city into highlighting BRTs and bicycles as the key factors behind Bogotá urban miracle. Moving from urban dystopia to a model, just by investing in bikes and buses, made ambitious mayors and policy actors in many cities think that they could also do it. But to become 'ambassador' someone has to pay for your travels. Looking at the political economy of who paid for the travels of the Peñalosa brothers around the world as well as the travels of numerous officials, journalists and NGOs that came to Bogotá on study tours since 2005, one realizes that the world recognition of Bogotá is not the result of a marketing strategy designed and orchestrated from Bogotá as urban marketing theorists suggest (Duque Franco 2011). Many international organizations such as World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank or the World Health Organization, global think tanks such as ITDP and EMBARQ and global philanthropic organizations such as Hewlett, Rockefeller and the Energy Foundation- have often funded the trips of the Peñalosas to conferences and events in other cities to spread the agenda of sustainable transport and urban public health.

In the following sections, I show that four sets of transnational networks of actors have been particularly active in the construction and circulation of Bogotá as a world policy model in the early 2000s: 1) a transnational network of sustainable transportation experts, advocates, and global think tanks that want to promote cost-effective non-car modes of transportation, particularly BRT and bicycle policies; 2) a transnational network of public health advocates that sought to increase physical exercise in cities around the world; 3) a network of ambitious "green mayors" that want to solve global climate change through the promotion of public-private collaborations at the local level; and 4) Bus manufacturing companies, especially Volvo, Mercedes and Skania, which are interested in promoting BRT around the world to increase their sales and production.

Sustainable Transport Advocates and Global Think Tanks

An important encounter that spurred the interest in Bogotá of sustainable transport advocates took place in New York in the early 2000s. After leaving office as mayor in 2000, Enrique Peñalosa moved to New York to prepare his presidential candidacy campaign. As a visiting scholar at NYU's *Center for Latin American Studies*, he wanted to reflect on his experience as mayor and write a book on alternative urbanization strategies in developing cities. Thanks to an Eisenhower fellowship, during the first months of 2001, Peñalosa visited different US cities to learn and broaden his network of contacts in the area of urban planning and public space. Later that year, he was invited to give a speech for an event sponsored by ITDP. While ITDP directors had heard of him and Bogotá before, during his presentation they were impressed by his charisma, his rhetorical abilities in English and the way in which he, via Powerpoint, presented a powerful story of urban transformation with the help of images, statistics and emotional quotes such as his now famous "a quality city is not one that has great roads but one where a child can safely go anywhere on a bicycle."

ITDP, which was growing at the time thanks to the increasing availability of funding from USAID and philanthropic organizations such as the Hewlett Foundation, saw in Peñalosa a perfect messenger to spread their sustainable transportation message worldwide. ITDP origins can be traced to 1984 when its current director Michael Replogle founded "Bikes not Bombs." At the time, Michael was part of the US peace and environmental movement. After an oil-related explosion in Nicaragua in 1984, he started the organization by sending 100 bicycles to Nicaragua. After the success of the campaign, similar campaigns in other continents, such as the "Bikes for Africa" campaign, followed. In the late 1980s, however, he led a strategic planning process for the organization and they decided to shift away from sending bikes and materials to Third World countries and concentrate on transportation policy reform in developing countries. In this new context, ITDP focused on a "best practice" strategy in order to effect policy change worldwide: "we look for examples that have a compelling narrative, and also something than can be measured… people prefer to hear stories much more than numbers" (Replogle, personal interview, 2013). And so as much as Enrique Peñalosa became Bogotá ambassador worldwide, he also became ITDP's ambassador and ITDP funded many of his travels to developing cities, particularly in Asia and Africa. On these trips he worked to convince mayors and local officials of the benefits of building BRTs and bike- and pedestrian-friendly infrastructure. As Peñalosa became embedded in international transportation policy circuits, Bogotá's urban transformation story became abstracted from the many legal, fiscal and citizen culture reforms undertaken in the 1990s to a streamlined story in which non-motorized physical infrastructure had transformed the city in the 3 years that Peñalosa served as mayor. This boiled down story of urban transformation, however, played well among the many mayors and planners in developing cities that sought to start an iconic urban project during their limited time in office. In this context, Bogotá's transportation policies provided a relatively inexpensive and easy to implement example to follow.

Many cities around the world sent delegations to learn from Bogotá after Enrique Peñalosa talked to their political leaders and several built a BRT or established a Ciclovía initiative using Bogotá as reference (Hidalgo & Gutiérrez, 2012). Yet, ITDP was conscious that cultural, political and legal variables were important in policy replication and, therefore, they sought to build at least one BRT system on each continent so that these would become "best practices" themselves to smaller culturally proximate cities. For example, to inspire Guangzhou officials to build a BRT, ITDP funded several visits of Enrique Peñalosa to Guangzhou along with study tours of Guangzhou officials to Bogotá. When a BRT was eventually built, Guangzhou set the stage for the dozens of systems that have been built in China. Instead of sponsoring visits and study tours to Bogotá, ITDP would take Chinese officials to Guangzhou. The effectiveness and success of ITDP's

"best practice" strategy to promote BRTs around the world resonated among ITDP's funders and, some years later, the Hewlett Foundation adopted a similar "best practice" strategy to promote their environmental objectives of reducing emissions by focusing in urban policy change in China and Mexico's largest cities (Hal Harvey, personal interview, 2013). ITDP has also received funds from other philanthropic sources to fund study tours. Soon, other international institutions interested in transportation and international development including the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank as well as philanthropic organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation or the World Resources Institute/EMBARQ also started to use the Bogotá story and Peñalosa's presentations to promote transportation policy changes in many developing cities at once. For instance, ITDP organized a recent 2013 study tour of a San Francisco delegation to Mexico City so that San Francisco "could learn from a world-class BRT system" funded by the Rockefeller Foundation.

However, sustainable transport is not only about global think tanks and big global players. An important set of actors that have been influential in constructing *Ciclovía* as a "best practice" and mobilizing it around the world have been local advocates and leaders that have implemented a *Ciclovía* initiative in their home cities. For example, when I interviewed Susan King, director of Sunday Streets --San Francisco's Ciclovía-- in 2010 she said she had a spreadsheet with 32 cities that she has advised since San Francisco started a regular Ciclovía program in 2008 (King, personal interview, 2010). By the summer of 2013, her spreadsheet included 72 cities (King, personal interview, 2013). Although most local leaders in other cities of the San Francisco Bay Area that have attempted to replicate the program might have not been to Colombia, they have seen videos of Bogotá's Ciclovía and experienced San Francisco's program first hand. Some cities in the area implemented a program and kept the Bogotá reference, for instance Oakland's Oaklavía, whereas others, such as Berkeley, named it Sunday Streets in a clear reference to San Francisco's program.

Randy Neufeld of the Chicago's Alliance for Walking and Biking (AWB) has also been an important promoter of *Ciclovía* in the US. Inspired by *Ciclovía*, after attending an ITDP seminar in Bogotá, he came back and gathered several community leaders to push the local government to do a similar program in Chicago (Randy Neufeld, personal interview, 2013). Whereas the Chicago program has run into many obstacles, AWB was key in spreading the idea of Ciclovía to other US bicycle advocacy organizations through the organization of conferences and retreats for bicycle advocates. More recently, this organization helped launch the Open Street Project, a US-specific city network that seeks to promote Ciclovía-style programs across the country.

Public Health Advocates: Ciclovía and the Promotion of Physical Exercise in Cities

As noted above, in 2003, ITDP organized a four-day international seminar in Bogotá together with the local non-profit Ciudad Humana that brought hundreds of city planners, elected officials, academics, transportation planning consultants and representatives of civic organizations from more than 30 countries from the North and the South. The objective was for other cities "to witness [Bogotá's] successes first hand" (ITDP, 2003). A 2003 ITDP press release called "Bogotá Shares Urban Revolution with the World," shows the kind of Bogotá's successes that ITDP was interested in sharing with other cities:

> "Latin America's largest network of bicycle routes of 150 miles long (250 km); a world-class Bus Rapid Transit system of dedicated bus lanes called TransMilenio; the world's longest pedestrian-only street, spanning 10.2 miles (17 km) and hundreds of miles of sidewalks, many through the city's poorest neighborhoods; Car-Free Sunday [Ciclovía], when many streets are closed to motorized traffic to make space for thousands of cyclists and pedestrians."

Together with Enrique Peñalosa's travels around the world, this 2003 ITDP-*Ciudad Humana* international seminar was an important step in *worlding* Bogotá's non-motorized infrastructure and policies as international references in sustainable transportation planning and urban design. In particular, the attendance of Enrique Jacoby, from the Pan-american Health Organization (PAHO), led to the construction of a transnational collaboration of sustainable transportation and public health advocates around Ciclovía. Since the World Health Organization's (WHO) Ottawa conference in 1986, international public health strategies have been shifting to a new strategy centered on health promotion (Kickbusch 2003). This new strategy sought to move away from a risk factor approach -based on pedagogical strategies to modify healthy risk behavior- towards a renewed focus on the contexts or "settings of everyday life" that determine health habits (Kickbusch, 2003: 385). Simultaneously, through the Healthy Cities initiative, the WHO has also attempted to strategically focus this new health promotion strategy in cities to create a "strong lobby for public health at the local level" (Kickbusch, 2003). Key elements of the Healthy Cities strategy included the creation of inter-sectoral participatory committees at the local level with an emphasis on urban policy change.

The confluence of these new strategies advocated from the WHO has made public health advocates more concerned with the dynamics of urban policy and planning in recent decades. Given increasing concerns over obesity and sedentary lifestyles worldwide and new scientific findings that recommended at least 150 minutes of moderate exercise or 75 minutes of vigorous physical activity per week (WHO, 2010a), Ciclovía became an ideal policy aligned with this new public health promotion agenda focused on cities (Cervero et al. 2009; Sarmiento et al. 2010). In 2005, partnering with Ciudad Humana, PAHO and the US Center for Control Disease (CDC) funded a Ciclovía seminar in Bogotá. This collaboration between sustainable transportation and public health advocates was a fruitful one and resulted in the creation of the *Red de Ciclovías Recreativas de las Américas (CRA)*, an institutionalized city network of different cities in the Americas that hold a regular Ciclovía event. Since its creation, the network holds a yearly congress and has a website with an "official" Ciclovía manual in Spanish and English downloadable for free thanks to PAHO and CDC funding. Illustrated with case studies from Bogotá and Guadalajara, the manual contains administrative and logistical details ranging from strategies to convince politicians to implement Ciclovía, to strategies to get funding, to logistical details about how to recruit and manage volunteers to run the event. Similarly, the WHO has also made use of online material and short videos from Bogotá's Ciclovía to effect policy change in many cities at once. For instance, in 2010 the WHO hired Guillermo Peñalosa for the campaign "1,000 Cities, 1,000 Lives." Using videos and visual material from Bogotá and other cities with Ciclovía-type events, the WHO sought to "open up public spaces to health" (WHO, 2010b) and convince urban decision makers around the world of the health benefits of street closures and policies that promote physical exercise in urban environments.

Ambitious Green Mayors

Another important trasnational actor in mobilizing Bogotá's *Transmilenio* and *Ciclovía* has been C40, an international network of cities founded in 2006 by Ken Livingstone, former mayor of London, with funds from the Clinton Climate Initiative. For instance, my interviews in San Francisco show how the first time San Francisco mayor at the time Gavin Newsom heard about Ciclovía was not from Enrique Peñalosa but from Ken Livingstone, in a C-40 meeting during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2008 (Wade Crowfoot, personal interview, 2010).

Livingstone is well known in transportation planning circles for having succesfully introduced a controversial congestion pricing scheme in London modeled after Singapore's example. While the pricing scheme has succeeded in reducing car traffic in central London, the controversy

arises not only from the high fees Londoners are charged to enter the city with a car, but also because, while the pricing scheme has been fairly lucrative for its private-sector operator, it has failed to raise the initially promised funding for public transport (Transport for London 2007). Since leaving London's city government, Livingstone has devoted himself to the promotion of inter-urban collaboration and public-private partnerships to fight climate change and reduce urban carbon emissions. In 2006, after partnering with the *Clinton Climate Initiative*, he founded C-40, an international network of cities to promote and share local best practices in fighting climate change. Using the scientific findings of the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and recognizing the "economic benefit of taking climate action," [29] C-40 urged mayors, city officials and business leaders worldwide to reduce emissions through private-public collaborations at the local level. C-40 can be characterized as the G-20 of ambitious green cities and has indeed urged and issued recommendations for G-8 leaders to take climate action.

What brought Gavin Newsom and Ken Livingstone together in Davos was the launching of SlimCity, a partnership between the World Economic Forum, the World Bank, the International Energy Agency and ICLEI (a global network of cities to promote sustainability). SlimCity sought to promote "exchange between cities and the private sector to support action on resource efficiency in cities – actions in areas that include energy, water, waste, mobility, planning, health and climate change."[30] Because BRT and Ciclovía are often run by public-private partnerships, Bogotá became a model that wedded well with this transnational alliance of mayors and private sector actors that sought to solve climate change by promoting locla public-private partnerships and urban "best practices."

Bus Manufacturers and the promotion of Latin American BRTs

Finally, another important set of actors that have promoted Bogotá worldwide, and especially through funding study tours to Transmilenio BRT, are bus manufacturing companies. The most important ones are Volvo, Mercedes and Scania. Against the powerful metro and light rail lobby that, led by the Siemens and Alstom, which would bring policymakers from around the world to European cities to show them examples of trams and light rail systems, bus manufacturers have paid for numerous study tours of bus companies and mayors around the world to visit and learn from the Latin American BRT meccas of Curitiba and Bogotá. Indeed, many of the trips to Curitiba that helped aligned bus company owners in Bogotá with Enrique Peñalosa to build *Transmilenio* were paid by Volvo and Mercedes, both of which had bus assembly plants in Curitiba at the time. Here learning from France or Bogotá or Curitiba is not only a matter of learning from the North or the South, it is also about promoting a particular technology: light rail or BRT business interests.

Since the early 2000s, Volvo has developed new and more sophisticated ways of influencing and promoting BRT around the world by intervening in the generation and dissemination of scientific knowledge around sustainable transport. Under the collective name of *Volvo Research and Educational Foundations* (VREF), four inter-related foundations have collaborated to finance high-level research and graduate education in the areas of sustainable transportation, environment and energy.[31] VREF has funded workshops, seminars and conferences around the world as well as ten Centers of Excellence (CoEs). CoEs seek to serve as collaborative platforms for senior researchers, postdocs and PhD students interested in both technical and policy-oriented sustainable

[29] C-40 Cities Website. Communique. Source: www.c40cities.org/docs/communique_2007.pdf (accessed Dec 8, 2010)
[30] World Economic Forum. 2008. SlimCity Initiative. Source: http://www.weforum.org/en/media/Latest%20Press%20Releases/PR_SlimCity (accessed December 7, 2010)
[31] The four VREF foundations are: 1) the Volvo Research Foundation, 2) the Volvo Educational Foundation, 3) the Dr. Pehr G. Gyllenhammar Foundation, 4) the Håkan Frisinger Foundation for Transport Research.

transportation solutions. In 2010, a Center of Excellence specifically devoted to BRT was established in Latin America Santiago de Chile thanks to VREF funding. The BRT COE is a consortium of four university institutions situated in four different continents (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Technical University of Lisbon and University of Sydney) and EMBARQ that seeks "to support the successful deployment of BRT, through the identification and effective communication of the conditions necessary for success at the strategic, tactical and operational decision levels."[32] While much of the research on BRT produced and promoted at this center is based on case studies and examples from Latin America (particularly Curitiba, Bogotá and Santiago), research results are often published in English. The BRT CoE also regularly promotes conferences, webinars and workshops in which leading experts in the field of sustainable transportation are invited to participate and discuss their research. In other words, through the creation of this CoE, VREF has not only crontibuted to create an important center for the production of high-level research on BRT, it has also successfully contributed to the dissemination of the Latin American experience with BRT (especially those in Curitiba, Bogotá and Mexico City) among transportation policy experts around the world.

Conclusions

As we have seen, "best practices" and policy models are either celebrated as inspirational examples that can spur policy change and learning in other places or critiqued as "one-size-fits-all" models that do not consider the complexity of local contexts. Yet, beyond this "contextual critique," less is known about the actors, networks and agendas that are involved in the construction and mobilization of certain policies as world policy models or, in policy-maker parlance, international "best practices."

In this chapter, I showed that the construction and wide circulation of Bogotá as a world policy model of sustainable urban transport since the early 2000s reflects an increasing focus of the apparatus of international development on the circulation of urban policy models and "best practices" as a new arena to effect global impact, what I called the logic of "leveraging cities." Bogotá's *Transmilenio* and *Ciclovía* are, then, part of a larger set of cost-effective, impact-oriented and financially-sustainable policy models promoted by international development banks and global philanthropy that seek to intervene in global climate change through their replication in as many cities as possible. In this chapter, I also identified a set of transnational actors that were key in constructing and circulating a particular "Bogotá model" in the early 2000s. This model is a simplified narrative of urban success and transformation of Bogotá –from urban dystopia to world model- that highlights transportation and public space interventions, and specifically BRT and bicycle policies, while rendering the important political, administrative and fiscal reforms that I described in chapter 1 invisible and, therefore, immobile.

[32] http://www.brt.cl/about-us/vision-and-objectives/ (accessed Aug 1, 2015)

PART II. INFRASTRUCTURES OF POLICY CIRCULATION:

Urban Policy Forums, Study Tours and Digital Policy Platforms

Chapter 3. Urban Policy Forums as Relational Sites of Inspiration and Persuasion

"Enrique Peñalosa – the former mayor of Bogotá who has been instrumental in Bogotá's building of parks, bicycle paths, and the Bus Rapid Transit system Transmilenio– endorses the "Bogotá model" in developing cities around the world. His stump speech, which has been given in Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, China, Ghana, South Africa, and several Latin American countries, talks about public space as dignity for poor people, highways as "monuments to inequality," and bicycle paths as an indicator for a healthy, equitable society... The winds of activism and communication have brought Bogotá's story to many cities around the world, dispersing seeds of ideas that include carfree days, bicycle paths and a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system known as Transmilenio."

Hermann 2004, *Bogotá Inspires the South* [33]

"One of the main theories of change that we have at SPUR is that learning from other cities is important and that is one of the reasons that we do our program series of 250 urban policy forums a year... And so when people, when there are urban experts like, I don't know, Janet Sadik-Khan or Gil Peñalosa, or people like that… or sometimes professors, people like Robert Cervero, who… in their careers become experts in various cities, we try to provide venues for them to share their knowledge… we hope people are influenced… There are two different theories [of change] operating there... One is that staff of public agencies and leadership of public agencies are getting influenced. The other is that it is the public… some of the opinion leaders…. that we are hopefully creating the civic will to understand ideas or the possibility of [implementing] some of these urban innovations."

SPUR (San Francisco Planning and Urban Research) President, 2015 [34]

Introduction

On February 17, 2015 the Knight Foundation announced through a press release the award of a $1 million grant to Gil Peñalosa's consultancy company *8-80 Cities* to promote more active, livable cities across the US: "the support builds on the success of an earlier Knight investment in 8-80 Cities to host a conference and international study tour for civic innovators from several U.S. cities that stimulated a host of local projects." Through a series of "learning opportunities" that include a conference, city learning tours and different immersion workshops for local leaders, the Knight Foundation is seeking with this grant to "expose participants, who come both from inside and outside local government, to international best practices in using public space to build more vibrant

[33] *Bogotá Inspires the South*. Article by Gabrielle Hermann at Carbusters Magazine (carbusters.org), a project of World Car-Free Cities Network, Available at: http://carbusters.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2009/11/Carbusters-20.pdf (accessed Jul 1, 2015)

[34] SPUR (San Francisco Planning and Urban Research) President, personal interview, 2015

cities."[35] In just two paragraphs, this press release summarizes the important role of "best practices" and policy models in promoting agendas –in this case public health and livability- in many cities at once. But, perhaps more importantly, it also points to the existence –and importance- of a series of mobile infrastructures of policy circulation in the form of conferences, study tours and printed and online guides where these "best practices" and models are learned by the right kind of messengers: local public, private and civic leaders capable of influencing urban politics and the planning process in their cities.

The following three chapters of this dissertation seek to answer a "how" question about the circulation of Bogotá policies: how does the Bogotá model circulate? When looking at how Bogotá ideas arrived in Guadalajara and San Francisco, one realizes that while global philanthropy and international organizations have been important actors behind the circulation of the Bogotá model, they also cannot impose their policy and planning models unilaterally on cities. Local actors have their own agendas, beliefs and aspirations and are embedded in particular urban politics and governance dynamics. Rather than through coercion "from above," Bogotá policies have circulated in these cities when influential local leaders –which include mayors and high ranking officials but also local advocates, business leaders or well-respected journalists- were persuaded of their appropriateness and have decided to pursue them through forming coalitions to introduce them in the local government agenda. However, moving influential local actors from knowledge to action requires not only exchanges of technical knowledge but active processes of inspiration, persuasion and trust building that are both rational and emotional. Each of the next three chapters will analyze in detail three infrastructures that have been key for the circulation of the Bogotá's *Ciclovía* and *Transmilenio:* urban policy forums, study tours and digital policy platforms.

In this chapter, I focus on one those infrastructures of policy circulation, one that has been, perhaps, the most important for the circulation of Bogotá policies: urban policy forums. At its most basic level, an urban policy forum can be defined as an on-site learning venue in which knowledge about urban policies and planning mechanisms from one or several other cities is mobilized through textual, narrative and visual material to an audience of actors involved in urban planning and policymaking. While there are many sites and venues in which experts and practitioners learn and exchange information about other cities' policies, what characterizes urban policy forums is their potential to inspire and move participants from knowledge to action. However, to realize this potential, more than information sharing needs to take place. Based on the experience of several forums in which the mobilization of Bogotá policies helped produce policy changes in the cities of Guadalajara (Mexico) and San Francisco (California), the following sections reveal common practices and spatial characteristics of these relational infrastructures of policy circulation and the ways in which inspiration and persuasion are assembled to result in policy learning and circulation. After analyzing –and participating in- many conferences and forums where Bogotá policies were presented to an audience, I found that those that have resulted in the mobilization of the Bogotá model in another city have used a particular type of expert, what I call here "persuasive practitioners." These experts do not rely on technical or scientific knowledge to legitimate their expertise. Rather, their legitimacy relies in a simplified narrative that puts them at the center of Bogotá's urban transformation.

[35] http://www.knightfoundation.org/press-room/press-release/8-80-cities-will-help-civic-leaders-build-more-act/ (accessed March 1, 2015)

Policy Learning and Urban Policy Forums

Despite their central role in the introduction and circulation of new policy ideas, the role of conferences and policy forums is undertheorized in the literature on policy learning. Conferences, forums and workshops are often considered a "black-box" in which exchanges of knowledge and face-to-face contacts lead to a change in beliefs among participants but less is known about the actual practices through which policy-makers and advocates learn about new policies. Reflecting on the recent literature on policy learning, Gilardi & Radaelli (2012, p. 162) have noted that "we still do not know much about how communities of social actors –especially policy-makers- learn." For example, Sabatier, a key theorist of policy learning, has acknowledged that, in fragmented political systems, the exercise of raw power to impose one policy is not possible and has argued that an "advocacy coalition framework" is a better way to think about how actors align in different coalitions around particular sets of policies. And despite his acknowledgement that policy learning always takes place in a field of power shaped by coalitions with different values and beliefs, his interpretation of how coalition members learn new policy ideas and change their beliefs is rationalistic and depoliticized; a linear process of diffusion that somehow goes from neutral experts to local advocates:

> "[The Advocacy Coalition Framework] has said very little about the generation and diffusion of new ideas concerning, e.g., causal relationships and policy instruments. One would assume that they are often developed by neutral experts in e.g., universities, and then adopted and popularized by advocates from the appropriate coalitions (Nelson 1987)" (Sabatier 1988: p. 159).

Recent work in geography has started to reveal more details about the learning dynamics, knowledge and expertise mobilization and face-to-face practices that take place in these relational sites of policy circulation. For example, McCann (2011) and Cook & Ward (2012) have analyzed the role of conferences as key *informational infrastructures* that facilitate the movement of policies and policy knowledge across space. In contrast to McFarlane or collaborative planners, their interest in less in the transformative possibilities of those forums than in the practices that take place during these events. Cook & Ward (2012: p. 138) use conferences as "temporary (i.e. time-limited) events that bring together people from particular epistemic communities for face-to-face interaction and the exchange of verbal, visual and symbolic information." While they acknowledge that learning occurs in conferences, their emphasis is in the capacity of conferences to create transnational networks through the formation of relationships between policy elites over distance, what they call *trans-urban policy pipelines*.[36] According to these authors, the mobilization of particular types of experts, those associated with reputable city or policy models, and the formal and informal face-to-face communications that occur during conferences are key elements to create trust and lubricate transnational policy pipelines and, therefore, policy mobilities across space.

Even though email, social media and skype have made information exchange easier, there are features of face-to-face contact that can hardly be matched by technology-mediated encounters. It it precisely these spatial features of face-to-face encounters that policy forums seek to mobilize. For example, economic geographers Storper & Vernables (2004) have distinguished four key aspects of face-to-face (F2F) contacts. First, they argue that thanks to its high frequency, possibility of rapid feedback and visual and body cues, F2F is an efficient communication technology that allows for the exchange of information and knowledge that is not easibly codifiable and transmitted through other means. Second, F2F contacts provide a way to build trust, relationships and collaborations between

[36] The policy actors connected through these pipelines include, among others, "academics, activists, advocates, consultants, evaluators, gurus, journalists, politicians, policy making professionals and so on." (Cook & Ward 2012: p: 142).

actors. While the later stages of a collaborative project often involve the exchange of codifiable information, which is easier to do through technology-mediated communications, it is in the early stages where F2F contacts prove essential to build the trust that lubricates multi-actor collaborations and their intermittent exchanges. Third, F2F help create social and professional networks: "[it] gives them the means to become members of a structured milieux, to get 'in the loop.' " (Storper & Vernables 2004: p. 357). Finally, they argue that F2F communication is, above all, a performance that serves not just to transmit knowledge but also to produce inspiration through stimulating imitation and competition. The combined effects of these four features create what they call "buzz:" "Individuals in a buzz environment interact and cooperate with other high-ability people, are well placed to communicate complex ideas with them, and are highly motivated" (Storper & Vernables 2004: p. 365). For them, buzz environments are derived from co-location and physical proximity and therefore cities and regional districts are privileged environments for the transmission of non-codifiable (or tacit) knowledge and inspiration through F2F contact: "to reap these benefits in full almost invariably requires co-location, rather than occasional interludes of F2F contact" (Storper & Vernables 2004: p. 365).

There is, however, an ongoing debate in economic geography on whether buzz and the transmission of tacit knowledge can only occur through co-location at the local and regional level. Some authors argue that "buzz can be transmitted both electronically and face-to-face" (Asheim et al. 2005: p. 7) while others have pointed at networks as a more appropriate geographical metaphor to conceptualize how knowledge, inspiration and buzz trave (Amin & Cohendet 2003). For example Amin and Cohendet (2003) have argued that it is the relational proximity in terms of values, vision and vocabulary shared among members of a particular network or community rather than co-location what is key for an effective transmission of tacit knowledge. However, even transnational networks and communities of practice need an infrastructure, even if mobile and intermittent, to allow for F2F between network members. That is precisely the role that forums and conferences play. Face-to-face contacts, however, are not limited to the actual spaces provided in conferences, they also include informal activities outside the event such as the logistical preparations to participate, sharing a hotel room or going dancing together. As Faulconbridge (2006) has shown, these social activities are important trust-building elements that, while often not advertised as part of the official programs, are essential parts of the trust-building environment and buzz that a conference creates.

Policy Forums, Urban Politics and Expertise Mobilization

Economic geography debates on F2F and buzz are not however interested in power and politics and therefore little is said in those debates about how the transmission of knowledge, trust building and motivation generated by F2F is used for the purposes of agenda setting or reshaping urban governance structures. In the case of policy forums it is important to understand variables such as who organizes the forum and whether the organization of spaces for F2F simply reflect existing power relations among urban actors or is deliberately organized to try to change those urban governance structures. While a policy forum per se is not able to change urban power structures, the learning processes and policy models mobilized in them do have the potential to change, or at least start changing, the beliefs of urban actors towards a particular policy direction.

In Chapter 2, I reviewed four key transnational networks of actors that have been key for the construction of Bogotá as a world policy model fueled thanks to conferences, workshops and study tours funded by the increasing availability of philanthropic funding for climate change, emission reductions and public health initiatives in cities. However, conferences and policy learning forums are also often organized and funded by local organizations interested in influencing local policy agendas. For example, SPUR, one of the most influential urban policy think tanks in San Francisco

and a vocal advocate of BRT and bicycle policies in the city, has often used urban policy forums to push for policy change in that direction in the city. In the last years, they have invited Enrique and Gil Peñalosa in several occasions to talk about transportation and bicycle policies. By understanding SPUR's theory of policy change behind the organization of these forums, it becomes clear that the policy change potential of forums is not only harnessed by powerful national and global actors but is also done by local actors in their effort to influence agendas and promote policy change in their home cities:

> SPUR President: [Between our San Francisco and San Jose offices] we do 250 events every year at SPUR and every year there are several events about BRT through the lens of studying transit systems in other cities, from what other cities are doing right…
>
> Sergio: How is that strategy useful for SPUR, I mean, the whole "learning from other cities" strategy?
>
> SPUR President: I think that one of the main theories of change that we have at SPUR is that learning from other cities is important and that is one of the reasons that we do our program series of 250 urban policy forums a year. A very large percentage of them are focused on learning from other cities. And so when people, when there are urban experts like, I don't know, Janet Sadik-Khan or Gil Peñalosa, or people like that… or sometimes professors, people like Robert Cervero, who… in their careers become experts in various cities, we try to provide venues for them to share their knowledge.
>
> Sergio: How do you think that works? What kind of people attend and why do you think it's important to have Janet Sadik-Khan or Gil Peñalosa talk about what happened in New York or Bogotá?
>
> SPUR president: Well actually I don't know who attends… it's a little bit of a message in a bottle, we hope it works but we can't prove it. We hope people are influenced… There are two different theories [of change] operating there... One is that staff of public agencies and leadership of public agencies are getting influenced. The other is that it's the public… some of the opinion leaders…. that we are hopefully creating the civic will to understand ideas or the possibility of [implementing] some of these urban innovations. So there are two different theories: one is a leadership theory, that public agencies staff would learn something; and the other is that the public, people of the public, would get more excited about this idea[37]

Besides these two theories of policy change behind the celebration of policy learning forums, it is also interesting the distinction tha SPUR president makes between two types of urban transportation experts: experts like Robert Cervero, whose legitimacy resides in his technical-scientific knowledge of transportation and his status as professor of urban transportation planning at a prestigious university, and experts like Janet Sadik-Khan, former NYC Transport Commissioner, or Gil Peñalosa, former Bogotá Parks Commissioner, whose legitimacy resides in having implemented programs and policies that are perceived as a success by an international community of experts and practitioners. Here it is interesting that the fact that one is from New York and the other from Bogotá is less important that the fact that both are *world recognized* experts.

Learning is not rational: inspiration and persuasion as emotional aspects of policy learning

[37] SPUR (San Francisco Planning and Urban Research) President, personal interview, 2015

In previous sections I have shown how debates in geography suggest that the availability of formal and informal spaces for face-to-face contact and encounters are an essential characteristic of conferences and policy learning forums. Conversations in hallways, card exchanges over coffee-breaks, informal meetings during meals or closed-door meetings are essential not only to learn implementation details of the new policies proposed in sessions but also to build trust between the different actors involved in urban policymaking and planning, particularly when the policies being discussed are new or still peripheral to the mainstream of the planning profession. However, this is never a rational learning exercise in which all policy alternatives are considered. As noted by Grabher, practitioners do not deliberately 'scan' their environment in search of a specific policy or piece of information. Rather, they are "surrounded by a concoction of rumours, impressions, recommendations, trade folklore and strategic misinformation" (Grabher 2002: p. 209).

To characterize policy learning beyond assumptions of policy actors as rational individuals, I draw from a rich tradition in urban planning scholarship that has highlighted the importance of narratives and storytelling in planning (Forester 1993, Throgmorton 1996, Sandercock 2003) as well as more recent debates that seek to conceptualize the role of emotions in planning practice (Hoch 2006, Gunder 2011). For example, Leonie Sandercock (2003: p. 18) has noted how stories can act as a catalyzer of policy change "partly by inspirational example, and partly by shaping a new imagination of alternatives." Storytelling is different from other ways of transmitting knowledge: a story has a setting, a chronological logic (a beginning and an end), a clear plot with protagonists (heroes, villains, innocent people) and a moral tension that normally points to a potential solution (Sandercock 2003, Jones & McBeth 2010). However, to act as a catalyzer of change, a good story needs to have a 'potential for generalizability' (Sandercock 2003) and be persuasively told by legitimate and credible storytellers (Throgmorton 1996, Jones & McBeth 2010). Similarly, recent debates that seek to conceptualize the role of emotions in planning practice (Hoch 2006, Gunder 2011) have noted that what make policy actors pay attention and get inspired by a particular policy does not only reside in its outcomes through some standardized or rational evaluation mechanism. It is also about the capacity of the policy –and, more specifically, the expert presenting the policy- to emotionally move actors and show them the effects of that particular policy in their wellbeing as well as in the wellbeing of those they care about. As noted by planning scholar Charles Hoch (2006: p. 368):

> "attention, perception and reflection used in planning judgment also rely upon emotional dispositions and sensitivity. The practical activity people engage in when learning and adopting a belief involves more than cognitive judgment about the value of the belief (its truthfulness or goodness). The activity draws upon emotions and feelings (its meaning and significance). Most people recognize that emotions and feelings shape beliefs. The desires and preferences we hold direct our attention, motivate our interests, compel our assent and alert us to risks."

Hoch (2006: p. 378) further argues that persuasive planners are not those that present the best scientific evidence available but rather those that "shape the emotional response of relevant stakeholders," in other words, those that can "organize the objects of persuasion in ways that actively subvert emotional intelligence, manipulating images and text to project beliefs that will provoke a predictable emotional response."

Bogotá Experts: the Peñalosa brothers as "persuasive practitioners"

In the last two decades, different types of experts have used references to Bogotá in conferences, workshops and forums around the world. They include university professors, transportation consultants, urban planners, or bicycle advocates. However, there is a type of expert that has been key in the spread of the Bogotá model. After analyzing –and participating in- many conferences and

forums where Bogotá policies were presented to an audience, I found that those that have resulted in the mobilization of the Bogotá model in another city have used a particular type of expert, what I call here "persuasive practitioners." These experts do not rely on technical knowledge or scietnific expertise to legitimate themselves. Instead, their legitimacy relies on their participation in the implementation of these policies and in a simplified narrative that puts these policies at the center of the Bogotá's transformation. The main representatives of this type of expert are two Bogotá's public figures who claim expertise based on their local knowledge and their participation in the transformation of Bogotá during the 1990s: Enrique Peñalosa, Bogotá mayor from 1998 until 2000 and a key person behind the design and implementation of *Transmilenio* BRT; and his brother Gil Peñalosa, Bogotá Commissioner of Parks, Sports and Recreation from 1995 until 1998 and a key person in the expansion of *Ciclovía* from 24 kilometers in 1994 to 121 kilometers in 1999.

Even though their expertise resides in their local knowledge, Bogotá experts are constantly on the move. Indeed, it was difficult to interview them while I did fieldwork in Bogotá. The first time I approached Enrique Peñalosa was after a talk he gave at Bogotá's Universidad de los Andes. After the Q&A session finished he left the room and rushed through the university hallways. The only way I could ask him for an interview was while walking with him as he left the university: "I have to run now, I have to give a talk in Jakarta tomorrow. Email me, that is the best way to reach me," he said as he hurried to the airport. Similarly, when I eventually interviewed Gil Peñalosa in 2013, after having to reschedule three times, he excused himself about his busy schedule by saying that "in the last six years I have travelled and given advice to more than 160 different cities around the world." Through their travels and talks, Bogotá's experts have persuaded mayors, NGO representatives, public officials, bicycle advocates, and many different policy actors in cities in every single continent to promote non-car pedestrian infrastructures and policies. They have become "Bogotá ambassadors" in the world while receiving substantial benefits in the form of honorariums and consultancy assignments charged in the many conferences, workshops and forums in which they have displayed and mobilized their persuasive capacities. There is an interesting division of labor between them. While both use references to Bogotá's larger urban transformation during the 1990s and highlight their participation in these events as a way to gain legitimacy, they have specialized in different aspects of the Bogotá model: Enrique Peñalosa has become a common speaker in forums about transportation and cities whereas Gil Peñalosa has specialized on public space and bicycle conferences. Therefore, while Enrique often promotes BRTs around the world, Gil is well known among *Ciclovía* advocates.

To produce inspiration and move conference participants to action, "persuasive practitioners" use two strategies. On the one hand, they make extensive use of narrative and visual artifacts to convey a simplified story that links urban transformation –in Bogotá and other cities- with specific small public space and transportation interventions so that participants can identify with the heroes of these narratives and think that it can be easily replicated in their cities. Second, they use a diverse set of emotional artifacts to connect with their audiences and create urgency to move them to action, including relational comparisons between cities and the creation of artificial games of inter-city competition. Finally, spaces for formal and informal face-to-face interaction and communication during policy forums are also essential for the creation of multi-actor coalitions that will be neccesary to eventually move Bogotá policies from ideas to items in another city's agenda.

In the following sections I analyze in depth two forums that have been key for the spread of Bogotá policies in Guadalajara in San Francisco to analyze the kind of learning, persuasion and

inspiration dynamics that allowed the circulation of Bogotá model. First, I analyze a policy forum celebrated in Guadalajara in 2003 that had Enrique Peñalosa as main speaker. This forum resulted in the creation of a policy learning coalition of Guadalajara local business and media elites that became key to push for the implementation of a Ciclovía-style program as well as a BRT line in Guadalajara. Second, I analyze the *Towards Car-Free Cities* conference in Portland in 2008, which had Gil Peñalosa as keynote speaker and was key in "energizing" San Francisco bicycle advocates to demand a Ciclovía program in their city. Because both forums have already taken place when I started this project, I have reconstructed what happen through a combination of in-depth interviews with forum participants, media archives, written and recorded speeches, as well as internet archives, particularly comments in tweets and policy blog comments where forum participants shared their thoughts about the events.

Enrique Peñalosa in Guadalajara: An Infinity of Small Things

In 2003, Enrique Peñalosa visited Guadalajara for the first to give a talk titled *Una Infinidad de Pequeñas Cosas* (An Infinity of Small Things). The auditorium was packed with representatives of Guadalajara's local and state government, the local business community, journalists, architects, environmental advocates, university students and citizens with a general curiosity in urbanism and urban politics. While he started with a broad theoretical reflection on the need of developing cities to change their role models, his talk was, more than anything, a dramatic narrative of urban transformation; a powerful –and simplified- story in which he claimed to have radically transformed Bogotá thanks to a series of small urban interventions and policies focused on improving public space, public transportation and bicycle infrastructure.

Peñalosa's talk in Guadalajara in 2003 was the triggering event that resulted in 15 study tours of local politicians, planners, *empresarios*, bus company owners, NGOs and journalists to learn from Bogotá. In 2004, inspired by Bogotá's Ciclovía, the mayor of Guadalajara inaugurated *Vía Recreactiva* in Guadalajara, Latin America's second largest car-free street program which draws about 250,000 participants to walk and bike in the city streets every Sunday. A couple of years after, the governor of the state of Jalisco inaugurated *Macrobús*, a BRT line that moves about 125,000 people per day in Guadalajara. *Macrobús* not only looked shockingly similar to Bogotá's *Transmilenio* BRT, it had, indeed, a Colombian as head of the system.

But what exactly is the connection between the mobilization of Bogotá's policy ideas by Peñalosa in 2003 in Guadalajara and those policy outcomes? And how can we analyze that connection? An analysis that assume this relationship to be a linear knowledge transfer between Bogotá and Guadalajara's mayors will fail to illuminate the different actors, practices and spaces that need to be assembled, mobilized and learned for a policy idea to actually be adopted in another city. There are, after all, plenty of examples of talks about great ideas that never leave conference rooms. Indeed, many of the ideas presented by Peñalosa in Guadalajara had been happening already in Curitiba or Quito and other cities since the 1970s. Why adopt them now in Guadalajara? Why was the Bogotá example so appealing? Similarly, an analysis that hurries to assume that this policy transfer is happening now because of an all-encompassing global force or moment that is moving all cities towards a particular way of organizing urban space and transportation systems will also fail to understand the different local and transnational actors that need to collaborate in order to introduce a new urban planning policy in a city's agenda. In the following sections, I pay particular attention to the practices through which Bogotá policies were mobilized and learned in this forum, the physical and spatial characteristics where these practices took place as well as how they combined and changed, through friction rather than imposition, the original beliefs and agendas of the local actors that organized the event.

Enrique Peñalosa's talk in Guadalajara was, in reality, a fund-raising event of *Ciudades*

Públicas, a non-governmental organization that would eventually become Guadalajara 2020 (GDL 2020) in 2004. Despite its name, *Ciudades Públicas* was a private-led organization whose roots can be traced back to a small group of *empresarios*[38] from the local jewelry industry that started to organize in the mid 1990s to "clean up" Plaza Tapatía -a central public square where their jewlery showrooms were located- from prostitutes, drug addicts and informal street vendors. Initially the empresarios thought about hiring a music band or an opera singer to raise funds for their cause but an urban planner they knew recommended that they invite Enrique Peñalosa, "who was a world recognized expert in urbanism and has given talks in many cities around the world"(GDL 2020 leader 1, personal interview, 2013). [39]

While in this case it was this group of local *empresarios* rather than ITDP or an international organization who funded Peñalosa's trip, it was the "world recognition" he had cultivated thanks to his conferences around the world what elevated him to the category of "world expert" in urbanism: "we didn't even know who he was, or his ideas, we just wanted to have a recognized expert in urban issues that would be able to attract many people" (GDL 2020 leader 1, personal interview, 2013). [40] And although the *empresarios* were initially more interested in the fund-raising possibilities of the event than in Peñalosa's ideas, Peñalosa's visit resulted in two important outcomes: 1) it started shifting the beliefs of the members of *Ciudades Públicas* and the objective of their organization from their narrow and conservative emphasis on "cleaning up" Plaza Tapatía to the goal of transforming the city through transportation and public space interventions; and 2) it helped forge a local alliance of representatives of the private sector and media elites decided to influence the government to translate those beliefs into public policy. This rearrangement of urban governance in Guadalajara started with a particular event: Peñalosa's visit to Guadalajara and his narration of Bogotá as a powerful story of urban transformation.

The Bogotá Story as a Story of Urban Transformation

About two thousand *tapatíos* -Guadalajara inhabitants- attended Peñalosa's talk at the *Instituto Cultural Cabañas*, a historical building located at the heart of Plaza Tapatía. His talk was a dramatic narrative in which he claimed to have radically transformed Bogotá during his administration (1998-2000) thanks to a series of small urban interventions and policy initiatives focused on improving public space, public transportation and bicycle infrastructure. While anyone familiar with Bogotá and Colombian politics knows that decentralization and democratization processes in Colombia as well as the role of previous Bogotá mayors played a crucial role in the transformation of the city (Martin & Ceballos, 2004; Gilbert, 2006), Peñalosa's talk was a story that put him at the center of Bogotá transformation. It was a story of heroes (his administration), villains (those that promoted car-oriented infrastructure) and innocents (children that cannot play in the streets anymore and households without cars). If Bogotá, this urban backwater in the Third World has done it, why can't Guadalajara do it? This was the powerful moral of the Bogotá story told by Peñalosa.

Images of the then new and flashy *Transmilenio* Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) as well as bicyclists taking over the city during Ciclovía prominently featured in his powerpoint presentation. As a leader from GDL 2020 noted, when they brought experiences from European and North American cities to Guadalajara, politicians and other city leaders considered them "exercises of dreaming," but in the case of Bogotá: "this was a Latin American city, it was poorer and had more violence problems than

[38] *Empresario* is a difficult word to translate into English; it could be translated as both entrepreneur and business owner. Therefore, I kept the Spanish original.

[39] Original in Spanish; "Que era un experto mundialmente reconocido en urbanismo y ha dado charlas por todo el mundo."

[40] Original in Spanish: "Ni sabíamos quien era o sus ideas, simplemente queríamos traer a algún experto reconocido que atrajera a mucha gente… Y también nos habían dicho que una charla que dió en Ciudad Juárez convocó a más de 400 personas."

Guadalajara… and they were doing it!" (GDL 2020 leader 2 interview, 2013).

During his talk, Peñalosa used different artifacts to shape the audience emotions and capture their attention, particularly quotes that directed participants to identify themselves with the victims of car-oriented urbanization: the children and the poor. In his presentations throughout Latin America and the global South, Peñalosa was not shy to talk about class and how car-oriented urbanization benefits the rich, i.e., those capable to owning a car. However, it is through the figure of the child that he attempts to emotionally move his often car-owning middle and upper class audiences. In his talk in Guadalajara, children and low-income populations were often invoked:

> "The absence of low-cost and high-frequency public transport and, in many places, the total absence of public transport leave children, young people without cars, the old and low-income populations that cannot drive stranded. It is an environment that engenders exclusion"[41]

The narratives, images and emotional quotes mobilized during the forum helped Peñalosa explain forum participants the new policies implemented in Bogotá but, perhaps more importantly, it inspired the core group of GDL 2020 leaders to become involved in the more comprehensive goal of transforming the city through transportation and public space interventions. As noted by a GDL 2020 member:

> "People used to go and look at Curitiba. However, as a Brazilian friend of mine told me one time: the Curitiba model is very difficult to imitate because the city is full of Germans, it's very different from other Latin American cities, even different from other cities in Brazil. Then Bogotá made its appearance. Bogotá had its origins in Curitiba but Bogotá had an absolutely Latin American context and it is a city with apparent misfortune, drug trafficking… More than specific programs… I think what Bogotá gave us was the aspiration of a better city that, you know… yes, we can… that transformation was possible in Guadalajara too" (GDL 2020 leader 3, personal interview, 2014) [42]

In this quote, we clearly see how the Bogotá story of urban transformation functions as a key element to mobilize the aspirations of influential policy actors in Guadalajara, even more so than a rational assessment of the quality or effectiveness of the policies themselves. Peñalosa's eloquent use and mobilization of this story –and his constructed centrality to this transformation- is what makes him not just another transportation expert talking about a "best practice" but what I have called a "persuasive practitioner" and, therefore, a key person behind the spread and circulation of the Bogotá model.

Peñalosa's public talk at *Instituto Cultural Cabañas* was not the only event members of GDL 2020 organized for him. During his 3-day visit, he gave two public talks, several press conferences and other events that provided opportunities for face-to-face communication, not only between Peñalosa and Guadalajara actors but also between Guadalajara elites themselves. For example, he

---

[41] Original in Spanish: "La ausencia de transporte público de bajo costo y alta frecuencia y en muchos lugares la ausencia total de transporte público, deja varados a los niños, los jóvenes sin automóvil, los viejos, los ciudadanos de menores ingresos que no pueden conducir. Es un ambiente excluyente" (Gdl 2020 Archive, 2013, p 13)

[42] Original in Spanish: "Porque antes todos iban a Curitiba. Sin embargo, como le dijo un amigo suyo brasileño, el modelo de Curitiba era muy difícil de imitar porque la ciudad estaba llena de alemanes, era muy diferente a otras ciudades latinoamericanas, incluso a otras ciudades de Brasil. Sin embargo, cuando aparece Bogotá, Bogotá tiene estos orígenes de Curitiba pero Bogotá tenía un contexto absolutamente latino y era una ciudad aparentemente desgraciada, con narco… Lo que aportó Bogotá más allá de programas concretos fue la aspiración de una ciudad mejor… sí, se puede… que también era posible la transformación de Guadalajara"

had breakfast with 50 local *empresarios*, lunch with University of Guadalajara faculty members and other local public opinion leaders, and dinner with the owners and directors of the main local media companies. As noted by a GDL 2020 leader, "we heard the Bogotá story 7 times in 3 days" (GDL 2020 leader 2, personal interview, 2013). If Peñalosa's time in Guadalajara was limited to 3 days, why this emphasis on promoting face-to-face encounters with other *empresarios*, the media and public opinion leaders?

To answer this question we need to understand GDL 2020 interpretation of their sources of power in the city. As noted by one of their leaders, their power to influence urban policy and government agendas in Guadalajara derives from three main sources: 1) their social and political network of relationships; 2) their capacity to maintain a low profile as an organization by giving political trophies of their achievements to local politicians; and 3) their capacity of emphasizing the need to act on particular urban problems by influencing three types of actors: a) key politicians and public officials; b) individuals that directly impact the urbanization process (including real estate developers, bus company owners, etc.); and c) people with "de facto" power or "individuals with the capacity to have an impact in the media and form public opinion, such as some university professors or people with a column in a newspaper" (GDL 2020 leader 2, interview, 2013).[43] GDL 2020 interpretation of their sources of power suggests a particular network of actors that goes beyond public and private spheres and that they see crucial to introduce new possibilities of planning and policy futures in the city agenda. It is by understanding these beliefs and vectors of power that one understands the ways in which the talk as well as the formal and informal meetings of Enrique Peñalosa in Guadalajara were organized by GDL 2020 in their effort to place their shifting beliefs of how the city should be transformed in the local government agenda.

From South to North: Ciclovía in San Francisco via Madison, Davos and Portland

In less than five years, Guadalajara's *Vía Recreactiva* program has become the second largest *Ciclovía* program in the world –only after Bogotá's program- with more than 300,000 people walking and biking every Sunday in the otherwise car-clogged thouroughfare Avenida Vallarta. Guadalajara is not, however, the only city that referenced Bogotá to implement a street closure program in the last decades. Since 2000, more than 400 cities have referenced Bogotá to implement a *Ciclovía* program. San Francisco's Sunday Streets, established in 2008, has become indeed one of the most popular Ciclovía programs in the US. In comparison to the one million people that *Ciclovía* gathers in Bogotá every Sunday or the 300,0000 people of Guadalajara's *Vía Recreactiva*, Sunday Streets is a rather humble program although one that has been growing over the years and that has served as a model for many other US cities. Sunday Streets was launched in 2008 with two pilot events that opened up 5 miles of the city's waterfront -from Bayview to Chinatown- for bikes, pedestrians and physical activities from 9am to 1pm. In 2009 the number of events increased to six and the neighborhoods where it took place was also expanded. In 2010 a total of nine events were held, attracting approximately 20,000 San Franciscans. Since then, the program has become a permanent institution in the city with nine events per year and about 15,000 and 25,000 participants (Zieff et al. 2013).

When Sunday Streets was launched, a letter from the then San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom proudly announced in the program website that: "Sunday Streets originated in Bogota, Columbia [sic] as a day to promote free, health and community oriented events. 30 years after the first program, the concept has spread around the world... now, it is back in San Francisco!"[44] The

[43] Original in Spanish: "ciudadanos con poderes fácticos… [son] individuos con la capacidad de tener impacto en los medios de comunicación y la opinion pública, por ejemplo algunos profesores de la universidad o gente que escribe columnas en los periódicos"

[44] Sunday Streets website. Available at: http://www.sundaystreetssf.com (accessed Dec 1, 2010)

history section of Sunday Streets also included Enrique Peñalosa's often-cited quote "A quality city is not one that has great roads but one where a child can safely go anywhere on a bicycle." Yet, a closer examination of the different local and transnational actors, networks and events involved in this particular South-North policy circulation reveals much more complex practices and infrastructures of policy circulation than a linear transfer from Bogotá's mayor to San Francisco's mayor.

All my field interviews in San Francisco showed how the confluence of the green ambitions of San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom and the advocacy work of a local alliance of bicycle and livable city advocates that included the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition (SFBC) and the local non-profit Livable City, resulted in the launching of Sunday Streets. They also point at certain workshops and conferences as key sites where the idea for Sunday Streets started to take form. For instance, Susan King (2010, personal interview), the manager of the non-profit organization that run the program from 2008 until 2014 notes:

> "The San Francisco Bicycle Coalition (SFBC) played a lead role in advocating for Ciclovía [in San Francisco]... and, at the same time, Mayor Gavin Newsom was at a World Conference of Mayors in Davos, Switzerland, and Ciclovía was the buzz. So he came back talking about it and Leah [executive director of the SFBC]... just had this workshop on Ciclovías and it both kind of came together and said let's make it happen"

Paradoxically, some of the key policy forums in which influential San Francisco policy actors first learned about Ciclovía did not take place either in San Francisco or Bogotá. Mayor Newsom learned about it at the International Conference of Mayors, in Davos, Switzerland, in 2008 whereas SF bicycle advocates first heard about it at the *Pro Walk and Pro Bike* conference in Madison in 2006. It was however the *Towards Car-Free Cities* conference in Portland in 2008, which many San Francisco bicycle advocates cite as a key site of inspiration to energize and move a coalition of bicycle and public space advocates in San Francisco to demand a Ciclovía-style program and push the mayor to implement it.

To the question of where the inspiration to push for a Ciclovía-style program in San Francisco came from, Cheryl Brinkman, chair of the Board of Directors of Livable City, the non-profit that runs Sunday Streets, answers that it came from Gil Peñalosa during the *Towards Car-Free Cities Conference* in Portland: "he was the reason that Leah [executive director of the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition at the time] and I got very energized about the idea of doing it in San Francisco" (Brinkman, personal interview, 2013). The use of the word "energized" here is interesting. When Noah Budnik took charge as the new executive director of the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition in 2014 replacing Leah Shahum, he also used the word "energy" to refer to the enthusiasm among US advocates to transform cities through bicycle infrastructure and policies:

> "There is incredible energy across the country to transform cities into healthy, livable places, and I'm so excited to work with communities around the city to put San Francisco on the forefront of this transformation."[45]

To be energized is different from learning, even though the two can reinforce each other. While learning is related with the acquisition of new knowledge, energizing has to do with the activating of

[45] http://sf.streetsblog.org/2014/12/03/noah-budnick-named-sf-bicycle-coalitions-new-executive-director/ (accessed March 13, 2015)

internal motivations that derive into some sort of action.[46] Therefore, although learning about a new policy could serve as energizer or motivator to move an urban policy actor –be it a mayor or an advocate- to action, it is not necessarily always the case that new knowledge would result in energizing. Indeed, by the time San Francisco bicycle advocates attended Portland's *Towards Car-Free Cities* conference, many of them have already heard about Ciclovía before. For instance, a member of the SFBC recalls that before going to the Portland conference in 2008 they have heard about Bogotá's Ciclovía through a video posted in the transportation policy blog Streetfilms. Another SFBC member recalls first hearing about Ciclovía in 2006 in the *Pro-Walk and Pro-Bike* conference in Madison, Wisconsin where SFBC staff met with members of the then called Chicago-land Bicycle Federation, led by US bicycle advocate Randy Neufeld, who brought the idea to Chicago after having atended the 2003 ITDP international seminar in Bogotá. This shows that the idea of Ciclovía started to circulate widely and be known among US bicycle advocates in 2006 thanks to different mobile infrastructures of policy circulation such as policy blogs, conferences and study visits to Bogotá. But if bicycle advocates in San Francisco have already heard about Bogotá before, what happened at Portland's conference that was particularly "energizing"?

In the following sections, I describe and analyze how this conference provided a similar policy forum to the one that took place in Guadalajara in 2003 in the sense that not only knowledge about Bogotá policies was shared, it helped inspire and solidify a core group of San Francisco bicycle and public space advocates to push for the implementation of a Ciclovía program in San Francisco. This "energizing" was important in the context of the strong opposition that was already coming from local merchant associations in San Francisco's Fisherman's Wharf, who were lobbying the mayor, city supervisors and local government officials against the program before it was launched as they imagined their middle-class customers to arrive in their businesses by car and not by bicycle. In doing that, I show that persuasive policy learning forums and the Bogotá model have been used to align and inspire not only local policy actors in other cities in the global South but also actors in the North. In the following sections, I analyze the spatial characteristics and practices of organizers, participants and key speakers of the *Towards Car-Free Cities* conference in Portland to understand how the "energizing" -or inspiration for action- of US bicycle policy advocates was produced in practice through the mobilization of the Bogotá model.

Towards Car-Free Cities

The Towards Car-Free Cities conference in Portland was organized by the local bicycle advocacy organization Bike Portland in alliance with the World Car-Free Network (WCFN), an international network that define themselves as "the hub of the global carfree movement, which promotes alternatives to car dependence and automobile-based planning."[47] One way in which WCFN has sought to promote their car-free cities global agenda is through the organization of the Towards Carfree Cities annual conference series. Between 1997 and 2011, these conferences have been organized in different cities in Europe and the United States in collaboration with one or several local partners, often bicycle and/or public space advocacy groups and non-profits. The only time these conferences were celebrated outside Europe or North America were in 2006 in Bogotá and in 2011 in Guadalajara, acknowledging the achievements of these two Latin American cities with car-free policies.

[46] The Oxford English dictionary defines "energize" as "to rouse into energy or activity, call into active operation." Learning, on the other hand, is defined as "to acquire knowledge of (a subject) or skill in (an art, etc.) as a result of study, experience or teaching."

[47] World Car-Free Network website. Available at: http://www.worldcarfree.net/about_us/global/ (accessed Aug 1, 2014)

The network character of the organization gives much flexibility to local partners in terms of the organization of the conference but it also means that they need to raise funds. The effort, however, often pays off for local advocates as the celebration of an international conference is a good opportunity for organizers and participants to not only learn and be inspired about what other advocates are doing elsewhere but also to gain legitimacy with local government officials in their home cities. But while the international character of the conference could give legitimacy to *Ciclovía* and other bicycle policies, there was, however, no a priori guarantee that this event would have an effect beyond the exchange and sharing of knowledge and case studies from different cities among advocates. Certain elements, however, contributed to make this a persuasive policy forum that had an impact on urban governance and political agendas in other cities, not only in Portland but also in San Francisco and Guadalajara.

Portland in 2008 was the 8th edition of the conference series and the first time it took place in the United States. It brought together activists, advocates and professionals from around the world to share policy ideas and advocacy strategies to promote non-car dependent forms of city-making. The goal was to build a global car-free movement that raised awareness of the social, environmental, economic, and public health impacts of private cars. The conference had Gil Peñalosa as keynote speaker and, during the same weekend the event took place, Portland celebrated its first Ciclovía-style program called Sunday Parkways.

Gil Peñalosa: Mobilizing the Bogotá Story of Urban Transformation in the North

One of the key similarities between the Portland conference in 2008 and the Guadalajara forum in 2003 is that they both had a Bogotá expert as keynote speaker. While Enrique Peñalosa was the main speaker in Guadalajara, Portland bicycle advocates invited his brother Gil. In both cases, however, their narration of a simplified Bogotá story of urban transformation based on small public space and transportation interventions resulted in the inspiration and persuasion of influential local actors. And, in both cases, the centrality this narrative gives them in the "miraculous" transformation of Bogotá during the 1990s also contributed to give them legitimacy and credibility as international experts in public space and urban transportation. For example, in his speech in Portland Gil Peñalosa argued that: "[Bogotá's transformation] has nothing to do with the guerrilla or drugs or whatever, it is that a lot of changes took place [in the city]."

But not only is their story of Bogotá's urban transformation simplified in this kind of event but their role in this transformation is magnified and therefore, often, misinterpreted by conference participants. For example, in a blog article titled *Peñalosa Inspires, Gives Portland a Reality Check* a US bicycle advocate that attended the 2008 Towards Car-Free Cities conference writes:

> "[Gil] Penalosa is the former Commissioner of Parks, Sport, and Recreation for the city of Bogota, Colombia. During his tenure, he transformed that city (population 7 million) by creating hundreds of acres of new parks, developing a connected network of greenways (linear parks) and bike paths, setting up an ambitious public transit system (utilizing Bus Rapid Transit) and establishing the "Ciclovia", a carfree streets program adored by millions of Bogota residents each week (and by urban planners around the world)."[48]

This short summary shows the centrality of bicycle, public space and BRT policies as signature marks of Bogotá's urban transformation (the Bogotá model) and the centrality of Gil in "transforming" Bogotá. While it is true that Gil was Commissioner of Parks, Sport and Recreation in Bogotá and that he played an important role in expanding Ciclovía during his tenure, he did not by any means start or "establish" the *Ciclovía*, a program that has been taking place in Bogotá since

[48] http://bikeportland.org/2008/06/18/penalosa-inspires-gives-portland-a-reality-check-7915 (accessed May 1, 2015)

the 1970s (Montero forthcoming). And while "setting up" Bus Rapid Transit in Bogotá can be indeed attributed to his brother Enrique, Gil had little to do with the implementation of Bogotá's BRT system.

Narratives of Bogotá are invoked to highlight the central role he and his brother played in Bogotá's transformation but also to counter the claims of US city officials about the lack of funding for new transport and public space interventions:

> "I want to tell you a little bit about Bogotá. Not because Bogotá is perfect, it's far from perfect, but it´s a city that was going down the hill and it went from hopeless to hopeful. So I'm going to show you a few things… In Bogotá, and I am going to show you these not because I was the commissioner [audience laughs] and, after me, then one of my brothers was the mayor, but because Bogotá had one tenth of the per capita income of the US. So everytime I go around the US, always, the politicians tell me 'oh we don't have money.' So I want to tell you that it's not an issue of money, it's an issue of priorities."

In order to move advocates and planners to action they also spread a particular message: "transportation is not a financial issue, it's not a technical issue, it's a political issue." This sentence, or variations of it, can be found in almost all of the keynote speeches of Enrique and Gil Peñalosa. "Persuasive practitioners" are experts in the city but their expertise does not rely on scientific or technical arguments. Rather, it relies on having implemented programs and on, supposedly, having "transformed" a city. Therefore, when they transmit their knowledge and expertise, theirs is a message of political action: advocates, planners and city leaders cannot just present neutral arguments or try to achieve consensus around transportation decisions.

Laura Lieto (2015) has argued that when policies travel from one city to another what travels is not the policy itself but a socially constructed "mythical narrative" about the success of that policy in the city where it was first implemented. In narratives, as in myths, heroic protagonists are essential elements for its transmission and circulation. In the Bogotá urban transformation myth, the Peñalosa brothers played that role. Being perceived as central protagonists of Bogotá's urban transformation legitimates them as "practitioner" experts, a legitimacy that is put into use to capture the attention and respect of different policy audiences, from mayors to private sector representatives to advocates and activists. This, however, is only one side of the kind of expertise they mobilize in forums and conferences around the world. It is their persuasive capacities to inspire and move influential policy actors to action that allow these experts to influence political agendas in many cities at once. An effective strategy they use for this purpose is the creation of inter-city competition dynamics between cities through the mobilization of relational comparisons.

Producing Inter-City Competition through Relational City Comparisons

The role of inter-city competition in shaping urban agendas has been the object of heated debates in economic and urban geography. While some authors have argued that globalization has increasingly made cities and city-regions the new key territorial units for economic accumulation and governance in an inevitably competitive and globalizing world (Ohmae 1995, Scott & Storper 2003), others have criticized the shift in local agendas towards economic growth and competitiveness narratives as part of a broader movement that allows for the introduction of a more entrepreneurial stance in local governments (Harvey 1989, Jessop & Sum 2000, MacLeod & Goodwin 1999, Jonas & Ward 2007). For instance, David Harvey has argued that this entrepreneurial stance focuses on "the construction of place rather than amelioration of conditions within a particular territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) political and economic goal" (Harvey 1989: p. 8).

Whether inter-city competition is real or a narrative to justify neoliberal policies, the main actors in both sides of the debate have been multinational firms, mayors, local public officials, local

private sector organizations and the different combinations of public-private partnerships and coalitions formed between them. Less is known about how the narrative of inter-city competition is also increasingly informing the action of local advocacy organizations. As I will show in this section, bicycle advocates have made use of inter-city competition as both an advocacy strategy to persuade mayors but also as a motivation for their own policy action. In both cases policy forums are sites where this competition is produced and circulated through the use of relational comparisons, artificial city rankings and the construction of city models and anti-models.

In my interviews with US bicycle advocates, they often refered to two ways in which inter-city competition shapes their advocacy strategies and everyday practices. First, the narrative of inter-city competition can be an effective tool to put pressure on mayors and high-level public officials to demand more bicycle programs and infrastructure. For example, Noah Budnick, current executive director of the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition, notes how the strategies of bicycle and public space advocacy organizations have changed in the last 5-10 years: "now we are more concentrated on the idea of generating competition among mayors, to show them what other cities are doing that they are not doing" (Budnik, personal interview, 2013). According to Budnick, this kind of advocacy strategy has become more effective in recent years because cities are increasingly competing to attract people and talent and "the possibility of biking to work is now more associated with the quality of life of a city" (Budnick, personal interview, 2013). In this new context, their advocacy strategies have become more focused in persuading particular individuals with decision-making and agenda-setting power in the local government:

> "the target now is also different, now we are more focused in identifying people in the mayor's office that we need to convince… and this idea of increasing competition among cities help us convince them" (Budnick, personal interview, 2013)

There is a second way in which the work of bicycle advocacy groups is affected by inter-city competition. This has to do with competition between advocates themselves. While conferences are often portrayed as key sites that allow and sustain collaborations between advocacy networks, they are also sites where competition is produced and reinforced through exchanges of information and achievements. For example, San Francisco tranportation advocate Andy Thornley recalls how when San Francisco bicycle advocates learned that Chicago was going to start a Ciclovía program during the *Pro Walk and Pro Bike* conference in Madison in 2006, this created a competition dynamic that resulted in San Francisco advocates becoming more interested in learning and organizing a Ciclovía program: "What? How was it possible that Chicago was going to do it before San Francisco!" (Thornley, personal interview, 2013).

Enrique and Gil Peñalosa have often used and promote this sense of competition between advocates to push for the Bogotá model in US cities through the construction and circulation of relational comparisons between cities. In Portland's Toward Car-Free Cities conference, there was a particular way in which Gil Peñalosa used relational city comparisons to move conference participants to action. This was through exposing participants to city pairs constructed as extremes and urging them to think about where would they want to live. For this, Gil makes use of a more traditional technique: mobilizing images of European cities –Copenhagen, Paris- as models. But in order to do that, he also needed to mobilize anti-models or "worst practice" examples. Two are favorites: Houston and Los Angeles. This mobilization requires knowledge about the realities and perceptions of US cities among advocates, something that Gil, who studied at UCLA and has lived in the US and Canada, knows well:

> "So how to move from thinking and talking to doing?... That is what this conference is about! [cheeers and applauses] What kind of cities are we going to build?... How do we want to live? Houston is a model of a city, Copenhagen is another model. Which one do we want?"

These city comparisons are also often used by his brother Enrique Peñalosa. For example in a 2014 policy forum organized in San Francisco by SPUR, one of the first questions Enrique Peñalosa's asked his audience used a similar city-pair to move people to action. In this one, Houston was, again, presented as "worst practice" and this time it was Amsterdam, instead of Copenhagen, which provided the model or "best practice:" "Before we decide what transport system we want we need to know what kind of city we want. Do we want a city such as Amsterdam or one like Houston?"

In making this model vs. anti-model comparisons, images of these cities are used in their powerpoint presentations both in an idealized and caricaturized fashion: Amsterdam or Copenhaguen as bicycle paradises and Houston or Los Angeles with car-clogged highways. Gil's use of relational city comparisons with visual narrations is both a strategy to inspire his audience but also a persuasion technique that he is happy to share with them so that they can form local coalitions that can help them overcome opposition in their home cities:

> "And you have to visualize some of the changes, when you visualize then you are able to bring more people on board. When you only have an idea, the enemies of the idea they make up all of these ghosts around the idea, but if you have the visuals you start to get people on board… Look at this main street, would you rather live in this town with this main street or in this other one? So you know these are the kind of things that work… it's not rocket science. The rocket science is to actually do it."

During his speech in the Portland conference, Gil Peñalosa is not shy to mobilize and promote different kind of competition between bicycle advocates to move them to action. Throughout his presentation, as well as in his talks with public officials, Gil stressed that creating livable cities in today's world is really about "economic survival," reinforcing the idea that providing public space and bicycle infrastructure is an essential aspect to compete for talent and creative people in a globalized world. A day before the Portland conference took place, NYC Mayor Bloomberg and NYC Transportation Comissioner Janet Sadik-Khan proudly announced that New York was going to start a new program that summer based on Bogotá's Ciclovía with the launching of three pilot car-free events. This is also used by Gil to promote competition between the advocates attending the conference:

> "I was wondering how I was going to give you inspiration… then this morning I looked at the New York Times… and I saw mayor Bloomberg and our friend Janet Sadik-Khan… and what were they doing? They were announcing that in August they are going to have a 3-day Manhattan free of cars… [audience applauses] That is fantastic! ... And actually Portland has a lot to do with it. Because in New York they were thinking about it, we talked with them about it, three years ago, a year ago, and we said you know Portland is doing it... and Chicago is doing it. Then New York said: no, we are going to do it ahead of them! [audience laughs]. You know this is such a healthy competition!"

One of the most effective relational comparisons used by Gil is the creation of imaginary city leagues in which cities compete with each other. A couple of months before the celebration of this conference, the League of American Bicyclists, a federal bicycle advocacy organization based in Washington DC, gave a platinum-level award to Portland that recognized the city as "the most bicycle friendly community" in the US. Awards serve to spread a particular message about what a "good city" should be by elevating certain policies and cities that are compatiable with that as models. This has been a strategy often used by international organizations, think tanks and nonprofits. Indeed the making of Bogotá as a world policy model has also rested in the prestige of

diverse prizes and awards that the city received in the mid 2000s such as the Venice Architecture Biennal's Golden Lion award. The assumption behind the creation of city rankings and policy awards is that situating some cities at the top and others at the bottom will create a game of competition between key decision-makers in those cities to move up the ranking. Rankings also have the capacity to frame policy problems and assign certain policies as solutions to them. If the ranking is succesful and sufficiently recognized among experts in a particular field, then decision-makers, be it public, private or non-profits, will feel the pressure to comply with the recommended policies suggested by the ranking organization to climb up the ranking ladder.

However, being at the top of the ranking can eventually render inter-city competition ineffective. Because Portland already won the top award given by the League of American Bicyclists, new categories and hierarchies of inter-city competition had to be invented. During his speech, Gil used the idea of "city leagues" and sports championships analogies to place Portland advocates and local officials in a supposedly new competitive level in which they are not competing with other US cities anymore but rather in an imagined top league of world-class bicycle cities exemplified by Copenhagen, Vancouver or Paris:

> "Where does Portland want to play? Does Portland want to stay as a champion of [American cities]… or does Portland want to be a world champion? [applauses and cheers from the audience]... It would be fantastic if Portland says OK, thanks for the [League of American Bicyclists] award but now we are in a different league… now we are not going to be benchmarking ourselves with the Houstons, and Lexingtons, and Atlantas and Buffalos and whatever… Honestly… Portland has to be in the ranks with the Copenhagens, and Vancouvers and Melbournes and Paris and Athens and Barcelona and Berlin. That's where Portland belongs! [energetic applauses and cheers from the audience] That's the challenge! [applauses]"

Gil does not place Bogotá in this kind of world-class leagues as many of the conference participants and bicycle advocates have been to Bogotá and know it is far from being a great city for bicycling:

> "I do have to find it ironic and funny when a Columbian (sic) says Portland "is far from being great" no matter what his pedigree. He hails from a city that has a fatal car bombing every few years, and a country that features a violent insurgency, paramilitaries, and national forces who recruit and deploy child soldiers... Call me a nationalist, but I've been to Bogata (sic), and it's far from being great."[49]

The power of mobilizing Bogotá to inspire advocates and local officials to action does not reside in portraying Bogotá as a world-class bicycle city but rather as a compelling story of urban transformation: if Bogotá, this poor and chaotic city in the Third World, has been able to do it, imagine what your city could do. This moral of the Bogotá story has proven useful both in the global South and the North. For example, writing about the Portland conference, a bicycle advocate says:

> "I think examples like Bogota are very useful because it puts things into perspective: if a city in an impoverished third-world country, plagued by violence and civil war, can implement such ambitious urban planning, imagine what a wealthy and hyper-liberal city like PDX could (and should) do"[50]

---

[49] Comment on policy blog. Available at http://bikeportland.org/2008/06/18/penalosa-inspires-gives-portland-a-reality-check-7915 (accessed Aug 9, 2015)

[50] http://bikeportland.org/2008/06/18/penalosa-inspires-gives-portland-a-reality-check-7915 (accessed March 1, 2015)

This is interestingly similar to the argument made by a GDL 2020 leader after the 2003 talk of Peñalosa in Guadalajara:

> "When we tried to bring experiences from European and North American cities to Guadalajara, politicians and other city leaders considered them impossible to implement or "exercises of dreaming" but in the case of Bogotá... it was a Latin American city, it was poorer and had more violence problems than Guadalajara… and they were doing it!" (GDL 2020 leader 2 personal interview 2013)

Forums and the Mobilization of Emotional Artifacts

In his talks and speeches, Bogotá "persuasive practitioners" often make use of different artifacts to emotionally connect with their audiences and capture their attention and imagination. In that sense, the persuasiveness of their talks do not reside just in the transmision of narratives about what Bogotá and other cities have done from their privileged worldview as international experts. It is also about their capacity to emotionally move them and show them that urban planning decisions affect their wellbeing as well as those they care about.

As analyzed in previous sections, Enrique Peñalosa often refers to poor populations, who are unable to afford a car, to demand more bicycle and public transport interventions. However, it is through the figure of the child that he attempts to emotionally connect with his often middle-class -and car-owning- audiences when talking about class and road space:

> "A great city is not one with great highways… but one where any child with a bicycle could safely go anywhere... cars are to children today what wolves used to be in the Middle Ages" (Enrique Peñalosa in policy forum in the San Francisco Bay Area in 2007).[51]

While Gil also often uses references to low-income populations to justify bicycle policies, they are far less central in his speeches in the US. In contrast to Latin American countries, low-income populations in the US often have access to cars. He, however, does also make use of children extensively to inspire his audiences. Indeed the non-profit he founded in Canada to coordinate his talks and conferences around the world, *Cities 8-80,* is named like that meaning that ideal urban public space should be designed so that both an 8-year old child and an 80-year old person feel safe to walk and bicycle.

Conferences and forums are privileged places for the mobilization of emotional elements that are hard to convey in printed or online documents. This is why a database of "best practices" would never have the same effect than hearing about a policy from someone, especially if that person has been involved in the policy story you are hearing (Linde 2001). For example, in response to a summary of Gil Peñalosa's speech published in a local bicycle policy advocacy blog, another advocate reflects on how words cannot capture the emotional elements at work during the talk:

> "Jonathan has done a great job summarizing Gil's speech, but what no print summary can do is catch the warmth and personality and presence of this man. He clearly gets it in a way that most elected and appointed officials do not, and he does not shy one bit from saying what needs to be done. The sheer beauty of his presentation style is that he encourages you to be better, and that even when he's listing all the areas in which you need to improve, you never feel like he's putting

[51] Available at: http://www.insidebayarea.com/argus/localnews/ci_6027239 (accessed March 10, 2015)

you down, belittling your accomplishments, or discouraging you in any way. He has tremendous warmth and humor, and really brings home his points"[52]

Mobilizing Face-to-face Contacts, Experiential Learning and Legitimacy

Finally, besides Gil Peñalosa's speech, the 8th edition of the *Towards Car-Free Cities* in Portland provided many opportunities for participants to communicate and build trust before, during and after the conference. During the 5 days the conference lasted, there were more than 50 workshops and panel sessions, spaces for close-door meetings between participants, mobile workshops to learn about Portland's public transportation and bicycle infrastructure, a press conference and several social activities including a community "depaving" of an asphalt parking lot, an art show, morning yoga sessions, night music shows, a movie night and a closing party. Very importantly, even though it was officially not part of the conference, the weekend after the conference Portland celebrated Sunday Parkways, one the first US street-closure programs inspired in Bogotá's *Ciclovía*, and many of the conference participants stayed to experience it. For example, when I asked San Francisco advocate Cheryl Brinkman why she thought the Portland conference was important for San Francisco, she said that hearing Gil Peñalosa was "very inspiring" but also "actually experiencing" Sunday Parkways was great to better understand "how it could be like in San Francisco" (Brinkman, personal interview, 2013). Similarly, a SFBC advocate notes that while they already knew about Ciclovía because they have seen an online video about it, experiencing Portland's Ciclovía was important for SFBC staff to realize that they could do the same in San Francisco (SFBC Member, personal interview, 2010).

In San Francisco, the Towards Car-Free Cities conference in Portland had generated a lot of talk among public space and bicycle advocates[53] in San Francisco due to the fact that it was the first time the international conference was going to take place in the US. Rumours about the conference started to be known in meetings as well through an email list they share called "CarFree Living." It was indeed through this listserve that San Francisco bicycle advocates started to organize a panel as well as logistical details to attend the conference. They organized a panel called *The Battle for San Francisco (1922-2008): From Critical Mass to Congestion Pricing* that brought together key bicycle activists and advocates in the city such as Chris Carlsson, Dave Snyder and Leah Shahum. Many of them also rode the train together to Portland.

---

[52] Comment on blog post on Peñalosa's speech during Portland's conference. Available at: http://bikeportland.org/2008/06/18/penalosa-inspires-gives-portland-a-reality-check-7915 (accessed Jun 1, 2015)

[53] In my interviews I heard different names San Francisco bicycle advocates use to refer to themselves as a local community such as: sustainable transport advocates, transit advocates, bicycle advocates, green groups, livable city advocates, etc. Even if each organization has different mission and objectives, by those names they generally refer to a group formed by a network of local advocacy organizations and non-profits whose work revolve around the broad idea that less cars, more pedestrian- and bicycle-oriented spaces and better public transit would be beneficial for the city and its citizens. They include organizations such as the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition, Livable City, Rescue Muni, SPUR, SF Transit Riders Union, Transform and individuals that have forged themselves a name in the local bicycle advocacy and activist world such as Dave Snyder (director of the SF Bicycle Coalition in the 1990s) or Chris Carlsson (founder of Critical Mass). The distinction between bicycle activist and advocate is important here. SFBC members often see themselves as "advocates" to point at the fact that they are open to collaborate with local government agencies and to distinguish themselves from the more radical demands of bicycle "activists," which in San Francisco are often identified with organizers of Critical Mass and other bicycle organizations that are skeptical about collaborating with the state. The idea of "car-free cities," however, seems to be able to bring them together. Not only was this the name of the Portland conference and the transnational movement that organized it (World Car-Free Network) but it is also the name that the San Francisco advocates and activists chose for their common local communication listserve.

By the time San Francisco bicycle advocates went to Portland, San Francisco was in the middle of a battle around the planning of a Ciclovía-style program that confronted bicycle advocacy organizations such as SFBC and Livable City against Fisherman's Wharf merchants' association. Merchant associations have been traditional opponents of new transportation or public space projects in San Francisco that involve changing the uses of the street to discourage cars. Their reasons to oppose these changes can often be summarized in two fears: 1) fear of losing street parking for their customers; and 2) fear of business disruption during construction works. These fears are based on their deep-seated belief that the majority of their customers arrive to their shops by car and that, therefore, any new transit project that reduces street parking or hinders car traffic would negatively affect their business. This belief has been behind many of the organizing efforts of merchants against Sunday Streets first and, later, against San Francisco's BRT proposals. Even though city planners have produced and presented surveys and studies that show that the majority of customers of local merchants arrive by foot, bicycle or public transportation, changing this belief has proved difficult. Behind this deep-seated belief lies the generalized perception that buses are for lower class populations and that their customers will arrive by car not by bicycle or public transportation.

Conferences and forums, particularly those with some sort of world recognition, not only facilitate help build a sense of community among participants through providing spaces of face-to-face communication and experiential learning, they also halped give legitimacy when these advocates are back in their city. For instance, according to transportation advocate Cheryl Brinkman, the Portland conference gave Ciclovía "a varnish of legitimacy" in San Francisco: "the [Portland] conference gave a varnish of legitimacy to these ideas, especially to discuss this [later in San Francisco] with people that may have never heard them before, such as politicians and the corporate world… if they talked about it in a conference, they think, then it must be legitimate" (Brinkman, personal interview, 2013). Similarly, the spaces for informal interaction during the conference not only allowed them to connect and re-energize as a group, they also helped them gather more tools in the policy battle around Sunday Streets that was starting to take place in San Francisco. For instance, during the conference, San Francisco advocates met with Clarence Eckerson, the producer of the famous Streetfilms *Ciclovía* video, who gave them several copies of it. When they were back in San Francisco, Cheryl Brinkman and other transportation advocates used these materials in the many community meetings they had to organize to get public support for the program in the face of merchants' opposition.[54]

Conclusions

It is difficult to identify one specific site or moment when a policy idea from elsewhere first arrives in another city. This chapter pointed at policy forums as important sites of policy circulation for the Bogotá model. Yet, any exercise of tracing the arrival of an idea back to a particular event such as the celebration of a forum is always a partial exercise. It is tempting to assume that the first time a recognized expert from one city visits another city marks the beginning of an inter-city policy learning process. And while the visit of Enrique Peñalosa in 2003 to Guadalajara is a clear example of that, there are plenty of examples of conference and forums that do not result into policy action after participants leave the conference premises. While urban policy forums are learning insfrastructures the potential to result in policy change in other cities through the mobilization of policy ideas and models from other cities, to realize that potential they need to inspire, energize and persuade influential local actors from another city and help them form broader coalitions of actors.

[54] I analyze these processes in more detail in chapter 5

In my analysis of two forums that resulted in the circulation of Bogotá policies in Guadalajara and San Francisco, I highlighted the role of a particular type of expert, what I have called "persuasive practitioner," which have been particular effective in inspiring, energizing and persuading urban policy actors accross the world. To do so they rely on several strategies that have analyzed in practice. To produce inspiration and move conference participants to action, "persuasive practitioners" use two strategies. First, they make extensive use of narrative and visual artifacts to convey a simplified story that links urban transformation –in Bogotá and other cities- with specific small public space and transportation interventions so that participants can identify with the heroes of these narratives and think that it can be easily replicated in their cities. Second, they use a diverse set of emotional artifacts to connect with their audiences and create urgency to move them to action, including relational comparisons between cities and the creation of artificial games of inter-city competition. Finally, spaces for formal and informal face-to-face interaction and communication during policy forums are also essential for the creation of multi-actor coalitions that will be neccesary to eventually move Bogotá policies from ideas to items in another city's agenda.

Finally, urban policy forums do not take place by chance or by a pure interest in knowledge exchange. The practices of inspiration and persuasion mobilized by Bogotá's "persuasive practitioners" are often orchestrated by different sets of local and transnational actors. A careful analysis of not only what happens during forums but also who attends and organizes them can, indeed, tell us much about the politics of policy learning. It is then when we begin to understand that while inter-city policy learning, the process of making changes in urban policies, programs or planning mechanisms based on the experience of another city, might be a voluntary process -as opposed to, for example, a policy imposition from a higher level of government- it is also a process shaped by different local and transnational actors seeking to translate their beliefs and visions about how the city should be organized into public policy.

Chapter 4. Study Tours: Producing Policy Converts, Building Consensus and Expanding Coalitions through Experiential Learning

"Latin America is today the epicentre
of the global BRT movement...
Bogotá's 110 km Transmilenio is recognised
as the Gold Standard of BRT. Delegations of officials
and dignitaries from around the world visit Bogotá
to marvel at the system."
Suzuki, Cervero and Iuchi 2013: p. 110

Introduction

In November 2011, a delegation of ten public officials from Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam visited Bogotá to learn about BRT. During their three days in Bogotá, they rode buses together, toured different station areas, and visited Transmilenio's control center and a maintenance area. They also met with senior staff from Transmilenio S.A., the directors of a BRT concessionary bus company, public officials at Bogotá Urban Transport Management and Planning Agency and members of the local transportation NGO *Ciudad Humana*. The visit was part of a larger study tour to different Latin American and Asian cities organized and funded by the World Bank *South-South Experience Exchange Facility*, a fund established in 2008 as "a strategic instrument to leverage greater development impact from results-oriented [South-South] knowledge exchanges." The South American tour (November 16-24, 2011), which included visits to Bogotá, Curitiba and Rio de Janeiro, involved 10 Vietnamese high-ranking public officials and emphasized policy and institutional issues. The Asian tour (May 30-June 7, 2011), which included visits to Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Jakarta, involved a 16-people delegation of mostly technical staff focused on BRT implementation. According to Andre Bald, a World Bank Senior Infrastructure Specialist in Vietnam: "the lessons learned [during the study tour] influenced planning immediately." After coming back from the study tour, "the Department of Transportation and the Planning Department sent the Concept Design to develop a Bus Rapid Transit corridor called Ho Chi Minh City Greenway."

Study tours have been an important infrastructure used by local and international organizations to circulate the Bogotá model and, with it, help promote BRTs and bicycle policies in cities around the world. From 2000 until 2011, about 10,0000 decision makers from around the world visited Bogotá on a study tour to learn about BRT. This means that, on average, one delegation went to Bogotá every four days. Often described as peer-to-peer experiential learning mechanisms to transmit tacit knowledge, much more than learning, however, takes places during these tours. While urban scholars have been slow to analyze the relationship between study tours and urban policy change, different organizations, from the World Bank to global philanthropy to local NGOs, have been increasingly resorting to this type of knowledge exchanges to influence local agendas and promote policy change in cities around the world.

In this chapter I analyze the organization of Bogotá study tours to show the frequency of this phenomenon as well as the complexity of local and transnational actors, networks and agendas behind them and to better understand how the learning, trust-building and governance dynamics that take place during them contribute to policy change when participants are back in their cities. The chapter is divided in three parts. After a brief review of what the academic literature tells us about study tours, the first part of the chapter analyzes a dataset of delegation visits to Bogotá's *Transmilenio* BRT from 2000 until 2011 by country of origin. Quantitative data is complemented with

interviews with *Transmilenio* staff in charge of coordinating study tours. The analysis reveals also more details about the beliefs and motivations of the complex network of actors that have funded and organized study tours to Bogotá in the last 15 years and concludes that South-South or South-North is often a poor characterization of the many local and transnational actors that have used study tours to Bogotá to promote changes in urban planning and transport policy agendas in cities around the world. In the second part, I use qualitative methods –mostly interviews with participants and organizers of study tours-, participant observation, and archival research to analyze the role of model and "peer" cities in the organization of study tours by analyzing the visit of a San Francisco delegation to Mexico City to learn about BRT. The analysis reveals also how San Francisco is currently in the middle of a local and transnational battle to build a world-class BRT given the absence of "gold standard" examples in the US. In the third part, I also rely on qualitative methods to analyze in depth several Bogotá study tours organized in Guadalajara to learn about *Ciclovía* and *Transmilenio*. Findings suggest that study tours can be powerful learning and governance tools thanks to their capacity to create "policy converts," the building of trust and consensus around a policy agenda and the mobilization of public opinion.

What is a Study Tour

Study tours are short visits in which a delegation of people, normally between 3 and 20 persons, travel to another place to experience first hand something that has the potential to improve their organizations or places of origin. An expectation of learning from one or several people, programs or organizations in the visited place is often the main justification of these tours. Participants are often selected not just because of their learning capacities but also because they are considered important or influential actors that will be able to translate those experiences back in their home places. In the field of education, study tours have often been conceptualized as powerful forms of "experiential learning," as participants learn something new by experiencing directly in another setting (Axford et al. 2010). A common cited theorist behind these conceptualizations is David Kolb. Drawing from the epistemological bases of pragmatist philosophers and experiential educators such as Dewey, Piaget or Freire, Kolb argued that learning is a process in which "ideas are not fixed and immutable elements of thought but are formed and re-formed through experience" (Kolb 1984, p. 26). In Kolb and Fry (1975) learning model, four elements combine, in no particular order, to form a learning spiral: concrete experience, observation and reflection, the formation of abstract concepts and testing in new situations. Under this interpretation of learning, study tours are important elements of this spiral even if concrete experience is only one among the four elements at work in a learning process.

But what does the literature tells us about them and their role in not ony transferring ideas but creating conditions for policy change in many cities at once? In the following paragraphs I analyze two strands of literature that use study tours as an important category of analysis in itself rather than merely an outcome of other forces and variables. The first one analyzes the role of study tours from a historical and political economy perspective and seeks to reveal how these short visits have traditionally served to sustain colonial systems of domination, the international development apparatus or US intellectual hegemony in the Third World. A second strand of debates focuses instead on the actual practices study tour participants and seeks to understand the kind of learning and governance dynamics that take place during them.

Historicizing Study Tours: Colonialism, Transatlanticism, Developmentalism

Study tours are not by any means new mechanisms to circulate ideas about how urban space should be organized. For example, urban and planning historians have documented the ways in which the transfer of the British idea of the "garden city" in Asia, Oceania and Africa in the early 20th century

was a clear example of how the transfer of urban planning knowledge was part of a broader British colonial system of intellectual domination (King 1980, Home 1990). Similarly, Freestone (1998) has shown how "lecture tours" of British planners to Australia sponsored by the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association (GCTPA) as well as study tours of Australian and New Zealand high-ranking officials to Letchworth, the English mecca of garden cities, were key not only to the transfer of the "garden city" idea but also to the very development of modern planning thought in Australia. Among the many infrastructures of circulation of urban planning ideas in the early 20th century, Freestone (1998: p. 159) highlights "the printed media, education, conferences, official and private correspondence and study visits" as the most relevant in maintaining and reinforcing colonial circuits of knowledge domination.

While urban ideas originated in Europe such as the garden city or the CIAM principles of modernist architecture became key in the planning of African, Asian and Latin American cities during the first part of the 20th century through numerous trips and exchanges between European architectural studios and universities on the one hand and academics and practitioners from the global South on the other hand, since the 1960s, European architects were overshadowed by North American planners. US-trained planners brought with them new ideas such as community development and economic development planning that were transferred to cities in developing countries with the help of international development institutions as well as American foundations. For example, ideas of community development and economic development planning first penetrated Colombia's government apparatus through two mechanisms: 1) the numerous missions of US economists and planners sent by the World Bank to Colombia as well as the training of Colombians in US universities during the 1950s and 1960s (Escobar 1989); and, 2) the establishment of Pan-American cooperation schemes funded by the Organization of American States and the Ford Foundation such as CINVA[55] or SIAP,[56] which sought to raise awareness about the importance of advocacy planning and community development in an effort to pacify Colombia and avoid a Communist revolution (Peña 2008). In this context, Parmar (2002) has argued that, since the 1950s, American foundations –particularly Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford- have helped consolidate US intellectual hegemony and the ideology of "liberal internationalism" in the Third World through the creation of "international knowledge networks" based on the funding of exchanges of academics, practitioners and high ranking officials from Asia, Latin America and Africa in US elite universities.

During the early 20th century, urban knowledge and ideas on how to plan and organize cities circulated not only North-South but also through North-North circuits, particularly across the Atlantic. If the garden city concept and European ideas of regionalism first arrived in the US in the 1920s thanks to the frequent visits to Britain of members of the *Regional Planning Association of America* (Birch 1980), as American foundations started to expand their activities outside the US since the 1930s, they also generously funded tours and exchanges of local government officials from Europe to learn from the US. According to Saunier (2001: p. 390), "speeches at congresses, exchange visits, [and] cash help from the Rockefeller Foundation (direct funding or wages paid to Americans in charge of modernizing European structures and methods)" were key elements that the Rockefeller Foundation used to align European local government reformers and association of European city officials with American ideals around the professionalization of local government functions and finances. Cook et al. (2014) have also provided evidence of knowledge exchanges through study tours in the late 1950s between British and Russian planners. Comparing our current era of *fast policy* (Peck & Theodore 2015) with planning Russian and British planning exchanges in the 1950s, they suggest that consultancies and think tanks might have taken a larger role not only in

[55] Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento Urbano
[56] Sociedad Inter-Americana de Planeación

organizing study tours but also as the main "knowledge intermediaries," a role, they argue, traditionally played by government branches and professional bodies.

If North-South and North-North exchanges of people and ideas have been an important infrastructure behind the transfer of modern planning and development ideas during the late 19th and 20th century, the 21th century seems to bring a growing momentum to South-South exchanges as different actors are realizing about the potential of these exchanges to produce policy and institutional changes. For example, since the 2008 Accra Agenda for Change, the World Bank has become increasingly focused in organizing and funding South-South study tours. In 2008, the World Bank established the *South-South Experience Exchange Facility* as "a strategic instrument to leverage greater development impact from results-oriented [South-South] knowledge exchanges."[57] While raised awareness and enhanced knowledge are desired outcomes of these exchanges, it is the "consensus built, coalitions fostered and networks expanded" that take place during these exchanges which the World Bank see as fundamental outcomes to create policy and institutional change in many cities at once. What makes study tours different from other strategies focused on influential individuals to promote institutional change - for instance, capacity development through training workshops- is that, in study tours, the focus is not only on learning but on "inspiring, equipping and connecting" what the World Bank calls "agents of change." This label applies to both individuals ("leaders") and groups ("teams and coalitions").[58]

While the World Bank and philanthropic foundations are already developing sophisticated conceptualizations of South-South knowledge exchanges through study tours and other mechanisms to promote policy change in many cities at once, scholars have only recently started to critically analyze the actual practices that take place during them as well as their connection with urban policy change in other cities. In the following section I review a set of literature debates that have focused on analyzing the actual practices that take place during study tours. I show that there are two different strands in this more practice-centered debates, one that emphasizes their role as powerful mechanisms of experiential learning and trust building and another more critical strand that analyze them as legitimacy and lobbying instruments in the hands of elite public and private actors.

Practicing Study Tours: Learning, Trust Building and Elite Control

Geographers and organizational theorists are becoming increasingly interested in study tours and short visits as mechanisms of learning in and between organizations. For instance, Faulconbridge (2006: p. 32) has analyzed short visits between advertising company delegations located in different cities as important mechanisms that "lead to the type of trust-based relationships that are vital for learning." Visits and circulating models, renders or texts from other places are important because they enable local communities of practice to engage in conversations among themselves to start a learning process (Faulconbridge 2010). But what is the relationship between study tours and policy change? Writing about study tours and urban policy, Campbell (2012) has shown that study tours are important not just because of the exposure and experience of local public and private actors to new policy ideas but also because of the "clouds of trust" created among participants during them. When they are back in their home cities, these trust networks facilitate contact and meetings among them and help push for the implementation of the new policies they experienced together. Similarly, in her study of South African study tours to Bogotá, Wood (2014a) has shown that the learning and trust building dynamics that took place during these study tours proved crucial in facilitating the implementation of BRTs in South African cities.

---

57 http://wbi.worldbank.org/sske/resource-library/vietnam-urban-transportation (accessed March 23, 2015)

58 http://wbi.worldbank.org/sske/resource-library/vietnam-urban-transportation (accessed March 23, 2015)

Critical urban geographers have been more skeptical of the learning possibilities of study tours and have emphasized instead their role as legitimacy and lobbying instruments in the hands of elite public and private sector actors. For example, in her study of how Barcelona and Bilbao have been mobilized as global models, Sara González (2011) has highlighted the important role played by what she calls "policy tourism" or the visits of hundreds of delegations from other cities. Her ethnographic study of the policy actors that participate in these tours reveals that, beyond learning new policy ideas, it is the legitimacy, reassurance and comfort that what they are planning to do at home is not at odds with current international "best practices" that are the key dimensions behind the organization of study tours. They create "a sense of being 'in tune' with what is happening elsewhere" among tour participants (González 2011: p. 1412). In their analysis of the study tours undertaken by public and private sector elites in Manchester in preparation for the city Olympics bid, Cook and Ward (2012) have also been skeptical of the learning outcomes of study tours and concluded that many of these trips had the objective of lobbying the International Olympic Committee rather than learning anything. An interesting finding of their research is that study tours often took multiple points of reference: "policy transfer does not necessarily involve a single, linear and literal policy movement from place A to place B but can involve places using a multitude of points of reference elsewhere in terms of what to do and what not to do."

The analysis of Bogotá study tours I undertake in this chapter engages with these literature debates in several ways. First, I show that while Bogotá study tours have been characterized and celebrated as South-South and South-North knowledge exchanges, they have often been, even if not always, mediated by a set of actors, organizations and agendas based in the global North. Particularly, development banks such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank and think tanks funded by global philanthropy such as ITDP and EMBARQ have often used them in an effort to spread their particular interpretation of sustainable transport worldwide by promoting Bogotá's "best practices" in BRT and bicycle planning. Yet, local organizations have also used them and, as the chapter will examine for the case of Guadalajara, study tours have been most effective when local and international organizations have collaborated. Second, it confirms the important role of having multiple points of reference to effectively mobilize a policy. Bogotá is only one among the different BRT meccas of this network of transnational actors. While Bogotá has been the destination of many study tours to promote BRT and bicycle policies, having other examples of "peer" cities is of critical importance. Many study tours include Bogotá as one of many stops in a double effort to persuade participants that what they are experiencing is part of a global trend but also so that participants can identify with other "peer" cities in terms of size, urban structure, etc. Third, my findings confirm the role of study tours as both experiential learning and governance mechanisms. Study tours are particularly helpful to create policy converts, building consensus and creating trust so that coalitions can be expanded. Finally, this chapter shows also the important role of study tours as instruments to alter public opinion through the mobilization of journalists and reporters, something that is under-theorized in the practice-focused literature on study tours and, in general, in the policy mobilities debates.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in three parts that use a different combination of research methods. In the first part, I analyze a dataset of delegation visits to Bogotá *Transmilenio* from 2000 until 2011 to understand some general characteristics of Bogotá study tours including the country of origin of participants, their frequency and their changes over time. I triangulate this quantitative data with interviews with *Transmilenio* staff in charge of organizing the visits to refine the findings. In the second part, I draw from interviews and archival research on US study tours to the three Latin American BRT meccas (Bogotá, Curitiba, Mexico City) funded by ITDP and US foundations to show how, in addition to geographical or cultural proximity, foundations draw from both model and "peer" cities to persuade city delegates. Finally, in the third part, I use in-depth

interviews with participants in several study tours to understand the kind of practices that take place during them and their role in affecting urban governance and policy agendas.

Bogotá Study Tours in Numbers

It is hard to find reliable quantitative data on study tours. One would think that because this type of "policy tourism" (González 2011) shapes the global imaginaries and reputations of cities, local governments would be interested in keeping track of these visits. This, however, is often not the case. And while Bogotá's local government does not track city delegations that come to "learn from Bogotá," *Transmilenio* S.A., the public-private partnership that operates BRT in the city and organizes the tours, has been tracking delegation visits since the system started operations in December 2000. During the first years of operation, Transmilenio S.A. officials were so pleased that delegations from other countries requested tours to learn about their system that they organized them for free. Over the years and as visits from other cities significantly increased, they started charging for them. In 2004, a new marketing department was established and a full-time person was hired to attend these visits. However, rather than having an active role in attracting delegations from other cities, this department has functioned as an executor of visits organized by other entities.

I had access to a dataset that included all *Transmilenio* visits by country of origin, number of participants and year. Before drawing conclusions, there are certain limitations to this quantitative data that need to be addressed. First, I only had access to visits from 2000 until 2011. However, because the 2000s has been the key decade for the construction and mobilization of the Bogotá model, the data provides interesting trends and characteristics to analyze the circulation of the model in its take-off years. The second limitation is that the figures only account for official visits to *Transmilenio*. This means that delegations that did not officially enroll in a tour are not taken into account. Similarly, delegations that may have come to learn other Bogotá policies such as *Ciclovía*, its libraries and schools in the peripheries or "cultura ciudadana" initiatives are not included. However, evidence from my interviews show that visits to *Transmilenio* are often highlights of Bogotá study tours. While the available quantitative data only speaks for official visits to Bogotá's BRT system I use it as a proxy to analyze characteristics of Bogotá study tours. There is no record that I know of Bogotá study tours with the level of detail recorded by Transmilenio S.A. For comparative purposes, I will also refer to data on delegations visits to Guangzhou BRT system during 2010 and 2011. This data was compiled by ITDP staff in China[59] and includes both official and unofficial delegation visits by city of origin.

[59] This data can be found in http://www.sitevisits.net/en/delegations.aspx (accessed Oct 13, 2014)

Figure 8. BRT Study Tours Executed by Transmilenio S.A. in Bogotá (2000-2011) by Origin of Delegation (Country)

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS	%	PARTICIPANTS	%	DELEGATION SIZE (average)
COLOMBIA	241	28.9%	5,261	53.2%	21.8
MEXICO	70	8.4%	673	6.8%	9.6
BRAZIL	62	7.4%	663	6.7%	10.7
PERU	45	5.4%	376	3.8%	8.4
ECUADOR	37	4.4%	248	2.5%	6.7
UNITED STATES	33	4.0%	196	2.0%	5.9
VENEZUELA	27	3.2%	175	1.8%	6.5
CHILE	24	2.9%	165	1.7%	6.9
ARGENTINA	24	2.9%	114	1.2%	4.8
SOUTH AFRICA	21	2.5%	343	3.5%	16.3
CHINA	18	2.2%	174	1.8%	9.7
INDIA	16	1.9%	129	1.3%	8.1
GUATEMALA	15	1.8%	59	0.6%	3.9
PANAMA	13	1.6%	68	0.7%	5.2
BOLIVIA	13	1.6%	42	0.4%	3.2
KOREA	12	1.4%	167	1.7%	13.9
JAPAN	12	1.4%	60	0.6%	5.0
SPAIN	12	1.4%	28	0.3%	2.3
PUERTO RICO	11	1.3%	47	0.5%	4.3
SWEDEN	10	1.2%	92	0.9%	9.2
Other countries	117	14.0%	817	8.3%	7.0
TOTAL	**833**	**100.0%**	**9,897**	**100.0%**	**11.9**
Without Colombia	592	71.1%	4,636	47%	7.8

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Transmilenio S.A. archives

Figure 9. BRT Study Tours Executed by Transmilenio S.A. in Bogotá (2000-2011) by Delegation Origin (World Region)

WORLD REGION	NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS	%
Latin America & the Caribbean	635	76.2%
Asia	80	9.6%
Africa	44	5.3%
Europe	39	4.7%
US/Canada	34	4.1%
Oceania	1	0.1%
TOTAL	**833**	**100.0%**

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Transmilenio S.A. archives

From 2000 through 2011, a total of 833 delegations visited Bogotá's *Transmilenio* on a study tour. This means that, on average, a delegation came to Bogotá every four days. Together, they mobilized a total of 9,897 people, an average of 12 people per delegation. 71% of these delegations (or 47% if we count the number of delegation members) came from outside Colombia.[60] The number of delegations going to Bogotá experienced a boom in the early 2000s with a total of 440 visits from 2000 until 2004.[61] The pace decreased from 2005 until 2008, ranging from 61 in 2005 to 42 in 2008, and increased again from 2009 until 2011, with 60-70 visits per year. This dry analysis of total number of visits becomes richer if we take into account the delegations' countries of origin. The analysis reveals then an uneven geography of "learning from Bogotá" characterized by three features: 1) the importance of proximity (with Latin American and the Caribbean countries accounting for more than three quarters of delegation visits); 2) the predominance of South-South exchanges and the existence of some South-North exchanges; and 3) the existence of *spatio-temporal waves* in the organization of study tours or, in other words, the concentration of delegations visits by country of origin in certain periods of time.

Proximity and the Geographies of BRT Learning

Figure 8 above shows that 76% of Bogotá study tours that took place between 2000 and 2011 came from other Latin American and the Caribbean countries. Five countries only -Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Peru and Ecuador- accounted for 55% of all the tours and 73% of all participants. This data confirms the importance of geographical proximity in the organization of study tours, particularly when we compared this the data with Guangzhou BRT visits. For example, in 2009, eight delegations from China visited Bogotá to learn from *Transmilenio*. After Guangzhou BRT started operations in Februrary 2010, only 2 delegations from China visited Bogotá during 2010-11 whereas 89 Chinese delegations went to visit Guangzhou BRT during that same time period. Figures 10 and 11 (below) confirms this proximity dynamic with Latin American delegations going mostly to Bogotá and Asian delegations to Guangzhou.

[60] In addition to these delegation visits, the workshops, seminars and BRT fairs that Transmilenio S.A. organized in Bogotá during that same period attracted an extra 4,500 people who are not included in the figures above.

[61] Transmilenio only started to register delegation visits on an annual basis since 2005

Figure 10. Study Tours to Bogotá BRT by Country of Origin (2010-2011)

COUNTRY	DELEGATIONS	%
BRAZIL	31	21.5%
COLOMBIA	24	16.7%
ARGENTINA	11	7.6%
MEXICO	10	6.9%
UNITED STATES	8	5.6%
CHILE	6	4.2%
JAPAN	5	3.5%
KOREA	5	3.5%
SPAIN	5	3.5%
SWEDEN	4	2.8%
BOLIVIA	3	2.1%
ECUADOR	3	2.1%
CHINA	2	1.4%
GERMANY	2	1.4%
KENYA	2	1.4%
GUATEMALA	2	1.4%
Others	21	14.6%
TOTAL	**144**	**100.0%**
Without Colombia	120	83.3%

Source: Own Elaboration based on Transmilenio S.A. archives

Figure 11. Study Tours to Guangzhou BRT by Country of Origin (2010-11)

COUNTRY	DELEGATIONS	%
CHINA	89	50.9%
UNITED STATES	35	20.0%
INDONESIA	12	6.9%
INDIA	6	3.4%
PHILIPPINES	4	2.3%
UNITED KINGDOM	4	2.3%
BRAZIL	3	1.7%
DENMARK	2	1.1%
FRANCE	2	1.1%
GERMANY	2	1.1%
VIETNAM	2	1.1%
Others	14	8.0%
TOTAL	**175**	**100.0%**
Without China	86	49.1%

Source: Own Elaboration based on ITDP data for Guangzhou

Data in these figures suggest that while proximity, be it geographical or cultural, might be an important variable in the organization of study tours, it is also not by any means the only variable at play. For instance, Brazil and Ecuador sent many delegations to Bogotá from 2000-2011 even though they both have BRT examples at home (Curitiba and Quito). Also, in 2011 more American delegations went to Guangzhou than to Bogotá, despite Colombia being geographically closer to the US. There are different hypotheses that could explain this. One could be interest in novelty, for instance, that because many delegations from the United States had already been to Bogotá during the early 2000s, they would choose to go Guangzhou after the system was inaugurated in 2010. Yet, neither the proximity nor the novelty hypothesis would be able to explain the paradox that during 2010-11, Japan never sent any delegations to Guangzhou whereas they sent four delegations to Bogotá in 2011 and another one in 2010. Complementing this quantitative data with interviews with Transmilenio staff, the next section makes this proximity hypothesis more complex by showing that the country of origin is not always the place where the idea of organizing a study tour originates.

South-South?

Based on the quantitative data presented above, we could conclude that BRT study tours to Bogotá have been predominantly South-South exchanges with some evidence of South-North exchanges (particularly with the United States, Spain, Japan, Germany and Sweden). While study tours are sometimes organized and arranged directly by cities, interviews with Transmilenio staff reveals an infrastructure of North-based organizations that have coordinated and funded Bogotá study tours that includes international development institutions, global philanthropy and bus manufacturers. To the question of who are the main clients that bring delegations to visit Transmilenio, he responds:

> "the entitities that have brought more delegations to Bogotá are two NGOs: one is called ITDP and the other is EMBARQ, which is based in Washington DC and is funded by Shell Foundation. Other entities that have brought delegations are the World Bank and the Colombian Ministry of Transport… the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank have also brought delegations… and also bus manufacturers such as Volvo or Mercedes" (Transmilenio S.A. study tour manager, personal interview, 2013)

The interview reveals also more details about the paradox sketched above on Japanese delegations visiting Bogotá: "the Japanese Agency of International Cooperation… has brought many delegations from Central America because they have a lot of agreements with countries in Central America... Europeans have also brought many Africans to Bogotá." This suggests that the circulation of the Bogotá model cannot be conceptualized as an urban marketing campaign orchestrated from Bogotá or Transmilenio S.A. or as a matter of South-South learning alone. Rather, the organization of Bogotá study tours is part of larger network of transnational actors that have used Bogotá as a model to materialize a particular global development agenda: sustainable urban transport. Therefore, while there are plenty of examples of city delegations in the global North that have gone to Bogotá to learn about BRT (such as Philadelphia, San Francisco or Boston), it is unclear how many of the US, European and Japanese visits to Bogotá are used in cities in those countries or rather re-used and re-packaged as urban development knowledge to be applied in other, less developed, countries.

Waves of BRT Interest

An analysis of the changes in delegation visits by country of origin over time reveals that rather than a process of linear and incremental learning, there have been specific periods of

time, or what I call here *spatio-temporal waves of interest*, in which BRT is picked up in certain countries. Indeed, sending delegations to Bogotá on study tours has been a common strategy to the creation of global buzz around BRT. For example, of the 45 Peruvian and 37 Ecuadorian delegations that went to Bogotá from 2000 until 2011, the majority did so during 2000-05. During 2006 and 2007, however, South Africa and Brazil became the top countries to send delegations to Bogotá, only after Mexico. India makes its appearance in the ranking of top Bogotá visitors during 2008 and 2009 with 4 delegations each year and China does it in 2009 with 8. The numbers suggest also a BRT frenzy among Argentinian and Brazilian planners and public officials in 2010 and 2011. Indeed, in 2011 Brazil became the only example in Transmilenio archives of a foreign country sending more delegations to Bogotá than all other Colombian cities combined. The United States had a first momentum of sending delegations to Bogotá in the early 2000 and then another one around 2011. An exception to this wave-pattern is Mexico, which has consistently sent between 4 to 7 delegations per year to Bogotá from 2000 until 2011. According to Transmilenio S.A. archives, Mexico sent 70 delegations or 673 people from 2000 until 2011. According to my estimates, around 15 of those visits would correspond to study tours from Guadalajara.

Figure 12. Transmilenio Visits 2000-2004

COUNTRY	DELEGATIONS	%	PARTICIPANTS	%
COLOMBIA	190	43%	4,286	72%
PERU	**32**	**7%**	**270**	**5%**
MEXICO	**30**	**7%**	**241**	**4%**
ECUADOR	**25**	**6%**	**215**	**4%**
VENEZUELA	**15**	**3%**	**129**	**2%**
UNITED STATES	**12**	**3%**	**65**	**1%**
PANAMA	11	3%	40	1%
Others	125	28%	745	157%
TOTAL	**440**	**100%**	**5,991**	**100%**

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Transmilenio S.A. archives

Figure 13. Transmilenio Visits in 2006

COUNTRY	DELEGATIONS	%	PARTICIPANTS	%
COLOMBIA	9	18%	394	52%
MEXICO	**7**	**14%**	**144**	**19%**
BRAZIL	**4**	**8%**	**33**	**4%**
SOUTH AFRICA	**3**	**6%**	**48**	**6%**
VENEZUELA	3	6%	9	1%
ARGENTINA	2	4%	2	0%
CHILE	2	4%	5	1%
ECUADOR	2	4%	5	1%
GUATEMALA	2	4%	5	1%
Others	36	72%	108	14%
TOTAL	**50**	**100%**	**753**	**100%**

Source: Own Elaboration based on data from Transmilenio S.A. archives

Figure 14. Transmilenio Visits in 2008

COUNTRY	DELEGATIONS	%	PARTICIPANTS	%
COLOMBIA	5	12%	130	25%
BRAZIL	**4**	**10%**	**17**	**3%**
INDIA	**4**	**10%**	**38**	**7%**
MEXICO	**4**	**10%**	**50**	**10%**
SOUTH AFRICA	**3**	**7%**	**73**	**14%**
CHILE	2	5%	8	2%
Others	20	48%	197	38%
TOTAL	**42**	**100%**	**513**	**100%**

Source: Own Elaboration based on data from Transmilenio S.A. archives

Figure 15. Transmilenio Visits 2009

COUNTRY	DELEGATIONS	%	PARTICIPANTS	%
COLOMBIA	12	19%	119	25%
CHINA	**8**	**13%**	**69**	**15%**
MEXICO	**5**	**8%**	**23**	**5%**
INDIA	**4**	**6%**	**22**	**5%**
BRAZIL	**3**	**5%**	**20**	**4%**
PHILIPINES	3	5%	12	3%
KENYA	3	5%	35	7%
UNITED STATES	3	5%	17	4%
Others	21	34%	158	33%
TOTAL	**62**	**100%**	**475**	**100%**

Source: Own Elaboration based on data from Transmilenio S.A. archives

Figure 16. Transmilenio Visits in 2011

COUNTRY	DELEGATIONS	%	PARTICIPANTS	%
BRAZIL	**18**	**23.7%**	**289**	**37.0%**
COLOMBIA	10	13.2%	136	17.4%
ARGENTINA	**8**	**10.5%**	**58**	**7.4%**
MEXICO	**5**	**6.6%**	**60**	**7.7%**
UNITED STATES	**5**	**6.6%**	**9**	**1.2%**
JAPAN	4	5.3%	25	3.2%
Others	26	34.2%	204	26.1%
TOTAL	**66**	**100.0%**	**645**	**100.0%**

Source: Own Elaboration based on data from Transmilenio S.A. archives

There are several hypotheses that can be stated about these country-specific waves of BRT interest. A preferred one among transportation experts is that as Transmilenio expanded the capacity of carried passengers per hour compared to Curitiba's system, it showed the world that BRT could compete with metros as a transportation technology and, therefore, BRT systems were adopted by countries experimenting the highest rates of economic growth at the time, the so-called BRICS countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (interview with EMBARQ transportation expert 2013). This hypothesis, however, not only is unable to explain why Russia is completely absent from this BRT frenzy, but also this technical and economic argument does not take into account what Bogotá "persuasive practitioners" tell in one conference after the other: that transportation is not about money but about political will to do it. To spread a new technology worldwide not only technical details need to be communicated, influential policy actors have to be willing to learn and be actively persuaded about its apropriateness.

A more convincing hypothesis, in my perspective, is that a combination of two dynamics were at play behind these waves. First, that study tours participants belong to countries that are the focus of the main organizations that have spread BRT around the world: ITDP (which has a strong focus on South Africa, China and the US) and EMBARQ (focused on Mexico, Peru, Brazil, India). The country-specific focus of ITDP and EMBARQ responds, at the same time, to the geographical emphasis of the global philanthropic foundations that fund them. For instance, Hewlett and the Energy Foundation have provided ITDP plenty of funds to promote BRT study tours for Chinese and Mexican delegations because their global strategy to reduce GHG emissions is currently focused on urban China and Mexico. Similarly, US study tours to learn from Latin American and Asian BRTs have also often been funded by American foundations, particularly Rockefeller and Alton Jones Foundation (now Blue Moon), in their strategy to comply with their environmental and GHG reduction goals in the US through cheaper and faster to implement public transportation alternatives to metros and light rail. Second, the waves of BRT interest in South Africa, Brazil and China in recent years suggest also the increasing association of BRT as a signature urban development project to improve a city's world image in cities of the global South. The celebration of the World Cup in 2010 in South Africa and in Brazil in 2014 were important reasons behind the increase in visits of South African and Brazilian delegations in the 4-5 year period previous to these events. Interviews with Transmilenio S.A. officials confirm the existence of a relationship between these country-specific BRT waves of interest and the celebration of international events. They also show how an international network of

philanthropy-funded think tanks and development institutions have promoted and reinforced this relationship:

> "In Lula's Brazil, during Lula's government, EMBARQ and ITDP and also the World Bank and the Inter-american Development Bank, they were all focused in the forthcoming 2014 World Cup, so they brought Brazilians in industrial quantities to Bogotá" [62] (Transmilenio S.A. study tour manager, personal interview, 2013)

"Peer" Cities and the Global Circulation of BRT

While Bogotá's *Transmilenio* has become "the most powerful BRT reference for planners and practitioners worldwide" (Hidalgo & Gutiérrez 2013), as more cities around the world implemented BRT, Bogotá or Curitiba –the birthplace of BRT- are not the only cities that are able to produce inspiration and learning among urban policymakers and planners. My interviews for this project reveal an important dynamic at play in study tours: the role that certain cities can play as "peer" cities. As noted by a former director of Transmilenio and now senior consultant at EMBARQ's office in Mexico City:

> "These days there are more city references for organizing BRT study tours. The captive market that Bogotá had for a while is, today, not the case anymore. For example, intermediate cities can now go to Pereira [a half million people city in Colombia]… cities tend to look for their peers" (EMBARQ Senior Consultant, personal interview, 2013).

The fact that there are other cities that can also serve as BRT references do not mean that model cities such as Bogotá or Curitiba do not matter anymore. Rather they work in combination with "peer" cities. For instance, writing about South African delegations that went to Colombia to learn about BRT on several ITDP-sponsored tours, Wood has shown evidence that city size was an important variable to inspire and convince touring policymakers:

> "When I went to Bogotá for the first time in 2007, I thought that is not doable. That thing is huge. There are six lanes running that way and another six moving that way. Bogotá is so much bigger than Johannesburg and I thought this BRT project cannot happen here… Only when I went to the city of Pereira and saw their BRT that I realized this can be done in Johannesburg. Their system really inspired me… The landscape of Johannesburg is more like Pereira. The trunk [road] is more like ours … Pereira convinced me that Johannesburg could do it." (interview with South African policymaker cited in Wood 2014b).

Size, urban structure, similarities in the planning apparatus or stage in the planning process are important variables that delegates look for in other cities to identify and "peer" cities and, therefore, the importance of including a diverse set of cities in study tours. For instance, in the Vietnamese study tour to Latin American and Asian cities that I sketched in the introduction of this chapter, the World Bank sought to expose delegates to cities in different stages of BRT implementation. Vietnamese planners and engineers first visited a set of Asian cities (Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Jakarta) that had "newer systems in place" so that they could learn about BRT implementation from cities at an early stage in the planning process. Some months later, the World Bank brought another group of Vietnamese policymakers and public officials to a different set of Latin American cities (Bogotá, Curitiba, Rio) that had "mature

[62] Brasil con Lula, en el gobierno de Lula, tanto EMBARQ como ITDP ellos y el banco mundial y el banco interamericano de desarrollo se enfocaron en tema del mundial de futbol que se viene en Brasil, entonces trajeron brasileños en cantidades industriales

BRT systems at work" so that they could experience how BRT works in model cities with well-established systems. The tour therefore was organized based on several criteria: cultural or geographical proximity was important in choosing Asian cities as part of the tour, and yet there was another important criteria: technical planners and engineers were taken to Asian cities to learn about the challenges in early stages of BRT implementation in its early stages from other transportation engineers while policymakers and politicians were taken to Latin American cities so that they could meet mayors and public officials that have already successfully implemented a BRT system. For both South African and Vietnamese policymakers, beyond proximity, the "peer" element played an important role in their learning and inspiration processes.

In the previous section, I showed that quantitative data on Bogotá study tours suggest proximity is an important variable in the organization of study tours, as the majority of delegations that went to Bogotá came from other Latin American cities while those going to Guangzhou came mostly from China and other Asian countries. I also showed that interviews with Transmilenio S.A. staff revealed that international development banks and global sustainable transport think tanks like ITDP and EMBARQ have been key actors in organizing and funding these tours. In this section, I draw from my interviews and archival research on US study tours to the Latin American BRT meccas (Bogotá, Curitiba, Mexico City) funded by ITDP and US foundations to shed light on the ways in which they try to promote BRT through study tours in the absence of powerful examples in the US. In doing so I show how, in addition to geographical or cultural proximity, foundations also draw from both model and "peer" cities to persuade city delegates.

Curitiba: The Original Yet Long Ignored BRT Model

During the 1970s and 1980s, European-inspired light rail systems became the preferred mass transit technology in the US due to their perceived cost-effectiveness compared to heavy rail (Pickrell 1992). The hegemony of light rail in the US was, however, challenged in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the context of decreasing federal funding for transit by an even more cost-effective transportation technology, this time coming from Latin America: Bus Rapid Transit. While US transportation planners have known about the Curitiba system since it first started in 1974, it took 30 years for this transit model to capture the imagination of US politicians, policymakers and transportation advocates as legitimate solution for mass transit in US cities. The popularization of BRT in the US in recent decades has to do with political economy factors such as decresasing availability of federal funds for transportation but also to the role of US foundations in promoting and spreading the model. For instance, during the 1990s, the W. Alton Jones Foundation (now Blue Moon Foundation) was interested in promoting new and more cost-effective ways to decrease emissions in US cities and they did so through the funding of several study tours of US transportation planners and local officials to Curitiba to learn about their innovative rapid bus system. Similarly, Curitiba planners, including Curitiba former mayor Jaime Lerner, came to the US in several occasions to talk about the trasnportation innovations implemented in the Brazilian city. Yet, the current transnational infrastructure of think tanks, development banks and transportation experts that have supported and legimitated BRT as a viable mass-transit transportation alternative to light rail was yet not at work. For example, in comparison to the full room and standing ovation that Enrique Peñalosa received as keynote speaker of a 2008 symposium at UC Berkeley's Department of City and Regional Planning called "Bogotá, the Renaissance of a City," when Jaime Lerner gave a talk about Curitiba at the same department in the late 1970s, nobody showed up in his talk (Allan Jacobs, personal interview, 2012). But while BRT did not achieve

broad recognition in the US until the early 2000s, there are isolated examples of US cities that did try to replicate Curitiba's system before the sustainable transport paradigm and the Bogotá model emerged. Los Angeles is one of the early examples of cities in the US that implemented a BRT system and, indeed, a study tour to Curitiba was an important event in making this happen.

Thanks to a $286,000 Alton Jones Foundation grant named "Learning from Curitiba," Los Angeles mayor Richard J. Riordan led and organized a delegation of 24 people that travelled to Curitiba in January 1999, a year before Bogotá's Transmilenio started operations. The delegation included two Los Angeles county supervisors, high-ranking officials at Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Agency (LACMTA) and different transportation and civic leaders from Southern California. During a 2-day visit, the delegation visited Curitiba's City Planning office, rode the bus system together and talked to different Brazilian planers, politicians and the media about the different ways in which Los Angeles could learn from Curitiba. After getting off a bus, the mayor of Los Angeles told a Brazilian reporter: "[in Los Angeles] we don't have dedicated busways like you have, in fact we have squandered or wasted billions of dollars in subways that have only solved about 1% of our problems." [63] Of course there was a political economy that explained the mayor's enthusiasm with the Curitiba system. As rail projects in Los Angeles had significantly overrun in costs in previous years (LACMTA had a $7 billion debt at the time) and federal funding for transit stagnated, the Curitiba system provided a cheaper alternative to Los Angeles planners. The organization of the Curitiba study tour in 1999 was indeed crucial to create a group of BRT enthusiasts in Los Angeles that later became key for the many planning studies and bureaucratic processes needed to transfer the model and implement MetroRapid, Los Angeles' own BRT. As noted by a US Federal Transit Administration report:

> "The Metro Rapid program was initiated in March 1999 by the MTA's Board of Directors following an initial feasibility study. Staff was directed by the Board to conduct the administration's feasibility study in response to a visit to Curitiba, Brazil, by MTA and City of Los Angeles officials." [64]

Here, as Pickrell (1992) showed for the case of light rail in the 1980s, we see how rational transportation planning models and feasibility studies followed political consensus around a transportation policy model rather than the opposite. LACMTA staff, i.e. planners, were "directed" to conduct a feasibility study "in response" to the visit rather than the opposite. This shows that planning decisions are never a rational process of 'scanning' the horizon to evaluate all existing policy alternatives. Rather certain alternatives are constructed as appropriate policy solutions in particular periods of time. These constructions can be understood as different assemblages of local and transnational knowledge, expertise and power that, shaped and constrained by political economy factors, elevate certain provincial planning experiments to models and "best practices" that world-class cities should have. The point here is not so much to suggest that rational planning is a mere formality at the service of powerful actors, but rather to show that both rationality and power are important logics to understand how planning decisions are made (Flyvbjerg 1998). It is in this context of

---

[63] A video of this visit was also produced and funded by the W. Alton Jones Foundation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QAuVLs1H1NQ (7'48") (accessed Jun 1, 2015).

[64] FTA. 2006. Bus Rapid Transit: page 16-17. FTA-CA-26-7068-2004.1. Available at: http://www.nbrti.org/docs/pdf/WestStart_BRT_Ridership_Analysis_Final.pdf (Accessed June 1, 2015).

rationality and power where study tours and, more generally, processes of inter-city policy learning take place. But, as we are reminded by McCann & Ward (2011), policy formation is always a relational-territorial exercise, as much as policies are affected by territorial political struggles they are also affected by circulating agendas, models and expertise. Accounts of study tours, and inter-city policy learning processes more broadly, that do not take into account the ways in which both local and transnational actors shape rationality and power will inevitably fall short in their explanatory capacity.

ITDP and the Quest for a World-Class BRT in the US

Given the proliferation of BRT systems around the world and the lack of standardization on the key elements that make a BRT different from, for instance, an express bus line, ITDP released in 2012 a BRT standard guide so that all new and existing BRT projects in the world could be classified according to one single standard definition. In doing that, ITDP sought to promote higher-quality standards in new BRT projects and, at the same time, establish themselves as global BRT experts. ITDP's BRT guide created a "minimum standard" in the form of five critical design elements that must be present for a corridor to qualify as BRT: dedicated lane(s), dedicated right-of-way, off-board fare collection, preferential intersection treatments and platform-level boarding. Systems that comply with these characteristics are considered "true BRT corridors." Depending on the existence of additional features –service planning, passing lanes, safe stations, high quality of service, integration with other transportation modes, secure bicycle parking, etc.- BRT corridors can earn points to become bronze, silver or gold-standards systems.

According to a 2013 ITDP report, only seven cities have a world-class example of BRT, what they call a "gold-standard" BRT. Interestingly, all of them were cities of the global South: six in Latin America (Bogotá, Curitiba, Lima, Guadalajara, Medellín and Rio de Janeiro) and one in China (Guangzhou).[65] While more than 20 cities in the US are currently planning or about to open a BRT system only 5 of them have a BRT in service that ITDP considers a "true" BRT line: Cleveland (silver), Los Angeles, Eugene, Pittsburgh and Las Vegas (bronze). None of them provides a "gold standard" example:

> "Once a gold-standard BRT is in operation in the United States, American cities will have a true example to look to. Today, the models are in cities abroad and international examples do not always play well domestically. Instead, American cities aiming to implement BRT often model themselves after other American cities which have good — but not gold-standard — BRT and this leads to more systems in the United States which do not reach their potential. The effective implementation of one gold-standard BRT in the United States will have the likely impact of spurring other cities to see BRT as a viable, high class transit system." [66]

Other BRT commentators in the US have highlighted the importance of having culturally and geographically proximate examples. For example, Congressman Earl Blumenauer has noted how the lack of BRT examples is hindering its expansion as a transit alternative in the US:

> "While bus rapid transit has worked well in large and medium-sized cities from Bogotá, Colombia to Curitiba, Brazil to Guangzhou, China, it is less well known in the United

[65] https://www.itdp.org/library/standards-and-guides/the-bus-rapid-transit-standard/best-practices-2013/ (accessed July 14, 2015)

[66] (Weinstock, A., Hook, W., Replogle, M., & Cruz, R. (2011). Recapturing global leadership in bus rapid transit. Available at: http://www.nbrti.org/docs/pdf/ITDP_report_BRT_rating_2011.pdf (accessed June 1, 2015)

> States. BRT is sometimes met with skepticism and resistance from transportation planners and engineers who are unfamiliar with how to build high-quality BRT systems, since we have limited examples here at home. Citizens too are often concerned about dedicating the requisite street space to buses." [67]

In order to help spread BRT in the US, ITDP is currently focused on three US cities that they see have the potential to build a gold-standard BRT. San Francisco, together with Chicago and Boston, is one of them. As noted by the ITDP Regional Director for the US and Africa: "if San Francisco can pull it off then in the future we will be taking people [from the US] to San Francisco" (ITDP Regional Director, personal interview, 2013). This is the same logic used by ITDP in the late 2000s in Asia -to leverage Guangzhou to spread BRT adoption in Chinese cities- now at work in the US.

In this context, San Francisco experiments in transportation policy are truly a local, national and transnational battleground, especially for those that strongly favor -or oppose- BRT. While the main opponents at the local level are merchant associations, which fear losing parking spaces and business disruption during construction work, San Francisco's transportation policy is also the site of a national and transnational battle between BRT and LRT (light-rail transit) supporters that involves international development banks, global think tanks as well as bus and light-rail manufacturers. In the following section, I examine a San Francisco study tour to Mexico City organized by ITDP to shed light on the ways in which ITDP seeks to persuade US policy actors with study tours to the Latin American BRT meccas. In doing so, I also show the limits of study tours in the face of organized local opposition and different notions of what it means to be a "peer" city.

San Francisco: A Local and Transnational Battle to Build a World-Class BRT

The San Francisco Bay Area is currently a laboratory of experimentation in urban transportation policy, particularly in BRT and bicycle planning. After a decade and a half of planning, delays, and fierce opposition by local merchant associations and residents, six BRT lines are scheduled to open between 2015 and 2020 in the San Francisco Bay Area. If plans come to fruition, by 2020 the Bay Area could become, with about 50 miles of BRT, the metropolitan area with more BRT miles in the US.

[67] Congressman Earl Blumenauer, in Weinstock, A., Hook, W., Replogle, M., & Cruz, R. 2011. *Recapturing global leadership in bus rapid transit*. Available at: http://www.nbrti.org/docs/pdf/ITDP_report_BRT_rating_2011.pdf (accessed June 1, 2015)

Figure 17. BRT Lines Expected to Open in the San Francisco Bay Area (2015-2020)

BRT lines	City/Region	Expected Opening	Miles	Total Cost (US million)	Cost per mile (US million)
Santa Clara-Alum Rock	South Bay	2015	7.2	114	15.8
Stevens Creek	South Bay	2017	8.5	145.2	17.1
El Camino Real	South Bay	2018	17.3	188	10.9
East Bay (Oakland-San Leandro)	East Bay	2017	9.5	174	18.3
Van Ness	San Francisco	2017-2018	2.2	126	57.3
Geary Blvd.	San Francisco	2019-2020	7	263	37.6
Total			**51.7**	**1,010.2**	**19.5**

Source: Own elaboration

As noted by the president of the AC Transit Board of Directors, while planners in the Bay Area have heard and talked about BRT since the 1980s, it is only recently that "the whole idea [of BRT] has really come of age in America."[68] The coming of age of BRT in the US is not a coincidence. It is also not just the result of an incremental learning experience. Rather, it took off in a particular moment of time – the early 2000s- pushed by a set of local, national and transnational actors.

The first time BRT appeared in an urban planning document as a mass transit alternative for San Francisco was in 2003, when building a BRT network was included in Proposition K's expenditure plan. Prop K was a half-cent local sales tax increase promoted by the San Francisco County Transportation Authority (SFCTA) to improve public transit in the city. It was passed in November 2003 with the approval of 73% of San Francisco voters. For José Luis Moscovich, SFCTA executive director from 2002 until 2011 and a key person behind the drafting and lobbying of Prop K, the decision to include a BRT network as opposed to more light rail lines was influenced by two issues: 1) changes in federal funding programs for urban mass transit; and 2) the numerous delays and cost overruns of San Francisco's Third Street light rail project (Moscovich, personal interview, 2013). According to José Luis Moscovich, the shift towards BRT during his tenure at the SFCTA stems from a conversation he had with an administrator of the Federal Transit Administration in the late 1990s in which he learned that there were so many projects competing for federal funds that implementing the projects already approved in the program for new transit investments (New Starts) would take about 100 years. This made clear to him that in order to build new mass transit projects in San Francisco, they needed to raise dedicated local funds to leverage the increasingly reduced federal coverage ratios coming from the FTA and from the state of California.

Given this situation, SFCTA planners and experts turned to the Latin American experience with rapid buses as a potential more cost-effective alternative. Born and raised in Argentina, José Luis Moscovich was very much familar with the Latin American experience with rapid buses even though he had not been to Curitiba or Bogotá. As a master student of transportation engineering at UC Berkeley in the early 1980s, he was suprised about the lack of consideration of buses as a mass transit alternative in US cities. Indeed, Moscovich was part of a group of graduate students at Berkeley that questioned the writings of professor Vukan Vuchic, the main expert of mass transit in the US at the time and whose mass transit

[68] http://www.insidebayarea.com/argus/localnews/ci_6056378 (accessed June 14, 2015)

models only included light rail and heavy rail alternatives (Moscovich, personal interview, 2013).

While there seemed to be an implicit agreement between supervisors and the SFCTA executive director about including BRT as the key capital investment project in Prop K, introducing a new transit model in the agendas is not easy task, especially when the model is not that well known. Not only planning experts and supervisors need to be persuaded for transportation policy innovations to occur but a whole set of actors involved in transportation decision making. Clear support from a mayor would have helped moved the project faster but the lack of mayoral leadership for BRT in San Francisco, as it is often the case for BRT in most US cities, was another disadvantage for implementing the project. No study tours took place in San Francisco in this moment, which might be indeed indicative of the lack of a broad coalition of motivated actors that is often needed to implement the policy.

In 2005, in a clear strategy to block or, at least, delay the Geary BRT project, the Greater Geary Boulevard Merchants' Association (GGBMA) demanded that SFCTA elaborate an economic impact study that would address their concerns before proceeding with any further BRT plans. This demand proved the fragility of the previous pro-BRT alliance nurtured by Moscovich and, in 2006, a group of 6 local organizations that previously supported SFCTA in passing Prop K wrote a public letter addressed to Moscovich in which they supported merchants in their demands of an economic study and also urged SFCTA to re-consider a light rail alternative in Geary as opposed to BRT. Signatories included Emily Drenen (Walk San Francisco), Dan Krause (Rescue Muni), Gabriel Metcalf (SPUR), Tom Radulovich (Livable City) and Leah Shahum (San Francisco Bicycle Coalition).[69] The weakness of the SFCTA leadership over the process [particularly their hesitations during public hearings and community meetings] and the lack of mayoral support are reflective of the fragility of the alliance. The constant delays of the process favored merchants' interests.

According to Andy Thornley, former SFBC policy director, (personal interview, 2013), "there was not a clear alliance among advocates and the SFCTA to support BRT. For instance, in the beginning many San Francisco advocates aligned with the idea that rail should be favored rather than BRT. This created a lack of support for SFCTA and supervisors from potential strong allies such as the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition, Livable City, etc." He further argues: "during public hearings, many times there would be representatives of both SFCTA and SFMTA [the city agency in charge of BRT implementation] and many times this would create a funny scene and it was not clear for the public, both neighbors and merchants, who was in charge. They would also repeat things like 'we're still looking at it' all the time to avoid conflict and concessions." In other words, the tendency of planners to avoid conflict with merchants made it difficult to make progress and eventually weakened the alliance between SFCTA and the city transportation advocates. This change in urban governance dynamics benefited the merchants' position, particularly given the lack of mayoral leadership for BRT, and resulted in a significant delay of the project as SFCTA planners had to re-assess the project.

In 2011, José Luis Moscovich retired and new project managers at both SFCTA and SFMTA took over the project of building two BRT lines. A new mayor and new supervisors took office as well. In this context, ITDP sought to intervene in San Francisco urban politics to accelerate the BRT implementation process through the organization of a study tour that sought inspiring and re-energizing the new urban governance actors involved in the project.

[69] http://www.savegearyblvd.com/news/gearybrt_march_06.html (accessed Jun 1, 2014)

While ITDP has usually taken politicians and planners on study tours to Bogotá, which they, together with Guangzhou, consider the "gold-standard" of BRT, this time they decided to bring the San Francisco delegation to another Latin American BRT mecca: Mexico City. The idea was to bring them to a city that the San Francisco delegation could identify as peer. In this case, compactness was deemed as something that Mexico City and San Francisco shared and an element that could bring these cities together as peers: "Mexico City is more compact than Bogotá and, therefore, potentially more similar to San Francisco" (ITDP Regional Director, personal interview, 2013). And while the tour did energize and inspired participants, particularly the fast pace of construction of Mexico City's Metrobús system, the Mexican example offered little inspiration in terms of the aspects that have been most controversial in the San Francisco BRT debate: local contestation from merchants' and the lengthy participatory planning processes required by San Francisco legislation to start construction, which had delayed the project for already more than 15 years. This made the learning process between Mexico City and San Francisco difficult as for delegates these aspects were much more important than the fact that Mexico or San Francisco had similar compact urban structures.

Peer Cities and the Limits of Study Tours

In June 2013, I attended an event at the *San Francisco Planning* and *Urban* Research Association (SPUR) called "Hola BRT Real!" The event gathered some of the participants of a study tour that, earlier that year, had brought a San Francisco delegation to Mexico City to learn about BRT and bicycle sharing programs. The 16-member San Francisco delegation included three city supervisors (John Avalos, Scott Wiener and Eric Mar), three legislative aides, SFCTA and SFMTA planners and engineers, the executive director of the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition, the director of transportation programs at SPUR, a community advocate that has opposed the project and a reporter from the San Francisco Chronicle. While most of the participants of the tour already knew about BRT and had read about Curitiba and Bogotá, for many of them this was the first time they had seen a BRT in practice. In talking about the tour, speakers often used the word "eye-opening" to describe their experience. For example, the San Francisco Chronicle reporter Michael Cabanatuam said "I've seen videos but I've never seen it for real, only now that I went to Mexico City" while Michael Schwartz, SFCTA project manager for the Van Ness BRT, said "this was an eye-opening experience," Peter Gabancho, SFMTA project manager said: "it was very impressive… it was really eye-opening for me, even though I have read about it and I am familiar with the literature on BRT."

Sponsored by ITDP with funds from the Rockefeller Foundation, the aim of this study tour was to expose a San Francisco delegation to a "true" BRT project to make sure that San Francisco builds a fully-fledged BRT that could later serve as an example for other US cities (ITDP Regional Director, personal interview, 2013). ITDP Regional Director in charge of organizing this tour further elaborates on how ITDP uses study tours to promote BRTs and how the participants and the cities to visit are selected depending on the planning stage of the BRT project. If BRT has no political support yet, ITDP would invite key politicians and political figures in the city. Sometimes they would also invite community organizers that might oppose the project as well as local journalists so that they can write about BRT and help mobilize public opinion in favor of the project. If the project has been approved and is already in the design phase, they invite city government officials and key officials and planners at local transit agencies in charge of project design and implementation. The San Francisco study tour was a hybrid of these two types because even though two BRT lines have already been approved for the Van Ness and Geary corridors, the strong

opposition of local merchants, particularly in the Geary Boulevard, risks delaying and eventually suspending the project. This is what happened in the Berkeley extension of the East Bay BRT line, where the organized opposition of Telegraph merchants and NIMBY residents successfully stopped the project from its implementation within Berkeley borders.

San Francisco planners, journalists and community advocates were most impressed about the pace at which BRT projects had been implemented in Mexico. While in San Francisco, BRT has been in the making for about 15 years due to the lack of mayoral leadership, bureaucratic delays and organized opposition by local association merchants, in Mexico City, as it happened in Bogotá, Guadalajara and other Latin American cities, once BRT was endorsed by the mayor, construction did not take more than 3 years. This generated mixed feelings among San Francisco delegates. Most of them, particularly transportation planners, admired the fast pace of construction of BRTs in Latin America, yet most also thought that the process of project approval in San Francisco needed to go through participatory mechanisms that were not undertook in Mexico: "I don't know how much we want to borrow from them [about that]," said an SFMTA official referring to the lack of community involvement. A community advocate that also attended the tour and had been a vocal opponent of the project in San Francisco said that they were all impressed with the speed of construction of BRT in Mexico City but there are two set of values that they, in San Francisco, cannot ignore: "public participation and the needs of existing communities."

Similary, the Mexico City example provided little help to meet one of the most difficult challenges of BRT implementation in San Francisco: merchants' blockage of the project. After coming back from the Mexican study tour, city supervisor Eric Mar attended a BRT community meeting with Geary neighbors and merchants. He was clearly excited about the project and started the meeting by saying that for him "it was critical to speed up the Geary BRT project… while also taking into account the concerns of neighors and merchants." In his presentation, he talked about how BRT has worked for many cities in China including Guangzhou and that he recently went to Mexico in a tour organized by ITDP: "the BRT that I saw there, they have developed it faster than here… it even runs in part of the historic Zocalo… I was impressed about how it functions as the spine of a larger transportation system… and also that the ride was about 6 pesos which is something like 30 cents." At this point, an angry merchant stood up in the meeting and shouted "yes, but they don't have unions there." Throughout the meeting, merchants would interrupt and shout at SFCTA planners. A particularly critical moment came when an SFCTA planner presented a survey made in March 2013 that showed that 78% of the customers that shop in Geary Boulevard arrived in the businesses by walking, using transit, or with a bicycle. The merchants were visibly angry and in disbelief. At some point, David Heller, head of the Geary merchants' association, said: "I wasn't interviewed and I'm the president of the Geary merchants, of the 35 merchants that I represent only 1 was interviewed" and then, in an effort to undermine the legitimacy of planners, he started asking other merchants in the meeting "were you interviewed?" At this point, other people in the audience also said "shut up, quiet" to him. Nevertheless, it was clear that he had enough good allies in the meeting to intimidate planners and undermine their rational planning tools to accelerate the implementation of the project.

Therefore, while the tour to Mexico City might have been effective in energizing city supervisors and planners in San Francisco to accelerate the implementation of BRT in San Francisco, it provided few tools on how to deal with one of the hardest challenges to implement BRT –or any new mass-transit system project- in the US: local merchants'

association complaints and blockage based on their deep-seated belief that losing a lane of traffic or street parking would mean losing their middle-class customers.

The Practice of Study Tours

In this part of the chapter, I use interviews with participants and organizers of study tours as well as archival research to identify and examine in depth a series of study tours to Bogotá that my interviewees considered important for the introduction of Ciclovía-style program and a BRT line in Guadalajara. Most of these study tours had already taken place by the time I was doing fieldwork and, therefore I did not have the chance to conduct participant observation. I analyze in depth these study tours and situate them within the larger and shifting context of urban politics and governance in these two cities to explore the motivations and beliefs of the actors that organize them as well as the ways in which the practices that take place during them are able –or not- to produce change in policy agendas in the visiting cities.

Guadalajara Study Tours to Bogotá: Producing Policy Converts

If the Bogotá story of urban transformation told by Enrique Peñalosa was key in inspiring and seducing GDL 2020 *empresarios* in 2003 about the possibilities of transforming their city through sustainable transport interventions, it was through study tours to Bogotá that a core group of GDL 2020 members and high ranking government officials became "converts" of the Bogotá model; public-private alliances between GDL 2020, officials and bus company owners solidified; and public opinion was mobilized in favor of BRT in Guadalajara. While GDL 2020 was the first entity to organize study tours to Bogotá, soon after, other organizations, including the local and the state government as well as the local environmental NGO *Colectivo Ecologista Jalisco* (CEJ), with funds from the Hewlett Foundation, started to organize them as well.

The first Guadalajara study tour to Bogotá was organized by GDL 2020 (then still called *Ciudades Públicas)* a couple of months after Enrique Peñalosa's talk in Guadalajara. From January 28 until February 7, 2004, eight local *empresarios* paid for their travel and hotel expenses to visit the capital of Colombia. While Peñalosa and his Bogotá story of urban transformation had certainly inspired them, they needed to see it by themselves to believe it:

> "We thought it would be a good idea to go to Bogotá to see if it was true all that [Peñalosa] told us about the city: how in a city which had 50% of Guadalajara's per capita income, 40 years of guerrilla, and with rampant drug trafficking… how could he do that? We didn't really believe him, we thought he was probably lying…. We needed to see it ourselves to believe it" [70] (GDL 2020 leader 1, personal interview 2013)

To organize and guide the tour, they hired Lucy Barriga, former director of Bogotá's *Ciclovía* program, who had successfully started a Ciclovía-style program in Ciudad Juárez and was living in Mexico at the time. During 11 days, they visited different urban transport and public space improvements in Bogotá as well as new libraries, schools and social housing units built in the peripheries. As it is usual in delegation visits to Bogotá, they rode *Transmilenio* and rented bicycles for the Sunday *Ciclovía*. Thanks to Lucy Barriga's contacts they also met with

[70] Original in Spanish: "entonces después de tanto nosotros dijimos pues estaría bueno ir a Bogotá para ver si es cierto que todo esto que nos dicen de cómo una ciudad que ingreso per capita no es el 50% de ingreso per capita del ingreso de Guadalajara, que tiene 40 años de guerrilla que el narcotráfico es campal ¿cómo pudo hacer eso? No les creemos nada y decíamos además mentiroso… necesitábamos verlo para creerlo"

different representatives of Bogotá local government and the Sports and Recreation Department (IDRD). The tour served to consolidate a core group of 3 GDL 2020 *empresarios* who became determined to replicate the Bogotá model in Guadalajara. While Lucy Barriga exposed to a variety of programs and policies beyond urban transport and public space interventions, they decided to focus on what they thought was the easiest program to replicate, the Sunday *Ciclovía* program:

> "we were drooling over what we saw… wow… the libraries, the compensation houses, the Ciclovía, the Transmilenio… We were so impressed, you know… the last day of the visit was on a Sunday and we went to the Ciclovía… [one of the GDL 2020 leaders] had not ridden a bicycle in 25 years, and he loved it!… and right there bicycling on Bogotá's 7th Avenue we decided that this would be the first thing we would copy from the Colombians… since it also seemed the easiest and cheapest program to do"[71] (GDL 2020 leader 1, personal interview, 2013)

When they came back, this core group of 3 *empresarios* used traditional interest group strategies to put pressure on the local and state government such as mobilizing their networks of social and political connections to replicate Bogotá policies in Guadalajara. Interestingly, they also resorted to the same practices through which they have learned and become "converted" to the Bogotá model: 1) the organization of policy forums in Guadalajara in which they invited Colombian and international sustainable transport experts to give talks and press conferences, including Enrique Peñalosa and his brother Gil; and 2) the organization and funding of about 15 study tours between 2004 and 2011 that brought more than one hundred influential policy actors from Guadalajara to Bogotá.

In September 2004, after having participated in a Bogotá study tour and pressed by GDL 2020 *empresarios*, the mayor of Guadalajara, Emilio González, inaugurated *Vía Recreactiva*, an 11-kilometer weekly car-free program inspired by Bogotá's *Ciclovía* that takes place every Sunday in Avenida Vallarta, a main artery of the city normally reserved for high-speed car traffic. While *Vía Recreactiva* is a recreational rather than a transportation program, its inauguration pointed towards an embryonic, even if rather experimental, policy shift in the local government agenda towards promoting non-car forms of urban transport. Yet, the local and state governments continued to heavily invest public resources in car infrastructure and highways showing that this was a rather isolated episode than part of a clear movement toward more sustainable transport planning in the city. After *Vía Recreactiva* was implemented and institutionalized, the next challenge for GDL 2020 members became pushing for the replication of Bogotá's *Transmilenio* in Guadalajara. However, building a BRT network posed not only more technical, planning and financial difficulties than closing some streets on a Sunday, it also required aligning powerful actors that could oppose and block the project.

It should be noted here that BRT was not a new idea for Guadalajara urban and transportation planners. In 1996, transportation planners working for Jalisco's state transportation agency CEIT travelled to Curitiba and, upon return, they produced technical feasibility reports that recommended the implementation of several public transportation

[71] Original in Spanish: "no, pues se nos caía la baba, no no no… las bibliotecas, las casas de compensación, la ciclovía, el Transmilenio, etc. vueltos locos nosotros... el último día que fue un domingo y fuimos a la Ciclovía… [GDL 2020 member] tenía 25 años que no se subía a la bicicleta y le encantó… Y vamos por la carrera séptima y decimos qué le podemos copiar a los colombianos y entonces se nos ocurrió pues esto, que se ve fácil y barato de hacer"

corridors in the metropolitan area as well as a proto-BRT system (CEIT planner, personal interview, 2013). However, none of the mayors of Guadalajara or Jalisco governors took these technical studies seriously. However, GDL 2020 leaders were not politically naïve and they knew very well that in order to introduce a new policy such as BRT in the local and state government agenda they needed not only technical arguments but also to put pressure and persuade influential policy actors such as high ranking politicians, people that influence in the urban process (particularly bus company owners) and people with media and public opinion power (GDL 2020 leader 2, personal interview, 2013). As argued by Throgmorton (1996), to get traction, policy and planning ideas need to be not only technically sound, they also need to be persuasively told by credible and trusted messengers. Forums with Bogotá "persuasive practitioners" and study tours to Bogotá became two favorite strategies for GDL 2020 members to persuade these actors, even if, as we will see in the following sections, these local actors could only be persuaded if they saw that Bogotá policies could be aligned with their own interests.

In 2007, Guadalajara mayor Emilio González became governor of the state of Jalisco. Through his participation in a Bogotá study tour and the collaborations that preceded the launching of *Vía Recreactiva*, he had already established a trust relationship with GDL 2020 core members. Furthermore, given the popular acceptance of the program, which had grown from 11 kilometers and 10,000 participants in 2004 to 21.5 kilometers and around 100,000 participants by 2007, he had also become convinced of the potential electoral benefit of promoting the sustainable transport agenda demanded by GDL 2020 and a new generation of bicycle and public space advocacy groups that had emerged in the city since the mid 2000s. While González was involved in many corruption scandals, such as the diversion of public funds to Catholic and conservative organizations and the wasteful spending of Jalisco public resources in the organization of Guadalajara's 2011 Panamerican Games, he had, as noted by one of my informants, "a good political instinct," and saw in *Vía Recreactiva* and BRT two programs that could help him clean up his corrupt image as well as become a political platform for the PAN party to win the following elections.

Therefore, although BRT was included in the state government agenda in 2007 and had the firm support and leadership of the governor, it still required a "policy champion" inside the state government to push the policy through the many state and local planning bureaucratic mazes as well as to build the necessary coalitions to ensure its implementation. In Mexico, states are in charge of mass transit planning but mayors need to approve the implementation of any new project that lies within their borders. Because Guadalajara is a 4.5 million metropolitan region comprised of 8 different municipal governments, building a comprehensive BRT network required the political support of several mayors in the region.

But even if state officials and mayors achieved a political alliance over BRT, the alignment of powerful non-government actors that could block the program was also needed. While in San Francisco, as in most US cities, local merchant associations are often the main opponents of new urban mass transit projects given their fear that losing on-street parking would result in losing customers (Henderson 2013), in Guadalajara, as in most Latin American cities, it is bus company owners, and their associations, who are often the strongest enemies of BRT projects as they see them as a declaration of war on their traditional business model (Flores 2013, Lindau et al. 2014). As we will see in the next sections, study tours to Bogotá played an important role in forming a political champion within the state government –Diego Monraz- as well as in facilitating trust and consensus over BRT among *panista* (members of the PAN party) mayors in Guadalajara and between Monraz and Guadalajara's private bus company owners.

Policy Ownership and Partisan Politics on the Move

While Emilio González was putting together his cabinet during the fall of 2006, he sent Diego Monraz, who would later become chief of Jalisco's transportation department, on a Bogotá study tour funded by GDL 2020. During his tenure, Monraz went 9 times to Bogotá. These visits proved critical for him to take ownership of the project but also to build a network of contacts within the PAN party, with bus company owners and with sustainable transport experts that helped him implement a full-fledged BRT line in Guadalajara in a record time of 2 years. A key study tour that helped him persuade and align officials and mayors around BRT took place in 2006. Funded again by GDL 2020 although led this time by Monraz, two high-ranking representatives of the State of Jalisco and six mayors of Guadalajara's metropolitan region went to Bogotá on a study tour.

This tour was BRT-focused and most of the activities gravitated around different aspects of the Transmilenio system. It was, however, a political mission so the technical and implementation details were less important than understanding the political risks of the project and how to deal with potential opponents. Besides experiencing Transmilenio firsthand, which by then was not new for either Monraz and many of the participants, two things made this tour important. First, meeting with Víctor Raúl Martínez, a former bus company owner that moved from opposing BRT to becoming the director of one of Transmilenio most successful concessionary company, helped them "click:"

> "Víctor Raúl was very clear in his presentation, he was a great salesmen and infected everybody with his enthusiasm… One needs that human touch, from human to human… Do you know when someone tells you about his experience and that helps you click things? Víctor Raúl was the person that helped us click… He touched our head and our heart and all the mayors came back convinced to do something about it" (Monraz, personal interview, 2013)[72]

Meeting Víctor Raúl was important for Monraz to learn firsthand about his experience organizing bus company owners and the importance of aligning them early in the negotiations. Later, as Monraz was implementing BRT in Guadalajara, Victor Raúl also became a valuable ally to persuade Guadalajara bus company owners of the benefits of BRT as well as to threaten them to give the concession to a Colombian company if they did not collaborate with the state government plans.

[72] Original in Spanish: "Víctor Raúl tenía mucha claridad en sus exposiciones, era un gran vendedor y te contagia su enamoramiento por lo que hace… uno necesita el toque humano, de humano a humano… no conocimos a Peñalosa ni a Mockus en ese viaje pero VR nos convenció… ¿como cuando una persona te habla de su experiencia y hace clic? Víctor Raúl fue el que nos ayudó a hacer clic… Víctor Raúl nos tocó el corazón y la cabeza y todos los alcaldes volvieron convencidos de hacer algo"

Figure 18. Víctor Raúl Martínez (center, on his back) talking to a Johannesburg delegation in Bogotá in 2007

Source: BRT Planning Guide (ITDP 2007: p. 194). Photograph by Lloyd Wright

As BRT was becoming Monraz's main political mission within the PAN party, his interest in going to Bogotá and learning from Víctor Raúl and others about what worked well and the mistakes that caused delays in the implementation of Transmilenio was understandable, but what motivated all the other high ranking officials and busy mayors to take a week off to go to Bogotá? According to Monraz the fact that the tour was organized by GDL 2020 was important as "they had already done the *Vía Recreactiva* and they had that credibility, they had success in social management" (Monraz, personal interview, 2013). The motivations of politicians and public officials to go on study tours are, of course, much more complex than that. Ethnographic analysis have shown that the motivations to participate in study tours are often associated with the tourism and leisure aspects of the visit or to the fact that colleagues or acquaintances are going too (González 2011). When male-only groups are involved in study tours, many of my interviewees noted that going to Bogotá's table-dance bars were often off-the-record visits informally organized by participants. While off-the-record, these visits are important parts of study tours and spaces where trust, camaraderie and complicity is built across political factions and potential disagreements over a policy proposal or between politicians and bus company owners. This way of building and facilitating trust seems, however, far from being a unique or inherent characteristic of male groups of Latin American politicians or businessmen. For instance, in her ethnography of deal-making practices in Vietnam, Hoang (2015) has shown the importance of Saigon's luxury hostess bars to build trust and facilitate deals between male groups of Vietnamese state officials and real estate investors noting how "men rely on the labor of hostess-workers to ease the tensions between factions, facilitate personal relations of trust, and broker business deals."

But beyond the leisure aspects of going to Bogotá together with colleagues, there was also an important political motivation that brought all these mayors together. After the local elections that took place in 2006, 6 out of the 8 elected mayors of Guadalajara's metropolitan region were members of the PAN party. It was those 6 *panista* mayors that went together to Bogotá. This was the first time in decades that the PAN party had achieved control of all of the largest local governments in the metropolis so "there was a momentum [among PAN mayors] about doing something together" (Monraz, personal interview, 2013), even if it was less clear what this could be. With funds from GDL 2020, this tour was, in reality, Monraz's attempt to persuade them that a BRT network could be the kind of metropolitan project they could collaborate around as well as a PAN legacy to win the following elections.

In any case, whether "learning from Bogotá" might or not have been the main motivation of the participants to attend this study tour, the ideas mobilized and the trust created by the end of it had important consequences for urban governance in Guadalajara, particularly the alignment of PAN mayors and high ranking state officials around the idea of building a BRT network under the leadership of Monraz. After this tour, many others followed in which influential actors from Guadalajara were brought to Bogotá. As government officials took ownership of the project, many of the tours started to be funded by the state government or, sometimes, by GDL 2020 through government transfers.

Expanding coalitions: study tours as facilitators of public-private alliances

In December 2006, the Jalisco state government sponsored an important study tour led by Monraz in which bus company owners and government bureaucrats were brought to Bogotá. This time: " the idea was to convince *transportistas* (bus company owners) and bring along the novice transport bureaucrats [at Jalisco State government], who did not yet have the profile, to learn [about BRT]" (Monraz, personal interview, 2013).[73] Interestingly, the words *convince* and *learn* are used by Monraz in the same sentence to describe the objective of the study tour. This shows how study tours cannot be easily classified as either learning or governance mechanisms alone. Rather, elements of both are often at work in them. The idea of the "profile" ("el perfil") is also an interesting one: it is a metaphor to refer to a group of insiders that have already been convinced about the appropriateness of the Bogotá model to solve Guadalajara's problems: GDL 2020 empresarios, high-level officials and politicians of the PAN party and the city media elites. In order to implement these policies, however, lower-rank officials and bureaucrats, what Lipsky (1979) called *street-level bureaucracy,* had to be brought into this group of insiders. Study tours also helped that happen.

But while bureaucrats were not likely to confront plans coming from the top of the *panista* hierarchy, associations of bus company owners could very well do so. Examples of blockages and disruptive protests organized by traditional bus company leaders against new BRT projects abound in Latin America (Flores 2013). Incorporating bus companies as concessionaries of a BRT agency controlled by the state is a drastic change to the transportation model that has become entrenched in most Latin American cities since the 1950s in which competing private companies with multi-year bus route permits provide their services with minimal state supervision or accountability (Vasconcelos 2001, Lindau et al. 2014). In Guadalajara, this assemblage of old buses, overworked drivers, unaccountable bus company owners and corrupt transport bureaucrats, popularly known as the *pulpo camionero* (bus octopus), results not only in very low public transport standards but also in frequent fatal

[73] Original in Spanish: "La idea era convencer a los transportistas y llevar a funcionarios neófitos que no traían el perfil para que aprendieran."

accidents that kill, every year, between 40 and 70 people including public transport users, pedestrians and bicyclists (citation). BRT is not, however, necessarily a threat to this entrenched system, especially if only one or two BRT lines are built. Newly created BRT agencies do not become in charge of the whole public transport system but only of routes in the new BRT corridors. The companies that own those routes are the ones that need to become concessionaries or shareholders of the new BRT agency. The rest of bus routes are, often, untouched.

Guadalajara *transportistas* had already been to Curitiba in the 1990s in the same trip organized jointly with CEIT state planners. As noted above, while this study tour resulted in many pro-BRT technical documents produced by planners, it did not result in any significant policy change in Guadalajara. This time, however, Monraz's aggresive leadership and the governor support for BRT were about to change things. The December 2006 trip led by Monraz brought to Bogotá some of the most important *transportista* leaders in Guadalajara, including representatives of the two main bus associations in the metropolis: the *Alianza de Camioneros* and *Sistecozome*. Together, they attended several workshops on public transport at Bogotá's Tequendama Hotel and rode bikes together during Ciclovía. But as noted by one study tour participant, "we were mostly taken to Bogotá to talk to Víctor Raúl Martínez" (Guadalajara bus company owner, personal interview, 2013). All the participants met with Víctor Raúl Martínez at Transmilenio garages and toured not only the stations but also the offices of Martínez's BRT concessionary company SI99, located next to the garages. A tour of SI99 headquarters has also become a common part of Bogotá study tours, especially when bus company owners from other cities are involved. I was indeed given this tour when I went to interview Víctor Raúl in Bogotá. In contrast with the austere and poorly maintained common areas available for bus drivers in Guadalajara, SI99's headquarters were clean and shiny. In the first floor, a glass-window gym facilities for workers is among the first thing one see but there is also a modern and colorful cantina with an affordable menu where Víctor Raúl invited me for lunch. The cantina was packed with drivers, secretaries and SI99 staff. Víctor Raúl's office was located on the second floor among other air-conditioned modern offices with plenty of sofás and spaces to seat and chat.

Tours of BRT concessionary offices are, indeed, part of a longer genealogy that Víctor Raúl Martínez knows very well given his involvement in the organization of more than 10 study tours to Brazil in the late 1990s that were critical for the implementation of Transmilenio in Bogotá. Here an explanation of this experience is in order to better understand how Martínez had already used study tours as a tool to persuade other Bogotá *transportadores* when he was an independent bus company owner himself. When Enrique Peñalosa announced in 1998 that he was determined to build a BRT network in Bogotá, the 64 Bogotá private bus companies that existed at the time opposed and revolted around idea, organizing several strikes that paralyzed the city for days. Víctor Raúl Martínez was the first bus company owner to support the idea. While Peñalosa had hired a professional team including several psychologists and negotiating experts to convince bus company owners to join forces and become concessionaries of Transmilenio S.A., it was through Víctor Raúl that these negotiations were able to succeed and, here again, study tours played a fundamental role. The son of a famous and respected Bogotá bus leader, Víctor Raúl had earned an MBA and worked abroad for some years. After he came back to Bogotá in the mid 1990s to take control of his father's company, he undertook a comprehensive analysis of his family business and realized that the old business model that relied on low-paid drivers and old buses that were expensive to maintain was not only barely financially sustainable but had also originated a dangerous cycle of competition between drivers to pick up as many passengers as possible,

popularly known as *la guerra del centavo* (the war of the penny), that resulted in very low quality standards and numerous fatal accidents.[74]

Between 1998 and 2000, Víctor Raúl led more than 10 study tours to Brazil and Ecuador organized first by Bogotá's local government and later by himself with funding from Volvo and other bus manufacturing companies. The objective of these tours was to persuade Bogotá private bus leaders to change their business model and join him in becoming BRT concessionaries. During them, Bogotá *transportadores* [75] toured the famous Curitiba *Rede Integrada de Transporte* (RIT) system but were also brought to Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Quito to observe different ways in which bus companies could be integrated as concessionaries of a centralized system. Because many of these tours were sponsored by bus manufacturers, they often included visits to Mercedes and Volvo bus factories in Curitiba as, in case of becoming concessionaries, they would eventually have to choose and buy a common model for all the buses. Several of my interviewees in Bogotá noted that there was one tour that was particularly critical to persuade Bogotá *transportadores* to become Transmilenio concessionaries. This took place during a visit to Brazil where one Sao Paulo bus concessionary arrived by helicopter to the meeting:

> "A very important moment [of the negotiations] was when Bogotá bus company owners met with a Brazilian transport businessmen in Sao Paulo and he arrived to the meeting by helicopter. He told them how he also started in the businesss with a Chevrolet [old bus]. This was so important because they realized that there were possibilities of making good business [if they changed their business model] "
> (Former Head of Transmilenio, personal interview, 2012)

A former member of Peñalosa's team in charge of the negotiations with Bogotá *transportadores* reveals more details about how this "aha" moment was, indeed, carefully orchestrated by the team formed by Bogotá local government negotiators and Víctor Raúl Martínez:

> "In Sao Paulo I wanted to show them examples of two or three rich [transport] companies, as people learn with examples they experience. There, I had met a [transport] businessman that arrived to his office by helicopter as it is very difficult to move around in Sao Paulo… I knew that this was going to impress Bogotá bus company owners "look, you are such poor men, look what an important and well organized transport company looks like, and it is so profitable that the owners are able to transport themselves to the office everyday by helicopter." Those examples soak through much more than any other thing. I needed that they see their offices, that they would tell each other "they have helicopters and cars with chauffers… look at their nice canteens." We needed to awake in them the sense that the transport industry was not a poor men's industry."
> (Former Head of Negotiations with Bogotá transportadores, personal interview, 2013)

Interestingly, it was in Sao Paulo, which did not even have a BRT at the time, rather than in Curitiba where Bogotá bus leaders had this realization. It was the mobilization of individual and collective aspirations through encounters with peer transportation businessmen rather

---

[74] Because Bogotá bus companies linked bus driver's wages to the number of people they picked up rather than to the number of miles or hours worked, bus drivers in Bogotá entered in harsh competitions with each other that often ended in fatal accidents. Initially, many transportadores were both route owners and drivers but, as they accumulated routes, they were also able to establish larger companies that hired low-paid drivers for operating the route they owned in exchange of a fixed amount of money

[75] In Guadalajara, bus company owners are called *transportistas*. In Bogotá they are called *transportadores*. I use both terms in this chapter depending on whether I am refering to Guadalajara or Bogotá bus company owners.

than the common characteristics of cities, urban structures or legislations what facilitated this particular alignment. In this case, this experience facilitated learning but that learning experience resulted into action because the experience was able to activate a particular individual aspiration. To reinforce these aspirations through experiential learning processes, the tour included visits to different cities as part of a carefully designed "persuasion plan" in which the team of negotiators of Bogotá local government sought to "control the narratives:"

> "I also brought them to Quito. In order to implement a persuasion plan one needs to control the narratives, right? I brought them there so that "look, you thought you were more developed than the Ecuadorians?... I mean, they already knew that Brazil was more developed [than Colombia], but "look, even here in Ecuador they have better transportation systems" and, yes, they also have [poor] companies like yours."
> (Former Head of Negotiations with Bogotá transportadores, personal interview, 2013)

After participating in this tour, Víctor Raúl Martínez helped led many other study tours of Bogotá *transportadores* that eventually led to the creation of SI99, which stands for Yes (to Transmilenio) 1999. SI99 was comprised by 35 small bus company owners and became the first pro-Transmilenio concessionary company in Bogotá. However, according to the head of the local government negotiating committtee, while there were many study tours organized by Víctor Raúl, it was the one to Sao Paulo where local officials and transportadores went together that had the most importance. He, therefore, confirms a distinction or typology that many of my interviewees have made regardig study tours between those aimed at political persuasion to introduce a new policy (agenda-setting) and those aimed at learning technical issues once the decision of building a BRT has already been made:

> *Head of negotiating committee*: That one trip was the decisive one. Then there were other trips related to the day-to-day [management] of Transmilenio but those did not have such political relevance as this one.
>
> *Sergio*: Why did that one have more political relevance?
>
> *Head of negotiating committee*: Beacuse all the *transportadores* came with us to that one, we showed them around, we convinced them, because after that trip they came back convinced about it. Then there were other trips that Víctor Raúl did as well, to solve or obtain knowledge about particular financing problems, to go buy buses, to go and see how bidding processes are done, or to learn other things. But those were mostly procedural trips, mere procedures let's say, the decisive one was that one trip"

Bringing Guadalajara *transportistas* to Bogotá and showing them around SI99 offices aimed at persuading them to become concessionaries of Guadalajara's BRT through the creation of a similar setting that worked to persuade Bogotá transportistas in Sao Paulo in the late 1990s. Indeed, reflecting on the objectives of this tour, a leader of GDL 2020 made a very similar comment to what happened in Bogotá bus company owners in Sao Paulo:

"[Guadalajara trasnsportistas] were brought to Bogotá and there the leader of Bogotá's transportistas told them about how their old business did not have any future based on their incomes. This was very powerful, that someone from "peer to peer" tells you this. They were going to listen to him more than to someone that does not belong to the guild"

(GDL 2020 leader 2, personal interview, 2013) [76]

However, interviews with Guadalajara *transportistas* reveal that while the visit to SI99 did impress them, they never fully trusted Víctor Raúl because they thought he was going to get the concession of Guadalajara's first BRT line. In that sense, the alliance between Diego Monraz and Víctor Raúl Martínez, consolidated through the organization of study tours, became a mechanism in the hands of Monraz not only to build trust relationships with bus company leaders in Guadalajara but also to diminish their negotiation power. Unlike the many bus company strikes that often precede the introduction of new BRT lines in Latin American cities, in Guadalajara the fear of *transportistas* that the concession would be given to the Colombians if they did not collaborate with the government helped Monraz implement his ambitious *panista* plans to build a BRT line in less than two years with little opposition.

Hewlett Foundation and Colectivo Ecologista Jalisco (CEJ): Mobilizing Public Opinion

So far, I have analyzed examples of South-South study tours –Guadalajara-Bogota, Bogotá-Sao Paulo, Bogotá-Quito- in which funding came mostly from local organizations, with the exception of some of the study tours of Bogotá transportadores to Brazilian cities, which were funded by Volvo and Mercedes. But transnational actors have also been involved in the study tours that took place between Bogotá and Guadalajara that led to the implementation of Guadalajara's Macrobús BRT. In Guadalajara, they first appeared in 2007 when Hewlett Foundation provided funds to the local environmental NGO *Colectivo Ecologista Jalisco* (CEJ) to organize a study tour to Bogotá to help mobilize public opinion in favor of building a BRT system. In the following sections I analyze the ways in which transnational actors promoted the process of inter-city policy learning between Guadalajara and Bogotá through the mobilization of local public opinon, namely by funding the travel of Guadalajara journalists to Bogotá. In doing that, I show the important role of the local media and public opinion in promoting policy circulation as well as the practices through which US foundations are able to influence public opinion and the media in cities of the global South through the collaboration with local NGOs and non-profits.

While GDL 2020 chose to align Guadalajara's local media elites –the owners and editors of the main local newspapers- into the project of replicating Bogotá policies through different mechanisms, including personal connections as well as formal and informal activities during Peñalosa's talk in Guadalajara in 2003, CEJ sought to align the reporters that actually write and talk every day about urban transportation in local newspapers and radio stations:

> "Starting in 2007, we, reporters, began to be educated in issues of sustainable mobility. GDL 2020 and CEJ introduced the issue in Guadalajara, a new concept for most politicians and the media in Guadalajara… GDL 2020 disseminated the issue among *empresarios* and politicians and CEJ was more focused on educating the ordinary reporter" (Local reporter, personal interview, 2013) [77]

[76] Original in Spanish: "Por ejemplo se les llevó a Bogotá y allí el líder de los transportistas de Bogotá les contó cómo ese viejo negocio no tenía futuro en base a ingresos [Victor Raúl Martínez imagino]. Esto era muy poderoso, que alguien "de igual a igual" se lo dijera ya que les iban a hacer más caso que si lo dice alguien que no es del gremio."

[77] Original in Spanish: "En 2007, los reporteros se empiezan a educar en temas de movilidad sustentable… Guadalajara 2020 y el Colectivo Ecologista Jalisco introdujeron el tema en Guadalajara, un concepto nuevo para la mayoría de los politicos y los medios en Guadalajara. Guadalajara 2020 se encargó de difundir el tema entre empresarios y politicos y el Colectivo tuvo más impacto social y en los medios, estaban más enfocado en educar a los reporteros de a pie."

Colectivo Ecologista Jalisco (CEJ) is a non-partisan environmental NGO founded in 1986 by a University of Guadalajara professor. Since its creation, CEJ has been involved in different campaigns in the city including air pollution, toxics, environmental health and waste management. CEJ first involvement in urban transportation dates back from 1994, when they covered with a gas mask the statue of goddess Minerva, located in one of the most iconic plazas of Guadalajara, to denounce the city's air pollution due to increased car use. While the image was highly visible in local newspapers, the campaign did not have the desired results in terms of changing Guadalajara's government policies towards favoring public transportation and bicycles as the local media and the government perceived the organization as a group of reactionary activists rather than a "legitimate" policy actor. This, however, would change in the mid 2000s when urban transportation issues were taken up again by CEJ after receiving a generous grant from Hewlett Foundation to promote sustainable urban mobility in the city.

Hewlett provided CEJ with funds to influence urban policy but also with valuable resources such as their international reputation and network of contacts, which helped bring international experts in sustainable urban transportation to Guadalajara via ITDP and EMBARQ, who were also Hewlett grantees in Mexico. Hewlett also trained CEJ members in media strategies to influence policy and funded and helped them organized a study tour of local reporters to Bogotá and Curitiba that was key to change CEJ perception in the media*:*

> "By 2008, CEJ had already about 200 newspaper articles published in mobility issues. The production of press briefs started in 2006 but what really catapulted them was the [Hewlett] study tour to Curitiba and Bogotá" (Silva, personal interview, 2014)[78]

Before analyzing this study tour, it is important to understand CEJ own interpretation of their sources of urban power to influence policy agendas so that we can better understand the ways in which the tour was design to help introduce BRT in Guadalajara's local agenda. While CEJ interpretation of power to influence the local policy agenda is different from GDL 2020, given that the NGO has less high-level personal connections, the leaders of both organizations coincide in highlighting the important role that the media and public opinion leaders have to introduce new policy issues in the city. For Mario Silva, the person in charge of CEJ sustainable mobility programs, to introduce a new item in Guadalajara's agenda it is key to access what he calls "the red circle," which he defines as "the circle of power or those that form and control public opinion about public issues in the city" (Silva interview, 2014). He further reveals four ways in which an advocate or NGO representative can access the local "red circle" or, in other words, to become a public opinion leader able to influence local policy agendas: 1) writing or being mentioned in columns and op eds in local newspapers; 2) producing -or helping journalists produce- investigative reports; 3) appearing in political gossip columns; and 4) moving from generating *reactionary briefs* ("notas de reacción") or giving opinions about topics that are already being discussed in the media towards generating *information briefs* ("notas de información") or placing new discussion topics in the media by producing and presenting your own data and reports.

Nine people participated in the CEJ-Hewlett study tour to Bogotá, Sao Paulo and Curitiba that took place from June 30 until July 7, 2007: three reporters from the main local newspapers (El Informador, Mural and Público), two radio reporters (Notisistema and Radio Universidad de Guadalajara), the communication director of Jalisco's Department of

[78] Original in Spanish: "En 2008, el CEJ ya tenía como 200 notas de prensa publicadas en temas de movilidad. La producción de notas empezó en 2006 pero lo que realmente las catapultó fueron los viajes a Bogotá y Curitiba"

Transportation, two CEJ representatives and one from Hewlett Foundation. One the main objectives of the tour was that local reporters would learn about the kind of sustainable mobility policies that Hewlett and CEJ wanted to promote in Guadalajara by experiencing them in other Latin American peer cities. These included learning new concepts such as BRT, *Ciclovía* or "non-motorized mobility," which at the time not only were unknown for the average citizen in Guadalajara but also for their journalists. Thanks to Hewlett's contacts, they were also able to interview important personalities in the world of sustainable transportation such as Jaime Lerner, former mayor of Curitiba, Edgar Sandoval, first head of Bogotá's *Transmilenio* BRT and Víctor Raúl Martínez. They also met with journalists at Bogotá's *El Tiempo* newspaper. These meetings provided material that reporters used to write articles for weeks. Very importantly, the study tour to Bogotá, Sao Paulo and Curitiba was able to "convert" them to the sustainable transportation gospel. After the study tour, "reporters themselves became activists of sustainable urban mobility in Guadalajara" (Silva, personal interview, 2014).

Hewlett's international reputation and its perception as a neutral agency also helped mobilized the journalists. When asked about why they accepted to go to the tour, many of the journalists interviewed say that the fact that Hewlett organized the tour made it sound more prestigious and respectable, especially "because it was not organized by the government, because that could have been read like they were buying us" (local reporter 2, personal interview 2013). When talking with journalists, the funding sources behind study tours are much more scrutinized than with other actors I interviewed. Because government officials and politicians often attempt to "buy out" journalists in Mexico, some local newspapers in Guadalajara have explicit policies that ban their employees from accepting any kind of gifts that come from the government. A reporter from the local Mural newspaper mentioned that they were not even allowed to eat or drink coffee in press conferences organized by the government. Because Hewlett is perceived as a prestigious apolitical international foundation these conflicts of interest do not exist even if, with the organization of study tours, Hewlett has a political agenda as well.

This 6-day tour resulted in a large number of articles, reports and radio shows in Guadalajara that helped positioned sustainable urban mobility issues in the local public opinion. But there was another important outcome of the study tour: it helped create legitimacy and a trust relationship between the person in charge of urban mobility programs at CEJ –Mario Silva- and local reporters. This trust was built over repeated and informal face-to-face contacts while sharing flights, making dinner plans or going out and dancing cumbia together. After the tour, CEJ was positioned in the local media as an expert in sustainable mobility and Silva became a credible spokesperson and legitimate source of information. When reporters needed to write an article about transportation in the city, they directly called his cell phone to interview him or ask him for specific data through *whatsapp* messages. In this way, the collaboration between reporters and CEJ and the trust built during the study tour funded by Hewlett helped not only give issues of sustainable urban mobility more visibility in the local media but also situated CEJ closer to Guadalajara's *red circle*. As reporters kept writing about BRT and bicycle policies and editors and directors –some of whom are part of GDL 2020- gave these articles priority, journalists helped mobilized public opinion in favor of sustainable urban mobility policies in Guadalajara and put pressure on the government to do something about it. Whereas in the 2006 local and state elections in Guadalajara urban mobility was not a significant issue in the public agenda, only a year after the topic had become highly visible and politicized. By 2007, new civil society groups such as *Ciudad para Todos* and *GDL en Bici* had emerged to protest the top-down construction of car-oriented

infrastructure and the lack of car alternatives to move around the city (Díaz 2011, Soto 2012) while the implementation of Guadalajara's second BRT line became an electoral battleground that confronted PRI and PAN political leaders in the 2009 local elections (Arriaga & Silva 2012).

Conclusions

The analysis of Bogotá study tours that I undertook in this chapter points at three interesting findings. First, while having culturally and geographically proximate examples is important to organize study tours, the interviews confirmed also the important role of having multiple points of reference to effectively mobilize a policy. By now, Bogotá is only one among the different BRT meccas of this network of transnational actors. Although Bogotá has been the destination of many study tours to promote BRT and bicycle policies, having other examples of "peer" cities is of critical importance. Many study tours include Bogotá as one of many stops in a double effort to persuade participants that what they are experiencing is part of a global trend but also so that participants can identify with other "peer" cities in terms of size, urban structure, etc. Second, the evidence presented in this chapter confirms also the role of study tours as both experiential learning and governance mechanisms that are used by public and private actors as well as non-profits. Study tours are particularly helpful to create policy converts, building consensus around a policy and creating trust so that coalitions can be expanded. This chapter showed also the important role of study tours as instruments to alter public opinion through the mobilization of journalists and reporters, something that is under-theorized in the practice-focused literature on study tours and, in general, in the policy mobilities debates. Third, while Bogotá study tours have been characterized and celebrated as South-South and South-North knowledge exchanges, they have often been, even if not always, mediated by a set of actors, organizations and agendas based in the global North. Particularly, development banks such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank and think tanks funded by global philanthropy such as ITDP and EMBARQ have used Bogotá's *Transmilenio* BRT in an effort to spread their particular interpretation of sustainable transport worldwide based on cost-effective and impact-oriented transportation policy solutions. However, as the example of Guadalajara illustrates, local organizations and politicians have also used study tours in pursuing their own urban governance and politicial objectives.

In her book *Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development*, Jennifer Robinson (2006) argued that urban theory needs to move beyond conceptualizations of a modern North and a developing South. The analysis of the local and transnational actors and networks that organized study tours to Bogotá's *Transmilenio* in this chapter suggest that we also need to move beyond ideas of Northern vs. Southern policy networks towards looking at the multi-directional traffic of policy models and collaborations between policy actors situated in the North and the South. This conceptualization of urban policy and "best practices" can help us reveal less evident local and transnational collaborations that shape urban policy and construct certain policies and interventions in models and best practices while rendering other immobile.

Chapter 5. Digital Policy Platforms: Leveraging Urban Policy Change through the Circulation of Digital Objects

"Without question, digital technology has accelerated
the tempo of the world's activity and the pervasiveness of human connections.
Many of us are far more connected to stories and information
than we have ever been, yet the noise and ubiquity of this digital world
makes it harder to surface and share personal stories of change and impact…
Now it's time to give social impact organizations the
tools and connections they need to tell more and better stories
—paired with specific asks that convert audiences up a ladder of engagement.
Through the ideas in this report, we envision an innovative
new storytelling marketplace, where for the first time
social impact organizations can leverage an interactive platform
that provides strategic guidance, content, case studies and links
to capacity building tools—all to elevate the practice of digital storytelling."
(Rockefeller Foundation 2014: pp. 1-2) [79]

"Streetfilms first major publicity came following a visit to Bogotá, Colombia
in late 2007 by introducing the advocacy community
to the weekly car-free event in Bogotá called Ciclovia,
Since publication, that film has been viewed over 250,000 times
and U.S. cities like Portland, Los Angeles, and San Francisco
are just a few who have cited it as an integral resource
inspiring their leaders to try their own celebrations."
Streetfilms.org website [80]

Introduction

In May 2014, the Rockefeller Foundation, in collaboration with the DC-based strategic communication company Hattaway Communications, unveiled its "Digital Storytelling for Social Change" report. Based on several interviews with leaders in entertainment media and news, brand strategy, technology, philanthropy, government, nonprofits and businesses, the report sought to explore and suggest practical advice on the ways in which digital technology could "elevate the practice of storytelling" to help expand the influence capacity of organizations focused on social and policy change. In a section called "digital storytelling platforms" the report analyzed different formats and platforms to communicate stories online that could be effective in promoting change. After an analysis of several digital formats – including text, images, and videos- and platforms -including email, blogs, social media and online video platforms among others- the report suggested that online videos, whether on video platforms such as YouTube or Vimeo or embedded in blogs or social media platforms, were among the most promising digital formats to captivate audiences and inspire change worldwide:

---

[79] https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/app/uploads/Digital-Storytelling-for-Social-Impact.pdf (accessed Dec 1, 2014)

[80] http://www.streetfilms.org/about/history/ (accessed July 22, 2015)

> "Because video uses images, sound and movement, it can be the most captivating digital format for storytelling. It's also the most popular: users are more likely to click on videos than other content. The medium allows the audience to experience stories emotionally, and to connect with the people whose lives are featured—which can encourage empathy and further motivate people to take action. "Virality" can also be achieved through highly entertaining, interesting or moving content, expanding reach to new audiences and potentially gaining visibility in traditional news media."
> (Rockefeller Foundation 2014: p. 22)

The previous two chapters of this dissertation analyzed policy forums and study tours as key infrastructures of policy learning that facilitated the circulation of Bogotá's *Transmilenio* and *Ciclovía* through the inspiration, persuasion and alignment of multi-actor coalitions. This was done by exposing them to the Bogotá story of urban transformation through the charismatic and emotional speeches of Bogotá's "persuasive practitioners" as well as through "eye-opening" learning experiences in the form of study tours to Bogotá to see *Transmilenio* or *Ciclovía* firsthand. In this chapter I show that due to the increased use of information and communication technologies, not only is there a mobile infrastructure of policy circulation in the form of conferences and study tours, there is also a virtual infrastructure in the form of blog posts, online "best practice" guides and videos embedded in different digital platforms that have very actively contributed to the global circulation of the Bogotá model. This "immobile" way of traveling -immobile from the point of view of the policy actor- has made it such that policy makers, planners and policy advocates around the world can be familiar with the experience of Bogotá and use it in their proposals to change planning decisions in their cities without having actually been there.

Many of my interviewees in San Francisco noted how their first encounters with Bogotá's *Transmilenio* or *Ciclovía* often took place via text, images or videos circulated online through different digital platforms such as email, policy blogs or social media. For example, a member of the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition noted how before going to the 2008 Portland conference described in Chapter 3 they have already heard about *Ciclovía* through a video posted in Streetfilms.org: "we ha[d] already seen the video, we are big fans of Streetsblog and Streetfilms so we already knew about it " (SFBC member, personal interview, 2010). The 9-minute video shows the streets of Bogotá during a regular Sunday *Ciclovía* event and the opinion of about ten *Bogotanos* from different ages, genders, and socio-economic statuses. English subtitles were added when the conversation was in Spanish. Since 2007 this video has been seen more than 250,000 times and has been circulated globally through progressive urban policy blogs, personal websites, tweets and facebook pages. Many of my interviewees in San Francisco also noted how the video was key to persuade the mayor to implement a Ciclovía-style program in San Francisco in 2008. But how exactly are digital materials like this video able to persuade people and promote policy change?

In this chapter, I am interested in the practices and digital materialities that are behind the online circulation of urban policies as well as the role of digital objects in processes of urban policy change. Digital materials are not just floating around in the internet. Similar to the organization of conferences or study tours, it is important to situate the production and circulation of digital materials within a political economy that is both local and transnational: who produces digital material on Bogotá and why? How do these digital materials help empower particular local actors and certain agendas in cities? The chapter is divided as follows. First, I briefly review a set of debates that can help us conceptualize the relationship between policy circulation, urban politics and digital objects. While policy mobilities authors

have started to theorize and analyze the everyday practices and the many sites and "situations" through which policies circulate, there is a lack of attention in these debates to the role that digital materials play in global policy circulations. To do so I bring together recent debates on actor-network theory in planning with debates on the relationship between media and urban politics to provide a framework of analysis that is more attentive to the role of digital technologies and objects in processes of policy change. Second, to explore this role in practice, I retroactively follow through a combination of digital archival research and multi-sited interviews in New York, Bogotá and San Francisco, three key moments in the production and circulation of Streetfilms.org *Ciclovía* video: 1) the creation of Streetsblog.org and Streetfilms.org in 2006 in New York funded by US philanthropist Mark Gorton; 2) the shooting of the video in Bogotá in 2007 and its editing in New York by Streetsblog and Streetfilms staff; and 3) the mobilization of the video in San Francisco in 2008 by the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition and the ways in which the video altered urban governance dynamics and facilitated policy change. In doing so, this chapter provides also an experimental territorial-relational methodology to study the digital materialities through which policies increasingly circulate. This methodology is attentive to the active role of digital objects such as blog posts, images or videos play in shaping planning processes as well as to the local and transnational political economies in which the practices of production and circulation of these objects are embedded.

The Political Agency of Media and Digital Objects

Planning with things

In a provocative article called *Planning With Things*, Robert Beauregard (2012) argued that in planning theory "humans are given ontological status and nonhumans are denied it" (Beauregard 2012: p. 183). In other words, he argued that while objects such as apartment buildings, buses, renders or photographs are certainly acknowledged in theorizations of planning processes, planning theorists have traditionally reduced nonhumans to objects that are passively manipulated by human actors without properly considering -and explaining- the role that objects play in shaping and allowing particular planning outcomes. For instance, analyzing the transcript of a planning deliberation process between an architect, an urban developer and a group of urban planners described by Forester (1996), Beauregard shows the important role that "a site plan, a three-dimensional model and photographs" played in the final planning decision of building a new urban development project: "absent these objects, the discussion would have proceeded with greater uncertainty. Talk would have been highly speculative, with each participant unsure as to the references made by others" (Beauregard 2012: p. 184).

In making this argument, Beauregard joins a number of planning and urban studies scholars that are demanding more attentive theoretical treatment to the role that objects and networks of humans and nonhumans play in planning practice (Rydin 2012, Lieto & Beauregard 2013, Healey 2011) and, more broadly, in the making of cities (Gandy 2005, McFarlane 2011, Farías & Bender 2012). This move in planning theory and urban studies is part of a broader shift in the social sciences that, since the late 1980s, has sought to critique the tenets in which the whole modern scientific method has been built: the separation between humans and nature (Latour 1993, Haraway 1991). For instance, Bruno Latour (1993) has argued that modern science erased hybridity from academic accounts of reality in its effort to divide and classify knowledge into lean categories and disciplinary boxes. Latour's (1993) argument is not that we are entering a post-post-modern era but rather that "we have never been modern." In other words, even though the scientific method adopted by the

social sciences only gives agency to humans in the explanation of social processes, our everyday life has always been affected by combinations of diverse objects and subjects so this new way of thinking beyond the human/nature divide should not surprise us at all. For Latour (2005) agency should be thought in relational and always shifting terms, i.e., as a capacity predicated on the associations of different actors, whether human or nonhuman, rather than thinking of agency as an intrinsic characteristic of certain human actors. Building on the work of Law (1986) and Callon (1986), Latour (1999) started to delineate in the 1990s a methodology to study reality by rendering visible the connections and associations between subjects and objects, something that he has developed further under the idea of actor-network theory (ANT):

> "ANT is not the empty claim that objects do things 'instead' of human actors: it simply says that no science of the social can even begin if the question of who and what participates in the action is not first of all thoroughly explored, even though it might mean letting elements in which, for lack of a better term, we would call *non-humans*… The project of ANT is simply to extend the list and modify the shapes and figures of those assembled as participants and to design a way to make them act as a durable whole" (Latour 2005: p. 72).

Advocates of using ANT in planning and urban studies argue that this perspective can offer new ways to analyze cities and urban processes relationally, moving beyond conceptualizations of the urban as merely a "container" that is passively affected by global flows, ideas and agendas towards new concepts such as actor-networks or assemblages that seeks to situate process of city-making and urban policymaking as a co-production of both local and global forces and human and non-human actors (Graham & Marvin 2001, Allen & Cochrane 2007, McFarlane 2011, Farías & Bender 2012, Healey 2013). In that context, the emergence of a new technology is not just a new tool used by already powerful human actors to do what they were doing before but it can also reshape the very distribution of power between actors in urban governance structures.

The limits of relationality to conceptualize urban politics and planning

These efforts to put 'assemblage' and ANT approaches at the center of contemporary urban and planning theory have been questioned by more orthodox neo-Marxist urban scholars, who fear that the more fluid accounts of power in ANT and assemblage theory will result in an underestimation of the importance of institutional arrangements and political economy issues (Brenner, Madden and Wachsmuth 2011). Other authors, however, do not see relational vs. political economy accounts of cities and urban policy as a dichotomy as long as the networks and connections between human and nonhuman actors are grounded in the territorial political economy dynamics that always restrain their actions, practices and travels. For example, Beaumont & Nicholls have emphasized the importance of not leaving territorial dynamics as a secondary aspect of networks: "Territories do not come at the expense of extensive networks and flows but, rather, they are constituted by and contribute to these social networks" (Beaumont and Nicholls 2007: p. 2559).

McCann and Ward (2010) provide an alternative to this dilemma by proposing to think about urban policymaking as a "relational/territorial" process, that is, paying attention to the ways in which urban policy is co-constituted by connections to both situated and circulating actors, agendas and socio-political struggles:

> "while there are substantial literatures in urban studies that emphasize cities' relationality and fluidity and while there are other equally important literatures that emphasize their territoriality, we argue that urban policy-making must be understood as both relational and

territorial; as both in motion and simultaneously fixed, or embedded in place" (McCann & Ward 2010: p. 176).

Among the literatures that McCann and Ward refer as putting too much emphasis on "territorial" dynamics are the "growth machine" debates in urban politics (Logan & Molotch 1987, Cox & Mair 1989). These literatures have important lessons about how urban policy is often shaped by coalitions of actors under the narrative of local economic growth. Yet, as Jonas (2015) has recently pointed out, there is a need to develop more relational understandings of urban politics that are able to better conceptualize how changing global discourses such as current concerns around sustainability and climate change –and their associated scientific and policy objects- create new possibilities for urban coalitions and associations between urban actors that do not only respond to the politics of urban regimes and "growth machine:"

"The discursive landscape of urban development is rapidly becoming colonized by references to sustainability, climate adaptation, and low-carbon economy, each in its turn a sign of a "new environmental politics of urban development" (NEPUD) (Jonas, Gibbs and While 2011)… The spaces where these new politics play out are battlegrounds between conflicting visions and political rationalities underpinning discourses of mobility, sustainability and economic growth" (Jonas 2015: p. 285).

Mediating urban planning and policy-making: digital objects and planning practice

While there has been an interest in developing a more relational vocabulary in planning and urban studies to conceptualize the urban policy process as co-constituted by networks of humans and nonhumans that are both local and transnational, the role of the media in urban politics and policymaking processes remains under-explored despite the increasing ubiquity of the media and technology-mediated objects in everyday life (Featherstone 2007). For instance, according to Rodgers et al (2014), debates about media and urban politics can be divided in two threads. First, traditional analysis of urban politics that foucs on studying the ways in which media elites are aligned into powerful local "growth machine" coalitions (Cox 1999, Logan & Molotch 1987). These studies often equate the role of the media with a specific set of elite actors, particularly owners of local newspapers, and analyze the ways in which these media elites can empower local coalitions of public and private actors. Second, a more recent strand of literature that analyzes media as a privileged medium through which urban representations, imaginaries and city brands are produced and circulated (Beauregard 2003, Greenberg 2008). For example, Greenberg (2008) has shown the role that the media has played in constructing and circulating a particular branding of New York aimed at selling the city. Rodgers et al. (2014) argue that in both accounts, however, "the media are seen as merely representing a preexisting world of interests and ideologies." They advocate instead for an approach in which the media and media objects are conceptualized as active agents that shape everyday practices in the city and, therefore, urban politics. In this account, the power of the media is not thought as absolute or residing in the owners and executives of local media companies. Rather the emphasis is on the everyday, on what people do with media and how the media and media objects allow or limit possibilities for political alliances and action in the city.

Related are debates about the "narrative turn" in planning (Forester 1993, Throgmorton 1996, Sandercock 2003). These authors have argued that planning is always performed through stories and narratives. In recent years, however, storytelling techniques are quickly changing and evolving as new technological innovations occur and spread. This has

not diminished the power of narratives and storytelling. Rather, advances in technology have open up new ways to communicate and transfer stories. For instance, in her exploration of the role of storytelling techniques over time, "from the campfire to the computer," Leonie Sandercock (2010: p. xxii) has argued that "multimedia is fast becoming the twenty-first century's favoured form of storytelling."

In the remainder of this chapter I build on these two debates -the need to pay more attention to the role of nonhuman actors in urban planning and the role of media objects in urban politics- by examining the ways in which a video on Bogotá's *Ciclovía* allowed for the passing of a Ciclovía-style program in San Francisco. While giving agency to the video and emphasizing the practices through which the video allowed for urban policy change in San Francisco, I also trace the local and transnational political economy that surrounded the production and circulation of this video. As the following sections will show, digital objects such as online videos are not just passive objects simply used by powerful policy actors to reproduce urban political and power dynamics, they also have the capacity to change urban governance structures through facilitating new associations of actors.

Creating Digital Platforms of Policy Circulation: Streetsblog and Streetfilms

The production and wide circulation of Bogotá's *Ciclovía* video cannot be understood without the creation of the digital platforms Streetsblog.org and her sister website Streetfilms.org- in New York City in 2006. In the last decade, Streetsblog has become a common news source for progressive transportation planners and sustainable transportation advocates in the US. With more than 5,000 daily readers, the blog provides daily information about sustainable transportation initiatives happening throughout the world in the form of short blog posts often accompanied by images. Streetfilms, on the other hand, produces short films about sustainable transport policies of cities that they see as US or international "best practices" in the field that they then distribute online in an effort to inspire policymakers and advocates in many cities at once. As of 2015, they have produced around 500 videos that have been viewed over 5 million times.[81] Streetfilms videos are viewed not only in their website, but also the possibility of embedding them in other websites and their effort in distributing physical copies have significantly increased their audience.

Philanthrocapitalism and the Political Economy of Digital Policy Platforms

Both Streetsblog and Streetfilms were created thanks to funding from Mark Gorton, a financier and hedge-fund millionaire behind the creation of LimeWire, the world leading peer-to-peer file sharing software between 2000 until 2010. He is also the founder of Tower Research Capital, a high-frequency trading company that is increasingly replacing traditional stock exchange traders with electronically designed algorithms that can buy and sell stocks much faster than humans. With more than 400 employees worldwide, Tower Research Capital, which he founded in 1998, is today responsible for more than half of all stock trading in the United States. Besides a millionaire, Mark Gorton is also an avid biker and an enthusiast of non-car forms of urban transportation. Using a similar approach to the new generation of philanthropists that Bishop and Green (2007) have called "philanthrocapitalists," since the late 1990s Gorton has put his business skills and a small fraction of his fortune at work in the philanthropic enterprise of improving non-car and sustainable modes of transportation in US cities, particularly New York City, where he lives. His goal was to change the ways in which people talked about transportation through the use

[81] http://www.streetfilms.org/about/ (accessed Aug 5, 2015)

of new communication technologies. And, as philanthrocapitalists often do, he thought that this would be best executed through identifying "solutions that work" and spread them through investing in non-profits and think tanks.

One of Gorton's first philanthropic interventions was to provide hundreds of thousands of dollars in grants to Transportation Alternatives, an advocacy organization that has existed in New York since the 1970s. Indeed, for several years, he became the major funder of the organization. Yet, he soon became frustrated with how the message of bicycle lanes and sustainable transport policies was not reaching widely enough and as fast as he wanted. In 1999, Gorton founded his own non-profit, OpenPlans, which sought to use open-source software technology to improve urban transportation systems. The objective was "making it easier for planners to share information, and easier for communities to discover information and act on it."[82]

While initially focused in New York City, OpenPlans soon became interested in having an impact in urban transportation systems around the world: "We're a team of 50 transit nerds, journalists, and engineers. We're based in New York City, but we have staff and projects located in far off places (like Portland and Australia)."[83] Its non-profit character and its interest in changing cities through identifying sustainable transportation solutions soon draw the attention of the World Bank and different US foundations including Rockefeller Foundation, Surdna Foundation and the Knight Foundation among others, which have provided funds to OpenPlans to influence urban transportation policy around the world. Indeed, Streetsblog and Streetfilms were funded and created through OpenPlans. However, each platform has its own genealogy and protagonists that I review in the following sections.

Streetsblog: Leveraging Cities through Digital Narratives

An important figure behind the creation of Streetsblog is Aaron Naparstek, a New York-based journalist and bicycle advocate who wrote a regular transportation column at The New York Press. According to Naparstek, he and other New York transportation advocacy organizations were frustrated about the lack of media coverage of sustainable transportation policies in the city and also about the little change in that direction occurring in the city, "compared to the impressive transportation changes happening in cities like London, Paris, Seoul, Bogotá or Portland to move away from the car paradigm" (Naparstek, personal interview, 2013). Under Mayor Giuliani (1994-2001), not only there had been very little progress in terms of the promotion of bicycle infrastructures in New York City, NYPD police highly regulated and repressed bicycle protests in the city (Blickstein 2010).

The first time Naparstek wrote about Bogotá was a column on *Transmilenio* at The New York Press as a reaction towards the precarious situation of public transportation in New York: "the idea was to use the Transmilenio story to show that NYC buses were so slow" (Naparstek, personal interview, 2013). Given the lack of success of his columns in changing NYC policies around bus and non-car transportation in New York, Naparstek pitched Mark Gorton the idea of creating a digital platform that would cover stories, images and videos of sustainable transport policies from other cities as a way to change things in New York. After a couple of weeks, Streetsblog was born.

Naparstek defines Streetsblog as a form of "advocacy journalism," that is, while embracing a journalistic style, "we do not pretend to be 'objective' as in presenting an issue from all different perspectives possible… Instead, we start from the idea that New York

[82] http://openplans.org/ (accessed Aug 1, 2014)
[83] http://openplans.org/ (accessed Aug 1, 2014)

needs to move in the right direction in transportation issues" (Naparstek, personal interview, 2013). The type of "advocacy journalism" that Streetsblog embraces is similar to what some media scholars and commentators have called "alternative media." Chris Atton (2004), for instance, has defined "alternative media" as "a range of media projects, interventions and networks that work against, or seek to develop different forms of, the dominant, the expected (and broadly accepted) ways of "doing" media" (Atton 2004: p. ix). And while Streetsblog has a desire to create change by communicating stories not covered by the mainstream media, their main goal is not to disrupt mainstream media but rather make mainstream a set of ideas that they see congruent with the sustainable transport paradigm: "Streetsblog objective is to put new ideas [related with sustainable transport] into the mainstream… making these ideas go viral" (Naparstek, personal interview, 2013). The final aim was that by making these ideas mainstream, mayors and planners would eventually adopt them.

The idea of making certain ideas mainstream or "common sense" has long been the object of philanthropy and, particularly, US foundations (Lagemann 1989). In the case of urban planning, different authors have shown the role that the media has in setting agendas about the organization of urban space through its capacity to "engineer public beliefs" (Gunder 2010). The main way in which Streetsblog has sought to make sustainable transport mainstream is through the production of easily accessible blog posts that document transportation policy stories from other places. In doing that they circulate and make certain policy ideas more mainstream while making a statement about how New York was lagging behind compared to those policies from other cities. In other words, Streetsblog represents the logic of "leveraging" cities in a digital context, that is, using digital narratives about other cities' policies to "leverage" transportation policy change in New York:

> "competition between cities is a powerful tool for change… to go to New York City and say, hey, you're lagging behind London or Paris… or even better, you're lagging behind Bogotá, a Third World city, and sorry if this is an insult to Bogotá, but being able to say that it is very powerful" (Naparstek, personal interview, 2013).

Streetfilms: Digital Videos with Eye-Opening Capacities

In the introduction of this chapter, I showed how the Rockefeller Foundation's (2014: p. 22) report identified online videos as possibly "the most captivating digital format for storytelling" to promote social change thanks to its combination of images, sound and movement. But years before this report was written, many advocates, non-profits and philanthropic organizations had already realized the potential of online videos to influence and change policy. Indeed, shortly after launching Streetsblog, Mark Gorton and Aaron Naparstek realized that having short video examples of the transportation policies they described in the blog would make their posts much easier to understand and visually attractive to a wider audience. In this context, Gorton invited filmmaker and former Bike TV producer Clarence Eckerson to join the project to create a sister website to Streetblog that they eventually called Streetfilms.

But what makes videos advance the objectives of Streetsblog and Streetfilms better than other types of digital formats? In my research, I found that many government officials and policy advocates that have never been to Bogotá often used the word "eye-opening" to describe their experience of watching Streetfilms' Ciclovía video, a metaphor also often used, as we saw in Chapter 4, by those that see Ciclovía or BRT for the first time in a study tour. Indeed, when I asked Clarence Eckerson why he thought his Ciclovía video has been so used and circulated around the world, he also relied on the eye-opening metaphor: "I think that film really opened a lot of people's eyes… in the United States, nobody knew about Ciclovía"

(Eckerson, personal interview, 2013). Later in this chapter I will analyze the ways in which this eye-opening capacity of the Streetfilms' video on Ciclovía was an important element that facilitated the creation of an alliance between members of the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition and high ranking officials at San Francisco's local government.

YouTube and social media and their role in changing transportation advocacy

So far, I have explained the creation of Streetsblog and Streetfilms at the convergence of the interests and agendas of several local and transnational human actors. On the one hand, philanthrocapitalist Mark Gorton with extra funds coming from other foundations and international organizations interested in leveraging policy solutions from other cities to reduce emissions and promote non-car transportation policies in as many cities as possible. On the other hand, Streetsblog and Streetfilms leaders Aaron Naparstek and Clarence Eckerson in their effort to transform New York urban mobility through the production and circulation of narratives of sustainable transportation policies in the form of digital images, videos and text.

However, the success of the digital material produced and circulated through Streetsblog and Streetfilms cannot be understood without explaining the technological advances that allowed the instant share of videos online and its rapid spread through screens across the world. In particular, the emergence of YouTube and social media in the mid 2000s was key in this process. As noted by Clarence Eckerson:

> "blogs were starting to become really popular and so was YouTube… you know back when I was first doing my films, cable access was more popular, that was the way you could get your films out there… until YouTube came along it was really hard to have a lot of videos down the web and get viral videos" (Eckerson, personal interview, 2013).

Technological advances in recent years are not just providing advocates extra tools, as many scholars have argued, social media and video platforms like YouTube are indeed transforming the ways in which nonprofits engage in advocacy work (e.g. see Guo & Saxton 2012). For instance, in the case of Streetsblog and transportation advocates, in just a couple of years, showing what other cities were doing become easier to do. And while using international and inter-city comparisons is not by any means a new advocacy tactic, the emergence of social media in the mid 2000s and the easiness of circulating digital materials has intensified the potential of that advocacy technique in a way that even surprised advocates themselves:

> "the increase in use of social media amplified the power of the advocacy we were doing in a way that even surprised us. Now we can post a video on Bogotá and a lot of people will look at it… Who was going to be looking at a video of Bogotá's *Transmilenio* or *Ciclovía* before social media other than urban planning and transportation nerds?" (Naparstek, personal interview, 2013).

Digitalizing Bogotá: The Art of Telling the Bogotá Story Online

The idea of doing a Streetfilms video on Bogotá came in 2006 after Ethan Kent, from the New York non-profit Project for Public Spaces, wrote a post on Streetsblog about *Ciclovía* after a short visit to the capital of Colombia. Titled "Ciclovía: Is NYC ready?" the article used photographs of *Ciclovía* and quotes from Gil Peñalosa to describe the program and present it as "an idea that can be relatively easily applied in many different forms in a wide range of urban contexts." To urge New York advocates and policymakers to do a *Ciclovía* program, he wrote about how Gil Peñalosa is helping other cities in the US and Latin America implement

similar programs. Hyperlinks were added to Gil's consulting company as well as to some of the cities doing the program to redirect interested readers to more digital resources:

> "Gil's expertise and infectious enthusiasm is being shared around the world as he works with cities to promote walking, bicycling and placemaking as director of Walk and Bike for Life in Oakville, Canada. Among his many efforts, Gil is currently working with leaders in Chicago, Cleveland, Baltimore, and Vancouver trying to develop programs similar to Ciclovia at a smaller scale. He also helped set up a successful program in Guadalajara, Mexico that is now in its third year; it began with eight miles and when it reached 75,000 participants, it was increased to 14 miles and currently attracts 140,000 every week. Several other cities in South America, like Quito, Ecuador and Santiago, Chile have also successfully implemented similar programs." [84]

The post was so successful in making New York and US transportation and public space advocates interested in Bogotá that Mark Gorton decided they should build on that story and make a video that could become even more influential than the post. In 2007, he paid for the travel costs of three New York transport advocates -Aaron Naparstek (from Streetsblog), Clarence Eckerson (from Streetfilms) and Karla Quintero (from Transportation Alternatives)- as well as the cost of flying Gil Peñalosa from Canada to Bogotá to shoot a video focused on the transportation policy innovations in the capital of Colombia, particularly, on Bogotá's bicycle lanes, Ciclovía and BRT.

In Bogotá, New York advocates met with Gil Peñalosa, who showed them around and gave them a particular story of the city that highlighted how the city was transformed thanks to a series of specific interventions implemented by him and his brother. In other words, it was the Bogotá story of urban transformation he often mobilizes in policy forums now at work through digital circuits. But in appearing in the video and helping New York advocates choose what policies and parts of Bogotá they should show, Gil was not just a passive actor that US philanthropy and New York-based organizations used for their objective of introducing sustainable transport policies in the US. Appearing in the video was also strategic for Gil Peñalosa himself as it contributed to place him at the center of the Bogotá story of urban transformation that was starting to emerge globally thanks not only to the conferences of the Peñalosa brothers around the world and the many study tours to Bogotá but also through widely circulated printed and digital materials like this video:

> "Gil was amazing on that trip, everyday he was out with us… Gil also saw that as an opportunity because he saw our films and he knew that if Clarence does a film the way he does when he comes down here, this is going to make us get even more on the world stage and also [people are going to] talk even more about his work and his brother and the city." (Eckerson, personal interview, 2013)

Editing Policy Change

An important aspect that will determine the storytelling capacity of digital objects and, therefore their capacity to inspire and move people to action, is the editing process. In her article *Narrative and Social Tacit Knowledge*, Linde (2001) argued that narratives, and especially oral stories, are extremely effective in transferring certain types of tacit knowledge between organizations that are hard to transmit through other means. In that text, however, she is also skeptical about the learning potential of narratives and stories when they are not told face-to-face. For her, the occasions and events in which stories are told are also important elements

[84] http://www.streetsblog.org/2007/06/06/ciclovia-bogota/ (accessed Jun 1, 2014)

in the transmission of knowledge as the stories are personalized and tweaked to adapt them to the concerns of the audience:

> "Oral stories have a feature which has been analysed as "recipient design" (Sacks, 1992). That is, when someone tells me a story, even a story he has told many times before to others, he tailors the telling to me, to our ongoing relation, and to the particular point in our conversation he wishes to make. Often a story in conversation is formed as a response to a previous story, or as an indirect suggestion of a possible course of action for a problem described in a previous story. In contrast, a story in a data base of stories is inert."

Because of this feature of oral stories, she is skeptical about the potential use of databases of stories about "best practices." Yet, she is more optimistic about the role that stories captured in video can play in transmitting knowledge given the capacity of videos to combine different textual and visual elements. Yet, if in oral stories transmitted face-to-face the charismatic and persuasive capacities of storytellers are essential, in the case of videos, the selecting and framing skills of the editors become critical:

> "A videotaped story may or may not be effective, depending on the skill of the storyteller and the hidden skill of the archivist who created the index categories allowing one to find the story. An unedited transcript of a recording of an oral story is difficult to read, and is unlikely to aid or delight anyone but a folklorist or linguist who is accustomed to working with such hybrid texts. Such texts require a great deal of editing and framing before they are actually useable."

In describing the editing process of the *Ciclovía* video, Eckerson reveals how the production and editing of Streetfilms videos are designed to both persuade policymakers and so that they can be used in community meetings and planning deliberations processes in other cities:

> "every time one of our films is watched by one person you know we're infecting their mind and they're going to infect a lot more people so our goal was to always try to provide tools that people out there need either for their own understanding or to use [them] to educate people… If we make a film and we have change even in just one city because of that film, that's a big success… Here is a prime example: we did a film a couple of years ago on Portland's bike boulevards becoming neighborhood greenways… and we just got an email from the guys in Seattle, who had been using our film for the past two years in neighborhood meetings, and now they're getting neighborhood greenways and it's all funded and it took a while but people loved the video [in the community meetings], it help them understand the idea" (Eckerson, personal interview, 2013)

The success of Streetfilms videos –and Streetblogs blog posts more generally- is therefore not measured in the number of plays or in how many people watch them. It is their capacity to reach, inspire and, eventually, persuade individuals and groups involved in the urban policymaking process what drives their production and edition. For example, Gorton's original idea was to make one video about all Bogotá transportation policies from which New York could learn. However, they gathered so much material that, in the editing process, Eckerson, director of video production at Streetfilms, decided to make three different videos so that they could have a bigger impact once posted online:

> "I thought we would get more people to watch if instead of a half hour video on Bogotá we had four films that are 6 or 7 minutes each... [with] concepts like Ciclovia or Bus Rapid Transit sometimes you can go up to 10 minutes and people will stay riveted but, you know, people don't want to sit down in the internet and watch a half hour film. So number one, [if

it's short], they are more likely to watch it themselves. And second, they are also more likely to use it themselves… if they want to present it in a community meeting, or to a transportation person or if they want to put it in their own blog"
(Eckerson, personal interview, 2013)

Eckerson notes also how one of the key aspects of the editing process is to make a video harness it potential storytelling capacities. As he argued in a blog post titled *Streetfilms University: The Simple Art of Editing*:

"There are many ways and styles to edit a film. But as a beginner don't get bogged down much on what music you are gonna use or how you are gonna begin the video or fancy animated graphics or kinds of transitions/fonts/titles you want. Just concentrate on your interviews. Edit them down to tell the story you want to. All of the other elements will actually be easier to decide once you have soundbites lined up. Trust me."[85]

In the case of the *Ciclovía* video, making it bilingual by having Gil Peñalosa speak in English and adding subtitles in English when Bogotanos spoke in Spanish made the video particularly apt to circulate across the many blogs and websites on bicycle, sustainable transport and public health issues in the English-speaking world.

Assemblages of human and non-human actors

Through the production and circulation of the video, Mark Gorton and NY advocates sought to leverage the story of Bogotá to promote transportation policy changes in NYC. While initially designed to make a change in NYC, the video ended up having a life of its own once circulated online and has been used by advocates in many cities in the US, Latin America and beyond. Eckerson uses the metaphor of the "perfect storm" to describe the complex set of technological advances and local and translational actors and discourses, what ANT theorists would call an assemblage of human and nonhuman actors, that allowed the wide circulation of Bogotá's *Ciclovía* video in the mid 2000s:

"it was like a perfect storm when that video landed, it was like YouTube was just becoming popular, people watching more and more videos online, transportation was becoming a bigger topic in the country… urban planning was becoming much more popular, people were moving back to cities you know in the last 10 years,… money was starting to go into [transportation] advocacy, biking was becoming more popular, the Peñalosa story was growing popular because he was no longer in office and was touring around the world, you know, there are lot of reasons I can't really point to one… it wasn't like we dropped the film in the United States and then all the people found it. There were already people waiting for something like that to come along, as a tool to push sustainable transportation through. This was the multiplier they needed, this is the convincing or the educating thing they needed" (Eckerson, personal interview, 2013)

In doing so it shows the importance of understanding the role of people, objects and discourses play in worlding particular policies as world policy models but also, at the same time, the role that mobile policies and planning programs play in bringing together and stabilizing a disparate set of actors, even if only for a short period of time.

Leveraging Bogotá Online

[85] http://www.streetfilms.org/streetfilms-university-the-simple-art-of-editing-you-can-do-it/ (accessed Jun 1, 2014)

Stories abound about the number of cities that have used that video to inspire their local leaders start a Ciclovía initiative in their cities without having gone to Bogotá. In Streetfilms website, San Francisco, Portland and Los Angeles are listed as cities in which the video played an important role in persuading policymakers to do a Ciclovía initiative. Eckerson also notes that he constantly receive emails from cities around the world about how the video has helped groups of people and advocates come together and persuade the necessary people to do a Ciclovía initiative:

> "In Cape Town, South Africa they had their first Ciclovía on the African continent ever, it was very small but two women down there organized it and they contacted me later: we used your videos, we got started by your videos." (Eckerson, personal interview, 2013)

Indeed, given the success of this video, Gil Peñalosa was hired by the World Health Organization for the campaign "1,000 cities, 1,000 lives." Using videos and visual material from Bogotá and other cities with Ciclovía-style events, the WHO sought with their visual campaign to convince urban decision makers around the world of the health benefits of street closures and policies that promote physical exercise in cities. This evidence points to the persuasive potential of videos in influencing public policy. However, while there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of the important role that this video has played in starting new Ciclovía initiatives around the world, there is a lack of in-depth analysis of the ways in which this video has actually been able to translate into urban policy change. In the following section, this chapter addresses this gap by exploring the role of the Streetfilms video in starting a Ciclovía-style program in San Francisco. In doing so, I show that the ways in which digital objects are used "on the ground" are not just determined by the interests of the transnational actors that created both the objects and the digital platforms through which they circulate, they are also affected by urban governance dynamics and struggles over the uses of urban space.

Digital Objects as Urban Governance Mechanisms in San Francisco

In 2008, San Francisco launched a Ciclovía-style program called Sunday Streets. As chapter 3 showed, Sunday Streets took place due to the confluence of two important urban policy actors in the city: the SFBC and the mayor of San Francisco. Both of them had learned about *Ciclovía* through different forums and networks of peers. For example, some San Francisco bicycle advocates first heard about *Ciclovía* in 2006 during the ProWalk/ProBike conference in Madison and were again "re-energized" hearing from Gil Peñalosa and experiencing the program by themselves in Portland during the 2008 Towards Car-Free Cities conference. On the other hand, San Francisco mayor, Gavin Newsom, first learned about Ciclovía in 2008 from Ken Livingstone at a meeting of mayors during the World Economic Forum in Davos.

While the seeds of *Ciclovía* were planted in these two sets of important policy actors in San Francisco through different policy forums, how was this circulating policy idea territorialized in the streets and policy documents of San Francisco? As geographers Leitner et al. (2002) remind us, and as it should be clear at this point of the dissertation, a critical analysis of the ways in which urban policies circulate from one city to another must be attentive not only to how ideas travel through fluid networks but also to the ways in which these networks interact -and transform- "actually existing" political-institutional-regulatory frameworks and urban governance structures.

The history of street closure programs in the US

The San Francisco Bay Area has the privilege of having a long tradition in environmental activism, progressive urban planning and public space advocacy. Although some critics have

argued that the environmental movement in the Bay Area has been downhill since the sixties, Richard Walker has argued that, new forms of environmental struggles and movements, particularly those that are place-based, are on the rise with the resurgent interest in city cycling as "one of the most exciting grassroots mobilizations in the Bay Area in years" (Walker 2007: p. 215). Indeed, San Francisco is the birthplace of Critical Mass, a monthly bicycle protest originated in 1992 to reclaim the streets from cars and that has quickly spread around the world (Carlsson 2002). In the last decades, bicycle activists and advocates in the Bay Area have been successful in raising consciousness about the benefits of bicycling among the population as well as in lobbying local governments for alternative ways of transportation, more bicycle lanes and car-free days. In that sense, the establishment of Sunday Streets in 2008 is only a tip of the iceberg of the history of bicycle advocacy in the city.

But long before Sunday Streets was established, San Francisco had actually had its own weekly car-free event since the late 1960s. Thanks to the struggles of an environmental advocacy group called *San Francisco Tomorrow*, one and a half miles of JFK Drive, a motorized street within Golden Gate Park, have been closed for cars every Sunday and reserved for bikes and pedestrians since 1967. This initiative originated a couple of years before *Ciclovía* started in 1974 in Bogotá. Indeed, both the origins of Bogotá's *Ciclovía* and the San Francisco JFK program were part of a broader moment in the late 19760s and early 1970s in which the environmental movement was starting to gain traction worldwide and the 1973 oil crisis was making urban planners question the financial sustainability of the auto-oriented model of urban development that cities were following since the 1950s, particularly in the US (Owen 1973) but also in the rapidly urbanizing cities of Latin America (Currie 1976). In this context, many cities started to look for new models of urban planning and, in the case of street-closure programs, long before Bogotá's *Ciclovía* became a policy model, New York's closure of the inner loop of Central Park in 1966 became a world reference for mayors and planners in the US and beyond.

In his book *Tactical Urbanism*, Lydon et al. (2015) argued that the first city to do a weekly street closure program was not Bogotá or New York but rather Seattle, which started "Bicycle Sundays" in 1965. In my research, I am more interested in understanding the ways in which certain cities and programs such as New York's Central Park street-closure or Bogotá's Ciclovía are constructed and circulated as policy models rather than in tracing a program to an "original" one. A relational and socially constructed approach to policy travel implies that all urban policies or planning mechanisms cannot be reduced to one single history. Rather, policies travel with multiple reference points and policy models. This is never a lineal process but rather affected by the ways in which a city is constructed as a world model as well as the role of policy models -and the broader networks of actors through which they travel- to result in policy change in other cities. In the case of San Francisco in the 1970s, I found ample evidence of the role of the New York's Central Park program in making the JFK closure happen. It is also interesting noting the suprising similarity between the role of policy forums and persuasive capacities of New York City Parks Commissioner Thomas Hoving in the mid 1960s and the role of the Peñalosa brothers in spreading *Ciclovía* globally in the mid 2000s:

> "[San Francisco] supervisor Jack Morrison initially suggested the idea of a road closure, based on the successful closures in New York's Central Park in 1966. The proposal was to test the road closure concept and to return the Music Concourse to its former status as a pedestrian mall. For nearly 15 hours on Sunday, January 22, 1967, the Music Concourse was closed to cars. It was considered a big success. In February of 1967, SPUR (San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association) brought in Thomas Hoving, the New York City Parks Commissioner who closed Central Park to cars, for a discussion called "Parks For

People." John Hirten, SPUR Executive Director, considered Hoving's ideas and attitudes to be very relevant to San Francisco and its needs. Over 1000 people attended the meeting including S.F. Mayor John Shelley, Senator Gene McAteer, members of the Board of Supervisors and other officials. Once SPUR became involved, things simply fell in place. This was the hippie era. People were becoming more aware of the cars effect on the environment. On March 9th, 1967, the Recreation and Parks Commission voted to enact the road closure on a trial basis with no recorded opposition" [86]

Indeed, the existence of New York's Central Park street-closure program also shaped the institutionalization of *Ciclovía* in Bogotá. Although Ciclovía first started in Bogotá in 1974 thanks to a group of three bicycle enthusiasts that sought to promote bicycling as a mode of urban transportation, its institutionalization by the local government occurred in 1983 after the mayor of Bogotá at the time, Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, returned from a New York trip where he was impressed by Central Park street closures (Montero forthcoming). However, while Bogotá's *Ciclovía* was significantly expanded during the early 1980s, under Ramírez Ocampo, and again in the mid 1990s, under Mockus and Gil Peñalosa, to its current extension of 70 miles, San Francisco's JFK closure never grew over its initial mile and a half despite the efforts of different advocacy groups such as *San Francisco Tomorrow* or the *Alliance for Golden Gate Park* during the last four decades.

The expansion of JFK closure and the politics of bicycling in San Francisco

In 2006, the SFBC led a coalition of "green" advocacy organizations in the city that included the Sierra Club, Walk SF and others to demand from Mayor Gavin Newsom the expansion of JFK closure to Saturdays. To contextualize this demand not only historically but also within contemporary politics in San Francisco it is important to understand two key issues in the politics of bicycling in San Francisco in the mid 2000s. First, by 2005, the SFBC has grown significantly as a political organization thanks to the increase in its membership but also thanks to the popularity of urban cycling and the discourse of sustainability and climate change both locally and globally. This gave the SFBC more political leverage in the city. As noted by former SFBC program director Andy Thornley:

"Over the past couple of decades the SFBC has grown and matured as a political force. Not only it has a bigger membership, more than 12,000 members now, it's also connections to elected officials, including making endorsements when there are elections. The SFBC is very much sought after by politicians now, partly because… you know if they get the SFBC endorsement then its members will hand out flyers and hold up signs in their houses and so forth. But partly also because, cynically or not, bicycling has become something that politicians want to hold on to these days… bicycling is green and sustainable." (Thornley, personal interview, 2013)

The second important factor that explains why the SFBC decided to focus on street-closures in the mid 2000s has to do with the fact that the 2005 San Francisco Bicycle Plan - approved by the Board of Supervisors in June 2005 and in which the SFBC was very closely involved- went through an injunction. The injunction was the result of San Francisco anti-cyclist activist Rob Anderson, who filed a lawsuit against the plan on the basis that all the new projected bicycle lanes should go through environmental reviews before construction. Until a

[86] David G. Miles Jr. (2000) Available at http://www.cora.org/SaturdayClosuretHistory.htm (accessed May 5, 2015)

San Francisco judge eventually lifted the ban in 2010, the injunction meant that the city had to put on hold the more than 30 bicycle lanes projected in the plan. Because implementing new bicycle infrastructure was banned between 2005 and 2010, the SFBC and allies decided to focus their energies on street-closure programs such as expanding the JFK program.

With the support of San Francisco Supervisor McGoldrick, the SFBC demanded the mayor and other city supervisors the expansion of the Sunday JFK Drive program to Saturdays. However, the Board of Trustees of the De Young Museum, which is located on JFK Drive, opposed the idea arguing than this would make it harder for them to attract customers. While the San Francisco Board of Supervisors approved the measure in favor of the SFBC petition, mayor Gavin Newsom eventually exercised his right of veto and did not allow the full expansion of the program to Saturdays to happen. This created a political crisis between, on the one hand, the "green" advocates led by the SFBC, and, on the other hand, Gavin Newsom, who wanted to be recognized as the "green mayor" and yet was vetoing a program to promote cycling in the city.

To understand Newsom's veto, it is important to understand another layer of urban politics in San Francisco: the role of urban elites and their power to influence urban agendas through funding mayoral political campaigns and their personal relationships. An important funder of Gavin Newsom's political campaign has been San Francisco socialite, philanthropist and president of the Board of the De Young Museum's Board of Trustees Diane Wilsey. Wilsey represents another side of the current world of philanthropy, one less interested in solving global gas emissions through business tools and cost-effective solutions than the traditional philanthropic concerns that urban elites have exercised for centuries: the promotion of cultural conservation and the arts. During the last decade, Wilsey not only has raised millions of dollars for the renovation of San Francisco's Grace Cathedral, she also helped establish several trusts in the city to promote the arts, including the San Francisco Ballet trust. But her biggest project in the city was, indeed, the revamping of the De Young Museum in the early 2000s to put San Francisco in the map of world-class tourism for contemporary art. Between 1999 and 2005, Wilsey raised $190 million from friends and patrons to rebuild the earthquake-damaged museum with a new design by renowned Swiss architects Herzog & de Meuron. As noted by a San Francisco local newspaper: "[Wilsey] played a central role in picking the architects and lobbying politicians, commissioning new art and even choosing Italian stone flooring that wouldn't be hard on high-heeled feet." [87]

Wilsey had big plans to make the De Young and San Francisco an international destination for global cultural tourism and she did not envision her high-heeled global tourists arriving at the museum on bicycles. Therefore she used her personal connections to Gavin Newsom to forcibly oppose the plans of the SFBC-led "green" coalition to expand the JFK closure to Saturdays. Diane Wilsey had not only been an important founder of Newsom's mayoral campaign, the mayor had also met his current wife, San Francisco actress Jennifer Siebel, thanks to a blind date arranged in 2006 by members of the Wilsey family. The favors owed to the Wilsey family were indeed able to make the aspiring "green mayor" veto a pro-bicycle policy. This created not only a personal conundrum for Newsom but also a political crisis and harsh confrontations between the coalition of "green" advocacy groups and the mayor. It is in this local context of confrontation between advocacy groups and Gavin Newsom where the *Ciclovía* idea was mobilized in San Francisco: as a way to move the advocates and mayor beyond the JFK Drive controversy through a new program that would

[87] http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/PROFILE-Dede-Wilsey-De-Young-built-on-one-2603110.php (accessed May 5, 2015)

bring bicycles outside the park and into the streets of the city.

Figure 19. San Francisco's JFK Drive Sunday Closure with the De Young Museum on the background

Source: Photograph by author (November 2010)

The political agency of digital objects: San Francisco through Bogotá's eyes

While SFBC members and the mayor had heard about *Ciclovía* in different conferences and policy forums, it was in this particular urban political conjuncture when the San Francisco policy terrain became fertile for implementing the idea. Yet, the role played by the Streetfilms's *Ciclovía* video and its persuasive and storytelling capacities should not be underestimated in this process of policy change. The Streetfilms Ciclovía video was key in aligning the mayor's aide Wade Crowfoot with the SFBC into advocating for the program:

> "So we, the SFBC, we were talking with Wade Crowfoot. You know, why does it have to be in the park? We were talking about that: we showed him the video about what Bogotá has done… also, [we said] look Chicago is about to do it, Portland is going to do it too. And so, in short, Wade said yes I'd love to pitch this to the mayor."
> (Thornley, personal interview, 2013)

An interview with Crowfoot gives more detail about how the visual and multimedia materialities of the video were important elements that allowed a "crazy idea" happening in a Third World city become common sense in San Francisco, something that printed reports or images of Ciclovía had not been able to accomplish:

> "the SFBC approached me and basically said we have this crazy idea, this thing called Ciclovía in Bogotá and they actually suggested that I watch a video, which was the Streetsblog video of the Ciclovía… If you would have explained to me that a lot of people in Colombia do that I wouldn't have understood it but then when I actually saw it in the video, I thought, that's really interesting" (Crowfoot, personal interview, 2010)

Crowfoot's statement on how his understanding of the program changed after he "actually saw it" in the video is similar to participants of Bogotá study tours, which often refer to them as "eye-opening" experiences. This suggests that at least part of the agency of digital videos to promote policy change relies not only on transmitting the Bogotá story but also in its capacity to make odd ideas seem common sense. After Crowfoot was persuaded, the next step was engaging the mayor in this emerging pro-Ciclovía alliance through what Crowfoot called a "policy pitch." The SFBC helped Crowfoot prepare the pitch with different printed and digital materials about Bogotá and other US cities planning to do it. Indeed, the central part of the pitch included making the mayor see the 9-minute Streetfilms video:

> "we helped Wade Crowfoot pitched this idea to mayor Newsom and as Clarence Eckerson will tell you, from Streetfilms… we are one of those stories where that video has been over and over again, it has been the fulcrum, the force of decision that got the mayor to say yes… So the pitch to the mayor included 'mayor sit watch the video'… It was very persuasive to folks that say 'I don't know what you're talking about' or 'that's crazy' but then, when they see the video, they say 'oh now I see,' and 'yes, of course we might do this.' " (Thornley, personal interview, 2013)

It is interesting that Thornley uses the word "fulcrum" to describe the role of the video in the process. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines fulcrum as "the support about which a lever turns." This points at the importance of digital videos in the process of leveraging policy change through persuading key policy actors.

But there are other ways in which the Ciclovía video helped allow passing Sunday Streets in San Francisco. While the creation of the alliance between bicycle advocates and the mayor's office was an important step to put a *Ciclovía* program in San Francisco's local government agenda, after the mayor gave green light to Sunday Streets and announced a pilot program of 3 events during the summer of 2008, new opponents came to stage: Fishermans's Wharf and Pier 39 merchants. The merchants of this San Francisco tourist mecca protested this decision on the basis that it would hurt their businesses if Embarcadero was closed for cars in the middle of August, what they call "their Christmastime."[88] In his account of San Francisco urban politics, DeLeon (1992) argued that merchants benefit from a favorable public opinion from both politicians and the general public. He also argued that part of the power of merchants and small-business owners reside in their desirability as allies by different groups including progressives, downtown business and the city hall (DeLeon 1992: p. 571). Thornley reached a similar conclusion when reflecting about the politics of mobility in San Francisco. He argues that the power of merchants resides in a certain "mythology" prevalent among US politicians and citizens that see them as representatives of the American Dream and as entrepreneurs that are key for neighborhood economic vitality (Thornley, personal

[88] http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Car-free-parties-planned-for-Embarcadero-3277163.php#photo-2426792 (accessed May 2, 2015)

interview, 2013). Given this general perception, it is difficult for city supervisors and elected officials to pass any project that would infringe upon merchants' opinions. However, the fact that Sunday Streets already had the mayor's leadership and an aide of the mayor was specifically devoted to help passed it changed things.

For example, anticipating the merchants' reaction, Wade Crowfoot recommended bicycle advocates to do extensive outreach to get community support in favor of Sunday Streets. In this context, Cheryl Brinkman, from Livable City, who had just come back from Portland's Towards Car-Free Cities conference and Susan King, who would later become Sunday Streets director, organized several community meetings where they presented the program to neighbors and merchants. Brinkman had met with Clarence Eckerson in Portland and he had given her several DVD copies of the Ciclovía video, which they used in the meetings together with a powerpoint presentation with images of cities with street closure programs around the world. These digital materials helped them explain the program to people but also, by showing that San Francisco was not the only city doing it, they provided people reassurance that what they were proposing to do was not a "crazy idea" but part of a global movement already happening in other cities.

While it was important to gather public support to counteract merchants' arguments in the local public opinion, there are also other ways in which the direct involvement and leadership of a mayor can help pass a program in particular to avoid internal fragmentation and potential confrontation within the city government bureaucracy and hierarchies. For instance, the fact that the mayor supported the program:

> "[the mayor's leadership] made a lot of difference, because for instance the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SMFTA) responds to the mayor so he can give them a call to make sure that this program was going to happen. It also makes it easier to coordinate the different city departments that had to be involved in the program: the SFMTA, the Department of Parks and Recreation, the Port of San Francisco, the Department of Public Health, etc." (Thornley, personal interview, 2013)

Indeed, the final test for the program took place when the Interdepartmental Staff Committee on Traffic and Transportation (ISCOTT) met to vote about giving permits for Sunday Streets. ISCOTT gathers the heads of all city departments involved in closing a street. Fisherman's Wharf merchants showed up in the meeting to protest and complain about the project. Wade Crowfoot and the bicycle advocates also showed up in the meeting. According to Susan King:

> "during the meeting, you could see the internal struggle [of ISCOTT committee members]… you could feel Gavin Newsom foot on their neck. Many of them voted and say "aye" with their head looking down. If it wasn't because Gavin Newsom was supportive of the program and that probably he had spoken to them before, they would have favored the merchants"(King, personal interview, 2013).

The mayors' office did however made a compromise with the merchants and only celebrated 2 of the 3 events initially planned for 2008. It is interesting noting here that the Bayview merchants, a low-income neighborhood through which Sunday Streets was also going to pass through, did support the program as they saw it as a way to attract people and customers to their neighborhood in the South of the city. Yet, because they were much less organized and had less political connections, the wealthier merchants at Fisherman's Wharf become the "voice" of the merchants that prevailed in negotiations with the mayor's office over Sunday Streets.

Conclusions: Networks, Politics, Fulcrums

If the visit of New York City Parks Commissioner Thomas Hoving to San Francisco was key in persuading San Francisco mayor to institutionalize JFK Drive closure in the late 1960s, in 2008, a video of Bogotá's *Ciclovía* starring former Bogotá Parks Commissioner Gil Peñalosa became key to push for a new street-closure program in the city. Technology made possible to bring Peñalosa's storytelling capacities, images of *Ciclovía* and an English narration of the program to San Francisco mayor's office without having to take the mayor to Bogotá or Peñalosa to San Francisco. Sunday Streets did not happen in San Francisco just because the mayor watched a video about *Ciclovía*. However, the video did play an important role in allowing new alliances in the city to occur as well as to move forward a political confrontation in San Francisco between bicycle advocates and the mayor that had come to a blockage. As one of my interviews put it, the Streetfilms video was an important fulcrum in the process of leveraging Bogotá's *Ciclovía* to produce policy change in San Francisco.

In following the video retrospectively through the creation of Streetsblog and Streetfilms in 2006, its shooting in Bogotá guided by Gil Peñalosa in 2007, its editing process in New York and its circulations in San Francisco in 2008, in this chapter I experimented with a relational-territorial methodology that sought to show the different local and transnational actors -both human and nonhuman- involved in what otherwise seemed as very "local" processes of decision-making. The analysis revealed how Streetfilms' *Ciclovía* video was able to convey the storytelling capacities of Bogotá's "persuasive practitioners," which are often mobilized through policy forums, with the "eye-opening" experience that study tours participants often use to describe their visits to Bogotá. However, in digital materials, the spaces for face-to-face interaction are lost or at least reduced to the people watching it together. Similarly, the materials and spaces of interaction are significantly reconfigured. The conference rooms, spaces for coffee breaks or after-conference dinners of policy forums and the buses, stations, roads, bicycles and hotel rooms of Bogotá study tours are substituted with other type of materialities: a screen, a computer, an office in the City Hall, a community meeting room, etc. Therefore, although watching a video cannot be compared to the experience of listening and interacting with Bogotá experts in forums or seeing *Transmilenio* or *Ciclovía* first hand, the video was able to captivate policy actors in a much more effective way than documents or images are able to do.

Finally, while having a fulcrum can be an important piece to leverage policy change, the San Francisco story also illustrates that changes in policy and planning mechanisms will ultimately depend on whether there is a network of actors with enough decision-making power to engage and put the fulcrum to use. To better conceptualize the process of policy change in cities then, one certainly needs to understand the key urban political actors and their struggles in the city but also go beyond the city limits and understand policy initiatives as part of broader transnational struggles about what should be the most appropriate ways to use urban spaces or move around the city. The current transnational momentum around bicycling, sustainability and climate change opened up new possibilities for unexpected local alliances in San Francisco. This empowered certain actors that had been traditionally neglected in policy and planning decisions such as the SFBC. The emergence of new communication technologies and the fact that transnational elites funded the production of sophisticated digital objects of policy persuasion that favor non-car forms of transportation helped the SFBC push for bicycle policies in San Francisco. At the same time, it also contributed to circulate a new global imaginary of Bogotá as a world policy model of sustainable urban transportation.

This, however, does not mean that traditional actors, agendas and power relations in

the city such as the capacity of urban elites to influence decisions around urban planning are downplayed. Rather, the point here is to develop more fluid and relational ways of thinking and conceptualizing the ways in which urban policy and planning decisions are made by giving attention to the everyday practices and political economy of local and transnational human actors but also to the role that objects such as documents, images and digital materials play as important fulcrums in processes of leveraging urban policy change.

Bibliography

Abers, R. 2000. *Inventing Local Democracy: Grassroots Politics in Brazil*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Acosta, O.L. and R. M. Bird. 2003. *The Dilemma of Decentralization in Colombia*. Working Papers 0404, International Tax Program, Institute for International Business, University of Toronto. Source: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/iib/ITP0404.pdf (accessed Mar 3, 2009)

Adams, W. M. 2003. *Green development: Environment and sustainability in the Third World*. London: Routledge.

Allen, J. and Cochrane, A. 2007. Beyond the territorial fix: regional assemblages, politics and power. *Regional studies*, *41*(9): 1161-1175.

Allmendinger, P. 2002. Towards a post-positivist typology of planning theory. *Planning Theory*, *1*(1), 77-99.

Aguilar, L.F. 2006. *Gobernanza y Gestión Pública*. México D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Appadurai, A. 2002. Deep democracy: urban governmentality and the horizon of politics. *Environment and Urbanization*, 13(2): 23-43.

Arantes, O., C. Vainer and E. Maricato. 2000. *A cidade do pensamento único. Desmanchando consensos*. Rio de Janeiro: Vozes.

Ardila, A. 2007. How Public Transportation's Past Is Haunting Its Future in Bogotá, Colombia. *Journal of the Transportation Research Board*, No. 2038: 9–15.

Ardila, A. 2004. *Transit planning in Curitiba and Bogotá. Roles in interaction, risk, and change*. Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Arriaga, E. and M. Silva. 2012. Between Political Fragmentation and Cooperation: Sustainable Mobility, Institutions, and Regional Planning in Guadalajara, Mexico. *Regional Development Dialogue*, Vol. 33 (1): 100-119.

Asheim, B., and J. Vang. 2005. Talents and Innovative regions: Exploring the importance of Face-to-Face Communication and Buzz. Paper *presented at the RGS-IBG Annual International Conference in London*. Available at: http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6369757.pdf (accessed Aug 1, 2015).

Axford, N., Jonas, M., Berry, V., Green, V., & Morpeth, L. 2010. Can study tours help promote evidence-based practice in children's services? *European Journal of Social Work*, *13*(4): 523-543.

Banister, D. 2008. The sustainable mobility paradigm. *Transport policy*, *15*(2): 73-80.

Baiocchi, G. 2005. *Militants and Citizens: The Politics of Participation in Porto Alegre*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Ballvé, T. 2012. Everyday state formation: territory, decentralization, and the narco landgrab in Colombia. *Environment and Planning D*, *30* (4): 603.

Bassett, T. and A. Marpillero-Colomino. 2013. Sustaining Mobility: Bus Rapid Transit and the Role of Local Politics in Bogotá. *Latin American Perspectives*, 40, 2: 135-145.

Beaumont, J., & Nicholls, W. 2007. Between relationality and territoriality: investigating the geographies of justice movements in The Netherlands and the United States. *Environment and Planning A*, *39*(11), 2554.

Beauregard, R. A. 2012. Planning with Things. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 32(2), 182-190.

Beauregard R A. 2003. *Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of US Cities*. London: Routledge.

Berney, R. 2011. Pedagogical Urbanism: Creating Citizen Space in Bogotá, Colombia, *Planning Theory*, 10 (1): 16-34.

Berney, R. 2008. *The Pedagogical City: How Bogotá, Colombia, is Reshaping the Role of Public Space*. PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.
Beauregard, R. 2012. Planning with things. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *32*(2): 182-190.
Biennale di Venezia. 2006. 10th International Architecture Exhibition: Official Awards http://www.labiennale.org/en/news/architecture/en/67078.1.html (accessed Nov 25, 2008)
Birch, E. L. 1980. Radburn and the American Planning Movement The Persistence of an Idea. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 46, Issue 4: 424-431.
Bishop, M., & Green, M. 2008. *Philanthrocapitalism: how the rich are trying to save the world*. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
Blaut, J. 1977. Two views of diffusion, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 67: 343-349.
Brand, P. and J. Dávila. 2011. Mobility Innovations at the Urban Margins: Medellín's Metrocables. *City*, 15 (6): pp. 647-660.
Brenner, N. 2004. *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*. New York: Oxford University Press
Brenner, N., D.J. Madden & D. Wachsmuth. 2011. Assemblage urbanism and the challenges of critical urban theory. *City*, *15*(2): 225-240.
Brenner, N. and N. Theodore. 2002. Cities and the Geography of "Actually Existing Neoliberalism". In *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe,* Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (eds.). Malden: Blackwell
Brest, P., & Harvey, H. 2010. *Money well spent: A strategic plan for smart philanthropy*. New York: Bloomsbury Press,
Bulkeley, H. 2006. Urban Sustainability: Learning from Best Practice? *Environment and Planning A,* Vol. 38: 1029-1044.
Bunnell, T. 2013. Antecedent Cities and Inter-referencing Effects: Learning from and Extending Beyond Critiques of Neoliberalisation. *Urban Studies*, 52(11): 1983–2000.
Burawoy, M. 1998. The extended case method. *Sociological theory*, *16*(1): 4-33.
Burchell, G. 1996. Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self, In A. Barry, T. Osborne, and N. Rose (eds.). *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Caldeira, T. 2000. *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Caldeira, T. and J. Hoslton. 2015. Participatory Urban Planning in Brazil, *Urban Studies*, Vol. 52 (11): 2001-2017.
Caldeira, T. and J. Holston. 2005. "State and Urban Space in Brazil: From Modernist Planning to Democratic Interventions." In *Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems*, Ong, A. and S. Collier (eds.). London: Blackwell.
Cain, A., G. Darido, M. R. Baltes, P. Rodriguez, and J. C. Barrios. 2006. "Applicability of Bogotá's TransMilenio BRT System to the United States." Tampa: University of South Florida.
Callon, M. 1986. Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of scallops and fisherman in St. Brieuc Bay. In: J. Law (ed.) *Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?* London: Routledge.
Campbell, T. 2013. *Beyond smart cities: how cities network, learn and innovate*. London: Earthscan.
Campbell, T. 2003. *The Quiet Revolution: Decentralization and the Rise of Political Participation in Latin American Cities*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Castro, J. 1998. *Descentralizar para Pacificar*. Bogotá: Editorial Ariel

Castro, J. 1994. *Tres Años de Soledad*. Bogotá: OP Gráficas.

Cervero, R. 2005. Progressive Transport and the Poor: Bogota's Bold Steps Forward. *Access,* No. 27: 24-30.

Cervero, R., O. Sarmiento, E. Jacoby, L.F. Gomez, & A. Neiman. 2009. Influences of built environments on walking and cycling: lessons from Bogotá. *International Journal of Sustainable Transportation*, *3*(4): 203-226.

Chabot, S., & Duyvendak, J. W. 2002. Globalization and transnational diffusion between social movements: Reconceptualizing the dissemination of the Gandhian repertoire and the "coming out" routine. *Theory and Society*, *31*(6): 697-740.

Cochrane, A. and K. Ward. 2012. Researching the Geographies of Policy Mobility: Confronting the Methodological Challenges. *Environment and Planning A*, 44 (1): 5-12.

Cook, I. R., & Ward, K. 2012. Conferences, informational infrastructures and mobile policies: the process of getting Sweden 'BID ready.' *European Urban and Regional Studies,* 19(2), 137-152.

Cook, I. R., Ward, S. V., & Ward, K. (2014). A springtime journey to the Soviet Union: Postwar planning and policy mobilities through the Iron Curtain. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 38(3), 805-822.

Cox K.R. 1999. Ideology and the growth coalition, in A E G Jonas, D Wilson (eds). *The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives Two Decades Later.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Currie, L. 1976. *Taming the Megalopolis: A Design For Urban Growth.* Oxford: Pergamon.

Dahl, R. 1961. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

De Landa, M. 2006. A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity. London: Continuum Press.

Del Castillo, J. C. 2003. El Urbanismo Público. In *Bogotá y lo público,* Departamento de Arquitectura (ed.). Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes

Del Castillo, A., O.L. Sarmiento, R.S. Reis and R.C. Brownson. 2011. Translating Evidence to Policy: Urban Interventions and Physical Activity Promotion in Bogotá, Colombia and Curitiba, Brazil. *Translational Behavioral Medicine.* Vol 1, No. 2.: pp. 350-60.

Del Cerro, G. 2004. *Towards an Urban Approach to Global Issues*. Paper presented at the GSA Third Annual Conference at Brandeis University, April 23 – 25. Available at: http://www.net4dem.org/mayglobal/papers.html (accessed April 1, 2008).

Díaz, R. 2011. Participación Ciudadana en la Creación de Una Agenda de Movilidad Urbana para la Zona Metropolitana de Guadalajara. In: J. Lanzagorta (ed) *Hilos Urbanos*. Zapopan: Etxeta.

Dillinger, W. and S.B. Webb. 1999. *Decentralization and Fiscal Management in Colombia*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2122. Source: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/14/000094946_99060706050088/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (accessed Mar 3, 2009).

Dolowitz, D. P., & D. Marsh. 2000. Learning from abroad: The role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-making. *Governance*, 13(1): 5-23.

Duque Franco, I. 2011. Bogotá: Between Identity and Urban Marketing. *Cuadernos de Geografía - Revista Colombiana de Geografía*, 20(1): 29-45.

Duque Franco, I. 2008. Planeamiento urbano en Bogotá 1994-2007. La construcción de un modelo. *Scripta Nova. Revista Electrónica de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales* Vol. XII, Núm. 270 (57).

Edwards, M. 2009. Gates, Google, and the ending of global poverty: philanthrocapitalism and international development. *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 15(2): 35–42.
Escobar, A. 1989. The professionalization and institutionalization of 'development' in Colombia in the early post World War II period, *International Journal of Educational Development*, 9 (2): 139–154.
Falleti, T. 2005. A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99 (03): 327-346.
Farías, I. and T. Bender. 2012. *Urban assemblages: How actor-network theory changes urban studies*. London: Routledge.
Faulconbridge, J. 2010. Global architects: learning and innovation through communities and constellations of practice. *Environment and Planning A*, Vol. 42 (12): 2842-2858.
Faulconbridge, J. 2006. Stretching tacit knowledge beyond a local fix? Global spaces of learning in advertising professional service firms. *Journal of Economic Geography*, Vol. 6 (4): 517-540.
Featherstone, M. 2007. *Consumer culture and postmodernism*. London: Sage.
Flyvbjerg, B. 1998. *Rationality and power: Democracy in practice*. Chicago: University of Chicago press.
Flores, O. A. 2013. Expanding transportation planning capacity in cities of the global South: public-private collaboration and conflict in Chile and Mexico. Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Forester, J. 1993. *The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Forester, J. 1996. Argument, power, and passion in planning practice. In S. J. Mandelbaum, L. Mazza, and R. W. Burchell (eds.). *Explorations in planning theory*. New Brunswick, NJ: CUPR Press.
Foucault, M. 1980. *Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon Books.
Foucault, M. 1977. *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. New York: Vintage Books.
Francis, G. and J. Holloway. 2007. What Have We Learned? Themes from the Literature on Best-Practice Benchmarking. *International Journal of Management Reviews*, Vol. 9 (3): 171-89.
Freestone, R. 1986. Exporting the garden city: Metropolitan images in Australia, 1900–1930. *Planning Perspectives*, *1*(1), 61-84.
Galvis, J. P. 2014. Remaking Equality: Community Governance and the Politics of Exclusion in Bogota's Public Spaces. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *38*(4): 1458-1475.
Gandy, M. 2005. Cyborg urbanization: complexity and monstrosity in the contemporary city. *International journal of urban and regional research*, *29*(1): 26-49.
Gilardi, F., & Radaelli, C. 2012. Governance and learning. In *Oxford handbook of governance,* David Levi-Faur (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gilbert, A. 2008. Bus Rapid Transit: Is Transmilenio a Miracle Cure? *Transport Reviews: A Transnational Transdisciplinary Journal*, Vol. 28 (4): 439-467)
Gilbert, A. 2006. Good urban governance: evidence from a model city? *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, *25*(3), 392–419.
Gilbert, A. and J. Dávila, 2002. Bogotá: Progress Within a Hostile Environment. *In D. J.Myers* and *H. A.Dietz* (eds.). *Capital City Politics in Latin America: Democratisation and Empowerment. Boulder, CA: Lynne Reiner.*
Goldman, M. 2005. *Imperial Nature: The World Bank and Struggles for Social Justice in the Age of Globalization*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Goldman, M. 2001. The Birth of a Discipline, Producing authoritative green knowledge, World Bank-style. *Ehtnography*, Vol. 2(2): 191-217.
Gomescásseres, T. 2003. *Deporte, Juego y Paseo Dominical: La Recreación en los Espacios Públicos Urbanos: el Caso de la Ciclovía de Bogotá*. Master's Thesis, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
González, S. 2011. Bilbao and Barcelona in Motion: How Urban Regeneration Models Travel and Mutate in the Global Flows of Policy Tourism, *Urban Studies* v.48 no. 7, 1397-1418.
Grabher, G. 2002. Cool projects, Boring institutions: Temporary collaborations in social context, *Regional Studies*, 36(3): 205–214.
Graham, S and S Marvin. 2001. *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition*. London: Routledge,
Greenberg M, 2008 Branding New York: How a City in Crisis was Sold to the World. London: Routledge.
Greenhill, R., A. Prizzon, & A. Rogerson. 2013. The age of choice: Developing countries in the new aid landscape (A Synthesis Report; Working Paper No. 364). London: Overseas Development Institute.
Grindle, M.S. 2007. Going local: *Decentralization, democratization and the promise of good governance*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gunder, M. 2011. A metapsychological exploration of the role of popular media in engineering public belief on planning issues. *Planning Theory*, *10*(4): 325-343.
Haraway, D. 1991. The actors are cyborg, nature is coyote, and the geography is elsewhere: postscript to 'cyborgs at large'. *Technoculture*, *3*: 183-202.
Hardoy, J. E. 1968. *Urban Planning in Pre-Columbian America*. New York: George Braziller.
Harris A and S. Moore. 2013. Planning histories and practices of circulating urban knowledge. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 37(5): 1499–1509
Harvey, D. 1989 From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. *Geografiska Annaler. Series B. Human Geography*, 3-17.
Healey, P. 2013. Circuits of Knowledge and Techniques: The Transnational Flow of Planning Ideas and Practices, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 37(5): 1510-26.
Healey, P. 2011. The Universal and the Contingent: Some Reflections on the Transnational Planning Flow of Planning Ideas and Practices. *Planning Theory*, 11 (2): 188-207.
Healey, P. and R. Upton. 2010. *Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices*. London: Routledge.
Hidalgo, D. and L. Gutiérrez. 2012. BRT and BHLS around the world: Explosive Growth, Large Positive Impacts and Many Issues Outstanding, *Research in Transportation Economics*, Vol. 39, 1: pp. 8-13.
Hidalgo, D. & Hermann, G. 2004. "The Bogotá Model for Sustainable Transportation; inspiring developing cities throughout the world" in: TRIALOG - Zeitschrift für das Planen und Bauen in der Dritten Welt / *A Journal for Planning and Building in the Third World*, 82, 3-2004.
Hoang, K. K. 2015. *Dealing in Desire: Asian Ascendancy, Western Decline, and the Hidden Currencies of Global Sex Work*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hoch, C. (2006). Emotions and planning. *Planning Theory & Practice*, *7*(4): 367-382.
Holston, J. 1989. *The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Holston, J. and T. Caldeira. 2005. "State and Urban Space in Brazil: From Modernist Planning to Democratic Interventions." In *Global Assemblages*, A. Ong and S. Collier (eds). London: Blackwell.
Home, R. 1990. Town planning and garden cities in the British colonial empire, 1910–1940.

Planning Perspectives 5.1: 23–37.
Hood, C. 1995. The "New Public Management" in the 1980s: variations on a theme. *Accounting, organizations and society*, *20*(2): 93-109.
Hunter, F. 1953. *Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Irazábal, C. 2005. *City making and urban governance in the Americas: Curitiba and Portland*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Iregui, A.M., J. Ramos and L.A. Saavedra. 2001. Análisis de la Descentralización Fiscal en Colombia. *Borradores de Economía*. Bogotá: Banco de la República de Colombia.
IDRD (Instituto Distrital de Recreación y Deporte). 2005. *La Ciclovía: Laboratorio para el Futuro*. Bogotá: Instituto Distrital de Recreación y Deporte.
ITDP. 2007. BRT Planning Guide. Available at https://www.itdp.org/the-brt-planning-guide/ (accessed Aug 1, 2014)
ITDP. 2003. "Bogotá Shares Urban Revolution with the World" Press Release, Available at http://www.itdp.org/news/bogota-urban-revolution (accessed Sep 20 2013).
Jacobs, J. M. 2012. Urban geographies I: still thinking relationally, *Progress in Human Geography*, 36(3), pp. 412–422.
Jaramillo, S. 1998. La Imagen de Bogotá en Textos de los Años Treinta y los Noventa. In A. Saldarriaga, R. Rivadeneira and S. Jaramillo (eds.). *Bogotá a Través de las Imágenes las Palabras*. Bogotá: TM Editores-Observatorio de Cultural Urbana.
Jessop, B., & Sum, N. L. 2000. An entrepreneurial city in action: Hong Kong's emerging strategies in and for (inter) urban competition. *Urban studies*, *37*(12), 2287-2313.
Jonas, A. E. G. 2015. Rethinking Mobility at the Urban-Transportation-Geography Nexus. In Cidell, J., & Prytherch, D. (Eds.). *Transport, Mobility, and the Production of Urban Space*. London: Routledge.
Jonas, A. E. G., Gibbs, D., & While, A. 2011. The new urban politics as a politics of carbon control. *Urban Studies*, *48*(12): 2537-2554.
Jonas, A.E.G. and K. Ward, K. 2007. Introduction to a Debate on City-Regions: New Geographies of Governance, Democracy and Social Reproduction. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,* 31(1): 169-178.
Jonas, A. and K. Ward. 2004. Competitive City-Regionalism as a Politics of Space: A Critical Reinterpretation of the New Regionalism. *Environment and Planning A,* Vol. 36: 2119-2139.
Jones, M. and M. McBeth. 2010. A narrative Policy Framework: Clear Enough to Be Wrong? *Policy Studies*, Vol. 38 (2): 329-353.
Kharas, H. 2007. The new reality of aid. Paper presented at the *Brookings Blum Roundtable*. Available at: http://www.webprodserv.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08aid_kharas/08aid_kharas.pdf (accessed Aug 1, 2014)
Kickbusch, I. 2003. The Contribution of the World Health Organization to a New Public Health and Health Promotion. *American Journal of Public Health*, 93: pp. 383-388.
King, A.D. 1980. Exporting planning: the colonial and neo-colonial experience. In G. Cherry (ed.), *Shaping an Urban World*. New York: St Martin's Press.
Kingdon, J. 1984. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
Kolb, D.A. 1984. Experiential learning: experience as the source of learning and development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Kolb D A, Fry R, 1975, Toward an applied theory of experiential learning. In C Cooper (ed.). *Theories of Group Process*. London: Wiley.

Latour, B. 2005. *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Latour, B. 1999. 'On Recalling ANT.' In J. Law and J. Hassard (eds) *Actor Network Theory and After*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Latour, B. 1993. *We have never been modern*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Law, J. (ed.). 1986. *Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?* London: Routledge.
Le Galès, P. 2011. "Policy Instruments and Governance," In M. Bevir (ed.) *The SAGE Handbook of Governance*. London: Sage.
Leitner, H. C. Pavlik and E. Sheppard. 2002. Networks, Governance, and the Politics of Scale: Inter-Urban Networks and the European Union. In Herod, A. and Wright, M. (ed). *Geographies of Power: Placing Scale*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lieto, L. 2015. Cross-border mythologies: The problem with traveling planning ideas. *Planning Theory*, 14(2), 115-129.
Lieto, L. and R.A. Beauregard. 2013. Planning for a material world. *Crios*, *3*(2): 11-20.
Lindau, L. A., Hidalgo, D., & de Almeida Lobo, A. 2014. Barriers to planning and implementing Bus Rapid Transit systems. *Research in Transportation Economics*, *48*: 9-15.
Linde, C. 2001. Narrative and social tacit knowledge. *Journal of knowledge management*, *5*(2): 160-171.
Linos, K. 2013. *The Democratic Foundations of Policy Diffusion: How Health, Family, and Employment Laws Spread Across Countries*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lipsky, M. 1979. *Street level bureaucracy*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Logan, J. and H. Molotch. 1987. *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lydon, M. and A. García. 2015. *Tactical Urbanism: Short-Term Action for Long-Term Change*. Washington DC: Island Press.
MacLeod, G. and M. Goodwin. 1999. Space, Scale and State Strategy: Rethinking Urban and Regional Governance. *Progress in Human Geography* 23: 503-27.
Marcus, G. E. 1995. Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography. *Annual Review of Anthropology,* 24: 95-117.
Marsden, G., K.T. Frick, A.D. May, E. Deakin. 2011. How Do Cities Approach Policy Innovation and Policy Learning? A Study of 30 Cities in Northern Europe and North America. *Transport Policy*, Vol. 18, Issue 3, Pp 501-512.
Martin, G. and M. Ceballos. 2004. *Bogotá: Anatomía de una transformación, políticas de seguridad ciudadana 1995-2003*. Bogotá: Ed. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
Martin Barbero, J. 2003. Los Laberintos Urbanos del Miedo. *Universitas Humanística*, 56: pp. 69-79.
Matsumoto, N. 2007. Analysis of Policy Processes to Introduce BRT Systems in Asian Cities from the Perspective of Lesson-drawing, In *Air Pollution Control in the Transportation Sector*, pp. 351–376, Hayama: IGES.
McCann, E.J. 2011. Urban policy mobilities and global circuits of knowledge: Towards a research agenda. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 101: 107–130.
McCann, E. J. and K. Ward 2012. Assembling urbanism: following policies andstudying through 'the sites and situations of policy making. *Environment and Planning A*, *44*, p. 42-51.
McCann, E. J. and K. Ward (eds). 2011. *Mobile Urbanism: Cities and Policy-Making in the Global Age*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
McCann, E., & Ward, K. 2010. Relationality/territoriality: toward a conceptualization of cities in the world. *Geoforum*, 41(2), 175-184.

McFarlane, C. 2011. *Learning the City: Knowledge and Translocal Assemblage*. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
McGoey, L. 2012. Philanthrocapitalism and its critics. *Poetics*, 40(2): 185–199.
Mendoza, M. 1998. *Scorpio city*. Barcelona: Seix Barral.
Meseguer, C., and F. Gilardi. 2009. What is new in the study of policy diffusion? *Review of International Political Economy*, 16(3), 527-543.
Mintrom, M. 1997. Policy entrepreneurs and the diffusion of innovation. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, No. 3: 738-770.
Mockus, A. 2001a. *Cultura Ciudadana, programa contra la violencia en Santa Fé de Bogotá, 1995-1997*. Washington DC: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.
Mockus, A. 2001b. Programa de Gobierno 2001-2003 (accessed Mar 3, 2008) www.dapd.gov.co/www/resources/hzq_programa_de_gobierno_2001_2003_antanas_mockus_sivickas.pdf
Mockus, A. 1995. Plan de desarrollo económico, social y de obras públicas para Santa Fe de Bogotá, D.C. 1995-1998 "Formar ciudad." Available at: www.dapd.gov.co/www/resources/uhr_21_fck_pd_1995_1998_fc_estructura_general.pdf (accessed Dec 8, 2008)
Molotch, H. 1976. The City as a Growth Machine: Towards a Political Economy of Place." *American Journal of Sociology* 82: 309-32.
Montezuma, R. 2005. The Transformation of Bogotá, Colombia 1995-2000. Investing in Citizenship and Urban Mobility, *Global Urban Development*,1 :1-10.
Montezuma, R. 2011. *Ciudadanos, Calles y Ciudades: las Américas Unidas por una Ciclovía*. Bogotá: Fundación Ciudad Humana.
Montero, S. forthcoming. Worlding Bogotá's Ciclovía: From Urban Experiment to International "Best Practice." *Latin American Perspectives*.
Montero, S. 2009. Experimenting with Neoliberalism and Democracy: The Transformation of Urban and Regional Governance in Bogotá, Colombia, in the Context of Decentralization. Unpublished master's thesis, Department of City and Regional Planning, University of California, Berkeley.
Moore, S. 2013. What's Wrong with Best Practice? Questioning the Typification of New Urbanism, *Urban Studies*, 50(11), 2371-2387.
Mosse, D. 2007. Notes on the ethnography of expertise and professionals in international development. Paper presented at "Ethnografeast III: Ethnography and the Public Sphere." Lisbon, June 20-23, 2007.
Niño Murcia, S., N. Lugo Torres, C. Rozo Montejo, & L.A. Vega. 1998. *Territorios del miedo en Santa Fé de Bogotá. Imaginarios de los Ciudadanos*. Bogotá: TM Editores-Observatorio de Cultura Urbana
Ohmae, K. 1995. *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies*. New York: Simon and Schuster Inc.
Ong, A. 2011. Worlding Cities or the Art of Being Global. In *Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Ong, A. and A. Roy (eds). 2011. *Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Ortiz, J. 1985. Las Ciclovías de Bogotá. In *Alternativas de Transporte en América Latina: La Bicicleta y los Triciclos*. St. Gallen, Switzerland: CESTA/SKAT.
Owen, W. 1973. Automobiles and Cities, Strategies for Developing Centres. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Parmar, I. 2002. American foundations and the development of international knowledge networks. *Global networks*, *2*(1): 13-30.
Parnell, S. and J. Robinson. 2012. (Re)theorizing cities from the global South: looking beyond neoliberalism, *Urban Geography*, 33(4), pp. 593–617.
Pasotti, E. 2010. *Political Branding in Cities: The Decline of Machine Politics in Bogotá, Naples, and Chicago*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Peck, J., & Theodore, N. 2015. *Fast Policy: Experimental Statecraft at the Thresholds of Neoliberalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Peck, J., & Theodore, N. 2012. Follow the policy: a distended case approach. *Environment and Planning A*, 44(1): 21-30.
Peck, J. and N. Theodore. 2010. "Mobilizing Policy: Models, Methods, and Mutations," *Geoforum*, 41: 169–174.
Peña, M. 1998. El Programa CINVA y la acción comunal. *Bitácora Urbano Territorial*, *1*(12): 185-192.
Pickrell, D. H. (1992). A desire named streetcar fantasy and fact in rail transit planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *58*(2), 158-176.
Piketty, T., & Zucman, G. 2014. Capital is back: Wealth-income ratios in rich countries, 1700-2010. Source: http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/PikettyZucman2013WP.pdf (accessed Aug 1, 2015)
Porter, M. 2001. Regions and the New Economics of Competition. In *Global City-Regions: Trends, Theory, Policy*, A. Scott (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press
Portes, A. and B.R. Roberts. 2005. The Free Market City: Latin American Urbanization in the Years of the Neoliberal Experiment, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 40 (1): 43-82.
Rabinovitch, J. 1996. Innovative land use and public transport policy: the case of Curitiba, Brazil. *Land Use Policy*, 13 (1), 51-67.
Radaelli, C. 2004. The Diffusion of Regulatory Impact Analysis: Best Practice or Lesson-Drawing? European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43 (5), pp: 723-747.
Restrepo, D. 2004. De la Descentralización a la Regionalización. Nuevo Escenario de la Guerra y Oportunidad para la Paz. *EURE-Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Urbanos Regionales*, vol. XXX, No. 89: 81-96.
Restrepo, D. 2002. Luchas por el Control Territorial en Colombia. *Economía, Sociedad y Territorio*, enero-junio, vol. III, Núm. 12: 517-537.
Restrepo, D. 1992. *Descentralización y Neoliberalismo*. Bogotá: Fondo Editorial (CEIR-Realidad Municipal).
Robert, M. and J.M. Witte. 2008. *Transforming Development? The Role of Philanthropic Foundations in International Development Cooperation*. Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute.
Robinson, J. 2006. *Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development*. London: Blackwell.
Rockefeller Foundation. 2014. Digital Storytelling for Social Impact. Source: https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/app/uploads/Digital-Storytelling-for-Social-Impact.pdf (accessed Dec 1, 2014)
Rodgers, S., C. Barnett & A. Cochrane. 2014. Media practices and urban politics: conceptualizing the powers of the media-urban nexus. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *32*(6): 1054-1070.
Rogers, E. M. 1995. [1962]. *Diffusion of innovations*. New York: Free Press.
Rogers, R. 2011. Why philanthro-policymaking matters. *Society*, *48*(5): 376-381.
Rose, R. 1993. *Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space*. New Jersey: Chatham House.

Rose, R. 2002. "When all other conditions are not equal: The context for drawing lessons." In C. Jones Finer (ed.), *Social policy reform in socialist market China: Lessons for and from abroad*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Roy, A. 2012. Ethnographic Circulations: Space-Time Relations in the World of Poverty Management. *Environment and Planning A*, Vol. 44 (1): 31-41-

Roy, A. 2011. Urbanisms, Worlding Practices and the Theory of Planning. *Planning Theory* 10 (1): 6-15.

Roy, A. 2010. *Poverty Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development*. London: Routledge.

Roy, A. 2009. The 21st-century Metropolis: New Geographies of Theory. *Regional Studies*, 43(6): 819-830.

Sabatier, P. 1988. An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein, *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 21 (2-3): 129-168.

Salazar, J. 2007. La Planeación de Bogotá: Un Sistema Híbrido de Desarrollo Progresivo, *Bitácora Urbano-Territorial*, No. 11: 208-219.

Salazar, J. 2003. ¿Qué Hemos Aprendido del Espacio Público? In Universidad de los Andes (ed.), *Bogotá y lo Público*. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes.

Sandercock, L. 2010. From the campfire to the computer: An epistemology of multiplicity and the story turn in planning. In Sandercock, L. and G. Attili (eds.). *Multimedia Explorations in Urban Policy and Planning: Beyond the Flatlands*. London: Springer.

Sandercock, L. 2003. Out of the closet: The importance of stories and storytelling in planning practice. *Planning Theory & Practice*, *4*(1): 11-28.

Sarmiento, O. L., Torres, A., Jacoby, E., Pratt, M., Schmid, T. & G. Stierling. 2010. The Ciclovía-recreativa: a mass recreational program with public health potential. *Journal of Physical Activity and Health*, 7: S163–S180.

Sassen, S. 1991. *The Global City: London, New York, Tokyo*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Saunier P.Y. 2001. 'Sketches from the Urban Internationale, 1910-50: Voluntary associations, international institutions and US philanthropic foundations. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 25(2): 380-403.

Scott, A.J. (ed.). 2001. *Global City-Regions: Trends, Theory, Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press

Scott, A.J. and M. Storper. 2003. Regions, Globalization and Development. *Regional Studies*, 37.6 & 7: 579–593.

Silva, A. 1992. *Imaginarios Urbanos: Bogotá y Sao Paulo: Cultura y Comunicación Urbana en América Latina*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.

Simmons, B.A., F. Dobbin, and G. Garrett (eds.). 2008. *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shipan, C. R., and Volden, C. 2008. The mechanisms of policy diffusion. *American Journal of Political Science*, *52*(4): 840-857.

Shore, C., & Wright, S. (Eds.). 2003. *Anthropology of policy: Perspectives on governance and power*. London: Routledge.

Socolow, S.M., & L.L. Johnson. 1981. Urbanization in Colonial Latin America. *Journal of Urban History*, 8(1): 27-59.

Solano, F. 1996. *Normas y Leyes de la Ciudad Hispanoamericana, 1492-1600*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas.

Sorensen, E. and Torfing, J. 2009. Making Governance Networks Effective and Democratic through Metagovernance. *Public Administration*, 87: 234–258.

Soto, J. 2012. Guadalajara (Mexico): A Critical Mass of Associated Citizens, In Carlsson, C., Elliott L.R., and Camarena A. (Eds) *Shift Happens! Critical Mass at 20*. Oakland: AK Press.

Stone, C. 1989. *Regime Politics*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Stone, D. 2001. Learning lessons, policy transfer and the international diffusion of policy ideas. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation Working Paper, No.69/01. University of Warwick.

Storper, M. & A.J. Venables. 2004. Buzz: face-to-face contact and the urban economy. *Journal of Economic Geography*, *4*(4), 351-370.

Suzuki, H., Cervero, R., & Iuchi, K. 2013. *Transforming cities with transit: Transit and land-use integration for sustainable urban development*. Washington DC: World Bank Publications.

Tarchópulos, D. 2006. El plan de Bogotá de Le Corbusier, Sert y Wiener: la impronta de la nueva habitabilidad. *Scripta Nova: revista electrónica de geografía y ciencias sociales*, (10), 86.

Throgmorton, J. A. 1996. *Planning as persuasive storytelling: The rhetorical construction of Chicago's electric future*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Transport for London. 2007. Central London Congestion Charging - Impacts monitoring Fifth Annual Report. London: Transport for London.

Tsing, A. 2005. *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Vettoretto, L. 2009. A preliminary critique of the best and good practices approach in European spatial planning and policy-making, *European Planning Studies*, 17(7), pp. 1067–1083.

Wedel, J. R., C. Shore, G. Feldman, S. Lathrop. 2005. "Toward an anthropology of public policy." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 600, 30-51.

Weinstock, A., Hook, W., Replogle, M., & Cruz, R. 2011. *Recapturing global leadership in bus rapid transit*. Washington DC: ITDP.

WHO (World Health Organization). 2010a. *Global Recommendations on Physical Activity for Health*. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization.

WHO (World Health Organization). 2010b. *1000 Cities, 1000 Lives*. Available at: http://www.who.int/world-health-day/2010/1000cities_1000lives_brochure_blue.pdf (Accessed Sep 24, 2013)

Wood, A. 2014a. Learning through policy tourism: circulating bus rapid transit from South America to South Africa. *Environment and Planning A*, *46*(11), 2654-2669.

Wood, A. 2014b. The politics of policy circulation: unpacking the relationship between South African and South American cities in the adoption of bus rapid transit. *Antipode*. DOI: 10.1111/anti.12135.

World Bank. 2010. Cities and Climate Change: an Urgent Agenda. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTUWM/Resources/340232120533065627 2/CitiesandClimateChange.pdf (accessed Aug 10, 2011).

Wright, G. 1987. Tradition in the service of modernity: architecture and urbanism in French colonial policy, 1900-1930. *The Journal of Modern History*: 291-316.

United Nations. 1973. *Interregional Seminar on New Towns: London, 4-19, 1973*. Archivo Currie, Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango, Bogotá (RM0040).

Vasconcellos, E. 2001. *Urban transport, environment, and equity: the case for developing countries*. London: Earthscan.

Zieff, S. G., Hipp, J. A., Eyler, A. A., & Kim, M. S. 2013. Ciclovia initiatives: engaging communities, partners, and policy makers along the route to success. *Journal of Public Health Management and Practice*, Vol. 19: S74-S82.