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After several decades of apparent growth in racial tolerance, how do whites react when a black runs for a major political office? The recent candidacies of Jesse Jackson, Tom Bradley, Wilson Goode, and Harold Washington for prominent national, state and local positions have renewed interest in the ways in which a politician's race affects voting behavior. This paper explores the role of race in contemporary American elections by studying the California gubernatorial election of 1982 in which Tom Bradley, the black Democrat, was narrowly defeated by George Deukmejian. This election is particularly appropriate for exploring the extent of racially-motivated voting because Bradley's campaign sought to assuage the fears of white voters. How whites reacted to so unthreatening a black candidate should provide important clues about the conditions under which racial attitudes govern electoral choices.

Cues for Racial Voting

Racial voting refers to decisions that are motivated by the desire to obtain or retain benefits, be they symbolic or material, for one's own ethnic group. There obviously are several ways in which racial identifications may be engaged in a given election. The nomination of a black is a particularly visible cue of the ethnic relevance of one's voting decision, especially when the black candidate, like Jesse Jackson or Harold Washington, makes racial solidarity an important campaign theme (Sears, Citrin and Kosterman, 1987; Kinder and Sears, 1981;

Baker and Kleppner, 1983). But racial feelings also may be aroused when none of the candidates are black. Policies that bear directly on race relations occasionally are central in school board, mayoral, congressional and even presidential elections (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Kinder and Sears, 1981). And even issues without a manifest racial content, such as taxing or spending policies, may elicit feelings of ethnic consciousness that influence voting (Sears and Citrin, 1985).

Previous research (Key, 1949; Wolfinger, 1974; Pettigrew, 1976) indicates that the perception of racial threat is critical in provoking negative reactions to black candidates among whites. Among the factors that stimulate such fears during an election are the size of the black population, the history of race relations in the community, and the salience of racial themes in the campaign. In addition, whether the election is partisan or not seems to matter, in that party identification may inhibit the inclination of racially intolerant whites to oppose a black candidate.

One possible stimulus for anti-Bradley voting among whites in 1982 is that this marked the first genuine opportunity for a black to become governor. In mayoral elections at least, the first serious candidacy of a black increases concern among whites regarding the allocation of power among the racial groups (Pettigrew, 1976). Another reason for expecting Bradley's race to count against him is that the political mood in California at the time was largely unsympathetic to the political demands of

minority groups. The feeling that government was already doing too much for blacks contributed to support for the tax revolt (Sears and Citrin, 1985), for example, and a constitutional amendment that forbade forced busing of schoolchildren had won overwhelming approval at the polls in 1979.

Other features of the gubernatorial contest in 1982, however, seemed likely to mitigate the impact of race. Although racial fears had influenced voting in the Los Angeles mayoral election of 1969, when Bradley first ran against Sam Yorty (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Hahn, Klingman and Pachon, 1976), by 1982 he was a well-known and uncontroversial figure whose entire political career bespoke caution and accommodation. In Los Angeles, he had solid support among the white establishment, and there was no serious opposition to him in the Democratic gubernatorial primary. Moreover, the general election is a partisan contest.

Finally, both candidates downplayed racial issues during the campaign. In the hope of minimizing the defection of whites, Bradley stressed his fiscal conservatism and background in law enforcement. Deukmejian too avoided explicit discussion of racial policies, although some observers have characterized his "tough" stand on crime and his opposition to the gun control initiative then on the ballot as subtly racist. Bradley's race did surface as a campaign issue in early October when Bill Roberts, Deukmejian's campaign manager, told reporters that covert anti-black sentiment would swing a close election to his candidate. A few days later Deukmejian accepted Roberts'

resignation, and the issue received relatively little further press coverage.

In contrast to the heated recent mayoral elections in Chicago and Philadelphia, therefore, the absence of overtly racial themes in the Bradley-Deukmejian election is striking. Certainly, the election was never framed as a conflict between blacks and whites. So the question we are left with is this: Does race matter when neither candidate, black or white, raises the issue?

Measuring Racial Voting

The conventional method for determining the impact of racial attitudes on voting is a multivariate analysis in which one controls for the influence of alternative motives for voting such as party loyalty or preferences on non-racial matters. This approach toward measuring racial voting does not, however, speak directly to the question of whether Bradley's race per se caused whites to vote against (or for) him. Given that the Democratic party is widely perceived as more liberal on civil rights issues and more likely to support the political aspirations of blacks and other minority groups, racial identifications are likely to influence voting in partisan contests whatever the ethnic background of the competing candidates. To establish that Bradley's race played a catalytic role in provoking opposition among whites thus requires some standard for comparison.

The ideal comparison would be to contrast the Bradley-Deukmejian contest with an election in which the Democratic candidate was a white clone of Bradley. But since this ideal is

inherently unattainable, we worked with the best available alternative--the other statewide elections in 1982.[1] Thus, the critical evidence for establishing the impact of Bradley's race is the relative importance of anti-black sentiments in a series of concurrent voting decisions. The claim that Bradley lost white support because of his race implies that the coefficient for racial attitudes will be larger when we predict the gubernatorial vote than the decisions in the contests without a black candidate.

Table 1 below summarizes the main features of the four elections we analyze, namely the gubernatorial contest and the elections for U.S. Senator, Lieutenant Governor and State Superintendent of Schools.

INSERT TABLE 1

We regard the senatorial contest that pitted Jerry Brown, the flamboyant white Democrat, against Pete Wilson, the moderately conservative Republican who ultimately won, as the critical comparative case. During Brown's tenure as governor, the appointment of blacks, Hispanics and women was a prominent policy. Thus, although his campaign did not emphasize racial

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1 Another possible baseline is the historical record: we might compute an expected Democratic vote based on the outcomes of recent elections in which there were no black candidates, measure the deviation from this "normal vote" and attribute this difference to the short-run impact of Bradley's race (Campbell et al., 1964; Boyd, 1972). We rejected this technique here, partly because in a period characterized by electoral volatility it is risky to assume, even for heuristic purposes, that there is an underlying "normal vote" and partly because there is no method for disentangling the unique contribution of any of several short-run factors.

issues, his prior record led voters to regard him as favorable to black political needs and demands. In comparing the underpinnings of support for Bradley and Brown, therefore, we "control" for the candidates' party and racial ideology in an effort to single out the role of skin color.

The varying characteristics of the remaining two statewide elections in 1982 further clarify the conditions under which a candidate's race matters. The elections for lieutenant governor and state superintendent of schools were both low-key events. In the former contest, the winning white Democrat was the incumbent Leo McCarthy who resembled Bradley in his conventional liberalism. And in the nominally non-partisan contest for state superintendent of schools, the black incumbent Wilson Riles was upset by a white opponent. In this campaign, the performance of California's public schoolchildren on standardized test scores, not manifestly a racial matter, was the dominant issue.

Data

This study is based on a secondary analysis of two pre-election surveys. The polls we analyze are a Los Angeles Times survey conducted between October 10th and 14th, 1982, two and a half weeks before the November 2nd election, and a California Poll conducted by the Field Institute between October 24th and 31st.[2]

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2. Both surveys employed telephone interviewing and sampled a representative cross-section of the California population over eighteen. Both also used random digit dialing techniques in which numbers are generated in proportion to local prefix allocation in order to remove the biases due to the absence of unlisted numbers

Each survey included several items that tap racial attitudes. Table 2 lists these questions and provides the marginal distributions of the responses. The questions contained in the Los Angeles Times Survey (LAT) can be divided into those that tap resentment of governmental favoritism toward blacks and others that attribute stereotypically unfavorable personal characteristics to blacks as a group.[3] The core of our analysis employs these indicators of racial attitudes as predictors of voting behavior in the abovementioned four statewide elections.

INSERT TABLE 2

Results

According to the CBS News exit poll, Bradley won 44.9% of the white votes and 91.3% of the votes cast by blacks (Baker and Kleppner, 1986, p.227). In the 1983 Chicago mayoral election, however, only 13.3% of the whites supported Harold Washington,

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from the directories used to select the initial clusters. In addition, the California Poll employed a multistage weighting procedure to ensure the representativeness of the sample with respect to age, sex and party registration. The Los Angeles Times survey confined questioning to respondents self-reported as registered to vote, while the California Poll interviewed only registered voters who said they were "absolutely certain" to vote in the upcoming election.

3 The former category resembles the items described elsewhere as measures of "symbolic" or "modern" racism, an attitudes that fuses anti-black affect and conservative morality (Sears, 1987; McConahay, 1986). In this paper, however, we are concerned with estimating the effects of racial attitudes in a global sense rather than identifying the specific beliefs that influenced voting.

while 96.6% of black voters did so. This alone indicates that the impact of race on voting was weaker in the California case. The relevant California Polls show that Bradley did as well as previous Democratic nominees in holding on to the party faithful. For example, Jerry Brown won 81% of the votes of white Democrats in his two gubernatorial campaigns. Bradley was supported by 79% of this group in 1982, surpassing the 71% won by Pat Brown when he was defeated by Ronald Reagan in 1966.

Bradley also enjoyed a high level of personal popularity. The LAT survey asked respondents to rate the candidates for major statewide offices on a scale of 1 (most unfavorable) to 4 (most favorable). Among whites, Bradley's mean rating was 2.99, with 79% rating him either favorably or very favorably. This was a more positive evaluation than either Deukmejian (2.78) or the two white senatorial candidates. Wilson received a 2.69 mean rating and Brown a much lower 2.12, with only 38% of the white electorate evaluating him favorably. The California Poll conducted just before the election found the identical pattern of ratings.[4]

When asked directly in a September 1982 California Poll, few Californians (3%) mentioned Bradley's race as a reason they might vote against him (Henry, 1983). Moreover, a majority of these

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4 The California Poll used a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high) to rate the candidates. In this survey, among whites who were registered and said they intended to vote Deukmejian and Bradley had almost identical ratings, (6.3 vs. 6.1). But once more, Bradley was much more favorably viewed than Jerry Brown (4.4).

respondents in a September 1982 California Poll were Republicans who were unlikely to vote for a Democratic candidate of either race. Clearly, people might be reluctant to state openly that they would not vote for someone just because he is black, and the data in Table 2 show that negative images of blacks and opposition to their political aspirations were much more widespread than Bradley's favorable public image might imply. For example, 23% of whites in the LAT survey felt that blacks were more prone to violence than any other racial or ethnic group. Forty-three per cent believed that the state government should make no special effort to help blacks and other racial minorities. And 33% complained that blacks had been receiving too much attention from government.

Table 3 below shows how racial feelings were related to voting intentions and evaluations of the candidates in the 1982 California election. These data derive from the LAT survey, but the findings of the California Poll confirm the following fundamental points:

1. Negative feelings about blacks generally increase opposition to Bradley. For example, 79% of the whites who felt government had been paying too much attention to blacks and other minorities said they would vote for Bradley compared to 32% of those who believed government was not doing enough for these groups.
2. The strength of this zero-order relationship is much stronger among Democrats than Republicans.

3. The relationships between racial beliefs and voting intention (or candidate evaluations) are extremely similar in the senatorial contest where both candidates were white. For example, the differential in support for Brown between those who felt government had been paying too much and too little for blacks was 50% as compared to 47% for the gubernatorial contest. If anything, Bradley was more popular than Brown even among those expressing anti-black sentiments.

4. The survey questions that refer to the characteristics of blacks as a group, the more stereotypical items, are only weakly related to voting intentions. The relationship worth pursuing further involves beliefs about how government should respond to the political demands of blacks.

INSERT TABLE 3

Did race matter in the Bradley-Deukmejian contest in 1982? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that anti-black sentiments were a determinant of how people voted, but no, in that Bradley's race apparently neither triggered nor enhanced the influence of racial attitudes. To estimate the role of racial beliefs more precisely and to extend the comparisons across electoral contexts, Table 4 provides the multivariate analyses promised above. Because voting

intention, the dependent variable, is dichotomous, the estimation procedure is probit rather than ordinary least squares.[5]

Table 4 reports the results for all four statewide elections and for both the LAT and CP surveys. The model includes the respondent's age, sex, level of education, party affiliation, racial attitudes and preferences on several policy questions that have no manifest linkage to race as predictors of voting decisions. All but the demographic variables were rescored to vary between "0" and "1".

For respondents in both surveys, racial attitudes were measured by a Black Treatment Index constructed by combining answers to the questions about the amount of attention black political demands should receive and about whether blacks deserved special treatment form state government. For respondents in the LAT survey, we also constructed a Black Character index by adding responses to the questions about the perceived violence and law-abidingness of diverse ethnic groups in a similar fashion.[6] The two indices of racial feelings correlated at

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5. The analysis was replicated with a Net Candidate Evaluation measure derived by subtracting the respondent's rating of Deukmejian (Wilson, Hallett, Honig) from his rating of Bradley (Brown, McCarthy, Riles) as the dependent variable. The estimation procedure employed in this instance was OLS regression. In every case, the results were fundamentally the same as those reported in Table 4.

6 For each item, respondents who named blacks or Mexican-Americans as more prone to violence (or less law-abiding) were given a score of "0", those who named some other group were scored ".5" and those who said all groups were equal or refused to answer were coded as "1".

.18.

INSERT TABLE 4

Because the LAT and CP surveys did not include the same questions, the predictive equations for the two sets of data are not identical. In the LAT survey, the measures of non-racial issues were a question about the importance of the crime issue to the respondent, the respondent's ideological self-identification and the respondent's intended vote on handgun control (Proposition 15). In the case of the CP survey, these measures were intended vote on handgun control, the Small Government Index and responses to a question about whether people receiving welfare truly needed it.

Preferences on the non-racial issues were statistically associated with feelings about blacks. For example, in the CP survey, the Black Treatment Index correlated .21 with how one intended to vote on Proposition 15, the handgun control initiative, .23 with scores on the index measuring attitudes toward the proper size of government and .36 with the question about the need for government spending on welfare.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the "race effect" reported in Table 3 is substantially reduced in the multivariate model presented in Table 4 The substantive meaning of this result, however, is ambiguous. If one regards conservative preferences on issues such as gun control or the government spending as subtly, subliminally or symbolically racist, then some portion of these ostensibly "non-racial"

influences on the vote should be added to the observed impact of anti-black beliefs. In other words, focussing on the Black Treatment coefficient alone leads to an interpretation of the gubernatorial election that somewhat underestimates the impact of race.

The results of Table 4 indicate that controlling for the impact of potentially confounding factors, there remains an influence of racial attitudes on voting in the 1982 Bradley-Deukmejian election. The coefficient for Black Treatment (1.05) in the LAT survey is statistically significant at conventional levels, although it should be noted that in the CP data the effect for this variable does not quite cross this threshold.

More important for the question of whether Bradley's race cost him votes, however, is the relative magnitude of the influence of anti-black sentiment in predicting voting decisions in the four statewide elections. Table 4 shows that the overall effect of racial attitudes, however they are computed, is no stronger in the biracial Bradley-Deukmejian contest than in the other contests. In the LAT survey, the Black Treatment coefficient is almost the same in the equations predicting gubernatorial and senatorial votes; in the CP data, this measure only has a significant effect in the case of the senatorial contest. Not surprisingly, the salience of crime as an issue had less of an effect on voting for Senator than Governor (LAT), and opinions about handgun control played the same role in both choices.

The results for the contest between Riles and Honig for the office of State Superintendent of Schools provide an important insight into the way the electoral context shapes the influence of race on voting. The candidates in this election were similar in several respects. Both were professional educators. Neither was publicly identified with a particular political party or ideological camp. Indeed, neither was widely known among the electorate. The main differences between them were that Riles was the incumbent and that he was black.

Given that the election for superintendent of schools is nominally a non-partisan affair, it is understandable that the estimated coefficient for party affiliation is much smaller in this instance. What is striking is the stronger influence of anti-black sentiment in this biracial contest than in any of the others, including the gubernatorial election. Like Bradley, Riles projected a moderate and conservative personal image. His prior record could hardly be viewed as inimical to "white interests," and his campaign ignored racial issues. Yet the belief that government was doing too much to help blacks gave a large boost to his white challenger. The implication is that in the absence of a partisan anchor and little detailed information about the candidates, race becomes a more salient cue for voting decisions.

The contrasting results between the two biracial contests examined validates our emphasis on the role of contextual factors in shaping the extent of racial voting. In the case of the

Riles-Honig election, even a moderate black seemed to elicit racial antagonism. In the gubernatorial election, however, partisan loyalties and widespread knowledge about Bradley inhibited negative reactions to his race.

Discussion

Throughout this paper, we have distinguished between two meanings of racial (or ethnic) voting. The first refers to the impact of racial identifications on electoral choice. On this point, our evidence suggests that resentment over the extent of the government's attentiveness to the demands of blacks consistently had a significant influence on voting in California in 1982.

Racial attitudes influenced the gubernatorial election in 1982 largely through their association with partisanship and with opinions on other so-called social or cultural issues. In California, as elsewhere in the nation, anti-black feelings pushed one toward Republican candidates, even if one were registered as a Democrat. Negative feelings toward minorities were one element in a cluster of conservative beliefs--opposition to handgun control, to "big" government, to "soft" judges, to progressive "social engineering." As such, racial attitudes were implicated in Bradley's defeat, and Brown's as well, but they were not the major cause of those defeats.

The second meaning of racial voting refers to the specific role of a candidate's race in engaging group identifications. From this perspective, we found that that Bradley's race was not

an important catalyst for anti-black voting in 1982. We attribute the absence of strong opposition to Bradley on account of his race to his persona, past record and the nature of the election campaign.[7] Throughout his career, Bradley acted to reassure white voters that his election would not threaten their interests. He consistently eschewed appeals to black pride and consciousness in favor of themes that emphasize his competence as a manager and his ability to unify the political community.

Expediency as well as conviction dictated this strategic approach. Blacks comprise less than a fifth of the electorate in Los Angeles and less than a tenth in the state as a whole. This approach apparently succeeded in keeping the defection of white Democrats in the 1982 gubernatorial election to normal levels. On the other hand, Bradley failed to mobilize black voters. To the contrary, a February 1983 report by The Field Institute indicates that turnout among blacks was unusually low in 1982 and argues that this was a significant factor in Bradley's defeat.

By 1982, then, Bradley was regarded by the public as a leading liberal Democrat rather than a spokesman for black demands. Indeed, as his overwhelming victory in the Democratic primary demonstrated, Bradley was more highly-regarded than any other leader in his party by voters of both races. Our data

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7 Additional support for this conclusion comes from a comparison of the present results with the study of Bradley's mayoral elections conducted by Kinder and Sears (1981). That analysis indicated that the influence of symbolic racism on opposition to Bradley diminished between 1969 and 1973, when racial tensions had receded and racial issues were less prominent in the campaign.

indicate that when white Democrats who designated themselves as conservatives split their ticket in California in 1982, they almost always voted for Bradley as governor and against Brown as Senator.

It is misleading, then, to say, as many journalists did after Deukmejian's upset victory in 1982, that Californians are not yet ready to tolerate a black governor. After all, Carol Hallett, the Republican candidate for lieutenant governor, lost by a much more decisive margin and no one seriously argues that the state would not elect a woman to this lesser office. The fact that Bradley would have won had he handled the gun control issue more effectively, mobilized more blacks or presented himself as a more forceful candidate suggests that his race did not prevent his victory. Doubtless there is a small segment of the electorate who would not vote for a black as governor, but it is unlikely that this group would vote for any white liberal Democrat either.

Bradley ran for governor in a period of Republican and conservative gains in California. In 1982 he had the advantage of running against a less well-known candidate. In the 1986 rematch between Governor Deukmejian, Bradley suffered an overwhelming defeat, winning only 33% of the white vote as compared to 44% in 1982 (Field Institute, 1986). Does this mean that racially-motivated voting had increased? This seems extremely unlikely. References to race were even less frequent during the campaign in 1986 than they were when Bradley ran for

governor in 1982. The political professionals discounted the role of race so heavily that pollsters such as Mervin Field did not include any questions about racial issues in their preelection surveys. (This, incidentally, made it impossible to replicate our analysis for the 1986 election.)

We have not yet considered the possibility that the social desirability of expressing tolerant opinions led white respondents to conceal their negative feelings about blacks. If covert racism were pervasive, distorting our measurement of racial attitudes or voting intention, we may have underestimated the impact of race in the Bradley-Deukmejian election.

The influence of hidden phenomena obviously is difficult to demonstrate. Clearly, in a close election the existence of even a relatively small number of people who deliberately misrepresent their preferences may be enough to falsify the pollsters' predictions and swing the outcome of the vote. But we doubt that covert racism substantially attenuated the parameter estimates presented in Table 4.

First, the polls we analyzed were conducted by telephone and did not concentrate on racial issues, thereby reducing the chances of eliciting the social desirability response set. Second, respondents did not appear reluctant to express anti-black sentiments. When one-third of the white respondents freely expressed the view that government was doing too much for racial minorities, it seems unlikely that others felt intense pressure to conform to a social norm of racial liberalism. Finally and

most importantly, we have shown that the candidate's race did seem to matter in the contest between Riles and Honig. It is difficult to see why covert racism should have shaped answers to questions about Bradley but not about Riles.[8]

Comparisons

A major implication of this study is that the impact of a candidate's race on voting varies with the electoral context, broadly defined. When the ethnic relevance of an election is unclear, in part because of how the campaign is conducted, a black candidate need not elicit widespread racially conscious responses.

Harold Washington's candidacy for mayor of Chicago in 1983 stands in striking contrast to Bradley's political strategy. Washington's entry into the fray transformed the election into what Baker and Kleppner (1986) characterize as a "race war." His campaign combined appeals to racial pride, culminating in the slogan "Now it's our turn to take over," with attacks on the incumbent mayor, Jane Byrne, for discriminating against blacks.

Despite the official condemnation of racist appeals by

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8 In addition, it is more likely that anti-Bradley voters anxious to conceal racist feelings would say that they were undecided rather than either express open support for Deukmejian or make the dissonant statement that they would vote for the black candidate. Yet when we investigated the social background and political attitudes of the undecided white respondents, we found no evidence that they were covert racists. That is, they did not closely resemble Deukmejian voters or respondents who openly expressed anti-black attitudes. As a group, undecided voters fell in between Bradley and Deukmejian supporters on the various predictors of voting intention in our model.

politicians and editorial writers, ethnic themes predominated at the grass-roots level. When Washington won the Democratic primary because his two opponents split the white vote, the Republican Bernard Epton, a wealthy Jewish liberal, became the unlikely hero of many white ethnics who always had voted Democratic.

The mobilization of black voters was the basis of Washington's success in both the primary and general election. Turnout among blacks rose from 34.5% in the 1979 primary to 64.5% in 1983, the same level of participation as among whites. In the general election of 1983, 73% of the registered blacks voted, compared to 67.2% of the whites. Virtually every black who went to the polls voted for Washington. White Democrats, on the other hand, deserted their party's nominee is droves. According to the CBS News exit poll, Washington won only 22% of the white Democratic vote in the 1983 general election, clearly because he was regarded by the defectors as a symbol of black power and open housing.

His ability to hold on to the votes of some well-educated and ideologically liberal white voters enabled Washington to win the 1983 election with 51 per cent of the vote. In 1987 he was opposed in the Democratic primary by ex-Mayor Byrne. In this campaign, racial themes were more muted. Washington won 25% of the white vote, double his share in the previous general election (New York Times, Feb. 25, 1987, p.1).

Chicago illustrates the conditions that maximize the extent of racially-motivated voting. The city has a long history of

racial conflict. Tensions intensified in the years leading up to Washington's election when the growth of the black population threatened the existing patterns of housing and schooling favored by white "ethnics." Washington's assertive style made his challenge to the existing political order unmistakable. Ethnic identifications and prejudices immediately were engaged and the result was the racial polarization of Chicago politics.

In May 1983, Philadelphia held a Democratic primary in which the city's black managing director, Wilson Goode, opposed Frank Rizzo, the white former mayor and police commissioner. This is an especially interesting election for our purposes, since it resembled the Bradley-Deukmejian contest in several important respects. First, racial issues were not openly or extensively discussed in the Philadelphia campaign. (Keiser, 1987). Second, Goode's personal style, like Bradley's, was managerial rather than agitational. In addition, Goode did not carry Harold Washington's negative baggage of legal problems and unmet financial obligations that might have provided a ready rationalization for a racist vote.

On the other hand, there were also contextual factors that might have been expected to intrude the racial factor into the election. The balance of political power between blacks and whites was a longstanding issue in Philadelphia politics. In 1979, there was a strong black contender in the Democratic primary; in that year's general election, another black activist ran as an Independent candidate. Both called for the redirection

of governmental services to improve the position of black residents. And although Rizzo did not overtly appeal to the racial anxieties of whites he may not have needed to: his recent record included an explicit "Vote White" campaign in the 1978 election on the question of revising the city charter to permit him to run for a third term. Thus, when he ran against Goode, Rizzo was already a well-established symbol of opposition to black political demands.

Despite Goode's moderate style and the absence of racial themes from the campaign, the pattern of voting in the Philadelphia mayoral election resembled the mayoral contest in Chicago rather than the California gubernatorial election. Goode was able to obtain only 25 per cent of the white vote in the Democratic primary and won largely because of the high turnout among blacks, 97 per cent of whom voted for him. Like Washington, Goode did best among liberal, well-educated whites and garnered virtually no support in the Italian and Irish neighborhoods. However, he was able to contain the defection of white Democrats in the general election by downplaying racial issues and mending fences with the Democratic party organization and Frank Rizzo (Keiser, 1987).

Where racial divisions are well-entrenched and the white candidate has an established following, then, the fact that the black candidate adopts a conciliatory style does not automatically diminish racial voting. In this regard, it is worth noting that Bradley did not face a Rizzo or Yorty-like opponent

in the Democratic gubernatorial primary in either 1982 or 1986.

The candidacy of William Lucas for Governor of Michigan in 1986 is another interesting case study for the impact of race on voting. Lucas was a black Republican running against a popular incumbent, James Blanchard. He ran as a fiscal conservative, promising to cut taxes and reduce welfare spending, yet simultaneously appealed to voters to "make history" by electing the nation's first black governor. This failed to occur, and Lucas won only 31% of the vote, compared to 44% for the white Republican candidate for governor four years previously. Clearly, Republicans had defected, but was this because of Lucas' race or because of the overwhelming popularity of his opponent?

Jesse Jackson's presidential campaigns provide a final illustration of the varying role of race in electoral politics. In 1984, Jackson was the first serious black candidate for the nation's highest office and his campaign focussed on the need to improve the power and status of racial minorities. He accepted the support of black nationalists and explicitly challenged the "white power elite."

Jackson's candidacy obviously mobilized blacks to register and to vote for him in the Democratic primaries. But his campaign also "countermobilized" whites in the sense that racial attitudes governed their evaluations of Jackson (Sears, Citrin and Kosterman, 1987). Analysis of the 1984 National Election Study showed that hostile opinions on racial issues and negative feelings about blacks influence whether white Democrats,

including those with liberal opinions on other issues, preferred Mondale to Jackson. And negative evaluations of Jackson, particularly in the South, had an independent effect on the likelihood of voting for Reagan and identifying with the Republican party (Sears, Citrin and Kosterman, 1987).

Because of his prior history, his personal style and his campaign rhetoric, Jesse Jackson in 1984 stimulated feelings of racial identification and hostility. Preliminary commentary on Jackson's 1988 campaign suggests that he has been more successful in attracting white support with a populist campaign that minimized references to race (New York Times, April 10, 1988, p.E1). Subsequent analysis of survey data will indicate whether this approach resulted in a diminished influence of racial attitudes on voting decisions and whether some support for Jackson among whites reflected the desire to express a symbolic commitment to racial harmony by voting for a black.

Conclusion

The intensity of racial identifications and beliefs and the presence of situational factors that engage these attitudes jointly determine how white voters react to black candidates. We have proposed that disentangling the unique role of the candidate's race requires comparing the influence of attitudes toward blacks in biracial contests and similar elections where both candidates are white. By this criterion, Tom Bradley's race was not a significant cause of his failure to be elected governor.

The evidence of the 1982 California gubernatorial election is that a black candidate does not automatically provokes widespread antagonism among whites. Yet it also appears when a black candidate, like Harold Washington, makes the balance of power between the races a salient issues, racial identification rather than party affiliation or political philosophy is the dominant influence on voting decisions. The strategic problem for a black candidate, of course, is how to frame a campaign that maximizes the benefits of black mobilization while minimizing the electoral costs of white countermobilization. And given the large body of evidence that the American public remains deeply divided on racial matters, this dilemma is likely to be an enduring one.

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Table 1

Characteristics of 1982 California Election

	Race of candidates	Partisan contest	Salience of race issues	Level of interest
Governor	Biracial	Yes	Low	High
U.S. Senate	Both white	Yes	Low	High
Lt. Governor	Both white	Yes	Low	Low
Sup't Schools	Biracial	No	Low	Low

TABLE 2

Racial Opinions Among White Californian Voters, October, 1982

Government Treatment of Blacks

"The government should not make any special effort to help Blacks and other racial minorities because they should help themselves."

Agree strongly	20.4%	
Agree somewhat	13.8%	
Disagree somewhat	24.1%	(California Poll)
Disagree strongly	35.5%	
Don't know	6.2%	

"Over the past few years, Blacks have been getting more favorable treatment from government than other races have."

Agree strongly	20.5%	
Agree somewhat	21.8%	
Disagree somewhat	24.8%	(California Poll)
Disagree strongly	21.9%	
Don't know	11.0%	

"Do you think that government has paid too much attention to blacks and other minority groups . . . or about the right amount . . . or do you think the government hasn't paid enough attention to blacks and other minority groups?"

Too much attention	32.8%	
Right amount	44.4%	
Not enough attention	15.4%	(Los Angeles Times Poll)
Don't know	6.3%	
Refused	1.1%	

"How do you think the government in Sacramento should treat blacks and other minorities? Do you think it should make every effort to improve their economic condition, or do you think it should make no special effort to help them?"

Make every effort	46.0%	
Make no special effort	43.3%	(Los Angeles Times Poll)
Don't know	8.8%	
Refused	1.9%	

TABLE 2
(continued)

Perceived Traits of Blacks

"Which of the following groups are the least law-abiding: Blacks, Italians, Japanese-Americans, Jews, or Mexican Americans -- or do you think they are all pretty much equal in that respect?"

All equal	34.3%	
Blacks	24.2%	
Hispanics	20.3%	(Los Angeles Times Poll)
Other	1.8%	
Not sure	15.1%	
Refused	4.2%	

"Which of the following groups are more prone to violence: Blacks, Italians, Japanese-Americans, Jews, or Mexican Americans -- or do you think they are all pretty much equal in that respect?"

All equal	31.8%	
Blacks	23.3%	
Hispanics	25.5%	(Los Angeles Times Poll)
Other	0.8%	
Not sure	13.2%	
Refused	5.4%	

Sources: California Poll (Field Institute) and the Los Angeles Times Poll. Number of cases: 730 for CP and 833 for LAT.

TABLE 3

Racial Beliefs and Voting Intentions, by Party

Is government paying too much attention to blacks?

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Too Much	Right Amount	Not Enough	Too Much	Right Amount	Not Enough
Vote for Bradley	57%	80%	93%	13%	29%	38%
Rating of Bradley	2.9	3.1	3.5	2.5	2.9	2.8
Vote for Brown	54%	60%	92%	8%	11%	30%
Rating of Brown	2.2	2.6	3.0	1.5	1.7	1.8

Should Sacramento make every effort to help blacks?

	Democrats		Republicans	
	No Special Effort	Make Every Effort	No Special Effort	Make Every Effort
Vote for Bradley	66%	87%	20%	27%
Rating of Bradley	3.1	3.3	2.7	2.9
Vote for Brown	54%	78%	8%	16%
Rating of Brown	2.3	2.8	1.5	1.7

TABLE 3 (con't)

Which group is less law-abiding?

	Democrats				Republicans			
	Blacks	Hispanics	Other Group	All Equal	Blacks	Hispanics	Other Group	All Equal
Vote for Bradley	69%	76%	91%	78%	22%	28%	11%	27%
Rating of Bradley	3.1	3.1	3.4	3.1	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.8
Vote for Brown	64%	62%	74%	69%	12%	8%	0%	17%
Rating of Brown	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.8

Which group is more prone to violence?

	Democrats				Republicans			
	Blacks	Hispanics	Other Group	All Equal	Blacks	Hispanics	Other Group	All Equal
Vote for Bradley	68%	71%	87%	84%	20%	31%	14%	23%
Rating of Bradley	3.0	3.1	3.5	3.2	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.8
Vote for Brown	68%	68%	72%	63%	8%	16%	4%	14%
Rating of Brown	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.5	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.6

Source: Los Angeles Times Poll, October 1982.

TABLE 4
Probit Estimates of Voting Intentions in Four Elections,
For Two Models of the Vote
(asterisks indicate statistical significance at the .05 level)

CALIFORNIA POLL

	Governor Vote	Senator Vote	School Superint. Vote	Lt.Governor Vote
Party	1.33 *	1.44 *	.51 *	1.19 *
Education	.13 *	.13	.25 *	.03
Gender	.12	.20	.13	.36
Age	-.07	-.04	.09	.03
Black Treatment	.13	.74 *	.83 *	.42
Welfare	.09	.27	.14	.07
Opinion on Gun Control (Prop 15)	.35 *	.43 *	.22	.69 *
Gun Ownership	.25	.06	.00	.05
Size of Gov't	.87 *	1.40 *	.73 *	1.09 *
N of cases	417	411	277	216

TABLE 4 (con't)

LOS ANGELES TIMES POLL

	Governor Vote	Senator Vote
Party	1.24 *	1.14 *
Education	.02	.07
Gender	.28	-.06
Age	-.16 *	.01
Black Treatment	1.05 *	.98 *
Black Character	-.02	-.01
Opinion on Gun Control (Prop 15)	.33 *	.28
Political Ideology	1.23 *	1.94 *
Salience of Crime	.93 *	.14
N of cases	440	433

Notes: Dependent variables are scored with the Democratic candidate (and Wilson Riles) as 1 and the Republican (and Bill Honig) as 0. Party is scored 0 if the respondent is a Republican, 1 if the respondent is a Democrat. Education is scored 1 for those with less than a high school diploma, 2 for those with with a high school degree, 3 for those with some college, 4 for those with a college degree, and 5 for those with some graduate training. Gender is scored 1 if the respondent is female. Age is divided into four categories: ages 18-35 = 1, 36-50=2, 51-65=3, 66 and up = 4. For the CP data, the Welfare item is divided into four categories, from strongly agree (0) to strongly disagree (1). Gun Control is scored 0 if the respondent favored Proposition 15, 1 if opposed, .5 if undecided. Gun Ownership is a dummy variable scored zero if either guns or rifles were present in the respondent's household. The Size of Government Index contains four categories and is scored in the "big government" (or pro-Democratic) direction. For the LAT data, Self-designated Political Ideology has five categories, ranging from strong conservative (0) to strong liberal (1). Crime Salience represents the respondent's assessment of the importance of crime as a political issue, ranging from 0 to 1 in order of decreasing importance. The Black Treatment and Black Character Indices, described in detail in the text, range from 0 to 1.