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Mapping Internationalization: Domestic and Regional Impacts

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This article introduces a conceptual design for mapping the domestic impact of internationalization. It proposes that internationalization leads to a trimodal domestic coalitional profile and advances a set of expectations about the regional effects of each profile. Aggregate data from ninety-eight coalitions in nineteen states over five regions suggests that between 1948 and 1993 the three coalitional types differed in their international behavior. Internationalizing coalitions deepened trade openness, expanded exports, attracted foreign investments, restrained military-industrial complexes, initiated fewer international crises, eschewed weapons of mass destruction, deferred to international economic and security regimes, and strove for regional cooperative orders that reinforced those objectives. Backlash coalitions restricted or reduced trade openness and reliance on exports, curbed foreign investment, built expansive military complexes, developed weapons of mass destruction, challenged international regimes, exacerbated civic-nationalist, religious, or ethnic differentiation within their region, and were prone to initiate international crises. Hybrids straddled the grand strategies of their purer types, intermittently striving for economic openness, contracting the military complex, initiating international crises, and cooperating regionally and internationally, but neither forcefully nor coherently. These findings have significant implications for international relations theory and our incipient understanding of internationalization. Further extensions of the conceptual framework can help capture international effects that are yet to be fully integrated into the study of the domestic politics of coalition formation.

International relations still lacks universally accepted propositions with unchallenged empirical status regarding the precise links between a state's level of economic openness and its general approach to conflict and cooperation. Furthermore, until recently the literature has been overwhelmingly concerned with the impact of bilateral trade interdependence, and much less so with how overall openness to the global political economy may affect state choices for conflict or cooperation. Some studies have focused largely on great powers but we are still bereft of a more universal understanding of this relationship.¹ Yet growing levels

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¹ For a landmark contribution see Rosecrance, 1986.

of internationalization force greater attention to the links between openness, domestic distributional effects, and resulting strategies for coping with—or interpreting—external threats and opportunities. Nor have efforts to understand the domestic impact of global norms yet yielded a commonly agreed framework. This article seeks to contribute to the task of conceptualizing internationalization's impact on domestic and regional politics.

Section I provides a working definition of internationalization while laying out a conceptual scheme for mapping the domestic impact of both material-economic and political-normative dimensions of internationalization. Relying on recent efforts to relate these effects to foreign policy, section II introduces a trimodal domestic coalitional profile, outlines the respective grand strategies (domestic, regional, and global) of each modal coalition, and derives a set of expectations about the regional effects of coalitional balances.² Section III provides quantitative evidence derived from five regions (the Middle East, South Asia, Latin America's Southern Cone, and East and Southeast Asia) including ninety-eight coalitions in nineteen states. Section IV outlines paths for exploring further the impact of internationalization on domestic and regional politics.

I. Internationalization: Definition and Signals

Internationalization involves the expansion of global markets, institutions, and certain norms, a process progressively reducing the purely domestic aspects of politics everywhere.³ This expansion provides signals—displaying opportunities and constraints—for different actors, who join coalitions with different proclivities to embrace or reject internationalization. Although not a brand new phenomenon, our knowledge about this complex process is still rather limited. It is not simply about what [growing] percentage of a state's GDP is accounted for by international activities and about the political implications thereof, but also about what [growing] fraction of local identity issues becomes affected by international regimes, institutions, and values, relative to the past. Internationalization thus threatens interests, cultures, and political entrepreneurs endangered by its advance, who in turn forge coalitions with competing integrated interpretations of the international political, economic, and strategic context.⁴ The essential logic behind the constitution of contending coalitions in response to internationalization is encapsulated in Polanyi's (1944) dialectic “double movement”—global market expansion and the political response to it—but does not end there and requires adjustments to the new millennium.

With respect to *economic incentives and threats* from internationalization, the analysis begins with an understanding of who gains and who loses from external liberalization, given different institutional configurations. Openness to global markets, capital, investments, and technology affects individuals and groups via changes in employment status, labor incomes, and returns on assets, via changes in prices of goods and services consumed, and via the provision of public services (Nelson, 1992). A common approach to map distributional impacts relies on the cleavage between tradables (internationally competitive) and nontradables (uncompetitive) sectors, advancing that “laborers, managers, and investors in the protected industry stand to lose, at least temporarily, from the removal of a protective wall” (Bruno, 1988:230). Whereas owners of uncompetitive sector-

² Solingen's (1998) qualitative study developed a bimodal profile and did not aggregate quantitative data along coalitional lines.

³ That more and more aspects of domestic politics are exposed to external phenomena does not necessarily imply that domestic responses are uniform. Internationalization involves reduced barriers to international flows of goods, capital, and ideas but not necessarily global convergence, at least not in the short to medium terms.

⁴ For landmark great-power studies of coalitions integrating political-economy and strategic factors see Gourevitch, 1986, and Snyder, 1991.

specific assets have incentives to pressure governments for protection, export-intensive ones benefit from openness. Related approaches emphasize large banking and industrial complexes already involved in foreign activities that favor openness.⁵ Liberalization is also presumed to benefit labor and “symbolic analysts” in competitive industries (firms), their suppliers, and consumers of imported products. An array of international economic institutions (World Bank, IMF, WTO, and others) bolster progressive openness.

Yet the same international context can trigger different responses even by comparable domestic political-economies. The economic and political impact of internationalization is neither simple nor uniform; differential effects dominate despite some broadly similar effects across countries (Keohane and Milner, 1996). Variations emerge from contingencies regarding trade or financial thrusts toward integration, actors’ ability to read signals under uncertainty, and institutions blocking relative price signals and/or freezing old coalitions. Arguing that no existing social science theory successfully predicts these choices, Keohane and Milner (255) also suggest that “there seems to be enough leeway for action that leadership can make a difference,” echoing Gourevitch (1986), who included leadership and entrepreneurship as important barriers to predicting coalitions in second-image reversed models. Political entrepreneurship thus provides a valuable pivot for anchoring the sinews of internationalization. Finally, political-economy models often black-box the response of key actors in the dilemmas of internationalization, such as the military and ethno-confessional leaders.

The *political-normative opportunities and threats* stemming from internationalization involve expanding international institutions and normative frameworks that facilitate the operation of certain domestic groups and entrepreneurs while foiling the values and political agendas of others. The variable degree to which these processes and structures influence state behavior is still under debate, yet their progressive diffusion has forced serious attention to their increased role. The constructivist research program aims at a better understanding of the nexus between international institutions, transnational and domestic actors, and their joint impact on the preferences, values, and behavior of states, subnational and transnational movements, and on patterns of compliance and defiance (Klotz, 1995; Finnemore, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The extent to which international institutions and norms merely constrain behavior or, alternatively, define state identity seems—for at least some constructivists—to be largely contingent on the strength of both domestic movements and institutions upholding them and their international allies and referents (Risse-Kappen, 1995).

The mechanism at work here emphasizes more persuasion and socialization than exchange and cost-benefit calculations (although both are recognized). This requires the crafting of coalitions by “norm entrepreneurs” who use appropriate conjunctures to promote aversion to free trade, war, slavery, or torture. Internationalization often multiplies the range of identities individuals can embrace, deepening the methodological difficulty of isolating core identities that might explain a given behavior. Whereas social identities of early rural social formations were relatively easier to map, the identity of a late twentieth century Hindu/software engineer/mother-of-two/pacifist/born in a Bihari village/currently residing in dynamic Bangalore is defined by a far more complex social and institutional context that now also includes no less than international regimes in telecommunications and nonproliferation.

⁵ On the complementarity of sectoral and factoral (land, labor, and capital) analysis see also Baldwin, 1988, Frieden and Rogowski, 1996, and, on internationalized firms, Milner, 1988. On the “bankers’ alliance” and their populist nemesis see Maxfield, 1990. On labor markets, see Garrett and Lange, 1996:57–60.

FIG. 1. Positions regarding international economic and security regimes.

The open-ended understanding of international normative and institutional effects mirrors the absence of a simple formula for estimating the political impact of expanding global markets. Domestic responses to international regimes range from issues pertaining to classical (military) security to human rights and environmental considerations. For the sake of simplifying complexity the security cluster in conceptual Figure 1, as well as the empirical analysis that follows, will address classical (military) security considerations.⁶ However, the general schema can be adapted to address a more complex cluster. For instance, some overlap can be detected among activists and movements that detract nuclear weapons, environmental degradation, and human rights abuses. Although some activists have serious misgivings regarding inequities in international regimes such as the Nonproliferation Treaty, many tend to endorse them. Yet there is no direct correspondence between supporting these regimes and acquiescing with the implications of economic liberalization. There can be tensions between freer economic exchange and regulating on behalf of the environment, but there are also synergistic effects between contracting state budgets, reducing defense expenditures, and weakening the military politically, which often enhance human security. Despite occasional references in the discussion below, Figure 1 leaves out for a later stage the complexities introduced by environmental and human rights considerations. The (vertical) economic cluster is no less of a simplification, encompassing global markets and institutions from trade and technology to capital flows.

While mapping domestic constituencies according to their position on both clusters, we can allow for various levels of commitment to support or reject a

⁶ Figure 1 elaborates on Hirschman's (1963:285–291) simpler but inspiring formulation of a parliamentary debate over economic reform.

cluster. Individual and institutional actors may feel particularly strong about a certain issue but less so about others. Figure 1 outlines sixteen political spaces ranging from the northeastern corner (cell SE) of quadrangle II, where we find strong support for both clusters, to the southwestern corner (cell $\bar{S}\bar{E}$) of quadrangle III, locating strong opposition to both. Capital letters are used to represent positions that are held strongly (for instance, S for strongly favoring a security regime and $\bar{S}$ for strongly opposing it) while lower-case letters represent more weakly held or ambivalent positions. Cell $\bar{s}E$ thus reflects a position weakly opposing a security regime while strongly favoring economic openness. Instead, $s\bar{e}$ reflects a position that weakly favors a security regime while weakly opposing economic openness.

Consider the hypothetical dilemma of an Indian partner to a multinational venture with a U.S. firm. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition's detonation of a nuclear device in 1998—an affront to the nonproliferation regime—may touch a nationalist chord that might place her in the category of “weakly opposed” to that regime. However, quite possibly, the potential costs for her business and her strong commitment to economic openness are likely to loom large on her motivations to replace or lobby the Indian government. She could thus find herself gravitating from $\bar{s}E$ to quadrangle II (to sE , for instance) as the costs [of policies such as testing a nuclear device] for her own business rise. A competitive industrialist sympathetic to Likud in Israel may have followed a similar pattern in the 1999 elections, suspecting that Likud's security positions—privileging hypernationalist policies—derailed foreign investment and economic expansion. Instead, a hypothetical Indian minister that once decried the nuclear program as a pacifist now favors tests and weaponization in response to his large support base among Hindu nationalists from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang movement. Once positioned somewhere in the horizontal space between $s\bar{E}$ and $s\bar{e}$ (given modal opposition to internationalization at the time as well as suspicions of the nonproliferation regime) he is now entrenched in quadrangle III or IV. Our imaginary examples will likely find themselves supporting competing coalitions in the battle over internationalization.

Political entrepreneurs rely on the available institutional context (different forms of parliamentary democracy, autocracy) to broker coalitions across these cells through logrolling or exchanging the mutual rights of partners to seek their most valued preference. They employ both material and cultural issues to develop the right blend, selling, adapting, and disposing of it altogether when necessary. This process requires an ability to interpret the mobilizing capacity of prevailing norms, identity concepts, and historical myths no less than the mobilizing capacity of promises and myths about global markets. In crafting coalitions, political entrepreneurs combine different power resources that prospective coalitional partners may command, such as the military's coercive capabilities, industrialists' potential to invest, employ, and exit, labor's option to strike, central banks' imputed independence, organizational advantages of threatened state bureaucracies, or the threats of violence from ethno-religious zealots. Entrepreneurs fashion coalitions that maximize their own relative power and control over coalitional resources, using available rules and structures to translate interests and values into bargaining resources at particular sites, from the ballot box to legislatures, street protests, bureaucracies, military barracks, and corporate boardrooms. Out of these bargains emerge grand strategies—of domestic, regional, and global reach—designed to pursue the most valued preferences of coalitional partners.

II. Implications for Regional Orders: Ideal-Typical Coalitions and Strategies

On the basis of these sources of coalitional mobilization three archetypal domestic coalitions can be isolated from a much richer empirical menu. Myriad combi-

nations and constellations are possible in the 16-cell matrix, fitting the political and institutional landscape of different states. However, building on the basic premises condensed in Figure 1, three ideal-typical coalitions capture the thrust of responses to internationalization.⁷

Internationalizing coalitions aggregate primarily constituencies from quadrangle II and are often driven by the most dynamic sectors favoring openness—notably those tied to international finance—including their associated “symbolic analysts” and labor force.⁸ Consumers of imported products, state agencies entrusted with economic reform (independent central banks, finance ministries, managers of export-processing zones), and competitive agricultural exporters also gravitate toward these coalitions. The armed forces join these coalitions when openness does not threaten them financially or institutionally or when the organizing entrepreneur succeeds in purging expansive military-industrial-complex tendencies within the armed forces.

Backlash coalitions are primarily entrenched in quadrangle III comprising sectors threatened by external liberalization, such as private and state-owned enterprises and banks, urban unskilled, uncompetitive formal sector blue-collar labor, state employees and agencies vulnerable to reform (such as those dealing with capital controls or import licensing), often including the military and its associated industrial complex, as well as internal security agencies and opponents of international regimes that curtail national sovereignty. Civic-nationalist, ethnic, and confessional entrepreneurs wary of withering away with internationalization are expected to be part of such coalitions. These movements, an important lever for mass mobilization appealing to communal, “organic” values threatened by crude market forces, often appropriate long-standing critiques of international capitalism as wasteful and corruptive, defying “Western” regimes and institutions.

Hybrid coalitions span quadrangles I and IV, are much less clear-cut in their composition, and can bring together otherwise strange bedfellows (such as Patrick Buchanan and Lenora Fulani, at least at some point).⁹ State-employed scientific and technological communities, particularly in the military-industrial complex, can be expected to oppose international security regimes that essentially put them out of work, making them typical supporters of politicians pivoted in quadrangle III. However, the more exit options available (for instance, private sector jobs as a consequence of economic openness) the more likely they are to gravitate into quadrangles II or IV. Peace (as well as environmental and human security) movements are expected to endorse emerging international regimes in those issue-areas because of moral conviction. These regimes also endow them with expanded political and legal rights at home and abroad. At least some of these constituencies are lukewarm at best—and sharply critical at times—of economic aspects of internationalization, making them natural dwellers of quadrangle I, although not invariably so. The more heterogeneous the hybrid coalition, the more it is likely to be affected by distributional conflicts within itself.

⁷ These categories modify Solingen, 1998, by introducing hybrid coalitions more explicitly and identifying patterns of logrolling. For Max Weber (1949:93), ideal types are conceptual constructs, not a historical or “true” reality. They are a *limiting* concept with which real situations are compared. As Ruggie (1993:31–32) suggests, Weberian ideal types are “selective and deliberately one-sided abstractions from social reality, and their methodological role is to serve as ‘heuristic’ devices in the ‘imputation’ of causality—for example, by helping to pinpoint differences between the logic of the ideal type and patterns of outcomes on the ground.”

⁸ Notice the suffix, as *internationalizing* indicates a process, a path, an empirical approximation but never quite the ideal type.

⁹ Quadrangle I includes strong and weak opponents of economic openness who otherwise endorse security regimes strongly or weakly. Quadrangle IV includes weak and strong proponents of economic openness who oppose security regimes strongly or weakly.

Patterns of Logrolling and Grand Strategies

Politicians of all stripes compete for the allegiance of constituencies in quadrangles I and IV and may themselves dwell in hybrid quarters when neither internationalizing nor backlash quadrangles hold much promise. "Positive logrolling" is more likely between those who feel strongly positive about one cluster but are ambivalent about the other (cells sE and Se). For instance, at least some human-security movements with strong ties to international regimes compromise on economic issues to advance their mission. "Negative logrolling" is likely between those who feel strongly negative about one cluster but are ambivalent about the other (cells $\bar{s}e$ and $s\bar{E}$). Fervent economic nationalists thus might suppress some sympathy for international regimes in other issue-areas to link with strong opponents of an international security regime who otherwise are mildly supportive of external economic liberalization. This is the stuff of a classical convergence between economic-nationalists and security-nationalists (Gilpin, 1987). High uncertainty about the likely impact of internationalization concentrates constituencies in quadrangles I and IV. With wide segments of society behind the "veil of ignorance"—unable to envisage where and how they will come out at the end of the process—leaders' rhetoric can be particularly powerful. Imputed, not real, effects of internationalization—both on economics and security—become the raw material for political platforms. Leaders of all stripes can use the state to advance their programs; at times they capture different state agencies concurrently, making the state itself the battlefield over internationalization.

Political entrepreneurs aggregate policy preferences of coalitional partners into "grand political-economic strategies" revealing a coalition's position regarding the global political economy and institutions, the domestic extraction and allocation of resources, and the regional strategic context. Grand strategies can be explicitly stated—as in a party platform or a *coup d'état* pronouncement—but more often they are implicitly embedded or progressively developed in discrete policy positions. A grand strategy becomes *raison d'état* once a certain coalition prevails politically as a function of its resources relative to the opposition and of the institutional context within which it operates. Grand strategies identify potential threats to coalitional survival—at home, in the region, throughout the world—and devise political, economic, and military means to counter them. An internationalizing grand strategy includes adjusting the domestic political economy to the requirements of internationalization, weakening opponents to favored international regimes, and maintaining secure access to foreign markets, capital, investments, and technology. A cooperative (stable and nonviolent) regional climate serves this strategy well. Central to this program is macroeconomic stability (low tolerance for inflation) which reduces uncertainty, encourages savings, and enhances investment. Where the strategy succeeds, protection declines markedly and foreign trade and private economic activity account for growing shares of GDP.

Internationalists also resist mobilizing resources for potential military conflict so as to both avoid unproductive, inflation-inducing investments and budgetary drain under the shroud of "national security" and undercut backlash beneficiaries of state rents. Military expenditures are expected to be restrained to protect the overall strategy and incurred only as an insurance, lest they lead to costly regional arms races.¹⁰ Furthermore, cooperative, stable, and nonmilitarized regional environments have positive global externalities by minimizing risk, enabling foreign investment, decreasing the likelihood of sanctions, reinforcing ties to economic institutions, and enhancing internationalists' reputation as credible members of the new global institutional order.

¹⁰ On military expenditures and macroeconomic performance see Cohen et al., 1996.

Backlash grand strategies seek to preserve state entrepreneurship and military-industrial allocations, resist external pressures for economic liberalization and intrusions on sovereignty, and target internationalizing adversaries at home and abroad. Regional insecurity and competition is a natural side-effect at best, and a dominant requirement at worst, of this grand strategy. Regional cooperation threatens backlash coalitions because it scales back military imperatives, erodes statist privileges, and devalues nationalist and confessional myth-making as a political currency. Intransigent and uncertainty-inducing regional policies raise the propensity for conflict and the risks for foreign investors, potentially triggering denial of aid and technology. Backlash coalitions thrive with such responses, at least in the short and medium terms, given their inherent affinity with state and military entrepreneurship, import-substitution, classical populism, price controls, nominal wage increases, overvalued currency to raise wages and profits in nontraded-goods sectors, and import controls through tariffs and multiple exchange rates (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991:9). Their strategy rebuffs fiscal orthodoxy and stabilization plans, particularly as imposed by the IMF, and international regimes in various issue-areas, represented as “Western” diktats.

All coalitions are constrained internally by the relative strength of their domestic challengers, leading to different degrees of coherence in their grand strategy. *Pristine* grand strategies are most feasible where there is massive support for both internationalization clusters (that is, where quadrangle II has a clear majority) and where there is massive rejection of both (quadrangle III is the political center of gravity). Either case allows leaders freer implementation of more coherent strategies, closer to the ideal type. *Diluted* grand strategies are more common where leaders must attract support from quadrangles I and IV. Internationalizing leaders pivoted in quadrangle II, for instance, may reach out to constituencies that feel strongly positive about one cluster but are mildly opposed to another ($\bar{s}E, S\bar{e}$). Backlash leaders may reach out of quadrangle III to attempt “negative logrolling” between those strongly opposed to one cluster and ambivalent about the other (cells $\bar{S}e, s\bar{E}$). Either effort leads to more diluted variants of grand strategies. *Defiled* grand strategies are the result of logrolling difficulties and/or the small size of cells $\bar{s}E, S\bar{e}, \bar{S}e$, and $s\bar{E}$. This forces entrepreneurs to court cells $\bar{S}E$ and $S\bar{E}$, which they can do sequentially or inter-temporally (as in Hirschman’s “shifting alliances”) endorsing/rejecting one cluster at time t and another at $t + 1$. These “Voodoo politics” (Williamson, 1994) and “bait-and-switch” strategies (Drake, 1991) involve promises made with full knowledge that they will have to be betrayed. Politicians can also attempt an ambitious scheme that requires vastly disparate constituencies to forfeit and converge in a joint endorsement—or a joint rejection—of both clusters, a scenario that Hirschman (1963:289) labels “*mutual sacrifices*.” This maneuver essentially isolates diehard SE and $\bar{S}\bar{E}$, often requires wielding the threat of national collapse, and can be recognized from efforts to craft national-unity governments and grand coalitions. Politicians who previously advanced unsuccessful or tension-ridden grand strategies and who essentially produced the threat of national collapse, later wield that threat to survive politically.

In sum, *logrolling efforts*, *sequential courting*, and *ambitious unifying maneuvers* can strain the internal coherence of a given grand strategy. On the one hand, constituencies may be either unaware or dismissive of the internal tensions that logrolling induces within a strategy, thus obviating the need to estimate dissonance and trade-offs. On the other hand, politicians—particularly the risk-prone—miscalculate their ability to have the cake (e.g., favorable Moody credit classifications) and eat it too (e.g., engage in aggressive regional policies). They may be able to maintain an inherently unstable mixed strategy for some time, as Israel’s Likud and India’s BJP coalitions have done. However, in time the deep tensions in that strategy force a reshuffling of the coalition, a reformulation of the strategy, or both.

A Typology of Regional Orders

Coalitions are also constrained externally by regional coalitional balances of power. The latter reflects the identity and strength of competing coalitions in neighboring states, which produce three main types of regional orders.¹¹

1. *Zones of stable peace* flourish where most states in the region (and extra-regional powers with a strong presence in the region) have coalitional majorities in quadrangle II. The potential for armed conflict and military build-ups threatens the fundamentals of their grand strategy: macroeconomic, political, and regional stability, and global access. Domestic considerations drive economic rationalization and military cutbacks as much as external factors, acting as tacit self-binding commitments, assurances against militarized strategies, and inducements to diffuse disputes. De-escalation dominates under symmetric regional conditions that assuage potential prisoner's dilemma situations, as in most arms races. This symmetric restraint helps leaders ward off domestic backlash criticism regarding economic reform, shrinking militaries, and cooperative regional standpoints. The synergies between domestic and regional policies are also translated into reduced transaction costs, facilitating agreement on issues under dispute and moderating the need to scrutinize compliance and enhance transparency. Internationalizing orders require regional cooperation but not necessarily economic integration because their underlying logic is global. They do lead to absolute increases in regional trade and investment and trade-creating schemes sensitive to an "open regionalism" that lubricates ties to the global economy. With strong, symmetrical quadrangle II coalitions in a given region, more pristine internationalizing strategies are feasible. Where coalitions straddle quadrangles I, II, and IV, more diluted versions are expected due to logrolling and sequential courting. Time horizons are shorter, the credibility of self-binding and symmetric commitments at the regional level is watered down, and cooperation and diffuse reciprocity are more tentative and unstable. Paradoxically, formal regional arrangements liberalizing trade seem more compelling here, to weaken recalcitrant backlash quarters and to signal more believable commitments to international investors.

2. *War zones* prevail where most states in the region (and extra-regional powers with a strong presence in that region) are ruled by leaders aggregating constituencies primarily from quadrangle III, emphasizing economic self-reliance, military prowess, sovereignty, and national or confessional purity. Coalitional symmetry (across states) here operates to heighten power balancing and competitive mechanisms, as entrepreneurs rely on civic-nationalist or ethno-confessional themes to condemn not merely internationalism but also the backlash leadership across the border. This symmetry fuels risk, instability, and conflict that—sometimes unwillingly—results in armed conflict. The pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is symptomatic of a risk-prone strategy imbued with parochial symbolism that also caters to inward-looking economic nationalists, civil or military. Military-industrial and ancillary scientific-technological constituencies loom large in these orders, foiling collective security arrangements that threaten their existence. Integrative economic schemes are similarly ill-fated, lest they drive key constituencies—private and state monopolies—literally out of business. Backlash leaders attempt imperial commercial strategies (Hirschman, 1945) that maximize economic profit, military power, and regional influence, all of which sustain and reproduce their power at home. The more embattled backlash leaders and the

¹¹ Extra-regional states may also be part of the regional coalitional balance of power.

more strenuous their efforts to court from quadrangles I and IV, the more diluted their grand strategies. Competing backlash leaders—at home and in the region—outbid each other in radicalizing the strategy, leading to spiraling escalation of conflict domestically and across the border.

3. *Zones of restrained conflict* reflect coalitional competition among internationalizing, backlash, and hybrid leaders at the regional level. Under these conditions, no pure coalitional type dominates across states within a region. Backlash leaders depict internationalizing or hybrid neighbors as “lackeys” and executors of Western imperial designs, attributes also applied to internationalists and hybrids at home. They portray domestic economic reform only through its negative fallouts and efforts to liberalize regional trade as hegemonic. This regional environment constrains internationalists’ ability to advance cooperative stances and self-binding commitments regarding military investments but preserves their incentives to de-escalate conflict that might foil their domestic and global agendas irreversibly. With regional instability investments suffer and economic reform becomes more costly politically. Insofar as mixed orders exhibit regional trade their inherent asymmetry—closure versus openness—enhances discord and instability. The benefits from trade are channeled to respective coalitional beneficiaries at home. Yet stronger internationalizing and backlash leaders in a hybrid region—less encumbered by domestic pressures—can reach a certain “live-and-let-live” framework, an *ersatz* cooperation less tainted by the short-term considerations affecting weaker versions. Embattled leaders have strong incentives to strengthen their coalitional namesakes across the border. Stronger internationalizing neighbors enable internationalizing leaders to infuse their own strategy with greater integrity and coherence. Likewise, stronger backlash neighbors enable greater coherence in backlash strategies. In hybrid orders regionally hegemonic coalitions (Nasserism in the 1960s) impact the fate of domestic—and eventually regional—coalitional balances, shifting them toward their own type.

III. An Empirical Application

Classifying Coalitions

The conceptual scheme in the preceding discussion gained sharper definition toward the twentieth century’s end but its referents are of longer gestation. Thus, the empirical application that follows spans most of the postwar era, identifying entrepreneurs organizing ninety-eight successive coalitions in nineteen states comprising five regions: the Middle East, East and Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Southern Cone of Latin America. These regions account for a significant portion of the industrializing world, much of which shared similarly high levels of what neorealism describes as anarchic, self-help, historical contexts, and much of which was poorly endowed with effective regional institutional infrastructures that might facilitate cooperation.

The design and available data make this a particularly hard test for the empirical exploration of coalitional effects on grand strategy. Indeed, most years when internationalizing effects have been strongest (1990s), presumably sharpening their impact on coalitional type, are excluded in the aggregate statistical analysis.¹² This is so primarily because homogeneous aggregate data for most dependent variables is only available up to 1993. Nonetheless, our confidence in this analytical path may be enhanced if, even under a more inauspicious era

¹² I have tried to complement this deficiency by including some post-1993 data—where available—in the longitudinal discussion of individual cases.

FIG. 2. Causal logic.

for internationalizing strategies than the 1990s, one can still discern different behavioral patterns across coalitions along the expected criteria. Given the period under consideration the analysis is confined to economic openness and military security. Both the prevailing authoritarianism of the pre-1990 era and the Cold War environment help explain the relative marginality of peace and human rights movements as ruling coalitional partners during most of this period.

Following the argument outlined in Figure 2 the empirical analysis begins with the identification of coalitions according to their composition, for example, to the nature of the partners logrolled by political entrepreneurs. This identification of the independent variable relies on extensive qualitative research including public and private statements, press accounts, memoirs, party platforms, parliamentary debates, legislative proceedings, and personal interviews with politicians, business and military leaders, diplomats, bureaucrats, officials from peak associations, labor, and political parties. A vast literature in comparative politics and political economy also enabled a better specification of coalitional composition.¹³ Identifying coalitions was far easier where democratic institutions allowed a free press and free political expression, which only suggests that democracies are allies of political analysis, not necessarily that they correlate with any grand strategy. Entrepreneurs from all stripes rely on democratic institutions or authoritarian means.

It is important to recognize that no ideal-typical coalition or entrepreneur has perfect empirical referents; some cases reflect starker instances than others. Internationalizing entrepreneurs craft coalitions primarily from quadrangle II constituencies and from quadrangles I and/or IV when needed. Backlash entre-

¹³ The main sources include those by Amsden (1985, 1989); Haggard (1990); Haggard and Kaufman (1992); Barkey (1992); Chan and Clark (1991); Moon (1994); Bresser and Luiz (1978); Bill and Springborg (1990); Kohli (1988); Erro (1993); Gould and Ganguly (1993); Gereffi and Wyman (1990); Deyo (1990); Frankel (1978); Al-Khalil (1989); Beblawi and Luciani (1987); MacIntyre (1994); Migdal (1988); Rudolph and Rudolph (1987); Arian and Shamir (1995); Niblock and Murphy (1993); Richards and Waterbury (1990); Smith, Acuña, and Gamarra (1994); Bowie and Unger (1997); and Rodan (1996).

preneurs rely on coalitions largely from quadrangle III and quadrangles I and/or IV when needed. Hybrid entrepreneurs rely on mixed coalitions from any quadrangle, either concomitantly or sequentially. The resulting classification of coalitions on the basis of their composition is reflected in Appendices I, II, and III. Appendix IV contains an inclusive, chronological listing of all coalitions by country and type. The beginning date corresponds to the inception of a coalition, which frequently—but not always—coincides with a particular entrepreneur's ascent to power. The end date corresponds to the end of a coalition or, for some cases in the 1990s, the year 1993 marks the last year for which aggregate data are available. At times entrepreneurs start out with one coalition but later replace it in response to changes in coalitional opportunities and/or external crises (Park Chung Hee, 1961 vs. 1963; Sadat, 1970 vs. 1974). Hybrids are particularly prone to shifts and whereas they may start with a different coalitional makeup they may end up leading a diehard coalitional version, as Argentina's Videla and Galtieri. Where successive entrepreneurs in a single state reflect a continuous and roughly similar coalitional arrangement they are listed together (Lee Kuan Yew–Goh Chok-Tong, 1965–1998; Yitzhak Rabin–Shimon Peres, 1992–1996).¹⁴ A coalition may include a few key individual and institutional actors close to political entrepreneurs or more formal representatives of large political constituencies (more frequent in democratic systems).

Grand Strategies in Action

Against this threefold identification of entrepreneurs and supportive coalitions we can evaluate differences in their grand strategies through concrete policies vis-à-vis external economic liberalization, military investments, and regional and international security. On all fronts the cases listed are analyzed along a continuum and relative to the other two categories. Policies are seldom linear or coherent although internationalizing and backlash versions, as expected, reveal sharper trajectories than hybrids.

Economic Openness. Approaches to the economic cluster can be estimated from statements of intention regarding fiscal or tariff targets, budget rules, foreign investment blueprints, or borrowing ceilings, *inter alia*. They can also be assessed on the basis of concrete steps, such as the actual removal of quantitative import restrictions, elimination of tariffs, unification of import tariffs and export subsidies, and the reduction of state control over credit allocation by freeing interest rates, removing subsidies and barriers to entry, and privatizing the banks.¹⁵ Clearly, external liberalization is a matter of degree and none of the cases fits “laissez-faire” policies across the board; most states retain selective protectionism, regulation, and industrial policies. Furthermore, policy outcomes can be at odds with initial intentions and concrete steps, particularly as the coalition's relative strength and resources are important intervening variables. Policy success is thus not a wholly reliable indicator of policy commitment although success can strengthen the entrepreneur's commitment to the policy. Openness to foreign investment is only a prerequisite, not a guarantee that investments will materialize. Success is the daughter of a more complex set of factors, including regional stability. Hence, growing trade openness (TO) may be a symptom, not a very reliable measure of the presence of an internationalizing coalition, although it

¹⁴ Due to this grouping, the 55 entries listed in Appendix IV actually involve a larger number of coalitions (98). The very first entry, for instance, includes five coalitions (from Frondizi to Lanusse), entries for Iraq (1964–1979) and Brazil (1964–1990) an even larger succession of coalitions, and Thailand's (1960–1997) up to 16.

¹⁵ Bruno, 1988. On the particular importance of financial liberalization see Loriaux et al., 1997, and Kahler, 1998.

does indicate a significant probability that liberalizing policies have been implemented.

No single indicator of TO is free of methodological problems and each captures a different dimension of trade policy.¹⁶ Settling for a common operational indicator of TO leads to “imports plus exports as percentage of GDP.” Although many other considerations affect this index, it does offer the advantage of the most comprehensive data base.¹⁷ Building on yearly-aggregated data on TO for each coalition (N = 572) yields a mean TO value of 88 for internationalizing coalitions, 38 for backlash, and 52 for hybrid (see Appendix V). Mean internationalizing TO values are more than double those of backlash and less than double those of hybrids. The difference in means across coalitions is significant at the .01 level. A test of multiple comparisons shows a mean difference of 50 between internationalizing and backlash and of 36 between internationalizing and hybrid, both significant at <.001. Only the mean TO difference between hybrid and backlash is statistically insignificant. This finding is entirely compatible with the anticipation that hybrids can gravitate toward backlash policies, particularly when backlash constituencies are strong. Data on mean yearly changes in TO suggest that internationalizing coalitions increase their TO by 1.9 percent per year and hybrid ones by 1.1 percent whereas TO for backlash coalitions decreases by 0.23 percent per year on average.

This aggregate comparison is quite suggestive but ignores initial conditions, country-specific considerations such as size (larger states often have smaller trade shares), and peculiar policy dynamics. Longitudinal comparisons of successive coalitions in a single state provide more controlled assessments of coalitional impact.¹⁸ The case of Chile suggests an arguably dramatic imprint of coalitional changes on TO values. Allende’s coalition reduced TO from 29 percent average in the preceding decade to 23 in 1972 (\$8 bn. 1970 GDP). Pinochet’s coalition raised TO from 29 (1973) to 53 (1975) in two years, and 66 percent in 1989 (GDP of \$25 bn.), more than doubling Allende’s average. Democratic internationalists Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei averaged 60 percent (1990–1996). No less dramatic is the case of South Korea, where TO levels were under 13 percent under Syngman Rhee’s coalition dominated by a profligate military and backed by the Liberal Party (opposing conservative fiscal and monetary policies), bureaucrats, and import-substituting firms (Cumings, 1990; Tun-jen Cheng, 1990; Haggard and Moon, 1993). Park Chung Hee launched an internationalizing strategy in 1964 that nearly doubled TO by 1968, from 20 to 38 percent. By 1974 TO nearly quadrupled, reaching 67 percent of a rapidly growing GDP, and rising to 73 (1980s) under Chun Doo Hwan’s liberalizing thrust. With an initially more favorable natural and industrial resource endowment than its southern nemesis, North Korea’s backlash regime under Kim Il-Sung gave real meaning to an inward-looking strategy. Foreign trade by 1994 still amounted to only 13 percent of GDP and was significantly lower in earlier periods (Pollack, 1994). Under Taiwan’s Chiang Ching-kuo and the Kuomintang’s internationalizing strategy TO trebled from 30 (1960) to 89 percent (1973), reaching 99 percent averages by the 1980s (Chan, 1988; Jeon, 1995). Indonesia’s average TO under backlash Sukarno was 21 percent declining to 18 (1960–1965) but rising sharply after

¹⁶ Most indices (Edwards, 1997) build on limited samples and time periods. There are no data bases for most measures (including effective protection rates) that cover the entire period and countries.

¹⁷ Data for 1950–1992 are from Heston and Summers’s Penn World Tables (1991, 1995). In a few instances it was possible to supplement this with data from the UN Statistical Yearbook (1999) for 1993–1998. The longitudinal analysis below is also based on data for 1992–1996 by *World Development Indicators* (World Bank, 1998:310) and *World Development Report* (World Bank, 1991–1997). Data for North Korea, the PLO/Palestine and several Arab states, and the 1950s in general is scarce, requiring greater reliance on qualitative sources.

¹⁸ See Appendix IV. This section also provides more disaggregated data than that contained in coalitional averages in the appendices.

Suharto's coup from as low as 10 (1964) to 33 percent (\$6 bn. 1966 GDP) and over 50 percent by the late 1970s (\$78 bn. 1980 GDP). Suharto's average TO of 47 percent had more than doubled Sukarno's.

In the Middle East Egypt's TO declined from over 53 percent (early 1950s) prior to the 1952 revolution to a 37 percent average under Nasser (\$4.4 bn. 1965 GDP), a pattern maintained under Sadat's early (backlash) tenure. Following Sadat's 1974 *infitah* (liberalizing) revolution TO climbed from 33 (1973) to over 61 (1975) and 78 percent (1979), replacing Nasser's 37 percent average with 66. Under Mubarak's initial hybrid coalition, TO halved from 82 (1981) to 41 percent (1986) climbing back up to 60 (early 1990s) once liberalizing forces began asserting themselves politically within the ruling coalition. In Syria's relatively small economy (\$1.4 bn. 1965 GDP, \$13 bn. 1980, \$17 bn. 1995), a TO of over 50 percent (late 1950s) declined to 38 percent average after the ascent of backlash Ba'th and 1960s nationalizations. Only in the 1980s was TO restored to a 48 percent average, reflecting perhaps a more vigorous political presence of Damascus merchants favoring *infitah*, but certainly no reversal in control by the Ba'th and the military-industrial complex. Iraq's TO declined from 64 percent (\$2.4 bn. 1965 GDP) in the early 1960s, under Ba'th rule, to 55 on average (late 1960s, early 1970s) and 71 in the late 1970s, with expanding oil revenues and incipient reforms by Saddam Hussein's circumstantial coalition against Ba'th rivals. Soon thereafter, however, TO halved to 47 percent (mid-1980s), when Saddam's regime became heavily pivoted on a backlash economy and military-industrial complex, although TO rose somewhat by the late 1980s. Sanctions on Iraq after 1990 render any TO measures for this period useless for our purposes. In Israel, under decades of hybrid coalitions from Ben Gurion onwards, TO doubled from 38 percent in 1960 (\$4 bn. 1965 GDP) to 83 percent (1977). Following Begin's ascent, TO grew to over 90 percent initially but soon declined to 73 by the end of his tenure, as his once hybrid coalition came to be dominated by backlash constituencies. Under a hybrid national unity government, TO declined from 80 (1984) to 64 percent (1991). Labor's internationalizing coalition started at 65 percent after taking over from backlash Shamir in 1992, restoring TO to 80 percent by 1996 (\$92 bn. GDP). In South Asia, Pakistan's TO averaged 28 percent (\$9 bn. 1970 GDP) under backlash Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, increasing slightly to 34 under hybrid Zia and remaining around 36 percent under hybrids Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, both politically shackled by Islamist fundamentalist forces and the military-industrial complex.

As for other, larger, economies, Brazil's TO increased slightly from a 12 percent average in the early 1960s (\$19 bn. 1965 GDP) to 18 in the 1970s (\$35 bn. 1970 GDP). A hybrid succession maintained TO at 15 percent on average into the 1990s, rising soon after the accession of internationalizing Collor de Mello and Cardoso. Argentina's TO remained below 15 percent (\$16 bn. 1965 GDP, \$77 bn. 1980) for decades—under backlash and hybrid rule from Perón to Alfonsín—until the late 1980s. TO was lowest under backlash Peronist coalitions (early 1950s and mid-1970s). Under Menem's internationalizing revolution in the 1990s, TO rose to over 18 percent in a now much larger economy (\$281 bn. 1995 GDP), reaching Argentina's highest TO in half a century. Considering trade in goods as a percentage of goods-GDP, TO grew from 23 (1986) to 44 percent (1996). In India, ruled for decades by backlash coalitions from Nehru to Indira Gandhi, TO averaged 10 percent (\$172 bn. 1980 GDP). Following Morarji Desai's brief and incipient liberalization (1977), TO rose to nearly 16 percent (1979), surpassing 20 percent only in 1992, notably after N. Rao's liberalization, and reaching 27 percent in 1995 (\$325 bn. GDP). This more than doubled I. Ghandi's earlier average. In Iran, an economy highly dependent on oil exports, (Mohammed Reza Pahlavi) Shah's hybrid rule shows a TO average of 34 percent in the 1960s (\$6 bn. 1965 GDP) rising to 71 in 1974 (\$11 bn. 1970 GDP), a dramatic

change not obvious from the long-term average for the Shah. Soon after the Shah's replacement by Iran's backlash Islamic Republic, TO plummeted from 61 (1977) to 9 percent (1986). The rise of a "moderate" Islamist wing helps explain a slight recovery by the early 1990s, when TO reached over 30 percent (\$64 bn. 1994 GDP), still lower than three decades earlier. The Islamic Republic had more than halved the Shah's average TO of 46 percent to 20. In sum, even in large economies, but most pronouncedly in smaller ones, coalitions do appear to leave significant marks on their countries' levels of TO, notwithstanding geography, natural endowments, and earlier historical trajectories.

Another measure commonly used to gauge internationalizing policies is *export growth/GDP*. Díaz Alejandro (1983) argued that actual export growth rates, particularly for nontraditional exports, were the best index for TO for industrializing states (better than actual effective rates of protection and subsidization). Mean yearly export ratios for internationalists neared 44 percent, almost three times the backlash mean of 16 percent and nearly double the hybrid mean of 25 (Appendix V).¹⁹ The hypothesis of equal variances across the three groups can be rejected at the .01 level. The differences in means across coalitions are statistically significant at the .01 level. Mean changes in exports/GDP reflect an increase of 1.3 percent yearly for internationalists and 0.45 for hybrids and an average yearly decline of 0.27 for backlash coalitions.

Moving beyond global coalitional averages, it is even more instructive to examine exports/GDP in light of coalitional variations within the same state. South Korea's exports/GDP grew under internationalists from below 8 (1965) to 26 percent (1976) under Park to 35 percent average under Chun and Rho. There is no reliable data on North Korea's exports, which have been limited to military and primary products. Under successive internationalizers in Taiwan, exports/GDP grew from below 16 (1965) to 52 percent as early as 1977 and higher thereafter. Under Sukarno Indonesia's ratio averaged less than 19 percent, doubling under Suharto to 39 (1973). During Mahathir bin Mohamad's more inward-looking phase in Malaysia (1980–1987) exports/GDP were below 55 percent average, rising with liberalization (1987 onwards) to over 77 percent. Singapore's already high exports/GDP ratios (115 percent, late 1960s) rose to over 200 by the 1990s under Lee Kuan Yew. Beyond East Asia, Chile's exports/GDP average under Allende (11 percent for 1971–1973) grew to 23 (1976) under Pinochet, averaging 27 for his entire period and 33 percent under his democratic internationalizing successors. In Israel, exports/GDP averaged 25 percent under successive hybrids, rising to 29 under Begin and 33 percent under a national unity government (1984) but even more sharply under an internationalizing Labor-Meretz coalition. In Egypt, Nasser's 20 percent average rose slightly to 24 after Sadat's *infitah* but remained at 21 average under Mubarak's hybrid era. Export ratios in Jordan declined from 60 percent average (1960s–1970s) to much lower levels by the 1980s. The 41 percent average in the 1990s provides some evidence for Jordan's assertions that its internationalizing goals notwithstanding, sanctions on Iraq had devastated its exports.

In larger economies, Argentina's ratios under decades of successive backlash and hybrid coalitions were lower than 9 percent (5 in the 1970s under backlash Isabel Perón) rising slightly under internationalizing Menem's first two years to 11 percent despite an overvalued peso.²⁰ Brazil's ratios averaged only 7 percent under hybrids, rising to 12 under internationalizing Collor de Mello (early 1990s).

¹⁹ All data on exports are from *World Tables* (1980, 1995), supplemented in a few cases with 1993–1998 data from the UN *Statistical Yearbook* (1999). The longitudinal analysis also relies on data from the *World Development Report* (1991–1997) and *World Development Indicators* (1998) for 1992–1996.

²⁰ The backlash average would likely have been even lower had data for Juan D. Perón's presidency been available from this data set.

In India, Rao's liberalizing efforts may be credited with raising export ratios to near 10 percent (1996) from 5.5 averages under I. Gandhi. Iran's ratios averaged 11 percent under the Shah, plummeting to 4 after the backlash Islamic revolution. As with other measures, export success is not a flawless indicator of efforts to expand exports. Both external factors (health of the global economy) and internal micro- and macroeconomic ones affect performance. On the whole, however, a clear pattern differentiates across coalitional variants in their effort to internationalize via exports.

Data on *foreign direct investment* (FDI) growth provide yet another measure of changing openness.²¹ The mean yearly FDI for internationalizing coalitions was \$712 million, slightly less for hybrids (\$655M), and only \$38M for backlash (F = 4.075, significant at <.018). The difference in coalitional means for FDI is significant only at the .05 level.²² Looking at variances between each pair of coalitions, it is possible to reject the hypotheses that there is no difference between means for internationalizing and backlash (p = .014), but only at the 0.5 level. The differences between hybrids and the other two categories are not statistically significant. Notably, internationalizers increased FDI inflows by \$110M yearly on average and hybrids by \$33M whereas inflows decreased by \$25M yearly under backlash coalitions.

Looking at intra-state variations across coalitions, Argentina's FDI flows were \$10 million (1974) under backlash Isabel Perón and remained below \$512 million on average under hybrids until 1988. Menem's internationalizing revolution trebled FDI from \$1.8 bn. (1990) during his first year in office to over \$6 bn. (1993), averaging \$3.7 bn. yearly. Average FDI inflows under hybrids in Brazil (1960s–1970s) was \$1.5 bn. and declined dramatically under Franco. With Cardoso's internationalizing strategy FDI leaped to \$10 bn. (1996), the combined total of the previous three years. Following independence, backlash and hybrid coalitions in India discouraged FDI. Desai's brief interlude initiated FDI flows (\$3 million by 1980), which averaged \$50 million under I. Gandhi in the early 1980s, rising to \$237 million under Rajiv Gandhi's hybrid coalition. Internationalizing Rao trebled FDI from \$148 to \$435 million from 1991 to 1992. How low these levels are for a huge country like India becomes evident when we consider smaller economies. In Chile, negative flows during Allende's last year were superseded by \$299 million average inflows under Pinochet and \$428 million under his democratic internationalizing successors. Relying largely on grants and loans, FDI flows into South Korea were rather low (\$68 million average under Park) but grew significantly in the late 1980s reaching \$2.3 bn. by 1996. FDI averaged \$1.7 bn. yearly under Lee Kuan Yew, nearly doubling from \$5.5 bn. (1990) to \$9.4 bn. (1996) under Goh Chok Tong. Net FDI into Indonesia grew tenfold between 1970 and 1989 (\$457 million yearly average under Suharto) and Malaysia's averaged \$2.5 bn. yearly since the 1980s.

Under backlash Z. A. Bhutto, FDI averaged \$9 million yearly, rising to \$104 million under hybrids Zia, \$194 million under Benazir Bhutto, and \$319 million under Nawaz Sharif. In Israel FDI remained low—\$78 million yearly—under successive inward-looking and hybrid coalitions until the 1980s. Labor's internationalizing revolution expanded inflows dramatically from \$300 million (1991) to nearly \$2 billion (1995), now representing 7.3 percent of gross domestic investment, up from 1 percent in 1980.²³ Benjamin Netanyahu's initial hybrid coal-

²¹ All data on FDI are from *World Tables* (1980, 1995), supplemented in a few cases by data from the UN *Statistical Yearbook* (1999) for 1993–1998. The longitudinal analysis also relies on data from the *World Development Report* (1991–1997) and *World Development Indicators* (1998:334) for 1992–1996.

²² FDI data for backlash and hybrid coalitions are extremely scarce. Data for 118 backlash cases (of 144) are missing with some exceptions from India, Israel, Argentina, and Pakistan.

²³ Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics webpage (<http://www.cbs.gov.il/lmsec.cgi>).

tion reversed this pace by 1998, as investments were affected by the political and security uncertainty that “makes it harder to utilize the opportunities embodied in the globalization process.”²⁴ In Egypt, FDI yearly inflows following Sadat’s *infitah* more than doubled between 1974 and 1976, averaging \$599 million but declining sharply (1980s) to \$169 million yearly under Mubarak’s hybrid period, rising again in the 1990s under a revamped internationalizing coalition. Summing up, shifts from backlash to internationalizing coalitions and vice versa correspond with expected changes in FDI flows for the overwhelming majority of cases. Yet FDI is responsive not merely to policy but also to a coalition’s credibility and regional (in)stability. For instance, greater stability following the Oslo peace process could account partially for higher FDI flows into the Middle East. The prospect that greater stability will enhance foreign investment is, of course, central to the calculus of internationalizing coalitions.

The Military-Industrial Complex. Military investments were overall high during the Cold War, particularly in regions more directly affected by it.²⁵ Hence, one might argue that the dice is somewhat loaded against finding effective differences across coalitional variants. Furthermore, several internationalizing coalitions—notably in East Asia—were particularly engulfed by Cold War threats and their regional corollaries, factors that neutralized efforts to tame military investments. Nonetheless the evidence does reveal clear contrasts across coalitional variants. As expected, while investing in military capabilities, internationalizers largely prevented them from overwhelming domestic economic reform, regional stability, or global access. Instead, backlash coalitions spearheaded and maintained a *Wehrwirtschaft* (war economy) as a key pivot of their grand strategy. There are significant differences in mean military expenditures as a percentage of GDP (MILEX/GDP), averaging over double for backlash (9.53 percent) than for internationalists (4.59 percent) with hybrids in the middle (7.58) (F statistic of 26.19 significant at the <.001 level).²⁶ MILEX/GDP declined by 0.15 percent yearly on average for internationalizers and by 0.07 percent for hybrids but rose by 0.62 percent for backlash coalitions. Data on MILEX/central government expenditures (MILEX/CGE) reflects a similar pattern.²⁷

These figures suggest rather restrained military investments by internationalizers, considering that many among them faced threatening regional environments. At the high end, Taiwan’s MILEX/GDP was 8 percent (1961–1987 average) declining to 6 percent by the 1970s–1980s as internationalization took root, down to 4 percent in the 1990s.²⁸ Averages for internationalizing Southeast Asia by 1990–1991 were 2.8 percent. Thailand’s MILEX halved from 5 (1985) to 2.6 percent (1994). Between 1985 and 1994 Malaysia’s declined from 5.6 to 3.9 percent, Singapore’s and Brunei’s from 6.7 to 4.8, and Vietnam’s from 19.4 to 5.7 percent. MILEX growth in Southeast Asia lagged by 50 percent behind GDP growth. Figures for MILEX/central government expenditures (MILEX/

²⁴ Statement by the Director of Israel’s independent Central Bank. See Bank of Israel webpage (www.bankisrael.gov.il).

²⁵ Data on military expenditures (MILEX) in this section are from SIPRI *Yearbooks* (1975–1996); *IISS The Military Balance* (1995–96:266–267); *Human Development Report* (1994:170; 1996:174–175); ACDA (1976, 1982, 1990, 1996); and *World Development Indicators* (1998:279).

²⁶ Looking at the variance between each pair of coalitions reveals that the mean differences between internationalizing and backlash (4.9) and internationalizing and hybrid (2.9) is significant at <.001. The difference between backlash and hybrid is significant only at the .05 level.

²⁷ MILEX/CGE averaged 20 percent for internationalizers, 31 for backlash and 22 for hybrids. The mean difference between internationalizing and backlash was 11 and between backlash and hybrid 7, with little significant differences between internationalizing and hybrid. MILEX/CGE declined by nearly 0.4 percent yearly on average for internationalizers and by 0.15 percent for hybrids but rose by 0.9 percent for backlash coalitions (see Appendix V).

²⁸ Chan, 1992. Taiwan’s MILEX/CGE reached 40 percent in the 1970s and 1980s but no data were found for the late 1980s–1990s.

CGE) also reveal a general decline under internationalizers, from 27 percent under Park to 15 under Kim Young Sam, from 25 percent under backlash Sukarno to 13 percent under Suharto, and down to 18 percent in Thailand. Despite routine military acquisitions there has been neither an arms race nor an offensive buildup threatening neighboring states (Ball, 1993–94).

Among internationalizing coalitions, South Korea's deserves special attention because of external and internal conditions that weighed heavily in favor of an expansive military complex. Despite such circumstances, Park—a military ruler—subdued supporters of a large statist military-industrial complex that threatened his grand strategy (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Amsden, 1989). Park relied on technical and economic experts able to check “the arbitrariness and rashness of the military officers” (Park, 1976:107). Cultivating national strength, argued Park, meant “doing away with those activities that tend to drain or waste our natural resources in a broad sense” (171; see also Jones and Sakong, 1980; Moon and Hyun, 1992). Hence, he reduced MILEX/GDP from 5.5 percent on average under Syngman Rhee (1960–1962) to 4.6 percent (1963–1970). Even during a more inward-looking hiatus (1970s) MILEX/GDP remained at 5 percent despite a sharp decline in U.S. military assistance since 1969 (U.S. grants ceased completely in 1978). Inflation and government expenditures remained relatively low and budget deficits relative to GDP declined in the late 1970s. At 5 percent, MILEX/GDP was comparable to the industrializing world's average for the 1970s–1980s (West, 1992) and far lower than in other high-conflict regions, notably the Middle East (15–25 percent). Moreover, while South Korea's GDP grew by 10 percent (1965–1989 average), MILEX/GDP remained largely constant, declining to 3.6 percent by the early 1990s.

Paradoxically, this last figure was comparable to Argentina's (late 1970s–early 1980s) in a region characterized by the lowest threat perceptions worldwide. At its peak South Korea's MILEX accounted for 26 percent of the budget on average throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and down to 15 percent in the early 1990s, whereas Brazil—considered a low military spender—allocated 20 percent (1967–1973 average).²⁹ Understanding the role of military-industrial complexes in Argentina and Brazil during backlash and hybrid decades helps resolve this paradox. Even an average MILEX/GDP above 2 percent was high for a low-conflict region and Argentina's reached over 6 percent by the early 1980s. So-called internal security can hardly be summoned to explain such investments since most non-democratic regimes—including South Korea's—built police states. Rather, Argentina's puzzle lies in a long succession of civilian and military leaders who relied on inward-looking allies, invariably including interlocked state enterprises and the military-industrial complex. The latter's eventual demise under Menem's internationalizing revolution drove MILEX to all-time lows—1 percent in 1992—and ended universal conscription altogether.

The absence in Brazil of a stable conquering internationalizing coalition comparable to Argentina's in the early 1990s was related to the armed forces' lingering resistance. Yet internationalizer Collor slashed MILEX/GDP to below 1 percent (.30) and MILEX/CGE to a low of 4 percent, denied military salary raises, and purged officers from the bureaucracy, policies Cardoso endorsed subsequently. In Chile MILEX rose from below 2 percent average (1960s–early 1970s) to 3.5 percent after the 1973 coup. Argentine provocations that nearly unleashed a war over the Beagle Channel (1978) led Pinochet to increase MILEX to 7 percent briefly, declining below 2 percent by the late 1980s. Protecting his economic program—and despite the military's abominable human rights record

²⁹ For a comparison with another region subject to security dilemmas and Cold War tensions, as the Korean peninsula was, MILEX/CGE averaged about 40 percent in the backlash Middle East.

at home—Pinochet avoided any military buildup or external confrontation, as advised by prominent Chicago School Chilean economists and businessmen within his coalition.³⁰ With a smaller economy from which to draw resources than Argentina's, a higher MILEX/GDP yielded smaller absolute military resources for Chile. Yet Pinochet also reduced MILEX when stabilization efforts required it (1975–1976, 1981), in sharp contrast to his Argentine counterparts.

Coalitional shifts help explain evolving MILEX/GDP patterns even in Israel, which arguably faced potential combined attacks by Arab states during most of this period. A high 1948–1977 average—20 percent—clearly mirrored a regional cauldron of war fueled by backlash regimes. Yet the average declined to 7 percent (1960s) when Prime Minister Levy Eshkol and Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir attempted a proto-internationalizing shift, foiled by external (Nasser and the Six Day War) and internal (see below) backlash forces. A very high MILEX/GDP average after the surprise combined Arab attack in October 1973 declined to 18 percent (1985–1989) after a hybrid national unity government imposed structural adjustment, with Labor's Shimon Peres as Finance Minister. The rise of the first truly internationalizing coalition in 1992 brought MILEX down to 9 percent, downsized dramatically once-powerful defense firms, and privatized others.

Other hybrids and would-be internationalizers in the Middle East have maintained lower MILEX/GDP than most of their neighbors. Morocco's remained below 3 percent in the 1960s, nearly doubled in the late 1970s after the Western Sahara conflict with Algeria flared up, but gradually declined to below 2 percent (1990s). Tunisia's MILEX was consistently lower than 2 percent until the mid-1970s and—except for a brief period in the early 1980s when it rose to 5.5 percent—remained around 2 percent thereafter. MILEX/CGE for both Morocco and Tunisia were as low as 3 percent in the midst of a region that devoted nearly 40 percent on average. MILEX/CGE declined in Jordan from 44 percent in the 1960s and 1970s to 24 percent in the 1990s with incipient internationalization, while MILEX/GDP declined from 15 percent in the earlier period to 8 percent in the latter. Most dramatic was Sadat's contraction of Egypt's MILEX from 52 (1975) to 13 percent (1979), an average decline of 3.86 percent yearly.³¹ Egypt's pre-1970s high ratios lead naturally to our next coalitional profile in MILEX performance.

Backlash coalitions clearly reflect the hypothesized penchant for MILEX with means of 9.64 percent of GDP and mean yearly increases of 0.63 percent. The high incidence of such coalitions in the Middle East helps account for very high regional averages (nearly 19 percent of GDP in the 1970s–1980s), over three times higher than the industrializing world's average. Iraq's reached over 50 percent (1973–1985), 10 times that global mean. MILEX/GDP under Nasser and Sadat's backlash period (1970–1973) reached 24 percent, and Syria's mean under Hafez al-Asad was 16 percent (1973–1985) declining to less than 10 percent after 1988, with a very incipient liberalization.³² MILEX/CGE averaged about 40 percent in the backlash Middle East. The PLO's militarization, natural for a national liberation movement, absorbed nearly 70 percent of budgets and helped forge its status as a state-within-other-states, particularly in Jordan and Lebanon. Since 1993, despite some initial internationalizing motions and pressures from international donors, the Palestinian Authority has continued to privilege funding for its influential military and security services. In Israel, Netanyahu's initial hybrid coalition slid toward more backlash constituencies, reverting MILEX/GDP decline

³⁰ Labán and Larraín, 1995; Scheetz, 1992. MILEX/CGE under Pinochet averaged 15 percent, up from 8.6 percent under Allende.

³¹ MILEX/CGE declined from highs of 30 (Nasser) and 48 percent (Sadat's backlash period) down to 34 percent with Sadat's *infitah* and 16 percent under Mubarak.

³² SIPRI warns its figures for regimes such as Iran tend to underestimate MILEX/GDP.

under internationalizers while proclaiming a strategic decision to increase MILEX and “strengthen security” as the first budgetary priority, all this despite the most favorable regional strategic conditions ever. A significant backlash exception in this region might be Iran’s Islamic Republic but only if one considers MILEX/GDP exclusively and if the likely underestimated allocation acknowledged by SIPRI sources is ignored. MILEX/GDP was relatively low —6 percent average—in the early 1980s, rising sharply to 34 percent by 1985 during the Iran-Iraq war and declining below 3 percent in the 1990s. However, MILEX/CGE was as high as 30 percent, much closer to the backlash average in the region. Elsewhere Kim Il-Sung’s MILEX/GDP resembles the Middle East, averaging 25 percent (1985–1994) and perhaps much higher according to SIPRI, astonishing levels given basic domestic subsistence needs and a foreign debt that kept North Korea at the world’s bottom in credit standing.

Not every backlash coalition exhibits such high levels of MILEX/GDP although they do tend to have higher ratios than their internationalizing counterparts in the same country. India’s 3.3 percent average under I. Gandhi declined after Rao’s liberalization efforts to 2.5 percent (1990s) but rose sharply under hybrid Hindu BJP-led coalition (1998) to near 4 percent and even more sharply after its nuclear tests and the Kargil war (Burns, 1998). BJP tamed somewhat its earlier inward-looking economic proclivities moving to capture some liberalizing segments (quadrangle IV) while heeding to nationalist and military pressures for higher MILEX (Dugger, 2000). MILEX/CGE averaged about 18 percent from the 1960s to early 1980s, declining slightly under hybrids to 15 percent and down to 13 percent under the incipient internationalizing efforts of N. Rao. Backlash Z. A. Bhutto doubled Pakistan’s MILEX/GDP from 3 percent average in the previous decade to 6.2 percent (1970s), a level maintained by successive hybrids (1980s–1990s). Backlash and hybrids in Brazil retained comparable ratios over decades—below 2 percent of GDP—but slightly higher for backlash coalitions. Argentina’s MILEX/GDP climbed up to 6 percent reflecting a more virulent nationalism and militarism that led to the Falklands/Malvinas war. Aggressive military buildups here can be traced to a quintessential backlash entrepreneur—Juan Perón (1946–1955)—who became a model beyond his region. Unsurprisingly, a second Peronist administration increased MILEX/GDP (relative to its military predecessors!) to 2.5 percent upon taking over in 1973, but not MILEX/CGE. Allende increased Chile’s real defense expenditures slightly, from 2.1 percent of GDP (1960s average) to 2.77 (1970–1972). Sukarno’s MILEX/GDP averaged 5.4 percent (early 1960s) whereas Suharto’s averaged 3 percent (1970s–1980s) and 1.2 percent (late 1980s–early 1990s), in tandem with a deepening of Indonesia’s internationalizing drive. MILEX/CGE fell from 25 percent under Sukarno to 13 percent on average under Suharto.

Hybrids facing powerful backlash constituencies at home and in the region exhibit, as expected, higher mean MILEX/GDP (7.7 percent) and an essential inability to contract them. Jordan’s King Hussein represented a paradigmatic case of suppressing internationalizing tendencies to accommodate regional and domestic realities (i.e., backlash politics and heavily militarized neighbors). Jordan’s MILEX averaged 16.5 percent (1960s–1970s) while participating in major wars against Israel and military encounters with the PLO and Syria. Ratios declined to 12.5 (1980s average) and—with a liberalizing thrust in place—down to 8 percent (early 1990s). MILEX/CGE were nearly halved in the transition to incipient internationalization in the 1990s. Egypt’s Mubarak faced similar domestic and regional backlash pressures as Jordan did. His hybrid coalition reduced MILEX/GDP dramatically from earlier backlash levels to around 5 percent by 1994. MILEX/CGE follow a similar pattern, as reported earlier. Iran’s MILEX/GDP average was below 7 percent under the Shah (1960s), rose slightly in the early 1970s, but remained lower than the average for hybrids.

Regional and International Behavior

The domestic program of *backlash* coalitions—extensive militarization, economic closure, emphasis on civic nationalism or confessional purity—is expected to have negative security externalities throughout a region. Emphasis on civic, ethnic, or religious differentiation, territorial aspirations, sovereignty, and self-reliance, all contribute to creating a climate of risk, instability, conflict, and competition. The logic of this strategy—particularly militarization, nationalist brinkmanship, and resulting heightened balances of threat—has often led willy-nilly into armed conflict.³³ Kim-Il Sung's attack on, and ejection from South Korea, Nasser's encroachment in Yemen and quarantine of Israel in 1967, Sadat's 1973 October War, Begin's invasion of Lebanon, Asad's threats to Israel and invasion of Lebanon, Arafat's threats to Jordan and Lebanon, Perón's intimidations of neighbors with a fusion bomb, Galtieri's Malvinas debacle, repeated Indo-Pakistani military encounters and nuclear swaggering, Iran's Islamic Republic threats to Saddam Hussein and Saddam's own invasions of Iran and Kuwait, are all instances of this pattern. Not unsurprisingly many of these cases brandished weapons of mass destruction. This "upgrading" in military prowess was pivotal to the challenge of "Western-dominated" international regimes such as the nonproliferation regime.

The Korean war unfolded against the background of parallel efforts by Rhee—promoting the aggressive motto "Let us march North"—and Kim Il Sung, committed to invade the South and overthrow Rhee. Kim emphasized *Juche* and *chajusong* (all-round independence) and *minjok tongnip* (national or ethnic independence). Rhee's coalition included extreme nationalists, notably Yi Pom Sok (South Korea's first Minister of Defense and Prime Minister) who exalted the nation, the state, and racial purity while opposing reliance on foreigners. Sukarno launched aggressive regional policies and removed Indonesia from the UN. Zulfikar A. Bhutto sought an "Islamic bomb" designed to succeed even if Pakistanis, in his own words, must "eat grass." Neighboring backlash coalitions in India fueled several wars against China (1962), Pakistan (1965, 1971), and Sri-Lanka (1987–1990). They also opposed most international regimes for decades—particularly the Nonproliferation Treaty, as the crowning example of neocolonialism—and pioneered the region's nuclearization (1974) under strong domestic inducements to offset the Congress party's responsibility for India's defeat by China (1962). A fundamentalist Hindu BJP-led coalition exacerbated regional tensions that had subsided under Rao. In 1998, BJP's need to rally a fissiparous and unwieldy coalition swayed its policies in the direction of nuclearization but nascent internationalizing pressures have progressively hybridized BJP since.

The conjunction of backlash coalitions and war in the Middle East is extensive. Nasser's closure of the Strait of Tiran and expulsion of UN peacekeepers in 1967 led to Egypt's most devastating military defeat by Israel (Quandt, 1996). He actively sought hegemony over the Arab world, intervened in Yemen against Saudi Arabia with chemical weapons, and launched a "war of attrition" against Israel in 1969. Syria's Ba'th aggressive pan-Arab bent accounts for its reputation as "the beating heart of Arabism," calling for war to liberate Palestine, war against "reactionary" pro-Western kingdoms, and the revival of Greater Syria including Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. The most radical backlash version peaked in 1966–1970—leading to the Six Day War—but even the more moderate version under Hafiz Asad has maintained a stranglehold over Lebanon. *Fatah*—

³³ On war as "waste by-product" of the military's pursuit of growth, wealth, and prestige see Van Evera, 1994; Posen, 1984; and Snyder, 1991. On how armed races are much more likely to induce wars see Chan, 1992, and Sample, 1997.

the PLO's dominant political faction since the 1960s—had early on embraced a national-populist strategy advocating total war on Israel and on “pro-Western” Arab regimes. Threatened leaders (in Jordan, Lebanon) waged military battles to prevent PLO efforts to undermine them from within. Actual combat between Iraq and Iran was minimal before Saddam Hussein's consolidation and the ascent of Iran's Islamic Republic. Only after 1979 did a spasmodic war erupt (1980–1988) leaving one million people dead and two million wounded. Saddam Hussein invested \$85 billion in military hardware during that war (against a 1985 GDP of \$47 billion). Efforts to restore his coalition's wherewithal after this devastating war led him to invade Kuwait. His coalitional commitments included staggering allocations to one of the most extensive nonconventional weapons infrastructure worldwide, employing 20,000 scientists and technologists. Saddam Hussein's regime continues to resist the UN Security Council's oversight of Iraq's nonconventional program a decade after its inception.

Israel's own backlash and hybrid politics progressed from milder versions (Menahem Begin in 1977 but not 1982) to less moderate ones (Yitzhak Shamir, 1980s–early 1990s; Netanyahu, 1996–1998). These coalitions included fundamentalist religious parties and civic-nationalist ones exalting self-reliance and high distrust for international allies and institutions. As expressed by former minister Rafael Eitan: “what the world thinks does not matter at all,” a clear articulation of resistance to internationalizing trends.³⁴ Begin's coalition was cajoled into accepting Sadat's Camp David initiatives but also unleashed a war on Lebanon. Shamir's was dragged by the U.S. into the Madrid Peace Conference but otherwise maintained intransigent demands. Netanyahu's obliterated most progress in Arab-Israeli reconciliation since Oslo, the child of internationalizing interlocutors in the region. Netanyahu exemplifies the inherent instability of hybrids with a strong backlash component. Despite some (initial) support from economic liberalizers (quadrangle IV) his coalition was essentially pivoted on quadrangle III: greater Israel constituencies (religious, settlers, civic-nationalists), populist, developing-town, protected business and labor opposed to the economic consequences of peace with Arab neighbors, and Russian immigrants dependent on state subsidies and housing. Consequently, internationalization was not the coalition's most valued preference. Netanyahu sacrificed foreign investment and global economic access to continued rejection of regional concessions and international inducements, helping shift the regional coalitional balance of power away from the incipient internationalization of the early 1990s.

Argentina's backlash policies shared traits with its Middle Eastern namesakes, including extreme statist militarization, nationalism, populism, regional aggressiveness, and anti-Western rhetoric. Both brands resulted from a competitive outbidding among rival backlash factions appealing to large populist, bureaucratic, and military-industrial constituencies that Peronism and Nasserism had mobilized earlier. Perón challenged most international regimes, initiated a nuclear program (1950s), and announced—misleadingly—Argentina's mastery of fusion technology. Successive unstable and short-lived coalitions extended Perón's grand strategic blueprint for decades, including vast nuclear investments. This coalitional makeup converted a relatively peaceful region into one with militarized confrontations (Chile, Beagle dispute), a full-fledged war (Great Britain, Malvinas/Falklands), and relentless nuclear competition (with Brazil). Backlash outbidding overwhelmed weak hybrids, with Videla and Galtieri embracing radical backlash wings (Massera, Anaya) advocating militarized initiatives against

³⁴ Getzler, 1998. On anti-Western fundamentalism see Greenberg, 1994. On how cultural elements of globalization associated with Labor policies mobilized the orthodox vote towards Netanyahu, see Friedman, 1996:13.

Chile and Great Britain. Brazil's responses were shaped by its own succession of hybrids that, while avoiding aggressive expansionism, also retained nuclear competition.

Internationalists are expected to endorse cooperative regional relations that enable economic reform, military downsizing, and global access. Accommodation with international security regimes is expected to minimize risks and sanctions, facilitate foreign borrowing and investment, and reinforce global economic access. The record suggests that this proclivity remains even in regions with entrenched security dilemmas, prone to foil internationalizing strategies. For instance, South Korea's Park quickly abandoned Rhee's "Let us march North" slogan and sought to reduce tension: "However pressing and urgent . . . unification may be, the goal must never be pursued by means of violence or military force" (1976:125). Similar self-binding commitments were rare in a backlash Middle East where threats to use force prevailed. Park proposed to North Korea a "peaceful competition between our free system and theirs to determine which system can give the people a better life" (1976:94–96), warning that "unless a policy of high economic growth is sustained, there will be no way to meet increased defense spending." Park's Open Door Policy sought to strengthen global access through relations with all states—regardless of ideological stripe—vesting South Korea with an improved reputation. Even as the North developed nuclear weapons, Park signed the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968 and ratified it in 1975 to protect his internationalizing thrust and avoid antagonizing two major guarantors of that thrust (the U.S. and Japan). Even after President Carter advocated the removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, Chun's internationalizing drive sustained impeccable nonproliferation credentials and cooperative overtures toward the North. Roh's "Economic Commonwealth" policy had coalitional backing from powerful *chaebol* interested in shifting labor-intensive operations to the North, strengthening North-South cooperation (Nordpolitik) while deepening South Korea's global trade and investment.

South Korea's relatively moderate security policies are brought to relief by three additional considerations. First, staying an internationalizing course was no small domestic political effort for a country geographically engulfed by powerful backlash adversaries—North Korea, China, the Soviet Union—particularly given North Korea's repeated attacks on South Korean civilians. Second, under extreme vulnerability, South Korea's renunciation of the alleged best survival option—nuclear weapons—is unusual and not easily explainable via U.S. security guarantees or coercive pressure alone. These guarantees were never fool-proof in the eyes of many South Koreans. Furthermore, U.S. pressures did not invariably yield denuclearization in South Africa, Egypt, Pakistan, India, Israel, the Southern Cone, and North Korea for decades. Thirdly, compliance with the NPT is particularly remarkable for a regime taking cues from a strong military with an unquestionable capacity to overwhelm North Korea in a nuclear race, and particularly as the North threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire."

Taiwan's record, facing a similar regional predicament, is comparable to South Korea's in its pursuit of accommodating regional policies, renouncing an expensive nuclear competition, and effectively joining the NPT despite a questionable U.S. commitment to Taiwan after normalization with China and the abrogation of the Washington-Taipei Security Treaty. Taiwan's aplomb in responding to China's militarized threats in 1996 is symptomatic of a consolidated internationalizing coalition. Further South, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Brunei established ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), declaring that its philosophical basis is "the concept of free enterprise" and that

the alternative to free trade is not just poverty but war.³⁵ ASEAN established a successful record of diffusing disputes, operating with one eye on domestic challenges and the other on enhancing collective appeal to foreign investors. Global access—not defensive intra-regional trade—was the objective. Suharto, who otherwise suppressed East Timor, reversed Sukarno's aggressive regional policy and restored Indonesia to the UN (Emmerson, 1996:38). Early commitments to a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) among ASEAN states culminated in 1995 with the Bangkok Treaty.

The Southern Cone's internationalizing revolution of the 1990s was accompanied by historical foreign policy reversals. Menem embraced all international regimes—economic, political, and strategic—shunned by Argentina for decades, scrapping the Cóndor II missile, joining missile and weapons control regimes (MTCR, Wassenaar), ratifying the NPT, leaving the Non-Aligned Movement, joining the allies' naval contingent in Iraq, renewing diplomatic relations with Britain, welcoming EU investments, and becoming a formal U.S. non-NATO ally. These policies were complemented by two main regional initiatives. First, a common market (Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR) emerged after decades of empty rhetoric—as an accessory to global liberalization—increasing regional trade fivefold (1991–1995). Second, internationalists Collor and Menem concluded agreements on denuclearization, explicitly renouncing nuclear weapons for the first time and establishing mutual verification and inspection procedures complemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Another historical first was joint Argentine-Brazilian military maneuvers in 1998. Cooperation with Chile—a more veteran internationalist in the region—deepened as well.

Even more remarkable, given a violent history, were internationalists' cooperative strides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Sadat, an early precursor, reverted Nasserism by signing the first ever Arab peace agreement with Israel.³⁶ Lingered backlash pressures within Egypt and throughout the region explain frequent challenges but even this “cold peace” has endured for two decades. Similar pressures affected King Hussein until Iraq's defeat (1990) discredited his backlash—including Islamist—opponents, strengthening the internationalizing camp. Jordan and Israel established diplomatic relations soon after an incipient but key internationalizing dyad—Israel and the PLO—executed the most dramatic breakthrough in the conflict's history. Israel's Labor-Meretz coalition came to power (1992) backed by urban professionals, middle-class, highly skilled labor, export-oriented industrialists and cooperative agriculture, and a vast pool of technical, scientific, service, managerial, and entrepreneurial groups. A mandate for socio-economic renewal within the “green line” (pre-1967 borders) and a territorial compromise beyond that line enabled Palestinian-Israeli mutual recognition in Oslo (1993). Economy Minister Yossi Beilin brought to relief the coalition's internationalizing logic: a peaceful regional transformation that would enable Israel to deepen its ties with the global marketplace, an objective that required becoming “a more welcome member of the international club” (*Haaretz*, Nov. 5, 1995, B2).

Internationalizing trends, albeit far weaker than in Israel, may also account for Palestinian evolution toward Oslo (Tessler and Nachtwey, 1999). Chief negotiator Ahmed Quray (Abu 'Ala) became Economy Minister and head of a National Council for the Encouragement of Investment. Another leading architect of Oslo and eventual Minister of International Cooperation, Nabil Sha'ath, repeat-

³⁵ Acharya, 1992:152. See also interview with Lee Kwan Yew, “Survey: Asia. A Billion Consumers,” *The Economist*, Oct. 30, 1993, 329, 7835.

³⁶ On the relationship between *infatih* and peace see Tessler and Nachtwey, 1999.

edly enunciated the Palestinian Authority's (PA) global orientation and regional cooperative policies. A dense international institutional overlay (chiefly the European Union, World Bank, and U.S. agencies) imposed economic, administrative, and security targets compatible with an internationalizing agenda. However, the PA faced awesome challenges in implementing that strategy in tandem with forging statehood. Its conciliatory policies triggered backlash responses including Islamist terror, diluting the PA's initial thrust after Oslo, particularly as security forces expanded and state bureaucracies proliferated, partially to mitigate unemployment but also to reward political allies. The PA and Israel made unprecedented cooperative strides between 1993 and 1995. Neighboring internationalizers, from Morocco and Tunisia to some of the Gulf countries, joined in a supportive regional network known as the Multilateral Peace Process geared to address differences over security, economic, refugees, water, and environmental issues.³⁷ By 1995 backlash responses to Oslo in Israel, Palestine, and throughout the region began corroding most achievements.

The record for *hybrids*, as expected, is mixed. Where they were able to isolate diehard backlash fringes (from quadrangle III), wars were avoided even if deep regional cooperation never materialized. This is even true for democratic versions like Argentina's Alfonsín and Brazil's Franco who never reached the higher levels of economic or security cooperation later attained by internationalizers. Where hybrids slid into radical backlash coalitions—Videla and Galtieri's intertemporal courting of economic liberalizers first and extreme nationalists and protectionists later—wars ensued even in the least threatening regional environments. A similar pattern evolved under Netanyahu, reversing most bilateral and multilateral cooperative gains. Iran's Shah asserted Iranian identity regionally but carefully avoided conflagrations of the kind that later engulfed the Islamic Republic. Jordan's hybrid coalitions under Nasserism's heyday could hardly avoid wars with Israel (1967, 1973). Israel's own hybrids often failed to reach peace agreements—except Camp David 1979—because of either domestic or neighboring backlash pressures. Mubarak's intertemporal and sequential logrolling of hybrid coalitions found expression in policies asserting intermittently Egyptian, Arab, and Islamist themes while preserving Sadat's inheritance. Mahathir's Malay-nationalist and Islamic themes were progressively overwhelmed by stronger internationalizing forces in ASEAN, attesting to the considerable influence exerted by a coherent regional coalitional landscape, particularly but not uniquely, on hybrids. Finally, hybrids in India and Pakistan straddled various regional and international postures, failing to advance cooperation despite mild attempts by Rajiv Gandhi, Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif. Hybrids who worked hardest at attracting quadrangle II constituencies also went furthest in cooperative regional overtures and in efforts to tame military-industrial and nuclear complexes, as with Morarji Desai. However, such efforts never went as far as Rao, his Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, and former World Bank vice-president Moeen Qureshi who headed a brief transitional administration in Pakistan, perhaps the only internationalizing interlude in a hybrid succession.

Given this comprehensive overview of the comparative regional and international behavior of different coalitions, it is hardly surprising to find that, over the period of time under study, backlash coalitions initiated over 30 international crises, hybrid coalitions about 17, and internationalizing coalitions only 2 (see Appendix V).³⁸ In other words, of all the international crises initiated

³⁷ On the genesis and evolution of the Multilaterals see Solingen, 2000.

³⁸ For data on international crisis initiation see Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000. Differences between internationalizing and backlash coalitions in crisis initiation are statistically significant at the .05 level. Egypt, Israel, Iran, and Iraq account for the bulk of these crises.

under this period by the countries under study, backlash coalitions account for 62 percent, hybrids for 34 percent, and internationalizers for 4 percent. The mean number of international crises initiated by backlash coalitions is 1.4 as opposed to 0.11 for internationalizers and 0.94 for hybrids.

A coalition's relative domestic strength, the nature and extent of logrolling across quadrangles, and the distribution of coalitional power in the region creates notable differences even within coalitional categories. Inter-regional comparisons suggest that different coalitional mixes throughout a region create and reproduce typical regional orders and, conversely, are influenced by them. Where internationalizers reached a significant presence in a region, they relied more on concerts, collective security, and multilateralism (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991; Ruggie, 1993) avoiding aggressive steps, assisting members subject to threats or aggression, and compromising on territorial disputes. ASEAN produced peaceful stability on the ashes of earlier wars, incipient Arab-Israeli internationalizers moved the region in the direction of Oslo, and their Southern Cone counterparts made MERCOSUR and denuclearization a reality. Ascending "zones of peace" challenge lingering backlash coalitions in the region, undermining most pillars of their grand strategy—from the merits of economic closure to the advantages of militarization—as ASEAN has done in Vietnam and Cambodia, easing their eventual inclusion in an internationalizing regional framework. Middle East internationalizers have been far more fragile, given a mixed region with active backlash constituencies, more demanding domestic logrolling and sequential courting, and meager successes at economic openness, relative to other regions. With shorter time horizons, less credible commitments, and widespread coalitional asymmetries across the region, cooperation and diffuse reciprocity were more tentative and unstable. Recalcitrant backlash rivals ended the brief cooperative spurt launched in Oslo, reflecting the wobbly nature of mixed regions and hybrid coalitions.

IV. Conclusions

In an effort to understand the impact of internationalization—in both its material-economic and political-normative dimensions—on the regional behavior of states, the article begins by introducing a simplified domestic coalitional landscape, mapping constituencies according to their position regarding internationalization (Figure 1). From myriad political constellations three ideal-typical coalitions stand out—internationalizing, backlash, hybrid—as the product of entrepreneurs' logrolling efforts, sequential courting, ambitious unifying maneuvers, and manipulation of uncertainty. Coalitions are expected to differ in preferences over domestic and international resource extraction and allocation, time-horizons, and regional and international behavior. Accordingly, they endorse different grand strategies with synergistic domestic, regional, and global effects. The coalitions' relative strength at home and regionally explains more pristine or diluted versions of ideal-typical strategies. Strong internationalizers throughout a region are expected to create more cooperative and peaceful regions than clusters of strong backlash coalitions. Hybrid coalitions, diluted strategies, and mixed regions create unstable regional orders that elude extensive cooperation or warfare until domestic or regional coalitional equipoises are superseded.

Evidence from a sizeable part of the industrializing world suggests significant behavioral differences between the three coalitions regarding economic openness, military investments, international regimes, and regional policies. Aggregate data indicate that these differences are statistically significant for mean trade openness, exports as a percentage of GDP, foreign direct investment,

military expenditures, and crisis initiation.³⁹ Differences between internationalizing and backlash coalitions are—as expected—more pronounced, whereas differences between backlash and hybrids are rarely significant in the aggregate. A more disaggregated longitudinal analysis of successive coalitions in individual countries offers a more detailed portrayal that takes into account initial conditions and country-specific considerations such as size, validating the expectation that coalitions make a difference beyond geography, natural endowments, and earlier historical trajectories. Moreover, the analysis of military expenditures suggests that, although regional security dilemmas cannot be ignored, different coalitions filter such dilemmas through the requirements of their grand strategy. Thus, backlash coalitions can overspend even where security dilemmas are relatively low and internationalizing coalitions can underspend relative both to their available resources and to the level of security dilemmas prevailing in the region. Furthermore, backlash coalitions have initiated over 10 times the number of international crises initiated by internationalizers (with hybrids closer to the backlash end of the spectrum). The overview of the texture of regional relations by region is compatible with these findings, as backlash coalitions exhibit a proclivity for risky competition and instability that begets war, particularly where such coalitions dominate a given regional cluster.

These results regarding economic and security variables are particularly significant if one takes into account the need to rely on a quantitative data set that poses a particularly hard test for discerning coalitional effects. The systematic inclusion of post-1993 data would have arguably sharpened the effects of internationalizing policies, as would have the inclusion of data from Taiwan and other cases. Yet coalitional differences in behavior are rather clear even under a more inauspicious era for internationalizing strategies.⁴⁰ At the same time, it is important to recognize this article's conceptual and empirical focus on the likely *regional* behavior of coalitions, as a consequence of their composition and grand strategy. Coalitional proclivities regarding human rights, respect for the environment, or social equity are beyond this analysis and further research may well suggest fewer differences there, and perhaps alternative coalitional patterns.

Most importantly, the evidence provides support for the hypothesized synergies between all pillars of a “grand strategy,” along the domestic, regional, and global spheres. Each coalition type appears to uphold a clearly differentiated policy cluster connecting economics and security. Thus, entrepreneurs coalescing internationalizing coalitions are more prone to deepen trade openness, expand exports, attract foreign investments, tame profligate military-industrial complexes, initiate less international crises, eschew weapons of mass destruction, defer to international economic and security regimes, and strive for regional cooperative orders that reinforce those objectives. Pristine and coherent grand strategies of any sort are rare but the links between a commitment to internationalization and regional cooperation and stability are evident. In contrast, backlash leaders are found to restrict and reduce trade openness and reliance on exports, curb foreign investment, build expansive military-industrial complexes and weapons of mass destruction, initiate international crises, challenge international regimes, and exacerbate civic-nationalist, religious, or ethnic differen-

³⁹ The only variables significant at only the .05 level rather than .01 are foreign direct investment, for which there is scarce data for backlash coalitions, and crisis initiation.

⁴⁰ For subsequent applications, limitations, and a future research agenda for coalitional analysis see Solingen, 2002.

tiation by emphasizing territoriality, sovereignty, militarization, and self-reliance. These policies' risks and externalities make war more likely even when they are not the most favored option. Hybrids straddled the grand strategies of their purer types, intermittently striving for economic openness, contracting the military complex, initiating international crises, and cooperating regionally and internationally, but neither forcefully nor coherently.

As for global "world-time" considerations, the coalitions analyzed here are more or less evenly spread over time, suggesting that coalitional effects can be found even in the midst of changing global circumstances in the last four decades. At the same time, global trends can have profound effects on domestic coalitional balances of power. It is possible that the Cold War provided a more supportive global structure for backlash objectives, from economic closure to militarization and regional conflict, which may help explain the relative weakness of internationalizers during that era and their sometimes diluted grand strategies. The post-Cold War era, in contrast, has provided an international economic and institutional environment far more favorable to internationalizing agendas. At the same time, the unintended effects of IMF, World Bank, G-8, and other conditionality programs have sometimes weakened internationalizing coalitions and, in some cases, the cooperative regional orders these coalitions endorsed. Many feared in 1997 that the Asian crisis might have precisely that effect, although internationalizing coalitions seem to have stayed the course thus far, with few exceptions. Protected markets in the industrialized world, the volatility unleashed by global capital liberalization, and the tendency to approach reform with myopic disregard for safety nets and equity considerations remain a dangerous challenge for internationalizing coalitions.

This framework and findings have several implications for theory. First, they defy notions of linear progression toward economic liberalism and regional cooperation, allowing for possible cyclical patterns and Polanyan "double movements" (Polanyi, 1944). The focus moves from classical interdependence theory's emphasis on bilateral economic gains to international openness as an engine of regional cooperation. Second, further extensions of the framework outlined in Figure 1 can help capture international effects dearest to constructivism insofar as ideas, identities, and evolving "cultures" find their way into the domestic politics of coalition formation. A coalitional account will benefit from a deeper understanding of how and why domestic constituencies become socialized into international ideational structures. Domestic constituencies stake positions vis-à-vis international institutions making the latter endogenous to a coalitional argument while providing more tractable venues for assessing when, how much, and why international institutions play a role domestically, and consequently, in foreign policy. These effects are more pronounced and can be better tracked empirically in the last decade, which was not the focus of the empirical study here.

Third, classical state-power structures cannot be ignored, even if coalitional balances of power can override them. The shadow of past security trajectories do enhance the power of backlash constituencies and do raise barriers for internationalizing coalitions, thus affecting the speed and shape of cooperative processes and outcomes. But, without knowledge of coalitional configurations—at home and throughout a region—classical security considerations often underdetermine. The absence of genuine security constraints does not guarantee regional cooperation (the Southern Cone for decades) nor do genuine security constraints place unsurmountable barriers (Oslo process in the Middle East). Favorable regional coalitional balances of power can relax such constraints. Whether or not such balances will evolve in the Middle East, South Asia, and other troubled regions will be significantly contingent on how domestic constituencies interpret internationalization and its corollaries.

Appendix I. Internationalist Coalitions

<i>Entrepreneurs</i>	<i>N⁺</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Mean TO</i>	<i>Change in TO</i>	<i>Mean Exp/GDP</i>	<i>Change in Exp/GDP</i>	<i>Mean FDI \$US Millions</i>	<i>Change in FDI \$US Millions</i>	<i>Mean Miles/GDP</i>	<i>Change in Miles/GDP</i>	<i>Mean Miles/CGE</i>	<i>Change in Miles/CGE</i>
ing Hee (1964–1979)	15	S. Korea	49.3	2.8	18.2	1.3 ⁽¹⁴⁾	68 ⁽⁷⁾	(–12.8) ⁽⁶⁾	4.6	–0.01	26.5 ⁽¹³⁾	.3 ⁽¹²⁾
o Hwan (1980–1988)	9	S. Korea	72.7	1.1	34.6	1.6	184	78.2	5.2	–0.12	27.1	–0.2
Woo (1989–1992)	4	S. Korea	61.5	(–3.7) ⁽³⁾	36.2	–0.8	–97.5	–304.3	3.8	–0.1	21.4	–1.4
ng Sam (1993–1998)	5	S. Korea	67.4	5.9	34.2	1.8	–1351	273.8	3.2 ⁽⁴⁾	(–0.1) ⁽⁴⁾	15.5 ⁽²⁾	(–3) ⁽²⁾
hing-kuo-Li Teng Hui (1988)	11	Taiwan	99.4	0.5	*	*	*	*	6.2	–0.26	40.5 ⁽¹⁰⁾	(–2.3) ⁽⁹⁾
(1968–1998)	31	Indonesia	46.8	2.2	27.4	1	989 ⁽²⁶⁾	(–2.4) ⁽²⁵⁾	2.6 ⁽³⁰⁾	(–0.03) ⁽³⁰⁾	13.3 ⁽²⁶⁾	(–.3) ⁽²⁵⁾
n Yew-Goh Chok-Tong (1998)	34	Singapore	314 ⁽²⁸⁾	3.9 ⁽²⁷⁾	147 ⁽²⁹⁾	3.9 ⁽²⁸⁾	1768 ⁽²⁶⁾	151 ⁽²⁵⁾	5 ⁽³¹⁾	(0.08) ⁽³⁰⁾	22.1 ⁽²⁹⁾	.4 ⁽²⁸⁾
Pinochet (1973–1989)	16	Chile	49.9	2.3	26.7	1.3	299	78.9	5.5	–0.06	15.3	0.3
Aylwin-Eduardo Frei (1996)	7	Chile	60.2	–0.9	33.5	–0.6	428 ⁽⁴⁾	(–217) ⁽⁴⁾	2.1	–0.09	15.9 ⁽⁶⁾	0.5 ⁽⁶⁾
Menem (1989–1998)	9	Argentina	18.5	0.6	10.3	–0.4	3690 ⁽⁴⁾	1319 ⁽⁴⁾	1.4 ⁽⁸⁾	(–0.1) ⁽⁸⁾	30.6 ⁽⁵⁾	(–3.6) ⁽⁵⁾
o Collor de Mello (1992)	2	Brazil	15.8	1.95	12.1	0.9	633	536	0.9	–0.1	4.2	–0.6
o H. Cardoso (1995–1998)	3	Brazil	17.1	0.1	7.3	–0.1	*	*	1.6 ⁽²⁾	0.15 ⁽²⁾	*	*
/Leekpai (1960–1997)	39	Thailand	54.1	1.7 ⁽³⁸⁾	29.2 ⁽²⁶⁾	1.5 ⁽²⁵⁾	1021 ⁽²⁶⁾	263 ⁽²⁵⁾	3.1 ⁽³⁸⁾	(–0.02) ⁽³⁷⁾	18.1 ⁽²⁹⁾	.08 ⁽²⁸⁾
-Sadat (1974–1981)	8	Egypt	65.5	6.1	23.4	0	535	94.3 ⁽⁷⁾	22.4	–3	34.6	–6.8
ssain (1991–1998)	7	Jordan	*	*	40.7 ⁽²⁾	(–2.5) ⁽²⁾	32.5 ⁽²⁾	(–3) ⁽²⁾	8.1 ⁽⁶⁾	(–0.2) ⁽⁶⁾	24 ⁽⁴⁾	(–1.2) ⁽⁴⁾
ourgiba-Zine Ben Ali (1995)	25	Tunisia	74.6 ⁽²²⁾	1.5 ⁽²²⁾	34.7 ⁽²³⁾	0.74 ⁽²³⁾	134 ⁽²⁰⁾	10.1 ⁽²⁰⁾	2.7	0.01	7.2 ⁽²³⁾	.04 ⁽²³⁾
san II (1983–1996)	16	Morocco	52.3 ⁽¹⁰⁾	(–0.2) ⁽¹⁰⁾	22.4 ⁽¹¹⁾	0.45 ⁽¹¹⁾	166 ⁽¹¹⁾	37.6 ⁽¹¹⁾	4.4 ⁽¹⁴⁾	(–0.19) ⁽¹⁴⁾	18.2 ⁽⁹⁾	.2 ⁽⁷⁾
abin-Shimon Peres (1996)	5	Israel	64.4 ⁽¹⁾	.3 ⁽¹⁾	32.7 ⁽²⁾	1.2 ⁽²⁾	(–243) ⁽²⁾	(–151) ⁽²⁾	9.2	–0.46	22.2 ⁽⁴⁾	(–.4) ⁽⁴⁾
Coalitional Means	246		88.6 ⁽²²³⁾	1.9 ⁽²²¹⁾	44.1 ⁽²⁰⁴⁾	1.3 ⁽²⁰¹⁾	712 ⁽¹¹⁵⁾	110 ⁽¹⁶⁹⁾	4.6 ⁽²³⁸⁾	(–0.15) ⁽²³⁶⁾	19.8 ⁽²⁰¹⁾	(.4) ⁽¹⁹⁴⁾

|| data for Trade Openness, Exports/GDP and FDI 1993–1998 from *United Nations Statistical Yearbook* (1999); all other data for Trade Openness (1960–1992) from *Penn World Table* (Web address: www.nber.org/pwt56, by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA: 1995); all other data for Exports/GDP calculated from World Bank, *World Tables* (1995, 1989, 1980); all other data for FDI from World Bank, *World Tables* (1995), FDI reported at current prices; Data for Miles/GDP from *SIPRI Yearbooks* (International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, 1999, 1996, 1995, 1990, 1986, 1984, 1975); Data for Miles/CGE from U.S. Arms and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures* (1996, 1990, 1982, 1976).

Appendix II. Backlash Coalitions

Entrepreneurs	N ⁺	Country	Mean TO	Change in TO	Mean Exp/GDP	Change in Exp/GDP	Mean FDI \$US Millions	Change in FDI \$US Millions	Mean Miles/GDP	Change in Miles/GDP	Mean Miles/CGE	Change in Miles/CGE
Rhee's (1960–1963)	4	S. Korea	19.8	1.7 ⁽³⁾	*	*	*	*	5.5	(-0.6) ⁽³⁾	*	*
Sukarno (1960–1967)	8	Indonesia	21	0.26 ⁽⁷⁾	18.7 ⁽³⁾	(-0.45) ⁽²⁾	*	*	3.4	(-0.39) ⁽⁷⁾	24.7 ⁽¹⁾	*
Hafiz-Ahmad Khatib (1971)	9	Syria	37.9	-0.88	20.7 ⁽⁷⁾	(-0.37) ⁽⁶⁾	*	*	8.6	0.2 ⁽⁸⁾	34.5 ⁽³⁾	(-3.8) ⁽²⁾
Asad (1972–1997)	27	Syria	47.9 ⁽²⁰⁾	0.9 ⁽²⁰⁾	14.3 ⁽²⁰⁾	(-0.28) ⁽²⁰⁾	*	*	12 ⁽²⁶⁾	(-0.07) ⁽²⁶⁾	40.4 ⁽¹⁹⁾	1.5 ⁽¹⁹⁾
Hassan al-Bakr (1964–1979)	16	Iraq	71.5	1.9	*	*	*	*	10.5 ⁽¹⁴⁾	(0.33) ⁽¹³⁾	36.4 ⁽¹³⁾	(-6) ⁽¹²⁾
Hussein (1980–1987)	8	Iraq	67.8 ⁽⁸⁾	(-5.1) ⁽⁸⁾	*	*	*	*	30.8 ⁽⁶⁾	8.4 ⁽⁶⁾	38.4 ⁽³⁾	6.9 ⁽³⁾
Nasser (1960–1970)	11	Egypt	37	(-0.7) ⁽¹⁰⁾	20.1 ⁽⁶⁾	(-0.4) ⁽⁵⁾	*	*	8.7	(0.92) ⁽¹⁰⁾	29.9 ⁽²⁾	5.2 ⁽¹⁾
Sadat (1971–1973)	3	Egypt	32.8	0.07	19.4	0.73	*	*	24.5	6.1	48.9	13
Sani-Sayed Khomeini (1989)	10	Iran	20.6	-2.1	4	-0.22	*	*	4.2 ⁽⁸⁾	(-0.19) ⁽⁷⁾	33.5 ⁽⁸⁾	(-2) ⁽⁷⁾
Ben Begin (1978–1983)	6	Israel	87.9	-1.7	29	-0.5	-10	-14.7	26.6	-0.08	31	-1.9
Shamir (1990–1991)	2	Israel	66.6	-3.7	30.9	-2.2	-69	-80	11.7	-0.65	23.7	-1.4
Menon (1974–1976)	3	Argentina	13.4	0.6	5.6	0.3	10 ⁽¹⁾	1 ⁽¹⁾	2.2 ⁽¹⁾	.6 ⁽¹⁾	10	0.8
Castelli (1981–1982)	2	Argentina	15.4	2.5	8.3	0.8	464	-186	6.1	0.2	20.4	4.5
Kubitschek (1960–1961)	2	Brazil	12.2	0.8	*	*	*	*	1.9	-0.3	*	*
Allende (1971–1973)	3	Chile	25.1	0.17	11.5	-0.53	(-5) ⁽¹⁾	*	2.8	0.3	8.6	-0.5
Ali Bhutto (1971–1977)	7	Pakistan	28.4	0.84	*	*	8.8 ⁽⁵⁾	(-0.7) ⁽⁴⁾	5.9	0.29	31.8	-1.1
Nehru-Indira Gandhi (77)	18	India	10.5	0.04 ⁽¹⁷⁾	*	*	0	0	3.1	0.09 ⁽¹⁷⁾	18.6 ⁽¹¹⁾	7 ⁽¹⁰⁾
Indira (1981–84)	4	India	15.4	-0.2	*	*	50	13.5	3.3	0.05	18.3	0.08
Coalitional Means	144		38.3 ⁽¹³⁸⁾	(-23) ⁽¹³³⁾	(15.6) ⁽⁶⁶⁾	(-0.27) ⁽⁶³⁾	37.6 ⁽²⁶⁾	(-24.6) ⁽²³⁾	9.5 ⁽¹³⁶⁾	0.62 ⁽¹²⁸⁾	31 ⁽⁹¹⁾	0.9 ⁽⁸⁵⁾

all data for Trade Openness, Exports/GDP and FDI 1993–1998 from *United Nations Statistical Yearbook* (1999); all other data for Trade Openness (1960–1992) from *Penn World Table* (Web address: www.nber.org/pwt50), by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA: 1995); all other data for Exports/GDP calculated from World Bank, *World Tables* (1995, 1989, 1980); all other data for FDI from World Bank, *World Tables* (1995), with the exception of Israel 1990–1992, data from Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel (Web address: www.cbs.gov.il/lnmse.cgi, 1998, FDI reported at current prices; Data for Miles/GDP from *Sipri Yearbooks on International Peace Research Institute*, Stockholm, 1999, 1996, 1995, 1990, 1989, 1986, 1984, 1975); Data for Miles/CGE from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures* (1996, 1990, 1982, 1976). Values for N represent the life-span of the coalition. Where different, actual N used for calculation is in parentheses and superscript.

Appendix III. Hybrid Coalitions

<i>Entrepreneurs</i>	<i>N⁺</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Mean TO</i>	<i>Change in TO</i>	<i>Mean Exp/GDP</i>	<i>Change in Exp/GDP</i>	<i>Mean FDI \$US Millions</i>	<i>Change in FDI \$US Millions</i>	<i>Mean Miles/GDP</i>	<i>Change in Miles/GDP</i>	<i>Mean Miles/CGE</i>	<i>Change in Miles/CGE</i>
Aljazeera	14	Argentina	14.2	(-0.33) ⁽¹³⁾	10.1 ⁽⁹⁾	(-0.64) ⁽⁸⁾	9 ⁽¹⁾	*	1.9	(-0.05) ⁽¹³⁾	14.9 ⁽⁷⁾	(-1.5) ⁽⁶⁾
Videla (1977-1980)	4	Argentina	13.9	-0.9	7.9	0.15	271	142 ⁽³⁾	5.6 ⁽³⁾	(-0.1) ⁽²⁾	15.5	1.3
Menem (1983-1988)	6	Argentina	15.2	-0.17	8.7	0.15	512	158	3.8	-0.58	17.1	-0.6
Graciano (1982-1995)	26	Brazil	16	0.03	7.3	0.19 ⁽²⁵⁾	1477 ⁽¹⁸⁾	(-65) ⁽¹⁷⁾	1.4 ⁽²⁵⁾	0.004 ⁽²⁴⁾	9 ⁽²⁴⁾	(-0.6) ⁽²³⁾
Abdullah (1980-1997)	3	Brazil	18.5	0.2	10.1	-1.7	(-292) ⁽¹⁾	(-1600) ⁽¹⁾	1.3	0.13	3.5	0.13
Abdullah (1980-1997)	18	Malaysia	140	4.6	71.2	2.1	2493	267	4.3	-0.18	11.6 ⁽¹⁶⁾	(-1.3) ⁽¹⁶⁾
Abdullah (1980-1997)	22	Morocco	44	0.38	20.4 ⁽¹⁸⁾	(-0.44) ⁽¹⁷⁾	38.8 ⁽¹⁰⁾	8.9 ⁽⁹⁾	3.9	0.19	14.8 ⁽¹⁶⁾	.6 ⁽¹⁵⁾
Abdullah (1980-1997)	10	Pakistan	34.1	0.68	*	*	104	10.5	6.3	0.11	25.6	0.2
Abdullah (1980-1997)	3	Pakistan	35.8	-0.03	14.2	.5 ⁽²⁾	194	44.7	6.6	-0.03	27.2	1.1
Abdullah (1980-1997)	3	Pakistan	37.2	1.2	16.9	0.5	319	35.7	6.8	0.0001	27.1	-1.1
Abdullah (1980-1997)	3	India	15.8	1.1	*	*	2.7	2.7	3.4	-0.07	16.9	0.1
Abdullah (1980-1997)	6	India	16.4	0.5	7.6 ⁽²⁾	0	225	17.2	3.3	-0.13	14.8	-0.72
Abdullah (1980-1997)	4	India	19.4	0.3	9.6	0.6	339 ⁽³⁾	90 ⁽³⁾	2.5	-0.1	13.1	0.13
Abdullah (1980-1997)	20	Iran	45.6	0.43 ⁽¹⁹⁾	10.7 ⁽⁶⁾	(-1.3) ⁽⁵⁾	*	*	7.9	0.11 ⁽¹⁹⁾	28.4	-0.23
Abdullah (1980-1997)	17	Egypt	59.8 ⁽¹¹⁾	(-1.6) ⁽¹¹⁾	20.9 ⁽¹²⁾	0.22 ⁽¹²⁾	193 ⁽¹²⁾	(-24.5) ⁽¹²⁾	5.7 ⁽¹⁶⁾	(-0.48) ⁽¹⁶⁾	15.7 ⁽¹⁴⁾	(-1.6) ⁽¹⁴⁾
Abdullah (1980-1997)	16	Jordan	86.5 ⁽³¹⁾	2.9 ⁽³⁰⁾	41 ⁽¹⁹⁾	1.1 ⁽¹⁸⁾	26.3 ⁽²⁰⁾	1.5 ⁽¹⁹⁾	15	(-0.32) ⁽³¹⁾	44.1 ⁽²⁵⁾	(-0.37) ⁽²⁴⁾
Abdullah (1980-1997)	18	Israel	62.3	2.6 ⁽¹⁷⁾	24.8 ⁽¹³⁾	0.96 ⁽¹²⁾	78.4 ⁽⁵⁾	(-18.5) ⁽⁴⁾	20.1	1.1 ⁽¹⁷⁾	42.4 ⁽¹¹⁾	0.0001
Abdullah (1980-1997)	6	Israel	76.1	-0.2	32.9	1.1	94.3	16.7	17.8	-2.3	25.6	0.32
Abdullah (1980-1997)	1	Israel	*	*	*	*	*	*	8.6	-0.1	*	*
Abdullah (1980-1997)	216	Coalitional Means	52.4 ⁽²⁰⁹⁾	1.1 ⁽²⁰⁵⁾	25 ⁽¹⁵³⁾	.45 ⁽¹⁴⁵⁾	635 ⁽¹²⁹⁾	32.9 ⁽¹²³⁾	7.6 ⁽²¹⁴⁾	(-0.07) ⁽²⁰⁶⁾	22.1 ⁽¹⁷⁵⁾	(-1.5) ⁽¹⁶⁹⁾

I ll data for Trade Openness, Exports/GDP and FDI 1993–1998 from *United Nations Statistical Yearbook* (1999); all other data for Trade Openness (1960–1992) from *Penn World Table* (Web address: www.nber.org/pwt56, by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA: 1995); all other data for Exports/GDP calculated from World Bank, *World Tables* (1995, 1989, 1980); all other data for FDI from World Bank, *World Tables* (1995), FDI reported at current prices; Data for Milesx/GDP from *Sipri Yearbooks* (International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, 1999, 1996, 1995, 1990, 1989, 1986, 1984, 1975); Data for Milesx/CGE from U.S. Arms and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures* (1996, 1990, 1982, 1976).

Appendix IV. Coalitions by Country

Entrepreneurs	N	Country	C	Mean TO	Change in TO	Mean Exp/GDP	Change in Exp/GDP	Mean FDI \$US Millions	Change in FDI \$US Millions	Mean Milex/GDP	Change in Milex/GDP	Mean Milex/CGE	Change in Milex/CGE
izi-Alejandro Lanusse (1960–1973)	14	Argentina	H	14.2	(−0.3) ⁽¹³⁾	10.1 ⁽⁹⁾	(−0.64) ⁽⁸⁾	9 ⁽¹⁾	*	1.9	(−0.05) ⁽¹³⁾	14.9 ⁽⁷⁾	(−1.5) ⁽⁸⁾
ron (1974–1976)	3	Argentina	B	13.4	0.6	5.6	0.3	10 ⁽¹⁾	1 ⁽¹⁾	2.2 ⁽¹⁾	.6 ⁽¹⁾	10	0.8
Videla (1977–1980)	4	Argentina	H	13.9	−0.9	7.9	0.15	271	142 ⁽³⁾	5.6 ⁽³⁾	(−0.1) ⁽²⁾	15.5	1.3
o Galtieri (1981–1982)	2	Argentina	B	15.4	2.5	8.3	0.8	464	−186	6.1	0.2	20.4	4.5
nsin (1983–1988)	6	Argentina	H	15.2	−0.17	8.7	0.15	512	158	3.8	−0.58	17.1	−0.6
Menem (1989–1998)	9	Argentina	I	18.5	0.6	10.3	−0.4	3690 ⁽⁴⁾	1319 ⁽⁴⁾	1.4 ⁽⁸⁾	(−0.1) ⁽⁸⁾	30.6 ⁽⁵⁾	(−3.6) ⁽⁵⁾
Kubitscheck (1960–1961)	2	Brazil	B	12.2	0.8	*	*	*	*	1.9	−0.3	*	*
branco-Jose Sney (1964–1990)	26	Brazil	H	16	0.03	7.3	0.19 ⁽²⁵⁾	1477 ⁽¹⁸⁾	(−65) ⁽¹⁷⁾	1.4 ⁽²⁵⁾	0.004 ⁽²⁴⁾	9 ⁽²⁴⁾	(−.6) ⁽²³⁾
o Collor de Mello (1990–1992)	2	Brazil	I	15.8	1.95	12.1	0.9	633	536	0.9	−0.1	4.2	−0.6
rango (1992–1995)	3	Brazil	H	18.5	0.2	10.1	−1.7	(−292) ⁽¹⁾	(−1600) ⁽¹⁾	1.3	0.13	3.5	0.13
o H. Cardoso (1995–1998)	3	Brazil	I	17.1	0.1	7.3	−0.1	*	*	1.6 ⁽²⁾	0.15 ⁽²⁾	*	*
Allende (1971–1973)	3	Chile	B	25.1	0.17	11.5	−0.53	(−5) ⁽¹⁾	*	2.8	0.3	8.6	−0.5
Pinochet (1973–1989)	16	Chile	I	49.9	2.3	26.7	1.3	299	78.9	5.5	−0.06	15.3	0.3
Aylwin-Eduardo Frei (1990–1996)	7	Chile	I	60.2	−0.9	33.5	−0.6	428 ⁽⁴⁾	(−217) ⁽⁴⁾	2.1	−0.09	15.2 ⁽⁶⁾	0.5 ⁽⁶⁾
. Nasser (1960–1970)	11	Egypt	B	37	(−0.7) ⁽¹⁰⁾	20.1 ⁽⁶⁾	(−0.4) ⁽⁵⁾	*	*	8.7	(0.92) ⁽¹⁰⁾	29.9 ⁽²⁾	5.2 ⁽¹⁾
-Sadat (1971–1973)	3	Egypt	B	32.8	0.07	19.4	0.73	*	*	24.5	6.1	48.9	13
-Sadat (1974–1981)	8	Egypt	I	65.5	6.1	23.4	0	535	94.3 ⁽⁷⁾	22.4	−3	34.6	−6.8
Mubarak (1982–1997)	17	Egypt	H	59.8 ⁽¹¹⁾	(−1.6) ⁽¹¹⁾	20.9 ⁽¹²⁾	0.22 ⁽¹²⁾	193 ⁽¹²⁾	(−24.5) ⁽¹²⁾	5.7 ⁽¹⁶⁾	(−0.48) ⁽¹⁶⁾	15.7 ⁽¹⁴⁾	(−.16) ⁽¹⁴⁾
l Nehru-Indira Gandhi (1960–77)	18	India	B	10.5	0.04 ⁽¹⁷⁾	*	*	0	0	3.1	0.09 ⁽¹⁷⁾	18.6 ⁽¹¹⁾	.7 ⁽¹⁰⁾
Desai (1978–1980)	3	India	H	15.8	1.1	*	*	2.7	2.7	3.4	−0.07	16.9	0.1
andhi (1981–84)	4	India	B	15.4	−0.2	*	*	50	13.5	3.3	0.05	18.3	0.08
ndhi (1985–1990)	6	India	H	16.4	0.5	7.6 ⁽²⁾	0	225	17.2	3.3	−0.13	14.8	−0.72
ia Rao (1991–1994)	4	India	H	19.4	0.3	9.6	0.6	339 ⁽³⁾	90 ⁽³⁾	2.5	−0.1	13.1	0.13
Sukarno (1960–1967)	8	Indonesia	B	21	0.26 ⁽⁷⁾	18.7 ⁽³⁾	(−0.45) ⁽²⁾	*	*	3.4	(−0.39) ⁽⁷⁾	24.7 ⁽¹⁾	*
(1968–1998)	31	Indonesia	I	46.8	2.2	27.4	1	989 ⁽²⁶⁾	(−2.4) ⁽²⁵⁾	2.6 ⁽³⁰⁾	(−0.03) ⁽³⁰⁾	13.3 ⁽²⁶⁾	(−.3) ⁽²⁵⁾
ad Reza Pahlavi (1960–1979)	20	Iran	H	45.6	0.43 ⁽¹⁹⁾	10.7 ⁽⁶⁾	(−1.3) ⁽⁵⁾	*	*	7.9	0.11 ⁽¹⁹⁾	28.4	−0.23
eini-Sayed Khomeini (1979–1989)	10	Iran	B	20.6	−2.1	4	−0.22	*	*	4.2 ⁽⁸⁾	(−0.19) ⁽⁷⁾	33.5 ⁽⁸⁾	(−.2) ⁽⁷⁾

16	Hassan al-Bakr (1964–1979)	Iraq	B	71.5	1.9	*	*	*	*	10.5 ⁽¹⁴⁾	(0.33) ⁽¹³⁾	36.4 ⁽¹³⁾	(−6) ⁽¹²⁾
8	Hussein (1980–1987)	Iraq	B	67.8 ⁽⁸⁾	(−5.1) ⁽⁸⁾	*	*	*	*	30.8 ⁽⁶⁾	8.4 ⁽⁶⁾	38.4 ⁽³⁾	6.9 ⁽³⁾
18	Yitzhak Rabin (1960–1977)	Israel	H	62.3	2.6 ⁽¹⁷⁾	24.8 ⁽¹³⁾	0.96 ⁽¹²⁾	78.4 ⁽⁵⁾	(−18.5) ⁽⁴⁾	20.1	1.1 ⁽¹⁷⁾	42.4 ⁽¹¹⁾	0.0001
6	Begin (1978–1983)	Israel	B	87.9	−1.7	29	−0.5	−10	−14.7	26.6	−0.08	31	−1.9
6	Peres (1984–1989)	Israel	H	76.1	−0.2	32.9	1.1	94.3	16.7	17.8	−2.3	25.6	0.32
2	Shimon Peres (1992–1996)	Israel	B	66.6	−3.7	30.9	−2.2	−69	−80	11.7	−0.65	23.7	−1.4
5	Netanyahu (1997)	Israel	I	64.4 ⁽¹⁾	3 ⁽¹⁾	32.7 ⁽²⁾	1.2 ⁽²⁾	(−243) ⁽²⁾	(−151) ⁽²⁾	9.2	−0.46	22.2 ⁽⁴⁾	(−4) ⁽⁴⁾
1	Jordan (1960–1991)	Jordan	H	*	*	*	*	*	*	8.6	−0.1	*	*
16	Jordan (1960–1991)	Jordan	H	86.5 ⁽³¹⁾	2.9 ⁽³⁰⁾	41 ⁽¹⁹⁾	1.1 ⁽¹⁸⁾	26.3 ⁽²⁰⁾	1.5 ⁽¹⁹⁾	15	−0.32 ⁽³¹⁾	44.1 ⁽²⁵⁾	(−37) ⁽²⁴⁾
7	bin Mohamad (1980–1997)	Malaysia	I	*	*	40.7 ⁽²⁾	(−2.5) ⁽²⁾	32.5 ⁽²⁾	(−3) ⁽²⁾	8.1 ⁽⁶⁾	(−0.2) ⁽⁶⁾	24 ⁽⁴⁾	(−1.2) ⁽⁴⁾
18	II (1961–1982)	Morocco	H	140	4.6	71.2	2.1	2493	267	4.3	−0.18	11.6 ⁽¹⁶⁾	(−13) ⁽¹⁶⁾
22	II (1983–1996)	Morocco	H	44	0.38	20.4 ⁽¹⁸⁾	(−0.44) ⁽¹⁷⁾	38.8 ⁽¹⁰⁾	8.9 ⁽⁹⁾	3.9	0.19	14.8 ⁽¹⁶⁾	.6 ⁽¹⁵⁾
16	Ali Bhutto (1971–1977)	Morocco	I	52.3 ⁽¹⁰⁾	(−0.2) ⁽¹⁰⁾	22.4 ⁽¹¹⁾	0.45 ⁽¹¹⁾	166 ⁽¹¹⁾	37.6 ⁽¹¹⁾	4.4 ⁽¹⁴⁾	(−0.19) ⁽¹⁴⁾	18.2 ⁽⁹⁾	.2 ⁽⁷⁾
7	Bhutto (1978–1987)	Pakistan	B	28.4	0.84	*	*	8.8 ⁽⁵⁾	(−0.7) ⁽⁴⁾	5.9	0.29	31.8	−1.1
10	Bhutto (1988–1990)	Pakistan	H	34.1	0.68	*	*	104	10.5	6.3	0.11	25.6	0.2
3	Bhutto (1991–1993)	Pakistan	H	35.8	−0.03	14.2	.5 ⁽²⁾	194	44.7	6.6	−0.03	27.2	1.1
3	Rhee's (1960–1963)	S. Korea	H	37.2	1.2	16.9	0.5	319	35.7	6.8	0.0001	27.1	−1.1
4	Hee (1964–1979)	S. Korea	B	19.8	1.7 ⁽³⁾	*	*	*	*	5.5	(−0.6) ⁽³⁾	*	*
15	Hwan (1980–1988)	S. Korea	I	49.3	2.8	18.2	1.3 ⁽¹⁴⁾	68 ⁽⁷⁾	(−12.8) ⁽⁶⁾	4.6	−0.01	26.5 ⁽¹³⁾	.3 ⁽¹²⁾
9	Woo (1989–1992)	S. Korea	I	72.7	1.1	34.6	1.6	184	78.2	5.2	−0.12	27.1	−0.2
4	Sam (1993–1998)	S. Korea	I	61.5	(−3.7) ⁽³⁾	36.2	−0.8	−97.5	−304.3	3.8	−0.1	21.4	−1.4
5	Goh Chok-Tong (1965–1998)	S. Korea	I	67.4	5.9	34.2	1.8	−1351	273.8	3.2 ⁽⁴⁾	(−0.1) ⁽⁴⁾	15.5 ⁽²⁾	(−3) ⁽²⁾
34	Halfiz-Ahmad Khatib (1963–1971)	Singapore	I	314 ⁽²⁸⁾	3.9 ⁽²⁷⁾	147 ⁽²⁹⁾	3.9 ⁽²⁸⁾	1768 ⁽²⁶⁾	151 ⁽²⁵⁾	5 ⁽³¹⁾	(0.08) ⁽³⁰⁾	22.1 ⁽²⁹⁾	.4 ⁽²⁸⁾
9	Asad (1972–1997)	Syria	B	37.9	−0.88	20.7 ⁽⁷⁾	(−0.37) ⁽⁶⁾	*	*	8.6	0.2 ⁽⁸⁾	34.5 ⁽³⁾	(−3.8) ⁽²⁾
27	Shing-kuo-Li Teng Hui (1978–1988)	Syria	B	47.9 ⁽²⁰⁾	0.9 ⁽²⁰⁾	14.3 ⁽²⁰⁾	(−0.28) ⁽²⁰⁾	*	*	12 ⁽²⁶⁾	(−0.07) ⁽²⁶⁾	40.4 ⁽¹⁹⁾	1.5 ⁽¹⁹⁾
11	Leekpai (1960–1997)	Taiwan	I	99.4	0.5	*	*	*	*	6.2	−0.26	40.5 ⁽¹⁰⁾	(−2.3) ⁽⁹⁾
39	Burgiba-Zine Ben Ali (1971–1995)	Thailand	I	54.1	1.7 ⁽³⁸⁾	29.2 ⁽²⁶⁾	1.5 ⁽²⁵⁾	1021 ⁽²⁶⁾	263 ⁽²⁵⁾	3.1 ⁽³⁸⁾	(−0.02) ⁽³⁷⁾	18.1 ⁽²⁹⁾	.08 ⁽²⁸⁾
25		Tunisia	I	74.6 ⁽²²⁾	1.5 ⁽²²⁾	34.7 ⁽²³⁾	0.74 ⁽²³⁾	134 ⁽²⁰⁾	10.1 ⁽²⁰⁾	2.7	0.01	7.2 ⁽²³⁾	.04 ⁽²³⁾

see as Appendices I, II, and III.

Appendix V. Test of Significance

Descriptive Statistics				ANOVA						
	Coalitions	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variables	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Trade openness: imports + exports as % of GDP	Internationalist	225	88.29	90.27	Trade openness: imports + Exports as % of GDP	Between Groups	2	125856.04	31.89	<0.001
	Backlash	138	38.29	24.78		Within Groups	569	3946.1		
	Hybrid	209	52.39	40.19		Total	571			
	Total	572	63.11	66.13						
Exports as % of GDP	Internationalist	206	43.99	45.06	Exports as % of GDP	Between Groups	2	54724.35	23.66	<0.001
	Backlash	66	15.61	7.76		Within Groups	422	1156.46		
	Hybrid	153	24.94	21.12		Total	424			
	Total	425	32.72	35.78						
Foreign Direct Investment (\$US Millions)	Internationalist	175	711.59	1314.77	Foreign Direct Investment (\$US Millions)	Between Groups	2	5177735.2	3.592	0.029
	Backlash	26	37.61	152.32		Within Groups	327	144157.6		
	Hybrid	129	654.78	1152.56		Total	329			
	Total	330	636.28	1210.08						
Military Expenditures as % of GDP	Internationalist	239	4.59	4.22	Military Expenditures as % of GDP	Between Groups	2	1154.42	26.19	<0.001
	Backlash	136	9.53	8.76		Within Groups	586	44.08		
	Hybrid	214	7.58	7.27		Total	588			
	Total	589	6.82	6.92						
Military Expenditures as % of CGE	Internationalist	201	19.78	9.99	Military Expenditures as % of CGE	Between Groups	2	3809.97	25.08	<0.001
	Backlash	91	30.7	12.66		Within Groups	464	151.89		
	Hybrid	175	22.01	14.41		Total	466			
	Total	467	22.74	12.94						
Number of Crises Initiated During Coalition	Internationalist	18	0.11	0.32	Number of Crises Initiated During Coalition	Between Groups	2	8.43	4.065	0.023
	Backlash	22	1.41	1.74		Within Groups	55	2.07		
	Hybrid	18	0.94	1.7		Total	57			
	Total	467	0.86	1.52						

<i>it Variable</i>	<i>(I) Coalitions</i>	<i>(J) Coalitions</i>	<i>Mean Diff. (I – J)</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>95 % Confidence Interval</i>	
						<i>Lower</i>	<i>Upper</i>
penness: imports + ts as % of GDP	Internationalist	Backlash	50.0018*	6.7921	<.001	33.6930	66.3130
		Hybrid	35.9027*	6.0348	<.001	21.4126	50.3928
	Backlash	Internationalist	-50.0018*	6.7921	<.001	-66.3103	-33.6933
		Hybrid	-14.0992	6.8903	0.124	-30.6432	2.4449
	Hybrid	Internationalist	-35.9027*	6.0348	<.001	-50.3928	-21.4126
as % of GDP		Backlash	14.0992	6.8903	0.124	-2.4449	30.6432
	Internationalist	Backlash	28.3768*	4.8100	<.001	16.8157	39.9379
		Hybrid	19.0434*	3.6294	<.001	10.3200	27.7669
	Backlash	Internationalist	-28.3768*	4.8100	<.001	-39.9379	-16.8157
		Hybrid	-9.3334	5.0081	0.189	-21.3706	2.7038
Direct Investment Millions)	Hybrid	Internationalist	-19.0434*	3.6294	<.001	-27.7669	-10.3200
		Backlash	9.3334	5.0081	0.189	-2.7038	21.3706
	Internationalist	Backlash	673.9895*	252.3541	0.024	66.7345	1281.2444
		Hybrid	56.8212	139.3288	1.000	-278.4542	392.0965
	Backlash	Internationalist	-673.9895*	252.3541	0.024	-1281.2444	-66.7345
Expenditures as % of GDP		Hybrid	-617.1683	258.1086	0.052	-1238.2705	3.9339
	Internationalist	Internationalist	-56.8212	139.3288	1.000	-392.0965	278.4542
		Backlash	617.1683	258.1086	0.052	-3.9339	1238.2705
	Internationalist	Backlash	-4.9377*	0.7131	<.001	-6.6497	-3.2256
		Hybrid	-2.9888*	0.6248	<.001	-4.4889	-1.4888
Expenditures as % of CGE	Internationalist	Internationalist	4.9377*	0.7131	<.001	3.2256	6.6497
		Hybrid	1.9488*	0.7281	0.023	0.2009	3.6968
	Hybrid	Internationalist	2.9888*	0.6248	<.001	1.4888	4.4889
		Backlash	-1.9488*	0.7281	0.023	-3.6968	-0.2009
	Internationalist	Backlash	-10.9193*	1.5572	<.001	-14.6607	-7.1779
of Crises Initiated During Coalition		Hybrid	-2.2273	1.2742	0.243	-5.2888	0.8343
	Backlash	Internationalist	10.9193*	1.5572	<.001	7.1779	14.6607
		Hybrid	8.6920*	1.5928	<.001	4.8650	12.5191
	Hybrid	Internationalist	2.2273	1.2742	0.243	-0.8343	5.2888
	Internationalist	Backlash	-8.6920*	1.5928	<.001	-12.5191	-4.8650
		Backlash	-1.2980*	0.4576	0.019	-2.4281	-0.1679
	Internationalist	Backlash	-0.8333	0.4800	0.264	-2.0186	0.3519
		Hybrid	1.2980*	0.4576	0.019	0.1679	2.4281
	Backlash	Internationalist	0.4646	0.4576	0.943	-0.6655	1.5948
	Hybrid	Internationalist	0.8333	0.4800	0.264	-0.3519	2.0186
		Backlash	-0.4646	0.4576	0.943	-1.5948	0.6655

an difference is significant at the .05 level.

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