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Rebuilding Los Angeles: Labor-Community Coalition Organizing around Transit and Housing

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Rebuilding Los Angeles:
Labor-Community Coalition Organizing around Transit and Housing

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology by

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2019
Los Angeles has long been infamous as a sprawling megalopolis, where racialized inequalities are embedded in and perpetuated by land use. L.A. has also been the home of the prototypical growth machine, which helped create and deepen these inequalities through direct and indirect displacement and racialized uneven development. This history of uneven investment has left neighborhoods of color with rent gaps that increase vulnerabilities to gentrification and displacement. In more recent decades, with the rise of slow growth movements, scholars have argued that this prototypical growth machine has died or at least lost its consensus. However, I argue that the L.A. growth machine has more recently re-formulated itself around an agenda of transit-oriented development that aims to take advantage of racialized rent gaps in
historically disinvested neighborhoods. Despite its popular image as dominated by freeways and single-family housing, L.A.’s public transit build out is the largest contemporary public infrastructure project in the country, rebuilding L.A. by reshaping transportation and land use.

Community-based organizations and advocacy groups have responded to gentrification and displacement pressures around this influx of investment in transit and accompanying transit-oriented development, and have put forward an alternative vision of equitable development, distinct from the anti-development NIMBY vs. pro-development YIMBY binary of urban development logics. These equitable development organizations have strategically responded to slow growth radical flank effect threats to the traditional growth machine and bridged tensions between organized labor and community groups around urban development to form a labor-community coalition. This coalition leveraged its members’ unique resources to push for and win innovative equitable development policy. I address the broad conceptual question of how do urban development politics shift in response to multiple countermovements? How does this help us better understand how residents of color form cross-sector coalitions to bridge city trenches?
The dissertation of Mary Caroline Stepick is approved.

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2019
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Carol and Alex Stepick, and to the Los Angeles community residents and organizers who welcomed me into their community building, visioning, and strategizing spaces.
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Chapter 1

Rebuilding and Reimagining L.A.: Contested and Racialized Urban Development Politics

Introduction

Los Angeles has long been infamous as a sprawling, fragmented megalopolis, where racialized, extreme inequalities are embedded in and perpetuated by land use (e.g. Davis 2000, Morrow 2013). L.A. has also been the home of what has been understood to be the prototypical growth machine, which has created and deepened inequalities through racialized uneven development. L.A.’s patterns of uneven investment and historical disinvestment, which have left communities of color with rent gaps that increase vulnerabilities to displacement and gentrification, help illustrate the racialized political economy in American cities. In more recent decades, with the rise of slow growth homeowner movements, some scholars have argued that the L.A. growth machine that created and deepened these inequalities, has died (Fulton 1997) or at least lost its consensus (e.g. Purcell 2000). However, this does not fully explain what has happened to the growth machine’s underlying interests or how it has transmuted its practices into different forms of rent exploitation. This also leaves open the question of whether or not the slow growth movement and the erosion of the pro-growth political consensus opens opportunities for other countermovement groups outside of the binary
anti-development not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) vs. pro-development yes-in-my-backyard (YIMBY) of urban development logics.

In this dissertation I argue that the L.A. growth machine has re-formulated itself more recently around an agenda of transit-oriented development (TOD) that is able to take advantage of racialized rent gaps in historically disinvested neighborhoods. Historically disinvested communities of color are organizing to resist transit-oriented displacement while also contending with growth coalition allies in local government who retain an interest in maintaining business confidence (Block 1977). While L.A. was long the prototypical example of a growth machine that promoted horizontal sprawl, it has evolved to facilitate vertical densification under the guise of ‘smart growth’\(^1\) and TOD. Community-based organizations and advocacy groups have responded to these gentrification and displacement pressures, putting forward an alternative vision of equitable development. Their approach is distinct from the anti-development NIMBY vs. pro-development YIMBY binary of urban development logics, as they recognize that both NIMBY and YIMBY approaches reproduce racially exclusionary development and surveillance practices (McElroy and Szeto 2017).

These equitable development organizations have strategically responded to slow growth radical flank effect threats to the traditional growth machine and bridged city trenches (Katznelson 1981) and tensions between organized labor and community groups around urban development to form a labor-community coalition. This coalition

\(^1\) Smart growth generally refers to urban planning and policies that are intended to combat the negative effects of sprawl through encouraging compact development and walkability, and reducing reliance on the automobile (Dong and Zhu 2015). It may include “green”
leveraged its members’ unique resources to win an innovative equitable development policy that links deep affordability and jobs standards. I analyze these movement building and policy development processes to address the broad conceptual question, how do urban development politics shift in response to multiple countermovements? How does this labor-community coalition organizing success help us better understand how residents of color form cross-sector coalitions to bridge city trenches and resist racial dispossession?

Citywide Coalition Forms To Resist a Top-Down Planning Blueprint

Patricia\(^2\) raised her hand and stood, waiting for the microphone. She asked, “Is this who you want to live here? What about this plan will help support the residents who have lived here since before these developments started coming into our neighborhoods?” She spoke in Spanish, pausing after each sentence for translation, addressing the L.A. Department of City Planning planner assigned to the Cornfields Arroyo Seco Specific Plan (CASP). A few audience members applauded. Several nodded and looked to the planner, who had just finished delivering a PowerPoint presentation at a public hearing in Highland Park that included colorful sketches depicting what the planner described as a vibrant sidewalk scene that could exist there if they implemented the CASP as the Planning Department envisioned it. The images included professionally dressed adults riding bicycles in bike lanes and sitting at sidewalk cafes on the bottom floor of newly built multi-story mixed use buildings.

\(^2\) All names of individuals who are not public officials, unless otherwise noted, are pseudonyms.
Patricia added that the street and sidewalk cultures in Chinatown and Highland Park were already vibrant, but that the residents didn’t look like the mostly white professionals in the sketches. The planner’s response was to say they would make a note of the comments and that, “This is why we are having these forums—to hear what local residents want to see. This is all preliminary still.” In concluding the presentation the planner noted that the CASP has exciting potential, as the innovative planning mechanisms it included could be applied more broadly across the city. A resident from the nearby neighborhood of Boyle Heights then said, “That is why we are here! Because this is not what we have worked for so long for in the Boyle Heights Community Plan. What we need, and what most communities need is affordable housing, access to good jobs, and green and public spaces that are safe and meant for the families who already live in our neighborhoods!”

Residents from Boyle Heights attended that CASP public forum and several subsequent events and workshops in neighboring communities because residents and organizers recognized a shared threat of displacement now that their historically disinvested, predominantly low-income neighborhoods of color had become targeted for public and private investment around public transit. They also recognized a shared opportunity to leverage land use planning to mitigate and prevent displacement and

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3 This phenomenon is similar to ‘green gentrification’ (Gould and Lewis 2017), in which environmental assets, including open space in historically disinvested neighborhoods, are targeted for investment, resulting in gentrification and displacement pressures. In this dissertation I focus on TOD, as it is an environmental asset that has attracted widespread attention and investment from public officials and the private sector.
leverage that investment for community benefits for residents who had lived in the neighborhoods through periods of intense public and private disinvestment.

In 2011 organizers from the Southeast Asian Communities Alliance (SEACA) approached organizers at the East LA Community Corporation (ELACC) because SEACA members were starting to engage in workshops about the CASP, which, as originally formulated, they recognized could dramatically change the zoning and subsequent development and land use in the Chinatown and Highland Park neighborhoods. These neighborhoods had some of the highest proportions of foreign-born residents and lowest-income residents in L.A., including public housing residents. The proposed specific plan would upzone\(^4\) much of the neighborhoods and decrease parking requirements, without any requirements for community benefits or mechanisms to prevent displacement of existing low-income neighborhood residents. In other words, developers could build luxury high rises without building expensive parking, increasing their potential profit margins, without any concessions to the city or existing low-income residents.

Planners discussed how they hoped to use the CASP as a TOD and smart growth blueprint for the rest of the city as they updated planning around the public transit expansion to include more density near transit. This focus on TOD planning as a

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\(^4\) Increasing the zoning designation for land parcels results in developers being able to build more densely. For example, a parcel that is zoned R1 is zoned for single-family residential development and use, but if it is changed to R2 or above it is multifamily and the square footage that can be developed for housing—or floor area ratio increases, which allows landowners to potentially extract more value from the same plot of land. Zoning changes can also change the use, for example changing industrially zoned land to residential or commercial or mixed use.
mechanism for neighborhood ‘revitalization,’ as planners referred to it in 2011, was in part an outcome of the large-scale reinvestment in public transit. In 2008 L.A. County voters passed Measure R, a half-cent sales tax to fund transportation. This accelerated the construction of public transit rail lines. This investment in public transit rail also represented a new amenity and public investment in several historically disinvested neighborhoods of color. Meanwhile, urban planning models of TOD and smart growth call for the intensification and densification of land use near transit through mixed use development that encourages increased use of public transit and walkability and decreased driving. However, this massive public investment in public transit and the accompanying private investments in TOD were not accompanied by mechanisms to prevent the displacement of low-income residents in these neighborhoods, who are more likely to take public transit.

SEACA recognized this risk and quickly organized their members and reached out to potential allies, working with public interest attorneys at Public Counsel to understand the zoning language and potential impacts. SEACA’s youth members became urban planning experts and worked with organizers and attorneys to rewrite the proposed specific plan to include community benefits. SEACA organizers were also frustrated that much of the public participation around the CASP was conducted during times when their youth leaders were in school. They asked ally organizations to attend and participate, highlighting their shared concerns. Public Counsel attorneys had

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5 At one L.A. City Planning Commission meeting SEACA presented a video their youth members had put together articulating their position and the Planning Commissioners repeatedly stated that this form of public participation should not set a precedent.
worked with ally organizations on other community plan updates, working with organizers and community residents to ensure that the community plan update process be driven by current residents' participation and priorities. They therefore also recognized the risk posed by planners’ desires to implement CASP components in other communities that had organized for years around the community planning process and risked losing those efforts if a TOD blueprint like that in the CASP were to be imposed top-down across the city.

SEACA organizers noted that, though their organization was relatively new to working on land use campaigns, the CASP provided a strategic opportunity for coalition organizing and policy. They stressed the need to not only prevent the passage of the specific plan as it was originally presented in their neighborhoods, but that if they could pass something that leveraged this investment to secure affordable housing and community benefits, it could serve instead as a positive model in planning processes across the city. The seeds of a city-wide anti-displacement coalition that would become the Alliance for Community Transit-Los Angeles (ACT-LA) were sown, starting with solidarity mobilizations and participation in the CASP process, and acknowledging the risk of further racial dispossession and displacement if planning models without significant direction from directly impacted low-income residents of color were to be imposed top-down across the city.

The campaign ultimately succeeded in significantly transforming the CASP from a TOD planning mechanism to upzone near transit without any concessions for affordability or community benefits to an innovative planning tool that leveraged investment already entering the neighborhood to secure affordable housing, public
process, and community benefits. SEACA and allies had advocated to include innovative planning policies, such as a Super Density Bonus Program and linking parking to affordable housing units to incentivize affordable housing construction. The Los Angeles Department of City Planning quietly abandoned its plan to have the CASP serve as a blueprint for TOD across the city.

State disinvestment and the subsequent investment in transit and accompanying TOD without anti-displacement mechanisms had already prompted organizing independently in numerous neighborhoods. The coordination of this organizing across neighborhoods in the ACT-LA coalition challenged the dominant growth machine development ideology and practice as well as slow growth and NIMBY approaches that aimed to stop development outright. ACT-LA’s organizing efforts built on the CASP campaign victory to develop a citywide campaign that culminated in passing a citywide equitable development policy in 2016. ACT-LA’s approach to equitable development built on previous land use anti-displacement organizing efforts by member organizations and overlapping coalitions and similarly stressed the right of existing residents of color to stay in their homes and benefit from an influx of investment in historically disinvested neighborhoods. Equitable development also stresses the need for policy and planning mechanisms to leverage this development for housing affordability and community benefits, including quality jobs with career ladders for current residents. It represents an alternative urban development approach to the binary anti-development NIMBY vs. pro-development YIMBY urban development ideologies, and complicates this multi-movement and countermovement urban political space. This dissertation follows these
contested processes and analyzes how they complicate growth machine, coalition formation and organizing, and countermovement theories.

The Lean, Mean Growth Machine

Scholarship on the political economy of cities is wide ranging and includes analyses of political machines (e.g. Sonenshein on L.A. 2004), political fragmentation (e.g. Fogelson 1967, Dear and Flusty 1998), demographic shifts and labor markets (e.g. Light 2006), and urban regimes (Stone 1989, 2013) and growth machines (Molotch 1976, Logan and Molotch 1987, Molotch 1993). Growth machine and urban regime theories are predominant frameworks to understand the political economy of development in cities that lack dominant political machines. These theories help us to understand the structural economic interests in local urban development and how a growth coalition works to facilitate business investment, often mediating state and federal policy.

Growth machine theory argues that the politics of urban development is driven by capitalist interests in the intensification of land use, shared by members of a growth coalition (Molotch 1976, Logan and Molotch 1986).⁶ The growth coalition is comprised of a wide range of actors, including real estate developers and investors, landowners, elected officials, public agencies, insurance companies, utility companies, universities, cultural institutions, construction and building trades unions, and others with a financial and/or professional interest in intensifying land use who use city politics as a vehicle to

⁶ See also: Stone (1989, 2013) on urban regime theory and the role of elites in local governance.
achieve their material goals, while also attempting to mediate politics and investment at various scales (Molotch 1976, Logan and Molotch 1987, Molotch 1993). These wide-ranging groups share an interest in continued intensification of urban land use and pro-growth ideology. The alliance between city government and capital in the growth coalition reflects underlying shared interests in the exchange value of land and visible evidence of economic investment, as members of the state apparatus have a vested interest in capital accumulation and depend on sustaining business confidence (Block 1977, 19).

However, their collaboration is not automatic, as state managers have a broader rationality than more narrowly focused individual capitalists (ibid.). Still, local governing coalitions establish systems of cooperation to encourage business investment (Stone 1989, 2013). This cooperation is likely particularly salient in infrastructure development, as the state has a clear role in driving such development. In contemporary L.A. this relationship is strengthened by fiscal and regulatory pressures, including California Propositions 13, passed in 1978, and 218, passed in 1996, which constrain tax revenues (Pincetl 1999a, 1999b), the dismantling of the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA), the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, and the Palmer decision,\(^7\)

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\(^7\) The Costa Hawkins Rental Housing Act is a state law, enacted in 1995, which sets limits on rent control, allows for vacancy decontrol, and allows landowners to evict tenants if they claim to plan to transition the property from rental to for sale. It has been documented to be often abused and responsible for an upsurge in evictions (McElroy and Szeto 2017). The 2009 Palmer/Sixth Street Properties LP v. City of Los Angeles state appellate court decision ruled that inclusionary housing policy mandating affordability set asides violated the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act.
effectively discouraging local government from more proactively pursuing affordable housing (Chiland 2018).

Growth coalition members may passively benefit from state managers acting in their shared interest, but they are often also politically active in lobbying and consultation efforts, including being appointed as public advisors (Pincetl 1999b). In the case of developers, they are generally omnipresent activists in City Hall and other political arenas (Molotch 1993). However, this does not mean that developers and other members of the growth coalition are simply another interest group in a pluralist political field. In fact, as Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) argue regarding labor and capital, the term interest group obscures underlying structural inequalities and assumes a pluralist, level playing field that is not accurate in capitalist society. Indeed, Pincetl (1999b) demonstrates that, taken to the extreme as it has been in Irvine, California, with The Irvine Ranch Company operating as a structural speculator and monopolizing control of land use politics, growth coalition members can completely undermine participatory democracy. This dominating influence can prevent other groups from presenting alternatives, shaping the agenda, or having meaningful participation (ibid.).

Though developers are the omnipresent activists, residents directly impacted by proposed developments are often dismissed as narrow, parochial interest groups. The literature on the growth machine primarily discusses organized opposition to growth machine politics as being comprised of slow growth homeowners who desire to limit impacts of development on their quality of life and, separately, of environmentalists, who aim to limit environmental impacts of development. The growth machine literature largely does not address low-income renters of color who are most vulnerable to
displacement. These low-income renters of color are exploited and dispossessed through elected officials and developers’ politics of abandonment (Pulido 2016) and disinvestment, which creates a racialized rent gap. Growth coalition members are then able to take advantage of that rent gap, leading to gentrification and displacement of long-term residents.

Urban intensification of land use is predicated on uneven investment and development (Smith 1982, 1984), displacement (Marcuse 1985), and racial dispossession (Robinson 1983, Ranganathan 2016, Pulido 2016). Patterns of uneven development involve disinvestment and devaluation of large areas of the city (Smith 1984). This leads to rent gaps between the ground rent actually capitalized and collected by landlords and the potential ground rent they could collect if the land were put to a more profitable use (ibid.). This process is most visible in reference to residentially and commercially zoned properties, but is also present in the conversion of industrially zoned properties to more profitable uses and is linked to transportation uses (Smith 1982). Due to the racialized processes of disinvestment through the politics of abandonment of Black and Latinx and other racialized immigrant neighborhoods (Pulido 2016) and marking these neighborhoods as blighted and therefore in need of demolition and renewal (Acuña 1984, Hyra 2017, Weinstein 1996), rent gaps are

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8 While in much of this dissertation I refer to residents, communities, and neighborhoods of color, this is not meant to erase the specificity of Black, Latinx, Korean, Japanese, and other racialized immigrant groups’ experiences with gentrification, displacement, dispossession, and resistance, and who have organized together in multiracial and multiethnic coalition across neighborhoods.
generally racialized. This makes the exclusion of directly impacted low-income residents of color from land use politics and from much of the literature on the growth machine all the more notable. Growth machine theory implies but does not fully analyze racialization of dispossession in growth machine politics. Much of this literature discusses racialized inequalities in the built environment, but rarely does so in terms of patterns and practices of racial dispossession, directly tying urban development to racial capitalism.

However, low-income residents of color have long resisted gentrification and displacement pressures (Hunter 2013). Residents of color organize and resist displacement and dispossession, with varying degrees of success. This has included resistance to direct displacement from urban renewal (Gans 1965, Hunter 2013) and public housing demolition (e.g. Gratz 2015), freeway development and expansion (Acuña 1984, Hunter 2013, Segal 2015), and large sports and entertainment complexes that razed large swaths of neighborhoods (Saito and Truong 2014). It also includes resistance to more gradual and indirect displacement through gentrification (e.g. Marwell 2007).

Urban development in the U.S. is always already a racialized political economic process with certain actors and economic interests driving it and others excluded, but this process and these actors are in flux and contested. This contestation is rooted in asset-based community organizing that uplifts Black, Latinx, and other racialized immigrant placemaking\(^9\) and the right of low-income residents of color who have weathered disinvestment to stay in their neighborhoods as they experience an influx of

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investment. While growth machine politics are local, increasing financialization of real estate is a national and global phenomenon, presenting a tension for organized resistance that largely focuses at the local level. To contest these parallel and overlapping structural challenges, groups develop a multipronged strategy.

The growth coalition presents their financial interests as job-creating projects beneficial for all (Molotch 1993, 32). Growth machine policies however, do not generally succeed in revitalizing disinvested areas (Molotch 1993). Still, they are successful in promoting development because “the symbolic power of edifice success colors local perceptions, builds political careers, and points to a ‘something that can be done’” (ibid., 35). The visibility of development reinforces the hegemony of the growth machine and facilitates growth coalition members’ city boosterism (ibid.). However, visible—especially large-scale—development, is also likely to attract the attention of those opposed to rapid neighborhood change, including not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) homeowners concerned about their quality of life, property values, and traffic and anti-displacement and anti-gentrification organizers concerned with displacement pressures on low-income residents of color.

Further, growth machine theory is premised on the idea that growth is primarily horizontal. By this understanding, sprawl encroaching on natural lands is an understandable outcome of this interest in intensification of land use. Slow growth movement advocates argue against the impacts of traffic and greater auto use that development can bring. Separately, environmentalists advocate against further encroachment on natural lands. A growth machine shift to focusing on TOD would appear to appease these concerns, as the intensification of land use is primarily vertical
and oriented to encouraging public transit use, not driving. However, TOD without affordability components that prevent the displacement of extremely low-income residents who are core transit riders leads to their replacement by higher income residents who are more likely to own cars (Dominie 2012). This confounds the “green” sustainability claims of TOD advocates as well, as this displacement of core transit riders undermines sustainability goals (ibid.), representing a new form of “green gentrification” (Gould and Lewis 2017). Further, without a comprehensive strategy to address historic inequities that allowed for uneven development and land use planning dominated by white homeowners who preserved single family zoning in their neighborhoods, the city’s built environment is likely to continue to reproduce racial, economic, and gender inequalities.

While the slow growth movement has succeeded in pushing the growth machine to shift its approach, the growth machine literature does not explain what has happened to the growth machine’s underlying interests or how it has shifted in response to multiple movements. As analysis of resistance to the growth machine focuses largely on NIMBY and slow growth movements that primarily target housing, it does not fully explain how multiple countermovements interact and how residents of color and organizers form cross-sector coalitions that navigate and bridge city trenches (Katzenelson 1981) that separate workplace issues and neighborhood based issues.

The primary question that remains from these literatures, and that I address in this dissertation is: How do racialized urban development politics shift and what role does organized resistance to the growth machine play? To attend to this question, I start from the premise that urban development in the U.S. is always already a racialized
political economic process based on racial dispossession, in which growth coalition actors create and extract capital by dispossessing residents of color from land, property, and community. It is through this broader awareness that I then ask the following questions: How do growth machine practices shift over time to reflect different periods of racial capitalism and in response to different forms of resistance? How do these different forms of resistance interact with the growth machine and with each other in a multi-movement urban political space? How does this help us better understand how residents of color and organizers form coalitions that navigate and bridge city trenches (Katzenelson 1981) and urban siloes? To address these questions, I focus on Los Angeles, which had long been viewed as home to the prototypical growth machine (e.g. Davis 2000, Fulton 1997, Purcell 2000), though in recent decades L.A. has been decentered from analyses of urban political economy. I examine how this exemplar of the growth machine has shifted and changed over time.

Case Selection: "LA Is The Infrastructure Capital of the Country. Wait What?" -Eric Garcetti

In his keynote address at the Move LA annual convening of transportation advocates, L.A. Mayor Eric Garcetti took his position on stage, dressed in a smart suit and tie. As he made his way to address the attendees from the dais some gave him a standing ovation, and others clapped half-heartedly. He stood in the spotlight and espoused a city booster’s ideal image of L.A.: a city on the cutting edge of

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10 L.A. Mayor Eric Garcetti, Move LA Conference Keynote address May 23, 2016, Los Angeles, CA
unprecedented transportation development and technology. I sat in a back corner next to an organizer from one of the ACT-LA member organizations. I took notes as she counted off on her fingers the number of times Garcetti used words and phrases like cutting edge, innovative, forward looking, game changing, and future prosperity. She noted to me that Garcetti’s technology-fetishizing view of L.A. as cutting edge and suddenly invested in public transit, ignored the long history of L.A., in which transportation and racial dispossession have always been intimately connected. She leaned over and said, “This is why we do the political ed work with our members. So residents don’t believe this hype. So they know that this isn’t the first time the City has told folks we need to push forward with this kind of development because ‘it is for the greater good.’”

While in other cities like Philadelphia, growth coalitions leverage the symbolic capital in the history of the built environment by engaging in memory politics to promote redevelopment (Hunter, Loughran, and Fine 2018), in L.A. the growth coalition has relied on collective amnesia to manufacture the urban landscape they desire. This was the case in early L.A. when settler colonialists erased the indigenous Tongva, Chumash, and Tataviam inhabitants and used Spanish colonialist imagery to promote a white supremacist settlement. It continued with the promotion of Hollywood and a globalized downtown as the dominant image of L.A. and the erasure of the displacement and racial dispossession of communities of color through urban renewal, redevelopment, freeway construction, and HOPE VI public housing demolition. More recently this collective amnesia being used to promote growth machine development goals has continued with the erasure of L.A.’s transportation, housing, and racial
dispossession history, with city boosters asserting that L.A.’s current transportation boom is unprecedented in the history of the city. Still, counter-hegemonic resistance to urban redevelopment (Hunter 2013) and the mobilization of collective memory “from below” (Hunter, Loughran, and Fine 2018), reveal that communities of color in L.A. most vulnerable to displacement and dispossession are aware of the strategies that belie shifting tactics of the growth coalition.

As I detail in the next chapter, far from new and unprecedented, L.A. has a history of transportation infrastructure being tied to housing and displacement and racial dispossession. Similar to the creation of racialized housing rent gaps, historic and concerted disinvestment in transportation and housing has created an opportunity more recently for the growth coalition to promote investment in public transit infrastructure and the accompanying TOD as a mechanism to advance their interests in the intensification of land use. This investment in L.A. transportation infrastructure is the largest contemporary infrastructure project in the U.S. and growth coalition members and transportation advocates argued that investment in transit infrastructure and TOD could be a solution to the climate, housing, and un/underemployment crises in L.A. (e.g. Dreier 2012). Proponents argued that it would encourage residents to get out of their cars and take transit, thereby lowering greenhouse gas emissions, increase housing density and lead to greater affordability through supply and demand, and create jobs in the construction of the rail and TOD (ibid.). However, especially in the early years of TOD city boosterism, these advocates did not specify equity provisions, anti-displacement mechanisms, or targeted hire measures to ensure that these public
investments would benefit the residents of color most vulnerable to gentrification and displacement pressures.

Though the current investment in transportation in Los Angeles is the largest contemporary public infrastructure project in the United States, L.A. is not alone in this move toward funding public transit and facilitating the TOD that follows. Between 1998 and 2008, 175 new public transit rail lines were developed nationwide, many funded in part with federal financing through the New Starts Program (Belzer and Poticha 2009). Following the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 2009, 78 cities began plans on new light-rail public transit projects (Fitzgerald et al. 2010). There has also been an increase in local funding and mandating the development of transit infrastructure projects by ballot initiative, which L.A. has continued to drive through the passage of Measure R in 2008 and Measure M in 2016, an election year that set the record for infrastructure ballot initiatives across the country. Still, as the largest contemporary public infrastructure investment in the country and in a city with dense organizing infrastructure, the growth machine shifts to TOD and organizing successes in incorporating equitable development provisions in TOD, hold lessons for other cities making these investments in public transit infrastructure.

L.A. residents and organizers have long recognized that transit investment and TOD planning and development could lead to increased gentrification and displacement pressures (e.g. Avila-Hernandez 2006). Despite increased investment in public transit, including through the sales tax increases from Measure R in 2008 and Measure M in 2016, the latter of which extended the half-cent sales tax from Measure R and is projected to result in over $150 billion projected for public investment in transportation
infrastructure, public transit ridership has decreased. The mechanism behind this ridership decrease is the displacement of core public transit riders who are majority extremely low-income residents of color who do not own cars, and their replacement by households that are more likely to own cars (Dominie 2012).

Low-income residents are pushed out farther from transit where they may need to purchase cars or carpool. Meanwhile, the new residents in TOD areas may take transit more than they did previously, but less than the previous transit-dependent residents did. In L.A. neighborhoods that experienced gentrification within a half-mile radius of a public transit stop, the percentage of extremely low-income households decreased, rates of driving increased, and overall regional vehicle miles traveled also increased (Dominie 2012; Chatman et al. 2016). Simply densifying housing near public transit does not lead to lower rates of driving and higher rates of transit ridership, as proximity to transit does not predict car-ownership (Chatman 2013). However, parking availability and being extremely low-income do predict lower rates of car ownership (Chatman 2013), which points to the opportunity SEACA and Public Counsel found in tying the opportunity for developers to reduce expensive parking requirements to housing affordability, so that transit-dependent residents could remain in their neighborhoods. Lack of access to transit is associated with unemployment and public transit access is key to addressing racialized jobs-housing mismatch and Black unemployment (Covington 2018). Therefore, residential displacement of transit-dependent low-income residents of color undermines not only environmental goals by leading to increases in regional vehicle miles traveled (VMT), but also undermines job access and equity goals as residents of color are less able to access employment.
Residents in neighborhoods experiencing transit-oriented gentrification and displacement pressures also reported decreases in bus service in areas where light rail transit had been introduced (Stepick 2014). Residents reported that unlike the buses, which had been cut, the new light rail did not take them where they needed to go (ibid.). This is particularly concerning as L.A. Metro has the largest bus ridership share of any public transit system in the country (L.A. Metro 2015) and the median household income of bus riders in L.A. is around $15,000 (ibid.), making these residents particularly vulnerable to rent burdens and residential displacement. In 2016, when ACT-LA’s equitable development policy was on the ballot in L.A. as well as an extension of the transportation infrastructure sales tax measure, the city was the most unaffordable city in the U.S., with 60% of households paying over 30% of their incomes on housing. Meanwhile, 60% of new private development was being constructed within a half-mile radius of transit stops, but only 2% of it included affordability provisions.

Rent burdens and displacement pressures are compounded by falling wages and rising unemployment. L.A. consistently ranks in the top three most rent burdened cities, and has the highest proportion of renters of any large U.S. city (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2017, 2018, 2019; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 2019). While rents near transit stops and across the city have risen, real wages have fallen, particularly for Black and Latinx workers. Unemployment for Black workers specifically was 17% in 2016, a rate nearly twice that for white workers (American Community Survey 2015).

To address these disparities, the L.A. Black Worker Center (LABWC) organized and advocated for the Construction Careers Policy, which they won in 2012. The
LABWC developed the first master project labor agreement (PLA) approved by a regional transportation agency. It includes requirements that 40% of workers on transit construction projects live in high poverty zip codes, 10% are disadvantaged workers, and 20% are apprentices. The first transit line this policy applied to was the Crenshaw/LAX line, which was constructed in a neighborhood with a population of 66% Black residents and whose residents have a median income that is 35% lower than the city average. The Crenshaw/LAX line construction achieved the 40% high poverty, 10% disadvantaged workers, and a 20% target for apprentices, and also included hiring 25% Black workers and 5% women workers. The LABWC celebrated this victory, but maintained that they would continue to organize so that this became the new baseline for construction across the city and not an outlier. These hiring requirements only applied to the construction of the transit lines themselves, and not to the TOD construction around the transit lines. To ACT-LA, this represented a victory and potential model for hiring language as well as a loss from all the TOD that was already constructed or in process. To build in similarly strong hiring language in an equitable TOD policy ACT-LA saw a need to partner with organized labor.

Scholars highlight the ascendancy of labor organizing in L.A. (Davis 1990), Milkman 2006), after an early history of labor union busting and growth machine and state violence against unions. Much of this focus on labor organizing emphasizes innovative service sector union organizing of low-wage immigrant workers (ibid). However, it has also entailed a strengthening of building trades unions, which form a key component of the traditional growth coalition (Logan and Molotch 1987), and who have also advocated for investment in “green” construction (Matsuoka and Gottlieb
As building trades unions and grassroots organizations have often found themselves in opposition regarding urban development projects, this dissertation lends insight into how these groups navigate these tensions and how TOD politics bring together unexpected partners.

Prior to forming the labor-community coalition Build Better L.A. (BBLA), ACT-LA was already a cross-sector, multi-issue coalition. The coalition consisted of anti-displacement community-based organizations, affordable housing advocacy organizations and community development corporations, worker centers, environmental justice organizations, transit justice organizations, and policy and legal advocacy organizations. By the time organized labor approached the coalition, ACT-LA had conducted a multi-year, grassroots and grasstops, participatory policy development process to develop an anti-displacement equitable TOD policy. The decision whether or not to join representatives of organized labor and form the BBLA coalition represented an opportunity to bypass the long, frustrating City Hall legislative policy process, which had yielded relatively few results after the CASP campaign victory, and to include the ACT-LA equitable TOD policy in a ballot initiative.

Still, due to the fraught relationship with some segments of organized labor, and the shift from ACT-LA’s extremely participatory policy development process, the decision of whether or not to join organized labor in coalition was an extremely tense one. In chapter three I detail how this coalition formation was facilitated by a radical flank effect from slow growth movement mobilization and the recognition of the need to share complementary resources, including institutional and grassroots authenticity. Though the slow growth movement is generally conceptualized as the primary
countermovement in response to the traditional growth machine, it is not often analyzed in relation to multiple countermovements or as a radical movement. However, in the context of urban development, slow or no-growth advocates can present a radical threat to the growth machine, opening growth coalition members to new ideas and approaches. Ultimately ACT-LA members voted to join organized labor and form BBLA with the understanding that they would push the labor-community coalition to ensure the anti-displacement policy components and deeply inclusive hiring standards were included in a BBLA equitable development policy. ACT-LA also made the decision to join with the clear commitment to continue to participate in other anti-displacement efforts and coalitions.

This citywide cross-sector coalition formation runs counter to many of the warnings about fragmentation in L.A. and city trenches (Katznelson 1981) more broadly. Los Angeles is commonly analyzed as a postmodern global city produced and reproduced by fragmentation (Hunter 2014) and organized elite interests (Davis 1990). Scholars of Los Angeles urban development highlight geographic, racial, economic, and political fragmentation that underscores and exacerbates extreme economic and political polarization (Davis 2000, Dear and Flusty 1998, Fogelson 1967, Hunter 2014, Mollenkopf and Sonenshein 2013, Pincetl 1999a, Purcell 2000). Scholars of L.A. have also expressed a mounting concern with how political fragmentation shapes planning and land use, leading to encroachment on wildlands and increased environmental hazards, particularly for low-income residents of color (Dear and Flusty 1998, Pincetl 1999b, Wolch et al. 2002, Pulido 2006). While this ecological orientation largely focuses on environmentalists, scholars also maintain that the racial, class, national origin, and
political fragmentation in L.A. generally forestalls coordinated, scaleable, multiracial progressive organizing (Pincetl 1999b; Wolch, Pincetl, and Pulido 2002).

This contention that fragmentation prevents scalable coalition organizing echoes the concern in the literature on urban governance about the city trenches and issue siloes that fragment coordinated policy advocacy (Katznelson 1981). Katznelson (1981) asserts that city trenches in the U.S. separate issues and organizing along three lines: the workplace, political parties, and residential neighborhoods, impeding class solidarity and organizing across these lines and issue areas. However, these literatures, on city trenches and on fragmentation in L.A. do not explain how a citywide, cross-sector, multiracial and multiethnic coalition of urban organizations like ACT-LA could succeed in putting forward a coordinated, citywide policy and vision for equitable development.

Data and Methods

I first examine secondary data of the history of development and planning in L.A. and compare that to contemporary growth machine configurations and politics. The contemporary data comes from multi-sited ethnography in various overlapping planning and land use political fields and coalitions in L.A. from 2011-2017. This includes extensive participant observation with ACT-LA, from the founding of the coalition in 2011, through its successful campaign to pass Measure JJJ/"Build Better LA" as a city ballot initiative in the November 2016 election, and its implementation efforts that followed.11 Throughout this process I worked at various points as an organizer, applied

11 My initial fieldwork in 2011 was funded by the Dartmouth College Postgraduate Project Fellowship. Subsequent fieldwork was supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF)
researcher and research coordinator, facilitator, and volunteer notetaker with the coalition. I took extensive field notes, which I shared with the coalition, and I conducted in-situ interviews with staff and member participants.

My long-term connection and commitment to the coalition’s work facilitated access and trust, though coalition members were concerned that I not write about their campaign strategy before they had won the campaign. In each meeting and with each new coalition member in attendance, participants indulged me in delivering an extended introduction, including disclosures of my research goals and my commitment to keep information about their coalition strategy confidential until after campaign completion. I therefore made sure to keep my field notes internal to the coalition membership through 2016. As part of my participant observation I conducted applied quantitative and spatial analysis and accompanied the coalition to various delegations where they referenced this research in combination with members’ testimonies.

In parallel to this participation, I conducted participant observation with overlapping coalitions, including Move LA, Investing in Place, Renters Day LA, and Green LA, as well as ethnographic observations at other organizations and professional associations including meetings of the Urban Land Institute, the American Planning Association, the Los Angeles Business Council, UCLA Anderson School of Management, and the UCLA Lewis Center Downtown Los Angeles Forum on Transportation, Land Use, and the Environment. I attended over 50 local government meetings and hearings on relevant housing, transportation, planning, and equity

Graduate Research Fellowship, the UCLA Sustainable L.A. Grand Challenge Policy Fellowship, and the UCLA Graduate Dean’s Scholar Award.
policies, including at L.A. City Council, L.A. Planning Commission, Metro Board, L.A. County Board of Supervisors, and the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG). I also participated as a researcher in the applied research for a Health Impact Assessment (HIA) with the L.A. Department of Public Health of the Build Better L.A./Measure JJJ policy, conducting secondary data analysis, participant observation, stakeholder interviews, and focus groups. I used audio recordings only at a couple of public meetings and used a recording device only at a couple of interviews for the HIA with permission, but my typing speed allowed me to capture most exchanges nearly verbatim, and, in the case of coalition meeting notes, I always shared and checked my notes with meeting participants to ensure accuracy. In addition to my own field notes, I include analysis of official documents, reports, news articles, public social media accounts and websites, and mailing materials, such as those used preceding the November 2016 election.

Overview

This dissertation is organized around three central arguments and the literatures and the data they bring together to address the broad conceptual questions: How do urban development politics shift in response to multiple countermovements? How does this help us better understand how residents of color form cross-sector coalitions to bridge city trenches? In chapter two, I analyze historical processes and more recent ethnographic data to examine how the L.A. growth machine has adapted to different periods of racial capitalism. I highlight how the growth machine promotes and implements different forms of racial dispossession to facilitate intensified land use for profit and how residents and community groups have resisted these practices. In
chapter three I analyze ethnographic data to explain how a credible threat of a radical flank effect led to the formation of a labor-community coalition. I reveal that, rather than leading to compromise, the persisting tensions between the labor and community partners led to policy innovation. In chapter four I analyze how this case reveals multiple countermovements. I discuss how these countermovements include, but also move beyond the NIMBY-YIMBY binary to put forward the alternative urban development logic of equitable development. I conclude in chapter 5 by discussing how the equitable development groups are attempting to leverage their new legitimacy to organize and advocate around strategies that will continue to challenge local growth machine politics in the contemporary context of global financialization of the housing market.

Chapter 2

How The L.A. Growth Machine Shifts and Adapts in Different Periods of Racial Capitalism

Introduction: A History of Displacement

“It’s just like how we talked about this before, with Chavez Ravine and the freeways. The government doesn’t care about us, about poor communities of color—except when they think they can make money off of us,” Luz states in Spanish and I translate into English via a headset for members of ally organizations who do not speak Spanish, as she gestures to the photos on the wall depicting the forceful displacement
of residents from Chavez Ravine. We see other residents nod their heads in agreement as they look around the room at the ‘gallery walk’ depicting images of displacement and resistance in neighborhoods of color in Los Angeles, including images of the freeways cutting through Boyle Heights and East L.A., the demolition of the Bunker Hill community to make way for downtown development, and HOPE VI demolition of ‘The Flats,’ the public housing projects in Boyle Heights that had been the largest public housing project West of the Mississippi, and more.

The images of the violent Chavez Ravine displacement next to images of Dodgers Stadium, which stands there now, appear to capture the attention of most of the participants. Luz continues, “This is why we have to come together. Because even there they tried to resist but it wasn’t enough. And I know we all love the Dodgers, but now no one talks about that. We just go to games, but this could happen here. We have to make it so they can’t ignore us and pretend this never happens.” In this organizing meeting, residents connected historical and contemporary displacement and racial dispossession and noted that this history is often ignored by those in power. Luz emphasized that they needed to build their own narrative—a counter-hegemonic narrative (Hunter 2013)—acknowledging this omission of violent racial dispossession.

To better understand how low-income residents resist and contest direct and indirect displacement that is driven by a new era of TOD and planning, in this chapter I first analyze how various formulations of the L.A. growth machine over time have used transportation and housing planning and development to accumulate capital through racial dispossession. In contrast to the colorblind collective politics of amnesia of contemporary city boosters who assert that L.A.’s contemporary investment in
transportation infrastructure is unique and unprecedented, housing and transportation planning and development have been connected in L.A. since early days of colonization. Early L.A. real estate developers built transit lines to connect their housing developments. Still, this link has gained renewed importance in the contemporary era of TOD.

A significant image of Los Angeles is of a sprawling megalopolis, dominated by freeways and single-family homes in racially segregated neighborhoods rife with tensions and violence. However, L.A.’s public transit development is the largest contemporary public infrastructure project in the country, rebuilding L.A. by reshaping transportation and land use with an emphasis on denser TOD. The city is also home to dense networks of social movement organizing, many of which focus on the built environment and racial justice. This public transit rebuild is hotly contested, with multiple interests contending over the impacts and best strategies to maintain a mythical past of bucolic single family neighborhoods vs. to combat housing shortages, racial inequities, and displacement resulting from this large scale investment in historically disinvested neighborhoods. These concerns are not unique to L.A., but as the prototypical example of both sprawl and the traditional growth machine, L.A. provides a strategic research site to examine the transformation of the growth machine through different eras of racial capitalism. However, less scholarly attention has been paid to how the L.A. growth machine has reformulated itself in more recent years around this housing-transportation nexus and how this reformulation compares to earlier L.A. growth coalition practices.

The growth machine is predicated on uneven development, racial dispossession, and displacement. While housing and transit have always been linked in urban
development in L.A., the growth machine literature does not fully address how racial dispossession has been driven by housing and transit development. It also do not explain how L.A. has transformed from an explicitly white supremacist growth regime to a colorblind one focused on ostensibly environmentally-friendly TOD. Finally, it does not fully address how the growth coalition responded to resistance.

To address these gaps I analyze the various formulations of the growth machine, focusing on how transportation and housing planning and development have driven racial capitalism and racial dispossession in different eras of L.A. development. I bring together theories on racial capitalism and the growth machine to answer the following research questions: What are the mechanisms of accumulation through racial dispossession that the L.A. growth machine has deployed through its development of and policy advocacy for transportation and housing? Who are the changing actors, and what are the changing claims, and practices of the L.A. growth machine? How have they responded to resistance and what forces have prompted shifts in growth machine practices?

In this chapter I build on analyses of racism that explain how practices of institutional racism have adapted to shifting norms over time to maintain white supremacy. I argue that the scholarly declarations of the death (Fulton 1997) and loss of hegemony (Purcell 2000) of the L.A. growth machine were premature, though the slow growth movement did prompt shifts in the growth machine’s practices. Instead, I argue that the L.A. growth machine has adapted to incorporate some of the frames and claims of its opposition through emphasizing the sustainability of TOD. I analyze how the growth machine in L.A. has not died as some have claimed (Fulton 1997), but instead,
has adapted to the increased influence of environmentalists and other slow growth advocates to incorporate greenwashed environmentalist frames focusing on smart growth TOD.

This revamped ‘smart growth’ machine originally did not include anti-displacement or other social equity provisions and therefore undermined sustainability goals, as extremely low-income core transit riders were displaced and replaced by residents more likely to own cars (Dominie 2012, Chatman et al. 2017). This reformulation of the growth machine maintains the growth coalition’s imperative to intensify land use for profit, which continues to perpetuate racialized patterns of displacement and dispossession. In turn, contemporary grassroots resistance to this racialized displacement has prompted the growth coalition to selectively adopt equity as a frame, while leaving its definition flexible enough to still allow for intensification of urban development. Further, this resistance has not been just reactionary, but is rooted in proactive, asset-based community-organizing that uplifts Black, Latinx, and immigrant placemaking, advancing the idea that the United Neighbors In Defense Against Displacement (UNIDAD) espouses of “better neighborhoods, same neighbors,” (Donlin 2015).

I trace the changing composition, claims, and outcomes of the L.A. growth machine, key pivotal events that shaped racialized land use, and the resistance movements that have prompted these shifts. Far from discrete time periods with clear start and end dates, I draw rough lines around different eras and focus on critical junctures and policies and practices within each, while examining the messy, blurry transitions between them. I argue that urban development in the U.S. is always already
a racialized political economic process based on racial dispossession, in which growth coalition actors create and extract capital by dispossessing Black, Latinx, and other racialized and other racialized immigrant Angelenos. In response to shifting political fields and resistance, growth coalition members, claims, and practices are in flux and adapt over time.

In each roughly delineated time period from colonization of the area that would become L.A. and the joint development of housing and transit to contemporary TOD politics, I examine three connected areas of analysis: how housing and transit development are linked in racialized growth machine politics, the forms of racial dispossession used to advance these developments, and how the growth machine responded to resistance. These three areas shift over time and start with explicit white supremacy, direct displacement through settler colonialism and exclusionary displacement through racially restrictive covenants and racially discriminatory real estate practices and mobilization, and violent repression by private business interests leading the growth coalition in early L.A. This is followed in roughly mid-century L.A. by paternalistic racism, direct displacement through urban renewal and freeway development as well as politics of abandonment and exclusionary displacement leading to growing racialized rent gaps, and violent repression of uprisings. An intervening transition period follows, in which the racially coded slow growth movement destabilizes the growth machine while global capital shifts and increased financialization of housing market debts focuses growth machine activity in particular neighborhoods. Local growth coalition actors, with their practices of uneven development and creation of rent gaps and interests in attracting capital, have facilitated financialization of real estate, though
much of the profit is now reaped by non-local corporate actors. In this chapter the final period I analyze is the more contemporary TOD era through the 2000s, characterized by colorblind racism, direct displacement via public transit infrastructure development and indirect and exclusionary displacement via gentrification, and incorporation and cooptation of resistance in the more contemporary period.

Racial Capitalism and Dispossession in the Context of Urban Development

“Capital can only be capital when it is accumulating, and it can only accumulate by producing and moving through relations of severe inequality among human groups—capitalists with the means of production/workers without the means of subsistence, creditors/debtors, conquerors of land made property/the dispossessed and removed…. These antinomies of accumulation require loss, disposability, and the unequal differentiation of human value, and racism enshrines the inequalities that capitalism requires” (Melamed 2015, 77).

Though not as central to the canon as many argue it should be (Kelley 2017; Pulido 2016; Ranganathan 2016), Cedric Robinson’s (1983) treatise on racial capitalism reveals that racism is and always has been integral to capitalism. In the context of land use, racial capitalism partitions groups, rendering some city residents as disposable and their neighborhoods as racially devalued places (Pulido 2016, 8; Ranganathan 2016, 81; Hunter 2013). Though mainstream white discourse portrays dysfunction in Black and Latinx neighborhoods, Du Bois (1899) revealed that challenges and problems residents in these neighborhoods face are symptoms of larger structures.
This devaluation and dispossession maintains inequalities that facilitate capital’s need for ongoing accumulation through the state-finance-racial violence nexus (Melamed 2015, 78). This nexus adds the mechanism of racial violence to David Harvey’s (2010) state-finance nexus, which argues that the governance is simultaneously political and economic, particularly as state governance is increasingly financialized. This is clear in Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s (2002) definition of “racial capitalism as a technology of antirelationality (a technology for reducing collective life to the relations that sustain neoliberal democratic capitalism).” Recently, Jackie Wang (2018) has named this phenomenon “racialized accumulation by dispossession,” describing the racialized expropriation of land and capital through predatory speculation and debt incumbency. This phenomenon is not unique to L.A., particularly considering that L.A. is part of the West South, where Black experiences resemble those in the Deep South (Hunter and Robinson 2018).

Within the contemporary context of neoliberalism and increasing financialization of housing debts and assets as tradable commodities, racial violence and dispossession are perpetuated through the ostensibly color blind actions of the state and capital. These actions are removed from the social utility of assets like housing. Analyzing “the formerly hidden Whiteness” (Seamster 2015, 1056) of urban political regimes reveals both how those in power justify white accumulation and how race and capital structure politics in ways that both constrain and facilitate mobilization (McGovern 2019).

Though the growth machine literature largely does not directly address racial capitalism, urban development provides a compelling lens through which to examine how accumulation through racial dispossession is embedded in urban governance.
Historic disinvestment is key to my analysis, as it prevents low-income neighborhoods of color from accumulating wealth and underpins the uneven development that creates rent gaps (Smith 1979), leaving residents more vulnerable to displacement and further racial dispossession. Landlords, speculative investors, and their growth coalition partners facilitate accumulation through racial dispossession by identifying and exploiting the gap between rents actually collected in disinvested neighborhoods of color and the rents that could be collected if the land were put to more profitable uses by investing in amenities intended to attract capital that will not benefit low-income residents of color.

Racial segregation and the accompanying disinvestment through the politics of abandonment (Pulido 2016) and the marking of neighborhoods of color as blighted and therefore in need of demolition and renewal (Acuña 1984, Hyra 2017, Weinstein 1996) are mechanisms of racial dispossession. However, superficial diversity through gentrification is not a solution (Hyra 2017), as it perpetuates racial dispossession through direct, indirect, and exclusionary displacement (Marcuse 1985). Direct displacement is the pushing out of residents through a variety of formal and informal and physical and economic mechanisms (ibid.), such as through publicly sanctioned eviction through eminent domain or real or alleged infractions, landlord or neighborhood pressure, coercion, or violence, neglect, or raised costs. Indirect displacement includes exclusionary displacement, in which residents no longer feel welcome in their neighborhoods, and where changes to the neighborhood and units mean that they or residents with similar racial and economic characteristics would be unable to move in (ibid.). These forms of displacement are mechanisms of accumulation through racial
dispossession, as landlords and other members of the growth machine create surplus value through racialized uneven development.

Indeed, the fictitious commodities of land, labor, and money are the basis both of capitalism (Polanyi 1944) and of race (Wolfe 2001), as racialization is related to institutionalized coercion and methods for surplus value extraction (Singh 2017). Thus, racialization is inextricably tied to the creation and exploitation of surplus value in land use. However, racial capitalism is widely analyzed in terms of labor (e.g. Singh 2017), but this lens has not been applied as such to growth machine politics and practices. An exception is Pulido’s (2016) analysis of Flint’s infrastructure as a racialized politics of abandonment rooted in racial capitalism (Pulido 2016). Further, while this literature does not often center residents of color or portrays them as reactionary, Hunter (2013) reveals that in city politics, Black residents are active placemaking agents.

Though its focus is primarily on the shared interests of the state and capital, growth machine theory goes partway towards explaining how various actors that share an interest in intensified land use drive planning, policy, and development and create and maintain the conditions of uneven development and, therefore, the potential for capital accumulation through racial dispossession. Still, the growth machine literature does not directly address mechanisms by which L.A. growth coalition actors in different periods of time have created and exploited surplus value in land use through racialized practices of disinvestment and dispossession. This dissertation addresses that gap.

Further, the analysis in this dissertation begins with an historical analysis because, as Pulido (2016) notes, “any analysis of racial capitalism requires attention to the past and how wealth, power, and poverty have historically been created.”
Gaps in Growth Machine Theory

Growth machine theory does not adequately explain how growth coalitions adapt and change over time, deflecting, absorbing, or fracturing in response to resistance and structural change. Fulton (1997) asserts that slow growth resistance effectively killed the L.A. growth machine, while others counter that development in L.A. reached its natural geographic limits (Dear 1996), or that it lost its political consensus (Pincetl 1999, Purcell 2000, Deener et al. 2013). Light (2006) argues that arguments about this decline ignore the transformation of L.A.’s demographics and political economy, as ethnic place entrepreneurs developed parallel growth coalitions driven by people of color. Further, growth machine theory stresses horizontal, sprawling growth that encroaches on natural lands (Dear 1996), but does not fully explain a shift to vertical intensification of land use. From the literature it is not fully clear how and why growth coalitions transform and adapt, how they are racialized beyond the participation of ethnic place entrepreneurs, and what the emerging ideology, claims, practices, and actors in different periods of racial capitalism are.

Growth machine theory helps us to understand the structural economic interests in local urban development. A major shortcoming of this literature, however, is that it does not adequately explain how non-elite actors that support equitable growth successfully challenge elites or incorporate their priorities into the growth machine. This is made all the more difficult as growth machine theory situates community residents and environmentalists as peripheral and generally oppositional to intensifying land use through development, even though empirical studies have shown this is not always the case (e.g. Pincetl 1992, Pattillo 2007). Molotch (1993) contrasts the established social
connections, cultural capital and professionalism of growth coalition members with the self-righteousness and disorganization of residents and community groups advocating for growth controls (ibid., 34). However, scholars have demonstrated that nontraditional growth coalition members actively shape city development and neighborhood change (e.g. Pattillo 2007, Pincetl 1992, Hunter 2013), though in some instances their participation may follow similar strategies to traditional urban regime members (Pincetl 2003) as growth coalition members “set the regulatory stage” (Pincetl 1999b, 209).

Pincetl (2003) reveals how environmental nonprofits are active agents in shaping land use, having “effectively become partners in the local urban regime and in local governance arrangements” (ibid., 981). She describes how such organizations replicate urban regime strategies by facilitating public-private partnerships that leverage public funds under circumstances of fiscal constraint due to California’s Propositions 13 and 218 (ibid.). This is a significant intervention in the growth machine literature that otherwise largely neglects how groups like environmentalist nonprofits may take a central role in land use politics as facilitators and conveners of coalitions. Still, it is an open question as to how environmentalist or simply “greenwashed” (Delmas and Burbano 2011) speculative development practices, TOD, and smart growth are, as a growth coalition response to the increasing influence of environmentalists and other slow growth advocates. The literature on “greenwashing” focuses on how corporations respond to external regulatory, environmentalist, and consumer pressures (ibid.) by selectively disclosing of environmentally beneficial or benign practices, while obscuring their overall performance (Marquis et al. 2015).
Further, the literature does not fully explain the role of private equity in further destabilizing the social utility of housing increased from the 1990s onward, with local and national governments facilitating their participation in growth machine efforts to intensify the commodification of housing (Rolnik 2013). Financialization of housing increased from 1993, when the World Bank published its report, _Housing: Making Markets Work_, detailing how governments could facilitate private equity investment in the market (Rolnik 2013). This, along with finance deregulation in 1999,\(^1\) resulted in dramatic increases in investment and trading in housing debts, with mortgage markets rising to more than half of GDP (Schwartz and Seabrook 2009). This financialization permeated throughout the housing industry, including an increase in financial sector control over the construction market (Rolnik 2013).

The 2008 financial collapse originated in the financialization of the housing market and practices of subprime mortgage trading (ibid.). Despite acknowledgement of the risks of financialization of housing, bundling and trading of housing debts has only increased since 2012, with the increased trading of rent-backed mortgages by private equity firms. While growth machine interests focus on intensification of land use and financialization interests focus on the intensification of profit, financialization of land use and housing has become a central tool of private equity and a new target for anti-displacement organizers. Though the growth machine and private equity firms engaged in the financialization of housing are distinct, particularly in their scale, this points to an

\(^{12}\) In 1999 the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act effectively repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and allowed commercial banks to offer financial services.
overlap between growth machine interests and those of private equity, as both are invested in the influx of investment in housing construction and exchange. These multiple actors and scales point to the need for a multipronged and multi-scalar strategy to combating local displacement.

Resistance to Infrastructure-Led Displacement

Residents have long organized and mobilized to resist displacement from public infrastructure projects, such as mid-twentieth century freeway developments and urban renewal (Acuña 1984, Davis 1990, Bullard 2004, Avila-Hernandez 2006). In Philadelphia’s Black Seventh Ward for instance, residents formed organizations and worked in biracial coalitions with whites to resist urban renewal and freeway development (Hunter 2013). Similarly, in Washington, D.C. a biracial coalition successfully resisted the construction of a highway system. San Francisco residents organized a freeway revolt, successfully prevented freeway construction through downtown (Carlsson 2009). In California, grassroots groups mobilized to resist the massive displacement caused by freeway development in the 1940s and 1960s. This displacement included the cutting up of the L.A. immigrant gateway neighborhood of Boyle Heights that resulted in the direct displacement of 10% of the neighborhood’s residents and originally did not include a single entrance or exit for residents to access the new infrastructure (Acuña 1984). But the highway commission was a powerful participant in the growth coalition and largely succeeded in overcoming this resistance to build freeways and make transportation narrowly focused on automobiles (Pincetl 1999a), though notable exceptions include the resistance to the 710 freeway extension, both historically and more contemporarily (Segal 2015), and its expansion that would
displace residences in Southeast L.A. to accommodate more goods movement traffic (Roosevelt 2009).

This legacy of transportation infrastructure projects leading to displacement of low-income people of color and the disruption of their neighborhoods to benefit other interests influences how neighborhood residents and organizations view public infrastructure developments (Avila-Hernandez 2006). In the mid-twentieth century, the interests of low-income residents of color were similarly excluded in urban renewal, which was predicated on displacement (Fullilove 2004). Concerns about slum housing conditions and the lack of adequate affordable housing that ostensibly drove urban renewal were replaced with programs to subsidize the construction of single-family homes (Pincetl 1999a). TOD and smart growth represent a response, in part, to the adverse outcomes of the dominance of the single family home and the dominance of the automobile.

The political process of contesting and shaping TOD investments is understudied. As large-scale public infrastructure projects, in large part driven by top-down, rationalized planning processes ostensibly for the greater good of the region, public transit development and associated TOD has some similarities to freeway development and urban renewal. As the proposal to build the Crosstown Expressway through Philadelphia’s Black Seventh Ward led to “massive disinvestment and abandonment” across the neighborhood despite the fact that the freeway was never actually constructed (Hunter 2013, 115-116), proposals and planning for rail public transit are associated with an increase in home values and gentrification pressures well before the transit is ever built (Immergluck 2009). However, urban renewal resulted in
neighborhoods of color being marked as targets for government intervention and therefore discouraged community-based and private investment in redevelopment (Hunter 2013, 118).

Displacement and Cognitive Models in Urban Planning

Despite grassroots resistance, freeway developments and urban renewal were implemented largely in top-down processes. Specific urban planning models and visions, such as those of Robert Moses, motivated these state-driven redevelopment projects and resulted in mass displacement. More recently, Anthony Foxx, the U.S. Transportation Secretary under Obama, expressed that the nation would be better off if urban planning had not followed Robert Moses’ models of freeway expansion and modernist developments and instead followed the models of urban walkability central to smart growth (Halsey 2016).

Though urban planners nearly universally lambaste urban sprawl (Clark 2018), sprawling development is also the outcome of intentional, coordinated planning and policy (Basmajian 2013). However, the considerable negative externalities of sprawl have led to a growing consensus since the 1990s with urban planners arguing for smart growth as a response to sprawl (Clark 2018). This tension between massive public infrastructure projects, planned sprawl with its negative externalities, and urban walkability reveals the power of ideologies and models for urban planning over time. Urban planning more broadly has been critiqued as a professional field for using models based on specific theories of ideal development that are not necessarily appropriate for specific neighborhoods (Schweitzer 2012). Critics further point out that urbanist
planning models often do not prioritize or even consider social equity (ibid., Butler 2019).

The power of cognitive models for urban planning and redevelopment can be seen in the case of the Pruitt-Igoe myth, which was built from a misconception that the demise of the St. Louis Pruitt-Igoe public housing complex was due to the demographics of the residents, rather than modernist architecture and lack of repairs (Friedrichs and Friedrichs 2011) or institutional and structural racism and inequalities (Bristol 1991). The myth that demographics were to blame justified subsequent demolitions of public housing projects (ibid.). This reveals the importance of studying racialized cognitive models and frames used in urban planning and politics, as they have material consequences in the development and displacement outcomes particularly in low-income neighborhoods of color.

Analysis: Transit and Housing in Los Angeles: A History of Racial Dispossession

Early L.A.: Settler Colonialist Growth Machine Manufactures a “Southwestern Outpost of White Supremacy”13

Los Angeles’ early history of racial dispossession is based on explicitly white supremacist land use policy and practice, with its roots in settler colonialism. Though long occupied by indigenous communities, including the Tongva, Chumash, and Tataviam, Spanish colonizers declared the area that would become L.A. to be Spanish territory as a part of Alta California in 1781. These colonizers established the mission

13 Avila (2006)
system, linking housing and transit via mission colonial settlements along *El Camino Real* (Survey LA 2016). During this period, colonizers dispossessed native populations of land and resources, exploiting their labor to produce agricultural surplus, and using authoritarian religious rule in the missions to attempt to forcibly convert indigenous peoples to Catholicism and create loyal subjects. About a third of the indigenous population is estimated to have died through their forced labor and exploitation of the colonial mission system (McWilliams 1946).

*Alta California* became officially Mexican territory in 1822 when news of the Mexican War of Independence reached the area. The Mexican era was characterized by instability, with contention over whether to maintain authoritarian religious rule and a mercantilist economy vs. establishing a secular society with free trade (Survey LA 2016). This instability extended to governance. Between 1822 and 1846 the region had twelve governors and fifteen administrators (Harlow 1948). However, large landowning *Californios* of Spanish or Mexican descent assumed powerful local control over racialized field workers (Torres-Rouf 2013). Los Angeles became increasingly important to *Californios* as a regional commercial hub, and the Mexican government declared it the first city in *Alta California* in 1835 and then as the territorial capital (Fogelson 1967). During the Mexican era, Mexican and local officials and landowners secularized the missions and replaced them with privately owned ranchos as the primary political economic form of social organization. This reflected a broader shift towards privatization. While Spanish colonizers had been reluctant to grant private land, with only twelve rancho tracts being established in Southern California during the Spanish era, forty-three were granted in the Mexican era (Fogelson 1967).
The shift toward privatization and free trade also resulted in a shift in attitudes towards facilitating trade with Anglos, and ultimately granting them land (ibid.), and in the last battle of the Mexican War of California, to United States forces occupying Los Angeles. Though land grants were ostensibly respected in writing, they frequently passed into American ownership, with the land patterns remaining intact while previous owners were dispossessed (Pincetl 1999a). The Pacific Railway Acts of 1862 and 1864 linked housing and transportation development and facilitated the privatization of land as rights to public land along the rail line was granted to railroads (ibid.). The Homestead Law in 1862 allowed the relatively small amount of remaining land be granted to individuals. Still, land was largely privately owned and concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number, including the Southern Pacific Railroad and other members of the early L.A. growth coalition, such as the Chandler family of the L.A. Times and the Title Insurance & Trust Company of Los Angeles (ibid.).

The large-scale dispossession of indigenous peoples in the area accelerated through the 1800s, through Spanish colonization and the Mexican era. This dispossession was shortly followed by explicitly genocidal extermination campaigns in the gold rush era (Gutiérrez Nájera and Maldonado 2017), with U.S. cavalry exterminating 15,000 indigenous inhabitants from 1848 to 1865 (Pincetl 1999a). White settler colonialists in early L.A. exterminated, dispossessed, and discursively erased Native Californians in their explicit effort to establish a “southwestern outpost of white supremacy” (Avila 2006) and to exploit the vast Southern California oil reserves discovered in the 1890s (Jackson 1985). The legacy of this material dispossession persists in contemporary discursive erasure of Native Californians. Contemporary U.S.
multiculturalism, in concert with manifest destiny and historical erasure continue to render invisible Native Californian populations, including Tongva, Chumash, and Tataviam, even while celebrating Oaxacan and other indigenous migrants to region (ibid.).

The ads and cultural products manufactured to sell L.A. to white migrants, such as the national best selling novel Ramona that was featured prominently in the L.A. Times, emphasized a Spanish colonial past and erased Mexican and indigenous inhabitants as well as migrants of color (Jones 2009). White colonizers fled ethnically diverse neighborhoods in the Northeast and Midwest, drawn by L.A. land barons’ promises of bucolic, exclusively white neighborhoods, which growth coalition city boosters pitted against an image of immigrant squalor and labor unrest in the crowded cities of the Midwest and Northeast. These ads specifically targeted native-born whites and they emphasized low-density suburban morphology in contrast to crowded tenement dwelling (Light 2006, 130).

Once migrants arrived in L.A., they encountered racism that was reinforced by growth coalition members including homeowner associations and the L.A. Times. In 1908 in Pico Heights, a neighborhood west of the original L.A. city boundary of Hoover Street, an informal group of local residents purchased a property to prevent Harry Stricklen, a Black philanthropist, from constructing a home for elderly Black residents. The L.A. Times reported “Pico Heights residents may breathe easier. Hillard Stricklen … says he won’t start up his home for aged colored people … out of consideration for the feelings of citizens who feel squeamish over the thought of having black-skinned neighbors” (Peterson 2017). By 1919 white residents in Pico Heights mobilized the Los
Angeles County Anti-Asiatic Society, forming the Electric Home Protective Association and mobilizing grassroots racism, door knocking Japanese-American households in an effort to compel them to leave (ibid.). When a Methodist Church announced plans to move to the neighborhood, locating on a streetcar line and serving Japanese residents, white residents mobilized the Protective Association and convinced the L.A. City Council to deny permits to the Church (ibid.).

White supremacy and a xenophobic reaction against Midwestern and Northeastern political models shaped how early L.A. officials structured city government. Fearing the immigrant-based political machines of the Northeast, they aimed to make city government more professionalized through a civil service system that insulated city administrators from political bosses (Pincetl 1999) and that was less responsive to local interests (Mollenkopf and Sonenshein 2013). This xenophobic reaction interacted with the larger national progressive movement towards greater transparency and democratic oversight, which spurred the formation of local planning commissions and other councils. In 1909, L.A. voters replaced the ward system that many claimed led to corruption and replaced it with an at-large structure and nonpartisan elections (Sonenshein 2004, 31). Overall, city government was characterized by political fragmentation and wholesale exclusion of ethnic minorities from the political process (Fishman 1992). City politics was primarily administrative and managerial, conferring greater power to growth coalition members to set policy, particularly around land use and development (Pincetl 1999).
Early L.A. Growth Coalition Facilitates Rapid Growth

Early 1890s L.A. politics set the foundation for tight links between growth coalition members, with businessmen playing an active role in urban policymaking through the L.A. Merchants’ Association (Pincetl 1999a). In the Progressive era the growth machine’s role was strengthened, as reforms established boards and commissions with business elites appointed to serve in governance roles (ibid.). For example, representatives from the L.A. Realty Board, the Chamber of Commerce, Fire Insurance Exchange, and business groups were appointed by the Mayor to serve as City Planning Commissioners (Weiss 1987, 93). Members of these groups, in particular the L.A. Realty Board, supported public works projects and the media campaigns to lure native-born whites and fuel growth (Weiss 1987, 79). These are examples of early, hegemonic white growth coalition actors and practices, which continued as the growth coalition facilitated the development of explicitly white supremacist garden communities, developed zoning laws and racially restrictive covenants, and facilitated redlining to promote their interests in continual speculative investment in the city they had manufactured.

L.A. had unusually aggressive speculative investors (Soja 1989, 195). These place entrepreneurs acquired the lands from which Native Californians were dispossessed cheaply and then marketed L.A. to native-born whites (Light 2006). Developers manufactured white neighborhoods by constructing single-family bungalow

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14 Property values in L.A. increased by 200% between 1865-1866, by another 500% in 1868, and then the process repeated again with the railroad boom (Jackson 1985, 121-122).
homes\textsuperscript{15} in planned developments, targeted native-born whites to migrate to their developments, and manipulated regulations, through zoning and lending restrictions, to ensure that their developments remained restricted to white residents. As a result of their actions, Los Angeles grew at a phenomenal pace, and became the most segregated city in the country by the 1960s (Fulton 1997), with native-born whites remaining the majority demographic group until the 1970s (Light 2006, 130).

Thus, early Los Angeles is characterized by racial dispossession through the direct displacement, physical and discursive erasure of Native Californians and indirect exclusionary displacement of residents of color excluded from new, exclusionary white developments, and violent repression of organized resistance that fueled rapid growth.\textsuperscript{16} This rapid growth was orchestrated by what has been considered “one of the most successful growth machines ever” (Fulton 1997, 7), which effectively highlighted the push factors of slum conditions in Northeastern and Midwestern cities (Light 2006) and pulled native-born whites toward a white fantasy, resulting in L.A. being the quintessential boom city of the 20th century (Jackson 1985).

A Growth Machine Organized Around & Driven by Public Infrastructure

The L.A. growth machine dominated city and county politics for much of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Facilitating growth and keeping pace with speculative

\textsuperscript{15} 94\% of Los Angeles homes were single-family, detached houses in 1930 (Light 2006, 179).

\textsuperscript{16} L.A.’s rapid growth was both in population and land area. In 1900 L.A. was the 36\textsuperscript{th} largest city in the U.S. with 102,000 residents and by 1960 it was the third largest city with 2.5 million residents. The land area comprising L.A. expanded from 99 square miles in 1920 to over 450 square miles by 1960 (Deener et al. 2013).
development was local government’s primary function and interest (Pincetl 1999a, 124-125). This rationale and practice centered around public infrastructure, as L.A.’s infrastructure has been tightly linked to speculative housing development since this early era. The major growth machine players tied water and transit to their developments and formed a growth coalition to ensure that they maintained infrastructure access and continued development expansion. The early L.A. growth coalition was comprised of business elites, including land developers, business organizations, and the owners of the L.A. Times, who worked with key public sector officials to guarantee public capital and bonding functions (Deener et al. 2013, 385). In concert, these growth coalition actors subsidized and facilitated access to water and transit in outlying areas, fueling expansion (Erie 2006). These early land barons imported water and native-born white residents and built an economy founded on land speculation, entertainment, and oil, moving literal mountains to do so (ibid.). Their power was particularly concentrated in the case of L.A., with fewer than 90 land barons dominant through the 1920s (ibid.). This concentration of land ownership, and resulting influence, is in part a legacy of the land consolidation during the Mexican era and early U.S. era (Pincetl 1999a).

One of the key growth coalition actors in this early era, Harry Chandler, exemplified the links between different growth coalition institutions, industries, and interests. Chandler worked delivering newspapers and through savvy and marriage became the owner of the L.A. Times, which he used to promote business interests, union busting, and the migration of native-born whites to L.A. Chandler became an aggressive real estate developer himself, succeeding in connecting Huntington’s Pacific
Electric Railway to his real estate development tracts. Huntington had also linked speculative investment and infrastructure. As the heir to a San Francisco railroad fortune, he built the L.A. Red Car system and subdivided and developed plots of land along his transit line (Fulton 1997). Chandler’s manipulation of media, politics, land use, and public investment—particularly public infrastructure and utilities—resulted in Chandler amassing a fortune of $200-500 million by the end of his life (ibid.).

This followed the pattern the L.A. growth coalition had already established years earlier to orchestrate how real estate development of L.A. could be facilitated by infrastructure development. Moses Sherman was a member of the Board of water and other growth coalition members, including Henry Huntington, Harrison Otis, and William Mulholland invested in land in the San Fernando Valley before a reliable water source to the area had been developed. City officials posed as cattle ranchers and bought up land in the Central Valley while the L.A. Times regularly covered the water crisis and endorsed a $23 million bond to pay for an aqueduct (Jones 2009). The bond measure passed in 1907 by a margin of ten to one. The growth coalition then lobbied to annex the San Fernando Valley to L.A. These dynamics are dramatized and creatively expanded upon in the film Chinatown (ibid.).

Rail and Housing Drive Early L.A. Development

Transportation infrastructure has always driven L.A.’s sprawling development (Dear 1996), with early developers linking their developments by transit (Jackson 1985). Maclay Widney and Francis P.F. Temple developed the first streetcar line in 1874, followed by other real estate developers (ibid.). In the 1880s L.A. real estate boom the population increased by 500% and the Electric Railway Homestead Association sold
tracts west of Hoover Street, which formed the city boundary between Los Angeles and this new area of Pico Heights that was annexed in 1896. The first electric railway connected these Pico Heights housing developments and the streets were originally named for public infrastructure, including Telegraph Street, Electric Street, and Telephone Street (Peterson 2017).

Most notably, Henry Huntington incorporated strings of transit lines into the Pacific Electric Railway Company and developed rail transit that spanned the region and connected his residential developments (ibid.). His interests in infrastructure, including rail and water, were subordinate to land and real estate, sometimes running infrastructure developments at a loss and remaining “more interested in selling land than streetcar tickets” (Jackson 1985, 122). This is reflected in the practices of other early L.A. growth coalition members as well, who “realized that their real business was growth itself. That is, they must invest to provide the essential infrastructure that the city lacked—water, power, a port, transportation—and then use this infrastructure to lure the new population and businesses which alone could justify the investments” (Fishman 1992, xvi).

The 1920s involved a financial crisis in privately owned and operated rail transit and the rise of the automobile, leading to road development. This expanded sprawling development beyond the rail lines, prompting fragmentation and a decline of the central downtown. By the time engineers began designing the freeway system, L.A. had already transitioned from having one of the most extensive and efficient transit systems to being the most automobile-oriented city in the world (Fulton 1997). In the Great
Depression era, this auto-dependence deepened as four major manufacturers developed plants in L.A.

Land Use Policy: How The Early L.A. Growth Machine Used Zoning to Promote Their Interests

Key members of the early L.A. growth coalition used their influence to write and shape land use policy to promote their private interests. The L.A. Realty Board lobbied to establish the country’s first citywide use-zoning law in 1908 and worked to strengthen zoning in the 1920s. The board members hired a professional city planning consultant to write new zoning law to give to the L.A. City Council (Weiss 1987). These members were divided in their vision of L.A., with some advocating the use of zoning to promote higher density, but a majority of smaller-scale developers advocating for a perpetual, sprawling development model (ibid.). No matter their vision, zoning provided a tool for developers to increase profits. The close links between developers and city government allowed for manipulation of real estate value through the use of zoning. Developers could buy a property with a less profitable zoning designation and request a zone change. Such applications occupied more than 80% of the agendas for the L.A. City Planning Commission in the 1920s (ibid.).

Several growth coalition members had vested interests in zoning large portions of L.A. exclusively for single family homes. For example, the L.A. Realty Board wanted to preserve L.A.’s image as home to bucolic, white neighborhoods and Downtown L.A. developers and businesses wanted to ensure that other areas were zoned single-family so that Downtown remained the only shopping district (Weiss 1987). Their strategies
included consolidating political power and influence and leveraging the Federal Housing Administration’s mortgage insurance program, establishing strict deed restrictions, including racially restrictive covenants, resisting annexation of small suburbs, and creating the L.A. County Regional Planning Commission to target planning outside of the jurisdiction of L.A. City land use regulation (Weiss 1987, 80). Many of these strategies, particularly those using federal investment and those that follow Progressive Era formations of regional councils and commissions are not unique to the L.A. growth machine, but highlight how local growth machines leverage funding and policy at multiple scales for their generally localized interests. In the early 1930s the L.A. growth coalition worked with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Federal Housing Administration to establish racially discriminatory redlining and encourage further suburbanization, which was reinforced by federal freeway development (Pincetl 1999a), enacting a new era of racialized uneven development.

Early Seeds of Resistance and Repression To Growth Machine Infrastructure-Driven Displacement

Growth machine responses to resistance in this early era involved direct and violent repression, largely enacted by private business elites, though with public support. Early growth coalition members, such as Harrison Gray Otis and Harry Chandler aggressively mobilized against any forms of resistance, particularly labor movement and socialist efforts. The ads and news coverage promoting white migration to L.A. also explicitly emphasized that L.A. was a union-free town (Jones 2009). Otis, head of the L.A. Times and founder of the L.A. Chamber of Commerce, focused on
culling any pro-union organizing or sentiment (ibid.). He went after employers who agreed to negotiate with unions, ensuring that they could no longer secure credit, and declared, “We will make this town union-free. You’re either with me or you’re against me” (ibid.). He called the L.A. Times building a fortress and his employees his phalanx, keeping a stash of weapons ready to suppress labor insurgents. The paper did not cover migrant labor rebellions and organized opposition to Uptown Sinclair’s bid to be a socialist Governor of California in 1934, quoting his novels out of context (ibid.).

Mid-Twentieth Century L.A.: State-Led Displacement and Racial Dispossession Through Urban Renewal and Freeway Development

Thanks in no small part to the explicitly white supremacist ideology, practices, and policies promoted by early L.A. growth coalition members, L.A. grew into the most segregated city in the U.S. by the 1960s (Fulton 1997). Racial capitalism manifested itself in land use practices during the mid-twentieth century era, roughly from the postwar years through the 1970s, through direct displacement and racial dispossession. The early L.A. growth machine adapted to its constraints. From its foundations in explicitly white dominant settler colonialism, promoting sprawl throughout the region, the L.A. growth machine began to confront the limits of sprawling development and instead leveraged historic disinvestment in neighborhoods of color. Large scale projects such as urban renewal and freeway development were mechanisms of racial dispossession and directly displaced thousands of residents of color. However, these same underlying structural mechanisms of growth machine reformulation, disinvestment and sprawl, also
prompted resistance, most visible in Watts Rebellion and then in the tax revolt and slow growth movements.

Racialized Uneven Development

The L.A. growth coalition members recognized the need to address disinvestment and the opportunity that disinvestment in neighborhoods of color held if they could harness state support for redevelopment. While the early L.A. growth coalition was explicitly white supremacist, manufacturing a city for white consumption and physically containing residents of color, the mid-century L.A. growth coalition shifted to creating inflated land values through systematic practices of racialized uneven development and politics of abandonment through redlining, violent removal, and redevelopment. Redlining through the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation’s (HOLC) residential security maps that the Federal Housing Authority then adopted, racially discriminatory covenants and real estate practices were the basis for disinvestment and the politics of abandonment. This disinvestment was deepened by Federal Housing Authority and local practices designating Black and Latinx and other racialized immigrant poor and working class neighborhoods as slums so that they could be demolished and redeveloped as racially segregated public housing that deepened disinvestment and racial dispossession by stymieing wealth accumulation (Ranganathan 2016). Local organizations promoted and helped enforce white dominant land use. In the all-white suburb of Culver City in 1943, air raid wardens assisted families in ensuring bombers would not see lighted houses and used this opportunity to get homeowners without racist covenants to promise that they would not rent or sell to Black residents (Rothstein 2017).
Where the growth coalition identified rent gaps, violent displacement recovered land that could have intensified uses for consumption by white elites, excluding previous Black and Latinx and other racialized immigrant residents and local business owners. The mechanisms of this racial dispossession in the mid-twentieth century included violent, direct displacement through urban renewal and freeway development. While these mechanisms were violent and often large-scale, the growth coalition framed racial dispossession in the 20th century around individual and the collective behavioral faults of communities of color, including criminality, loan delinquency, and bad credit, and not around the political and capital interests driving it wayward behavior, not the public policy that drove it (Ranganathan 2016, 25).

Same Interests, New Methods: L.A. Growth Coalition Facilitates Urban Renewal and Freeway Development

Urban renewal became national policy and practice, giving the state and developers access to disinvested, low-income, generally majority people of color neighborhoods, allowing them to directly displace and dispossess existing residents largely at the public’s expense. Displaced residents had no promise to be able to return to their homes or neighborhoods, or that the redeveloped housing would be affordable. Nationally, approximately 400,000 residential units were demolished through urban renewal projects and they were replaced by fewer than 11,000 public housing units (Weiss 1980).

In 1948, growth coalition members formed the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) and focused its efforts on the racially and ethnically diverse working
class neighborhood of Bunker Hill on the western edge of Downtown L.A. State officials, including from the Health Department and the LAPD declared the neighborhood blighted, following the pattern for urban renewal in marking neighborhoods of color as targets for government intervention and therefore discouraging any other forms of investment, paving the way for displacement and dispossession (Hunter 2013). By law, the CRA could use eminent domain to dispossess property owners and residents in blighted neighborhoods and then redevelop the land itself or circumvent the competitive bidding requirements for public projects and sell directly to private developers, for whom the CRA could modify existing land use to allow for greater density (Deener et al. 2013). Downtown property owners and developers lobbied City Council and the CRA to use Title I of the 1949 Federal Housing Act to buy land in Bunker Hill once it had been declared blighted, to make it available to private developers for the purposes of redevelopment (Acuña 1984).

Bunker Hill was an early example of this process in L.A., but one of the most visible abuses of growth coalition power through urban renewal was the 1957 forcible removal of 7,500 low-income Mexican, Black, and white residents from Chavez Ravine, where the L.A. Times vilified poor residents for defending their homes against armed police (Acuña 1984). This violence was preceded by several years of organizing by growth coalition members. From 1951 they had organized to designate the area blighted and in need of redevelopment. While Norris Poulson campaigned for L.A. Mayor he referred to the area and stressed that he would not support housing projects that he deemed un-American socialist projects (Johnson 2014, 323). This Cold War era assertion echoes the reactionary fears of worker organizing expressed by Chandler and
other early growth coalition members. L.A. growth coalition mobilization also succeeded in stopping the development of what could have become one of the largest public housing programs in the U.S. (Parson 1983). Instead, they channeled concerns about housing to focus on the need for urban renewal programs to address housing designated as blighted (Soja 1989).

Growth coalition members were directly involved in driving urban renewal. Mayor Poulson remarked at a 1958 Town Hall luncheon that “If you are not prepared to be part of this greatness [urban renewal], if you want Los Angeles to revert to pueblo status … then my best advice to you is to prepare to resettle elsewhere…” (Kovner 1958). On the Eastside of L.A., business interests were also active in growth machine politics. The manager of the L.A. branch of Bank of America, George Russell, chaired the East Central Area Welfare Planning Council (ECAWPC). Another ECAWPC member, the manager of Sears, Roebuck & Co., N.E. Surbaugh, used his position to collect a biased survey of Boyle Heights residents in an attempt to justify urban renewal (Acuña 1984). However, Congressional Representative for the area, Edward Roybal, intervened to avoid another Bunker Hill story of dispossession, noting that the majority of his constituents’ only form of wealth was their homes (Acuña 1984, 73-74). Meanwhile, governance remained fragmented, structured in such a way to make it challenging for the public to hold state officials accountable. Resistance to suburban annexation and the dominance of single family zoning and development was institutionalized in appointed positions that followed through home rule in the Councils of Government (COGs), which remained fragmented until the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) was formed in the 1960s (Pincetl 1999a). This regional
governance system is not unique to the region, instead stemming from federal efforts to better coordinate regional transportation and federal transportation funding.

The growth coalition also supported freeway planning that led to direct displacement of large swaths of low-income neighborhoods of color, mobilizing planning mechanisms such as the master plans (Acuña 1984). While early L.A. development was linked by transit, the dominance of the automobile and development of freeways accelerated suburbanization and transit disinvestment (Light 2006). Following the 1965 Watts Rebellion, the McCone Commission found that the riots were caused by lack of both employment and affordable and reliable public transit. Though federal mandates and subsidies made fares more affordable to the elderly and routes more accessible for disabled residents, needs for low-income residents remained largely unmet (Dilger 2003, 42).

Public transit gains were further stymied by federal highway projects that were commonly cast as urban renewal projects, but which neighborhood advocates recognized as large-scale displacement (Dilger 2003, 44). As elsewhere across the country, city officials made paternalistic claims that highway construction would benefit neighborhoods by clearing out dilapidated housing stock, though much of which was never replaced as promised. They also asserted that routes were chosen based on the advice of neutral, technocratic traffic engineers whose only goal was to alleviate traffic congestion (Dilger 2003, 44). Racial and economic equity advocates maintained that these claims provided political cover for slum clearance and the construction of infrastructure that disproportionately benefited those who did not live in the low-income neighborhoods of color (Dilger 2003, 44).
The pattern of freeway development deepened racial displacement and dispossession, directly displacing tens of thousands of residents in majority Black and Latinx neighborhoods. The Black middle-class neighborhood of Sugar Hill was targeted for demolition to build the freeway system (Rothstein 2017). While postwar L.A. saw a dramatic increase in Black residents, who formed chocolate cities primarily located in South L.A., these residents had to contend with violent racial dispossession through freeway developments and hyper-policing (Hunter and Robinson 2018). The 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act did not require any relocation assistance for displaced residents and the U.S. Senate removed language stating that such assistance was even permitted, asserting it would drive up the costs of what was supposed to be a public good (Rothstein 2017).

This federal public infrastructure development enacted racial dispossession in ways that the state and its growth coalition partners had repeatedly attempted to in Sugar Hill. Initially, neighborhood association leaders in the Sugar Hill area attempted to dissuade Black professionals from buying property, then tried to buy that property. When that failed the neighborhood association went to court to try to enforce the racist covenant, but a state judge ruled that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment (ibid.). The L.A. City Council then voted to rezone Sugar Hill for rental property, preventing Black residents from building further wealth, and finally, the neighborhood was demolished by freeway construction in 1957 and those who had built wealth and community were not compensated for their dispossession (ibid.).

The immigrant gateway neighborhood of Boyle Heights, directly east of Downtown was hit particularly hard, with six freeways cutting up the neighborhood,
displacing residents and local businesses through eminent domain, and originally not including any entrances or exits for residents to access the roads from the neighborhood (Acuña 1984). In contrast, majority white neighborhoods were left relatively undisturbed in the early freeway construction. In later freeway planning in majority white neighborhoods, residents—particularly homeowners—mobilized and prevented the construction of freeways through their neighborhoods (Light 2006).

Freeway development also hastened decentralization and pulled residents and consumers away from Downtown. In this way transportation development facilitated uneven development over this period. Growth coalition members identified the racialized rent gap opportunity in this disinvestment from Downtown and mobilized the CRA to redevelop Downtown L.A. in the 1970s. L.A. Mayor Bradley implemented a massive redevelopment program targeting the Central Business District and resulting in a 50% increase in office space between 1972-1982 (Saltzsein and Sonenshein 1991). However, in the 1970s, the influence of white homeowner slow growth advocates also increased, shaping the transformation of Downtown L.A. as well. White homeowners prevented the demolition of skid row, but out of fear that other skid rows would expand to their neighborhoods (Deener et al. 2013). Instead, the growth machine acknowledged white homeowners' fears and used local planning tools to quarantine majority Black and Latinx extremely low-income and chronically homeless residents in a restricted area of Downtown through concentrating shelter and social services in a bounded area enforced by the LAPD (ibid.).
Organizing and Resistance

Postwar L.A. saw the rise of conservative elected officials and corporate executives, who enforced segregation and the violent removal of residents of color from land deemed valuable, as well as the violent repression of organized resistance. In 1950, William H. Parker was appointed as chief of police and in 1953 Norris Poulson was elected Mayor. Together they enforced policing of Black neighborhoods “as if it were an alien community during wartime” (Horne 1997). Poulson was followed by Mayor Yorty, who vocally supported Police Chief Parker’s militaristic antiblack policing practices. Mayor Yorty was widely seen as a failure due to violent racism and visible resistance during his tenure and as one of the worst mayors in the country’s history for his racist practices that exacerbated white supremacist violence (Mollenkopf and Sonenshein 2013). The direct repression and spatial and political exclusion in the context of national organizing led to the Watts Rebellion (Pincetl 1999a), Chicano blowouts (Soja 1989), and creative uses of spatial entitlement by residents of color who asserted a right to space in the face of direct repression (Johnson 2014).

These resistance movements led to a shift in the racialized political economy of L.A. Elsewhere in the U.S. white voters reacted against the Civil Rights era turmoil and elected conservative politicians, including at the statewide level, voting in Ronald Reagan to replace California Governor Pat Brown, who had enforced civil rights law as Attorney General and signed into law the Fair Employment Practices Act. However, in L.A., white voters prompted a shift in local racialized politics, voting out conservative white leaders whom they saw as having exacerbated violence in growing neighborhoods of color (Mollenkopf and Sonenshein 2013, 137). In contrast to Yorty,
Tom Bradley, L.A.’s first Black Mayor, was perceived as sensible and progressively cosmopolitan (Mollenkopf and Sonenshein 2013, 150). Bradley ushered in a new period of the L.A. growth machine, which focused largely on Downtown redevelopment, where it was wildly successful. However, this transition period of the L.A. growth machine, discussed in more detail in the section that follows, still relied on intensification of land use and direct displacement with racialized impacts. It also faced its first serious threats from the growing slow growth movement.

Meanwhile, over a similar time period starting in the 1960s, environmentalist and homeowner groups had begun to organize and mobilize against further sprawl and largely unregulated development. In the 1960s, a coalition of homeowner groups called the Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations mobilized to stop the construction of a four lane freeway planned from Mulholland Drive and succeeded in creating a regional park in its place (Fulton 1997, 16). Governance changes facilitated the spread of these growing movements that became the slow growth movement. The result was a dramatic increase in growth control measures and an increase in public officials who supported slow growth goals (Fulton 1997). Majority white homeowners, with significant social and political capital also took control of the community planning process, using the community planning process to restrict development in their neighborhoods by downzoning much of the city by 60% starting in the 1970s through the 1990s (Morrow 2013).

Though both are generally extremely contentious and often unsuccessful in the face of growth machine mobilization (Logan and Molotch 1987) growth controls stemming from environmentalist advocacy to curb environmental degradation from
development are distinct from slow growth or no-growth movements. Some early results of environmentalist advocacy that targeted environmental degradation from development can be seen in the institutionalization of environmental impact statements (EIS) as a result of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 and environmental impact reports (EIR) as a result of the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970 that followed NEPA. Other successes include the habitat conservation plans (HCP) required by the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, and Proposition 20, the Coastal Initiative of 1972 that proposed to preserve coastal habitats and public access from large-scale development in California. Members of the growth coalition, including labor unions, the state Chamber of Commerce, and the California Real Estate Association framed their opposition to the Coastal Initiative in terms of putative job losses and arguing that environmentalist proponents of the initiative were elitist (Pincetl 1999a, 194-196).

In 1972, environmentalists mobilized to pass Proposition 20, restricting coastal development. Labor unions made their alliance to the growth coalition clear by joining the Chamber of Commerce and California Real Estate Association in opposing the Coastal Initiative (Pincetl 1999a). Preceding this, homeowner association president and slow growth advocate, Marvin Braude, was elected to L.A. City Council in 1967. Also prior to the Coastal Initiative, in 1970, environmental impact reviews had been passed at the federal and state level, providing more avenues for challenges to planning and development decisions (Fulton 1997, Pincetl 1999a). The L.A. Planning Director in the 1970s, Calvin Hamilton, developed a progressive vision challenging the traditional growth machine’s sprawling practices and lack of citizen participation. He developed a
General Plan that envisioned community planning in 35 high density centers for neighborhoods linked by public transit (Fulton 1997), setting the stage for later intensification of downtown L.A. and TOD planning efforts across the city.

However, work on these community plans lagged and the residents who had participated in developing them, particularly active homeowner groups, grew frustrated that they were not being completed or implemented (ibid.). Additionally, in the 1970s the L.A. housing market became among the most expensive in the U.S., pushing further sprawl in cheaper outlying areas that had previously been considered too far out and arid (Fishman 1992). The lack of movement on environmental protections in the face of sprawl and continued environmental degradation frustrated activists, who also bumped up against the limits to citizen participation that came about through Nixon’s dismantling of Great Society Programs (Pincetl 1999a). Though California was an early state to pass environmental review, having passed the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in 1970, other environmentalist policies were introduced but few passed from then through the Reagan years (ibid.). It is important to note that, though environmentalists concerned with sprawl sought to curb development that caused and accelerated environmental degradation, their focus was distinct from slow growth homeowner groups.

By the late 1970s, homeowners’ frustrations with the publicly subsidized growth machine reached a boiling point, with far-reaching fiscal consequences. A statewide ‘taxpayers revolt’ mobilized homeowners to pass Proposition 13 in 1978. The results of Proposition 13 extend beyond 1970s growth machine sprawl into contemporary funding for public services, having effectively gutted service institutions (Fishman 1992). These
funding reductions were compounded by shifts in federal funding a few years later when Reagan withdrew federal funding for urban development (Purcell 2000). The resulting fiscal pressures also led to an increasing reliance on outside partners (Pincetl 2003) and the eventual use of sales tax revenues to fund redevelopment (Pincetl 1999a).

LA Transition Period: Slow Growth Resistance Disrupts Political Consensus for Growth

The 1980s-1990s saw the continued rise in influence of the slow growth movement in L.A. Some have argued that its successes led to the death of the growth machine (Fulton 1997), others argue that it led to a decline in its hegemony (Pincetl 1999a, Purcell 2000) as it continues to chug along due to the interests at stake (Warner and Molotch 2000). Others argue that the death/decline arguments obscure the influence of ethnic place entrepreneurs (Light 2006). In these late-twentieth century decades, the growth machine did bump up against limits in the slow growth movement successes. The growth coalition also lost some of its traditionally strong key players, including the Chandler family, when the L.A. Times was sold in 1999 (Light 2006).

Slow growth movement leaders also led attacks on the CRA, pushing out its Directors in 1988 and 1990, and then granting CRA oversight to City Council in 1991 (Deener et al. 2013). Meanwhile, nearly all of City Council supported preserving low density, which, due to racialized uneven development practices, was concentrated in majority white neighborhoods (Light 2006). The growth machine responded and adapted by redirecting growth to intensification and densification primarily in Downtown L.A. (Deener et al. 2013, 411). Slow growth advocates and elected officials reinforced
this redirection by passing Proposition U in 1986, which decreased commercial zoning everywhere except Downtown L.A., Hollywood, and mid-Wilshire (Fulton 1997). One organization supporting this measure was Not Yet New York and a representative of the organization, Laura Lake, argued that Proposition U was a response to the threat of developers destroying communities (Whittemore 2011). It is notable that years later the campaign for the Neighborhood Integrity Initiative also used New York City, and Manhattan specifically as the threatened future for Los Angeles, should development continue apace.

A year prior, in 1985, Republican state lawmakers passed the Ellis Act, a law that many have argued facilitates rent control evasion and evictions that allow landlords to take advantage of rent gaps (McElroy and Szeto 2017).¹⁷ During this period, the growth machine also continued practices of violent racial dispossession through HOPE VI programs to demolish public housing projects, which, similarly to urban renewal, were never fully replaced and the units that were replaced were largely unaffordable to the previous residents (Brooks et al. 2012, Popkin et al. 2000).

Growth Machine Focuses on Downtown Redevelopment

While white homeowners made advancements in limiting growth in their neighborhoods, Mayor Bradley envisioned L.A. as a cosmopolitan, globalized city and

¹⁷ The Ellis Act allows landlords to evict tenants if they plan to transform their property from rental to for sale. If landlords are unable to sell the property they can return it to the rental market at market rate due to vacancy decontrol, even if the previously-occupied rental unit had been covered under rent control. Ellis Act evictions have been rising steadily in L.A. in recent years (Barragan 2017).
focused his efforts on developing relationships with business and redeveloping Downtown (Deener et al. 2013). He directed federal funds towards these efforts and forged an informal coalition in City Hall (Sonenshein 2004), replicating traditional growth coalition interactions. Still, even elected representatives in slow growth strongholds, including Pat Russell, Marvin Braude, and Michael Antonovich had ties to the growth machine and accepted developer funds (Fulton 1997, Light 2006). The revolving door of the growth coalition remained strong, as long as it directed racialized uneven development. Dan Garcia served as Planning Commission President for ten years and then transitioned to real estate law, while remaining a top fundraiser for Bradley and powerful City Hall lobbyist (ibid.) Bradley’s campaign manager, Nelson Rising, working in real estate and facilitating the massive redevelopment of Library Square. At the 1987 Library Tower groundbreaking Bradley spoke in support of continued intensification of land use, stating, “All cities must grow to survive and prosper” (ibid., 43). However, the increasing influence of the slow growth movement soon prompted another shift in growth machine practices, away from public declarations of the importance of growth (Fulton 1997) and away from Downtown office spaces to politically contentious mega developments for sports and entertainment complexes (Eisinger 2000).

As homeowner groups in majority white neighborhoods organized to resist development in their neighborhoods and the use of their tax dollars to fund growth machine developments elsewhere, they focused on the mega developments planned for Downtown L.A. These included the Staples Center, Nokia Theater, the Grand Avenue Project, and L.A. Live. Joel Wachs, a Council Member representing the East Valley, formed Citizens Against Secret Handouts (CASH) to mobilize existing homeowner
associations to prevent these mega developments from using public tax dollars (Purcell 2008). Meanwhile other organizations, including ones that would become core to ACT-LA years later, negotiated a community benefits agreement (CBA) in an attempt to leverage this investment for the low-income residents of color in the neighborhood surrounding L.A. Live and Staples Center.

CASH campaigned for a new ballot initiative that would require a voter referendum to approve any new sports facility that received public funds (ibid.). The growth coalition perceived this ballot initiative campaign as a credible threat and began negotiations that resulted in developers taking on the risk and costs of development rather than the city (ibid.). This threat was all the more credible given the successes of the slow growth movement, including an explosion of 76 growth control ballot initiatives in California from 1986-1988, about half of which were in Southern California and about 70 percent of which were successful (Horton 1995). The ballot initiative campaign was also backed by Valley homeowner associations that had been organizing around Voters Organized Together for Empowerment (VOTE) to advance the fair share Valley secession movement, which ultimately was not successful in seceding, but had numerous victories mobilizing homeowners who resented paying more in taxes than they perceived they received in public services (Purcell 2008).

However, it is important to note that the main concern of the homeowners that won this negotiation victory was in use of public funds, rather than in equitable development, preventing displacement, or providing benefits to existing residents (Purcell 2000). Horton (1995) argues that for many, slow growth represents a coded signal for white middle class exclusionism of racialized immigrants and native-born
Black and Latinx residents by restricting high-density and affordable development, joining NIMBY and nativist sentiments under the racially coded language of preserving neighborhood character and quality of life. Suburban voters also directly rejected increasing affordable housing called for in the housing needs assessment (Light 2006). The Grand Avenue project originally included community benefits including the CRA agreeing to finance the development of 500 affordable housing units, but these were pushed back and scaled back until finally the CRA was closed. By the end of the twentieth century housing in L.A. County had become increasingly unaffordable, with 40 percent of the region’s households spending more than the recommended 30 percent of their incomes on rent (Light 2006).

The Growth Machine Is Not Dead: Ethnic Place Entrepreneurs Direct Growth to Immigrant Gateway Neighborhoods

Light (2006) argues that accounts of the decline in the L.A. growth machine obscure the multiple interests and activities of a globalized growth machine, including immigrant place entrepreneurs focused investment in immigrant gateway neighborhoods. This coincided with macro shifts in increased financialization and globalized capital (Rolnik 2013). Increasingly, smaller scale landlords were replaced by large investment companies and limited liability companies (LLCs), which protected investors from risk and facilitated absenteeism and disinvestment (Travis 2019). Ethnic place entrepreneurs also directed transnational capital to specific neighborhoods (Light 2006). Due to the history of planning and zoning that had been dominated by white homeowners who used their political capital to restrict density in their neighborhoods
(Morrow 2013) and immigrant coethnic networks connected to global capital (Light 2006), global capital investments and financialization of the construction and housing market largely focused on neighborhoods with less restrictive zoning. Though development continued across the city, particularly in cyclical boom times, these trends directed greater density and intensification of land use to particular neighborhoods and corridors.

In contrast to early L.A., with city boosters encouraging white migration to L.A., in the 1980s and 1990s the native-born white population in L.A. decreased while large numbers of Asian, Mexican, and Central American immigrants came to the city, encouraged by co-ethnic place entrepreneurs (Light 2006). Chinese place entrepreneurs mobilized public and private resources to attract a professional class of Chinese immigrants to Monterey Park, while Koreatown developers advertised their Wilshire investment opportunities in Seoul (ibid.). Koreatown became an immigrant gateway neighborhood, though ultimately more successful commercially than residentially, particularly after the 1992 uprisings, when Koreatown place entrepreneurs turned to Korean banks to finance their expanded developments (ibid.). Japanese real estate investors also targeted Los Angeles starting in the 1980s (Edgington 2013).

The Growth Machine Encounters Significant Resistance: Slow Growth Victories

As already discussed, in this period in the late twentieth century in L.A., a set of slow growth interests converged to resist what they perceived as unchecked development. Though they had different motivations and may have acted separately,
these groups organized and mobilized toward common goals of slowing growth. These
groups included environmental groups concerned about the impacts of sprawl causing
further environmental degradation. They succeeded in delaying and scaling back
development in Playa Vista wetlands and in the Santa Monica mountains (Purcell
2000). Suburban homeowners also organized and mobilized to resist development,
 focusing resisting the use of their tax dollars to fund growth machine development and
preventing the development of high density housing in their neighborhoods. They
resisted larger projects that could serve as centers to draw investment for further
development (Purcell 2000). They also mobilized planning tools, including suing the city
for violating the General Plan in allowing high rise development. They elected slow
growth leaders to public offices, putting them in awkward positions between federal,
state, and regional mandates to increase affordable housing, and local residents who
opposed increased density (Light 2006). In L.A. County, municipalities, including
Pasadena, Monterey Park, and Santa Monica also institutionalized local growth control.
Santa Monica shifted from being dominated by growth machine interests in the early
1970s to a City Council with a significant Renters Rights presence. This organized
contingent won rent control and adopted a slow growth strategy of a six month building
moratorium in their attempt to mitigate displacement pressures (Fulton 1997). It is
important to note that renter organizing in the region has taken many forms across
different geographies and over time, with some renters rights groups using slow growth
strategies while others target specific developments to resist while leveraging
investment to direct it toward affordable housing. I discuss these variations in more
detail in chapter 4.
Slow growth influence extended to public transit as well. In the 1980s residents in Crenshaw and Inglewood formed the Southwest Transportation Coalition to advocate for a transit rail line in their neighborhood. Beverly Hills and Hancock Park residents objected to these proposals that would make their exclusive neighborhoods more accessible from the Eastside (Morrow 2013). Congressman Henry Waxman succeeded in preventing subway development in these neighborhoods by declaring the area a methane zone where subway development could not take place (ibid.). Councilmember Zev Yaroslavsky sponsored and won a ballot measure that prevented tax funds from being used for tunneling projects, which effectively prevented the extension of the subway to Crenshaw, despite community support for a transit line there (ibid.).

Racial Justice Community-Based Organizations and Labor Unions

While environmentalist and homeowner organizations focused on the periphery of L.A. and majority white single-family neighborhoods, HOPE VI displacement of public housing residents and the 1992 uprising in response to the Rodney King police brutality verdict prompted the formation of racial justice community-based organizations in poor and low-income neighborhoods of color. These organizations responded to racial dispossession, but focused on asset-based community-organizing that uplifted Black, Latinx, and other racialized immigrant placemaking. Many of these organizations, such as Community Coalition, focused on Black placemaking,\(^18\) countering the stigma of having been labeled as blighted due to supposed dysfunction rather than disinvestment and racial dispossession.

The Bus Riders Union (BRU) was established in 1994 as a part of the Labor Community Strategy Center, to address disinvestment in the bus system that poor and low-income L.A. residents of color relied on. Many organizations, such as Action for Grassroots Empowerment and Neighborhood Alternatives (AGENDA), which was founded in 1993 and would grow into Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE), also focused on interracial relations between Black residents and immigrant groups of different ethnicities. Others, such as Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE), founded in 1996, targeted disinvestment by addressing slum housing conditions and the lack of decent affordable housing. Other organizations, such as the East LA Community Corporation (ELACC), founded in 1995, focused on affordable housing creation and preservation. These organizations and others formed in the same time period addressed pressing issues of racial justice in different ways and many became increasingly involved in local land use planning efforts. They focused organizing efforts on anti-displacement campaigns, transit justice, and environmental justice efforts that built on earlier organizing such as Mothers of East Los Angeles (MELA), which had also targeted environmental racism in land use.

This time period also coincided with a dramatic shift in the racial politics of organized labor, with L.A. at the forefront. Most notably, Justice for Janitors organizing and the leadership of the L.A. Federation of Labor prompted a shift from anti-immigrant union politics to an approach that explicitly acknowledged that immigrant rights are workers rights (Milkman 2006). Like they had nationally, unions in L.A. had long reflected national racially exclusionary labor practices, excluding Black workers explicitly. A split labor market (Du Bois 1899) and exclusion of Black workers from
construction trades meant that Black workers did not see any employment gains from freeway infrastructure development (Rothstein 2017). Indeed, it was not until 1964 that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) refused to certify exclusively white unions (ibid.). In this context, the success of the L.A. Black Worker Center’s racial justice hiring campaign for a Project Labor Agreement and Construction Careers Policy for the construction of rail infrastructure discussed in the previous chapter is all the more notable.

Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) are one area where labor-community coalitions have come together to address housing, jobs, and other community benefits. L.A. was at the forefront of the labor-community strategy to advocate for and negotiate CBAs, starting at the end of this era and continuing through the 2000s. However, CBAs generally target one large development at a time and organizers expressed frustration with the long, drawn-out process of negotiating a CBA that was not necessarily scalable. Still, anti-displacement and labor organizations in L.A. have been at the forefront of negotiating CBAs on large development projects. In 2001 a coalition led by community organizations successfully negotiated the first comprehensive CBA in the country, requiring that the massive downtown development L.A. Live include affordable housing, living wages, and local hire. In the subsequent Lorenzo Project CBA negotiations between several of the same community groups and Geoffrey Palmer, the notorious L.A. landlord who sued the city over inclusionary housing, the coalition strived to improve on the L.A. Live CBA. The Lorenzo Project was developed on the site of a demolished community hospital and the negotiated CBA included affordable housing, living wages, local hire, as well as a community clinic, an at-risk hiring program, funding
for community health, an affordable housing trust fund, job training, and support for local businesses. This represented the first CBA that was fully funded by a private developer (Wu 2011).

Contemporary L.A.: Slow Growth Movement Opens Space for Equitable Development and Growth Machine Reformulates Itself Around TOD

Scholars have demonstrated that the political economy of place in L.A. has long privileged wealthy landowners and others who profit from development that encroaches on wildlands by subsidizing their land and services that prevent and respond to environmental hazards at the cost of the environmental and public health of inner city low-income residents of color (Davis 1998, Wolch et al. 2002). However, the slow growth movement’s successes detailed above led to a weakening of this traditional growth coalition. Though Fulton (1997) declared it dead, others asserted that its decline created “a political opportunity rather than a political vacuum” (Purcell 2000, 97), in which “other spatial visions for the city” (ibid.) could shape development politics and the built environment. In this section I argue that, with its focus on ostensibly “green” environmentalist goals of increased public transit use through rail TOD and on the already dense corridors away from majority white single family neighborhoods, and the ready cooptation of equity frames as class neutral and colorblind while retaining interests in intensification of land use for profit, TOD provides a potential political solution for the growth machine.

While the traditional growth machine focused on horizontal growth, environmentalist successes in slowing further encroachment on natural lands and
homeowner organizations’ successes in slowing intensified development near their single family homes prompted a shift in growth machine practices to vertical land use intensification and “green” framings focused on TOD and smart growth. However, despite the growth coalition broadening to include select environmentalists and transportation advocates and “green” and equity frames, the underlying interests in intensification of land use for profit persist. Wolch et al. (2002) point out that “there are many (and often conflicting) environmentalisms that shape the activities of local social movements and actors” (ibid., 396) and that sustainable planning and development must be critically examined before its application “in megacities deeply polarized by race, class, and national origin and plagued by fragmented, undemocratic administration” (ibid., 398). Much analysis of environmentalist responses has focused on slow growth movements (Logan and Molotch 1987, Pincetl 1999a), though these movements have largely resulted in “redirect[ing], rather than slow[ing], the pace of growth in the city, making downtown its new epicenter” (Deener et al. 2013). This redirection has entailed an intensification of land use at the urban core through TOD, framed as a solution to housing, transportation, environmental, and employment crises (Dreier 2012) due to its emphasis on building dense, mixed use developments near public transit rail.

The expansion of this model of TOD “smart growth” planning and development is a broader, neoliberal public-private model that is a response to sprawl (Daniels 2001), and is not limited to L.A. Particularly in the context of reduced federal funds for urban development and reduced state revenues post-Proposition 13 statewide, constrained resources also prompt local governments to attract private investment and form public-
private partnerships, with TOD being a particularly appealing vehicle for such
development. The predominant model in smart growth urban planning, cited almost
without fail at L.A. planning commission meetings and discussed in the literature
(Artibise et al. 1997, Fitzgerald et al. 2010), is Portland, Oregon’s “green” smart growth.
The state of Oregon was the first state to implement urban growth boundaries, Portland
opened its MAX light-rail in 1986, sparking a trend (English 2018), and the city was an
early leader in proactively linking housing and transportation planning in an effort to limit
sprawl (Daniels 2001). Local government in Portland also succeeded in implementing
additional growth controls (Pincetl 1992) and has provided limited affordable housing in
formerly industrial areas that have been rezoned and redeveloped as mixed use, largely
luxury residential and commercial uses along public transit lines near the downtown
core.

However, there is another side to this ostensibly color blind Portland model,
which is massive displacement of Portland’s Black residents and working class
residents of color pushed by rising housing costs to live beyond the urban growth
boundary and commute long distances to jobs in the city (Gibson 2013, Goodling et al.
2015). It is important to note that the aspects of the Portland model cited by L.A. growth
coalition members focus on mixed income, mixed-use TOD and sustainability, and not
on the equity strategy with a racial justice focus that has been adopted much more
recently by Portland’s Bureau of Planning and Sustainability thanks to the organizing
and advocacy of community-based organizations (Bates 2018). Until recently, Portland
lacked substantial renter protections and the effects of the financialization of the
housing market can be seen in the significant flipping of housing stock, especially in low-income neighborhoods (Sung and Bates 2017).

In L.A., elected officials raised the Portland model as a mixed income mixed use TOD planning model in City Planning meetings and beyond. In a meeting to discuss how to translate the Plan del Pueblo, which community residents had developed to incorporate their priorities into the Boyle Heights Community Plan Update, a walkability advocate who was an older white woman insisted that the Portland model was the correct strategy instead of the Plan del Pueblo’s focus on affordable housing for extremely low-income residents. She continued, “It has to be mixed use, mixed income. You don’t want to just be reproducing concentrated poverty and unsafe, inefficient, non-walkable environments do you? I understand some groups just push for affordable housing for the very poor and that’s great. That’s important. But it’s not sustainable and it won’t work. And let me tell you, it’s not doing these communities any favors.” She asserted this mixed use smart growth model would be beneficial before reading the Plan del Pueblo, which incorporated mixed use as well as detailed planning language around air quality buffer zones and job preservation and creation in industrially-zoned areas, affordable housing preservation and incentive zoning, and preservation and creation of green spaces and community serving local business corridors.

In L.A. key public and private actors coalesced around strategizing how to implement the TOD “smart growth” model in a city famous for sprawl. These actors included Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, transportation and environmentalist public transit advocates, organized labor, urban planning associations, and other members of the growth coalition. The primary newcomers to the growth coalition were the
environmentalist public transit advocates, who had long acted as outsider pressure groups, but organized to serve as conveners of TOD coalitions.

One such group was Move LA, whose Executive Director, Denny Zane, had been City Councilmember and Mayor of Santa Monica, implementing mixed use, pedestrian and transit-friendly amenities and land use “before these policies became known as ‘smart growth’” (Move LA 2019). At Move LA’s annual conference representatives of the business and development community and public officials came together to speak about the need to invest in transportation infrastructure in order to stimulate economic development. In advocacy around State Bill 375, which directed localities to coordinate housing and transportation planning to address greenhouse gas emissions, Move LA only addressed housing argued that “the costs of that growth need to not fall unfairly on disadvantaged communities,” but primarily addressed jobs-housing balance (Zane, Eaken, and Bernstein 2011). Similarly, the American Lung Association in California did not address housing affordability in its materials on S.B. 375, instead arguing that jobs-housing balance is beneficial for regional public health (American Lung Association 2012). This public health and “green” messaging was echoed by a growing TOD coalition that included large environmental and public health organizations, convened by Move LA. The keynote address at Move LA conferences was generally given by the Mayor—first Mayor Villaraigosa, to be followed by his successor Mayor Garcetti.

In his successful candidacy for Mayor in 2005, Villaraigosa called for L.A. to become the greenest big city and when he won he appointed environmental activists as city officials (Matsuoka and Gottlieb 2013). Villaraigosa had served as a union president of the American Federation of Government Employees and brought organized labor,
which some scholars argued had gained more prominence than the business community, into city politics (Mollenkopf and Sonenshein 2013), and into his vision for developing L.A. as well. As Mayor, Villaraigosa championed transportation infrastructure as central to his city boosterism, promoting his ambitious 30-10 plan to complete a projected 30-year plan for rail infrastructure in ten years (ibid.). This vision for L.A. dramatically increased rail public transit infrastructure, though much of it focused on already dense corridors. Indeed, proposed rail lines through wealthier, majority white and single-family neighborhoods faced the steepest opposition (Linton 2017). Notably, this ambitious public transit infrastructure plan did not include any mechanisms to prevent the direct and indirect displacement of poor and low-income residents of color along the TOD corridors.

Due to fiscal pressures, particularly accelerated by Proposition 13, to implement his 30-10 plan, Villaraigosa needed to raise revenue. The newly formed TOD machine, with members of the traditional growth machine, including a strengthened presence of organized labor and the new presence of environmentalist transportation advocates, organized to pass Measure R, a 2008 ballot initiative that provided a half cent sales tax towards transportation infrastructure funding. By bringing in formerly outsider organizations and “green” framing the growth coalition succeeded in persuading $\frac{3}{4}$ of voters to pass a tax measure to fund infrastructure development. This facilitated a significant increase in transportation infrastructure development, which contributed to racial dispossession through eminent domain direct displacement when the lines were built and indirect displacement gentrification pressures when the lines were announced (Immergluck 2009) and opened (Dominie 2012). The results of this displacement
undermined the “green” environmentalist and transportation goals of increased ridership as core, transit-dependent extremely low-income residents of color were displaced and replaced by higher income residents more likely to own cars (ibid.). This led to an overall decrease in transit ridership and an increase in regional vehicle miles traveled (ibid., Chatman et al. 2016).

Hollywood was in Garcetti’s district when he served on City Council and it would become a center of contention around TOD and densification of development, ultimately culminating in the Neighborhood Integrity Initiative ballot measure. The Hollywood Community Plan Update (HCPU) was particularly contentious. The City had targeted the neighborhood, particularly near rail transit for increased density, but faced stiff opposition. In response to contention over the HCPU, in 2012 Mayor Villaraigosa told a reporter, “You love to write about this being the city of sprawl and how we are not like New York and other cities that are more vertical...This is L.A.’s opportunity to match the growth of our transit system with the jobs and housing that is critical to smart growth” (Nagourney 2012). Garcetti agreed, arguing that building guidelines had not changed in 24 years and badly needed an update, while organized residents argued that they needed to preserve the low-rise development and quality of life (ibid.).

This investment in transportation infrastructure without mechanisms to prevent displacement coincided with an erosion of resources and support for affordable housing. In 2009 the Palmer/Sixth Street Properties LP v. City of Los Angeles state appellate court decision ruled that inclusionary housing policy mandating affordability set asides violated the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act. This resulted in market-rate developers no longer providing set asides for affordable units in their developments. It also had
broader reaching ramifications as it was interpreted by local officials. While this ruling affected jurisdictions statewide, local affordable housing land use advocates contend that the *Palmer* ruling should not prevent local jurisdictions from using other affordable housing incentive mechanisms. However, officials in the L.A. Department of City Planning shared with grassroots organizers in meetings regarding Community Plan Updates that they feared implementing any type of inclusionary policy in planning documents would be challenged in court and they preferred to avoid that possibility.

This chilling effect on affordable planning policy mechanisms combined with a decrease in available funding for affordable housing as L.A. City Council followed the state legislature and voted to dismantle the Community Redevelopment Association in 2012 (Deener et al. 2013). In this context of constrained resources and scant political will to advance affordable housing, the massive influx of investment in transportation infrastructure through Measure R, which attracted federal transportation funds\(^\text{19}\) as well, had the particular potential to destabilize historically disinvested neighborhoods. Meanwhile, the California state legislature had passed S.B. 375 in 2008, which mandated local regions to coordinate housing and transportation planning, which was carried out in L.A. through SCAG.

\(^{19}\) The multiscalar funding effort coordinated between L.A. City, County, Metro, and state and federal funds, including American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds, America Fast Forward Transportation Bonds, as well as Federal Transit Administration Capital Investment Grants, Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act loans, and Federal Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Program grants (Linton 2017).
The multiscalar nature of transportation and housing land use policy, planning, and funding resulted in some roadblocks as well. For years the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), L.A.’s transportation authority, averred that it did not have jurisdiction over land use and housing, despite being a significant landowner due to eminent domain takeover of parcels to hold rail materials during construction. Organizing and advocacy organizations repeatedly pressured the MTA to acknowledge its status as a landlord and the opportunity to enact affordable housing and community benefits requirements on this land, but the MTA dismissed them. However, the MTA board approved a change of leadership that led to a significant change in orientation towards affordable housing and displacement, with its first Black woman Deputy CEO, Stephanie Wiggins and CEO Phil Washington, who implemented equity standards for MTA-owned land. Villaraigosa developed a Transit Corridors Cabinet that included numerous city departments and focused on coordinating with MTA, and which included a concern for affordable housing near transit (Office of Mayor Antonio R. Villaraigosa 2012). The Cabinet first met with the public at a Move LA annual conference.

In 2012 the TOD growth coalition attempted to pass an extension of Measure R’s half cent sales tax to fund transportation through Measure J, but it failed to garner the necessary ⅔ vote to increase revenue. Anti-displacement and transportation justice organizations including the BRU mobilized to oppose Measure J. Opposition to Measure J and transit-oriented displacement was the focus of the national Right to the City Conference that these organizations hosted in L.A. in 2012, culminating in a march from MTA headquarters to empty, MTA-owned lots across from a Gold Line light rail station in Boyle Heights. These groups argued that Measure R facilitated displacement of low-
income residents of color and targeted ‘choice riders’ to encourage them to get out of their cars, while ignoring core, transit-dependent bus riders. The BRU distributed handouts detailing their opposition and their seven reasons to oppose Measure J, which they called “L.A. Metro’s boondoggle sales tax extension” (Bus Riders Union 2012a). In the flyer they noted that Measure J would extend Measure R without stipulating where funds would go, and that only 20% of funding from Measure R was dedicated to bus service (ibid.).

In addition to racial dispossession through direct and indirect displacement resulting from the construction of rail lines, investments in transportation had racist impacts for riders of color. The BRU and its allies have advocated against continued disinvestment in public transit bus service, which serves poor and low-income residents of color in Los Angeles. In 2011 the BRU filed a civil rights complaint asserting that the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s (MTA) cuts to bus service were racially discriminatory. Indeed, persistent underfunding of public transit service is a national pattern of disinvestment, even while federal agencies and localities pour funds into capital projects to build public transit lines (English 2018).

This 2011 BRU lawsuit followed their successful 1996 civil rights lawsuit Labor/Community Strategy Center v. LACMTA in which they argued that MTA had created a separate and unequal transit system and MTA had been required to reverse fare hikes and invest in expanding bus service (Mann 2012), though MTA had subsequently rolled back the court mandated expansion of the bus system (Bus Riders Union 2012b). In 2011, though the FTA found strong evidence of racial discrimination, they failed to rule against the MTA and instead further studies were ordered (Bus Riders...
Union 2012b). The BRU and allies maintain that cuts to bus service have escalated concomitantly with increased funding for public transit rail construction, which they have found does not adequately serve MTA’s transit-dependent core ridership (Dominie 2012, Stepick 2014). In 2016 the BRU filed another civil rights complaint against Metro for racially discriminatory policing on transit.

Coopting Equity Frames as Class Neutral and Colorblind

Equity is a slippery, elastic frame that can be used to undermine anti-racist goals (Pulido 2006), or be used pragmatically and strategically to accomplish racial justice goals (Saito 2015). Urban planning is dominated by colorblind discourse, the imposition of theoretical models without grassroots engagement, and policy feedbacks that constrain and shape imagined alternatives for urban planning and policy (Schweitzer 2012).

TOD growth machine politics incorporate environmentalist and homeowner movement concerns by promoting ostensibly “green” goals of increased public transit ridership through densification largely in areas removed from majority white single family home neighborhoods. This reformulated TOD growth machine retains an underlying interest in attracting private investment. This is due to the growth coalition members’ interest in business confidence (Block 1977), especially as public investment in housing has consistently declined while public policy and planning facilitate public private partnerships, joint development, and have done little to nothing to curb the financialization of housing debts. TOD is generally prompted by public investment in transit infrastructure, with the surrounding development financed by a mixture of funds including local, state, federal, and private funds. However, this development initially took
place without coordinated planning or overarching requirements to include affordable housing or anti-displacement provisions or hiring components. Instead, support for TOD largely arose from concerns with sprawl and a desire to have more public transit riders. Public pressure led to an eventual recognition that without those provisions core riders would be displaced and regions would end up with lower ridership. However, in the meantime, TOD attracted capital investments, rendering historically disinvested neighborhoods profitable and growth machine interests quickly seized upon these opportunities to take advantage of historically created rent gaps.

This influx of investment in TOD in historically disinvested areas results in racial dispossession through direct and indirect displacement. This is particularly stark considering how displacement of core, extremely low-income riders of color undermines ridership and regional sustainability goals as they are replaced with residents more likely to own a car, leading to an overall increase in regional vehicle miles traveled (VMT), which is associated with an increase in greenhouse gas emissions (Dominie 2012, Chatman et al. 2016). As sustainable development is meant to include social equity as one of its three pillars, TOD without clear anti-displacement and equity provisions is at best greenwashed urban development.

TOD growth machine politics use ostensibly class neutral and color blind “green” frames. While anti-displacement organizations elevated class and racial equity in Community Plan Update processes, TOD growth coalition members initially ignored equity and then gradually incorporated it as a flexible frame. In many instances this cooptation stripped equity of a class or racial justice lens. A persistent pattern in transportation planning was to use equity to mean equal geographical distribution of
resources. This was particularly apparent in SCAG meetings, where representatives from smaller cities argued that they should receive resources equal to larger, more populous areas like the city of L.A.

This is reflective of transportation planning more broadly. In an analysis of local option sales taxes to fund transportation, Lederman et al. (2018) analyze discursive use of equity in terms of geography, modality (type of transportation used), temporality, and income. In contrast, in meetings of Investing in Place, a transportation justice advocacy coalition, meetings organizers led presentations sharing data maps and other visualizations that revealed that race was by far the most significant predictor of transit ridership, bike and pedestrian usage and fatalities, and more. They prioritize equity opportunity zones for transportation investments defined by indicators of historic disinvestment and disenfranchisement, including race/ethnicity, household income, and households with low vehicle ownership. In chapter 4 of this dissertation I discuss further the elastic, flexible use of equity as a frame and the assertion of equitable development as an alternative logic of development that acknowledges racial dispossession and uneven development.

Gradually, TOD growth coalition members incorporated equity frames, at first coopting them and misusing them, but eventually many used class and race based equity to develop guiding principles and then policy. Move LA was also influenced to incorporate equity as a result of its membership in the LA Thrives coalition, which has an explicit class and racial equity focus, and in response to opposition to their failed Measure J campaign. Move LA’s annual conferences gradually focused increasingly on equity, from a starting point where it was only mentioned by one of the dozens of
panelists to it being the focus of most of the panels and the keynote address. In their successful 2016 campaign to pass Measure M, which also extended the Measure R half-cent sales tax to fund transportation, the coalition incorporated equity provisions, including a new bus rapid transit program, paratransit, active transportation funding for bike and pedestrian safety, and funding for state of good repair for operations. Active transportation advocacy organization, Investing in Place, lauded these additions, but expressed concern that the funding allocated to them was inadequate and reliant on subregions to allocate spending, with some of the most vulnerable low-income neighborhoods of color with high fatality rates refusing to dedicate funding to active transportation (Investing in Place 2016).

Overlapping coalitions with members explicitly focused on race and class equity influenced these changes. Green LA, for example, a coalition of environmentalist, environmental justice, active transportation, transportation justice, and anti-displacement organizations, worked to incorporate equity provisions in community and specific plans and transportation funding for active transportation and bus only lanes. In a Green LA meeting in 2011 where organizers celebrated winning a bus-only lane as a result of an eight year campaign, they bemoaned how bus service had dropped 12% since the passage of Measure R and discussed the challenges of addressing equity in multiscalear and multi-jurisdictional planning, policy, and funding. An organizer argued that they needed to work on incorporating safety provisions in the specific plans L.A. city was currently working on because there currently were none in neighborhoods with the highest fatality rates, and that this was part of how racism was institutionalized, asserting that “first they criminalize Black and brown youth and then they kill them by
ensuring it isn’t safe to bike or walk anywhere and there are never enough buses coming by, but the city says that’s up to Metro and on it goes.” Years later, Investing in Place, an active transportation advocacy organization that had worked on pushing for equity provisions in Measure M, lauded the changes to the measure. However, the group also expressed concern that the funding allocated to equity was inadequate and reliant on subregions to allocate spending. The group pressured localities with some of the highest bicycle and pedestrian fatality rates that had initially directing funding to roads and other capital improvements, which they speculated elected officials viewed as most visible, to redirect funding to active transportation targeted in low-income neighborhoods of color with the highest rates of pedestrian and cyclist fatalities (Investing in Place 2016). Investing in Place and ally organizations continued to advocate for racial justice transportation policies and Metro recently adopted a motion, *Defining Equity Focused Communities*, which uses race and ethnicity, household income, and low vehicle ownership to target transportation investments. This is a concrete step to ensure that equitable transportation development practices are not color blind.

Grassroots organizing and mobilization prompted a shift in city politics as elected officials increasingly supported equitable development (Saito 2018). This included the election of long-time community organizer, Marqueece Harris-Dawson to L.A. City Council. Harris-Dawson facilitated deep community engagement around TOD planning in the Crenshaw neighborhoods, where grassroots organizing focused on Black placemaking (Sulaiman 2019). In a Special Meeting of the Housing Committee of the L.A. City Council in 2016, while the Chair asserted that L.A. needed housing at all levels
and that included market-rate, Harris-Dawson contended that “the market will not do this on its own.” He highlighted the work of the Renters Day L.A. Coalition, its priorities and solutions, and called for a coordinated effort to prevent the creation of homelessness by preventing displacement. He critiqued the Costa Hawkins Act and how it constrained rent control, exacerbating rent burdens and Ellis Act evictions, leading to a net loss of affordable housing. Harris-Dawson concluded by stressing his common refrain that “Those most affected must be valued as an integral part of the solution side in political decision making if we are to succeed in ending this housing crisis.”

Conclusion

In contrast to the dominant image of L.A. as a smoggy destination for freeway dwelling automobiles, and the collective amnesia promoted by city boosters who claim that the current investment in transportation is completely unprecedented and exceptional, transportation and housing planning, policy, and development have always been linked in L.A. Housing and transportation planning and development in L.A. have also been intimately tied to uneven development and racial dispossession. In early L.A. settler colonization and the privately-driven and organized growth machine built an explicitly white supremacist city with rampant real estate speculation focused along privately owned and operated transit lines. The growth coalition members enforced their will through direct, violent suppression of organized resistance. This is followed by direct displacement and racial dispossession through urban renewal and freeway development and ongoing politics of abandonment that resulted in growing rent gaps. Growth coalition members facilitated violent policing that targeted organizing and resistance in neighborhoods of color. L.A.’s prototypical growth machine then started to
face credible threats with resistance that included wealthy white homeowners, who downzoned their neighborhoods (Morrow 2013) while global capital primarily targeted areas already zoned for greater density (Light 2006). The slow growth movement’s successes in challenging the traditional growth machine prompted the growth coalition to reformulate itself with new environmentalist and transportation advocacy partners to promote a “green,” color blind and class neutral TOD vision of vertical intensification of land use near transit. This resulted in direct displacement via public transit infrastructure development and indirect and exclusionary displacement via gentrification pressures near TOD, as well as cooptation and gradual incorporation of equity and resistance.
Chapter 3

Radical Flank Effects and Authenticity in Labor-Community Coalition Formation: Uneasy Partnerships and Innovation in Urban Development Policy

A Contentious Vote

As I helped cut and distribute the pieces of paper that would serve as ballots I couldn't help but notice the mounting tension in the room. The organizers, executive directors, and organizational members of the Alliance for Community Transit-Los Angeles (ACT-LA) coalition who usually greeted me with smiles took the papers with furrowed brows and quickly turned back to those sitting near them to express their concerns. It was nearing the end of a long and tense meeting in which organizational members of the ACT-LA coalition were to vote on whether or not they would join representatives of organized labor to form a new coalition and shift the inclusionary housing policy they had worked on for several years from a legislative campaign to a ballot measure campaign, which would become Measure JJJ, in partnership with organized labor. The ACT-LA coalition members’ concerns covered process issues both that day and moving forward with a new coalition, as well as unease about the possible changes to the substance of the policy that their members had worked on for several years. Some noted that the majority vote process they were undertaking that day was a departure from the participatory, consensus-driven process the coalition usually used,
and they worried that this rush could reflect a shift away from grassroots organizing that several coalition members felt was the core strength of ACT-LA.

A long-time resident-leader and elder made the case for joining the Build Better L.A. (BBLA) labor-community coalition and pursuing the ballot initiative strategy. He said, “It’s about time we go around City Hall. We’ve been working with them for years—decades even! And they keep shutting us out even though it’s clear we know what we’re talking about. We’ve been organizing around this particular policy for years alone and they keep putting us off. Meanwhile our communities need affordable housing and these bad developments aren’t stopping. I say it’s high time we go around them and say—excuse me, but—eff you! We have the power to do it ourselves!” Several participants at the meeting nodded, laughing and some shrugged and nodded. The local legislative avenues for enacting the policy measures they had worked on for years were limited and the participants recognized the opportunity to take advantage of the financial resources from the partnership with organized labor and circumvent the City Hall legislative process. However, several participants also expressed ambivalence and anxiety about the partnership, particularly with one partner—organized labor—contributing the considerable financial resources necessary for a ballot measure campaigns and some labor organizations being actively on opposite sides from grassroots CBOs currently campaigning to prevent developments that they feared would displace their members.

The primary misgivings coalition members voiced about process were about power imbalances in the proposed partnership with organized labor and what that could entail with a shift to a ballot initiative strategy. Several participants expressed
apprehension about the possibility that organized labor would hold too much power in the coalition and the short timeline to get the ballot initiative written could mean that ACT-LA’s members would not have an equal voice in what would be included in the policy. I sat back down near a group of organizers huddled together. One said, “It’s not like we weren’t just out on the opposite side. I don’t know how we’re going to keep the building trades from throwing our members under the bus. What guarantee is there that they won’t just take what they can get for their members? And meanwhile they keep supporting projects that displace our members—who don’t get access to those jobs in the first place!” Other organizers nodded their agreement. As I moved around the room, helping chart small groups’ questions and misgivings on butcher paper, a Black organizer from an organization based in South L.A. emphasized that, “If we go ahead with this [partnership with organized labor] then we have to make sure we’re talking about race. I mean it has to be explicit. And I can’t be the only Black guy in the room bringing it up with labor folks. How are we going to make sure it stays in the policy?” The other members of the group nodded vigorously and one added, “I mean they say they want our members leading this, which is great, and our members know what’s up so you’d think that wouldn’t be an issue, but we’ll see.”

I moved around the room and sat near a group of organizers and executive directors, one of whom pursed her lips and said “I really don’t want this to be a repeat of the CBA [community benefits agreement] process. What a nightmare. Still, we have our lessons learned from that at least! How to hold our own with the trades, etcetera, etcetera. Now we have to make sure we take advantage of the opportunity of the threat of the NII.” She was referring to the Neighborhood Integrity Initiative (NII), a proposed
ballot initiative put forward by the Coalition to Preserve Los Angeles (CPLA) and financed by the AIDS Healthcare Foundation, which would place a moratorium on large development in Los Angeles, and which had prompted organized labor to approach ACT-LA.20 An organizer added, “I just don’t see how our members can get into those jobs though because—at least our members—so many are undocumented. But maybe we can push the trades to do better…to open up to workers of color and stop supporting bad projects.” She shrugged and those around her took a deep breath, several sighing deeply.

An impassioned speech by another organizer earlier in the meeting had argued as much, emphasizing that, while not ideal, the ballot initiative process funded by organized labor meant that labor organizations felt that they needed ACT-LA to be able to appeal to voters and win, and ACT-LA therefore had an opportunity to leverage this and push organized labor and ensure the policy was strong for ACT-LA’s goals and membership. She shared that representatives from organized labor had in fact said as much when they approached ACT-LA asking to partner; that they had stressed that ACT-LA’s expertise in affordable housing would be helpful in writing the ballot measure, but more crucially, ACT-LA’s membership, with its grassroots, direct experience fighting

20 At the time of the meeting described above, CPLA had successfully collected enough signatures to get the Neighborhood Integrity Initiative (NII) on the November 2016 ballot. The NII included a provision that would place a two-year moratorium on development that would require a General Plan Amendment, zone change, or height district amendment. The land use policy ACT-LA had been working on for several years used similar triggering mechanisms of General Plan Amendments and zone changes to incentivize affordable housing at deeper levels of affordability than previously included in the California state density bonus law.
displacement, would be much more appealing to the voting public. She continued by explaining that the ballot initiative could potentially lock in deeper levels of affordability than an inclusionary housing policy that went through the City Hall legislative process likely would and ACT-LA could also pressure labor partners to include targeted, inclusionary hiring provisions deeper than they had in any other policy, community benefits agreement (CBA), or project labor agreement (PLA).

A representative of affordable housing community development corporations (CDCs) made a different case for joining the coalition. He emphasized that several affordable housing developers absolutely hated the idea of partnering with organized labor and were fearful they would lose projects that just couldn’t pencil out as economically feasible with additional labor costs, but they had finally agreed to vote to join the labor-community coalition. Their vote was based on both a moral imperative that acknowledged that housing and jobs impacts are not siloed in the low-income neighborhoods of color where CDCs build and on the recognition that the NII’s proposed development moratorium represented a radical approach that threatened some affordable housing development in practice and in principle. He shared that even those adamantly opposed to partnering with labor had agreed to support the labor-community ballot initiative strategy due to their recognition of a shared threat. This impassioned speech seemed to stir some who were similarly wary to partner with labor, albeit perhaps for other reasons, to acknowledge the unique opportunity at hand.

Participants handed me ballots with their brows furrowed, some shaking their heads, others shrugging. I helped count the ballots several times over. The decision to join the coalition overwhelmingly passed with no opposing organizations, though a small
number of organizations abstained. The participants who had organized the meeting breathed a collective sigh of relief and exclaimed that the real work was about to start to be able to ensure ACT-LA members pushed for an innovative and strong policy that could benefit their organizational memberships. In closing, they also underscored that this coalition organizing and policy campaign would be a heavy and intense lift, but would be far from the only strategy the coalition would pursue. They stressed that the concerns voiced over this vote made it even more clear that they needed to continue to engage in anti-displacement tenant protection organizing and advocacy and would work to ensure that this policy could build power so they could work on additional strategies including campaigns to divest from racist transit policing and pursuing housing decommodification through community land trusts.

Introduction

While scholars have highlighted the potential for labor-community coalitions to contribute to labor movement revitalization, in the context of urban development politics, tensions between building and construction trades and community-based organizations may be particularly challenging to overcome. One underlying source of tension is the participation of building trades in local growth coalitions and their mobilization in support of urban developments that low-income community groups perceive as threatening displacement of low-income residents of color. Indeed, outside of community benefits agreements (CBAs), which often focus on single, albeit large, projects, affordable housing and labor standards are rarely paired in large scale urban policy. The case of the Build Better L.A (BBLA) labor-community coalition confounds this trend.
This labor-community coalition formed in response to a radical flank effect (RFE) threat from the NII, a slow growth ballot initiative that would have enacted a moratorium on large-scale development. This RFE prompted organized labor to recognize the value of the institutional and grassroots authenticity of ACT-LA, a coalition of anti-displacement, affordable housing, environmental justice, and transit justice organizing groups. Representatives of organized labor, including building trades unions, asked ACT-LA to form a labor-community coalition and partner in developing and passing an inclusionary housing and labor standards policy and the groups worked intensively to overcome persistent tensions. This resulted not in compromise as might be expected, but in policy innovation. ACT-LA leveraged the urgency of the RFE threat to enact affordable housing and hiring provisions in the ballot measure that were deeper and more holistic than they had expected to pass in a legislative strategy where they expected the policy to be chipped away at and passed piecemeal over a longer period of time.

In this chapter I analyze how and why these groups came together, through an analysis of understudied mechanisms of coalition formation, including radical flank effects and the perception of institutional and grassroots authenticity as coalition resources. I argue that these factors can help organizations overcome differences in organizational culture, ideology, and strategy. I find that institutional and grassroots authenticity can be both resources and sources of tension between differently resourced and racialized organizations working in coalition. I further analyze how uneasy partnerships within the coalition may lead not to compromise as one might expect, but to policy innovation. In this case, uneasy coalition partners leveraged the urgency of the
RFE and their unique resources to push for innovative policy. Finally, I discuss how this coalition organizing and policy victory shaped subsequent strategy development, opening pathways for labor movement revitalization and building legitimacy that groups could leverage in future organizing and advocacy.

Coalition Formation

Scholars of social movement coalitions highlight the roles of social and organizational ties (Bystydzienski and Schacht 2001; Obach 2004; Corrigall-Brown and Meyer 2010), elite allies (Stearns and Almeida 2004), shared threats (Van Dyke 2003; Okamoto 2010), and shared or flexible ideologies (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Lichterman 1995) in facilitating coalition formation. The literature has also shown that differences in organizational culture and strategy can inhibit coalition formation (Lichterman 1995; Roth 2010). However, this does not explain the impacts of uneasy partnerships once coalitions have formed. The case of an urban development labor-community coalition tests how and why organizations overcome differences in organizational culture and strategy and what impact these differences have on the goals of the coalition once it has formed.

The role of perceived threat and crisis in prompting coalition formation is underscored in the broader literature on coalition formation (e.g. Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005). Threat matters more than opportunity (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; McCammon and Campbell 2002), but a crisis alone is not sufficient, particularly for lasting coalitions across ideological boundaries (Staggenborg 1986), across movements (Van Dyke 2003), and in cases with differential access to resources (Borland 2010). Activists translate crises through fraught organizational work, framing coalitions as
strategic action (Borland 2010). Crises can be understood as episodes of contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) that unsettle strategic action fields, prompting incumbents to attempt to reproduce the field as it was or to try new strategies to maintain their position in transformed fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). One option incumbents have is to ally themselves with challengers (ibid.). As members of the growth coalition, building trades unions under threat from the NII may be understood as incumbents and anti-displacement organizations may be understood as challengers, but how these groups overcome ongoing tensions and direct opposition to work in coalition is understudied.

In the context of urban development politics, labor-community relationships are often fraught and groups may not share common identities or interests. This may be particularly evident if they do interact in land use policy arenas, but are often in opposition to one another. As differently resourced and racialized organizations (Ray 2017), unions and community-based organizations contest and legitimate unequal distributions of resources.

Labor-Community Coalitions

In urban areas, labor-community coalitions are thought to hold potential for labor movement revitalization by bridging the city trenches (Katzenelson 1981; Krinsky and Reese 2003) that divide workplaces from community. Katzenelson (1981) argues that these trenches forestall coordinated working class organizing as residential segregation siloes issues related to housing, race, and ethnicity in residential neighborhood organizing and keeps it separate from class-based organizing that is limited to workplaces. This is reinforced by labor unions' focus on bread and butter issues of
wages, hours, and conditions of their members and history of racial and gender
exclusion. In contrast, labor movement organizers in social movement unions, equity
and inclusion issue campaigns, bargaining for the common good contract campaigns,
and labor-community coalitions attempt to bridge these trenches.

Labor-community coalitions are often understood as a component of social
movement unionism that scholars have argued will contribute to labor movement
revitalization (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1994; Clawson 2003; Nissen 2003;
Tattersall 2006, 2010; Turner 2004; Turner and Hurd 2001). However, labor-community
coalitions in urban development politics face challenges not only in their formation, due
to tensions and mistrust between partners, but also in bridging the demands of different
sectors in ways that contribute to union revitalization without undermining housing
affordability (MacDonald 2011). City trenches are reinforced by city governance that is
fragmented geographically, racially, and by issue. In L.A., scholars have long
recognized this fragmentation as a barrier to collective action, as “transportation, land
use, air quality, waste management, and housing are related yet are never addressed
as a system” (Weinstein 1996, 38), and they have called for multi-sectoral planning
processes to deal with these issues systematically (Soja and Scott 1996).

Labor-community coalitions have varying definitions, sometimes used
synonymously with community unionism (e.g. Fine 2005), and with varying
understandings of the term community (Tattersall 2008). I follow the majority of scholars
on this topic, including Tattersall (2008), Black (2018), and Lipsig-Mumme (2003), and
use community to represent the participation of community-based organizations
(CBOs). Labor-community coalitions may be more likely to form if partners have key
activists who work as “bridge-builders” (Nissen 2004; Rose 2000), shared identities or common interests (Obach 2004), and if they perceive a threat or crisis (Tattersall 2006, 2010).

The external political environment also shapes the likelihood of labor-community coalition formation. The state defines policy arenas, structuring organizational interactions and leading some organizations to interact and therefore be more likely to form alliances or be in competition, or to be less likely to form coalitions because they interact less frequently (Obach 2010). However, the literature has yet to systematically address how organizations that come into contact frequently but are often in conflict in the political arena—as is the case for example when building trades unions and CBOs are on opposite sides of a proposed development—overcome such conflict to join in coalition.

Though community-benefits agreements (CBAs) provide instructive examples of labor-community collaboration in urban development, CBA campaigns are often very narrow in scale and organized labor is often represented by service sector unions, which may have more congruent ideologies to CBOs (Saito 2012) and generally have more women and workers of color than building trades unions. CBA partnerships are generally restricted to single projects, rather than broader policy campaigns, limiting the broader institutionalization of their demands (Belongie and Silverman 2018). MacDonald (2011) argues that land use campaigns in the context of extractive urban development, force labor-community coalitions into positions where they generally compromise and prioritize workplace demands at the cost of residential demands, reproducing urban accumulation and displacement patterns.
There are therefore open questions in the literature on labor-community coalition formation, including: What mechanisms and resources facilitate labor-community coalition formation in an urban development policy arena where these groups are often in opposition? What leads such uneasy partnerships to policy innovation rather than compromise? And how can labor-community coalitions contribute to labor movement revitalization by opening pathways to organizing new workers without fundamentally undermining housing affordability goals?

Radical Flank Effects:

Considering the importance of political threats to coalition formation (Van Dyke 2003; Tattersall 2006, 2010; Okamoto 2010), an understudied potential mechanism of generating external crisis is the radical flank effect (Haines 1984). This phenomenon is commonly understood as the outcome of elites’ and funders’ interpretations of racialized, leftist mobilization as a threat, which prompts elites to channel resources to more moderate challengers (Haines 1984). Such positive radical flank effects normalize more moderate groups’ tactics, ideologies, and discourses (ibid., Schifeling and Hoffman 2017) and can also lead to alliance-building (Truelove and Kellogg 2015).

In the case of new technology markets, Truelove and Kellogg (2015) find that if a radical group of engineers threatens shared occupational goals, more moderate engineers may join in coalition with more moderate challengers in an attempt to maintain their position of power. Relative radicalness may also arise due to within-movement conflict and factionalization (McCammon, Bergner, and Arch 2015). Such radical flank effects may then open opportunities for the passage of moderate policies (ibid.). However, the process is dynamic and iterative, and those moderate policies may
create future opportunities through policy feedback effects for the more radical groups to advance their agenda, thereby incrementally opening the political opportunity structure to progressively more radical claims (ibid.).

However, this case of conflict and positive radical flank effects is presented as a conflict-based foil to cases of cooperative coalitions passing policies, and does not fully explain how positive radical flank effects could prompt coalition formation between uneasy partners. The literature on coalition formation notes that more radical groups’ actions can undermine coalitions (Barkan 1986), which could be extended to explain negative radical flank effects (Haines 1984). The role in coalition formation of positive radical flank effects, however, is not fully developed in the literature.

I build on McCammon, Bergner, and Arch’s (2015) and Truelove and Kellogg’s (2015) findings by bringing together positive radical flank effects and coalition formation and by examining how coalition formation can be part of a strategy of building power and legitimacy to leverage in a longer-term, multi-pronged strategy. However, perceived radicalness is relative and may not always be leftist to be considered a threat. Indeed, perceived radical messages are heterogeneous, but generally target external, hegemonic sociopolitical systems (Karrell and Freedman 2019). In the case of urban development politics, slow growth rhetoric and strategy is radical in its attempts to subvert hegemonic growth machine rhetoric and practice. Further, in contrast to the early analysis of RFE of Black organizing, slow growth advocacy is often perceived as a credible threat from politically powerful white homeowner groups and advocates.\(^{21}\) The

\(^{21}\) In the next chapter I discuss how low-income residents of color also often organize to oppose developments that they perceive threaten displacement in their neighborhoods, and how these
role of radical flank effects as crises that unsettle strategic action fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012) in urban development politics, shifting the positions of incumbents and challengers and prompting coalition formation, is understudied.

Within this larger strategic action field, organizations can be analyzed as relational and dynamic. Levitsky (2007) analyzes “niche activism” of different organizations that at times cooperate, filling specific roles and gaps they see in the field. However, this does not fully explain how organizations that actively collaborate view their roles and negotiate different theories of change. Walker, McCarthy, and Baumgartner (2011) reveal that non-membership based advocacy organizations and those with grassroots membership do not necessarily compete and instead may perform complementary roles through a “productive division of labor” (ibid., 1296). This is due to the necessity in issue advocacy for both expertise from professional advocacy organizations and racialized moral legitimacy from grassroots authenticity (ibid., 1322).

Authenticity:

Another understudied, though secondary, potential mechanism of labor-community coalition formation is the role of perceived authenticity as a resource to coalition partners. While financial resources have been shown to play a role in coalition formation (Bandy 2004), other organizational resources may also play a role. The role of institutional and grassroots authenticity as a mechanism in coalition formation is
understudied, and could help explain how organizations with diverging organizational cultures, ideologies, and strategies could perceive one another as having complementary resources. Further, the literature does not explain how these organizations leverage their distinctive resources in coalition organizing to prioritize their respective goals.

Authenticity is situational and relational, and social movement organizations (SMOs) signal different types of authenticity to different audiences (Walker and Stepick Forthcoming). Two types of authenticity are institutional authenticity and grassroots authenticity. With institutional authenticity, SMOs signal that they are legibly typical actors that fit the mold of a category of organization and have recognizable expertise in a specific issue area (ibid.). In cross-sector coalition formation and advocacy, such expertise is likely to be perceived as a relevant resource. With grassroots authenticity, SMOs signal that they have moral authority on an issue and act as legitimate representatives of directly impacted constituencies (ibid.).

Racialized organizations (Ray 2017) that work directly with residents of color may be better able to signal that they represent directly impacted constituencies, particularly in anti-displacement politics. Additionally, lacking financial resources may be perceived to be a signal of grassroots authenticity (Walker and Stepick Forthcoming), though in some contentious political fields, like entrepreneurial healthcare activism, actors with financial stakes are seen as more committed (Schleifer and Panofsky 2014). Indeed, in urban development politics homeowners and business owners are often consulted as stakeholders, while renters may not be. In the case of urban development politics, property ownership generally confers moral authority, but the lack of property and
therefore the vulnerability to displacement may also confer grassroots authenticity to speak on the issue of the housing crisis.

Organized labor has effectively mobilized grassroots authenticity as moral power in worker dramas (Chun 2009), and mobilizations of worker organizations (Fine 2006). However, in the context of widespread concern over a housing affordability crisis, building trades unions that are seen to support market rate development, may lack sufficient grassroots authenticity to speak to the issue of residential displacement in the eyes of some audiences. As housing displacement is a particularly racialized issue, racialized organizations are likely to have differential access to grassroots authenticity on housing and displacement issues. Though L.A. has long been at the forefront of addressing racial inequalities and immigrant rights in organized labor (Milkman 2006), its leadership, especially in the building and construction trades remains dominated by white men. The grassroots authenticity of CBOs in Black, Latinx, and other racialized immigrant neighborhoods vulnerable to displacement may help counterbalance this. Alternatively, grassroots authenticity may present a boundary to coalition formation, as different groups may choose to “organize one’s own” (Roth 2004), linking organizational form and organizing culture with concerns about authenticity (Roth 2010).

Analysis

When ACT-LA member organizations voted and agreed to form the labor-community coalition, BBLA organizers discussed the value of perceived authenticity in their partnership. Representatives from organized labor recognized that they had much to gain from a partnership with groups that not only had technical expertise in affordable housing, but also could signal the moral authority to speak about displacement. ACT-LA
had reached out to representatives of organized labor multiple times previously in an attempt to get their support and ask them to join their coalition, and had only had success with service sector unions, whose membership overlapped in some instances with ACT-LA’s members and who had also expressed their need, as union members, for affordable housing. Aside from service sector unions, organized labor had given ACT-LA tepid responses when asked if they would join their coalition working on anti-displacement affordable housing policy, and building trades unions had repeatedly mobilized on opposite sides from ACT-LA member organizations in public fora on proposed developments and land use policies.

City Trenches: Labor-Community Tensions Around Development

Though city trenches are generally thought to divide workplace and residential neighborhood issues (Katznelson 1981), urban development projects regularly bring workers and residents into the same political spaces. However, building trades and construction workers and neighborhood residents are often on opposite sides of the issue. This means that the city trenches remain obstacles to building working class solidarity.

In L.A. there have been numerous contentious development projects, but one notable example at the time was the proposed Reef development, a mega project that would replace a parking lot with “1,444 condos and apartments, a grocery store, a gallery, a 19-story hotel with 208 rooms, and more than 67,000 square feet of shops and restaurants,” with the housing comprised predominantly of luxury units (Barragan 2017). ACT-LA members and allies argued the Reef would cause displacement in the
low-income, historically disinvested South LA neighborhood, while building trades representatives and local officials argued it would create jobs.

A Health Impact Assessment of the proposed development confirmed a high risk of displacement (Avey et al. 2015). Community groups also expressed concern over the lack of meaningful community engagement and misleading tactics in which residents were asked to sign cards in support of the Reef in exchange for food and raffle tickets without receiving information about the development. They testified that the Reef falls short of any existing or proposed affordable housing policy, including the existing state density bonus law, the not yet passed Measure JJJ, the Mayor’s proposed linkage fee, and the draft Southeast LA Community Plan. The development therefore represented a loss of opportunity for very low-income and extremely low-income affordable housing units in a neighborhood where affordable housing was sorely needed.22

Considering the fraught relationship between anti-displacement community organizations and organized labor in support of developments like the Reef, it was far from a forgone conclusion that a labor-community coalition would form when organized labor approached ACT-LA and asked them to partner on a ballot initiative. In fact, even after the success of the BBLA, tensions between building trades unions and community groups around the Reef remained. With ostensibly opposed material interests, these groups had a tenuous, contentious relationship and ACT-LA responded to the ask to

22 Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE), an ACT-LA member, successfully sued the developer under CEQA, arguing that the development would result in increased greenhouse gas emissions. This led to an increase in the number of units set aside for affordable housing (Kim 2017).
join in coalition on a ballot initiative with cautious optimism. What had changed to prompt building trades and the L.A. County Federation of Labor to approach ACT-LA? A credible threat had emerged to threaten development at all levels of affordability, prompting organized labor to shift its strategy and recognize the value of the resources ACT-LA members could bring to a coalition effort. The NII and its proposed moratorium on development requiring a General Plan amendment, zone change, or height district amendment represented a radical approach to organized labor, who perceived the NII as a credible threat to their members, particularly those in the building and construction trades.

Labor-Community Coalition Formation

While the case of the BBLA labor-community coalition supports the literature on coalitions, in that an external crisis prompts the formation of a cross-sector coalition (e.g. Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005), and organizers had to engage in fraught organizational work to present labor-community coalition formation as strategic (Borland 2010), the case still presents understudied mechanisms behind coalition formation. These include radical flank effects and perceived institutional and grassroots authenticity as coalition resources. While radical flank effects (Haines 1984) are commonly understood as actions by groups on the radical left that open opportunities for more moderate groups, this case confounds an easy definition of radicalness and demonstrates that a positive radical flank effect can create external crises that facilitate cross-sector coalition formation.
Radical Flank Effects as a Mechanism for Labor-Community Coalition Formation and Innovation

In urban development politics in L.A., slow growth advocates have long acted as challengers to the growth machine, though powerful slow growth constituents often came from the political right (e.g. Horton 1995; Saito 2009). When slow growth advocates succeeded in garnering enough signatures to place the Neighborhood Integrity Initiative (NII) on the November 2016 ballot they represented a radical flank movement that initiated an episode of contention, unsettling the field of urban development politics in L.A. This created a crisis that growth coalition incumbents in the field attempted to counter through different strategies. This RFE divided incumbents in the growth machine, prompting building trades unions to seek out more moderate affordable housing and anti-displacement challengers who actively sought to leverage investment for community benefits as allies and form the Build Better LA coalition.

The credible threat and urgent ballot initiative timeline of this RFE created a sense of urgency that not only prompted coalition formation, but gave the community partners, which had fewer financial resources, leverage once the coalition had been formed. Because organized labor felt the urgency to develop their own initiative in partnership with ACT-LA, they felt they had to listen to ACT-LA’s priorities. Though the sped up timeline frustrated ACT-LA’s consensus-driven grassroots organizing model, the uneasy partnership emboldened ACT-LA to demand deep and strong policy provisions, which would be set in place and not subject to negotiation once the ballot measure was written.
Long-time members of the growth machine, including market-rate developers and apartment owners opposed the NII and also expressed their opposition to the policy BBLA put forward on the November 2016 ballot, Measure JJJ, which requires developers who obtain a General Plan Amendment or zone change to include broad and targeted labor standards and affordable housing at deeper affordability levels than they had previously been required to. Both Measure JJJ and the NII targeted discretionary General Plan Amendments and zone changes, which are forms of zoning relief that do not require concessions from developers in the forms of affordable housing or other community benefits, and which deepen inequalities (Fischer et al. 2018). The NII aimed to put a moratorium on these forms of zoning relief, while Measure JJJ aimed to leverage developers’ practice of using zone changes to intensify land use to force developers to provide affordable housing, hiring and wage standards, and other community benefits.

Elected officials remained neutral through this episode of contention, none risking taking a stand on Measure JJJ, which market-rate developers claimed would cause them to take their business outside of L.A. In interviews with for-profit developers, they asserted that Measure JJJ would require increased costs in labor and affordable housing construction that would force them to develop projects outside the city limits. One for-profit developer said, “We generally pay the prevailing wage rate, but if it’s not triggered then we don’t pay it and with all these added costs, we would probably just walk away from a deal that we would otherwise build. It’s better to have the city just upzone a whole area—like they did with the Arts District. That way they’re encouraging investment and we can build the housing this region really needs.”
The threat that developers would stop constructing housing in the city of L.A., resulting in their threats of “no new affordable housing” (Building Industry Association 2016) was echoed by Measure JJJ opponents throughout the campaign, including the editorial board of the Los Angeles Times. The editorial board argued that voters should reject Measure JJJ, which would “impose some of the nation’s most demanding affordable housing and wage mandates on privately-funded development” (LA Times Editorial Board 2016). It is worth noting that, despite the threat of the development moratorium in the NII, not all growth coalition groups were pushed to embrace the more moderate option of Measure JJJ, though it did push organized labor to partner with ACT-LA.

The NII’s radical flank effect reveals how the politics of urban development confounds easy definitions of radicalness, which is relational and situational and therefore may be better understood in the context of racialized strategic action field incumbents and challengers. While radicals can be understood as activists who prefer riskier direct action tactics, sometimes including violence (Cross and Snow 2011), for the creation of an RFE, I take a broader view of social movement actors’ strategies and how they are viewed by hegemonic actors. In the case of the NII, the two year moratorium on development that would require approvals for density increases, was perceived by incumbent members of the growth coalition to be a radical strategy put forward by groups led by white homeowners and property owners with political capital. Though some grassroots, leftist anti-displacement groups that use direct action tactics later lent their support to the NII, the perception by hegemonic actors of the strategy situates the NII as a radical approach.
In growth machine politics in Southern California, slow growth advocates have often included NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) homeowners, who oppose large-scale development that would impact their quality of life, and environmentalists who argued against the environmental impacts of development (Fulton 1997). The largest, most visible advocates and funders of the NII were not these usual suspects, however. The primary backer was the AIDS Healthcare Foundation, an organization that was involved in lawsuits attempting to stop construction of towers that would obstruct the view from its headquarters (Paluch 2016). However, slow growth homeowner groups and, later, grassroots anti-displacement organizations later joined in support of the NII.

These grassroots anti-displacement groups argued that ACT-LA’s approach was too moderate, as Measure JJJ leveraged development investment for affordable housing, jobs standards, and community benefits, but still allowed for large-scale, mixed-income development, which these groups argued would displace extremely low-income residents. While ACT-LA shared these concerns, they argued that this development had been continuing, particularly accelerated near the public transit buildout, and it was a lost opportunity to secure community benefits. This episode of contention not only divided incumbent growth coalition members, but also divided anti-displacement groups, who continued to work as allies in other contexts, including in a tenant rights coalition, Renters Day LA. ACT-LA remained actively involved in Renters Day LA, advocating for relief for the most rent burdened through limits on evictions for

23 Michael Weinstein, President of the AIDS Healthcare Foundation had already courted controversy by publicly opposing Truvada, pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP), as a form of HIV prevention (Ryan 2015).
demolitions and conversions, which is a point they campaigned on to change Costa Hawkins and the Ellis Act, ending unaffordable and unfair rent increases, and funding for new affordable housing.

The primary contention between ACT-LA and other anti-displacement groups was around affordability levels, as they are calculated by area median income (AMI) of the entire locality, not just of a specific, historically disinvested neighborhood. At one of the advisory meetings for the Health Impact Assessment (HIA) of Measure JJJ, a representative of one of these anti-displacement organizations that was not an ACT-LA member expressed her concern that Measure JJJ would expedite developments at levels unaffordable to extremely low-income (ELI) residents who made up the majority of her neighborhood. ACT-LA members nodded in response, but with furrowed brows. They took turns attempting to clarify that Measure JJJ would not expedite developments, and would involve a far more involved process and requirements for developers than the current system of discretionary zoning relief. ACT-LA members agreed that their concern revolved around extremely low-income (ELI) residents,24 as existing affordable housing density policy did not incorporate them, while Measure JJJ did. These organizers also argued that they needed to pay attention to the risks of not

24 Affordability levels are set as percentages of the area median income (AMI) of the entire locality. Low-income (LI) affordable housing units were set aside for households earning less than 80% of AMI, Very Low-Income (VLI) units for households earning less than 50% of AMI, and extremely low-income (ELI) units for households earning less than 30% of AMI. At the time in L.A., ELI was roughly $25,000 for a family of four and 72% of ELI households in were severely cost burdened, paying more than 50% of their income on housing (California Housing Partnership 2018).
passing Measure JJJ in the midst of a development boom, in which developers secured spot zoning relief without being required to provide any community benefits for existing residents, or took advantage of existing density bonus law without any ELI or hiring provisions. Still, some anti-displacement tenant rights groups lent their names to the opposition of Measure JJJ and support of the NII in the press and mailers, including a mailer that was made to resemble an eviction notice. This latter mailer prompted concern and even panic from some of the extremely low-income renters involved in the ACT-LA coalition, who brought it to organizers asking what it meant.

In the midst of the disruption of the field caused by the NII, growth coalition incumbents from organized labor approached anti-displacement challengers who had signaled they could be open to partnership. They formed the BBLA labor-community coalition, bringing together uneasy allies. The less financially well-resourced partners leveraged the urgency of the RFE and pushed labor partners to shift their priorities in what became Measure JJJ. Due to the perception of the NII as a credible threat to the goals of organized labor and ACT-LA, and the opportunity to pass a policy that could both counter the NII and advance their respective goals, BBLA coalition members bridged this fraught relationship, and continued to push one another to adapt their demands to this new alliance. This productive tension resulted in organized labor agreeing to include deeper affordability requirements than they had originally considered and to include targeted and more inclusive hiring standards. It also resulted in ACT-LA affordable housing developer member organizations agreeing to include more expansive—and therefore more costly—jobs standards.
The threat of the NII also opened the door to meetings with other growth coalition members. Once Measure JJJ passed, City Councilmembers who had previously ignored or taken their time in returning ACT-LA’s meeting requests, promptly replied and set up meetings. One Councilmember told ACT-LA organizers and members that the numerous business groups they had met with had told them that Measure JJJ was the lesser of two evils, as compared to the NII, though they still expressed concern about the labor standards. Notably, these business groups still opposed Measure JJJ and no elected officials endorsed Measure JJJ.

Authenticity as a Resource in Labor-Community Coalition Formation:

As building trades unions and anti-displacement and affordable housing organizing groups are sometimes publicly opposed on issues of urban development, organized labor perceived that their partnership with affordable housing and anti-displacement organizations in the BBLA coalition was necessary to win the policy. They believed it could lend additional credence to the labor-community coalition’s claims about the housing crisis and about what they believed to be an effective—if admittedly partial—policy remedy to the housing crisis. Labor partners discussed this credibility in the eyes of the voting public as coming from what can be understood as grassroots and institutional authenticity (Walker and Stepick Forthcoming). They highlighted how ACT-LA members included residents most vulnerable to displacement, and how ACT-LA member organizations included several affordable housing developers and land use attorneys who had the expertise necessary to write a policy with affordable housing provisions. In the public campaign for Measure JJJ the affordable housing developer organization whose members had been so hesitant to join in coalition with organized
labor, became a core spokes-organization for Measure JJJ in the press, emphasizing the moral obligation to build more affordable housing with good jobs standards and the feasibility to have it pencil out as economically feasible. In the debates around this issue this lent institutional authenticity to the campaign.

ACT-LA is a coalition of CBOs and advocacy organizations, anchored by organizations that organized labor perceived to have institutional authenticity through the CBOs’ long-term engagement in grassroots anti-displacement and affordable housing organizing and equitable land use policy advocacy with low-income residents of color in different neighborhoods throughout the city. ACT-LA member organizations’ engagement in equitable affordable housing policy advocacy made them recognizable as experts in this area to organized labor. These ACT-LA member organizations had been instrumental in overhauling the Cornfield Arroyo Seco Specific Plan (CASP) in Chinatown and Lincoln Heights to ensure that these high-poverty immigrant gateway neighborhoods were not up-zoned without any provisions to prevent displacement of residents and community-serving businesses. Member organizations had also been central to the L.A. Live community benefits agreement (CBA). Additionally, ACT-LA member organizations were also active in other coalitions and campaigns for tenant protections, against development projects that would displace low-income residents of color, and against big banks profiting from the financialization of housing.

Several member organizations had also worked on community plan update (CPU) processes, engaging in years-long organizing efforts in which their respective members drafted people’s plans for Boyle Heights, South Los Angeles, Southeast Los Angeles, and more. The CPU processes continued to be dragged out by the city over
10+ years while ACT-LA organized around a larger-scale equitable TOD policy and the coalition realized there was an opportunity to include tools to strengthen community plans through this separate policy strategy. ACT-LA also recognized the risk of community plans potentially undermining the deep affordability and hiring measures they wanted to pass as a citywide policy.

Additionally, at the point that the BBLA coalition was forming, ACT-LA had already made it publicly known that they had concrete ideas for a citywide affordable housing policy, with particularly deep targets near public transit. In the context of an overly complex web of land use legalities, complicated in part by large developer Geoffrey Palmer’s successful lawsuit against the City of L.A. that effectively stopped the city’s previous inclusionary housing policy, organized labor saw ACT-LA’s expertise in this convoluted policy arena as an essential resource in a ballot initiative campaign with a fast-approaching deadline. ACT-LA’s institutional authenticity was therefore a resource in the eyes of their BBLA coalition partners. They anticipated that ACT-LA’s members’ experience would confer legitimacy in the eyes of the voting public, and ACT-LA’s policy expertise made the actual writing of the policy feasible under the urgent deadline to submit ballot initiative language.

Through the labor-community coalition, ACT-LA also gained access to institutional authenticity (Walker and Stepick Forthcoming) in labor policy. However, this was also a source of internal coalition tension around how labor policy and labor unions are racialized organizations with a history of racism and explicit anti-blackness. ACT-LA member organizations expressed concern that building trades unions would limit hiring provisions to include only their existing memberships, without including provisions
directly targeting Black, Latinx, other racialized immigrant, and women members historically excluded from the trades. ACT-LA navigated these tensions and concerns by consulting with the LA Black Worker Center, as a source of labor policy expertise that directly addressed their membership’s concerns around equity and inclusion in hiring and labor standards. Still, ACT-LA recognized the expertise of labor lawyers and advocates in writing targeted hire policy language.

All coalition partners acknowledged their complementary types of expertise as resources in their coalition work developing the policy, and they anticipated that the voting public would respond positively to their respective legibility as representatives of different issue areas. Still, while institutional authenticities may be complementary coalition resources, coalition partners can also leverage their institutional authenticity to gain an upper hand in coalition organizing. Throughout the process of writing the ballot initiative with the BBLA coalition, ACT-LA was wary of being excluded from drafting the labor standards where they had relatively less institutional authenticity, and actively sought guidance from the LA Black Worker Center, which had clear expertise in the area and a recent relevant victory in the LA Metro Construction Careers Policy. ACT-LA also highlighted how their BBLA labor partners perceived ACT-LA’s grassroots authenticity as a necessary resource, to argue that the policy needed to include targeted provisions that could benefit those same ACT-LA members who had historically been excluded from the building trades.

ACT-LA signaled its grassroots authenticity in press conferences and advocacy events, in which members who had experienced displacement or who were particularly vulnerable to displacement spoke about their experiences and the need for policy
change. This highlights the centrality of directly-impacted constituencies in grassroots authenticity. In addition, many resident leaders who served as spokespersons for Measure JJJ had been involved in several of the campaigns listed above and had deep working knowledge of the technical components of land use policy. Having participated in People’s Planning Schools and in drafting People’s Plans and in the drafting of components of Measure JJJ itself, they spoke fluently about technical planning issues such as floor area ratios (FAR) different affordability levels. Here, expertise is not limited to institutional authenticity, as BBLA coalition members expected the expertise of grassroots resident-leaders could lend credibility to the policy being a grassroots initiative developed with and for the city’s residents who were most vulnerable to displacement.

Further, ACT-LA members emphasized both their deep connections to their specific neighborhoods and placemaking organizing there as well as their activities in coalitions across neighborhoods. The ACT-LA Organizing Committee (OC) built trust across neighborhood, race, ethnicity, and language through ‘TOD Tours,’ in which resident-leaders took ACT-LA members from different neighborhoods on tours of their neighborhood, highlighting previous community uses of the land such as neighborhood theaters and community centers, employing a memory politics from below (Hunter et al. 2018). The OC was also active in the Free Lots coalition, in which they engaged in the political project of Black placemaking (Hunter et al. 2016) and Chicano placemaking, Korean placemaking, Japanese placemaking, and more, through activating vacant lots with art and organizing displays depicting previous and potential uses of the space. These often focused on lots that Metro had left vacant for years after demolishing the
previous buildings to store materials in the construction of public transit rail. OC members discussed these organizing activities and their understanding of shared experiences of displacement and dispossession both in public advocacy for Measure JJJ and in their behind the scenes discussions of how important it was to build trust across race, ethnicity, and neighborhood. They also contrasted this years-long organizing and trust building work with the accelerated labor-community coalition formation and organizing.

Uneasy Partnerships Leading to Innovation

While an external crisis prompted by an RFE and the resources of institutional and grassroots authenticity helped facilitate the formation of the cross-sector labor-community coalition, the partnership remained uneasy. However, this tension led not to compromise, as one might expect from the partnership of organizations that often had divergent priorities in urban development (MacDonald 2011), but to innovation. ACT-LA leveraged its institutional and grassroots authenticity to push to include deep affordability and targeted labor standards, which, in turn, representatives of organized labor embraced as they recognized their potential for labor movement revitalization.

The affordability measures and labor standards included in Measure JJJ were in many ways deeper and both more targeted and farther reaching than existing policies and programs. This deepening in addition to the combination of housing and labor standards in a large-scale land use policy represented policy innovation. While CBAs and a small number of guidelines for land use in other states bring together housing and jobs standards, a citywide land use policy had not successfully bridged city trenches to address these issues together by targeting practices commonly used by developers.
Further, while initial TOD advocates focused on TOD around public transit rail, ACT-LA ensured that Measure JJJ defined transit hubs much more broadly, to include high service bus stops, which effectively covered much more of the city. This means that the original TOD planning, such as that in the initial CASP that targeted already dense corridors without any affordable housing or hiring provisions is essentially superseded by this far-reaching TOD planning tool that includes bus corridors and affordable housing and hiring provisions.

Though the affordability incentives in Measure JJJ were in part modeled on the California State Bonus Law, Measure JJJ includes extremely low-income (ELI) components, which are deeper levels of affordability than the state density bonus or other land use development laws in the area. Measure JJJ also includes provisions that are particularly targeted for transit-oriented communities (TOC) located near public transit, to prevent displacement of core public transit riders. These innovations to affordable housing inclusionary zoning policy were outcomes of ACT-LA’s years-long grassroots organizing policy development process with its members. When asked how these provisions would impact their work, market-rate developers uniformly told me that it would freeze development in L.A. because the provisions would be too expensive for their projects to pencil out. They claimed that they would simply move all of their work outside of the city limits. However, once implemented, developer associations noted that the TOC program has led to an increase in TOD development, including a significant number of affordable units, by increasing predictability and leveling the playing field in the approval and development process (Pimentel 2019).
Acknowledging the opportunity to include strong inclusionary housing components through a ballot measure process—as compared to a City Hall legislative process in which city councilmembers could chip away at the policy provisions—ACT-LA insisted on including particularly deep affordability provisions. However, they did not compromise on other provisions, trading them for the deep affordability. Rather, ACT-LA staff recognized the uneasy acquiescence of some of their organizational members with grassroots memberships when they voted to join in coalition with organized labor, fearing that might lead to compromise, and expressed that they refused to sacrifice the goals and priority areas that members had worked on. While organized labor partners recognized the expertise of ACT-LA in affordable housing development and policy and their institutional authenticity as representing affordable housing advocates, the negotiations over specific provisions were tense and extended into late hours as the partners drafted the ballot measure. ACT-LA leveraged both institutional authenticity by emphasizing expertise in affordable housing policy, and grassroots authenticity by insisting that the provision include deep affordability that their members could speak to as spokespeople in the campaign.

In labor standards provisions, ACT-LA also leveraged its position representing residents vulnerable to displacement and historically excluded from the building trades. ACT-LA followed the guidance and expertise of the L.A. Black Worker Center and pushed organized labor partners in BBLA to include not only local hire, apprenticeship, and prevailing wage requirements in the jobs standards portion of Measure JJJ, but to also include language targeting underrepresented and disadvantaged workers. This also represented an innovation in policy, which ACT-LA partners hoped would result in
greater outreach to historically excluded workers of color and women workers that were better represented in their organizations’ memberships and particularly vulnerable to residential displacement. The specific language includes even more targeted categories, such as single mothers and formerly incarcerated workers, opening new avenues for labor revitalization through outreach to new constituencies.

Though the partners in BBLA may have had a contentious relationship outside of the coalition and remained wary of one another, this relationship led to policy innovations that laid a path for new organizing and future policy advocacy. This is a perhaps unexpected outcome of an RFE. The RFE of the NII brought together these wary allies, and the BBLA partners may have been more moderate than NII backers, but were still far enough apart on these issues and had different, complementary resources in institutional and grassroots authenticity that they leveraged to push one another to put forward innovative measures that incumbent members of the growth coalition had not previously considered viable or worthwhile.

Labor-Community Coalition Formation as Components of Broader Movement Strategies

Social movements are often analyzed cross-sectionally in binary terms of success vs. failure of a protest event, coalition formation, or specific policy or campaign victory. However, movements and movement actors continue to try to build power and apply lessons learned, influencing future movements and movement organizations (Morris 1984; Voss and Sherman 2000). Therefore, I consider here not only the coalition formation and policy outcomes of coalition organizing, but also how this coalition
process and the policy victory shaped longer-term strategy development. BBLA coalition members achieved outcomes beyond the policy campaign victory and the specific components of the policy. Organized labor partners gained policy mechanisms that could in turn contribute to labor movement revitalization and ACT-LA gained political legitimacy to leverage in future organizing and advocacy campaigns. Once Measure JJJ passed and the NII was defeated, ACT-LA pivoted to strategize how to leverage this legitimacy in the organizing and advocacy efforts that they had committed to pursuing when they voted to join the BBLA coalition.

The specific components of the Measure JJJ policy, many of which ACT-LA pushed to deepen, include tools and potential mechanisms for labor movement revitalization. Through Measure JJJ, building trades unions gained a renewed presence in residential construction, an area from which they had been largely pushed out since the 1970s, thereby providing a path to innovation and labor movement revitalization in unorganized sectors of the construction workforce. Further, by passing a policy that provides a pipeline into jobs with prevailing wages and labor standards protections, the BBLA coalition set up a mechanism for recruitment and retention of underrepresented workers of color and women workers. This provides a pathway into the trades and the labor movement that moves beyond isolated targeted outreach programs and pre-apprenticeship programs. Indeed, Measure JJJ creates a pipeline for targeted workers and can connect with pre-apprenticeship programs, such as that recently developed by the L.A. County Federation of Labor, the Second Chance Pre-Apprenticeship Bootcamp, which works with a wraparound reentry organization and targets formerly incarcerated workers who want to enter the building trades. Measure JJJ increases the
demand for labor, which was already high in the building boom, which in turn, provides a fertile ground for building trades outreach to workers historically excluded from the trades, including women and workers of color.

In the final, extremely tense vote, ACT-LA members made clear that participating in BBLA was reflective of and contingent on ACT-LA continuing to develop a broader, long-term, multi-pronged, field-shifting strategy. While pursuing the Measure JJJ strategy, ACT-LA repeatedly returned to its goals and members to evaluate next steps and continued to participate in other tenant rights organizing and advocacy coalitions and campaigns, supporting member organizations’ respective campaigns. In an ACT-LA Policy Committee meeting participants mapped out how ACT-LA’s goals and priorities mapped onto different issue areas and policy advocacy strategies. In ACT-LA Organizing Committee meetings resident-leaders mobilized other coalition members to support direct action tenant rights and transit justice campaigns.

In addition to pursuing a multi-pronged strategy while working on the Measure JJJ campaign as part of their coalition organizing and advocacy, once Measure JJJ passed, ACT-LA strategized how to leverage their new legitimacy. Prior to the Measure JJJ campaign the member organizations had largely been dismissed by City Hall legislators, and were often treated as parochial, narrow interest groups. In lobbying visits prior to the formation of BBLA, City Hall officials often told ACT-LA members that they only represented a small portion of their constituency and told them that they were anti-development (despite ACT-LA members’ repeated assertions that they were not opposed to development as long as it benefitted current residents) and that they had to
meet with other stakeholders who understood the importance of investing in disinvested neighborhoods.

In meetings with the head staff of the City Department of Planning and staff and resident leaders of the grassroots organization prior to the formation of BBLA, the Director of the Department, Michael LoGrande stressed, “We appreciate your preparation and the time you have taken to come and meet with us and present all the hard work you have done on your planning document. Unfortunately, I can’t give you any firm answers at this moment because we need to be able to listen to what everyone has to say to make sure we aren’t prioritizing some interests over others.” At a planning in the streets organizing event an ACT-LA member organization held at one of the empty TOD lots, one of the city planners assigned to the area told me, “It’s just so difficult. You have great events like this where people tell you exactly what they want and don’t want to see, but then there are other people in the neighborhood we have to listen to who maybe want to see a Wal-Mart or a Starbucks. It’s just really difficult to balance all these different voices and interests.” These two examples illustrate the role of liberal pluralism in constructing all civil society groups as ostensibly equal stakeholders, without recognizing the underlying structural imbalances of power (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980) groups like ACT-LA organized to counter.

Prior to the formation of BBLA, city officials also told ACT-LA members that the city had these issues under control and they were planning to address them through their own policy initiatives, which were repeatedly delayed and on which they did not want to receive unsolicited input. Though City Hall officials remained conspicuously silent throughout the Measure JJJ campaign, subsequent to its passage, decision
makers contacted ACT-LA to consult with them on planned proposals. This suggests that the campaign victory strengthened ACT-LA’s institutional and grassroots authenticity in the eyes of an audience that had often dismissed them.

Once Measure JJJ passed, while ACT-LA organized to ensure successful implementation of the policy, the coalition also kept a careful eye on other related policies in an attempt to prevent them from undermining Measure JJJ. The City moved forward with some of its own housing initiatives, including a Linkage Fee, which would require developers to pay fees that would go towards funding affordable housing. ACT-LA organized to ensure that these fees did not provide a less costly alternative to developers who might otherwise be subject to providing affordable units on site or paying steeper fees under Measure JJJ. The success of the coalition’s policy campaign provided concrete policy mechanisms through implementation and enforcement and their increased legitimacy led to the same actors who had previously dismissed the coalition as a narrow interest group now consulting them on policy development.

While the formation of the labor-community coalition and its successful work to pass Measure JJJ are significant milestones, they have farther reaching consequences than a single outcome measure of coalition formation or campaign victory. Further, because ACT-LA and its member organizations had years of experience in long-term land use planning and policy campaigns that rarely had a clear victory or solution, they were already skillful at translating shorter term campaigns into longer term power building. Organizers and worker leaders engaged in this interpretive work along the way, emphasizing how they needed to continue to invest time and effort in capacity building with grassroots members across organizations, neighborhoods, languages,
race, and ethnicity to be able to deeply engage with community planning work. This was clear in their emphasis on the potential opportunity to strengthen the provisions of Measure JJJ in community plans if residents could engage with them meaningfully, and the potential threat of the City to undermine provisions in Measure JJJ through the community plans if residents did not have a voice in that process. Though the ballot initiative campaign was shorter term and had a clearer victory than many of the organizing and advocacy campaigns ACT-LA and its member organizations had engaged in, organizers still discussed the victory within the larger, dynamic processes of building power and a shifting political field.

Conclusion

Considering building trades unions’ position as racialized organizations (Ray 2017) in the growth coalition (Logan and Molotch 1987), urban development politics can be particularly challenging for labor-community coalition formation and organizing. This case demonstrates that radical flank effects can create the crisis necessary to bring together labor and community partners and that perceptions of institutional and grassroots authenticity can facilitate labor-community coalition formation. However, labor-community urban development policy coalitions can also hold potential for policy innovation, as uneasy partners organize and push one another to deepen targeted policy provisions, which can lead to new pathways for labor revitalization. I further argue that community partners may join in such coalitions not only because they see the benefits of increased access to resources, but also as part of a longer-term, multi-pronged strategy. In the next chapter I discuss how this partnership confounds the easy dismissal of community-based organizations as narrow, anti-development, NIMBY
interest groups, and how they responded to assertions that housing undersupply is the root cause of the housing crisis.

Chapter 4

Neither NIMBY nor YIMBY: Urban Organizations’ Strategic Positioning with a Multiplicity of Movement-Countermovements

Introduction

Movement-countermovement dynamics are generally understood and analyzed in binary opposition, while the multiplicity of countermovements and their legibility in relation to the original movements has not been fully explained. How do countermovements that are legible to authorities as directly in opposition to mainstream movements open political space and facilitate legibility for other countermovement groups? This chapter examines how urban organizations’ equitable development approach was previously not legible to authorities, who dismissed them as parochial, anti-development interest groups. It further analyzes how these urban organizations
leveraged the episodes of contention from the conflict between binary movement opposition of NIMBY and YIMBY groups to strategically position equitable development as a third, alternative logic of urban development. In this process the coalition of urban organizations gained political legitimacy, positioning themselves as policy architects and consultants for citywide policy.

Carving Out An Alternative Logic of Development

At an Alliance for Community Transit-Los Angeles (ACT-LA) policy committee meeting after the coalition had succeeded in passing Measure JJJ and succeeded in defeating Measure S, which was the ballot initiative name for the Neighborhood Integrity Initiative (NII), the coalition members reflected on their recent victories. One organizer stated, “I’m just really looking forward to actually implementing policies instead of fighting off backlash.” After some weary smiles and applause the conversation shifted to the members’ concerns moving forward. One committee member shared, “It’s been a frustrating last several months because electoral politics gets over simplified to these binary extremes. It’s either NIMBY [Not In My Backyard] meaning never build anything, or YIMBY [Yes In My Backyard] supply-side build at all costs for economic development and there’s no space for what else could happen. So now we need to transition back into that space and keep pushing for community-driven processes that support equitable development without displacement. I worry about how all this will be spun and want to be sure we avoid a situation where the defeat of Measure S could be interpreted as a mandate for supply-side, build at all costs. Instead we need to show how to do equitable development—not build and screw the rest—and how to engage communities to do that. We need to think through again how to message
that and implement it. The next arena is in the Community Plans. And repealing Costa Hawkins statewide.” The committee members discussed the necessity to push for deep renter protections at both of these scales, implementing the equitable development principles that the coalition had developed with its grassroots membership at the local neighborhood level through Community Plans and preventing displacement by repealing the statewide Costa Hawkins law that facilitates evictions.

A committee member added, “I am anxious, but it feels great that we’re finally having full-on discussions around land use and planning in the public sphere and more residents are starting to learn more about the General Plan and think about community plans. It’s also an opportunity with JJJ implementation, to make sure folks don’t get confused with this false binary—between NIMBY and YIMBY.” Another member added, “Remember when City Council thought we were the NIMBYs?! Just because we were opposing bad projects—and we still do! And now they finally realize we aren’t just small neighborhood groups trying to keep everything the same like the rich NIMBY homeowners do. And we’re also not just saying go ahead and build everything! I’m just worried that since we defeated Measure S so soundly City Hall and developers won’t be so concerned anymore. It’s great that we proved ourselves to be able to do this kind of work and it’s great that we won and showed that we could overcome divisions through this kind of citywide, cross-sector coalition, but there are some very serious divisions that these campaigns uncovered and how we move next is critical. We need to make sure that we proactively address tenant rights issues now. That’s what’s essential. YIMBYs are already saying ‘upzone around transit’ so we need to make it clear that’s
not going to work for our communities and we need to make it clear what equitable
development is actually all about.”

The concerns the ACT-LA Policy Committee members expressed at this meeting reflect the coalition’s shifting position in the wake of their policy victories. This chapter addresses the following research questions: How and why were the CBOs leading ACT-LA able to reimagine, reshape, and institutionalize an alternative LA land use urban regime? How does a cross-sector coalition that had long been dismissed by growth coalition members as having parochial, anti-development, NIMBY goals, and by some anti-displacement advocates as having pro-development YIMBY goals, overcome the city’s various forms of fragmentation and leverage growing divides between NIMBY and YIMBY housing advocacy groups to make space for an alternative politics of equitable development?

Long dismissed by decision-makers as (putatively) anti-development, parochial, narrow interest groups, the citywide, multiracial, cross-sector coalition had succeeded in overcoming L.A.’s infamous urban political fragmentation, bridging city trenches, and leveraging growing divisions between anti-development NIMBY groups and pro-development YIMBY groups to imagine and put forward a third, alternative approach to urban development. Though the coalition had long organized and advocated around this equitable development approach, they had been dismissed and had not been fully legible to decision makers who projected their understanding of growth machine opposition as NIMBY onto this group. The coalition organized across neighborhoods and racial, ethnic, and linguistic barriers and formulated equitable development principles that they wrote into and passed as citywide policy. By leveraging the credible
threat of a separate NIMBY policy and the diametrical opposition of YIMBY groups, the
citywide cross-sector coalition acted as policy architects and put forward policy to
institutionalize their equitable development approach.

This approach emphasizes development without displacement, through renter protections, and affordable housing production and preservation. Core to the equitable development approach is not only these policy strategies, but also building community power to have a voice in shaping land use through truly participatory and equitable community planning, with the ultimate goal of building community ownership in low-income communities of color. ACT-LA member organizations built this vision in response to shared concerns over transit-oriented displacement in neighborhoods across the city, and the need for a coordinated organizing and policy effort to capture the value of this investment in historically disinvested neighborhoods of color and harness it for community benefits for current residents. The coalition developed short and long-term strategies to build community power to shape land use through a wide range of tactics, including through TOD tours, specific plan and community plan organizing and advocacy, and a citywide policy.

In an early document from 2011, ACT-LA outlined principles for equitable TOD, with organizing and policy mechanisms for each. These principles included community self-determination, community decision-making, no displacement, no criminalization, environmental justice, and economic justice. Years later, the coalition articulated how Measure JJJ included specific mechanisms for equitable development. These included incentivizing more affordable housing, creating revenue for the affordable housing trust fund, creating local, livable wage jobs, creating new incentives for inclusive Transit
Oriented Communities, and monitoring and protecting existing affordable and rent stabilized units.

In organizing meetings and actions ACT-LA members articulated what equitable development could look like in practice. They emphasized that their vision is not only responding to threats of displacement and racial dispossession, but is also proactive and asset-based. Community resident members worked with organizers to articulate what investment without displacement could look like in terms of preserving existing affordable housing, activating green and community spaces, and supporting community-serving local businesses and creating deeply affordable housing and supporting community self-determination to build on existing community assets, including cultural spaces, local entrepreneurship like street vending, and sustainability practices such as collective reuse practices and public transit ridership. In practice, this translated to policy principles such as those in Measure JJJ, but also detailed, technical planning language identifying ideal community-serving uses lot by lot in community plan updates. While many suggestions involve stronger state intervention in property markets and zoning regulation, due to the history of the state’s role in racial dispossession, a core theme is community self-determination with the goal of community ownership of land and direction of land use.

Countermovements and Urban Equity Organizations’ Strategic Positioning

Countermovements arise in opposition to existing movements. They may be progressive or reactionary (Lo 1982), but are understood in reference to that opposition (Zald and Useem 1987, 245). Countermovements are likely to arise when the original movement shows signs of success, is interpreted as a credible threat, and when the
countermovement can secure elite allies (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Countermovements are more likely to succeed when they pursue multiple tactics that balance professionalized organization with grassroots mobilization and avoid internal divisions (Dixon 2008). More recently, scholars have analyzed movement-countermovement dynamics within a larger context of competing interests to show how countermovements may also arise in anticipation of movement opposition (Dorf and Tarrow 2018) and how countermovements can mobilize voters to oppose credible threats from the original movement (Vann 2018).

Scholars have also discussed how countermovements may then prompt the rise of a counter-countermovement that differs from the original movement and the countermovement that arose in opposition (Zald and Useem 1987, 249). They have also analyzed how movement-countermovement dynamics shape political opportunity structures as they compete for influence (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Still, movement-countermovement dynamics are generally understood and analyzed in binary opposition, as a “tango of movement and countermovement as SMOs and adherents on both sides attempt to defeat each other, convert third parties to adherents, and draw authorities to one side or the other” (Zald and McCarthy 1987, 245). The third actor, when it is considered, is generally the state. However, the multiplicity of countermovements and their legibility to authorities in relation to the original movements has not been fully explained.

Scholars of within-movement conflict reveal that the splitting off and mobilization of factions can open opportunities for more moderate policy passage, which in turn, can open opportunities for more radical policy advancement (McCammon, Bergner, and
This chapter takes a broader perspective, beyond a binary movement-countermovement or within-movement factionalization to ask: How do countermovements that are legible to authorities as directly in opposition to mainstream movements open political space and facilitate legibility for other countermovement groups? How do third party countermovements strategically position themselves in this multiple movement context?

Strategic Positioning and Legibility

Analyses of strategy link structure and agency in an examination of the choices movement groups make within the constraints of a larger political context (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Jasper 2004, 2006; Ganz, Voss, Sharpe, Somers, and Strauss 2004; Morris and Staggenborg 2004). While much research on social movement strategy focuses on binary movement-countermovement interactions, strategic actions are not limited to discrete choices within this dichotomy, but instead can be interdependent, multivalent, and dynamic within a larger movement context of multiple actors and organizations (Downey and Rohlinger 2008, 5-6). Strategy can help explain intra-movement dynamics, including moderate and radical flanks and a multiplicity of movement-countermovement interactions.

Scholarship on radical flank effects uses a unidimensional measure of strategic dimension that evaluates the relative radicalness of goals and tactics (Haines 1984), while a bidimensional framework examines the depth of challenge and breadth of appeal (Downey and Rohlinger 2008, 9). Still, scholars note that strategy is multidimensional (Downey and Rohlinger 2008, 9). Unidimensional and bidimensional frameworks may obscure how groups strategically position themselves in response to
their perceived legibility by authorities. Further, groups may leverage episodes of contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) that unsettle strategic action fields, as opportune times for strategic positioning.

Perceived legibility is orthogonal to Downey and Rohlinger’s (2008) analysis of breadth of appeal and relates to how organizations navigate their external political environment, in which they are more or less legible to authorities. Perceived legibility is also a component of institutional authenticity, which refers to the perception of social movement organizations as typical actors that fit the mold of a specific category of organization and have recognizable expertise in a specific issue area (Walker and Stepick Forthcoming). Institutional authenticity and perceived legibility are inherently relational, as organizations recognize that authorities are more likely to understand organizations with similar forms and claims to those with which they are already familiar (Clemens 1993).

States have an interest in making communities and groups legible (Scott 1998) and when organizations conform to the forms that authorities expect to find those organizations are perceived to have institutional authenticity and are likely to be rewarded (Walker and Stepick Forthcoming). When organizations use unfamiliar cognitive and cultural models they may not be legible to the state (Scott 1998). Indeed, excluded groups may strategically use well-known and easily understood forms and tactics for this reason, though they may then use them in innovative ways that destabilize institutions (Clemens 1993). However, the dynamic intra- and inter-movement component of organizations’ strategic positioning and how it interplays with their legibility has not been fully explained. How then, can organizations become legible
to authorities and reimagine and reshape the organizational and political logics that had excluded them?

Urban Organizations and Governance

While growth machine theory and urban regime theory have been critiqued as overly focused on business elites and structural forces (e.g. Gilbert 1999), scholars of urban organizations and urban governance examine the roles of nonprofits and CBOs in local politics. The literature on urban organizations highlights the political agency of community-based organizations (CBOs) (Marwell 2004, 2007) and their meso-level role mediating between local neighborhood needs and dynamics and macro-level activity of the state and economy (McQuarrie and Marwell 2009). Scholars reveal the essential role of such organizations in service delivery (Marwell 2004, de Graauw et al. 2013, Levine 2013), and their involvement in interest group-type lobbying for resource allocation (Berry and Arons 2005). Such organizations may facilitate the participation of residents otherwise excluded from local politics. However, increasing participation may not be the answer to inequality, as it may obscure underlying structural inequalities in civil society groups (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980), participatory structures and processes may be co-opted (Walker 2014, Walker et al. 2015), and these processes may reinforce the authority of elites (McQuarrie 2013).

Further, CBOs are heterogeneous in their interests, structures, cultures, and practices, with some more likely to reproduce growth machine logics (Pincetl 2003, McQuarrie 2010). The reproduction of growth machine logics and practices varies based on the structure of the field, and the structure, culture, and priorities of the organizations, with potentially different consequences for those that prioritize service
delivery and resource allocation (McQuarrie 2010) as compared to those that prioritize political advocacy. The role of urban organizations as policy architects reimagining urban governance and institutionalizing new logics of urban governance in contemporary urban development politics is understudied.

Urban organizations acting as social movement organizations (SMOs) may intervene in a strategic action field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012) cognitively, by resisting dominant frames and theorizations and offering new ones (ibid.). SMO mobilizations may also drive shifts in the political opportunity structure in various ways, including by directly intervening in institutional processes and “serving both as architects of settlements and as vehicles for diffusing or legitimating already theorized forms” (ibid., 153). This theorization of SMOs as architects of settlements analyzes movement actors as central—and not just oppositional—actors in political contention.

Such urban organizations are racialized and may help to legitimate unequal and inequitable distribution (Ray 2019). However, other urban organizations mediate this racially inequitable distribution, with many advocating for greater racial equity (Marwell 2004, 2007). Still, in a colorblind racism context, advances towards more equitable distribution is far from a given. If organizations are concerned about racial interest convergence (Bell 1980), organizations with racial equity goals must strategically position themselves within this colorblind racism context in their attempts to challenge racism and construct group-based interest. This challenge is particularly apparent in the use of equity, which is a slippery, elastic frame that different groups can use to mean racial and class equity while others use to mean something else entirely.
Equity as An Elastic Frame:

While equitable distribution became an orienting logic of governance during the Great Depression, it faded from prominence for much of the 20th century (Pincetl 1999a). However, equity as a frame has increased in prevalence in recent years (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009), but has proven to be an elastic term that different actors imbue with varied, sometimes depoliticized and color blind meanings. This is analogous to shifts to colorblind discourse in several areas where actors may still have racial justice goals (Saito 2015).

Pulido (2006) notes that a shift in the scholarship on environmental racism, to framing environmental racism in terms of environmental injustice and then inequity reflects a de-politicization of the antiracist underpinnings of the movement and scholarship. In the planning field in particular, equity is an elastic concept, subject to misinterpretation and cooptation. Planners often lack clear guidance on how to engage residents equitably, with the acknowledgement that different neighborhoods have different racialized and classed histories (Zapata and Bates 2015). Urban planning is dominated by colorblind discourse, the imposition of theoretical models without grassroots engagement, and policy feedbacks that constrain and shape imagined alternatives for urban planning and policy (Schweitzer 2012). Saito (2015) reveals how movement organizations pragmatically and strategically used race-neutral language to accomplish racial justice goals as they acknowledged operating in a political field dominated by colorblind discourse.

Schillinger (2017) notes that the commonly circulated image of people of different heights watching a baseball game, depicting differences between equality, equity, and
liberation is lacking, as it reinforces the notion that inequalities and inequities are rooted in biological differences and the shorter, disadvantaged individuals need help.

Schillinger argues that this analogy does not lead us to an understanding of the need to eliminate racism, and that in fact, racism limits our ability to imagine alternatives and instead constrains us to focusing on tweaking existing circumstances, while directly impacted communities of color reimagine and propose alternative solutions. How have urban organizations working on anti-displacement racial justice goals reimagined urban development logics to present an alternative to the binary movement-countermovement NIMBY vs. YIMBY approaches to instead center social equity? How has the elastic interpretation of equity influenced the growth machine’s response to this alternative approach?

Analysis: Beyond NIMBY vs. YIMBY

ACT-LA Doubly Dismissed as NIMBY and as YIMBY

For several years ACT-LA worked on developing an equitable TOD policy with their grassroots members and tried to lobby City Councilmembers to champion and introduce such a policy. Concurrently, many ACT-LA member organizations actively opposed development projects that they saw as threatening to displace their members, who were largely extremely low-income people of color, and the community-serving small businesses in their communities. Especially in the early years of ACT-LA’s City Hall lobbying efforts, City Hall officials often ignored these groups or dismissed them as having narrow, neighborhood-based, anti-development interests. Officials routinely
responded that the city had to keep the interests of the larger whole in mind and that some change would be necessary.

In one meeting at the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG), discussing S.B. 375, a state law that requires localities to coordinate land use and transportation planning to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, officials made this argument that they had to pay attention to the larger whole and some neighborhoods would have to endure change and increased development and density, using the phrase “for the greater good.” This response demonstrates both a top-down, technocratic approach to planning where the state imposes a model that makes heterogeneous communities legible to the state (Scott 1998), as well as a perception by authorities that neighborhood organizations generally have narrow, NIMBY interests regarding proposed development and land use. This makes sense given the rise of NIMBY politics in Southern California as the hegemonic countermovement resisting the urban growth machine (e.g. Davis 1990, Fulton 1997).

Though the slow growth movement has always been heterogeneous, authorities often understand it in terms of opposition to the growth machine and as being dominated by anti-development NIMBY activists. Though environmentalists concerned with curbing sprawl and environmental degradation are distinct from NIMBY homeowners who advocate no or slow growth, growth coalition members often conflate the two groups. This is evident in how elected officials and developers discuss environmentalist land use policies, such as the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). In public fora growth coalition members discuss CEQA as red tape that unnecessarily slows down development, while community residents and equitable
development groups acknowledge the policy’s imperfections but see it as one of the few avenues for public engagement in development and land use. The growth coalition attitude toward CEQA reflects the continued strength of growth machine rhetoric, which is also reflected in YIMBY arguments to remove zoning and other regulatory barriers to dense development, though deregulation does not necessarily lead to greater housing production or affordability and is likely to lead to gentrification (Rodriguez and Storper 2019). It is also a demonstration of how ostensibly “green” planning policies and tools can be used and interpreted by different interests.

Growth coalition opposition to Measure JJJ echoes this attitude toward zoning regulations. For example, the L.A. Times Editorial Board published its opposition to Measure JJJ, putting forward the vague threat of interfering with market forces. They stated, “Creating good housing policy means balancing how much the government can demand against how much the real estate market will bear” (L.A. Times Editorial Board 2016). This statement implies that Measure JJJ architects lack an understanding of housing market dynamics. Similarly, speakers at a Los Angeles Business Council event argued that the real estate business is inherently reliant on speculative investment and it would be naive to think that regulating development to force developers to provide for low-income renters would actually provide more affordable housing. Numerous

25 In reality, two years after Measure JJJ was passed, affordable housing creation in L.A. has not slowed, with 3,500 units of affordable housing being proposed under Measure JJJ incentives.
speakers highlighted cities that had removed zoning and development regulations as examples of how to facilitate the building of more housing.\textsuperscript{26}

Speakers discussing the 2016 L.A. ballot measures at an American Planning Association (APA) event similarly dismissed the expertise of ballot measure policy architects and the capacity of voters to understand the issues at stake. The speakers asserted that the proponents of such measures lack an understanding of what comprehensive planning entails and instead act rashly out of frustration. The speakers shook their heads in exasperation at these efforts to “plan by ballot initiative,” resulting in what they believed were draconian measures—referring both to the NII and to JJJ—that addressed administrative issues that they argued should not be legislated, particularly not by ballot initiative. They insisted that voters could not possibly understand the complexities of planning processes and that these initiatives were driven by a frustration with dense development and a general public mistrust of expertise.

Though Measure JJJ policy components have not slowed development (L.A. Department of City Planning 2018), growth coalition members opposed the measure, citing it as unnecessary and harmful regulation, conflating it with anti-development slow growth measures. Measure JJJ opponents conflated JJJ with anti-development NIMBY politics despite the fact that equitable development was not new in L.A. Coalitions of urban organizations had actively put this model forward in the L.A. Live/Staples Center community benefits agreement (Saito 2015) and in the multiple community plan updates

\textsuperscript{26} This attitude reflects neoliberal growth machine ideology, though in fact such deregulation does not necessarily lead to more housing or greater affordability, but is likely to lead to gentrification (Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2019).
throughout the city, as well as in the Cornfields Arroyo Seco Specific Plan (CASP). ACT-LA member organizations advocated not for NIMBY conservation of quality of life but for harnessing investment in historically disinvested neighborhoods of color for equitable development. Still, authorities persisted in conflating organizations advocating for this model of equitable development with NIMBY groups.

While growth coalition members projected NIMBY interests and logics onto equitable development groups including ACT-LA, others projected the binary opposition, YIMBY (yes in my backyard) logics onto ACT-LA when they gained prominence around the time of the 2016 election. The YIMBY groups offered a supply and demand logic that an abundant supply of housing would be the answer to the region’s housing, transportation, and air quality crises. They positioned themselves as a countermovement directly in opposition to NIMBYs. YIMBYs support supply-side development approaches, which scholars have shown reproduce racially exclusionary logics and outcomes (McElroy and Szeto 2017) and do not address how the filtering process that would lead to increased supply to becoming affordable is a long, unreliable process that would not adequately address affordability in the near or long term (Zuk and Chapple 2016). Meanwhile, this binary opposition of NIMBY vs. YIMBY ignores the third alternative of equitable development that leverages investment for community benefits, which historically disinvested communities have long organized and advocated for.

Equitable development eschews the NIMBY or slow growth approaches to increased development, while also resisting the YIMBY approach to increasing housing supply at all income levels for all residents. It questions the YIMBY philosophy of supply
and demand, arguing that supply and demand ignores how growth coalition members in the real estate industry (Smith 1979) and intensified speculation drive urban housing economics (Capelle 2017). Equitable development advocates also resist YIMBY policies, such as the failed California Senate Bill 35 that would have expedited the public review and approval process for multifamily housing with certain standards, including a set number of affordable units. These advocates note that increased housing supply in a stratified housing market does not necessarily lead to housing affordability (Capelle 2017, Zuk and Chapple 2016), and can lead to devastating impacts particularly for low-income residents of color. Indeed, luxury apartments as a proportion of all apartments constructed have increased each year since 2012, with the 2017 figure at 70% in L.A. (RentCafe 2018). The figure is even higher in cities and states without any inclusionary housing or density bonus programs.

At a meeting of the advisory group for the Health Impact Assessment that the L.A. Department of Public Health conducted on Measure JJJ, a representative of an anti-development organization that was not a member of ACT-LA accused ACT-LA of writing a YIMBY policy that facilitated more development without greater affordability or community involvement. In the moment this caused confusion and then ACT-LA representatives asked questions and explained the part of the bill’s text that caused the confusion. Though ACT-LA representatives negated this accusation of promoting and facilitating development at all costs, anti-development groups persisted in claiming that Measure JJJ and its proponents promoted YIMBY interests including the development of projects that would displace extremely low-income residents without mitigations. This reveals the hegemonic influence of NIMBYism to bend all countermovements to be
legible through that lens, with YIMBY logics reflecting a binary opposition, while equitable development remained illegible to many.

At an ACT-LA organizing committee meeting resident leaders discussed how different publics still did not seem to understand equitable development, even though Measure JJJ was just a small piece of their strategy. They emphasized that Measure JJJ was “not a silver bullet at all” and would not just lead to 100% affordable housing at the lowest income levels, but was a partial solution within the speculative market. One resident leader stated, “We can’t just keep ceding whatever they want to developers. This is one way to say they have to give something in return. That said, community control is the end game and this is a strategy to build power in the meantime.” Others nodded their heads in agreement and an organizer chimed in, “We’re also not going to stop being critical of bad developers or of the city or the county while they implement these policies.” This reveals how these leaders and organizers viewed equitable development as a multipronged strategy, with policy components as well as continued organizing and mobilization against bad development and for longer-term community control. It also points to how ACT-LA and its member organizations organized to resist unregulated Wall Street investments in real estate and renter protections as they recognized that Measure JJJ could only address financialization of housing insofar as the affordable housing and hiring provisions applied across types of developers and investors. In this way, organizers and advocates recognized that Measure JJJ was an improvement on community benefit agreements that are not only much narrower in scope, but had to be negotiated directly with developers, which would likely prove more
difficult if the development was one small part of a rent-backed security owned and traded by corporate investors.

While the binary movement-countermovement of NIMBY vs. YIMBY may have been most legible, this example also reveals the multiplicity of countermovements. First, NIMBY and YIMBY movements are each heterogeneous. Traditional NIMBYs, white homeowners who aim to protect their neighborhood’s quality of life by opposing development (Davis 1990), have often allied with other homeowners, small business owners and other stakeholders who perceive development to be threatening to their way of life and/or conducting business. In Southern California the slow growth movement has its roots in and is often conflated with NIMBYism and others actively mobilizing to exclude immigrants (Horton 1995). A group of slow growth advocates supported the Neighborhood Integrity Initiative, as a contemporary effort to curb large-scale development. They argued that the community plans, which largely guide planning and land use in the city, were out of date. As Morrow (2013) notes, white homeowner groups largely shaped the original community plan processes, restricting development in their neighborhoods and directing density to lower income neighborhoods of color.27 Many of the same and overlapping groups have opposed community plan update processes that they feared would lead to more density, such as in the case of the Hollywood Community Plan update process where slow growth groups sued to stop the process.

27 Westside neighborhoods largely succeeded in restricting zoning to single-family housing, while the proportion of multifamily residences in neighborhoods with majority residents of color dramatically increased (Morrow 2013, 164).
Pro-housing groups are also heterogeneous. A large portion of YIMBYs advocate for an abundant supply of all types of housing, arguing that greater supply at all levels of affordability, including market rate housing, will solve the housing crisis. Other pro-housing groups point out that financialization of the housing market has led to an overproduction of housing that is unaffordable to most and that this oversupply in the upper end of a stratified housing market does not address the housing crisis. Such groups actively oppose luxury and market rate developments in historically disinvested areas, with some supporting inclusionary housing and some only supporting 100% affordable housing development. Still other groups only support the preservation of existing affordable housing and oppose 100% affordable housing developments in such neighborhoods because the income levels are set on a city/countywide basis, pricing out the majority of extremely low-income current residents who are renters of color and often do not include first right of return for residents who have been displaced. In response to the NIMBY-YIMBY binary, Los Angeles organizers put forward a new acronym: PHIMBY, arguing for public housing in my backyard (Meronek 2019).

Developers and other members of the growth coalition echo the YIMBY view that the solution to the housing crisis is to remove regulatory barriers to building more housing at all levels. In interviews with developers for the Measure JJJ Health Impact Assessment, market-rate housing developers uniformly argued that policies like inclusionary housing would lead them to leave the city and build elsewhere, saying that such policies lead to decreases in building permits. In the case of L.A. Measure JJJ has led to an increase in building and at the time, organizers questioned this metric, as permit rates do not always directly correspond to construction rates.
JJJ confronts the claim that affordable housing is too expensive to build in general and particularly when developers must attend to labor standards. ACT-LA’s subsequent campaign for a public bank also points to a possibility for funding affordable housing, storing affordable housing trust fund dollars from for-profit developers who contribute to the fund in exchange for higher density through value capture, and potentially providing a mechanism to fund 100% affordable housing development without requiring the high return on investment that private developers expect.

Organizers also pointed out that the logic of undersupply ignores the financialization of the housing market and the creation of artificial scarcity. They pointed out that post-2008 housing crash, Wall Street investors purchased millions of surplus housing units across the country and held them intentionally vacant, skewing supply figures at every level of affordability. Private equity firms also purchased housing that had been foreclosed on due to the subprime mortgage trading crisis and used rent-backed mortgage securities to transform these properties from undervalued blight into profitable investments. The results can be seen in the significant increase in property flipping in hot housing markets (Sung and Bates 2017).

YIMBY groups have countered thatcharacterizations of their positions are misconstrued and oversimplified, and over time they have adjusted their positions to call for affordable housing in addition to housing for all income levels. Still, they have generally mobilized majority white groups even in cities that are majority people of color, and in some cases argued against or silenced anti-displacement groups that are majority people of color (Axel-Lute 2019). YIMBY groups spread rapidly, with about 100 YIMBY groups sprouting up in a three-year period across the world (Meronen 2019).
Some argue that YIMBYs provide a clear solution to the housing crisis that elides the messy, racist historical and contemporary context of housing development and appeals to developers and other capitalists, including tech companies and investors (ibid., Szeto and Meronek 2017).

This colorblind politics of collective amnesia conflates both racist real estate practices and anti-displacement opposition of luxury development that would displace low-income residents of color (Meronek 2019). In contrast, equitable development organizers use a grassroots “memory politics from below” (Hunter et al. 2018), in which they engage in culturally specific, intergenerational placemaking, actively mapping how land was used over time. The ACT-LA Organizing Committee did this through TOD Tours in which elders in different communities shared how community theaters and other key spaces had been demolished and organizing had been repressed. They then engaged in active community planning by taking over vacant lots with representations of what the space had been and could be used for. This counterhegemonic visioning ran in contrast to the current and proposed uses by developers. It also did not fit neatly into the NIMBY-YIMBY binary, as they opposed developers’ proposed uses of luxury development and non-community-serving businesses, but did not oppose all development. In fact, fatigue at having to repeatedly organize and mobilize against bad developments while their work on community plans was dismissed and deprioritized was a primary motivation for originally forming ACT-LA and pursuing citywide policy campaigns.
Strategic Positioning with Multiple Countermovements

Within the context of multiple countermovements, countermovement legibility to authorities and differentiation by movement actors can be challenging and requires strategic positioning. The movement-countermovement conflict produces episodes of contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) that unsettle strategic action fields, and alternative countermovements may leverage this crisis through strategic positioning. The existence of a legible, binary countermovement, YIMBYs, did not automatically open space for equitable development movement groups or equitable development logics. ACT-LA strategically positioned its policy work in this context. The coalition leveraged the credible threat of a NIMBY ballot initiative, emphasizing how an equitable development approach would address the affordable housing crisis while a development moratorium could make it worse, and they stressed how equitable development policy includes mechanisms to ensure that any new development includes strong affordability measures and targeted labor standards, while simple abundant supply of all types of housing exacerbates gentrification and displacement pressures. In the context of a hot housing market the policy has not led to a slowdown in private development, but has harnessed it to provide affordable housing units and hiring standards.

By leveraging the binary movement-countermovement arguments and credible threats and by securing a significant policy victory in Measure JJJ, ACT-LA, as representative of equitable development groups, gained legibility and legitimacy. Authorities saw that this group’s goals and claims differ from those of NIMBY or YIMBY groups. While they had once dismissed them as anti-development and ignored meeting
requests, they began to consult ACT-LA on housing and transportation policy. ACT-LA remained vigilant, stressing that they must ensure that the implementation of Measure JJJ ensured that the deep measures of affordability and targeted labor standards are not undermined and that they continue to actively support anti-displacement campaigns and policies, as well returning to and developing more directly anti-racist transit decriminalization campaigns.

The growing influence of equitable development could be seen in two failed YIMBY policies proposed after the passage of Measure JJJ: S.B. 827 and S.B. 50 which attempted to correct some of the errors of S.B. 827 but was still unsuccessful. In response to pushback on these bills, YIMBY groups put forward positions that supported not just strict supply and demand solutions to the housing crisis but also anti-displacement policies (Jacobus 2018). Democratic California State Senator from San Francisco, Scott Wiener, put forward Senate Bill 827 in early 2018 as a supply-side solution to the housing crisis. Proponents argued that S.B. 827 would address the long history of segregationist planning that led to low-density zoning in majority white homeowner neighborhoods, resulting in the current housing shortage (Ilas 2018). However, numerous groups, including homeowner groups, as well as anti-displacement organizations, ACT-LA, and more opposed S.B. 827 (ibid.). ACT-LA argued that the proposed bill, which would increase allowable zoning densities near transit would undermine the housing and hiring standards passed in Measure JJJ (ACT-LA 2019). Others also derided the bill for not including rental protections (e.g. Schweitzer 2018), considering the threat of displacement of low-income renters by TOD and the claims by
outspoken NIMBYs that they support renter protections like right of return and right to remain (e.g. Gaisford 2018).

Urban Organizations as Policy Architects of Equitable Development

While equitable development is an alternative logic of urban development to NIMBY vs. YIMBY logics, it is an elastic framework that can potentially be slippery and subject to cooptation and misuse as a colorblind approach rather than one rooted in racial justice. ACT-LA’s use of equitable development is rooted in an analysis of racial and class inequalities and historic disinvestment. However, growth coalition members often used equity to mean something entirely different. At a SCAG meeting, where representatives of 89 different Southern California governments convened to plan implementation of land use and transportation policy, authorities discussed equitable distribution as a geographic measure. They also conflated equity and equality and argued that smaller governments should have a share of resources equal to those provided to larger jurisdictions, no matter the race and class make up or need of the localities. This is an example of how institutions are racialized and how their cooptation of equity as colorblind language can legitimize unequal racialized distribution of resources (Ray 2019).

Organizations may use colorblind frames strategically (Saito 2015), but for L.A. organizations that have racial justice goals, they had to differentiate what they meant by equity. At that SCAG meeting representatives from ACT-LA member organizations distributed themselves throughout the room so that they were present in each of the breakout groups, where they ensured their feedback countered this colorblind use of equity and they could present the coalition’s priorities. This is the most literal example of
strategic positioning from my fieldwork. In an Investing in Place coalition meeting of
advocacy and grassroots organizing organizations discussing transportation justice and
planning, organizers explained that they used geospatial data on race as research had
revealed that this captured disinvestment, class disparities, and transportation injuries
and fatalities. They then presented this data to Metro and other governing bodies in an
attempt to shift policy discussions of equity from colorblind to racially cognizant.

Equitable development is a frame, but it also extends beyond simply a frame to a
logic with material consequences in how it is interpreted and institutionalized in policy.
Through ACT-LA’s policy work, both in writing and passing policy and in other policy
organizing, the coalition implemented specific mechanisms to achieve racial justice
goals even with such an ostensibly race-neutral frame. In Measure JJJ, these
mechanisms include shifting from local hire and apprenticeship requirements to targeted
hire for zip codes with specific proportions of residents of color and underrepresented
worker hiring requirements, including lists of workers that are disproportionately people
of color, including formerly incarcerated workers.

This equitable development approach came out of a 10+ years process that
ACT-LA member organizations had conducted with resident members to understand
and engage in land use planning. For example, organizations in South LA developed
the People’s Plan and organizations in Boyle Heights developed the Plan del Pueblo,
each of which directly engaged residents and put forward a detailed vision of how
zoning and land use could bolster community assets and address the needs of and
prevent the displacement of current residents. ACT-LA advocates acknowledged that
historically, land use has been a tool of racial dispossession through red lining,
disinvestment, segregation, and denial of resources and that disinvested communities
are often forced to react to land use policies and development projects that threaten to
displace current residents. They questioned if land use policy could instead be a tool to
proactively engage and resist this dispossession, but recognized that they needed to
engage residents in reenvisioning what equitable community development could look
like. The principles of equitable development can be seen in Measure JJJ, but also in
the community planning processes member organizations engaged in. For example, the
People’s Plan includes four principles: Create a net gain of affordable housing and stop
displacement, create inclusive economic development that supports local workers and
businesses, prioritize environmental justice and enhance community health, and
strengthen community leadership in the land use planning process.

Conclusion

While they had been long dismissed as parochial NIMBY interest groups or had
their equitable development community planning work deprioritized, ACT-LA member
organizations established themselves as successful urban policy architects with the
passage of Measure JJJ. By circumventing the City Hall legislative process they were
no longer groups that developed policy proposals and facilitated civic participation, but
were policy architects, and became recognized as groups with expertise and influence
to be consulted in future urban policy matters. City and County officials who had
repeatedly delayed setting meetings with them previously began to reach out to them to
ask for input on equitable development guidelines.

While the movement-countermovement literature generally analyzes long-
standing binary opposition such as those revolving around abortion or gun control
policies, this analysis of equitable development reveals that there can be a multiplicity of countermovements and that they are not necessarily long-entrenched divisions, but rather that newer conflicts can open the political field. It further reveals how movement actors outside of the binary opposition are constrained by the more legible binary framework through which authorities view movements and countermovements. However, these movement actors can strategically position themselves in the context of movement-countermovement conflict.

Chapter 5

Conclusion: Building From Here

Introduction

Though the dominant image of L.A. is of a smoggy megalopolis dominated by cars and freeways, it is also the site of the largest public infrastructure project in the country. This contentious buildout of the public transportation system provides a lens to examine the shifting strategies that drive uneven development and racial dispossession and how organizations bridge city trenches to resist displacement and dispossession and put forward alternative logics of urban development. The underlying structural interests of capital accumulation have meant that, similarly to how white supremacy
shifts and adapts over time, growth machine strategies have shifted and adapted to new systems and forms of resistance.

With the success of the slow growth movement in L.A. and increasing recognition of the need for sustainability and more housing, TOD has provided a useful avenue for the most recent growth machine reconfiguration. However, the presence of multiple countermovements and the strategic positioning of urban organizations has opened local development politics to new approaches to equitable development. Still, the goals of equitable development are constrained by the contemporary realities of a highly commodified and financialized housing market, few labor protections, and the easy cooptation of equity as colorblind.

I began the analysis for this dissertation with the understanding that urban development in the U.S. is always already a racialized political economic process based on racial dispossession, in which growth coalition actors create and extract capital by dispossessing residents of color from land, property, and community. While growth machine theory helps us understand the structural economic interests in local urban development, it does not adequately address how these structural economic interests are embedded in and driven by racial capitalism. Traditional growth machine theory also does not fully explain how growth machine interests adapt and respond to pressures from multiple movements and how movement organizations can shift from being dismissed as peripheral interest groups to being central policy architects. Considering this premise, I asked the question, how do such organizations form cross-sector coalitions to bridge city trenches and resist racial dispossession, to better understand the broader question, how do urban development politics shift?
First, the L.A. growth machine has implemented different forms of racial dispossession to facilitate accumulation through intensification of land use over time and residents and community organizations have resisted these practices. Though contemporary city boosters mobilize a colorblind collective politics of amnesia to frame the current public transit infrastructure development as unprecedented and cutting edge, housing and transportation infrastructure have always been linked and central to the L.A. growth machine’s strategy of urban development. This has been the case with early explicitly white supremacist developments connected by privately owned and operated rail transit, to strategies to devalue and disinvest from neighborhoods of color, creating racialized rent gaps and dispossessing residents of color to build freeways and more recently, public transit rail. This latter development has spurred organizing efforts to resist transit-oriented displacement. Movement building organizations counter city boosters’ colorblind collective politics of amnesia with organizing practices that acknowledge histories and contemporary realities of racial dispossession through memory politics from below, while fostering asset-based organizing.

Though these urban organizations had long been dismissed by elected officials and other members of the growth coalition as peripheral, parochial interest groups, they recognized a shared threat of transit-oriented displacement and gentrification and formed a citywide coalition, ACT-LA, across neighborhoods, racial, ethnic, and linguistic differences, and issue areas. A radical flank effect threat then led this citywide, multiracial, multi-issue coalition to form a labor-community coalition. Growth coalition members perceived a radical credible threat to their operations in the form of a slow growth measure and building trades unions and organized labor reached out to ACT-LA
as a partner that could lend institutional and grassroots authenticity to their efforts to resist a development moratorium.

This case reveals the effect of a radical flank effect, as perceived by hegemonic actors, and the role of authenticity as a resource in coalition formation. Further, rather than driving divisions or compromise, ongoing tensions between labor and community partners in the coalition led to policy innovation. The urban organizations long dismissed as peripheral, parochial interest groups positioned themselves as policy architects of the first citywide deeply affordable inclusionary housing measure to also include deeply targeted hiring provisions. This policy is one part of ACT-LA’s multi-pronged strategy to advance equitable development as an alternative urban development logic. While the NIMBY-YIMBY binary may have been more easily understood by policymakers, media, and the public, equitable development organizing and advocacy reveals that the contentious politics of urban development is heterogeneous and comprised of multiple countermovements. It further reveals how urban organizations can strategically position themselves within the context of multiple countermovements.

Leveraging Legitimacy for Multi-pronged Strategy

ACT-LA has been consistently clear that Measure JJJ is only one piece of a larger, multi-pronged strategy to address equitable development. This was particularly salient when the coalition decided to join organized labor to develop the ballot measure, and it has remained clear through the implementation of the policy that they won. ACT-LA has remained active in anti-displacement coalitions and campaigns and has leveraged their increased legitimacy from the successful citywide policy to have greater influence on other local and statewide anti-displacement affordable housing policies and
have increased their efforts in other strategies, including community ownership through community land trusts that take land out of the speculative housing market, campaigns to defund racially discriminatory policing to build power around transit justice, and campaigns around public banking efforts, which also tackle the underlying causes of housing insecurity in the contemporary financialized housing market.

**Contemporary Context of Financialization**

Despite the fact that financialization of housing was at the root of the 2008 financial crisis, private equity firms retain the ability to bundle and trade housing debts. Indeed, with the influx of public dollars to these firms post-crisis, they developed new strategies to profit from housing. These firms took public bailout funds and instead of injecting them into local economies, they bought up large swaths of distressed properties, the majority were undervalued due to the subprime crisis that the same firms had created (Hanson 2019). The firms then purposely withheld these properties from the market, transformed many from for-sale to rental properties, and repackaged the housing debts as rent-backed securities that they packaged and traded with other investments (ibid.).

This practice not only separates the social utility of housing from the exchange of manufactured debts, but also shifts the burden and risk of investments away from the investment firms. This also spreads the impact of financialization practices beyond foreclosed homeowners to renters and majority renter cities like L.A. Further, this confounds the spurious supply and demand logic discussed in the previous chapter, as the supply of actual housing is hoarded and the product supply that these processes require is actually of ever increasing debt.
While private equity firms and institutional investors are distinct from local growth coalition members, structural shifts in the urban political economy facilitate financialization. Local growth coalitions abandoned public housing and resist fare-free public transit, while facilitating private investment in housing and transportation. In my fieldwork, growth coalition members in a wide range of settings consistently insisted that public-private partnerships were the ideal solution. This is an outcome of both ideology and structural constraints, particularly post-Proposition 13 and the fiscal constraints it has created. Still, though the influence of financialization continues to increase and while it remains distinct from localized growth machine practices, there are overlapping interests in intensified investment. The form that investment takes may be somewhat incidental for private equity firms, but growth coalitions still largely shape local housing and planning policy where this financialization has increasingly targeted. Coordinated organizing strategies to protect the social utility of housing from these investment practices where the risk is transferred to those who are already most vulnerable reveal the need for proactive policy and planning that acknowledge these dynamics.

ACT-LA—particularly post-Measure JJJ victory—and ally organizations across the state have organized around strategies to combat financialization of housing. Financialization complicates the already multi-pronged strategies for organizations that have focused much of their organizing at the local level. These groups have steadily worked to build statewide and national coalitions and international solidarity networks to confront the realities of financialization and the lack of regulation at each of these scales.
At the statewide level, these strategies have included state-specific policy campaigns to overturn the Ellis Act, as analyses revealed that big banks were financing “displacement mortgages” (Stein 2018). Targeting the Ellis Act also reflects the broader equitable development principle of preservation of affordable housing. In some cases banks were claiming Community Reinvestment Act credits to finance loans to purchase housing that was affordable at the time of purchase, though the properties would be converted from rental to for sale, and the low-income tenants evicted via Ellis Act evictions (Stein and Murray 2019).

The Ellis Act is a specific policy mechanism that has helped intensify and accelerate the increase in predatory real estate practices in low-income neighborhoods of color, as private equity firms targeted ‘distressed’ properties in these neighborhoods. Such firms have bought these properties in bulk, leading to a dramatic increase in real estate owned properties (REOs), which transform rental income streams into securitized assets (Stein 2015). This process reflects an acceleration of the growth machine’s processes of racialized uneven development and manufacture and exploitation of rent gaps. This large scale investment in transforming single-family homes into rental properties by large investment corporations, representing $220 billion in housing value nationally, is another mechanism of racial dispossession as neighborhoods of color have been particularly targeted (Eisfeldt and Demers 2018).

Another strategy that ACT-LA and allies have pursued is to organize advocate for public banking. The campaign for a Los Angeles public bank was narrowly defeated, but state legislation that would develop a state-owned bank (which would be the nation’s second public bank after South Dakota) and allow localities to charter their own public
banks was recently passed. Local legislative champions of the L.A. banking measure argued that this institution would be necessary to manage the revenues from cannabis taxes, while ACT-LA and ally organizations argued that it could become a new source of financing for equitable development.

Though the Transit-Oriented Communities program from Measure JJJ has led to an increase in affordable housing units (L.A. Department of City Planning 2018), L.A. housing production continues to fall below housing needs, and organizers have argued that public banks could finance deeply affordable housing. One possibility organizers have discussed is to require that public banks follow the Anti-Displacement Code of Conduct, which organizations have mobilized to get big banks to follow (Stein and Murray 2019). This code reflects equitable development principles, including requiring borrowers comply with tenant protections, refusing to fund unreasonable evictions, responsible investing in low-income neighborhoods, creating good jobs with strong labor standards, financing local, community-serving small businesses, and more.

ACT-LA has also increasingly focused on decommodification of housing, taking it out of the highly financialized housing market, through community land trusts and community ownership of underutilized public lands. This latter strategy has long been a focus of ACT-LA, due to the loss of so many community spaces through eminent domain to hold equipment and materials during the construction of the public transit rail lines. In its TOD Tours, ACT-LA worked with Free Lots L.A. to activate these empty lots, engaging collective memory from below (Hunter 2018) and envisioning future uses that would serve the existing community. In the contemporary context of hyper financialization of housing, organizers have identified public banking and public land as
two strategic opportunities to shift the role of the state in urban development from a core growth coalition member to a partner in equitable development.

Future Research

The findings of this dissertation point to the need for future research on financialization of housing and public goods and organizing strategies that target financialization. This could include how growth coalition actors have expanded their traditionally local focus in an attempt to align their interests with those of globalized corporate investment capital and under what conditions they are unable to do so and are sidelined by increasing financialization. It could also address the larger questions of if and how local organizations can effectively resist this larger trend of financialization by non-local corporate actors that are presumably less accountable to local constituencies and if local growth machine policies and practices are still effective sites of organizing and resistance, given this trend.

To address a new aspect of city trenches, future research could investigate how funds in workers’ pension funds are invested in private equity firms deeply engaged in the financialization of housing. The largest such firm, Blackstone, which buys significant portions of housing stock and trades housing debts in bundled investment packages, is present in multiple public employee pension funds. In addition to the city trenches between issue siloes of organized labor and affordable housing discussed in this dissertation, this particularly contemporary example of financialization has the potential to divide movements. Alternatively, as private equity firms reach across labor and housing issues, this could instead be a focus point for organizing and mobilizing in coalition across these city trenches. This could also be a focus for bargaining for the
common good strategies that reimagine collective bargaining and labor-community coalition targets.

Future research should also systematically examine organizing and coalition strategies that target financialization, including at different scales. This could include local strategies to decommodify housing and take it out of the private market, such as through community land trusts and through campaigns to bring back public housing and address the serious deficits in the market-based Section 8 housing voucher system. It could also include campaigns for public banking, such as the campaign for the L.A. public bank, which recently failed to garner enough votes, as well as the more recent successful statewide campaign for a California public bank. This could usefully be linked to analyses of national coalition organizing on these issues, such as through the Right to the City Alliance and Communities United for a Just Transition. Future research on organizing should also address the connections between these types of organizing efforts and those that target decriminalization of public transit and public space, acknowledging their connection in addressing racial violence and the containment and criminalization of poverty.
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