

UC San Diego

UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

Honor Bound: The Military Culture of the Civil Guard and the Political Violence of the Spanish Second Republic, 1931-1936

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5zq5b591>

Author

Chamberlin, Foster Pease

Publication Date

2017

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Honor Bound: The Military Culture of the Civil Guard and the Political Violence of the
Spanish Second Republic, 1931-1936

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor
of Philosophy

in

History

by

Foster Pease Chamberlin

Committee in charge:

Professor Pamela Radcliff, Chair
Professor Richard Biernacki
Professor Frank Biess
Professor Judith Hughes
Professor Jeremy Prestholdt

2017

Copyright

Foster Pease Chamberlin, 2017

All rights reserved.

The Dissertation of Foster Pease Chamberlin is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

Chair

University of California, San Diego

2017

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Signature Page.....	iii
Table of Contents.....	iv
List of Abbreviations and Spanish Words.....	vii
List of Tables.....	xii
List of Images.....	xi
List of Maps.....	xii
Acknowledgements.....	xiii
Vita.....	xv
Abstract of the Dissertation.....	xvi
Introduction.....	1
Part I- The Military Culture of the Civil Guard.....	26
Chapter 1- The Origins and Evolution of the Civil Guard's Military Culture, 1844-1923.....	28
1.1. Introduction.....	28
1.2. The Civil Guard on Paper.....	30
1.2.1. Tensions Emerge from a Contested Foundation.....	30
1.2.2. Ahumada and Honor.....	39
1.3. The Civil Guard in Practice: The Unofficial Aspects of its Culture.....	45
1.3.1. Internal Structures.....	46
1.3.1.1.Housing and Family.....	46
1.3.1.2.Discipline.....	52
1.3.2. Relationships with the <i>Pueblo</i>	56
1.3.3. Duties.....	59
1.3.3.1.Patrols.....	60
1.3.3.2.Crime Fighting.....	63
1.3.3.3.Humanitarian Services.....	66
1.4. The Civil Guard's Culture in the Era of the Emergence of Mass Politics....	68
1.4.1. The Early Years.....	68
1.4.2. The Restoration.....	72
1.5. Conclusion.....	82
Chapter 2- Creating a Class Apart: The Acculturation of a Civil Guard.....	86

2.1 Introduction.....	86
2.2. The Making of an Enlisted Man.....	88
2.3. The Making of an Officer.....	99
2.3.1. Social Origins and Entering the Infantry Academy.....	99
2.3.2. Discipline and Daily Life at the Infantry Academy.....	103
2.3.3. Moral Training and Nationalist Indoctrination at the Infantry Academy.....	109
2.3.4. Prior Experiences in the Army and Morocco.....	122
2.3.5. Civil Guard Officer Admissions and Training.....	126
2.4. Conclusion.....	127
 Chapter 3- Confronting the Mass Politics of the Second Republic.....	 129
3.1. Introduction.....	129
3.2. The Coming of the Republic.....	131
3.3. Republicans: The New Leadership.....	137
3.4. Working Class Organizations: Old and New Enemies.....	143
3.5. Supporters of the Civil Guard.....	158
3.6. The Civil Guard Responds: An Old Repertoire in a New Context.....	164
3.7. Conclusion.....	173
 Part II- The Case Studies.....	 176
 Chapter 4- Castilblanco: The Ultimate Disrespect.....	 179
4.1. Introduction.....	179
4.2. The Local Incident: Mobilization, Military Culture, and Contingency in Castilblanco.....	182
4.2.1. The Origins of the Conflict: A Context of Regional Tension.....	182
4.2.2. Local Tensions and Violence.....	186
4.3. The National Aftermath.....	194
4.3.1. Sanjurjo, Supporters, and the Seeds of Rebellion.....	194
4.3.2. The Socialists Take Back the Narrative.....	209
4.5. Conclusion.....	225
 Chapter 5- Arnedo: Adding Death to Injury.....	 228
5.1. Introduction.....	228
5.2. The Local Incident: Mobilization, Military Culture, and Contingency in Arnedo.....	231
5.2.1. The Origins of the Conflict: A Cast of Actors.....	231
5.2.2. Choosing Violence.....	238
5.3. The National Aftermath.....	243
5.3.1. The Socialist Response.....	243
5.3.2. The Government Response.....	249
5.3.3. The Seeds of Rebellion Germinate.....	254
5.4. Conclusion.....	262

Chapter 6- Asturias: Glory and Disgrace.....	265
6.1. Introduction.....	265
6.2 The Regional Incident: Mobilization, Military Culture, and Community in Asturias.....	270
6.2.1. The Origins of the Conflict: A Community and its Outsiders.....	270
6.2.2. The Shifting Boundaries of Honor: Patterns in How Civil Guards Responded to Violent Attack.....	276
6.2.2.1. A Combat Ritual: The Typical Response.....	278
6.2.2.2. A Fight to the Death: The Glorified Response.....	285
6.2.2.3. Surrender and Collusion: The Dishonorable Response.....	288
6.2.2.4. Multiple Responses in One <i>Casa-Cuartel</i> : The Curious Case of the Oviedo Command Headquarters.....	293
6.3. The Repression.....	299
6.3.1. Assembling Doval’s Team.....	299
6.3.2. Old Methods on a New Scale.....	303
6.3.3. Polarizing National Repercussions.....	310
6.4. Conclusion.....	318
Epilogue and Conclusion.....	321
EC.1. Epilogue: The Popular Front and the Civil War.....	321
EC.2. Conclusion.....	326
Appendix- Simplified Table of Civil Guard Ranks, Duties, and Structures during the Second Republic.....	333
Works Cited.....	334

LIST OF ABBRIVIATIONS AND SPANISH WORDS

- AAA- Archivo del Ayuntamiento de Arnedo (Arnedo Municipal Archive)
- Academia General Militar- General Military Academy
- ACD- Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados (Archive of the Congress of Deputies)
- AHN- Archivo Histórico Nacional (National Historical Archive)
- AHPLR- Archivo Histórico Provincial de La Rioja (La Rioja Provincial Historical Archive)
- AGM- Archivo General Militar de Segovia (General Military Archive of Segovia)
- Aspirante- an apprentice civil guard
- Bachiller- similar to a high school diploma
- BOGC- Boletín Oficial de la Guardia Civil* (Official Bulletin of the Civil Guard)
- Bracero- a landless laborer in the Extremadura region
- C.- carpeta (folder)
- Cacique- a local clientalist leader
- Cuerpo de Carabineros- the Spanish customs police
- Cartilla- handbook
- Casa-cuartel- Civil Guard barrack/station
- Casa del Pueblo- a UGT local's center
- CDMH- Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica (Historical Memory Documental Center)
- CEDA- Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Parties)
- CNT- Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation of Labor)
- Colegio de Guardias Jóvenes- School of Young Guards

Colegio de Huérfanos del Cuerpo- School of Orphans of the Corps

Cuerpo de Seguridad- Security Corps

DSCD- Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de Diputados (Record of the Sessions of the Congress of Deputies)

Desamortización- the sale of Church estates and municipal common lands to private owners

Exp.- expediente (file)

f.- folio

FC- Fondos contemporáneos (Modern Collections)

FNTT- Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra (National Federation of Workers of the Land)

GC- Gobierno Civil (Civil Government)

Guardias jóvenes- young guards

Ley de Defensa de la República- Law of the Defense of the Republic

Patria- Motherland

Pronunciamiento- a (relatively) bloodless *coup d'état*

PSOE- Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party)

Pueblo- people or town

Reglamento militar- Military Regulations

Reglamento para el servicio- Service Regulations

REHGC- Revista de Estudios Históricos de la Guardia Civil (Historical Studies of the Civil Guard Review)

RTGC- Revista Técnica de la Guardia Civil (Civil Guard Technical Review)

SEHGC- Sección de Estudios Históricos de la Guardia Civil (Civil Guard Historical Studies Section)

Sexenio Revolucionario- Revolutionary Sexennium, a six-year period of political turmoil from 1868-74

SGC- Sección Guardia Civil del Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior (Civil Guard Section of the General Archive of the Ministry of the Interior)

Turno system- rigging elections during the Restoration period to ensure that the Liberal and Conservative parties took turns in power

UGT- Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers' Union)

Virgen del Pilar- Virgin of the Pillar

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Key Foundational Documents of the Civil Guard.....	45
Table 2.1: Career Tracks of the Colegio de Guardias Jóvenes' 1914 Graduating Class..	94
Table 2.2: Number of Battles Treated in the Academy's 1920-21 Military History Textbook.....	118
Table 6.1: The Civil Guard Posts of 4 th Company (Sama) in the Insurrection of October 5, 1934.....	280

LIST OF IMAGES

Image 2.1: The Alcázar of Toledo, Home of the Infantry Academy.....	119
Image 2.2: The Kissing of the Flag at the Infantry Academy’s 1923 Flag Swearing Ceremony.....	120
Image 3.1: Civil Guards Protecting the Offices of <i>ABC</i>	140
Image 3.2: A Civil Guard Colonel Giving a Speech during a Homage, Salamanca 1935	161
Image 3.3: The Maid of Honor Offers the Flag to the Colonel, Salamanca 1935.....	161
Image 3.4: The Risk of Having “Humanitarian Sentiments”: A Civil Guard Injured at Arroyomolinos de León.....	169
Image 4.1: The Corpses of Two of the Guards Found Beaten to Death in Castilblanco	180
Image 4.2: Photographs of Castilblanco from the News Magazine <i>La Estampa</i> 1.....	192
Image 4.3: Photographs of Castilblanco from the News Magazine <i>La Estampa</i> 2.....	193
Image 4.4: The Castilblanco Funeral in Badajoz.....	198
Image 4.5: The Photograph of Castilblanco Prisoners being Tortured.....	218
Image 4.6: Anselmo Trejo Gallardo and his Clients, Including Cristina Luengo with her Child.....	224
Image 5.1: Sanjurjo as Prisoner No. 52 in el Dueso Prison.....	261
Image 6.2: The Cover of the November 1934 Issue of the <i>RTGC</i>	284
Image 6.3: The Ruins of Sama’s <i>Casa-Cuartel</i>	286

LIST OF MAPS

Map 6.1: Asturias with the Towns where the Principal Battles with the Civil Guard Took Place and the Routes of the Various Army Columns.....	276
Map 6.2: The Civil Guard's Oviedo Command Headquarters and the Pelayo Barracks with the Directions of Artillery Fire on the Barracks.....	294

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, my thanks must go out to my advisor, Pamela Radcliff. Her innumerable hours spent reading and commenting on my sometimes barely legible drafts have proven essential to transforming what began as little more than a jumbled collection of observations into a completed dissertation. From my first year of graduate school, her support has immersed me in the world of Spanish history and taught me what it means to be a historian of modern Europe.

I also had the privilege of receiving feedback on chapter drafts from many other sources. I would like to thank all the students in the Department of History's dissertation writing seminars, which were led by Judith Hughes and Stanley Chodorow. The high standards set by these two professors in particular made me a better writer. I was also fortunate to receive expert commentary from Geoffrey Jensen, Matthew Kerry, and the participants in the Spanish History Symposium. All of the other graduate students studying Spanish history here at UC San Diego have made their mark as well. Special thanks goes out to David Henderson, who was fated to read almost as many drafts as my advisor. His criticism of my ideas between sets while surfing, during hikes in the Peninsular Ranges, or over a craft beer were, however, as important as his written comments. My gratitude to all others who provided support in some way as well. I would like to mention in particular Patrick Adamiak, Juan Diego Marroquín, Katherine Thompson, and Jessica Weant.

In Spain, I am deeply indebted to Eduardo González Calleja, whose unflagging encouragement and support (often over a *menú del día* at the Biblioteca Nacional) led me to consider him my unofficial second advisor. Of course, I also must thank the staff of

each archive and research library I visited there. In particular, I want to mention the staff of the Sección Guardia Civil del Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior and the Archivo General Militar de Segovia, who tolerated without complaint the flood of requests for personal service records I brought with me. I would also like to thank Juan Ortiz and Colonel Jesús Narciso Núñez Calvo for providing me with additional documents.

Several organizations contributed the financial support necessary to bring both the research and writing phases of this project to completion. The J. William Fulbright Commission funded my research year, and its wonderful staff supported my efforts in Spain. A fellowship from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation allowed me to dedicate my full attention to completing the writing and revising process over the past year. Finally, grants from the UC San Diego Department of History and the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte de España's HISPANEX Program enabled additional research trips to Spain.

Lastly, I would like to thank my parents and grandparents for instilling in me an intellectual curiosity that has driven me to complete this work. As for my sister, her patience allowed me to read the *Revista Técnica de la Guardia Civil* in the mountains of Utah while I was supposed to be assisting her with her own field research.

VITA

- 2010 Bachelor of Arts, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
- 2012-2015 Teaching Assistant, Revelle College Humanities Program, University of California, San Diego
- 2013 Master of Arts, University of California, San Diego
- 2015-2016 Teaching Assistant, Eleanor Roosevelt College Making of the Modern World Program, University of California, San Diego
- 2016 Instructor, University of California, San Diego
- 2017 Doctor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego

PUBLICATIONS

“Guardianes del Honor: Los guardias civiles y la historia de su institución durante la Segunda República.” *Revista de Historiografía*. Forthcoming.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Modern European History

First Minor Field: Early Modern European History
Professors John Marino and Cynthia Truant

Second Minor Field: Political Violence and Social Theory
Professors Richard Biernacki, Harvey Goldman, and Patrick Patterson

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Honor Bound: The Military Culture of the Civil Guard and the Political Violence of the Spanish Second Republic, 1931-1936

by

Foster Pease Chamberlin

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, San Diego, 2017

Professor Pamela Radcliff, Chair

This dissertation considers why the Civil Guard, Spain's gendarmerie, was one of the most violent organizations in the country during the politically turbulent Second Republic period. The work argues that while the Civil Guard's military armament and the general increase in the number of protests were important factors, the corps' military culture, which centered on honor, also led to violence because it made guards unable to

adapt to the mass forms of political contestation that accompanied the Republic. The Civil Guard's founders had believed that if members sought to gain honor through earning the respect of the public then they would naturally act with restraint. However, as mass politics took hold in Spain, the Right learned to exploit this desire for honor while the Left only antagonized the Civil Guard by criticizing it. Failing to win respect from all classes of an increasingly mobilized population, guards learned to instill fear as a substitute for that respect and used violence as their tool for creating fear. The Republic's mass press ensured that guards would now be criticized for their harsh and at times extralegal tactics, which only made them feel the need to defend their honor even more vigorously. As the intensity of the confrontations with Spain's workers escalated, many guards abandoned their hopes for earning the respect of all classes and came to view honor as glory won in a battle to subdue their opponents.

Using the example of the Civil Guard, this dissertation suggests the inability of Europe's gendarmeries to adapt their organizational cultures to the new socio-political landscape of the continent's fledgling democracies was an important reason why so many of these regimes collapsed during the interwar period. In order to prove this argument for Spain, this work draws upon, principally, personal service records of civil guards, telegrams from the Ministry of the Interior, and newspapers. It also proposes that the idea of repertoires, borrowed from social movement theory, can help explain how police forces act in confrontational situations by treating policemen as independent actors who make claims of their own.

Introduction

During its Second Republic period (1931-1936), Spain saw the highest level of political violence of any Western or Central European parliamentary regime in the interwar years.¹ The Civil Guard, Spain's militarized police force or gendarmerie, caused more of the deaths in this violence than any other profession.² In other words, the public order problem that came to have such grave consequences for the Republic was largely fueled by one of its own police forces, the very force charged with maintaining public order. While the level of violence in Spain was not high enough to constitute a civil war, it did give those who started the Civil War by rebelling against the Popular Front government in July 1936 their main justification for doing so because they could argue that they would restore order to Spain. Therefore, the question of why the Republic was not more successful at maintaining public order, and, more importantly, the *perception* of

¹ After decades of varying estimates, two years ago Eduardo González Calleja published an exhaustive catalogue of every instance of political violence in the Second Republic that proves this statement. He counted 2,629 deaths from political violence during the Second Republic period. Italy, the second most violent country in the region in the interwar period, saw a maximum of 2,600 deaths by political violence. González Calleja only considered deaths because they can be counted much more reliably than other types of violence. He made sure each incident was documented by at least one primary and one secondary source. He defined an incident of socio-political violence as “an individual or collective confrontation over power.” “Una confrontación individual o colectiva por motivos de poder.” *Cifras cruentas: Las víctimas mortales de la violencia sociopolítica en la Segunda República (1931-1936)* (Granada: Editorial Comares, 2015), 2, 6-7, 57, 64, 75. Stanley Payne's “tentative” review of “newspapers, monographs, and other works” yielded a remarkably similar total of 2,455 killings. *The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-1936: Origins of the Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 358-59. Juan Blázquez Miguel, while also completing a catalogue as detailed as that of González Calleja, has been criticized by multiple historians for errors and a lack of a precise methodology. His totals are 3,623 dead and 12,520 injured. *España turbulenta: Alteraciones, violencia y sangre durante la II República* (Madrid, 2009), 717. For a summary of the criticism of Blázquez Miguel's work, see González Calleja, *Cifras cruentas*, 80-81.

² This statement is also based on González Calleja's statistics. If the small-scale civil war in the Asturias region in October 1934 is excluded, the total political violence deaths during the Second Republic comes to 1,545. The Civil Guard (and the Carabineros customs police) killed 413 people or 26.73% of that total. The professions with the second highest number were the police and Assault Guards (another public order force) with 161 killed or 10.42%. It should be noted that the professions of half the perpetrators could not be identified, which means that it is possible that in actuality another profession exceeded the Civil Guard's violence; however, one can at the very least conclude that the Civil Guard was a very significant contributor to the political violence of the Second Republic. González Calleja, *Cifras cruentas*, 114.

order, has been perhaps the most central facet of the debate over the structural causes of the Civil War. Given the amount of violence it perpetrated, the Civil Guard is clearly crucial to answering this question, but it is an actor that has usually not been at the center of the historiography on the political violence of the Second Republic.

The question of why guards caused the most deaths of any profession does have an obvious and valid answer in that they were often put in confrontational situations where they were outnumbered and scared, and lethal rifles were the only means they had to defend themselves.³ Critics of the Civil Guard go further to argue that they were trigger-happy servants of the Right and enemies of the people who were only too willing to open fire on crowds of protesters, often without any provocation. However, these explanations are incomplete because they do not take seriously the fact that the Civil Guard was a protagonist in its own right, with a unique culture that shaped its view of events and its actions.

This dissertation argues that the Civil Guard had a distinct military culture of its own, and honor was its principal component. Guards sought to gain honor through respect from the public won by discipline, sacrifice, loyalty, and political neutrality. Their organization, therefore, did not explicitly associate itself with either side of the political spectrum, but conservative elites learned to exploit its desire for honor while that same desire only increased mutual animosity with the working classes. When guards did not receive the respect they felt they deserved from this segment of the population, they

³ For such a portrait of civil guards as simply obedient to their orders, see Fernando del Rey, "Reflexiones sobre la violencia política en la II República española," in *Conflicto político, democracia y dictadura: Portugal y España en la década de 1930*, Mercedes Gutiérrez Sánchez and Diego Palacios Cerezales, eds., (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos, 2007), 39-40.

turned to violence as a means to create a climate of fear that would serve as a substitute for respect.

This Civil Guard culture faced a new challenge with the unprecedented mass mobilizations of the Second Republic, and guards were unable to adapt their culture to this new context. Instead, they simply resorted to violence more frequently to defend their honor as they understood it. Guards were endowed with a military culture intended to assist them in maintaining public order, but, in the Second Republic, it led them to behaviors that in fact increased the level of violence. Beginning in 1934, many also turned to seeking a more militarized version of honor through battle with the populations they policed instead of through cooperation with them.

Historians have certainly recognized the role of political violence in the downfall of many of Europe's interwar democracies. While in most cases the violence did not directly lead to the overthrow of a democratic regime, it did create a perception of disorder that gave fascist parties the public support they needed to seize power. Most studies of this phenomenon have focused on street clashes between different political organizations.⁴ Police forces play a prominent role in such works as they were caught in the middle of these battles for control of the streets; however, these studies do not examine the cultures of police forces because policemen are viewed as agents of the state

⁴ Germany and Italy have received particular attention. For example, for Germany, see Richard Bessel, *Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 1925-1934* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Dirk Schumann, *Political Violence in the Weimar Republic 1918-1933: Fight for the Streets and Fear of Civil War* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009); and Pamela E. Sweet, *Neighbors and Enemies: The Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929-1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For Italy, see Paul Corner, *Fascism in Ferrara, 1915-1925* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975) and Adrian Lyttleton, *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

following orders rather than protagonists with their own claims and motives. Police historians have begun to fill this gap in the historiography, although there is still much to be done. Most of their work has centered on whether or not the police contributed to the rise of fascism in the country in question. They conclude that while the police generally made an effort to maintain an attitude of political neutrality as agents of the state, they sometimes did take a softer approach or even lent active support to radical right-wing groups.⁵ As such, most studies of interwar policing examine the culture of the institutions they study as that culture is relevant to the relationship between police forces and the politics of the period rather than to the causes of these institutions' violent behavior.

The literature regarding political violence in Second Republic Spain in particular is especially voluminous because of its link with the Civil War that followed. Supporters of the Franco dictatorship, past and present, have always played up the political violence of the Second Republic (and especially the Popular Front period that immediately preceded the Civil War) as part of the revolutionary strategy of “the Reds” and as evidence of the Republic’s instability.⁶ They do so as a way to justify the military rebellion of 1936, arguing that it was necessary to restore the public order (never mind

⁵ See Gerald Blaney, Jr., ed., *Policing Interwar Europe: Continuity, Change and Crisis, 1918-40* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); His-huey Liang, *The Berlin Police Force in the Weimar Republic* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970); and Gerard Oram, ed., *Conflict and Legality: Policing mid-twentieth century Europe* (London: Francis Boutle, 2003).

⁶ See, for example, Joaquín Arrarás, “Frente Popular,” chap. 9 in vol. 2 of *Historia de la Cruzada Española* (Madrid: Ediciones españolas, 1940); Eduardo Comín Colomer, *La mayoría de edad (16 de febrero de julio de 1936): periodo de bolchevización*, vol. 3, *Historia del Partido Comunista de España* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1967); and Fernando Rivas Gómez, *El Frente Popular: antecedentes de un alzamiento* (Madrid: Librería San Martín, 1976).

that the war that the rebellion sparked took some 400,000 lives).⁷ More academic perspectives built on social scientist Juan Linz's work classifying the various political parties of the time according to their loyalty to the Republic to interpret the increasing violence with a structural-functionalist approach, thereby seeing it as a consequence of a general polarization in Spanish politics.⁸ Some placed blame on a particular political group, while others pointed a finger at the Republican regime for failing to incorporate radical groups into a peaceful democratic power system.⁹ More recently, Fernando del Rey has led a cultural and discursive turn that finds the key to the "brutalization" of politics in increasingly extremist rhetoric from both sides of the political spectrum.¹⁰ As in studies of political violence in other European countries, the police (and the Civil Guard in particular) often play an important part in these works but not as an actor with the agency to make its own socio-political claims.

Those works that have considered the role of the Civil Guard have, until the last ten years or so, divided neatly into two camps: the defenders and detractors. The defenders, naturally, are led by the guards themselves, who have conducted the vast

⁷ This figure includes those killed in battle and in the rearguard, but not those who died in the war's aftermath. Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012), xi.

⁸ Juan J. Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain," chap. 5 in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe*, eds. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

⁹ For the former, see, for example, Stanley Payne, *Spain's First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). For the latter, see Pamela Beth Radcliff, *From Mobilization to Civil War: The Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900-1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and Julián Casanova, *De la calle al frente: El anarcosindicalismo en España (1931-1939)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1997). For a thorough historiography of works on political violence in the Second Republic, see "La historiografía sobre la violencia política en la Segunda República española," chap. 1 in González Calleja, *Cifras cruentas*.

¹⁰ Rey, "Reflexiones sobre la violencia política"; Fernando del Rey, *Paisanos en lucha: Exclusión política y violencia en la Segunda República española* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2008); and Fernando del Rey, ed., *Palabras como puños: la intransigencia política en la Segunda República española* (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 2011). Rey borrows the idea of the process of brutalization in interwar Europe from George L. Mosse, "The Brutalization of German Politics," chap. 8 in *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

majority of the historical research. They began their work in earnest in 1968 with the founding of the *Revista de Estudios Históricos de la Guardia Civil (REHGC* or *Historical Studies of the Civil Guard Review*). Civil guards felt the need to defend the honor of their institution against the increased criticism it received in the last years of the Franco dictatorship.¹¹ These writers sought to clear the Civil Guard's name through cataloging the achievements of its members and, regarding the Second Republic, to justify their actions as a valiant and apolitical defense of public order in a dangerous time of chaos.¹² As insiders writing to a small audience of other guards and military historians, these authors were also interested in documenting in great detail changes to the Civil Guard's organizational structure over time.¹³

After the death of Franco, the Civil Guard historians eliminated overtly Francoist language, but they argued against the calls during the Transition period for the demilitarization of their institution by highlighting how its military organization had, throughout its history, enhanced its effectiveness in maintaining public order.¹⁴ By the end of the 1980s, a new generation of Civil Guard historians had emerged that adapted the narrative of the Civil Guard's history to the new democratic context by emphasizing

¹¹ For more on the how these Civil Guard historians from 1968 to the present wrote about their institution during the Second Republic, see Foster Chamberlin, "Guardianes del Honor: Los guardias civiles y la historia de su institución durante la Segunda República," *Revista de Historiografía* (forthcoming).

¹² Examples of such works that consider the Second Republic period are Francisco Aguado Sánchez, *La revolución de octubre de 1934* (Madrid: Librería San Martín, 1972); A. Díaz Carmona "El 10 de agosto de 1932," *REHGC* 1-2, no. 2, 4 (1968-1969); and, even though they were published after the death of Franco, Fernando Rivas Gómez "La República en marcha," *REHGC* 9-10, no. 17-19 (1976-1977) and Rivas Gómez, *El Frente Popular*.

¹³ See, for example, Francisco Aguado Sánchez, "Organización de la Guardia Civil: Desde la fundación hasta la actualidad," *REHGC* 2-3, no. 4-5 (1969-1970).

¹⁴ Examples are Francisco Aguado Sánchez, *La historia de la Guardia Civil*, 7 vols. (Madrid: Ediciones Históricas, Cupsa Editorial, Planeta, 1983-1985); Fernando Rivas Gómez, "Rebeldía y represión en Casas Viejas," *REHGC* 16, no. 29 (1983): 125-58; and Fernando Rivas Gómez, "El entierro del Alférez de los Reyes y su trascendencia histórica," *REHGC* 20, n. 37 (1987): 141-178.

its services to the citizenry rather than its defense of the public order.¹⁵ This new generation also stressed the political neutrality of the Civil Guard even more than its predecessors while continuing to defend the military structure of the institution. Taken together, the Civil Guard historians have assembled an invaluable catalogue of the deeds of their fellow guards and of the structural changes the organization has undergone, taking advantage of its internal archival records. But the natural interest of these writers in defending the honor of the institution has meant that they have only examined it from the inside looking out.

The Civil Guard historians were not defending themselves against a chimera. There is a long tradition in Spanish historiography of characterizing civil guards as brutal agents of oppression and defenders of the Right without providing evidence for these assertions. Take the British hispanist Gerald Brenan, who explains that “living as they did among their enemies, they [civil guards] became unusually ready to shoot.”¹⁶ This understanding of the Civil Guard continues to be commonly held by historians today. For example, Helen Graham states that the Civil Guard “functioned virtually as a force of occupation in the countryside.”¹⁷

¹⁵ Examples are Agustín M. Pulido Pérez, *La Guardia Civil ante el Bienio Azañista, 1931/33* (Madrid: Almena Ediciones, 2008) and Miguel López Corral, *La Guardia Civil: Claves históricas para entender a la Benemérita y a sus hombres (1844-1975)* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2011).

¹⁶ Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth: The Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 157.

¹⁷ Helen Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War: 1936-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 6. See also Stanley G. Payne, “Political Violence During the Spanish Second Republic,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 25 (1990): 269-88 and Paul Preston, *The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic, 1931-1936*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994).

Critical historical appraisals of the Civil Guard by those who did study the institution were begun in the 1980s by historians who supported its demilitarization.¹⁸ Manuel Ballbé argues in the very influential *Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional (1812-1983)* that Spain's constitutional regimes throughout the modern period consistently took a militarized approach to maintaining public order, including by applying military justice to civilians, declaring states of emergency frequently, allowing the military undue influence on politics, and having militarized forces of public order like the Civil Guard.¹⁹ According to Ballbé, the problem with the Civil Guard being militarized was that it involved this public order force in the praetorian politics of the army and exempted the force from civilian control, thereby leaving its brutality unchecked. Diego López Garrido, another influential critic of the Civil Guard in the 1980s, agrees, adding that the creation of a militarized Civil Guard was an example of how elements of the absolutist *ancien régime* found their way into the thinking of conservative liberals.²⁰ Ballbé and López Garrido conclude that the militarization of maintaining public order blocked the formation of a stable democracy in modern Spain.

In recent years, a new generation of historians has made an effort to bridge the gap between the defenders and detractors of the Civil Guard. Gerald Blaney, Jr. has done the most work on the Civil Guard itself. He takes exception to the Civil Guard historians' previous portrayals of their institution as apolitical and demonstrates that it can be analyzed as an actor that made political claims. He also believes that both the

¹⁸ Gerald Blaney, Jr., "La historiografía sobre la Guardia Civil. Crítica y propuesta de investigación," *Política y sociedad* 42, no. 3 (2005): 34.

¹⁹ *Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional (1812-1983)* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1985).

²⁰ *La Guardia Civil y los orígenes del Estado centralista* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1982) and *El aparato policial en España: historia, sociología e ideología* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1987).

Civil Guard historians and academics like Ballbé and López Garrido place undue emphasis on the Civil Guard's military structure and that it should instead be studied as a police force.²¹ According to Blaney, for both sides "oversimplifications are compounded by surprisingly poor methodology: statements on mentalities within the corps are made with little to no consultation of Civil Guard primary sources. Instead, analyses are based on either official legislation, or on the uncritical acceptance of assessments by highly subjective contemporary observers and statesmen from outside the corps."²² In contrast, he draws on the Civil Guard's own internal publications to show that civil guards during the Second Republic thought of themselves as police and saw their mission as maintaining public order in a politically neutral fashion. However, they considered maintaining order to be more important than maintaining loyalty to whatever government was in power.²³ Therefore, despite their initial acquiescence to the Republic, as time went on, increasing numbers of guards became disenchanted with the regime as the political violence of the period called into question the ability of the Republic to maintain order, even if the guards themselves were causing much of the violence.²⁴ The result was that when the rebellion began in July 1936, somewhere around half betrayed their duty to obey orders from the government and joined the rebels instead. Hence, it was the Republic's own inability to stay in the guards' good graces, rather than the institution's militarized structure, that led many of them to undermine the democratic regime.

²¹ Gerald Blaney, Jr., "The Civil Guard and the Spanish Second Republic 1931-1936," PhD diss. (University of London, 2007), 3. Blaney's full critique of Ballbé and López Garrido's argument can be found in his article "Historiografía sobre la Guardia Civil."

²² "New Perspectives on the Civil Guard and the Second Republic, 1931-1936," in *The Spanish Second Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War (1931-1936)*, ed. Manuel Álvarez Tardío and Fernando del Rey Reguillo (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 202.

²³ Gerald Blaney, Jr., "Between Order and Loyalty: the Civil Guard and the Spanish Second Republic, 1931-1936," in Oram, *Conflict and Legality*, 42-43.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 47.

Regarding the causes of Civil Guard violence, Blaney is similarly critical of historians like Ballbé and López Garrido: “interpretations that seek to explain this [violence] primarily (or exclusively in the case of Ballbé) through the military nature or the corps’ regulations do not, and cannot account adequately for broad variations in the degrees of violence used by civil guards.”²⁵ He believes that the roots of the violence in fact lie in the intersection between the national and the local socio-political contexts. However, he does not pursue this line of argument in his works; he is more concerned with why most civil guards turned against the Republic than why they were so violent.

Blaney’s approach to the Civil Guard as a police force with a dynamic political culture is undoubtedly an important contribution to the study of the politics of the Second Republic. Yet not everyone agrees that he has developed a compromise position between the detractors and defenders. In a review, Chris Ealham lambasts one of Blaney’s articles as simply another apology for the Civil Guard disguised in new clothes. He finds that Blaney takes an institution “widely seen as anti-democratic” and “belittles its role as a force of repression.”²⁶ He also objects to Blaney “citing uncritically the official Civil Guard press” and concludes that “in short, his ‘new perspective’ consists of offering a vision of the corps based entirely on how they perceive themselves.”²⁷

Ealham himself prefers to focus on the violence of the Civil Guard as part of a battle between the working and middle classes for control of public space. He writes in his *Class, Culture, and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937* that the bourgeoisie in Barcelona were stricken by a sense of moral panic, which justified the use of “legitimate” force to

²⁵ Blaney, “Civil Guard,” 52.

²⁶ Chris Ealham, “The Emperor’s New Clothes: ‘Objectivity’ and Revisionism in Spanish History,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 48, no. 1 (January 2013): 199.

²⁷ *Ibid.* Blaney’s other articles are more critical of the Civil Guard.

quell what they felt was violence that threatened the social order.²⁸ By deploying governmental forces (including the Civil Guard) to limit worker access to the streets, the bourgeoisie hoped to dominate the public sphere and establish a hegemony that would keep workers repressed. The problem was that the republicans failed to build up the Civil Guard and other police forces enough to ensure “the extension of state power on the streets and the establishment of a new system of bureaucratic surveillance to regulate civil society.”²⁹ These units were forced to rely on brutality as a substitute for the resources they lacked. Even as he criticizes Blaney for being yet another defender of the Civil Guard, Ealham himself falls into the pattern of Civil Guard detractors. His class-based explanation for the institution’s behavior is innovative, but understanding the guards’ own perspectives on this fight for public space lies outside the purview of his study.³⁰ In other words, Ealham too sees the civil guards as simply agents of the state rather than as actors with their own agency. While Blaney may have benefited from a broader base of primary sources, it is ironic that Ealham criticizes him for work that adds, in studying the perspectives of the guards themselves, an important line of inquiry to Ealham’s own of field of research.

Most recently, Eduardo González Calleja has also tried to bridge the gap between the defenders and detractors of the Second Republic’s civil guards by stating that “the general nature of the Civil Guard in this key period of our history [the Second Republic] is as far from the humanitarian character that Gerald Blaney wants to show as it is from

²⁸ *Class, Culture, and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 10.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 15-16.

³⁰ Citing Ballbé and López Garrido, he characterizes the Civil Guard as specializing in “preventive brutality,” “a direct form of exemplary violence against those who dared to contest the urban order.” *Ibid.*, 17-18.

the indiscriminately repressive character at the orders of the centralist power that Manuel Ballbé or Diego López Garrido try to demonstrate.”³¹ Instead, González Calleja finds his explanation for the actions of the guards in the Spanish state’s preoccupation with maintaining public order. He argues that the nineteenth-century understanding of public order as “a *de facto* and *de jure* state opposed to disorder” was not altered during the Second Republic.³² This broad definition gave the police a “*carte gris*” that allowed them to justify neutralizing any threat to their authority by claiming it was “disorderly.” In other words, the police may not have been entirely above the law, but they were at the very least held to a different standard. This “*carte gris*,” combined with what González Calleja describes as the Civil Guard’s “orderist” and defensive mentality, caused the high levels of Civil Guard violence in the Second Republic.³³ Like Ealham, González Calleja thus presents an unflattering characterization of the Civil Guard while also suggesting another useful framework for understanding its behavior, in this case the state’s approach to public order.

Despite the advances noted above, González Calleja remarks that “a competent study of the political and professional culture of the state security forces still remains to be done.”³⁴ This dissertation seeks to fill a part of that gap. Its goal is neither to defend nor criticize the Civil Guard. Rather, its aim is to show that the violence of the force in the Second Republic was not simply a consequence of the guards being agents of the

³¹ “La caracterización general de la ejecutoria de la Guardia Civil este período clave de nuestra historia está tan lejos del carácter humanitario que quiere demostrar Gerald Blaney como del carácter indiscriminadamente represivo a las órdenes del poder centralista que pretenden Manuel Ballbé o Diego López Garrido.” *En nombre de la autoridad: La defensa del orden público durante la Segunda República Española (1931-1936)* (Granada: Editorial Comares, 2014), 92.

³² “Un estado de hecho y de derecho opuesto al desorden.” *Ibid.*, 3.

³³ *Ibid.*, 90.

³⁴ “Aún queda por hacer un estudio competente de la cultura política y profesional de las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado.” *Cifras cruentas*, 39.

state who countered popular mobilizations, but rather that they were also violently asserting a claim of their own, namely, that their honor must be respected. In making this argument, I build on Blaney's idea of examining the Civil Guard as a police force, but I bring its military character back into the equation. And rather than simply outlining its military organization, as the historians who are members of the Civil Guard have done, I analyze how their institution's military structure shaped the way civil guards did their jobs as policemen. By focusing on the question of violence, I do not consider, as do Ballbé and López Garrido, whether the Civil Guard's military nature made it prone to become involved in praetorian politics.³⁵ However, again in contrast to the Civil Guard historians, I do take it as a given that the Civil Guard had political inclinations, for, as Clive Emsley (one of the most prominent police historians) argues, "to the extent that they are expected to enforce a code of laws and dominant conceptions of public order, the police cannot, in the broad sense, be anything other than political."³⁶ Therefore, I ask how guards reconciled their political involvement with their strong commitment to political neutrality. I find the answer in their culture of honor, which was pandered to by conservatives and insulted by working-class groups. My concern is how organizational culture and political context interacted to shape individual guards' political inclinations and roles in the violence of the Second Republic.

Beyond the specific case of the study of the political violence of the Second Republic, this dissertation also makes interventions in the fields of police history and

³⁵ Isabel Hull explains this distinction between the study of military culture and militarism in *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 2.

³⁶ "Introduction: Police and the European Nation-State in the Nineteenth Century," in *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives*, ed. Mark Mazower (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), 2-3.

military history, as well as in the study of political violence more generally. To begin with, police historians typically analyze their subjects within the framework of modernization, studying how police forces have tried to improve crowd control methods, implement more scientific methods of criminal investigation, and police the politics of the citizens under their jurisdiction more thoroughly.³⁷ Therefore, these scholars are primarily interested in public order, criminology, political policing, and the international relations between police forces. They have not devoted as much attention to the organizational culture of police forces themselves.³⁸ Nor have they written much on gendarmeries, which are often neglected in the historiography of police forces because of their military character and because, of the four topics of interest listed above, gendarmeries are usually only directly relevant to the question of public order.³⁹ While Blaney introduced the idea of using a police history approach to study the Civil Guard, he deemphasized its military character in order to do so. In this dissertation, I hope to go beyond seeing the Civil Guard as either a police *or* military force to demonstrate that a key to understanding the behavior of a gendarmerie is precisely studying this interaction between its military structure and its policing mission. I will examine how the balance between these two elements shifted as the Civil Guard responded to intensified opposition during the Second Republic.

³⁷ The definitive work in this vein is Hsi-Huey Liang, *The Rise of the Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1992).

³⁸ An exception is Hsi-Huey Liang's classic study *Berlin Police Force*. It offers a model of how to study the organizational culture of a police force because Liang delves into the backgrounds of Berlin's policemen, as well as their training, beliefs, fears, and shifting political attitudes. However, his focus on influence of the police on the politics of Weimar and the Nazi seizure of power means that political violence forms only an ancillary part of his work.

³⁹ The edited volumes Blaney, *Policing Interwar Europe* and Oram, *Conflict and Legality* are exceptions.

A fairly recent trend in military history will allow me to study these two elements simultaneously. Whereas military historians (and the Civil Guard historians) have traditionally been most interested in battlefield strategies and tactics and military organizational structures, over the past few decades the focus has shifted to military culture.⁴⁰ A leading advocate of the idea of military culture, Isabel Hull, explains it as “a way of understanding why an army acts as it does in war” based on its “habitual practices, default programs, hidden assumptions, and unreflected cognitive frames.”⁴¹ In other words, studies of military culture presume that the actions of military organizations are best explained by examining their routines rather than their ideologies. My aim is to demonstrate that this notion holds as true for studying gendarmeries performing policing duties as it does for studying armies in war.⁴² Therefore, I examine not only the regulations that officially define a civil guard’s values and guide his actions but also how those regulations are inculcated during training and acted upon in actual policing situations.

Regarding Spain, military and intellectual historian Geoffrey Jensen has applied the idea of military culture to the Spanish Army of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He defines military culture as “the fundamental ethos and attributes, derived

⁴⁰ Before the cultural turn had brought the term “military culture” into vogue, American military sociologists were pioneering such work in the 1950s and 1960s as they investigated the changing nature of the military profession in the wake of the Second World War. In particular, this dissertation seeks to replicate, as far as possible, the depth of Morris Janowitz’s 1960 study of the officer corps in the United States, similarly examining the social origins, training, career paths, daily life, beliefs, and politics of an elite military organization. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (London: Collier-Macmillan).

⁴¹ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 2, 93.

⁴² Christopher Browning examines practices rather than ideology in a military police force, Nazi Germany’s Order Police, but he does not use the term military culture because he deemphasizes the role of cultural indoctrination in the Order Police’s genocidal actions. *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998), 184.

from shared practical, political, and intellectual experiences, that contribute to army officers' common understanding of war, of their profession, and of the broader environment in which they live and work, including their relationship to civil society."⁴³ This definition is similar to Hull's, but Jensen also emphasizes the relationship between military practices and politics and society at large. Whereas he examines this interaction through studying military intellectuals, I turn to civil guards, whose daily patterns of interaction with civilians shaped how they responded to protests. As such, this dissertation is in part an effort to alert military historians who are interested in the nexus between military and civilian culture to the possibilities of researching gendarmeries, which constantly come into contact with civilians of all classes.

As this work is particularly concerned with honor, the central component of the Civil Guard's military culture, I also look to literature that considers the nature of honor. As a starting point, I take historian of the American South Bertram Wyatt-Brown's definition of the term from his classic work *Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South*. He defines honor as "the inner conviction of self-worth. . . the claim of that self-assessment before the public. . . [and] the assessment of the claim by the public, a judgment based on the behavior of the claimant. In other words, honor is reputation."⁴⁴ This definition makes clear how crucial public perception is to honor. Therefore, how the public shaped the Civil Guard's conception of its honor, and how that conception in turn shaped its relations with the public, are central questions treated in this dissertation.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Cultura militar española. Modernistas, tradicionalistas y liberales*, trans. Jaime Blasco (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2014), 14. Original English courtesy of Geoffrey Jensen.

⁴⁴ *Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 14.

⁴⁵ More recent scholarship has also emphasized the role of gender in shaping conceptions of honor. For instance, Lorien Foote adds the idea of masculinity to Wyatt-Brown's definition to see honor as "when a

Wyatt-Brown's definition of honor represents it as an individual trait; however, I will argue that for the Civil Guard, it operated both at the individual level and at the institutional level: the personal honor an individual civil guard gained or lost could add to or subtract from the honor of his institution as well. Honor is also usually thought to exist outside of the state and often in conflict with it. As social anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers explains, the law has never "appealed to adherents to the code of honor" because a law court "excludes the possibility of demonstrating personal worth through the display of courage."⁴⁶ But, as a police force, the Civil Guard was part of the legal system itself. Guards struggled to reconcile the law and honor governing their behavior, but their special military regulations gave them the authority to use violence when they felt their honor demanded it.

To understand the mechanisms that led civil guards to choose to defend their honor when they faced incidences of left-wing activism, I will turn to sociologist Charles Tilly's idea of contentious politics. Tilly explains that "contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interests, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties."⁴⁷ Because of this emphasis on opposition to the government, studies of contentious politics typically focus on leftist political actions against the state without also analyzing state responses.⁴⁸ In contrast, I examine the Civil Guard as an integral part of the contentious politics

man's self-worth is based on public reputation and the respect of others." *The Gentlemen and the Roughs: Manhood, Honor and Violence in the Union Army* (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 6. I will view the guards' defense of their honor as also a defense of their masculinity, and so how gender shaped their views on both their own role in society and those who opposed them will be considered here.

⁴⁶ "Honor," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 6:509.

⁴⁷ *Contentious Performances* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 5.

⁴⁸ The same holds true for studies of political violence. Julio Aróstegui, "Violencia, sociedad y política: la definición de la violencia," *Ayer*, no. 13 (1994): 44.

dynamic, framing it as both a representative of the state and a protagonist that made claims of its own, even if they were often made implicitly. While guards followed the orders given to them by the government, they also had a high degree of autonomy, since they usually operated in rural areas and in detachments of just a few men. Their primary mission may have been to maintain order, but in reality their top priority was often ensuring that protesters showed them the proper respect.

I will also apply Tilly's idea of a "repertoire of collective action" to help explain the patterns of behavior that guards exhibited when confronting contentious claims-making. As summarized by social historian Mark Traugott, the term "repertoire" suggests "that any given population tends to choose from a fairly limited and well-established set of alternative methods for organizing its protest activities. Rather than invent techniques de novo, groups typically revert to one of a handful of familiar options, even when those might be less than ideally suited to achieving the desired outcome."⁴⁹ This definition restricts the term to those organizing "protest activities," but I will demonstrate, at least in regards to the Civil Guard, that those sent to oppose protests also drew upon a repertoire of a few familiar options for quelling perceived threats to the public order. This repertoire existed largely independently from the direct orders of the state; instead, it was shaped by the military culture of the civil guards, as discussed above. When they felt their honor was threatened, about the only actions guards had in their repertoire were shouted warnings and opening fire. The narrowness of these options was as much a cause of the frequent violence of these confrontations as elements of the protesters' repertoire, such as hurling insults and rocks at guards. As such, the root cause

⁴⁹ *The Insurgent Barricade* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010), 19.

of the political violence lies at the intersection between the repertoire of protesters and that of the forces of public order.

This dissertation is divided into two parts, the first of which outlines the nature and the development of the Civil Guard's military culture both as an institution and within the generation of guards that would serve during the Second Republic. The second part then uses case studies to investigate how this culture shaped the actions of these guards and evolved during the Republic as they faced the new mass politics of the period. This interaction between military culture, democratic politics, and social movements is introduced in Chapter Three and then explored in detail at both the local and national levels in the case studies of the second part that focus on specific incidents of political violence involving the Civil Guard.

In order to understand which elements of the Civil Guard's military culture during the Second Republic were inherited from the past, Chapter One traces how this culture developed from the founding of the institution in 1844 by the liberal state up until 1923. The inclusion of honor as the centerpiece of the Civil Guard regulations was intended to ensure the corps would be honest, apolitical, and restrained, but it also meant linking the group to an extra-legal code that predated and existed outside of the new liberal system that the Civil Guard was supposed to enforce. Many other signature characteristics of the institution's culture emerged during these early years as well, such as strict discipline, living in small barracks, patrolling in pairs, and wearing distinctive uniforms to be easily recognized. From the mid-nineteenth through the early-twentieth centuries, as the Civil Guard steadily expanded its reach across all of Spain, a tradition of antagonistic relations

with the working classes developed as civil guards fought bandits, Carlists, and anarchists, all of whom enjoyed some local support. During the Restoration period, as civil guards found themselves increasingly policing emerging forms of mass political mobilization, they turned to violence as a way to create a climate of fear that would serve as a stand-in for the respect that they felt was owed to them.

Chapter Two delves into recruitment and training to reveal how this military culture was inculcated in the generation of civil guards that served under the Second Republic. It shows that most of them received almost no training specifically as police; instead, they had to rely on the military education they received in the army. Most enlisted men came from working-class rural families and started out serving in the army, whether by volunteering or being drafted, where they received only minimal training. As for the officers, many of them hailed from families with a tradition of military service. Most attended the Infantry Academy in Toledo, where classes focused primarily on technical military training. An effort was also made to instill a sense of discipline and sacrifice in the cadets through speeches, the example of the professors, and the regimented structure of life at the academy. Honor was defined as glory won in battle, usually through death. After the academy or basic training, many future guards were then sent to Morocco, where they became familiar with the nature of wartime violence and how one could win honor on the field of battle. The Civil Guard seems to have appealed to those who enjoyed a military lifestyle but not the extreme danger and brutality of life in Morocco. The Civil Guard itself had no formal training for its members. Rather, its insular military culture had to be instilled during a six-month apprenticeship period spent shadowing experienced guards. During this critical period, new guards learned to shift

their definition of honor away from looking for approbation from their military peers to seeking it from the public they lived amongst.

Chapter Three then considers the shift to policing in a new political context of mass-mobilized popular democracy by examining the interactions between the Second Republic's new political forces and the Civil Guard. These forces responded to the democratic structures of the Republic by encouraging mass political participation, which sometimes included confronting guards in the street. Yet the ossified culture of the Civil Guard precluded adaption to the new policing situation; guards instead moved quickly to violence as a means of ensuring they were respected, as they always had. In the first year of the Republic, republicans in the government were best positioned to change this situation, but their need for a force of public order and their fears of alienating that force by offending its honor meant that they made no such effort. While anarchists maintained their opposition to governmental authority in general, Socialists emerged as a group that could oppose the Civil Guard from within the Republican system through letters of protest, articles, speeches, and demonstrations. The corps' conservative supporters mobilized as well, seeking its cooperation through financial assistance, homages, and messages of praise. Since guards pledged political neutrality, they could not participate directly in the debate over their role in the Republic, but they could make a claim of their own, that their honor should be respected, when policing protests. Unfortunately, their repertoire for making this claim was quite limited; it essentially consisted of verbal warnings and opening fire with powerful rifles. The mass mobilization of the Republic meant that guards felt the need to defend their honor with force more frequently, and the result was an increase in amount of violence they perpetrated.

Chapters Four through Six offer case studies of three of the most prominent incidents of political violence in the Second Republic in order to understand further how the Civil Guard's military culture evolved and shaped its actions during the period. While these examples are far from typical cases (rather, they are three of the Republic's most extreme cases of violence), their prominence means that extensive sources are available that permit a closer examination of the nature and evolution of the repertoire that had developed between the Civil Guard and the working classes than would be possible with more commonplace examples. In addition, these cases demonstrate how the Civil Guard, when faced with its greatest challenges of the period (and among the greatest in all its history), instinctively looked to its understanding of honor as its reference point for shaping its responses.

Each of these chapters examines the origins, unfolding, and aftermath of the incident in question at the local, regional, and national levels. Regarding each of the three incidents, I argue that the cause of the events that transpired was the clash between primarily the Socialists' political culture of mass mobilization to alter the structures of the Republic and the Civil Guard's military culture of defending honor. There was a role for individuals too in selecting from the repertoires of each side in a particular moment. As the different players vied to shape the narrative of each incident that would be told at the national level, guards had to rely on others to present their version of the story while their own extralegal retribution efforts gave ammunition to their opponents. Offended by even the government's half-hearted efforts to rein them in, many guards came to the conclusion that the military suppression, rather than the policing, of mass politics was the only solution to the perceived lack of respect it engendered.

The first case study, treated in Chapter Four, uses the Castilblanco incident, in which villagers in Badajoz Province killed their town's four guards, to demonstrate how shifting local power relations during the Republic increased tensions between guards and working-class parties even at the national level. As Socialists mobilized rural workers to take direct action to improve the workers' socio-economic situation, the resistance of the Civil Guard to those efforts proved the cause of the Castilblanco incident. But the decisions of individuals, shaped by organizational cultures, were also important causal factors. In this case, poor choices by local authorities and the guards provided the immediate conditions for the incident. Afterwards, Director General of the Civil Guard José Sanjurjo's interpretation of Castilblanco as an offense to the institution's honor led him to a bombastic response that did little to win the corps sympathy from workers, while Socialists failed to look beyond their standard criticisms of the Civil Guard to seize the opportunity for a de-escalation of tensions with the corps.

Local tensions led to violence at the Arnedo incident, the subject of Chapter Five, that had national political repercussions as well, except this time it was the civil guards who killed eleven. Socialist efforts to provide workers with a political voice and an industrialist's efforts to block these efforts provided context in this case. Then, the poor leadership of one officer was again also key in transforming a peaceful protest into a tragedy. Sanjurjo's lack of political tact continued after this incident, leading to his dismissal as director general and starting him and some guards down a path of revolt that culminated in the failed coup attempt of August 1932.

Chapter Six considers the third and most famous case: the Socialist-led revolt of October 1934 in Asturias. The incident was by far the most violent of the Second

Republic period. While civil guards had proven ill-equipped to handle the smaller confrontations they faced fairly regularly, they came into their element in this war-like situation, bravely defending their posts throughout the province. The fighting led some of them to seek glory in battle, as the army did, because winning the respect of the populace was clearly a lost cause. After the rebellion was suppressed militarily, a civil guard officer, Major Lisardo Doval Bravo, led the brutal repression that followed. Through a program of mass arrests and the torture of prisoners, Doval sought to instill enough fear in the population so that it would never attack the Civil Guard again. When civil liberties were restored, however, his methods wound up provoking a public outcry that helped sweep a left-wing government into power and sunk the Civil Guard's reputation to a new nadir. When the Civil War of 1936-1939 broke out, many guards chose the vision of honor as glory in battle that was already common in the army and had been hinted at by some guards in Asturias, selecting open war as a means to force respect out of those who had never been willing to provide it without coercion.

These chapters demonstrate how studying Europe's gendarmeries as institutions whose actions are shaped by their own cultures rather than only the orders of the state can help explain the destabilizing violence of the interwar period. In the case of the Civil Guard, honor was the defining characteristic of its military culture that drove guards to employ violence as a means to impose respect through fear, even if the institution's founders originally intended for honor to moderate their actions. This honor code was the product of conservative nineteenth-century liberalism attempting to adapt an older, more informal method of social regulation to the formal legal code of the liberal state. As civil guards tried to enforce these two competing codes in rural areas, local resistance

pushed them to develop violent practices in response. When faced with the new mass politics of the Second Republic, guards employed these violent practices to defend their honor, and the consequence was unprecedented violence on their part. When the cultural continuity ensured by the Civil Guard's strong military culture clashed with the rupture of the Second Republic's mass politics, the resulting violence created an environment that was unfavorable to democratic stabilization.

Part I- The Military Culture of the Civil Guard

These first three chapters of the dissertation seek to understand the origins of the Civil Guard's violence during the Second Republic. Chapter One does so by examining the military culture of the institution from its origins in the 1840s, Chapter Two the inculcation of that culture in the generation of guards that would serve during the Republic, and Chapter Three the interaction between that culture and the new political contestations of the Republic. Throughout these chapters, I highlight the roles of liberal governments, opposition groups, and individual actors in the formation of this culture. The Civil Guard was born of conservative liberalism's militarism and need for a force of public order to defend its achievements, while one aristocrat largely laid the groundwork for the corps' culture by making honor its guiding principle. Violence became a means for guards to defend their honor as they faced the confrontational tactics of opposition groups that challenged the exclusionary politics of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century liberalism. Meanwhile, liberal governments surrendered control of the training of guards to the army and other guards, who reproduced their entrenched habits while the army introduced its own brutal practices and military interventionism. By the time the Civil Guard became part of a democratic system under the Republic, it was ill equipped to face the mass mobilizations that accompanied the new regime peacefully. The Civil Guard had to rely on conservative and military supporters to respond to perceived threats to its honor at the national level, and a limited repertoire at the local level led guards to progress quickly to violence there. But the Republican government also played a role,

failing to alter the regulations, training, and equipment of the force such that it could bring peace rather than violence to the Republic.

Chapter 1- The Origins and Evolution of the Civil Guard's Military Culture, 1844-1923

1.1. Introduction

Two basic components comprise the military culture of an institution: its official, codified doctrines, regulations, and policies and its unofficial, unwritten habits, beliefs, and practices. In the Civil Guard, this first component exhibited an unusually strong influence given the virtually sacred status that its founding documents attained, but the second is also essential to understanding the Civil Guard's behavior during the Second Republic because, since guards were so dispersed, they had to operate with a high degree of autonomy. Since both the founding documents of the force shaped this first component of its culture so heavily, and the tensions between those foundations and the changing socio-political landscape of Spain so heavily shaped the second, this chapter, which establishes what the culture of the Civil Guard was during the Second Republic, must look all the way back to its foundation in order to do so.

This foundation was largely the product of the conservative side of Spain's nineteenth-century liberal transformation, which combined a preoccupation with public order and *ancien régime* elitism with a liberal desire for an expansion of private property and state authority. Yet even within the conservative Moderate Party there were differing visions of the role of the military in society. The Civil Guard that emerged from these tensions was a military force tasked with policing civilians. The Duque de Ahumada, the nobleman considered to be the founder of the institution, is the one who enshrined honor in the regulations as the defining feature of its military culture. In applying the old aristocratic notion of honor to this new, modern police force, he redefined it to mean the

approbation of the Civil Guard by the public. He did so to ensure that his civil guards would be firm but just in their enforcement of the law, but he also inadvertently opened the possibility that they would use violence to defend their honor.

The second part of the chapter considers the second element of military culture: the habits that arose as the Civil Guard's members balanced the mandates of their regulations with on-the-ground realities—in this case, those of living in and policing rural communities. Military elements of a guard's life, such as living in a barracks and being subject to strict discipline, were intended to isolate him from the corrupting influences of small-town life while elevating his class status so that he would be respected and obeyed. However, this isolation from the everyday townspeople brought the civil guards closer to other town elites such as the landowners and clergy. This distancing process was exacerbated by their daily policing duties. These were intended to win respect from the *pueblo*¹ through fighting crime, maintaining order, and performing humanitarian services; but they in fact bred resentment because the Civil Guard attempted to impose the dictates of the central government upon local communities that largely operated under their own informal methods of social regulation. Unwilling to admit they were not receiving the respect they felt they deserved, yet still bound to maintain political neutrality, guards deemed the town elites who praised them to be the “good” citizens and the only ones whose opinions mattered.

The last section examines how these contradictions and tensions in the Civil Guard's culture shaped the ways in which it responded to the rise of mass politics in the

¹ “*Pueblo*” means both “town” and refers to a community of people, whether the people of a town or even the people of a nation as a whole.

late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries as it sought to carry out its primary mission: maintaining public order. Despite Ahumada's wish that the Civil Guard not be used as a force of political repression, governments deployed it for precisely this purpose from virtually its founding. As anarchists turned to terrorism as a means to challenge the exclusionary Restoration regime (1874-1923), the government granted the Civil Guard impunity to combat these efforts with the same violence that it had employed against banditry in the preceding decades. Then, in the early twentieth century, anarchists and republicans shifted to more organized forms of political contestation such as mass protests and strikes. Guards were ill-equipped for confronting these new forms of mobilization, being more adapted to hunting bandits than controlling crowds, and violence was often the result—violence that only increased the hostility that the working classes had developed towards them. In using violence to impose respect, guards were placing their desire for honor above their duty to maintain the peace.

1.2. The Civil Guard on Paper

1.2.1. Tensions Emerge from a Contested Foundation

The Civil Guard was born of the clash between the *ancien régime* and liberalism that defined the first half of the nineteenth century in Spain and Europe as a whole. After the death of the absolutist king Ferdinand VII in 1833, Spain descended into a seven-year war of succession between, essentially, liberals and absolutists known as Carlists. The liberals desired a central, parliamentary government governed by a constitution and the universal application of the idea of private property, which meant selling Church lands and municipal common lands to private owners. This process, known as *desamortización*, was greatly feared by the peasantry, who stood to lose the critical

resource of the common lands, so many joined the Carlists or supported bandits who claimed to be robbing the rich to feed the poor. The liberals won the war, but they still had to cement their legitimacy after seven years of violence and political instability.² Unfortunately, the liberals themselves were deeply divided. The conservative faction, known as the Moderate Party, was composed of strict centralizers who wanted shared sovereignty between the king and the people and stringent property requirements for voting. They were also against the creation of a national militia, which the more radical faction, the Progressive Party, favored, along with looser property requirements for voting and vesting sovereignty entirely in the people. The rivalry between these two factions, as well as tensions with the crown, led to political chaos from 1833-43 and a power vacuum that allowed banditry to surge in the countryside.³ It also led to frequent military interventions in politics in the form of relatively bloodless *coup d'état* attempts known as *pronunciamientos*.⁴

Such a chaotic environment created a desire among the governing elites for a disciplined police force that could rein in the banditry, prevent a Carlist resurgence, protect the persons and property of those who benefited from the *desamortización*, and generally bring a restoration of order that would be conducive to political stability. In fact, the steady increase in crime in the first decades of the nineteenth century had hatched a plethora of police forces throughout Spain to combat banditry. But, since all of

² Mary Vincent, *Spain, 1833-2002: People and State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1.

³ Magdalena de Pazzis Pi Corrales, "La seguridad pública en España (1833-1844)," in *VI Seminario Duque de Ahumada: La Fundación de la Guardia Civil (9, 10 y 11 de mayo de 1994)* (Madrid: Ministerio de Justicia e Interior, 1995), 28.

⁴ For an expanded definition of the "*pronunciamiento*," see Eduardo González Calleja, *La razón de la fuerza. Orden público, subversión y violencia política en la España de la Restauración (1874-1917)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1998), 144-48.

these forces were local in nature, they were too small to have a wide impact and susceptible to bribes from the bandits themselves.⁵ For the Progressives, the answer was the National Militia, which was composed of local units in which property owners were the ones keeping order. The problem with the Militia was that it was intimately linked to the Progressives and its local nature made it prone to corruption.⁶ As for the Moderates, they envisioned a professional force under direct orders from the national government that could further their centralization and state-building projects. Therefore, when the Moderates took power in 1844, they dissolved the Militia and moved to replace it with a new, professional force of public order.⁷

The idea of such a force was not entirely new to Spain. In the eighteenth century, there were already a number of militarized regional police forces.⁸ However, the core of the Spanish Bourbons' public order system was the army.⁹ Meanwhile, the French Bourbons already possessed a kind of national police force in the form of the *Maréchaussée*, which could trace its origins at least as far back as the sixteenth century. It had a military structure and series of small posts around France from which members would conduct patrols.¹⁰ When the French Revolution broke out, the revolutionaries saw the value of this *ancien régime* institution as a force for national unity, and so they simply

⁵ Pazzis Pi Corrales, "Seguridad pública," 19-20.

⁶ Raymond Carr, *Spain, 1808-1975*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 159 and Vincent, *Spain*, 30.

⁷ López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 71.

⁸ Ballbé, *Orden público y militarismo*, 28, 33 and López Garrido, *Aparato policial*, 31-32.

⁹ López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 19.

¹⁰ For more on the *Maréchaussée* see Clive Emsley, "The Most Useful Corps for the Nation. . . : The *Maréchaussée*," chap. 2 in *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth Century Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

changed its name to the Gendarmerie Nationale and actually expanded its numbers, which were then further augmented by Napoleon.¹¹

Napoleon spread gendarmerie model across Europe as he conquered the continent. In the case of Spain, Joseph, the brother Napoleon had installed on the Spanish throne, founded a number of police forces, including a Spanish gendarmerie. All of these units disappeared when the French withdrew from Spain in 1814, but King Ferdinand VII did create a customs force known as the Cuerpo de Carabineros that had a military structure.¹²

The legacy of the *ancien régime* and the Napoleonic period meant that all Spanish liberals, whether Moderates or Progressives, desired a militarized public order system.¹³ The Progressives favored the Militia, while most Moderates maintained the idea of the gendarmerie. The Moderates wanted a strong state to “restore order” and were impressed by the fact that France’s Gendarmerie survived the French Revolution.¹⁴ Various attempts were made in the ensuing decades to re-found such a gendarmerie in Spain, but the political turmoil rendered all of them non-starters.¹⁵ In the early months of 1844, when Moderate Prime Minister (*presidente del consejo de ministros*) Luis González Bravo was considering how to replace the Militia, he naturally envisioned a gendarmerie

¹¹ Miguel Martínez García, “La Guardia Civil e instituciones de seguridad extranjeras,” in *Fundación de la Guardia Civil*, 86. For more information, see Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State*, 37-77.

¹² Pazzis Pi Corrales, “Seguridad pública,” 20-21, 23. See Ballbé, “Orden público y militarismo,” 99-102 for more information on the founding of the Carabineros.

¹³ Ballbé, *Orden público y militarismo*, 127.

¹⁴ Blaney, “Civil Guard,” 31 and Emilio de Diego García, “Los artífices de la fundación de la Guardia Civil,” in *Fundación de la Guardia Civil*, 105.

¹⁵ Martínez García, “Guardia Civil e instituciones de seguridad,” 87-88.

with a military structure and members recruited from the army that would represent the central government throughout the country.¹⁶

Yet from the very beginning the question of exactly how militarized this new force would be was a central point of debate. Since González Bravo was running a civilian government somewhat at odds with a powerful military faction within the Moderates led by General Ramón María Narváez, he wanted to be sure that the new force would be under the control of the civilian Ministry of the Interior (*Ministerio de la Gobernación*) and not part of the army. This civilian supervision would ensure that the military's power in the developing centralized state was not further augmented. He proposed naming the force the Corps of *Civil Guards* (*cuero de guardias civiles*) to emphasize its civilian nature.¹⁷ A decree dated March 28, 1844 created such a corps and gave it the broad mission of providing “order, public security, and the protection of people and properties,” noting that “neither the standing army nor the National Militia can attend to this service without harm to their peculiar organization and objectives, without detriment to military discipline, and without unfortunate annoyances and damages of the greatest importance for the wealthy and working classes.”¹⁸

The man chosen to build this new force (which was already being referred to as simply “the Civil Guard [*la Guardia Civil*]”) was Francisco Javier Girón y Ezpeleta, II

¹⁶ López Garrido, *Aparato policial en España*, 44.

¹⁷ López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 81-82, 87.

¹⁸ “Órden, á la seguridad pública y á la proteccion de las personas y de las propiedades.” “Ni el ejercito permanente ni la Milicia Nacional pueden atender a este servicio sin menoscabo de su peculiar organizacion y objeto, sin detrimento de la disciplina militar, y sin molestias ineficaces y perjuicios de la mayor trascendencia para las clases acomodadas y laboriosas.” Real decreto creando un cuerpo especial de fuerza armada de infantería y caballería bajo la dependencia del ministerio de la Gobernación de la Península, y con la denominación de Guardias civiles, *Gaceta de Madrid*, March 31, 1844.

Duque de Ahumada. The duke was a blue-blooded aristocrat, field marshal, and representative of the most conservative and militaristic wing of the Moderate Party, which was particularly concerned with public order.¹⁹ He was a natural choice because his father had already been active in trying to found a gendarmerie for Spain two decades earlier, he had already worked with the Mossos d'Esquadra police force in Catalonia and studied other European gendarmeries, and he had had experience with military organization as Inspector General of the Army.²⁰ Upon being named to the office on April 12, 1844, he immediately began studying the March 28th decree, and within a week he demonstrated his militarist inclinations by proposing to modify the decree to place the new force entirely under the Ministry of War (*Ministerio de Guerra*) and give it a centralized structure that would reduce the provincial governors' control over it.²¹

As it happened, just a couple of weeks later, on May 3rd, Queen Isabella II replaced González Bravo as prime minister with General Narváez. As the leader of the pro-military Moderate faction, Narváez was supportive of the Civil Guard project as a whole and of his old friend Ahumada's suggestions to allow the Ministry of War some control over the new force. Since most ministers of war were generals, doing so would give the army complete control of public order in Spain.²² However, the Ministry of the Interior still wanted a say, and so Narváez compromised. On May 13, 1844, he issued a new decree placing the Civil Guard partially within the minister of war's portfolio.²³

¹⁹ López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 97.

²⁰ Blaney, "Civil Guard," 28 and Diego García, "Artífices de la fundación," 108.

²¹ Enrique Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1976), 34-35.

²² López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 95.

²³ Narváez was able to act unilaterally because the Cortes had been suspended during a state of emergency. Miguel López Corral, *La Guardia Civil: Nacimiento y consolidación, 1844-1874* (Madrid: Editorial Actas, Ministerio de Justicia e Interior, Secretaría General Técnica, 1995), 38-39 and Joaquín de Azcarraga

Since the force did not actually come into existence until after the May 13th decree, it is usually considered the institution's founding document.²⁴ Article One of the decree explains the roles of each ministry: "The Civil Guard depends on the Ministry of War for that which concerns its organization, personnel, discipline, materiel, and payroll, and on the Ministry of the Interior for that which is related to everyday services and movements."²⁵ The document also creates the General Inspection, which is like the general staff of an army and allows the centralized command structure broad control over the Civil Guard's internal affairs down to the lowest-ranking officer. The hope was that such an organization would ensure the cohesion of a corps dispersed all around the country.²⁶ Despite all this, Narváez, who was not quite as enthusiastic about militarization as Ahumada, also inserted a clause saying that the Civil Guard's role was to be distinct from that of the army.²⁷ In short, the strength of the military's political power within the ostensibly civilian governments of nineteenth-century Spain had produced a hybrid force with both military and civilian characteristics, and the tension between these elements was to become one of the defining features of the Civil Guard's history right through the Second Republic.²⁸

Servet, "Decretos y reglamentos fundacionales de la Guardia Civil," in *Fundación de la Guardia Civil*, 42-43.

²⁴ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 36 and López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 99-100 make this claim.

²⁵ "La guardia civil depende del ministerio de la Guerra por lo concerniente á su organizacion, personal, disciplina, material y percibo de sus haberes, y del ministerio de la Gobernacion por lo relativo a su servicio peculiar y movimientos." Article 1, Real decreto declarando que la guardia civil depende del ministerio de la Guerra en lo concerniente á su organización, personal, disciplina, material y percibo de sus haberes, y del ministerio de la Gobernación por lo relativo á su servicio peculiar y movimientos, *Gaceta de Madrid*, May 14, 1844.

²⁶ Article 2; López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 100; and Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 374-75.

²⁷ López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 101.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 106, 180. For examples of the difficulties the Civil Guard's hybrid identity created, see *Ibid.*, 108-13.

This tension between the military and civilian competencies over the Civil Guard was apparent in the first task its organizers faced—creating the regulations for the new force. Ahumada himself drafted a set of regulations that resembled the French model where the Gendarmerie could receive orders from Ministry of the Interior officials but was considered part of the army (and thus under the auspices of the Ministry of War).²⁹ However, the Ministry of the Interior also drafted its own regulations, which, naturally, gave it more direct control over the institution than Ahumada’s version did. Narváez favored the Ministry of the Interior in this case, and it published the Civil Guard’s *Reglamento para el servicio* (Service Regulations) on October 9, 1844. These regulations reject the French Gendarmerie model and echo the March 28th decree in declaring the mission of the Civil Guard to be “the protection of people and property,” envisioning the Civil Guard as primarily a policing rather than a military force.³⁰ But they also state that the Civil Guard’s goal is “public order” rather than “order [and] public security,” a slight change in wording that shifts the emphasis from the security of the citizenry to an abstract idea of “order” that could presumably be defended at the expense of an individual’s safety.³¹ Furthermore, the document concludes by stating that part of the Civil Guard’s mission is ensuring the tranquility of “the persons and property of honorable and peaceful men,” not the tranquility of all citizens.³²

²⁹ Miguel Martínez García, “La Gendarmería Nacional francesa y la fundación de la Guardia Civil,” *Cuadernos de la Guardia Civil*, no. 16 (1996): 202.

³⁰ “La protección de las personas y las propiedades.” Real decreto aprobando el reglamento para el servicio de la Guardia civil, Article 1, *Gaceta de Madrid*, October 10, 1844. Martínez García, “Guardia Civil e instituciones de seguridad,” 81-82, 91-92 and López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 103.

³¹ “Orden Público.” Article 1. Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 123.

³² “Las personas y bienes de los hombres pacíficos y honrados.” Article 56.

This idea of the Civil Guard as a force to ensure public order is reinforced by the *Reglamento*'s Chapter 3, which enumerates the corps' duties. The first few articles of the chapter are all about maintaining public order. Article 26 instructs civil guards to “stamp out and repress any riot or disorder that occurs in their presence,” even if they have not received specific orders to do so.³³ If such action is necessary, Article 27 contains instructions on how the commander should proceed:

1° He will evaluate the means that prudence dictates for persuading the members of the crowd to disperse and not continue altering public order.

2° When these means are ineffective, he will threaten them with the use of force.

3° If despite this intimidation the rioters persist with the same disobedience, he will reestablish tranquility and the rule of law with the vigorous use of force.³⁴

The key articles of the *Reglamento para el servicio* remained little altered up through the Second Republic.³⁵ Therefore, given that civil guards received almost no training in crowd control (see Chapter Two), Article 27 constituted some of the only instruction that they had on how to proceed in confrontational situations. The vagueness of these articles left plenty of room for improvisation and for unwritten patterns of behavior to develop, a subject that will be explored in Chapter Three.³⁶ Suffice it to say here that the third step allowed guards to initiate violence if their orders were not respected. Naturally, Article 28 also stipulates that “if the rioters or rowdies makes use of any violent means during

³³ “A sofocar y reprimir cualquier motín o desorden que ocurra en su presencia.”

³⁴ 1° Se valdrá del medio que le dicte la prudencia para persuadir á los perturbadores á que se dispersen y no continuar alterando el orden.

2° Cuando este medio sea ineficaz, les intimará el uso de la fuerza.

3° Si á pesar de esta intimacion persisten los amotinados en la misma desobediencia, restablecerá a viva fuerza la tranquilidad y el imperio de la ley.

³⁵ It was refined in 1852 and updated in 1923. *Contestaciones completas del “Instituto Reus” para el ingreso en el Cuerpo de la Guardia Civil* (Madrid: “Instituto Reus” Centro de enseñanza y publicaciones, 1935), 115. All quotes in this section are from the 1844 original.

³⁶ Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 1:226.

the first warnings, the Civil Guard will also employ force from that point on without preceding with other notifications or warnings.”³⁷

Meanwhile, the Ministry of War issued its own *Reglamento militar* (Military Regulations) six days after the Ministry of the Interior’s *Reglamento para el servicio*. Ahumada’s suggestions influenced the drafting of the *Reglamento militar*, but it was ultimately written by a Ministry of War commission. The document never even mentions the minister of the interior’s roles and confers on the inspector general (formerly the director general) broad powers to shape the centralized organization and discipline of the corps, envisioning it as a branch of the army.³⁸

1.2.2. Ahumada and Honor

As is shown by the fact that he did not entirely get his way with the drafting of the regulations, the Duque de Ahumada was not the sole founder of the Civil Guard, but his outsized influence as its first inspector general and his status as a legendary father figure did give the corps a firm foundation upon which to construct a cultural unity.³⁹ In other words, for a highly hierarchical organization like the Civil Guard, it makes sense to find the origins of its military culture in Ahumada’s early leadership, especially because the focus of this dissertation will be on how low-ranking civil guards interpreted the values he instilled in the organization.

³⁷ “Si los amotinados ó perturbadores hicieren uso de cualquier medio violento durante las primeras intimaciones, la Guardia civil empleará también la fuerza desde luego, sin preceder otras intimaciones ó advertencias.” By the time of the Second Republic, Article 27 was Article 26 and Article 28 was Article 27.

³⁸ Martínez García, “Guardia Civil e instituciones de seguridad,” 90-91; López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 102-03; Blaney “Civil Guard,” 29; and Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 1:223.

³⁹ Francisco Aguado Sánchez, *El duque de Ahumada: Fundador de la Guardia Civil* (Madrid: Dirección General de la Guardia Civil, Servicio Histórico, 1969), 313, 400 and Maximiliano Lasen Paz, “La acción social en el Cuerpo,” in *Fundación de la Guardia Civil*, 199.

The duke's most important legacy was the *Cartilla del Guardia Civil*, a handbook he wrote that was originally meant simply to complement the regulations and clarify the two different sets—from Interior and War—but that took on a life of its own as the fundamental text defining the corps' values.⁴⁰ The *Cartilla* was largely memorized and kept in the breast pocket of a guard's uniform at all times—historians have referred to it as the “Bible of the Civil Guard.”⁴¹ First issued in 1845, it became so revered that it was never substantially altered after one revision in 1852.⁴² As José Díaz Valderrama, one of the first Civil Guard historians, wrote in 1858, “the guards not only know the articles from memory but also record them in their hearts, on the doors of their rooms, and even on the walls of their homes.”⁴³

With the initial work of creating the regulations over, Ahumada had more time to think beyond the model of the French Gendarmerie as he was writing the *Cartilla*.⁴⁴ He wound up defining what the moral code of the Civil Guard would be in the document's famous first article: “Honor must be the watchword of the civil guard; therefore, he ought to preserve it without stain. Once lost it can never be recovered.”⁴⁵ In other words, Ahumada took the idea of honor from his own aristocratic background and applied it to this quintessentially liberal institution. The match appears an odd one because it asked an

⁴⁰ Martínez García, “Gendarmería Nacional francesa,” 204; López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 106; and Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 1:221.

⁴¹ Blaney, “Civil Guard,” 37 and López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 107.

⁴² It was updated in 1923. To avoid confusion, this dissertation will henceforth refer to the 1923 version, which only slightly altered that of 1852, since the 1923 version was the one in effect during the Second Republic.

⁴³ “Los Guardias no solamente los saben de memoria, sino que los graban en su corazón, sobre la puerta de su dormitorio y aun en la pared do [sic] se albergan.” *Historia, servicios notables, socorros, comentarios de la Cartilla, y reflexiones sobre el Cuerpo de la Guardia Civil* (Madrid: J. M. Ducazcal, 1858), 44.

⁴⁴ Martínez García, “Guardia Civil e instituciones de seguridad,” 90.

⁴⁵ “El honor ha de ser la principal divisa del guardia civil; debe por consiguiente conservarlo sin mancha. Una vez perdido no se recobra jamás.” In *Contestaciones completas del “Instituto Reus,”* 106.

institution tasked with the liberal project of enforcing the written law to be governed in part by an extralegal system arbitrated by approbation from the public rather than the courts' readings of the law. But his plan was also liberal in that it deemphasized traditional social categories, instead suggesting that honor, rather than being reserved exclusively for the aristocracy, could be possessed even by enlisted guards who would presumably come from lower-class backgrounds.⁴⁶ Just as honor had once been a factor helping aristocrats to maintain their elite social status, it would now aid guards in gaining an elite status in the towns they policed, granting them the respect they needed to be obeyed and shielding them from corruption.⁴⁷ As Article 2 itself states, "the greatest prestige and moral strength are the corps' first elements, and assuring the morality of its members is the fundamental basis for the existence of this institution."⁴⁸ Whereas previous police forces in Spain had disappeared as soon as the governments that founded them fell from power, Ahumada hoped that by making the Civil Guard loyal to the abstract idea of honor, it would come to represent more than just the Moderate Party and thereby be acceptable to whoever succeeded the Moderates in power.⁴⁹ Ahumada was transforming the old aristocratic value of honor from a hallmark of the *ancien régime* to a method for creating the kind of professional, bureaucratic force that liberals so desired.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Jesus Cruz writes of how nineteenth-century reformers strove to make previously aristocratic values and practices open to anyone in "Bourgeois Conduct and the Making of Polite Society," chap. 2 in *The Rise of Middle-Class Culture in Nineteenth-Century Spain* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011).

⁴⁷ Article 9 prohibits civil guards from accepting any compensation for services rendered beyond thanks. Emsley notes that such an elite status was typical of gendarmerie forces. "Peasants, Gendarmes and State Formation," 78.

⁴⁸ "El mayor prestigio y fuerza moral del Cuerpo es su primer elemento, y asegurar la moralidad de sus individuos la base fundamental de la existencia de esta institución." In *Contestaciones completas del "Instituto Reus,"* 106.

⁴⁹ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 371-72.

⁵⁰ The fact that honor was so important to Spain's gendarmerie may remind readers of stereotypes about honor's outsized role in Spanish society. However, this dissertation only concerns honor as a guide to the

As Ahumada saw it, honor would have another benefit in guiding civil guards in their policing duties. It would automatically temper their behavior by having them always keep in mind what the public would think of their actions. Article 4 prohibits physical or verbal maltreatment of the citizenry because, as the next article explains, “always faithful to his duty, calm when in danger and carrying out his functions with dignity, prudence, and firmness, the civil guard will be more respected than one who with threats alone manages to alienate everyone.”⁵¹ In other words, the *Cartilla* attempts to make honor a guard’s guide in judging how to apply force as stipulated in Articles 27 and 28 of the *Reglamento para el servicio*. Therefore, Ahumada goes on to state in the famous Article 7 of the *Cartilla* that a guard’s “first weapons should be persuasion and moral strength, resorting to those [weapons] that he carries with him only when he sees himself offended by others or [when] his words have not been enough. In this case, he will always leave in good stead the honor of his arms.”⁵² While this article advocates a non-violent approach to policing, it also suggests that violence is acceptable if a guard’s honor is offended, even if only verbally. Given that the *Cartilla* states that his honor could never be regained if lost, he was under tremendous pressure to defend it.

Civil Guard’s actions. Whether or not Ahumada’s choice to emphasize honor in the *Cartilla* was also a result of a particular obsession within the Spanish nobility is outside the scope of this study. For more on the idea of honor in Spain, see José Luis Pitarch, “El honor,” in *El honor y el honor militar* (Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1984), 27-54. Ahumada was not the only one envisioning a broader application of honor around this time. Throughout the nineteenth century, army officers more generally increased their emphasis on honor as a way to maintain their image of themselves as gentlemanly even as the number of nobles in the army steadily declined. Julio Ponce Alberca and Diego Lagares García, *Honor de oficiales: Los tribunales de honor en el ejército de la España contemporánea (siglos XIX-XX)* (Barcelona: Ediciones Carena), 54.

⁵¹ “Siempre fiel a su deber, sereno en el peligro y desempeñando sus funciones con dignidad, prudencia y firmeza, el Guardia Civil será más respetado que el que con amenazas sólo consigue malquistarse con todos.” In *Contestaciones completas del “Instituto Reus,”* 106.

⁵² “Primeras armas deben ser la persuasión y la fuerza moral, recurriendo a las que lleve consigo sólo cuando se vea ofendido con otras o sus palabras no hayan bastado. En este caso, dejará siempre bien puesto el honor de las armas.” In *Ibid.*

Therefore, as defined in the *Cartilla*, honor could be a force working to restrain or encourage him to use violence, depending on the situation. Ahumada seems to have hoped that honor would ensure that guards employed the broad powers given to them in Articles 27 and 28 of the *Reglamento para el servicio* with prudence, but he did not foresee that it could drive them to do the opposite as well.

Ahumada's concern that his men's behavior be respectable at all times went so far that he ordered them to be subject to on-duty discipline at all times.⁵³ Indeed, the *Cartilla* regulates every aspect of a guard's life, not just his official duties. Ahumada understood that appearances matter to public perception; therefore, the *Cartilla* demands of a civil guard that he have a courteous but serious and sober attitude while on patrol and that he pay meticulous attention to his uniform and personal appearance, stipulating such details as how often he should shave, that he should not greet friends he may see with shouts or nicknames, and that he should be polite when asking to enter a domicile or view documentation.⁵⁴ The *Reglamento militar* regulated his private life as well: it contained prohibitions on patronizing gambling houses, having a bad reputation, causing a public scandal, and associating with suspicious persons.⁵⁵

In addition to honor, Ahumada saw a military structure as key to enabling the Civil Guard to be immune to corruption and ultimately loyal only to the central government. Militarization meant isolation from local influences. Housing in barracks and strict discipline would serve to distinguish civil guards from the people they policed while enhancing unit solidarity. Ahumada also insisted that his organization be

⁵³ Article 32, *Cartilla del Guardia Civil*, in *Ibid.*, 111.

⁵⁴ López Corral, *Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*, 48-51.

⁵⁵ *Contestaciones completas del "Instituto Reus,"* 114.

composed entirely of volunteers from the army.⁵⁶ An all-volunteer force meant that these men would be committed to the institution, and the fact that they had been in the army would also make them accustomed to a job that entailed what he called sacrifice—the willingness to endure harsh physical conditions (Ahumada’s physical requirements were even stricter than the army’s) and danger for one’s country.⁵⁷ Since most enlisted men came from a peasant class excluded from the political system, he (and Narváez) hoped that they would not enter the force with political predispositions.⁵⁸ As a consequence, Ahumada had to find a way to elevate these men to a social level in which they would value the idea of property, the protection of which would be one of their primary duties.⁵⁹ Therefore, he also insisted that all recruits know how to read and write (essential skills anyway for checking documentation and writing tickets and reports) and that their pay be higher than that of the army (which would also help prevent corruption).⁶⁰

Unfortunately, the low literacy rate in Spain, along with the fact that the pay was still barely enough to survive on, meant that the Civil Guard was to have persistent problems finding enough volunteers who met its qualifications.⁶¹

To sum up, in the Civil Guard the Moderates founded a police force that reflected the tensions within their party between military and civilian, and between *ancien régime*

⁵⁶ In contrast, the March 28, 1844 decree envisioned some recruitment from the civil service as well. “La Oficialidad de la Guardia Civil,” *REHGC* 16, no. 30 (1983): 11.

⁵⁷ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 373-74. These requirements were established from the time of the March 28th decree. Enrique Martínez Ruiz, “El Guardia Civil en el momento fundacional,” in *Fundación de la Guardia Civil*, 129.

⁵⁸ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 375.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁶⁰ Higher pay was also a requirement that was first enumerated in the March 28th decree. Blaney, “Civil Guard,” 27.

⁶¹ López Corral, *Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*, 36 and Gonzalo Jar Couselo, “El Oficial de la Guardia Civil en el momento fundacional,” in *Fundación de la Guardia Civil*, 118.

and liberal influences. The outcome was the perpetually ambiguous position of the Civil Guard as a militarized force carrying out a civilian policing mission under the orders of both civilian and military officials. Ahumada was successful in adapting the *ancien régime* notion of honor as a way to ensure the professionalism the Moderates so desired, but when this professional military force enforced the dictates of the central government on a rural Spain accustomed to the informal structures of town life, respect from all classes of society was not the result.

Table 1.1: Key Foundational Documents of the Civil Guard

Name of Document	March 28th Decree	May 13th Decree	Reglamento para el servicio	Reglamento militar	Cartilla (final version)
Date	March 28, 1844	May 13, 1844	October 9, 1844	October 15, 1844	July 29, 1852
Key Figures	González Bravo	Narváez, Ahumada	Ministry of the Interior	Ministry of War, Ahumada	Ahumada
Key Characteristic	Ministry of the Interior dependency	Dual dependency	Envisions the Civil Guard as police force	Gives the Civil Guard a military organization	Enshrines a moral code of honor

1.3. The Civil Guard in Practice: The Unofficial Aspects of its Culture

The Civil Guard began performing its duties in September 1844 in Madrid, and it expanded gradually outward from Madrid across all of Spain over the next two years, making its very beginnings a symbol of the expanding power of the central government.⁶² The organization's numbers grew quickly to match the expansion—from an initial 1,870 men to 5,015 just two years later.⁶³ Regional organization was based on the provincial

⁶² Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 36, 38, 44.

⁶³ Miguel López Corral, "Proyección inicial de la Institución," in *Fundación de la Guardia Civil*, 46.

system that was established in 1833, thereby linking the Civil Guard to yet another liberal project meant to standardize the relations of the central government with all areas of the country. Each town of any size was given a Civil Guard post of usually six men but sometimes as few as four.

Strongly rooted in the regulations, the culture that guided these guards' actions remained remarkably constant over time. Therefore, this section will draw on a variety of examples from the mid-nineteenth century through the Second Republic in outlining the most salient features of the Civil Guard's culture as it stood at the time of the Republic. The contradictions inherent in having a military force police civilians became the defining features of this culture. Family housing in barracks and strict military discipline were meant to keep such a culture uncorrupted, but they made guards outsiders in places where local identity was extremely important. Guards prided themselves on their humanitarian services and fight against crime, but their deployments as a force of political repression did not win them any popularity. In fact, where they failed to win the respect of the lower classes as they worked to protect private property and enforce the official laws in rural communities, they won the patronage of local elites, which in turn worsened the perception of the guards as servants of the propertied.

1.3.1. Internal Structures

1.3.1.1. Housing and Family

Perhaps Ahumada's most important strategy for ensuring his men were honorable was combining their police stations and quarters into one building called the *casa-cuartel*

(house-quarters).⁶⁴ These *casas-cuarteles* were intentionally isolated, often placed at the edge of town, at a crossroads or other strategic point, to ensure that guards formed tight bonds with other guards. The buildings allowed them to both live and work together in close proximity, rather than with townspeople who might seek to corrupt them.⁶⁵

Developing relationships with locals was dangerous because, in the words of Julian Pitt-Rivers, in rural Spain “to enter into friendship with someone means putting oneself in a state of obligation.”⁶⁶

The design of the *casas-cuarteles* was meant to provide a military lifestyle even in a remote town. They were rather Spartan structures, bearing a closer resemblance to a barracks than a police station.⁶⁷ A typical layout included a dormitory for unmarried guards and small units for the families of married ones, a slightly larger unit and a small office for the station commandant, a kitchen area, a stable, and a central patio and armaments room where a daily meeting would take place. An unmarried guard’s personal possessions were expected to fit into just a single chest.

Mayors around the country wanted Civil Guard posts in their towns to keep order and reinforce their authority, but the municipal government had to pay for guards’ lodging. Given the limited funds available to most municipalities, the state of a guard’s

⁶⁴ The term *casa-cuartel* was in fact first used by the Ministry of the Interior in the Reglamento para el servicio, but Ahumada whole-heartedly embraced the idea. Juan Carlos Rodríguez Burdalo, “La casa-cuartel,” in *Fundación de la Guardia Civil*, 144.

⁶⁵ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 103 and López Garrido, *Aparato policial en España*, 51.

⁶⁶ *The People of the Sierra* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 138. I draw on this anthropological study of a small Andalusian town in the 1940s frequently, although it describes a later period, because it is still one of the most highly regarded analyses of small town society in Spain, and most of the characteristics of rural life he describes were not new in the 1940s.

⁶⁷ Diego López Garrido calls the *casas-cuarteles* “the clearest manifestation of the absolute difference between military and police structures.” “Es la manifestación más clara de la absoluta diferencia entre la estructura militar y la policial.” *Guardia Civil*, 147.

casa-cuartel was often quite decrepit, and guards were frequently housed in whatever building the local authorities had available. Ahumada commonly arranged for former monasteries and convents seized in the *desamortización* to be converted to this new purpose.⁶⁸ By 1850, 30% of his men were housed in such structures, even though the Ministry of Health had declared many of them uninhabitable.⁶⁹

This situation had changed little by the time of the Restoration in 1874. Many civil guards were still housed in old convents and some did not even have running water or electricity.⁷⁰ Civil guards also frequently found themselves fairly isolated from the outside world because of poor roads and a lack of telegraph and telephone lines. While the *casas-cuarteles* may have been barracks, they were certainly not forts, as the walls were often quite flimsy. This combination of poor communication (even if there was a telegraph or telephone line, it was easily cut) and poor-quality housing made the *casa-cuartel* potentially vulnerable to assault by the *pueblo* itself. However, at least according to Fernando Rivas, no such assault had ever been successfully carried out prior to the Second Republic, no doubt because the *pueblo* lacked military arms.⁷¹ Another result of the lack of government money for housing was that, without funding for expansions of the *casas-cuarteles*, guards sometimes had to be off-site in rented apartments.⁷² Here one sees how the government's budgetary restraints helped prevent the full isolation of the

⁶⁸ See Rodríguez Burdalo, "Casa-cuartel," 150-52 for more information on the relationship between the *casas-cuarteles* and the *desamortización*.

⁶⁹ Lasen Paz, "Acción social en el Cuerpo," 185.

⁷⁰ *Complemento al Consultor del Guardia Civil y Apéndice de 1930* (Ávila, 1931), 115-16 and "Sobre gratificación de agua (10 febrero 1927)," in Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 4: 355.

⁷¹ "Rebeldía y represión," 136.

⁷² See Miguel López Corral, *La Guardia Civil en la Restauración (1875-1905): Militarismo contra Subversión y Terrorismo anarquista* (Madrid: Editorial ACTAS, 2004), 310-12 for more on the inadequate state of Civil Guard housing during the Restoration.

civil guards from civilian society. Those men and their wives who lived outside of the *casas-cuarteles* could and did form relationships with their landlords and neighbors.

In 1860, Ahumada took another measure to ensure that his men were not influenced by such obligations in ordering that a guard could not be posted in his hometown or that of his wife, thereby removing them from the proximity of any friends and relatives they might have.⁷³ However, there were limits on this approach to isolating civil guards as well. They could still be stationed *near* their hometowns, and many obtained transfers to their native provinces.⁷⁴ In addition, they often remained at the same post for years (especially if it was near their home towns), which makes it highly unlikely that they resisted forming any bonds with the local community during that time.

As Ahumada saw it, in addition to keeping guards isolated, the *casa-cuartel* had the added benefit of allowing them to live with their families, placing their military professional lives and civilian family lives in the same building.⁷⁵ The inspector general encouraged his guards to get married and have children because he believed the public would have greater respect for middle-class family men.⁷⁶ Another reason why he pushed for high pay was so that guards could afford to raise families, especially since he prohibited them from contracting debts (an inability to pay such debts might dishonor them).⁷⁷ Given that being a guard was a career position, it is safe to say that most were

⁷³ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 75.

⁷⁴ See López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 289-92 for more on transfers during the Restoration. Clive Emsley notes that this practice was typical of gendarmeries. "Peasants, Gendarmes and State Formation," in *National Histories and European History*, ed. Mary Fulbrook (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 78-79.

⁷⁵ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 77. Martínez Ruiz argues that this idea of having families live inside a barracks is a "authentic revolution within military sociology," but in fact the French Gendarmerie already had such a system. "Auténtica revolución dentro de la sociología militar." *Ibid.*, 81.

⁷⁶ Lasen Paz, "Acción social en el Cuerpo," 184 and Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 82.

⁷⁷ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 376.

married and had children.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, Ahumada also placed restrictions on marriages to ensure that guards were augmenting rather than diminishing the honor of the corps. He required that the guard be at least 28 years of age, that he be economically solvent, and that his bride obtain a letter of good conduct from her town mayor or priest.⁷⁹ The promise of moving out of the dormitory and into a family unit no doubt encouraged civil guards to marry. Permission to marry was granted if the guard met the requirements and it could be confirmed the prospective bride was unmarried, but the process took a few months. A secret marriage was considered serious misconduct, yet service records show that they did occur.⁸⁰

Marriage was another limit on a civil guard's isolation because, although wives and children lived within the confines of the *casa-cuartel*, they had to venture out into the community for shopping and schooling at the very least. Guards also sometimes married women from the towns where they were stationed. To counteract this problem, if a guard did marry a local woman, he was always transferred. Moving out of her hometown must have been difficult for many guards' wives, but such a marriage also had benefits. It offered poor women from rural areas housing, a steady family income, and upward social mobility. While they may have previously held some form of employment, they were now to be housewives.

⁷⁸ As an example, see Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN), Fondo contemporáneo (FC)-Tribunal Supremo Reservado, Expediente (Exp.) 22, folio (f.) 226 for a list of all the family members in Oviedo's *casa-cuartel* on October 5-8, 1934.

⁷⁹ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 72-73. These requirements were later altered to three years of military service and a minimum age of 23 for officers. *Escalafón General de los Generales, Jefes y Oficiales de la Guardia Civil en 1.º de enero de 1932* (Madrid: Taller-Escuela de Artes Gráficas de la Gaa. Civil, [1932]): 92 and "Matrimonio," *RTGC* 22, no. 261 (November 1931): 536.

⁸⁰ *Escalafón General de los Generales*, 91-93.

With wives' greater status came greater responsibility. Whereas fearlessness and the authority to defend one's reputation was the essence of honor for a man in rural Spanish society, shame defined it for a woman.⁸¹ Shame was almost the opposite of a man's sense of honor in that it consisted of the fear of reprobation by society.⁸² In rural Spain, the intimate relationship between a woman's shame and a man's honor (in that a man was obliged to defend a woman's honor) meant that the Civil Guard had to interest itself in the private lives not only of its members but also of their wives in order to safeguard its cherished reputation. Therefore, when an officer inspected a post, he evaluated the personal conduct of both the guards and their families.⁸³ Although the Civil Guard's sense of honor was not exactly the same as that of the *pueblo*, it did recognize the important role that women had in rural Spanish society's conception of honor in order to win the respect of that society.

To take an extreme example of how important civil guards considered the reputation of their wives, in 1935, when some items were stolen from a civil guard's chest at a post in the province of Huelva, an investigative judge determined that the wife of the post commandant (a corporal) was the thief. The *Revista Técnica de la Guardia Civil* (*Civil Guard Technical Review, RTGC*), a magazine published from 1910 to 1936, describes what happened next:

When the corporal got the news, he did not get upset and said, "I will look into it." And after a few seconds two detonations disturbed the peace of the station.

⁸¹ Pitt-Rivers, *People of the Sierra*, 89-91, 112 and Julian Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status," in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, ed. J. G. Peristiany (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 44. Unlike townspeople, guards wanted to be respected for their discipline, sacrifice, and political neutrality more than for their fearlessness.

⁸² Pitt-Rivers, *People of the Sierra*, 113.

⁸³ "Revistas de inspección," in Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 4:352.

What happened? We don't know. What's certain is that the corporal killed his spouse with his pistol and committed suicide immediately.⁸⁴

The author of the article, Lieutenant Coronel Lara, is not sure what to make of this case, for he is unable to decide whether the corporal's duty to obey the laws against murder and suicide or his duty to uphold his honor was more important. He begins by condemning what he calls a crime against divine and social law but then spends most of the rest of the piece praising the corporal's sense of honor. Even if Lara cannot condone the corporal's actions, he can empathize with his decision to use violence to defend his honor: "surely in an act of limitless affection towards the mother of his children, [he] took her life so that she would not have to endure the shame."⁸⁵ In this example, the corporal chose safeguarding his family's shame (and thereby his honor and that of his institution) over obeying the written law. In an institution where honor could never be regained once lost, the only solution seemed to him to be death.

1.3.1.2. Discipline

As Ahumada saw it, civil guards would be members of both their biological families and the institutional family of the Civil Guard itself. Not only did he bring this family together in the *casas-cuarteles*, he also saw enforcing strict discipline and hierarchy as part of inoculating his guards from corruption and winning them the respect of the public.⁸⁶ As the head of his biological family and one of the leading figures of the

⁸⁴ Cuando llega a este Cabo la noticia no se inmuta y dice: Me enteraré. Y a los pocos segundos el ruido de dos detonaciones altera la paz del cuartel.

¿Qué pasó? Se ignora. Lo cierto es que con la pistola el Cabo mata a su esposa y se suicida inmediatamente.

Lara, "Notas del mes," *RTGC* 26, no. 307 (September 1935): 365.

⁸⁵ "Seguramente en un cariño ilimitado hacia la madre de sus hijos, quitarle la vida para que no sobreviviera al oprobio." *Ibid.*, 366.

⁸⁶ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 376-77 and López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 263.

town where he was stationed, a guard's authority reigned almost supreme, but within the institution he submitted to the stern parental authority of his officers. Because of this need to distinguish guards from the civilians that lived around them as deserving respect, guards had more restrictions placed on their lives than others. Their code of honor itself demanded conformity and obedience to superiors, but the *Reglamento militar* also established that guards would be tried by military courts.⁸⁷ Discipline was harsh because, it was thought, it had to be in order to maintain that moral standard believed necessary for winning the respect of the people. In the words of the *Reglamento militar* itself, "discipline, an essential element in all military bodies, is of more and greater importance in the Civil Guard, since the dispersion of its individuals makes even more necessary in this corps the rigorous completion of their duties, constant emulation [of superiors], blind obedience, love of service, unity of sentiments and honor and the good name of the institution. Given these considerations, no offense, not even the lightest, is concealable."⁸⁸

The Civil Guard's concern for discipline required that commanding officers have tremendous power over their men. Much of the commanders' power stemmed from the fact that they could take many disciplinary actions against their men without the approval of any higher authority or jury.⁸⁹ A commander who took a dislike to one of his men

⁸⁷ Reglamento Militar para la Guardia civil, article 72, in *Contestaciones completas del "Instituto Reus,"* 115.

⁸⁸ "La disciplina, elemento esencial en todo cuerpo militar, los es más y de mayor importancia en la Guardia civil, puesto que la diseminación en que se hallan su [sic] individuos hace más necesario en este Cuerpo el riguroso cumplimiento de sus deberes, constante emulación, ciega obediencia, amor al servicio, unidad de sentimientos y honor y buen nombre de la Institución. Bajo esta consideraciones, ninguna falta, y aun la más leve, es disimulable." Reglamento Militar para la Guardia Civil, article 66, in *Contestaciones completas del "Instituto Reus,"* 114.

⁸⁹ López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 272.

could make life very difficult for him. He even had control of his subordinates' movements—permission was needed to travel outside the province where one was stationed—and leave was rarely granted.

One reason why officers were given such power was that since their men would be spread out in small posts around the country, it was impossible for an officer to be stationed at every post, and there was a danger that each post would develop its own culture, replicating the disunity that had previously so hindered policing in Spain. Therefore, the periodic inspections the *Reglamento militar* required officers to perform took on special importance, and officers were encouraged to take a paternalistic attitude towards their men by being themselves models of good conduct and by policing everything from the enlisted man's dress and equipment to his recordkeeping and even his moral and personal conduct.⁹⁰ The inspections were a serious business. Officers who found that regulations had been violated had the power to impose disciplinary measures.⁹¹

Personal service records show that officers did punish civil guards and lower-ranking officers for even the slightest offenses.⁹² Not only disobedience, but simple inexactitude in the completion of duty could earn one a note in one's record. The range of violations was quite wide, but many had to do with laziness or sloppiness—dodging inspections, not reporting for duty, making mistakes in filling out reports, not reporting or failing to investigate an incident. Of course, these reprimands or short periods of house

⁹⁰ López Corral, *Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*, 30 and Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 104, 115.

⁹¹ "Revistas de inspección," Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 4:352.

⁹² For details on the use of personal service record sources in this dissertation, see "A Note on Personal Service Records" in the bibliography.

arrest were just slaps on the wrist; the real punishment was the unfavorable note in one's service record—a stain on one's honor that officers went to every effort to have expunged.

In keeping with the Civil Guard's concern about regulating the private lives of its members, violations of its moral regulations seem to have been the most common cause for disciplinary action after punishments for sloppiness in the completion of duty. Bringing what was seen as the moral turpitude of the masses into the supposedly isolated *casa-cuartel* was especially frowned upon. There are enough examples in the service records to conclude that violating a moral regulation was another way in which guards blurred the strict division that they were supposed to maintain between the military *casa-cuartel* and the civilian *pueblo*.

Even though the officers who judged these cases were concerned about the public's opinion of the civil guards, ultimately guards were only legally responsible to their superior officers, not the public. The Code of Military Justice was strict in its enforcement of discipline inside the Civil Guard, but it also served as a shield from civilian interference. According to Article 28 of the *Reglamento militar*, “the civil guard, as a soldier, is free from all responsibility when he has executed well and faithfully the orders of his superiors.”⁹³ In effect, this regulation, plus the fact that courts-martial meant that guards would be tried by other military men, ensured that guards simply did not receive convictions for crimes related to the use of violence. One is led to agree with Eduardo González Calleja, who goes so far as to say that the system gave guards a

⁹³ “El Guardia civil, como Soldado, es ajeno a toda responsabilidad cuando ha ejecutado bien y fielmente las órdenes de sus Jefes.” In *Contestaciones completas del “Instituto Reus,”* 113.

measure of impunity.⁹⁴ Of course, they were subject to some restrictions, for example, they were barred from unnecessarily firing their weapons, arbitrarily detaining people, and entering a domicile without authorization.⁹⁵ However, guards suspected of violating such regulations were always judged by other members of the military, never by civilians. Guards were much more likely to be disciplined for violations of the regulations than for abuses committed against the public.

1.3.2. Relationships with the *Pueblo*

The civil guards' housing arrangements and strict discipline may have had some success in isolating them from corrupting local influences, but that isolation did not encourage warm relations with the public. The Civil Guard and the *pueblo* were also separated by their starkly contrasting understandings of law and justice. Guards were often a town's only direct representatives of the central government and its laws. Yet in a society where things were accomplished at least as much through personal relationships and favors as through official channels, these institutions must have had only vague meaning for many local residents.⁹⁶ The *pueblo* and the guards' conceptions of law and justice were so different that occasionally guards would even protect criminals if a town tried to lynch them, making clear that the *pueblo*'s self-policing would not be permitted to extend to criminal justice—that was the exclusive domain of the governmental authorities.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ *Nombre de la autoridad*, 249-50.

⁹⁵ Archivo General Militar de Segovia (AGM), Expedientes Personales, Pedro Salvó Pérez and *Contestaciones completas del "Instituto Reus,"* 124, 126.

⁹⁶ Blaney, "Civil Guard," 45-46, 168.

⁹⁷ "Servicios," *RTGC* 24, no. 284 (October 1933): 369 and Lara, "Notas del mes," *RTGC* 25, no. 291 (May 1934): 206. See Blaney, "Civil Guard," 168-69 for more examples. Emsley observes that this problem of conflicting ideas of justice between gendarmeries and populations was a common problem in Europe.

Nevertheless, given that their duties, as well as their very survival, required interaction with the public, civil guards had to find a way to co-exist with, and at least be tolerated by, the *pueblo*.⁹⁸ Although a strict commitment to enforcing the law without favoritism was a component of the guards' honor code, so was having the support of the public, and, at times, the former commitment had to be relaxed in order to maintain the latter. If Pitt-Rivers' assertion that "it is a commonplace that you can get nothing done in Andalusia save through friendship" is correct, then a guard who truly had no friends in the *pueblo*, at least in Andalusia, would be rather ineffectual.⁹⁹ Resentment towards the guards was strong enough that they were not going to get any cooperation from most people, and so they had to identify those who would work with them.¹⁰⁰

Guards labeled these people "good citizens," declared that only the opinions of "good citizens" mattered, and voilà, they had the support of everyone that mattered.¹⁰¹ Guards justified this thinking by believing they were allying themselves with other men of honor. The *Reglamento para el servicio* even required that they "ensure respect for the persons and property of peaceful and honorable men."¹⁰² The fact that guards themselves had very limited resources meant that they had to accept some gifts, such as free lodging, *casa-cuartel* improvements, or letters of support. In the clientelist culture of the *pueblo*,

"Peasants, Gendarmes and State Formation," 81-82. The discussion of the *pueblo* in this section is based on Pitt-Rivers, *People of the Sierra*.

⁹⁸ Javier Moreno Luzón, "Teoría del clientelismo y estudio de la política caciquil," *Revista de Estudios Políticos* (Nueva Epoca), no. 89 (July-September 1995): 194-96, 215 and Pitt-Rivers, *People of the Sierra*, 206.

⁹⁹ Pitt-Rivers, *People of the Sierra*, 140.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 131, 156.

¹⁰¹ For an example of this way of thinking, see "Servicios," *RTGC* 24, no. 284 (October 1933): 369-70.

¹⁰² "Velar por el respeto á las personas y bienes de los hombres pacíficos y honrados." *Reglamento para el servicio de la Guardia Civil*, article 68, in Miguel Arlégui Bayones, *Doctrinal de Servicio para la Guardia Civil* (Valladolid: Imprenta Castellana, 1908), 222.

where much was accomplished through the exchange of favors, the idea of the “good citizen” allowed guards to maintain a reciprocal relationship with town elites that would exchange protection for these favors, all without violating their commitment to eschew corrupt practices.¹⁰³ The guards’ regulations list a multitude of crimes against property for which they could fine or arrest people, and the vast majority of them concern rural forms of property such as trees and animals.¹⁰⁴ Property owners would often request that a detachment of civil guards be posted on their estates if protesters, strikers, squatters, or thieves threatened their possessions. Frequently, they would offer to provide lodging and pay the Civil Guard’s expenses.¹⁰⁵ The practice gave the peasantry the impression that the Civil Guard was in the pay of the landowners. Often, rural estates proved the settings for political violence as peasants, in part angered at the very presence of guards defending large estates, attacked them and were met with their rifles.

The station commandant in particular established a special relationship with the town mayor because he had to pay frequent visits to the mayor’s house in order to receive information on suspicious persons, news from Madrid of relevant new legislation, and orders from the civil governor.¹⁰⁶ The commandant’s relationship with the mayor was just one component of his position as one of his town’s most powerful members. This

¹⁰³ Civil Guard regulations prohibited accepting any gifts, and there is surprisingly little evidence of civil guards ever accepting bribes. Arlégui Bayonés, *Doctrinal de Servicio*, 10. Not even left-wing critics, who denounced the Civil Guard in every way they could, accused it of being corrupt. For example, Gerald Brenan, who was critical of the Civil Guard’s violence, called it “one of the few really reliable and incorruptible bodies of men in Spain.” *Spanish Labyrinth*, 157.

¹⁰⁴ Reglamento para el servicio, articles 581-592, in *Contestaciones completas del “Instituto Reus,”* 133-35.

¹⁰⁵ Gobernador civil to Ministro de la Gobernación, 16 June 1931 and 20 June 1931, AHN, FC-Ministerio (M^o) del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 16, Jaén, nos. 1048 and 1084 and A Ministro Gobernación and Ministro Gobernación a Gobernador civil, AHN, FC-M^o del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz.

¹⁰⁶ Cartilla del Guardia Civil, articles 200 and 203, in *Contestaciones completas del “Instituto Reus,”* 142, 144.

position marked a dramatic increase in status from the commandant's likely origins as a rural laborer. Traditionally, the station commandant was part of what opposition groups called the "unholy trinity" of powerful people in the town, the other two being the mayor or *cacique* (see below) and the local priest.¹⁰⁷ Each member symbolized one of the three main institutions that exhibited external influence on the *pueblo*: the government, the military, and the Church. The alliance among these forces was real, and it stemmed from the elite's shared goal of maintaining social order, their frequent association with each other, and their distance from the rest of the *pueblo* because of its resentment of them. However, the collaboration was in no way formalized, and each one's primary loyalty lay with his institution rather than with the town's other elites.¹⁰⁸

1.3.3. Duties

A civil guard's primary duty was to maintain public order. On a day-to-day basis, fulfilling this mission basically meant conducting patrols to monitor the population and prevent crime. At times, it also entailed policing protests and tracking down suspected criminals. Lastly, guards occasionally performed humanitarian services as an added way to assist the citizenry. Patrols, crime fighting, and humanitarian services are considered in this sub-section, while the last section of this chapter treats policing protests, the function of the Civil Guard most central to this dissertation's subject. All of these duties made total isolation from the *pueblo* impossible, but they did not necessarily engender a positive relationship either. The favorable press generated by the occasional

¹⁰⁷ Graham, *Spanish Republic at War*, 6.

¹⁰⁸ For example, in 1911 the Director General of the Civil Guard praised a captain for arresting a priest who was wanted for "dishonest abuses." "Abusos deshonestos." AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Reservado, Exp. 22, f. 127.

humanitarian service did little to alleviate the tensions born of the guards' constant monitoring, enforcement of unpopular laws, and pursuit of criminals that local communities may not have viewed as such.

1.3.3.1. Patrols

Patrols were the principal task that civil guards performed on a daily basis, and nowhere did the tensions and contradictions inherent in their job become more apparent. On the one hand, a guard was to maintain his social distance from the *pueblo*, and this distance was reinforced by his military bearing, his distinctive uniform, his position of authority, and his ability to read and write. On the other hand, the guard was to involve himself intimately in the life of the *pueblo*, monitoring for criminal activity (ordinary and political) and protecting private property. His work performing these duties was supposed to win him the respect of the *pueblo*, but more often than not it in fact bred resentment as the guard enforced the letter of the law imposed by the central government over the informal structures of rural life.

Despite the civil guards' desire for the respect of the *pueblo*, patrols were designed more to ensure their safety and to shield them from corrupting influences than to develop warm relations with the community. After morning inspection, a guard began the task he was assigned the night before.¹⁰⁹ While one man was always assigned to be station orderly for the day, most were sent out on patrol. In 1931, Director General José Sanjurjo explained the procedure: "When patrols start out they are given a paper bearing their hour of departure, the time at which they must present themselves in the districts

¹⁰⁹ Cartilla del Guardia Civil, article 198, in Arlégui Bayonés, *Doctrinal de Servicio*, 141.

they have to patrol, the time they remain at posts, etc., and finally the hour and route of their return.”¹¹⁰ By being assigned a different route every day, they kept criminals guessing as to where they would be at any given time, and they generally followed circular routes to cover as much ground as possible.¹¹¹ Patrols could be arduous, and frightening if the town was hostile. One guard recalls his first such experience: “The first service that I did in the Civil Guard was a night patrol through the *pueblo* and its surroundings. . . That patrol gave us a beating I will remember my whole life: We looked at all the shadows, dark places, open doors, and river banks... nothing escaped our fierce vigilance, such that when six o’clock in the morning arrived and we finished our service we were covered in mud” and totally exhausted.¹¹²

Such patrols were usually conducted in pairs known as *parejas*. In fact, this practice was so common that the *pareja* became one of the characteristic images associated with the Civil Guard. Within the *pareja* the more senior guard acted as commander, leading the way in questioning passersby and handing out citations (his presumably superior reading and writing skills helped here), while the junior member stood eight to twelve paces back to serve as a backup and avoid any surprises.¹¹³ The *pareja* was a manifestation of the Civil Guard’s military culture in miniature. A strict hierarchy and division of roles were maintained even at this most basic level, but the

¹¹⁰ “The Spanish Civil Guard,” *The Police Journal* 4, no. 33 (1931): 532.

¹¹¹ Cartilla del Guardia Civil, article 43, 48, in Arlégui Bayonés, *Doctrinal de Servicio*, 46, 48.

¹¹² “El primer servicio que hice en la Guardia Civil fue una vigilancia nocturna por el pueblo y sus extramuros. . . Nos dimos una paliza de patrullar que recordaré toda mi vida: Mirábamos todas las sombras, oscuridades, portales abiertos, márgenes del río... nada se sustraía a nuestra voraz vigilancia, de tal forma que cuando llegaron las seis horas de la mañana en que finalizaba el servicio, estábamos llenos de barro.” Gabriel Ferreras Estrada, *Memorias del sargento Ferreras* (León: Imprenta Provincial, 2002), 59-60.

¹¹³ Cartilla del Guardia Civil, article 36, in Arlégui Bayonés, *Doctrinal de Servicio*, 42.

system also fostered a tradition of mentorship and solidarity. The junior guard could both learn from and befriend the senior, while both were assured they would also have someone else supporting them no matter what threats they might face on patrol. In this way, the *pareja* was a metaphor for the relationship an individual guard was supposed to have with his institution as a whole; it would always support him as long as he upheld its honor.

Despite the efforts to have guards maintain their distance from the *pueblo* during their patrols, the fact was that they had to interact with it on a daily basis in order both to enforce the state's laws and maintain their honor. To begin with, they had to get their patrol paper signed and the time noted by the custodians or proprietors of the places they were ordered to visit that day, requiring interaction and cordial relationships with these people at a bare minimum.¹¹⁴ More broadly, Article 202 of the *Cartilla* states that guards “will be sure to get to know the residents of the *pueblos*, and very particularly the property owners,” and, as Sanjurjo put it, “it is part of their duties to ascertain from labourers, passers-by, and shepherds what strangers may have been seen in the district.”¹¹⁵ Therefore, guards were talking with residents all the time, but, far from establishing friendly relations, the goal was to monitor their behavior, including political activity, and to identify any potential miscreants.¹¹⁶ Guards were the eyes and ears of the state in *pueblos* that had prized their independence, but guards' observations could travel

¹¹⁴ Sanjurjo, “Spanish Civil Guard,” 532.

¹¹⁵ “Procurarán conocer á los vecinos de los pueblos y muy particularmente á los dueños.” In Arlégui Bayonés, *Doctrinal de Servicio*, 144 and Sanjurjo, “Spanish Civil Guard,” 535.

¹¹⁶ However, civil guards were prohibited from spying directly. Article 27, *Cartilla del Guardia civil*, in *Contestaciones completas del “Instituto Reus,”* 110. Emsley points out that political surveillance was a common function of gendarmerie forces. “Peasants, Gendarmes and State Formation,” 79-80.

up the chain of command to the minister of the interior or even the prime minister.¹¹⁷ Of course, always overwhelmingly outnumbered by the townspeople, guards were also constantly being watched, and they had to be careful not to go beyond what the *pueblo* would tolerate.¹¹⁸

1.3.3.2. Crime Fighting

Despite the fact that public order was the civil guards' primary mission and humanitarian services their most celebrated duty, most of their time was devoted to fighting crime, if one includes their time spent on patrol.¹¹⁹ Since guards received no formal training in investigative work, they had to rely on connections with the locals and sometimes violent methods to bring in criminals. Of course, enforcing criminal law demanded knowledge of it, and knowledge of the law must have been a challenge for guards, many of whom had only basic reading and writing skills. Hence, the *RTGC* contained extensive discussions of the penal code and other legislation, in contrast to only brief articles on crowd control techniques.

The Civil Guard's crime fighting was not immune to the influence of its military culture. Article 100 of the *Cartilla* made responding to a robbery sound like a military operation: "if a robbery is attempted, [the civil guards] will attack the criminals without counting their number, always keeping in mind the honor of arms and the good name of the Institution."¹²⁰ Certainly, a civil guard's job could be a dangerous one; the crime

¹¹⁷ López Garrido, *Guardia Civil*, 164.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 182.

¹¹⁹ During the Second Republic, more of the *RTGC*'s pages were concerned with fighting ordinary crime than any other subject.

¹²⁰ "Si se intentase algún robo, atacarán á los criminales sin contar su número, dejando siempre bien puesto el honor de las armas y el buen nombre de la Institución." In Arlégui Bayonés, *Doctrinal de Servicio*, 73.

reports of the *RTGC* reveal frequent shootouts with robbers and murderers. Such violence was particularly prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when banditry was one of the greatest problems that the Civil Guard faced. Against bandits, the Civil Guard's militarization did prove effective, as confrontations with bandits often meant a firefight that required more discipline and firepower than a civilian force could offer. To combat the widespread banditry of the chaotic *Sexenio Revolucionario* period (Revolutionary Sexennium, 1856-1874), the government revived an 1821 law nicknamed the *ley de fugas* (fugitive law). It authorized forces of public order to open fire on prisoners attempting to escape. What this really meant is that guards were given *carte blanche* to kill bandits because they could simply claim that anyone shot had been trying to escape. The tactic did reduce the level of banditry, but also meant that any confrontation became a fight to the death.¹²¹ Of course, many bandits were in part political criminals, and many were supported by townspeople as a way of fighting against the expanding power of urban liberalism. The guards saw their violent campaign against banditry as bringing order to the countryside, but their efforts did not endear them to the working classes.

Given the state's unquestioning support of the Civil Guard's actions, taking to the streets in protest was the only method of regress for members of the working classes who felt more endangered than safe by the presence of the Civil Guard. To take one example, in 1919, civil guards in Gijón (Asturias) shot a boy in the back who was running away from them, claiming he had been hit by a warning shot. A few weeks later, they killed an

¹²¹ López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 389.

innocent bystander in the same city during another pursuit. The funerals of both men were attended by thousands. Gijón's workers were far from appreciative of the security the Civil Guard supposedly brought them; instead, as Pamela Radcliff has observed, they were asking for protection from the state's own police force.¹²² The local republican newspaper, *El Noroeste*, was quite clear that such actions were not winning the Civil Guard the respect of the public: "The Civil Guard has not been instituted to cause terror, but rather trust. . . but when an individual of that corps uses his weapon to kill without reason, indiscriminately, he dishonors the uniform that he wears."¹²³

Part of the problem was that the guards' military culture left them almost totally unprepared to conduct criminal investigations. Despite the *RTGC*'s articles on fingerprinting and other new criminological techniques, guards appear to have relied almost exclusively on denunciations, informants, witnesses, and interrogations when investigating crimes. Not that they were meant to be detectives. Those were to be found in the Investigation and Vigilance Corps (Cuerpo de Investigación y Vigilancia), but that organization was understaffed even in the cities, and it almost always left rural cases to the Civil Guard. Therefore, lacking much knowledge of investigative techniques, a civil guard had to rely on his knowledge of the people he policed. He laid the groundwork by identifying potential troublemakers while on his patrols from among the less respected elements of the population.¹²⁴ Then, when a crime did occur, all he had to do was round

¹²² *Mobilization to Civil War*, 275-77.

¹²³ "La guardia civil no ha sido instituida para causar terror, sino confianza. . . pero cuando un individuo de ese Cuerpo usa del arma para matar sin motivo, irreflexivamente, deshonra el uniforme que viste." "Un cabo de la guardia civil mata de un tiro á un muchacho," *El Noroeste*, 24 October 1919.

¹²⁴ Reglamento para el servicio, article 36, in *Contestaciones completas del "Instituto Reus,"* 120.

up the usual suspects and interrogate them to find the perpetrator.¹²⁵ Admonishments against brutality in the *RTGC* suggest that some guards used beatings as a way to obtain confessions.¹²⁶ Surely, in the view of the guards, a flagrant violation of the law could only come from someone without honor anyway. Guards were encouraged to single out certain groups for extra vigilance such as beggars, vagrants, and Roma people, known to the civil guards as *gitanos*.¹²⁷ In fact, station commandants maintained a secret log of those who had criminal records, had acted suspiciously, or held suspicious opinions. It was their duty to make inquiries regarding the conduct of these people and make a yearly note of it. In this way, the commandant tapped into the *pueblo*'s own system of informal social regulation through rumor as a way to aid him in his enforcement of the official laws.¹²⁸

1.3.3.3. Humanitarian Services

Civil guards took the most pride in their humanitarian services—assisting the citizenry in times of floods, fires, or other crises. These duties were a chance for them to prove their honor during peacetime and to demonstrate in an inherently apolitical way that they were working for the good of the entire citizenry.¹²⁹ Sanjurjo proudly wrote in Britain's *The Police Journal* that “in cases of fire, flood, epidemics, etc. the Guard gives

¹²⁵ For an example of this pattern, see “Servicios,” *RTGC* 24, no. 284 (October 1933), 369.

¹²⁶ José Osuna Pineda, “Educación Moral: Sanas doctrinas,” *RTGC* 22, no. 260 (October 1931): 443 and Al Sr Ministro Gobernación, 1 July 1931, AHN, FC-Mº del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Almería, no. 58.

¹²⁷ Reglamento para el servicio de la Guardia Civil, article 36, in Arlégui Bayonés, *Doctrinal de Servicio*, 209.

¹²⁸ If someone had five years of exemplary conduct, he was removed from the list. This tactic made the Civil Guard prone to such mistakes as pegging the crimes of many different people on to one person. Fernando Rivas Gómez, “La Guardia Civil en el Reinado de Alfonso XIII.(I),” *Revista de Estudios Históricos de la Guardia Civil* 21, no. 39 (1988): 127.

¹²⁹ López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 407-20.

its services without being called upon. The result of this devotion to duty has been that some 500 Civil Guards hold the Cross of the Order of Beneficiencia (Order of Charity), a decoration given only to those who have saved the lives of others at the risk of their own.”¹³⁰ Humanitarian services were even enshrined in the *Cartilla* as a way to win honor from upright citizens. Ahumada portrays the appearance of a guard as “always a happy prognosis for the afflicted. . . he who believes himself approached by murderers will find himself free from them, he who has his house enveloped in flames will consider the fire extinguished, [and] he who sees his son swept away by rushing waters will believe him saved.”¹³¹

Despite all the celebration of humanitarian services, Gerald Blaney has demonstrated that they in fact made up a very low percentage of the total duties guards performed.¹³² And when events like fires did occur, the Civil Guard’s role was more to prevent disturbances and thefts during the fire than actually assisting fire departments in fighting the blaze.¹³³ Nevertheless, only the occasional humanitarian service was needed to boost the corps’ image of itself as universally beneficent, leading supporters of the institution to begin calling it the *Benemérita* (Meritorious).

¹³⁰ “Spanish Civil Guard,” 540.

¹³¹ “Siempre un pronóstico feliz para el afligido. . . el que se crea cercado de asesinos, se vea libre de ellos; el que tenga su casa presa de las llamas, considere el incendio apagado; el que vea su hijo arrastrado por la corriente de las aguas, lo crea salvado.” Article 8, in *Contestaciones completas del “Instituto Reus,”* 107.

¹³² Blaney, “Civil Guard,” 43.

¹³³ *Cartilla de Guardia Civil*, article 62, in Arlégui Bayonés, *Doctrinal de Servicio*, 54.

1.4. The Civil Guard's Culture in the Era of the Emergence of Mass Politics

1.4.1. The Early Years

The Civil Guard's culture may have remained fairly constant, but the social and political environment in which it operated did not. In the mid-nineteenth century, guards developed violent practices to combat Spain's serious banditry problem. By the last decades of the century, more contradictions between their culture and mission were emerging as they faced the nascent challenges of mass political organizations and protests. The Civil Guard's military culture and its emphasis on honor were intended to facilitate the disciplined application of force to maintain order in these situations. But with defending their honor the guards' top priority, the more protesters offended that honor, the more the Civil Guard responded with violence. The result was the creation of a vicious cycle in which Civil Guard violence increased tensions with working-class communities, tensions that, in turn, made these communities more prone to oppose both the Civil Guard and the government. Governments of the Restoration period responded with increased deployments of the force to clamp down on this opposition, thereby setting the stage for further eruptions of violence.

The Civil Guard historians maintain that their institution was not originally intended to be an instrument for suppressing political protest, but articles 27 and 28 of the *Reglamento para el servicio* suggest otherwise.¹³⁴ From the beginning, guards' duties included keeping watch over protests, strikes, and festivals, and they wound up being deployed frequently to urban areas to maintain the public order through crowd control.

¹³⁴ López Corral makes this argument that the original intent of the Civil Guard was not suppressing political protest most forcefully in *Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*.

These deployments were known as concentrations. The Civil Guard historians believe that Ahumada had been against the idea of having the Civil Guard suppress street protests because he thought doing so would undermine his efforts to build a corps that had a reputation for political neutrality.¹³⁵ However, it seems more likely that Ahumada also saw the Civil Guard as a force of public order, and he simply objected to specific deployments that appeared to be defending a particular political faction. For example, just two months after the Civil Guard began operating, the government ordered it to detain certain officers who had been involved in an attempted *pronunciamiento* against the Moderates in power. Ahumada submitted a letter of resignation in protest at such a political use of his corps, but Narváez refused to accept it.¹³⁶ The government, fearful that even a small disturbance might upend its tenuous hold on power, ignored Ahumada's objections and continued to order the Civil Guard to concentrate at sites of potential unrest during frequently declared states of emergency.¹³⁷ The Civil Guard resented these concentrations, because they meant guards had to neglect their rural policing duties, leave their families, and, Ahumada feared, make their institution look like a shock force for protecting the power of the Moderates.¹³⁸

Despite its military structure, the Civil Guard was intended to be a police rather than combat force, yet the serious challenges to liberalism that the Carlists posed meant that it would also have to be deployed for counter-insurgency purposes. Given its broad

¹³⁵ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 129, 372; López Corral, "Proyección inicial de la Institución," 74; and López Corral, *Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*, 118.

¹³⁶ Aguado Sánchez, *Duque de Ahumada*, 339.

¹³⁷ López Corral, "Proyección inicial de la Institución," 72-73. Manuel Ballbé argues in *Orden público y militarismo* that Spain had a long tradition of abusing the state of emergency dating back to the *ancien régime*.

¹³⁸ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 139-40.

reach and local knowledge, the Civil Guard was too effective as an anti-guerrilla force to be kept out of the fight, and the Civil Guard found itself aiding the army in the Second and Third Carlist Wars and in fighting the Republican insurrections of the *Sexenio Revolucionario*. Since there was by this time a Civil Guard post in towns around the country, the Carlists especially could no longer automatically control territory where they enjoyed wide sympathy. Instead, they always had to capture Civil Guard posts as their first objective, and this proved surprisingly hard to do, meaning that these rebel groups had difficulty controlling enough territory to move beyond the guerrilla stage of warfare. As for the guards, it became evident not only that they would have to help combat insurrections but also that they would be the first targets of any rebel group.¹³⁹ Although the Civil Guard was meant to be a rearguard force, its strong military culture stood in such contrast to the rampant indiscipline in the regular army that civil guards sometimes even wound up being deployed as shock troops on the front lines.¹⁴⁰

In 1854, Ahumada's efforts to prevent his Civil Guard from becoming a tool for suppressing political protest were again undermined when the Progressives launched a major uprising. Since the Progressives threatened to dissolve his beloved corps, even Ahumada had no qualms this time about deploying the Civil Guard to defend the Moderate regime.¹⁴¹ Crowds battled the Civil Guard in the streets of Madrid (with some street fighters shouting "Death to the Civil Guard" [*¡Muera la Guardia Civil!*]) and at other points where civil guards concentrated across the country (although there were

¹³⁹ For more information on the role of the Civil Guard in fighting Carlism, see "La Guardia Civil y los carlistas," chap. 5 in *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 180-81.

¹⁴¹ See Aguado Sánchez, "Se impone el relevo," chap. 30 in *Duque de Ahumada* for more on the duke's role in the events of 1854.

some Civil Guard units that supported the uprising).¹⁴² According to Civil Guard historian Enrique Martínez Ruiz, the fact that many people saw the institution fighting against the popular uprising in Madrid made the so-called Revolution of 1854 the moment when its reputation as a force of repression and enemy of the people began.¹⁴³ Eventually, the rebellion spread around the country, and the Progressives seized power.

The victory of the Progressives was the greatest threat to the Civil Guard's existence until the Civil War of 1936-1939. The Progressives were antagonistic towards the force not only because it was associated with the Moderates and had spent the last several years fighting against Progressive conspiracies but also because it was in part formed as an alternative to the Militia that the Progressives hoped to revive. Fortunately for the Civil Guard, the Progressives shifted to the right once in power as the Democrats became the new party of the populist Left. The Progressives began to see the Civil Guard as a useful instrument for keeping order in the countryside, and so they decided simply to replace Ahumada rather than dissolve the institution as a whole.¹⁴⁴ Ahumada's successor, General Facundo Infante, made minor adjustments, such as a small reduction in the Civil Guard's size, to appease the Progressives, while maintaining the basic character of the institution.¹⁴⁵ Therefore, some historians have judged Infante as almost as important a director as Ahumada, because it was Infante who ensured not only that the Civil Guard weathered the animosity of the Progressives, but also because he established

¹⁴² For a detailed account of the Civil Guard's fight against Progressive conspiracies and against the so-called Revolution of 1854, see "La Guardia Civil y los progresistas," chap. 6 in Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 139.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 230-31.

¹⁴⁴ López Corral, *Guardia Civil: nacimiento y consolidación*, 102.

¹⁴⁵ Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 374 and López Corral, *Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*, 67-72.

that the Civil Guard as a state institution committed to serving whatever government was in power rather than just the Moderates.¹⁴⁶

The Civil Guard also survived the 1868 seizure of power by a coalition of left-wing Progressives and Democrats, but the institution's willingness to submit to whatever government was in office was pushed to the limit when the Republicans took over in 1873. Republican efforts to restart the National Militia and place the Civil Guard fully under civilian control, along with widespread disorder, proved more than the guards could bear. In 1874, many opted to break their commitment to political neutrality by supporting the coup led by General Manuel Pavía that ended the parliamentary Republic and paved the way for a restoration of constitutional monarchy.¹⁴⁷ The incident proved that the guards, while serious about upholding their political neutrality as part of their honor, were also willing to make exceptions if they felt a regime endangered their ability to defend their honor by fundamentally altering the nature of their institution or by inhibiting its ability to maintain public order.

1.4.2. The Restoration

It was during the Restoration period that the Civil Guard was truly transformed into the militarized and violent force for suppressing protest that the Second Republic would inherit. When large numbers of workers took to streets as their only means of having a political voice in the exclusionary Restoration system, governments increasingly drew on the Civil Guard to counter these movements and maintain the status quo,

¹⁴⁶ López Corral, *Guardia Civil: nacimiento y consolidación*, 102 and Martínez Ruiz, *Creación de la Guardia Civil*, 378.

¹⁴⁷ See López Corral, *Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*, 99-106 for more on the Civil Guard's role in Pavía's coup.

including in urban areas. The regime's further militarization of the institution was meant to protect guards and ensure they were effective suppressors of protest. Yet without a corresponding effort to adapt the Civil Guard to its new role as an urban public order force, it often responded with violence to confrontational situations. Guards earned a reputation for brutality, and it is in this period that one sees the tradition of animosity between the Civil Guard and the working classes become entrenched. As emerging mass political movements criticized the Civil Guard, this animosity was only deepened because guards interpreted the criticism as an attack on their honor.

The very structures of the Restoration regime tested the Civil Guard's commitment to political neutrality, but in the realm of local rather than national politics. In a system known as the *turno pacífico*, the country's two main parties rotated in and out of power. This rotation depended on a nationwide network of local clientelist leaders, known as *caicques*, who could mobilize the votes necessary to ensure that the correct party won an election. It was these *caciques*, some of whom wielded tremendous power at the local level, who presented a new threat to the Civil Guard's goal of political neutrality. *Caciques* gained influence by bestowing favors upon their clients, and many supported guards by providing housing for them.¹⁴⁸ Although guards did sometimes return such favors by intimidating people into voting the way the *cacique* wanted them to, tensions arose when guards refused to do favors because they could only act upon orders given to them through official channels.¹⁴⁹ In other words, the Civil Guard did not

¹⁴⁸ López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 57-58, 167.

¹⁴⁹ González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 53; Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, vol. 4, *La Guardia Civil en la Monarquía y la República 1900-1932*, 68; and López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 539.

fit neatly into the local clientelism of the Restoration, but it was not immune from its influence either. Above all, guards resented the damage it did to their reputation when the people thought of them as the servants of the *caciques*.¹⁵⁰

Suppressing political protest became the most important function of the Civil Guard in this period because the success of the Restoration's *turno* system depended on political demobilization.¹⁵¹ The most prominent new movement opposing the Restoration system was anarchism.¹⁵² There were currents within early anarchist associations that favored abiding by the law in order to operate in the open. But repeated wholesale repressions of these associations by the government weakened the moderate voices within the movement.¹⁵³ Many anarchists were drawn to Russian theorist Pieter Kropotkin's notion of the "propaganda of the deed," the idea that a spectacular act of violence could inspire workers to join the cause of revolution.¹⁵⁴ Extremists known as "terrorists" believed that any attack upon the bourgeoisie was a form of "propaganda by the deed."¹⁵⁵ In 1882-1883, there was a series of arson attacks and murders of property owners in Andalusia, which the government blamed on an anarchist secret society known as the Black Hand (*Mano Negra*). Although there is debate among scholars about whether or not the Black Hand actually existed or was just fabricated as an excuse to target anarchists, the fear was real enough to prompt a particularly brutal repression by

¹⁵⁰ López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 65-66.

¹⁵¹ This is one of the main arguments in López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*.

¹⁵² The Civil Guard was also active in combatting republican and Carlist insurrectionary movements in the first decades of the Restoration. See *Ibid.*, 434-68.

¹⁵³ George Richard Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868-1898* (Berkeley: University of California, 1989).

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 60-61.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 70-71.

the Civil Guard.¹⁵⁶ This repression shocked many Andalusian rural workers and made more join unions to oppose what they saw as the oppressive ruling class and their servants, the civil guards.¹⁵⁷

The regime, rigid in its habit of maintaining public order with armed force, primarily responded to the perceived threat of anarchist terrorism by increasing the militarization of the forces of public order, frequently employing violence as a technique for combatting unrest, and relying heavily on the Civil Guard to put down any kind of disturbance.¹⁵⁸ Indeed, the Restoration government gradually expanded the number of civil guards to over 25,000 by 1923.¹⁵⁹ The corps was the muscle behind the Ministry of the Interior's top-down control of public order throughout Spain. Each Civil Guard command was under the direct orders of its province's civil governor. These civil governors were appointed by the prime minister and were responsible for public order in their provinces. If martial law was declared, which happened frequently, then the command would receive its orders from a captain general who would act as the military governor of its province.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ Julián Casanova, "La cara oscura del anarquismo," in *Violencia política en la España del siglo XX*, dir. Santos Juliá (Taurus, 2000), 71. The Civil Guard's efforts were not limited to the Black Hand. For example, in conjunction with the police, it made frequent use of torture as an investigative tool in the aftermath of an 1892 insurrection in Jerez de la Frontera (Cádiz). Temma Kaplan, *The Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868-1903* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 179-80. For more on the Civil Guard's fight against anarchism, see López Corral, "La subversion anarquista," *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 536-614.

¹⁵⁷ Ballbé, *Orden público y militarismo*, 239.

¹⁵⁸ González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 23, 50 and Ballbé, *Orden público y militarismo*, 236-37. This is also one of the main arguments in López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*.

¹⁵⁹ See González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 46-47 for data on the Civil Guard's expansion during the Restoration.

¹⁶⁰ Temma Kaplan, *Red City, Blue Period: Social Movements in Picasso's Barcelona* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 6. See González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 65-73 for a complete listing of the declarations of states of emergency and martial law during the Restoration.

The Civil Guard as an organization was also further militarized during the Restoration, increasing its impunity while lending it additional legal protection from civilians. In 1878, the Civil Guard was made officially part of the army (although it remained a separate career track and partially under the Ministry of the Interior), and its internal discipline was tightened when it was included in the military's uniform Code of Military Justice in 1890.¹⁶¹ A series of court cases therefore established that crimes committed against guards, even if only insults, would be tried by court martial, a precedent that was then codified by the *Ley de Jurisdicciones* (Law of Jurisdictions) of 1906.¹⁶² The courts also set precedents time and again that it was appropriate to beat someone with a sword or rifle butt for insulting a guard.¹⁶³ This militarization was intended to ensure that guards would be respected as representatives of law and order, but such brutal tactics seem to have been more about breeding fear than respect. As Miguel López Corral explains, "the most important difference between the civil guard of this period with respect to that of the first thirty years was that, while Ahumada insisted on constructing a police force with a military mentality, the Restoration administration tried to make him [the guard] into a soldier capable of carrying out policing functions."¹⁶⁴

By the last decade of the nineteenth century, the focal points of this more militarized Civil Guard's fight against anarchism shifted from rural to urban areas.

¹⁶¹ López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 263, 272.

¹⁶² López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 99-100; Ballbé, *Orden público y militarismo*, 233-39, 277; and López Corral, *Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*, 108-11, 199-200.

¹⁶³ See Arlégui Bayonés, *Doctrinal de servicio*, 3-9 and Blaney, "Civil Guard," 54-55 for lists of incidents during the Restoration deemed by the courts to be insulting the Civil Guard or not.

¹⁶⁴ "La diferencia más importante entre el guardia civil de esta etapa con respecto al de los primeros años fue que, mientras Ahumada porfió por construir un policía con mentalidad militar, la Administración de la Restauración lo hizo por un soldado capaz de desempeñar funciones policiales." López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 339-40.

Barcelona became the epicenter of political violence as government repression of the anarchist movement there forced some adherents to conclude that terrorism was the only means of resistance.¹⁶⁵ The story of Lieutenant Narciso Portas Ascanio, the Barcelona section (*línea*) chief from 1890, illustrates this dynamic of violence. In 1889, 1890 and 1893 he participated in the repression of strikes and protests there.¹⁶⁶ A cycle of violence in the city began in 1893 when an anarchist bomber killed two as revenge for the government's harsh repression of an uprising in Jerez.¹⁶⁷ The bomber was executed, but a friend avenged the death with two explosions in Barcelona's Liceo Theater that killed 22 people.¹⁶⁸ Portas was a leader in the police investigation that resulted in six anarchists being executed for the crime after they had been tortured while in custody.¹⁶⁹ Anarchists tried to strike back again by planting bombs in two Civil Guard posts in Barcelona Province.¹⁷⁰ The bombings sparked fears among Barcelona's bourgeoisie that the city's dysfunctional police force was incapable of dealing with the anarchist threat. Therefore, a special section of the Judicial Police (*Policia Judicial*), led by Portas, was created in Barcelona.¹⁷¹ Another bombing followed in 1896; this time killing six during the Corpus Christi celebration. The calls from the city's bourgeoisie for harsh measures against terrorism became shriller.¹⁷² Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo responded by

¹⁶⁵ Kaplan, *Red City, Blue Period*, 31. For more on why anarchism was popular in Catalonia, see Angel Smith, *Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction: Catalan Labour and the Crisis of the Spanish State, 1898-1923* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007).

¹⁶⁶ González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 276.

¹⁶⁷ Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology*, 185.

¹⁶⁸ Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology*, 186 and González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 272.

¹⁶⁹ González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 276-77.

¹⁷⁰ Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, vol. 3, *La Guardia Civil en la Restauración y la Regencia, 1874-1907*, 165, 167.

¹⁷¹ González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 279-81.

¹⁷² López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 581.

outlawing the anarchist movement altogether and declaring a state of emergency that gave Portas free rein to carry out a crackdown.¹⁷³ His investigative strategy consisted of first using his emergency powers to arrest 300 people of any and all radical persuasions.¹⁷⁴ Then, his team interrogated the suspects in the Montjuïc prison, using torture to build a case against five anarchists who frequented a working-class bar. Despite numerous accusations that Portas' team had tortured the suspects, the five were found guilty and executed, and 63 more were sent to a penal colony in Morocco.¹⁷⁵

Portas had brought Barcelona's middle class results, but at a cost. Many writers were jailed in Montjuïc and they managed to smuggle out horrific accounts of the tortures there. The testimony of one prisoner is typical: "He adds that he has spent eight days without eating or sleeping; that his nails had been torn off; that he has got [sic] numberless blows with the rod; that he has had the gag applied to him and his testicles compressed by means of a guitar string."¹⁷⁶ The news provoked an international outcry, and the anarchists learned that denouncing such cases in the press was an effective way to undermine public support for the institution most responsible for their suppression. Republicans joined the chorus too—outrage over the Civil Guard's actions providing an easy way to work up a crowd.¹⁷⁷ González Calleja explains that "the narration, more or less true, of the 'crimes of Montjuïc' became an important element in the political

¹⁷³ Ibid., 583-87.

¹⁷⁴ Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology*, 193.

¹⁷⁵ González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 284-86; López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 587-89; and Kaplan, *Red City, Blue Period*, 35.

¹⁷⁶ "Proceedings of the Court Martial," in *Revival of the Inquisition* (London: J. Perry, 1897), 6.

¹⁷⁷ López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 587. For more denunciations of the Civil Guard's actions, see López Corral, *Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*, 187-91.

socialization of Barcelona's popular sectors and contributed not a little to the consciousness-building of successive generations of youths."¹⁷⁸

Portas was transferred to Madrid after an attempt against his life in Barcelona.¹⁷⁹ Public opinion had so turned against Portas by this point that the would-be assassin was generally thought of as a hero.¹⁸⁰ Republican firebrand Alejandro Lerroux was most vocal in his accusations against Portas, calling the lieutenant a "thug" and an "executioner."¹⁸¹ Portas challenged Lerroux to a duel, and Lerroux was tried by a military honor court after he refused to fight over actions that he deemed "unworthy of a gentlemen."¹⁸² Lerroux was acquitted, but the two did get in a brutal fistfight when they saw each other on a street in Madrid.¹⁸³ The case was one of the few in which a guard attempted to defend his honor through the extralegal means of a duel. Despite it all, Portas was never prosecuted and went on to become a general in the Civil Guard.¹⁸⁴ As for the anarchists, they did succeed in having their revenge on Cánovas; he was assassinated by one of their number on August 8, 1897. A repression of anarchism throughout Spain followed that crippled the movement for several years.¹⁸⁵

In the first decade of the twentieth century, even as bombings continued in Barcelona, anarchists began shifting their strategy anyway from "propaganda of the

¹⁷⁸ "La narración más o menos exacta, de los «crímenes de Montjuïc» se transformó en un importante elemento de socialización política de las capas populares de Barcelona, y contribuyó no poco a la toma de conciencia de sucesivas generaciones de jóvenes." González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 290.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 291.

¹⁸⁰ Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology*, 199.

¹⁸¹ "Esbirro" and "verdugo." Rafael Abella, *Lances de honor* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1995), 127. López Corral, *Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*, 184-85.

¹⁸² "Indigna de un caballero." Abella, *Lances de honor*, 127-28.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 128.

¹⁸⁴ López Corral, *Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*, 184-86.

¹⁸⁵ González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 293-94.

deed” to undermining the political demobilization upon which the state depended through strikes and mass protests.¹⁸⁶ Adherents to this new strategy were known as anarcho-syndicalists, and they founded the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* union (National Confederation of Labor, CNT) in 1910. Republicans also turned from plotting insurrections to mass political mobilization around the same time, a trend exemplified by Lerroux’s growing Radical Party, which he founded in 1908.¹⁸⁷ Such counter-hegemonic movements benefitted from the urbanization of the first decades of the twentieth century, which made large numbers of workers available to be mobilized for protest in cities like Barcelona.

Having a more militarized Civil Guard confront these mass political mobilizations meant that protesters responded with violence as well.¹⁸⁸ The state was not reluctant to deploy the Civil Guard to urban areas given the inability of urban forces of public order to quell these large-scale mobilizations. Certainly, the Civil Guard had seen plenty of concentrations in the mid-nineteenth century, but most of these had been caused by attempted *pronunciamientos* rather than mass protests. Urban strikes involved larger, more coordinated efforts, yet the large concentrations of guards sent to counter them were untrained in controlling hostile crowds. The result was an increased likelihood that violence would erupt and a significant decline in the Civil Guard’s prestige during this

¹⁸⁶ Smith, *Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction*, 154. For more on this shift see López Corral, “Las agitaciones de masas,” in *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 469-536 and Pamela Radcliff, “The emerging challenge of mass politics,” chap. 9 in *Spain since 1808*, José Álvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

¹⁸⁷ For more on Lerroux’s role in the emergence of mass politics, see José Álvarez Junco, *El emperador del paralelo: Lerroux y la demagogia populista* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1990).

¹⁸⁸ Smith, *Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction*.

period as it increasingly came to be seen as a repressive force fighting to maintain the power of the rich at the expense of the poor.¹⁸⁹

Indicative of this new trend was Barcelona's first general strike in 1902, the harsh suppression of which was avenged by the 1905 bombing of the city's flower market.¹⁹⁰ The violence reached a peak in what is known as the Tragic Week of 1909, when over 100 people were killed in street fighting as they protested conscription for an unpopular war that had broken out in Morocco.¹⁹¹ Once again, there was international outcry over the repression that followed, this time to the point of precipitating the fall of the Conservative government on Antonio Maura.¹⁹² Between 1917 and 1921, the levels of mass mobilization throughout Spain peaked because of the inspiring example of the Russian Revolution and a huge rise in prices created by demand from the belligerent countries in the First World War.¹⁹³ The parliamentary regime's frequent declarations of states of emergency and deployments of the Civil Guard and the army (which often sparked violent confrontations) crippled the CNT but failed to halt the violence.¹⁹⁴ In 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera toppled the parliamentary regime in a coup and the king allowed him to stay on as dictator. Primo de Rivera justified his seizure of power by promising to restore order.

¹⁸⁹ The idea that the Civil Guard's prestige declined as it became a force for suppressing political protest during the Restoration is yet another central argument of López Corral in *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*.

¹⁹⁰ Kaplan, *Red City, Blue Period*, 61, 81.

¹⁹¹ For a detailed account and analysis of the Tragic Week, see Joan Connelly Ullman, *The Tragic Week: A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). See Rivas Gómez, "Guardia Civil en el Reinado," 120-24 for a description of the Civil Guard's important role in combatting the unrest.

¹⁹² Smith, *Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction*, 182.

¹⁹³ González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 637-38.

¹⁹⁴ González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 554. For more on this period see Smith, "The Road to Dictatorship: The Destruction of the Catalan CNT and the Fall of the Restoration Regime, 1920-1923," chap. 10 in *Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction*.

The Civil Guard's mission of maintaining order had always been political in that it meant maintaining a moderate liberal order of private property and the enforcement of laws promulgated by the national government. From the beginning, the force combatted the Carlists' attempts to restore the *ancien régime* and the more diffuse resistance that banditry represented to the decline in local autonomy. Within a few years, the Civil Guard was also assisting Moderate governments in countering the explicitly political mobilizations of the Progressives. However, it was only during the expansion of mass politics in the second half of the Restoration, as Carlism and banditry weakened, that the primary mission of the Civil Guard came to be keeping order during strikes and other mass protests. Spain's growing working classes were developing new methods of political contestation, and guards sought to defend the state and the honor of their institution in the face of these new challenges with the same violence that they had deployed in fighting the bandits. The Civil Guard was intended to be strong medicine against the banditry problem, but when its military force was applied to mass protest on a much wider scale, the political impact was greater as well. Now, the Civil Guard's violence had new political meaning because working-class movements interpreted it as part of a broader class conflict.

1.5. Conclusion

The tensions within the organizational culture that shaped the Civil Guard's actions during the Second Republic dated back to the very foundations of the institution. Regarding its official structure, the dual dependency compromise worked out between the more and less militaristic factions of the Moderate Party began the identity crisis of the Civil Guard that has lasted up to the present day. The question of whether the institution

should be under the Ministry of War or the Ministry of the Interior might seem an academic one, but it spoke to the larger issue of how much control the civilian government would have over the corps.

Another factor that wound up contributing to the ambiguities of the Civil Guard's culture was the code of honor that the institution's principle founder, the Duque de Ahumada, inscribed in the *Cartilla*. By establishing honor as the basis for that culture, he could encapsulate all the military values he thought most important for his men to have: discipline, obedience, a capacity for sacrifice, and political neutrality. Synthesizing the liberal idea of progress and an aristocrat's understanding of tradition, he believed that giving his men a sense of honor would make them immune to corruption and political partisanship as well as restrained in the use of force because they would have a sense of accountability to the public. The result was the paradoxical situation of a military culture being applied to the context of civilian policing. The tensions built into this culture could produce violence instead of limiting it. Much depended on the social and political context in which the Civil Guard would be deployed.

The contradictions built-in to the corps' initial structures indeed became both amplified and entrenched by the day-to-day practices that guards developed over time. Isolation, for example, which was maintained through the corps' housing arrangements and strict discipline, was another key to Ahumada's strategy for ensuring that guards were honorable and to enforcing the laws of the state in local communities. Yet the fact was that policing these communities inevitably meant becoming a part of them. The distance that guards were supposed to maintain and their efforts to extend governmental authority to fiercely local communities meant that they became resented (and even

hated), rather than respected, by the lower classes. Relations were much cozier with local elites, who were happy to provide benefits like housing as added incentives for protecting their persons and property. However, these relationships only further diminished the reputation of the guards in the eyes of the majority of the *pueblo* because they made them look like the servants of the wealthy.

As this already resentful population became increasingly mobilized politically over the course of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the ossified culture of the Civil Guard proved unable to find ways to respond peacefully to the new challenges to the liberal order. The successes that the Civil Guard had had fighting banditry and surviving regime changes meant that the *Cartilla* became so revered that it was never substantially updated after 1852, but the contradictions contained within the founding documents only became exacerbated as the Civil Guard sought to maintain order in Spain's evolving socio-political landscape of Spain. While the primary mission of the institution had always been to maintain the public order, governments could not resist using the force to restore the peace as well as keep it, in urban as well as rural areas, although the state never provided any training in crowd control methods. In the eyes of the working classes, the corps began to seem like a force more for class oppression than maintaining order. Meanwhile, governments also allowed guards to adopt increasingly brutal tactics to combat first banditry and then the rise of anarchism and other mass political movements. By the time of the Restoration, anarchists as well as republicans had realized that they could damage the reputation of the Civil Guard that its members held so dear by denouncing its harsh methods to the public. Guards then sought to defend their honor with more violence, a response facilitated by the Restoration regime's

application of the military justice system to civilian cases involving the Civil Guard.

Whatever Ahumada's original intentions, the force's unchanging desire for honor had made resorting to violence to enforce respect always a possibility, but it was the changing needs of civilian governments in the face of new mass forms of political contestation that allowed the corps free rein to employ such violence. Ultimately, the failure of these governments to provide a stable, pluralist political system created the violent opposition movements to which the Civil Guard responded in kind.

Chapter 2- Creating a Class Apart: The Acculturation of a Civil Guard

2.1. Introduction

Whereas the previous chapter examined how the military culture of the Civil Guard as an institution developed, this chapter will focus on how new guards were imbued with this culture. Their training emphasized preparing them to live a military lifestyle isolated from the society that they policed rather than how to perform that policing.¹ Given the sharp differences in social origins and training between enlisted men and officers, I will treat the two groups separately. For enlisted men, the question was how to transform working-class recruits into respected authority figures in rural Spanish society. The Civil Guard's answer was requiring service in the army and literacy. For the generation of guards serving under the Republic, this service often entailed being sent to fight in Morocco. How experience in Morocco influenced guards' behavior during the Second Republic is difficult to determine, but at the very least it seems to have further increased their distance from the civilian population. As for training by the Civil Guard itself, this was conducted solely by station commandants during a six-month apprenticeship period. This one-on-one training allowed recruits to learn through example about the desire for honor and loyalty to the institution characteristic of the Civil Guard, while also experiencing first-hand the way in which guards balanced their duty to follow their regulations and orders with the social structures of the *pueblo*.

¹ The chapter will concentrate on the period from roughly 1893 to 1923 when almost all of the guards who served under the Republic were trained.

This chapter contains greater details about the training of officers in the army since greater documentation is available and more attention was paid to their education, as they were intended to be the moral leaders of the corps. Officers had to set an example during their inspections, lead criminal investigations, and carry out administrative functions. Preparation for the job was done almost entirely in the army, where they were trained to lead soldiers rather than policemen. Often the indoctrination process began at a young age since many came from military families, and it continued during their education at the Infantry Academy. There, a rigid daily schedule was meant to make discipline the cadets' guiding principal while acclimating them to the military milieu. Speeches and the professors' examples also taught cadets to believe honor was glory won through sacrifice for the nation. Despite the Civil Guard officers' professed neutrality, their training at the academy became increasingly nationalist and politicized in the wake of the Spanish-American War as professors taught that the army could intervene in politics for the greater good of the *patria* (motherland). After the academy, many officers served in Morocco, where, as other scholars have argued, they learned to see their enemies as inferior Others towards which any form of violence, however cruel, was justified in the name of avenging the honor of the nation.² The only formal training that the Civil Guard itself gave the officers who joined the force was a six-month apprenticeship, during which they had to reorient their sense of honor to be something derived from the respect of the *pueblo*. However, as examples in subsequent chapters will demonstrate, they did not forget their experiences as members of an isolated military

² See Sebastian Balfour, *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War* (Oxford University Press, 2002) and Gustau Nerín, *La guerra que vino de África* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2005).

family culturally distant from civilian life. Taken as a whole, the training of civil guards constituted another contradiction inherent in their institution's culture—they prepared for policing civilians almost exclusively by training for war. While such preparation may have contributed to Ahumada's original goal of making them a class apart, it did not engender harmonious and peaceful relations with the populace.

2.2. The Making of an Enlisted Man

As throughout its history, the enlisted men of the Civil Guard during the Second Republic were overwhelmingly working class in origin, and most were rural day-laborers.³ Enlistment presented advantages to the landless laborer. The corps offered a job with higher pay and less physical exertion. In addition, it held the promise of upward social mobility. As discussed in the previous chapter, it could propel a laborer from being at the bottom level of his town's society to being one of its most important and (at least supposedly) respected members.⁴ The story of Gabriel Ferreras de Luis is probably a typical one. He was raised in a small town in León Province in the 1910s—a town which he remembered in his memoir primarily for its “ancestral Catholicism” and the festival of its patron saint.⁵ He moved to the South at age 12 or 13 and worked up to 12 hours a day at a farm in Seville Province, subject to the violent punishments of a cruel

³ Of the 26 civil guards surveyed for whom an occupation was listed in their personal service records at the Sección Guardia Civil del Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior (SGC), 17 (65.38%) were classified as day-laborers, three were other types of agricultural workers, and all of the rest were tradesmen. Of the 40 who had a place of birth listed, 36 (90%) were born outside of a provincial capital. Juan Blázquez Miguel, *La Guardia Civil durante la Segunda República y el 18 de Julio* (Madrid: María Tomás Pérez, 2010), 358; Ricardo de la Cierva, “Un problema urgente de análisis institucional: La Guardia Civil española en el corazón de la dialéctica Ejército pueblo,” *REHGC* 2, no. 4 (1969): 18; González Calleja, *Nombre de la autoridad*, 90; and Pulido Pérez, *Guardia Civil ante el Bienio Azañista*, 192 all agree that most guards were from working-class origins, but the data above constitute the first verification of these claims with quantitative evidence.

⁴ Blaney, “Civil Guard,” 42 and Pulido Pérez, *Guardia Civil ante el Bienio Azañista*, 27.

⁵ “Catholicismo ancestral.” Ferreras, *Memorias del sargento Ferreras*, 31-32.

overseer.⁶ From the beginning, he dreamed of joining the Civil Guard as a way to break the monotony and simply because “the life of the civil guard was not as hard as that of the small farmer.”⁷

The question was how to transform these rural laborers into local elites who would be respected and obeyed. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Duque de Ahumada believed the answer lay in the militarization of the institution and the literacy of its members. The requirement that all volunteers had served in the army was maintained, with the exceptions that sons of a civil guard and graduates of the Colegio de Guardias Jóvenes (see below) could also join.⁸ Indeed, service records suggest that the vast majority of civil guards came from the army.⁹

For the lower classes, joining the army was very unpopular during the Restoration period. Resistance to the draft was vehement because of the harsh conditions and dangers presented by Spain’s colonial wars in Morocco (1909-1927), even sparking the Tragic Week of 1909.¹⁰ Any male age 17-36 who was single and met certain physical requirements could be drafted to serve for three years.¹¹ At least before 1919, this burden fell exclusively on the poor because the wealthy could opt out by paying a fee.¹² Thousands left the country to avoid being drafted, and a tradition even developed where towns would have a celebration for those who were not selected.¹³ Yet despite the

⁶ Ibid., 41, 43.

⁷ “La vida de guardia civil, no era tan dura como la del hortelano.” Ibid., 41, 57.

⁸ Sanjurjo, “Spanish Civil Guard,” 375.

⁹ Of the 36 civil guards whose prior experiences could be verified, 33 (91.67%) had served in the army.

¹⁰ Balfour, *Deadly Embrace*, 19.

¹¹ Bernardo Rubio López, *Nuestros soldados* (Bolaños, 2004), 9. Before 1912 the term of service was four years.

¹² Balfour, *Deadly Embrace*, 205.

¹³ Fernando Puell de la Villa, *Historia del Ejército en España* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2000), 134 and Rubio López, *Nuestros soldados*, 12-15.

unpopularity of serving at the time, a fair number of future guards actually volunteered to join the army.¹⁴ A large number were also drafted, but the fact that they then joined the Civil Guard indicates that they liked military life enough to volunteer to continue serving in a militarized institution.¹⁵ Therefore, even though guards hailed from the very same social strata as the rural protesters they so often faced, in joining the Civil Guard they had already distinguished themselves by their taste for a military lifestyle.

Another path to joining the Civil Guard was the Colegio de Guardias Jóvenes (School of Young Guards). The institution was founded by Ahumada himself in 1853 as a military school for children of civil guards.¹⁶ Classes were taught by Civil Guard officers and allowed students to earn a *bachiller* or early high school diploma.¹⁷ Although only a very small percentage of guards entered the force from the colegio, it is of particular interest because it was one of the only schools before the Civil War run by the Civil Guard.¹⁸ Therefore, it provides a unique window on the values, practices, and self-image that guards themselves thought were important to instill in their successors.

The Colegio de Guardias Jóvenes had great symbolic importance to the corps. Its affiliated Colegios de Huérfanos del Cuerpo (Schools of Orphans of the Corps), one for boys and one for girls, cared for male and female orphans of primary-school age.¹⁹ As

¹⁴ Of the 26 civil guards for which data were available, 11 (42.31%) volunteered for the army.

¹⁵ 15 of the 26 (57.69%) were drafted.

¹⁶ Francisco Manfredicano, "La Compañía de Guardias Jóvenes de la Guardia Civil," *REHGC* 3, no. 6 (1970): 139-40. The school was originally called the Compañía de Guardias Jóvenes. Faustino Ramírez Barreto, *Listado de las vicisitudes de los alumnos del colegio de guardias jóvenes "Duque de Ahumada" (1.853-2.003): (con motivo de la celebración de su 150° aniversario)* (Valdemoro, 2002), XVI.

¹⁷ Ramírez Barreto, *Listado de las vicisitudes*, XIII.

¹⁸ Of the 43 enlisted civil guards examined, only three are listed as having been *guardias jóvenes*.

¹⁹ Those who did not wish to join the Colegio de Guardias Jóvenes could also enter the Colegios de Huérfanos. See the colegio regulations of 1887, 1910, 1916, and 1922 in Ramírez Barreto, *Listado de las vicisitudes*, LV-LVIII. The children of deceased civil guards were considered "huérfanos" (orphans) even if their mothers were still alive.

part of the paternalistic embrace of their institution, these schools ensured guards that their children would be provided for by the corps itself if they were killed in the line of duty. Their children would still be raised within the insular world of the Civil Guard, just as they would have within a Civil Guard post (see Chapter One). The *guardias jóvenes* became symbols of the respect the corps had for members who had sacrificed their lives and of the solidarity of the corps, for guards routinely gave donations to help support the colegio.²⁰

Aside from instruction in the *Cartilla*, there does not appear to have been any training in how to perform the civilian policing duties of the Civil Guard at the Colegio de Guardias Jóvenes.²¹ Instead, the emphasis was placed on the core Civil Guard values of discipline, obedience, and Christian morality. Discipline reigned supreme and was to be instilled through the monotony of the daily schedule. As for disobedient students, they were often punished by having to copy many times a passage by Calderón de la Barca that conveniently summarized the values that they were supposed to learn:

Here the principal
duty is to obey,
and the means of doing it
is neither to request nor deny anything.
In sum, here courtesy
good behavior, loyalty
honor, bravery
reputation, repute
resolve, obedience,
fame, honor, and life are
the measures of good fortune.
The army is no more than a
religion of honorable men.²²

²⁰ “Relación de las cantidades donadas a favor de los Colegios de Huérfanos Guardia Civil,” *Boletín Oficial de la Guardia Civil (BOGC)* 10, no. 34 (1 December 1935): 1,482.

²¹ López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 219.

²² Aquí la más principal

Although Calderón wrote this passage about the army in 1650 (it is from a comic scene in one of his plays where a veteran gives advice to a new recruit), it summarized the Civil Guard's values remarkably well because of its emphasis on honor through living an obedient and respectable life rather than through the death in battle that a soldier might face.²³

While honor was described as a religion for the Civil Guard, morality at the Colegio de Guardias Jóvenes was also defined by Catholicism—"knowledge of Christian doctrine" was required for entry, *guardias jóvenes* took classes on the subject, and they were required to say a rosary every day.²⁴ Through the vehicle of the colegio, the Church was able to institutionalize its influence on the Civil Guard as a whole. In 1864, a priest placed an image of the Virgen del Pilar (Virgin of the Pillar) in the school. By the next year, the Virgen del Pilar had become the official patron of the colegio, and, in 1913, her patronage was officially extended to the entire Civil Guard.²⁵ Likewise, a nun wrote the

hazaña es obedecer
y el modo como ha de ser
es ni pedir ni rehusar.
Aquí en fin, la cortesía
el buen trato, la lealtad
el honor, la bizarría
el crédito, la opinión
la constancia, la obediencia
fama, honor y vida son
caudal de buena fortuna
la milicia no es más que una
religión de hombres honrados.

Comedia famosa. Para vencer a amor, querer vencerle, quoted in Ramírez Barreto, *Listado de las vicisitudes*, LXXVII.

²³ Pedro Calderón de la Barca, *Para vencer amor, querer vencerle*, in *Obras completas*, ed. Angel Valbuena Briones, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Aguilar, 1960), 2:529, 540.

²⁴ "Conocer la Doctrina cristiana." Manfredicano, "Compañía de Guardias Jóvenes," 142, 149.

²⁵ Jesús Narciso Núñez Calvo, "XC Aniversario del patronazgo de la Virgen del Pilar en la Guardia Civil (1913-2003)," *Guardia Civil*, no. 706 (February 2003): 79.

Hymn of the Civil Guard in 1924 for the Colegio de Huérfanos before it was adopted by the corps as a whole.²⁶ The hymn touches on all of the Civil Guard's most sacred values, including honor, order, loyalty, and nobility. The chorus sums up these values by having guards pledge themselves to the honor of the Civil Guard as an institution and, in addition to the standard king and country, dedicating them to their mission of preserving law and order:

Glory to you, institution.
 For your honor I want to live.
 Long live Spain, Long live the King.
 Long live law and order
 Long live the honored Civil Guard.²⁷

Not all students at the Colegio de Guardias Jóvenes would go on to become guards, but the entire curriculum aimed to produce graduates of a similar social rank. There was training for white-collar professions such as teacher, telegraph operator, mailman, merchant mariner, accountant, mechanic, metallurgist, electrician, and construction project manager.²⁸ Indeed, despite the pageantry surrounding the *guardias jóvenes* as symbols of the Civil Guard's institutional solidarity, most of the students pursued one of these civilian careers rather than becoming civil guards (see Table 2.1), indicating that, even though a large percentage of guards had fathers who had the same profession, a relatively small percentage of guards' sons may have wanted to subject

²⁶ Faustino Ramírez Barreto, *Semblanza histórica de la Asociación Pro-Huérfanos de la Guardia Civil* (Madrid: Asociación Pro-Huérfanos de la Guardia Civil, 2008), 132.

²⁷ Instituto gloria a ti.
 Por tu honor quiero vivir.
 Viva España, Viva el Rey.
 Viva el orden y la ley
 viva honrada la Guardia Civil.

In *Ibid.*, 133.

²⁸ AGM, Expedientes Personales, sect. 1, legajo P-501 and Ramírez Barreto, *Semblanza histórica*, 64-65.

themselves to the hardships and dangers of life in the corps. These alternative career paths offered to *guardias jóvenes* suggest that white-collar workers were understood to be the civilian equivalents to guards in terms of socio-economic status. Certainly, having a son become such a professional would mean that a guard had advanced the social status of his family if he had begun as a farm laborer himself.

Table 2.1: Career Tracks of the Colegio de Guardias Jóvenes' 1914 Graduating Class

Career	Number of Students
Postal	37
Telegraphy	35
Military	10
Undecided	5
Teaching	4
<i>Bachillerato</i> (between a high school diploma and a bachelor's degree)	3
Public Works	2
Civil Engineering	1
Customs	1
Electrician	1
Forestry	1

Ramírez Barreto, *Semblanza histórica*, 85.

Girls at the orphans' school were prepared to have a similar social rank and were also subject to military-style discipline.²⁹ School regulations described their instruction as “primary education and job training appropriate for their sex.”³⁰ Therefore, the curriculum for girls reveals what the female social equivalent of the male civil guard was thought to be. From age sixteen, the girls were instructed in languages, double-entry bookkeeping, typing, dressmaking, sewing, ironing, hairdressing, and manicuring. For

²⁹ López Corral, *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 221.

³⁰ “Instrucción primaria y enseñanzas de labores propias de su sexo.” “Reglamento de 1916,” quoted in Ramírez Barreto, *Listado de las vicisitudes*, LVI.

advanced students, training in teaching and music was also available.³¹ In other words, the girls seem to have been also expected to take skilled working-class or white-collar jobs, especially as secretaries or in the clothing industry. At the same time, these classes gave them the skills necessary to make them eligible for marriage to someone of a similar social rank.

For the majority who did not attend the colegio, the final element of Ahumada's strategy for ensuring that guards were respectable was at least requiring them to be able to read and write. Therefore, before anyone could join the Civil Guard as an enlisted man, he had to pass an entrance examination to verify that he had a basic level of education. The content of the exam varied greatly over the years, but, by the beginning of the twentieth century, it tested only basic arithmetic, reading, and writing.³² Even if the exam hardly ensured guards would have all the skills that they needed to do their jobs, it did make membership in the Civil Guard a certification of at least a basic level of education. Since even in the early twentieth century many Spanish rural laborers still could not read, this certification automatically elevated a new guard to a higher social status than that of the people he worked amongst in the small towns, especially in Southern Spain.³³

After completing their service in the army and passing the literacy test, aspiring civil guards received six months of apprenticeship-style training, where each aspirant was assigned to a veteran member for individual, experiential, on-the-job training. Those

³¹ Ibid.

³² Fernando Rivas Gómez, "La enseñanza de la Guardia Civil," *REHGC* 7, no. 13 (1974): 152.

³³ The illiteracy rate was 55% in 1900, and, despite dramatic improvement, it was still 27% in 1930. Albert Carreras and Xavier Tafunell, *Historia económica de la España contemporánea (1789-2009)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2010), 461.

who failed to learn the regulations and prove themselves able to fulfill their duties were let go.³⁴ Individual training had the advantage of allowing the apprentice to learn by doing and to have the opportunity to practice the tasks he would be performing as a guard in the real-world. The method also allowed him to become familiar with the realities of rural policing from someone who was actually on the job. The disadvantage was that, with instruction left up to hundreds of non-commissioned officers, the Civil Guard's administrative apparatus and the government had no control over what trainees were being taught. Instead, practices both good and bad were passed down from one generation of guards to another, creating a closed system in which unofficial habits became more and more entrenched.

Recruits were known as "*aspirantes*" during their training period. Not yet officially guards, they wore civilian clothes and a yellow armband as they shadowed a sergeant. The *aspirantes* activities as they went about their daily lives were also monitored. They could be called up for service if extra manpower was needed and simply handed a spare firearm and ammunition.³⁵ When they were ready for formal admission into the Civil Guard, they declared their religion to be Catholicism and performed the ceremony of swearing their loyalty to the flag of Spain by kissing it.³⁶ They were also read the regulations of the Code of Military Justice "so that claiming ignorance of them would never be an excuse."³⁷ From their first day in the corps, guards

³⁴ Ibid., 153.

³⁵ For a personal account of being an *aspirante*, see Ferreras, "Aspirante en activo. La incipiente agitación social," in *Memorias del sargento Ferreras*, 55-57.

³⁶ SGC, Expediente Personal, Pedro Manzanares Ureta.

³⁷ "Así como de que no le servirá de disculpa en ningún caso el alegar ignorancia de ellas." SGC, Expediente Personal, Miguel Abajo Ortega.

had already pledged multiple loyalties, not only to the military hierarchy and the government, but also to the more abstract idea of the *patria*. Honoring all these commitments would prove a constant balancing act during the Second Republic.

After the six month apprenticeship, station commandants then reinforced the training and indoctrination of enlisted men during educational sessions held at least once-a-week. Lessons, often developed from sources like the *RTGC*, could be on morality, analysis of new legislation, developments in criminology, or simply a review of the *Cartilla* and *reglamentos*. These sessions would also reinforce military bearing through drills of maneuvers and marches.³⁸ The lessons were a time to strengthen morale and the bond between commander and subordinate. In addition, they were an opportunity for the instructor to verify that the loyalty of his men was intact, which would become important when that loyalty was tested at the outset of the Civil War.³⁹

In sum, the recruitment and training of enlisted men for the Civil Guard was about elevating working-class recruits to a lower-middle-class social status that would distinguish and distance them from the rural townspeople they were to police. The process began with ensuring recruits had basic writing, reading, and arithmetic skills that many rural laborers did not possess. Then, the policy of voluntary enlistment from the army guaranteed that the Civil Guard was receiving men with a taste for the disciplined military lifestyle to which most Spaniards were resistant. Finally, the apprenticeship period and educational sessions placed responsibility for training a guard entirely within the insular world of his particular *casa-cuartel* and its commandant. By the time an

³⁸ *Cartilla del Guardia Civil*, Article 187, in Arlégui Bayonés, *Doctrinal de Servicio*, 135.

³⁹ Antonio de Reparaz and Tresgallo de Souza, *Desde el Cuartel General de Miaja al Santuario de la Virgen de la Cabeza* (Valladolid: Artes Gráficas Afrodísio Aguado, 1937), 28-29.

aspirante officially entered the Civil Guard, his level of education, his military bearing, and his loyalty to a national institution all separated him from the rest of the rural society that he was to police and that he himself had been a part of just a few years prior.

This recruitment and training process created a pair of problems if the goal was forging an effective force of public order for the twentieth century. The entrance requirements for enlisted personnel gave the Civil Guard men who could stand apart from the rural citizens they policed because of their military service and at least rudimentary education. However, with service in the army being considered their principal training, the Civil Guard offered those who aspired to join its ranks no formal schooling (with the exception of the Colegio de Guardías Jóvenes) and no chance to learn policing techniques from a curriculum developed by the state. Despite the fact that many guards only possessed the most basic reading, writing, and math skills upon joining the force, their job required knowledge of a large body of civil and military law, as well as the ability to complete official documents and analyze fingerprints.⁴⁰ Even at the colegio, discipline and morality were emphasized but policing hardly given a thought. The apprenticeship period was the first time most aspirants would be introduced to the military culture of the Civil Guard itself, and this training must have had a profound effect given how fully many guards would embrace this culture. Since they did not learn them anywhere else, it is here that the enlisted men had to become acculturated to all the rhythms and habits of daily life as a civil guard—how to conduct patrols, check papers, issue fines, make arrests, police festivals and protests, etc. In allowing individual sergeants complete

⁴⁰ Rivas Gómez, “Enseñanza de la Guardia Civil,” 152-53, 157.

control of this essential period, the state permitted a highly personalized training that could reproduce the corps' habits but sacrificed any control over the content, thereby forfeiting this chance to influence the culture of the institution from above. The insularity of the enlisted men's training suggestions itself as one reason why the corps' culture had such a high degree of continuity.

2.3. The Making of an Officer

2.3.1. Social Origins and Entering the Infantry Academy

Civil Guard officers constituted a more homogeneous group than the enlisted men because they came from similar social backgrounds and almost all attended the same school. For about half of the officers who served in the Second Republic (at least 49.94% of those sampled), their indoctrination into the insular military community no doubt began in infancy because their fathers had also been in the military.⁴¹ These future officers were born in all different parts of the country and in cities and towns both large and small, probably because military families were scattered around the country, following the military father wherever he was posted. Almost all of the officers' military fathers were also in the officer corps, and about half (51%) of them had been infantry officers.⁴² Another 20 percent appear to have come from the *Cuerpo de Intendencia* or Administrative Corps, whereas, only 11.6 percent were Civil Guard officers.⁴³ What these numbers suggest is that the Civil Guard's officer corps was a fairly homogeneous

⁴¹ 43 of the 87 personal service records of officers sampled at the SGC and the AGM listed fathers as having served in the military.

⁴² 42 of the 43 military fathers were officers and 22 of them had been in the infantry. Officers typically lived on or near military garrisons where they would be immersed in military life.

⁴³ 9 were in the *Cuerpo de Intendencia* and 5 were Civil Guard officers.

body socially, drawn from a military milieu increasingly isolated from civilian society. However, within this milieu, the Civil Guard did provide upward society mobility because it enjoyed a higher prestige within the army than the infantry and especially the *Cuerpo de Intendencia*.⁴⁴

That so many Civil Guard officers came from military families was no accident. The Duque de Ahumada himself had established the requirement that all Civil Guard officers come from the army, and the army favored military sons in its admissions to the Infantry Academy.⁴⁵ In addition, the sons of military families often attended preparatory schools specifically designed to ready students for the military academies, giving them a further advantage when taking their entrance examinations.⁴⁶ In a time when anything more than a primary school education was thought to be reserved for elites, attending such a military preparatory school identified these boys as members of a class apart.⁴⁷ Since so many Civil Guard officers attended a military academy, their shared experience was greater than that of enlisted guards.

My analysis of the training future Civil Guard officers received in the army will concentrate on the Second Infantry Academy (1893-1927) because a large majority of the Second Republic's Civil Guard officers attended this school, and, as Morris Janowitz

⁴⁴ Balfour, *Deadly Embrace*, 181 and Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 2.

⁴⁵ "Oficialidad de la Guardia Civil," 11. Varying but small numbers of officer vacancies were also filled by promotions from the ranks. During the Restoration, two attempts were made to create a school for enlisted men seeking to become officers, but both projects were short-lived. López Corral sees these schools as lost opportunities for the Civil Guard to provide formal training in policing techniques to its officers. *Guardia Civil en la Restauración*, 222-243.

⁴⁶ José Luis Isabel Sánchez, "La formación de los oficiales de Infantería entre 1909 y 1921," in *Protectorado Español en Marruecos: La historia trascendida*, dir. Manuel Aragón Reyes, 3:332.

⁴⁷ Carolyn Boyd, *Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain 1875-1975* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), xiv, 5, 13-14.

states, “education at a service academy is the first and most crucial experience of a professional soldier. The educational experiences of the cadet cannot obliterate his social background, but they leave deep and lasting impressions.”⁴⁸ Sometimes I will also mention the Infantry Academy’s predecessor, the Academia General Militar (General Military Academy), because a few of the highest ranking Civil Guard officers at the time of the Republic were old enough to have attended that school and because of the continuity between its teachings and those of the Infantry Academy.⁴⁹ While most of the courses at the Infantry Academy concerned technical subjects, the entire structure of the academy life was meant to instill in the cadets the importance of blind discipline, sacrifice, and a thirst for glory, all of which were to be channeled towards service to the *patria*. In this way, cadets were trained to become part of a military family that was supposed to be a leader of but also separated from civilian society. This family served the nation, but that did not preclude intervention in politics if the army felt its place within that nation was under threat.

⁴⁸ 66 of the 87 sampled. *Professional Soldier*, 127.

⁴⁹ At times, I will draw upon accounts of experiences at the Infantry Academy by officers who would not go on to join the Civil Guard since it can be assumed that all shared similar experiences in their years as cadets. This section is one of the first concerted studies of the education provided by the Infantry Academy, and I hope it will prompt further research on this institution as a way to understand the formation of the military culture that guided the actions of the Spanish Army as well the Civil Guard during the Second Republic and the Civil War. Geoffrey Jensen, *Irrational Triumph: Cultural Despair, Military Nationalism, and the Ideological Origins of Franco’s Spain* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2002), 9. Jensen does make some remarks on the Infantry Academy in *Irrational Triumph* and *Cultura militar española*, as does Paul Preston, “The Making of a Hero: 1892-1922,” chap. 1 in *Franco*. José Luis Isabel Sánchez has assembled an impressive collection of facts on the academies in *La academia de Infantería de Toledo*, vol. 1 (Toledo: Cecaf, 1991); *Alfonso XIII y la Academia de Infantería* (Imprenta Academia de Infantería); “Formación de los oficiales,” in Aragón Reyes, *Protectorado Español en Marruecos*; and *Toledo y los Centros de Instrucción militar* (Madrid: Villena, 1987), but these works contain little interpretation of these facts. George Hills also makes some interesting comparisons between the Infantry Academy and the United Kingdom’s Royal Military College at Sandhurst in “Toledo 1907,” chap. 3 in *Franco: The Man and His Nation* (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1967).

The practice of having centralized schools for the training of officers began in Spain in the early nineteenth century, as the army transitioned to being a force led by professional, middle-class officers rather than aristocrats. These schools took on various forms until 1883, when the creation of the Academia General Militar de Toledo united them all under one roof.⁵⁰ The Academia General was intended to base Spanish military education on the example of the Prussian Army, which had been victorious in the Franco-Prussian War.⁵¹ The Academia General experiment was short-lived, however. When General López Domínguez, a former artillery officer, became Minister of War in 1893, he brought back the practice of having a separate academy for each branch of the army.⁵² In Toledo, the Academia General was succeeded by a second Infantry Academy (the first ran from 1874 to 1883).⁵³ While some of the oldest officers had attended the Academia General Militar, most of the prominent officers during the Second Republic and the Civil War had graduated from this second Infantry Academy. The year 1910 had an exceptional graduating class that included Francisco Franco, Juan Yagüe, and Emilio Esteban Infantes, all of whom would become key commanders on the Nationalist side in the Civil War.⁵⁴ Also, graduating the next year was Lisardo Doval Bravo, a Civil Guard

⁵⁰ Isabel Sánchez, “Formación de los oficiales,” in Aragón Reyes, *Protectorado Español en Marruecos*, 326-27.

⁵¹ Jensen, *Irrational Triumph*, 26.

⁵² Gabriel Cardona, “La reforma de la enseñanza militar en la II República (1931-1932),” in *La enseñanza militar en España: un análisis sociológico*, coors. Julio Busquets and Valentina Fernández Vargas (Madrid: C.I.F.A.S., 1986), 70.

⁵³ For more information on the first Infantry Academy, see “La Academia de Infantería- Primera época (1874-83),” chap. 4 in Isabel Sánchez *Academia de Infantería*.

⁵⁴ Preston, *Franco*, 9. Busquets calls this group the “Generation of 1915.” *El militar de carrera en España: Estudio de Sociología Militar* (Barcelona: Ediciones Ariel, 1967), 173.

officer who went on to play a prominent role in the history of the Second Republic (see Chapter Six).⁵⁵

2.3.2. Discipline and Daily Life at the Infantry Academy

Once those who passed the exam entered the Infantry Academy, they quickly learned that discipline would define every aspect of their lives.⁵⁶ Professors hoped that the structure of academy life itself would instill in cadets the proper military values.⁵⁷ As one academy retrospective explains, the thinking was that “the military life is not all fun and games; discipline, that harsh law, breaks ambition and limits one to nobler purposes. The soldier does not belong to himself; he is only an atom of the formidable organism that governs him.”⁵⁸ Discipline was portrayed as a moral ethos in and of itself and was revered with quasi-religious fervor. As the academy’s director told the entering class of 1925, “obedience and subordination are the offerings of the will of the *Patria* itself on the altar of mutual blessings.”⁵⁹

The teaching of discipline began with each cadet being assigned a number that was displayed on all his clothing and would stay with him throughout his time at the academy.⁶⁰ In this way, the cadet would immediately begin to subsume his individual

⁵⁵ SGC, Expediente Personal, Lisardo Doval Bravo.

⁵⁶ “El campamento de Los Alijares,” *ABC*, April 24, 1911.

⁵⁷ Isabel Sánchez, “Formación de los oficiales,” in Aragón Reyes, *Protectorado Español en Marruecos*, 329.

⁵⁸ “No todo es bello y sonriente en el ambiente militar; la disciplina, dura ley, quebranta esperanzas limitando hermosos propósitos. El militar no se pertenece a sí mismo; es sólo un átomo del formidable organismo que le gobierna.” *Breve Bosquejo Histórico de la Academia de Infantería*.

⁵⁹ “Obediencia y subordinación son la ofrenda de la propia voluntad a la Patria en aras del común beneficio.” Quoted in Hilario González, *Resumen histórico de la Academia de Infantería* (Toledo: Imprenta-Escuela Tipográfica del Colegio de M.^a Cristina para Huérfanos de la Infantería, 1925), 219.

⁶⁰ Francisco Franco quoted in Vicente Pozuelo, *Los últimos 476 días de Franco* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1980), 92. Franco’s autobiographical remarks contain one of the richest accounts available of everyday life at the academy, but the reader must remember that he made these comments over 50 years after his academy days, and he shaped them so as to glorify his own legacy.

identity to that of the military collective. Once classes began, cadets followed a strict schedule that spelled out how they would spend every hour of the day, lending their lives a monotonous rhythm that would provide an accurate preview of what garrison life would be like once they were officers.⁶¹ They were expected to get up immediately upon the sound of the bugle call, and then, once-a-week, to take a collective shower in ice-cold water.⁶² After breakfast, a cadet spent five-and-a-half hours in class and had only four hours and fifteen minutes per day to study. For the most part, his efforts were dedicated to technical subjects such as military regulations, tactics, and weaponry.⁶³ Ultimately, professors were more concerned with the acculturation of the students into the military way of life than with their intellectual development.⁶⁴

In addition to maintaining a strict daily schedule, the academy attempted to teach discipline by dictating every aspect of the cadets' lives through a harsh set of regulations.⁶⁵ In fact, a 1920 report on the academy went so far as to claim that the only method of educating had previously been "scolding, threats, and punishments."⁶⁶ The newer attitude was that "moral punishment and dignified humiliation are the most

⁶¹ Franco quoted in Pozuelo, *Últimos 476 días*, 220 and Isabel Sánchez, *Academia de Infantería*, 170.

⁶² Isabel Sánchez, *Academia de Infantería*, 316 and *Breve Bosquejo Histórico*.

⁶³ *Academia de Infantería: Memoria de los cursos de 1918-1919 y 1919-1920* (Escuela tipográfica y encuadernación del Colegio de María Cristina para Huérfanos de la Infantería), 16 and Cardona, "Reforma de la enseñanza militar," 68. This assertion regarding subjects studied is based on class schedules found in *La Academia de Infantería en 1910* (Toledo: Imprenta y encuadernación del Colegio de María Cristina), 57-70; *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 61; *Breve Bosquejo Histórico*; *Índice del profesorado y alumnos, plan estudios y organización de la enseñanza* (Toledo: Imprenta particular de la Academia de Infantería), 11-13; and Isabel Sánchez, *Academia de Infantería*, 314-15. The technical nature of the classes was a hold-over from the Academia General Militar, which had been based on the highly technical Prussian Staff College.

⁶⁴ Busquets, *Militar de carrera en España*, 54-55.

⁶⁵ The regulations dictated the students' lives to a minute degree. For example, while marching they were required to carry six pairs of socks and six handkerchiefs, among other things. Isabel Sánchez, *Academia de Infantería*, 297. Even the showers had their own 13-point set of rules. *Ibid.*, 316, 321.

⁶⁶ *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 35.

effective methods.”⁶⁷ Each cadet was required to carry a handbook with him at all times, and it had to be presented to any professor at any time upon request. The handbook contained, in addition to a variety of useful information such as the schedule of classes, the cadet’s grades, a list of all the more serious punishments he had received, and an evaluation of his various capacities, such as temperament, memory, imagination, love of work, and character.⁶⁸ In particular, the cadet himself was required to write down each punishment he received, the hope being that this act would promote reflection and that, in the words of the aforementioned report, “every time he presents the handbook he will blush upon showing his offense, each presentation being a new punishment.”⁶⁹ For more severe punishments, the academy often turned to forms of shaming and social isolation, such as confinement to the cadet’s room, detention in the corrections cell, loss of vacation time, or, in extreme cases, public expulsion from the academy.⁷⁰

While strict discipline was certainly the norm in Spanish schools of the time, the emphasis on social rather than corporal punishments suggests that for the academy’s professors discipline was more than simply a practical measure; it was also a way to train future officers to be models for society who would be in the vanguard of enhancing its discipline and order.⁷¹ Professors looked to the example of Germany, for they believed that its rapid rise to world power status was driven by the positive influence its well-

⁶⁷ “El castigo moral, la humillación digna, son el más eficaz resorte.” Ibid., 34. Janowitz observes a similar shift in attitudes about discipline in the U. S. Army around the same time. *Professional Soldier*, 38-39.

⁶⁸ *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 38-39.

⁶⁹ “Cuantas veces exhiba su cartera sentirá sonrojo al mostrar su falta, siendo cada exhibición un nuevo castigo.” Ibid., 40.

⁷⁰ Isabel Sánchez, “Formación de los oficiales,” in Aragón Reyes, *Protectorado Español en Marruecos*, 329-30.

⁷¹ Boyd, *Historia Patria*, 11 and Jensen, *Cultura militar española*, 186.

disciplined army had had on its society.⁷² A conscious effort was made to turn cadets not only into soldiers but also into leaders in an increasingly dominant bourgeois society.⁷³ Professors hoped to elevate the relatively low social prestige that the military profession enjoyed in Spain to the level of respect it had had in Prussia.⁷⁴ As one book of advice for the cadets explains, “the student, by means of the union of scientific and practical intelligence, is educated to live in the society of which he forms a part.”⁷⁵

Cadets did receive some training in interacting with the bourgeois social circles with which an officer was expected to associate. The letter of recommendation that applicants to the academy were required to solicit proved that they could win the favor of a prominent person in their town.⁷⁶ Once accepted, they had to present themselves in their uniforms to the military governor of their province. Afterwards, they would wear their uniforms around town, practicing “care in the use of the uniform, good military comportment, [and] the perfect salute to superiors.”⁷⁷ Francisco Franco recalls how when he and his friends passed by the casino, that quintessentially bourgeois institution, the officers there would “submit the pretended martial airs of the cadets to their critical

⁷² José Ibáñez Marín and Luis Angulo Escobar, *Los cadetes*, (Madrid: Establecimiento tipográfico «el trabajo»), 87. Although, at least one prominent officer also criticized the Prussian Army’s discipline for being too harsh. Jensen, *Irrational Triumph*, 127.

⁷³ For the rise of bourgeois culture to hegemony in Spain, see Cruz, *Rise of Middle-Class Culture*. Ironically, this vision of officers as bourgeois leaders has its origins in the days when officers were aristocrats forming an elite group apart. Gabriel Cardona, *El problema militar en España* (Madrid: Pere Molás Ribalta, Historia 16), 98-99.

⁷⁴ Jensen, *Cultura militar española*, 168.

⁷⁵ “El alumno, mediante la educación científica y la inteligente práctica unidas, se educa e instruye para vivir en la sociedad de que forma parte.” *Consejos a los Alumnos de la Academia de Infantería* (Toledo: Imp. particular de la Academia de Infantería, 1917).

⁷⁶ Franco quoted in Pozuelo, *Últimos 476 días*, 90.

⁷⁷ “Cuidado del uso del uniforme, del buen porte militar, de la perfección en el saludo a los superiores.” *Ibid.*, 92.

appraisal.”⁷⁸ Thus began the notorious hazing ordeal first-year cadets had to endure. The implication was that they had to suffer now but that someday the casino would be the appropriate social space for them too.

The contradiction was that even as cadets were encouraged to become exemplary members of society, the environment of the academy only taught them how to interact with other members of the same military rank. Cadets rarely ventured outside of the academy grounds during the academic year. On the infrequent occasions when they were allowed to explore other parts of Toledo, they often sought out drinking establishments and houses of prostitution instead of gathering in more respectable parts of town.⁷⁹ Franco described the academy as isolated from the town and its relations with the inhabitants as “cold.”⁸⁰ For many cadets, their academy experience was undoubtedly an exciting time when they stepped out of the isolated world of the town where they were raised for the first time.⁸¹ But in reality, they simply stepped from one form of isolation to another. Franco noted that only during cadets’ marches through the small towns around Toledo did they begin for the first time “to get to know up close the great virtues and nobility of the Spanish people.”⁸²

Dining was another aspect of the academy experience that seems to have strengthened a sense of insular comradeship among the future officers.⁸³ Officers bonded

⁷⁸ “Sometían a su juicio crítico la pretendida marcialidad de los cadetes.” Quoted in Pozuelo, *Últimos 476 días*, 92. For more on the relationship between casinos and the bourgeoisie see Cruz, *Rise of Middle-Class Culture*, 198-200.

⁷⁹ Preston, *Franco*, 9-10. Rainy-day classes at the Academy’s April encampment even included two lessons on venereal diseases. *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 102-03.

⁸⁰ Quoted in Pozuelo, *Últimos 476 días*, 98.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁸² “Empezamos a conocer de cerca las grandes virtudes e hidalguía de ese pueblo español.” *Ibid.*, 101.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 93.

in particular over the *migas* or fried breadcrumbs, an unlimited amount of which was served daily for breakfast along with coffee and rolls.⁸⁴ The sight of *migas* even decades later would often bring back memories of the academy.⁸⁵ One nostalgic text entitled *Los cadetes* cried, “oh sustaining breakfast, our stomach’s *migas*, food of the most beaten down of the cadets’ souls! You constitute a symbol that evokes intimate memories!”⁸⁶ The text’s author also reminisces on the dining hall as “something more than the hub of the shared companionship of all who don the uniform; it is, as we say, a hallmark of fraternity and familiarity.”⁸⁷

Indeed, the academy was portrayed as a family, one which would take the place of the young cadets’ biological families to form the new core of their identities.⁸⁸ Still, the abrupt change in lifestyle must have come as a shock to many of the teenaged cadets; at least one at the Academia General Militar was not afraid to tell his friends in a letter how he missed his mother.⁸⁹ As Franco recalls, “it is not necessary to elaborate on the change that the student suffered in those first days. To pass from the calm life of the family to having to do everything at the call of a bugle, made worse by hazing, increased the difficulties of this difficult stage.”⁹⁰ Cadets were learning to transfer their affections from

⁸⁴ Major Luiz Bermúdez de Castro, quoted in Isabel Sánchez, *Academia de Infantería*, 268 and *Breve Bosquejo Histórico*.

⁸⁵ *Consejos a los Alumnos*, 15.

⁸⁶ “¡Oh sustancioso desayuno, migas de nuestro estómago, alimento el más azoado de las almas cadetiles! ¡Vosotras constituís un símbolo que evoca recuerdos íntimos!” Ibáñez Marín and Angulo Escobar, 76.

⁸⁷ “Es algo más que el nudo del compañerismo común á todos los que visten uniforme; es, digámoslo así, un sello de fraternidad y de familia.” Ibid.

⁸⁸ *Consejos a los Alumnos*, 15.

⁸⁹ Letter quoted in Isabel Sánchez, *Academia de Infantería*, 170.

⁹⁰ “No es necesario encarecer el cambio sufrido por el alumno en esos primeros días. Pasar de la sosegada vida de familia a tener que realizar todo a toque de corneta, agravado por las novatadas, aumentaba las dificultades de esta difícil etapa.” Quoted in Pozuelo, *Últimos 476 días*, 96.

their personal family to the military family and the *patria*, but they would do so through hardship.

The idea of the regulated, disciplined military family being the model for society as a whole was one that Civil Guard officers brought with them into their policing in the Second Republic. While the regular army was fairly isolated from the general population by garrison walls and foreign deployments, every day guards had to confront what they saw as the indiscipline of civilian life. Although they had an even stronger ethos of social isolation than the army and their barracks continued to provide them with the military social milieu they had become accustomed to at the academy, they also demanded social acceptance from those around them and were disappointed when they were not esteemed by all classes as the vanguard of a more disciplined and orderly society.

2.3.3. Moral Training and Nationalist Indoctrination at the Infantry Academy

Moral training was an essential part of the Infantry Academy experience, and its basic goal was to instill three core values—discipline, sacrifice, and honor. As discussed in the previous section, the hope was that by emphasizing discipline, obedience, and subordination to superior officers, daily life at the academy would accustom the young cadets to a military lifestyle and teach them to follow orders.⁹¹ Above all these daily routines stood their duty to serve the *patria*, even at the cost of their lives. The thinking was, in the words of one academy publication, “only when the student constantly places his will in agreement with duty, such that he cannot do anything else, will he be worthy

⁹¹ *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 18-19; *Consejos a los Alumnos*, 11; and Preston, *Franco*, 10.

of receiving the investiture of command.”⁹² This idea of sacrifice was of course also instilled to ensure that the future officers would be willing to die in battle. As Miguel Primo de Rivera put it in an address to cadets, “for whom could one give better one’s life than for the *Patria*, in which is contained all the most sacred loves of man!”⁹³ The idea of sacrifice was further extended to be a glorification of the hardships that went with living a military life—the harsh conditions, the physical rigor, and the potential for psychologically jarring experiences. Together, discipline and sacrifice fell under the category of abnegation, a willingness to give up the entirety of civilian life for the rigors of a military one or, in the words of one book of advice to cadets, the demand that “the soldier sacrifice his pleasures, his passions, his liberty, and even renounce his life in service of the King and the interest of the *Patria*.”⁹⁴ Cadets were expected to become officers for whom self-interest was entirely replaced with concern for the collective interest of the army and, by extension, the *patria*.

The reward to the individual for submission to the army was honor, which was defined as simply the respect one gained for sacrificing for the nation and being obedient.⁹⁵ Self-worth was to be achieved through a complete submission of the self to the demands of a larger entity. This idea of honor through sacrifice, referred to as glory, was to be pursued with a single-mindedness that speeches and literature addressed to the

⁹² “Sólo cuando el alumno tienda constantemente a poner su voluntad de acuerdo con el deber, de modo que no pueda hacer otra cosa, será digno de recibir la investidura del mando.” *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 36.

⁹³ “¡Por quién mejor se puede dar la vida que por la Patria, en la que se encierran todos los amores más santos del hombre!” Quoted in González, *Resumen histórico*, 222-23.

⁹⁴ “El militar sacrifica sus gustos, sus pasiones, su libertad, y hace renuncia de su vida en servicio del Rey y del interés de la Patria.” *Consejos a los Alumnos*, 12-13.

⁹⁵ *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 19; Cardona, *Poder militar*, 92; *Consejos a los Alumnos*; and Ponce Alberca and Lagares García, *Honor de oficiales*, 29.

cadets called religious.⁹⁶ The Prince of Asturias (heir to the Spanish throne) united the ideas of honor as religion and sacrifice when he said at an academy ceremony in 1920, “honor is the most sacred thing in life, to which one ought to sacrifice absolutely everything.”⁹⁷

These ideals were the result of the combined influence of the French and Germans on Spanish military thinking in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After its victory in the Franco-Prussian War, the German Army was the model for military forces throughout Europe. Its doctrines emphasized the moral training of officers as critical to success on the battlefield—officers at every level of command had to have the courage and initiative to adapt quickly as the situation on the ground changed unpredictably.⁹⁸ The French Army, which was still the filter through which many of these ideas came down to Spain, adapted the German model to create the idea of *élan*—a fighting spirit that rejected complicated battlefield maneuver in favor of a blind glorification of the offensive.⁹⁹ The rhetoric in the Spanish Army followed a similar line, emphasizing the winning of glory through sacrifice to the *patria*, while rigidly insisting on discipline rather than initiative.

Instilling these values in cadets was an important part of the Infantry Academy’s mission, but this moral training did not take place primarily inside the classes themselves. Rather, the admissions selection process, the examples of professors, and ceremony were

⁹⁶ *Consejos a los Alumnos*.

⁹⁷ “El honor es lo más sagrado de la vida, al que se debe sacrificar todo en absoluto.” Quoted in *Historial de la Academia de Infantería*, Biblioteca Central Militar, 16.

⁹⁸ Howard, Michael. “The Influence of Clausewitz.” In *On War*, by Carl von Clausewitz, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 34, 36.

⁹⁹ Howard, “Influence of Clausewitz,” 37.

the preferred methods. Most professors were concerned that new students were not receiving a patriotic education in primary school and that they were entering with no love for the army in their hearts.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, one reason why exceptionally generous admissions preferences were given to sons of military men was the hope that their fathers had instilled the proper values in them from a young age.¹⁰¹ The low age of admission meant that, even though cadets were to become commissioned officers upon graduation, not even a *bachiller* could be required for entry.¹⁰² The thinking was that young minds would be suppler and more open to inculcation with military values than older ones, and a certificate of good conduct was included in applications.¹⁰³ The academy preferred to produce eighteen-year-old officers than to risk the perceived dangers of indiscipline and unpatriotic thinking in civilian schools.¹⁰⁴

At the Infantry Academy, the example set by professors was the primary method for teaching cadets about discipline, sacrifice, and nationalism.¹⁰⁵ The professors, specially selected to be examples of military virtue, were glorified as the most important component of the cadet's education, and they were expected to mold every aspect of course instruction and time spent outside of the class alike into a model of how to live a

¹⁰⁰ *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 13.

¹⁰¹ Isabel Sánchez, *La academia de Infantería*, 218 and Bengt Abrahamson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), 50.

¹⁰² *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 11.

¹⁰³ Preston, *Franco*, 10 and AGM, Expedientes Personales, sect. 1, legajo C-3859.

¹⁰⁴ Cardona, "Reforma de la enseñanza militar," 77. While there was some concern that cadets were too young, most professors were more concerned that they were not receiving a patriotic education in primary school and that they were entering with no love for the army in their hearts. *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 13.

¹⁰⁵ There were exceptions such as the rainy-day sessions at 1920 the field encampment, which included "Moral Education and Comradery" and "Discipline and Morale." *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 102-03. The 1920-21 curriculum also included 147 short readings on philosophy, hygiene, individual and collective psychology, ethics, military morality, and sociology. *Ibid.*, 22.

virtuous life.¹⁰⁶ According to *Los cadetes*, the hope was “that the teachers, seasoned by years and knowledge, bring altruism, tenacity, a physiological and technical attitude, and *love, much love for the flag*, to the soul of their disciples!”¹⁰⁷ Franco, for one, acknowledged that the examples of their professors were what most inspired the students.¹⁰⁸

As in civilian schools, these professors, rather than the state, designed the curriculum. The Restoration regime did not exercise its oversight powers in this regard in an effort to avoid controversy, but it thereby lost an opportunity to forge national consensus that would contribute to the stability of the regime.¹⁰⁹ This failure was particularly grievous at the military academies, which were on paper under the direct control of the Ministry of War. For the Restoration governments, maintaining the loyalty of the army to the civilian authorities was critical to ensuring that the army’s constant interventions in politics during the mid-nineteenth century would not continue. All of the emphasis at the academy on sacrifice for the nation had the potential to serve that purpose. After all, liberals had also used nationalism as a way to rally support for the state through much of the nineteenth century. As José Álvarez Junco explains in his definitive text on the idea of the nation in nineteenth-century Spain, they enlisted intellectuals and artists to define the history of Spain as a struggle towards liberal ideals such as national sovereignty and limited government.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ González, *Resumen histórico*, 195.

¹⁰⁷ “¡Que los maestros, sazonados por los años y por el saber, lleven altruismo, tenacidad, ambiente técnico y psicológico y *amor, mucho amor á la bandera*, al alma de sus discípulos!” Ibáñez Marín and Angulo Escobar, *Los cadetes*, 100-01.

¹⁰⁸ Franco quoted in Pozuelo, *Últimos 476 días*, 100.

¹⁰⁹ Boyd, *Historia Patria*, 12.

¹¹⁰ “La nacionalización de la cultura,” part 2 in *Mater dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus, 2001).

However, Álvarez Junco argues that the liberals never took enough control of the educational system to make their national narrative hegemonic.¹¹¹ Catholic conservatives filled the vacuum by developing their own brand of nationalism based on an understanding of Spanish history as the story of the nation in the service of God rather than the state.¹¹² Geoffrey Jensen demonstrates that both currents were present in the officer corps of the nineteenth century, but, by the early decades of the twentieth, more and more professors were teaching cadets that they had a moral obligation to defend against any insult to the collective honor of the nation as a whole in addition to their individual honor.¹¹³ Professors believed that this national honor transcended the state and should be the ultimate object of a soldier's loyalty. Therefore, political intervention by the army in favor of the interests of the nation as a whole was justifiable, such as when disorder threatened to damage the reputation of the nation.¹¹⁴ What exactly professors considered an honorable nation was not set in stone, but they certainly thought that it would respect Catholic traditions and the military itself. The fact that Restoration governments allowed professors the freedom to give students such instruction makes the Infantry Academy another example of the liberal state's failure to take full advantage of education as a tool for promoting its preferred understanding of the nation.

The influence of the Prussian/German model is again in evidence here, along with major events of the second half of the Restoration period. The Academia General Militar was founded on the belief that making a historically-rooted nationalism the central

¹¹¹ "Éxitos y fracasos en el nacionalismo español del XIX," part 4 in *Ibid.*

¹¹² "La opinión conservadora, entre religión y nación," part 3 in *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Irrational Triumph.*

¹¹⁴ Preston, *Franco*, 10.

component of an ethos of military honor was the key to Prussian military success.

Therefore, the Academia General's professors taught cadets this conservative and traditionalist brand of nationalism rooted in a glorification of Spain's military past.¹¹⁵

The influence of Prussian military values was carried over into the second period of the Infantry Academy.

Then, from 1898 to 1923, the belief of many army officers that their nation's reputation was under siege drew them back to political intervention. In 1898, Spain's loss to the United States in the Spanish-American War gave the academy an air of sadness and pain, especially since many veterans of the colonial wars were professors there.¹¹⁶ The political bent of instruction began to increase, for, according to Paul Preston, "defeat was attributed to the treachery of politicians who had sent naval and military forces into battle with inadequate resources."¹¹⁷ Or as *Los cadetes* put it, "after periods of military grandeur and its political peak, Spain, like France, had their ordeal of disasters produced by egotism and lack of foresight."¹¹⁸ To cure its depression, the academy was taken up with the regenerationist thinking of the intellectuals that came to be known as the Generation of '98, and professors taught that it was army officers who would lead the regeneration of Spain.¹¹⁹ For example, during a speech at the academy in 1908, King Alfonso XIII linked religion and a nostalgia for an imagined glorious past when he expressed how intensely he felt "the hope that Spain will return, with the help of

¹¹⁵ Jensen, *Irrational Triumph*, 26-27.

¹¹⁶ Ibáñez Marín and Angulo Escobar, *Cadetes*; 13; Isabel Sánchez, *Academia de Infantería*, 226; and Cardona, *Problema militar en España*, 128.

¹¹⁷ Franco, *Preston*, 6.

¹¹⁸ "Tras períodos de grandeza militar y de auge político, España como Francia, tuvieron su calvario en desastres producidos por el egoísmo y la imprevisión." Ibáñez Marín and Angulo Escobar, *Los cadetes*, 13.

¹¹⁹ Jensen, *Irrational Triumph*, 16 and Puell de la Villa, *Historia del Ejército en España*, 122.

God, to occupy among the nations the place that in times past it occupied.”¹²⁰ The next year, the Tragic Week and defeat of the Spanish Army at the battle of Barranco del Lobo were also understood by the cadets as caused by a degenerate political system in need of a nationalist revitalization.¹²¹ By 1917, officers were back to open political intervention, forming *juntas de defensa* or defense councils that succeeded in blocking the government’s military reform efforts.¹²² Social unrest during the First World War also seems to have increased anxieties at the academy about left-wing political movements and led to open rhetoric advocating military intervention in politics.¹²³

According to Boyd, training the population through history classes and textbooks to have a common national vision of this past was especially important for strengthening “sentimental attachments to the nation-state,” but professors at the Infantry Academy were also allowed to interpret the past as they saw fit during the cadets’ one semester of military history.¹²⁴ Certainly, the professors agreed on the existence of a Spanish nation, and they believed that the army was its very foundation, winning glory through its sacrifices to defend the *patria*. As Jensen explains, “officers stressed the ostensible roles education, national identity and ‘moral’ strength had played in these decisive wars of the past.”¹²⁵ While battles involving both foreign and domestic forces were covered, the Reconquest, the Spanish War of Independence, and “the preponderance of our military

¹²⁰ “La esperanza de que España vuelva, con la ayuda de Dios, a ocupar entre las naciones el puesto que tiempos pasados ocupó.” Quoted in *Historial de la Academia*, 9.

¹²¹ Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mi vida junto a Franco* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977), 20 and Preston, *Franco*, 12.

¹²² For more on the *juntas de defensa*, see Boyd, *Pretorian Politics*.

¹²³ Examples can be found in *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 141-42, 150.

¹²⁴ Boyd, *Historia Patria*, 67-68.

¹²⁵ Geoffrey Jensen, “Moral Strength through Material Defeat? The Consequences of 1898 for Spanish Military Culture,” *War & Society* 17, no. 2 (October 1999): 30.

art in the sixteenth century” in particular were all glorified (see Table 2.2).¹²⁶ Even the location of the academy itself, Toledo’s Alcázar or castle, was made a symbol of Spain’s glorious military past to encourage cadets to identify with the nobility of a bygone era (see Image 2.1).¹²⁷ This vision of the army’s role in the nation conflicted with regional or class-based conceptions of identity. By teaching cadets that Spain had had a magnificent past because of its military success, professors gave them the idea that Spain could return to its former glory if the military was afforded proper respect, and one academy director even cautioned against those evil Spaniards who did not acknowledge or depreciated Spanish history.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ “La preponderancia de nuestro Arte militar en el siglo XVI.” *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 47.

¹²⁷ Jensen, *Irrational Triumph*, 102 and *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 223.

¹²⁸ *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 142.

Table 2.2: Number of Battles Treated in the Academy’s 1920-21 Military History Textbook

Conflict	Number of Battles Covered
Campaigns of Alexander	1
Roman Empire	3
Reconquista	2
Campaigns of the Great Captain (Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba)	1
Conquest of the Americas	1
“The Preponderance of our Military Art in the Sixteenth Century”	3
Campaigns of Maurice of Nassau	1
Campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus	1
“The Decadence of the Military Art”	2
Campaigns of Frederick the Great	1
Campaigns of French Revolution	1
Napoleon	6
Spanish War of Independence	3
Carlist Wars	1
Crimean War	1
Italian Wars of Unification	2
Hispano-Moroccan War	1
American War of Independence	1
Austro-Prussian War	3
Franco-Prussian War	4
Russo-Turkish War	1
Russo-Japanese War	4
Balkan Wars	1
First World War	2

Adapted from *Academia de Infantería: Memoria*, 47.



Image 2.1: The Alcázar of Toledo, Home of the Infantry Academy
Isabel Sánchez, *Academia de Infantería*, 231.

The final way in which cadets were taught military values was through the ceremonies and speeches that dotted the Infantry Academy calendar. The speeches cadets heard displayed a remarkable uniformity in the messages they conveyed. Honor and duty were their central points, and cadets were urged to have a religious devotion to these two ideas. The ceremony that seems to have had the greatest impact was the matriculation ritual for the entering class of cadets where they were read the Military Code of Justice, sang the national anthem, and solemnly kissed the flag of the *patria* and swore their loyalty to it (see Image 2.2).¹²⁹ They were asked, “do you swear to God and promise the King to serve their flags constantly, to defend them until losing the last drop of your blood, and not to abandon those whom you are commanding during an act of war

¹²⁹ *Breve bosquejo histórico* and Franco quoted in Pozuelo, *Últimos 476 días*, 98.

or the preparation for it?,” and they answered, “yes, we swear.”¹³⁰ As one cadet at the Academia General Militar put it, “from that point on I considered myself a true soldier and things changed for me.”¹³¹ Franco, similarly, called the ceremony “an event of great transcendence.”¹³² It was here that the new cadets were first introduced to how the academy would teach them to understand duty and honor, and their commitment to the army and nationalism was secured from the outset in this ritualized fashion.¹³³



Image 2.2: The Kissing of the Flag at the Infantry Academy’s 1923 Flag Swearing Ceremony
Isabel Sánchez, *Academia de Infantería*, 377.

There is evidence that the Infantry Academy had some success in imparting its particular understanding of military values on its cadets through classes, the influences of its professors, and its ceremonies.¹³⁴ Emilio Esteban-Infantes, General José Sanjurjo’s

¹³⁰ “¿Juráis a Dios y prometéis al Rey servir constantemente sus banderas, defenderlas hasta perder la última gota de vuestra sangre y no abandonar a los que os están mandando en acción de guerra o preparación para ella?” “Sí, juramos.” Franco quoted in Pozuelo, *Últimos 476 días*, 98.

¹³¹ “Desde este punto me consideré verdadero soldado y cambiaron para mí las cosas.” Quoted in Isabel Sánchez, *Academia de Infantería*, 170.

¹³² Franco quoted in Pozuelo, *Últimos 476 días*, 98.

¹³³ Isabel Sánchez, *Academia de Infantería*, 149-53.

¹³⁴ Franco, for one, was deeply affected. Preston, *Franco*, 9, 11.

biographer and long-time aide-de-camp, stated that Sanjurjo's spirit was forged at the Academia General Militar: "The spirits of the gentlemen cadets were inculcated with the idea that the highest aspiration of all soldiers ought to be the surrender of all their existence to the benefit of the *Patria*, it being the greatest glory to die in defense of its integrity."¹³⁵ Jensen also believes that the textbooks of one prominent academy professor probably did turn the political opinions of students to the right.¹³⁶ No doubt the effect was even greater at more overtly regenerationalist second Academia Militar General, but that institution lies outside of the purview of this study, for none of the civil guards considered here attended that academy.¹³⁷

Since the vast majority of Civil Guard officers who served during the Second Republic had attended the Infantry Academy, they had already been imbued with a common set of values even before they entered the corps. The academy had made them accustomed to strict discipline and isolation from civilian society. It had also taught them the importance of sacrifice and honor, even if its definition of honor was somewhat different from the Civil Guard's. In addition, as regenerationist ideas became prevalent within the officer corps after 1898, the academy increasingly taught cadets that the military had a duty to serve the *patria* that ranked above even its duty to serve the government. During the Second Republic, Civil Guard officers would have to decide whether they were more committed to a conservative notion of the *patria* or their corps' emphasis on serving whatever government was in power.

¹³⁵ *General Sanjurjo: (Un Laureado en el penal del duero)*, 2nd ed. (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1958), 103.

¹³⁶ Jensen, *Cultura militar española*, 168.

¹³⁷ For more on the second Academia General Militar, see Carlos Blanco Escolá, *La Academia General Militar de Zaragoza (1928-1931)* (Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1989).

2.3.4. Prior Experiences in the Army and Morocco

Once future Civil Guard officers graduated the Infantry Academy, they usually spent a few years (32 months on average) as lieutenants in the infantry before joining the Civil Guard. In the infantry, most found themselves far from the valiant warriors and societal leaders the academy had taught them to be. They found themselves, rather, as poorly paid and little respected members of the lower end of the middle class.¹³⁸

Garrison life meant immense boredom and the lack of any stimulation for motivated officers.¹³⁹ Low-ranking officers' days consisted of parades, drills, horseback riding, guard duties, and endless paperwork.¹⁴⁰ Many of them held posts that only existed to give positions to the army's excessive number of officers, and some commanded units that existed only on paper.¹⁴¹ Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, cousin of Franco Bahamonde, recalls his reaction to arriving at his first posting to find his platoon at half strength: "Was it for this reality, I said to myself, that I have spent three years studying the campaigns of Hannibal, the Great Captain, Napoleon, the Franco-Prussian War and the Russo-Japanese, logistics, the tactics of the three armed forces, etc., etc.?"¹⁴² Lacking any other purpose, such officers looked to the training they had received at the Infantry Academy and dedicated themselves to following orders and regulations with bureaucratic exactitude.¹⁴³ Overall, garrison life must not have been so distasteful to future Civil

¹³⁸ Carolyn Boyd, *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 27, 32-34.

¹³⁹ Balfour, *Deadly Embrace*, 81.

¹⁴⁰ Balfour, *Deadly Embrace*, 213 and Preston, *Franco*, 13.

¹⁴¹ Puell de la Villa, *Historia del Ejército de España*, 105.

¹⁴² "¿Para esta realidad, me decía, he pasado tres años estudiando las campañas de Aníbal, del Gran Capitán, de Napoleón, la guerra franco-prusiana y la ruso-japonesa, logística, táctica de las tres armas, etc., etc.?" *Vida junto a Franco*, 23.

¹⁴³ Balfour, *Deadly Embrace*, 213.

Guard officers that they opted to give up military life entirely, but it must have also left them wanting a career with more interest and activity.

Life for officers who did tours in Morocco, including many who went on to join the Civil Guard, was the polar opposite of that of the garrison.¹⁴⁴ Although officers faced danger and terrible living conditions in Morocco, life did offer more than boredom, and many future guards saw combat there.¹⁴⁵ With danger came chances for quick promotion and glory for the bold and ambitious officer. Consequently, officers' attitudes towards Morocco were less clear-cut than those of enlisted men. Most, like the lower classes, had little taste for the poor conditions and danger of service there. They preferred the security and predictability of garrison life and tried to avoid being sent to the protectorate.¹⁴⁶ There was a select group, however, known as the *africanistas*, who relished the opportunities in Morocco to live out the code of glory through abnegation and sacrifice that they had learned at the Infantry Academy.

The *africanistas*' justifications for supporting the colonial project in Morocco were contradictory. On the one hand, they argued there was a commonality between Spaniards and Moroccans, stemming from the former Muslim rule of Spain, that put Spaniards in a unique position to adopt a parental role toward the Moroccans.¹⁴⁷ They

¹⁴⁴ 31 (35.63%) of the sampled Civil Guard officers could be verified as having served in Morocco.

¹⁴⁵ 20 (64.52%) of the Civil Guard officers who had served in Morocco could be verified as having been in combat.

¹⁴⁶ Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 123.

¹⁴⁷ Geoffrey Jensen, "Morocco and Spain in the eyes of Antonio García Pérez," in Aragón Reyes, *Protectorado español en Marruecos*, 3:506-07. For more on Spanish officers' perceptions of Moroccans, see Geoffrey Jensen, "Muslim Soldiers in a Spanish Crusade: Tomás García Figueras, Mulai Ahmed er Raisuni and the Ideological Context of Spain's Moroccan Soldiers," chap. 9 in *Colonial Soldiers in Europe, 1914-1945: "Aliens in Uniform" in Wartime Societies*, eds. Eric Storm and Ali Al Tuma (New York: Routledge, 2016).

even identified with the Moroccans in certain ways. Sebastian Balfour notes that “the harsh landscape of northern Morocco, the sobriety, toughness, and valour of the enemy, their apparent acceptance of death and destiny all resonated with the ideal values of the Spanish colonial military.”¹⁴⁸ On the other hand, Moroccans were also described as so debased that they needed the Spanish to help them with their own regeneration.¹⁴⁹ To reconcile these two characterizations of Moroccans, *africanistas* argued that the difference between Spaniards and Moroccans was that the latter lacked the honor and religious devotion that drove Spaniards to fight as a sacrifice for something greater than themselves. They believed that Moroccans, in contrast, fought for the individual gain that the spoils of war promised.¹⁵⁰ As the *africanistas* became more accustomed to the harsh life of fighting in Morocco, they became more alienated from life in the metropole.¹⁵¹ As they came to identify with what they saw as the positive aspects of Morocco and its people, they projected what they considered to be its negative aspects back onto peninsular Spaniards.¹⁵²

The Infantry Academy taught officers rigid adherence to the tactical theory and regulations they had memorized, but these rules had little relevance to counter-insurgency warfare in a colonial context. Given the situation on the ground in Morocco, they realized they had to adapt and improvise tactics of their own. They learned to take pride in their reliance on instinct, fancying that it was their *cojones* (balls) that guided them.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁸ Balfour, *Deadly Embrace*, 202.

¹⁴⁹ Jensen, “Morocco and Spain,” in Aragón Reyes, *Protectorado Español en Marruecos*, 506.

¹⁵⁰ Jensen, “Morocco and Spain,” in Aragón Reyes, *Protectorado Español en Marruecos*, 507. See, for example, Berenguer, *La Guerra en Marruecos: (Ensayo de una adaptación táctica)* (Madrid: Librería “Fernando Fé,” 1918), 23-24.

¹⁵¹ Balfour, *Deadly Embrace*, 172.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 202.

¹⁵³ Payne, *Politics and the Military*, 154.

Especially vexing was the problem of identifying who exactly the rebels were amongst the population.¹⁵⁴ One solution employed was brutality. It was hoped that the sexual abuse of Moroccan women and the torture and execution of prisoners would make the population too afraid to support the rebellion.¹⁵⁵ Another factor causing brutality was the army's desire for revenge. After its poor performance in the 1909 Melilla War, the army felt the need to prove itself. This feeling was drastically intensified by its defeat at the Battle of Anual in 1921, in which thousands were killed and almost the entire Melilla sector lost to the rebels. As Balfour explains, "like the 1898 Disaster, Anual branded the minds of colonial officers with failure. In the prevailing military ideology, defeat was like losing masculinity. From then on, revenge and reaffirmation became obsessive goals."¹⁵⁶

Several historians have argued recently that the army officers who led the suppression of the 1934 rebellion in Asturias and led the Nationalist side in the Civil War developed their brutality in Morocco.¹⁵⁷ Even though Civil Guard officers were not usually the *africanistas* that played so famous a part in these events, Chapter Six of this dissertation will trace how guards also turned to torture as a means to extract revenge in the suppression of the 1934 revolt. While direct causation is difficult to prove, the fact that large numbers of these guards, both officers and enlisted men, had previously served in the Moroccan wars suggests that the brutalizing influence of the conflict may have extended beyond the *africanistas* into Spain's armed forces more generally as well.

¹⁵⁴ *Enseñanzas de la campaña de Rif en 1909* (Madrid: Talleres del Depósito de la guerra, 1911), 11.

¹⁵⁵ Payne, *Politics and the Military*, 155.

¹⁵⁶ *Deadly Embrace*, 82.

¹⁵⁷ See footnote 2.

2.3.5. Civil Guard Officer Admissions and Training

The Civil Guard was not a particularly popular choice for army officers because advancements were so slow in its closed promotion system.¹⁵⁸ Those who did join the corps were not the *africanistas* who reveled in the hardships and violence of Morocco and hoped for quick promotion there.¹⁵⁹ Instead, the force seems to have been for those to whom the military life did hold enough appeal so that they sought to continue it in a setting that would offer more stimulation and independence than the monotonous existence of the army garrison officer.¹⁶⁰ In addition, the Civil Guard presented the officer who did not foresee himself winning glory as an *africanista* with the opportunity to still hold a position of prestige within the military hierarchy.¹⁶¹ Suddenly, these advantages made the Civil Guard very attractive when the army, around 1922, altered the rate of its promotions to be about the same as that of the Civil Guard. Admission to the force was by a waitlist based primarily on seniority in the army; there was no exam as there was for enlisted men.¹⁶² Requests for admission to the Civil Guard skyrocketed after 1922 to the point where, two years later, there were 500 officers on the waitlist to fill around 12 vacancies.

Officers always entered the Civil Guard as either first or second lieutenants.¹⁶³

Like the enlisted men, they also had a six-month apprenticeship period, but theirs was

¹⁵⁸ “Oficialidad de la Guardia Civil,” 16.

¹⁵⁹ *Africanista* types would have been more attracted to the Foreign Legion, which enjoyed a privileged place within the army in exchange for frequent front-line deployments.

¹⁶⁰ “Oficialidad de la Guardia Civil,” 11.

¹⁶¹ “Oficialidad de la Guardia Civil,” 11, 17 and Balfour, *Deadly Embrace*, 181.

¹⁶² “Oficialidad de la Guardia Civil,” 17. The entry process varied somewhat over the years.

¹⁶³ The Civil Guard was open to army officers of all ranks, but in practice only lieutenants joined, presumably because officers lost seniority upon entry into the Civil Guard. *Ibid.*, 16.

known as the “*prácticas*,” and they shadowed a captain instead of a corporal.¹⁶⁴ This period was crucial for reorienting the officer’s sense of honor from defining it as glory won in battle to respect won from the public. However, there is unfortunately virtually no information available on this key phase in the acculturation process since Civil Guard officers of the time left no memoirs and station records are not available to the public. One is left to speculate that, as with the enlisted men, this individualized mentorship was a powerful factor in perpetuating the Civil Guard’s unique culture, because it was the only training that officers received specific to the corps. By shadowing a captain on-the-job, the new lieutenant could go beyond the regulations to learn the habits of the institution that governed how Civil Guard officers operated in practice, from their strict emphasis on discipline during inspections to their harsh methods for pursuing criminals to their insistence that their honor be respected by all classes of society.

2.4. Conclusion

Given the corps’ entrance requirements and its almost total lack of in-house training apart from apprenticeships, service in the army was clearly considered to be the primary training for the Civil Guard. For the typical officer who would serve under the Second Republic, this training may have begun with coming from a military family. After a military preparatory school and three years at the Infantry Academy, the typical officer knew little else but a military lifestyle with its emphasis on discipline and glory through sacrifice in the name of the *patria*. For both officers and enlisted men, service in

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 13.

the garrisons and perhaps in Morocco acclimatized them to a military lifestyle that was quite distinct and isolated from civilian society.

The problem with service in the army was that it gave guards no training in how to do their jobs as policemen. That task was left up to individual sergeants and captains during the apprenticeship period. There enlisted recruits would gain experience patrolling civilian populations, and officers would learn to inspect and manage a group of Civil Guard posts. A shift in mentality was required as well. Whereas in the army honor was to be won through glory in battle, guards had to learn to seek it through respect from the people they policed.

In leaving guards' training entirely in the hands of the army and Civil Guard mentors, civilian authorities gave up an opportunity to steer the Civil Guard's culture in new directions. Army service began to distance guards from civilian life even before they joined the force, and professors at the Infantry Academy had free rein to replicate in the next generation the conservative and interventionist shift of the late-Restoration officer corps. Then, the apprenticeships allowed engrained habits within the Civil Guard to be passed down as well. The guards themselves were the only ones with the power to adapt their training and methods to the increasing need to police the large protests and strikes of the early twentieth century. But the institution's structures were too ossified to adapt rapidly to the changing socio-political climate of the Second Republic, and when guards were met with challenges to their honor, they fell back on the idea that they had learned in their army days of seeking glory in battle and of being ultimately responsible to the *patria* rather than the *pueblo*.

Chapter 3- Confronting the Mass Politics of the Second Republic

3.1. Introduction

The last two chapters examined the contradictions that emerged from the development of the Civil Guard's military culture, first, as an organization and, second, through the individual recruits who would serve during the Second Republic. This chapter turns to how those contradictions became amplified as the Civil Guard came into contact with the unprecedented political mobilizations ushered in by the new regime.¹ I lay out not only what the positions of the major players in the Republic's socio-political struggles were relative to the Civil Guard, but also how these groups expressed their positions. Once the players are established here, in the subsequent chapters I will explore in more detail how the interactions between them led to violence involving the Civil Guard and increased tensions between guards and working-class groups.

A lack of consensus both among and within the Republic's various political players was a significant hindrance to the regime's consolidation, and what approach each faction would take towards the Civil Guard was a frequent sticking point. Many republicans were initially skeptical of whether or not this institution that was accustomed to suppressing mass mobilizations for oligarchic regimes could be reconciled with the

¹ In January 1931, the Civil Guard was composed of 29,074 men stationed around the country in every town of any size. González Calleja, *Nombre de la autoridad*, 121. The force still had a dual ministerial dependency and its primary mission was still the maintenance of public order in rural areas, but by this time there was a separate body, the Cuerpo de Seguridad (Security Corps), for the cities, although the Civil Guard did sometimes still intervene in urban areas and performed certain functions there such as guarding government buildings. For more information on this corps, see Julio de Antón, *Policía y Guardia Civil en la España republicana* (Madrid: Arroyomolinos, 2001); González Calleja, "La sombra de Casas Viejas: La Guardia de Asalto y las transformaciones en los cuerpos de Seguridad y Vigilancia," chap. 4 in *Nombre de la autoridad* and Diego Palacios Cerezales, "Ansias de normalidad. La policía y la República," chap. 10 in *Rey, Palabras como puños*. This chapter concentrates on the first year of the Republic, 1931, but I will also mention relevant examples from later years.

Republic. But they quickly came to see the Civil Guard as essential for policing the wave of strikes and protests that had accompanied the Republic, and, fearful of losing its loyalty, they turned away from adapting the force's culture to its new circumstances. Meanwhile, anarchists and Socialists were best poised to take advantage of the Second Republic's legalization of unions, strikes, and protests. Anarchists would continue to oppose the Civil Guard as a matter of principle, but the Republican government's failure to incorporate their street politics into its legal framework of contestation also pushed them to insurrections that involved violent clashes with the Civil Guard.

The Socialists were more willing to operate within the Republic's bounds of legality, but they too were divided between more moderate leaders and more radical rank-and-file members. The latter pushed an oppositional stance towards the Civil Guard that manifested itself in letters of complaint, newspaper articles, speeches, and protests. Whereas the Civil Guard was accustomed to policing protests, albeit often with violence, it had to rely on others to defend it in the press and the Cortes. Conservative groups were happy to take on this role as they sought to adapt to the new political environment with a mass mobilization of their own. The downside for the Civil Guard was that it appeared more in league than ever with landowners and Catholic conservatives.

Finally, this chapter argues that the Civil Guard had a repertoire of its own, one that was heavily shaped by the corps' regulations but that also made its own claim: the Civil Guard's honor should not be offended. The law permitted the institution to use violence as a response to insult, and its regulations only instructed guards to give warning and then open fire with their lethal rifles. However, it was up to the commander at the scene to decide when to apply deadly force, and it is here that the corps' culture of honor

sometimes drove him to advance to this stage quickly. This repertoire was not new to the Second Republic, but when the number of strikes and protests expanded greatly under the new regime, so too did the violence of the Civil Guard. At the same time, Republican governments failed to reform the institution's culture and tactics to adapt it to the new normal of policing political contestation in the streets.

3.2. The Coming of the Republic

During the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera, the general fulfilled his promise to restore public order in Spain by permanently suspending constitutional rights. Having taken over the government, the military now had total control over public order.² Some Civil Guard historians see the Primo de Rivera dictatorship as a golden age for the Civil Guard because, by suspending the constitution, the regime gave guards essentially free rein to suppress suspected criminals and political dissidence as they saw fit.³ The low levels of political violence made their jobs much safer because they could simply preemptively arrest anyone they thought might cause political conflict.⁴ The king and Primo de Rivera also spoke to guards' desires for honor by granting them various medals and recognitions. However, perhaps the greatest honor they bestowed upon the Civil Guard was making one of Spain's most prestigious generals, Lieutenant General José Sanjurjo Sacanell, its director general in 1928. Sanjurjo soon developed a unique paternal affection for the guards, who reciprocated by venerating him as a leader who brought honor to their institution. Morris Janowitz identifies two basic types of officers,

² Eduardo González Calleja, *El máuser y el sufragio: Orden público, subversión y violencia política en la crisis de la Restauración (1917-1931)* (Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, 1999), 278.

³ See, for example, "La Seguridad pública en el periodo constitucional," *REHGC* 15, no. 28 (1982): 112.

⁴ González Calleja, *Nombre de la autoridad*, 44.

heroic leaders and military managers, and Sanjurjo was a prime example of the former.⁵ A look at Sanjurjo's life reveals a man of soaring pride and ambition, but one who was also largely successful in maintaining an image of himself as simply a dutiful soldier, concerned only with service to his country rather than politics. His story reveals much about how guards wanted to see themselves. Perhaps one reason they looked up to him so much was that he won his honor in a way they usually could not as policemen: glory in battle. Janowitz notes that even as military organizations needed more and more military managers, heroic leaders remained important for maintaining tradition and motivating an organization's members.⁶ The jobs of civil guards were by nature largely managerial, but they were drawn to Sanjurjo by his preference for deeds over words, his self-proclaimed political neutrality, and his keen awareness of his public image. In fact, he built around himself much the same fiction as they did around their institution.

Sanjurjo came from a deeply Catholic Carlist family, and, his father having been killed in the Third Carlist War, José began a military life while still a boy in the Colegio de Huérfanos de la Guerra (School of War Orphans) in El Escorial.⁷ In 1890, he entered the Academia General Militar in Toledo, where, by his own admission, he was a poor student, preferring adventure novels to textbooks.⁸ He explained that “of the military course of study I always liked, more than the texts learned in the loneliness of the study

⁵ *Professional Soldier*, 21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 35-36.

⁷ Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 19; Enrique Sacanell Ruiz de Apodaca, *El general Sanjurjo, héroe y víctima* (Ediciones Altaya, 2008), 25; and Díaz Carmona, “10 de agosto de 1932,” 62.

⁸ AGM, caja 1161, exp. 14.

rooms, what it has of adventure, of personal inspiration.”⁹ His hero was General Juan Prim, whom he described as “brave, collected, and very patriotic. . . he made his soldiers love him.”¹⁰ A general who won honor by personally leading his men by being first in bravery: that was the kind of officer Sanjurjo wanted to be.

Once he had graduated from the academy, Sanjurjo’s primary concern as a young officer was to gain this personal honor, and he aimed to win it on a battlefield, as Prim had done. In 1896 Sanjurjo would get his first chance when he was sent to fight in the ongoing conflict in Cuba. There, he was decorated and promoted for fighting in numerous actions and being wounded several times.¹¹ In Cuba, he also gained a reputation for calm in the face of danger and for having particularly warm and friendly relations with the soldiers under his command.¹² After the war had ended, Sanjurjo was bored by the administrative position he held in Madrid.¹³ When war broke out again in 1909 in Morocco, he was quick to volunteer.¹⁴ In the Rif, where he was to spend much of the next twenty years, he was truly in his element, and he came to prefer life there, with its frequent opportunities for winning further glory, to the comparatively dull life of peninsular Spain.¹⁵ Thus he became a leading *africanista*, in contrast to the civil guards, who chose a career in policing rather than staying on in Morocco. His most glorious moment came on February 1, 1914, when, as a major, he was seriously wounded twice

⁹ “De la carrera militar me gustaron siempre, más que los textos aprendidos en la soledad de los gabinetes, lo que tiene de aventura, de inspiración personal.” Quoted in Sacanell, *El general Sanjurjo, héroe y víctima*, 28-29.

¹⁰ “Valiente, sereno, muy patriota. . . se hacía querer de sus soldados.” Quoted in *ibid.*, 29.

¹¹ AGM, caja 1161, exp. 14.

¹² Díaz, “El 10 de agosto de 1932,” 63 and Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 26, 28-29.

¹³ AGM, caja 1161, exp. 14 and Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 35.

¹⁴ Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 37.

¹⁵ Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 50; Gabriel Cardona, *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la guerra civil* (Madrid: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1983), 33; and AGM, caja 1161, exp. 14.

but kept fighting for another five hours because he feared if he left the battlefield to go to the hospital, his men would retreat without their leader in front of them.¹⁶ For this action, Sanjurjo received a merit-based promotion and the Cruz de San Fernando, Spain's highest military award for valor.¹⁷ The 1st of February 1914 was perhaps his finest moment, when he was most the man he wanted to be, because he was winning honor on the battlefield through his own personal leadership and bravery.

The deed brought him to the rank of lieutenant colonel, a level where leadership was more commonly exercised at an observation post or an office desk than at the front of a battle where sheer physical tenacity could still be enough to win the day. As he continued to receive merit-based promotions, by 1923, Major General Sanjurjo was in a position of such prominence that he found himself involved in politics as well as office work.¹⁸ Seeing himself as a purely military man, he had previously avoided politics, but he actively supported Primo de Rivera's coup of that year.¹⁹ Sanjurjo and Primo de Rivera grew close as the two worked together to achieve victory in Morocco.²⁰ In 1927, they did so, and Sanjurjo, who received another Cruz de San Fernando for his efforts, became Spain's most prestigious general.²¹ But when the war ended, so did his *raison d'être* in Morocco, and he requested a transfer to the peninsula.²²

¹⁶ AGM, caja 1161, exp. 14 and Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 45.

¹⁷ AGM, caja 1161, exp. 14.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Sacanell, *El general Sanjurjo, héroe y víctima*, 59, Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 68-69.

²⁰ Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 68 and Sebastian Balfour, *Deadly Embrace*, 247.

²¹ López Corral, *La Guardia Civil: Claves históricas*, 291 and Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 94, 95-99, 230.

²² Sacanell, *El general Sanjurjo, héroe y víctima*, 73.

In 1928, Primo de Rivera granted Sanjurjo's wish by having him named the director general.²³ In so doing, Primo de Rivera put a man who had dedicated his life to gaining honor at the head of an institution where honor reigned as the most important value. The guards quickly grew fond of their new director, and he of them.²⁴ Addressing them in a warm, paternal tone in his general orders, he won their loyalty just as he had with his troops in Cuba and Morocco. He knew how to flatter the guards with remarks like "the *benemérito* corps is like a well-rehearsed orchestra; its practitioners know its mission perfectly, and the one who leads hardly has to do anything except keep the baton in his hand."²⁵ Of course, his task was made easy by the fact that the guards were glad to have the general add his personal prestige to that of their institution.

Around the same time that Sanjurjo was made director general of the Civil Guard, Primo de Rivera's popularity was on the wane and the republicans began to launch a series of revolts aiming to overthrow both the dictatorship and the monarchy. As usual, guards led the way in crushing these uprisings, but they realized that putting down these increasingly popular movements was beginning to damage their prestige. Both republicans and monarchists understood that having the support of the Civil Guard was essential, and so they each courted it in their own way. The republicans distributed a manifesto to Civil Guard posts and promised to restore order.²⁶ As for the king, he

²³ Diaz, "El 10 de agosto de 1932," 68 and Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 107-08.

²⁴ C. Gallego Pérez, *La lucha contra el crimen y el desorden (Memorias de un teniente de la Guardia Civil)*. Madrid: Rollán, 1957), 169. The *RTGC* was effusive in its praise of Sanjurjo. See, for example, "Lealtad de la Guardia Civil," *RTGC* 22, no. 255 (May 1931): 242-43 and especially "El general Sanjurjo," *RTGC* 22, no. 258 (August 1931): 347.

²⁵ "El benemérito Cuerpo es como una orquesta bien ensayada; sus profesores saben perfectamente su misión, y el que dirige apenas tiene que hacer otra cosa sino mantener en la mano la batuta." Quoted in Rivas Gómez, "República en marcha," 155.

²⁶ "Guardia Civil: Cantos de sirena," *La Correspondencia Militar*, March 18, 1931 and Blaney, "Civil Guard," 75-76.

offered a pay raise, gave it a medal, and made its nickname “*Benemérita*” official, while the military press spread rumors that the republicans wanted to dissolve the corps.²⁷ The guards, caught between their commitment to serve the government in power and a public that was turning against that government, took a wait-and-see attitude. As Gerald Blaney explains, “civil guards looked to which group, the monarchist or the republicans, would prove the stronger in this contest for power and, most importantly, prevent a complete breakdown of authority and thus avert a lapse into revolution.”²⁸

By 1931, Primo de Rivera had resigned and it had become clear that the elections that had been called for April 12th would be a *de facto* plebiscite on whether or not the monarchy should go as well. As usual, the guards professed their “profound political neutrality” regarding these deployments.²⁹ When republican parties won the elections by a large majority in urban areas, the will of the people was clear, but the stance that the Civil Guard would take remained uncertain. Both republicans and monarchists knew that whichever way Sanjurjo went, the guards would probably follow, given their loyalty to him and their general commitment to obey the orders of their director general. As far as Sanjurjo was concerned, the April 12th elections had made his choice clear. That very night, he announced to a cabinet meeting that the monarchy could no longer count on the Civil Guard’s support.³⁰ Both abdication of the king and the declaration of the Republic occurred two days later. That there has been much debate about whether Sanjurjo formally declared his adhesion to the Republic before or after the abdication speaks to

²⁷ “Guardia Civil: Cantos de sirena,” and Blaney, “Civil Guard,” 78-79.

²⁸ Blaney, “Civil Guard,” 75.

²⁹ “Profundamente apolítico.” “Guardia Civil: Sinceridad electoral,” *La Correspondencia Miliar*, January 24 1931. Blaney, “Civil Guard,” 84.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 90.

how important it was to the Civil Guard that their leader not declare his loyalty to a government that was not in power, even for an hour.³¹

While the civil guards followed Sanjurjo's lead in not opposing the Republic, their enthusiasm about the new regime was mixed. Blaney notes how some guards reacted positively to the proclamation of the Republic, while others stayed in their posts or sullenly watched over celebrations.³² They had been put in an awkward position because in many towns the republicans and Socialists they had persecuted for decades were now in control of the local government and actually able to give them orders.³³ The *RTGC* addressed the coming of the Republic with a tone of acceptance rather than celebration, encouraging guards to maintain their commitments to discipline, political neutrality, and order, especially with a perceived danger of communism lurking, while also reassuring them that none other than Sanjurjo was their leader and that the country continued to respect their work.³⁴

3.3. Republicans: The New Leadership

The Republicans, so long adversaries of both the government and the Civil Guard, suddenly found themselves in power in April 1931. A major reform or dissolution of the corps was expected, but, the influence of first conservative republicans and then the institution's own evident utility to the Republic meant that no sweeping reform materialized. The new liberties and hopes the republicans gave to the working classes in particular had ushered in an unprecedented wave of strikes and protests, but the Republic

³¹ Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 131-33. See Blaney, "Civil Guard," 94-100 for more on this debate.

³² "Civil Guard," 100-03.

³³ Manuel Azaña, *Diarios completos: Monarquía, República, Guerra Civil* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2000), 425.

³⁴ "La República española," *RTGC* 22, no. 255 (May 1931): 241.

frequently deployed the Civil Guard, known for its propensity for violence, to police these mobilizations while taking no steps to reduce its violent tendencies.

The provisional government that took power in April 1931 was a broad coalition of widely differing political viewpoints, including opposing perspectives on the Civil Guard. Some conservatives late to jump on the republican bandwagon, such as Minister of the Interior Miguel Maura Gamazo, brought the Restoration's hardline approach to public order to the Republic and supported maintaining the Civil Guard unaltered. In this view they were joined by Alejandro Lerroux's more broad-based Radical Party. As Lerroux steered his party to the right, he replaced his anti-Civil Guard rhetoric with praise for the institution. Meanwhile, the center-left Acción Republicana (Republican Action), party of the emerging republican leader Manuel Azaña Díaz, called for the reform or even dissolution of the Civil Guard. Since left republicans had been repressed under the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, they came into the Second Republic skeptical of the Civil Guard's loyalty and usefulness. As for the left-republican Radical Socialist Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español or PSOE), the largest party in the coalition, they favored the immediate disbanding of the corps (see below).

This combination of forces meant that the provisional government looked to move quickly to modify heavily or even dissolve the Civil Guard. However, Maura refused to make any changes. He explains: "My companions, including the president [the conservative republican Niceto Alcalá Zamora], asked me to dissolve the corps, or, at the least, to modify it such that we would give the sensation that we had dissolved it. After long hours of study and reflection, I categorically denied not only to dissolve it but even

to alter a single comma of the famous regulations. They are, in truth, a model of foresight, of organization, and of disciplinary spirit.”³⁵

It would not be long before other members of the government came around to Maura’s position. After two incidents on the day of the Republic’s declaration, the Civil Guard and the new regime enjoyed a honeymoon period in which there were no cases of deadly violence involving the force.³⁶ The honeymoon ended abruptly on May 10th when an angry mob took to the streets in Madrid, demanding, above all, the immediate dissolution of the Civil Guard.³⁷ The crowd made for the offices of the conservative daily *ABC*, and Maura ordered a detachment to civil guards to protect the building (see Image 3.1). He felt this move was an opportunity “to demonstrate that Republic was not a synonym of anarchy.”³⁸ Because of concerns that the Civil Guard would “remain forever stigmatized as an ‘enemy of the Republic,’” Alcalá Zamora, at the urging of Azaña and other cabinet members, soon reversed Maura’s order and had the guards withdraw, but not before they had killed two in front of the *ABC* offices.³⁹ Afterwards, the *guardias de seguridad*, who were armed with swords instead of rifles, were left to deal with the crowds.⁴⁰

³⁵ “Mis compañeros, incluido el Presidente, me pedían que disolviera el Cuerpo, o, al menos, que lo modificase en tal forma que diésemos la sensación de que lo habíamos disuelto. Tras largas horas de estudio y reflexión me negué categóricamente no sólo a disolverlo, sino a alterar una sola coma de las famosas ordenanzas. Son ellas, en verdad, un modelo de previsión, de organización y de espíritu de disciplina.” Miguel Maura, *Así cayó Alfonso XIII* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1981), 206.

³⁶ See González Calleja, *Cifras cruentas*, 309 for more on these incidents.

³⁷ Maura, *Así cayó Alfonso XIII*, 244.

³⁸ “Demostrar que República no era sinónimo de anarquía.” *Ibid.*, 243-44.

³⁹ “Quedar para siempre estigmatizada como ‘enemiga de la República.’” Maura, *Así cayó Alfonso XIII*, 243, 245 and González Calleja, *Cifras cruentas*, 310.

⁴⁰ Maura, *Así cayó Alfonso XIII*, 246.



Image 3:1: Civil Guards Protecting the Offices of *ABC*
 Pulido, *Guardia Civil ante el Bienio*, 86.

The next day, the situation became more serious as the crowds began burning churches and convents around Madrid and other cities. In an indication of its deep skepticism of the Civil Guard, the cabinet decided to declare a state of war that would allow them to deploy the army rather than send the Civil Guard into the streets. In the end, the *guardias de seguridad* were able to protect some buildings and the army dispersed the crowds easily, all without causing a single injury or death.⁴¹ Meanwhile, the Civil Guard killed a total of nine more people in other cities, causing almost all the deaths during the church burning incidents.⁴²

Nevertheless, the level of unrest and the bad publicity of the May events made the government begin to see the value of the Civil Guard as the only force capable of quelling the disturbances. Therefore, the plans to alter or dissolve the corps were

⁴¹ Ibid., 252-54, 257.

⁴² González Calleja, *Cifras cruentas*, 310-11.

dropped, and the government did not hesitate to deploy it in the future.⁴³ Maura's successor as minister of the interior, the more center-left Santiago Casares Quiroga, echoed his sentiments regarding the Civil Guard almost verbatim, calling the *Cartilla* and *Reglamento* "admirable, unshakeable things. It is not possible to take out even a comma. It is a magnificent work that of the Duke of Ahumada. I myself know some articles and concepts from memory."⁴⁴ In the end, there was no major shift in the government's approach to the Civil Guard and public order in general during the Second Republic because republicans believed, as much as any previous rulers, that they could not risk any breakdown in order without risking the survival of their entire regime.⁴⁵

In fact, the provisional government actually took measures to strengthen its powers to maintain public order and to found a new police force that would assist in this task. On October 21st, it promulgated the Ley de Defensa de la República (Law of the Defense of the Republic), which restricted the freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly granted by the Constitution by broadly prohibiting "acts of aggression against the Republic" and by granting the minister of the interior sweeping powers to ban strikes, protests, and associations.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, Maura spearheaded the development of a new force that would be charged with maintaining public order in cities, leaving the Civil

⁴³ Miguel López Corral considers this development part of a pattern he labels the "leftist government mutation syndrome." He posits that whenever leftists come to power they see that they need the need the services of Civil Guard to maintain order, and they drop their criticisms of the institution. "Síndrome mutante de los gobiernos de izquierdas." "Los gobiernos izquierdas y la Guardia Civil," *Guardia Civil*, no. 521 (September 1987): 41.

⁴⁴ "Cosas admirables, inconmovibles. No es posible quitar ni una coma. Es una obra grandiosa la del Duque de Ahumada. Yo me sé algunos artículos y conceptos de memoria." Ladera, "Cuarenta y cinco minutos de charla, sobre la Guardia Civil, con el Excmo. Sr. D. Santiago Casares Quiroga, Ministro de la Gobernación," *RTGC* 24, no. 280 (August 1933): 283.

⁴⁵ González Calleja makes this argument in *Nombre de la autoridad*.

⁴⁶ "Actos de agresión a la República." Ley declarando actos de agresión a la República los que se mencionan, *Gaceta de Madrid*, October 22, 1931. González Calleja, *Nombre de la autoridad*, 193.

Guard to concentrate on rural policing.⁴⁷ He hoped that by arming the force with pistols and batons rather than rifles, it would be less violent than the Civil Guard.⁴⁸ The new unit, known as the Sección de Asalto (referred to in this dissertation as the Assault Guard) would be an elite quick-response force within the Ministry of the Interior's Cuerpo de Seguridad. And so, unlike the Civil Guard, the Assault Guard would avoid the ambiguities of dual ministerial dependency, but it was not entirely civilian either—officers were recruited directly from the army.⁴⁹ As for the civil guards, they had long complained that they were not intended for public order duties in cities, yet they feared, with good reason, that this new corps was intended to supplant their institution gradually as the Republic's primary force of public order.⁵⁰

Instead of taking the risk of antagonizing the Civil Guard through reforms or a fazing-out, the various Republican governments decided in the end that they needed both the civil and assault guards to help maintain order. Therefore, they took measures to ensure the loyalty of the Civil Guard to the new regime. They required that civil guards swear allegiance to the Republic, which almost all of them did. The governments hoped to use the guards' commitment to honor as a way to guarantee their loyalty. Politicians knew that boosting the Civil Guard's honor would solidify its support as well, and so they frequently sung its praises. There were material incentives as well; over the course of the

⁴⁷ Maura, *Así se cayó Alfonso XIII*, 265.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 274.

⁴⁹ Whereas the Civil Guard was a separate career track from the army, Assault Guard officers were detailed directly from the army and remained on its promotion lists. There are few studies on the Assault Guard in particular because of a lack of sources and the short duration of the force. For more, see the articles mentioned in footnote 1 on the Cuerpo de Seguridad more generally.

⁵⁰ Blaney, "Civil Guard," 157.

Republic the Civil Guard benefited from several pay increases and expansions in size.⁵¹ The problem was that a new contradiction was created. The working classes welcomed the Republican regime as their savior from oppression, but the fact that that regime began to support the Civil Guard, which for workers was the clearest symbol of their oppression, contributed to the growth in the number of workers who were open to making their political claims outside of the Republican system.

3.4. Working Class Organizations: Old and New Enemies

The Spanish Left was divided during the Second Republic between various socialist, anarchist, and communist parties and unions. As the Civil Guard struggled to adapt its policing to the new democratic context of the Republic, so the new era only deepened internal divisions within working-class groups because they were unable to arrive at a consensus about how much to operate within the Republican system in pursuit of social reform.⁵² This section, and the case studies in the subsequent chapters, will focus on how these divisions resulted in uncoordinated approaches to the Civil Guard that served to heighten tensions with the force without effecting any substantive changes in its organization or culture that might have helped reduce its violence. After a brief consideration of the anarchists here, both this section and subsequent chapters will focus on the approach of the Socialists to the Civil Guard, since their willingness to take advantage of both the Republic's new legal and extralegal opportunities for political

⁵¹ See Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, vol. 5, *Los agitados años treinta*, 49-54 for details on pay.

⁵² Pamela Radcliff presents this lack of consensus over how to operate under a democratic system as the defining characteristic of the European Left more generally in the interwar period. "The Political 'Left' in the Interwar Period, 1924-1939," chap. 14 in *The Oxford Handbook of European History, 1914-1945*, ed. Nicholas Doumanis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

contestation best exemplifies the new complexities in the relationships between the Civil Guard and the working classes brought about by the Republic.⁵³ More radical Socialist leaders deployed incendiary rhetoric and even violence against the institution as a way to harness the mobilizing potential of opposition to a force so hated by the working classes, provoking harsh responses by the Civil Guard. Yet some Socialist leaders were more reticent about alienating a force so fundamental to the authority of the Republican state, which meant that in the end the Socialists only increased the tensions between the working classes and the Civil Guard without either significantly reforming or eliminating the force.

Although repressed during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, the anarcho-syndicalist CNT experienced a rapid expansion after its legalization in April 1930 to reach a peak membership of some 800,000 by September 1931.⁵⁴ Given the Civil Guard's extensive and brutal efforts to suppress anarchists during the Restoration, by the time of the Second Republic the animosity between the two groups was deep-seated. Anarchists took advantage of the freedoms of association, the press, and assembly offered by the Republic, but ultimately their ideology precluded full support of the Republican system and certain forms of legal political expression such as voting and filing complaints with state institutions. The Republic's obsession with public order, inherited from the Restoration, was particularly abhorrent to them, and the Civil Guard was the ultimate symbol of the authority of the state that they so opposed. Therefore, the CNT

⁵³ As for the Communists, they will receive only brief mention in Chapter Six since they were not a major political player in Spain until 1936.

⁵⁴ Payne, *Spain's First Democracy*, 28 and Manuel Redero San Román, *Estudios de Historia de la UGT* (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1992), 48.

press denounced the Civil Guard vigorously as a cruel and bloodthirsty. For example, a 1932 article in the newspaper *CNT* accused guards of conducting forced abortions, hanging peasants, and torturing prisoners.⁵⁵

Anarchists believed in direct action, making claims in the street rather than through the government, but direct action did not necessarily mean violence and revolution. Sometimes, they worked for more limited goals such as improved working conditions and civil liberties.⁵⁶ However, members of the *Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (Iberian Anarchist Federation or FAI), a pressure group of radicals within the CNT who saw insurrections as anarchists' only options, gained the upper hand within the larger anarcho-syndicalist movement as frequent suppressions by the government and hostility from the Civil Guard increasingly frustrated the broader membership.⁵⁷ The result was an escalation of the clashes with guards in the streets and a vicious cycle of increasing mutual animosity.⁵⁸ In 1932 and 1933, the anarchists reached the point of launching three general insurrections. While all of these were suppressed with relative ease, the pattern anarchists exhibited of making Civil Guard posts their first objectives solidified this practice as a standard component of a workers' insurrectionary repertoire, one that the Socialists would later draw on as well (see Chapter Six).

Concentrating here on the early years of the Republic, while anarchism had long been the most powerful working-class movement in Spain, the regime gave the socialist PSOE the chance to be the party that advocated for workers within the Republican

⁵⁵ "La novedad de los guardias de asalto," *CNT*, December 23, 1932.

⁵⁶ Radcliff, *Mobilization to Civil War*, 284.

⁵⁷ This is one of Casanova's central arguments in *Calle del frente*.

⁵⁸ Blaney, "Civil Guard," 59 and Brenan, *Spanish Labyrinth*, 156.

system, and its membership also grew rapidly in 1931. The Socialists, as they saw it, sought to transform Spanish society by taking political power away from the *caciques* and placing it directly in the hands of the people. To them, the Civil Guard was key to the survival of the old order, and so they opposed it with letters of complaint, newspaper articles, speeches, and protests. While the party leadership wished to proceed with caution to avoid open conflict with the institution, the possibility of using criticism of the hated Civil Guard as a way to mobilize rank-and-file members was hard to resist. While the Civil Guard was certainly not new to criticism, which it interpreted as an offense to its honor, the institution was not accustomed to the opposition being so open and widespread. Lacking a public press or representation in the Cortes of their own, guards had to rely on others to respond to adversaries for them. The exception was when guards were policing protests, in which case violence could become a tool for asserting their own position.

Opposing the Civil Guard was part of a broader strategy by Socialists in 1931 to build their power, especially at the local level. The elections of that year had swept the PSOE into many towns' city halls, and the Socialists' union, the Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers' Union or UGT), was expanding rapidly.⁵⁹ However, the real power in many towns was still in the hands of the *caciques*. Therefore, the Socialists launched an offensive against them, constantly denouncing the old *caciquil* system in the press and the Cortes. Since they viewed the Civil Guard as the muscle that gave the

⁵⁹ The UGT counted about 300,000 members in April 1931 and close to 700,000 in December of that year before surpassing the CNT and peaking at just over one million members in June 1932. Redero San Román, *Estudios de Historia de la UGT*, 48 and *Boletín de la Unión General de Trabajadores de España* 3, no. 36 (December 1931): 367.

landowners and the *caciques* their power, the Socialists also called for the dissolution of the corps, regularly including this objective in their party programs.⁶⁰ The unpopularity of both the *caciques* and the Civil Guard made them easy targets around which the rank-and-file seeking radical change and some party leaders could unite in opposition.

In contrast to the official government support, the long-standing animosity between the Civil Guard and most working-class people continued into the Second Republic, but the mass politicization that accompanied the fall of the monarchy gave these people the desire to express their grievances against the institution, and the Republic's freedoms of the press and assembly gave them the ability to do so. One way Socialist organizations allowed workers to make their complaints known was by sending telegrams to the minister of the interior, and his ministry appears to have received such messages almost daily. The complaints were most commonly about the Civil Guard using unnecessary force or detaining excessive numbers of people, and an incident of Civil Guard violence could provoke a whole slew of telegrams. While the veracity of most of the complaints cannot be determined, their sheer number is further proof that the relationship between civil guards and townspeople was often fraught. Yet frequently the complaints were only of a local nature, requesting the transfer of a particular station commandant or officer.⁶¹ Once again, one sees the importance of the local commander in shaping the Civil Guard's relationship with a particular *pueblo*. That most local

⁶⁰ Adrian Shubert, *The Road to Revolution Spain: The Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860-1934* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 12 and Rivas *Frente Popular*, 36. Such sentiments are voiced in Javier Bueno, "La tragedia de Yeste: Hay algo más que culpas individualizados," *Claridad*, June 8, 1936 and La Directiva a Ministro de la Gobernación, 21 October 1931, AHN FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz.

⁶¹ See, for example, Gobernador a Ministro, 10 July 1931, AHN FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, Exp. 15, Gerona, no. 613 and the Cimas case discussed below.

organizations concentrated their efforts on the transfer of particular guards rather than the abolition of the institution as a whole was typical of the local nature of Spanish politics in general.⁶² Yet unlike landowners' requests for extra protection, which were often granted (see below), calls for the transfer of a civil guard or other such requests were almost never heeded, a fact that must have been frustrating for the working classes and fed the Socialist argument that the real power under the Second Republic still lay with the *caciques*.

The non-violent means through which the Socialists opposed the Civil Guard, including speeches and newspaper articles as well as telegrams, fit within Juan Linz's classification of the Socialists as semi-loyal to the Republic.⁶³ That is to say, they were willing to play by the Republic's rules of political participation, but they were also willing to violate those rules if they felt doing so was the only way to advance their interests. Here, while the Republic generally allowed freedom of speech and of the press, "injuring" the armed forces, including the Civil Guard, not only physically but also verbally or in writing, was not permitted, and so by criticizing the Civil Guard the Socialists were playing on the boundaries of legality.

Military prosecutors, acting on behalf of the Civil Guard, frequently pressed charges against authors who they felt were damaging the corps' honor. The injuries did not have to be direct—anything that suggested the corps was not living up to a part of its honor code could warrant proceedings being filed, such as claiming that guards were the servants of a particular segment of the population rather than the benefactors of all

⁶² Radcliff, *Mobilization to Civil War*, 2.

⁶³ See Linz, "Great Hopes to Civil War."

people. Calls for the dissolution of the Civil Guard were also considered injurious because they implied that the corps was not respected by everyone. But Socialists were prepared to meet these legal challenges. They wrote critical pieces anonymously, destroying the original manuscripts, and, if an editor was asked the identity of the author by an investigative judge, he simply claimed that the piece had been sent in the mail or that he could not remember. If the judge did discover the author's name, he or she, no doubt not coincidentally, often turned out to be a deputy of the Cortes. Deputies enjoyed parliamentary immunity, which could be revoked by the Cortes, but it almost never was for these types of cases. In other words, deputies could essentially attack the Civil Guard in writing with impunity, but the prosecutors still went through the motions of filing charges as symbolic gestures.⁶⁴ Even if the guards could not punish those who insulted them, they would not stand by and do nothing when they felt their honor had been offended.⁶⁵

At the national level, Socialist opinion regarding the Civil Guard was not completely united. Some believed that rather than dissolving the corps entirely, the government should change its culture to make it a tool of the Republic rather than of the *cacique*. As Julián Besteiro, leader of the conservative wing of the party, famously said to Azaña, "it is an admirable machine. We should not eliminate it, but rather make it

⁶⁴ For those who lacked parliamentary immunity, the consequences of insulting the Civil Guard could be more serious. In 1932, a prosecutor asked for two years banishment and a thousand peseta fine for someone who said during a rally that "the *Benemérita* was a pack of murders." In this case, the defendant was acquitted though. "La Benemérita era una turba – de asesinos." Archivo Histórico Provincial de La Rioja (AHPLR), *Sentencias del Tribunal de Derecho y Tribunal de Jurado: Año 1932*, Sentencia no. 164.

⁶⁵ This paragraph is based on the court records found in AHN FC-Tribunal Supremo Recursos.

work in our favor.”⁶⁶ The party’s two other most prominent leaders, Indalecio Prieto and Francisco Largo Caballero, also seem to have thought that eliminating the Civil Guard might not have been wise.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the Socialist Party as a whole, bowing to the influence of prominent members more willing to pander to the rank-and-file, moved forward with its efforts against the Civil Guard. Most horrifying to guards themselves was a committee that Socialists in the Cortes formed on November 26, 1931 to investigate reports of abuses by the institution and consider how it might be reformed.⁶⁸ Guards were offended by the suggestion that the *Benemérita* might be in need of reform, and they feared that the committee was actually intending to dissolve rather than simply alter their organization. Adding insult to injury was the fact that the leader of the committee was Margarita Nelken Mansberger, a left-wing Socialist deputy from Badajoz Province who guards would come to see as the antithesis of everything they stood for.

An examination of Nelken’s life provides an example of what the civil guards firmly believed that they were *not*. There was much for them to dislike in her very background. First of all, her parents were of foreign origins, her father being German and her mother French, although Margarita had been born in Spain.⁶⁹ Second of all, she was

⁶⁶ Of course, guards would argue that they were already under the orders of the Republican government. “Es una máquina admirable. No hay que suprimirla, sino hacer que funcione en favor nuestro.” In Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 425.

⁶⁷ Maura, *Así se cayó Alfonso XIII*, 245, 249.

⁶⁸ Gabriel Morón, *En el camino de la historia: El fracaso de una revolución* (Madrid: Gráfica socialista, 1935), 81.

⁶⁹ Acta de la Circunscripción de Badajoz. Reclamación sobre la capacidad legal de D^a Margarita Nelken Mansbergen, Diputado electo por dicha circunscripción, 4 October 1931, Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados (ACD), Serie General, Legajo 481, n. 27.

not Catholic; her parents were Jewish, and she was an atheist.⁷⁰ Thirdly, her wealthy background enabled her to receive an excellent education and enter the intellectual elite of Madrid and Paris.⁷¹ She was secular, urban, and cosmopolitan where guards were Catholic, rural, and insular. She had studied music and art in Paris and quickly emerged as a prolific and respected art critic. After returning to Madrid, she began to take an interest in social activism and feminism, and in 1918 she founded Spain's first nursery for the children of working mothers.⁷² However, the Church, eager to maintain its monopoly on social services, soon shut the operation down.⁷³

Such disappointments made Nelken vehemently anti-clerical. She accused the Church of mismanaging its social services and of using them to push its moral agenda.⁷⁴ She believed that the Church's insistence on keeping sex within the confines of marriage stifled women's freedom of expression. She herself had two children out of wedlock and lived with the father of the second even though he was already married.⁷⁵ In essence, she was suggesting women also be able to enjoy the kind of sexual freedom that was already tolerated for many men in Spanish society, such as Sanjurjo. After his wife had died in childbirth, the famous general lived a promiscuous lifestyle as a widower, also having a child out of wedlock as well as frequenting brothels and contracting syphilis.⁷⁶ Even his

⁷⁰ Paul Preston, "Margarita Nelken: A Full Measure of Pain," in *Doves of War: Four Women of Spain* (Harper Collins Publishers, 2002), 300-01.

⁷¹ Preston, "Margarita Nelken," 301, 306-07 and Robert Kern, "Margarita Nelken: Women and the Crisis of Spanish Politics," in *European Women on the Left: Socialism, Feminism, and the Problems Faced by Political Women, 1880 to the Present*, eds. Jane Slaughter and Robert Kern (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 148.

⁷² Autobiography quoted in Josebe Martínez Gutiérrez, *Margarita Nelken (1896-1968)* (Madrid: Ediciones del Orto), 15-16.

⁷³ Preston, "Margarita Nelken," 307.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 307-08.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 304-05, 312.

⁷⁶ Sacanell, *General Sanjurjo, héroe y víctima*, 103.

friend and aide-de-camp Emilio Esteban-Infantes had to admit that the general was always “sensitive to feminine beauty.”⁷⁷ As for the civil guards, for whom the sexual conduct of both themselves and their wives was held to a stricter standard by their regulations, Nelken’s ideas of sexual liberation must have seemed particularly shocking, although they appear to have had no difficulty turning a blind eye to Sanjurjo’s licentiousness.

Around this same time, the poverty Nelken witnessed in Madrid’s working-class neighborhoods made her see women’s liberation as part of the larger economic inequalities in Spanish society. She came to believe that freedom for women could only be attained by eliminating the repressive structures of society through a turn to socialism. As she explains in her bestselling book *La condición social de la mujer en España* (The Social Condition of the Woman in Spain), “the feminist question in Spain is. . . a purely economic question.”⁷⁸ She believed that only when women no longer had to depend on men economically could they truly be free.⁷⁹ Given her new attraction to socialism, she toured Spain during the Primo de Rivera years giving lectures to workers. Along with the Church, she came to identify the Civil Guard as part of society’s structure for oppressing the worker. She became the force’s most vocal critic, to the point where Sanjurjo wrote her a personal letter expressing his disappointment at her position but also his confidence that her attitude would change as she got to know the professionalism of his guards

⁷⁷ “Sensible a la belleza femenina.” *General Sanjurjo*, 119.

⁷⁸ “La cuestión feminista en ES es. . . una cuestión puramente económica.” *La condición social de la mujer en España* (Barcelona: Editorial Minerva), 29.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 231.

better.⁸⁰ One can imagine the alarm with which guards then reacted to the news that Nelken would lead the congressional investigation of their organization.

Like virtually every other aspect of her life, Nelken's election to the Cortes had been controversial. Nelken joined the PSOE in 1931 and began writing a column commenting on the sessions of the Cortes for *El Socialista* that made her well-known within the party.⁸¹ When a vacancy for representing Badajoz Province opened up in October 1931, the Socialists nominated Nelken so that the PSOE could have a female deputy, even though Nelken had never lived in Badajoz.⁸² Nevertheless, her criticism of the Civil Guard on the campaign trail appealed to the province's large numbers of landless laborers, or *braceros*, and she won the special election by a large majority.⁸³ However, Deputy Diego Hidalgo Durán of the Radical Party contested the results, claiming that she was not a Spanish citizen, given that her father was German. A congressional committee was formed, and it determined that although it was true that she had never formally declared her Spanish citizenship, an exception would be made.⁸⁴

Nelken's controversial election to the Cortes damaged her reputation. Azaña was outraged that a mere art critic (and a woman) could suddenly be propelled to such a prominent position.⁸⁵ Even many Socialists made demeaning comments about her.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ Blaney, "Civil Guard," 113 and Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 171.

⁸¹ Preston, "Margarita Nelken," 318.

⁸² Juan-Simeón Vidarte, *Las Cortes Constituyentes de 1931-1933: Testimonio del Primer Secretario del Congreso de Diputados* (Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1976), 83.

⁸³ Preston, "Margarita Nelken," 319 and Acta de la Circunscripción de Badajoz. Reclamación sobre la capacidad legal de D^a Margarita Nelken Mansbergen, Diputado electo por dicha circunscripción, 4 October 1931, ACD, Serie General, Legajo 481, n. 27.

⁸⁴ Acta de la Circunscripción de Badajoz. Reclamación sobre la capacidad legal de D^a Margarita Nelken Mansbergen, Diputado electo por dicha circunscripción, 4 October 1931, ACD, Serie General, Legajo 481, n. 27.

⁸⁵ Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 426.

⁸⁶ Preston, "Margarita Nelken," 300.

They felt challenged by her outspoken nature and refusal to downplay her femininity in Spain's masculine world of politics.⁸⁷ Despite all the antipathy from political elites, she was an instant success with Badajoz's *braceros*, joining them in seeking to push the PSOE in a more radical direction, such as by insisting on the dissolution of the Civil Guard.⁸⁸ She was moved by the extreme poverty she witnessed in the province and took to her new role as representative of its citizenry with the same gusto that she had previously for women's liberation.⁸⁹ If Sanjurjo was the paternal protector of the civil guards, Nelken had become the maternal protector of the *braceros*.

Nelken had appointed herself enemy-in-chief of the guards, and they could not have found an opponent who would have been easier for them to despise. She had an international background where they celebrated themselves as uniquely Spanish. She rejected Catholicism as the root cause of Spain's ills where they saw it as an essential guide for righteousness. She advocated sexual freedom for women when they did not even have this freedom as men. And finally, she championed revolutionary socialism where they sought to defend order and the status quo. Once Nelken was a deputy for Badajoz, the province became a battleground of contrasting visions for Spain as the guards sought to defend their honor against what they saw as a serious affront to it. The next chapter will examine how this tension resulted in the death of four guards in the province and a national shift in their institution's attitudes towards the Republic.

⁸⁷ Shirley Mangini, "Visible Women of the Second Spanish Republic," chap. 2 in *Memories of Resistance: Women's Voices from the Spanish Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 31.

⁸⁸ Preston, "Margarita Nelken," 332.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 321-22.

While outspoken leaders like Nelken pushed the boundaries of freedom of speech under the Republic, workers of all affiliations were taking advantage of their new freedom of assembly in unprecedented numbers, refining a repertoire of protest that had been developing since at least the Restoration. Just as freedom of speech was limited by the prohibition on insulting certain institutions like the Civil Guard, protests were required to receive government authorization, and they were routinely supervised by the Civil Guard. It was while the institution was either monitoring or dissolving a demonstration that most of the political violence involving the corps occurred, excluding periods of rebellion. By the Second Republic, the strike had become the dominant method for political claims making, but most strikes had limited and local demands such as better pay, improved working conditions, increased workers' rights, or adherence to the Agrarian Reform Law.⁹⁰ Guards were almost always third parties in these occasions—their goal being to monitor demonstrations to assure order was maintained, and one must remember that most did stay peaceful and that most guards never used their weapons in the line of duty, at least before the Civil War.⁹¹ However, they did present easy targets upon which the crowd could vent its anger towards the government or the Right, or both. Since taking to the streets to protest was much more a part of the Left's repertoire of claims making than the Right's, when clashes with protesters did occur, they only added to the perception that the Civil Guard was a violent suppressor of the Left and protector of the Right. Particularly bad for the guards' reputations was when they were

⁹⁰ The number of strikes in Spain almost doubled in 1931 to 734 from 402 the previous year (although the number of workers on strike actually declined slightly). Payne, *Spain's First Democracy*, 141.

⁹¹ "Sucesos," *RTGC* 23, no. 264 (February 1932): 64 and Gallego Pérez, *Lucha contra el crimen*, 188.

ordered to shield scab workers from strikers, a duty that guards believed was simply ensuring everyone the right to work.⁹²

The typical repertoire of strikers during the Second Republic was to march around town and in front of the town hall shouting slogans, listening to speeches, and yelling taunts at the civil guards. If more aggression was desired, rocks and even pistol shots could be directed at them as well. Protesters were not usually trying to provoke a violent response from guards, but again, they were the symbol of the state presence upon which anger could be expressed. One cause of the lethality of these confrontations was simply the large number of firearms involved. While guards always carried their powerful Mausers, large numbers of pistols were also in circulation among civilians, and it was common practice to bring a firearm to a protest, just in case. In other words, the fact that the protesters were sometimes armed, and that guards always were, automatically made lethal violence a possibility during a demonstration. As noted in Chapter One, contact between guards and the townspeople they patrolled was frequent, despite efforts to separate the two groups. But during a confrontational situation, the guards appeared to protesters as a faceless line of dangerous oppressors (and townspeople would not have known guards who had been concentrated from other towns), while the protesters appeared to the guards as a hysterical, angry mob that had to be brought under control.⁹³ So even though guards almost always responded to situations created by some other

⁹² See, for example, Gobernador a Ministro Gobernación, 10 October 1931, AHN FC-M^o del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 19, Valladolid, no. 173.

⁹³ Such fears were fed by the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century obsession with mass psychology. See Carlos Gil Andrés, *La República en la plaza: los sucesos de Arnedo de 1932* (Logroño: Gobierno de la Rioja/Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2002), 52-60 for a complete discussion of the influence of this field on the Civil Guard.

party, their very presence, meant to maintain order, could cause order to break down due to the widely held animosity against them.

The repertoire of strikers during the Second Republic was not necessarily different from that of the late Restoration period; the increased violence lay in the fact that so many more strikes occurred. However, there were also a few cases in which the perceived brutality and anti-republicanism of the Civil Guard was itself the cause of protests that turned violent. For example, after the guards of Fuensalida (Toledo) had been accused of mistreating some cattle thieves they had arrested, a mob attempted to assault the town hall when the mayor tried to calm them down. According to the *RTGC*, the guards fired warning shots, but when the crowd responded with rocks and small arms fire, they turned their rifles on the assailants, killing two (including a child) and wounding five.⁹⁴ Occasionally, guards were even the ones to cause a protest to begin with. The minister of the interior received one complaint from Motril (Granada) claiming that the town's Civil Guard captain harassed port workers every night with insults and searches, even beating a Socialist worker without provocation. The author concludes that all this must have been part of a premeditated plan on the part of the captain to create a disturbance in the public order that would allow him to gain the authority necessary for an open crackdown on the Socialists.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ José María Ruiz Alonso, *La Guerra Civil en la Provincia de Toledo: Utopía, conflicto y poder en el Sur del Tajo (1936-39)* (Ciudad Real: Almad, ediciones de Castilla-La Mancha, 2004), 39 and "Servicios," *RTGC* 23, no. 273 (November 1932): 464.

⁹⁵ Miguel Sanchez a Ministro de la Gobernación, 24 September 1931, AHN FC-Mº del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 15, Granada, no. 1063. See Blaney, "Civil Guard," 140 for more examples.

3.5. Supporters of the Civil Guard

The elites of town society continued to be the main supporters of the Civil Guard during the Second Republic. But the new regime challenged these elites' positions of power. While during the Restoration the *cacique* had been the epitome of the town elite, his power was undermined by freer elections. This development might not have been so bad for the Civil Guard, given its uneasy relationship with the *caciques*, except that it brought republicans and Socialists who had been critical of the institution to power in most towns. Then there were the landowners. They needed the Civil Guard more than ever before to protect their persons and property against the protests and strikes that swept the country in 1931. Their methods for courting the favor of the Civil Guard did not change, but they took on greater significance when the praise of the propertied stood in such contrast to the insults of the workers. In addition, these landed elites took their support for the Civil Guard to the national level. Adapting to the new mass politics of the democratic system, right-wing politicians and newspapers defended the institution against attempts to reform or eliminate it.

There were three main ways in which local elites offered support to the Civil Guard during the Second Republic: financial assistance, homages, and telegrams of praise. As discussed in Chapter One, the Civil Guard had always relied on local elites for some financial support, but this aid took on new importance during the Second Republic. As had been the case under previous regimes, since the Republican government lacked enough funds to provide every town with a Civil Guard post and to support the numerous concentrations of guards in one province or another, local governments and private

individuals were allowed to sponsor guards' housing.⁹⁶ If, as often occurred during the Second Republic, Socialists took control of a local government and withdrew official support, then the Civil Guard was forced to look to wealthy individuals to make up the difference. For example, when the towns of Llerena and Monasterio (both in Badajoz Province) decided that they were not going to provide guards a *casas-cuartel* any longer, local property owners offered free accommodations themselves, fearing that without the Civil Guard their persons and property would be unsafe and their town would descend into anarchy.⁹⁷

Second, organizing a homage to the *Benemérita* was another tried-and-true way for local elites to strengthen their alliance with their town's guards that took on new significance because it could be done under a Republican guise. These ceremonies were supposed to demonstrate the much sought-after respect that a whole *pueblo* had for the Civil Guard, reinforcing the relationship between the two. With speeches by prominent figures in the town and the Church overseeing the ceremonies, the reality was that these events allowed townspeople to show guards who was on their side. Although the ceremonies were fairly simple affairs, they seem to have been key events for guards because they were always reported in the *RTGC* and they were often attended by the command chief or another high-ranking officer. During most of the town celebrations,

⁹⁶ Manuel García Mercadillo, *Guía del Instructor*, 2nd ed. (Zamora: Calamita, 1935), 58-59. See Blaney, "Civil Guard," 126-27 for a list of examples of such cases.

⁹⁷ La comisión a Ministro Gobernación, 10 September 1931, AHN FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz; Propietarios y vecinos al Ministro de la Gobernación, 16 November 1931, AHN FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz; Ministro de la Gobernación a Director Guardia Civil, 10 December 1931, AHN FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 17, Madrid, no. 246; and Ministro de la Gobernación a Director Guardia Civil, 19 December 1931, AHN FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 17, Madrid, no. 501.

the civil guards had to be on duty, but this one was especially for them.⁹⁸ Often, the homages involved the donation of a new Republican flag to a Civil Guard post, which allowed the organizers to conduct these events under a Republican pretext, even though the emphasis was on the Civil Guard rather than the Republic. A maid of honor (*madrina*) always presided and handed-over the flag to the station commandant, her femininity representing the pure soul of the *pueblo* that the masculine guard would protect. When she was able to praise the guards with the same terms of abnegation, duty, bravery, and order that they used to describe themselves, she affirmed that their mission to bring military values into civilian society was succeeding.⁹⁹ All this symbolism was presented as a show of support for the Civil Guard from the entire *pueblo*, but it was hard to miss the presence of the wealthy and the absence of workers in the audience.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ There was even a banquet and a dance after the flag giving ceremony in Villanueva de San Juan (Seville). "Miscelánea," *RTGC* 26, no. 302 (April 1935): 161.

⁹⁹ "Homenaje a la Guardia Civil en Salamanca," *RTGC* 26, no. 306 (August 1935): 322 contains a transcription of such a speech.

¹⁰⁰ See José Manuel Macarro Vera, *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República* (Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Sevilla, 1985), 193-94 for a description of how the wealthy in Seville organized a homage to the Civil Guard to show their support while worker organizations refused to participate.



Image 3.2: A Civil Guard Colonel Giving a Speech during a Homage, Salamanca 1935
 When the reporters in the background publish his words, they will serve as free propaganda for the Civil Guard.
RTGC 26, no. 306 (August 1935).



Image 3.3: The Maid of Honor Offers the Flag to the Colonel, Salamanca 1935
 “Homenaje a la Guardia Civil en Salamanca,” *RTGC* 26, no. 306 (August 1935): 322.

Third, following in the tradition of the *caciques*, local associations of landowners and businessmen could attempt to sway the government in the Civil Guard’s favor through telegrams of support addressed to the minister of the interior. These gestures served to counteract telegrams of protest sent by the Socialists and to demonstrate to guards who was on their side. Frequently, salutatory telegrams were presented as emanating not just from the propertied, but rather from people of all classes. For example, from July to October 1931, the minister of the interior received various

telegrams from Guadix (Granada) either praising one Capitan Alfonso Cimas or denouncing him for persecuting workers. Those denouncing him, unafraid to antagonize the Civil Guard since they were already attacking it, all mentioned that the telegrams were from explicitly worker organizations such as the Socialist Party. In contrast, those defending him claimed to represent “all social classes,” which seems unlikely given the telegrams from the workers’ organizations. The contrast suggests that employers were more careful not to violate the Civil Guard’s ethic of political neutrality by proclaiming that they represented only one segment of the town and revealing that the Civil Guard’s support was indeed only partial.¹⁰¹

Whereas the Civil Guard needed the Right to maintain its sense of honor, property owners felt they needed the Civil Guard to maintain their very existence. The minister of the interior received many telegrams from employer and Catholic groups, written with hints of desperation, pleading for the number of guards in one town or another not to be reduced.¹⁰² When the municipal government of Berlanga (Badajoz) proposed removing its guards, “numerous residents” offered “anything necessary in order to avoid the absence of the Civil Guard, which would create the gravest risk to persons and things.”¹⁰³ A withdrawal of “the only police force that merits confidence” alarmed the right-wing

¹⁰¹ See the 11 telegrams on the Cimas case in AHN, FC-Mº del Interior, SerieA, legajo 39, Exp. 15, Granada.

¹⁰² For example, when the municipal government of Callosa Segura (Alicante) proposed eliminating its Civil Guard post in 1931, the authors of the six telegrams the minister of the interior received protesting the move constituted a who’s who of the town’s right-wing organizations: the Employers’ Federation, the Radical Youth, the Catholic Youth, the Catholic Circle, the club Industrial Development, and the Casino Society. AHN, FC-Mº del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Alicante.

¹⁰³ “Numerosos vecinos.” “Toda clase elementos necesarios para evitar se ausente Guardia Civil que supondria gravisima amenaza para personas y cosas.” Numerosos vecinos de Berlanga (Badajoz) a Ministro de la Gobernación, 14 October 1931, AHN, FC-Mº del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz.

agrarian unions of Melilla, who feared the absence of the “only guarantee that sustains the morale of rural workers.”¹⁰⁴ The fears of the elites were not totally unfounded. In addition to their frequent deployments to protect property, there were also cases where guards shielded *caciques* in their *casas-cuarteles* against angry mobs.¹⁰⁵

A final source of support was the national right-wing press. The Civil Guard’s sense of honor had always demanded public support, and, with the coming of the Republic, this support became a question of survival in the face of the calls by some Socialists and republicans for the institution’s reform or dissolution. Guards had traditionally trusted in the services they performed to speak for themselves, but, with the existence of their institution called into question on the national stage, the guards needed positive media coverage. The institution’s supporters were happy to take on this role as another way to strengthen their relationship with the *Benemérita*, in this case at the national level. The powerful right-wing press proved the vehicle through which to transmit this support. Papers knew how to flatter the guards by eulogizing the very aspects of their military culture in which guards themselves took the most pride. For example, the center-right *El Imparcial* printed exactly what they wanted to hear when it said that the *pueblo* saw their institution as “the symbol of integrity, of valor, of discipline, of abnegation, and of patriotism.”¹⁰⁶ Guards delighted when newspaper

¹⁰⁴ “Única fuerza policia que meréceles confianza. “Única garantía sostiene moral trabajadores campo.” Presidentes Sindicatos Agrícolas al Sr Mtro Gobernación, 29 September 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 17, Málaga, no. 1301.

¹⁰⁵ Presidente Gallardo a Ministro de la Gobernación, 27 August 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 7, exp. 12, Sevilla 1931 and Statement of Deputy Marcos Escudero, *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de Diputados*, (DSCD), September 11, 1931.

¹⁰⁶ “El símbolo de la honradez, del valor, de la disciplina, de la abnegación y del patriotismo.” Quoted in “Leyendo la prensa,” *RTGC* 22, no. 261 (November 1931): 550.

articles praised their institution, and the *RTGC* frequently reprinted these pieces. Invariably, the sources were papers of the Catholic Right such as *ABC* and *El Debate*. The articles often appeared after an incident of violence involving the institution so that the Right stood as its defender against potential criticism. The Cortes was also a powerful venue for supporting the Civil Guard because not only were detailed summaries of its sessions reprinted in all the major newspapers, providing free publicity, but also because agrarian and Catholic deputies could act as the Civil Guard's advocates when legislation concerning the institution was under consideration.

3.6. The Civil Guard Responds: An Old Repertoire in a New Context

While civil guards had to rely on civilian supporters and military prosecutors to reply to the intensified criticism they faced at the national level under the Republic, they could respond directly to the surge in protests and strikes that accompanied the new regime. It is in understanding how they did so that the idea of repertoires of collective action becomes useful. Police institutions have not previously been considered in the study of repertoires because it was thought that they simply follow orders and do not have an organically developed set of options to choose from when confronting contentious claims makers. However, in this section I will demonstrate, using the example of the Civil Guard, that police could also be claims makers themselves and could have a repertoire of their own in the absence of specific orders or any training in crowd control techniques (even the *RTGC* remarked that “in cases of public disorders, doubts and uncertainties almost always arise over the modes, forms, or procedures to

follow”).¹⁰⁷ The basic components of the repertoire, being based in the regulations, had remained the same for decades, but the higher number of protests that guards had to confront and greater perceived challenges to their honor meant that they resorted to the violent components of their repertoire more frequently during the Second Republic.

Usually lacking any specific instructions besides to go monitor or dissolve a protest, civil guards had only the *Cartilla* and *Reglamento para el servicio* to guide them. The Republic, eager to demonstrate its ability to maintain order, kept articles of the *Reglamento* intact that encouraged guards to move quickly to suppress any sign of disorder, aggression, or insult on the part of a crowd with violence. The *Reglamento* also took a hard line on injuring the Civil Guard either verbally or physically, backed by the fact that such offenses fell under military jurisdiction and were defined broadly by the famous Article 7 of the Code of Military Justice as “those [cases] that attack and show disregard for the military authorities and those that injure and libel. . . they tend to diminish the prestige or loosen the ties of discipline or subordination of the armed forces.”¹⁰⁸

While guards certainly did not want to be physically injured, just as important to them was avoiding the injury their honor would receive if they were verbally insulted or had their authority challenged by a physical assault.¹⁰⁹ The commonly heard cry of

¹⁰⁷ “En casos de desórdenes públicos, casi siempre surgen dudas y vacilaciones sobre los modos, formas o procedimientos a seguir.” Manuel Martín Rubio, “La conservación del orden público,” *RTGC* 24, no. 280 (June 1933): 214.

¹⁰⁸ “Los de jurisdicción y desacato a las autoridades militares y los de injuria y calumnia. . . tiendan a menoscabar su prestigio o a relajar los vínculos de disciplina o subordinación en los organismos armados.” Ley dando nueva redacción al apartado que señala del artículo 7.º del Código de Justicia Militar, 27 August 1932, in *BOGC* 7, no. 26 (10 September 1932): 758.

¹⁰⁹ A perfect example of how the guards’ focus on honor made them particularly sensitive to insults can be found in a letter the guards of Barcelona presented to the Government of Catalonia that complained of their institution being insulted during the May Day celebrations in 1931. They protested that “all its [the Civil

“Death to the Civil Guard!” touched upon guards’ fears of lacking the respect of the public, physical harm, and having their institution dissolved all at once.¹¹⁰ Another favorite, “at them who are few!,” played on their sense of isolation by challenging their trust in discipline and superior firepower to keep them safe when surrounded by a hostile crowd. The cry also reminded them that those who did not support their institution greatly outnumbered those who did.¹¹¹ As for insults to guards’ mothers, these were obvious provocations to men for whom honor was so important.¹¹² All told, the guards’ focus on honor made them particularly sensitive to insults and willing to act with violence to suppress them. Thus, when guards used violence against those who offended them, they too were making a claim: the honor of the *Benemérita* must not be infringed.

When a protest was illegal or seemed to be becoming disorderly (such as when insults were thrown at the Civil Guard), the reader will recall that Article 7 of the *Cartilla* dictates that a guard’s ““first weapons should be persuasion and moral strength, resorting to those [weapons] that he carries with him only when he sees himself offended by others or [when] his words have not been enough. In this case, he will always leave in good

Guard’s] virile force and iron discipline has been necessary in order to endure stoically and without blinking the whole wave of filth that the Communist slime has projected on the Institute with its most obscene insults. But what is crucial is that this does not happen again and will never happen again. It is not possible to permit a corps whose principal motto is honor and whose prestige and glory has traveled unscathed around the whole world, being admired by our own and foreigners, to be left to be trampled upon by professionals of disorder and crime.” “Ha sido precisa toda su fortaleza viril y su férrea disciplina para aguantar estoicamente y sin pestañear toda la ola de inmundicias que sobre el Instituto ha proyectado la baba comunista con sus más procaces insultos y groseras provocaciones. Pero esto es preciso que no se repita y no se repetirá. No es posible consentir que un Cuerpo cuya principal divisa es el honor y que ha paseado incólume su prestigio y su gloria por el mundo entero, siendo admiración de propios y extraños, se deje pisotear por los profesionales del desorden y del crimen.” “La Guardia civil de Barcelona presenta una nota al Gobierno de la Generalidad,” *Ejército y Armada*, May 6, 1931.

¹¹⁰ “¡Muera la Guardia Civil!”

¹¹¹ “¡A ellos que son pocos!”

¹¹² See García Mercadillo, *Guía del Instructor*, 69-70 for a complete list of the actions and phrases that were considered insulting the armed forces.

stead the honor of his arms.” Although this article was meant to prevent violence, it made guards reliant on having enough respect from the public to be obeyed, and, when this obedience was not forthcoming, it actually encouraged them to respond with violence. Sometimes persuasion did work, but the problem was that if protesters did not listen to the guards, then the guards were likely to punish the crowd severely for this lack of respect.¹¹³ If the guards failed at their attempts to persuade, regulations required them to sound a bugle call of warning twice before using force to dissolve a protest.¹¹⁴

Unfortunately, most Civil Guard posts did not have a bugler, so they were reduced to shouting their warnings, and often these could not be heard amidst the general din of the protest.¹¹⁵ After the warnings, the guards were to open fire and were also to do so at any time if they were attacked.¹¹⁶ In other words, they did not have to wait to be attacked in order to use force; disobedience was enough to legitimize such action, once persuasion and warnings had been tried.¹¹⁷ After the crowd dispersed (or, more likely, fled in panic), the last step was to arrest a large number of “ring leaders” to make clear that members of the crowd were the guilty parties, even if the guards had been the ones causing all the serious casualties. Very commonly in such instances, the casualty count at the end of the

¹¹³ For examples of civil guards successfully using persuasion to prevent violence, see “Servicios,” *RTGC* 22, no. 257 (July 1931): 336 and “Servicios,” *RTGC* 24, no. 283 (September 1933): 331.

¹¹⁴ Penal Code, Article 252, quoted in “Ecos,” *RTGC* 24, no. 279 (May 1933): 176.

¹¹⁵ Enrique Luque, “Sobre orden público,” *RTGC* 26, no. 303 (May 1935): 190.

¹¹⁶ The reader will recall from Chapter One that according to Article 27 of the 1923 version of the Reglamento para el servicio de la Guardia Civil, “If rioters or rowdies make use of any violent means during the first warnings, the Civil Guard will also employ force from that point on without preceding with other notifications or warnings.” “Si los amotinados o perturbadores hicieren uso de cualquier medio violento durante las primeras intimaciones, la Guardia Civil empleará también la fuerza desde luego, sin preceder otras intimaciones o advertencias.” In *Contestaciones completas del “Instituto Reus,”* 117. Articles 252 and 253 of the Penal Code and the Law of Public Order of 1933 provided similar guidelines. *Ibid.*, 117-18.

¹¹⁷ Arlégui Bayonés, *Doctrinal de Servicio*, 8. If someone was fleeing and did not obey the cry “Stop, Civil Guard!,” the use of force was also authorized. “¡Alto a la Guardia Civil!” *Ibid.*, 102.

day would be one or two guards lightly wounded and several protesters dead and severely wounded.

Part of the problem was that the Civil Guard's regulations left few intermediate options between a violation of the law and the application of force. This situation sparked a debate among guards about whether they should, as one letter to the *RTGC* put it, "ensure cold compliance with Article 7 of the *Cartilla* or abandon the field?"¹¹⁸ Given their commitment to exact obedience, it seems that almost all guards would have, at least in theory, favored cold compliance.¹¹⁹ However, in practice, guards had the option of delaying the application of deadly force once the line of legality had been crossed, buying protesters more time to disperse. The most common device for doing this was firing shots in the air, which was not according to regulations because, so the thinking went, every shot a guard fired was meant for a guilty party, but a stray bullet fired in the air could hit someone innocent, potentially making the guard liable for manslaughter.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, the practice was widespread, belying the assertion that the guards followed their orders and nothing more.

Judging from the opinions expressed in the *RTGC*, the Civil Guard's culture was at least open to those guards who chose to delay the application of force, despite all the talk of blind adherence to the regulations. The guards' image of themselves as humanitarian servants of the community served as a countervailing force. The *RTGC* praised a detachment that, when attacked with insults, rocks, and small arms fire on its

¹¹⁸ "¿Darse frío cumplimiento al artículo 7.º de la Cartilla o abandonar el campo?" Francisco Carmona, in "Ecos," *RTGC* 25, no. 288 (February 1934): 57.

¹¹⁹ This assertion is based on the fact that in every case of Civil Guard violence, the *RTGC* always mentioned a provocation and then deemed the violence justified.

¹²⁰ "Ecos," *RTGC* 24, no. 279 (May 1933): 176.

way to retrieve a stolen sewing machine, retreated instead of opening fire, leaving three of their number injured. It concludes: “tell us if [these] few civil guards, whose powerful arms can cause hundreds of deaths per minute, could have been more humanitarian.”¹²¹

When angry workers attacked two *parejas* in Arroyomolinos de León (Huelva), they were beaten up and disarmed (although “it is very difficult to disarm a *pareja*”) when they tried to respond with persuasion rather than immediately opening fire (see Image 3.4).¹²² The *RTGC* praised their “humanitarian sentiments,” even if it ultimately determined that their “prudence and philanthropy brought them grim consequences.”¹²³ In other words, being disarmed could still be considered honorable if framed within the context of the humanitarian aspect of the Civil Guard’s mission.



Image 3.4: The Risk of Having “Humanitarian Sentiments”: A Civil Guard Injured at Arroyomolinos de León
“Servicios,” *RTGC* 23, no. 273 (November 1932): 463.

¹²¹ “Dígasenos si unos cuantos guardias civiles, cuyas potentes armas pueden causar centenares de muertos por minuto, pueden ser más humanitarios.” “Servicios,” *RTGC* 23, no. 273 (November 1932): 465.

¹²² “Es muy difícil desarmar una pareja.” *Ibid.*, 463.

¹²³ “Sentimientos humanitarios.” “La prudencia y la filantropía les deparó funestas consecuencias.” *Ibid.*

The other factor depriving guards of intermediate options for crowd control was their weaponry, which was designed for military use and did not lend itself to non-lethal coercion. The regulation armament was the Mauser rifle, built for militaries to have a long range, a rapid rate of fire, and plenty of stopping power, at the cost of being heavy and bulky. Unfortunately, these same features made the Mauser about the opposite of the ideal policing weapon, which would have a short range, high maneuverability, and the ability to deliver non-lethal force. Guards had found the Model 1893 Mauser so uncomfortable when on long patrols and so unwieldy in confrontational situations that by the time of the Second Republic they were transitioning to the Model 1916 short-barrel version, which lessened but did not eliminate these problems, but most still carried the Model 1893.¹²⁴ Although guards were required to keep their barrels pointed in the air unless they were about to fire, the deadly potential alone of the Mausers could aid guards' efforts to persuade protesters to back down, even if such a tactic meant they were obtaining obedience through fear rather than respect.¹²⁵ Indeed, the Mauser was indicative of the orientation of guards to see conflicts with protesters who had crossed the line of legality more as battles than situations to be deescalated, and, since they regularly carried 150 rounds of ammunition, they were ready for a prolonged firefight.¹²⁶ Their entirely military training and lack of any formal instruction in crowd control techniques meant that seeing these situations in any other way was not even a possibility for most.

¹²⁴ "El armamento Mauser de la Guardia Civil," *Armas. Especial: El armamento de la Guardia Civil (1844-2002)*, no. 3: 74, 77 and Federico, "El armamento de la Guardia Civil," *RTGC* 25, no. 288 (February 1934): 54. Mounted units carried the Model 1895 Mauser Carbine.

¹²⁵ Obligaciones del soldado de infantería, Article 39, *Contestaciones completas del "Instituto Reus,"* 7.

¹²⁶ Sanjurjo, "Spanish Civil Guard," 380.

The guards' other armaments were also in keeping with this theme of understanding policing as a military exercise. While other police forces in the United States, Britain, France, and Germany were moving to clubs for hand-to-hand engagements and tear gas for non-lethal crowd control, the Civil Guard still used bayonets and mounted units, and some officers carried swords.¹²⁷ There was talk within the Civil Guard of making a similar shift to non-lethal weapons, but most movement was towards a shift from the cumbersome rifles to only-slightly-less-deadly pistols.¹²⁸ By 1923, almost all guards had a pistol, but they only carried them, along with a sword, "for walking out and orderly duties."¹²⁹

If, in the end, whether or not the Civil Guard's response to a protest turned violent largely depended upon how quickly it proceeded from warnings to the use of its deadly weapons, then the emotions, shaped by their culture, of the particular guards on the scene were at least as important in determining the outcome of the confrontation as their regulations. They always claimed that in every use of violence they were simply doing their duty, but fear seems to have often been a factor in cases where they turned to violence quickly. With the law giving them almost complete impunity, it was all too easy for guards to pull their triggers at the first sign of danger. In one embarrassing instance, when a group of suspected thieves failed to obey orders immediately to stop and get on the ground, civil guards opened fire, wounding two, before the suspects had time to

¹²⁷ Palacios Cerezales, "Ansias de normalidad," 609-10. For details on swords, see "Las armas blancas del Guardia Civil," *Armas. Especial: El armamento de la Guardia Civil (1844-2002)*, no. 3: 10-23.

¹²⁸ These assertions based on trends observed in the *RTGC*.

¹²⁹ "Las pistolas de la Guardia Civil," *Armas. Especial: El armamento de la Guardia Civil (1844-2002)*, no. 3: 92 and Sanjurjo, "Spanish Civil Guard," 380.

reveal they were actually *carabineros* in the middle of an undercover operation.¹³⁰ Much depended upon the ability of the commanding officer on the scene, usually a non-commissioned or junior officer, to control the urge to apply disproportionate force. Here is where festering mutual animosity between a *pueblo* and its guards could come to have deadly consequences. For example, Socialists in a town in Córdoba Province praised the lieutenant of their section for avoiding a “day of mourning” when their sergeant, supposedly under the influence of property owners, had guards use their rifles “to calm hunger” during a bread march.¹³¹

Certainly, guards were aware of the fact that they had a dangerous job, and their speeches and writings were full of talk of sacrifice and a willingness to die in the line of duty. One corporal wrote in the *RTGC* that guards were “opposing gunfire and the explosion of bombs with their brave chests, generously and stoically shedding their blood in the holocaust of order, peace, and law, an august and silent mission that makes them worthy of high praise.”¹³² Nevertheless, death was not something that they sought out either. These were men interested in preserving their careers and their families, not the *africanistas* shouting slogans like “Long live death!”¹³³ Yet what they feared was a loss of honor as much as a loss of life or limb.

¹³⁰ “Sucesos y servicios recientes,” *RTGC* 24, no. 275 (January 1933): 15-16.

¹³¹ “Día luto.” “Calmar hambre.” Centro socialista a Ministros Gobernación, Guerra, Justicia, Trabajo [sic], y “El Socialista,” 9 June 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 15, Córdoba, no. 665.

¹³² “Oponiendo su bravo pecho al fuego de las armas, al estallido de las bombas, derramando estoicos su sangre generosa en holocausto del orden, la paz y el derecho, misión augusta y silenciosa que los hace dignos de loa.” Eladio Urien, “Trabajadores del Orden,” *RTGC* 24, no. 277 (March 1933): 110.

¹³³ “¡Viva la muerte!”

3.7. Conclusion

Perhaps here is the place to return to the question of why the Civil Guard was so violent during the Republic. The problem was essentially one of a disconnect between continuities on the part of the Civil Guard's organizational culture and shifts on the part of the political culture of Spain's working classes in particular. The Civil Guard's lethal armament and repertoire of action for policing protests from the Restoration period remained unchanged during the Republic. The regulations and institutional habits that constituted that repertoire gave guards few options for responding in a non-violent manner to disorder or insult. Their culture of intolerance for both disorder and insult did not help the situation. Therefore, put in the simplest terms, this repertoire contributed to making violence a possible outcome of a confrontation between guards and protesters, and the increased number of strikes and protests during the Second Republic meant that that outcome occurred more frequently.

The new character of working-class political contestation during the Republic also amplified previously existing contradictions inherent in the dynamic between the Civil Guard's military culture and its policing mission, making violence more likely. The multitude of different factions that constituted the Republican political landscape all had their own stances on the institution, but these above all served the interests of the party in question rather than the need to find a way to maintain order peacefully in the Republic. For the anarchists, unqualified opposition to the Civil Guard was nothing new, but Socialist opposition took advantage of the wider variety of options for claims making made available by the Republic. Socialists criticized the Civil Guard in the mass press, the Cortes, and through letters of complaint. In doing so, the Socialist leaders aimed to

please rank-and-file members eager for radical change, but their remarks, which guards perceived as offenses to their honor, soured relations between the Civil Guard and not only the Socialists but also the Republic as a whole, which essentially tolerated this opposition. Ironically, guards had to rely on landowners and other conservatives more than ever to provide support at both the local and national levels and reaffirm their institution's honor, even as guards were now supposed to be serving a regime that would break the power of the old elites. And so tensions were high as protesters and strikers (who were usually affiliated with a working-class group) faced off with guards. Protesters saw them as the repressive servants of the landowners while guards saw protesters as a disorderly mob out to dishonor and even destroy their institution.

If the violence of the Civil Guard in the Second Republic stemmed from the clash between its strong cultural continuities and the flourishing of mass politics under the Republic, the question remains of whether or not this situation was inevitable. Republicans had the best chance of altering it since they held most of the reins of power. They have been criticized for both failing to demilitarize the forces of public order and for blindly insisting that the authority of the state remain unquestioned even as they allowed opposition parties to engage in the politics of the streets (see Introduction). While these criticisms are certainly legitimate, in their concern for not offending the pride and thereby losing the loyalty of their most powerful force of public order, republican governments took no steps to modernize the Civil Guard's weaponry or modify its regulations and training to encourage less violent methods of policing. The Republic created the conditions for violence when it opened the political landscape to mass

participation but made no attempt to ready its principle force of public order to policing mass political mobilizations peacefully.

Part II- The Case Studies

Part One of this dissertation characterized the military culture of the Civil Guard, and Chapter Three established the tensions that emerged as this culture interacted with various forces at work in the Republic, namely, the republican governments, working-class groups opposed to the institution, and conservative groups supportive of it. The three cases studies in this second part will now examine how the interactions between these different forces not only led to three of the period's most prominent cases of political violence but also contributed to the broader process of polarization under the Republic as disparate reactions to the incidents pushed the Republic's principle actors further from the possibility of peaceful coexistence. The four key factors that will be examined are the culture of the Civil Guard, newly energized forms of mass mobilization and communication (particularly as utilized by the Socialists), the policies of the Republican state, and the choices of individuals within each of these other categories. I consider all four elements at both the local and national levels.

To study the influence of the Civil Guard's culture in these events, I began by examining how the training, regulations, and habits outlined in the previous chapters shaped the day-to-day relations between guards and local residents in the two towns and one region examined here. Then, I turn to the incidents themselves, where in each case the clash between the repertoires of the guards and workers led to violence. While guards were guided by their regulations in these cases, the outcomes were always contingent upon the choices of local commanders as well. I add this element of contingency, which was a result of the high degree of autonomy that commanders enjoyed at the local level,

to the causal factors outlined in the previous chapter here because individual choices are by nature best studied on the level of particular cases.

Meanwhile, the role of increased mass political mobilization can be seen at both the local and national levels. In all three cases examined here, workers were seeking to change their political, social, and economic circumstances locally in a more concerted way than ever before. Nationally, the new freedoms and democratic structures ushered in by the Republic meant that politicians and the press held the Civil Guard more accountable for its actions than ever before. Now, the fallout from a significant number of deaths in an incident or the torture of a group of prisoners could be enough to shift the national political landscape. Guards, instead of adapting their practices to this new scrutiny, relied on conservative groups to justify them in the public sphere, while groups on the Left, particularly the Socialists, criticized the guards with little concern for their sensitivity about their honor. Individuals could add a level of contingency to the Civil Guard's role in this larger process of polarization as various political actors and the Civil Guard itself struggled to shape how the public would interpret a particular outbreak of political violence. As it happened, the Socialists had a congresswoman who guards found particularly antithetical to their values lead the party's campaign against them while they themselves were led by a director general who, while effectively appealing to their desire for honor, was also particularly inept at producing rhetoric that would prove conciliatory in a Republican context. The Republican state did not do much to help the situation either. Instead of seeking to adapt the Civil Guard's culture to the new policing context, it took superficial measures to block the politicization of the force that in the end only served to further sour the institution's relations with the regime.

Although there were dozens if not hundreds of incidents of political violence involving the Civil Guard during the Second Republic period, the notoriety of the three incidents considered here means that much more source material exists regarding them than other cases, allowing me to offer detailed descriptions of how each of the elements identified above contributed to the creation of both violence and polarization. Of course, these cases are famous because they are exceptional rather than typical, but their very extremes serve to highlight to the effects of the different forces at work. Furthermore, each one is important because it marks a turning point in the Civil Guard's approach to maintaining order under the new Republican regime. Whereas Chapter Three focused on the clash between the continuities in the Civil Guard's culture and the rapid shift in the socio-political environment in which it operated at the beginning of the Republic, this second half of the dissertation argues that over time the Republic did precipitate a change in its culture, but not in a way that made it less violent. On the contrary, the fallout from the two incidents considered in Chapters Four and Five, the first involving the deaths of civil guards and the second of protesters, soured many guards to the regime and even prompted some of them to contemplate armed rebellion. However, it was a much larger-scale event, the uprising of October 1934 that is the subject of Chapter Six, that introduced guards to a more militaristic vision of policing as a battle with the working classes rather than an effort to win their respect. For guards who joined the rebellion in 1936, the Civil War would become this battle.

Chapter 4- Castilblanco: The Ultimate Disrespect

4.1. Introduction

At around 10 PM on New Years' Eve 1931, a detachment of civil guards arrived in Castilblanco to find all four of the guards who had been stationed in the town lying dead in the street, beaten to death with sticks, stones, knives, and the butts of their own rifles (see Image 4.1). How had these brutal murders occurred? The right-wing press deduced that they could have only been the work of semi-savage peasants led by revolutionary provocateurs, while the Socialists believed that the social structures that created the oppression and poverty of the rural working-class were to blame. More recently, historians have found an explanation in the increasing mobilization of rural workers as socialist and anarchist ideas and practices made their way from the national level down to Spain's more isolated areas.¹ This chapter explains these mobilizations as just one of the factors leading to the outburst of violence, the others being the Civil Guard's culture, the policies of the Republican state, and the choices of individual actors.² As such, the incident is an excellent example of how the interactions between these different forces could produce not only violence but also subsequent polarization.

¹ For social historian Martin Baumeister, the event highlighted how even as modern popular politics moved into the Spanish countryside during the Second Republic, there was "a total division between the rural masses and important sections of the new political elite, who combined a narrow concept of politics with authoritarian notions of law and order." "Castilblanco or the Limits of Democracy: Rural Protest in Spain from Restoration Monarchy to the Early Second Republic," trans. Jane Rafferty, *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 1 (Mar., 1998): 19. Historian of the press Marie-Claude Chaput adds an examination of the reaction to Castilblanco in the press. She joins Baumeister in noting that the national coverage immediately interpreted the incident as part of its "collective imagination of a primitive and savage periphery." "Castilblanco (Badajoz, 31 de diciembre de 1931): La marginación de la periferia," *Centros y periferias: prensa, impresos y territorios en el mundo hispánico contemporáneo: homenaje a Jacqueline Covo-Maurice* (PILAR, 2004): 204.

² Baumeister and Chaput do both argue that without changing its approach to public order, the Republic was unable to incorporate remote parts of the country like Castilblanco fully into the Republican system, and Eduardo González Calleja agrees that the Republic's public order mentality was too rigid. He adds that since



Image 4.1: The Corpses of Two of the Guards Found Beaten to Death in Castilblanco “Después del asentino de los cuatro cuardias civiles de Castilblanco,” *ABC*, January 5, 1932.

The deaths at Castilblanco had their roots in the dynamic between the increased mass mobilization in Badajoz Province under the Republic and the Civil Guard’s rigid policing culture. As the Socialists in particular mobilized Badajoz’s landless peasantry to demand agrarian reform, the Civil Guard responded to the protests with its usual harsh tactics. The object of protest shifted to the Civil Guard itself, whereas previously, its

the Republic failed to alter the Civil Guard’s culture, Castilblanco was a key point at which relations between the Civil Guard and the Republic soured. A Civil Guard that did not tolerate any challenges to its authority became increasingly unwilling to tolerate a regime in which incidents like Castilblanco occurred. “La sombra de Castilblanco: El papel represivo y la dudosa lealtad de la Guardia Civil,” chap. 3 in *Nombre de la autoridad*.

actions may have caused only resentment. Guards' normal operating procedures prevented incidents like Castilblanco in most cases, but, in the tense atmosphere of the Republic, a few key mistakes by individuals in Castilblanco were all that was needed to turn one town's anger into deadly violence.

As important as the violence itself were the ways in which opposing forces sought to shape how the incident would be perceived by the public at the national level, particularly through the mass press. The leaderships of the two principle groups involved, the Civil Guard and the PSOE, did not want to see news of Castilblanco spark further violence, but the organizational cultures of both institutions, combined with the provocative actions of a few prominent figures, steered them to courses of action that only served to augment tensions further. The freedom of the press allowed by the Republic made shaping how an event was portrayed in the papers especially important for public relations.³ But Civil Guard Director General José Sanjurjo, who was more familiar with military than political culture, was so shocked by Castilblanco's insult to its guards that he made controversial comments to reporters that squandered his chance to use the incident as a way to improve public sympathy for the Civil Guard. Meanwhile, the Socialist leadership advised moderation, but some prominent figures like Margaret Nelken, looking to please the radical rank-and-file, continued to repeat the party's usual line on the Civil Guard's role in the structural inequalities of rural Spain, destroying its chances of improving relations with the institution. As the incident was debated in the

³ Morris Janowitz explains that the modern officer, especially a top-ranking one, "must develop a capacity for public relations, in order to explain and relate his organization to other military organizations, to civilian leadership, and to the public." *Professional Soldier*, 10.

Cortes and in court, it became part of a larger debate over whether state agencies like the Civil Guard should be primarily defenders of the old liberal idea of order or a new social order under the Republic.

4.2. The Local Incident: Mobilization, Military Culture, and Contingency in Castilblanco

4.2.1. The Origins of the Conflict: A Context of Regional Tensions

The roots of the Castilblanco incident are to be found in the conflict between the mass mobilizations enabled by the Republic and the Civil Guard's constant duty to enforce the laws of the liberal state. The town of Castilblanco is located in Badajoz Province, one of the poorest in Spain and one where the *latifundia* system of land tenure was most prevalent.⁴ A small number of landowners held most of the land in huge tracts and raised livestock or low-intensity crops like olives.⁵ They needed large numbers of laborers for the olive harvest, but these people did not make enough during that time to sustain them for the rest of the year when they were mostly unemployed.⁶ The system was partly the result of the *desamortización* of the first half of the nineteenth century, a system that the Civil Guard was created in part to defend.⁷

During the Restoration period, protests over food, taxes, and unemployment, usually led by women, were common. However, in the early twentieth century, a new force for political mobilization began to emerge, the union, and particularly the Socialist

⁴ Martin Baumeister, *Campesinos sin tierra: supervivencia y resistencia en Extremadura, 1880-1923*, trans. Joaquín Abellán (Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, Secretaría General Técnica, 1997), 70.

⁵ Francisca Rosique Navarro, *La reforma agraria en Badajoz durante la IIª República (La respuesta patronal)* (Departamento de Publicaciones de la Excma. Diputación Provincial de Badajoz, 1988), 55-56.

⁶ Preston, "Margarita Nelken," 332 and Rosique Navarro, *Reforma agraria en Badajoz*, 83.

⁷ Baumeister, *Campesinos sin tierra*, 90-91, 300.

UGT (and subsequently its agrarian arm, the Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra [National Federation of Workers of the Land or FNTT]). Strikes gradually took over as the primary means for rural workers to express their grievances, making Badajoz a classic example of the shift to mass politics discussed in Chapter One.⁸ With the advent of the Republic, Badajoz's landless laborers were mobilized by their hope for immediate improvements in their social and economic conditions. Drawing on their new repertoire of direct challenges to local socio-economic structures, the number of strikes in the province soared, as did the number of property invasions as the poor gathered acorns on private lands.⁹ These acts naturally drew the poor into intensified conflict with the Civil Guard, which was charged with policing strikes and protecting private property.

At the national level, the Socialist leadership wanted to moderate the rank-and-file's impulse to direct action in order to allow the Republic's agrarian reform measures time to take effect. There were forces pushing it in a more radical direction too, however. Although Socialists were part of the government, they jockeyed with the left republicans for power within that government and at the regional and local levels. In addition, they needed to please their membership base, especially since there was a danger that they would lose ground in Badajoz Province to the CNT, which was calling for the immediate occupation of large estates.¹⁰ Some of the most radical Socialists, such as Nelken, responded to these pressures by sharpening their own rhetoric, using denunciations of the

⁸ “¿Del motín a la huelga? Protesta social y lucha contra obrera organizada en Badajoz,” chap. 4 in *Ibid.*

⁹ See “Delincuencia, estado y sociedad rural en Badajoz,” chap. 3 in *Ibid.* for background on the history of petty crime as a social phenomenon in Badajoz.

¹⁰ Juan García Pérez, “La II República: nueva ocasión perdida para la transformación del campo extremeño,” in *Historia de Extremadura*, ed. Ángel Rodríguez Sánchez, vol. 4, *Los tiempos actuales* (Badajoz: Universitas Editorial, Consejería de Educación y Cultura), 1001.

Civil Guard as a way to deflect the anger of the landless laborers. They judged that alienating the institution was a small price to pay for the mobilizing power that criticism of the force could have.

The resulting tensions between the Civil Guard and the Socialists in Badajoz reached their peak in Almendralejo, one of the province's larger towns. On November 7, 1931, some 40 people invaded hunting estates in the area, and Civil Governor Manuel Álvarez Ugena, who was a member of Prime Minister Azaña's *Acción Republicana* party, called in a concentration of civil guards in an example of the government's policy of deploying the Civil Guard instead of disbanding it.¹¹ On the 29th, these guards were ordered to protect strikebreakers who were going to work during an olive harvest strike.¹² Strikers threw rocks at the guards, and they responded by opening fire.¹³ The Civil Guard command chief, Lieutenant Coronel Pedro Pereda Sanz, requested that Álvarez Ugena send a military judge to investigate accusations that his men had been insulted.¹⁴ On December 7th, the Almendralejo *Casa del Pueblo* (House of the People), as local UGT centers were known, sent a telegram to the minister of justice denouncing the Civil Guard and ominously warning that "the moment will arrive when our pacifist intervention will be

¹¹ To Sr. Ministro Gobernación, 7 November 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz and Gobernador civil to Ministro Gobernación, 7 November 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz.

¹² Las Directivas al Sr Mtro Gobernación, 30 November 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz.

¹³ Gobernador civil to Mtro Gobernación, 30 November 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz.

¹⁴ Gobernador to Ministro, 3 December 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz.

powerless to contain justified popular anger.”¹⁵ Álvarez Ugena dismissed the complaint as politically motivated.¹⁶ By the 17th, the Civil Guard had arrested 14 people, including the mayor, who was blamed for fomenting the protests.¹⁷ At this point, the provincial UGT intervened to call for all prisoners to be released and for the dismissal of Coronel Pereda.¹⁸ On the 25th, the FNTT announced a general strike for the 30th and 31st to demand the dismissal of both Pereda and Álvarez Ugena, the release of all prisoners, and the appointment of a special judge to investigate abuses committed against workers.¹⁹ Minister of the Interior Casares Quiroga concentrated 50 civil guards in the province for the days of the strike (Álvarez Ugena had asked for 200) and ordered troops from Madrid to supply food and guard public transportation in the provincial capital.²⁰

What began as a clash between the *pueblo* of Almendralejo’s idea of justice and that of the Civil Guard became a larger political struggle as soon as the general strike was declared. The Civil Guard had already injured several workers in Badajoz since the start of the Republic, but it was only when it challenged the Socialists politically, by arresting their affiliates, that they fought back. The strike gave the restless rank-and-file a cause around

¹⁵ “Llegará momento en que nuestra intervención pacifista sea impotente contener justa cólera popular.” Ministro Justicia al de Gobernación, 7 December 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 17, Madrid, no. 229.

¹⁶ Gobernador to Ministro, 8 December 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz.

¹⁷ Agrupación Socialista to Ministro Gobernación, 18 December 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz and Gobernador civil to Mtro Gobernación, 30 November 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz.

¹⁸ Agrupación Socialista to Ministro Gobernación, 18 December 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz.

¹⁹ N. de Pablo, “Paro general: Se anuncia para los días 30 y 31 en todos los pueblos de la provincia,” *La Verdad Social* December 25, 1931.

²⁰ Ministro Gobernación a los Gobernadores civiles de Sevilla y Badajoz, 27 December 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz; Gobernador civil al Ministro Gobernación, 26 December 1931, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 14, Badajoz; and “Fuerzas madrileñas de Intendencia, en Badajoz,” *ABC*, January 2, 1932.

which to unify, and, if successful, it would demonstrate that the Socialists were the ones effectively in control of the province, with the ability to dictate appointments to positions of authority there.

In the days leading up to the strike, the Socialist propaganda machine went into action to drum up support for it. *La Verdad Social*, the UGT organ in Badajoz, printed several articles criticizing the comportment of the Civil Guard in the province.²¹ Nelken, meanwhile, published a caustic open letter to Casares Quiroga in *El Socialista* in which she denounced the application of military justice in Almendralejo and accused the civil guards there of being defenders of the landowners and provocateurs of violence.²² Nevertheless, the strike was legal, and it was meant to be peaceful.²³ The organizers wanted only a limited demonstration of their power.

4.2.2. Local Tensions and Violence

It was within this context of local, provincial, and national tensions between civil guards, Socialists, anarcho-sindicalists, and republicans that the strike leading to the Castilblanco incident began. Within Castilblanco, tensions between guards, newly mobilized rural workers, and town elites also proved the immediate causes of the incident. The Socialists, in their drive to extend their reach, had probably arrived in the town around the time that the Republic began. They had established a *Casa del Pueblo* that connected

²¹ Most historians have claimed that the strike was primarily about Álvarez Ugena and Pereda not enforcing agrarian reform measures, but these articles almost entirely concern Civil Guard violence (mostly perpetrated while trying to stop people from illegally gathering acorns) rather than specific agrarian reform measures not being enforced. See, for example, Preston, *Coming of the Spanish Civil War*, 94.

²² Copies of all of these articles in *La Verdad Social* can be found in AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Recursos, legajo 86, exp. 6. Margarita Nelken, "Carta abierta al señor ministro de la Gobernación," *El Socialista*, December 26, 1931.

²³ Pablo, "Paro general," 1.

the town to the national movement by receiving a copy of *El Socialista*.²⁴ While its residents most likely had only a vague idea of their union's doctrines and structures, the idea of the strike as a way for them to challenge Castilblanco's status quo was now on the table.

This status quo was one of poverty and stark socio-economic inequality.

Castilblanco (population approximately 3,000) was located in a district (*comarca*) so remote that its official name was Extremaduran Siberia (Siberia Extremeña).²⁵ The road to the town was almost impassable for automobiles and necessitated taking a ferry across the Guadiana River, and the soil was so poor that most people survived on hunting and raising goats.²⁶ The Socialist Juan-Simeón Vidarte visited the town after the incident and recalled seeing "homes more fit to house animals than human beings."²⁷ The land tenure problem was also extreme here; ownership of over half the land was concentrated in the hands of less than two percent of the property holders.²⁸ The mayor, Felipe Maganto, was a member of the Radical Party who had been in office since before the Republic and who was himself a security guard for a large property owner.²⁹

Stationed in Castilblanco in part to protect these properties were four civil guards, José Blanco, Francisco González Borrego, José Matos González, and Agripino Simón

²⁴ Francisco Largo Caballero, quoted in "Información telefónica de la mañana," *Diario de Cádiz*, January 6, 1932.

²⁵ "Alternaciones de los municipios en los Censos de Población desde 1842," Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), copyright 2017, <http://www.ine.es/intercensal/intercensal.do?search=1&cmbTipoBusq=0&textoMunicipio=castilblanco&bt nBuscarDenom=Consultar+selecci%F3n>.

²⁶ Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 172 and Glicerio Sánchez Recio, introduction to *Castilblanco*, by Jiménez de Asúa, Vidarte, Rodríguez Sastre, and Trejo (Universidad de Alicante), 29.

²⁷ "Viviendas, más dignas de alojar animales que seres humanos." *Cortes Constituyentes de 1931-1933*, 308.

²⁸ Sánchez Recio, introduction to *Castilblanco*, 28.

²⁹ González Calleja, *Nombre de la autoridad*, 98; "Informe del letrado Sr. Rodríguez Sastre al consejo de guerra," in *Castilblanco*, 233; and Francisco Espinosa Maestre, *La primavera del Frente Popular: Los campesinos de Badajoz y el origen de la guerra civil (marzo-julio de 1936)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2007), 34.

Martín, who would also be the ones to face the nascent political mobilization of the townspeople. These guards were typical examples of the generation described in Chapter Two. Two of them, Matos González and Simón Martín, had previously been in combat while serving in the army in Morocco. In addition, González Borrego and Matos González were from Badajoz Province. All were between 28 and 32 years old and had been in the Civil Guard for seven to eight years. Both Matos González and Simón Martín were also married and had two children each. As for González Borrego, he had been stationed in Castilblanco since 1926 after requesting a transfer back to Badajoz, and he was now engaged to a woman from the town, so he presumably had good relations with the *pueblo*.³⁰

The story of the station commandant, Corporal Blanco, illustrates how the disconnect between the Civil Guard's culture of strict enforcement of the law and a *pueblo's* more flexible sense of justice could create tensions and how these tensions could be accentuated by both the mass political mobilizations that accompanied the Republic and differences between individual guards. Aside from González Borrego, all of the guards in Castilblanco, including Blanco, had been in the town for a year or less. According to a local newspaper, Blanco was popular during his eight years stationed at a town in his native Galicia, but, judging from a letter he wrote on December 5th to his mentor for the corporal's exam, his relations with the townspeople in more restive

³⁰ All of the personal information above is from SGC, Expedientes Personales, Francisco González Borrego, José Matos González, and Agripino Simón Martín. Little is known about the corporal, José Blanco, because his personal service record was not preserved. Eduardo Comín Colomer, *De Castilblanco a Casas Viejas* (Madrid: Temas españoles, 1959), 10.

Badajoz were anything but cordial.³¹ He seems to have been the kind of to-the-letter guard of whom Ahumada would have approved. However, apparently, his predecessor in Castilblanco had been laxer. When Blanco began arresting acorn robbers daily, the townspeople were angry and confused. There were several confrontations and one attempt to assault the *casa-cuartel*, but Blanco only redoubled his efforts. The day after the attempted assault, he arrested 33 acorn gatherers and sent them to the municipal judge, who warned him that “that day something serious was going to occur.”³² Blanco concludes his letter by bragging that he was tidying up the town for the civil governor and the “people of order” by leaving the acorn thieves “more docile than lambs.”³³ Blanco steadfastly refused to adapt the strict adherence to the law that was part of the Civil Guard’s culture to this Extremaduran *pueblo*’s more informal idea of social justice. When it became obvious that he was not winning the respect of much of the town, he contented himself with only the approval of the town’s elite by categorizing them as the “people of order.” Less than a month after he wrote his letter, Blanco’s failure to reconcile the cultures of the Civil Guard and the *pueblo* would cost him and his men their lives.

It was in this context of tension between the civil guards and the townspeople of Castilblanco that news arrived that the FNTT was to go on strike on the 30th and 31st of December. Some 300 people duly marched through town on the 30th without incident,

³¹ “La Guardia Civil de Castilblanco,” *Faro de Vigo*, January 3, 1932. The letter was published in the *RTGC* after his death. “Por los mártires de Castilblanco,” *RTGC* 23, no. 264 (February 1932): 62.

³² “Ese día iba a ocurrir algo gordo.” “Mártires de Castilblanco,” 62.

³³ “Gente de orden.” “Más mansos que corderos.” *Ibid.* It is possible that this letter was fabricated, but, if this was the case, it would be just as useful as a window into what civil guards *thought* an ideal station commandant should be like.

shouting denunciations of *caciquismo* and the Civil Guard.³⁴ In framing their act as a strike and in asking for more than simply bread, the townspeople of Castilblanco were shifting to a form of claims making that sought structural change rather than just material benefits.³⁵ The town's civil guards, meanwhile, stayed in their *casa-cuartel* on this first day, despite the fact that the strike was technically illegal since it had not been registered with the municipality. The people of Castilblanco, through their show of collective strength, had finally forced Blanco to allow them to bend the rules.

The next day, however, the choices of several individuals proved key steps in the chain of events that led to the Castilblanco deaths, indicating that the event was in no way inevitable. The first decision was made by Mayor Maganto, who, perhaps fearing that the protest was really about challenging the local power structure as much as the dismissal of two provincial officials, ordered Blanco to dissolve it on the second day.³⁶ Blanco and his three civil guards followed the mayor's request, although not without some trepidation. Blanco made a second fateful decision by marching all three straight into the crowd, inexplicably ignoring the standard Civil Guard practice of having them stand to the side, while he went to ask the president of the *Casa del Pueblo* to dissolve the protest.³⁷ What mostly likely happened next is that a woman, Cristina "la Machota (the Butch)" Luengo Rodríguez, attempted to join the crowd and Simón Martín pushed her back with his rifle. Some of the protesters grabbed his rifle to stop him, and he

³⁴ Sánchez Recio, introduction to *Castilblanco*, 14.

³⁵ Baumeister, "Castilblanco or the Limits of Democracy," 18-19.

³⁶ Preston, *Coming of the Spanish Civil War*, 94.

³⁷ *ABC* speculates that Blanco was still "accustomed to the Galicians' comprehension and cordial and human treatment." "Después del asesinato de los cuatro guardias civiles en Castilblanco," *ABC*, January 3, 1932.

responded by firing the weapon, killing a man named Hipólito Bermejo “Retuerto” Corral. The crowd, horrified, fell upon all four guards and killed them with whatever weapons they could find. Only one protester was injured in the tumult.³⁸ One woman brought Bermejo Corral’s body into her home, but, in a final show of disrespect, the guards’ bodies were left in the street for hours.³⁹

Expanding Socialist influence in Badajoz and the tensions that process engendered with the Civil Guard were the causes of the strike in Castilblanco, but it was the choices of a few individuals that provided the immediate conditions for such a bizarre eruption of violence. To begin with, if there had not been such a stark contrast in the way in which Corporal Blanco and his predecessor had interpreted their duty to protect private property, Castilblanco’s residents may not have been resentful enough to turn against their civil guards with violence. Even on the day of the strike, if Maganto had not called out the Civil Guard, if Blanco had not sent his men into the crowd, or if Simón Martín had not gotten involved in a scuffle, the deaths would have been avoided. In the tense atmosphere of the Second Republic, the poor choices of just a few enlisted guards and the spontaneous fury of a crowd were enough to cause a tragedy that was to have consequences at the national level.

³⁸ The events of December 31, 1931 in Castilblanco have been retold many times, and versions vary widely, but I have tried to balance the prosecutors report, summarized in Sánchez Recio, introduction to *Castilblanco*, 15; with defense attorney Luis Jiménez de Asúa’s version, *Castilblanco*, 260-65; and that of the Sixth Chamber of the Supreme Court, AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Reservado, exp. 23, n. 10, to provide the most accurate possible reconstruction.

³⁹ Pedro de Pereda Sanz, quoted in Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 4:271-72.



Image 4.2: Photographs of Castilblanco from the News Magazine *La Estampa* 1

1. Left and right- some of detainees after the event 2. The street in Castilblanco where the event occurred. Xs mark where the bodies of the civil guards were found, with Blanco's in black. Notice the extreme poverty evident in the surroundings. Below, the detachment of guards arrives on the scene. 3. On the left, José Matos González, on the right, Francisco González Borrego 4. On the left, the widow of Matos González with their two children, in the center, the fiancée of González Borrego, on the right, the widow of Corporal Blanco with their daughter.

“Las turbas enloquecidas, asesinan a cuatro guardias civiles, en Castilblanco,” *La Estampa* 5, no. 209 (0 January 1932): 15.



Image 4.3- Photographs of Castilblanco from the News Magazine *La Estampa* 2

1. Castilblanco's *casa-cuartel* 2, 5, and 7. More detainees 3. The rifles of the civil guards, broken while being used to beat them 4. Mayor Maganto 6. Castilblanco's municipal judge and prosecutor.

Ibid., 16.

4.3. The National Aftermath

4.3.1. Sanjurjo, Supporters, and the Seeds of Rebellion

Castilblanco was certainly not the first instance in which political protesters had killed civil guards. Two were killed in Barcelona during the Tragic Week in 1909 and two more by anarchists in Bera de Bidosoa (Navarre) in 1924, for example.⁴⁰ While guards mourned these losses, they were also taken in stride as sacrifices for the *patria*. Yet here, for the first time since 1874, some civil guards contemplated rebellion in the aftermath of the Castilblanco incident, a fact that leads to the question of how the occurrence could have pushed them to consider such a radical violation of their commitment to serving the government in power. The answer again lies in the incompatibility between the Civil Guard's rigid culture of honor and the Republic's game of mass politics. To begin with, guards' desires to take their own private revenge on Castilblanco's residents did not create good publicity. The townspeople there had not just killed but dishonored their guards. Such an obvious refutation of the idea that the *pueblo* respected the Civil Guard led its members to conclude that outside forces must have been at work, and their fears that Nelken would dissolve their beloved corps made a conspiracy theory all too easy to develop. From there, one individual again drove events forward, in this case Director General Sanjurjo, whose own sense of military honor led him to make impolitic statements to the papers. His remarks were welcomed by the right-wing press, however, which wanted to score political points on the Socialists while solidifying conservatives' relationships with the Civil Guard. Together, Sanjurjo and his

⁴⁰ Rivas Gómez, "Guardia Civil en el Reinado," 124 and Lorenzo Silva, *Sereno en el peligro: la aventura histórica de la Guardia Civil* (Madrid: Editorial EDAF, 2010), 210-11.

supporters began a realignment of the Civil Guard's values by suggesting that rural workers were not worthy of at least ostensibly equal treatment and that the corps' ultimate loyalties lay with the *patria* rather than the government in power.

Since the civil guards were the Republic's only rural policemen, they had to be the ones at the Castilblanco crime scene even though it would have been difficult for them to have a dispassionate response to the deaths of their comrades. After doing some investigating, the guards that Lieutenant Colonel Pereda Sanz had dispatched to the town began making arrests, detaining some 50 people in the town hall.⁴¹ The guards could not resist retaliating in some way for the four deaths, which they considered to be the ultimate insult to their institution's honor. They forced the prisoners to remain standing with their hands in the air on the town hall balcony for an hour and a half, hitting anyone who lowered his arms with their rifle butts.⁴² The townspeople of Castilblanco had gone outside of official channels to address their grievances against their guards through protest and, ultimately, murder, and now guards followed suit by prioritizing their desire to avenge the dishonor over their prerogative to follow official criminal investigative practices. In so doing, they gave their opponents a way to turn public attention away from the murders and construct a counter-narrative of Castilblanco where guards were once again the victimizers rather than the victims.

At the national level, the Civil Guard's director general was its public face, and his reaction to an event like Castilblanco would speak for the entire corps. In letting

⁴¹ Comín Colomer, *Castilblanco a Casas Viejas*, 11.

⁴² Statement of Deputy Sediles, *DSCD*, January 12, 1932. Although there were some who denied that any torture occurred, the general consensus was that what took place at the town hall did constitute an act of torture. Sánchez Recio, introduction to *Castilblanco*, 23.

Sanjurjo remain in the post, the Republic allowed a man more adept at defending his military honor than tactful public relations guide how the incident shaped preceptions of the Civil Guard. Sanjurjo spent New Year's Eve at a dinner in Zaragoza's Gran Hotel held in his honor. Already in the spotlight of the press, reporters followed his every move the next morning as he prayed before the Virgen del Pilar, did an interview with the newspaper *Heraldo de Aragón*, and attended a wedding. It was during this wedding that news of Castilblanco reached him. As soon as the ceremony was over, he set off to get to the town as fast as he could.⁴³ Other senior officers do not seem to have shared his paternal concern. According Emilio Esteban-Infantes, he briefly stopped in Madrid en route to Castilblanco to reprimand the division subinspector and zone inspector for not heading for the town themselves. Esteban-Infantes explains that "Sanjurjo, cordial and suave in his behavior, was harsh when denouncing offenses of this nature."⁴⁴ After some difficulties getting his car across the Guadiana, the first thing Sanjurjo asked when he arrived in Castilblanco was "but you haven't killed them [yet]?", suggesting that perhaps his belief that the Civil Guard could take matters into its own hands in order to defend its honor exceeded that of his men.⁴⁵ He found a witness to show him the scene of the crime and tell him what happened, but it was when he heard of how the bodies had been abandoned and, supposedly, mutilated that he was filled with indignation, saying that he

⁴³ "La estancia del gen. Sanjuro en Zaragoza," *Heraldo de Aragón*, January 2, 1932.

⁴⁴ "Sanjurjo, cordial y suave en su trato, era duro para sancionar faltas de esta naturaleza." *General Sanjurjo*, 172.

⁴⁵ "El director general de la Guardia Civil en Badajoz: 'Lo absurdo es que se haya creado una Oficina de información contra la Guardia civil y que esté dirigida por Margarita Nelken,'" *La Libertad*, January 5, 1932 and Espinosa Maestre, *Primavera del Frente Popular*, 35.

did not want to hear anymore.⁴⁶ Perhaps what horrified him was that a soldier's death was supposed to bring him honor, but this *pueblo* only showed further disrespect for the dead.

On January 4th, Sanjurjo arrived in the city of Badajoz for the fallen guards' funeral and to meet their families.⁴⁷ Thousands of people attended the event (see Image 4.4), and the dignitaries present consisted the usual display of the Civil Guard's supporters. Along with the obligatory presence of Minister of the Interior Casares Quiroga, Deputy Salazar Alonso of the Radical Party, various clergymen, and Badajoz's city councilmen (except the Socialist ones) were all there. But it was Sanjurjo who received the most attention from the press.⁴⁸ He gave a tearful speech at the burial in which he explicitly called the Civil Guard's cult of honor a religion.⁴⁹ He explained "all religions have their martyrs; we are a religion of honorable men and these are ours."⁵⁰ In a subtle warning to those like Nelken who called for the dissolution of the corps, he added "pity Spain the day in which there are no men capable of making the sacrifice as do those who pertain to this institution!"⁵¹ At the same time, he promised that "the Civil Guard, without a spirit of revenge and for which there is no doubt about the nobility of their hearts, will continue doing its duty exactly and at all costs," and he said that the

⁴⁶ Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 174.

⁴⁷ Vicente Santiago Hodsson, "Visita a Castilblanco," *RTGC* 23, no. 264 (February 1932): 57.

⁴⁸ "Entierro de las víctimas de Castilblanco," *El Debate*, January 5, 1932.

⁴⁹ Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 175-76.

⁵⁰ "Todas las religiones tienen sus mártires; nosotros somos una religión de hombres honrados y éstos son los nuestros." In Santiago Hodsson, "Visita a Castilblanco," 57.

⁵¹ "¡Pobre España el día en que no haya hombres capaces de realizar el sacrificio, como lo hacen los que pertenecen a esta Institución!" In "De los graves sucesos de Badajoz," *Diario de Barcelona*, January 5, 1932.

Civil Guard would always be loyal to the Republic.⁵² He could already sense the danger of Castilblanco causing the guards to take further acts of revenge, but he himself was not yet ready to step fully outside the bounds of legality.



Image 4.4: The Castilblanco Funeral in Badajoz
Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*.

However, after the ceremonies, Sanjurjo's sense of honor could no longer permit him to restrain his remarks in an interview he granted the local newspaper. He prided himself on not being a politician, but it was moments like this when he would have been wise to watch his words, for the interview was quoted in other papers across the country. Yet he began the session by declaring that "in a corner of Badajoz Province there is a Riffian hideout. General Sanjurjo's subordinates [that is, the civil guards] have the mission of bringing the rule of justice to it."⁵³ He went on to describe the town as "the

⁵² "La Guardia Civil, sin espíritu de venganza, que no cabe en la nobleza de sus corazones, seguirá cumpliendo exactamente y a toda costa con su deber." In Santiago Hodsson, "Visita a Castilblanco," 57. "Entierro de las víctimas," 3.

⁵³ "En un rincón de la provincial de Badajoz hay un foco rifeño. Los subordinados del general Sanjurjo tienen la misión de llevar hasta él el imperio de la justicia." In "Director General de la Guardia Civil."

most deplorable possible. I didn't know that such savage towns still existed in Spain."⁵⁴ It seems that his visit to Castilblanco had had a profound effect on him. In drawing a comparison between the townspeople and the Moroccans that many Spaniards viewed as racially inferior (see Chapter Two), he was contributing to the idea that the kind of brutality seen in Morocco could be employed against the rural poor in Spain as well. His statement envisioned policing rural Spain as a fight to pacify supposedly uncivilized people rather than an effort to win the respect of all citizens.

Sanjurjo's next statement was even more provocative, shifting from blaming local "savage" townspeople to theorizing about a national conspiracy: "The incident had been premeditated. Of that there is absolutely no doubt in my mind. Everything had followed a plan. The attack on the *Benemérita*, the destruction of that post, were a deed agreed upon by the leaders of the movement."⁵⁵ Even as he demeaned them, he also refused to believe that the residents of a *pueblo* could have so disrespected the Civil Guard all by themselves. Therefore, there must have been a conspiracy directed from the outside, and Nelken was the perfect suspect since she had been criticizing the Civil Guard and she was one of the organizers of the strike. Indeed, her newer kind of attack on the institution's honor upset him even more than the town's physical assault: "We are not pained by the sacrifice of our lives; since its creation this institution has answered the call of duty without regard for distance or effort. What pains us is that this loyalty to our mission is not recognized and that preaching against our discipline and our sentiments is given free

⁵⁴ "Lo más deplorable posible. Yo no sabía que aún quedaran en España pueblos salvajes." In *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ "El suceso ha sido premeditado. De eso no me queda ya ninguna duda. Todo ha obedecido a un plan. La agresión a la *Benemérita*, la destrucción de aquel puesto era una hazaña acordada por los dirigentes del movimiento." In *Ibid.*

rein.”⁵⁶ He even pointed to Nelken directly, remarking on “the danger to the social peace posed by the continued hostility manifested by some political organizations [i.e. the Socialists] against the *benemérito* institution. The absurd thing is. . . that an office of information has been created against the Civil Guard and that this office is led by Margarita Nelken, who is not even a Spanish citizen, but rather German. That is to say, she comes from the country that has the best-organized espionage in the entire world.”⁵⁷ His outrage at being challenged by a woman and, supposedly, a foreigner, had made him into a conspiracy theorist. He echoed the fear of revolution so common on the Right at that time:

It is essential to brake hard to avoid catastrophe, but if we do not pull on the reins, the difficult moment will soon arrive in which all social harmony will be broken.

Since our mission is to save Spain from this great disaster, we gladly accept the sacrifice that is imposed upon us, but we will not tolerate that liberty that is conceded to divisive propagandists and those that have as their end to make us objects of a vicious persecution.⁵⁸

While Sanjurjo’s official speech may have urged his men to be restrained, his off-the-cuff remarks, which seemed to reveal his true feelings, were also broadcast

⁵⁶ “A nosotros no nos duele el sacrificio de nuestras vidas; desde su creación este Instituto ha respondido al cumplimiento del deber sin mirar distancias ni esfuerzos. Los que nos duele es que no se reconozca esta lealtad de nuestra misión y se deje libre la predicación contra nuestra disciplina y nuestros sentimientos.” In *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ “El peligro que supone para la paz social la continua hostilidad que manifiestan algunas organizaciones políticas contra el benmérito Instituto. Lo absurdo es. . . que se haya creado una oficina de información contra la Guardia civil y que esta oficina esté dirigida por Margarita Nelken, que ni siquiera es ciudadana española, sino alemana. Es decir, que procede del país que mayor ha organizado el espionaje en el mundo entero.” In “Habla Sanjurjo,” *El Debate*, January 5, 1932.

⁵⁸ Se precisa frenar fuerte para evitar la catástrofe, pero si se obstinan en tirar de la cuerda, no tardará en llegar el momento difícil en que se rompa toda la armonía social.

Porque la misión nuestra es evitar a España este gran desastre, aceptamos gustosos el sacrificio que se nos impone, pero no se tolerará esa libertad que se concede a los propagandistas disolventes y a los que tienen por finalidad hacernos objeto de sañuda persecución.

In “Director general de la Guardia Civil.”

nationwide in the press. He believed the Civil Guard was the only bastion holding back social revolution, and so any undermining of the *Benemérita* must be halted at all costs. In other words, defending the Civil Guard (and thereby the social order) was more important than defending the Republic. Here one sees the seeds of the redefining of the Civil Guard's idea of loyalty that Sanjurjo would use to justify his *pronunciamiento* less than a year later.⁵⁹ In fact, he told a biographer after the insurrection that while Castilblanco did not turn him against the government, it did make him think that the anti-Civil Guard propagandists could no longer be tolerated.⁶⁰

All this is not to say that Sanjurjo had any intention of backing down from his provocative statements even then. Upon his return to Madrid the next day, he continued to feed remarks to the press that were more a reflection of his anger than any effort towards deescalating the situation or even factual accuracy. When reporters repeated back to him his remarks regarding Nelken, for instance, he replied, "I have no corrections to make to that."⁶¹ He also doubled down on his previous linking of Castilblanco and Morocco by stating that "only in Monte Arruit [where 3,000 Spanish soldiers were killed and their bodies mutilated] had I seen such cruel and violent butchery of human bodies."⁶² While portraying the people of Castilblanco as barbaric, on the one hand, in

⁵⁹ González Calleja notes that the idea of "political manipulation of the illiterate masses mixed with traces of dehumanization and even social racism" would become commonplace in anti-revolutionary rhetoric as the Republic went on. "Manipulación política de la masa analfabeta se mezclaba con atisbos de deshumanización e incluso de racismo social." *Nombre de la autoridad*, 100.

⁶⁰ El Caballero Audaz, *Sanjurjo, caudillo y víctima (Vida heroica de un gran soldado de España) (Opiniones de un hombre de la calle)* (Madrid: Caballero Audaz, 1932), 67.

⁶¹ "A eso no tengo nada que rectificar." In "El general Sanjurjo insiste en que el origen de los trágicos sucesos es sólo un problema político," *La Nación*, January 5, 1932.

⁶² "Sólo en Monte Arruit había visto un ensañamiento tan cruel y tan violento en cadáveres humanos." In *Ibid.*

another interview that same day, he described them as prosperous on the other: “In this case one cannot say that it [the incident] was caused by hunger or the social question. Castilblanco is a rich, relatively rich, place. All its residents have employment, land, or livestock, and there is no hunger there yet.”⁶³ It seems Sanjurjo would say anything in order to build up his conspiracy theory, and in this interview he pointed a finger at Socialist deputy for Badajoz Manuel Muiño Arroyo, claiming that “this gentleman, in a rally, said that he was a fan of mathematics and he had been able to calculate grams of Civil Guard flesh per Spaniard.”⁶⁴

The horror of Castilblanco was amplified by Lieutenant Coronel Pereda Sanz, who wrote the official report on the incident as the chief of Badajoz Command even though he had been one of the causes of the strike in the first place. Naturally, he tried to make the massacre seem like it had been premeditated, and he played up rumors that the bodies had been mutilated in order to portray the perpetrators in the worst possible light while steering all blame away from the Civil Guard itself. He claims that the massacre began when Bermejo Corral slit Corporal Blanco’s throat. Simón Martín only had time to shoot Bermejo Corral before the three remaining civil guards were shot with pistols, the crowd then beating their corpses with all manner of different objects, gouging out their eyes, and

⁶³ “En este case no se puede decir que obedece ni al hambre ni a la cuestión social. Castilblanco es un lugar rico, relativamente rico. Todos sus vecinos tienen trabajo, tierras o matanza, y allí no hay hambre todavía.” In Luis de Armiñan, “El general Sanjurjo hace a ‘Heraldo’ un relato de los sucesos de Castilblanco,” *Heraldo de Madrid*, January 5, 1932.

⁶⁴ “Este caballero, en un mitin, dijo que era aficionado a las matemáticas y había llegado a calcular los gramos de carne de Guardia civil que correspondían a cada español.” In *Ibid.*

dancing “among the bodies, wetting their feet in the still un-coagulated blood of those who in life were their friends.”⁶⁵

Marie-Claude Chaput finds that in the first few days after the event, denunciation was the theme in newspapers across the political spectrum.⁶⁶ After that, however, each side started to search for hidden meanings and the true guilty parties. Surely, there was a political advantage to be gained here. The Right seized upon the rhetoric of Sanjurjo and Pereda Sanz to conclude that the murders were premeditated by Socialist agitators.⁶⁷ The conservative *El Debate* was already declaring as early as the 1st that “the responsibility of the Socialists in events like Castilblanco is not a secret to anyone,” and the next day it added that the Socialists “attack civil guards’ honor or persons” and that such attacks “by criminals and crazies” cannot be tolerated.⁶⁸ That same day, even before Sanjurjo’s talk of a “Riffian hideout,” *ABC* declared that “the least civilized Riffians didn’t do more.”⁶⁹ The monarchist *La Nación* made clear that while it did not blame the Socialist Party in its entirety, certain deputies, and it mentioned Nelken specifically, had gotten out of control.⁷⁰ These papers’ insistence that a few provocateurs were behind the events allowed them to ignore any socio-political tensions that may have been at play. While Chaput emphasizes that national newspapers attributed the “savagery” of Castilblanco to

⁶⁵ “Entre los cadáveres, mojado sus pies en la sangre aún no coagulada de aquellos que en vida fueron sus amigos.” Quoted in Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 4:271-72.

⁶⁶ “Castilblanco: Marginación de la periferia,” 193.

⁶⁷ Chaput, “Castilblanco: Marginación de la periferia,” 197-98.

⁶⁸ “Para nadie es un secreto la responsabilidad de los socialistas en sucesos como el de Castilblanco.” “Lo del día,” *El Debate*, January 1, 1932. “Atacan a los guardias civiles en su honor o en sus personas.” “De criminales y de locos.” “Lo del día,” *El Debate*, January 2, 1932.

⁶⁹ “Los rifeños menos civilizados no hicieron más.” “La guerra contra la Guardia Civil,” *ABC*, January 2, 1932.

⁷⁰ “Los inductores morales del crimen de Castilblanco,” *La Nación*, January 5, 1932.

its peripheral location, the Right also echoed Sanjurjo in claiming that the town was actually a prosperous community free from poverty.⁷¹ Doing so allowed these papers to argue that it was provocateurs rather than socio-economic conditions that were igniting the latent violence of rural Spain.

To take an example, *La Nación* interviewed a law student who was from Castilblanco but living in Madrid who claimed that the town's civil guards "lived with the residents in the most perfect harmony," currying favor by tolerating off-season hunting and fishing.⁷² However, "at the start of the Socialist propaganda, Castilblanco's moral conditions changed. 'It was,' he adds, 'this propaganda made by the deputies García, Muiño, and Nelken that incited the spirits, leaving in them a restless state of rebellion and of hate.'" ⁷³ Interestingly, despite the student's theory about the effects of Socialist propaganda, the guards' behavior that he describes seems to match Corporal Blanco's predecessor. Perhaps the real shift in the town's attitude towards its guards was more related to the rigid policing style of the new commandant rather than the new propaganda in town.

Along with the scapegoating of Socialists like Nelken, the right-wing press used Sanjurjo's words to extend the implications of the incident beyond the Civil Guard to the nation as a whole. For the conservative *Diario de Barcelona*, as for Sanjurjo, the alleged

⁷¹ Chaput, "Castilblanco: Marginación de la periferia," 204. *ABC* did both, claiming that Castilblanco was a miserable town surrounded by rich lands because it is "consumed in internal struggles, of African ferocity, and primal instincts." "Se consume en las luchas internas, de ferocidad africana, y los instintos primarios." "Después del asesinato," *ABC*, January 3, 1932.

⁷² "Convivían con el vecindario en la más perfecta armonía." Quoted in "Después del asesinato de los cuatro guardias civiles en Castilblanco," *ABC*, January 7, 1932.

⁷³ "Al iniciarse las propagandas socialistas, cambiaron las condiciones morales de Castilblanco. 'Fueron—añade— estas propagandas realizadas por los diputados García, Muiño y Nelken, las que soliviantaron los espíritus, dejando en los mismos un fermento de rebeldía y de odios.'" *Ibid.*

mutilations of the corpses, rather than the deaths themselves, were most shocking, offending the honor of not only the Civil Guard but also of all of Spain as a civilized European country. It concluded that “in order for Spain not to have to be ashamed of itself before the others, a proportional reparation for the infamous massacre is necessary.”⁷⁴

This talk of a crackdown to restore order or even take revenge appealed to some civil guards who feared that they might meet a fate similar to that of their comrades in Castilblanco. The Communist-sympathizing deputy José Antonio Balbontín claimed that he overheard a Civil Guard colonel on a train who insisted “that the Republic hadn’t defended the Civil Guard effectively [and] that the Civil Guard would have to defend itself [and] that what had to be done, and what he recommended to his subordinates, was to react furiously against the first worker or peasant protest that came within range.”⁷⁵ One of the Castilblanco prisoners also recalled that “a guard said, ‘I believe Miss Nelken is coming,’ and others replied, ‘if that bitch comes, we’re going to shoot her down.’”⁷⁶ These anecdotes were no doubt exaggerated, but they capture the Civil Guard’s state of fear and anger after Castilblanco.

There were rumors that guards were in fact ready to rebel then and there, and one guard recalls that his comrades in the 4th Division (*Tercio*) (Seville) were prepared to take

⁷⁴ “Para que España no tenga que avergonzarse ante las demás, es necesaria una reparación proporcionada a la infame hecatombe.” “La mayor vileza,” *Diario de Barcelona* January 5, 1932.

⁷⁵ “Que la República no defendía con eficacia a la Guardia civil, que la Guardia civil tendría que defenderse por sí misma, que lo que había que hacer y así lo recomendaba él a sus subordinados, era reaccionar furiosamente contra la primera manifestación obrera o campesina que se pusiera a tiro.” Statement of Deputy Balbontín, *DSCD*, January 6, 1932.

⁷⁶ “Un guardia dijo: «Creo que viene la señorita Nelken», y otros contestaban: «Si viene esa tía puta la vamos a pegar cuatro tiros.»” Declaration of Florencio Bravo Nieto, quoted in *Castilblanco*, 208.

this step against a government that “tolerated the insults and infamous injuries” against their institution.⁷⁷ They concluded that “we had to adopt an attitude consistent with the magnitude of the Extremaduran tragedy. We could not and should not remain in suicidal and cowardly passivity.”⁷⁸ In their desire to avenge Castilblanco’s insult to their honor, they fantasized about violent and extralegal acts of revenge. One of them wanted “some men to march to Castilblanco and burn the town along with all its inhabitants.”⁷⁹ Another suggested shooting “all the authors, accomplices, and accessories, and, above all, the political instigators, without waiting for the end of the trial. . . [thereby] taking justice into our own hands.”⁸⁰ In the end, they decided that they would put their trust totally in the hands of Sanjurjo regarding what course of action to take.⁸¹

Upon Sanjurjo’s return to Madrid, he had a meeting with the field officers there. They too were ready to rebel against the government that they blamed for Castilblanco. However, despite his bravado at the funeral, Sanjurjo was not prepared to take this step. According to Esteban-Infantes, he explained that if the Civil Guard rebelled it would do so alone and would seem to be doing so only for its own benefit, rather than that of the *patria*.⁸² Even as Sanjurjo made the political calculus about whether or not to rebel, he was sure to keep in mind public opinion and introduced the idea of the need to defend the

⁷⁷ “Toleraba los insultos y las infamantes injurias.” Gallego Pérez, *Lucha contra el crimen*, 176. These rumors are mentioned frequently in the January 5th edition of *El Sol*. See also “Acerca de una supuesta entrevista entre el Sr. Lerroux y el general Sanjurjo,” *ABC*, January 8, 1932.

⁷⁸ “No podíamos ni debíamos permanecer en una suicida y cobarde pasividad. No podíamos ni debíamos permanecer en una suicida y cobarde pasividad.” Gallego Pérez, *Lucha contra el crimen*, 176.

⁷⁹ “Marchar a Castilblanco unos cuantos y pegarle fuego al pueblo con todos sus habitantes.” *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ “Sin esperar la terminación del Sumario, a los autores, cómplices y encubridores y, sobre todo, a los instigadores políticos. . . haciendo justicia por nuestra propia mano.” *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 177-78.

⁸² Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 177.

Spanish nation in order to maintain at least the pretense of political neutrality. At the same time, he did not make much of an effort to calm down his men. Instead, he forwarded a letter signed by the Civil Guard colonels to Casares Quiroga that hinted that if the government did not crackdown on disorder, the Civil Guard would take matters into its own hands.⁸³ Then, in a general order Sanjurjo issued to the corps on the 7th, he urged his men to “follow our regulations exactly,” including the controversial Article 7 of the *Cartilla*, assuring them, in his usual parental manner, that “I don’t need to repeat to you that, doing your duty as you do, I will always answer for you. I know that I have your confidence; rest absolutely assured that you have mine most completely and all my affection.”⁸⁴

Sanjurjo was not the only one reaffirming his confidence in the Civil Guard. The Right mobilized in every way it could to show its support as never before.⁸⁵ On the day of the funeral in Badajoz, sympathizers lined up all day to pay their respects at the Civil Guard headquarters.⁸⁶ The conservative Valencian paper *Las Provincias* had effusive praise for Sanjurjo and the Civil Guard, referencing the idea of the nation to assert that “his labor is among the most significant and patriotic that has been done in Spain” and that “without Sanjurjo and without the Civil Guard, the nation would not survive in these

⁸³ González Calleja, *Nombre de la autoridad*, 101-02.

⁸⁴ “Cumplid exactamente nuestros Reglamentos.” “No necesito repetiros que, cumpliendo como os digo, responderé siempre por vosotros. Sé que tengo vuestra confianza; tened la absoluta seguridad de que tenéis la mía más completa y todo mi cariño.” “Orden general del Cuerpo del día 7 de Enero de 1932,” *BOGC* 7, no. 2 (10 January 1932): 33.

⁸⁵ Rivas Gómez, “Entierro del Alférez,” 152.

⁸⁶ “Graves sucesos de Badajoz,” 39.

times.”⁸⁷ All of these displays were more about demonstrating the Right’s support of the Civil Guard than mourning the dead at Castilblanco. Perhaps the best example was a mass in Bilbao to which guards were invited. According to left-republican Vicente Patrás, after the service, both the clerics and guards joined in a pro-Civil Guard demonstration in which the crowd shouted not only “long live the Civil Guard” but also “Death to the Republic.”⁸⁸ On the 7th, after a funeral for the slain guards attended by Sanjurjo in Madrid, a crowd also began shouting “death to Miss Nelken” as well as “long live the Civil Guard.”⁸⁹

Just as in more ordinary circumstances, the Right reaffirmed its support of the Civil Guard both through displays honoring the institution and through financial assistance. Funerals for the fallen guards were held around the country, and a large service in Madrid even sparked a pro-Civil Guard demonstration that had to be broken up by the Assault Guard.⁹⁰ Contributions to the families of the deceased civil guards were also a symbol of support. In fact, the incident received so much attention that the Civil Guard was able to give about twice as much money to each Castilblanco family as to those of the other guards who died in the line of duty in 1931 and 1932.⁹¹ Yet, for

⁸⁷ “Su labor es de las más trascendentales y de las más patrióticas que se han hecho en España.” “Sin Sanjurjo y sin la Guardia Civil, no quedaría en estos instantes de la nación.” “Palabras del general Sanjurjo,” *Las Provincias*, January 6, 1932.

⁸⁸ “Viva la Guardia civil.” “Muera la República.” *DSCD*, January 20, 1932.

⁸⁹ “Después de los sucesos de Castilblanco y Arnedo,” *Diario de Barcelona*, January 8, 1932.

⁹⁰ From January 5th to 8th *ABC* dedicated a full page every day to documenting funerals, homages, donations, and other demonstrations of support from around the country. “Después de los trágicos sucesos de Castilblanco. Funerales por las víctimas y homenajes a la Guardia Civil,” *ABC*, January 8, 1932. A demonstration after another funeral in Valencia had to be broken up by police after they feared violence would erupt with a counter-demonstration. “La fuerza pública disuelve en Valencia una manifestación formada al terminar unos funerales por los guardias muertos en Castilblanco,” *Ahora*, January 10, 1932.

⁹¹ “Antecedentes oficiales de distribución de los donativos hechos a las familias de las víctimas de tropa de la Guardia Civil, a partir del advenimiento de la República,” *BOGC* 7, no. 335 (10 December 1932): 1030-37.

Sanjurjo, this was not enough: “In my opinion, the authorities cannot limit themselves to attending the burials and giving some alms to the families of the victims.”⁹² Presumably, he also wanted them to silence all criticism of the Civil Guard.

Gender played a prominent role in the Right’s reaction to Castilblanco as well. If Nelken was the Civil Guard’s most sinister enemy as a woman seeking to upend society itself, then those women who sought to maintain the status quo would have to be mobilized to counter her and defend an institution that was perceived as having the same goal they did. Indeed, some society women accompanied their signatures at the Civil Guard’s headquarters with denunciations of Nelken. They also formed a commission that asked the President of the Congress of Deputies to have her expelled from the body and staged a demonstration in favor of the Civil Guard in front of the Ministry of War.⁹³

4.3.2. The Socialists Take Back the Narrative

The fact that four civil guards had been killed during a Socialist strike was embarrassing for the movement and threatened to undermine both its campaign against the Civil Guard and its public image more generally. Socialists would have to defend themselves in three key arenas of democratic contestation: the press, the parliament, and the courts. At first, party moderates took the lead in the Cortes by presenting a muted response acceptable to their republican allies, but more radical critics of the Civil Guard were already returning to their old talking points in the press. By the time the alleged

⁹² “A mi juicio, el Poder público no puede limitarse a asistir a los entierros y otorgar unas limosnas a las familias de las víctimas.” In Armiñan, “General Sanjurjo hace a ‘Heraldo’ un relato.”

⁹³ “Repercusiones de los sucesos palpitantes en la situación política y parlamentaria,” *ABC*, January 6, 1932 and Emilio Esteban-Infantes, *Apuntes para la historia: La sublevación del General Sanjurjo* (Madrid, 1933), 29.

murderers of the four guards were put on trial, the old Civil Guard practice of torturing prisoners enabled the Socialists to reverse the dominant Castilblanco narrative, turning the town's residents into the victims. The Socialists may have succeeded in neutralizing the political advantage that the Civil Guard and its supporters stood to gain in the aftermath of the incident, but their continued criticism of the institution, without regard for its sensitivity to insult, ensured that any chance of reconciliation between the two was lost, setting the stage for further conflict.

The responses to Castilblanco by the Socialists in the press followed a pattern similar to those of the Right. Initially, they also denounced the killings. Francisco Largo Caballero denied that his party had ever had violent intentions against the Civil Guard and even claimed that Castilblanco's *Casa del Pueblo* had not been admitted to the UGT.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, after a few days, some Socialists began to search for ways to divert attention away from the fact that the civil guards had died during one of their strikes to their own understanding of the underlying causes of the Republic's violence.⁹⁵ Whereas the Right saw the causes of the incident in the combination of the savage nature of the villagers and the incendiary rhetoric that the Republic permitted, the Socialists looked to socio-economic structures, blaming poverty and, as usual, *caciquismo*. Yet in their eagerness to seize control of the narrative in the press, Socialists wound up repeating, even in the wake of these deaths, their usual talking points that guards had already found offensive. The result was an increased tension between the two groups than began to approach the level of animosity between the Civil Guard and the anarchists.

⁹⁴ "Repercusiones de los sucesos."

⁹⁵ Chaput, "Castilblanco: marginación de la periferia," 193-94.

The Socialists dispatched two of their deputies, Manuel Muiño and Celestino García Santos to Castilblanco to investigate on behalf of the party, and they found that the *caciquismo* system was alive and well there while the townspeople lived in a “state of misery” far from the prosperity reported by the Right.⁹⁶ Over the past three years, there had been a serious employment crisis, but the local government, which they claimed was monarchist, had embezzled relief funds sent by the Republic. Yet ultimately their conclusion in light of these conditions was the same despite what had transpired in Castilblanco: they demanded that Álvarez Ugena, who they said had failed to address Castilblanco’s problems, be dismissed.⁹⁷

Some Socialists also seized the opportunity presented by Castilblanco to reiterate their denunciations of the Civil Guard, even if it was perhaps not the most opportune time to do so. García told a reporter from the republican daily *El Sol* on the 2nd that “these events, even if they are not excused, are explained by the excesses of authority,” and he proceeded to point out several cases of the Civil Guard committing what he saw as abuses in Badajoz Province.⁹⁸ Muiño added that “I am convinced that if in Castilblanco there had not been the Civil Guard, nothing would have happened.”⁹⁹ As for Nelken, in an editorial published in *El Socialista* the next day, she stopped just short of arguing that the murders were justified. She claimed that when some townspeople had asked for work, Corporal

⁹⁶ “Estado de miseria.” “Las gestiones de los compañeros Manuel Muiño y Celestino García consiguen del juez especial un trato humano a los detenidos de Castilblanco,” *La Verdad Social*, January 8, 1932.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ “Estos sucesos, si no se disculpan, se explican por los excesos de autoridad.” In “El subsecretario de Gobernación presidirá el entierro de los guardias civiles muertos en Castilblanco,” *El Sol*, January 2, 1932.

⁹⁹ “Yo estoy convencido de que si en Castilblanco no hubiera habido Guardia civil nada hubiese pasado.” In *Ibid.*

Blanco told them that “the work that he would give them would be the rod.”¹⁰⁰ She continued, “we are the first to recognize that the death of those four civil guards of Castilblanco constitutes a shameful act of barbarism, but we cannot help but also recognize that beasts will be beasts, and that the man treated like a beast and induced to be a beast cannot, in the moment, respond in any other way.”¹⁰¹ As time went on, the more radical Socialists also returned to their full criticism of the Civil Guard. Even a month after Castilblanco, the editor of *La Verdad Social* was again denouncing the Civil Guard as “above all law and all authority. . . as in [the] dictatorial era” for reportedly attempting to censor his newspaper.¹⁰²

At this point, while actually killing critics like Nelken was no more than a fantasy for the civil guards, they could make at least a token effort to silence people like her. Military prosecutors filed charges against several Socialists, including Nelken, for insulting the Civil Guard in the press, but, probably not coincidentally, all of the authors were deputies in the Cortes, and the body never granted a suspension of their parliamentary immunity. Nelken was the most common target of these accusations; she had at least three cases opened against her for articles in *La Verdad Social* and *El Socialista* written both in the lead-up and aftermath of the FNTT strike.¹⁰³ All told, such

¹⁰⁰ “El trabajo se lo daría él con una estaca.” “Después de la huelga de Badajoz: Lo que se debe comprender,” *El Socialista*, January 3, 1932.

¹⁰¹ “Somos los primeros en reconocer que la muerte de aquellos cuatro guardias civiles de Castilblanco constituye un vergonzoso acto de barbarie; pero no podemos por menos de reconocer también que las fieras no tienen por qué conducirse sino como fieras, y que el hombre tratado como una fiera e inducido a ser fiera, no puede, llegado el momento, responder de otro modo.” *Ibid.*

¹⁰² “Por encima de toda ley y de toda autoridad. . . como en época dictatorial.” “El gobernador de Badajoz contra los socialistas,” *El Socialista*, February 5, 1932.

¹⁰³ The files for these cases can be found in AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Recursos, legajo 85, exp. 1906; AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Recursos, legajo 86, exp. 6; and AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Recursos, legajo 86, exp. 1905.

accusations appear to have been little more than nuisances to the accused, given their parliamentary immunity, but they did create at least the illusion that something was being done to defend the Civil Guard's honor against insult. Yet all this attention did nothing to tarnish Nelken's popularity among Badajoz's working classes. She continued her speaking tours in the province and even had a street in Almendralejo named after her.¹⁰⁴

Meanwhile, democratic governance and a free press meant that an event as shocking as Castilblanco would also be debated in the parliament and the courts, and the press would relate all that transpired to the public. These forums brought the different interpretations of the incident into dialogue with each other, highlighting the agendas and motivations behind each one. In the Cortes, the debate within the PSOE about how aggressively to target an institution like the Civil Guard that was part of the Republican state reduced the Socialists to a tepid response that simply repeated standard talking points. There was even more division among the republican parties, whose reactions ranged from strong condemnation of the Civil Guard (the Radical Socialists) to an equally strong condemnation of the Socialists (the Radicals). Although President Azaña could still find near consensus in suggesting that the institution should at least be respected as part of the Republic, how long such agreement would be possible was an open question.

The Cortes was in recess until January 5th. On that day, the Castilblanco media frenzy was at its height, and how the issue would be addressed in the Cortes was awaited with anticipation.¹⁰⁵ In fact, tensions indicative of the disunity within the PSOE erupted

¹⁰⁴ "Margarita Nelken, de viaje," *El Socialista*, February 5, 1932.

¹⁰⁵ Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 426.

even before the debate began. That morning, Nelken gave an impassioned speech to the Socialist parliamentary group in which she spoke of the poverty of Castilblanco's residents and the abuses of the Civil Guard. Manuel Muiño retorted that she was a dangerous provocateur of Badajoz's workers. It was agreed that Andrés Saborit, who did not represent Badajoz, would speak for the Socialists in parliament that day.¹⁰⁶

The raucous debate before the full Cortes captured how both the various republican parties and the Socialists used Castilblanco for their own political ends and how even Nelken's own party rejected her challenge to the patriarchy of the Spanish political system.¹⁰⁷ Radical Diego Hidalgo began the discussion with rhetoric as harsh as any in the right-wing press, more focused on discrediting the Socialists than the Castilblanco incident itself. He called for the application of the Ley de Defensa de la República and argued that the Socialists should have protested to the government or the Cortes rather than launching a strike. He then went on to suggest that the strike had been provoked by two or three Socialist leaders, among them the deputy for Badajoz Nicolás de Pablo, who Hidalgo claimed had been stripped of his post in the provincial government. Later in the debate, the Carlist Joaquín Beunza accused two other Socialist deputies for Badajoz, Nelken and Muiño, of being the instigators.¹⁰⁸ Nelken tried to defend herself, but members of her own party instead escorted her out of the chamber.¹⁰⁹

As for the Socialist who was allowed to speak, Saborit reiterated his party's usual talking points, arguing that the strike was peaceful and that structural problems such as

¹⁰⁶ Preston, "Margarita Nelken," 324-25.

¹⁰⁷ Baumeister, "Castilblanco or the Limits of Democracy," 6.

¹⁰⁸ *DSCD*, January 5, 1932.

¹⁰⁹ Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 427.

caciquismo, poverty, and poor communications, rather than particular individuals, were responsible for the crime.¹¹⁰ The Radical Socialist Eduardo Ortega y Gasset went further than the Socialists were willing and took the opportunity of the death of four civil guards to criticize their institution and call for its reform.¹¹¹ He had some reasonable points, such as that the Civil Guard was the only gendarmerie in Europe still armed with rifles, that military jurisdiction should not be applied to such cases, and that “we have to concern ourselves with the mentality of the armed force with which we have to defend the public order,” proposing that its revered *Cartilla* be changed.¹¹² However, he also, as Azaña put it, raised for discussion “the prestige of the institution, as if these guards had been not the killed, but rather the killers.”¹¹³ Ortega y Gasset said that the Civil Guard “is habituated to obey the *cacique*” and has a mentality that sees the *pueblo* as a “contemptable rabble.”¹¹⁴ He also called the institution the toughest gendarmerie in Europe, prompting Beunza to accuse him of insulting the force. Most provocatively, he suggested that the *pueblo* was not guilty of the crime, but rather, “we could have avoided that barbarism produced by causes that justified it in a way.”¹¹⁵

Ortega y Gasset’s speech sparked a debate among several deputies over whether or not crimes against the Civil Guard should be tried by court-martial. At this point, Azaña felt the need to intervene as a voice of moderation. He pointed out the fact that the

¹¹⁰ *DSCD*, January 5, 1932.

¹¹¹ Vidarte, *Cortes constituyentes*, 299.

¹¹² “Tenemos que preocuparnos de que la mentalidad y la manera de proceder de la fuerza armada, con la cual tenemos que defender el orden público.” *DSCD*, January 5, 1932.

¹¹³ “El prestigio del Instituto, como si hubieran sido estos guardias, no los muertos, sino los matadores.” *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ “Está habituada a obedecer al cacique.” “Chusma desdeñable.” *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ “Evitemos que esa barbarie se produzca por causas que la justifican en cierto modo.” *Ibid.*

deputies had turned Castilblanco into a political question but that it was not the fault of any political party. He denounced those who used the Castilblanco dead as a political weapon, observing that to attack the Civil Guard was to attack the Republic, of which the institution was now an obedient part.¹¹⁶ This position suggested that left republicans had fully accepted the Civil Guard as a necessary component of a Republic that was not afraid to assert its authority. The fact that everyone except the Radicals applauded the speech, considered one of Azaña's best, demonstrates that at this point there was still room for the full acceptance of the Civil Guard into the Republican system.¹¹⁷

Competing interpretations of the Castilblanco incident also collided at the trial of those accused of the murders, but this time the Socialists and the military were the ones to confront each other. For the military, the trial was an open-and-shut case of bringing 22 residents of Castilblanco to justice not so much for the murder of the civil guards as for offending their honor. As for the Socialists, the trial was about working within the Republican system (in this case, its courts) to point out to a mass audience the continuities between that system and the old regime. The Socialist team of defenders had little chance of winning the case, but they could highlight that the Civil Guard had tortured prisoners, that a court-martial was trying civilians in peacetime, and that the real problem was *caciquismo*. In sum, the two parties presented sharply contrasting beliefs on the source of political violence under the Republic. For the military, it was provocateurs and disorderly elements who refused to respect the armed forces. For the Socialists, it

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 427-28.

was a repressive social structure in which the state colluded with the rich to suppress the poor.

After the debates in the Congress of Deputies, Juan-Simeón Vidarte, the body's secretary and a Socialist, set off on his investigative trip to Castilblanco. Along the way, he was joined by a local lawyer, Anselmo Trejo Gallardo, and they began to plan a defense for those accused of the Castilblanco murders. Recognizing that winning any kind of clemency from a military tribunal was going to be an uphill battle, they resolved to enlist the aid of the Socialists' greatest legal scholar, Luis Jiménez de Asúa.¹¹⁸ Their best hope was a photograph of the prisoners being tortured in the town hall that Trejo had obtained from a Badajoz newspaperman (see Image 4.5). Nevertheless, the truth was that the accused probably never stood a chance at the trial, and the Socialists only dedicated their top lawyers to the case because they knew it was going to be a sensation and it gave them the chance to recast the civil guards as the villains in the Castilblanco story.¹¹⁹ The proceedings would also put into public view what the Socialists considered to be the injustice of trying civilians by court-martial. Either way, the trial, to take place July 17-19, 1933 in Badajoz, was not going to be about the guilt or innocence of the accused, it was going to be about whether the Civil Guard or the Socialists were to have their way under the new regime.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Vidarte, *Cortes constituyentes*, 306.

¹¹⁹ Baumeister has a somewhat different take on why the Socialists gave the Castilblanco defendants their top lawyers. He writes that the Socialists "took the court-martial as an opportunity to test the degree of democratisation" of the justice system achieved by the Republic. "Castilblanco or the Limits of Democracy," 6-7.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.




Image 4.5: The Photograph of Castilblanco Prisoners being Tortured
Castilblanco, 214.

The prosecuting attorney, Ricardo Calderón, accused 22 people of insulting the armed forces, intending to insult the armed forces, illegally demonstrating, and profaning corpses.¹²¹ Given that, as one of the defense attorneys put it, “no one can affirm with surety who injured or killed,” Calderón did not present any murder charges, but that did not matter since he could still ask for the death penalty for six of the accused for insulting the armed forces.¹²² He requested prison terms for the rest, including six life sentences.¹²³ In Spain’s inquisitorial military justice system, Calderón had only to guard

¹²¹ “Calificación definitiva del fiscal,” in *Castilblanco*, 113.

¹²² “Nadie puede afirmar con seguridad quién hirió o mató.” “Informe del letrado Sr. Reodríguez Sastre al consejo de guerra,” in *Castilblanco*, 224.

¹²³ Sánchez Recio, introduction to *Castilblanco*, 29-30.

against the arguments of the defense since the military investigative judge had already laid out the evidence and recommended a guilty verdict. The judge had even gone so far as to suggest that the murders had been planned, echoing the Right's interpretation of the event.¹²⁴ And Calderón had what appeared to be a strong case anyway: many of the defendants had already confessed, some had been found with blood on their clothes and/or with weapons, and there were plenty of witnesses. Therefore, he kept his oral argument short, just briefly reminding the judges of the most incriminating evidence for each defendant.

However, a closer look at his speech reveals that most of the evidence Calderón had was just a jumble of contradictory witness statements—the 84 witnesses seemingly all pointing fingers at each other.¹²⁵ As for the physical evidence, most of it consisted of weapons found at the scene that could not be definitely linked to any particular individual. For example, Calderón cited five witnesses accusing Cristina Luengo, the only woman of the 22, of instigating the attack and of dancing in the blood of the fallen guards, but he provided no other evidence to prove these claims.¹²⁶ Most importantly, Calderón built his case entirely on confessions and testimonies made during the initial Civil Guard investigation of the incident, not on depositions made during the main judicial hearing at which the defense attorneys were present.¹²⁷ Calderón tried, rather tenuously, to use contradictions in the defendants' testimonies to argue that they had

¹²⁴ “Calificación definitiva del fiscal,” in *Castilblanco*, 113 and “Informe del letrado Sr. Vidarte al consejo de guerra,” in *Castilblanco*, 149.

¹²⁵ “Calificación definitiva del fiscal,” in *Castilblanco*, 97-101.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 100.

¹²⁷ Baumeister, “Castilblanco or the Limits of Democracy,” 8.

agreed on what to say in advance at the main hearing but then did not remember exactly what they were supposed to say. He was especially eager to discredit the assertion that all the defendants were mistreated during the initial investigation by suggesting that several rescinded their initial confessions by falsely claiming they were maltreated.¹²⁸ However, it is also entirely possible that the stories of maltreatment were true and that the confessions were obtained under duress.

The Socialist defense team consisted of four attorneys in all, the fourth being Antonio Rodríguez Sastre, who was perhaps brought in because he was in the military.¹²⁹ They divided up the defendants, with Trejo, as the least experienced, taking the simplest cases and Jiménez de Asúa the four most difficult.¹³⁰ Since many of the defendants had made incriminating statements during their initial interrogations (although almost all were later retracted), the defense was forced to undermine rather than strengthen the credibility of its clients' statements. Fortunately for them, all the defenders were able to highlight major inconsistencies in each of their clients' testimonies and suggest that their clients had been fabricating stories under torture. For example, between January 1st and 5th Hilario Bermejo gave four declarations and told a different story every time.¹³¹ Calderón requested the death penalty for Pedro "El Garrucho" Álvarez Bravo, for five witnesses had testified against him, but Rodríguez Sastre pointed out that every one of these witnesses later testified that he or she had been mistreated by civil guards.¹³²

¹²⁸ "Calificación definitiva del fiscal," in *Castilblanco*, 102-10.

¹²⁹ Sánchez Recio, introduction to *Castilblanco*, 43.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹³¹ "Informe del letrado Sr. Vidarte al consejo de guerra," in *Castilblanco*, 174-75.

¹³² "Informe del letrado Sr. Rodríguez Sastre al consejo de guerra," in *Castilblanco*, 201-02.

Indeed, Rodríguez Sastre in particular devoted much of his oral argument to highlighting how both defendants and witnesses stated that they were tortured by a wide variety of methods usually involving being beaten while tied in a distorted and painful position.¹³³ Some of the defendants even needed medical assistance and had medical examinations that confirmed the presence of blunt-force injuries.¹³⁴ In fact, the investigative judge had admitted that some guards had mistreated the prisoners by asking that their institution as a whole not be blamed for their actions. As a military man himself, this judge could not help but defend the honor of the Civil Guard, even if it undermined his recommendation that the defendants be found guilty.¹³⁵

The defense team went beyond seeking to prove the innocence of its clients by also bringing the Socialist Party's alternative view of guilt and justice into the courtroom, which saw the Republic as the defender of the *pueblo* rather than necessarily the enforcer of a legal code inherited from the monarchy. The defenders began by arguing that it was impossible to determine which particular individuals had killed the civil guards, for they had not been killed by individuals but rather by the crowd, even the entire *pueblo*, as a collective act.¹³⁶ They then suggested that guilt actually lay not on an individual but on a social phenomenon: *caciquismo*. For instance, the beginning of Trejo's statement read like an article in *El Socialista*. He described Castilblanco as mired in medieval feudalism, "that is to say, in *caciquismo* and the oppression of a barbaric capitalist

¹³³ Ibid., 201-19.

¹³⁴ "Informe del letrado Sr. Jiménez de Asúa al consejo de guerra," in *Castilblanco*, 254.

¹³⁵ "Rectificación de Jiménez de Asúa," in *Castilblanco*, 308.

¹³⁶ "Informe del letrado Sr. Rodríguez Sastre al consejo de guerra," in *Castilblanco*, 227 and "Rectificación de Jiménez de Asúa," in *Castilblanco*, 311.

economic system, of an irresponsible and unaccountable political regime.”¹³⁷ For him, it was capitalism that was barbaric rather than Castilblanco’s residents. As for the Civil Guard, no echo of Azaña’s vision of the force as in the service of the Republic was to be found here. Instead, Trejo stated that the Civil Guard “was in Castilblanco a force of protection and blind obedience to the abuses and injustices of the *cacique*.”¹³⁸ Vidarte went so far as to criticize the *Reglamento* as archaic and with precepts of “blind obedience and absolute impunity.”¹³⁹ The defenders argued that the Civil Guard was so dangerous that the *pueblo*’s actions were actually self-defense, after all, Simón Martín had fired first, and, Vidarte argued, the protesters felt they had to respond by killing all the guards because their institution’s discipline was such that if one fired all the others would follow suit.¹⁴⁰ Such assertions may have appealed to Socialist readers of the book that the defense lawyers published of their statements, but they can hardly have been likely to convince the officers who made up the court-martial.

The final strategy that the defenders tried was the insanity plea; they argued that their clients had temporarily lost their minds while in the midst of the angry mob.¹⁴¹ Therefore, again, no one individual could be blamed for the murders, only the crowd as a whole.¹⁴² Jiménez de Asúa, later to write a book on criminal psychology himself,

¹³⁷ “Es decir, en el caciquismo y la opresión de un bárbaro sistema económico capitalista, de regimen político irresponsable e impunista.” “Informe del letrado Sr. Trejo al consejo de guerra,” in *Castilblanco*, 121.

¹³⁸ “Fué en Castilblanco una fuerza de protección y obediencia ciega al cacique para sus atropellos e injusticias.” *Ibid.*, 120.

¹³⁹ “Ciega obediencia y de impunidad absoluta.” “Rectificación del letrado Señor Vidarte,” in *Castilblanco*, 320.

¹⁴⁰ “Informe del letrado Sr. Vidarte al consejo de guerra,” in *Castilblanco*, 146, 167.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 161.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 160.

pursued this line of argument the furthest.¹⁴³ Much of his oral statement reads like a literature review of the field of crowd psychology, which was burgeoning at the time. All the leading figures such as Gustave Le Bon, Sigmund Freud, and Gabriel Tarde make appearances.¹⁴⁴ Jiménez de Asúa even included a discussion of the Italian jurisprudence on the subject.¹⁴⁵ While his learnedness doubtless impressed readers of the published version of the trial's proceedings, he must have only confused the judges, who were simply officers rather than legal scholars. It seems unlikely they were open to adopting the esoteric legal maneuvers he suggested, such as his idea of the "legitimate defense of the multitude."¹⁴⁶ Of course, one could argue that when civil guards were the ones doing the killings they were also experiencing a momentary collective insanity, but Jiménez de Asúa must have felt confident that they would never defend themselves in that way since doing so would involve admitting that their discipline was not always as ironclad as they claimed.

Once the defense had rested its case, Calderón added an unusual twist to the trial during his rebuttal: he dropped the charges against one of the accused, Cristina Luengo.¹⁴⁷ Trejo had dedicated a good half of his statement to her case, noting contradictions in the witness statements against her and arguing that these were only based on rumors about her anyway. He also appealed to the judges' emotions by pointing out that she was a mother who had to look after her children.¹⁴⁸ He even compared her to

¹⁴³ *Psicoanálisis criminal* (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1940).

¹⁴⁴ "Informe del letrado Sr. Jiménez de Asúa al consejo de guerra," in *Castilblanco*, 265-86.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 283-85.

¹⁴⁶ "Legítima defensa de la muchedumbre." *Ibid.*, 297. More 296-99.

¹⁴⁷ "Rectificación del fiscal D. Ricardo Calderón," in *Castilblanco*, 304.

¹⁴⁸ "Informe del letrado Sr. Trejo al consejo de guerra," in *Castilblanco*, 122-34.

Louise Michel and Rosa Luxemburg, calling her “the martyr of the proletariat, sacrificed and maltreated, as so many others, by the talons of *caciquismo*, [that] enemy of civilization and of humanity, and by the tangled oppressor of a barbarous judicial and social system.”¹⁴⁹ Even though her nickname was “the Butch,” Trejo’s argument that a woman should not be mixed up in the man’s business of challenging the Civil Guard’s honor and facing its retaliation proved convincing. Luengo’s case stands in contrast to that of Nelken’s. While Luengo may or may not have directly participated in the Castilblanco murders, her position as prisoner and defendant allowed Trejo to portray her as a helpless victim; whereas, Nelken’s position of power and continued criticism of the Civil Guard made her a better villain, even if an untouchable one.



Image 4.6: Anselmo Trejo Gallardo and his Clients, Including Cristina Luengo with her Child
Jiménez de Asúa et al., *Castilblanco*, 131.

¹⁴⁹ “Informe del letrado Sr. Trejo al consejo de guerra,” in *Castilblanco*, 132. “La mártir del proletariado, inmolada y maltrecha, como tantas otras, por las garras del caciquismo, enemigo de la civilización y de la humanidad, y por el tinglado opresor de un bárbaro sistema jurídico y social.” “Rectificación de Anselmo Trejo Gallardo,” in *Castilblanco*, 324.

Aside from Luengo, the court-martial found all the other Castilblanco defendants guilty and handed down the six death sentences and six life sentences, with the rest receiving short sentences that they had already served out. Were the 21 found guilty the ones who killed Castilblanco's four civil guards? We will never have a precise answer. But the Castilblanco trial was never about determining who the murderers were. For the prosecution, as the charge of "insulting the armed forces" suggests, the trial was about avenging the insult to their institution's honor more than the deaths of the four civil guards. For the defense, it was an attempt to recast the residents of Castilblanco as the victims in the incident rather than a realistic hope that they would be acquitted. The trial proved an example of the Republic's continuation of the military's role as the legal defender of the Civil Guard's honor. But the Socialists' defense of the accused also constituted one of the most strident criticisms yet of the Civil Guard's place in the Republic.

4.5. Conclusion

The isolated town of Castilblanco saw two significant changes in 1931 that brought it more in touch with the rest of Spain. First, a new Civil Guard station commandant began enforcing the letter of the law in a way that was unfamiliar to the town. Second, an ascendant Socialist presence began to give Castilblanco's residents the idea that they could organize to demand a better life. These two opposing visions of justice came into direct confrontation on December 31, 1931 (during a provincial strike that was itself the product of tensions between the Socialists and the Civil Guard), when the *pueblo* (or at least a sizable portion of it) decided spontaneously to dispose of these four men trying to impose an outside law upon them. Thus the clash between the Civil

Guard's long-held duty to enforce the law and obey orders and the town's new political mobilization set the stage for Castilblanco, but ultimately the murders were contingent upon the individual decisions of Mayor Maganto, Corporal Blanco, and the townspeople.

The deaths opened the gates to a much larger outside intervention in which the Castilblanco drama would be played out on a national rather than local stage. First, more civil guards poured into the town, and there were a precious couple of days in which their vision of justice reigned. The guards themselves had to be the ones to exact retribution for the insult to their honor committed by the town, and they did so by means of torture—the jumbled testimonies and confessions they extracted suggesting that criminal investigation was not the primary goal of these initial interrogations. By January 4th, the Castilblanco *incident* had national attention, but that attention had already shifted from Castilblanco the *town* to Badajoz the provincial capital, where the remarks of one charismatic individual, Sanjurjo, more shaped by his offended honor than political expediency, would set the tone of the scapegoating and conspiracy theorizing that would characterize the Right's reaction to the event. As for the Socialists, many simply continued to repeat their denunciations of *caciquismo* and the Civil Guard as before, even using the Castilblanco trial as a propaganda vehicle. Both sides sought to seize upon the stir generated by the incident to draw attention to their vision of the Republic as the defender of either public order or the working-class *pueblo*. The result of this struggle to take control of Castilblanco's narrative was an increasingly tense political environment that alienated some guards from the government enough for them to contemplate rebellion. This spiral of violence, repression, public outcry, and polarization was to be repeated on a much larger scale in October 1934 (see Chapter Six). Yet by New Years'

Day 1932, the bloodshed of the week of December 31st to January 6th was just getting started.

Chapter 5- Arnedo: Adding Death to Injury

5.1. Introduction

As the deputies were leaving the chamber after the Castilblanco debate, Socialist Deputy Amós Sabrás Gurrea, in tears, announced that he had just received a call from another Socialist deputy for Logroño Province, José Orad de la Torre, saying that “something truly horrible has happened.”¹ While confusion and dismay reigned in the hallways of the congress, reporters turned to Minister of Justice Álvaro de Albornoz for more information, but he responded sarcastically, “now they’re going to be talking every day of killings by the Civil Guard.”² Returning to his office after the debate, Prime Minister Azaña wrote in his diary that reporters were waiting at his door to ask him “if it’s true that some event has occurred. ‘I don’t know anything,’ I responded, ‘ask Interior.’ A little later [Minister of the Interior] Casares enters the office and tells me that, in Arnedo, the Civil Guard has clashed with the *pueblo* and has killed six or eight. Just what we need.”³ Another instance of political violence involving the Civil Guard was indeed about to give Azaña more headaches, but the fact is that Albornoz had not been far off when he remarked that there would be killings by the Civil Guard every day. There had already been six other incidents in the previous four days in which a total of ten civilians had been killed by the Civil Guard and dozens more injured. In Xeresa

¹ “Ha sucedido algo verdaderamente horrible.” Quoted in “Con ocasión de la huelga general, se produjeron ayer en Arnedo lamentabilísimos sucesos, resultado herido un cabo de la Guardia civil y seis paisanos muertos y unos veinticinco heridos, algunos de ellos de mucha gravedad,” *La Rioja*, January 6, 1932.

² “Ahora se va estar hablando todos los días de muertos por la guardia civil.” Quoted in *Ibid.*

³ “Me preguntan si es verdad que ha ocurrido un suceso en Arnedo. «No sé nada —respondo—, pregunten a Gobernación.» A poco de estar en el despacho entre Casares y me cuenta que, en Arnedo, la Guardia civil ha chocado con el pueblo y ha matado a seis u ocho. Es lo que nos faltaba.” Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 427.

(Valencia), for example, four were killed, the same as the number of civil guards killed at Castilblanco, and yet Xeresa did not even make the front page of most newspapers.⁴ Like Castilblanco, however, Arnedo was something exceptional, this time not because guards were killed but rather because of the number of people they killed and the way in which they did so.

At Arnedo, as at Castilblanco, the entrenched military culture of the Civil Guard, the rising challenge to the status quo presented by Socialist mobilization, the efforts of the Republican state to balance these forces, and the decisions of key individuals all came together to both precipitate the incident and give it polarizing implications at the national level. Locally, newly mobilized workers making demands set the stage for the incident (although here in an industrial rather than agricultural setting), but it was ultimately contingent upon the spontaneous decisions of the civil guards present. While it is unclear exactly what happened that day, it is evident that in the chaos of the moment the guards' automatic response was an excessive use of force.

While a combination of local structures and contingent events led to the Arnedo incident, its repercussions would serve to drive a wedge between the Republic and the Civil Guard as a whole. The reactions of both the Socialists and the government sought to advance their visions for the Republic without turning the Civil Guard against it. Socialists replicated their pattern of denouncing the force while also joining the republicans in the government in adopting a moderate official stance. The government contemplated beginning a reform effort while, also predictably, not taking any steps to

⁴ González Calleja, *Nombre de la autoridad*, 113.

alter the system by which the civil guards at Arnedo got away with murder. In the end, the reforms that did take place had much to do with the individual foibles of Azaña on the one hand and the Civil Guard's high-profile director general, Sanjurjo, on the other. When Sanjurjo's concern for honor over political expediency led him to imply that defending the Republic was not his top priority, Azaña had to dismiss him. The blow wounded Sanjurjo's honor enough to push him to join a rebellion that August. While most guards were not yet ready to follow suit, the subsequent reforms that Azaña did enact, which guards interpreted as insulting, planted the idea that their honor might be better maintained through violent rebellion in the name of order and the *patria* than through loyalty to the government in power.

There are few works in the historiography that concern the Arnedo incident specifically. In the 1980s, Roberto Pastor Martínez published a pair of articles that provide an account of the incident and the debate about it in the Cortes.⁵ He concludes that the failure of the government to bring the perpetrators to justice demonstrated that “the impunity of the actions of the police forces continued to be total.”⁶ Then, in 2002, local historian Carlos Gil Andrés published a book-length study of the event that examines its origins, the incident itself, and its aftermath in great detail.⁷ The work is of note for framing the event in the context of worker mobilization during the Second Republic and for considering the civil guards involved as individual actors rather than

⁵ “Una página del movimiento obrero riojano: Sucesos de Arnedo, 5 de enero de 1932,” *Cuadernos de Investigación Histórica* 10 (1984): 193-207 and “Sucesos de 5 de enero 1932 en Arnedo en el Congreso de los Diputados,” *Ibid.*, 209-218.

⁶ “La impunidad en las actuaciones de la fuerza policial siguió siendo total.” “Página del movimiento obrero,” 205.

⁷ *República en la plaza*.

simply faceless agents of the state, which is probably why it has become one of the most widely cited local studies of the Second Republic. At the same time, its thoroughness no doubt explains why virtually no one has published anything on the incident since then. This chapter does not seek to supersede Gil Andrés' work, but rather uses Arnedo as an example of how the Socialist mobilization during the Republic, employer intransigence, and the limited repertoire of the Civil Guard provided the context in which individual actors could make choices that led to local violence with national repercussions.

5.2. The Local Incident: Mobilization, Military Culture, and Contingency in Arnedo

5.2.1. The Origins of the Conflict: A Cast of Actors

As at Castilblanco, the stage for Arnedo was set by a Socialist mobilization that sought to challenge entrenched power structures and usher in a Republic in which the Socialists themselves would hold the reins. While it is impossible to know exactly why the civil guards opened fire that day, characteristics of both the individual actors present and of their organizational cultures more generally may have influenced the guards' spur-of-the-moment decision. The Socialists intended for their strike to be peaceful, but their leaders could not resist employing provocative but not uncommon Socialist rhetoric against *caciques* and guards as a way to work up the crowd. As for the guards, their previous service in Morocco and prior disciplinary infractions suggest they were not the best candidates for ensuring that peace was maintained.

As in Badajoz, worker mobilization in Arnedo had begun during the Restoration period. Yet unlike Castilblanco, by the time of the Second Republic Arnedo was in the process of becoming an industrial town through its growing shoe industry, and it was

somewhat larger, with a population of over 5,000.⁸ It was located in Logroño Province (also known as La Rioja) in northern Spain, which was more industrial in general and lacked the severe land distribution problem of Andalusia and Extremadura. That is not to say that Arnedo was a rich town. Although its shoemakers made a bit more than agricultural laborers, they could still only afford the most spartan existence.⁹ In the first decades of the twentieth century, businessmen had been developing the town's shoe industry, but many of their employees still worked on farms part-time.¹⁰ One of the largest factory owners was Faustino Muro Rubio, who had shrewdly risen from sandal-maker to industrialist in the 1900s. As in rural Badajoz Province, unions were beginning to make inroads into La Rioja around the same time. The UGT maintained a small following in Logroño throughout the Restoration, but the CNT gained much more ground in La Rioja after the anarcho-syndicalists' arrival in 1919.¹¹ The Primo de Rivera dictatorship wiped out the CNT's presence, however, putting the UGT, which had long been seeking to establish itself in Arnedo, in a position to expand rapidly in 1931.¹² Muro had begun his own years-long fight against unionization in 1911, enduring a prolonged strike in 1915 that required a concentration of civil guards.¹³ Since Muro also had political power by being a member of the city council, he can be considered a

⁸ "Alternaciones de los municipios en los Censos de Población desde 1842," INE, copyright 2017, <http://www.ine.es/intercensal/intercensal.do?search=1&cmbTipoBusq=0&textoMunicipio=arnedo&btnBuscarDenom=Consultar+selecci%F3n>.

⁹ Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 170.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 172.

¹¹ Francisco Bermejo Martín, *100 Años de Socialismo en La Rioja (1882-1992)* (Logroño: Gráficas Isasa, 1994), 28, 55, 96, 98.

¹² *Ibid.*, 102, 122.

¹³ Since 1870, the town had boasted a Civil Guard post that became a section headquarters soon after that. Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 231-32.

cacique. This influence aided his efforts to prevent unionization. By 1931, his sandal factory's workers had still not achieved this goal.¹⁴

Municipal elections in April and May 1931 swept republicans and Socialists into Arnedo's town hall, but elites like Muro would not relinquish their socio-economic power so easily.¹⁵ Accounts of the exact sequence of events differ, but it seems that two months earlier, Muro had fired one of his 170 workers, and a republican commission wrote a letter of complaint to the civil governor, saying that the dismissal had occurred for political reasons. The civil governor noted that Muro had encouraged his workers to vote for monarchist candidates in the April elections.¹⁶ Fifteen more of Muro's workers threatened to walk out if he did not hire back the first employee, but his aversion to labor organizing was so great that he simply fired all of these workers as well.¹⁷ The mayor, two civil governors, and an arbitration board all met with Muro to try and get him to rehire the workers, but he would not budge. The negotiations stretched on through the rest of 1931, with Arnedo's growing UGT local, which had opened in June, taking up the workers' cause.¹⁸ On January 5, 1932, regional Socialist leaders were scheduled to meet with the civil governor, Ildefonso Vidal Serrano; the chief of the Civil Guard's Logroño Command, Rodrigo Palacios; the Radical mayor, José María Fernández Velilla Herrero; city councilmen; and factory owners in Arnedo's town hall to negotiate a resolution to the dispute. The Socialists organized a strike for the same day to support their demands that

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 61-67.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 74.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 70.

¹⁷ Statement of Deputy Sabrás, *DSCD*, 6 January 1932, 3015.

¹⁸ AHPLR, GC/M-18/2-6 and Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 74-80.

the workers be rehired and that the eight-hour day be respected.¹⁹ Here was an opportunity for the UGT to demonstrate its new presence in the town and that the *caciques'* authority would no longer go unchallenged.

On the evening of January 4th, regional Socialist leaders used incendiary rhetoric to fire up the crowd in preparation for the strike, even though it was supposed to be peaceful. The speakers there did remind the 600 some people assembled that the strike was to be a peaceful one, with Orad de la Torre even saying that “everyone should be in the street accompanied by their women and children in order to give the sensation that we want peace.”²⁰ Still, such precautions suggest that the leaders anticipated that there could be trouble with the forces of public order. Orad de la Torre promised that he would be “always at the head of the strikers; the first breast that would be put in danger would be his.”²¹ The speakers’ own language also became rather bellicose as they tried to use the crowds’ anger as a motivational tool. Several spoke of bringing the fight to the factory owners, and Jesús López Ortega, president of Logroño’s *casa del pueblo*, even asserted “that the movement ought to begin peacefully, but. . . if the owners want war, with war we will respond.”²² The speakers denounced Mayor Fernández Velilla Herrero with particular vitriol because he had tried to prevent the strike and had tolerated labor law violations, Orad de la Torre even saying that he felt like murdering him.²³ As for Muro, one speaker asserted that when workers ask him for bread, “he seeks to answer them with

¹⁹ Archivo del Ayuntamiento de Arnedo (AAA), sig. 518/3.

²⁰ “Todos deben estar en la calle acompañados de sus mujeres e hijos para dar la sensación de que se quiere la paz.” AAA, sig. 518/3. Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 89.

²¹ “Siempre a la cabeza de los huelguistas, el primer pecho que se ponga al peligro será el suyo.” AAA, sig. 518/3.

²² “Que el movimiento debe iniciarse pacíficamente, pero. . . si los patronos queiren [sic] la guerra, con la guerra se les contestará.” Ibid.

²³ Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 73, 139.

the shrapnel of the Civil Guard.”²⁴ Orad de la Torre claimed that the only reason why he did not bring pistols to the event was because the time for bloody revolution was not yet right.²⁵ These leaders simply could not resist applying their party’s stock revolutionary language to local circumstances as a way to stir up the crowd, thus heightening the atmosphere of tension, even if their intentions were actually no more than a peaceful strike.

24 civil guards policed the strike in this atmosphere of both long-standing tensions and provocative rhetoric, and four individuals led them who were not exactly the Civil Guard’s finest. The number present was so much larger than at Castilblanco because Arnedo was a section headquarters and some guards had been concentrated from nearby towns.²⁶ The section chief was Second Lieutenant Juan Corcuera Piedrahita. He had a somewhat unusual career in the Civil Guard in that he obtained his officer’s commission in 1926 after long years of service as an enlisted man—he had joined the force in 1902—rather than through the usual path of attending the Infantry Academy. Therefore, he was 51 years old and about to retire by January 1932. He was a native of La Rioja, but his service in the Civil Guard had taken him all around the country before he finally returned to the region when he became the chief of the Arnedo Section upon his promotion to second lieutenant.²⁷ Although he had previously been praised for his energy in arresting murder suspects, he seems to have been lackadaisical in his command of the Arnedo Section as his career wound down. He received two days of house arrest in

²⁴ “Este pretende contestarles con la metralla de la Guardia Civil.” AAA, sig. 518/3.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Relación nominal de la fuerza del Cuerpo de la Guardia Civil que tomaron parte en los sucesos ocurridos en esta Ciudad el día 5 de los corriente, in Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 233.

²⁷ SGC, Expedientes Personales, Juan Corcuera Piedrahita.

1927 for ordering the station commandant of a town in his section to arrest some murder suspects instead of leading the pursuit himself.²⁸ In 1930, the command chief reprimanded him for not reviewing his section's documentation and for only doing six percent of the paperwork himself, demonstrating "an apathy and neglect inappropriate for the section chief."²⁹ He does not appear to have been popular with Arnedo's citizenry either. One resident recalls that he frequented the casino, rubbing elbows with the mayor and a factory owner.³⁰ There is an interesting parallel here between Muro and Corcuera. Both had risen in socio-economic status over the course of their careers, one from worker to factory owner and the other from enlisted man to officer, but they seem to have preferred to reinforce their new status as members of Arnedo's elite rather than strengthen their relations with the town's less fortunate.

Sergeant Clemente Hernández Ramírez, who led the guards concentrated from the town of Badarán, joined Corcuera and his men. Despite his lower rank, Hernández was even older than Corcuera at 53. Unusually, Hernández spent nine years in the army before joining the Civil Guard in 1906. Also a native of La Rioja, he had managed to spend most of his career in the region, being stationed in the town of Treviana since 1926.³¹ However, in May 1931, local republicans asked Civil Governor Vidal Serrano for his dismissal. They claimed that Hernández and his men had violently broken up republican celebrations on April 14th and that he had participated in monarchist events. Somewhat prophetically, the republicans warned that if he was not transferred, "a day of

²⁸ AGM, Expedientes Personales, sect. 1, legajo C-3307.

²⁹ "Una apatía y abandono impropio del Jefe de Línea." Quoted in Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 236.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 235.

³¹ SGC, Expedientes Personales, Clemente Hernández Ramírez.

mourning could easily occur.”³² Hernández’s commanding officers investigated, and, although the sergeant and his men denied wrongdoing, they admitted that they had monarchist sentiments. Hernández agreed that he should be transferred and in June he arrived in Badarán.³³

There were also two corporals in Arnedo on the day of the strike, José Camarzana Sáiz and Leandro Dueñas Benito. Only the 50-year-old Dueñas’ personal service record survives, and it reveals that he had had a career remarkably similar to those of Corcuera and Hernández. Born in La Rioja, he had joined the army in 1901 and the Civil Guard in 1911, spending most of his career in his native region. In 1925, he became station commandant of the town of Zarratón, where two years later he was punished with two weeks of arrest because he and his men had attacked loiterers with swords outside of some taverns they had closed without filing any charges against them or wearing their regulation uniforms during the incident.³⁴

As for the 22 civil guards second class, they were by no means inexperienced and a *pueblo* like Arnedo would not have seemed unfamiliar to them.³⁵ All appear to have been from Northern Spain (and ten were from La Rioja). In addition, they all appear to have been married and to have served in the Civil Guard for at least ten years (the average age for all 26 was 37.4 years old). Ten had also seen combat in Morocco during their time in the army and been laborers before that.

³² “Es muy fácil que ocurra un día de luto.” Quoted in Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 238.

³³ *Ibid.*, 237-38.

³⁴ SGC, Expedientes Personales, Leandro Dueñas Benito and Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 238-39.

³⁵ These statements based on the personal service records of the 22 guards, almost all of which are available in the SGC, and on Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 239-40.

5.2.2. Choosing Violence

On the day of the strike, Socialist leaders continued to employ provocative language that may have made these civil guards feel threatened, but ultimately the deadly outcome was the result of the poor leadership of one individual officer and an organizational culture that led the guards quickly to violence. The strikers began picketing around 7 AM on January 5th, and they brought the town to a virtual standstill, even blocking agricultural workers from going to tend the fields.³⁶ At 2:30 PM, about 800 strikers, including many women and children, gathered in the plaza in front of the town hall to hear more speeches and await the arrival of Civil Governor Vidal Serrano. The speeches echoed those of the previous evening, urging peace while also threatening violence. Along with more denunciations of Mayor Fernández Velilla Herrero, Orad de la Torre urged the strikers to ask those shop owners who did not join the strike to do so and to hint that, if they did not, windows may be broken. Moisés Beaumont, a leading Socialist from another town in the region, echoed the Civil Guard's own language of duty and sacrifice as he steeled the crowd for the possibility of violence, declaring that "all have the duty to sacrifice their bread, the bread of their children, and even their lives, if it was necessary, in defense of their legitimate rights."³⁷

Upon the arrival of Civil Governor Vidal Serrano, the Socialist leaders joined him in the town hall to begin the negotiations. These negotiations were short, however, because Vidal Serrano brought news that a labor arbitration board had decided in favor of the workers. The factory owners therefore agreed to rehire them and respect the eight-

³⁶ "Ocasión de la huelga general," and Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 95, 97.

³⁷ "Todos tienen el deber de sacrificar su pan, el pan de sus hijos y hasta la vida si fuese necesario en defensa de sus legítimos derechos." AAA, sig. 518/3.

hour day.³⁸ Around 4 PM, the Socialist leaders announced the victory to the crowd gathered in the plaza in front of the town hall, and it erupted in jubilation.³⁹ It then split up into several groups as strikers paraded around the streets of the town to celebrate. After about an hour, two of the groups re-converged on the plaza, shouting “long live the strike!,” “down with the *caciques!*,” “down with the mayor!,” and even “death to the Civil Guard!”⁴⁰ The guards were posted in front of the town hall, and, perhaps feeling threatened, Lieutenant Corcuera ordered his men to clear the plaza. As they used their rifles to push the crowd back, Civil Guard Alejandro Fernández hit a girl in the head. Several members of the crowd responded by shoving him to the ground (some witnesses say he simply tripped), and they kicked Sergeant Clemente when he came to Fernández’s aid.⁴¹

Then the firing began, but accounts differ as to who fired first. The civil guards claimed that they answered shots fired from the crowd; whereas, townspeople said that Corcuera gave the order to fire as soon as he saw the tussle with Clemente and Fernández. Gil Andrés summarizes the confused testimonies the guards gave of what happened next according to the now-lost investigative report of José Calviño, civil governor of Vizcaya: “Of all the guards present only eleven confessed to having used their rifles. Two of them excused their action saying that they only fired in the air, four that they only did so at random, without aiming and without knowing if they caused

³⁸ Julián Hernández al Gobernador Civil, 3 February 1932, AHPLR, GC/M 18- 2/6.

³⁹ Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 99, 101-03.

⁴⁰ “¡Viva la huelga! ¡Abajo los caciques! y ¡abajo el Alcalde!” “¡Muera la Guardia Civil!” “Ocasión de la huelga general” and Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 101-08.

⁴¹ Gil Andrés *República en la plaza*, 113, 142. For other accounts, see “Los sucesos de Arnedo,” *El Liberal*, January 7, 1932.

casualties, and the five others stated that they only pulled the trigger against an individual ‘who was brandishing a pistol,’ shielded from behind a column some fifteen meters away.”⁴² A few witnesses confirmed that it was only the guards from out of town that fired. As soon as the shooting started the crowd fled in panic in all directions, the guards shooting down several as they made for shelter in a pharmacy across the plaza.⁴³ Most witnesses agreed that the shooting continued for no more than a minute, guards firing blindly in all directions until Lieutenant Colonel Palacios came out of the town hall and ordered them to cease fire.⁴⁴ In that amount time, the guards killed six (one man, four women, and a two-year-old boy) and injured more than 30 others (Corporal Camarzana was also shot in the leg).⁴⁵

This slaughter left Arnedo in an extremely difficult position. It lacked the resources to cope with all the wounded that came flooding into its Hospital de la Magdalena, which became packed with family members, doctors, nuns, and victims ranging in age from five to 63.⁴⁶ The doctors came from all across La Rioja to Arnedo to help, but the town needed money to pay for them, as well as medical supplies, hospital staff, and coffins. On January 8th, Mayor Fernández Velilla Herrero sent a rather desperate letter to the civil governor asking for 50,000 pesetas from the national

⁴² “De todos los guardias presentes solo once confiesan haber hecho uso de sus fusiles. Dos de ellos excusan su actuación diciendo que sólo dispararon al aire, cuatro que lo hicieron al azar, sin apuntar y sin saber si causaron bajas y los cinco restantes afirman que sólo aprestaron el gatillo contra un individuo ‘que esgrimía una pistola’ resguardado detrás de una columna, a unos quince metros de distancia.” Gil Andrés *República en la plaza*, 113.

⁴³ “Los sucesos de Arnedo: El entierro de las víctimas constituyó un acto de profunda emoción,” *El Liberal*, January 8, 1932.

⁴⁴ The account of the Arnedo incident in this paragraph is based on Gil Andrés’ reconstruction of the event using the arguments of both the prosecution and the defense in now-lost record of Corcuera’s trial, the Calviño report, and interviews with now-deceased witnesses. *República en la plaza*, 108-22.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 32, 143.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

government, but his request was denied.⁴⁷ Having only alcohol and cotton at their disposal, doctors resorted to amputations, leaving five no longer able to work.⁴⁸ Five victims also died of their wounds, bringing the final death toll to eleven.

All three main causes of the Civil Guard's violence during the Republic identified in Chapter Three—inappropriate weaponry, a general increase in protests and strikes, and a military culture predisposed to violence—can be seen at work in Arnedo. The UGT brought workers out into the streets to contest their town's power structures as never before. There seems to have been no reason that the Civil Guard could not have policed this mobilization peacefully. But its culture of sensitivity to insult combined with its lethal weaponry, limited repertoire of responses, and the poor leadership of one individual commander led to a very different outcome. Although some of the Socialists' rhetoric had been provocative, witnesses agree that the demonstration was entirely peaceful, and so Lieutenant Corcuera had no reason to order its dissolution, which caused the tussle between Clemente, Fernández and the crowd.⁴⁹ Perhaps the cries of "Death to the Civil Guard!" made Corcuera feel that his men's honor and safety were being intolerably threatened. While regulations did allow his men to fire without warning if attacked, their Mausers made the number of casualties particularly high when discharged into a crowd at close range. Whether or not Corcuera gave the order to fire, he clearly did not take firm control of the situation, nor were his men rigidly disciplined and obedient, as some Civil Guard historians have claimed, because they fired randomly and

⁴⁷ Velilla al Gobernador Civil, 8 January 1932, AHPLR, GC/M- 18/2-6 and Subsec. de Orden Público Carlos Esplá al Gobernador Civil, 30 January 1932, AHPLR, GC/M- 18/2-6.

⁴⁸ Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 24.

⁴⁹ The Calviño report makes these assertions. *Ibid.*, 142-44.

some may not have even fired at all.⁵⁰ The spontaneity of their actions suggests that they were not guided so much by a reasoned decision based on their regulations as by a reflex conditioned by the culture of their organization. All told, the fact that Colonel Palacios was able to bring the shooting to an end as soon as he exited the town hall suggests that, had Corcuera demonstrated firmer leadership, things might have gone quite differently. Absent such guidance, in the moment of confrontation the guards had to select from the options in their repertoire in an instant, and they chose opening fire all too easily.

Was Arnedo revenge for Castilblanco, as some historians have asserted?⁵¹ The spontaneity and confusion of the actions of Corcuera and his men suggest not, although their jumpiness was no doubt influenced by the fear that swept the Civil Guard in the wake of Castilblanco and Sanjurjo's response to it.⁵² In other words, Arnedo demonstrated the limitations of the Civil Guard's culture as it confronted the frequent popular mobilizations of the Second Republic. These mobilizations caused guards to feel increasing anxiety about the opposition, real or imagined, that their institution, their honor, and even their lives faced. Although the Civil Guard emphasized discipline and obedience, its strict hierarchy meant that the poor leadership of one inept officer, coupled with this anxiety, could have disastrous consequences.

⁵⁰ Rivas, "República en marcha," 126 and Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 4:280.

⁵¹ Payne, *Spain's First Democracy*, 76.

⁵² Blaney, "Civil Guard," 149 and Casanova, *Calle al frente*, 46.

5.3. The National Aftermath⁵³

5.3.1. The Socialist Response

While the Socialists had had to manage the bad publicity generated by the fact that the Castilblanco incident had occurred during an FNTT strike, Arnedo was free propaganda that bolstered their argument that they were fighting against the violent repression of local elites and the Civil Guard. In the event's aftermath, they followed a familiar script of mobilizing financial resources, charismatic leaders, and the press to highlight their version of the story. But while they could attract national media attention to the Arnedo funeral, moderate leaders reluctant to criticize the Civil Guard prevented the party from presenting a unified narrative. Instead of coordinating with republicans to enact meaningful reform of the Civil Guard, Socialists wound up limiting themselves to propagandistic stunts that were high on drama but low on substance.

At the local level, Socialists certainly took the lead in supporting the victims and their families, whereas the government did not feel obliged to join in this effort the way that it had after the Castilblanco incident since the victims were not representatives of the state (even if representatives of the state had killed them). Rejected by the national government, on January 17th, Mayor Fernández Velilla Herrero put out a call for donations to local governments around the country.⁵⁴ The Socialists responded enthusiastically, presenting 12,000 pesetas to the families of the victims at their funeral,

⁵³ Unlike the previous chapter, this one does not include a section on the responses of conservative groups since these were generally muted. Right-wing papers preferred to continue to focus their attention on Castilblanco. The coverage they did contain on Arnedo emphasized the claimed that the protesters fired first, and some even insisted that Arnedo must have been part of the plot to attack civil guards, one that simply did not go as planned. See, for example, the quotation from *El Correo Catalan* in "Los comentarios de la Prensa burguesa a los sucesos de Arnedo," *Solidaridad Obrera*, January 8, 1932.

⁵⁴ AAA, *Arnedo: Libro de actas de la Comisión Municipal permanente del Ayuntamiento*, 72.

Socialist parliamentary deputies 100 pesetas to the family of each person killed or wounded, and the UGT over 8,000 pesetas later on.⁵⁵ However, all these donations provided the victims' families with far less than the approximately 43,000 pesetas the family of each civil guard killed in Castilblanco received from the government alone.⁵⁶

The Socialists' support for their fallen comrades also extended beyond monetary assistance into all their usual forms of mobilization: letters of complaint, strikes, rallies, and speeches. Many worker organizations, especially from northern Spain, sent telegrams of protest that demanded the dissolution of the Civil Guard.⁵⁷ In addition, the UGT, joined by the CNT, staged a regional protest strike on January 7th that almost completely shut down La Rioja.⁵⁸ Speaker after speaker before the crowd in Logroño harshly denounced the Civil Guard and Sanjurjo, one even suggesting that they had to prevent a Sanjurjo dictatorship supported by the Civil Guard and another, envisioning a strange reversal of roles for the civil guards, called them "bandits."⁵⁹ Despite the rhetoric, the strike was a peaceful one, perhaps because the army patrolled the streets of Logroño that day instead of the Civil Guard.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ "Al cerrar la edicion: Ultimos telegramas: España," *Diario de Barcelona*, January 8, 1932; "El entierro en Arnedo del cadáver del fallecido en el Hospital de Logroño, de ocasión a una nueva manifestación de sentimiento," *La Rioja*, January 9, 1932; and Pastor Martínez, "Página del movimiento obrero," 168.

⁵⁶ Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 168-69.

⁵⁷ See "Telegramas de protesta;" "Sucesos de Arnedo: El entierro;" "Después de los sucesos de Arnedo: Manifestaciones del Sr. Calviño al corresponsal de EL LIBERAL en Logroño," *El Liberal*, January 9, 1932; and "Si en Logroño se plantea una huelga general, la organización socialista de Guipúzcoa se solidarizará con el movimiento," *Heraldo de Aragón*, January 7, 1932 for examples.

⁵⁸ Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 219. There was also a protest strike in San Sebastián on the 9th. "Actitud de las organizaciones obreras ante los sucesos sociales," *La Rioja*, January 9, 1932

⁵⁹ "Bandidos." "En el mítin celebrado ayer en el Frontón Beti-Jai, se atacó duramente a la Guardia civil y a los socialistas," *Diario de la Rioja*, January 8, 1932.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

The event that most directed the spotlight at the Socialist cause was the funeral they put on for the Arnedo victims in the town itself. The event, with perhaps 2,000 workers from around La Rioja and beyond in attendance, was as much a spectacle as the one for Castilblanco had been, but this time the Socialists were at the center of attention.⁶¹ Numerous deputies from the party were in attendance, and now it was Margarita Nelken's charismatic presence that stole the show, as had Sanjurjo's at the Castilblanco funeral.⁶² For instance, during the deputies' visit to the hospital beforehand, Nelken created a touching scene as she broke into tears while kissing a five-year-old boy who had had his leg amputated.⁶³

At the cemetery, Nelken gave a speech "in the name of socialist women. . . in the name of all the female workers of Spain" that invoked her womanhood as a tool for accentuating the pathos of the moment as she spoke of the two-year-old child who had been slain.⁶⁴ Her speech was remarkably similar to the one Sanjurjo had given at the Castilblanco funeral. She likewise called these victims "martyrs" and included a call for peace: "Neither revenge nor hate before death, which is, perhaps, the only truth in life."⁶⁵ She never mentioned the Civil Guard, but she did not have to. The actions of Lieutenant Corcuera and his men had already done more to undermine the corps' reputation than anything she could have said. At the end of her speech, overcome with emotion, Nelken

⁶¹ "El entierro de las víctimas de Arnedo, y un mitin de la U. G. T. y de la C. N. T.," *Heraldo de Aragón* January 8, 1932.

⁶² "Después de los luctuosos sucesos de Arnedo, se declaró el paro general por veinticuatro horas en casi toda la provincia," *Diario de la Rioja*, January 8, 1932.

⁶³ "Sucesos de Arnedo: El entierro."

⁶⁴ "En nombre de las mujeres socialistas. . . en nombre de todas las trabajadoras de España." Quoted in "Sucesos de Arnedo: El entierro."

⁶⁵ "Venganza, no; odio, tampoco; antes la muerte, que es, tal vez, la única verdad de la vida." Quoted in *Ibid.*

nearly fainted and had to be helped out of the cemetery.⁶⁶ In Badajoz, Sanjurjo's tears had been signs not of effeminate weakness but of a Homeric honoring of fallen comrades. Nelken's dizziness, in contrast, was to be interpreted as effeminate; her femininity gave her her appeal. As the only prominent woman in the PSOE, she was in a unique position to be able to use these dead, many of whom were women, to bolster the Socialist cause.

For some Socialists like Nelken who had not backed down after Castilblanco, Arnedo allowed them to renew their efforts to rally the Socialist Party behind the reform or dissolution of the Civil Guard. Military prosecutors continued to open cases against writers in left-wing newspapers whom they accused of insulting the Civil Guard, but these cases went nowhere, as usual, because all authors were deputies in the Cortes with parliamentary immunity.⁶⁷ Since the Socialists were also in the government, however, not all of them had the luxury of taking such an oppositional stance given the need to compromise with their republican partners. At the same time, even Socialist members of the government had to be forceful in their condemnation of these deaths during a strike by their own party's union. Therefore, Francisco Largo Caballero visited Azaña on the morning of the 6th and announced that the Socialists were ready to resign in protest. After being calmed down by Azaña, he agreed with Azaña and Casares Quiroga to carry out the reforms of the Civil Guard that Maura had blocked, "decapitating it."⁶⁸ That evening, the UGT issued a statement that was much more moderate than those of its locals. It contained only limited criticism of the Civil Guard, asserted that "one ought to feel the

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Recursos, legajo 86, exp. 6; AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Recursos, legajo 86, exp. 1923; AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Recursos, legajo 89, exp. 18; and AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Recursos, legajo 90, exp. 114.

⁶⁸ "Descabezándola." Azaña, *Diario completos*, 427.

same pain in the case of Castilblanco as in that of Arnedo,” and reassured the public that the UGT “has demonstrated its animosity towards violence and disorder.”⁶⁹

As it had for Castilblanco the day before, the Cortes provided a forum in which the different interpretations of the Arnedo incident could vie with each other for general acceptance. The lack of unity among the Socialist parliamentary group about how to respond to Arnedo continued when the deputies met prior to the Cortes session on the afternoon of the 6th. Juan-Simeón Vidarte described the meeting as “even more tempestuous than that of the day before” because some deputies regretted the moderate stance their party had adopted on the 5th and suggested that they call for an immediate dissolution of the Civil Guard.⁷⁰ However, the session was ultimately dominated by an account by José Orad de la Torre of what had happened in Arnedo. He embellished his report with anecdotes that seem to have been made up to heighten the drama of the story while glorifying his own role and emphasizing the Socialists’ lack of any culpability.⁷¹ He repeatedly underlined that the strikers obeyed all the instructions of the Civil Guard to the letter and were not aggressive in any way. Making no mention of the incendiary rhetoric he had used in his speeches, he claimed that on the morning of the strike, one Civil Guard corporal had remarked, “one has to end these protests with gunshots.”⁷² Orad de la Torre supposedly responded by giving the corporal a lecture: “Corporal, you don’t have the right to make those statements and adopt this attitude of challenging the *pueblo*, which is behaving in the most correct manner. When authority is respected,

⁶⁹ “El mismo dolor debe sentirse en el caso de Castilblanco que en el de Arnedo.” “Tiene demostrada su enemiga a la violencia y al desorden.” “Sucesos de Arnedo.”

⁷⁰ “Aún más tempestuosa que la del día anterior.” Vidarte, *Corte Constituyentes*, 301.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² “Estas manifestaciones hay que acabar a tiros.” “La tragedia de Arnedo,” *El Socialista*, January 7, 1932.

authority ought to be the first to show respect.”⁷³ Magically, the corporal did an about-face and agreed that all he wanted was peace. Orad de la Torre announced to the crowd, “The corporal is a worker like us; he says that he wants no more than peace. Long live peace!”⁷⁴ After a similar exchange with Lieutenant Corcuera, Orad de la Torre again announced “that he [Corcuera] is here at the service neither of the workers nor of the employers. . . he is here at the service of the law, to defend the liberty of all.”⁷⁵ With that, some even shouted “Long live the Civil Guard!”⁷⁶

Amós Sabrás began the Arnedo debate in the Cortes with a report on what happened in the town on the previous day based on the account Orad de la Torre had just given to the Socialists, complete with some of his embellishments. Sabrás was particularly critical of Lieutenant Colonel Palacios, who, according to Sabrás, refused to order the civil guards to stop firing or not to fire at those trying to help the wounded. Sabrás also read a telegram to the congress that requested that Casares Quiroga order the guards concentrated in Arnedo to moderate their actions because they were threatening workers and hitting them with their rifle butts. The telegram, supposedly, had been sent by Orad de la Torre that morning, but Casares Quiroga said he had not received such a telegram, and there were no other reports of aggression by the Civil Guard that morning. Despite all this, Sabrás ultimately bowed to the moderate stance of the national leadership

⁷³ “Cabo, no tiene usted derecho a pronunciar esas frases y a adoptar esa actitud de desafío con relación al pueblo, que se está portando de la manera más correcta. Cuando se respeta a la autoridad, la autoridad debe ser la primera en respetar.” Ibid.

⁷⁴ “El cabo es obrero como nosotros, dice que no quiere más que la paz. ¡Viva la paz!” Ibid.

⁷⁵ “Que él no está aquí al servicio ni de los obreros ni de los patronos; que él está aquí al servicio del derecho, para defender la libertad de cada uno.” Ibid.

⁷⁶ After the debate in the Cortes, Orad de la Torre gave another more graphic speech to Madrid’s masonic lodge, describing Arnedo as revenge for Castilblanco. The lodge agreed to call for the guilty to be punished and for Sanjurjo’s immediate dismissal. Vidarte, *Corte Constituyentes*, 305.

and concluded by assuring the congress that he did not think that the incident stained the prestige of the institution as a whole, especially if it cooperated with the investigation.⁷⁷

5.3.2. The Government Response

If the Socialists had to present a stern response to this attack on their strikers without alienating their allies in the government, the government itself had to show that it was responding to the incident without alienating its largest force of public order. It attempted to do so through its own interventions in the Cortes and three different investigations. The Arnedo deaths also stood to give the government the momentum it needed to steer the Civil Guard in a less violent direction, but, in the end, the guards at Arnedo went unpunished and no changes were made to ensure that such an incident would not happen again.

At the debate in the Cortes the day after the incident, Casares Quiroga gave the government's response to Sabrás. Although he praised Sabrás and Orad de la Torre, he spent most of his speech defending the Civil Guard, his position as its commander-in-chief leading him to turn to the same arguments about hostile masses and humanitarian civil guards that were common on the Right. He reminded the congress that there were different versions of the story, and they would have to wait for investigations to determine the cause. He then went on to reason that the fact that the crowd converged on the plaza from two directions might have given the impression that it had "hostile intentions," and he even suggested that, far from being aggressive, Lieutenant Corcuera

⁷⁷ *DSCD*, January 6, 1932.

had urged some stores not to go on strike out of a humanitarian concern that townspeople be able to acquire basic items.⁷⁸

Several speeches followed that of the minister of the interior, most in general agreement with Sabrás and some voicing support for Nelken as well in the face of Sanjurjo's remarks about her.⁷⁹ Then, the Communist-leaning José Antonio Balbontín brought in an extreme view of the Civil Guard as an institution "that only exists in order to fight, battle, and kill peasants where large property owners are concentrated," prophesizing that whether the government dissolved it or not, "it will be dissolved [eventually] by the revolutionary *pueblo*."⁸⁰ Azaña felt the need to intervene once again at this point. The moderate position he had taken the day before now served him in good stead, for he was able to deliver a consistent message even though the civil guards had been the aggressors rather than the victims at Arnedo.⁸¹ As he had defended the Civil Guard against Ortega y Gasset's attacks the day before, he now defended it against Balbontín's, echoing the corps' own rhetoric in order to do so: "The Civil Guard has, through the spirit of the institution, blind obedience to the constituted power."⁸² Azaña argued that the only thing that mattered in the Arnedo case was whether or not there had been aggression against the guards, that is to say, whether or not they had obeyed their regulations.⁸³

⁷⁸ "Intenciones hostiles." Ibid.

⁷⁹ Statement of Deputy Lluhí, Ibid.; Statement of Deputy Sediles, Ibid.; and Statement of Deputy Balbontín, Ibid.

⁸⁰ "Que sólo existe para luchar, batallar y matar a los campesinos allí donde la gran propiedad está concentrada." "Será disuelta por el pueblo revolucionario." Ibid.

⁸¹ Speech of the Prime Minister, Ibid.

⁸² "La Guardia civil tiene, por espíritu del Instituto, la obediencia ciega al Poder constituido." Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

The prime minister, with characteristic arrogance, recalled the reaction to his remarks in his diary:

The speech was better than yesterday's. Today even the Radicals have applauded me. The ovation was enormous, and the government has been left, not only victorious, but fortified. The political effect in the Cortes, profound.

Ortega [y Gasset] says that these two speeches of mine are my "consecration" as prime minister.⁸⁴

Historians agree that Azaña's rhetorical skill in these speeches was so successful that the government actually emerged stronger from these two incidents that initially threatened to cause a governmental crisis.⁸⁵ However, the underlying issues remained the same. In his desire not to alienate the force, Azaña himself had subscribed to the Civil Guard's view that all it had to do to operate under the Republic was follow its regulations. Taking advantage of the Arnedo incident to push through meaningful reform without also turning the Civil Guard against the regime would be a delicate balancing act indeed. But first, the government had to determine exactly what had happened and to punish the guilty parties.

On the same day as the debate in the Cortes, two judicial inquiries were announced, one civilian and the other military, and one special investigation for the Ministry of the Interior led by Vizcaya's civil governor, José Calviño.⁸⁶ These efforts were a test of whether or not the state would continue to permit the Civil Guard's violent

⁸⁴ El discurso ha sido mejor que el de ayer. Hoy me han aplaudido hasta los radicales. La ovación ha sido enorme, y el Gobierno ha salido, no sólo victorioso, sino robustecido. El efecto político en las Cortes, profundo.

Ortega dice que estos dos discursos míos son mi «consagración» como jefe de Gobierno.

Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 428.

⁸⁵ See, for example, Baumeister, "Castilblanco or the Limits of Democracy," 6.

⁸⁶ Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 130-31.

excesses to go unpunished. As it turned out, the guards at Arnedo did indeed walk free because the new regime had left unaltered the regulations that gave the Civil Guard broad powers to employ deadly violence as a means of crowd control and the law that placed the force under the legal jurisdiction of military.

Calviño's civilian report was quite damning of the Civil Guard's role in the events and especially that of Lieutenant Corcuera. Calviño concluded that Corcuera was unjustified in giving the order to dissolve the crowd and that the guards' use of deadly force was also unjustified, whether or not there had been any aggression against them and whether or not Corcuera had given the order to fire. At the very least, Calviño argued, the guards should have given warnings before opening fire, and Corcuera should have given the order to cease firing as soon as it became clear that the crowd was in no way resisting.⁸⁷

A few days later, one Major Mateo Castillo Fernández, of the infantry, submitted the report of the military's own investigation to the Ministry of the Interior. His interpretation of the event contrasted sharply with Calviño's. He concluded that the crimes of insulting and committing aggressions against the armed forces had been committed. Therefore, he recommended that a criminal investigation be opened. Major Carlos Muñoz Merino, a military prosecutor, did so, but he could not find enough evidence to bring a case against anyone in the crowd. Instead, he did the opposite and filed charges against Lieutenant Corcuera for eleven counts of manslaughter and 24 of assault and battery.⁸⁸ Since this all-military trial precluded the presence of a star Socialist

⁸⁷ Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 143-44.

⁸⁸ Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 146, 149 and AGM, Expedientes Personales, sect. 1, legajo C-3307.

legal team, Corcuera's trial received none of the publicity of the Castilblanco case. Given the way that the Civil Guard's regulations were written, Muñoz Merino had a difficult task to prove Corcuera guilty. He had to demonstrate that there was neither insult nor aggression towards the Civil Guard since either one of these might have justified Corcuera's actions according to the regulations. However, given the contradictory nature of the evidence, Muñoz Merino needed to rely on speculation to make his case. He argued that, since the strike had been peaceful up to the time of the incident, there was no reason to believe that the crowd suddenly became aggressive in the plaza.⁸⁹

The court-martial announced its decision on February 24, 1934. The judges focused on whether or not someone from the crowd had fired first, and, since the contradictory testimonies could not give them a definite answer to that question, they unsurprisingly concluded there was not enough evidence to find Corcuera guilty.⁹⁰ The Civil Guard regulations' hard line on insulting the force had meant that a civil guard like Corcuera was in effect immune from any conviction related to deaths like those of Arnedo, even though, unusually, one military prosecutor broke the military's tradition of always defending its own by filing charges against the lieutenant. Calviño's civilian report had also demonstrated quite a different understanding for when it was appropriate for a guard to employ force, but as long as the corps' regulations remained unchanged and the military would always interpret them, there was little chance of guards being held legally responsible for their actions in any real sense. Nevertheless, the government was

⁸⁹ Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 147-48.

⁹⁰ Gil Andrés, *República en la plaza*, 155-57 and AGM, Expedientes Personales, sect. 1, legajo C-3307.

unwilling to risk the Civil Guard's loyalty by altering these fundamental components of its identity.

5.3.3. The Seeds of Rebellion Germinate

The government was more willing to meddle in matters of organization and personnel. Unfortunately, these efforts wound up creating more dissatisfaction with the Republic than increased loyalty and reduced violence. Once again, organizational cultures combined with the emotionally-charged reactions of individual leaders to produce this outcome. On the one hand, Sanjurjo shared the Civil Guard's sensitivity to insult but took it to an extreme. On the other, Azaña's superficial reform efforts were more vindictive than substantive. They were indicative of the republicans' failure to divine what guards would or would not find unacceptable to their honor.

Despite the confidence Azaña expressed in the Cortes about the Civil Guard's loyalty, he had his doubts. He knew that Sanjurjo was not planning a coup, but the prime minister was concerned that the general might eventually be won over by those who saw him as a potential "restorer of social order."⁹¹ These concerns were more products of the fallout from Castilblanco than Arnedo, but it did not help that Sanjurjo had written in his January 7th general order that he hoped "everyone knows that if our dead touch our souls, we are also pained by those that fall before us in the fight of blindness, trickery, or ignorance with the strict line of duty."⁹² This statement seems almost to praise rather than apologize for the Arnedo killers by suggesting that the victims at Arnedo were

⁹¹ "Restaurador del orden social." Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 430.

⁹² "Sepan todos que si nuestros muertos nos llegan al alma, también nos duelen los que caen frente a nosotros en la lucha de la obcecación, el engaño o la incultura con el cumplimiento escrito del deber." Sanjurjo, "Orden general del Cuerpo," 33.

simply collateral damage caused by the guards' duty to obey their orders blindly. He could not conceive of civil guards failing to do their duty; therefore, he fit Arnedo into his conspiracy theory, concluding that "the events of Arnedo demonstrate that the attacks on the Civil Guard are the beginning of an organized plan against the institute."⁹³

Therefore, just two days after his Solomonic speech, Azaña decided to dismiss Sanjurjo from his post as director general of the Civil Guard. Although Sanjurjo, according to Azaña, had previously expressed interest in being relieved of the difficult post, now "his *amour propre* would not suffer" the indignity of being made to appear to have abandoned the Civil Guard when it was attacked.⁹⁴ Azaña sought to ease the blow by simply making Sanjurjo the director general of the Carabineros instead, even though the command of this smaller force was less prestigious. Azaña felt that he had to act immediately, and so he called Sanjurjo into his office on January 8th, resolving to send the general directly to military prison if he resisted. Never a master of political tact, Sanjurjo only further incriminated himself while chatting at the beginning of their meeting by revealing that Castilblanco had made him nothing short of paranoid. He denounced the Socialists in Badajoz Province and in the government and spoke of "a plan to exterminate small guard posts."⁹⁵ He also presented himself as the one keeping the Civil Guard in line, but Azaña retorted that his job was simply to obey the government at all times, not to act as some kind of arbiter between the government and the Civil Guard. He then informed Sanjurjo that he was going to be transferred to the Carabineros. The

⁹³ "Los sucesos de Arnedo demuestran que los ataques a la Guardia civil son el comienzo de un plan organizado contra el Instituto." "El proyecto de reforma agraria será modificado antes de llevarlo a las Cortes," *El Liberal*, January 7, 1932.

⁹⁴ "Su amor propio no padecía." Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 430-31.

⁹⁵ "Un plan para exterminar los pequeños puestos de guardias." *Ibid.*, 431.

general again let his emotions get the best of him, a tear rolling down his cheek as he struggled to find words to respond to the news. In the end, Azaña agreed to delay the order for a few days as long as Sanjurjo kept their conversation a secret.⁹⁶

Sanjurjo's transfer took place on February 3rd.⁹⁷ In his farewell general order to the Civil Guard, he spoke to his men as a father leaving a son on his own. As usual, honor provided the framework for the entire piece, and, amidst his effusive praise for the honor of the institution as a whole, there was an ambiguous message about where its ultimate loyalties should lie. He praised obedience to and sacrifice for the government, but also suggested that "if some day you have doubts, if on some occasion you falter, do not hesitate to ask for the help or council of your old director general."⁹⁸ In other words, he was suggesting that someday civil guards might have to make a choice between their duty to the Republican government and their loyalty to Sanjurjo, between two different understandings of honor's source.

Azaña's transfer of Sanjurjo turned out to have a touch of irony because it was primarily meant to prevent the general from becoming the focal point of a conspiracy, but the move so offended Sanjurjo's honor that he became open to talk of a coup, which he had previously frowned upon. His desire to rid himself of a government that had so offended him was not his only motivation, however. He explained to Alejandro Lerroux that he was concerned about anarchism, efforts to give Catalonia autonomy, and the

⁹⁶ Ibid., 430-32.

⁹⁷ Decreto nombrando Director general de Carabineros al Teniente general D. José Sanjurjo Sacanell, y disponiendo cese en el cargo de Director general de la Guardia civil, *Gaceta de Madrid*, February 5, 1932.

⁹⁸ "Si alguna vez dudáis, si en alguna ocasión desfallecéis, no vaciléis en pedir la ayuda o el consejo de vuestro antiguo Director general." "Orden general de la Dirección General de la Guardia Civil del día 4 de Febrero de 1932," *BOGC* 7, no. 5 (10 February 1932): 129.

Socialists' "constant injurious attacks on the Civil Guard and announcements of its dissolution: events like those of Castilblanco."⁹⁹ By the summer of 1932, Sanjurjo had joined a group of generals hoping to oust the left republican-Socialist government but not end the Republic. Their plan was not particularly well thought out; basically, it was hoped that if Sanjurjo took Seville and General Emilio Barrera Luyando seized parts of Madrid, then the Azaña government would be forced out, as in the *pronunciamientos* of the nineteenth century. The conspirators felt they had to act quickly because the government already had thorough knowledge of their plans and Catalonia was about to be granted its autonomy, and so they decided that the rising would begin on August 10th.¹⁰⁰ In fact, Azaña let the rising happen so that he could catch the conspirators red-handed.

Despite the plot's low chances of success, Sanjurjo thought that his prestige alone would be enough to carry the day.¹⁰¹ In a sense, he turned out to be right, for he was successful in persuading both the Civil Guard and army units in Seville to rise up on the 10th, the soldiers opting to follow Sanjurjo over their own commander.¹⁰² Although Sanjurjo was attempting to overthrow the government, he tried to maintain the myth of his political neutrality in the manifesto he released that day. He presented the Republic as a time of violence and chaos and stated that the goal of the rebellion was "above all, that social peace and discipline be restored, in benefit of all classes."¹⁰³ He had deemed

⁹⁹ "Constantes ataques injuriosos a la Guardia Civil y los anuncios de su disolución: sucesos como los de Castilblanco." Archivo Sanjurjo, notas autobiográficas, quoted in Sacanell, *General Sanjurjo, héroe y víctima*, 98.

¹⁰⁰ Payne describes the conspiracy in *Politics and the Military*, 283-87 and *Spain's First Democracy*, 96-99.

¹⁰¹ Díaz Carmona, "10 de agosto de 1932," 126.

¹⁰² Eduardo de Guzmán, *La Segunda República fue así* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977), 156.

¹⁰³ "Ante todo, que la paz y la disciplina sociales se restablezcan, en beneficio de todas las clases." In Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 316.

what he understood to be the defense of public order as more important to maintaining his honor than staying loyal to the government in power.

The uprising did not go as smoothly in Madrid. Director General of Security Arturo Menéndez knew that it was to begin with an attack on the Ministry of War at 4 AM on the 10th, and so he had a company of assault guards waiting in the ministry's garden. Sure enough, Menéndez and Azaña watched from the building as the assault guards fought off the attackers while the Civil Guard prevented the adjacent Palacio de Comunicaciones from being taken.¹⁰⁴ Although a few civil guards did participate, both army and Civil Guard units throughout the city refused to rise up, rendering the uprising a total failure in the city by late morning.¹⁰⁵

The failure in Madrid and in other cities left the rebels in Seville alone, and Azaña began mobilizing forces from around the country to converge on the city.¹⁰⁶ He wrote in his diary, "I'm going to attack them by land, by air, and by sea. . . [my forces] have made all the arrangements to isolate Seville totally so that they will cook in their own juice."¹⁰⁷ Sanjurjo, however, was undaunted. His plan was to go out himself and meet any units that arrived to oppose him, trusting that his personal honor and courage would win them over without a fight. Clearly, his experiences as a prominent general had not shaken his belief that setting a personal example of bravery was the best way to lead. Unfortunately for Sanjurjo, the commanders of the 9th Infantry Regiment did not share his confidence, and they withdrew their support on the night of the 10th. Although the Civil Guard's

¹⁰⁴ See Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 582-86 for a description of the events.

¹⁰⁵ Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 4:303-06 also describes the rising in Madrid.

¹⁰⁶ Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 204.

¹⁰⁷ "Voy a acometerlos por tierra, por aire y por agua. . . se han tomado las disposiciones para aislar totalmente a Sevilla, y que se cuezan en su propia salsa." Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 587-88.

Seville Command continued to stand with the former director general, Sanjurjo realized that the game was up, and he fled Seville in a taxi with a few confidants around 2 AM.¹⁰⁸ The fugitives made for Huelva, but they were discovered by civil guards and *guardias de seguridad* at the entrance to the city and arrested.¹⁰⁹

Sanjurjo was immediately jailed in Madrid, where he awaited trial in military prison incommunicado. A confession he gave and the manifesto he had released left little doubt of his guilt, and so the Sixth Chamber of the Supreme Court gave him and a few others only a summary court-martial on August 24th. The defendants could not contest the evidence that the prosecution presented that day. However, when the prosecutor stated that the defendants' actions had deprived them of the military virtues of honor and patriotism, they were outraged. One of them retorted, "I have been a prisoner of the Moors. Various times they put the mouths of their rifles on my chest to kill me, but... they never insulted me! And here today it has been said that we do not have honor."¹¹⁰ The court found Sanjurjo guilty of military rebellion the next day, sentencing him to death.¹¹¹ The rapidity of these proceedings stands in stark contrast to the two-year ordeal that both the accused in the Castilblanco incident and Lieutenant Corcuera were going

¹⁰⁸ Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 208-12 and Eduardo González Calleja, *Contrarrevolucionarios: Radicalización violenta de las derechas durante la Segunda República, 1931-1936* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2011), 102.

¹⁰⁹ Esteban-Infantes takes pains to prove that Sanjurjo only went to Huelva to surrender himself to a Civil Guard unit that was not involved in the rebellion, but the city's proximity to the Portuguese border suggests he was actually attempting to flee Spain. *General Sanjurjo*, 212-17. The issue was of such concern for Esteban-Infantes because attempting to flee the country in the face of danger would hardly be in keeping with Sanjurjo's image as a selfless soldier ready to sacrifice anything for the *patria*. Better to argue that the general surrendered himself prepared to answer for his actions in court.

¹¹⁰ "Yo he estado prisionero de los moros. Varias veces me pusieron al pecho las bocas de los fusiles para matarme, pero... ¡jamás me insultaron! Y hoy aquí se ha dicho que nosotros no tenemos honor." General Miguel García de la Herrán quoted in El Caballero Audaz, *General Sanjurjo (su vida y su gloria)* (Madrid: Caballero Audaz, 1940), 105-06. Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*, 222.

¹¹¹ Court documents in AGM, caja 1161, exp. 14.

through. The government seems to have felt the need to act quickly to make an example of Sanjurjo.

Still, Azaña commuted Sanjurjo's sentence to life in prison on the same day that the Sixth Chamber announced its verdict.¹¹² He explains his reasoning in his diary:

I have considered the subject as a political case in that it ought to become most useful to the Republic. To execute Sanjurjo would oblige us to execute afterwards six or eight others that have incurred the same punishment, and those of Castilblanco. It would be too many bodies in the path of the Republic. *Pronunciamentos* must be discredited by their own failure and by the discredit of their instigators. Shooting Sanjurjo, we would make a martyr of him, and we would found, without wanting to, the religion of his heroism and his gentlemanliness. . . A more exemplary punishment is Sanjurjo failed, alive in prison, than Sanjurjo glorified, dead.¹¹³

Azaña grasped that Sanjurjo's honor was more important to both him and his followers than his life, and so the harshest punishment would entail destroying that honor.

Therefore, Azaña ordered the general stripped of all the honors he had earned and sent to a prison for common criminals rather than a military prison (see Image 5.1).¹¹⁴ While allowing the military justice system jurisdiction over civilians in some cases was controversial, military prison promised to be a place where Sanjurjo could feel at home and be respected. To be placed among ordinary criminals, among those whom the civil

¹¹² Decreto conmutando la pena de muerte impuesta a don José Sanjurjo y Sacanell por la de reclusión perpetua con todas las accesorias determinadas en el fallo del Tribunal sentenciador, *Gaceta de Madrid*, August 26, 1932.

¹¹³ He considerado el asunto como un caso político, en el que debe hacerse lo más útil a la República. Fusilar a Sanjurjo nos obligaría a fusilar después a otros seis u ocho que están incurso en la misma pena, y a los de Castilblanco. Serían demasiados cadáveres en el camino de la República. Hay que desacreditar los pronunciamentos, por su propio fracaso y por el descrédito de sus fautores. Fusilando a Sanjurjo, haríamos de él un mártir, y fundaríamos, sin quererlo, la religión de su heroísmo y de su caballerosidad. . . Más ejemplar escarmiento es Sanjurjo fracasado, vivo en presidio, que Sanjurjo glorificado, muerto.

Azaña, *Diarios completos*, 608.

¹¹⁴ AGM, caja 1161, exp. 14.

guards saw as their true enemies, was horrifying.¹¹⁵ According to one reporter, there was even a prisoner there who had killed a civil guard.¹¹⁶ In the end, however, Sanjurjo found that life in the prison was not so bad after all the years that he had spent in Morocco.¹¹⁷




Image 5.1: Sanjurjo as Prisoner No. 52 in el Dueso Prison
Sanjurjo has an “x” over his head.
Esteban-Infantes, *General Sanjurjo*.

Azaña’s crushing of the rebellion gave him enormous political capital, and he felt the time was now right to “decapitate” the Civil Guard, punishing it for its involvement in the rising. Within a month of the rebellion, he had reduced the size and functions of the director general and the general staff, changing their names to inspector general and general inspection; appointed a brigadier general instead of a major general to be the new inspector general; and placed the corps solely under the Ministry of the Interior, ending its dual dependence on the ministries of the Interior and War. He also eliminated the institution’s rank of major general and its post of subdirector general, the highest

¹¹⁵ Esteban-Infantes describes the reaction of Sanjurjo and his friends to the news in *General Sanjurjo*, 227-32.

¹¹⁶ Caballero Audaz, *General Sanjurjo (su vida y su gloria)*, 77.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 69.

positions that a Civil Guard officer could attain.¹¹⁸ Finally, he dissolved the Civil Guard's 4th Division, the one that had sided with Sanjurjo in Seville (and had also considered rebelling after Castilblanco), although this did not translate to any change on the ground since supervision of the two commands in Seville was simply transferred to the 28th Division.¹¹⁹ These changes were typical of Azaña's approach to military reform. While he was careful not to take things too far, he could not resist letting a touch of vindictiveness creep into his decrees. The alterations may appear to have been only cosmetic, but the civil guards interpreted them as a deep offense to their honor because the changes reduced their control over their own institution, eliminated the highest position they could attain, reduced their corps' prestige, and weakened their links with the rest of the military. At the same time, the reforms did nothing to address the Civil Guard's violence, the real threat it posed to the Republic, and nothing to provide civil guards with non-lethal weaponry, improve their regulations and training regarding non-lethal crowd control, or modify a judicial system that gave them almost complete impunity. Sanjurjo had rebelled in part because Azaña had offended his honor; now the prime minister's actions threatened to send the Civil Guard on a similar path.

5.4. Conclusion

Both Castilblanco and Arnedo were incidents with national repercussions that were caused by unique local circumstances, although these circumstances themselves

¹¹⁸ Decreto suprimiendo en el Ministerio de la Guerra la Dirección general de la Guardia civil; transfiriendo al Ministerio de la Gobernación todos los organismos y servicios del Instituto de la Guardia civil que no resulten suprimidos en virtud de este Decreto, y creando en el Ministerio de la Gobernación la Inspección general de la Guardia civil, *Gaceta de Madrid*, August 17, 1932.

¹¹⁹ Decreto declarando disuelto el 4^o Tercio de la Guardia civil, *Gaceta de Madrid*, August 14, 1932. All of these reforms are summarized in Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 4:319-21.

were shaped by larger trends. In both cases, Socialists were struggling to undermine the entrenched power structure of the old *caciquismo* system. Nevertheless, the outcomes of the two strikes were far from predetermined. Despite the Civil Guard's ethos of discipline, its behavior at Arnedo was as spontaneous as Civil Guard Simón Martín's fatal scuffle in Castilblanco. Trained to respond to any verbal or physical insult, lacking clear instructions from their superiors, and on edge in the aftermath of Castilblanco, when they felt threatened, the civil guards in Arnedo turned to a tactic that certainly was part of their repertoire, opening fire.

As at Castilblanco, divisions within the Socialist ranks blocked them from presenting a unified message after Arnedo. They consistently supported the victims of both Muro and the Civil Guard, but they employed stock revolutionary rhetoric during the strike and afterwards that focused on making the funeral and Cortes debate into national media spectacles that would bolster their own image. Meanwhile, the leadership backed the government's moderate approach that sought to avoid offending the Civil Guard. The prime minister's only substantive response to the incidents was transferring Sanjurjo, a move that smacked more of payback than a desire for reform. As it happened, Azaña's decision fulfilled his fears of rebellion by making Sanjurjo into a conspirator. In his reaction to the *Sanjurjada*, Azaña again sought to punish more than reform, only adding to the corps' resentment towards the Republic.

Given the tensions created by the regime's rapidly changing socio-political landscape, the Civil Guard's fraught relationship with the working classes, and its difficulties with non-lethal crowd control, it may have been inevitable that some incidents akin to Castilblanco and Arnedo would occur with the coming of the Republic. However,

the true tragedy of the two events lies in the fact that reactions on all sides only served to increase the likelihood that such cases would happen again. The root problem was a failure to be concerned with cultures of the other interested parties and with making a reduction in violence the first priority. By criticizing the civil guards for being the servants of the *caciques*, radical Socialists offended the thing guards cherished most, their honor, without ever actually effecting much reform. Meanwhile, in their stubborn refusal to admit wrongdoing under any circumstances, guards scapegoated “instigators” like Nelken instead of considering possible weaknesses in their own culture, regulations, and tactics, and most republicans and many Socialists did not question those structures either.

As a result, the consolidation of the Republican regime continued to be hindered in part by frequent instances of political violence that were often perpetrated by its own forces of public order. The level of political violence in 1932 remained almost identical to that of the 1931 and actually increased in 1933.¹²⁰ It was the outcry following one such episode, the shooting of 14 prisoners by assault guards following a January 1933 anarchist uprising in the town of Casas Viejas, that began to undermine the Azaña government, eventually leading to success for the center-right parties in the November 1933 elections.¹²¹ This conservative shift in the Republic would in turn set in motion a series of events that culminated in the Socialist-led uprising of October 1934, which was the most serious outburst of violence that the Republic and its forces would have to contend with prior to the Civil War.

¹²⁰ According to González Calleja, there were 196 political violence deaths in 1931 from April 14th, 190 in 1932, and 311 in 1933. *Cifra cruentas*, 75.

¹²¹ The most complete account of the Casas Viejas incident is Jerome Mintz, “The Uprising at Casas Viejas,” chap. 13 in *The Anarchists of Casas Viejas* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

Chapter 6- Asturias: Glory and Disgrace

6.1. Introduction

The civil guards at Oviedo Command headquarters were anxious on the night of October 4, 1934. There were rumors that the appointment of members of a right-wing Catholic party to the cabinet might spark an uprising. Sometime after midnight, the command chief, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Moreno Molina, received a call from the station commandant in the town of Posada de Llanera. Two of his men had been shot and one was dead. Moreno Molina immediately dispatched reinforcements.¹ By morning reports were flooding into the command headquarters and Civil Governor Fernando Blanco Santamaría's office of attacks on Civil Guard posts as towns throughout the province's mining areas rose up in rebellion. Communication with some posts had been cut. Hundreds of rebels were said to be assembling on the outskirts of Oviedo. Moreno Molina turned his attention from sending reinforcements to preparing for his own position to be attacked. Blanco Santamaría managed to declare a state of war and Army Colonel Alfredo Navarro Serrano to send a request for more ammunition and air support before all communication with the city was cut off.² It had become clear that this was not just another protest or even insurrection. This was a war, a concerted attack on the Civil Guard and other government forces the likes of which the institution had never seen before. It would have to both draw on and adapt its culture to this unprecedented situation, which would have a greater impact on the course of the Republic and the

¹ Paco Ignacio Taibo II, *Asturias, Octubre 1934* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2013), 181-83.

² AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Reservado, Exp. 22, fs. 4-6.

institution's relationship with the new regime than any other single event prior to the outbreak of the Civil War almost two years later.

Indeed, with a total of 111 civil guards killed in all of Spain (along with at least 1,051 civilians and 173 members of other government forces), the Socialist-led insurrection of October 1934 was the most violent attack on the Civil Guard in its history up to that point.³ In fact, rarely in European history has a police force faced such a direct and deadly assault.⁴ The uprising was also by far the most violent episode of the Second Republic period—the month of October 1934 accounting for over half of the total deaths by political violence. Yet only in the Asturias region did the revolt reach proportions that one might call a war—the estimated 1,084 deaths there made up over 80% of the risings' total.⁵ This was certainly not the first time that Civil Guard posts had been attacked in Spain, and guards responded, as they always had, by defending their *casas-cuarteles*. But these more concerted attacks raised new questions about what following their code of honor meant. When a *cuartel's* walls were weakened by dynamite and guards began to run out of ammunition, there was no clear answer to the question of when they could surrender with honor. Those who sought glory through a fight to the death adapted a new approach of absolute enmity from the army that was praised in the Civil Guard press and echoed in military tribunals, leading to its more widespread adoption by the Civil Guard in July 1936.

³ Servicio de Estudios Históricos de la Guardia Civil (SEHGC), Carpeta no. 15, armario no. 3, Guerra Civil; Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre*, 507; J. A. Sánchez G.-Saúco, *La revolución de 1934 en Asturias* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1974), 144 and González Calleja, *Cifras cruentas*, 175. The numbers in parentheses are according to the official statistics and are almost certainly an underestimate.

⁴ Shubert, *Road to Revolution*, 8.

⁵ González Calleja, *Cifras cruenta*, 175.

The shift in the Civil Guard's thinking that began during the battles of October 5, 1934 continued as it led the subsequent repression. Guards followed a familiar program for repressing revolts of mass arrests, beatings, and even torture in hopes of sowing enough fear in the population to ensure that it would never put their honor at risk again. Since the scale of the assault on the guards had been unprecedented, the scale of the repression was naturally magnified in turn. However, the extra-judicial killings and sadistic tortures perpetrated by Civil Guard Major Lisardo Doval Bravo and his team were more than simply an expanded version of previous repressions. Earning the respect of all classes was no longer a concern. Doval's team, appointed by the government and supported by conservatives, sought to take its revenge on the workers of Asturias and systematically terrorize them. Yet these efforts failed to prevent further opposition to the Civil Guard. On the contrary, the atrocities had more profound national repercussions than ever, sparking renewed criticism of the institution in the 1936 electoral campaign that contributed to the polarization process and the Civil Guard's shift away from its ideal of political neutrality.

The October 1934 revolt was the most important event of the Second Republic period. It was a turning point that marked a hardening of attitudes on both the Right and the Left, a point at which the battle lines began to be drawn that would become the Republican and Nationalist sides in the Civil War.⁶ Therefore, the revolt has certainly seen plenty of attention in the historiography of the Second Republic (and of the Civil War).⁷ Works on the event specifically also abound, but the vast majority are propaganda

⁶ Payne, *Spain's First Democracy*, 222-23.

⁷ For example, both Paul Preston and Stanley Payne, in their general histories of the Second Republic, devote entire chapters to the October 1934 revolt. "A Bluff Called: The insurrection of 1934," chap. 5 in

pieces written in its aftermath (see below). There are surprisingly few academic studies specifically dedicated to the subject, despite its importance, no doubt because of the limited source base—most of the official records were either destroyed during the Civil War or are still classified.⁸

The goal of this chapter is to present Asturias in the last months of 1934 as, first, another case study in how the interactions between the Civil Guard's culture, mass political mobilizations, governmental policies, and individual choices amplified the political violence of the Second Republic. Second, the chapter treats the revolt as a key point in a shift in the Civil Guard's culture and its relationship with the Republic that

Coming of the Spanish Civil War and “The Revolutionary Insurrection of 1934,” chap. 9 in *Spain's First Democracy*, respectively. The rebellion has taken on special importance for apologists of the Nationalist side, who argue that it was the true beginning of the Civil War, thereby making the Socialists the ones who started the war. While many historians of the Francoist era made this argument, it has recently been revived by popular historian Pío Moa. See, for example, his *1934: comienza la Guerra Civil: el PSOE y la Esquerra emprenden la contienda* (Barcelona: Ediciones Áltera, 2004). Let me be clear: while October 1934 in Asturias can be considered a very small-scale civil war, it was not the same as the Civil War of 1936-1939. From October 19, 1934 to July 17, 1936, the level of political violence was simply not high enough for the period to be categorized as part of a civil war. For a list of criteria for a conflict to be considered a civil war, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 13.

⁸ Regarding Asturias, Adrian Shubert's social history *Road to Revolution* is the most cogent study, examining the causes of the revolt in the socio-economic structures of Asturias' coal mines, but he does not actually consider the rebellion itself. Matthew Kerry's “Radical Politics in the Spanish Second Republic: Asturias, 1931-1936” (PhD diss., University of Sheffield, 2015) adds a cultural dimension to the study of the miners' radicalization, and he does include a chapter on the revolt itself. While the collection *Octubre 1934: Cincuenta años para la reflexión*. (Madrid: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1985) contains a variety of different perspectives from prominent historians of the Second Republic, it has little on the Civil Guard's role in the events. David Ruiz's *Octubre de 1934: revolución en la República española* (Madrid: Editorial Síntesis), an updated version of his *Insurrección defensiva y revolución obrera: El octubre español de 1934* (Barcelona: Editorial Labor Universitaria, 1988), traces the Socialists' path to revolt in detail, but also contains less on their violent confrontation with the Civil Guard in Asturias. Local writer Paco Taibo's lifetime of work on October 1934 in Asturias also deserves mention because of the oral testimonies he collected from hundreds of participants. His most recent is *Asturias, octubre 1934*. Concerning the Civil Guard's role, Francisco Aguado Sánchez's *Revolución de octubre de 1934* contains little analysis but is of note because it draws on Civil Guard documents not available to the public. Regarding the propaganda that emerged in the aftermath of the revolt, Sarah Sanchez brings interesting perspectives from the field of comparative literature in *Fact and Fiction: Representations of the Asturian Rev. (1934-1938)* (Leeds: Maney Publishers, 2003), and Brian D. Bunk views these works as gendered commemorative imagery that helped create a polarized collective memory (or remembrance) of the event that led to civil war in *Ghosts of Passion: Martyrdom, Gender, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).

culminated with many guards themselves violently rebelling against the government in 1936. Thus, this chapter tracks both continuities and changes in the Civil Guard's culture in October 1934 and afterwards. Armed rebellion was itself a form of mass political mobilization. Since the attack on and defense of a Civil Guard post were already in the repertoires of both workers and civil guards, distinct patterns emerged as dozens of posts were assaulted in Asturias. At the same time, the isolation of these small units and unprecedented scale of the attacks meant that there was also considerable variation in how individual commanders chose to respond. Afterwards, the Civil Guard's militarization ensured that those who fought to the last would set the new standard of how to respond to such a situation. Similarly, during the suppression of the revolt, the Civil Guard carried out its now standard, if unofficial, practices of mass arrests and of torturing prisoners. However, the particularly violent nature of this mass mobilization, the desire of elite society and the government for an especially harsh crackdown, and the cruelty of the individual officer that the government selected to lead the effort resulted in a scale of repression not previously seen from the Civil Guard. The institution was adapting to the increasingly polarized politics of the Second Republic by embracing a more openly antagonistic stance towards the working classes. Yet it could not prevent the Republic's working class organizations from using the mass media to inform the public of its methods and thereby tarnish its reputation, deepening resentments on both sides.

6.2. The Regional Incident: Mobilization, Military Culture, and Community in Asturias

6.2.1. The Origins of the Conflict: A Community and its Outsiders

As was the case with the Castilblanco and Arnedo incidents, the origins of the rebellion in Asturias lie at the intersection of local socio-economic tensions and broader national (and even international) political trends. The Radicals and the CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas or Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Parties), which was a coalition of conservative Catholic parties, did well in the November 1933 elections. The Socialists' horror over the Republic's conservative turn at the polls is hard to overestimate. While different factions of the party had previously been at odds regarding how much to play-along with the Republic, most agreed that having the CEDA enter the government would be intolerable. Castilblanco and Arnedo had roots in the Socialists' efforts to bring about their vision of the Republic throughout Spain, but now Socialists were fighting to prevent the country from moving further from that vision. The focus of the Socialist press shifted from criticism of *caciquismo* and the Civil Guard towards a new enemy that was perceived to be a more immediate threat: fascism. The international context is important here because fascism's success in Italy and Germany had become as frightening for the Left as communism's success in Russia was for the Right. Engelbert Dollfuss' dictatorial rule in Austria particularly alarmed Socialists because, although the Spain's fascist party was miniscule at the time, they saw the CEDA as part of a similar "clerical fascist"

movement.⁹ Alcalá Zamora agreed that the CEDA should not be part of the government, and so he had Lerroux's Radicals lead minority governments that excluded the CEDA.¹⁰ However, difficulties with coalition partners and in-fighting within the Radical Party meant that by October 1934 the president had no choice but to accept a new government under Lerroux that included three CEDA ministers. News of the new government leaked on the 4th of the month, and the Socialist leadership ordered a general strike to begin the very next day.¹¹ Was this to be a protest, an insurrection, or a revolution? The implications of the long-standing divisions within the leadership were greater than ever when it gave mixed signals as to the object of the strike and made few preparations besides stockpiling some weapons and distributing propaganda pamphlets.¹² As it turned out, most of Spain simply did not participate on October 5th, although there were strikes and skirmishes in some provinces, and the Catalan government attempted to declare itself a state within a federal republic.¹³ Those who did rebel faced a government that was willing to unleash the brutal potential of the Civil Guard's culture.

The rebellion was most serious, and the repression harshest, in Asturias. National politics provided the spark that ignited revolution in Asturias, but a strong sense of community in the face of serious socio-economic tensions explain why it was the only region where a revolution was attempted in earnest. Asturias was Spain's most important coal-mining region, and, while the miners were far from a unified group, their shared

⁹ A. Ramos Oliveira, "Prólogo," in *La Revolución Española de Octubre: Documentos sensacionales inéditos* (Santiago: Editorial Occidente, 1935), 5-6 and Luis Araquistáin, "La Revolución Española de Octubre," in *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁰ Payne, *Spain's First Democracy*, 183-84.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 212-23.

¹² Shubert, *Road to Revolution*, 14-15 and Kerry, "Radical Politics," 207.

¹³ Payne, *Spain's First Democracy*, 214-16.

opposition to local elites did create a sense of community. The miners believed that various groups of outsiders—bosses, the clergy, and the forces of order—were colluding to oppress them socially and economically. When the right-wing parties took power in 1933, the miners began to feel that there was no longer hope of the current regime improving their situation. They came to the conclusion that they would have to expel the outsiders and take control of their community for themselves.¹⁴

The forces of order, and especially civil guards, were the first targets both because they were the armed representatives of the government in power and because workers regarded them as the instruments of the domination of their communities by outside elites. In addition, attacking a town's *casa-cuartel* had become a standard part of the repertoire of insurrection. The association of the Civil Guard with the local elites, in this case, the mining companies, was particularly strong in the coalfields. While the mining companies had their own police, they needed civil guards to combat more serious unrest. Therefore, they sometimes paid for the construction of *casas-cuarteles*, particularly as Socialist-dominated local governments cut municipal funding for housing guards.¹⁵

Conflict between miners and the Civil Guard had a long history in Asturias. As early as 1897, guards killed two and wounded seventeen more during a food riot in the large mining town of Mieres.¹⁶ The participation of Asturias in the nationwide general strike of 1917 (see Chapter One) significantly worsened the atmosphere of tension. Although the strike began peacefully in Asturias, the region's military governor ordered

¹⁴ This paragraph is based on some of the main arguments made in Shubert, *Road to Revolution* and Kerry, "Radical Politics."

¹⁵ For examples see Shubert, *Road to Revolution*, 86 and Kerry, "Radical Politics," 173.

¹⁶ Shubert, *Road to Revolution*, 106-07.

the government forces to hunt down strikers “like wild beasts.”¹⁷ Confrontations between the two groups caused several deaths.¹⁸ Most infamous was the “train of death,” a train that ran the length of Asturias filled with guards who had orders to fire on all subversives they passed by.¹⁹ After the strike was over, 300 were detained in Oviedo’s Model Prison (Cárcel Modelo), and many were tortured.²⁰ The left-wing press seized on the brutality of the repression, as it had in the 1890s, as a way to vilify the regime, once again describing “horrible crimes,” “infamies,” and women driven mad with terror.²¹

With the arrival of the Second Republic, wildcat strikes became common and tensions with the forces of order were again on the rise. By 1934, civil and assault guards were being deployed frequently to combat an intense period of strikes and protests.²² Matthew Kerry notes that while the forces of order were unable to bring a stop to the mobilization, their efforts did create “a new cycle of protest and repression” that fomented “a growing confrontational and militant attitude amongst local leftists.”²³ On May 17th, for example, the region’s incendiary Socialist organ, *Avance*, denounced the Civil Guard for enforcing a Duro Felguera company lockout by preventing workers from entering one of its mines.²⁴

¹⁷ “Como fieras.” Rodolfo Llopis, “Etapas del proletariado español,” in *Revolución Española de Octubre*, 50, 52 and González Calleja, *Razón de la fuerza*, 529.

¹⁸ Maximiano García Venero, *Melquíades Álvarez, Historia de un liberal*, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Ediciones Tebas), 365.

¹⁹ Ruiz, *Octubre de 1934*, 157.

²⁰ Angeles Barrio Alonso, *Anarquismo y anarcosindicalismo en Asturias (1890-1936)* (Madrid: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1988), 178.

²¹ “Horrorosos crímenes.” “Infamias.” Manuel Llana, “La huelga de Agosto en Asturias,” *España* 3, no. 134 (1 November 1917): 7.

²² Shubert, *Road to Revolution*, 150 and Kerry, “Radical Politics,” 172.

²³ Kerry, “Radical Politics,” 139, 172.

²⁴ “Ayer no se trabajó en varios grupos de San Martín, como protesta contra la intervención de la fuerza pública,” *Avance*, May 17, 1934.

As in Badajoz, criticism of the Civil Guard served as a cause around which the local community could unify.²⁵ In another incident on September 1st, *guardias de seguridad* killed a worker during a protest by a Socialist women's group in the large mining town of Sama de Langreo, but a participant remembered them as civil guards.²⁶ According to Kerry, the incident "fomented the gulf between security forces and the local left, illustrating the fears, feeling of disempowerment and humiliation of the local community. . . . Again, local communities were invaded by what was described as an external force."²⁷ Indeed, *Avance* expressed outrage that the civil governor had deployed these forces to Sama without its mayor's knowledge or consent and concluded that "Sama de Langreo has lived through a few hours of war. It was the invasion of a foreign army."²⁸ Workers felt more endangered than protected by the forces of order, and they prepared to fight back against what they saw as a military occupation of their community.

While the miners of the Asturian coalfields had a longer history of political mobilization than the farm laborers of Castilblanco or the factory workers of Arnedo, many of the causes of their conflict with the Civil Guard were the same. Tensions with the institution were longstanding because of its association with the powerful mining companies. The Asturian workers were also just as resentful of its interventions in their local affairs as Castilblanco's residents had been. The corps' frequent use of violence and mass arrests in response to the increase in strikes and protests that accompanied the

²⁵ Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 173.


²⁶ "Los desórdenes promovidos ayer por elementos socialistas y comunistas," *ABC*, September 2, 1934 and Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 134.

²⁷ "Radical Politics," 196-97.

²⁸ "Sama de Langreo ha vivido unas horas de guerra. Era la invasión de un ejército extranjero." "La fuerza pública disuelve a tiros una pacífica manifestación de mujeres, mata a un joven socialista y hiere a dos manifestantes, a tres transeúntes y a dos guardias," *Avance*, September 2, 1934.

Second Republic did irreparable damage to its reputation. By 1934, there was no hope of winning the miners' respect; both sides were preparing for armed confrontation. Yet once again it was the efforts of Socialists at the national level to carve out a political space for themselves in the Republic that proved the spark that ignited this major eruption in political violence. Convinced that a CEDA-dominated government would spell the end of the Republic's usefulness to the Socialist cause, party leaders gave in to the radical impulses of the rank-and-file. On October 5, 1934, the miners deposed area civil guards from their positions of authority as a matter of course—they were the local representatives of a state that the miners believed brought them only oppression. But the scale and violence with which the miners expelled the guards could not have been imagined even a year earlier.

6.2.2. The Shifting Boundaries of Honor: Patterns in How Civil Guards Responded to Violent Attack



Map 6.1: Asturias with the Towns where the Principal Battles with the Civil Guard Took Place and the Routes of the Various Army Columns
Aurelio de Llano Roza de Ampudia, *Pequeños anales de quince días: La revolución en Asturias, Octubre 1934* (Oviedo: Talleres tipográficos, 1935), 204.

This section will examine several of the *casas-cuarteles* that the miners attacked to identify patterns of behavior on the part of both the miners and guards and to determine what guards felt their honor required of them in these combat situations that were far more dangerous than anything policemen would normally be expected to face. What becomes clear is that, given the range of different responses to the miners' assaults, there was little universal consensus on what honor required because the Civil Guard's version of it was oriented towards civilian policing rather than military combat. Therefore, much depended on the individual officer in command. This section identifies three possible responses. Most posts did engage in intense firefights, but they would surrender after sustaining a few casualties and, perhaps, having the *casa-cuartel* damaged by dynamite. However, a few officers looked to their training in the army to seek glory through death

defending the *patria*, while a handful of others felt it was not their duty to lose their lives in a siege they could not break.

In the aftermath of the rebellion, the fact that guards were under military jurisdiction ensured that they were judged according to the military's definition of honor. Those who fought until resistance was no longer possible were honored, and those who chose not to seek any glory at all were punished. The majority who put up a fight but then surrendered were not questioned. These guards had not abandoned that idea of the Civil Guard's policing as a negotiation between their duty to enforce the law and their need to accommodate the realities of the communities where they worked. In this extreme situation, their duty was to hold their posts against the reality of a *pueblo* in revolt, and so they chose to fight but did not hold out until the bitter end. However, those who did fight to the death introduced a new idea of honor into the Civil Guard, one of glory through death in battle, although officers had already been exposed to it in the army. Therefore, the continuity in the Civil Guard's idea of honor was strong, but a rupture was beginning that would continue into the Civil War.

The Asturian rebels inflicted casualties on 32 Civil Guard posts in this first phase of their attack. The story of each one cannot be considered in this chapter; therefore, I will concentrate on the 4th Company (Sama), which encompassed almost all of the major mining areas, 50% of the posts that sustained casualties in Asturias, and 70% of the total Civil Guard casualties in Asturias.²⁹ Of this company's 23 posts, all of which fell to the

²⁹ Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 122, 506.

rebels, I will examine in detail a handful that illustrate the variety of responses to the assault.

6.2.2.1. A Combat Ritual: The Typical Response

There were three main groups of elites that miners sought to expel from their communities on October 5, 1934—usually through death or imprisonment—civil guards, priests and monks, and mining company managers. However, the nature of the confrontations with each of these groups was unique. Arrest and murder of religious and mining company personnel was sporadic and often did not involve armed resistance. Many priests and monks tried to escape through disguising themselves as workers while nuns were not subject to violence since they did not present a threat to the vision of a community ruled by the working-class male.³⁰ In contrast, guards were fellow men who stood armed and ready to resist the miners' revolt. Therefore, a town's *casa-cuartel* or other police installation was always the first target of the uprising's revolutionary violence.

The procedure of these fights with the 4th Company's posts seemed to follow a predetermined pattern since taking a town's *casa-cuartel* was already part of the repertoire of insurrection. Most guards defended their honor by putting up a vigorous defense of their post, but when they had taken casualties and their building had sustained severe damage, they felt they could surrender with dignity. Table 6.1 illustrates the patterns in more detail. Rebels, outnumbering guards from between about five to one to 100 to one, surrounded a post in the early hours of the morning. Around 4 or 5 AM they

³⁰ For details, see Matthew Kerry, "Painted Tonsures and Potato-sellers: Priests, Passing and Survival in the Asturian Revolution," *Cultural and Social History* (2017): 1-19.

would begin their assault, often pausing several times to give the guards a chance to surrender, promising that prisoners would be treated fairly. The guards usually refused, but they sometimes did allow their families the chance to leave the *casa-cuartel*. The miners' shotguns and pistols made little headway against the guards' rifles, but dynamite proved a surprisingly effective weapon, destroying the flimsy walls of the *casa-cuartel* and forcing the guards to attempt an evacuation. It was during these almost always unsuccessful efforts to break out of their encirclement that the guards took many of their casualties.³¹ Trapped and defenseless, they would then surrender.

³¹ Some guards from La Felguera managed to hide out in the mountains and two even reached Oviedo in disguise. Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de Asturias de 1934*, 159.

Table 6.1: The Civil Guard Posts of 4th Company (Sama) in the Insurrection of October 5, 1934

1. The number of guards at the post on October 5, 1934, not including reinforcements that arrived during the revolt or other government forces present.
2. For the sake of consistency, all data in these columns are from Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 506.
3. For the sake of consistency, all data in this column are from González Calleja, *Cifras cruentas*, 234-35.
4. D= dynamite, O= other explosives, P= pistols, S= shotguns, R= rifles
5. Torrens= Civil Guard Lieutenant Gabriel Torrens Llompart facilitated the surrender
6. The fight lasted until 2 PM on the 6th.

Sources principally Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934* and Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*. Please note that this table represents a synthesis of sometimes differing accounts and that limited information was available for some posts.

<i>Casa-cuartel</i>	Type of Post	No. of Guards ¹	No. of Rebels	Guards Killed ²	Guards Injured ²	No. of Rebels Killed ³	Time of Attack	Rebel Arms ⁴	Damage to Cuartel	No. of Sally Attempts	Surrender ⁵	Fate of Commander
Sama de Langreo	Company	62	500-2000	38	1	4	2:30 AM ⁶	DOPRS	Severe	3	Yes	Cross of San Fernando
Caborana	Section	8					9 AM-4 PM			1	Yes, Torrens	6 months prison
Boo	Post	5									Yes, Torrens	Life sentence
Cabañaquinta	Post	9			3			D		1	Yes	
Moreda	Post	10	200		5	1		DS		3	Yes	
La Rabaldana	Post	7	300	3	3		4 AM	D	Destroyed		Yes	
Santa Cruz	Post				4		4 AM	D	Destroyed	1	Yes, Torrens	
Turón	Post											
La Felguera	Section		400+	1				D	Blown up		Some do	
Barredos	Post	10			1		2-6:30 AM	DOPS	Burned down		Yes	
Campo de Caso	Post										Flee to Nava	
Ciñaño	Post	5	200	4		1	3:30 AM	DOPS	Burned down		Yes	
El Entrego	Post	6	100	4	2		3:30-8 AM	DOPS	Severe	1	Yes	
Laviana	Post	11	500	4	3	1	4-8 AM	O			Yes	
Sotroñdio	Post	11	500	2	3		3 AM	DPS	Severe	3	Yes	
Ujo	Section	6			1	1	5-9 AM	D			Yes	Death sentence
Campomanes	Post	5	60+	12	7	7	10:30 AM	DORS	Roof collapses		Yes	
Murias (Mieres)	Post		1300 (Mieres)	1	2					1	Yes	
Pajares	Post	4			1						Abandoned	
Pola de Lena	Post	6	100+			2	5 AM	PS			Immediate	6 years prison
La Rebollada (Mieres)	Post	14	1300 (Mieres)		4				Some	2	Yes	
Riosa	Post										Yes	
Santullano	Post	5		2	3		4-9 AM	D	Destroyed	Moved buildings	Defeated	
Totals				71	43	17						

Looking at the testimonies of rebel leaders who participated in the attacks on the *casas-cuarteles*, what stand out are their repeated attempts to allow the civil guards to surrender. These efforts may have been exaggerated to make the rebels look more humane, but it makes sense that they would have encouraged surrender in order to spend less precious ammunition and time on subduing the guards. If the guards, realizing their hopeless situation, had surrendered without a fight, they would have been spared their heavy losses. But there was a consensus that their honor would not permit such a course of action.¹ While their understanding of honor certainly included the notion of sacrifice, this meant the hardships of daily patrol and the remote possibility of death at the hands of a criminal or protester. Death in pitched battle was not part of the bargain. However, when they did face such a possibility, they risked their lives in order to uphold the honor of the institution. Only once they had taken casualties, their *casa-cuartel* was no longer defensible, and escape was not possible did most guards feel that surrender was acceptable. They may not have won glory fighting to the death, but they demonstrated they were no cowards either.

While there were exceptions, both sides actually tried to fight in a humane manner, such as by respecting white flags.² When negotiating surrenders, several posts

¹ Only one post in the 4th Company surrendered without a fight (Pola de Lena), although a few did abandon their *casas-cuarteles* (see Table 6.1). Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 227.

² There were reports of guards shooting at rebels during ceasefires at Sotroñido and Sama (see below) and of guards even firing at another guard who tried to surrender at El Entrego. Fernando Solano Palacio, *La Revolución de Octubre. Quince días de Comunismo Libertario* (Madrid: Fundación de Estudios Libertarios Aselmo Lorenzo, 1994), 101 and David Antuña quoted in *Ibid.*, 207. There were also reports of attempts by crowds of rebels to kill captured guards in Riosa and Castañón. SEHGC, *Memorias de Comandancias, Oviedo and Sergeant Marino Prieto*, quoted in Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 196. Aguado Sánchez asserts that several civil and assault guards taken prisoner at El Entrego were shot and that a civil guard from El Barredos was executed after he failed to obtain the surrender of Pola de Laviana's *casa-cuartel*. *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 154, 158.

wanted guarantees that they would not be killed, which certainly suggests a level of mistrust, but, ultimately, almost every post did surrender, and some entrusted their families to the rebels while they continued to fight. In other words, the animosity between the two groups, while intense, had not reached a point at which either side felt that annihilation was the only solution. The miners' goal was not necessarily to kill the guards, only to remove them from their position of authority in the community.

There was a gendered component to the script that the two sides followed as well. Guards faced the unique and often awkward situation of having their wives and children with them in the *casas-cuarteles* even as they entered combat, which was considered to be a purely masculine sphere. Contemporary sources on the fighting do not present a homogenous vision of what the role of families was in these situations. In some cases, the defense of their families was portrayed as giving the guards an extra motivation to fight, and wives could have a role in the fighting by lending moral support and caring for wounded guards.³ For example, the cover of the November 1934 *RTGC* depicts a woman handing ammunition to two guards who are furiously defending their *casa-cuartel* (see Image 6.1). In addition, even if a combat role was considered inappropriate for them, their presence did put them in danger, and there were at least two posts in the 4th Company where the wife of a guard was killed. Brian Bunk notes that conservative propaganda pieces written after the revolt celebrated one of these women in particular, Julia Fraigedo, for being killed while actually taking part in the fighting in Ciaño.⁴ Yet

³ Bunk argues that the idea that a man's role was to defend his family increased the violence of the revolution more broadly. See "Grandsons of the Cid: Masculinity, Sexual Violence, and the Destruction of the Family," chap. 4 in *Ghosts of Passion*.

⁴ See, for example, Jenaro G. Geijo, *Episodios de la revolución* (Santander, 1935), 159-65. The other woman was killed in the explosion that destroyed the La Felguera post after she refused to evacuate with

he emphasizes that, “her actions did not signify that she was unwomanly because her deeds personified the protective ideal of Spanish womanhood. . . She was not being celebrated for defending the police barracks but rather for fighting and dying beside her husband.”⁵ While women were thus sometimes portrayed as making a positive contribution to the defense of a post (and the families inside), women and children could also be depicted as weakening the guards’ resolve, their terror and weeping causing the surrender of a post.




Image 6.1: The Cover of the November 1934 Issue of the *RTGC*
 Hemeroteca Digital, Biblioteca Nacional de España

Either way, the unusual presence of women and children in the masculine world of combat could aid the defense of guards’ honor in such a setting. Wives in particular either provided support for that defense, reaffirming its legitimacy, or women and

the other family members. The seventeen-year-old son of one of the guards there also participated in the fighting and was seriously wounded. Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 159.

⁵ *Ghosts of Passion*, 128.

children provided an excuse with which guards could surrender with honor. Both guards and rebels understood that women should not participate directly in the fighting, and ceasefires were sometimes negotiated so that families could leave the *casas-cuarteles*, even if the guards intended to keep up the fight.⁶

6.2.2.2. A Fight to the Death: The Glorified Response

There were several posts in 4th Company that did fight to the death, adopting a militaristic understanding of honor as death in battle rather than negotiation with the community. This section will focus on the two most such famous examples from 4th Company, Sama de Langreo and Campomanes. In both of these cases, the attitudes of the commanding officers were crucial. The Civil Guard's rigorous discipline meant that guards dutifully followed officers' decisions to keep up the fight even as the situation grew desperate, but guards surrendered when the officers were killed. To the miners, the officers had exceeded the boundaries of the ritual fight, and so they responded with increased violence as well. These confrontations were the most celebrated by the Civil Guard's supporters in the aftermath of the rebellion, paving the way for future encounters to be similarly bloody.

Sama's post was under the command of José Alonso Nart, a 36-year-old captain who had served for several years in Morocco before joining the *Benemérita*.⁷ Equipped with a machine gun, the guards there were able to resist the miners all day despite the fact that the *casa-cuartel* was no more than a large row house (see Image 6.2). The defenders

⁶ Of the 4th Company posts, this occurred at Sama, Ciaño, El Entrego, and Sotroñido, for instance.

⁷ Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 150.

attempted to escape the confines of the *cuartel* twice, and twice they were beaten back.⁸ They also refused various requests for their surrender, although they did pause to permit the evacuation of the women and children inside.




Image 6.2: The Ruins of Sama's *Casa-Cuartel*
Source: Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil*, 5:91.

By the morning of the 6th, the guards were very low on ammunition, food, and water, and dynamite explosions had made the air suffocating. They had already held out longer than any other 4th Company post. If Nart had decided to surrender at that moment, no one would have questioned his actions. However, he chose the path of glory through death by making a last-ditch attempt to escape to the mountains that had no hope of

⁸ Ibid., 151, 155.

success. Indeed, he and his party of volunteers became scattered during the attempt, and all were killed.⁹ The defenders who remained surrendered just minutes after Nart's death, which indicates that it was his determination that had led them to sustain the fight for so long in the first place.

It appears that some miners believed that the guards had overacted their part in this ritual by holding out in such a long and bloody fashion, voiding the need to play by the ritual's unwritten rules. As the guards left the *casa-cuartel* with their hands in the air, some of the rebels opened fire with their shotguns, killing between five and ten and thereby exacting their own revenge for the deaths of several of their comrades in the fight.¹⁰ As for the guards, they suffered a total of 38 killed and 1 injured, but Nart did win his glory—in 1945 he was posthumously awarded the Cross of San Fernando.¹¹

The story of Campomanes is in many ways similar to that of Sama. Like in Sama, the fact that the guards at Campomanes kept fighting for so long seems to have been largely a consequence of their commander's determination not to surrender; once he died, the others capitulated quickly. These officers' refusal to give up was not shared by the average guard, who felt that a vigorous fight was enough to maintain the Civil Guard's honor.

The post at Campomanes had surrendered on the 5th after the roof of the *casa-cuartel* had collapsed and the station commandant had been killed.¹² Lieutenant Fernando Halcón Lucas, who like Nart had perhaps acquired a taste for glory during his

⁹ Tomás, quoted in "Ataque a los cuarteles"; En Gijón se ha organizado un gran Hospital Militar," *La Prensa*, October 23, 1934; and Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 159-62.

¹⁰ Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 218-20.

¹¹ Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 506 and Gallego, *Lucha contra el crimen*, 53.

¹² Lara, "Notas del mes," *RTGC* 25, no. 298 (December 1934): 528 and Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 228.

service in Morocco, would not consider surrender an option. He arrived in Campomanes soon after the *casa-cuartel*'s fall with 35 men from León.¹³ His party came under attack as it approached the town and found itself stuck in the middle of the road with its machine gun malfunctioning. Halcón had half his men stay near the vehicles while he took shelter with the rest in a factory. After a prolonged siege, dynamite killed all but one inside the factory in Campomanes.¹⁴ Seeing that it had fallen, the remaining guards in the street fled.¹⁵ As had been the case with Nart, the drive of an individual officer was required to keep his men fighting to the last. This time, the rebels punished Halcón for excessive resistance by mutilating his corpse.¹⁶

6.2.2.3. Surrender and Collusion: The Dishonorable Response

Civil guards like Nart and Halcón demarcated the upper boundary of what actions the Civil Guard considered honorable when the 4th Company was put to the test by the frontal assault of October 5, 1934. Others defined the lower boundary through actions that were deemed dishonorable. The arbitrator here was the military justice system, which convicted four of the 4th Company's guards of, variously, negligence, crimes against military honor, and military rebellion.¹⁷ In these instances, the guards surrendered with little or no fighting. Even if resistance was futile, the courts-martial (composed primarily of officers in the regular army) ruled that a substantial fight was required, preferably until the *casa-cuartel* was no longer defensible or ammunition had

¹³ SGC, Expedientes Personales, Fernando Halcón Lucas and Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 165-66.

¹⁴ For details, see Manuel Luengo Muñoz, "Revolución de Asturias de 1934: El Combate de Campomanes," *REHGC* 1, no. 1 (1968): 33-48.

¹⁵ Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 169-70.

¹⁶ Lara, "Notas del mes," 531.

¹⁷ Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 561.

run out and there was no hope of escape. A close examination of the most prominent such trial, that of Lieutenant Gabriel Torrens Llompart, chief of the Ujo Section, permits a reconstruction, through counterexample, of the minimum requirements for defending the Civil Guard's honor in a combat situation.

The fight at Ujo began in a similar manner to that of others in the coalfields. The assault on the *casa-cuartel* commenced around 5 AM with the heavy use of dynamite. After suffering one wounded, Torrens then surrendered the post around 9 AM, but, according to one of the rebels directing the attack, he could have kept fighting because they found unopened boxes of ammunition and grenades inside the *casa-cuartel*.¹⁸ What would cause serious trouble for Torrens, however, were his actions after his surrender. The rebels informed him that he and his men would be killed unless he aided them in obtaining the surrender of other *casas-cuarteles*, and he agreed to cooperate. Three other 4th Company posts, Caborana, Boo, and Santa Cruz, had been fighting vigorously against the rebels and refused multiple offers to surrender, but, when Torrens spoke to the commanders of each one, they agreed to give in.¹⁹ Given the hierarchical nature of the Civil Guard, when an officer of their own institution told them that their efforts were futile, they felt they could surrender with honor. Just as Nart and Halcón had been able to push their men to resist beyond the call of duty, Torrens was able to persuade guards to give up more quickly than usual. After these successes with the Civil Guard, Torrens became a kind of negotiator-in-chief for the rebels, parlaying later in the conflict with

¹⁸ Alberto Fernández, "Octubre de 1934: Recuerdos de un insurrecto," *Tiempo de historia* 17 (April 1976): 13-14.

¹⁹ Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 140-42, 147.

both General Carlos Bosch's column in the south of Asturias and General Eduardo López Ochoa's column coming down from the north.

Ultimately, it was the army that would be the judge of Torrens' actions when he was court-martialed after the rebellion was over.²⁰ At the trial, the prosecutor focused his statement on Torrens' failure to make honor his first priority. But the vision of honor the prosecutor outlined was that of the army's idea of death in battle. The investigative judge had already established an expectation of a fight to the death when he had asked Torrens, "why did you not defend the building until its collapse, as was your duty, evacuating at that point the families of the guards and continue it [the fight] with your subordinates in the place of honor until losing your life[?]."²¹ The lieutenant had to admit in response "that effectively he recognizes that he could have resisted until the last moment without effecting the evacuation and leaving them [his men] to become prisoners."²² The prosecutor therefore portrayed Torrens' actions as a disgrace "for all who believe that honor is the first of the duties that one must complete," because the lieutenant chose to save his life when he should have understood that "to die killing is to live with honor even though one's life ends."²³

Torrens' defender, Civil Guard Lieutenant Pedro Martínez García de Ribadesella, also made honor central to his argument, describing his client as "a modest soldier who. .

²⁰ This sub-section is based on the record of Torrens' trial, which is housed in AHN, FC- Tribunal Supremo Reservado, Exp. 14.

²¹ "Como no defendió el edificio hasta su derrumbamiento, como era su deber, pudiendo cuando ellos se entregaron hacer la evacuación de las familias de los guardias y seguir él, con sus subordinados, en el puesto de honor hasta perder la vida."

²² "Que efectivamente reconoce que pudo resistir hasta el último momento sin efectuar la evacuación y dejarse hacer prisioneros."

²³ "Desgraciadamente para todos los que estiman que el honor es el primero de los deberes que tiene que cumplirse." "Morir matando que es vivir con honor aunque la vida acabe."

. always had as his motto the cult of honor.”²⁴ At the trial, Torrens had a new story to prove this claim, explaining that he had attempted a sally from the *casa-cuartel* in order to allow the families inside a chance to escape. Unfortunately, according to him, his men were surrounded by rebels outside of the building and captured. This narrative allowed him to avoid surrendering at all (thus conforming to the idea that rapid surrender could not be honorable) and made an apparently foolish decision to leave the *casa-cuartel* seem like a humanitarian effort to save women and children. The story played on the notion that the presence of family members at these fights was detrimental to the male sphere of combat.²⁵

The defense also tried to argue that Torrens had not willingly aided the rebels by dropping the idea of political neutrality. One of his men assured the prosecutor that Torrens read right-wing newspapers like *El Debate*, and García de Ribadesella declared that his client “detests socialist ideals.”²⁶ Torrens himself seemed to think that his use of violence would prove that he did not sympathize with the rebels. He recounted how he had shot a worker in the leg when the man ignored a traffic stop. García de Ribadesella also proudly presented as evidence of Torrens’ lack of sympathy for the rebels that he had fired on workers during the June 1934 general strike and bragged that *Avance* had “injuriously censured his conduct.”²⁷

²⁴ Un modesto soldado que. . . tuvo siempre por lema el culto al honor.”

²⁵ García de Ribadesella concluded that “there was no surrender, my defendant did his duty up until the last moment.” “No hubo rendición, mi defendido cumplió hasta el último instante con su deber.” A series of witnesses also testified that everything Torrens did was for humanitarian reasons.

²⁶ “Detesta el ideal socialista.”

²⁷ “Censuró injuriosamente su conducta.”

The judges were not convinced by the defense's efforts. Instead, they concluded that Torrens had surrendered the post "without having exhausted all means of defense" and without negotiating any conditions.²⁸ The original copy in Torrens' handwriting of the letter demanding the surrender of General Bosch's column also convinced them that he had aided the rebels willingly. They found him guilty of crimes against military honor for his surrender and of military rebellion for cooperation and leadership in the uprising. He received a death sentence, which was later commuted to life in prison by the Supreme Court.²⁹

Torrens' case highlights the shifts in emphasis within the Civil Guard's culture brought about by the exceptional circumstances of the October 1934 uprising. Torrens and García de Ribadesella sought to ground their defense in the humanitarian component of the Civil Guard's conception of honor, but the judges of the court-martial, five out of six of whom were not civil guards, would have none of it. They preferred the prosecutor's more militarist definition that emphasized death in battle. Even the defense's story about Torrens being overwhelmed by the rebels suggests that it held the idea that there could be no honorable surrender. In addition, its celebration of Torrens' distaste for socialism and previous violence against workers is indicative of the move away from the Civil Guard's ideal of political neutrality toward explicit antagonism with the working classes.

²⁸ "Sin haber agotado todos los medios de defensa."

²⁹ Torrens was freed by the amnesty of 1936, joined the Communist Party, and led militiamen on the Granada front in the Civil War. José Luis Cervero, *Los Rojos de la Guardia Civil: Su lealtad a la República les costó la vida* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2006), 382-83.


6.2.2.4. Multiple Responses in One *Casa-Cuartel*: The Curious Case of the Oviedo Command Headquarters

Stepping outside of the coalfields, the case of the Oviedo Command headquarters also deserves consideration because the different definitions of honorable conduct discussed above all manifested themselves in this one large *casa-cuartel*, allowing for close comparison between them.³⁰ While all were prepared to defend the building, in this case the senior officers felt that full military combat was not the role of the Civil Guard. Some of their junior officers saw the situation differently, urging offensive actions and putting the protection of honor above the protection of life. As in the case of Torrens, the military courts would decide which definition of the Civil Guard's role would be given precedence, and they chose the fully military pursuit of glory.

Different ideas of what defending a *casa-cuartel* should entail emerged as soon as the rebels had the Oviedo Command headquarters thoroughly pinned down on the 6th. The 61-year-old Colonel Juan Díaz Carmena and the aforementioned Lieutenant Colonel Moreno Molina ordered guards to remain in the building and hold out for as long as possible even though the third officer, Major Gonzalo Bueno Rodríguez, urged sallies to aid outlying posts. The colonels' orders suggest that they saw the Civil Guard's role in combat as being entirely self-defense. When the rebels brought a captured artillery piece to bear on the building, the colonels decided that such a situation was no place for a police force like the Civil Guard to be in. Therefore, on the 8th, they asked Colonel Navarro for permission to evacuate to the army's adjacent Pelayo Barracks (see Map

³⁰ This sub-section is based on record of the trial of Civil Guard commanders at Oviedo in AHN, FC-Tribunal Supremo Reservado, Exp. 22, unless otherwise noted.

6.2), but Navarro ordered them to stay in place unless defense of the *cuartel* could not be maintained. An hour later, the Civil Guard colonels concluded that this was already the case. Although some of the bolder officers may not have agreed with this decision, they supported their commanders and gave their unanimous consent to the evacuation.



Map 6.2: The Civil Guard’s Oviedo Command Headquarters and the Pelayo Barracks with the Directions of Artillery Fire on the Barracks
Roza de Ampudia, *Revolución de Asturias*, 89.

When the rebellion was over, the two colonels were court-martialed for negligence (and crimes against military honor in the case of Díaz Carmena as well). One of the principal questions in the case was whether or not they had disobeyed Colonel Navarro’s order in abandoning the *casa-cuartel* so quickly, before they had run out of ammunition and supplies. A team of engineers evaluated the amount of damage that the building had sustained, and they concluded that the building was very flimsy and that it had been hit by 10-12 cannon balls. Colonel Moreno Molina emphasized that one ought to “keep in mind that the Civil Guard’s *casa-cuartel* is not a military position—well, the

building is already given the name ‘*casa* [house]’—and one can evacuate it if the defense necessitates it.”³¹ The judges were not convinced; they concluded that since the *casa-cuartel* had only been attacked by one piece of artillery and the only casualties were five injured, the structure was never really in danger.

While Nart and Halcón led their men to continue fighting even after most units would have surrendered, the Oviedo commanders’ lack of enthusiasm for involving the Civil Guard in military combat had a trickle-down effect as well. In fact, the low morale of the guards was also a factor contributing to the colonels’ decision to evacuate. At the trial, their defender attributed the low morale to the artillery bombardment, the lack of reinforcements, and the constant fighting. He also portrayed the presence of women and children as detrimental to masculine combat by noting the demoralizing effect of the terrorized and weeping families inside the *casa-cuartel*. But again the investigative judge was unimpressed. He maintained that the low morale was caused in part by the poor leadership of the commanding officers: “with other more decisive and energetic chiefs there would not have been such a disagreeable spectacle of attacks and nervousness among the personnel that had to complete such an elevated and honorable mission.”³²

Contrasting ideas of honorable leadership were also apparent in the evacuation to Pelayo. The colonels’ plan was to have a main column go first with the remaining supplies and a second follow quickly with the rest of the men. Major Bueno again seized the opportunity to be in the lead and volunteered to head the first column. It came under

³¹ “Tener en cuenta que la casa Cuartel de la Guardia Civil no es una posición militar pues ya al edificio se la antepone el nombre de “casa” y puede evacuarse si conviene a la defensa.”

³² “Con otros Jefes enérgicos y decididos no se hubiese dado tan desagradable espectáculo de ataques y nerviosidades en personal que tenía que cumplir tan elevada y honrosa misión.”

machine gun fire as it made its way between buildings, and Bueno and two sergeants were killed.³³ These men had died while facing danger in combat, but the colonels were not eager to follow suit. The three corpses lay in the street while the colonels quickly slipped through in a car without harm as part of the second column.³⁴ Although a retrieval of the bodies would have been of no practical value, at the trial the judges deemed avoiding the dishonor of having them lie in the street important enough to be worth the risk, as did the junior officers who had volunteered to lead a retrieval attempt. Yet once again the two Civil Guard colonels, now joined by Colonel Navarro, considered prudence the better part of valor.

Once the guards were inside the Pelayo Barracks, ambiguities over what the military status of the Civil Guard was caused problems as well. Major Vallespín, who was in charge of the building's defense, offered command to Colonel Díaz Carmena as the senior officer (Navarro was already occupied as military governor), but Díaz Carmena refused, arguing that a guard could not command army forces since his institution was not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War. In fact, the guards were under the Ministry of War at that moment since the civil governor had declared a state of war. While they may not have understood that this was the case, the larger issue was that apparently some officers envisioned the Civil Guard as an essentially peacetime policing force while others saw it as fully ready to take on a combat role if necessary.

Indeed, since the Civil Guard's regulations had little to say regarding this unanticipated situation of seemingly an entire region attempting to remove its guards

³³ Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 312.

³⁴ Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica (CDMH), Político-social (PS)-Madrid, 2121, Exp. 1.

from power, the decisions of individual officers, which were guided by the predilections of their organizational culture, became more important than ever. On the 11th, General López Ochoa's column lifted the siege of the Pelayo Barracks.³⁵ But, like Torrens, colonels Díaz Carmena and Moreno Molina (as well as some of the army officers) still had to answer for the choices they had made before a court-martial. The tribunal found both guilty and gave Díaz Carmena a life sentence for crimes against military honor and Moreno Molina four years for negligence. As in the other cases this section has considered, the judges ruled not only on the guilt or innocence of these two officers, but also, by extension, on whether or not the expectations of the Civil Guard were to be closer to those of a police or military institution. The colonels' plan of action was that of virtually every Civil Guard post when attacked: defend the *casa-cuartel*. But when the rebels brought artillery to bear, they transformed the fight (as least in the minds of these colonels) into a full-scale military siege of the kind that the Civil Guard was simply not prepared to counter. Even inside Pelayo, these officers felt that holding one's ground was the honorable, and prudent, course of action for the guards and that military command should be left to army officers. Other more junior officers, and the court-martial, thought differently. They believed that honor and prudence (and even survival) were not compatible. Cases such as the younger officers' eagerness to retrieve the bodies of their fallen comrades indicate that defense of honor, rather than of life, was to be the primary consideration and that honor had to be asserted through offensive action.

³⁵ Eduardo López Ochoa, *Campaña militar de Asturias en octubre de 1934 (Narración táctico-episódica)* (Madrid: Ediciones Yunque), 101-110.

October 1934 in Asturias was certainly not the first time that the Civil Guard had fought against an uprising, but never before had it faced such a concentrated assault. The attacks were a test of how this militarized police force's honor code would guide its actions in military combat. Suddenly, guards' *casas-cuarteles* seemed more like the blockhouses of the Rif than bases for rural policing. Even though the scale of the attacks was unprecedented, they did follow a script that had been developed for generations by, principally, the anarchists. In every town that rose up, the Civil Guard post, as the key symbol of the central state's imposition of its authority over the locality, was the first target. The guards dutifully played their part, defending that authority and their honor along with it. As usual, the rebels' pistols and shotguns were no match for the guards' rifles. However, the miners' dynamite and overwhelming numbers reversed the usual balance, making the guards' defensive efforts largely symbolic. After their *casas-cuarteles* were rendered indefensible and escape had proven impossible, guards felt that they had demonstrated their valor and that they could surrender.

There were variations on the theme, however, and much depended on the attitude of the individual station commandant. Some officers, like Captain Nart and Lieutenant Halcón, preferred to fight to the death in hopes of winning glory, and their units did indeed suffer the highest casualties. Others, such as Lieutenant Torrens and the colonels in Oviedo, believed that putting up some fight without exhausting all means of defense was sufficient. As it appears that each officer acted in a way that he believed was honorable, the matter came down to a question of differing definitions of honor.

Courts-martial made matters somewhat clearer in the aftermath of the conflict. Judges found guards like Torrens, Díaz Carmena, and Moreno Molina guilty of not

upholding their “military honor.” Meanwhile, the tone of the Civil Guard press in the months that followed was one of celebration rather than sadness.³⁶ For example, in the November 1934 issue of the *RTGC*, a list of fallen guards bore the title “Glory to the Heroes,” and the Civil Guard was described as the “vanguard of the army.”³⁷ After this attack on the Civil Guard by seemingly the entire *pueblo*, maintaining a peaceful coexistence with that *pueblo* would no longer be a concern. Henceforth, for many guards, as for the army, honor would mean glory in battle.

6.3. The Repression

6.3.1. Assembling Doval’s Team

In the aftermath of the rebellion, the Civil Guard led a repression on a scale more massive than anything it had ever conducted before. For the first time, a team of guards would deem the working-class population of an entire region to be enemies. As with the Civil Guard’s role in combatting the revolt itself, this outcome was the result of both continuities in the Civil Guard’s culture and the altered political environment of late 1934 in Spain. The guards’ actions in the repression resembled those they had taken after previous uprisings in that they tortured prisoners in order to exact revenge on those who had insulted the honor of their institution.³⁸ Previous chapters of this dissertation have also examined how guards used violence to instill fear in populations that would not show them respect, responding sharply to any insult. Yet at least the fiction that the

³⁶ Sanchez, *Fact and Fiction*, 137.

³⁷ “¡Gloria a los heroes!” *RTGC* 25, no. 297 (November 1934): 426 and “La revolución de octubre: Llor a ‘la Benemérita,’” *RTGC* 25, no. 297 (November 1934), 425. An article in a previous issue of the *RTGC* had expressed outrage over that fact that some referred to guards as “shock troops.” Osuna, “Eso es lo sensible,” *RTGC* 23, no. 268 (June 1932): 211.

³⁸ *Los crímenes de la reacción española* (Madrid: Sección Española de Socorro Rojo Internacional, 1935), 7 also argues that the primary motivation of the “reaction” was revenge.

guards enjoyed the respect of the whole population was still the goal. Asturias changed that. After this violent mass mobilization of the region's working classes, the hope that guards could still win their respect was gone. Therefore, the unprecedented scale and deliberately horrifying nature of the repression were new because they were meant to terrify into submission a population with which the Civil Guard had been unable to cooperate. It was the Radical-CEDA government that enabled the corps to take this approach by declaring a state of war, creating a special investigative team with almost unlimited powers, and, finally, appointing a particularly brutal officer to lead this group. Whereas the miners of Asturias had challenged the Civil Guard's right to enforce the law of the Republican state in their communities, guards now tested whether there were any limits on their authority under the Republic or if they had the ability to take the administration of justice into their own hands.

Army columns from neighboring provinces, as well as colonial troops sent directly from Morocco, managed to defeat the rebellion in Asturias militarily within two weeks. Afterwards, conservative newspapers put pressure on the government to ensure that workers would never attempt a revolution again.³⁹ The revolt had spread around the country the bourgeoisie's panicked fears of the social order being upended that Chris Ealham observes in Barcelona during the Restoration. The government's goals for the repression were indeed ambitious: rounding up the leaders of the revolt, finding all 11,465 weapons that had been removed from a captured arms factory, and getting back all 14,425,000 pesetas that had been taken from the Bank of Spain in Oviedo.⁴⁰

³⁹ See, for example, *ABC*, October 19, 1934.

⁴⁰ Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 504 and Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 583-84.

And so while there were societal pressures for a harsh response, it was the Radical-CEDA government that set the stage for a particularly brutal repression. It moved quickly to declare a nationwide state of war, ban all socialist organizations, reinstate the death penalty, and crack down on private arms possession.⁴¹ As for who would lead the repression, the government considered the Civil Guard the natural choice because it was a military force with experience in rural counter-insurgency and criminal investigation. However, 86 members of the corps had just been killed in the region, more than in any other single conflict in its history up to that point.⁴² The Civil Guard was in no position to carry out its duties in a neutral and humanitarian fashion.

Diego Hidalgo, now minister of war, wanted an officer with toughness and knowledge of the region to lead a special investigative team in Asturias. General Francisco Franco, who was the special director of military operations, suggested Civil Guard Major Lisardo Doval Bravo, who he had known since their days as cadets in the Infantry Academy. As was the case with the Civil Guard as a whole, Doval was in one sense the ideal candidate for the job. He had been hardened by several years of service in Morocco (receiving a Cross of Military Merit), and he had extensive experience with criminal investigation and political repression alike. He knew Asturias well, having served in the region for about ten years, and had participated in the harsh repression of

⁴¹ Decreto declarando el estado de guerra en todo el territorio de la República Española, *Gaceta de Madrid*, October 7, 1934; Ley estableciendo las penas que se indican para sancionar los delitos que se determinan, *Gaceta de Madrid*, October 17, 1934; and González Calleja, *Nombre de la autoridad*, 217-18.

⁴² Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 539 and Aguado Sánchez, *Revolución de octubre de 1934*, 506.

the general strike there in 1917. During the 1920s, he earned a medal or note of thanks for apprehending criminals or suppressing disorders on an almost yearly basis.⁴³

In another sense, however, the choice of Doval boded ill for Asturias' workers. His work repressing strikes and protests had given him a reputation for cruelty and violence.⁴⁴ He quelled the 1930 general strike in Gijón so ruthlessly that the CNT tried to kill him in revenge.⁴⁵ On April 18, 1931, just four days after the Republic began, the municipal governments of Oviedo, Gijón, and Mieres all demanded his transfer for ignoring whatever regulations he found inconvenient.⁴⁶ Previous chapters have explored how the Civil Guard was willing to bend the law when it came to questions of honor, but it appears Doval was willing to ignore it completely. He held the ideal of loyalty to the government in power in similar disregard. It was only in April 1934 that the Amnesty Law had released him from the penal colony of Villa Cisneros in the Spanish Sahara, where he had been banished for participation in the *Sanjurjada*.⁴⁷ In other words, in Doval Franco had found the experience, ruthlessness, and politics he was looking for. As for Hidalgo, he was so impressed with Doval during an interview in Madrid that he gave the major special powers, effectively making him the dictatorial governor of Asturias.⁴⁸

⁴³ SGC, Expedientes Personales, Lisardo Doval Bravo and CDMH, PS-Documentación particular, 637, Exps. 1-2.

⁴⁴ Ruiz, *Octubre de 1934*, 348-49; José Ruiz del Toro, *Octubre (Etapas de un period revolucionario en España)* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Araujo, 1935), 185; and Juan-Simeón Vidarte, *El bienio negro y la insurrección de Asturias: Testimonio del entonces Vicesecretario y Secretario del PSOE* (Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1978), 342.

⁴⁵ Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 490.

⁴⁶ Comité Republicano Socialista a Ministro Gobernación, AHN, FC-M° del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 18, Oviedo, no. 1219.

⁴⁷ Silva, *Sereno en el peligro*, 235.

⁴⁸ Diego Hidalgo, *¿Por qué fuí lanzado del Ministerio de la Guerra?: Diez meses de actuación ministerial* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1934), 92. López Ochoa writes that he effectively ceded command to Doval upon his arrival. *Campaña militar de Asturias*, 180-82.

There were many guards who were enthusiastic about Doval's project. From October 23th, he had at his command a mobile division composed of five columns of 100 civil guards and 25 assault guards, with access to an infantry and machine gun unit as well.⁴⁹ He received telegrams from civil guards around Spain requesting to join the force, eager to do their part in avenging their institution.⁵⁰ He looked for men who similarly had experience in war and repression. Captain Nilo Tella Cantos, who was also a decorated veteran of the Moroccan wars and already had a poor reputation in Asturias, took over the Model Prison of Oviedo's Investigative Office.⁵¹ Meanwhile, Captain Antonio de Reparaz Gallo led the effort to track down the most prominent leaders of the revolt. As for Doval, he personally took charge of an abandoned convent known as Las Adoratrices that he had converted into a detention center.

6.3.2. Old Methods on a New Scale

Doval's basic methods for tracking down arms and fugitives were straightforward. He began by systematically sweeping through the mining towns, arresting thousands and detaining them in makeshift facilities such as those mentioned above.⁵² His teams used motor vehicles to come up on a town quickly, taking any fugitives hiding there by surprise. Army Colonel Antonio Aranda Mata, who observed Doval's work, describes the next step: "the work is quite simple: with admirable patience

⁴⁹ Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 492 and "La admirable labor que realiza en Asturias la fuerza pública a las órdenes del comandante Doval," *ABC*, November 14, 1934.

⁵⁰ CDMH, PS-Gijón J, Carpeta (C.) 50, Exp. 1.

⁵¹ AGM, Expedientes Personales, sect. 1, T-310 and Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 515. In 1931, even the rumor that he was to be stationed in Avilés was enough to prompt the city's municipal government to insist that this did not occur. A Ministro Gobernación, 20 July 1931, AHN, FC-Mº del Interior, Serie A, legajo 39, exp. 18, Oviedo, no. 1151. He was also present in the Pelayo fight.

⁵² See Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 513, 515 for a complete list of detention centers.

and meticulousness, the forces go through each house,” and, if a wanted man was not found, his relatives were detained until he turned himself in—and he had to do so with a rifle.⁵³ Aranda concludes that while the technique seems excessive, “it gives some admirable results.”⁵⁴

Without question, Doval’s men carried out a systematic program of torture inside their detention facilities.⁵⁵ Even Francisco Aguado Sánchez admits that “there is no doubt that the special commissary for public order [Doval] exceeded his duties.”⁵⁶ As previous chapters of this dissertation have demonstrated, torture was a standard investigative technique for the Civil Guard, and these men were under pressure to make large numbers of arrests and weapons confiscations quickly. However, the goal of the torture seems to have been to terrorize the population into never challenging the Civil Guard’s authority again as much as to gather information. The vast majority of the prisoners were never charged with any crime.⁵⁷ About half simply received a frightening beating and were then released.⁵⁸ Given that, by the best estimate, 15,000 people were detained between October and December 1934 in Asturias, it is safe to say that a

⁵³ “La labor es bien sencilla: con paciencia y meticulosidad admirables, las fuerzas van recorriendo casas por casa.” Quoted in “Admirable labor que realiza en Asturias.”

⁵⁴ “Va dando unos resultados admirables.” Ibid.

⁵⁵ “Escrito de los presos de Oviedo al Fiscal General de la República,” in Ignatus, *La represión de octubre: documentos para la historia de nuestra civilización* (Barcelona: Tierra y Libertad, 1936), 129. Given the government’s secrecy about its operations, determining what occurred next inside the detention centers requires relying on the investigative reports and eye-witness accounts contained in the books and pamphlets that the workers’ parties published about the repression. While doubtless some of these accounts are exaggerated, their quantity and the similarities between them allow for at least a basic reconstruction of what occurred.

⁵⁶ “No hay duda alguna que el comisario especial de Orden Público se excedió en sus atribuciones.” *Revolución de octubre*, 316.

⁵⁷ Doval’s papers contain several letters of complaint from people who were arrested without be charged with any crime. CDMH, PS-Gijón J, C. 50, Exp. 1, Órdenes y notas.

⁵⁸ Even so, more than 10,000 people were processed through the military court set up in Gijón between October 1934 and February 1935. Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 562-63.

substantial portion of the region's working-class population went through this experience.⁵⁹ If the goal had been to punish and make an example of the revolt's leaders, then such vast numbers would not have been necessary. As for the investigative aspect of the operation, although the guards had some success learning the locations of weapons, most wanted men were found during the mass round-ups rather than through leads gained during interrogations.⁶⁰ But guards also felt that they had been insulted by the entire community of Asturian workers, and they wanted to punish each member of that community. While the courts could never handle such a massive operation, the guards could at least exact one night of their own style of revenge on each prisoner, terrifying him enough, they hoped, that he would never try to stand up to them again.

The torture methods employed by Doval and his men were not especially sophisticated. In fact, ordinary beatings, long a standard practice of the Civil Guard, were the most common technique employed. In addition to verbal abuse, prisoners frequently complained of broken ribs, knocked-out teeth, testicle mutilation, and wrist injuries from being tightly handcuffed during the beatings. Between these sessions, the guards kept them in crowded and damp cells with little food or water. The goal of such treatment was often to force prisoners to sign pre-written confessions or denunciations of other suspects. Mock executions were employed if the beatings were not enough to obtain the confession.⁶¹ Guards wished to terrorize the working-class population rather than kill it off, but the fact that guards deemed mock executions effective suggests that

⁵⁹ Ibid., 542.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 503. Quite a few of the revolt's leaders also managed to escape into exile. Ibid., 533.

⁶¹ These assertions are based on a variety of accounts, especially those collected in Ignotus, *Represión de octubre*.

prisoners considered summary executions a real possibility. Such treatment was too much for some to bear. There were quite a few reports of mental breakdowns and attempted suicides among the prisoners, some successful.⁶² In a few cases, the beatings themselves proved deadly as well.⁶³ More commonly, guards sent prisoners to the hospital (but only if absolutely necessary) or left them with chronic injuries or permanent scars.⁶⁴ In other words, the guards were making little effort to hide their work. Only knowledge of what was going on inside the detention centers would make Asturians fearful enough to give up hope of another revolt.

Doval added a psychological element to his work as another way to terrorize the population. Even his choice of a former convent as his main detention center was symbolic. As was often the case with the *casas-cuarteles*, two markers of nineteenth-century liberalism's legacies were brought together—the abandoned convent and the Civil Guard. But for many commentators, Las Adoratrices provoked comparisons to even earlier historical periods—they described Doval's work as “medieval” and “inquisitorial.”⁶⁵ Juan-Simeón Vidarte even saw a kind of perverse poetry in the convent being a place “where previously God was invoked, and now it recalled Dante's Inferno.”⁶⁶ Inside the convent, Doval played loud music that echoed through the halls

⁶² For more, see Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 551-52, 562.

⁶³ Among other sources, several such accounts can be found in Alexandre Jaume, *La insurrección de octubre. Cataluña, Asturias, Baleares* (Santi Jordi: Res publica Ediciones, 1997).

⁶⁴ *La Revolución de Asturias (Documentos)*, (Mexico: Ediciones Defensa Roja, 1935), 17. Taibo writes that the tortures left 82 workers disabled for life. *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 519. For another example, see “Las denuncias de Félix Gordón Ordás al Presidente de la República,” in Ignotus, *Represión de octubre*, 174-75 for a list of prisoners who had to be hospitalized in the Mieres district.

⁶⁵ For example, Fernando Solano Palacios, *Revolución de octubre*, 184, 188, 192 and Ignotus, *Represión de octubre*, 6.

⁶⁶ “Donde antes se invocaba a Dios y ahora se asemejaba al infierno de Dante.” Vidarte, *Bienio negro*, 342.

along with the screams of the prisoners being tortured.⁶⁷ In an interview decades later, Ignacio Lavilla, who was an editor of *Avance* and a prisoner in Las Adoratrices from November 11 to December 20, 1934, described the building as having “very high ceilings, an absence of furniture, stone floors, [and] dampness.”⁶⁸ He told how guards escorted him through a passageway to a large office. There Doval stood, with a map of Asturias spread out before him. He told Lavilla that he wanted him to point out where Amador Fernández, president of the Socialist miner’s union in the region, was hiding. Lavilla noticed that “Doval had a tic that he used to impose more respect. An earlobe trembled when he became enraged. He always had a deep frown; there was forever an expression of contained violence on his face.”⁶⁹ After a few more hours in his cell to think it over, Lavilla was brought before Doval again but refused to divulge the information. Doval unleashed his violence, hitting Lavilla a few times himself before ordering the guards to finish the job. Lavilla remarked that “the disciplinary rigor of the guards was absolute. They were young [and] silent. They struck without warning, coldly and unfeelingly.”⁷⁰

This account may have been exaggerated, but its cinematic tone speaks to the fact that Doval was trying to mythologize his work in Las Adoratrices. The medieval setting, the psychological manipulations, the guards’ reputations for coldness, and his own

⁶⁷ Díaz Nosty, *Comuna asturiana*, 364 and Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 495.

⁶⁸ “Techos muy altos, ausencia de muebles, losa en el suelo, humedad. En el pasillo de acceso, una cómoda larga.” In Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 498.

⁶⁹ “Doval tenía un tic que utilizaba para imponer más respeto. Le temblaba el lóbulo de una oreja cuando se enfurecía. Siempre estaba con el ceño fruncido, tenía eternamente en la cara un gesto de violencia contenida.” In *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ “El rigor disciplinado de los guardias era absoluto. Eran jóvenes, silenciosos. Golpeaban sin advertencia, en seco, en frío.” In *Ibid.*, 499.

infamous personality combined to create horror stories that were ripe for telling to friends and families of the over 500 prisoners who passed through the facility.⁷¹ In a sense, Doval was indeed seeking to impose more respect. But it was a respect that was synonymous with fear, not admiration.

Some historians have conflated the atrocities committed by the army (particularly the colonial units) and the Civil Guard, but in fact the differences between them are quite revealing.⁷² The colonial troops carried out their standard practices of killings and looting.⁷³ Neither of these was the goal for the guards. They would have their revenge, but through their own customary method of torture, which they also thought of as an investigative technique. There were exceptions, however.⁷⁴ For example, Lieutenant Rafael Alonso Nart, the brother of the captain who had been killed during the rising, led one of the sweeps of Langreo area. He arrested 24 people with apparently little concern for whether or not they were guilty of participation in the rising, tied them up, and brutally killed them near the town of Carbayín with swords and other weapons before tossing the bodies in a mass grave. It was the largest single massacre of the repression.⁷⁵ For the younger Nart, even torture was not enough to avenge his brother's death—only more killing would suffice.

In one sense, the methods of Doval and his team were nothing new, indicating continuity in the Civil Guard's practices as a force of political repression. Guards

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 503.

⁷² See, for example, Brenan, *Spanish Labyrinth*, 288.

⁷³ For details, see Balfour, *Deadly Embrace*, 253-55.

⁷⁴ For other examples, see Jaume, *Insurrección de octubre*, 45-46.

⁷⁵ Ruiz, *Octubre de 1934*, 346-47; "Las denuncias de Félix Gordón Ordás al Presidente de la República," in Ignotus, *Represión de octubre*, 222-30; and *Crímenes de la reacción española*, 49-55.

followed their institution's standard, if unofficial, investigative technique of beating confessions and denunciations out of prisoners. In so doing, guards exacted their own punishment on prisoners for insulting their institution before they handed the suspects over to the judicial system. Victims' descriptions of the tortures they endured in Las Adoratrices or the Model Prison are almost identical to the testimonies of those held at Monjuich in the 1890s, for instance (see Chapter One). However, what Doval did was also unprecedented. While Lieutenant Portas had conducted a broad round-up of anarchists and other political activists in Barcelona, he did not target the entire population. In contrast, the scale of Doval's operation matched the scale of the Asturias rebellion, with the number of arrests in the thousands instead of hundreds. The way in which his team systematically sought to terrorize its victims, scarring them both physically and mentally, suggests that this time guards were trying to do more than make an example out of revolutionary activists. The guards were also trying to instill fear in as many working-class Asturian families as they could. No longer did they maintain the fiction that their deeds would earn them the respect of most of the population. Now, the Asturian working class was the enemy, and it had to be forced into submission.

Government policies, political pressures, and individual leaders all played a part in this shift in attitude on the part of the Civil Guard. It was the Lerroux government that made a particularly harsh officer the special commissary and, at least initially, did not put him under any oversight. Conservative sectors of society also put pressure on Doval to come down hard on the revolutionaries, without perhaps knowing what exactly doing so would mean. Nevertheless, the fact that Doval's actions were the logical extension of long-standing elements of the Civil Guard's culture leads one to believe that the basic

pattern of mass arrests and torture would have been followed even if another officer had been appointed to the position, although Doval took these practices to a new extreme.⁷⁶

The repression in Asturias provided a hint of what the guards' culture made them capable of when they were given free rein to take revenge on those they believed had challenged their honor.

6.3.3. Polarizing National Repercussions

October 1934 saw the Socialists move outside of the legal bounds of political contestation, but Doval also paid little heed to the law during the repression. Since his work lacked grounding in the law, he sought support for it from the public. He had some success in doing so, at least among the conservative sectors of society, and ultimately it was his ambition, rather than his methods, that proved to be his undoing. Meanwhile, left-wing groups began to construct a counter-narrative that presented Doval's efforts as nothing short of demonic. It was the government's assignment of the Civil Guard, and Doval in particular, and its toleration (at least initially) of the team's brutal methods that allowed this new interpretation to emerge. In enabling Doval's excesses, the Radical-CEDA government forfeited its ability to argue that it had stayed faithful to the Republican rules of the game while the Left had not. The ability to portray such right-wing governments once again as the enemies of the Republic enabled left-wing parties to find common ground and take the reins of power for themselves.

At first, the government's strategy was simply to have the public know as little about the repression as possible. It used censorship to ensure that only favorable

⁷⁶ Blaney, "Civil Guard," 209.

coverage of its forces got through, and it banned the papers of the workers' parties anyway. While the remaining papers had limited coverage of the repression, they were filled with exaggerated stories of atrocities perpetrated by the rebels.⁷⁷ In the judgment of Sarah Sanchez, "these newspaper reports had the desired effect and Spanish public opinion immediately after the insurrection was definitely against the miners, calling for revenge and severe reprisals."⁷⁸ After the deaths of so many guards, all the usual means of showing support for the institution and its work were also set in motion—letters and articles of praise, donations, and homages.⁷⁹ Doval's efforts in fact earned him special praise. His papers contain 70 letters of congratulations and thanks written between October and December 1934. The letters came from all over Spain, including quite a few from Asturias.⁸⁰

Doval understood that the Republic's mass press would ensure that the whole country would be watching him (to the extent that the censorship allowed). Therefore, he tried to take advantage of this publicity to strengthen his already extraordinary power in Asturias. He may have aspired to become the director general of security or even the inspector general of the Civil Guard.⁸¹ His strategy was to hold frequent press

⁷⁷ Antonio María Calero, "Octubre visto por la derecha," in *Octubre 1934*, 168. See Brennan, *Spanish Labyrinth*, 286 for a particularly colorful summary of these claims.

⁷⁸ *Fact and Fiction*, 37. See this book for a more thorough analysis of the works from all sides of the political spectrum about October 1934 that emerged in the revolt's aftermath.

⁷⁹ See Blaney, "Civil Guard," 215-20 for details. SEHGC, *Memorias de Comandancias*, Albacete, 100-03 also contains an account of a homage in Albacete attended by Prime Minister Lerroux. For an example of an effusive article of praise, see "Admirable labor que realiza en Asturias." For the commemorations of Captain Nart in Gijón, see "Gijón se ha organizado." For demonstrates of support for the Civil Guard during the April 14, 1935 Republic Day celebrations, see Lara, "Notas del mes," *RTGC* 26, no. 303 (May 1935): 184.

⁸⁰ CDMH, PS-Gijón J, C. 50, Exp. 1.

⁸¹ Ruiz del Toro, *Octubre*, 187. In November 1934, as the CEDA pushed for more power in the government, it suggested Doval for the post of inspector general. Octavio Ruiz Manjón, *El Partido Republicano Radical, 1908-1936* (Madrid: Tebas), 465.

conferences when high-profile arrests were made, assuring the public that “as long as a single rifle remains in the province, I will not leave Asturias.”⁸² But weeks went by and he had still not located the fugitive he wanted most: Ramón González Peña, the supposed “*generalísimo*” of the revolt.⁸³ Captain Reparaz and his men eventually confirmed that he was in the house of a religious family friend by keeping it under observation while disguised as miners. However, early on the morning of December 3rd, it was Doval who led a team of 90 civil and assault guards in the raid on the house, taking a photo of the handcuffed prisoner for the newspapers.⁸⁴ Doval promptly received another flood of congratulatory telegrams from around the country, and Oviedo residents staged a large celebration in front of his office.⁸⁵

Doval may have sought positive publicity, but he could not keep the darker aspects of his work a secret forever. Just weeks into his assignment, challenges to his narrative were beginning to emerge, particularly in England and France. Some of these documents found their way into Spain, usually in the form of pamphlets that reprinted investigative reports. These pamphlets sought to shock the reader through the sheer number of accounts of executions and torture the reports contained, repeating the familiar form of writing about Civil Guard atrocities that radical groups had been following since at least the 1890s. The primary goal was to undermine the government that had permitted

⁸² “Mientras quede un solo fusil en la provincia, no me marcharé de Asturias.” Quoted in Díaz Nosty, *Comuna asturiana*, 364.

⁸³ “Admirable labor que realiza en Asturias.”

⁸⁴ Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 526.

⁸⁵ CDMH, PS-Gijón J, C. 50, Exp. 2 and “Ayer de madrugada fue capturado en Ablaña el cabecilla socialista de la revolución, González Peña,” *El Noroeste*, December 4, 1934.

such atrocities to take place, but the propaganda certainly did not help the Civil Guard's reputation either, particularly since Doval made such a charismatic villain.

In early November, a left-republican deputy, Félix Gordón Ordás, brought dozens of cases of executions and torture from around northern Spain directly to the attention of President Alcalá Zamora since Prime Minister Lerroux had refused to allow Gordón Ordás to present his evidence in the Cortes.⁸⁶ Doval's team reacted angrily, accusing Gordón Ordás of using his report to boost his own political career and arresting a mailman who brought newspapers containing his accusations into Asturias.⁸⁷ José Valdivia, the director general of security, sent an inspector to investigate all this, but Doval blocked the inspector's efforts as well, claiming that his special status placed him under the exclusive supervision of the minister of war. Captain Reparaz, writing during the Civil War, recalled how resentful the guards in Asturias were about the increasing scrutiny. He wrote that "the [masonic] lodges influenced things in Madrid. The government recommended 'much caution' in our labor," advice that in his opinion forced the guards to treat important prisoners "like distinguished guests in the prisons."⁸⁸

Ultimately, it was Doval's refusal to have his power challenged rather than his cruelty that ended his reign in Asturias. Angered by Doval's rebuke of the inspector and envious of his power, Valdivia convinced Lerroux to order him transferred to Morocco

⁸⁶ "Denuncias de Félix Gordón," in Ignotus, *Represión de octubre*.

⁸⁷ Reparaz and Souza, *Cuartel General de Miaja*, 18-19.

⁸⁸ "Las logias influían en Madrid. El Gobierno nos recomendaba "mucho cuidado" en nuestra labor." "Como huéspedes distinguidos de las cárceles." *Ibid.*, 19-20.

on the December 8th.⁸⁹ Yet the major enjoyed the support of conservatives to the end.⁹⁰ The very day of his transfer, members of “good society” in Oviedo marched in protest and regional newspapers praised his work.⁹¹ Meanwhile, the censors prevented *ABC*, which thought Doval’s methods so excellent that they should have been extended to the whole country, from publishing a scathing editorial that claimed his dismissal was proof of the Lerrox government’s “weakness.”⁹²

Doval’s transfer did not mean that the repression was over, however. Captain Tella, for instance, continued his work at the overcrowded Model Prison, but word was also spreading about what that involved.⁹³ An extensive report by Socialist deputy Fernando de los Ríos, based on interviews with inmates at the Model Prison, was published in the French press, and soon after, 547 prisoners managed miraculously to sign and smuggle out an open letter to the attorney general of the Republic denouncing their systematic maltreatment. The piece contains dozens of examples, with horrific beatings so severe that they caused serious injury or death again being the most common theme.⁹⁴ Two weeks after Doval’s departure, Tella was ordered to join him in Morocco.⁹⁵ Reparaz interpreted all this as just one more example of the ingratitude with which the Spanish government and people repaid a civil guard who had worked so

⁸⁹ Ricardo de la Cierva, *Fracaso del octubre revolucionario. 1934-1935. La represión* (Madrid: ARC editores, 1997), 108 and González Calleja, *Nombre de la autoridad*, 235-36.

⁹⁰ Robert Gellately writes that “police justice” in Nazi Germany received even more widespread public support. *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁹¹ Taibo, *Asturias, octubre 1934*, 530 and Díaz Nosty, *Comuna asturiana*, 370.

⁹² “Debilidad.” Quoted in Ruiz del Toro, *Octubre*, 187. “El Gobierno cree que es más interesante desarticular los medios revolucionarios que demostrar dureza en la represión,” *ABC*, November 1, 1934.

⁹³ This prison, with a capacity of 200, was housing 983 inmates at the time. Díaz Nosty, *Comuna asturiana*, 370.

⁹⁴ “Escrito de los presos,” in Ignatus, *Represión de octubre*.

⁹⁵ Ruiz, *Octubre de 1934*, 350-51.

selflessly for them.⁹⁶ Reparaz even remarked, in a sarcastic reversal of the Civil Guard's usual sensitivity to insult, that "my modest personality shared the honor of the libel and injury that were so prodigiously dedicated to my chief [Doval]."⁹⁷

When President Alcalá-Zamora called new elections for February 1936, the counter-narrative of the repression threatened to win a coalition of left-wing parties enough votes to end the entire reign of right-wing governments in Spain. Since elections could only be held if the country was not under a state of emergency, all constitutional guarantees were restored in January 1936. The Right's stories of rebel atrocities were central in its electoral propaganda, but now stories of atrocities perpetrated by government forces could dominate the electoral propaganda of a new coalition of left republicans, Socialists, and Communists known as the Popular Front. In fact, amnesty for political prisoners became the main policy point around which the disparate members of the Popular Front united. Once again, the Left was using denunciations of the Civil Guard's actions as a rallying cry, mixing renewed calls for the dissolution of the force with the main message that the right-wing forces that had given the Civil Guard free rein to behave so cruelly had to be removed from office.⁹⁸ As similar pieces had when denouncing previous repressions, this propaganda portrayed victims in an almost

⁹⁶ Reparaz and Souza, *Cuartel General de Miaja*, 20.

⁹⁷ "Mi modesta personalidad compartiera el honor de la calumnia y de la injuria que tan pródigamente fueron dedicadas a mi jefe." *Ibid.*, 28.

⁹⁸ One book, dated February 1, 1936, called for all of the above: "The suppression of the Assault and Civil Guards, the punishment of the governors who reconquered Asturias with the indigenous *regulares* and the forces of the Legion, [and] the elimination of all military and civilian positions of government that distinguished themselves in the repression." "La supresión de los cuerpos de la Guardia civil y de Asalto, el castigo de los gobernantes que reconquistaron a Asturias por los regulares indígenas y las fuerzas del Tercio; la eliminación de todo cargo de gobierno de los militares y civiles que se distinguieron en la represión." Iñotus, *Represión de octubre*, 8. Also see Jaume, *Insurrección de octubre* for an example of how tales of the atrocities and opposition political propaganda were woven together.

religious way as martyrs to the revolution in the face of the forces of reaction, which included the Civil Guard.⁹⁹ Some even went beyond sympathizing with the victims into praise for the act of rebellion itself. The strategy worked. Public outrage over the repression was one of the main reasons why the Popular Front was able to coalesce to win the elections of February 16, 1936.¹⁰⁰

Margarita Nelken, who contributed her own book to the propaganda publishing frenzy, provides an example of how the tone in some of these pieces had radicalized relative to that of the first three years of the Republic.¹⁰¹ Nelken had fled to France and then the Soviet Union after being involved in the rising in Madrid.¹⁰² Impressed by the Soviet example, she allied herself with the most radical positions within the PSOE in her book, unafraid of deepening her party's divisions. She explained why October 1934 had been justified at a time when moderate Socialists were regretting the decision to rebel and argued that the rising's failure had been caused by the hesitancy of these moderates.¹⁰³ She came to the conclusion that the Republic had really been nothing more than a continuation of the oligarchic systems of the monarchy and that only a revolution could effect real change.

Naturally, Nelken also took the opportunity to reiterate her criticisms of the Civil Guard, understanding it as an essential tool in maintaining the status quo. She accused

⁹⁹ Bunk, "Your Comrades will not Forget!": Revolutionary Martyrs and Political Unity," chap. 3 in *Ghosts of Passion*.

¹⁰⁰ José E. Álvarez, "The Spanish Foreign Legion during the Asturian Uprising of October 1934," *War in History* 18, no. 2 (2011): 223.

¹⁰¹ *Por qué hicimos la revolución*, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Balaños y Aguilar). She wrote the book in Moscow 1935 but could not publish it in Spain until March of the following year.

¹⁰² Preston, "Margarita Nelken," 340-43.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 345-48.

the guards of electoral manipulation and of being “the enemy incarnate, ferocious in their hatred and in their acts, of the working class.”¹⁰⁴ Her tone was even more confrontational than it had been in 1932. For instance, rather than lamenting Castilblanco, she actually praised the killings as being “the one time that the workers, fired upon by the Civil Guard during a peaceful protest, had had the courage to respond. . . In Castilblanco, the Civil Guard continued to be at the orders of the same property owner as under the monarchy, and continued being, as under the monarchy, a corps made up of intangible, unassailable beings, of demigods above all responsibility.”¹⁰⁵ Of course, she also criticized the Civil Guard’s actions in Asturias, reprinting several of the reports on the atrocities.

While the failure of the October 1934 uprising tilted the Socialist leadership as a whole away from revolution and back toward electoral coalition building, the Civil Guard’s own actions had aided radical leaders like Nelken in encouraging the rank-and-file to demand more sweeping and immediate changes than ever before. Brian Bunk argues in *Ghosts of Passion* that commemorations of the Asturias rebellion polarized Spain into conservative and leftist camps with competing narratives that sought to dehumanize the other side. The resulting hostile political environment led into the Civil War. Portrayals of the Civil Guard’s actions in Asturias contributed to this process. Conservatives praised and rewarded the institution for its part in fighting back against the rebels. Bunk notes the importance of October in giving conservative men the idea that

¹⁰⁴ “El enemigo encarnizado, ferroz en su odio y en sus procedimientos, de la clase obrera.” *Por qué hicimos la revolución*, 81.

¹⁰⁵ “Una única vez los trabajadores, ametrallados por la Guardia civil durante una manifestación pacífica, habían tenido el coraje de contestar. . . En Castilblanco, la Guardia civil seguía a las órdenes del mismo propietario que bajo la Monarquía; y seguía siendo, como bajo la Monarquía, un cuerpo formado por seres intangibles, inatacables, por unos semidioses superiores a toda responsabilidad.” *Ibid.*, 62-63.

their homes and families were under siege by the Left, which led them to want to defend the domestic sphere with violence.¹⁰⁶ The story of the guards in Asturias gave credence to this line of thought because they literally did have to use violence to defend their homes and families against revolutionaries. Meanwhile, working-class groups saw those who rose up and attacked the guards as the heroes. During the 1936 election campaign, these groups mobilized as never before to pile on denunciations of the Civil Guard for the atrocities it had committed during the repression, desperate to end the string of center-Right governments that they saw as nothing short of despotic. The result was a febrile political atmosphere where tensions were so high that they frequently spilled over into violence. Such was the environment that the guards most feared, one where both their lives and the honor of their institution were in danger. But it was an atmosphere that, through the aftershocks of their actions during the repression, was partially of their own making.

6.4. Conclusion

The interactions among the four factors on which Part Two of this dissertation has concentrated, the Civil Guard's military culture, the mass mobilizations of the Socialists in particular, Republican governmental policy, and the choices of individual actors, all played a part in explaining why both the insurrection of October 1934 in Asturias and its aftermath were two of the most violent and polarizing events of the Second Republic period. On the surface, the cause of the violence during the revolt itself is easily explained: rebels attacked Civil Guard posts, and guards defended themselves. However,

¹⁰⁶ "Grandsons of the Cid," chap. 4 in *Ghosts of Passion*.

the pattern that these combat rituals fell into was shaped by the Civil Guard's history of conflict with Asturian miners and the institution's tradition of honor, which guards felt demanded that they put up a fight until further resistance was no longer feasible. There were also a few individual officers who chose to fight to the bitter end following a more militaristic vision of honor as glory through death in battle. Afterwards, these individuals were glorified while courts-martial showed little sympathy for those who did not put up much of a fight. Through these courts-martial, the Republic was permitting the army a part in defining what honorable conduct for a civil guard would mean in such an unprecedented situation. Therefore, the state was complicit in this introduction of an understanding of the institution's honor as an absolute confrontation rather than a negotiation with citizens. This new current in the corps' thinking stayed with it as it entered the even more turbulent year of 1936.

The Civil Guard's routines, government policy, and individual leaders also had their roles in making the repression of the Asturian revolt the most brutal mainland Spain had seen in decades. The practice of arresting large numbers of suspects and beating confessions and denunciations out of them was not new to the Civil Guard. However, what was different was that the scale of the rebellion meant the rounding up and terrorizing of almost an entire class of people rather than just known members of a particular movement like anarchism. Retribution for the Asturians' challenges to the Civil Guard's position of authority was not enough. Doval and his subordinates wanted to create a systemic climate of fear that would ensure the miners would never rise up again. Doval was a particularly cruel officer, but he had been appointed by the Radical-CEDA government and was encouraged by the conservative sectors of society.

While Socialist rebellion may have been crushed, the movement's mass mobilizing power returned to legal forms of contestation as it joined with other left-wing groups to focus national media attention on the excesses of the repression during the election campaign. The Civil Guard's gallantry in resisting the rebellion should have greatly elevated its public image, but it was the brutality of its response afterward that became the central, and effective, rallying cry of the victorious Popular Front. Civil guards like Doval had felt that they could step beyond the bounds of legality during the repression, but the mass politics of the Republic ensured that they would ultimately face consequences for their actions.

Epilogue and Conclusion

EC.1. Epilogue: The Popular Front and the Civil War

By 1936, the mass political mobilization that had been one of the defining features of the Second Republic had reached new heights, but its character was not the same as that of 1931. Polarization was the word of the day as the political center lost adherents to radical groups on both sides of the political spectrum that saw violence as a political tool and toleration of the other side as impossible. In this atmosphere of political tension and violence, the two phenomena that civil guards hated most came rushing back after the lull of 1935: public disorder and criticism of their institution. In fact, the first seven-and-a-half months of 1936 saw a higher number of deaths in political violence than any other entire year of the Republic if October 1934 is excluded.¹ The numbers suggest that it was not so much that the Civil Guard was more violent once the Popular Front government took power in February 1936 (although it still held its place as the most violent group that could be identified among professions and political persuasions), but rather that other groups became more violent, most notably the fascist Falange, which was founded in 1933 and caused 6.85% of the *segundo bienio*'s total political violence deaths but 15.69% of the Popular Front's.² In other words, the high level of political violence during the Popular Front period can be explained by the combination of the forces of public order's continued frequent recourse to violence and the increasing use of violent street confrontations as a principal strategy of political contestation by radical groups on both sides of the political spectrum.

¹ González Calleja calculates a total of 428 deaths. *Cifras cruentas*, 75.

² These assertions are made from data found in *Ibid.*

Given the Civil Guard's desire for order, it is ironic that its harsh repression of the October 1934 rebellion had been one of the factors that drove the polarization in the first place. Right-wing opposition groups like the CEDA and the monarchist Renovación Española made every effort to create the perception that the Popular Front was allowing public order to slip out of control. This perception was one of the primary reasons why many civil guards became open to abandoning their commitment to political neutrality in favor of rebellion against the government in power, even though the Civil Guard itself was in fact one of the main perpetrators of the violence.³ Meanwhile, emboldened Socialists and Communists resumed their calls for the dissolution of the force in the press and letters of complaint with an even more biting tone.⁴ For guards, the temptation to take extralegal action to silence these voices was strong. As the loyalty of more and more officers to the Popular Front diminished, the government felt the need to make frequent transfers and dismissals to keep disloyal commanders out of key posts, which made guards feel that the government was politicizing their institution.⁵

In April 1936, the willingness of more guards to disobey the Popular Front government, coupled with the violence of radical youth groups in particular on both sides of the political spectrum, sparked a new spiral of revenge killings that would augment support for a military rebellion that would supposedly restore public order. On the 14th of

³ See the famous debates about political violence in the Cortes in *DSCD*, April 15-16, 1936 and June 16, 1936.

⁴ Blaney, "Civil Guard," 238-40 and González Calleja, *Nombre de la autoridad*, 127. For an example of a critical newspaper article, see Margarita Nelken, "El orden que hay que mantener," *Claridad*, June 18, 1936. For examples of letters of complaint, see the more than 50 denunciations of guards near Reinosa (Santander) in CDMH, PS-Santander L, C. 463, Exp. 22 from March to April 1936.

⁵ For more on these measures and the reasons why so many guards turned against the Popular Front more generally, see Rivas, *Frente Popular*, especially 142-51 and Blaney, "Civil Guard," 227-49.

the month, a Civil Guard second lieutenant was killed during the Republic Day parade in Madrid. The Civil Guard had become such a divisive symbol that the government prohibited a public funeral, but a command chief disobeyed this order, and, sure enough, Assault Guard Lieutenant José Castillo, who was linked to the Socialist Youth, and his men killed six as the procession became a street battle between different radical groups.⁶ On July 12th, Falangists retaliated by killing Castillo. That very night, a group of assault guards and Socialists led by Civil Guard Captain Fernando Condés Romero, who also had ties to the Socialist Youth, then murdered a prominent monarchist leader in return.⁷ Conspirators who had been plotting a military coup felt that the assassination would shatter enough people's confidence in the ability of the Popular Front to maintain order that they could set the date of their rising on mainland Spain for July 18th.⁸ As for Condés, his commitment to revolutionary socialism was certainly unusual for a civil guard. However, the Civil War, the conditions for which Condés inadvertently helped create, would reveal that many guards shared his willingness to break the law in the name of vengeance by the summer of 1936.

Estimates of how many guards sided with the rebellion of July 1936 vary widely from 41% to 71%.⁹ Whatever the number, considering that the rebels were only able to seize control of about half the provincial capitals and a third of Spain's total land area in

⁶ For more on these incidents, see Rivas Gómez, "Entierro del Alférez."

⁷ It seems that Condés had originally intended simply to kidnap rather than kill the politician. For more on these murders, see Ian Gibson, *La noche en que mataron a Calvo Sotelo* (Barcelona: Editorial Argos Vergara, 1982).

⁸ See Payne, *Politics and the Military*, 339 for details.

⁹ Ramón Salas Larrazábal has 41% and Juan Blázquez Miguel and Carlos Engel Masoliver have 71%. Salas Larrazábal, *Los datos exactos de la guerra civil* (Madrid: Ediciones Rioduero, 1980), 270-71; Blázquez Miguel, *Guardia Civil durante la República*, 359; and Carlos Engel Masoliver, *El Cuerpo de Oficiales en la Guerra de España* (Valladolid: AF Editores), 34. Blaney deems Engel's estimate to be the most accurate. "New Perspectives," 214.

the initial days of the rising, one can conclude that there was widespread sympathy for the rebels among the guards. Making their duty to follow orders, their loyalty to the government in power, or their accountability to the public the priority should have made guards loyal to the Popular Front. But the fact that in every province where guards went against the sentiments of the civilian populations, they did so in favor of the rebels (although there were individual exceptions) suggests that most guards who stayed loyal to the Republic did so to survive in loyal provinces while many who joined the rebels did so out of conviction.¹⁰

This conviction was the result of a shift in the Civil Guard's conception of honor away from an emphasis on political neutrality and accountability to the public as a whole. Having failed to win the respect of all classes as a force for order, after October 1934 many guards turned to a more military model of honor that demanded they win glory on the battlefield. After so many guards had been killed and so many workers had been tortured, mutual compromise between the two seemed impossible. The working-class public was now the enemy, and other military men and rebel political groups such as the Falange were the audience from which guards now sought approbation. It is no coincidence that the Civil Guard played a major part in all five of the famous sieges that the rebel forces withstood at the Santuario de Nuestra Señora de la Cabeza (Jaén), the Alcázar of Toledo, Oviedo, the Simancas Barracks (Oviedo), and Albacete, none of

¹⁰ According to Salas Larrazábal, a total of 19 companies also passed over to what is known as the Nationalist side later in the war, whereas there was not a single company that passed over to the Republican side. *Datos exactos*, 271. Perhaps the most dramatic individual exception is that of Major José Rodríguez-Medel Briones, chief of Navarre Command. He ordered his officers to maintain their loyalty to the government and resist the Carlist uprising in the region, but they refused and killed him instead. Blaney, "Civil Guard," 256-58.

which had particular strategic value.¹¹ Yet as the commanders of the guards in these battles understood it, their honor left no room for surrender; death was an end in and of itself.

For almost one hundred years, successive governments had allowed civil guards to defend their honor with violence without any real legal repercussions. When the Popular Front threatened to take this ability away, many guards chose to support a rebellion that would eliminate the civilian government. The fact that so many guards joined the rebellion proves that they were making claims of their own beyond the orders of the state. Even if they were not fighting for the respect of the whole public, their rebellion was an assertion that the state had to uphold the tradition place of religion, family, and the *patria* in society. Catholic conservatives, as always, would be there to cheer them on in this venture. Ahumada said that honor could not be regained once lost, but guards tried to do so anyway through revenge. The rebellion offered them full license to take revenge on the workers who had offended them. It promised to reshape the governmental system such that further challenges would be impossible.¹² By supporting what became a regime that suppressed free speech, democratic government, and worker mobilization, these guards helped eliminate the only restraints on their use of violence as a means of maintaining order and honor.¹³ The clampdown of the Franco regime on dissent and free expression meant that guards could unleash their impulse to take revenge

¹¹ Volumes 5 and 6 of Aguado Sánchez, *Historia de la Guardia Civil* contain a description of each of these sieges.

¹² In the Nationalist rearguard, guards were essentially given free rein to shoot anyone that they felt deserved to be executed. Payne, *Politics and the Military*, 415.

¹³ Rafael Cruz sees the Nationalist regime as carrying out a process of “de-democratization.” *En el nombre del pueblo: República, rebelión y guerra en la España de 1936* (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 2006), 332-33.

without any accountability to the public. As a result, guards became some of the perpetrators of the infamous political repression that sought to eliminate all opposition from Nationalist Spain.

EC.2. Conclusion

The rebels who sparked the Spanish Civil War used the period's high level of political violence to justify their actions. This dissertation has sought to explain why civil guards had been some of the main perpetrators of this violence. The sheer number of protests that guards had to respond to during the Republic and the fact that rifles were often their only weapons go a long way towards accounting for their violence. This dissertation has suggested that the force's military culture of honor was also a key factor, and it has looked all the way back to the founding of the institution in order to examine how its culture came to have such deadly implications.

The Civil Guard was at its core a liberal project, intended to extend the reach of the national government's laws and reforms into the countryside. That mission would meet intense resistance in these rural areas, and so guards would need a code that would ensure their integrity and discipline. The Duque de Ahumada adapted his aristocratic idea of honor to the corps' liberal purpose, hoping that a desire for the respect of the public would guide guards in responding to resistance in a measured fashion. The honor culture of the force proved effective in giving it a strong organizational identity and shielding it from overt corruption, but it also had several unintended consequences. The infusion of an extralegal notion of honor into the guards' culture meant that their actions were determined by more than their duty to follow orders and enforce the law. On the one hand, the need to win the respect of the public meant that the strict enforcement of

the law was not always possible. At times, guards had to look the other way in order to be at least tolerated by a particular *pueblo*. On the other hand, their idea of honor did not tolerate disrespect, and they believed that violence was an appropriate response to disobedience or insult.

When guards faced perceived disorder, their regulations gave them few options to respond aside from employing warnings and opening fire to assert their claim that their honor must be respected. While guards responded with violence to working-class people who resisted their imposition of state authority, their desire for public affirmation created the opportunity for *de facto* alliances with local elites who knew how to flatter them with material support, letters of praise, and homages. As Spain's liberal elites cut off the rest of the country from political power during the Restoration regime, the anarchist movement emerged as a challenge to government authority in general. When anarchists were pushed to violence as the only means of resistance, the state and alarmed conservatives encouraged guards to respond harshly. Guards turned to mass arrests and torture as a means to create fear among opposition groups that refused to respect them.

If military culture is determined by not only a unit's regulations but also by its unwritten habits, then examining the social origins, training, and daily life of its members is also essential to understanding its behavior and, in this case, its violence. In the case of the Civil Guard, lacking any schools or formal training programs of its own (except the Colegio de Guardias Jóvenes), army experiences and apprenticeships formed the core of its acculturation process, transforming rural laborers into members of the town elite. In the army of early twentieth-century Spain, many future guards experienced the brutalities of war in Morocco, and officers in particular were exposed to the army's view of honor

as fighting for the *patria* on the battlefield. The apprenticeship period, then, was key to teaching aspirants how to be policemen, including how to seek honor from the maintenance of order rather than from valor in battle. While this form of training allowed for a high degree of continuity as guards passed down the habits they had learned on-the-job, it gave the state no ability to shape the culture of these guards.

The culture of the guards serving under the Second Republic may have been similar to that of their predecessors, but the mass political mobilization of the time called for adaptation rather than entrenchment. Unprecedented levels of strike and protest activity accompanied the Republic, and these events often involved insulting guards in some fashion. Guards frequently responded as they always had, with violence, becoming a major contributor to the surge in political violence that also accompanied the Republic. Freedom of the press meant that opponents of the Civil Guard, particularly Socialists, could express their criticisms in writing as well. The institution's idea of political neutrality blocked it from launching a public relations campaign of its own, and so the conservative sectors of society, rapidly developing a mass politics as well, were the ones to sing the institution's praises, deepening the perception that guards were the servants of reaction.

In the second half of this dissertation, case studies of incidents of political violence involving the Civil Guard illustrated how the strained relationship between the institution's culture and the Second Republic's mass politics increased the violence of the period. The Castilblanco and Arnedo incidents both involved local communities being inspired to take to the streets by the Republic's atmosphere of political and social contestation and then clashing violently with the Civil Guard. Afterwards, the Socialists

did little to alter their crowd-pleasing criticisms of the force, while guards, represented by Director General Sanjurjo, showed little tact when responding to these perceived insults in the national media spotlight. The attacks pushed some guards, along with Sanjurjo, to revolt in August 1932, but most guards were not yet ready to defend their honor by violating their commitment to the government in power.

In October 1934, it was the miners of Asturias who led the way in violent contestation by rebelling against the government, an action that began with the violent expulsion of the Civil Guard from their communities. Most guards believed that their duty demanded that they defend their posts, but they also felt that they could surrender honorably if that defense was no longer viable. A few officers, however, led their men in fights to the death, choosing to seek honor through death in battle. While these cases were the exceptions, their subsequent glorification and the growing impossibility of the Civil Guard earning the respect of all classes of society meant that this more militarist version of honor gained ground within the force.

In the repression of the Asturias revolt, the Civil Guard employed its usual strategy of mass arrests and torture, but the fact that seemingly an entire region had risen up against them meant that for the first time they carried out a systematic program of instilling fear in that entire region. Yet the guards' efforts to avenge the physical attacks against them backfired when the mass political parties and media of the Popular Front made scathing criticism of the repression the focal point of the 1936 election campaign. The Civil Guard that the new Popular Front government took control of in February 1936 was more antagonistic towards Spain's working classes and less committed to political neutrality than ever before. When military rebellion broke out in July, many guards took

advantage of the chance it offered to seek revenge against those who refused to show the Civil Guard the proper respect.

Looking across the different instances of political violence involving the Civil Guard in this dissertation, a pattern can be identified of these outbursts emerging from the interactions among the corps' military culture, the mass mobilizations of the Second Republic, the policies of the different Republican governments, and the choices of individual actors. The Civil Guard had developed a military culture that could survive regime changes, but it lacked the flexibility to adapt to the mass political participation of the Second Republic, where ordinary citizens, mobilized by political groups like the Socialists, felt able to criticize government institutions and to take to the streets to demand reform. The contradiction was that while Republican governments believed that forces like the Civil Guard were necessary for maintaining the order that they needed to stabilize the new regime, they took almost no steps to adapt these forces to policing the mobilizations that the Republic unleashed. The limited repertoire that guards had for responding to protester provocations (such as insults to their honor) meant that they often moved quickly to opening fire. Their desire for revenge and lack of training in investigative techniques meant that they turned to mass arrests and torture to punish populations that did not respect them. In a governmental system with a free press and legal opposition parties, such practices would not go un-criticized, but this criticism further antagonized an institution so sensitive to insult, creating a cycle of the violence that the Republic was never able to break. Although the rebellion of July 1936 was ostensibly meant to restore order, it only unleashed more violence on a scale Spain had not seen for over a hundred years.

The question of why so many of the interwar democracies collapsed has been one of the most studied in modern European history. Clearly, gendarmeries played a central part in this process, but their roles have not received as much scholarly attention as overtly political parties. Using the example of the Civil Guard, this dissertation aimed to suggest several new approaches to studying gendarmeries that should prove useful to future researchers investigating such forces even outside of Europe. First, I emphasize that most of these units were created in the wake of the French Revolution to enforce the liberal reforms of the nineteenth century. And so gendarmeries must be thought of as at their cores part of, rather than opposed to, liberal regimes, which were not democratic at that time. Yet by the early twentieth century, as many European countries were transitioning to democracies with mass political participation, police forces were usually willing to acquiesce to the anti-liberal ideology of fascism.

The second suggestion, borrowing the idea of military culture from military history to study police forces, should aid in determining how this shift away from loyalty to liberal regimes occurred. Studies of military culture will investigate not only an institution's official regulations but also how these regulations are interpreted through its members' habits and unofficial practices. Habits evolve as gendarmes adapt to exigencies of policing at the local level and may be influenced by priorities that go beyond the official missions of enforcing the law and maintaining order. However, it is the state that determines where there is room for unofficial habits to develop, and it has the ability to influence (although never totally control) the social origins, prior experiences, and training of an institution's members, which are all essential factors in

the formation of a military culture. One such prior experience that may predispose members to violence is colonial military service. The role of colonial conflicts in the brutalization of Europe's armed forces has attracted scholarly attention, but the role of such experiences in the brutalization of the continent's police forces deserves further study.

The third suggested tool for researching gendarmeries involves taking the idea of repertoires from the study of social movements making claims against the state and applying it to these agents of the state themselves. Doing so constitutes a method for describing a gendarmerie's actions when responding to protests that goes beyond official regulations to observe the patterns of behavior a force actually exhibits. By suggesting that forces of public order can also have repertoires, I call attention to the fact that in their responses to protest they were also making claims (or counterclaims) of their own that did not always exhibit the same priorities as those of the state. By considering police forces as historical actors in their own right, historians should be able to shed new light on what created the conditions of instability that facilitated the fall of many of the continent's liberal democracies in the interwar period.

APPENDIX- SIMPLIFIED TABLE OF CIVIL GUARD RANKS, DUTIES, AND STRUCTURES DURING THE SECOND REPUBLIC

Rank	Command	Jurisdiction	Duties	Receives Orders From
Civil Guard Second Class	None	Small town	Patrols	Station commandant
Civil Guard First Class	Pair (<i>pareja</i>)	Small town	Leading patrols	Station commandant
Corporal	Post (<i>puesto</i>)	Small town	Station commandant (Sending out patrols, keeping records, sending reports)	Mayor, command chief via section chief
Sergeant	Post (<i>puesto</i>)	Larger towns	Station commandant, <i>aspirante</i> training	Mayor, command chief via section chief
Lieutenant	Section (<i>línea</i>)	Judicial district (<i>partido judicial</i>)	Inspections, sending reports, direct command during special occurrences	Command chief
Captain	Company (<i>compañía</i>)	1/3-1/2 of a province	Inspections, direct command during special occurrences, administration, <i>prácticas</i> training	Command chief
Major	None	None	Command's second-in-command, staff positions	Command chief
Lieutenant colonel	Command (<i>comandancia</i>)	Province	Command chief (inspections, giving and receiving orders)	Civil governor, prime minister, superior officers
Colonel	Division (<i>tercio</i>)	2 or 3 provinces	Inspections	Superior officers
Brigadier General	Zone (<i>zona</i>)	Region	Inspections	Superior officers
Major General	Civil Guard	All of Spain	Administration	Director general
Director or Inspector General (army general)	Civil Guard	All of Spain	Inspections, strategic direction and administration, the public face of the Civil Guard	Minister of the interior, prime minister

WORKS CITED

A Note on Personal Service Records

The personal service records of a total of 87 Civil Guard officers and 43 enlisted men who served during the Second Republic were viewed for this study at the Sección de la Guardia Civil del Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior and the Archivo General Militar de Segovia. The records viewed at the SGC were all of civil guards notable for some reason, usually because they were involved in a prominent instance of political violence. The records in the AGM are all of officers. There I viewed all the available records of generals and coronels serving during the Second Republic, which appeared to be about half all the generals and coronels, as well as those of other notable officers. The amount of information contained in each file at both archives also varied widely; in particular, information from the Second Republic period in many files in the AGM appears to have been deliberately removed. Given these limitations on what records have survived and how many could be viewed, the records that were consulted can hardly be considered a random sample; nevertheless, I have in some cases still discussed the data they contain in aggregate when the data demonstrate such clear patterns that they can be at least suggestive of general trends. In addition, the hope is that assertions about the social origins and culture of the guards drawn from at least some quantitative evidence are an improvement upon the unsubstantiated claims made about these subjects that have previously dominated the historiography.

1. Archives and Archival Sources

Archivo del Ayuntamiento de Arnedo (AAA)

Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados (ACD)

-Serie General

Archivo General Militar de Segovia (AGM)

-1.1.1. Expedientes Personales

Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN)

Fondos contemporáneos (FC)-

-Ministerio (M^o) del Interior (formerly Ministerio de la Gobernación)

-Tribunal Supremo Recursos

-Tribunal Supremo Reservado

Archivo Histórico Provincial de La Rioja (AHPLR)

-Gobierno Civil (GC)

-*Sentencias del Tribunal de Derecho y Tribunal de Jurado: Año 1932*

Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica, Salamanca (CDMH)

Político-social (PS)-

-Documentación Particular

-Gijón J

-Madrid

-Santander L

Instituto Nacional de Estadística

- Alternaciones de los municipios en los Censos de Población desde 1842 (online)
Sección Guardia Civil del Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior (SGC)
- Expedientes Personales
Servicio de Estudios Históricos de la Guardia Civil (SEHGC)
- Carpetas
- Memorias de Comandancias

2a. Newspaper and Periodical Archives

ABC

- Hemeroteca Digital
Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado (Online)
- Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados*
- Archivo del Fundación Pablo Iglesias*
- Hemeroteca (Online)
Biblioteca Nacional de España
- Hemeroteca Digital
- Sala de Prensa y Revistas
Hemeroteca de la Biblioteca Central de Bilbao
- Hemeroteca de Gijón (Online)*
- Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid*
- Instituto de Estudios Riojanos*
- Real Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de Badajoz*
- Repositorio de la Universidad de Oviedo (Online)*
- Sección Guardia Civil del Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior (SGC)*

2b. Contemporary Newspapers, Periodicals, and Official Publications

- ABC. Madrid.*
- Avance. Oviedo.*
- Boletín Oficial de la Guardia Civil (BOGC). Madrid?.*
- Boletín de la Unión General de Trabajadores de España. Madrid.*
- Claridad. Madrid.*
- CNT. Madrid.*
- La Correspondencia Militar. Madrid.*
- El Debate. Madrid.*
- Diario de Barcelona. Barcelona.*
- Diario de Cádiz. Cádiz.*
- Diario de la Rioja. Logroño.*
- Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de Diputados (DSCD). Madrid.*
- Ejército y Armada. Madrid.*
- España. Madrid.*
- La Estampa. Madrid.*
- Faro de Vigo. Vigo.*
- Gaceta de Madrid. Madrid.*

Heraldo de Aragón. Zaragoza.
Heraldo de Madrid. Madrid.
El Liberal. Bilbao.
La Libertad. Badajoz.
La Nación. Madrid.
El Noroeste. Gijón.
La Prensa. Gijón.
Las Provincias. Valencia.
Revista Técnica de la Guardia Civil (RTGC). Madrid?.
La Rioja. Logroño.
El Socialista. Madrid.
El Sol. Madrid.
Solidaridad Obrera. Madrid.
La Verdad Social. Badajoz.

3a. Research Libraries

Biblioteca de la Academia de Artillería
Biblioteca Central Militar
Biblioteca del Museo del Ejército
Biblioteca Nacional de España
University of California- San Diego Library. Special Collections

3b. Contemporary Published Sources and Memoirs

La Academia de Infantería en 1910. Toledo: Imprenta y encuadernación del Colegio de María Cristina, n.d.

Academia de Infantería: Memoria de los cursos de 1918-1919 y 1919-1920. Escuela tipográfica y encuadernación del Colegio de María Cristina para Huérfanos de la Infantería, [1920?].

Arlégui Bayones, Miguel. *Doctrinal de Servicio para la Guardia Civil*. Valladolid: Imprenta Castellana, 1908.

Azaña, Manuel. *Diarios completos: Monarquía, República, Guerra Civil*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2000.

Berenguer. *La Guerra en Marruecos: (Ensayo de una adaptación táctica)*. Madrid: Librería "Fernando Fé," 1918.

Brenan, Gerald. *The Spanish Labyrinth: The Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War*. Canto edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990 [1943].

Breve Bosquejo Histórico de la Academia de Infantería, [1924?].

El Caballero Audaz [José María Carretero]. *El General Sanjurjo (su vida y su gloria)*. Madrid: Caballero Audaz, 1940.

———. *Sanjurjo, caudillo y víctima (Vida heroica de un gran soldado de España) (Opiniones de un hombre de la calle)*. Madrid: Caballero Audaz, 1932.

Calderón de la Barca, Pedro. *Para vencer amor, querer vencerle*. In *Obras completas*, edited by Angel Valbuena Briones. Vol. 2, *Comedias*, 529-66. 2nd ed. Madrid: Aguilar, 1960.

Complemento al Consultor del Guardia Civil y Apéndice de 1930. Ávila, 1931.

Consejos a los Alumnos de la Academia de Infantería. Toledo: Imp. particular de la Academia de Infantería, 1917.

Contestaciones completas del "Instituto Reus" para el ingreso en el Cuerpo de la Guardia Civil. Madrid: "Instituto Reus" Centro de enseñanza y publicaciones, 1935.

Los crímenes de la reacción española. Madrid: Sección Española de Socorro Rojo Internacional, 1935.

Díaz Valderrama, José. *Historia, servicios notables, socorros, comentarios de la Cartilla, y reflexiones sobre el Cuerpo de la Guardia Civil*. Madrid: J. M. Ducazcal, 1858.

Escalafón General de los Generales, Jefes y Oficiales de la Guardia Civil en 1.º de enero de 1932. Madrid: Taller-Escuela de Artes Gráficas de la Gua. Civil, [1932].

Estado Mayor Central del Ejército. *Enseñanzas de la campaña de Rif en 1909*. Madrid, Talleres del Depósito de la guerra, 1911.

Esteban-Infantes, Emilio. *Apuntes para la historia: La sublevación del General Sanjurjo*. Madrid, 1933.

Esteban-Infantes, Emilio. *General Sanjurjo: (Un Laureado en el penal del duoso)*. 2nd ed. Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1958.

Fernández, Alberto. "Octubre de 1934: Recuerdos de un insurrecto." *Tiempo de Historia* 17 (April 1976): 11-21.

Ferreras Estrada, Gabriel. *Memorias del sargento Ferreras*. León: Imprenta Provincial, 2002.

- Gallego Pérez, C. [Juan Español Cándido]. *La lucha contra el crimen y el desorden (Memorias de un teniente de la Guardia Civil)*. Madrid: Rollán, 1957.
- García Mercadillo, Manuel. *Guía del Instructor*. 2nd ed. Zamora: Calamita, 1935.
- Geijo, Jenaro G. *Episodios de la revolución*. Santander, 1935.
- González, Hilario. *Resumen histórico de la Academia de Infantería*. Toledo: Imprenta-Escuela Tipográfica del Colegio de M.^a Cristina para Huérfanos de la Infantería, 1925.
- Guzmán, Eduardo de. *La Segunda República fue así*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977.
- Hidalgo, Diego. *¿Por qué fué lanzado del Ministerio de la Guerra?: Diez meses de actuación ministerial*. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1934.
- Ibáñez Marín, José and Luis Angulo Escobar. *Los cadetes*. Madrid: Establecimiento tipográfico «el trabajo», [1903?].
- Ignotus [Manuel Villar]. *La represión de octubre: documentos para la historia de nuestra civilización*. Barcelona: Tierra y Libertad, 1936.
- Índice del profesorado y alumnos, plan estudios y organización de la enseñanza*. Toledo: Imprenta particular de la Academia de Infantería, [1925?].
- Jaume, Alexandre. *La insurrección de octubre. Cataluña, Asturias, Baleares*. Santi Jordi: Res publica Ediciones, 1997 [1935].
- Jiménez de Asúa, Vidarte, Rodríguez Sastre, and Trejo. *Castilblanco*. Universidad de Alicante, n.d.
- Jiménez de Asúa, Luis. *Psicoanálisis criminal*. Buenos Aires: Losada, 1940.
- López Ochoa, Eduardo. *Campaña militar de Asturias en octubre de 1934 (Narración táctico-episódica)*. Madrid: Ediciones Yunque, n.d.
- Maura, Miguel. *Así cayó Alfonso XIII*. Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1981 [1962].
- Morón, Gabriel. *En el camino de la historia: El fracaso de una revolución*. Madrid: Gráfica socialista, 1935.
- Nelken, Margarita. *La condición social de la mujer en España. Su estado actual: su posible desarrollo*. Barcelona: Editorial Minerva, [1919?].

———. *Por qué hicimos la revolución*. 2nd ed. Madrid: Balaños y Aguilar, [1936].

Reparaz, Antonio de and Tresgallo de Souza. *Desde el Cuartel General de Miaja al Santuario de la Virgen de la Cabeza*. Valladolid: Artes Gráficas Afrodisio Aguado, 1937.

La Revolución de Asturias (Documentos). Mexico: Ediciones Defensa Roja, 1935.

La Revolución Española de Octubre: Documentos sensacionales inéditos. Santiago: Editorial Occidente, 1935.

Roza de Ampudia, Aurelio de Llano. *Pequeños anales de quince días: La revolución en Asturias, Octubre 1934*. Oviedo: Talleres tipográficos, 1935.

Ruiz del Toro, José. *Octubre (Etapas de un periodo revolucionario en España)*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Araujo, 1935.

Sanjurjo, José. "The Spanish Civil Guard." *The Police Journal* 4, no. 33 (1931).

Solano Palacios, Fernando. *La revolución de octubre. Quince días de comunismo libertario*. Fundación de Estudios Libertarios, Anselmo Lorenzo, 1994 [1936].

Spanish Atrocities Committee. *Revival of the Inquisition*. London: J. Perry, 1897.

Vidarte, Juan-Simeón. *El bienio negro y la insurrección de Asturias: Testimonio del entonces Vicesecretario y Secretario del PSOE*. Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1978.

———. *Las Cortes Constituyentes de 1931-1933: Testimonio del Primer Secretario del Congreso de Diputados*. Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1976.

4. Secondary Sources

Abella, Rafael. *Lances de honor*. Barcelona: Planeta, 1995.

Abrahamson, Bengt. *Military Professionalization and Political Power*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972.

Aguado Sánchez, Francisco. *El duque de Ahumada: Fundador de la Guardia Civil*. Madrid: Dirección General de la Guardia Civil, Servicio Histórico, 1969.

———. *La historia de la Guardia Civil*. 7 vols. Madrid: Ediciones Históricas, Cupsa Editorial, Planeta, 1983-85.

- . “Organización de la Guardia Civil: Desde la fundación hasta la actualidad.” *REHGC* 2-3, no. 4-5 (1969-70).
- . *La revolución de octubre de 1934*. Madrid: Librería San Martín, 1972.
- Álvarez, José E. “The Spanish Foreign Legion during the Asturian Uprising of October 1934.” *War in History* 18, no. 2 (2011): 200-24.
- Álvarez Junco, José. *El emperador del paralelo: Lerroux y la demagogia populista*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1990.
- . *Mater dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX*. Madrid: Taurus, 2001.
- Antón, Julio de. *Policía y Guardia Civil en la España republicana*, Madrid: Arroyomolinos, 2001.
- Aragón Reyes, Manuel, dir. *El Protectorado Español en Marruecos: La historia trascendida*. Vol. 3. [2013?].
- Armas. Especial: El armamento de la Guardia Civil (1844-2002)*, no. 3 (n.d.).
- Aróstegui, Julio. “Violencia, sociedad y política: la definición de la violencia.” *Ayer*, no. 13 (1994): 17-55.
- Arrarás, Joaquín. “Frente Popular.” Chap. 9 in vol. 2, *Historia de la Cruzada Española*. Madrid: Ediciones españolas, 1940.
- Balfour, Sebastian. *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War*. Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Ballbé, Manuel. *Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional (1812-1983)*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1985.
- Barrio Alonso, Angeles. *Anarquismo y anarcosindicalismo en Asturias (1890-1936)*. Madrid: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1988.
- Baumeister, Martin. *Campesinos sin tierra: supervivencia y resistencia en Extremadura, 1880-1923*. Translated by Joaquín Abellán. Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, Secretaría General Técnica, 1997.
- . “Castilblanco or the Limits of Democracy: Rural Protest in Spain from Restoration Monarchy to the Early Second Republic.” Translated by Jane Rafferty. *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 1 (Mar., 1998): 1-19.

- Bermejo Martín, Francisco. *100 Años de Socialismo en La Rioja (1882-1992)*. Logroño: Gráficas Isasa, 1994.
- Bessel, Richard. *Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 1925-1934*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.
- Blanco Escolá, Carlos. *La Academia General Militar de Zaragoza (1928-1931)*. Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1989.
- Blaney, Jr., Gerald. "The Civil Guard and the Spanish Second Republic 1931-1936." PhD diss., University of London, 2007.
- . "La historiografía sobre la Guardia Civil. Crítica y propuesta de investigación." *Política y sociedad* 42, no. 3 (2005): 31-44.
- . "New Perspectives on the Civil Guard and the Second Republic, 1931-1936." In *The Spanish Second Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War (1931-1936)*, edited by Manuel Álvarez Tardío and Fernando del Rey Reguillo, 202-17. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
- , ed. *Policing Interwar Europe: Continuity, Change and Crisis, 1918-40*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
- Blázquez Miguel, Juan. *España turbulenta: Alteraciones, violencia y sangre durante la II República*. Madrid, 2009.
- . *La Guardia Civil durante la Segunda República y el 18 de Julio*. Madrid: María Tomás Pérez, 2010.
- Boyd, Carolyn. *Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain 1875-1975*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- . *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.
- Browning, Christopher. *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*. New York: Harper Perennial, 1998.
- Bunk, Brian D. *Ghosts of Passion: Martyrdom, Gender, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.
- Busquets, Julio. *El militar de carrera en España: Estudio de Sociología Militar*. Barcelona: Ediciones Ariel, 1967.

- Cardona, Gabriel. *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la guerra civil*. Madrid: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1983.
- . *El problema militar en España*. Madrid: Pere Molás Ribalta, Historia 16, [1990].
- . “La reforma de la enseñanza militar en la II República (1931-1932).” In *La enseñanza militar en España: un análisis sociológico*, coordinated by Julio Busquets and Valentina Fernández Vargas, 65-80. Madrid: C.I.F.A.S., 1986.
- Carr, Raymond. *Spain, 1808-1975*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982 [1966].
- Carreras, Albert and Xavier Tafunell. *Historia económica de la España contemporánea (1789-2009)*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2010.
- Casanova, Julián. *De la calle al frente: El anarcosindicalismo en España (1931-1939)*. Barcelona: Crítica, 1997.
- . “La cara oscura del anarquismo.” In *Violencia política en la España del siglo XX*. Directed by Santos Juliá, 67-104. Taurus, 2000.
- Cervero, José Luis. *Los Rojos de la Guardia Civil: Su lealtad a la República les costó la vida*. Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2006.
- Chamberlin, Foster. “Guardianes del Honor: Los guardias civiles y la historia de su institución durante la Segunda República.” *Revista de Historiografía*, forthcoming.
- Chaput, Marie-Claude. “Castilblanco (Badajoz, 31 de diciembre de 1931): La marginación de la periferia.” *Centros y periferias: prensa, impresos y territorios en el mundo hispánico contemporáneo: homenaje a Jacqueline Covo-Maurice*. PILAR, 2004: 191-205.
- Cierva, Ricardo de la. *Fracaso del octubre revolucionario. 1934-1935. La represión*. Madrid: ARC editores, 1997.
- . “Un problema urgente de análisis institucional: La Guardia Civil española en el corazón de la dialéctica Ejército pueblo.” *REHGC* 2, no. 4 (1969): 15-27.
- Comín Colomer, Eduardo. *De Castilblanco a Casas Viejas*. Madrid: Temas españoles, 1959.
- . *Historia del Partido Comunista de España*. Vol. 3, *La mayoría de edad (16 de febrero de julio de 1936): periodo de bolchevización*. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1967.

- Corner, Paul. *Fascism in Ferrara, 1915-1925*. London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Cruz, Jesus. *The Rise of Middle-Class Culture in Nineteenth-Century Spain*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011.
- Cruz, Rafael. *En el nombre del pueblo: República, rebelión y guerra en la España de 1936*. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 2006.
- Díaz Carmona, A. "El 10 de agosto de 1932." *REHGC* 1-2, no. 2, 4 (1968-9).
- Díaz Nosty, B. *La comuna asturiana: Revolución de octubre de 1934*. 2nd ed. Bilbao: Zero, 1975.
- Dirección General de la Guardia Civil, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia. *VI Seminario Duque de Ahumada: La Fundación de la Guardia Civil (9, 10 y 11 de mayo de 1994)*. Madrid: Ministerio de Justicia e Interior, 1995.
- Ealham, Chris. *Class, Culture, and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- . "The Emperor's New Clothes: 'Objectivity' and Revisionism in Spanish History." *Journal of Contemporary History* 48, no. 1 (January 2013): 191-202.
- Emsley, Clive. *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth Century Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- . "Introduction: Police and the European Nation-State in the Nineteenth Century." In *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives*, edited by Mark Mazower, 1-25. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997.
- . "Peasants, Gendarmes and State Formation." In *National Histories and European History*, edited by Mary Fulbrook, 69-93. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.
- Engel Masoliver, Carlos. *El Cuerpo de Oficiales en la Guerra de España*. Valladolid: AF Editores, [2008].
- Esenwein, George Richard. *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868-1898*. Berkeley: University of California, 1989.
- Espinosa Maestre, Francisco. *La primavera del Frente Popular: Los campesinos de Badajoz y el origen de la guerra civil (marzo-julio de 1936)*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2007.

- Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75-90.
- Foot, Lorien. *The Gentlemen and the Roughs: Manhood, Honor and Violence in the Union Army*. New York: New York University Press, 2010.
- Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco. *Mi vida junto a Franco*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977.
- García Pérez, Juan. "La II República: nueva ocasión perdida para la transformación del campo extremeño." In *Historia de Extremadura*, edited by Ángel Rodríguez Sánchez. Vol. 4, *Los tiempos actuales*. Badajoz: Universitas Editorial, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, [1985].
- García Venero, Maximiano, *Melquíades Álvarez, Historia de un liberal*. 2nd ed. Madrid: Ediciones Tebas, n.d.
- Gellately, Robert. *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Gibson, Ian. *La noche en que mataron a Calvo Sotelo*. Barcelona: Editorial Argos Vergara, 1982.
- Gil Andrés, Carlos. *La República en la plaza: los sucesos de Arnedo de 1932*. Logroño: Gobierno de la Rioja/Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2002.
- González Calleja, Eduardo. *Cifras cruentas: Las víctimas mortales de la violencia sociopolítica en la Segunda República (1931-1936)*. Granada: Editorial Comares, 2015.
- . *Contrarrevolucionarios: Radicalización violenta de las derechas durante la Segunda República, 1931-1936*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2011.
- . *El máuser y el sufragio: Orden público, subversión y violencia política en la crisis de la Restauración (1917-1931)*. Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, 1999.
- . *En nombre de la autoridad: La defensa del orden público durante la Segunda República Española (1931-1936)*. Granada: Editorial Comares, 2014.
- . *La razón de la fuerza. Orden público, subversión y violencia política en la España de la Restauración (1874-1917)*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1998.

- Graham, Helen. *The Spanish Republic at War: 1936-1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Hills, George. "Toledo 1907." Chap. 3 in *Franco: The Man and His Nation*. London: Robert Hale Limited, 1967.
- Howard, Michael. "The Influence of Clausewitz." In *On War*, by Carl von Clausewitz, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 27-44. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Hull, Isabel V. *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
- Isabel Sánchez, José Luis. *La academia de Infantería de Toledo*. Vol. 1. Toledo: Cecaf, 1991.
- . *Alfonso XIII y la Academia de Infantería*. Imprenta Academia de Infantería, n.d.
- . *Toledo y los Centros de Instrucción militar*. Madrid: Villena, 1987.
- Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. London: Collier-Macmillan, 1960.
- Jensen, Geoffrey. *Cultura militar española. Modernistas, tradicionalistas y liberales*. Translated by Jaime Blasco. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2014.
- . *Irrational Triumph: Cultural Despair, Military Nationalism, and the Ideological Origins of Franco's Spain*. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2002.
- . "Moral Strength through Material Defeat? The Consequences of 1898 for Spanish Military Culture." *War & Society* 17, no. 2 (October 1999): 25-39.
- . "Muslim Soldiers in a Spanish Crusade: Tomás García Figueras, Mulai Ahmed er Raisuni and the Ideological Context of Spain's Moroccan Soldiers." Chap. 9 in *Colonial Soldiers in Europe, 1914-1945: "Aliens in Uniform" in Wartime Societies*, edited by Eric Storm and Ali Al Tuma. New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Kaplan, Temma. *The Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868-1903*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- . *Red City, Blue Period: Social Movements in Picasso's Barcelona*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
- Kern, Robert. "Margarita Nelken: Women and the Crisis of Spanish Politics." In *European Women on the Left: Socialism, Feminism, and the Problems Faced by Political*

Women, 1880 to the Present, edited by Jane Slaughter and Robert Kern, 147-62. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981.

Kerry, Matthew. "Painted Tonsures and Potato-sellers: Priests, Passing and Survival in the Asturian Revolution." *Cultural and Social History* (2017): 1-19.

———. "Radical Politics in the Spanish Second Republic: Asturias, 1931-1936." PhD diss., University of Sheffield, 2015.

Liang, His-Huey. *The Berlin Police Force in the Weimar Republic*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970.

———. *The Rise of the Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1992.

Linz, Juan J. "From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain." Chap. 5 in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe*, edited by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

López Corral, Miguel. "Los gobiernos izquierdas y la Guardia Civil." *Guardia Civil*, no. 521 (September 1987): 41-52.

———. *La Guardia Civil: Claves históricas para entender a la Benemérita y a sus hombres (1844-1975)*. Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2011.

———. *La Guardia Civil: Nacimiento y consolidación, 1844-1874*. Madrid: Editorial Actas, Ministerio de Justicia e Interior, Secretaría General Técnica, 1995.

———. *La Guardia Civil en la Restauración (1875-1905): Militarismo contra Subversión y Terrorismo anarquista*. Madrid: Editorial ACTAS, 2004.

López Garrido, Diego. *El aparato policial en España: historia, sociología e ideología*. Barcelona: Ariel, 1987.

———. *La Guardia Civil y los orígenes del Estado centralista*. Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1982.

Luengo Muñoz, Manuel. "Revolución de Asturias de 1934: El Combate de Campomanes." *REHGC* 1, no. 1 (1968): 33-48.

Lytton, Adrian. *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929*. New York: Routledge, 2004.

- Macarro Vera, José Manuel. *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República*. Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Sevilla, 1985.
- Manfredicano, Francisco. "La Compañía de Guardias Jóvenes de la Guardia Civil." *REHGC* 3, no. 6 (1970): 139-52.
- Mangini, Shirley. "Visible Women of the Second Spanish Republic." Chap. 2 in *Memories of Resistance: Women's Voices from the Spanish Civil War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.
- Martínez García, Miguel. "La Gendarmería Nacional francesa y la fundación de la Guardia Civil." *Cuadernos de la Guardia Civil*, no. 16 (1996): 187-205.
- Martínez Gutiérrez, Josebe. *Margarita Nelken (1896-1968)*. Madrid: Ediciones del Orto, [1997].
- Martínez Ruiz, Enrique. *Creación de la Guardia Civil*. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1976.
- Mintz, Jerome. "The Uprising at Casas Viejas." Chap. 13 in *The Anarchists of Casas Viejas*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.
- Moa, Pío. *1934: comienza la Guerra Civil: el PSOE y la Esquerra emprenden la contienda*. Barcelona: Ediciones Áltera, 2004.
- Moreno Luzón, Javier. "Teoría del clientelismo y estudio de la política caciquil." *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. (Nueva Epoca), no. 89 (July-September 1995): 191-224.
- Mosse, George L. *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Nerín, Gustau. *La guerra que vino de África*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2005.
- Núñez Calvo, Jesús Narciso. "XC Aniversario del patronazgo de la Virgen del Pilar en la Guardia Civil (1913-2003)." *Guardia Civil*, no. 706 (February 2003): 78-81.
- . "Los Guardias Civiles de Casas Viejas." *Guardia Civil*, no. 708 (April 2003): 66-69.
- Octubre 1934: Cincuenta años para la reflexión*. Madrid: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1985.
- "La Oficialidad de la Guardia Civil." *REHGC* 16, no. 30 (1983): 11-21.
- Oram, Gerard, ed. *Conflict and Legality: Policing Mid-twentieth Century Europe*. London: Francis Boutle, 2003.

- Pastor Martínez, Roberto. "Una página del movimiento obrero riojano: Sucesos de Arnedo, 5 de enero de 1932." *Cuadernos de Investigación Histórica* 10 (1984): 193-207.
- . "Sucesos de 5 de enero 1932 en Arnedo en el Congreso de los Diputados." *Cuadernos de Investigación Histórica* 10 (1984): 209-218.
- Payne, Stanley G. *The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-1936: Origins of the Civil War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
- . "Political Violence During the Spanish Second Republic." *Journal of Contemporary History* 25 (1990): 269-88.
- . *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- . *Spain's First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.
- Pitarch, José Luis. *El honor y el honor militar*. Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1984.
- Pitt-Rivers, Julian. "Honor." *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, edited by David L. Sills, 503-11. Volume 6. New York: Macmillan, 1968.
- . "Honour and Social Status." In *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, edited by J. G. Peristiany. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966.
- . *The People of the Sierra*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961.
- Ponce Alberca, Julio and Diego Lagares García. *Honor de oficiales: Los tribunales de honor en el ejército de la España contemporánea (siglos XIX-XX)*. Barcelona: Ediciones Carena, n.d.
- Pozuelo, Vicente. *Los últimos 476 días de Franco*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1980.
- Preston, Paul. *The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic, 1931-1936*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 1994.
- . *Franco: A Biography*. London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993.
- . "Margarita Nelken: A Full Measure of Pain." In *Doves of War: Four Women of Spain*, 297-408. Harper Collins Publishers, 2002.

- . *The Spanish Holocaust*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012.
- Puell de la Villa, Fernando. *Historia del Ejército en España*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2000.
- Pulido Pérez, Agustín M. *La Guardia Civil ante el Bienio Azañista, 1931/33*. Madrid: Almena ediciones, 2008.
- Radcliff, Pamela. “The emerging challenge of mass politics.” Chap. 9 in *Spain since 1808*, edited by José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- . *From Mobilization to Civil War: The Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900-1937*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- . “The Political ‘Left’ in the Interwar Period, 1924-1939.” Chap. 14 in *The Oxford Handbook of European History, 1914-1945*, edited by Nicholas Doumanis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Ramírez Barreto, Faustino. *Listado de las vicisitudes de los alumnos del colegio de guardias jóvenes “Duque de Ahumada” (1.853-2.003): (con motivo de la celebración de su 150º aniversario)*. Valdemoro, 2002.
- . *Semblanza histórica de la Asociación Pro-Huérfanos de la Guardia Civil*. Madrid: Asociación Pro-Huérfanos de la Guardia Civil, 2008.
- Redero San Román, Manuel. *Estudios de Historia de la UGT*. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1992.
- Rey, Fernando del. *Paisanos en lucha: Exclusión política y violencia en la Segunda República española*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2008.
- , ed. *Palabras como puños: la intransigencia política en la Segunda República española* (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 2011).
- . “Reflexiones sobre la violencia política en la II República española.” In *Conflicto político, democracia y dictadura: Portugal y España en la década de 1930*, edited by Mercedes Gutiérrez Sánchez and Diego Palacios Cerezales, 19-97. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos, 2007.
- Rico Sánchez, Alberto. “Retribuciones de la Guardia Civil. 1931-1936.” *Ayer. La extrema derecha en la España contemporánea*. Madrid: Asociación de historia contemporánea Marcial Pons, Ediciones de historia. 71, no. 3 (2008): 267-289.

- Rivas Gómez, Fernando. "La enseñanza de la Guardia Civil." *REHGC* 7, no. 13-14 (1974).
- . "El entierro del Alférez de los Reyes y su trascendencia histórica." *Revista de Estudios Históricos de la Guardia Civil* 20, n. 37 (1987): 141-178.
- . *El Frente Popular: antecedentes de un alzamiento*. Madrid: Librería San Martín, 1976.
- . "La Guardia Civil en el Reinado de Alfonso XIII.(I)." *Revista de Estudios Históricos de la Guardia Civil* 21, no. 39 (1988): 105-28.
- . "Rebeldía y represión en Casas Viejas." *REHGC* 16, no. 29 (1983): 125-58.
- . "La República en marcha." *REHGC* 9-10, no. 17-19 (1976-77).
- Rosique Navarro, Francisca. *La reforma agraria en Badajoz durante la IIª República (La respuesta patronal)*. Departamento de Publicaciones de la Excma. Diputación Provincial de Badajoz, 1988.
- Rubio López, Bernando. *Nuestros soldados*. Bolaños, 2004.
- Ruiz, David. *Insurrección defensiva y revolución obrera: El octubre español de 1934*. Barcelona: Editorial Labor Universitaria, 1988.
- . *Octubre de 1934: revolución en la República española*. Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, n.d.
- Ruiz Alonso, José María. *La Guerra Civil en la Provincia de Toledo: Utopía, conflicto y poder en el Sur del Tajo (1936-39)*. Ciudad Real: Almud, ediciones de Castilla-La Mancha, 2004.
- Ruiz Manjón, Octavio. *El Partido Republican Radical, 1908-1936*. Madrid: Tebas, [1976].
- Sacanell Ruiz de Apodaca, Enrique. *El general Sanjurjo, héroe y víctima*. Ediciones Altaya, 2008.
- Salas Larrazábal, Ramón. *Los datos exactos de la guerra civil*. Madrid: Ediciones Rioduero, 1980.
- Sanchez, Sarah. *Fact and Fiction: Representations of the Asturian Rev. (1934-1938)*. Leeds: Maney Publishers, 2003.

- Sánchez G.-Saúco, J. A. *La revolución de 1934 en Asturias*. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1974.
- Schumann, Dirk. *Political Violence in the Weimar Republic 1918-1933: Fight for the Streets and Fear of Civil War*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2009.
- “La Seguridad publica en el periodo constitucional.” *REHGC* 15, no. 28 (1982): 11-148.
- Shubert, Adrian. *The Road to Revolution Spain: The Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860-1934*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
- Silva, Lorenzo. *Sereno en el peligro: la aventura histórica de la Guardia Civil*. Madrid: Editorial EDAF, 2010.
- Smith, Angel. *Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction: Catalan Labour and the Crisis of the Spanish State, 1898-1923*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2007.
- Sweet, Pamela E. *Neighbors and Enemies: The Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929-1933*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Taibo II, Paco Ignacio. *Asturias, Octubre 1934*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2013.
- Tilly, Charles. *Contentious Performances*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Traugott, Mark. *The Insurgent Barricade*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010.
- Ullman, Joan Connelly. *The Tragic Week: A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Vincent, Mary. *Spain, 1833-2002: People and State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Wyatt-Brown, Bertram. *Honor and Violence in the Old South*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.