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Metarecognition: Fukuyama's End and Hegel's Desire of Recognition

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Abstract

The study concerns itself with the consequences of the view that liberal democracy is the conclusion to government form – as hypothesized by Francis Fukuyama in "The End of History?" Through examining the phenomenon of metarecognition, through the lens of the Hegelian dialectic, the ideological victory of democracy, that was seemingly evident in 1990, is sought to be explained as to how its totality was reversed. This reversal is a product of the reflective spirit interfering with the sought after effect of arguing for a specific government form. Recognition, as a previously desired symptom of undertaking an ideological identity, transitions into its primary purpose. This shift in the nature of identity has seen authoritative and collective movements reemerge following the hypothesized conclusive paradigmatical shift to liberal democracy with the fall of the Soviet Union. The paper analyzes how liberal democracy has returned to equal footing with collective government systems in terms of satisfying the desire of recognition in an effort to understand the nature of future political development. The previous uniqueness of liberal democracy has become negated in its interaction with the human subconscious. Further political change must only then satisfy the condition of being modern in the sense of forcing a reflective spirit upon the individual.

Background

"What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." - Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?"

Fukuyama made this controversial claim in a time in which it appeared to that liberal democracy was being settled upon as the undisputed standard of governance. Throughout the world, in 1990, a unilateral movement towards adopting liberal democracy was being pursued. All societies at this juncture seemed to be unified by a constant of either a government being a liberal democracy or having announced its plans to become such. Those hesitant to adopt freedom and liberty as a core value faced global pressure to change. The unilateral nature of this movement among the world's governments was in stark contrast with the nature of ideological uncertainty of the 20th century. The breakthrough of stability was a noteworthy change that Fukuyama sought to understand. The approximately universal resolution of the world to adopt liberal democracy appeared to be undeniable and the continuation of the trend seemed to be a foregone conclusion.

The political instability of the world had appeared to settle in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union. Very little could be offered in the way of alternative political possibilities with the emergence of the preeminence of the American hegemony. So powerful was the world's attraction to liberal democracy that its antithesis, a dictatorship, became often forced to hide in the veneer of the liberal democratic system to maintain legitimacy globally – an emergently necessary disguise to be prosperous in the globalized modern world (Held 251). Sovereignty, in

the case of openly authoritative states, became superseded in the quest for global human rights that were viewed as only capable of being fulfilled within liberal democracy. Invasions of the Middle East became tolerable when only fifty years prior a similar undertaking was cause for a world war.

To Fukuyama, with the development of a universal direction, the absolute answer to government was thus readily apparent. The end of history had been determined in relation to what mankind would perpetually concern itself with. While the victory of liberal democracy was not total immediately, Fukuyama believed that this "ideal will govern the material world in the long run" (*The End of History*, 4). With the conclusive absolute global prerogative set, internally, it would be expected that society would occupy itself with increasing the recognition of disenfranchised groups until there could be no differentiation. The progress towards recognition of all in totality seemed destined to consume society for eternity – settling any statist concerns as new issues of recognition emerge over time (*The End of History and the Last Man*, xxi). Externally, the nations that remained in the past, in terms of governmental form, would be excluded from the newfound global liberal democratic community. A then emerging pressure to adopt liberal democracy was put upon all governments nonadherent as a means to enact the global shift towards the absolute standard. The spread of knowledge of the unique benefits offered by liberal democracy was destined to manifest an unstoppable movement driving the world into uniformity. With this vision in mind, it became then reasonable to conclude that the Hegelian march of progress towards the absolute had been fulfilled in regards to the political sphere. As the Western world equated liberal democracy with the freest system, the final grand ambition of society seemed destined its inevitable spread throughout the world.

What the end of history entails to Fukuyama is clear, but equally as apparent has been the significant deviation from this theory that has occurred since the prediction was made.

Fukuyama's absolute answer to government has been demonstrated by current events to not be a complete assessment of reality. Some piece of political reality is not encapsulated by a liberal democratic end. As evidenced by the reversal of the victories that liberal democracy had during the 20th century, the communication that liberal democracy has with the human self consciousness is no longer held to be superior.

Fukuyama's paper posits the collapse of the Soviet Union, the final form of an authoritative political system, as the final necessary victory for liberal democracy (*The End of History and the Last Man*, xiii). Contrary to the expectation of Fukuyama, nostalgia for the former U.S.S.R government is a majority opinion in Russia. The hypothesized appeal of democracy appears to be waning as positive opinions towards authoritarianism are increasing in some parts of the former Soviet Bloc (Pew Research Center). While there has been some success in the spread of liberalism to the former Soviet states, liberal democracy has not universally become the desired form of governance.

Additionally, in the West, there has been a rise in undemocratic efforts on both the left and right political spheres. The political fight between collective & collective, and collective & individual, exists as an omnipresent conflict impossible to forcefully conclude within the restrictions of a liberal democracy. Liberal democratic values dictate that the freedom to dissent is as important as the freedom to assent. With disdain being held to this fact by both the followers of the system and its opponents, malcontent is sown ubiquitously. The perceived weakness of maintaining this value diminishes faith in the system and eventually leads to change. Assenters acquire doubt in their own belief as the ability of liberal democracy to protect

disenfranchised people faces contradiction. Alternatively, a conundrum develops in how to recognize those unwilling to recognize another identity. The demonstration of the inability to protect its own value of recognition is all too apparent to its critics as forcefully answering their very own criticism would contradict the premise of recognition and freedom that defines the liberal democratic ideal.

While the willing rejection of liberal democracy and the rise of critical movements in the West have demonstrated that Fukuyama's prediction was not fully encompassing of the end of history, there remains the question of where the logic of his paper fails. Fukuyama makes a powerful and accurate allusion to G.W.F. Hegel in his identification of the desire of recognition being a key factor in the appeal of liberal democracy to the people (*The End of History and the Last Man*, xvi). However, his use of Hegel to understand the absolute is not complete and therein lies the error in which reality deviates from his thesis. This paper will concern itself with examining where exactly Fukuyama's theory went astray and will attempt to revise the hypothesis to better encapsulate the truth of the end of history. Contrary to Fukuyama's claim of history ending with the acceptance of liberal democracy as the best form of government, Hegel's notion of the individual's desire of recognition becomes truly finalized in history with the metarecognition of one's role within the struggle between the collective and individual.

The Circumstance of the Rise of Liberal Democracy

In Fukuyama's initial article *The End of History?*, liberal democracy is defined as the absolute form of government. The absolute is taken in this paper in a Hegelian understanding as Fukuyama uses Hegelian logic in the construction of his argument. To Hegel, the absolute is meant to signify the realization of the absolute concept. In terms of government, the other forms of governance prior are thus to be regarded as failed attempts to realize the absolute concept. From this objective, it can be reasoned that other forms are discarded through their failure to fulfill the human spirit in some regard. Through their failure, revision was undertaken by the collective human spirit. The process of becoming, in terms of government, is then taken upon through history.

Hegel believes that the absolute form of government is meant to realize maximum freedom for its citizenry (Parkinson). The historical motor was argued by Hegel to be driving government towards aligning with the ultimate feature. Contradictions and inadequacies alike prompt change as history engages with dialectical thought. While the exact freedom that Hegel is referring to remains deliberated by philosophers, a modern take on freedom is that which is the freedom offered by liberal democracy.

Fukuyama's argument certainly held weight in 1990 as world events pointed to this conclusion. However, beyond relying just on empirical observations, the contents of Fukuyama's book offer something unique in their logical assessment for the development of this near total global paradigm of government form. Having outlasted all of its competitors in the ideological struggle of the 20th century, liberal democracy had appeared to be the univocal future of

government (*The End of History and the Last Man*, xi). Yet, it remained somewhat unapparent why this exact development had occurred so universally. Fukuyama took the reason behind this ascension of liberal democracy to be beyond coincidence and, rather, the result of a dialectical progression.

Long prior to the completion of the ascension, the foundational question for governance was why humans organize themselves in the manner that they do. From understanding the role of government, the structure itself could be refined as to better match the primary ambition. A journey was set upon through analyzing the beginning simple abstractions of the purpose of government to create a better state. As motivated by human spirit, the abstractions of the purpose of government were studied to pierce the heart of the matter. With this process of refinement, the ultimate ambition is to arrive at the absolute itself. Turmoil arose from the conflicting solutions to achieve the absolute government, but ultimately, in 1990, an answer in liberal democracy had apparently emerged as the end of history.

Fukuyama made it his task in *The End of History* to identify the exact feature responsible for the dominance of liberal democracy over the world. It was argued that through communication incurred by the dialectical nature of the global ideological struggle some superior benefit was being understood by the people in their landing upon a universal solution. This unknown, but theoretically ubiquitous, benefit was somehow able to uniquely satisfy the human condition and render all other competitors demonstrably inferior. To the people, it was no longer feasible to adopt outdated models of government that failed to provide what liberal democracy apparently could.

To understand the ascension of liberal democracy, it becomes necessary to identify the reason behind the radicalization of politics that began to occur before the start of the First World

War. Changes in political systems were spurred on by the observation of the failures of the Ancien Régime in satisfying the human condition. The path to correct such errors began through the emergence of new political theory (*The End of History and the Last Man*, xii). The mediation necessary to reach the absolute began in order to resolve the disparity between the desire of freedom and the outcome of control.

Through this dialectic, the expectation of the role of government was transformed throughout the world. The growing disillusionment towards political philosophies possessing the idea of a *persona non grata*¹ became the objective for modern government to satisfy. It became clear through the political events happening during the turn to modernity that dispelling the notion of a *persona non grata* from society in totality was necessary to satisfy the desire of the people.

Usually, the term *persona non grata* is reserved for expelled diplomats. The term will take upon a new meaning in an effort to forge a connection with the metaphysical term mentioned in the footnote. The *persona non grata* is herein defined as a person not within the purview of recognition of society. A historical example of the *persona non grata* is a peasant in a feudal system. The role of the peasant is not one of autonomous agency. However, equally as important to defining the antiquated system, the peasant has no pursuit of recognition to establish self agency as the topic is undiscovered. By current standards, this stagnant life philosophy would be repulsive for the individual to tolerate or for the government to adopt. The modern peasant is

¹ *Persona non grata* is a play on the metaphysical term *entia non grata* as used by W.V.O. Quine in *Word & Object*. *Entia non grata* is defined therein as entities that may or may exist but certainly are not welcome/relevant to a discourse (Quine 224). The alteration to the *persona non grata* is motivated by Thomas Piketty's observation of the change of the expectations of people in the modern world (2). As explained later in the "He that Walks on High" section of the paper, a fundamental shift has taken place in modernism with all being ordered within society. This universal consideration should not be confused with necessarily being a positive affirmation of an identity, but rather an opinion that asserts existence of an identity.

someone expected to desire change and further to make this struggle a defining aspect of their lives. Autonomy, social mobility, and freedom of choice, all have become intrinsic aspects to the human condition upon their realization. These conditions that were mainly unsatisfied by governments existing in premodern times became the motivation for a change in governance.

The implementation of these new paradigmatic features is an ideal from which any deviation yields disgust. This disgust exhibits itself in reaction when either individual or society fails in regard to autonomy. The individual is tasked with the self-determination necessary to match the aim of the system. To be either a criminal or of wasted potential is taken as an insult to the society itself.

A change in the motivation of modern punishment has arisen to match the ambition of modern governance. The law is enforced as is necessary to bring the ne'er-do-wells back into the fold of society. Restorative justice exists as the motivation behind moral repair. Rather than money to fill the king's coffer, it is now the case that the sluggard is taxed to force a return to labor. The criminal is sent to prison under the pretense of reformation, rather than strictly to make more misconduct unfeasible.

Alternatively, a denial of the autonomous agency of the individual by government is received as a denial of the most basic of human rights. This condemnation by free societies towards non free societies dually brings along the expectation that any nonautonomous agent would formulate constant attempts to change their stagnancy.

The desire for social reform and improving standards does not exist for the *persona non grata* society as it is an unknown concept. A *persona non grata* society views the current conditions as a given and that alterations are merely a change in those that occupy the roles within the structure. With a static view of the possibilities of society, some other feature of the

human spirit besides self determinism is reasoned to be behind one's societal status. However, once this ability of determination of the individual is realized, misalignment with the acceptance of being a persona non grata is created, and revolution becomes an inevitable prospect.

Modernity contends the thought of such an unrecognized person existing to be unfathomable. The creation of modern political schemes stems from this very desire of society to fulfill the desire of recognition for all. New political systems arose in the years preceding the First World War in response to the changing expectations of humanity, particularly in the West. As an attempt to eliminate the presence of the persona non grata, the discourse of governance focused on altering the relation between government and individual.

The expectation of the Hegelian thinker would be that the solutions offered are repeated and unending until the political theory that best satisfies the human condition emerges. Humanity went about discovering this ultimate form through holding each political system in comparison during the 20th century. The government form that best satisfied the people was that which could provide universal recognition. To Fukuyama, liberal democracy evidenced itself as the position that satisfied this requirement through its promise of individual freedom. The persona non grata was eliminated most effectively through universal recognition and therefore became the government of the end of history.

During the era of global ideological strife, liberal democracy emerged as the system that performed the best in terms of human desire. All competitors possessed some flaw in their treatment of the individual in its attempt to satisfy the desire of recognition. This effectiveness, as communicated to the people over time, explains the circumstance of the rise of liberal democracy as the apparent universal absolute standard by 1990.

Fukuyama's Allusion to the Desire of Recognition

G.W.F. Hegel identifies the desire of recognition in his master-servant dialectic as a fundamental feature of the human condition. In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, it is argued that self-consciousness is only established by the mutual recognition of another consciousness (Pippin). This process emulating the shape of Hegel's formulation of an object as its being and not being is applied to define recognition.

A dialectical relationship is found within the role of the master and of the servant. For one to be a master, there must be a servant and, for one to be a servant, one must have a master – as is true through definition. Each side relies on recognizing the other to establish identity. Without either role, the position of master or servant would be meaningless. Upon their mutual recognition, each side attempts to dominate the other as necessitated by the internal inequality of this relationship. The servant stands at a higher footing than the master through providing labor itself. From this equal standing, yet unequal product, servants become motivated to overthrow their masters. However, without the dichotomy, the servant is unable to sustain their identity. The conflict eternally persists through this inherent connection. Self-consciousness is formulated through the mutual recognition of each identity.

Recognition, as something cemented in existence within the master-servant dialectic, is claimed by Fukuyama as the element of the human condition that liberal democracy superiorly satisfies. The promise of providing self-consciousness universally is the appeal that no other government could provide and thus makes certain of the liberal democratic end. The aforementioned persona non grata is destined to no longer exist as universal recognition through freedom is the innate ambition of a liberal democracy.

Ideologies are considered modern in their foundation upon seeking to eliminate the idea of the *persona non grata*. This is a common point of unity within democracy, fascism, and communism in so far as all elements of society are to be ordered. The dialectical movement that was necessary to crown liberal democracy as the modern paradigm occurred after the near century long struggle between the modern ideologies, e.g., communism and fascism, for global dominance. Each system undertook differing approaches to the issue of mutual recognition between ruler and ruled.

With the defeat of Nazi Germany and the fall of the Soviet Union, liberal democracy could claim ideological victory over all competitors that had emerged in the 20th century. In the perspective of Fukuyama, the defeat of communism and fascism occurred for a reason beyond coincidence (Fukuyama, xi). Both popular alternatives were demonstrated, on a global stage, to be inferior choices to the power of liberal democracy in satisfying the desire of recognition. The world had time to experience each system and found that liberal democracy fulfilled the human condition in a way that no other could.

A goal of universal recognition is argued by Fukuyama to be the reason that liberal democracy came to dominate the world in 1990 (*The End of History and the Last Man*, xx). A desire for recognition that humankind exhibits was observed by both G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx in their own suppositions of what the future of governance would be. However, ultimately, Fukuyama would align with Hegel's interpretation to establish the underlying reason for the dominance of the liberal democratic system.

Liberalization was believed to be the tool in which the march towards total recognition would be carried out (*The End of History and the Last Man*, xviii). With enough movement towards the absolute, society would be able to fulfill the desire of recognition held by mankind

completely. This doctrine is internally enforced as legitimacy of the government is inherently tied to the creation of an all-encompassing system. From the promise of the resolution of this issue, the persona non grata is superiorly satisfied – theoretically leaving no ideological competitors.

The Liberal Democratic End

The absolute condition is characterized, in a Hegelian sense, through the immediate sense of certainty of its realization of the concept (Heidegger 97). Fukuyama believes liberal democracy to be the system capable of meeting this standard. However, *The End of History* notes dually that there still may be temporary movements away from the paradigm. The permissibility of discourse, as necessary for the framework of liberal democracy to avoid contradiction, creates inevitable drift from the paradigmatic standard.

The government is not impervious to temporary change as general disruptions occur that allow for alternatives to rise in popularity. Deviations are structurally permissible as non-exclusion is a core tenant of the liberal democratic promise. The political discourse of reform remains constant in the liberal democratic end as is necessary to avoid contradiction in terms of universal recognition. Arguments for change in government form are not only tolerable, but expected as they are proof of fulfilling freedom and the desire of recognition for all.

In spite of rejections of liberal democracy, the governmental form is still considered as the end. Fukuyama believes that any deviation away from the paradigm remains as part of a gradual global progression to liberal democratic universality. The return to liberal democracy is inevitable upon proper demonstration of the the inferior satisfaction of recognition offered by any replacement system of governance.

To explain the desire for movement away from liberal democracy and maintain the theory of the liberal democratic end, Fukuyama introduces the concept of the last man (Fukuyama, xxiii). As liberal democracy provides a unsatisfying life to many an individual, in terms of asserting their being, the superior satisfaction of recognition thus becomes unapparent in its uniqueness to the system. From this lack of apparent direction, the last man is no longer aware

of liberal democracy's superiority and the system is able to change without contradiction of its absolute standing.

Fukuyama's absolute government is contemporarily claimed to be flawed by its opponents in its allowance of dissenting elements. There is internal doubt of the superiority of liberal democracy when dissenters persist and threaten the recognition of others. A return to the other political ideologies already defeated in the 20th century ideological struggle becomes possible through this doubt. Fukuyama's theory necessitates that through this strife the supremacy of liberal democracy will once again become apparent.

Through this constant logical move of the last man in face of strife, it can yet be asserted that liberal democracy is the absolute form of governance. The temporary political deviations can be explained through the supposition of an inevitable correction. The paradigm is reestablished upon remembering the forgotten supremacy of liberal democracy and therefore the characterization of the theory as the end can be maintained.

This logical move helps to explain the deviations that would be asserted to be evidence of liberal democracy not being absolute. Through saying that the system is merely being taken for granted as the reason for the liberal democratic paradigm to be challenged, one does not discount the absolute of liberal democracy itself. However, even so, the discourse following the challenge is supposed to infinitely concern itself in relation to liberal democracy. A gradual global progression is meant to be happening that will eventually encompass all. The last man addendum to the end of history becomes necessary to save the theory.

For the end of history to be liberal democracy, no other system could be viewed as a viable alternative. Any deviation from the system would provide unsatisfactory results in satisfying the human condition and would necessitate a perpetual return to the endpoint of liberal

democracy (Fukuyama, xxi). The finitude of the liberal democratic system is placed in juxtaposition with the infinitude of the discourse surrounding the absolute status of liberal democracy, and thus the whole is formed with all being encompassed by liberal democracy itself.

Certainly in 1990, this system could be reasonably made as a claim to be the absolute end. All other competitors had collapsed when put in conflict with the benefits of liberal democracy. Despite not being a certain conclusion in 1990, as the ascension of liberal democracy was too recent, it could be reasonably declared that any solutions capable of surviving the temporary deviation would be preposterous. The ascension appeared to be a conclusive declaration of the end, as liberal democracy appeared certain to defeat all other modern ideologies with enough passage of time.

The Error of the Liberal Democratic End

The end theorized by Fukuyama has not come to fruition. For Fukuyama's thesis to be true, the aforementioned form of the absolute must concretely revolve around liberal democracy. Contrary to this expectation, the discourse surrounding governance has moved beyond liberal democracy. The theorized immediate return to the system from a deviation has failed to arrive unilaterally, and rather the conflict of individual and collective has become the domineering aspect of political theory.

Liberal democracy, as the true end of history, has failed to encapsulate the form of the absolute. The certainty needed to establish the absolute has been diminished by political situations that the liberal democratic world has failed to adequately deal with. One such issue constantly persisting within the logic of a liberal democratic framework has been dissidence.

Political minority positions question the legitimacy of the state and are dually unable to be denied existence as universal recognition is a core tenant of the system. For dissent towards government to be eliminated, the absolute status of liberal democracy ought be unquestionable. This is an untenable request to make upon a free society without engaging in contradiction. Education as coercion towards this standard itself goes against the freedom that is the basis of the system. Fukuyama attempts to build in the element of dissent towards government form into his theory through the last man. However, the addendum of the last man and the circular end of the system shifts the system to becoming an example of Hegel's bad infinity. Mere transitions between government forms does not change the outcome, and the desired destination is unable to be reached.

To reach Hegel's true infinity, government has moved to the interaction of counter ideologies to form a universal application of the desire of recognition. Counter ideologies are

able to satisfy the desire of recognition through their dissent itself. Similar to the logic of the master-servant dialectic, a dissenter must be opposed to an assenter and vice versa. As every ideology possesses an opponent, as is necessary to find its own meaning, the recognition achieved becomes universal. Infinite interaction between the differing social identities becomes the sole purpose of political existence.

As minority positions are generally dissident against a liberal democracy, or how it currently manifests itself, there is a gaping issue with Fukuyama's thesis arising. Those arguing against the system appear to be content with their recognition through political opinion alone. The satisfaction achieved by both dissident and assenter does not require the liberal democratic framework to succeed. Further, current politics have demonstrated this political conflict that satisfies the desire of recognition can operate outside the discourse of the liberal democratic system.

The addendum of the last man has fallen flat in accounting for the nature of counter movements in achieving recognition in their own right. An infinite return to liberal democracy is posited within this last man theory of the end, but no such return is necessary with recognition being achieved elsewhere. The liberal democratic system, being unable to forcefully answer counter positions, cannot keep the political discourse contained within the system itself.

Additionally, in terms of the error of the liberal democratic system in being the absolute, religious fundamentalists, who can be identified as willing proponents of the persona non grata society, have continued in their existence. While it may be the case that persona non grata systems are considered enemies of the liberal democratic system abroad, so much so that there is open movement to overthrow such governments, the fundamentalist opinion remains intact domestically. Extremists are opposed to the promise of liberal democracy in that their ambition

is the preclusion of the recognition of all people within society as equal. The failure to deal with opinions of preclusion produces a reaction in society of needing to infringe upon their right to recognition. From whichever movement thereafter, there is a failure to enforce the promise of liberal democracy that was argued to be the reason for it being the absolute.

The presence of the religious fundamentalist within society could be excused by some residual element of the antiquated system, but with the same treatment appearing with the spread of radical Islam into much of the Western World, this can be dismissed as the reason for fundamentalist persistence.

Satisfying the desire of recognition is one of the core explicit premises of the liberal democratic system. The system is constructed with the promise that people will be recognized as equal in their assembly of the government. Yet, in spite of this promise, there is apparent inequality within the liberal democratic system. Certain social groups can be identified as not possessing the same de jure or de facto rights. Modern social activism is built upon rectifying such discrepancies, but, in a meta sense, their request for equality abates the identity of the group denying equal recognition initially.

To avoid the issue of necessary preclusion, the argument for a stronger system of education is often given to gradually rid society of this element. However, such strong education can be rewritten as coercion. Liberal democracy innately contradicts itself in its promise of universal recognition as to protect some it must exclude others. The reaction to fundamentalist opinions are natural, especially in light of the issue of the persona non grata, but are preclusive in their own right. The superior satisfaction of all, as thought to be the reason behind liberal democracy's ascension, cannot be truly carried out through discourse remaining solely around the system.

The inability to deal with the persona non grata is the point of contention for the modernist. The original motivation in radicalizing politics has once again come to the fore in examining the flaws of the liberal democratic system. Through the error brought about by internal contradiction, achieving recognition for all equally becomes impossible. This violation of the promise made by liberal democracy has left people feeling unrecognized. A collective begins to form in the attempt to correct the error and the end of history as liberal democracy is no longer is relevant to the ambition of universal recognition.

Metarecognition

Through a Hegelian perspective, the absolute is an alignment between explanans and explanandum. All other positions towards the truth of the matter become unviable insofar as they are not capable of dynamically encompassing all reality. The infinite interaction between each side of the dichotomy responsible for being ought to provide an inescapable definition. The truth of the end of history must be a conclusion that is impossible to be moved beyond as the unifying point of discourse for it to be considered the absolute. Upon noting the errors of a liberal democratic end previously discussed, Fukuyama's thesis fails to consist of such dynamism and thus needs to be revised through inclusion of the effects of the reflective spirit.

The nature of political identity has changed since 1990. At this time, it could be argued that the function of identities was similar to that of the unreflected understanding of the master-servant dialectic. Recognition was still being fulfilled, but each identity maintained that the purpose of the roles was to act as either a master or servant should. Masters were intended to command and servants were intended to follow.

As noted by Hegel in his examination of the master-servant dialectic, this expectation is altered through reflection. Much like how the servants are able to grasp the lack of fundamental difference between them and their masters, the reflective individual is able to apply the same finitude of being to the ideological conflict. As each individual is a product of the system itself and each contains an element of mortality, a new understanding of the similarity of identity is fostered. This finitude forms a bridge between the two identities in which both sides view themselves as having the same purpose in acquiring recognition.

Much like how the finitude of being is able to conjoin identities in the master-servant example, the omnipresent contradiction within each political system is similarly used to rationalize sameness. The importance of the consequences of each differing government structure is abandoned as satisfying recognition moves into a metasphere. The benefits of liberal democracy in providing freedom are diminished as within this metascope there is no perceivable difference in the purpose of identities. In terms of interaction with the subconscious desire for recognition, each identity evolves into being an identity with no relevant qualifiers besides satisfying the human condition. The external values of said identity are subconsciously taken by the individual to be irrelevant to the actual purpose of adopting the belief. Satisfying the desire of recognition becomes the purpose of identity through reflection and no longer can be described as the consequence of the identity. This phenomenon of the human spirit in replacing the true value of identity to the consciousness is described henceforth as metarecognition.

Metarecognition aims to fully encapsulate history as it moves beyond the reliance on government forms providing recognition themselves. A better analysis of how humans truly interact with political ambition is necessary to define the end of history. Each modern government form possesses a contradiction of some kind. Yet, despite knowledge of innate contradictions, ideologies are embraced and viewed as potentially that which can come to dominate the world. The acceptance of this contradiction makes exact government form irrelevant to how recognition is achieved by each individual. An alternative course to achieve the desired recognition is used and is found within the collective-individual identity conflict.

Metarecognition, as the end of history, is recognition fulfilled by the individual simply through the assertion of identity. The ultimate outcome of government form is irrelevant to the recognition fulfilled simply through not being a persona non grata. Entry into the discourse of

recognition satisfies the desire of recognition itself. All that becomes necessary for universal achievement of the desire of recognition is awareness of the identity conflict between individual and collective. The desire of recognition is fulfilled as each non-persona non grata makes an individual dialectical choice on whether they wish to be part of either the collective or individual identity. From this choice, universal recognition is achieved insofar as the innate conflict between collective and individual satisfies the conditions necessary for the human spirit.

The role of government form merely is to resolve the issue of the persona non grata and ensure it is no longer an element of society. From this expansion of self-autonomy, each individual is forced into the dialectic of the collective and individual. With the universal modern commitment to each person possessing an ideological stance, an all-encompassing sphere of discourse is created. From such a sphere, the end of history develops as breaking free from the universal modern commitment to identity itself is untenable.

The question of the end of history becomes solely adduceable to the expansion of all to be partaking in this aforementioned conflict. Metarecognition uniquely captures the ability of differing beliefs to satisfy the desire of recognition. Through this capability of metarecognition, the issues of Fukuyama's thesis are resolved. A new appeal of adopting political identity arises, not in terms of adopting the structure being argued for, but, rather, from harnessing the conflict itself to fulfill recognition.

The unending discourse that truly characterizes the end is found within this individual-collective conflict. To resolve the issues observed with liberal democracy so far, despite failing innately in its promise of recognizing all, one is still able to achieve recognition through the conflict with other ideologies. Excluded groups are able to maintain identity insofar as wishing to exclude another identity is an admittance to the existence of the identity itself. Recognition

moves beyond dependency on the question of government form as the conflict is able to create recognition alone. The interaction with government only is relevant through the universal modern permissiveness of a self-determinant individual – a facet of modernity incurred through the elimination of the persona non grata from society.

The identity conflict, even within a liberal democratic system, fulfills the human desire for recognition. The ability of a liberal democracy to transmit the identity conflict contributed to its near universality. However, to stop at just conflict within a liberal democracy being capable of doing such would not encompass the whole truth as the identity conflict is available in other government forms.

As noted by Fukuyama, liberal democracy, as characterized by its individuality, becomes inevitably confronted by collective ideologies that question its form as the supreme. The inevitability of this confrontation is built upon the emergence of the last man or, maybe, just the drift of time. Either way, with no method of resolving the conflict in a way that confines this discourse only to a liberal democratic system, an adjustment needs to be made to encompass this emerging characteristic of society.

Fukuyama's hypothesized liberal democratic control of the discourse is no longer present as a form of mutual recognition is achieved within the collective-individual dialogue. As collectivism is able to fulfill recognition through its relation to liberal democracy, and even political dissidents within the collective are recognized, the benefits that only liberal democracy was thought to have offered are no longer exclusive to the system.

Proponents of individualism and collectivism spread interaction with the conflict to totality through merely posing the question of which system to adhere to. The person is capable of acquiring the desired self-consciousness through the question itself. The persona non grata is

absolutely resolved as both sides of the conflict demand an answer. The satisfaction of the desire of recognition appears within this movement, and liberal democracy is no longer relevant in defining the end of history.

The desire for recognition is being fulfilled through the conflict surrounding identities themselves. The struggle between individual and collective satisfies the desire of recognition to the individual in a superior way in relation to the end as once it emerges there exists no way in which identity can be moved beyond the collective-individual discourse.

The two sides mimic the relation of master-servant as neither can exist with the total destruction of the other. While the individual may be arguing for liberal democracy as the absolute, it would not align explanans and explanandum in that the same recognition fulfilling argument can occur without the context of a liberal democracy. It becomes available to turn to the meta of the argument itself in order to perform the task of giving recognition to every person. All that becomes necessary for the individual to satisfy the desire of recognition is knowing their role in the individual and collective conflict.

The unending conflict between collective and individual is indubitably formed as each are dependent on the existence of the other – a fact established by reflection brought about by the faults of the liberal democratic end. The participants on either side are unaware of the infinite back and forth that awaits them. Genuine is the belief in all individuals that there exists a certain answer to a question of government. As one is innately incapable of recognizing the cycle internally, the historical awareness flaw of the liberal democratic end is avoided. The conflict between individual and collective becomes innate to society.

The Problem of Reflection in the End of History

The issue raised of an infinitely indefinite end was rejected on the grounds that an awareness of history needed to be accounted for in considering the true conclusion that encapsulates the entirety of the discourse. Fukuyama's stance of a liberal democratic end is thus rejected on the grounds that this end of history contains a conclusion that invariably leads to further conflict. The conflict, as incurred by reflection, exists beyond the purview of liberal democracy and thus establishes the thesis of metarecognition as the true conclusion to history.

While this observation of the reflective moment dismisses Fukuyama's thesis, the issue also remains potentially open in terms of applicability to the paper's own solution. It would appear that both Fukuyama's thesis and metarecognition possess the same flaw in those that are aware of history would preoccupy themselves with interacting with said history in the hope of avoiding a similar outcome. A key difference, however, arises in metacognition's interaction with human spirit. The interaction prevents awareness from affecting result – further, cementing the evidence needed to favor metarecognition as the end of history.

It would not be difficult to see that a similar logic could be applied to the metarecognition solution to the end of history. One who is a part of the conflict between collective and individual would be eventually faced with the same dilemma in seeing that the system is disposed to infinitely repeat in the same form across time. However, to demonstrate the deviation of Fukuyama's logic from reality and the adherence of metarecognition, it becomes necessary to explore the real application and the change political outlooks have incurred since 1990.

Through certain awareness that the end of a particular liberal democratic government is nigh, as evidenced by the observation of the Fukuyaman last man within society, a

transformation in the motivation of society occurs on the basis of avoiding the same played out deficient conclusion.

To practically demonstrate this phenomenon, the change that the awareness of an endpoint brings is clearly demonstrated in society's interaction with Michael Hopf's aphorism, "Hard times create strong men, strong men create good times, good times create weak men, and weak men create hard times." A cycle of dependence is developed that is meant to be reinforced ad infinitum until eventually it is a given conclusion that the interaction of the weak and strong are inversely codependent. The weak man is equivocal to what Fukuyama describes as the last man. The cycle is a practical description of how Fukuyama would expect the end to behave. Hopf and Fukuyama both believe that these circular cycles of governance are undertaken infinitely.

However, through enough repetitions of the Hopf cycle, deviation begins to occur in the consideration of what is a "good time." The self-proclaimed strong no longer necessarily argue for a return to the liberal democratic paradigm as the satisfaction of recognition has been found elsewhere – metarecognition.

The strong's conflict against the weak suffices to establish universal mutual recognition. The weak mutually ascertain a collective identity in some regard as another force attempts to control their autonomy – as established by the universality of the removal of the persona non grata. Each individual becomes capable of ascertaining their recognition through this strong/weak dialectic.

The now universal capability of the person to be self-determinant innately bases itself off of an opposition. The Hopf example makes this apparent with the strong's consideration of the weak politically. The ambition is to rectify the previous errors of the government in terms of

recognition. However, the weak² inherently holds opposition to the aims of the divergent strong. The formulation of these identities foremost serves as a means to maintain identity itself, rather than concern with the liberal democratic system. Through the recognition ascertained by the conflict of identities, specific government forms are now beyond the true point of contention.

The metarecognition phenomenon is fulfilled across all forms of modern government. From authoritative to conventionally free governments, a base freedom of assuming identity is given to all. Authoritative governments may hold severe disdain towards an identity, but through this formulation of disdain the existence of such a group is posited. The principle of the enemy of the state is used to find the legitimacy of government actions. All embrace this internal contradiction as a means to establish the mutual recognition that the human spirit requires. A collective state pursuing homogeneity ironically commits itself to creating separate identities to satiate this desire of recognition. Universal recognition then transitions into being found in the sphere of discourse surrounding identity. Self-determination becomes detached from specific governmental form through this movement.

Identity becomes impossible to check for truth or contradiction in the modern world³. The basis of these identities often contains a very real aspect of a person, but the motivation behind establishment lies in achieving mutual recognition. Even upon noting the unending nature of the identity conflict, an identity is still assumed through opposition to the conflict itself.

As symptoms of the supremacy of identity in satisfying human spirit, issues of proving self-worth become focused upon to maintain the difficulty of the present. Tying back into the

² The use of the word weak should not be taken as this side of the paradigm being worse than the other. The paper simply wishes to maintain the terminology used by Hopf for clarity's sake.

³ This is not to say any particular identity is not true, just that the ambition of asserting an identity is subconsciously tied to satisfying recognition.

Hopf cycle, the strong's presence becomes intrinsically tied to the satisfaction of recognition of a particular segment of society. The issues that the strong concern themselves with are motivated through proving self-worth. A motivation that is in conflict with the defenders of the liberal democratic end as innately self-worth is founded on establishing hierarchy. For one person to have a greater worth another must have less. Implicit to this relationship, recognition is then unequal. The initial faults of the Hopfian bad time in failing to recognize all universally is embraced as recognition turns to self-determinant identity.

To transition the theoretical to the practical, one could identify excessive materialism as such an identity necessitated by obtaining recognition. However, an exclusionary movement is being formed from one's own internal desire to be part of the materialistic class. The proponents of excessive materialism oft attempt to identify the unmaterialistically motivated element of society as *persona non grata*. On the surface of this statement, an opinion has emerged that threatens liberal democracy's promise of maintaining universal recognition, but with the nature of the structure itself there is little that can be done to remain true to the rules of liberalism and still be able to counter this movement. To root out the derisive nature of the strong collectively, as a society, is the undoing of the premise of liberal democracy that Fukuyama claims to be the driving force behind its absolute status.

The excessive materialist is in fact positing the existence of the poor through declaration of the person to be a nonperson. This is however not apparent to the discourse within liberal democracy as this is a discourse detached from governance.

Within the purview of liberal democracy, universal equal recognition is the end ambition. However, facets of society innately prevent such an ideal from ever being achieved as their own discourses are founded upon excluding another community. As previously mentioned, one's right

to dissent is uncontrollable without contradiction. Any reaction thereto is an assessment of one group's place within societal hierarchy. If one were to declare the dissenter a liar, their position would be assumed to be lower than that of those believing in the truth. Further, if one were to not act upon dissent, the lack of universal recognition of who is being critiqued is assumed if not explicit. Malcontent towards the system is generated in this inevitable interaction with the dissenter towards universal recognition.

The system of metarecognition does account for such a statement and the recognition received by the hierarchically inferior. The contradictory nature of any government form is embraced in its realization that the contradiction itself gives the desired recognition. The dissenter and assenter, critic or adherent, are identities within themselves. The self-determination to be part of any category fulfills the mutual recognition necessary to satisfy the human spirit. The infinite nature of the indefinite metarecognition conclusion thus yields the product of recognition itself.

In the course of the discovery of the metarecognition end, a trichotomous arrangement is formed between the strong, weak, and the unknowing individual. The strong and weak will first press the unknowing person until knowledge of either side of the conflict is inevitable. Three parts are desired to become two, and with such a desire, the last bastion of a liberal democratic end is rooted out in this very movement.

As the emergence of the self-determinant strong is only inevitable with an infinite interaction with a cyclical end, the demise of liberal democracy as the true endpoint becomes a foregone conclusion. No longer are the strong or weak concerned with the superior fulfillment of the desire of recognition that a liberal democracy affords, but, instead, motivation turns to the interaction between identities itself.

A change in the interaction of humanity with the end emerges as the strong, wishing to assert their identity, form solutions to counter the deficiencies of society. The strong become a force with the aim of convincing others that indeed they too should be concerned with these issues. The awareness of the end by these "strong elements" is the beginning of the self-destruction of a liberal society as the endpoint of discourse. Rather than concerning oneself with the political structure of a nation, the desire of recognition becomes fulfilled through the conflict of the strong and weak – more appropriately labeled as the conflict of identities.

The progression of the discourse is evident in the liberal democratic contempt towards communism, fascism, and anarchism. The contradiction of a system that recognizes all is embraced to dissuade those wishing to change the structure itself. The promise of universal recognition is abandoned with this move, yet people remain content. Inadvertently, liberal democracy becomes a part of the metarecognition system as the system's own conflict with its ideological rivals provides the very same recognition that was promised initially. To the defender of liberal democracy, the change is unnoticed, but the irrelevance of the structure itself is cemented.

The freedom afforded by liberal democracy requires the strong to persist as denying their identity would be the destruction of the structure of the system itself. The issue of the identity of the strong reveals the flaw of the hypothesis of this endpoint as the end of history. The cycle generates doubt that pushes the contention beyond liberal democracy. However, this doubt's relation to metarecognition emerges as encompassing the strong and weak dialectic as part of the logic itself and confirms why this should be considered the end of history. The issue of recognizability of the end affecting the end itself is avoided as nothing can exist beyond the collective and individual dialectic.

Recognizability is the ultimate flaw of Fukuyama's endpoint. Interaction of such an endpoint with the ebbs and flows of societal movement creates doubt and eventually an inevitable countermovement in which the system collapses through its inability to offer a non-contradictory stance on dissidence.

He that Walks on High

The allusion of Fukuyama to Hegel holds some base persuasion in explaining the end of history. The boldness of Fukuyama's statement in opening up the current discourse is acknowledged. The targeting of recognition as a basis in which humans are motivated to change government is what motivates the hypothesis of metarecognition. However, Fukuyama's use of Hegel's logic is not yet a complete understanding of the referenced work itself. Recognition, as maintained in a form impervious to change, can be found within the persistence of the very struggle between collective and individual identities.

A preemptive proclamation of the struggle to be over with a Hopfianesque cycle is an insufficient understanding of the true nature of the end. The incompleteness persists with the Hopf cycle as further movement is necessary to align conscience with outward truth. An outward truth that may be temporarily satisfied in the liberal democratic paradigm soon succumbs to alteration from the awareness of history.

The emptiness of the conclusion arises out of the knowledge that the cycle will repeat ad infinitum. The motivation to pursue a deviating system in response comes about from the constant inadequacy of the system in dealing with dissent. The collective reaction thereto dually fuels the fight for the individual to assert their individuality as still relevant. In turn, this reaction creates a collective of individuals seeking to maintain individuality supreme. Within this moment, Fukuyama's thesis of the recognition offered by liberal democracy being the end of history reveals itself to be no longer relevant to the ambitions of the individual. Rather, recognition becomes pursued in the identity conflict.

To the system of metarecognition, it is never apparent internally that this unending movement will go without definite conclusion. To proclaim that neither the individual or collective is capable of concluding history is patently incoherent internally. Both possess the ability to be a singular government, and, by extension, should have the capability to be the absolute.

The only persona non grata capable of existing in earnest is the unknowing, unreflective person. The threat to such a person existing is, however, countered innately by modern politics. The incessant need to order society within modern politics poses the issue of reflection upon the individual. The identification of political stance is the unifying universal feature from which modern politics differentiates itself from its predecessors.

Within the liberal democratic system, so substantial is the embracing of universal reflection that rather than dissuading dissidence, dissidence is accepted as a main feature to ensure recognition. Liberal democracy determines unimportant discourse to be viewed as a positive rather than crippling to progress. Irrationalists in the political scene can never be disallowed insofar as their existence contains purpose. A purpose that is founded purely upon identity rather than the form of government being argued for. Political minorities emerge as a necessity to the promise of the system of recognition to all. While often not apparent to the participants, each seemingly contradictory feature is founded upon ridding society of the persona non grata. Government forms and personal opinions are worthwhile only in the sense that they provide mutual recognition. Outcome is irrelevant to this purpose as any system becoming absolutely supreme would counteract the very value identity has to the human spirit.¹

Removing an unreflected existence is the purpose of any modern political system, liberal democratic or otherwise. The modern political purpose exhibits itself dually within the collective

system. The member of the collective society is educated about the existence of individualism. An education that posits individual identity as a negative would at first glance appear to function as a motivation to rid the world of such a view, yet also it is the establishment of mutual recognition. Teaching the collective population of the flaw of the individual is positing the existence of the individual itself and therein sates people's need for the identity conflict. Upon education, the two sides then interact with each other and fulfill the desire of recognition. Insofar as all are educated of the flaw of individualism, all are absolved of their *persona non grata* status. The basis of the legitimacy of the collective government is found through the admission of the most basic of individual choices in that one must willingly admit themselves to being a member of the collective sphere.

Both systems, being dually capable of satisfying the issue of the *persona non grata* without one another, remain *prima facie* contradictory to the end being stable within the metarecognition framework. The definite characteristic, commonly imagined within any Hegelian system, appears yet again to be unfulfilled. The question then becomes whether it is possible to reconcile an indefinite reality with Hegelian philosophy.

Hegel's *Science of Logic*, however, reveals the nature of the end to behave in this exact manner. The nature of the end that can be grasped from the master-servant dialectic is one that involves an unending conflict. There can be no conclusion as ultimately one needs the other to survive by its own definition. On the other hand, it must be the case that awareness of an unending conflict does not yield deviation from the path – as is the issue with Fukuyama's thesis. Balance must be struck as the masters and servants both require this innate opposition to give

identity to their own positions. The end relation in this dichotomy exhibits itself identically in shape within the conflict of collective and individual in the modern world.

The two political ideological principles cannot hold meaning individually without the existence of the other. Like a master needing a servant, an individual needs a collective – and vice versa. Through etymological definition, the individual can be considered as the indivisible entity within society. Collective identity is formed from the harmonization of the individual with a greater sphere. Once harmonization is complete, the individual is once again indivisible in the sense it would be impossible to differentiate one from another. The two spheres of indivisibility, upon knowing the existence of the other, then become involved in the same unending battle that was identified in the master-servant dialectic.

The distinct individual takes all necessary steps to avoid becoming part of the collective. Freedom, to this distinct individual, is absolute in its preeminence over all other considerations of right action. An attitude becomes innately adopted that ironically will destroy all distinct individuality as adherence to this belief is identical across the affirming population and therefore becomes collectivized. The individual joins the collective sphere in the adoption of the principles that counter collective thought. The counter is required to sustain the system, but is, in turn, the creation of a collective spirit. The previously identified education by the collective to dissuade but also to declare existence of the individual is mirrored by the individual's attitude to the collective. If asked, however, the individual will still proclaim indivisibility in their being. This is a false identification of which indivisibility the individual is partaking in, an error that is impossible to identify internally.

Within the system, one could identify themselves as individual or collective, but in terms of the desire for recognition they become one and the same. An individual becomes innately

collectivized in its unity that is formed in conflict with the collective. The collective requires individual motivation to become admitted in the first place. An individual choice must be made to reject individuality. To join is to die as an individual, but in order to die, one must have lived first. Individual and collective become conjoined in a meta consideration. The two become one singular being in terms of their consideration towards fulfilling the desire of recognition.

Rationalization will be attempted as counter collective movements will be claimed to be the only collective tolerable to ensure no further exclusionary collectivization in the future. Yet, there is no denying at this point in the dialectical movement that the individually collective fight against collectivism becomes intrinsic to the "individual" itself.

The nature of the collective can similarly be reworked to be a consequence of individuality. All those joining the collective must willingly forgo individuality as established by the nature of education within a collective system. Once the soon to be collectivized person is taught that they themselves can be an individual, any reaction thereafter, whether positive or negative, is the assertion of individual choice. Joining either side negates the indivisible harmony of the collective as even with saying yes to collectivism there is an admission of individual spirit. The most indivisible question of which side of the dichotomy the person wishes to identify cannot be avoided, and the individual is thus established as the harbinger of the collective. All modern collectivism exhibits individuality and thus stands in innate contradiction.

Within a Hegelian sense, individual and collective have become one and the same post reflection. The inversions have become unified while no one participating in the system finds themselves capable of realizing the nature of their own identity - an identity that is unified with its own opposition. One side cannot be eliminated as both collective and individual rely on the other for their definition. The shape of the end of the history has come to a conclusion that

perfectly aligns with Hegelian philosophy. The movement between the identities is to be valued above all as a definite conclusion eliminates the value of the system to the human spirit.

The case of the identity, individual or collective, will persist in perpetuity in the same form that it does now as all are able to grasp the desired satisfaction from this relation. No definite conclusion will arise as the two conflicting sides require the existence of the other. A false belief that either side is capable of absolute victory is unprovable internally. Universal recognition is eventually achieved, and nothing can break the interrelation between differing identities. The answer to what the ultimate society is contains no inferior answer, in terms of satisfying the desire of recognition, as the ultimate fulfillment is achieved no matter the outcome.

This fulfillment that follows reflection, as something detached from specific government form, threatens the progress that liberal democracy has been able to make. The previous superiority of the system in ensuring freedom for its citizens no longer suffices as determining liberal democracy to be the conclusion to history itself as only being done through subconscious efforts.

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