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Women's Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties

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The women's movement has made dramatic progress in improving the opportunities for women, but women are still underrepresented in the parliaments of all advanced industrial democracies. In 1992, for example, women averaged only 16 percent of the membership of national parliaments in advanced industrial nations (Rule 1994). Thus, women participate little in the national decision-making process, and this underrepresentation also exists at lower levels of government. The severe underrepresentation of one-half of the population not only limits the diversity of parliaments but also contradicts one of the central tenets of representative democracy.

Comparative research on women's representation in national parliaments has primarily focused upon characteristics of the electoral system to explain cross-national patterns. Party-list PR systems with large district magnitudes appear the most conducive to high levels of women's representation (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). One example of a national-level finding that supports this relationship is the German case. Half of the Bundestag is elected by a plurality system and the other half by proportional representation; in 1994 women won 19.1 percent of the seats by plurality election and 26.2 percent by proportional election.

Virtually all of prior comparative empirical research has focused only on national-level patterns of women's parliamentary representation. A national-level analysis overlooks the fact that individual parties vary greatly in the proportion of women MPs within each nation. Parties differ in the number of women they nominate, where they rank women on party lists, and the proportion of women that they send to parliament. Parties are the real gate-keepers to elected office; they control which candidates are recruited (Norris 1996; Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Because parties play such an important role in the composition of parliament, we must understand how parties differ in encouraging or discouraging women's access to Parliament. Therefore, we must add the role of parties to the research agenda on women's representation.

This paper analyzes party-level variation in women's representation in parliament. By treating the party as the unit of analysis, rather than the nation, we can isolate the role of the party in promoting women. Prior research addressing the impact of party upon women's representation is limited to case studies of individual parties or single national party systems. With a small number of cases it is difficult to disentangle the interrelated effects among party characteristics.

Our study of parties in twelve advanced industrial democracies enables us to go far beyond these prior studies. This research determines which party characteristics are conducive to the parliamentary representation of women. In addition, examining the representation of women can also provide insight into two larger questions. First, how can party characteristics enable

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parties to increase the descriptive representation of other underrepresented groups? Second, how can those same characteristics influence the ability of a party to adapt to new political pressures generated from new social conflicts?

### **Examining Party-Level Differences**

We will systematically examine four general party characteristics that have been hypothesized to affect the proportion of women MPs: 1) a party's organizational structure; 2) its ideology; 3) the proportion of women party activists; and 4) party gender-related representation rules.

#### **Party Organization**

Prior research suggests four aspects of a party's organizational structure that may influence women's representation: the degree of centralization, the degree of institutionalization, the location of candidate nomination, and the party size.

The first component, centralization, describes the distribution of control over decision-making among the levels of the party hierarchy. For our research, the question is whether a centralized or a decentralized party better promotes female MPs. A highly centralized party means that party leaders have the control to create openings for women-- when they want to do so. Matland and Studlar (1996), for example, state that centralized procedures specifically allow the party leadership to respond to pressures for greater representation. In response to pressures from other parties and the electorate, party leaders generally want to gain votes by broadening the diversity of party MPs. Therefore, we can expect that women will be better represented where the party leaders *can* effectively make an effort to promote women candidates through the use of particular party policies.

Further, a central party organization can more directly be held accountable for low proportions of female candidates. Groups pressuring for increased representation have a central target at which to aim their demands, and if those demands are not met, the groups can fault the party leaders. In a more decentralized system each region or locality must be individually pressured to support women. The regions or localities may be less likely to do so without the possibility of sanctions from central party control.

The second component, degree of institutionalization, determines the nature of the rules by which MPs are recruited. Highly institutionalized parties are bureaucratic;<sup>1</sup> they are full of formalized, explicit rules. A low degree of institutionalization signifies ad hoc, pragmatic decision-making (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). The degree of institutionalization may affect the career ladder of officeholders. Highly institutionalized parties provide all potential MPs, especially those without ties to the power-center, with a set of understandable rules. Czudnowski (1975) reasons that the more institutionalized the selection process, the easier it is for any outsider to understand how the selection process works. Those not in power know how candidates are recruited and also can anticipate the criteria by which each applicant will be judged. The aspiring officeholders are privy to the way the selection process works and know how to prepare. If the rules do not discriminate against women, and the rules are the same for everyone, we might expect that women would have a better chance in a highly institutionalized environment.

In addition, with institutionalization, party leaders have less leeway to bend the rules in favor of certain candidates. Weakly institutionalized parties tend to bias candidate nomination in

favor of those who have accumulated "personal political capital", resources based upon personal status or external group support (Guadagnini 1993). Thus women, as newcomers to parties, would have fewer resources and would find it more difficult to catch up with established men. Therefore, the career of a woman in a less institutionalized party would have to begin outside of the party where the aspiring officeholder could gain a power base.

These two characteristics of party organization can work together to shape the process by which party policies are created and implemented. Specifically, a party may create formal rules to promote women candidates, but without central control the rules may be unenforceable. In sum, the degree of institutionalization and centralization together define the possible strategies a party can use to promote women candidates. Norris and Lovenduski (1995, p. 198) use centralization and institutionalization together to create a typology of party organization. Each type of party holds certain characteristics that shape how the party promotes women. For example, Norris and Lovenduski point out that centralization coupled with informal practice affords party leaders with both control and the leeway to promote whomever they want. Hence, in a centralized-informal party the fate of women candidates lies with the preferences of the party leaders. Although a decentralized party may leave party leaders without direct control to influence who is nominated, the addition of institutionalized decision-making allows the party leadership the option to make recommendations to the local bodies. In the institutionalized, rule-oriented party, the local bodies are more likely to pay attention to such rules from a central source. In other words, centralization and institutionalization may not work independently to determine the options a party has to support women. The two features are interlinked and thus their influence must be examined together as well as separately.

A more specific aspect of party organization is the *level of nomination* for parliamentary candidates.<sup>2</sup> On the one hand, we might hypothesize that localized nomination is more hospitable to women because women are more likely to work in community politics. Those women who aspire to political office can start by holding office at the local level and working their way up to the national level (Lovenduski and Norris 1993). Such is the case in Swedish parties where local office is the springboard to national office (Sainsbury 1993). On the other hand, we may expect that a centralized nomination pattern provides a more structured internal party career ladder. Those women who work in the party bureaucracy can be repaid with a party office. Czudnowski (1975, p. 226) contends that this intraparty career ladder is characteristic of the Labor parties in Europe. A specific example of the career ladder within the party bureaucracy is found in the German parties (Kolinsky 1989). Party workers pay their dues with several years of service to the party ("Ochsentour") before they are rewarded with the most prestigious position—a place on the party list to the national legislature.

Finally, we might expect that smaller parties would be the first to nominate women because they have less to lose. Then later, perhaps once the ground has been broken, the larger parties will follow. National-level evidence for this hypothesis comes from Matland and Studlar (1996). They found that it was the smaller Norwegian Leftist parties that began promoting women. Czudnowski (1975) more generally addresses the relative strength of parties in a national system and argues that the majority parties would be less concerned with "problems of sociodemographic representation" than would a minority party (p.181).

## Party Ideology

Our second explanatory factor is the ideology of a political party. We expect that Left parties are more likely to support women's candidacies than Right parties because Left parties espouse more egalitarian ideologies (Duverger 1955; Beckwith 1986). Traditionally the women's movement has been linked to Left parties (Jenson 1982). Specific to our research, Left parties may be more likely to see fit to support an underrepresented group, such as women. Matland and Studlar (1996) suggest that parties on the Left may "feel a need to be sensitive to groups traditionally excluded from the circles of power..." (p. 27).

In addition, Left parties may be more likely to employ active strategies to increase women's representation because an egalitarian ideology justifies intervention into recruitment (Lovenduski and Norris 1993). Matland (1996), for example, finds that Leftist parties in Norway began to send higher percentages of women than Rightist parties to parliament in the 1980s. Rule (1987) theorizes that women are less likely to be nominated by Rightist parties because they hold a more traditional view of women's roles. Rule adds a Right party indicator to a national-level model to predict women's parliamentary representation and finds the indicator to be weak.

Lovenduski and Norris (1993) contend that while Left ideology may once have been a strong influence on women's parliamentary representation, it is no longer as strong. Left parties may no longer be the only parties to support women because support for women spreads across the ideological spectrum. Matland and Studlar (1996) support this diffusion of support for female candidates across parties in the same nation with case studies of Norway and Canada. However, women must first establish themselves within Leftist parties in order for the support to spread. Therefore, the impact of party ideology on women's representation must be examined over time.

In addition, the traditional unidimensional Left/Right ideological continuum may be too simple to describe how ideology affects women's representation. The lines of political conflict were once based upon 'Old Politics' cleavages of class conflict. Old Left parties are oriented toward the concerns of the working class; and Old Right parties are oriented toward business interests. The rise of a 'New Politics' cleavage adds a new dimension to our conceptualization of ideology (Inglehart 1977). "This New Politics dimension involves conflict over a new set of issues: environmental quality, alternative lifestyles, *minority rights*, participation, and *social equality*" (Dalton 1986, p.153).<sup>3</sup> This new cleavage has spurred new parties, especially New Left parties that have been active proponents of women's issues. The New Left and its parties are even more closely linked to the women's movement than are the traditional Left parties such as the Labour and Socialist. The New Left served as the "birthplace" for the women's movements (Jenson 1982).

Thus, a **Left** party in general may not necessarily promote women candidates. The Old Left parties, particularly Labor parties, have historically been supported by trade unions and thus may still be primarily concerned with socioeconomic issues, and not issues of social equality. Conversely, New Left parties, as representatives of postmaterialist values, may be more open to helping out underrepresented groups and actively endorse gender equality. Additionally, without strong union ties, New Left parties lack the entrenched hierarchies that can block new entrants into the nomination process.

The year a party enters the political system may be another measure of 'newness' that affects the representation of women. Single-nation evidence suggests that new parties may be more supportive of female candidacies. For example, in the Netherlands the newest party, Groen Links, has the highest proportion of women of all Dutch parties (Leijenaar 1993). New parties

may be more likely to open their doors to a less powerful group such as women and to encourage them to run for office for three reasons. First, new parties may be more likely to hold postmaterialist values such as equality and increased internal democracy (Dalton 1991). Pippa Norris (1996) adds that new parties may be more receptive to entry by minority groups than traditional parties. Secondly, new parties have few entrenched power holders and are thus open to newcomers because no incumbents will be deposed in the process. So, new parties' lack of traditional power centers, plus the possibility for new rules and norms, suggests women can use this malleability to their advantage. Innovative policies to promote women are more likely where there are no previously established norms. Third, new parties may try to lure female voters with female candidates. New parties need to attract new voters if they are to survive. One strategy might be to appeal to women by demonstrating the party's willingness to run a larger proportion of female candidates than other parties in the nation.

### **Women Activists**

During the 1970s, when gender equality became part of the social agenda of advanced industrial societies, increasing numbers of women took their demands for increased participation to the political parties (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Sainsbury 1993). Lovenduski and Norris's research (1993) suggests that women's participation in parties at the grassroots level has increased to rival men's in recent years in Sweden and Germany.<sup>4</sup> Women have increased party participation as party members, activists and local party officers.

Once women began to enter the lower party ranks, they could directly increase pressure for representation at the highest level-- Parliament. In other words, women's participation inside the party as party activists at the local level, as organizers of intraparty women's groups, and as internal officeholders should buoy women's power in the party. This power should increase women's opportunities and resources to lobby for further support of women as candidates for parliament. Women's party activity also creates a new pool of politically experienced women. In studying Swedish parties, Sainsbury (1993) argues that women's direct activity within parties increased the number of women MPs, explaining how representation changed over time. Thus we might expect those parties with higher proportions of women activists will display correspondingly high proportions of women MPs.

### **Party Rules**

We believe that the rules of a party concerning the gender of candidates may be the most direct influence on the proportion of a party's female MPs. Parties can act to increase the proportion of nominated female candidates by creating formal rules that prescribe more equal proportions of women in the party's overall composition of candidates. Such direct action can take the form of a quota, mandated percentages of women, or a target, recommended percentages of women. This use of gender quotas denotes a process of changing attitudes toward women in politics which has led to a change in the formal rules. Implementation of gender quotas or targets by parties not only reflects the acceptance that gender underrepresentation is a problem, it also demonstrates a willingness to act to fix the problem.

Gender goals and quotas within parties first emerged in the late 1970s. The number of parties implementing these goals and quotas rose throughout the 1980s. In advanced industrial societies, the number of parties establishing quotas and targets doubled between 1975 and 1985.



Those nations where quotas or targets were established by one party in 1975 may have experienced a diffusion of quotas to the other parties in the system by 1985. This factor may play an important role in explaining the growth of women's representation over time.

The parties which implement formal rules to promote women's representation should directly increase the number of females nominated. Matland (1993) gives evidence of the strong and rapid effect of gender quotas adopted by the Norwegian Labor Party in 1983. The percentage of women in the Labor party delegation increased from thirty-three in 1981 to fifty-one by 1989. Previous research addressed the impact of these new party rules on a systematic cross-national basis (Caul 1997); however, the impact of party quotas at the *party level* must also be assessed. Matland and Studlar's research (1996) suggests that larger parties are more likely to adopt gender quotas and goals when pressured with the adoption of these rules by a rival party, usually a smaller party to the Left. When a rival party directly supports women candidates, the competing parties are afraid they may lose votes if they fail to do the same. In response, the other parties adopt quotas or targets of their own and women's representation increases across the board. Thus, not only do gender goals and quotas impact a specific party, but also impact the competing parties within the party system of a nation. Matland (1993) traces this process of gender quota diffusion in Norway. The quotas began in 1977 with a fringe Left party and soon spread to every party in the system except the Progress Party. Sainsbury (1993) reports that a diffusion of recommendations, targets for 40 percent female candidates, similarly swept the Swedish party system.

Both party organization and ideology may condition gender rules for candidates. First, party organization affects the party's capacity to make enforceable rules concerning equal representation of candidates. For example, in the U.S. the weak and decentralized parties are unlikely to attempt to establish candidate quotas because the parties lack any mechanism to enforce them.<sup>5</sup> Secondly, party ideology is likely to affect whether or not parties see fit to adopt quotas. Often Leftist parties use positive discrimination, or quotas, which result in sharp increases in women in parliament. For example, the Green Party of Germany was one of the first to adopt quotas. Quotas fit in with the egalitarian ideology of Left parties. A more Leftist party might reason that equal opportunity is not enough to help severely underrepresented groups. Instead, the rules should help to bring women's representation on par with men's. Distinctly, more conservative parties may extend their "hands off" approach to the economy to the gender composition of party candidates as well (Lovenduski and Norris 1993, p. 320).

Germany is an exemplar for the impact of party-level gender quotas. In Germany, quotas have resulted in a sharp rise in women's representation in the Bundestag since 1990 (Kolinsky 1993). All German parties, except the CSU, established at least target numbers of women to be nominated in the 1980s. The SDP instituted a quota system in 1988; at least 40 percent of all party officers had to be female by 1988 and the same for female candidates by the year 1998.<sup>6</sup> Progress toward this goal steadily increased the number of females nominated. Strikingly, in 1989, 56 percent of the women in the Bundestag were newly elected after 1983; this increase in women legislators occurred in the era of gender quotas (Kolinsky 1991).

## **Electoral System**

The focus of this research is on party-level differences. However, the electoral system remains an integral component in explaining women's representation. Several studies have established that a nation's electoral system strongly influences women's representation in national legislatures.

Party list PR systems produce more women in parliament than plurality systems (Lakeman 1994; Duverger 1955). The standard explanation is that parties in plurality systems are less likely to nominate a woman because the parties worry they will lose the seat to a male competitor. In party list PR systems, in contrast, parties are more likely to add women to the list in order to broaden their appeal and balance the ticket. The perceived electoral risk with a female candidate decreases when a female is part of a group, rather than the sole candidate.

Within this same line of reasoning, studies demonstrate that as the number of candidates elected from a district (district magnitude) increases, so does the number of women nominated to the list and elected (Beckwith 1992; Matland 1993; Rule 1987). Three or more seats per district means that more than one person on the party list can win a seat. Czudnowski (1975) broadly theorized that party lists allow parties to balance the ticket to represent a number of groups within the party. This logic applies to striking a gender balance on the ticket; women can be added to the party list to broaden appeal without deposing established males. Even if the women are not ranked first on the list, they can still be elected to office if the party wins more than one seat. Hence, research suggests that large, multi-member districts and party lists are most conducive to women's representation in legislatures.

In summary, these four general characteristics of political parties--organizational structure, ideology, women's activism and gender party rules--work in conjunction to shape the party environment. Party characteristics condition: the career ladder of aspiring politicians; the candidate selection and nomination process; the ability of parties to respond to pressures to increase the representation of internal groups; the likelihood of supporting underrepresented groups; the kinds of actions and policies parties adopt to promote those groups; and whether the parties are able to implement those policies once adopted. In short, we expect each of these characteristics will influence the amount of support a party gives to women candidates, which in turn will influence the proportion of women in a party's delegation to parliament. Furthermore, electoral rules also work in combination with all of the other party influences. Characteristics of parties are directly linked to the type of electoral system. The electoral rules may influence the range of possible strategies a party can use to promote female candidates. "If parties want to help women by affirmative action policies, selection quotas, positive training mechanisms, or financial assistance, this is easiest where there are national or regional lists of candidates" (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p. 195)

### **Data Analysis**

Our primary focus is to explain variation in individual parties' proportion of women in the national legislatures in advanced industrial democracies. The analysis is based on sixty-eight parties in twelve advanced industrial democracies.<sup>7</sup> This study is limited to the U.S. and Western European nations because these nations are the main focus of the established cross-national party literature and because data on the proportion of women MPs by party was published for these nations in Katz and Mair (1992). The criterion for a party to be included in the study was that it achieved at least one seat in parliament in any one of the three time points under review. The threshold for inclusion is low in order to incorporate new and small parties which are expected to have some special characteristics that are conducive to promoting female candidates. Further, in order to remain part of the study, the party had to have available information on the breakdown of MPs by gender. We have collected measures for each of the independent and dependent variables from published national statistics and other data sources. A full list of variables and



their sources are listed in Appendix B. The dependent variable in each case is the proportion of women in a party delegation to the lower house of the national legislature.

The participation of women is examined at three points in time: 1975, 1985 and 1989.<sup>8</sup> These time points were selected because it was at the beginning of this time frame that women increased pressures for greater political representation (Lovenduski and Norris 1993, p. 5). By 1975, attention had been called to the dearth of females in parliament in advanced industrial democracies. By 1985, ten years later, some parties have substantially increased in their level of women's representation. Finally, by 1989, which is the last data point available in Katz and Mair's (1992) study, we can evaluate how new parties and new rules for gender parity affect party levels of women's representation.

### **Women as MPs and as Party Candidates**

Table A (in appendix) presents the percentage of women in the national parliaments in 1975, 1985, and 1989, as well as the percentage point difference between 1975 and 1989. The data support the expectation that the percentage of women by party increases over time. The average percentage of female MPs is 12 percent in 1975, 19 percent in 1985, and 23 percent in 1989. There has been progress, but it has been limited.

It is also readily apparent that there are substantial variations among parties in the percentage of women they send to parliament. For example, the Norwegian Labor Party had 19, 42 and 50 percent women MPs in 1975, 1985 and 1989, respectively. In stark contrast, the Fianna Fail of Ireland had 1, 3 and 6 percent women MPs in the same three years. Likewise, the British Conservatives sent a very low percentage of women to parliament in all three years: 3, 3 and 5 percent. Within Italy, the Communists sent 18, 19 and 32 percent female delegations to the national legislature, while the Liberal Party sent no women in any year. We observe a similar variation within most nations.

Taking into account that basic party characteristics are fairly stable, a party's proportion of female MPs should be strongly correlated with the previous time point. The same parties that elect the highest proportion of women candidates in 1975 should generally be among the highest in this respect in the next two time points. This expectation is born out. We observe strong, positive and highly statistically significant correlations between the percentage of women MPs for all three years. The correlation between the percentage of women MPs in 1975 and 1985 is .43.; the correlation between 1985 and 1989 is .69.

Of course, a party cannot send female MPs to parliament if the party does not run female candidates. Before examining party characteristics we want to look at the relationship between each party's percentage female candidates and female MPs for the three years under review. Parties that nominate more women candidates should have more women MPs in parliament. Again, the data confirm our prediction: The correlations between women candidates and MPs are strong, positive and significant in each case. For 1975 the correlation is .71, for 1986 it is .51 and for 1989 it is .63. In general, where parties are nominating a high proportion of women candidates, women are sent to parliament in substantial numbers.

## Predicting the Representation of Women

### Party Organization

The manner in which a party is organized may impact how well women are represented as Members of Parliament. To measure party characteristics we rely on data collected by Lane and Ersson (1991).<sup>9</sup> They created summary measures that correspond to the characteristics identified in the established literature on party organization and women's representation. Our first hypothesis is that a more highly centralized party will better promote women MPs. According to Lane and Ersson all of the separate indicators in the summary index of integration measure the internal unity of a party. However, factor analysis reveals that the components of this index measure two different dimensions. Thus, factor analysis suggests that we should not mix these indicators. Therefore, we created two indices of what we call leadership centralization and membership centralization (see appendix).

Table 1 displays the bivariate relationships between both indices of party centralization and the percentage of women MPs. Our second index of centralization is moderately related to percentage of women MPs in each year. However, the first index of centralization is only positively related to women MPs in 1975. More highly centralized parties appear only slightly more likely to have women MPs.

**TABLE 1. Party Organization and Women's Representation**

Party Characteristic	% Women 1975	% Women 1985	% Women 1989	1975-89 N
Leadership Centralization	.21	.07	-.08	(36-43)
Membership Centralization	.22	.15	.20	(36-43)
Candidate Nomination Level	-.18	-.29**	-.22*	(52)
Index of Institutionalization	.22	.23*	.25*	(54-57)
Membership Central.* Institutionalization	.19	.16	.21	(35)
Party Share of Vote 1975	-.17	-.20	-.12	(56-60)
Party Share of Seats 1975	-.14	-.20	-.08	(56-60)

Note: the range of number of cases across the three time points is enclosed in parentheses; \*\*\*=p.01; \*\*=p.05; \*=p .10

A second set of party characteristics measures the degree of institutionalization. Highly institutionalized parties are characterized by adherence to formal rules. Less institutionalized parties are characterized by a more ad-hoc and pragmatic approach to decision-making. Lane and Ersson's summary index of programmatic orientation measures the extent to which parties are led

by specific political agendas. In this measure, the more programmatic the party, the more institutionalized it is on the scale. The moderate, statistically significant (in 1985 and 1989) relationships indicate that the more programmatic the party, the more likely they are to elect women to office.

As Norris and Lovenduski (1995) suggest, the degree of centralization and the degree of institutionalization may work together within each party to influence women's representation. Rather than each having a separate influence, the established hypothesis is that one characteristic of party organization limits the other; centralization and institutionalization may interact. Therefore, we assessed the relationship between the interaction term of centralization and institutionalization and the proportion of women MPs. To create the interactive term we multiplied the Index of Membership Centralization and the Index of Institutionalization. This interaction term yields a positive correlation with percent women MPs at all three time points, but this is not a strong or statistically significant relationship.

A more specific measure of party centralization is the pattern of candidate nomination. The level at which a party nominates candidates may affect women's access to nomination. "Candidate Nomination Level" scores nomination at the local level as a one and nomination at other levels as a two.<sup>10</sup> In 1985 and 1989, significant negative correlations indicate that candidate nomination at the local level is associated with higher percentages of women MPs. This finding suggests that centralized control over nomination is *not* conducive to women's representation as hypothesized.


We also hypothesized that smaller, weaker parties, which tend to be fringe parties, may be positively related to women's representation. The party's total share of the vote and total share of seats measure the strength of the party. Again, weak and insignificant correlations indicate that smaller parties do not seem to be more hospitable to women's representation. This finding lends no support to the contagion hypothesis in the aggregate. Smaller parties are not strongly associated with high levels of women MPs even in 1975.

This finding may be attributed to the fact that small parties exist on both sides of the ideological continuum. Not only are there small parties with Postmaterialist concerns, but also there are new and small parties with populist and ultra-right concerns. This suggests that rather than the size of the party, it is the ideology of the party which affects women's representation in parliament.

## **Party Ideology**

Party ideology may condition a party's general attitude toward promoting female candidates; Left Parties may be more supportive of gender equality than Right parties. As a first test of this idea, Figure 1 displays the average percentage of women MPs for different ideological families of parties in 1989.<sup>11</sup> Overall, the chart supports the hypothesis. Across the chart from Left to Right we observe that on the whole, the party types to the Left have higher percentages of women MPs and the parties to the Right have lower percentages. Environmental and communist parties average the highest percentages of women. In stark contrast, the discontent and ultra-Right parties send virtually no women to parliament. Two surprising party types are the conservative and rural, which both have more women MPs on average than the Left socialist parties. Therefore, when we categorize parties by general types, the parties we consider to be more 'Leftist' hold higher average levels of women MPs. However, a few parties toward the middle of our chart indicate that this is not a perfect relationship. Because party type is an extremely blunt

indicator of ideology we can only conclude that party types give us a general idea of the proportion of women a party will send to the legislature.



In order to measure party ideology rather than party labels, we first use an established measure based upon the standard Left/Right ideological continuum. 'Self-Location', as indicated by Lane and Ersson, measures how parties are classified in the opinion of voters themselves (1991, p.9). The moderately strong and statistically significant correlations between Self-Location and percent women MPs support the contention that Leftist parties do tend to send more female MPs to parliament than Rightist parties (Table 2).

Because a simple Left/ Right scale does not fully reflect party disposition toward women in office, we incorporate not only a Left/Right summary score but also separate measures of Old Politics and New Politics ideology. National specialists scored each party on its stance on four particular issues: increasing public services, public ownership, social policy and environmental policy (Laver and Hunt 1992).<sup>12</sup> The national specialists assigned scores to the positions of party leaders on each issue-- the 'elite-level scores'.<sup>13</sup> The specialists also assigned scores on the same issues to party voters--the 'voter-level scores'. The expectation is that for each issue the 'Leftist' orientation will be related to higher percentages of women MPs. We created an index for the Old Politics and the New Politics dimension (see appendix). This summary index was created for both the elite and the voter levels.

The correlations between these four indices all reveal the same relationship: the more Leftist the party, on old or new cleavages, the more women MPs the party tends to have (Table 2). The most striking finding is that the summary indices for the New Politics dimension at both the elite and voter level yield higher correlations than the Old Politics indices. Simply put, higher percentages of women in the legislature are strongly associated with Leftist parties--especially New Left-- at all three points in time.

**TABLE 2. Party Ideology and Women's Representation**

Ideological Measure	1975	1985	1989	1975-89 N
Left/Right Self-location	-.35**	-.25*	-.37***	(47-53)
Elite Old Politics Index	-.18	-.27*	-.28**	(57-60)
Elite New Politics Index	-.31***	-.28**	-.33**	(57-60)
Voter Old Politics Index	-.18	-.25	-.26*	(57-60)
Voter New Politics Index	-.37***	-.29**	-.33**	(57-60)
Newness of Party Year Founded	.07	.08	.03	(60-63)

Note: the range of number of cases across the three time points in enclosed in parentheses; \*\*\*=p.01; \*\*=p.05; \*=p .10

Further, we find little support for the diffusion of women's representation across the ideological spectrum. Ideology does not appear to play a stronger role in 1975 than in 1985 or 1989. The correlations for the Old Politics indices actually grow stronger over time. This moderate strengthening of the Old Politics indicator suggests that Old Left parties may have responded in the late 1980s to New Left parties' efforts to promote women MPs in the early 1980s.

A related expectation is that the 'newness' of the party is positively associated with women's representation. The correlation between the year a party was founded and the percent women MPs is weak in each case. Newer parties measured on simple chronological age do not appear to be more hospitable to women.

### **Women Activists**

With more women active at different levels within a party, the party may send more women to the national legislature. We examined data on the percentage of women at three internal levels of the party: representation on the party's National Executive, among middle-level elites, and among local party activists (see appendix).

The first striking finding about women party activists is that the average percentage of women party activists at the local level is lower than the average percentage of women who are middle-level party elites. Further, both of these averages are lower than the percentage of women on the National Executive in 1975, 1985 or 1989! The average percentage of women local activists is twelve while the average percentage of women middle-level elites is fourteen. The average proportion of women on the National Executive is sixteen in 1975, twenty-four in 1985 and by 1989, the average grows to twenty-seven. Parties appear to have more women at the top of the internal party ranks than at the lower-level elite positions. This finding violates Putnam's

supposed 'law of increasing disproportion', which would imply that the representation of women should be lower at higher organization levels.

Table 3 presents the bivariate relationships between the percentage of women party activists and the corresponding percentage of women MPs. In each year we observe a moderately strong and statistically significant relationship between the level of women in the party's National Executive and its level of MPs. We also assessed the relationship between the percentage of women MPs in each year with the percentage of women on the party National Executive in 1975. The correlations grow stronger and more significant over time. This finding reveals a lag effect. In a party where there is a higher proportion of women on the National Executive in 1975, by the next time point there is a higher percentage of women in parliament. In sum, women at high levels in the party appears to reinforce more women in parliament.

**Table 3. Women Party Activists and Women's Representation**

<b>Representation by Political Level</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>1985</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1975-89 N</b>
National Executive	.32*	.47**	.42***	(46-57)
Middle-level Elites	.35*	.55*	.47*	(26)
Local Activists	.35	.48**	.40*	(17)

Note: the range of number of cases across the three time points is enclosed in parentheses; \*\*\*=p.01; \*\*=p.05; \*=p .10

A high level of women working within the party ranks, but not necessarily at the top party post, may also increase the party's promotion of female candidates. The middle-level elites indicator measures the percentage of women party elites who are delegates at the party's national conference. The survey from which this measure was taken was conducted from 1977 to 1981. The bivariate relationships between middle-level party elites and party MPs are positive and significant in all three years. This suggests that parties that have high levels of women delegates in 1977, also have higher levels of women officeholders in later years.

The third level of women within the party, the percentage of women as local activists, measures women's strength at the lowest existing organizational level in 1977-81. Again, the expectation is that women's strength at lower party levels will be reflected in women's strength as party MPs. The data support our expectation: The percentage of women as local activists is positively related to the percentage of women MPs at all three time points. The relationship is strongest in 1985 and then weakens in 1989. For both middle and local levels of elites, we do not observe the same increase in the strength of the correlations over time as we do for the National Executive. Rather, the correlations with women MPs by 1989 are not quite as strong as 1985, suggesting that the level of women activists within the party in the late 1970s does not have the same impact by 1989 as it did in 1985.

### **Party Rules**

The introduction by parties of gender quotas on candidates may affect the representation of women in parliament. Gender goals and quotas for women candidates within parties appear to be important to women's election, yet they have only been studied on a case by case basis. Party rules range from strict quotas to softer recommendations for a certain proportion of women



candidates. Accordingly, parties with explicit quotas score two points, while parties with targets score one point, and parties with no gender rules score no points (see appendix). Each party was scored in this manner in 1975, 1985 and 1989.

Only three out of our sixty-eight parties had any candidate gender goals or quotas in 1975. A few small Leftist parties employed candidate targets. The number of parties with candidate gender rules grows by 1985 and reaches its highest level in 1989 at twenty-one out of sixty-eight parties.<sup>14</sup> In 1989, those parties which have implemented candidate gender rules average 28 percent women in their delegation to parliament, while those parties without any form of gender rules average 22 percent women.

Table 4 displays the relationships between the presence of party candidate gender rules and the percentage of women MPs. As one might expect, gender rules have a lagged effect. For candidate gender rules adopted in 1975 there is a low correlation in 1975 itself, and a higher and significant correlation in both 1985 and 1989. For those rules adopted by 1985 there is a weak positive correlation with MPs in 1985 itself. However, by 1989 the rules adopted in 1985 seem to have had their impact. Finally, those parties which adopted candidate rules by 1989 only impact levels of women MPs in 1989. The correlation is a significant .27. In summary, the impact of gender rules takes a few years to develop, even beyond the next election. The effects of the quotas instituted in the late 1980s may not show up until the mid 1990s.

**TABLE 4. Party Rules and Women's Representation**

Candidate Gender Rules	1975	1985	1989	1975-89 N
1975 Rules	.19	.29**	.25*	(59)
1985 Rules	--	.02	.25*	(60)
1989 Rules	--	--	.27**	(60)

Note: the number of cases is enclosed in parentheses; \*\*\*=p.01; \*\*=p.05; \*=p .10.

### Electoral Rules

As hypothesized earlier, parties in a party-list PR electoral system may have higher levels of women in their delegation to parliament. Parties in a party-list PR system scored a one and parties in any other type of system scored a zero. The resulting correlations were strong and significant in each year, even increasing in 1989.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, table 5 shows that parties embedded in party-list PR electoral rules do send more women to Parliament.<sup>16</sup>

**Table 5. Electoral Rules and Women's Representation**

Electoral Measure	1975	1985	1989
Electoral System	.36**	.36**	.46**
District Magnitude	.21	.45***	.22

Note: \*\*\*=p.01; \*\* =p .05; \* =p .10

## Multivariate Analysis


These findings lend support to the conclusion that several party characteristics are conducive to women's representation. There are strong relationships for variables in each of the four categories. Our next goal is to determine which characteristics work best together to maximize women's representation.

To avoid possible multicollinearity problems, the strongest independent variables from each of the five categories were selected and entered into a multivariate regression analysis. From the party organization variables both the Index of Institutionalization and the level of candidate nomination were selected as a measures of party centralization.<sup>17</sup> From the party ideology variables the New Politics Index emerged as the strongest. From among the women activist indicators the percentage women on the National Executive 1985 was selected.<sup>18</sup> In addition, the presence of rules in 1985 was selected.<sup>19</sup> The lagged variables were utilized as predictors because the bivariate relationships suggest that it takes time for these variables to have their desired impact. Finally, the type of electoral system in 1989 is included.

### Causal Flow Chart

These party characteristics are linked.<sup>20</sup> Their combined impact on women's representation may not be simultaneous, but rather linked in a chain of favorable influences. Figure 2 displays the manner in which we hypothesize that these party characteristics work together to influence women's representation.

Figure 2: Party-Level Influences on Women's Representation: A Causal Model



The broader and indirect party influences on women's representation lie toward the Left and the direct influences lie closer to women's representation. The first and broadest influence is the electoral rules in which the parties are embedded. Generally, the electoral system should be linked to the ideologies of the parties and the electoral system should also shape the internal organization of those parties. Specifically, a party-list PR system should increase the ability of a party to adopt candidate rules because achieving gender balance on a list should be more feasible than mandating one particular seat be filled by either gender.

As we move through the causal process, we hypothesize that parties with New Left values have more women on their National Executive. Parties with New Left values should also be willing to adopt candidate gender rules. In addition, we hypothesize that a more highly institutionalized party nominates more women to a rule-making body such as the National Executive and is more apt to turn to formal rules to help promote women. Further, these rule-oriented parties should more likely to implement these candidate gender rules. Also, the level of candidate nomination should impact the ability of the party to implement those candidate rules.

At the next level, we expect a reciprocal relationship between the two most direct influences.<sup>21</sup> Parties may adopt internal gender targets and quotas for party decision-making bodies, such as the National Executive. In turn, the presence of women on the National Executive may encourage the adoption of candidate rules; women active at high levels within the party can add the direct pressure necessary to create and implement gender quotas and goals. Finally, we expect women on the National Executive and candidate rules to both have a direct and significant impact on the level of women in parliament.

### Estimating the Model

Table 6 show the results of multivariate analyses in 1989.<sup>22</sup> The first model predicts the level of Women Activists on the National Executive of each party in 1989.<sup>23</sup> The only strong and significant indicator in this model is the Index of New Politics. Hence, in 1989 a party's level of postmaterialist values alone best predicts its level of women activists.

**Table 6. Multivariate Analyses 1989**

Party-Level Measures	Women Activists 1989	Candidate Rules 1989	Women MPs 1989
Index of Institutionalization	-.02	-.28*	.01
Level of Candidate Nomination	-.05	.11	-.14
New Politics Index	-.52***	-.27*	-.13
Electoral System	.09	.18	.35***
Women Activists	--	.43***	.39***
Candidate Gender Rules	--	--	.06
Adjusted R-Square	.21	.30	.41

Note: Table entries are standardized regression coefficients. \*\*\*=p.01; \*\*=p .05; \*=p .10

The second model predicts the presence of candidate gender rules in 1989. The index of institutionalization, the index of New Politics, and the level of women activists all predict the

presence of candidate rules. Yet the indicator for women activists is the strongest. In our initial causal flow chart we expected that high levels of New Left values and women on the National Executive would advance the adoption of gender rules. We also expected that parties with *high* levels of institutionalization would be more likely to adopt these rules. However, according to this multivariate model, once we control for the other variables in the equation parties with *low* levels of institutionalization tend to have higher levels of women MPs.<sup>24</sup> In response, we might hypothesize that if candidate gender rules are largely a function of women on the National Executive and their efforts to pressure the party, then parties which are rule-oriented are less flexible and more focused upon the party's program and thus reluctant to adopt measures to promote women.

In the third model we finally predict the level of women MPs in 1989. The type of electoral system and women activists both directly impact the level of women MPs.<sup>25</sup> Comparing the models, while the impact of a party-list PR electoral system appears limited to the final outcome of women MPs, we find that a high level of women activists in the National Executive is important both to the implementation of candidate rules and to the level of women MPs directly. In contrast, the impact of the index of New Politics is mediated by the Women Activists variable. In sum, New Left values are important in elevating women within the party's internal hierarchy. Then, women use their new power to push for candidate gender rules and to promote women MPs.

According to our theoretical model, candidate gender rules should be a powerful influence on women's representation.<sup>26</sup> On the one hand, it is possible that gender goals and quotas do not have the strong effect which we had hypothesized. Upon close inspection of the data over time, of the parties with candidate gender rules in 1985, five out of the fifteen decline or remain the same in their proportion of women MPs from 1985 to 1989. On the other hand, and based on the success of the lagged candidate gender rules variable in the bivariate analysis, we expect that gender quotas and targets take time to realize their full impact. It was not until the mid-1980s that many parties began adopting such candidate gender rules. As such, the effects of these new rules might not be visible until the 1990s. Our data on the percentage of women MPs by party stops at 1989. Future research must assess the continuing impact of quotas in later years.

## Conclusions

The women's movement and rising levels of women's political participation have increased the pressure on parties to send more women to parliament. Our findings reveal that certain party characteristics actually influence party-level variation in women's representation. High levels of institutionalization, a localized level of candidate nomination, and Leftist and Postmaterialist values all individually enable parties to increase the descriptive representation of women. Further, high levels of women working at internal party offices and the presence of formal rules designed to increase the number of women MPs are each conducive to women's representation.

The finding that women's party activism is integral to women's representation in parliament is especially encouraging in an era when women's activity in party politics has increased substantially. Not only can women party activists pressure the party for women's representation in parliamentary office, activists can also institutionalize the gains made by pressing to implement rules that call for guaranteed proportions of female candidates.

These findings have larger implications for party adaptation. The same party-level characteristics that are conducive to women's representation may also help other traditionally

underrepresented groups, such as ethnic minorities and environmentalists. Party-level characteristics which influence the manner in which parties adapt to new social pressure can be broken down into two groups-- 1) the characteristics which increase the likelihood parties will want to promote an underrepresented group and ; 2) the characteristics which enable parties to directly increase their proportion of MPs. First, parties with New Left values of social equality and minority representation are *more likely to see the need* to promote traditionally underrepresented groups within the party. Second, New Left values, low levels of institutionalization, and the presence of women party activists in high-level positions together *help parties adapt* by increasing the likelihood parties will implement new rules to promote women candidates.

Importantly, underrepresented groups may increase their representation through party channels. Environmentalists, racial and ethnic minorities, and citizen movements more generally might find descriptive representation by establishing themselves within the internal ranks of parties. Leftist (especially New Left) parties appear the most likely to welcome activists from underrepresented groups. The internal organization of these parties is secondary to the presence of activists who can directly push for increased representation and who themselves can be recruited for national office. Specifically, activists at high levels of office within the party, such as the National Executive, have the most power to press for increased representation and new candidate rules.

National level research has identified structural factors which influence underrepresentation, most specifically the type of electoral system. These structural factors are difficult to change. However, there are opportunities for activists to affect change, even through traditional channels. Because parties are vote-seeking organizations they can be pressured to promote minority candidates. As the gatekeepers to parliamentary office, the parties' efforts can directly increase the proportion of underrepresented groups in parliament.

**Table A. Percentage of Women MPs by Party**

<b>Political Party by Nation</b>	<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>% Women 1975</b>	<b>% Women 1985</b>	<b>% Women 1989</b>	<b>Change 1975-1989</b>
<b>Austria</b>					
People's Party	(OVP)	6	9	12	+ 6
Freedom Party	(FPO)	0	16	21	+21
Greens	(GA)	-	12	50	+50
Socialist Party	(SPO)	9	12	21	+12
<b>Belgium</b>					
Christian People's	(CVP)	12	18	23	+11
Socialist (Flemish)	(BSP)	3	6	11	+8
Liberty (Flemish)	(PVV)	0	5	4	+4
People's Union	(VU)	9	6	20	+11
Ecology (Flemish)	(AGA)	-	50	14	+36
<b>Denmark</b>					

Socialist People's	(SF)	22	43	33	+11
Social Democrats	(SD)	11	18	33	+22
Social Liberals	(RV)	31	20	50	+19
Christian People's	(KRF)	33	20	25	- 8
Center Democrats	(CD)	0	38	44	+44
Liberal	V)	17	27	14	-3
Conservative	(KF)	20	31	31	+11
Progress Party	(KRP)	13	17	44	+31
<b>Finland</b>					
People's Democratic	(SKDL)	38	31	26	-12
Social Democratic	(SPD)	24	32	46	+22
Center Party	(KESK)	18	28	27	+ 9
Swedish People's	(SFP)	22	8	25	+ 3
National Coalition	(KOK)	25	42	50	+25
<b>Germany</b>					
Social Democratic	(SPD)	5	10	27	+22
Christian Democratic	(CDU)	8	7	15	+ 7
Christian Social Union	(CSU)	2	6	10	+ 8
Free Democratic	(FDP)	10	9	20	+10
Greens	(G)	--	20	38	+18
<b>Ireland</b>					
Worker's Party	(WP)	0	0	0	0
Labour	(LAB)	5	7	0	-5
Fianna Fail	(FF)	1	3	6	+5
Fine Gael	(FG)	2	8	10	+8
Progressive Dems	(PD)	--	29	33	+4
Greens	(G)	-	0	0	0
<b>Italy</b>					
Proletarian Democ	(DP)	17	0	25	+8
Communist Party	(PCI)	18	19	32	+14
Socialist Party	(PSI)	1	1	5	+4
Christian Democrat	(DC)	3	3	5	+2
Republican Party	(PRI)	7	0	0	- 7
Liberal Party	(PLI)	0	0	0	0



Social Movement	(MSI)	3	5	3	0
Radical Party	(PR)	50	9	23	-27
Greens	(VER)	--	--	46	--
<b>Netherlands</b>					
Communist Party	(CPN)	0	67	--	--
Labour Party	(PvdA)	17	21	29	+12
Pacifist Socialist	(PSP)	0	33	--	--
Radical Political	(PPR)	33	50	--	--
Christian Democrats	(CDA)	10	16	13	+3
Democrats '66	(D'66)	25	67	33	+8
People's Party	(VVD)	18	19	18	0
Green Left	(GL)	--	--	50	--
<b>Norway</b>					
Socialist People's	(SV)	19	50	41	+22
Labour Party	(DNA)	19	42	50	+31
Center Party	(SP)	14	17	27	+13
Christian People's	(KRF)	5	25	29	+24
Liberals	(V)	0	--	--	--
Conservatives	(H)	17	30	24	+7
Progress	(FRP)	0	0	0	0
<b>Sweden</b>					
Communist Party	(VPK)	21	16	38	+17
Social Democrats	(S)	23	34	40	+17
Center Party	(C)	12	32	36	+24
People's Party	(FP)	15	39	43	+28
Right Party	(M)	16	22	30	+14
Environmental	(MPG)	--	--	38	--
<b>UK</b>					
Labour	(LAB)	5	5	9	+ 4
Liberal/Liberal Dem	(LIB/SDL)	0	0	9	+ 9
Conservatives	(CON)	3	3	5	+ 2
<b>US</b>					
Democrats	(DEM)	6	5	8	+ 2
Republicans	(REP)	2	6	5	+ 3
Average		12	19	23	+11

Standard Deviation		11	18	16	
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Source: Katz and Mair (1992). Note: If no data are available for 1975, then the difference score is the percentage point difference between 1985 and 1989.

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## DATA APPENDIX

### LIST OF SOURCES FOR VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY

#### Dependent Variables :

1. **Percentage women** among the total of a party's **MPs** in 1975, 1985 and 1989 were collected from Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1992).
2. **Percentage of women** among the total of a party's **candidates** in 1975, 1985 and 1989 were taken from Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1992).

#### Party Organization Variables :

1. The indices of centralization: We began with Lane and Ersson's (1991) Summary Index of Integration, a measure of the inner organization of parties. A factor analysis was performed on the group items in Lane and Ersson's Index of Integration using a principle components analysis and I extracted two dimensions. The first dimension is made up of the items entitled organizational element , party leader post, party leadership, candidate nomination, and the summary variable itself . This factor score is called 'Index 1'. The second dimension is made up of form of organization, party congress frequency, and party factions. This factor score is called 'Index 2 '. In both cases, higher the value, the more integrated the party. The candidate **nomination level** is taken from Lane and Ersson (1991). It is one of the individual components in the integration category and is also included in Index 1. A score of one indicates that nomination occurs at a low level and a two indicates that nomination occurs at some other level. I have supplemented the Lane and Ersson data by scoring missing parties upon the same criteria. I relied upon three sources which describe candidate selection: Gallagher (1992), Gallagher and Marsh (1988), and Norris (1996).
- 2.. The index of institutionalization is Lane and Ersson's (1991) Summary Index of Programmatic Orientation. The individual items are: **degree of pragmatism, degree of target orientation, and the degree of extent** (comprehensiveness of issues addressed). A factor analysis was performed on the group items using a principle components analysis. The group items made up a single dimension. The higher the value, the more programmatic the party.
3. The **percentage of a party's votes** in the election closest to 1975, 1986 and 1989 were collected from Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1992). The **percentage of a party's seats** in the corresponding three elections was taken from Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1992). The membership ratio and the **absolute number of members** were collected from Lane and Ersson (1991).

#### Ideological Characteristic Variables:

1. **Party Types** are taken from Lane and Ersson (1991). Each variable was coded as a dummy (1=yes, 2=no) for: Religious Party, Ethnic Party, Rural Party, Socialist Party, Communist Party, Left-Socialist Party, Liberal Party, Conservative Party, Discontent Party, Ultraright Party, Environmental Party.

2. **Self-Location on the Left-Right Orientation** is taken from Lane and Ersson.

3. Both elite and voter-level scores of ideology based upon their issue positions were collected from Laver and Hunt (1992). For each issue, a party could be scored from one to twenty, the lower the scores, the further Leftist or postmaterialist the party position on the issue. The first two scores are clearly based upon traditional class issues. The second two scores concern postmaterialist values.

The variables break down as follows:

1) leader and voter adjusted mean scores on **increase services vs. cut taxes**. Promote raising taxes to increase public services. (1) Promote cutting public services to cut taxes. (20)

2) leader and voter adjusted mean scores on **public ownership vs. Anti-public ownership**. Promote maximum public ownership of business and industry. (1) Oppose all public ownership of business and industry. (20)

3) leader and voter adjusted mean scores on **Pro-permissive social policy vs. Anti**. Promote permissive policies on matters such as abortion and homosexual law. (1) Oppose permissive policies on matters such as abortion and homosexual law. (20)

4) leader and voter adjusted mean scores on **environment vs. growth**. Support protection of the environment, even at the cost of economic growth. (1) Support economic growth, even at the cost of damage to the environment. (20)

4. **Year Party Founded** was collected from Day (1988).

#### Women Activists Variables:

1. The **percentage of women** on the party's **National Executive** in 1975, 1986 and 1989 is collected from Katz and Mair (1992).

2. The **percentage of women as middle-level elites** 1977- 1981 is taken from Reif, Cayrol and Niedermeyer's 1980 European Elections Study, European Political Parties Middle-Level Elites Project. The answers to the common survey were taken between 1977 and 1981. Middle-level elites are not local and they are not office-holders.

3. The **percentage of women as local-level activists** 1977- 1981 is taken from Reif, Cayrol and Niedermeyer's (1980) European Political Parties Middle-Level Elites Project. The local party is defined as the lowest existing organizational level. Respondents were asked to give an estimate of the percentage of active female members at the local level.

#### Party Rules Variables:

1. The **party rules** pertaining to the proportion of female candidates in 1975, 1986 and 1989 was scored from the rules detailed in Katz and Mair (1992). I scored 0= no rules, 1= targets or recommendations, 2= gender quotas. I checked these formal rules against actual practice by researching whether the rules were actually implemented according to the area specialist authors in Lovenduski and Norris (1993)

2. The party rules pertaining to the proportion of women as candidates **or** in internal party positions for 1975, 1986 and 1989 was taken from Katz and Mair (1992) and coded in the same manner as the purely candidates variables.

#### Electoral System Variables:

1. The **effective magnitude** for each party is the effective magnitude for the nation to which the party belongs. Effective magnitude is a measure taken from Taagepera and Shugart (1989)

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### Endnotes

1. Harmel and Janda (1982) call the bureaucratic party 'complex'. Under their measurements of complex parties, Harmel and Janda's research suggests that complex parties tend to cluster by nation.
2. Norris and Lovenduski (1995) warn that "cross-national comparisons of recruitment are hindered by the complexities of the decision-making process within each party" (p. 198). Norris and Lovenduski remind us that recruitment often takes part at more than one level in the party. Secondly, Norris (1996) warns that formal nomination rules are often supplemented or overridden by norms. Taking seriously these warnings, in our analysis we begin with an established measure of level of party nomination. Then, we have examined national-level literature to check for errors in the cross-national measures.
3. We have added the italics to emphasize those issues expected to be most directly related to the support of women candidates in New Left Parties.
4. Lovenduski and Norris note that their findings are limited to Sweden and Germany because data on other nations was unavailable
5. Specific to research on the United States, Baer (1993) points out that the women's representation literature omits the role of organizations. In contrast to the European literature, in studies of the U.S. the role of the party has been overshadowed by individual characteristics. Although parties are usually

characterized weak in the U.S., Baer argues that the Democratic and Republican parties have strengthened in recruiting and promoting candidates. Therefore, even in the U.S. parties strongly impact the representation of women.

6. This SDP action came in response to the Greens, who had previously established 50 percent gender quotas for all offices. This example supports the contagion theory of Matland and Studlar (1996).

7. The nations included in this study are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US

8. The percentage of women in parliament, taken from Katz and Mair (1992), is the closest possible data point to each of this study's fixed intervals.

9. We began with several measures of party characteristics collected from several established sources. In order to uncover which measures tapped underlying sub-characteristics, we performed a factor analysis. The groupings of items under party organization, ideology and activism were factor analyzed using a principle components analysis involving the extraction of a varying number of factors, corresponding to each grouping of items. The only set of indicators which are intended to measure the same characteristic, yet do not appear to tap the same dimension are Lane and Ersson's summary index of integration items. Therefore, we present the factor scores from each of these dimensions as Index 1 and Index 2 of centralization (see Appendix A). Lane and Ersson's measure is not ideal for this study but it is the best measure available. However, because the measure is flawed we cannot determine the true impact of party centralization on the level of women in Parliament. In future research we should re-test this hypothesis with a more adequate measure.

10. Although the 'Level of Candidate Nomination' is one of the components which makes up our index of centralization 2, for our purposes we must assess the impact of this variable on its own as well. Lane and Ersson included the level of nomination with the other measures of centralization. Yet the established literature on women's representation clearly treats the level of candidate nomination as something distinct from the overall degree of party centralization. We have a separate set of hypotheses about the level of candidate nomination. The degree of centralization is theorized to impact the general nature of a party, its policies, and the party's ultimate ability to implement candidate gender rules. The party leadership may have control over party policies and decisions, yet candidate nomination may still for the most part occur at a local level. The level at which candidates are nominated is theorized to be a more direct influence on women's access to Parliament than the general degree of centralization.

11. Party types taken from Lane and Ersson (see appendix). The authors define a discontent party as a party formed around some concrete issue as the starting point. Discontent parties are also characterized by charismatic leadership and elements of populism. Ultra right parties belong to the tradition laid down by the fascist parties of the inter-war period. They are anti-democracy and nationalistic. For further definition of party types see Lane and Ersson (1991; p. 103-111).

12. The first issue to which specialists assigned scores is 'Increase Public Services vs. Cut Taxes'. Those parties which promote raising taxes to increase public services were assigned the lower scores, while those parties which promote cutting public services to cut taxes were assigned higher scores. The second issue, 'Public Ownership', measures a party's position on "promoting maximum public ownership of business and industry vs. opposing all public ownership of business and industry"(Laver and Hunt 1992 p.124) The third issue, 'Social Policy', measures a party's position on permissive policies on matters such as abortion and homosexual law. Again, low scores indicate Pro-Permissive Social Policy and higher scores indicate Anti-Permissive Social Policy. The fourth issue is 'Environmental Policy'. Those parties which are Pro-Environmental Policy support protection of the environment, even at the cost of economic growth. In contrast, those parties closer to Anti-Environmental Policy support economic growth, even at the cost of damage to the environment. The first two issues we have detailed, 'Increase Services vs. Cut Taxes' and 'Public Ownership' are indicators of the 'Old Politics' because they refer to the traditional economic cleavage. The second two issues 'Social Policy' and 'Environmental Policy' are indicators of 'New Politics' because they cover the major issues of postmaterialist concern.

13. A factor analysis was performed on the party ideology variables as well. At the Elite-Level, both Old and New Politics indicators only produce one factor, which seems to tap the standard Left/Right



dimension. However, at the Voter-Level the factor analysis yields two factors; the first the Old Politics dimension and the second the New Politics dimension.

14. In 1989 four out of the twenty-one parties which use candidate gender rules are missing data on the percentage of women MPs in the Katz and Mair study. These parties are the PSB in Belgium, the CPN, PPR in the Netherlands, and the V in Norway.

15. We categorized Ireland as a non party-list PR system because Grofman (forthcoming) finds that Ireland's electoral system, the Single-Transferrable Vote, is actually closer to a plurality system than to a PR system. When we do categorize Ireland as a party-list PR system the correlation between electoral system and percent women MPs decreases in each year to .25 in 1975, .27\* in 1985, and .31\* in 1989.

16. We further examined the effects of electoral rules by assessing the relationship between district magnitude and a party's proportion of women in parliament. We use the nation's effective district magnitude for each party in that nation. Although district magnitude has a statistically significant relationship with percent women in parliament in 1985, it does not show any relationship in 1975 or 1989.

17. We include two measures from the centralization category—the Index of Institutionalization and the level of candidate nomination—because both have equally strong correlations and it is therefore difficult to say which is the strongest indicator. We have also conducted the same multivariate analyses using only the Index of Institutionalization in one model and only the level of candidate nomination in the other. When candidate nomination level is excluded very little changes in any of the three models. When the Index of Institutionalization is excluded the model which predicts the presence of candidate rules changes substantially. Instead of several equally strong predictors, the only strong predictor of candidate rules becomes the presence of women on the National executive (beta= .4\*\*\*). However, the explained adjusted variance drops to 24% in this model, indicating that the model is best specified when the Index of Institutionalization is included.

18. We have used the elite-level variables from each of these categories because the characteristics of party-elites is the focus of the established literature.

19. When we do not use the lagged Women Activist and Candidate Rules variables and instead use the indicators of both from 1989 the models change very little. The same predictors remain strong in each model. However, the explained adjusted variance drops.

20. Intercorrelation exists among the party characteristics. The New Politics index is highly associated with the percentage of women on the National Executive, and to the index of institutionalization. Further, the level of women on the National Executive has a moderate relationship with the index of institutionalization. Strikingly, the presence of candidate rules strongly correlates with the New Politics index, the level of women on the National Executive and the type of electoral system.

21. It is difficult to determine the sequence of the relationship between gender party rules and women party activists. From the case study literature it appears that women party activists began pressuring parties to open their hierarchies to women, and as more women gained clout within the party changes occurred at even higher levels. Many parties set aside seats on the National Executive for a representative of the women's wing. Perhaps these women used their position to press for opportunities for women candidates.

22. We tested the same models for both 1975 and 1985. Overall, both the 1975 and 1985 models are very similar to the 1989 models. In both years, when predicting the level of women activists the New Politics index is the only strong and statistically significant indicator. When predicting candidate rules, all of the variables have slopes of about .20 yet the level of women activists is the strongest and is statistically significant in 1975. Finally, when predicting the level of women MPs, in 1975 the type of electoral system, the New Politics index and women activists are all the most important indicators. In 1985 all of these are important indicators as well as the level of candidate nomination.

23. We have employed a pairwise deletion of the missing data because we are missing different scores on some indicators. When the same multiple regressions are run with a listwise deletion of the missing data the explained adjusted variance on each equation increases considerably.

24. The bivariate correlation between candidate gender rules and institutionalization is very weak, but it too is negative indicating that low levels of institutionalization are associated with high levels of women MPs

25. Although we can observe which indicators have the greatest impact in this series of equations, many of the slope coefficients are not significant and the models predict little of the adjusted variance. The problem with statistical significance can be attributed to our small number of cases and the high intercorrelation among the independent variables. Similarly, the adjusted R-Square falls considerably from the R-Square itself due to this high multicollinearity. Therefore, while the multivariate analysis shows which indicators are most important while controlling for the other factors, we may have too many independent variables for such a small number of cases.

26. Candidate gender rules is a highly intercorrelated indicator (as indicated by its strong correlations with several indicators and by its low tolerance levels in the multivariate regression). Therefore, its impact may be reduced by multicollinearity problems.