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RESEARCH ARTICLE

The limits of awards for anti-corruption: Experimental and ethnographic evidence from Uganda

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Abstract

Conventional anti-corruption approaches focus on detecting and punishing the misuse of public office. These approaches are often ineffective in settings where social norms do not support reporting and punishing corruption. Attempting to build anti-corruption norms, we conducted a field experiment in Uganda that offered elected, local leaders the chance to earn awards for overseeing development projects according to legal guidelines. We then conducted a second field experiment that informed other leaders and the public about the award winners. Offering leaders the chance to earn recognition did not improve the management of projects or change leaders' norms about corruption. Informing other leaders and residents about the award winners also did not change behaviors or attitudes related to corruption. A paired ethnographic study shows that the possibility for recognition generated excitement but was not able to overcome resignation by local leaders. Our study provides some of the first experimental evidence about using awards to motivate public officials to act with integrity and to build anti-corruption norms among both leaders and the public. The results imply that awards have limited effects for anti-corruption in settings with endemic corruption and where they cannot be used instrumentally by awardees.

INTRODUCTION

Most anti-corruption interventions involve new forms of monitoring or punishment that attempt to change the cost-benefit calculations of officials tempted to engage in corrupt acts (Batory, 2012;

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Bobonis et al., 2016). Yet, strategies to combat corruption through monitoring and punishment are often ineffective in settings where social norms do not support reporting and punishing corruption (Persson et al., 2013). The long-term experience of corruption, which we define as the use of public office for private gain, creates social expectations that corrupt acts are normal (Garrett et al., 2016). This can demobilize the public (Chong et al., 2015) and increase corrupt behavior by officials (Fisman & Miguel, 2007). When tolerance for corrupt acts is normalized, even people who are negatively affected by corruption fail to report it because of apathy, powerlessness, and resignation (Fleming et al., 2022; Garrett et al., 2016).

We investigate whether offering positive recognition to elected, local leaders who manage public projects with integrity strengthens anti-corruption norms among leaders and the public, and improves leaders' efforts to administer the projects with integrity. While awards are becoming a larger part of public administration (Federman, 2020; Hatry, 2010), there is limited empirical evidence about whether they can promote integrity and build anti-corruption norms in settings where corruption is endemic. We provide one of the first research designs that yields causal evidence. Public, positive recognition might challenge descriptive norms about corruption (Abbink et al., 2018; Köbis et al., 2015) and realign expectations of the public for how their elected leaders act (Gottlieb, 2016). Public, positive recognition may therefore strengthen social and professional expectations that leaders manage public resources with integrity.

The setting for both of our experiments is Bwindi National Park, Uganda. The park runs a revenue-sharing program that involves using gate fees from tourist visits to fund community development projects in the surrounding villages. The residents of each village elect committee members to manage and oversee these projects. Despite being mandated to provide management and oversight, residents report that committee members often play favorites when distributing benefits, collude with contractors for kickbacks, and neglect their management and oversight roles. Many residents report apathy towards and disengagement with the revenue-sharing process because they perceive these patterns to be entrenched. Thus, the setting provides an opportunity to establish and reinforce anti-corruption norms and raise expectations for leaders.

In our first field experiment, the treatment involved offering these elected leaders eligibility for symbolic, positive recognition in advance. To receive recognition, the committee members needed to provide oversight of a local project according to national guidelines. We provided all committee members in both treatment and control groups with a checklist that summarized their committee responsibilities. The checklist included tasks like documenting the justification for selecting contractors, regularly overseeing the implementation of projects, and releasing funds to contractors only upon the completion of projects. We told the committee members assigned to treatment about the chance to earn radio announcements and public signs touting their excellence and integrity if they completed these tasks, both as part of an initial training and regularly in outgoing phone calls. This treatment intended to offer leaders who carried out their responsibilities with integrity the chance to boost their prestige and social status. We designed this treatment based on an embedded ethnography to ensure that it was locally appropriate and perceived to have significant promise by both local leaders and residents.

In our second field experiment, the treatment involved disseminating information about the leaders who had earned awards for excellent management to other leaders and to the public. We did this by randomizing telephone calls to thousands of people who live in villages that received park-funded development projects. The calls explained which leaders received recognition and what actions they took to earn recognition. This treatment was intended to challenge descriptive norms that acting with integrity was unusual or out of reach. Learning about positive examples might increase expectations for integrity among leaders and the public. Though a survey and behavioral games, we evaluate whether receiving information about awardees changed attitudes and actions related to anti-corruption and expectations for integrity by leaders.

Prospectively offering eligibility for an award to committee members did not cause substantively important improvements in adherence to legal guidelines for project management. It also did not cause

substantively important changes in leaders' stated attitudes about corruption or governance. Unsurprisingly then, there is no evidence that residents perceived projects to be delivered more successfully when their leaders were offered recognition prospectively. There is also no evidence that learning about the local leaders who earned awards for adhering to guidelines changed residents' or leaders' attitudes and behaviors related to corruption. The lack of a substantial anti-corruption response across all of the pre-registered outcomes occurred despite successful delivery of both interventions: in the first experiment, treated leaders reported knowing they would be recognized if they implemented management guidelines at much higher rates than the control group; in the second experiment, both leaders and residents assigned to treatment reported learning about the committee members who earned awards much more often than the control group. These results are even more remarkable given the local leaders' strong expectations at baseline that the recognition scheme would improve effort and outcomes.

We embedded an ethnographic study in all phases of both experiments. We carried out 60 focus group discussions and 48 key informant interviews of both residents and leaders in control and treatment villages. Because of safety considerations related to the COVID-19 pandemic, we completed many of the interviews by telephone. The goal of the linked ethnographic study was to interpret the results of the field experiments and to explore the conditions under which recognition schemes might shift norms and outcomes related to corruption and good governance. The ethnographic study reveals that despite initial excitement, local officials did not always feel motivated by awards because they felt that project outcomes were beyond their control, often owing to corruption at other levels of government. The ethnographic study also reveals that overcoming norms that support corruption, such as a moral obligation to report corruption, is likely to be a slow process that will require persistent, multi-year efforts. Many committee members reported that they would have been motivated by monetary awards. This evidence suggests that it may be particularly difficult to use awards to overturn norms that support endemic corruption.

We make several contributions to the study of non-financial incentives in public management. While there is evidence that awards and other non-financial incentives improve effort by workers in short-term assignments (Bradler et al., 2016; Kosfeld & Neckermann, 2011) and volunteer activities (Islam et al., 2019), it is unclear whether these results extend to public officials, particularly those who have won election. Some studies have demonstrated the potential for non-financial awards to increase effort among community health workers (Ashraf et al., 2014a), but other studies have found no consistent relationship between receiving awards and work performance in the public sector (Federman, 2020; Perry et al., 1989). While subjects in our study generally live in poverty, they are community leaders with considerable social status. Our study confirms that positive recognition may not motivate effort among individuals who already enjoy prestige and social standing (Besley & Ghatak, 2008). It is possible that recognition of public officials, even if it is symbolic, needs to be more instrumental and connected to employment, promotion, personnel rotations, or reputation to change target behaviors. It is also possible that recognition needs to be linked to and build upon more established anti-corruption norms, rather than in a setting with endemic corruption.

Our study also provides evidence across the full life cycle of awards by separately testing the effects of prospectively offering recognition and retrospectively learning about leaders who earned recognition. Whereas past studies have investigated prospective offers of recognition (Ashraf et al., 2014a; Kosfeld & Neckermann, 2011), there is less evidence about the effects of learning about officials who earned recognition. In the context of short-term work assignments, hearing about co-workers who receive unexpected recognition boosts effort by the workers who are not recognized (Bradler et al., 2016), but these results may not map to longer term efforts in the public sector. There is promising evidence that being exposed to ethical leadership can promote integrity in public service (Downe et al., 2016; Hassan et al., 2014). Recognition schemes may offer an attractive way to make that type of exposure salient. However, our results call into question the prospect of using awards to motivate leaders and catalyze public involvement in holding officials accountable, which has been seen as a promising way to improve public administration (Björkman & Svensson, 2009; Buntaine et al., 2021).

In terms of policy, using non-financial awards in public management is very attractive given the low cost and political feasibility. Scholars and practitioners are paying increasing attention to how normative approaches can promote integrity in the public sector (Van Montfort et al., 2013). This study shows that these types of efforts are unlikely to change more fundamental norms that operate within public life over short periods, at least in settings where corruption is endemic. It may be more promising to focus on selecting public officials who are predisposed to act with integrity (Meyer-Sahling et al., 2021) or creating work environments with supportive managerial practices (Honig, 2021). Positive recognition may need to be linked with more instrumental concerns of the officials who are being recognized, such as access to promotion, salary increases, election, or favorable staffing rotations. Alternatively, it may be necessary to offer recognition consistently over long periods.

Our research also extends a broader literature about the role of awards in the public sector (Frey & Gallus, 2017; Hartley & Downe, 2007). While there is a growing body of research that investigates how public rankings and awards motivate governmental units (Anderson et al., 2019; Plaček et al., 2020), less research has been conducted about individual-level interventions that aim to improve public service motivation, norms of good governance, and integrity in public office. Most existing research deals with pre-existing levels of motivation and/or normative attitudes and their correlation with effort and accomplishment in public service (e.g., Alonso & Lewis, 2001; Miao et al., 2018; Van Loon et al., 2018). Our study breaks new ground by testing individual-level interventions that might raise motivation and norms around integrity, providing a model for evaluating efforts to improve public administration through normative interventions and non-financial incentives.

RESEARCH EXPECTATIONS

This misuse and mismanagement of public resources has large, negative consequences around the world. The effects are especially important for people in low-income countries, where corruption has been linked to poor public services (Nguyen et al., 2017), lower productivity (Faruq et al., 2013), decreased health outcomes (Azfar & Gurgur, 2008), and lower environmental quality (Zhou et al., 2020). Yet, the normal strategies to reduce corruption through monitoring and detection have made limited headway in settings without supportive norms (Batory, 2012).

In contexts where corruption and public mismanagement are endemic, it is difficult to build expectations, norms, and anti-corruption pressures, since there are few “principled principals” willing to stamp out corruption when they are alerted to it (Persson et al., 2013). In these settings, people lack incentives to report corrupt acts or enforce anti-corruption rules, particularly when responsibility for governance outcomes is diffused across many levels of government (Buntaine & Daniels, 2020). Corruption can even emerge as a cooperative behavior within social networks, tapping into deep-seated psychological tendencies for collaboration and norms of reciprocity (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015). A growing body of research questions the efficacy of anti-corruption approaches based on monitoring and enforcement without first building supportive norms (Batory, 2012).

Shifting underlying norms about integrity and corruption could increase official and public demand for good governance. Yet, in contexts where people are accustomed to corrupt practices, it can be difficult to shift norms and generate public and official pressure for integrity. For example, Peiffer and Alvarez (2016) have shown that public willingness to engage in anti-corruption actions is higher in contexts where the performance of the government is already high and expectations for corruption are already low. It is a major challenge to transition to that high-functioning state.

Some programs have attempted to shift underlying public and official norms about corruption through positive recognition. For example, the Accountability Lab and their Integrity Icon program run campaigns in many countries where members of the public nominate officials who demonstrated integrity for national recognition.¹ These campaigns aim to change public expectations and empower

¹ See <https://integrityicon.org/>.

public sector workers who act with integrity. To our knowledge, however, evidence is lacking about the immediate and long-term consequences of this type of approach.

Prospective recognition in threshold award schemes—those that offer awards to any person who achieves certain performance criteria (Hartley & Downe, 2007)—may promote integrity for a number of reasons. First, local officials are often embedded in local networks that offer reward and punishment through social mechanisms. In a recent experiment, Wagner et al. (2020) found that allowing community health workers to keep profits from offering health treatments reduced effort, perhaps because the social rewards of providing free treatment are more valuable where officials are members of their communities. Second, salient recognition may bring more instrumental benefits to public officials, such as promotion and electoral success. Finally, awards may support intrinsic motivations by reinforcing goals, benchmarks, and standards within communities of practice, such as public officials tasked with managing certain types of projects.

However, prospective recognition might also backfire by causing those who do not expect to be recognized to decrease their effort on the targeted behaviors. In volunteer settings, the offer of threshold recognition has caused attrition among volunteers who do not expect to earn recognition, perhaps as a strategy to protect self-image (Islam et al., 2019). Likewise, an experiment that involved announcing that the rankings of top students in a professional training program would be published reduced effort by low-performing students, perhaps as a psychological defense mechanism to decrease the informativeness of the resulting ranking (Ashraf et al., 2014b). These results suggest that the opportunity to earn recognition might demobilize people who do not expect to be recognized.

For retrospective recognition, we derive expectations based on the potential importance of changing citizens' reference points about what government should do and how public officials should behave. Evidence from a vignette experiment showed that receiving a prime that describes how often similarly situated people engage in corrupt practices affects choices framed as corrupt in a real-stakes game (Köbis et al., 2015). Related evidence about tax compliance among the public has come to similar conclusions (Hallsworth et al., 2017), which has generated a more general interest in how descriptive norms shape behavior related to public administration (John et al., 2019). There is also evidence that changing the public's expectations for elected leaders can affect voting behavior (Gottlieb, 2016), suggesting that hearing about positive examples of official who act with integrity could change expectations for what is possible and desirable, potentially increasing social pressure on leaders to act with integrity.

Our research stands in contrast to research that considers how the structure of remuneration affects the potential for bribery and extortion (Polinsky & Shavell, 2001). For example, it is possible that performance-based pay in the civil service can be an effective tool for recognizing good performance and thus decreasing incentives for corruption. Sundström (2019) found, however, that when corruption is rampant such schemes can worsen corruption by fostering collusion between civil servants and the higher-level managers that evaluate performance. Skladany (2009) argued that performance-based incentives would have to be directed at high-level bureaucrats and politicians at the level of 10 to 20 times annual salaries to be effective at limiting corruption. It may be more feasible to shift underlying norms and expectations.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Setting

Our study is set in Uganda, a low-income country with high levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2020). Social norms against corruption are relatively low and expectations for officials to engage in corrupt acts are relatively high. Bukuluki et al. (2013) described how using public office to benefit the family, clan, or community of the official is often expected and not considered problematic. The interventions we pursue can therefore be understood as an attempt to overturn norms that lead to the acceptance of corruption.

Our study specifically takes place in the context of a publicly-funded program where villages choose and oversee an annual development project. In particular, at Bwindi National Park in western Uganda, the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) shares 20% of collected gate fees from tourists' visits with the 96 villages that border the park. The goal of the program is to promote local development and increase support for the conservation of park resources. During the revenue sharing cycle studied in this paper, UWA shared a total of UGX 4.2 billion (~USD 1.14 million) across 96 villages and 63 projects (some villages pursued joint projects). While the revenue-sharing program is often touted as a model for people-centered conservation, previous research has noted many problems of accountability, corruption, and inequitable participation (Adams et al., 2004; Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Buntaine et al., 2018; Laudati, 2010; Tumusiime & Vedeld, 2012).

Seeking to ensure the appropriate administration of the revenue-sharing scheme, UWA created a set of national guidelines for the administration of projects in 2013. According to the guidelines, villages hold elections to select members of procurement and management committees. The procurement committee is responsible for evaluating contractor bids, selecting a contractor, and approving payments to contractors who implement projects. The management committee is responsible for overseeing the work, regularly reporting on progress, and confirming completion of the agreed deliverables. Services on these committees is uncompensated.

Management of the revenue-sharing funds is multi-layered, however, which contributes to accountability problems (Buntaine & Daniels, 2020). UWA first transfers funds to the district government, which transfers funds to the sub-county government, which works with elected village-level procurement and management committees to implement the projects that are chosen by the residents of each village. This process results in a large percentage of revenue-sharing funds being lost to corruption and mismanagement. UWA staff have informally reported that up to 80% of projects are not delivered as planned, often owing to corruption. Surveys of residents echo these assessments, with a majority of residents indicating that corruption is a major problem. These types of problems are common in community-led development schemes (Platteau & Gaspart, 2003).

We completed an extensive set of baseline interviews and focus group discussions with residents and local leaders to explore the perceived reasons for corruption in revenue-sharing (see Appendix Section 5.2, which lists the interviews, and Appendix Section 5.3 for extended list of direct quotations).² Baseline discussions revealed that corruption was perceived to be a consequence of greed among local leaders, weak and selective enforcement of laws, and community acceptance of corruption. The committee members are supposed to be at the front line of managing and overseeing projects but often play favorites, collude with contractors to defraud the community, or neglect their oversight duties, according to residents. For instance, committee members are sometimes subject to strong pressures from family members, friends, and village members to offer preferential access to jobs or contracts from revenue sharing or to distribute the benefits from revenue-sharing projects to their immediate social networks. Many residents report that they no longer participate in revenue sharing because they do not expect projects to benefit them, suggesting widespread disengagement and disillusionment with the scheme. In summary, residents' expectations for leaders are not high and the existing social norms are not strongly aligned with sanctioning leaders that use their authority inappropriately. Strengthening anti-corruption norms and expectations for leaders could thus be a foundational step toward addressing corruption and mismanagement.

Although members of the committees tend to have high status within their communities, in general, they are not upwardly mobile economically or politically. Committee members generally live in poverty and have few if any opportunities to use their committee service to seek election to higher office. This sets them apart from politicians and bureaucrats who may be motivated by future election, career advancement, or professional standing. Instead, because they are deeply embedded in the communities that they serve, both leaders and residents reported at baseline that committee members might

² All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher's website and use the search engine to locate the article at <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com>.

be motivated to gain social status and prestige within their communities. These social resources have a large motivating effect across a variety of settings (Truys, 2010) and may be especially important in smaller communities with dense social networks. Recognizing local leaders is thus an excellent test of whether externally boosting social status for certain behavior can motivate effort and reset norms.

To develop the treatments in the field experiments, we used baseline interviews to investigate how recognition could be carried out in a way that local leaders and residents believed would motivate committee members by raising their status and prestige (see Appendix Sections 5.2 and 5.3). Interviews revealed that social recognition of local leaders through public events, radio announcements, and certificates of excellence could be a source of social prestige that was valuable given the small size and close social relations within villages. Residents also reported that social recognition of leaders would create a positive collective reputation for the entire village, thereby increasing the motivation of community members to hold their leaders accountable. Both residents and leaders thought recognition could change description norms about corruption and provide positive examples of integrity that could be used to pressure local leaders who performed poorly, particularly if disseminated in semi-permanent ways like public signs placed in frequently trafficked areas. Positive, public recognition also was expected to contribute to a sense of healthy competition between villages. These baseline findings motivated the design of both our experiments.

Baseline/control condition

We condensed the national revenue sharing guidelines into checklists of specific tasks that committee members were supposed to complete. Our research team provided a half-day, in-person training to all elected committee members in both treatment and control on these tasks, after conferring with leadership at UWA about the content of the training. We left copies of the checklists with each of the committees after the training in both English and the local language. Our research team prompted all committee members in both treatment and control to complete the checklist items during the upcoming revenue-sharing procurement and implementation cycle. We operated a voice-response system that reminded all committee members of the checklist items during outgoing voice calls at least every two weeks over the course of a year. All training and outgoing voice calls used the local language. Appendix Section 1.5 shows that we completed full length, outgoing voice calls with approximately 55% of committee members in both the treatment and control conditions in an average week, with no appreciable decline in contact rates over time. As part of these calls, the voice-response system provided committee members with the option to listen to descriptions of checklist items covered in previous calls in case they missed an individual call.

All checklist items could in principle be completed by committees regardless of management and corruption problems at other levels of government. For example, one of the checklist items asked procurement committees to evaluate at least three contractor bids prior to selecting a contractor. Since the subcounty government often advertises and collects bids and sometimes only presents the procurement committee with a single bid, this item could instead be fulfilled by formally submitting a request for additional bids. Appendix Section 1.2 contains a complete list of the procurement and management items in the checklist.

Prospective recognition treatment

For the treatment in the first experiment, our research team told members of procurement and management committees about the opportunity to earn an award if they completed a checklist of items while implementing revenue sharing. We presented the opportunity to earn recognition as an add-on to the in-person training for the treatment group. We also reminded committee members in the treatment group about the possibility of an award as part of a short addition to the bi-weekly calls. In all

outgoing calls, committee members assigned to treatment were reminded that recognition would consist of a large sign placed at the entrance of their village with the names of individual committee members and radio announcements in the region (see Appendix Section 1.3 for details). The award was jointly given by the Uganda Wildlife Authority, the universities of the authors, and the Bwindi Information Network, which is a long-standing non-government project in the area focused on providing residents with more tools to communicate with park management. The treatment is a kind of “threshold” scheme that involved recognition to any committee that completed procurement and management guidelines, rather than a competitive scheme that recognized only the best performers (Hartley & Downe, 2007).

Retrospective recognition treatment

Following the completion of projects, our research team evaluated every committee based on whether they completed the checklist items and regularly reported on the progress of their projects to the voice-response system. After evaluating the committees and selecting for awards those that completed a substantial portion of the checklist, but prior to disseminating the awards publicly through signs and radio announcement, we randomly assigned half of the members of committees and residents who subscribed to the voice call platform to hear a series of four 2-minute messages over 2 weeks about the excellent work of the four recognized committees (see Appendix Section 1.4 for details). Members of committees and residents assigned to control received four placebo calls of approximately the same length on the same schedule about recommended actions to control COVID-19: washing hands, wearing a mask, avoiding large gatherings, and monitoring symptoms. The placebo calls ensure that contact itself was not responsible for driving the outcomes.

Outcomes

We measured several pre-registered outcomes about the behavioral and attitudinal effects of the recognition treatments, both among committee members and among a sample of the residents of revenue-sharing villages. Since the recognition treatments were meant to change norms about corruption and expectations for leaders, we measured self-reported norms about corruption, related real-stakes behaviors in games, and project outcomes that reflect effort to act with integrity. The measures thus capture anti-corruption norms and behaviors, along with project outcomes that could potentially improve based on a change in these norms.

To understand whether the offer of prospective recognition motivated leaders, we measured the extent to which committees filled out the project management checklists corresponding to their formal responsibilities and made unprompted calls reporting the status of their projects as instructed. We also completed a phone-based survey with committee members to gather self-reported measures of effort on tasks and attitudes about corruption and governance. All surveys were enumerated by telephone to address safety concerns with the COVID-19 pandemic (see Appendix Section 1.6). Because self-reported outcomes may be subject to various types of demand effects, we asked committee members to play two behavioral games for monetary compensation to measure honesty and propensity to prioritize private gain over public benefits. In the honesty game, we asked each player to think of a number between 1 and 10 in each of five rounds, but not reveal the number to the enumerator. We then presented the player with a random number between 1 and 10 in each round and asked whether they had guessed correctly. In each round, the player won 1000 shillings (~USD 0.30) if they stated they guessed correctly. Respondents who reported many correct guesses and therefore received the largest amount of winnings would on average be reporting dishonestly. In the public benefits game, we asked each committee member to choose how much of a 5000-shilling fund to keep for themselves. The remaining amount would be tripled and sent randomly to three members of their village. Respondents in this game who kept less for themselves behaved in line prosocial preferences. Taken

together, this suite of measures captured whether the treatment changed program outcomes, stated norms about corruption, and basic behaviors relevant to anti-corruption norms.

We also completed phone-based surveys with members of the public after the prospective recognition experiment to understand whether leaders' efforts resulted in higher levels of public satisfaction, stronger anti-corruption norms, and more willingness to punish leaders who engage in selfish behavior. We used the same survey measures described above but substituted a punishment game for the public benefits game. In this game, respondents were asked how much of a 5000-shilling fund they would like to keep, with the amount they kept also being sent to a leader who kept all of the fund in the public benefits games described above. The goal of this behavioral measure was to assess whether being exposed to the prospect of an award and its downstream consequences increase anti-corruption norms and a willingness to act on them at a personal cost. We completed these behavioral games with a random sample of residents.

While the prospective offer of recognition might change the actions of leaders and by consequence the norms and expectations of the public, retrospective recognition might change attitudes and behaviors more directly. In particular, learning about leaders who had discharged their duties with integrity might have created or strengthened norms about appropriate behavior among both committee members and residents. Accordingly, we remeasured all the same outcomes as the prospective recognition experiment for both groups to test whether being directly exposed to examples of integrity in public management led to new norms and patterns of behavior relevant to anti-corruption.

We also collected in-depth qualitative data at three points during the implementation of the experiment using focus group discussions and key informant interviews with both residents and local leaders (Appendix Section 5.2 has a full list of interviews). Our efforts are in line with the call for pairing qualitative and quantitative data collection for public administration research in developing countries (Bertelli et al., 2020). We conducted a total of 37 in-depth interviews with members of project committees and residents (19 interviews in treatment areas and 18 interviews in control areas). We organized and conducted 60 focus group discussions with community members and select members of project committees (29 focus groups in treated areas and 31 focus groups in control areas). Additionally, we completed 11 key informant interviews with district, subcounty, and Uganda Wildlife Authority officials. We purposefully selected the participants to ensure that we accounted for the perceptions of relevant groups.

We completed the interviews and focus groups in three distinct waves of data collection. First, we conducted a series of focus groups and interviews prior to the launch of the recognition treatments. A main goal of this first wave of data collection was to gather data on how people understood corruption and norms of behavior in common situations where corruption might emerge through the presentation of short vignettes. Transcripts from these activities also provide data about how committee members and local residents thought symbolic recognition might change outcomes. Second, we conducted a series of focus groups and interviews during the implementation phase of the experiment, when committees were tasked with oversight and, if part of the treatment group, received regular reminders about the opportunity to earn recognition. The second wave of data collection focused on observing the reactions of leaders and residents to common challenges that arose when implementing revenue sharing projects and understanding if and how opportunities for recognition changed behaviors related to those challenges. Third, we conducted a final series of interviews following the public recognition of four committees to understand how people reacted to recognition. The interviews focused on behavioral and normative reactions to learning about leaders who earned recognition.

The systematic collection of data from open-ended interviews and focus groups thus provided crucial evidence that allows for a better interpretation of the experimental results and provides formative evidence for practice. More generally, ethnographic methods that are integrated into experimental projects can help with "mechanism mapping," which involves understanding what causal pathways are at work and therefore shedding light on whether the intervention could have similar effects in other settings (Williams, 2020). Combining methods of causal inference with ethnographic methods also generates new hypotheses that can facilitate additional lines of scholarly inquiry (Paluck, 2010).




FIGURE 1 CONSORT diagram tracking design of prospective recognition experiment.




FIGURE 2 CONSORT diagram tracking design of retrospective recognition experiment.

A timeline of the treatments and data collection phases of the study is displayed in Appendix Figure A1. Figures 1 and 2 summarize the research design and sample sizes for each of the experiments.

Analysis

For quantitative data analysis, we estimated treatment effects and standard errors using pre-specified regression models with pre-specified covariates. We estimated the following regression for individual-level outcomes:

$$Y_i = \alpha_i + \tau D_j + \beta X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

Where Y_i is the outcome of interest, τ is the sample average treatment effect, D_j is an indicator of the treatment assigned at the committee level, β is a vector of parameter estimates for covariates used to improve precision, X_{ij} is a pre-specified list of covariates, and ϵ_{ij} is an error term clustered that the unit of assignment (the highest level of collective project and thus joint committee to which a village belongs). Some committees formed joint projects after the initial random assignment. In these cases, the newly joint committee was treated if any of the villages that made up the joint effort was assigned to treatment initially. We weight all analyses by the inverse probability of assignment to treatment under this procedure. As we discuss in our presentation of the result, the experiment has sufficient power to detect substantively relevant effects both for project-level outcomes and individual-level outcomes. The tables presenting the treatment effects display the minimum detectable effect of the pre-registered one-sided tests at 80% power for each outcome, using an approximation based on the standard errors of the estimates (see Gelman & Hill, 2006, pp. 440–442).

For qualitative data analysis, we transcribed the recordings of focus groups and key informant interviews and then analyzed them thematically using a grounded theory approach. We used grounded theory as a complement the deductive approach taken with the pre-specified field experiment. This allowed concepts and interpretations to emerge from the data inductively based on open-ended queries. In particular, we coded the transcripts using Dedoose, an online software for qualitative data analysis. We coded the transcripts from the interviews and focus groups in an iterative manner that involved assigning individual phrases and statements into categories based on open-ended queries. Working with a team of research assistants, we performed comparisons of concepts and categories across participants, sites, and over the three phases of data collection to check for bias, precision and consistency in coding (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The open-ended approach helped to identify and observe culturally appropriate symbols, values, and norms that might not have become visible with a purely deductive approach. This approach allows us to offer a much richer interpretation of the experimental results and potential for future interventions on the participants' own terms. A list of codes produced in this iterative process is in Appendix Section 5.1.

We compiled a selection of excerpts for this main paper and present an extended list of excerpts that support the main conclusions in an extended ethnographic appendix (Appendix Section 5.3). In reaching our conclusions, we returned frequently to the interview transcripts themselves to place individual objects of analysis back into the context of each participant's narrative and broader experience to avoid taking small pieces of information out of context. This entire process was guided by three broad thematic queries:

1. What were local expectations for the role that symbolic recognition might play in shaping project outcomes?
2. How did community members and leaders react to the opportunity to earn recognition while implementing projects? How did they react to learning about the leaders who earned recognition?
3. What limitations did community members and leaders perceive about using positive recognition to change norms and behavior? Could those limitation be overcome with alternative program designs?

RESULTS

Prospective recognition

Field experimental evidence

There is no evidence that committees treated with the *prospective* offer of an award completed required management tasks more often than control committees not informed in advance of the possibility for an award. This result holds for both the number checklist items completed and the number of oversight reports submitted (Table 1, Panel A). We have sufficient power to rule out that the treatment caused

TABLE 1 Treatment effects of prospective recognition on pre-registered outcomes.

	Estimate	95% CI	Control mean	Min	Max	MDE	N
Panel A: Observed project outcomes							
Worksheets completed (+)	0.09	(−0.75, 0.92)	0.88	0	5	1.03	62
Status reports (+)	−0.09	(−0.76, 0.59)	0.54	0	7	0.83	62
Procurement committee rating (+)	−0.36	(−0.7, −0.03)	3.46	1.25	4	0.41	62
Management committee rating (+)	−0.29	(−0.58, 0.00)	3.46	1	4	0.36	62
Panel B: Committee member survey outcomes							
Expected recognition (+)	1.58	(1.17, 1.99)	3.09	1	5	0.51	340
Proportion checklist complete (+)	−0.05	(−0.14, 0.04)	0.45	0	1	0.11	336
Hours spent on tasks (+)	−0.26	(−1.99, 1.47)	7.33	0	40	2.13	340
Project delivered as planned (+)	−0.09	(−0.26, 0.08)	0.35	0	1	0.21	341
Honesty game (−)	0.01	(−0.06, 0.08)	0.38	0	1	0.09	336
Leader compensation game (−)	64	(−191, 320)	2000.08	0	5000	315	332
Anti-corruption norms index (+)	0.08	(−0.27, 0.43)	0.01	−3.12	1.22	0.43	340
Panel C: Resident survey outcomes							
Perceived program effectiveness (+)	0.18	(−0.18, 0.54)	0.00	−3.59	1.20	0.40	1370
Honesty game (−)	0.02	(−0.03, 0.07)	0.39	0	1	0.05	652
Punishment game (−)	215	(45, 385)	1684	0	5000	191	645
Anti-corruption norms index (+)	0.09	(−0.14, 0.32)	0.02	−4.55	1.37	0.26	1367

Note: MDE is the minimum detectable effect at 80% power for each outcome.

an increase of a single checklist item and less than a single status report per committee over several months, which our partners thought was a minimum substantive effect of interest. We also asked two high-level UWA managers and the responsible community conservation ranger assigned to each village to rate the performance of each of the committees in implementing revenue sharing, to address the possibility that our primary measures did not capture the effort of the committee members. We formed the three ratings into a weighted sum for each set of committees based on the confidence each rater had in their score, using a pre-specified procedure. Both procurement and management committees assigned to treatment did worse on these more holistic ratings.

In addition to these independently observed measures, we conducted a survey and played experimental games with committee members designed to reveal underlying norms after the completion of the revenue-sharing cycle, but prior to the evaluation and recognition of committees. We completed these surveys and games over the phone (see Appendix Section 4 for detailed descriptions of the outcomes). The estimates of the effect of treatment on these self-reported measures and behavioral game outcomes are displayed in Table 1, Panel B.

Validating the successful delivery of treatment, committee members assigned to treatment were much more likely to state that they expected to be recognized publicly if they performed their committee roles according to guidelines. Yet, there is no evidence that they reported completing significantly more checklist items or spending more hours on committee work. Nor is there evidence that the projects they managed were delivered as planned more often, based on self-reported status. We played two behavioral games with committee members for monetary rewards to elicit honesty and prosocial preferences. In the honesty game, we asked each player to think of a number between 1 and 10 in each of five rounds, but not reveal the number to the enumerator. We then presented the player with a random number between 1 and 10 in each round and asked whether they had guessed correctly. Counter

to expectations, there is no evidence that committee members treated with the prospect of earning recognition reported a lower proportion of correct guesses. In a second game designed to elicit prosocial preferences, we asked each committee member to choose how much of a 5000-shilling fund to keep for themselves, while the remaining amount would be tripled and sent randomly to three members of their village. Counter to expectations, we do not observe evidence that committee members who were treated with the prospect of earning recognition kept significantly less of the fund for themselves.

Finally, we asked a series of direct questions to probe anti-corruption and good governance norms among committee members and formed those questions into a pre-registered index (see Appendix Section 4). There is no evidence that treated committee members held systematically higher anti-corruption norms after the offer of recognition. We also estimated complier average causal effects using treatment as an instrument for expecting recognition and found no evidence that there is a substantively significant, positive effect for any outcomes for committee members who complied with their treatment assignment (Figure A9).

We conducted a similar survey with residents of all the villages that benefited from revenue sharing (Table 1, Panel C). During the project, residents received phone calls informing them about the responsibilities of their elected committees. Residents in treated villages also received notices that their committees were eligible for awards if they performed their procurement and management duties with excellence. We hypothesized that the treatment would indirectly cause residents to perceive better project outcomes (through greater committee effort) and that it would thereby also increase anti-corruption norms. There is no evidence that residents perceived projects assigned to treatment to be delivered more effectively.

Therefore, we also do not find detectable evidence that residents in treated communities displayed greater honesty or held stronger anti-corruption norms, which we expected would come about as downstream outcomes to better project performance. We also played a behavioral game with residents, where they were presented with a chance to keep an unexpected bonus, with the amount that they kept sent to a local leader who had not shared any their own windfall with members of their community. We do not observe higher rates of costly punishment by residents of selfish leaders in treated villages.

Ethnographic evidence

We collected ethnographic evidence at baseline, during implementation of the treatments, and at the endline once public recognition of select committees had been completed. We collated responses from across these phases to understand why the offer of prospective recognition might not have caused the changes in behaviors and norms that the public and leaders expected at the baseline. The main impediments to changing norms and behavior included a lack of tangible incentives, poor understanding of the type of recognition that was available, and feelings of resignation among the treated committee members. Although there is no evidence of an average effect of the prospective recognition treatment from the field experiment, it is important to note that some of the communities assigned to treatment observed improvements in the implementation of revenue sharing projects through increased community participation and vigilance, which they attributed to the possibility of earning recognition. Thus, the ethnographic evidence shows the plausibility of effects in a limited number of places, even if there is not a detectable average effect.

One respondent stated,

This time there was limited theft like when compared to the previous projects. We were more vigilant. This time people were not getting goats as they did in previous revenue-sharing projects. Most people in the previous projects did not get goats and even those who got very poor quality of breeds i.e. very young or not worth the money that was budgeted for but this time everyone got. We followed all steps of the guidelines from identifying the contractors to participate in the whole revenue sharing process. [R3.I21]

While another shared,

We worked very hard in order to get this recognition and indeed we were happy when we got it. A schedule was drawn with a member designated to look after the project on a daily basis. The community members would participate but mostly remind us to do our roles properly so that we get the reward. The community members were active, at some point they organized to work with the contractor when he got challenges on the route [for the road] that had been identified, they cleared the bushes and helped to remove some of the rocks as well. [R3.I19]

Although the idea of community recognition was welcomed within the communities, there was a general feeling during and after implementation that the recognition approach did not focus on tangible benefits to the committee members. Since the experiment was implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic when economic conditions deteriorated significantly, it may be the case that symbolic, social benefits became less salient and less important. COVID-19 restrictions during implementation of the experiment included curfews, stay home orders, and the closure of key sectors of the economy, which increased the value of material wealth and cash income compared to symbolism.

Responses during interviews included: “The committee members who led projects to this level would have been rewarded with something else like if they were given some money as a reward, it would have been good. I think it’s the best form of recognition for committee members” [R3.I3]; “I think that in addition to all of that [symbolic recognition], the individuals should be given a tangible token such as money or goats or just a hamper of household products like soap” [R3.I12]; “Giving certificates and an envelope., & according to what the person has done and the profit made, we may give cows or envelopes” [R2.FGD22]; and “I don’t think there is any problem with it [symbolic recognition] but maybe there would be a need to reward people a bit differently other than putting their names on the signpost. A tangible gift for remembrance would be good” [R3.I4].

Discussions with community leaders and community members also showed that the concept of recognition was not always well understood. This could be because it was not fully explained to the committee members or because the messages sent by voice message were misunderstood by some committee members. Similarly, there was limited engagement of community members during the implementation phase of the project. It may have been more effective to work directly with members of communities that had social influence to roll out and reinforce the opportunity for recognition. In the future, prospective recognition might be more widely publicized to a broader audience to better mobilize collective action around awards.

Discussions revealed how low education levels among community and committee members were also a key challenge in fulfilling the standards for management and oversight. For instance, discussion with committee members showed that although the project materials and checklists of management actions were translated into the local language and were available verbally during training and voice calls, many committee members were illiterate or semi-illiterate. They relied on the understanding of a few committee members to determine how to carry out their oversight roles. One respondent stated, “because we are not educated and when we get someone from outside and knows that we are not educated, they will exploit us” [R1.FGD11] and another added,

You know the level of education also matters, most of our women are illiterates and they are very few who are educated and those who completed at least primary seven... When they [women] are seated with men, they normally listen to what men say and they are very few who can put up a hand and say something, so it is their natural habit. [R1.IDI12]

This could have limited how well committees were able to use the guidance documents and checklists to carry out the management and oversight envisioned in revenue sharing standards. Similarly, participants observed that community members did not always understand what they were entitled to

under revenue sharing and that they had low standards for the delivery of revenue sharing projects because of repeated exposure to corrupt officials and failed projects in previous years. Under these conditions, it may have been difficult for community leaders and the public to envision alternate ways of managing revenue sharing projects. Participants shared experiences including:

The project here was not very successful because there was a bit of conflict and disorganization. We were organized at the beginning because we had agreed on what we wanted until some officials came and imposed on us the idea of cattle. Because of this disorganization, the project was bound to fail. [R3.I16]

The contractor never provided us with any form of accountability. There was a lot of government leaders' interference for the district, this made us become suspicious that there was corruption happening. As a member of the community, I am not sure about how much was spent and cannot gauge how much of the funds that were supposed to be used were actually used. [R3.I7]

Besides these main factors, other common explanations for the lack of impact of the offers of recognition were the voluntary nature of committee service and the significant economic stresses faced by committee members in daily life. These stresses were more severe during the COVID-19 pandemic. Most of the committee members expressed concerns that they had responsibility for multiple tasks in their villages. Some were part of village health teams or were elected to their village council, while others reported having to attend to their own business for their survival. Without compensation for their service on the project committees, attention to oversight of the revenue sharing projects was low at times. Discussions also revealed that an unequal division of labor and power relations within households negatively affected women who served on committees. Female committee members indicated that they were heavily absorbed into domestic chores and care work, including working in gardens and caring for children and the sick. This sometimes affected their participation in committee meetings and ability to monitor the project. Other challenges in carrying out management and oversight tasks include limited monitoring and support from local government, a lack of opportunities to engage meaningfully in the management of the nearby Bwindi National Park, weak and selective enforcement of laws on corrupt officials, and community acceptance of corruption when it benefits them.

Retrospective recognition: Leader and public norms

Field experimental evidence

We conducted a second field experiment that involved randomly making voice calls to committee members and residents about the four committees that earned recognition (further information in the section "Research Design" above). Four calls of 2 minutes in length were made over the course of 2 weeks to subscribers of the voice-response system, and randomized at the individual level. Each call contained specific information about how the committee had adhered to revenue sharing standards and why that was important for ensuring the success of their project. Each of the calls was repeated up to three times for each resident or committee member if initial attempts failed to reach the individual. Any given call reached approximately 55% of committee members (Appendix Figure A2). We then repeated the endline survey and behavioral games to understand whether learning about award winners changed norms and behaviors related to corruption. The results are displayed in Table 2.

For committee members, we first collected evidence about whether each committee member had heard which of the committees earned recognition and what they did to earn it. As displayed in the first row of Table 2, Panel A, treated committee members were much more likely to have heard which

TABLE 2 Treatment effects of retrospective recognition on pre-registered outcomes.

	Estimate	95% CI	Control mean	Min	Max	MDE	N
Panel A: Committee member survey outcomes							
Heard about recognition (+)	0.54	(0.45, 0.63)	0.26	0	1	0.12	317
Residents recognized efforts (+)	0.26	(0.02, 0.49)	4.23	1	5	0.30	325
Honesty game (-)	0.01	(-0.06, 0.09)	0.48	0	1	0.10	320
Leader compensation game (-)	14	(-243, 272)	2353	0	5000	326	319
Anti-corruption norms index (+)	0.05	(-0.17, 0.27)	0.00	-3.65	0.91	0.27	325
Panel B: Resident survey outcomes							
Heard about recognition (+)	0.33	(0.29, 0.38)	0.34	0	1	0.06	1558
Perceived program effectiveness (+/-)	0.05	(-0.05, 0.14)	0.01	-5.07	1.13	0.12	1573
Honesty game (-)	-0.03	(-0.08, 0.02)	0.51	0	1	0.06	694
Punishment game (-)	-40	(-220, 139)	2252	0	5000	227	687
Anti-corruption norms index (+)	0.02	(-0.07, 0.12)	0.00	-6.37	1.07	0.12	1569

Note: MDE is the minimum detectable effect at 80% power for each outcome.

committees had received an award and what they did to earn the award, confirming the successful delivery of the treatment. Treated committee members who heard about the committees that received awards were slightly more likely to report that residents recognized their efforts in the revenue-sharing program, indicating perhaps that committee members thought the recognition program made their tasks more salient to the public.

However, beyond successfully receiving notice of the awards, treated committee members did not exhibit detectable changes in underlying behaviors and norms as compared to control. They were no more likely to report truthfully whether they had picked a random number correctly in an honesty game. They were also no more likely to give up a personal payment for a multiple of that payment to village members in a leader compensation game (these games are described in more detail in the previous section). They were also no more likely to report stronger anti-corruption norms in direct survey items. Overall, learning that the committees had been recognized did not cause detectable changes that might have come about through a desire for emulation or new descriptive norms.

As with committee members, there is strong evidence that residents assigned to treatment heard about the awards more often. As displayed in the top row of Table 2, Panel B, residents assigned to treatment were 33% more likely to have heard of the committees that earned recognition and what they did to earn recognition than residents assigned to the control group. However, residents were no more likely to play the behavioral games involving honesty and issuing a costly punishment to leaders who prioritized personal gain over social benefits in ways consistent with stronger anti-corruption norms. Likewise, an index of anti-corruption norms created from survey items is not statistically different between the treatment and control group.

For both committee members and residents, we estimate complier average causal effects using individual-level treatment assignment as an instrumental variable for having heard about the committees being recognized (see Appendix Section 2.2). We do not find evidence that non-compliance with the treatment attenuates the main results of the retrospective treatment.

Ethnographic evidence

At the endline data collection, key informant interviews with committee members revealed that members who received recognition with signs and radio announcements felt happy about the successful

implementation of their project. They attributed their achievements to active community participation in the implementation of the project, the vigilance of the community, and transparency exhibited during the implementation of the project.

For instance, participants noted that community leaders who had worked well for their communities could be rewarded through appointments to other leadership positions, while those who could not perform well could be dropped from their positions. In some villages, community leaders were dropped from leadership positions by the end of the study because the community felt that they had not achieved expectations for the management of the revenue sharing projects. This kind of reaction indicates the potential for better management of future revenue-sharing projects based on recognition in this cycle, even if norms related more directly to corruption did not change. One participant stated,

When the councilors interfered, they [community members] were very vocal and these councilors have been removed from leadership positions within our community. The community members want to work hard and they want to make sure that this road is worked to the best that it can be because we know the importance of this road. [R3.I2]

During the last wave of data collection, participants revealed that social recognition may have a positive impact on the execution of future revenue projects. The current social recognition set benchmarks in terms of reputation and transparency for community leaders. Many were hopeful that those benchmarks would inspire diligence and integrity during the next cycle.

In addition, social recognition created an environment of positive competition between communities. Residents of villages where social recognition was not earned showed eagerness to learn from villages that had excelled in their revenue sharing projects. This desire to learn from positive examples could increase community participation in future revenue sharing projects, even if effects were not observed during the timeline of this study. Reflecting this theme of social recognition, participants stated:

As the saying goes, a good name is better than many riches. So, indeed, this recognition will have an impact... I would choose a good name among my people because that is also capital. It is more valuable than having money and being alienated from the people. “ [R3.I13]

I would rather be poor and with a good name instead of being distrustful in order to accumulate fame and wealth. This sets a good record across the generations. For example, my children will know that I worked on this road even when I am gone. I am 60 years old now and a good name is very important to me. When my name is read on the radio, I get more respect in the community. [R3.I2]

I think it will encourage people to work hard to not only perform extraordinarily but also to leave tangible results that anybody can see. [R3.I16]

While participants were optimistic about the potential for recognition to change expectations for future rounds of revenue sharing, a single year of experience with this kind of recognition may have been too short to change underlying norms and behaviors. Social norms change is a gradual process that requires continuous social engagement and active social mobilization (de la Sablonnière, 2017), which was not possible to measure in the context of this study. The ethnographic study also points to heterogeneity in responses to recognition, which could be investigated in future research. A less optimistic interpretation is that participants' hopes do not translate into behaviors, replicating a common pattern of a wide gap between intentions and behaviors (Sheeran & Webb, 2016).

DISCUSSION

Our study demonstrates that it is hard to change the norms and behaviors of community leaders by offering the prospect of earning an award, particularly if those leaders operate within a system of public management that makes them feel powerless to overcome corruption. The lack of response to the prospective recognition treatment is especially meaningful considering evidence that treated committee members strongly expected to receive positive recognition if they completed financial and project management tasks (see Figure A5). This main result is consistent with related work showing that attempts to improve public management through nudges like measuring and rating performance are often ineffective if they do not address root causes of dysfunction in the public sector (Muralidharan & Singh, 2020).

The results of the retrospective recognition field experiment underscores how difficult it is to shift public norms. Learning about positive examples of committees that undertook their responsibilities with diligence and integrity did not change the underlying norms that might support anti-corruption efforts. While many members of the committees and the public were optimistic at the final interviews, believing that the recognized committees set new benchmarks for future rounds of revenue sharing, it remains to be seen whether these new benchmarks will inspire community engagement, promote diligence in the implementation of public projects, and support a growing expectation of integrity among elected community leaders. Recent research has highlighted how raising civic expectations among the public might offer a pathway to better governance (Gottlieb, 2016). Yet the pathways to creating these expectations in scalable ways are not easy to identify.

Our experiment is relevant to efforts to use awards and public recognition to motivate action by linking prestige and social status to certain types of targeted behaviors. Awards have been used to motivate public officials in settings where the opportunity to link performance to material compensation is limited, with the idea that prestige and social standing can substitute for material rewards (Frey, 2007). In this study, since the targeted committee members are not generally economically or politically mobile, we are able to focus on the social value of prestige and community standing. This makes the results of our experiment most relevant to local officials operating in non-professionalized settings. Based on the null results in this experiment, we hypothesize that awards may be more motivating for public officials who have a clear motivation for professional or political advancement. It is also possible that awards might be better used to motivate officials who do not already enjoy high social or professional status, such as frontline bureaucrats or public service providers. Another possibility is that awards would be more successful in settings where they are able to build upon strong, existing anti-corruption norms, likely where corruption is less endemic.

Our experiment is also relevant to attempts to establish or reinforce social norms among audiences who observe awards. Many types of organizations use awards as a way of reinforcing organizational values and professional standards, as well as promoting desirable behaviors (Hartley & Downe, 2007). Our experiment suggests that awards on their own have a limited ability to shape broad norms or expectations for acceptable behavior, though we did find limited evidence of community pride and raised expectations for community leaders as part of the ethnographic findings in this study. One hypothesis is that award schemes that are maintained over time in salient ways will have a larger effect at building norms around targeted behaviors than the sort of single-shot intervention studied here.

The results of our study are consistent with emerging evidence about awards in other contexts. For example, Robinson et al. (2021) find that pre-announced awards for student attendance at school had no effect on increasing attendance and that earning an award for attendance has a negative effect on subsequent attendance, perhaps by highlighting that good attendance is different than descriptive norms. This real-world study contrasts with efforts to investigate the consequences of awards in short-term labor markets (Kosfeld & Neckermann, 2011). Taken together with our study, these divergent results suggest the need to study award and recognition schemes across a range of realistic

environments and over longer periods. This is especially important for scholars of public administration and management, since many of the performance-based schemes involving remuneration used to motivate private sector workers are not available.


One limitation of our study is that it was implemented in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, when material concerns became extremely salient among the study population. It may be the case that awards meant to boost social status would be more effective in settings without such significant material concerns. It would be useful to test award schemes in a wider array of settings where the targeted agents have basic financial security and might therefore value prestige and social standing relatively more. It would also be useful to understand how financial and non-financial awards complement one another, since many participants in this study claimed they would have been more motivated by a small payment.

This study suggests that recognition schemes should not be considered in isolation, but must be seen within the context of more systematic and structural approaches to anti-corruption. Some respondents were hopeful that recognition of committee members could set new standards, as in Finkel et al., 2012's findings related to civics education, but we did not find evidence that the recognition improved the delivery of projects. At best, positive recognition might play a supporting role in more structural reforms of the public sector, which have been shown to reduce corruption (Hummel et al., 2021). It is possible that recognition offers a complement to traditional anti-corruption approaches or would be better applied in settings where corruption is less endemic. Our study answers calls for better evidence about the consequences of recognition both for official action and public norms (Federman, 2020), suggesting that caution is warranted.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

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Appendix:

The Limits of Awards for Anti-Corruption: Experimental and Ethnographic Evidence from Uganda

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Contents

1	Implementation	3
1.1	Timeline	3
1.2	Committee Checklist Items	3
1.3	Details of Prospective Recognition Treatment	5
1.4	Details of Retrospective Recognition Treatment	6
1.5	Completion of Outgoing Calls	7
1.6	COVID-19 Safety	9
2	Additional Results	10
2.1	Standardized Effects	10
2.2	Complier Average Causal Effects	14
3	Pre-registration	16
4	Measurement	17
5	Ethnographic Evidence	23
5.1	Codes for Qualitative Evidence	23
5.2	List of Focus Groups and Interviews	27
5.3	Extended Ethnographic Evidence	33

1 Implementation

1.1 Timeline




Figure A1: **Timeline of interventions and data collection.**

1.2 Committee Checklist Items

Procurement Committee

- Gain UWA approval for selected project. Do one of the following:
 - Pursue project approved by UWA;
 - Follow UWA Guidelines to make a change by getting permission from the Community Conservation Warden to hold a new planning meeting, holding a meeting, and securing the support of the community for a change.
- Secure and review bids for project. Do one of the following:
 - For each separate project complete the tasks associated with evaluating the bids and fill out at least three Contractor Bid Rating Worksheets;

- Complete less than three Contractor Bid Rating Worksheets and fill out a Request for Additional Bids Worksheet to show the Committee’s efforts to secure more bids from the Subcounty Chief.
- For each project, inform the Bwindi Information Network which contractor you have selected once the recommended contractor has been identified by your committee;
- Promptly report problems and provide updates to Project Management Committee the Bwindi Information Network and report to the Bwindi Information Network at least once every four weeks once a contractor begins work, even if there are no problems;
- Fill out the Contractor Evaluation Worksheet for each contractor;

Management Committee

- Select contractor identified by the Procurement Committee and report the contractor you have selected to the Bwindi Information Network;
- Fill out a Project Summary Worksheet for each contractor selected and contact the Bwindi Information Network once completed;
- Promptly report problems and provide updates to the Subcounty Chief or UWA’s Community Warden along with the Bwindi Information Network and report to the Bwindi Information Network at least once every two weeks once a contractor begins work, even if there are no problems;
- Ensure proper labeling of revenue sharing project by contractor. Do one of the following:
 - Make sure the contractor has properly labelled all revenue sharing projects before providing the committee’s final approval of project;
 - Receive permission from the Warden of Community at UWA Headquarters Bwindi to move ahead without proper labeling;
- Fill out the Contractor Evaluation Worksheet for each contractor;

1.3 Details of Prospective Recognition Treatment

Each combined project management committee (PMC) / community procurement committee (CPC) assigned to treatment was offered the opportunity to earn recognition if they completed a checklist of items during the implementation phase of revenue sharing. We regularly remind members of procurement and management committees that the form of recognition to be given to all villages that adhered to guidelines was:

1. A large sign prominently placed along a roadway near or entering a village that commends the village for excellence in revenue sharing, listing the names of the members of the PMC and CPC in that village (or parish), unless they opted out.
2. A radio announcement commending the village for excellence in revenue sharing and specifically naming the members of the PMC and CPC in that village (or parish), unless they opted out.

Our research team, in partnership with the Uganda Wildlife Authority, offered training to both committees assigned to treatment and control at the start of the revenue-sharing cycle on the management and oversight checklists to be completed. These trainings were offered in-person and included the chance to ask questions. At the end of each training, committees assigned to treatment were verbally informed about the possibility of earning recognition if they completed all the tasks covered in the training.

As part of these baseline training sessions, we collected all available mobile phone numbers for committee members. During the next several months, members of committees assigned to both treatment and control received identical reminder messages about completing the management and oversight tasks covered in the baseline training sessions, delivered by outgoing mass voice calls. These messages covered both instructions for completing the tasks and the reasons why the tasks were important for the management of revenue sharing projects. Committee members also received instructions about how to receive either phone-based support for completing the tasks or replay previous outgoing messages. At the conclusion of these calls, members of committees

assigned to treatment were reminded of the opportunity to earn recognition for completing the tasks and the specific format that the recognition would take. In addition to regular outgoing voice calls to members of committee, irregular mass calls to all subscribers of the Bwindi Information Network highlight the potential for project committees assigned to treatment to earn recognition.

1.4 Details of Retrospective Recognition Treatment

Upon completion of the implementation phase of the revenue-sharing cycle, we collected checklists from all committees and compiled all of the incoming oversight reports that they had submitted during the last several months. Based on the completion of the worksheets and calls, we determined that four committees had substantially achieved the guidelines for the management of revenue-sharing.

For each of these four committees, we conducted additional in-depth interviews to find out more about how implementation of the project had gone and what stood out to committee members about their performance. Based on these interviews, we developed a series of four, two-minute messages describing the key accomplishment of each committee. In these messages, we congratulated the committees and explained how their actions helped to improve management of revenue sharing and deter corruption.

We distributed these messages using the same platform for outreach as other parts of the study. The Bwindi Information Network is a service with 4025 subscribers who have opted-in to receive ongoing messages about park management and local events. We randomly assigned half of the subscribers to receive messages about the committees that had been recognized by outgoing voice calls over two weeks. We attempted each call three times for each subscriber. We also assigned half of the committee members, whose contact information we obtained during baseline training to these exact same treatment arms.

The subscribers assigned to the control condition received four outgoing voice calls describing different actions they could take to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in their communities, to ensure that contact with participants remained the same. We designed these messages in consul-

tation with a local hospital. The messages dealt with washing hands, wearing a mask, avoiding large gatherings, and monitoring symptoms. These were all in line with official requirements and recommendations of public health authorities at the time.

1.5 Completion of Outgoing Calls

During implementation of both of the field experiments, committee members received outgoing voice calls. In the prospective recognition experiment, these outgoing voice calls provided reminders about the checklist items in both the treatment and control groups, and reminders of the opportunity to earn recognition in the treatment group. In the retrospective recognition experiment, the outgoing voice calls provided information about the members of committees that had earned recognition and the actions they took to earn recognition. Excluding outgoing calls that failed for technical reasons with the service provider and calls that were repeats for the subset of subscribers who we failed to reach with an identical earlier call, we see that any given outgoing calls reached approximately 55% of committee members (Figure A2) and that the rate did not decline notably during the study (Figure A3). Additionally, the rate of contact is higher including incomplete calls, which are logged whenever the user hung up prior to the end of the recording. In some cases, audio files contained extra seconds of unused time at the end of the file, which cause calls to be logged as incomplete at a higher rate.




Figure A2: **Summary of completion status of all outgoing calls to committee members, excluding those that failed for technical reasons and repeated attempts**




Figure A3: Per call completion status of all outgoing calls to committee members, excluding those that failed for technical reasons and repeated attempts

1.6 COVID-19 Safety

We originally planned to complete all data collection using in-person surveys, focus groups, and key informant interviews. However, the COVID-19 pandemic significantly disrupted our initial plans and required us to shift to remote interactions with committee members and residents. After March 2020, all interactions with participants in this study were conducted remotely.

We developed a strict safety protocol that was approved for emergency use by the lead author's home institution for training the enumeration team to conduct surveys remotely. The training took place outdoors with protective equipment and social distancing strictly observed. Upon completion

of the training, enumerators completed the surveys remotely from their own homes. The survey on retrospective recognition was added later but completed remotely according to the same safety protocols. The only contact with participants after March 2020 was to collect completed oversight booklets from committee members, which was again conducted outdoors according to approved safety procedures.

The first two rounds of qualitative data collection were completed in person, but the final round after the conclusion of the public recognition of committees were completed by telephone to committee members and residents. This precluded the use of focus group interviews for the final stage of qualitative data collection.

The installation of signs in the recognized villages strictly followed public health guidelines. The project manager traveled individually by private vehicle to oversee the installation of the signs, while taking all precautions required by local law including distancing and masking. Taken together, these practices mitigated risks of continuing the research during the active pandemic.

2 Additional Results

2.1 Standardized Effects

The following figures report the estimates of treatment effects displayed in the main text as standardized effect sizes. This is done by dividing each estimate and its standard errors by the standard deviation of the control group. The resulting estimates are displayed on the same scale, which is the treatment effect in standard deviations or z-scores. In particular, $Z_Y = \frac{Y - \bar{Y}_C}{\sigma_{Y_C}}$, where Z_Y is the transformed outcome, Y is the raw outcome, \bar{Y}_C is the mean of the control group, and σ_{Y_C} is the standard deviation of the control group. We use the same procedure for committee-level outcomes.




Figure A4: **Effects of prospective recognition treatment on oversight records or externally-rated committee performance.** *Notes:* 95% confidence intervals derived from robust standard errors.




Figure A5: **Effects of prospective recognition treatment on effort, project delivery, play in behavioral games, and anti-corruption norms of committee members.** *Notes:* 95% confidence intervals derived from robust standard errors.




Figure A6: **Effects of prospective recognition treatment on residents' perceptions.** Notes: 95% confidence intervals derived from robust standard errors.




Figure A7: **Effects of learning about recognized committees on committee members' behaviors and attitudes.** Notes: 95% confidence intervals derived from robust standard errors.




Figure A8: **Effects of learning about recognized committees on residents’ behaviors and attitudes.** *Notes:* 95% confidence intervals derived from robust standard errors.

2.2 Complier Average Causal Effects

The prospective recognition treatment with committee members could be considered a type of encouragement design, which caused committee members to have more confidence that they would be recognized for their efforts. To rule out the possibility that the intent-to-treat results in Figure 2 (committee survey outcomes after prospective recognition treatment) are attenuated by non-compliance in encouragement to expect recognition, we re-estimate complier average causal effects by using treatment as an instrumental variable for the expectation of being recognized (i.e., the manipulation check measured from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)). Even though first-stage results are strong, there is no evidence that committee members who were effectively encouraged to expect recognition have local average treatment effects that would be unexpected under the null hypothesis.




Figure A9: **Complier effects of prospective recognition treatment on effort, project delivery, play in behavioral games, and anti-corruption norms of committee members.** *Notes:* 95% confidence intervals derived from robust standard errors. Standardization is done by divided estimates and confidence intervals by the standard deviation of the relevant outcome among compliers in the control group.

Likewise, the retrospective field experiment that delivered notification to both committee mem-




Figure A10: **Complier effects of retrospective recognition treatment on committee members’ perceptions that residents recognized effort, play in behavioral games, and anti-corruption norms.** *Notes:* 95% confidence intervals derived from robust standard errors. Standardization is done by divided estimates and confidence intervals by the standard deviation of the relevant outcome among compliers in the control group.

bers and residents about the officials and committees that had received awards for excellence in revenue-sharing had significant non-compliance. Using treatment as an instrument for whether committee members or residents had heard about the committee who received awards, we estimate complier average causal effects for the key outcomes presented in the main manuscript. There is no evidence that the main treatment effects are attenuated by non-compliance.




Figure A11: **Complier effects of retrospective recognition treatment on perceived program effectiveness, play in behavioral games, and anti-corruption norms of residents.** *Notes:* 95% confidence intervals derived from robust standard errors. Standardization is done by divided estimates and confidence intervals by the standard deviation of the relevant outcome among compliers in the control group.

3 Pre-registration

We filed three pre-analysis plans associated with the field experimental aspects of this project: (1) an initial plan prior to the assignment of treatment (dated: 8 January 2019); (2) an updated plan documenting changes to the design and measurement protocol made necessary because of the COVID-19 pandemic prior to the collection of outcome data (dated: 6 June 2020); and (3) an addendum to the pre-analysis describing additional follow-up measures and a follow-up experiment prior to the collection of those outcome data (dated: 26 January 2021). All of the results reported in the main text follow the procedures outlined in the updated and addendum pre-analysis plans, though we note the following decisions that were not explicitly covered in the updated or addendum plans:

1. There were no baseline surveys conducted for village Ntungamo (village.id 65), which was due to an oversight during implementation of the baseline survey. We cluster impute the covariates for this village from parish averages for analysis, in line with the imputation pro-

cedures outlined in the updated PAP.

2. Our description of the covariate project delivered (O1) was incomplete in the PAP. In practice, villages had multiple projects of different sizes in previous cycles, which makes aggregation difficult. We therefore use average level of satisfaction with implementation from previous RS projects from village residents as this covariate. We believe this measure comes closest to our intention of conditioning on past performance at implementation of revenue-sharing projects.
3. The updated pre-analysis plan does not mention how cluster imputation will work for covariates that are not measured on a Likert-scale. For monthly income (R22), we use the middle value of each income band as a numeric value for income. We transform the measure of literacy (R23) onto an interval scale as with other measures.
4. We report confidence intervals instead of p-values in our presentation of results, as these allow us to more easily interpret the positive or negative effects that we can rule out with confidence. These confidence intervals are derived from robust or cluster robust standard errors as outlined.
5. For ease of exposition, we have chosen to report on the treatment effects on aggregate indices of survey items, rather than individual survey items. The transformation of survey items into indices is covered in our section on multiple testing.

4 Measurement

As indicated in Figure A1, we collected data for the field experimental part of this research in several stages. When the project was first designed, we planned to complete baseline and endline surveys with committee members and residents in the field. We completed baseline surveys with committee members concurrently with the training on oversight responsibilities. We completed baseline surveys with a quota of residents from each of the revenue-sharing villages based on a

random walk pattern. The COVID-19 pandemic forced us to complete all surveys after the baseline remotely by call center (see Section 1.6).

To conduct surveys of committee members after baseline, we used telephone numbers collected at the initial, in-person training on committee responsibilities for oversight. In the case of residents, we contacted all 4025 opt-in subscribers to the Bwindi Information Network as potential survey respondents. We developed this network over several years to promote communication between residents who lived near the park. Subscribers include residents from every frontline village, except those recently established. For each round of remote surveys, we attempted to contact each potential respondent three times over three distinct days. In each round of the surveys, we randomized the order of the call list.

While full copies of the survey instruments are available in replication materials, Table A1 reports the measures used as outcomes and reported in the main text.

Table A1: Outcome measures reported in the main text

Figure 1: Prospective Recognition and Observed Committee Outcomes	
Worksheets Completed	The total number of oversight worksheets completed by each combined project committee, including the Contractor Bid Rating Worksheet, Contractor Evaluation Form (x2), Project Summary Worksheet, and Completion of Contract Worksheet [0-5].
Status Reports	The total number of unprompted, incoming status reports during the revenue-sharing implementation period [0-5].
Procurement Committee Rating	The average rating of the procurement committee performance as evaluated by the community conservation wardens and community conservation rangers [1 (poor) - 4 (excellent)], weighted by the certainty of the evaluation [1 (very uncertain) - 4 (very certain)].

Management Committee Rating	The average rating of the management committee performance as evaluated by the community conservation wardens and community conservation rangers [1 (poor) - 4 (excellent)], weighted by the certainty of the evaluation [1 (very uncertain) - 4 (very certain)].
Figure 2: Prospective Recognition and Self-Reported Committee Outcomes	
Expected Recognition	(MC1) If our committee completes all items of the checklist, we expect to receive public recognition in the form of signs, radio announcements, or ceremonies once coronavirus restrictions are lifted [1 (strongly disagree) - 5 (strongly agree)].
Proportion Checklist Complete	(D1) Proportion of committee checklist items reported completed from among 11 items on each checklist for the combined committee [0-1]
Hours Spent on Tasks	(C1.e) How many hours on average do you think you spent each week on your management or procurement committee responsibilities during the period of implementation for revenue sharing? [number]
Project Delivered as Planned	(D2) Have these project(s) been fully delivered as planned? [yes vs. all other responses]
Honesty Game	(D3) Respondent asked to think of number 1-10 without revealing it. Enumerator states a random number from 1-10 and asks if it matches the respondent number, with 1000 shilling reward if respondent reports a match. Played for five rounds. Proportion of reported matches [0-1]

Leader Compensation Game	(D5) Each committee member is offered a fund of 5000 shillings and they can keep any portion. Whatever amount is left over after their withdrawal is tripled and sent to three random, anonymous residents in their village. Outcome is amount kept by committee member [0-5000]
Anti-Corruption Norms Index	(M2) Combined index of committee anti-corruption norms and values, aggregated by taking the mean of the z-scores of available items for each respondent [-3.12 to 1.22]

Figure 3: Prospective Recognition and Resident Perceptions

Perceived Program Effectiveness	(H2) Combined index of resident perceptions of revenue sharing, aggregated by taking the mean of the z-scores of available items for each respondent [-3.59 to 1.20].
Honesty Game	(D3) Respondent asked to think of number 1-10 without revealing it. Enumerator states a random number from 1-10 and asks if it matches the respondent number, with 1000 shilling reward if respondent reports a match. Played for five rounds. Proportion of reported matches [0-1]
Punishment Game	(D4) Each resident is offered a windfall bonus of 5000 shillings and they can keep any portion. Whatever amount they keep will also be sent to a local leader who has displayed a willingness to keep more resources in the Leader Compensation Game [0-5000]
Anti-Corruption Norms Index	(M1) Combined index of resident anti-corruption norms and values, aggregated by taking the mean of the z-scores of available items for each respondent [-4.55 to 1.37]

Figure 4: Retrospective Recognition and Committee Outcomes	
Heard about Recognition	(MC.c) Have you heard about the committees that received awards for excellence in revenue sharing and what they did to earn those awards? [yes/no]
Residents Recognized Efforts	(C2) I believe local residents have recognized efforts that the management and procurement committees have made to implement revenue-sharing projects successfully [1 (strongly disagree) - 5 (strongly agree)]
Honesty Game	(D3) Respondent asked to think of number 1-10 without revealing it. Enumerator states a random number from 1-10 and asks if it matches the respondent number, with 1000 shilling reward if respondent reports a match. Played for five rounds. Proportion of reported matches [0-1]
Leader Compensation Game	(D5) Each committee member is offered a fund of 5000 shillings and they can keep any portion. Whatever amount is left over after their withdrawal is tripled and sent to three random, anonymous residents in their village. Outcome is amount kept by committee member [0-5000]
Anti-Corruption Norms Index	(M2) Combined index of committee anti-corruption norms and values, aggregated by taking the mean of the z-scores of available items for each respondent [-3.12 to 1.22]
Figure 5: Retrospective Recognition and Resident Outcomes	

<p>Heard about Recognition</p>	<p>(MC.r) Have you heard about the committees that received awards for excellence in revenue sharing and what they did to earn those awards? [yes/no]</p>
<p>Perceived Program Effectiveness</p>	<p>(H2) Combined index of resident perceptions of revenue sharing, aggregated by taking the mean of the z-scores of available items for each respondent [-5.07 to 1.13].</p>
<p>Honesty Game</p>	<p>(D3) Respondent asked to think of number 1-10 without revealing it. Enumerator states a random number from 1-10 and asks if it matches the respondent number, with 1000 shilling reward if respondent reports a match. Played for five rounds. Proportion of reported matches [0-1]</p>
<p>Punishment Game</p>	<p>(D4) Each resident is offered a windfall bonus of 5000 shillings and they can keep any portion. Whatever amount they keep will also be sent to a local leader who has displayed a willingness to keep more resources in the Leader Compensation Game [0-5000]</p>
<p>Anti-Corruption Norms Index</p>	<p>(M1) Combined index of resident anti-corruption norms and values, aggregated by taking the mean of the z-scores of available items for each respondent [-6.37 to 1.07]</p>

5 Ethnographic Evidence

5.1 Codes for Qualitative Evidence

Round 1 Codes

- A Women participation in decision making in Community Development Projects (CDPs)
- Existing strategies to address barriers to women participation in decision making in CDPs
- How to improve participation of women
- Factors that influence women participation in decision making in CDPs
- Barriers to women participation in decision making in CDPs
- Facilitators to women participation in decision making in CDPs
- Perceptions about women participation in decision making in CDPs
- Quality of women participation in decision making in CDPs
- Strategies women use to influence decision making in community development projects
- Opportunities to shift social expectations about corruption and the governance of local projects
- Effectiveness of the existing mechanisms to detect and fight bribes
- Existing cultural resources and opportunities to fight corruption
- Existing efforts to fight corruption
- Projects that have the potential to attract corruption at the community level
- How the revenue sharing program can ensure effective participation by women
- Community participation in revenue sharing programs
- Knowledge about availability of revenue sharing
- Community initiated projects using the RSF

- District/subcounty initiated community projects using RSF
- Knowledge about the governance committees (CPC & PMC)
- Governance challenges in Revenue sharing
- The management committee
- The procurement committee
- Perceptions about corruption and ways in which corruption occurs in the community
- Consequences of bribery/corruption
- Drivers of corruption in the community
- Knowledge about corruption
- Manifestations of corruption in the community and local projects
- Mechanisms in place to fight corruption
- Terminologies for corruption in the community
- Social norms and expectations about corruption
- Opportunities to fight corruption at the community level
- How communities reward people who have done good for the community
- Suggestions on how to recognise communities
- Mechanisms in place to recognize people who have done good for the community
- Possible mechanisms to recognise good performance
- Perceptions about public recognition in revenue sharing and fighting against corruption
- Suggestions on how to recognise people for good performance

Round 2 Codes

- Perceptions on performance and trust towards state actors and community structures
- Engagement with community members
- Experience with grievance mechanisms
- Improved access to basic services
- Participation in fighting corruption
- Participation in monitoring community projects
- Participation in public meetings
- Provision technical support and supervision to community structures
- Effectiveness of the local leaders at district, sub county and village levels been in the fight against petty corruption
- Improved access to basic services
- Limited influence peddling
- Participation of both men and women in community projects
- Reduced levels of corruption in community projects
- Reduced political interference in community projects
- Societal expectations from relatives holding public offices
- Community response to eligibility for recognition
- Feeling about having a public reception at the sub county
- Knowledge about eligibility for recognition
- Perceptions about eligibility for recognition
- Relevancy of public recognition

- Changes among community members, leaders, or committee behaviors as a result of eligibility for recognition
- Desisting or engagement in corruption behaviors among community leaders
- Improvement in quality of service delivery
- Increased participation in community projects
- Cultural and community resources available to fight petty corruption
- Strengths and weaknesses in the available cultural and community resources to fight against petty corruption

Round 3 Codes

- Knowledge about eligibility for recognition
- Perceptions on learning about eligibility for recognition
- Changes in perception over time and why did it change
- Feeling about when first learned about eligibility for recognition
- Training on management revenue sharing fund and projects
- Experience and participation in selection of project contractors
- Feel after the training and announcement of eligibility for recognition
- Perceptions about implementation revenue sharing projects
- Perceptions about the checklist
- Perception about the recognition messages
- Feeling about the recognition of excellence made
- Community leader perception about the recognition/announcements on radio
- Community perception about public reception at the sub county/announcements on radio

- Perceptions about the selection criteria and involvement of UWA in the selection process
- Influence of recognition community leader's norms change towards corruption
- Motivation of community leader to work
- Motivation of community members to participate in community projects
- Perceptions of community leaders who did not receive the award
- Perceptions about the kind of sign post/award in the village
- Perceptions about the signposts at cross roads in the village
- What could have be done differently in order to achieve impact
- Changes in community projects as a result of eligibility for recognition
- Desisting or engagement in corruption behaviors among community leaders
- Improved service delivery
- Increased participation in community projects
- Strengths and weaknesses of community recognition in the fight against petty corruption

5.2 List of Focus Groups and Interviews

Round 1 Focus Group Discussions and In-depth Interviews, Scoping and Pre-Implementation Phase

- R1.I1 – In-depth interview with PMC member, Mukono village, 14/06/2019 (T)
- R1.I2 – In-depth interview with CPC member, Omubunga Village, 6/15/2019 (T)
- R1.I3 – In-depth interview with CPC member, Kyabworo village, 6/15/2019 (C)
- R1.I4 – In-depth interview with PMC member, Murushasha village, 6/17/2019 (C)
- R1.I5 – In-depth interview with PMC member, Kyogo-Kabale Village 6/18/2019 (C)
- R1.I6 – In-depth interview with CPC member, Nyakabungo-Kashekyera Village, 6/18/2019 (T)

- R1.I7 – In-depth interview with PMC member, Ndeego village, 6/20/2019 (T)
- R1.I8 – In-depth interview with PMC member, Nteko village 6/21/2019 (T)
- R1.I9 - In-depth interview with CPC member, Nombe village, 6/22/2019 (C)
- R1.I10 - In-depth interview with CPC member, Rugandu village, 6/19/2019 (T)
- R1.I11 - In-depth interview with Community Leader, Kanugu 7/4/2019 (T/C)
- R1.I12 - In-depth interview with District official, Kisoro 7/4/2019 (T/C)
- R1.I13 - In-depth interview with Local Leader, Kisoro 6/22/2019 (T/C)
- R1.I14 - In-depth interview with Subcounty official, Rubanda 6/19/2019 (T/C)
- R1.I15 - In-depth interview with UWA officials, Kisoro 6/21/2019 (T/C)
- R1.I16 - In-depth interview with Subcounty Official, 6/19/2019 (T/C)
- R1.FGD1 – Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Kazahi village (14/06/2019) (C)
- R1.FGD2 – Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Kazahi village (14/06/2019) (C)
- R1.FGD3 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Omubunga village, 6/15/2019
(T)
- R1.FGD4 - Focus Group Discussion with Community Members-Youths, Omubunga village,6/15/2019 (T)
- R1.FGD5 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Bugandaró, 6/15/2019 (C)
- R1.FGD6 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Kyabworo village, 6/15/2019
(C)
- R1.FGD7 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members Mpung village, 6/17/2019 (T)
- R1.FGD8 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Rukungwe village,6/17/2019 (T)
- R1.FGD9 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Rukungwe village, 6/17/2019
(T)

- R1.FGD10 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Female), Murushasha village, 6/17/2019 (C)
- R1.FGD11 – Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Kyogo village, 6/18/2019 (C)
- R1.FGD12 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Female), Kyogo village, 6/18/2019 (C)
- R1.FGD13 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Nyakabungo village, 6/18/2019 (T)
- R1.FGD14 - Focus Group Discussion with Community Members-Youths, Nyakabungo village, 6/18/2019 (T)
- R1.FGD15 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Mashoho village, 6/20/2019 (C)
- R1.FGD16 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members Youths, Mashoho village,6/20/2019 (C)
- R1.FGD17 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Ndeego village, 6/20/2019 (T)
- R1.FGD18 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Murore village, 6/21/2019, (C)
- R1.FGD19 - Focus group discussion with Community members adults (Female), Murore village, 6/21/2019, (C)
- R1.FGD20 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Nteko village 6/21/2019 (T)
- R1.FGD21 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Nombe village, 6/22/2019 (C)
- R1.FGD22 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members Youths, Nombe village,6/22/2019 (C)
- R1.FGD23 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members Youths, Nombe village,6/22/2019 (C)
- R1.FGD24 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members Youths, Kashija village,6/22/2019 (T)
- R1.FGD25 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Kashija village, 6/22/2019 (T)
- R1.FGD26 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Mataka village, 6/19/2019 (C)
- R1.FGD27 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Female), Mataka village, 6/19/2019 (C)
- R1.FGD28 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (male), Rugandu village 6/20/2019 (T)
- R1.FGD29 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Female), Mukono Village, 12/06/2019(T)

R1.FGD30 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Mukono village 12/06/2019 (T)

R1.FGD31 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Female), Nyamizo village 12/06/2019
(T)

Round 2 Focus Group Discussions and In-depth Interviews, Implementation Phase

R2.I1 - In-depth interview with PMC member, Kyabworo village, 11/27/2019(C)

R2.I2 - In-depth interview with CPC member, Nyamizo village,11/25/2019(T)

R2.I3 - In-depth interview with PMC member, Rugandu village,11/19/2019 (C)

R2.I4 - In-depth interview with CPC member, Ndeego village, 11/20/2019 (T)

R2.I5 - In-depth interview with CPC member, Nteko village, 11/27/2019(T)

R2.I6 - In-depth interview with PMC member, Nombe village, 11/23/2019 (T)

R2.I7 - In-depth interview with UWA official, Nkuringo, 11/27/2019(T/C)

R2.I8 - In-depth interview with District official, Rubanda, 11/26/2019(T/C)

R2.I9 - In-depth interview with Community leader, Mpungu 02/12/2019(T/C)

R2.I10 - In-depth interview with Community leader, Nkuringo 11/27/2019(T/C)

R2.FGD1 - Focus Group Discussion with CPC members, Kazahi village 11/26/2019 (C)

R2.FGD2 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male) Kazahi village, 11/26/2019 (C)

R2.FGD3 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Female), Bugandaro village, 12/4/2019
(C)

R2.FGD4 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members Youths, Omubunga village 12/4/2019(T)

R2.FGD5 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Bugandaro village, 12/4/2019 (C)

R2.FGD6 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Omubunga village 12/4/2019,
(T)

- R2.FGD7 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Rukungwe village, 11/25/2019 (T)
- R2.FGD8 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Rukungwe village, 11/25/2019 (T)
- R2.FGD9 – Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Kyogo village (Kabale) 11/30/2019 (C)
- R2.FGD10 – Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Female), Kyogo village, 11/30/2019 (C)
- R2.FGD11 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Nyakabungo village (Kashekyera), 11/30/2019 (T)
- R2.FGD12 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members Youths, Nyakabungo village 11/30/2019(T)
- R2.FGD13 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Mashoho village, 11/26/2019(C)
- R2.FGD14 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members Youths, Mashoho village, 11/26/2019(C)
- R2.FGD15 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Ndeego village, 11/26/2019 (T)
- R2.FGD16 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Murore village, 11/27/2019 (C)
- R2.FGD17 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Female), Murore village, 11/27/2019 (C)
- R2.FGD18 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Nteko village 11/27/2019(T)
- R2.FGD19 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Female), Nteko village 11/27/2019(T)
- R2.FGD20 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Male), Nombe village, 11/28/2019 (C)
- R2.FGD21 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members Youths, Nombe village, 11/28/2019(C)
- R2.FGD22 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (Female), Kashija village, 11/28/2019 (T)
- R2.FGD23 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Kashija village, 11/28/2019 (T)
- R2.FGD24 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members, Mataka village, 11/19/2019 (C)

- R2.FGD25 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (female), Mataka village, 11/29/2019 (C)
- R2.FGD26 - Focus Group Discussion with Community members adults (male), Rugandu village, 11/19/2019 (T)
- R2.FGD27 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members Mpungu 02/12/2019 (C)
- R2.FGD28 - Focus Group Discussion with PMC/ CPC members Mukono 03/12/2019 (T)
- R2.FGD29 - Focus Group Discussion with Community Adult Female members Mukono 03/12/2019 (T)

Round 3 In-depth Interviews, Post-Implementation Award Phase

- R3.I1 – In-depth interview with adult male, Kyabworo village 9/13/2021(C)
- R3.I2 – In-depth interview with CPC, Bugoro village, 9/14/2021 (C)
- R3.I3 – In-depth interview with CPC member, Kiriba Rubanda village, 9/13/2021 (C)
- R3.I4 – In-depth interview with CPC member, Kyabworo village, 9/13/2021(C)
- R3.I5 – In-depth interview with adult female, Kikobero village, 9/4/2021 (T)
- R3.I6 – In-depth interview with adult female, Nteko village 9/5/2021(T)
- R3.I7 – In-depth interview with adult female, Ryamihanda village,9/4/2021 (C)
- R3.I8 – In-depth interview with adult male, Kikobero village 9/13/2021 (T)
- R3.I9 – In-depth interview with adult male, Kiriba village, 10/9/2021 (C)
- R3.I10 – In-depth interview with adult male, Nteko village, 10/9/2021(T)
- R3.I11 – In-depth interview with adult male, Ryamihanda village 10/9/2021(C)
- R3.I12 – In-depth interview with CPC member, Kikobero village 10/9/2021 (T)
- R3.I13 – In-depth interview with CPC member, Nteko, 10/9/2021(T)
- R3.I14 – In-depth interview with PMC member, Kikobero village, 10/9/2021 (T)

- R3.I15 – In-depth interview with PMC, member, Nteko village, 10/9/2021 (T)
- R3.I16 – In-depth interview with PMC member, Kikobero village, 10/9/2021 (T)
- R3.I17 – In-depth interview with PMC member Kiriba village, 10/9/2021 (C)
- R3.I18 – In-depth interview with Local leader, Ruhiya subcounty, 10/18/2021 (T/C)
- R3.I19 – In-depth interview with PMC member, Bugoro village, 10/13/2021 (C)
- R3.I20 – In-depth interview with PMC member, Kiriba village, 10/13/2021 (C)
- R3.I21 – In-depth interview with PMC member, Kyabworo village, 10/13/2021 (C)
- R3.I22 – In-depth Interview with CPC member Ryamihanda village, 10/10/2021 (C)

5.3 Extended Ethnographic Evidence

What were local expectations for the role that symbolic recognition might play in shaping project outcomes?

- ... if a village is appreciated it makes other people who were doing bad know that others do good things... putting on the poster and showing your victory means that there was no corruption also it means that the leadership is good and if they appreciate them, corruption will reduce and it calls for them not to change leaders often to reduce on corruption. – FGD CPC/PMC, Kashijja Village [R1.FGD25]
- It means that there shall be no corruption. It shall mean that corruption has started reducing... and other people if they hear that Village X was the best, other leaders will be inspired to do good—FGD Adult Female Nyamizo Village, Kanungi[R1. FGD31].
- that Village shall inspire other villages... and the community shall be grateful for having defeated the others, they will be still sure of doing better next time—FGD Adult Male Nombe Village, Kisoro[R1. FGD21]

- I think people shall be happy for having benefited from the RS funds and shall highly promote good utilization of Revenue Sharing Funds... even the would be corrupt shall be inspired to do better—FGD Community Structures Nyakabungo Village, Rubanda[R1. FGD13]
- When you find yourself being appreciated like that you feel so happy so the next time they bring funds you use the money in a better way than you did previously—FGD, Community Structures Mashoho, Rubanda [R1. FGD15]
- That person would feel so happy and hence people doing well his job for his people. When you do well for us we be proud of you but if you are a thief people cannot sit with you. – FGD Adult Male, Kyabworo Village [R1.FGD6]
- when something good comes to the village and you hear that you are the winner, no one hates good and no one likes corruption even other people can appreciate the village when they see that signpost they can comment that these people are hardworking. —FGD, Adult Female, Mukono Kanungu[R1. FGD29]
- The community will feel that the committee was not corrupt... and will never like the former sub county chief who embezzled funds—FGD Committee members, Mpungu Kanungu[R1. FGD07]
- I would feel very happy and next time the funds are released I would do my best and get 100
- That can put an end to corruption. Like finding I'm with other chairmen and I defeat all of them, it would make them know that even when they took bribes they didn't help them because this chairman has been known everywhere. But someone who has started taking bribe, it is very hard to stop them what I would advise the government is that when someone steals, they sell his property and pays off immediately—FGD Adult Men Rukungwe Village, Kanungu[R1. FGD09]
- They shall also have a name as a village such that their village does not have a bad name. In case there is any donation, they know that they have marketed their village which is corrupt free and does things according to the provided procedures —IDI CPC Member, Nombe Village Rubanda[R1. I09]
- ... they say that people of this village are trustworthy and when you give them things they use them well and their village moves forward... you can be proud of the leaders in place in such a way that they

are re-voted back because they gave you a good name—FGD, Adult Female, Mukono Kanungu[R1. FGD29]

- As an old woman people would go telling others how I was on the committee and did good work without any corruption—FGD, Community Structures Mashoho, Rubanda[R1. FGD15]
- It (corruption) can reduce because when they appreciate a certain village and they don't appreciate yours moreover you were given same money, you can decide to behave well the next time to be like the best village... when a village is announced on the radio that the village constructed a road using their money it becomes an eye-opener for other areas to ask where their money went because they don't have a road. —FGD, Adult Female, Mukono Kanungu[R1. FGD29]
- The village would be good but not with corruption, when you go to Bushenyi it has cars and other nice items but have corruption, the solution is for government to investigate the very corrupt people and be chased—FGD Adult Men Rukungwe Village, Kanungu[R1. FGD09]
- Can feel happy because of being recognized among many villages that used the money well and have not been corrupt leaders... so it can make villages or leaders use their money well and be recognized. —FGD Adult Female, Nteko Kisoro[R1. FGD20]
- Hearing that our village emerged the best would make me happy. You would even know the park would be proud of you because as a village you would have done well... it would show that there is no corruption and people work together—FGD Adult women, Kyogo Rubanda[R1. FGD12]
- if that village wins all over other villages and it's being aired on radio, ... I think that leader will remain in power because he/she does not have that vice of corruption—FGD Adult men Kazahi Village, Kanungu[R1. FGD02]
- I think corruption can end because if another one sees that you have appreciated me for doing well, they will also work well to get the gift I got—FGD Committee Members Bugandaro Village, Kanungu[R1. FGD05]
- ... if a village is appreciated it makes other people who were doing bad know that others do good things... putting on the poster and showing your victory means that there was no corruption also it

means that the leadership is good and if they appreciate them, corruption will reduce and it calls for them not to change leaders often to reduce on corruption – FGD CPC/PMC, Kashijja Village[R1. FGD24]

- ... This kind of appreciation is good because even other cells can get into competition with the cell that won and those who are selected add in much more effort so that they can also be appreciated. Even the cell that was the first to be appreciated would work hard to maintain that kind so standard hence doing away with corruption— FGD Community Structures Mashoho, Rubanda[R1. FGD15]
- ... That person would feel so happy and hence people doing well his job for his people. When you do well for us we are proud of you but if you are a thief people cannot sit with you– FGD Adult Male Kyabworo Village [R1.FGD6]

How did community members and leaders react to the opportunity to earn recognition while implementing projects? How did they react to learning about the leaders who earned recognition?

- ... Village members are trying to fight corruption together with the village committees ... the village members, sub county leaders, and district members cooperate—FGD Adult Female Nteeko village, Kisoro [R2.FGD]
- As a community member, I feel very happy because our leaders used the funds as planned to promote the community—FGD Youths Female Masosho Village, Rubanda[R2.FGD14]
- it (recognition) was talked about and we want recognition. . . This would make us happy knowing that we were awarded. We are not happy because we have been disabled by the district—FGD Community structure Kashija Village, Kisoro[R1. FGD23]
- I will be happy because I know people are receiving proceeds from the revenue sharing—FGD Adult men omumbuga Village, Kanungu[R2.FGD06]
- I would feel proud about my village and this gives me respect. If the village members are happy, I also feel happy —FGD CPC/PMC, Kashija village [R2.FGD23]

- I also become very happy due to good leadership. I also feel so happy because the village does not practice corruption and I am respected somewhere else because of being in a truthful village. — FGD PMC/ CPC members, Mukono Village [R2.FGD28]
- They feel happy because the project was completed well, they gave us another term office. — FGD CPC/PMC, Nyakabungo Village [R2.FGD11]
- Yes, they have told us, park calls us and tells us...we would feel happy but we are not using the money the way it's not supposed to be used—FGD CPC/PMC, Nyakabungo Village [R2.FGD11]
It adds to development because everyone will want to know how they did it and who did it and this adds respect—FGD Adult Male Nteeko Village, Kisoro[R2.FGD18]
- As a committee, we shall be happy, and the community members shall be happy—FGD Committee members Bugandaro Village, Kanugu[R2.FGD05]
- Community members appreciate leaders and are encouraged to always turn up for the meetings to ensure that they are involved in the planning and implementation of projects—FGD Female Youth Nkakabungo Village, Rubanda[R2.FGD12]
- It is good to work together with leaders and committee members on my side I would appreciate—FGD Youths, Nombe Village, Kisoro[R2.FGD21]
- These people wouldn't appreciate ...because they were not fully involved in these projects and in generating ideas—FGD Adult PMC/ CPC members Mukono village [R2.FGD28]
- This will encourage people to be to work hard. Someone who works hard will be rewarded always—IDI PMC member, Nteeko Village[R2.I8]
- Yes, it can make them happy because it means that they used well the money for revenue sharing and I can put trust in them that next time that money should not go elsewhere –FGD Adult Female Mukono village [R2.FGD29]
- Me that would make me happy, you never know that money worked on the school or water. A school can help my children attend school or water can be nearer rather than getting it from far areas in Munyanga this can make you happy –FGD Adult Female Mukono village [R2.FGD29]

- I would feel proud about my village and this gives me respect If the village members are happy, I also feel happy — FGD CPC/PMC, Kashija village — [R2.FGD23]
- I also become very happy due to good leadership. I also feel so happy because the village does not practice corruption and I am respected somewhere else because of being in a truthful village— FGD, PMC/ CPC members Mukono Village— [R2.FGD28]
- It has improved on the implementation and completion of projects in the community as planned. . . The contact phone number of revenue sharing is never available whenever we call them for assistance—IDI CPC member Ndeego Village, Rubanda [R2.I14]

What limitations did community members and leaders perceive about using positive recognition to change norms and behavior? Could those limitation be overcome with alternative program designs?

- ... when the councilors [negatively] interfered, they [community members] were very vocal and these councilors have been removed from leadership positions within our community. The community members want to work hard and they want to make sure that this road is worked to the best that it can be because we know the importance of this road. — IDI CPC, Bugoro Village [R3.I2]
- because we are not educated and when we get someone from outside and knows that we are not educated, they will exploit us— FGD PMC/ CPC members, Kyogo village[R1. FGD11]
- one is level of education you know the level of education also matters, most of our women are illiterates and they are very few who are educated and those who completed at least primary seven, two when they are sited with men, they normally listen to what men say and they are very few who can put up a hand and say something so it is their natural habit — IDI LG Official, Kisoro [R1.I12]
- Another reason why people bribe is ignorance. For example where you find that some things are meant to be yours but because you are ignorant about them and you find that to get them you will need to first pay some money but if we were aware of what is supposed to be ours, we would not be giving bribes—FGD Adult Men, Rukungwe[R1. FGD9]
- The reason corruption increases is because, when the money is released the local person doesn't take responsibility. The fact that it comes from people from top offices, and the local person knows very

little or nothing about it, even if the money is embezzled you cannot trace it. . . even if you knew you don't have the right cannot claim that money as yours. . . — FGD Adult Men, Rukungwe[R1. FGD9]

- Finding that I know someone and want him to do the job but doesn't have the certificate so I give him the job so that on the much money they give him I can also benefit – FGD CPC/PMC, Mpungu[R1. FGD7]
- When you are a leader, relatives think that you should favor them for example when you are distributing items like for NAADs, Revenue sharing, they want to receive more than once. . . and if you get jobs on they will be wanting you to give it to them. . . so they think that since you are a boss you need to favor them or get something bigger, but in most cases, the proper way would be balancing so that if you choose one from the family, then you can balance it by choosing also the community member on the other side so that they don't say that you only favor your family—FGD CPC/PMC, Mpungu[R1. FGD7]
- it (recognition) was talked about and we want recognition although there is confusion and there are no more meetings. . . because of district interference, it has discouraged us and the guidelines provided are not useful. This would make us happy knowing that we were awarded. We are not happy because we have been disabled by the district—FGD Community structure Kashija Village, Kisoro[R1. FGD23]
- It has improved on the implementation and completion of projects in the community as planned. . . The contact phone number of revenue sharing is never available whenever we call them for assistance—IDI CPC member Ndeego Village, Rubanda [R2.I14]

We chose to do a cattle project. There were some thoughts towards doing a road project as well. When they received the money, they decided to divert it towards the road project. And initially, they educated us on what we should base on to select the contractor, and eventually, we selected people whom we thought were competent, transparent, and were going to serve the needs of the people. However, some money was diverted towards the road project, the cattle we managed to procure ended up not being enough for the beneficiaries—IDI CPC, Kikobero village[R3.I12]

- the project here was not very successful because there was a bit of conflict and disorganization. We

were organized at the beginning because we had agreed on what we wanted until some officials came and imposed on us the idea of cattle. Because of this disorganization, the project was bound to fail—IDI PMC Kikobero Village [R3.I16]

- The road was done well by the contractor. We wanted to open the road and this was done. However, the route was changed a bit from the requests of the residents. Some local leaders somehow interfered with what the community had proposed to serve their interests. The councilors interfered with where the road was going to pass and influenced the contractor to make it go through near their homes. The reason was not clear why the route was changed to the community members—IDI CPC, Bugoro Village [R3.I2]
- I don't know, I can't answer that because I am not sure. Like I told you, we were not told what we would receive if we performed well. We did our best to ensure that all is done. The contractor never provided us with any form of accountability. There was a lot of government leaders' interference for the district, this made us suspicious that there was corruption happening. As a member of the community, I am not sure about how much was spent and cannot gauge how much of the funds that were supposed to be used were used. —IDI PMC Member - Kiriba A, Rubanda [R3.I7]
- you see this is the problem which we have in Uganda now, people have been corrupted, their minds have been corrupted. First, the chairperson will look at how much money they are going to give him let's say fifty million he will first look at that and what he gets let's say as salary and that is the main problem we Ugandans are having even in our homes people don't bring back the balance after buying things and this is also corruption so it started from homes, even kids sent them to the market with some little balance they don't bring it back, so Uganda if we don't change now, where we are heading is bad. —IDI UWA officials, Kisoro [R1.15]
- Like in my sub county I had a person who had a case a simple case but I got a phone call from Kampala asking why am detaining the person it was from the IGGs office he had family wrangles with his wife a simple which I could have handled but because I got pressure but did I solve the problem no I had to let the man go — IDI Subcounty official, Rubanda [R1. I4]
- Corruption in Revenue Sharing started a long time for example when the contractor would not supply

physical goats but rather would request the beneficiaries to appear with their goats and pictures would be taken, then the beneficiaries would be given money. The educated ones formed the Association (MCCDA) to embezzle the Revenue Sharing Funds. — FGD PMC/ CPC members Rukungwe Village [R1. FGD8]

- ... corruption has eaten us and finished us. So when money comes to the district, the budget for it as if it is there's and yet it comes for us who are suffering from animals in the forest. And when it is like 10 million they know that 5million is theirs, 3 is for the parish and 2 is for us at the village and they continue to say that they are the ones to look for the tenderer we start negotiating with them arguing that even if the money is less, let us get our tenderer, and they refuse, they source for their tenderer and bring us fake goats alleging that take it or leave it if you don't want. We end up taking them but when they reach home; they die; that's how corruption is. —FGD Adult Male Omumbuga Village [R1.FGD3]
- The people at the park edge have their crops destroyed by wild animals. Such people should have their crops refunded and this is possible compensation. This will encourage them to do conservation in their communities. — IDI PMC member, Kyabworo [R3.I21]
- The committee members who led projects to this level would have been rewarded with something else like if they were given some money as a reward, it would have been good. I think it's the best form of recognition for committee members... — IDI CPC, Kiriba Village [R3.I3]
- I think that in addition to all of that, the individuals should be given a tangible token such as money or goats or just a hamper of household products like soap. — IDI CPC, Kikobero village [R3.I12]
- Giving certificates and an envelope. And according to what the person has done and the profit made, we may give cows or envelopes. —FGD PMC/CPC members, Kashija Village [R2. FGD22]
- The order or means of sending money from UWA should be changed two or three members should be picked to be educated about the park related issues. The Park should put a plan for opening village bank accounts so that money should be sent on those accounts other than through district officials. — FGD PMC/CPC members, Mashoho Village [R2.FGD13]

- I think the other way is to organize a function and shake hands with members of the committee as they had said they would, initially. — IDI Adult Male, Ryamihanda Village [R3.I2]
- I don't think there is any problem with it but maybe there would be a need to reward people a bit differently other than putting their names on the signpost. A tangible gift for remembrance would be good. — IDI CPC Member, Kyabworo Village [R3.I14]
- UWA can sponsor children from the village. It should offer solar systems to the community. Supply water to benefit the community. Increase education to inspire other villages. — FGD Adult Male, Nombe Village [R1.FGD21]
- I think it was a good effort just that not everybody listens to radio. I would have wanted the committees to be recognized in the presence of all the locals, like at a big event, so that others can learn that exceptional performance is recognized. — IDI PMC Member, Nteko Village [R3.I20]