

UC Berkeley

UC Berkeley Previously Published Works

Title

Citizen response to local service provision: Emerging democratic accountability in decentralized West Africa?

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/62s7d4kv>

Author

Wilfahrt, Martha

Publication Date

2022-10-01

DOI

10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102498

Copyright Information

This work is made available under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution License, available at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

Peer reviewed

Citizen Response to Local Service Provision: Emerging Democratic Accountability in Decentralized West Africa?

Martha Wilfahrt
Assistant Professor
University of California, Berkeley
martha.wilfahrt@berkeley.edu

Abstract: A central tenet of democratic theory is that the threat of electoral sanction holds politicians accountable to citizen preferences. But do voters who receive social service investments evaluate the state more positively and does this translate into electoral rewards for incumbents? I examine this question in decentralized Senegal, where locally elected governments are responsible for providing basic social services. Pairing village-level data on local service delivery with local electoral results and public opinion surveys, I present evidence that receiving new public goods investments does improve citizen evaluations of their local governments, but that voters are more likely to reward incumbent mayors than they are incumbent parties. I argue that this is a rational strategy for voters in new democracies with weak party institutionalization and suggests that party systems are an important scope condition for how voters try to hold their governments accountable in emerging democracies.

Acknowledgements: The author acknowledges the support of the Boren Fellowship and Cornell University's Einaudi Center and Houston J. Flourney Fellowship. This research benefitted from the excellent research assistance of El Hadji Almareme Faye. Previous versions of this project were presented at the 2015 ASA annual meeting, the 2016 MPSA annual meeting and the 2016 APSA annual meeting as well as at Northwestern University's Buffett Institute for Global Affairs. Additional thanks to participants of UC-Berkeley's Africa Studies Workshop, notably Leonardo Arriola and Shelley Liu, as well as Robert Braun, Kathleen Klaus, Kristin McKie and Lisa Mueller.

Introduction

“In politics,” observed a mayor in rural Senegal in 2014, “words do nothing, the population has to see real outcomes. You need concrete realizations to advance [electorally].”¹ The mayor’s assumption, that African voters reward politicians who deliver public goods, is supported by an emerging empirical literature on democratic accountability in the region. Recent research provides fine-grained evidence of how politicians pursue votes by delivering public goods: African incumbents have been found to direct public services to co-partisans (Burgess et al. 2011) or to co-ethnics (Kramon and Posner 2012) with an eye toward electoral objectives. Yet to date, only a handful of studies have evaluated the flip side of this equation: do citizen evaluations of their governments improve upon receipt of new social services? And do these investments translate into electoral gains for incumbents?

This paper offers insight into these dynamics by examining citizens’ attitudinal and electoral responses to local public goods delivery in decentralized Senegal, where citizen proximity to local elected officials should facilitate their ability to hold local representatives accountable (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). Indeed, I find evidence of emerging accountability at the local level: rural Senegalese do appear to reward incumbents who deliver goods in their vicinity. Critically, however, I find that electoral rewards are more likely to accrue to incumbent mayors than they are to locally incumbent parties, suggesting that although voters seek to hold their elected representatives accountable, parties are not the primary vehicle for doing so.

These findings allow me to make two contributions to our understanding of emerging democratic accountability in Africa. First, I offer an important caveat to *how* we study whether voters punish poorly performing incumbents at the ballot box by arguing that national party systems are an important scope condition for how these dynamics play out. In contexts where party systems are weak, deinstitutionalizing or

¹ Interview, Diourbel Region, 16 February 2016.

prone to party proliferation (see Kelly 2020), evidence of voter efforts to hold their elected officials responsible for their actions in office will not necessarily track with party vote share, complicating our ability to identify retrospective accountability. As I document, the sharp uptick in the number of political parties combined with shifting coalitional dynamics results in a high degree of party switching among Senegal's local politicians. Because mayors have few incentives to cultivate their position within their party when the party environment is in constant flux, they focus their efforts on developing a personal vote based on their personal reputation for action. While my empirical approach compliments similar studies on dominant party regimes, such as those studied by de Kadt and Lieberman (2020) in Southern Africa, or two-party systems, like that of Ghana (Harding 2015), therefore, my findings reveal that we may need to adjust *where* we look for evidence of democratic accountability, tracking support for individual incumbents as they switch parties, in the far more common setting on the continent of weakly institutionalized party systems.

My second intervention follows directly from the first. I seek to decouple the assumption that the personalization of politics around specific candidates is inherently at odds with norms of democratic accountability. In so doing, I offer an important corrective to the tendency to dismiss any signs of loyalty to individual politicians as a manifestation of 'big man politics' or uneven patron-clientelist ties in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging democracies (see Mueller 2017). Under certain macro-political environments, these relations may reflect citizens' efforts to hold incumbents accountable for their work in office when parties do not offer them a vehicle for doing so.

I build my argument around three distinct sources of data. I begin by presenting qualitative data drawn from extensive interviews with local Senegalese politicians. Local elected officials report feeling acute pressure from voters to deliver local services and fully expect to be penalized electorally if they fail to do so, suggesting that the core

tenets of democratic accountability are alive and well in these relationships. These interviews simultaneously reveal that incumbent politicians perceive their own reputation as far more important for their prospects for reelection than the party they run with.

I then present two sets of statistical analyses to support the idea that rural Senegalese seek to hold their elected representatives accountable. I first deploy a difference-in-difference regression of geocoded local electoral returns at the voting booth level to show that Senegalese villages that see greater improvements in locally delivered social services are more likely to increase their vote share for the incumbent mayor, regardless of what party he runs with. This is not insignificant; over 40% of mayors in my sample switch their party affiliation from one election to the next. For their part, incumbent parties see little boost in electoral fortunes for goods delivered under their administration, but they do better when they retain the incumbent mayor on their party list. I then draw on geocoded Afrobarometer data to show that citizens attitudes change in line with the expectations laid out by theories of democratic accountability: Afrobarometer respondents are more positive about their local governments when their villages receive new public goods from the local state, supporting the contention that public service delivery does in fact shape political evaluations in line with our theoretical expectations.

This article begins with a short review of the literature on democratic accountability, before articulating why I expect the locus of citizen efforts to hold their elected representatives accountable to vary as a function of a country's party environment. I then introduce the case of decentralized Senegal and present original qualitative data to show how local elected officials negotiate their electoral fortunes vis-a-vis constituents and national political parties. I then address the central question at hand - how citizens respond electorally and attitudinally to local service delivery - before engaging the argument's implications for emerging democratic accountability and

decentralization reforms in the region in the conclusion.

2. Theory

A core tenet of democratic theory is that electoral competition allows citizens to hold government officials accountable at the ballot box. Following Downs (1957), research on developed democracies has established a strong relationship between incumbent performance and voters' subsequent electoral choices. Because voters can punish poorly performing incumbents, incumbents are incentivized to deliver some basket of desired goods in anticipation of voters' electoral threat (Ashworth 2012; Svobik 2013). The resulting theoretical assumption is that politicians who deliver high-demand services and policies will be rewarded by voters while those who fail to do so will be punished.

Students of African politics have voiced long-standing concerns about both sides of the accountability equation. For their part, African politicians are often assumed to seek their own interests first and foremost, eschewing citizen efforts to hold them accountable (classically Bayart 1993) as unrestrained leaders personalize political life (e.g. Jackson and Rosberg 1982). In turn, African voters have been conceptualized as being motivated by private payoffs rather than programmatic politics (Kitschelt 2000). More extreme perspectives effectively deny agency to African citizens, assuming citizen loyalty to community 'big men' negates meaningful options towards voice or exit (Mkandawire 2015, 571). However construed, scholars have repeatedly diagnosed a lack of accountability as a core weakness of African political systems, viewing the personalization of politics as an impediment to the emergence of programmatic offerings (see Mueller 2017).

Recent work questions whether democratic accountability is in fact missing in the region. Survey data shows that African voters are sophisticated and strategic political principals who pursue their economic interests at the ballot box rather than blindly

following patrons (Lindberg and Morrison 2008). Work in African political economy has documented how politicians act with an eye to future voter approval or sanction, for example by targeting public services to co-partisans (Briggs 2014; Jablonski 2014), indicating that politicians do feel pressure to meet citizen demands.

In turn, a smaller number of papers have studied whether voters who receive social services actually reward well-performing politicians electorally. Harding (2015), for example, finds in Ghana that the incumbent party's vote share increases significantly when local road conditions improve. Marx (2018) argues similarly that when citizens in low-information environments can clearly attribute a good to an incumbent's behavior, they reward the incumbent electorally. Not all work is equally optimistic, however. de Kadt and Lieberman (2020) document that South African voters are in fact more likely to penalize elected officials than to reward them following the delivery of basic social services, a finding they attribute to a ratcheting up of citizen expectations and the fact that greater exposure to government work simultaneously exposes citizens to more government corruption, increasing dissatisfaction.

Together these studies offer cautious encouragement for democratic accountability in the region, but this evidence comes from countries with relatively stable party environments, notably Ghana, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Lesotho. This leaves unexamined the large number of African electoral regimes that have weaker party systems. At the extreme, in party systems experiencing what Kelly (2020) dubs conditions of 'party proliferation,' hundreds of political parties populate the electoral landscape. Of course, the majority of these parties remain unviable at the national level, with most new parties created to serve as vehicles for politicians to bargain their way into national coalitions. A core consequence of these dynamics is that they undermine the emergence of a stable opposition capable of checking the presidential majority. Many African party systems are defined by low levels of party institutionalization (e.g. Kuenzi and Lambright 2001), and dynamics of party

proliferation define a diverse array of African electoral regimes, from Senegal, the case under study here, to Benin, Cameroon, Madagascar, and Kenya among others. As a result, voters in a growing number of African electoral regimes face what Bleck and van de Walle (2018, 125) describe as a ‘dizzying number of political parties in each election cycle,’ few of which will actually play “a meaningful role in the legislature after the election.” To date, little attention has been paid to how these national level party dynamics impact the local political arena. In Senegal, local elections are increasingly won by a more diverse set of parties. From a remarkable 98.6% of local elections won by the two major coalitions in 2002, only 74% of local governments were captured by a dominant coalition in 2014. Although this percentage remains high, the jump from minor parties winning five local governments in 2002 to 99 in 2014 is a noticeable increase.

Work on Africa’s party systems has yet to examine how these trends in party proliferation impact how citizens evaluate and reward incumbents. Yet doing so is critical for two reasons. The first relates to our ability to identify retrospective voting. Political parties are often assumed to serve as the default vehicle for democratic accountability (Franklin et al. 2014). In institutionalized party systems, a politician’s current party affiliation is the natural vehicle with which to do so; the party offers a brand that the politician has presumably invested in. But in party environments where politicians have little incentive to remain loyal to their political party, looking at incumbent party vote share risks missing votes that accrue to incumbent politicians who switch parties between elections. National level trends toward party proliferation and/or coalition politics open a strategic space for mayors to advance electorally: local politicians may align themselves strategically with either a prominent or a new party in an effort to bolster their personal credentials while national party officials, for their part, are eager to recruit well-known candidates at the local level.

As a result, where the number of national parties is increasing and/or party

brands are diluting, a two part-process encourages politicians to cultivate a personal vote for their responsiveness to local need on the one hand while voters respond by *personalizing* politics, weighing an individual incumbent's reputation and track-record more than their party label, on the other (see Cain et al. 2013; Zittel 2017). The combined consequence is that individual reputations and personalities become "the main anchor of interpretation and evaluation in the political arena" (Balmas and Sheaffer 2015, 1).²

Politicians may be self-interested in this respect, but that does not mean they are unaccountable and the very act of politicians investing in a local personal vote, I argue, reflects their sensitivity to citizen demands. This is the key second implication for democratic accountability in Africa's emerging democracies. I draw on recent debates on the growing personalization of politics around the world (e.g. Garzia 2013) to explain why party structures are not the only venue by which voters may seek accountability from their local elected officials. When parties fail to serve as stable cues to voters about the policies they will see in the future (as well as the politicians who will serve under the party's label), rewarding individual politicians is a rational solution for voters looking to ensure that well-performing politicians who deliver tangible goods remain in office.

In this way, I join recent work that reclaims agency for citizens to hold their politicians accountable, even if these relationships fall short of our normative expectations. Take, for example, Bussell's (2019) argument that we see a form of 'constrained' accountability emerging in patronage democracies. The delivery of constituency services by Indian legislators, Bussell argues, reflects citizens efforts to hold their politicians accountable, even if these practices are not fully realized. My own findings, that a distinctly *local* form of accountability relations is emerging in rural

² If a key link in the ability of citizens to hold their politicians accountable is information, one consequence may be that voter perceptions are more sensitive to information on incumbent individuals rather than parties. This could help explain null findings of information treatments, for example those of Lierl and Holmlund (2019).

Senegal as citizens reward local politicians' personally in lieu of the parties they run with, is unlikely to have been foreseen by proponents of decentralization. Nonetheless, my findings join Bussell's idea of *constrained* accountability and de Kadt and Lieberman's arguments of *nuanced* accountability to suggest that citizens in emerging democracies seek well-performing politicians at various levels and through various means, even if the observed effects are varied and deviate from our best theoretical hopes.

3. Studying Democratic Accountability in Decentralized Senegal

3.1 Local Politics and Local Accountability in Rural Senegal

I study the micro-dynamics of voter responses to local service delivery in the context of rural Senegal, a case that offers a lucrative test for theories of democratic accountability for two reasons. The first is Senegal's relatively durable commitment to decentralization. Local governments are theorized to respond more readily to local preferences because citizens should be better able to monitor and sanction local officials (see Olowu and Wunsch 2004). Although Senegal first created local governments in the mid-1970s, the local state gained meaningful authority and autonomy following reforms in 1996.

First, these reforms transferred authority over nine policy domains to the local state, including control over high-demand local public goods, like the construction of basic health and primary education facilities (Vengroff and Ndiaye 1998). These investments are financed through central government transfers, primarily the *Fonds de Dotation de la Decentralisation* (FDD). Although the 1996 reforms did devolve several local tax handles to local governments, local tax receipts tend to be quite low, meaning that the FDD is the primary financial lifeline of the local state. Even though the local state remains dependent on central government transfers, local governments have constructed a significant number of public goods over the past two decades. 36% of the

local governments in my dataset constructed new preschools, for example, while over 84% built at least one new primary school between 2002 and 2014 (averaging of three per local council per five-year term). Similarly, 63% percent built one or more new health clinics. Importantly, these same public goods investments are a high priority among citizens. Among those surveyed by the Afrobarometer in Rounds 2, 4-6, over 54% of respondents list at least one of the sectors under study here - health, education, and water - as a principal area of concern for their communities.³

The 1996 reforms further subjected all local government council seats to the popular vote. Senegal's local governments are elected under a mixed proportional-majoritarian closed list system. Voters cast ballots for two electoral lists: a majority list, the plurality winner of which takes 50% of local council seats, and a proportional list that allocates the remaining 50% of seats according to party vote share. Although it is generally common knowledge that the top candidate on a party's majority list will be their candidate for mayor, this system complicates efforts at retrospective voting for an incumbent mayor since voters can only choose between closed party-lists with no assurance about who the mayor will be.

Following the country's first alternation of power between parties with the election of Abdoulaye Wade of the *Parti démocratique sénégalais* (PDS) in 2000, Senegal has seen a remarkable liberalization of political space both nationally and locally, meaning that most local elected officials compete for re-election in highly competitive races. At the same time, Senegal is a typical example of a country that has seen a rapid growth in the number of political parties in the country since the early 2000s. Increasingly, political entrepreneurs form new political parties, even when they have little realistic ability to win elections, as a vehicle to gain access to state patronage (Kelly 2020; Osei 2012). At the national level, this results in broad governing coalitions, as ruling parties co-opt small opposition parties. This dynamic can weaken regime

³ The full distribution of responses can be seen in Appendix A.

strength (Creevey et al. 2005), resulting in low party institutionalization and a high degree of electoral volatility as opposition parties rarely form around any programmatic orientation (Resnick 2013).

As seen in Table 1, however, this has differential effects at the local and national level. Although national elections do see robust competition, both in terms of the number of party lists contesting legislative elections and the number of first round presidential candidates, the number of party lists running locally has seen an unparalleled explosion in numbers. Of the 167 party lists that ran in at least one local government in 2014, for example, 90% of lists were only run in ten local governments or less. An increasingly small number of lists run in more than fifty local governments, though major national coalitions – or some constellation of their constituent parties – are present in most local governments. It is worth noting that although national ruling coalitions tend to dominate Senegalese national political life, local electoral environments are much more fluid. The decision of a party to run in a coalition or not is largely a function of local party strength and a given party may run alone in some local governments while running as part of a coalition in others. Still, there has been an increase in the prevalence of coalitions locally. From approximately 15% of lists being coalitions in 2009, for example, the 2014 elections saw over 60% of lists representing coalitions, many of them locally comprised with no national presence.

Table 1

Senegalese electoral competition since 2000 - National versus local dynamics in electoral list

National Elections		# First round candidates	Total # electoral lists
Presidential 2012		12	
Legislative 2012			24
Presidential 2007		15	
Legislative 2007			14
Presidential 2000		8	
Legislative 2000			25

Local Elections						
	Total # lists	Avg # lists per LG	Max # lists in a LG	Avg # LGs per list	% lists running in <10 LGs	% lists running in >50 LGs
Locals 2014	167	4.2	10	9.3	89.8%	2.9%
Locals 2009	58	2.9	11	25	73.8%	9.5%
Locals 2002	17	2.6	6	69	41.6%	25%

Data calculated from National Electoral Returns. Unit of analysis is electoral list (party or coalition).

There are two important consequences of these national-level political dynamics at the local level. First, as mentioned above, local electoral politics are quite competitive; it is extremely rare that one party can dominate local elections. In the 2014 local elections, for example, roughly 50% of elected councils were won by a party with less than a ten percent gap between themselves and the next highest vote-earning party. Over 25% won by a margin of five percent or less. Because of the mixed proportionality-plurality model, we ultimately see less diversity within local government councils than vote share would predict. Still, this has not resulted in complete dominance by larger parties. The proportionality rules still encourage small parties to compete (Kelly 2020, 32) and many smaller parties have proven capable of winning local elections when they can recruit prominent local candidates to lead their party lists; a trend that has grown over time.

A second consequence that emerges directly from the proliferation of political parties is a high degree of partisan switching, as local politicians strategically align with parties in an effort to gain a prominent place on electoral lists, to gain favor with prominent national politicians, or both. This is seen most clearly among the presumptive or incumbent candidates for the local mayor. As noted, mayors almost always run as the first candidate on a party's majority list and, although not legally required, in practice win the post by virtue of the skewed nature of seat allocation. Local politicians who want a high-ranking spot on an electoral list can then either attempt to prove their worth (or 'electoral weight') to leaders of more established parties or seek a smaller party to run with.

The proliferation of parties in the country thus undercuts incentives for local political entrepreneurs to remain loyal to any given national party, a reality encouraged by national party leaders who frequently recruit local politicians to build their party's political base in the countryside.⁴ This generates substantial turnover in party affiliation as local politicians respond to national and local political trends alike. Table 2 illustrates the impact of the increasing fragmentation of the party system at the local level over time. Among the sample of local governments used in this paper - those surveyed in Rounds 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Afrobarometer - we can see that over 40% of mayors in my dataset switch parties between one electoral cycle to the next. Cumulatively, this has increased the diversity of parties winning the majority in local elections, as seen in the decreasing concentration of winning parties. This has not come at the expense of the presidential majority, however, who has won the majority of votes in approximately 63% of local governments quite consistently across the presidencies of Abdoulaye Wade, of the PDS, and Macky Sall's *Alliance pour la république* (APR). Instead, this growing diversity reflects the splintering of the opposition.

⁴ For an example, see Sabaly 24 January 2017.

Table 2

Evidence of Increasing Local Party Switching Over Time

	2002-2009	2009-2014	Total Sample
% Mayor Reran	84	76.9	78.9
% Mayor Switched Parties	28.6	47	41.5
% Switchers who Switch to Pres. Majority	50	40.4	42.4
	2002	2009	2014
% LGs won by Pres. Majority	62.8	63.6	62.6
Winning Party Concentration*	52.3	47.1	40.9

*Calculated with a Herfindahl Index of the number of local governments won by a party. Data calculated from sampled local governments only.

The Senegalese case offers fertile ground to test theories of democratic accountability for these reasons: local governments deliver numerous important services and local elections are highly competitive. Still, Senegal poses three clear scope conditions. Most obviously, there is ample reason to expect that at the level of the central government, drivers of democratic accountability will be distinct from those I identify locally. One reason for this might be that ruling coalitions tend to dominate the party landscape more effectively at the national level, as discussed above. My findings cannot rule out that voters focus on holding incumbent parties accountable in national elections. Nonetheless, recent research shows that while Senegalese voters are keen to hold incumbent legislative deputies accountable, voters are most concerned about the local delivery of goods (46%), with only 4% reporting the deputy's party as the most important factor driving vote choice (Bhandari et al. 2021, p. 6).

Secondly, it bears acknowledgement that Senegal has made more progress in its decentralization reforms than many of its neighbors. Nonetheless, given that most countries on the continent have on-going decentralization reforms⁵ and that this remains

⁵ Over 80% of sub-Saharan African countries have legislation on local governance and 75% have some

a significant area of donor interest, the country's experiences still offer useful lessons for the subregion. Even acknowledging that the empirical findings of this study are likely geographically bounded, however, invites future reflection on how the features of electoral systems and party environments interact to constrain or enable different manifestations of democratic accountability, a question has been prominent in the broader comparative literature (see Franklin et al. 2014), but often absent from work in sub-Saharan Africa.

Finally, although many countries are experiencing party proliferation, one critical dynamic in the Senegalese case is the existence of meaningful party competition. The dynamics behind party creation and its implication for local governance are likely to be far different in countries like Cameroon or Uganda, for example, where the dominant, authoritarian party always wins elections.

3.2 Qualitative Evidence of Local Personal Vote-Seeking

I draw on qualitative data from original fieldwork to illustrate two key points for my argument: first, local politicians view their personal reputations as divorced from the parties they run with and, secondly, local politicians feel pressure to respond to constituent demands.

These dynamics are seen clearly in the reelection of the mayor of Ida Mouride to a third term in 2014. During his second term in office, the mayor had constructed three new health facilities, one new elementary school and extended the piped water grid to over 20% of the community's villages and the community rewarded his 'long standing service to the community.'⁶ Yet in what was a highly competitive election, the mayor did not win under the influential banner of President Sall's APR, but by running instead with a newer and much smaller party - the *Mouvement pour la Démocratie et*

form of local elections (<https://knowledge.uclga.org/-L-environnement-institutionnel-des-collectivites-territoriales-.html?lang=fr/>).

⁶ Interview, local government councilor, Kaffrine Region, 10 February 2016.

les Libertés or MODEL. The mayor had intended to run with the APR, but in a common story heard across the country, the approach of the 2014 locals fostered intra-party rivalries within many local party branches as rival factions clambered for top place on the APR's majoritarian list.⁷ Sensing that he didn't need the APR to win, the mayor joined MODEL, where he was assured a spot at the top of the list. The mayor acknowledged that this had not been costless, requiring significant leg work on his part to alert people to follow him to this relatively unknown party, "but they [the citizens] know me, and they know that I work," he concluded.⁸ Ultimately, the mayor won reelection, with MODEL winning the largest vote share in two-thirds of the local government's voting booths.

Interviews across the community told a similar story. In the words of one local bureaucrat, the mayor had been underestimated by other political actors in the area and "he won with MODEL because he is so popular, he has produced a lot for the community." MODEL as a party label conveyed little in and of itself, he continued, but it served its purpose as a vehicle for the mayor to get his name before voters.⁹ The way in which voters personalize local political loyalties is illustrated well in the response of one village chief when asked about his village's political leanings: "we follow the mayor and right now he is with the MODEL."¹⁰ Indeed, none of the village chiefs that I interviewed in 2014 offered a contrasting story. "The APR may be the most influential party," another chief observed, "but the mayor is the most influential person."¹¹

The case of Ida Mouride substantiates a core dimension of my argument: a politician's reputation becomes their most valuable brand, rather than their partisan identity, which they are less bound to for electoral success. This is not to deny that

⁷ 53.8% of local governments saw more than one member party of President Sall's BBY national coalition run in 2014. A full 10% of local governments saw three or more parties from the coalition compete against each other locally.

⁸ Interview, Kaffrine Region, 8 February 2016.

⁹ Interview, Kaffrine Region, 9 February 2016.

¹⁰ Interview, Kaffrine Region, 8 February 2016.

¹¹ Interview, Kaffrine Region, 8 February 2016.

party affiliation is a relevant factor nor that some mayors win because they are on the list of a prominent party; Ida Mouride's mayor did, after all, originally want to run with the APR. But even as interviewees spoke of alignment with the President as a useful signal of a candidate's ability to deliver future benefits, at the end of the day, no one thought this would outweigh the performance of an incumbent with a proven record in their community. My interviews suggest that politicians anticipate sanctions for *failing* to deliver services more than anything else. When asked whether he would run in the upcoming 2014 local elections, a mayor in Ziguinchor Region could only sigh in the face of his admittedly weak performance in office. "I will discuss it with the population," he responded, before detailing his skepticism that such a conversation would go well.¹² Ultimately, he opted not to run.

That others in the community weigh personal characteristics over party is supported by the fact that 33% of village chiefs (n=318) interviewed in 2013 reported that their first criteria for choosing candidates to support was their campaign promises, with a full 24% simply saying they vote for whom they 'like' or, more often, 'have hope in.' Only 16.8% indicated that they vote based on political party.¹³ Across rural Senegal, therefore, local politicians and opinion leaders agree that elected officials must deliver and, critically, that they must deliver the visible infrastructure that citizens desire.

For their part, national parties actively try to recruit prominent local leaders to bolster their local electoral fortunes. As one local government secretary described of his local government in 2016: "the APR sees now that [the mayor] is influential, that he is important, that he is with another party. They are going to court him inevitably, coming with suitcases of money..."¹⁴ But for local politicians, these promises are fleeting. Political parties are seen as stingy, not delivering on their promises, or using local alliances opportunistically during elections only to disappear once they were over. This

¹² Interview, 9 March 2013.

¹³ See Author 2021 for a discussion of this data.

¹⁴ Interview, Diourbel Department, 17 February 2016.

is not to deny exceptions; citizens in local governments that benefit from administrative redistricting dictated from the center tend to reward national incumbents positively (Gottlieb et al. 2019). Yet here again the presence of well-known local politicians plays a prominent role. Take, for example, the case of Fass Thiekene, which became its own local government in 2009 following the petitioning of Senator El Hadji Mouhamed Dieng, a close ally of then President Abdoulaye Wade. Dieng was subsequently elected mayor of the new local government. “You cannot fool the population,” Fass Thiekene’s local government secretary summarized of Dieng’s election, “people know who is useful and who helps them.”¹⁵ National-local relationships clearly matter but are often interpreted locally as being a property of local politicians, part of a broader portfolio they offer their constituents, rather than reflecting attributes of political party in and of itself.

4. Evidence from Electoral Returns

Local politicians may perceive a need to build a personal reputation as a competent provider of basic social services to win reelection, but does delivering new public goods actually generate electoral benefits for the incumbent? I test this question by looking at voting-booth level electoral results from the 2002, 2009 and 2014 local elections for a subset of Senegal’s local governments - those surveyed by the Afrobarometer data I employ in the next section - between 2002 and 2014.

4.1 Electoral Return Data

4.1.1 Electoral Dependent Variables

I assemble a dataset on local electoral returns, provided by Senegal’s *Direction General des Elections*, for the 2002, 2009 and 2014 local elections. To do so, I match each polling location to the geographic coordinates of its village using GIS data provided

¹⁵ Interview, Kaffrine Region, 10 February 2016.

by the *Centre de Suivi Ecologique* in Dakar. On average, approximately 37% of villages have their own polling location. Because not all villages have voting booths, I construct Voroni diagrams in ArcGIS, which divides a local government's territory into polygons around each polling site, to assign villages to their most geographically proximate polling station. Comprehensive lists of actual village assignments by vote booth are not available, but the assignment process is not subject to local political influence. Sub-prefects, deconcentrated state officials, propose new voting booth locations to the country's electoral commission who reviews all requests. Distance is the key criterion for assignment and once created, voting booths are rarely eliminated, suggesting that my spatial assumption is plausible.¹⁶ In 2014, over 75% of villages were within two kilometers of the nearest voting booth.

My data allows me to distinguish between two key outcomes: the percent of a polling location's vote share that goes to the incumbent political party and the percent that goes to the incumbent mayor.¹⁷ To do so, I code (a) whether a mayor reran, (b) what party he ran with and, in turn, (c) whether he was reelected. The latter is more straightforward than the former. Because local electoral lists are not centralized, I assembled data on which mayors reran by reading local newspaper coverage, looking to available documentation of local council composition as well as by employing a research assistant in Dakar to fill remaining gaps. I drop the small number of cases where it remains unclear whether an incumbent reran or not ($n = 4$) as well as eighteen cases where administrative redistricting rendered a unit without a viable incumbent.¹⁸ As noted earlier, a large percent of mayors switch parties ($\sim 40\%$) and the majority rerun ($\sim 63\%$). Although there is a relationship between rerunning and one's record of public

¹⁶ Interview Bernard Cisse, *Direction Générale des Elections*, Dakar, 12 February 2016

¹⁷ Results are collapsed by village when a village is home to multiple polling sites. Given the tendency to form coalitions in Senegalese parties, I code incumbents as winning if a member party of the coalition wins the next election.

¹⁸ For example, an incumbent mayor whose district was split would only be eligible to run in one unit. Approximately 26% of local governments in my sample had experienced some form of redistricting between 2002 and 2014, slightly below the national average of 33%.

goods delivery, there is little evidence that better or worse performing mayors are more likely to switch parties in general or switch to the presidential majority, in particular (See Appendix C).

4.1.2 Independent Variables

I pair these electoral returns with an original dataset on village-level public goods delivery by matching villages to their stock of public goods in the three electoral years under study (2002, 2009 and 2014). The village-level public goods data comes from the Senegalese Ministry of Education, the Senegalese Ministry of Health, the *Programme d'Eau Potable et d'Assainissement du Millénaire* (PEPAM) and the 2000 and 2009 rounds of the *Enquête villages sur l'accès aux services sociaux de base*, conducted by the Senegalese National Agency for Statistics and Demography. When possible, data is verified and adjusted with information from local government planning documents (*Plan local du développement*, or PLDs) and reports on local water infrastructure (*Plan Local d'Hydraulique et d'Assainissement*, or PLHAs).

This dataset focuses on the most significant infrastructure investments under the responsibility of Senegal's local governments: education and basic health facilities. I calculate three measures of new public goods delivery at the level of the voting booth. First, I measure the percent of villages in the voting booth's catchment area that have a locally provided public good to measure the number of goods delivered. Put otherwise, what percent of villages have at least one service? I secondly look at the average distance that villages voting at a given polling location must travel to the nearest primary school and clinic. This variable is inverted so that the results can be read more intuitively as the average reduction in villages' average distance to local services during the incumbent's term in office.¹⁹ Finally, I look at the average number of total goods per

¹⁹ Because this is calculated with point and because villages naturally vary in size, in reality there will be some variation in travel distance within villages.

village in a catchment area, allowing me to capture repeat delivery to villages during an incumbent's term. All three sets of measures are calculated at two time periods, allowing me to compare the stock of locally provided goods on the eve of local elections (2014, 2009) to what was available at the onset of the incumbent's term (2009, 2002), effectively estimating the impact of newly delivered infrastructure.

One of the highest demand services in rural areas - clean water infrastructure - is technically not devolved to the local level, but many local governments are nonetheless very active in this domain. Because many smaller-scale clean-water projects, like modernized wells or extending piped water grid, are provided by local governments, not considering their potential impact on voter evaluations risks underestimating the effect of incumbent performance. Accordingly, I suggest we think of these as coproduced goods between the local and central state and I include basic water infrastructure in a subset of models to account for the possibility that voters take into account incumbent efforts to improve access to clean water. I reproduce the three variables laid out above but include whether a village received new basic water infrastructure to each measure.

I standardize all variables so that coefficients indicate the effect of a one standard deviation shift in the independent variable to facilitate comparison across coefficients. These variables are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3

Measures of Service Delivery - Electoral Data

Locally delivered public goods			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Range</i>
% Villages with Services	% villages in voting booths catchment area with a locally provided public good	0.47	0 - 1
Avg Dist LG Services	Average inverted distance (km) to nearest primary school and basic health facility for villages within a voting booth's catchment area	2.7	-84 - 0
Avg Ttl Goods per Village	Average number of total goods per village in a voting booth's catchment area	0.77	0 - 5
With coproduced water infrastructure			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Range</i>
% Villages with Services w/ H2O	% villages in voting booths catchment area with a locally provided public good + clean water infrastructure	0.66	0 - 1
Avg Dist LG Services w/ H2O	Average inverted distance (km) to nearest primary school and basic health facility + clean water infrastructure for villages within a voting booth's catchment area	3.1	-58 - 0
Avg Ttl Goods per Village w/ H2O	Average number of total goods per village in a voting booth's catchment area + clean water infrastructure	1.27	0 - 6

4.1.3 Difference-in-Difference Design

Because I have electoral return data as well as counts of local services available in each village for the years of three local elections, 2002, 2009 and 2014, I analyze this data with a difference-in-difference design. Employing linear regressions with fixed effects by time-period and voting booth, I model the effect of changes in a voting booth's social service access on changes in vote share for the incumbent party or mayor in subsequent elections. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the vote bureau. The time and unit fixed effects control for time invariant factors. This means that demographic characteristics that are relatively static in the short-term or baseline levels of access and need are absorbed in the model.

This modeling strategy assumes that the estimated relationship between changes in service delivery and changes in vote shares is not driven by an omitted time *variant* confounder. To address this concern, I include a small set of potential confounders that

are likewise differenced to account for changes over time. Mayors and parties elected in more competitive local governments might be more likely to deliver more services, for example, and I control for the number of political parties running lists in each local election accordingly. Models include a measure of whether the party or mayor was in the presidential majority and whether the mayor ran for reelection or not. Models estimating mayoral vote share include a measure of whether the incumbent party ran for reelection as well. Third, because parties and mayors rerunning in local governments that were redistricted face distinct redistributive and electoral environments when they run for reelection, I include a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a local government was redistricted during an electoral term or not. Finally, we might expect that there are time-dependent differences in electoral cycles, leading me to control for whether a unit is observed in the first or second time-period under study. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Appendix B.

4.2 Do Voters Reward Incumbents Electorally When They Receive Public Goods?

Results are presented in Figures 1-3. Figure 1 looks at the effect of improved service delivery on the percent change in votes for the incumbent party and incumbent mayor. Comparing across these two measures of incumbency, incumbent mayors appear to benefit the most from service investments. The strongest effect is seen in the percent of villages at a polling location with at least one local government service. Here, a one standard deviation shift in service access - equivalent to increasing the percent of villages with a service by 21% - increases the mayor's vote share by 17%. Mayors further improve their vote share when they reduce the distance that voters face to the nearest average social services; a one standard deviation reduction in average distance to the basket of local government provided social services, equivalent to approximately four kilometers, generates a one and a half percentage point increase in vote share on average. The increase doubles when we include coproduced water infrastructure in the

measure. These findings do not translate easily to the incumbent political party. Figure 1 suggests that many of the benefits seen for incumbent mayors are insignificant for parties. The exception is the first model which suggests that parties do see vote share increases for improving the percent of villages with a service, but this effect is nine percentage points smaller than that found for mayors. Interestingly, increasing the percent of villages with access to services including water infrastructure is associated with a decrease in party vote share by three and a half percentage points on average. Less surprisingly, vote share for both measures of incumbency decrease as local elections become more competitive and more parties run (see full model results reported in Appendix D).




Fig. 1. % Change in Vote Share (Standardized Coefficients with 90 & 95% CIs)

Note: Results of linear models with time and unit fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at polling location.

Figure 1 suggests that voters reward their incumbent mayor more than the incumbent political party for local social service delivery. Given the nature of Senegal's party environment, however, is voter support of the mayor contingent on their choice of which party to run with? I turn to this question in a series of models that interact social service delivery with whether a mayor switched political parties. The results are displayed in Figure 2, which plots the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in each measure of public goods delivery interacted with a categorical variable capturing the incumbent mayor's choice of partisanship: incumbents in the opposition may choose to remain in the opposition, switch to another opposition party or switch to the presidential majority, while mayors elected under the presidential majority can remain with that party or join the opposition.

If voters reward well-performing mayors regardless of their party choice, we should see little difference in significance across their choice of which party to run with within each set of models. Figure 2 gives tentative support for this. For purely locally produced public goods, it does not appear to matter which party the mayor runs with. The sole exception is a penalty incumbents seem to face when they switch between opposition parties despite making improvements to minimize the average distance to basic social services. In contrast, mayors who deliver more co-produced goods see a more varied fate; those who ensure a greater proportion of villages at each voting booth have at least one public good including water infrastructure are punished when they switch to the presidential majority but rewarded if they remain in the presidential majority. Conversely, incumbents who do more to minimize the average distance to local public goods including water are rewarded if they switch to the presidential majority as well as if they remain in the opposition.




Fig. 2. Marginal effect of one SD shift in goods delivery x party switching on vote share (with 95% confidence intervals)

Note: Results of linear models with time and unit fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at polling location.

I probe this relationship in a final series of models that examine whether a party’s electoral performance is conditional on the mayor rerunning on the party list or not. I interact the same measures of local service delivery introduced above with a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the incumbent mayor reran with the incumbent party. These results are visualized in Figure 3.²⁰ As seen in the first row of results, a substantial improvement in the percentage of villages at a voting booth with at least one service (co-produced or otherwise) significantly improves the incumbent party vote share when the mayor runs with the locally incumbent party relative to when he does not. This effect appears somewhat bounded by the nature of how we measure new service delivery, but there is a similarly positive effect for improving the total number of goods per village by approximately one to three services as well; this is the

²⁰ These variables are not standardized to ease interpretation.

most commonly observed outcome for both measures of service delivery in the bottom row. Mirrored effects of the interactions, as recommend by Berry et al. 2012), can be found in Appendix E.




Fig. 3. Marginal effects of mayor rerunning with incumbent party*service delivery on incumbent party vote share (with 95% confidence intervals)

Note: Results of linear models with time and unit fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at polling location.

In sum, data from local electoral returns indicate that voters reward incumbents for social service delivery, but that incumbent mayors tend to fare better than locally incumbent parties and that locally incumbent parties tend to fare better when the incumbent mayor remains on their party lists. These effects would be largely obscured if we were to look at incumbent party vote share alone.

5. Evidence from Attitudinal Data

Voters who receive new social service investments may reward incumbents, but is

there evidence that this is driven by a change in attitudes about local government performance? I briefly assess whether receiving a new social service or access to a new social service correlates with subsequent evaluations of local governance on the part of rural Senegalese respondents to the Afrobarometer to evaluate whether attitudinal mechanisms correspond to expectations of democratic theory.

5.1 Data Overview

I employ four, georeferenced rounds of the Afrobarometer - rounds 2, 4, 5 and 6 - for a total sample of 2,438 rural respondents.²¹ I match enumeration areas to the public goods dataset introduced in section 4.1.2 to generate inventories of public goods in each respondent's village as well as their local government as a whole for the year the survey was conducted and the year of the previous local government election (2002 or 2009). Because the data is not a panel, I am unable to track over time changes in individual public opinion, but the data do allow me to assess how actual public goods delivery impacts respondents' political evaluations rather than relying on an individual's own subjective evaluations of access.

The Afrobarometer samples within enumeration areas, meaning that respondents are nested within the same local government (the average local government in the dataset sees respondents from 2.6 villages interviewed). Because this violates assumptions of independence among units of observation, I estimate the effects of new service delivery on Afrobarometer respondents' attitudes using hierarchical models. This includes mixed-level logistic regression for binary dependent variables as well as mixed-level linear regressions, as introduced below. Models also include fixed effects for a respondent's survey round and the electoral time-period (2002-2009 or 2009-2014), which, along with the control variables detailed in section 5.1.3, help account for likely sources of confounding. A map of local governments surveyed can be found in Appendix

²¹ Round 3 is not included because villages are not georeferenced below the local-government level.

F.

5.1.1 Attitudinal Dependent Variables

The Afrobarometer surveys provide several questions with which to evaluate how public goods delivery shapes respondents' evaluations of their local government. This includes a respondent's evaluation of the performance of their local government councilor ('do you approve or disapprove of how your local councilor has performed their job over the past twelve months?'), which I dichotomize by collapsing the categories of 'approve'/'strongly approve' and 'disapprove'/'strongly disapprove.' A second variable captures how much a respondent trusts their local elected council, measured on a four-point scale (ranging from 'not at all' to 'a lot'). Similarly, I examine whether respondents who receive access to new public goods evaluate their elected officials as being more responsive to their needs ('how often the councilor listens to people like themselves') than those that did not receive comparable investments. Finally, I exploit a battery of questions about local government performance asked in Round 4 to create an index of respondent's evaluations of their local council's work in health, education, and water infrastructure as well as in local development planning more generally. Collectively, these variables offer generalized insight into respondents' attitudes about their local government, but they are not perfect measures. The first and third question ask about one's local councilor, for example, and do not specify the mayor. Nonetheless, as seen in Figure 4 below, attitudes generally seem to move together, suggesting that political reputations may track with overall evaluations of the state.

5.1.2 Attitudinal Independent Variables

As with the electoral data, I construct two measures of respondents' exposure to new social services, to capture varying levels of spatial proximity to respondents. First, I construct a count measure of services delivered directly to a respondent's village: did a

village receive any of three key public goods - a new primary school, a new preschool, or a new basic health facility? Secondly, I account for the possibility that individuals will assess their local government's performance as a whole by measuring the percent of villages in a local government receiving access to a new locally delivered service. This measure is logged to account for skewness in the data. As with the electoral data, I replicate these measures to include co-produced basic water infrastructure. These variables are summarized in Table 4.

Table 4
Measures of Service Delivery - Attitudinal Data

Locally delivered public goods			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Range</i>
New in Village	Number of new locally provided public goods in village	0.49	0 - 3
In % Villages Receiving New Goods	% of villages in a local government gaining a new locally provided public good (logged)	-2.33	-4.51 - -0.56
With coproduced water infrastructure			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Range</i>
New in Village w/ H2O	Number of new locally provided public goods in village + clean water infrastructure	0.67	0 - 3
In % Villages Receiving New Goods w/ H2O	% of villages in a local government gaining a new locally provided public good + clean water infrastructure (logged)	-1.52	-3.49 - -0.09

Of course, several potential confounders may influence the relationship between the receipt of new public goods and a respondent's evaluation of their local government. I include a range of controls that cover (a) a respondent's demographic characteristics, including their ethnicity and partisanship, (b) their baseline level of public good access, (c) past electoral competitiveness at the nearest polling location to their village, (d) levels of ethnic diversity in their area and (e) whether their local government was redistricted during the electoral cycle under study. These control variables are detailed in Appendix B.

5.2 Do Individual's Evaluations of the Local State Improve Following Service Delivery?

Figure 4 presents odds ratios and coefficients for the effects of new service delivery on attitudes towards the local state. Full model results can be found in Appendix G. Across models, delivery of village-specific infrastructure generates the most consistent reward for local politicians. There is a 30% increase in the odds of a respondent evaluating their local councilor's performance positively when their village has received a local government good (co-produced or not). The delivery of new local government services likewise significantly improves evaluations of local government performance among Round 4 respondents, and, across rounds, respondents appear to trust their local government more when they receive new investments. The notable exception is that there is no effect of receiving a good on the degree to which respondents' think their local elected councilors listen to people like themselves. Additional robustness checks are presented in Appendix H. Notably, the effects do not appear to be driven by female respondents, who may disproportionately benefit from the services under study, nor by respondents' baseline level of access. Results are not sensitive to the exclusion of Round 6 respondents, who were surveyed in an election year and, as shown in Appendix I, respondents do not appear to systematically conflate services delivered by the central and local government.




Fig. 4. Does Receiving New Services Improve Evaluations of the Local Government? (with 95% confidence intervals

Note: Results of mixed-level logit (panel a) and linear models with robust standard errors (panels b-c).

Not all measures of new service delivery perform equally well, however. Voters appear to be influenced by goods targeted in their immediate vicinity, but not the

performance of the local state as a whole, as seen in the null effects of the logged percent of village receiving new goods. Together with the electoral results from Section 4, this serves as an important complement to Kramon and Posner's (2013) call for scholars to recognize the potential biases induced by the study of a single public good. My findings suggest in corollary that how we measure social service distribution is equally important. Looking at higher levels of aggregation in Figure 4, for example, would obscure or negate altogether the degree to which voters are in fact responding to the delivery of goods by the local state.

6. Conclusion

This paper assesses a core assumption of democratic theory that has only rarely been studied in Sub-Saharan Africa: do voters' attitudes and voting behavior reward incumbents who deliver the social services they desire? Looking at the case of decentralized Senegal, I conclude that voters are highly responsive to targeted social service delivery, weighing the reception of new public goods heavily when evaluating the performance of local incumbents. My findings come with a caveat however: the benefits for well-performing incumbents are more likely to accrue to individual mayors than the locally incumbent party. This finding may strike some as unsurprising given Africa's long history of personalized politics, but in contrast to dominant expectations that this would undermine accountability, I suggest that voters may be quite rational to turn to politicians' individual reputations in contexts where parties themselves are poor cues for future performance.

This holds important implications for the study of democratic accountability and decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa. It firstly suggests that we theorize the national party environment as an important scope condition for our expectations about where democratic accountability will emerge. My findings indicate that the dynamics of democratic accountability in young democracies may not follow a uniform path. Where

political parties are less reliable cues to voters given broader volatility in the party environment, voters may invest in the reputations of local politicians instead of party brands. While studying how electoral rewards accrue to the incumbent party makes ample sense in stable two-party or dominant party regimes, therefore, looking broadly across the continent demands we think through what options voters have for holding their elected officials accountable. Despite the fact that Senegal's local electoral system is expected to minimize the role of personal reputations to the benefit of the party (Carey and Shugart 1995), Senegalese voters appear to view *candidates* as more reliable cues of future public goods delivery than parties. This echoes the findings of Adida et al. (2019), who observe in Benin – which has also seen a rapid increase in the number of political parties – that voters are similarly more attentive to individual candidates despite also having a formal institutional environment that should prime party loyalty. This suggests that institutional design alone – be it electoral rules or the nature of decentralization reforms - may not generate robust predictions without attention to the broader political context.

A second set of implications for on-going decentralization reforms on the continent follow. Although Senegal decentralized earlier and more extensively than many countries in the region, nearly all African countries have begun decentralization reforms of their own. The assumption that decentralization will encourage government accountability has been core to the international community's push for these reforms. My findings from Senegal thus serve as evidence that decentralization reforms are capable of bolstering accountability: voters are watching what their local governments do and attempting to hold them accountable. Some might view the fact that voters reward incumbent mayors in lieu of incumbent parties as normatively suboptimal for local democratic consolidation, but this should not obscure the emerging consensus among politicians and voters alike that it is the responsibility of the former to deliver to the latter.

Still, the evidence presented here also comes with a word of caution about decentralization's broader impacts on the political environment. One reading of my argument is that decentralization itself may exacerbate national-level patterns of party proliferation. Even if party systems begin to weaken as a function of national-level political choices, local electoral dynamics may amplify these patterns as local political actors gain autonomy at the expense political leaders, as has been documented by Dargent and Muñoz (2011) in Colombia. Qualitative evidence presented in section 3 suggests that ambitious local politicians often pursue local elected office by switching party affiliation while entrepreneurial party elites eagerly search for viable allies in the countryside as a vehicle with which to bolster their value in national coalitions. Put otherwise, even if the nature of the party system shapes the initial degree of decentralization (Riedl and Dickovick 2014), decentralization in turn creates consequential changes for the party environment. In this way, my findings pull out distinct national-local interactions: not only are newly created local governments not mere replicas of central state politics, but as they become increasingly important sites of contesting political power, they may influence national-level political dynamics as well.

CITATIONS

- Adida, Claire, et al. 2019. "Under What Conditions Does Performance Information Influence Voting Behavior? Lessons from Benin." In *Information, Accountability and Cumulative Learning: Lessons from Metaketa I*, edited by Thad Dunning, et al. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Ashworth, Scott. 2012. "Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (1):183-201.
- Balmas, Meital, and Tamir Sheafer. 2015. "Personalization of Politics." In *International Encyclopedia of Political Communication*, edited by Gianpietro Mazzoleni. John Wiley & Sons.
- Bardhan, Pranab, and Dilip Mookherjee. 2006. *Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bayart, Jean-François. 1993. *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. London, UK: Longman.

- Berry, William, et al. 2012. "Improving Tests of Theories Positing Interaction." *Journal of Politics* 74 (3):653-671.
- Bhandari, Abhit, et al. 2021. "Able and Most Willing: An Empirical Anatomy of Information's Effect on Voter-Driven Accountability in Senegal." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Bleck, Jaimie, and Nicolas van de Walle. 2018. *Electoral politics in Africa since 1990*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Briggs, Ryan. 2014. "Aiding and Abetting: Project Aid and Ethnic Politics in Kenya." *World Development* 64:194-205.
- Bussell, Jennifer. 2019. *Clients and Constituents: Political Responsiveness in Patronage Democracies*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Cain, Bruce, et al. 2013. *The Personal Vote: Constituency service and electoral independence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Carey, John, and Matthew Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to cultivate a personal vote." *Electoral Studies* 14 (4):417-439.
- Creevey, Lucy, et al. 2005. "Party Politics and Different Paths to Democratic Transitions: A Comparison of Benin and Senegal." *Party Politics* 11 (4):471-493.
- Dargent, Eduardo, and Paula Muñoz. 2011. "Democracy against Parties? Party System Deinstitutionalization in Colombia." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 3 (2):43-71.
- de Kadt, Daniel, and Evan S. Lieberman. 2020. "Nuanced Accountability: Voter Responses to Service Delivery in Southern Africa." *British Journal of Political Science* 50 (1):185-215.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An economic theory of political action in a democracy*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Franklin, Mark, et al. 2014. "Elections and accountability." In *Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Garzia, Diego. 2013. "Changing Parties, Changing Partisans: The Personalization of Partisan Attachments in Western Europe." *Political Psychology* 34 (1):67-89.
- Gottlieb, Jessica, et al. 2019. "A Signaling Theory of Distributive Policy Choice: Evidence from Senegal." *Journal of Politics* 81 (2):631-647.
- Harding, Robin. 2015. "Attribution and Accountability: Voting for Roads in Ghana." *World Politics* 67 (4):656-689.
- Jablonski, Ryan. 2014. "How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid Distribution." *World Politics* 66 (2):293-330.
- Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. 1982. "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood." *World Politics* 34.
- Kelly, Catherine. 2020. *Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6/7):845-879.
- Kramon, Eric, and Daniel Posner. 2013. "Who Benefits from Distributive Politics? How the Outcome One Studies Affects the Answer One Gets." *Perspectives on Politics* 11 (2):461-474.
- Kuenzi, Michelle, and Gina Lambright. 2001. "Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries." *Party Politics* 7 (3):437-468.
- Lierl, Malte, and Marcus Holmlund. 2019. "Performance Information and Voting Behavior in

- Burkina Faso's Municipal Elections." In *Information, Accountability and Cumulative Learning: Lessons from Metaketa I*, edited by Thad Dunning, et al. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Lindberg, Staffan, and Minion Morrison. 2008. "Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana." *Political Science Quarterly* 123 (1):95-122.
- Marx, Benjamin. 2018. "Elections as Incentives: Project Completion and Visibility in African Politics." Working Paper. <https://sites.google.com/view/bmarx/research?authuser=0>
- Mkandawire, Thandika. 2015. "Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic Performance in Africa." *World Politics* 67 (3):563-612.
- Mueller, Lisa. 2017. "Personal politics without clientelism? Interpreting citizen-politician contact in Africa." *African Studies Review* 61 (2):28-54.
- Olowu, Dele, and James Wunsch. 2004. *Local Governance in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Osei, Anja. 2012. *Party-voter linkage in Africa : Ghana and Senegal in comparative perspective, Ghana and Senegal in comparative perspective*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Resnick, Danielle. 2013. "Continuity and change in Senegalese party politics: Lessons from the 2012 elections." *African Affairs* 112 (449):623-645.
- Riedl, Rachel, and J. Tyler Dickovick. 2014. "Party systems and decentralization in Africa." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 49 (3):321-342.
- Sabaly, Elhadji Lonka. 24 January 2017. "Tournée Nationale de Modou Diagne Fada.Le Secrétaire général de LDR/Yessal fait escale dans le Département." https://www.setal.net/Velingara-Politique-Tournee-Nationale-de-Modou-Diagne-Fada-Le-Secretaire-general-de-LDR-Yessal-fait-escale-dans-le_a53214.html.
- Svolik, Milan W. 2013. "Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (3):685-702.
- Vengroff, Richard, and Momar Ndiaye. 1998. "The impact of electoral reform at the local level in Africa: the case of Senegal's 1996 local elections." *Electoral Studies* 17 (4):463-482.
- Zittel, Thomas. 2017. "The Personal Vote." In *The Sage Handbook of Electoral Behaviour*, edited by Kai Arzheimer, et al. London, UK: Sage.

Supplementary Materials

A1: Reported Biggest Problems by Afrobarometer Respondents
A2: Full Model Results - Electoral Data

A2: Descriptive Statistics

A3: Full Model Results - Electoral Data

A4: Figure 3 Mirrored Interactions

A5: Map of Afrobarometer Sample


A6: Full Model Results - Attitudinal Data

A7: Robustness Checks of Figure 5

A8: What role for the Central Government?

A1: Reported Biggest Problems by Afrobarometer Respondents

Figure A1 shows the distribution of responses to a series of three questions in the Afrobarometer that ask respondents to identify their biggest problems and concerns. The figure displays the percent of respondents who list at least one of their three responses in the associated category. As is immediately clear, livelihood concerns are paramount; almost all rural Senegalese interviewed, for example, prioritized some aspect of poverty alleviation, such as the ‘cost of living’ or ‘food security,’ as among their top three biggest concerns. Respondents note problems in the macroeconomy (primarily job creation or ‘the economy’ more generically) and agriculture as the second and fourth most frequent categories. However, the public goods under study here - health, water and education - are also in high demand.



A2: Descriptive Statistics

TABLE A2a: Descriptive Statistics - Electoral Data				
Dependent Variables				
	N	Average	SD	Range
% Votes Incumbent Party	6,465	54.4	36.6	0-100
% Votes Incumbent Mayor	6,331	50.9	27.6	0-100
Independent Variables				
	N	Average	SD	Range
% Villages with Services	5,052	47.09	21.07	0-100
Avg Dist. LG Services	5,053	-2.74	4.3	-84.98-0
Avg Ttl Goods per Village	5,060	0.771	0.689	0-5
% Villages with Services w/ H20	5,052	66.05	22.52	0-100
Avg Dist. LG Services w/ H20	5,053	-3.11	5.16	-58.45-0
Avg Ttl Goods per Village w/ H20	5,060	1.266	0.897	0-6
Control Variables				
	N	Average	SD	Range
Incumbent Party Pres. Majority	5,060	0.673	0.469	0-1
Mayor in Pres. Majority	3,856	0.492	0.5	0-1
Mayor Switched Parties	5,755	0.159	0.366	0-1
Mayor Switched Pres. Majority	5,755	0.238	0.426	0-1
Incumbent Mayor Reran	5,587	0.623	0.484	0-1
Incumbent Party Reran	5,060	0.954	0.209	0-1
Mayor Reran with Party	5,587	0.459	0.498	0-1
# Parties Running	6,285	3.103	1.077	0-7
Administrative Redistricting	5,741	0.193	0.389	0-1
Electoral Cycle 1 (2002-9)	7,683	0.333	0.471	0-1
Electoral Cycle 2 (2009-14)	7,683	0.333	0.471	0-1

TABLE A2b: Descriptive Statistics - Attitudinal Data

Dependent Variables				
	N	Average	SD	Range
Local Councilor Performance	1,683	0.51	0.49	0-1
Local Council Evaluation (Rd 4)	426	1.79	0.76	1-4
Trust in Local Government	2,376	1.93	1.16	0-3
Local Councilor Listens	1,776	1.03	1.12	0-3
Relative Econ. Conditions	2,555	2.68	0.84	1-5
Independent Variables				
	N	Average	SD	Range
New Services in Village	2,653	0.49	0.49	0-3
New Services in Village w/ H20	2,653	0.69	0.67	0-3
Ln % Villages New Access	2,618	2.28	0.71	0.09-4.05
Ln % Villages New Access w/ H20	2,653	3.09	0.63	1.11-4.52
Control Variables				
	N	Average	SD	Range
Age	2,618	39.9	15.2	18-87
Female	2,653	0.48	0.49	0-1
Education	2,642	1.47	1.78	0-9
Lived Poverty	2,613	1.91	0.93	0-4
Own Economic Conditions	2,645	2.51	1.09	1-5
Ln Avg D Baseline Services	2,541	5.31	3.65	0-10.65
Ln Village Population	2,645	6.67	1.54	1.95-11.42
Copartisan LG	2,653	0.63	0.48	0-1
Coethnic Mayor	2,653	0.56	0.49	0-1
Lagged Gap Parties Voting Booth	2,553	0.31	0.25	0-1
Lagged Gap Parties LG	2,629	0.19	0.18	0.00-0.94
Arrondissement ELF	2,621	67.44	16.53	16.66-96.1
Administrative Redistricting	2,653	0.08	0.27	0-1
Electoral Cycle 1 (2002-09)	2,653	0.45	0.49	0-1
Electoral Cycle 2 (2009-14)	2,653	0.55	0.49	0-1
Round 2	2,653	0.29	0.45	0-1
Round 4	2,653	0.25	0.43	0-1
Round 5	2,653	0.23	0.42	0-1
Round 6	2,653	0.23	0.42	0-1

A3: Full Model Results - Electoral Data

	% Votes Incumbent Party					
	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>	<i>M3</i>	<i>M4</i>	<i>M5</i>	<i>M6</i>
% Villages with Services	6.585* (3.364)					
Avg Dist. LG Services		-2.075* (1.232)				
Avg Ttl Goods per Village			2.406 (1.750)			
% Villages with Services w/ H20				-2.723 (1.686)		
Avg Dist. LG Services w/ H20					0.061 (1.370)	
Avg Ttl Goods per Village w/ H20						0.630 (1.544)
Incumbent Party Pres. Majority	1.435** (0.619)	1.241** (0.620)	1.299** (0.616)	1.199* (0.618)	1.275** (0.617)	1.286** (0.617)
Mayor Reran	2.844*** (1.084)	2.678** (1.084)	2.907*** (1.076)	3.155*** (1.115)	2.822*** (1.084)	2.892*** (1.076)
Mayor Reran & Switched Parties	-1.602** (0.717)	-1.852*** (0.712)	-1.784** (0.710)	-1.608** (0.714)	-1.804** (0.711)	-1.821** (0.708)
# Parties Running	-3.327*** (0.743)	-2.969*** (0.712)	-3.045*** (0.714)	-3.505*** (0.809)	-2.996*** (0.713)	-3.080*** (0.722)
Administrative Redistricting	1.566 (3.235)	2.273 (3.261)	1.694 (3.236)	0.328 (3.071)	1.578 (3.221)	1.394 (3.230)
T1	-12.147*** (1.410)	-10.409*** (1.176)	-11.209*** (1.196)	-8.916*** (1.269)	-10.694*** (1.155)	-10.851*** (1.222)
T2	-40.461*** (1.909)	-38.127*** (1.608)	-39.136*** (1.646)	-35.969*** (1.722)	-38.394*** (1.573)	-38.691*** (1.697)
within R2	0.728	0.728	0.727	0.727	0.728	0.727
Number Obs.	3,695	3,692	3,695	3,695	3,692	3,695

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Coefficients from standardized variables and represent a one standard deviation shift. Result of linear regressions with fixed effects by time period and voting booth. Robust standard errors clustered at the voting booth are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A3b: Figure 2 Model Results

	% Votes Incumbent Mayor					
	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>	<i>M3</i>	<i>M4</i>	<i>M5</i>	<i>M6</i>
% Villages with Services	17.992*** (3.221)					
Avg Dist. LG Services		7.505*** (1.463)				
Avg Ttl Goods per Village			3.123** (1.440)			
% Villages with Services w/ H20				-2.627* (1.590)		
Avg Dist. LG Services w/ H20					5.846*** (1.451)	
Avg Ttl Goods per Village w/ H20						1.796 (1.364)
Mayor in Pres. Majority	1.657** (0.645)	2.119*** (0.650)	1.566** (0.663)	1.435** (0.667)	1.388** (0.655)	1.575** (0.665)
Mayor Switched Parties	-1.816** (0.801)	-2.262*** (0.812)	-2.543*** (0.820)	-2.484*** (0.820)	-2.706*** (0.820)	-2.547*** (0.821)
Mayor Switched Parties X Mayor in Pres. Majority	0.826 (0.720)	0.625 (0.713)	0.837 (0.727)	0.947 (0.722)	0.976 (0.723)	0.761 (0.725)
Incumbent Party Reran	-1.417*** (0.511)	-1.698*** (0.539)	-1.604*** (0.537)	-1.644*** (0.536)	-1.603*** (0.538)	-1.618*** (0.537)
# Parties Running	-6.469*** (0.638)	-6.133*** (0.619)	-6.097*** (0.624)	-5.831*** (0.634)	-5.908*** (0.629)	-6.118*** (0.626)
Administrative Redistricting	5.922 (4.260)	5.224 (4.581)	4.451 (4.589)	3.543 (4.675)	4.639 (4.573)	4.344 (4.608)
T1	-13.032*** (1.116)	-8.446*** (0.829)	-7.883*** (0.840)	-8.005*** (1.144)	-7.953*** (0.816)	-7.892*** (0.890)
T2	-18.227*** (1.548)	-11.488*** (1.145)	-10.368*** (1.158)	-10.480*** (1.595)	-10.595*** (1.108)	-10.389*** (1.239)
within R2	0.189	0.192	0.176	0.175	0.184	0.175
Number Obs.	3,640	3,637	3,640	3,640	3,637	3,640

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$. Coefficients from standardized variables and represent a one standard deviation shift. Result of linear regressions with fixed effects by time period and voting booth. Robust standard errors clustered at the voting booth are reported in parentheses.

TABLE A3c: Figure 3 Model Results

	% Incumbent Party Votes					
	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>	<i>M3</i>	<i>M4</i>	<i>M5</i>	<i>M6</i>
% Villages with Services	0.174 (0.173)					
% Villages with Services X Mayor Reran with Party	0.124** (0.059)					
Avg Dist. LG Services		-0.435 (0.277)				
Avg Dist. LG Services X Mayor Reran with Party		0.553 (0.369)				
Avg Ttl Goods per Village			2.345 (2.377)			
Avg Ttl Goods per Village X Mayor Reran with Party			1.134 (1.553)			
% Villages with Services w/ H20				-0.305*** (0.074)		
% Villages with Services w/ H20 X Mayor Reran with Party				0.289*** (0.070)		
Avg Dist. LG Services w/ H20					-0.125 (0.299)	
Avg Dist. LG Services w/ H20 X Mayor Reran with Party					0.426 (0.358)	
Avg Ttl Goods per Village w/ H20						-0.620 (1.721)
Avg Ttl Goods per Village w/ H20 X Mayor Reran with Party						1.815 (1.281)
Mayor Reran with Party	-2.409 (3.399)	5.343*** (1.773)	3.110 (2.093)	-17.636*** (5.644)	5.224*** (1.759)	1.587 (2.543)
Incumbent Party Pres. Majority	1.010* (0.605)	0.929 (0.610)	0.931 (0.603)	0.806 (0.622)	0.892 (0.606)	0.920 (0.605)
Mayor Reran	1.451 (1.234)	0.922 (1.247)	1.136 (1.240)	3.138** (1.311)	0.931 (1.238)	1.194 (1.239)
# Parties Running	-3.056*** (0.723)	-2.704*** (0.691)	-2.762*** (0.694)	-3.319*** (0.786)	-2.710*** (0.695)	-2.790*** (0.703)
Administrative Redistricting	1.521 (3.222)	2.143 (3.248)	1.581 (3.230)	0.231 (3.062)	1.448 (3.209)	1.274 (3.223)
T1	-12.067*** (1.296)	-10.533*** (1.128)	-11.259*** (1.148)	-9.057*** (1.218)	-10.756*** (1.105)	-10.874*** (1.173)
T2	-40.572*** (1.816)	-38.418*** (1.581)	-39.387*** (1.611)	-36.191*** (1.702)	-38.619*** (1.543)	-38.882*** (1.662)
within R2	0.726	0.726	0.724	0.730	0.725	0.724
Number Obs.	4,057	4,054	4,057	4,057	4,054	4,057


*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Coefficients from standardized variables and represent a one standard deviation shift with the exception of the interaction term. Result of linear regressions with fixed effects by time period and voting booth. Robust standard errors clustered at the voting booth are reported in parentheses.

A4: Figure 3 Mirrored Interactions


Theoretically, I expect that the impact of local service delivery on party vote share will be conditioned by whether or not the mayor reruns on the party list. This expectation is symmetrical, however, leading me to replicate the inverse of the interaction as recommended by (Berry et al., 2012). These results are presented in Figure A4. The results are less robust for the third measure of public goods, which was statistically significant at middling levels in Figure 3. Still, there is evidence that mayors who rerun with the party help garner bigger vote shares (or conversely, the mayor not rerunning suppresses vote shares) in the first row of results.

FIGURE A4: Marginal Effects of One SD Improvement in Service Delivery with and without Incumbent Mayor on Incumbent Party Vote Share

with 90 & 95% Confidence Intervals



A5: Map of Afrobarometer Sample



A6: Full Model Results - Attitudinal Data

TABLE A6: Figure 5 Model Results

	Local Councilor Performance (Odds Ratios)				Local Government Eval (Rd 4)				Trust in Local Government				Local Councilor Listens			
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12	M13	M14	M15	M16
New in Village	0.263** (0.122)				0.202*** (0.068)				0.135*** (0.051)				0.024 (0.058)			
In % Villages Receiving New Goods		-0.057 (0.100)				-0.045 (0.063)				-0.014 (0.045)				0.026 (0.049)		
New in Village w/ H2O			0.269*** (0.102)				0.148*** (0.054)				0.123*** (0.044)				0.042 (0.049)	
In % Villages Receiving New Goods w/ H2O				0.136 (0.117)				-0.056 (0.095)				0.001 (0.052)				0.005 (0.058)
Age	0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
Lived Poverty	-0.135* (0.074)	-0.113 (0.074)	-0.136* (0.073)	-0.130* (0.073)	-0.169*** (0.042)	-0.179*** (0.042)	-0.172*** (0.042)	-0.184*** (0.042)	-0.025 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.031)	-0.022 (0.032)	-0.091*** (0.034)	-0.084** (0.035)	-0.092*** (0.034)	-0.091*** (0.034)
Education	-0.063* (0.039)	-0.057 (0.039)	-0.060 (0.038)	-0.060 (0.038)	-0.052** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.023)	-0.047** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.023)	-0.056*** (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.016)	-0.055*** (0.016)	-0.053*** (0.016)	0.001 (0.018)	0.002 (0.018)	0.002 (0.018)	0.002 (0.018)
Female	0.090 (0.123)	0.080 (0.124)	0.093 (0.123)	0.084 (0.123)	-0.044 (0.070)	-0.043 (0.071)	-0.045 (0.070)	-0.046 (0.071)	0.045 (0.054)	0.039 (0.055)	0.045 (0.054)	0.045 (0.054)	-0.038 (0.058)	-0.034 (0.058)	-0.038 (0.058)	-0.038 (0.058)
OwnEconomic Assessment	0.223*** (0.062)	0.211*** (0.063)	0.224*** (0.062)	0.218*** (0.062)	0.163*** (0.040)	0.144*** (0.040)	0.157*** (0.040)	0.144*** (0.040)	0.078*** (0.027)	0.077*** (0.027)	0.078*** (0.027)	0.078*** (0.027)	0.055* (0.030)	0.050* (0.030)	0.055* (0.030)	0.054* (0.030)
In D Baseline Services	-0.045* (0.024)	-0.051** (0.024)	-0.050** (0.023)	-0.046* (0.023)	-0.037** (0.015)	-0.044*** (0.015)	-0.041*** (0.015)	-0.044*** (0.015)	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.024*** (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.009)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.011)
In Village Pop	-0.074 (0.054)	-0.044 (0.054)	-0.077 (0.053)	-0.050 (0.053)	-0.003 (0.033)	0.024 (0.033)	-0.001 (0.033)	0.016 (0.033)	-0.069*** (0.024)	-0.057** (0.024)	-0.068*** (0.023)	-0.057** (0.023)	-0.047* (0.026)	-0.036 (0.026)	-0.049* (0.026)	-0.045* (0.026)
Co-Partisan Mayor	0.023 (0.125)	-0.022 (0.126)	0.029 (0.125)	0.032 (0.124)	0.176** (0.076)	0.178** (0.077)	0.178** (0.077)	0.181** (0.077)	0.104* (0.055)	0.106* (0.055)	0.105* (0.054)	0.107** (0.055)	0.049 (0.060)	0.030 (0.060)	0.050 (0.060)	0.050 (0.060)
Co-Ethnic Mayor	0.107 (0.139)	0.150 (0.140)	0.105 (0.137)	0.102 (0.138)	-0.018 (0.082)	0.007 (0.083)	-0.011 (0.082)	-0.011 (0.083)	0.044 (0.058)	0.052 (0.059)	0.039 (0.058)	0.042 (0.058)	0.072 (0.066)	0.078 (0.067)	0.071 (0.066)	0.071 (0.066)
Lagged Gap Parties at Booth	-0.081 (0.293)	-0.102 (0.295)	-0.167 (0.289)	-0.102 (0.289)	-0.357* (0.183)	-0.273 (0.185)	-0.385** (0.184)	-0.328* (0.185)	0.147 (0.122)	0.154 (0.123)	0.108 (0.122)	0.138 (0.122)	-0.083 (0.144)	-0.075 (0.145)	-0.095 (0.144)	-0.086 (0.143)
Lagged Gap Parties in LG	-0.509 (0.414)	-0.594 (0.421)	-0.461 (0.407)	-0.524 (0.408)	-0.037 (0.375)	-0.311 (0.375)	-0.077 (0.366)	-0.298 (0.377)	-0.253 (0.180)	-0.292 (0.184)	-0.244 (0.178)	-0.270 (0.179)	-0.149 (0.207)	-0.154 (0.212)	-0.139 (0.208)	-0.151 (0.207)
Arrondissement ELF	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Time Period, 2009-2014	-0.163 (0.205)	-0.339 (0.211)	-0.183 (0.202)	-0.206 (0.202)	-0.171* (0.098)	-0.196* (0.102)	-0.182* (0.097)	-0.205** (0.103)	-0.150* (0.082)	-0.203** (0.083)	-0.156* (0.081)	-0.182** (0.081)	-0.113 (0.097)	-0.153 (0.099)	-0.111 (0.096)	-0.117 (0.096)
Administrative Redistricting	-0.087 (0.252)	-0.143 (0.260)	-0.097 (0.248)	-0.098 (0.248)	0.073 (0.120)	0.020 (0.117)	0.056 (0.118)	0.021 (0.120)	-0.054 (0.112)	-0.061 (0.116)	-0.053 (0.111)	-0.061 (0.111)	-0.126 (0.120)	-0.157 (0.124)	-0.127 (0.120)	-0.126 (0.120)
Number Obs.	1,504	1,478	1,504	1,504	383	380	383	383	2,101	2,073	2,101	2,101	1,595	1,567	1,595	1,595
Number L2.	162	159	162	162	43	43	43	43	167	164	167	167	162	159	162	162


*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Standard errors reported in parentheses. All models include fixed effects for survey round.

A7: Robustness Checks of Figure 5

A7a: Figure 1 Replication without Round 6 of the Afrobarometer

Respondents to Round 6 of the Afrobarometer were surveyed in 2014, the same year that local elections were held. Because it is possible that some individuals were surveyed *after* the 2014 local elections, I replicate the models in Figures 1 and Figures 2 but drop all Round 6 respondents. These results, presented in Figure A7a, suggest that Round 6 respondents do not drive the results presented in the main text. With the notable exception of the insignificance of local councilor performance in the replication, respondents' attitudes towards the local state appear to be consistently driven by exposure to local service delivery.

FIGURE A7a: Replication of Afrobarometer Results w/o Round 6
with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals




Note: Results of mixed-level logit (panel a) and linear models with robust standard errors (panels b-c).

A7b: Results with Local Governments Surveyed in Both Time Periods

The sample of local governments employed in this paper is based on the Afrobarometer’s sampling strategy, itself aimed at obtaining a nationally representative sample of Senegalese citizens. This results in some local governments that are sampled repeatedly, and hence are observed over two electoral cycles while others are only surveyed in one period or the other. Figure A7b replicates the findings of Figure 1 in the main text but restricts the sample only to local governments that are observed in both periods. Respondents in these communities are still more positive about their local councilor’s performance and responsiveness, but we do see shifts in some results, most noticeably in the insignificance of service delivery measures on trust in local government. That respondents in these areas are slightly less responsive to service delivery may reflect the reasons that they are repeatedly sampled in the first place, for example, some communities are home to specific ethnic minorities. Still, this remains only twenty-three percent of the overall sample.

FIGURE A7b: Replication of Afrobarometer results with LGs sampled in both time periods with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals




Note: Results of mixed-level logit (panel a) and linear models with robust standard errors (panels b-c).

A7c: Heterogenous Effects by Baseline Access

Could individuals' responses to receiving new public goods investments by their local government be influenced by their baseline level of access? I reproduce the models in Figure 1 by distinguishing between villages that have a high initial level of access to services (health, water, education) and those that had little or no access (defined here as access to one or none of these services), as a test of whether or not there may be a ceiling effect to service delivery. If the political benefits of receiving an additional good weakens as villages become better served by the local state, this would suggest that there are heterogenous effects of delivery.

If anything, the results presented in Figure A7c indicate the inverse. There is little evidence that villages that have no baseline access to services disproportionately reward the local state upon receipt of a new service or new access to services. Instead, what little movement we see in Figure A7c suggests that it is at times respondents who already had a good degree of access who are moved by new service delivery. Nonetheless, the overall message seen in Figure A7c is that my main results are not driven by either the most well-doted or the most deprived villages.

FIGURE A7c: Heterogenous Effects By Baseline Access Level
with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals



Note: Results of mixed-level logit (panel a) and linear models with robust standard errors (panels b-c).

A7d: Does Having a Councilor in Your Village Impact Attitudes?

As seen in Table A7d, results are consistent when models include a dummy variable that captures whether a village is home to a local government councilor or not. Because this data is only available for a subset of surveyed communities, the sample is necessarily reduced. Table A5d does not suggest that respondents in villages with councilors have dramatically different attitudes towards the local state: although the presence of a councilor in one's village does correlate positively with evaluations of one's local councilor's performance, it does not consistently do so across dependent variables. Nor does it overturn the results presented in the main text with the exception of M3 which loses significance and M2, which gains it.

TABLE A7d: Figure 1 Replications - Does Having a Councilor in Your Village Matter?


	Local Councilor Performance (Odds Ratios)				Local Government Eval (Rd 4)				Trust in Local Government				Local Councilor Listens			
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12	M13	M14	M15	M16
New in Village	0.270** (0.122)				0.202*** (0.068)				0.135*** (0.051)				0.027 (0.058)			
In % Villages Receiving New Goods		0.282*** (0.101)				-0.043 (0.062)				-0.014 (0.045)				0.046 (0.050)		
New in Village w/ H20							0.155*** (0.054)				0.123*** (0.044)				0.027 (0.049)	
In % Villages Receiving New Goods w/ H20				0.161 (0.115)				-0.052 (0.094)				0.001 (0.052)				0.012 (0.059)
Councilor in Village	0.481** (0.221)	0.498** (0.218)	0.412* (0.222)	0.489** (0.219)	0.158 (0.209)	0.143 (0.209)	0.228 (0.209)	0.139 (0.212)	-0.010 (0.093)	-0.028 (0.094)	-0.005 (0.092)	-0.021 (0.092)	0.141 (0.109)	0.146 (0.110)	0.127 (0.110)	0.141 (0.110)
Number Obs.	1,504	1,504	1,478	1,504	383	380	383	383	2,101	2,073	2,101	2,101	1,595	1,595	1,567	1,595
Number L2.	162	162	159	162	43	43	43	43	167	164	167	167	162	162	159	162

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Standard errors reported in parentheses. All models include fixed effects for survey round.

A7e: Heterogenous Effects by Gender

All of the goods delivered by the local state have potentially unequal gendered implications. Specifically, we might expect that female respondents will respond most positively to new primary schools and basic health facilities since they are more likely to interact with these facilities if they have young children. Local governments that coproduce water infrastructure further alleviate women's labor. I subset the survey data by gender to see if there is in fact evidence of a particularly strong effect among women. The results, reported in Figure A5d, do not support the idea that female respondents are disproportionately driving the results. With the exception of the outlier effect of the logged percent of villages receiving new goods, including water infrastructure, female respondents do not appear to weigh local service delivery strongly when assessing the local state.

FIGURE A7e: Afrobarometer Replications - Women Only
with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals




Note: Results of mixed-level logit (panel a) and linear models with robust standard errors (panels b-d).

A8: What role for the Central Government?

One concern is that respondents might conflate services delivered by the central and local government. Not only does the national government retain control over ‘quality’ improvements, such as the appointment of personnel, it also makes important parallel investments to devolved domains, such as higher education (middle and high schools), advanced health care (health centers and hospitals) and major water infrastructure (boreholes and water towers). If respondents reward the local state for these investments, it might suggest that they are generically positive about public goods delivery rather than rewarding those who actually did the work to implement a project. Figure A8a establishes that this does not go both ways. I look at a basket of central state investments that are roughly similar to those delivered locally: the central government delivers middle schools and high schools, health centers and hospitals and large-scale water infrastructure, such as boreholes or water towers. Specifically, I examine whether a village receives a new central government good in their village. Because this is a rare outcome, I further include a count measure of the total number of new central government goods delivered to a local government as a whole as well as the average number of new central government services per village. Receiving investments delivered exclusively by the central government does not appear to lead respondents to reward the local government for these investments.

FIGURE A8a: Does Receiving CG Services Improve Evaluations of the Local Government?

LGs Sampled in Both Rounds Only




Afrobarometer respondents do not reward the local state for central state goods, but do they reward the center for goods delivered locally? To test whether the public goods under study here are in fact attributable to the local state I rerun the models presented in Figure 1 of the main text, but substitute central-government evaluations as the dependent variables.²² Specifically, I look at evaluations of the performance of the respondent's deputy in the National Assembly as well as the President in addition to whether or not the Deputy is seen as listening

²² In line with the local government outcome variables, I adjust measures of co-ethnicity and co-partisanship to the national level: whether a respondent is a co-ethnic with the President (President Abdoulaye Wade was Wolof for Round 4 while President Macky Sall, elected in 2012, is Peuhl) and whether a respondent's reported partisanship is the same as the ruling party or coalition in the most recent national election.

to people like the respondent and generic trust in the central government, an averaged measure of reported trust in the President, the National Assembly and the ruling party.

These results, reported in Figure A8b, suggest that respondents do generically reward government actors across levels of government when they receive new investments. Respondents indicate that their deputy listens more, that they have more trust in the central government and they evaluate the Presidents performance more positively. Again, however, these effects are specific to investments that target a respondent's village, with no positive or negative effect for how the local state fares as a whole. This finding is supported in the frequent claims made by local officials that the central government should care about the resources available to the local state. As one mayor argued in 2013, President Macky Sall - despite himself serving as a mayor of Fatick early in his political career - had forgotten what things were like on the ground. If he didn't deliver to rural areas soon, the 2014 local elections would be a challenge for the Presidential majority.²³

FIGURE A8b: Do Respondents Reward the Central Gov. for Local Service Delivery?
with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals




Note: Results of mixed-level logit (panels a-b) and linear models with robust standard errors (panels c-d).

Despite the fact that individuals seem to evaluate central state officials more positively when they have received local investments, survey data from the Afrobarometer suggests that this may not translate into rewards for the incumbent party at the national level as readily as I find it does for local government incumbents. Because the Afrobarometer asks respondents who

²³ Author Interview, Saint-Louis Region, 21 February 2013.

they would vote for if an election was held the next day, I am able to code whether they indicate they would vote for the party that is the local incumbent local government and whether that party is the incumbent at the national level. Because this question was not asked in Round 2, these analyses are limited to later rounds of the survey only. These results are displayed in Figure A8c. Although we see further evidence here of the positive impact of receiving a new social service in one's village on likely votes for the local incumbent, there is no support for the idea that the delivery of new local government services impacts national level vote choice.

FIGURE A8c: Does Service Delivery Correlate with Prospective Vote Choice?
with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals



Note: Results of mixed-level logit models.

Works Cited

Berry, W., Golder, M., & Milton, D. (2012). Improving Tests of Theories Positing Interaction. *Journal of Politics*, 74(3), 653-671.