My goal with this research is to contribute to our current understanding of how contact with and incorporation into the modern world-system may affect the trajectory of change among indigenous peoples. I do this by examining (1) the nature of social organization among the various peoples known collectively as Mississippian; (2) the processes involved in the supplanting of their political, cultural, and economic structures during the sixteenth-century conquest; (3) the changes that occurred within the precolonial Mississippian cultures following their initial contact with European agents in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries; and (4) the impact of such changes on the Mississippian people’s subsequent integration into the world-system. By expanding our understanding of the process of incorporation and the concurrent structural transformations, I seek to extend Chase-Dunn and Hall’s hypothesis that episodes of incorporation, disintegration, and reincorporation may vary in highly predictable and interrelated ways in “interchiefdom systems as well as interstate systems.”

In this essay I employ the methodologies of historical sociology, which are aimed at studying the past to discover how societies operate and evolve. I start from the perspective that we can best understand social change in terms of its historical specificities rather than generalizations that dominate contemporary sociology. I incorporate historical detail gleaned from previously published works from the fields of anthropology, archaeology, and history to develop a detailed explanation of what Peter Peregrine has called the
“Mississippian World-System,” the nature of its sixteenth-century contacts with
European agents, and the effect of those contacts on the area’s subsequent
incorporation into the European world system.3 When did the Mississippian
culture first begin to decline and under what specific conditions? How were
these changes related to contact with early European explorers? The
Mississippians are a fitting case on which to focus since the North American
continent was largely “external” to the modern world-system prior to contact
with European explorers in the decades following 1492. By focusing on this
episode of incorporation and the associated transformation of the
Mississippian system’s social structures and processes, I hope to understand
better the dynamics of change that occur when two “worlds” collide.

INCORPORATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Although Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall assert that territorial
expansion is part of the cycle that all hierarchical polities go through as they
grow in power and size and then decline, the form expansion has taken in the
modern era differs from earlier episodes in a number of ways. A sizable body
of research supports the proposition that expansion of the modern world-
system has been associated at different times with “the remolding of existing
political structures, sometimes their dismemberment, at other times the
fusion of several, and sometimes the creation of entirely new and quite arbi-
trary delimited structures.”4

The nature of incorporation—and, in particular, the point at which an
area becomes “incorporated” into the world-system—has been the subject of
active debate between two major factions that subscribe to the world-system
perspective. On the one hand, Immanuel Wallerstein identifies three types of
areas or intensities of incorporation as the areas relate to the world-system:
(1) external arenas, (2) incorporated areas, and (3) peripheralized areas. In
this view, so long as the core’s trader-type relations with groups in the exter-
nal arena involve only precious goods or plunder, those groups will remain
external to the world-system.5 In this conceptualization, incorporation has
occurred when presumably core areas establish ongoing and systematic rela-
tions with economic actors in the previously external area, the stipulation
being that core agents routinely transport durable goods from the previously
external area to the core. These formerly external areas are incorporated into
the world-system as peripheral zones when, by its expropriation of surplus
from the periphery, the core becomes more prosperous.6 Concurrently,
incorporation may disrupt internal structures in the periphery, where social
institutions, particularly the economy, become dependent on core resources.
Others have followed Wallerstein’s lead and further articulated the concept of
incorporation even as they have failed to demystify it completely.7

Rejecting three or four categories of incorporation as overly simplified,
Hall and Chase-Dunn suggest instead that, because of variation in form and
intensity, we are better served to envision the incorporation of various peoples
into the world-system as falling along a continuum from external to the world-
system to effective or full incorporation.8 These theoretical models share a
number of assumptions, primary among which is the assertion that incorporation has involved in all known cases social changes that unfold over several generations and cumulation—as the region becomes more tightly incorporated into the world economy, "external pressures impinge more forcefully on local groups. When such pressures are sufficiently strong and of sufficient duration the structure of local groups [is] changed." A third shared assumption is that because such changes are structural in nature, they are not likely to be completely reversed even in the unlikely case that the incorporation project is abandoned.

Although territorial expansion is not unique to the modern world-system, the form it has taken since 1492 differs from earlier episodes. In contrast to precapitalist societies, for which intrusion into new territories was largely "irregular, unsystematic, [and] not integral to normal economic activity," expansion in the modern era has had "an orderly, methodical, permanent character." In particular, incorporation has imposed new modes of production and social relations onto the peoples in formerly external arenas through conquest, economic and political domination, or colonization. In fact, a central tenet of current research is that these earliest episodes of contact, exploration, and preemptive colonization in the southeastern section of North America acted—in Wallersteinian terms—as precursors or conditioners to the area's "nominal" or "effective" incorporation into the world-system and, thus, must be recognized as an early part of the incorporation process.

When European colonists made their way to the Western Hemisphere in the early seventeenth century—imbued with the tenets of capitalism and the canons of Christianity—they were on a seemingly divine mission to implement their "civilizational project," the doctrine that legitimized their commitment to civilize the "backward barbarians." In fact, one seventeenth-century scholar and writer candidly elaborated the prevailing English position on colonialism: "The ends to this voyage [to North America] are these: 1. to plant Christian religion. 2. To traffike. 3. To conquer. Or to doe [sic] all three." Clearly, English success at meeting all three goals had a significant impact on the groups who inhabited the region at the time. We can assume that the permanent transformation that the indigenous social order had undergone during the preceding century made implementing their civilizational project easier. In fact, Tocqueville and others attributed England's success at colonizing and "civilizing" North America to a "clean slate advantage," which I argue was the early stages of world-system incorporation that played out during the preceding century.

The Mississippian system, a network of relatively autonomous and highly varied cultures, emerged around 1000 CE and flourished until around 1500 CE. Arguably, the Mississippians made up not so much a single "culture" as a fundamental economic and social system that was "marked by a pervasive and progressive sameness among Indians over a large area of the Southeast." Although there is evidence that the Mississippian system began to decline around 1200 CE, there is no clear consensus on that point or on the causes or pace of that decline. In fact, it is worth noting that R. Barry Lewis cites archaeological evidence to show that the period between 1300 and 1500 CE,
what has been considered the final phase of the Mississippian era, was instead marked by “the greatest social complexity of Mississippian groups in the region.” Nonetheless, within decades of the Mississipians’ first contact with European adventurers, warfare, Europeans’ diseases, and the destruction of Native villages had permanently transformed their social and political order.

THE PRECONTACT MISSISSIPPIAN SYSTEM AND ITS INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

According to extant archaeological evidence the emergence of the Mississippian system generally can be associated with the rise in a horticultural economy based largely on the organized production of maize, beans, and squash; the emergence of a material surplus; and the articulation of a relatively elaborate trade network. Furthermore, one widely recognized feature of the Mississipians was the prevalence of ceremonial mounds that have generally been associated with a hierarchical social system.

Artifacts of trade with people in distant places suggest that the system was part of one or more complex networks that linked powerful leaders together in a “pan-Mississippian web of competition for access to prestige-goods.” This network of relatively autonomous complex chiefdoms—existing alongside less centrally organized social groups—appears to have encompassed most of the region’s people into an integrated set of economic and political linkages that arguably constituted “core-periphery differentiation without much evidence of core-periphery domination.” Still, based on extant archaeological evidence, we can safely conclude that there was a high degree of cultural and structural variability within the Mississippian system.

The Mississippian presence in the southeastern region of North America took three primary regional variants, generally identified as the Middle, South Appalachian, and Plaquemine Mississipians. “A more intensive and formal network of inter-regional trade, and perhaps a greater degree of political centralization (and ascribed positions of authority) distinguished the Middle Mississippian core region more than other Mississippian variants.” By 1000 CE the Middle Mississippian system had encompassed the central Mississippi River valley and the lower Ohio and Tennessee River valleys; it had spread eastward across the Appalachian mountain chain and included middle and eastern Tennessee, northern Mississippi and Alabama, and the northwest corner of Georgia. The system radiated out from the paramount chiefdom located at the large population center at Cahokia and, as the system became less centralized, there were relatively less powerful complex chiefdoms at Moundville, in what now is central Alabama, and at Etowah and Coosa in present-day northwestern Georgia.

The Plaquemine Mississipians’ economy differed from the Middle Mississipians’ in that corn played a less dominant role. Because other non-Mississippian groups, with whom the Plaquemines had few interactions, surrounded them, these non-Mississippian groups buffered the Plaquemines from external pressures that might have been imposed by the Mississippian culture at large, perhaps explaining their uniqueness over time. Evidence suggests
that the South Appalachian Mississippian culture groups that were dispersed across the area south and east of the Appalachians also differed in a number of ways from the Middle Mississippians. In particular, Mississippian groups in that area had a less centralized political organization and that their political and social leaders attained their positions through achievements rather than by way of a system of ascribed social and political ranking. Charles Hudson suggests that the South Appalachian groups may have been more centralized and autonomous at an earlier time before joining the Mississippian system. In fact, he postulates that they may have reorganized themselves around Mississippian-like relations as a defense against encroachment by other groups, possibly Mississippian migrants migrating outward from the Cahokian center.

In spite of their differences, the system of Mississippian chiefdoms constituted a trade network involving the exchange of essential foodstuffs, information, prestige goods, and political and military alliances, all of which were important factors in the physical and social reproduction of local groups and the chiefdoms to which they owed allegiance. These linkages almost certainly would have influenced in important ways the relations between various groups and the internal structures at all levels of the system. They also would have mediated the way class or classlike hierarchies structured the production of ideology and their social reproduction, as well as the relations of production and trade and the accumulation of wealth. While these internal structures would have been important to powerful chiefs exacting tribute from groups within their sphere of influence, they would also have played a critical role in their establishing and maintaining legitimacy over other spatially dispersed and culturally unique groups of people.

**The Internal Organization of the Precontact Mississippian System**

There is irrefutable evidence that the Mississippian chiefdoms, or "societ[ies] with a definite structure, and with some systematic form of political organization . . . [including] a definite mechanism for replacing the political leader." According to the typology proposed by John Scarry and others, simple Mississippian chiefdoms exercised authority and administrative control over a relatively discrete area that comprised small villages or farmsteads surrounded by uninhabited buffer zones. These simple chiefdoms differed in a number of ways from complex chiefdoms in that the latter involved a powerful chief whose sphere of authority was sufficient to establish direct or indirect control over one or more other simple chiefdoms. In turn, paramount chiefdoms enjoyed power over one or more complex chiefdoms and possibly some number of simple chiefdoms, maintaining control that was "one or two administrative levels above the local community." The relations between simple, complex, and paramount chiefdoms were decidedly hierarchical and involved the payment of tribute (for example, corn or preferred selections of deer meat) by the local community to those above it in the hierarchy. They also influenced the distribution to secondary and tertiary mound sites the various exotic status markers that secured regional status positions.
Mound sites that adjoined the larger population centers appear to have been largely ceremonial, administrative, or religious in nature; however, “the common folk may have gotten more than religious advice and alliances from the elites, for there is some evidence . . . that corn was stockpiled at the major centers presumably to carry the general populace through years of bad crops.” Such hoarding may have fostered the legitimacy of elites, forged a sense of solidarity between themselves and nearby non-elites, and lessened intratribal conflict during lean times. In fact, this system of rationing may have been one of any number of ways leader systems mediated local conflict. Given the clear evidence of intergroup conflict and warfare, complex chiefdoms may have emerged in parts of the system—and this appears to have been particularly true in the South Appalachian area—as a way of combining defensive forces against common enemies, perhaps other but stronger Mississippians.

The social organization of the known Mississippian societies arguably made up the beginnings of a class system that would have typified a society in the early stages of developing a state mechanism. Hierarchical classes and status groups were almost certainly important in structuring local relations of social control, particularly at the core. Evidence also shows that elites controlled trade goods, exchange relations, information, and political alliances with other powerful leaders and had the power to incorporate external groups into their sphere of influence, possibly in an attempt to strengthen their own positions. Those external groups may well have allied themselves with the stronger Mississippians because political and economic relationships had been imposed on them.

**Political Structures**

Paramount chiefs exercised ceremonial, political, economic, and administrative control over villages often separated by great distances. For instance, according to his own journals, de Luna helped a powerful chief exact tribute from another chief who had rebelled and withheld tribute. The Coosas of Georgia dominated and exacted tribute from less-powerful bands throughout eastern Tennessee, northeastern Alabama, and northern Georgia. Furthermore, de Soto’s chronicler referred to the powerful Lady of Cofitachequi, who had under her jurisdiction or overlordship numerous villages in what is now South Carolina. These journals provide further evidence that “The Lady” exercised authority over a dozen or more less powerful chiefdoms dispersed between the Atlantic coast and the Blue Ridge Mountains.

Archaeological evidence suggests that trade and social relations cemented the hierarchical relationships between remote local chiefdoms and powerful paramount chiefdoms. Like the burial mounds and mortuary rituals for which the Mississippians are noted, the payment of tribute, “down-the-line” exchange, and powerful ideology are involved. The “link between interregional diplomatic-military activity, basic production, and regional and local settlement patterns [is an] obvious way for large-scale interactions to structure behavior at the local and household levels.” For instance, hierarchical
classlike structures and status groups would have been central to the expansion of the system and the incorporation of remote “external” regions into its network of political, economic, and social relations, perhaps associated with population increases that resulted from the organized production of corn and a subsequent need for new land on which to increase production capacity.45

Resettlement of population groups into remote areas was one way Mississippians could have increased their productive capacity. It was also a way core powers could appropriate control with more certainty over new territories and control the relocation of excess populations by providing at least some degree of security. The folklore of southeastern indigenous groups appears to support this perspective. For instance, the historic group known as the Catawbas, who claimed as their territory much of what is now South Carolina, believed that their ancestors had migrated from the Great Lakes area in some remote past.46 Likewise, the Cherokee share a similar story of their origins that places their ancestral roots in much the same area.47

Economic Structures

The more complex Mississippian social groups, generally located in rich river basins in the interior, produced goods not only to meet the consumption needs of the local populations but also to use as objects of intraregional trade; in return they received from great distances trade goods, with elites controlling their differential distribution to other members.48 Although Natives of the Southeast had engaged in long-distance trade as early as around 3600 BCE, Michael Johnson asserts that trade in many parts of the region lacked spatial and chronological continuity. However, “an extensive trade network appears to have developed during the Woodland period” that involved locals engaging in regularized exchange of locally produced goods, some of which held prestige value elsewhere, in exchange for other goods that they were lacking or found scarce.49 For instance, freshwater pearls appear in archaeological sites far from the coastal areas of what is now South Carolina, where they are indigenous. Archaeologists have found copper from the Great Lakes area in Mississippi. They also have found copper and mica from the Appalachian area in village remains throughout the system and marine shells from the panhandle in what is now northern Florida.50

Trade was not simply internal to the Mississippian system. For instance, the ancient Great Trading Path connected the villages in the Appalachians and the Iroquois in the Northeast, suggesting regularized trade. Archaeologists have found Mississippian trade items far west of the Mississippi and artifacts similar to those from Mesoamerica in Mississippian sites.51 Moreover, there is evidence that after the emergence of the Mississippian system, trade networks expanded, developed into new patterns of distribution and exchange, and began to involve both power and prestige.52 In short, trade was a “critical element in any explanation of the evolution of Southeastern societies” and the social reproduction of their political relations and power structures.53 Through the control of trade relations and the distribution of prestige goods to peripheral areas within the Mississippian system, paramount
and complex chiefdoms gained much of their power. This, in turn, often led to an increase in stability and security in an area where otherwise intertribal warfare was a way of life.\textsuperscript{54}

**EUROPEAN CONTACT AND INCORPORATION**

There is a general consensus that the Mississippian system had begun to disintegrate sometime between 1300 and 1500 CE, possibly from sustained warfare or unsustainable population growth.\textsuperscript{55} However, Lewis makes a convincing argument that disintegration was primarily in the core regions as the system decentralized and that the system was simply going through the normal stages of cycling between complex and simple chiefdoms.\textsuperscript{56} Anderson proposes that such cycling occurs when an area “fails to evolve more efficient higher-level regulatory or control units.”\textsuperscript{57} A third alternative may be that disintegrative changes resulted from direct or indirect contact with Europeans, given the convincing evidence that the Mississippian system was very much in existence in the early sixteenth century. Although there is little agreement as to the extent of those groups’ development or disintegration at the dawn of European colonialism, it is safe to assume that the Mississippian system had already become somewhat unstable.

From before 1500 onward, Spanish ships made contact with people who lived along the coast of Florida and other parts of the Caribbean basin as they searched for “land, slaves, and other sources of wealth.”\textsuperscript{58} Throughout the sixteenth century, while Europeans exported tons of gold and silver, and thousands of enslaved Natives to work on Caribbean plantations, they were also introducing onto what had been “virgin soil” contagious diseases against which the indigenous people had no natural resistance. What ensued has been described as highly lethal “germ warfare” that weakened the ability of the Native populations to ward off the advance of “civilization” and to withstand the forced labor to which they found themselves subjected.\textsuperscript{59}

The journals by Colón and his chronicler, Las Casas, leave us with little doubt that the Europeans’ initial encounters with the Natives were far from amicable. Rather, what emerges is a story of bloody conquest and the enslavement and death of hundreds of thousands of Native people.\textsuperscript{60} Confident of the superiority of European technologies of war, Colón boasted that “with fifty men we could subjugate them all and make them do whatever we want.”\textsuperscript{61} He used considerably more than fifty men to enact his plan and succeeded not in making them do his bidding but in destroying most of the Native populations from the Caribbean islands between 1492 and the 1520s. Their demise came at the hands of soldiers who tortured, mutilated, murdered, enslaved, imposed inhuman labor conditions, and exposed them to contagious diseases. In fact, Sauer estimates that the population of Santo Domingo alone declined from about a million inhabitants to “insignificant numbers” during the relatively short period of Colón’s occupation.\textsuperscript{62} In many ways this first recorded contact established a colonial model that Europeans would apply to their relations with Native populations in North America and elsewhere.
Still, evidence suggests that the Native people did not succumb to their conquerors willingly but rather exerted substantial resistance. However, the warfare that ensued, in the face of the Europeans’ superior technologies of war, further weakened the indigenous people. Europeans kidnapped and enslaved thousands—perhaps hundreds of thousands—of Natives and placed them into the coercive labor systems in the West Indies and Brazil. This almost certainly diminished the indigenous peoples’ capacity to reproduce themselves physically and socially. Furthermore, under the wretched conditions of slavery and the constant threat of death, Natives were overworked, family relations were disrupted, the indigenous birthrate fell drastically, and the population declined significantly.

Scholars generally accept that neither Colón nor his men traveled to the North American mainland. In fact, history next tells of Giovanni Cabotto (John Cabot) and his crew of eighteen sailors landing in 1497 somewhere between Maine and Labrador, claiming the “new founde lande” for the British crown and laying the foundation for England’s claim to North America more than a century later. Although there is no indication that Cabotto and his men had direct contact with indigenous peoples, artifacts from the voyage have been located at archaeological sites far removed from the area, suggesting that European goods had been introduced into a long-distance circuit of trade. Thus when we consider the range of various bands’ travels, it does seem highly possible that Native groups in the distant interior would have soon felt the effects of pathogens that explorers would have passed on to anyone with whom they came into contact. Diffusion of European diseases through such contacts may well account for the Mississippian system’s accelerated rate of depopulation, which appears to have begun some 150 years earlier.

Although the European expeditions from the early sixteenth century presumably were aimed at locating gold and a passageway to the Orient, records indicate that the enslavement of Natives by Europeans during this era was a common practice. For instance, the hostility that greeted Ponce de Léon in 1513 when he first landed in Florida can be taken as evidence that previous experiences with Europeans had conditioned the Natives to fear capture and enslavement. Although the identities of those earlier Europeans are unknown, they established a pattern that was repeated in the decades that followed.

Hudson contends that “the real impetus . . . to explore and colonize the mainland came in 1519 when Hernán Cortés encountered the wealthy and populous Aztec empire in Central America. Not only did Cortés discover gold—the jewelry and ritual objects that elites had amassed—which could be appropriated by force but he also found a large population habituated to subordination,” one that constituted an available labor force to be exploited in extracting wealth from beneath the earth’s surface. Because Spain and Portugal quickly converted their conquests in Central and South America into astonishing imperial successes and the assurance of dominant roles in the Western Hemisphere, France and England were challenged to step up their own explorations lest imperium pass them by.
Cortés’s successes suggested to European heads of state that “if such wealth and power could be had in New Spain, then it was possible that as much or even more could be found in the land to the north.” To the disappointment of all, subsequent achievements in North America paled in the short-term by comparison to the wealth the Spanish had extracted from “New Spain.” Nonetheless, the possibilities of finding a shorter path to the mineral wealth in New Spain, a route to the Far East, or riches similar to those that had been found in the south accelerated European explorations into North America. However, the earliest recorded explorations of Europeans appear to have as their object wealth in the flesh—slaves.

No reliable account of the numbers of slaving ventures into the North American continent or of the numbers of Natives who were ultimately enslaved exists, but there are numerous glimpses in the records of early expeditions. For instance, in 1520 two slavers, Pedro de Quejo and Francisco Gordillo, sailed for de Ayllón across the Caribbean to the continent, landed near today’s Winyah Bay, South Carolina, seized seventy Natives, and returned to Santo Domingo, where they sold their cargo into the slave trade. As Florentine explorer Giovanni da Verrazzano sailed west for the French in 1524 and 1525 searching for a passage to Cathay, he traveled along the eastern coastline of the North American continent that blocked his way. Before heading northward toward New York and Nova Scotia, da Verrazzano landed his fleet at Cape Fear, in what is now North Carolina, where he reported capturing an unspecified number of captives to carry back to France.

The capture of slaves was not the sole motivation for Europeans to explore North America—others also sought new lands to colonize. In 1526 de Ayllón led some six hundred colonists to a site near the mouth of a river that appears to have been located on what is now coastal South Carolina. While in that location the Europeans captured and enslaved numerous Natives and exported them to the West Indies, where they sold them into the sugar industry. In 1528 Pánfilo de Narváez, leading an expedition to conquer Florida, attempted unsuccessfully to establish a colony on the western coast of the Florida peninsula. Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca, a survivor from that failed expedition, recounted seeing evidence of earlier European expeditions, along with devastated lands and peoples, burned settlements, and abandoned agricultural lands. His accounts also support the claims that Native men, women, and children had been terrorized, seized, and carried off into slavery by the earlier Spanish adventurers.

Although it was primarily private adventurers who promoted European colonization, they typically did so under the auspices of various state powers. European royals extended to various “explorers” monopoly rights to conquer and plunder previously “unsettled” regions in exchange for a share of the profits and sovereignty over newly settled areas. The charter served as the mechanism that legitimated the colonial project in large part because the charter designated its holder as the agent of the king, and therefore was considered the representative of God. This can be seen in the charter granted to de Soto by the Spanish Crown, which included the following terms:
Crafting Europe’s “Clean Slate” Advantage

You will take . . . five hundred men with the necessary arms, horses, munitions, and military stores; and . . . make the said conquest and settlement within a year first following . . . You will take the necessary subsistence for all that people during eighteen months—rather over than under that time—entirely at your own cost and charges. . . . I bestow on you the conquest of these lands and provinces.

I give you . . . power and authority . . . to conquer, pacify, and populate the lands. . . . You shall . . . have the two hundred leagues . . . with the annual salary of fifteen thousand ducats, and five hundred ducats gratuity. . . . If the gold which may be taken from the mines shall be paid us the tenth . . . but from the gold and other things that may be got by barter, or is spoil got by incursions, or in any other manner, shall be paid us thereupon one-fifth of all. . . . All other, of the character that may be and is found, whether by finding it by accident or discovering it by search, [you] shall pay us the half . . . and shall any person or persons have gold, silver, stones, or pearls, taken or found, as well in the said graves, . . . or Indian temples . . . or other concealed religious places, or interred . . . and do not make it known . . . they have forfeited all the gold and silver, stones and pearls, besides the half of their good to our tribunal and exchequer.

With these words, the king endowed de Soto with authority to conquer sovereign peoples, plunder their temples and grave sites, capture them and sell them as slaves, steal or destroy their property, and establish over them feudal-like domains; de Soto and his men appear to have carried out their mission with enthusiasm and determination.

As they traveled though the Southeast from 1539 to 1543, the de Soto caravel found extensive depopulation, Spanish weaponry, and other artifacts left by various earlier explorers. In fact, they encountered Juan Ortiz, who had traveled earlier in the area with de Narváez, was lost, and had lived for twelve years among the Appalachees. Farther inland, they met other Natives who reported the appearance “many years before” of the de Ayllón expedition. There is no way to verify that the depopulation de Soto encountered was caused by European diseases, warfare, or both. However, because artifacts from European expeditions have been found long distances from places they visited, it is reasonable to assume that contact—either direct or indirect—and depopulation were related. Furthermore, the open enmity encountered by subsequent explorers also suggests that, because of prior contact with European adventurers, Natives were wary of others who followed.

As the de Soto expedition traveled northward from southern Florida, it kidnapped and enslaved Natives at virtually every stop, as documented by chronicler Las Casas, who recorded several incidents following the expedition’s landing in 1539:

Captain Juan Ruiz Lobillo went out with about forty or fifty infantry, and they captured several Indian women. . . . [De Soto] ordered General Vasco Porcallo de Figueroa to go to Očita because it was
reported that people had come together there; and this captain having gone there, he found the people departed and he burned the village and threw an Indian, which he had for a guide, to the dogs. . . .

[T]he Governor likewise sent Johan de Añasco in the ship’s boats along the shore with some foot soldiers to disperse a gathering of the Indians, or to see and hear what was up. He found them on an island, where he had a fray with them and killed with the small cannons that he carried nine of ten Indians and, they in turn, shot or cut down as many or more.84

In encounters farther inland de Soto’s attempts to enslave Natives continued. In one encounter “the Governor dispatched four captains in as many directions to search for them: many men and women were taken who were put in chains. . . . Of the prisoners, some of the chiefs, whom the Cacique interceded for, were let go; of the rest, each one took away with him as slaves those he had in chains, none returning to their country save some whose fortune it was to escape.”85 If we can assume that the records of these few days are somewhat representative of the entire expedition, they provide evidence that at almost every major settlement, perhaps scores of Native men were enslaved and used as beasts of burden; at the same time, hundreds of women were demanded for domestic duty and sexual exploitation.86

Because de Soto was experienced at conquering and enslaving Indians and Africans and operating in a hostile environment where Europeans were in a distinct minority, he used with impunity brutal coercive measures to establish and maintain social control. Such behavior was justified by the blend of colonial ideology and Christian rhetoric of the day as described by Adam Smith in 1776: “The pious purpose of converting [the Natives] to Christianity sanctified the injustice of the project. But the hope of finding gold there was the sole motive which prompted them to overtake it. . . . All the other enterprises of the Spaniards in the world subsequent to those of Columbus seem to have been prompted by the same motive. It was the thirst for gold.”87

Because the provisions de Soto and his men had transported from Cuba fell far short of meeting the terms of the royal charter and the needs of the large entourage, their pursuit of food created other opportunities for conflict with the Native populations. In fact, it meant that de Soto and his men had to regularly locate food to supply their own dietary needs as well as those of their captives.88 While it appears that every village had corn and other foodstuff on hand, the villages of complex and paramount chiefdoms held especially large stores, apparently to distribute to smaller villages during droughts and other crop failures. Although these stores were particularly attractive to the Spanish, whose daily needs were great, the Natives rarely relinquished their much-needed supplies freely. Consequently, wherever they went, de Soto and his men commandeered the supplies of entire villages, robbing corncribs, destroying crops and storage facilities, and leaving villages ill-prepared to meet the approaching winter. In other cases, where stores had been hidden, they destroyed villages altogether.89
In the aftermath of the various European explorations—particularly the de Soto expeditions—significant demographic changes were noted throughout the Southeast. Within two centuries of first contact almost the entire indigenous population of the Southeast had died or been exterminated—Perdue estimates that 95 percent of the population had died. Entire villages were abandoned, and residents scattered throughout the countryside in an effort, we can assume, to avoid being enslaved or killed by de Soto and his men. Consequently, their crops were left to be destroyed, and their burial places and sacred temples, many of which were first sacked, were left to be torn down for their materials. The long-term effect of such destruction is not recorded, but in all likelihood, it reduced the prestige and legitimacy of local leaders, weakened their ideological power, and resulted in the dissolution of chiefdoms and the emergence of newly constituted tribes in their place.

Numerical strength and the disparity in technology between Europeans and Natives played a major role in de Soto’s conquest and decimation of the Native populations. Even though European conquerors were outnumbered, their ships, weaponry, armor, and other material advances gave them a decided advantage in warfare. Hudson contends that it was also “the horses that won the battle for the Spaniards.” In fact, de Soto’s scribe recorded that “without them [the horses] . . . we were unable to contend, the Indians being so numerous; besides, man to man on foot, whether in the water or on dry ground, they were superior, being more skilful and active, and the conditions of the country more favourable to the practice of their warfare.”

Although “the Indians were superior to Spanish foot soldiers . . . they were no match against the cavalry,” however, the captured Natives did not succumb readily as is evidenced by de Soto’s accounts of the battle of Mabilia, which Hudson describes as an ambush of the Europeans by Natives who had banded together in an apparent effort to rid themselves of the expedition’s destructive effects. With the competitive advantage their horses and weapons of war gave them, the Spanish soon regained their superior position and killed some twenty-five hundred Natives, burned their villages, and destroyed their stores and crops.

The de Soto expedition made its way through Florida, northward and into what is now North Carolina, westward into eastern Tennessee, southward into northern Georgia, and across Alabama to Mississippi and western Tennessee and, after de Soto’s death, westward into Texas before returning to the Gulf Coast, a circuitous route that exposed thousands of indigenous people directly to the Europeans, their culture, and diseases that within a few years spread to the remainder of the region’s population. In the decades following their contact with de Soto and his men, indigenous groups in the region’s interior underwent extreme and sudden demographic and organizational decline. Superior technology and weaponry, horses, and attack hounds gave the Europeans a decided advantage over the Natives, who, when they tried to avoid subjugation, were simply tracked down and killed or enslaved.

In the decades following de Soto’s expedition numerous Spanish, French, and English groups made contact in one form or another with the region’s Natives. Among those were expeditions led by Tristán de Luna y Arellano,
who with his entourage traversed Alabama and northwest Georgia between 1559 and 1561, attempting to establish a Spanish colony on the Alabama River.99 Jean Ribaut headed a group of French Huguenots, who in 1562 established a colony on Port Royal Sound, which they subsequently abandoned when they moved to the mouth of St. Johns River in what is now northeastern Florida.100 In 1565 John Hawkins, en route home to England, saved the French from certain starvation and ended their fledgling colonization effort. Subsequently, Pedro Menéndez established a Spanish colony nearby, and Juan Pardo led two expeditions through what is now Georgia, South and North Carolina, and eastern Tennessee, one during 1566 and 1567 and the second during 1567 and 1568.101

In some cases Natives turned their association and trade with Europeans to an advantage that disrupted intergroup relations, sometimes because they acquired European weapons that their enemies lacked and sometimes because the Spanish directly intervened on their behalf against another group.102 As an example de Soto used the threat of attack to subdue the leader of the Pacaha on behalf of his enemy the cacique of Casqui, and Jean Ribaut joined the Timucuans in an attack against a neighboring group because they "seemed to control the passageway to the Appalachian Mountains, reputedly rich in gold and silver."103 In a similar situation members of the Juan Pardo expedition, having been left behind to live with the chief of Joara in what is now western North Carolina, joined an attack against the Chiscas, a neighboring rival. In yet another incident de Luna helped a powerful Coosa chief exact tribute from a rival village chief who had rebelled and withheld tribute from him.104 Intervening on behalf of one chief or another was not the sole domain of the Spanish, but it gave those who were allied with the Europeans a significant comparative advantage.

The Europeans also undermined in a number of ways the elite structures of accumulation, which had contributed to the legitimacy of the system and status of chiefs. First, they introduced European goods, particularly weapons and armor, into the indigenous system of trade and political relations. Second, European explorers, who presented themselves as supreme chiefs, kings, and emissaries of God, frequently demanded allegiance and tribute from local chiefs, disrupting the indigenous political alliances and undermining the legitimacy of Native elites.105 Both de Soto and Juan Pardo arbitrarily “designated” new high chiefs along the route as a matter of convenience and to secure food and other provisions for themselves.106 Thus, they effected a realignment of intergroup loyalties that almost certainly had far-reaching effects in terms of information and power networks.

Hudson argues that although trade continued between Native groups and with European explorers, many of the material symbols and artifacts associated with earlier powerful chiefdoms disappeared soon after contact, seemingly because complex chiefdoms collapsed and lost any semblance of social control, all of which contributed to the eventual disintegration of the Mississippian system.107 This development is evidenced by the appearance of a number of loosely confederated groups where there had earlier been powerful chiefdoms, a phenomenon that appears to have resulted from the
relocation of entire cultural groups from one area to another and the breakdown of political structures. Although complex chiefdoms persisted into the nineteenth century, many—perhaps most—of those that survived had been weakened or replaced by a “lower level of sociopolitical complexity” and had been succeeded by more politically decentralized tribes.

As an example, archaeologists attribute the emergence of the South Appalachian Mississippian and ancestors of the Cherokee culture in western North Carolina to the Pisgah phase, which dated between AD 1000 and AD 1500. An important feature of this group that separates it from others that lived farther east was the Pisgah system of social stratification that had also characterized the Mississippian. Beginning as several chiefdoms living east of the Appalachians, by 1700 they had re-formed into two distinct bands, the Upper and Lower Cherokee, and had relocated farther west and south. Hoig contends that the “more rebellious” groups that lived on the Nolichucky or French Broad formed the Overhill Cherokee as a separate group and moved into the Little Tennessee River Valley, which had earlier been occupied by Muskogean people. The Muskogeans, in turn, had relocated farther south, into Georgia and Alabama. The great Muskogean paramount chiefdom Coosa, which had been located at the headwaters of the Coosa River in north Georgia, on disintegration reappeared some distance farther southwest in central Alabama. There they joined with other groups to form what began to be identified by Europeans as the Creek Nation.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Contact with Europeans had a number of direct and indirect effects, some intended and others not. First, the indigenous population was decimated by diseases and warfare imposed by the Europeans. Additionally, Natives were weakened by the destruction and theft of their food stores, which were needed to sustain them through the winter or during periods of low crop yield. Second, military and political interventions by the Europeans into the intra-regional affairs of the Native groups undermined political and social structures necessary to the social reproduction of the social order. Third, these actions weakened the status of powerful chiefs and headmen who had previously offered stability. And, finally, these changes contributed to the escalation of intergroup conflict and subsequent hostile relationships with the Europeans.

The disruption of the Native economy almost certainly led to protracted periods of hunger and undernourishment that are obvious from examination of skeletal remains from the period. That, in turn, would have undermined the legitimacy of the chiefs. At the same time demographic changes further diminished the population’s vitality. Relocations contributed to the disruption of established trade and communications networks that had kept the Mississippian system intact. Finally, the decline of the birth rate and disruption of family relations contributed to the Native population’s inability to remain self-sufficient, defend itself, and reproduce itself physically and socially.

Chiefdoms that had managed to survive contact with Europeans had been permanently altered—their culture had been modified to accommodate new
political and power relations and to incorporate foreign technology, goods, and customs. At the same time, economic organization had shifted from a diversified and sustainable economy that incorporated horticulture, hunting, and foraging, along with trade in various prestige goods to increased dependence on hunting and gathering. Although the effect would not have shown itself immediately, the introduction of horses was an important part of this transformation; their adoption into the Native culture led to increased mobility and dependence on hunting. The Native populations thereafter were more susceptible to seasonal and climatic variations and often found themselves in conflict with neighboring groups with whom they competed for territory, increasingly scarce game, and trade routes. Groups that remained in the area were unable to withstand the economic, political, social, and geographic pressures presented by European settlers.

In the century following contact with the Europeans, as Hopkins and Wallerstein have argued is the case with all previously external societies on contact with a world-system, the existing political structures had been dismembered. From the widely dispersed Mississippian groups “entirely new and quite arbitrary delimited structures” that came to be identified as the southeastern Indian “tribes” had been created. These were the “Indians” that later settlers encountered in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is not surprising that eighteenth-century Native American chronicler James Adair observed that except for their languages, these various southern groups had far more cultural similarities than differences, a phenomenon that can possibly be explained by their having had common roots in the Mississippian system. Nonetheless, they were in a number of ways a noticeably different people than their ancestors with whom Europeans first had contact. They were more loosely connected to other groups throughout the region and more competitive and warlike. Many had reverted from organized horticulture to a more nomadic existence and to dependence on hunting and gathering for their subsistence. Most important, their populations had thinned dramatically and their defenses had been weakened such that they were unable to resist further incorporation of their people into the European world-system.

The social organization of precontact North American Native societies was radically transformed by contact with European explorers and conquerors, the region’s population had dramatically declined and had become more decentralized and dispersed, rudimentary trade relations between the European explorers and Native populations had been established, and the way was opened for subsequent colonization and the redevelopment of the area under the rules of capitalism. Given the frequency and extent of conquest and plunder in the first half of the sixteenth century and the resulting transformation of internal social, political, and economic structures, the region had ceased to be “external” to the European capitalist world economy well before 1606 and, arguably, had been marginally incorporated into the world-system. This period, in short, created through a system of conquest, enslavement, and genocide the “clean slate advantage,” which historian Philip Curtin contends was instrumental in England’s subsequent success at its colonization project in North America.
In systematically examining the processes involved in the particular form that incorporation took in the southeastern part of North America, four particularly significant facts emerge. First, contact between indigenous Americans and their European conquerors was ongoing and relatively regularized throughout the sixteenth century. Second, Native populations had undergone significant demographic changes that had the effect of increasing intertribal conflict, decentralizing political control, and weakening resistance to subsequent encounters. Third, the economic, social, and political structures essential to the survival and reproduction of the Mississippian society and its culture had been destroyed or significantly altered, and their mode of accumulation had been permanently transformed. Fourth, given the changes that had occurred in the indigenous social, political, and economic relations and the loss of population, if contact with Europeans had ceased at any point after 1530, the Mississippian system would almost certainly have been unable to reestablish itself in its earlier form.

The process that would in time bring about the full incorporation of the remnants of the Mississippian system into the world economy would begin in 1606 CE, when the English crown chartered the London Company to colonize the southeastern section of the North American continent. Although this period has long been treated as the beginning of the region’s incorporation into the world-system, current research provides evidence that incorporation began a century earlier when the rise of the European sphere of influence paralleled and conditioned the fall of the Mississippian system, laying the groundwork for the area’s subsequent incorporation into the world-system as a peripheral zone.

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NOTES


13. Hopkins and Wallerstein, “Patterns of Development.”


19. In the place of BC and AD I use CE to signify “in the current era” and BCE to designate “before the current era.” This correlates with the use by some of the same designations to signify “Christian era” and “before the Christian era.”


24. Peregrine, “Introduction,” xxi; see also Hudson, Juan Pardo.


34. Lewis, “Early Mississippi Period”; Paul D. Welch, “Models of Chiefdom Economy: Prehistoric Moundville as a Case Study” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1986); Peebles, “Moundville.”


40. Hudson, *Juan Pardo*.

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52. Johnson, *Native Tribes*.

53. Chase-Dunn and Hall (*Rise and Demise*, 14) also assert that “all regularized material exchanges should be included as criteria for system boundedness. Thus, it is necessary for us to consider how relatively localized networks of bulk-goods exchange are nested within much larger networks of prestige-goods exchange in any system”; Janet Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Jane Schneider, “Was There a Pre-Capitalist World-System?” in *Core/Periphery Relations in Precapitalist Worlds*, ed. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 45–66.


56. “Late Prehistory”; Lewis, “Mississipi Period.”


58. Ibid., 56.

University of New Mexico Press, 1987).


66. Derek Croxton, “The Cabot Dilemma,” *Essays in History* 33 (1990–1991): http://etext.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH33/croxto33.html. The acceptance by other European nations of England's claim was based on the rule that the first nation to achieve landfall had the strongest claim to dominion and is evidence of the informal rules of colonization that represented the early interstate system.

67. Ibid.


71. Ibid.


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81. Ibid., 67.

82. Hudson, Knights of Spain; see also Stanley W. Hoig, The Cherokees and Their Chiefs: In the Wake of Empire (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1998).


85. da Silveria, True Relation, 83.

86. Hudson, Southeastern Indians.


88. Hudson, Knights of Spain. Hudson documents numerous cases of de Soto’s forces seizing stored corn from villages and administrative centers throughout the region. He asserts that “sixteenth-century expeditions, being unable to carry along a sufficient supply of food, had to obtain it, by persuasion or force, from the people they encountered” (24).

89. da Silveria, True Relation, 128; Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 74.

90. Perdue, The Cherokee, 28; Trigger and Swagerty (“Entertaining Strangers,” 390) posit that the Natives of the Southeast suffered the greatest decline of any region in North America.


93. Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 113.

94. da Silveria, True Relation, 38.

95. Ibid.

96. Hudson, Knights of Spain.

97. da Silveria, True Relation, 97.

98. Milanich and Hudson, Hernando de Soto; see also da Silveria, True Relation, 38.


101. Milanich and Hudson, Entertaining Strangers; Hudson, Knights of Spain.


103. da Silveria, True Relation, 124–27; Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 16. When the French discovered they were in error, they severed their alliance with the Timucuans and quickly moved to establish a relationship with the other chief, who actually offered access to the riches of the Appalachians, in particular gold.
104. Anderson, “Fluctuations.”
105. da Silveria, True Relation, 55.
106. Milanich and Hudson, Entertaining Strangers; Hudson, Knights of Spain.
108. Scarry, Stability and Change, 226; Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 3. Hudson identifies the southeastern tribes in the historic period by their language groups as follows: Algonkian (e.g., Powhatan and Shawnee), Iroquoian (e.g., Cherokee and Tuscarora), Siouan (e.g., Tutelo, Biloxi, Catawba), and Muskogean (e.g., Choctaw, Chickasaw, Alabama, and Creek). Although other language groups existed in the South, the above included most of the region’s population and can be traced to the pre-Columbian people, most of whom had been part of the Mississippian system.
112. Swanton, Indians of the Southeastern United States. Swanton asserts that the Cherokee descended from Iroquoian ancestors that migrated into the Southeast, taking on many of the ways of the Muskogee (Mississippian) people in order to reduce conflict with them.
113. Hoig, The Cherokee, 10; see also Hudson, Southeastern Indians.
114. A part of the Creek Confederacy forced out of Georgia formed the Seminoles and became one of the last tribes to arrive on the Florida peninsula; see David H. Cochran, The Creek Frontier, 1540–1783 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967). See also J. Leitch Wright, Creeks and Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration of the Muskogule People (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986).
115. da Silveria, True Relation, 37.
116. Hudson, Juan Pardo.
117. Trigger and Swagerty, “Entertaining Strangers.”
118. Cochran, Creek Frontier.
119. Trigger and Swagerty, “Entertaining Strangers.”
121. Hudson, Southeastern Indians.
123. Ibid., 364; Wolf, Europe.
124. Curtin, Rise and Fall.
125. Wolf, Europe.